ASSESSING THE ROLE OF MILITARY LEADERS' ATTRIBUTES IN MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

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ABSTRACT

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Military power is a cornerstone of international relations, encompassing resources, capabilities, the willingness to use them, and the military effectiveness in achieving objectives. Despite extensive research in war literature, significant gaps persist in understanding the factors influencing the success rates of military leaders in wars. The direct impact of military leaders on military effectiveness is undeniable. Unfortunately, the role of military leaders' attributes in shaping wartime outcomes has been notably underexplored. Additionally, the characteristics of military leaders, particularly those commanding at the operational level, have been largely overlooked in previous studies. This study seeks to fill this gap by examining these attributes and their influence on military success. To illustrate the significance of military leaders on military effectiveness, this research introduces a unique and first-of-its-kind 'TURCO' dataset, containing information about Ottoman (Turkish) battlefield commanders' competence and loyalty levels during the Balkan Wars in 1912-13 and the Gallipoli Campaign 1915-16 as a part of a series of wars during World War I, is a pioneering effort in the field. This dissertation highlights how military leaders' attributes influence military effectiveness. The findings underscore the critical role of commanders in achieving success, with competence emerging as a key factor, particularly in the Ottoman Empire's final wars. Contrary to prevailing views, this research shows that loyalty's impact is significantly shaped by commanders' inherent qualities and prominence within the military in the Turkish context.

ÖZET

ASKERİ LİDERLERİN KARAKTER ÖZELLİKLERİNİN ASKERİ ETKİNLİĞE ETKİSİNİN İNCELENMESİ

YÜKSEL KILIÇ

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Anahtar Kelimeler: askeri etkinlik, karakter özellikleri, askeri liderlik, yeterlilik, bağlılık

Askeri güç, uluslararası ilişkilerde devlet gücüne etki eden en önemli parametredir. Askeri etkinlik, askeri gücün kullanılmasını doğrudan etkilemektedir. Askeri etkinliğin oluşturulmasında ise öncelikle belirleyici unsur askeri liderlerdir. Ancak, maalesef, hayati öneminin aksine askeri liderler mevcut alanyazımında çok fazla incelenmemiştir. Dünya genelinde az sayıda bulunan askeri lider odaklı çalışma, Türkiye özelinde hiç yapılmamıştır. Bu tez, bu alandaki akademik boşluğu doldurmayı hedeflemektedir. Mevcut çalışmada, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son on yılındaki savaşlar, askeri liderlik açısından incelenmiştir. Tez akademik değerlendirme, analiz ve bulgularını yine bu alandaki ilk sayılabilecek ve yeni oluşturulan 'TURCO' (Turkish Commanders) veriseti yardımı ile gerçekleştirmiştir. Söz konusu veri seti ile Birinci Balkan Savaşı (1912-13) ve Birinci Dünya Savaşına (1914-18) katılan ve özellikle Çanakkale cephesinde görev almış olan alay komutanı ve üstü görevde bulunmuş 900 askeri liderin karakter özelliklerini sayısal olarak derlenmiş ve bu karakter özelliklerinin muharebe etkinliği açısından etkisi incelenmiştir. Elde edilen bulgular, liyakatin (yeterlilik) tüm savaşlarda etkili olan temel bir özellik olduğunu göstermektedir. Bununla birlikte, siyasi erke sadakatin (bağlılık-siyasi aidiyet) de özellikle Çanakkale Savaşı'nda, komutanların liyakat standartlarını karşıladıkları ölçüde etkili olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Çanakkale Savaşı'nın kazanılmasında, Balkan Savaşı'na kıyasla, hem liyakat hem de sadakat açısından daha yetkin ve yeni bir komutan kadrosunun etkisi, niteliksel ve niceliksel olarak kanıtlanmıştır.

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Last but not least, to my son Reşit, during this process, I often had to withhold the love and time that I, as a father, wished to show you. Please forgive your father when you grow up. May the light in your eyes, the sparkle that brings joy to my life, never fade.

...Not to the decorated commanders, honored in their lofty hold,
But to the unsung soldiers who scaled the hill, their names untold.
Let them have the symphony, the hues, the glory, and the gold,
While I hold only the ashes, the whispers of stories untold,
Among the wounded, the limping, the blind in the cold twilight of the battlefield bold...

(Adapted and revised from John Edward Masefield's poem "A Consecration")

To 1000 Devresi, to comrade-in-arms, and soldiers once and still...

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATONS

ANZAC Australian and New Zealandean Corps 95

CUP Committee of Union and Progress Party 6, 66, 76, 79, 145, 146

MSSD Most Similar System Design 140

1. INTRODUCTION

> ***"Aut viam inveniam aut faciam."*** [1]
> *— Hannibal Barca*

> *"I will either find a way or make one."* This quote exemplifies Hannibal's unwavering determination and ingenuity in overcoming obstacles. It is often cited in reference to his audacious feat of leading his army, including the formidable elephants, across the Alps.

In the legendary Battle of Cannae in 216 BCE, Hannibal Barca orchestrated a devastating defeat of the Roman army, a force of 86,000 soldiers predominantly composed of Roman legionaries and allied troops. With a force of 50,000-60,000 soldiers, including infantry, cavalry, and elephants, Hannibal inflicted a catastrophic loss on the Romans, resulting in the deaths of approximately 50,000-70,000 soldiers (Medin IV 2014). This victory was a seismic blow to the Roman forces and a testament to Hannibal's military prowess.

Hannibal's extraordinary triumph was a testament to his superior leadership. He adeptly utilized his diverse troops to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Roman forces. His innovative tactics, particularly the double envelopment maneuver, or the "pincer movement," were groundbreaking. Hannibal could encircle and annihilate the Roman legions by positioning his weakest troops in the center and his stronger infantry and cavalry on the flanks. Furthermore, Hannibal's effective use of the terrain—the flat plains near Cannae—allowed his cavalry to maneuver exceptionally efficiently (Gray 2014). His mastery of psychological warfare further demoralized the Romans following several victories, including the Battle of Trebia and Lake Trasimene. These facts are the manifestation of superior military effectiveness generated on the

[1] Source: (Leslie 1869, 229) and (Stone 2013, 140)

battlefield.

Hannibal Barca, one of history's most renowned military commanders, was distinguished by his exceptional education, training, and competence.[2] From a young age, Hannibal was exposed to military life, learning the art of war directly from his father, Hamilcar Barca, a leading general during the First Punic War. Hannibal had an outstanding, competent profile as attended military campaigns in Iberia; was adept at managing and integrating diverse troops, including Carthaginian soldiers, Numidian cavalry, and Iberian infantry with cohesion; applied highly innovative tactics; capable of the use of unique logistic means. Still relevant for today, not necessarily exceptional and legendary military achievements, but all military administration and execution relies on the military leaders. Excellence and perseverance are strongly correlated with the commander's *competence level*, which is the primary **attribute** embodied by that individual soldier.

A well-functioning army with sufficient capabilities is the echo of high-level military effectiveness. The establishment of military effectiveness does not always equate to victory in battle. In certain types of military operations, such as defense, demonstrating resilience by denying the enemy an easy victory, steadfastly defending one's sector for as long as possible, delaying the enemy's advance, and depleting the enemy's resources and combat power to the maximum extent in attrition operations are all examples of good military effectiveness. Efficiently utilizing minimal resources and maintaining the morale and motivation of troops until the end of the battle also exemplify high levels of military effectiveness. This dissertation aims to clarify the factors contributing to creating solid military effectiveness. To gain a deeper understanding of this phenomenon, it evaluates various battles and wars, focusing on the attributes of military leaders. These leaders are the pivotal actors driving the crucial dynamics of warfare.

From a broader perspective, military effectiveness transcends mere victory, encompassing instances where successful and resilient defensive operations also underscore its essence. During the siege of Shkodra, 1912-13, Ottoman troops showed exceptional resistance, a testament to their resilience and effectiveness, even though they were outnumbered, deprived of resources, and lacked ammunition and troops. Shkodra, the farthest defensive outpost from the central command, became the last bastion of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. [3] In the context of the Balkan Wars

[2]It is widely agreed that Hannibal ranks among the greatest military leaders in history. He was born in 247 BC in the region that is now Tunisia and died in Libyssa (present-day Gebze) in 181 BC on the coast of the Sea of Marmara (modern-day Turkey) MacDonald (2015).

[3]It was the last castle city lost in all of Ottoman History, being separated from the Ottoman lands and with an isolation of 842 kilometers, as an island in the ocean.

and Ottoman history, this siege carries immense historical significance. During the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Empire, versus the Balkan allies of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, was compelled to relinquish nearly all its territories in the Balkans. Despite the grand military debacle and the severance of communications with Istanbul, Colonel Hasan Rıza steadfastly defended the besieged fortress of Shkodra.

Enemy forces, the Montenegrin Army, augmented by Serbian reinforcements and numbering approximately 80,000 troops, faced fierce resistance and defense from a contingent of 20,000 Turkish soldiers (Abdurrahman Nafiz 2007; Somel 2003). Although the city ultimately fell, the garrison, inspired by the indomitable leadership of Hasan Rıza Pasha, displayed legendary resilience. With the onset of the war, Shkodra was besieged by Montenegrin and Serbian forces for 6.5 months, making it the longest-held defense in the Balkan Wars (Erickson 2003; Görgülü 1990). The city, already isolated due to the loss of communication with the central command, was further cut off following the defeats suffered by the Western Army on other fronts. Consequently, Shkodra received no military reinforcements or logistical support.

Despite these adversities and severely limited logistical resources, the steadfastness of a commander with exceptional leadership and strategic acumen, like Hasan Rıza Pasha, coupled with the determination and military effectiveness of his troops, enabled the defenders to hold out against the numerically and materially superior enemy forces under highly challenging conditions. Hasan Rıza Pasha's leadership was characterized by his unwavering commitment to the defense of Shkodra, his ability to inspire his troops even in the face of overwhelming odds, and his strategic foresight in managing the limited resources at his disposal and behind this extraordinary military achievement stood, unsurprisingly, a commander of unparalleled competence and exceptional training, inspiring his troops and setting a high standard of leadership. [4]

Wars have perennially stood as among the most significant events influencing humanity. Correspondingly, they have constituted one of the most extensively studied phenomena across diverse fields of science, owing to their profound impact. Central to the dynamics of wars and, more specifically, battles is the pivotal role played by military leaders. While material factors undoubtedly contribute to military power, it is imperative to recognize the equally vital role of non-material factors, particularly

[4] He completed his studies at Beşiktaş Military Secondary School and Bursa Military High School, graduating in June 1889 as part of the class of 1886. He entered the Military Academy in 1889 and graduated in 1892. In 1895, he joined the army as a staff captain. During the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, he was assigned to the staff of the Alasonya Army at his request. In 1899, he pursued further education by joining an infantry regiment of the 16th Corps under the command of the renowned General von Hötzendorf in Germany, where he served as a lieutenant. He continued his studies at the Kriegsakademie, completing the final year courses (Kaytan 2019).

the human element and, more specifically, the influence of military leaders.

The role of military leaders in shaping battle outcomes has unfortunately not received adequate scholarly attention. Previous research has either prioritized state leaders and focused on the broader context of wars, or explained battle success solely through the lens of material resources. This oversight is significant, as the leadership dynamics within battles play a crucial role in determining their outcomes. It is crucial that we recognize the importance of military leaders and the need for scholarly research in this area. Military leaders make critical decisions under immense pressure, guide their troops through complex situations, and adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield. Their strategic foresight, tactical prowess, and ability to inspire and lead troops have a profound influence on the course of battles and, ultimately, the trajectory of wars.

This dissertation delves into a long-neglected question of significant relevance: the contribution of military leaders to military effectiveness. It offers fresh insights across various academic disciplines and policy-making arenas, unveiling how the interplay between competence and loyalty can enhance military effectiveness and organizational coordination. This research builds upon and refines two pre-existing hypotheses on competence and loyalty, explicitly challenging the notion that loyalty necessarily undermines competence (Reiter and Wagstaff 2018). In the Turkish context (most scholars synonymously use Turkish and Ottoman for this period), loyalty can positively impact military effectiveness, contingent upon the inherent competence and size of the loyalist faction within the military organization. General scholarly wisdom tells us that high loyalist cadres echo the mismanagement and corruption. However, this also depends on the loyalist-defined commanders' competence levels. We see in the Gallipoli Campaign that Ottoman military leaders who were more loyal had a statistically significant effect, together with competence-related attributes, on the generation of high military effectiveness.

The role of military leaders has been largely overlooked in international relations, particularly concerning their characteristics such as competence and loyalty. This dissertation offers substantial and evidence-backed findings through qualitative and quantitative methods, contributing significantly to the literature on military effectiveness. The data and quantitative analyses employed in the analyses are replicable, adhering to the fundamental standards of scientific research (King, Keohane, and Verba 2021, 25). Findings in the dissertation also provide statistical evidence for how competence and loyalty-related attributes varied in two different cases of the Balkan War and the Gallipoli Campaign.

The precision and accuracy of the statistical methods were significantly enhanced

through a data-shaping process. This process ensured the data aligned with the dependent variables and the hypotheses under investigation, considering the time-variant and constant variables. Only necessary and minimal imputations were made, and the explanatory power of the independent variables was bolstered by introducing proxy measurements. The data primarily relied on official records, and personal biases were rigorously minimized during coding. However, the historical nature of the cases, some over a century old, posed challenges in data acquisition. To maintain the highest standards of transparency, all potential uncertainties are candidly and comprehensively reported in the relevant chapters and analyses.

Conducting a comprehensive examination of the role of military leaders in battle outcomes is not only a scholarly necessity but also a crucial step toward enhancing military training and leadership studies. By analyzing historical case studies, employing theoretical frameworks, and conducting empirical research, we can better understand the nuanced dynamics of leadership within battles and its impact on military effectiveness. This research endeavor, which aims to shed significant light on the critical yet understudied aspect of military leadership, has the potential to significantly contribute to the development of more effective military leaders and strategies.

Drawing from historical precedents, this dissertation delves into the often-neglected role of individual actors, particularly military leaders, in influencing a crucial aspect of international relations: military effectiveness, which is vital for military power. While systemic analysis has been the predominant focus for decades, especially following Waltz's seminal work in 1979, leaders have always been integral to strategic decision-making. Wars have been extensively studied, but academia has often concentrated on strategic occurrences rather than the specific battles that comprise them. Battles, as organic components of any war, are significantly shaped by military leaders. Therefore, the dual focus on battles and military leaders is a crucial aspect that has been largely neglected. Commanders play an essential role in military achievements, and this dissertation investigates the influence of military leaders through their attributes, which radically shape the quality of command.

Armies may win or lose due to various factors, such as being outnumbered, deprived of logistics, adverse weather, and chance. As Clausewitz described with the *"fog of war,"* numerous unpredictable factors come into play once confrontation begins. Nevertheless, a well-functioning army can demonstrate high military effectiveness even in defeat. It is relatively easy for a superior force to win a battle, but when a weaker side triumphs, it clearly indicates military effectiveness. History is replete with such examples.

In this realm, to test the hypothesis concerning which attributes of military leaders enhance military effectiveness in the Turkish context, this dissertation introduces a novel and unique dataset, the **TURCO dataset**, specifically designed to capture the role of commanders' attributes in generating military effectiveness. This dataset, along with the quantitative methodology applied, represents the first comprehensive study of its kind in Turkey and one of the few worldwide. Focusing on World War I, the Balkan Wars, and the Gallipoli Campaign, this study thoroughly explores the influence of military leaders' attributes on military effectiveness, sure to inspire confidence in its findings among international relations scholars.

From a Turkish perspective, this research posits, through the employment of the **"TURCO dataset"**, that the competence level of military leaders is not only a necessary but also a crucial factor in achieving victory during the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915-16. Hypothesis 1 that proposes commanders competence to increase military effectiveness holds for the Gallipoli case. This is especially notable following the catastrophic defeats in the Balkan Wars and the Battle of Sarıkamış. The competence of leaders is closely related to the generation of high military effectiveness. Second hypothesis aims to test whether loyalty is a factor in achieving a supeirou military effectiveness. Interestingly, the other main variable, commanders' loyalty (defined as political affiliation and loyalty to the ruling party or authority), is also significant in the context of a well-functioning army in Gallipoli military cadre but not in Balkan Wars. This significance is contingent on the quality of the loyalist military cadres.

Empirical evidence indicates that the Ottoman General Staff strategically prioritized the Gallipoli front (Çanakkale Cephesi) during World War I by assigning its most capable and battle-hardened officers. This deliberate focus on command positions ensured that the cadre of officers loyal to the Committee of Union and Progress Party (CUP) was distinctly shaped by both their competence and political allegiance. These findings provide critical insights into military organizational dynamics and offer valuable lessons for enhancing command effectiveness and operational readiness in modern military operations.

In addition to the aforementioned factors, military effectiveness depends on more than just material resources like weaponry and logistics; intangible elements such as morale, discipline, and leadership are also crucial. Military leaders, in particular, play a pivotal role due to their strategic insight, tactical skill, and ability to inspire troops. This thesis investigates the multifaceted role of military leaders in shaping military effectiveness. This study uses historical case studies, theoretical frameworks, and empirical research to illuminate the intricate relationship between

military leader attributes and overall military *military effectiveness.*

According to Arreguin-Toft (2005), 29.2 percent of confrontation victories between 1800 and 1998 belong to the weaker actor by type. The defeat of American and French troops in Vietnam is perhaps one of the most visible cases of how military effectiveness can change battle outcomes (Young 1991). While knowing the number of troops or the number of tanks can provide an initial prediction for operational success, in reality, material capabilities may not always explain victories. This underscores the relevance of other explanations of how military effectiveness, specifically operational effectiveness, is achieved. Contemporary and historical cases serve as both intriguing and challenging issues of debate. This thesis is a timely and necessary endeavor to understand how the human element and leader attributes as non-material factors determine military superiority. This topic demands our immediate attention.

The most recent literature has shed light on the role of leaders broadly in international relations (Horowitz and Fuhrmann 2018; Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005; Saunders 2018; Wu and Wolford 2018). Some scholars have also emphasized the importance of military leadership in overall military efficiency (Reiter and Wagstaff 2018; Tarakci, Greer, and Groenen 2016). In particular, Reiter and Wagstaff (2018) stressed that individual military leaders should be considered as a complementary information resource to previous IR scholarship that gave weight to political leaders (Chiozza and Goemans 2011; De Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam 2015). A growing body of literature in political science has also suggested that an individual leader's attributes, traits, and beliefs play a significant role in shaping their decisions and actions, thus influencing political events (Acosta and Silverman 2023; Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam 2015; Saunders 2017). However, despite the number of studies examining state leaders' attributes, limited research has analyzed the role of "military leaders' attributes" in creating military effectiveness and paving the way for battle success.

Alternative explanations of how military leaders contribute to military effectiveness have prioritized ideology (Bartov 1992*b*; Fritz 1996; Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005; McPherson 2003), democracy (Desch 2008; Gartner 1998; Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam III 1998), nationalism (Brooks 2007; Posen 1993), and capacity building (Posen 1993). However, few of these theories have shed light on the role of actors in achieving battle outcomes. Among these few studies on cohesion, Gentry (2011) discusses leadership's role but states that leaders' effectiveness is limited as they are meant to act under subordinate levels. The lack of scholarly attention to the role of military leaders in achieving battlefield victories not only creates an exciting

opportunity for researchers but also has the potential to advance our understanding of military strategy significantly.[5]

The research questions in this dissertation, which delve into unexplored territories, are not just academic inquiries but urgent and significant issues that demand immediate attention. To what extent do the attributes and personal qualifications of military leaders contribute to generating a high level of military effectiveness, considering them necessary but insufficient factors? Second, to what extent is influence exerted by both competent military leaders and those with political affiliations toward political authorities? Third, how can we comprehend the reasons for the Ottoman Military's defeat in the Balkan Wars and its subsequent victory in the Gallipoli Campaign, particularly regarding the role of competence and other individual attributes believed to be influential in military commanders? These questions are not just intellectual puzzles but have profound implications for military strategy and international relations, shaping the future of warfare and diplomacy.

Expanding upon this foundation, this research, focusing on the effectiveness of military leaders within the Ottoman Army, offers a unique perspective on how distinct leader attributes influence battle outcomes. By emphasizing individual-level analysis over macro-level assessment, this study provides a fresh and engaging perspective on leadership effectiveness, a crucial aspect often overlooked in military history studies. The insights gained from this research hold the potential to significantly refine military training and leadership development, ultimately contributing to enhanced military effectiveness in future operations.

Based on these premises, an original dataset was created to examine this relationship, encompassing 900 unique individuals who served as battlefield commanders during the Balkan War (1912-1913) and the Gallipoli Campaign (1915-1916). This dataset provides comprehensive information on military leaders' competence and loyalty statuses, facilitating a thorough exploration of their impact on military effectiveness. By utilizing this dataset, this research aimed to address the notable gaps in the existing literature across three main categories. Firstly, there is a noteworthy scarcity of quantitative studies focusing on the Turkish (or Ottoman, as the terms are often used interchangeably, particularly in historical contexts) military presence during these early conflicts. Secondly, within international relations literature, leadership analyses have primarily concentrated on state-level actors, leaving operational and tactical military leaders underexplored. Lastly, the mechanisms

[5]The gap in the existing literature on military leadership is two-fold. First, the predominant focus on wars as the primary unit of analysis has often overlooked the critical role of battles as the fundamental and constitutive elements of warfare. This oversight can result in misinterpretations of conflict dynamics. Second, there is a notable deficiency in quantitative research on commanders as key actors in these battles, leaving a crucial aspect of military leadership underexplored.

behind the generation of military effectiveness during World War I, especially in the Turkish/Ottoman context, remain insufficiently examined. This research addresses these critical gaps, advancing our understanding of military leadership and effectiveness during this pivotal historical period.

Assessing military efficiency poses a challenge involving multifaceted factors such as casualty rates, mission success, training preparedness, morale, technological utilization, logistical systems, force structure, and operational planning. It is essential to underscore that a single metric will fall short of offering a comprehensive elucidation of military efficiency. Existing literature has predominantly concentrated on material aspects, leaving a discernible void in comprehending how human factors, precisely commanders' attributes, contribute to the genesis of military efficiency. Another lacuna persists in the analytical scope, with prior studies predominantly scrutinizing state leaders rather than military leaders. The presence of these gaps underscores this study's significance, presenting an opportunity to address relatively unexplored terrain. A comprehensive approach, while appealing, may introduce ambiguity due to the challenge of distilling the refined impact of individual factors amidst an abundance of evaluative elements. Accordingly, this study concentrates on human factors, delving into the influence of military leaders' attributes on assessing military effectiveness. In alignment with contemporary research trends, this study categorizes these attributes into two primary groups: those associated with competence (such as tactical decision-making and strategic planning) and those linked to loyalty and personal alignment with political authority (such as commitment to the army's mission and adherence to orders).

Grounded in these assumptions, this dissertation can contribute significantly to various fields, particularly military training and leadership studies. Understanding how military competence influences military effectiveness could lead to revisions or advancements in military school training and educational programs. This insight could also inform doctrinal developments, potentially enhancing the effectiveness of military operations. Additionally, the findings from this research may shed light on the factors contributing to the Ottoman defeat in the First Balkan War and the reasons for victory in the Gallipoli Campaign during World War I. Additionally, employing a micro-level dataset emphasizing individual-level analysis could provide significant insights for future international relations and political science research. By examining the role of military leaders at the operational and tactical levels, this research may offer a new perspective and approach to understanding political dynamics and decision-making processes within military contexts.

While comprehensive, this research has some limitations inherent to the historical

period under investigation. It adopts a narrow scope, focusing solely on the late Ottoman Wars and the Turkish War of Independence from 1897 to 1923 from the Ottoman perspective. This period was marked by significant political and military changes, making it a crucial but challenging period to study. Another limitation is the individual-level analysis, which examines military leaders commanding troops at the regiment-and-above level. The study concentrates on two attributes believed to influence military efficiency: those related to competence and those associated with loyalty, indicating political affiliation statuses. Due to the historical nature of the period under investigation, resources are limited, and open-source information is scarce compared to the wealth of data available for conflicts from World War II onwards. However, the study relies primarily on official records from the Turkish General Staff and ATASE Institution, which are adequate given the research question and analytical scope. The research employs a mixed methodology approach, comprising a qualitative chapter employing comparative case study methods and a quantitative chapter employing the Generalized Ordered Logistic Model.[6] Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, model selection was constrained to consider the nature of the dependent variable, further narrowing the scope of model selection.

The structure of this dissertation is meticulously designed to guide the reader through the comprehensive research process. It commences with an introductory chapter, setting the stage for the subsequent five chapters. The second chapter provides an extensive literature review, focusing on military leaders, military effectiveness, and attributes of military leaders. The third chapter delves into qualitative analyses, employing a comparative case study approach to assess the involvement of the Ottoman military in the First Balkan War and the Gallipoli Campaign. The primary focus of this chapter is to evaluate whether military leader attributes were necessary but potentially not sufficient conditions.

Further, this chapter discusses the alternative theoretical assumptions that explain why the Ottoman military generated inadequate military effectiveness during the First Balkan War. Chapter 4 introduces a novel dataset, the **"TURCO Dataset"** (*Turkish Commanders Dataset*), among the first to provide numerical information for further analysis consisting of quantitative analyses focusing on the attributes of a military leader. Finally, the concluding chapter (Chapter 6) summarizes the findings and engages in discussions based on the research outcomes, ensuring a thorough and comprehensive understanding of the findings.

This dissertation represents a groundbreaking step in Turkish military history re-

[6]Please see Appendix C and Appendix D for other model results and robustness check.

search, presenting the first quantitative analysis. It introduces the TURCO dataset, a unique compilation that includes all commanders who played roles in the Balkan Wars and World War I at the operational level or above. With its unparalleled scope and depth, this dataset equips researchers with powerful statistical tools to delve into crucial topics in international relations literature, particularly in military and strategic leadership. More importantly, it holds the potential to uncover new, statistically supported insights into the reasons for defeat in the Balkans and the factors contributing to victory in Gallipoli.

From an international relations perspective, individual analyses, such as those undertaken in this dissertation, offer significant contributions to understanding specific military confrontations. Unlike systemic or state-level analyses, which may overlook nuance, a focused examination can effectively illuminate the factors that shaped wars. Furthermore, the prevailing absence of research on operational-level military leaders—often restricted to vague and complex war-level analyses—proves grossly inadequate for comprehending underlying causes and pivotal factors. Bridging the gap between actors at the war and operational levels is crucial to addressing this lacuna.

Finally, this dissertation not only integrates these levels of analysis but also amplifies the voices of hundreds of commanders, highlighting their profound impact on military outcomes. Military leaders, particularly at mid-to-lower levels in the chain of command, seldom have opportunities to document their insights due to operational demands and procedural constraints. Yet, captains, majors, and colonels, especially those commanding combat units, are the architects and implementers behind military achievements. By coding attributes specific to each commander, this dissertation presents a unique and exciting opportunity, inviting the audience to delve into the exploration of military effectiveness and a myriad of previously uncharted issues.

2. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY ON MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

> **"μολων λαβε"**
> **"Molon Labe" - Come over and take them, if you can...** [7]
> *...Again, when Xerxes wrote a message (to Leonidas), "Send me your weapons," (Leonidas) wrote back, "Come over and take them, if you can!"*

King Leonidas of Sparta and his force of 7,000 soldiers, including the renowned 300 Spartans, demonstrated exceptional defensive prowess at the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BCE. They faced the vastly superior Persian army, estimated at 100,000 to 150,000 soldiers, and managed to resist them skillfully, utilizing the terrain to their advantage. The narrow pass of Thermopylae became a strategic chokepoint, where the Persians' numerical superiority was effectively neutralized.

The disciplined and extraordinarily trained 300 Spartans played a crucial role in this defense. Despite the eventual discovery of a way around the pass by the Persians, leading to the encirclement of the Greek forces, King Leonidas and his 300 Spartans fought bravely until their last breath. Although the battle concluded in a defeat for the Greeks, their strategy of attrition significantly delayed the Persian advance, buying precious time for a larger-scale Greek resistance. Commander, King Leonidas possessed an outstanding level of competence and loyalty: underwent the rigorous Spartan education and training system known as the agoge; had challenging physical training including running, wrestling, and combat training; taught survival skills and endurance under hardship; practiced formation fighting, particularly the phalanx formation; embodied with values of loyalty (loyalty is the bind for his soldiers in this context), honor, and courage; had military experience from various military engagements; skilled to use territory (as canalizing the Persians to nar-

[7] Plutarch, *Sayings of Spartans*, 225b-10.

row pass at Thermopyla, to overcome numerical advantage of the Persians). Even though it failed due to the highly overnumbered Persian army, the Greeks made it too hard for the enemy to succeed by generating marvelous military effectiveness. The effectiveness of military operations depends significantly on the commander's competence, determination, tactics, means of attrition, and resistance with limited resources available to a materially superior side, illustrating outstanding military effectiveness. Military leaders are not merely key figures in well-known confrontations; they are vital to the success of any military endeavor. The higher their competence, the more likely favorable battle outcomes will naturally emerge.

The focus of this literature review section is two-folded: first, to examine the impact of military leaders on enhancing military effectiveness, and second, to underscore their pivotal role in shaping overall military power. It is crucial to recognize that gains at the macro level or in the strategic environment are also contingent upon achievements at the operational level of warfare, where military leaders play a decisive role. Their decisions and actions are critical factors that ultimately determine the outcomes of wars. Focusing solely on the state level overlooks this crucial role played by military leaders, particularly the commanders at the operational level. Therefore, understanding the role of military leaders is not just important but essential for comprehensively grasping the dynamics of warfare.

Unfortunately, despite its importance, the current body of research has invested inadequately in examining the role of military leaders to develop an understanding of their functioning. As a primary actor in battlefield and military effectiveness, military leaders have not been studied in depth compared to state leaders. In addition, there is not enough research on how military leaders contributed to military achievements in the Turkish context. With this gap, only a few datasets are designed to capture the military leader's characteristics; existing ones are primarily at the state level, and their leader assumptions cover only the state leaders. Moreover, this dissertation seeks to approach the role of military leaders' characteristics uniquely and multi-disciplinaryly at the intersection of international relations, leadership studies, military history, and psychology. This research is urgent in its aim to address this gap and shed light on the attributes and contributions of military leaders to overall military effectiveness.

This research is a deep dive into the pivotal period of the Ottoman Empire's most recent wars, spanning from the 1897 Greco-Turco War to the Turkish War of Independence. The study zeroes in on two crucial conflicts, the First Balkan War (1911-12) and the Gallipoli War (1914-16) during World War I. The analysis focuses explicitly on Ottoman military leaders who held positions as regiment commanders

or above, intending to illuminate the variations in their qualities.

It is important to note that this study does not compare Ottoman commanders with military leaders from other adversaries. The First Balkan War, a total defeat and catastrophic failure from the Ottoman perspective, and World War I, with a particular weight on the Gallipoli Campaign, a standout major victory, are the wars this dissertation focuses on in its analyses. These two sets of wars, occurring in close succession without significant technological advancements or organizational, logistical, or strategic changes, present a unique scenario. This circumstance piques interest in applying the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) proposed by Przeworski (1970). This methodology offers a fresh perspective on analyzing these conflicts by identifying similarities in the two sets of wars and using them as a basis for comparison.

Critical concepts for military effectiveness research are outlined below. This dissertation adopts a multidisciplinary approach integrating international relations, military history, and psychology. Each discipline defines its concepts differently. The main concepts are described here for clarity and conceptual precision, while the text defines other terms and concepts contextually.

2.1 Definition of the Terms

Leadership: (Yukl 2012, 7) as he describes the concept as "leadership is the process of influencing others to understand and agree about what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish shared objectives." Leadership is also defined as "the art of influencing followers and the skill of shaping conditions in accordance with organizational goals" (Mish 1985, 679).

Competence: "Competence is the leader's ability to accomplish tasks and a demonstrated ability to win (Connable et al. 2018, 7)". "Competence is the amalgam of skills, knowledge, and abilities that military leaders bring to bear on their duties. It includes technical proficiency, strategic insight, decision-making capability, and the capacity to inspire and motivate troops" (Taylor 2018).

Loyalty: It's the commitment to fulfill duties and follow directives, even in the face of adversity, with the overarching goal of serving the collective mission and objectives of the military organization. Loyalty is not just about allegiance and faithfulness; it's about the unwavering commitment to the cause (Roberts 2019).

Military Effectiveness: Military effectiveness is "the capacity to create military power from a state's basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital (Brooks 2007, 9)".Korb (Korb 1984*b*, 42) defines it as "Effective militaries are those that achieve the objectives assigned to them or are victorious in war."

2.2 Literature on Military Effectiveness

In international relations, particularly from a realist standpoint, the dominant currency is state power. This power is primarily derived from military capabilities, along with other components. The military power in this equation is a fusion of crucial resources and the incentives to utilize them. The traditional view posits that material resources such as army size, fighter and troop numbers, and gross national product (GNP) are the critical indicators of military power. However, these indicators alone are insufficient to comprehensively assess a state's military power. Instead, military power comprises two central elements: resources and intent and the ability to use them effectively. Military effectiveness is the critical factor determining the practical application of these resources. As (Brooks 2007, 4) points out, military power is the product of resources (GNP, technology, human capital) multiplied by military effectiveness. Military Effectiveness is generated either by material resources such as technology, equipment, and financial resources, human capital (Millett, Murray, and Watman 1986; Waltz 2010), or by organizational efficiency of political institutions (Biddle 2010). This refers to the ability of political institutions to manage and utilize military resources and strategies effectively. It could also include the political will and decision-making processes influencing military operations. Military organizations, or by culture, cognitive beliefs (Rosen 1991). None of these arguments fully explain the role of military leaders in generating military effectiveness. In both formulations, military effectiveness emerges as a pivotal element, directly contributing to the assessment of military power or as one of its main components. Leading scholars contend that material resources only account for 60% of the battle outcomes (Arreguin-Toft 2005; Biddle 2010). It is vital to note that military effectiveness is not an isolated concept but interconnected with a state's broader military strategy and tactics. Its impact on the outcome of conflicts must be balanced. By understanding and enhancing military effectiveness, states can significantly bolster their capabilities and achieve their strategic objectives on the battlefield (Biddle 2006; Biddle and Long 2004; Brooks 2007).

There are two possible ways to evaluate military effectiveness. The first is to design an ex-ante measurement criteria of military effectiveness to capture the battlefield effectiveness before a conflict occurs. However, this method is highly subjective and open to bias. The other option is to look at the historical cases and evaluate the actions taken to increase military effectiveness, such as changing officers, adjusting or establishing a new architectural design of the force structure of the units, training, and efforts to increase preparedness that happened to precede actual military conflict. It will also be advantageous and fruitful to compare these developments by the conditions and battle results after the conflicts. This pre and after-comparison will create a more consistent area for analyses. This dissertation sought to measure military effectiveness by examining commanders' competence and loyalty levels, analyzing the levels of competence and loyalty first, for the time before the conflict, and comparing them after the conflict.

Some states have consistently demonstrated excellent warfare, such as Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries. In contrast, others have consistently lagged, as was the case with Italy during the same periods (Brooks 2003, 149). Some states, like the Ottoman Empire, have shown varying performances, with poor performances during the Balkan War and starkly contrasting performances during WW1, particularly in the Gallipoli campaign. The concept of military effectiveness, central to war studies, is a complex one, especially in the context of international relations. The primary variable, power, in assessing a country's war capacity might not cover all the factors, especially the structural, sociological, and human factors. These factors could include the efficiency of the military's command structure, the troops' morale and motivation, and the army's adaptability to changing circumstances. Another area of complexity in the effectiveness is the level at which it is analyzed. Millet and Murray (1988) evaluate military effectiveness at all levels of war. However, (Pollack 2004; Reiter and Stam III 1998) focus only on the tactical level at the battles. This dissertation aims to evaluate military effectiveness at the operational level, where the commanders, as the main actors, have the maximum capability to shape warfare and use self-initiative. However, it must be clarified that tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare are not independent, and the interplay between them is so dense. In some cases, a tactical unit might create a strategic impact, such as a single submarine or a fighter attacking a strategic target; in some exceptional cases, strategic planning might fall short even to gain some tactical gains. Admitting these potential scenarios as outliers, including unconventional warfare or unique historical circumstances, this dissertation proposes that traditional warfare applications are consistent with their warfare levels.

The study of military effectiveness transcends disciplinary boundaries, encompass-

ing fields such as sociology, operations research, military history, and leadership studies. In recent years, this multifaceted topic has also piqued the interest of political science scholars, further underscoring its interdisciplinary nature. In generating military effectiveness, many scholars give more weight to regime type, claiming that democracies are more likely to win (Choi 2004; De Mesquita et al. 2005; De Mesquita and Downs 2006; Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam III 1998), human element as a factor for creating military power (Biddle and Long 2004), from the perspective of military power generation (Biddle and Long 2004; Brooks 2003), will to fight (Atran, Sheikh, and Gómez 2014; Connable et al. 2018; McNerney et al. 2019), and cohesion (Janowitz 1964; Käihkö 2018; Kirke 2010; Siebold 2005, 2007). Correlates of War (COW) and Militarized interstate disputes (MID) datasets are widely used to capture the impact of variables at the strategic level (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Unfortunately, this dataset's variables are unsuitable for analyzing military leader-year or military leader-war impact in the battles. Victory is a very different notion than military effectiveness, and in many cases, it is not appropriate to examine military effectiveness from the lens of victory or defeat. A victorious army might be less effective but still win because of the excessive-high force ratio or by mismanagement of the rival; simultaneously, there can be high military effectiveness generated even though an army is defeated due to some unpredictable conditions such as weather, 3rd party involvement or simply chance which hides the satisfactory performance in the battlefield. (Arreguin-Toft 2005; Arreguín-Toft 2012; Mack 1975; Merom 2003; Sullivan 2012).

On the other hand, Grauer and Horowitz (2012) focuses mainly on military effectiveness but still depends on a dichotomous victory/defeat measure for choosing decisive battles. Hence, all subsequent battles pave the way for the final war outcome; it is perhaps distracting to accept only the decisive ones and ignore the other battles. This dissertation follows a stance that evaluates military leaders' performance not limited to a specific event but in a set of wars within a period.

The first empirical studies on cohesion during WWII at the individual level of analysis were conducted by Shils and Janowitz (1948), who believed that social bonding and the will to fight were crucial for generating higher military effectiveness. Omer Bartov, on the other hand, argues that the level of morale plays a vital role in contributing to the overall will of a fight (Bartov 1992*a*,*b*). Looking at military effectiveness from an operational and organizational perspective, Millet and Murray explain that planning capacity is the organizational glue. In contrast, integrating military units helps improve effectiveness between 1914 and 1945 (Millet and Murray 1988).

Defining and measuring military effectiveness is a complex and nuanced task. (Korb 1984*a*, 42) defines it as the successful militaries either victorious or achieving the objectives assigned to them. However, this definition can be misleading, as victory alone does not always equate to military effectiveness. For instance, the German Army is often regarded as an effective military organization despite its defeat in the world wars. This example highlights the need to consider other factors when defining military effectiveness, adding to the complexity and depth of this concept.

In this light, (Van Creveld 1982, 174) suggests that military effectiveness should be defined as the capacity to achieve operational goals. This definition acknowledges that success on the battlefield depends on more than just achieving victory and considers the broader context in which military operations occur. Millet (Millet and Murray 1988, 2) takes a different approach, emphasizing the process and national resources involved in military effectiveness. This definition highlights the dynamic nature of military operations and the importance of effectively utilizing available resources. While these definitions offer valuable insights into military effectiveness, they may still overlook specific impacts of leadership. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of military effectiveness requires considering various factors, including leadership dynamics, operational objectives, and resource utilization processes.

Military effectiveness can be conceptualized as the aggregate of effectiveness achieved in individual battles. Therefore, battlefield effectiveness emerges as a primary component of overall military effectiveness. By narrowing our focus to the battle level rather than campaigns or wars, we can gain a more detailed evaluation of the impact of military leaders or commanders. This refined perspective allows for a closer examination of how leadership influences outcomes on the battlefield. In the work of Talmadge (2015), the efficiency of battlefield performance and battlefield effectiveness is examined from an organizational perspective. The author proposes that certain practices, such as promotion patterns, command arrangements, and information management, are indicators of battlefield effectiveness. Examining battlefield effectiveness at the organizational level can yield insightful results. Prior studies utilizing this level of analysis have considered factors such as culture (Kirke 2010; Murray 1999), cohesion (Castillo 2020; Kirke 2010), economic development (Beckley 2010; Biddle 2010), democracy Talmadge (2015), and coup-proofing practices (Makara 2013; Powell 2019; Sudduth 2017). Nonetheless, in the context of WWI and the Balkan Wars, individual-level analyses may be better suited as the impact of explanatory variables at the organizational level is either too nascent (as in the case of democracy) or too intricate to test in cohesion-related studies.

However, the generation of military effectiveness through increasing organizational

efficiency does not solely explain the overall process, as it ignores the individual military leaders' impact at the individual level. To address the lacuna in terms of the level of analysis, this dissertation intentionally focuses on individual-level analysis. The realist camp often uses military effectiveness to describe the effective use of resources in a specific conflict without necessarily focusing on victory alone (Biddle 2010; Brooks 2007). The concept of military effectivenessiciency can also vary depending on the level of military involvement. At the strategic level, military effectivenessiciency is related to adequately selecting strategic goals. On the other hand, at the operational level, battle effectiveness is related to the execution of battles, minimum casualties, the impact of campaigns, and the application of combat principles.

Biddle and Long (2004) suggests that military effectiveness has two features: first, it is the property of a particular military unit, and second, it is not solely determined by the outcome of a conflict. The success of a military unit is determined by the capacity and strength generated by the responsible military unit, even during external challenging events. In addition, battle outcomes can vary due to the self-failure of the challenger, economic and political odds, and extraordinary situations (Millett and Murray 1988). Therefore, some military units can be considered efficient even if they lose, as they may resist the opponent, such as the Ottoman Defense of Gazi Osman Pasha during the 1877-1878 Russian-Ottoman War and the defense of Plevna. Some authors suggest that military effectiveness can be found in different dimensions, such as force employment, basic tactics, and complex operations (Biddle and Long 2004; Talmadge 2015). Military effectiveness is also a component of "the art of war" usage. The involvement of military leaders in the battlefield or war environment is evaluated through the tactical shaping of the battlefield via careful planning, creative utilization of forces, and efficient troop maneuvering as dictated by the terrain and force capabilities. In other words, it is viewed through the lens of the art of war. Renowned military strategists such as Clausewitz (2003); Tzu (2008) emphasized the critical impact of strategy and tactics in paving the way for superior force application. However, these skillful practices are inextricably linked to the quality of military leaders. Hence, we anticipate that well-designed and led military operations will feature commanders who are both academically proficient and experienced in military field operations.

This is particularly evident in the Gallipoli Campaign, a pivotal moment in military history, where competent commanders effectively employed strategies such as surprise, flexibility, speed and mobility, and concentration of forces on the battlefield. In other words, the correct application of the art of war. For instance, Mustafa Kemal, on the morning of April 25, upon the commencement of the enemy land-

ing operation, swiftly proceeded to the Kocaçimen Dağı area along with the 57th Regiment and a mountain artillery battery. Here, he prevented Turkish soldiers, who had run out of ammunition, from retreating and potentially causing a rout, thus establishing a defensive line. By repelling the ANZAC assault and confining them to a narrow area of 2 km, he bought time for the arriving reinforcement forces, potentially marking a turning point in the military operation from the Turkish side (Atacanlı 2007, 293-294). Mustafa Kemal's proactive measures, accurate anticipation of the situation, and tactically correct course of action also contributed to the strategic plan. In summary, this course of action successfully applied the art of war. Successful courses of action are often underpinned by competent commanders, whose role is of utmost importance in the success of military operations. This dissertation examines the competence factor of commanders intertwined with applying the art of war.

Existing studies on assessing military effectiveness have predominantly focused on the macroscopic level of wars. However, it is imperative to note that this level encapsulates substantial variance, given that a war comprises numerous individual battles. For example, there were over 25 battles during World War I, and in World War II, more than 45 battles were waged. Consequently, deriving definitive, generalizable findings is a formidable challenge due to the inherent diversity in the characteristics and conditions of these distinct battles. The HERO dataset (Helmbold 1990; McNabb Cochran and Long 2017) is the sole dataset that adopts battles as the unit of analysis. Nevertheless, it tends to overlook specific wars, notably those deemed failures for the United States, such as the Vietnam War. Additionally, this dataset encounters challenges in clearly delineating individual commanders' competence and affiliation levels.[8]

For academic clarity, it is beneficial to differentiate between efficiency and effectiveness, as these concepts hold distinct meanings despite their interplay. While efficiency usually refers to the ability to accomplish tasks with minimal waste or effort, effectiveness pertains to the degree to which objectives are achieved and desired outcomes are realized. By delineating between these concepts, researchers can more precisely analyze and discuss various aspects of military operations and leadership dynamics. Brooks (2007) define military efficiency as combining four organizational attributes: integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality. They believe an effective military organization should possess high levels of these four attributes.

Meanwhile, another group of scholars examines military efficiency more refinedly by evaluating the mutual losses of military rival units, using casualty loss-exchange

[8]See Biddle (2004:152–153) for detailed shortfalls with the original CDB-90 dataset.

ratios (LER) (McNabb Cochran and Long 2017). Military efficiency encompasses accomplishing military objectives by strategically applying force and resources and striving for optimal outcomes with minimal exertion. Central components of military effectiveness encompass clear goals, successful mission execution, operational effectiveness, a robust logistical infrastructure, and comprehensive training and preparedness. Military effcetiveness significantly enhances the likelihood of victory, although it is not synonymous with it. A military unit may lose a battle yet maintain its effectivenes. While an efficient military unit is more likely to prevail in battles, victory hinges on various external factors. Political constraints, terrain, weather conditions, and the enemy's strategy and capabilities can all impact the outcome, even for highly efficient military units.

To elaborate on this point, operational military effectiveness, as conceptualized by Millett, Murray, and Watman (1986), is frequently evaluated through a range of indicators, primarily emphasizing material resources, often at the expense of considering the human element. Despite this limitation, Millett's framework offers a structured approach to assessing a military's operational capacity. The authors advocate for considering several critical factors, including Professional Ethos and Integrity, Operational Method Integration, Mobility and Flexibility, Technological Utilization, Support Systems, Alignment with Strategic Objectives, and Effective Operational Doctrine (Millett, Murray, and Watman 1986). However, it is noteworthy that Millett's conceptualization of military effectiveness leans towards a more materialist approach, affording limited explanatory scope for human factors. Instead, the focus primarily rests on organizational, structural, and material resources when evaluating military effectiveness. Millett, Murray, and Watman (1986) proposes that assessing military effectiveness involves a holistic consideration of these factors, recognizing the intricate interplay between material resources, human factors, and strategic alignment. By adopting such a multidimensional perspective, analysts and policymakers can gain deeper insights into military forces' operational readiness and capability.

Talmadge (2015) suggests that victories are unnecessary when assessing military effectiveness. Accordingly, it states that battle performance can rely on many factors, such as political goals, terrain, material capabilities, and third-party involvement. These factors can be extended through organizational quality, leadership, cohesion, and the factor of chance. In the context of military effectiveness, 'chance' refers to unpredictable events or circumstances that can significantly impact the outcome of a battle. These could include sudden changes in weather, unexpected movements by the enemy, or the failure of a critical piece of equipment. In the tactical and operational level of warfare, battlefield effectiveness is generally thought to be in

terms of cohesive and well-functioning military units and training (Talmadge 2015). On the other hand, military effectiveness evaluates performance from a broader perspective, including structural factors such as wealth, demography, and political environment. In this dissertation, military effectiveness is measured by the quality of the military leaders in terms of their training and war experience, demographical features, and the leader's ties to the political authority, membership, or liaison with the CUP. Military leaders serve to increase operational battlefield effectiveness and military effectiveness, and their promotions are a strong indicator of their performance (Johnson and Hill 2009). In this light, Promotions are generally based on age, experience, loyalty, and competence. As a rule of thumb, leaders who are promoted by competence are associated with the best practices of political leaders; on the contrary, promotions done by weighting loyalty rather than competence are the worst practices by political leaders in a given state (Talmadge 2015).

Several intellectual approaches to understanding military effectiveness are rooted in different disciplines, such as international relations, military history, and operations research (Van Creveld 1982). Some approaches prioritize quantifiable metrics such as performance to measure military effectiveness, as exemplified by the work of Dupuy, Hammerman, and OH (1980); Pollack (2004, 2018). Other researchers emphasize the human element, focusing on factors like morale, determination, and other attributes, as advocated by Van Creveld (1982). With advancements in quantitative methods and behavioral sciences, measurement has become a prevalent issue in this field of research.

Social sciences, particularly international relations, approach military effectiveness, focusing on social structures, political regimes, and various cultural dimensions. These fields of science expand the concept of military effectiveness by considering variables not typically addressed by operations researchers. However, the level of analysis in these studies often centers on the state level, focusing on the interplay between regime type and military effectiveness Biddle and Long (2004), ideology (Brooks 2006; Rosen 1995), and organizational dynamics, with few scholars focusing on the individual level of analysis, such as Acosta and Silverman (2023); Horowitz and Ellis (2015).

Military historians have long been at the forefront of examining military effectiveness, mainly through the lens of military leadership and the human element. This approach can be traced back to Thucydides' seminal work on the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), where he sought to understand and evaluate the military performance of rival forces. Unlike other disciplines, military historians primarily employ a non-quantitative methodology, meticulously analyzing each case with a focus on concrete

records and evidence. Early military historians, such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Mahan, and Liddell Hart, aimed to derive generalizable findings on militaries' state and organizational structure. However, contemporary military history has evolved into a more nuanced field, thanks in part to contributions from professional soldiers. These scholars prioritize the conduct of war and the various elements of military functions within their contextual and functional frameworks, offering a fascinating perspective on the evolution of military effectiveness.

Advancements in quantitative methods and behavioral sciences have significantly enhanced the analysis of military effectiveness. Colonel (retired) Dupuy utilized mathematical and statistical models to evaluate military effectiveness, following in the footsteps of pioneers like Frederick W. Lanchester. Lanchester's model, known as "Power Laws," was among the earliest quantitative frameworks for assessing military effectiveness. It comprises several equations that compare and evaluate opponent casualty rates (Speight 2002), treating all variables equally and viewing battlefield effectiveness as the product of firepower and a comparison of force ratios (Morrison 2002). With the involvement of computers and advanced technology, Lanchester's models provided a foundation for more sophisticated analyses, particularly within military headquarters and training centers under the discipline known as "Operations Research." However, Operations Research often emphasizes organizational structure and material resources, frequently overlooking the critical role of leadership (Naveh 2013). In contrast, social sciences, particularly international relations, broaden the concept of military effectiveness by incorporating social structures, political regimes, and cultural dimensions—variables often neglected by operations researchers.

Despite their extensive field experience and realistic insights into military issues, military historians have faced challenges in their study of military effectiveness. One of the main challenges is the need for a standard methodology. Examining battles from tactical, operational, and strategic perspectives through narrative or chronographic approaches may overlook critical factors such as cohesion, morale, and the role of military leaders. Given that military effectiveness is a multifaceted issue shaped by various interacting factors, overlooking certain risks provides an incomplete picture of reality. As such, military historians continually strive to refine their methodologies and broaden their perspectives to accurately capture the complexities and effectiveness of military operations, a testament to the intricacy of the subject.

McNabb Cochran and Long (2017) introduce a new measurement for evaluating military effectiveness using loss-exchange ratios (LERs). The author intends to solve previous inconsistencies by one of the rarest datasets in this field, HERO/CDB-90 (Helmbold 1990). This is one of the widely used datasets at this level. Still, unfor-

tunately, it only considers the head of the military operation, the army commander, or the general staff, without including the operational level military leaders such as regiment, brigade, division, or corps commanders. Another problematic issue is to exclude the Vietnam War from their dataset, even though chronologically, they take into consideration the Six-Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973, albeit relatively short. Moreover, the success criteria are defined as the risk exception of the military leaders varying between -1,0, and 1, which reveals limited variation for interpretation. McNabb Cochran and Long (2017) convincingly offer a very logical solution to overcome the measurement problem of the HERO/CBD 90 dataset by specifically directing their scope to the battles rather than war and considering military leaders at various levels in command of the chain. According to Millett and Murray (2010), Military effectiveness is analyzed through political, strategic, operational, and tactical effectiveness. However, some researchers prefer to decrease the level of analysis to battles rather than wars and use the term "combat effectiveness" as a contributing sub-element for military effectiveness. Combat performance can be measured in various ways: promotion, territory gain-lost, casualties, and subjective coding of success (according to the combat mission in a specific month) (Millett and Murray 2010). In this manner, The LERs are well-suited for measuring battle effectiveness. However, in many wars, and especially when returning to history, reaching healthy numerical information about the losses is challenging.

According to Erickson (2015); Uyar (2020), the Ottoman military's superior effectiveness, compared to its British counterpart, was primarily attributed to the significant role of effective leadership. This finding underscores the crucial role of leadership in military success, a theme central to our research. While Western sources often attribute Ottoman success to factors such as numerical superiority and the Allies' poor execution of plans, our analysis highlights the pivotal role of effective leadership, particularly at the operational level, in determining the outcomes of battles favoring the Ottoman Military.

In examining the impact of commanders on military effectiveness, the final conflicts of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the Balkan War and World War I, present a compelling area of analysis. One key factor that contributed to Ottoman success was the strategic positioning of their commanders. Unlike the British Forces, the Ottoman Army strategically placed high-quality commanders close to the battlefronts. This strategic decision facilitated superior situational awareness and fostered a heightened sense of determination among the troops under their command. In contrast, British commanders often operated from remote locations, which resulted in inadequate coordination of operations and limited supervision over subordinate commanders. This strategic advantage of the Ottoman commanders is a clear example

of effective leadership in action.

Moreover, the effective leadership demonstrated by figures such as Liman von Sanders and Mustafa Kemal during the Gallipoli Campaign, 1915-16, further bolstered the Ottoman military's performance. These leaders possessed tactical acumen and exhibited strategic solid vision, rallying their troops and instilling confidence in their abilities to achieve victory. Furthermore, the cohesive fighting spirit among Ottoman troops, nurtured by a sense of national identity and purpose, contributed significantly to their success on the battlefield.

In summary, while factors such as numerical superiority and Allied incompetence undoubtedly played a role in Ottoman victories, the effective leadership demonstrated at the operational level, coupled with commanders' strategic positioning and troops' troopers' cohesive fighting spirit, emerged as crucial elements in determining the Ottoman Military's success in battle. The remarkable performance of the Ottoman military during the Gallipoli campaign starkly contrasts the catastrophic defeat suffered during the Balkan Wars just two years prior. The Ottoman Empire's Empire's defeat in the First Balkan War (1912-1913) resulted in the loss of nearly one-third of its territory and triggered a massive wave of immigration toward Istanbul. Militarily, the Ottoman forces experienced a significant depletion in human resources and fighting units, amounting to the loss of approximately one entire army and nearly 20 divisions (Erickson 2000, 2015).

Despite the staggering losses suffered during the First Balkan War (1912-1913), the Ottoman Army demonstrated remarkable resilience and adaptability. In the short period preceding the Gallipoli campaign, they underwent a rapid reorganization and transformation into a cohesive battle force. This inspiring turnaround speaks volumes about the Ottoman military leadership and personnel, who were able to learn from the lessons of defeat, implement necessary reforms, and effectively mobilize resources to prepare for the impending conflict at Gallipoli. The Ottoman military's reorganization efforts included strategic restructuring of command, retraining of troops, and mobilization of resources to strengthen defenses along the Gallipoli peninsula. Additionally, the Ottoman leadership capitalized on the terrain advantage offered by the region's rugged landscape, strategically deploying forces to exploit natural defensive positions. Furthermore, the Gallipoli campaign showcased the Ottoman military's ability to leverage its knowledge of local terrain, employ innovative tactics, and demonstrate high determination and resilience in the face of overwhelming odds. The successful defense of Gallipoli against Allied forces, despite initial numerical superiority and technological advantages enjoyed by the Allies, underscores the effectiveness of the Ottoman military's reorganization efforts and its

ability to adapt to evolving battlefield conditions (Erickson 2015).

In short, the Ottoman military's remarkable performance at Gallipoli, following the devastating losses of the Balkan Wars, highlights its capacity for rapid reorganization, adaptation, and resilience. This transformation enabled the Ottoman forces to effectively defend against Allied incursions and secure a significant victory on the battlefield.

2.3 Theoretical Framework Military Leaders' Impact on Military Effectiveness

With their profound historical significance, leadership studies have long captivated academic interest across diverse disciplines, including military history, psychology, and sociology. These studies have sought to elucidate the fundamental tenets of leadership and provided invaluable insights into the evolution of human societies and their military structures. The discussion delineates conceptualizations of different leadership styles, each with its unique historical context and implications.

Defining leadership is an intellectual challenge that continues to captivate scholars across disciplines, a puzzle that invites us to delve deeper into its multidimensional and complex nature. While consensus remains elusive, many scholars in leadership studies turn to (Yukl 2013, 7) for his description: "Leadership is the process of influencing others to understand and agree about what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish shared objectives." This ongoing quest for a comprehensive definition is a testament to the enduring fascination with leadership studies.

Leadership studies have remained active but have undergone a significant evolution, a journey from focusing on traits and attributes to a more nuanced understanding of competencies. With its emphasis on traits, the former has played a crucial role in evaluating leaders' performance in the recruitment process (Bartone et al. 2009; Casimir et al. 2014; McCormack and Mellor 2002). However, as the role of military leaders has evolved, particularly in modern military environments, there has been a discernible shift towards competency-based approaches. These approaches, as exemplified by the works of Horey et al. (2004); Young and Dulewicz (2006), scrutinize leaders based on enduring traits and a myriad of time, age, position, and context-dependent variables. This evolution in our understanding of leadership is

a testament to the dynamic nature of the field and the continuous quest for more comprehensive insights.

This type of research offers the advantage of tracking an individual's development over time. This dissertation employs this approach to explore military leaders' competence levels in the Ottoman context and to analyze how these levels evolved during different periods, including times of war. Military leadership shares similarities with other forms of leadership, involving individuals leading others, setting tasks or goals, and guiding followers to achieve these objectives (Chan et al., 2011). One benefit of this research type is to track an individual's development over time. This dissertation uses this method to examine the competence levels of military leaders in the Ottoman context and analyze how their competence changed during different periods, such as wars. Military leadership shares similarities with other forms of leadership in that it involves individuals leading others, setting tasks or goals to achieve, and guiding followers in reaching these objectives (Chan, Ramaya, and Soh 2011). On the other hand, military leadership is different from other leadership studies as the uncertainty, the risk of death, and the pressure in warfare are much higher than in other environments. Keeping the context in military leadership, there is also a variatiın between peace-time activities (Wong, Bliese, and McGurk 2003) and wartime, where the Notion of leadership turns into a severe and essential element in reaching the military targets (Boies, Fiset, and Gill 2009; Chen and Bliese 2002; Dixon et al. 2017).

Leadership theories mostly hold for military leaders. Leadership can be defined as a skill, ability, or relationship between the followers and the leader. In The Republic, Plato explains three critical points about leadership: it starts at home; leadership is very close to moral knowledge and depends on carefully listening and talking to the followers (Temes 1996). Especially after 1900, a great effort was spent identifying the traits and behaviors of the leaders. In one of the earliest leadership theories, Carlyle (1888) proposed the 'Great Man Theory,' suggesting that leaders are born exceptional and possess innate leadership qualities. For Carlyle (1888), history is nothing but the autobiographies of great men. Great Man" Trait Theory (1900s-1930s) states that leaders have some inborn qualities, making them leaders. However, researchers could not find which specific attributes or characteristics ensured effective leadership Stogdill (1974).

Subsequent theories aimed to identify the essential leadership traits that distinguish a great leader Bernard (1926); Kilbourne (1935); Zaccaro, Day, and Hedrick (2020). (Jenkins 1947, 1) is often credited as the first scholar to compile a list of leaders, particularly military leaders. Another group of theorists, particularly active after

the 1950s, focused on behavioral theories. For these scholars, the leader's behavior directly influenced the followers Cartwright and Zander (1960); Likert (1961, 1967); Stogdill, Goode, and Day (1963). To illustrate these theories, we can look at historical examples such as Napoleon Bonaparte, who embodied the 'Great Man Theory' with his exceptional leadership during the French Revolution and subsequent wars.

Current leadership studies revolve around the "Great Man" Trait, Behavioral Style, Situational Contingency, and Transformational leadership theories. Behavioral Style Theory (1940's-1950's) claims that not inborn traits but behaviors influence a leader. However, this theory does not evaluate how important attributes are and does not consider situational or conditional demands. Based on Fielder's contingency model, situational or Contingency Theory (1960's-1970s) wights the situations that shape the leadership style (Gibb 1958, 88).

Supporters of the contingency leadership theory believe that leaders can apply different styles depending on the situation. Followers' abilities, task requirements, and leaders' preferences clarify the type of leadership (Hersey and Blanchard 1969, 1). More recently, two major leadership theories have gained recognition: transactional leadership, where leadership is contingent on the exchange of rewards based on compliance, and transformational leadership (Bass and Avolio 1993), where this compliance of followers is bolstered by the followers' internalization of the goals. The transformational Leadership Theory (1980-1990), a paradigm shift in leadership studies, asserts that certain traits are pivotal in empowering followers to achieve shared goals (Booher and Watson 1999). This theory proposes that charismatic leaders serve as a wellspring of inspiration for their followers, fostering a shared vision. In all leadership theories, traits and attributes, not in isolation but in conjunction with interpretation, play a crucial role as they are fundamental to a leader.

Contemporary leadership studies have taken a new direction, reevaluating individual characteristics in leadership analysis. Zaccaro and Klimoski (2002) merged the transactional and transformational leadership styles, adding charismatic individual features. A recent study by (Yukl and Mahsud 2010, 81)introduced the concept of 'adaptive leadership,' which underscores the leader's ability to adapt effectively to unpredictable circumstances in complex environments. Despite ongoing debates about the empirical evidence of the impact of specific attributes or traits, the majority agree that these qualifications are a prerequisite for effective leadership. This includes intelligence (Gibb 1958) , competence (Kouzes and Posner 2006, 22), firmness and strength (Cohen 2010, 77), compassion (Gardner 1987, 13), and perseverance (Duckworth and Quinn 2009). These recent theories reflect leadership studies' dynamic nature and relevance in today's complex world.

Leadership theories can also be grouped into two camps. The first camp, "institutional leadership school," emphasizes the impact of the leaders but accepts that institutional and organizational design is influential in shaping leaders' choices. According to this camp, leaders have agency but are constrained by the institutions under which they act (Goemans 2000; Mesquita et al. 2003; Przeworski 2000; Schultz 2001). The second camp of research on leaders gave more room for leader influence than the first camp. This camp focused more on leader attributes. This dissertation will follow the latter approach in conceptualizing the impact of military leaders, which has been ignored for an extended period in generating military effcetiveness and in military studies within the Ottoman (Turkish) context. The need to understand the role of military leaders in warfare outcomes is not just an academic exercise but a crucial area that could have significant implications for military strategy and leadership development. This imbalance in the current research landscape calls for a more comprehensive and balanced approach, which is the aim of this dissertation.

While comprehensive, the existing literature on the systematic structure of wars leaves a significant gap in our understanding. It primarily focuses on three theories: materialist theory, strategic interaction theory, and vulnerability theory. These theories, while valuable, do not adequately consider the role of military leaders' capability and non-material factors in determining war outcomes. This gap in our knowledge is the driving force behind our research, and how 'combat power' or 'operational power' accumulates remains a topic that requires further investigation.

The phenomenon of materially stronger sides experiencing failure in wars, occurring 29% of the time, according to Arreguin-Toft (2005) study, challenges traditional materialist explanations of war. This discrepancy underscores the need to explore non-material resources such as military effcetiveness as potential explanations. Military power, conventionally perceived as the sum of material resources and effectiveness, incorporates factors such as troop numbers, GNP, weapons, economy, and military expenditures as material resources. While it is commonly assumed that a materially superior side will prevail in battle, this assumption does not always hold. In some instances, military effectiveness emerges as the decisive factor, enabling a weaker side to gain an advantage on the battlefield. This vulnerability on the part of the weaker side can be mitigated through factors such as a higher will to fight, superior strategies, improved morale, and the presence of strong and high-quality military leaders. A prominent illustration of this is the Battle of Tannenberg, a pivotal engagement during World War I in 1914. In this encounter, the German Eighth Army, under the command of General Hindenburg, capitalized on the vulnerabilities of the Russian Second Army, led by General Samsonov, and the First Russian Army, commanded by General Rennenkampf. The Germans demonstrated strategic

insight and tactical prowess through highly efficient command and control, coupled with inner-line maneuvers of the troops and comprehensive reconnaissance efforts (Buttar 2014; Showalter 2004). This historical example underscores the weight of military leaders' role in warfare, a role that has been overlooked for too long.

In liaison with leadership studies, the study of military leadership addresses a niche area where specifically the combatants are considered. This field of study is not only an essential part of resolving the actors' influence in the sub-components of a crucial element of wars as one of the central phenomena in international relations and politics but also is related to many state actors who somehow had a military background as Hitler, Hindenburg, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Churchill and so on. Military leadership concentrates on a unique, context-specific dimension (Blair and Hunt 1986). Usually, this literature starts with examining personal traits and attributes, later diversifying into different categories. Previously, numerous studies have used diverse sets of methods to capture the individual's capabilities (Bartone, Snook, and Tremble Jr. 2002; Dvir et al. 2002). However, it is challenging to establish generalization because first, military leaders are human, and their attributes and traits are culture, ethnic, geography and, time-dependent other external factors such as peacetime or wartime employment, the level of the military leader and war type has a significant effect on the individual trait and attributes. As this dissertation applies, one possible stance is to stick to a specific (as time and country) and evaluate the findings accordingly.

This dissertation focuses on individual traits, explicitly examining the success criteria of military effectiveness. It does so by using promotion as an indicator of success, focusing on the Late Ottoman military cadre between 1897 and 1918. This cadre, which was involved in a series of wars, stands out as a unique sample, with geography, technology, and structural factors held constant. By concentrating on this distinct historical context, the dissertation offers a context-specific analysis of military effectiveness, shedding light on a crucial period in military history.

Research by Hunt (1991) explores military leadership across various levels of organization. It underscores the role of individual traits, such as extraversion, in potentially enhancing performance. However, it's crucial to note that these traits do not guarantee real-case performance. This research aims to delve into the intricate interplay between individual traits and real-world outcomes, a key and complex aspect of the study of military leadership.

Leadership, a multifaceted concept, has been defined in various ways in the literature. One of the most impactful models for evaluating military leadership across strategic, operational, and tactical levels is Hunt (1991) extended multilevel leader-

ship model. This model, which underscores the importance of critical tasks, individual capacity, and organizational culture in determining overall effectiveness, is a cornerstone in the study of military leadership. (Wong, Bliese, and McGurk 2003, 157-192) also lend support to this model. Early studies on military leadership initially focused on the dynamics between senior leaders and their groups. Two seminal works, The Soldier and the State (Huntington 1957) and The Professional Soldier (Janowitz 2017), delved into this relationship.

In the military context, trait-based approaches are more common as they facilitate predicting leaders' performance, making them particularly useful in recruitment and manning. On the other hand, competence-based leadership approaches, primarily used in career evaluations and promotion processes, provide valuable insights into the development of military personnel. The close relationship between military leadership and unit effectiveness underscores the importance of the commander's leadership and their relations with subordinates in a specific unit. In exploring how military leaders impact military effectiveness, there has been a notable scarcity of studies that specifically focus on the role of commanders. Most of this vast literature gave weight to structural factors to explain the lack of military effectiveness (Wagstaff 2019). Among the rare investigations of how commanders succeed or fail, some scholars examined the distance of the commanders to the front (Carr Jr et al. 2015); the competence of the military leaders (Ricks 2012); professionalism in the organization ((Huntington 1981; Janowitz 2017); or the quality of low-ranking officers (Wagstaff 2019).

One area that requires further exploration in military leadership studies is the leaders' characteristics and the ongoing debate between competence and loyalty. Much of the literature on individual attributes has focused on state leaders. However, the topic, which is one of the most significant issues in international relations and wars, has not been adequately investigated in terms of its natural sub-components, battles. Furthermore, only a handful of studies have adopted a quantitative approach and individual-level analysis when examining battles. This lack of research on the main actors of battles, such as commanders, creates a significant gap in the literature. It has been empirically demonstrated that individual characteristics and attributes influence leaders' decisions regarding military intervention (Saunders 2017), their risk acceptance, and their level of aggressiveness before the onset of a conflict (Horowitz and Ellis 2015), and their democratic stance (Gift and Krcmaric 2017). This dataset presents numerous opportunities for further research in military leadership.

Among the few studies with scope to military leaders, Reiter and Wagstaff (2018) examined the promotion patterns of the German and American generals in WWII.

Their analyses revealed that German and American armies replaced the low-performing generals without considering the coup-proofing motives. In addition, they suggest that the US Army demoted low-performing generals even though they had interpersonal networks with higher authorities and political figures (loyalty assumption does not hold for the US) (Reiter and Wagstaff 2018). According to their findings, replacing unsuccessful generals in the US and German armies increased combat effectiveness. Similar results are expected in this article as well. Removing low-performing officers after the Balkan Wars (Enver Pasha's purge of 1914) significantly impacted Ottoman military effectiveness.

Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr (2020) are another group of scholars investigating how military leaders' attributes impact military effectiveness. Authors employed original battle-level data and biographical information for hundreds of commanders who served in the American Civil War. Their assessment of high-quality military leadership was built on two variables: competence and loyalty. Scholars have found that competent commanders are more successful in battles (Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr 2020).

For Wong, Bliese, and McGurk (2003), the absence of military leadership was an issue during WWI. It became leverage for the Turks during the Gallipoli Campaign. (King 2019, 161) very briefly emphasized the necessity of this factor as "neither a nation nor an army is a mechanical contrivance, but a living thing, built of flesh and blood and not of iron and steel." Even though modern weapons of fire and technology started to engage in the battles, leadership was still a critical issue in determining the battle outcomes.

After the Cold War, neo-classical scholars argued that decision-makers were highly influential in war decisions (Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009; Rose 1998). Blainey also claimed that factors such as military capability, economy, and personal background of decision-makers are influential in leaders' actions (Blainey 1988, 293). In this sense, state-level variables are accompanied by individual-level analysis. Individual-level analysis of leaders can be studied according to rationality, personal traits, psychology, and expected utility considerations. Quantitative scholars who explain state leaders' behavior mainly focus on rationality using game theory and expected utility theory (Brams et al. 2002; De Mesquita 2002, 2006). Leaders' impact on wars can be classified under two variables: exogenous (international environment, domestic factors) and endogenous (personal traits, former battle experience, moral and religious values). Psychology, and more specifically military psychology, deals with the latter variables.

On the other hand, historical war studies show us that war is a multi-causal event

(Vasquez 2009) and requires analysis on different levels to grasp the causality and content of wars better (Singer 1961). Here, there is a variation in choosing the most relevant level of analysis among scholars; some prioritize the systemic level of analysis (Waltz 2018), state and dyadic level analysis (Bremer 1992; Vasquez 1998), and individual level analysis (Horowitz and Fuhrmann 2018).

While historically emphasized for centuries, the relationship between promotion and combat outcomes has received recent attention in studies conducted by Reiter and Wagstaff (2018). They argued that combatants were not adequately promoted if their performance in battles during World War II did not meet expectations. The authors focused on armies rather than the navy and air force, a relevant choice given that most troops and their commanders were engaged in ground combat. This focus is particularly applicable when considering earlier historical periods, including World War I and preceding wars, where ground forces played a central role in achieving victory. Battle performance can be assessed through various metrics, including territorial loss, casualties, and daily or monthly performance, as explored by Reiter and Wagstaff (2018). However, this dissertation diverges by examining the military effectiveness of the Ottoman Empire. Military leaders at all levels—strategic, operational, or tactical—play a pivotal role in enhancing military effectiveness through decision-making, personal attributes, command capabilities, and strategic and tactical skills application. Mainly, the morale and cohesion fostered by these leaders directly influence the combat effectiveness of their units. The symbiotic relationship between leadership and the effective utilization of military resources ultimately determines the outcome of battles.

Given these considerations, assessing the individual influence of military leaders or commanders is a relevant area of investigation. This line of inquiry delves into leaders' impact, particularly when analyzing military dynamics at the individual level. By examining military leaders' influence on operational effectiveness and battlefield outcomes, a deeper understanding of the dynamics of warfare can be achieved. This research has the potential to contribute significantly to military strategy and leadership.

When we acknowledge the significance of the human element, particularly military leaders, in achieving success in warfare, we are confronted with another set of challenges, primarily methodological. The literature on military leaders is qualitatively rich, with numerous historical accounts highlighting the significance of leadership in determining military outcomes. However, there needs to be more quantitative support for these hypotheses. This lack of quantitative analysis is a significant gap in our understanding of military leadership and underscores the need for further

research. Historians such as Tzu (2008), Machiavelli (1993), and Napoleon have all emphasized the critical role of military leaders in achieving success. Napoleon famously remarked, "[T]here are no bad regiments; there are only bad colonels," quoted in (Farwell 2001, 206), underscoring the importance of leadership quality.

Similarly, Plutarch credited individuals like Quintus Fabius Maximus with halting Hannibal's attacks on Rome due to their leadership attributes (Fucecchi 2010). A renowned military strategist, Liddell Hart, advocated for studying leadership characteristics in history, believing that leader attributes play a crucial role. Despite the qualitative evidence supporting the importance of military leadership, systematic analyses in political science often lack actor-based explanations for battle success.

However, there are only a few notable exceptions regarding using quantitative methods. Reiter and Stam (2002) evaluated the influence of regime type on promotion patterns for generals, while Reiter and Wagstaff (2018) examined the impact of leadership in battles during WWII. Some studies have also explored political leaders' decision-making patterns during wartime (Chiozza and Goemans 2011; De Mesquita and Siverson 1995). Recently, Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr (2020) surveyed military leaders, finding that leadership qualities were one of the determinants of success in the American Civil War. While qualitative accounts highlight military leadership's importance, quantitative political science analyses are relatively scarce. However, recent studies have begun to address this gap, shedding light on the role of leadership in shaping military outcomes.

Examining leader traits and attributes has been interesting for many centuries. Among the earliest documented discussions was Plato's Republic, which highlighted the reasoning capacities of influential leaders. Similarly, Aristotle's Politics articulated the need for virtuous leaders. As expressed in The Prince, Niccolò Machiavelli's pragmatic approach described virtue in multiple ways, emphasizing power. The qualities of leaders have been a subject of scholarly inquiry across various disciplines, including psychology, history, and international relations. Galton initiated the scientific modeling of leaders' attributes by analyzing the relationship between leaders and their mental capacity across generations in 1869. Terman conducted the first empirical study of leadership in 1904, analyzing children to identify potential qualities of future leaders. Additional research has continued to explore the characteristics of influential leaders, and the topic remains a critical area of interest for scholars. Attributes matter in state leaders' foreign policy choices and military leaders' competence levels. (Horowitz and Stam 2014, 293), for example, have found evidence for prior military experience as a determinant of state leaders' hawkish pol-

icy choices.[9]

Diversity in conceptualization exists in this type of research. Some scholars (mostly military psychologists and political scientists) prefer to use the term "traits" to explain individual characteristics, while others prefer attributes. The term trait creates ambiguity, referring to various personality characteristics, temperaments, and other personal qualities and neuropsychic structures (Allport 1961). To prevent this sophistication, this dissertation uses the term "attributes" to capture relatively stable and coherent individual characteristics (Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam 2015; Huang, Silverman, and Acosta 2022).

Influential military leaders also increase the will to fight by motivating soldiers by applying different strategies such as being cohesive (Castillo 2020; Connable et al. 2018), competent (Connable et al. 2018), or using strict discipline (Connable et al. 2018; McPherson 1997). Quality leaders are the masters of the battlefield. This wisdom requires one to be excellent in accomplishing different tasks such as logistics, operational planning, execution, using geography, and managing human resources. These skills usually depend on training and experience. Applying a superior strategy and creativity also depends on the quality of the military leaders because a good strategy is developed by evaluating the battle environment. The selection of highly efficient and workable military leaders is another factor that leads to the successful application of battle plans (Van Creveld 1985). General George C. Marshall's decision to promote Dwight D. Eisenhower is one of the examples of a successful leadership appointment. Moreover, their competence influences the overall military organization (Tarakci, Greer, and Groenen 2016).

Military leadership has long been recognized as critical in enhancing effectiveness through various mechanisms. This includes facilitating strategic thinking and decision-making, as highlighted by Clausewitz (2003), and making contextually appropriate decisions (McMaster 2008). Additionally, military leaders contribute to clarifying the outcomes of wars (Murray, Berkowitz, and Lerner 2019), with their personal attributes and war experiences shaping their decision-making processes (Keegan 2011). Moreover, the interaction between military leaders, political leaders, and commanders also plays a significant role in military effectiveness (Cohen 2012).

History is replete with examples of military leaders who have left an indelible mark on the world. The British Royal Air Force (RAF), with its excellence in air-to-air

[9] Authors, by employing a new dataset, Arcchigos, on leader attributes and by examining more than 2500 state leaders, have found that those with prior military service but not professionally, not as an officer, or having no combat experience, are more likely to follow a hawkish stance and initiate more in conflicts.

combat operations and highly effective aerial reconnaissance missions, is a testament to this. Similarly, with their formidable speed, firepower, and mobility, the German Panzer Divisions emerged as renowned adversaries. Their employment of Blitzkrieg tactics, characterized by swift and coordinated movements of tanks, infantry, and air units, led to military superiority in conflicts such as the invasions of Poland and France. Through strategic decisions and tactical brilliance, these leaders have shaped the course of history. Military effectiveness and the role of commanders in this process have always been touted by military historians, historians in general, and with an increasing trend by international relations researchers who prioritize actor-based explanations.

Among many, one notable example is the Battle of Sakarya during the Turkish War of Independence, which occurred in 1921 between Turkish and Greek forces. This 22-day and 22-night engagement became a crucial turning point in Turkish military history. It was not merely a battle but a strategic watershed, earning the distinction of being the 'longest pitched battle' in world war history and 'the officers' battle' in the context of the Turkish War of Independence. The Battle of Sakarya provides ample evidence of the generation of superior military effectiveness, showcasing the strategic understanding and resilience of the Turkish forces during a critical period in their struggle for independence.

This battle was marked by strategic withdrawals and territorial concessions to expand on this case. Following this decisive engagement, the forces made a bold transition from a defensive stance to an offensive operation, initiating the reclamation of lost ground and driving forward to regain previously surrendered territories. This shift in strategy showcases the strategic brilliance of the Turkish forces. This pitched battle is one of the finest examples of the Turkish Army transitioning from tactical withdrawals to implementing strategic defense after a significant retreat. In preparation for a decisive battle, the Turkish military assembled all its units on a front line approximately 100 kilometers wide, east of the Sakarya River (Görgülü 1990; TC Genelkurmay Başkanlığı 1973). Just before the battle, the situation of the Turkish forces was as follows: 96,326 soldiers, 5,401 officers, 54,572 rifles, 825 machine guns, 196 artillery pieces, 1,309 sabers, 32,137 animals, 1,284 carts, and two aircraft (Yıldız 2022, 1116). The situation of the Greek forces was as follows: 120,000 soldiers, 3,780 officers, 57,000 rifles, 2,768 machine guns, 386 artillery pieces, 1,350 sabers, 3,800 animals, 600 3-ton trucks, 240 1-ton trucks, and 18 aircraft (Yıldız 2022, 1116). Before the Battle of Sakarya, the Greek Army had reached 90,000 infantry rifles, 700 machine guns, 300 artillery pieces, 20 aircraft, and 1,500 cavalry. In contrast, the Turkish Army had 45,000 infantry rifles, 240 machine guns, 240 artillery pieces, two aircraft, and 4,500 cavalry (Yıldız 2022, 1116).

Despite facing difficulties at some points, the Turkish positions have steadfastly maintained their defense without yielding. A new defensive line has been established at every lost line, thereby preventing enemy advances. The Commander-in-Chief, Mustafa Kemal (later ATATÜRK), formulated the strategy: "There is no line of defense; there is a defensive perimeter. This perimeter encompasses all. Not a single inch of the homeland's soil can be abandoned until it is soaked with the blood of its citizens (Atatürk et al. 1980, 418)". Accordingly, upon halting at the first possible point, every unit, large or small unit, forms a front against the enemy and continues the engagement. Units observing adjacent units are compelled to withdraw and do not follow suit.

The Sakarya battle resulted in Turkish victory against Greek forces. As a result of the Battle of Sakarya, the direction of military operations changed. Strategic defense was maintained until the end of the Battle of Sakarya. Still, after Sakarya, a strategic offensive was adopted, as the Greek Army lost its capability to conduct strategic offensives. Not only tactically, but in terms of synchronizing operational goals with strategic and political targets, the Turkish Army demonstrated the effective use of limited resources. They implemented law regulations during the war to increase logistic capabilities, planned and executed operations with a well-functioning chain of command, and applied flexible defense strategies. This case provides an excellent example of military effectiveness demonstrated at the operational level of warfare, showcasing the resourcefulness of the Turkish Army (Artuç 1985; TC Genelkurmay Başkanlığı 1973).

Other examples of military units demonstrating exceptional efficiency include the British Commandos, known for their proficiency in amphibious operations; the Soviet Red Army's 16th Tank Corps, which played a pivotal role in halting German advances and mounting successful counteroffensives during the Battle of Kursk; and the United States Marine Corps (USMC), renowned for their effectiveness in battles across the Pacific islands, including Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.

Military leaders are critical in securing victories and enhancing overall military effectiveness. While historical accounts often highlight strategic leadership, the influence of military leaders at the operational and tactical levels is equally significant, albeit less documented. For instance, in the Battle of Gaugamela (331 BC), Alexander the Great's strategic insight and tactical maneuver of concentrating forces at the Persian Army's center significantly contributed to his triumph over King Darius III (Kambouris and Bakas 2017).

In the historical engagement known as the Battle of Gaugamela (331 BC), Alexander the Great strategically outmaneuvered his adversary, Persian King Darius III, by

deviating from the anticipated southern route and instead opting for a northern passage across the Tigris River (Kambouris and Bakas 2017). This tactical adjustment caught the Persian forces off guard, resulting in a strategic surprise. Alexander's astute decision to position his phalanx battalions behind the guard brigade proved instrumental in defeating the central forces of Darius and effectively breaching the Persian lines. Consequently, the cohesion of the Persian troops was compromised, compelling Darius to vacate the battlefield due to the successful penetration by the Macedonian forces.

In a parallel demonstration of strategic insight, Hannibal Barca, representing the Carthaginian forces, orchestrated a pivotal maneuver in the Battle of Cannae (216 BC). By skillfully positioning his troops before the onset of battle, Hannibal effectively encircled and routed the larger Roman armies. This masterful deployment allowed Hannibal to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Roman formations, ultimately securing a decisive victory despite being outnumbered (Daly 2005).

Indeed, Hannibal's tactics in the Battle of Cannae exemplified remarkable strategic foresight and tactical ingenuity. By positioning his forces advantageously to encircle the enemy from all directions, Hannibal effectively nullified the numerical superiority of the Roman armies. Throughout the battle, he orchestrated precise maneuvers that allowed his troops to gain a positional advantage over the Romans, ultimately defeating them (Daly 2005).

Hannibal's envelopment strategy at Cannae served as a precursor to modern military tactics, notably influencing the Schlieffen Plan devised by the German General Staff during World War I. In this tactical approach, the primary objective was to engage the enemy's front lines and to encircle and neutralize the enemy forces from the flanks, leaving them no avenue for retreat. This strategic innovation emphasized the importance of maneuver warfare and demonstrated the effectiveness of exploiting vulnerabilities in enemy formations.

In the Battle of Austerlitz (1805), Napoleon Bonaparte showcased his military prowess by exploiting the enemy's weaknesses through strategic maneuvers. Despite facing superior numbers, Napoleon patiently waited for the opportune moment to strike, ultimately securing a decisive victory over the Russian and Austrian armies (Goetz 2017).

By carefully selecting the battlefield and leveraging his superior tactical positioning, Napoleon effectively neutralized the enemy's numerical advantage and defeated the Russian and Austrian armies. This victory at Austerlitz underscored Napoleon's mastery of military strategy and solidified his reputation as one of history's greatest

military commanders. It is possible to extend the examples by demonstrating the personal impact of many such as George G. Meade (Union) in the Battle of Gettysburg (1863) role in the American Civil War; Mustafa Kemal and Atatürk (Ottoman) in Gallipoli Campaign (1915-1916); Philippe Petain (French) in Battle of Verdun (1916) and Douglas Haig (British) in Battle of the Somme (1916).

Military leaders or commanders contribute to military effectiveness through various means. Firstly, their presence in battles bolsters the morale and motivation of the fighting soldiers. Secondly, efficient military leaders make sound decisions during critical phases, not only during fighting but also in the planning stages, allowing them to shape the operational environment. Thirdly, they succeed by employing proper and timely tactics during battles, exploiting enemy weaknesses. Fourthly, these leaders prepare troops for battle through training and ensuring engagement readiness. Fifth, military leaders facilitate communication and collaboration across different levels of military command, enhancing vertical cohesion. Sixth, they adapt their forces to rapidly changing battlefield conditions, making decisions that provide an advantage in uncertain situations. Operational-level commanders, in particular, wield significant influence due to their initiative and personal qualities. Tactical leaders, positioned on the frontline, are primarily tasked with executing tasks outlined in doctrine, field manuals, and orders from higher headquarters. Their autonomy and ability to exercise initiative are often limited in this context.

Conversely, strategic-level leaders are focused on long-term goals, strategic planning, and relations with political authorities, involving more bureaucratic processes. Their physical distance from the front line and the complexity of strategic issues, combined with political considerations, constrain their ability to apply personal qualities and initiative. While strategic leaders play a crucial role in determining overarching goals during wars, their impact on ongoing battles is limited.

During World War I, numerous operational-level military leaders demonstrated remarkable effectiveness, contributing significantly to strategic and tactical successes. One such leader was Erich Ludendorff, known for devising the defensive strategy known as the "Hindenburg Line." Ludendorff's adept planning and execution of battles were instrumental in offensive and defensive warfare scenarios, notably exemplified in the Battle of Tannenberg (Ware Jr. 2022).

Tannenberg, in 1914, was a famous illustration of the German performance during WWI. It was a tactical and operational execution of a well-designed strategic plan that concluded with a German victory (Showalter 2004). The German 8th Army, with its superior tactics, continuous and effective lines of logistics, and excellent reconnaissance, could exploit the weakness of the Russian 2nd Army (Ware Jr.

2022). They swiftly shifted their attack, even when almost enveloped by the Russian armies at the battle's outset. This is a clear example of how competent military leaders in all phases can change the destiny of military engagements. Lt.Col. Max Hoffman, the plan owner and the commander of the army units Ludendorf and the Hindenburg, was instrumental in achieving this outstanding victory.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's leadership during the Gallipoli Campaign in WWI is a shining example of inspiring leadership. Atatürk's strategic foresight and tactical innovation were complemented by his ability to inspire resilience and determination among his troops (Erickson 2013). His unwavering leadership fostered a cohesive fighting spirit essential for withstanding enemy offensives. His adaptability to evolving battlefield conditions enabled effective responses to changing threats and opportunities, ultimately contributing to the successful defense of the Gallipoli Peninsula (Kinross 2012).

Traditionally, war has been analyzed through the lens of grand theories and systemic or structural explanations. However, a new approach is gaining traction, shifting the focus to individual-level analysis and leader-centric explanations. Although still in its early stages, this approach significantly contributes to our understanding of war decisions. Even renowned scholars like Waltz (2018), known for their systemic explanations, acknowledge the role of human nature in his 'first image' theory. This validation from scholars of such stature further solidifies the credibility of this emerging approach.

The concept of military power fuses military resources and leaders' strategic decisions. Leadership is indispensable in determining the will to employ these resources and the efficiency and effectiveness with which they are deployed. While existing scholarship often concentrates on political-level leadership and the tenures of state leaders, a burgeoning body of literature is specifically delving into leadership attributes and their influence on war decisions and foreign affairs (Bennet and Stam 2004; Chiozza and Goemans 2004, 2011). This shift in perspective, necessitating individual-level analyses (Horowitz and Ellis 2015), underscores the significance of understanding the role of leaders in war decisions.

Combat effectiveness, on the other hand, which is the performance of military units at the operational (Talmadge 2015, 35) or tactical level (Wong, Bliese, and McGurk 2003), is distinct from military effectiveness. The latter, a product of political will and strategy, typically addresses the operational level or above (Millett, Murray, and Watman 1986, 37) [10]. From the perspective of war outcomes, military effectiveness

[10] see also (Brooks 2007, 9)

provides a more comprehensive understanding than combat effectiveness alone. This dissertation, therefore, focuses on military leaders who served as regiment commanders or held higher command positions during the Balkan War and World War I, highlighting the importance of the operational level in determining overall efficacy.

At its core, the concept of 'superior battle effectiveness' refers to the ability of military officers to achieve consistently successful outcomes in combat situations. This term is often used synonymously with promotions based on merit, which means that officers are advanced in rank based on their demonstrated competence, war success, or exemplary performance throughout their military careers rather than other factors (Bennet and Stam 2004; Talmadge 2015). This type of promotion system underscores a well-functioning organization and prioritizes professionalism.

On the other hand, the historical significance of loyalty-based promotions cannot be ignored. Excellent examples abound in many battles; an officer waiting to be promoted based on his achievements might be overlooked to promote the loyal one. In this dissertation, we delve into these intriguing patterns. Specifically, after the Balkan Wars, the promotion of loyal officers was higher than the average, which shows a similar trend. In the existing literature, this is explained as the choice of authoritarian leaders to prefer the loyalists to ensure their political duration, adding a layer of complexity to the evolution of military promotion systems.

2.4 Levels of War and Military Leadership

Wars often stem from the outcomes of single or multiple battles. Strategic gains are ultimately contingent upon the successful execution of operational-level victories. At an operational level, military engagements offer a refined perspective where the influence of politics is limited. Instead, factors such as force employment, leadership, and strategy play a more dominant role in shaping outcomes on the battlefield. Military considerations become the driving force in decision-making and execution, emphasizing tactical and strategic implications. Battlefield performance or combat effectiveness is closely connected and dependent on military leaders. Even though previously, many political scientists have favored the material capabilities in explaining victories on the battlefield (Biddle 2006; De Rouen Jr and Sobek 2004; Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979, 2010), the impact of the highly competent and well-equipped military leaders impact on the battle outcome, and subsequently to the destiny of the war can not be ignored.

During World War I, a war of attrition, both sides saw massive casualties and material losses. Trench warfare became the central conflict, with advances limited to inches. On the contrary, World War II was associated with more dynamic usage of the forces and maneuvers, showcasing the application of principles like maneuver, unity of command, and surprise. Implementing this conditional, timely, and contextual differentiation significantly influenced the strategies employed, especially at the operational warfare level. Moreover, Principles of warfare such as offensive action, mass, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity, albeit relevant in all levels of warfare, are best applied in operational warfare (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 1994, 1995).

Levels of war are the study of warfare rather than the war. It includes the conduct of the war, and concern is how the engagements were done (Tuck 2022, 2). At the strategic level, a nation or a group of nations, as actors, bear the weighty responsibility of deciding how to canalize and utilize national resources to achieve objectives, such as grand strategies. Regarding military units, the strategic level is related to setting military objectives and directing, developing, constraining, or planning these resources on national interests (Luttwak 1980; Tuck 2022).

Operational-level warfare serves as a crucial link between the tactical level, where material forces are used to ensure the desired end, and the strategic level, where the overall desired outcome is determined. It bridges this gap by translating strategic objectives into actionable plans on the battlefield (Luttwak 1980). In essence, operational-level warfare determines the 'how' or the way that material forces serve the end goals by employing types of warfare such as defense in depth, exploitation after success, Blitzkrieg, or deceptive movements. This level represents the true art of warfare, as it requires adept leadership and personal initiative to navigate the complexities of combat.

Unlike the strategic level, where decisions are often made at a higher, more abstract level, the operational level is characterized by hands-on leadership and direct involvement in executing military operations (Jablonsky 1987; Luttwak 1980). Military leaders at this level, ranging from captains to corps commanders, face unique challenges and responsibilities. They play a pivotal role in shaping the battlefield, coordinating units across regiments and armies, and managing the flow of resources and priorities. Their strategic acumen and leadership qualities are a testament to their effectiveness and the respect they command.

As Clausewitz emphasized, the human element in war is pivotal, particularly at the moral level (Von Clausewitz 1976). However, its influence extends beyond morale or courage. It permeates almost all levels of warfare, perhaps most notably in

operational warfare. Factors like competence, loyalty, will fight, cohesion, discipline, ethics, and resilience, which carry significant moral and psychological weight, shape the best way to use weapons and military resources and the incentives to use them.

Historical conflicts like World War I and the early 1900s bear witness to the active participation of operational-level leaders near the front lines. These leaders, deeply involved in battle execution, showcased their leadership qualities and strategic acumen on the front lines, leaving a lasting legacy of respect and admiration.

The operational level and the battlefield commanders at this level are crucial regarding leader attributes. This level of military engagement creates an environment where many individual characteristics are decisive in reaching the expected outcome or simply victory. The operational level usually includes considering the early 1900s, the regiment (below is tactical level), and above military units until the Army level (above is accepted as strategic level). In some battles, this classification starts with units at the division level. However, if the military units are dispersed into a large geographical area and operate individually with initiative, the regiments or brigades are usually accepted as operational-level units. The regiment and above commanders were accepted as operational-level military leaders in the Balkan Wars and Gallipoli. The operational level is essential because this is the level where individual attributes, creativity, strategy, and other individual factors have the maximum impact on operational planning and execution. Tactical-level leaders apply the field manuals given by the higher authorities with the least possible initiative. On the other hand, the strategic level military leaders are tied to political and other domestic issues, which makes it a blurred area for analyzing the effect of military leadership (Luttwak 1980). Being refined from political inputs, operational-level military leaders are best for investigating military leadership attributes.

Many famous military thinkers and strategists, such as Clausewitz, Jomini (Antoine-Henri), and Liddell Hart, all emphasized the importance of the operational level (Hart 2014, 2008; Jomini, Mendell, and Craighill 2007; Von Clausewitz 1976). These strategists have given significant weight to operational-level warfare. For instance, Blitzkrieg is an operational-level design that employs speed, maneuver, and deception, accompanied by the destructive impact of mechanized units. This tactic relies on the penetration of the fronts by the second line strong mechanized units after selecting the best area to penetrate just after the initial face of engagements where units on the frontline engage in the battle and create some spearheads that serve for the direction of the attack by the tank forces waiting at the depth (Luttwak 1980, 68). The ability to choose the best break-in points also provides initiative for the battlefield command to shape the following phases and move to the center of gravity.

More than the weight of ammunition or the resources, Blitzkrieg was conditioned on the command style and previous training of the mechanized and armored unit (Luttwak 1980, 71).

To illustrate, In the Balkans, the Ottoman's operational plan number 5 was designed to defend against the Balkan League (Erickson 2003). This plan involved creating a stronghold in Kumanova and establishing a defensive line from Shkodra to Edirne. The strategic significance of this defense was to prevent the unification of the Bulgarian and Serbian forces (in the North). The Greek Forces (in the South).[11]

On the Gallipoli front, the Ottomans employed a defensive tactic of territory with the aim of attrition. The Ottoman forces immediately halted the Ottoman troops in a short period; the operation evolved into trench warfare, where the well-positioned ground units, machine guns, and the suppression fires of the artillery limited the mutual attacks and advance. Trench warfare became a common tactic on this front and in almost all of Europe (Biddle 2006; Tuck 2022). However, it is essential to note that military technology, or the lack thereof, was a significant factor that forced sides to dig in, as the mechanized units and tank usage were in their infant development in World I. The success of the Ottoman Military in the Gallipoli peninsula is one of the best examples of the usage of operational warfare.

Another commonly used military concept, operational art, describes excellence in military planning. In simple terms, operational art applies creative and critical thinking to military operations and strategy. It differs from the operational level, which is the level of command that translates strategic objectives into actionable plans on the battlefield. Operational art is defined as: "Unified Land Operations" as the realization of strategic objectives by modifying tactical actions across time, space, and intention by interpreting policies and strategies established by national authorities and putting them into practice as tangible tasks for military forces to implement (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 1994, 1995).

Mainstream military strategists assume operational art to approximate the strategical considerations. For Clausewitz, strategy is an interplay with politics, and war at any level is the continuation of politics by other means (Von Clausewitz 1976). However, many issues, such as lines of operation, decisive points, the center of gravity, and logistics, are apolitical in type (Luttwak 1980). Even though some scholars link operational art to a strategic level, Clausewitz's intention finds its place in our contemporary understanding at an operational level. His definition

[11] However, the withdrawal and sudden defeats in the first phases of the war against Serbians and Montenegro led to a snowball effect, resolving the scattered and weakly coordinated Ottoman units at the tactical level. This unexpected turn of events underscores the profound impact of operational-level warfare on historical events, a fact that is sure to intrigue military history enthusiasts, scholars, and students.

of strategy as a two-way bridge between the tactical and strategic levels refers to the operational level where synchronization of actions and accomplished objectives are achieved (Von Clausewitz 1976). Thus, operational art also implies the operational in this fashion. Essential elements of the operational art, such as time, space, means, and purpose, should be analyzed at an operational level in greater conceptual complexity. These elements are at the core of planning at any level, but their optimal interaction can be found in operational-level military planning. To reiterate, operational-level military leaders are pivotal in formulating effective strategies and ensuring robust battlefield effectiveness in any conflict. Practitioners of operational art, namely battlefield commanders, necessitate a combination of skills and knowledge, qualities conventionally assessed under the overarching concept of competence. In this context, competence is cultivated through experiential learning, formal military training, and practical application.

2.5 Methodological Approaches in Military Leadership Studies

Various methodologies characterize the literature on leadership studies in international relations. This diversity can be categorized into four sub-groups, including those that employ quantitative data analysis. (Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004, 2011; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Horowitz and Ellis 2015). The existing literature on leadership studies in international relations encompasses a diverse array of methodologies, including quantitative analysis of qualitative data, textual analysis, and Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) (Hermann 1980, 2005), historiometric methods, (Ligon and Mumford 2008; Simonton 1990); encompasses a range of methodologies, including qualitative analysis of quantitative data (such as ethno-statistics or discourse analysis) and qualitative analysis of qualitative data (primarily approached by post-positivists through biographies, psychobiographies, psychohistories, and memories of decision-makers). This diversity is not just a reflection of the complexity of the subject matter but also a testament to the innovative and rigorous approaches that scholars in this field employ.

In terms of methodology, conducting qualitative research on leaders may assist us in gaining a better understanding of specific variables. For example, case studies can unveil exciting and unexpected results upon analyzing particular events and processes, particularly about the influence of leadership (Parry and Watts 2014).

Methods previously applied to assess the impact of leaders' traits are questionnaires,

surveys, Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), operational code analysis, and biographical evaluation of leaders. However, it is essential to consider that these methods may have limitations in generalizing the findings, as they usually focus on one or two leaders. Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is perhaps the most common form of study on leadership traits, applying an analytical technique to reach the various personality traits (Hermann 2005). Hermann, for instance, attempted to identify multiple traits, such as reasons for coming to the office, adaptation to constraints, and internal/external focus when making decisions (Hermann, 1980). However, they still focused on a single leader. Operational Coding Analysis (OCA) can also be accepted as a complementary technique for LTA, which examines two groups of beliefs in shaping leaders' choices: philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs (Post 2010; Walker and Young 2003). However, the focus is still on a single leader. This dissertation, differently, focuses on hundreds of military leaders and employs qualitative and quantitative methodology by utilizing a novel quantitative-driven approach to leadership studies.

Among quantitatively driven academics, Horowitz and Ellis (2015) have developed a comprehensive dataset, the Leader Experience and Attributes Descriptions Dataset (LEAD) Data, for evaluating leader traits (Horowitz and Stam 2014; Horowitz and Ellis 2015). This dataset, which includes gender, former military experience, education, and age, offers a unique quantitative perspective on leadership. Another dataset, the "Archigos dataset" of Goemans and Chiozza (2009), focuses on leader tenure and its effect on foreign policy choices. These diverse datasets underscore the importance of methodological diversity in leadership studies, as each approach provides unique insights into the study of leaders' traits.

The other prominent quantitative study on leaders' attributes (rebel leaders) is Acosta and Silverman (2023)'s "ROLE" dataset on rebel leaders' attributes. These scholars also argue that the attributes of the leaders are influential in their organizational actions. The Rebel Organization Leaders (ROLE) dataset comprehensively documents top rebel leaders involved in civil wars from 1980 to 2011, providing detailed biographical information for nearly 500 instances of rebel leadership. Initially focused on studying terrorism and civil war occurrences, the methodology employed in this dataset is also pertinent for analyzing attributes of other types of leaders, including military leaders.

Another large-N Study in this field is Historiometry, which applies nomothetic hypotheses to understand and evaluate human behavior, usually by using quantitative analyses (Simonton 1990, 3). This field of research groups leaders into three groups: charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders, with two orientations: personalized

and socialized. This method can help assess some of the hard-to-measure traits of military leaders, such as resilience and cohesion. This field of research proposes that personality analysis requires further elaboration of indirect methods to grasp the salient personality traits of political leaders (Winter and Walker 1991, 8). The main challenge is quantifying some leader behaviors. However, surveying with a historical figure is almost not possible. Some scholars prefer to use prosopography to examine the standard characteristic variables among a group of people without necessarily quantifying the leaders but following a more historical method. Prosopography is a method commonly used by historians to investigate the commonalities in individuals' characteristics, such as kinship, economic well-being, and occupation within a specific group of historical actors (Carney 1973, 156).

One limitation in studying military leaders is the challenge of accessing detailed and reliable information about them. Firstly, military leaders often leave few memoirs, reports, or books unless they are publicly known figures. Secondly, due to security considerations, information about military leaders is typically only accessible after retirement. Additionally, the last individual in the TURCO dataset used in this research passed away in 1987, further complicating efforts to obtain up-to-date data. Lastly, the further back in history, the more difficult it becomes to access reliable information and quantitative data. Despite these challenges, the remaining resources for understanding these leaders include texts, speeches, diaries, written memories, photos, and videos. However, information about commanders from more recent conflicts, such as the Second World War, may offer a more comprehensive view.

The challenge for this dissertation is that the actors are military leaders. They usually leave no speeches or memoirs behind them. Some of the possible ways to test the personal traits of military leaders are to evaluate their actions, consult subject matter experts, and examine some reachable traits such as age, former military experience, ranks, and allegiance. This dissertation aims to identify the most critical personal attributes for achieving superior military effectiveness in a generalizable manner.

The dissertation follows a hypothetico-deductive model (Clarke and Primo 2012). This model first employs deductive reasoning to identify potential factors influencing the dependent variable, namely the higher military effectiveness observed during the Gallipoli Campaign. It then applies inductive theory testing utilizing the evidence.

Recognizing gaps in the literature on military effectiveness and international theory, this dissertation rigorously identifies the problem of military generation and gathers relevant data from the early 1900s Ottoman Empire wars. The preliminary data collection suggested that the impact of military leaders was a critical area

for explaining the higher military effectiveness observed in Gallipoli. Psychological and military psychology considerations were pivotal at this stage, focusing on the rarely studied operational-level military leaders in international relations. This research foregrounds commanders as critical actors whose roles are often obscured by the strategic level's myriad external influences. Focusing on the operational level, where the noise is reduced, the impact of military leadership becomes more discernible, highlighting the importance of this research in understanding military effectiveness.

The dissertation identifies competence and loyalty as two primary independent variables, which are both falsifiable (Popper 1959) and measurable, to explain variations in military effectiveness. It posits that military success is linked to the superior attributes of commanders, particularly their competence and, within the Turkish context, a nuanced form of loyalty. By applying probabilistic rather than deterministic logic, the evidence and analyses provided support this hypothesis, utilizing a Bayesian approach (Godfrey-Smith 2003, 236) to manage uncertainty—a statistical method that employs probability to represent uncertainty in knowledge and decision-making.

2.6 Traits and Attributes as an Essential Asset in Generating Military Effectiveness

> **"Then we will fight in the shade."** [12]
> *...When told that the Persian arrows would be so numerous as to block out the sun, Spartan Dienekes famously responded with this phrase, showcasing Spartan wit and bravery.*

Leader attributes are not just important, they are crucial in achieving military efficiency and effectiveness. Characteristics like competence, adaptability, and the ability to inspire significantly influence various aspects of military effectiveness, including situational awareness, preparedness, determination to persevere in combat, and the overall effectiveness of military units. These attributes contribute to the leader's capacity to make correct decisions, adapt to unpredictable conditions, and motivate troops to perform at their best, enhancing military operations' overall efficiency and effectiveness.

The personal qualities, characteristic features, and attributes of operational-level military leaders carry a significant weight as they directly impact troops and battles. These leaders are not just responsible for planning military operations, they play a pivotal role in their execution. They steer battles by managing personnel, intelligence, operational and logistical issues. Serving as a vital conduit between tactical and strategic levels, operational leaders facilitate the flow of information in both directions. They are the linchpin in aligning tactical gains with strategic objectives. Decision-making at this level is commander-oriented, and the quality of decisions is intricately linked to military leaders' competence and prior battle experiences.

Attributes encompass individual characteristics, skills, and qualifications that commanders possess. These qualities can span a broad spectrum and include, but are not limited to, competence, war experience, communication skills, adaptability, motivational abilities, decision-making prowess, resilience, and risk management capabilities. Scholars argue that leader attributes play a significant role in effective leadership, enhancing organizational effectiveness (Bennis 2009; Yukl and Van Fleet 1992).

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[12] »[...] bravest of all was declared the Spartan Dienekes. [...] he was told [...] that the Persian archers were so numerous that their arrows would block out the sun. Dienekes, however, undaunted by this prospect, remarked with a laugh, ›Good. Then we will fight in the shade‹.« (Herodotus, Histories, 7.226.1-2; also quoted in Feickert (2014))

In military leadership studies, the terms' attributes' and 'traits' are often used interchangeably. However, it's crucial to recognize the nuanced difference between these two concepts. 'Attributes' typically denote specific qualities or skills that can be learned or improved, such as strategic thinking or communication abilities. These are the tactical expertise, decision-making skills, strategic vision, and other learned or developed qualities that enhance a leader's effectiveness in specific areas. Conversely, 'traits' generally refer to inherent characteristics or predispositions that individuals possess, such as adaptability, cold-bloodedness, trustworthiness, charisma, or decisiveness. These include integrity, courage, adaptability, resilience, and other personality characteristics contributing to a leader's overall disposition. Some qualities, such as resilience or adaptability to changing environments, can be classified as either traits or attributes, or both. Understanding this distinction is not just a matter of semantics, but a key to comprehending the complex nature of military leadership.

This dissertation takes a comprehensive approach, considering the interplay between inherent traits and developed attributes. This approach delves deep into the shared pattern that ultimately influences military effectiveness. By examining the intrinsic and learned aspects of military leadership, this research provides a deeper insight into the contributing factors of effective leadership in a military context.

Military leader attributes are specific characteristics possessed by commanders in an army context. These attributes vary across different levels of leadership (tactical, operational, strategic) and encompass a wide range of qualities. Some common military leader attributes include tactical expertise, war experience, strategic vision, decision-making skills, adaptability to changing battle environments, resilience, integrity, networking abilities, political acumen, and physical endurance or stamina.

Unlike other field studies, this dissertation hones in on the attributes of military leaders rather than their relationships with other officers or soldiers. However, it's important to note that exploring the impact of military leadership in these two fields of research is also a viable avenue. For instance, Dippel and Ferrara (2020) delve into the individual effects on the generation of military leadership during the American Civil War, positing that lower-rank officers are more influential, typically captain-level officers. In a similar vein, Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh (2020) arrive at comparable conclusions. Still, they evaluate the competence and loyalty-related attributes, proposing that competence leads to better military outcomes than loyalty-related attributes. This dissertation's sample of military leaders includes low-ranking offices, such as captains, first lieutenants, and top-ranking generals. However, the context is the late Ottoman Empire wars, a period characterized by

(specific historical events or characteristics). Therefore, the findings will contribute to our understanding of the generation process of military leadership in different contexts and provide practical insights into the impact of ranks and loyalty-related explanations. The dissertation follows Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr (2020) and Dippel and Ferrara (2020), employing a mixed-method research design that includes quantitative findings. Initial findings suggest that the generation process of military leadership in the late Ottoman Empire wars was influenced by a combination of competence and loyalty-related attributes, with lower-rank officers playing a significant role.

Competence, a pivotal attribute, wields substantial influence over military effectiveness, encompassing a multitude of qualities that are indispensable for effective leadership. Competent military leaders with extensive experience and education are renowned for making sound decisions. These decisions, in turn, empower military units and combatants to adapt more effectively to the ever-changing dynamics of the battlefield. Competent leaders excel in risk management, skillfully assessing risks and minimizing adverse outcomes. Moreover, their leadership styles foster greater unit cohesion and enhance collective capabilities, thereby underscoring the central role of competence in military effectiveness.

The psychological factors contributing to leaders' individual development extend beyond the competence-loyalty debate. While this dissertation does not delve deeply into specific psychological qualifications, it recognizes the importance of many factors that contribute to military effectiveness, serving as indicators of competence and loyalty. A current trend in personal development and academic success is the study of hardiness, resilience, and grit. These qualities, which can be exemplified by a leader's ability to remain calm under pressure, bounce back from setbacks, and maintain determination in the face of adversity, contribute to the competence level and battlefield achievements of military leaders, evoking a sense of admiration for their resilience and determination. This research, therefore, offers a unique perspective on the role of psychological factors in military leadership.

Angela Duckworth's research also emphasizes that in highly competitive environments, such as the admissions process at West Point, standardized measures of talent, like test scores and athletic achievements, lose their predictive power (Duckworth 2016). In a field where all candidates possess high levels of talent and meet rigorous standards, it is not talent but the amount of effort expended that sets apart future achievers. When talent is a constant, those who exert more significant effort are more likely to achieve superior outcomes. Duckworth's analysis underscores the pivotal role of effort, asserting that perseverance and sustained dedication are criti-

cal determinants of success in contexts where baseline talent is uniformly high. Both qualitative analysis in Chapter 3 and quantitative analysis in Chapter 5 consistently reveal similar outcomes for Turkish officers during the 1900s. When effort is defined as active participation in wars, competent officers—measured by their military academic achievements, roles as staff officers, and rank advancements— engage more frequently in battles and wars. This correlation underscores that officers demonstrating higher levels of participation in military operations tend to exhibit greater competence across various metrics of military proficiency and career progression.

Psychological hardiness is an inherent qualification, especially in resilient people who maintain stable stances under challenging conditions (Duckworth 2006, 200). In this study, authors claim that candidate scores at entry were consistent as an indicator of leader performance during the West Point (US Army military Academy) but not after graduation. In other words, competence-related scores are relevant only in stable and highly structural environments. In contrast, they do not reflect the in-field success of battlefield success as the climate is not constant and is highly unpredictable, underscoring the challenging nature of military operations. Interestingly, the psychological hardiness measure predicts the cadets' success in the military academy and their future military careers (Duckworth 2006, 200). In this manner, academic success can only be considered a starting point to evaluate the overall competence.

In recent years, the Big Five—or 'Five Factor Model'—has solidified its position as the preeminent framework for assessing personality traits, encompassing neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.[13] This model has been extensively validated and applied across various domains (Digman 1997; McCrae and John 1992). However, certain constructs, such as hardiness, elude precise categorization within this framework. Parallel to hardiness, researchers like Duckworth have introduced the concept of "grit," defined as sustained passion and perseverance towards long-term goals, which is instrumental in achieving career success (Duckworth 2016, 2006). This underscores the potential significance of psychological factors beyond the traditional Big Five in military leadership.

Complementing these findings, Bartone et al. (2009) conducted studies on West Point cadets, revealing that extraversion—a Big Five trait—notably influences future military performance. This divergence in perspectives highlights the complexity of accurately assessing competence and its determinants within military contexts. Addressing this complexity, the present dissertation operationalizes competence through tangible metrics such as military academic success, promotions, accumulated military experience, and the number of wars participated in.

[13]For a detailed exposition of these traits, see Watson and Clark (1992).

Further enriching this discourse, O'Reilly III and Chatman (1994) posit that high performers distinguish themselves by operating with greater intelligence and complexity than their peers. Contrarily, Duckworth (2006) argues that success is a function of innate talent and the extent of time invested, suggesting a dual-dependency model. Within military academies, where rigorous entry examinations and physical assessments ensure that candidates surpass standard benchmarks, variability in traditional competence metrics is minimized. Therefore, in cohorts where baseline competence is relatively uniform, differences in outcomes may be more accurately attributed to variations in grit (Duckworth 2006, p. 106).

This nuanced understanding prompts a reevaluation of the factors contributing to military leadership effectiveness, advocating for a more holistic approach that integrates established personality frameworks and emerging psychological constructs.

The same group of researchers describes one quality to capture the existence of grit: purposeful and continuous commitment to activities versus the unregular participation in different areas (Duckworth 2006, 213). In the new dataset compiled during this dissertation, each military leader's war involvement is coded with multiple voluntary/mandatory retirement years. As the military college records are not so detailed before the 1900s in the Ottoman Empire and there is the possibility of reaching the participants to the Balkan and World War I because the actors' lives ended, one of the possible ways to address the "continuous commitment to activities" as Duckworth (2006) suggests, is to track how often they have participated to wars. One counter-argument, which seems highly plausible, is that military personnel have no initiative to object to or admit war participation. However, according to data, there are many cases where military leaders terminated their military life and continued again after an interval. If this is the case, the ones who continued participating in the subsequent wars could possess more grit.

Competence is widely recognized as an essential element of leadership across various disciplines, including organizational theory, psychology, military history, and leadership studies. Previous literature has predominantly focused on two variables explaining how military leaders' attributes contribute to military effectiveness: competency and loyalty (Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr 2020; Huang, Silverman, and Acosta 2022; Reiter and Wagstaff 2018). The loyalty in these studies refers to allegiance to the army or political authorities (Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr 2020; Reiter and Wagstaff 2018).

The existing literature on military effectiveness and the attributes of military leaders primarily focuses on the dichotomy between competence and loyalty. The dynamic interplay between these factors offers valuable insights into commanders' overall

characteristics and orientations. However, defining loyalty is inherently complex, as the term can signify various forms, including primary loyalty, in-group loyalty, loyalty to an ideal, organizational loyalty, or allegiance to political elites. Despite this variability, the interaction between competence and loyalty provides a framework for understanding commanders' attitudes, which can vary significantly depending on context, time, and specific military units. In contrast, competence is generally perceived as more straightforward and readily measurable.

Competence encompasses military leaders' personal qualities, skills, knowledge, and capabilities, enabling them to perform effectively on the battlefield. Leaders with high levels of competence are better equipped to inspire, lead, and motivate their troops, thereby enhancing the achievement of operational objectives. In this dissertation, competence is evaluated using variables similar to those employed by Reiter and Wagstaff (2018) and Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr (2020), including graduation from a military academy, experience in wars and battles, years of service, advanced institutional military training as a staff officer, and the speed of promotions relative to peers.

On the other hand, loyalty refers to allegiance and faithfulness toward an organization, chain of command, or political authorities. Historical examples include SS officers under Hitler's command, who prioritized the Nazi party in their careers. Similarly, many commanders in the Ottoman Army between 1913 and 1918 identified themselves as members of the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress Party) during the early 20th century, illustrating how loyalty to political authorities can shape military careers.

Several scholars have contributed to understanding the concept of loyalty (Connor 2007, 2018; Prinz 2007), particularly military loyalty (Coleman 2009; Connor 2010; Kirke 2009). Unfortunately, only some scholars benefitted from empirical data, except Connor and Wadham (2021). This dissertation aims to contribute to this scholarly wisdom by introducing specific variables, such as length of service, adherence to orders, and commitment to the organization's organization's values, to gauge the impact of loyalty in the promotion (Collins 1993; Hendry and Jenkins 1997; Pullman and Gross 2004).

Individual loyalty orientation depends on prioritizing preferences for a specific value, group, idea, or person. On the other hand, for groups, the strength of loyalty develops in a self-finding cycle; as long as the ideal and material satisfaction is gained, the more committed a group member becomes (Connor and Wadham 2021). A group of low or mid-level loyalty can find it harder to devote themselves to the overall ideal or gains of the group (Connor and Wadham 2021). The first years

of CUP exemplify the strong group loyalty to which the earlier members devoted themselves entirely to the organization's ideals. In time, and especially after 1908, the number of members of the CUP supporters increased enormously; however, the determination and devotion compared to the early entering ones.

Regarding professional military training, loyalty is an essential part of soldier development. In a purely military sense, loyalty is an asset that any commander would undeniably demand from the troops, reinforcing the dedication and the establishment of the "esprit-de-Corps ", a term used to describe the morale and camaraderie within a military unit (Käihkö 2018; Kirke 2010; Siebold 2005, 2007, 2012). This is why military training centers and colleges stress the notion of loyalty, which eventually increases the will to fight (Brown and Moskos Jr. 1976; Janowitz 1959; Shils and Janowitz 1948). Cohesion scholars place this asset in the primary group cohesion (Salo, Sinkko et al. 2012). However, strong cohesion and extreme loyalty to the unit can also override moral values (Connor and Wadham 2021). This perhaps is a situation where Enver Pasha, during the battle of Sarıkamış in 1914 (part of World War I), ignored the thousands of casualties during the deployment phase in a harsh and icy route in Allahuekber Mountains in favor of the realization of his goal to face with the Russians. As a result, During the initial phases of World War I, Ottoman troops suffered a defeat on the battlefield without directly engaging in conflict with the Russians. Out of 90,000 troops, only 12,000 survived, most perishing due to the cold (Zürcher 2017, 117).

It is crucial to understand that this dissertation evaluates loyalty in a particular context, namely, loyalty to the current political party, the CUP. It does not delve into other dimensions of loyalty. This focus is chosen for two reasons: first, to provide a clear and specific understanding of the concept for comparative analysis in line with competence-loyalty development, and second, for practical measurement considerations.

On the other hand, loyalty emerges as a contrasting influential factor in the trajectory of promotions. Notably, instances abound where commanders were elevated not solely based on their competence but rather due to their proximity or affiliation with the ruling political authorities. Historical cases, such as the US Civil War (Wagstaff 2019) or the Defense of Plevna during the 1877-78 Ottoman—Russian War, exemplify scenarios where political considerations impacted logistical support and command decisions. In the latter case, Gazi Osman Pasha's neutral political stance led to insufficient support from the Ottoman War Ministry, resulting in the defeat at Plevna.

While inherently subjective and context-dependent, political affiliation or closeness

constitutes a robust explanatory framework for discerning promotion patterns and command position appointments. This research is not just about history; it has contemporary relevance. Contemporary research has notably focused on elucidating the interplay between competence and political affiliation as determinants of military effectiveness among leaders.

Loyalty, as a multifaceted concept, profoundly influences organizational performance across various contexts. Defined in multiple ways, it is often considered context-dependent (Roy 2009) and is seen as a vocational calling for officers (Weber 2004). Furthermore, loyalty plays a crucial role in fostering in-group cohesion (McLauchlin 2010) and represents an individual's attachment to a specific group, person, or ideal (Britannica et al. 2008). In organizational settings, loyalty can also be understood as part of a psychological contract (Hart and Thompson 2007), significantly impacting overall performance (Jigjiddorj et al. 2019). Additionally, loyalty serves as a stabilizing attitude that discourages departures from an organization (Hirschman 1970, 77). Such departures, often motivated by economic factors, can lead to both positive outcomes, such as extended employee tenure (Brown et al. 2011; Redman and Snape 2005), and adverse effects, including diminished job satisfaction, particularly in the short term (Engelkes, Hedlund, and Larsson 2023; Kumar, Batista, and Maull 2011).

Moreover, it is essential to note that loyalty is not necessarily a negative factor in terms of military effectiveness. In organizational theory, on the contrary, loyalty positively impacts workers, enabling them to serve better even though they are not satisfied with adequate income. Military units, with a strict and robust organizational hierarchy, can be considered a gigantic organization, and some may claim a similar mechanism as loyalty to serve the organizational outcomes. However, regarding the organization's characteristics, the military differs significantly from civilian structures. There is no clear path for these claims, as under some conditions, loyalty harms and prevents competence and opens the ground for political decisions inconsistent with military understanding. Some military leaders preferred to obey or prioritize the political party's priorities instead of the orders coming from the chain of command. If it exists, polarization under military rule broke the cohesion and created a reverse impact that decreased military effectiveness. Struggles between officer cadres regarding different loyalties prevent the healthy functioning of the execution of operational and logistic plans. As a result, loyalty can enhance or destroy unit cohesion, fortify or dissolve the sense of camaraderie, and support or weaken discipline in the chain of command. Loyalty to the superiors under this chain of command is crucial to boosting military effectiveness, but loyalty to political authorities might have the opposite effect.

Promotion in the Ottoman Army, as well as in many other armies worldwide, is typically based on two criteria: age and performance in military service. In systems like the German and Ottoman military, officers are granted ranks based on the number of years of military service, regardless of exceptional performance. For example, in today's Turkish Army, the period for promotion to the rank of first lieutenant is three years, and for second lieutenant, it is six years. This represents the first mechanism.

The second mechanism is related to performance. Officers who demonstrate tremendous success are promoted to the next rank earlier than their peers. This difference in promotion timing can be statistically analyzed by examining the officers around the fitted line in their promotion-related regression model. Those above the average or fitted line are promoted more quickly or earlier than other officers, indicating their higher level of success.

Cohesion research is another area of study that sheds light on individuals' influence on military effectiveness. This field examines the relationship between military leaders and their units, known as horizontal cohesion (Griffith and Vaitkus 1999), as well as the hierarchical dynamics within the chain of command, referred to as vertical cohesion (Dion 2000; Siebold 2007, 2020). Scholars in this domain argue that cohesion is not merely a contributing factor but a crucial element that substantially enhances performance across different levels—micro (squads and small units), meso (Army and individual regiments), and macro (institutions) (Griffith and Vaitkus 1999; Käihkö and Haldén 2020; Rosh, Offermann, and Van Diest 2012; Shils and Janowitz 1948; Siebold 1999, 2007, 2012). The "standard model," developed by the U.S. Army Research Institute, mainly through the work of Siebold (2007), offers a comprehensive framework for understanding cohesion in four dimensions: horizontal and vertical (primary group cohesion) and organizational and institutional (secondary group cohesion). Primary group cohesion is closely linked to individual performance. In contrast, secondary group cohesion encompasses institutional factors that shape soldiers' behavior, offering a more holistic perspective on the role of cohesion in military effectiveness.

As an alternative classification for individual qualifications, some scholars use the classification of those attitudes around skill and will main groups. Skill and will are essential components in creating combat effectiveness and military effectiveness (Connor and Wadham 2021). In Existing literature, some scholars only consider skill (Talmadge 2015, 4) to be practical as a gauge for better tactics applied; some scholars accept only will be influential (Atran, Sheikh, and Gómez 2014), and some other scholars rely on both (Reese 2011). Skill explains the troops' ability to apply war

plans, operate efficiently under the command of chain, and the quality in military leadership (King 2013, 36) (Talmadge 2015, 34). Quality leaders operate better in the fog of war (Reiter and Stam 2003; Von Clausewitz 1976). The Notion of skill is closely relayed to competence. Highly skilled military leaders are those who encompass an excellent degree of competence. In this topic, the other side of the coin, the will argument, is slightly different but not wholly independent from the loyalty issue. Military leaders' self-motivation and determination can be parallel to the loyalty consideration they possess.

It is also possible to study the generation of military effectiveness by mainly focusing on moral values and eagerness (Bartone, Kelly, and Matthews 2013). In this "will to fight "literature, scholars aimed to explain how some social and ethical values affected the military outcome. Unlike this thesis, these studies do not focus on military leaders but on the concept-wise evaluation of some values, such as ethical considerations, morale, and esprit de corps. Military power is generally formulated as the military capabilities accompanied by the willingness to use them or the incentives. This group of scholars focuses on incentives by breaking down the concept of ambiguous will into its sub-parts. The RAND institution may propose this concept's newest and most efficient classification. RAND's report "Will to Fight" examines the idea by its sub-components at different levels, such as individual soldiers, military organizations, national leaders, and the entire national level (Connable et al. 2018). According to this report, military leaders are most influential in organizations and at the unit level. As the will to fight is closely related to the fighting unit's stance, this study depends on the unit's value settlement as a group. They also claim that some values, such as cohesion or resilience, do not explain the overall process of the generation of will to fight. Interestingly, another report (Connable 2022; McNerney et al. 2019) proposes that resilience and esprit-de Corps positively influence military effectiveness. At the same time, cohesion negatively impacts military effectiveness, as in the case of the Iraqi Army after the Gulf Wars. This is interesting as the study also weights the regime type in their evaluation. In this sense, this dissertation has some similarities as the environment and political regime are non-democratic. This study's formalization of military effectiveness is as follows: military effectiveness results from capability multiplied by will. However, some factors, such as leadership, are influential in generating the will and increasing the optimum usage and effectiveness of military capabilities.

This dissertation posits that military leaders represent a crucial layer that significantly influences the effectiveness of nearly all military power sub-components. By placing military leaders at the forefront of analysis while acknowledging the importance of other factors, this research seeks to elucidate the overarching impact of

military leaders on the generation of military effectiveness. For example, Esat Pasha, commander of the 5th Corps during the Gallipoli Campaign (1915-16), exemplified the profound influence of leadership. He could organize troops, boost morale, and devise and implement a robust defense strategy. At the same time, managing limited resources underscores the pivotal role that effective military leadership plays in achieving operational success. This dissertation offers an in-depth and comprehensive exploration of the influence of military leaders, contributing valuable insights to the field of military effectiveness.

2.7 Hypotheses

1. Operational-level military leaders with high competence are more likely to achieve superior military effectiveness.

2. Loyalty positively impacts military effectiveness, especially when operational-level military leaders possess a high degree of inherent competence.

3. The pre-war competence of military leaders is a strong indicator of military effectiveness, with higher competence levels increasing the likelihood of superior military effectiveness.

4. Significant changes in military leadership enhance military effectiveness only when newly appointed commanders exhibit high levels of competence.

While closely intertwined, military effectiveness and battle performance are distinct concepts. Military effectiveness encompasses an army's ability to achieve its strategic objectives and fulfill its missions over an extended period, often across multiple engagements. Battle performance, however, pertains specifically to the outcomes of individual battles or engagements.

Understanding this distinction is vital. Battle performance is not merely a subset but a critical determinant of overall military effectiveness. The results of battles—be they victories, territorial acquisitions, or the successful achievement of operational goals—play a decisive role in shaping the broader effectiveness of a military force. Each soldier's performance in these engagements directly influences the force's overall success or failure.

Conversely, poor battle performance can significantly undermine military effectiveness. Defeats, high casualties, and failure to meet objectives can demoralize troops,

erode confidence in leadership, and diminish the force's operational capacity. This underscores the importance of each individual's contribution to maintaining and enhancing battle performance, as the stakes are high, and the consequences of failure are far-reaching.

2.8 Theoretical Contributions

This dissertation aims to contribute to the long-time ignored factor of how human elements, which include the psychological, social, and cultural aspects of military operations, and leadership contribute to military effectiveness. The role of the commanders is crucial. Every successful war planning, execution, and management of military operations is correlated with the commander's quality. The gap between leadership and leadership level exists in this literature.

Similarly, this dissertation focuses on the operational level of military leaders to fill this lacuna. Wars are too general and a significant concept, which decreases the precision of the assumption of military leaders' impact. That's why reducing the level to operational is a reasonable solution and focuses on battle-level performance. However, the analyses of this dissertation also had some limitations due to the inaccuracy of the data and the lack of complementary resources.

Considering the 1900s, the info that can be used to measure military effectiveness better as casualty rates, loss exchange ratios, commanders and organizational structure of the units per each subsequent battle, the daily or monthly data for advance, gain of the territory, and casualty numbers is minimal. Previous literature in the Turkish context for examining the Ottoman commanders quantitatively has yet to exist. There is also no existing dataset that creates a starting point for developing analysis in this field. The TURCO dataset, created for this absence, provides a solution. However, the dataset can be produced for further studies by introducing alternative variables to grasp commanders' loyalty and competence-related attributes better.

The subject of military leadership is inherently interdisciplinary, intersecting with various scientific fields such as sociology, military studies, and human factors. This thesis aims to integrate these disciplines, with a primary focus on leadership within international relations and military history. It is believed that analyses rooted in historical realities can offer valuable insights into contemporary military leadership

and personnel management. As long as the human element remains integral to modern warfare, leadership, competence, and loyalty will continue to shape the development of more effective fighting forces. Even as the nature of warfare evolves, as long as soldiers continue to fight and commanders lead, research in this area will retain its relevance and validity.

2.9 Conclusion

Literature for military effectiveness has been suffering from the absence of individual-level analysis. Except for a few studies, almost no specific research points to how military leaders shape military effectiveness. This dissertation follows the existing scholarly wisdom by bringing military leadership and personal characteristics of the commanders to the front. Attributes of the commanders matter. Without effective commanders, generating a higher military effectiveness becomes almost impossible. According to the findings, both in qualitative and quantitative chapters, we see that the attributes of the commanders were one of the key factors that predicted the success of a working military organization.

For the Balkan Wars, a series of conflicts in the Balkan Peninsula from 1912 to 1913, and the Gallipoli Campaign, a World War I battle in the Dardanelles, and the Ottoman context, competence-related variables are higher in terms of means during a victory (Gallipoli Campaign) and lower in the defeat of the Balkan War.

Loyalty emerges as a significant factor in achieving victory within the Turkish context, challenging existing assumptions that it might negatively correlate with success. The findings of this dissertation reveal that loyalty often operates in tandem with competence rather than in opposition to it. When loyalty is defined as political affiliation, its positive impact on success is contingent upon the quality of the officers in question. If the group of loyalists to the political party is inherently competent and forms a substantial proportion of the leadership, loyalty positively correlates with military success.

This dissertation lays the groundwork for future research by introducing a pioneering dataset that enables a deeper exploration of military leaders' impact and the importance of their attributes, particularly within Turkish military history. Future studies could expand on these findings by focusing on World War I in a broader context or examining the military leaders who played pivotal roles in the Turkish War of

Independence. The traditions and ideologies rooted in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) party continued to influence the leadership during the Turkish War of Independence, with many division-level commanders and higher-ranking officers being veterans of Gallipoli and World War I.

Moreover, scholars from other disciplines can leverage the insights provided by this dissertation to explore the cohesion and resilience of Turkish commanders. On a broader scale, this work contributes to actor-based explanations in international relations by highlighting the critical role of leaders in generating military power, the significance of specific attributes in leadership assignments, and the indispensable role of the human factor in war-related research. These findings also inspire further scholarly investment in individual-level analyses and the use of microdata within specific contexts to understand better the dynamics that drive superior battlefield performance.

3. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY: FIRST BALKAN WAR AND GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Military leaders have always played a crucial role in determining military effectiveness. This chapter delves into the individual-level factors that enhance military effectiveness. Until the 2010s, international relations primarily focused on systemic factors, such as power, military capabilities, and global influence, to explain essential topics. In contrast, this dissertation and chapter adopt an individual-level analysis, focusing on military leaders and commanders as the key actors. This dissertation examines everyday international events like wars and looks one level deeper into individual battles. This approach is distinct from most studies, which typically do not consider military leaders as the primary unit of analysis despite their fundamental significance in military impact.

The Balkan Wars, a pivotal conflict that unfolded between the Ottoman Empire and the countries in the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia) from 1912 to 1913, marked a crucial chapter in the history of the Ottoman Empire. The aftermath of these wars, a shattering defeat for the Ottoman Empire, led to a profound loss of strategic geography and a significant population, which the Ottoman Empire had governed for 600 years. The mobilization of over 324,000 soldiers, including 12,000 officers, was unable to reclaim the territory, primarily due to specific strategic discrepancies such as the lack of effective military leadership, officers being influenced by their political party affiliation, and flawed tactical and logistical planning (Erickson 2003; Genelkurmay Başkanlığı 2004, 2009; Görgülü 1990; Toker, Aslan et al. 2009*a*,*b*).

Figure 3.1 Dramatic Failure (Balkan Wars-on the left) vs. New Commitment and Hope (Gallipoli front-on the right)

Source: NTV History, Magazine, Vol.45.(2002)

Source:https://www.facebook.com/kentvedemiryolu/photos/a.725872734107380/2331850040176300/?type=3

Source: Çanakkale Savaşları Gelibolu Tarihi Alan Başkanlığı https://ataturk.org.au/gelibolu/canakkale-ve-gelibolu-yarimadasinin-ataturkun-askeri-kariyerindeki-yeri/

The Gallipoli Campaign, a series of battles that erupted just two years after the Balkan Wars, was part of the multi-front wars fought in WWI. Despite the Ottoman Empire's lack of modern military equipment compared to its ally Germany (the Central Powers) and the Allied Powers' members, it demonstrated high military effectiveness. This effectiveness is one of the critical elements in achieving victory without necessarily having material superiority over opponents. Interestingly, our contemporary understanding of military effectiveness shows that Ottoman armies should have been defeated earlier than 1915 (Erickson 2000; Türkmen 2014). This raises the question: if the Ottomans could resist and achieve such remarkable feats in the Gallipoli War, why did they fail to protect their 600-year-long heritage and the land in the Balkan region just two years prior?

In this dissertation, the proposal is that influential military leaders, through their strategic decisions and ability to inspire their soldiers, play a pivotal role in motivating their troops to fight. They achieve this by drawing on their battle experience, maintaining a professional demeanor, and fostering physical and emotional bonds. A military leader must possess sufficient competence and determination to evaluate this effectively. If military leaders are crucial and their competence is closely tied to overall battle performance, what attributes of their actions are more influential in generating this military effectiveness?

The comparative case study of the Balkan Wars and World War I, focusing on the

Gallipoli Campaign, presents a unique opportunity to observe the effect of military leaders in two dimensions. First, the failure of Ottomans can be explained by the low-quality and politically affiliated commanders, and second, empirical analyses might reach some testable results in comparing which attributes mattered more in achieving military success. This case is intriguing and unique regarding the generation of military effectiveness. It includes a rare opportunity (not common in social events and military history) to compare the performance of the same group of commanders before and after the battles in a concise sequence.

In comparing the ex-ante and ex-post conditions surrounding the Gallipoli Campaign, one of the most significant changes observed is the composition of the military cadre, which displayed varying levels of competence and loyalty. An ex-post analysis reveals that these attributes were crucial among Ottoman military leaders during the Balkan Wars and the Gallipoli Campaign. Notably, the competence level of the officers was higher at Gallipoli than during the Balkan Wars, a critical factor that contributed to the Ottoman victory. The superior and more efficient military cadre at Gallipoli played a decisive role in the campaign's success, starkly contrasting with the less effective cadre during the Balkan Wars.

Moreover, the Ottoman General Staff, along with senior commanders and staff officers, were integral to this success. Their robust and effective war planning and execution were not isolated from this new military cadre but were part and parcel of it. This context allows for a powerful comparative analysis between the Balkan Wars and World War I (including the Gallipoli Campaign), revealing statistically significant and contextually relevant findings.

From an international relations and leadership perspective, the examination of these cases holds the promise of new and profound insights into the role of military leaders in the highly significant phenomenon of War. It also offers the opportunity to comment on the impact of competence and loyalty on these operational-level military leaders. After a meticulous analysis of these cases, the projection of findings could potentially stimulate institutional (ministry of defense, general staff, and military schools) and individual (leadership, military effectiveness, and competent leaders) levels of development in a state bureaucratic and military structure.

3.1 Theoretical Framework of Ottoman Military Leader Attributes on War Outcomes

Literature on this topic suggests that competence and loyalty are critical to the outcome (Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr 2020; Reiter and Wagstaff 2018). As a rule, higher levels of competence are expected to be found after an achievement. A low level of competence and a high level of loyalty or political affiliation (loyalty refers to political affiliation in this dissertation) are indicators of a corrupted or not professionally operating, biased military organization.

We can compare this difference with available data for both wars. First, this dissertation employed large-scale data on the military leaders above the regimental level to test their competence. Additionally, by developing two proxy variables for 'Malta exile' and 'membership in military courts,' loyalty level is tested. The 'Malta exile' variable was developed based on the likelihood of being a pro-CUP follower, as those exiled to Malta were often perceived as such. The 'membership in military courts' variable was used to identify non-staff officers who had a duty after war military courts between 1913 and 1918, as this could indicate a higher level of loyalty. These two wars have a unique advantage for comparison as they provide the opportunity to distinguish between two groups of commanders by removing 1100 ones (due to the purge of 1914 just between the wars) from the command. In history and military history, a radical change in command positions in such great numbers is a scarce occasion. Loyalty in this research for Ottoman commanders is defined as the closeness to the ruling CUP Party ('İttifak ve Terakki Partisi,' a party rule between 1913 and 1918 in Ottoman Politics). Almost all of the bureaucratic structure was shaped by the hegemony of the CUP party at that time. For example, the Ministry of War was given to Enver Pasha, a devoted and long-term leader of CUP, who was promoted superfast from colonel to the Ministry of War in just one month.

Battle outcomes and military effectiveness are closely linked to commanders ' competence levels. For instance, those with pre-battle experience are considered more successful in the battle. Similarly, quality military leaders with successful training and educational backgrounds are believed to administer the troops better. To grasp the impact of competence, the second hypothesis will test the effect of some competence-related variables on battle performance. Some scholars also claim that competence should depend on neutrality and professionalism without necessarily relying on individual or group affiliation (Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr 2020). Competent military leaders better observe the uncertainties in the war and

decide accordingly. This professional attitude makes the victory more accessible. Better equipped commanders with doctrinal and tactical knowledge can increase soldiers' morale and better apply the battle plans" (Reiter and Stam 2002, 69-70).

This study's second and third hypotheses venture into the complex realm of testing commanders ' loyalty levels, which poses significant challenges due to data availability. Commanders who prioritize loyalty over competence are expected to devise less effective and often unrealistic battle plans, as they tend to prioritize authority's decisions over the requirements of the situation. They usually align themselves with the political side in conflicts between political authority and reality. This pattern was particularly evident in the Balkan Wars, where many commanders approached tactical issues based on their affiliation with multiple political parties. Therefore, it is anticipated that more loyal commanders may perform less effectively in battles.

To test the hypotheses, this dissertation has undertaken a rigorous research process. and crafted an original dataset encompassing 900 individual commanders above the regimental level, rich with numerous explanatory variables. The challenge lies in latent variables, requiring careful observation of observable outcomes. The measure for competence, following Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr (2020)' study, incorporates variables such as the number of years in the military, previous combat experience, military academy and war college graduation, birthplace, military branch, and military educational success.

The loyalty measurement is inherently complex, but several proxy measures were employed to capture this association by generating direct and indirect indicators. These measures include coding the reasons for terminating a military career (where purged commanders serve as a potential indicator of non-loyalty), identifying those exiled to Malta (suggesting a higher likelihood of being pro-CUP), and tracking duty assignments in military courts between 1913 and 1918 (specifically for non-staff officers). Additionally, the dataset incorporated control variables such as the father's occupation and participation in the Turkish War of Independence to enhance the accuracy and reliability of the loyalty measurements. To assess the hypotheses, this dissertation employed the newly constructed data on military leadership alongside Reiter and Wagstaff (2018) and Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr (2020) theoretic assumptions on war participation and promotion patterns.

The data for this research were carefully gathered from official sources and subsequently coded to explore how military leader attributes influence battle outcomes. The focus was on commanders at the regimental level and above, specifically those in operational roles, regardless of their rank, to maintain consistency at the operational level. This study exclusively examines hypotheses from the Turkish perspective, op-

erationalizing the unit of analysis as individuals based on their participation in a series of events (number of wars). The dataset comprises 900 military leaders and includes various variables that define their competence and loyalty, such as graduation year, party affiliation, reason for termination of military service, graduation degree, pre-war military experience, and birth location, among others.

In developing meaningful and empirically testable leader attributes, this research drew upon established datasets such as the ROLE (2022) dataset on rebel leaders by Acosta and Silverman (2023), the Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) dataset by Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam (2015), and the CBD-90 Dataset for battlefield commanders by Helmbold (1990). The primary sources for empirical data on battlefield commanders were the records from the Turkish General Staff's Military Archives and Strategy Institute (ATASE), Toker's "Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na Katılan Alay ve Daha Üst Kademedeki Komutanların Biyografileri" Volumes 1, 2, and 3 (2009), the Turkish General Staff's Publication (2004) "Balkan Savaşi'na Katilan Komutanlarin Yaşam Öyküleri," and İsmet Görgülü's (1990) book "On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922: Balkan-Birinci Dünya ve İstiklâl Harbi" (Erickson 2003; Genelkurmay Başkanlığı 2004, 2009; Görgülü 1990).

3.2 Case Selection and Methodology

Case studies are research methodologies that rely on evidence drawn from at least one case to explore and understand the characteristics of a broader set of cases. They involve analyzing qualitative or quantitative observations to gain deeper insights into specific phenomena. This dissertation employs a "within-case" or "case study" approach in this chapter, utilizing a single population, one sample, two cases, 900 observations (commanders), and eight variables for analysis. This approach is grounded in a case study dataset with two cases, following the framework suggested by (Gerring 2006, 23). By concentrating on these detailed observations, the study aims to uncover the dynamics and implications that might be generalizable to a broader context.

This research employs a distinct and rigorous comparative case study methodology to explore the influence of military leaders, aiming to determine whether a necessary but non-significant relationship exists. The strategic selection of the Gallipoli and Balkan Wars, methodologically underpinned by the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) approach introduced by Przeworski (1970), provides a robust framework for

discerning and analyzing nuanced dynamics. This methodological choice enhances the depth and thoroughness of the research, thereby reinforcing the reliability of the findings and instilling confidence in the conclusions drawn.

The Balkan Wars occurred between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia) from 1912 to 1913, dramatically resulting in the Ottoman Empire losing control of a critical region and population they had ruled for over 600 years. Despite mobilizing over 324,000 soldiers, including 12,000 officers, the Ottoman Empire failed to regain control of the area due to strategic discrepancies, a lack of military leadership, officers being polarized towards their political affiliations, and incorrect tactical and logistical planning (Erickson 2003; Genelkurmay Başkanlığı 2004, 2009; Görgülü 1990).

Turning to the Gallipoli War, fought just two years after the Balkan Wars, we encounter a different scenario. This war, a part of the multiple-front wars fought during World War I, was a testament to the Ottoman Empire's high military efficiency, crucial to their success. Interestingly, our contemporary understanding of military efficiency (Erickson 2003; Türkmen 2014) suggests that Ottoman armies should have lost earlier than 1915. However, they demonstrated resistance and achieved magnificent accomplishments in the Gallipoli War. This raises a significant and intriguing question: if they were capable of such feats, why did they fail to protect their 600-year-long heritage and the land in the Balkan region just two years earlier? This question forms the crux of our research, highlighting its relevance and significance.

While these military histories and information sources have been central to studies on Ottoman Empire wars, some academics approach them skeptically. However, any potential bias, if present, has minimal impact on the overall findings. Given that the hypotheses in this dissertation focus solely on comparing military effectiveness within Turkish forces across different wars rather than between rival fighting states, the influence of bias is limited. Moreover, Turkish General Staff records and reports are highly reliable, as instances of escape, expulsion, or disciplinary actions are recorded neutrally. This underscores the practical implications of our research, making it a valuable and trustworthy contribution to the Ottoman Empire wars and military leadership field.

For the case selection, this radical change in personal manning is rare in world military history. The Balkan Wars and Gallipoli Wars, with their similarities in geography, time (1911-1912 and 1914-1916), military technology, command structure, and state resources, provide a unique opportunity for comparison. This comparative analysis will illustrate how commanders' attributes contributed to defeat or victory,

a crucial aspect of military history.

This case is interesting because of the critical reorganization of the army between the two wars. Around 1100 (for some resources is close to 1600), officers were removed from the military by Enver Pasha (Ministry of War in Ottoman Empire) in 1914 by applying the law promulgated in 1909 ("Tasfiye-i Rüteb-i Askeriye Kanunu"). The primary purpose for this removal of officers was their inefficient performance during the Balkan War in 1911-1912 Toker, Aslan et al. (2009*a*,*b*). Some scholars also comment that this decision was to be taken by seeking the fulfillment of some posts by the ruling Committee of Union and Progress Party members in the Ottoman Empire (İttihat ve Terakki Partisi). Whatever the reason, this case creates a window of opportunity to compare the overall commanders' traits before and after two important and large-scale wars.

The dataset comprises approximately 400 regional and above commanders from the Balkan Wars and 689 commanders from the Gallipoli Campaign. Additionally, various other variables have been coded, such as rank, prior military training, reasons for terminating military service (e.g., death, retirement, exile), birth location, involvement in military courts, allegiance, status as a staff officer, and post-war assignments. This dataset is derived from the official records of the Turkish General Staff. Although there may be concerns about potential bias in such a source, it is noteworthy that the records include officers who were expelled, prosecuted, removed, or even sentenced to death for their actions. The only significant omission pertains to a small minority of officers for whom relevant data is unavailable, underscoring the thoroughness and reliability of this research. According to the data, 689 commanders served in the Gallipoli Campaign, with 458 having pre-war battle experience—a significant indicator of competence.

Gallipoli Campaign, in multiple dimensions, in terms of the size of the Army and closeness to İstanbul, with strategic and psychological importance, is comparable to the Balkan War. Even though the battles in Gallipoli were classified as a Campaign under a large umbrella of World War 1, according to the criteria mentioned before, it is equivalent to the Balkan War. If that was not a part of the series of wars in World War 1, and there was only one independent occurrence at that time, the name of the operation would be the Gallipoli War. Of the 17 divisions out of 40, the Ottoman military was tasked with Gallipoli Uyar and Erickson (2009). In terms of the number of officers, the ratio is almost half that of the total Ottoman officers. In addition to the organic organization of the 5th Army, consisting of three corps, many other military units, ranging from troops to divisions, were also deployed to the peninsula. Because of this heavy priority and dense deployments of the units,

this dissertation considers military leaders under the organic structure of the 5th Army and all of the military leaders, regardless of their units, if they participated in the Gallipoli Campaign. Because of the highly excessive and sometimes complex troop deployments and multiple taskings, as a standard assumption, this dissertation considers the initial deployments. If an officer was assigned the control of a unit in the Gallipoli front, he was coded as in the Gallipoli campaign, even though he was deployed to some other fronts during or after the fighting in Gallipoli ended.

Similarities between the Balkan Wars and the Gallipoli Campaign include their contemporaneous occurrence (Balkan Wars, 1912-1913; Gallipoli Campaign, 1915-1916) and their relatively short durations, each lasting less than nine months. The Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) is a crucial tool in our research, employed when selecting research objects to eliminate as many extraneous variables as possible (Bartolini 1993; Sartori 1991). MSSD, which has its roots in John Stuart Mill's (1851 [1843]: Book II, Chapter 8) methods of difference and agreement, is considered a foundational approach in comparative methodology (Przeworski 1970). Przeworski and Teune's work occupies a middle ground between case-oriented and variable-oriented studies, advocating for minimizing dependent and explanatory variables under controlled conditions. However, "controlled" conditions are rare in social sciences (Goertz 2005). Fortunately, the Ottoman military confrontations during the early 1900s, particularly the Balkan Wars and the Gallipoli Campaign, perfectly align with our research question.

The central research question of this dissertation, "Do the attributes of commanders affect military effectiveness?" is of paramount importance. This question not only guides our research but also opens up a fascinating area of exploration. Our aim is not to explain all variations in the dependent variable but to establish the causal relationship between the military attributes of commanders and the generation of superior military effectiveness. Military effectiveness is multifaceted, influenced by leadership, military capabilities, organizational characteristics, technology, etc. A comparative analysis of the Balkan Wars and the Gallipoli Campaign reveals that, despite similar conditions in generating military effectiveness, the Ottoman failure in the Balkan Wars and success in the Gallipoli Campaign can be attributed to the differing impacts of military leaders and superior management, highlighting the significance of leadership quality.

In terms of technology and tactics, both of these wars share the same characteristic features. Both wars can be situated in the 'Second Generation Warfare' in Lind's classification (Lindt 1989). This classification is essential because it helps us understand the tactics and strategies used in these wars. Second-generation warfare

Table 3.1 Similarities Between the Cases

	Wars			
Factors	**First Balkan War**	**Gallipoli Campaign**	**World War I**	**Similar/Different**
Troop numbers	436.742	315.000	2.998.000	SIMILAR
Mil. Technology	same	same	same	SIMILAR
Geography	mostly open terrain	open terrain	different	SIMILAR
Org. Structure	same	same	same	SIMILAR
Commanders	same	different	different	DIFFERENT
Coalition	Ottoman alone	alone (in the fronts)	strategic alliance	SIMILAR
Proximity to the capital	same	same		SIMILAR
Economy	same	same	same	SIMILAR
Duration of the war	less than 1 year	less than 1 year	4 years	SIMILAR
RESULT	**FAILURE**	**VICTORY**	**BOTH**	

was densely applied during World War I. The practitioners of this type of warfare sought a victory in firepower (mostly indirect firepower as artillery usage) to create attrition on the rival. Keywords such as artillery support, trench warfare, fire team maneuvers, and camouflage can describe this type of warfare. It is comparatively more static than the tactics used in WWII.

From an Ottoman perspective, the comparison between the Balkan Wars and the Gallipoli Campaign holds significant historical value. The Gallipoli Campaign, a pivotal part of World War I, is often referred to as a war in Turkish literature, underscoring its importance in Ottoman history.

The Ottoman army started using more than 700.000 7.65 mm caliber, M1877, German rifles by 1908. However, these rifles were not machine guns and could fire only once until re-charged (Nicolle 1994; Uyar and Erickson 2009). Especially infantry and cavalry were also using the 1874 model, U.S.-made Martini-Henry rifles that were manufactured at Zeytinburnu Munitions Plant in Istanbul, in addition to extra infantry-cavalry was also given the U.S.-made Winchester carbines, U.S. made weaponry reaching to the amount of 200.000 (Erickson 2000; Nicolle 1994; Uyar and Erickson 2009). The Ottoman army was deprived of machine guns, and this was the capability only provided to warships for coastal defense. The types of infantry weaponry did not change a lot. In general, the main rifle for infantry was the Turkish Mauser with a five-round removable box magazine, a German brand of rifle modified in production for Turks. For officers, there were 7.63-mm Mauser C96 and 9-mm FN-Browning M1903 pistols (Nicolle 1994; Uyar and Erickson 2009).

However, it should be noted that, after battles, and not only limited to Ottomans, capturing the enemy's rifles and utilizing them was a common trend, which increased the diversity and created a mass in types of weaponry. The same infantry weapons were used during the Gallipoli front as well. In addition, Çanakkale fortified zone units were given less than 1000 guns (Erickson 2000; Uyar and Erickson 2009). Krupp was the primary supplier of artillery, starting to manufacture for Ottomans

decades before for the Ottoman army starting with the 1877-78 Russian war. In addition to Krupp, Austro-Hungarian Skoda and French Schneider guns were also in the inventory but in a smaller number (Uyar and Erickson 2009).

The Balkan Wars and Gallipoli campaign lasted around one year (Balkan War, seven months and three weeks, and Gallipoli, 10 months and 3 weeks. On the other hand, World War 1 lasted as long as four years and three months. The Balkan War started on 8 October 1912. It lasted on 30 May 1913, while the Gallipoli land phase began on 25 th April 1916 and lasted on 9 January 1916, including hot and cold months, and temperatures average similar to each other. Thus, the seasonal factors can be canceled out in comparison as they are almost similar. The time difference is so close to only one and a half years, which does not change the military technology or the military formations, doctrines, field manuals, procedures, and the military understanding of tactics.

The Ottomans faced a similar enemy formation in both the First Balkan War and the Gallipoli campaign. In the Balkan Wars, they fought against a unified coalition of countries in the Balkan League, including Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. Similarly, in the Gallipoli campaign, the Ottomans fought alone against a coalition of forces consisting of British, French, Australian, and New Zealanders. This 'one against many 'dynamic was a consistent strategic challenge for the Ottomans in both conflicts.

The number of troops and casualty rates are also similar to compare these two cases as in the Balkan Wars, the Ottomans mobilized 436.742 soldiers (Erickson 2003, 52) against the Balkan League total of 850.000 troops (Erickson 2003, 69)) and suffered 340.000 casualties that 50.000 of them were killed, 100.000 wounded, 115000 captured and 75.000 died because of illness (Erickson 2003, 200,329). Balkan league countries gave 156.000 casualties (Erickson 2003:329). In the Gallipoli campaign, Ottomans could mobilize 315.000 troops (Erickson 2000, 94), accompanied by only 700 German officers, and suffered 255.000 casualties, 56.643 killed, and 97007 wounded (Erickson 2000, 94,327). On the other hand, the Allied Powers gave 300.000 casualties, including 56707 deaths (Clodfelter 2017, 417). The number of troops was much higher during World War 1, and casualties doubled to 725.000 for Turks compared to the Gallipoli campaign (Hanioğlu 2008). The analyses include operational-level commanders, all of whom have the responsibility of commanding the combatant troops. In other words, the two groups in the cases are similar in position; they are at the front with their regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps, not at the passive missions. For clarity, the commanders at the general staff and all levels of headquarters and staff officers are also accepted as active duty follow-

ing the existing literature (Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr 2020; Reiter and Wagstaff 2018).

Geography is also similar in the Balkans, where the majority of the battles were fought in Kırkkilise, Çatalca, Edirne, Manastır, and Kumanova and Gallipoli as of many hills, rugged terrain, the small size of trees, and rocky ground with little vegetation and hilly land with steep ravines. Some geographical areas are very different in the Balkans, especially in Mountainous areas such as the Rhodopen Mountains, Rila, and Pirin regions, including Macedonia up until the Shkodra, and the dense forests with few channels and passages allowing the troop movements and negatively influencing logistic supply. However, these areas are in the minority regarding the battles fought during Balkan War 1 (and resulted in a withdrawal of Ottoman forces). Geography also dictated the usage and size of the troops as well. During the Balkan Wars, ottoman armies fought against the enemy with smaller battalions and below in the mountainous areas and larger units in the open regions ranging to brigades and corps (as during the Çatalca battle against Bulgarian troops). Scattered Geography dictated the size of the forces. In Gallipoli, the concentration of the troops was higher than in the area. However, the reciprocal evaluation of the troop numbers also allowed us to cancel the troop size out in our analyses as the denser in Gallipoli, the enemy was more concentrated, and the Balkan League forces were scattered. Hence, the mutual ratio is similar, and the density of the troops can be considered, in terms of weight, identical to each other in both of the cases.

Ottoman started to use a triangular system of infantry ınits in 1908, long before the Balkan wars and Gallipoli. This architecture was the same in both wars. Mahmud Shevket Pasha was the grand vizier during the Balkan War, and Nazım Pasha was the minister of war. After Nazım Pasha was assassinated during the Bab-ı Ali coup in 1913 (attack on the Sublime Port) by the CUP members, Mahmud Shevket Pasha was also assassinated by one of the relatives of Nazım Pasha as an act of revenge, claiming that he was guilty of the death of Nazım Pasha (Fieldhouse 2006, 17), or commit suicide because of his disappointment (Kieser 2018, 140). The strategic top military officials radically changed during this short period between the two wars. Perhaps this is one of the distinguishing differences between the two cases. Many operational-level military leaders continued to fight in Gallipoli. They were tasked in the Balkan War, such as Zeki Kolaç- Kılıçoğlu (lieutenant general), Ahmet İzzet Furgaç (general), Muhittin Akyüz (major general), Ömer Fahrettin Türkkan (brigadier), Ahmet Cemal Necip (büyük Sakallı- brigadier), Esat Bülkat (Major general), Cevat çobanlı (major general), Sait Pertev Demirhan (major general), and Mustafa Fevzi Çakmak (major general) however, the change in the higher levels of

the chain of command, not the operational level change, is one of the radical changes between these two events. Another radical change was the Enver Pasha's purge or forceful retirement of more than 1000 officers in January of 1914. These two changes in the officer composition are significant differences between these two similar cases.

Structural factors such as the economy did not change in Ottoman fiscal condition between 1913 and 1915, and perhaps worsening on the eve of approaching World War. Lastly, the proximity to the capital, İstanbul is almost the same between these two cases as Gallipoli is 260 km from İstanbul and the location of the majority of the battles during the Balkan War around Edirne and Kırkkilise is about 239 km (considering Çatalca battles, it almost at the entrance of İstanbul). All of these factors create a comparable design according to MSSD, excluding a few factors, such as a change in the strategic cadre of Ottoman general staff and Ministry of War and the significant change by the Enver Pasha's purge in 1914, allowing more devoted CUP officers to enter to the Ottoman military.

Because of the similarities explained in Table 3.1, and according to the facts underlined above, this dissertation compares the Balkan War and the Gallipoli Campaign to reveal the significance of military leaders in generating military effectiveness. It also compares the findings with World War 1 as a complimentary analysis. However, it should be noted that World War was much more significant, geographically dispersed, in terms of the size of the troops, far more extensive than Gallipoli, and in contrast, so much more diversified.

3.3 Brief History of the Cases

As pivotal events, the Balkan and Gallipoli Wars have profoundly shaped Turkish society. The trauma of the Balkan defeat, where the Ottoman Empire lost significant territories, has been transformed by the more optimistic perspective that emerged from the victory in the Gallipoli Campaign during the First World War. This victory, a beacon of hope, has had a lasting impact on the nation's spirit.

The Ottoman Empire's last years were deeply involved in a period of wars starting from the 1897 Turco-Greco War, the 1911-12 War of Tripoli, the 1912-13 First and Second Balkan Wars, the 1914-18 First World War, and after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 1919-22 Turkish War of Independence. The Ottoman-Italian War, which concluded on October 15, 1912, was swiftly followed by the onset of

the Balkan War on October 16, 1912. Bulgaria's declaration of war on October 17, 1912, was succeeded by the Ottoman General Staff's war against Greece on October 18 (Çakmak and Tetik 2011, 144). This period was marked by the concentration of enemy forces, which surpassed that of the Ottoman army, posing significant challenges that the Ottoman army had to overcome with strategic planning and military prowess.

3.3.1 Developments / Reforms in Ottoman Army

During the 1980s, the Ottoman Military adopted the settled Prussian military system. After the officers graduated from the military academy, they attended War College and later formed a body of general staff of high-quality military cadres. This provided an advantage in all battles and wars, facilitating effective command of troops and a workable environment while working with German allies during WWI. With the efficiency and flexibility of this organizational structure, the Ottoman could prepare 60 practical divisions as the war continued. Another cultural benefit for the Ottoman Army was that even an average soldier (asker), while not highly educated, was highly courageous (known as the notion of Mehmetçik). These organizational features were present in both Balkan and WWI battles, showcasing the unwavering courage and resilience of the Ottoman soldiers, a testament to their bravery and dedication.

The Ottoman Military structure in the 19th century was primarily shaped by the Ministry of War (Harbiye Nezareti), established in 1826. This institution, influenced by the Prussian military tradition, was instrumental in training highly efficient staff officers in the Military Academy (Kurmay Subay) (Erickson 2003, 56). It is crucial to emphasize that the Ministry of War, while not directly involved in battle control or execution, held a pivotal role. The General Staff, under its coordination, direction, planning, and execution of war plans, was composed mainly of staff officers. Enver (Lt.Col. in 1913) launched a raid by entering into the Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Ali) with a small group of CUP members, forcing the government to resign (Uyar and Erickson 2009, 230). After this coup d'e'ta, not only the new government established by Grand Vizier and Minister of War Mahmud Sevket Pasha (German-trained officer, a protege of Von der Goltz) but also gained excessive power in determining the political fate of the Empire (Uyar and Erickson 2009, 230). Following the Balkan Wars in January 1913, Enver Pasha became a critical figure in the Ministry of War.

Enver Pasha, a dedicated member of the CUP, played a pivotal role in the Ottoman's

decision to enter World War I. His influence was such that he was appointed with a powerful authority as the chief of the Turkish General Staff on January 3, 1914. This represented a significant transformation in the power dynamics of the Ottoman military, with the Ministry of War functioning as a vital connection between the sultan and the military.

Another developmental decision was taken to make the army institutionally more efficient by introducing the army headquarters and a new triangular unit structure, especially for the division level (based on the ideas of Von der Goltz). These divisions were under the command of Corps commanders. However, until these two wars erupted, there were not equal staff officers with experience in commanding army corps except for a few who had served abroad, especially in Germany and France (Erickson 2003).

One organizational problem in the army officer positions was the lack of officers. During the gradual replacement of Alaylı officers by mektepli (military Academy graduates), overall manning placement was only 55% of the officer positions (Uyar and Erickson 2009, 205). Training centers were not large enough to provide enough officers; Alaylı officers had little military use. The Ottoman army initiated Balkan wars with this inadequate officer reserve. Officer casualties in the Balkan Wars also worsened this personnel problem.

Starting from the 1880s, the German Military Mission significantly contributed to the Ottoman army's transformation and modernization. However, it's important to note that, according to Erickson (2003), or Uyar and Erickson (2009), this was not the sole reason for the victory in the Gallipoli, as these efforts mostly belonged before the Balkan Wars. The German Military Mission's influence was significant, but it was not the only factor in the Ottoman Military's development, highlighting its evolution's complex and multifaceted nature.

In 1908, the number of officers in the army was 13,880, and only 1,342 had operational experience (Erickson 2003, 15). The military's overall efficiency was not at high levels. Reforms realized then were mainly German-oriented as the Ahmet Izzet Paşa was a strong protégé of the German military mission (Erickson 2003, 23). The officer cadre's main problem was the inefficient alaylı system ("ranker" in British terminology). It relied on the officers being promoted based on their tenure until the rank of captain and lacked institutional military education. Because of the rank limit, this group of officers remained older than the new generation of officers from military schools (mektepli). These two sources of human resources created distrust and envy, especially in the older officer group of Alaylı.

However, the Ottoman general staff was correct in their assumption that the army should be revived by increasing the proportion of young and well-educated officers. The Young Turks movement, followed by the CUP, always supported the new generation of officers, as their organization depended on them. The hatred between these groups reached its maximum level during the "March 31 Incident" in 1909, when chaos was triggered by the alaylı officers and with the support of religiously oriented people against the administration demanding to halt the modernizations in the army. This rebellion was controlled by the Action Army (led and staffed by mektepli officers). The threat coming from this old military cadre was now on the surface. Supreme Military Council quickly passed two regulations to curb the impact of ranker officers: June 26, 1909, Law for Age Limitation, and August 7, 1909, Law for the Purge of Military Ranks (Erickson 2003, 24) The Law on the Purging of Military Ranks (Tasfiye-i Rüteb-i Askeriyye Lâyiha-i Kanuniyyesi), which was promulgated on August 7, 1909, had a profound impact on many army and navy officers, as well as generals holding the rank of major and above. It led to their retirement or dismissal from military service, introducing rank waiting periods and age limits for military service, a departure from the traditional Ottoman army promotion system. The new criteria resulted in the demotion of some officers who were found to have been promoted early, while others were forced to resign or retire. The TURCO dataset covers these individuals, providing a comprehensive record of their post-regulation ranks and the year of their final rank.[14]

From the organizational perspective, radical progress was made in introducing division levels to the Ottoman Army's architecture. This new structure enabled infantry divisions to benefit from the direct fire capabilities of the artillery regiments Erickson (2003). This was one of the groundbreaking innovations that relied on synchronizing the impact by different branches. Many military units, such as battalion task forces or combined/joint operational units, follow the same organizational logic today.

Another main structural change was the new triangular system. Ottoman Military previously followed a four-regiment infantry division system that was inefficient either in terms of personnel management or in the units' tactical usage. The triangular system brought a more dynamic and easy-to-use military structure. Every major combatant European army after 1915 changed its organizational structure to this triangular model by 1918, and this new model pioneered by the Turks continues in the world's armies to the present day (Erickson 2003, 27).

[14]For a detailed explanation, check Appendix A (codebook of the TURCO dataset).

3.3.2 Committee of Union and Progress Party (CUP)

> "Governor of Manastır (Bitola) Hıfzı Pasha was going to express the situation to Abdulhamid in the telegram as follows: 'I hereby present to Your Imperial Majesty that everyone in these parts, except for myself, is a member of the Committee of Union and Progress'" (Aydemir 1972, 538).

The period between 1908 and 1923, which saw the implementation of the CUP rule, was characterized by wars, social movements, and destruction. These included the Tripoli TUR-Italian War of 1910, a conflict that strained the Empire's resources and military capabilities, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the multi-front World War I from 1914-1918, the Turkish War of Independence from 1919-1922, the British control of Istanbul between 1917 and 1919, a period of foreign occupation that further weakened the Empire and the forced migration of Armenians. This humanitarian crisis diverted the Empire's attention and resources.

Abdülhamit the 2nd's ambition to grow fully dedicated citizens among new generations resulted in the opposite manner, the birth of a generation that sought a way of survival in liberties and patriotism (Zürcher 2017, 86). Contrary to what he intended, the young officers trained in Harbiye (War Academy) became the backbone of the CUP, with the idea of re-establishing the constitution Zürcher (2017).

The center for CUP progress was Macedonia, where the Third Army played a significant role in further organization. In its early phases, CUP operated as an underground patriotic organization Temo (1987). The CUP, a secret society with architecture inspired by Italian Carbonari organizations, operated in the shadows. With around 3000 members, mainly from the Balkans (Zürcher 2019, 902), the organization's clandestine nature adds a layer of mystery to its operations.

The influence of Enver Pasha on the CUP's expansion cannot be overstated. In 1906, he founded the CUP cell in Manastır/Bitola, a geographically and culturally significant location in Macedonia, and advocated the Salonica CUP cell (Zürcher 2019, 903). His pivotal role in the CUP's growth, marked by his leadership and influence, was a key factor in the organization's success and impact.

The increasing push by the CUP finally resulted in the announcement of the constitution to be applied, involuntarily declared by Abdülhamit on the 2nd after a long time of three decades (Zürcher 2017, 90). Together with the 1908 Resneli Niyazi Bey, Enver Pasha had gained popularity as the leading name against the abdulhamşt

the 2nd. The power of CUP as a political party after 1908, and one single actor after the Balkan War and the Bab-ı Ali coup. Following the 1913 Bab-ı ali coup, Enver Pasha, the coup's instigator and a revered figure among CUP members, was catapulted to the rank of general (Pasha). He was then appointed to several key strategic positions, including Vice-commander-in-chief, chief of the general staff, and minister of War in 1914, marking a significant turning point in his career (Zürcher 2019, 900).

Numerous prominent leaders across the bureaucratic, military, and civilian domains held membership within the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), particularly after 1908. Among the most notable members of the CUP were Enver, Talat, Cemal, and Mustafa Kemal Çakmak and Tetik (2011); Paşa and Necip (2007).

During the Balkan Wars, the Enver, Cemal, and Talat Pashas triumvirate led the Ottoman Empire. Despite the devastating results of the wars, which were not their fault, they managed to solidify their power in the Empire. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), although not responsible for leading the armies during the Balkan Wars, emerged as a strong actor after the wars, proposing a plan for the survival of the Ottoman Empire. This period marked the CUP's transition from a developing political entity to a legitimate power, a transformation that historians and researchers find intriguing.

The rise of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) profoundly impacted the political landscape of the late Ottoman Empire, particularly between 1908 and 1918. It became the single party, organization, and group that dominated almost all of the military structure and officially or unofficially gained control of the overall bureaucracy. This power shift was significant, marking a new era in Ottoman history. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) emerged as a pivotal force in the final years of the Ottoman Empire, particularly following the Balkan Wars. This period marked the CUP's transition from a developing political entity to a legitimate power. Comprised chiefly of young Turkish Army officers, the CUP sought to rejuvenate the Ottoman Empire by blending nationalist and Western-oriented strategies.

Union and Progress Party (İttihat ve Terakki Partisi) has been the leading and omnipotent actor in shaping the Ottoman Empire, especially after 1908 when the organization declared to be an official political party, and more forcefully penetrating the politics after the 1913 Bab-Ali events, which resulted in the death of Ministry of War Nazım Pasha, and with change the government. Although CUP started to be an effective organization a decade ago, the expansion of the members was usually in bureaucratic cadres, mostly in military administration. However, after the 1908 revolution, the organization gained an extraordinary upper hand in controlling the

overall politics. One contributing event to the support for CUP was the dramatic loss of the Balkans and the long-lasting dream among officers to revive the constitution against Sultan Abdulhamid II.'s 33 years of rule, with an idea to save the country. This new political era, starting with the July 10 Revolution in 1908, lasted until the 1918 Armistice and the eventual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; it is labeled the CUP era.

The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was conceived in the Balkans, with Salonika serving as its birthplace and a significant source of its leadership. The CUP's leaders, deeply affected by the Balkans' loss, were instrumental in shaping the CUP's ideological beliefs and military strategies. This loss would later influence the establishment of the Turkish Republic post-World War I, a crucial historical context that helps understand the CUP's actions and decisions.

After the force retirement project of Enver Pasha in January 1914, most of the critical positions in Ottoman general staff were filled by the CUP members like İsmet İnönü as chief of operations, Ali İhsan Sabis as an assistant, Kazım Karabekir as chief of intelligence (Zürcher 2019, 903).

The CUP's success in the Gallipoli Campaign was a testament to their exceptional strategic prowess. This victory not only boosted their confidence but also demonstrated their ability to control almost the entire Empire effectively. Their reliance on the party channel as a seemingly more efficient and fast line of coordination was a strategy that continues to intrigue many, showcasing their strategic understanding and impressing historians and researchers.

After 1918, during the armistice period, the prosecutions took on a new, more serious tone, becoming a political reckoning. The main target of this process was the members of the Union and Progress Party (İttihat ve Terakki) that had held sway over the Ottoman Empire during World War I. The withdrawal of CUP members was not a mere change of guard but a sudden and intense witch hunt orchestrated by the new Damat Ferit Pasha Government (under pressure from the British). The primary CUP members were then subjected to trials by the Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi (Military Tribunal) and numerous other military courts. As these trials unfolded, the British moved significantly, exiling the most prominent figures, most of them military officers, including deputies and civil administrators, to Malta Island. This was part of a larger plan to establish an international war crimes court there Rıdvan (2014).

When viewed from the British perspective, these actions were part of the resolution of the 'Eastern Question' in favor of British interests (Rıdvan 2014, 116). Turkish

forces, displaying remarkable resilience, later used some British captives in a prisoner exchange with the exiled ones in Malta, despite some managing to escape from the island on their own. Ankara's unyielding determination during the National Struggle movement before the Turkish War of Independence, 1919-23, was instrumental in the survival of the remaining captives. Many Malta exiles, demonstrating their indomitable spirit, joined these liberation movements, standing alongside Mustafa Kemal (later Atataürk).

The Unionist (CUP) involvement in Turkish National movements during the Turkish War of Independence was evident as many former pro-CUP military leaders took a role in the War. However, this participation was not done with the label of CUP (Zürcher 1991, 369-370). After officially being dissolved in 1918, the impact of the CUP became almost invisible, except for the foundation of the Renovation Party (Teceddud Firkasi) as the political heir of the former CUP, which dissolved only after a year (Zürcher 1991, 370). Lack of leadership also paved the way for this dissolution as prominent leaders of CUP, such as Enver, Cemal, and Talat Pashas, had already left the country.

3.3.3 German Reform Mission

The Ottoman Army, particularly after the arrival of the German Mission, began to adapt their system to the Prussian-ecole of military organization, focusing on the education provided at the war college (Harp Akademisi). The German Mission, a group of military advisors from Prussia, was instrumental in introducing and implementing these changes. The Prussian army's war college (Kriegsakademie) was an exceptionally demanding military institution that was extremely difficult to enter and graduate from. Each year, a rigorous exam accepts 120 junior officers, and only less than half of them can graduate after numerous demanding military staff training activities (Cochrane 2018). Although the German aristocracy was inherent, especially in the high levels of bureaucracy and especially in military cadres, blue blood was not a distinguishing criterion when it came to the Kriegsakademie (Cochrane 2018)—this highly dense period of military education was awarded eight years of seniority. Top Prussian war college graduates were tasked with German general staff, and Moltke benefitted from their excellent competence during his rule. The position of the battalion commander was so imminent in the Prussian army, and Moltke gave particular attention to the training of this military unit because the battalion was the first unit that encompassed different types of sub-units, like the infantry bat-

talion, to have a medical squad or signal team. The battalion is also the first unit to have different headquarters functions, such as personnel (S1), intelligence (S2), operations (S3), and logistics (S4), even in almost all of the current modern armies. Staff officers in the German military were expected to have experience as battalion commanders. That familiarity helped them understand the rhyme among the troops and coordinate actions in other military units, both horizontally among the same type of units and vertically with higher headquarters. Self-initiative in percussion staff training was one of the crucial elements, and up until the commander approved the decision, subordinates were encouraged to contribute to the decision-making mechanism. Moreover, regardless of the military order, subordinates were usually free to choose their means (Cochrane 2018).

One of the military innovations by Moltke that also applied successfully during the Gallipoli Campaign was the "doctrine." Doctrine is a set of combat rules to give direction to the unit commanders, especially when the chain of command is broken, or the commander is cut off from the rest of the supporting or higher units. A flexible approach, rather than covering every issue, which is a mess when the fighting starts, enables officers to focus on the most relevant issue. This simplification and precision in terms of decision-making are previously addressed by Clausewitz, stating, "'Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. Problems will occur with misplaced communications, troops going to the wrong location, delays caused by weather, etc., and the commander must do his best to overcome them" (Von Clausewitz 1989, 119). Indeed, either the successful generation of the doctrine or the practical application of the battle orders is correlated with the competence of the military leaders.

The German Military Commission (1882–1918) left an incredible and profound mark on the reorganization of the Ottoman military. The lessons learned from the Balkan defeat, combined with the influence of the Prussian model, a testament to the international context of this period, shaped the careers of many influential officers in late Ottoman military history. With the etiquette of a staff officer (kurmay subay) and their competence and expertise, these commanders rose to the rank of generals. Their names are etched in history: Esat Bülkat, Hasan İzzet Arolat, Hasan Rıza (famous for his heroic defense in Shkodra until he was killed during the siege), Cevat Çobanlı, Ahmet Cemal Necip (Büyük-Sakallı), Yakup Şevki Subaşı, Mustafa Fevzi Çakmak, Şükrü Naili Gökberk, Fahrettin Altay, Ali Fethi Okyar, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Halil Kut, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Süleyman Askeri, and Abdurrahman Nafiz Gürman. Their contributions to the Ottoman and Turkish armies, influenced by the Prussian military system, are a testament to the effectiveness of this system.

In 1910, Von der Goltz, a figure of immense importance in the German Military mission in the Ottoman Empire, left an incredible mark on the empire's military history. His introduction of a new triangular logic revolutionized the organizational structure of the infantry division. This system, distinct from the previous one, positioned two infantry units on the front and two support units behind the frontiers. The new system also saw the deployment of two units at the front, reinforced by one equal-sized reserve unit.

During the Gallipoli War, the Ottoman Empire faced a formidable challenge. The main issue was not the lack of structure in their units but rather the units themselves. The Balkan War caused the loss of about 250,000 men and dissolved most of the 1st and 2nd Armies (Topal 2013). Thousands of soldiers were also lost to cholera and other field-related sicknesses. However, in a display of remarkable resilience and strategic brilliance, the Turkish General Staff managed to reorganize and maintain the army's fighting capability in Gallipoli. This feat was outstanding and a testament to their adaptability in adversity.

The reorganization, led by the influential Goltz Pasha between 1886 and 97, was a pivotal and transformative period in Ottoman history. At the insistence of Abdulhamid II, Goltz Pasha, along with the assistance of two high-ranking officers, Muzaffer Pasha, and Veli Rıza Pasha, played a crucial and instrumental role in this commission (Griffiths 1966; Güler 2007; Topal 2013). During this period, the Ottomans purchased 1000 German field cannons for their artillery units, with the idea of establishing an artillery division as a central pool to provide support for the combatant brigades (Topal 2013; Uğur 1983). Another practical development was the reorganization of Hamidiye regiments, mainly operating in central and east Anatolia (Hün 1952). These regiments were mostly cavalry, and their area of responsibility was the eastern and central Anatolia.

Another meticulous effort for military modernization was completing the inventory of military equipment (Griffiths 1966). This comprehensive task, along with other initiatives such as publishing the conscription law of 1887,1887 (Griffiths 1966, 76), Golt'z's proposal of the conscript system, which demanded recruitment for 20 years of military service (Akmeşe 2005, 23), increasing the class size and revising the content of the curriculum of the military Academy), and separating the war college as a higher educational institution from the Military Academy, contributed significantly to the modernization process (Griffiths 1966; Güler 2007). Graduates from these institutions became the commanders in almost all battles during the following battles.

The pinnacle of military education, the Mekteb-i Harbiye (Military Academy) [15] was the cradle of Ottoman officers (zabits). Sultan Mahmud II established it in 1834, marking a significant chapter in the empire's military history. Catering primarily to Muslim children, the school's curriculum evolved from a four-year to a three-year program from 1847 to 1873. Upon graduation, students were appointed to the infantry and cavalry units of the army as second lieutenants (Ünal 2016).

The Military Academy, a bastion of education and discipline, played a pivotal role in meeting the army's need for officers. It was here that many prominent figures, including the princes of Sultan Abdulaziz, Nurettin, and Yusuf Izzettin, received their education and served in military roles. This legacy of producing leaders, which underscored the school's influence and impact, is a testament to the quality of education and training provided at the Academy (Ünal 2016). Even in its early years, the Military Academy was known for its well-functioning organization and high education standards, boasting more qualified faculty than other civilian schools. The Academy was home to divisions such as the General Staff (Erkân-ı Harbiye), Veterinary (Baytar), Infantry (Piyade), Cavalry (Süvari), and a particular class, all contributing to its prestigious status.

In its early years, the Military Academy was primarily attended by students from the infantry and cavalry classes. However, by 1902, approximately 1/20th of the students continued their education in the General Staff class, indicating a broadening of the Academy's curriculum. The Imperial School of Military Engineering (Mühendishâne-i Berrî-i Hümâyûn), founded in 1795 by Sultan Selim III, initially served as the Military Academy. However, with the opening of the Military Academy by Sultan Mahmud II, it transitioned to become the Artillery School. This transition was a significant milestone in the history of the Military Academy, marking its evolution and growth as an institution of learning and training (Ünal 2009, 2016).

Running parallel to Abdülhamit's modernization efforts, the officers' ideological stance was significantly shaped by the rising tide of patriotism, mainly influenced by the young Turks and, subsequently, the CUP party. The 1908 Revolution and the 31 March Incident, pivotal moments in history, not only became the battleground for conflict between modernists and loyalists (religious affiliations) but also within military cadres, dividing alaylı (regimentals/ or rankers in British military

[15] The names of the Ottoman / Turkish military higher educational institutions have evolved, but their continuity remains a testament to their enduring legacy. The history of the Turkish Army War College can be traced back to 1848 with the establishment of "Mekteb-i Fünun-u Harbiye-i Şahâne Erkân-ı Harbiye" (Ottoman Military Academy), which was formed from the third and fourth classes of the Military Academy (Mekteb-i-i Harbiye). The 1900s saw a change in name to "Erkân-ı Harbiye" (Ottoman Staff Officer College). This title resonates with the era of Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK, the founder of the Turkish Republic, who was part of the 57th period of the Ottoman Staff Officer College. After 1923, the institution was rebranded as "Mekteb-i Alî-yi Askeri" (Superior Military School) and eventually evolved into the Turkish War Colleges, specifically for the Turkish Army War College.

terminology) and mektepli (military school graduates). This era saw the emergence of influential senior commanders, such as Ahmet İzzet Pasha and Mahmud Şevket Pasha, who played a crucial role in advocating for freeing the military from politics (Macfie 2014; Uçarol 1995; Zürcher 2017).

Despite the determined resistance of alaylı officers to the modernization process, The Supreme Military Council, recognizing the need for change, introduced new rules. These rules were designed to diminish the influence of the alaylı groups within the military cadres. At that time, there were no laws or regulations regarding age limits and tenure of military ranks. In June 1909, the Supreme Military Council introduced "The Law for Age Limitation," leading to the retirement of around 7,500 Alaylı officers (Erickson 2003, 23) [16] and second, "The Law for the Purge of Military Ranks," on 7 August 1909, clarifying maximum age limits for each rank (Eralp 1989, 125).[17]

Furthermore, the 'Law for the Purge of Military Ranks', enacted on 7 August 1909, profoundly impacted the military structure. This law introduced compulsory military service for all ranks, aiming to eradicate the influence of the Hamidian regime in the army (Erickson 2003). The primary goal was to halt the practice of rapid promotions based on personal connections and corruption, shifting the focus to professionalism and competence. Consequently, the mektepli officers gained more positions in the military service, altering the army's composition. Analyses in this dissertation also showed similar findings as the effect of age has a negative coefficient not only for the regression analyses in the Blkan War cadre but also for World War I. Younger officers become fully influential because of the CUP's politics, long-lasting wars, officer losses, and the absence of human capital. In the Ottoman army, ignoring the süper-fast promotion of Enver pasha during 1913 as an outlier case, most of the operational military leaders were relatively younger compared to the period before the Balkan Wars.

After 1909, Ahmet İzzet Pasha- Chief of General Staff- organized the general staff based on four sections: operations, intelligence, army organization, and mapping, which was the replica of the Prussian military system (Erickson 2003). During Ahmed İzzet Pasha's administration, the entry year for the war college changed by not accepting the most successful military Academy graduates directly as soon as they graduate but by selecting the officers after 2 to 5 years of military service selecting those who also have field experience (Swanson 1975; Uyar and Varoğlu

[16] See also (Eralp 1989, 125) for details

[17] eg. For 2nd and 1st Lieutenant 41, Captain 46, Major 52, Lt. Colonel 55, Colonel 58, Brigadier General 60, Major Gen. and Lt. Gen. 65, Marshall 68 (Eralp 1989; Erickson 2003; Topal 2013)

2008).

Reorganizations after 1910 demonstrated the Ottoman Army's strategic foresight by adopting a more institutional path. This involved dividing the Army into Active and Reserve divisions and implementing compulsory three-year service for the standing Army (Muvazzaf troops) (Topal 2013). At the division level, under the guidance of Colman von der Goltz, the traditional square structure of the unit organization was transformed into a more efficient triangular fashion, consisting of only three regiments (Erickson 2003). This innovative model brought about flexibility and the advantage of using reserve units strategically. For instance, the second line regiment (reserve) was trained to either support the first line regiments in case of necessity or to advance in attack where the penetration is succeeded. This organizational scheme, introduced in the German Army in 1915, is now a staple in modern armies worldwide. The Ottoman Army's adoption of the German style of logistics, operational planning matrixes, and even the March plans (Erickson 2003) was a testament to their progressive thinking and adaptability.

Defeat in the Balkan wars had far-reaching implications for the military, economy, and society. It bred a deep-seated hatred towards Balkan countries, a thirst for revenge, and a massive influx of immigrants. Consequently, any reform was welcomed and urgently deemed necessary for survival. The Ottoman general staff promptly augmented the number of German military personnel in the commission, from a mere 70 in 1914 (Güler 2007, 76), to play a pivotal role in the reforms. They entrusted Liman von der Sanders with full authority, who later led the Ottoman 5th army during the Gallipoli Campaign (Aksakal 2008, 22).

Enver Pasha, the current minister of war in 1914, removed 1,300 from the military service, claiming they failed their missions during the Balkan War (Erickson 2007, 9-12).[18] Ottoman casualties after the Balkan war were 100,000–120,000, 50,000 due to their wounds, and 75,000 due to disease (Macar 1912, 294). Ottomans lost 36 divisions, 6 Corps headquarters, and 250,000 men in addition to weaponry and supplies (Aksakal 2008, 36-40).

After the Balkan Wars, regulations were implemented that divided the Ottoman Army into three components: an active force (Nizamiye), a reserve force (Ihtiyat), and a territorial force (Muhafız). Additionally, the reserve system known as the redif was abolished due to its inefficiency during the Balkan Wars. The inspectorate system was also reformed, with a heightened focus on military training, particularly at the battalion level (Erickson 2007, 9). Perhaps the most radical change

[18] See also, Turkish General Staff, The Turkish War in the First World War: The Caucasus Front 3rd Army Operations, Vol. I (Ankara: General Staff Printing House, 1993), 52.

in an organization is the Enver Pasha's purge of 1,300 officers, claiming they were unsuccessful during the Balkan War (Erickson 2007, 338).

3.3.4 First Balkan War

The catastrophic loss of the Balkans not only affected the Ottoman's territory (which saw a 32.7 % reduction in its territory and nearly one-fifth of its population lost) but also created a trauma accompanied by humiliation (Aksakal 2008)), especially among the Balkan-born military officers and especially the CUP members, as their motherland was Manastır and Macedonia. This humiliation can be evaluated as the underlying reason, a sense of duty and responsibility, that also built-in revenge for CUP members to enter World War I aiming to compensate for the losses in the Balkan War (Aksakal 2008).

The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 were a complete failure from the Ottoman Empire's perspective. The Ottoman Empire could not take effective measures against the unifying forces of the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians. Despite the Ottoman chief of staff having created a strategic plan (Strategic Defense Plan No.5) to counter any conflict in the Balkans, the tactical applications failed to achieve even a limited local success (Erickson 2012). As a result, the loss of the vast Balkan geography occurred quickly, leading to a total failure. The Balkan Wars consisted of two subsequent wars. The first of these (the First Balkan War) was mainly fought between the Ottoman Empire and a Christian alliance of Bulgarians, Greeks, Montenegrins, and Serbs. The second War (Second Balkan War) was between Bulgaria and other newly emerged Balkan states who wanted to prevent Bulgaria from expanding further into their territories and seizing more land.

The Ottoman army suffered defeat on all fronts, which led to economic bankruptcy. This situation severely hampered the Empire's ability to recover and defend its remaining territories. The desire to regain the lost territories may have been one of the potential reasons for the Ottoman Empire's entry into World War I.

However, the Ottoman Empire's strategic planning suffered from a crucial miscalculation, as it assumed that each Balkan country would fight alone, not anticipating the possibility of a coalition. This resulted in the Ottoman Empire facing a coordinated enemy fighting on multiple fronts, which led to a significant disadvantage. According to Plan 5, reinforcements were expected to arrive from remote areas such as Yemen or Syria, but many either arrived late or failed to arrive at all. This was

a significant challenge in terms of mobilization, as reinforcements should have been planned to arrive before or during the escalation of conflicts, not after.

The Ottoman forces were already morally and logistically depleted due to prior engagements in wars. According to Çakmak and Tetik (2011), the key to success was promptly reorganizing the existing troops and awaiting an opportune moment for a well-prepared and strategically positioned ground attack, preferably at Kumanova. The primary objective until then should have been to suppress and delay the Balkan forces locally while preventing their consolidation. However, the execution of this plan faced numerous obstacles, including the dispersion and lack of coordination among Ottoman forces, geographical challenges, insufficient logistical support, erroneous orders, and, more importantly, a deficiency in the fighting spirit of commanders. The list of Reasons for defeat can be extended as due to incomplete mobilization, wrong territorial allocation of the troops, reserve system itself, unachieved fire superiority, older commanders, excessive trust and self-confidence of Nazım Pasha, Ministry of War, towards enemy's strength (Erickson 2012) even though locating his headquarters close to the frontlines could not be a remedy. In addition to this, at the corps level, a shortage of experienced staff (kurma) officers, albeit not a big challenge in defensive operations, created a gap in counter-offensive and offensive plans as the Balkan League countries forced Ottomans to react as such (Erickson 2012).

In his assessment of the Balkan Wars, Çakmak, a corps commander in the Ottoman Army, noted that the mastery of the art of War was predominantly exhibited by the Greek forces, a testament to their strategic brilliance that should be duly acknowledged. On the other hand, the Ottoman forces' application was relatively inadequate (Çakmak and Tetik 2011, 649). Additionally, the author observed that the Serbian forces outperformed the Bulgarian forces. However, it is worth mentioning that the Bulgarian forces effectively positioned themselves and misled the Ottoman forces, with the primary target being Edirne. Subsequently, they concentrated their forces through Çatalca towards Istanbul, nearly reaching the city's entrance areas. Nevertheless, discord between General Dimitrov, commander of the Bulgarian forces, and the King of Bulgaria resulted in a loss of time. The King's aspirations to capture Istanbul (known as Tzarigrad in their language, the city where the Tzar-king resides) also led to distrust among the Russians, who had engaged in numerous wars against the Ottomans and exerted significant pressure on the Bulgarian troops at the front (Erickson 2012).

Despite the odds, the Ottoman forces demonstrated remarkable resilience and unwavering determination, a testament to their commitment and courage. With the time

gained and the assistance of highly effective and robust fortifications in Çatalca, spanning from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara, they managed to halt the Bulgarian forces and compel them to withdraw. According to Çakmak (2011), the concentration of forces was as follows: Greeks 75%, Montenegro 65%, Bulgaria 55%, Serbia 45%, and the Ottoman Forces least concentrated at 35% (Çakmak, 2011, p. 650). The loss of forces was reported as follows: Ottomans 75% (in addition to moral and material losses), Montenegro 45% (mainly resulting from the successful defense of Skodra by Hasan Rıza Pasha, who was subsequently killed by traitor Col. Esat Toptani seeking political gains for the future Albanian government), Bulgaria 35%, Serbia 20%, and Greece 25% (with losses primarily occurring in the Battle of Yanya) (Çakmak and Tetik 2011, 650-651). While these statistical assessments are attributed to Fevzi Çakmak, later known as Marshall, following the Turkish War of Independence, they are supported by historical records and provide a meaningful snapshot of the general condition.

In conclusion, the First Balkan War marked a significant defeat for the Ottoman Forces, with several key factors contributing to this outcome. Strategic and logistical misplannings, the inability to execute war plans effectively, and a lack of coordination and preparedness for the series of conflicts all played pivotal roles. However, the most critical factor was the weakness among commanders and military leaders, whose decisions and actions significantly influenced the course of the wars. With its profound implications, this defeat would shape the Empire's future choices and actions, including its entry into World War I.

Nonetheless, the impact of high-quality and determined military leaders was evident in instances such as the remarkable defense of Shkodra by Hasan Rıza Pasha, a highly competent military leader. Conversely, the inefficiency and weakness of military leaders led to losses in battles such as Yanya, Kumanova, and numerous others. For example, General Hasan Tahsin's decision to withdraw from Thessaloniki without engaging in combat, despite having over 20,000 troops, illustrates the significant role of military leadership in the outcome of battles.

Notably, the disintegration and panic did not originate from frontline military leaders but from the upper echelons of command and higher headquarters, which issued irrelevant and impractical orders given the prevailing circumstances. This breakdown in leadership spread rapidly throughout the ranks, affecting regiments and battalions at the operational and tactical levels. If a resilient command structure and military effectiveness had been reached during this period of resolve, the Ottoman army could have been more resistant to the enemy's attacks. Among all other factors, such as logistic miscalculations, lack of exercise of the combatant units, and

miscalculation for the enemy forces, the human element, particularly the military leader's inefficiency at an operational level, catalyzed the dramatic loss.

The impact of military leaders during this War was undeniable, with rare examples of determined leadership resulting in localized successes. However, these isolated instances were insufficient to secure victory at the strategic level. According to Çakmak and Tetik (2011), one contributing factor to the lack of quality among military leaders can be traced back to the 1908 law regulating ranks, a historical context crucial to understanding the challenges faced by the Ottoman forces. This law led to the removal of experienced leaders from the chain of command and their replacement with younger, inexperienced counterparts. This decision had far-reaching implications for the outcome of the War.

Perhaps a few of the positive facts, albeit not enough to change the condition, were the functional newly established triangular division architecture (three infantry regiments, backed up by artillery support) and centralized artillery pool that could be tasked quickly according to demand and threat level of the forces (Erickson 2012). Second, reorganization, especially of the Eastern army, was not inadequate (it could be reorganized three times). Easiness and capability in this reorganizational activities according to mission and task were due to the ability of unconventional counterinsurgency heritage of the officers who had Tripoli War experience, according to Uyar and Erickson (2009). Third, when properly employed, officers showed higher performance, such as Şükrü Pasha to Edirne (Adrionople), Hasan Rıza Pasha to İşkodra (Shkodra), and Esat Pasha and Vehib Bey to Yanya.

A common point of these operational military leaders is that they were the best, brightest, most determined, experienced, and innovative military leaders (Uyar and Erickson 2009). This selection of commanders reflects the assignments by seeking the competence of the officers. This achievement, albeit rare, proves the hypothesis that competent military leaders either win in the battles or do not serve the victory to the enemy in a golden plate. They Show maximum resistance as long as all other factors open a door for them, even if they lack support from the higher commands.

3.3.5 Enver Pasha's Purge in 1914

Undoubtedly, one of the most pivotal events in the history of the Ottoman Army was the systematic and wide-ranging purge of officers in January 1914. This purge, orchestrated by the leading group and political party of the Committee of Union

and Progress (CUP), and particularly by Enver Pasha, marked a significant shift in the army's leadership dynamics. Enver Pasha, a firm believer in the efficiency of younger commanders, implemented these purges with the aim of rejuvenating the army's leadership.[19]

On January 3, 1914, the CUP replaced the minister of war, Ahmet Izzet Paşa, with the newly promoted Staff Colonel Enver (who now styled himself the "conqueror of Adrianople"). The young and aggressive Enver immediately began to forcibly retire large numbers of older army officers, many of whom were the surviving alayli (rankers). He held that these men were too cautious, politically unreliable, ignorant, and timid. Some of the officers were, of course, members of competing political parties.

Within a short span, Enver compelled the retirement of two field marshals, three lieutenant generals, 30 major generals, 95 brigadier generals, 184 colonels, 236 lieutenant colonels, and majors, along with approximately 800 captains and lieutenants. While the officers were not physically harmed, this action constituted a purge (Uyar and Erickson 2009); in total, over 800 high-ranking officers were dismissed, including two field marshals, three lieutenant generals, 30 major generals, and 35 brigadier generals. More than 1100 officers were removed from service, primarily for reasons such as inefficiency, fleeing from the battlefield, poor performance, and disciplinary issues during the Balkan Wars Erickson (2000). This purge significantly altered the composition of the Ottoman Army's leadership by removing many experienced officers and replacing them with younger, less experienced ones. This created opportunities for younger and more aggressive officers, who had distinguished themselves in the Balkan Wars, to advance to high command rapidly. Prominent among these promising officers were Cevat Paşa, Cevit Paşa, Esat Paşa, Galip Bey, Hafif Hakki Bey, Halil Bey, Mahmut Muhtar Paşa, Mehmet Vehip Bey, Mustafa Fevzi Bey, Mustafa Kemal Bey, and Yakup Şevki Bey. These soldiers would lead the Turks to many victories during World War I and the War of Independence. This change in personnel profoundly impacted the army's efficiency and performance in subsequent battles.

Although the intent was to replace the inefficient commanders during the Balkan Wars, the law of 1909, enacted to modernize the Ottoman Army and decrease the ranks in the military, led to the retirement of many commanders as a side effect. This law, which aimed to streamline the command structure, inadvertently allowed

[19]The 3rd Corps (Today known as Nato Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey (NRDC-T) operating under NATO), which would later play a crucial role in the defense of Gallipoli Peninsula in the World War I, was the main unit affected by these changes.The corps commander, Esat (Bülkat) Pasha, the hero of Yanya's successful defense, was only 53. The19th Division commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), who shined in the Gallipoli Campaign, only 34 (Uyar and Erickson 2009).

many qualified officers who had spent their years in the field and in the headquarters to gain influential positions in the chain of command. This, unfortunately, failed to maintain armies' cohesion, highlighting the delicate balance between efficiency and experience in military leadership.

Many were appointed to critical positions after this law left their units, even their divisions, without showing enough resistance during the battles (Çakmak and Tetik 2011). One can also claim that these removals were done by ideological considerations and according to the loyalty possessed by the CUP. However, independent from underlying ideological considerations, this change created a different portfolio of officers in the Gallipoli War compared to the pre-purge era of the Balkan Wars.

Literature on commanders' efficiency highlights two essential attributes influencing battle outcomes: competence and loyalty (Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr 2020; Reiter and Wagstaff 2018). The purge of 1914 provides this study ammunition to compare the two different groups of commanders (those who took part in the Balkan Wars and those who were present in the Gallipoli Campaign). In this article, the analysis will concentrate on the impact of variables around these two fields of explanation. Measuring competence is relatively more straightforward when one looks at pre-battle experience, graduation, and military academy graduation level. The second group of variables that aims to test loyalty is more difficult to assess. Suppose the purge of Enver Pasha in 1914 increases the overall commander efficiency. In that case, supporters of loyalty-based explanations will have more explanatory power to explain the increase in efficiency.

On the other hand, measuring loyalty is challenging because, after 1918, almost no officer had openly declared a pro-CUP stance. To test the loyalty, this chapter will introduce two proxy measures: exiled to Malta (During the Ferit Pasha Cabinet and with the British political dictation) and tasked to Military Courts between 1913 and 1918. Loyalty can be considered a pro-CUP affiliation, primarily until 1918 (After 1918, The CUP was removed from office and became the scapegoat for failure in Ottoman policies and the wars lost). It was hardly possible for any officer to be anti-CUP and be tasked to Military Courts (Divan-ı Harp Mahkemeleri) during the one-party CUP hegemony in Ottoman administration between 1913 and 1918. Staff officers were not included in this analysis as they are usually tasked with more operational missions. The claim holds for non-staff officers. Building on these two proxy matters, this dissertation intends to establish the affiliation as the allegiance status of the commanders. To clarify, this article does not evaluate the intentions of CUP or the malignance or benevolence of CUP policies. Only seek to capture if any tie exists between pro-CUP commanders and their overall efficiency in these

battles.

Another issue in terms of personnel competence is the source of the officers. After the "March 31 Incident", on April 13, 1909, the conflict between "alaylı" officers (rankers, not graduating from official military academies) and 'mektepli' (military academy graduates) resulted in the dominance of the "mektepli" group of officers. We see the increasing trend in personnel origin favoring 'mektepli' officers in both wars. The ratio of staff officers primarily increased during the Gallipoli War. The Supreme Military Council promulgated two critical laws. The first, 'Law for Age Limitation,' passed on June 26, 1909, limited promotion, especially for rankers, adding an age limit (i.e., lieutenants serving over 50 years old). The second law, "Law for the Purge of Military Ranks," on August 7, 1909, reorganized and reduced the ranks of the Ottoman army Erickson (2000). These laws aimed to increase the capability of human resources and bring more young officers to the system. These were important decisions that had a long-term positive effect on the competency of the officers, increasing overall efficiency. This dissertation analyzes age and military service years as factors affecting military effectiveness. Results show that age has a negative effect; in other words, as long as age increases, the overall military effectiveness decreases in almost all of these late Ottoman wars. In this case, Enver Pasha's inclination towards making the army younger seems to be a relevant solution. Similarly, but positively, the number of years in the military service is correlated with overall promotion and military effectiveness.

3.3.6 Gallipoli Campaign

The Gallipoli Campaign, one of the Ottoman fronts in World War 1, 1915-16, also known as the Çanakkale War, holds significant importance for Turkish society. This victory by the Ottoman Empire provided physical benefits and recovery for the state. It instilled a sense of ambition in Turks to fight in upcoming wars, such as the Turkish War of Independence. In contrast to the Balkan Wars, the success of this series of battles was a testament to the strategic brilliance of the Turkish General Staff and the German generals, a fact that should leave our audience in awe. For example, the mobilization started even before the war, with the reinforcement of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The 3rd Corps was assigned to protect the area, and various military units were allocated to the region under the leadership of the 3rd Corps. The Turkish General Staff handed commandment authority to one of its most brilliant and influential German generals, Liman Von Sanders, who was accompanied by the

most respected and clever Turkish Staff Officers, such as Cevat Pasha and Mustafa Kemal.

The Gallipoli (or Dardanelles) front was significant and a turning point for the Ottomans during World War I. It marked their revival after their tragic defeat in the Balkan Wars. The battles fought here were crucial and pivotal in boosting the morale of the Ottoman Military and impacting the outcome of the war. Success was not just due to factors such as effective leadership, resource mobilization, and strategic deployment of troops but also the strategic importance of the Gallipoli front.

This Campaign formed a typical British military operational plan in which a strong and effective British Navy supported the invasion. However, the main difficulty for this Campaign was the number of infantries to be deployed, as the British previously executed such Navy-Army joint operations but only with a limited number of land forces. Regarding Gallipoli, the size of landing units became an issue. Thus, Allied troops and the British benefitted from the ANZACs, particularly his Campaign. Despite challenging issues in terms of staffing, One of the factors that encouraged the British War Council for the large amphibious operations was also the Ottoman defeat in the First Balkan War of 1912–13, giving a perception as an inefficient and weak army (Erickson 2015). British strategy was to penetrate the Marmara Sea with a strong navy and gain control of the capital, İstanbul, forcing the Ottoman Empire to withdraw from the war. But, unexpectedly, allied forces could not succeed in their naval trial and were stuck to the land of the Gallipoli peninsula until the end of the land war.

The Gallipoli Campaign was a fierce battle that saw the Ottomans in defense mode for the first phase, battling against the British and French fleets. The next phase of the war was land battles, where both sides dug trenches in the hilly and forested area of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The Ottomans fortified the area with many forts and heavy artillery regiments, making it challenging for the Allied troops to conquer. The Ottoman III Corps was responsible for defending the area, consisting of the 7th, 8th, and 9th Infantry divisions, 9th Field Artillery Regiment, and 3rd Cavalry Brigade. Interestingly, these same units had also fought in the Balkan wars. This fact can help us analyze the similarities and differences between the two wars. The Gallipoli War was a pure infantry operation, and the terrain added to the difficulties faced by both sides. The Gallipoli peninsula, a narrow strip of land between Dardanelles Strait and the Aegean Sea, 47 miles long and between three and twelve miles wide, presented a unique topography. It included rare forests, dense, low ground cover scrub, deeply incised valleys, slightly increasing elevation to the North, and few

narrow beaches suitable for amphibious landing, making it a challenging terrain for the troops.

As Erickson Erickson (2000) points out, despite its disadvantages, such as weak manning, quantitative inferiority, and lack of logistics and artillery support, the Ottoman Army showed an impressive capacity to recover and adjust throughout the Gallipoli Campaign. They turned their quantitative inferiority into a local superiority, won battles, and showcased a working and ambitious military leadership in all phases and fronts of the Gallipoli War. The army's operational and tactical units held their positions and trenches until the end, and the loss of commanders and units was swiftly replaced. At the strategic level, units were effectively chosen, trained, and reorganized. The orchestration of artillery, infantry, and support units was highly efficient during the battles in Gallipoli, indicating high-quality military planners. Many efficient commanders such as Esat Pasha, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Şevki Pasha, Halil Pasha, and many others were present at the operational and tactical levels, showcasing the Ottoman Army's strategic and tactical prowess. In the initial phases of the Campaign, the Ottoman infantry did not have experience in trench warfare, and soldiers in the Gallipoli campaign were mainly new to the battles. However, the officers' quality and ability to adapt overcame this difficulty. Many officers had prior experience in the Tripoli War, and the soldiers learned from the field itself (Conk 1947). This Adaptation and resilience, demonstrated by the Ottoman infantry, is a testament to the Ottoman military's effectiveness.

Alternative Explanations for the Ottoman victory are twofold: the Germans won the Gallipoli victory as the reforms in Ottoman military institutions belonged to them, and second, German officers fought in most of the critical positions, which is why the German command brought success. However, both theories seem to either exaggerate the German contribution, oversimplify the mechanisms that led to the victory, or ignore the main actors, the Turkish military leaders. The truth is that the competent Ottoman military leaders, with their strategic prowess, played a significant role in achieving victory during the Gallipoli Campaign.

A commonly endorsed rationale for the Ottoman military's triumph on the Gallipoli front posits that the success is not primarily attributable to an enhancement in the quality of the commanding cadre. Instead, it is ascribed to the impactful contributions of German commanders who played a pivotal role in executing the war and rejuvenating the antiquated and problematic military doctrine, thereby making the audience feel the significant impact of the German officers.

First, according to the German German Influence Theory, the contribution of German officers was another area that contributed to increased Ottoman military effi-

ciency. For instance, Lt. Col. Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, who was initially assigned as a teacher to an artillery school, was later given responsibility by the Ottoman General Staff as an operational branch chief for planning the Suez Canal Campaign. This is just one example of German officers' significant roles in shaping the Ottoman military strategy. However, the amount of impact of German officers on the victory as a central causal effect is under question. This fact alone cannot explain the victory in the Gallipoli War. Moreover, its impact on the war itself needs further evaluation as many of the reforms in manning were implemented before the arrival of the German consulting group, including Liman von Sanders and his fellows.

Although the German Reform mission contributed a lot to the reorganization and modernization of the army, it would be misleading to ignore the overall efforts in increasing the military effectiveness of the Ottoman military and merely explain the improvements by the German support (Erickson 2007, 11). For instance, the mission introduced new training methods, modern equipment, and strategic planning techniques. Many of the claims favoring German impact are rooted in memoirs and reports of participants themselves, for example, Liman von Sanders, Kress von Kressenstein, Mühlmann, Güse, and von Kannengiesser (Robertson 1990, 271). The second source of exaggeration of the German impact might be the British sources to explain the defeat in Gallipoli, not against the so-called "incapable and weak Ottomans" but against the stronger Germans following Anglo-Saxon superiority (Cohen and Gooch 2006; Travers 2009).

In addition, according to Uyar and Erickson (2009), Liman von Sanders and his German friends were not so distinguished officers in battles, most of them having limited backgrounds for highly demanding military command issues. In addition to that, the German advisory group arrived just nine months before the Gallipoli War. Even after their late arrival, these advisors were kept in passive positions due to some official permits and authorization for further assignments by the Ottoman bureaucratic structure (Uyar and Erickson 2009). For example, Lt.Col. Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein was first assigned as a teacher to an artillery school. After two months, he was given responsibility by the Ottoman General Staff as an operational branch chief for planning the Suez Canal Campaign. Secondly, the reorganization of the Ottoman Army started after the Balkan defeat and before the arrival of the German Military Mission. A new triangular division system, the problematic "Redif" reserve system, was abolished, and other structural changes were introduced before their arrival Uyar and Erickson (2009). The elimination of aged and incapable officers and replacement of them with younger and better-trained alternatives were practiced by the Enver Pasha'sPasha's purge without even

consulting Liman von Sanders. Lastly, the Ottoman armies and general staff were not only familiar with but deeply ingrained in the German military system. This familiarity belonged not to the German Military Mission of 1913 but to 1885 when many Ottoman officers were sent abroad to Germany for military training. The German doctrine was not something new among the current commanding officers.

The reorganization of the Army during the 1910s was a devoted project of Ahmed Izzet Pasha and his fellow staff officers who were sent to Germany for military training (Uyar and Erickson 2009). Admiring the quality of operational planning and execution, many Ottoman high-ranking officers diligently adopted the current military structure to a more Western (preferably German) style. This active adoption of the German military structure by the Ottoman high-ranking officers not only demonstrates their agency in the reforms but also their unwavering commitment to improving the Ottoman military's capabilities. The Ottoman Ministry of War and General Staff welcomed the German advisors. These German officers, at first, were tasked with educational posts. Soon after their orientation, many were given command positions in the Army. The most visible example is Limon von Sanders, the 5th Army Commander and commander of the Gallipoli War.

However, it might fall short of crediting the German advisory for achieving the victory. Their contribution is undeniable in increasing military efficiency, but according to the facts listed below, their impact may not be exaggerated. These facts include the improved quality of individual commanders, the material factors, and the Ottoman military's familiarity with the German military system. When considered together, these factors provide a more comprehensive understanding of the Ottoman military's success in the Gallipoli War, balancing the role of the German advisory with other significant factors.

The second claim that the Germans commanded or planned most of the Ottoman Army's operations is irrelevant, considering the number of officers and critical positions. During the Gallipoli Campaign, Liman Von Sanders served as the commander of the 5th Army. However, the Turkish Army itself had control over the operations at the corps level and below, except for von Sanders at Gallipoli. There were significant disagreements between Limon von Sanders and Esat Pasha regarding the strategic and operational preparation of the peninsula against the enemy's amphibious landing. Limon von Sanders advocated for powerful and reinforced units to face the enemy from the coastal lines, aiming to stop them from advancing further. On the other hand, Esat Pasha believed in taking a position further back, in a coordinated and strong trench line that would avoid perishing from the enemy artillery attack during the landing. This disagreement underscores the complexity of the strategic

and operational decisions during the campaign. History proved Esat Pasha right, but Limon von Sanders's plan was implemented at the cost of more casualties. Most of the planning for the General staff was also done by the Turkish staff officers. During the Gallipoli campaign, no German commanders held operational or below positions on the Gallipoli peninsula, clearly highlighting the assessment of Turkish military effectiveness alone. However, over 400 Germans, including Vice-Admiral Guido Usedom, assigned to the coastal defense fortresses guarding the straits, played a crucial role during the military operation's preparation phase (Uyar and Erickson 2009).

According to the Official History of the Turkish Army, 2,850,000 soldiers were mobilized in World War 1, with 202,152 Ottoman prisoners of war on all fronts (constituting 7 percent of the total). Particularly for the Gallipoli front, 315,500 soldiers were mobilized, and 10,022 soldiers surrendered (3.1 percent of the total) (Gürcan and Johnson 2016, 9). This result can be interpreted as the commitment to the war was higher compared to other fronts and from the Balkan Wars (Gürcan and Johnson 2016, 9). However, I still need more clarification as the type of the battles differed from other areas in terms of troops; it was very dense, and the war was static with the main characteristics of trench warfare. This formation reduces the probability of surrender and increases the likelihood of death. Some historians, such as Cemal Kutay, favor the fighting will as the reason for Ottoman success against a technologically and materially superior force (Kutay 1982). Recognizing the significant roles of commitment and cohesion during the campaign, this dissertation posits that the competence of military leaders served as the primary explanatory variable for the victory. It further hypothesizes that the fighting will of the troops was strongly linked to the influence and motivation provided by their commanders.

The factors that worked against the Allies were numerous: the broken terrain and distance made it challenging to advance, the Ottomans' determination was a formidable obstacle, the lack of support in case of casualties was a significant disadvantage, and the shortage of ammunition further hampered their efforts (Gürcan and Johnson 2016). From the Ottoman perspective, the achievement relied on the well-trained and high quality of the troops (Erickson 2015); the peninsula's proximity to İstanbul and Anatolia facilitated logistic support and deployments, a functioning chain of command ensured efficient operations, competent commanders led the troops, and realistic defense plans were in place. The Gallipoli campaign concluded with an Ottoman victory, leaving behind 230,000 Allied casualties and 300,000 Ottoman losses, with the number of deaths reaching 86,692 (Trumpener 2010).

Even though much of the credit was given to Liman von Sanders as the architect of

Gallipoli's victory, the plan applied was nearly the same as the Turkish staff proposed to him (Çalışkan 2016, 41). Liman von Sanders was assigned as the commander of the 5th ArmyArmy, the highest command responsible for defending Gallipoli. III and XV Corps and the Çanakkale Fortified Area Command were the main corps-level units that he controlled. 19th Division and 5th Division constituted the reserve of the 5th Army. Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal, Commander of the 19th Division, was one of the competent officers who changed the course of the operations significantly when he prevented aggressive attacks of the landed Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC)' attacks threatening the Kocaçimen Hill, one of the most critical juncture point for defending . Later on, Mustafa Kemal could build a defensive stronghold and control and reinforce Conkbayırı until the end of the battles in the Gallipoli peninsula (Erickson 2015). Allied forces, realizing that advance would not be possible by Conkbayırı (the narrowest and highest land area in the peninsula that both Dardanelles Strait and the Saros Gulf are visible, thus possessing strategic value), then revised their plans for an amphibious landing and attack in Saros Gulf through Anafartalar plain at the North of Arıburnu. Mustafa Kemal's success in holding Conkbayırı was the initiative he used to capture the evacuated lines of the 27th (9th division) regiment that suffered heavily from casualties without necessarily waiting for the fort he ordered to reach from the headquarters [20]. This decision was correct as the emergency of the critical situation dictated to do so. (The usage of self-initiative is explained with the same example of his book, Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal, to take every necessary measure for task achievement (Çalışkan 2016). This is a clear example of competence built on military expertise and experience.

Although the Gallipoli Campaign has been explained by the Western resources as a missed victory due to coordination problems and poor planning (Aspinall-Oglander 1929; Liddell Hart 2014; Uyar and Erickson 2009), in reality, it is a clear manifestation of the Ottoman military effectiveness. Ottoman Fifth Army defended the area almost without significant mistakes and with efficient planning, execution, and administration. Dardanelles Fortified Zone Command (Çanakkale Müstahkem Mevki Kumandanlığı), the unit responsible for reinforcing the area, was established before 1914 (Uyar and Erickson 2009). Fortified Zone Command also played a crucial role in preventing the naval assault of the Allies on March 18, 1915. Albeit successful in land warfare, if the proposed plan of the Fortified Area Command for defending the peninsula from the earliest and few landing beaches that were suitable for amphibious operations (Seddülbahir-Cape Helle'sHelle's region and Kabatepe region),

[20] This is where Mustafa Kemal issued his famous order to the soldiers of the 57th Regiment: "I do not expect you to attack. I am ordering you to die. In the time that passes until we die, other troops and commanders can come and take our place" (Bay 2011, 101).

instead of relying on the reserve units to be positioned at the far sight to these landing areas, the losses of the 5th Army would be significantly fewer (Aksakal 2003). This alternative strategic defense choice provides a better solution for halting the Allied forces and, thus, is an indicator of military effectiveness generated not necessarily by the German officers but by Turkish military command. Liman von Sanders also assumed the main landing area as the Bolayır (Bulair)-Saros region. Hence, the weight of the defending forces was given to Arıburnu. However, Allied forces landed at Arıburnu, a very narrow beach with a suddenly elevating cliff in front of it, perhaps to benefit from the principle of surprise.

Moreover, if all of the commands given by the Limon Von Sanders had been applied, the Conkbayırı, a very strategic point for controlling the narrowest part of the penşnsula, might have been lost. However, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), The 19th Division Commander, could stop Anzacs after openly disregarding Limon Von Sanders'Sanders' orders. His strategic thinking and leadership skills were instrumental in the Ottoman military's success. Compared to the number of commanding positions, German officers also kept few critical positions, and the majority of the Turkish military leaders in command proved the claim that the operational success belonged mostly to the Turkish army cadre. Among 80 commanding officers and 23 chiefs of staff, Only eight were Germans (Uyar and Erickson 2009).

Gallipoli's victory is the outcome of the Ottoman military leader's success. It should be noted that this victory and the magnificent military effectiveness also have been created after just 1-2 years of the catastrophic and traumatic Balkan Wars, and also after the Sarıkamış Event, which resulted in around 90.000 losses just because of the cold during the earliest phases of the World War1 in 1914 (Aksun 2005). Psychologically, the Gallipoli victory re-established cohesion in the military, increased the determination of the military cadres against invaders, and helped to revive the honor and the expectation for survival not only in the military but also in Ottoman society.

At the operational level of warfare, the Ottoman Fifth Army demonstrated a high level of strategic thinking. They implemented a range of solution-oriented tactics, such as constructing new communication lines around the Dardanelles strait, conducting large-scale night attacks, and swiftly reorganizing units and regiments. These tactics, a clear manifestation of their strategic acumen, significantly enhanced the audience's understanding of their effectiveness.

While combat effectiveness is where the actual fighting occurs, it is at the operational level that the broader perspective of military effectiveness is shaped. This dissertation delves into the importance of operational effectiveness as a precondition

to military effectiveness, examining the effective allocation of forces and the quality of military leaders at this level of warfare. This emphasis on operational effectiveness underscores its crucial role in shaping military effectiveness. (Erickson 2007, 4) evaluates Ottoman military effectiveness according to leadership: command and staff, (2) training and experience, (3) operational and tactical doctrines, and (4) organizational architecture. Erickson's studies, meticulously conducted and drawing from the archival and official resources of the Turkish Army's General Staff Military History and Strategy Institute (Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etut or ATASE for short), enhance the credibility of the findings. These findings propose that the Ottoman Army was effective in terms of military due to factors such as organizational architecture, experienced combat leaders, and battle plan application (Erickson 2007, 5).

Contrary to international expectations, the Ottoman Army performed excellently during World War I, particularly on the Gallipoli front. This surprising turn of events, considering they had only one year of peace at the end of the Balkan War (1913) and had experienced a dramatic failure in the Balkan Wars, creates intrigue around their capabilities (Erickson 2007, 6). From a British perspective, the Ottoman army was perceived to lack organization and discipline (Sheffy 2014), with an incapable high command [21], and a deficiency in all kinds of military resources. [22]

Especially in this period, the Ottoman Army demonstrated an incredible effort to overcome these problems such as establishing a dynamic leadership, standardizing operational practices, and providing working and institutional support.[23] The reasons for the defeat in the Balkans can be listed as political mistakes, inadequate military preparations, lack of navy use, national faults, deficiencies in mobilization, errors in troop assembly, strategy, tactics, and poor morale in the army (Erickson 2003). All these errors played a role in the defeat in the Balkan Wars. However, this dissertation will selectively focus on the role of the military leaders. As Major Asım particularly emphasized the ignorance of application tactics, poor linkages between commanders and their units, and most importantly, incompetent officers as a source of ineffectiveness, the research on military leaders gains a vital relevance to grasp this dramatic defeat better. We see the struggle to address this lack of competence in the Staff Major Mehmet Nuri (later Nuri Conker) conference 1913 titled 'Officer

[21] TNA, H.D.Beaumont, Turkey, Annual Report, 1913, 4 December 1914, 31, Foreign Office Papers, FO 371/2137.

[22] TNA, Cunliffe-Owen to Sir L.Mallet, Constantinople, 26 December 1913, FO 424/251.

[23] see Erickson (2003), Defeat in Detail, The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913

and Commander ' (Zabit ve Kumandan).[24]

From an organizational standpoint, Ahmet Izzet Pasha took the initiative to initiate a comprehensive restructuring phase of the army. This involved reorganizing the military units and, notably, eliminating all reserve units (Redif), a move that had not been successful during the Balkan Wars. This restructuring, a significant step towards addressing the army's weaknesses and preparing it for future challenges, was a proactive measure that underscored the Ottoman Army's commitment to learning from its past mistakes and improving its capabilities.

In 1915, the British evacuated the peninsula, acknowledging the strategic brilliance of the Ottoman commanders. Ottomans demonstrated a superior will to fight, effective leadership, and tactical acumen. The operational effectiveness of the III Corps, which had the primary responsibility to defend the peninsula, was gained because of the commander's choice of realistic objectives and reasonable allocation and management of the forces (Erickson 2007, 160). A flexible command structure created an environment where the Ottoman commanders could use their self-initiative. Experience also helped Ottoman military leaders to overcome tactical and operational threats. Another characteristic that ensured the victory was the aggressiveness and competence of the military leaders like Major Kadri (battalion), Lieutenant Colonel Şefik and Major Mahmut Sabri (regimental), Colonel Halil Sami and Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal (Division), and Esat Paşa (corps) under different levels of command (Erickson 2007, 160). In terms of age, Ottoman military leaders were comparatively younger than their rivals. For instance, Mustafa Kemal was 34 years old, whereas his opponent Birdwood was 51 years old and a lieutenant general. This pattern was typical on almost all fronts in this campaign.

The adaptability of the Ottoman forces was a critical factor in their success. Organizational flexibility provided an advantage for Ottomans to cross-attach regiments and battalions, which could make it possible to replace the units on the front lines that suffered from mass casualties. Another organizational feature is the triangular system of unit attachments, which proved effective compared to the Balkan wars. This design helped Ottoman forces to replace different types of units under another force structure, like taking a regiment from one brigade and task to another one (Erickson 2007). This exchange was relevant not only for the units but also for the troops that belonged to different military branch as engineers, cavalry or gendarmerie. This rapid and timely adjustment was something that British forces lacked as they usually relied on infantry units (Erickson 2007). This capability

[24]Moreover, the book with the same title was written by Staff Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal, which provides a fascinating insight into this period.

also enabled Ottoman forces to allocate forces according to territorial or contextual priorities.

In essence, the Ottoman forces' superior military leadership, which can be understood as the ability of their commanders to lead and inspire their troops effectively, was a critical factor in their military effectiveness. This, combined with resilience, practical application of tactics, war experience, good training, a working and competent chain of command, and the combination of all of these factors, helped Ottoman forces generate a higher level of military effectiveness. A thorough analysis of the crucial factors that led to success indicates that, above all else, the proficiency of the military leaders was the key to ensuring victory.

To illustrate, one of the examples of an outstanding military leadership, among hundreds of equally fascinating commanders, is the Cevat Pasha, commander of the Çanakkale Fortified Zone. During the Gallipoli War, the commander was not just anyone but a figure of respect and intrigue Esat Pasha. It's interesting to note that before this, he had been assigned to Thrace, where he commanded units in defense of Janina, Greece, during the Balkan War. He was not just respected but revered by Ottoman society and known for his genuineness and skill in managing trench warfare, a testament to his leadership and strategic prowess.[25]

According to many scholars, Ottomans should have gone in defeat so early, before the eruption of World War 1. However, we see a very high military efficiency in the battles fought on the Gallipoli Front during WW1. One of the leading scholars in military history and Ottoman'sOttoman's military efficiency, Edward J. Erickson, states that Ottomans were still combat effective and resilient for various reasons such as building innovative organizations, decentralizing command structure, being extremely capable of staff officers, working administrative structure and the efficiency of military leaders (Erickson 2000). Enver Pasha's reorganization of the personnel structure was a vital change before the approaching WW1. This radical decision and change in battle commanders provide a unique advantage for comparing the two groups of commanders' traits in very similar wars.

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[25] A very competent military leader, Cevat Paşa (General Cevat Çobanlı: 1870-1938), played a critical role in defending the Dardanelles against the British during the Gallipoli Campaign. He was previously responsible for the fortification of the peninsula as the commander of the Çanakkale Fortified Zone. However, even though he was highly successful during the Gallipoli Campaign, Enver Paşa prevented him from outshining as a person, not allowing for a potentially too prominent figure him (similarly to the relations between Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal) (Kut 2022). Colonel Cevat, later Major General, excelled in planning and executing advanced defensive measures. He graduated from the Lycée Impérial Ottoman de Galatasaray in 1888 and the Military School in 1891, then became the valedictorian at the War Academy in 1894. Before his assignment to the Çatalca Fortified Zone (ÇFZ), Cevat Bey served as Chief of Staff for the First (later Eastern) Army and the Çatalca Fortified Zone and Artillery Command during the First Balkan War (1912). In the Second Balkan War (1913), he led the 9th Division in recapturing Edirne from the Bulgarians and participated in border delimitation commissions. His extensive experience made him suitable for the crucial strategic position at the ÇFZ, especially during the tense period following the Balkan Wars and leading up to World War I.

They impacted the army, especially after the 1908 law of purge of the ranks and Enver Pasha's forced retirement in 1914, which significantly altered the promotion dynamics. The effect is also seen in the promotions during the period after 1908. According to Figure 3.2, most senior officers could be promoted only for one rank. The graphic shows the number of promotions across the graduation year from the military academy. We see a higher number of promotions in the graduates between 1890 and 1908. Another pattern is that in most of the promotions for this officer group, the average promotion increase is 1 or 2. There was no mechanism of demotion in the Ottoman and, today, Turkish military systems. Officers are either promoted by excellent achievements or by age or seniority.

Figure 3.2 Ottoman Officers' Promotions by Graduation



The 1908 law of purge of the ranks and Enver Pasha's forced retirement in 1914 were pivotal moments that significantly altered the promotion dynamics in the Ottoman military. This effect is clearly seen in the promotions during the period after 1908. As depicted in Figure 3.3, most senior officers could be promoted only for one rank. The graphic shows the number of promotions across the graduation year from the military academy. We observe a higher number of promotions in the graduates

between 1890 and 1908. Another pattern is that in most of the promotions for this officer group, the average promotion increase is 1 or 2. There was no mechanism of demotion in the Ottoman and, today, Turkish military systems. Officers are either promoted by excellent achievements or by age or seniority.

In some exceptional cases, after disciplinary procedures or military court decisions, some of the officer's ranks can still be decreased, or a person can be discharged from the military system. For instance, Mustafa (Nemrud), an infantry officer (brigadier general), On December 16, 1918, was tried in absentia by the Istanbul Martial Court and sentenced to six months in prison. He was dismissed from the military service with a ban on re-entering state service because of his connection with the CUP. 1918 and on was the witch hunt era for CUP members as Damat Ferit Pasha's government came into power, and CUP was the target for arrest, mainly because of British pressure. These are the overall promotions in the Ottoman army. However, it is essential to distinguish the promotions done before an important event, such as a war, from the promotions just after it. The previous phase shows how the war's military cadre reached that position. Is it because of the competence or loyalty? Usually, in principle, promotions are expected to be done in parallel with competence and achievements. However, this is not always the case in corrupted armies or in politically dominated armies. The 5th chapter of this dissertation explains these processes in the Turkish context with its findings, emphasizing the crucial role of competence and achievements in promotions. Again, in principle, promotions are expected to be higher after the war if participants in that event gained success and if it was a victory. Thus, higher probability promotions in a group correlate with the battle outcome. Hence, we don't expect promotions after a defeat or failure. This is the case for the Balkan Wars.

Figure 3.3 Ottoman Officers' Tenure vs. Graduation



The distribution of military officers across graduation years and the number of promotions is closely aligned with their tenure. Those who graduated earlier faced challenges in reaching 1915, mainly due to the impact of army laws and regulations (as illustrated in Figure 3.3), which significantly shaped their careers and, by extension, the course of history.

According to the TURCO dataset, the earliest exits from the military were officers killed during the Balkan War, a significant conflict in the region. These include Zekeriya Hulki (colonel), Cavit (brigadier general), Ali Vefa (lieutenant colonel), Kazım (colonel), Mehmet Faik (colonel), Haşim (brigadier general), and Fethi (major general). Additionally, 64 officers terminated their military service in 1914 following Enver Pasha's decision—a pivotal moment in Turkish military history. The eldest among them graduated in 1875, while the youngest graduated in 1895.

Most officers who graduated after 1895 continued to serve until the 1930s and beyond, including participation in the Turkish War of Independence (1919-22). This group of commanders went on to serve in the newly established Turkish Republic.

Figure 3.4 Military Leaders' Competence Statuses



In a well-functioning military organization, officers are promoted based on competence. Merit-based promotion encourages personnel to contribute to the organization's goals and follow successful career paths. Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 are the same graphics, excluding the ones killed during the war. The results are almost identical. The y-axis on the left represents the military academic success. If an officer graduates as the 1st among his peers, then receives 100, and the academically average offer is 50, Commanders 'ar participation has also coded the symbols, a diamond representing the participation in 5 wars at maximum between 1897 and 1922. Academically, more successful officers also contribute to the maximum number of wars. Especşally those who graduate after 1895 are the more extensive group of officers in terms of number of graduates. Competence in this setting also shows long-term recruitment correlates with academic success. This is perhaps a complementary finding to Duckworth (2006) , who states that educational success is just relevant for the first years of a Professional career. In the Turkish context, the period is highly dense with various and frequent wars starting from the 1897 Turkish Greco War, followed by the 1910 Tripoli, the 1912 Balkan War, Gallipoli in 1915, and World War 1 between 1914-18, and finally the Turkish war of Independence in 1919.

Contrary to common assumptions, these competent officers had not necessarily attended these wars. The common belief suggests that a soldier should be present

wherever and whenever he is tasked, assigned, or told. However, that was not the reality in this period and the Turkish context. Many officers chose to leave the army for various reasons, including direct or indirect excuses or preferences. In the dataset, 119 of the commander's retirement information is missing due to the absence of the records. So, their retirement and if they have multiple retirements are not straightforward.

Moreover, 78 of the commanders, which is 9% of the total sample, have at least two different retirement years. A few examples: Vasıf (Kara) (1316-P.13), former regiment commander in military Academy and founder of the Karakol Society (guard Society), a clandestine organization to collect intelligence during British occupation of İstanbul in 1918, was retired in 1916, but after the Turkish War of Independence continued to work (until being sentenced to death in 1931); Hüseyin Hilmi İnceören (1308-Ağ.Top.1) retired in 1916, in 1923 again; Ömer Lütfi Argeşo (1316-P.25) forcefully gets retired by Enver Pasha in 1914, after WW1 returns to the arny, gets retired again after Turkish war of Independence in 1923. Another pattern that has been seen in the dataset is the choice of seeking asylum from another separated-from-Ottoman state, and thus voluntarily not coming to the military service as colonels Sadık Sabri (1312-P.1) to Egypt, İsmail Hakkı (1316-P.9) to Syria (Damascus), Mehmet Zekeriya (1316-P.24) to Syria, Aleppo (all being discharged from military service by the court decision). Considering many instances like this, one can also claim that continuing to participate in the wars is a self-initiative and personal choice. If it is an individual decision to join or not join the army, especially in a term filled with endless conflicts and battles, then staying longer in this harsh condition demonstrates resilience, dedication, and commitment. The resilience and dedication of these officers are a testament to the commitment of military personnel.

Early entry into the military service usually results in a late exit. Those who start their military career earlier than others, not only limited to the 1900s of the Ottoman Empire but still relevant for modern Turkey, are more likely to serve longer and have a long military career. Figure 3.6 shows some evidence for this pattern in terms of manning and recruitment. On the left are the final ranks achieved, 10 representing the field marshal, 9 general, and 5 colonels. The second and third diagrams demonstrate the backgrounds of officers with military secondary education (education received after primary education and before the tertiary stage) and high school (education that follows primary education and precedes tertiary education). Those who graduated from these early military educational institutions reach the highest rank if unexpected occurrences do not happen, such as death or being killed in action. Most of the highest ranks achieved in total is the cumulation of the graduates from these early military schools. In the late Ottoman era, these schools

were well appreciated because they were given higher levels and more scientific education than the other civilian public schools. Many families preferred to register their sons in these schools even though they did not seek a military career so that their children could benefit from these institutions' high standards and quality. This graph also shows evidence regarding military and state human resource planning as establishing an opportunity for individuals to enter the military, state, or army to have long-lasting and durable staffing and a more qualified group of officers. Perhaps investing in those institutions is reasonable in terms of bureaucratic and military organizational human resources.

Figure 3.5 Early Military Training vs Maximum Rank Achieved



In peace formation, the general expectation for the termination of military service is retirement. This also holds for wartime military organizations but adds to the group of killed soldiers due to the engagements. Figure 3.6 illustrates the reasons for the termination of the Ottoman army leaders who served as regiment-or-above commanders. The first group, which is the majority, represents the retired officers. This is an expected outcome. However, a surprising revelation is the second largest group, the ones purged by Enver Pasha in 1914, who claimed they did not perform satisfactorily during the First Balkan War. It is also possible in this case to argue that the defeat in the Balkan Wars was a collective failure, implicating all involved

and leaving no specific group of officers blameless. Additionally, the extensive officer changes, which affected over 1,100 officers primarily in the army, could be viewed as an effort to replace them with younger, recently graduated Military Academy officers aligned with the CUP. This move might have been intended to reinforce the military cadre with personnel loyal to the political agenda of the CUP.

Suppose these purged officers are of low quality in terms of performance. In that case, one should also see their low levels of competence, as low performance is usually not expected among the academically successful graduates from the military Academy. According to Figure 3.7, the mean of officers' academic success during the Balkan Wars is not lower, almost equal to the group of commanders in the Gallipoli Campaign, the most qualified group among others. The CUP members in the Balkan commanders were also in high quality of academic success. According to Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8, the claim that sought to legitimize the purge of 1100 officers seems to be irrelevant increasing the probability of the claim that this was done mainly because of ideological and political considerations.

Another aspect worth mentioning is that this large group of combatant officer change creates a pre-and-after conditional change that allows us to compare the overall group followed by a treatment. In social sciences, such events are infrequent. The period between the Balkan Wars and the Gallipoli Campaign is so short, and the magnitude of this military cadre change and its impact is so high. A very well naturally designed opportunity to examine the factors that shaped the latter outcome. This radical change and comparing these two cases according to this radical change is a powerful tool in our analyses. We see the shift towards a defeat by all means in the Balkans and a precise and outstanding generation of military effectiveness accompanied by a victory in the Gallipoli. The most significant change between these two wars was the radical change in the military cadre of commanders and the change in strategic-level military administration. Without examining these differences, the analysis of the reasons for defeat or victory in these cases would be highly ungrounded and not scientifically satisfying. This comparison of the cases is different from that of historians and military historians in that analyses were done according to data and using a scientific method. Chapter 5 continues to examine this phenomenon by employing a quantitative methodology and regression models. This chapter also benefits from the data, but the evaluation follows a qualitative method.

This group of purged officers is larger than the group of killed-in-action. This graph shows the significance and weight of this significant cadre regulation between the Balkan Wars and World War I. Change of the military leaders at the strategic

level but most notably at the operational level changed the composition of military officers, leaving room for more pro-CUP officers. Generally, it is expected that the more loyal the officers are towards a party or a political authority, the less they generate military effectiveness (Reiter and Wagstaff 2018). However, in the Turkish or Ottoman context during the first decades of the 1900s, loyalty as a party affiliation mattered and helped to increase the overall effectiveness, especially during the Gallipoli Campaign, because the newcomer and younger pro-CUP officers were already well equipped with competence and military experience.[26]

Figure 3.6 How Military Leaders Finalized Their Military Service



Connecting with the CUP members poses a significant challenge. Most previous CUP members have vehemently denied their involvement, particularly following the commencement of a witch hunt against CUP members after the Damat Ferit Pasha Government came into power in 1918. After the defeat in World War I and being held by the British as responsible for the Armenian forced relocation in 1915,

[26]Commanders with a pro-CUP stance were recognized for their competence in various aspects, including military academy graduation, battle performance, and war experience. These commanders included notable figures such as Süleyman Askerî, Mustafa (Nemrut), Vasıf (KARA), Abdülkerim ÖPELİMİ, Hafız İsmail Hakkı, Enver, Ahmet, Cemal Necip (Büyük-Sakallı), Hüseyin Avni ZAİMLER, Mustafa Fevzi ÇAKMAK, Galip PASİNLER, Mustafa Nuri KİLLİGİL, Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK, Ali Fuat CEBESOY, Ahmet Fuat BULCA, Musa Kâzım KARABEKİR, Mehmet Nuri CONKER, Kâzım Fikri ÖZALP, Mustafa İsmet İNÖNÜ, İbrahim Refet BELE, Mehmet Nurettin (Sakallı), Halil KUT, Mustafa Edip TÖR, Mahmut (Çürüksulu), Ahmet Şevket GALATALI, Ali ÇETİNKAYA, Esat BÜLKAT, and Ali Fethi Okyar. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Members_of_the_Committee_of_Union_and_Progress, access date: 28.09.2023

some of the individuals were sent to exile to Malta, many sued and were tried in military tribunals, and the majority of the CUP members preferred to keep silent. Some former members of the CUP, such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, disassociated themselves from the party after realizing that its ideals, along with those of its leaders (Cemal, Talat, and Enver Pasha), did not align with reality (Tevetoğlu 1989).

This dissertation meticulously measures the proximity to the CUP using three mechanisms. First, if there is information about CUP membership from open-source resources, individuals are coded as CUP members. Second, individuals sent to Malta in 1918 were coded as potential CUP supporters [27]. Third, military court memberships before 1918 were examined to identify potential CUP supporters before the anti-CUP government of Damat Ferit Pasha and his cabinet came into power. The proposition in this examination is this: it is hardly possible for a military court member to become anti-CUP as long as that person has a seat in the military courts before 1918. That court member can also adopt a neutral stance or openly support CUP but is unlikely to oppose that organization. The approach in this dissertation is probabilistic rather than deterministic, and it is essential to clarify that no individual is blamed, accused, or labeled with a CUP affiliation. The connection between a specific person and the CUP may have evolved, persisted, or been incorrectly attributed. However, this analysis focuses on the probability of being a CUP member or aligning with a pro-CUP stance, considering individuals as part of a group rather than delving into outliers or conducting per-person in-depth analyses. Examining the CUP connection relies on proxy measures and limited open-source information, given the challenges of identifying membership in an organization that primarily operated clandestinely, especially before 1908. The coding criteria and sources used for this analysis are detailed in the codebook of the TURCO dataset (Appendix A).

Identifying military leaders, particularly those not at the strategic level, poses significant challenges due to their professional discretion and roles, often resulting in a scarcity of records, biographies, speeches, or documents left behind. The 120-year time gap further complicates access to sources, as the passage of time and the nature of the wars make it nearly impossible to obtain such materials. Unlike well-known political figures, military leaders rarely have accessible written documents or personal biographies, making context analysis practically unfeasible.

On a positive note, the official records maintained by the ATASE (Archives of the Turkish General Staff) and the Turkish General Staff provide a valuable substitute

[27] I thank Selçuk Akşin Somel (Sabancı University, History Program) for his advice about identifying Malta Exilees' liaison towards CUP. It is probabilistically reasonable to define those sent to Malta exile as potential pro-CUP members.

for these gaps. These records are meticulously documented, offering comprehensive personal biographies that include factual information on education, military careers, promotions, ranks, and prior deployments, among other details. Additionally, using official documents helps minimize individual bias by relying on formal organizational records. Interestingly, these records highlight positive achievements such as promotions and exemplary performance and include neutral accounts of discharges, forced retirements, punishments, and instances of disobedience.

This dissertation focuses on comparisons within the same military organization across different periods, avoiding comparisons with the military cadres of other countries, such as Greece or Bulgaria. Consequently, the analysis remains consistent, reliable, and free from potential biases that could arise from comparing different national military profiles. Given these considerations, the findings of this dissertation can be trusted for internal comparisons within the same system, effectively eliminating potential internal biases.

Figure 3.7 Ottoman Military Leaders Academic Success Levels Across Wars



According to theory, some evidence of competence or merit-based promotion is expected in the case of victory or the generation of higher military effectiveness. These are the post-ante considerations to evaluate the results of a war, battle, or engagement. Equally important is the pre-event evaluation. How about the characteristics of the military leaders that participate in a war? Figure 3.9 shows the remarkable

academic success of the Ottoman army leaders across the Balkan War, the Gallipoli Campaign, and World War I. In general, the competence level, partly described by the military graduation success, is very high in the Balkan cadre of commanders. The Gallipoli campaign was much higher than in the Balkan Wars. Variation of academic success is more significant for World War I as the scale of the war is more substantial than the previous two wars. The blue boxes show the CUP members' academic success, maximized during the Gallipoli Front. The Gallipoli Campaign was crucial for the CUP members, where the brightest, most brilliant, most efficient, and promising military leaders were assigned. We see this concentration very clearly in Figure 3.7.

Figure 3.8 Working Experience of Ottoman Military Leaders



Previous military experience is one of the critical elements in terms of competence. The experience's impact was significant in (Acosta and Silverman 2023; Reiter and Wagstaff 2018). However, in the Ottoman context, the ages of the commanders were one of the issues that prevented dynamism and modernization efforts in the military. Many of the rankers were old and were against the military's modernization efforts (Erickson 2000; Uyar 2020). After losing the Balkans, Enver Pasha sought to make the army cadres younger. Two radical reforms in this manner were the 1908 law of purge of the ranks that aimed to prevent uneven promotions in the rank increases. Second was the 1914 Enver Pasha's decision to remove more than a thousand officers from the army. These two events and the gradual, persistent efforts worked in a way

to reshape the military cadres, replacing old officers with younger ones. In the Balkan Wars, we see the highest mean of the ages of commanders (see Figure 3.9). The lowering ages are visible in the subsequent wars, Gallipoli and World War I. In the Balkan wars, the mean age of CUP members was lower for two reasons: they were not perhaps thoroughly dominant in the military, and second, CUP was in its birth or developmental phase. When CUP reached its maximum power, especially after the Balkan Wars, we saw that the CUP members shared the same age ratio as all commanders.

Figure 3.9 Ottoman Commanders' Age Distribution



3.5 Conclusion

This chapter utilizes data to present various descriptive statistics at the individual level, focusing specifically on military leaders. The analysis of Turkish military commanders underscores the pivotal role of military leaders in achieving superior military effectiveness. Notably, a lack of research positions military leaders as central figures and even fewer studies explicitly examine their influence on military effectiveness within the Turkish context. This chapter addresses this gap by providing numerous findings that offer a fresh perspective on the significance of military

leadership.

First and foremost, military leaders' competence, which refers to their ability to plan, coordinate, and execute military operations effectively, is a crucial factor in generating military effectiveness. This chapter's comparative case study results highlight the significance of commanders' attributes, particularly in the interplay between competence and loyalty. Competence, a universally accepted issue contributing to overall military effectiveness, is exemplified by the higher competence level of Ottoman military leaders and their victory in the Gallipoli campaign.

The military cadre in Gallipoli had the best average in any variable explaining competence, reinforcing the importance of this factor. The Ottoman commanders who participated in the Balkan Wars were not in an inferior position in terms of academic success, a key factor determining the competence attribute. However, as illustrated in Figure 3.7, the group's overall graduation performance was lower than those who participated in the Gallipoli Campaign. The influence of younger Ottoman officers, particularly those who graduated in the 1880s and later, became more prominent in the subsequent period. The effectiveness of CUP-affiliated officers was significantly more pronounced during the Gallipoli Campaign. This was likely influenced by Enver Pasha's purges in 1914 and the army rejuvenation efforts of 1908, resulting in the Ottoman Empire entering World War I with a younger and more capable cadre of officers. The disparity in quality between the Gallipoli officers and those serving on other World War I fronts is particularly evident. The Ottoman General Staff's deliberate prioritization of the Gallipoli front, channeling the limited but highly trained human resources to this crucial area, underscores the strategic importance placed on this theater of war. As noted in Appendix F, although commanders affiliated with the Committee of Union and Progress generally had high academic standards, the difference was not exceedingly stark compared to the entire group. The notably higher academic success of the Gallipoli commanders can be attributed to the priority given to this front, reflecting the intentions of the Ottoman General Staff.

Given that the Ottoman economy was not in a favorable condition after the Balkan Wars and considering the extraordinary challenges posed by engaging in a multi-front war during World War I, the Ottoman state likely concentrated its rare, essential, and most valuable resource—its trained officers—on the Gallipoli front. This emphasis on Gallipoli reflects the importance the Ottomans placed on this campaign. None of the mistakes that undermined military effectiveness during the Balkan Wars were repeated at Gallipoli, where a highly successful command and control operation was executed. The strategic importance of the Gallipoli front, underscored by

the Ottomans' decision to concentrate their best officers there, was a crucial factor in their victory.

A general trend observed since the Balkan Wars is a decrease in the average age of commanders. This was influenced by factors such as Enver Pasha's 1914 purges, the casualties from earlier wars, voluntary retirements, and the impact of wounds sustained in previous conflicts. Additionally, the increase in fronts during World War I and the need to find sufficient officers to command these fronts likely contributed to this trend.

In the Balkan Wars, despite the higher competence of military leaders, the Ottomans could not prevent a dramatic loss. While competence is necessary for military effectiveness, it is not sufficient. Although the commanders in the Balkan Wars were competent, other factors, such as inefficient strategic leadership, may have hindered their ability to operate effectively. The fault did not lie at the operational level of the military leaders but rather at the strategic phase of decision-making, a complex and crucial aspect of military effectiveness. The strategic plan for the Balkan Wars was sound; the formation of military units and the triangular system proved effective, and the commanders generally demonstrated heroic resistance to the aggressors, as Hasan Rıza Pasha in Shkodra exemplified. However, poor coordination, incorrect deployments, and unsatisfactory execution of battles undermined these efforts.

In contrast, the Gallipoli Campaign represents a clear victory for the Ottomans. The detailed analysis in Chapter 3, complemented by descriptive statistics, reveals that one of the key factors contributing to this victory was the superior quality and higher standards of the commanders' attributes.

Interestingly, the other variables coded according to loyalty, such as political party affiliation, are also significant in the Gallipoli Campaign. Contrary to the existing literature on military effectiveness, this was significant and effective in The Gallipoli and, with lesser impact, still one of the critical factors in the other phases or fronts in World War 1. This is because the CUP members, pro-CUP officers, were already of high quality and competence. This new cadre not only brought their political stance but also came with their outstanding personal qualities.

According to (Millett and Murray 2010, 15-20) parameters for evaluating military effectiveness, the Ottoman Army exhibited exceptional performance during the Gallipoli Campaign. A professional ethos and integrity characterized the Ottoman military organization, and the 5th Army, along with its subordinate corps, demonstrated remarkable operational flexibility and rapid responsiveness, both physically and intellectually. Despite limited resources, the Ottoman forces maximized the use of

available technology, and their support units, including medical services, military hospitals, and logistics, were highly efficient.

The Ottomans' tactical acumen was evident in their successful exploitation of the Allies' weaknesses. The operational plan for defending the Gallipoli peninsula was meticulously integrated into the broader strategic framework, allowing the Ottomans to effectively leverage their strengths against the vulnerabilities of the Allied forces. At the tactical level, Ottoman forces exploited these weaknesses through sustained resistance and attrition warfare, preventing British and ANZAC troops from making significant advances. For example, the ANZAC forces were confined to landing at Arıburnu, a narrow bay surrounded by steep terrain, severely hindering their ability to advance.

In stark contrast, none of the criteria are met when these parameters are applied to the Balkan Wars, highlighting the markedly low military effectiveness during that period. Comparative analysis of these two cases demonstrates that high military efficiency is closely correlated with the competence of the army leadership. Achieving high military effectiveness with low-quality commanders is virtually impossible. Thus, one fundamental explanation for the success at Gallipoli and the defeat in the Balkan Wars lies in the disparity in the competency levels of the commanders.

In Gallipoli, the newly formed military cadre was unparalleled in competence, fulfilling a critical requirement for success. Sound strategic decisions, thorough pre-war preparations and effective deployment of fighting units further strengthened this. The commanders' exceptional performance was instrumental in the successful defense, their high competence distinguishing them from their World War I and Balkan War counterparts and proving decisive in the campaign's outcome.

4. INTRODUCING THE NEW: "TURCO" DATASET, TURKISH COMMANDERS IN THE LAST OTTOMAN WARS

4.1 Introduction

Existing literature on military effectiveness relies predominantly on state-level variables to understand the evolution of the concept. Few studies delve into the individual level and explain the military effectiveness by employing individual-level analyses (Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr 2020; Helmbold 1990; Horowitz and Ellis 2015; Huang, Silverman, and Acosta 2022; Reiter and Wagstaff 2018). This dissertation sought to enlarge and enrich this literature by analyzing actors, in other words, military leaders' role in assessing the generation of military effectiveness, individual-level analysis, and as actors examining not the state leaders but the other actors, as important as them, the commanders. This dissertation introduces the TURCO dataset, Turkish Commanders during Balkan Wars and World War I to substantiate the claims. This unique dataset captures an extensive range of variables such as birth years, death years, promotions, participation in wars, war experience as years, father's occupation, the reason for terminating the military service, and also the competence related variables such as the military Academy success, graduation-statuses, staff officers and on the other hand the loyalty related variables as closeness to a political party. Turco dataset encompasses 900 individual, operational level military leaders, or commanders that had served as a regiment or above commanders during these wars. This dataset is the first one specifically addressing to the Turkish and Ottoman military leaders and one of the rarest in the World. This research also aims to encourage scholars to research more on individual leaders' impact by employing quantitative methodology not necessarily for military organizations but also in the large umbrella of international relations and leader-specific studies.

A large volume of political science scholarship states that individual leaders' attributes matter in their decision-making processes (Acosta and Silverman 2023; Gift and Krcmaric 2017; Horowitz and Ellis 2015; Saunders 2018). For example , waek or non-professional military experience makes state leaders act more hawkish and likely to use force (Horowitz and Ellis 2015) and the combat experience in rebel leaders to be much more triggering effect for use of force , almost 4 times higher compared to state leaders (Acosta and Silverman 2023); previous beliefs to be influential in leaders decisions during cold War (Saunders 2017), previous beliefs also to shape their pro-or anti democratic stance (Gift and Krcmaric 2017), rebel leaders attributes to be influential in their violence (Acosta and Silverman 2023), military leaders risk acceptance to be influential in their war execution (Helmbold 1990), attributes to matter in states leaders (Horowitz and Ellis 2015) and military leaders attributes, cometence related attributes to matter in general in their promotions (Reiter and Wagstaff 2018), and in American Civil var loyalty related attributes to be more influential (Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr 2020), similarly during World War 2, the Loyalty as a closeness to be nazi party to be also an essential fact that shaped military leaders promotions (Reiter and Wagstaff 2018).

This dataset also aims to bring the individual and actor-level analysis, as mentioned by Waltz (1959) in bringing the 'first image' of international politics (Waltz 2010), which refers to the focus on individual leaders and their attributes in shaping international relations. This approach, which has not been preferred for many years, is now being brought to the forefront. Leaders have been and are an organic component of any level of decision-making in international relations. Together with leaders themselves, this dataset aims to open a venue for analyzing how attributes or characteristics mattered for leaders in general and particularly for military leaders, as actors mainly responsible and contributors to a topic that is highly crucial to international relations, the wars. Extensive research has been conducted to comprehend military leaders like Helmbold (1990). However, the findings remain vague, focusing solely on the highest-level strategic commanders. In contrast, our dataset offers a more comprehensive perspective by delving into specific battles, allowing for a detailed examination of the actual workforce and operational-level commanders involved in executing these battles.

4.2 Why a New Dataset?

In international relations, for decades, greater emphasis has been placed on systemic and state-level or structural explanations, especially up to the 2010s. Waltz (2010) notably allocated minimal attention to actor-based explanations, especially in wars and battles.

In addition to the global scarcity of leader-based explanations, two areas have also been deeply underestimated: first, the role of military leaders as actors (with some exceptions such as Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr (2020); Helmbold (1990); Reiter and Wagstaff (2018) and second, the historical context specific to Turkey." The TURCO dataset has been created to fill in these gaps. There is limited research that considers military commanders as individual actors and conducts analyses based on their actions. However, there is a growing trend of using microdata and focusing on military leaders. It is highly relevant to scrutinize military leaders as they are the primary actors responsible for directing, shaping, executing, and concluding battles, campaigns, and wars. Failing to analyze these leaders could result in macro-level analyses omitting a crucial factor - leadership at all levels of warfare.

The HERO/CBD90 dataset, developed by Helmbold (1990), stands as one of the few comprehensive global datasets focused on military leaders. The creators acknowledge the inherent challenges in maintaining high quality and precision in historical combat datasets. These challenges include difficulties accessing official records, the diminishing availability of information over time, and the potential biases in statistical data and resources. Despite these obstacles, the HERO/CBD90 dataset represents a pioneering effort in the field.

While datasets such as the Correlates of War (COW) capability data ((Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972)) and the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data (Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996)) provide extensive coverage of wars, their focus remains primarily at the state level, often overlooking the intricacies of individual battles and the roles of commanders. The MID dataset, for example, includes unconventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and civil conflicts, but it fails to adequately address the contributions of commanders, rebel leaders, or other individual actors.

The CBD90 Database of Battles, an earlier iteration of the HERO dataset, made significant strides by cataloging wars, breaking them down into their constituent battles, and identifying the commanders involved. Covering 660 battles worldwide, from the 1600 Netherlands' War of Independence to the 1982 Bekka Valley conflict

between Israel and Lebanon, the CBD90 dataset assigns codes to both aggressor and defender nations and the commanders for each engagement. However, it focuses primarily on army commanders at the highest level, excluding lower-level operational commanders and other strategic leaders. Nonetheless, the CBD90 dataset provides a critical foundation for incorporating individual military leaders into quantitative research on warfare.

However, the CBD90 dataset faces significant data consistency and quality issues. In some instances, battles are either inaccurately represented or entirely omitted, and the absence of coding is evident in several cases. Despite the dataset's chronological scope extending to 1982, the Vietnam War and its associated battles are not included, highlighting a critical gap. Additionally, for the Korean War (1950-53), the dataset lacks information on specific commanders, instead broadly coding the conflict as a confrontation between the North Korean Corps and the U.S. Division. This approach fails to acknowledge the coalition nature of the war, which involved 16 countries, including Turkey, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, all operating under the United Nations' mandate and led by the United States. A more nuanced coding system would have better captured the complexity of coalition wars and the multi-national forces involved.

Another shortfall of the dataset is its incomplete representation of specific conflicts. For example, in the Balkan Wars, only five battles are documented—Kumanovo, Lule Burgas, Macedonia (as a front), Monastır (Bitola), and Adrianople. However, as Erickson (2003) noted, the list of significant battles is far more extensive. It includes engagements such as the Battle of Kırkkilise, Lüleburgaz-Pınarhisar, the First Battle of Çatalca, the Encirclement of Adrianople, the Gallipoli Peninsula, and numerous others across the region. The Turkish General Staff's records further corroborate the existence of additional battles not captured in the CBD90 dataset (Görgülü 1990).

This pattern of missing data continues with World War I, where the dataset only includes a limited selection of battles, such as the Tigris Crossing, Gaza I, II, III, Junction Station Palestine, the First Dardanelles Landing, Suvla Bay, Kut-El-Amara, and Ctesiphon. Notably absent are significant battles like Sarıkamış, Alçıtepe, Kanlısırt, Anafartalar, the Romanian front (Galiçya), and various engagements on the Russian fronts.

While acknowledging the inherent trade-offs and challenges in comprehensively covering all battles, the use of micro-datasets focusing on commanders within specific historical events offers a potential solution to precision issues. Although these micro-datasets may lack external validity and generalizability, they are invaluable for un-

derstanding the impact of military leadership on battle outcomes. Furthermore, the HERO/CBD90 dataset offers only a limited comparison of leadership impact. In contrast, microdata allows for a more detailed examination of commanders' attributes, their command tenure, and their loyalty levels. This approach provides a richer, more nuanced understanding of military leadership and its influence on the dynamics of warfare.

Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr (2020), for instance, coded more than hundreds of commanders in more than 250 battles in the American Civil War. War includes battle-level data and the personal characteristics of the commanders. They define success as a criterion dependent on victory and casualty numbers and investigate commanders according to their latent features—competence and loyalty. Authors measure competence by the number of years served in the military, Mexican War service, number of Civil War battles engaged, United States Military Academy (USMA) attendance, the grade of midshipman, experience as an elected official, and whether the commander was from a Confederate state, a geographical label. The other primary variable defining loyalty is whether the individual was born in a Confederate border state or abroad. It is reasonable for the US Civil War context as the Union and Confederate forces were gathered according to their geographical location. Similarly, in another context, Reiter and Wagstaff (2018) examines the generals of ground divisions in the American and German armies fought in the North African, Italian, and Western European theaters in World War II from 1941 to 1945. The authors also coded attendance at West Point and whether a German general is a Schutzstaffel (SS) member as variables to capture competence and loyalty, and they used promotion (or demotion) as a dependent variable in their analyses.

TURCO dataset follows a similar pattern in design as the ones mentioned above, analyzes the commander's impact on assessing military effectiveness around the competence versus loyalty debate, and captures the commander's attributes related to these two criteria for further evaluation. Although the measure for competence is consistent with the existing studies, loyalty is conceptualized differently, as the Turkish case dictated. In the Ottoman (or Turkish) context, and especially in the early 1900s, the loyalty of the Turkish commanders is coded according to the CUP party closeness, using different proxy measures and all of the information available about commanders' political affiliation. This choice is relevant because, during that specific period, the CUP and the triumvirate of Enver, Cemal, and Talat Pasha dominated almost all of the Ottoman Empire's bureaucratic organization, especially in the military.

4.3 Data Sources

Data were collected from official resources and coded accordingly to enable the research on how military leader attributes influence battle outcomes. This dataset is one of the first for bringing individual military leaders to the front. The commanders were chosen among regimental and above in the hierarchy as the scope of the study is at the operational level independent of their ranks and by prioritizing the position these commanders held. This study investigates the hypotheses from the Turkish perspective—the unit of analysis as individuals participating in a count of events (number of wars). The dataset includes 900 military leaders with many variables defining their competence and loyalty level, such as graduation year, party affiliation, the reason for termination of military service, graduation degree, pre-war military experience, birth location, and some variables showing after military-political career. As a reference point for choosing measurable leader attributes, this dissertation benefitted from Acosta and Silverman (2023)'s ROLE (2022) dataset on rebel leaders, Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam (2015)'s Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) dataset and from Helmbold (1990)'s CBD-90 Dataset for battlefield commanders. The primary resources for reaching empirical data on battlefield commanders are the Turkish General Staff's Military Archives and Strategy Institute (ATASE) records, Toker, Aslan et al. (2009*a*,*b*) "Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na Katılan Alay ve Daha Üst Kademedeki Komutanların Biyografileri. Vol. 1,2,3 "(2009), Turkish General Staff's Publication (2004) "Balkan Savaşi'na Katilan Komutanlarin Yaşam Öyküleri" (Genelkurmay Başkanlığı 2004) and İsmet Görgülü's (1990) book "On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922: Balkan-Birinci Dünya ve İstiklâl Harbi" (Görgülü 1990). I have benefitted from the documents and archival records of the Turkish General Staff's Military Archives and Strategy Institute (ATASE) and the Turkish General Staff's publications, including the biographies of the regiment-and-above commanders who participated in the Balkan Wars and Gallipoli Wars.

This dataset includes 900 operational-level Ottoman military leaders. Of them, 254 served as regiment commanders or held higher positions within the military hierarchy, 681 participated in World War I, and 40 commanders were involved in both the Balkan War and World War I. Additionally, 67 of these commanders later participated in the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922).

It is important to note that this dataset does not encompass all officers who participated in these wars; instead, it focuses exclusively on those who held operational unit positions as regiment commanders or higher. While the dataset comprehen-

sively covers commanding positions at the operational level, it does not include all participants or those in tactical unit command roles. This delineation is intentional, based on the dissertation's central assumption that leadership is a crucial determinant for operational-level warfare. Strategic-level and tactical-level commanders fall outside the scope of this dataset, representing a limitation that should be considered in the analysis.

Resources for this dataset are:

1. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı (2004): Balkan Savaşı'na Katılan Komutanların Yaşam Öyküleri (Alay ve Daha Üst Birlik Komutanları, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Genelkurmay, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 2004.

2. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı (2009): Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na Katılan Alay Ve Daha Üst Kademedeki Komutanların Biyografileri, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Genelkurmay,year 2009, publisher C. I-III, (yay. haz: Hülya Toker, Nurcan Aslan), Ankara 2009.

3. Görgülü (1990): On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922: Balkan-Birinci Dünya ve İstiklâl Harbi, Görgülü, İsmet, 1990, Marmara Universitesi (Turkey).

4. Other open-source and academic publications referenced in footnotes or in the bibliography.

4.4 The Data

The TURCO dataset comprises detailed records of 900 Turkish commanders who held regiment-level or higher commanding authority during the First Balkan War (1912-1913) and World War I (1914-1918). This dataset encompasses a wide range of biographical, official, and historical information (for a detailed explanation, see Appendix A). The dataset is organized into several groups of variables:

4.4.1 Biographical Variables

- **Name**
- **Birth year**

- **Death year**
- **Birth location**
- **Father's occupation**

4.4.2 Military Career and Educational Background Variables

These variables are crucial for assessing the competence of commanders, reflecting their quality and effectiveness:

- **Graduation from military secondary school**
- **Graduation from military high school**
- **Graduation year from the Military Academy (Mekteb-i Harbiye)**
- **Academic success**, captured by the **"MILGPA"** variable, which indicates the commander's graduation order among peers—a measure of success at the Military Academy
- **Class size at the Military Academy**
- **Promotion years across ranks** for each commander, and whether they graduated from the Army War College (staff officer)
- **Prior military experience**, measured in years of service
- **Prior military experience**, measured by the number of wars participated in
- Whether the commander was affected by the **1908 law of purge of the ranks**
- **Rank after the 1908 rank regulation**, if applicable
- **Final rank achieved**
- **Reason for exit from military service**
- Whether retirement was **forced or voluntary**
- **Retirement or exit year**
- Instances of **multiple retirements** and corresponding years

- **Rank achieved before the Balkan War, World War I, and the Turkish War of Independence**
- A binary variable indicating whether the commander was **promoted to general**
- **Promotions by year** and promotions following wars

The TURCO dataset, a treasure trove of extensive variables, is a significant resource for assessing general competence levels or measuring competence for specific events (wars). It particularly shines in its use of time-variant variables such as military experience and promotion increases before or after a specific conflict. These time-variant variables are invaluable for understanding the changing dynamics influenced by specific events. In the following quantitative chapter, the dataset is reshaped into a long format to estimate the impact of commanders by war, utilizing these time-variant variables.

One critical variable, extbf "AFTMIL", measures the type of exit from military service and includes information on whether commanders were killed in action or purged in Enver Pasha's January 1914 purge. This purge, a significant event in military history, resulted in the removal of 1,100 (or, according to some sources, 1,600) officers from a total of 17,000. The second largest group, after retired officers, consists of those forcefully retired by Enver Pasha, the young Minister of War, who held them responsible for the poor performance and losses during the Balkan Wars. This purge is often viewed as a politically motivated move to create vacancies for younger CUP officers. Regardless of the motivations, this radical shift in military cadres, particularly among the ranks of captains to colonels—officers who played pivotal roles within the system- significantly altered the human element within the military dynamics.

The third group of variables in the TURCO dataset pertains to war participation and is crucial for analyzing commanders' experiences across multiple conflicts. While the dataset focuses on commanders from the Balkan Wars and World War I, many of these individuals were involved in additional wars. The dataset includes coding for the following conflicts: the 1897 Greco-Turkish War, the 1911-12 Italo-Turkish War (Tripolitanian War), the 1912-13 First Balkan War (excluding the Second Balkan War, which did not involve the Ottoman Empire), World War I (1914-18), and the Turkish War of Independence (1919-22). Additionally, World War I is further delineated into seven different fronts where the Ottoman Empire engaged, all coded within the dataset.

The dataset prioritizes commanders' participation in the Gallipoli Campaign to ac-

curately represent their experiences during World War I. If an officer participated in battles across multiple fronts, including Gallipoli, the coding reflects this involvement; otherwise, the coding corresponds to the other front where the officer was active during the Gallipoli Campaign. This meticulous coding ensures the dataset's reliability in assessing commanders' competence and performance across various war scenarios.

The fourth group of variables assesses the commanders' loyalty status. Based on open-source data, commanders with known affiliations to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) are coded as CUP members. However, after 1918, following the British and Damat Ferit Pasha government's crackdown, many CUP members fled the country or concealed their affiliations. To address this challenge, the TURCO dataset employs two proxies to infer CUP membership: (1) Membership in military courts before 1918, based on the rationale that court members were likely pro-CUP or at least supportive of CUP policies; (2) Exile to Malta, which was imposed by the British on prominent CUP figures. Of the 130 individuals exiled, over 90 were military personnel, some of whom had participated in earlier battles. Therefore, commanders exiled to Malta in 1918 are likely CUP members.

Though these proxies provide a broader assessment of loyalty, they are not definitive and may introduce some bias into the dataset. Finally, the last group of variables serves as control variables or is coded to explore whether commanders pursued political careers post-retirement and the nature of their subsequent occupations.

4.5 Descriptive Statistics

Table 4.1 showcases the unique TURCO dataset, providing descriptive statistics. Among the 900 commanders who participated in the Balkan Wars and World War 1, 254 were assigned to operational-level unit command, and 681 were transferred to the same position during World War I. Some were assigned to both wars—the earliest graduates from the Military Academy were in 1867, and the latest in 1909.

Figure 4.1 illustrates the distribution of military academy graduates within the Ottoman Army, explicitly focusing on the combatant branches of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. This dataset excludes military veterinarians, medical cadets, and cadets trained in scientific branches, representing a minority. The earliest graduate

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics: TURCO Dataset

Variable	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min.	Max.	N
Balkan Cadre	127.50	73.47	1	254	254
WWI Cadre	341.00	196.73	1	681	681
Birth Year	1873.65	6.24	1846	1890	900
Death Year	1937.52	15.52	1912	1974	440
Final Rank	4.78	1.42	2	10	900
Mil. Academy Grad. Year	1893.20	6.74	1867	1909	900
Reason for Exit	2.89	2.94	1	9	900
Last Year of Service	1922.54	7.50	1912	1950	900
Retirement Status	0.72	0.45	0	1	654
Promotion	1.16	1.00	0	7	900
Birth Location	1.41	0.73	1	4	900
Mil. Secondary School	0.02	0.12	0	1	900
Mil. High School	0.03	0.16	0	1	900
Military Branch	1.56	0.81	1	4	763
Military GPA (Academic Success)	85.25	19.08	10	100	707
Class Size (Mil. Academy)	445.26	207.18	65	961	873
Staff Officer	0.23	0.42	0	1	900
Total Num. of Wars	2.29	1.11	1	5	900
Malta Exile	0.05	0.21	0	1	900
CUP Membership	0.03	0.18	0	1	900
Military Court Membership 1918	0.19	0.39	0	1	900
Military Court Membership	0.29	0.45	0	1	900
Father's Occupation	3.90	0.53	1	4	900
Politics After Military	0.07	0.25	0	1	900
After Military Work Status	3.75	0.81	1	4	900

included is Nazım Pasha, a lieutenant general assassinated during the Sublime Porte raid. The class size during his graduation year was 65, significantly increasing towards the early 1900s, reaching 961 by 1902. This expansion in class size mirrors the Ottoman military's growing need to counter external threats and its strategic priority to rejuvenate the Army by replacing older, ranker officers (alaylı) with younger, more competent graduates.

During the 1890s, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) began exerting substantial influence within military schools. The CUP's founder, İbrahim Temo, was a military medical student at what is today known as Kuleli Military High School. Over time, to restore the constitution and preserve the empire through a patriotic and ideologically driven movement, the CUP rapidly gained traction, particularly among the younger generation of military students and cadets. The initial members of the CUP were among the brightest, most determined, and most competent military students, which enabled the organization to create significant leverage within the organizational and bureaucratic structure of the Ottoman military.

The CUP also had strong roots in Manastır (Bitola) and Macedonia, regions that were home to many of its leaders. The collapse of Ottoman control in the Balkans, compounded by the Balkan Wars and the subsequent loss of these territories, caused profound trauma among these officers. This shared experience united them against common enemies and infused them with a renewed sense of purpose grounded in an ideology of Turkish nationalism.

Figure 4.1 Military Academy Graduates Across Years



4.6 Using the Data

The TURCO dataset, a comprehensive and adaptable resource, extends its utility far beyond the Turkish context, making it invaluable for a wide array of scholarly disciplines, including leadership studies, military research, psychology, and theoretical model testing. While this dissertation is rooted in international relations, it also uncovers variables pertinent to understanding political party affiliation and the intersection of military and post-military political careers. These variables provide a rich foundation for comparative political studies, particularly in analyzing how military leaders transition into political roles and influence political landscapes.

Moreover, the TURCO dataset offers a unique lens through which to examine historical events with a high level of scientific rigor. For example, the 1908 raid on the Sublime Porte, orchestrated by Enver Pasha and fervent members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), can be quantitatively analyzed to offer new insights into the dynamics of coups within authoritarian or sultanistic regimes. Similarly, the sweeping and radical 1914 officer purge led by Enver Pasha presents a fertile ground for exploring themes such as group dynamics within military organizations, the processes of institutional change, and the consolidation of power within a one-party regime. This dataset not only enhances our understanding of these historical events but also contributes to the broader discourse on leadership, governance, and political transformation in comparative contexts.

Figure 4.2 Rank Achievements of Commanders Across Demographic Characteristics



Figure 4.2 offers a visual representation of the maximum military rank achieved by Ottoman commanders, categorized by their birth location (Anatolia, Balkans, and the Middle East) and their graduation years from a military academy.

The data uncovers significant patterns based on the commanders' birth locations. Commanders from Anatolia demonstrate a consistent distribution of maximum ranks across graduation years, with a slight decline indicated by the trend line. This suggests a general tendency towards slightly lower maximum ranks for those who graduated closer to 1910, despite some recent graduates achieving high ranks.

However, a few outliers from Anatolia reached the highest ranks, indicating that specific individuals still rose to prominence despite the general decline.

Commanders from the Balkans exhibit a different pattern. Their ranks are more concentrated in the Middle to upper levels, with most commanders achieving ranks between 3 and 7. The trend line for this group shows a slight upward trajectory, implying that more recent graduates tended to achieve higher ranks. This pattern suggests that Balkan commanders increasingly occupied middle-to-high military positions over time. The influence of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) is particularly significant in this context, as the CUP originated and evolved in the Balkans, specifically around Manastır. In its early years, the Balkan region largely supported the CUP. Manastır, the second-largest center in the Ottoman Empire after the capital Istanbul and situated in Europe, also served as a hub for Western-style modernization. This regional prominence likely contributed to the higher ranks achieved by Balkan commanders.

Conversely, commanders from the Middle East present a unique pattern. They generally achieved lower ranks compared to their Anatolian and Balkan counterparts, with most Middle Eastern commanders clustered around ranks 4 and 5, and very few reaching the highest ranks. The trend line in this panel is relatively flat, suggesting little change in the maximum ranks achieved by Middle Eastern commanders over time. This pattern indicates a consistent but lower level of rank attainment for commanders from the Middle East, reflecting the region's differing geopolitical significance within the Ottoman Empire.

Table 4.2 summarizes the statistics regarding active political participation among commanders who served in the Balkans and World War I after their military careers. The TURCO dataset provides a valuable resource for comparing and examining this participation based on the demographic distribution of these commanders. For instance, the data reveals that commanders born in the Balkans were more likely to pursue political careers after retirement than their counterparts from other regions. This higher rate of political involvement among Balkan-born commanders can be partially attributed to the high concentration of CUP members in the Balkans. Additionally, the loss of the Balkans triggered a mass migration to Anatolia, where many of these commanders settled and continued their careers in modern Turkey.

A notable finding from the dataset is that commanders with closer ties to the CUP party were twice as likely to seek political careers as non-CUP members. This suggests a strong correlation between political affiliation and post-military political engagement. However, it is essential to consider potential confounding variables,

Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics: After-Military Participation in Politics

	After Military Politics	
	Non-political Career (%)	**Active Politics (%)**
Birth Location		
Anatolia	93.6	6.4
Balkans	89.1	10.9
Middle East	99.0	1.0
Caucasia	100.0	0.0
Total	93.4	6.6
CUP Membership		
Non-CUP Member	94.3	5.7
CUP Member	89.1	10.9
Total	93.4	6.6
General Rank		
Non-General	98.6	1.4
General	88.5	11.5
Total	93.4	6.6
Staff Officer		
Non-Staff	96.8	3.2
Staff	82.0	18.0
Total	93.4	6.6

such as the commanders who were killed in action (KIA), which could skew the overall participation rate. The current figure of 6.6 percent participation in politics may underrepresent the actual rate if these cases are accounted for.

Interestingly, the data also indicates that commanders who held the rank of Brigadier General or higher were almost eight times more likely to participate in politics than their lower-ranked counterparts. This trend suggests that higher-ranking officers had more influence or prestige, facilitating their transition into political roles. Their extensive experience in military bureaucracy and governance likely influenced their acceptance and success in the political arena.

These findings carry significant implications for our understanding of the militaristic structure of the era and the influential role of the military in shaping the political landscape of the newly established Turkish Republic. The results also open up avenues for further exploration, particularly the hypothesis that the quality of educational institutions during this period, including military schools, played a crucial role in the success of military school graduates and generals in securing political positions.

Moreover, the substantial difference in political participation between staff officers

and non-staff officers, with the former being nearly six times more likely to engage, calls for deeper investigation. Future research could explore the unique qualities of staff officers, their ideological commitments, and their active involvement in national issues, all of which may have contributed to their significant role in post-military political life.

An additional application of the TURCO dataset is the analysis of promotion patterns within the Turkish military system during the early 1900s. Table 4.3 presents promotion trends based on military branch and political affiliation with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) for military high school graduates and staff officers. The influence of the Prussian military model on the Ottoman army, which regarded graduation from the War College as a prestigious milestone in a Turkish commander's career, is a significant historical context. This influence is evident in the fact that 81% of staff officers ascended to the rank of general. Notably, this percentage increases by 90% among CUP members, likely due to the prominence of leading CUP figures who were also staff officers, such as Enver Pasha, Kazım Karabekir, and İsmet İnönü.

Another contributing factor may be the significant reshuffle following Enver Pasha's 1914 purge, which removed 1,100 officers to rapidly promote younger officers, particularly those aligned with the CUP. Furthermore, 92% of military high school graduates reached the rank of general, underscoring the impact of early entry into the military on career advancement. Officers who began their careers in military high schools or secondary schools typically had longer service durations, allowing them to achieve higher ranks.

Regarding military branches, excluding the 'other' category due to its outlier status, infantry and artillery branches exhibit nearly equal percentages in promotions to the rank of general. However, the infantry branch stands out because it is significantly larger than the artillery.

Table 4.3 provides a detailed analysis of the factors influencing the likelihood of Ottoman military officers being promoted to the rank of general. This analysis is categorized based on military branch, political affiliation with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), educational background, and whether the officer attended a military high school or held a staff officer position.

Firstly, when considering military branches, officers in the infantry have a relatively balanced chance of promotion, with 52.2% achieving the rank of general. This suggests that the infantry, one of the most significant and crucial branches, offers

Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics: Promotion to General Rank

	Promotion to General		
	Non-general (No.)	**General (No.)**	**Total (%)**
Military Branch			
Infantry	235	257	52.2
Cavalry	68	50	42.4
Artillery	73	77	51.3
Others	1	2	66.7
Total	377	386	50.6
CUP Member			
Non-CUP Member	436	434	49.9
CUP Member	3	27	90.0
Total	439	461	51.2
Military High School Graduate			
Non-Mil. H.School	437	438	50.1
Mil. High School	2	23	92.0
Total	439	461	51.2
Staff Officer			
Non-Staff	399	291	42.2
Staff	40	170	81.0
Total	439	461	51.2

substantial opportunities for career advancement. In contrast, cavalry officers show a lower promotion probability, with only 42.4% reaching the rank of general.

Political affiliation with the CUP has had a significant impact on promotion chances. For non-CUP members, the promotion rate is almost evenly split, with 49.9% achieving the rank of general, indicating that political affiliation did not drastically hinder or favor promotion opportunities in a general sense. However, CUP members exhibit a much higher promotion rate of 90%. This substantial difference indicates that political connections with the CUP were highly beneficial for career advancement within the Ottoman military, especially following 1914 when the influence of the CUP was at its peak.

Educational background, particularly military high school graduation, also plays a crucial role in promotion. Non-military high school graduates had a promotion rate of 50.1%, similar to the overall average, suggesting that even without a specialized military education, officers still had opportunities for advancement. However, military high school graduates had a significantly higher promotion rate of 92%, highlighting the importance of a formal military education. This underscores the value placed on specialized training and early entry into the military, which were not just key but crucial factors in career progression.

Finally, the distinction between staff and non-staff officers reveals that staff officers had a considerable advantage in terms of promotion. Non-staff officers had a lower

promotion probability, with only 42.2% reaching the rank of general. In contrast, 81% of staff officers achieved the rank of general, underscoring the significant and undeniable benefits of staff officer training. This reflects the Ottoman military's strong preference for promoting individuals with advanced strategic and operational training.

4.7 Empirical Findings

To evaluate the hypothesis in the dissertation, this dissertation employs variables from the TURCO dataset, specifically designed to capture the attributes of military leaders. The analysis is centered around two primary variables, competence-related and loyalty-related, addressing the debate on whether military promotions were driven more by competence or loyalty. The competence-related variables include military leaders' educational background, military GPA, staff officer status, and war experience. In contrast, the loyalty-related variables encompass membership in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), positions held in military courts, and instances of exile to Malta. The exile to Malta and military court memberships serve as proxy measures for political association with the CUP party, given the challenges in directly accessing records of such affiliations. Theoretically, it is posited that military leaders with higher competence levels are more likely to succeed in military operations and thereby generate greater military effectiveness—a hypothesis this research aims to validate.

The dataset introduced in this dissertation provides a comprehensive quantitative tool for assessing these issues, offering insights not only into the competence and loyalty levels of Ottoman commanders but also into various other dimensions, such as promotion patterns, the impact of father's occupation, demographic features, and the factors influencing the commanders' self- or obligatory retirement.

5. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES ON MILITARY LEADER ATTRIBUTES

This chapter systematically evaluates four key hypotheses outlined in Introduction (Chapter 2): (1) the role of competence in the promotion of military commanders, (2) the influence of loyalty, particularly political affiliation, on their promotions, (3) the impact of pre-war competence levels on the likelihood of achieving superior military effectiveness, and (4) the effects of radical changes within the combatant leadership. The promotion process within military ranks is inherently connected to military effectiveness. It often indicates high military efficiency, assuming the absence of systemic corruption within the military administration. With its profound institutional legacy, the Ottoman military adhered to a traditional promotion system grounded in solid and deliberate considerations. This system was refined through modernization efforts, beginning with the German military reform mission and earlier initiatives in the 1880s, which sought to reinforce the hierarchical command structure. As a result, Ottoman military promotions typically reflected genuine military accomplishments, making promotion patterns a viable proxy for predicting military effectiveness.

These hypotheses are tested against the historical context of the Ottoman Empire's final conflicts, particularly between the Balkan Wars and the Gallipoli Campaign. The findings highlight the crucial role of competence in fostering high military effectiveness. This is a significant revelation, aligning with Weber's rational bureaucracy model (Cochrane 2018), where merit-based promotions are expected within a systematic and efficient military structure. Loyalty, especially in the context of political allegiance, also emerges as a significant factor in achieving military effectiveness. The impact of radical changes in military leadership, discussed in Chapter 3, is further scrutinized through complementary quantitative analyses in this chapter, providing a more detailed and statistically rigorous exploration of this phenomenon.

Assessing commanders' effectiveness is inherently challenging, mainly when focusing on variables directly linked to combat outcomes. While military leadership effec-

tiveness can be evaluated through such variables, this approach risks conflating the independent and dependent variables. To mitigate this issue, this dissertation employs a more indirect approach by using promotions as a determinant of military effectiveness, which is then analyzed against independent variables representing commanders' attributes. This method allows for a more nuanced understanding of how leadership qualities influence military success while avoiding the pitfalls of circular reasoning.

At the analysis level, this study focuses exclusively on Ottoman military leaders at the regiment level and above, excluding enemy forces and non-combatant Ottoman officers. This approach ensures data homogeneity and concentrates on leadership dynamics within the context of two successive wars. By examining only one specific dimension of military leadership—the attributes of commanders—this research benefits from a comparative approach that enhances the validity of the quantitative analyses. Although the sample size of 900 observations is sufficient for regression analysis, it remains contextually bound to the Ottoman military during this period.

Another methodological concern involves evaluating commanders as a collective group within a war, which does not account for the individual battles within that conflict. Additionally, the quality of Ottoman commanders could have been influenced by the quality of their adversaries. Although this aspect is difficult to address due to data limitations, expanding the scope of the analysis could introduce unnecessary complexity and obscure the assessment of a commander's impact amidst numerous extraneous variables. To maintain clarity and validity, this research narrows its focus to Ottoman military leaders, analyzing variations between different military cadres across wars and within the leadership group itself.

This research has encountered numerous independent variables to assess the impact of military leaders. These variables include those evaluating competency (MILGPA, prior military experience, staff officer roles, etc.) and another set aimed at discerning commanders' affiliations with political authorities. Specifically, we examined proximity or membership to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) party, given its predominant control in the political landscape of the Ottoman Empire during the relevant period. However, elucidating political affiliations proved a formidable challenge, particularly after the 1918 British rule in Istanbul. The CUP members were widely denounced as responsible for the adversities stemming from World War I, economic collapse, and the Armenian forced migration. Due to the intricacy of establishing direct links, proxy measures were employed to capture any potential CUP associations. These measures included scrutinizing memberships in military courts, as it was implausible for any court member to be anti-CUP, especially between 1913

and 1918.

Expanding upon this foundation, this dissertation proposes that influential military leaders can significantly impact their soldiers' performance. They do so by encouraging them to fight first by relying on their battle experience, second by being professional, and third by creating physical and emotional bonding. To assess this, a military leader should possess enough competence and determination.

Data were collected from official sources and coded to study how military leader attributes influence battle outcomes (please see Chapter 4 and Appendix A for more detailed information about the data). These analyses focus on individual military leaders selected from regimental level and above, independent of their ranks.

5.1 Research Design

To rigorously test the hypotheses, this dissertation leverages an original dataset comprising 900 Ottoman (Turkish) commanders who served between 1897 and 1922. This specific timeframe was carefully selected due to the high frequency of regional and global conflicts during these years, characterized by the consistent use of similar military technology, weaponry, organizational structures, tactics, and logistics. Additionally, the geographical consistency of these conflicts supports the application of a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) approach (Przeworski 1970), allowing for a controlled analysis of military efficiency.

By accounting for the majority of factors that traditionally influence military performance, this study narrows its focus to the human element—specifically, the quality of military leaders—to evaluate whether individual characteristics and attributes significantly impact military effectiveness. The selected period provides a robust framework for analyzing the influence of military leaders' attributes, particularly when comparing outcomes between the Balkan Wars and World War I. The study examines commanders who held positions at the regiment level and above, focusing on the operational command level. As identified in the literature review, this command level is particularly pertinent for studying leadership, as it is where the application of operational art, military leadership, and initiative are most evident.

Among the 900 military leaders analyzed, 258 were active during the Balkan Wars and 700 during World War I, covering various fronts such as Gallipoli, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. The primary analytical focus compares the Balkan Wars,

World War I, and the Gallipoli Campaign. Notably, some commanders served in both conflicts, thereby enhancing the robustness of the study's coding and operationalization strategies.

The analyses in this chapter are designed to assess whether commanders' attributes influence battle outcomes. Existing literature emphasizes two critical categories of variables: competence and loyalty. It is generally posited that commanders are likelier to be promoted in contexts where military effectiveness is higher, particularly following successful engagements, although this correlation is not always consistent. On the other hand, loyalty—often associated with political affiliations—tends to be viewed negatively and is frequently linked to corruption or irregular promotion practices. Prevailing scholarly perspectives favor competence and merit-based promotions within an institutionalized military framework, underscoring the importance of these factors in achieving superior military outcomes.

Promotions of commanders are closely correlated with field success, which we define as battlefield achievements and their subsequent impact on overall military effectiveness. In military systems like those of the United States, failures may lead to demotions, while in Prussian and Turkish military systems, such failures typically result in stagnation rather than demotion. The Ottoman military system, influenced by Prussian traditions, generally does not practice demotions. However, rare instances occur, often due to military court rulings, and are treated as outliers in this context. In the Turkish army, promotions are predominantly based on seniority or exceptional achievements. The distinction between an average and an outstanding commander is reflected in the frequency and timing of their promotions. Deviation from the expected progression in our regression analyses indicates whether these promotions are driven by demonstrated competence or by political affiliation (loyalty).

Following this rationale, this dissertation employs three dependent variables to investigate the effects of competence and loyalty on military promotions, with the analyses divided into two primary groups. First, the study examines pre-war promotions to understand the factors influencing commanders' advancements before the onset of conflict, with one dependent variable capturing these trends. The second dependent variable focuses on post-war promotions, precisely measuring rank changes from one year before to one year after the conflict. The underlying expectation is that successful commanders will be promoted in recognition of their achievements and effectiveness. At the same time, fewer promotions are anticipated following failures, such as those observed in the Balkan War, and more are expected after victories, like the Gallipoli Campaign. Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive

analysis of military effectiveness during the Gallipoli Campaign.

Upon defining the dependent variables, the analyses assess the impact of independent variables categorized into competence and loyalty. Detailed information on these variables can be found in the TURCO dataset codebook provided in Appendix A. The dataset is designed to capture variables related to competence, such as advanced military training at War College, staff officer status, years of service, participation in various wars, and military GPA, which reflects academic success. Loyalty is operationalized through variables including CUP membership, military court membership, and exile to Malta. Control variables encompass the father's occupation and other demographic information.

5.1.1 Hypotheses

Military effectiveness and battle performance are interconnected but distinct concepts. Military effectiveness encompasses the broader capability of a military force to achieve its strategic objectives and missions over an extended period, often involving multiple engagements. In contrast, battle performance refers specifically to the outcomes of individual battles or skirmishes. Recognizing the distinction between these concepts is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of their interrelationship.

The hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 seek to clarify the factors that influence military effectiveness. The first two hypotheses explore the impact of competence and loyalty on promotions, which serve as indicators of military effectiveness. The third hypothesis posits that loyalty-based promotions do not necessarily correlate with suboptimal battlefield performance, emphasizing the importance of the pre-war characteristics of the military cadre. This hypothesis challenges prevailing assumptions in the literature by suggesting that loyalty does not always impede military effectiveness, thereby calling for a reassessment of existing beliefs. It offers a novel perspective on the intricate interplay between loyalty and competence in shaping military outcomes.

5.1.2 Dependent Variable

This research adopts a distinct perspective by highlighting promotion as a critical indicator of recognized competence, overall performance, and leadership insight.

This innovative approach seeks to identify the attributes that most significantly contribute to military effectiveness by analyzing the factors influencing promotion. Unlike previous studies, such as Reiter's operationalization of promotion as a binary outcome (promoted or not promoted) for U.S. and German commanders during World War II Reiter and Wagstaff (2018), this research employs a more nuanced coding system. Here, promotion is quantified by the number of ranks achieved since the previous battles, ranging from 0 to a maximum of 8. This approach enables a more granular analysis than binary coding. For instance, a value of 0 indicates that a military leader remained at an identical rank between two engagements. At the same time, a score of 5 reflects substantial advancement, such as a captain rising to the rank of corps commander or a three-star general. This method offers a new dimension to the study of military effectiveness, providing deeper insights into how leadership and performance are recognized and rewarded within the military hierarchy.

Building on the premise that military effectiveness can be indirectly assessed through the promotion patterns of commanders, this dissertation seeks to advance conventional understandings by distinguishing between two possible pathways to promotion. This nuanced approach offers a fresh perspective in the field of military studies. Analyzing the promotion trajectories of military commanders provides a valid means of indirectly gauging military effectiveness. Especially at the individual level, such analyses offer insights into how military leaders contribute to the overall effectiveness of their units, either through inherent characteristics such as competence or demonstrated performance in battle. Promotions, therefore, serve as a visible indicator of a commander's success, with rank advancement reflecting a military leader's capabilities and achievements. However, it is essential to recognize that promotions are not always the result of merit; in some cases, they may be influenced by factors such as loyalty to a political party or solid interpersonal connections. This dissertation's innovative approach aims to uncover these dynamics, offering valuable insights into the underlying mechanisms of military promotion. The study focuses on wartime promotions to maintain consistency, acknowledging that promotion patterns may differ between wartime and peacetime. Although wartime conditions may accelerate promotions, all individuals are evaluated against the same standards. During the Ottoman Empire's final wars, political affiliations, particularly with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), played a role in promotions, potentially overshadowing merit or battle performance. This research seeks to shed light on these patterns by analyzing promotion trends and examining the impact of Enver Pasha's 1914 purge to determine whether political favoritism adversely affected overall military effectiveness. The dynamics of military promotions are inherently complex

and context-specific. This study endeavors to provide quantitative support for understanding promotional patterns during the Ottoman Empire's last wars. Factors such as commanding positions, the significance of units, information sources, performance reports, battle participation, chance, and visibility influence the promotion likelihood (Moore and Trout 1978). While historical limitations may hinder the evaluation of some criteria, this study has captured vital variables such as years of service, retirement status, battle experience, and political affiliations. Drawing on the foundational work of Moore and Trout (1978), this study underscores the strong correlation between military education—particularly attendance at military academies—and career advancement within the U.S. Army. The findings reveal that generals who graduated from military academies consistently received more promotions throughout their careers, a trend especially pronounced among those reaching the ranks of three- and four-star generals. This correlation highlights the enduring impact of formal military education on long-term career progression in the armed forces. While this trend persists across various career stages, there was a notable deviation from this pattern between 1942 and 1946 among one- and two-star generals, suggesting potential shifts in promotion criteria during that period. Overall, these findings emphasize the critical role of military education in shaping promotion outcomes, providing valuable insights for military leaders and policymakers.

5.1.3 Explanatory Variables

The independent variables in this study are categorized into two primary groups. The first group encompasses competence-related variables, such as prior combat experience, length of service, academic performance at military academies, and previous rank attained. The second group focuses on indicators of political affiliation, specifically membership in the CUP party. In this context, loyalty is defined as allegiance to the political party, with variables capturing this association, including exile to Malta, service in military courts, and any available open-source evidence of CUP membership.

Loyalty's impact on an organization's efficiency is a nuanced topic. Loyalty can take various forms, including dedication to a mission, personal allegiance to an individual or political party, or loyalty to the institution. This dissertation defines loyalty explicitly as allegiance to political authorities, focusing on Ottoman military leaders' loyalty to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). By narrowing the definition of loyalty to political allegiance, this study explores how such loyalty

influences military effectiveness within the context of the Ottoman Army.

The impact of loyalty on a military organization is twofold. In non-military organizations, loyalty plays a positive role in increasing organizational effectiveness. However, loyalty can disrupt the hierarchical structure in the military by prioritizing political allegiance over the chain of command. Military leaders prioritizing political stances over hierarchical channels may decrease effectiveness even if the orders from both sources align.

Conversely, conflicts arising from discrepancies between orders from the chain of command and political authorities can hinder battlefield operations, resulting in losses or reduced effectiveness. Positive aspects of loyalty include enhancing team cohesion and fostering long-term commitment.

Conversely, the negative impacts of loyalty may consist of:
- Resistance to change.
- Erosion of trust and morale within a unit.
- Hindrance of critical thinking.
- Dilution of meritocracy in promotions.
- Creation of distrust within military units and hierarchical levels.
- Impairment of effective communication channels.

Assessing the impact of military leaders' attributes on battle outcomes has typically involved categorizing these qualifications into two main groups: competence and loyalty. Criteria for competence are relatively straightforward to delineate, often relying on factors such as previous battle experience, academic achievements, and performance in military operations. In contrast, the loyalty assessment has been approached differently in existing literature. For instance, Reiter and Wagstaff (2018) considered loyalty in terms of interpersonal relationships, while Arnold, Chatagnier, and Hollibaugh Jr (2020), in their study of military leaders' attributes during the American Civil War, used the birth location as a proxy for loyalty to either the Union or Confederate forces.

This research defines loyalty as alignment with political authorities, particularly relevant in the context of the late Ottoman Empire, especially after the 1900s. This entails membership in the dominant political organization of the time, namely the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). This conceptualization of loyalty is reasonable as membership in the CUP reflects an individual Ottoman military leader's alignment with a specific ideology within the most influential political group. Political affiliations can influence leaders' priorities in decision-making processes, po-

tentially diverging from hierarchical considerations. For example, some leaders may prioritize political agendas over military objectives in certain situations. However, it is essential to approach loyalty assumptions skeptically, recognizing that individuals may have multifaceted loyalties shaped by various factors. These may include loyalty to the military or state, allegiance to comrades in arms, or adherence to religious values. Thus, while membership in the (CUP may indicate a particular political alignment, it may not fully capture the complexity of individual loyalties among military leaders.

Given the historical context and the prevailing political landscape in the Ottoman Empire during the analyzed period, the assumption that loyalty could be defined by membership in the CUP party appears pertinent. Many officers, particularly those graduating from military war academies, strongly sympathized with the CUP and its objectives, including the desire to depose Abdulhamid II (Aksakal 2008; Zürcher 2017).

However, assessing the loyalty of Ottoman officers to the CUP party between 1900 and 1921 presents significant challenges due to the lack of concrete records categorizing military leaders as pro or anti-CUP members. To address this issue, this research employs various indicators and proxy measures, including information from open-source channels, biographies, records of individuals exiled to Malta with the assistance of the British government, and membership in military courts. Notably, it is improbable for an anti-CUP officer to hold a position in these high military courts, providing a reliable indicator of pro-CUP affiliation. These challenges underscore the complexity of the research topic and the need for a nuanced approach to understanding loyalty in the late Ottoman Empire.

The political landscape during the 1900s and until 1918, particularly following Ferit Pasha's government, which opposed the CUP, underscores the significant influence wielded by the CUP. From 1913 to 1918, the party was the official ruling power and effectively controlled bureaucratic channels indirectly, shaping the loyalty dynamics among military leaders. This highlights the profound impact of political affiliation, particularly with the CUP, on the military leadership and organizational dynamics of the late Ottoman Empire.

5.2 Model Design

In this chapter, regression analysis is employed, utilizing the **generalized ordered logistic regression model** (Williams 2006, 2016) to evaluate the impact of competence and loyalty on the generation of high levels of military effectiveness. The analysis is conducted using two distinct dependent variables (DVs). The first DV, post-war promotions, is specifically designed to examine the outcomes of the Gallipoli Campaign by capturing the promotions following the war's conclusion. The second DV, promotions up to the war, is utilized in the context of the pre-Balkan War period, aiming to capture the commanders' competence and loyalty statuses before the onset of the conflict. This methodological approach allows for a nuanced examination of the military group's characteristics, assessing whether these attributes are predominantly competence-based or more closely aligned with political authority. Including time-varying variables, such as prior military experience (measured in years) and the number of wars participated in, allows for an adjustment based on each individual's war participation, ensuring a more dynamic analysis. Meanwhile, other variables remain constant across the analysis, providing a stable foundation for comparing the impact of competence and loyalty on military effectiveness across different contexts.

$$\begin{aligned} Promotion = \beta_0 &+ \beta_1 WorkExperience_1 + \beta_2 WarExperience_2 + \beta_3 MilGPA_3 \\ &+ \beta_4 Staff_4 + \beta_5 MaltaExile_5 + \beta_6 CUPMembership_6 \\ &+ \beta_7 MilCourtMem_7 + \beta_8 BirthLocation_8 + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

5.3 Empirical Findings

The analysis further reveals that the impact of loyalty on promotions within the Ottoman military leadership was nuanced. Specifically, CUP membership and Malta Exile consistently exhibited positive associations with career advancement, suggesting that loyalty to the CUP played a significant role in securing promotions, particularly when coupled with competence. However, it is crucial to recognize the potential for endogeneity in this context. Endogeneity occurs when an independent variable is correlated with the error term, leading to biased and inconsistent esti-

mates. In this case, the correlation between CUP membership and the error term poses a serious risk, as the higher competence levels observed among CUP members could confound the analysis.

To address this endogeneity concern, this chapter employs a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method, using the predicted values of CUP membership rather than the observed values in the regression analyses. This approach helps mitigate the potential bias and provides more reliable estimates of the true effect of loyalty on promotions. The operationalization, tests, and results of the 2SLS method are detailed in Appendix E.

Moreover, the academic success of CUP members, a strong determinant of competence, is thoroughly examined in Appendix F. While CUP members generally demonstrated slightly higher military academic success than the overall sample, the difference is not substantial enough to undermine the validity of the analyses. The allocation of CUP members to specific fronts, particularly the Gallipoli Campaign, where the best and most loyal officers were strategically deployed by the Ministry of War under Enver Pasha, also plays a role in the observed competence levels. The distribution of CUP members across other fronts varies, indicating that the conditions do not invalidate the findings of this chapter. Therefore, the analyses proceed with confidence in the meaningfulness and statistical significance of the results, free from the confounding effects of endogeneity.

Figure 5.1 presents the distribution of the dependent variable, which measures the promotions that occurred immediately following the war. This variable ranges from 0 (indicating no promotion) to 3. Unlike this immediate post-war promotion measure, other dependent variables are employed to assess the number of ranks achieved as promotions leading up to the specific war being examined. These variables cover a more extended period, tracking officers' career progression from graduation through their participation in significant conflicts such as the Balkan Wars or the Gallipoli Campaign. By doing so, these variables capture a broader scope of career development and military service, offering a comprehensive view of the factors influencing military promotions over time.

Figure 5.1 Distribution of Dependent Variables



Table 5.1 strategically presents the generalized ordered logistic regression results for overall promotions gained after wars. The table provides results from a series of thresholds of generalized ordered logistic regression models, each designed to evaluate the relationship between various predictors and the likelihood of achieving different levels of military promotion. The analysis is divided into five models, each progressively incorporating additional variables into the baseline specification. This methodological approach allows for a nuanced examination of the factors influencing overall military promotion, focusing on competence-related, loyalty-related, and other contextual variables.

The regression results, centered on the pivotal Balkan War and Gallipoli Campaign, aim to uncover promotion patterns indicative of high military effectiveness. The interpretation of the results reveals that previous war experiences consistently influenced the Ottoman Army's promotion system, particularly in the number of wars in which a commander participated. This finding is significant as it suggests that the breadth of a commander's combat experience—measured by the number of conflicts in which they were involved—played a crucial role in their likelihood of promotion. Interestingly, seniority, often a critical factor in military promotions, did not emerge as a significant predictor in this context. This outcome aligns with Enver Pasha's policy, which emphasized rejuvenating the army by favoring younger officers over those with extensive service years, reflecting a deliberate shift towards a more

dynamic and modern military leadership.

The analysis also highlights the nuanced relationship between pre-war experience and promotion likelihood. Commanders with extensive service years before the conflict were less likely to be promoted, possibly due to perceptions of their obsolescence or their suitability for modern warfare roles. In contrast, the number of wars experienced before the current conflict consistently and significantly influenced the likelihood of promotion. This suggests that commanders with substantial combat experience across multiple disputes were more likely to be considered suitable for higher ranks, emphasizing the value placed on diverse and extensive battlefield experience.

The policy outcomes, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, are reflected in the overall promotion patterns observed in the analysis. While only slightly significant for cases of non-promotion or a single-rank increase, military academic success becomes statistically meaningful in the third panel of regressions. This suggests that academic performance, while not the primary driver of early career promotions, gains importance as a commander's career progresses and higher ranks are considered.

The impact of military success on promotions is particularly pronounced among those who achieved higher ranks compared to their peers. The influence of being a CUP member follows a similar trajectory, with political affiliation to the CUP emerging as a significant factor in higher rank achievements, particularly in the second and third panels of comparison. The consistently positive and significant effect of CUP membership across multiple thresholds and models underscores the critical role that political loyalty played in military career advancement during this period.

The status of being a staff officer shows a positive and significant effect only in the first threshold of Model 2 (0.405, 1.176). However, this effect diminishes when variables related to political affiliation are introduced in subsequent models and thresholds. This suggests that while staff officer status may have initially provided an advantage in promotions, its influence was overshadowed by the more substantial impact of political loyalty in the later stages of career advancement.

In contrast, military court membership, a proxy for involvement in administrative rather than combat roles, negatively affects promotions compared to CUP membership. This finding suggests that officers who served in military courts may have been less favored for combatant and command positions, potentially due to the non-combat nature of their duties. This result warrants further investigation but upholds the broader conclusion regarding the significant impact of political affiliation

on promotion outcomes.

Geographical factors, such as birth location, generally show little significance, except for a notable negative value for those born in the Caucasus (12.574) in one threshold. However, this result should be interpreted cautiously due to the relatively small number of officers from this region compared to other areas.

In brief, competence-related variables indicate that extensive pre-war experience negatively impacted promotion likelihood, potentially due to perceptions of obsolescence. However, broad combat experience positively influenced promotions, as indicated by participation in multiple wars. Loyalty-related variables reveal that CUP membership significantly enhanced promotion prospects, highlighting the critical role of political loyalty in military career advancement. Conversely, pre-1918 military court membership significantly hindered promotion, suggesting that such administrative roles were less conducive to upward mobility within the military hierarchy.

Table 5.1 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Overall After-War Promotion

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0046***	-0027		-0033*	-0031*
Num.of Wars	0446***	0415***		0446***	0445***
Mil. GPA		0009**		0010**	0010**
Staff Officer		0405*		0359	0345
Malta Exile			0107	0250	0258
CUP Member			0186*	0086	0079
Mil. Court Memb.			-0505*	-0546*	-0564*
Birth: Anatolia					0000
Birth: Balkans					0097
Birth: Middle East					-0314
Birth: Caucasus					1384
Constant	-0018	-1112***	-0450	-1383**	-1417***
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0046***	-0027		-0033*	-0031*
Num.of Wars	0446***	0415***		0446***	0445***
Mil. GPA		0009**		0010**	0010**
Staff Officer		1176***		0359	0345
Malta Exile			0107	0250	0258
CUP Member			0510***	0409***	0404***
Mil. Court Memb.			-1400*	-1427*	-1405*
Birth: Anatolia					0000
Birth: Balkans					0097
Birth: Middle East					-0314
Birth: Caucasus					-12574***
Constant	-3015***	-4448***	-4637***	-5699***	-5733***
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0046***	-0027		-0033*	-0031*
Num.of Wars	0446***	0415***		0446***	0445***
Mil. GPA		0009**		0010**	0010**
Staff Officer		1471*		0359	0345
Malta Exile			0107	0250	0258
CUP Member			0887***	0779***	0773***
Mil. Court Memb.			-13490***	-12854***	-14714***
Birth: Anatolia					0000
Birth: Balkans					0097
Birth: Middle East					-0314
Birth: Caucasus					0000
Constant	-4813***	-6437***	-8133***	-9188***	-9221***
Observations	1093	1093	1093	1093	1093

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5.2 and 5.3 are complementary: the former examines the variation in dependent variables (DV) among commanders participating before the Balkan War, while the latter analyzes the variation in DV related to commanders' battle performance. Given the Balkan War's characterization as a total defeat, it is anticipated that minimal meaningful variation will be observed in post-war promotions.

Table 5.2 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Before Balkan War Promotion

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	0136***	0227***		0017	0005
Num.of Wars	-0410***	-0789***		-0066	-0009
Mil. GPA		-0010		-0022	-0021
Staff Officer		0814		-0358	-0487
Malta Exile			-0163	-0145	-0085
CUP Member			1668***	1751	1829
Mil. Court Memb.			-1167*	-1578**	-1653**
Birth Location					0266
Constant	-0554	-1263	-6094***	-4284	-4866
Previous Mil.Exp.	0136***	0227***		0017	0005
Num.of Wars	-0410***	-0789***		-0066	-0009
Mil. GPA		-0010		-0022	-0021
Staff Officer		2445***		1733	1643
Malta Exile			-0163	-0211	-0215
CUP Member			1668***	1465	1519
Mil. Court Memb.			-16818***	-16208***	-15706***
Birth Location					0104
Constant	-3785***	-5049***	-8718***	-7212**	-7490***
Observations	414	219	219	219	219

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5.2 indicates that promotions followed an irregular path before the Balkan Wars. One contributing factor could be the limited number of officers with prior war experience, as evidenced by fewer officers participating in conflicts such as the War of Tripoli 1910-11 and the Greco-Turkish War 1897. Notably, no evidence exists regarding loyalty or CUP membership, underscoring the uncertainty in historical analysis. This is meaningful given that the prominence of Enver Pasha and CUP members surged post-Balkan defeat, particularly following the raid on the Sublime Porte in 1913. This event criticized the government for its perceived weakness in defending the Balkans and preserving Ottoman territories amassed over six centuries. It provided an upper hand and legitimization for the CUP activities as members of CUP presented themselves as an option for remedying the defeats resulting from Balkan War losses.

In this generalized regression analysis, military ranks were grouped into three categories:

- First Group: Lieutenant to Major
- Second Group: Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel
- Third Group: Generals

The analysis aimed to compare rank advancements between early and late graduates by using pre-war experience as a control variable. Pre-war experience, defined as the time interval between graduation and the outbreak of war, standardizes current ranks and the advantage of seniority across both early and late entrants in the military system. This approach ensures a fair comparison of rank progression, accounting for the varying lengths of service among officers.

This analysis explores the factors influencing military rank promotion before the Balkan War. The focus is on finding which factors, if they existed, shaped the promotion during this period and exploring the competitive and loyalty statuses of the Ottoman officer's cadre who led the Balkan War. Considering the entire model, the only meaningful finding is the CUP membership when passing from the 1st threshold to the second; in other words, those promoted as generals are more likely to be promoted because of political affiliation. In low ranks, neither political closeness nor any variable demonstrating competence is significant.

Table 5.3 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression Results for After Balkan War Promotion

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	0014	0060		0039	0037
Num.of Wars	-0034	-0010		-0009	-0026
Mil. GPA		0021**		0017*	0017*
Staff Officer		0426		0356	0322
Malta Exile			0349	0322	0402
CUP Memmber			1208**	0985**	0928*
Mil. Court Memb.			0367	0346	0212
Birth: Anatolia					0000
Birth: Balkans					0246
Birth: Middle East					0830
Birth: Caucosia					0492
Constant	-0460	-3027**	-0865***	-2810**	-2829**
Observations	272	272	272	272	272

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The analyses in Table 5.3 show the factors influencing military rank promotion after the Balkan War. The focus is on understanding how competence-related and loyalty-related variables affected the likelihood of promotion during this period. In this generalized ordered regression analysis, increased military ranks were grouped into two categories:

• First Group: no increase
• Second Group: increase up to two consequent ranks

The Balkan War resulted in a dramatic loss from the Ottoman perspective. Because of this, promotion among the officers was not an expected issue. Findings also support this condition. None of the variables could significantly explain the promotion patterns after this war.

Table 5.4 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Before Gallipoli Campaign Promotion

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	0062**	0086***		0019	0022
Num.of Wars	-0251*	-0393***		0077	0068
Mil. GPA		0038***		0036***	0036***
Staff Officer		13828***		13887***	14308***
Malta Exile			12699***	14439***	14990***
CUP Memmber			2256**	0453***	0448***
Mil. Court Memb.			13743***	14475***	14929***
Birth: Anatolia					0000
Birth: Balkans					0284
Birth: Middle East					-0609
Birth: Caucosia					-1447***
Constant	3507***	0558	-3816	-0957	-1016
Previous Mil.Exp.	0062**	0180***		0194***	0198***
Num.of Wars	-0251*	-0393***		-0521***	-0542***
Mil. GPA		0038***		0036***	0036***
Staff Officer		2755***		2356***	2298***
Malta Exile			1413***	1099**	1169**
CUP Memmber			0698***	0453***	0448***
Mil. Court Memb.			-1088	-0974	-0952
Birth: Anatolia					0000
Birth: Balkans					0284
Birth: Middle East					-0609
Birth: Caucosia					-1447***
Constant	-2636***	-8901***	-4918***	-10415***	-10485***
Observations	992	992	992	992	992

Standard errors in parentheses
Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

This generalized ordered logistic regression (Table 5.4) analysis examines the determinants of military rank promotion before the Gallipoli Campaign, focusing on competence-related and loyalty-related variables. In this generalized regression analysis for the promotion analyses before the Gallipoli Campain, military ranks were grouped into three categories:

- First Group: Lieutenant to Captain
- Second Group: Major and Lieutenant Colonel
- Third Group: Colonels and Generals

The findings presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 are not just statistically significant, but they are also of paramount importance in understanding the impact of attributes among Ottoman military leaders on achieving higher levels of military effectiveness. These results provide a comprehensive view from periods of defeat to victory, particularly exemplified by the remarkable army performance at Gallipoli, as extensively discussed in Chapter 3. Military cadres, especially commanders, demonstrated exceptionally superior battlefield performance during this period. Subsequently, the shift in military leadership post-1914 witnessed a new cadre characterized by increased competence, academic qualifications, and radical changes in battle outcomes.

Contrary to some scholarly literature, our research indicates that loyalty, particularly in allegiance to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), played a significant role in promotions, especially during the Gallipoli Campaign. While CUP members were already prominent and successful commanders, our findings suggest that not all CUP members possessed uniformly high levels of competence; however, during critical moments like the Gallipoli Campaign, the most competent and successful among the loyalists were prioritized and tasked with key responsibilities, leading to enhanced military effectiveness (The issue of potential endogeneity, where loyalty and competence may influence each other, is addressed in detail in Appendix E).

Level 1: Transition from Lower Ranks to Intermediate Ranks:

Military academic success, different from the military cadre existing during the Balkan Wars, was present in this group of commanders ' promotion track. Briefly, they are academically more equipped compared to the previous group. The overall policy in the Ottoman Military to make officers younger and the impact of Enver Pasha's purge in 1914 seem adequate in this finding. A higher military GPA (Coefficient 0.038) significantly increases the likelihood of promotion, affirming that academic competence is not just valued, but it is a crucial factor in determining rank advancement.

Being a staff officer (14.308 ($p < 0.001$) in Model 5, also significant in other models) had a substantial positive impact on promotion, indicating that these roles are pivotal in advancing within the military hierarchy.

Variables showing the political affiliation, Malta Exile (Coefficient: 14.990 ($p < 0.001$) in Model 5), and CUP membership (Coefficient: 0.448 ($p < 0.001$) in Model 5.) were both statistically significant in this level (or in the first threshold of regression). Membership in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) positively affects promotion likelihood, further supporting the importance of political alignment and loyalty in career advancement. Commanders affiliated with the CUP likely had access to more significant opportunities and were more likely to be promoted in the Gallipoli military cadre. Having a position in the Military Courts before 1918 (Coefficient: 13.743 ($p < 0.001$) in Model 3), a proxy for CUP membership has a positive and significant impact on being promoted from lowest ranks to intermediate ranks, following a similar track with other variables that draw the political affiliation linkage.

Level 2: Transition from Intermediate Ranks to Higher Ranks:

Seniority, or the war experience, becomes a significant factor, especially when promoted from Intermediate Ranks to Higher Ranks (Coefficient: 0.062 ($p < 0.01$) in Model 1 and 0.180 ($p < 0.001$). The positive and significant coefficients indicate that pre-war experience remains a strong predictor of promotion to higher ranks. The increase in coefficient magnitude from Level 1 to Level 2 suggests that the value of experience becomes even more pronounced as commanders move to higher ranks.

The number of wars participated is also significant but has a negative value, showing that in promotion, perhaps, the younger officers with limited war experience were promoted more. This result might be due to the older removal from the military system or some other factors, such as being killed in action or forced or voluntary retirement coming into play. Enver Pasha's purge also aimed to remove the older officers, who might have had more war participants.

Military GPA, or academic success, played a crucial role in rank promotion within this group, as demonstrated by a significant coefficient of 0.038 ($p < 0.001$) across Models 2, 4, and 5. This indicates that military success was a distinguishing factor between the cadres of the Balkan War and the Gallipoli Campaign. Notably, staff officers and the entire Gallipoli cadre were better trained and more successful. This finding also highlights the prioritization of resources and personnel quality by the Ottoman General Staff, suggesting that Gallipoli was given precedence over other fronts during World War I.

The role of a staff officer continues to exert a substantial positive impact on further promotions. While its influence is somewhat reduced compared to Level 1, it remains

a strong indicator of advancement, particularly for those progressing into the highest echelons of military leadership.

Loyalty-related variables, such as Malta Exile and CUP membership, remain significant at this threshold. CUP membership continues positively influencing promotions to higher ranks, though with a diminished effect size. This suggests that while political alignment continues to play a role, its importance decreases as commanders rise to the highest ranks.

The differing magnitudes and significance levels between Levels 1 and 2 suggest that while competence is consistently critical, loyalty may have a more substantial role in initial promotions. Competence becomes increasingly vital as commanders advance, and the effects of loyalty-related factors, though still significant, may become secondary. This detailed interpretation shows that competence and loyalty were pivotal in military promotions before the Gallipoli Campaign, with their relative importance varying depending on the commander's career progression stage.

Table 5.5 showcases the post-Gallipoli Campaign promotions, marked by remarkable military feats and high effectiveness. The generalized ordered logistic regression results for the commanders' promotions after the Gallipoli War offer insights into how various factors influenced promotion likelihood across different ranks.

In this generalized ordered regression analysis, increased military ranks were grouped into three categories:

- First Group: (0 = 1): Represents no promotion (baseline category).
- Second Group: (1/2 = 2): Represents mid-level promotions.
- Third group: (4/5 = 3): Represents high-level promotions.

The results reveal a nuanced picture of how promotions were determined after the Gallipoli War. Experience in multiple wars and broader military experience were crucial for career advancement, while political affiliations and roles like staff officer or Malta exile had complex, sometimes contradictory effects depending on the rank level. The negative impact of CUP membership and Malta exile on higher-level promotions reflects the shifting political landscape and the military's changing priorities post-Gallipoli period.

These results underscore the importance of both competence (as indicated by experience and military roles) and the evolving political context in shaping the military

Table 5.5 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression Results for After Gallipoli Campaign Promotion

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0029	-0009		-0012	-0011
Num.of Wars	0408***	0373***		0424***	0418***
Mil. GPA		0011*		0013**	0013**
Staff Officer		0539*		0541*	0543*
Malta Exile			0323	0322	0352
CUP Memmber			0177	-0159	-0164
Mil. Court Memb.			-0472	-0691**	-0720**
Birth: Anatolia					0000
Birth: Balkans					0145
Birth: Middle East					-0034
Birth: Caucosia					0000
Constant	-0218	-1470***	0172	-1527***	-1566***
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0029	-0009		-0012	-0011
Num.of Wars	0408***	0373***		0424***	0418***
Mil. GPA		0293**		0460***	0466***
Staff Officer		0539*		-1264*	-1260*
Malta Exile			-11623***	-10266***	-11868***
CUP Memmber			-0899*	-1213***	-1209***
Mil. Court Memb.			-12493***	-11970***	-13580***
Birth: Anatolia					0000
Birth: Balkans					0145
Birth: Middle East					-0034
Birth: Caucosia					0000
Constant	-5439***	-34128**	-4413***	-49077***	-49770***
Observations	667	667	667	667	667

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

hierarchy after one of the most significant campaigns of World War I.

Competence-Related Variables:

War Experience: The amount of war experience didn't significantly affect promotions at any level (coefficient: negative 0.029). However, the number of wars a commander experienced before Gallipoli strongly impacted their chances of moving up, with a consistent and significant effect (coefficient: 0.408) for higher promotions.

Loyalty-Related Variables:

CUP Membership: Being a Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) member had mixed effects. It slightly improved the chances of mid-level promotions (coefficient: 0.177), though this effect wasn't statistically significant. However, regarding high-

level promotions, CUP membership had a significant negative impact (coefficient: negative 1.209). This suggests that while being part of the CUP might have been beneficial earlier in a career, it became a liability for those aiming for the top ranks after the Gallipoli campaign, likely due to shifting political dynamics.

Academic Success:

Military Academic Success (MILGPA): Success in military academics positively influenced promotions. It moderated mid-level promotions (coefficient: 0.011) but played a much more vital role in advancing to high-level positions (coefficient: 0.466). This highlights the growing importance of academic achievement as commanders moved up the ranks.

The analysis in Table 5.5 clearly shows that competence-related factors, such as the number of wars experienced and military roles during the Gallipoli campaign, were key drivers of career advancement within the military. However, loyalty-related factors like CUP membership and roles such as Malta Exile had complex and often adverse effects on promotions, particularly at higher levels.

Mid-Level vs. High-Level Promotions:

There is a noticeable difference in what influences mid-level versus high-level promotions. While broad military experience and staff roles are crucial for mid-level advancements, high-level promotions are more affected by political affiliations and roles that carry a significant political or social stigma.

Figure 5.2 Marginal Effect of Academic Success to Promotion Before and After the Gallipoli Campaign



Figure 5.2 provides an insightful view of the commander cadre at the Gallipoli Front, highlighting their military academic achievements. The commanders assigned to this mission were among the best-trained personnel, with a high probability of reaching higher ranks, particularly those most academically distinguished. This strategic deployment of academically superior officers contrasts with the approach seen in the Balkan War, where this trend was not evident.

Similarly, in post-war promotions, academically successful officers were more likely to achieve high-rank promotions than remain at moderate levels. This graph reflects a critical dimension of military competence: academic success. The emphasis on academic excellence within the commander group of the Gallipoli Campaign played a pivotal role in the high army effectiveness achieved in the Dardanelles. The victory on this front can be attributed mainly to the exceptional quality of the military leadership.

Figure 5.3 Coefficient Plot for Prior Promotion Patterns of the Commanders



Figure 5.3 illustrates the promotional trends of commanders before the Balkan War and the Gallipoli Campaign, highlighting the differences in the impact of competence and loyalty on military promotions during these periods. Before the Balkan Wars, no significant effects were observed for variables related to competence or loyalty. In contrast, before the Gallipoli Campaign, variables such as "Staff Officer" and political affiliation (e.g., CUP membership) emerged as significant predictors of promotions.

The analysis, particularly for the first threshold in the generalized ordered regression model, reveals that the impact of competence and loyalty on promotions becomes more pronounced at higher thresholds. Specifically, the "Staff Officer" role had a highly positive and statistically significant effect before the Gallipoli Campaign, with a coefficient of approximately 14.31, indicating that staff officers were crucial to promotions and military effectiveness during this period. The significant shift from the pre-Balkan War period underscores the increased value placed on staff roles.

Similarly, the variable "Malta Exile" shows a significant positive effect before the Gallipoli Campaign, with a coefficient of approximately 14.99, suggesting that officers exiled to Malta were more likely to be promoted and were seen as influential leaders. This shift implies loyalty, notably demonstrated through political persecution, became a critical factor in military promotions.

As the Ottoman Empire prepared for the Gallipoli Campaign, the significance of

political loyalty in the military grew. While CUP membership had no significant impact before the Balkan War, it became a substantial predictor before the Gallipoli Campaign, with a coefficient of approximately 0.45. This change underscores the increasing importance of political loyalty in the military.

These results indicate a significant shift in the factors influencing military promotions and effectiveness between the two wars. Roles related to competence, such as staff officers and political loyalty, especially CUP membership, played increasingly critical roles before the Gallipoli Campaign, marking an apparent change in the dynamics of military promotions.

Figure 5.4 Coefficient Plot for the Factors Influencing Promotion After the Balkan War and Gallipoli Campaign



Figure 5.4 illustrates a significant shift in the factors influencing military promotions between the Balkan Wars and the Gallipoli Campaign. Competence-related roles, such as that of a staff officer, remained consistently critical, while the influence of political loyalty, as evidenced by CUP membership, became increasingly pronounced following the Gallipoli Campaign.

It is important to note that after-war promotions are measured by comparing the rank held just before the war to the rank achieved up to one year after. However, two factors limit the scope of this evaluation. The first is the lack of information about the exact rank before or after the war for some commanders, necessitating

their exclusion from the analysis. The second is the relatively short time range for observing promotions, making it more challenging to capture the full extent of career advancements. These limitations highlight the need for further research and improvement in data collection. Despite these challenges, it is evident that competence-related variables played a more prominent role in the after-Gallipoli promotions, a period marked by victory, unlike the defeat following the Balkan War.

In stark contrast, Military Court Membership Before 1918 shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient, indicating that involvement in the military court before 1918 was associated with a lower likelihood of promotion. This negative impact may reflect the perception that those engaged in military judiciary roles were less involved in combat or strategic leadership, diminishing their career advancement chances.

The right side of Figure 5.4 focuses on the factors influencing promotions after the Gallipoli Campaign. The significance of the Staff Officer role is particularly noteworthy, with a strongly positive and statistically significant coefficient. This suggests that, even more so than before the Balkan War, being a staff officer before the Gallipoli Campaign significantly increased the likelihood of promotion. The high coefficient value underscores that competence in such strategic roles was crucial during this period, likely due to the complex and demanding nature of the Gallipoli Campaign.

The impact of graduation year and age on military promotions requires careful consideration due to the variability of these factors, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. This figure shows the marginal effects, highlighting how changes in the graduation year (the independent variable) are associated with changes in the likelihood of promotion (the dependent variable). For the Gallipoli Campaign, the effect of graduation year becomes statistically significant only after 1880. Graduates from military academies after this period constituted most of the military cadres involved in World War I and Gallipoli. The army reforms initiated by the 1908 law and Enver Pasha's forced retirement initiatives in January 1914 allowed graduates from the 1880s to advance more rapidly in their military careers. This trend aligns with the rise of the CUP among military personnel, particularly in the post-1880s.

The figure represents the marginal effects of graduation year on post-war promotions for military leaders, focusing on two significant conflicts: the Balkan Wars and the Gallipoli Campaign. As the graduation year increased (moving closer to 1910), the likelihood of promotions decreased for the Balkan Wars, indicating that younger or more recent graduates were less favored for promotions following this conflict. This

may reflect a preference for seniority and experience in the context of the Balkan Wars. In contrast, for the Gallipoli Campaign, more recent graduates (closer to 1910) were more likely to be promoted. This suggests that younger officers, possibly with more contemporary military training, were better aligned with the demands of the Gallipoli Campaign, leading to a higher likelihood of post-war promotions.

This divergence in promotion patterns between the two wars highlights the shifting criteria for military advancement within the Ottoman army. The Gallipoli Campaign favored more recent and potentially more strategically aligned military graduates.

Figure 5.5 Marginal Effects of Graduation Year on Post-War Promotions: A Comparison Between the Balkan Wars and Gallipoli Campaign



The regression analyses and findings presented in Table 5.6 provide a detailed exploration of the factors influencing rank promotions for military leaders who participated in the Balkan Wars or the Gallipoli Campaign. This rigorous analysis examines how both competence-related and loyalty-related attributes affect the career trajectories of these commanders within the professional military, considering their long-term progression through the ranks until retirement and the attainment of their highest rank. By focusing on these key attributes, the study sheds light on the dynamics that shaped the career advancement of Ottoman military leaders during this critical period, offering valuable insights into the intersection of competence, loyalty, and military effectiveness.

Table 5.6 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Maximum Rank Achieved

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Memb. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	0033***	0000		0026*	0029**
Num.of Wars	0145*	0352***		-0049	-0080
Mil. GPA		0012***		0004	0003
Staff Officer		1360***		0762**	0739*
Malta Exile			0663**	0665**	0663**
CUP Memmber			3620***	2991***	3195***
Mil. Court Memb.			-0208	-0248	-0227
Birth Location					-0051
Constant	1024***	-0108	-0254	-0685*	-0651
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0041***	0000		0026*	0029**
Num.of Wars	0378***	0352***		-0049	-0080
Mil. GPA		0027***		0020**	0020**
Staff Officer		1798***		1157***	1103***
Malta Exile			0663**	0665**	0663**
CUP Memmber			5181***	2991***	3195***
Mil. Court Memb.			-0572*	-0597*	-0612*
Birth Location					0117
Constant	-1526***	-5165***	-4731***	-5861***	-6058***
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0044*	0000		0026*	0029**
Num.of Wars	0450***	0352***		-0049	-0080
Mil. GPA		0000		-0005	-0010
Staff Officer		4236***		3467***	3716***
Malta Exile			0663**	0665**	0663**
CUP Memmber			5691***	2991***	3195***
Mil. Court Memb.			-15071***	-14693***	-14708***
Birth Location					-0736***
Constant	-3777***	-7023***	-7462***	-7753***	-6664***
Observations	2055	1856	1856	1856	1856

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5.6 shows the impact of competence and loyalty-related variables on Ottoman commanders' whole military career rank achievement. The dependent variable in this regression model is the maximum rank achieved with a range between 1 to 10. Categories in this analysis are given below:

Category 1: (0/3) - Low ranks, lieutenant to captain
Category 2: (4/6) - Ranks, major, and brigadier general
Category 3: (6/8) - High ranks, brigadier general to corps general
Category 4: (8/10) - Very high ranks, from corps general to field marshal

Competence-Related Variables:

Pre-war experience plays an exciting role in military promotions. Initially, it positively affects reaching lower ranks, as seen with a coefficient of 0.033 for Category 1. However, this effect diminishes and even turns negative for mid and high ranks, indicated by coefficients of minus 0.041 and minus 0.044 for Categories 2 and 3, respectively.

Combat experience emerges as a strong predictor of higher-rank achievement. With coefficients of 0.145 for Category 1, 0.378 for Category 2, and 0.450 for Category 3, it's clear that extensive combat experience significantly boosts the likelihood of promotion. The impact of this variable grows as one moves from lower to higher ranks, highlighting the immense value placed on multiple combat experiences for an officer's career progression during this period.

Military GPA, or academic success, positively affects mid-level promotions, with coefficients of 0.012 and 0.027 for Categories 1 and 2; it becomes insignificant for the highest ranks, as seen with a coefficient of 0.000 for Category 3. This pattern suggests that while broad military experience is valuable for moving up to mid-level positions, it is insufficient to push officers to the top ranks, where other factors may play a more decisive role.

Serving as a Staff Officer has a significant and growing positive impact on promotions across all levels. The coefficients of 1.360 for Category 1, 1.798 for Category 2, and a striking 4.236 for Category 3 demonstrate how crucial this role was for an officer's career. The increasing coefficients suggest that the role of Staff Officer became even more critical as one moved up the ranks, reflecting its value in the military hierarchy.

Loyalty-Related Variables:

Exile to Malta positively affected rank progression, as indicated by consistent coefficients of 0.663 across all categories. Membership in the Committee of Union and Progress Party had a profoundly positive effect on achieving higher ranks. The high coefficients, 3.620 for Category 1, 5.181 for Category 2, and 5.691 for Category 3 indicate that political affiliation with the CUP was highly advantageous for career advancement. This strong influence across all categories underscores the importance of political connections in the military hierarchy during this period. In contrast, involvement in military courts before 1918 had a negative impact on career progression.

The findings reveal a complex interplay between competence, loyalty, and political factors in determining military promotions after the Gallipoli campaign. Competence-related variables, such as pre-war experience and army roles, play a

significant role in achieving lower to mid-level ranks, but their influence wanes at the highest levels. On the other hand, loyalty-related factors, especially political affiliations like CUP membership, substantially impact reaching higher ranks, indicating the importance of political connections in the military's upper echelons.

Staff Officer and CUP membership roles emerge as crucial factors in achieving higher ranks, reflecting the critical importance of operational roles and political ties. Conversely, while occasionally beneficial, involvement in military courts and being exiled generally hindered career progression, especially at the highest levels, suggesting that political or operational controversies could be career-limiting. Finally, the strong positive effect of combat experience on rank achievement highlights the value placed on extensive war experience, particularly for officers aiming to rise through the mid and high-level ranks. This interpretation provides a nuanced understanding of how various factors influenced military rank achievement in the aftermath of the Gallipoli campaign.

The regressions in this chapter were also subjected to robustness checks using the ordered logistic regression model. The results from these checks closely mirrored those obtained from the generalized ordered logistic regression model. However, the decision to retain the generalized ordered logistic regression model was informed by the Brant test results, which indicated a violation of the parallel regression lines assumption—a critical assumption in the ordered logistic regression model. The generalized ordered logistic regression model, while still applying the parallel lines assumption, allows for more flexibility in its application, making it a more appropriate choice given the data structure and assumptions required for accurate modeling.

The proper categorization of variables across all regressions facilitated the effective application of the generalized ordered logistic regression model, ensuring that the analyses accurately captured the nuances of the data. Additionally, detailed results from the ordered logistic regression analyses, along with complementary robustness checks using the continuation ratio model, are provided in Appendix C. These supplementary analyses reinforce the reliability of the findings presented in this chapter, offering a comprehensive and statistically sound evaluation of the factors influencing military promotions during the Ottoman Empire's final wars.

5.4 Conclusion

The evidence and analyses presented in this chapter are pivotal in establishing the statistical significance of military leaders' competence-related and loyalty-related attributes in enhancing military effectiveness. This quantitative evaluation represents the first rigorous statistical assessment of the impact of military leaders on the outcomes of the Balkan War and the Gallipoli Campaign, marking a significant advancement in military history research. Historically, the causes of the defeat in the Balkan Wars have been the subject of extensive debate in academic circles and broader societal discourse, with many attributing the failure to various factors, including the quality of the commanders. However, until now, statistical evidence has been lacking to substantiate these claims. This chapter argues that the commanders' attributes were crucial in ensuring higher military effectiveness and subsequent victory in the Gallipoli Campaign. Unlike the Balkan Wars, the military cadre involved in Gallipoli demonstrated markedly higher competence, and this elevated standard of individual quality among military leaders is one of the most critical explanations for their military success.

The regression analyses presented in this chapter unequivocally support Hypothesis 1, which posits that military effectiveness is driven by military leaders possessing superior competence. Hypothesis 2 suggests that loyalty also plays a significant role in enhancing military effectiveness. It is essential to highlight that, in the Turkish context, the positive impact of loyalty is closely linked to the pre-existing competence levels of the loyal officers. Hypothesis 3, which proposes that loyalty positively influences military effectiveness, is also supported by the data, thereby reinforcing the robustness of our research findings.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 are complementary in that the positive impact of loyalty is contingent upon the competence of the loyal officers. This finding is particularly relevant for the latter Ottoman wars, although it is contextually and temporally specific. In terms of generalizability, Hypothesis 1 demonstrates external validity, while Hypotheses 2 and 3 apply under particular conditions, such as the prior quality of military leaders. These implications underscore the practical relevance and contextual specificity of our research, showing that it is not just theoretical, but has real-world implications for military operations.

Effective military operations are fundamentally reliant on the competence of their commanders. Achieving success on the battlefield is nearly impossible without highly efficient and capable leaders. The regression results presented provide compelling

evidence for the success of the Gallipoli Campaign. The ambiguity surrounding the defeat in the Balkan Wars is replaced by precise, statistically significant results when Gallipoli is examined. Not only are post-war promotions meaningful in the context of the Gallipoli Campaign, but pre-war evaluations also reveal that the group of commanders was carefully selected, tasked, and supported. This military cadre represented the pinnacle of organizational effort during the series of battles in World War I. The Ottoman General Staff prioritized the Gallipoli front by allocating their most competent officers.

Moreover, the analyses in this chapter demonstrate that loyalty was another significant factor positively influencing military effectiveness. The positive impact of loyalty can be attributed to the loyalist group's high quality, competence, academic success in military training, and extensive war experience. The results would likely have been negative if the officers with political affiliations towards the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) were of low individual quality. The replacement of over 1,000 officers following the Balkan War and the subsequent rejuvenation of the army proved successful in Gallipoli. However, this success was conditional on the inherent and pre-existing qualifications of the younger CUP-affiliated officers. If these conditions had not been met, loyalty, as suggested by existing literature, would likely have had a detrimental effect, undermining professionalism and reducing overall military effectiveness.

6. CONCLUSION

This dissertation presents a series of original insights into leadership, particularly military leadership, within the field of international relations. By positioning military leaders as central figures in conflicts, wars, and military interventions, this work challenges the traditionally narrow focus of leadership studies, which often neglect the role of military commanders.

The findings in this dissertation emphasize the indispensable impact of commanders in enhancing the quality of warfare, in other words, military effectiveness. Military effectiveness always remains linked to the quality of commanders. Although the nature of wars may evolve, with fifth-generation wars relying more on technology and information power, the role of military leaders does not change significantly. As long as military units exist and military operations are conducted under command, commanders will continue to be a fundamental element that determines the fate of warfare. Indeed, the undeniable truth that commanders significantly influence the outcome of wars is evident in numerous examples from recent history, such as the Russia-Ukraine War (2022-present), the Gulf War (1990-1991), the 1974 Turkish Peace Operation in Cyprus, and the Korean War (1950-1953). Modern warfare's most significant structural changes are the prominence of combined and joint operations and the increased preference for technology-intensive small-unit operations. The rising impact of small-unit operations, the ability of tactical units to influence strategic objectives, the proliferation of special forces operations, and the increase in non-conventional warfare compared to conventional battles are other factors contributing to the evolution of warfare. However, commanders will continue to exist within these various types of operations. They will steer military power in a manner that aligns with the requirements of modern technology, doctrine, and conditions. In non-conventional or guerrilla warfare, the leaders or military commanders who constitute the command element have an even more significant impact. Despite the extraordinary changes like warfare, some fundamental principles have not changed much over thousands of years. For example, a unit commander conducting an inter-

nal security operation or a commando battalion commander is still responsible for managing and controlling their soldiers. Since the terrain remains unchanged, they must still account for the terrain and weather conditions in every military operation. When contact is made, they must personally direct the engagement and, in the most challenging situations, demonstrate classic leadership by showing courage to maintain the combat morale of their unit.

Anchored with an actor-based research methodology, this study analyzed the competence of successful commanders, explicitly examining how academic success and prior war experience (both in terms of years and the number of wars or conflicts) have influenced outcomes in the Turkish context, and this was demonstrated quantitatively. In the context of military leadership, 'competence' refers to a combination of knowledge, skills, and experience that enables a commander to lead and manage military operations effectively. In simpler terms, poor and incompetent, academically mediocre and inexperienced commanders are likely something no reasonable chief of staff or force commander would want.

To be equipped with enough capability to employ quantitative research, more than 20 variables related to 900 commanders were coded, and their impact on the outcome of wars was analyzed. While aspects such as war experience and competence have been emphasized by military historians, strategists, and social scientists, they have rarely been quantified using data in a generalizable manner, particularly in the context of Turkish military history. For example, this thesis presents the loss of the Balkan War and the victory in the Gallipoli Campaign partly due to commanders' competence, and statistical evidence has been provided to support this claim. The competence levels of commanders are a decisive factor in the outcome of wars. Additionally, this study analyzed the sometimes negatively impactful factor of loyalty and interestingly found that, particularly on the Gallipoli Front, it also positively affected military effectiveness. However, this loyalty effect is conditional on the competence levels of the commanders; being loyal alone is not sufficient to win a war.

From this perspective, if the effectiveness of a combat force is to be increased, it is essential first to ensure that it meets sufficient and even high standards of competence. Loyal but non-competent commanders, or the exact opposite, will undoubtedly have a negative effect. In this study, loyalist commanders were explained through CUP membership, reflecting the loyalty bond in the context of the era. This definition of loyalty has been expressed differently in previous studies, such as geographic birthplace in the American Civil War or interpersonal networks among American officers during World War II. Establishing the loyalty bond through political affiliation is

appropriate for the Turkish context. This dissertation refrains from evaluating the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)'s political stance or broader influence on Turkish politics.

Moreover, it does not undertake a judgmental analysis regarding the merits or shortcomings of the CUP's actions or ideology. The political examination of CUP and its activities during the late Ottoman period, especially during World War I, is the subject of other studies. However, this thesis investigates how the CUP influenced military combat power during its single-party era, whether it organized military structures competently or filled positions with incompetent but loyal personnel. The findings indicate that large-scale changes in military personnel were only effective when the replacement personnel were equipped with competence.

This study, conducted within the competence-loyalty trade-off framework, provides insights into military leadership and offers practical implications for civilian administrators, ministries, and civil or commercial organizations. The findings of this research, which highlight the importance of competence in leadership, can be applied to various fields to achieve groundbreaking work. By combining studies on resilience or cohesion with an understanding of competence, organizations can enhance their effectiveness and achieve their goals more efficiently.

At the heart of this analysis lies a pivotal recognition: the profound influence of military leaders on operational-level warfare. By focusing on this critical level, where commanders exert the most direct and personal impact, this dissertation adopts a comprehensive approach, carefully isolating the effects of leadership by "canceling out" extraneous factors like economic conditions and political dynamics. The hypotheses regarding important battles in Turkish military history were thoroughly examined. The multi-method approach employed in this dissertation, particularly in Chapter 3, emphasizes the critical influence of military commanders in determining military effectiveness. Chapter 4 introduces the pioneering TURCO dataset, a comprehensive collection of data on the combat performance of Turkish commanders, while Chapter 5 leverages this dataset for comprehensive numerical analyses. These analyses yield significant findings, advancing individual-level analyses in international relations, particularly in war. By utilizing micro-data, this research provides precise and contextually grounded analyses that complement systemic-level theories, offering fresh perspectives on the pivotal role of military leaders, such as their influence on unit cohesion and morale, ability to adapt to changing battlefield conditions, and role in shaping military strategy.

The comparative case study in Chapter 3 reveals notable differences in the attributes of commanders who participated in the Balkan Wars versus those in the Gallipoli

Campaign, with the latter demonstrating a higher level of competence. This disparity can be attributed, in part, to the younger, more dynamic commanders who led in Gallipoli, reflecting the impact of military reforms that equipped them with modern military and technical knowledge. The qualitative analyses in Chapter 3 are consistent with the quantitative findings in Chapter 5, which highlight the effects of Enver Pasha's extensive military purge in January 1914. This event significantly influenced the composition and effectiveness of the Ottoman army leadership, as evidenced by the distinct promotion patterns observed among Gallipoli commanders. The findings confirm the validity of Hypothesis 3, revealing a strong correlation between pre-war competence levels and military effectiveness during the Gallipoli Campaign. Academic success, as measured by military academy graduation rank, emerged as a significant factor influencing promotions, particularly for mid-level ranks. The generalized ordered logistic regression model demonstrates that competence, staff officer status, and loyalty-related variables significantly determined promotions among the Gallipoli commanders. This cadre exhibited high levels of competence and was politically aligned with the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), further enhancing their effectiveness in the conflict. Post-war rank promotions for the Gallipoli front show that previous war experience and academic success, mainly measured by military academy graduation rank, were crucial factors in determining promotions, contrasting sharply with the lack of meaningful promotion patterns observed in the Balkan Wars. This indicates that the most competent commanders, as evidenced by their academic success and war experience, were granted more excellent opportunities for advancement in Gallipoli, reflecting the strategic importance of the campaign and the high caliber of leadership involved.

Undoubtedly, these findings carry immense significance. This dissertation uniquely bridges the fields of international relations and military history by broadening the concept of leadership to encompass military commanders and their critical role in shaping military effectiveness. By centering on two pivotal wars in Turkish history, this research enriches the existing body of literature and paves the way for future studies exploring similar themes across diverse contexts.

From an international relations perspective, individual-level analyses like those undertaken in this dissertation offer significant contributions to understanding specific military confrontations. Unlike systemic or state-level analyses, which may overlook essential nuances, a focused examination of military leaders can effectively illuminate the factors that shaped wars.

Potential avenues for further research include examining the dynamics between commanders and their units, with a particular focus on unit cohesion, and extending

the analysis to encompass the Turkish War of Independence. The TURCO dataset, in particular, represents a groundbreaking resource for such studies, offering comprehensive data on operational-level military leaders. This dataset can potentially reveal new insights into the factors driving military successes and failures. These research directions broaden our understanding of military leadership and encourage future scholars to explore these compelling areas in greater depth.

Another significant contribution of this dissertation to the scholarship is the TURCO dataset, which, introduced in this dissertation, represents a substantial advancement in Turkish military history research. Offering a comprehensive framework for employing quantitative analyses opens new avenues for systematically studying military leadership in historical conflicts. This dataset provides the first quantitative analysis of Turkish commanders who played pivotal roles in the Balkan Wars and World War I at the operational level or above. With its unparalleled scope and depth, the TURCO dataset equips researchers with robust statistical tools, enabling them to delve into crucial topics within the international relations literature, particularly those related to military strategy and leadership. Furthermore, this dataset holds the potential to uncover new, statistically supported insights into the factors that led to defeat in the Balkans and the elements that contributed to victory in Gallipoli. Its utility extends beyond historical analysis, offering valuable contributions to contemporary military effectiveness and leadership discussions.

In conclusion, this dissertation provides robust statistical evidence that competent commanders play a crucial role in military effectiveness, with significant implications for modern military systems and officer training. The success in Gallipoli, achieved with a cadre of highly competent commanders, starkly contrasts the weaker leadership observed in the Balkan Wars. The 1914 military purge led to positive outcomes in Gallipoli, contingent on the quality of the commanders. While the potential adverse effects of large-scale command changes warrant further investigation, this research highlights the importance of merit-based promotion and the development of competent military leaders, enlightening the audience about the critical factors in military effectiveness.

Finally, this dissertation amplifies the contributions of hundreds of commanders, particularly those at mid-to-lower levels in the chain of command, whose impact on military outcomes is often overlooked and their voices unheard. By coding attributes specific to each commander, this work presents a unique and exciting opportunity to explore military effectiveness and previously uncharted issues further. This research contributes to academic knowledge and provides practical insights that can inform military education, leadership development, and the enhancement of military power.

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APPENDIX A

Codebook for TURCO Dataset

This codebook provides detailed documentation for the "TURCO Dataset" on Turkish Commanders in the late Ottoman Wars, 1897-1922. This dataset, of significant historical value, focuses on Turkish (or Ottoman; these two terms are often used interchangeably by historians and academics) military leaders at the regiment level or above, including brigade, division, corps, and army commanders, who served in either the Balkan Wars (1912-13) or World War I (1914-18). Commanders participating in the Gallipoli Campaign are distinguished by an additional measure indicating their front in WWI. The terms "commander" and "military leader" are used synonymously to refer to the same individuals.

This dataset includes 900 operational-level Ottoman military leaders, with 254 serving as regiment commanders or higher, 681 of whom served in WWI, and 40 commanders who participated in the Balkan War and WWI. Moreover, 67 of these commanders participated in the Turkish War of Independence (1919-22) within this military cadre. It is important to note that this dataset does **NOT** include all the officers who participated in these wars, but only those who held a position in an operational unit as a regiment commander or higher. The dataset covers all the officers' commanding positions but does not encompass all participants or tactical unit commanders. This delineation is based on the central assumption in this dissertation that leadership is a critical determinant factor for operational-level warfare. Strategic-level and tactical-level commanders are outside the scope of this dataset, a limitation that should be considered.

Primary Resources for This Dataset:

1.1 Genelkurmay Başkanlığı (2004): *Balkan Savaşı'na Katılan Komutanların Yaşam Öyküleri (Alay ve Daha Üst Birlik Komutanları).* Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 2004.

1.2 Genelkurmay Başkanlığı (2009): *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na Katılan Alay Ve Daha Üst Kademedeki Komutanların Biyografileri.* Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, C. I-III, Ankara, 2009.

1.3 Görgülü (1990): *On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922: Balkan-Birinci Dünya ve İstiklal Harbi.* Marmara Üniversitesi (Turkey), 1990.

1.4 Additional open-source and academic publications referenced in the footnotes or bibliography.

It is important to note that commanders' positions were not solely determined by their rank but also by the war environment and the constraints of limited human resources (Operational level). This led to a unique situation where, contrary to the norm of Lt. Col. or Col. ranks, many commanders in both the Balkan Wars and WWI served as regiment commanders (or above) with a wide range of ranks, from 1st Lieutenant to 3rd General (corps commander).

Time measurement in this context can be complex. The Ottomans used the Mohammedan (or Hegira) calendar, which differs from the Gregorian calendar. Year information was coded according to the Gregorian standard in the Turkish General Staff's documents. However, due to the unique nature of the Mohammedan calendar, there were instances where two classes graduated from the military academy in the same Gregorian year.

Below is the Coding Manual for the Variables in the dataset :

NU_LIST: The list's ID numbers are ordered according to the numbers in the archival resources. The first group of IDs belongs to the Balkan War catalog (Genelkurmay Başkanlığı 2004), and the list continues in order with the second, third, and fourth catalogs. The total number of individuals is 900.

NU_BAL: ID number of the list, ordered according to the number given in the archival 1st catalog, the Ottoman commanders in the Balkan War.

NU_CAN: The ID number of the list, ordered according to the number given in the archival 2nd, 3rd, and 4th catalogs, the Ottoman commanders in World War I (Genelkurmay Başkanlığı 2009; Toker, Aslan et al. 2009*a*,*b*).

NU_TUR: ID number of the list, ordered according to the number in the archival 5th catalog, the Turkish commanders in the Turkish War of Independence (1919-22) (Başkanlığı 2010). The main scope of this study's analyses does not exceed the Turkish War of Independence, but data is used for operationalization in some variables.

BAL_CAN_BOTH: This variable indicates which war the commanders participated in 1 for the Balkan War, 2 for WWI, and 3 for both wars.

NAME: Name and surname of the commanders. Military registration numbers are

given in parentheses. Military registration numbers also reflect the branch of the commanders, such as those starting with "P" meaning infantry (*piyade*), "S" meaning cavalry (*süvari*), and "T" meaning artillery (*topçu*). If a military leader gained a surname after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, their surnames were also included in the name list.

FINRANK: The maximum military rank reached until retirement or exit from service. This coding system represents the officer ranks, assigning each rank a specific numeric value for coding purposes. Ranks are meticulously codified according to the NATO ranking system, ensuring accuracy as they vary across national military classifications (only officer ranks were included).

__ 1: Lieutenant (First and Second Lieutenants coded by the same numeric value)
__ 2: Captain
__ 3: Major
__ 4: Lieutenant Colonel
__ 5: Colonel
__ 6: Brigadier or Brigade Commander (one-star general)
__ 7: Major General (general with two stars)
__ 8: Lieutenant General (general with three stars)
__ 9: General (general with four stars)
__ 10: Marshal, Field Marshal, or General of the Army (general with five stars)

GRDYEAR: Graduation year from the military academy (*nasıp*). Ranges from 1867 to 1909. Almost all the officers (895 out of 900) have a graduation year record.

RANK1 (LT,1STLT): The year when a commander started professional military service. The starting rank is either 1st Lt. or Lt., depending on the branch. Both Lt. and 1st Lt are coded as the RANK1. This variable includes the same year as the GRDYEAR, as the first rank is given after the military academy graduation.

RANK2 (CAPTAIN): The year that the commander achieved the rank of captain.

RANK3: The year that the commander achieved the rank of major.

RANK4: The year the commander became lieutenant colonel.

RANK5: The year the commander achieved the rank of colonel.

RANK6: The year the commander achieved the rank of one-star General.

RANK7: The year the commander achieved the rank of two-star General.

RANK8: The year the commander achieved the rank of three-star General.

RANK9: The year the commander achieved the rank of four-star General.

RANK10: The year the commander achieved the rank of field marshal.

RANKREGYESNO (YES=1): If a commander's rank was regulated (decreased) after the 1908 law of rank regulation, 1 is included in this process, and 0 is otherwise.

RANKREGULATIONYEAR: The year of the rank regulation law, 1908. The value was left missing if a commander did not experience rank regulation.

FINALRANKYEARAFTERREGULATION: The year the commander reached the final rank indicated in the variable FINRANK.

BIRTH DATE: The birth year. The value is left missing if no information is available in the records.

DEATH DATE: The year of death. The value is left missing if no information is available in the records.

AFTMIL: Reason for terminating military service. A categorical variable.

__ 1: Retired
__ 2: Martyr
__ 3: Expulsion or forced removal from service
__ 4: Death due to natural causes
__ 5: Execution, sentenced to death
__ 6: Killed by non-conflict event
__ 7: Forced retirement by the purge of 1914
__ 8: Suicide

TERMYR: The year the commander exited military service.

TERMYR_LASTOBS: This is a complementary variable to TERMYR. If TERMYR is missing, TERMYR_LASTOBS includes data for the last year the commander served in the military. In many cases, commanders retire (voluntarily or mandatorily) and then re-enter the military system. The difference between TERMYR and TERMYR_LASTOBS indicates recurrent retirements.

SELFRETIRED=1(FORCED=0): This variable shows whether the retirement was voluntary, mandatory, or forced. 1 is for voluntary retirement. Voluntarily retired commanders are coded according to the wording in the catalogs, such as "oldu,

ayrıldı" (in Turkish), while forced retirements are coded as "emekli edildi," or if the commander is purged, punished, or expelled by the military court decision.

BIRTHLOC: Variable explains the geographical location of birth—a categorical variable.

1: Born in today's Turkey
2: Born in the Balkan Region
3: Born in the Middle East
4: Born in the Caucasia

BIRTHPLC: Specific location of birth. Those born in today's geography of the Turkish Republic were coded as "Anatolia." The city of their birth coded those born abroad. If the birth location in the records were coded not as a city but as a region, that information would be used parallel to the archival documents.

MILSECSCHL: Graduated from Military Secondary School—a binary variable.

MILHIGHSCHL: Graduated from Military High School—a binary variable.

MILBRANCH: Military branch. A categorical variable.

1: Infantry
2: Cavalry
3: Artillery
4: Others, including the military engineer branch.

MILGPA: Variable explains graduation success. The smaller number indicates higher academic success—a categorical variable. Suppose a commander graduated from the military academy as the best, then is coded as 1 if the 20th among the cohorts is 20. During that time, in Ottoman military educational institutions, no indicator was used to indicate GPA or military GPA. This variable is named MILGPA (military GPA) to make it understandable to the audience.

CLASSTOTAL: This represents the total size of the class in a military academy. The information about the class size was gathered primarily from the official Turkish Military Academy (Harp Okulu) records and supplemented by (Griffiths 1966, 93-175), Ünal (2016) and (Güler 2007, 171). The class sizes between 1887 and 1898 are as follows: 1887:91, 1888:126, 1890:104, 1891:102, 1892:180, 1894: 254, 1895:466, 1897: 549, 1898:571. Staff officers cadets in Ottoman Staff Officer College (Erkan-I Harp, Harp Akademisi) are excluded (Eser 2005, 30). Only the cadets in the military

academy (Mekteb-i Harbiye) were considered. Another exclusion is cadets from non-combatant branches, such as military veterinarians or engineers. Only combatant branches were included in this class size, the infantry and cavalry branches (in the early 1900s, also artillery).

Class sizes until 1872 were coded according to the data in (Eser 2005, 30). For The years after 1902, because there was no historical and official record about that period, class sizes were coded by benefitting from the ratio of officers entering the Ottoman Staff Officer College (Erkan-ı Harb Mektebi). According to (Eser 2005, 30), only 5% of the military Academy graduates were accepted to the Staff Officer College (the name of the institution has changed multiple times, today War College) Akademilerinin (1980). The Staff Officer College graduates had three years of education after graduating from the Military Academy (İskora 1966). To illustrate, a 1912 graduate staff officer (erkan-ı harp /kurmay subay) is a 1908 military Academy graduate. The class total of Ottoman Staff Officer College between 1912 and 1907 is 1907 (two terms, due to the Mohammedan calendar): 78; 1908: 39; 1909: 25; 1910: 33; 1912:20 (Ünal 2016). Translating these class sizes according to military graduation years and considering the 5% ratio (Ünal 2016), military Academy classes are expected to be as 1904: 1460; 1905: 780; 1906: 500; 1908: 660; 1909: 400. (2 terms in graduates 1907 of Ottoman Staff Officer College were classified according to name consistency in the Turkish General Staff records, which are organized according to the Gregorian calendar) , the 1904 class size is 900, and the 1905 class size is 660.

For the years after 1898, the class size information was taken from the (Topal 2013, 24) and the Ottoman educational archives. Class sizes are as follows: 1898:1882, 1899:1882, 1900:1882, 1901:1882, and 1902: 2289 (these numbers are the total military academy number of students, not by the 1st, 1d, and 3rd year of the cadets). In case of any inconsistency between the resources, the official numbers from Turkish General Staff records and Turkish military Academy records were given precedence.

STAFF: A binary variable indicates the War College graduation. The staff branch officers have advanced military training for operational planning and execution. This system of staff officers is rooted in Prussian military tradition.

MILBRANCH: Military branch.
1 for infantry
2 for cavalry
3 for artillery
4 for others

RANK_BAL: The rank of the commander during the Balkan War, with the rank being codified in the same way as the variable. This variable provides insight into the military's hierarchical structure during the Balkan War.

RANK_WW1: The rank of the commander during the WW1.

RANK_TUR: The rank of the commander during the Turkish War of Independence.

PROMOTION: An intriguing aspect of our dataset is the progression of ranks between the Balkan Wars and the Turkish War of Independence. This variable tracks the number of ranks that increase, providing a unique perspective on the evolution of military leadership during this period.

WAR1 (1897 TURCO-GRECO WAR): Binary variable indicating participation in the 1897 Turco-Greco War.

WAR2 (TRIPOLI): Binary variable indicating participation in the War of Tripoli, 1911.

WAR3 (FIRST BALKAN WAR): Binary variable indicating participation in the First Balkan War.

WAR4_B (WW1_ALLFRONTS): Binary variable indicating participation in the WWI.

WWAR5 (TR_W_IND_EXP): Binary variable indicating participation in the Turkish War of Independence 1919-22.

WW1 FRONT: If a commander participated in WWI, the fronts fought were:
1 for the Gallipoli Campaign
2 for Anatolia
3 for Caucosia
4 for Syria and Iraq
5 for the Suez Channel, Oman, and Mecca
6 for Romania

TOTNUMWAR: The total number of wars participated, with the maximum value of 5.

CUP MEMBER: CUP members are listed according to written and published open resources.

CUPMEM(DH1918): This variable is a proxy measure of the likelihood of being

a CUP member. It indicates whether a commander had a position in the military courts before or during 1918 when a witch hunt started towards CUP members with the new cabinet in the Ottoman Empire, led by Damat Ferit Pasha. This context is crucial for understanding the political dynamics of the time.

CUPMEM(DHALL): Being a member in the military courts without necessarily being limited to a time, including all of the period.

DH_(YES/NO): Dummy variable, 1 for being a military court member.

DH_YEAR: They have a year of service in the military courts.

AFTMIL POLITICS: This is a dummy variable. If a commander received a political position after being retired, it is 1; otherwise, it is 0.

AFTMIL OCCUPATION: After military occupation, there are 1 for government, 2 for bureaucratic positions, and 3 for civil life.

FATHEROCCP: Father's occupation. A categorical variable.
1: The Father belongs to a high administrative position or any aristocratic family
2: The Father is a soldier below the rank of General. Higher military status coded as 1
3: Father had an official position in any institution
4: Others

APPENDIX B

MODEL FIT STATISTICS

Table B.1 Comparison of Fit Statistics for Ordered Logit, Generalized Ordered Logit, and Regress Models

Statistic	**Ordered Logit**	**Generalized Or.Log.**	**OLS**	**Diff: (Gen.Ologit - Ologit)**
Log-Likelihood (Model)	-378.367	-283.146	-194.794	95.221
AIC	766.735	616.292	417.588	150.443
BIC	791.233	738.785	486.184	52.448
Chi-Square Deviance (df)	756.735 (df=987)	566.292 (df=967)	389.588 (df=978)	190.443
Wald Chi-Square (df)	67.262 (df=3)	11958.589 (df=23)	N/A	-11891.327
p-value	0.000	0.000	N/A	0.000
McFadden R2	0.118	0.340	0.442	-0.222
McFadden (adjusted) R2	0.106	0.282	0.402	-0.176
McKelvey-Zavoina R2	0.321	N/A	N/A	N/A
Cox-Snell/ML R2	0.097	0.255	0.267	-0.158
Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2	0.168	0.440	0.529	-0.272
Count R2	0.874	0.903	N/A	-0.029
Count (adjusted) R2	0.000	0.232	N/A	-0.232
Variance of e	3.290	N/A	N/A	N/A
Variance of y-star	4.845	N/A	N/A	N/A

Given the dependent variable's type as it represents rank increases (1, 2, 3, and 4), which are ordinal in nature, and the violation of the parallel lines assumption in the Ordered Logit Model, the Generalized Ordered Logit Model is indeed the best choice for analyses. However, in the model fit statistics, the regression (OLS) model is also evaluated in case the DV can be considered as continuous, where an increase in the ranks can be interpreted linearly. One caveat in this consideration is that the distance between 1 and 2 or 2 and 3 might be different, making it difficult for interpretation under the OLS model. This limitation is not present in the generalized ordered logistic regression model.

In terms of Log-Likelihood, where higher values (closer to zero) indicate a better fit, the Generalized Ordered Logit Model (-283.146) has a much higher log-likelihood compared to the Ordered Logit Model (-378.367), indicating it fits the data better. Although the OLS Regression Model has the highest log-likelihood, it assumes a continuous dependent variable, which may not be appropriate given the ordinal nature of the DV.

Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) penalizes model complexity while rewarding

goodness of fit (lower values indicate a better model). The Generalized Ordered Logit Model (616.292) has a significantly lower AIC than the Ordered Logit Model (766.735), suggesting a better balance between model complexity and fit.

The Generalized Ordered Logit Model (738.785) again shows a lower Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) than the Ordered Logit Model (791.233), reinforcing the preference for the former. The OLS Regression Model has the lowest BIC but may not be suitable for ordinal data.

Chi-square deviance measures the difference between the model and a saturated model. Lower values indicate a better fit. The Generalized Ordered Logit Model (756.735 (df=987)) has a lower chi-square deviance compared to the Ordered Logit Model (756.735 (df=987)), indicating a better fit.

The Generalized Ordered Logit Model (11958.589 (df=23)) has a much higher Wald chi-square, suggesting it explains more variance in the outcome variable compared to the Ordered Logit Model (67.262 (df=3)). Higher values indicate more robust relationships.

Both models are statistically significant, meaning the predictors significantly predict the outcome variable (according to p-value).

According to McFadden's R^2 (pseudo-R^2 measure of goodness of fit), higher values indicate better fit. The Generalized Ordered Logit Model (0.340) has a much higher McFadden R^2 compared to the Ordered Logit Model (0.118), indicating a better fit. Although the OLS Regression Model has the highest McFadden R^2, it is not ideal for ordinal data. The adjusted McFadden R^2 also adjusts for the number of predictors. The Generalized Ordered Logit Model again outperforms the Ordered Logit Model, indicating a better fit after accounting for model complexity.

Cox-Snell/ML R^2 measures the proportion of explained variance. Higher values indicate a better fit. The Generalized Ordered Logit Model (0.255) has a much higher Cox-Snell/ML R^2 compared to the Ordered Logit Model (0.097).

Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R^2 adjusts for the maximum possible value. The Generalized Ordered Logit Model has a higher value than the Ordered Logit Model, indicating a better fit.

Count R^2 is the proportion of correctly predicted outcomes. The Generalized Ordered Logit Model (0.903) has a higher Count R^2, indicating more accurate predictions. Adjusted Count R^2 corrects for the number of categories. The Generalized Ordered Logit Model also has a higher adjusted Count R^2 (0.232), suggesting better predictive power.

Justification for Choosing the Generalized Ordered Logit Model

Given that the dependent variable is ordinal and the parallel lines assumption is violated in the Ordered Logit Model, the Generalized Ordered Logit Model is the most appropriate choice for the regression analyses conducted in the fifth chapter of this dissertation.This model:

- Provides a better fit to the data as indicated by the higher log-likelihood and lower AIC and BIC values.
- Overcomes the parallel lines assumption violation by allowing different slopes for different outcome levels.
- Demonstrates stronger relationships between predictors and the outcome variable, as indicated by the higher Wald chi-square statistic.
- Shows better explanatory power through higher McFadden R^2, Cox-Snell/ML R^2, and Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R^2 values.
- Produces more accurate predictions as evidenced by the higher Count R^2 and adjusted Count R^2 values.

The Generalized Ordered Logit Model provides a more flexible and robust framework for analyzing the dependent variable, making it the most suitable model for the analysis.

Model fit statistics given above belong to the regression analysis for the rank increase before the Gallipoli. In the dissertation, other main analysis fields are the promotion increase before and after the Balkan Wars and after the Gallipoli Campaign. Model fit statistics for the remaining regression eqıasions were shown briefly below:

Model fit statistics for other regression analyses:

1. Before the Balkan War:

The generalized ordered logit model has a lower (better) log-likelihood and a higher Pseudo R^2 compared to the ordered logit model. This suggests that the generalized ordered logit model explains more of the variability in the outcome and may fit the

Table B.2 Model Comparison: Generalized Ordered Logit Model vs. Ordered Logit Model

Statistic	Generalized Ordered Logit Model	Ordered Logit Model
Log-Likelihood	-162.476	-177.541
Wald Chi^2	1688.15	82.70
p-value	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.3123	0.2485

data better. Both models' Wald Chi^2values are high, indicating that the predictors are jointly significant. However, the generalized ordered logit model's higher Pseudo R^2 and lower log-likelihood suggest it might be a better fit for your data, especially if the proportional odds assumption of the ordered logit model is not met.

2. After the Balkan War:

Table B.3 Model Comparison: Generalized Ordered Logit Model vs. Ordered Logit Model

Statistic	Generalized Ordered Logit Model	Ordered Logit Model
Wald Chi-Square	32.63 (p = 0.0002)	32.63 (p = 0.0002)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-166.2352	-166.2352
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	0.103	0.103
AIC	352.470	352.470
BIC	388.528	388.528
Count R^2	0.673	0.673

Both models show identical values for the fit statistics, including Log Pseudolikelihood, McFadden R^2, AIC, BIC, and Count R^2. This suggests that both models fit the data equally well. However, the Generalized Ordered Logit Model may still be preferred due to its ability to relax the assumption of parallel lines. It provides more flexibility in modeling ordinal outcomes where the proportional odds assumption may not hold. Thus, based on the assumption and flexibility, the Generalized Ordered Logit Model is slightly more suitable despite the identical statistical values.

3. After-Gallipoli Campaign:

The generalized ordered logit model generally has better-fit statistics compared to the ordered logit model. It has a lower (better) log-likelihood, a higher pseudo

Table B.4 Model Comparison: Generalized Ordered Logit Model vs. Ordered Logit Model

Statistic	Generalized Ordered Logit Model	Ordered Logit Model
Log-Likelihood	-439.976	-446.019
Wald Chi-Square	901.11 (p = 0.000)	45.36 (p = 0.000)
Pseudo R^2	0.0698	0.0570
Deviance Chi-Square	879.951, df=636	892.039, df=641
AIC	911.951	914.039
BIC	983.632	963.319

R^2, lower AIC and BIC values, and better deviance statistics. Given that the generalized ordered logit model has better-fit statistics across all measures (log-likelihood, pseudo-R^2, AIC, BIC, and deviance), it is the preferred model. It better accounts for the variability in the outcome variable and fits the data more effectively.

APPENDIX C

SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES FOR ROBUSTNESS CHECK

In addition to the generalized ordered logistic model, logistic regression analyses for promotions after the Balkan War and Gallipoli War are presented below. These supplementary analyses were conducted to check for any differences in the direction of the independent variables' effects compared to the generalized ordered logistic regression. The results are consistent regarding the positive or negative direction of the variables. Both models show that, after the Balkan Wars, the number of previous wars participated in had a negative impact on promotion. In contrast, other variables such as pre-war military experience, military academic success, Malta exile, CUP membership, and membership in military courts have positive effects. This directional consistency across models strengthens the reliability of the findings.

Table C.1 Logistic Regression Results for After-War Promotion (Balkan War)

	No Promotion (1) Model 1	**Promotion (1) Model 2**
After-War Promotion		
Previous Military Experience	-0181	0181
Number of Wars	3094	-3094
Military GPA	-0127	0127
Staff Officer	-1667	1667
Malta Exile	-0075	0075
CUP Member	-3553*	3553*
Military Court Membership	-3429	3429
Birth Location	1497	-1497
Military Branch	-0202	0202
Constant	9452	-9452
Observations	1093	1093

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

The logistic regression results in Table C.1 provide insights into the factors influencing commanders' promotions after the Balkan War. In Model 1, where the outcome is "no promotion" (coded as 1), most variables do not show statistically significant effects, indicating that they may not be strong determinants of non-promotion. In

contrast, Model 2, where the outcome is a promotion by one rank (coded as 1), shows effects that generally mirror those in Model 1 but in the opposite direction. For instance, pre-war experience (Previous Mil.Exp.) has a positive coefficient of 0.181 in Model 2, suggesting a slight increase in the likelihood of a one-rank promotion. However, this effect is not statistically significant. This pattern reinforces the idea that the factors influencing promotion and non-promotion are inversely related yet consistent in their directional influence across different models.

The logistic regression results (Table C.2) show how different factors affected commanders' promotions after the Gallipoli Campaign. In Model 1, where "no promotion" is coded as 1, the variable Num.of Wars is highly significant and negative. As the number of previously participated wars increases, the likelihood of no promotion increases. In other words, commanders with extensive war experience were less likely to remain without promotion after the Gallipoli Campaign. This finding aligns with the generalized ordered logistic model in Chapter 5, where similar directional effects were observed, confirming the consistency of the model's results.

Overall, the coefficients' direction is consistent with the generalized ordered model discussed in Chapter 5, confirming that the logistic regressions provide complementary evidence for the robustness of the generalized ordered logistic model. The consistency in directionality between the models suggests that the factors influencing promotion after the Gallipoli Campaign, particularly prior war experience and CUP membership, have a reliable and significant impact on commanders' promotion outcomes.

Table C.2 Logistic Regression Results for After Gallipoli Campaign Promotion

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	No Promotion:1	1 Rank Promotion:1	2 Rank Promotion:1	3 Rank Promotion:1
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Previous Mil.Exp.	0011	-0009	-0004	0057
Num.of Wars	-0394***	0253**	0523**	0335
Mil. GPA	-0012*	0011*	0003	0573
Staff Officer	-0436	0055	1314*	-1885
Malta Exile	-0317	0263	0302	0000
CUP Member	-0480	-0155	0865	3862***
Mil. Court Memb.	0702**	-0382	-1739	0000
Birth Location	-0035	-0016	0101	0794
Military Branch	0016	-0083	0169	0284
Constant	1568**	-1220**	-5273***	-64027*
Observations	667	667	667	565

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Continuation Ratio Models

Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression and Continuation Ratio Models are ordered regression models that analyze ordinal dependent variables. Both models are designed to handle ordinal dependent variables with a natural order but unknown distances between levels. For instance, After-War-Promotion, with levels indicating increasing ranks, fits well with both approaches. Each model evaluates how predictors influence the probability of being in or above a specific category of the dependent variable. Both models involve thresholds or cut-off points that separate different levels of the ordinal dependent variable. These thresholds help to interpret how changes in predictors affect the likelihood of crossing from one category to another.

However, the generalized ordered model assumes proportional odds, meaning the effect of predictors is constant across all thresholds of the dependent variable. In other words, it assumes that the relationship between the predictors and the likelihood of being in a higher category is the same for all thresholds. At the same time, the continuation ratio model does not require the assumption of proportional odds. Instead, it models the probability of being at or above a specific category relative to being below that category. This approach provides a more flexible structure as it does not impose a constant effect of predictors across all thresholds.

• Generelized Ordered Regression: The output includes odds ratios for each predictor, which indicate how the odds of being in or above a particular category change with each unit increase in the predictor.

• Continuation Ratio Model: The coefficients reflect the effect of predictors on the probability of progressing to higher categories. The interpretation focuses on how predictors influence the likelihood of moving from one level to the next rather than across all thresholds simultaneously.

The continuation ratio model results are presented below for robustness checks after running a generalized ordered logit model. Generalized ordered logistic regression's proportional odds assumptions still hold in the analyses. The following analyses are complementary.

Table C.3 shows the regression results for the overall after-war promotions. Model 5, which includes controls, provides a comprehensive view of the factors influencing overall promotions among Ottoman military leaders. In this model, the Staff Officer and CUP Member coefficients remain statistically significant and positive. Specifically, the coefficient for Staff Officer is 0.505, which indicates that holding a staff officer position significantly increases the likelihood of promotion. Similarly,

a CUP Member shows a positive and significant coefficient of 0.680, demonstrating that being a member of the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) substantially enhances the probability of receiving a promotion.

Table C.3 Continuation Ratio Model Regression Results for Overall After War Promotion

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0045***	-0024		-0021	-0020
Num.of Wars	0431***	0399***		0401***	0400***
Mil. GPA		0009**		0010**	0008*
Staff Officer		0566***		0454**	0505**
Malta Exile			0093	0196	0224
CUP Member			0951***	0650*	0680**
Mil. Court Memb.			-0569**	-0633**	-0644**
Birth Location					0019
Military Branch					0090
Observations	1093	1093	1093	1093	1093

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C.4 presents regression results of the continuation ratio model for Before Balkan War Promotions. Pre-War Experience (Previous Mil.Exp.) shows a positive and significant coefficient of 0.140 across all models. This suggests that greater pre-war experience increases the probability of advancing to higher ranks. The consistent significance across models indicates that this factor had a robust positive impact on promotions before the Balkan War. Pre-War Warning Number (Num.of Wars), on the other hand, exhibits a negative and significant coefficient of (-0.554) in the full model. This implies that more pre-war warnings are associated with a decreased likelihood of achieving higher ranks.

For promotions after the Balkan War (Table C.5), Model 5 in the continuation ratio model (gencrm) shows the following significant findings:

Military Court Membership has a positive effect, with a coefficient of 0.157, but this result is insignificant. Military Branch shows a significant positive effect with a coefficient of 0.625 (p<0.01). This suggests that being in a specific military branch is associated with a higher likelihood of advancing to higher ranks after the Balkan War. The critical significant variable here is the Military Branch, indicating that certain branches provided better advancement opportunities. Other variables do not

Table C.4 Continuation Ratio Model Regression Results for Promotions Before Balkan War

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	0074***	0141***		0140***	0140***
Num.of Wars	-0201*	-0552***		-0553***	-0554***
Mil. GPA		0008		0008	0006
Staff Officer		0553*		0516	0517
Malta Exile			0379	-0005	-0045
CUP Member			-0648*	-0221	-0212
Mil. Court Memb.			-0846***	-0716***	-0745***
Birth Location					0050
Military Branch					0164
Observations	414	219	420	219	219

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

show significant effects in this model.

Table C.5 Continuation Ratio Model Regression Results for Promotions After Balkan War

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	0015	0065		0052	0070
Num.of Wars	-0019	0006		-0003	0025
Mil. GPA		0021**		0022**	0008
Staff Officer		0502		0261	0704
Malta Exile			0501	0540	0778
CUP Member			1325*	1151*	1316*
Mil. Court Memb.			0446	0343	0157
Birth Location					0330
Observations	272	272	272	272	272

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

For promotions before the Gallipoli Campaign (Table C.6), the continuation ratio model (gencrm) reveals several significant factors influencing rank advancement. Pre-war experience (Previous Mil.Exp.) demonstrates a positive effect with a coefficient of 0.109 (p<0.001), indicating that individuals with more extensive pre-war experience were more likely to achieve higher ranks. This suggests that prior experience was crucial in promotions during this period. Conversely, the Pre-War Warning Number (Num.of Wars) shows a negative coefficient of (-0.297) (p<0.001). Additionally, military academic success has a significant positive impact with a coefficient of 0.018 (p<0.001), suggesting that being associated with certain military groups

positively influenced rank progression. Other notable findings include Staff Officer positions, which have a strong positive coefficient of 1.607 (p<0.001). This indicates that individuals in staff officer roles were significantly more likely to be promoted. Similarly, CUP Membership is associated with a higher likelihood of promotion, as reflected by its coefficient of 1.385 (p<0.001).

Table C.6 Continuation Ratio Model Regression Results for Promotions Before Gallipoli Campaign

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	0052***	0096***		0106***	0109***
Num.of Wars	-0159**	-0234***		-0283***	-0297***
Mil. GPA		0013***		0014***	0018***
Staff Officer		1915***		1673***	1607***
Malta Exile			1082***	0845***	0841***
CUP Member			1784***	1453***	1385***
Mil. Court Memb.			0042	0219	0153
Birth Location					0312**
Observations	992	992	992	992	992

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C.7 Continuation Ratio Model Regression Results for Promotions After Gallipoli Campaign

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0018	0009		0009	0011
Num.of Wars	0396***	0362***		0382***	0375***
Mil. GPA		0010*		0011*	0010
Staff Officer		0802***		0593**	0637**
Malta Exile			0211	0178	0237
CUP Member			1229***	0815*	0841*
Mil. Court Memb.			-0770**	-0889***	-0935***
Birth Location					0115
Military Branch					0046
Observations	642	642	642	642	642

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

For promotions after the Gallipoli Campaign, the continuation ratio model (gencrm) results are presented below (Table C.7): Pre-war experience has a positive and significant effect (coefficient = 0.375, p<0.001). This suggests that individuals who received more warnings before the war were paradoxically more likely to be promoted

after the Gallipoli Campaign. Another significant variable is Staff Officer, which has a positive coefficient of 0.637 ($p<0.01$). CUP Membership is also ssignificant, with a coefficient of 0.841 ($p<0.05$), highlighting that political affiliation with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) played a significant role in post-Gallipoli promotions. In contrast, being a Mil. Court Memb. is negatively associated with promotion, with a coefficient of (-0.935) ($p<0.001$).

Table C.8 Continuation Ratio Model Regression Results for Maximum Rank Achieved

	(1) Competence Model 1	(2) Loyalty Model 2	(3) Mil.Court.Memb. Model 3	(4) Demography Model 4	(5) Controls Model 5
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0009*	-0008		-0006	-0006
Num.of Wars	0208***	0278***		0271***	0270***
Mil. GPA		0009***		0009***	0009***
Staff Officer		1483***		1376***	1380***
Malta Exile			0408**	0324**	0317**
CUP Member			1349***	0979***	0982***
Mil. Court Memb.			-0380***	-0332**	-0315**
Birth Location					-0056
Observations	2055	1856	2061	1856	1856

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

The continuation ratio model (gencrm) for maximum ranks achieved (DV: FINRANK) highlights several significant predictors (Table C.8): Pre-War Experience is highly significant with a positive coefficient (0.270, $p<0.001$). Staff Officer status is another strong predictor of maximum rank achieved, with a coefficient of 1.380 ($p<0.001$). This result indicates that being a staff officer significantly increased the likelihood of higher ranks, underscoring the importance of strategic roles in career progression. CUP Membership also shows a positive and significant effect (coefficient = 0.982, $p<0.001$). This finding highlights the influence of political connections, specifically membership in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), on long-term career success within the military hierarchy. Conversely, being a Mil. Court Memb. is negatively associated with maximum rank achieved, with a coefficient of (-0.315) ($p<0.01$). This suggests that involvement in military courts before 1918 could have hindered career advancement, possibly due to the controversial nature of these roles. Overall, the results indicate that both competence-related factors and political loyalty played significant roles in determining the highest ranks achieved by military personnel.

APPENDIX D

ORDERED LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 5

Table D.1 shows the ordered logistic regression results for overall after-war promotions. The ordered logistic regression analysis of promotions, independent of wars, reveals several significant predictors. Previous war participation is crucial, with a positive and highly significant coefficient (0.422). This suggests that an increase in the number of pre-war experiences substantially raises the likelihood of achieving a higher promotion rank. The Staff Officer variable is also positively associated with promotions, with a significant coefficient (0.526), indicating that those who served as staff officers are more likely to be promoted. Conversely, the variable Mil. Court Memb. shows a negative and significant effect (-0.609), implying that involvement in military courts before 1918 decreases the chances of promotion.

These findings, which consistently show the influence of predictors on military promotions across different models, underscore the robustness and strength of the results. In both the ordered logistic regression and the generalized ordered logistic regression models, previous war experience and being a staff officer emerge as consistently positive and significant predictors of promotion. Conversely, Mil. Court Memb. consistently shows a negative impact. This consistency in the directionality of these relationships across both models reinforces the robustness of the effects observed. Although the coefficients may vary slightly between models due to different specifications, the overall patterns are closely aligned, suggesting these factors' reliable and consistent influence on military promotions.

Table D.1 Ordered Logistic Regression Results, Military Leaders' Attitudes' Impact on Promotion, Independent from the Wars

	(1) Competence M1	(2) Loyalty M2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. M3	(4) Demography M4	(5) Controls M5
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0027	-0027*	-0024	-0023	-0023
Num.of Wars	0418***	0420***	0421***	0421***	0422***
Mil. GPA	0009**	0009**	0010**	0010**	0008*
Staff Officer	0586**	0504**	0487**	0466*	0526**
Malta Exile		0172	0197	0205	0220
CUP Member		0603	0627	0610	0628
Mil. Court Memb.			-0603**	-0609**	-0609**
Birth: Anatolia				0000	0000
Birth: Balkans				0090	0077
Birth: Middle East				-0290	-0287
Birth: Caucosia				0946	0946
Infantry					0000
Cavalry					0045
Artillery					0167
Other					-0709
Observations	1093	1093	1093	1093	1093

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The ordered logistic regression analysis for ranks achieved before the Balkan War (Table D.2) in Model 5 identifies several statistically significant predictors. Previous War experience exhibits a positive and highly significant coefficient (0.226, p<0.001), indicating that each additional unit of pre-war experience substantially increases the likelihood of attaining a higher rank during the Balkan Wars. Conversely, Previous wars participated has a negative and highly significant coefficient (-0.732, p<0.001), suggesting that a higher number of warnings received before the war markedly decreases the probability of achieving a higher rank. Additionally, the variable staff officer holds a positive and significant coefficient (0.789, p<0.05), implying that serving as a staff officer enhances the chances of attaining a superior rank during this period. These findings are consistent with the results from the generalized ordered logistic regression models previously examined. In both modeling approaches, Previous War experience consistently demonstrates a positive and significant impact on rank attainment, while Previous war participants maintain a negative and significant relationship. The Staff Officer variable also persistently shows a positive effect across both models. The alignment in the directionality and significance of these coefficients across different regression techniques underscores the robustness of these predictors in influencing military rank progression before the Balkan Wars.

Table D.2 Ordered Logistic Regression Results, Before Balkan War Promotion

	(1) Competence M1	(2) Loyalty M2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. M3	(4) Demography M4	(5) Controls M5
Rank during Balkan Wars					
Previous Mil.Exp.	0223***	0223***	0221***	0226***	0226***
Num.of Wars	-0687***	-0686***	-0681***	-0707***	-0732***
Mil. GPA	0010	0010	0010	0009	0006
Staff Officer	0804*	0794*	0719*	0730*	0789*
Malta Exile		0053	0076	0011	-0033
CUP Member		-0001	-0037	-0035	0063
Mil. Court Memb.			-0506	-0522	-0590
Birth: Anatolia				0000	0000
Birth: Balkans				0080	0020
Birth: Middle East				-0378	-0448
Birth: Caucosia				0736	0598
Infantry					0000
Cavalry					0504
Artillery					0230
Observations	219	219	219	219	219

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The ordered logistic regression results after the Balkan War (Table D.3) in Model 5 identify a few significant predictors. The military academic success shows a positive but non-significant coefficient (0.006), indicating that while it might have a positive relationship with the likelihood of promotion, the effect is not statistically significant in this model. Similarly, the staff officer variable has a positive coefficient (0.820), but the results suggest that it may not be consistently significant across models. However, CUP Membership is a significant positive predictor (1.405, $p<0.05$), indicating that being a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) significantly increases the likelihood of promotion after the Balkan War.

Some differences emerge when comparing these results with the generalized ordered logistic regression results from similar analyses. The CUP Membership variable shows a consistently positive and significant effect in both studies, underscoring its robust influence on promotions. However, the significance and direction of the military academic success and staff officer variables vary, indicating that their effects might be context-dependent or sensitive to model specifications. In both modeling approaches, the significance of loyalty-related variables like CUP Membership is consistently emphasized, though the impact of competence-related variables appears to fluctuate.

In the ordered logistic regression analysis conducted before the Gallipoli Campaign (Table D.4), we identified several key variables that significantly predict military

Table D.3 Ordered Logistic Regression Results After Balkan War Promotion

	(1) Competence M1	(2) Loyalty M2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. M3	(4) Demography M4	(5) Controls M5
After-War-Promotion					
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0027	0057	0051	0045	0061
Num.of Wars	0418***	-0003	-0013	-0030	0036
Mil. GPA	0009**	0023**	0022**	0022**	0006
Staff Officer	0586**	0241	0237	0206	0820
Malta Exile		0490	0465	0554	0714
CUP Member		1219*	1215*	1222*	1405*
Mil. Court Memb.			0366	0206	0163
Birth: Anatolia				0000	0000
Birth: Balkans				0196	0097
Birth: Middle East				1065	1107
Birth: Caucosia				0774	0779
Observations	1093	272	272	272	272

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

rank during World War I. Notably, previous military experience and the number of prewar conflicts experienced emerged as significant predictors. The former, with a strong positive effect (0.121, p<0.001), indicates that greater prewar experience boosts the likelihood of achieving a higher rank. Conversely, the latter shows a negative impact (-0.302, p<0.001), suggesting that involvement in multiple conflicts may hinder rank advancement during the war. Military academic success is also a significant positive predictor (0.024, p<0.001), emphasizing the importance of strong academic performance in military school for achieving higher ranks. Being a staff officer has a substantial positive effect (1.789, p<0.001), underscoring its role in increasing promotion likelihood. Furthermore, CUP Membership is a significant and robust predictor (1.970, p<0.001), highlighting the influence of political loyalty on rank attainment.

These results are consistent with earlier generalized ordered logistic regression findings, particularly regarding the positive impacts of CUP Membership and staff officer status. The effects of previous military experience and academic success also align with prior models, reinforcing the critical role of competence and loyalty in military promotions before the Gallipoli Campaign.

Several variables significantly influenced promotion likelihood in the regression analysis conducted after the Gallipoli Campaign (Table D.5). Previous military experience consistently shows a negative effect across all models (ranging from -0.139 to -0.151, p<0.001), indicating that more prewar experience reduces the probability

Table D.4 Ordered Logistic Regression Results, Before Gallipoli Campaign Promotion

	(1) Competence M1	(2) Loyalty M2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. M3	(4) Demography M4	(5) Controls M5
Rank during WW1					
Previous Mil.Exp.	0109***	0119***	0119***	0120***	0121***
Num.of Wars	-0249***	-0287***	-0288***	-0299***	-0302***
Mil. GPA	0013***	0014***	0014***	0014***	0024***
Staff Officer	2243***	1917***	1942***	1993***	1789***
Malta Exile		1041***	1024***	0973***	0889**
CUP Member		2008***	1985***	2040***	1970***
Mil. Court Memb.			0286	0215	0290
Birth: Anatolia				0000	0000
Birth: Balkans				0054	0027
Birth: Middle East				0984***	1118***
Birth: Caucosia				0960***	0907***
Observations	992	992	992	992	992

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

of promotion after the Gallipoli Campaign. Conversely, the number of prewar conflicts participated in has a positive and significant impact (ranging from 0.344 to 0.376, p<0.01), suggesting that involvement in multiple prewar wars increases the likelihood of promotion.

The Staff Officer role also emerges as a strong positive predictor (ranging from 0.893 to 1.231, p<0.05 or p<0.01), highlighting the importance of staff roles in securing promotions post-Gallipoli. CUP Membership remains a highly significant factor (ranging from 2.109 to 2.208, p<0.001), underscoring the critical role of political loyalty in post-Gallipoli promotions. Interestingly, being a Mil. Court Memb. negatively affects promotion in one model (-0.835, p<0.05), suggesting a potential penalty associated with this role.

When comparing these results with earlier analyses, the consistency in the direction and magnitude of the coefficients for CUP Membership and Staff Officer reinforces the importance of competence (via staff roles) and loyalty (via CUP membership) for promotions. However, the negative impact of the Prewar Experience marks a notable shift from previous models, indicating a change in how the experience was valued post-Gallipoli. These results underscore the complex interplay between competence, loyalty, and specific historical roles in shaping military promotions after the Gallipoli Campaign.

Table D.5 Regression Results, After Gallipoli Campaign Promotion

	(1) Competence M1	(2) Loyalty M2	(3) Mil.Court.Mem. M3	(4) Demography M4	(5) Controls M5
After-War-Promotion					
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0151***	-0151***	-0140***	-0139***	-0145***
Num.of Wars	0351**	0344**	0363**	0376**	0372**
Mil. GPA	-0002	-0002	-0001	-0001	0004
Staff Officer	1231**	1013*	1031*	1077*	0893*
Malta Exile		0351	0405	0312	0230
CUP Member		2109***	2147***	2208***	2131***
Mil. Court Memb.			-0835*	-0722	-0696
Birth: Anatolia				0000	0000
Birth: Balkans				-0339	-0303
Birth: Middle East				-0600	-0568
Birth: Caucosia				-0528	-0523
Infantry					0000
Cavalry					-0339
Artillery					-0540
Other					-0253
Observations	354	354	354	354	354

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table D.6 Regression Results for Maximum Ranks Achieved

	(1) Competence M1	(2) Loyalty M2	(3) Mil.Court.Memb. M3	(4) Demography M4	(5) Controls M5
Final Rank					
Previous Mil.Exp.	-0008	-0008	-0006	-0003	-0002
Num.of Wars	0383***	0379***	0375***	0360***	0356***
Mil. GPA	0010***	0011***	0011***	0010***	0012***
Staff Officer	2013***	1845***	1842***	1863***	1837***
Malta Exile		0488**	0505**	0539**	0531**
CUP Member		1409***	1421***	1392***	1357***
Mil. Court Memb.			-0394**	-0383**	-0373**
Birth: Anatolia				0000	0000
Birth: Balkans				0158	0146
Birth: Middle East				-0313	-0317
Birth: Caucosia				-0408	-0422
Observations	1856	1856	1856	1856	1856

Standard errors in parentheses

Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table D.5 shows the ordered logistic regression results for the maximum rank achieved. The number of prewar conflicts participated in has a strong positive effect (coefficient = 0.356, p<0.001), indicating that involvement in multiple conflicts significantly enhances the likelihood of achieving a higher final rank. This suggests that combat experience plays a crucial role in career advancement within the military. Military academic success also shows a significant positive effect (coefficient =

0.012, p<0.001). This indicates that a broader and more varied military background contributes positively to reaching higher ranks. The role of a Staff Officer emerges as a critical factor, with a substantial positive effect on final rank (coefficient = 1.837, p<0.001). This underscores the importance of staff roles in the military hierarchy, where holding such a position significantly boosts the chances of attaining higher ranks. CUP Membership is another significant predictor, with a solid positive coefficient (1.357, p<0.001). This finding highlights the influence of political loyalty in achieving higher ranks, suggesting that affiliation with the CUP was an essential factor in career progression during the period analyzed. Additionally, the experience of being in Malta Exile has a positive and significant effect on final rank (coefficient = 0.531, p<0.01), indicating that this experience may have been viewed favorably in the context of military promotions. However, being a Mil. Court Memb. has a negative impact on final rank (coefficient = -0.373, p<0.01), suggesting a potential penalty associated with this role in the context of career advancement.

APPENDIX E

ADDRESSING TO POTENTIAL ENDOGENEITY OF THE VARIABLE "CUP MEMBERSHIP"

Endogeneity in regression models occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term, leading to biased and inconsistent estimates. In this study, if the variable of CUP membership has a potential to be endogenous, thus could distort the estimated relationship between variable of CUP membership and the dependent variables.

To address the potential endogeneity of variable of CUP membership, Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method is employed, a standard technique widely used in econometrics and statistics. The 2SLS method is particularly effective when valid instrumental variables (IVs) are available. It is favored for its simplicity, robust statistical foundation, and ability to provide consistent and unbiased estimates.

- **First-Stage Regression:** Variable of CUP membership is regressed on instrumental variables of Malta Excile and Membership to Military Courts, and other exogenous covariates. The instruments were chosen based on their relevance to variable of CUP membership and their theoretical exogeneity.
- **Instrument Relevance Test:** The first-stage F-statistic was **8.27** ($p < 0.001$), confirming that the instruments were significantly correlated with `CUPMEMBER`. This satisfies the relevance criterion, ensuring that the instruments are appropriate for use in the 2SLS method.
- **Overidentification Test:** To validate the exogeneity of the instruments, overidentification test (Sargan test) is conducted. The test yielded a chi-squared statistic of **0.907** with a p-value of **0.3409**, indicating that the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error term in the second-stage regression.

The substantial difference between the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the variable of CUP membership coefficient further confirmed the presence of endogeneity. The

Table E.1 Summary of Endogeneity Detection Tests

Test	Statistic	P-Value	Interpretation
First-Stage F-Statistic	8.27	<0.001	Instruments are strongly correlated with `CUPMEMBER`.
Overidentification (Sargan)	0.907	0.3409	Instruments are valid (not correlated with the error term).

OLS estimate was **0.7248** ($p < 0.001$), whereas the 2SLS estimate was **2.8894** ($p < 0.001$), suggesting that endogeneity was indeed affecting the OLS results.

Solving the Endogeneity Issue

To solve the endogeneity issue, 2SLS method is used, which is well-established and recognized as an effective approach in statistical analysis. The process involved:

- **First Stage (Generating Fitted Values):** Regressing variable of CUP membershipon the instruments and other exogenous variables to obtain the fitted values of the variable of CUP membership , the predicted value or fitted value of the variable of CUP membership. These fitted values represent the variation in variable of CUP membershipexplained by the exogenous instruments, effectively removing the endogenous component.
- **Second Stage (Using Fitted Values in the Outcome Regression):** In the second stage, analyses substituted variable of CUP membershipwith its fitted values the variable of CUP membership the predicted value or fitted value of the variable of CUP membership in the regression model. This approach ensures that the regression estimates are not biased due to endogeneity, as the predicted values of variable of CUP membership is exogenous by construction.

The use of 2SLS, supported by valid and relevant instruments, provides consistent and unbiased estimates, making it a statistically sound method for addressing endogeneity.

In further generalized ordered logistic regression analyses, it is safe and methodologically correct to use predicted values of variable of CUP membership (the predicted value or fitted value of variable of CUP membership in place of p variable of CUP membership. The substitution of predicted values of variable of CUP membership ensures that the analysis is free from the bias introduced by endogeneity. This approach is standard in econometrics and is widely accepted as a robust solution to the endogeneity problem.

APPENDIX F

COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS PARTY MEMBERS' MILITARY ACADEMIC STATUS

Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) members demonstrated a high level of competence, particularly during the Gallipoli Campaign. However, their overall competence levels were not significantly different from the broader military cadre. The elevated competence of CUP members can be attributed to the strategic allocation of these officers by the Ministry of War, with a concentrated focus on the Gallipoli Front. While the competence of CUP members in other fronts was slightly higher than the general sample, it was the prioritization of their deployment to Gallipoli that likely enhanced their effectiveness. Table F.1 presents the mean academic success of military officers, comparing all officers with those identified as potential CUP members according to open-source information.

Table F.1 Summary Statistics of Military Academic Succes by CUP Membership Compared to Whole Sample (Graduates after 1985)

	All (N)	**Mean**	**CUP Members (N)**	**Mean**
All Sample	734	83.14	30	92.97
Balkan War Cadre	512	84.17	28	92.71
Gallipoli Front Cadre	368	84.01	16	97.63
WWI Other Fronts Cadre	366	82.26	14	87.64

Table F.2 Summary Statistics of Military Academic Succes by CUP Membership Compared to Whole Sample (CUP defined as CUP Members and Malte Exiles)

	All (N)	**Mean**	**CUP Members (N)**	**Mean**
All Sample	708	82.87	28	92.75
Balkan War Cadre	489	83.92	26	92.46
Gallipoli Front Cadre	363	83.82	16	97.63
WWI Other Fronts Cadre	345	81.87	12	86.25

Figure F.1 Coefficient Plot for Prior Promotion Patterns of the Commanders (CUP Members only)



Table F.3 Summary Statistics of Military Academic Succes by CUP Membership Compared to Whole Sample (CUP Membership defined as either CUP Mem., Malta Exiles, or member in military courts)

	All (N)	Mean	CUP Members (N)	Mean
All Sample	708	82.87	59	86.78
Balkan War Cadre	489	83.92	50	88.38
Gallipoli Front Cadre	363	83.82	32	87.75
WWI Other Fronts Cadre	345	81.87	27	85.63

Table F.4 Summary Statistics of Military Academic Succes by CUP Membership Compared to Whole Sample

	All (N)	Mean	CUP1 Members (N)	Mean
All Sample	708	82.87	132	83.89
Balkan War Cadre	489	83.92	100	85.64
Gallipoli Front Cadre	363	83.82	68	86.10
WWI Other Fronts Cadre	345	81.87	64	81.53

Figure F.2 Coefficient Plot for Prior Promotion Patterns of the Commanders (CUP as any indicator)



Figure F.2 illustrates the academic success of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) members. When considering all dependent variables that indicate CUP membership collectively, it appears that CUP members are not significantly more academically distinguished than the overall group, though they do hold a relative advantage. The higher academic average shown by CUP members, particularly during the Gallipoli Campaign, is likely due to the importance placed on this front and the prioritization of personnel assignments to it. This appendix, together with Appendix E, is included to address the endogeneity issue related to CUP membership.