

**RURAL ORDER, REVOLT AND MESSIANISM IN THE EARLY
SIXTEENTH CENTURY ANATOLIA: THE REBELLION OF 1526-27**

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**RURAL ORDER, REVOLT AND MESSIANISM IN THE EARLY
SIXTEENTH CENTURY ANATOLIA: THE REBELLION OF 1526-27**

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ABSTRACT

RURAL ORDER, REVOLT AND MESSIANISM IN THE EARLY SIXTEENTH CENTURY ANATOLIA: THE REBELLION OF 1526-27

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This thesis deals with the rebellion of 1526-27, the last episode of a series of seemingly religious-messianic uprisings in early sixteenth-century Anatolia. Seen as part of the Kızılbaş movement, the literature on the subject is insufficient. These uprisings are often regarded as an extension of the political-religious rivalry between the Ottomans and the Safavids but have not been thoroughly analysed in terms of social history. Additionally, studies emphasising the conflict between the Ottoman state centre and the nomadic Türkmens, primary adherents of the Kızılbaş movement, fail to surpass the limitations of the functionalist approach that assumes a causal relationship between sedentism/nomadism and religious orthodoxy/heterodoxy. In this thesis, we aim to fill a serious gap in Ottoman historiography regarding the relationship between rural rebellion and messianism, from a Marxist perspective. After introducing our central problematique in the first chapter, we critically examine various conventional, Weberian, and Marxian perspectives on pre-capitalist Ottoman rural society in chapter two. We conclude that the concept of tributary mode of production offers a more feasible framework for discussing class relations within the Ottoman social formation. In the third chapter, we analyse *tahrir* data to expose the relationship between the Türkmens of Bozok and the Ottoman tributary state. In chapter four, we focus on the process of fief allocation, which indicates the dynamics of intra-ruling class struggles on the control and division of rural revenue sources. In the last chapter, we revisit the rebellion of 1526-27, comparing it with late-medieval peasant uprisings in Eurasia.

ÖZET

ERKEN ON ALTINCI YÜZYIL ANADOLUSUNDA KIRSAL DÜZEN, İSYAN
VE MESİHÇİLİK: 1526-27 AYAKLANMASI

CAN GÖRTAN

TARİH YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, Haziran 2024

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Abdurrahman Atçıl

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı Kır Toplumı, On Altıncı Yüzyıl, Anadolu, Kızılbaş

Bu tez, 16. yüzyılın başlarında Anadolu'da yaşanan görünüşte dini-mesihçi bir dizi ayaklanmanın son bölümü olan 1526-27 isyanını konu alıyor. Kızılbaş hareketinin bir parçası olarak görülen konuyla ilgili literatür yetersizdir. Bu ayaklanmalar çoğu zaman Osmanlılar ile Safeviler arasındaki siyasi-dini rekabetin bir uzantısı olarak değerlendirilse de sosyal tarih açısından derinlemesine analiz edilmemiştir. Ayrıca, Osmanlı devlet merkezi ile Kızılbaş hareketinin başlıca taraftarları olan göçebe Türkmenler arasındaki çatışmayı vurgulayan çalışmalar, yerleşiklik/göçebelik ile dini ortodoksluk/heterodoksluk arasında nedensel bir ilişki olduğunu varsayan işlevselci yaklaşımın sınırlarını aşmamaktadır. Bu tezde, Marksist bir bakış açısıyla, kırsal isyan ile mesihçilik arasındaki ilişkiye dair Osmanlı tarih yazımındaki ciddi bir boşluğu doldurmayı hedefliyoruz. Birinci bölümde temel sorunsalımızı ortaya koyduktan sonra, ikinci bölümde kapitalizm öncesi Osmanlı kırsal toplumuna ilişkin çeşitli geleneksel, Weberci ve Marksist perspektifleri eleştirel bir biçimde inceliyoruz. Haraççı üretim tarzı kavramının, Osmanlı toplumsal formasyonundaki sınıf ilişkilerini tartışmak için daha uygun bir çerçeve sunduğu sonucuna varıyoruz. Üçüncü bölümde Bozok Türkmenleri ile Osmanlı haraççı devleti arasındaki ilişkiyi serimlemek için tahrir verilerini analiz ediyoruz. Dördüncü bölümde, kırsal gelir kaynaklarının kontrolü ve bölüşümünde egemen sınıf içi mücadele dinamiklerini ortaya koyan tımar tahsisi sürecine odaklanıyoruz. Son bölümde, 1526-27 isyanını, geç Orta Çağ'da Avrasya'da gerçekleşmiş köylü ayaklanmalarıyla karşılaştırarak yeniden ele alıyoruz.

In memory of my mother and my beloved cat Aziz

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
OZET	v
LIST OF FIGURES	x
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Preliminary Remarks	1
1.2. Structure of the Thesis	5
1.3. On Method and Perspective	10
2. A CRITIQUE OF STATE-CENTRED APPROACHES IN OTTOMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE SO-CALLED CLASSICAL AGE	12
2.1. A Historiographical Survey	12
2.2. On Methodology: Predicaments of Conventional Approaches	20
2.3. Tribute-payers and Fief Holders in Conventional Ottoman Historiography	29
2.4. Marxist Debates on Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production: General Perspectives and the Ottoman Context.....	42
2.4.1. Main Political Confrontations	43
2.4.2. A Seminal Debate; Thought-Provoking Yet Full of Errors	46
2.4.3. Jairus Banaji’s Comments on the Misuse of the Conceptual Framework of the Marxist Theory of History	50
2.4.4. How and Where to Locate “Laws of Motion” of the Pre-capitalist Modes of Production.....	54
2.4.5. The Tributary Mode of Production: From Samir Amin to John Haldon	59
2.4.6. Tax (Tribute) vs. Feudal Rent	65
2.5. Conclusion	74

3. TÜRKMEN TRIBESMEN OF BOZOK DURING THE REBEL- LION OF 1526-27	78
3.1. Sancak of Bozok around 1520.....	78
3.2. Topographic Features and Demography of the Region	79
3.3. General Remarks on the Relationship Between the Tributary State and Tribes-men	83
3.4. Introduction to the Archival Sources: TTd.155 and 998.	92
3.5. Rebellious Tribes of Bozok.....	94
3.5.1. Tribe of Çiçeklü	95
3.5.2. Tribe of Mesudlu	103
3.5.3. Tribe of Akçakoyunlu	108
3.5.4. Tribes of Hisarbeylü and Söklen	114
3.6. General Assessment	120
4. PROLONGED ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OTTOMAN Vİ- LAYET IN ANATOLIA: CONFLICT AND CONCESSION IN ZÜLKADIRIYE BETWEEN 1515 AND 1533	123
4.1. Introduction	123
4.2. Ruling Personnel Administrative Divisions in “Vilayet-i Türkmen” During the 1520s.....	125
4.3. An Assessment of the Ottoman Take-over of Zülkadiriye.....	129
4.4. Management of Revenue Sources and Its political Manifestation: Timar 134	
4.4.1. Introduction of the Timar Registers in Question.....	136
4.4.2. Distribution of Timar Holders in Zamantu c.1524 [TTd.124] ..	139
4.4.3. Distribution of Timar Holders in Zamantu c.1528 [TTd.142] ..	145
4.5. Preliminaries for a Discussion on the Tributary State and the Com- mon Law	158
4.5.1. An Evaluation of Sultanic Directives About Fief Bestowals in the Region.....	172
4.6. Conclusion	184
5. CONCLUSION: A GENERAL ASSESSMENT ON THE REBEL- LION OF 1526-27	187
5.1. A Framework of Rural Uprisings in the Pre-Capitalist Context	187
5.2. The Events of 1526-27	196
5.2.1. Late August-Autumn of 1526: Baba Zünnun Rebellion	197
5.2.2. Winter of 1526 – Summer of 1527: Zünnunoğlu and Kalender Şah Rebellions	201
5.3. General Conclusion	210

BIBLIOGRAPHY	218
APPENDIX A	233
APPENDIX B	241
APPENDIX C	245
APPENDIX D	265

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1. Çiçeklü cemaats according to sheep/household ratio.....	97
Figure 3.2. Relationship between average herd size per household and economic balance between pastoralism and agriculture in semi-nomadic Çiçeklü cemaats.....	101
Figure 3.3. Mesudlu cemaats in terms of sheep/household ratio	104
Figure 3.4. Relationship between average herd size per household and economic balance between pastoralism and agriculture in semi-nomadic Mesudlu cemaats	104
Figure 3.5. Hisarbeylü cemaats according to sheep/household ratio	115
Figure 3.6. Relationship between herd size per household and economic balance between pastoralism and agriculture in semi-nomadic Hisarbeylü cemaats.....	116
Figure 3.7. Söklen cemaats according to sheep/household ratio.....	118
Figure 3.8. Relationship between average herd size per household and economic balance between pastoralism and agriculture in semi-nomadic Söklen cemaats	118
Figure A.1. Population, paid tributes and the economic indicators of the tribes of Çiçeklü, Mesudlu, Ağcakoyunlu, Hisarbeylü and Söklen according to B.O.A TTd. 155	233
Figure B.1. Distribution of fief holders in Zamantu according to B.O.A TTd.124 (c.1524)	241
Figure C.1. Distribution of fief holders in Zamantu according to B.O.A TTd.142 (c.1528)	245

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Preliminary Remarks

This thesis is about rural unrest, the so-called *kızılbaş* rebellions, in early sixteenth-century Anatolia, the masses involved in these uprisings, their opposition to the tributary regime of Ottoman centralised feudalism, and the state's response to them. I will focus on the rebellion of 1526-27, which was the last of the chain of millenarian uprisings in Anatolia, following Şahkulu (1510-11) and Şah Veli (1519-20) rebellions. The bulk of the historiography about the *kızılbaş* includes works of cultural and intellectual history in which analysis of these uprisings does not constitute a principal place. However, with this thesis, I will attempt to re-evaluate the *kızılbaş* issue as a matter of social history by focusing on a case of a rebellion from the perspective of historical materialism.

The purpose of this contribution is two-fold. First, conventional Ottoman historiography was reluctant to recognise pre-capitalist Ottoman rural tribute payers, that is, peasant cultivators and nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists as historically active subjects. As a critique of this framework, I will focus on a rural uprising, and illustrate the class character of the Ottoman pre-capitalist formation, arguing that in the Ottoman social formation, even at the peak of Ottoman power, social stability did not mark the social relations. Rather, class conflicts and social dynamism was pivotal in the formation of these relations. In this historical context, rural taxpayers were not passive observers. Secondly, I aim to revisit the current discourse about millenarianism and messianism. By focusing on the social relations of production and distribution, I will try to develop a materially grounded explanation of rural messianism.¹

¹An inspirational work for this approach is Rodney Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free: Medieval Peasant Movements and English Rising of 1381* (London: Routledge, 2003); For a general theoretical framework, we should also underline Rodney Hilton, *Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism*. (London: Verso, 1990).

The *kızılbaş* rebellions of the early sixteenth century have hardly been a focus of social history. If we put aside historical and sociological works which shallowly interpret the *kızılbaş* movement among peripheral and nomadic-tribal responses to Ottoman attempts of centralisation from the mid-fifteenth to the sixteenth century,² there is no scholarly significant work of social history about these uprisings. In such functionalist depictions of sixteenth-century Ottoman Anatolia, it is inferred that nomadic and tribal elements of the periphery, such as the *kızılbaş* movement, were naturally adherent to religious heterodoxies, whereas the settled segments of the Ottoman society, peasants and *tımar* holders, whose interests are assumed by this line of thought to be naturally represented by the Ottoman state centre, were followers of religious orthodoxy.³ Resting on centre/periphery, settled-peasant/nomadic-tribal and agricultural/pastoral dichotomies, the conventional scholarship tends to analyse *kızılbaş* uprisings within the framework of Ottoman-Safavid conflict.⁴ Accordingly, the Safavids represented the interests of peripheral and nomadic-tribal elements in Anatolia.⁵ It was merely the actions of Safavid agents, propagandists, and provocateurs that triggered the rural *kızılbaş* uprisings. I argue, however, that such approaches, on the one hand, are plagued by nationalist distortion of historical reality, that is, an understanding and presentation of pre-capitalist Ottoman society as an example of organic solidarity whose stability could only be shaken by the disturbances instigated by its external rivals, on the other hand, such a discourse is also anachronistic as it attributes the qualities of the modern state to these late medieval-early modern states in their state capacities of creating mass political, religious or ideological adherences and formulating the basic pillars of mass political consciousness.

Taking macro-level interstate confrontation as the reason for social protest and discontent obstructs the possibility of interpreting history from below, that is, from the vantage point of oppressed and exploited social classes, and it also hinders analysis

²Şerif Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 229-303; Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (The Eothen Press, 1985), 14-23; Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 175-178; Marcus Dressler, "Inventing Orthodoxy: Competing Claims for Authority and Legitimacy in the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict", in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Mauris Reinowski (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 172-173.

³Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013); Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr "Qızılbaş Heresy and Rebellion in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century." *Anatolia Moderna* 7 (1997); Rıza Yıldırım, "Turcomans Between Two Empires: The Origins of the Qızılbaş Identity in Anatolia (1447-1514)" *PhD Thesis*, Bilkent University, 2008.

⁴Adel Allouche, *The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906-962 /1500-1555)*, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983); Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont's successive articles: "Études Turco-Safavides, III. Notes et Documents sur la Révolte de Şâh Velî b. Şeyh Celâl." *Archivum Ottomanicum* VII (1982) and "Un rapport inédit sur la révolte Anatolienne de 1527." *Studia Islamica* 62 (1985) were also part of a project on the diplomatic history of the Ottomans and Safavid relations.

⁵Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, (Bloomington, Indiana: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1983)

from a theoretically Marxist class perspective. However, rural revolts were a fundamental component of class relations in a pre-capitalist historical setting. They either contain an analytical value in explaining the dynamics of the transition from feudal to capitalist mode of production as symptoms of the conflict-ridden nature of such processes, or they simply occur as sporadic events, in Marc Bloch's own words, "like flashes in the pan," stemming from the exploitative nature of pre-capitalist rural social relations, along with more consistent everyday forms of resistance.⁶ Yet in both cases, the study of these revolts is indispensable for a historical materialist analysis of pre-capitalist social formations which focuses on the political subjectivities of the direct producers, peasant agriculturalists and nomadic pastoralists, who lived under the tributary pressure of the pre-capitalist ruling classes and the state in general. More importantly, these uprisings present a fertile ground for empirically exposing the nature of class relations and struggles between the ruling and the ruled.⁷

In fact, these themes were subject to an abstract and theoretical discussion in Ottoman-Turkish historiography between the late 1960s and mid-1990s. During this period, the primary concern of economic history was to explain the phenomenon of underdevelopment in Turkey and historicise the reasons behind the delay of the indigenous development of capitalism in Ottoman society with reference to the conceptual arsenal of the popular currents in the discipline of historical sociology. Weber's concepts of Sultanism and patrimonialism, and Marx's theory of the Asiatic mode of production were the two most popular responses to the question of the delay or absence of capitalist development in Ottoman-Turkish history. Accordingly, the late medieval-early modern Ottoman state—here state is often understood to be Sultanic authority—was so powerful in its capacities over social property and market relations that it acted as an obstacle against the indigenous and independent development of capitalist mentality, urban bourgeoisie and monetary economy, in contrast with the development path in feudal Europe to capitalism, which resulted from the dispersed nature of political authority. Postulating the state-society relations as an external relationship between two dichotomous and antagonistic entities, these analyses assumed that in the despotic/Sultanic/Asiatic Ottoman formation the state rules over society uninterruptedly, whereas in feudal Europe (civil) society determines the state which was too weak to exert a central power. Therefore, bottom-up class struggles, particularly rural uprisings in the pre-capitalist Ottoman context, are concluded to have no analytical value or historical significance compared to intra-state and intra-bureaucratic conflicts. Nevertheless, with the rise of the pop-

⁶Marc Bloch, *French Rural History: An Essay on its Basic Characteristics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1966), 169-170.

⁷For an emphasis on the central role of empirical analysis in the Marxist method, see: John Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode of Production* (London and New York: Verso 1993), 24-25

ularity of the world systems theory as an explanatory framework for backwardness in non-European peripheral social formations, the aforementioned literature came to deemphasise the uniqueness of the Ottoman state-society relations. Moreover, with the steady decline in the popularity of economic history in Ottoman-Turkish studies from the mid-1990s onwards, these themes were less and less addressed except for a few younger historians who in the 2000s discussed the social history of the late Ottoman empire with their studies on production and property relations, land regime, peasant rebellions, rural banditry, and the nascent working-class movements.⁸ However, a similar bottom-up reading of social history is still lacking in the historiography of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Let us now briefly discuss the literature of cultural and intellectual history regarding the *kızılbaş*, since one of the central aims of this thesis is to discuss the issue of messianic religious movements among the rural populations in relation to their material conditions of living within an exploitative and hierarchal class society. We have already mentioned that earlier approaches to the *kızılbaş* tended to contextualise these uprisings within the wider framework of the Ottoman-Safavid religio-political conflict. However, a recent generation of historians refined this framework by introducing the concept of confessionalisation, that is, the idea that in the period under discussion, political and religious identities merged, giving rise to a new relationship between politics and religion.⁹ At the same time, they have broken away from strict definitions and assumptions of clear-cut confessional identities, at least for the period before the mid-sixteenth century. In the wake of the so-called narrative and linguistic turn in Ottoman historiography, the new generation of historians also deconstructed the conventional assumption of demarcation between urban/socially elite circles' high Islamic orthodoxy and rural "folk Islam" shaped by syncretism, antinomianism and millenarianism. They discovered that, in fact, millenarianism cut across social, class and spatial differences, in the confessionally ambiguous religious milieu of the early sixteenth-century Mediterranean and Middle East. Not only the mentality of the commoners but also portrayals of emperors, kings, and sultans in court historians' narratives and these rulers' self-portrayals as well, were all

⁸ Attila Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in the Late Ottoman Empire: Moral Economy, Revolt, and the Tanzimat Re-forms." *International Review of Social History* 57 (2012). For an early-era uprising, Saygın Salgırlı, "The Rebellion of 1416: Re-contextualizing an Ottoman Social Movement." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 55 (2012).

⁹ Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, *The Kızılbaş/Alevis in Ottoman Anatolia: Sufism, Politics and Community* (Edin-burgh University Press 2020); Zeynep Oktay, "Historicizing Alevism: The Evolution of Abdal and Bektashi Doc-trine." *Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies* Vol. 13 No 3-4 (2020): 425-456. Derin Terzioğlu, "How to Con-ceptualize Ottoman Sunnitization: A Historiographical Discussion," *Turcica* 44 (2012-3), 301-338. Derin Terzioğlu, "Confessional Ambiguity in the Confessional Age: Philo-Alidism, Sufism and Sunni Islam in the Ottoman Empire, 1400-1700." in *Entangled Confessionalizations? Dialogic Perspectives on the Politics of Piety and Community-Building in the Ottoman Empire, 15th-18th Centuries*, ed. Tijana Krstić and Derin Terzioğlu (Gorgias Press, 2022), 563-624.

informed by the belief that the Apocalypse would soon be upon them.¹⁰ Therefore, the actions and aspirations of sultan and dervish such as Süleyman I and Kalender Şah, emperor and preachers, such as Charles V and Thomas Müntzer, essentially bore the mark of the same millenarian spirit.

My counterargument here is that, in practice, however, the millenarian mentality and apocalyptic expectations manifested themselves differently in the case of the ruling and the ruled sectors of society and thus crystallized in accordance with the world views of opposing social classes. We cannot understand Messianism, Millenarianism and religious eschatology as a monolithic current of thought without taking into consideration the class character and class divisions of the pre-capitalist societies in question.¹¹ We thus need to integrate methodologies of social history in the debate about the *Kızılbaş* for a critical departure from the existing literature, overly inclined towards cultural and intellectual history. This departure also marks the boundaries between idealist history writing and historical materialism.

1.2 Structure of the Thesis

In my thesis, I will focus on the rebellion of 1526-27, which was instigated by nomadic and semi-settled tribesmen in the *sancak* of Bozok, and then spread to the environs of Tokat in the province of Rûm and the recently annexed *Beylik* of the Zülkadirids with the involvement of settled populations of these regions, such as peasants and tımar holders. This rebellion was the last of the chain of mass uprisings with a

¹⁰Cornell H. Fleischer, “A Mediterranean Apocalypse: Prophecies of Empire in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries”, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 61 (2018), 18-90; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Sixteenth-century Millenarianism from the Tagus to the Ganges” in *Explorations in Connected History*, (Oxford University Press 2005): 102-137.

¹¹The rural poor’s ability to use the religious discourse for their benefit remains an unanswered question in the Ottoman context. These instances are better studied for late-medieval and early-modern European social movements. Rodney Hilton’s comments about the relationship between rural discontent and the religious discourse are worth mentioning here: “We should be aware that the exploited not only resisted in practice, they also resisted ideologically to unexpected ways, especially by taking over ideologies that were not intended to help them and turning them to their own use. . . . They could also use the contradictions and ambiguities of the Christian religion to back their own cause. There is no need to go into detail here, but I would draw attention to the numerous rebellious movements, primarily peasant, which selected Christian doctrines about the brotherhood of man, equality before God, etc. . . . It may be thought that I present an over-simplified view of the use of Christian concepts by peasants against their rulers. One might ask: what about the complex history of Christian heresy? Conservative historians are at pains to explain such rebellions against orthodoxy as occurring entirely within the area of mentality or spirituality. Most historians of heresy are, however, unable to exclude the possibility that heretical movements also articulate social discontents.” (Hilton, 1990, 9-10). In fact, in conventional Turkish historiography, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak’s *Babailer İsyanı (Aleviliğin Tarihsel Altyapısı yahut Anadolu’da İslam-Türj Heteredoksisinin Teşekkülü*, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2011), 144-160, is a noteworthy study for Ocak’s attempt to analyse the Babai uprising with the perspective of social history while integrating the religious-messianic aspect of the rebellion into the picture. However, Ocak quite readily dismisses theoretically informed perspectives, such as the Marxist framework as “ideological approaches” for their supposed distorting impact on the authenticity of works of history.

messianic *Kızılbaş* outlook that shook the foundations of Ottoman rule in Anatolia within a twenty-year interval roughly between 1510 and 1530. Contrary to the upheavals of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that is, the wider *Celâlî* phenomenon, these uprisings did not create conditions for a long-term disruption the social formation. Nor did they apparently stem from such structural shifts as dramatic changes in demography, the climate, and inflation. Nevertheless, their memory and impact on Ottoman official discourse were so intense that any bandit, rebel, and rebel leader in Anatolia after the 1520s was called a *Celâlî* with reference to the name of the supposedly antinomian dervish leader of the 1519-20 rebellion in Bozok, Şah Velî b. Celâl. In the same vein as its predecessors, the rebellion of 1526-27 was also led by an influential dervish figure, Kalender Şah, who was known to be the religious leader of the *tekke* of Hacıbektaş. Except for a few lines about his family origins recorded by Ottoman chroniclers depicting the rebellion and a couple of Sufi poems in anthologies of the Alevî-Bektaşî literary tradition, we lack enough information to reconstruct Kalender Şah's personal story.¹²

My chief primary sources are Ottoman land surveys of the previously mentioned regions compiled in the 1520s. These land surveys do not offer easy reading and transparency concerning the social and economic conditions of peasants and nomads, some parts of these documents are not legible because of the inevitable ill effects of the passage of time on their physical qualities, and more importantly, without collaborative teamwork, they are difficult to mine for data. One should also be aware of the risk that statistical simplifications based on these documents may overshadow the vividness of the social reality. However, for such a vast source base to fit the framework of a master's thesis, I will use it selectively and thematically in a problem-oriented manner, inevitably resorting partly to a statistical method.

For Bozok, I will exclusively rely on the data about the economic activities of the *Türkmen* tribes who were reported in Ottoman chronicles to be chief participants of the rebellion. My analysis will focus on herd sizes per tribal sub-groups, which I will calculate based on the registered animal taxes, the comparison of animal taxes with agricultural taxes if tribal groups in question were engaged in seasonal farming activities, and also by looking at the amounts of fines and fees related to pastoral economic activity.¹³ The method I follow was previously employed by Rudi Paul Lindner who discusses the relationship between horse-drover *yörüks* of Eski-il in the

¹²Zeynep Yürekli discusses the history of the *tekke* of Hacı Bektaş, along with Seyitgazi, in the middle of the confessional policies of the Ottomans against the Safavids and their *kızılbaş* followers, and its temporary closure for two decades upon Kalender Şah's uprising (1526-27). *Architecture and Hagiography in the Ottoman Empire: The Politics of Bektash Shrines in the Classical Age*, (Ashgate e-book, 2012), 33-37

¹³These documents are preserved in the archives coded as B.O.A TTd. 155 ve B.O.A. TTd. 998

Karaman province and the Ottoman state in the sixteenth century.¹⁴

For the settled agricultural milieu of the provinces of Rûm, the changes in the patterns of land distribution among peasant taxpayer households across generations, and between the rural notables and the peasantry would be a seminal topic for further analysis regarding the rural unrest. The quantitative picture that detailed and synoptic land surveys of these regions present requires a statistical approach backed by the tools that computational social sciences may provide. Previously, Oktay Özel in *The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia: Amasya 1576–1643*, Ali Açıkel in *Changes in settlement patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of the District of Tokat (1574–1643)* drew an integrated picture of the rural milieu of the province of Rûm, on the wake of great *Celâli* uprisings. Yet the social and economic life of the peasants Rûm in the age of the *Kızılbaş*, that is, during the last decades of the fifteenth century to 1530s, remained as an enigma. Michael A. Cook mentions the population movements and land holding patterns in the environs of Tokat around the 1520s exhibited a slightly different pattern than those observed in the Aydın and Hamid regions.¹⁵ These observations deserve to be re-examined, especially concerning the *kızılbaş* movement, in a separate study which exceeds the scope of our master thesis. My selective focus regarding the province of Rûm here is, therefore, guided only by the place names that are mentioned in a report by the Beylerbey of Karaman, Mahmud Paşa, which contains information about the places where the rebel army passed by, camped and fought pitched battles against the Ottoman forces.¹⁶

I will also include in my discussion the involvement of *tımar* holders of Zülkadiriid origin in the rebellion of 1526-27. In addition to the analysis of the *tımar* registers of Zülkadiriye belonging to the 1520s,¹⁷ I will also scrutinise a collection of legal orders sent by the Sublime Porte to the Beylerbeyis of Karaman and Zülkadiriye concerning fief allotment procedures in these provinces between the 1520s and the early 1530s, as these sources are coterminous with the upheavals in the region.¹⁸ I will match this archival material with contemporary accounts in Ottoman chronicles,

¹⁴Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*

¹⁵Michael A. Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450–1600*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) There were records of vacant peasant plots, some of them were labelled “mevkuf-ı kızılbaş” in *tahrir* registers of Rum. A comparison of *mevkuf* entries in B.O.A. TTd. 19 (1485) and B.O.A. TTd. 79 (1519-20) would be informative for shedding light upon the social and economic reasons behind the intensity of the *kızılbaş* movement regarding land distribution and population movements in the province of Rum.

¹⁶Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Un rapport inédit sur la révolte Anatolienne de 1527.” *Studia Islamica* 62 (1985): 164ff.

¹⁷These documents are preserved in the archives coded as B.O.A TTd. 124 and B.O.A. TTd.142

¹⁸Bayezid Devlet Kütüphanesi, Nadir Eserler Kısımı, Veliyüddin Efendi nr.1970

which more or less reiterate the same depiction of the events around the rebellion.

The difficulty of my project is self-evident. First, as I underlined above, no significantly developed literature on social history specifically about the *Kızılbaş* rebellions is available. However, studies on messianism as a cultural and intellectual movement may lay the groundwork for an alternative reconsideration and approach. Along with these works, the highly developed literature on the *Celâli* rebellions also offers me a methodological guideline to follow. Yet another problem arises from the limits of the primary sources I will use. In the Ottoman land surveys, these rebellions were scarcely mentioned. Therefore, I must reconsider and evaluate the statistical information offered in these documents in a dialogue with the social grievances stemming from the very nature of production relations in the Ottoman countryside. However, conventional Ottoman historiography has long distanced itself from treating rural rebellions with a focus on production and distribution relations, exploitation and class struggles. This has several reasons. The discipline of history is a highly ideological field – even if many historians claim the opposite. Modern Ottoman-Turkish historiography from the 1950s onwards developed strictly along Weberian lines with the impact of the US-sponsored “modernisation theory” on the field. In the context of the Cold War, a generation of historians has remained highly doubtful of the applicability of the Marxist framework to the Ottoman particularity, especially in the pre-capitalist context. Therefore, I devote a significant portion of the project to discussing the analytical weaknesses and strengths of various Weberian and certain Marxist approaches to the Ottoman state and society in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Here two important books, *The State and the Tributary Mode of Production* by John Haldon, and *Kabileden Feodalizme (From Tribe to Feudalism)* by Halil Berktaş, and various polemical articles of these scholars are two pivotal scholarly works attacking the myth of silent rural producers and lack of class struggles in the Ottoman social formation.¹⁹

Keeping these in mind, in the second chapter of my thesis, I will embark on a critical evaluation of the historiography of the Ottoman state and society in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. I will devote Chapter Three to exposing the conditions of rural society in Bozok affected by the rebellion. In Chapter Four, I will focus on the dynamics of the confiscation and re-allotment of timars in Zülkadiriye, which I think clearly demonstrates the administrative disorder and violence in the region after the

¹⁹Halil Berktaş, “The Feudalism Debate: The Turkish End -Is ‘Tax vs. Rent’ necessarily the product and sign of a modal difference?” *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 14 (3) (1987): 291-333; Halil Berktaş “The Search for Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography.” In *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, ed. Halil Berktaş and Suaiya Faroqhi, (Routledge 1992), 109-184; Halil Berktaş, “Three Empires and the Societies They Governed: Iran, India and the Ottoman Empire.” in *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, ed. Halil Berktaş and Suaiya Faroqhi (Routledge 1992a), 240-263; John Hal-don, “Theories of Practice: Marxist History-Writing and Complexity” *Historical Materialism* 21 (4) (2013): 36-70.

official integration of the principality of Zülkadir in the Ottoman territories. This chapter is of particular importance for at least two reasons. On the one hand, I will challenge the myth of a strong/centralised/bureaucratic state and show that like any other pre-capitalist state the Ottoman state centre had to co-opt with local elements to retain its nominal sovereignty in certain provinces distant from its range of direct intervention. The concept of power bloc, used by neo-Marxist state theoreticians to emphasise the fragmented nature of the capitalist state between the fractions of the ruling and dominant classes, would be pivotal for developing an alternative to the strong state paradigm and its variations.

On the other hand, I will also demonstrate the dynamics of intra-ruling class conflict in a pre-capitalist context over the distribution of land and the revenues appropriated from rural direct producers. I argue that the tripartite structure of inter-class struggle (between the ruling and the ruled) over rents, tributes and usufruct rights, and intra-class struggle (within the factions of the ruling class) over the distribution of revenues and control of revenue sources create a pendular motion in pre-capitalist formations between centralisation and decentralisation, and rural unrest and stability. Perhaps, the “laws of motion” of a social formation (or a mode of production) can be searched through these social responses they produce.²⁰

One methodological problem observed among Marxists is the tendency to substitute one of the economic, political and ideological instances of a social formation for the social-historical reality itself. It is often forgotten that these are essentially analytical distinctions, abstractions and tools utilised to deconstruct the complexity of real concrete. For instance, reducing the laws of motion of a social formation to its economic logic alone also misleadingly reduces the concrete social-historical reality to an *ahistorical* abstraction. In this case, historical and empirical research to understand the *tendencies* (not *determinations*) of the social formation in question, which is a complex articulation of economic, political, ideological, cultural, and other forms of social relations, becomes unnecessary.

Class, taken not as a sociological abstraction, but as a social relation, nexus and carrier of the abovementioned forms of social relations, and class struggles, both as

²⁰Jarius Banaji's *Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation* is an influential work for his emphasis on the methodological importance of discovering specific and historical laws of motions of modes of production (and social formations) to discern one mode of production from another. But as he discusses the laws of motion solely through their economic logics; for instance, dynamics of private rent-taking by land-lords in the feudal mode of production and centralised states' fiscal drive in the tributary mode, he falls into economic reductionism. Class relations and struggles are rarely mentioned in Banaji's account regarding the laws of motion of modes of production. Also, Chris Wickham in his article titled “The Uniqueness of the East” has previously underlined that state tax-raising and private rent-taking rested on separate economic logics, corresponding to different modes, but he added that from the rural producers' perspective, this difference was mostly indistinguishable and unimportant. Wickham's latter point is, I think, useful for developing a “class-centred” formulation of laws of motion for pre-capitalist social formations and emphasising their common aspects.

a result and precondition of the articulation of these forms, are two focal points for developing an alternative within the Marxist theoretical framework to understand “motion” in a given social formation. In this way, social formations are understood as not *ahistorical* abstractions but concrete historical structures, relations and processes. Empirical study regains importance in exploring tendencies of transition and motion of these historical social formations. Since the tendencies of transition and motion historically derive from the unpredictable upshots of class struggles, social formations are conceptualised as empirically open-ended processes, rather than reflections of supra-historical laws or rules of pre-determination.²¹

I will reconsider and review my findings of the previous chapters in the last chapter, which will analyse the rebellion of 1526-27 itself. I will try to overcome the difficulty caused by the absence of serious works of social history and even political history about the uprisings between 1510 and 1530 in the Ottoman Anatolian countryside by evaluating my case study in a dialogical manner with the historiography on late medieval–early modern peasant uprisings and religious and messianic discourses embedded in these events.

1.3 On Method and Perspective

Stemming from the narrative and linguistic turn in historiography, the scholarly community of the discipline of history has been divided into two camps. Narrative history, nowadays the hegemonic genre, presents history writing akin to fiction, a kind of storytelling, and the historian as a craftsman in selecting, approaching and interpreting primary materials. This approach also entails a defeatist position regarding the impossibility of grasping the objective knowledge of the past. History writing is nothing more than a minimalist attempt at literary representation of the past, rather than a totalising science of reconstructing the objective truth.²² On the other hand, the discipline of history can still be viewed as a “soft science” resting on

²¹In reaching these conclusions, I have been influenced by British Marxist historians, particularly Rodney Hilton, who highlights the determining role of the class conflict, the struggle for rent between the peasants and land-lords in feudal society as its prime mover. (Hilton 1990, 1-11). Rent-taking relations, apart from their apparent economic logic, were also relations of political dependence, required ideological legitimisation, backed by legal and juridical systems, and rested on local differences such as kinship structures, and more generally, cultural factors. In this respect, classes were not purely economic phenomena and class struggles were not solely economic struggles. However, for the analysis of the Ottoman social formation, we cannot reduce the class conflict simply to struggles for the tribute between the rural producers and fief holders. Tributary, or centralised feudal states were more complex structures than their Western counterparts. They rested on vast financial resources and fiscal capacities, creating an internally differentiated and fragmented ruling class whose intra-class struggles over control and distribution of revenue sources were equally important to understanding the movement in tributary formations.

²²Richard J. Evans, *In Defense of History*, (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1999), 56; 86-87.

a body of organised knowledge. Combining literary and linguistic skills to approach primary sources, source criticism in the selection of these materials, social and economic theories, and context-related secondary material in the interpretation of past events, processes and structures, it may be possible to reconstruct the past reality—not as exactly what it was, but with an interpretative perspective in dialogue with the present.

Being inclined to the latter position, I also admit that value-neutral or objective history writing is hardly possible as a scholarly endeavour. The historical reality, that is, the objective truth of the past, exists independently from historians' intervention, ideologies and value-sets. However, as soon as it is selected as an object of analysis for history writing, it ceases to be a transcendental reality but becomes a reconstruction of that reality in accordance with this or that vantage point of the historian. "Writing history to show the way it really happened" is an endeavour destined to be futile given the inexhaustible distance between historical reality and its representation as not only a linguistic reconstruction but also an ideologically and theoretically informed one. Neither can language itself express and expose the social-historical reality totally nor can any ideological-theoretical perspective create the means of delving into an analysis of all aspects of it in total. The historical materialist perspective I adopt in the analysis of the *Kızılbaş* issue and rural revolts with a messianic outlook is therefore not an overly ambitious attempt to expose what had actually happened with all its clarity but a humble interpretation of these events and processes with a class perspective.

2. A CRITIQUE OF STATE-CENTRED APPROACHES IN OTTOMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE SO-CALLED CLASSICAL AGE

2.1 A Historiographical Survey

The Ottoman social formation was not devoid of struggles between the peasants and those who appropriated agricultural surplus, even during the empire's zenith. These struggles took diverse forms, ranging from open rebellion to banditry, or from peasant flight to seeking upward mobilisation by joining the ranks of the religious functionaries or timar holders. Such rural struggles were not unique to the Ottoman Empire. Instead, pre-capitalist, exploitative social formations universally experienced such tensions between direct producers and the ruling class whose economic and political existence depended on pumping out surplus wealth from tribute-paying commoners.

As Marc Bloch suggests, a social system is not only characterised by its internal structure but also understood by the reactions it produces. Social stability and conflict compose a totality: "Agrarian revolt is as natural to the seigneurial regime as strikes are to large-scale capitalism."¹ Eastern European and Balkan nationalist, and later Marxist, historiographical traditions which accepted the validity of the model of feudal exploitation² for the Ottoman social formation, often portrayed *klephts* and *hajduks* as champions of equality and social justice against the feudal oppression of the Ottoman rule.³ Balkan nationalist historiography depicted these bands of brigands as freedom fighters whose political cause stemmed from religious and na-

¹Bloch, *French Rural History*, 170.

²Halil İnalcık, *From Empire To Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History*, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 1995), 19-41.

³Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), 71-82. For a critique of the blending of nationalist discourse with Marxist "history from below" on the issue of haiduks: Fikret Adanır, "Heiduckenentum und osmanische Herrschaft" *Südost-Forschungen* 41 (1982): 42-116.

tional sentiments. Later Marxist contributions combined the preceding nationalist discourse with the peasantry's alleged anti-feudal resistance against the "primitive-feudal" social system established by the Ottoman conquest.⁴ Albeit the absurdity of combining nationalist sentiments with the Marxist approach, these works were also distinguished by emphasising the analytical value of the concept of the feudal mode of production in the analysis of the Ottoman social formation.⁵

However, the phenomenon of rural revolt as a manifestation of the struggle between the peasantry and the appropriators of agricultural surplus (whether in the form of banditry, open revolt or other forms) remained a neglected, or even a dismissed theme in conventional Ottoman-Turkish historiography.⁶ For the traditional approaches, the point of departure was usually the assumption that the Ottoman social formation resembled a non-feudal and patrimonial system marked by stasis, with no room for sensible exploitative transactions between peasants and their overlords. It is highlighted that the peasants did not owe rents and tributes to their overlords personally, but in theory, they paid taxes for the state collectively. Thus, presuming a class struggle between the peasants and landlords would be fiction. Alternatively, in a Marxian sense, the Ottoman social formation was put as an example of the Asiatic mode of production, radically distinct from the fundamental dynamics of feudalism with the lack of class struggles.⁷

Therefore, conventional Ottoman-Turkish historiography often focused on the relations of distribution of power within the "state elite", instead of the relations of production which may have triggered further discussion on the relationship between the direct producers and appropriators of their surplus, including the rural discontent. Weberian conceptual framework of "status groups", and briefly defined political and cultural antagonisms such as, "state elites and commoners", and "rulers and ruled" were oft-referred heuristics in conventional approaches. In the discussions about the nature of the Ottoman state, the terms "ruling class" and "ruling elite" were often

⁴İnalçık, *From Empire to Republic*, 21

⁵For instance, Vera P. Moutafchieva underlines the primitive character of Ottoman feudalism in contrast to the already developed, advanced forms of feudal relations in the Balkans. (Moutafchieva 1988). This study is the most well-known among Turkish Ottomanists in addition to Bistra Cvetkova's studies.

⁶As an example; Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman route to state centralization*, (Cornell University Press 1994), 86-88

⁷Çağlar Keyder and Huricihan İslamoğlu, "Agenda for Ottoman history" *Review* (1977): 37-45. Especially on page 45: "It was mentioned above that the production process in the Asiatic mode of production does not create conflict or a confrontation between the producers and the appropriators of surplus... class conflict is not graspable in the (Asiatic) production experience."; Sencer Dıvıçcioğlu, *Asya Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı Toplumunu* (Kırklareli: Sermet Matbaası, 1981) 54, 93. Here we can also mention Şerif Mardin's "advice" to young researchers inspired by Marxism who have looked in vain for the dynamics of opposition of classes in the Ottoman social formation. According to him, employment of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production would be more accurate in approaching the Ottoman reality in Marxian terms: Şerif Mardin, *Religion Society and Modernity in Turkey*, 42.

used interchangeably and synonymously, creating further ambiguity.⁸ In this line of thought, the concept of class was defined via the administrative functions that groups of individuals fulfil to keep the centrifugal tendencies assumed to challenge the power of the central state administration at bay. In this framework, briefly, authentic social movements of the tribute-paying rural commoners (peasant agriculturalists and nomadic pastoralists) are held to be lacking analytical importance.

In this section, we delve into the methodological, theoretical as well as factual problems of the historiographical canon in Ottoman studies, regarding the debates about modes and relations of production in the Ottoman Empire. This canon can be divided into three categories.

The first is the empiricist legacy of Ö. L. Barkan (1980) which poses similarities to the Rankean approach. This perspective still influences Ottoman historiography, notably through his impact on Halil İnalcık (1967; 1993; 1994; 1995). The second category consists of the sociological contributions of Şerif Mardin (2006) and Metin Heper (1985) whose ideas were developed in a conversation with, and therefore by the impact of the conceptual framework of the modernisation theory of the 1950s. They maintain that the Ottoman-Turkish case represents a distinct ontology compared to Europe, due to the legacy of its Islamic institutions, culture and/or its strong state tradition. The third category is the academic-Marxist literature which underlines the analytical strength of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production for understanding the dynamics of the Ottoman social formation. Prominent advocates included Sencer Divitçioğlu (1981); and Çağlar Keyder and Huricihan İslamoğlu (1977) as the second generation. Although Keyder and İslamoğlu later abandoned the AMP formulation, they maintained their view on the uniqueness of the Ottoman social formation which, in their perspective, does not fit the feudal mode of production. Consequently, they constructed their reading of the Ottoman and Turkish history on state-society relations revealing this uniqueness.⁹

In Western Marxism, Perry Anderson's *Lineages of the Absolutist State* is worth mentioning regarding its formulations of the dynamics of the Ottoman social formation. Adopting a legal formulation concerning property status, Anderson concludes that the Ottoman social formation was determined by a despotic and non-feudal

⁸As an example of oscillation between the terms “ruling class” and “ruling elite” see: Rifa’at ‘Ali Abu El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, sixteenth to eighteenth centuries*, (Syracuse University Press, 2005), 12-13.

⁹Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century*, (London and Leiden: Brill, 1994); Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: a study on capitalist development*. (London: Verso, 1987).

state that impeded the development of private property on land.¹⁰ Anderson does not intensively refer to the Asiatic mode of production as a heuristic. Instead, he emphasises, albeit at the risk of reinforcing Orientalist stereotypes, the role of Islam and related religious institutions in forming the distinct ontology of the empire from the feudal states of the West.¹¹ Needless to mention many AMP theorists, including Anderson, developed their theories based on Barkan-İnalçık school's emphasis on the unique characteristics of the *miri* land regime, the purported freedom of Ottoman peasantry compared to European serfdom, and a legal-formalist understanding of (Western) feudalism compared to the *sui generis* character of the Empire.

Halil Berktaş (1987; 1989; 1992; 1992a)¹² stands out as an exceptional persona among the Ottomanists for his views about the nature of the Ottoman social formation. Berktaş argues that the Ottoman social formation was not totally separate from the basic tenets of the Marxist definition of feudalism. His critique of the conventional approaches addresses two main issues.

Firstly, he illustrates how the Ottoman-Turkish historiographical tradition diverged from Fuat Köprülü's liberal nationalism. Köprülü viewed Ottoman history through universalist lenses, in contrast to Barkan and his followers' particularism which reminds the German historical school of the nineteenth century in many respects.¹³ The divergence in the historiography towards a nationalist and statist particularism was an ideological byproduct of the context of sharp policy changes of the Republic in the 1930s and 1940s¹⁴, corresponding to the rise of fascism and then the Cold War.

Secondly, Berktaş tries to deconstruct the Stalinist doctrine of five successive stages in human societies, by delineating that slavery cannot be considered a universal mode of production. Instead, he suggests that slave mode was related to the unique spatiotemporal conditions of the Mediterranean basin. According to Berktaş, in many other regions of the world, the dissolution of primitive clan and tribal societies directly led to the emergence of feudal social relationships in an uneven, multilineal

¹⁰Perry Anderson, *The Lineages of the Absolutist State*, (London: NLB, 1974), 365.

¹¹Ibid, 375-376: "Islamic political traditions possessed no conception of urban liberties." If we accept that a set of ideas, a specific Islamic and/or patrimonial mentality exclusively dominates and shapes the sphere of social relations in the Islamic world, why do we insist on the explanatory strength of the Marxist framework? We should also underline "Marxist" Anderson's unpalatable choice of reading the "Islamic world" through Gibb and Bowen's well-known orientalist textbook. Bryan S. Turner, *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, (London: Routledge, 1978), 7-8.

¹²We should also mention Oğuz Oyan who espouses similar arguments with Berktaş, especially in his criticism of Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay's *Fodalite ve Osmanlı Toplumsal Düzeni*. See, Oğuz Oyan, *Feodalizm ve Osmanlı Tartışmaları*, (Ankara: İmaj Yayıncılık, 1998).

¹³Halil Berktaş, "The Search for the Peasant", 110-112.

¹⁴Ibid, 137-156.

fashion and varying tempos.¹⁵ His two interrelated assertions are: “i) a distinctive "Asiatic" mode of production does not exist; ii) Ottoman society in XV.-XVI. centuries cannot be thought separately from the feudal mode of production.”¹⁶ In a nutshell, Berktaş’s approach, to quote from Hobsbawm’s introduction to Formen, “resembles a formal revision of Marx’s list of socio-economic formations by omitting “Asiatic mode”, limiting the scope of the “ancient”, but correspondingly extending that of the feudal.”¹⁷

The conventional historiography, centred around the *sui-generis* character of the Empire, does not credit the analytical value of the concept of mode of production. On the Marxian side, however, the parties in the mode of production debate have reached an uneasy consensus with the introduction of the concept of “tributary mode of production” to the Ottoman studies by John Haldon (1993)¹⁸, originally a Byzantinist yet has much to say about the early Ottoman state and social formation.

The concept of tributary mode was not Haldon’s contribution to the field. Instead, it was revisited after the 1930s and gained popularity after being proposed by Samir

¹⁵Halil Berktaş, “The Feudalism Debate: The Turkish End”, 312. Turkish political left in general, was ardently following the well-known Stalinist-Soviet doctrine of five successive historical stages: An assumption that societies are universally destined to pass the stages of primitive communalism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism in a unilinear fashion. Historical TİP’s (Workers’ Party of Turkey) leader M. Ali Aybar and his follow-ers’ [İdris Küçükömer, Muzaffer Sencer, Sencer Divitçioğlu etc.] theses on Ottoman society were exceptional. Their theses drew a striking parallel with non-Marxist historians and sociologists in Turkey who were insisting that the Ottoman state was somehow a *sui-generis* formation, or was an example of Asiatic despotism. According to Aybar, the Ottoman state was oppressive in its nature. State apparatuses were often abused by the Ottoman bureaucratic caste who plundered the social welfare, thus blocking any possible development of social classes and productive forces that would lead to the development of capitalist market relations. In 1966, during TİP’s Congress of Malatya, these theses were harshly criticised by a fraction of party delegates, who were supportive of the formulation of the National Democratic Revolution. According to this perspective, the bourgeois revolution in Turkey was incomplete. An anti-feudal and anti-imperialist national democratic front composed of the intelligentsia (including the progressives from the civilian and military bureaucracy, and leftist students), national (milli) faction of the bourgeoisie (against the comprador bourgeoisie), poor peasants and the working class would primarily terminate the feudal or semi-feudal relations in Turkish countryside, which were the basis of Turkey’s dependency to the American Imperialism. At this stage, a socialist revolution would be utopic given the persistence of feudal relations and the development level of the productive forces in Turkey. See Rasih Nuri İleri, *Mihri Belli Olayı I*, (Anadolu Yayınları, 1976), 73-74. Moreover, TİP’s second leader, Behice Boran’s approach of “centralised feudalism” was incompatible with Aybar’s presumption of state/society *antagonism* in the Ottoman social formation, yet Boran maintained that Turkey had gradually become a capitalist country from the nineteenth century onwards. Therefore, formulations like the persistence of feudal and semi-feudal relations in the Turkish countryside were socially and politically irrelevant in the actual political struggle. See: Behice Boran, “Metod Açısından Feodalite ve Mülkiyet I” *Yön* 50 (1962) and idem. “Metod Açısından Feodalite ve Mülkiyet” *Yön* 51 (1962a). For the political context in which the Stalinists turned the idea of five stages into an unquestionable doctrine; see Joshua A. Fogel, “The Debates over the Asiatic Mode of Production in Soviet Russia, China and Japan.” *The American Historical Review*. 93 (1), (1988): 56-79.

¹⁶Halil Berktaş, *Kabileden Feodalizme*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1989), 12.

¹⁷Eric Hobsbawm “Introduction” in *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, (New York: International Publishers, 1964), 61; see also: Witold Kula, *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a model of Polish economy 1500-1800*, (London: NLB, 1976), 13.

¹⁸Galip Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009), 121 n.7. In fact, this concept was also used by Şevket Pamuk previously, more or less synonymously to the former conceptualisation of the Asiatic mode of production but not in a refined manner compared to Haldon’s revitalising contributions. Alp Yücel Kaya “Samir Amin’in Ardından Türkiye’de İktisat Tarihi Tartışmalarını Hatırlamak” *Mülkiye Dergisi*, 43 (2), (2019): 366-7

Amin (1976).¹⁹ Amin admits AMP's inadequacy in highlighting the internal dynamics, and class struggles within the social formations of the East, while also affirming the uniqueness of feudal Europe in its rapid transition to capitalism. Amin contends that in all forms of the tributary mode, production of use-values predominated over market relations (or production of exchange-values.) The surplus product was extracted from direct producers through extra-economic means, and religion served as the dominant ideology. Productive forces developed at a slower pace, and what forced the development of productive forces was fundamentally the class struggle between tribute payers and the tribute-collecting class.²⁰

While these common features are observed in various social formations across time and space, they alone cannot explain the rapid emergence of capitalism only in Europe. What was specific to European feudalism was the weaker super-structure, or to put more clearly, the fragmented sovereignty of the state, which triggered the expansion of market relations. Conversely, the excessively centralised tributary states of the East hindered the development of market relations by plundering the accumulated wealth of the urban trade networks thanks to their power capacities. According to Amin, as a slightly evolved, borderline or peripheral variant of the tributary mode, European feudalism was marked by a synthesis between the Roman heritage and Germanic-barbarian clan communalism which in turn, quite differently from the East, resulted in the dispersal of the political power, and thus a weaker central power. By medieval standards, this was a vulnerable and backward type of state, politically fragmented by the unending feuds between the members of the feudal aristocracy and the central authority.²¹

“The advantage of backwardness” is an oft-referred theme in “the transition debate” among Marxist scholars, particularly in the light of Marx's growing interest towards the Slavic peasant commune, *obshchina*, and its revolutionary potential for Russia, in the last decade of his life.²² Amin suggests in his formula that, as a peripheral and backward variant of the tributary mode, Western European social formations showed more flexibility towards the transition to capitalist relations. Decentralised

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Samir Amin. “Modes of Production, History and Unequal Development” *Science Society*, 49 (2) (1985): 203.

²¹Ibid, 206.

²²Eric Hobsbawm “Introduction”: 49-50; Theodor Shanin, “Marx, Marxism and the Agrarian Question: I Marx and the Peasant Commune”, *History Workshop* 12 (1981), 108-128. Economic and social backwardness and their revolutionary potential are also discussed by Trotsky in his 1905, and *The History of the Russian Revolution*. Marx's unit of analysis concerning the issue of backwardness was the prevalence of a specific form of property ownership, the Slavic peasant commune, which was not fundamentally related to the level of autonomy that the state allowed for market relations. Conversely, Amin's measure regarding backwardness is the state's inability to hinder the economic and political power of the nascent bourgeoisie.

feudal states of the West were relatively powerless to obstruct the emergence of economic-corporate autonomy of urban-mercantile classes. According to this view:

“What accounts for the development of capitalism in the West is the unique autonomy of its cities and their quintessential class, the burghers or bourgeoisie. In other words, capitalism emerged in the West less because of what was present than because of what was absent: constraints [of the state] on urban economic practices.”²³

We must underline here that Amin’s analysis of the development of capitalism in Europe the stagnation in the Eastern core of the tributary social formations, is based on a strict subject-object dichotomy in the relationship between the state, and society or economy.²⁴ Treating the state as an inherently repressive agency against the potentially authentic development of capitalist relations is, in fact, a trademark of the classical liberal school of thought.²⁵ Amin’s account, on the other hand, bears the marks of structuralist Marxism of the 1970s which emphasised “the relative autonomy of the political and ideological superstructure from the economic base” to break away from “economic reductionism” of the vulgar Marxism of Soviet textbooks. Accordingly, the state, where political and ideological domains of a social formation crystallise, may operate relatively autonomously from the economic control of the ruling class, by organising itself as a [political] ruling class. While this interpretation is crucial for developing a nuanced Marxist state theory without reifying the state into a mere instrument of the ruling classes’ economic interests, it is equally important to avoid attributing omnipotent power to the state, thereby reifying the society into an object of the state. Since the “relativeness” of the autonomy of the state is a qualitative attribute, it is quite challenging to stipulate “the nature, limits and determinants of that relative autonomy.”²⁶

To revisit Haldon’s emphasis on the concept of the tributary mode, we should underscore that he uses this concept interchangeably with or as a synonym of the feudal mode of production. His main objective in employing this concept is to more adequately represent what Marx had intended in his analysis of the feudal mode

²³Ellen Meiksins Wood. “Agrarian Origins of Capitalism” *Monthly Review*, 50 (3) (July-August 1998).

²⁴cf. Galip Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 29

²⁵We should remember that World-Systems thinkers, including Samir Amin, were famously criticised by Robert Brenner for revising Marxism in Smithian lines as they considered market relations the prime mover from feudalism to capitalism. Robert Brenner “The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism” *New Left Review*, No:104 (July-August 1977)

²⁶Fred Block, “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of State” *Socialist Revolution* 33 (6) (May-June 1977): 9. We will discuss the limits of state autonomy, as well as neo-Marxist contributions to state theory and how we can rethink these in the Ottoman context in our chapter on the timar system in the province of Zülkadiriye.

of production in comparison to other modes of production by breaking away from nineteenth-century vocabulary which had inevitably constrained Marx in setting out his ideas on non-European societies and their distinguishing features.²⁷ Secondly, he seeks to illustrate the web of “relationship between state structures, their personnel (state elites) and the relations of production in pre-capitalist social formations,” emphasising “how ‘autonomous’ can such states become, and under what conditions.”²⁸

Therefore, his object of analysis is the functioning of the pre-capitalist state formations and the limitations that feudal/tributary relations of production impose on the autonomy of the state elites and rulers’ actions. Haldon’s contribution is best understood through his debate (Haldon, 2013) with Jairus Banaji (2010), who underlines that locating historically specific and determinate “laws of motion” of modes of production is indispensable for a historical analysis that seeks a sensible balance between theory and historical complexity. Banaji argues that different economic processes between the producers and appropriators of surplus, and political configurations within the ruling class determined feudal and tributary societies, and thus, they cannot be subsumed under the same modal characteristic. He concludes that in the tributary mode (which he uses more or less synonymous with the Asiatic mode of production) the state has causal priority as a determining factor over the formation of economic, social and power relations.

We should also note Chris Wickham (1985) who argues that in all pre-capitalist social formations, tax and rent as primary forms of surplus appropriation that briefly represented tributary and feudal social relations coexisted in a contradictory manner. These contradictions were crystallised in the intra-ruling class conflicts for political centralisation and decentralisation. In other words, according to Wickham, the history of pre-capitalist social formations could be viewed as a constant struggle for dominance between the tributary mode of production, and the feudal mode of production. Wickham’s modal distinction between tax and rent, with the assumption that these two correspond to different modes of production, coexisting within pre-capitalist social formations and resembling a constant tendency to transform from one to the other, was sharply criticised by Halil Berktaş (1987). Berktaş underlines that since both forms necessitate “extra-economic coercion” as the only mechanism of direct extraction of the surplus labour of the peasants, tax and rent do not correspond to different modes of production but reflect the balance of power between the state centre and the local power holders at an institutional, and briefly,

²⁷John Haldon, *State and the Tributary Mode*, 10

²⁸Ibid, 16

superstructural level.

2.2 On Methodology: Predicaments of Conventional Approaches

Starting from Ömer Lütfi Barkan's works, which exemplified Rankean approach in his commitment to writing a "value-free" history through documentation²⁹, Ottoman-Turkish studies have long revolved around the theme; "particularity", emphasising the *sui generis* character of the Ottoman state and social formation. In addressing questions about the particularities of the Ottoman social formation, a comparative yet misleading framework was often adopted, juxtaposing the Ottoman land regime from Mehmed II to the late sixteenth century with medieval Europe of the early and high Middle Ages. However, taking "medieval Europe" as a unit of analysis for comparison has certain drawbacks. Spatiotemporal differences and variations in economic, political, legal, etc. structures of the pre-capitalist European social formations cannot melt in the same pot of the so-called medieval Europe. Therefore, the *ad hoc* solution was to compare the easily graspable external attributes of the historically specific entities to overcome this methodological problem. These external attributes include the legal-formal structures, the juridical and tenurial statuses of the tribute-paying subjects and the forms of surplus appropriation from the peasantry which were selected in a rather arbitrary manner.

Barkan's two chief criteria to distinguish Western European feudal organisations from the social relations in the Ottoman countryside were the prevalence of corvée in the agricultural economy and fragmented political and dynastic authority in the West, compared to the absolute power of the Ottoman sultans.³⁰ Therefore, the Ottoman social formation is seen as radically distinct from feudalism concerning its production relations, social classes, and material basis of political power.³¹ When

²⁹Halil Bertkay, "The Search for Peasant", 149-151; John Haldon, *State and the Tributary*, 159.

³⁰Ömer Lütfü Barkan, *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980), 828ff. In mainstream historiography, İnalçık has also equated feudalism solely to administrative decentralisation. See, Halil Bertkay, "The Feudalism Debate", 325 fn.13.

³¹For an early and neglected alternative to the formulations of the precursors of mainstream historiography: İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, *Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 152-153: "Osmanlı tarihinin toprak meselelerini tetkik ederken kurunu vusta Avrupasının toprak münasebetlerini mikyasa ve esas olarak almamız ve bizdeki münasebetleri bu mikyasa göre mütalea ederek Osmanlılarda feodalite veya bilmem hangi nizam vardı veya yoktu gibi dipsiz münakaşalara girmemiz semeresiz ve aldatıcı neticeler verir. Doğru neticelere varmak için Osmanlı cemiyetinin içtimâî çehresini, her şeyden evvel Osmanlı devrinin kendi şartları içinde ve müstakil olarak tespit ve tetkik etmemiz lazımdır. Halbuki tarihçilerimizin aşağı yukarı hepsi Osmanlı devrinin sınıf münasebetleri mevzuubahis olunca bu devirde tıpkı Avrupadaki gibi bir feodal cemiyet nizamının mevcut olup olmadığını araştırmışlar ve Osmanlı müesseselerinin kendine mahsus olan haricî vasıflarına aldanarak daima yanlış neticelere varmışlardır. Hattâ o derecede ki, bu yanlış neticeler onları Osmanlılarda bir zamanlar Avrupalıları bile gıptaya sevkedecek kadar dilâne bir sınıf ahengi yaşanmış olduğu kanaatine sürüklemiştir." See also: (Boran 1962) and (1962a).

the historical unit of analysis is considered a *sui generis* entity, there would be no need for an elaborate theoretical model or series of abstractions. A listing of numerous phenomenal facts for the sake of comparison would be adequate for the descriptive scope of the analysis.

According to Berktaş, compared to Fuat Köprülü's openness to recent developments in historical research, Barkan symbolised an intellectual regression in Ottoman-Turkish studies, despite his efforts of transcribing and translating countless amount of kanunnames, a complete defter, or daily records of a major construction site.³² Köprülü, however, was well aware of what "distinguishes the true historian from the traditional chronicler and constitutes a dividing line between l'histoire événementielle and modern synthetic history."³³ Following Bloch's definition of history as "above all the science of change" Köprülü's effort to comprehend "the historical development of society in motion" directly led him to the problem of choosing between "form and content, outside appearance and inner logic, (in terms of causal factors) between primary and secondary, internal and external" as a point of departure in his historical methodology.³⁴ His numerous studies on the social origins of religious sects in Anatolia or on the conflict between the state and the nomadic tribes reveal that he somehow accepted the validity of internal relations (i.e., class interests which do not necessarily expose themselves in the immediate appearance of the social phenomenon) as "precondition and result"³⁵ of the historical processes.

According to Berktaş, Köprülü's main premises were compatible with the ideological tendency of the 'French phase' of republican Turkey, which followed the ideas of Enlightenment universalism.³⁶ The subsequent, "Prussian phase" of the republic was marked by the liquidation of the intra-assembly opposition and external opposition from 1926 onwards. Coupling these political developments, an official doctrine

³²Halil Berktaş "The Search for Peasant", 150

³³Ibid, 142.

³⁴ibid.

³⁵Here, Berktaş chooses the term "determinants" of historical processes and mentions "the determination of the economic base in the last instance", reminding Althusserian-structuralist terminology, even though he claims at the very beginning of the essay that his critique of concrete empirical research does not mean that he follows Althusserian, theory. Following Bertel Ollman, *Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method*, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), I revised the term "determination" which denominates a cause-effect relationship, to "precondition and result" to underline "a double movement that processes in mutual interaction undergo in becoming both effects and makers of each other's effect simultaneously." (Ollman 2003, 71) This formula paves the way for a better understanding of the complexity of social relations, by discarding the infamous base-superstructure metaphor. However, if we follow Berktaş's "determination" formula, then "class" solely and misleadingly appears as an economically structured object in the technical process of labour, rather than an experienced process by real human subjects, incorporating economic, as well as political, ideological and cultural relationships. Halil Berktaş, "The Search for Peasant", 110, 142; cf. Galip Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 43, 115; G.E.M de Ste Croix, *The class struggle in the ancient Greek world: From the archaic age to the Arab conquests* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 32.

³⁶Halil Berktaş, "The Search for Peasant", 148.

of history emerged in the cultural scene. This doctrine negated the Ottoman past as a totally irrational and reactionary period, depicting the Ottoman sultans as usurpers of national sovereignty.³⁷ At the same time, aligned with the ambitions of the nation-building process, it also promoted nationalist sentiments. The Turkish Thesis of History, personally launched by Mustafa Kemal in 1928-30, presupposed a Central Asian ‘golden age’, when ancient Turks, before converting to Islam, had allegedly been reigning according to traits of freedom and egalitarianism since time immemorial.³⁸ From 1928 onwards, historical particularism, in terms of adherence to an extremist form of nationalism akin to racism began to dominate the officially supported historiographical discourse.³⁹ This trend continued until the conservative-modernists like Barkan took over in the late 1930s and 1940s. Subsequently, the paradigm of the Central Asian Golden Age shifted to the Ottoman Golden Age of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, emphasising the historical particularity of Turkish-Islamic civilisation.

Barkan’s articles can be considered instructive and introductory forewords of his publications of Ottoman documents, rather than comprehensive works of synthetic history. It is doubtful whether Barkan developed a proper methodology for the standards of contemporary historiography and applied it to his works. Lacking theoretical frameworks to aid him in classifying the elements and fragments of empirical reality in accordance to their primary, secondary, etc. importance, Barkan resorted to a naïve idea that the document speaks for itself; a pitfall of positivist-historicist approach. He seemed to believe that the more archival documents he transcribed, the more transparently the historical reality would reveal itself.⁴⁰

³⁷Halil Berktaý “The Search For Peasant”, 141; idem. *Kabileden Feodalizme*, 285-286. In fact, the depiction of dynastical rule as a period of tyranny and usurpation of old freedom of the people is a recurrent theme in the discursive arsenal of the bourgeois revolutions. French Revolution was depicted as the revenge of the Gallo-Romans against the Franks by the Jacobins, see Marc Bloch, *The Feudal Society: The Growth of Ties of Dependence*, (Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2004), 148; Mustafa Akdağ, *Türkiye Halkının Dirlik Düzenlik Kavgası: Celali İsyanları*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2013) reminds this line of approach in his depiction of the Celali revolts partly as a struggle between the Türkmens and the *değişirme* elite.

³⁸Halil Berktaý “In Search For Peasant”, 141.

³⁹Nevertheless, according to Berktaý, the official doctrine of Turkish history was rather encapsulating in its definition of Turkishness, in comparison to the exclusivist, racist ideology of Nazism.

⁴⁰Witold Kula’s critique of the conventional historians’ “ideographic conception of history” is valid for Barkanian mainstream historiography. However, the critique of document fetishism does not mean that theory is, by itself, a substitute for archival or primary sources. We should also highlight the dogmatic and vulgar tendencies of certain Marxists who excessively elaborated on the concept of mode of production at the expense of reducing the complexity of the social relations of production to the form of surplus appropriation through the infamous base-superstructure model. In fact, this tendency was no more than abstract historical formalism as Banaji puts forward. (Banaji 2010, 2; 52-53) In Kula’s words: “The elaboration of a theory requires first of all the construction of a model. . . Most historians do not recognize the need to construct a model, and every attempt in such direction surprises them and even calls for their indignation. The myth of history as a science of the concrete and of the non-recurring, the myth of history as a descriptive science concerned exclusively with the unique, not only has no relation to the problems of construction a model but is even adverse to the idea. This ideographic conception of history is not concerned solely with the interpretation of the facts; the same frame of mind determines all the elements and all the phrases of the historian’s work, beginning with the critique of the sources and selection of facts. Marxist science, although opposed in principle to ideographic history, in actual fact has frequently and

“Reinforced by empiricism and historicism, his inability to distance himself from his documentation evolves into an unquestioning identification with the judgments and ideological vantage point of his sources, which is that of the Ottoman state; consequently his own perspective becomes a fusion of ‘the Empire imagined by itself’, — the medieval ideology and self imagination that presume an uninterrupted harmony between social classes— and the ideological current of statist-nationalism of late 1930s well-known by its dictum of “Turkish society as an amalgamated mass without classes and privileges.”⁴¹

In a nutshell, Barkan’s legacy in Ottoman historiography cannot be understood independently from the political and ideological divisions shaping the modern Turkish historiographical genre: The tension between the two competing political agendas in republican Turkey, one being the paradigm of Westernist/liberal-modernism, the other, the modern-conservatives.⁴²

In fact, the difficulty of establishing a sensible balance between the particularities and the universal aspects of a historical social formation often manifests itself in the necessity of resorting to abstractions and conceptual frameworks. The researcher deconstructs the complexity of her/his object of analysis by using these heuristic mechanisms. Moreover, the researcher’s vantage point in approaching complex social/historical phenomenon determines her/his preferences in holding this or that element of the object of analysis is of primary, secondary, etc. importance for the study.⁴³ On the contrary, in Barkanian fashion, the researcher may refuse the pivotal role of abstract conceptual frameworks in establishing a historical inquiry and abstain from theoretical interventions to arrange elements of the real concrete in the thought concrete.⁴⁴ Barkan, by refusing the necessity of using abstractions and conceptual frameworks in works of history, maintains that

“the point that is particularly necessary for the historian, is not the broad similarities of the sociologist that are obtainable through succes-

unfortunately resembled this frame of mind in the past. The proposition, correct in itself, concerning the ‘concrete character of the truth’ understood in a dogmatic manner, has in fact made research into new laws impossible. . . If the elaboration of a theory is not a mere intellectual game, the premises taken as a whole must correspond to the existing conditions in societies under examination. Such a theory, once constructed, will be valid only in relation to the societies (known today or to be discovered tomorrow) in which the elements comprising our model are actually present. The more elements we introduce in the model, the richer will be the theory we construct; but the number of societies to which this theory could be applied will decline commensurately.” (Witold Kula 1976, 19-20)

⁴¹Halil Berktaş, “In Search For Peasant”, 150.

⁴²For a discussion of these two competing political agendas: Mustafa Bayram Mısırlı “Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyete: Kapitalizme Prusya Tipi Geçiş” *Praksis* 5 (2002): 217-255.

⁴³For the term “vantage point” see: Ollman, *Dance of the Dialectic*, 60-75.

⁴⁴Ibid. 60.

sive abstractions, but the specific forms assumed by general laws and directions of evolution under the influence of factors specific to time and place and of particular historical circumstances.”⁴⁵

A refined work of history seeks a sensible balance between the particular features of its object of analysis and its place within the universal context. However, when it comes to class relations, especially regarding the Ottoman peasantry and tribute payers, Barkan dismisses the validity of class analysis in favour of a particularistic perspective. His aim, in his words, was to avoid “the danger of ‘passing value judgments’ on Ottoman state and class system.” According to him, general conceptions of class exploitation and class struggle, apart from modern sociological categories, are no more than value judgments resting on the contemporary notions of justice and equality. Hence, applying these notions to the historical particularity of the Ottoman Empire would be irrelevant. Moreover, he believes, depicting the interaction between *sipahi* and *reaya* as an exploitative class relationship based on the personal subjection of the peasantry likewise the Western medieval feudal system would not be accurate for the standards of the historical inquiry claims to be objective.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, Barkan’s criterion of objectivity is open to debate. Although Barkan is widely known in the West for his Braudelian studies on Mediterranean-wide price and population movements, thus often taken as the representative of the Annales school in Turkey, according to Berktaş, Barkan’s approach differed from that of Köprülü and the Annales, showing similarities with Ranke’s ideas on history writing, particularly in the methodology he employed for studying land tenure and peasants in the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁷ Considered as the founding father of modern historiography, Ranke is severely criticised for blending his realism with theology, for precisely being an Idealist, or simply being an apologist for German imperial power.⁴⁸ Similarly, Barkan’s and his followers’ eulogy of the Ottoman Classical Age of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a golden age, a lost paradise representing perfect *class harmony* between the State and the peasantry, rather than a period of ongoing and recurring class conflicts in various forms⁴⁹ could be seen as an apology for the Ottoman state – especially, given the defensive tone of the Barkan-İnalçık school against nationalist and/or Marxist approaches of Balkan historians.⁵⁰

⁴⁵Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, 675; cited in Berktaş “In Search for Peasant”, 151-152.

⁴⁶Barkan, *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, 728; cf. Berktaş “In Search for Peasant”, 150-151.

⁴⁷Ibid. 150

⁴⁸Peter Gay, *Style in History*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), 61-62

⁴⁹Halil Berktaş “In Search for Peasant” 148-149.

⁵⁰Barkan, *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, 770; Halil İnalçık, “On the Social Structure of the Ottoman Empire:

Beyond the discursive baggage stamped by the statist nationalism of the 1930s, Barkan's state-centred approach owes much to Ranke, who presumed state power as the principal, if not sole, agent in history.⁵¹ Ranke's commitment to representing the past, "as it actually happened" through a systematic study of primary and secondary sources was methodologically doubtful, as the basis for gathering and assessing facts, and thus the reconstruction of historical reality was not independent of the researcher's vantage point.⁵² This initial vantage point is socially and politically determined as seen in Ranke's increasingly conservative turn in response to political upheavals and the rising German socialist movement of the nineteenth century. It is also accurate to assert that Barkan's approach reflects the cultural and political milieu of the 1930s and the Cold War.⁵³ The historians' choices in their studies whether to align with hegemonic approaches reflecting ruling-class ideology or to take a relatively non-conformist path are somehow constituted by their vantage points and vice versa.⁵⁴ Academic establishment in the discipline of history had been heavily shaped by the hegemonic ideas of the Westernist-modernist and modern-conservative cultural fractions of the ruling class in Turkey until Marxist theory with its various interpretations and rival schools started to exert influence on the literature in the 1960s, especially in the field of economic history concerning debates on the historical origins of underdevelopment and dependence of Turkish economy.

Previously, in the 1950s, as the Turkish academic establishment increasingly came under the influence of modernisation theory, historical and sociological endeavours started to revolve around questions regarding economic backwardness, the relative underdevelopment of the mechanisms of political participation in Turkey and the his-

Paradigms and Research" in *From Empire to Republic* (İstanbul: İsis Press, 1995).

⁵¹Gay, *Style in History*, 87-90.

⁵²Peter Blackledge, *Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 3; 23-24.

⁵³Concerning the historical context, we must particularly underline articles 141-142 in the old Turkish penal code regarding political activities based on class organisations, borrowed from fascist Italy, were detrimental to the development of Marxist studies in Turkish academia before the relatively liberal political context between 1961 and 1971, at least, in terms of the constitution.

⁵⁴For the pivotal role of "vantage point" in Marx's abstractions see (Ollman 2003, 101): "In the social sciences, the notion of vantage point is most closely associated with the work of Karl Mannheim. But for Mannheim, a point of view is something that belongs to people, particularly as organized into classes. The conditions in which each class lives and works provide its members with a distinctive range of experiences and a distinctive point of view. Because of their separate points of view, even the few experiences that are shared by people of opposing classes are not only understood but actually perceived in quite different ways. As far as it goes, this view-which Mannheim takes over from Marx- is correct. Marx's conception of point of view goes further, however, by grounding each class's perceptions in the nature of its habitual abstractions in order to show how starting out to make sense of society from just these mental units, within the perspectives that they establish, leads to different perceptual outcomes. In uncovering the cognitive link between class conditions and class perceptions, Marx helps us understand not only why Mannheim is right but how that he describes actually works. As part of this, point of view becomes an attribute of the abstraction as such (Marx speaks of the point of view or vantage point of accumulation, relations of production, money, etc.) and only secondarily of the person or class that adopts it."

torical origins of economic and political stagnation of the Ottoman Empire. Based on the discourse of a strict West-East dichotomy, it was surmised that the West surpassed its traditional economic and political forms through the emergence of free markets, notions of private property and individualism, and the strengthening of civil society vis-à-vis the state. In contrast, the East was hindered by the persistence of its traditional patrimonial structures (conservatism, religion, collectivism) and the despotic nature of the state (bureaucratic tutelage over the economy and civil society) which impeded the development of economic and political mechanisms resembling those of the West.

The impact of the modernisation theory, whose basic premises rested on structural-functionalism shaped around interpretations of the ideas of Weber and Durkheim, marked a “theoretical turn” for the future of Ottoman-Turkish studies. Since then, the purported stagnation and failed transition of the Ottoman social formation were increasingly associated with the persistence of the patrimonial structures, the strong state tradition rooted in the Ottoman past, Islamic culture and its authentic institutions, etc.⁵⁵ This theoretical shift seemingly meant a rupture from particularistic historical narratives like Barkan’s works which treated history and sociology as separate fields of knowledge. Yet, despite the theoretical background and comparative manner of these new approaches, Barkan’s interpretation of state-society relations in the Ottoman social formation remained largely untouched. The view of the Ottoman polity as *sui generis* was simply replaced by a negative emphasis on the historical and ontological uniqueness and distinctiveness of Near/Middle Eastern state-society relations in a broader spatiotemporal context, highlighting their static nature, inability to generate change and trigger a transition to capitalist relations compared to their Western European counterparts due to their intrinsic, ontological qualities.⁵⁶

Under the influence of the Weberian framework, Ottoman-Turkish studies have long overlooked the relevance of Marxist class analysis. Yet this did not mean that they completely lacked analytical tools to explain social processes and dynamics in the Ottoman context. Instead, they have favoured a top-down approach centred on an almost anthropomorphic view of the state, portraying it as capable of determining social processes centrally without facing significant societal restrictions or opposi-

⁵⁵For a summary of the theoretical origins and the critique of the paradigm of strong state tradition in Ottoman-Turkish studies: Demet Dinler, “Türkiyede Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisi” *Praksis* 9 (2003): 17-54.

⁵⁶For instance, while Barkan’s unit of analysis was an isolated image of the Ottoman Empire from the rest of the world, İnalçık’s effort was centred on establishing the place of the Ottoman state and society in Near Eastern traditions. In other words, as the modernisation theory gained currency in Turkish academic life, the geographic scope of the analyses was expanded to illustrate the shared histories of the East vis-à-vis the West.

tion. According to the proponents of this state-centred approach, in terms of the struggles between the owners and non-owners of the means of production, Ottoman history was nothing but a case of History of Absences.⁵⁷ Alternatively, they have emphasised the dynamics of intra-ruling class (or intra-elite) contestations, evident in the dynamics of court politics or the conflicts between the centre (the bureaucratic class of *kapıkulus*) and periphery (vaguely defined local power holders; tribal leaders, *mülk* and *vakif* owners, remnants of old Anatolian Beyliks.)⁵⁸ In this context, it is assumed that the main source of political power, and of the capability to sustain and reproduce it was the parties' proximity to and influence over the administrative apparatuses of the state. However, it is often glossed over that the entire political system was essentially shaped by social relations that enabled a small minority, who held the monopoly of fulfilling military and/or administrative functions, to appropriate and distribute the surplus product of the direct producers— masses of rural commoners who were mostly engaged in agriculture or animal husbandry. This explains why the literature on the peasant movements and rural revolts in the so-called Ottoman classical age, spanning from Sheikh Bedreddin and Börklüce Mustafa's rebellion of 1419 to the early sixteenth-century uprisings was relatively limited, compared to the significant scholarly attention to the *Celâlî* phenomenon of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁵⁹

As the focus of the historical research was narrowed down to the actions of the state elite, or briefly, to the state centre, whilst the surrounding societal factors like class relations and class struggles were dismissed, the distinctiveness of the Ottoman state was often explained in terms of the mental sets of its personnel, shaped by traditions, religion and culture. From this ontology-centred perspective, Islamic civilisation and culture, Near Eastern state traditions, and patrimonial values were

⁵⁷German Sonderweg historians' emphasis on the continuation of traditional forms of domination, their presumption of the lack of class struggles and bourgeois revolution in German history; and consequently, their depiction of German history as a History of Absences draws striking similarities with the mainstream Ottoman historians' views. For a critique of Sonderweg see Richard J. Evans, "The Myth of Germany's Missing Revolution" *New Left Review* I/149 (Jan-Feb,1985).

⁵⁸The concept of centre-periphery was applied to Ottoman history first by Şerif Mardin. It has turned out to be a cliché in conventional Ottoman-Turkish studies, particularly in dealing with instances of social turmoil. Mardin asserts that "Successive confrontations and co-optations (in the West) had important consequences. The confrontations had been varied: conflict between state and church, between nation builders and localists, between owners and non-owners of the means of production... In the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century, these characteristics of multiple confrontations and integration seem to be missing. Rather the major confrontation was unidimensional, always a confrontation between the center and the periphery." (Mardin 2006, 229) In this concise expression of the History of Absences, the centre refers to the state bureaucracy, and the periphery refers to a wide range of primordial groups in the provinces, i.e. from the nomads to turbulent religious sects, to pre-Ottoman nobility and powerful families. For a critique of the History of Absences and East-West dichotomy in social analysis, see: Galip Yalman *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 133-137.

⁵⁹Since the rise of the Celalis coincides with the impact of extra-societal and global dynamics; the price revolution, the Little Ice Age or the demographic crisis, historians dealing with the period could escape from the immediate questions about state-society relations and class dynamics of the Ottoman social formations.

key to understanding the Ottoman state and society. The state elites were mainly concerned with the maintenance of these, and they shaped the society accordingly.⁶⁰ In an alternative, but equally state-centred perspective informed by empiricism and inductivism of comparative historical sociology, the nature of the Ottoman state is discarded as the starting point in the analysis. Maintaining the states are merely institutional ensembles, and the state elites are rational profit maximisers within these institutional limits, the focus is shifted to analysing variations in institutional structures and comparing different methods of state-making in various historical-social formations affected by similar historical processes.⁶¹

In both perspectives, a top-down approach to state-society relations is self-evident. The Ottoman state is considered as the maker of the legal, political, economic etc. forms of social relations independent of the societal responses against the actions of the centre. In this broad perspective, the state and society (and social classes) are seen as distinct entities, implying that the sources of political power in the Ottoman state are not directly linked to social relations of production. According to this view, the state is believed to influence society from above, operating autonomously from social processes.⁶² Yalman based on a neo-Gramscian framework, attacks the conventional approaches by emphasising the indispensability of class analysis to develop a relational and historical approach to the relationship between the state and society. He argues against taking the state in a priori terms, underlining “the need to treat concepts like ‘the State’ as ‘empirically open-ended’ so as to come to terms with the relational and the historical character of social reality.”⁶³ He emphasises the constitutive roles of class power and class relations in social reality, including the state as a “form of social reality.” On the other hand, he distances his position from vulgar expositions which reduce social class merely to an entity defined at the level of the labour process and the state merely as a tool or apparatus that ensures the political domination of the exploiting classes.

Yalman’s insights about the relationship between the modern state and the bourgeoisie could also be informative for retrospectively reviewing the relationship be-

⁶⁰For instance, (Heper 1985); and (Mardin 2006) prefer to concentrate on questions regarding the ontology of the state and society. Albeit Marxian in its outlook, when it comes to questions regarding the non-European social formations, (Anderson 1974) too cannot escape from the ontology-centered and culture-centered presumptions.

⁶¹Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 50-1. In Ottoman studies, the main proponent of the empiricist comparative perspective inspired by Theda Skocpol is Karen Barkey, who compares the differences between Ottoman and French institutional structures and state-making vis-à-vis societal responses to monetisation of the economy and attempts of fiscal centralisation. (Barkey 1991) and (Barkey 1994, 8-15; 87)

⁶²Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 51-53

⁶³Ibid, 110-111; quoted from Phillip Corrigan, Harvie Ramsay and Derek Sayer, *Socialist Construction and Marxist Theory: Bolshevism and Its Critique*, (London: Macmillan, 1978), 9.

tween the pre-capitalist Ottoman state and the fief holders of all sorts: it was an internal relationship of mutual dependence, mediation and collaboration, rather than a contingent relationship of control and domination. What had shaped the class content of the Ottoman state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was the maintenance of social and spatial control over, and thus the exploitation of the rural commoners by the fief holders, and the redistribution of the surplus wealth of the direct producers among the fractions of the tribute-collecting classes. These measures encompassed economic processes and political, ideological, and legal-institutional forms of domination, as inseparable elements of a social formation.⁶⁴

2.3 Tribute-payers and Fief Holders in Conventional Ottoman Historiography

The dismissal of the analytical value of class analysis can be attributed to two prominent figures of Ottoman historiography: Ömer Lütfi Barkan and early Halil İnalcık. They argued that the Ottoman social formation did not align with a class society in the Marxian sense — a social formation based on the exploitation of the direct producers and reproduction of the mechanisms of exploitation. As mentioned earlier, Barkan believed that applying theoretical frameworks like Marxism to studies on Ottoman society would be futile due to the purportedly *sui generis* character of the Ottoman social formation. His analysis was confined to comparing the Ottoman case with medieval Europe in terms of apparent forms of exploitation, the presence of demesne labour or not, and briefly, the forms of agricultural organisation in the peasant economy.

On the other hand, İnalcık, influenced by the theoretical turn in Ottoman Turkish studies, was more willing to incorporate his empirical findings with theoretical frameworks, in an eclectic manner. He resorted to Weberian theory to avoid Marxist class analysis and instead proposed the usefulness of the concept of “status group” which, as discussed previously, is descriptive rather than analytical.⁶⁵ Regarding the peasant sector, İnalcık developed the *çift-hane* system thesis on the forms of organisation of the productive activity of the Ottoman peasantry, heavily influenced

⁶⁴Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 115: “For, as both Marx and Gramsci underlined the point, the class is not a phenomenon that can be confined solely to the economic instance, for the distinction between state and society, and for that matter between the political and the economic, is ‘methodological’ rather than ‘organic’, to use Gramsci’s terminology.” We will discuss these theoretical positions and contributions of Marxist state theory in more detail through a concrete historical case about the establishment of the Ottoman timar system in Zülkadiriye in chapter four

⁶⁵Halil İnalcık, “Comments on “Sultanism”: Max Weber’s Typification of the Ottoman Polity”; idem. *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*. (London, Phoenix 1994), 68-69

by Chayanov's theory of the family labour farm, and peasants' "self-exploitation", which is also descriptive in approach.⁶⁶

Barkan's historical analysis focuses on the organisation of the Ottoman state, which he believed had the authority to control and influence rural relations of production upside down, thereby shaping the power relations between peasants and *sipahis* according to a general "statist principle" uninterrupted.⁶⁷ His method, as mentioned, was based on "approaching the Ottoman empire on its own terms", which entailed a systematic study of Ottoman cadastral surveys, tax registers, general Sultanic law and provincial *kanunnames* as they were. He argued the centralised state, by monopolising the conduct of periodic tax registers and land surveys, and by its power to enforce the Sultanic and provincial law without being interrupted by centrifugal elements, such as local dynasties or feudal forces, has maintained the status of the peasantry as free taxpayers during the so-called classical age. At the same time, it kept the small, medium or large fief holders simply as replaceable state functionaries within a strictly supervised bureaucratic framework, i.e., as military officials without any economic and political class interest apart from being the representatives of the state in their localities. They also had no hereditary rights or power of private jurisdiction over the peasants. It was argued that those were foundational elements of Western feudalism, drawing a strong contrast to Ottoman society.⁶⁸ As Berktaş

⁶⁶ Halil İnalçık, "Village, Peasant and Empire" in *The Middle East and the Balkans in the Ottoman Empire: essays on economy and society* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) 137-160. For Chayanov's methodology and its critique from a Marxist perspective see Utsa Patnaik. "Neo-Populism and Marxism: The Chayanovian View of the Agrarian Question and Its Fundamental Fallacy. Part One". *Social Scientist*, 9 (12) (1981). It would not be wrong to assert that Chayanov's theory contributes to widening our scope to understand the contingent dynamics of pre-capitalist agricultural production in certain respects, for instance, concerning the impact of the demographic cycles on the level of self-exploitation of the peasant households in their productive activities. However, the fundamental problem in Chayanov's analysis might be summed up as follows: "Because Chayanov concentrates on the self-sufficient petty producer alone to the exclusion of all other real-life categories, anything in the nature of a relation of production simply does not exist in his work; certainly not relations within the peasantry (since by assumption this is a homogeneous set of economically identical family farms) and not even... the relation between the peasants and landlords." (Utsa Patnaik, 1981: 29)

İnalçık's approach, influenced by Chayanov, isolates the Ottoman peasants' productive activity from social relations, reducing pre-capitalist agricultural production to a simplistic relationship between a hypothetical peasant family and nature. In this narrow focus, he overly emphasises the reciprocal and collectivist aspects of pre-capitalist agriculture on a household basis while neglecting to address the exploitative relationship between peasant communities and those who appropriated the agricultural surplus, a crucial dimension of economic and social processes in the pre-capitalist epoch. Glossing over the external social relations of peasant households in this manner allows the author to present a *sui generis* model of peasant economy by avoiding debates about pre-capitalist modes of production and forms of exploitation. For a critique of Chayanov, also see, Zülküf Aydın, *Çağdaş Tarım Sorunu: Ekonomik, Politik ve Sosyolojik Kuramlar, Yaklaşımlar, Politikalar*, Ankara: İmge kitapevi yayınları, 2017, 55-67.

⁶⁷ Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Çiftçi Sınıfların" 739, 775: "işte biz imparatorluk içinde köylünün çiftini bozup bir başka yere gitmesini veya serseri gibi dolaşmasını men eden kayıtları böyle umumi bir devletçilik prensibi içinde manalı bulmaktayız."

⁶⁸ While the state's legal monopoly did not always guarantee the peasants' freedom in practice, fief owners' right of private jurisdiction did not necessarily undermine the peasants' de facto "status" as "free men." As Bloch underlined "Similarly, the north and north-east of England was long characterised by the degree of freedom enjoyed by its peasantry. Among the small cultivators many, while in general subject to the jurisdiction of the lords' courts, had the status of full free men; they could change their masters as they wished; they were accustomed in any case to alienate their lands at will, and altogether their burdens were lighter and more precisely fixed than those which weighed so heavily on some of their less favoured neighbours and indeed, outside the 'Danish' region, on the majority of peasants." (Bloch, 2004: 49). Legally

highlights:

“Fascinated by an Ottoman documentation that viewed all phenomena through the eyes of the central bureaucracy and gave an exaggerated picture of the state’s power and degree of actual control, Barkan, in the name of ‘approaching the Ottoman Empire on its own terms’, took all the legal-political forms at face value.”⁶⁹

This idealised view of the relations between the peasantry and fief holders led Barkan to assume that social relations as reflected and addressed in the Sultanatic or provincial law and day-to-day relationships between the rulers and the ruled were identical. These legal texts, reflecting the state centre’s point of view, were primarily concerned with preserving the traditional social barriers between the tribute-paying commoners (*reaya*) and the tribute-collecting military men (*askeri*).⁷⁰ As long as these elements fulfilled their prescribed social functions based on strictly fixed hierarchies, society was thought to display perfect class harmony.⁷¹ The natural consequence of this assumption is to equate feudalism with sporadic and extra-legal practices of the fief-holders, such as excessive tribute demands, against the rural commoners. As a matter of fact, such practices, which Ottoman state officials and chroniclers described as *zulm*, were seen as a tendency of degeneration against which the state constantly fought with the prospect of protecting the *reaya*. Here it is important to note that feudalism is falsely associated with the unlawful oppression of the peasantry and degeneration of the administrative system towards political decentralisation [derebeyleşme temayülleri] vis-à-vis the presupposed class harmony in the Ottoman society constituted according to, in Barkan’s words, “general statist

defined or juridical status cannot be a criterion for determining whether or not the peasants were free. Instead of reducing the concept of class to legal status, it would be more accurate to underscore whether the peasants were tied to the land, or otherwise. The basis of the pre-capitalist exploitation was the restriction of the peasants’ mobility, and their inability to discard their means of production as a free labour force, by a combination of political and economic means. In the Ottoman case, *resm-i çiftbozan* was, in practice, an unaffordable amount of levy for an ordinary peasant household. A peasant, who possessed a çift size of land, was fined 300 *akçes* for *resm-i çiftbozan*. For *nim-çift*, it was 150 *akçes*. For the peasant plots smaller than *nim-çift* it equaled 70 *akçes*. (İnalçık, 1959: 578). Moreover, the fief holders were entitled to collect fees and fines for criminal punishment and demand tribute for marriage. They also had monopolies over the usufruct of mills; fishing in the ponds and rivers within the borders of a timar, foraging wild berries, and harvesting honey from bee hives were subject to tithe demands.

⁶⁹Berktaş “In Search for Peasant” 153.

⁷⁰For these social divisions and their mutual responsibilities, Halil İnalçık “Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rüsümü” *Belleten* 92, (1959): 594-600.

⁷¹Barkan *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, 739: “İmparatorluğun kendisine mahsus gayeler ve zaruretlere karşısında tahakkuk ettirmiş gözüktüğü bu ahengli sınıf ve vazife taksimatında çiftçi sınıfların hisselerine düşen ağır mükellefiyetlerden kaçıp kurtulabilmeleri imkanını kaldırmak için raiyyet oğlu raiyyettir prensibi yanında reyalığı devlet teşkilatı içinde toğrağı işlemek mükellefiyetini hukuken ve bilfiil üzerine alan bir hukuku amme müessesesi her türlü hususi ve şahsi hürriyet ve mukavelenin fevkinde bir devlet işi olarak tanzim ediyor.” On the contrary, Berktaş underlines that “The Conventional formulae of the legalistic ruling class history” of the West-ern middle ages was also based on similar assumptions of “complementary and organic harmony of the social strata.” (Berktaş 1992, 124).

principle.”⁷² However, as an alternative formulation, it could be maintained that the state as a part of social relations of production, legally intervened in the relations between the tribute collectors and tribute payers to keep the rate of exploitation of the tribute payers within a sustainable limit for the reproduction of rural economy. These interventions did not indicate a state-peasant alliance, on the contrary, they were shaped in line with the long-term interests of the dominant class, even though the local fief holders’ power over the peasants was seemingly restricted.

Rather than delving into the analysis of the historical context of these exploitative transactions (social organisation of labour) which stemmed from the totality of the economic, political, legal-institutional and ideological dimensions of the social relations in Ottoman society, the conventional history writing confined itself with a comparison of a check-list of phenomenal facts concerning the classical type of manorial organisation in Western Europe during the early and high middle ages, and the Ottoman timar system of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In other words, the complexity of the social-historical reality is deduced into a prevalence of one single or a few dimensions of it, aside from the arbitrariness of the selection procedure of the units of comparison for analysis.⁷³ We have underlined the predicaments of this method in the previous subtitle.

To reiterate, the basic elements purportedly distinguished Ottoman society from classical Western European feudalism are as follows: a) In Europe, seignorial demesne farms, called *domaine*, *r serve*, or *manoir*, which were cultivated by dependent peasants for the fief owners’ benefit, were asymmetrically larger than the peasants’ independent family plots and possessions, called manse or tenure. As a result of this asymmetry, and also of the scarcity of agricultural labour force, it became common for peasants to pay their tributes in the form of labour rent (*corv e*)

⁷²Barkan, *T rkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, 757.

⁷³ mer L tfi Barkan, *H davendig r Livası Tahrir Defterleri*, (Ankara: T rk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları 1988), 95: “Tarımsal ve sosyal m nasebetler d zeni olarak sipahi tımarının  zelliklerini belirtebilmek i in, onu Orta  ađın ilk yarısında Batı Avrupa memleketlerinde klasik  ekliyle ortaya  ıkmıř olan “feodal” rejimin *seny r malikaneleri* ile karřılařtırmak yerinde olacaktır.” Barkan does not specify the reason why he does not choose to compare the Ottoman timar with the forms of agricultural organisation in Western Europe during the late medieval and renaissance periods marked by a certain degree of monetisation in the overall economy and increasing centralised powers of the kings vis- -vis the feudal aristocracies. If he had followed this path, he could not have fallen into subjective judgements such as that the Ottoman peasants were freer, more prosperous, etc. than those in Europe. On the contrary, he could have emphasised the common aspects between the rural rebellions that broke out in European feudal social formations during the late Middle Ages, many of which had religious overtones, and such rebellions in the Ottoman Empire, which started from 1419 and lasted until 1526-27. Moreover, he could have developed a universalist rather than a particularist perspective within the notion of rural oppression shared in different social formations in the same periods. For an agenda and fundamental questions to be asked for a comparison between Ottoman society and Western European feudalism, cf. Ođuz Oyan, *Feodalizm ve Osmanlı Tartıřmaları*, (İmaj Yayıncılık: Ankara 1998), 58-9: “Batı Avrupa feodalizminin temel kurucu unsurlarını ayırdelemek gerektiđinde, a) onun belirli bir ařamasını ve onun  zelliklerini saf/katkısız kabul edip feodalizmi tanımamızı bununla mı sınırlandıracadıř, yoksa b)  eřitli ařamaların bir arada bulunması olanaksız g rece  zerk  zelliklerinin keyfi bir bileřimini mi se ip alacadıř, ve nihayet, c) t m bu ařamalara ortak olan  z m   ekip  ıkarmaya  alıřacadıř?... T rkiye  rneđinde... aydınlarmızın, feodalizm konusundaki bu lanıklık ortamında, bilinđli/bilinsiz genellikle ikinci yolu se erek tarih dıřı bir feodalizm tanımına savruldukları g r lebilmıřtir.”

by working on demesne lands in certain periods, as a feudal duty they owed to their overlords. The feudal economic organisation primarily rested on agricultural production in demesne farms. The role of scattered petty peasant household farms in the overall agricultural organisation was negligible. b) Administrative roles and military power of the fief owners grew at the expense of the kings' authority, leading to the restriction and disintegration of central authority. Fief owners also had the right to divide their lands among other vassals by delegating military and administrative duties without obtaining their overlords' consent. c) There was no uniform legal system regulating the organisation of agricultural production and labour, the relations between peasants and fief owners, the transfer of land, and taxation procedures. Additionally, fief owners mostly held personal juridical authority over the peasants. Overall, all these rights of the fief owners were hereditary, rendering the direct intervention of the central authority in the relations between the fief owners and peasants less significant. Kings' authority over their vassals and lesser fief holders became procedural and nominal.

According to Barkan and İnalçık, the Ottoman conquests in the Balkans paved the way for an anti-feudal transformation in the region because the Ottoman Empire abolished the corvée obligations imposed on the peasants by local lords and introduced a briefly monetised and standardised taxation system.⁷⁴ Also, by eliminating the political fragmentation in the Balkans and Anatolia into petty states and principalities, and installing a centralist-bureaucratic administration, the Ottomans briefly abolished local customs and laws. These developments coupled with a unitary legal system that regulated the relations between the fief-holders and peasants in favour of the latter.⁷⁵ Although the demesne farms [hassa], which could be considered to be a feudal remnant, continued their existence in the *sipahi* fiefs, they have lost their importance in terms of their role in the agricultural organisation. The state prevented the expansion of these demesne farms at the expense of peasants' household farms.⁷⁶ In a similar vein, although practices such as *çiftbozan resmi*, which

⁷⁴Barkan, *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, 769-70; 832-33; Halil İnalçık, "Balkanlarda Osmanlı Fetihlerinin Sosyal Koşulları" *Adam Akademi* 1 (2011) 1-10. Here it seems that the authors incorrectly identify the feudal form of exploitation with labour-rent. Authors who identify agricultural payments in kind, such as share-cropping, seen in the peripheral countries in the twentieth century with feudalism or semi-feudalism, also make a similar mistake. For a criticism of views that reduce feudalism solely to the form of surplus appropriation, Rodney Hilton, "Introduction" in *The Transition From Feudalism to Capitalism*, (Verso 1985), 9-30.

⁷⁵Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, 127; 730ff., idem. *Hüdavendigâr Livası* 24-26, 97; Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire, the classical age*, 73-4; cf. Berktaş "In Search for Peasant," 155-8. However, both Barkan and İnalçık stress that the Ottoman state pragmatically preserved local customs and laws in distant and newly conquered regions such as Hungary, Zülkadiriye or Kurdish provinces, as a concession to the regional power holders to win their support. The Ottomans also ratified their hereditary rights of landhold-ing. It seems the so-called Ottoman "bureaucratic centralism" and its manifestations, i.e., unified laws, codifications and practices, were valid only in some of the provinces conquered until Mehmed II's death.

⁷⁶Barkan, *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, 879-80; idem, *Hüdavendigâr Livası*, 96.

restricted peasants' spatial mobility akin to the restrictions imposed on feudal serfs, and marriage tax [resm-i arus] could be reminiscent of feudal relations, collection of these dues were strictly controlled by the centralist structure of the state as these taxation procedures had never been transformed to personal rights of the fief holders but remained as bestowed revenue sources to the fief-holders directly by the centre.⁷⁷ Finally, the fact that villagers complaining about the illegal practices of the *sipahis* could freely appeal to the *kadi* courts should be considered evidence of a state-peasant alliance against the interests of the fief owners.

The methodological mistake of Barkan-İnalçık school in approaching feudalism and contrasting it to the Ottoman society is that “when discussing European feudalism and the Ottoman system of state and society,” they “select the most decentralised ‘medieval’ phase of European history and compare it with the Ottoman Empire in its most ‘centralised’ stage, that is, in the shape it took on during the Süleymanic period.”⁷⁸ They also fall on deaf ears to novel approaches to medieval European society and economy since Marc Bloch’s contributions to the field. Berktaş succinctly explains starting from Marc Bloch’s studies on medieval French rural society, how generations of medieval historians and economic historians, not all of them were Marxists, dismissed the conventional formula of feudalism: Large seigneurial demesne plus compulsory labour.⁷⁹ Previously, the lords were considered “private estate managers” and, the peasants were characterised as serfs; restricted in a legal categorisation between Roman slaves and free petty agricultural producers, owing labour services to their overlords and personally dependent on their lords like quasi-slaves. In this respect, the manorial estate of the feudal age was also held to be a degenerated continuation of Roman *latifundium*. The disintegration of the Carolingian Empire adds “fragmentation of sovereignty”, as the third pivotal element to the classic formula.⁸⁰ In fact, this idealised depiction that shaped the traditional perspectives on feudalism emanates from the manorial records [polypptyques] of large ecclesiastical and secular estates of Île-de-France from the ninth century onwards.⁸¹ Bloch challenges these assumptions by exhibiting that traditional scholarship rests on very few *polyptyques* remaining from the inventories of

⁷⁷Barkan, *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, 834-5, idem, *Hüdavendigâr Livası*, 104.

⁷⁸Suraiya Faroqhi “In Search of Ottoman History” in *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, ed. Halil Berktaş and Suraiya Faroqhi, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992a), 215. Such a view identifies the feudal mode of production with the institutional forms familiar to the decentralised phase in West-ern Europe, especially in Capetian France.

⁷⁹Berktaş “In Search for Peasant,” 125-132.

⁸⁰Large demesne-corrée-fragmented sovereignty trio, the pre-Blochian notions of feudal society, is the ground on which Barkan and İnalçık compare the Ottoman rural society and “bureaucratic centralism” of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with the “feudal West.”

⁸¹Berktaş “In Search for Peasant,” 121-2.

large seigneuries, which were inevitably one-sided in their focus on the agricultural organisation of large demesne lands. There was no comparable document from small and medium-sized seigneuries exhibiting the agricultural organisation in their presumably smaller demesnes. More importantly, the role of peasant holdings in the medieval economy was completely overshadowed by silence for both seigneurial documents were exclusively concerned with demesnes and that the peasants were mostly unable to produce written documents to exhibit their own experience. In any case, the demesne lands were surrounded by countless small peasant possessions, whose role in the economic organisation of the feudal society was glossed over by traditional scholarship. Bloch's novelty in the field is that by breaking away from technical and legal definitions of peasants' statuses stemming from the Roman law and refusing to take the depictions in *polyptyques* identical to the actual organisation of the medieval rural economy, he focuses on the independent peasant household and reconstructs the role of the lord mainly as a tax-rent collector.⁸²

Still, one question remains unanswered regarding the comparison between the Ottoman social formation and the determining aspects of the feudal social structures of the West. The feudal lords had jurisdictional rights over their subject populations, which included the right to try the peasants and to collect criminal dues and fines. These rights were further expanded to the lesser knights, most likely as a part of a trend of commutation of labour services starting from the eleventh century.⁸³ According to Rodney Hilton, lordly rights of private jurisdiction and collecting judicial fees and fines should be counted as a part of the feudal relations of production, along with seigneurial monopolies over the use of mills, ovens and wine presses, contrary to the schematic depictions of law as a part of the social superstructure.⁸⁴ In the Ottoman context however, although the fief holders (*sipahis*) were entitled to the right to collect criminal fees and fines [registered as *bad-i heva*], marriage tax [resm-i arus] and profited from the usufruct of certain monopolies such as mills [resm-i asiya], they did not have private jurisdictional rights over the rural tribute payers. Instead, centrally appointed kadis fulfilled this function under religious and customary law. So, the following question needs an answer: Did kadi justice serve as an institution that decisively established a state-peasant alliance against the timar holders?

In conventional Ottoman studies the idea of class harmony, more of a legal fiction reflecting the Ottoman state's official discourse, has been exaggerated to imply an organic solidarity between the state and the direct producers in Ottoman society.

⁸²Berktaş "In Search for Peasant," 126. See also, Oyan, *Feodalizm ve Osmanlı Tartışmaları*, 94-5.

⁸³Hilton, "Introduction," 16-17.

⁸⁴Idem, *Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism*, 3.

Barkan and İnalçık's depiction of the Ottoman polity as an entity *sui generis* has further been supported by the existence of the state monopoly on judicial functions.⁸⁵ Accordingly, the *kadi* courts tied the provinces directly to the centre's will. Additionally, the state's capacity to conduct periodic land surveys and tax registers by centrally appointed officials along with *kadis*, bolstered the central control over the allocation of revenue sources, preventing the emergence of a hereditary blood nobility in the localities. Both *kadis* and centrally appointed surveyors were considered immune to the landed interests of the local *sipahis* or other high-ranking officials. The proper functioning of the *kadi* courts and the periodically conducted surveys also ensured the peasants' status as free tenants of the state. According to such narratives, if there had been injustices against the peasants in provincial courts or the assessment of taxes and tithes, these were only sporadic cases and instances of personal corruption of the *kadis* or the other local officials, rather than indicators of a structural conflict between classes.⁸⁶ Therefore these state-centred perspectives have tended to gloss over the class context, and thus the influence of the asymmetry in the power relations between these classes on the decisions of the local *kadi* courts and on the processes of tax collection. "The tendency to focus on the state and its interaction with provincial society and then explore the courts from this perspective disregards the realm in which courts and the society interacted with relative independence from external forces."⁸⁷

Nevertheless, many contemporary Ottomanists including İslamoğlu-İnan (1994) and Barkey (1994) have limited their analysis to exploring the functional role of the *kadi* courts in legitimising the Ottoman regime in the eyes of the peasants.⁸⁸ However, based on the evidence gathered from the court records of Kastamonu and Çankırı from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ergene argues that the balance of

⁸⁵cf. Berktaş, "In Search for Peasant," 155.

⁸⁶For instance, (Barkan 1988, 31-32) emphasises personal incompetence and corruption of the officials as the chief reason for the grievances against a cadastral survey in the province of Rum in the 1570s. However, the expropriation of the peasants was not a novel practice or a sporadic act of personal corruption, in fact, it was prevalent. See: M. A. Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972): 22-5.

⁸⁷Boğaç A. Ergene, *Local court, provincial society and justice in the Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu (1652-1744)* (Leiden/Boston: E. J. Brill, 2003), 2-3.

⁸⁸İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire*, 6-7; Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 102-107; cf. Boğaç A. Ergene, *Local court, provincial society*, 99ff. İslamoğlu's approach is particularly interesting yet anachronistic since she somehow employs Gramsci's concept of hegemony to explain the legitimising function of *kadi* justice. However, I think, the concept of hegemony is valid for the context of the nation-state in which the personnel of the state bureaucracy is on paper, recruited from all the segments of the society; state officials and bureaucrats are not a privileged caste in terms of immunity from taxation, and most decisively, the state presents itself as the pursuer of the national-popular interests independent of the social class divisions and class interests. No nation-state claims to be a "bourgeois state." However, pre-capitalist states had no such claims; theoretically, the state belonged to the ruler or the members of his dynasty and, in practice, functions of the state were monopolised by a privileged social segment, first and foremost with immunities from paying taxes and tributes. cf. Huri İslamoğlu "Peasants, Commercialization, and Legitimation of State Power in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia" in *Ottoman History as World History* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2007)

power in these courts, although peasants enjoyed a certain degree of bargaining power with the state and ruling classes through these mechanisms, actually favoured of the military elite, local notables, title holders who could exploit their political influence, and townspeople who could afford the litigation costs.⁸⁹ Moreover, peasant communities were prone to rely on their independent mechanisms for dispute resolution.⁹⁰

Ergene's conclusions may well be generalised for the early sixteenth century: The socio-economic backgrounds and residential affiliations of the litigants mattered not only in the decision-making of the provincial courts but also in the larger framework of dispute resolution. Specifically, Ergene's conclusion on the class nature of the functioning of the *kadi* justice may also be valid for the disadvantageous class position of the peasantry in the processes of tax assessment and vis-à-vis the tax assessors and *sipahis*.

In conventional accounts, we often encounter an anthropomorphic conception of the state, depicted with its ability to intervene in the immediate relationship between the peasants and *sipahis* through its legal network, acting as a conscious agent operating strictly around the notion of 'adl, thereby in principle, protecting the peasantry against injustices ("mezalim" in official discourse) of small, medium or large fief holders equally.⁹¹ İnalçık has preferred to expound the Ottoman state's rationale of protecting the peasantry with reference to Near Eastern State traditions formulated in the *nasihatname* literature as the notion of the Circle of Justice [daire-i adliyye].⁹² Arab-Persian (Sassanid) principles of politics were undoubtedly influential in Ottoman state-making and bureaucratic rationale but this was not the whole story. It would not be realistic to gloss over the universal features of the pre-capitalist states in their social and economic evolution.⁹³

⁸⁹Boğaç A. Ergene, *Local court, provincial society*, 66-75

⁹⁰Ergene, *Local court, provincial society*, 177-183; an interesting point here is the unofficial mechanism of trial by the members of the peasant community called "Görgü Cemi" among the Alevis. Equally important was probably the role of rural shrines and dervishes respected by the peasant and nomadic communities in dispute resolution. As Faroqhi suggests the peasants and nomads, who constituted the backbone of the Kızılbaş movement often sought organised support around rural shrines. Suraiya Faroqhi, *Anadoluda Bektaşilik*, (İstanbul: Simurg, 2003): 24-25; see also Barkey *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 123-132.

⁹¹Halil İnalçık "State and Ideology under Sultan Süleyman I" in *The Middle East and the Balkans in the Ottoman Empire: essays on economy and society*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993): "Zulm, which means "injustice" in modern and Ottoman Turkish, was used in Ottoman administrative terminology to describe illegitimate taxation and excessive violence committed by local military and administrative officials. There are numerous orders preserved in the sicils sent to prevent these kinds of actions. These orders were usually drafted in response to personal, written complaints of the taxpayers." Also see: (Ergene, 2003: 37)

⁹²Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire, the classical age*, 65-75; Berktaş, "Three Empires and the Societies They Governed," 243.

⁹³Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Toplumsal Düzeni*, (Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 1994): 244-246.

As Berktaý succinctly puts it, the alleged influence of the Cycle of Justice on the formation of Ottoman bureaucratic mentality does not prove that the Ottoman polity was an entity *sui generis*. On the contrary:

“the state’s claim to provide ‘protection’ and ‘justice’ . . . was a rather universal form which simultaneously sought to sanctify existing social hierarchies (for the West: the theory of ‘the three orders’; for the East: ‘The Cycle of Justice’) and to *safeguard an average rate of exploitation that would not exhaust the capacity for reproduction of the peasant economy*.”⁹⁴

The crux of the matter here is that conventional as well as many of the contemporary approaches to Ottoman social formation are prone to euphemise the class character of the Ottoman state by emphasising the influence of particular political and ideological forms (external attributes) in state-making which are seemingly centred around the principle of protecting the peasantry against the abuses of the fief owners, officials, etc.⁹⁵ Needless to mention, such analyses misleadingly presume a clear-cut boundary between the state and society in practice. As Ollman suggests, in social analysis those operating in accordance with *the philosophy of external relations*, quite misleadingly “take the boundaries as given in the nature of reality as such, as if they have the same ontological stature as the qualities perceived.”⁹⁶

It would be accurate to maintain that the tendency of the contemporary state-centred Ottoman historiography to depict the Ottoman state as an “intentional embodied causally efficacious agency with a capacity to create and/or subordinate class interests”⁹⁷, not only resumes Barkan’s presumption of “an organic unity of the interests of the peasant and the state”⁹⁸ but also stems from İnalçık’s great emphasis on the Circle of Justice to illustrate the particular bureaucratic rationale of the Ottoman state. If we follow these approaches,

“the state in question would appear as an organic entity whose institutions have grown with and out of the nation in the course of centuries, rather than being conceived as artefacts that were constructed as a result of human activity. In as much as the traditional view would oblige

⁹⁴Berktaý “Three Empires and the Societies They Governed”, 252.

⁹⁵Berktaý, “The Feudalism Debate,” 294.

⁹⁶Ollman, *Dance of the Dialectic*, 71.

⁹⁷İslamođlu-İnan, *State and Peasant*, 2-3. Although Barkey seemingly questions the ‘intentionality’ of the state, she still operates within a paradigm that assumes the state is a causally efficacious agency. (Barkey, 1994: 26ff). For the critique of this paradigm on theoretical grounds: (Yalman 2009, 121-129) in the same vein but on empirical grounds (Ergene 2003, 99-134).

⁹⁸Berktaý, “In Search for Peasant,” 149.

the state to be primarily concerned with the maintenance of the existing social hierarchy, it would have an elective affinity with the organic theories of state and/or society which had a long pedigree from Plato to the Middle Ages, and were generally appropriated to legitimise the inequalities, in Weberian terms, between different status groups on the grounds that they are in conformity with the principles found in nature.”
99

We should also underscore that the theoretical influence of the neo-Weberian formulations asserted by Michael Mann, Theda Skocpol and their followers aimed at “bringing the state back in” to a central place in explanations of policy and policy formation, distinguishes İslamoğlu-İnan’s and Barkey’s historical viewpoint from simply being followers of Barkan’s and İnalcık’s historicist orthodoxy. Put frankly, Barkey’s research question is methodologically biased in its standpoint: “Why did Ottoman peasantry not engage in rebellious activity on their own or in alliance with other groups?”¹⁰⁰ Her major goal was to show how effectively the Ottomans regulated social classes to prevent their possible rebellion.¹⁰¹ By taking the model of state development in Western Europe about the 1500s and the societal resistance in response to the centralising state (especially the French case)¹⁰² as an ideal type, Barkey concludes that compared to Western Europe, the Ottoman Empire was a totally distinctive case for its relative lack of peasant or elite challenges to state consolidation. Instead of peasant rebellions, what was often encountered in Ottoman Anatolia was nothing more than sporadic acts of banditry, which were readily engulfed by the mechanisms of bargaining and incorporation that the Ottoman state-making offered.¹⁰³

In line with the Weberian framework, Barkey prefers to define the distinctive nature of the Ottoman state as a patrimonial structure resulting in a prebendal (against feudal) structure of state-society relations. This unique combination of social structure and state action, on the one hand, hindered the emergence of any collective action of the elites or the peasantry against the state; on the other, was able to deter the possible class alliances between them, by creating strong patron-client ties

⁹⁹Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 137-138. For Aristotle’s conceptualisation of the state as an organism and its links to Romantic conservatism through Hegel, see, Martin Jay, *Marrxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 25-27

¹⁰⁰Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 11.

¹⁰¹Ibid, 19.

¹⁰²For her comparison of France and the Ottoman Empire see: Karen Barkey, “Rebellious Alliances: The State and Peasant Unrest in Early Seventeenth-Century France and the Ottoman Empire” *American Sociological Review* 56 (6) (1991), 699-715.

¹⁰³Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 7-8.

and organised community relations in favour of the state itself.¹⁰⁴ Principally, state control was established by imposing periodic rotation of regional offices; this mechanism further rendered the horizontal ties within the local community weaker whilst improving the vertical channels of connection between the centre and periphery.¹⁰⁵ As seen in most state-centric approaches, Barkey prefers to talk of the state in a priori terms by stressing that the Ottoman state resembled “a strong patrimonial-bureaucratic form with a specifically Near Eastern and Islamic cultural meaning.” While its patrimonial aspect ensured the absolute authority of the sultan over his subjects, its bureaucratic aspect extended the absolute authority of the sultan over the vast territories of the empire through a complex set of administrative means whose ideological essence was the notion of “the reign of justice within a circle of equity.” Moreover, the notion of the circle of equity¹⁰⁶ (or circle of justice) as a general bureaucratic rationale, also provided the major counterbalance to the absolute authority of the sultan.¹⁰⁷

The Ottoman bureaucratic structure was characterised by two separated chains of command composed of separate bodies of judicial (and religious) -administrative (ilmiye class; *kadi*) and military-administrative (askeri class; *sipahi*, *subaşı*, *sancakbeyi* and *beylerbeyi*) cadres in the provinces. According to Barkey, and also for İslamoğlu-İnan, among these two branches, the *kadi* courts had the pivotal role in fulfilling the legitimating concern of the state.¹⁰⁸ *Kadi* courts served for

“the legitimating concern of the state that was expressed through the paternalist idiom premised on a pervasive belief that the state rules approximated to good and just order, were the institutions that made possible the recourse to the ruler’s justice by all.”¹⁰⁹

Barkey and İslamoğlu-İnan maintain that the Ottoman centre did not meet major political and ideological challenges from the peasantry before the nineteenth century and the reason behind the absence of such challenges was the ability of the provincial

¹⁰⁴Ibid, 11-13.

¹⁰⁵Ibid, 26.

¹⁰⁶Ibid, 27.

¹⁰⁷Ibid, 28.

¹⁰⁸Ibid, 39; İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and Peasant*, 6-7.

¹⁰⁹İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and Peasant*, 6. However, it is possible to draw a more realistic picture of the *kadi* justice: “. . . since it was part of a *kadi*’s official duties to judge complaints and if necessary, pass them on to Istanbul, the documents at hand tend to reflect a biased picture. Probably the composition of letters of complaint addressed to the central administration provided many *kadis* with opportunities to pose as protectors of the *reaya*, even though in real life, they were no less rapacious than the governor’s men.” Suraiya Faroqhi, “Political Activity Among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanate Legitimation (1570 - 1650)” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 35 (1) (1992):17.

courts to administer justice with relative fairness.¹¹⁰ However, as Ergene underlines:

“the main problem with this position is that it is a logical deduction and not a historical observation, and it will remain so until these historians accomplish the difficult tasks of not only demonstrating that the courts in Anatolia satisfied most of their clients by dispensing justice fairly but also of proving that this satisfaction generated a continuous popular support for the regime.”¹¹¹

As we mentioned before, since Weber’s ideal types and the real concrete do not necessarily correspond, Weberians have to move from theory to empirical investigation to illustrate the validity of their a priori assumptions about the state as an independent causal actor and its autonomous capability to influence social relations through its institutional mechanisms.¹¹² Hence, Barkey pursues evidence for her assumptions by analysing an exhaustive collection of court records [kadı sicilleri] from Saruhan and İslamoğlu-İnan conducts an extensive study of the Ottoman fiscal records of the province of Rum. This approach carries defects of the positivist methodology in its commitment that the more factual evidence based on the documents is exposed the more accurately could the historical reality be reconstructed. Resting on a pool of documents, such as *sicils*, prepared directly by the state officials, thus reflecting the state’s perspective, they inevitably accept from the very beginning of the induction process to be biased from the vantage point of the state. Apart from these reservations, we, as readers, do not know whether this collection of documents was gathered eclectically by excluding the exceptional cases that could undermine the validity of their generalisations about state-society relations. For example, in the famous trial record of Oğlan Sheikh, we hear what Oğlan Sheikh had preached only in a summarised (and possibly distorted) version through the statements of the Sunni-orthodox ulema and probably the other complainants and witnesses.¹¹³ It seems that the state officials’ chief concern was prosecuting and eliminating a heretic, who was likely to provoke the subjects to a rebellion, as soon as possible, rather than distributing justice. It is possible to encounter such legal cases in which evident power inequalities between the defendant and complainant parties produced similar results.

¹¹⁰Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 103; İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and Peasant*, 9-10; cf. Boğaç A. Ergene, *Local court, provincial society*, 3.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 53.

¹¹³Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler yahud Dairenin Dışına Çıkanlar*, 15.-17. *Yüzyıllar*, (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları 2013), 335-341.

Therefore, contrary to the top-down approaches with a priori assumptions about the nature of the state and its institutions, Ergene's alternative approach which takes into account the possible impact of the power relations between the litigant parties on the decisions of the *kadi* courts paves the way for further analyses prone to leave the state and its institutional mechanism empirically open-ended. This line of approach may also lay the ground for understanding the social relations of the so-called classical age from the perspective of the subaltern, rather than retreating to a repetition of the basic pillars of the state-centred ideology of the state-officials of the period, presented and resurrected into the present-time under a state-centric theoretical disguise.

2.4 Marxist Debates on Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production: General Perspectives and the Ottoman Context

Given the conflict-ridden nature of the rural social relations, the rural revolts of early sixteenth-century Anatolia would have constituted a highly illuminating starting point for the Marxist researchers who sought to analyse the class character of the Ottoman state and society. However, the debates within the Marxist circles in Turkey between the late 1960s and early 1990s were circumscribed by unending arguments about the Marxist concept of mode of production, which was elaborated by both sides (those supportive of the feudal mode and the others supportive of the Asiatic mode of production) in a theory centred, abstract and scholastic manner.¹¹⁴ This was partly due to the predominance of the Stalinist dogma of five successive universal-historical stages,¹¹⁵ stemming from a misleading and trivialising interpretation of Marx's earliest classification of historical social formations in *The German Ideology*. Additionally, a highly mechanistic understanding of the contradiction between the forces and relations of production, and the assumption that the former, as the prime mover of history, determines the latter, again attributed to Marx's *Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, led Marxist circles in question to overlook the role of subjective and interpersonal factors, that is, the concrete cases of class struggles in their analyses about historical-social

¹¹⁴ As Haldon underlines, in general, Marxists in the field of history, had long been concentrated exclusively on the problems of general theory and meta-theory, rather than on specific empirical research (Haldon 1993, 24-5). The Turkish case is not different in this manner.

¹¹⁵ Joshua A. Fogel, "The Debates over the Asiatic Mode of Production in Soviet Russia, China and Japan." *The American Historical Review*. 93 (1), (1988): 56-79.

formations.¹¹⁶

In Jairus Banaji's (2010) terms, such approaches all fell into *abstract historical formalism*. Unidimensional analyses of the objective structures of a social formation inevitably gloss over the historical interplay between economic and/or political struggles of the class subjects and thus result in "the reification of the concept of mode of production into a predetermined historical stage" which contradicts with Marx's own empirically open-ended method.¹¹⁷ These theoretical positions reflected the immediate aims of varying Marxist groups in their political strategies of revolution. Historical materialism has often been instrumentalised, and distorted, under the pretext of justifying the political objectives of these groups. Marxist theory of history which is quite complex and multi-layered in its very nature, turned into a caricature of itself, reduced to a set of simple formulas devoid of historical context, density and vitality.

2.4.1 Main Political Confrontations

To classify these various positions among Turkish Marxists, firstly, the most prominent spokesman of the Asiatic mode of production theory, Sencer Divitçioğlu and his intellectual circle, envisioned a socialist transformation primarily based on the

¹¹⁶Hegel's metaphysical Geist resurrects in Stalin's formulaic technological determinism in a pseudo-materialist tone: "First the productive forces of society change and develop, and then, depending on these changes and in conformity with them, men's relations of production, their economic relations, change." Quoted in Paul Blackledge, *Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006: 98. It is also important to underscore that Marx's abovementioned book was written in an extremely naturalist and objectivist manner to bypass the Prussian censorship. The obvious drawback of this manoeuvre is the minuscule emphasis on the creative role of the human praxis in the course of history.

¹¹⁷John Haldon, "Theories of Practice: Marxist History-Writing and Complexity" *Historical Materialism* 21 (4) (2013): 38. Marx emphasises the importance of empirical observation in his scientific approach to historical processes which was later distorted into a cosmology in which the dialectic was considered as an *a priori* principle able to explain historical change in general. In *The German Ideology*, he underlines: "...definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production. The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they *really* are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will." Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, (London: Lawrence Wishart, 1974): 46-7. Marx's argumentation follows as: "This method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fanatic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this active life process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with idealists." (Ibdi, 48). Marx's methodological preference is also strictly underlined by Ollman "In his most explicit statement on the subject, Marx claims that his method starts from the 'real concrete' (the world as it presents itself to us) and proceeds through 'abstraction' (the intellectual activity of breaking this whole down into the mental units with which we think about it) to the 'thought concrete' (the reconstituted and now understood whole present in the mind). The real concrete is simply the world in which we live, in all its complexity [or empirical field attained through documented evidence in historical studies]. The thought concrete is Marx's reconstruction of that world in the theories of what has come to be called "Marxism." The royal road to understanding is said to pass from one to the other through the process of abstraction." (Ollman 2003, 60).

people (*halk*) through democratic voting principles.¹¹⁸ In Divitçioğlu's classification of "three orders", the bourgeoisie and people are led by the *kapıkulu*, referring to the civilian and military bureaucracy whose strength within the political power structure in modern Turkey stemmed from the survival and continuation of the supposedly Asiatic-despotic character of the Ottoman state into the republican period.¹¹⁹

The second wave of supporters of AMP theory was not directly involved in the political struggles but mostly came from the academic-Marxian circles of the late 1970s. Its foremost representatives Huricihan İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder, reiterated the wide-spread assumption that in social formations dominated by the Asiatic mode of production, primal class dynamic between the direct producers and appropriators of surplus was absent. Class conflicts were not evident in the immediate production experience since the agricultural surplus of the peasants was appropriated by an anonymous collective, that is, by the state, in the form of taxation.¹²⁰ According to İslamoğlu and Keyder, only after the penetration of the merchant capital into the Ottoman economy from the seventeenth century onwards, did the internal power configuration—explained through the centre-periphery paradigm—begin to generate dynamics of class conflict, primarily and more significantly between the state-officials and the nascent mercantile classes, but also and secondarily, within the fractions of the ruling class as the state-centre lost its ability and resources to strictly supervise the relationship between the local elites and the small holding peasants.¹²¹

¹¹⁸“Öyle ise sınıf ve toplumsal ilişkileri birlikte ele alan bir analize göre, yapımızdaki halk, kapıkulu, ve kapitalistler, üç ayrı tabaka teşkil ederler. Ve bundan dolayıdır ki, Türkiye’de sosyalizm ancak halka dayanarak kurulmalıdır. Bu dönüşümün tek yolu, diğer koşullar aynı kaldığı takdirde, Türk tarihinin nesnel koşullarının belirlediği demokratik rejim içinde oy devrimi yoludur. Türkiye’de ancak halkın oyuna dayanarak sömürü olayı ortadan kaldırılabilir ve halkın toplumsal fayda fonksiyonu azamî kılınabilir.” Sencer Divitçioğlu, “Türk Sosyalizmi Halka Dayanarak Kurulmalıdır” in *Geçivermiş Gelecek*, (İstanbul. Bağlam Yayınları, 1991), 54. These ideas complies with Aybar’s political line to come to power as a democratic-socialist party, like Labour Party of the UK, through electoral processes, on a voter-base composed of the unionised workers, progressive urban intellectuals and “oppressed and despised” segments of the society such as the Kurds and Alevis.

¹¹⁹It would not be wrong to maintain that the basic premises of the Asiatic mode of production theory and Şerif Mardin’s centre-periphery conceptualisation somehow constituted the backbone of arguments supported by the so-called left-liberal current in contemporary Turkish politics. See, Sungur Savran “Sol Liberalizm: Maddecî Bir Eleştiriye Doğru” 11. *Tez*, No:2, (1986): 10-40.

¹²⁰Huricihan İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder, “Agenda for Ottoman History” *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, Vol.1 No.1, (1977): 31-55. The reason behind this assumption was the sultan’s exclusive title to soil that curtailed the private exploitation of the peasants. However, this was no more than a legal fiction, and discarded by Marx in his later reconsideration of the East. “They half-accepted that West European feudalism was basically a peasant society, as the Ottoman Empire very obviously was; to keep the pre-conceived boundaries intact, they then equated feudalism with small producers plus individual lordship, and AMP with small producers plus strong state, and went on maintaining that the Ottoman regime was based not on feudal but on Asiatic mode of production.” (Berktaş 1987, 300) We can also count Asaf Savaş Akat, Seyfettin Gürsel and Şevket Pamuk among the members of this intellectual circle.

¹²¹Huricihan İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder, “Agenda”; Divitçioğlu also maintains that only by focusing on the time period between the fourteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries, before the internal (*Celali revolts*) and external (growing bullion flow to the East from the New World) factors instigated a tendency of “corruption” in the Ottoman land regime, Ottoman social formation might be understood in its purest and authentic form. (Divitçioğlu 1981, 14). I suppose this line of thought was indebted to Ömer Lütfi Barkan who, consciously or unwittingly, did not touch upon the seventeenth century onwards.

From their early works onwards, İslamoğlu and Keyder's main pursuit was to illuminate the process of integration, articulation and consequently, "peripheralisation" of the Ottoman social formation to the world economy. The continuation of a strong, centralised and bureaucratic state structure though underwent a period of relative disintegration during the eighteenth century which was reversed by Mahmud II's reforms, and the durability and perpetuation of the small-holding peasantry for centuries kept their roles as the explanans and explanandum in their approach. Highly informed by Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory, both İslamoğlu and Keyder discarded the concept of the Asiatic mode of production later on since this conceptualisation frankly reflected the Orientalist baggage of the nineteenth-century European intellectual discourse that ascribed an ontological stagnancy and lack of internal dynamism to the "Eastern" societies based on their supposedly "essential (internal), therefore un-changing and ahistorical properties of culture and geography."¹²²

On the other hand, supporters of the feudal mode of production thesis argued that feudal relations continued to predominate the Turkish countryside even after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Kemalist reforms of the 1920s and 1930s focused only on transformations in the superstructural and cultural properties of the society, but a social programme of land reform that could revolutionise the rural relations in the Turkish countryside backfired by the opposition of the landlords (*ağas*). In this respect, the bourgeois revolution in Turkey remained incomplete. Therefore, they maintained that the revolutionary programme of the socialists—codified as the National Democratic Revolution (NDR)—must decisively rest on anti-feudal and anti-imperialist objectives as they consider Turkey a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country. A purely socialist revolutionary agenda was thought of either as a long-term political goal of the working class, in other words, the subsequent stage of the National Democratic Revolution,¹²³ or it was asserted that the National Democratic (or bourgeois-democratic) stage and the socialist revolution were intertwined.¹²⁴

¹²²Huri İslamoğlu "Oriental Despotism in World System Perspective" in *Ottoman History as World History*. ed. idem. (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2007): 15-44. See also: Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, (Verso 1987), 7-21. In his seminal work, Keyder no longer refers to the Asiatic mode of production as a useful heuristic to explain the social and economic relations in the Ottoman classical age yet highlights the continuation of Byzantine and Ottoman systems marked by a strong state protecting the peasants' freeholding rights against centrifugal and feudalising tendencies of the local magnates.

¹²³Apart from Doğan Avcıoğlu's Yön, propagating for a vanguard of patriotic officials in the military to establish a national democracy, in socialist circles this program was first supported by Mihri Belli's *Türk Solu* and then by *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*. Doğu Perinçek's circle later split from Aydınlık and published their own journal, *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, with a hardline Maoist agenda. Yet both sides held the view that Turkey is a feudal, or semi-feudal country.

¹²⁴Mahir Çayan and his followers distinguished their position among the NDR circles by their emphasis on the permanent revolution (Kesintisiz devrim.) According to them, the political agenda of the working class was pivotal in a revolutionary program. Worker demonstrations of 15th-16th of June 1970, proved that the level of political consciousness of the working class, despite Turkey being a predominantly rural country with a low proportion of industrial proletariat in the overall labour force, allowed the socialists to

In their historical analyses, supporters of the NDR concluded that the nature of the relations of production and its class character in the Ottoman social formation resembled a “variant” of the feudal mode of production, thus involving the feudal exploitation of the peasantry. The most prominent spokesman of this theoretical stance with his publications in the Turkish political left and among left-wing scholars, was Halil Berktaş who had long held his position as a leading member of the Aydınlık circle until the early 1990s.

A third group, composed of the intellectual circle around TİP (Workers’ Party of Turkey), including Behice Boran and Korkut Boratav, supported the thesis of “Ottoman centralised feudalism.” They emphasised that the pressure of the world market and the dynamics of monetisation gradually led to the dissolution of the feudal relations that were predominant in the Ottoman social formation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, starting from the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Consequently, the essentially feudal relationship between the *sipahis* and peasants which was based on in-kind payments, restriction on peasants’ mobility, land use and crop patterns limited to the cultivation of cereals such as wheat and barley, gave way to forms of labour exploitation and landownership, such as sharecropping, tenant farming or independent petty commodity production by peasant households. These new forms of production were shaped by the demands of merchant capital over the agricultural sector and by the penetration of commercial capitalism into the rural relations of production.¹²⁵

2.4.2 A Seminal Debate; Thought-Provoking Yet Full of Errors

It is essential to address Korkut Boratav’s contributions and the debate between Boratav and his critics, the foremost was Muzaffer Erdost, about the nature of the rural relations of production in Turkey during the 1960s and 70s. Boratav and Erdost’s methodological preferences, and thus, their fundamental mistakes in this debate were often repeated and re-occurred in the studies by Turkish Marxist circles concerning the Ottoman social formation.

Based on a statistical survey of land ownership conducted by the Ministry of Rural Affairs covering the years 1962-1969, covering 22.047 villages in 43 provinces,

take the vanguard of anti-feudal and anti-imperialist political movements. This was a more Leninist-like position stemming from Lenin’s pre-1917 conclusion of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

¹²⁵Korkut Boratav’s ideas on the transformation of pre-capitalist peasantry and the emergence of petty commodity production in the Turkish rural sector could be followed in; Alp Yücel Kaya “Samir Amin’in Ardından Türkiyede İktisat Tarihi Tartışmalarını Hatırlamak” *Mülkiye Dergisi*, 43 (2), (2019): 371-374.

Boratav concluded that, contrary to the claims of the circles supporting the NDR programme, feudal or quasi-feudal relations in contemporary Turkey were quite limited. The survey revealed that only 701 villages corresponding to 3.2% of the total number of villages, were owned by big landowner families.¹²⁶ Apparent forms of property ownership, empirically exhibited in the statistical data, are one of the chief criteria in shaping Boratav's view on the Turkish rural sector. The other criteria are the forms of organisation of agricultural labour and methods of its exploitation. Accordingly, the ratio of landless peasants who cultivated the landlords' lands as sharecroppers or tenants to landowning peasant households engaged in petty commodity production showed whether semi-feudal relations were dominant in the Turkish countryside. The population of landless peasants, who were employed as sharecroppers by landlords owning lands larger than 20 hectares, was around 90.000, which corresponded to only 3.3 % of the total number of agricultural labourers.¹²⁷ Therefore, in terms of land ownership and labour organisation patterns, the role of feudal or quasi-feudal relations in the rural sector was negligible. On the other hand, petty peasant ownership directed at petty commodity production, which encompassed 75-80% of the rural population, was proportionately the most widespread production relation in the Turkish rural sector. Lastly, only 10% of the peasant families were employed as agricultural wage labourers, marking purely capitalist relations in the rural sector. In the wider context, the products of the petty commodity producers in the rural sector were appropriated by merchant capital and usurers instead of turning into productive capital investments in the agricultural sector. This situation illustrates the dominance of *underdeveloped capitalism* in Turkey.¹²⁸

Boratav's emphasis on the underdeveloped capitalism marked by the preponderance of petty commodity-producing peasant households indebted to the merchant capital was castigated by the circles propounding the dominance of feudal or semi-feudal relations in the Turkish rural sector. Among these critiques, the most prominent one was Muzaffer Erdost's attack on Boratav's method of interpreting statistical data and his theoretical stance. Erdost developed his analysis based on the assumption that, categorically only the wage labour relationship, which constituted a small proportion in total—seen only in 600.000 of 9 million units of agricultural production—could be labelled as capitalist.¹²⁹ Regarding this small proportion of wage labour in the rural sector, he argued, it would be inaccurate to conclude capitalist

¹²⁶Zülküf Aydın, *Çağdaş Tarım Sorunu*, (Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 2017), 82-83.

¹²⁷Ibid. 84. If families owning larger than 50 hectares of land are taken as landlords, then the rate of landless sharecroppers in the total agricultural labour force drops to 2.6%.

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹Ibid. 90.

relations dominated the Turkish countryside. Erdost, likewise his opponent, underlined that the peasant household units engaged in petty commodity production vastly outnumbered the wage labourers in agriculture. However, his interpretation of petty commodity production differs from Boratav who takes it as decisive proof of underdeveloped capitalism. According to Erdost, the relationship between the market forces and petty commodity-producing peasants does not necessarily mark the dominance of capitalist relations. Although the bulk of the peasantry was engaged in petty commodity production, that is, production of exchange value marked their productive activity at face value, the impulse of profit maximisation was not the actual drive for their productive activity. Peasants sold their products in the market mostly to purchase salt and other fundamental subsistence re-sources in return. Even when they entered market relations through the sales of fundamental cereals, the rate of marketed wheat did not exceed 10% of the gross production.¹³⁰ That petty commodity production aimed at the subsistence of peasant households rather than profitability was a decisive criterion for Erdost to define the relations of production in the Turkish countryside as pre-capitalist and semi-feudal.

Apart from Erdost's interpretation that petty commodity production of small landholding peasant families was marking a pre-capitalist and semi-feudal production relationship, according to him, the combination of the landless peasantry with supposedly archaic surplus extraction forms such as sharecropping especially in the Kurdish region demonstrated the existence, and even, the regional dominance of feudal mode of production in the Turkish rural sector. Based on his observations and research in the villages of Hakkari, Erdost highlighted that Boratav intentionally misinterpreted the statistical data of the rural Ministry to come up with general and totalising conclusions about Turkish society in line with the political programme of TİP.¹³¹ Specifically for Hakkari, if Boratav had taken landless agricultural labourers as semi-independent peasants under feudal exploitation (which made up 46% of peasant households), and small landowning peasantry (counted %53 in the data set) as a form of continuation of pre-capitalist production relations, he would have found that an overwhelming majority of the peasants were exposed to feudal or semi-feudal exploitation.¹³² When this approach had wholly been applied to the Turkish countryside, the dominance of the semi-feudal relations would have appeared obvious given that petty commodity production did not constitute a separate mode or

¹³⁰Ibid. 90-91.

¹³¹Accordingly, the peasantry in modern Turkey did not constitute an independent class but a fraction of the petty bourgeoisie (small landowning petty commodity producers) and a fraction of the proletariat (the agricultural wage-labourers, sharecroppers, and tenant farmers.)

¹³²Muzaffer Erdost "Türkiye Tarımında Hakim Üretim İlişkisi Üzerine" *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, 13 (1969): 39-40.

relation of production, but a part of the feudal relations of production.

While Boratav's conclusion that capitalism in Turkey resembled an underdeveloped form might be accurate in the last analysis, in estimating whether capitalism or feudalism is predominant, he followed a questionable method as he associated sharecropping strictly with semi-feudalism and wage labour with capitalism. Forms of labour exploitation and surplus appropriation other than wage labour, are conventionally, and often inaccurately associated with the existence and/or dominance of pre-capitalist modes of production in a social formation. Historical observation, however, may suggest seemingly pre-capitalist labour processes; "forms of surplus appropriation" such as slave labour, serfdom (here I use the term synonymous with *corvée*) and sharecropping (based on in-kind payments), might be articulated with and take an essential part in the capitalist mode of production in line with the landlords' drive for capital accumulation.¹³³ Such forms may be subjected to the *laws of motion* of the capitalist mode of production and do not necessarily prove the co-existence or articulation of pre-capitalist modes alongside capitalism. Boratav's fundamental mistake in his method is to deduce the mode of production from the statistical preponderance of certain relations of production which he conflates with apparent forms of labour exploitation and patterns of land ownership.¹³⁴ By resorting to the statistical method Erdost made the same mistake as Boratav but concluded on the contrary since he associated the numerical superiority of landlessness among the peasantry and sharecropping as a labour process directly with the feudal mode of production. Concomitantly, Erdost, similar to Boratav's mistake, reduces the production relations to the specific forms of surplus appropriation and modalities of property ownership and then deduces the mode of production from these. If the distinctions between these concepts are not frankly put, then a mode of production would easily and misleadingly be equated to the most wide-spread relation of production, which is also misleadingly equated to the widespread forms of surplus appropriation observed in a social formation.

¹³³Zülküf Aydın, *Çağdaş Tarım Sorunu*, 84-85: "Latin Amerika üzerine yapılan birçok çalışma yarıcılık kurumunun büyük toprak ağalarınca kullanılmasının feodalizmin bir işareti olmadığını fakat büyük toprak sahiplerinin kârlılık hesaplarının bir sonucu olduğunu ortaya koymuştur... Toprak ağası-yarıcı ilişkilerinin en yaygın olduğu Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi üzerine yaptığım kendi çalışmam da şu gerçeği ortaya koymuştur: Birçok durumda tarımsal üretimde ücretli işçi değil de yarıcı kullanmak toprak sahibi için hem ekonomik hem de politik açıdan çok daha yararlıdır. Sermaye birikimi kapitalizmin temel özelliklerinden biridir ve toprak ağasının aldığı kararlarda sermaye biriktirme çabasının etkisi çok büyüktür."

¹³⁴Zülküf Aydın, *Çağdaş Tarım Sorunu*. 85-86. It is crucial to mention the methodological hazards of simply relying on the statistical data, which inevitably exhibits the actual social relations in a simplified and categorised, thus in a rather synthetic manner, to conclude dominant, articulated, secondary, etc. mode(s) of production in a social formation. This warning should also apply to the medieval and early modern historians who work on land surveys, tax registers, and manorial records.

2.4.3 Jairus Banaji's Comments on the Misuse of the Conceptual Framework of the Marxist Theory of History

This very conclusion about the importance of primarily discovering the specific laws of motion of that mode of production before locating the modality of the production relations in each social formation was stressed by Jairus Banaji (2010) as a sharp criticism of the penchant for, what he labels, the *abstract historical formalism* of vulgar Marxism. He defines two common erroneous positions:

The first error of the vulgar Marxist tendency was marked by espousing a rather naturalistic conception of history, contrary to Marx's and Engels's task of laying the ground for a scientific theory of history.¹³⁵ Marx and Engels elaborated on how "historically specific laws of motion [of the social processes] regulate the movement of different epochs in history."¹³⁶ However, distorting historical materialism to a general and abstract principle of the historical process, vulgar Marxists' commitment was to prove that the development of all social relations is determined by the development of productive forces (understood as technology and technical properties of production) and the properties of the geographical environment set limits on or unleashes the progressive of development of productive forces.¹³⁷ This formulation was voiced first by the ideologues of the Second International before resonating among the members of the Bolshevik party through the impact of Plekhanov's interpretation of history and finally crystallised under Stalin's rule.¹³⁸ However,

¹³⁵Jairus Banaji, *Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation*, (Leiden: Brill, 2010): 46-47.

¹³⁶Ibid, 47. Laws of Motion could be defined as historical and context-bound transformation tendencies and dynamism of social formations, clearly put in Marx's analysis of the dynamics of the capitalist mode of production in *Capital*. They were not abstract and ahistorical sets of laws applicable to each social formation irrespective of their historical context.

¹³⁷Banaji, *Theory as History*, 47.

¹³⁸In fact, the tendency to resort to the formulaic principle of the ideologues of the Second International fetishised universally applicable stages of development in history had already found followers among the Old Bolshevik cadres as their support of the provisional government in the following months of the February Revolution, long before Stalin's ascension to power indicated. Accordingly, a socialist revolution necessarily follows a bourgeois regime, intrinsically committed to developing capitalist relations. This a priori logic divides history into predetermined sequential stages: feudal tsardom is followed by a bourgeois capitalist nation-state, and the nation-state is followed by proletarian socialism.

If Marx's famous sentence in *The Poverty of Philosophy*: "The hand-mill gives you the society with the feudal lord; and the steam-mill with the bourgeois capitalist" which is, by itself, a mockery of Proudhon's reduction of the complexity of actual social relations to the law-like expressions of the abstract economic categories, is cherrypicked from the passage, it becomes inevitable to understand Marx's statement as an example of productive forces determinism. However, in the same passage, Marx clearly underlines the creative role of the human praxis, as itself a productive force in constituting its means of production and survival, and in return, humans' subjection to the straitjacket of the social relations stemming from their very creative activity.

In the 1930s context, productive forces determinism, or technological determinism espoused by the Stalinist dia-mat church, gave ideological justification for dismantling the principles of proletarian democracy for a Bismarckian or Bonapartist political configuration in support of a top-down and rapid policy of industrialisation led by a technocratic-bureaucratic party oligarchy.

“Marx had been emphatic that abstract laws do not exist in history, that the laws of motion which operate in history are historically determinate laws. He indicated thereby that the scientific conception of history could be concretised only through the process of establishing these laws, specific to each epoch, and their corresponding categories.”¹³⁹

Nevertheless, Marx and Engels, especially in their early considerations about the socio-economic nature of the Oriental society had given too much emphasis on the geographical properties of the East. This could be considered a weakness in their early approach, ascribing too much explanatory power to objective structures (geography and climate) at the expense of neglecting intersubjective factors of the processes and results of class dynamics and struggles. According to Engels, the aridity of the East made irrigation the first condition of agriculture. The village communities, the local administration or the central government had to solve this problem by constructing irrigation canals, which was undoubtedly a costly undertaking and required an unquestionable authority to mobilise a large manpower. Rendering the individual initiative in agriculture obsolete, the state’s monopoly over the development of forces of production gave its unique shape to the Eastern social formations: “The combination of the monopoly by the state in the economic initiative and surplus product, and the lingering on of the village communalism” which resulted in “a complete lack of internal dynamism within the Oriental system.”¹⁴⁰ This configuration resulted in the emergence of strong centralised states, the lack of a mediating class of nobles between the village communities and the state, and the absence of private property on land, drawing a sharp contrast to the historical path that the remnants of the Western/Roman world followed. These underlying considerations stamped by geographical determinism were further elaborated by some twentieth-century scholars, such as Karl Wittfogel, who sought to analyse the roots of the so-called Asiatic despotism (versus Western democracy) in the Asiatic mode of production and turned Marx and Engel’s early formulations about precapitalist modes of production to a weapon for anti-Soviet critique.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹Banaji, *Theory as History*, 48. For Plekhanov’s geographical determinism see: Marian Sawer, *Marrism and the question of the Asiatic mode of production*, (Springer, 1977): 115-125. Here the author underlines the fact that for the Stalinist position, “geographical environment provides, on the one hand, the condition of any social development, and on the other hand may retard or accelerate that social development but is never a determining influence.” Ibid.116-117.

¹⁴⁰Ibid. 43-46

¹⁴¹Among the Turkish AMP theorists, to say the least, nobody has attempted to prove that the Ottoman state had built irrigation canals in the arid central plateau of Central Anatolia or elsewhere, in Wittfogelian fashion, if we put aside the individual investments of the state-elite to increase the productivity in their demesne (hassa) lands, especially in rice cultivation. Even the most orthodox follower of AMP theory, Sencer Dıvıtcıođlu, has only mentioned the welfare function of the state as the sole appropriator of the peasant surplus. The Ottoman state distributed a part of this surplus through public investments such as constructing bridges for communication and caravanserais for trade networks, mosques and dervish lodges for religious prestige and service, public baths, bazaars, dockyards, fountains and waterways. (Dıvıtcıođlu 1981, 27; 87-88) As a critique see also (Berktaş 1987, 300).

Nevertheless, productive forces determinism did not gain currency among the parties involved in the mode of production debate in Ottoman-Turkish historiography. Rather, the modality of rural production relations kept constituting the focal point of the Ottoman-Turkish debate, mostly crippled by the parties' seeking for a "law of virtual identity" between forms of labour exploitation (or, surplus appropriation) and relations of production.¹⁴²

This discussion brings us to the second error of vulgar Marxism, which Banaji calls the failure of abstraction: "the conception of 'relations of production' as forms of exploitation of labour, and the classification of 'modes of production' according to the simple formal identities which this equation yielded."¹⁴³ Banaji reminds us that Marx had ascribed two distinct meanings to *Produktionsweise* (mode of production) in *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. One of these was the labour process (*Arbeitsprozess*), or in Lenin's words "technical process of production" or "system of production" which defines and describes the technical conditions of a peculiar productive activity.¹⁴⁴ In Marx's various other passages, we see a broader and more historically specific meaning had been attached to the concept of *Produktionsweise*:

"Modes of production are variously called 'forms of production'; 'forms of the social process of production'; 'epochs in the economic development of society'; 'epochs of production'; 'periods of production' or finally 'historical organizations of production'. Here, the 'mode of production' figures as a 'social form of production' or 'social form of the production process'."¹⁴⁵

The key to understanding epochs of production in the Marxist analysis lies in the emphasis put on their historical specificity. Marx distinguishes different epochs of production by a detailed analysis of their specific relations of production, i.e., "the various forms which the subjugation of labour assumed *historically*" The historical complexity of relations of production cannot be deduced to one singular form of surplus appropriation, one generalised mechanism of exploitation, only one specific type of possession or a property regime valid for each one of the epochs of production.

Nevertheless, vulgar Marxist historical interpretation in its method of formal abstraction misleadingly inverts Marx's approach by deducing modes of production

¹⁴²Banaji, *Theory as History*, 53.

¹⁴³Ibid. 61.

¹⁴⁴Ibid, 50-51. In this sense, petty commodity production, handicrafts manufacturing, nomadic-pastoralism or small landholding peasants' subsistence farming could be defined as "modes of production." (a technical classification).

¹⁴⁵Ibid, 51-52.

from the given forms of exploitation. Here, as an example, whom Banaji has in mind and targets is Maurice Dobb, who held feudalism virtually identical to what he meant by serfdom.¹⁴⁶ In this framework, Dobb uses the term serfdom synonymous with a wider family of “forms of exploitation” encapsulating not only the labour services (corvée) but also the peasants’ obligations to pay tributes and rents to their overlords either in kind or in money. For Dobb the fact that the direct producers (peasants) remained in possession of their primary means of production (the land), exploitation took place by the virtue of direct politico-legal compulsion, or briefly, by “coercive *mechanisms* of ex-traction of surplus labour.”¹⁴⁷

Marx, however, had conceptualised serfdom in a more historically specific, stricter and narrower sense, which denotes the performance of labour services of a group of dependent peasants in a lordly demesne, which was itself also a historically specific type of property.¹⁴⁸ Definite types of labour processes and mechanisms of appropriation of surplus labour in a social formation do not, by themselves, indicate this or that mode of production shapes the social processes of the social formation in question. “Modes of production are impenetrable at the level of ‘simple abstractions’” such as wage-labour, money, money-rent, market-mechanisms coercion, serfdom, tribute, tax, etc., to come up with promising conclusions about and concretise the internal dynamics of social relations of a *Produktionsweise* (taken as an epoch of

¹⁴⁶Maurice Dobb, “A Reply” in *The Transition Debate*, (Verso 1978): 58; cf. Paul Sweezy “A Critique” in *ibid.* 33; Banaji, *Theory as History*, 52-53.

¹⁴⁷Banaji, *Theory as History*, 52-53 and note 36. In fact, the mechanisms of surplus extraction (appropriation of the peasant’s surplus by “extra-economic” means) do not automatically prove the dominance of this or that mode of production. Archaic types of *Arbeitsprozess*; serf or slave forms of labour exploitation may articulate in the capitalist system without constituting a distinct *Produktionsweise*. For instance, the second serfdom in Eastern Europe, slavery in the Americas; in terms of petty commodity production, village-level putting-out manufacture (based on the patriarchal labour organisation within the peasant household) etc. during the age of commercial capitalism. In other words, “forms of exploitation may remain antique, [patriarchal], feudal or semi-feudal in character while the relations of production acquire a bourgeois character.” (Banaji 2010, 56-57) However, what Banaji glosses over here, for the sake of accusing Maurice Dobb of vulgar expositions, is, I think, that these archaic forms articulated into the capitalist mode of production in a specific context when capitalist ground rent had already appeared and, thus the primary means of production of the peasants, the land itself, turned into a commodity. This is an unresolved debate among Marxists, stemming from diverse interpretations of Marx’s one of the most powerful yet enigmatic texts: Genesis of the Capitalist Ground Rent; Chapter 47 in *Capital* Vol.III.

¹⁴⁸It is not surprising that Marx adopted a pre-Blochian notion of feudalism in his writings which indirectly bore the influence of “Whig interpretation of history”: a notion that history ultimately progresses from the social forms resting on bondage and slavery to human emancipation and liberties. In the economic field, this meant that feudalism was an oppressive and irrational system based on the semi-slavery of the peasants; a dark age in European history following the prosperity of classical antiquity. It is surmised that with the emergence and advent of capitalist market relations, humans managed to emancipate themselves from personal bondage and lordly oppression and started acting as free individuals with bargaining power in the labour market.

We have discussed in the previous pages why in the Blochian sense, serfdom cannot be reduced solely to the performance of labour services in demesne lands, to quasi-slavery as a direct continuation of late Roman *colonus* and to the personal bondage and total dependence of the peasants to the lords in a legally undifferentiated manner. The agricultural production of the smallholding peasant households, rent-in-kind and money-rent imposed on them in return, as well as payments for the usufruct of mills, etc. and jurisdiction were more significant elements of the feudal system than labour services performed in the privately owned demesne lands. Also see, especially with respect to the “Transition Debate”, George Comninel, “English Feudalism and the Origins of Capitalism” *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 27 (4) (2000): 1-53.

production). Instead, following Marx’s method in *Capital*, the Marxist approach to pre-capitalist historical social formations also requires a rigorous and systematic investigation of the “laws of motion” of the epoch of production under analysis.¹⁴⁹

“These ‘laws’, in practice, are the constraints imposed on a given society by the ways in which the totality of production relations is configured and by the technical possibilities open to it for the development of surpluses.”¹⁵⁰ Contrary to the formal and simple abstractions and categories that vulgar Marxists resort to in historical analysis, “the process of ‘true abstraction’ is simultaneously a process of ‘concretization’, of the definition of specific historical laws of motion.”¹⁵¹ What Marx did in his *magnum opus* *Capital* was to exhibit the laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production by the analysis of their operation at the level of each unit of production (in Volume I) and at the level of the social totality —social process or relations of production (in Volumes II and III).¹⁵²

2.4.4 How and Where to Locate “Laws of Motion” of the Pre-capitalist Modes of Production

As for the pre-capitalist modes of production, historians briefly agree that Marx’s writings about the pre-capitalist societies are rather sketchy, and far from being consistent compared to his meticulous work and acute analysis of capitalism.

This is partly because Marx had almost completely focused on exposing the dynamics of the “bourgeois epoch of production” as Hobsbawm addresses.¹⁵³ The rest of the history of the other epochs of production played a focus of attention for him as long as they carried the dynamics about the origins of and illustrated the transition to capitalism.¹⁵⁴ Secondly, although Marx and Engels had sufficient knowledge of pre-capitalist societies, they had to rely on the present literature available to them which cannot, in fact, compete with contemporary studies in terms of depth and scope.¹⁵⁵ These do not mean that even if Marx had failed in some of

¹⁴⁹Banaji, *Theory as History*, 59.

¹⁵⁰John Haldon, “Theories of Practice,” 40.

¹⁵¹Jairus Banaji, *Theory as History*, 59.

¹⁵²*Ibid*, 60.

¹⁵³Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction,” 20.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid*.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid*.20-21; John Haldon, “Theories of Practice,” 43.

his observations of the pre-capitalist social formations in certain respects, the validity of historical materialism is at stake, since from its very nature, his theoretical framework is open to be supported or developed by further empirical studies. From my point of view, the Marxist approach to the pre-capitalist social formations requires a prudent theoretical minimalism backed by open-mindedness and creativity in interpreting historical sources, documents and artefacts.¹⁵⁶

In the field of pre-capitalist “oriental” history, however, Marx’s earlier reliance on Hegel’s *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* along with Bernier’s travel accounts of India,¹⁵⁷ which were accounts circumscribed by the well-known orientalist prejudice on the East—peoples without history, societies marked by stasis, no internal social dynamism is well known.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, since Marx and Engels were primarily interested in the genesis and the analysis of the capitalist mode of production in Europe, particularly in Britain, how their conceptualisations would be applied to explain the social relations and class struggles in non-capitalist, and maybe, non-feudal, Eastern social formations remained an enigma. In this respect, one could say that not only could Marx and Engels’ early works on the Eastern social formations be judged to be deficient, but also the conceptual framework they offered is far from accurately explaining the dynamics of the pre-capitalist formations, in both the European and non-European.

The logical conclusion of this line of thought is retreating to the idea that the mode of production is more a taxonomic concept based on “simple formal abstractions” than an explanatory one and, it gains its fullest explanatory capacity as a “hardened scientific concept” only when used regarding purely capitalist societies since “only in this one case the economic is self-contained and dominant, subsuming all social-life.”¹⁵⁹ The argument follows as:

¹⁵⁶“Historical materialism, while firmly embedded within the philosophical terrain of a realist materialist epistemology, is less a philosophy itself than it is an empirical theory. It rests not on abstract dogmas derived philosophically, but on premises that can be verified by empirical analysis, and it is only its ability to provide a viable re-search programme that will vindicate its claims” (Haldon 2013, 38).

¹⁵⁷Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction,” 21-2; Jairus Banaji, *Theory as History*, 16-7: “The tradition that influenced Marx in the 1850s maintained that ‘Asiatic despotism’ lacked ‘intermediate and independent’ classes between the sovereign and the mass of the subject population, or, more realistically, that the aristocracy, such as it was, was a creature of the sovereign and completely unlike any other equivalent group in Europe.” The result was that the right of property was none or, at least, subject to the arbitrary and unchallenged decisions of Asiatic rulers. Given that the Asiatic ruler was the proprietor of all the land in the empire, there was no nobility enjoying the stability of a hereditary class. “Yet Bernier was willing to acknowledge that ‘the jagirdars enjoyed ‘an authority almost absolute over the peasantry’, a nuance Marx ignored in reducing Asiatic régimes to the bipolar simplicity of a mass of village communities on one side and an all-powerful sovereign on the other.’” (emphasis added). However, in Ottoman-Turkish historiography, Sencer Dıvıçcıoğlu and his followers continued to support the model that Marx and Engels embraced in the 1850s.

¹⁵⁸Huri İslamoğlu “Oriental Despotism in World-System Perspective” in *Ottoman History as World History* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2007), 15-21. While the concept of AMP was reviewed among the structuralism-inspired French Marxists in the late 1960s as a refutation of the Stalinist orthodoxy, it was problematic from its very formation.

¹⁵⁹Robert Albritton, *A Japanese Reconstruction of Marxist Theory*, (London: Macmillan 1986): 232-4.

“when ‘mode of production’ is used as a concept of historical materialism to refer to different historical periods, it should be used on analogy with this one clear and precise case; . . . to refer to feudalism as a ‘mode of production’ signals to the reader that a materialist approach is being adopted, and that feudalism is going to be examined as a way of organizing the re-production of material life.”¹⁶⁰

This defeatist theoretical position questioning the explanatory strength of the concept of mode of production for the analysis of pre-capitalist social formations, I suppose, is indebted to Maurice Dobb’s and his followers’ depiction of feudalism as exploitation of direct producers by extra-economic means, i.e. through political and ideological means. In addition to Banaji’s above mentioned critique of this tendency of shifting the attention to simple formal abstractions, the logical conclusion of Dobb’s formula leads to substituting the distinctions between economic, political and ideological instances of a social formation (as a unit of analysis), which are in fact analytical tools to deconstruct the complexity of the concrete historical cases, for the reality itself (social formation as the real-concrete).¹⁶¹

For instance, one of the chief criteria that Rober Albritton, inspired by the Japanese Uno school of Marxism, offers to distinguish one mode of production from another is the particular types of articulation of the economic, the political and the ideological.¹⁶² Accordingly, feudalism, or the pre-capitalist modes of production in general, are marked by the primacy of political and ideological factors in their laws of motion, whereas capitalism operates through pure and self-contained economic processes, rendering the formative role of political and ideological forms of social reality of secondary. By the same token, it is argued that “feudalism has no tendency to purify itself towards economic laws of motion of feudalism... When we look at the history of feudalism, we see that it takes many forms,” in respect of the relative articulation of the political and ideological “and though we may abstract from these forms in order to arrive at a more general type, feudalism itself has no tendency to do this.”¹⁶³ Hence, feudalism and other pre-capitalist modes of production are determined only by their political and ideological aspects. They cannot be analysed

¹⁶⁰Ibid. 233.

¹⁶¹In Dobb’s scheme these methodological distinctions and analytical tools are misleadingly substituted for the organic. However, in social and/or historical concrete, these three “social functions”, and also culture, always appear as an articulated totality –indeed not as a motionless structure but as a dynamic relation and process- in social relations of production, in which borders of the economic, political, ideological and cultural cannot be readily grasped. The same is true for the misuse of the infamous base-superstructure metaphor. See, for instance, (Anderson 1974, 403-404). Assuming clear-cut boundaries between economic, political and ideological inevitably recalls the base-superstructure metaphor, which is in fact an analogy and cannot be substituted for the reality itself in a theory-centric manner. For an alternative approach see, Maurice Godelier, “Infrastructures, Societies, and History” *New Left Review* 1/112, (1978).

¹⁶²Albritton, *A Japanese Reconstruction*, 233.

¹⁶³Albritton, *A Japanese Reconstruction*, 234; cf. John Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode*, 100-101.

through their economic laws of motion as the economy does not form a separate form of reality in pre-capitalist social formations from political, ideological, legal, kinship, cultural relations etc.¹⁶⁴

In this framework, the pre-capitalist modes of production may appear to be descriptive and simple concepts abstracted but in a determining manner, from certain types of articulation of the political and ideological aspects of the social formations corresponding to more or less the same level of development of the productive forces.¹⁶⁵ As such, they remind us of the ideal types that Weber uses as heuristics for historical comparison and categorisation of constant social structures rather than Marx's particular emphasis on the mode of production to understand social formations in their motion. Therefore, to avoid the deficiencies of Weberianism, questionable in elucidating social change and development properly, this line of thought labelled as political Marxism, attributes excessive explanatory power equally to the class structures in differentiating modes of production and thus to the notion of class struggle in approaching their internal dynamics of transition.¹⁶⁶

Previously, Rodney Hilton has underlined that the class conflicts between lords and

¹⁶⁴In fact, the claim that the economy forms a completely separate and self-contained form of reality in the capitalist epoch, whereas, in pre-capitalism, the economy was combined with, and moreover, determined by political and ideological relations, stems from a misunderstanding of Marx's method in *Capital*, where, in Volume One, the capitalist mode is discussed at the level of each production unit separately, in isolation from the wider social relations. Marx's great and unfinished project, with Volumes Two and Three, would be aiming at the analysis of circulation and expansion of the capital, encompassing the broader social relations and constituting a totalising social system. It is really unfortunate the manuscripts of the Third Volume end with a short discussion on classes in capitalist society because from here Marx seemed to be expanding his analysis of capitalism with the discussion of social forms and relationships, like classes and state, which cannot be reduced to purely economic forms of realities.

¹⁶⁵For instance, according to (Anderson 1974, 401-410) since all pre-capitalist modes of production are based on the appropriation of peasant surplus through extra-economic means, exploitation in a political-economy sense is not an analytically valid starting point to define the feudal mode of production and distinguishing it from, if they existed, the other modes corresponding to the same level of development of productive forces. Alternatively, various types of articulations of the political and the ideological, in other words, the superstructure with the base (economic). In this framework, Western feudalism with its fragmented sovereignty and juridical processes controlled by the lordly class itself, appears as a distinctive mode of production. Apart from his strict adherence to base-superstructure metaphor, the logical result of his excessive emphasis on supposedly determining the impact of political-legal structures in definition rather than conceiving economic, political, ideological and cultural instances as an articulated totality in social relations of production, is the substitution of Marxist theory with Weber's classifications.

However, (Haldon 1993, 91-99) succinctly underlines that Anderson's point has at least two weaknesses. First is that, in Marx's method, not only the mode of surplus appropriation but also the way in which labourers are combined with the means of production are fundamental in differentiating one mode from another. Anderson glosses over this second element. Secondly, Anderson implicitly dismisses the heuristic value of the concept of mode of production for pre-capitalist social formations, since, if we follow his account, we may define as many pre-capitalist modes as possible corresponding to variations in forms of political-legal structures. Such analysis would inescapably be descriptive. On the contrary "in pre-capitalist social formations supposedly super structural elements may function also as relations of production, they are the mode of expression and realisation in social praxis of these relations. So that in using a broad category 'feudal mode of production' or 'feudal relations of production', in its political economy sense, the infinite variety of forms of relations of production and their societal multifunctionality is already taken into the equation."

¹⁶⁶Albritton, *A Japanese Reconstruction*, 233, 240-41; the pioneering work of political Marxism was Robert Brenner's well-known analysis of the transition to capitalism in England. He successfully integrates the factor of the human subject, i.e. the class struggles specific to feudalism, in explicating the origins of the transition to capitalism against trade-centred models and more structural demographic-oriented explanations.

peasants in England during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries played a pivotal role in the transition from feudalism to agrarian capitalism. Hilton's emphasis on the class conflict as the prime mover of the feudal society had a significant impact on locating laws of motion in the class conflicts, highlighting their historical specificity to the epoch of production in question and the formative role of human praxis in historical movement, rather than delegating it to any structural (objective) aspect such as economic logic.¹⁶⁷

To return to our point of departure and revisit Banaji's emphasis on the analytical importance of spotting historically specific laws of motion of a mode of production to distinguish it from another and embrace its complexity, it can be said that Banaji, to some extent, fails to develop a model surpassing state-centred explanations—interestingly reminding the state-centeredness of the conventional Ottoman historiography—for the pre-capitalist structures so far labelled as Asiatic systems. He acknowledges that Marx's views on the isolated self-sufficient village communities do not hold for the Ottomans and Safavids where the caste system did not exist.¹⁶⁸ But following Marx, he also underlines the lack of hereditary nobility and corvée form of labour exploitation and more importantly, the absence of private property on land in the East as its distinguishing features.¹⁶⁹

Most decisively, according to Banaji, "tributary" social formations of the East differed from the feudal systems of the West primarily with their centralised fiscal mechanisms based on their states' (Mughals, Ottomans, Muscovites, late Romans, Byzantines, late Sassanids, Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, Chinese dynasties) territorial control over the flow of high levels of liquidity to the central treasury.¹⁷⁰ The dynamic relationship between territorial expansion and economic growth is key to understanding the movement in the social formations of the East. In this respect, Banaji seems to locate the laws of motion of the "tributary mode" between the political history of the tributary states, in terms of territorial expansion and contraction, and the internal power configuration between the ruler and the ruling class, as well as the economic logic of a highly monetised social system.¹⁷¹ In this perspective, class dynamics hold an analytical value only insofar as they serve to construe intra-state struggles.

¹⁶⁷Paul Blackledge *Reflections*, 135-136.

¹⁶⁸Even for the Indian village, the idea of self-sufficiency was a fabrication of the English colonial administration. Banaji, *Theory as History*, 17.

¹⁶⁹John Haldon "Theories of Practice," 44-45; Banaji, *Theory as History*, 354-6.

¹⁷⁰Banaji, *Theory as History*, 23-40.

¹⁷¹*Ibid*, 37.

Banaji prefers to employ the concept of the “tributary mode of production”¹⁷² in his approach to Eastern social formations, discerning them as based on a completely distinctive mode of production from that of the feudal systems of the West. The concept of the tributary mode of production was, in fact, previously proposed, and developed by Samir Amin, who, contrary to Banaji, aimed to reach a single and universal definition of a mode of production for the social formations preceding capitalism.

2.4.5 The Tributary Mode of Production: From Samir Amin to John Haldon

Amin offers three general historical stages all of which correspond to a historically specific and distinctive articulation of the relations of production and the level of development of productive forces: the communitarian stage (not primitive communist), which rested on the emergence of a small amount of surplus used collectively; the tributary stage entailing a more developed rural production able to sustain a state and cities; and the capitalist stage, marking industrialisation and urbanisation.¹⁷³

The tributary mode resembled an extreme variety in terms of the modes of labour organisation and the status of the direct producers. Therefore, for Amin, it is not accurate to reduce the pre-capitalist class societies to two forms, that is, slavery and feudalism for two reasons. Firstly, it is dubious that presuming a separate slave mode of production is a valid categorisation. Slavery as a labour process corresponded to various levels of the development of productive forces, not necessarily defining a particular stage before feudalism. Secondly, the slave form of labour did not reproduce itself historically and through socially specific mechanisms. Instead, it seems to have emerged as an “accessory and accidental form” by the pressure of market relations.¹⁷⁴ In this respect, slavery can safely be dismissed as a relevant mode of production.

As for feudalism, Amin underlines that conventionally it describes a specifically Western European form of a pre-capitalist social formation originally shaped by synthesis and developed in combination between “communitarian forms” introduced by the Barbarians and “more advanced Roman heritage.”¹⁷⁵ However, this does not

¹⁷²Ibid, 22-3; 356.

¹⁷³Samir Amin, “Modes of Production, History and Unequal Development,” 203.

¹⁷⁴Ibid.

¹⁷⁵Ibid, 204.

mean that feudalism was a distinct mode of production. It was a sub-form, a peripheral variation of a:

“general tributary state presenting common fundamental characteristics which prevail over the specifics: (i) the predominance of use value and the restricted domain of market relations; (ii) the extraction of excess production by extra-economic means; (iii) the dominance of the ideological moment and the form of the dominant ideology, characterised by social alienation in nature, being of a religious type (this follows from (ii)); (iv) the apparent stability is in reality only the relative slowness of the progress of productive forces within this mode of production; and (v) a fundamental class struggle between peasants and the tributary class serves as a moving force in the sense that it impels the development of productive forces.”¹⁷⁶

From a strictly empiricist perspective, Amin’s interpretation could be dismissed as an attempt at oversimplification based on pure theory, which promises to cover a vast geography and chronology without consulting the historical specificity and complexity of numerous social formations observed in time and space.¹⁷⁷

However, the relevance of the Marxist analysis of the pre-capitalist societies stems from its analytical strength in underlining the formative role of class struggles and thus the potential it poses to dig into the *shared histories of the oppressed*. Particularism and/or relativism are often upheld by nationalists and post-modernists who have a penchant to dismiss universal history as an irrelevant field of study.¹⁷⁸ It is imperative here to ask, from *the vantage point of the rural commoners* of the pre-capitalist epoch, whether it is necessary to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the class dynamics of the feudal West and the so-called Asiatic East. I think the synthesis of one universal mode of production may be illuminating to come up with the common dynamics of pre-capitalist class struggles, without reducing it to a simplistic mechanism of struggle for rent between the exploited and exploiters, but developing a multi-layered perspective that integrates the contradictions within the state-elite, the ruling class, fractions of the dominant class (could be defined in various other ways) to the picture. The tributary mode of production thesis aligns with this agenda.

¹⁷⁶Ibid, 203.

¹⁷⁷cf. John Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode*, 91ff.

¹⁷⁸Samir Amin, *Class and Nation, Historically and in the Current Crisis*. (Monthly Review Press, 1980), 12-13. When Amin wrote these lines, post-modernism and its relativist assumptions had not challenged the legitimacy of universal histories yet. In addition, contemporary neo-positivists, inspired by Skocpol, Mann, etc. adopt “an agnostic approach to the problem of determination, which is in fact key in Marxist theory, and prefer a plurality of interrelated causal elements which determine and overdetermine one another according to context –time, place and structure.” The notion of class struggle in such approaches has no analytical priority, or no relevance at all. Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode*, 48.

We know that Marx indeed later dismissed his earlier Orientalist assumptions about the East, regarding socially stagnant structures and lack of classes, after acquainting with Russian historian and sociologist M. M. Kovalevskii's works in the 1870s, but remained distant to the idea of a universal feudal mode of production for social formations in which, according to him, class relations and production were distinctive from those of the classical structures of medieval West: ¹⁷⁹

“When he read Kovelevsky, he had abandoned his earlier view about the government as the original owner of all the land, denouncing its doctrinal character and the role it played in legitimating the dispossession of indigenous communities by the French (in Algeria) and the British (in northern India).”¹⁸⁰

What appears as the key element in Marx's later focus on the East, is the dismissal of the exclusive explanatory priority attached to the completely fictitious idea that the Sultan possesses an exclusive title to the soil, and following Kovelevskii, the stress on a more dynamic structure that “a form of class-struggle that pitted ruler against ruling class and (in his pages on the Mughals) the gradual consolidation of a subversive rural aristocracy, the *zamindars*, whose relation to the state had always been fraught with tension.” ¹⁸¹

These observations must be further discussed by empirical studies, of course. As a general tendency, in tributary formations, the fief holders (*sipahis* in the Ottoman case) usually sought to transform their fief-holding status into an irrevocable title, and along with this transformation, to expand the “content” of their possession of a certain amount of land and revenue sources by increasing their share in the tributes vis-à-vis the centre or securing additional sources of income for themselves. The hypocentre of the intra-ruling class conflict was the tension stemming from the centralist agenda of the ruler and the centrifugal tendencies of the local power holders, to whom the ruler had to delegate his authority under a set of terms and in return for the fulfilment of, mostly, military-administrative duties.¹⁸² However,

¹⁷⁹Banaji, *Theory as History*, 20. Marx and Engels had a growing interest in the revolutionary potentials of the East, mainly Russia, especially after the fall of the Commune. Therefore, they revised their former Orientalist baggage and sought a more complex and dense analysis. See Marx's interesting lines in his letter to Wilhelm Liebknecht, dated 4 February 1878: “...we have studied the *Turkish peasant*—i.e. the mass of the Turkish people—and in this way have come to see him as indubitably one of the *ablest and most moral representatives of the peasantry in Europe*.” Marx Engels, *Collected Works* Vol.45, 296.

¹⁸⁰Banaji, *Theory as History*, 20.

¹⁸¹Ibid, 21-22.

¹⁸²Its clearest example in the Ottoman case was the developments during Mehmed II's reign as most of the *mülk-timars* and *waqf* lands were confiscated and turned into ordinary *timars* allotted to *sipahis* under strict surveillance of the centre. Oktay Özel, “Limits of Almighty, Mehmed II's Land Reform Revisited” *JESHO* 42 (2), (1999): 226-246; John Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode*, 167-168. Starting from the last decades of the fifteenth century and most intensively during Ivan IV's reign, Rurik rulers' attempts

in whatever form the power con-figuration within the ruling class and between the ruling class and the ruler himself appears, this does not change the fundamentals of the relationship between peasant masses and appropriators of surplus.¹⁸³

This emphasis on the general characteristics of intra-ruling class conflict coheres also with non-Marxist historians' definition of feudalism:

“in terms not of the economic relationships which underlie the phenomenal forms of the political structures of surplus distribution and power, but of the types of political/legal structures themselves - structures of vassalage, enfeoffment, and so on, together with the supporting elements of the dependent tenant or serf peasantries, and the fragmentation of judicial and political authority and powers.”¹⁸⁴

For Haldon, non-Marxists' legal-institutional approach, and historical materialists' political-economic approach, which prioritises production relations, are not mutually exclusive.¹⁸⁵

As we mentioned, Amin directly refers, except for the third criterion, to the relations of production to distinguish the tributary mode of production from the other modes. Among these five criteria, the second and the fifth conceptualise the notion of class struggle, chiefly between the direct producers, free of their status, and the appropriators of surplus (the tributary class, encapsulating both the Western feudal nobility and the Eastern/Asiatic service nobility or centrally appointed officials of the Imperial state.) For this reason, his contribution is especially valuable for Ottoman-Turkish historiography since the hegemonic approaches in this field, either influenced by sui-generis interpretation or Asiatic mode of production theory, are prone to gloss over the notion of class struggle in explaining the dynamics of the Ottoman social formation by stating that even if the Ottoman peasantry was an exploited class, this was an anonymous process of exploitation not graspable in the direct process of production, thus did not result in wide-spread peasant revolts

to transform the traditional Boyar class to a service nobility, directly answerable to the ruler himself, reflect a similar tendency. However, in both cases, usually a third element, the peasantry is glossed over.

During Mehmed II's reign, the introduction of a centrally and strictly supervised fief system was backed by the preparation of a detailed *Kanunname*, that sought to standardise the tax and tributes that peasants (and nomadic pastoralists) owed to their overlords. This ensured the fief owners' control over the peasantry, a more effective tribute system, but also, the centre set limits on the fief-holding class. In the Moskowite case, the introduction of the *pomestye* system and transformation of the Boyars to a service-nobility also necessitated restrictions on peasants' mobility, clarified in the *Sudebniks* of Ivan III and Ivan IV.

¹⁸³Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode*, 85. Here we refer, not only to the coercive method of surplus appropriation but also to the restrictions on the peasants' mobility and control over their means of production by the ruling class.

¹⁸⁴Ibid, 72.

¹⁸⁵Ibid, 72-3.

contrary to what was seen in feudal Europe.¹⁸⁶ The strength of Amin’s analysis lies in its refusal of the false assumption that identifies the East with stasis in terms of class struggles.

Yet a serious problem in Amin’s account is the distinction he presupposes between the mode of production and social formation. This leads him to conceptualise social formation as an articulation of a complex group of modes of production among which there is a dominant one.¹⁸⁷ Here Amin reduces the concept of mode of production to the phenomenal form of surplus appropriation—a fallacious tendency, which we discussed referring to Banaji’s critique in the previous pages—and consequently reaches the conclusion that given a social formation is composed of several modes of production, the predominant mode of production in any particular social formation denotes the predominant form of surplus.¹⁸⁸ His argument follows as, particularly for the tributary mode, the linkage of the secondary modes such as slave-owning and simple commodity production is assessed “in terms of the circulation of original surplus (i.e. generated by the dominant tributary relations itself), to which added the possible generation of secondary surplus (from the dominated relations).”¹⁸⁹ However, Banaji asserts that the distinction between modes of production and social formation may, rather than being a consistent assertion to delve into the social and historical complexity, “obscure and mystify the mechanisms of modes of production.”¹⁹⁰ Even in its purest form, feudal relations of production were supported by a variety of forms of labour which included domestic slaves, hired workers recruited

¹⁸⁶ Barkan, *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, 728; Halil İnalçık, *The Middle East and Balkans Under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993: 149; Sencer Divitçioğlu, *Asya Üretim Tarzı*, 71-2; İslamoğlu and Keyder, “Agenda,” 37-8; 45.

¹⁸⁷ Samir Amin, *Unequal development: an essay on the social formations of peripheral capitalism*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976): 16.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. 18; Wickham also highlights that a social formation is constituted by different modes of production, and only one of them holds dominance over the others. According to him, rent-taking and tax-raising denominate two distinct modes of productions; respectively, feudal and tributary. What constitutes the uniqueness of the East is the predominance of tax-raising over rent-taking. In other words, in the Islamic world, India and China, tributary mode of production is the dominant mode of production over that of feudal. But tax-raising and rent-taking co-exist antagonistically and this antagonism creates a constant tension at the political level between centralization and decentralization in tributary social formations. This tension manifests itself in dynastic cycles in accordance to the power configuration within the ruling class. The fractionalization within the ruling class represents evidence for two antagonistically co-existing modes of production. (Wickham, 1985).

¹⁸⁹ Amin, *Unequal development*, 19.

¹⁹⁰ Banaji, *Theory as History*, 92. Haldon is among the ones who put a distinction between the mode of production and social formation. According to him, the concept of mode of production is a macro-level, descriptive and heuristic device, which represents the ideal-typical relationships corresponding to a particular level of development of productive forces, whereas social formation implies historically specific societies in which micro-level relationships and processes are observed. These two concepts are, not mutually exclusive but analytically complementary to each other. (Haldon 1993, 59-61). For a critique of Haldon’s perspective, see Blackledge, *Reflections* 146; note 155. In his polemic with Banaji, Haldon discards his former view and underlines that “a mode of production is not a Weberian ideal-type, or a *prioristic* construct within a series of such constructs generated in the abstract and against which historical data can be measured, but on the contrary a set of relationships generated and generalised out of actual historical examples.” (Haldon 2013, 41).

from the impoverished segments of the peasantry, free tenants performing temporary services and serfs bound by labour services. Neither the existence of slaves nor hired labourers in this context meant the co-existence of slave and capitalist modes along with the feudal mode of production. On the contrary, these labour forms were incorporated into feudal relations.¹⁹¹ The same is true for the subsumption of nomadic-pastoralist economic organisations, which do not constitute separate modes of production in the sense of the *Produktionsweise*, by the tributary relations (if we think of the Ottoman context, for instance). In fact, such an interpretation that presumes an articulation of several modes misleadingly seeks a virtual identity between forms of exploitation and relations of production, thus reducing the mode of production to the presence of a characteristic labour form; a fallacy discussed in the previous pages.

Nevertheless, Amin's assertion of the concept of tributary mode, while problematic in the abovementioned respects, has given a new impulse to the analysis of pre-capitalist social formations. Amin's conclusion was further elaborated by John Haldon (1993; 2013), who discusses the tributary mode in relation to the complexity and historical specificity of the Byzantine, Ottoman and Mughal imperial state formations. I think Amin's accounts undoubtedly suffer from theory centrism whereas Haldon's account is fairly balanced between historical materialist theory and empirical analysis of specific societies. Though Haldon's research agenda revolves around the question of particularly pre-capitalist states, can act relatively autonomously from the relations of production and in what conditions,¹⁹² his analysis must not be confused with the state-centric approaches we discussed earlier in this chapter. Haldon asserts that state formations are products of the context of class antagonisms, thus their capacities and actions, which necessarily represent the interests of the ruling class, are constrained and determined by the fundamental dynamics of the relations of production. The reproduction and prevalence of relations of exploitation and subordination constitute the fundamental logic behind the state's institutional arrangements.¹⁹³ However, this does not mean that the ruling class always act as a homogenous ruling bloc over the subordinated and exploited classes; instead, it might also be divided into rival fractions over the matters regarding the control over means of production and distribution of surplus among their ranks and these divisions might manifest themselves in political-ideological grounds.

¹⁹¹For instance, even the manorial system in thirteenth-century England, considered as the classical epoch of manor, was far from resembling unification and systematization in respect of property types and forms of feudal rent as well. Eugene A. Kosminskii, *Studies in the Agricultural History of England in the thirteenth century*. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956).

¹⁹²Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode*, 16.

¹⁹³*Ibid*, 37-38.

2.4.6 Tax (Tribute) vs. Feudal Rent

This conclusion brings us to the debate concerning whether tax-tribute denominates a modal distinction from the feudal mode of production. Do tax and rent constitute two different types of surplus extraction? Or can we consider tax (tribute), within the same family of forms of appropriation of surplus, such as rent in kind, rent in money and labour rent, briefly as another form of feudal rent yet particular to the more centralised types of pre-capitalist states?

As mentioned, Banaji stresses for a historically more accurate and sensible analysis, the distinction between feudal rent and tax, which, according to him, constitute the crucial difference between feudal West and Asiatic regimes, ought to be maintained and not to be minimised for the sake of a synthesis of a general and universal “feudal mode of production” thesis.¹⁹⁴ In the same vein, he reiterates the phenomenal forms of surplus appropriation do not necessarily illustrate the existence of distinct modes of production within one social formation. Instead, defining the modes of production through their historically specific laws of motion, which manifest themselves in the production relations, would be the real Marxist method. Nevertheless, Banaji does not explain the law(s) of motion for the tributary mode.

Chris Wickham (1985) also draws a modal distinction between rent and tax, in terms of the economic logic behind their differentiation, and also regarding the survival of the centralised states (socio-political differentiation) in Asia albeit in a continual process of dynastic takeovers.¹⁹⁵ For the moment, we can live aside the socio-political dimension of Wickham’s approach, as he acknowledges that he takes the difference between tax and rent for granted,¹⁹⁶ and concentrates on his conclusion of the difference between their economic logic. In the first section of his article, he touches upon and criticises Perry Anderson (1974) who defines the feudal mode through its super-structure; i.e., parcelised sovereignty, a hierarchical political-military system based on vassalage, etc.¹⁹⁷ Here, Wickham seems to follow “a systematic economic analysis” based on “the correspondence of given sets of productive forces and social relations of production” in differentiating modes of production from one another.¹⁹⁸ But from that perspective which implies the feudal

¹⁹⁴Banaji, *Theory as History*, 22.

¹⁹⁵For the survival of the centralised state structures in the East, (Wickham 1985, 171-182); for the difference between tax and rent in their economic logics, (Wickham 1985, 182-187).

¹⁹⁶Ibid, 171.

¹⁹⁷Ibid, 169.

¹⁹⁸Ibid, 168. From that perspective, there would be no clear difference between tax and rent. Interestingly enough, Wickham also admits that from the peasants’ standpoint, tax and rent are indistinguishable unless

mode of production was a world system, the problem of uniqueness of the West in its trajectory to capitalism remains unresolved.¹⁹⁹

Wickham tries to solve this dilemma by presuming a relationship of domination between tax-raising and rent-taking forms and concludes that the medieval and post-medieval West was one of the rare examples where rent-taking (or feudalism) dominated over other forms of surplus appropriation. On the other hand, in many pre-capitalist societies including the Ottomans, tax-raising (or tributary mode of production) was dominant.²⁰⁰ He also discards the definition of feudalism as “private justice plus serfdom-labour service”, and of the Asiatic mode of production as “autarchic village communes” plus “tax-raising state owning all landed property and carrying out large-scale necessary public works” since they are historically too rare and geographically too limited, being far from constituting an analytical standpoint.²⁰¹ He proposes a more simple pattern about the relationship of a state bureaucracy, i.e., state class with the peasants. In this system, the state class had the political rights to obtain peasants’ surplus by holding public institutions, such as timar, for only a limited period. Their political rights to hold fiefs did not necessitate tenurial control over the peasantry, unlike the feudal system in the West.²⁰² In this sense, the system might be considered a “state version of feudalism.”²⁰³ However, this formulation fails to recognise the co-existence of rent-taking and tax-raising in an antagonism, both politically and in terms of their economic logics; thus the

they are forced to corvée in their local overlords’ private demesne, i.e., both are unnecessary outgoings enforced by various extra-economic sanctions. *Ibid*, 183.

¹⁹⁹This assumption in the sense that it admits, as a law, feudalism was predestined to end up with capitalism. However, I think, the transition to capitalism from feudalism was only a tendency, not a law. The speed of transition the capitalism may vary in its tempo; it can be retarded by the reciprocal impact of the power configuration within the ruling class on production relations or blocked as well by historical circumstances. Therefore, the question of transition must be considered as an empirically open-ended one. The uniqueness of Western Europe in its trajectory toward capitalism may be related to the fact that it never experienced nomadic incursions from the tenth century onwards (Bloch 2004, 56) whereas the Middle East, Anatolia, Eastern Europe, China and Indian subcontinent were harassed by waves of invading Turkic and Mongolic nomads for several times in the same period. This point is also underlined by Bertkay with reference to Bloch. (Berkay 1987, 317-8; 329).

²⁰⁰Wickham, “The Uniqueness of the East,” 169-170; This argument is based on that “each concrete society is probably a combination of several modes, among which, however, one must dominate the others.” However, I agree with Banaji on his conclusion that the distinction between social formation and mode of production must be discarded. It would be more accurate to state that, pre-capitalist societies, and particularly the Ottomans, were marked by one single mode which is indeed an exploitative class system, and may integrate forms of exploitation characteristically belong to other modes such as slavery and wage labour. However, these integrated forms of exploitation themselves do not constitute separate or secondary modes of production. I think, the real tension, contrary to Wickham’s tax vs. rent antagonism, is the one between the exploitative mode (either labelled as tributary or feudal) and pre/proto-class, non-exploitative social relations, such as varieties of nomadism and rural communalism.

²⁰¹*Ibid*, 170.

²⁰²The assumption of the lack of tenurial control in the Ottoman land regime, is factually incorrect. (Berkay 1987, 328 note.25).

²⁰³Wickham, “The Uniqueness of the East,” 170-171.

complexity of tributary social formations.²⁰⁴ Wickham's counterargument is simple: instead of emphasising the distinction between public vs. private and legal characteristics of landed property, which, by definition include superstructural aspects of a social formation in defining and distinguishing its mode of production, he offers an analysis of the nature of the tributary states' economic resources whereby "the separate identity of state (tax) vis-à-vis the landlords (rent) could be explored."²⁰⁵

Tributary states differed from their feudal counterparts primarily because they did not only tax the peasantry but imposed taxes or obligations on the landlords as well. In other words, due to their centralised political power,²⁰⁶ tributary states claimed a certain percentage of the surplus extracted from the producers by non-producers. Because of the internal differentiation within the ruling class, tributary social formations exemplified more complex economic and socio-political mechanisms than their feudal counterparts.²⁰⁷ But this argument, by itself, is insufficient to establish a modal difference between tax and rent in terms of their economic logic in operation, at least from the perspective of the rural tribute payers and direct producers. An exploration and comparison of "the relationship between alternate exploiting groups and the peasantry" is needed.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁴Ibid.171; to further illustrate the point he mentions the ones who do not distinguish between tax and rent since both two are based on extra-economic coercion; as a result, they are centralised and decentralised (public and private) variants of the same economic system, namely feudal. The problem of this formulation, according to Wickham is that, it presupposes all extra-economic surplus extraction from the peasantry has to be the same economic form; this conclusion glosses over the historical complexity of a vast range of social formations. Ibid, 183-184. However, Haldon finds the definition based on extra-economic coercion useful for analytical purposes: "If...we are looking for similar patterns of social relations of production (between producers and non-producers, or with regard to the modes of surplus appropriation and distribution, and so forth), then a mode of production is quite specific - it describes the ideal form of these fundamental economic relationships and is, in consequence, a very valuable instrument for narrowing down the field of possible interpretations of the empirical data." (Haldon 1993, 64)

²⁰⁵Wickham, "The Uniqueness of the East," 184.

²⁰⁶It seemingly stemmed from the eminent rights of the ruler over all landed property. But what did the ruler's claim of ultimate ownership stem from? Wickham does not see the question of how the state came to take over all the property, as a relevant problem for his purposes. The answer might lie in the circumstances of conquest combined with an ideology which regards all land as nominally owned by God, thus by the community, and by thus the state. But the eminent rights of the ruler were not a trademark of the Eastern states; "William the Conqueror claimed no less full ultimate ownership of land, and indeed exercised his eminent rights rather more seriously, without being any less emblematic feudal monarch, in all senses. But the Seljuks, and still more, the Ottomans, went beyond this: they did not merely have eminent rights; they owned. This difference does not turn on legal prerogatives; it turns on power. In Turkey, the state had the political strength to maintain its rights to all land as the state and as the immediate landowner, real and uncontested for centuries." (Wickham 1985, 179-180) Regarding Wickham's emphasis on state power, however, maintains that Wickham falls into inconsistency and ambiguity, on the one hand by excluding legal forms (public vs. private) from the definition of the mode of production for they are super structural, on the other by including state power, which is super structural as well, to the definition. Bertkay's argument follows as "Treating a certain manifestation of state power is justified if and only if it can be separately shown that such a non-feudal mode actually exists at the economic level and that the state power in question derives from and rests on - is the superstructure of- that non-feudal mode." (Berkay 1987, 306-7)

²⁰⁷Wickham, "The Uniqueness of the East," 184: "The feudal mode can exist without the tributary mode, but the tributary mode cannot exist without the feudal mode... it continually has to fight off the feudalization of some of its local institutions; its history is the history of resultant antagonisms."

²⁰⁸Ibid, 183-4, cf. Bertkay 1987, 298-300. Here by distancing himself from the political economy concept of rent, Wickham equates feudal rent thus feudalism to direct personal and private control of the land by the landlords, while taxation thus tributary mode to the overriding rights of the state. As Bertkay

In the tributary mode, driven by an economic objective solely on financing wars and an expanded bureaucracy, the state confined itself to creating the conditions of reproduction of the peasant economy by securing the maintenance of household plots. It did not intervene in the immediate processes of production, and thus “does not need to control the economic and social lives of its subjects.”²⁰⁹ In the feudal mode, the land-lords tended to intervene in the production process in order to ensure their political power and control over the peasantry.²¹⁰ As a focal point, supposedly different dynamics of class struggle might reveal the modal difference between tributary and feudal modes. The ruling classes in the feudal mode are relatively separated from the production process and their counterparts in the tributary are near-totally separated. In the feudal mode, therefore, the class struggle is simply between the landlords and the peasantry over the control of the processes of production, whereas the struggle takes place between the state, peasants and landlords over the amount of the payable taxes in the tributary mode.²¹¹

I am not sure that Wickham successfully demonstrates the difference in the economic logic of tax and rent, for he acknowledges that he takes the alleged modal distinction between the two for granted.²¹² This assumption, I think, hampers the validity of his further arguments although there are certain inspiring points in these. In his objection to Wickham, Berktaş maintains that if there is a modal distinction between tax and rent, three preconditions are required:

“(a) A demonstration that in the case of the ‘feudal’ or ‘rent mode’ on the one hand, and the ‘tax mode’ on the other, we are faced with two

suggests, these conclusions remind Weberian terminology which draws a sharp line between patrimonial and prebendal forms of domain. Therefore, Wickham’s analysis is problematic in at least two respects: Firstly, he deduces the mode of production from the institutional form of surplus extraction; secondly, he defines the mode of production through legal forms of property ownership, in other words, he reduces the relations of production to property relations.

²⁰⁹Wickham, “The Uniqueness of the East,” 185-187. The basic premises of this statement are empirically wrong, at least for the Ottoman society, and hampers the consistency of his further arguments. As underlined: “The Ottoman state did control the peasants tenurially: it positioned and empowered its fief-holders to watch agricultural production quite closely, so that a peasant could not change his main crops, could not freely change arable to meadow or vice versa, could not let his land go uncultivated for three years in a row without paying a fine or risking confiscation of his holding, could not even cut down trees on his land without the timariot’s permission – Ottoman land-codes give hundreds of examples of regulation of this kind.” (Berktaş 1987, 328 note.25).

²¹⁰Wickham, “The Uniqueness of the East,” 185-186.

²¹¹Ibid. According to Berktaş, here, Wickham’s choice of the words “relative separation” and “near-total separation” does not preclude him from being in line with orthodox Turkish Ottomanists and AMP-theorists who presume that the European feudal lord *directly* engages in production as a manager of a private agricultural enterprise while the Ottoman (timar holder solely acts based on collecting taxes without showing a tendency to intervene into the production process. (Berktaş 1987, 303-4). Another point to mention is Wickham’s emphasis on peasant-landlord alliance in cases of *acute forms of class struggle* observed in tributary formations. I think this suggestion is also wrong for idealising the rural rebellions in Europe as always containing pure peasant character.

²¹²Wickham, “The Uniqueness of the East,” 171.

different ways in which the direct producers and the means of production are combined; (b) A further demonstration that out of these two different ‘ways of combining’, there necessarily flow two different types of surplus extraction; (c) A final demonstration that a + b together determine two different essential class structures. All this may also be expressed by saying that we have to be shown two different basic relations of production between a (different) principal producing class and a (different) principal exploiting class.”²¹³

Wickham fails in proving these preconditions: concerning the first precondition, Wickham acknowledges that both in his tax mode and supposedly opposing rent mode, the combination of the peasants with their means of production was observably reflecting the same pattern.²¹⁴ Concerning the second precondition, Wickham also accurately rejects the idea of associating feudalism solely with demesne production and corvée. Apart from enforced labour, rent in kind, money rent and feudal rent in the form of tax (in kind or in cash) are inseparable from the peasant standpoint since both are based on extra-economic coercion.²¹⁵ So what remains for the credibility of his argument is his hypothesis on the relative separation and near-total separation of the ruling classes from the processes of production, in feudal and tributary modes of production, respectively.

This assumption is also open to be challenged on theoretical and empirical grounds. In light of these considerations, we can safely dismiss Wickham’s proposition of feudalism (rent) vs. non-feudalism (tax) dichotomy and safely reformulate it as private

²¹³Berktaý, “The Feudalism Debate,” 302.

²¹⁴Wickham, “The Uniqueness of the East,” 183; cf. Berktaý, “The Feudalism Debate,” 302. Berktaý grounds his objection to Wickham with reference to Marx’s oft-quoted sentences in *Capital* Volume 3: “It is furthermore evident that in all forms in which the direct labourer remains the ‘possessor’ of the means of production and labour conditions necessary for the production of his own means of subsistence, the property relationship must simultaneously appear as a direct relationship of lordship and servitude so that the direct producer is not free; a lack of freedom which may be reduced from serfdom with enforced labour to a mere tributary relationship.” Also quoted in Haldon, *State and the Tributary Mode*, 77.

²¹⁵Wickham, “The Uniqueness of the East,” 183. Marx himself subsumes tax under feudal rent: “Should the direct producers not be confronted by a private landowner, but rather, as in Asia, under direct subordination to a state which stands over them as their landlord and simultaneously as sovereign, then rent and taxes coincide, or rather, there exists no tax which differs from this form of ground rent. Under such circumstances, there need exist no stronger political or economic pressure than that common to all subjects to that state. The state is then the supreme lord. Sovereignty here consists in the ownership of land concentrated on a national scale. But, on the other hand, no private ownership of land exists, although there is both private and common possession and use of land.” Marx Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol.37, 777. In respect of Marx’s last sentence, Haldon warns the reader adding that: “states in Asia may at times (although by no means always) have claimed a theoretical ‘ownership’ of all land, and they may even, at times (although again, as we shall see, for fairly limited periods), have been able more-or-less effectively to control the distribution of the surpluses appropriated therefrom. But in general, the land was under the effective control of a ruling class of one sort or another, usually at least partially integrated into the state’s apparatuses of rule, which in practice treated the land and the direct producers no differently from the ways in which western European feudal landlords who had full legal possession treated their own lands and tenants. Marx’s notion that ‘no private ownership of land existed’ where the state claimed absolute ownership rights must be interpreted very carefully, therefore, especially in the light of the rider which he adds (perhaps expressing his own doubts as to the exactitude of his terms): ‘although there is both private and common possession and use of land’. I suggest that this passage by itself in fact provides no grounds for seeing tax and rent as somehow mutually exclusive.” (Haldon 1993, 81-82).

feudalism vs. state feudalism.²¹⁶ Therefore, we can further assert that the contradiction between the central government and the timar holders in the Ottoman context—from lowest to highest rank—was not an antagonism between two distinct modes of production, yet a political antagonism internal to feudalism itself on control and distribution of surplus within the fractions of the ruling class.²¹⁷ According to Berktaý,

“the various interpenetrations of *feudal tax* and *feudal rent* are nothing but so many reflections of the various ways in which the feudal state’s ‘eminent rights’ and the more particular land-rights of the feudal ruling class may meet in conflict and submerge one another within one specific synthesis, which then gives way to another specific synthesis as the balance of power changes.”²¹⁸

Last but not least, we ought to return to Banaji’s interpretation of the tributary mode of production as a separate mode from feudalism and Haldon’s critique of his conclusions. Banaji acknowledges that the model of self-sufficient and isolated village communities coupled with an all-powerful state mechanism, which lacks any significant class formation is far from describing the essential characteristics of Asiatic regimes properly.²¹⁹ Another point that was claimed to distinguish the Asiatic regimes from the West is the absence of private property in land, i.e., rulers’ exclusive title to the soil of their dominions, a theme central to Marx’s analysis during the 1850s. However, as Banaji suggests, in historical cases of China, Safavid Persia, Mughal India, Russia and the Ottoman Empire, “the actual arrangements under which the land was held were more complex and subject to variation” notwithstand-

²¹⁶Berktaý, “The Feudalism Debate” 301; Berktaý’s assumption rests on “Marx’s concept of feudal rent as a general concept of political economy, general form of a type of surplus appropriation which encapsulates labour rent, rent in kind, money rent and tax. These are all forms of the expression of unpaid surplus labour in pre-capitalist economic class formations.” (Haldon 2013, 43; 48).

²¹⁷Wickham, “The Uniqueness of the East,” 180. In his depiction of the Ottoman timar, Wickham resorts to the basic premises of conventional Ottomanists. (cf. Haldon 1993, 168-171) Wickham’s further argument is also ambiguous. Did the Ottomans dismantle the timar system for it contained feudalising dangers or simply for it became obsolete as a military system against new infantry tactics they faced on the European front, and also the system of in-kind payments based on village-level cereal production turned into an inefficient method under the inflationary pressure of Spanish silver? Berktaý comes up with a historically more nuanced explanation, without employing East/West, tax/rent, or tributary/feudal dichotomies: “Medieval statehood calls for the solution, within the context of primitive levels of transport and monetisation, of the double problem of maintaining the basic producing class, spread out over the face of the earth, in subject and tax-paying status (in other words, preventing any evasion of surplus transfer), and of sustaining, with a part of these revenues, the army and the bureaucracy. Whatever the starting point may be, the typical method adopted sooner or later is to distribute land, together with the peasant families attached, in the form of at least initially conditional allocations of *pronoia* (Byzantium), *beneficium* or *feodum* (Western Europe), *kat’ia* (classical Islam before the Turks), *iktâ* (Seljukides of Iran and of Anatolia), *timar* (the Ottomans), etc., to commanders and soldiers; it must be added that in a society divided to estates, where the exploited are entirely disarmed, there is a close correspondence between the army and the greater part of the ruling class.” (Berktaý 1987, 312-13); (Haldon 1993, 85ff.); (idem 2013, 54-55).

²¹⁸Berktaý, “The Feudalism Debate”, 310-11.

²¹⁹Banaji, *Theory as History*, 17.

ing their own doctrines of landed property.²²⁰ In fact, the most striking characteristic of the Asiatic regimes, as European observers suggested, “was the peculiar servility of the ruling class” to the ruler him-self.²²¹ Nevertheless, according to Banaji, the absence of private property in land was the main reason behind Marx’s reluctance to accept an all-encompassing notion of feudalism and this theme constitutes the key to the modal distinction between feudal-ism and Asiatic style regimes.²²² The ruler’s exclusive title to soil creates constant tension between the ruler and the fractions of the ruling class who seek to transform their revenue or land allotments into hereditary holdings and titles, independent from the intervention of the ruler.

Once put in this way, a different picture from the Orientalist model that depicts the Asiatic style regimes with a total absence of intermediary classes between the state and village communities emerges.²²³ Stemming from Marx’s reluctance to accept feudalism as a universal pre-capitalist mode of production and referring to Trotsky’s emphasis on the peculiarities of Russia, Banaji draws a sharp line of demarcation between feudalism and tributary mode of production. For feudalism, Banaji’s chief criterion is the combination of serfdom (labour-rent) with private landlords holding direct control over the means of production and the labour processes.²²⁴ According to this formulation, the question of whether tax is a form of feudal rent has no explanatory role.²²⁵

Banaji considers the tributary mode of production as a novel and a more accurate

²²⁰Ibid, 18-19.

²²¹Ibid, 19.

²²²Ibid, 19-20.

²²³Ibid, 19-20.

²²⁴Ibid, 253-256; Haldon, “Theories of Practice,” 44.

²²⁵Banaji, *Theory as History*, 256; regarding the feudal rent, both Banaji and Haldon refer to Marx’s notes about the ground rent in *Capital* vol.3, and interestingly they reach different conclusions or use these notes to justify different theoretical positions. However, in Banaji’s analysis, the theoretical influence of *Grundrisse* is distinguishable in his commentary about the tributary mode, although here there is no specific reference to Marx’s work where he underlines that “The result at which we arrive is, not that production, distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but that they are all elements of a totality, differences within a unity. Production is the dominant moment, both with regard to itself in the contradictory determination of production and with regard to the other moments. The process always starts afresh with production. That exchange and consumption cannot be the dominant moments is self-evident, and the same applies to distribution as the distribution of products. As distribution of the agents of production, however, it is itself a moment of production. A definite [mode of] production thus determines a definite [mode of] consumption, distribution, exchange and *definite relations of these different moments to one another*. Production *in its one-sided form*, however, is in its turn also determined by the other moments.” (emphasis added) Marx Engels, *Collected Works* Vol.28, 36-37. Following Marx, we may conclude that effective control of the state over the means of production results in a different configuration of relations of production in comparison to private and direct control of a lordly class. But, contrary to Banaji, I am not sure if this differentiation indicates a distinction in the modalities, since in both types, the peasants are the actual possessors of the land, necessitating extra-economic means for surplus appropriation. In other words, the mode of surplus appropriation remains the same, while, in accordance with this or that type of power configuration between the state-centre and local power holders, the rate of exploitation may show variance. Haldon, “Theories of Practice,” 54; 300-301, note 14.

branding for the former Asiatic mode of production concept. He defines the tributary mode of production “as a mode of production where the state controls both the means of production and the ruling class and has unlimited disposal over the total surplus labour of the population.”²²⁶ The basic assumption dominating the following pages of Banaji’s analysis is the inseparability of economic from political, ideological and cultural levels of social reality in pre-capitalist modes, which I agree.²²⁷ Banaji further underlines that:

“The autocratic centralism of the tributary mode and its backbone in the recruitment of a pliant nobility were not just ‘political superstructures’ to some self-contained economic base, they were essential moments of the structuring and organisation of the economy (*of the relations of production*).”²²⁸

A strictly supervised government apparatus ensured the tributary state’s fiscal interests, whose resources were directed to the upkeep of a vast military and administrative bureaucracy and a standing army.²²⁹ According to Banaji, the crucial distinction between feudal and tributary systems, therefore, lies in the fact that in the latter, the state had resources to control its elite to its own fiscal advantage.²³⁰

For the relations of production, Banaji adopts a narrower and simplistic definition. The general form of exploitation in tributary systems is the subjecthood of the peasantry to taxation by the state (and its tax collectors, its officials to put it differently.) The tributary state’s determining role in appropriating peasants’ surplus reflects the fundamental economic difference between tax and rent; in the latter, the peasants were tied to private landlords.²³¹ Here Banaji seems to share the assump-

²²⁶Banaji, *Theory as History*, 23.

²²⁷Ibid. 24; this conclusion can also be applied to misleading state-society and state-market antagonisms for the bourgeois epoch of production. What is interesting here is that, after admitting all these, Banaji also reaches the conclusion that the tributary state has a causal primacy over the formation of relations of production. The reason behind his insistence on the causal primacy of state is, I think, and he also admits, an interpretation –yet a misleading interpretation– of Trotsky’s reading of Russia’s particularities.

²²⁸Banaji, *Theory as History*, 24. For Trotsky, the relative autonomy of the state (as in the Russian case) does not change the fundamentals of the relationship between the exploited and the exploiters: “*In the last analysis, royal power of course remains an organisation for the oppression of the working masses and especially the peasant serfs.* But surely there is a difference between a state power which amalgamates with the landowning class, and a state power which dissociates itself from that class, creates its own bureaucratic apparatus, and acquires its own enormous power, i.e., a state power which, while protecting the interests of the exploiters against the exploited, becomes a relatively independent force – and the primary one – among other dominant forces.” (italics are mine) Leon Trotsky, 1905, (Chicago: Haymarket Books 2016), 282.

²²⁹Banaji, *Theory as History*, 24-25.

²³⁰cf. Haldon, “Theories of Practice” 58.

²³¹Banaji, *Theory as History*, 38-40. As we mentioned previously, determining the law of motion that configures the economic logic of a mode of production is pivotal in Banaji’s method. However, as also mentioned, Banaji does not come with a satisfactory proposition for the law of motion of the tributary mode. He sim-

tions of Weberian scholars that the non-European pre-capitalist states constituted themselves “as an autonomous actor in the evolution of economic, social and power relations.”²³²

Presuming the state as a monolith marked by its ruler’s total disposal over a disciplined ruling class could be problematic.²³³ As Haldon suggests, although tributary states appear to be pre-eminent at face value, this pre-eminence is often temporal. More importantly, the degree of the state’s actual control over land and office, and the extent of the ideological integration of diverse and often antagonistic elements of the ruling class into the state may also differ in effect by historical, cultural and political circumstances.²³⁴ All tributary political systems were chiefly concerned with establishing mechanisms of effective control over their fiscal resources. Either the tributary states manage to develop disciplined bureaucratic strata or simply rest

ply underlines the dynamics of territorial expansion and contraction of the tributary states, that entailed expansion and constriction of their financial infrastructures. Therefore, he locates the law-like nature of the tributary formations at the level of the state, at its fiscal drive. For feudalism, however, he focuses on the micro-level dynamics; the organisation of labour and the ebb-and-flow of the land/labour ratio within the estate, which paves the way for a class analysis. We cannot reach the same conclusion for the model he proposes for the tributary systems; on the contrary, his exclusive emphasis on the state for the TMP blocks the possibility of a class analysis integrating the peasantry into the historical analysis. cf. Haldon, *State and the Tributary Mode*, 103-109. On the other hand, Banaji also accepts that the politically powerful personnel in the tributary formations may establish “private estates” and employ feudal-like forms of exploitation over the peasants who were personally bonded to their authority and subject to boon services, as in the case of paroikoi in Byzantine private estates. The state, as long as it retained its power, protected the peasants (free tenants) from the expansion of such forms of exploitation and property. (Banaji 2010, 39) This approach resembles similarities with Ömer Lütfi Barkan’s emphasis on “ortakçı kullar” as a form of labour akin to serfdom yet limited in its scale in the Ottoman Empire.

²³²Haldon, “Theories of Practice,” 42. In this respect, Banaji’s tributary state resembles the paternalist model of the Ottoman state, proposed by [İslamoğlu-İnan (1994) and Barkey (1994)] We will further discuss the analytical weaknesses of Weberian state-centrism and offer an alternative by referring to concept of power bloc, used by neo-Marxist state theorists, in the chapter on the Ottoman timars in Zülkadiriye.

²³³To further illustrate the distinction between ‘landed nobility’ and ‘patrimonial officialdom’ or landowner and bureaucrat in terms of their sources of power, Banaji resorts to Weber’s framework of patrimonial domination. (Banaji 2010, 25-6). On the contrary, Haldon insists that landlordship and bureaucracy are two different phenomenal political-institutional expressions of the same fundamental economic relationship between the exploited and the exploiters. In both cases, the surplus is extracted directly through the coercive power of the dominant elite or state. Haldon 2013, 55.

Concerning the relationship between the exploited and the exploiters, within the exploiters and between the state and the exploiters, Haldon proposes three terms: “ruling class”, “elite” and “power elite.” The term ruling class combines economic and political domination. It refers to a group whose political power stems from both their access and control over the means of production (land), but also from their ability to exclude others from such access. As a tribute-collecting class ruling over the rural direct producers, the ruling class acts as a monolithic power bloc. However, in terms of its internal configuration, it is far from being such. Therefore, Haldon proposes the term ‘elite’ to refer to members of the ruling class who occupy a higher social status and economic situation than their peers. It is thus a category that combines economic, political and cultural dimension of social relations. The elite comprises separable elements or factions, divided according to “family and clan ties, geographical location or origin, political affiliation, functional position in the state system of which they are a part, and so forth.” Lastly, he mentions the power elite, which denotes the dominant elements within the wider network ruling class. (Haldon 2013, 56-7).

These distinctions are pivotal for the Ottoman case in distinguishing ordinary sipahis from sancakbeyis, beylerbeyis and the viziers of the Imperial Council. It was rare for an ordinary sipahi to rise to the ranks of the power elite. While members of the Serbian and Bosnian feudal nobility, and the notable families of the Byzantines quite readily entered, and exclusively held the ranks of the power elite, during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. See, Heath Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003, 115-130

²³⁴Haldon, “Theories of Practice” 59. The power of coercion appears as the key element for the durability of the tributary state. Haldon’s following three hypothetical statements may apply to certain historical cases, such as the Norman conquest of England and the Arabic conquest of Persia, Early Safavids, Byzantine and Ottoman Empires.

on the loyalty of the integrated elements of the local notables to the ruler himself, in both cases, lands and revenue sources are allotted to these elements:

“There is an inherent structural contradiction between the need for the state to collect its revenues directly, on the one hand, and the inevitable process of delegation and the clearly observable tendency of members of elites to strive for a degree of economic autonomy. The history of all centralised states is thus also the history of the constant tension between the interests of the elite as representatives of the state and carriers of a state ideology, on the one hand, and their interests as individuals who strive to free them-selves from dependency on the ruler and the court or palace on the other – indeed, this is a structural contradiction which cannot be avoided, although its forms and expression may vary enormously according to a range of variables.”²³⁵

But this structural contradiction manifesting itself as an intra-elite, or more generally intra-ruling class contestation over the control of the means of production and the distribution of surplus wealth which constitute “the means of social and political reproduction” of the ruling class, neither illustrates the existence of a different mode other than feudalism nor denominates the conflictual co-existence of two different modes of production.²³⁶ Dominance of this or that fraction of the ruling class on, what Haldon calls, political relations of surplus appropriation and distribution, do not alter the fundamental conditions of the inter-class relationship, that is, between the direct producers and expropriators.

2.5 Conclusion

In this brief chapter, we aimed to develop a theoretical framework, whereby instances of rural revolts can be identified and located in their relation to the internal dynamics of the Ottoman social system in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, other than being conceived as sporadic events that deserve no serious historical investigation.

Analysis of mass social uprisings, which would be accurate to be labelled as the acute form of class struggles, in terms of class relations may pave the way for a more integrated picture of the Ottoman social formation in the period under study. However, as we tried to illustrate in this chapter, Ottoman-Turkish studies from the 1930s onwards have stuck into the state-centred approach in which the rural

²³⁵Ibid. 60-61.

²³⁶Ibid. 54-56; 63.

poor, tribute payers and commoners, whether mainly agriculturalists or nomadic-pastoralists, as a class, are of little analytical importance.

Conventional approaches in historical studies remained indifferent towards social theory whereas the others followed a line inspired by Weberian theory. From the 1960s onwards, Marxist and Marxian theories started to exert influence on economic history concerning the underdevelopment and peripheralisation of Ottoman/Turkish social formation. Yet it remained ineffective in the field of social history. This was precisely because of the nature of the debate within the Marxist circles its abstractionist, formalist tendency that glosses over the necessity of studying concrete historical situations. It is quite unfortunate that while Western historiography, either Marxist or non-Marxist, provides extensive and dense literature covering late medieval and early modern peas-ant uprisings, Turkish historiography in this respect is still in its infancy. Balkan Marxist historiography may have constituted a departure point as a theoretically in-formed approach towards rural uprisings, but the language barrier was yet another problem.

To restate the main arguments of this chapter, in the first place, we ought to underline that the historian's vantage point strictly determines how he selects facts and based on these facts, how he interprets the historical document and information. Yet the documentary evidence by itself does not provide historical transparency, at least for three substantial reasons. First and foremost, the recorded history never stands for what actually happened. As E. H. Carr underlines, it is always refracted through the mind of the recorder. Take for instance an Ottoman chronicler's account of a social upheaval. Depiction of the event would be directly or indirectly tied to the chronicler's affiliation to the state, his class interests, and eventually his worldview. Secondly, the gap between the past and the present makes it hard for a historian to understand and delve into the mindsets of the actors of historical events. Hence, the historian needs to look at the events from a wider perspective, without glossing over the historical context, without ignoring its influence on the historical actors' mindsets. As the third point, and stemming from the second, even if the historian manages to view the past in its complexity, his conclusions would be an interpretation of the past through the eyes of the present precisely because he is bound to the present by his very conditions of existence. In other words, his vantage point in the present socio-political context inevitably determines the focal points in his interpretation of past events.²³⁷

In conventional Ottoman historiography, the fact that historical actuality and historical recording are not identical was often underestimated, and this misreading

²³⁷E. H. Carr. *What is History?* (London: Macmillan, 1961).

resulted in the depiction of the Ottoman state and society as entities *sui generis*, which do not require a theoretical intervention to deconstruct the historical complexity. For more theory-oriented historical interpretations, however, the problem usually appeared at the level of their theoretical choices. For instance, Weberian theory, which does not fundamentally undermine the foundations of the former *sui generis* interpretation, allows historians to maintain a descriptivist tendency. They confine their analysis to a juxtaposition of ideal types regarding state and society and conduct historical comparisons referring to these abstract prescriptions. Such endeavours not only seem deficient in penetrating the complexity of the concrete historical reality but also fall short of exposing the change and dynamism within the social formation being analysed. These tendencies did not emerge and gain currency *ex nihilo*; indeed there are certain political and social reasons behind the hegemony of these abovementioned tendencies in Ottoman-Turkish studies. But if we are to follow Marc Bloch's dictum: "History is, in its essentials, the science of change" we cannot confine ourselves to the descriptivist nature of the conventional and conventional-inspired but at face value theory-oriented branches of history writing.

Marxism, with its emphasis on class relations, with its class perspective in the historical analysis may have constituted an alternative. However, as we mentioned, in the debates both within Turkish and Western Marxist circles concerning the pre-capitalist modes of production, it was often forgotten that the basic concepts of Marxism, such as mode of production, social relations of production, class, and even state should be taken as empirically open-ended. In other words, they were open to historical investigation, not a priori and abstract principles preceding "the historian's craft". The vacuum between the abstract and concrete in the debates concerning the mode of production in the Ottoman social formation might have been filled by research on the acute form of class struggles: rural rebellions and turmoil.²³⁸ Such an approach, by no means, glosses over the fact that antagonisms between the exploited and the exploiters well reflected themselves in "the patient, silent struggles

²³⁸We have discussed the mode of production debate between Wickham (1985), Bertay (1987), Banaji (2010) and Haldon (1993; 2013) at length and what surprised us was the fact that, while all these authors have dealt with the question whether extra-economic coercion in surplus extraction is an adequate criterion in distinguishing modes of production, none of them attempted to discuss coercion in terms of the reaction it produces within the ranks of the direct producers, through an analysis of the rural revolts in social formations they define either Asiatic, tributary or feudal. Even, Haldon comes to conclude that since the class struggle in its broader sense, between the exploited and the exploiters, is a structural constant, an omnipresent feature, rather than being an analytically useful factor, it contributes a little to enhancing our understanding of the tributary social systems. (Haldon 2013: 54) I completely disagree. The problem in Haldon's account is that, by solely focusing on the state itself, he eventually considers intra-ruling class conflict and the class struggle between the direct producers and appropriators of surplus as separate fields in a social formation. However, I contend that intra-ruling class conflict and inter-class conflict are interrelated in a social formation. In the Ottoman case, acute forms of intra-ruling class conflict were usually followed by peasant uprisings which included disgruntled elements of the lower sipahis and tribal chieftains. The only way for the state to suppress such uprisings was to recognise the former privileges of the disgruntled elements of the ruling class and thus isolate the revolting peasantry.

carried on by rural communities over the years”;²³⁹ i.e., daily manifestations of class antagonisms in the pre-capitalist rural context. Analysis of the instances of mass social uprisings, such as rural revolts, may provide an integrated picture of the social formation in question, from the vantage point of the exploited and the oppressed classes.

²³⁹Bloch, *French Rural History*, 170.

3. TÜRKMEN TRIBESMEN OF BOZOK DURING THE REBELLION OF 1526-27

3.1 Sancak of Bozok around 1520

The *sancak* (sub-province or judicial district) of Bozok was a sixteenth-century Ottoman judicial-administrative division in central Anatolia, which almost corresponds to the contemporary province of Yozgat, along with a small proportion of southern districts of Çorum and south-western districts of Sivas including present-day towns of Gemerek and Şarkışla.

The earliest extant *tahrir* registers of the sancak, possibly compiled after the Ottoman authority in the region was established in 1522,¹ give no information about its internal administrative divisions (*nahiyes*).² This ambiguity probably stems from the fact that the region was almost completely inhabited by nomadic and semi-nomadic Türkmen tribes who seasonally migrated between summer pastures and winter quarters. The predominance of a mobile population in the region as well as the lack of permanent settlements, would have impeded the Ottomans from establishing an efficient bureaucratic-administrative control over the region during the first decades of their rule.

While only five villages were recorded in the region during the 1520s, the number of permanent settlements (villages) increased to 702 in the mid-century. Parallel to this development, the region started to be governed according to the classical structure of the Ottoman provincial administration, with sancaks divided into districts (*kaza*) under the judicial administration of a judge (*kadı*) directly responsible to the Sultan. Kazas were comprised of sub-administrative units called nahiye where deputy judges or nâibs resided. The attachment of the sancak of Bozok to a larger provincial unit

¹B.O.A. TTd. 155 and B.O.A TTd.998

²Lütfi Arslan, "H.963 / M.1556 tarihli mufassal tahrir defterine göre Bozok Sancağının ekonomik ve demografik yapısı." *Yüksek Lisans Tezi*, Ankara Üniversitesi, 2005, 21.

(eyâlet) in the 1520s is unclear. Certain registers list the sancak of Bozok among sub-provincial units of Karaman, Rûm, or Zülkadriye between 1525 and 30.³

In the 1520s, Bozok appears to be an exceptional sub-administrative unit with a distinct local legal code (*Kanunname* of Bozok), which was essentially a reiteration of the Zülkadirid criminal code (Alaüddevle Bey *Kanunu*) with some additions and alterations to Zülkadirid regulations in fiscal matters concerning the economic and social mode of organisation of the highly numerous nomadic tribes in the region by the Ottomans.⁴ As a territory recently annexed from the Zülkadirids, it would be safer to assume that the region was part of the Vilâyet-i Zülkadriyye, which corresponded to former Zülkadirid possessions (Maraş-Elbistan, Eastern, and North Eastern parts of Kayseri [present-day towns of Pınarbaşı and Sarız] and Bozok). This conclusion is supported by the fact that summary data of the first detailed land survey of the region (TT 155 which was compiled around 1528⁵) was given in TT 998 (which must have been compiled in the second half of the 1520s) which included information about former Zülkadirid territories.

Due to the ambiguities regarding the administrative structure and status of the region in the 1520s, the literature on the micro-history of Bozok is based on the surveys compiled around 1550 and onwards.⁶ However, without referring to the earliest land survey of the region (TT 155) the social conditions that prepared the ground for the rebellion of 1526-27 remain untouched.

3.2 Topographic Features and Demography of the Region

Let us begin with the geography and physical characteristics of the study area. A large part of the region lies on the Central Anatolian Plateau, with altitudes

³Mehmet Öz, “Bozok Sancağında İskan ve Nüfus, 1539-1642” *XII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Bildiriler* (Eylül 1999), 789.

⁴Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*. (Oxford University Press, 1973), 43ff.

⁵Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr “Le district de Kirsehir et le tekke de Hacı Bektaş entre le pouvoir Ottoman et les émirs de Zülkadir” *Collection Turcica*, (2005), 270: Gives 17th of July - 5th of August, 1520 for the date of compilation of this document. However, a note in the synoptic version (TTd. 998, fol.632) concerning tax reductions of the tribes regarding social unrest (fetret) in the region may be considered as a piece of evidence illustrating that the survey was completed shortly after the rebellion of 1519-20 or 1526-7. The next register of the region, which was more detailed than TTd. 155, was prepared in 1556, nearly forty years after the compilation of TT 155. This proves from another dimension that an efficient bureaucratic and administrative control of the region could not be established in the first half of the sixteenth century.

⁶Faruk Sümer, “Bozok Tarihine Dair Araştırmalar” in *Cumhuriyetin 50. Yıldönümünü Anma Kitabı*, (Ankara: DTCF Yayınları, 1974); Yunus Koç, *XVI. Yüzyılda Bir Osmanlı Sancağının İskan ve Nüfus Yapısı*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1989); Mehmet Öz, “Bozok Sancağında İskan ve Nüfus”, Lütfi Arslan, “H.963/M.1556 tarihli mufassal”

ranging from 1000 to 1400 meters, making it suitable for sheep grazing. These plateaus make up 52 per cent of the land in the contemporary province of Yozgat.⁷ The average altitude drops below 1000 meters in Kızılırmak Valley to the west and south and in Yeşilirmak Valley to the north. The plateau is divided by tributaries of Kızılırmak and Yeşilirmak, such as the Çekerek River in the northeast which joins Yeşilirmak in the north, and the Delice (or Kanak) River which flows through the southern and western parts of the region and joins Kızılırmak in the west. The narrow lowland strips flooded by these rivers and their tributaries were called “öz” by the locals.⁸ These areas, used as winter quarters (*kışlak*) by the tribesmen and recorded as *mezra’u* in the surveys, provided vital conditions for the semi-nomads to engage in seasonal agricultural production. The harsh continental climate in the region limits agricultural activity mainly to the cultivation of wheat and barley. In total, the plains in these narrow valleys constitute 11 per cent of the land in the region.⁹ To the east, the area is separated from the upper reaches of Kızılırmak by a mountain range called Akdağ which stretches north-east to south-west and reaches about 2200 meters at its peak. This mountainous zone was crucial for the nomadic tribes’ economic activity, as they used their customary summer pastures in the eastern parts of the region at high altitudes around 1850 to 2000 meters on Akdağ. It is known that in the sixteenth century, seventeen different places in this mountainous zone were used as *yaylak* by the nomadic tribes.¹⁰ Instead of wandering great distances to find suitable pastures for summer grazing, the nomadic tribes relied on the natural resources of the region. In total, 37 per cent of the land in the region was mountainous.

Besides the topographical features of Bozok, it is important to briefly discuss the region’s demographics as portrayed in the synoptic survey of the 1520s (TT 998). In the *kaza* of Bozok, sixteen Türkmen tribes (*kabile*) with 505 sub-tribal units or clans (*cemaat*) were recorded.¹¹ These tribes included Kızılkocalu, Süleymanlu, Ağçalı, Selmanlu, Çiçeklü, Zakirlü, Mesudlu, Ağcakoyunlu, Kavurgalu, Demircilü, Kamanlı ve Kanak, Ali Beylü, Sekilü, Tacirlü, Deli Alilü and Şam Bayadı. Among these, with 2536 tax-paying households¹² (*hane*), the Şam Bayadı tribe was the most populated. Süleymanlu and Ağçalı tribes were the second and third most

⁷“Yozgat”, *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, vol. X, 7627

⁸Faruk Sümer. “Bozok Tarihine Dair Araştırmalar” 310-11.

⁹“Yozgat”, *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, vol. X, 7627.

¹⁰Yunus Koç, *XVI. Yüzyılda bir Osmanlı Sancağının*, 7.

¹¹TTd. 998 fol.638.

¹²TTd. 998 fol.631

populated, with 1683 and 1574 *hanes*, respectively.¹³ The Kavurgalu tribe was the least populated, with 29 households.¹⁴ In total, 14.404 adult males (*nefers*) and 11.259 tax-paying household leaders (*hanes*) were recorded while the numbers for two main tax-exempt groups, *sipahi/sipahizade* and *müsellem* were 590 and 387,¹⁵ respectively. Using M. A. Cook's formula for population estimates,¹⁶ it is estimated that between 40.000 and 50.000 people, spread across 884 *mezra'as*, were living in Bozok around 1520.¹⁷

Due to its topographical characteristics and the lack of urban settlements, the region was remote from important roads and considered to be impassable.¹⁸ The local Türkmen dynasties emerged after the collapse of the Seljuks of Rûm, and the Ottomans in the later period did not regard the Bozok region as a strategic place to conquer. Hence the nomadic tribes inhabiting the region somewhat managed to preserve their autonomy until the 1520s. The area was colonized by Türkmen tribes after the collapse of Byzantine rule in Anatolia at the end of the eleventh century. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the region was under the rule of the Danişmendids, whose territories, including important regional centres in north-central Anatolia, Amasya, Tokat and Sivas, were labelled as Danişmendiye, later known as the province of Rûm. The Danişmendid rule was followed by the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum's domination in Anatolia until they were vassalized by the Mongols after their defeat at the battle of Kösedag (1243). From 1256 onwards, the Mongol-Ilkhanids permanently stationed their occupation forces in Anatolia and nomadic Mongol tribes began to colonise pasturelands of the central Anatolian steppes.¹⁹ From the second half of the thirteenth century to the Timurid invasion of Anatolia, Bozok remained under the control of these Mongol tribes, who were later forcefully taken back to central Asia by Timur.²⁰ With the region emptied of Mongolic tribes,

¹³TTd. 998 fol.600; fol.606.

¹⁴TTd. 998 fol.613.

¹⁵TTd. 998 fol.638.

¹⁶One of the most preferred formulas for the population estimates is: (*nefer* x 3 or *hane* x 4.5) see, M. A. Cook, *Population Pressure*, 85.

¹⁷Using the multiplier 4.5 for the nomadic households likewise their peasant counterparts, could be inaccurate. According to anthropological studies, nomadic households were smaller, core families, in comparison to settled ones. See, Anatoly Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), 126-7.

¹⁸Hanna Sohrweide. "Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkung auf die Shiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert" *Der Islam* 41 (1965): n.501, 173.

¹⁹Claude Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A general survey of the material and spiritual culture and history c.1071-1330*. (London: Sidgwick Jackson, 1968), 275, Faruk Sümer, "Bozok Tarihine Dair Araştırmalar," 311.

²⁰Faruk Sümer, "Bozok Tarihine Dair Araştırmalar" 311-2.

Türkmens who had long grazed their herds in pasturelands east of Kayseri and south of Sivas, and who had traditionally been subjects of the Türkmen dynasty of Zülkadir, centred in Elbistan and Maraş, occupied the region in the name of the Zülkadirids, without facing any political opposition.²¹ Among these Türkmen tribes, the Kızılkocalu tribe was particularly mentioned in Aşıkpaşazade's accounts as troublemakers and raiders in the environs of Amasya and Tokat. Their activity in the region ceased only after the execution of their tribal leaders by Yörgüç Paşa in Amasya.²² While the Ottomans decisively established their rule in north-central Anatolia in the 1420s, the Bozok region remained in Zülkadirid hands until the first decade of the sixteenth century. Ottoman-Zülkadirid relations were strained in the wake of Selim I's Çaldıran campaign (1514) as their ruler, 'Alâ' al-Dawla Beg refused to give logistical support to the Ottoman armies. Therefore, Zülkadirid sovereignty came to an end in 1515 when 'Alâ' al-Dawla Beg was defeated and killed in the battle of Turnadağ (1515) as a retaliation for his stance in the Ottoman-Safavid conflict. Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beg, 'Alâ' al-Dawla's nephew and pretender, then safely usurped the Zülkadirid throne and ruled as an Ottoman vassal until his execution with his three sons on Suleyman I's order by Ferhad Paşa in 1522. With the execution of Ali Bey, the Ottomans formally annexed Bozok.

The most important development in Bozok during Ali Bey's rule was the Şah Veli uprising (1519-20) which bore similarities to the rebellion of 1526-27 in terms of the regions it affected, its religious-messianic outlook, and the support of tribal elements.²³ Some tribes in Bozok had already been dispersed before the uprising of 1526-27 and as a consequence, the remnant tribal groups in the region, who likely had kinship ties with the ones who formerly migrated to Iran, were seen as heretics and potential rebels by the Ottoman authorities. These ongoing upheavals strained the relationship between the tribesmen of Bozok and the Ottoman authorities.

²¹Ibid. 313; These tribes were namely, Kızıl Kocalu, Selmanlu, Ağçalı, Çiçeklu, Zakırlı, Mesudlu, Ağca Koyunlu, Kavurgalı, Demircili, Şam Bayadı, Söklen, Hisar Beğlü, Karalı, along with remnant Mongol (Tatar) tribes of the region.

²²Aşıkpaşazade, *Osmanoğullarının Tarihi*, (eds.) Kemal Yavuz and M. Yekta Saraç, İstanbul: K Kitaplığı, 2003, 182-184.

²³Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Etudes turco-safavides III; notes et documents sur la révolte de Şah Veli bin Şeyh Celâl" *Archivum Ottomanicum* 7 (1982).

3.3 General Remarks on the Relationship Between the Tributary State and Tribes-men

The peasants, scattered among distant and isolated villages and divided within these villages between small and fragmented household plots were easily taxable. They seemed far from posing a threat to the political and economic domination of the Ottoman ruling class as long as the ruling class remained united and did not lose its political power over the subjugated masses due to political and ideological factionalism. However, the political hegemony of the ruling class over the nomadic and semi-nomadic Türkmens had always been on a knife edge since these peoples, contrary to the settled peasantry, were the free peoples of the countryside for a couple of reasons.²⁴

Firstly, as they were primarily engaged in pastoralism in a mobile form, their extreme mobility between summer pastures and winter quarters provided them with means to escape from efficient taxation. Secondly, their tribal ties enabled them to mobilise such a large population that could be enough to challenge Ottoman provincial armies in case of a rebellion. Thirdly, and stemming from the second reason, since they had constituted the backbone of the armies of former Anatolian beyliks, such as Karamanids and Zülkadirids,²⁵ large numbers of armed *müsellem* troops were registered within tribal groups.²⁶ Lastly, “their internal mode of organization, emphasizing the internal authority of the chief, did not [necessarily] encourage the tribe’s dependence on the apparatus of the Ottoman government.”²⁷ Therefore, the unequal power configuration between settled agriculturalists and fief holders, derived from the restriction of peasants’ spatial mobility and the imposed armed-unarmed dichotomy, did not fully apply to the tribute-demanding centre’s relation with the Türkmen tribes. This could be seen as an anomaly for the essence of feudal/tributary social formation. Recognising the possible threats posed by the nomads, Ottoman administrators decided to subjugate them like settled peasantry through certain regulations aimed at settling the nomads by forcing them into sedentary agriculture or at least by restricting their seasonal migration routes “within a

²⁴Anatoly Khazanov. *Nomads and the Outside World*, XVIII.

²⁵For instance, Turgut, Bayburd, and Varsak tribes were at the Karamanid service. Dulkadirids rested on the Bozok tribal federation. In Alaüddevlü Bey Kanunu, we find references to troops recruited from the ranks of Turcoman tribes. See: Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *XV ve XVI ncı asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ziraî ekonominin hukukî ve malî esasları. 1-ci cilt*, Kanunlar, (İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2001), 124.

²⁶İnalcık gives an estimate of Turkish nomads made up 15% of the population in Anadolu province in the 1520s. When *yaya* and *müsellem* troops of nomadic origin are added, the percentage goes up to 27%.

²⁷Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 55.

predictable, “settled” routine.”²⁸

Before delving into the details of the tributary relations between the Ottoman state and nomadic tribes, it is important to discuss the various types of economic organisations based on pastoralism and how pastoral nomadic economic organisation differs from settled agriculture or other types of nomadism that do not extensively include pastoralism. Khazanov identifies four broad typological forms of pastoralism: “herdsmen husbandry (transhumance), semi-sedentary pastoralism (agropastoralism), semi-nomadic pastoralism, and ultimately pure pastoral nomadism as the most extreme form” of pastoralism.²⁹ While these classifications may seem overly broad for analytical purposes, they are useful because they highlight the border between pastoralism and agriculture, as well as between mobility and sedentism.³⁰

Khazanov’s main argument revolves around these distinctions:

“The more specialized mobile pastoralists become, the more dependent they become, in turn, on the outside, non-pastoralist, mainly sedentary world. . . . The economic dependence of nomads on sedentary societies, and their different modes of political adaptation to them, carried corresponding ideological implications. As the nomadic economy had to be supplemented with agriculture and crafts, so, too, did the nomadic culture need sedentary culture as a source, a component, and a model for comparison, imitation, or rejection.”³¹

In essence, nomadic pastoralism, in its various forms, exists in a symbiotic relationship with the sedentary “outside world” whose economic organisation is primarily based on agricultural production. Except for the pure pastoral nomads whose economic organisation could be characterised by the absence of agriculture even in a supplementary form, in semi-nomadic pastoralist and semi-sedentary pastoralist societies, agriculture gains a supplementary or primary role in the economic organisation of these communities.³²

²⁸Ibid, 51.

²⁹Anatoly Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, XXXII

³⁰Pastoralist communities and hunter-gatherers share the distinctive characteristic of mobility. However, a crucial difference between these two stems from the basis of their economic organisation according to Khazanov. Hunter-gatherers are food-extracting whereas mobile pastoralists are food-producing communities. (Khazanov 1994, 15).

³¹Ibid. XXXI-XXXII.

³²Khazanov underlines that the ratio of pastoralism and agriculture in the economic system of mobile pastoralists allows to distinguish between typologies of semi-nomadic pastoralism and semi-sedentary pastoralism. In semi-nomadic pastoralism the predominant economic activity is still pastoralism and in line with the requirements of husbandry, pastures are changed during the course of the entire or the greater part of the year. In this kind of pastoralism, agriculture plays a secondary or supplementary role yet even minimal occupation with agriculture has a considerable impact, particularly on the species-composition of herds, the routs and, the seasonal prevalence of pastoral migrations. Variants of semi-nomadic pastoralism

If we set aside the economic and social pressures stemming from external factors like taxation and imposed limitations on mobility, as Khazanov argues, pastoral economy within a tributary state, even considering its own ecological and technological limits, is non-autarkic and faces issues of economic balance. Nomadic pastoralists depend on the sedentary populations to acquire certain necessary agricultural and crafted goods. Semi-nomadic and semi-sedentary pastoralists, while engaged in agriculture to some extent, also rely on market exchanges with the sedentary populations. Additionally, except for a few cases³³, since nomadic pastoralists and sedentary agriculturalists often share the same ecological zones, these two societies compete for land use. The limited productive capacity of pastures compels the pastoralists to seek new pasturelands, leading to conflicts with settled agriculturalists who seek to expand arable land. Limitation of their periodic rotation of pastures in favour of the agriculturalists would upset the balance between resources and requirements, creating a discrepancy in the optimal territory required for the continuation and subsistence of pastoral economic activity and the available options.

Khazanov argues that “Pastoral nomadism is doomed to stagnation because its economy is extensive and allows no permanent solution to the problem of balance at the expense of intensification of production.”³⁴ Climatic fluctuations and stock epidemics further endanger the economic balance of pastoralism. Economic instability and non-autarky are almost inherent attributes of the pastoral economy. Nomads simply have two options to cope with these obstacles; sedentarisation or predation.³⁵ In the Ottoman case, particularly in Bozok, enforced sedentarisation was observed. As an additional and decisive factor to the authentic instability of nomadic pastoralist economic organisation, the taxation measures of the Ottomans likely resulted in the immediate impoverishment of nomads, unless the tribesmen increased the share of agricultural production in their overall economic activity by adapting semi-nomadic or semi-sedentary variants of pastoralism from the outset.

Historical observations suggest that this transition was not a smooth process. Defection to the Safavid Empire which offered more suitable conditions for the tribesmen,

depend on whether a division of labour within the community exists between the ones who are solely occupied with agriculture and the others with husbandry, or whether the same groups are occupied with both agriculture and husbandry. In semi-sedentary pastoralism, the general economic balance is changed in favour of agriculture. In this case, seasonal migrations as a requirement of pastoralism are still present yet compared to semi-nomads, these migrations are often shorter in time and distance. Since the time that the flock spends in pasturelands is shorter, semi-sedentary pastoralists are also occupied to a limited extent in laying in fodder. For these typological differences, Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, 19-22.

³³Ibid. 62

³⁴Ibid. 71.

³⁵Ibid. 83.

and open rebellion—often intertwined with Safavid sympathy, as evidenced in the cultural and ideological discourse of such rebellions—were not uncommon. For example, Linder’s study on Atçeken tribes in the Karaman region provides insight into rethinking the relationship between the Ottomans and the nomadic tribes of Anatolia in the context of sedentarisation, conflict, and rebellion.

The subjugation of the nomadic Türkmens into tributary relations went hand in hand with Ottoman expansion in Anatolia, particularly through the annexation of Karamanid and Zülkadirid territories between 1460-1520. Lindner suggests observing the developments regarding the relationship between the Ottoman administration and nomads through fiscal and administrative regulations, particularly provincial customary law concerning nomadic tribes. These texts "outline Ottoman intent and bureaucratic purpose: how to increase revenues from the nomads, how to fit their lives into a settled model, how to make them pay for transgressions against settled society."³⁶

The initial step of subjugating nomads to tributary relations involved turning their summer pastures and winter quarters into revenue sources for the benefit of the fiefholders. This process bears similarities to what Rodney Hilton calls the “absorption of allodial property”³⁷ into feudal/tributary control, thereby reducing the autonomy of nomadic communities. When tributary relations engulfed the nomadic communities, they were taxed on their herds and the products of their herds. Equally important was the taxation imposed on their usufruct rights of summer pastures and winter quarters, which were crucial for the continuation of their economic organisation.³⁸

The principal tax imposed on the nomadic communities was *resm-i ganem* or *adet-i agnam* (sheep-tax). According to Suleyman I’s general law book, fiefholders were to collect one akçe for every two sheep, counting a sheep with its lamb as one unit. An exception was made for flocks of fewer than twenty animals, which required the

³⁶Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 54.

³⁷Rodney Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free: Medieval Peasant Movements and English Rising of 1381*, (London: Routledge, 2003), 42; Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, 123-4: “. . .corporate ownership of pastures is characteristic of the overwhelming majority of nomadic societies and, moreover, the forms of corporate ownership are far more varied than are those of the ownership of livestock by individuals and individual families.”

³⁸Of course, the earliest method was taxing nomads by their manpower, through the recruitment of *yaya* and *müsellem* troops from tribal ranks. However, with the development of gunpowder weapons and the emergence of disciplined infantry in the second half of the fifteenth century, the military potential of the nomads turned obsolete. Ottoman armies backed by gunpowder weapons and including professional soldiers (*kapıkulu*) managed to defeat predominantly nomadic-tribal armies in the battles of Otlukbeli (1473) and Çaldıran (1514). Nevertheless, former Anatolian beyliks had resorted to a tribal system until their annexation by the Ottomans. Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 56.

owner of the herd to pay 12 *akçes* as *resm-i kara*.³⁹

Lindner compares Mongolian and Ottoman taxation practices regarding herd sizes. In Mongolian practice, “it had been one per cent of the herd from herds of more than a hundred animals, with smaller herds owning no sheep tax.” In contrast, the initial Ottoman sheep tax was harsher in that "it was imposed on all herds" including the ones with fewer than 100 animals and "it may have been as high as one sheep in every ten."⁴⁰ In Mehmed II's early reign, the tax was set at one *akçe* for three sheep, later increased to one *akçe* for two sheep, and collected accordingly throughout the later fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.⁴¹

As mentioned, a mature sheep and its lamb were counted as one unit. We have also highlighted that all nomadic pastoralists were required to pay a minimum tax, unlike the Mongolian practice that aimed at preserving the nomadic way of life. If a nomad's stock had dwindled to 24 animals⁴² or fewer, they had to pay a minimum tax called *resm-i kara* equalled to 12 *akçes*.⁴³ This minimum tax requirement did not consider the nomads' ability to pay, which, according to Lindner, clearly reflected the Ottomans' desire to settle and transform nomadic communities into landless peasants. “A nomad with marginal flock might be forced to sell sheep to obtain money for his tax payment” and if the herd size fell below the necessary minimum for natural reproduction, the herd could likely to perish by attrition or disease.⁴⁴

Another challenging aspect of the sheep tax for nomadic prosperity was the timing of its collection. Initially collected at the beginning of autumn, Mehmed II later in his reign changed this practice and "declared that the sheep tax is to be assessed in May, after lambing."⁴⁵ Bayezid II and his successors, ordered the tax to be collected in early April, after the lambing season.⁴⁶ These shifts and regulations aimed to maximise the revenue by assessing the tax when the herd size was at its greatest before the nomads migrated to their summer pastures, ensuring the maximum amount

³⁹Ahmet Akgündüz. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri*, IV, (1992) 312; For Lindner, a nomad whose herd had dwindled to twenty-four animals or below, owed *resm-i kara* which was 20 *akçe*. *Nomads and Ottomans*. 57-8.

⁴⁰Ibid. 56

⁴¹Ibid.56-57; Neşet Çağatay, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Reayadan Alınan Vergi ve Resimler” *Ankara Üniversitesi DTCF Dergisi* 5 (1947): 486.

⁴²In Suleyman I's first general law, 20 animals or few. Ahmet Akgündüz. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, c.IV (1992), 312.

⁴³Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*. 57-8

⁴⁴Ibid. 59.

⁴⁵Ibid. 58. It was collected in May in the sancak of Bozok during the 1520s. Barkan, *Kanunlar*, 129.

⁴⁶Akgündüz. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*. c.IV. 314.

of revenue was collected.⁴⁷

Another annual tax levied on nomads was the sheep-fold tax (*resm-i ağıl* or *resm-i yatak*), assessed in the fall when flocks were confined to folds made of stone or wood for mating and spending winter on a fief holder's land.⁴⁸ While Suleyman I's first Sultanic law code did not mention the sheep-fold tax, it can be found in provincial codes compiled in this period. For example, in the *kanunname-i Rûm*, the tax rate was equivalent to *resm-i bennak* (twelve akçes in the Sultanic law⁴⁹) or one sheep per herd.⁵⁰ This tax had a smaller impact on nomads' prosperity (though still significant for a poor pastoral nomad) but together with the sheep tax, it had a confining effect on nomadic activities and their numbers.⁵¹

In addition to these two annual taxes, there were also recurrent ones, namely *resm-i yaylak* (or *resm-i otlak*), and *resm-i kıslak* (or *resm-i duhan*) collected when the nomadic communities chose places other than their customary or prescribed summer and winter pastures to graze their herds. As Lindner underlines, even minor climatic variations could affect nomads' migration routes as they sought to find the best meadows for grazing. Hence restricting their marches to prescribed summer and winter pastures might weaken their herds over time.⁵²

According to Süleyman I's general law book, the fine for summer grazing was 20 *akçe* or one animal worth 20 *akçes* for sizable herds, 15 *akçes* for medium-sized herds and 10 *akçes* for modest-sized herds.⁵³ For winter grazing, "the rule was that if a herd not assigned to a particular area entered and wintered there, the nomad offender owed a fine a one-year-old ewe if his herd were large, and six *akçes* (the presumed value of a lamb) if his herd were poor."⁵⁴ The exception, which indeed reveals the Ottoman administrators' intention to transform the nomads into settled agriculturalists, was that if a nomad engaged in agricultural production in this winter quarter, it was then forbidden for a fief holder to demand *resm-i kıslak*. Instead, he collected agricultural taxes, *öşür* and *resm-i zemin* (or *resm-i dönüm*).⁵⁵

⁴⁷Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*. 58-59

⁴⁸Ibid. 62.

⁴⁹Ahmet Akgündüz. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*. c.IV. 306.

⁵⁰Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, *Ordu Kazası Sosyal Tarihi*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1985), 152.

⁵¹Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 63.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*. c.IV. 312.

⁵⁴Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*. 64; Akgündüz. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*. c.IV. 313.

⁵⁵Akgündüz. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*. c.IV 313; Yediyıldız, *Ordu Kazası Sosyal Tarihi*. 165.

The principal means to assimilate nomads into tributary relations were the restriction of their seasonal migration routes in line with the fiscal interests of the fief-holders, and following the former procedure, subjection of their usufruct rights over summer pastures and winter quarters to fief-holders' taxation demands. Lindner makes a similar point by stating that a nomad:

“soon found himself paying repeated fines, whose cumulative impact could impoverish him unless he kept moving. Under the impact of the sheep tax and fines creating instability in the pastoral economic mode of organization, the poor nomad had the final choice of settlement” —and the first step of it was to become a semi-nomad— “or revolt.”⁵⁶

As nomadism can be defined as the yearly rotational movement of households between summer pastures and winter quarters based on the economic organization of pastoralism,⁵⁷ “sedentism,” on the other hand, indicates the immobility of the household regardless of the annual alteration of productive activities.⁵⁸ The intermediary step between nomadism and sedentism is the process of sedentarisation, gradual yet conflict-ridden, which could be classified into two categories: semi-nomadic pastoralism and semi-sedentary pastoralism, depending on whether pastoralism or agriculture becomes the predominant economic activity, with the other becoming subsidiary.⁵⁹ Lindner suggests that a comparison of land and sheep taxes levied on semi-nomads may give a clear-cut indication of the changing balance between pastoralism and cultivation.⁶⁰

The picture Lindner draws to illustrate the impact of Ottoman taxation on the nomadic communities shows a resemblance to the “failure and fall-away” model among the sedentarisation models touched upon by Salzman. In one version of this model,

“individual pastoralists who do not succeed in building a viable household production unit, and who in consequence cannot support themselves and their families through pastoralism, ‘drop-out’ of the pastoral sector,

⁵⁶Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 66; Anatoly Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, 84.

⁵⁷Philip Carl Salzman, *When nomads settle: Process of sedentarization as adaptation and response*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 10.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Anatoly Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*. 19; Onur Usta and Oktay Özel. “Sedentarization of Turcomans in 16th century Cappadocia: Kayseri 1480-1584.” in *Between Religion and Language: Turkish Speaking Christians, Jews and Greek Speaking Muslims and Catholics in the Ottoman Empire*, (İstanbul: Eren Yayinevi, 2011), 156-7.

⁶⁰Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 85.

taking their families in the sedentary agricultural sector and seeking employment there.”⁶¹

The pressure of Ottoman taxation, especially on poor nomads whose herd size was lower than the subsistence minimum for the reproduction of the herd and thus continuation of nomadic activities,⁶² forced the nomads to opt for predation as an acceptable means of survival⁶³ or seasonal agricultural activity in their winter quarters,⁶⁴ often recorded as *mezra’as* (marginal arable plots of land),⁶⁵ which paved the way for sedentarisation as these *mezra’as* turned into villages in the long run.

The agricultural activities of semi-nomadic pastoralists, primarily focused on cultivating wheat and barley in these *mezra’as*, did not escape Ottoman taxation. However, the taxation process differed from that imposed on settled peasants who paid an annual *resm-i çift* (or *boyunduruk resmi*) along with religious taxes in kind (*öşür*) to their fief-holders. For these semi-nomadic seasonal cultivators, the *resm-i çift* was a predetermined minimum of twelve *akçes*.⁶⁶ Religious taxes (*öşür* and *salarlık*) were also collected in line with the common practices of agricultural taxation.

However, the principal tax levied on semi-nomadic cultivators (often recorded as *haricden gelip ekenler*) was *dönüm akçası* (or *resm-i zemin*) collected by the fief-holders based on an assessment of the productivity of the cultivated land.⁶⁷ Compared to *resm-i çift*, according to İnalçık, the tax ratio of *resm-i zemin* was seemingly high and I think, it was also susceptible to abuses by the fief-holders in the assessment of the soil’s productivity. In principle, since small-fief owners would seek higher revenues in the long run, they would also encourage more semi-nomadic cultivators

⁶¹Salzman, *When Nomads Settle*, 12.

⁶²According to (Linder 1983, 89) the minimum herd size required for the continuation of pastoralism is sixty sheep. See also: Anatoly Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, 30.

⁶³*Ibid.* 90.

⁶⁴Ahmet Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, IV, 313 (§147): "Yörük tâifesi bu kısımdandır; öşür ve resim verdiği yerde resm-i kışlak vermeye ve illâ yörük kangı yerde ya’ni tımarda kışlar ise, resm-i kışlak üç akçe vermek kanundur." As we see, if nomads engage in cultivation in their winter quarters, they are exempt from *resm-i kışlak*.

⁶⁵Onur Usta and Oktay Özel, "Sedentarization of Turcomans," 155.

⁶⁶Ahmet Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, IV, 312 (§136): "Ve yörük sipahi yerin dutup zirâ’ar etse, öşür ve sâlârlık verdikten sonra boyunduruk resmi deyü on iki akçesin alalar, ziyâde almayalar." In *Kanunname-i Bozok*, however, *resm-i çift* levied on semi-nomadic agriculturalists is counted among revoked practices (*bi’dat*): "Ve dahi her çiftten on ikişer akçe resm-i çift alınır imiş. Memalik-i Osmanîde yörük taifesinden resmi çift alınmamakla mezkûrlardan resmi çift ref’ olundu." Barkan, *Kanunlar*, 128. But in a detailed (*mufassil*) cadastral survey compiled in 1520s for Bozok; we see that some tribes were obliged to pay *resm-i çift* (*resmi-hane* in the document): "Kabile-i Şam Bayadî, resm-i hane altışar akçe alınır." TTd.155, fol.230.

⁶⁷Halil İnalçık, "Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rûsumu" *Belâten XXII*, sayı: 92 (1959) p.590ff.; Neşet Çağatay, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Reayadan Alman Vergi ve Resimler," 504-5 .

to engage in seasonal farming in *mezra'as* under their control.

The relationship between the small-fief holder and the seasonal cultivator was a daily, face-to-face relationship grounded in paternalist and patriarchal values of the pre-capitalist epoch. These two were described by Thompson as “loose descriptive terms” to characterise a social formation as a whole yet they were “profoundly important components not only of ideology but also of actual institutional organisation of social relations” in pre-capitalist societies.⁶⁸ Therefore, in such cases, the procedures followed in the assessment of the fertility of the soil were likely to be in line with the long-accustomed, customary practices based on the locals’ experiences. In order to attract the other nomads to settle and cultivate, a small fief-holder would abstain from demanding extra and unjust taxes from agriculture. Portraying an image of a just overlord, he was expected to rely on the suggestions, expectations and concerns of the local commoners. Whereas the cultivators of the fields recorded as Sultanic demesne, or demesnes of high officials, *sancakbeyi* or *beylerbeyi*, encountered centrally appointed tax collectors and assessors, *il yazıcısı*, *haric emini* or *kethüda*, yearly and occasionally in March.⁶⁹ These officials were likely to adopt harsher attitudes towards the tribute payers than the local fief-holders who also had tribal connections with the commoners.⁷⁰ Under the pressure of monetary stringency and expenses of war preparation, following Akdağ, we can speculate that these tax assessors and collectors might have occasionally demanded higher *resm-i zemin* amounts from semi-nomadic cultivators by intentionally assessing infertile plots as fertile, effectively doubling the tax burden. Such practices and abuses of the officials became widespread in Anatolia in the wake of the campaign of Mohacz (1526).⁷¹

⁶⁸E. P. Thompson, “Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?” *Social History* 3 (2) (1978): 137.

⁶⁹Neşet Çağatay, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Reayadan alınan,” 505: “Dönüm (zemin) resminin alınma zamanı, çift resminin alınma zamanı olan mart iptidasıdır.”

⁷⁰Fiscal administration of these large demesnes, organised as mukataca necessitated the installation of tax farmers, long before this system became a widespread fiscal practice. The dynamics of their relationship with the rural tribute payers are expected to be different from that of between *sipahis* and their subjects: “The tax farmer’s main function was to provide the state with money. Therefore, his contractual relationship with the state was defined in strictly pecuniary terms. In this relationship, the state was the recipient of money capital which was advanced prior to the collection of taxes. Hence during the process of realization of interest, the tax farmer, unlike the *sipahi*, had no obligation to perpetuate the ideological political relationship between the direct producer and the state. His concern was the maximization of returns on capital advanced. Although legally bound by the traditional rates of taxation, he sought constantly to transgress these bounds.” Huricihan İslamoğlu and Çağlar Key-der, “Agenda,” 51.

⁷¹Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik Düzenlik Kavgası: Celali İsyanları*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları 2013): 90-91, 112, 116.

3.4 Introduction to the Archival Sources: TTd.155 and 998.

Our insights into the relationship between the Ottomans and Türkmen tribes in Bozok around 1520 are primarily based on the detailed survey of the region, TT 155 and its synoptic version, TT 998. The detailed survey begins with a section titled "*salgun-i sultani* der Kaza-i Bozok" listing the tribes in the province along with the corresponding amounts of "*salgun-i sultani*" collected from them. This tax likely originated from the former Zülkadirid customary taxes that Ottomans continued to collect in the first half of the sixteenth century.⁷² The exact method of taxation was not explicitly stated, but a note in TD 998 suggested that *salgun-i sultani* was reduced for the tribes whose members were scattered [bazı boylar ve cemaatler fetret sebebiyle müteferrik olup] as a consequence of the ongoing social unrest in the region.⁷³ Therefore it could be inferred that the survey was most probably compiled shortly after the Ottomans had managed to quell the rebellion of 1526-7.

The rest of the document lists the sub-tribal units or clans (*cemaat*) under the heading of each tribe, along with the name of the winter quarters they were registered, and the corresponding taxes collected.⁷⁴ If a clan's economic activity was primarily pastoral, the scribe recorded only the principal tax, *resmi-i ağnam*, and occasional feed and fines (*resm-i arus* and *bad-ı heva*) along with the names of tax-paying household leaders and adult male bachelors. The local *kanunname* specified the tax levied on sheep was one *akçe* per two animals, allowing us to roughly estimate the herd size for the tribal groups and the average number of sheep for taxpaying households, of course with a certain caution, due to the potential for nomads to conceal some of their animals from the registrars.⁷⁵ Following Linder's approach, I used an average of sixty heads of livestock per household as the subsistence minimum for a nomadic pastoralist household.

⁷²Kabile-i Çiçeklü; 7000 akçe, Kabile-i Ağcakoyunlu 2500 akçe, Kabile-i Mesudlu 5000 akçe, Cemaat-i Söklen 500 akçe, Cemaat-i Hisarbeyli 2000 akçe; BOA. TTd. 155, fol.14. The amount paid by Kabile-i Hisarbeyli is unreadable in the document but these numbers are compatible with the data in BOA TTd. 998, fols.635, 632; the total amount collected in Bozok was 122.500 akçes.

⁷³"Salgun-i mezkur mukaddema yüz elli bin akçe imiş haliya bazı boylar ve cemaatler fetret sebebiyle müteferrik olup halkı noksan gelüb evvelki salguna mütehammil olmadıkları sebebden tetebbü olunub reyası nakıs olan cemaatlerün salgunu tahfif olunub deftere kayd olunmuşdur. Min b'ad salgundan tımara tasarruf eden sipahiler defter mucibince salgunlarını aldıklarından sonra deftere hilafen ziyade nesne taleb etmeyeler. Salgun-ı mezkur reaya evi kışlaya kondukda kanun-ı sanide alnur ve her cemaate resm-i ganem kayd olunmuşdur ve her mezraya hasıl kayd olunmuşdur müselleme taifesinin rüsum-ı ağnamından ve mahsul-i çiftinden gayrıdır." TTd. 998 fol.632.

⁷⁴These entries mostly follow as "cemaat-i X der-mezra-i Y: hasıl (in akçes), resm-i ganem (in akçes), *resm-i arus*(in akçes), *bad-ı heva* (in akçes)".

⁷⁵Hiding the animals from the surveyors would be a widespread practice. In *Kanunname of Bozok*: "Ve eğer sayıcıdan koyun gizlese, koyun başına bir akçe alına." Barkan, Kanunlar, 127.

If a sub-tribal unit was involved in supplementary agricultural activities, then the scribe also noted the amounts of agricultural tithes in kind and money, specifying the *mezra'as* cultivated by these groups. Additionally, if a watermill was present, the tax related to its (*resm-i asiyab*) was included in the total sum of taxes.⁷⁶

As Lindner suggests, comparing the agricultural tithe to the sheep tax for each sub-tribal unit provides a clear indication of the pace of sedentarisation among the nomads.⁷⁷ However, it is important to highlight that in Lindner's case, tax-paying households of Atçeken clans were recorded according to the size of their plots like ordinary peasants. They were not exempt from paying customary land taxes (*resm-i çift* and *resm-i zemin*.) This allowed Lindner to compare sheep tax and agricultural taxes on a per-household basis. In the Bozok region, however, tribesmen engaged in seasonal agriculture in certain *mezra'as* were not recorded based on the size of the plots they were cultivating. This allows for a comparison of the taxes related to husbandry and agriculture per sub-tribal unit or clan group.

On the other hand, calculating the average amount of the agricultural tithe per taxpaying household may not be a consistent method in this case. The document (TTd.155) and the local *kanunname* of Bozok do not clarify whether the tithes were paid individually by tax-paying households or collectively by the clan groups. It is inferred from the document that in nomadic-clan types of social groups, the ownership of key resources, particularly the pastures, was shared by the members of the community.⁷⁸ In line with the corporative ownership of the pastures, agricultural land in the winter quarters might have also been held and tilled communally, suggesting that agricultural tithes were probably paid communally. With rare exceptions, however, the livestock was owned privately.⁷⁹ Therefore estimations about the tributary pressure on the overall pastoralist economic activity of each sub-tribal unit or clan can be made by illustrating the average herd size for each tax-paying household. Regarding the pace of sedentarisation, comparing the amounts of *resm-i aġnam* with agricultural tithes for each sub-tribal unit seasonally occupied with grain cultivation can expose the economic balance between pastoralism and agriculture, allowing us to differentiate between semi-nomadic and semi-sedentary pastoralism.

⁷⁶These entries mostly follow as “mezra-i X cemaat-i mezbur ziraat eder; hasil: el galle” (in kind and its money equivalent).

⁷⁷Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 85.

⁷⁸Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, 125, 131.

⁷⁹Ibid.123.

3.5 Rebellious Tribes of Bozok

As previously mentioned, the formal annexation of Bozok by the Ottomans, following the execution of the last Zülkadirid ruler Ali Bey, in 1522, faced opposition from the Zülkadir Türkmens in the region. These tribes had a known sympathy towards the Safavids. During Ali Bey's governorship of the region as an Ottoman vassal, Bozok tribes had already rebelled in 1519-20, under Şah Veli a *sufi* mystic from the region.⁸⁰ Although Ali Bey managed to quell the rebellion and execute the ringleaders the opposition persisted. In the spring of 1526, when the bulk of the Ottoman army was campaigning against the Hungarians, a new insurrection arose in the region. This time, the uprising was sparked by the injustices committed by Ottoman tax assessors against a certain Musa from the Söklen tribe. The tribes of Çiçeklü, Mesudlu, (or Masadlu), Ağcakoyunlu, Hisarbeylü, and Söklen joined the uprising.⁸¹

According to Sümer's micro-historical study on the population and settlement patterns in the *sancak* of Bozok, the Çiçeklü tribe inhabited the region corresponding to the present-day town of Boğazlıyan, located fifty kilometres southeast of Akdağ mountain, which offered suitable highland terrain for summer pastures.⁸² The Çiçeklü tribe likely migrated seasonally along a short route between Boğazlıyan and Akdağ. The winter quarters of Mesudlu and Ağcakoyunlu tribes were located twenty kilometres east of Akdağ, between the eastern slopes of the mountain and the valley of Kızılırmak. This region corresponds to the present-day towns of Şarkışla and Gemerek, formerly known as nahiye-i Gedük and Çubuk.⁸³ Hisarbeylü tribe wintered in the western and north-western foothills of Akdağ. Contemporary villages of Hisar Bey and Has Bek are located twenty kilometres east of the town of Sarıkıya. Back in the day, the environs of these villages must have been controlled by the Hisarbeylü tribe.⁸⁴ Lastly, the winter quarters of the neighbouring Söklen tribe were

⁸⁰Faruk Sümer, *Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 1999): 73, Hanna Sohrweide. "Der Sieg der Safaviden Persien", 167-70.

⁸¹Faruk Sümer, *Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde*, 77, Hanna Sohrweide, "Der Sieg der Safaviden Persien", 173-5. In B.O.A TTD. 155, Hisarbeylü and Söklen were recorded as sub-tribal units under the heading of Şam Bayadı tribe. These tribes might have already joined the rebellion of Şah Veli (1519) and consequently lost the majority of their members and influence. A certain Hisar Bey from Zülkadirid nobility was reported among the followers of Şah Veli.

⁸²Faruk Sümer, "Bozok Tarihine Dair Araştırmalar" 315.

⁸³Ibid. 316, Lütfi Arslan, "H.563/M.1556 Tarihli Mufassal Tahrir Defterine", 34

⁸⁴Faruk Sümer, "Bozok Tarihine Dair Araştırmalar", 317

along the upper reaches of the Kanak River, north of Sarıkaya.⁸⁵ All these tribes had easy access to the summer pastures in Akdağ mountain, requiring a march of approximately twenty kilometres from their winter quarters.

3.5.1 Tribe of Çiçeklü

Among the five tribes we examined, the Çiçeklü tribe stood as the most populous with 819 *nefers*, divided into 566 *hanes*, 131 *mücerreds*, 60 *sipahis* and *sipahizades*, and 19 *müsellems*⁸⁶. In a nomadic milieu, the *hane* entries were likely to be representing tents. In TT 155, under the heading of *kabile-i Çiçeklü*, 39 sub-tribal units (*cemaats*) were recorded in their winter quarters. If they were engaged in seasonal agricultural activities, the *mezra'as* they cultivated were also listed under the clan heading with the tithes recorded in both in kind and their money equivalents.⁸⁷ Among these *cemaats*, besides those registered as “*cemaat-i Çiçeklü*”, smaller tribes with distinct names were also noted, though they were somehow incorporated into the larger tribe.⁸⁸

Regarding the *mezra'as* controlled by Çiçeklü, these units were recorded either solely as winter quarters and pastures (*kışlak*), as cultivated land (*ekinlik*) or often serving both purposes. Some *kışlak* entries are difficult to read because of the physical conditions of the document.⁸⁹ Additionally, *resm-i ağnam* entries in the document were erased by the impact of humidity. Since the synoptic survey provides the total sums including occasional fees and fines regarding marriages and criminal cases (*resm-i arusand bad-ı heva*) for *cemaats*, it is challenging to obtain a clear figure if any entries regarding these occasional fees are also unreadable. However, for *mezra'a* entries, even when the tithe amounts given in TT 155 are unreadable, we can estimate the tax amounts by following the related *mezra'a* entries in TT 998.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶High numbers of sipahis and müsellems, who were of Zülkadirid origin, might illustrate that Çiçekli was one of the prominent tribes in the military organisation of the former Beylik. Sümer underlines the tribe's role in military conflicts between Zülkadirids and Karamanids in the fifteenth century. In B.O.A. TTd.124 and 142 (See Appendices B and C of the chapter on Zülkadirid timars) tribal sipahis coming from the Çiçeklü tribe and Taf clan are not uncommon.

⁸⁷B.O.A. TTd. 155 fols.140-158, TTd. 998 fols.608-10.

⁸⁸For instance, *cemaat-i Taf* was recorded with nine units within the Çiçeklü tribe. (TT 998 fols.608-9) It was followed by *cemaat-i Yapasınlı* with three and *cemaat-i Harun* with two units. There are also certain *cemaats* with only one unit, which were often recorded as “*yüzdecıyan*”. These were namely, Şeyh İsmailü, Karpuzlu, Köşkerlü, Karalu, Şarklu and Beş Bacaklı. *Yüzdecıyan* was a distinct group among the nomadic pastoralists who enjoyed a relative tax reduction on their herds. *Resm-i ağnam* for ordinary nomads was one akçe per two heads whereas for “*yüzdecıyan*” this tax is reduced to forty akçes per hundred heads. Neşet Çağatay, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Reayadan Alınan”: 487.

⁸⁹For the Çiçeklü tribe, 8 *kışlak* names are unreadable and missing.

According to the data from the document, the sub-tribal units or clans of the Çiçekli tribe were spread among at least sixty-five *mezra*'as. Of these, at least 11 were solely used as winter quarters (*kışlak*.) Forty-five of them were cultivated for subsidiary agricultural activity,⁹⁰ and the remaining nine served both purposes as both winter quarters and cultivated land (*ekinlik*.) These *mezra*'as, were often under the control of one particular sub-tribal unit and its primary kin groups, with exceptions being rare.

Based on the document, a sub-tribal unit that recorded with only a *kışlak* entry, along with related sheep tax and occasional fees and fines, was likely engaged in pure nomadic pastoralism. Sixteen clans within the Çiçeklü tribe fit this description since, according to the document, no agricultural tax was demanded from them.⁹¹ Conversely, those engaged in agriculture, either subsidiary or dominant economic activity, could be considered a semi-nomadic pastoralist community. For these groups, *cemaat* entry and taxes concerning husbandry are followed by one or a couple of *mezra*'a entries with respective amounts of agricultural tithes recorded both in kind (*keylçe*) and its money equivalent in terms of *akçes*.

The agricultural tithe was recorded one-fifth of the total harvest in the *Kanunname* of Bozok. Although collected in kind, it was also recorded as its money equivalent in the document; accordingly, per *kile* of wheat equalling five *akçes*. The total amount of tithe for each cultivated *mezra*'a, including the ones tilled by the members of the sub-tribal units registered under the other four tribes, rarely exceeded 1000 *akçes*.⁹² These modest amounts of yearly yields indicate that the scale of agricultural production was limited either by a short duration of cultivation in a year or by the soil's low productivity.

Excluding one *cemaat* recorded as *sipahizadegan*, twenty-two Çiçeklü clans could be considered semi-nomadic pastoralists, if not semi-sedentary pastoralists, although the agricultural tax often made up the larger portion of their total tax paid.⁹³ Unlike their settled peasant counterparts, the tribesmen, if they were engaged in subsidiary agriculture, were not recorded according to the size of the land they

⁹⁰Two of these cultivated *mezra*'as were exclusively at the disposal of seven *nefers* of *sipahizadegan*. These *mezra*'as were namely Bağçecik and Acıpınar (TTd. 155, fol.153)

⁹¹We are unable to read the sheep taxes of six nomadic pastoralist clans because of the physical conditions of the document.

⁹²Which equals to 200 *kiles* of grain. (= 10 *müd*).

⁹³For only "cemaat-i Taf, der *mezra*-i ...kanak", the sheep tax paid was higher than the agricultural tithe (TT 155, fol.147). For "cemaat-i Taf der *mezra*-i Acıcakışla" (TT 155 fol.149), "Cemaat-i Taf der *mezra*-i Uzunin ve Küçükark" (TT 155 fol.148), "Cemaat-i Çiçeklü der *mezra*-i Yeğencik" (TT 155 fols.150-1), "Cemaat-i Taf der *mezra*-i Ağaçviran and Tatarviran" (TT 155 fol.152) and "Cemaat-i Poladlu" (TT 155 fols.153-4) sheep tax and agricultural tithe were equal or quite the same.

cultivated, i.e., *çift* status. The document provides no evidence of a division of labour between the members of such communities who were engaged in year-round cultivation and those in pastoralism. Therefore concluding that some clans were semi-sedentary pastoralists requires caution. Instead, we can reach less ambitious conclusions about the process of sedentarisation by highlighting the relationship between average herd size per household and the ratio of sheep tax to agricultural tithes for clans. If we observe a sub-tribal unit where the average herd size per household barely meets the subsistence minimum of 60 animals (or with a liberal estimate regarding the nomads' ability to hide their animals from counting, between 55 and 65 heads) and the ratio of sheep tax to agricultural tithe was less than one fifth, this *cemaat* was likely in the process of sedentarisation.⁹⁴

For the sub-tribal units, with a sheep-to-household ratio lower than the subsistence minimum, and particularly those with fewer than thirty heads of flock coupled and a ratio of sheep-tax to agricultural tithe smaller than one-fifth, these groups would likely in transition from semi-nomadic pastoralism to semi-sedentary pastoralism.

The missing part in this picture is the sub-tribal units that neither met the subsistence minimum for their livestock nor found cultivable soil for supplementary agricultural activity. It would be reasonable to assert that these groups, maintaining nomadic pastoralism in the most marginal conditions were the true victims of the Ottoman fiscal pressure. Certain clans had no option but to rebel or flee to the Safavid realm, which offered economically, politically and militarily favourable conditions to nomadic Türkmen tribes.⁹⁵

Figure 3.1 Çiçeklü cemaats according to sheep/household ratio

Average herd size per household	Below 30 heads	30-54 heads	55-65 heads	66-99 heads	100 heads and above
Nomadic clans	1	5	2	1	1
Semi-nomadic (and Semi-settled?) clans	1	3	1	11	3

⁹⁴This process could be shown more accurately by a durational analysis, by comparing a series of tahrir registers covering a period of 30 to 60 years. However, since our immediate purpose is to spotlight the juncture of the rebellions in the 1520s, we have resorted to a cross-sectional study. Needless to mention there is no extant tahrir register of the region belonging to the period before the region was annexed by the Ottomans.

⁹⁵Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 111-2.

The table⁹⁶ above clearly shows the economic disparities within the sub-tribal units of the Çiçeklü tribe. The majority of these groups, solely reliant on pastoralism, struggled to meet their basic needs. Many of these clans had livestock per household below the necessary subsistence minimum for the continuation of pastoralist economic activity. Only one exception among these nomadic pastoralists was the clan, “Cemaat-i Harun, der mezra-i Dügünöyüğü”, which had a relatively better off position with 100 sheep per household.⁹⁷ The *mezra*’a of Dügünöyüğü served as both winter quarters and cultivated land for another Harun clan (*cemaat-i Harun-i diğ̈er der mezra-i Dügünöyüğü*).⁹⁸ It is uncertain if both clans paid agricultural tithes from their agricultural activities in Dügünöyüğü, so I opted for classifying the clan of Harun as purely nomadic pastoralist according to the data preserved in the document, and Harun-i Diğ̈er as semi-nomadic pastoralist. We can speculate that the dual use of the *mezra*’as might have enabled nomadic-pastoralist clans like Harun to shift their economic organisation from pure pastoralism to seasonal subsidiary agriculture. This shift could occur when tax pressures endanger the stability of their herd size. As herd sizes dwindled towards the subsistence minimum, these clans likely purchased agricultural products from nearby markets, to supplement their livelihoods or to meet the demands of sheep tax.⁹⁹ This flexibility was likely supported by strong reciprocal relations with their close-knit kin group recorded in the same winter quarters. Another example highlights the dynamics of economic adaptation among nomadic-pastoralist groups. For instance, the “cemaat-i Yapasınlı der mezra-i Yavahacı el mezbur”¹⁰⁰ with an average herd size at the subsistence minimum, shared its winter quarters with a close-knit kin group also recorded as “cemaat-i Yapasınlı”, engaged in cultivation in the same *mezra*’a. It is plausible that this nomadic pastoralist clan would eventually enter into subsidiary agricultural production in Yavahacı. Conversely, we observe that three nomadic pastoralist

⁹⁶Nine clans of Çiçeklü whose sheep-tax amounts are unreadable in the document are not included in the table.

⁹⁷TTd. 155 fol.145.

⁹⁸TTd. 155 fol.145; *cemaat-i Harun* and *Harun-i Diğ̈er* would be “primary kin groups”, a term underlined by (Khazanov 1994, 128) “What I understand by primary kin group is a number of separate and independent families which are very closely connected with one another through ties of kinship, reciprocal relations, common residence, etc., the core of which is made up of very close consanguines (microlineage), who are descended from one close ancestor and who in the past have frequently made up one family -brothers, cousins, uncles, nephews, etc. Amongst nomads, a primary kin group consists of closely related families which all year round, or for part of the year, pasture together and help and support each other. Such groups are, of course, considerably less stable than an individual family and all the families of a primary kin group run their own households and keep their own livestock. The primary kin group consists of several autonomous economic cells which do not automatically have the right to make claims on each other’s property and labour. Thus the primary kin group must not be confused with the extended family.”

⁹⁹Mustafa Akdağ, *Türkiyenin İktisadi ve İctimai Tarihi*, (İstanbul. Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2010), 664; observes that between the years 1500 and 1520, the market price of one head of sheep fluctuated between 25 and 35 akçes, whereas one *kile* of grain was priced between 4 and 7 akçes. In the document (TT 155) one *kile* of grain equals five akçes.

¹⁰⁰TTd. 155 fols.144-5.

clans registered within the Çiçekli¹⁰¹ tribe with inadequate herd sizes per household did not have any primary kin groups engaged in seasonal agriculture in the winter quarters they inhabited. These poorest clans likely faced limited options: either transform their winter quarters into cultivated fields by adopting a semi-nomadic economic organization (depending on the agricultural productivity of the soil) or flight from Ottoman taxation by various means, including rebellion or migration.

Regarding the Çiçeklü clans, who practised both agriculture and pastoralism, briefly speaking, for the semi-nomadic clans of the tribe, the average herd sizes for households were often above the subsistence minimum, unlike their pure-pastoralist counterparts. This apparent relative prosperity could be attributed to their ability to allocate a portion of the agricultural surplus to keep the size of their flocks within sustainable limits. Additionally, among these semi-nomadic pastoralists, there were also privileged groups such as the “*yüzdeciyan*” who enjoyed a tax reduction on their herds. Among the sub-tribal units of Çiçeklü, whose herd sizes were above the subsistence minimum, six of them were recorded as *yüzdeciyan*.¹⁰² Ordinary Türkmens were obliged to pay one *akçe* per two sheep, whereas, for *yüzdeciyan*, the sheep tax was reduced to forty *akçes* per one hundred sheep. Despite this reduced tributary pressure on their pastoral economic activity, these *yüzdeciyan* groups also actively engaged in agricultural production in their winter quarters. Linder suggests that even the largest herds were vulnerable to decimation by the impact of bad weather or epidemics, which could prompt nomadic communities to adapt to a settled way of life by increasing the share of agriculture in their overall economic activity.¹⁰³

The involvement of these wealthier *yüzdeciyan* groups in agriculture might also be partly related to the requirements of their relatively sizable flocks. For instance, the clan of Şeyh İsmailü had a substantial flock of 4500 heads at its disposal and cultivated nine *mezra'as*; a fairly high number of cultivated *mezra'as* observed among semi-nomadic communities. The available labour force included at least 54 *nefers* of tribesmen. The total size of these nine *mezra'as* was probably between 1300 and 1950 *dönüms*, half of which was sown and the other half was possibly left for grazing of the flock.¹⁰⁴ These cultivated fields could also provide fodder for their herds after

¹⁰¹These were namely, Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezra-i Saruoğlan (TTd. 155 fol.140), Cemaat-i Çiçekli, der mezra-i Habib Kethüda Kışlası (TTd. 155 fol.142) and Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezra-i Acıcağöl (TTd. 155 fol.150).

¹⁰²These clans were namely, cemaat-i Koştemürlü (TTd. 155 fol.154) cemaat-i Şeyh İsmaili (TT 155 fol.155), cemaat-i Köşkerlü (TTd. 155 fol.157), cemaat-i Karalu (TTd. 155 fol.157-8) cemaat-i Şarklu and cemaat-i Beşbacaklu (TTd. 155 fol.158)

¹⁰³Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*: 61-2, 90.

¹⁰⁴Our calculation is based on tithes collected from these nine *mezra'as*. A total tithe of 3900 *akçes* was collected which, in kind, equals 780 *kiles* of wheat. In the Kanunname of Bozok, the amount of tithe was ordered as one-fifth. Therefore, the total production in these nine *mezra'as* was 3900 *kiles* of wheat. If 20

the grain harvest.¹⁰⁵

However, the involvement of the clan groups in agriculture does not always indicate or ensure a viable herd. As shown in the table below, five sub-tribal units registered under Çiçeklü barely met the subsistence minimum, or their herd sizes per household were significantly below the necessary minimum.¹⁰⁶ One notable point is that the cultivated *mezra'a* entries and winter-quarter entries for four of these tribes were the same. In other words, there was no additional *mezra'as* used primarily for seasonal cultivation were registered at these clans' disposal. This observation suggests that these clans may have recently transformed their economic organization from pure pastoralism to semi-nomadic pastoralism in response to the impact of the tributary pressure on the stability of their herds.

Hypothetically we can consider the high proportion of agricultural tithe over sheep tax, coupled with a subsistence minimum per household far below the required amount as an indicator of the tempo of sedentarisation. Accordingly, at least one of these clans in question was likely on the verge of transforming its economic activity to semi-sedentary pastoralism¹⁰⁷, as shown in the table below:

kiles of wheat equals 1 müd of wheat (Öz 1999a, 88), the total production must be equal to 195 müd. If we take the rate of agricultural productivity following Bruce McGowan's one-third (McGowan 1969, 167), the total amount of sown seed for a harvest of 195 müd of wheat would be 65 müd. Given that a two-field system of land rotation was practised, in fact, the available land could be sown by 130 müd of seed. M. A. Cook gives the size of a *çift* corresponds to a piece of land sown by 10 müd of grain. (Cook 1972, 68) (We consider here the müd as a measurement unit for harvest and seed were the same.) Accordingly, the total size of the *mezra'as* at Şeyh İsmailü's disposal equals 13 *çifts*. This makes between 1300 and 1950 dönüms, if we assume that the agricultural quality of the soil was low in the region.

¹⁰⁵ Onur Usta and Oktay Özel, "Sedentarization of Turcomans." (2011), 155.

¹⁰⁶ These clans were, *cemaat-i Yapasinlı*, der *mezra-i Yavahacı* (TTd. 155 fol.143-4), *cemaat-i Çiçeklü*, der *mezra-i Darlıhyurt* (TTd. 155, fol.146), *cemaat-i Taf*, der *mezra-i Uzunin ve Küçük ark* (TTd. 155 fol.148), *cemaat-i Taf*, der *mezra-i Acıcakışla* (TTd. 155 fol.149) and *cemaat-i Bahaddinlü* (name of the winter quarter cannot be read) (TTd. 155, fols.152-3)

¹⁰⁷ *Cemaat-i Çiçeklü*, der *mezra-i Darlıhyurt*; the sheep tax for this clan, which included 27 nefers and 19 households, was entered 50 akçes whereas the agricultural tithes from Darlıhyurt and Çilviran were 1000 and 400 akçes respectively.

Figure 3.2 Relationship between average herd size per household and economic balance between pastoralism and agriculture in semi-nomadic Çiçeklü cemaats

Ratio of sheep tax to tithe sheep/ household	(+)1:1	1:1	1:1(+) -1:5	1:5(+)-1:10	1:10(+)
Below 30 heads					1
30-54 heads		1	2		
55-65 heads			1		
66-99 heads	1		7	2	1
100 heads and above			1	1	1

For the majority of semi-nomadic sub-tribal units of Çiçeklü however, the ratio of sheep tax to agricultural tithe quite often fluctuated between 1:1 and 1:5. In other words, agricultural taxes paid were slightly higher than the sheep tax for these *cemaats*. Excluding one clan group with an average of a hundred or more sheep per household, the remaining ten groups require an explanation regarding the ratio of sheep tax to agricultural tithe, which could be considered as an indicator of sedentarisation. Upon closer examination, we observe that seven of these clans had herd sizes slightly above the required amount of sixty heads, and the remaining three clans barely met the subsistence minimum or fell below it. This raises the following questions: Were these semi-nomadic groups able to invest their agricultural income to maintain their flocks at a sustainable size for the reproduction of pastoralist economic activity? Were the net agricultural profits per household sufficient for replenishing the herds below the subsistence minimum?

To further explore these questions, let us examine the data concerning “Cemaat-i Yapasınlı der-Yavahacı”¹⁰⁸ as a case study. This clan group had one of the smallest average herd sizes per household, ranging from 46 to 50 heads. Additionally, the ratio of agricultural tithe to sheep tax was five, the highest among the eight sub-tribal units in question. Yapasınlı clan was registered in its winter quarters, served for sheltering and pasturing the herd in winter and for seasonal cultivation, as well.

The total sheep tax recorded for the clan was 1000 *akçes*, indicating that the clan had

¹⁰⁸TTd. 155 fols.143-4.

2000 head of sheep at its disposal. The agricultural tithe demanded from the yields in Yavahacı was 5000 *akçes*, equivalent to 1000 *kiles* of wheat in kind. According to the sancak *kanunname* the tithe rate was one-fifth; thus, 5000 *kiles* of grain were produced by the clan members of Yapasınlı and 4000 *kiles* were left at the clan members' disposal. Considering mill losses and the amount of grain spared as a reserve for the following year's seed,¹⁰⁹ it is roughly estimated that the remaining 2670 *kiles* of wheat were shared between 42 families, corresponding to 64 *kiles* of wheat per family.

Assuming that approximately 59 *kiles* of wheat would be stocked for family consumption¹¹⁰, unless the family consumption was restricted to its minimum, only 5 *kiles* of wheat would be the total marketable product per household. The net agricultural income per household in the Yapasınlı clan would then be 25 *akçes*. If the approximate amount of 50 heads was the average size of flock per household, agricultural income would only be barely enough to cover the sheep tax. It is important to note that household expenses also included occasional fines and fees (*bad-ı heva.*)¹¹¹ In these conditions, there was no room left to invest in livestock to increase the herd size above the critical limit.

Suppose we apply the same procedure of calculation to the other seven clans in the same category (ratio of sheep tax to agricultural tithe between 1:1 and 1:5, and flock size per household at or slightly above the subsistence minimum) whose ratios of tithe to sheep tax is even smaller than five. In that case, we see that these families' net agricultural incomes were not only sufficient to cover the animal tax per family but also to meet the requirements of family consumption. These results suggest that clan groups were internally divided between households that pursued pure nomadism and those engaged in subsidiary agricultural activity in addition to pastoralism. The document does not provide evidence to distinguish between tribal households with a combined economy and pure pastoralists. In any case, we can conclude that sedentarisation was underway for the majority of the clans constituted the Çiçeklü tribe.

¹⁰⁹Following Mehmet Öz, *XV.-XVI Yüzyıllarda Canık Sancağı*, 113, we assume this amount as one-third of the total product after taxation.

¹¹⁰Suraiya Faroqhi, "Rural Society in Anatolia and the Balkans during the Sixteenth Century, I" *Turcica: Revue d'études Turques* 9 (1977): 192 underlines less than 1500 kg of consumable grain was enough to keep a family alive in the sixteenth century. Assuming that 1 kile of wheat equals 25.6 kg; in terms of kile, the required amount of wheat for family subsistence is approximately 59 kiles. Here we presume that the diet is based only on grain products.

¹¹¹Rudi Paul Lindner illustrates that there is a correlation between high fines and small herds. (Lindner 1983, 87) For instance, the total sum of *bad-ı heva* paid by 42 hanes of Yapasınlı in *mezra'a* of Yavahacı, with 46 heads of sheep per household is 1000 *akçe* whereas for 46 hanes in Şeyh İsmailü clan with a herd of 4500, and 97 heads of sheep per household, *bad-ı heva* is only 445 *akçes*.

3.5.2 Tribe of Mesudlu

The Mesudlu tribe consisted of twelve clans, with only one of them adhering strictly to nomadic pastoralism in its pure form.¹¹² Ten clans were recorded as “yüzdeciyan”.¹¹³ The total population included 274 *nefers*, with 199 tax-paying households, 28 *mücerreds*, 14 *sipahi* and *sipahizadegan*, and 16 *müsellems*.¹¹⁴ Compared to the Çiçeklü tribe, the number of *sipahis* and *sipahizades* in Mesudlu clans was relatively low. This suggests that the Mesudlu tribe held a lesser political and military significance compared to the roles played by the Çiçeklü tribe during the rule of the Zülkadirids.

In terms of population size, the majority of Mesudlu clans were relatively small. The most populous clan was the clan of Uvralu, with 101 *nefers* was the most populous.¹¹⁵ It is followed by cemaat-i Avşar with 52 *nefers*¹¹⁶. Each of the remaining ten clans had populations of fewer than 22 *nefers*, four of them having less than ten *nefers*. These small population sizes might indicate that the tribesmen of Mesudlu were heavily involved in the rebellions of 1526-27 (or in the previous Şah Veli uprising) and lost many members as a result of clashes with the Ottoman forces or migration to Iran. This interpretation is further supported by the evident economic destitution that the remaining Mesudlu groups were experiencing in their pastoralist economic activities.

Among the twelve sub-tribal units of Mesudlu, only one had a flock size adequate for the continuation and reproduction of pastoralism. Another Mesudlu clan registered in the *mezra'a* of Saru had a herd size per household slightly below the subsistence minimum.¹¹⁷ The remaining ten clans, including the pure nomadic clan recorded without a cultivated *mezra'a*, struggled to maintain their pastoralist economic ac-

¹¹²TTd. 155, fol.169. This clan is recorded as “Cemaat-i Mesudlu ki an-nahiye-i Kars amedend.” In TTd. 998, the earliest synoptic survey of Zülkadirid territories, we observe twenty clans of Mesudlu under *yurtluk-ocaklık* status (fols.505-596). It seems there had still been a limited connection between Zulkadir Türkmens inhabiting the mountainous region of Northern and Eastern Cilicia and the ones in Bozok around the 1520s. This may also suggest that correspondence of Baba Zünnun-Kalender Çelebi uprisings of central and north-central Anatolia and upheavals in Cilicia in the late 1520s were somehow related to these tribal ties between these mobile nomadic groups who were living in distant territories yet still had connections with each other.

¹¹³In addition, the tributary status of one of the Mesudlu clans, recorded in the winter quarters called Emirçardağı and Söğütlüceviran is unreadable in the document yet they are also likely to be yüzdeciyan as their counterparts in the tribal group. TTd. 155, fols.168-169. In this manner, all of the semi-nomadic clans in the Mesudlu tribe are recorded as yüzdeciyan who enjoyed a relative tax reduction on their herds.

¹¹⁴TTd. 998 fol.613.

¹¹⁵TTd. 155 fols.169-171.

¹¹⁶TTd. 155 fols. 171-2.

¹¹⁷TTd. 155, p.168: “Cemaat-i Mesudlu, der mezra-i Saru, yüzdeciyan”

tivities in marginal conditions, with herd sizes far below the subsistence minimum of sixty heads of sheep per household. Five of these clans had fewer than thirty heads of sheep at their disposal.¹¹⁸

Under these challenging conditions, agriculture became the predominant economic activity for these clan groups. Among the forty-two winter quarters where Mesudlu clans were registered, agricultural tithes were paid on cereal production in forty-one of them. Although the volume of agricultural production did not exceed 50 müds in these winter quarters, it is apparent that Mesudlu clans were on the brink of abandoning pastoralism in favour of settled agriculture.

Figure 3.3 Mesudlu cemaats in terms of sheep/household ratio

Average herd size per household	Below 30 heads	30-55 heads	55-65 heads	66-99 heads	100 heads and above
Nomadic communities	1				
Semi-nomadic and semi-settled	5	4	2		

Figure 3.4 Relationship between average herd size per household and economic balance between pastoralism and agriculture in semi-nomadic Mesudlu cemaats

Ratio of sheep tax to tithe	(+)1:1	1:1	1:1(+) -1:5	1:5(+) -1:10	1:10(+)
sheep/household					
Below 30 heads			1	2	1
30-54 heads			2	1	1
55-65 heads					2
66-99 heads					
100 heads and above					

The tables above clearly illustrate the trend of sedentarisation among Mesudlu clans. While the majority of the clans were recorded as “yüzdecıyan” with a slight tax

¹¹⁸See Appendix A: no.1,6,8,11,12 under Mesudlu tribe

reduction on their herds, pastoralism seems to have lost its dominance in the general economic balance of the productive activities of sub-tribal units of Mesudlu. For most clans, the total amount of tithes paid on agricultural products was five or more than five times higher than the sheep tax. As shown, none of these semi-nomadic clans had average herd sizes that allowed for the reproduction of pastoralist economic activity with relative ease.

Given the preponderance of agricultural tithes over the sheep-taxes paid by Mesudlu clans along with lower ratios of average herd size per tax-payer household, we can conclude that these clans had already been internally divided between members, engaged in year-round agricultural activities and those maintaining seasonal pastoralism. In other words, an internal division of labour has emerged between agriculturalists and herdsmen, resembling the internal economic organisation of settled village communities. However, the document does not provide evidence to discern the clan members fully committed to agriculture from those maintaining transhumance; perhaps members of these clans fulfilled these roles interchangeably.

If our conclusion derived from the very limited data that the documentation offers is accurate, then it would be better to define Mesudlu clans as semi-sedentary pastoralists in line with the elements and distinctions of four broad classifications of pastoral nomadism in general given by Khazanov.¹¹⁹ An observation that supports our conclusion is that certain clans registered under the Mesudlu tribe were involved in the cultivation of cotton and cucurbits along with cereals.¹²⁰ Cultivation of diverse crops in addition to cereals could indicate that the tribesmen committed significant time and resources to the agricultural sector alongside livestock breeding. Thus, some members of these clans were exclusively engaged in agriculture for the whole year and did not join other clan members in their seasonal migrations to summer pastures. Production of a cash crop like cotton, which was probably in high demand in town markets,¹²¹ verifies Khazanov's key point that nomadic communities do not live in complete isolation from the settled people.

An equally important point to underline is that the cultivation of crops by the tribesmen indicated the tributary pressure on pastoralist economic organisation.

¹¹⁹Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, 21-22. Nevertheless, in order not to create confusion of terminology I preferred to define any of such clans engaged in agricultural activity along with pastoralism as semi-nomadic pastoralists (instead of introducing the concept of semi-sedentary pastoralism) irrespective of the economic balance between agriculture and pastoralism in the Appendix A

¹²⁰TTd. 155 fol.171: For instance, in seven meza'as where cemaat-i Uvralu was engaged in cotton cultivation. 550 akçes of the total agricultural tithe, which corresponded to 11 menn of cotton was cotton-tithe (öşr-i penbe). TTd. 155 fol.172: Cemaat-i Aşşar was cultivating wheat, cotton and cucurbits in Mezra-i Aşşar-ı Büzürğ (mezra'a-i Aşşar-ı Küçük and Musa fakı were attached) "El-Galle 100 kile 500, Öşr-i Penbe 10 menn 250, Öşr-i Bostan 100".

¹²¹One "menn" of cotton is priced at 50 akçes in tithe records.

For instance, clans of Uvralı and Avşar might have been cultivating highly lucrative cotton for sale in town markets to cover their losses in herds stemming from demands of the Ottoman financial apparatus. The amounts registered for these clans in the *tahrir* reveal the extent of the agricultural production for the market. However, these values should be approached with relative caution since they mostly represent approximations and reflect the average amount of production over a three-year interval.¹²² Nevertheless, we can infer that these tithe amounts recorded in the *tahrir* could reflect periodic trends in agricultural production. In this respect, tithe amounts paid by Uvralı and Avşar clans may reflect the intensity of these tribesmen's involvement in agriculture-for-market, which, indeed, acted as a pull factor into sedentarisation.

When we examine the Uvralı clan, we observe that they were producing various agricultural goods in varying amounts in the eleven winter quarters they were registered at the time of tax collection. The total amount of grain-tithe paid by the clan was 830 *kiles* in kind and 4150 *akçes* in its money equivalent. This makes a total amount of 4150 *kiles* of grain yields in these eleven winter quarters. After doing the necessary calculations, we found out that 2213 *kiles* of grain was left for family consumption, which corresponded to 56,661 kilograms of grain.¹²³ Considering that the Uvralı clan included 85 tax-paying households, we assess the amount of consumable grain per *hane* as 666.6 kilograms, far below the suggested 1500 kilograms for per-capita family consumption. In these circumstances, it seems unlikely that the Uvralı clan was producing grain for market purposes. Instead, grain production was probably directed toward internal consumption as a supplement to dairy products.

However, in seven *mezra'as* we also observe that Uvralı clansmen were engaged in cotton cultivation with the tithe amount recorded as 11 *menn*, corresponding to 550 *akçes* in its money equivalent. If we assume that cotton tithe was collected as one-fifth of the total production, likewise the grain-tithe, the volume of marketable cotton surplus would be 44 *menn* with a monetary value of 2200 *akçes*. The income per *hane* obtained by cotton sales was thus 25.8 *akçes*, which roughly covers the market price of a sheep.

On a communal basis, the profits from marketing cotton remained slightly below the volume of the monetary tributes demanded from the Uvralı clan. Paying 2536

¹²²Mehmet Öz, "Tahrir Defterlerinin Osmanlı Araştırmalarında Kullanılması Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler", *Vakıflar Dergisi*, 22 (1991): 429-439.

¹²³After the amount of grain paid as tithe is extracted, we also extract one-third of the grain which corresponds to the amount of seed reserves and mill losses. For a discussion about these calculations see: Kayhan Örbay, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Tarımsal Üretkenlik Üzerine Tetkikat ve Notlar", *Bellekten* 81 (2017): 815.

akçes in total for animal tax and criminal fees and fines [*bad-ı heva*], commercial agriculture was barely helping them to make their living under the tributary pressure of the Ottoman fiscal apparatus. Nevertheless, this financial balance may indicate their tendency towards organising their productive activity towards agriculture and the eventual sedentarisation of the clan.

A similar situation can be observed for the Avşar clan, which was engaged in agricultural activity in three winter quarters. The total grain tithe collected from these *mezra'as* was recorded as 220 *kiles*, equivalent to a total production of 1100 *kiles*. After the necessary calculations, we find that the total amount of grain left for internal consumption is 15,018 kilograms, resulting in 408.89 kilograms reserved for per-household consumption. This amount is frankly less than one-third of the annual need of a family of five individuals, leaving no marketable surplus. Therefore, in a similar vein to the Uvralı clan, grain production for Avşar clans remained as a supplement to dairy products obtained from sheep breeding rather than being directed at market sales.

In the winter quarter called Avşar-ı Büzürg, however, we observe the production of cucurbits (*bostan*) and cotton alongside grain. *Bostan* tithe was recorded as 100 *akçes* without mentioning the demanded amount in kind. If we assume that cucurbits were cultivated exclusively for the market and that the tithe for cucurbits was one-fifth, the clan's total income from cultivating cucurbits was 400 *akçes*. In addition to cucurbits, the clan was producing cotton. The cotton tithe was recorded as 5 *menn* in kind and 250 *akçes* in its money equivalent, corresponding to 1000 *akçes* of profits of cotton production for the clan. Subtracting the total of 1055 *akçes* of monetary tributes (*resm-i ağnam* and *bad-ı heva*) demanded from the clan from the total 1400 *akçes* of income, the net income of the clan was 345 *akçes*, which was presumably invested in replenishing the depleted numbers of the herds.

In any case, for both Uvralı and Avşar clans, the continuation and reproduction of pastoralist economic activity did not exclusively rest on the internal and authentic mechanisms of transhumance. Instead, it highlighted a growing dependence on the profits obtained from agricultural activity. This conclusion is also compatible with the fact that the ratio of sheep tax to agricultural tithes for these two clans was approximately 1:5 and that the average herd sizes per *hane* in these clans were calculated as 32 and 20, respectively. These figures fall far below the necessary amount of 60 heads required for the replenishment of the herds exclusively by the natural reproduction of the flock.

This reduction in herd sizes, the increasing role of agricultural activity in the overall economic balance, and the involvement in the production of marketable agricultural

goods were interconnected processes triggered by the Ottoman taxation system imposed on the nomadic-pastoralist tribesmen.

3.5.3 Tribe of Akçakoyunlu

The physical conditions of the document obstruct conducting a fully comprehensive analysis of the economic situation of the Akçakoyunlu tribe. Sheep tax entries for four of the nine clans recorded under the tribe are unreadable in the detailed survey. The synoptic survey, on the other hand, only gives the sum of the sheep tax and marriage tax amounts, and criminal fees and fines of each clan, so approximations based on these summarised values would also be unhealthy.¹²⁴ Therefore it is sufficient here to focus on the demographic aspects of the tribe and the distribution of the nomadic and semi-nomadic clans. The Akçakoyunlu tribe consisted of nine sub-tribal units, four of them being semi-nomadic pastoralists, as indicated by their recorded agricultural tithes in certain *mezra'as*. The remaining five clans were pure nomadic pastoralists, according to the document.

A total of 513 *nefers* were registered under the nine sub-tribal units of Ağcakoyunlu, comprising 437 tax-paying households, 37 *mücerreds*, 21 individuals registered as *sipahi* and *sipahizade* and 5 *müsellem* troops. The clans had access to eight *mezra'as*, seven of which were cultivated land (*ekinlik*) and only the *mezra'a* of Minarekaya was specified as the shared winter quarter of two Mesudlu clans, registered under Ağcakoyunlu.¹²⁵

In comparison to the Çiçeklü and Mesudlu tribes, the prominent clans within the Akçakoyunlu tribe are characterised by their large populations. Among them, the clans of Akçakoyunlu, Mihmadlu and Beğmişacılu had their tax bases registered within the sultanic demesne.¹²⁶ This inclusion of large population groups within the sultanic demesne distinguished the Akçakoyunlu tribe from the other tribes in consideration. It is worth noting that this aspect deserves further commentary, particularly regarding the political implications of the discontent among Akçakoyunlu tribesmen.

It is noteworthy to highlight that tax revenues from Türkmen clans with large pop-

¹²⁴In the Appendix A, I have shown these values in parentheses.

¹²⁵TTd. 155 fols. 180-1.

¹²⁶Leading clan of the tribe, cemaat-i Ağcakoyunlu had 136 *nefers* (TTd. 155, fols.174-6, TTd. 998, fol.592); Mihmadlu clan was registered with 197 *nefers* (TTd. 155, fols. 177-9, TTd. 998 fol.592). Beğmişacılu had 74 *nefers* (TTd. 155, pp.176-7). It was followed by İleminlü and Gedük Akçakoyunlusu clans, both of which had 42 *nefers* of the adult male population. (TTd. 155, fol.179, fol.180).

ulations were often shared by the sultan, princes and higher state officials. This was because these clans constituted larger tax units and were more traceable compared to smaller, scattered clans that could evade taxation in remote corners of the Anatolian countryside. The centrally appointed tax collectors found it easier to track the movements of these larger tribal population groups in their seasonal migrations.¹²⁷ However, the appointment of tax collectors from outside of the clan groups disrupted the day-to-day relationship between ordinary clan members and their leaders who were often members of the same kin group and distant relatives. Kinship ties likely provided a certain degree of legitimacy for tributary demands of clan leaders from their commoner clan members especially when they were appointed as sipahi-kethüda relying on the revenues of their kinsmen as fiefs.¹²⁸ Inclusion of tribal revenue sources into the sultanic demesne, however, may render the tribesmen's, especially the tribal leaders' loyalty to the state dubious. These tattered relations may result in conflicts during tax assessment and collection by centrally appointed officials.¹²⁹

For example, the clans of Akçakoyunlu, Mihmadlu and Beğmişacılu showed a clear hierarchy in their name lists, starting with *sipahis*, *sipahizades* and *müsellems*, who enjoyed certain privileges compared to ordinary clan members.¹³⁰ Interestingly, these clan notables had no shared patronymics with ordinary clan members. This does not necessarily mean there were different genealogies within the same clan.

¹²⁷cf. İlhan Şahin, *Osmanlı Döneminde Konar Göçerler: incelemeler, araştırmalar*, (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2006) 187-8.

¹²⁸For instance, the first listed name under the entry of “cemaat-i İleminlü, an-kabile-i Akçakoyunlu” was a certain Polad Kethüda veled-i Murad who was also recorded as a sipahi. (TTd. 155 fol.179). Polad was likely the clan leader of İleminlü whose sheep tax, marriage and bad-ı heva taxes and also the agricultural tithes were granted as a fief to him. The existence of one other “veled-i Murad” entry among the listed names suggests that Polad was a clan member, not an appointee from the centre.

¹²⁹cf. Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 95 “In order to collect these revenues and use them for Ottoman purposes it was essential to circumvent the chief and neutralize his potential opposition. In some cases, the Ottomans bought the chiefs off with revenue grants and offices elsewhere. In order, however, to sever his tribesmen's ties to him, it was necessary to reach below him, to reach into and divert sub-tribal units, our clans... The cadasters show the Ottoman government bypassing the chiefs, reaching down into the structure of the tribe, and dealing directly with the clans and their headman to act as agents of the Ottoman government instead of tribal chiefs. This policy weakened the political structure, the most important structure indeed, of the tribes.”

¹³⁰Fifteen sipahis and sipahizades were listed for Akçakoyunlu clan. Seven of them were sipahis and the remaining eight were sipahizades. No müsellem was mentioned among the members of this clan. (TTd. 155 fol.174). Their names were: Ağa Veli, veled-i Sungur (sipahi), Çalabverdi v. Saf Ali (sipahi), Şadi v. Ağa Veli (sipahizade), Kılıç, birader-i O (sipahizade), Hamza, veled-i Sungur (sipahi), İbrahim, b. O (sipahizade), Devletyar v. Hamza (sipahi) Halil v. Sungur (sipahizade), Hacı b. Devletyar (sipahizade), Şeyh b. O (sipahizade), Seydi, b. diğer (sipahizade), ? (sipahi) Fakı v. Ağacık (sipahi), Hüdaverdi v. Bali (sipahi), Ali v. Mehmed (sipahizade). For Beğmişacılu, the name list starts with a müsellem who was the only notable of the clan: Arab Hacı Kethüda, veled-i Firuz Hacı. His brother Şehraldı, veled-i Firuzşah was an ordinary clan member with no privileges (TTd. 155 fol.176) For Mihmadlu we see Emir Kathüda, veled-i Ebulhayr (sipahi) denoted as the first one in the name list. There were also three müsellems registered in the clan, two of which were Firuz v. Ali and Hamza b. O. *Sipahis* of these *hassa* clans must have been awarded with fiefs in elsewhere, possibly revenues of certain dependent clans, which were not mentioned in the document. *Müsellems* were simply exempt from agricultural taxes and sheep-tax in return for fulfilling military duties during campaigns. Yet since both groups were recorded in sultanic demesne, their marriage and criminal fees and fines belonged to the sultan.

These notables could still belong to the same extended kinship group as the ordinary clansmen, being grandsons of the same progenitor. Yet the key point here is that the internal differentiation within these clans marked the transformation of ordinary clan members into tribute-paying subjects of clan leaders — appeared as tribute-collecting and privileged feudal military class— had already been an intensifying trend during the Zülkadirid rule.¹³¹ The Ottoman take-over of Bozok likely coincided with the process of dissolution of tribal egalitarianism and the emergence of feudal relations among ordinary Türkmens and their tribal leaders in the region.¹³² In this respect, we could assume that the Ottomans faced no difficulty in installing certain clan leaders as *kethüdas* or middlemen, responsible for transmitting the revenues of the sultanic demesne to the centre while preserving these clan leaders' *sipahi* or *müsellem* statuses as members of the feudal-military class. This strategy appears to have been employed with the Beğmişacılu and Mihmadlu clan leaders. However, for the Akçakoyunlu clan, we note that no listed *sipahi* was granted additional *kethüda* status. *sipahis* of both clans were enfeoffed with tributes of lesser clans; specifically, clans of İdem, Gedik Akçakoyunlusu and two Mesudlu clans registered under Akçakoyunlu were the most probable revenue sources.¹³³

These transferrals were not smooth processes. The Ottoman policy aimed to reduce these clan leaders' traditional control over their kinship groups, turning them into simple functionaries of the state at the clan level. In other words, once tribal notables, they were turned into mediating middlemen between the centre and the periphery. This policy also involved enfeoffing these tribal notables with revenues of alien clan groups over which they had no authority derived from traditional kinship ties. Such adjustments may have triggered reactions among tribal notables against the introduction of new Ottoman regulations in the region.

For the same reason, the ordinary clansmen may have been dissatisfied with their new overlords simply because they were turned into tributary subjects of tribal notables outside their kin group. Furthermore, the Ottoman taxation system for nomadic pastoralists strangled their authentic economic mode of organisation by depleting their needed resources to keep the herds at a feasibly reproducible size.

¹³¹ As Lindner suggests, although kinship ties were at the kernel of the tribal idiom and ideology, in practice, what constituted a tribe was the shared interests of its clan members and the economic and political advantages of getting together as nomadic pastoralist communities. (Linder 1983, 33) However, the clans of Bozok seemed to have already been internally divided between different interest groups before Ottomans came into the picture.

¹³² Feudal dues, tributes and obligations originating from Zülkadirid custom are briefly explained in *Bozok Sancağı Kannunamesi* in Barkan *Kanunlar*

¹³³ İleminlü clan, on the other hand, had its own leader, Polad Kethüda veled-i Murad, who was registered as a *sipahi* and probably collecting sheep tax and agricultural tithes of his tribe as his fief (TTd. 155 fol.179) In addition, Akçakoyunlu clan paid “*resm-i yaylak*” (summer grazing fine) and “*resm-i niyabet-i kışla*” (sheepfold tax) to Polad Kethüda.

Considering these political, cultural and economic factors, we can understand the Akçakoyunlu tribe's support for the messianic upheavals in the region, starting from the Şah Veli rebellion in 1519 to Zünnun Oğlu and Kalender Şah uprisings of 1526-1527.

A clear indication of local tribesmen's support for these rebellions can be found in the frequently occurring notes of *mürde* (dead or lost) above the listed names in the defter, written in red ink, seemingly after the compilation of the register.¹³⁴ For instance, in the entry regarding the Gedük Akçakoyunlusu, out of forty-two *nefers*, including one *müsellem*, eighteen were later denoted as *mürde* by the scribes.¹³⁵ Location "Gedük" corresponded to the contemporary town of Gemerek, near the village of Sızır, reported to be the headquarters of infamous kızılbaş rebel Şah Veli bin Celal.¹³⁶ This region was known as a turbulent zone of kızılbaş activity since the Şahkulu uprising (1511).¹³⁷ These *mürdes* of the Gedük Akçakoyunlusu clan could be among the Türkmens who perished or fled to the Safavid realm during the rebellion of 1526-27.

Although the physical conditions of the survey prevent us from conducting a detailed analysis of the economic mode of organisation and transition of all listed Akçakoyunlu clans under the impact of the Ottoman taxation system, we can still discuss the economic indicators of five clans whose tax and tribute amounts can be followed in the document. However, before delving into these details, it is important to note that the leading Akçakoyunlu clan, which included fifteen *sipahis* and *sipahizades* —a formidable military group— seemingly faced challenges in finding suitable grazing land for its flocks to winter. For they were paying *resm-i niyabet-i kışla*, also known as *resm-i kışla*, to the *sipahi* headman of the İleminlü clan.

As Lindner emphasises, the quality of pasturelands for herds is vulnerable to even minor climatic fluctuation, forcing nomads to seek the best grazing grounds. However, Ottoman practices, such as the imposition of *resm-i yaylak* and *resm-i kışlak*, aimed to restrict nomads' seasonal migrations to a prescribed routine between fixed

¹³⁴Feridun Emecen, "Yaya ve Müsellem", TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi: "Mürde kelimesi ölenler yanında başka yerlere gidenleri de ifade etmekte.."

¹³⁵TTd. 155 fol.180.

¹³⁶The data of the village of Sızır (Hınzır) is also shown in the document (TTd. 155 fol.253; TTd. 998 fol. 623) Around 1529 the village was populated by forty-eight *nefers*; thirty-eight of them were tax-paying subjects. There were also two *muhasıls*, a *hatib* and a *muezzin* registered in the village. This may indicate that after the pacification of the region, Şah Veli's *zaviye* might have forcibly turned into a mosque with a *vaqf*. Yet still kızılbaş activity in the village did not come to an end. Among the inhabitants of the village, seventeen *nefers* were later recorded as *mürde*; we distinguish three of them as young unmarried males; *mücerreds*. I believe these *mürde* entries do not denote people who died of natural causes but the ones who perished or fled during the rebellion of 1526-7. See also: Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Notes et documents sur la révolte de Şah Veli b. Şeyh Celâl", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VII (1982), 5-69.

¹³⁷Feridun Emecen, "Şahkulu Baba Tekeli", TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi.

summer pastures and winter quarters without additional tributes for the usufruct. If a nomadic clan chose to spend winter in a different winter quarter than usual, they had to pay an extra tribute, *resm-i kışlak* to the local *sipahi*. They were also required to pay pen-due, known as *resm-i ağıl* or *resm-i yatak* for barns they constructed for their animals.¹³⁸

In the case of the Akçakoyunlu clan, these two taxes amounted to 3000 *akçes*, adding to the burden of the usual sheep tax and tithes paid for two *mezra'as* where they engaged in seasonal agriculture.¹³⁹ Burdened with taxes, nomads faced a dilemma: settle down and become more controllable by financial authorities or instigate open rebellion. If they possessed military capabilities, they could also opt to offer their services to rival political powers, such as the Safavids.¹⁴⁰ Nomadic tribes often relied on their military skills as a resource to secure conditions to maintain their flocks, making this a well-known survival strategy vis-à-vis settled powers.¹⁴¹

For the clans of İleminlü and Gedük Akçakoyunlusu, the herd sizes per taxpayer household were below the feasible amount required for flock replenishment. Members of the İleminlü clan were engaged in additional agricultural activity, yet their grain yields were also insufficient for a family's estimated yearly consumption.¹⁴² This meant they had to rely on their flock for consumption, which led to further contraction of their herd sizes in addition to the adverse effects of the tax burden. Gedük Akçakoyunlusu, on the other hand, was a purely nomadic clan barely making a living with very inadequate household herds comprising about 24-25 heads of sheep. A striking point for both clans was the relatively high amounts they paid as criminal fees and fines; 630 and 600 *akçes* respectively.

Low herd sizes per household and relatively high amounts of *bad-ı heva* for certain clans could be indicative of the financial bottleneck that these clans were experiencing. In this respect, these two Akçakoyunlu clans do not deviate from this pattern. Moreover, as we mentioned before, the *mürde* notes above listed names of the clan members of Gedük Akçakoyunlusu could be taken as evidence about the conflict between the nomads and Ottomans. In terms of the correlation between scanty family herds and a higher amount of *bad-ı heva*, the Mihmadlu clan also shows a striking example. The per-household herd size is counted as 33-34 heads, while the

¹³⁸Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 62-4.

¹³⁹TTd. 998 fol.613.

¹⁴⁰Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 66.

¹⁴¹Jürgen Paul, "Nomads and Bukhara. A Study on Nomad Migrations, Pasture and Climate Change (11th Century CE)" *Der Islam* 93, (2) (2016): 506.

¹⁴²It is calculated as 471 kilograms of grain.

total amount of *bad-ı heva* was 3000 *akçes*, equaling the total sheep tax imposed on the clan.

This high amount of criminal fees and fines was, in the first place, related to the fact that Mihmadlu was a highly populated nomadic group including 177 households. *Bad-ı heva* did not only include penalties regarding the harm and damage that flocks caused during seasonal migrations but also related to criminal matters arising from interpersonal disputes. Populous clans thus had a higher potential for paying higher amounts of *bad-ı heva*. Nevertheless, a large flock, as in the case of Mihmadlu with 6000 heads of sheep, with very low averages for family flocks—33-34 heads—inescapably resulted in an extra tax burden for the clansmen.

On the contrary, for instance, the clan of İdem, which included only six taxpayer households sharing a flock of four hundred heads was paying only 90 *akçes* for *bad-ı heva*. The average sheep per taxpayer household for İdem is counted as 66-67 heads, slightly higher than the required minimum. The average would be counted even higher, 133 heads, considering the clan was, in fact, composed of three extended family groups of close kin.¹⁴³

We make similar observations for the Mesudlu clan registered at Minarekaya. Counted on herd size per taxpayer household basis, with forty heads of sheep, one could conclude that the pastoralist economic activity of the clan was taking place in marginal conditions. Yet, as we also observe, they paid 90 *akçes*, a relatively low amount for *bad-ı heva*. This clan was not a crowded group, probably including around only 25-30 members. A small population meant fewer quarrels, and thus a lesser payment for criminal fees and fines, as one could expect. On the other hand, if the Mesudlu clan's herd size is calculated based on extended families, we see that the flock composed of forty hundred sheep is shared by only two families,¹⁴⁴ each having a flock of two hundred heads at their disposal. This amount is far above the required minimum of sixty heads to continue pastoralist economic activity. In this respect, the Mesudlu clan seemed to be a well-off group compared to the other

¹⁴³It is not feasible for now to conduct a detailed analysis of the name lists for each clan to find out extended family structures. *Hane* entries in *defters* practically referred to each adult male household leader in a rural community who represented the basic unit of taxation. In this respect, values given for hanes were fiction when they referred to real family and kinship structures. In the pre-modern context, we expect to come across extended families composed of several male offsprings of the same father, and their wives and children. Even uncles' sons and their atomic families were included to these large kinship groups. As a matter of fact, we can conclude herds were in fact not private properties of atomic families or a person but under shared responsibility and ownership of extended family groups. Our calculation based on herd size per taxpayer household is indeed a simplification for immediate analytical purposes; it is also a fiction. For instance, in the referred İdem clan, the name list is read as Hacı Bey, veled-i Sevindik; Firuz, veled-i Hacı Bey; Hüdaverdi, veled-i Saru Sevindik; Duran, veled-i Turamış; Cuma, birader-i O; Saruca, veled-i Sevindik. On the contrary, given six hanes, this name list suggests that the clan is composed of at least three close kin groups. Calculated as such, her size per family would of course be higher than herd size per taxpayer household. See: TTd. 155 fol.180.

¹⁴⁴The name list included: Şah Veli, veled-i Ali Kulu; Mahmud, birader-i O; Hüseyin, birader-i diğer (mücerred); Mezid, birader-i diğer; Er Kulu, birader-i diğer; Yusuf, veled-i Hatip. TTd. 155 fol.181.

members of the Akçakoyunlu tribe.

In a nutshell, the document exposes a rather fragmented picture of the material conditions of the clans of the Akçakoyunlu tribe in terms of their economic circumstances. The physical conditions of the document make it difficult to reach a comprehensive and complete conclusion about the economic situation of the clans of the Akçakoyunlu tribe.

3.5.4 Tribes of Hisarbeylü and Söklen

Lastly, we discuss the economic situation of the Hisarbeylü and Söklen tribes. Analysing these two tribes in one section is appropriate since they inhabit the same geographical zone (upper reaches of the Kanak River and the western and north-western foothills of Akdağ mountain) and exhibit similar demographic trends.

The Hisarbeylü tribe comprised twenty-one sub-tribal units, divided into three purely nomadic and eighteen semi-nomadic pastoralist clans.¹⁴⁵ For these sub-tribal units, the number of *nefers* did not exceed twenty-two, with an average number of *nefers* per clan being only seven. A similar population pattern was observed for the Söklen tribe, which included twenty-three sub-tribal units, with only one being considered purely nomadic-pastoralist.¹⁴⁶ The population pattern of the Söklen tribe showed that the population of sub-tribal units did not exceed nineteen in terms of *nefer*, with an average number of five *nefers* per clan, even smaller than that of Hisarbeylü.

In total, seventeen Hisarbeylü clans comprised a population of 228 *nefers*, divided into 179 tax-paying households, 19 *mücerreds*, 7 *sipahis* and 15 *müsellems*. For the Söklen tribe, there were 114 *nefers* divided into 83 tax-paying households, one *mücerred*, seven *sipahis* and eight *müsellems*. Compared to the Çiçeklü, Mesudlu and Akçakoyunlu clans, the Hisarbeylü and Söklen clans consisted of smaller population groups. Among the twenty-one sub-tribal units of Hisarbeylü, only five included more than ten tax-paying households. For the Söklen tribe, only two out of twenty-three clans included more than ten households. The frequent observation of clans with low populations in both tribes may suggest that members of Hisarbeylü and Söklen had largely participated and, as a consequence, already dispersed in rebellions, possibly in the rebellion of Şah Veli of 1519-20, before the survey was compiled.

¹⁴⁵TTd. 155 fols.275-282.

¹⁴⁶TTd. 155, fols.283-291.

According to the data preserved in TT 155, the transition from nomadism to settled agriculture was far from successful for Hisarbeylü clans. Among the seventeen clans of Hisarbeylü whose sheep taxes could be followed in the document and thus their respective herd sizes are predictable, none of them reached the required average herd size per household for sustainable pastoralism. The problem appears more acute for the three clans recorded as pure nomadic pastoralists. These three clans shared the *mezra'a* of Kargadalı as their winter quarters and lacked an adequate amount of herds per household for sustainable pastoralist activity.¹⁴⁷

In two Hisarbeylü clans recorded in Kargadalı, the average herd sizes per household were forty heads for both, significantly below the required subsistence minimum. Yet we can assume that in the meantime these primary kin groups might engage in subsidiary agriculture in this rural settlement. For the Has Bey clan recorded in the same winter quarter, the situation seems more desperate. The average herd size per household was only seventeen and even if the clan were to transform its economic organisation from pure nomadic pastoralism to semi-nomadic pastoralism with subsidiary agricultural production, this transition might result in competition with two other Hisarbeylü clans for cultivable land in Kargadalı.

Figure 3.5 Hisarbeylü cemaats according to sheep/household ratio

Average herd size per household	Below 30 heads	30-54 heads	55-65 heads	66-99 heads	100 heads and above
Nomadic communities	1	2			
Semi-nomadic and Semi-settled	10	2	2		

As indicated in the table above, for the vast majority of semi-nomadic pastoralist clans of Hisarbeylü, average herd sizes per household were far below the subsistence minimum. The decline in pastoralist economic activity may have begun for Hisarbeyli clans before the Ottomans annexed Bozok, or at least before the survey was conducted, yet agricultural production remained at a modest scale. Thirty-one *mezra'as* were recorded as cultivated lands at the disposal of these Hisarbeylü clans,

¹⁴⁷TTd. 155, fol. 274: “Cemaat-i Has Bey, an kabile-i Hisarbeylü, der mezra-i Kargadalı”, “Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezra-i Kargadalı”, “Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezra-i Kargadalı.” The latter two might have been primary kin groups wintering in the same rural settlement. Cemaat-i Has Bey, wintering in the same place, was led by a certain Ali Bey veled-i Yusuf. Since the title “bey” was not common among the tribesmen recorded, we can surmise that Has Bey was a prominent clan during Zülkadirid rule, yet lost its prominence and fell into poverty with the annexation of the region by the Ottomans.

but agricultural tithes paid by these sub-tribal units rarely exceeded 1000 *akçes*.¹⁴⁸ The trend of decrease in pastoralism did not coincide with a significant increase in agricultural production for the Hisarbeylü clans. For only five out of fourteen sub-tribal units, we observe that agriculture played a relatively dominant role in their general economic balance.

Figure 3.6 Relationship between herd size per household and economic balance between pastoralism and agriculture in semi-nomadic Hisarbeylü cemaats

Ratio of sheep tax to tithe	+1:1	1:1	1:1(+)-1:5	1:5(+)-1:10	1:10+
sheep/household					
Less than 30 heads		1	4	3	2
30-54 heads		1	1		
55-65 heads	1		1		
66-99 heads					
100 heads and above					

The table above illustrates that all the listed Hisarbeyli clans did not have adequate herds for sustainable pastoralism yet the share of the agricultural production was still far from replacing pastoralism as the predominant economic activity. Only two clans of Hisarbeylü, whose ratios of sheep tax to agricultural tithe were smaller than 1:10, showed grain production per *hane* above the required amount for family subsistence.¹⁴⁹ When agricultural production per household exceeded the required amount for family subsistence in a sub-tribal unit and herd sizes per household were far below the required minimum, we can assume that the majority of members of the clan may have been involved in seasonal cultivation alongside pastoralism. This could be an indicator of the transition from semi-nomadic to semi-sedentary pastoralism.

¹⁴⁸The two exceptions were cemaat-i Hisarbeylü (winter quarter is unreadable) which was cultivating three mezra'as, namely Belağcahan, Çanakçı kışlası and Yeni Bey Öyüğü. A total amount of 1100 akçes of tithe was entered (TTd. 155 fols 281-2) for this group. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü der mezra-i Güzelceköprü was cultivating Güzelceköprü, Hunlar vıramı and Bozla. A total amount of 1600 akçes of tithe was entered. (TTd. 155 fol. 282, TTd. 998 fol.627)

¹⁴⁹For cemaat-i Hisarbeyli (winter quarter is unknown) cultivating Belcağhan, Çanakçı Kışlası and Yenicebey Öyüğü, with 65 kiles, the net grain production per household was slightly above the required amount for the subsistence of a family (TTd. 155, fols. 281-2; TTd. 998 fol.627). For cemaat-i Hisarbeylü der mezra-i Parmaksız, using its kışlak also as a cultivated field, net grain production per household was 90 kiles. (TTd. 155, fol.282).

On the other hand, it would be reasonable to assume that the remaining twelve clans, whose ratios of sheep tax to agricultural tithe were greater than 1:10, included households primarily occupied with pastoralism, with a minority engaged in cultivation as either a subsidiary, primary or possibly the sole economic activity. The geographical location of Hisarbeylü clans' winter quarters allowed for internal differentiation of clan members in terms of their economic focus. According to Khazanov, one of the distinguishing features of semi-sedentary pastoralism is that agriculture displaces pastoralism as the predominant economic activity, yet seasonal migrations between winter quarters and summer pastures are present, at least for a minority in the sub-tribal unit. However, in this case, seasonal migrations are relatively shorter in time and distance compared to those of semi-nomadic pastoralists.¹⁵⁰

The tables above illustrate that, for none of the Hisarbeylü clans was the average size of the household herd above the subsistence minimum while their engagement in agriculture remained at a modest scale. If we assume a direct relationship between the decrease in the herd size and the inclination towards agriculture, the Hisarbeylü tribe seems to be an exception. However, it should not be ignored that the Hisarbeylü clans dispersed and lost most of their members due to the previous Şah Veli rebellion, and therefore the labour force they could direct to the agricultural sector may be low.

It is important to note that in the document, the taxes related to husbandry or cultivation, were entered on a communal basis; in other words, the scribes did not distinguish between the primary, subsidiary or exclusive economic activities of the clan members. Therefore, our presumptions about the character of pastoralism in the clans (whether they were nomadic pastoralists in its pure form, semi-nomadic pastoralists or semi-sedentary pastoralists) fall short of explaining the economic activity at the household level concretely. It would not be incorrect to suggest that these sub-tribal units, regardless of what the document exposes at face value, possibly included households that had already settled, predominantly engaged in agriculture and ceased extensive pastoralism (may be continued in the form of transhumance), those who were exclusively occupied with pastoralism and those combined pastoralism and seasonal agriculture relatively equally in their overall economic activities.

The neighbouring Söklen tribe appears to be more prosperous than Hisarbeylü in terms of the sheep/household ratios for each clan and the share of agricultural production in the general economic balance. Only one clan, which had a herd size slightly above the subsistence minimum, was recorded as nomadic-pastoralist in its

¹⁵⁰Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, 20.

pure form.¹⁵¹

The physical conditions of the document allow us to estimate herd sizes of only seventeen clans of Söklen out of twenty-three. In contrast to Hisarbeylü clans, we do not observe an overall decrease in the herd sizes of Söklen clans. Seven of these clans had adequate household herds, and one of them had household herds at the subsistence minimum. On the other hand, seven clans had household sheep slightly below the required amount for maintaining pastoralist economic activity, and two clans had already shifted the focus of their economic organization in favour of agriculture

Figure 3.7 Söklen cemaats according to sheep/household ratio

Average herd size per household	Below 30 heads	30-54 heads	55-65 heads	66-99 heads	100 heads and above
Nomadic communities				1	
Semi-nomadic and Semi-settled	2	7	1	3	3

Figure 3.8 Relationship between average herd size per household and economic balance between pastoralism and agriculture in semi-nomadic Söklen cemaats

Ratio of sheep tax to tithe sheep/ household	+1:1	1:1	1:1(+)-1:5	1:5(+)-1:10	1:10+
Below 30 heads					2
30-54 heads			1	2	4
55-65 heads			1		
66-99 heads				2	1
100 heads and above			2	1	

¹⁵¹Ttd. 155, fol.237: "Cemaat-i Karaçerçili, an kabile-i Söklen." This clan includes two hanes and two nefers who had 160 head of sheep.

The figures above align with the presumed relationship between the herd size and the tendency towards sedentarisation. Within the general economic balance of the seven clans, agricultural activities played the predominant role. For six of these clans, the household herds were below or slightly below the required subsistence minimum for the continuation of pastoralism, indicating a clear shift in economic balance in favour of agriculture.

To exemplify the tendency towards sedentarisation, we can analyse the data of two Söklen clans whose household herd sizes were far below 60 heads. One of these clans, cemaat-i Söklen (winter quarter is unreadable in the document but it was possibly Tecir argı) had 60 heads of sheep shared by three households and was also involved in agricultural activities in three *mezra'as*: Tecir argı, Yağmur kışla and Ayrancı.¹⁵² The total grain yield from these *mezra'as* was 1200 *kiles*, 240 *kiles* of which was paid as tithe. Assuming one-third of the remaining 980 *kiles* was reserved for the following year's seed and mill losses, the three tax-paying households of the clan had a gross agricultural income of approximately 218 *kiles*, well above the required amount for family consumption.

The other clan, "cemaat-i Söklen in Bağcecik" had 40 heads of sheep shared by two households (one *nefer* was recorded as *sipahi*, and thus excluded from the calculation), and also farmed in its winter quarters.¹⁵³ The total grain yield from Bağcecik was 500 *kiles*, 100 *kiles* of which was paid as tithe. The gross agricultural income of these two households was then the average amount of 135.5 *kiles* which was more than twice the required amount for family consumption.

These household income figures, coupled with inadequate herd sizes for the continuation of pastoralism indicate a clear tendency towards settled agriculture in these sub-tribal units. Moreover, it would not be wrong to suggest that clans with ratios of sheep tax to agricultural tithe smaller than 1:10 were frankly inclined to semi-settled pastoralism if not fully settled agriculture. Entries for *resm-i asiyab* in certain *mezra'as* are worth mentioning for the increasing agricultural activity of these clans. For instance, in the *mezra'a* of Bağcecik, a water mill active for half a year was recorded.¹⁵⁴ In the *mezra'a* of Hozman, 180 *akçes* of windmill tax, which illustrates the presence of three watermills active for the whole year, was added to the total tax revenue.¹⁵⁵ In addition, entries concerning *mezra'as* recorded as

¹⁵²TTd. 155, fols.283-4; TTd. 998 fols.628.

¹⁵³TTd. 155 fol. 286; TTd. 998 fol. 628.

¹⁵⁴TTd. 155, fol.284

¹⁵⁵TTd. 155 fol.290.

the private property of certain tribesmen can also be regarded as evidence of the sedentarisation process of the tribe of Söklen.¹⁵⁶

3.6 General Assessment

In this chapter, we tried to expose the economic indicators of the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribesmen of Bozok, who, reportedly participated in the rebellion of 1526-27 according to the chronicler accounts. Based on the first extant *tahrir* register of sancak of Bozok compiled after the annexation of the region by the Ottomans, we investigated the material causes behind the social unrest in the region during the 1520s, likely to be rooted in the previous Şah Veli bin Celal uprising (1519-20) or even before.

The limits of the method we employ are self-evident. First of all, *tahrir* registers, regardless of whether their detailed or synoptic versions are employed for the research, present a statistical data set of the surveyed regions. A comparative examination of a series of successive *tahrirs* ideally conducted in thirty years' intervals may pave the way for a processual analysis of population movements, resource use, the volume of production and outputs, and changes in the surplus appropriated by the fief holders, and in brief, by the tributary state in a certain period. However, there is no extant *tahrir* register of the region in the inventories conducted by the Zülkadirids before the Ottoman takeover. Therefore, we do not have a chance to integrate the situation of Bozok tribesmen prior to the 1520s into the picture. On the other hand, Lütfi Savaş and Yunus Koç's studies based on the *tahrir* registers of Bozok conducted during the mid and late sixteenth century clearly illustrate that the Türkmens of Bozok have experienced a rapid transformation towards a sedentary life following the establishment of the Ottoman rule.¹⁵⁷ However, in any case, an analysis solely based on the study of *tahrir* registers presents nothing more than a simplified statistical "photographic negative" of human praxis. The past reality was indeed much more layered and vibrant than its statistical representation.

The primary aim of a *tahrir* commission was to expose the economic resources that enabled the reproduction of the military-administrative system. Taxes imposed on pastoralist economic activity and agricultural tithes, which stemmed from the prod-

¹⁵⁶TTd. 155 fol.288: "Mezra-i Alem Bey Kışlası, cemaat-i mezbur ziraat eder, der dest-i Kavs? Veli, ber vech-i tapu, ber muceb-i hüccet-i şer'iyeye", "Mezra-i Koçi Bey Kışlası, der dest-i Karaca ve Seydiyar, ber vech-i tapu, ber muceb-i hüccet-i şer'iyeye."

¹⁵⁷Lütfi Arslan, "H.963/M.1556 tarihli mufassal tahrir defterine göre"; Yunus Koç, *XVI. Yüzyılda bir Osmanlı Sancağının*.

ucts of direct interaction between human labour and natural resources, were open to unpredictable and adverse effects of ecological fluctuations. But, since these taxes were fixed to certain amounts or rates and collected in pre-arranged periods, we may assume that the estimated figures for those almost corresponded to the actual situation. The same can be said for mill taxes, stemming from feudal monopolies over usufruct, or marriage taxes, an expression of feudal/tributary political control over population dynamics of the tribute-paying commoners. However, it was quite obscure how accurately *tahrir* commissions gave estimates in these documents for criminal fees and fines [*bad-ı hava*], which were paid on occasion and in cash. Separation of the exercise of jurisdictional functions and penal powers could serve as a barrier against abuses in demanding such incidental fees. Yet one should not overlook the fact that, especially in periods of economic depreciation, fief holders may have tended to force innocent people to pay fees for trivial reasons or demanded higher amounts from the convicts than the prescribed fees and fines.¹⁵⁸ This is one of the human elements that a *tahrir* register cannot expose in its statistical neutrality.

On the other hand, based on the *tahrirs* we can reveal that the Ottoman sheep tax, collected at a rate of one *akçe* per two sheep, made it difficult for the nomadic pastoralists to keep a viable herd size to maintain their economic organisation. Apart from being pressured by the fixed amounts of tributes, the autarchic economic organisation of nomadic pastoralism was always vulnerable due to the ecological limits of transhumance and unforeseen climatic fluctuations. Under the Ottoman fiscal and land regime, nomadic pastoralists had to pay extra tributes if they altered their traditional migration routes to find better pastures and water sources for their herds. Add the impact of unexpected herd losses due to epidemics, casualties during the march, and penalties paid for crop damage by stray animals [*değtbani*] added to the *bad-ı hava*, it was obvious how vulnerable the pastoralist economic organisation was. Rudi Paul Lindler has previously shown the devastating results of recurring payment of penalties and extra tributes for the necessary rotation of winter quarters and summer pastures on the nomadic pastoralists in his study on the Atçeken *yörüks*.¹⁵⁹ We have partially touched upon the relationship between low level of household herds and higher penalties, fees and fines through a few clans recorded under the Akçakoyunlu tribe. The adverse effects of *bad-ı hava* on the nomadic pastoralist economy deserve to be examined with more precise statistical methods.

¹⁵⁸Coşgel, Metin M., Boğaç Ergene, Haggay Etkes, and Thomas J. Miceli. "Crime and Punishment in Ottoman Times: Corruption and Fines." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 43, no. 3 (2013): 364-66.

¹⁵⁹Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*.

Let us turn our attention to the human element again. In the disputes arising from counting the herds, determining the size of the cultivated lands, measuring and weighing the harvested grain and in similar occasions where custom and experience ruled over decisions rather than the preciseness of the modern techniques, or in issues like the remission of a penalty, normally recorded under *bad-ı hava*, locally revered and respected dervishes and sufis were likely to be acting as mediators and referees.¹⁶⁰ These unofficial mechanisms were not only a natural part of daily interpersonal relations in a tribal milieu but also a *terra incognita* for the centrally appointed kadis and other state officials. If we had court records or *mühimme-ahkam* registers of the region from the period, it would only be partly possible to go beyond the statistical-economic neutrality of the *tahrirs* and grasp the wider social relations more concretely and vividly. Only partly possible because the documents we mentioned provide information about the gaze and the reach of the state officials, and often reflect the prejudices of a radically class-divided society. For instance, lines written for Bozok Türkmens in the contemporary chronicler accounts frankly reflected elitist prejudices against the commoners. It is known that during his voyage in Anatolia, Şeyh Cüneyd highly probably came into contact with Bozok Türkmens; there were elements from the Zülkadirid tribal confederacy among the most loyal followers of the Safavids, for example, Söklen tribe, which was also reported to have joined the rebellion of 1526-27, was counted among these Zülkadirid tribes.¹⁶¹ Hence kızılbaş movement had a wide following in the Bozok region. Türkmens of Bozok were accused of lacking fidelity to true religion and adherence to kızılbaş by contemporary chroniclers.

However, our conclusion about whether these rebellions were simply an expression of religious discontent or the economic and social hardships Türkmens were experiencing reached boiling point, tax assessors and the kadi were lynched by an angry mob upon their excessive demands and insults, and then inevitably an armed uprising erupted, are directly related with adopting a top-down or bottom-up point of view and vantage point in interpreting these historical problems. In any case, the fact that the rebellious rural masses rallied behind locally or regionally revered dervish figures, Baba Zünnun and Kalender Şah, deserves a further explanation.

¹⁶⁰Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik Düzenlik Kavgası*, 115.

¹⁶¹Faruk Sümer, *Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişiminde*; Vladimir Minorsky, "Introduction" in *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk: A Manual of Safavid Administration*, (Cambridge : Trustees of the "E. J. W. Gibb Memorial" 1980 [1943]): 16, 190, 192.

4. PROLONGED ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OTTOMAN VİLAYET IN ANATOLIA: CONFLICT AND CONCESSION IN ZÜLKADIRIYE BETWEEN 1515 AND 1533

4.1 Introduction

In mid-spring 1522, when the Ottoman navy set sail from the capital to lay siege on Rhodes, Ferhad Paşa, Sultan Süleyman's brother-in-law and *beylerbey* of Rumeli, was also leaving the capital with a few thousand *kapıkulu sipahis* and Janissaries with the pretext of safeguarding the eastern border against any potential Safavid incursion while the main army led by the Sultan was preoccupied with campaigning in Rhodes.¹ For this mission, the provincial armies of Rum, Karaman, and Zülkadiriye were ordered to join the central army near Sivas.² However, at the same time, Ferhad Paşa was commissioned by the Sultan to eliminate Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey and his offspring. Ali Bey had already been ruling the predominantly tribal region of Zülkadiriye as an Ottoman vassal since the defeat and execution of his uncle Alaüddevle Bey in 1515, who was the last independent ruler of this Türkmen principality, by Selim I on his return from the campaign against the Safavids. Ali Bey's territorial control covered a large region, from Bozok to Hisn-ı Mansur in a northwest to south-east direction. He was said to be equal to the Crimean Khans in terms of royal protocol.³ Süleyman's immediate aim with Ali Bey's elimination seemed to seize the revenue sources of this large region for the Ottoman central treasury. Yet the dynamics behind this swift decision remain still enigmatic. Ferhad Paşa, described as a cunning and grim personality in chronicler accounts, succeeded in his mission. Ali Bey and his three sons in his entourage were deceived with a feigned invitation

¹Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, *Geschichte Sultan Suleymān Kānūnīs von 1520 bis 1557, oder, Ṭabaqāt ūl-Memālik ve Derecāt ūl-Mesālik* / vol. Celalzade Muştafa gennant Koca Nişāncı, ed. Petra Kappert (Wiesbaden: Steinher, 1981) (hereafter Celalzade) 68b.

²Ibid.

³İsmail Hami Danişmend. *İzahl Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, II, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 80.

for a feast at the military headquarters at Artukabad and were put to the sword on the 11th of June 1522.⁴ However, the swift decision to eliminate the ruling family proved detrimental to the re-establishment of a stable administrative structure in the region for a decade, as it was neglected the local polity was characterised by political allegiances intermingled with tribal identities.

According to the chronicler accounts, following the executions, Zülkadirid territory was divided into certain administrative districts [sancak] and administrative offices which were bestowed to the Sultan's loyal servants in line with the classical Ottoman provincial and administrative governance structure.⁵ Many of the fiefs and tribal revenue sources in Zülkadiriye were also added to the Sultan's demesne [havas-ı humayun] at the expense of their former owners; the local elites of the region.⁶ Archival materials illustrate that between 1522 and 1531 Zülkadiriye ceased to exist as a substantive administrative unit as a province [eyalet/vilayet or Beylerbeylik]. It started to be administered as a dependent sancak, first by provincial governors [Beylerbeyi] of Rum and then by Karaman. The extant lists of military-administrative personnel of the empire during the 1520s illustrate that the administrative posts in now dependent Zülkadiriye; Maraş, Elbistan, and Bozok, changed hands in very short periods. Such short-term offices may have created further instability in this newly annexed region. The administrative chaos continued for a decade with a deficiency in timar administration in the region which could not be swept under the rug. These complications could be followed in several imperial orders sent to provincial governors of Karaman and Rum from 1527 onwards, and alterations in two subsequent tahrir registers [timar-icmal] of the region compiled in the 1520s.⁷

Tension and conflict in the region culminated during the rural uprisings of 1526-27 led by antinomian dervishes named Baba Zünnun, Zünnunoğlu, and Kalender Şah. The tribesmen of Zülkadiriye and former fief holders of the Beylik joined with the mass of rural rebels. The problem of discontent among the fief holders and tribal notables was finally solved only after grand-vizier İbrahim Paşa intervened from the centre to make concessions and re-distribute the fiefs to the locals of Zülkadiriye during his mission to quell Kalender Şah's uprising.⁸ These events in Zülkadiriye after the removal of the ruling local dynasty illustrate the limits and capabilities

⁴Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont. "Trois Lettres de Ferhâd Paşa sur la fin de Şehsuvâr Oğlu Ali Beg Beylerbey de la ZülKadiriye (1522)" *Varia Turcica* XIX (1992), 248.

⁵Bostan Çelebi. "Gazavat-ı Sultan Süleyman" (Ayasofya no.3317) 46a; 96a (Hereafter Bostan)

⁶Celalzade 129b; 167a.

⁷B.O.A TTd. 124 and TTd. 142.

⁸Celalzade, 167b.

of power of the pre-modern Ottoman state. This historical example could be re-evaluated to reveal the nature of the pre-capitalist state in general.

In the rest of this presentation, first, we will discuss the structure of administrative divisions and clarify the identities of centrally appointed local governors of Zülkadiriye during the 1520s. Secondly, as key material sources of evidence, we will utilise two subsequent records of fief-bestowals in Zülkadiriye roughly belonging to the periods 1522-24 (TTd.124) and 1527-30 (TTd.142). As we mentioned, local magnates of Zülkadiriye were involved in or at least indirectly supported the seemingly messianic rural rebellions. These registers may trace the reasons behind the social malaise faced by the local elites of Zülkadiriye. We will try to evaluate and historicise the findings we derived from comparing the lists of fief-holders preserved in these documents to historicise the process of fief-bestowals. Thirdly, we will reconsider those findings in their relevance to a series of imperial orders, which were compiled between 1527 and 1533 to be dispatched to the surveyors and the provincial governors of Karaman and Zülkadiriye about procedures of enfeoffment processes in their zones of authority. This also includes a critique of state-centric theories on Ottoman state-society relations and law.

4.2 Ruling Personnel Administrative Divisions in “Vilayet-i Türkmen” During the 1520s

We observe the first official reference to Zülkadiriye within a list of Ottoman administrative units, that showed the divisions at the end of Selim I’s reign (1519-20). In this list, Ottoman districts [sancak] were mentioned as “livas”, under the leadership of “mir-liva” or “*sancakbeyi*”. Zülkadiriye, on the other hand, is labelled as “sub-districts of Türkmens, dominions of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali bey” [Kaza-ha-I Türkman, diyar-I Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey] which illustrates the privileged position of Ali Bey as a quasi-independent ruler.⁹ Sub-districts of Ali Bey’s dominions included *kazas* of Bozok, Maraş, Elbistan, Kars-I Maraş, Zamantu and Güvercinlik. The denomination of these administrative units as kaza exhibits that there had already been a body of religious-administrative personnel of kadıs, and their *naiibs* installed in these centres. Every listed kaza ends with “fi-yevm” entries and a certain amount of *akçes*, which must be the daily wage of kadıs installed in these places.¹⁰ Yet, because of the

⁹Ali Bey’s political autonomy was also underlined by contemporary chroniclers, such as Celalzade and Bostan Çelebi: Celalzade 68a; Bostan 45a.

¹⁰Bayezid Devlet Kutuphanesi, Nadir Eserler Kısmı, Veliyüddin Efendi nr.1969 fols.117b-118a

listing of the sub-administrative units as “kaza-ha” rather than “liva-ha”, contrary to the listings of the other provinces we can infer that the sub-administrative units of Zülkadiriye during Ali Bey’s time were not administered by centrally appointed district governors [sancakbeyi], but by the members of the Zülkadirid dynasty.¹¹ This administrative structure corresponds to the Central Asian tradition of rulers’ policy of dividing the governance of the territories among their sons. In a region intensively populated by Türkmen tribes, clan and tribal ties and more importantly, the dynastic charisma of the ruler as the supreme tribal leader were highly pivotal for an effective administration. Ottoman annexation of the region in 1522 would change this structure dramatically.¹²

This list is followed by another one showing the administrative divisions and military-administrative personnel with their base revenue totals in H.928 (1522) From this list we understand that upon the extermination of Şehsuvaroğlu and his sons by Ferhad Paşa, their lands were added as administrative units to the province of Rum for a very short period, then on May 9th, 1523, Maraş and Elbistan were transferred to the province of Karaman. To tighten the control over these regions, the capital seat the province of Karaman was also shifted from Konya to Kayseri, a more proximate location to the newly annexed Zülkadirid territories. In this list, a certain Süleyman Bey installed as *sancakbey* (or *mir-liva*) of Bozok with 418.000 akçes of the revenue base, was denoted. At the same time, Elbistan was bestowed to a certain Koçi Bey, who had a yearly revenue of 511.000 akçes, and Maraş was ruled by Kızıl Musa Bey, who was one of the sons of Kızıl Ahmed Bey of the Candarid dynasty, with 453.000 akçes of yearly revenues. The listed personnel, who were not recorded with their patronymic names in “veled-i X” fashion, could be of *devşirme* origin. These high-ranking *kapıkulus* were sent to the provinces as military administrators by their competency. Bostan Çelebi underlines after Ali Bey’s execution, the Sultan, dividing Ali Bey’s realm into certain *sancaks*, bestowed these to his slaves [kul] which are understood to be composed of both the personnel from the ranks of the *kapıkulu* and also from *müteferrika* class.¹³ For instance, Kızıl Musa Bey’s appointment as governor of Maraş could have been related to the fact that already during Alaüddevle Bey’s late reign, Zülkadirids had hosted a significant number of

¹¹We know that when Türkmen clans from Bozok and Rum rebelled under the leadership of Şah Veli bin Celal in 1519, their very first move was to storm Şehsuvaroğlu’s son Üveys Bey’s mansion in Bozok. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont “Etudes turco-safavides, III; notes et documents sur la révolte de Şah Veli b. Şeyh Celal” *Archivum Ottomanicum* 7, (1982): 29, 32.

¹²For the terminology for administrative divisions and personnel, I follow Metin Kunt’s *The Sultans Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government 1550-1650*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

¹³Bostan 45a: “Ve ol vilayetdem zulmi ref’ olıcak hazret-i sahib kıran Dulkadir vilayetin dahi sancaklara tevzi idüb kullarına ihsan idüb virüb ol vilayet ahali dahi zılal-i adalet ve reaya katre-i asude-hal oldular.”

Akkoyunlu nobles including Elvend Mirza and Murad Bey, as political refugees, and potential puppets and claimants against the newly rising Safavids.¹⁴ Kızıl Ahmed Bey, who had also long been in the service of Akkoyunlu's up until being pardoned by Bayezid II and assigned as *sancakbeyof* Bolu, and indeed his son Musa, could have had a certain degree of familiarity with the tribal milieu of the region and local power groups in the Zülkadirid realm.

Another source hints about the ruling personnel in Zülkadiriye is the first extant tahrir register of the region concerning fief bestowals.¹⁵ It suffices to underline here that this document resembles a combination of *tımar-icmal* and *tımar-ruznamce* records which includes the base revenue sources and amount of revenues of the fief-holders and dates of the bestowal of these fiefs along with information about the provincial origins of the fief holder as well as the reason of bestowal. According to the document, İskender Bey [Yularkıstı Sinan Paşa oğlu], again from the ranks of *müteferrika*, was assigned as *mir-liva* of Maraş on 13th of R. 929 (30th of January, 1523) with a revenue base of 251.000 *akçes*.¹⁶ Elbistan, on the other hand, was held by a certain Behram Bey who was installed to the office on 25 – C. – 930 (30th of April, 1524) with the title of *mir-liva* of Elbistan, with a yearly income of 245.000.¹⁷ Yet in the Elbistan section of the document, we see certain notes that four timars in Elbistan were granted with the testimony or by the intervention of the former governor Koçi Bey.¹⁸ In this case, we observe that the revenue bases of *mir-livas* of Maraş and Elbistan decreased to half compared to the amounts in the previous list. This must be related to the re-instigation of fief allotments in the region after the initial strife arising from Ali Bey's execution was overcome.¹⁹

The following three documents from Topkapı Palace Archives show the distribution

¹⁴By using the political claims of these Akkoyunlu refugee princes, Alaüddeve had entered into a struggle with Ismail Safavid for suzerainty over the Kurdish regions of Amid, Mardin, and Harput, which ended up with the decisive defeat of Zülkadirids finally in 1510-11. See, Refet Yinanç. *Dulkadir Beyliği*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi 1989), 90-95.

¹⁵B.O.A TTd.124

¹⁶B.O.A TTd.124, fol.50/1

¹⁷BOA TT d.124 fol. 1.

¹⁸TTd.124 fol.10: "Tımar-ı Yusuf veled-i Kara nurca? an-tahvil-i Ömer Divane; Karye-i Gergerecik [Gügercinlik]. Hasıl (Osmani): 2745. Mezkur Yusuf Zülkadirin sipahilerindendir deyu sabıken Elbistan sancağı beyi Koçi Beğ arz eyleyib, tevcih olundu; fi 15 safer sene 930." For similar notes about Koçi Bey's bestowals: fols.25, 36.

¹⁹It is followed from the notes in the document that the requirement for re-entering into the ranks of fief-holders without any controversy, for the ones of Zülkadirid origin, was proving their *sipahi* or *sipahizade* status during Ali Bey's lifetime. Although not specified, these dismissed *sipahis* had to present the official authorisation documents stamped by Ali Bey's seal to gain their fiefs again. This document also reveals that a sizable proportion of *sipahis* of Karamanid origin were also assigned with fiefs in Zülkadiriye after a duration of being "mazul." We will comparatively discuss this document with its following and supplementary, TTd.142, by embarking on the distribution of fiefs and the identity of fief-holders in the Zamantu region of Zülkadiriye, in the following section.

of offices and yearly revenues of the military-administrative personnel in the second half of the 1520s. One of them shows the situation in 1525-26.²⁰ In this document, there is no mention of Behram Bey of Elbistan but this time governorships of Elbistan and Maraş are both kept by İskender, veled-I Yularkıstı himself who was also assigned with the revenue bases of these two settlements with an income of 500.000 *akçes*. This time we see a certain Behram Bey in the office of governor of the *sancak* of Beyşehir in Karaman instead. There is no date given in the document, yet we read that the governorship of Bozok was assigned to Mustafa Bey, son of Hersekzade Ahmed, who would then be killed by Baba Zünnun's rebels in August 1526. That is why this document highly probably exposed the situation of the administrative units in 1525-26. We should also add that the administrative units of the former Zülkadiriye were now a part of the province of Karaman, headed by Mahmud Paşa, son of Davud Paşa, holding his office with yearly revenue of 400,000 *akçes*. This list is followed by another one in which the governorship of Maraş, albeit initially referred to as "mahlul," and Elbistan, which is now seen to have lost its place as a separately held administrative post, is now assigned to a certain Üveys Bey, with a yearly income of 400.000 *akçes*. İskender Bey, in this document, appeared as the governor of Malatya. Governorship of Bozok also seemed to be a vacant post after Mustafa Bey's death, then conferred to a certain Mahmud Bey, veled-i Şükrullah Bey.²¹ Mahmud Paşa, governor-general of Karaman, who was then killed in a pitched battle during the rebellion of Kalender Şah in late spring of 1527 is still being shown to be holding his office with a yearly income of 700.000 *akçes*, a combined amount with the tributes collected from Kayseri, so we can estimate that this document shows the situation in early 1527. The third document must simply be a copy and correction of the one we previously mentioned since the distribution of the administrative posts and their incomes remained unchanged.²² The only difference is that; as we mentioned above, the previously vacant post in Bozok is now assigned to a certain *müteferrika*, named Mahmud Bey, son of Şükrullah Bey, with a yearly income of 230.000 *akçes*.

Like his predecessors, Kızıl Musa and İskender Beys, Üveys Bey's duration of office as *mir-liva* of Maraş did not exceed two years. In the subsequent tımar register of Zülkadiriye that exhibited the results of fief bestowals conducted in the region roughly between H.934 – H.936 a certain Mehmed Bey appeared as *mir-liva* of Maraş. He was holding a demesne and sources of revenue in Maraş, and Elbistan.

²⁰TSMA d. 8303

²¹TSMA d. 10057.

²²TSMA d. 5246.

The latter, lacking a separate *sancakbeyi*, was then governed by the *mir-liva* of Maraş.²³ Amount of revenue totals for Mehmed Bey in this document were given in Halebî *akçe*, which was roughly equal to half of the value of Osmanî *akçe* in the 1520s. Compared with the results of the *muhasebe-icmal* register of the region.²⁴ This timar register (TTd.142) and the *muhasebe-icmal* we mentioned (TTd.998) were complementaries.²⁵ The detailed survey of the nomadic Türkmens of the Bozok studied in the previous chapter, also contains the same results as the summarised version, TTd. 998.²⁶

It seems that after Kalender Şah's uprising was quelled by İbrahim Paşa, for the first time after the annexation, these territories were surveyed in detail and the revenue sources were recorded extensively around late 1527 and 1528. It was necessary to conduct an extensive land survey of the region before its administrative structure was organised as a separate provincial governorship. It was the first time in 1533 that a provincial governor of Zülkadiriye, Ahmed Paşa, was addressed in a decree dispatched from the centre.²⁷ Thus, a provincial governorship structure in the region must have been established before that date, probably around 1530-31. After Şehsuvaroğlu's execution in June 1522, the administrative status and structure of the region remained ambivalent for a decade. The most immediate result of this administrative chaos was the inefficiency in the administrative apparatus, especially in fief bestowals.

4.3 An Assessment of the Ottoman Take-over of Zülkadiriye

Before entering the discussion about implementation of the timar system in Zülkadiriye, a few words about the reasons behind Şehsuvaroğlu's execution are needed. Given a decade-long political vacuum in the region after the execution, the elimination of the Zülkadirid ruling family proved to be far from being politically consistent. Instead, this decision seemed to be an example of arbitrary rule since it produced

²³BOA TTd. 142, fol.1

²⁴BOA TTd. 998, fols.418; 468

²⁵Added to these tahrirs, there is also a detailed [mufassal] survey of the region (BOA. TTd. 402) which exhibits similar results with TTd.142 and 998, yet most of this document is too heavily worn and damaged to be used feasibly for historical purposes. This document involves listed revenue sources of tribesmen of Maraş and villages in kazas of Maraş and Elbistan in detail. Yet Zamantu section of this survey is missing.

²⁶BOA TTd. 155.

²⁷Bayezid Devlet Kütüphanesi, Nadir Eserler Kısmı, Veliyüddin Efendi nr. 1970 55b. The excerpts from the manuscript are presented in the Appendix D.

detrimental results for governmental efficiency and administrative stability in the region.

In the Ottoman chronicler accounts the immediate reason behind Şehsuvaroğlu's removal was reported as the Türkmen prince's growing personal vanity and his covert intention of declaring independence after he realised that he had enough power to defeat the forces of rebel dervish Şah Veli (1519-20) and the mamluk renegade Canberdi Gazali (1520) successfully by resting primarily on his local forces. We should underscore that the chroniclers were not posing a transparent depiction of events. In these accounts, the discussion about parties' actions was overshadowed by the agenda of deriving moral lessons from them.²⁸ Another explanation was Ferhad Paşa's growing jealousy and hatred towards the Türkmen prince since Şehsuvaroğlu had shown brilliant performance in subduing the rebels on his own and thus rendered the central *kapıkulu* army led by Ferhad obsolete in their operations. The most extreme expression of this kind could be found in Danişmend's nationalist perspective about the event. According to him, the Zülkadirid family's elimination has simply resulted from a scheme by Ferhad against Şehsuvaroğlu. The cunning vizier manipulated the young sultan by fabricating false claims and lies about Şehsuvaroğlu's intentions. For Danişmend, this event did not only resemble the interpersonal rivalry between Ferhad and Şehsuvaroğlu, but in brief, was a clear indication of the underlying factional struggle between Christian-convert state-elite and dynasties of old Turkic nobility in Anatolia.²⁹ A third kind of explanation is that Suleyman I's decision to eliminate Şehsuvaroğlu was a rational decision given the geopolitics of the time, other than being Ferhad Paşa's agenda. Accordingly, a semi-independent, vassal principality in Anatolia, led by a Türkmen prince whose loyalty was dubious in the last analysis, seemed paradoxical considering the geopolitics of the Ottoman-Safavid war. An alien dynastic polity, whose grip of control corresponded to a considerable territorial extent and strategic geography at the centre of Anatolia, and rested on a highly mobile nomadic-tribal population constituted an imminent threat against the Ottoman sultan's authority.³⁰

Although all these opinions could be considered valuable for the scope of political history, none provides a ground for a first step in reaching a materially grounded

²⁸For a discussion of Celalzade's work on this perspective: Kaya Şahin, *Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

²⁹İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi* II, 80-82, 95.

³⁰Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Le District de Kırşehir et le Tekke de Hacı Bektaş Entre le Pouvoir Ottoman et les Émir de Zülkadir" *Collection Turcica* IX (2005), 269. Refet Yinanç, *Dulkadir Beyliği*, 104-105; For the geo-politics of Ottoman Safavid conflict, see Adel Allouche, *The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906- 962/1500-1555)*. (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983).

explanation. Alternatively, John Haldon's reading of the pre-capitalist state may aid us in producing a more layered analysis at the empirical level with a theoretical component. This approach, highly informed by Marxism, could be summarised as follows: States essentially develop in a context of class antagonisms between the exploiters and the exploited. Thus, state capacities and actions, which necessarily represent the interests of the ruling and dominant classes, are determined and constrained by the fundamental dynamics of the relations of production. Ensuring the prevalence and reproduction of relations of exploitation and subordination of the exploited masses constitute the key logic behind the state's institutional arrangements, including the fief system. However, the fact that the state represents the interests of the ruling and dominant classes does not mean that the ruling class is always free from fractionalisation and appears as a monolithic bloc over the subordinated and exploited. Instead, it might also be divided into fractions on the issue of the control over means of production and distribution of surplus wealth among their ranks and fractions in tributary (pre-capitalist) states and social formations. These divisions may be manifest on political-ideological grounds.³¹

In the Ottoman context of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the institutional arrangements that ensured the reproduction of the ruling class included law-making (general/Sultanic and local *kanunnames*, as well as Sultanic decrees dispatched from the centre upon the request of local administrators or complainants), the establishment of a properly functioning local administrative mechanism which by its very definition included military-administrative (*beylerbeys* and *sancakbeys*) and religious wings (kadis and their *naibs*) whose relationship was not hierarchal, and lastly, the bestowal of fiefs which ensured the control [both economically and politically] and distribution of revenue sources living and operating on the fundamental source of wealth; the land.³² The control and distribution of revenue sources, land and agricultural and pastoralist workforce through fief allocations has always been a matter of contestation between the elements and fractions of the dominant classes in all pre-

³¹ John F. Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode*, 14-68; 158-194; we will discuss these themes in detail in the subsection on Ottoman state, law and timar administration with reference to contemporary Marxist scholars' contributions to state theory.

³² It is worth mentioning here that Rifa'at Ali Abu-El-Haj also considers the religious wing of the Ottoman administration, kadis and related personnel, among the members of the ruling economic and politically dominant class. They did not only fulfil the role of an "ideological class" in legitimising the class rule, but also directly, as they sometimes appeared as timar holders, or most commonly indirectly, through the processes of circulation of sur-plus wealth (payments in litigation processes, marriages, title deeds, mortgaging etc.), appropriated the tribute payers' surplus labour. Formation of the Modern State, Syracuse University Press, 2005. Cf. Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, Cornell University Press: 1994; Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire*, Brill: 1994. Both Barkey and İslamoğlu-İnan, follow the legalist and state-centric convention in Ottoman historiography and claim *kadi* was a neutral arbiter between the peasants and sipahis; an argument which entails that the Ottoman state had no class character, it was autonomous from class relations. For a powerful critique of views that held kadis simply as neutral professionals who did not have any extra-judicial ties with the society, see, Boğaç A. Ergene, *Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the Ottoman Empire*, Brill: 2003, 99-124.

capitalist social formations. Centralisation- decentralisation dynamics, or in other words, centrifugal tendencies were endemic to the political and social history of the pre-capitalist age. Civil wars between princes and claimants, dynastic successions and take-overs, ebb-and-flow-like occurrences of the rise of strong monarchs with absolutist aims and their centralising policies followed by the tendency of decentralisation and sub-infeudation a few decades later; all such dynamics were, in fact, manifestations of intra-ruling class conflicts. In our case, the disturbances appeared from the practice of bestowal of timars in Zülkadiriye was at the centre of the conflict after the Ottoman take-over.

Ali Bey's elimination by force seemed to create a dramatic rupture in a properly functioning, albeit autonomous, local administration in Zülkadiriye. Between 1522 and 1531, the region was tried to be controlled from the distant provincial centres of Rum and Karaman, and at the local level, the main provincial centres were assigned to palace servants of *devşirme* or *müteferrika* origin for short periods, as we explained briefly in the previous pages. As a newly annexed territory, daily and local matters were solved according to the old customs of the Beylik and the laws of Alaüddevle Bey (and its version of Bozok). These provincial laws [liva kanunnameleri] were principally grounded on conflict resolution on criminal matters and say very few, if not nothing, about revenue sources, tribute and taxation procedures, status of peasantry and tribesmen, and allocation of fiefs, unlike the extensive content of Ottoman customary law.³³ In a tribal milieu where political loyalty and recognition intermingle with tribal identities and hierarchies, implementation of these flexible and undocumented local regulations necessitates the charismatic authority of a leader from the ruling Zülkadirid clan. Yet after the Ottoman annexation, the assigned governors who were of *kapıkulu* or *müteferrika* origin, simply lacked the power to subjugate the tribal clan groups to act as their ultimate leader. Some of these *müteferrikas* were related to the aristocracies of the Balkan provinces, like Hersekzade's son Mustafa, and assigned as governors to locations where they were alien to the local customs and inter-tribal networks. The endurance of local regulations and customs in the region different from the standardised prescriptions of rents and tributes in centrally promulgated and supervised Ottoman laws may have paved the way for extra-legal demands (labelled as *mezalim* in traditional Ottoman *nasihatnames* and *adaletnames*; associated with feudal oppression conventional historiography) of these cadres from the tribute payers.³⁴ We do not have an extensive

³³For a presentation and translation of Alaüddevle's law and its version used in Bozok: Uriel Heyd. *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*. (Oxford University Press: 1973), 44ff. In this respect, Dulkadirid provincial laws were quite different from the comprehensive content of the standard Ottoman provincial laws. See also, Heath Lowry "The Ottoman Liva Kanunnames Contained in the Defter-i Hakani" *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 2 (1981).

³⁴Such *müteferrikas* were possibly accustomed to exploiting their feudal rights in their home regions in the

amount of documentation about local complaints, but we can still speculate that such instances might have laid the ground for very short durations of service of the governors assigned to Zülkadirid centres between 1522 and 1531. Yet in the last analysis, the allocation of new revenue sources of a recently annexed territory perfectly fitted the demands of the palace servants and sons of Ottoman notables, looking for pensions to offer their services to the state as being installed as provincial governors.

These complications of the decision of the Ottoman sultan or centre, in general, may prove unlike portrayals of the Ottoman state as a coherent and rational decision-making agency, even potential short-term consequences of decisions of the state were not perfectly calculated and managed. Apart from satisfying the demands of the groups we mentioned, the only short-term benefit of Şehsuvaroğlu's removal was the addition of his revenue base, which was hitherto beyond the control of the Ottoman treasury, to Sultan's demesne. If the numbers in exposed the aforesaid lists are accurate, we can infer that Ali Bey's income was about two million *akçes* per annum, part of which was then conferred to and shared between the Sultan's servants. In fact, Suleyman I, on Ferhad Paşa's advice, had attempted to intervene in the finances of the Zülkadirid realm during Ali Bey's lifetime by ordering a land survey in the region. This intervention was protested by Ali Bey.³⁵ The survey would have also meant a mission of espionage in the region which had been previously affected by the messianic Şah Veli uprising a few years ago. The Ottoman centre may be plagued by the rumours that the Zülkadirid ruling family was hosting and hiding some of the convicts of rebellion, and of the existence of a significant *kızılbaş* population in the region.³⁶ We have no evidence that Ali Bey and his sons were executed as convicts of heresy yet in his letter in which he declared the Sultan his accomplishment of the mission, Ferhad Paşa claimed that his spies spotted that the victims had already been in communication with Ismail Safavi.³⁷ A combination

Balkans. For instance, the complaints against Ferhad Paşa's rule and injustices in Smedrevo finally led to his demise. See, Celalzade, 130a-130b. In a locality like Bozok, where its population was seen as nothing but primitive and ignorant herdsmen with heretical beliefs, the capricious behaviours of the state elite, often associated with feudal oppression, were inevitable. Even in the second half of the 16th century, the inhabitants of this region have still been seen as a group of bandit tribes and irreligious Qızılbaş. Such elitism had a striking similarity with the way twelfth-century Norman colonisers viewed the Irish people as narrated in Gerald of Wales's account of the Irish clans.

³⁵T SMA. e. 757/53; Chroniclers claim that surveyors were killed by Ali Bey but according to Danişmend this was nothing by a conspiracy orchestrated by Ferhad Paşa to hide his intentions and deceive the young sultan to take action against Şehsuvaroğlu.

³⁶T SMA. e. 777/55; for the extent of the paranoia about potential *kızılbaş* activity in the region, also see: Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont. "Seyyid Tamm, Un Agitateur Hétérodoxe a Sivás (1516-1518)", IX. TTK (Ankara 21-23 Eylül 1981), Bildiriler II, Ankara 1988, pp. 865-874.

³⁷Jean- Louis Bacqué-Grammont. "Trois Lettres de Ferhâd Paşa sur la fin de Şehsuvâr Oğlu" 249; If the Zülkadirid ruling family was put to the sword under the suspicion that they were hiding *kızılbaş* rebels that had joined Şah Veli uprising or that they were covertly following heretical religious teachings of the Safavids, this may explain why their estates and the fiefs they had bestowed previously were so hastily

of all these factors would have highly probably contributed to Ali Bey's demise. Eventually, the Zülkadirid realm was annexed by the Ottomans as a conquered territory.³⁸

4.4 Management of Revenue Sources and Its political Manifestation: Timar

Once a territory is conquered, management of its revenue sources becomes the immediate concern of the conquerors. The legal status of these lands fictively determines how the revenues are collected and then distributed by the institutional arrangements and practices of the pre-capitalist state.³⁹ Early Islamic legal fiction offered two categories concerning the legal status of land: *öşri* and *haraci*. In both types, revenues obtained from the real owners of the land were collected by the central state and then distributed to the local agents of the state as cash salaries in return for their services. This kind of a system requires a highly developed state capacity and complex institutional arrangements to fulfil the functions of pumping out the tributes of the producing masses directly in cash, and at the same time re-distributing these resources from the centre to the peripheries. The necessary component of this system is the existence of a high level of liquidity backed by a monetised and urbanised economy which renders in-kind payments obsolete. This system had been practiced in the Abbasid caliphate up until the tenth century when the caliphate experienced a sharp political and economic decline.

The disintegration of the Abbasid caliphate into competing local dynasties hampered the fluidity of the monetised economy and disintegrated it into a fragmented system of self-sufficient and predominantly agricultural local communities, in a similar fashion to what Western Europe experienced after the collapse of the Carolingian Empire. Rulers of the emergent local dynasties in the Middle East, unlike the Abbasid caliphs, did not hold the claims of both political and religious leadership. Their political superiority rested solely on their military prowess and power, and thus their political dominion was stemming from their right of conquest. In a sense, they were

confiscated and added to the state treasury. This practice would be in line with the fatwas of the Ottoman ulema in the wake of Çaldıran campaign that declared the *kızılbaş* were true unbelievers and thus, their properties and belongings were illegal, that is, under no religio-legal protection.

³⁸“ol memleketler Türkmen elinden feth olundukda” Celalzade 167a

³⁹The legal fiction that deems the land as the ruler's eminent domain may give the frame but what determines the land holding patterns, and rules for allocation and collection of the tributes from these lands stem from the actual power relations between parties that shape the “state capacity” in the sphere of production.

sharing their political authority with their military companions and comrades-in-arms. The most feasible way to ensure their loyalty, as well as field an army without resting on payments through the central treasury was to divide the land between the members of the military personnel and delegate the right of collecting tributes from all available assets of production on these lands to these military-men in return for their fulfilment of military and administrative functions in the local level. The legal expression of this new system was the invention of the concept of *arz-i miri*, in which the ruler, the ultimate owner of land in legal fiction, delegates the usufruct rights of the land to the actual people who inhabit and cultivate. Peasants' usufruct rights over the land were recognised as a status of hereditary tenancy in return for paying tributes and dues primarily based on their economic activity. On the other hand, the military men were also delegated to collect these tributes and dues as supervisors of these processes and become the master of land [sahib-i arz]. In other words, the relationship between the state and the peasant was mediated by this class of tribute collectors. In different centuries this system was either called as *iqta* or in the Ottoman context, as *timar*. The relative balance of power between the state and *timar* holders varied greatly in periods and from locality to locality, but the general rule was that, while the state intended to keep *timar* holders as its officers without any class interests, who were simply responsible for serving as cavalry soldiers at war, to maintain the military-administrative and economic structure in village level at peacetime. On paper, as docile officials of the state, *timar* holders could be easily recalled, and their rights could be revoked in case they did not fulfil their responsibilities, or worse, engaged in a conflict with the state. On the other hand, the class of *timar* holders intended to improve their alienable and revokable rights as the actual dominant class vis-à-vis the peasant cultivators and eventually transform their actual control over land and labour power to a hereditary and non-alienable status.⁴⁰

Ottoman provincial administration therefore had a pivotal role in maintaining the balance of power between the centre and the local fief holders in favour of the centre. Accordingly, the provincial governors were responsible for either approving petitions for fiefs or establishing a connection between local demanders and the centre. Fiefs whose documents of authorization or diplomas [berat] were directly approved and sealed by the provincial governor are called non-certified [tezkiresiz] *timars* which are roughly equal to the ones with a revenue base of less than 3000 *akçes*. Yet, demands or transferal of fiefs with revenue bases equalling a higher amount than three thousand *akçes* requires the approval of the centre with an imperial diploma, denoted as *hüküm-i şerif*, in *timar* registers, and such *timars* are categorically called certified

⁴⁰ John Haldon, *The State and The Tributary Mode*, 158ff.

[tezkireli]. In the process of the bestowal of certified timars, local administration only plays the role of referral about the social origins of the petitioner. The reason behind that precaution implemented by the centre must be related to preventing provincial governors from creating a body of loyal supporters by granting fiefs of higher value to their servants and retinue. The procedure of timar bestowals was practised as summarised up until 1531 when Suleyman I revised the system with a decree in which he ordered that all the petitions for initial admission for timar grants, independent from their revenue bases, would be officially approved by the centre hereinafter. After all that the role of the provincial governors in the bestowal process was simply reduced to a referral and an inspector indicates the impulse towards the development of a strictly centralised model of enfeoffment.⁴¹ Indeed there were certain exceptions as we will see in the case of Zülkadiriye.⁴² Here it is suffice to say that in its earliest phase of implementation, that is, in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, Beys in the frontier zones in the Balkans had enjoyed the full powers of transferring fiefs to their comrades at arms on higher amounts and independent from the Sultan's approval.⁴³ There also exists a collection of letters that such fief grants were non-alienable and hereditary as these grants included a text of oath sworn by the bestower Beys not to revoke the timars of their holders. These arrangements were reminiscent of the feudal practices of seignorial relations in the medieval West.⁴⁴ However such relatively decentralised variants in favour of the vested interests of the local elite were not restricted to the borderlands of Ottoman Rumelia; as will be seen in our case study, Anatolian provinces also constituted a patchwork of varying practices in terms of timar administration.

4.4.1 Introduction of the Timar Registers in Question

Now it is imperative to focus on our case study through an analysis of empirical materials that exhibit hard evidence for our points. In our analysis, we focused on the two earliest timar registers of vilayet-I Zülkadiriye, namely the ones numbered

⁴¹Douglas Howard. "The Ottoman Timar System and Its Transformation, 1563-1656", *PhD. Thesis*, Indiana University, 1987, 99-100.

⁴²Even if the decree of 1531 is usually interpreted as a centralising step in timar administration, in practice, the practice of initial [ibtida] timar bestowals without recourse to the centre and only with the certificate provided by the provincial governor was kept in effect as a case study about timar bestowals in Aydin province in 1575-76 illustrates: Douglas A. Howard, "Central and Provincial Administrative Interaction in Timar Bestowals in the Early Seventeenth Century" in *Decision Making and Change In The Ottoman Empire*, ed. Caesar E. Farah, (The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), 84-85

⁴³Linda T. Darling. "Historicizing the Ottoman Timar System: Identities of Timar-Holders, Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries", *Turkish Historical Review* 8 (2017): 151-152.

⁴⁴Baki Tezcan. *Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*, (Cambridge University Press 2010), 20.

124 and 142 in the *Tapu-Tahrir* section of the archives, dated 1522-24 and 1528-30 respectively. Given the extent and exhaustiveness of these documents, we opted to focus on a limited region; timar records of *nahiye* of Zamantu.

This region corresponded to the present-day towns of Pınarbaşı and Bünyan at the crossroads combining Zülkadirid centres Maraş and Elbistan to Bozok region, the geographical hypocentre of the rebellions of Baba Zünnun (1526) and Kalender Şah (1527). We know that after managing to defeat Ottoman provincial armies in the environs of Tokat and Sivas; for some reason, Kalender Şah led his forces towards the environs of Elbistan. Zamantu region is situated on their possible route. Although very few are known, we can speculate that he had a support base in this region.⁴⁵ We have at least one piece of evidence about the identity of one of his supporters: A poem written by an antinomian dervish named Koyun Abdal about Kalender's decision to depart to Iran.⁴⁶ In the synoptic survey of the region, we spotted a semi-nomadic clan called Koyun Abdallu recorded within a larger tribal group of Karı-kışlalı and also a vakıf record on behalf of "Koyun Abdallu evladından İbrahim Çelebi."⁴⁷ We know via the chronicler accounts that Kalender had also been supported by dismissed Zülkadirid sipahis whose lands were added to royal demesne after the annexation of the region by the Ottomans. Therefore, a comparison of the subsequent timar records showing the results of bestowals in the region shortly before and after the rebellion would be pivotal for our research objectives. But before going into the analysis of these timar records, we should briefly explain the method of approach we employ in the analysis of these documents.

Timar registers had long been employed as sources revealing the characteristics of taxation and tribute systems and land-holding patterns in the Ottoman classical age. Yet as Linda Darling suggests in her seminal article where she questions the idealised depictions of the timar system in the Ottoman *nasihatname* genre and in this vein, historicises the system's continuous patterns of change in the period between the late fourteenth to seventeenth centuries, *timar-ıcmal* registers could also be utilised to comprehensively reveal the identities of the timar holders within a certain period and in a certain locality.⁴⁸ Following the bestowal notes in these registers, it is possible to give an estimate of the number of fief-holders at a certain location and in a certain period. These notes also reveal the social and provincial

⁴⁵This must be the route which was used by Ismail Safavi in his destructive raid to the Zülkadirid realm in 1507.

⁴⁶Fahri Bilge. "1527 Tarihindeki bir İsyamı Hatırlatan Manzume: Kalender Vakası ve Koyun Abdal" *Erciyes* (Kayseri Halkevi Dergisi), sayı 17, 503-605

⁴⁷TTd. 998, fols. 548, 552.

⁴⁸Darling. "Historicizing the Ottoman Timar System," 147.

origins of the fief-holders.

The social origins of the fief holders were quite diverse. It did not only include sons of former fief holders but also slaves of the sultan and higher cadres of military-administrative strata, personal retainers and followers of provincial governors and princes, members of the civilian branch of the administrative wing, as well as the members of the religious bureaucracy.⁴⁹ In the lists of the names of these fief holders, a patronymic name; i.e., X, son of (veled-i) Y, often indicates that the fief-holder was highly probably descending from a former fief holder who had previously been recorded as a timar holder.⁵⁰ Yet as far as I observe in the documents I focused on, this was not a strict rule; some patronymic names also included epithets, such as “gedik”, which could denominate a castle guard, sergeant [çavuş] which might be used to define a personal bodyguard of a provincial administrator; “mevlana”, “hoca” or “hace”, commonly used for religious personnel from highest to lowest rank, or “çelebi”, a common epithet for a local notable.⁵¹ In such cases, we can surmise that the fief-holder in question entered into the service from outside of the class of fief-holders. A more direct indicator of being an outsider, on the other hand, was the naming of the fief holder without a patronymic. These fief holders could be centrally appointed palace servants or soldiers of *kapıkulu* origin, whose entry into the class of fief-holders was not exceptional.

The second dimension of the identities of the fief holders listed in the surveys concerns their provincial origins. In a standard note of bestowal, the scribe reiterated the name of the petitioner and then continued by stating the petitioner was formerly a fief-holder for this or that province if the petitioner in question was not bestowed with a fief for the first time. The ones that were bestowed with a fief for the first time were quite usually *sipahizades*, and locations of their fathers' fiefs were also mentioned in the note of bestowal. If no indication of provincial origins was sighted, plus, no patronymic name was given, then we could surmise that the petitioner was sent from the centre, possibly of *kapıkulu* origin, a member of the local provincial governor's armed retinue, or a local civilian administrator. Provincial origins of the petitioners were also clear indicators of whether the petitioner was a formerly dismissed [mazul] fief-holder. In such cases, the scribe strictly emphasised the location of the petitioner's former fief and occasionally its revenue base. A standard note of

⁴⁹Ibid. 148.

⁵⁰Ibid. 150. Sometimes we observe three generations, grandfather, father, and son, in these denotations. For example: “X, veled-i Y bin Z”. Another pattern is that, if the fief holder in question had a brother who had died while he was holding the fief in question, the formula of denotation usually follows as: “X, birader-i Y, veled-i X”.

⁵¹These epithets are of course quite diverse to be summarised in a few words and examples. Epithets like “lala”, “kethüda” or “katip” were also not uncommon among the timar holders.

bestowal continued with a statement about the reason for the re-entry to the fief system and lastly gave the date of delivery of the document of authorization.

Lastly, patronymic names themselves may have indicated the provincial and social origins of the listed timar holders, as well. For instance, the patronymic name “Abdullah” could be considered as a clue that the fief holder was of kul or Ghulam origin, irrespective of his provincial origins. But what is more important concerning patronymics is that, in TTd.124, and more intensively in TTd.142, we usually come across timar holders whose patronymic names referred to certain nomadic tribes and clans of the Zülkadirid milieu as these groups were usually named after their leaders. For instance, “X, veled-i Çiçek” entries are commonly encountered. Here the patronymic name indicated the timar holder’s genealogical connection with the Çiçeklü tribe. In cases of patronymics like “X, veled-I Taf”, “X veled-i Burunkesen”, or “X veled-i Paşa Bey” (many more examples could be cited), it is relatively more difficult to discern the tribal origins of the timar holders. Yet a close and comparative reading of the complimentary synoptic survey of the region (TTd. 998) reveals that such specific and relatively uncommon and sometimes bizarre patronymics were the names or cognominations of locally influential and famous clan leaders whose clans were called after their names or epithets. These references to tribal and clan connections were decisive evidence of Zülkadirid provincial origins and of being enrolled in the military-administrative structure of the former Beylik as tribal sipahis and *sipahizades*. Since the administrative and military organisation of the old Beylik was built on Türkmen tribes and clans loyal to the Zülkadirid family, we can claim that all the sipahis whose provincial origins were given as Zülkadiriye also had tribal connections, but we preferred to limit this distinction to those whose tribal ties could be most clearly demonstrated. The population of the local sipahis directly associated with the nomadic clans of Zülkadiriye must have indeed been much higher than those shown in the appendices.

4.4.2 Distribution of Timar Holders in Zamantu c.1524 [TTd.124]

In the Zamantu section of the earliest timar register of Zülkadiriye, showing the results of fief bestowals in the region between the years 1522 and 1525, 44 timar holders were listed in forty fiefs.⁵² This means that four timars were shared between parties.⁵³ The earliest date of bestowal was recorded as the 7th of Muharram, 929 (26th of November 1522), and the latest was the 19th of Rabiulahir, 931 (13th

⁵²BOA TT 124, fols.40-48.

⁵³n.8, 32, 33 and 37 in Appendix B

February 1525). Two fief bestowals, on the other hand, were not dated, one belonging to the petitioner of a promised *zeamet* with 20.000 *akçes* per annum, a certain Kasım, veled-i Kara Atlu from Zülkadiriye, and the other belonging to a former slave of prince Şehinşah (d.1511) from Karaman, called Mehmed, with a yearly revenue base of 2999 *akçes*.⁵⁴ Since there is no further evidence, it is difficult to come up with a clear answer for the reason why these bestowals were not dated, but we can speculate that for this or that reason, the authorisation of these fiefs might have not been realised. Especially, the discrepancy between the actual income of Kasım, calculated as 2000 *akçes* with an addition [ber vech-i iltizam] and the promised 20.000 *akçes* from the centre renders the case doubtful.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, I opted for treating these two as ordinary fiefs among the others in my conclusions.

One of the distinguishing aspects of the document is that after “fief of X” headings, revenue base settlements, which could either be villages or meadows, as well as nomadic or semi-nomadic tribal groups as tributaries were not listed in detail. The scribe only recorded one, two, or in a few cases, three or more units of revenue sources and gave the total revenues of both units in one heading of *hasıl*. Among these units, the entries were often followed by unspecified revenue sources with the phrase “and all others” [ve gahrıhim]. Revenue source villages and meadows, allocated as fiefs to a few *sipahi* s who were most probably of tribal origins were recorded as “unrecorded in the previous register” [haric ez-defter] and the revenue totals were given in estimated amounts [ber-vech-i tahmin].⁵⁶

These non-clarified revenue sources and estimated revenue totals of previously unrecorded settlements may be indicative that before the earliest extant detailed survey of the region, which was dated 1526-27⁵⁷, Ottoman authorities had already instigated a survey of Zülkadiriye shortly after annexing the region yet for some reason the survey could not be completed successfully. Given the rudimentary character and structure of the aforesaid timar register concerning clarification of revenue base settlement, between the years 1522 and 1525 Ottoman grip of power over Zülkadiriye was not tightened yet as seen in the inefficiency of the record keepers in stating the revenue sources comprehensively in the region. Another idea derives from the fact that because of the integration of a large portion of former Zülkadirid *sipahi* s’ fiefs

⁵⁴n.16 and 30 in Appendix B.

⁵⁵TTd.124 fol.45: “Tımar-ı Kasım, veled-i Kara Atlu, hüdavendigâr-ı (?) hazretleri askerine eşmek üzere elinde hükm-i şerif var. Karye-i Zereçil; ma-mezarı ve gayrihi. Hasıl 1941; ber-vech-i iltizam 2000. “Zülkadiri sipahilerinden olup yirmi bin akçe tımar tevcih olunmak için hükm-i şerif ibraz etti.” Here the term “iltizam” does not mean “tax farming” but completion. See: Howard “The Ottoman Timar System” 166.

⁵⁶See n. 14, 35 and 36 in Appendix B. Haric ez-defter entries meant either the Zülkadirids were also practising tahrir, or the Ottomans previously started a survey of the region which was not finalised.

⁵⁷B.O.A. TTd. 402.

into the royal demesne, keeping the records of the revenue sources of the region in the first years of the Ottoman rule may be handled by *mukāta'a emins* or *hassa emins* who had less interest towards meticulously recording the yearly incomes of a few remaining fiefs.

The document did not reveal much detail about the revenue sources. However, the social backgrounds and provincial origins of the holders of the bestowed fiefs were stated in detail. Equally importantly, the reason for each bestowal and authorization was frankly stated alongside whether the central or provincial authorities allocated the fief. Following these details, we can conclude the certification status of these fiefs. In bestowal notes at the bottom of each timar entry, the statement referring to a central (Sultanic) order [*hüküm-i şerif*] indicated the fief in question was a certified one [tezkereli]. Whereas the simple expression “bestowed” [tevcih olundu] without mentioning of central order indicated the fief in question was directly allocated by the provincial governor as a non-certified [tezkeresiz] fief. Certified / non-certified distinction corresponded to the revenue base amounts of the allocated fiefs. Accordingly, fiefs whose revenue bases equalled 3999 *akçes* and below were allocated directly by the provincial governor of Karaman as non-certified fiefs.⁵⁸ Among 44 timar-holders in Zamantu between 1522 and 1525, 32 of them were holding non-certified timars valued at less than 4000 *akçes*. There were two exceptions; one was the above-mentioned Kasım who had a fief of 2000 *akçes* at his disposal yet stood for a central order of allocation of ten times valuable *zeamet* to him. The second one is a certain Çavuş Sefer, who was bestowed half of the revenue base of a fief counted 8040 *akçes* as a non-certified one.⁵⁹ The epithet “sergeant” [çavuş] and that the provincial origins of Sefer were not identified could lead us to conclude that he was of *kapıkulu* origin or perhaps a soldier from the personal retinue of the governor-general. Although there were regulations determining the distinction between certified and non-certified timar in terms of their revenue bases, there could be exceptions probably shaped by local dynamics, as seen in this case.

Among these lesser valued timars, five fief-holders were recorded with yearly incomes up to 1999 *akçes*. One of these fief-holders was a former *sipahi* from Karaman; the other four were former *sipahi* s or *sipahizades* of Zülkadirid origin. Patronymic names of three of them lead us to conclude that these *sipahi* s were of tribal origins.⁶⁰

⁵⁸Imber claims that provincial governors of Karaman, Rum and Zülkadiriye could award timars valued at less than three thousand *akçes*. However, as we see in the case of Zülkadir between 1522-25, the standard maximum revenue base for non-certified timars was 3999 *akçes*, albeit in exceptions and unspecified cases. Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2002), 203.

⁵⁹See n.5 in Appendix B, and p. 40 in TT 124. The instructions are unclear, but the other half of the revenue base seems to be an emptied (mahlul) timar.

⁶⁰.14, 15 and 28 in Appendix B. “veled-i Çiçek” entries would be indicative of a genealogical connection with

Moreover, according to the listing, none of the Zülkadirid *sipahi* s of tribal origin had a fief valued at more than 3000 *akçes* at their disposal; this group could be considered the most destitute and powerless among the fief holders of the region.

The group of fief holders who were instrumental in strengthening Ottoman domination in the region was the fief holders of Karaman origin. Thirteen Karamanid fief-holders were recorded in the register, eight of which were without patronymic names and thus most likely of kul origin. As mentioned above, one of these Karamanids, a certain Mehmed was recorded as Prince Şehinşah's slave. This could be indicative of a certain trend in fief bestowals in Zülkadiriye in the earliest phase of Ottoman domination as we also see certain princely servants and slaves entered into the fief system in the sub-province of Elbistan in the same period.⁶¹ The most interesting case among these Karamanid *sipahi* s was a certain Aliyar who had been bestowed with a fief in Karaman as a reward for his participation in a battle against the Celalîs. After a duration of periodic dismissal, villages of Tiravşin and Okçu were allocated him as fiefs in early autumn of 1523.⁶² Celalîs mentioned in the note of bestowal must be Şah Veli rebels of 1518-19.⁶³ For the majority of the Karamanid *sipahi* s (11 out of 13), the apparent reason for bestowal was their re-entry into service after a certain duration of periodic dismissal. This was stated as "once holding a fief in Karaman, dismissed [for a period] then this fief was bestowed."⁶⁴ Based on the results obtained from timar ruznamçe records of Anatolian provinces, Soyudoğan concludes that for Anatolian *sipahi* s the average duration of holding a certain fief was limited to only three years.⁶⁵ The policy of imposition of a limited duration of fief-holding and periodic rotations were precautions of the central state to prevent the fief-holders from taking root in the villages assigned to them. By

the leader of the tribe Çiçeklü, predominantly inhabiting in the southeast corner of the former Zülkadirid province of Bozok, close to Zamantu region. TT 998 fol.608-10. Clans of the Çiçekli tribe were listed in detail in TTd.155 and TTd. 998. The population of sipahis originating from the Çiçeklü tribe has grown larger in the following timar register TTd.142.

⁶¹For instance, in TTd.124 fol.21: Tımar-ı Mehmed, veled-i Ali, ser-mehteran-ı merhum Cem: Karye-i Haceröyüğü, tab-i Elbistan Hasıl (Osmani) 6762 Hisse-i mezkur Mehmed 6550 *Mezkur Mehmed Karamanda kadimi timar tasarruf edip mazul olmağın bedel-i timar tevcih oldu. Fi 15 Şevval sene 930. TTd.124 p.22: Tımar-ı Seydi veled-i Mahmud, zaim: Karye-i Çopu, tabi-i Elbistan. Hasıl (osmani) 8000 *Mezkur Seydi şehzade Şehinşahın kulu oğlu olmağın, hükmi-şerif ile tımara çıkıp mazul olup, bu timar tevcih olundu. Fi (?) Rebiülahir 930.

⁶²TT 124 fol.41 "Tımar-ı Aliyar. . . Mezkur Karamanın sipahilerinden olup Karamanda Celali muharebesinde yoldaşlık edip, tımara çıkıp, tasarruf edip, mazul olmağın bu timar tevcih olundu. Fi 18 zilkade 929"

⁶³Earlier Şahkulu (1511) and Nur Ali Halife (1512) rebels were usually referred to as "surh-ser" or "kızıl-baş" in Ottoman accounts. The epithet of Celalî entered Ottoman terminology with the rebellion of Şah Veli b. Celal; the epithet itself and that the rebel masses gathered around an antinomian preacher reminds the Babaî uprising of the 1240s.

⁶⁴"Karamanda timar tasarruf edip, mazul olmağın, bu timar tevcih olundu."

⁶⁵Muhittin Soyudoğan, "Reassessing the *Timar* System: The Case Study of Vidin (1455-1693)", *PhD. Thesis*, Bilkent University, 2012. 69.

inhabiting the same location for years and generations, they could have developed strong local relations and eventually evolved into local feudal lords. Yet, if we think of the limits of state capacity of the age, it was clear that rotating the fief holders between distant provinces, except for punitive cases of extensive re-settlement of populations in Balkan provinces,⁶⁶ was not an efficient and feasible policy. In the Elbistan section of the timar-icmal defter, we occasionally detect certain Zülkadirid *sipahi* s who were formerly holding fiefs in the Rumelia but as the document illustrated, they opted for giving up their fiefs in these distant lands, entered into the periodic dismissal voluntarily and then petitioned to be bestowed with fiefs in their home province.⁶⁷ Yet keeping the fief holders in rotation with the granting of fiefs in adjacent and newly annexed territories was also elaborated as a strategy to constitute a loyal cadre of supporters of the centre in these new provinces, whose local elites' loyalty was indeed dubious. As İnalçık suggests the Empire employed this strategy successfully in different periods and different locations, such as in newly annexed Albania, Hungary, and Zülkadiriye, where local feudal and/or tribal ties vis-à-vis the state centre were rooted and resilient.⁶⁸ The numbers given by İnalçık about the provincial origins of fief-holders in Zülkadiriye for the first years of Süleyman I, roughly correspond to the distribution of the fief holders' provincial origins in the micro-scale of the sample case of Zamantu. Yet what is also imperative to be mentioned here is that these Karaman-originated *sipahi* s were not likely to be members of the native tribal aristocracy of Karaman; for the Ottoman authorities at the centre, the loyalty of the Karamanid tribal leaders and notables was as equally doubtful as the ones of Zülkadirid origin. To reiterate, fief-holders of kul origin were more trustable agents and instruments of the centre to balance the power of local notables in the newly annexed Zülkadiriye.

Lastly, we can touch upon the situation of the local Zülkadirid *sipahi* s facing this policy of fief distribution of the centre in 1522-25. Even if a significant portion of the *sipahi* s were of Karamanid and kul origin, twenty-eight of the listed forty-four fief holders were still Zülkadirid locals. Only one of them was previously assigned as a fief holder in a province other than Zülkadiriye. A Zülkadirid fief holder called Emin, veled-i Ağa was holding a fief in Karaman before but after a period of rotation, he was reassigned with a fief of 7000 *akçes* in Zamantu, transferred from İsmail and Aykud on 10th of Ramazan, 930.⁶⁹ Two points are unclear in this transaction;

⁶⁶Such as the forced settlement of the population of Saruhan in the Balkans, along with Saruhanid *sipahis* after Torlak Kemal and Börklüce's rebellion in Western Anatolia, c. 1420.

⁶⁷See TT 124, fols. 9, 16, 21, 29, 30.

⁶⁸Halil İnalçık. "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", *Studia Islamica* 2 (1954) 119.

⁶⁹TT 124 fol.43

identities of İsmail and Aykud and, non-intervention of the centre with a document of certification to this case of fief bestowal although the revenue per annum was higher than 3999 *akçes*. As we mentioned, not the official regulations but exceptions were the norm. There were four more Zülkadirid *sipahi* s, namely a certain Çakır, a certain Halil, and holders of a shared timar and very likely brothers Turali and Mansur, who were bestowed with fiefs on transferal from another fief-holder.⁷⁰ The document, again, did not reveal the reason for dismissal and the identity of these newly assigned fiefs' former owners. These were not likely to be predecessors of the new holders of these fiefs simply because the scribe tended to mention whether the fiefs transferred from deceased fathers to their sons as seen in several entries in the Elbistan section of the document, as well as the case of two nieces in Zamantu section.⁷¹ The reason for bestowal, however, was frankly stated; in the overwhelming majority of the cases, the key expression was “eligible, or deserves, to be enfeoffed” [*layık-ı dirlik olmağın*] and only in one case “for being a valiant person” [*yarar kimesne olmağın*]. It seemed to prove their fathers' identity as former fief holders of Zülkadiriye, and their statuses of being true sons of deceased *sipahi* s, oral testimonies of local notables among the fief holders were required. Here for instance, the judgement and authority of Mehmed, son of [Ali] Gazi⁷² known to be the local *sipahi* chieftain [*subaşı*] of Zamantu during the rule of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey's son Üveys Bey, was pivotal to prove their social origins.⁷³ A certain Dündar, son of Zülkadir holding a *zeamet* of 20,000 *akçes*, and Hamza, son of Cura Şeref, whose brother Çelebi would appear as serasker of Zamantu in the following timar register were also likely to be the other influential local personnel employed for their testimonies for proving *layık-ı dirlik* status of the petitioners.⁷⁴

Compared to the testimonies of the local notables, reference to fief-holding status during Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey's time was a less mentioned and thus seemingly less reliable way to obtain a fief for petitioners for non-certified fiefs. Out of twenty-eight Zülkadirid *sipahi* s in the list, only in five fief bestowal notes for seven *sipahi* s, one being for a shared timar of Paşa Bey's grandsons, we see a reference to petitioners' fief-holding statuses during Ali Bey's rule. The expression in such bestowal notes is

⁷⁰n.2, 27 and 37 in Appendix B

⁷¹n.33 in Appendix B

⁷²Gazi appears as Ali Gazi in the following timar register.

⁷³See n.23 in Appendix B

⁷⁴n.9 and 17 in Appendix B. Albeit being recorded as a *zaim* from the Zülkadirid family in TT 124, Dündar is lost without a trace in the next register. Nor is there a piece of evidence that his sons have succeeded him as fief-holders. It is possible that Dündar, *veled-i Zülkadir* could be Divane Dündar who was the only Zülkadirid noble who followed Kalender to the end until they were finally defeated and beheaded near Sarız. Celalzade, 168a: “Kalender-i nuhuset- ahterin ve Dulkadiroğlundan Divane Dündarın başları kesilip gürüh-ı melahide alef-i şimşir tasir vaki oldu.

formulated as “held a fief by Ali Bey’s authorization” [Ali Bey’den tımar tasarruf etmeğın]. Two of them were coming from the ranks of local notables; above mentioned Mehmed, son of Gazi, and Hamza, son of Cura Şeref. Two grandsons of Paşa Bey were also likely to be members of a family of local notables because of that they were listed in three generations.⁷⁵ Their grandfather Paşa Bey was probably a prominent clan leader during Zülkadirid rule.⁷⁶ The rest two belonged to two *sipahi* s holding non-certified fiefs and declared their statuses as former Zülkadirid *sipahi* s during Ali Bey’s rule.⁷⁷ For Cinci Ali, apart from the emphasis on his fief-holding status during Ali Bey’s rule, the expression “as for being a valiant person [yarar kimesne olmağın], deserves to hold a fief” was also added to the note of bestowal. Still, to figure out the eligibility or valour of the petitioners, testimonies of the local notables were probably needed. Eligibility [yararlık] was mostly associated with shown prowess on the field of battle but in the local context, we can speculate, the result of local investigations about whether the petitioner was somehow related to Şah Veli rebels, who devastated the region shortly before the Ottoman take-over, was taken into consideration. In any case, many of the former Zülkadirid *sipahi* s in the region were kept out of the system of fief allocation since the Ottoman authorities were dubious about their loyalty to the state. However, the composition of the fief holders in the region would dramatically change with new fief allocations made after the rebellions of 1526-1527 were decisively quelled by İbrahim Paşa who won the favour of Zülkadirid elites by recognizing their rights on formerly confiscated fiefs and revenue sources.⁷⁸

4.4.3 Distribution of Tımar Holders in Zamantu c.1528 [TTd.142]

The section of the following tımar register (TTd.142) shows the results of fief awards in the Zamantu region of Zülkadiriye covering a period starting from late 1527 to late 1530. The earliest fief bestowals shown in the document were dated 11th of Muharram 934 (7th of October, 1527), nearly three months after Kalender Şah’s

⁷⁵n.33 in Appendix B

⁷⁶We follow several clans recorded under “cemaat” of Paşabeylü in Zamantu section of the synoptic survey. TT 998 fol.564-565

⁷⁷n.29 and 40 in Appendix B

⁷⁸Margaret L. Venzke, “The Case of a Dulğadir-Mamluk İqtā’: A Re-Assessment of the Dulğadir Principality and Its Position within the Ottoman-Mamluk Rivalry” JESHO 43, (3) (2010): 418. Even if the Ottoman centre chose to compromise with the Zülkadirid former sipahis who supported or were directly involved in Kalender Şah’s uprising, investigations in the region about Celali affiliations could have continued until the last years of the 1520s as an entry in the synoptic survey traces: “Bağçe-i Devletyar veled-i Zülkadir ve arz-ı (karye-i) Camustil. Mezkur Celali olup, haliya hassa-i humayuna zabt olundu.” TT 998 fol.422.

rebellion was finally suppressed.⁷⁹ The latest record of fief bestowal was dated 22nd of Rebiülahir 937 (13th of November, 1530).⁸⁰ This period of three years that the document covered is highly illustrative of the changing Ottoman policy of the fief distribution system in the region, as a response to the mass discontent of the Zülkadirid elite after Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey's execution and subsequent fief confiscations. In the Zamantu section of this document, a total number of 215 fief-holders were named, whose revenue sources were recorded in 181 separate *timar* entries.⁸¹ A complimentary document, the synoptic survey of the region compiled in the same period gave the exact number of *sipahi* s and *sipahizades* inhabiting the *nahiye* as 122.⁸² The reason behind the discrepancy between these numbers may be that *sipahi* s from adjacent administrative regions of Zülkadiriye, such as Elbistan and Maraş, were also awarded fiefs and revenue sources in Zamantu.⁸³ In any case, the dramatic increase in the fief bestowals and numbers of the fief-holders in the region compared to the results of the previous timar register, provide apparent evidence of Ottoman efforts to restore the authority in the region by reaching a compromise with the local elites.

An equally distinguishing aspect of the document is that all available revenue sources of the fiefs were recorded in detail. Compared to the rudimentary character of the previous timar register in exposing the revenue bases, in TTd.142, under each fief entry every single income source; the villages, *mezra'as*, tribal clans, and specific taxes and tributes were listed in minute detail. In the preceding section, we underlined the possible reasons why the revenue sources of the fiefs documented in TTd.124 were recorded in a rather cursory manner. To reiterate, the chief reason would be the initial inefficiency of Ottoman control over this newly annexed territory because of certain political and administrative factors that we have briefly discussed. During the initial five years of the formal Ottoman rule in the region, a sizable portion of the local elites of Zülkadiriye were kept outside of the fief bestowal system by large-scale confiscations. The extermination of the local dynasty by a concerted plot of

⁷⁹TTd.142 fol.389: "Tımar-ı Katib Halil, veled-i Hüseyin; an-tamga-i Alaüddevlê Bey. Fi 11 Muharrem 934." This timar included three *mezra'a* nearby *nahiye-i Zamantu*, and also one *mezra'a* nearby *nahiye-i Mağara* (present-day town of Tufanbeyli) as its revenue sources, which amounted to 6587 akçes. The first name of this *sipahi* indicating his profession may suggest that he had been a member of bureaucratic functionaries of the former principality during Alaüddevlê's rule but was excluded from fief allocation after the Ottoman takeover until this date.

⁸⁰TT 142 fol.364: "Tımar-ı Hızır, veled-i İsfendiyar bin Süleyman. Babası bu tımara mutasarrıf iken fevt olmağın evladına tevcih olundu. Fi 22 Rebiülahir 937."

⁸¹TT 142 fol.348-398.

⁸²TT 998 fol.578.

⁸³It would be wrong to add forty-two *nefers* of castle guards of the fortress of Zamantu to the number of ordinary fief holders inhabiting the region because, in the synoptic survey, these persons were recorded with their daily wages and salaries [ulufeli]. TTd.998 fol.571.

the capital was also added as a factor to the local discontent. In any case, their loyalty to the Sultan seemed to be dubious.⁸⁴ Materialization of the state power at the provincial level, however, necessitated the collaboration of the members of the local elite with the centre as they fulfilled military and administrative functions in return for their previously held economic rights and political privileges as the fief-holder class were officially guaranteed and ratified. The fief-holding pattern was a political manifestation of redistribution of the agricultural (or products of animal husbandry as its variant) surplus of tribute payers among the fractions of the ruling class. A comparison of provincial revenue bases divided to the Sultan's, provincial governors', and fief holders' shares illustrated the relative balance of power between the Sultan, broadly speaking, the high-ranked administrators of *kapıkulu* origin, and the remnants of old Anatolian *beyliks*. In the earliest timar register of the region, it was shown that the total sum of the revenue base shared between forty-four fief holders amounted to 146,103 *akçes* whereas in TT 142, the total sum, divided between 181 fiefs and 215 fief holders, increased to 480,024 *akçes*. From the 1527 Summer onwards, the revenue sources formerly confiscated from Zülkadirid locals and annexed for Sultanic demesne were started to be redistributed to their former holders on the condition that they proved their or their forbearers' fief-holding status during Alaüddevle and Ali Bey's reigns meant a significant shift in the balance of political power in the local level in favour of the Zülkadirid elite.

In the previous subtitle, we also stressed the emergence of dismissed [mazul] *sipahi* s from Karaman as a new fief-holding group in Zülkadiriye upon the Ottoman annexation may have resulted in further alienation of the Zülkadirid elite towards their new overlords. The Ottoman centre aimed at diminishing the power of the local elite by installing the Karamanid *sipahi* s in the region, yet the turn of events proved the exact opposite of those aims. Likewise, the unemployed *sipahi* s from Teke and Karaman had once actively or inherently supported the Şahkulu Uprising (1510-11),⁸⁵ this time, the Zülkadirids who lost their statuses vis-à-vis an outsider group inevitably involved in the upheavals of 1526-27. The demands of dismissed *sipahi* s for allocation of new revenue sources as timars — a serious problem that hampered the political stability in the Anatolian provinces during the rule of late Bayezid II and especially after the civil war between Yavuz and his brothers —

⁸⁴The Ottoman centre was already aware of the discontent in Zülkadiriye at around 1524-25 as we follow in Celal-zade's *Tabakat* that on his return from Egypt to the capital after suppressing Ahmed Paşa's rebellion, İbrahim Paşa spent some time in Kayseri to appease the discontented Zülkadirid tribal leaders and sipahis, who lost their fiefs after Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey's removal, by promising restoration of their tribal rights, former fiefs and revenue bases. Celalzade, 129b-130a.

⁸⁵Feridun M. Emecen, "İhtilalci Bir Mehdilik Hareketi mi? Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İşyanı Üzerine Yeni Yaklaşımlar" in *Ötekilerin Peşinde. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak'a Armağan* Timaş Yayınları 2015, 530; Barkan *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi*, 826.

seemed to have been a cul-de-sac for the Ottoman centre from the 1510s to 1530s.⁸⁶ Newly conquered lands such as Zülkadiriye may initially seem to be suitable areas where new timars could be allocated to meet the demands and expectations of the unemployed *sipahi* s in rotation, but this policy also required dismissing the native elites of the newly annexed lands from the timar system. Such short-sighted measures only meant postponing a concrete solution to the problem of discrepancy between available revenue sources that could be turned into fiefs and the population of formerly dismissed *sipahi* s and *sipahizades* in rotation. They transmitted a similar dynamic of rebellion as that of Karaman to the newly annexed Zülkadirid lands. Thus, the prophylactic measures taken after the summer of 1527 may have included not only the distribution of most of the Sultan's demesne as timars among the Zülkadirid elite but also the return of the timars formerly allocated to *sipahi* s from Karaman after the annexation to their original holders. As evidence of the policy change of the centre, we should underline that *sipahi* s, who were recorded as of Karamanid origin in TTd.124, were lost without a trace in the name lists of TTd.142. A careful comparison of the names of the fief holders between the two registers, on the other hand, suggests that there was a continuity in the fief-holding patterns of the Zülkadirids in the region. A group of new Zülkadirid *sipahi* s, who had not previously been mentioned, joined the fief system as well. On the contrary, none of the previously mentioned Karamanid *sipahi* s seemed to be able to keep their fiefs and revenue sources in the region after the summer of 1527. However, our initial observations about the provincial origins of the registered timar must be clarified with hard evidence.

One of the complications that the document poses is, unlike the pattern we saw in the previous register, the provincial origins of the timar holders were not stated in the bestowal notes. In other words, TTd.142 was, for the most part, silent on the issue of whether the registered *sipahi* was originally from Zülkadiriye, Karaman, or elsewhere. Therefore, we need to employ a consistent strategy to discern the minuscule evidence that the document offers to the question of the provincial origins of listed fief holders. For the cases in which the bestowal notes referred to a letter of authorization previously given by Ali Bey or the official seal of Alaüddevle Bey, the provincial origins of the *sipahi* in question were obvious. However, only in six of the entire 181 timar entries, the former rulers of Zülkadiriye are mentioned.⁸⁷ In many

⁸⁶Halil İnalçık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, Volume 1: 1300-1600*. (Cambridge University Press 1994), 116-117. Topkapı Palace Archive collection holds a variety of documents concerning the demands of dismissed and unemployed sipahis from Anatolian provinces addressing Selim I and Süleyman I for re-entry to the service: TSMA e. 302/73, TSMA e. 321/14, TSMA e. 699/10, TSMA e. 699/13, TSMA e. 748/2, TSMA e. 750/74, TSMA e. 969/20. I suppose this problem was decisively solved only after the establishment of Budin Eyalet in 1541, thus with the transfer of this "surplus" of Anatolian sipahis and sipahizades to Ottoman Hungary.

⁸⁷See no.2, no.9, no.64, no.150, no. 176 and no.181 in Appendix C.

cases, we infer the provincial origins of the fief-holders through their patronymic names. These patronyms usually revealed the registered *sipahi* s' tribal and clan affiliations in the province.⁸⁸ Patronymic names, along with the recorded revenue source villages, meadows, and tribal clan groups, were also pivotal in illustrating the continuity and discontinuity patterns of the fief-holding statuses of certain families of Zülkadirid origin in Zamantu between the two successive timar registers.⁸⁹ Therefore the comparison of the names of listed *sipahi* s in TTd.124 and TTd.142 supplied hard evidence for provincial origins. By contrast, several *sipahi* s were recorded without a patronymic name. In the preceding subtitle, following Howard's and Darling's conclusions, we had underlined that such fief holders could be of kul origin or coming from the ranks of the personal retinue of high officials [kapı halkı], who somehow entered the ranks of the fief-holders. Thus, they formed a group of newcomers to the fief system compared to the *sipahizades*, who were customarily expected to take their fathers' place upon their retirement by age or death. On the other side of the coin, we also see records of fief-holders whose families were listed in a rather detailed manner. In such entries, either the former two generations, i.e., their fathers and their grandfathers, were mentioned or their brothers' fief-holding statuses were referred along with their fathers' service.⁹⁰ In addition, in only one entry we observe that a *sipahi* was registered as the "uncle's son" [emmizade] of another *sipahi*.⁹¹ These *sipahis*, recorded with a detailed list of their forebearers, could be the ones who were able to prove that they belonged to certain rooted fief-holder families in the locality. *Subaşı*s and other local notables acted as intermediaries who testified to such *sipahis*' forbearers' statuses.⁹² Lastly, if the listed *sipahis*' fiefs included the taxes and tributes of tribal groups along with the local customary taxes of Zülkadiriye which were denoted as "adet-i kadim" in the document, these could also be considered as referrals to their Zülkadirid provincial origins.⁹³ In terms of tax

⁸⁸Entries like X, veled-i Çiçek (referral to Çiçeklü tribe), Y, veled-i Ağca (referral to Ağcalu tribe), Z, veled-i Kiprin (referral to clan of Kiprin, mentioned in the synoptic survey, TT 998) etc. In very few cases, unique and extraor-dinary patronymics refer to clan groups within larger tribes. For instance, in no.23 of Appendix B, "veled-i Üsta-din" refers to a clan group called "Üstadin veledanı" who were also registered under Bertiz tribe of Maraş according to the information given in the synoptic survey: TT 998 (fol.450).

⁸⁹Members of prominent families such as sons of Cura Şeref, sons of Paşa Bey and sons of Ali Gazi were shown to hold their fief-holding status in both two successive registers.

⁹⁰Name lists that include three generations were usually formulated as "X, veled-i Y, bin Z". There are also combinations of "veled-i" and "bin" in cases like "X, bin Y, veled-i Z"; "X, bin Y, bin Z"; or "X, veled-i Y, veled-i Z". When a passed away brother is mentioned, "birader-i" entries appear as "X, birader-i Y, veled-i Z" or "X, birader-i Y, bin Z".

⁹¹In Appendix C, no.161: Abdüllatif, emmizade-i Cüneyd Divane. Karye-i Firuzca. Hasıl: 3500.

⁹²In one case, for a shared timar of four *sipahis*, such testimony of a *subaşı* and zaim was directly pointed out as a reference. In Appendix C, no.41: "... be-şehadeteyn-i Çelebi ve Süleyman Divane."

⁹³In "provincial origins" column of Appendix C, we defined the fief-holders whose local origins are almost un-doubtful, as Zülkadirid. Whereas for the cases with little evidence, we preferred to denote in brackets as [Zülka-dirid]. For the ones with no satisfactory evidence, we preferred to fill the provincial origins

and tribute bases of the fief holders in the region, we should also underline that sixteen *sipahis* were registered with their small piece of demesne land [çiftlik-i hod] as a fundamental revenue source, which was inherited from their fathers, indivisible and fixed at a value of two hundred *akçes*.⁹⁴ Ownership of such landed property could be considered as a piece of evidence revealing the local Zülkadirid origins of a recorded *sipahi*.

Several timar entries in the document revealed no evidence to infer the provincial origins of the *sipahis* in question. For the *sipahis* who were only recorded with patronymics in a generic manner, i.e., X, veled-i Y, and without supplying any further clue in the note of bestowal, it is not possible to surmise that those *sipahis* in question were of Zülkadirid origin. In some cases, generic X, veled-i Y entries were coupled with identifications of the listed *sipahis* or their predecessors, such as, “katip”, “kethuda”, “çavuş”, “lala”, “çelebi” or “hoca/hace”, which implied the social origins of the fief-holders. One could expect that for the most part, these identifications could also suggest that fief-holders in question were among the locals. However, they do not say much about the provincial origins by themselves. For the provincial origins, we follow the previously mentioned criteria. If there is no further evidence exhibiting Zülkadirid identity in the entries, we again do not opt for counting the *sipahis* in question among the locals.

Apart from this group, as mentioned above, the fief-holders who were recorded without a patronymic name were probably of kul origin or coming from the ranks of the personal retinue and servants of the provincial governors. In either case, it is not possible to come up with a satisfactory answer about the provincial origins of the members of this group, primarily because some of them could well be personal slaves and Ghulams of former Zülkadirid rulers Alaüddeve and Ali Beys other than being of *kapıkulu* origin.⁹⁵ As a result of the Ottoman centre’s policy change regarding the fief distributions in the region, the fief-holding rights of the *kuls* of local origin whose *timar* grants by their former overlords could have also been recognised by

column as “not giv-en.” Indeed, the latter category does not necessarily cover non-Zülkadirid *sipahis*, since we know that the Ottoman centre ordered that the candidates of Zülkadirid origin must enjoy priority in the enfeoffments in the region, a criterion that was frankly put in the commandments dispatched to the provincial authorities after 1527, as we will discuss in the following section of this chapter.

⁹⁴In Appendix C, no.19, no.27, no.28, no.29, no.33, no.47, no.51, no.58, no.95, no.96, no.117, no.122, no.136, no.163, no.173 and no.175. In fifteen of these timar entries in which personal demesnes were mentioned, the total revenue bases were counted as less than two thousand, and mostly less than a thousand *akçes*. Although “çiftlik-i hod” was not mentioned in the revenue sources section of every timar entry, I suspect that at least for the modest-sized timars with a revenue base of less than a thousand *akçes* (such timars were counted as seventy-three, corresponding to 40% of all recorded timars), these *çiftlik*s as landed property were usually recognised as a part of the allocated revenue sources.

⁹⁵There were also a certain number of *sipahis* whose fathers were probably slaves serving the former rules of Zülkadirîye, as the patronymic names like Abdullah (a generic name for a slave), Çerkes (probably a Mamluk), and Kul suggest.

the Ottomans. As we will see in the following subtitle regarding centrally ordained orders and legal regulations regarding timar allocations in Karaman (since former Zülkadirid territories were administered as a part of the eyalet of Karaman until 1531) and then in Zülkadiriye proper, the centre had become increasingly sensitive after the years of 1527-28 that corresponded to Kalender Şah's uprising and its suppression, to re-allocate even the emptied timars in the region primarily to the Zülkadirids as far as there existed a local candidate requesting for re-entry to the service. The candidate could either be a settled or a tribal *sipahizade*. For the settled ones we should count the ones whose fathers had been granted fiefs during the rule of former Zülkadirid Beys while serving as a Ghulam or personal retinue.⁹⁶ The *kul* category is therefore not necessarily limited to Ottoman *kapıkulus*.

Three groups of local *sipahis* fulfilled a role of utmost importance in the re-establishment of Ottoman authority in the region. The first group was the ones that held high-tier fiefs [*zeamet*], and direct descendants and relatives of these *sipahis* of high status. The second group included the members of the influential Türkmen tribes in the region which had previously constituted the backbone of the former Beylik's military forces. The Ottomans tended to integrate these tribesmen into the fief system if they accepted the suzerainty of their new overlords. These tribal *sipahis* also acted as functionaries in controlling the human and material resources of very mobile nomadic populations. The third was the group of *sipahis* that held low-tier fiefs with annual revenue at a value below 3000 *akçes*. With 155 members out of 215, they constituted the clear majority of the *sipahis* in Zamantu region. Their income was barely adequate to get a mediocre armament; the mount, the required weaponry, and padded leather armour with metal pieces attached, called *cebe*. Apart from obtaining this equipment, they did not have resources at their disposal to recruit armed retainers [*cebelü*] and pages [*gulam*]. In this respect, they were professional soldiers, who, on their own, did not have a military potential that could challenge the central authority, yet were useful in constituting a permanent police force that would ensure local security.

The document also revealed that certain Zülkadirid grandees retained their fiefs and social standing in Zamantu even after the catastrophic years of 1526-27. Moreover, they managed to ensure the entry of their close relatives to the ranks of the fief holders in the region, bolstering their power as local interest groups. One of these local notables was Mehmed, veled-i Ali Gazi who had been mentioned as *subaşı* of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali's son, Üveys Bey in the previous register with a revenue of 8000

⁹⁶For instance, four nefers of slaves of Alaüddeyle Bey [*uteka-i Alaüddeyle Bey*] were recorded among the inhabit-ants of the village of Palas. TT 998 fol.556.

akçes per annum.⁹⁷ In TTd.142 he was shown to hold a *zeamet* with a revenue base of 20,000 *akçes*, with a note mentioning that it was granted as a transferal [tahvil] from his father. The date of bestowal was the 20th of Safer 935 (3rd of November 1528).⁹⁸ His father Ali Gazi was not mentioned in TTd.124, it seems that he was already dead when the first timar register of the region was conducted around 1522-24. Despite this, it took four years for Mehmed to get full control of the fief that his father had once held. Either the rebellion itself compelled the Ottoman authorities to give such concessions to local notables to secure their loyalty vis-à-vis the *kızılbaş* or Mehmed himself deserved this promotion for his service in a campaign or against the rebels. The exact reason behind the increase in his revenue base was not clearly stated except for the reference to the transfer from his father. During the years 1527 and 1528 his four brothers, namely Hızır, Genci, Süleyman, and Hüdaverdi also joined the ranks of the fief holding cavalry with revenues per annum; 4480, 1466, 3732, and 5248 *akçes*, respectively.⁹⁹ The reason for bestowal was not specified in these cases. None of these names were mentioned among the fief holders in Zamantu in the previous register. Since it does not seem plausible to surmise that all these four brothers came to the suitable age to hold a timar in two consecutive years, their prompt rise to the ranks of the timar holding class must be related to the Ottoman centre's policy to appease the local elements in the face of the threat of a rebellion by redistributing the fiefs formerly confiscated to the Sultanic hass or granted to the alien elements like Karamanids or centrally appointed kuls to the local *sipahis*. As another example, we could point out the sons of Cura Şeref, among whom Hamza appeared as a fief holder in both registers. In TTd.124 he held a fief with an annual revenue of 5000 *akçes*, granted in August 1524 in recognition of his fief-holding status during Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey's rule.¹⁰⁰ In the next register, Hamza maintained his position as a fief holder; yet this time with a higher yearly income at a value of 9368 *akçes*, granted on the 20th of Zilkade, 934 (6th of August 1528).¹⁰¹ Beyond the promotion he received, his brother Çelebi, who was not mentioned in the previous register, was recorded as the serasker (alaybeyi or chief *sipahi*) of Zamantu with a fief worth 12,000 *akçes* and his other brother Abdi was also holding a small fief with a very modest yearly yield of 780 *akçes*.¹⁰²

⁹⁷TTd.124 fol.44. The date of bestowal was the 17th of Zilhicce 930 (16th of October 1524).

⁹⁸TTd.142 fol.387 (no.147 in Appendix C).

⁹⁹TTd.142 fol.362, 365, 371 and 381 (no.42, 54, 74 and 118 in Appendix C).

¹⁰⁰TTd.124 fol.43.

¹⁰¹TTd.142 fol.366.

¹⁰²TTd.142 fol.349, p.373.

No detail was given in the document about Çelebi's emergence as serasker; the date of bestowal was also lacking. His revenue base included "salgun-ı maktu" (must be the equivalent of resm-i çift in Zülkadiriye), agricultural tithes, mill, and market taxes of the large village of Pınarbaşı and its surrounding *mezra'as*, and tributes paid by Karakışlalı nomads. In the previous register a certain Karamanid *sipahi* called Mustafa, veled-i Mehmed bin Kökez was holding the tributes of the village of Pınarbaşı as his fief which equalled 2825 *akçes*.¹⁰³ This amount corresponded to "salgun-ı maktu" collected by Çelebi as a part of his fief. The rest of his revenue base around 10,000 *akçes* could have been transferred from Sultanic hass and added to Çelebi's *zeamet*. The other brother Abdi's timar however only included wheat and barley tithes of *mezra'as* of Kızıl-eşme and Sekrek-bükü, and the income obtained from a personal *çiftlik* [çiftlik-i hod] in the latter.¹⁰⁴

Another important group of *sipahis* recorded in Zamantu were the descendants of prominent tribal chiefs. These *sipahi* groups belonged to extended families organised within the tribal structure. From the perspective of the Ottoman centre, the failure to consider the expectations and demands of these local interest groups in the enfeoffment processes would have had fatal consequences. As was experienced in 1526-27, excluding the tribal elite from the fief system, moreover, confiscation and incorporation of such tribal groups' fiefs into Sultanic hass triggered mass discontent and sparked a series of uprisings. One of the examples that resemble such tribal networks was a group of *sipahis* descended from a certain Paşa Bey, after whom a group of Türkmen clans in the Zamantu region were denominated as Paşa Beylü tribe.¹⁰⁵ Two grandsons of Paşa Bey; İbrahim, veled-i Garib bin Paşa Bey and Zeynel, veled-i Murad bin Paşa Bey, who were also cousins, had been registered in TTd.124 as equal share-holders of a fief at a value of 4000 *akçes* on August 1524 based on they had been serving as fief-holders during Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey's rule.¹⁰⁶ According to TTd.142, İbrahim was keeping his fief with 5250 *akçes* of promotion on his yearly revenue which made up an amount of 7250 *akçes* granted on October

¹⁰³TTd.124 fol.41.

¹⁰⁴The military-administrative functions of such *sipahis* who held timars smaller than a yearly revenue of 1000-2000 *akçes* is a neglected topic in the literature, but I think members of this group acted as *cebelis*, lower-tier soldiers who fought under high-ranking and experienced *sipahis*, or maybe at least some of them were retired [mütekaid] *sipahis* living off a very modest income of such timars as a pension and in return, fulfilling local policing functions without partaking in campaigns. John Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode*, 169. Also see: Mücteba İlgürel, "İl Eleri Hakkında" *Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 12 (2010):131-2. TTd.998 begins with a list of groups exempt from customary taxes [haneha-i gayr-ı avarız] in which one of the headings concerns retired [mütekaid] *sipahis* and *sipahizades* in Zülkadiriye with a population of 3447 *nefers*. p.408.

¹⁰⁵TTd.998 fols.564-565.

¹⁰⁶TTd.124 fol.46.

1528.¹⁰⁷ His cousin Zeynel's timar however was granted to his sons by the initiative of the provincial governor as a share-holding [ber vech-i iştirak] at a value of 4028 *akçes* on May 1530.¹⁰⁸ It seems that Zeynel was also promoted to hold a timar at a value of around 7000 *akçes* before his death since his uncle's son Mustafa Çavuş's fief with a yearly revenue of 3200 *akçes* was registered on October 1528 as a transferal from both Zeynel and his father Konur.¹⁰⁹ Mustafa Çavuş's brother Piri was also granted an initial [ibtida] timar based on the tributes paid by İshaklı and Paşabeylü clans with a value of 2000 *akçes* on the same days as his brother.¹¹⁰ Neither Konur nor his sons were among the recorded timar holders in TTd.124. Both İbrahim and Zeynel could have played a role as mediators during the turbulent years of 1526-27 in Konur's or his sons' entry into the fief system and for their revered service, they could be awarded with promotion in their revenue bases.

A group of *sipahis* descending from a certain Taf Ali was also exemplary of the importance of tribal networks in the enfeoffment processes in Zamantu. Kaya Ali, who was one of the sons of Taf Ali, was recorded as “yörük başı” and a *zeamet* holder with a revenue base of 18,000 *akçes* based on the tributes of numerous *mezra*'as and clans of Kara Kışlalı and Tur Hamınlı. There was no trace of Kaya Ali or his father in the previous register TTd.124; he was most likely to be among the tribal leaders whose ancient rights and fiefs were recognised after Kalender's uprising. After he passed away, a portion of his timar was transferred to his three sons, namely, Piri, Yaraş, and Yevm-i Hayr in equal shares for 3090 *akçes* for each in November 1529.¹¹¹ In the following entry, we read that Kaya Ali's niece, Süleyman bin Feyyaz bin Taf Ali was also holding the same *mezra*'as and tribal revenues as his timar at a value of 3000 *akçes*, which was granted on May 1530, based on the recognition of his fief holding status during Ali Bey's rule.¹¹² Here it is worth mentioning that although Süleyman was known to be a former Zülkadırid *sipahi* serving until Ali

¹⁰⁷TTd.142 fol.372

¹⁰⁸TTd.142 fol.376 “Tımar-ı İskender ve Murad, veledıyn-i Zeynel. Mezkur Zeynel fevt olup, mirlıva arzı ile çelebi oğullarına ber vech-i iştirak tevcih olundu.” That these two sons were recorded as “çelebi oğulları” suggest Zeynel was a local notable holding a certified timar.

¹⁰⁹TTd.142 fol.371: Tımar-ı Mustafa Çavuş bin Konur; an-mahlul-i Zeynel ve Konur. Resm-i yava-i mütemekki-nan-i nahiye-i mezbur ve niyabet-i Pınarbaşı 2500. Mal-i sultan-i cemaat-i İshaklı 700. Hasıl 3200” Konur was not mentioned as one of the sons of Paşa Bey. Yet, the transferred revenue sources and that the clan of İshaklı was the heading clan of Paşabeylü tribe could be considered strong evidence about the family origins of the sipahis in question.

¹¹⁰TTd.142 fol.397: “Tımar-ı Piri veled-i Konur. Bad-ı hava-i cemaat-i İshaklı an-taife-i Paşabeylü; hisse-i Piri 1000. Adet-i selamlık ve behre-i? cemaat-i mezbur 200. Resm-i ağıl, taife-i Paşabeylü 800. Yekun 2000.”

¹¹¹TTd.142 fol.348: “Tımar-ı Piri ve Yaraş ve Yevm-i Hayr; an-evlad-ı Kaya Ali bin Taf Ali. Mezkur yörük başı 18,000 akçelik zeamet tasarruf eder iken fevt olmağın tevcih olundu.”

¹¹²TTd.142 fol.348: “Mezkur Süleyman Ali Bey'in fevtine değın bu mikdarlık tımar tasarruf etmeğın tevcih olundu.”

Bey's execution in 1522, seemingly it took eight years for him to re-enter into the service by proving his former fief-holding status yet with an inherited portion of a tribal fief whose yearly revenue was equal to only of an initial [ibtida] timar's value. While the Ottomans allowed these tribal *sipahis*' enfeoffment, at the same time they undermined and crippled their revenue sources and thus military potential by dividing the larger tribal revenues among cousins, nieces, and other members of the extended families of the clan networks. In line with this strategy, another implementation of the centre concerning the fief grants to tribesmen was to exclude certain revenue sources other than those of their tribes from being inherited by their sons and relatives.¹¹³ For example, on around the same days as Süleyman's enfeoffment, a part of Taf Ali and Kaya Ali's fief was annexed and transferred to a certain Atluhan, who seemingly had no connection with the Taf Ali clan and was possibly of *kul* origin.¹¹⁴ Lastly, three other members of the Taf Ali clan were documented in the register. Two of them, Mansur and Mustafa, veledeyn-i Taf Ali were enjoying an equal share of the annual 6018 *akçes* revenue of a village and a *mezra'a*, other than the ones listed at the disposal of the previously mentioned members of the clan.¹¹⁵ Durmuş, veled-i Taf Ali was also bestowed with a small annual revenue of 2638 *akçes* of a village.¹¹⁶ The dates of bestowal for the latter three were August 1528 and October 1528 respectively, nearly a year before Kaya Ali's sons and Süleyman were enfeoffed. Kaya Ali was probably alive while these timar grants took place in 1528 but his status as a *zeamet* holder did not guarantee the conferral of larger fiefs for his brothers Mansur, Mustafa, and Durmuş.

Of the *sipahis* recorded in the document, those from Çiçeklü and Ağcalu tribes constituted much larger population groups compared to other tribal *sipahi* groups. In this respect, they were distinguished from the others with more powerful local networks. We know that Çiçeklü tribe was among the Türkmens who actively supported and joined Kalender Şah's uprising. Previously, in the chapter about the Türkmen tribes in Bozok, we engaged in a discussion about Çiçeklü at length. The timar registers of Zamantu reveal that there were also certain clans and fief holders of Çiçeklü inhabiting the regions adjacent to Bozok. According to the results of the

¹¹³We will discuss these legal regulations and Sultanic commandments to the provincial governors concerning fief bestowals in the following subtitle in detail. Here it suffices to refer to a central order dated 27th of March 1531, dispatched to the provincial governor of Zülkadiriye. It was stated that: "Amma anun gibi boy beylerine ki hal-i huyutlarında boylarından gayrı ahar timarlar tevcih olunmuş ola, vefat ettiklerinden sonra oğullarına veya karındaşlarına veya akrabalarına heman boyları verilip ol ahardan ilhak olunan timarlar mahlul olıcak, ahar münasiblerine tevcih olunup verile." Veliyüddin Efendi 1970 fol.55a

¹¹⁴TTd.142 fol.343: "Timar-ı Atluhan, nısfı elinde ve an-tahvil-i Kaya Ali bin Taf Ali. Mezkurun elinde olan timarının nısfı ref' olunup ilhak olunmağın tevcih olundu. . . İlhak an-tahvil-i Taf Ali."

¹¹⁵no.70 in Appendix C.

¹¹⁶no.76 in Appendix C.

register, ten *sipahis* who descended or had genealogical connections with a certain Çiçek, highly probably the tribal leader after whom the tribe was named, were recorded and bestowed with fiefs in varying annual revenues in the Zamantu region between September 1528 and December 1529.¹¹⁷ The most valuable timar among the group of Çiçeklü *sipahis* was held by Çiçek, birader-i Çiçek with an annual revenue of 3840 *akçes*. This fief was transferred to him upon his brother's timar became emptied [an-mahlul-i biraderes].¹¹⁸ A piece of evidence illustrates that members of the Çiçekli tribe regained their former fiefs as a result of the contestation and negotiation with the Ottoman centre was Murad, veled-i Çiçek's timar which was granted to him as a recognition of his fief-holding status during Ali Bey's rule.¹¹⁹ Moreover, two *sipahis* of the Çiçeklü clan, namely Turdoğan, veled-i Çiçek, and Div Devle, veled-i Mirza bin Çiçek, were able to maintain their fiefs with promotions during the turbulent years between the two subsequent timar registers.¹²⁰ Another *sipahi* from the clan; Kılıç, veled-i Alişar bin Çiçek was granted with rice tithe of the clan of Taf which amounted to 500 *akçes* but this meant a decline compared to his former fief documented in the former timar register with annual revenue of 1225 *akçes* from *mezra'as* of Güllüce-viran and Kilizge.¹²¹ It seems that Kılıç turned out to be a retired *sipahi* living off a very limited amount of rice tithe, whereas a part of his former fief, *mezra'a* of Kilizge, was bestowed to a newcomer *sipahi* from the clan, Musa, veled-i Çiçek as a joint timar [be-nevbet] with a certain İsmail veled-i Maksud.¹²²

The other large population group of tribal *sipahis* were those descended from a certain Ağca. At least twelve *sipahis* of the Ağcalu tribe were recorded in TTd.142, whose timars were bestowed between August and October 1528.¹²³ Eleven of these timar holders were living off very modest annual revenues of less than 2999 *akçes*, two of them being shared timars between brothers.¹²⁴ Among the clan members, Seydi, veled-i Ağca stood as an exception with a large fief with an annual revenue of 22,074 *akçes* bestowed upon his father's death on October 1528, being the largest

¹¹⁷no.5, 87, 89, 101,103,142,156 and 181 in Appendix C.

¹¹⁸TTd.142 p.378

¹¹⁹TTd.142 fol.398: "Tımar-ı Murad, veled-i Çiçek; ber-muceb-i mektub-ı Ali Bey"

¹²⁰no.14 and 28 in Appendix B, and no.87 and 89 in Appendix C.

¹²¹TTd.142 fol.394 and TTd.124 fol.42

¹²²TTd.142 fol.378.

¹²³no. 6, 54, 60, 106, 107, 111, 132, 133, 164, 172 in Appendix C.

¹²⁴TTd.142 fol.384: "Tımar-ı Süleyman ve Durmuş, veledan-ı Ağca... hisse-i Süleyman 480, hisse-i Durmuş 480"; fol.396: "Tımar-ı Arslan ve Kayacuk, veledan-ı Ağca... hisse-i Kayacık 1504, hisse-i Arslan 2004.

timar recorded in TTd.142.¹²⁵ His timar did not only include revenue sources around Zamantu but also encapsulated tributes of tribal groups in distant areas of Göksun, Elbistan, and Bozok. For example, the clan of Hışır recorded under the Ağcalu tribe in Bozok was mentioned as “kavm-ı Seydi”; further illustrating Seydi’s control over these tribal groups.¹²⁶ An important point to underline here is that although the Ağcalu tribe seemed to be a widespread nomadic group dispersed over former Zülkadirid territories, there was no record of *sipahis* belonging to the Ağcalu clans in the previous timar register. Ağcalu clan members’ inclusion and integration into the fief system from August 1528 onwards could be part of the Ottoman strategy to re-establish their grip over Zülkadiyiye with the aid of such influential tribes of the locality which indeed required negotiation, concession, and compromise.

The right of fief-holding was inheritable as a status and sons of a *sipahi* were expected to enter the military caste but not necessarily as the full inheritors of the revenue sources, i.e., villages, *mezra’as*, tribal groups that were previously granted to their father or ancestors. However, contrary to this tendency, as we will see in the orders concerning the allocation of fiefs by the local administrators of the region, Zülkadirid *sipahis* were requested to be given fiefs only from their own region, and thus, Zülkadiyiye became a special region in the fief system where *sipahis* coming from other provinces could not be granted with timars. As a result, the fiefs in the region continued to be de facto hereditary. Moreover, since the fiefs in the region were only granted to Zülkadirids and in return, Zülkadirids were not allowed to be enfeoffed in other provinces, a significant surplus of *sipahizade* population was also registered in the region. These idle *sipahizades* were waiting to be enfeoffed from the pool of vacant timars while serving as *cebelüs* or *nökers* for their already enfeoffed family members. For instance, one of the *sipahis* of the Ağcalı clan, Bali, veled-i Şemseddin bin Ağca, was bestowed with the village of Çamrama with a modest revenue of 1235 *akçes* upon his father’s death. At the same time, nine *nefers* of “veledan-ı Şemseddin ve Ağcalu” were registered as *sipahis* and *sipahizades* within the tribe of Bertiz.¹²⁷

¹²⁵TTd.142 fol.393.

¹²⁶TTd.998 fol.603.

¹²⁷TTd.142 fol.379, TTd.998 fol.450: “Veledan-ı Şemseddin ve Ağcalu, sipahi ve sipahizadedirler. Nefer 9” There were also certain groups who were exempt from paying tributes and recorded as “nöker”. By the sixteenth century, this term had already lost its original meaning in Mongolian and started to be used synonymously for slave-soldier or Ghulam. It could also be referring to the comrades at arms of a notable, irrespective of their legal status, akin to the Slavic term *družina*. See Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, 92.

4.5 Preliminaries for a Discussion on the Tributary State and the Common Law

The last document we will discuss regarding the rebellions of 1526-27 is a series of central orders dispatched to the surveyors [tahrir emini] and provincial governors of Karaman and Zülkadiriye between 1527 and 1533 concerning the procedures they were advised to follow in timar bestowals in their zones of authority where the influence of local customs was strongly felt and a remnant elite of the former Beyliks maintained their local power well after the Ottoman conquest. These imperial directives that corresponded to the aftermath of Kalender's uprising, sealed a sharp policy change compared to the confiscations after Şehsuvaroğlu's execution in 1522. They also illustrated the fact that, *a tripartite power bloc of the ruling/dominant class fractions*, which crosscut and transcended beyond the frame of centre-periphery (or state-society) duality, needed to be formed for the effective administration of timars in these provinces.¹²⁸

State-centric approaches to Ottoman state-society relations eschew dwelling on such cases that illustrate the implicitly fragmentary nature of the Ottoman state as *a field of condensation of relationships* – involving conflict, negotiation, and concession – among the fractions of ruling and dominant classes. For they hold the state completely autonomous from the forces in society, not to mention, from class relations, and inherently coherent and united either as an instrument of materialisation of the Sultan's will or as a decision-making rational actor. Thus, such examples that could serve to understand the internal dynamics of apparent inconsistencies and irregularities in central decisions and eventual sharp policy changes at the provincial level over a relatively short period, are glossed over as insignificant and irrelevant developments stemming merely from state functionaries' hidden motives or personal ineptitude.¹²⁹ This tendency in conventional historiography, apart from its apparent methodological individualism, is an obstacle to developing a relational approach to the Ottoman state without reifying it as an apparatus or personifying it to a rational decision-maker. A new perspective on the Ottoman state, and state-society relations, is urgently required to go beyond the limitations and predicaments of the long-accustomed and hegemonic Weberian and *sui-generis* understandings of the

¹²⁸For the concept of power bloc, see, Nicos Poulantzas "Preliminaries to the Study of Hegemony in the State" in *The Poulantzas Reader*, ed. James Martin, (Verso 2008), 102ff.

¹²⁹For Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-El-Haj's observation on, for instance, how the phenomenon of corruption is treated in English historiography as a topic for legitimate scholarly analysis in regard to state-society relations, whereas in Ottoman historiography such cases are simply mentioned in a methodologically individualistic manner to get moral lessons and thus a reiteration of a pre-modern chronicler's point of view: *Formation of the Modern State*, (Syracuse University Press, 2005), 8-9.

Ottoman state. By locating the Ottoman state, not as an apparatus, nor an anthropomorphic entity as well, but as an *empirically open-ended relationship* within the wider framework of social relations it was embedded in, then could we delve into the dynamics of intra-ruling class struggles, and class struggles in general, in the Ottoman context.¹³⁰ In this respect, we can reconsider the decisions of the imperial council [divan-ı humayun] on administrative problems such as the principles of timar allocation, and the customary law in general, not as unilateral and top-down directives of the centre imposed on the periphery (and of the state on the society) but as formations and processes that both reflected the class character of the state (since the principal aim of these was the maintenance of the conditions of class oppression) and bore the marks of specific political struggles within which they were formed.¹³¹

It would be apposite at this juncture to clarify whom we refer by the ruling and dominant class fractions that constitute a power bloc, before engaging in a discussion of the regulations and legal texts about the procedures to be followed in fief bestowals in Zülkadiriye. The first element of the tripartite power bloc was the cen-

¹³⁰“The State’ is thus, for us, the entire repertoire of activities by means of which a ruling class endeavours to secure its collective conditions of production. This concept (like those of the productive forces and relations of production) is an empirically open-ended one. What defines the State is not any set of concrete institutions. These in fact vary historically, State-forms being constructed and reconstructed continuously in the course of class struggle. The State is defined by a (productive) function; it is this, and this alone, that enables us empirical-ly to identify in any particular context a particular institutional arrangement as ‘the State.’” Phillip Corrigan, Harvie Ramsay and Derek Sayer, *Socialist Construction and Marxist Theory: Bolshevism and Its Critique*, London: Macmillan, 1978. 9.

¹³¹Boğaç Ergene maintains that the customary law (qanun) by its very definition strongly bears the impression of being the “legislation of Sultan’s will” and, therefore is usually held as a tool of the imposition of the centre’s directives on the periphery. Practically, it also functions as a means of inclusion of and compromise with the provincial particularities of the peripheries. In this respect, it remains enigmatic in the Ottoman legal historiography whether qanun had a centralising function or represented peripheral expectations. Boğaç A. Ergene, “Qanun and Sharia,” in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Islamic Law*, eds. Rudolph Peters Peri Bearman, (Ashgate, 2014), 117.

“The tension between alternative functions of qanun” remains inexplicable primarily because of the strong tendency among conventional Ottoman historians to presume an apparent line of demarcation that purportedly divides the centre and periphery (and thus state and society) as two disparate entities external to one another. To reach a more meaningful synthesis about the Ottoman law, and the Ottoman state in brief, in the first place, we need to discard the long-accustomed Weberian and *sui-generis* theoretical frameworks on Ottoman state-society relations, to which many of Ottoman historians are prone to refer without entering into any layered discussion on the ontology of the Ottoman state and Ottoman social formation in general and thus on the entailing epistemological strategies to be employed in approaching these internally related fields, as though the basic premises of the historiographical canon are *ipso facto* unproblematic. Karen Barkey’s studies; *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, and *Empire of Difference* perfectly exemplify the tendency we criticise. Secondly, certain themes from two seminal works by Nicos Poulantzas – *Political Power and Social Classes* (1975) and especially *State, Power, Socialism* (1978) – and from the works of a generation of neo-Marxist scholars such as Bob Jessop, Derek Sayer, Phillip Corrigan, Göran Therborn, Timothy Mitchell, Bertel Ollman, etc. and Galip Yalman, in the Turkish context, could be reconsidered as building blocks in developing a new perspective on the Ottoman state-society relations. Bryan S. Turner had long before voiced the urgent need for a Marxist analysis of the Middle Eastern historical social formations through these theoretical frameworks. *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, 1978, 52. For an introduction and discussion on Poulantzas’s works, see: Stuart Hall, “Nicos Poulantzas: State, Power, Socialism” *New Left Review* 1/119 (January-February, 1980): 60-68. Bob Jessop, “Poulantzas’s State, Power, Socialism as a Modern Classic” in *Reading Poulantzas*, eds. L. Brettbauer et al. (London: Merlin Press 2011): 42-55.

This genre in neo-Marxism is first and foremost concerned with the analysis of the modern bourgeois state and says very few of the pre-capitalist state. It is imperative to underline there is no valid “supra-historical” state theory. However, to remember Marx’s well-known analogy; the only way to understand the anatomy of an ape is to understand the anatomy of a human. The analysis of the modern state provides analytical tools, at least an insight, for an approach to its pre-capitalist predecessors. This kind of approach also corresponds with Marc Bloch’s famous regressive method, “reading history backwards” in his approach to French rural society of the pre-capitalist epoch.

tral authority of the Sultan and his close associates in the imperial council.¹³² This central element formally provided the basis for the legitimacy of central orders and legal regulations as the hegemonic and reigning fraction.¹³³ The second element was the provincial governors who represented the imperial authority in their posts but not exclusively as docile agents of the centre.¹³⁴ The provincial governors indeed enjoyed limited powers in timar bestowal processes as the timars they could grant by their own certificate, without consulting the centre, were the ones with lower yearly yields.¹³⁵ This restriction seemed to serve as a precaution to prevent the provincial rulers from forming their local sphere of influence by subinfeudation and gradually, establishing a personal power base at the expense of the central administration. The crux of the matter in orders, regulations and laws concerning the timar administration and allocation was to keep the dynamics of decentralisation at bay while inevitably delegating certain military-administrative powers to the peripheral agents, given the material and technical constraints of the age. A further centralising measure in timar administration was the regulation of 1531, mentioned previously. With this decree, the centre was directly involved in initial [ibtida] timar bestowals by granting imperial diploma [berat-İnstitu] to sons of *sipahis* entering into service for the first time along with the provincial governor's certificate [tezkere]. Both documents were required for an enfeoffment to take effect, irrespective of the annual yields of these initial timars.¹³⁶ However, as Howard points out, there may be dif-

¹³²These cadres were predominantly composed of “political slaves” during Suleyman I's reign as underlines. (Tezcan 2010, 90-91).

¹³³It should be emphasised that in a tributary state, the centre must remain in a hegemonic and reigning role to keep the power bloc intact. Whereas, according to Poulantzas's analysis, in a capitalist state, the hegemonic fraction of the dominant class could not necessarily be the reigning one. Hegemonic/reigning distinction is related to that from the ranks of which class the top state personnel are recruited. “On Social Classes” in *The Poulantzas Reader* 208-9. For the Ottoman context of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the hegemonic and reigning character of the centre was obvious but not totally perpetual. A contrary example was the chaotic political situation towards the end of Bayezid II's rule. As the centre lost its hegemonic and reigning position, it also lost its ability to create mechanisms for institutional mediation for the conflict resolution between the fractions of the dominant class before they turned into armed conflicts. Consequently, these fractions and groups were directly involved in the civil war between Prince Ahmed and Prince Selim by taking sides or they supported Şahkulu rebellion, which brought the Ottoman authority in Anatolia near collapse.

¹³⁴These cadres were often coming from royal slaves of *değişirme* origin, who were defined as “political slaves” by Tezcan. But equally, we should count cadres coming from the ranks of *müteferrika*, Serbo-Croatian middle nobility, influential families of old Byzantine aristocracy, local Turkmen dynasties or ulema and sufi families of Anatolia. Haim Gerber also points out certain Bedouin chiefs installed as sancakbeys in former Mamluk territories. “Patrimonialism and Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Political System” in *State, Society, and Law in Islam*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 135.

¹³⁵Provincial governors could allocate fiefs with yearly yields amounting to lower than 6000 akçes in Rumelia and Anatolia and lower than 4000-3000 akçes in more distant provinces like Karaman, Rum, and Zülkadiriye. See: Ömer Lütfü Barkan, “Timar” *İslam Ansiklopedisi* XII, MEB Yayınları 1972: 315.

¹³⁶For obtaining these diplomas, timar candidates were obliged to pay a certain amount of fee to the central treasury. The implementation of such a policy could well be understood as an attempt to expand the fiscal resources of the treasury, instead of directly monetising the timar system by allowing the purchase of military fiefs by kuls and palace servants which became a common practice during the rule of late Bayezid II; a policy proved to be detrimental to the stability of the Ottoman rule in Anatolia as the alienated former sipahis joined Şahkulu rebels (1511). The pressure of monetisation on the Ottoman treasury was not a phenomenon confined to the developments starting from the late sixteenth century; in fact, there

ferences between the legal formulations and the actual practice in fief bestowals. By resorting to legal reductionism assuming that legal regulations and orders strictly determine the nature of administrative practices, one may overlook the context of actual transactions. In any case, the centre depended on the information provided by the peripheral agents, ranging from the provincial governors and district governors to the relatively lower-ranked members of the military-administrative personnel such as *subaşı*s and *alaybeyi*s on verification of the identity and eligibility of the local candidates.¹³⁷ The timar bestowals were negotiated processes between the centre and periphery. The head of the provincial administration was not a passive implementer of the central directives but an active agent in the enfeoffment processes shaped by the local dynamics about which the provincial governors naturally had first-hand knowledge.

The Impact of the local dynamics In the formation of the timar administration brings us to the third element in the tripartite power bloc; the native *sipahi* class of the provinces, a significant portion of whom were coming from the ranks of tribal aristocracies and the military-administrative elite of the former polities. According to İnalçık, as a general policy of conquest, by introducing the timar system to an annexed territory the Ottomans did not necessarily intend to disempower the traditional elite and terminate their landed interests. Recognising their former rights and privileges, peaceful integration of them into the military-administrative apparatus was aimed at the first step. Assimilation of these alien elements took place gradually.¹³⁸ This conclusion is drawn primarily from observations on Ottoman post-conquest policies in the Balkans where a fraction of the pre-Ottoman

were some early examples as we mentioned. The fiscal objectives of the central treasury would provide a more materially grounded explanation than abstractions such as centralisation and decentralisation. For a discussion: Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*. 22, 81-93.

¹³⁷Douglas A. Howard, “Central and Provincial Administrative Interaction in Timar Bestowals in the Early Seventeenth Century” in *Decision Making and Change In The Ottoman Empire*, ed. Caesar E. Farah, (The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), 84-85. Metin Kunt also gives striking examples of the role of the provincial administration in fief bestowals and the readmission of former sipahis to the system. See, *The Sultans Servants*, 25-26. We also presented evidence for the pivotal role of the testimonies of local sipahi chief-tains in the assessment of the credibility and eligibility of the candidates to be enfeoffed in the previous sections about TTd.124 and TTd.142

¹³⁸Halil İnalçık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest” *Studia Islamica* 2 (1954), 103, see also, John Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode*, 169. For a novel and interesting article about integration of Balkan nobility into the Ottoman timar system, see, Maria Kiprovska “Ferocious Invasion or Smooth Incorporation? Merging the Established Balkan Military System into the Ottoman Army” in *The Ottoman Conquest of the Balkans: Interpretations and Research Debates*, ed. Oliver Jens Schmitt, (Wien: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2016), 79-102.

However, in this literature, the integration of Bulgarian nobility into the fief system is never mentioned. It seems in tributary state formations, certain sections of the nobility of an annexed polity are often integrated into the power bloc of the conquerors rather than facing total extermination. Of course, there are exceptions with set-backs in the short term. For instance, Bayezid I or Prince Musa probably managed to eliminate the high and middle sections of the Bulgarian nobility as a retaliation for their collaboration with the Crusaders during the Nicopolis campaign of 1396. But such developments were junctural and very rare. And more importantly, eliminating a local aristocracy hampers the effective control over the peasantry as was seen in 1416 when Sheikh Bedreddin’s uprising in Bulgaria spread like wildfire. The same held for Börklüce’s uprising in Aydin, a province where the local elite was divided between the pro-Ottoman and pro-İzmiroğlu Cüneyd factions.

nobility and military elite maintained their land-holding rights converted to the form of timar or even kept their hereditary property rights over land and revenue sources.¹³⁹ Although İnalçık claims that the same policy was applied during the Ottoman conquests in Anatolia,¹⁴⁰ certain historical examples covering the first years or decades of Ottoman conquests of the Beyliks in Anatolia show just the contrary. For instance, after the conquest of Karaman in the 1460s and similarly, after the annexation of Zülkadiriye following the murder of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey in 1522, military-administrative positions and land rights of the local aristocracies and tribal leaders were briefly abolished, and most of their lands were confiscated for the state treasury to be allocated to the servants of the Sultan.¹⁴¹ It took more than a decade for the old Karamanid *sipahis* to be fully integrated into the Ottoman fief system; it is known that disgruntled elements of the local nobility fought against Bayezid II by siding with Cem; they revolted against a land survey in 1500, and they also supported Şahkulu rebellion (1511).¹⁴² Interregnum periods, civil wars and armed uprisings seemed to serve as a means of negotiation of these disgruntled elements with the centre for the restoration of their ancient fiefs and recognition of their landed interests. In a similar vein, the clear majority of the Zülkadirid elite, who were deprived of their ancient rights and privileges over the land and tribal revenue sources upon the Ottoman conquest, indirectly supported or directly involved in the rebellions instigated by Baba Zünnun (1526) and Kalender Şah (1527).¹⁴³ These examples show, especially in the Anatolian provinces where the legacy of pre-Ottoman Beylik identities prevailed, regulations concerning fief allocations were not formed as

¹³⁹Halil İnalçık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, 115-117.

¹⁴⁰Ibid. 118.

¹⁴¹The contrast between the Ottomans’ initial violence towards the old Turkmen military elites of Anatolia whereas their benevolent policies towards the Slavic nobles of the Balkans may stem from the fact that the predominantly Orthodox Balkan nobility was not seen as potential collaborators with Catholic Hungary, the primary and most serious antagonist of the Ottomans in the region geopolitics until 1526. On the other hand, during the same period, Anatolia was constantly under threat from the direction of the Persian plateau, where the tribal confederations like the Akkoyunlu or polities like the Safavids who managed to combine a confessional and messianic fervour and militantism with military-administrative apparatus led by *kızılbaş* tribes, and thus formed a centre of attraction for the old Turkic nobility of the Anatolia vis-à-vis the imperial cosmopolitanism of the Ottomans. A lesson drawn by the Ottoman elite from the defeat in Ankara (1402) against Timurid forces was that the nomadic polities of the East posed a more fundamental threat than that of the Catholic West to the Ottoman *raison d’etat*. Given the Serbian vassals and Rumelian *sipahis* of Bayezid I along with his *kapıkulu* troops fought valiantly against the Timurids whereas the Anatolian *sipahis*, as well as Tatar auxiliaries, who had political and tribal ties with the recently annexed Beyliks, changed sides and joined the Timurid forces in the heat of the battle, the Ottoman elite’s contrasting policies towards the Balkan and Anatolian military-elite reflected that historical experience.

¹⁴²Doğan Yörük, “Karaman Eyaletinde Osmanlı Tımar Düzeninin Tesisi (1483)” *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 40 (2006): 177-202.

¹⁴³The political turmoil in the Zülkadirid lands in 1526-27 could only be gradually eliminated with the implementation of a series of central orders and directives that regulated the methods of timar distribution in the region in favour of the re-admission of the old Zülkadirid elites to the timar system while allowing them to preserve their ancient rights and privileges. Alaaddin Aköz İbrahim Solak “Dulkadirli Beyliği’nin Osmanlı Devleti’ne İlhakı ve Sonrasında Çıkan İşyanlar” *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 153 (2004): 47-50.

top-down commandments unilaterally shaped by the will of the centre and therefore by the sultan and his close associates, but rather as bargaining processes with the periphery. Unfulfillment of the expectations of local elites, that is, their exclusion from the power bloc could have led to lethal consequences. In this context, the local elites of these provinces constituted the third element in the power configuration, as a fundamental group to be considered in the fief distribution and allocation processes in the periphery, next to the Sultan, his close associates in the centre, and the provincial governors.

Regarding our observations concerning the formation of the central decisions and common law¹⁴⁴ marked by processes of conflict, negotiation, and concession, it is productive to briefly touch on conventional approaches in the literature concerning the nature of Ottoman “decision-making” in administrative matters and clarify how our alternative approach differs from those. The state-centric makeup of Ottoman studies has strictly shaped the research objectives of Ottoman legal historiography and determined its scope of analysis in line with its basic assumptions about state-society relations. Two kinds of approaches to the Ottoman state of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries predominate the field: The former and long-established one is a “subjectivist” understanding of the state which takes the socio-cultural meaning of the state, purportedly inscribed in the thinking and actions of the state elite, as a starting point in analysis.¹⁴⁵ The latter and more recently developed one is what I would like to call “the systemic approach” which accentuates the state as an assembly of political and institutional mechanisms operating under objective rules, norms and regulations. The former perspective follows Weber’s concept of patrimonialism-Sultanism, in which the Ottoman state administration could be portrayed as nothing but the materialisation of the sultan’s uncontested authority and unrestricted will.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴Qanun; Sultanik custom (örf-i Sultani), Sultanik law, ruler’s law, state law or secular law as defined by various authors. See Boğaç A. Ergene, “Qanun and Sharia,” 109-20. Provincial law books (liva or sancak kanunnameleri) constituted a sub-group in the genre of the common law. See, Heath Lowry, “The Ottoman Liva Kanunnames Contained in the Defter-i Hakani” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 2 (1981), especially, 48, for a summary of the content of these laws.

¹⁴⁵cf. Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics” *The American Political Science Review* 85 (1) (1991) 81: “The state, Nettl wrote, is ‘essentially a socio-cultural phenomenon which occurs due to the cultural disposition among a people to recognize the state’s conceptual existence’... Notions of the state ‘become incorporated in the thinking and actions of individual citizens’ he argued, and the extent of this conceptual variable could be shown to correspond to empirical differences between societies, such as differences in legal structure or party system.” A revised version of this article was later published with the title: “Society, Economy and the State Effect” In *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*, ed. George Steinmetz, 76-97. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 1999.

¹⁴⁶However, different from Weber’s emphasis on the despotic character of patrimonialism-Sultanism, one of the examples of the contemporary Weberian analysis of the Ottoman state contends the benevolent, “enlightened despotic” character of the Ottoman regime up until the late sixteenth century when the first signs of decline started to be observed and then the regime embraced the infamous “Oriental-despotic” character. Apart from resting on the ultra-nationalist and fascist cliché of the forgone golden age purportedly resembled an “organic solidarity” between the Sultan, the state elite and the common people, this thesis also reproduces the so-called “decline paradigm” which has long been criticised as a biased method of periodisation in Ottoman historiography. Moreover, such presumptions about the “benevolent” or “despotic”

The state elite, i.e., military and civilian officials and administrators, lacked legal, political or economic autonomy apart from the ruler's demands, and were simply a tool of the arbitrary power of the Sultan, whose legitimacy derived from supposedly sacred sources, personal charisma, dynastic prestige, and military prowess. In this context of patrimonial domination, administrative practices were regulated via Qanun or Sultan law, which "meant a general ruling emanated from the will of the ruler."¹⁴⁷ In other words, just as the state (as a concept, as an ideological construct, as the marker of patrimonial ethos) was embodied in the ruler's persona, the administrative recipe of the state was also crystallised in the Qanun as the Sultan's verdict in an undifferentiated manner.

Of course, such an approach can neither satisfactorily explain the dynamics of factionalism and conflicts among the members of the state elite, nor the direct threats and uprisings against the state or Sultan's authority from the second half of the fifteenth to the last decades of the sixteenth century – the period considered to be the zenith of patrimonialism-Sultanism.¹⁴⁸ Nor can it entangle the tension presumed between the customary [örf] and religious law in Ottoman legislative mechanisms.¹⁴⁹ The insurmountable gap between the conceptual framework and abstractions proposed by Weber (ideal types) and the empirical level of the concrete historical cases is well known.¹⁵⁰ For example, Weber claims that a patrimonial-arbitrary type

character of the state as a starting point neither allow further research to approach the state as a nexus of social relations, as an arena of conflict between various power groups and fractions of the ruling class, in other words, as an "empirically open-ended process", nor it aims to shed light on the political actions, rebellions and protests of non-state groups; the common people, as an essential element to be integrated into the historical discussion about the social formation, including the state, in question. Unfortunately, Haim Gerber follows and applauds Metin Heper's (1985) afore-said simplistic depiction of the Ottoman state before the last decades sixteenth century. However, in the following pages, based on the results of his empirical research Gerber posits a more complex understanding of the Ottoman bureaucracy and administrative practices. See, Haim Gerber, *State, Society, and Law in Islami*, 127-173. Cf. Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*. 10.

¹⁴⁷ Halil İnalçık, "State, Sovereignty and Law During the Reign of Süleyman" in *Suleyman the Second and His Time*, Isis Press (1993a): 76-7; as a reference to the traditional sources of legitimacy of patrimonial domination İnalçık underlines the role of Turco-Mongolian imperial custom of Yasa or Töre in the emergence of Ottoman Sultan law as a legal system independent from the religious law. However, it is also imperative to underline here that the contents of the qanuns were context-specific, that is, they were reflexive of the pre-Ottoman local customs and practices on matters of taxation, administration, and land use of the annexed provinces other than being impositions of pre-supposed Central Asian norms and traditions. cf. Boğaç A. Ergene "Qanun and Sharia" 110. In his short article "Decision Making in the Ottoman Empire" in *Decision Making and Change In The Ottoman Empire*, ed. Caesar E. Farah, (The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993b) İnalçık summarises the basic tents of the Weberian understanding of the Ottoman state and the later contributions, based on the conceptualisation of a "centralised bureaucratic state", that underlines the emergence of an autonomous bureaucracy and in line with this development, the gradual transition of the Ottoman law as an objective set of rules and regulations in the course of the sixteenth century.

¹⁴⁸ Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, 34.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid 146-8.

¹⁵⁰ It is not even worth mentioning the well-known prejudices of the nineteenth-century thinkers towards "Eastern" societies, which were valid for young Marx, overly under Hegel's influence in viewing world history, as well as Weber. Marx's ideas about Eastern societies, especially of Russia, began to change after the suppression of the Paris Commune and fading hopes for a revolution in Europe. See, Theodor Shanin (ed.), *Late Marx and the Russian Road*. (Monthly Review Press, 1983); Bryan S. Turner, *Marx and the*

of personal rule would gradually evolve into a bureaucratic-rational form of interpersonal administration – bureaucratic-managerialism based on certain objective laws and regulations – as a response, primarily, to the economic pressure that the expansion of state financing would inevitably create. Weber locates and confines this development to the post-Tanzimat era. However, with the narrative turn in historiography and the expanding scope of the empirical studies on the Ottoman polity of the classical age – especially, critical analyses on the Ottoman *nasihat-name* genre – researchers have started to stress the bureaucratic-managerial nature of the Ottoman administration did mature earlier, around the mid-sixteenth century, especially among the cadres of chancery and finances [kalemiyye] branch of the state administration.¹⁵¹ Bureaucratic-managerialism could be best observed in the decision-making processes of the imperial council [divan-I humayun] which was the kernel of the institutional architecture of the Ottoman political system. The characteristics of the system could be discussed empirically by the analysis of the immediate results of these decisions. At its most extreme, it has been argued that bureaucratic managerialism, which, by definition, presupposed “the autonomous action of a body of professionals under objective rules”, was the definitive attribute of the Ottoman administration. Specifically, it was the fundamental principle behind the decision-making processes of the divan, that ensured “the survival” of such a vast empire over centuries.¹⁵² The idea of a patrimonial bureaucracy, perceiving the state elite solely as household servants of the Sultan, and the concept of patrimonialism-sultanism, highlighting the arbitrary nature of state-making have been, therefore, discarded altogether as mentality-oriented concepts that reduce the state into an ideological construct and obstruct further discussion about state-making as a material force observable at the empirical level. Instead, the structure of the political system has been reconceptualised as a “centralised bureaucratic empire” wherein the seemingly absolute sultanic power was in fact subject to checks and balances, thus, to some extent, limited by a body of “rational bureaucracy” acting autonomously under objective rules and fixed regulations explicit in the Sultanic/customary law and directives of the imperial council.¹⁵³ Rather than simply expressing the sul-

End of Orientalism. 1978.

¹⁵¹ Halil İnalçık “Decision Making in the Ottoman State” 11-12, Haim Gerber “Patrimonialism and Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Political System” 145ff. This development of course did not exclude the enduring patrimonial vestiges in the system such as personal favouritism, networks of patronage and the overall impact of influential households, apart from the Sultan’s own, on the bureaucratic corpus.

¹⁵² See as an example of such an approach: Fatma Acun and Ramazan Acun. “Demand for Justice and Response of the Sultan: The Decision Making in the Ottoman Empire in the Early 16th Century” *Études Balkaniques* 43 (2) (2007) 125-148.

¹⁵³ With the increasing power of the *ilmîyye* cadres in legislative action starting from Suleyman I’s famous jurist Ebu Suud and culminating in the 17th century, Sultanic power became further restricted in a system of checks and balances.

tan's absolute power, the common law was, therefore, the product of the rationality and pragmatism of this complex bureaucratic mechanism aiming at administrative stability. It was essentially members of the *kalemiyye*, specifically the chancellor [*nişancı*] who formulated legal compilations on issues about timar administration, taxation, land use and criminal penalties and examined whether the decisions of the *divan* were consistent with the pre-established regulations.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, in addressing complaints regarding various problems sent from the provinces to the centre, and issuing rescripts and orders regarding these, the members of the *divan* and the Sultan necessarily resorted to the legal knowledge and expertise of the *nişancı*, whose involvement and influence in legislative processes significantly intensified by the mid-sixteenth century.¹⁵⁵

These approaches to the Ottoman state, whether viewing it as an ideological construct of the patrimonial ethos of the state elite or as a material force evident in the institutionalised practices of a rational bureaucracy, are not necessarily mutually exclusive.¹⁵⁶ For a more nuanced understanding of the Ottoman state, İnalçık underlines that the patrimonial principle, emanated from the arbitrary rule of the Sultan, and the supremacy of objective rules and regulations as the guiding principle of the rational bureaucracy seemed to be in a continuing struggle in the Ottoman political system throughout centuries.¹⁵⁷ Although İnalçık takes a step forward in providing a more dynamic analysis of the Ottoman state as a field of contestation by insightfully delineating the oscillation inherent to the Ottoman political system between two extremes – patrimonial-Sultanism and bureaucratic-managerialism – the conceptual framework he employs prevents him from transcending the contours of the state-centric *problématique* of the Ottoman-Turkish studies.¹⁵⁸ According to his depiction, the motion of the political system has reflected the outcomes of

¹⁵⁴Boğaç A. Ergene, “Qanun and Sharia” 112; Halil İnalçık, “Kanun”, in *Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition*, edited by: P. Bearman, et al.: Brill, 2012. for the legitimising role of the past: Suraiya Faroqhi “Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic Legitimation”, *JESHO*, 35 (1992) 5ff.

¹⁵⁵“*Divan-i Humayun*’un ilk ve asli vazifesi şikayet dinlemektir.” Halil İnalçık, “Adaletnameler”, *Belgeler*, II, 3-4 (1965), 50. Fatma Acun and Ramazan Acun. “Demand for Justice” 129-130. The oft referred, and towering figure of the *kalemiyye* during Süleyman I’s reign was, of course, Celalzade Mus-tafa Çelebi, the mastermind behind Süleyman’s general law book. *Nişancı*’s role in the legislation was gradually diminished starting from the end of the sixteenth century and was replaced by the figureheads of the *ilmiyye* who represented the religious law. See; Halil İnalçık, “Kanunname”, in *Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition*, edited by: P. Beaman, et al.: Leiden: Brill, 2012.

¹⁵⁶John Haldon, *The State and The Tributary Mode*, 149.

¹⁵⁷Halil İnalçık “State Sovereignty and Law During the Reign of Suleyman” 79-81; “Decision Making in the Otto-man State” 15-16.

¹⁵⁸The concept of *problématique* signifies the internal logic of articulation of the conceptual order of a theoretical/scientific formation that distinguishes it from the others. See, Louis Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism” in *For Marx*. Just as humanist-idealist philosophy begins social analysis with its presuppositions about the essence of men, state-centric sociology, as its standpoint, embarks on whether despotism, benevolence or rationality represent the essence of administrative practices of the state (conceptual realm), then moves on to the analysis of the society (material or empirical field.)

power struggles taking place precisely at the state centre. To put it more concretely, what configured the characteristics of the Ottoman state was the relative balance of power among the members of the imperial council – the Sultan and his close associates (briefly, state managers), who acted either as “political slaves” or “state elite” depending on that very balance of power. On the other hand, peripheral agents’ impact on the political form of condensation of power at the centre is at best held to be external and minuscule, if not, totally irrelevant, and impotent. Provincial governors may be counted among the forces of the centre to the extent that their social origins and backgrounds secured them a position in the patronage networks of the grandees of the imperial council.¹⁵⁹ However, the native *sipahis* of the provinces, the third element in the power bloc we mentioned previously, are neglected completely as a political force. These fief-holders are treated merely as docile “state officials”, as though they are incapable of autonomous political action, let alone participating in a rural rebellion as a fraction of the dominant class, since the centre closely supervises their actions.¹⁶⁰

This presumption seems to be inaccurate, particularly for the provinces where the legacy of former Beyliks, the impact of tribal and clan networks, and kinship structures operated as alternative sources of legitimacy for the actual power of the local military-administrative elite, alongside the patrimonial authority of the Sultan. These peripheral particularities were eventually recognised in the directives, regulations, and legislation of the centre about fief allocations in these provinces. The state relies on various power relations that extend beyond the exterior of its institutional architecture and its formally defined and standardised administrative practices, and similarly, social forces infiltrate the state’s definite institutional architecture and form, and thus its administrative practices through these power relations.¹⁶¹ The boundary between state and society is complex and uncertain rather than perfectly fixed and sharply defined; it is “elusive and porous” as Mitchell asserts, and this elusiveness is “a clue to the nature of the phenomenon” of the state’s ability to create the effect of acting autonomously from the forces in society – from the immediate interests of the dominant class, for instance.¹⁶² In state-centric studies, however,

¹⁵⁹Metin Kunt, *The Sultan’s Servants*, 39-44, 57-67.

¹⁶⁰Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 36-37, 60-61. It is claimed that the autonomous, omnipotent, and omnipresent power of the Ottoman state prevents the emergence of any anti-state coalitions at the horizontal (societal) level, therefore Marxist concept of class as a political force is deemed completely irrelevant for a discussion on Ottoman history.

¹⁶¹Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy and the State Effect”, 76. Bob Jessop, “The State as a Social Relation.” in *State Formations: Global Histories and Cultures of Statehood*, (eds.) John L. Brooke, Julia C. Strauss, and Greg Anderson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 48-49.

¹⁶²Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy and the State Effect” 77. Mitchell’s focus is, of course, the ability of the modern capitalist state to present itself as representative of national popular interests, on the contrary of simply being an apparatus operating for the fulfilment of the demands of capitalists (the dominant

this elusiveness is envisaged as a complication to be eliminated with a precise and rigorous conceptualisation of the state that proposes to clarify the exterior of the object vis-à-vis the society. To overcome the boundary problem, the definition of the state is narrowed to a subjective system of decision-making, concretised in its core institutions whereby the peripheral elements are excluded.¹⁶³ This methodological choice is also consistent with their basic assumption: “the state as an autonomous entity, whose actions were not reducible to or determined by forces in society.”¹⁶⁴ Interpreted in the Ottoman context, this core institution is the Imperial Council; whether it operates as an apparatus for the implementation of the Sultan’s will or as a rational actor at the hands of a central bureaucratic collective of the state elites in decision/law/policy making, it is claimed to be autonomous from peripheral and societal forces.¹⁶⁵ In both cases, the state is personified as though it has the intrinsic qualities of essential unity, coherence and rationality. When put in this way, it is not possible to identify the state as a “form” of social reality,¹⁶⁶ in other words, as an arena of conflict between the fractions of the dominant class. Nor can the legislative and administrative “capacities” of the state be understood as processes “reflecting and refracting of the changing balance of forces [between these fractions] that are

class). State and society or economy appear as binary and distinct entities in modern capitalism through certain practices and techniques unique to the capitalist epoch. These techniques create the illusion that the state is a coherent, autonomous, and free-standing actor over society (or economy), able to intervene in the economy at the expense of the bourgeoisie. This is what Mitchell defines as “state effect.” For the pre-capitalist social formations, the notion of state autonomy is discussed in relation to the role of legal regulations that enable the state to intervene in the relationship between agricultural producers and landholders/owners. In the conventional Ottoman historiography, the Ottoman state is asserted to be autonomous from landed interests. The land codes that restricted the timar holders’ capacity to extract excessive amounts of surplus labour and wealth from peasant cultivators were held as evidence for such conclusions. Accordingly, Ottoman state power must be considered autonomous from, and even, antagonistic to class power. However, as Haldon underlines, by setting a sustainable rate of exploitation, the state secured the conditions for the reproduction of the agricultural economy that in turn secured the long-term interests of the dominant class. (Haldon 1993, 170). Unlike the claims of the conservative historians that the Ottoman state benevolently protected the peasants against feudal forces, ideological notions of the Ottoman state-elite, such as the Cycle-of-Justice, “sought to sanctify existing social hierarchies. . . and to safeguard an average rate of exploitation that would not exhaust the capacity for reproduction of the peasant economy.” Halil Berktaş, “Three Empires and the Societies They Governed” 252.

¹⁶³ Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State,” 86. Thus, Marxist conceptualizations such as class power and the class nature of the state are also excluded from the discussion since they could jeopardise the analytical value of the approach that presupposes the distinctiveness of state and society: “Statists. . . who stick to ‘historical induction’ as their chosen methodology. . . concerned with the study of ‘particular institutional order’ in a comparative perspective. However, to the extent that they stress the perception of the state as an ‘independent variable’, if only to justify their criticism of Marxist theories of state as being ‘society-centred’, the proponents of the statist approach reveal an implicit recognition of the state as a distinctive entity. This is made clear, especially by their insistence that ‘state power is sui generis not reducible to class power’. Hence the contention: the state should be treated as ‘a structure with a logic and interests of its own’, which, in turn, implies a conception of the state as a subject of its own right with the capability to pursue its own objectives.” Galip Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 50-51.

¹⁶⁴ Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy and the State Effect,” 81.

¹⁶⁵ In line with Mitchell’s observations on “statist” literature, among the Ottomanists, as well, the tendency to define the Ottoman state as a system or agency of “decision, law, or policymaking” is quite popular as seen in the titles of the articles we have referred to. Confining the definition of state to empirically identifiable institutions, such as the imperial council, is thought of as a solution that “minimise(s) the danger of reification”. Galip Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 53. Also see; Nicos Poulantzas, “The Political Crisis and the Crisis of the State,” in *The Poulantzas Reader*, 308.

¹⁶⁶ Galip Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 120.

seeking to advance their respective interests in, through, and in opposition to the state.”¹⁶⁷ Since the nature of the state is assumed to be unproblematic and monolithic rather than fragmented and fissured by the statist, they tend to neglect the formative role of intra-state and intra-ruling/dominant class struggles that reflect the impact of broader social relations in the making of the state processes; in the formation of legal prescriptions or administrative decisions – such as the imperial directives regarding timar administration, in our example.¹⁶⁸

It is imperative to underline that the state, being the pre-capitalist or tributary state, is *an institutional ensemble* and nexus of *social relations*. Regarding the latter point, as an organised force, it secures the conditions of class oppression and class rule corresponding to the particular social formation in which a non-producer minority, that is the ruling and dominant classes, appropriates, distributes among its ranks, and consumes the products the surplus labour of the direct producers. In the tributary social formations, maintaining political control over the producing manpower, most commonly the peasants, and keeping them disarmed, immobile, and thus, as a subservient mass to the tribute demands of the caste of fief holders was pivotal to the reproduction of the system. By the same token, the effective control of the land and the producing manpower living on it, albeit the ruler’s eminent rights over revenue sources, had to be delegated to the caste of fief-holders, given the technical capacities of the epoch.¹⁶⁹ The modality of the fief-holders’ control over the land and the content of the arrangement of revenue-raising appeared in various legal and/or institutional forms, statuses and expressions ranging from absolute ownership to possession of a clearly designated territorial unit in return for performing state services, mostly military. “State capacities”¹⁷⁰ in production relations and revenue-raising were, therefore, a complex system of delegated rights and powers to local and

¹⁶⁷Bob Jessop, “The State as a Social Relation” 48.

¹⁶⁸Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State” 88: “Like personhood, statehood is conceived [by the statist] in fundamentally idealist terms. The state stands apart from society as a set of original intentions or preferences, just as persons are thought of as units of autonomous consciousness and desire distinct from their material or social world. However uncertain its edges, the state, like the person, is an essential unity. . . . This image of unity is preserved even in analyses that introduce the element of conflict between different parts of the state apparatus. Such conflict is an important indication of the permeability of state boundaries because it enables one to trace how wider social differences reproduce themselves within the processes of the state. But in the statist literature, such wider connections are not examined. The essential unity of the state is taken as given, and conflicts are treated as secondary phenomena internal to this larger unity. Indeed the impact of such internal conflicts on policy-making is turned into part of the evidence for state’s independence from society.”

¹⁶⁹John Haldon, *The State, and the Tributary Mode*, 146.

¹⁷⁰In a relational perspective, it is analytically more viable to highlight state capacities, rather than state power. Despite the attractiveness of its analytical simplicity, the emphasis on the latter runs the risk of reifying the state to a sui-generis entity. As Jessop emphasises “Since it is not a real subject but an institutional ensemble, the state cannot exercise power. Indeed, one should not speak of the power of the state but of the various potential structural powers (or state capacities), plural, that are inscribed in the state qua ensemble. These powers are activated by changing sets of politicians and state officials located in specific parts of the state system.” Jessop “State as a Social Relation,” 48.

peripheral personnel. Personal dependence, and hierarchy between the members and fractions of the dominant classes, eventually create an “unstable equilibrium of compromises”¹⁷¹ between the centre, provincial governance, and the local fief-holders. These elements constituted a power bloc, as we mentioned before, in line with the long-term policy objectives which corresponded to the interests of all the fractions of the dominant class.¹⁷² geopolitical accumulation,¹⁷³ preservation of the traditional social divisions and impermeability between “estates,” and safeguarding the borders against any invasion attempt by an alien polity.¹⁷⁴

However, due to the very balance of forces in its configuration, the system was essentially and internally conflict-ridden because of that, apart from the underlying structural contradiction between the exploiters and the exploited, the ruling and dominant classes were divided into politically antagonistic factions over the control of the revenue sources, and the distribution of surplus wealth. The degree of control exerted over the means of production by this or that fraction of the dominant class also determined its capability of acting in a “relatively autonomous” position which marked its capacity to weaken, subordinate, and set limits on the political potential of the other fractions within the power bloc.¹⁷⁵ This capacity to act relatively autonomously did not refer necessarily and solely to the ability to concentrate coercive means and apparatuses against discontented and insurgent fractions or groups, but mostly and preferably to constitute mechanisms of institutional mediation for conflict resolution. The couplet of coercion-consent ensured the integrity of the elements of this power structure.¹⁷⁶ The central fraction, i.e., the Sultan and his close

¹⁷¹Nicos Poulantzas, “The Political Crisis and the Crisis of the State” in *The Poulantzas Reader*, 309.

¹⁷²Ibid.

¹⁷³The term “geopolitical accumulation” as a trait of the pre-capitalist state was coined by Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations*, Verso 2009. Feudal geopolitical accumulation had, in fact, two directions. The horizontal direction regarded the concentration of military resources for territorial expansionism by war-making. The vertical direction meant the intensification of tributary relations within a given territorial extent by the invention of more effective ways of taxation and imposition of new taxes on subject populations which in turn secured a more stable internal revenue base. This observation could be backed by the fact that the Ottoman state elite was occasionally divided between pro-war and pro-peace factions during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This was also true for periodic policy objectives. For example, Mehmed II’s reign was marked by a total war strategy of territorial expansion. In contrast, Bayezid II’s reign was a relatively peaceful period of vertical expansion of the revenue bases through institutional consolidation and legal standardisation.

¹⁷⁴The historical experience of the invasions of Mongols-Timurids was also constitutive as a material force in peripheral actors’ acceptance of the military and administrative capabilities of the centre. This was not unique to the Ottomans. For instance, the centralised feudal character of the Muscovite Russia of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with the system of *pomestye* contained striking resemblances to the Ottoman timar system, or more broadly, to the Islamic-Near Eastern iqta system. It is important to highlight that all such systems emerged under the historical impact of the Turco-Mongolian nomadic invasions.

¹⁷⁵Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode*, 155-158: Given limits set by the tributary production relations, the dominant fraction could act “relatively autonomously”, not in total independence from the other fractions to which a certain degree of authority must be delegated. (Haldon 1993, 242-45).

¹⁷⁶Here we refer to the concept of hegemony, coined by Antonio Gramsci. However, unlike the modern

associates in the Imperial Council, established its hegemony and reigned over the provincial governors and the local *sipahis* through strictly supervised institutional mechanisms that tied the peripheries to the centre by primarily creating consent. The centralised salaried army, the *kapıkulu* corps, on the other hand, was kept in reserve as a deterrent force against any potential opposition within the power bloc.¹⁷⁷ The emergence of a relatively monetised economic structure throughout the second half of the fifteenth century set the preconditions for the development of these apparatuses of coercion and consent. The personnel employed for these apparatuses were usually paid in cash directly from the central treasury. Therefore, just as the share of the Sultan and the central fraction of the dominant class in the distribution of wealth increased, the tribute flowing from the provinces to the centre began to standardise in monetary terms.

However, this corresponded only to a limited portion of the total surplus wealth. The fundamental constraint on the autonomy of the tributary state stemmed from, to reiterate, the necessity to keep the labour force tied to the land by maintaining economic and political control over the commoner masses. Apart from fulfilling administrative and/or military services in their localities, provincial *sipahis* were indispensable elements in curtailing the social and spatial mobility of the direct producers, as we mentioned before. In return, they were provisioned by the local resources, mostly by tributes collected in kind. Because of that very constraint, *sipahis* could not be eliminated in favour of the personnel of the apparatuses of the centre. If the opposite were possible, just appointing and sending tax collectors to villages and tribal communities a few times a year would have been sufficient for the reproduction of the entire system. Yet the structural constraints of the epoch of production in question did not allow such an absolute autonomy in the centre's actions that it could render the local power holders obsolete.

bourgeois state that presents itself as the protector of national-popular interests irrespective of social class divisions, the hegemony in the tributary state is established only within the power bloc, by the ruler or the centre, to create consent of the other fractions of the dominant class. On the contrary, the subjects, that is, tribute-paying commoners, were ruled, fundamentally, by coercion.

¹⁷⁷These personnel were integral in the centre to maintain its role of the hegemonic and reigning fraction. The flow of a portion of the provincial revenues to the centre directly in cash was the necessary condition to respond to the upkeep of the administrative and military apparatuses of the centre. The rapid Ottoman expansion between the Rivers of Euphrates and Danube, the annexation of the ports of the Levant and the conquest of the Nile basin from Mehmed II's rule to the early sixteenth century resulted in the creation of a standardised monetary zone, enabling the Ottoman centre to keep a highly effective bureaucratic apparatus and curtail the peripheral and feudal networks of power. See, Baki Tezcan, *The Second Empire*, 88ff. The benefits of high levels of liquidity in the Eastern Mediterranean for the Ottoman state's formation in a centralised manner as a late-medieval polity is also underscored in Halil Berktaş's "The Search for Peasant", 132-3.

4.5.1 An Evaluation of Sultanic Directives About Fief Bestowals in the Region

Based on these theoretical preliminaries, in this section, we will focus on the legal dimension of the conflict between the local elites of Zülkadiriye and the core of the power bloc, the Sultan, and his close associates, through analysis of the Sultanic directives about fief bestowals in the zone of uprising.¹⁷⁸

To reiterate, the timar system as a form of tax-farming was primarily a method of economic and political control over land use for agriculture and grazing, and over tribute-paying sedentary-agricultural and nomadic pastoralist commoners in a pre-capitalist social formation, despite being strongly associated with the military apparatus. As long as the three elements, i.e., the Sultan, the provincial governors and the local *sipahis*, constituted a harmonious power bloc, potential rural uprisings by commoners were kept at bay. However, if this ruling class coalition disintegrated for any reason, it became potentially easier for the commoners to surpass the “everyday forms of resistance”¹⁷⁹ against relations of exploitation and engage in uprisings that posed a potential to undermine the conditions for tribute demands of the ruling class. They may have even found allies among the disgruntled factions of their overlords, who normally held the monopoly of the use of arms as a political privilege vis-à-vis the commoners thus constituting a police force to crush any attempt of a commoner uprising in its very first step.

The central orders issued to the provincial governors of Zülkadiriye and Karaman regarding the fief allocation practices in the region, which we will cover in the following pages, precisely intended to prevent such an alliance between the rebellious commoners and the disgruntled groups of fief holders. The arrangements made by İbrahim Paşa during the suppression of the Kalender Şah rebellion to return the revenue sources in the region to their former holders, Zülkadirid *sipahis* and tribal leaders, were aimed at isolating the rebellious people by bringing these disgruntled elements back to the side of the state, in other words, re-integrating them to the power bloc at once. The following directives regarding the regulations of the timar administration were thus nothing but the official ratification of the policy implemented by İbrahim Paşa in the region. These legal texts were not determining power relations per se, on the contrary, their content was shaped by the relative balance of forces of the ruling class fractions at a given moment and locality, and

¹⁷⁸These directives are presented in Appendix D.

¹⁷⁹This term was coined by James C. Scott in *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 2008). Hiding grain or animals from the surveyors, disputes over the weighing of in-kind tributes, or conflicts over the measurement of plots divided into tax units could be examples of such daily forms of resistance.

thus they were formed by and reflected the results of the political struggles among them. They cannot simply be reified to the Sultan's will or decisions of a supposedly rational bureaucratic collective of the state elite operating in a top-down manner.

The documents introduced here are not the original Imperial edicts, orders and directives. These are only copied versions of these, compiled in the Veliyüddin Efendi manuscript. The copyist may have made mistakes or skipped some parts while copying from the originals. We do not have the chance to assess the authenticity and accuracy of these by comparing them with the originals. The presentation of these copies in the manuscript also does not follow a chronological order.

Based on the definition given by Halil İnalçık in his famous article, *Adaletnameler*, these documents can be described as *adaletnames* on the issue of timar allocation, in terms of diplomatics.¹⁸⁰ However, unlike İnalçık, we do not see these as orders given by the state/centre autonomously from the dynamics of society/periphery, and as confirmation of an ascribed administrative rationality to the centre in practice. On the contrary, these formations reflected the fragmented nature of the power bloc that the state's class character rested upon and the fact that "state-making" is an open-ended process reflecting on the variations in the configuration of the power bloc. Together with the general legal and administrative system, they were formed by the struggles among the fractions of the dominant class, and thus reflexive of that very fragmented nature.

The directives discussed in this section did not definitively resolve the disputes over the distribution of fiefs and surplus wealth among the ruling class fractions, once and for all of course. These only covered a limited period regarding the rebellion of 1526-27. The compilation comprises seven directives dispatched from the Imperial Council between 1527 or 1528 and 1533 to the provincial governors of Karaman (also ruling over the former territories of the Zülkadirids), to the later established provincial governorship of Zülkadiriye, and to the emin and katip who would survey the region.

The first of these documents, dated 20th of Recep, 933 (22nd of April, 1527), addressed the provincial governor of Karaman mostly for the procedures to be followed in allocating fiefs to the inheriting *sipahizades* in case of a *subaşı*'s death.¹⁸¹ The governor-general's name was not mentioned in the directive but later in the text, the governor-general was strictly advised to examine the fief authorisation documents

¹⁸⁰Halil İnalçık, "Adaletnameler", *Belgeler*, II, 3-4 (1965) 86-89.

¹⁸¹Veliyüddin Efendi 1970, 50b - 52a.

submitted by the former provincial governor of Karaman, Mahmud Paşa,¹⁸² who was known to be killed in an armed engagement with the rebel forces of Kalender Şah, nearby Cincife on the 8th of Ramazan, 933 (8th of June, 1527.)¹⁸³ A report of intelligence penned by Mahmud Paşa, probably addressing the commander-in-chief (serasker) İbrahim Paşa about the movements of the rebel forces, shows that Mahmud was alive in late April 1527.¹⁸⁴

In light of these pieces of information, the authenticity of the date given in the copy is dubious. It is probable that the copyist mistakeably gave the month that the directive was compiled as Recep. The directives must have been dispatched to Karaman after İbrahim Paşa quelled Kalender's uprising and a new provincial governor was installed in Karaman; probably after late June 1527.

However, the document's content demonstrates that the Ottoman centre was ready to make concessions to the local *sipahis* to prevent another uprising in the province. First of all, the terms and conditions of inheritance of *subaşı* fiefs were clarified. Administrative turmoil in the region during the first years of the Ottoman takeover may have paved the way for arbitrary practices in fief grants, which further alienated the local power holders to Ottoman rule. In the previous section, we have underlined that many of the high-ranking *sipahis* of Zülkadiriye had tribal connections. Therefore, contrary to an ordinary *sipahi*, let's say in a district in the province of Anatolia proximate to the centre's surveillance, isolated and almost like an ordinary state official just entitled to tax collection in return for military service, those men were formidable local powerholders whose discontent could unleash detrimental consequences for the Ottoman control. Accordingly, if a *subaşı* died and succeeded by numerous sons at the proper age to go on a campaign, all of them would receive fiefs of 4000 *akçes* of revenues per annum as their initial grants. The remaining sum of the *subaşı*'s timar would be divided among the successors in amounts deemed appropriate by the provincial governor, who would issue their fief certificate on the spot yet declare to the Imperial council on whatever conditions the late *subaşı* had previously been allocated with a fief, whether it was a grant stemming from participation in a campaign or an ancient tribal fief [kadimî ocak]. If the succeeding sons were fief-holders already, the provincial governor could grant them additional yields between 2000 and 3000 *akçes* and deliver their certificates. It is also understood that a significant number of *sipahizades* in the province were enrolled among per-

¹⁸²Op. cit., 51b

¹⁸³Celalzade, 166a.

¹⁸⁴Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Une rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527" *Studia Islamica* 62 (1985) 161; Hanna Sohrweide "Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien" *Der Islam* 41 (1965) 177-180.

sonal retinues of the provincial rulers and participated in campaigns without being granted fiefs.¹⁸⁵ The provincial governor was ordered to inform the centre about the situation of these people and their forefathers' status of fief-holding, and then the Sultan would declare his decision about in what amounts those would be enfeoffed.¹⁸⁶ For the succeeding sons, who were not old enough to participate in the military campaigns, the condition to hold a fief was to arm and cover the expenses of castle guards until they came to age to bear arms.¹⁸⁷ From the directives copied in the manuscript, it is understood that in 1527, the maximum yearly yield of a fief that the provincial governor of Karaman could grant with his own initiative amounts to 4000 *akçes*.

An Important point In the directives, that conflicts with the convention that the Ottoman centre forced *sipahis* to hold fiefs in provinces located other than their native provinces and sent them to distant regions in a rotational manner, is that in Karaman, including vilayet-I Türkmen, the fief holders were strictly ordered to be selected among the local inhabitants of the province. In the districts of Karaman, when a fief holder passed away without a successor, the vacant fief could only be granted to a local *sipahi* remaining without a fief [maczül] and dwelling in the same district. If within the district, the authorities found no other available unseated *sipahi*, the provincial governor, then, called for a fief holder whose fief was somehow located in another district yet resided in the district in question in return for the yield of his current fief. The centre thoroughly emphasised that a *sipahi*'s household and fief must be located in the same district. This order was not only valid for the cases of increase and advancement in yearly yields of the fiefs but also followed as a general procedure in enfeoffment.¹⁸⁸

The Ottoman centre, experienced after facing a series of revolts and informed about the particularities of the region, may have inferred that only the local *sipahis*, thanks to their local and tribal connections and networks, could serve instrumentally in appeasing the discontent of the local tribesmen and subduing these unruly tribes if necessary. Hence the directive ends with the commandment that the formerly emptied or confiscated fiefs of the Zülkadirids [Zülkadirli taifesinin] which were annexed to the administrative authority of the provincial governorship of Karaman, must be granted to the deserving members of the mentioned group, and that they

¹⁸⁵Formulated as “benam-ı subaşılardan vefat edip tımar tasarruf etmemiş yarar oğulları kalub ocak erleri olub...” Veliyüddin Efendi 1970, 51a.

¹⁸⁶Op. cit., 50b-51a.

¹⁸⁷Op. cit., 51b.

¹⁸⁸Op. cit., 51a-51b.

start to collect their revenues as soon as possible, even before the preparation of a proper survey of the region.¹⁸⁹

The next order is a reiteration of the directive given to the surveyors of the Zülkadiriye region. This document was copied without a date in the manuscript, but its content reveals that it followed the former directive dispatched to the governor of Karaman. The governor general's name is also mentioned. Accordingly, a certain İsa Bey replaced the previous ruler Mahmud Paşa.¹⁹⁰

It is frankly stated in the document that the re-conduct of a new survey aimed at re-constituting the legal status of the ancient fiefs and revenue sources of the Zülkadirid notables [ağaları], tribal leaders [boy beyleri], *sipahis* and descendants of comrades at arms [nöker oğlu nökerleri] formerly granted during Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey's reign. Accordingly, revenue sources of tribes and clans, villages and meadows, irrespective of to whom they were allocated after Ali Bey's execution upon the annexation of the province and regardless of whether they were registered as Sultanic, *sancakbeyis'* demesne or some foreigner *sipahis'* fiefs will be returned to their previous holders and owners without omissions in yields and any other alterations. The only conditions set on those whose fief-holding statuses will be reconstituted are to present their former diplomas [berat] issued by Ali Bey and testimonies of trusted notables of the region about whether they were formerly fief holders and tribal leaders.¹⁹¹ This group of former elites were the ones who had likely supported Kalender Şah's uprising to engage in negotiations and reach a compromise with the Ottoman centre based on the recognition of their formerly annulled rights and reconstitution of their confiscated fiefs.

Also, a distinction was drawn between the Zülkadirid elites, who were former *sipahis* and *sipahizades*, and the ones who were descending from military men formerly recorded and categorised as comrades at arms [nöker] during Alaüddevle and Ali Bey's reigns. These nökers could be slave soldiers or personal retinues of the Zülkadirid rulers who were not coming from the ranks of the native tribal nobility. It is declared that Zülkadirid nökers will also be counted as ordinary *sipahis* and granted fiefs, which will be recorded in a separate defter, as long as they prove that they are descending from a true nöker. Military men, who were not descending from noble and ancient *sipahi* families yet entered into service and recorded as *sipahis* during the late Zülkadirid rule, were also declared qualified for re-enfeoffment. In

¹⁸⁹Op. cit., 51b-52a.

¹⁹⁰Op. cit., 79a-83b.

¹⁹¹Op. cit., 79a-79b.

order to verify the social backgrounds and qualifications of these candidate *nökers* and *sipahis*, again stated that the local notables' testimony was required and decisive. But it is also added and strictly highlighted in the order that any action of counterfeit or perjury to allow the entry of non-military commoners, or outsiders, [ecnebilir] will be punished severely, probably with the execution of the attestors [ol şehadet edenlere siyaset ettirile] whose names will also be recorded in the official document of authorisation in case of any attempt of fraud.¹⁹²

It seems that the Ottoman centre faced a dilemma of choosing between fully authorising the provincial governor and his lesser staff and commissioning local notables—originally external elements to the Ottoman administrative hierarchy—to verify the candidates' identities for re-ensfeoffment. The administrative inefficiency and chaos in the region following the first years of the Ottoman conquest may have paved the way for the entry of personal retinues and followers of the governor generals and district governors to the fief system in Zülkadiriye much more easily than the actual practices in the core provinces of the Empire and to the detriment of the Zülkadiri local elite.¹⁹³ By empowering the local notables as attestors, the centre may have intended to prevent provincial governors from establishing a quasi-independent power base by granting fiefs to their dependents. A piece of evidence comes from the document itself which mentions a very extraordinary categorisation: Military corps called *silahî taifesi*, probably armed retainers or man-at-arms, gathering around *subaşı*s of district governors were causing troubles in the region by tyrannising over the commoners. It is declared that, by the Sultan's orders, the *silahî* corps were abolished and their activities would hereinafter be considered illegal.

The document provides no further information about the identity of the *silahî*s but we can surmise that the deprivation of the nomadic-pastoralist economy in the region must have also pulled economically distressed tribesmen to seek their fortunes as mercenaries and armed retainers at local governors' service. They could also be employed as local militia inspecting the commoners for any *Kızılbaş* or pro-Safavid leanings, a major issue of serious concern for the Ottoman authorities. The document also clearly reveals the fact that because of the ensuing chaos in the region following Şehsuvaroğlu's regicide, certain tribes were dispersed and migrated to distant provinces such as Adana, Diyarbekir and Aleppo.

A note in the document suggests that the region was already struck by internal polit-

¹⁹²Op. cit., 80b.

¹⁹³In a document we presented before (T SMA. e. 872/38) we observe a similar kind of complaint by a local *sipahi*

ical strife and tribal factionalism before the Ottoman takeover. Accordingly, certain Zülkadirid *sipahis*' and tribal leaders' fiefs and benefices had been confiscated by Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey himself, and conferred to his close relatives or certain other dependents.¹⁹⁴ No explanation was given about the reason behind these confiscations; one legitimate answer could be that Ali Bey may have punished certain fief holders and tribal leaders because of their direct support or silence during the uprising of Şah Veli bin Celal (1520) by confiscating their benefices. Another could be that certain tribal leaders' loyalty to Ali Bey was dubious given that his uncle Alaüddevle's grandsons were alive and under the Safavids' protection. Whatever the answer, the Ottoman centre did not approve of Ali Bey's policy towards these tribal leaders. Even deprived of revenue sources and fiefs, these tribal leaders joined the military campaigns, probably aided in the suppression of Kalender Şah's uprising. In return, they deserved to be re-enfeoffed with yearly yields equivalent to their former fiefs. One piece of evidence that supports the supposition that these tribal leaders actively participated in the suppression of Kalender Şah's uprising is that their newly conferred fiefs, apart from the bestowal of vacant ones, would be provided by cuts from the revenue sources of certain local *sipahis* who had chosen to remain silent and had not joined the local armies to quell the uprising.¹⁹⁵ It seems that the ones who remained indecisive and neutral vis-à-vis the developments became the real losers of the struggle.

The document also mentions that certain *sipahis* and tribal leaders lost their revenue sources as their subjects and dependents joined the rebels, migrated or perished during the rebellion. Moreover, it is highlighted that certain other *sipahis* and tribal leaders declared their allegiance to the rebels [ol müfsidlere mutâbacat eyleyüb] and probably migrated to the Safavid realm, leaving their subjects leaderless and their fiefs vacant. These rebellious tribes' and tribal leaders' names were not clarified in the document. An interesting point that could be inferred from these statements is that the rebellions did not develop as elite or *sipahi* uprisings. The rebellious commoners constituted a key element in the uprisings such that they could manage to win upper-class elements, who were likely to be disgruntled after the political developments and confiscations upon the establishment of Ottoman rule, to their cause. The Ottoman centre responded to these developments by granting the leaderless clans and tribal groups as fiefs to the tribal nobles who remained loyal to the Ottomans during the rebellions.¹⁹⁶ As a result of the population movements

¹⁹⁴Op. cit.,1970 80a.

¹⁹⁵“...kadimden tasarruf edegeldikleri tımarları bedeli mahlulden ve yahud haliya bu defa huruc-ı isyan eden müfsidler seferine gelmeyen sipahiler tımarlarından tedarik ve tevcih olunup verile.” Op. cit., 80a

¹⁹⁶Op. cit., 80b-81a.

during these rebellions, the traditional structure of the tribal and clan groups may have significantly changed. Therefore, the centre strictly orders the surveyors to record the population of Zülkadirid notables, tribal leaders, *sipahis*, their relatives, dependents and subjects, and the yearly yields of their revenue sources in minute detail.¹⁹⁷

Lastly, the collection and distribution of criminal fees and fines [*ceraim hususu*] in the district of Maraş was likely to be a contested issue between the tribal leaders and the district governor. Re-enacting the amounts of fees and fines prescribed in the old Zülkadirid custom, it is also declared that the district governor shall collect the fees and fines formerly enjoyed by the Zülkadirid rulers. Any remaining source of income from the demesne and personal revenue of Ali Bey shall be recorded in a separate *defter* and bestowed as fiefs to the qualified candidates. It is also noted that after Ali Bey's death, some tribal leaders, contrary to local customs, started to enjoy the criminal fees and fines formerly collected by Ali Bey. However, the tribal leaders shall collect only the fees for stray animals [*yava*] other than slaves, camels, horses and mules. When they install a tax collector [*kethüda*] for these criminal fees, their subjects shall not compensate for the costs of the *kethüda*.¹⁹⁸

Deterioration of the economic situation of the nomadic tribes after the Ottoman conquest may have turned the distribution of every single source of income and portion of revenue into a matter of conflict between Ottoman governors and the local tribal elite. Unlike the taxes and tributes, like *resm-i çift*, grain tithe or sheep tax, whose time of collection was fixed to a specific period of a year, criminal fees and fines, codified as *bad-ı heva* were collected on occasion and at the spot. The occasional nature of the payment and collection of these tributes also made them prone to abusive demands of the powerful, imposed on the tribute-payer commoners and subjects, especially during periods of economic decline. On the other hand, local balances of power would certainly determine the state centre's measures. For instance, while the criminal fees and fines were officially bestowed to the district governor in Maraş as a part of his yearly yield, in Bozok, chieftains and leaders of the tribes of Zakırlü, Hisarbeylü and Selmanlu, and possibly leaders of the other tribes, were officially allowed to collect the criminal fees and fines in accord with the ancient custom, as long as they proved their tribal origins by the testimonies of the local trustees and notables. It is also stated that a local levy called *sultan salgunu*

¹⁹⁷Op. cit., 83b.

¹⁹⁸Op. cit., 82a-82b. Also, see Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 144-146.

would be collected as prescribed by the ancient custom.¹⁹⁹ Later, it was recorded in the *tahrir* register that the tribute amounts were reduced because of the economic hardships the tribesmen experienced and their eventual dispersal.²⁰⁰

The next two directives are worth mentioning for illustrating the difficulties of the Ottoman centre in establishing a stable military administrative structure in a predominantly tribal region. In a directive dated 1st of Safer, 935 (15th of October, 1528), the governor-general of Karaman, Lütü Paşa was addressed regarding his query about Zülkadirid *sipahis* holding fiefs in Yeni-il.²⁰¹ As a remote region, located between the provinces of Karaman and Rum, and with a highly mobile nomadic population, the administrative status of Yeni-il seemed to create ambiguities, especially regarding fief bestowals to the tribal *sipahis* of Zülkadirid origin. It is underlined that, while Yeni-il was previously surveyed and recorded under the province of Rum, Zülkadirid *sipahis* holding fief in this region shall get their certificates from the governor-general of Karaman and gather under the banner of the troops from Karaman during military campaigns. A similar directive was also dispatched to the governor-general of Rum, informing him about the special status of the Zülkadirid *sipahis* in Yeni-il. It was also stressed and reiterated that in line with the previous orders, Zülkadirid *sipahis* would be bestowed with their ancient fiefs and holdings.²⁰²

In order to prevent possible conflicts between the newly appointed governor-generals and local *sipahis*, the centre had to remind the special status of the Zülkadirids in fief bestowals. Despite these measures, the provincial governors tended to revoke these *sipahis*' fief-holding rights quite readily, especially in case of any charges of criminal offences, without informing the centre and regardless of the significance of the offence. In response to a petition by two *sipahis* from İç-il, Hızır and Süleyman, whose timars were falsely revoked with the pretext of homicide [kan ettiler deyü] and granted to someone else, the centre reminded the governor-general of Karaman

¹⁹⁹Veliyüddin Efendi 1970, 82b-83a.

²⁰⁰B.O.A TTd. 998 fol.632.

²⁰¹This region corresponds to the plateau of Uzunyayla; the environs of the present-day towns of Kangal and Gürün located south of Sivas. It is widely accepted that Yeni-il as an administrative district was established in 1548, to control the highly mobile Türkmens of this region. Onur Usta, "Türkmen Voyvodası, Tribesmen and the Ottoman State (1590-1690)" (2011) *Master Thesis*, 7. It seems that before the establishment of the district, the region was already known as Yeni-il, denominated probably in comparison to the Eski-il Türkmens of Karaman. Yet there is still an inconsistency in the directive, regarding its date. We know that Lütü Paşa became the governor-general of Karaman in H.940/1533-34. Either the directive's date or the name of the addressed governor-general was copied incorrectly.

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to wait for centre's decision (the Sultanic decree) in fief revocations due to criminal offences. Typical accusations of such kind that resulted in immediate revocations were highway robbery [yol basdı] or homicide [adam kılıçlayub] and committing criminal offences several times [defa'âtle şirret ü şenaitleri zuhur oldu]. The centre urged the governor-general to act cautiously in such cases by obtaining the reports from the local district governors and kadıs for verification first. Then the governor general shall inspect the case personally and inform the centre about its content. The convict *sipahi*'s fief could be revoked and bestowed to any other candidate only in criminal cases that necessitated capital punishment [siyaset olunmak], which was also adjudicated centrally by the Sultanic decree.²⁰³

Nevertheless, similar kinds of conflicts continued to be observed in the region. In a later directive, likely to be dispatched to the newly installed governor-general of Zülkadiriye, dated 8th of Şaban, 937 (27th of March, 1531)²⁰⁴ it was stated that revocation of timars without any significant reason and through arbitrary judgements was strictly prohibited. The directive divided the criminal offences that *sipahis* could commit into two categories. The first was *cerime*; a category held for petty crimes and responded with chastisement, payment of a fine or both in accord with the interpretation of religious law by kadıs [şer'en te'dîb.] In these cases, revocation of the offender's fief was not allowed. The second category encapsulated serious crimes, codified as grave crimes [cürm-i ğalîz], that entailed capital punishment of the offenders for the sake of preserving law and order in the country. In such cases, it was legitimate for the provincial governor to revoke the offender's timar and bestow the vacant fief to another candidate. Another condition that entailed revocation was the unfulfillment of military responsibilities. Such *sipahis* who did not appear in campaign inspections and did not join the military campaigns were ordered to be disenefeeffed by the central orders.²⁰⁵

It seems the procedures regarding the inheritance of fiefs and the division of annual sums among the successor sons of deceased *sipahis* remained ambiguous, if not totally obscure until certain important points were clarified in the directive of 1531. This issue seemed to be a fundamental source of conflict between local governors and *sipahis* apart from disputes arising from immediate fief revocations as punishment for criminal cases. The directives of 1531 provided a more detailed list of procedures to be followed in cases of inheritance of fiefs of varying yearly revenues and legal

²⁰³Op. cit., 53a-53b.

²⁰⁴Op. cit., 53b ff.

²⁰⁵Op. cit., 54a-54b. For these categorisations and, punishment procedures Uriel Heyd *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, 259ff.

statuses. As mentioned previously, the first directive dated 1527 only touched upon the inheritance procedures of *subaşı* fiefs, whose annual yields were not specified in the text. However, in the directive dated 1531, fiefs were divided into three categories based on their yearly revenue sums. The first and most valuable category, specified as a *zeamet* or a timar of *subaşı*, generated a yearly yield of more than 20.000 *akçes*. If a *zeamet* holder or a *subaşı* passed away, his inheriting son would be bestowed with a fief valued at 8.000 *akçes* as an initial [ibtida] grant.²⁰⁶ This amount was twice as much as the initial amount given for the inheritors of *subaşı*s in the directives of 1527. Since a significant portion of the Sultanic and other high state officials' demesnes was redistributed as fiefs to the locals in the region, these *subaşı* timars began to yield higher yearly revenue. At the same time, as expressed in the directive, fiefs with annual revenues ranging from 10.000 to 20.000 *akçes* also became common. Inheritors of such timars would be granted a maximum of 4.000 *akçes* as their initial fiefs.²⁰⁷ For the inheritors of an ordinary *sipahi* with a fief generating a yearly yield of fewer than 10.000 *akçes*, the maximum initial grant was set at 3.000 *akçes*.²⁰⁸ A pivotal point expressed in the document is that, from these orders onwards, diplomas for initial fiefs, irrespective of their annual yields, would be issued from the centre.²⁰⁹ In other words, the governor-general no longer had the initiative to promote a random candidate to *sipahi* status without consulting the centre. This measure could be part of a strategy to prevent local governors from allocating fiefs to their followers, dependents and retainues to the detriment of the local elements.

The last point we point out concerns the most decisive concessions the centre made to the local elite. Upon the death of a tribal leader, revenues of his tribe that he held as a fief during his lifetime, would be transferred to his sons regardless of whether they reached maturity to join military campaigns or not. These underage sons would hold these fiefs without the obligation of arming auxiliaries [eşkinçi] until reaching maturity for direct military service. If the tribal leader left no son as a successor, then his tribal fief would be conferred to his brothers or other close relatives. In this way, the centre recognised the fact that these timars were inheritable and unalienable family holdings. The only provision that could be considered as a practice in favour of the centre was the restriction imposed on the expansion of these tribal fiefs. Accordingly, if a tribal leader had also been bestowed with revenue sources other

²⁰⁶Veliyüddin Efendi 1970, 54b.

²⁰⁷Op. cit., 55a.

²⁰⁸Op. cit., 54b.

²⁰⁹Op. cit., 54a.

than his tribe, these additional fiefs would not be transferred to his sons or relatives upon his death. These vacant timars were ordered to be granted to any other affording candidate.²¹⁰

In the imperial orders directly dispatched to Ahmet Paşa, governor-general of Zülkadiriye, dated 14th of Ramazan, 939 (9th of April 1533), we observe that the hereditary status of fiefs was expanded to those of *subaşı*s and ordinary *sipahi*s, whose tribal connections were not mentioned. In the document, after reminding that upon the death of a tribal chieftain, his tribal fiefs were directly transferred to his heirs, it is also underlined that the timars of *subaşı*s and *sipahi*s would be granted to their sons to be held jointly if they were at a suitable age for military service. For *subaşı* timars with a yield higher than 20.000 *akçes* per annum, it is prescribed that the part of the fief fewer than a yield of 20.000 *akçes* would be divided to his direct descendants, that is, his sons in accord with their ranks and probably military prowess and the remaining part would also be kept as a family possession to be bestowed to his other close relatives; to his brother, niece, uncle or uncle's son.²¹¹

The reason for these decisions and alterations was announced as follows: Certain notables from Zülkadiriye appeared before the Imperial Council and declared that in the locality of Zülkadiriye, none of the fief-holders were from external provinces [haricden] and that all fiefs were ancient family holdings [kadimi yurtları ve ocakları] of their holders. Emphasising these local customs, they requested benignity and the grace of the Sultan to grant vacant fiefs to the offspring of their former holders. In line with these local notables' request, it was strictly ordered that a fief in Zülkadiriye that became vacant upon its holder's death would only be bestowed to his sons or other close relatives. Only if no inheritor from the relatives could be found, could the fief be conferred to any other *sipahi* in rotation yet first and foremost, still of Zülkadirid origin.²¹² However, in the previous directive dated 1531, it was stated that a vacant non-tribal fief [mahlul oldukça ki boy olmaya], without an inheritor from the extended family, could well be conferred to any other *sipahi* in rotation, regardless of his provincial origins.²¹³

It seems that after the rebellion of 1526-27, it took six more years for all the elements of the Zülkadirid *sipahi*s, tribal or non-tribal, to find a compromise with the Ottoman centre, win back their former rights and statuses dating back to reigns of

²¹⁰Op. cit., 55a.

²¹¹Op. cit., 56a-56b.

²¹²Ibid.

²¹³Op. cit., 55a.

the Zülkadirid beys, and strengthen their class position vis-à-vis other elements of the power bloc. As we have suggested before, the Imperial orders and directives in question were shaped by the struggles and conflicts among the fractions of the ruling class. It was obvious in the locality of Zülkadiriye that local *sipahis*, who, in the conventional historiography, are defined as simple officers, military servitors and tax collectors of the state devoid of serious immunities and advantages facing a purportedly omnipotent centre, managed to reinforce their social standing as a feudal class. This configuration reminded the blood-nobility of the West, in terms of not only enjoying the rights of a hereditary military-administrative status but also the hereditary holding of revenue sources and possessions.

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, we discussed the formation of a balance of power between the Ottoman centre and local timar holders, some of whom were also tribal leaders, in Zülkadiriye following the annexation of the region by the Ottomans in 1522. It seems that the successive executions of Alaüddevle Bey and Ali Bey, who were not only the leaders of the Zülkadirid dynasty but also the supreme leaders of the Zülkadirid tribal confederation, inevitably created a power vacuum in the region that would last for about ten years. Fundamental administrative processes, such as timar bestowals; a means of political and economic control over the tribute-paying rural commoners, settled-agriculturalists or nomadic-pastoralist alike, were dramatically disrupted. A political cul-de-sac was that the vacant posts in Zülkadiriye, now organised around the Ottoman administrative system as sub-districts without any administrative autonomy, were bestowed as benefices to *müteferrikas*, proteges of palace circles, who were completely alien to the local customs and power-networks. In addition, many of the fiefs of former Zülkadirid sipahis and tribal leaders were revoked and included in the personal demesne of the Sultan and revenue sources of the governing elite. External elements, such as *sipahis* from Karaman and personal retinues and dependents of provincial governors were bestowed with fiefs in Zülkadirid *sancaks* as loyal servitors to the centre and a potentially balancing force to the local elite. However, these policies proved nothing but further alienation and discontent of the Zülkadirid locals to Ottoman rule.

İbrahim Paşa was the first from the centre to observe the detrimental consequences of these policies in Zülkadiriye. Upon his suppression of Ahmed Paşa's rebellion in Egypt, on route to the capital with the Egyptian treasury, İbrahim Paşa had an

intelligence report that former Zülkadirid *sipahis*, deprived of their revenue sources and started banditry were planning to ambush his entourage in the Taurus passes. Escaping from the ambush attempt, İbrahim met with the local notables of Zülkadiriye in Kayseri and promised them that the injustices regarding the fief allocations in the region would be eliminated.²¹⁴ However, a final solution would be reached only after the suppression of the rebellion of 1526-27. The uprising was instigated by semi-nomadic Türkmens of Bozok, members of the Zülkadirid tribal confederacy. It included antinomian, wandering and ascetic dervish groups, whom we could define as “dangerous classes” and then spread to the Zile-Tokat region, predominantly populated by the settled-agriculturalist peasantry, with the influx of *çiftbozan* peasants to the rebel ranks. We will discuss this issue in the following chapter. Here it suffices to say some of the former Zülkadirid *sipahis* may have joined the rebellion and rallied to Kalender Şah’s banner at this stage of the uprising. With the aid of these military professionals, the rebel forces managed to defeat a couple of provincial Ottoman armies in the mountainous and forested territory between Tokat and Sivas. Then the rebels mysteriously turned their direction to the South, started marching towards Zülkadiriye, and headed towards Zamantu region combining central Anatolia to Elbistan-Maraş region, probably upon the invitation of the Zülkadirid elite and tribal leaders, who had lost their ancient fiefs, rights and privileges and sought a bargain with the Ottomans. However, İbrahim Paşa, commissioned by the centre to quell this new uprising already had the intelligence of the movements of the rebel army and their intentions. This time he managed to convince and win the support of the Zülkadirid elite by promising the reallocation of fiefs in the region on the conditions favouring the terms of the locals. In turn, Kalender Şah and his followers, isolated and betrayed by the Zülkadirid elite were easily eliminated at a mountain pasture near Sarız.

The comparison of the results of two successive timar registers of Zülkadiriye compiled during the first and second half of the 1520s, illustrates the centre’s sharp policy change to win the support of the local elements in case of another rural uprising. The differences observed in the annual yields of the fiefs, the dramatic increase in the population of *sipahis* clearly underlined as of Zülkadirid origin or tribal background in the latter document, dismissal of the external elements such as *sipahis* of Karamanid origin from the fiefs in the region, and more importantly, the content of the directives dispatched from the centre to the provincial governors of Karaman and Zülkadiriye about fief bestowals in their control zones exactly expressed this policy change. The Zülkadirid elite successfully manipulated the chaos arising from the rebellion of 1526-27 as leverage and the local fief holders, assumed to be power-

²¹⁴Celalzade 129b-130a.

less and impotent vis-à-vis the state in the conventional narratives, managed to get concessions from the centre that aided them in reinforcing their position as a feudal local elite in the process.

In opposition to the clichés in Ottoman historiography, which assume that the state is a rationally functioning political mechanism or an intervening and regulatory subject acting in complete autonomy from social processes and forces, the example in question provides new questions to establish an alternative approach. We have emphasised that the pre-capitalist/tributary state is a dynamic relationship of conflict, concession and conciliation between the elements of the power bloc. This example also shows that the maintenance and reproduction of the capacities of the tributary state at the local and provincial levels necessitated the inclusion of the local fief holders in the power bloc and the representation of their interests.

5. CONCLUSION: A GENERAL ASSESSMENT ON THE REBELLION OF 1526-27

5.1 A Framework of Rural Uprisings in the Pre-Capitalist Context

Rural rebellions in the Late Medieval and Early Modern periods were not rare and exceptional events. The English Rising of 1381, which has occupied British Marxist historiography for a long time, was an archetype of these rural uprisings. The peasant populations were predominant in the rising, but impoverished lower-tier nobility, unemployed knights, and rank-and-file of the clergy, especially some parish priests, whom Hilton defines as the “clerical proletariat”¹ also joined the rebellion. John Wycliffe’s ideas, posing questions on the legitimacy of the convention of “the society of three orders” with an egalitarian interpretation of Christianity, which would be later labelled as Lollardy, indirectly influenced the political mobilisation of rural masses.² Remarkably, such rebellions that combined various elements of the rural poor, had never been purely peasant rebellions. The unique aspect of the 1381 Rebellion was that it also received the support of the townsmen. Perhaps, it is more accurate to define these rebellions as commoner revolts or plebian uprisings if we choose employing the concept of class loosely, simply as a marker of the distinction between the rulers and the ruled in the pre-modern context.³ However, one must not gloss over the fact that these rebellions started in the countryside with the active participation of the peasants. An unfair tax increase, ill-treatment of the peasants by tax collectors, the nobles’ or the king’s arbitrary dismantling of the framework drawn by the “old custom”, which symbolised hard-fought rights of the peasants in the feudal land regime—a complex system of intertwined and overlapping possession

¹Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 211

²John Ball, a leader of the rebellion, was preaching Lollard doctrines, yet Wycliffe opposed the rebellion. Ibid. 214-230.

³Rodney Hilton, *Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism*, 1990, 143; Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 124.

and usufruct rights, sparked an uprising. Such disturbances were endemic to the pre-capitalist rural class relations.

In a social structure radically divided between a small minority that monopolised the use of arms and acquiring martial skills and a clear majority of direct producers without access to military resources, any noticeable presence of simple peasants as a rebellious crowd could only be possible, unless very exceptional circumstances, if some unemployed and dismissed soldiers or lower-tier fief holders with military skills and somehow knowledgeable on military strategy have also joined the rebellion. It is not difficult to guess many of the rural uprisings solely based on isolated peasant discontent were likely to be suppressed by the superior local forces of the feudal elite within days, thus, without leaving a trace in the historical records. Even though the Rising of 1381 rested on a chain of alliances, reminding a popular front led by peasants, it took only two weeks for the political turbulence reached to a state of free-fall, after Wat Tyler, one of the leaders of the rebellion, was murdered while he was delivering the rebels' demands to the child-king Richard II.

A unique example of pure peasant discontent was the Jacquerie of 1358; a desperate uprising of the French peasants in Île-de-France who were facing extortionate taxes demanded by the French regency government in Paris and plunders of groups of robber knights and mercenary man-at-arms unemployed a due to a period of unstable ceasefire between the kingdoms of France and England. After John II of Valois, King of France, was captured by the English in the Battle of Poitiers (1356), the Duke of Berry, who ruled as a regent, forced the villagers to pay heavy taxes to collect the heavy ransom demanded by the English for the release of the king. Peasants considered these taxes and tributes not directly ratified by the king as illegitimate. Moreover, the regent had no efficient force at his disposal to protect the peasants against the harassment of the unemployed bands of *routiers* pillaging the countryside. Violation of the traditional agreement of protection between the feudal elite and the direct producer peasants provided the basis for peasant revolt. On the other hand, the king's captivity and the fragmentation of the feudal elite into factions supporting the duke's regency and those supporting the King of Navarre, claimant to the throne of France, encouraged the peasants to act boldly and express their hatred of the nobility in the most brutal ways, without any sensible political programme mediated by religious discourse. News of the revolt spread from village to village around Paris through gossip. However, the Jacques, who were isolated both geographically, and also in terms of expressing pure peasant discontent, which in turn secured additional support only among a tiny portion of the burghers of Paris, were easily put to the sword by the noble knights of the King of Navarre only

within two weeks of their rebellion.⁴

In rural uprisings, the circulation of critical and radical religious views against the dominant religious doctrine and its entailing institutional and social norms—more concretely put, apocalyptic expectations and chiliastic enthusiasm—were pivotal in mobilising the worldviews and imagination of silent and subordinate rural masses. These views laid the ground for great upheavals that sought to turn the world outside down. They were crucial for rural discontent to break down its spatial limits and social isolation and to find allies elsewhere. In this respect, millenarianism in the pre-capitalist historical context was a very material force. It should not be readily dismissed as an ideological and mystical distortion of the material conditions of the subaltern for the sake of would-be materialist analysis. The effectiveness of “ideologies” could pull excluded or disgruntled elements from the ruling bloc of the feudal elite—small-scale fief holders, knights, and ordinary soldiers—due to political, economic or any other reason, into the rebellion and lead them siding with the rural commoners. However, since the Jacquerie of 1358 had no refined ideological and political expression other than a fanatical hatred of the rural upper classes, it could not receive significant support from non-peasant groups.⁵

On the other hand, in exceptional geographical conditions, for instance, in unfavourable terrain for mounted feudal professionals’ military operations, a peasant uprising could turn into a protracted guerilla struggle by bands of “social bandits” who avoided pitched battles against their overlords’ forces and relied entirely on ambushes and hit-and-run tactics. During the same period as the emergence of the Jacquerie in the Paris basin, the peasants of Auvergne took advantage of the rugged terrain of the Massif Central, formed bands of social bandits, known as the Tuchins, and carried out “counter-pillage” activities against pillages of the English and Gascon *routiers*, as well as the demands of tax collectors of the government from the late 1360s to the 1380s.⁶

Another example of a protracted rural resistance posing a contrast to the ephemeral characteristic of peasant uprisings was the Catalan Civil War of 1462-1486. Catalanian peasants have been facing increasing restrictions and demands from the Aragonese nobility since the 1380s. Declining land revenues after the Black Death gradually pushed the nobility to demand excessive amounts of in-kind rent from the peasants with additional unpaid labour service. Moreover, the dramatic decline in

⁴Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 113-121.

⁵Ibid. 121-122.

⁶Ibid. 116.

the available agricultural labour force due to the Black Death and the population movements towards the newly colonised lands in the south of the Iberian Peninsula during the ongoing Reconquista necessitated, from the landlords' standpoint, restricting peasants' freedom of movement. By the mid-15th century, the Catalan peasantry was briefly pauperised, degrading to the status of servile peasants, called *remences*. The last straw was the nobles' attempt to force peasants from all status, along with the *remences*, to the most despicable feudal obligations, popularly labelled as *malos usos* (five evil customs). For example, if a peasant left his land and migrated elsewhere, he had to pay a large sum to his overlord as compensation for the revenue loss. Another one follows as in the case of intestacy, the inheritors had to pay one-third of their movable property as due owed to their overlords for getting the approval for the transfer of possession right of their father's plot.⁷

What benefited the Catalan peasants during the Civil War was the conflict between the high nobility and the king of Aragon. The king, willing to restore his authority, decided to form an alliance with the peasantry by annulling the practice of *malos usos* in 1455 to the detriment of the nobility. The nobles, supported by the influential patrician families of Barcelona, instigated a rebellion against the king in 1462. Taking advantage of a divided ruling class, thus a reduced political control over their local organisation, the peasants formed sworn associations for their cause, established village councils for military recruitment, and fought against feudal armies in the mountainous terrain. These conflicts, intensified in two successive periods 1462-71 and 1484-86, ended up with the victory of the peasants and the king. Bond services were abolished in exchange for monetary compensations paid to the nobles. It seems that religion played a minimal role as a referential ideology in the *remences* revolt, apart from the impact of the generic ideas of social justice and natural law, and the conception that a just king should protect his subjects from the excesses of the nobles.⁸

What we observe in the examples of the Jacquerie, the Tuchins or the *remences* is that as armed rebellions of peasants, they were acute political resistance movements that erupted when the excessive tribute demands of the nobility, continual loss of peasants' customary rights, privileges and concession, and briefly, deterioration of the peasants' material well-being reached an intolerable level. In fact, the conflict between the exploiters and the exploited was inscribed in more silent and daily forms of resistance of the subaltern; examples of which could be hiding grain or animals from tax assessors, or using legal loopholes in the feudal land regime

⁷Paul Freedman, "The German and Catalan Peasant Revolts" *The American Historical Review* 98 (1993); Hilton *Bond Men Made Free*, 117.

⁸Paul Freedman, "The German and Catalan Peasant Revolts"; Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 124.

which was an already complex system of intertwined rights of usufruct and possession for their benefit. The transition of dynamics of the daily conflict between the exploiters/oppressors and the exploited/oppressed to an all-out armed insurgency, which was a remarkably perilous undertaking from the medieval peasants' standpoint, required something more than simply economic distress. As mentioned, the circulation of eschatological ideas reinforced by radically egalitarian notions, attacking property and present social hierarchies, which were expectedly defined as heresy and apostasy by the social elite, may have paved the way for repudiation of the "natural order" of things by the exploited masses.⁹

Religious and even national discontent in the late medieval world could spark proto-communistic revolutionary movements with the involvement of plebian elements. An iconic example of an attempt at religious renewal coupled with national sentiments was Jan Hus and his followers' religious and political movement that shook the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century Bohemia. Influenced by the ideas of John Wycliffe, Jan Hus directed severe criticism towards the ecclesiastical establishment in Bohemia and the dogma of the Catholic church in brief, precursing the Reformation. Hus's discontent with the hegemony of the German theological scholars and their favouritism of Germans at the University of Prague to the detriment of the Czechs added a national dimension to his movement. Since the native Premyslid dynasty had died out and succeeded by German Luxembourgs, German influence in Prague especially among the merchants and in the church hierarchy was intensifying. Apart from the discontent stemming from the German takeover, because of the monetising impact of the Kuttenberg silver mines, in operation since 1237, on the regional economy, the intra-class differentiation and stratification within the nobility, townsmen and the peasantry had already become intensive. All these underlying elements of social, political and religious unrest triggered an upheaval in Bohemia that would last for about twenty years, starting from 1415, when Jan Hus was burned at the stake at the Consul of Constance, where he travelled responding to the invitation of Sigismund, the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Bohemia. During this period known as the Hussite Wars, Jan Hus's followers split into moderate Hussite and radical Taborite factions. It is an unresolved debate whether Hus's moralistic criticism of the ecclesiastical establishment also entailed a political radicalism aiming at dismantling all feudal bonds, hierarchies and institutions. However, as the chiliastic character of the Taborite articles suggests, these radical followers of Hus advocated a complete form of Christian egalitarianism, rejected the idea of the society of three orders, and the legitimacy of the secular and clerical authorities of the feudal social hierarchy. In this respect, the Taborites were exemplary of a

⁹Ibid, 113.

proto-communist movement.¹⁰

Perhaps one of the greatest and rarest events in which the political objectives of the rural poor were documented, was the German Peasants' War of 1525. This great rural uprising has also been inspirational for adapting Marxist theory to the analysis of concrete historical cases and processes since Engels's *The Peasant War in Germany*. Rural upheavals in Germany coincided with Martin Luther's moderate Reformation. Although the Lutheran movement was an uncompromising critique of the dogma of the Catholic church, it was equally supportive of the social status quo in line with the interests of the German Princes and patricians. Peasants' War, on the other hand, took place under the influence of radical preachers such as Thomas Müntzer, who not only called for a religious reform but also proposed a social revolution favouring the rural and urban poor. Yet the peasant upheavals were not directly religious or contained a refined and clear-cut religious ideology, so they were not termed "Münzerites" in historiography. Instead, they voiced a moral objection to serfdom and deterioration in their material conditions through a simple understanding of religion, which naturally had certain political implications.¹¹ However, the impact of the vernacularisation of the Bible on Müntzer's or other radical preachers' ability to spread their ideas among the rural commoners and on the formation of a peasant "class consciousness" must have been tremendous. Since the German Princes and the city elite had already come under the influence of Luther, Müntzer inevitably turned his face to the plebian masses and peasants to spread his ideas.

Famous 20 Articles of the Swabian Peasants articulate the peasants' social objectives.¹² Their demands, in general, were as follows: freedom in electing parish priests; the collection of the church tithe by the village churchwarden only to meet the needs of the village's elected priest and his followers, with the remainder to help the poor and needy; freedom from serfdom (in the sense of restriction of the freedom of movement) and abolishment of heriot; registration of areas of communal use such as forests, rivers and lakes as *allodium*, for the usufruct of which lords cannot demand extra tributes and fees; lessening of the burden of boon services and other arbitrary demands by the lords; fair re-measurement of peasant plots and the de-

¹⁰František Šmahel, "The National Idea, Secular Power and Social Issues in the Political Theology of Jan Hus", in *A Companion to Jan Hus*, ed. František Šmahel and Ota Pavlíček (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 214-253; Ernst Werner "Popular Ideologies in Late Mediaeval Europe: Taborite Chiliasm and Its Antecedents." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2, no. 3 (1960): 344-63.

¹¹Paul Freedman "The German and Catalan Peasant Revolts" 44.

¹²Henry J. Cohn, "The Peasants of Swabia, 1525" *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 3 (1) (1975): 14-18.

manding fair amount of tributes in return; and legal protection against injustices.¹³ The peasants, addressing good Christians, underlined that none of their demands conflict with the Word of God and the Gospel even if many “Antichrists” —referring to the clerics supportive of the status quo of the secular and ecclesiastical authorities—calumniously claim that the peasants are seducing people to rebellion and disorder by inventing a new Gospel.¹⁴

A key question to ask at that point concerns the problem of unchanging, static Asia, marked by the lack of class conflicts and social dynamics in the Middle Ages compared to the European cases. Does this image of Asia fit into the historical reality? We have previously discussed Marx and Weber’s Hegelianism/Orientalism in their presupposition of an unchanging and static East, and the unfortunate results of this perspective for the empirical-historical study of social formations. These presuppositions stem from the differences between traditional Eastern historiography grounded on the notion of cyclical motion (ebb-and-flow-like dynamics of dynastic take-overs, dynastic maturity, moral decline, corruption and eventual collapse, and replacement by a new dynasty) and the Western notion of linear progress that brings forth social dynamics and secular change.

In the Chinese case, for instance, traditional “elite” scholarships’ emphasis on the Confucian principle of social harmony as an explanatory key reinforced the view of an unchanging China in Western thought.¹⁵ Similarly, Ibn-Khaldun depicts the fundamental aspect of the history of the Islamicate world as a continuous cycle of the rise of tribally originated dynasties and their decay. As Arjomend underlines:

“The social structure he portrays consists of urban centers of civilization and tribal peripheries. Its political order rests on two distinct elements: ruling authority (mulk) and the instrument for gaining it, group solidarity (‘asabiyya). According to Ibn Khaldun both these elements are generated in tribal societies but are separated as a result of the complexity of civilization. Ruling authority is transferred to urban centers, while group solidarity is sustained and reproduced only in the tribal periphery. A cyclical rise and fall motion of tribally-originated dynastic states is generated by the interaction between the centers of civilization, where group solidarity is weak, and the tribal societies of the periphery, where

¹³Peter Blickle “The Economic, Social and Political Background of the Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants of 1525” *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 3 (1) (1975): 64.

¹⁴Henry J. Cohn, “The Peasants of Swabia, 1525” 14.

¹⁵Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, (London: University of California Press 1991), 352.

strong group solidarity is constantly reproduced.”¹⁶

The sole dynamic presupposed for the East is therefore “dynastic cycles”. The people and commoners are taken as analytically unimportant. They are considered silent observers of political developments or manipulated masses by the elite.¹⁷ In other words, the history of the East was not social but a dynastic history. However, peasant movements and uprisings, occasionally coinciding with dynastic collapses and takeovers, were a fundamental part of Chinese social formation as early as the Qin Dynasty (3rd century BCE).¹⁸ Similarly, rural unrests often combined with chiliastic religiopolitical vocabulary were not uncommon in the late medieval Islamicate world. For instance, the collapse of the effective Ilkhanid rule and the subsequent political chaos in the Persian plateau during the fourteenth century triggered the emergence of popular movements in rural and urban contexts based on chiliastic doctrines and millenarian discourse. The foremost were the Sarbadars, followers of the messianic and egalitarian teachings of an early fourteenth-century Sufi preacher named Seyh Halife. Started as a peasant movement and protest of excessive tribute demands of the Ilkhanid ruling class in the vicinity of Sabzevar in Khurasan, the Sarbadar movement developed in a predominantly political but also in religious lines gathering peasants, small-scale landowners, urban craftsmen and “dangerous classes” of antinomian dervish sects in a chain of class alliance.¹⁹ Another example was the Hurufis, predominantly a religious movement around Fazullah Astarabadi’s esoteric and lettrist teachings. Astarabadi’s followers, after their leaders’ execution, instigated a series of small-scale rebellions in the urban context of Timurid Persia during the fifteenth century.²⁰

In the Ottoman context, Şeyh Bedreddin and Börklüce uprisings (1416) were the most well-known examples of political protest that combined popular rural discontent with an alternative religious perspective inspired by millenarian and chiliastic doctrines. In recent years, the Balkan and Anatolian wings of the uprising of 1416

¹⁶Saïd Amir Arjomand, *Revolutions of the end of time: apocalypse, revolution and reaction.* (Leiden, Boston: Brill 2023), 6.

¹⁷Chris Wickam also underpins dynastic cycles as an explanatory framework for the “Uniqueness of the East” to the expense of glossing over class dynamics. (Wickham 1985)

¹⁸For a sketch of Chinese peasant rebellions: James P. Harrison, *The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions: A study in the rewriting of Chinese history*, (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 279-304; for a general survey of the historiography of Chinese peasant rebellions: Frederick Wakeman, “Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in Chinese History.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 36, no. 2 (1977): 201–37.

¹⁹H. R. Roemer, “The Jalayirids, Muzaffarids, and Sarbadars”. in *The Cambridge History of Iran* vol.6, eds. P. Jackson and L. Lockhart, 1-41. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); William F. Tucker “The Kufan Ghulat and Millenarian (Mahdist) Movements in.” in *Unity in diversity: mysticism, messianism and the construction of religious authority in Islam*, ed. Orkhan Mir-Kasimov, (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014), 180-82.

²⁰Tucker, “The Kufan Ghulat”, 185-6; Arjomand, *Revolutions of the end of time*, 53-61.

were studied from diverse perspectives, ranging from social history, and Marxian approach to the religious-cultural perspectives that emphasise the millenarianism of the movement and conventional approaches that primarily focus on the persona of Şeyh Bedreddin.²¹ The Şahkulu uprising of 1511 was another significant political event marked by the mobilisation of the rural poor against the Ottomans with millenarian militancy. Led by a *kızılbaş halife* from the sancak of Teke, named Şahkulu, political protest of the Türkmens and peasants was undoubtedly intermingled with adherence to the Safavids. Therefore, it has been a common yet un contemplated tendency in historiography to view the Şahkulu rebellion primarily as a part of the political history of the Ottoman-Safavid geopolitical rivalry. Traditional historiography highlighted factors such as Safavid intrigue, Bayezid II's decrepitude, his lack of authority over the state elite, and growing *sipahi* discontent in Anatolia as the causes behind the uprising.²² In contrast, modern approaches, stress less on the Safavid involvement and Shah Ismail's political intrigues in Anatolia and more on the results of confessional antagonism between the Ottomans and the Safavids. The *Kızılbaş* movement has recently been conceptualised within the messianic/millenarian context of the late fifteenth and sixteenth century Mediterranean and Islamic world. In addition to *sipahi* discontent in Anatolia, modern approaches also emphasise factional struggles within the state elite and the centralising policies of the state as explanatory factors behind the uprising of 1511. While the involvement of landless peasants and economically distressed nomadic Türkmens is also pointed out, a comprehensive social and economic history of the upheavals in Anatolia during the early sixteenth century is still lacking in the literature.²³

²¹ Barkey, *Empire of Difference*, 169-175; Saygın Salgırlı, "The Rebellion of 1416: Re-contextualizing an Ottoman Social Movement." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 55 (2012); Dimitris J. Kastiris "The Revolt of Şeykh Bedreddin in the Context of the Ottoman Civil War of 1402-1413." in *Halcyon Days in Crete VII*. edited by A. Anastasopoulos, (Rethymno, 2012), 221-238; Yuri Stoyanov "Apocalyptic and Trans-confessional Aspects of the Rebellion of Börklüce Mustafa and Sheikh Bedreddin: Problems of Interpretations and New Vistas for Research" in *Meltem: Book of the Izmir Mediterranean Academy* (2016). For the similarities between Spiritual Franciscans and Abdals of Rum, in terms of advocating asceticism, refusal of private property ownership, abhorrence towards the rich and powerful segments of the society, see Konstantine A. Zhukov, "The Cathars, Fraticelli, and Turks: A New Interpretation of Berkludje Mustafa's Uprising in Anatolia, c. 1415." In *The Proceedings of the XVIIIth International Byzantine Congress*, edited by I. Shevchenko, G. Litavrin, and W Hanak, vol. 2, 188-95. (Shepherdstown, West Virginia: 1996).

²² Şehabeddin Tekindağ, "Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyamı," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* I (3) (1967); idem, "Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyamı," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* I (4) (1968); Selahattin Tansel, *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, (Ankara: MEB Yayınevi 1969). Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife's letter of request to Selim I, published by Tansel could be a starting point for the social history of the Şahkulu rebellion. Ali, understood to be a member of the low-tier *ulema*, was complaining about corruption, unjust taxation, "customary taxes" like the marriage tax, poll taxes imposed on landless peasants (bennak), abuses of the kadıs, high-tier fief holders in his letter.

²³ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak "XVI. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Anadolu'sunda Mesihanik Hareketlerinin Bir Tahlil Denemesi." In *V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi: Tebliğler*, 817-25. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1990); Feridun Emecen, "İhtilalci Bir Mehdilik Hareketi mi? Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyamı Üzerine Yeni Yaklaşımlar." In *Ötekilerin Peşinde: Ahmet Yaşar Ocak'a Armağan*, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları 2015): 521-534; Rıza Yıldırım. "Turcomans Between Two Empires: The Origins of the Qızılbaş Identity in Anatolia (1447-1514)." *PhD Thesis*. (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2008): Yıldırım by identifying the kızılbaş movement as a "tribal protest" against the Ottoman "bureaucratic" centralised state, and es-

5.2 The Events of 1526-27

The literature on the subsequent rebellions of 1526 and 1527 was limited to Bacqué-Grammont's monography based on a report about the upheaval in Bozok and surrounding regions written by the governor-general of Karaman, Mahmud Paşa.²⁴ In addition, Zeynep Yürekli in his monography on the tekke of Hacı Bektaş, mentions Kalender Çelebi in the context of Kızılbaş rebellions and a presumed factional struggle within the Bektashi order only in a few pages.²⁵ We can also mention Kaya Şahin's discussion on Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi's narrative of the uprisings of 1526-27. Celalzade, who was conscripted into the central army led by İbrahim Paşa to quell the rebellion, was one of the known eyewitnesses of the uprising. Yet, according to Şahin, he most probably wrote about these rebellions decades after his active service. Celalzade's observations of the events reflected the context of the strict confessional antagonism between the Sunnis and the heretic Shiites. In addition to his testimonies, the narrative was enriched with quotations from reports of Ottoman officials, according to whom the rebellions erupted as a combination of popular dissent and latitudinarian beliefs. He did not gloss over the influence of the sheikh of the tekke of Hacı Bektaş, Kalender Çelebi, in the augmentation of the upheaval as a rival claimant to Sultan Süleyman's secular and religious powers. In this respect, Celalzade accused the rebels and their leader Kalender of acting against the Sharia and kanun by undermining the social order.²⁶ In the same vein, Kalender's denomination as "Şah" could be considered an indicator of his intention of combining religious authority with secular powers reminiscent of the Safavid policy that Şeyh Cüneyd, Şeyh Haydar and Şah İsmail had previously pursued.

In Celalzade's own words, Kalender and his followers instigated a rebellion to establish their secular (saltanat) and religious (hilafet) authority.²⁷ However, Bostan

establishing a functional causality between tribalism and heterodoxy, reproduces the old Köprülü paradigm. His approach could be considered as an offshoot of the Köprülü paradigm. H. Erdem Çıpa, *The Making of Selim*. (Bloomington; Indiana: Indiana University Press 2017), 43-48.

²⁴Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Une rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527" *Studia Islamica* 62 (1985). Also see, Hanna Sohreweide "Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien" 170-183.

²⁵Zeynep Yürekli, *Architecture and Hagiography in the Ottoman Empire.: The Politics of Bektashi Shrines in the Classical Age*. (England: Ashgate Publishing, 2021) Kindle edition: 35-6.

²⁶Şahin, *Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman*, 68-72.

²⁷Celalzade, 165a.

Çelebi, another contemporary chronicler of the uprising, depicted Kalender simply as a troublemaker (müfsid) who had already been in opposition to the Sultan's authority. According to Bostan, as Kalender became fearful of the Sultan's vengeance and retaliation for his anti-Ottoman activities, he allied with certain bandits from Kırşehir, nomads of Amasya and other unspecified dissenters, and instigated an open rebellion.²⁸ Bostan preferred to define the rebellious crowd as "bagi", a denomination and accusation based on religious law.²⁹ His choice of words reflected Bostan's social background as a religious official.

Neither of these cited works, however, are works of social history. Faruk Sümer, in his study on the relationship between Safavids and Turcoman tribes in Anatolia, touches upon the early sixteenth-century rebellions but his narrative does not exceed beyond the reiteration of what was written in chronicler accounts.³⁰ The only considerable exception is Mustafa Akdağ's work, which offers a *longue durée* perspective and social historical research agenda, not only on Celali Revolts of the late sixteenth century but also on the upheavals in the earlier period encapsulating the events in 1526-27. However, Akdağ's emphasis on the rebellions that took place in the early decades of the sixteenth century does not exceed a few pages.³¹

5.2.1 Late August-Autumn of 1526: Baba Zünnun Rebellion

The rebellion started in Bozok, likely among semi-nomadic Söklen clans. Clansmen asked a local dervish called (possibly) Baba Zünnun to resolve a dispute with the *kadi* and tax assessors on the amount of grain-tithe. Therefore, it is highly probable the event took place in late summer 1526, after the grain harvest, when tithe amounts were assessed and demanded from the tribute payers. The officials' men in return severely beat the dervish and insulted him by shaving his beard.³²

Humiliated and enraged clansmen responded by killing the *kadi* and tax assessors on the spot. Then the rebellious crowd stormed the *sancakbeyi*'s mansion and they

²⁸Bostan, 101b.

²⁹"... the word used by Muslim jurists to describe an act of rebellion is *baghy*. The word comes from the root word *baghâ*, which in its various forms could mean: (1) to desire or seek something; (2) to fornicate or cause corruption; or (3) to envy or commit injustice." Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law*, (Cambridge University Press 2001), 5.

³⁰Faruk Sümer, *Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde*, 75-8.

³¹Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik Düzenlik Kavgası*, 109-115.

³²According to the Vahidi's depiction of the antinomian dervish groups (Kalenders, Hayderis, Abdals of Rum and Camis) their head and faces were clean-shaved (*çar-darb*) or shaved beards with long hair and moustaches (Karamustafa 1993, 6ff.) If this is the case, the dervish does not fit into the depiction of an antinomian. Yet growing a beard and keeping it unshaven is also a tradition among the Alevis.

killed *sancakbeyi* Hersekzade Mustafa Bey, who was Hersekzade Ahmed Bey's son; a member of the Bosnian-Croatian nobility integrated into Ottoman state-elite.

An exceptional narrative of this rebellion could be found in Mevlana İsa's *Cami'ü'l-meknunat*. İsa emphasises the role of social conditions that triggered tribal disturbances contrary to the other contemporary chroniclers, prone to blame Safavid agents for instigating social unrest or point out religious ignorance and so-called heretical beliefs of the insurgents as the root cause of the revolt. Contemporary chroniclers (Celalzade, Bostan Çelebi, etc.) did not touch upon the social and economic reasons behind these rebellions. They straightforwardly described the insurgents as ill-mannered people by creation, thus prone to adopt *Kızılbaş* doctrines and revolt against the Sultan and true religion. However, according to İsa's narrative, after the conquest of the plain of Sirmia (later organised as *sancak* of Sirem; must be upon the conquest of Belgrade (1521) or the aftermath of the battle of Mohacz (1526)) Sultan Suleyman ordered the deportation of the Bozoklu tribe to be settled in these territories. He sent a high-ranking official (*beg*) and *kadis* to persuade them. But the tribesmen, opposing the Sultan's order, responded by killing the *beg* and *kadis* and rose up in rebellion.³³

Apart from Celalzade's and Bostan's narration of the events, their contemporary Kemalpaşazade, and later chroniclers and narrators Mustafa Ali, Solakzade, and Peçevi roughly reiterate the depictions in the earliest accounts.³⁴ According to Celalzade, Baba (must be a local dervish), a certain Zünnun from the Hisarbeylü tribe according to Faruk Sümer, and a certain Musa from the Söklen tribe were the three leaders of this rebellion.³⁵

An interesting source for the uprising was a letter dated 26 September 1526, presented in Marino Sanuto's *I Diarii*. The letter was about observations of Piero Sanson, son of the Venetian governor of Famagusta, Andrea Sanson, who was at Adana at the time of the rebellion.³⁶ We know that the uprising of 1526-27 also coincided with Türkmen upheavals in Cilicia, but the reporter clearly informs his father about the situation in Central Anatolia, along with the troubles in Cilicia. Piero Sanson calls the rebel leader "Tud Zarzardich" or "Turzarchag", very likely to

³³Barbara Flemming "Public Opinion Under Sultan Suleyman" In *Suleyman the Second and His Time*, eds. Halil İnalçık and Cemal Kafadar, (İstanbul: Isis press, 1993): 54-55.

³⁴Ümit Erkan, "16. yy'da Kızılbaş Ayaklanmaları" *Doktora Tezi*. (Samsun: Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, 2014).

³⁵"taife-i melahide serdarları olan Baba nam müfsid ile uruk-ı Zülkadırlüden Zünnun nam asi ve Söklünoğlu Musa nam pelid-i bi-din ile ol mevziden dönüp Sivas caniblerinden Artukabad ve Kazova taraflarını nahb ve talan etmeğe niyyet ve azimet eyledikleri" Celalzade, 161a.

³⁶Marino Sanudo, *I Diarii*, edited by Federico Stefani, Guglielmo Berchet and Nicolò Barozzi. Vol. 43. (Venice: F. Visentini, 1896): 319-20: 543-45.

be Baba Zünnun or Zünnunoğlu. According to the rumours, “Tud Zarzardich” had grown up in “Sophi’s”, that is, Ismail I’s court, and now returned to his home country to fight against the Ottomans. One of his followers and companions was “Ali Dolut’s” that is, Alaüddevle Bey’s son who had previously been in exile in the Safavid realm and returned with “Tud Zarzardich” to press his claim on Zülkadiriye. “Tud Zarzardich” managed to defeat the governor-general of Karaman—falsely identified as Iskender Paşa in Piero Sanson’s letter; in fact, the defeated Paşa was Iskenderpaşazade Hürrem—in a place called Kurşunlu-beli.³⁷ Under his command, he had fifty thousand armed *kızılbaş* (called “zente del Sophi” in the text) supporters. Piero informs that the countryside was in full disarray upon the news of the defeat of the armies of Karaman and the common people desired the the rebel leader’s victory. The Ottoman rule was unpopular among the commoners; the Sultan (in the text, Grand Turc) was disliked for his cruelty, and the common people were experiencing such economic depression that they had to sell their daughters in the bazaar to meet the tribute demands. It can be claimed that Piero exaggerated the situation with anti-Ottoman sentiments, but, on the other hand, he was so terrified of a possible rebel takeover of Adana that he mortgaged his property worth six thousand Ottoman *akçes* to a group of Armenian monks. In other words, a Venetian merchant was as equally terrified by a commoner uprising as a member of the Ottoman elite was, if we put aside his anti-Ottoman sentiments.

Ottoman chroniclers also provided information about the rebellious crowd. Celalzade describes them as savages or the folk of the wilderness of poor countryside and yet continues his narration by stressing their lack of proper morals and fidelity to true religion.³⁸ Kemalpaşazade claims that the Türkmen clans in Bozok had once freely wandered in the countryside, and after the Ottoman conquest, it became burdensome for them to live as common *reaya* with obligations of tribute payment and lack of spatial mobility.³⁹

Ottoman’s fiscal regulations indirectly forced pastoral nomads to quit the pastoral sector and pulled them into sedentarisation. This was a gradual but conflict-ridden process. Assuming an antagonism between forced settlement by the state and gradual sedentarisation could be misleading and anachronistic for the period in ques-

³⁷Must be a strategic mountain pass in the north-east of Kayseri, between Akdağ mountains and Kızılırmak and on the road combining Kayseri to Bozok.

³⁸“Yaban halkı vakir yer ademidir... sadakat-ı diyanetten beriler.” Celalzade, 159b.

³⁹“Bozoklu didikleri cemaat-i Türkmen ki kefil-i maişetleri hüsam ü sinan vekil-i maslahatları tîr ü kemandur divan-ı kitabete hazır u nazır olub yoklanur tururiken ol fasid seriret-i bed siretler sayir behayim gibi bayirede vü sayirede sayim ü sayir gezeyürürken başları yulara geçüb boyunları boyundırığa girmek raiyet-i tımar gidüb kalan raiyetler gibi hizmetkâr olub çift harcın u bağ haracın virmek ağır geldi” Kemalpaşazade, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân* X. Defter, Haz. Şerafettin Severcan, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1996), 342-343; quoted in Erkan “16. yy’da Kızılbaş Ayaklanmaları,” 41.

tion.⁴⁰ Given these rebellions, it would be inaccurate to claim sedentarisation process in Bozok took place spontaneously and smoothly without any conflict between the tributary state and the Türkmens. Tributes imposed on pastoralist economic activity could indirectly force nomads to settle. Sixteenth-century tributary states lacked the necessary “technologies of power” vis-à-vis the tribesmen other than taxation. The ability to force the nomads to settle, using brute force, mechanisms of population control and surveillance (forced settlement in the narrow sense) was a trait of the modernising bureaucratic state of the Post-Tanzimat era.

Under the impact of tributary pressure, the internal economic organisation [Arbeitsprozess] of the Türkmen clans were becoming internally differentiated. The clans with marginal flocks were transforming their material and social organisation in line with the necessities of settled and full-time agriculture as a response to the Ottoman regime of tribute on pastoralist economic activity.⁴¹ Sub-tribal units and clans of the larger tribal organisation were divided between semi-nomadic (pastoralism is dominant in the overall economic organisation) and semi-sedentary units (agriculture is dominant.) Settlement of the tribal chieftain or the clan leader to a winter quarter and tuning to a settled *sipahi* was probably a pull factor in the clans’ process of sedentarisation. Names of some winter quarters (possibly named after local notables, tribal chieftains and *sipahis*) in Bozok suggest that this process had already started in the region before the Ottoman take-over but intensified with it.

It could be expected that the tribal chieftains’ absence in seasonal migrations and their non-involvement in the production process, and that they started to carry out relations with dependent clans through the *kethüdas* eventually disrupted the internal cohesion of the tribal social structures. In this case, the tribal chieftain turned into a feudal lord who did not participate in the immediate processes of production and remained outside of the clan’s reciprocal relations, while collecting rents, tributes and dues from the clansmen by sending his servitors and *kethüdas*.⁴² In addition, the Ottoman installed *sancakbeyis*’ demands, and the surveillance of the government officials such as kadis, tax assessors and collectors, who were alien elements to the tribal milieu of Bozok, intensified the process of external feudalisation of the tribal social structure. The first phase of the rebellion started and developed mainly as a political protest of the nomadic and semi-nomadic Türkmen clans of

⁴⁰cf. Onur Usta Oktay Özel, “Sedentarization of Turcomans”, 154; 162; 175. Based on their study on Kayseri yöruks in the 16th century, they claim that sedentarisation was not a conflict-ridden but a natural and spontaneous process, and this process also followed the same pattern in the neighbouring provinces of Larende and Bozok.

⁴¹Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, 65-66.

⁴²Ibid, 95.

Bozok. Rebel leaders were locally known and recognised clan leaders and religious figures. The local scale of the uprising triggered the solidarity between clan groups interconnected with kinship ties, and thus enabled the rebellion to spread locally like wildfire. However, it also seems that the rebels did not receive support from non-tribal groups. Despite their initial victories against the local Ottoman forces, they became isolated in the Bozok-Tokat-Sivas triangle. The rebels won a pyrrhic victory against forces commanded by Hüseyin Pasha, the governor-general of Sivas, in rough terrain in the north of Sivas. Fatally wounded Hüseyin Paşa retreated to Sivas with the remnants of his defeated forces. Immediately after this battle, the remaining rebel forces could not hold on as their numbers dwindled and were eventually dispersed by the reinforcements commanded by Hüsrev Paşa, governor-general of Diyarbakır. The rebellion, which lasted from late August to October 1526, ended with the deaths of thousands of Türkmen nomads in Bozok and around Sivas-Tokat of the province of Rum, Those Türkmens who managed to save their lives were dispersed from their home provinces. Even if the Ottoman forces emerged victorious in the last decisive pitched battle it appears they could not fully reestablish state authority in the region. After the engagement, Hüsrev's forces retreated towards Erzurum to cut off the escape route of the Türkmens to Iran. It seems that local Ottoman authorities predicted that a new rebellion would break out as a mass migration into the Safavid realm. As the course of events illustrated, starting from the winter of 1526-27, Bozok Türkmens would start a new wave of rebellion.

5.2.2 Winter of 1526 – Summer of 1527: Zünnunoğlu and Kalender Şah Rebellions

Even if the first phase of the rebellion ended with an Ottoman military victory, though with heavy losses, rural disturbances, especially in the province of Bozok, did not end, as both exhausted Ottoman forces and the remnants of the rebels retreated into their strongholds and winter quarters. Parallel upheavals that took place in Cilicia in the meantime are beyond our scope.

After the suppression of each revolt, the Porte did not take any clear-cut institutional or fiscal measure that might have remedied the initial unease, nor did it advocate economic recovery of the regions affected by the devastation caused by the rebels or provincial troops. The later decision of mitigation of *salgun-i sultani*, for instance, was not a subsequent development. On the contrary, tax amounts were kept or even increased, and tributes previously imposed on the deceased or missing persons were demanded from the survivors who remained on the spot in the name

of collective responsibility.⁴³ Under these conditions, Turcoman tribes, again from Bozok; Hisar Beyli, Çiçekli, Ağca Koyunlu, Mesudlu and several sub-tribal groups instigated another uprising led by Zünnünoğlu, said to be Baba Zunnun's son. We should also consider that in the tribal context, these disturbances readily resulted in blood feuds. Relatives of the massacred party would likely instigate another uprising.⁴⁴

Directly heading towards Sivas, the insurgents aimed to flee to the Safavid realm as soon as possible (Bacque-Grammont 1982, 162). Later inserted "mürde" notes in TTd.155 with red ink would be the names of these dispersed tribesmen who managed to flee probably before the Ottomans reasserted their control on Bozok when the roads became available for the movement of the troops and started inspections to find out and punish the tribesmen who had been associated with the previous rebellion.

Ottoman forces were already on alert to prevent any migration movement to the east; the Sivas-Tokat region was being patrolled by Yakup Paşa, new governor-general of Rûm; and in the easternmost borders, Hüsrev Paşa of Diyarbekir's forces encamped in Pasin plain, near Erzurum. The insurgents managed to defeat Yakup Paşa of Sivas's forces but in the following engagement were massacred by Hüsrev Paşa of Diyarbekir's troops to the last man. Zünnünoğlu managed to flee from the field⁴⁵ Diyarbekir contingents again proved more effective than the troops of Karaman and Rum in defeating the rebels; and fought more valiantly against the insurgents for three possible reasons: 1) They were seasoned in a long campaign against the Safavids; there is no doubt that they had no sympathy for *kızılbaş* and could not be confused or terrified by messianic claims of the rebel leaders. 2) They were mostly local Kurdish troops, speaking Kurdish and thus immune to the demoralising effects of local rumours and gossip. Foreign troops had always been instrumental in suppressing rural uprisings with religious claims (like Latin mercenary knights serving for Seljuks against the Babais.) 3) following the second, they had no tribal-local ties with the insurgents.

However, the Ottomans' strict measures against instigators of the rural uprisings did not prevent the rural masses from gathering around new rebel leaders. By early 1527, the *tekke* of Hacibektaş appeared as the new centre of mass discontent. *Postnişin*, Kalender Çelebi, who was a grandson of Balım Sultan, and descended from Hacı

⁴³ Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Une rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527" *Studia Islamica* 62 (1985), 157.

⁴⁴ A similar observation in Piero Sanson's letter follows as "And now it is said that the relatives of the dead have three leaders, who are assembling people to take vengeance from sancaks of Adana and Jaza."

⁴⁵ Faruk Sümer, *Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde*, 77.

Bektaş according to popular Bektaşi belief⁴⁶ managed to mobilise his followers in Kırşehir and allied with groups of bandits (probably remnants of previous rebellions) to instigate a new uprising.⁴⁷ Mahmud Paşa of Karaman reported that the rebellion started in the environs of Budak-Özi and Keskün, the westernmost regions of the *sancak* of Bozok.⁴⁸

According to Celalzade, Kalender aimed to establish his earthly and divine authority.⁴⁹ Given the lack of sources, it is impossible to penetrate the discussion about Kalender's authentic purposes without speculating. As a regionally influential religious figure, he was likely to be seen as Mahdi primarily by the antinomian and latitudinarian dervishes, constituting his closest circle. Kalender was exalted as Mahdi in Koyun Abdal's lines, yet the authenticity of these lines is questionable.⁵⁰ Yet what was clear from Celalzade's account is that "Hacı-Bektaş Işıkları" and Abdals of Rum were constituting Kalender's closest circle and the most loyal followers. Celalzade's narrative reveals that the beginning of the rebellion contained carnivalesque features in that the dervishes raised banners, blew horns and beat their drums.⁵¹ From the narrative, we can speculate that 20-21 March 1527 (5 Cemazielahir, 933), which corresponded to the Nowruz Day celebrations, was the day Kalender and his followers rose in rebellion. Upon the news of a new uprising in Anatolia, İbrahim Paşa left the capital with a *kapıkulu* army on 22 April 1527 (28 Recep 933) to put an end to the upheaval in Anatolia once and for all.⁵²

In the meantime, governor-generals of Karaman and Anatolia were ordered to mo-

⁴⁶Yürekli, *Architecture and Hagiography*, 35. Also see Faroqi, "The Tekke of Hacı Bektaş: Social Position and Economic Activities",185.

⁴⁷"ve kır-ı şöretde asude olan kutubü'l-evliya merhum Hacı Bektaş kuddise südde-i evladından Kalender Şah dimekle maruf na-halef müfsid ki nice zaman olmuşidi ki şirretde ve şekavetde olub ol dahi kahraman-ı kahr-ı padişahinin havfından liva-i Kırşehirinden bazı eşira ile ittifak edüb bagy ü isyan eyleyüb..." Bostan, 101b.

⁴⁸Bacqué-Grammont, "Une rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527" *Studia Islamica* 62 (1985),164.

⁴⁹Celalzade, 165b.

⁵⁰"Mehdi-i zamandır adı/ bitsin mazlumun feryadı/ Hacı Bektaş'ın evladı/ Pirim Kalender geliyor." İsmail Özmen, *Alevi-Bektaşi Şiirleri Antolojisi*, vol.2, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1998), 563.

⁵¹"Zaviyelerinde olan dervişler sancakların kaldırıp kösler nefirler çaldırıp zamir-i masiyet -pezirleri fesada mail, hatır-i fitne-taşirleri dalale hamil idi. Kesret-i ivan ve ensar-ı dalalet-asar ile mesned-neşin-i mühid olan mezbur Kalender isyan-i ayin-i tuğyan-ı alemlerin kaldırıp, etraf ve canibinde olan bilad-ı müslimin ve zayi-i müminini garet ve hasaret eyledi. Furuc-ı muharreme katlarında helal ve ma'-i nameşru meşreplerinde mübah oldu ayin -i şer'-i nebeviyi muattıl, kavanin-i senen -i müsaffa -i salahallahu'l- aliyyi ve sellimi mühmel ve muhtall bildi. Ekna-ı memleketten emn ü aman ve insaf yerine cevri ü ittisap zuhur eyledi. Terayık-i seyl-i mesdud ve menahic ve maabir makud olup leyl ü nehar herc ü merc aşikar oldu" Celalzade, 165a-b. For similar observations about the antinomian community of the *tekke* of Seyyid Gazi, see: Yürekli, *Architecture and Hagiography*, 39-46. About fifty years later from Kalender's uprising, Düzmece Şah İsmail's rebellion would also be starting with a sacrificial feast in the tekke of Hacıbektaş. (Yürekli 2012, 48).

⁵²Celalzade, 165b. Bostan gives the date for the departure of the central army as "evail-i Şaban, 933." Bostan 102a.

bilise their troops to intervene against the insurgents.⁵³ While the central army was on its march towards the regions affected by the rebellion, Ottoman provincial governors were sending reports to İbrahim Paşa, about the rebels' objectives, movements and composition of the insurgent crowd. One of these reports, published by⁵⁴ was penned by the governor-general of Karaman, Mahmud Paşa during his stay in a military encampment near Sivas while waiting for orders from the grand-vizier. Based on the intelligence obtained by a certain spy called Veys, Mahmud Paşa informed the grand vizier about the movements, objectives, composition and size of the rebel army. Kalender's name was not mentioned in the document; Mahmud simply called him "cursed *kızılbaş*." It was reported that Kalender's army had camped near Kazgölü; on the road combining Zile and Tokat through Ezinepazarı, the present-day town of Pazar. Here they may have waited for local *çiftbozan* peasants to join their ranks, and then they moved to Artukabad, possibly through the plain south of Zile, where *nahiyes* of Meşhedabad and Yenimüsliman were located.⁵⁵ They followed the narrow Silisözü valley as their numbers increased with new conscripts and reached the plain of Artukabad. When Mahmud Paşa was writing his report, the rebels were planning to plunder the capital seat of the province of Rum in their encampments in Yıldız, about forty kilometres north of the city of Sivas.

Mahmud was overly optimistic. He was confident that the rebels were surrounded by the armies of Anatolia, Karaman and Rum thanks to the urgent mobilisation of the Ottoman provincial troops. However, as Bacqué-Grammont states, Mahmud was unaware that the Anatolian troops led by Behram Paşa were defeated by Kalender's forces near Kara-çayır located between the vicinity of the city of Sivas and *nahiye* of Yıldız.⁵⁶ Mahmud was equally wrong in his estimations about the size of the rebel army. He reported that only seven hundred horsemen and three hundred infantrymen had been enrolled in Kalender's army. He added Kalender had not received the expected support from Türkmens of Bozok, notorious *kızılbaş* notables of the region had not aligned with him, and even the ones in his ranks had been deserting his camp in great numbers.⁵⁷ Mahmud obtained this intelligence from a certain Hasan Beg from the Çiçeklü tribe, whose brother Turak Bey was within the rebel army. We have previously underlined that Çiçeklü was a militarily influential

⁵³Celalzade, 165b.

⁵⁴Bacqué-Grammont, "Une rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527" *Studia Islamica* 62 (1985), 164-67.

⁵⁵"Mevkuf-ı kızılbaş" records in TTd.79 are suggestive of the peasant support for Kalender's cause in Zile-Tokat region.

⁵⁶Bostan misleadingly gives "Kazova nam sahra" as the site of the battle between Behram and Kalender. Bostan, 103b.

⁵⁷"melain-i mezkure dahi eski kızılbaştan kimesne tabi olmayıp"

tribal group within the Zülkadirid confederacy. It seems that Çiçeklü chieftains deceived Mahmud Paşa about the situation of the rebel army as the course of events would suggest. Contrary to Mahmud Paşa's claims, the numbers of the rebels may have augmented during encamping in Kazgölü and Yıldız with the new participants from the rural poor.

When the central army was camping in the environs of Aksaray [memleket-i Yunaniye], previously defeated Behram Paşa, and forces of Karaman, on 8 June 1527, conducted a joint assault on the rebel forces who were stationed in Cincife, yet were ambushed, severely defeated and retreated to Sivas and Tokat in full disarray, by losing several high-ranking commanders including Mahmud Paşa himself.⁵⁸ Poorly equipped rebels now handed over significant quantities of weapons, mounts and armour left by the defeated Ottoman troops:

“sipah-ı İslam münhezim olup erbab-ı tuğyan ve ashab-ı hizlan fırsat ve nusret buldular. Işıklar alayı mansur olup cündü'l-İslam maksur düştü. Hariciler hazain ve esbaba malik olup, at ve don edindiler. Ruz be ruz kuvvet ve iştihar bulup kemal-tuğyanda oldular.”⁵⁹

Celalzade claims that after the rebels' victory in Cincife, former Zülkadirid fiefholders and tribal chieftains who had previously lost their privileges upon the Ottoman takeover recognised Kalender's authority, sought independence from the Ottoman rule and rallied to his ranks in mass.

“Dulkadirinin müfsidin ve eşşirası onlara tabi olup, leşker firavan ve cumhur-ı azimüşşan olmağla istiklali sancaklar kaldırıp ışıklar başka sultanlar oldular.”⁶⁰

I think there had already been professional soldiers enlisted in rebel ranks, although in low numbers, otherwise, the victories in Kara-çayır and Cincife would not be possible. These professionals were possibly *müssellems* from insurgent Bozok Türkmens. We should also add that the rumours about Kalender's messianic charisma may have demoralised the Ottoman local troops. Ottoman *sipahis* and their followers fought against Kalender's forces unwillingly, thinking of withdrawal at the first opportunity.

The news of the crushing defeat at Cincife led İbrahim Paşa to change his strategy

⁵⁸Celalzade, 166a-b.

⁵⁹Celalzade, 166b.

⁶⁰Ibid.

and resort to political rather than military means to cope with the insurgents' numerical advantage over his forces. However, the most urgent precaution the cunning vizier took was not to accept any of the defeated and retreating soldiers into his army, because those would spread rumours about Kalender's invincibility, that he was the awaited Mahdi, and thus would demoralise the *kapıkulu* troops.⁶¹

Zülkadirid support for Kalender was nominal. After the victory in Cincife, Zülkadirid notables may have invited him to Zülkadiriye proper (Elbistan-Maraş.) However, their hidden agenda was that they were seeking to start negotiations with İbrahim Paşa who would make concessions for the restoration of their former rights and privileges. In other words, they were bluffing about supporting Kalender.

Kalender accepted the Zülkadirid notables' invitation and rushed to the south with a dwindled number of followers, including only his loyal circle of *abdals* and a few Zülkadirid notables, one of them was a certain Divane Dünder. The interesting fact here is that there were only two weeks between Kalender's victory at Cincife (on the 8th of June) and his demise in Sarız on the 22nd of June 1527. His decision must be unpopular among the ordinary tribesmen and fugitive peasants, who seemed to have deserted his camp upon his decision to march towards Elbistan. Bostan claims at that point that Kalender marched south simply to proceed to Baghdad, upon the news that Hüsrev Paşa of Diyarbekir had cut his route to Iran in Pasin *plain*.⁶² It is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion about the developments in this two weeks' duration. The only certain thing was the Zülkadirid elites' betrayal of Kalender.

In fact, Mahmud Paşa had already commissioned agents and thanks to this network, the Ottomans were aware that the rebel army was a heterogeneous crowd with varying objectives. For instance, in the report addressing the grand vizier, Mahmud declares that he released Hasan Bey from the Çiçeklü tribe, who had been a captive since the suppression of one of the previous uprisings, tried to win his trust with gifts (these gifts might be a promise of tax immunity for his clan or simply, valuable horses, etc.) and in return, requested him to persuade his tribal fellows within the rebel ranks to turn away from Kalender.⁶³ Thanks to the agent network in the rebel camp once established by Mahmud Paşa, the grand vizier İbrahim Paşa may have managed to get into contact with the tribal chieftains and former Zülkadirid fief-holders who were supposedly constituting the strongest military element

⁶¹“Mağlup olan ümera ve leşkeri yasaklu eyleyip orduya götürmediler.” Celalzade, 166b-167a.

⁶²“Mezkur olan savaştan sonra leşker-i bağı Diyarbekir ve Kürdistan leşkerinin haberin alıb Acem tarafına gitmeğe ikdam idemeyüb bağdada gitmek kaskına diyar-ı Arab semtine müteveccih olub” Bostan, 104a.

⁶³Bacqué-Grammont, “Une rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527” *Studia Islamica* 62 (1985), 165-67.

in Kalender's rebel army.

İbrahim Paşa had already been a known political figure among the Zülkadirid notables since his return from suppressing Ahmed Paşa's rebellion in Egypt. On his route to the capital, he had listened to the notables' complaints about injustices previously committed by the former grand-vizier Ferhad Paşa after Ali Bey's execution. In a similar vein, İbrahim Paşa again officially promised enfeoffment of the former Zülkadirid fief-holders and recognition of tax immunities (must be statuses of *yurtluk* and *ocaklık*.) The mediators with İbrahim Paşa and the Zülkadirid chieftains were chieftains and trustees of Karacalu and Pişanlı tribes, as Celalzade underlines.

“erbab-ı fesadın ekseri Dulkadirlü taifesi olup mukaddemen ol memleketler Türkmen elinden feth olundukda, taife-yi mezburenin tımarları ve dirlikleri alınıp havass-ı hümayun için zabt, evbaş-ı memalik esbab-ı maaşdan mahrum olmağın bi-zaruri fesada ikdam ve mübaşeret eylemişlerdir. Anları ol taifeden hüsn-i tedbir ile tefrik, muceb-i feth ü zaferdir. Ale't-hakik... meşarih-i Dülkadirliden Pişanlı ve Karacalu boy beylerini ve sair benam ve ayanlarından bir kadı izz-i huzurlarına götürüp . . . ihsanlar eyledi. Mevaid-i mevfur ile ahdler ve istimaletler kıldı. İnşallahülazim feth-i müyesser oldukda ferman-ı padişah-ı cihan-muta ile cümleten Dülkadiriye kaimi iktalar ve tımarlar, cümle dirlikleri mukarrer olsun neyayir-i fitnenin intifasına sa'y eden Zülkadirlü boy beylerini gönderip anlar bu iltifat ile hoş hal olup, her birisi boylarına müteallik olan eşşira-yı fitnecuyi ve masiyethuy'un aram ü telkinlerine kefil oldular.”⁶⁴

Of course, the uprising did not develop entirely as a *sipahi* rebellion. As we mentioned at the beginning, it developed as a protest of the rural poor, and by the rebels defeated the local Ottoman forces, the tribal chiefs who had lost their former rights and the former Zülkadirid *sipahis*, who had lost their fiefs, contacted Kalender. However, it seems doubtful that these elements actually took part in Kalender's rebel army with their armed forces. As İbrahim Pasha noted, those who defeated the Ottoman forces in Karaçayır and Cincife were surprisingly semi-nomadic Turks, fugitive peasants and antinomian dervishes. İbrahim Paşa, during the inspections and interrogations about the reasons behind the defeats of the local provincial armies, clearly defines the rebels as a group of barefoot dervishes, fugitive peasants (Turks), dissenters and unruly *torlaks* (heretics).

“Taraf-ı İslam ile olup bu denlü vafir leşker ve güzide asker birle, bir bölük çıplak ışıklar, çiftbozan Türkler, münafıklar, erbab-ı şikakdan mühmel cıbil torlaklar ile mukabeleye kudret olmayıp, musafftan yüz çevirip fi-

⁶⁴Celalzade, 167a-b.

rar ihtiyar eylemek şerait-i merdanegi ve levazım-ı ferzanegiden dur ve mahcurdur.”⁶⁵

For the ordinary tribesmen and fugitive peasants, involvement in the rebellion was a means to protest the deterioration in their material conditions. Yet it is also known that messianic expectations were deeply rooted in the rural mentality, which triggered these masses to express their discontent through allegiance to a religious figure expected to bring justice to the world and improve the conditions of the oppressed and needy.⁶⁶ The messianic discourse was of course an unsystematised and unrefined expression of economic and political discontent rather than being expressive of a crystallised social programme. Furthermore, we know simply nothing about what Kalender or other leaders of the rebellions offered for a practical solution to the rural distress. If the rebel leaders were not members of the theological establishment in the pre-modern context, it was impossible to find any sources on the goals and program of the rebellion, except for partial references given by official chroniclers. An exception was Börklüce Mustafa, who advocated communal use of land and farm implements among the peasants if we consider Doukas as a reliable source for the Karaburun wing of the rebellion of 1416.

What could be inferred from the chronicler accounts (indeed, they were inevitably one-sided in their depictions) these enraged masses, attacking the state officials and supposedly the richer segments of the rural society, demolished the landed property, plundered their assets, and assaulted the women. This depiction of the rural masses' actions by the elite resembles a striking similarity with the French Jacquerie:

“emval ü asiyablarını garet ü hassaret eyleyip, etrafta olan reayayı dahi nehb ü yağma eyleyüb, külli fesada mübaşeret ü irtikab itdiler. Cihan per fitne ve aşub oldu/ Adl leggerleri mağlub oldu/ Zuhur ettii fesadat ve mezalim/ Emir ü hakim oldu halka-i zalim/ Raiyyet kaçdı köyler kaldı hali/ Amanın kalmadı kılınca mecali/ Mübah oldu dem ü eza ü acı halkın/ Alındı gitti başdan tacı halkın/ Reaya hali oldu ki mükedder/ Müslümanlar ziyade oldu muztarr/ Kamu emvali yağma eylediler/ Ayağı ser, seri pa eylediler/ Kızılbaş eylediler intisabı/ Edüp sittelere çok azabı/ Kılıçdan geçti müslim ser a ser/ Fesad ehline mülk oldu musahhar/ Elan âlânın oldu kendi asılıb(?)/ Nizama kesr geldi oldu mağlub/ Hükümet eyledi etrafa Türkman/ Ganem alayına gerek oldu çoban.”⁶⁷

⁶⁵Celalzade, 169a.

⁶⁶Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “XVI. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Anadolu’sunda Mesihyanik Hareketlerin Bir Tahlil Denemesi”, *V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi Tebliğler*, 21-25 Ağustos 1989, (Ankara 1990), 817-825.

⁶⁷Celalzade, 159a.

“Emval-i reayayı garet eyleyip bilad ve kuraya ateş-i suzan bırakıp ol diyarları nahb ü hasaret eylediler.”⁶⁸

“Memleket-i islamiyeden olan sittilere taarruz eyleyip, emval-i raiyeti talan ve tarac ettiler. Her canibde fitneler dökülüp, ezvac-ı evlad-ı be-rayaya yağma kılıp her taraf âşûb-kıyamet üslüb oldu.”⁶⁹

Moreover, the fact that the class composition of the insurgents was far from reflecting homogeneity, it would not be accurate to define these uprisings purely as peasant or nomad revolts. As they included impoverished fief holders and tribal notables, it would be more accurate to consider these rebellions, briefly, as rural uprisings. Here we should remember that “There were in fact very few ‘pure’ peasant movements at any rate on a mass scale, in the sense that the participants and leaders were exclusively of peasant origin.”⁷⁰ Bloch also underlines, “the great peasant insurrections were altogether too disorganised to achieve any lasting result’ and ‘almost invariably doomed to defeat and eventual massacre.”⁷¹

As the course of events suggests, tribal chieftains and former fief-holders sought to recover the political and economic privileges they enjoyed during Zülkadirid rule; a symptom of the intra-ruling class struggle over the distribution of the surplus obtained from peasants or ordinary tribesmen. The rebellion allowed them to bargain with the state.

As for Kalender’s personal objectives, we do not have a clue, except for the chroniclers’ accusation that Kalender pursued for establishing his secular authority. Here it is legitimate to ask whether the Zülkadirid notables ask and provoke Kalender to rise as a claimant for worldly powers. Given that the members of the Zülkadirid family formerly had close relations with the *tekke* of Hacı-Bektaş,⁷² this was probable. Another probability was, likewise the Sarbadars of Sabzevar, in an independent Zülkadiriyeh, a dual rule with a religious wing led by Kalender and his loyal dervishes and a military-administrative wing controlled by the tribal chieftains of the Zülkadirid confederacy would have been established.

In any case, in terms of the political positioning of the local elite (dispossessed fief-holders and tribal leaders who formerly lost their privileges), their temporal support to the rebelling party, and then negotiating with the state to recover their former

⁶⁸Celalzade, 163b.

⁶⁹Celalzade, 165a.

⁷⁰Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 121.

⁷¹Bloch, *French Rural History*, 170.

⁷²Yürekli, *Architecture and Hagiography*. Also see Faroqhi, "The Tekke of Hacı Bektaş"

rights, Kalender's uprising shows striking similarities with the Balkan flank of the rebellion of 1416. İbrahim Paşa was likely to be knowledgeable about the political tactics of Mehmed I to win the favour of dismissed Rumelian *sipahis* and persuade them to betray Bedreddin. History tragically repeated itself in the rebellion of 1526-27.

5.3 General Conclusion

Messianism in the Islamicate context is often discussed through the inclusion of this discourse into the royal vocabulary and in its relation to the construction of the rulers' images around this discourse, mainly through narrative literary sources. Although this discourse originates from the first major sectarian conflicts during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods (Tucker 2014) it appears that it penetrated more intensely into the elite discourse of power as a response to the legitimacy crisis the political and religious authorities were facing after the collapse of the Abbasid caliphate (1258) This phenomenon is also labelled as "royal counter-messianism," marked by the integration popular millenarian beliefs, apocalyptic expectations and messianic symbolism to the dynastic vocabulary and construction of the ruler's image around these ideas.⁷³

The image of ruler Mahdi resonated in the Ottoman elite discourse since the interregnum of 1402-1413.⁷⁴ From the suppression of Şeyh Bedreddin's uprising (1416) onwards, Ottoman sultans established close ties with Sufi masters and incorporated their esoteric teachings into the royal vocabulary as a policy to prevent the potential of messianic movement from below. With Mehmed II's rule, and his glorious achievement of the conquest of Constantinople, apocalypticism started to serve as a leitmotif of "the imperial ideology of westward conquests"; what Arjomend calls "realised messianism."⁷⁵ Architectures of this political agenda and discourse were the urban-Persianate Sufi masters, who started to exert their influence in the Ottoman court from Mehmed I's reign onwards. This development also marked the growing rift between the Ottoman establishment leaning towards Sufi-elitism and the traditional dervish orders of the countryside, such as Abdals of Rum and other

⁷³Arjomand, *Revolutions of the end of time*, 72.

⁷⁴Hüseyin Yılmaz, *Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought*. (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), 267.

⁷⁵Arjomend, *Revolutions of the end of time*, 79-81.

proto-Bektaşî groups with antinomian and latitudinarian leanings.⁷⁶

The relationship between the Ottomans and the Abdals was further strained with the rise of the *Kızılbaş* movement under the spiritual authorities of Şeyh Cüneyd and his descents Şeyh Haydar and Şah İsmail, from the second half of the fifteenth century onwards.⁷⁷ The messianic ethos of the Erdebil Sufis found adherents among members of the rural communities of Anatolia with relative ease. Antinomian dervish groups increasingly came under the influence of the Safavids of Erdebil, alarming the Ottoman authorities about the revolutionary messianic threat from below that the Safavid sympathisers were posing, as late as 1501.⁷⁸ It should also be reckoned those developments overlapped both with the first steps of confessional policies of Ottomans directed at Sunnitisation, which further alienated the confessionally ambiguous, “metadoxical” rural populations and with the eschatological anxieties about End Times, brought about by the entry into the last century of the first millennium of the Islamic calendar.⁷⁹

Besides, critical of the conformism within urban-Persianate Sufi networks, and institutionalised forms of Sufism, what scholars call “dervish piety” took root in the countryside marked by the dominance of vernacular Turkish.⁸⁰ The cultural milieu of rural convents of Kalenderis and Haydaris, along with itinerant dervish groups, such as Abdals, were likely influential in shaping the religious mentality and mystical set of beliefs of the rural populations. These groups of dervishes disdained mainstream Sufis’ close ties with the political and cultural elite, renounced elitism of the institutionalised Sufism, rejected *vakıf* establishment and property ownership, adhered to antinomianism and latitudinarianism, contrary to the social conservatism of the Sunni-minded “orthopraxy”, and embraced voluntary poverty and asceticism, which were antithetical of the social norms of the pre-capitalist, and tributary social relations. Messianism and apocalyptic visions were already key aspects of rural mysticism, especially in a social context where economic activity and the reproduction of material life took place in very marginal conditions. Constant threats of crop failure, famine, and endemic unproductivity (as in the case of Central Anatolian steppes), along with tribute demands from ruling classes regardless of the

⁷⁶Yılmaz, *Caliphate Redefined*, 242.

⁷⁷Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, *The Kızılbaş/Alevîs in Ottoman Anatolia*, 158.

⁷⁸Ibid, 262.

⁷⁹Terzioğlu, “Confessional Ambiguity,” 571; Dressler, “Inventing Orthodoxy.”

⁸⁰Zeynep Oktay. “Historicizing Alevism: The Evolution of Abdal and Bektashi Doctrine,” *The Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies* 13, no: 3-4, (2020), 429-31; Ahmet Karamustafa, “Kaygusuz Abdal: A Medieval Turkish Saint and the Formation of Vernacular Islam in Anatolia,” in *Unity in diversity: mysticism, messianism and the construction of religious authority in Islam*, edited by Orkhan Mir-Kasimov, (Leiden; Boston: Brill 2014), 330.

fluctuations in the rural wealth and the economic distress experienced by the rural commoners, made rural protest likely to adopt a messianic outlook. These protests often carried a political-moral claim to overturn the corrupt, oppressive and unjust order under the leadership of a charismatic antinomian dervish who was supposed to embrace “Alid” features vis-à-vis the illegitimate rule of the “Yazid.”⁸¹

However, we still lack primary sources produced by the popular classes themselves which could be pivotal to discuss the cultural-discursive elements of the formation of the messianism among the rural poor. Besides the lack of primary material produced from below, as state and elite-centred historiography has dominated the field, this phenomenon does not attract much attention in historiography. It should be underlined that messianism forms diverse imaginations, signifies different sets of meanings in the mentalities and worldviews of groups of people living in a radically divided society in terms of class and power, and thus triggers different and opposing kinds of social action. Therefore, it should not be considered as a holistic and homogeneous concept. As mentioned, the messianism of the rural poor represented their devotion to religious leaders, Abdal/dervish type of vernacular Islam, whom they tended to see as ultimate saviours in the face of the worsening material conditions. Their adherence was not necessarily stemming from that such leaders were consciously acting to radically transform social relations or they offered practical and actual solutions and regulations to social relations in favour of the rural poor.⁸² In this context, we can conclude that the rural masses’ vision and expectation of justice, though it was imaginary, and it lacked a clear-cut definition, was a material ideology that nevertheless disrupted the rural class and power relations, and dragged the “natural order of things” into chaos.

Despite the scarcity of sources, we can propose a few hypothetical claims about the sources of rural messianism. The first is the impact of vernacularization and dervish piety, which developed in opposition to the elite and state-supported Sufi circles, thus gaining an anti-establishment character, on the rural populations. In this way, the leaders of the antinomian dervish groups emerged as local trustees who acted as mediators on behalf of the common people in the daily conflicts with the Ottoman officials. They were likely seen as charismatic and just leaders who could address the economic and social problems experienced by the rural poor, whether or not they had an actual political program. In some cases of rural upheaval, they even assumed leadership of the rebellion.

⁸¹Ocak, “XVI. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Anadolu’sunda Mesiyenik Hareketlerinin Bir Tahlil Denemesi,” 820-21.

⁸²For instance, Ismail I was not a social reformer even if he, relying on a messianic discourse, managed to get militant support of the Anatolian Türkmén who were experiencing social alienation and economic distress under the Ottoman rule. H. R. Roemer, “The Safavid Period,” in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol.6, edited by P. Jackson and L. Lockhart, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986a), 331-32.

Secondly, in the Anatolian countryside of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, marked by confessional ambiguity, it is predictable that spiritual and religious charisma, the notion of justice, and the ethos of rebellion were associated with philo-Alidism and Ahl al-Baytism. Were groups of wandering antinomian dervishes, portrayed as simple beggars and vagabonds consuming hashish and exhibiting animalistic behaviours by writers from elite-Sufi and ulema circles, merely stayed as social parasites in the villages and quarters of Türkmen tribes? These observations may be true to some extent, but it can also be thought that such dervishes received respect mixed with fear from the locals as mystical storytellers. They might have recited memorised verses from the Abu-Muslim name, Ali's courageous deeds, and lamented the martyrdom of Husayn in Karbala.⁸³ It is known that during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, non-sectarian forms of philo-Alidism were integrated into Sunni confessionalism as an integral part of it.⁸⁴ However, antinomian dervish groups such as *abdals* of Rum maintained their revolutionary-Messianic Alid loyalties, an “unacceptable form of philo-Alidism” for the Ottoman authorities. With the rise of the Safavids and Kızılbaş movement, the division between acceptable and unacceptable forms of philo-Alidism began to be defined more strictly by the Ottoman authorities. This exacerbated the dynamics of social unrest in terms of confessional polarisation.⁸⁵

It is also highly probable that a dervish living as a hermit in a nearby cave was stigmatised as a deviant by the elites and *ulema* but revered as a healer or an *evliya* performing miracles by the local villagers.⁸⁶ A third point to underline here is the reciprocal nature of the relationship between antinomian dervishes and rural commoners; and briefly, the role of antinomian and latitudinarian dervishes and rural convents in the rural context. In his famous article on Otman Baba, *Dervish* and *Sultan*, İnalçık shows how an Abdal, without being attached to the institutions of the conventional Sufis, draws his social support from the poorest Yörüks, shepherds and landless peasants. According to İnalçık, Abdals' doctrines were shaped around the principles of reaching the help of the needy, helpless and oppressed and resisting the ones who oppressed common people in pursuit of worldly gain and material

⁸³Csirkés underlines that in the formative period of the *Kızılbaş* movement, such circles of legendary storytelling about messianic figures such as Abu Muslim were quite active in Anatolia and Iran. Ferenc Csirkés, “Popular Religiosity and Vernacular Turkic: A Qezelbash Catechism from Safavid Iran”, in *Safavid Persia in the Age of Empires*, ed. C. Melville (London, N.Y., New Delhi, Sydney, 2021), 214. Also see, Rıza Yıldırım “In the name of Hosayn's Blood: The Memory of Karbala as Ideological Stimulus to the Safavid Revolution”, *Journal of Persianate Studies* 8, no. 2. 127–54.

⁸⁴Terzioğlu, “Confessional Ambiguity,” 568.

⁸⁵Ibid, 567-586.

⁸⁶For instance, Şahkulu (1511) and Şah Veli (1520) for a time lived in a cave as ascetics and won local villagers' respect.

benefit.⁸⁷ Barkey rationalises the relationship between rural convents and peasants as a patron-client relation that works for both sides' benefit yet, following Faroqhi, also adds that as a closer and voluntary type of relation it “casts a shadow on *reaya-timar* holder relations which. . . were not so close.” What Barkey points out here, of course, regards the relationship between leaders of small rural convents and peasants. Faroqhi analyses the economic activities of the large rural convent complexes of the Bektashis such as the tekke of Seyyid Gazi, of the late sixteenth century onwards and exhibits that these foundations were also operating as financial centres in the countryside by loaning money at a relatively high interest rate.⁸⁸ The period Faroqhi examines corresponds to the gradual assimilation of Abdal, Kalenderi and Haydari groups into the Bektashi order and the transition of the Bektashi order in line with the mainstream and conventional Sufism as resting on a strictly institutionalised and supervised network. Otman Baba, Abdals of Rum and other proto-Bektashi groups of the early sixteenth century and earlier periods were totally alien to such a structure. Therefore, Faroqhi's observations about the economic activities of the convent of Seyyid Gazi, do not say much about the antinomien-latitudinarian ethos of the earlier periods onto which Abdal doctrines that İnalçık discusses were founded. Maybe the story about the correspondence of Yunus Emre, who appeared as a poor and needy peasant whose village was stricken by famine, with Hacı Bektaş as a famous saint in *Manakıb-ı Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli* indicates more about the ethics of reciprocity between Abdals and the rural poor of the earlier periods.⁸⁹

The last point to underline is the impact of the Eschatological anxieties of the Ottoman officials at the millenarian juncture of the early sixteenth century. The millenarian vocabulary and apocalyptic mode of thinking that shaped the world-views of the elite circles also entailed the expectation for the emergence of *decal* at the end times. The traumatic memory of the chaos that the *Kızılbaş* rebels led by Şahkulu; “Şeytankulu” in official Ottoman discourse dragged the Anatolian countryside in 1511-12 was still fresh. This was one of the reasons behind Ottoman officials' alert and strict response towards rural discontent voiced by antinomian dervishes. In the narratives about Şahkulu (1511) and Şah Veli (1519-20) uprisings, rebel leaders were depicted as imposters, with *decal*-like features, deceiving common people with pseudo-prophetic qualities, performing fake miracles, controlling *jinns*, living as ascetics in caves to replicate the mythos around the resurgence of the Mahdi from

⁸⁷İnalçık, *The Middle East and the Balkans*, 23.

⁸⁸Suraiya Faroqhi, “Seyyid Gazi Revisited: The Foundation as Seen Through Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Documents”, *Turcica*, XI (42) (1981), 90-122.

⁸⁹Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, ed., *Manakıb-ı Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli “Vilayet-Name”*. (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitapevi, 1958), 48-49.

the occultation, and recognised by their followers as such. No such qualities were explicitly mentioned for Kalender, except for his pursuit of *saltanat* and *hilafet*. As mentioned, Celalzade underlines he acted against and cancelled the obligations of the true religion. In the elite narratives of the rebellions of 1526-27, anti-*Kızılbaş* discourse was less employed. The rebels were condemned as *zümre-i baghi*, *ehl-i fesad*, *münafık*, *Harici* (instead of *Kızılbaş*, and also as a term distinguishing them from the Shi'ites at the same time invoking an acceptable form of "philo-Alidism"), *fırka-i dalal* (with erroneous beliefs, seemingly a milder choice than denominating them as *mürted* or *zındık*). Only Solakzade, among the contemporary chroniclers, explicitly states Kalender declared himself Mahdi.⁹⁰

However, neither the expectation of a Mahdi, permeated in the mystical thought of the rural commoners, nor the messianic claims of a dervish or spiritual leader, can alone explain the dynamics behind rural uprisings in pre-capitalist societies. In this historical setting, radically divided between armed tribute collectors and unarmed tribute payers, the political protest was almost tantamount to suicide for the rural commoners. For this reason, we devoted the second part of our thesis entirely to explaining that Ottoman rural society in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was a class society based on the exploitation of rural masses. In the third chapter, we showed that the fiscal and political mechanisms of the Ottoman tribute state left the nomadic pastoralists, who were the truly free and mobile groups of the countryside, in a dilemma: either evolve into dependent peasantry or rebel against the Ottomans. In the fourth chapter, we deconstructed views that presented the Ottoman state as a neutral mechanism monolithically organized from top to bottom, or as an agent able to determine social processes without encountering any obstacles. Focusing on the annexation process of a vassal principality and the fief distribution processes, which reflected the conflict-negotiation dynamics between the factions of the ruling class, we tried to illustrate that the state itself is a social relationship, a field of struggle between the factions of the ruling class, thus an open-ended process.

The last point needs further explanation, revealing the law-like dynamics of motion in the Ottoman social formation before the last decades of the sixteenth century, marked by the Great Celali uprisings. Tributary states were unable to transform the ruling classes into disciplined bureaucratic strata, entirely autonomous from the constraints of the existing relations of production. The political and social reproduction of the ruling classes depended on their coercive power to appropriate the surplus of the direct producers in the countryside. Establishing this structure required a compromise between the ruler and the fractions of the ruling class, organised as a power

⁹⁰Erkan, "16. yy'da Kızılbaş Ayaklanmaları", 255.

bloc with relative balances of power. If divisions within the ruling class escalated into open conflict, the rural commoners, under economic distress and influenced by revolutionary-Messianic religious ideologies, became emboldened to revolt. This was because the ruling class's political control over them was temporarily weakened

Here, I would like to underline a key point: Acute forms of intra-ruling class conflicts, such as an interregnum or a civil war between the heirs of the sultan, like the interregnum of 1403-12 or 1510-12, or conquest of a Türkmen principality by the Ottomans and subsequent forced removal of its old-ruling class from its seat (as seen in the upheavals in Karaman between 1483-1501; between 1515-1530 in Zülkadiriye), were usually followed by series of rural revolts of the commoners. The laws of motion of the Ottoman social formation between the fourteenth and late sixteenth centuries may be embedded in these class dynamics. Beginning with the Great Celali uprisings (the 1580s onwards), corresponded to a period of rapid monetisation and inflation as results of the external pressure of the developing Atlantic trade radically altered the balances of power of the ruling class fractions within the power bloc. After that, urban classes aligned with the janissaries appeared as a novel determining fraction. Local provincial elite (fief-holders) ceased to be an important fraction, yet the provincial governors (Beylerbeyis) started to exert their authority in the peripheries, relatively independent of the centre's intervention. They appeared as potential challengers of the sultan's authority, thanks to their local recruits (*kapı-halkı*, most of them were *levends* and unemployed former *sipahis*)

However, revolts of the rural commoners in the early sixteenth century, either stemming from messianic-*kızılbaş* sentiments or as a sporadic act of protest due to the deteriorating material conditions or both, reflected the fact that the ruling class fractions had to constitute and act as a harmoniously functioning power bloc for the maintenance and reproduction of the conditions of efficient control over the direct producers. This structure necessitated a certain degree of mutual dependence among its elements. On the contrary, the dismissal of local fief-holders in a province like "Vilayet-i Türkmen" where local customs and tribal allegiances dominated the social relations, triggered uprisings of the rural commoners.

It was not a mere coincidence that Şeyh Bedreddin and Börklüce Mustafa rebellions (1416) followed the Ottoman interregnum after the defeat of Ankara (1402). Börklüce's case was also interesting for the fact that it coincided with the power struggle between the supporters of İzmiroğlu Cüneyd and Ottomans in the province of Aydın. In Bedreddin's case, besides the rural commoners, Prince Musa's supporters in the Balkans, *akıncı* families and former fief-holders who were dismissed after Mehmed I's succession gathered under the Şeyh's banner until the Ottoman centre pardoned

them by ratifying their former privileges.

The second case was the Türkmen upheavals in the province of Karaman, and the Taurus region, following the annexation of the Beylik of Karaman, and then the struggle between Bayezid II and Prince Cem. The last of this series of revolts crashed in 1501-02 but a large population of the defeated Türkmen tribes in the Taurus region migrated to Iran. Those would be the most militant supporters and participants of Ismail I's campaigns.

The third case, the Şahkulu revolt in 1511-12, coincided with the struggle between Bayezid II's heirs, increasing alienation of the Türkmen tribes from the Ottoman rule and adherence to the Safavids, monetisation and revocation of the timars of local fief-holders in Anatolia in favour of the followers and dependents of the state-elite in the centre.

Fourth was the subsequent upheavals in the former territories of the Zülkadirids and in the province of Rum, during the 1520s, following the integration of the principality into the Ottoman realm in 1515, the extermination of the Zülkadirid dynasty by Ferhat Paşa in 1522, and revocation of the fiefs of the local elite. The rebellion of 1526-27, which ended with the execution of Kalender and his followers in Sarız, was the last of such examples.

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APPENDIX A

Figure A.1 Population, paid tributes and the economic indicators of the tribes of Çiçeklü, Mesudlu, Ağcakoyunlu, Hisarbeylü and Söklen according to B.O.A TTD. 155

Name of the tribe/mezra	Nef er	Han e	Müce rred	Sipahi /Sipahi-zade	Müsel lem	Tax paid in akçes (resm-i ağnam or tithe)	Average sheep per house-hold	Nomad or Semi-nomad	Bad-ı Hava
Kabile-i Çiçeklü									
1. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezraa-i Saruoğlan	18	12	3	2		200	33,33	N. inadequate herd (i.)	270
2. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezraa-i Ferah Kışla	33	16	13	4		u.(<1030)	u.	N, unknown (u.)	u.
3. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, u.	20	10	7			150	30	N, i.	300
4. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezraa-i Kepirce	11	9	1			400	88,8	N	165
5. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezraa-i ...ağıl	8	5	1			u.(<276)	u.	N, u.	u.
6. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, u.	30	24	3	1	1	600	50	N, i.	420
7. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezraa-i Habib Kethüda Kışlası	1	1				20	20	N, i.	15

8. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezraa-i Domuz deresi	13	13				u.(<491)		N, u.	u.
9. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezraa-i Teçe kavağı	44	31	8	4		400	25,8	N, i.	660
10. Cemaat-i <u>Yapasınlı</u> der mezraa-i Yava Hacı	66	42	22	1		1000	46,61	Semi-nomad, i.	1000
10a. Mezraa-i Yavahacı						5000			
11. Cemaat-i Yapasınlı, der mezraa-i Yavahacı el-mezbur	49	32	8	4		1000	62,5	N	600
12. Cemaat-i Harun, der mezraa-i Dügün öyüğü	13	12	1			600	100	N	200
13. Cemaat-i Harun-i diğer, der mezraa-i Dügün Öyüğü	6	5	1			202	80,8	Sn.	90
13a. Mezraa-i Dügün öyüğü						500			
13b. Mezraa-i Kaynar yer						300			
14. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezraa-i Darılı yurt	27	19	2	4	1	50	5,26	Sn, i.	390
14a. Mezraa-i Darılı yurt						1000			
14b. Mezraa-i Çil viran						400/400			
15. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezraa-i Çil viran el-mezbur	14	9	3			u.(<394)	u.	N, u.	u.
16. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, u.	27	14	4	3	1	500	71,4	Sn.	390
16a. Mezraa-i Karakuyu (iki başdan vakıf)						400/400			
16b. Mezraa-i Çokum ağıl						1200			
16c. Mezraa-i Şah ağıl						200			
17. Cemaat-i Taf, der mezraa-I ...kanak	51	38	4	2	4	1500	78,9	Sn	765
17a. Mezraa-i İpekcik						100			
17b. Mezraa-i Boyalıviran						400			

18. Cemaat-i Taf, der mezraa-i Uzun in ve Küçük ark	15	9	1	4	1	500	55,5	Sn, i.	275
18a. Mezraa-i Uzunin						300			
18b. Mezraa-i Küçük ark						300			
19. Cemaat-i Taf, u.	24	8	5	2	8	500	125	Sn	360
19a. Mezraa-i Virankadı						500			
19b. Mezraa-i Kethuda argı						1000			
20. Cemaat-i Taf, der mezraa-i Acıca kışla	12	12				300	50	Sn, i.	180
20a. Mezra-i Acıca kışla						300			
21. Cemaat-i Taf, u.	9	6	1	1		u.		Sn, u.	u.
21a. Mezraa-i Karakoç						500			
22. Cemaat-i Taf, der mezraa-i Çakalviran ma Ağaçviran	7	2		5		100	100	Sn	100
22a. Mezraa-i Çakalviran						1000			
23. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezraa-i Acıcağöl	2	2				50	50	N, i.	u.
24. Cemaat-i Çiçeklü, der mezraa-i Yeğencik	19	11	3	2	1	500	90,9	Sn	235
24a. Mezraa-i Yeğencik						600			
25. Cemaat-i Taf, der mezraa-i Baş firus	18	14	3			500	71,4	Sn	270
25a. Mezraa-i Tatar argı						1000			
25b. Mezraa-i Boğazağıl						100			
26. Cemaat-i Taf, der mezraa-i Tatar argı	5	5				u(<210)	u.	N, u.	u.
27. Cemaat-i Taf, der mezraa-i Tatar argı ve Ağaç viran	16	14	2			500	71,4	Sn	240
27a. Mezraa-i Kaldırım						200			

27b. Mezraa-i Ağaçviran						500			
28. Cemaat-i Yapasınlı, der mezraa-i Tatar argı	12	8	5			200	50	N, i.	240
29. Cemaat-i Bahaddinlü, u.	33	26	3	1		574	44,1	Sn, i.	500
29a. Mezraa-i Pir beylü						400			
29b. Mezraa-i Taşpınar						400			
29c. Mezraa-i Yassıpınar(malike vakf)						200/200			
30. Cemaat-i Sipahizadegan			7						
30a. Mezraa-i Bağçecik						700			
30b. Mezraa-i Acıpınar						700			
31. Cemaat-i Poladlu (yüzdecivan?), u.	55	43	4	1	1	1500	87,2	Sn	800
31a. Mezraa-i Erikli						500			
31b. Mezraa-i Çintemür						500			
31c. Mezraa-i Yoğunpelye						600			
32. Cemaat-i Koştemürlü (yüzdecivan?), u.	23	16	2	3	1	500	78,1	Sn	345
32a. Mezraa-i Emrud çayı						500			
32b. Mezraa-i Kavacık						200			
32c. Mezraa-i Olukkkaya						140			
32d. Mezraa-i Boğa alanı						200			
32e. Mezraa-i Kantara						100			
32f. Mezraa-i Yokuşyol başı						100			
32g. Mezraa-i Çupi çardağı						200			
33. Cemaat-i Şeyh İsmailü, yüzdecivan, u.	63	46	8	5		1800	97,8	Sn	945
33a. Mezraa-i Kılıçözü						1000			

33b. Mezraa-i Debildeyik						200			
33c. Mezraa-i Larende						1000			
33d. Mezraa-i Eriklü						400			
33e. Mezraa-i Kışlak-ı Rumbeylü						400			
33f. Mezraa-i Kızılcağışla						100			
33g. Mezraa-i Gökçekışla						500			
33h. Mezraa-i Çerik oğlu						100			
33i. Mezraa-i Sorkun						200			
34. Cemaat-i Karpuzlu, yüzdecian	29	28				<u>u(<1013)</u>	u.	N, u.	u.
35. Cemaat-i Köşkerlü, yüzdecian	24	10	3	10		375	93.7	Sn	360
35a. Mezraa-i Sağireni						700			
35b. Mezraa-i Karakısık						200			
35c. Mezraa-i Eimalıca						200			
35d. Mezraa-i Kafirderesi						700			
35e. Mezraa-i Çardaköyüğü						400			
35f. Mezraa-i Sorkun						200			
36. Cemaat-i Karalu, yüzdecian,	8	5	1			<u>u(<329)</u>	u.	Sn, u.	u.
36a. Mezraa-i Alaacalar pınarı						200			
37. Cemaat-i Şarklu, yüzdecian,	3	1	1			75	187	Sn	45
37a. Mezraa-i Kışlak-ı Ali kethüda						200			
37b. Mezraa-i Kışlak-ı Seydi Kavacı						700			
38. Cemaat-i Beş bacaklu, yüzdecian	4	2	1			75	93,5	Sn	60
38a. Mezraa-i Kışlak-ı Beş bacaklu						400			

39. Cemaat-i Yuvağılı	7	6		1		<u>u(<2489)</u>	u.	Sn, u.	u.
39a. Mezraa-i Dikilitaş						400			

Name of the tribe/mezra	Nefe r	Han e	Müce rred	Sipahi /Sipahizade	Müse llem	Tax paid in akçes (resm-i ağnam or tithe)	Average sheep per house hold	Nomad or Semi-nomad	Bad-ı Hava
Kabile-i Mesudlu									
1. Cemaat-i Mesudlu, der mezraa-i Til, yüzdecian	16	8	1	5	1	75	23,4	<u>Sn.i</u>	240
1a. Mezraa-i Til						310			
1b. Mezraa-i Meytut viran						100			
2. Cemaat-i Mesudlu, yüzdecian, u.	8	6			1	<u>u(<221)</u>	u.i.	<u>Sn.i</u>	u.
2a. Mezraa-i Elmalu						300			
3. Cemaat-i Mesudlu, der mezraa-i Kaman, yüzdecian	5	3	2			45	37,5	Sn.i.	75
3a. Mezraa-i Yağmak						200			
3b. Mezraa-i Çoğun(T)						200			
4. Cemaat-i Mesudlu, der mezraa-i Saru, yüzdecian	6	2	2			45	56,2	Sn.i.	70
4a. Mezraa-i Saru						200			
4b. Mezraa-i Bağdadlı viranı						100			
4c. Mezraa-i Boğaz kışla						30			
4d. Mezraa-i Derecik						1000			
4e. Mezraa-i Burnukır bardağı						200			
5. Cemaat-i Mesudlu, u. (yüzdecian?)	2	2				50	62,5	Sn.	30
5a. Mezraa-i Emirçardağı						100			
5b. Mezraa-i Söğütlüceviran						500			

6. Cemaat-i Mesudlu, an nahiye-i Kars amed-end	16	10	3			50	10	N, i.	200	
7. Cemaat-i Üvrulu, yüzdecıyan	101	85	7	4		1090	32	Sn.i	1446	
7a. Mezraa-i Kışlak-ı Sarı İshaklu						500				
7b. Mezraa-i Kabağağaç						750				
7c. Mezraa-i ?						750				
7d. Mezraa-i Siyah abdal						125				
7e. Mezraa-i Eymirli						500				
7f. Mezraa-i kışlak-ı Karaca Süleyman						800				
7g. Mezraa-i Kabacaoğlu						225				
7h. Mezraa-i Darıcı						500				
7i. Mezraa-i Sacebey Kışlası						500				
7j. Mezraa-i Saru Kullu						300				
7k. Mezraa-i Söğdücü						100				
8. Cemaat-i Avşar, yüzdecıyan, u.	52	37	2		10	300	20,2	Sn.i	755	
8a. Mezraa-i Avşar-ı büzürg						850				
8b. Mezraa-i Sarnıç						100				
8c. Mezraa-i Delüfakı oğlu						500				
9. Cemaat-i Çatalkışla, u.	18	11	2	5		200	36,6	Sn., i.	270	
9a. Mezraa-i Çatalkışla						400				
10. Cemaat-i Çomaklu	17	3	9		4	50	33,33	Sn., i.	255	
10a. Mezraa-i Toprakpınar						700				
10b. Mezraa-i Künbed						600				
10c. Mezraa-i Taşlıkuyu						500				
10d. Mezraa-i Diklitaş						200				
10e. Mezraa-i Kepirayık						500				
10f. Mezraa-i Körcekuyu						400				

11. Cemaat-i Ayvadlu, yüzdecıyan, u.	10	10				75	18,7	Sn.i	150	
11a. Mezraa-i Acıca						400				
11b. Mezraa-i Musa Abdal kavağı						700				
12. Cemaat-i Ağayillü, yüzdecıyan, u.	22	22				255	28,9	Sn.i	345	
12a. Mezraa-i Ağayillü						880				
12b. Mezraa-i Seydi öyüğü						100				
12c. Mezraa-i Başkışla(T)						200				
12d. Mezraa-i Sıraç						400				
12e. Mezraa-i Kavakkışla						400				

Name of the tribe/mezra	Nefe r	Hane	Müce rred	Sipahi /Sipahizade	Müse llem	Tax paid in akçes (resm-i ağnam or tithe)	Average sheep per house hold	Nomad or Semi-nomad	Bad-ı Hava
Kabile-i Ağcakoyunlu									
1. Cemaat-i Ağcakoyunlu, hassa-i padişah-ı alempenah, 1a. Mezraa-i Ayrubagöyüğü	136	117	4	15		u. (<8093) 730	u.	Sn.	u.
1b. Mezraa-i Boyadlu						420			
2. Cemaat-i Beğmişhacılı, hassa-i padişah-ı alempenah,	74	66	7		1	u. (<3628)	u.	N.	u.
3. Cemaat-i Mihmadlı, hassa-i padişah-ı alempenah,	197	177	13	1	3	3000	33,8	<u>Ni</u>	3000
4. Cemaat-i İleminlü,	42	29	12	1		690 (resm-i yatak 1500, mahsül-i niyabet-i kışla 1500)	47,5	Sn., i. 630	
4a. Mezraa-i Akçakaya ve <u>Ali fakı</u> kışlası						1000			
5. Cemaat-i İlyas Hacılı, u.	6	2		4		<u>u</u> (<182)	u.	N., u.	u.
6. Cemaat-i İdem, u.	6	6				200	66,6	N.	90
7. Cemaat-i Gedük Ağcakoyunlusu, u.	42	41			1	500	24,3	N., i.	600
8. Cemaat-i Mesudlu, der mezraa-i <u>Alınpınar</u>	4	4				<u>u</u> (<188)	u.	Sn. u.	u.
8a. Mezraa-i Alınpınar						200			

8b. Mezraa-i Gütül Kavak						100			
8c. Mezraa-i Viranşehir						1500			
9. Cemaat-i Mesudlu, der mezraa-i Minarekaya	6	5	1			100	40	Sn., i.	90
9a. Mezraa-i Minarekaya						200+30			
9b. Mezraa-i İki yol arası						300			

Kabile-i Şam Bayadı									
Name of the tribe/mezra	Nefer	Hane	Mücerred	Sipahi /Sipahizade	Müsel- lem	Tax paid in akçes (resm-i ağnam or tithe)	Average sheep per house- hold	Nomad or Semi-nomad	Bad-ı Hava
1. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Başkışla	19	16	2			100	12,5	Sn., i.	300
1a. Mezraa-i Başkışla						400			
1b. Mezraa-i Çağatay oğlu ve Kemal fakı						500			
2. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i İl kışla	8	8				<u>u</u> (<156)	u.	Sn.	120
2a. Mezraa-i Zinde kışla						200			
3. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü der mezraa-i?	8	8				50	12,5	Sn., i.	75
3a. Mezraa-i Öyük						100			
4. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Ramazanlu	8	7	1			200	57,1	<u>Sn i</u>	120
4a. Mezraa-i Ramazanlu						400			
4b. Mezraa-i Söylerkilise						100			
5. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Kürdi	10	8	1			100	25	<u>Sn i</u>	250
5a. Mezraa-i Kürdi						200			
6. Cemaat-i <u>Hisarbeylü</u> , u.	15	9	4	1	1	100	22,2	<u>Sn i</u>	200
6a. Mezraa-i Kemer, malikane vakf-ı zaviye						100(di-vani)100(mal-ikane)			
6b. Mezraa-i Söğüdcük						500			

7. Cemaat-i Hisarbeyli, der mezraa-i Kemer	7	7				200	57,1	Sn.i	100
7b. Mezraa-i Kemer, malikane vakf-ı zaviye						50/50			
8. Cemaat-i Has Bey, an cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Alikı	20	13	2	2		200	30,7	Sn. i.	300
8a. Mezraa-i Alikı						200			
9. Cemaat-i Has bey, an cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Gazi Köyü	6	4	1			100	50	Sn., i.	90
9a. Mezraa-i Gazi Köyü						200			
10. Cemaat-i Has Bey, an cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Kayacuk ağıl	9	7	2			u(<263)	u.	Sn. u.	u.
10a. Mezraa-i Kayacuk ağıl						200			
11. Cemaat-i Has Bey, an cemaat-i Hisarbeyü, der mezraa-i Kargadalı	6	6				100	33,3	N. i.	90
12. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Kargaadalı	5	5				100	40	N.i	75
13. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Kargadalı	6	5			1	100	40	N.i	90
14. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, u.	20	12	2	1	5	300	50	Sn.i	300
14a. Mezraa-i Çal ağıl						400			
14b. Mezraa-i Alımpınar						200			
14c. Mezraa-i Kayalu						100			
15. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Yağlıcağöl	10	8	1	1		100	25	Sn.i	150
15a. Mezraa-i Yağlıcağöl						200			

15b. Mezraa-i Kışlak-ı Topal Abdal (T)						200			
16. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Alakilise	22	16		1	4	u(<662)	u.	Sn. u.	u.
16a. Mezraa-i Alakilise						400			
16b. Mezraa-i Murad Abdal						300			
16c. Mezraa-i Derviş Budak						400			
17. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Budakkaya	12	9			3	100	22,2	Sn. i.	180
17a. Mezraa-i Budakkaya ma Kurucaöz						100/100			
18. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Kara öyük	3	2				u. (<116)		Sn. u.	
18a. Mezraa-i Karaöyük						200			
19. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, u.	9	8		1		100	25	Sn. i.	123
19a. Mezraa-i Belağcahan						400			
19b. Mezraa-i Çanakçı kışlası						400			
19c. Mezraa-i Yeni Bey Oyüğü						300			
20. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Parmaksız	3	1	2			20	40	Sn.i	45
20a. Mezraa-i Parmaksız						500			
21. Cemaat-i Hisarbeylü, der mezraa-i Güzelce Köprü	23	18	3		1	500	55,5	Sn.i	345
21a. Mezraa-i Güzelce Köprü						1000			
21b. Mezraa-i Hunlar vıranı						100			
21c. Mezraa-i Bozla ve ?						500			
1. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Pircepınarı	6		1			130	52	Sn.i	90

1a. Mezraa-i Pircepınarı						200/200			
2. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Beştepe	5		1			<u>u</u> (<330)	u.	<u>Sn.u</u>	u.
2a. Mezraa-i Beş tepe						200			
2b. Mezraa-i Yalnızca Şeyh						500			
3. Cemaat-i Söklen, u.	3	3				30	20	<u>Sn.i</u>	45
3a. Mezraa-i Yahya saray						500			
3b. Mezraa-i Yağmur kışla						500			
3c. Mezraa-i Ayrancı						200			
4. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Bağçecik	6	5	1			100	40	<u>Sn.i</u>	90
4a. Mezraa-i Bağçecik						400+30			
4b. Mezraa-i Çokkuyu						500			
4c. Mezraa-i Karacakısıık						200			
4d. Mezraa-i Sarucılar						500			
4e. Mezraa-i Karaseydi						400			
5. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Çukur viran	3	3				50	33,3	<u>Sn.i</u>	45
5a. Mezraa-i Çukur viran						500			
5b. Mezraa-i Ballık						200			
6. Cemaat-i Söklen, u.	5	5				130	52	Sn.i.	75
6a. Mezraa-i Gölcüğeş						200			
6b. Mezraa-i Koçi kethüda kışlası						400			
6c. Mezraa-i Piri Bey kışlası						600			
7. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Yaprak başı	1	1				50	100	Sn.	25
7a. Mezraa-i Yaprak başı						100			

7b. Mezraa-i Büklü viran						200			
7c. Mezraa-i Kul oğlu						200			
8. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Selam kavağı	4	3				80	53,3	<u>Sn.i</u>	60
8a. Mezraa-i Selam kavağı						400			
8b. Mezraa-i Şamlu saray						500			
9. Cemaat-i Söklen, u.	6	6				<u>u</u> (<272)	u.	Sn. u.	u.
9a. Mezraa-i Enek özü						200			
10. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Bağçecik	3	2		1		20	20	Sn.i.	45
10a. Mezraa-i Bağçecik, cemaat-i mezbur ve haricden Hacı ziraat eder						500			
11. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Yakabayad	3	1		1	1	u.	u.	Sn. u.	
11a. Mezraa-i Yakabayad ve Göllüçeğez						200			
12. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Şehirli Kethüda	3	3				100	66,6	Sn.	
12a. Mezraa-i Şehirli Kethüda						400			
12b. Mezraa-i Veled-i Köşe						500			
13. Cemaat-i Kara Çerçilü, ankabile-i Söklen, u.	2	2				80	80	N.	30
14. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Arpalık ve Atçasu	4	4				200	100	Sn.	60
14a. Mezraa-i Arpalık ve Atçasu						600			
14b. Mezraa-i Bayır						200			
14c. Mezraa-i Aşçı kışlası						300			
15. Cemaat-i Söklen, u.	2	2				<u>u</u> (<144)	u.	Sn.u.	u.

15a. Mezraa-i Alem Bey kışlası (T)						500			
15b. Mezraa-i Koçi Bey kışlası						1000			
16. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Kozcuğaz	4	3			1	100	66,6	Sn.	60
16a. Mezraa-i Kozcuğaz						400			
16b. Mezraa-i Ark-ı Haydar Bey ve ark-ı Zekeriya ve ark-ı Ali bin Söklen						1800			
17. Cemaat-i Söklen der mezraa-i Kozcuğaz	2	2				50	50	Sn. i.	30
17a. Mezraa-i Kozcuğaz						200			
17b. Mezraa-i Saycuğaz ve Çarşı köşesi						600			
18. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i u.	3	3				u.	u.	Sn. u.	u.
18a. Mezraa-i Karaca öyük						400			
19. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Yağsub öyüğü	3	3				100	66,6	Sn.	45
19a. Mezraa-i Yağsuböyüğü						500			
19b. Mezraa-i Dilkünallıyan						400			
20. Cemaat-i Söklen, der mezraa-i Koçak	5	3		2		50	50	Sn. i.	75
20a. Mezraa-i Koçak						400			
20b. Mezraa-i Piri Bey kışlası						200			
20c. Mezraa-i Emir Bey kışlası						200			
21. Cemaat-i Söklen, u.	10	3		1		u.(<420)	u.	Sn. u.	u.
21a. Mezraa-i Kuşaklıöyük ve Çıkrıkçı						400+400			
22. Cemaat-i Sarı Çelebili, an-kabile-i Söklen	19	15			4	530	70,6	Sn.	300

22a. Mezraa-i İn kışla						400			
22b. Mezraa-i Payanoğlu kışlası						500			
22c. Mezraa-i Hozman						500+180			
23. Cemaat-i Salur an-kabile-i Söklen	11	10	1			300	60	Sn.	135
23a. Mezraa-i Çomaktepe						400			

APPENDIX B

Figure B.1 Distribution of fief holders in Zamantu according to B.O.A TTd.124 (c.1524)

Fief holder(s)	Revenue base settlement(s)	Revenue Total	Social Background	Provincial Origins	Reason of Bestowal	Date of Bestowal
1. Sinan Kethüda, v. Osman	k. Köpeklü	2010	Sipahi-Kethüda	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief [layık-ı dirlik]	M.929
2. Çakır	k. Süksün k. Herne	2960	Sipahizade	Zülkadir	Transferred from [tahvil] Ayas, v. Abdullah, Deserves to hold a fief	M.930
3. Alagöz, v. Abdullah	k. Kozcuğaz m. Ağca-oğlu deresi m. Dağ-i Zeknir	4195*	Sipahi (of Kul origin?)	Rum/Karaman	Re-entry (previously in Karaman with Sultanic directive)	Za.929
4. Turgut, v. Musa	k. Gölarpa ve Bazarköy(günü)	2190	Sipahi	Zülkadir	Valiant person	Za.929
5. Çavuş Sefer	k. Ağca-in m. Saru-şeyh	8040 (4020)	Bey's retinue or kul?	Not given (Center?)	Holds a half of the revenue, Emptied [mahlul, the other half?]	R.930
6. İlyas, v. Gedik Mesud	k. Göllü ve Karaca-ıviran	4090*	Sipahi, may be a son of a castle guard	Karaman	Re-entry	Za.929
7. Ehlüddin	k. Görcün	1750	Sipahi of Kul origin	Karaman	Re-entry	Za.929
8. Murad ve Ali	k. İspidin k. Tokmak	6378 (3189/3189)	Sipahis of Kul origin	Karaman	Re-entry	L.930
9. Dündar, v. Zülkadir	k. Ağca-in k. Tuz-hisarı k. Günedoğan	20.000*	Zülkadiroğlu (Noble)	Zülkadir	Presents sultanic directive [hükm-i şerif]	Za.929
10. Aliyar	k. Tilavşin (Tiravşin) k. Okcu	3680	Sipahi of Kul origin	Karaman	Re-entry, as a reward for fighting against Celali	Za.929

11. Mustafa, v. Mehmed b. Kökez	k. Pınarbaşı	2825	Sipahizade, son of a zeamet holder in Karaman	Karaman	Deserves a promotion	Za. 929
12. Pir Gaib, v. Adil	m. Gümüşgin m. Çakıldaklı	2805	Sipahi	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief	Za.929
13. Mustafa, v. Minnet	k. Şami k. Kozamar	4233*	Sipahi, a notable [benam] of Karaman	Karaman	In place of the bestowed amount of revenue [beratı bedeli]; presented a Sultanic directive	R.931
14. Durduhan, v. Çiçek	k. Saru-oğlan (haric ez-defter)	1000 (ber vech-i tahmin)	Sipahi, tribal	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief	Za.929
15. Kılıç, v. Çiçek	m. Güllüceviran m. Kilizge	1225	Sipahi, tribal	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief	Za.929
16. Mehmed	k. Nurvana k. Levak k. Arpalu	2999	Sipahi of kul origin [gulam-ı şehzade Şehinşah]	Karaman	Re-entry	Not given
17. Hamza, v. Cura Şeref	k. Kösiran (Kesirin) k. Kenan k. Bey-viran	5000*	Sipahi	Zülkadir	Held a fief during Ali Bey rule; presents Sultanic directive	L.930
18. Emin, v. Ağa.	k. Güherdaş k. Sivricekilise	7000	Sipahi	Zülkadir	Transferred from İsmail and Aykud. Re-entry (previously in Karaman)	N.930
19. Aydoğmuş, v. Yirseng	m. Yassı-viran m. Ağçamescid	2910	Sipahi, tribal [see n.63 in Apx. C]	Zülkadir	Bestowal	M.930
20. Muzaffer	k. Orta-viran m. Tecek(avak?)	2999	Sipahi of Kul origin	Karaman	Re-entry, in place of the bestowed amount of revenue	Za.929

21. Turak v. Murad Bey	k. <u>Hörsine?</u> (1/4)	2800	Sipahi	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief	Z.929
22. İlyas, v. İsfendiyyar	m. Kızılca-in m. Gir-görsün	2235	Sipahi	Karaman	Re-entry	Z.929
23. Mehmed, v. [Ali] Gazi	k. Ekrek	hasıl: 9289 (<u>hisse-i mezkur:</u> 8000)*	Sipahi Ali Bey oğlu Üveys Bey subaşı	Zülkadir	Ali Bey oğlu Üveys Bey subaşı, on sultanic directive [ber muceb-i hükm-i şerif]	Z.930
24. Yusuf, v. Süli Bey	k. Çözeki (Hözek) k. Matrasun k. Saru-kaya	4000*	Zülkadir benanı [local notable]	Zülkadir	Presents Sultanic directive	Z.929
25. Hasan, v. Safi	m. Gündoğmuş (Şeyhi-viranı) m. Kuru-han	2515	Sipahi	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief	M.930
26. Şehsuvar	k. m. Çevlicek (Çevlikı)	2310	Sipahi of Kul origin	Karaman	Re-entry	M.930
27. Halil [bin Karaman] (Appendix C)	k. Zerezek	1860	Sipahi	Zülkadir	Transferred from Sefer Şah; deserves to hold a fief	M.930
28. Div <u>Devlet?</u> v. Çiçek	m. Kızılca-kışla m. Karaca-viran	1600 (tahmin)	Sipahi, tribal	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief	M.930
29. Gökşah, v. Nazar	m. nisf Söğüdü m. Kızıl-in m. Bayıracak?	2999	Sipahi	Zülkadir	Held a fief during Ali Bey's rule	S.930
30. Kasım, v. Kara Atlu	k. Zereçin	1941 (ber vech-i iltizam 2000) [20000**]	Sipahi	Zülkadir	Presents Sultanic directive, recruits men-at-arms [eşkıncili]	Not given
31. Emir v. Müslihiddin divane	k. Rumdiğın c. Yortan	2999	Sipahi, son of serasker-i Gedük	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief	Z.929
32. İsa ve İslam	k. Tomarza m. Saraycuk	2999 (ber vech-i iltizam 3150)	Sipahis of Kul origin	Karaman (İsa) Not given (İslam)	Transferred from Gürgen Divane; Re-entry (İsa)	R.931

33. İbrahim, v. Garib b. Paşa Bey; ve Zeynel v. Murad, b. Paşa Bey [haric-i defter]	m. Sinad m. Yersire m. Ağca-viran m. Gözeme m. Bab-düşen m. Şaban-bucağı	4000 <u>İbrahim</u> (2000) Zeynel (2000)	Sipahizade tribal Sipahizade tribal	Zülkadir Zülkadir	They held fiefs during Ali Bey's rule	L.930
34. Bahar, v. Gedik Bey, çoluk-ı Dimaşki Bey	m. Arab-oğlu m. nısf Kayapınar	2999	Sipahizade	Not given (of Mamluk origins?)	Deserves to hold a fief	L.930
35. Ali, v. Çiçek	m. Musa-şeyh m. Emirköy m. Yati-viran m. Timurluca	3000 [haric ez-defter, ber vech-i tahmin]	Sipahi, tribal	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief	L.930
36. Musa, v. Selman	m. Baş-yiri m. Ilgunlucak m. İlkindin m. Dereağızı m. Tomaran-yeri m. Kızılca-viran m. Kızıl-kilise	2000 [ber vech-i tahmin, haric ez-defter]	Sipahi, tribal [may be related to Selmanlu tribe]	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief	L.930
37. Turali ve Mansur, be-nevbet	m. Yarıkcahan m. Bağca-su m. Serkurd	2000 [ber vech-i tahmin]	Sipahi Sipahi	Zülkadir Zülkadir	Transferred from Mustafa v. Emek; deserves to hold a fief	R.930
38. Seydi, v. Bozkırlu	c. Alişarlu der m. Tuzhisar c. Karı-kışla t. Kayseriyve	2999	Sipahi, may be tribal	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief	L.930
39. Derviş, v. Mehmed b. Taf	k. Matrasun m. Ahiköy (haric ez-defter, tahminen)	2000 [ber vech-i İltizam: 2999]	Sipahi, tribal	Zülkadir	Deserves to hold a fief	N. 930
40. Cinci Ali	k. Samağar	2368	Sipahi	Zülkadir	He held a fief during Ali Bey's rule and deserves to hold a fief	N.930

APPENDIX C

Figure C.1 Distribution of fief holders in Zamantu according to B.O.A TTd.142 (c.1528)

Fief holder(s)	Revenue base Settlement(s)	Revenue Total	Social Background	Provincial Origins	Reason of Bestowal	Date of Bestowal
1. Piri ve Yaraş ve Yevm-i Hayr, v. Kaya Ali b. Taf Ali	k. Hassa c. Karı-kışlalı c. Tur Haminlü m. Çözeki m. Kürtüncük m. Girenci m. Kirsin m. Beştepe m. Belviran m. Saru-kaya m. Çevliki m. Karacaviran m. Şavlak-yurd m. Güzgünü m. Matrasun m. Kurd-in m Gözbabayurdu	Hisse-i Piri 3090 Hisse-i Yaraş 3090 Hisse-i Yevm-i Hayr 3090 (Total revenue base: 16296)	Sons (or grandsons) of a deceased zeamet holder (yörük başı) [Sipahizade] Tribal. related to c. Taf	Zülkadir Zülkadir Zülkadir	Death (fevt) of their father	R.936
2. Süleyman, b. Feyyaz b. Taf Ali	k. Hassa c. Karı-kışlalı c. Tur Haminlü m. Çözeki m. Kürtüncük m. Girenci m. Kirsin m. Beştepe m. Belviran m. Çevliki m. Karacaviran m. Şavlak-yurd m. Güzgünü m. Matrasun m. Kurd-in m Gözbabayurdu	Hisse-i mezkur 3000 (Total revenue base: 16296)	Sipahizade (Grandson of Taf Ali) Tribal. related to c. Taf	Zülkadir	Fief holder until Şehsuvar oğlu Ali Bey's death	N.936

3. Athhan ilhak: an- tahvil-i Taf Ali	m. Oluğu uzun k. Tomarza k. Hassa c. Karı-kışlalı c. Tur Haminlü m. Çözeki m. Kürtüncük m. Girenci m. Kirsin m. Beştepe m. Belviran m. Çevliki m. Karaca- viran m. Şavlak- yurd m. Güzgünü m. Matrasun m. Kurd-in m Gözbaba- yurdu	Osmani:491 3400 (Yekun 16296) Cem'an 3861 Ber-vech-i iltizam [it means completion; not tax farming sees: Howard 1986 p.166 no.559]: 3960	Of kul origin or a retinue		Transferr ed [Tahvil] from Kaya Ali b. Taf Ali * Transferr ed from Taf Ali	N.936
4. Abdi, v. Cura Şeref	m. Kızıl-eşme (an galle-i hınta) m. Sekrek- bükü (hasıl an galle) Çiftlik-i Sekrek (Döşek?) Bükü [TT 998 p.553]	760	Sipahizade	Zülkadir	Not given [His brother Hamza was a fief holder during Ali Bey's rule]	Za.934
5. Kaya, v. Piri v. Çiçek	m. Direklü viranı nd. Çörmüşek- viranı	405	Sipahizade, tribal [Çiçeklü tribe]	Zülkadir	Not given	Z. 934
6. Halil, v. Ağca	m. Beğresun	270	Sipahizade, tribal [Ağcalu or Ağcakoyunlu]	Zülkadir	Not given	Z.934

7. Halil, v. Burun Keseni; Pir Aziz, v. Hamza	k. Kazıyvası (hasıl marşum-ı bennak) c. Burun-kesenlü	1828 (Halil) 1327 (Pir Aziz)	Sipahizade, tribal (Burun kesenlü tribe) Sipahizade	Zülkadir Not Given	Not given	S.935
8. Bekir, v. Devletyar; Hamza, v. Eymir Safi	m. Karayusuf m. Güllücek	450 (Bekir) 450 (Hamza)	Sipahizade Sipahizade	Not Given Zülkadir [n.134, 173 and 174 below]	Not given	S. 935
9. Mezd, b. Ali b. Çerkes	m. Pınarbaşı m. Karaviran (Göksun)	999	Sipahizade [Grandson of a slave soldier?]	Zülkadir	In accordance with the authorization document [mektub] from Ali Bey	Za.934
10. İsfendiyar, v. Çakır	k. Süksün	992	Sipahizade	Zülkadir [see no.2 in Appendix B]	Transferred from his father upon his death	Za. 934
11. Nusret, v. Zakir	k. Ortaviran	583	Sipahizade [tribal;Zakirlü]	Zülkadir	Not given	Za. 934
12. Halil, v. Ahmed Hacı	k. Mahzur (Munzur?)	69	[son of a religious personnel?]	Not given	Not given [as salary?]	Za.934
13. Hamza, v. Kara Köse	m. Ekinlüce	200	Sipahizade	Not given	With diploma [ba-berat]	S.935
14. Kaya, v. Kiprin	m. Uçaca ördeklü m. Sorkun	1336	Sipahizade, tribal [clan of Kiprin]	Zülkadir	Not given	S. 935
15. Ali, v. Cihanşah; Şahkulu	m. Depesü delik	448 (Ali) 448 (Şahkulu)	Sipahizade Might be of kul origin or a retinue	Not given Center?	Not given	S.935
16. Murad, bd. Evrenos v. Hamid Ağa	m. Kızıl-çevlük ayağı	828	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir] *detailed family list could be an indicator of local origins.	Not given	S.935

17. Muaz, bd Veli v. Kasım Kethüda	k. Yılanluca	810	Kethüda's son	[Zülkadir]	Not given	S.935
18. Satılmış, v. Kara Lala b. Elçi	m. Hormudsun (note in TT 998 p.566)	600	Son of a lala	Zülkadir	Transferred from his father	S.935
19. Bolı Hacı [written as Karcı Hacı in TT 998 p.549]	m. Nurvana çiftlik-i hod	333	Religious personnel?	Not given	Not given	S.935
20. Sübhanverdi, v. Selman; ve Kara Emirhan	k. Samağar	840 (Sübhanverdi) 840 (Emirhan)	Sipahizade (possibly tribal; related to Selmanlı tribe) Of Kul origin or retinue?	Zülkadir Center?	Not given	S.935
21. İnebey, v. Zeynel	m. Karakuyu	600	Sipahizade	Not Given	Not given	S.935
22. Zeynel, v. Süleyman	k. Depecik-i Mahrama	460	Sipahizade [might be related to c. Kavurgalu (TT 998 p.560)]	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
23. Ali, v. Üstadin	k. Köpeklü k. Şerail k. Çandır- viran k. Siravan k. Nurvana m. Nenac m. Kendüsin	3956	Sipahizade [tribal; related to Bertiz tribe]	Zülkadir	Not given	Za.934
24. Hasan, v. Mehmed b. Hasan	m. Tecece Kavak	200	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir] listed three generations may be an indicator of local origins	Transferred from his father upon his death	S.935
25. Mirza, v. Üstadin	m. Yassı- pınar m. Yassıviran c. İsalu	3500	Sipahizade [tribal]	Zülkadir	Not given	Ra.935

26. Abdülkadir, v. Köşker; Ali fakı v. Timur	m. Söğüdü	554 (Abdülk.) 554 (Ali fakı)	Sipahizade-Tribal [c.Köşkerlü] Sipahizade, Tribal [c. Demürlü/Timurlu]	Zülkadir Zülkadir	Not given	Ra.935
27. Mehmed v. Kara-Hasan	m. Yerdüş? Çiftlik-i hod	347	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	Ra.935
28. Veled, v. Abdullah	m. Hörsine (tabi-i maraş) çiftlik-i hod	740	[Of Kul origin?]	Not given	Not given	Ra.935
29. Bedir, v. ?Kara, Şenlikçi	m. Kazgancı? Çiftlik-i hod der m. Ağcaviran	600	Sipahizade [şenlikçi: who opens the land into cultivation?]	[Zülkadir] see: no.99	Not given	S.935
30. Korkmas, v. Ali Koçi	m. Uzun-dirsek (1/2)	1500	Sipahizade	Not given	Transferred from his father	Ra.935
31. Şah Veli, v. Kul Hüseyin	m. Değirmencik m. Yabacuk m. Çoğum-ağıl m. Yer-kışla m. Kuru-viran	3497	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	S.935
32. Mirza, v. Musa; Feyyaz v. Mahmud	m. Günlüce m. Çiras	579 (Mirza) 579(Feyyaz)	Sipahizade Sipahizade	Not given Not given	Not given	S.935
33. Mahmud, v. Çağrgan, Şenlikçi	m. Ebulhindi Çiftlik-i hod der m. mezbur	600	Sipahizade [opens to cultivation] Tribal [cemaati Çağrganlu]	Zülkadir	Not given	Ra.935
34. İbrahim, v. Üstadın	k. İspidin m. Çiras m. Nenac m.	2087	Sipahizade [see n.23&25 above] [tribal]	Zülkadir	Not given	Za.934
35. Davud, v. İbrahim	m. Aşgın der Taf m. m.	1549	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	Za.934

36. Pir Bende; Osman ve İskender bd. Hüdabende	m. Segidin (t. Göstere) m. Tomaran Bac	3780 (Pir Bende) 2280 (Osman) 1500 (İskender)	Sipahizade Sipahizade Sipahizade	[Zülkadir] [Zülkadir] [Zülkadir]	Transferr ed from their deceased brother	Ra.935
37. Hamza, v. Şah Mehdi	k. Zeknir k. Kilamin k. Güzgün m. Kirsin m. Ağdın m. Yüregin m. Cünd m. -dere	4148	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	S.935
38. Ahmed; Gedik bd. Teberrük	c. Yörükân-ı Zamantu c. Alışarlı	5000 (Ahmed) 3000 (from Teberrük)	Sipahizade, tribal Sipahizade, tribal	Zülkadir Zülkadir	Deceased brother [for Gedik; Ahmed could be an older brother]	S.935 Ra.936
39. Hamza, v. Hamid	adet-i salgun- i m.	640	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	Ra.935
40. Alp Arslan v. Süleyman İsa v. Mehmed	c. Karı-kışlalı m.(s) [TT 998 p.548]	4374 (Alp Arslan) 4375 (İsa)	Sipahizade, tribal Sipahizade, tribal	Zülkadir Zülkadir	Not given	Z.934
41. İman, v. İlyas; Şadi, v. Niyaz- namaz?; Feyyaz, v. Nur-ı Hüda; Dede Bali, v. İbrahim	k. Tuzhisar ve mezraha-i tabi-i Kayseriyve (shared with Mirliva's demesne)	1325 (İlyas) 1325 (Şadi) 1325 (Feyyaz) 1325 (Dede)	Sipahizade Sipahizade Sipahizade Sipahizade	Zülkadir Zülkadir Zülkadir Zülkadir	With testimony of Çelebi and Süleyman Divane (be- şahadetey n-i Çelebi ve Süleyman Divane)	Z.934
42. Hızır, v. Ali Gazi	m. Yer m. Varta resm-i arusane- mütemekkina n-ı Zamantu gayr ez nahiye-i	4480	Sipahizade, descends from local notables [see n.145 below and also n.23 in Appendix B]	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935

	Pınarbaşı ve Yörükân					
43. Yaraş, bd. Hasan b. Taf	m. Çaylak c. Taf m. Ağca- viran-ı diğer der Taf	1000	Sipahizade, tribal [tribe of Taf]	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
44. Hasan, v. İskender	k. Süksün	1987	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Deceased father	Z.935
45. Ali, v. Kubad Bahadır	k. Kara-kilise	1600,5	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	S.935
46. Berkes, v. Divane Ali	k. Hassa k. (t. Elbistan) m. Kesdoğan (bedel-i mehir)	7900 1920 (bedel-i mehir) Yekun 9820	Sipahizade [tribal; c. Divane Alilü	Zülkadir (see: no.90)	Not given	S.935
47. Maksud ve. Yaraş v. Halil b. Karaman	k. Zerezek Çiftlik-i hod	1982 (her vech-i iştirak, be nevbet]	Sipahizade Sipahizade	Zülkadir Zülkadir (n.27 in Appendix A)	Deceased father, with the petition [arz] of mirliya.	S.935
48. Ali, v. Çalabverdi b. Çakırcı	k. Ağca-viran	1002	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Not given	Not given
49. Kabil, v. Kızılkoca	m. Karaca- ding	1800	Sipahizade, tribal [tribe of Kızıkkocalu]	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
50. Tanrıverdi, v. Selman	m. Çandur	1121	Sipahizade, tribal [tribe of Selmanlı]	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
51. Pir Mehmed, v. Köşker	m. Köşkerlü ma Gürizddin ve Çakıldaklı Çiftlik-i hod	1050	Sipahizade, Tribal [clan of Köşkerlü]	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
52. Hızır, v. İsfendiyar b. Süleyman.	k. Çıras	1000 (1/3)	Sipahizade tribal [tribe of Süleymanlı]	Zülkadir	Deceased father	R.937
53. Seydi, v. Yar Acacı	m. ? ma-Ekin	1540	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	S.935
54. Genci v. Ali Gazi; Mahmud v. Ağca	m. Ağca-oğlu deresi	1466 (Genci) 1466 (Mahmud)	Sipahizade Sipahizade (tribal)	Zülkadir Zülkadir	Not given	Za.934

55. Mahmud, v. Halil Lala	k. Munzur k. Kiprin k. Yerbel (3/4) k. Eskiköy k. Ağca dere adet-i salgun 22 kile	3535 bedel-i karye-i Pınarbaşı dade-şod 3691 Yekun:7825	Son of a Lala	[Zülkadir]	Not given	S.935
56. Hamza, v. Cura Şeref	k. Kenan m. Kapuluca m. Güllüce k. Pınarbaşı (resm-i arusane, bad-ı heva, niyabet- i gallat, ağnam, niyabet-i yatak)	9368	Sipahi	Zülkadir	Not given [with reference to Ali Bey in previous register]	Za. 934
57. Hüda-verdi, v. Devlet	c. Demircülü?, kavm-ı hod m. Çukur- viran m. Bel-viran m. Yılanlıca	1920	Sipahizade [Tribal]	Zülkadir	Not given	Not given
58. Davud, v. Bayram Hacı b. Şeref	k. Kızıl-kilise Çiftlik-i hod	1612	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Not given	S.935
59. Mansur	m. Tavşan- depesi m. Baş-pınarı	1265	Of Kul origin, or mirliva's retinue	Center?	Presented [arz] by mirliva of Maras	Z.935
60. Dönmez, v. Ağca	k. Girgörsin	2236	Sipahizade, tribal [c. Ağcalu]	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
61. Ali Divane, v. Mirza b. Hasan	k. Palan-kırdı m. Koz-ağıl	3800	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Not given	S. 935
62. Halil, v. Ali Paşa	m. Karapınar m. Ortaköy	3684	Sipahizade	Center	Presented Sultanic diploma (berat-ı humayun ibraz etti)	S.935

63. Aydoğmuş, v. Yirseng	k. Mengen c. Yirseng (arusane ve ağnam)	1253	Sipahi, tribal (c. Yirseng)	Zülkadir [n.63 in Appendix A]	Not given	S.935
64. Katib Ramazan, v. Hüseyin	k. Sultan ham c. Alişarlu (ağnam)	3095	Katib (scribe)	Zülkadir	With official seal [damga] of Alaüddeve Bey	M.935
65. Ahmed, v. Hülagu	k. Kilise- imran m. Şami	2224	Sipahizade	Not given	With diploma (ba-berat)	Z.934
66. Kara Hamza, v. Arab	k. Timurboğa m. Ağca-viran c. İshaklu (adet-i salgun an galle)	4814	Sipahizade tribal	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
67. Murad, v. Gürayış	k. Bel-viranı m. Divadin	2966	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	S.934
68. Hasan, v. Kasım b. İbrahim	m. İğdecik m. Ak-viran m. Çoğun- viran c. Okçulu ve Kozaklı	2211	Sipahizade tribal	Zülkadir	Not given	Za.934
69. Hüdaverdi, v. Üstadın	k. Savirtan m. Firuzca Çiftlik c.	2990	Sipahizade tribal	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
70. Mansur ve Mustafa, v. Taf Ali	k. İlkidin m. Çordin	3009 (Mansur) 3009 (Mustafa)	Sipahizade Sipahizade	Zülkadir Zülkadir	Not given	Z.934
71. Yanık Mehmed, v. Alem	m. Yatıviran k. Olcan (t. elbistan)	4073	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	Z.934
72. Emin, v. Kul	m. Oyüklü- viran m. Kızı-oğlu m. Emir ?	3019	Sipahizade [son of a Ghulam?]	Zülkadir [n.176 below]	Not given	S.935
73. Sübhanverdi, v. Melik Bey b. Demirci	k. Kaynarpınar c. Demircilü	3250	Sipahizade, Tribal	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935

74. Süleyman, v. Ali Gazi	k. Arslan-bey m. Sama öyüğü k. Sultan-hamı	3732	Sipahizade	Zülkadir	Not given	Za.934
75. Mustafa, v. Ali b. İpek	k. Yarıkcahan m. Ağca-ağıl m. Kuyu Alan	2048	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Not given	
76. Durmuş, v. Taf Ali	k. Bük-in ?	2638	Sipahizade, Tribal [clan of Taf in Çiçeklü tribe]	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
77. Gökşin b. Nazar b. Süleyman	k. Güllüceviran m. Kızılca-in	2100	Sipahizade [Probably related to Süleymanlı tribe]	Zülkadir [His brother Gökşah is mentioned in the previous register. Appendix A n.29]	Not given	S.935
78. Mustafa Çavuş b. Konur	k. Pınarbaşı (resm-i yava ve niyabet) c. İshaklu (mal-i sultanı)	3200	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir] (n.178 below)	Transferr ed from Zeynel and Kara Konur [his father and brother?]	S.935
79. Ahmed, v. Ahsen Hacı	k. Kürüviri	4560	Sipahizade [son of a religious personnel?]	Not given (n.151 below)	Not given	Za.934
80. İbrahim?, v. Garib b. Paşa Bey	k. Sinad k. Karacaviran m. Göz-baba m. Ağca-viran m. Sehlin m. Nurvana m. Söğütlüce c. İshaklu	7250	Sipahizade [Tribal; cemaat-i Paşa Beylü]	Zülkadir [see n.33 in Apx B]	Not given	
81. Resmyarkar(?), v. İsmail b. Yeksar	k. Ortaköy (3/4) m. Karabayır	5800	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Not given	S.935
82. Devletyar, v. Mesud	k. Köşkerlü k. Çakıldaklı k. Gürziddin k. Sıvgın	4990	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	M.935

83. Evrenos, bd. Yusuf v. İskender	m. Dağ-1 Zeknir m. Ağca-viran m. Ergini c. Yeğenciler nd. Eşrefler	2014	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Not given	Za.934
84. Çelebi, v. Cura Şeref	k. Pınarbaşı k. Köşkerlü m. Savıcaksu ve Çukurbel m. Handan- yeri c. Karı- kışlalu(adet-i salgun) bac-ı bazar c. Pınarbaşı (mısf bad-ı hava-i hurde)	12000	Chief sipahi (Serasker of <i>nahiye</i> of Zamantu	Zülkadir	[his brother Hamza held his timar with reference to Ali Bey, in the previous register]	Not given
85. Hüseyin, v. Fakih	resm-i yava-i n. Pınarbaşı m. m. Bel	2000	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir] must be related to Hamza v. Cura Şeref	Transferr ed from Hamza according to his will [be- ihtiyar-ı hod dade]	Za.934
86. İsmail, v. Taf	k. Matrasun m. Karşuluca c. Taf	2189	Sipahizade- Tribal	Zülkadir	Emptied and transferre d from his brother upon his death	S.935
87. Turdoğan, v. Çiçek	m. Çayıroğlan-ı diğer [nd. Sarı-oğlan]	3220	Sipahizade- Tribal	Zülkadir [n.14 in Appendix B]	Not given	S.935

88. Süleyman Divane, v. Kasım Divane	k. Hacıpaşalı k. Depecik-i mandana m. Arpa Gazi m. Şeyh viran m. Karaca Ali viranı m. m. Alakilise c. Karıkışlalu(adet-i salgun) c. Akdağlı (adet-i selamlık)	8835	Sipahizade [must be a local notable; see n.41 above]	Zülkadir	Not given	Za.934
89. Dev Devlet?, v. Mirza, b. Çiçek	m. Karaca-viran m. Kızılcağış a. Karapınar, Levak, Kuruöl	2990	Sipahizade, Tribal	Zülkadir [Appendix B, no.28]	Not given	S.935
90. Selman, v. Divane Ali	c. Taf	2160	Sipahi, Tribal	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
91. Mir Bey, bd. Şehsuvar	k. Kalaluca pirestlik m. Akça Şehir (Bozok) m. Karasofu ve Alınpınar (Bozok) c. Süleymanlu (Bozok)	2456	Brother of a deceased Sipahi [Tribal, c. Kalaluca Pirestlük] Eşkincilü? (TT 998 p.566)	Zülkadir	Deceased brother	Ca.936
92. Sübhanverdi v. Has? Lala	k. Şami k. Zerezek k. Pınarbaşı bac	8434	Son of a lala and zaim	Not given (n.170 below)	Not given [His brother holds a bestowal document]	Z.934
93. İskender ve Murad, v. Zeynel b. Murad	k. Okcu k. Çayırıcı c. İshaklu	4028 Shared fief (ber-vech-i iştirak)	Sipahizade Sipahizade [sons of a Çelebi, local notable]	Zülkadir Zülkadir	Bestowed with petition [arz] mirliva of Maraş upon their father's death.	Ş.936

94. Zekeriya, v. Seyid	m. Mişecik ma Güllüce m. Aydoğdu k. Hırpırı (Hinzırı) c. Karı- kışlalu(resm-i yatak) k. Han (niyabet, ber muceb-i adet- i kadim]	4048	Sipahizade	Zülkadir [collects taxes and tributes in accordance with local traditions]	With diploma	Ra.935
95. İbrahim, v. Sadi b. Taf	m. Ağcaviran Çiftlik-i hod der Kırşavi	840	Sipahizade, Tribal	Zülkadir	Deceased father	Za.935
96. Piri, v. Fakih	m. Küb-çukur Çiftlik-i hod [TT.998 p.561]	500	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Not given	Ra.935
97. Ahmed, v. Hızır	k. Sıvgın	1865	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	Z.934
98. Tanrıverdi, v. Çavuş	m. Kara- yusuf (nd. Kayaluca burun) c. ? Elbistan Bedel-i Ulufe	3018	[Son of a castle guard or retinue?]	Center?	Transferr ed from his father upon his will & in lieu of his salary	M. 935
99. Yevm-i hayr v. Saki b. ?Kara	k. Ağca-viran	1115	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Not given	S.935
100. Divane Kılıç, v. Divane Mehmet	k. Nurvana k. Karaca- viran	1219	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	Not given
101. Musa v. Çiçek; Maksud v. İsmail	k. Kilizge m. Ağrıhan	1135 [be-nevbet?]	Sipahizade; Tribal Sipahizade [tribal?]	Zülkadir [Zülkadir]	Not given	Not given
102. Tanrıverdi, v. İsa	k. Kara-kilise	1600	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	Not given
103. Çiçek, bd. Çiçek	k. Ahi-yükü (nd. Ömeroğlu deresi)	3840	Sipahizade, Tribal	Zülkadir	Transferr ed to him as his brother's timar became empty.	S.935

104. Mestan, v. Şadi Bey	k. Kes-doğan	1920	Sipahizade [evlad-ı Şadi Bey bin Divane Alilü TT 998 p.556]	Zülkadir	Not given	Not given
105. Veli, v. Özkürd	k. Kölete	1500	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	S.935
106. İskender, v. Ağca	m. Şeyh bebek (nezd-i Palas)	1920	Sipahizade, tribal [Ağcalu tribe]	Zülkadir	[must be transferred from his deceased father; see n.107]	S.935
107. Aziz, v. Ağca	m. Seğrek ağıl (nezd-i Palas)	1013	Sipahizade, tribal	Zülkadir	Transferred from deceased father	S.935
108. Kara Mehmed, v. Kara Çoban	k. Ağca-in	1166	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	Z.934
109. İbrahim, v. Göçgün	k. Girgörsün	1112	Sipahizade	Not given	Transferred from Konmaz	Not given
110. İsa ve Yusuf, v. Kani	m. Yırdam	1152 (İsa) 1152 (Yusuf)	Sipahizade Sipahizade	Not given Not given	Not given	S.935
111. Bali, v. Şemseddin b. Ağca	k. Çamrama	1235	Sipahizade [tribal? related to Ağcalu tribe]	Zülkadir	Transferred from his deceased father	M.935
112. Davud fakı, v. Yortan	m. Say Ağıl Çiftlik der k. Hasan depesi (Maraş) c. Davud fakılı (resm-i arusane ve bad-ı hava ve yava-i hurde)	383	Sipahizade, Tribal (c. Yortan)	Zülkadir	Not given	Z.934

113. Kara Seydi, v. Aybek	m. Karacaviran (nezd-i Güdük İsa) m. Toprakpınar c. Veled-i Aybek (resm-i arusane, resm-i ağnam ve bad-i hava ve yava-i hurde)	2368	Sipahizade, Tribal	Zülkadir	Not given	Ra.935
114. Ali, v. Halil	k. Yırdaş resm-i arusane-i nahiye-i Zamantu	1176 bedeli-i tımar der Hamzalu 3500 Yekun 4676	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Deceased brother	C.935
115. Pir Veli, v. İbrahim; Mezid, v. Mehmed	m. Veliran? c. Divane Hacı Hüseyin	564 (Pir Veli) 564 (Mezid)	Sipahizade Sipahizade	[Zülkadir] [Zülkadir]	Not given	S.935
116. Mehmed, v. Ahmed	Çiftlik -i hod	400	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Not given	Ra.935
117. Seydi Ahmed, v. Koyun	m. Kapuluca Çiftlik-i hod	3020	Sipahizade [tribal, cemaati-i Sıddıkoğlu TT 998 p.547]	[Zülkadir]	Not given	S.935
118. Hüdaverdi, v. Ali Gazi	k. Yirdüsiceler k. Güherdaş k.	5248	Sipahizade	Zülkadir	Not given	S.(935?)
119. Şamlu, v. Abdullah	m. Çoğumağıl	1482	[Of Kul origin?]	Not given	Not given	S.935
120. Emin ve Hüseyin, v. Kiprin	m. Küçün (nd. Kiprin) c. Kiprin (resm-i arusane) Çiftlik-i hod	830,5 (Hüseyin) 1030 (Emin)	Sipahizade Tribal Sipahizade Tribal	Zülkadir Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
121. Kubad ve Hacı Ali, v. Segbaz	k. ? depe	620 (Kubad) 620 (Hacı Ali)	Sipahizade Sipahizade	[Zülkadir] [Zülkadir]	Not given	S.935

122. İsa, v. Turasan b. Tulunu-yumru	c. Tulunu-yumru Çiftlik-i hoder mezra-i Tulunuyumru	800	Kethüda-i cemaat-i Tulunu-yumru; Tribal	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
123. Muzaffer, v. Ağa Hacı	k. Ev-yaba	556,5	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	Za.934
124. İbrahim	m. Çörmüşek	800	Probably of Kul origin or retinue	Center?	With diploma	S.935
125. Cem Kethüda ve Minnet	k. Kendüsin	835 (Cem) 835 (Minnet)	Kethüda; probably of kul origin Probably of kul origin	Center? Center?	Not given	Not given
126. Mehmed, v. Divaneği Kara	m. Samagar viranı	820	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	Transferred from his father	S.935
127. İsmail, v. Yağlı	m. Bacaluca	640	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	S.935
128. Gedük, v. Veli	m. Koğanlu ma -Göç	960	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	S.935
129. Yusuf Rind, v. Kiprin	m.	970	Sipahizade Tribal; clan of Kiprin	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
130. Emlük, v. Kızıl donlu; Ali, v. Hamza b. O	k. Kalecik-kaya ma Ali Kayası	464 (Emlük) 464 (Ali)	Sipahizade tribal (clan of Kızıl donlu) Sipahizade tribal	Zülkadir Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
131. Yevmi-i Hayr, v. İne Gazi	m. Pınar viranı	784	Sipahizade tribal (clan of İnegazilü)	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
132. Süleyman ve Durmuş, v. Ağca	k. Bac-in (Tac-in)	480 (Süleyman) 480 (Durmuş)	Sipahizade (tribe of Ağcalu) Sipahizade tribal	Zülkadir Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
133. Hasan, v. Halil b. Ağca	k. Kazgancı (1/4)	500	Sipahizade (tribe of Ağcalu)	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
134. İsa, v. Selim b. Eymir Safi	k. Çaylaklu	650	Sipahizade	Zülkadir	Transferred from Divane Seydi	S.935

148. Dede, v. Selman	k. Korkun m. Kizil- kilise m. Igdecik c. Artuklu ve Tatar	8119	Sipahizade (maybe tribal, related to Selmanlı tribe)	Zulkadir	Not given	[Za.93 4]
Dede v. Suleyman [Mukerrer]						
149. Budak, v. Hamza b. Kizil Karaca	k. Hamrama m. Eymir (nd. Günlüce) m. Birancuk c. Alisarlu (ağnam)	6000	Sipahizade	[Zulkadir]	Not given	S.935
150. Katib Halil, v. Huseyin	m. Sivrikilise m. m. (der nahiye-i magara)	6587	Katib (scribe)	Zulkadir	With official seal of Alaüddev le Bey	M.934
151. Seyhi, v. Ahsen Hacı	k. Karaca- dink m. İsa kulu k. Ozan-kaya	6000	[Son of a religious personnel?]	Not given	Not given	M.934
152. Çalabverdi, v. Çavuş	adet-i salgun- vı maktu der n. Zamantu resm-i koru-i Zamantu	5500	Sipahizade (son of a castle guard or a retinue?)	Center?	Not given [his brother Tanrıverdi holds a fief transferre d from his father and given in lieu of his salary, n.98]	S.935
153. Kılıç, v. Ahsen Gazi	k. Zeknir k. Korkun m.	2800	Sipahizade [c. Ahsen Gazilü]	Zulkadir	Not given	S. (935?)
154. Ali, v. Olduran	c. c. Curalu oğlu m. Vartan (der nahiye-i Kars; c. İsa Hacılı)	9000	Sipahizade [seems to be a tribal notable]	Zulkadir	Not given	Ra.935

155. Hızır, v. İlbey; Devletyar, v. Veli b. Selim	m. Çekirgelü-viran m. Yassı-pınar	500 (Hızır) 1410 (Devletyar)	Sipahizade Sipahizade	Not given [Zülkadir]	Not given	Ra.935
156. Çırak, v. Hasan; Kabil ve Hızır, v. Kanmış b. Çiçek	k. Odunluk m. Yeni-viran m. k. Boğazkışla m. ? ağıl m. ? viranı m. İğdecik m. Yaldın-ağıl m. Tay kendi	4381 (Çırak) 3000 (Kabil) 2401 (Hızır)	Sipahizade Sipahizade (tribal) Sipahizade (tribal)	Not given Zülkadir Zülkadir	Transferred from deceased father (Kabil & Hızır)	S.935 Ra.936
157. Ali, v. Hasan	k. Sıvgın	1865	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	Za.934
158. Mehmed, v. Emin bin Kazgancı.	m. Ağca-mescid c. İshaklu	3454	Sipahizade (tribal, maybe related to clan of Kazancı)	Zülkadir	Transferred from deceased father	M.936
159. Şad, v. Hızır	k. Kalacık k. Boğasun-ı sagır k. Kapuluca	2168	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	Not given
160. Sultan Ahmed, v. Timurhan.	c. Alişarlu (arusane) m. Kayacık-viran m. Say-ağıl m. Zavivecik	2435	Kethüda	Zülkadir	Not given	Not given
161. Abdüllatif, emmizade-i Cüneyd Divane	k. Firuzca	3500	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir]	[transferred from his uncle's son?]	Not given
162. Abdülaziz, v. Kurd inlü	k. Güdük-İsa	2334	Sipahizade [tribal, clan of Kurd inlü]	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
163. Zekeriyas Dede İlbaşı in TT 998]	k. Kiprin m. Karasilin Çiftlik-i holder k. İşpidin ve İlkindin	1400	İlbaşı [Sipahi headman] (see p.561 in TT 998)	Zülkadir	Not given	Z.934

164. Benam-ı Seydi, v. Ağca	k. Zak k. Ağca- mescid m. Seydi Ahmed m. (t. Göksun) c. Karacalu (bedel-i niyabet ki tasarruf kerde bud) (der-liva-i Bozok)	22074	Must be a tribal notable	Zülkadir	Transferr ed from his deceased father	S.935
165. Kılıç, v. Alişar b. Çiçek	resm-i enhar-ı c. Taf	500	Sipahizade Tribal	Zülkadir	Not given	S. 935
166. Divane Mirza, v. Divane Musa	k. Güllüce k. Çiras m. Kızılca-in	929	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	S.935
167. Mansur ve Karaca	k. Sovıcaksu	1103 (Mansur) 1103 (Karaca)	Of kul origin? Of kul origin?	Center? Center?	Not given	S.935
168. Üveys, v. Demirci	m. Bocuş	2097	Sipahizade [maybe related to Demircilü tribe]	Zülkadir (n.73 above)	Not given	S.935
169. Murad, v. Timur	m. Musa yoğun	500	Sipahizade (maybe related to Timurlu clan)	Zülkadir	Not given	Ra.935
170. Hüdaverdi, v. Has? Lala	k. Kızıl-ıviran k. Eski-köy c. Şeyhlü yavı m. Akkaya Gediği	8250	Son of a lala and zaim	Not given (n.92 above)	With diploma [ba-berat]	S.935
171. İbrahim, v. Murad	m. Dodurga k. Şavlak c. Çiçekli ve Alişarlı	3416	Sipahizade [Maybe related to Alişarlı or Çiçeklü tribes]	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
172. Arslan ve Kayacuk, v. Ağca	k. Körkin k. m. Ağca-ıviran	1504 (Kayacuk) 2004 (Arslan)	Sipahizade Tribal (Ağcalu tribe)	Zülkadir Zülkadir	Not given	S.935

173. Kasım, v. Selim [b. Eymir Safi?]	k. Samağar c. Şah Melik Hacıoğlu Çiftlik-i hodder Samağar	1445	Sipahizade	Zülkadir	Transferred from his father	S.935
174. İsmail, v. Selim b. Eymir Safi	m. Murağı m. Sergi m.	2557	Sipahizade	Zülkadir	Not given	S.935
175. Mahmud, v. Süleyman b. Kiprin	m. Habik Çiftlik-i hod	520	Sipahizade (tribal, related to clan of Kiprin)	Zülkadir	Not given	Ra.935
176. Karaca, v. Kul	k. Soğan	2103	Sipahizade [Son of a Ghulam?]	Zülkadir	With official seal of Alaüddevele Bey	Ra.935
177. Kılıç, v. Kızıl Hacı	k. m. Ağca-in k. Şavlak niyabet-i Sultanhanı c. Alişarlu	3000	Sipahizade; maybe related to Alişarlu clan	[Zülkadir]	Not given	S.935
178. Piri, v. Konur	c. İshaklu an taife-i Paşabeülü adet-i selamlık	2000	Sipahizade	[Zülkadir] n.78 above	Not given [His brother's fief was transferred from Zeynel and Konur]	S.935
179. Muzaffer, v. Gaib	k. Çağşar m. Gördük ümmet m. Alacık kava	1000	Sipahizade	Not given	Not given	S.935
180. İlhan v. Çalabverdi; Sarulu, v. Timur	c. Şeyhlü Tatarı m. Çiras	400 (İlhan) 500 (Sarulu)	Sipahizade (tribal?) Sipahizade (tribal?)	[Zülkadir] [Zülkadir]	Not given	Za.935
181. Murad, v. Çiçek	m. Koğalu-özü	1562	Sipahizade Tribal (Çiçeklü tribe)	Zülkadir	With letter of authorization by Ali Bey	Za.924

APPENDIX D

Excerpts from the manuscript: Bayezid Kütüphanesi, Nadir Eserler Kısmı, Veli-yüddin Efendi 1970

50b

tımar hususu için Karaman beylerbeyine hüküm:

Karaman beglerbegine hüküm ki şimdiki halde emrü celilü'l-kadrim bu vechile sadır oldu ki vilayeti-i Karaman subaşlarından min-bad bir subaşı vefat eyleyüb müteaddid oğulları kalsa ibtidadan yararına dört bin akçelik tımar tevcih edüb tezkiresin verüb bakiyesine dahi istihkaklarına göre ne mikdar virilmek vech ü münasib görürsen tevcih edip beratların verüb tasarruf ettiresin. Ve emrüm üzere ol yarar oğluna dört bin akçelik tımar tevcih eylediğinde tezkire-i senede babası ne asl subaşı olup ve ne tarikle zeamete çıkıp yoldaşlık ile mi çıkmışdır yoksa kadimi ocakları olup mu verilmişdir sıhhati vukuu üzere beyan eyleyüb tafsil edesin. Ve eğer zıkr olunan subaşların oğulları tımar tasarruf ederlerse, babaları vefat etdikte iki binden üç bine varınca ne mikdar terakki etdirilmek vech ü münasib görürsen ana göre emrüm üzere terakkilerin tedarik eyleyüb tevcih edip tezkirelerin viresin.

51a

Ama benam-ı subaşılardan vefat edip tımar tasarruf etmemiş yarar oğulları kalub ocak erleri olup dahi ziyade terakki ettirilmeğe müstehakk ve mütehammil ola. Anun gibilerin ahvalini ve babalarının zeametini ve kendülerin yararlıklarını tafsili ile yazıp südde-i saadetime arz eylesin. Ne denlü terakki etridilmek emr eder isem ana göre tedarik ve tevcih eyleyüp viresün. Vilayet-i mezburede tımar virilmeli olduğunda bedel bulunmayub ve ifraza dahi kabil olmayub ol tımarların ziyadesi olsa, ol vakit üç yüz akçe ziyade ile tevcih eyleyüb tezkiresin viresin. Emr-i şerifime muhalif min-bad üçyüz akçeden terakki tevcih etmeyesin. Ve bir sancakda bir tımar mahlul oldukda ol mahlul tımarı haricden kimesneye vermeyüb geri ol sancakda mütemekkin olup evi ve barkı anda olup yirlü ve yurtlu olup mazul olanlara tayin edüp tevcih eylesin. Ve eğer mazul sipahi bulunmazsa, evi ve barkı ol sancakda olup lakin tımarı ahar sancakda olan sipahilerden tımarlarına bedel olan sipahilere tevcih eyleyüb viresin. Senin elinde tımarın vardır demeyüb bu hususda ber vechile ihtimam eylesin ki bir sancakda mütemekkin olan sipahinin tımarı geri ol sancakda olup harice gitmeyüb sefer ü hizmet emr olundukda daima hazır ve müheyya bulunalar. Ve anın

51b

gibilerin ahar sancakda olan tımarların dahi gerü ol sancakda yirlü ve yurtlu olanlara tevcih eylesin. Amma bu mana mücerred terakki ecliçün olmayub her sipahinin tımarı mütemekkin olduğu sancağda olsun dimekdir. Ferman-ı şerifim üzere amel eylesin. Ve bazı sipahiler vefat eyledikde, sefere yaramayan sagir oğulları kaldıkda vilayet-i Karamanda vaki olan kalalardan ki hisar eratları ziyadece ola, anın gibi kalalerde vaki olan hisar eratları gediklerinden ol asl yaramayan sipahizadelere gerü yarayınca eşkin tımarı virmek üzere hisar eri gediği tevcih eyleyüb tasarruf ettiresin. Ve kadimden beğlerbeği beratıyla mutasarrıf olan sipahilerden birisi ki yoldaşlıkda bulunub müstehakk-inayet olub emrüm üzere bir mikdar terakki tevcih olunub tımarı tezkirelü oldukda dahi kadimden beğlerbeyi beratıyla tasarruf ederdik denilmeyüb, emrüm üzere tevcih olunan ziyade makbul olub, südde-i saadetimden berat-ı humayun virile. Ve mukaddeman Karaman beğlerbeyisi iken vefat eden Mahmud Bey vilayet-i mezburda tevcih eyleyüb tezkire virdiği sipahilerin tezkirelerine ve ellerinde olan beratlarına nazar eyleyüb dahi muvafık-ı emr ü kanun olan tezkirelere sen dahi mühr edüp südde-i saadetime irsal eylesin ki beratları virile. Ve haliya Karaman beğlerbeğliğine ilhak olunan Zülkadiriye taifesinin tımarlarından dahi şol

52a

tımarlar ki bilfiil mahlul olub kimsenin tasarrufunda olmaya, vilayet yazılıb tamam olunca ol mahlul olan tımarları gerü taifeyi mezbureden emrüm üzere tımara müstehakk olanlara tevcih eyleyüb tezkirelerin viresin ki bu yıl tımarları hasılına mutasarrıf olub sonra vilayeti mezbure defter oldukda her sipahiye kadimi tımarları tevcih olunub tezkireleri verildikde berat-ı humayunum verile. Ve bu hükm-ü humayunumu vilayet-i Karaman defterinde hıfz eylesin ki daima mefhum-ü şerifi mucibince amel oluna şöyle bilesin, alamet-i şerife itimad kılasın. Tahriren fi 20 Receb 933 (22 Nisan 1527)

bir sureti bu hükmün Anadolu beylerbeyisine yazıla ve bir sureti dahi Rum beylerbeyisi Yakub Paşaya yazıla

hala dergah-ı saadet destgahıma mektub gönderüb vilayet-i Zülkadiriye olan Yeni-il hususu için Rum beylerbeğisi arz edüb ol babda vared olan ahkam-ı şerife hususu için ilam eylemiş. İmdi mukaddeman zülkadirlü taifesine kadimi tasarruf ettikleri yirleri virilmek emrüm olunduğu kemakan mukarrerdir. Amma vilayeti mezburda sol yerler ki evvelden Rum vilayetinden olub Rum defterinde mukayyid ve mastur ola, anın gibiler zülkadirlüye yazılmak emr olunmamışdır. Buyurdum ki hükmü şerif-i vacibül ittiba'm varacak zikr olunan yeni il şöyle ki Rum defterinde evvelden

52b

mastur ve mukayyidsa ve kadimden Zülkadirlü tasarruf iderse anlara verilen mufas-

sal hükm-ü cihanmuta muktezasınca kadimi tasarruf edegeldikleri tımarlarını Rum beglerbegisi Rum defterinden tevcih eyleyüb tezkiresin viresin ki berat-ı humayun virile. Amma sefer vaki oldukda cümle Zülkadirlü bir taife olup anın gibi Yeni-il'den tımar tasarruf edenler sair Zülkadirlü ise bir yerde eşüb Karaman beylerbeyliğine tabi olup aza-i hizmet edeler, şöyle bileler.

haliya Karaman beglerbegisi Lütfi dam-ı ikbal-i dergah-ı muallama mektub gönderüb Zülkadirlü taifesinden olup ol canibde olan Yeni-il'den tımar tasarruf iden sipahilerin ahvalini ilam idüb, senin için zıkr olunan Yeni-il kadimden Ruma tabi olup, Rum defterinde mastur ve mukayyiddir deyü sabiken südde-i saadetime arz eylediğinde verilen hükm-ü humayunı hususeyn ilam eylemiş, imdi Zülkadirlü tafesine kadimden tasarruf idegeldikleri tımarları gerü kendülere virilmek emr olunduğu kemakan mukarrerdir. Amma kadimden Ruma tabi olup Rum defterinde mastur olan yirler kitabet olundukda Zülkadirlüye yazılmak dahi emr olunmamıştır. Buyurdum ki mezbur Yeni-il'den kadimden tımar tasarruf eden Zülkadirlü taifesi kaç nefer ise tımar verilmek babında müşarileyh Karaman beglerbegisi sabiken virilen mufassal hükm-ü humayun suretin

53a

taleb olunub getirtip dahi ol emr muktesasınca nahiye i mezburda Zülkadirlü olup tımar tasarruf edenlerin tımarını sen tevcih ve tayin edip tezkirelerin viresin ki beratları virile. Ama anın gibiler sefer vaki oldukda sair Zülkadirlü ile eşüb Karaman beglerbegisi ile eda-yı hizmet eyleyeler, Zıkr olunan taifeden bazılarına Karaman beylerbeyisi tezkire verip beglerbegisi ana göre südde-i saadetime berat-ı humayun virilmiştir. Anlara mütearız olmayub beratları tarihinden hasılların zabt etdiresin. Berat etmeyenlerin tımarlarını emrüm üzerine tedarik ve tevcih eylesin, tezkirelerin viresin söyle bilesin tahriren fi 10 safer 935 (24 Ekim 1528)

Şimdiki halde vilayet-i Karamanda bazı sipahilerin tımarları yol basdı veyahud adam kılıçlayub defaatle şirret ü şenaitleri zuhur oldu deyü alub ahâr sipahilere tevcih edüp tezkirle vermişsin. İmdi sipahi şenait edip, müstehak-ı siyaset olup, itdüğü şenait südde-i saaderime arz olunub, siyaset olunmağüçün hükm-ü şerifim varub, ol sipahi siyaset olunub tımarı mahlul olmayınca ol tımar alınub ahara virilmek emrüm değildir. Buyurdum ki hükm ü şerifim vardıkda, min bad ferman-ı şerifim üzere amel eyleyüb beylerbeyliğinde olan sancakbeğleri veyahud kadılar anın gibi bir subaşının veyahud sipahinin fesad ve şenaitin yazub sana arz eyleyeler.

53b

Sen dahi hak üzere gereği gibi teftiş ve tefahhus edüp fi nefsul emri bi haseb ül şerr ve'l kanun siyasete müstehakk olur, günahı ve cerimesi zahir ve sabit olacak olursa, anın gibileri dutub, habs edüp dahi kaziyyelerin tafsil üzere yazub, dergah-ı

muallama arz eylesin. Eger siyaset olunmak emr edüp hüküm ü şerif verilirse, emrüm mücebince siyaset olunub tımarları mahlul oldukda, ol vakit emr ü kanun üzere tımarların ahara tevcih edüp tezkirelerin viresin. Yohsa bu tarikile olmadın min bad kimsenenin tımarını ahara tevcih etmeyüb tezkire virmeyesin. Ve beratları anda virilen sipahiler hususunda dahi bu vechile amel eylesin. Şöyle ki, anın gibiler için şimdiden sonra dergah-ı muallama tezkirelerin varid ola makbul olmak ihtimali yokdur. Haliya İç-il sancağından darendgan-ı ferman-ı humayun Hızır ve Süleyman nam sipahiler gelüb kan eddiler deyü tımarları ahara virildiğin arz edip, bu hususda günahları olduğun [olmadığın?] sancağı beği ilam etmeğin, tımarları gerü kendülere mukarrer kılındı. Min bad emrü şerifin icrasında dikkat ü ihtimam eyleyüb dakika fevt eylemeyesin, şöyle bilesin.

Bundan akdem Zülkadiriye vilayeti Karaman beglerbeyliğine ilhak olundukda anda vaki olan cümle sipahilerin ala ve ednasının beratları südde-i saadetinden virilmek emrolunmuş idi haliya

54a

vilayeti mezbure baid yerde olub ilhak-ı tımara mutasarrıf olan sipahiler beratıçün atabe-i ulyama gelmekde taab ü zahmet çekdikleri eelden anlar hakkıda mezid - atıfet zuhura götürüp üç binden bir akçe eksik olan tımarlara anda sen berat vermek emr edip feamma cümle memalik-i mahrusa ve ekalim-i mühimmimde olan sipahi kullarımın oğulları hakkında zuhur bulan ferman-ı cihanmutam muktezasınca iptidadan tımar tevcih olunan sipahizadelerin az ve eğer çok ola beratları gerü südde-i saadetinden verilmesin emr edip buyurdum ki min bad ferman-ı cihanmutam mücebince sen dahi vilayeti mezburede vaki olan sipahizadelere iptida tımar tevcih etmelü olduğunda emrüm üzere ne mikdar tımar virilmelü ise kimin oğludur, babası ne mikdar tımara mutasarrıfıdır ve ne zamanda vefat etmişdir ve babasının vefatı sancak begleri mektubları ile mi zahir olunmuştur ve yahud gayrı tarik ile midir ve bil cümle sipahizadelikleri bu vechile malum ve zahir olmuşsa tezkirelerinde ana göre kayd ü tafsil eylesin ki mübhem ve müşgül kalmayasın. Tezakirin atabe-i ulyama geldikde makbul olmamak ihtimali olmaya. Vech-i mesfur üzere anın gibi sipahizadelerin ibtida tımarların beratları südde-i saadetinden virdükten sonra ol sipahizadeye sonra senin tarafından virilecek tımar tevcih olundukda geri tezkirelüye varınca sen anda beratın viresin tasarruf ettiresin ve anda vaki olan sipahi

54b

kullarımdan adını bahane ile bir husus isnad edip dahi bilasebeb tımarları alınmak emr değildir. Ferman-ı celilülkadrım anın üzerinedir ki bir sipahi kulumdan cerime sadır olub şer'en tedib olunmak lazım gele. Ol husus için tımarın almayasın. Ve amma cürm-i galiz edip ve kanun ile nizam-ı memleket için siyaset olunmak

lazım gele, siyaset olunduktan sonra tımarın ahara tevcih eylesin. Veyahud emr-i şerifimle bir hizmet ü sefer tayin olunub dahi defere ve hizmete gelmeyenlerin tımarların emrile alın. Bunlardan gayri tarikle kimesnenin tımarın bilasebeb alıp ahara virmeyesin. Ve sipahi kullarım hakkında dahi emr-i şerifim bunun üzerinedir ki vilayet-i mezburda yirmi binden yukarı zeamet tasarruf subaşılar vefat eyleyüb yarar bir oğlu kalursa ibtidadan sekiz bin akçelik tımar tevcih oluna, iki olursa birine sekiz bin birine yedi bin, üç olursa ikisine yedişer bin birine dahi altı bin akçelik tımar tevcih oluna. Bunların oğullarına sagir olursa cebelisün eşdirmek üzere anda senin tarafından berat virilecek tımarlardan istihkaklarına göre tımar tevcih edip veresin. Feamma zıkr olunan subaşılardan vefat edüb tımar tasarrıf etmiş oğulları olsa, bir olursa üç bin akçe terakki, iki olursa birine üç bin ve birine iki bin, üç olursa birine dahi bin beşyüz akçe tevcih oluna ve on binden aşağı tımar tasarruf

55a

eden sipahi vefat eyleyüb bir yarar oğlu kalırsa ibtidadan üç bin akçelik, iki kalırsa birine üç bin ve birine iki bin akçelik tımar verile. On binden yirmi bine varınca tımar tasarruf eden sipahi vefat eylese, bir yarar oğlu olursa dört bin, iki olursa birine dört bin dirine üç bin akçelik tımar tevcih oluna. Ve vilayet-i mezburede olan boy beyleri vefat eyleseler, oğulları var ise yarar olsun, sagir olsun boyları gayra verilmeyip oğullarına tevcih oluna. Oğulları olmayub karındaşları ve akrabası var ise anlara virile, asla oğulları ve karındaşları ve akrabası olmayacak olursa anın gibiler südde-i saadetime arz oluna. Emr-i şerifim ne vechile sadır olursa ana göre amel oluna. Amma anın gibi boy beğlerine ki hal-i huyutlarında boylarından gayri ahar tımarler tevcih olunmuş ola, vefat ettiklerinden sonra oğullarına veya karındaşlarına veya akrabalarına heman boyları verilip ol ahardan ilhak olunan tımarlar mahlul olıcak, ahar münasiblerine tevcih olunub verile. Vilayet-i mezburda bir bütün zeamet ve tımar mahlul oldukda ki boy olmaya, bedeli mazul bulunursa ana tevcih oluna. Bedeli mazul bulunmazsa on binden ziyadesin defter edip südde-i saadetime irsal eylesin. On binden aşağı emrüm üzere anda tevcih eyleyüb tezkireli olanların tezkirelerin viresin ve zeamet ve tımar tasarruf eden boy beylerinin ve subaşılarm

55b

veya sipahilerin yarar yetişmiş oğulları olub envai hizmette ve yoldaşlıkda bulunub muhall-i himmet ü inayet olalar. Ol asılları şahıslarıyla atebe-i ulyaya irsal eyleyüb ellerine mektubun verüb kimin oğludur ve ne vechile hizmetde ve yoldaşlıkda bulunmuştur, tafsili ile arz eylesin, anlar hakkında mezid inayetim ne vechile sudur olub emr edersem ana göre amel eylesin, ve bir sipahi pir-i fani olub asla sefere iktidarı olmayub müteaddid oğulları variken oğullarının birin ihtiyar edip, ana tımarından bir mikdar virmek murad edinirse kabul etmeyüb asla sefere iktidarı olmayub tımarında feragat eden pirlerin müteaddid oğulları oldukda, emrüm üzere

cümlesine alesseviyye tevcih eyleyüb tezkirelerin veresün. Ve defterde ana min bad bedeli olmamak üzere kaydedesin. Ve vilayet-i mezburda bir sipahi ihtiyar ile tımar-dan feragat idüb akibince ahar tımar ederse makbul tutmayub, anın gibi ihtiyar ile tımarından feragat edenlere üç yıl geçince ahar tımar virmeyesin. Min bad vilayet-i mezburede bu emrleri icra edüb her zamanda bu hükm-i cihanmutamın mazmunuyla amel eyleyüb hilafına cevaz gösteresin. Ve bu hükm-ü şerifi anda defter sandıklarında hıfz eylesin şöyle bilesin. Tahriran fi 8 şaban 937 (27 Mart 1531)

Zülkadiriye beglerbeyisi Ahmet Paşaya;

bundan (akdem) Zülkadirlü sipahileri hususlarında mezid inayetim zuhura getirilüb vilayet-i mezburda olan subaşıardan ve erbab-ı tımar-dan

56a

birisi vefat eyledikde tımarları ahara virilmeyüb oğullarına tevcih oluna. Ve boy beyleri vefat eylese oğulları var ise yarar olsun sagir olsun boyları gayra virimeyüb oğullarına tevcih oluna. Oğulları olmayub karındaşları veya akrabası olursa an-lara virle. Asla oğulları ve karındaşları ve akrabası olmayacak olursa, anın gibileri südde-i saadetime arz oluna. Emr ü şerifim ne vechile cari olursa ana göre amel ol-una deyü eylemişdüm. Haliya vilayet-i mezburenin ayan ve sikatı südde-i saadetime gelüb vilayet-i mezburede tımara mutasarrıf olan erbab-ı tımarın cümlesi haricden olmayub, her kimesnenin tımarı eben an-cedd kadimi yurtları ve ocaklarıdır. An-lardan birisi vefat edikde tımarları oğullarına inayet olunmak babında istida-i mer-hamet ve atıfet eyledikleri ecluden, mezburların hakkında mezid merhamet zuhura getirüb buyurdum ki vilayet-i mezburede az ve çok zeamet ve tımara mutasarrıf olan boy beglerinden ve subaşıardan ve sair sipahilerden şöyle ki bir kimesne vefat edüp tasarruf etdiği tımarı eben an-cedd kadimü'l ebenden tasarruf edegeldiği tımarı ve ocağı olucak, yirmi binden aşağısı oğlu yarar ise oğluna, ve müteaddid ise mer-tebeli mertebesince alel vechi'l-iştirak cümle oğullarına tevcih olunub verile. Yirmi binden ziyadesin dahi karındaşı var ise karındaşına, ve karındaşı olmayub karındaşı oğlu var ise ana, karındaşı oğlu yoğise emmüsü var ise

56b

emmüsüne ve emmüsü yoğise emmüsü oğluna, eğer emmüsü oğlu dahi yoğ ise sair akrabasına istihkaklarına göre tevzi ve tevcih edüp ana göre tezkire virile. Şöyle ki vech-i mesfur üzere asla ve kata hısımları ve akrabası yokise emrim bunun üzerinedir ki ol vechile ocak ve yurt olan tımarlar haricden kimesneye virilmeyüb gerü zülkadirlü taifesinden mazul sipahiler varsa anlara virilüb, mazul sipahi yoğise sahih sipahizade olanlara tevcih olunub tezkire virile. Ve tezkirelerinde ne vechile sipahizade olub tı-mar istihkakları bile tafsil olunub kayd oluna ki beratı humayun için süddei saade-time geldikde halleri malum olunmuş ola. Ve zikr olunan üslub üzere vefat edenlerin

oğlları sagir olacak olursa emrim üzere tımarları tevcih oldunkda adet ü kanun üzere yarar ve yaraklu müseallah cebelüleri eşdürmek üzere tevcih eyleyüb veresin. Min bad bu emr şerif üzere amel eyleyüb ve bu hükmü humayunumun bir suretin anda deftere kayd eyleyüb ve aynı ile hükmü şerifül kader ibka eylesesin şöyle bilesin. Tahriren fi 14 ramazan 939 (9 Nisan 1533)

79a

Şimdiki halde;

kemal-refet-i şahane ve fevr-i şefkat-i padişahaniden vilayet-i Zülkadirlü taifesinin hakkında mezid-inayet-i hüsrevanın zuhura getirüp mukaddeman Zülkadirlüye vali olan Şehsuvar Oğlu Ali Beyin eyasında taife-i mezbureden eğer ağalarıdır ve eğer boy beyleri eğer sipahileridir eğer kadimi nöker oğlu nökerleridir bilcümle mezburdan tımar tasarruf eden kimesnelerin kadimi tımarlarını gerü kendülere verilmek emr edüp bu hususun

79b

temin ve tayini için vilayet-i mezbure müceddeden yazılıp defter olunmak lazım ve muhtem olmağın mezbur-i eminin fahr-i erbabü'l kalem Zeyd-i Kadiriye katip tayin eyleyüp ellerine bu hükm-i şerifi-i cihanmuta-ı lazımü'l-işbayı verdüm ve buyurdum ki mezbur emr-i şerifim muktezasınca vilayet-i mezburenin kitabetine mübaşeret ettiklerinde taife-yi mezbureden kudretü'l-emacid ve'l-ekarim (...) olup anlardan gayrı mutemed ve (...) kitabet eyleyip mukaddema müşarileyh Ali Beyden tasarruf ettüğü eğer boydur ve eğer kura ve mezaridir ve eğer yurddur, şimdiye değin eğer hassa-i humayunum için zabt olunmuş ola, veyahud sancakbeyilerine verilüb veya subaşıllara ve sipahilere verilmiş ola, muhassılan her kimde olur ise olsun alınıp vilayet-i mezbure feth olunduğu zaman müşarileyh Ali Beyin beratıyla her kimin tasarrufunda ise beratı görülüp zikr olunan taifenin ayanı ve mutemedleri şehadetleriyle sahih ol boya ve ol tımara mutasarrıf olduğu malum ve muhakkak olunduktan sonra Ali Beyden ne mikdar boy ve tımar tasarruf ederse nakıs ve tağyir olunmayıp ale-ma-kan ol tımar ve olm kimesnenin üzerin mukarrer kılınıp deftere ol vech üzere kayd eyleyeler. Müşarileyh Ali Bey vefat edince kadimden Zülkadirlünün tasarruflarında olup sonra bazı Diyarbekire ve Adanaya ve Arabistana yazılan reaya ki zikr olunan vilayet defterlerinden vech-i

80a

meşruh üzere ol vilayetlerde oturup ziraat ve hırsat ederler heman oturdukları yerlerde ziraat ettikleri arazinin hukuk-ı şeriyelerin sahib-i arza verüp baki rüsum-ı adiyelerin kemakan veregeldikleri üzere Zülkadirlü taifesine verüp zikr olunan vilayet defterlerinde vech-i meşruh üzere ihrac olunmasın emr eyledim. Anın gibilerden dahi sancakta ne mikdar ise ana göre deftere kayd eyleyip her sipahiye beratı bedeli tev-

cih ve tayin eyleyeler. Zülkadırlü boy beylerinden ve sipahilerinden bazı kimesneler ki kadimi sipahiler olup mezbur Ali Beyden tımar tasarruf eyleyip lakin müşarileyh sonra tımarlarını alıp, akrabasına veyahud ahire tevcih eyleyüp Ali Bey vefat ettilde ol tımar anın üzerinde bulunmağın haliya sadır olan ferman-ı şerifim üzere ol sipahiye verilip anın gibiler mazul-i sıfrü'l- yedd kalıp hala vaki olan seferi mazulle seferlemiş ola; ol makule ne mikdar ahali var ise müstakil defter olunup anın gibilere dahi kadimden tasarruf edegeldikleri tımarları bedeli mahlulden veyahud haliya bu defa huruc-ı isyan eden müfsidler seferine gelmeyen sipahiler tımarlarından tedarik ve tevcih olunup verile. Ve yahud ol kadimi boylarına ve tımarlarına mutasarrıf olan sipahiler ile imkanda olan yerlerde müşterek kılmayıp

80b

anlar dahi ihya oluna. Ve taife-i mezbureden sipahi ve sipahizade olmayub, lakin kadimi nöker oğlu nöker olup Alaüddevleden ve Ali Beyden dirlik tasarruf edegelmiş ola, anlar dahi sipahi kısmından olup tımar verilmek emr eyledim. Ol makule kadimi nöker oğlu nöker olup dirlik tasarruf edenlere ne mikdar nefer ise anlar dahi müstakil defter olunup mahlulattan hallerine göre tımarlar tevcih ve tayin olunup verile. Amma bu bahane ile Alaüddevleden ve Ali Beyden dirlik tasarruf etmeyip ve nöker oğlu nöker olmayıp ecnebi olanlar nöker yazılıp tımar verilmekten ziyade hazar ve ihtiraz eyleyesin. Anın gibi nöker oğlu nöker yazıldıkda taife-i mezburenin ayan ve mutemedlerinden her kimin vukuf ve şahaderleriyle yazılır ise ol kimsenelerin esamileri ve şehadetleri bile yazıla, sonra zahir olup bir tarik ile ecnebi olanlar sipahi yazıldığı zahir olursa ol şehadet edenlere siyaset ettirile ve şol kimesneler ki kadimden sipahi ve sipahizade olmayıp lakin Alaüddevleden ve Ali Beyden tımar ve dirlik tasarruf edegelmişler ola; anın gibiler ol zamandan beri dirlik tasarruf etmişlerdir. Sipahi olup ol asıl ecnebiden tutulmayıp Ali Beyden tasarruf ettikleri tımarları emr-i şerifim üzere kendülere tevcih olunup verile. Ve taife-i mezbureden bazı boy

81a

beyleri ve sipahileri olup mukaddema isyan eden müfsidler reayası olup zayi olup bazı boyların dahi boy beyleri ve sipahileri kendüleri ol müfsidlere mutabaat eyleyüp, gidip, ol boylar ve reaya mahlul kalmışlar; ol babda emr-i şerifim budur ki ol boy ve cemaati giden boy beylerine ve sipahilere dahi vech-i mezkur üzere mahlul olan boylara ve cemaatlere ferman-ı humayunum üzere beratları bedeli tevcih ve tayin eyleyüp ana göre defter-i cedid-i hakaniye kayd oluna.

Ve taife-i mezbureden bazı kimseneler kadimden muaf ve müsellemler olup bazıları dahi sabıken ne tarik ile mezariye mutasarrıf olup eşerlerimiş, ol asılları dahi ale-ma-kan mukarrerdir; anın gibileri evvelden olduğu üzere mükerrer eyleyip tafsil üzere yazup deftere kayd eyleyeler. Vilayet-i mezburede bazı silahiler? olup sancakbeylerinin

subaşıları yanına düşüp reayaya zulm ü teaddi ederlermiş. Min-bad vilayet-i mezbu-
rede silahi taifesin ref eyleyip emrim budur ki şimdiden sonra silahi taifesi olmayıp
reayaya zülm ü teaddi eylemeyeler.

Ve taife-i mezbureye kadimden sefer emr olundukda

81b

bir mikdar akçe tayin edip boy beyleri alup ol çerinin ve sair mesarifine sarf ederler
imiş. Hala taife-i reayaya mezid-inayet-i hüsrevaniden zikr olunan çeri hususuna
tahfif eyleyip mesela kadimden beşyüz neferi tayin olunan boydan iki yüz elli nefer
çeri tayin için hizmetkarları olup vech-i mesfur üzere iki yüz neferden bir neferi ahar
hizmete gitmeyip daima yarağı ve siyakı? ile alayda havv-i müheyya olup ve her on
nefer çeri ki adet-i kadime üzere bir çadırları olup eda-yı hizmet eyleyeler.

Ve zikr olunan çericiye harçlık için reayadan adet-i kadimleri üzere bir yıllık sefere
beş yüz pare ve altı aylık sefere iki yüz elli pare ve üç aylık sefere yüz yirmi beş pare
salına ve emr-i şerifinden ziyade salınıp reayaya zülm ü teaddi olunmaya. Amma bu
mikdar çerici tayin olunduğu refahiyyet üzere sefer emr olunduğu eyyamda dirliğe
zaruret iktiza edip ziyade asker çıkarılmak lazım geldikde kadimden Zülkadırlü bey-
leri kemakan olur imiş ki iki eve bir, üç eve bir, dört eve bir adam çıkarırlar imiş.
Gerü ol üslup üzere ziyade adam çıkarılmalı lazım oldukda Zülkadiroğulları saldığı
gibi Karaman beylerbeyisi

82a

canibinden adam geldikde gerü ol üslub-ı kadimi üzere her? salınup muhalefet eyle-
meyeler.

Maraş nahiyesinde ceraim hususunda dahi kadimden kan cerimesin üç yüz pare ve
uğru cerimesiden yüz elli pare ve ok cerimesinden yüz elli pare ve kılıç cerimesinden
yüz elli pare, kız ve avrat dutsa erkek cerimesi üç yüz pare ve bir mahalleden bir
mahalleye kimsene gelip kasd ile ev baskınına adam başına kırkar pare cerime; ve
kul ve at ve düve ve katır yavas vaki olsa bu vechile kadimü'l-eyyamdan Zülkadırlü
tasarruf edip alırlarmış. Bunlardan gayrı kız ve avret tutsa dişi cerimesi yüz elli
pare ve kara bere cerimesi on iki pare ve kul cerimesi seksen pare ve atdan ve düve
ve kuldan gayrı vaki olan yava; bunlar(a?) kethüda nasb etmek hususları; kadimden
boy beyleri zabt ve tasarruf edegelmışler imiş, gerü ol üslup üzere mukarrer olup
vech-i mesfur üzere Zülkadırlü tasarruf ettikleri ceraimi kanun-ı kadim üzere san-
cakkbeyine hass eyleyip ve zikr olunan yava hususunda dahi yıllık ne mikdar nesne
hasıl olursa dikkat ü ihtimam üzere malum edinip dahi adalet üzere yazıp ve kadimi
yörük beyleri andan maada müşarileyh Ali Bey tasarruf ettiği haslardan

82b

ki Zülkadırlü taifesine emr üzere verilmek lazım gelse anun gibilerden sancakbeyinin haslarını tayin edip teknil eyleye dahi sancak beyine verilenden maada Ali Bey tasarruf ettiđi hususlarda ne mikdar baki hasları kalursa müstakil yazıp defter eyleyip ol haslardan kimesneye tımar tevcih ve tayin eyleyesin. Tasarruf edegeldikleri ceraimi dahi evvelden olageldiđi üzere gerü boy beylerine tayin eyleyip anlara dahi mütevec- cih olan yavalarını adalet üzere yazıp, cümle hususların bile hesap edip beratları bedeli tevcih ve tayin eyleyesin. Ve bazı boy beyleri ölüp kadimden Zülkadırlü tasarruf ettiđi ceraimin bazı bile tasarruf ederlermiş. Ol husus merfu olup vech-i mesfur üzere kadimden Zülkadırlü beyleri tasarruf edegeldikleri ceraim gerü boy beylerinin olup cümlesi alesseviye yazılıp defter oluna . Ve boy beyleri halkına kethüda nasb etdiklerinde reayada kethüdalık için bir akçe vermeyeler ve dahi almaya.

Vilayet-i Bozokda Zakir ođlanları ve Hisarbey ođlanları ve Selman ođlanları nam boy beyleri zıkr olunan ceraimden bazıyla tasarruf ederlermiş. Gerekdir ki Bozokda vaki olan cümle boy beyleri ayan ve mutemedleri marifetleriyle eđer boy beyidir

83a

ve eđer sipahilerdir, kadimden tevcihle tasarruf edegeldikleri sabit ve zahir olacak olursa, cümle boy beyleri olageldiđi üzere mukarrer eyleyip her taifenin kadimi tasarruf ettiđi üslup üzere tayin eyleyip deftere ana göre kayd eyleye. Vilayet-i mezburda olan salgın hususu dahi tebeddül ve teayyün olunup, adet-i mutada muzari üzere sultan salgunu her ne ise kemakan gerü mukarrer olup şimdiye deđin ne vechile olagelmiş ise deftere dahi ol vechile tayin olunup kayd eyleyeler. Mezburan emin ve katip vech-i memur üzere vilayeti yazıp defter ettiklerinden sonra defterler ile emrü'l-ümeraü'l-kıram Karaman beylerbeyisi İsa dam-ı ikbaleye gelip emr-i şerifim muktezasınca müşarileyh beylerbeyi dahi boy beylerine ve sipahilerine kadimi tımarlarını tevcih ve tayin eyleyip, az ve eđer çok, cümlesine tezkirelerin verüp südde-i saadete irsal eyleye ki dergah-ı muallamdan beratları verile. Mumaileyh beylerbeyi varmadın emin ve katip kata' kimesneye bir husus için tezkere vermeyeler. Ve evvelden vilayet-i Ruma emr olunan Bozok ve Kırşehir defterleri dahi vilayet-i Karamana ilhak olunmuşdur. Anın tımarların dahi müşarileyh Karaman beylerbeyisi tevcih eyleyip vere. Vilayet-i Zülkadıriyede vaki olan evkaf ve emlakı

83b

dahi mezburan emir ve katip yerliyerinden teftiş ve tefehhüs eyleyip ellerinde olan temessüklerin görüp evkaf ve emlak hususunda yerlüyerinde ne tarik ile sabit ve zahir olursa bir tarafa mukarrer etmeyip müstakil yazıp defter eyleyip dahi mumai- leyh Karaman beylerbeyisine vardıkda müşarileyh dahi görüp her ne vechile olmalı ise vukuu üzere emlak ve evkaf hususların yazıp dergah-ı saadet-destgahıma arz eyleyesin. Emr-i şerifimin üzerine cari ve sadır olursa ana göre amel oluna. Bil-

cümle müşarileyh emin ve katip taife-i mezburenin ağalarından ve boy beylerinden ve sipahilerinden ve sair reayalarından ve arazi ve mezariden bilcümle cümle ebvab-ı mahsulatdan nakir ve kıtmir haric ez defter bir habbe koymayup cümlesin yazup defter eyleyüp ve her boyun boy beylerin neslinden ve tevabi ve levahıkından kaç nefer kimsene olduğun ve cümle vilayet-i mezburenin sipahisi ne denlü olduğun defter eyleyip muhki ve mektum nesne komayup yazıp tayin eyleyeler; ve müşarileyh Ali?