

**MASS EMPOWERMENT IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: THE
CASE OF TURKEY**

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Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Sabanci University
SEPTEMBER 2021

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Date of Approval: October 15, 2021

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ABSTRACT

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TURKISH STUDIES M.A. THESIS, SEPTEMBER 2021

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Keywords: single-party, authoritarianism, Turkey, democratic transition, regime transformation

This thesis aims to explore the boundaries of mass agency in facilitating regime transformation from a single-party authoritarian regime. Such single-party variants of authoritarianism are characterized by repressive practices against opposition attempts, silencing of the renegade segments of the population, and power accumulation to a single figure. To this aim of regime survival, most single-party regimes are reluctant to relinquish political power and control, in order to ensure regime stability and longevity. The single-party era witnessed by early Republic Turkey carries the same characteristics of single-party authoritarianism; power accumulation, establishment of control over dimensions of life such as social or economic, and sole responsibility in dictating the trajectory of the regime. Despite the ultimate control of the regime for a prolonged period of 25 years, the regime preemptively democratized in a matter of five years, under the leadership of the authoritarian figures themselves. This study takes a qualitative approach of process-tracing to establish a robust descriptive base of analysis for the investigation of mass empowerment in regime transformation. Tentative conclusions reached by the study suggest that mass agency may be a crucial variable in a wide variety of regime transformations from authoritarian regimes and that resentment may be an essential part of inciting mass agency against the authoritarian regime.

ÖZET

DEMOKRASIYE GEÇİŞTE TOPLUMUM ROLÜ: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

TARIK ALI SERT

TÜRKİYE ÇALIŞMALARI YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, EYLÜL 2021

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Berk Esen

Anahtar Kelimeler: toplumsal hoşnutsuzluk, demokrasiye geçiş, tek-parti, otoriter rejim, Türkiye

Bu tez, otoriter tek parti rejimlerinden demokratik rejimlere geçişte toplumun rolünü öne çıkarmayı hedef almaktadır. Otoriter tek parti rejimi olarak tanımlanan yönetim sistemlerinin gücü tek elde birleştirme ve muhalefeti baskılama karakteristikleri dolayısıyla alternatif görüşleri dışarıda tutan bir yapıya sahip olarak kategorize edilebilir. Bu sebeple, tek parti otoriter rejimlerin güç ayrımı ve ortak karar mekanizmalarına zıt sistemler olduğu söylenebilir. Türkiye'nin kurulması ile başlayan tek parti rejimi, baskı seviyesini artıran otoriter tavrı ile Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası tarafından yönetildi. 1923'te kuruluşun 1950'de çoklu parti seçimlerine kadar devam eden tek partili siyasal ortamın yıkılması, bu sistemi kuran ve yaşatan rejimin kendisi tarafından başlatıldı; literatürün kalanı ile kıyaslandığında zıt tanımlanabilecek olan bu rejim hareketi, tek parti sisteminin hızlı ve barışçıl bir şekilde yıkılması ile son buldu. Bu tez, rejim değişimin arkasında toplumsal hoşnutsuzluğun bulunduğunu savunuyor. Çalışmada, ilgili kurumsal profiller ve değişimler incelenerek ve dönemsel istatistikî veriler ile desteklenerek ulaşılan sonuç, uzun süreli olarak bastırılan ve toplumsal ve siyasal bildirim sağlayamayan toplumların, otoriter bir rejime karşı muhalif liderleri motive edebileceği ve başarıya ulaştırabileceği yönündeki tezi destekler nitelikte.

*Dedicated to
my grandfather*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction	1
1.0.1. Chapter I - Introduction	1
1.1. Introduction	1
1.2. Research Question	3
1.3. Case Selection	6
1.4. Main Argument	8
1.5. Rival Arguments	9
1.6. Methodology	13
1.6.1. Chapter I - Conclusion	15
2. Historical Background and Theoretical Framework	17
2.0.1. Chapter II - Introduction	17
2.1. Theoretical Framework	17
2.2. Historical Background	21
2.2.1. Chapter II - Conclusion	30
3. Historical Narrative	32
3.0.1. Chapter III - Introduction	32
3.1. 1923-1929	32
3.2. 1930-1938	41
3.3. 1939-1945	47
3.4. 1946-1950	51
3.4.1. Chapter III - Conclusion	56
4. Causal Implications	58
4.0.1. Chapter IV - Introduction	58
4.1. Case-wide Implications	58
4.2. Theoretical Implications	59
4.2.1. Chapter IV - Conclusion	61

5. Conclusions	62
5.0.1. Chapter V - Introduction	62
5.1. Tentative Conclusions:	62
5.2. Further Research:	65
5.2.1. Chapter V - Conclusion	66
6. REFERENCES	67

1. INTRODUCTION

1.0.1 Chapter I - Introduction

The first chapter outlines the general argument put forward by this thesis in the form of the role of mass empowerment in the initiation and maintenance of the early-Republic era Turkey democratic transition. Defining the background of the authoritarian political context, the introductory chapter of the thesis aims to provide the theoretical basis for the causal mechanism applied as the main tool of the study.

In highlighting the methodology, the first chapter also provides insight into the process-tracing and comparative historical analysis methods utilized throughout the study. Brief historical background is provided to supplement the context of the arguments introduced throughout the chapter.

1.1 Introduction

Political opposition formation under authoritarian regimes is costly to initiate and maintain. An authoritarian regime characteristically controls the social, political, economic, and cultural spheres, aiming to accrue sufficient power to dictate indefinitely (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 70; Svobik 2012, 55-63). Challenges to authoritarian regimes are commonly repressed, through measures ranging from silencing the opposition to illegal detainments, and in extreme cases, political executions (Magaloni 2008, 723; Wright 2008, 283-309). Despite the perceived disadvantage of the opposition, there are cases in which authoritarian regimes are successfully challenged and transformed through a multitude of models such as through elite leadership, through the initiative of the regime, or through collective action on the side of the masses (Haggard and Kaufman 2012, 495-516).

Investigation of the factors pertaining to successful opposition under authoritarian

regimes is beneficial to the general understanding of democratic transitions. Primary characteristics to consider in this thesis are the pace and form of the transition, as regime transformations transpire in varying degrees, depending on the historical context of the chosen case (Smith 2005, 421-451). Taking into account the focus on accumulating and maintaining power by an authoritarian regime, the transition period can commonly be prolonged and violent, however, certain cases witness the reforma mode of transition, in which the authoritarian regime itself initiates and maintains the transformation process, leading to the dismantling of authoritarian power by the regime itself (Özbudun 2000, 105-110).

Coined under the term of authoritarian-led transitions, this concept proposes political learning on the part of the authoritarian leader; the authoritarian individual or group liberalizes the regime to the extent it deems suitable, often conceding to the opposition that gets stronger in opposite correlation to authoritarian power loss (Slater, Riedl, Wong and Ziblatt 2020, 315-332). Based on past political experience, the authoritarian figure may seek the incentive of a democratic loss in light of the political context and depending on the relative cost of repression; for example, the combination of motivated opposition supported by politically active masses may present such a case, given that the historical context provides sufficient political learning for the actors involved. While the political elite and regime members are mostly investigated under this scope, the political learning and behavior of the masses may present a significant variable as well.

The single-party period of Turkey from 1923 to 1950 presents an exceptional case in providing the historical context for a reforma. In addition to the democratization process being initiated and maintained largely by the regime itself, the pace of the transition was quick as opposed to the previous 27 years of single-party rule. The Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası - Republican People's Party - RPP) established its regime after the War of Liberation, under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's leadership; the party remained in power from 1923 to 1950, with rapid increase in state imposition throughout the era (Koçak 2017, 220-233; Demirel 2011, 361; Ahmad 1993, 15-72). The within-party dynamics influenced the shifting policies of RPP, and the ruling coalition commonly dictated the trajectory of its economic policies (Payaslı 2014, 175-197; Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 115-141; Sayarı 1978, 39-57). Regarding the population, the contradiction of the modernist Kemalist ideology and the traditionalist masses was exacerbated through the failure of rapid modernization efforts, while the governance system based on the utilization of local notables created a rift between the state and the society (Zürcher 2017, 200-221; Emrence 2003, 67-80). The regime relied on the intermediary local notables, especially in the Southeastern provinces, to keep the masses compliant and focused on elite cohesion

within the ruling coalition; the focus on securing elite cohesion often was to the detriment of the masses, creating the base of resentment against the regime by the population (Aktan 1966, 317-334; Karaömerlioğlu 1998, 34).

In reaction to demonstrations of mass resentment motivated by traditionalist sentiments, the regime established extensive control to contain and replace the anti-revolutionary initiatives within the society. The expansion of state control added to the resentment hosted by the masses due to its often repressive and imposing practice and the lack of noticeable improvements as a result of state presence (Koçak 2010, 124-163; Sayarı 2012, 182-194). However, in the aftermath of World War II, the control setup by the regime was rapidly dismantled through its own volition; liberalization steps were taken in political and social spheres by RPP, ultimately leading to the transformation of the regime to a multi-party system. RPP deconstructed the structure that afforded them mass compliance, tolerated and conceded to opposition instead of repressing political alternatives, and contradicted the expectations of the literature in regards to the behavior of authoritarian regimes (Sayarı 1978, 39-57; Yalman 1947, 46-58; Güngör 2010, 193-208; Hale 2013, 220-225).

While the regime liberalized itself, the main motivator for the transformation was the existence of competent political opposition with popular backing. The process that started with the Dörtlü Takrir (Memorandum of Four) led to the formation of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti - Democrat Party - DP). The party was founded in 1946 by ex-RPP members who were exiled due to their criticism of the regime through the memorandum, gaining significant popularity immediately. In response, RPP adopted most policies offered by DP and conducted early elections in 1946 to inhibit the provincial organization of the opposition. Following the elections DP pushed to reduce the advantage RPP had in elections, refusing to participate in the political arena until pertaining laws were equalized. The regime conceded, leading to their defeat in 1950 against the opposition.

1.2 Research Question

From a theoretical standpoint, authoritarian regimes establish control and unify power primarily to ensure regime stability and survival (Svolik 2012, 55-63; Haggard and Kaufman 2016, 30-57; Wright and Folsch 2012, 283-309). Based on this primary concern, an authoritarian regime would be expected to self-preserve in dire situations, determined partially by the longevity and extremity of the preceding period of authoritarian rule. The level of repression utilized by the regime is a crucial

variable in whether the ruler resists or attempts to make pacts to secure itself. Based on this knowledge provided by the literature, authoritarian regimes may be generally characterized by their focus on power accumulation and unification for regime continuity. To the same aim, authoritarian regimes are not expected to relinquish control over to political challengers through legal channels and will commonly aim to repress the opposition or at least disadvantage the challengers.

Single-party variants of authoritarian regimes display these characteristics in extremes in comparison to competitive variants. Previous research examines the examples of Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Philippines, and Tanzania in determining the variables of longevity for single-party authoritarian structures, proposing that the existence of a ruling coalition and its maintenance are critical in regime survival (Smith 2005, 421-451). Based on this understanding, a single party authoritarian regime is expected to form a robust ruling coalition to establish control, cohesion, and unity of authority, dictated by the ruling party. In comparison to competitive variants of authoritarian regimes where the regime allows a controlled political environment, single-party authoritarianism extends this control to practically eliminate the political competition.

However, as with all variants of political regimes, authoritarianism may be vulnerable to bouts of leadership challengers, spearheaded by different actors of the political and social arenas. The opposition against the regime may be motivated by reasons such as economic discontent, ethnic conflict or religious clashes; whatever the reason might be, commonly, a main actor rises to lead the challenge against the regime, representing the unified opposition against the authoritarian leader. In applicable cases, the elite, the masses, or the regime itself may initiate and maintain, or demand the initiation of political liberalization, to the aim of achieving democratic transition. Agency in terms of political leadership by the elite is often at the forefront, while the pressure created by mass demand may be less pronounced in certain cases such as this one.

The contradiction between the expectations of the literature and the historical narrative that the Turkish case provides is exceptionally beneficial to our understanding of democratic transitions from single party authoritarian regimes through opposition empowerment. Considering the longevity of RPP's rule and the high level of state imposition, the regime-led transition process in late 1940s is not to be expected, according to the characteristics of similar authoritarian structures (Greene 2010, 807-834; Rustow 1999, 510-522). Opposite to the liberalization arc of RPP, a prolonged authoritarian regime would be expected to retain power as long as possible. In this sense, the Turkish case challenges the common expectations of the literature

and prompts the question regarding the dynamics that factor into the reformative mode of transition that led to the first democratic elections being held in 1950. Additionally, the intertwined nature of the elite and mass opposition poses an interesting dynamic which may suggest political institutionalization and strategic voter behavior during the transition period.

Previous literature also focuses on the regime-initiated democratic transition effort as its primary conundrum, as the repressive measures utilized by the regime in the past would predict the opposite. However, while the existence of regime-led democratic transition is an interesting question, its broad range poses a difficult investigation; factors which push the regime to divert from the authoritarian mode of regime survival towards liberalization. As a crucial variable in the transition period, the timing and mode of transformation helps to distinguish an alternative answer to supplement the previous literature.

To this aim, this thesis narrows the question to the pace and form of transition, as the rapid escalation of liberalization steps present an exceptionality in this specific case. Especially regarding the single-party governance structure of the RPP, the dismantling of the regime got progressively faster, which ultimately led to the end of the single-party era with the defeat of RPP. Furthermore, the decades-long single-party period was brought to its end by the fair electoral practices put in place through the political concessions of the regime to the opposition, as well as their own initiatives of liberalization. The sudden shift in trajectory and the rapid pace of transition provide crucial information in understanding the Turkish case of regime transformation, hence, this thesis focuses on these qualities.

Research Q1: How was the extensively authoritarian RPP regime dismantled rapidly and through democratic institutions?

The long history behind the transition process of Turkey is critical to understanding the motivations behind the political actors, and the complex structure of clientelism and elite cohesion are essential to making sense of regime policy shifts. Especially the economic dimension of the single-party era is crucial to clarify the institutional positions and relative changes of the actors involved; the inclusion of these case-specific factors are essential to successfully tracing the historical background of the transition process and producing a comprehensive descriptive analysis.

The Republican People's Party regime was increasingly authoritarian throughout the early Republic era. Inherent problems of the preceding Ottoman Empire were left unanswered and new problems arose with the end of the War of Liberation, necessitating strict measures for the implementation of the top-down revolution.

Hard-liners of the regime were consistently in leadership positions and were able to dictate the political opposition against the regime, crippling alternative representation channels. Against this backdrop and under worsening economic conditions, the authoritarian regime moved to liberalize the political environment under the pressure of mounting opposition.

While the mere existence of opposition was at the will of the regime in earlier periods, 1945 saw the challengers of the regime demanding concessions by the government in liberalizations and succeeding. Furthermore, RPP itself aimed to adapt the trajectory of its critics, introducing further liberalization measures at its own volition. The course of the regime in ensuring its survival poses a significant puzzle to resolve, which may benefit the literature as a whole.

1.3 Case Selection

The Turkish case of democratic transition is exceptional in its method of transformation, pace of transition, and regime behavior. The case hosts within itself complex dynamics of cultural, social, economic, political, and religious clashes; conflicts arising from the clash of traditionalism and modernism diversify the variables of the case and the preceding legacy of the Ottoman Empire further complicates the picture.

The economic state of Turkey was strained due to the inherent war costs of the War of Liberation and the debts of the Ottoman Empire, as the Turkish Statistical Institute displays in their 2011 report. These financial burdens caused the generation of resentment for the first decade of the Republic, as the consequent wars since the beginning of the 20th century required significant funds to repair and compensate for. In this sense, the major military and political victories achieved in the War of Liberation were unable to solve the problems after the foundation.

Politically, the masses were apathetic towards governance and the state, commonly operating through local representatives in de facto manner (Karpaz 1963, 55-67; Özbudun 2015, 60-72; Sayarı 2014, 655-670). Throughout the War of Liberation, opposition was managed within the regime and the difficult war conditions legitimized the unified power of authority; the end of the war meant a rise in the cost of repression against the opposition. Under a modernist and democratic vision the state had to be accountable to opposition, however, trials at introducing opposition to construct a multi-party system caused social turmoil, further complicating the

political arena.

Major institutional structures of the Turkish Republic were tied to its patrimonial predecessor, from the ruling coalition that formed the basis of voter compliance for the regime, to the clashes between the proverbial center and the periphery of the country (Bakiner 2018, 503-522). The modernization efforts after the foundation were motivated and influenced by these clashes, with the regime constantly seeking to contain anti-revolutionary sentiments and promoting the modernist Kemalist ideology. The failure to deliver the revolution to the masses exacerbated the perceived cost of tolerance against organic opposition, forming a loop that generated mass resentment throughout the single-party era.

On the subject of the ruling coalition, the inclusionary nature of the War of Liberation left a wide range of constituents of different interests and beliefs to be tended to by the regime. The uneasy alliances created throughout the war effort reflected on Turkey's politics in the form of elite clashes; the ruling coalition was deliberately modified and homogenized on different occasions, implying political institutionalization, arguably due to the interaction of the actors within social and political spheres. Politics mostly remained between the economic, political, and military elites, as the governance structure of the regime relied on the exchange between military officials, bureaucratic personnel, and local notables (Zürcher 2007, 77-92; Sayarı 2011, 81-94; Keyder 1987, 71-91). The local notables operated as a buffer between the regime and the society, affording voter compliance for RPP but inhibiting its ability to connect with the masses. This disconnect fed the loop of mass resentment, with most of the modernization efforts being perceived as impositions of the state, without any material benefits for the lives of the ordinary citizens. The regime often utilized repression against this resentment, perceiving the society as backwards and seeking to curb traditionalist sentiments before opening up the political arena to political alternatives.

The connections of modern Turkey to Ottoman institutions, the complex workings of the ruling coalition, economic and social discontent, and the authoritarian measures practiced against challengers of the regime present a prime case relative to the research question. The single-party period of Turkey hosts a plethora of exceptional qualities that can benefit our understanding of authoritarian loss of power, regime transformations, elite interactions, political institutionalization, and democratic transitions; hence its selection for the study.

1.4 Main Argument

The main argument of the study is derived from a framework of mass agency, born from popular discontent. Seminal pieces of authoritarianism literature state the importance of resentment against the actions of the regime as a main variable in democratic transitions from authoritarian systems (Haggard and Kaufman 2016, 30-57). Characteristically, authoritarian regimes restrict representations of popular will through social and political channels, however, the significance of the resentment generated by the masses is less common as a focus point than the significance of elite clashes and coalition dissolution. Through the application of the discontent framework on the Turkish case, the effect of the masses in influencing decision-making, policy shifts, and regime transformations can be better highlighted.

The discontent framework primarily examines the reaction of the masses to discontent; as most authoritarian regimes tend to unify power in one institution, the discontent is attributed to the state. Relevant studies from the literature point out the significance of mass-elite and state-elite relations in authoritarian regime survival (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 1-26; Bunce and Wolchik 2010, 43-86; Greene 2010, 807-834; O'Donnell 1986, 64-84). Especially in cases resulting in regime transformation, the masses and the elite develop a symbiotic relationship as the masses support the opposing elite to challenge the repressive regime, while the opposition leaders utilize the grievances of the masses to come to power (Haggard and Kaufman 2012, 495-516; Higley and Burton 1989, 17-32). This relationship is multi-faceted, with factors such as the dividedness of the social arena and the motivation of the elite determining the conclusion of the transformation period. From a general standpoint, the discontent framework includes both the masses and the elite as core concepts, making it suitable for answering the question presented in this thesis.

Taking into account the main institutions and policy motivators in Turkey, the discontent framework is applicable. The state and the society were largely alienated from each other since the foundation and the attempts to bridge this gap by the regime resulted in failure, leading to further resentment on the side of the masses. Throughout the 1930s, the discontent of the masses grew as state imposition and economic grievances piled up, while there was no discernible improvement in the quality of life for the population in general. The following Second World War deepened the economic grievances of the masses and, as RPP shifted towards a statist trajectory to counteract the mass discontent, elite cohesion started to dissolve. The dissolution of cohesion weakened the ruling coalition, leading to the soft-liners of the regime to oppose statist policies, offering alternatives that tapped into the discon-

tent of the masses. The foundation of the Democrat Party in 1946 was the material result of this mobilization; the party followed a centrist rhetoric in terms of stoking traditionalist sentiments, except the inclusion of religious freedom in party rhetoric. Focusing primarily on economic problems, the opposition was able to garner mass support from the population who were denied their chance of a political alternative on two separate occasions. Hence, the mass discontent framework reliably explains the procession of the democratic transition process and is applicable to the case.

Factoring in the generally non-divided social environment, mobilization of political opposition coincides with the display of mass discontent (Lust-Okar 2004, 159-179). The underlying social, religious, and cultural resentment forms the basis of discontent for the masses, while the progressive increase in state imposition and the woes related to economic crises increase its severity. The negative disposition of parts of the ruling coalition to statist policies motivates regime soft-liners and results in opposition leaders to emerge and to take advantage of the mass resentment to gain popular support against the regime.

The multitudes of factors determining the main argument are important to process in utilizing the discontent framework, especially for the Turkish case. The historical context of the case provides robust background for the influence of the masses on the regime in democratic transition processes, hence, a better understanding for the role of mass resentment in achieving regime transformations may be provided for the literature.

1.5 Rival Arguments

The previous literature focuses on three main arguments in explaining the democratic transition process; additional minor factors are also cited, such as the institutional positions and historical backgrounds of actors, however, three main points stand out. The first point is based on the trajectory of the global context, especially during the Second World War, citing the rising security concerns of Turkey against the threat of Soviet encroachment and Nazi expansionism. The second point emphasizes the domestic political and economic environment, pointing out the dissolution of the ruling coalition as a motivating factor in regime change. The third and final point takes an individual-level approach, citing the personal character of İnönü as the primary reason for the transition. These arguments carry explanatory power for the establishment of a consistent historical narrative as they isolate significant motivators of the transition, however, they are not sufficient in explaining the pace

and method of transformation.

To expand upon the first argument; the global context. Turkey had gone through a prolonged period of economic crisis leading up to the Second World War, decreasing the pool of available resources for the war effort as displayed in the Central Bank Inflation and Price Stability chart published in 2013. On top of increasing domestic discontent, the global war pushed certain countries to pressure Turkey for access to the Straits. The Straits and the general Turkish territory were especially important for Russia, both based on the geopolitical importance of the location and its long-standing ambitions to gain control over the Caucasus and the Mediterranean (Avcioğlu 1974, 333-347; Zürcher 2017, 220-221; VanderLippe 2012, 96-102; Sadak 1949, 448-461). The paranoia over potential Soviet aggression materialized in the form of the re-signature of the Ankara Agreement; signed between the parties before in 1925, this agreement guaranteed mutual goodwill and impartiality. While the re-signing of the agreement had been rudimentary before, Stalin allegedly introduced certain conditions during the war, pressuring Turkey into signing. The demands said to be made by Stalin were focused on taking control of the Turkish Straits with direct intervention under the guise of providing protection and the territorial surrender of some Northeastern provinces of Turkey to the Soviets, taking advantage of the vulnerable position that Turkey was in under the war economy. Comparatively, the Russian armies were overwhelming for the Turkish ones, ruling out the possibility of a military encounter, increasing the paranoia of potential Soviet encroachment.

Recent literature on the subject disputed the claims of Soviet demands on Turkish territory, focusing instead on the aim of the regime to create a foreign threat to stay in power against the rising opposition in the form of the Democrat Party (Özkan 2020, 156-187; Deringil 2004, 86-102). Based on this analysis, the Soviet threat can only be considered a motivator for the democratic transition process, rather than an initiator of it. The intentions of the regime were to utilize the perceived Communist threat emanating from Stalin for gains in the political arena and to rally the masses around RPP as the only stable protector against the Soviet threat.

On the first rival argument found in the literature, this thesis argues that the global context was a minor motivator in initiating regime transition and that its significance lies mostly in the pace and method of the process. The first point to make in arguing this is the already Western-oriented trajectory of Kemalist modernization, as evidenced by specifically the Turkish Parliament Minutes of March 4th, 1924; the foundation of Turkey was based on Western principles of modernism and secularism, partly as a result of the French style education that most young officers such as Mustafa Kemal were trained under. Furthermore, the regime prioritized the

normalization of relations with Western countries following the War of Liberation instead of taking an agonizing stance against the bloc, moving to involve itself in international organizations such as the League of Nations (Tunçay 1999, 118-134; Demirel 2015, 187-193). Actions taken in the immediate aftermath of the War of Liberation, the rhetoric of Atatürk, and the strictly Western style of modernization show that the Western-leaning trajectory of Turkey during the Second World War is a predetermined path rather than an adaptive one (Tekeli and İlkin 2014, 211-243).

To further support this perspective, the timing of the democratic transition process can be cited; the formation of organic opposition and democratic transition coincided with the end of the war, when it could have taken place before. Stalin allegedly demanded an alternative arrangement to the agreement concerning the global status of the Straits, the 1936 Montreux Convention, as early as 1939. Based on the Soviet pressure argument, one would expect to observe earlier attempts at democratization rather than at the end of the threat; in addition, formation of legitimate opposition coincides with the initiation of liberalization. Hence, it can be argued that the global pressure emanating from potentially hostile states during the Second World War was a supporting factor in the democratic transition process. While the domestic economic burden of war preparations would significantly increase the discontent of the masses throughout the war effort, the diplomatic dimension of the conflict is arguably not the main factor that initiated the transition process.

The second argument cites the dissolution of the ruling coalition as an explanatory factor for the liberalization of the regime (Lewis, 1974; Kalaycıoğlu 2012, 171-182; Güneş-Ayata 1994, 83-96). According to the previous literature, the statist policies applied by the RPP regime were to the detriment of the economic interests of the ruling coalition and the general clientelistic network (Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 115-141; Koçak 2010, 124-163; Unbehaun 1994, 87-98). Given that the ruling coalition was a crucial component of governance for the regime, conflict within the coalition structure considerably weakened the authoritarian power of RPP; the division of elite and the subsequent formation of an organic and competent opposition led to regime transformation.

Elite division within the ruling coalitions of especially single-party regimes is a major variable in both initiating and determining the pace of regime transformations in authoritarian regimes (Magaloni 2008, 715-741; Haggard and Kaufman 2016, 30-57). In this sense, the second rival argument holds significant explanatory power in analyzing the democratization process in Turkey. The exceptional ruling structure of RPP depended on intermediaries in the form of local notables in securing mass compliance, as such, elite cohesion within the ruling coalition was a necessity for the

regime to continue. Thus, its dissolution has a sizable impact on the weakening of the regime and the subsequent liberalization process.

However, the second rival argument is primarily from a structural perspective. While it sufficiently explains how the authoritarian regime was weakened enough to concede to political opposition, it does not delve into the formation of opposition from an agency perspective. The erosion of elite cohesion within the ruling coalition determines the strength of the regime but it does not sufficiently explain the motivation of opposition. From a structural standpoint, the motivation can be mainly inferred from the detriment of regime policies for the interests of members of the coalition, although this would not provide the answer for the timing of democratization.

This thesis offers an agency perspective into the second rival argument. While the political maneuvers of the regime and the opposition matter a great deal in regime transformation, the agency of the masses is the crucial factor in determining motivation. Lust-Okar provide an expansive framework into this concept, stating the importance of the division of the social sphere in supplying motivation for political opposition (2004); a population that is fragmented into numerous diverse groups reduce the motivation of the potential opposition leaders as the cost-benefit analysis of a potential failure deter the opposition from acting. Meanwhile, a concentrated and undivided social environment encourages the formation of opposition, reducing the cost of opposition, and increasing the chance and benefits of a potential success. In this sense, the dissolution of the ruling coalition has a significant part in explaining the democratic transition process but can be enhanced with further explanatory power by considering the agency of the masses in motivating the opposition.

The third and final argument primarily concerns the personal character of İsmet İnönü and the principle tenets of Kemalism. Atatürk, and later İnönü, were strict, Western-style modernists and Kemalist hardliners. Under Atatürk, the regime itself constructed political opposition to bring multi-party dynamics to Turkey, reflecting intent for democratization. Based on the consistent and competent character of İnönü throughout the single-party era, the explanation argues that the democratization process was a result of İnönü's own volition.

The personal character of İnönü is arguably modernist given that the regime initiated previous attempts at democratization, which also supports the notion that regime transformation was a result of İnönü's character. However, involving the timing of the democratization process is crucial in determining additional factors; while prior attempts were made at involving opposition in the political arena, they were extensively controlled by the regime; the Progressive Republican Party (Terakîpverer Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Progressive Republican Party - PRP) in 1920s and

the Free Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Free Party - FP) in 1930s were closed down after garnering popularity and being found as inciting factors in rebellious mass movements, making their cases exceptional as opposition parties. Both parties operated for less than a year before their closure, with no chance at representing the population or getting involved in governance. In this sense, their existence mostly served to legitimize the RPP regime as democratic, and not as an organic opposition that represented certain parts of the population.

The previous attempts at democracy may be argued to be under different contexts of domestic turmoil, which necessitated the disarmament and closure of opposition parties to establish order and security. While this argument may be applicable to the first two decades of the Republic, it does not sufficiently explain the compliance of İnönü in undemocratic practices post-Second World War. As an example, the 1947 elections which featured the Republican People's Party against the Democrat Party were pulled forward to 1946 in an attempt to jeopardize the organizational capacity of the opposition, giving them less time to prepare for the elections. The strategy succeeded, prompting the opposition to protest the elections and make demands for liberalization, which ultimately secured opposition victory against RPP in 1950. For an argument based on the character of İnönü, it would be expected that İnönü complies with the elections in a proper manner, giving fair chance to the opposition to secure leadership. While İnönü can be considered a modernist and his character can be argued to have played a role in the democratization process, this thesis argues for a bigger role of elite-pact making. Essentially, this thesis argues that the Kemalist character of İnönü was the main variable in determining how the regime acted when the cost of repression exceeded that of tolerance but not before. İnönü chose to liberalize the system through concessions to opposition demands due to his hardliner Kemalist character and calculated, arguably, that repressing the opposition or the masses could lead to mass violent uprisings, choosing to relinquish power instead of risking major domestic turmoil.

1.6 Methodology

This thesis mainly utilizes the process-tracing approach to qualitative analysis. The complex historical narrative within the Turkish case requires the careful examination of primary and secondary sources and important events clarifying institutional formations and changes, policy shifts of the regime, milestones of resentment, and other relevant factors. This methodology offers a reliable framework for the analysis

of an extended historical period and enables the thesis to provide a consistent timeline of events which are tied together narratively and through qualitative evidence. The utilization of process tracing is critical in setting up the necessary descriptive basis for the application of the theoretical framework (Collier 2011, 823-829).

In addition to tracing the natural order of events within a given process, this thesis also utilizes the comparative historical method, with a focus on institutional characteristics and change. Historical narrative is divided into subsequent segments of time periods, divided by milestone events throughout the chosen era; the comparison of these different periods are aimed to be standardized to allow for a robust analysis, as disparity among variables pertaining to the milestone events inhibits the comparison process. This methodology allows for a transparent view of the potential shift of trajectory for the relevant actors over historical narrative and provides the necessary tools for understanding the difference the overall context makes in given time periods (Lieberman 2001, 1011-1035).

In order to reliably generate descriptive background from the expansive single-party era, periodization is required. The overall period is prolonged and dynamic, with numerous policy shifts, new political actors, shifts of institutional positions and historical events altering the course of the transition process; as such, periodization helps to divide the whole era into chapters in which the context may be reliably described and categorized under certain common characteristics. Dividing the early Republic era into smaller segments based on significant policy shifts of the regime is a feasible way of periodization for the Turkish case, as the most active actor of the political arena is generally RPP. The expansive control of the regime to dictate results in an unequal exchange between the actors of the environment and RPP may be determined as the most significant factor in the Turkish case, thus, periodization takes its actions as its focal point.

The resulting structure starts with the first seven years after the foundation, between 1923 and 1929. First conflicts with the masses following the foundation are critical for the basis of the study in the mass resentment argument; additional clashes within the ruling coalition indicate the fragility of the elite following the War of Liberation and the shifts of alliances in the new environment afforded by the Turkish Republic. Consequent political and social strife and the responses of the regime are fundamental to establish the significant role of discontent, not only from the masses, but also from potential opposition leaders and the ruling coalition. To this aim, highlighting the rapid modernization process and the social and economic environment leading up to the Great Depression in 1929 allows for a basis of understanding for the following period under economic crisis.

The second period takes place between 1930 and 1938 and inherits the social and political conflicts of the previous decade, with the Great Depression providing the global and domestic economic background. The policies of the regime as the response to this prolonged depravity period consistently favored the economic elite and repressed the masses, silencing their input in social and political spheres to keep domestic cohesion. The consequences of the rapid modernization period from the preceding decade factor into these policy decisions by the regime, paving the way for the mass discontent concept. Additionally, the introduction of political opposition by the regime at the beginning of the second period, and the events surrounding the foundation and subsequent closure of the introduced opposition justify the periodization depth for this period. The passing of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the transfer of leadership to İsmet İnönü marks the end of the second period, on the eve of the Second World War. The radical political, social, and economic environment introduced by the Second World War and the change in leadership from Atatürk to İnönü are significant variables in the equation, hence this period may be differentiated from the preceding and the following ones.

The last decade of the single-party era is divided into two; the first period highlights the war era between 1939 and 1945, while the second period focuses on the democratic transition process following the war, between 1946 and 1950. The division of the war era and its aftermath are feasible, given the significant motivating factors for the transition period that sprung out during the war and the radical shift towards liberalization by the regime. The foundation of the first organic opposition party in 1946 sets the second period apart from the first one, triggering dormant sentiments in the masses and the elite, ultimately resulting in regime transformation, hence its disparity from the preceding period.

Overall, the study is designed to be qualitative. The historical background that is necessary to introduce in the application of the discontent framework is vast, furthermore, the descriptive analysis that may be inferred through qualitative research is beneficial to the robustness of the study, as the period under investigation seldom produced quantitative data appropriate for methodical analysis. As such, the process tracing methodology is adopted to analyze the expansive and complex structure of single-party Turkish history.

1.6.1 Chapter I - Conclusion

In summary, the first chapter introduces the general historical background of the democratic transition period during early Republic era Turkey. The beginning of

the chapter focuses on the research question and the exceptional nature of the case in providing an exceptional study regarding democratic transitions and ties into the general literature on authoritarian regime survival. The position of mass agency and leadership is highlighted and situated within the literature and general ties are established to the case studied in this thesis.

The latter half of the chapter delves deeper into the historical background of the case, detailing the political and social context in providing the main arguments of the study. The primary main argument is specified as mass discontent inciting resentment, which in turn empowers the political opposition to challenge the regime. Previous arguments concerning the same period are examined and evaluated in the context of the general literature concerning the historical background.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0.1 Chapter II - Introduction

The second chapter of the thesis aims to establish the general theoretical framework utilized in putting forward the main argument of the study, namely the discontent over repression concept, and the costs of repression and tolerance. Giving a brief overview of these two concepts, the first-half of the chapter describes the theoretical approach and describes its methodologies.

The latter-half of the chapter focuses on the historical background of the Turkish case and aims to place the theoretical framework as applicable. The provided historical background is meant to serve as a condensed summary of the chain of events leading to regime transformation and enhances the background of the following chapters.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

Authoritarian regimes establish total control over the political sphere and repress political challenges as their method of regime longevity and survival (Linz and Stepan 1996, 14-33; Svoboda 2009, 477-494; Greene 2010, 807-834). While a multitude of factors combined with repressive measures ultimately decides whether the regime survives (such as the economic context or the level of authoritarianism practiced by the regime) the clear intent of the regime is to prolong its control (Bunce and Wolchik 2010, 43-86; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 15-45). To this end, authoritarian regimes display extensive flexibility in adapting to political environments, going as far as conceding to opposition for the long-term goal of prolonging its own authority (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 1-26).

Among authoritarian variants of governance, the single-party variant focuses on uni-

ifying the power in a single authority figure, whether a cadre or an individual, in ensuring regime survival (Svolik 2009, 477-494; Wright and Escriba-Folsch 2012, 283-309). Previous literature attributes the determination of behavior by authoritarian regimes in survival situations to the origins of the regime, rather than its existence (Smith 2005, 421-451). In this sense, the historical context that sets up the basis of authoritarian governance is a crucial variable in its maintenance and survival. Furthermore, the access of the ruling coalition and clientelist network of the regime to state resources and economic incentives through their influence over policy-making factors into the equation (Hankla and Kuthy 2013, 492-504). The level of access of the co-opted elite to state sponsored advantages helps determine the strength of the ruling coalition which enables the regime to reliably dictate the masses, and a reduction in this level of access may jeopardize the chances of regime survival for the single-party regime.

Based on this background, contradictory actions displayed by single-party authoritarian regimes can be explained through a multitude of concepts, such as the dissolution of the clientelistic network or pressure by the international community. These concepts can be combined and categorized according to their influence on the costs of repression and tolerance; the dissolution of the clientelistic network that keeps the economic elite cooperative, increases the cost of repression for the regime. The same dynamic may be generalized for the weakening of the ruling coalition, mass uprising based on discontent, and political violence.

To expand on this concept, the cost of repression represents the feasibility of measures that repress the social and political spheres by the regime, extending from banning protests to arresting opposition leaders. The cost of tolerance on the other hand, represents the cost of contradictory actions to repressive measures, for example, tolerating the formation of an organic (not regime initiated) opposition party and their subsequent propaganda to appeal to voters. The costs of repression and tolerance are not inversely correlated and an increase in the cost of repression does not necessarily mean the decrease of the cost of tolerance. The qualitative scale that these costs are placed on is highly contextual and cannot reliably be generalized (Dahl 1982, 170-181). However, especially in cases of single-party regimes, the costs of repression and tolerance are robust indicators for understanding and predicting regime behavior, moreso when the regime acts against the expectations from an authoritarian regime.

Based on the framework of the costs of repression and tolerance, this thesis offers a new motivating factor for the Turkish democratic transition. The previous literature masterfully incorporates the international and economic contexts of democratic

transition, as well as offering an individual-level perspective on İnönü's leadership in describing the initiation of the liberalization of the political structure. This thesis focuses on the perspective of the masses as an addition to the literature, based on the general discontent and the resulting resentment of the population initiating and maintaining regime transformation. The cost of repression, in this sense, rose steadily throughout the single-party era based on the discontent of the population with the governance of the regime. Economic, social, and political repression resulted in the culmination of mass resentment under an environment where the soft-liners of the regime were motivated to oppose the authority, resulting in a symbiotic relationship between the two.

In offering this perspective, this thesis utilizes a causal chain that is based on the concept of resentment resulting from mass discontent, and indirectly, on the concept of de facto political power (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016). Acemoglu and Robinson describe de facto political power as the informal methods of communication for political and social input by the masses which are generally indirectly delivered to the state, such as through the support of the masses to an opposite of the regime (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 938-963). Legitimate political and social input channels such as political petitioning and civil society organizations are generally limited under authoritarian regimes, essentially disabling political input into governance, silencing the majority of the opposition; in cases where these practices are realized, they tend to be biased towards supporters of the regime, leaving out the representation of potential opposition. In the absence of legitimate representation channels for the masses, de facto political power becomes a crucial variable in understanding regime behavior and calculating the cost of repression.

To detail the mass resentment framework, de facto communication of the masses triggers the first step of the causal chain of mass discontent; the display of negative sentiments through the de facto power of the masses pressures the regime into responding to either the general electorate or the political opposition as their representatives (Haggard and Kaufman 2012, 495-516; Gandhi and Przeworski, 12-18). This is especially true in the Turkish case, as the regime was not hostile to the populace, but utilized repressive measures to impose its ideology, indoctrinate the masses, and prolong its authority; direct conflict and hostility may decrease the chances of informal communication, negating the causal chain entirely (Svolik 2009, 483-488).

The second step of the causal chain focuses on the reception of the masses of regime response. Depending on the nature of regime action against the de facto communication of discontent, the masses may or may not be satisfied, which determines if

the third step follows; in cases of mass satisfaction with the response of the regime to discontent, regime maintenance is likely, and the authoritarian regime will prolong its authority through concessions to mass demand. In cases of dissatisfaction with regime action, the third chain of causality is invoked and the masses may seek additional concessions through increasingly radical measures, ranging from protests to violent uprising against the authority. The outcome of this conflict determines whether the regime is transformed or maintained and is case-specific as the unique origins of individual single-party regimes may wildly affect the dynamics of the conflict. Overall, the causal chain originates first through the reflection of mass resentment on the regime through formal/de facto channels of political input, the second step displays the reaction of the regime to the resentment of the masses in the form of either compliance or repression, the third step focuses on the reaction of the masses to the answer of the regime to discontent. The fourth and final step of the causal chain is entirely dependent on the third step; if the majority of the masses are content or are able to be repressed relative to the action of the regime, the regime will be maintained and the authoritarian leader will prolong survival. In the opposite case, a multitude of paths to regime transformation may be expected, as the historical context of the case is vital in the existence and progression of democratic transition.

For the period in question for this thesis, the response of the regime to political opposition, and the reflection of popular will to that extent, was to repress and expand control which highlights the additive nature of mass discontent; resentment from the masses is rarely based on one single incident, as the collective action problem prevents the agency of the masses from reacting to such events considerably. The culmination of authoritarian transgressions through repressive government policies can be considered additive in this sense, which may increase the potential backlash of both the masses and the regime in severity.

In cases of regime transformation to a non-authoritarian regime, the process may follow a multitude of paths. For the Turkish case, this may be determined as pre-emptive democratization, as the regime initiated the liberalization of the political system, ultimately leading to their exit from authority. According to the concept of pre-emptive democracy, figures leading an authoritarian regime may decide to relinquish power strategically, contradicting the general expectations from such a system of governance (Bunce and Wolchik 2010, 45-75). Coupled with the lack of mass support for the regime and the dissolution of the ruling coalition, this may be an expected consequence to the regime transformation step utilized in the causal chain of discontent. An additional, significant variable in an authoritarian figure initiating liberalization is the capacity for pact-making in the exit of the author-

itarian regime. As repression may be commonly utilized under an authoritarian structure, and taking into consideration political learning and resentment accumulation, the figures that utilized repression aim to guarantee their well-being after their exit, seeking non-accountability for their actions in charge (Higley and Burton 1989, 17-22; Friedheim 1993, 482-512). The level of repression and the acts committed to prolong regime survival may increase the cost of relinquishing power for the authoritarian figure, decreasing the chance of pre-emptive democratization.

There is also the additional framework of oligarchic tendencies in pre-emptive democratization (Tucker 2008, 127-147). This framework has not been applied to this thesis as it would increase the range of the study well beyond what could be conducted in the given timeframe, however, the distinction of oligarchic motivations in pre-emptive democratization may be beneficial for further additions to the literature. The Turkish case hosts groups that are likely to harbor oligarchic tendencies among the softliners of the regime and their influence on policy-making may be a significant variable of the democratic transition process.

2.2 Historical Background

The exceptionality of the Turkish case of democratic transition is derived from the rather quick and bloodless trajectory of the transition; the literature pertaining to the single-party period is critical in tracing the process of events that determined the transition effort as such. This chapter aims to provide the preliminary timeline as set by the literature, establishing the stances of institutions, and their progression and change throughout the single-party period.

The Kemalist ideology that dictated the foundation of Turkey was primarily a Western-modernist movement (Esen 2015, 600-620). As the leading figure of the War of Liberation and the foundation process, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Republic of Turkey, dismantling the previous Sultanate of the Ottoman Empire. Victory in war, however, was not able to compensate for the division of interests after the foundation of the Republic and the aim of strictly following democratic principles in governance could not be realized.

The first indicator of this division followed the first opposition attempts within the regime. Disillusioned and ideologically traditionalist military officers who fought in the War of Liberation came forward to challenge the authority of Atatürk, based on a range of motivations including feeling left out from the revolution and losing

advantages held previously under the Sultanate (Zürcher 1992, 154-157; Üngör 2008, 30; Dinçkol 2015, 339-354). Stripped of military status, these figures came forward in the political arena to form the first opposition front against Atatürk and the Republican People's Party, criticizing the rapid dismantling of the previous regime and traditional practices in lieu of modern and foreign implementations. The criticisms of the opposition were tolerated by the regime considering the unstable environment that the war left behind and the Progressive Republican Party was founded as the first formal opposition party of the single-party era.

Following the outbreak of the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925 in the East-Southeastern provinces of Turkey, the masses were determined to be not stable enough for the implementation of fully democratic institutions and practices, prompting their repression until they were stabilized (Emrence 2003, 70-73; Zürcher 1992, 155). This stabilization would take the form of rapid modernization steps that aimed to dissipate the traditionalist sentiments inherent from the Ottoman Empire, bring the modernist revolution from state-level to individual-level, and construct a population that would take the mantle in securing a Turkey under modernist and Kemalist principles. The rebellion was alleged to be tied to the Progressive Republican cadre, who were displayed as the disgraced military officers that aimed to establish a more powerful regime for themselves. The party was subsequently closed down by the regime, citing the traditionalist rhetoric and focus on religious freedom as inciting factors for the mass uprising in the Southeastern regions (Atatürk 1927, 223-250).

In the aftermath of the traditionalist rebellion and PRP's closure, the regime initiated a large-scale strategy for rapid modernization. According to the RPP regulations published in 1931, the effort was planned to integrate modernist ideals into the population, standardize them to the vision of the regime, and prevent the manipulation of traditionalist sentiments by political figures. However, the integration process was less-than-ideal in implementation, primarily due to the disconnect between the state and the masses. From the perspective of an ordinary peasant, the Kemalist revolution was not beneficial; the War of Liberation was exhausting for the population after 3 previous, consecutive wars, improvements to daily life were not significant, and the constant state imposition on what was acceptable was not properly understood (Zürcher 2017, 119-123; Aktan 1966, 317-330; Aydın 2018, 359-384). Furthermore, the nature of steps taken throughout late 1925s alienated the state from the masses on a major scale; transformations such as the changing of the calendar to Gregorian, the introduction of the Latin alphabet, and regulations introduced regarding clothing, especially traditional, radically changed the social environment that the population lived under and were used to. Anecdotal evidence from the relative period displays that these changes that were aimed at uplifting

and appeasing the masses instead pushed them away (Aslan 2011, 75-93). The modernisation effort was designed to be heavily intertwined with the daily lives of the targeted masses, increasing the perceived level of state imposition and encroachment for the population.

A major reason for this disconnect was the method of governance by the regime, which factors significantly into the later stages of regime transformation. Similar to the previous Ottoman experience, the central government operated through a ruling coalition composed of military officers, bureaucratic personnel, and local notables (Kalaycıoğlu 2012, 79; Unbehaun 1994, 221-230). Local notables were utilized as local loyalty magnets for the regime; incentives, advantages, and state resources were distributed primarily among these influential figures to captivate their voter audience, ensuring voter support through the local notables (Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 115-131; Güneş-Ayata 1994, 30-58). This constituency system lowered the cost of repression for RPP, as the popular support was secured as long as local notables were satisfied with the clientelist dynamics within the coalition. However, this system also severed the direct ties between the state and the masses, casting an alien and intimidating figure of the state over the population; a figure that was often demanding and imposing but did not provide perceivable relief or benefits for the ordinary lives of the citizens (Koçak 2010, 110-112; Demirel 2011, 304-316; Adak 2014, 39-59). The total domination of the state of both the social and the political environments resulted in the notion that the state and the regime were as one. Consequently, the modernization effort was counterproductive, increasing the perception of state imposition without observable benefits, enhancing the generation of social resentment against the regime. Expanding on the benefits of the revolution for the masses, the economic dimension of discontent accompanied the political and social dimensions in the 1920s.

Based on the political and economic context, the focus of the regime was on securing the cohesion of the elite within the ruling coalition in the first few years following the foundation. This focus shifted as a result of the Said rebellion in 1925, as the economic incentives taken in the Congress were seemingly not enough to ensure the harmony within the coalition and traditionalist sentiments inherent in the population were susceptible to the manipulation of the opposing elite. Following the closure of PRP, the regime took steps to prioritize the integration of Kemalist ideals into the population, seeking to deliver the revolution and its principles to the masses. This integration would secure the masses against the manipulation of traditionalist sentiments, creating a nationalist, modernist, and Kemalist populace that would responsibly vote against backwardness (Koçak 2005, 1-15). The most viable way of this integration was through rapid and coordinated modernization, put into practice

by the introduction of several radical changes to the daily lives of the citizens; the removal of traditional clothing from public spheres, transformation of language to be more contemporary, date and time modifications to fit the global schedule were some of the steps taken to this aim (Mutlu 2013, 54-95; Adak 2014, 59-71; Özbudun 1993, 189-210). The imposed changes on the status quo without proper explanation or material profits served to increase the discontent of the population, increased in magnitude by the inherent resentment for the regime by traditionalists among the populace.

In summary, the first decade of the republic was politically volatile, both within the ruling coalition and between the state and the masses. Against the radical changes emphasised by Atatürk to modernize Turkey after the military victory, significant figures who partook in the War of Liberation were perceivably more advantageous in the traditionalist status quo environment of the Ottoman Empire, and consequently opposed the modernist ideals of Kemalism. The seemingly absolute prestige and power of Atatürk, and the ostracization of some of these officers from the radical measures following the war were additional factors into their motivation to oppose the regime. The traditionalist nature of the opposition reflected in the rhetoric of the Progressive Republican cadre, tapping into the existent social, political, and economic resentment in the masses, some of which were triggered and utilized by Sheikh Said in 1925. The support for PRP, along with the magnitude of social unrest as a result of the Said rebellion, displayed a populace that was hostile to the modern principles of Kemalism, and a political environment that potentially could unravel the Kemalist revolution. The anti-revolutionist sentiments were of the highest threat to the regime, hence, opposition was quickly shut down and masses were aimed to be standardized through rapid modernization processes. However, the effort for modernization was not properly integrated at every level, relying heavily on the agency of local distributors of state imposition; the disconnect between the masses and the state necessitated the utilization of these local distributors, lowering the practical coordination and organization of the regime itself. Hence, the modernization effort brought increased state imposition and religious restrictions without any discernible benefits that would co-opt the masses. Leading into the 1930s, the domestic environment would remain largely the same, with the regime focusing on modernization efforts and the homogenization of the ruling coalition.

As volatile as the previous decade was, the 1930s hosted further political, social, and economic problems. The Great Depression negatively affected the economic context considerably, increasing the general discontent of the masses to higher levels, while regime actions responding to the masses disregarded this and previous sources of resentment. Similar to the example of the Progressive Republican Party, the

foundation and subsequent closure of the Free Party (FP) was also a critical juncture for the political and social volatility of the period, bringing increased authoritarian measures, as the reflection of popular will through its support to political opposition posed risk to the revolutionary actions of the regime.

Focusing on the masses, throughout the decade, the economic and social status of the peasantry was either stagnant or in decline (Tekeli and İlkin 2016, 130-140; Karaömerlioğlu 1998, 34; Tunçay 1999, 46-50; Sayarı 1978, 39-57). Generally, the interests of the ruling coalition overshadowed the needs of the masses. Ties of the economic elite to the central government through the coalition allowed for information fluidity between the parties; as a result, especially the importers among the economic elite were able to hoard general goods before the crisis and customs tax increases, causing considerable budget deficit for the state (Ahmad 1993, 46-80). With the Great Depression in effect, the economic elite were pre-informed and prepared, while the masses were faced with decreasing employment opportunities, especially in the agricultural sector, and rising prices of basic commodities. Industrial workers and similar manual laborers were silenced with the 1934 Labor Law, preventing political input from a growing part of the population.

The regime was unable to connect with the population, especially with the peasantry, laborers, and unions; a major reason for this was the limited organizational and mobilizational capacity of RPP (Esen 2014, 620-622). The consistently cohesive ruling coalition and the rare occurrences of popular mobilization reduced the necessity of a strong party organization for the regime. However, the low level of mobilizational capacity also meant that the regime was based on a limited audience of the masses with a considerable vulnerability to possible elite defections from the coalition.

Politically, the decade experienced turmoil from the beginning. Following the modernization effort conducted in the last five years, Atatürk aimed to introduce opposition to the political arena, possibly due to the perceived readiness of the masses to participate in democracy without being manipulated through traditional rhetoric. Following the initiative of Atatürk, the Free Party (FP) was founded by Fethi Okyar in 1930, a close friend of Atatürk and a hard-liner Kemalist. Positing a more liberal economic stance, FP quickly garnered popularity among the masses, displayed popularly by the masses in Izmir, when Okyar visited. National newspapers such as *Vakit* reported the significant gatherings on the front page on September 8th, 1930, displaying the exceptionality of mass involvement in politics.

Despite the control of the regime of the opposition, the fate of the Free Party did not radically differ from that of the Progressive Republican Party. Stripped of po-

litical input, major segments of the population were looking for an alternative to the current regime and especially the economic stance of FP managed to captivate a considerable number of voters (Emrence 2000, 31-52; Karaömerlioğlu 1998, 34). Besides the lack of political input, the increasing level of state imposition on the population throughout the modernization period drew resentment from the same segments; FP aimed to promote a liberalist agenda to counteract the economic discontent of the population following the Great Depression, however, similar to PRP, anti-revolutionist groups flocked to the ranks of the newly established opposition, based on it being the most realistic and attainable alternative to the regime. Furthermore, the popularity of the opposition was unexpected by the regime, exposing the lack of organizational capacity and the weakness of the regime in terms of legitimization by the masses (Emrence 2003, 67-77; Karpat 1963, 55-67).

The radical flocks under FP displayed their resentment of the regime on several occasions. Incidents such as political violence against RPP offices in İzmir broke down the perceived readiness of the population for multi-party politics in the eyes of the regime; protests against RPP imagery were prevalent in the mobilized groups, signaling the failure of the modernization effort, along with the additional resentment it brought out (Soyak 1973, 55-67; Emrence 2003, 67-68). The radical mobilization surrounding the Free Party displayed anti-revolutionist tendencies fueled by traditionalist values, as was the case for the Progressive Republican Party. While the closure of opposition was initiated by the regime in the latter case, FP would be disbanded through the personal decision of Okyar. Following the dissolution of the party in November of 1930, the Menemen incident on 23 December 1930 further proved the pent up resentment of the radical groups.

The reflection of the masses represented by the banner of the regime-initiated opposition showed that the rapid modernization effort failed in replacing the traditionalist sentiments of the masses with Kemalist ones. Furthermore, mass mobilization in the form of protests and attacks against RPP were considerably intimidating for the modernist progression of the Republic, as they posed a direct anti-revolutionist stance. From 1931 onwards, the regime shifted towards strengthening the ruling coalition, presumably to keep the masses in check through local notables.

On the economic dimension of the decade, Kemalist etatism was in practice. Etatism in this case differed from socialism; as a nationalist-developmental ideology, Kemalism, especially in the 1930s, emphasized the state providing incentives and support for the private sector (Esen 2014, 620-622). This would strengthen the local bourgeoisie, appeal to a wider range of elites as constituents, and maintain elite unity among the existing coalition. Consequently, the initiation of the first Five-

Year Industrial Plan in 1934 aimed to kickstart the industrial sector through the regulation and support of the state, in order to establish a thriving environment for the domestic economic elite (Fry 1971, 306-326). The plan included a limited scope of sectors, leaving out the agricultural sector as a recipient of support from the initiative. Considering the agricultural sector to be the largest in Turkey throughout the period, the focus of the plan was solely on supporting the establishment of a strong local economic elite, while the masses were largely ignored. Additionally, the Labour Law in 1934 restricted the rights of protest and organization of industrial workers; this may be interpreted as the regime making up for the lack of support from the masses by strengthening the mechanism that keeps them in check; the regime would substitute its reliance on a Kemalist majority for its further reliance on the ruling coalition. This shift would be prevalent until the late 1930s, with a sudden shift towards appealing the masses becoming dominant leading into the 1940s.

After Atatürk passed away in 1938, İnönü took the leadership of RPP and was titled as the next Grand Chief of Turkey. The transfer of leadership did not significantly alter the trajectory of the regime, as İnönü was a hard-liner Kemalist and a close friend of Atatürk, who chose to keep close to Kemalist ideals after taking the mantle. While an experienced politician and military officer, İnönü lacked the invulnerable aura unique to Atatürk, which may have contributed to the motivation of opposing political figures at the time.

The beginning of the Second World War in 1939 changed the overall context dramatically. The report published by the Central Bank Inflation and Price Stability Index in 2013 shows that war preparations took a drastic economic toll on the etatist structure of Turkey, with the prices of basic food items rising steadily throughout the period and stagnation in employment across all sectors (İlkin ve Tekeli 2016, 333-348). Masses were under heavy strain as the prices of basic commodities rose; political opposition within RPP focused on the etatist policies of the regime to be the core problem and criticized the protectionist approach to the market in favor of a more liberal approach.

The shift of the regime towards protectionism in response to the economic burden of the war conflicted with the interests of the economic elite, decreasing the stability of the coalition (İlkin ve Tekeli 1974, 110-136). A milestone of this degradation was the National Protection Law (NPL), introduced in 1940. The law aimed at increasing the regulatory power of the regime over the market, presumably throughout the war effort and negatively affected both the peasantry and the local notables (Sayarı 2011, 81-94). Under NPL, the state could force-buy agricultural produce from farmers at

fixed prices, inflicting a large portion of the peasantry with economic hardship; the yield leftover from state purchases were unable to cover the costs of the subsistence farmers, driving them into debt against large landowners (Karaömerlioğlu 1998, 34; Akman 2011, 73-91). The highlighted tables on the average prices received by farmers may display an increase in the income of farmers, although the inflation rate would suggest a stagnation or decrease in income. Meanwhile clauses on the appropriation of private land intimidated large landowners, causing suspicion within the circles of the economic elite.

Concerning the daily lives of the peasantry, the inflation rate radically rose during the war era in comparison to the 1930s. Throughout the last decade, the inflation rate fluctuated under 1 percent annually due to the relative autonomy of the central bank and the global deflation caused by the Great Depression (Emrence 2000, 31-51). With the beginning of WWII, the state relied increasingly on the resources of the central bank for the economic management of war preparations and the global turmoil. The sources displayed in the 2013 report of Inflation and Price Stability shows that the resources spent towards the funding of public deficit and similar draws on the state budget resulted in an overall increase of 12 percent in annual inflation rate between the pre-war and post-war periods.

Increased protectionism was detrimental to the interests of the economic elite, especially as the period progressed. The Wealth Tax of 1942 and the elusive Land Reform Project mentioned throughout the single-party period were among the concepts that intimidated the elite, as these policies defied the previous incentivization of the private sector by the state. This shift of trajectory by the regime caused suspicion among the growing economic elite, many of whom were involved with the ruling coalition, motivating them to oppose the unpredictable state to protect their own interests. Consequently, an opposition front formed of economically liberal soft-liners vocalized against the hard-liners of RPP, criticizing the etatist policies of the regime in favor of a free market economy without state regulation.

With the end of World War II, the international pressures on Turkey in terms of perceived hostile encroachment were eased. Reduced threat from the international arena exasperated domestic problems which were brought forward by the opposition. As a major milestone in the formal formation of the opposition, Dörtlülük Takrir (The Memorandum of Four) was signed and delivered to the parliament by forthcoming soft-liners of the regime in June 1945; the memorandum was mostly concerned with the implementation of free and fair elections, autonomy for universities, and transition to the multi-party structure, demanding the liberalization steps necessary for the realization of these principles to be taken by the regime. Turkish Parliament

Minutes of November 5th, 1945 legitimizes the memorandum by introducing their message and opening discussion regarding the topic, displaying the significance of the message for the hard-liners of the regime.

Curiously, this memorandum was preceded by discussions of the controversial Land Reform Bill throughout 1945. Through this land transformation project, hardliners of the regime aimed to reduce the political power of local notables and the economic elite by dividing large holdings of land among the peasantry (Aktan 1966, 317-330; Aydın 2018, 359-371). This would in turn empower the masses to resist the influence of notables, forming the state-mass connection and disenfranchising the power of the intermediaries. The critics of the Land Reform Bill argued that this transformation would reduce productivity and profitability in the agricultural sector, in addition to violating the right to private property guaranteed by the constitution (Ahmad 1993, 66-82). However, most softliners who supported the Memorandum of Four and opposed the government based on their etatist economic policies were directly or indirectly negatively affected by the Land Reform Bill (Aydın, 362-368). The infringement of their interests may suggest that the motivation of the opposition is not strictly for democratic principles, but for their own, primarily economic, interests.

Following the memorandum, four leading softliners were either exiled or left the ranks of the regime to unite as formal opposition under the banner of the Democrat Party (DP). Led by Adnan Menderes as the president and Celal Bayar as the founder, the cadre were established politicians joined by influential ex-RPP figures including Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü, who were also signatories of the memorandum. The experienced and motivated opposition started to organize for the 1947 elections, only for the elections to be brought forward by the regime and conducted in 1946 (Akşin 1997, 113). This political maneuver reduced the time for DP to propagate its message and garner mass popularity; against the unfair advantage of the electoral system and the power of the regime, RPP won the elections.

Considering their chances at winning the elections slim given the advantage the regime had in utilizing resources and bending electoral laws, the opposition argued against the unfair practice of the regime, publishing *Hürriyet Misakı* in 1947. On November 16th, 1947, the newspaper *Akşam* reported on the challengers of the regime and their declaration, which was prepared and published throughout the 1947 DP Congress and criticized the lack of democratic principles in the electoral and governance structures of the regime. In supporting the report, the Democrat Party refused to partake in future elections until electoral practices were standardized as free and fair, giving a chance for the opposition to win. The report was

centered around three main points for the remedy of this situation; removal of anti-constitutional laws, separation of party and state presidency, and modification of electoral law to increase fairness and transparency.

The regime responded with 12 Temmuz Beyannamesi (12 July Declaration) in 1947, to the mounting criticism of the opposition. The reaction of the regime to the discontent of the elite was swift as the declaration was nationally publicized a day later, as reported by the *Ulus* newspaper on July 13th. The declaration guaranteed equality in treatment to the opposition in the political arena by İnönü as the President, who would moderate the dialogue between the regime and the opposition. Consequently, İnönü openly supported the liberalization of the regime in concession to the demands of the opposition, reducing the influence of the hardliners in RPP considerably (Ahmad 1993, 44-74).

Following the 12 July Declaration and the damage to the hardliner faction of the regime, the liberalization process steadily quickened throughout the last three years of single-party structure. The regime aimed to adapt the policies put forward by the Democrat Party to their own policies in an attempt to curb their popularity and gain a wider basis of support from the masses. The private sector was consistently appeased to maintain elite cohesion within the ruling coalition, and religious and social concessions were made to appease the masses under repression (Ahmad 1993, 44-74; Zürcher 2017, 154-156). The regime aimed to become the representation for the masses by labeling the opposition as elitist landowners who were out to oppress and benefit from the population through their focus on the masses.

2.2.1 Chapter II - Conclusion

Overall, the second chapter provides an overview of the traced process throughout the study. Resentment over discontent, and the relative change of costs of repression and tolerance tied to it, are put forward as the primary approach to the Turkish case. Utilization of dynamic concepts that change according to their environment, such as the increase of resentment over a prolonged period of time affecting its political context, are well-suited to the exceptional pace and form of transformation witnessed in the Turkish case.

A summary of the historical events leading up to the transition period in the last decade of the single-party regime is provided to serve as the common literature that the study utilizes in the process-tracing segment. Significant milestones and the shifts between the chosen periods are emphasized to highlight the dynamic nature

of the case.

3. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

3.0.1 Chapter III - Introduction

The third chapter of the study is designed to be the main segment which provides a detailed historical narrative of the single-party era and establishes the links of the theoretical framework with the case. The chapter utilizes process-tracing and adheres to periodization, and is consequently divided into 4 different subsegments, each detailing a certain era within the single-party period. These periods are characterized by their common social, political, and economic contexts and serve to deliver concise descriptive analysis of institutional actors and positions.

3.1 1923-1929

The decade following the foundation of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was domestically volatile. The victory in the War of Liberation may have led to the foundation but it did not solve the many problems that Turkey would face in the upcoming years, with the first one being the division within the ruling coalition. Throughout the War of Liberation, Atatürk had to strengthen the Ankara government against the Sultanate in Istanbul, allying with local notables and traditional leaders to reinforce the liberation effort. Akin to the center and periphery relationship of the Ottoman Empire, this strategy established ties between the ruling political elite and the local notables through bureaucratic personnel. The end of the war meant that the uneasy alliances within the ruling coalition that conflicted with the strictly modernist vision of Atatürk had to be dissipated.

The foundational era, in this regard, started with clashes within the ruling coalition. A portion of the local notables that were allied with during the liberation effort were against the restructuring of the Ottoman system, preferring to keep the status-

quo under a leadership that would advantage their position, given their support in forming it. More importantly, some military officers who participated in the War of Liberation on the side of Atatürk and helped found Turkey criticized the rapid and radical modernization steps, with some taking a developmentalist approach to regime transformation, and some based on traditionalist sentiments (Zürcher 2007, 180-190). Atatürk himself in his notes stated that these alliances were temporary, if the other parties were disagreeable to the revolutionist stance of the newly founded RPP, and consequently, Turkey, under its leadership. This strife marked the first three years following 1923, with high profile military officers voicing their traditionalist statements, such as Rauf Orbay, the Chief Minister in 1924;

I am bound by conscience and sentiment to The Sultanate. My father was brought up under the beneficence of the monarch and was dignitary of the Ottoman State. The gratitude for those benefits is in my blood. I am not ungrateful and cannot be. I am obligated to remain loyal to the sovereign. My devotion to the Caliphate is imposed on me by my upbringing. Besides this, I would make a general observation. It is hard for us to control the general situation. This can only be secured by an authority that everyone is accustomed to regard as unapproachable high. Such is the office of Sultanate and Caliphate. To abolish this office and to try to set up an entity of a different character in its place, would lead to failure and disaster. It is quite inadmissible.

Rauf Orbay was not the only figure to come forward; Refet Bele, a prominent general in the War of Liberation, also expressed traditionalist sentiments; “(...) there can be no question of any form of government other than the Sultanate and the Caliphate”. Further supporters of these traditionalist sentiments would propagate the foundation of the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) in 1924, who came to oppose the radical modernization of Turkey.

In aim of homogenizing the ruling coalition to consist of hard-liner modernists, the Assembly, under orders of the regime, passed a law that obliged military officers to resign their military titles to participate in politics (Okyar 1999, 36). This move by the regime aimed to disenfranchise the traditionalist military officers from the ruling coalition, stripping away their military ranks to prevent a potential traditional uprising backed by the army and led by the opposition leaders. Consequently, two prominent traditionalist military officers from the War of Liberation resigned their military commissions in 1924; Kazım Karabekir and Ali Fuat. Consequently, along with Karabekir and Fuat, the opposition cadres began to form, composed of old comrades and friends of Atatürk, most of whom were significant figures during the War of Liberation. Uniting through the dismissal of their military ranks and tra-

ditionalist sentiments, the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) was founded under the leadership of Karabekir on November 17, 1924; the party consisted of prominent figures such as Ali Fuat, Refet Bele, Rauf Orbay, Cafer Tayyar, and İsmail Canbolat. Adopting a liberalist economic stance, PRP was able to appeal to the merchant classes, who were disadvantaged by the protectionist economic stance of RPP. Alongside its economic stance, PRP propagated religious freedom and traditionalist practices, quickly reaching masses of people by spreading throughout especially the Eastern provinces of Turkey (Demirel 2011, 313-333; Dinçkol 2015, 339-354).

The rapid increase in the appeal of PRP posed a significant threat for the regime. Despite the perceived centrism of the opposition party itself, some voter groups that flocked to its side were considered as traditionalist radicals; this not only meant that any opposition could be coerced into propagating traditionalist radicalism as a way of gaining popularity, but that the sentiment was inherent in the population (Aslan 2011, 75-93; Ahmad 1993, 60-86). Accordingly, the overwhelming support and mobilization of traditionalist groups empowered the PRP opposition, carving out a bigger portion for itself among the voter base for the opposition. This institutional change of PRP towards traditionalist populism would increase the mass support they were able to garner, forming a realistic threat against the authority of the regime.

The following year bore the consequences of the radical traditionalist camp siding with the PRP; Sheikh Said, an influential religious figure from the Nakşibendi sect, started an anti-revolutionist movement against the regime on February 13, 1925 (Sayarı 1978, 39-46). Said criticized the abolishment of the caliphate and the Sultanate, the modernization of daily life, and the general dismantling of the traditionalist regime; targets that the modernization effort focused on with the first indications being apparent in the decision of the Grand National Assembly to dispose of the title of caliphate and to exile the Ottoman founding family from Turkey in March 1924. The rebellion was concentrated mostly in the Eastern-Southeastern parts of Turkey owing to the Kurdish background of Said and his area of influence; while concentrated in the Southeastern regions of the country, the movement posed difficulties for the army and more importantly, it reflected the inherent traditionalist radicalism in significant parts of the population, painting a grave picture for the future of the regime if the same events were to transpire (Karpas 1973, 55-65).

After the suppression of the Said rebellion, the outbreak of mass mobilization in the form of the anti-revolutionist movement was attributed to the incitement of Progressive Republicans. Even before the anti-revolutionist movement, in an interview given to *The Times* on November 21st, 1924, Atatürk stated his belief that the

founding cadre of the opposition were being divisive and opportunistic for oligarchic and personalistic gains, and that their ties to the Sultanate were apparent in their ideology; statements made by Orbay and Bele in the same period were supportive of the perception of Atatürk, setting up a basis of prejudice for the regime to judge the opposition by (Zürcher 1992, 154-157). Atatürk would reiterate the point on the personalistic gains of the opposition cadre that formed PRP, stating his belief that they were ambitious generals leftover from the War of Liberation, aiming for a more powerful and advantageous position by dismantling the revolution (Atatürk 1927, 150-176). Consequently, laws pertaining to the closure of PRP were passed in March 1925, under the Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu (Law on the Maintenance of Order - LMO), in order to deal with the immediate conflict and punish the inciting parties of the rebellion.

The LMO introduced extensive powers for the regime to the aim of dissipating the domestic unrest; the coverage of treason as a crime was expanded to include the manipulation of religious sentiments for political gains, while two İstiklal Mahkemesi (Independence Tribunal) were formed in Ankara and Diyarbakır to determine and carry out the punishments (Zürcher 1992, 154-157). Under martial law, the movement led by Said was suppressed by the regime on March 31st in the same year and the perpetrators were executed; regarding PRP, the Tribunals recommended the closure of the party to the regime on May 5, citing its incitement of religious unrest through its party rhetoric. The focus of PRP on the rapid increase of party organization to the Eastern and Southeastern provinces was referenced as an indication to this claim, ultimately leading to the regime banning most of its leaders, and the party itself, from participating in politics on June 5th, 1925.

The first trial at multi-party politics had failed for the Turkish Republic, however, the period significantly clarified the institutional positions, shifts, and changes that would follow in its wake. Throughout the period, Atatürk masterfully coordinated politics within RPP itself; the first opposition party was formed by old friends and comrades of Atatürk, hence his focus was primarily on the inner workings of his party. As PRP was formed in late-1924, the prime minister of Turkey was replaced to fit with the political environment. PRP was successful in establishing a major voter base through rhetoric focusing on economic, social, cultural, and religious discontent, increasing the cost of repression for the regime. If repressive measures were taken, the possibility of domestic unrest could significantly damage or even overturn the modernist revolution, reverting Turkey to a traditionalist, backward state. Hence, Fethi Okyar, an economic liberal and a close friend of Atatürk, replaced İsmet İnönü, a hardliner Kemalist and another close friend of Atatürk, as the prime minister in 1924; arguably, the intent of Atatürk here was to keep the political en-

vironment moderate while analyzing the popularity of the opposition and adapting. The replacement of Okyar as the prime minister would appeal to the parts of the population that PRP was able to capture through its liberal rhetoric and keep social and political tensions low while RPP did damage control.

The following year is a more significant testament to this claim; after the outbreak of the Said movement, Okyar was replaced by İnönü on March 3, 1925. The strategy of appeasement and adaptation by the RPP was cut short due to the impact that the rebellion had, both militarily and mentally. The rapid spread of the movement took considerable effort from the Turkish army to dissipate, and more importantly, the popular backing of PRP and the rebellion reflected a problem ingrained in the society itself. While the comparatively traditionalist Ottoman Empire fell and the Republic of Turkey was founded in a legal sense, the modernist vision of the state was not delivered to the public, rendering them indifferent to the achievements after the War of Liberation. The promotion of a hardliner Kemalist would thus counter the radicalist threat with appropriate measures at all levels, affording the space for the regime to stay in power and integrate the revolution.

Securing a hardliner political figure, a compliant ruling coalition after the closure of PRP, and compliant but resentful masses, the regime moved to remove the roots of traditionalism from the population. The popularity of PRP and its traditionalist rhetoric were intimidating for the regime, as the sentiments evoked by them reflected significantly anti-revolutionist motives in sizable parts of the population (Koçak 2010, 145-150). This reflection threatened the integrity of the Republic, necessitating its repression through party closure and military action, and subsequent appropriation through a series of modernization steps, aimed to be intertwined primarily with daily life and education (Aslan 2011, 77-84; Metinsoy 2014, 86-117). Despite the governance structure affording the regime with extensive powers, especially the access to state resources, organization of the modernization effort was uncoordinated, and most of the times the central initiatives were locally modified or put in practice without proper planning (Üngör 2009, 60-92; Lewis 1987, 24-26). For example, anti-veiling campaigns of Turkish women were in part initiated by the central government, with local level institutions putting them into practice. While the regime delivered and demanded the execution of the modernization steps, their application would vary by province; Trabzon Türk Ocakları (Trabzon Turkish Hearth) was among the first local entities to suggest the removal of traditional clothing for both men and women in 1925. Coincidental with the Şapka Kanunu (Hat Law which replaced the traditional fes with Western style, brimmed hats for aesthetic and symbolic modernization) in 1925 that worked to the same effect for primarily men, the city council of Eskişehir prohibited the usage of traditionalist clothing in

1926, with Aydın following suit in 1927 (Mutlu 2013, 66-85; Aslan 2011, 79-84). While modernization principles were theoretically delivered to the local level, their application varied considerably, partly due to the weak party organization and mobilization structure of the RPP (Esen 2014, 622). Moreover, the impositions required for modernization efforts were attributed to the regime instead of the local applicers of the principles; this can be due to a number of factors such as the masses already being resentful of the government hence attributing the negatives to it, however, the main motivating factor can be identified as the cleavage between the state and the masses.

The governance structure of the regime primarily consisted of a strong central government with intermediaries that would secure the compliance of the masses. Military officers, state bureaucracy, and local notables were the main actors in maintaining this dynamic, forming a ruling coalition. The background of the coalition resided in the Ottoman-era Young Turks, who were a group of modernists that commonly participated in the War of Liberation and the foundation of Turkey. Previously divided along the same lines, the within-coalition dynamics were bi-polar; pro-decentralization and economically liberal members who previously founded the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) were in conflict with the centrist and protectionist members (Zürcher 2007, 102-200; Yalman 1947, 46-58).

Following the foundation of the Republic, this dynamic continued, leading to the opposition of PRP against the regime, evidenced by their political rhetoric and stance. Homogenization of the coalition was a necessity for the regime, as its instability threatened the unmaking of the modernist revolution, however, the political conflict overtook the discontent of the masses. Lacking any meaningful way of political input, the population were unable to address their grievances, brewing resentment throughout the first decade. The intermediary position of the local notables and the weak mobilizational capacity of RPP led to a counter-productive modernization effort, which would be evidenced by later trials at a multi-party system. The masses were largely ignored as to their wishes and demands, instead being forced to be reactionary to almost all actions taken in the political and social spheres (Adak 2014, 86-100; Ahmad 1991, 117; Karpas 1974, 69-84; Rustow 1959, 513-552). The only alternative to the regime that propagated change and uncertainty was PRP, which focused on familiar, traditional values; its closure took away the channel of input from the masses into the political arena.

Concerning the economic backdrop of the case, the War of Liberation was successful in removing the economically crippling capitulations exerted on the Ottoman Empire, however, the Treaty of Lausanne that enabled this removal also proliferated

the debts of the preceding empire on the states formed in its wake. Turkey inherited a significant amount of this debt, pushing the regime to adopt a nationalist-developmental economic model that would begin with conservatism and evolve into etatism in the future (Takim and Yalmaz 2010, 549-554). The intertwined nature of the ruling coalition also supported the idea of a developmentalist model, as the formation of local industrialists and bourgeoisie was advantageous for the expansion and strengthening of the coalition. Previously, Atatürk's speech in the İzmir İktisat Kongresi (Economic Congress of İzmir) outlined the fledgling Turkish economy in the same light;

“There can be no political independence without economic independence and the national sovereignty should be supported by financial sovereignty”

“A state which cannot levy a tax on foreigners but on its own citizens; a state which lacks the right to arrange its customs tariffs and other taxes; a state which cannot apply its jurisdiction to the foreigners in accordance with its law, that state cannot be called an independent state”

Following the opening speech and the processions, rapid development relative to these aims was executed, in partial aim to co-opt the economic elite involved with the ruling coalition; development of domestic production through the establishment of a bank to provide credit to industrialists, prohibition of luxury imports, the declaration of customs tariffs, and the adoption of laws pertaining to the encouragement of industry (Aktan 1966, 317-330). While nationalist and developmentalist, the new economic system was also tolerant of foreign capital, on the condition that they supported local growth (Esen 2014, 626). The measures taken by the regime in economic terms prioritized parts of the ruling coalition, aiming to increase the control of the regime through the co-optation of the elite. On the political side, the situation would become more complex for this co-optation effort with the introduction of the Progressive Republican Party and the issue of anti-revolutionist movements in its wake, which would lead to the *Takrir-i Sükun* as a milestone event in authoritarian progression (Özoğlu 2011, 23-26; Zürcher 1992, 155-156).

Masses also received slight benefits from the Congress; most significantly, the decision to remove *Aşar Vergisi* (1/10th Tax) that was applicable to the peasantry, in 1925. The Ottoman-era law foresaw the taxation of 10 percent of products in its early days, rising to 50 percent for certain produce as the Empire collapsed (Zürcher 2007, 29-35). The removal of the tax was arguably a way of appealing to the peasantry in the same way the elite were appealed to, however, the elite benefitted more in comparison to the masses (Dinçkol 2015, 340-350; Fry 1971, 310-326). Additionally, despite its comparatively low significance to the benefits of the elite, the tax

was a considerable source of income for both the preceding Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic; to make up for the decrease in income, the regime nationalized some of the inherited monopolies, further supporting the nationalist nature of the economy.

While the masses benefitted from the Congress and surrounding government policies to an extent, the general economic and social state of the peasantry marginally improved (Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 115-141). Agricultural workers and the peasantry made up the majority of the population in the earlier years of Turkey, with industrial workers becoming a significant part in the 1930s (Karpas 1973, 55-67; Pamuk 1988, 19-36). The agricultural workers of the segment consisted primarily of subsistence farmers who were small landowners and produced mostly for themselves. Lack of tools and knowledge in agricultural production limited the capacity for surplus which could be sold on the market of profit which kept the status quo in the land distribution and production model of Turkey (Karaömerlioğlu 1998, 33-36; Kalaycıoğlu 2012, 76). Economically, subsistence farmers had low purchasing power, although they were also not subjected to high tax rates; their relative independence from the system further reduced their integration to regime principles.

The influence of the laborer segment cannot be understated in the early period; making up nearly 80 percent of the population, the agricultural sector and the involved peasantry considerably influenced the trajectory of public opinion against the regime and while the rest of the population cannot be ignored as alternative voices, the general outlook of the masses was determined by the majority composed of manual laborers and peasantry (Karaömerlioğlu 1998, 33-36). Despite their size and significance, this consolidated part of voters were largely silent, owing to unequal practices of political and social input channels.

The lack of input channels for the population was a conscious decision on the part of the regime; the early trial at a multi-party system in 1924 resulted in the display of traditionalist ambitions in sizable parts of the population and parts of the ruling coalition. Influential military officers that fought in the War of Liberation disagreed with the rate and method of modernization or defended traditionalist ways of governance which found reflection in the masses, who mobilized against the regime. The threat to the revolutionary movement that just founded Turkey could be jeopardized, hence, repression was necessary to counteract the discontent expressed by the population (Atatürk 1927, 115-125).

Considering the education system as a tool of generational indoctrination, statistics pertaining to schools, teachers, and student enrollment displayed in the statistical indicators published by the Turkish Statistical Institution in 2011 shows the shift of

regime policy towards the integration of the masses into Kemalism as of 1925. Following the quantitative evidence, there seems to be a rapid increase in the number of schools following the closure of PRP and the suppression of the Said rebellion, suggesting that the educational system was attempted to be utilized as an outreach to the masses by the regime. This proposition is further supported by the policy shifts of RPP towards integrating the masses bringing increased focus on the improvement and proliferation of the education system, as the World War II era statistics suggest.

Lastly, the first mentions of the prolonged concept of the Land Reform Bill were made throughout the period as an additional way of appealing to the masses, although it was introduced incrementally due to its controversial nature, as debated in the parliament (Karaömerlioğlu 1998, 33-37; Tekeli and İlkin 2014, 423-424; Koçak 2017, 212-220). The policy was additionally utilized as an intimidation tactic against the local notables as RPP shifted more towards appealing to the peasantry in later years but was preliminarily blocked by the 1924 Constitution (Lewis 1974, 59-86). The reform project would later be mentioned in situations where the regime needed an upper-hand on the opposition, prompting suspicion by parts of the ruling coalition.

Turkey was a land of smallholders, however, the shortage of population caused by constant warfare reduced the available labor to efficiently produce and thrive (Ahmad 1985, 211-226; Karpas 2015, 90; Zürcher 1984, 76-83; Aktan 1966, 317-329). Cheap labor was abundant and local notables held voter loyalty and significant political influence while the economic discontent and general repression were attributed to the state, as their security apparatus enabled the power of the local notables. Industrialization of agriculture, which made up a significant portion of the exports, was delayed due to the ineffectiveness of production and the lack of labour, pushing the peasantry into a constant state of economic stagnation.

Based on this background of the peasantry and the combined resentment of the masses in religious, social, cultural, and economic dimensions, the regime sought to rapidly modernize the society and socially implement the Kemalist ideology and Turkish nationalism while nationalizing the economy (Özkan 2019, 70 ; Özbudun 1998, 37; Tunçay 1999, 21-32). The Said rebellion started a modernization movement and religious symbolism and institutions were gradually removed from the social sphere, clothing was modernized, the Gregorian calendar was adopted, sharia law was abandoned, and the Latin script replaced Arabic, in aim of standardizing Turkey to the level of Western countries (Ahmad 1985, 215-220; Zürcher 2017, 119-160). However, the modernization effort was not able to penetrate the society, both due to the level of disconnect between the state and the masses, and the lackluster

implementation of the process (Adak 2014, 59-84; Aslan 2011, 75-84). The attempt at modernization would be perceived by the masses as the intervention of the state in their daily lives, without meaningful returns improving their life standards. Discontent stemming from the top-down implementation of the modernization process added to the already existent resentment.

The following decade in the 1930s started with the crisis caused by the Great Depression. This era in the single-party period witnessed similar turmoil to the decade preceding it, displaying familiar shifts of policy by the regime, different focal points in establishing the ruling coalition or co-opting the masses, and other contextual actions. The historical background leading into the next ten years establishes the institutional positions of the Republican People's Party, the Progressive Republican Party, and the hardliners and softliners of the regime. Shifts in these institutional identities change throughout the course of the single-party period, indicating political institutionalization on the parts of the political actors (Özbudun 1993, 20).

3.2 1930-1938

Following the rapid modernization period and the start of the Great Depression, the regime started shifting towards a more protectionist version of statism and the developmentalist nature of economic policies became increasingly regime-centric (Keyder 1987, 43-55; Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 115-130; Tekeli and İlkin 2016, 225-232). Between 1929 and 1931, the control of the government over the market increased, especially on foreign trade; the hoarding of imports by the elite preceding the Great Depression had reflected negatively on the relationship of the masses and the regime, consequently, RPP arguably sought to regulate the economy to gain popular support and to somewhat decrease the discontent of the masses. The increasingly imposing regulation of the state was in line with the nationalist-developmental nature of the regime as RPP statism encouraged the initiation of national industrialization to form and strengthen the Turkish bourgeoisie, which kept the cohesion of the ruling coalition for the preceding period.

This principle would be largely effective throughout the 1930s, with the First Five Year Plan being accepted by the parliament in 1934 (Zürcher 1984, 63-65; Karaömerlioğlu 1998, 120-123; Pamuk 2012, 113-122). The plan focused on improving several industrial sectors at once, aimed to nationalize the market, reduce the dependence on imports and promote the growth of the Turkish bourgeoisie. The strategy was executed with the intent of ensuring the continuation of the regime-allied elite, with

a dedicated source of Turkish bourgeoisie to be co-opted into the ruling coalition in the future. Considering the fragility of the ruling coalition during the foundational period of 1923-1925, the Kemalist revolution could be threatened in the absence of elite cohesion, giving way to renegade elite to form opposition and utilize mass resentment.

While the plan succeeded in kick starting industrialization, the cost of the progress was largely paid by the industrial workers and the peasantry. The introduction of the Labour Law in 1934 restricted the ability of the workers to form unions or protest, essentially blocking any channels of political input for a majority (Ahmad 1985, 211-226; Özbudun 1993, 189-210; Karpat 1974, 69-84). Accordingly, the profits made by the ruling coalition and the patronage network were negatively correlated with the standard of living for the masses, especially the peasantry and the working classes. The groups that fueled the industrialization effort were politically and socially silenced, amassing resentment against RPP.

Kemalist statism worked to the benefit of the elite, with the masses being repressed to allow for progress and maintain domestic cohesion. RPP believed that the modernization effort solved the social discontent of the population and that most of the Islamist radical sentiments were removed. However, the modernization effort often victimized the rural population due to the top-down, imposing pressure of the state, the lack of meaningful improvements to daily life, and lack of equality in the application of the procedures (Adak 2014, 22; Metinsoy 2014, 86-110; Ahmad 1991, 3-21). From the perspective of the masses, discontent rose radically during the 1930s, as the power to purchase declined for the majority of the population, unexplained and radical changes were imposed, and the opposition was unable to make any significant improvements to the political system.

Seemingly a response by the regime to the economic discontent, the Free Party (FP) was started to be established through the initiative of Atatürk in 1930 (Ahmad 1993, 50-80; Demirel, 2015, 137-144). FP, in theory, functioned to legitimize the multi-party structure against criticisms of hegemonic authoritarianism towards RPP; accordingly it was incentivized by Atatürk, and created and headed by loyal Kemalist and close friend, Fethi Okyar. The communication, mostly through letters, from the period display that Okyar and Atatürk closely cooperated on both the foundation and the rhetoric of the Free Party (Okyar 1997, 110; Okyar 1980, 97). Based on the extensive influence of the Kemalism over FP, the nature of opposition that was practiced can be considered as a “safety-valve” utilization; the existence and mild opposition of FP over economic policies would legitimize the multi-party structure for the RPP, in addition to absorbing the discontent of the masses by

establishing a filtered political input channel. The Kemalist influence over the opposition guaranteed the containment of anti-revolutionist political actors, ensuring the stability of the modernist progression and commitment to secularism.

The crucial meetings were conducted between Atatürk and Okyar in Yalova in July 1930, followed by their communication over letters into August 1930 display the clear initiative of Atatürk in establishing the opposition and creating a multi-party structure. The content of their interactions suggest that the opposition had to abide by the general principles of Kemalism, especially Secularism and Republicanism;

“I observe with pleasure that we are in liaison on the merits of a Secular Republic. Alas, this is the main principle I yearned, and will always yearn for.”

The party was established one day later, in August, 1930, being nationally published by *Son Posta* newspaper a day later, reflected as a joyous occasion for the public. Another newspaper *Yarın* published an interview with Okyar following the establishment of FP and reflected a party rhetoric which was much more centrist than that of the Progressive Republican Party; policies were mostly focused on the plight of the peasantry and the general economic woes of the population following the Great Depression. Social state services were promoted, such as regulatory positions for the state in economic matters, support for local industrialists through incentives, strengthening of domestic bourgeoisie and the economic elite, and direct involvement of the state to help out impoverished individuals. Political, cultural, or religious problems were not brought forward, arguably to contain any potential anti-regime sentiments, whether emanating from economic discontent or from the failure of the modernization process. From this perspective, Okyar and Atatürk aimed to found a political opposition party that would appeal to the masses, serve as the political input channel for the population, and achieve the democratic multi-party structure that the revolution aimed for; given that the population were ready for the proliferation of politics.

On the side of the masses however, the level of discontent was high leading into the 1930s, owing to the implementation of rapid modernization procedures and economic crisis caused by the Great Depression. In this context, while the regime expected support for the opposition, the level of dynamism by the masses was surprising (Avcioğlu 1974, 421-433; Karpat 1974, 70-82; Sayarı 2011, 84-94). As with the case of the Progressive Republican Party, various discontent segments within the population united around the opportunity for opposition under the Free Party, aiming to utilize the only political alternative to the regime to display their resentment and deliver their demands. Expressions of discontent manifested as demonstrations and strikes, with an increase in militancy of the industrial workers (Ahmad 1993, 53-89; Emrence

2008, 51-67). Consequently, RPP became aware that the modernization effort had failed and the mass mobilization that the opposition brought, even when utilized as a safety-valve, was dangerous to the stability of the regime; the failure of the modernization process would be more pronounced in the following year as violent mass mobilization occurred.

As Okyar was a loyal Kemalist and the opposition was largely initiated by the regime, he chose to disband the party through his own volition; in the letter he delivered to the Interior Ministry, Okyar cited “his reluctance to come face-to-face with Pasha (Atatürk) in the political arena” as published by national newspapers such as the previously mentioned *Son Posta* in 1930. Hence, the second significant political opposition party of the single-party period was closed down by its leader after two months of its foundation.

The controversial Menemen incident following the shut-down of the opposition was the major indicator of the failure of the modernization process and the resentment it generated, as well as being a critical juncture for policy shift by the regime for the rest of the decade. Similar to the 1925 rebellion, the Menemen incident was religious on the surface and although the incident itself was comparatively more violent in display, it was on a smaller scale than the Said rebellion and the problem underneath was a bigger concern for the regime (Avcioğlu 1974, 414; Karpat 2015, 89-100). The incident took place in İzmir, a relatively advanced and urbanized part of the Republic which would be expected to be the first region to be modernized. However, an Islamist radical raised dissent, called for the restoration of sharia law and the caliphate, and the re-implementation of traditionalist social values among the society (Karaömerlioğlu 1998, 34; Kalaycıoğlu 2012, 73-78). The gendarmerie officer that was sent to contain the situation was beheaded by the dervish he was sent to arrest and paraded around the town to the support of the witnessing public. The severity of the situation doubled, as the incident garnered support from the local population, indicating the failure of the modernization effort en masse (Karpat 1973, 59-86).

The masses, even in the more advanced parts of the country, did not understand the revolution, nor cared to understand. The apparent reason for the additional discontent were the economic policies followed by the authoritarian regime which were consistently detrimental to the interests of the general population. The lackluster implementation of the modernization principles was not standardized in implementation and generated resentment by the population as it did not bring perceivable material benefits. The immediate popularity of the Free Party was evidence of the demand for alternatives by the masses, in the absence of formal channels of com-

munication with the regime (Karpas 1963, 55-67; Weiker 1975, 297-299).

The Third Republican People's Party Congress in 1931 displayed elite calculations as a response to mass discontent, in the form of new political-ideological measures involving the formation of the People's Houses (Karaömerliođlu 1998, 67-92; Karpas 1974, 68-84). The Houses were specifically designed for the delivery of Kemalist principles to especially the rural population, which would integrate the masses into the modernized and standardized society sought by the regime. The Houses doubled as propaganda institutions for the RPP, seeking to increase the popularity of the regime as well as increasing the productivity of agricultural workers, which would be criticized by future opposition groups.

Following the measures of the regime on preventing social turmoil and further integrating the modernization principles and considering the general economic discontent, policies of the regime shifted towards increased state regulation. Kemalist statism became more protectionist and the control of the regime on economic matters grew expansively (Sayarı 2011, 81-94). Parts of the ruling coalition, especially economic softliners within the RPP, were critical of the protectionist trajectory of the regime. Local notables, economic elite, and the general clientelistic network were intimidated by increased protectionism as well, as increased state regulation had the chance of hindering their interests, given that the regime had total control over the tools to do so. There was opposition to the softliners of the regime within RPP as the extreme statistas grouped around RPP hard-liner Recep Peker, leading to an internal and bi-polar conflict within the governing elite (Ahmad 1993, 55-76). The business community was prevented from organising to pace the growth of its influence, serving as a main point of discontent from the economic elite.

The response of the regime to the criticisms of the ruling coalition resulted in the replacement of the Prime Minister İnönü with Celal Bayar in 1937 (Tekeli and İlkin 2016, 331; Demirel 2015, 256-257; Sayarı 1978, 40-55). While İnönü was a hard-liner Kemalist, Bayar was a soft-liner liberal, with close ties to the economic elite through his involvement with state banks (Ahmad 1993, 50-72; Avciođlu 1974, 221-248). The promotion of Bayar to PM would indicate the effort of the regime to appeal to the elite through the appointment of a political and economic moderate, ensuring the maintenance of the strong ruling coalition. Economic policies of the last decade increased the political influence of the economic elite, forcing the regime to concede to its de facto demands; the promotion of a liberal soft-liner who was close to the business would regain the trust of the elite, maintaining the social cohesion of the coalition.

However, the promotion of Bayar was unable to make meaningful changes, as the

passing of Atatürk in 1938 led to the election of İnönü as the National Chief. İnönü's alliance with the conservative Chief of Staff Fevzi Çakmak isolated Bayar, the economic elite, and most RPP soft-liners (Karpas 2015, 96-115; Avcıođlu 1974, 286-304; Koçak 2017, 112-136; Sayarı 1978, 40-55; Heper and Sayarı 2013, 137-246). Consequently, Bayar was removed as the PM and a number of important deputies were not allowed to be re-elected in the 1939 elections. While some conservative political figures of the past such as Karabekir and Bele were re-accepted to politics, liberal soft-liners were reduced in number and power. The Independent Group (IG) was formed within RPP in 1939 to act as critics of the regime, although it was unable to present constructive opposition (Ahmad 1993, 77-83).

Based on this general background of the first two decades of the Republic, both the masses and the elite were discontent with RPP governance. The masses endured prolonged economic crises under the regime in addition to social, cultural, and religious discontent. The first opposition party, PRP, clarified the social, cultural, and religious dimensions of the discontent, which indicated the necessity of the state-society connection. The rapid modernization period that followed failed and the imposition of principles alien to the citizenry during the effort generated resentment. Similar to the Progressive Republican Party, the Free Party exposed the resentment of the masses against the state, with the following Menemen incident providing evidence to the failure of rapid modernization. Additionally, the Great Depression and the subsequent rapid industrialization period in the 1930s further increased the economic discontent of the peasantry and industrial workers. Leading up to WWII, the masses were highly resentful of the regime, which would increase in the following years.

For the elite, the business-friendly statism of RPP changed to be more protectionist, with the final years of 1930s increasing the perceived volatility of the regime (Karaömerliođlu 2000, 115-141; Aktan 1966, 317-334; Karpas 2015, 86-102). The promotion of hard-liners and conservatives with the election of İnönü decreased the political influence of the business community. Consequently, the economic elite became vary of the RPP and their economic policies; their influence was not sufficient to keep the state in check. Furthermore, regime soft-liners and parts of the ruling coalition were alienated from the political network, eroding the cohesion of the ruling coalition. Finally, the reappearance of the land reform concept drove an additional wedge between the state and the coalition.

The second trial at a multi-party structure had failed and showed that the RPP regime had a smaller base of support from the population than expected. The policy shift towards modernizing and integrating the modernization into the society

through institutions such as the People's Houses, attempts at answering the lack of political channels through applications such as the Wish System and political petitioning were ineffective due to their partial and often biased implementation (Lamprou 2017, 514-541; Mutlu 2013, 53-103; Adak 2014, 87). Alongside social modernization, the transformation of Kemalism to be more protectionist increasingly conflicted with the interests of the economic elite, leading to elite disintegration and opposition formation. Towards the end of the 1930s, the Republican People's Party drew resentment from both the masses and the ruling coalition, leading to instability for the regime. The passing of Atatürk in 1938 and the subsequent beginning of the Second World War in 1939 further complicated the future of Turkey leading into the 1940s.

3.3 1939-1945

The beginning of World War II in 1939 witnessed a radical increase in state control. The National Defence Law (NDL) was introduced in 1940, giving the regime the powers to control prices and the supply of goods, in addition to legitimizing forced labor, especially for mineral resources for war preparation (Ahmad 1993, 81-100; Zürcher 2017, 86-97; Koçak 2017, 321-346; Avcıoğlu 1974, 514-523). The new taxes and tax rate increases introduced under the NPL exacerbated the economic discontent of the masses as the prices of basic commodities rose and the war preparation efforts added to the depravity. The tithe abolished by RPP in 1925 was perceived to have returned with the introduction of the Agricultural Products Tax and small farmers negatively affected by its return (Pamuk 1998, 19-36; Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 115-141). The state wholesale bought agricultural produce at fixed prices and by force, driving the subsistence farmers into debt against large landowners, reducing productivity, and generating resentment. The farmers sold small amounts to the market to begin with and not being able to profit off of the produce that the state bought meant that their profit margins were further reduced (Koçak 2017, 113-129; Akman 2011, 73-91)

On the side of the elite, the introduction of the Wealth Tax in 1942 proved detrimental to the interests of the ruling coalition, speeding up the erosion of the ruling coalition (Koçak 2004, 1-15; Karpat 1963, 55-67; İlkin and Tekeli 2016, 303-321; Demirel 2015, 379). Aimed at strengthening the Turkish bourgeoisie, the law was aimed to transfer assets and capital from the racial and religious minority elite, to their patronage network of Turkish businessmen (Ahmad 1985, 211-226; Karaömer-

lioğlu 2000, 115-141). The introduction of the Wealth Tax and its discriminatory utilization was seemingly an appeasement policy of the government to the Turkish bourgeoisie, although the law caused controversy among all elite circles, further fragmenting the ruling coalition.

The shift of RPP towards appealing to the peasantry and the re-introduction of the land reform idea further sped up the dissolution of the ruling coalition; criticisms throughout the war years pushed İnönü to concede by replacing the hard-liner figures of the regime with liberal soft-liners in an attempt to moderate the political environment and establish elite unity (Koçak 2004, 1-15). The opposition within the RPP were able to influence decision-making on the part of the regime, taking a step of liberalizing the regime. As a whole, large landowners, local notables, and relevant economic elite were unsure of the trajectory of the regime. The authoritarian control established by the Republican People's Party allowed the regime to regularly shift policies to its own benefits and these benefits could jeopardize the interests of the elite.

Thus, at the end of the war, the ruling coalition that afforded RPP its authoritarian power was essentially a bipolar structure involving hardliner Kemalists and softliner economic liberals on the level of the elite. The protectionist economic policies of the regime consistently pushed away the elite, alienated big landowners, and was perceived as threatening to the interests of the ruling coalition. The policies introduced under the National Defence Law drove the majority of the masses into poverty and especially the resentful segments of the population in industrial workers, the peasantry, and small farmers were affected. Politically, the repression of the opposition blocked the political input of the society from relieving their resentment and making demands of the state, with the alternate channels of communication being limited and biased based on regional perceptions of race (Adak 2014, 79; Lamprou 1974, 514-541). The failures of the Progressive Republican Party and the Free Party in the last two decades already accumulated political and social resentment as was displayed in the 1925 Said rebellion and the 1930 Menemen incident and the popularity of both the opposition parties after their foundation.

Relative to its policies aiming to appease the masses, RPP achieved mostly the opposite of what they aimed for (Zürcher 2017, 129; Ahmad 1985, 220-221). The introduction of the NDL and the subsequent Agricultural Products Tax in 1942 were heavy burdens on the peasantry, as force-buying products from farmers at reduced prices pushed them into further debt. The discontent of the masses rapidly grew throughout the war period, as the prolonged economic crises and the restriction of political alternatives forced them to live in poverty.

Leading into the war years, RPP had been cooperative and supportive of the ventures of the elite. The bipolar structure of the party led to the formation of factions within the regime itself, ultimately resulting in the dissolution of the softliners from the state ranks. The formation of the Democrat Party (DP) as the third opposition party stemmed from this dissolution (Haytoğlu 1997, 1-11; Tekeli and İlkin 2014, 240-248; Sayarı 1978, 39-57). Elite division clarified the lines of hard and softliners in the political arena, formally dividing the regime within itself and leading to the formation of opposition if the opposition leaders are motivated (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 64-84). Regarding the motivation of the opposition leaders, the accumulated mass resentment displayed a small base of organic voters for the Republican People's Party, and the level of dependence of the regime on the ruling coalition and the local notables for communication with the masses incentivized the challenging of RPP. The soft-liners within RPP were motivated to oppose based on the threat to their interests posed by the statist policies of the regime and the potential mass support of the peasantry against RPP.

The founding cadre of the Democrat Party was composed of Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Köprülü who were among regime soft-liners. Their signatory part in Dörtlü Takrir was a vocal criticism of the statist policies of RPP, calling for economic and political liberalization. Additionally, these political figures publicly criticized the economic policies of the regime, through their columns in the Tan and Vatan newspapers (Demirel 2017, 520). Being large landowners and industrialists, their criticism increased after their appeal to the Law for Providing Land to Farmers (LPLF) was rejected by the regime; the law was both an appeasement tool for the masses and an intimidation tool for the dissenting elite and aimed to distribute the lands of private holdings among the subsistence farmers, hoping to increase their standard of living and garnering mass support against the liberal opposition.

The creation of the Democrat Party as formal opposition following the end of WWII saw ex-regime soft-liners evolving into political opposition, demanding concessions by the regime in exchange for the legitimization of RPP through their participation in multi-party elections. The discontent of the general populace was utilized as a way of pressuring the government into liberalizing electoral policies by the opposition leaders, leading to the electoral victory of DP in 1950.

As a final mention of the chapter, the detailed history of the Land Reform Bill is necessary in understanding the direct motivation of the elite-led part of the democratic transition process. The land reform project was introduced during the foundational period of Turkey and was principally planned to dismantle agricultural hegemonies

of the local notables, reducing their political influence on the society and decision-making (Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 15-41; Koçak 2017, 228-235; Zürcher 2017, 113-138; Aktan 1966, 317-330; Pamuk and Keyder 1984, 85). While the project did not achieve land distribution at large, the idea and expression of it was a threat to a considerable part of the ruling coalition, most of whom were large landowners or agricultural holdings. The concept would be publicly expressed by the regime during sudden increases in mass discontent and decreases in elite cohesion.

The hoarding of imports by the economic elite before the Great Depression and the reaction of the regime supports the concept of the Land Reform Bill as an intimidation tool against the ruling coalition and an appeal tool for the masses. Elite opposition was tried to be suppressed through the appeal to the peasantry, however, the problem of Turkey was “not the landless peasant, but the peasantless land” (Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 15-41; Pamuk and Keyder 1984, 85; Ahmad 1993, 46-75). The first iteration of the project as the Land and Settlement Law in 1930 did not achieve its goal of land distribution to the peasantry but was utilized by the regime as a way of intimidating the emerging opposition and appealing to the peasantry. A more comprehensive Settlement Law introduced in 1934 increased the threat that the reform project posed for the interests of large landowners, as it included the appropriation and distribution of private lands (Karpas, 1974, 69-84). The rhetoric surrounding the land reform also increased in frequency, as both Atatürk and İnönü delivered speeches highlighting the need for land for every family in Turkey throughout the 1930s (Avcioğlu 1974, 297-335). The land reform project would be put on hold with the outbreak of WWII and discussion continued the same year the war ended.

Overall, leading into the last five years of the single-party era, masses and the elite were thoroughly resentful of the regime, with the renegade elite having the necessary basis of motivation for challenging the authority. One significant event that made its mark as the representation of the discontent of the population was the Tan Incident, where a group majorly composed of students demonstrated against multiple left-leaning publications, with the primary target being the Tan newspaper. The significance of the event came from the unequal treatment of the perpetrators and the regime was perceived as taking sides by protecting those who opposed the leftist agenda; furthermore, the incident was partially incited by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın of the future-opposition cadre. While the perpetrators and whether the regime protected the perpetrators largely remained blurred, social and political tensions were high under a restricted political environment and shady dealing relative to its handling by the regime degraded the stability of the social arena further.

3.4 1946-1950

The same year the war ended, the regime moved to repair the cohesion of the ruling coalition, dismissing political figures that criticized the government. Adnan Menderes, Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, Refik Koraltan, and Celal Bayar were among these individuals who left the regime and the ruling coalition, citing the protectionist economic trajectory of the regime as a detriment to both the elite and the society. Similar to the homogenization of the ruling coalition in the 1920s against the traditionalist-conservative parts of the ruling coalition, the previous alliance turned into a conflict between the regime's hard and soft-liners after the war. Hard-liners of the regime stood for the strict implementation of Kemalist nationalist-developmentalism and defended the expansion of control by the state, meanwhile, the soft-liners advocated for economic, social, and political liberalization of Turkey.

The division between the components of the regime and the combined resentment of the masses forced the regime to respond to the discontent as the cost of repression rapidly increased against the resentment of the masses represented by the opposition. The alliance of hard-liners and military officials waned as the Chief of Staff Çakmak retired in 1944, taking away a portion of political influence from İnönü, who allied with Çakmak against the soft-liners before WWII started. İnönü would start his speech in 1945 by hinting at his preparedness to alter the political system in major ways, referencing the victory of democracy against fascism during the war, and opening up the discussion of political opposition (Ahmad 1993, 76-98).

The erosion of the political alliance between the military officers, the state bureaucracy, and the landlords provided the political room for the opposition, as RPP depended on this structure for mass compliance. Mentions of the land reform bill was also a point of contention that motivated the opposition leaders, as the concept threatened the interests of the elite (Koçak 2017, 96-176; Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 115-141). The timing of the bill supports the notion that the regime utilized the reform idea as an intimidation and appeasement tool for the elite and the masses respectively. However, similar to the past discussions of the land reform bill, the problem was not the lack of land, but the lack of technology to increase production; while the elite were threatened by the introduction of the bill, masses were apathetic to the potential benefits they may receive. The state proved to be undependable in these scenarios.

Against this backdrop, the soft-liners of the regime moved to formally found the Democrat Party. Menderes, Köprülü, and Koraltan were previously ousted from

RPP due to their public criticism of economic policies and Bayar resigned to join the opposition; consequently, the Democrat Party was officially formed in 1946 (Karpat 1973, 45-90; Demirel 2015, 225-278). Although the party cadre previously demonstrated public opposition to the regime in the form of the Memorandum of Four, DP was perceived to play the role of a token opposition, similar to the Free Party in the 1930s or the Independent Group during WWII (Koçak 2010, 118-127; Sayarı 1978, 39-57; Payaşı 2014, 175-197). DP would ideally not challenge the regime, but serve as a decoy for the establishment of the multi-party structure, answering the demands for liberalization; the public also perceived DP in the same light, as their main cadre came from RPP ranks. The party programme was not radically different from the Free Party, mostly focusing on advancing democracy and economic liberalization in Turkey, apart from their vocal support for religious freedom through party rhetoric, as evidenced by the official DP Party Programme of 1946. Strategically, the compliance of the opposition with the regime and the non-threatening stance it adopts can be considered as ways to establish the opposition without government attention and interference.

Accumulated mass resentment held by the masses challenged the regime's expectations of the opposition. Even before the war, the majority of the population was under social and political repression, in addition to prolonged economic crisis. The 1930s added to this resentment as the working class was largely silenced and World War II introduced further economic hardships that drove masses to poverty, with the economic strategy of RPP failing to improve their status considerably. The radical reforms made by the Kemalist regime inflicted various ailments on the majority of the population, without meaningful improvements to their quality of life. The regime imposed alien concepts on the citizenry without an explanation as to why they were imposed and the state was perceived to be demanding and intimidating (Adak 2014, 60-80; Sayarı 2014, 655-670).

Hence, the Democrat Party quickly became popular among the majority and the preferred alternative of the elite (Koçak 2017, 199). The lack of political channels for input by the masses prevented RPP from this insight beforehand as the frame where the society was able to reflect its will upon the state was concentrated around the opening and subsequent closure of PRP and FP, with little formal communication since. The opposition cadre were skilled politicians, who were able to utilize the hostility of the masses against the regime, criticizing the authoritarian nature of the single-party structure and the impositions of the state and attributing the worsening economic conditions to RPP leadership (Koçak 2010, 178-209; Avcıoğlu 1974, 225-318). Special emphasis was placed on the removal of state imposition in the countryside, which came in the form of the gendarmerie (Ahmad 1985, 113;

Zürcher 2014, 96-107). The security apparatus of the state was highly symbolic of its imposition on the masses, thus generally held in contempt by the rural population.

Sensing the legitimate effort of opposition by the DP and the success of their appeal to the majority, İnönü moved to intervene. Understanding the necessity of change, RPP responded to the mass discontent by introducing political and social liberalization measures to appeal to the masses as DP did, seeking to apply the tactics that brought success to the opposition. In an attempt to buy time for liberalization efforts and retain control, RPP held the 1947 general elections in 1946, giving little time to prepare for the DP propaganda structure (Demirel 2015, 419-441; Ward and Rustow 2015, 159-263). This move legitimized the perception of threat by the regime, as DP was considered a realistic challenger and was tried to be prevented from organizing. The difference in this process comparative to the cases of PRP and FP was the replacement of outright repression with populist competition; political institutionalization throughout the single-party period provided the necessary background for strategic movements by the political actors and the regime moved to respond to the discontent of the masses instead of practicing repression to its detriment. The dissolution of the ruling coalition was the crucial variable in the formation of competent and independent political opposition. The opposition followed a populist rhetoric, aiming to exploit the resentment of the masses against the regime and the domestic political context increased the cost of repression by the regime; the regime reacted by conducting the elections early and buying itself time to win over the masses.

While the populist rhetoric of the Democrat Party found reflection in the voter base and the party quickly gained popularity, conducting the elections early and against the unfair advantage held by RPP prevented the opposition from winning the 1946 elections; the disadvantage of the electoral system and the control of the regime over electoral practices radically decreased the chances of sole elite-led transition. One additional important factor was the allegiance of the state bureaucracy to the state; the state bureaucracy was on the regime's side, as the potential victory of the Democrat Party could mean their replacement with DP bureaucracy.

After the 1946 elections, the regime introduced rapid liberalization measures to get ahead of the Democrat Party in promising democratic principles. Article 22 introduced in the previous decade was abolished, removing the restriction on the founding of class-based associations, a move which seemingly appealed to the working class (Karaömerlioğlu 1998, 34; Tekeli and İlkin 2018, 366). The regime aimed to replace DP as the party of the masses while constructing the opposition as the big landowners who opposed the interests of the ordinary people, eliminating the

threat of replacement. However, the ambivalence of its economic and social policies, along with the existent discontent of the masses, caused RPP to fail in placating any constituency other than its loyal supporters (Ahmad 1993, 40-73).

Accounting for their disadvantage in the elections, the opposition refused to participate in the upcoming 1950 elections if the electoral process was not thoroughly democratized and published *Hürriyet Misakı* as the report detailing the shortcomings of the regime (Özbudun 2000, 60-72; Koçak 2017, 223; Karpat 2015, 98-105). The opposition forced the regime to amend certain electoral laws, interact with the opposition on an equal level, and concede to the demands for fair competition if it wanted to be legitimized by the involvement of the Democrat Party in the multi-party structure. For a political context marred with political party closures under authoritarian control, the opposition demanded the liberalization of the political arena in order to equalize the electoral ground and have a realistic chance at replacing RPP; this power was afforded by its popularity among the masses, as the discontent held by the society was dangerous for the stability of the regime. The risk of social uprisings similar to the previous trials at the multi-party structure was arguably higher, taking into consideration the accumulated resentment over social and economic woes.

Throughout the interactions of the regime with the opposition between 1945 and 1950, the electoral law was amended to permit direct elections, universities were granted administrative autonomy, and laws pertaining to press freedom were liberalized to better represent alternative inputs (Ahmad 1993, 34-66; Tekeli and İlkin 1974, 112-138). Starting with the conceding response of the regime to the elite with the 12 July Declaration, RPP introduced separate liberalizing measures that would improve electoral and political equality of the opposition. The rapid and encompassing nature of the liberalization measures demonstrated by the regime could be interpreted as the individual incentive of İnönü in constructing a multi-party structure and overall democratization of the system, however, the previous electoral strategy to prevent the opposition from organizing can be considered as a counterfactual, supporting the argument that the shift towards liberalization by İnönü was mainly motivated by the mounting pressure of the mass-backed opposition.

The years of 1946 and 1947 were monumental to the democratic transition process, as İnönü openly supported the soft-liners of RPP, dealing the death blow to the hard-liners; consequently, the single-party structure was abandoned and DP was given political equality to RPP in the political environment. Economically, however, the liberalization measures produced the opposite of the intended results; the Turkish lira was devalued in September 1946, import regulations were eased, and

the banks were permitted to sell gold (Zürcher 2017, 228; Koçak 2017, 316-324). The 7 September Measures were introduced into effect radically increased inflation, further alienating the targeted core audience of the regime. DP would exploit the measures to discredit the regime, countering the efforts of RPP.

Socially, the previous repression of religious representation and symbolism was partially lessened and lessons on religion were restored in schools (Avcioğlu, 1974; Sayarı 2012, 182-192). In this case, the regime that was strictly revolutionist and secular against the backwardness of its predecessor was attempting to remain in power through the manipulation of traditionalist ideals and considering the contradictory nature of Kemalist modernism with religious traditionalism this move can be interpreted as a radical attempt by the regime to gain mass support. While economic concessions were common, the attempt to appeal to the masses through religious concessions meant the regime was willing to alter its own principles to stay in power.

İnönü significantly promoted the transformation of the regime by blocking the hard-liners and promoting the softliners of RPP, leading to the resignation of Recep Peker as the Premier in 1947. The opposition was receptive of the cooperation by the regime and subsequently worked to promote the soft-liners of their own faction party while eliminating hard-liners that were opposed to interactions with the RPP. Significant names in Osman Bölükbaşı, Kenan Öner, and the ex-RPP hard-liner, Fevzi Çakmak were replaced by political moderates who were receptive to interaction and power sharing (Sayarı 1978, 39-57; Magaloni 2008, 715-740). The dismissed political figures would go onto found the conservative Nation Party (NP) in 1948, although with little political success. The cooperation of the regime and the opposition to the purge of hard-liners by both sides served to increase stability and maintain the status-quo.

Approaching 1950, the accumulation of discontent by the society empowered the opposition with political influence and popular support and the Democrats shifted focus towards winning over the state bureaucracy. Focusing their criticism on the incompetence of the RPP instead of the state, the opposition promised that the bureaucracy would not be punished for the transgressions of the regime and that the status quo would be protected with only improvements for the bureaucracy (Sayarı 2014, 655-670; Unbehaun 1994, 138). Approaching the 1950 election, the environment was seemingly advantageous for the opposition and all factors of success were lined up for an electoral victory. Organized propaganda by the Democrat Party was able to establish and garner mass support, the state bureaucracy was neutralized, and the regime conceded to the equalization of conditions for opposition parties. The masses experienced an uproar of political activity as the political

environment gradually liberalized and were emboldened to demonstrate against the regime, as was the case for the death of Marshal Çakmak in 1950. The regime largely ignored the death of Çakmak, forgoing the traditional rites of passage in his name, while foreign countries like Iraq and Syria were broadcasting prayers for his death. The dismissal of Çakmak's death triggered mass upheaval, with students engaging in conflict with the police and general vandalism; on the day of his funeral, the display of resentment rose further, the funeral was hijacked by protestors of the behavior of the regime, and violent conflict arose.

Consequently to this public demonstration of resentment, almost 90 percent of the registered voters in Turkey turned up to vote, displaying the popular mobilization around the opposition and the dynamism of the previously apathetic voter base (Magaloni 2008, 720-740; Demirel 2015, 552). Under democratic elections, the Democrat Party was able to gain 53.35 percent of the votes to the 38.38 percent of the RPP, with 408 seats compared to 39 respectively (Ahmad 1993, 96-118). The authoritarian power that the regime held for the last 25 years was dismantled in a matter of 5 years by a newly-founded opposition party defeating RPP. Furthermore, the regime itself had to concede and liberalize the social, political, economic, and even the religious spheres to remain in power, ultimately failing due to the long history of discontent behind the resentment it faced. To this end, the single-party era was finalized, the Republican People's Party was replaced by the Democrat Party, and the multi-party era began with the previous authority practicing opposition. Considering the rapid dismantling of the authoritarian system, the prolonged historical context, and the level of repression practiced by the regime, regime transformation was quick and bloodless, with all actors of the political arena accepting their respective positions under fair conditions.

3.4.1 Chapter III - Conclusion

The third chapter concludes with the dismantling of the authoritarian regime and the end of the single-party era. Referencing the repressive political, economic, and social context for both the masses and the elite, before and during the Second World War, the main descriptive segment of the study offers the rising level of mass resentment as an explanatory variable in the pace and form of transition for the case of Turkey. The chapter emphasizes the agency of the masses in spearheading the transformation of the regime through their empowering of the political opposition.

Discontent of the masses related to economic and social repression is aimed to be highlighted as the quasi origin of the accumulation of resentment, with the proceed-

ing era of single-party regime serving to incite further discontent. All actors are aimed to be objectively described according to their potential motivations regarding their actions within the political environment in establishing their institutional positions.

4. CAUSAL IMPLICATIONS

4.0.1 Chapter IV - Introduction

The fourth chapter of the study aims to distinguish between the case-wide and theoretical implications of the thesis. The study is designed as a political science endeavor foremost, and as such, the applicability and implications of the theoretical framework utilized in the study are separately described.

4.1 Case-wide Implications

For the Turkish case of democratization, the implications of a causal chain of mass resentment based on popular discontent is applicable. Evidence in the form of policies and regime actions and reactions suggest that the social, political, and economic context were instrumental in facilitating this environment, meaning that the process of events as outlined in this thesis may not be generalizable for the literature without individual qualitative analysis of historical and institutional backgrounds.

In the case of Turkey, the governance structure of the RPP that relied mainly upon the influence of local notables caused the disconnect between the state and the masses, creating the base for the generation of resentment. The lack of political input channels throughout the early period were tried to be amended by practices such as political petitioning and localized governance, or through direct state institutions in the form of People's Houses and Village Institutes, however, these fell short from alleviating the inequality and insufficiency of execution by the state. The accumulation of resentment over the social, political, and economic discontent by large segments of the population gradually increased the cost of repression.

The ruling coalition and the dynamics the coalition shares with the regime are unique to Turkey. The previous literature highlights ruling coalitions as a core mechanism

for authoritarian regimes; the regime tends to surround itself with co-opted elites, state bureaucracy, military officials, or similar groups to retain control of the state and the masses (Svolik 2009, 477-490; Magaloni 2008, 715-741; Wright and Folsch 2012, 283-309). The Turkish case added the local notables to the formula, producing a unique type of ruling coalition that directly regulates state communication with the masses. The influence of local notables and the economic clientele in decision-making created a regime highly dependent on its ruling coalition for survival and the lack of popular support due to mass resentment increased the threat of elite fragmentation.

Conclusively, the implications of this thesis serve to highlight the influence of the masses in early Turkish democratization. The trajectory of the period was largely dictated by the actions of the regime while the masses remained reactionary. Political input channels lacked coverage and availability, increasing the intensity of the reactions due to accumulated repression, especially in the peasantry and the rural populace. Hence, the brief moments of political alternatives were met with overwhelming popularity and support by the masses, who expressed their *de facto* reactions through their support for the Progressive Republican and Free Party cadres. These alternatives were repeatedly denied by the regime through party closures, further silencing the population without providing solutions.

Consequently, the repression of large segments of the population, namely the peasantry, was one of the main motivating factors of regime transformation in the Turkish case. Resentment hosted by the masses motivated and empowered the opposition to challenge the regime. The dissolution of the ruling coalition due to the etatist policies of RPP contributed significantly in establishing the opposition, as did the experienced cadre of opposition leaders who utilized the historical context to achieve maximum support. The resentment of the population over prolonged discontent prevented the closure of organic opposition in the form of DP, forcing the regime to concede to opposition demands. In this sense, the discontent framework also supports the concept of political institutionalization in the Turkish case, as it can be argued that the additive nature of resentment increased the cost of repression for the regime.

4.2 Theoretical Implications

Theoretically, this thesis aims to highlight the role of mass resentment in regime transformations. Considering the historical background of the Turkish case, accu-

mulation of discontent leads to an increase in the cost of repression, based on the increased chance of mass uprising against the regime. This effect is stronger given the domestic and global instability in the last decade and the prolonged process of accumulation over the course of the single-party regime.

The de facto display of power through support for the political opposition signifies the considerable influence of public opinion on authoritarian exits. Previous trials at a multi-party structure were able to be repressed by the government in short periods of time; the inability of the regime to repress the Democrat Party throughout 1945 to 1950 in the same way can be explained by the mass backing the opposing elite had and utilized. While previous iterations of political opposition were hindered in their ability to organize and challenge the regime due to different factors, the organic opposition in 1945 could make demands of the government for liberalization.

One of the main factors enabling this symbiotic relationship of the masses and the opposing elite was the statist policies of the regime fragmenting the ruling coalition. Previous literature cites the significant variable of economic conflict in maintaining elite cohesion (Greene 2010, 807-820; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 1-26; Friedheim 1993, 482-512; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 403-422). In the case of Turkey, the shift towards protectionist policies in the 1930s with increased state regulation was opposite to the previous incentivization of the private sector and led to the division of the regime into hardliners and softliners as the land reform project was mentioned more and more.

From a theoretical perspective, the masses in the Turkish case were the main variable in enabling the opposition to challenge the government through the Memorandum of Four and Hürriyet Misakı, and in the regime responding with the July 12 Declaration. The accumulation of political experience on the parts of the involved actors has a considerable part in the culmination of the process, as the opposition proposed a moderate rhetoric and attacked at strategic points of the regime to unite all opposition under itself.

Based on the democratic transition of Turkey, the masses can be considered a significant variable in initiating and maintaining regime transformation. Additional factors such as the global context or the motivation of the elite are crucial in this initiation, however, the lack of mass support for the challengers of the regime decreases the chance of success for the opposition, radically reducing the chance of motivated opposition leaders. Basic cost-benefit analysis of practicing opposition in the absence of support from a considerable part of the population is largely negative for the opposition, especially if the cost of repression is low due to mass apathy. In this sense, mass resentment can be utilized as a significant source of political power

by the opposition against a single-party regime; the generalization of the framework to other authoritarian variants requires further research into the subject.

4.2.1 Chapter IV - Conclusion

The exceptional pace and form of regime transformation in the case of Turkey necessitates the case-by-case application of the resentment-over-discontent framework. The primary factors to establish in applying the framework in a similar approach to another case requires the existence of certain institutions or their counterparts, such as the ruling coalition. The case-wide implications of the study may serve as a venture for authoritarianism literature, however, their applicability should be determined after the careful examination of the case at hand.

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.0.1 Chapter V - Introduction

The conclusion chapter outlines a brief summary of the historical narrative and delivers a shortened version of the process-tracing segment. This chapter discusses the role of the masses, the theoretical framework, and the general concept of democratic transitions in order to deliver concise and tentative conclusions regarding the Turkish case of democratic transition.

5.1 Tentative Conclusions:

The Turkish democratic transition was a complex process of regime transformation with a prolonged history of social and political cleavages as its background. These cleavages were apparent both in the masses and the elites, leading to a foundational period of turmoil which would affect the later years of the single-party period.

Discontent was prevalent during the foundation as the continuous state of war deprived both labor and supply resources of Turkey. The first political opposition as PRP exposed the inherent resentment of the population towards the economic context and escalated to mass uprising, displaying the instability of the masses to base the modern state upon. The subsequent closure of the political alternative that enabled the representation of the discontent segments, along with the imposition of Kemalist modernization without proper social integration further increased the resentment of the population.

The foundational decade was significant in generating the background of social, cultural, religious, and economic discontent of the masses, which would continuously accumulate over the single-party era. The emphasis on the cohesion and improvement of the ruling coalition and the Turkish bourgeoisie in the same era was

detrimental to the interests of the ordinary citizens; general economic hardship even before the Great Depression was effective in the increase of discontent, as well as the restrictions on alternative political expressions. Imposition of modernization served to increase the cleavage between the masses and the state, producing a divisive picture leading into the next decade.

The 1930s witnessed further accumulation of mass resentment. The introduction of the Free Party at the beginning of the decade represented the second political alternative to the regime, allowing the masses to display their discontent with RPP governance through their support for the opposition in public displays and local elections. The closure of the party was the second denial of alternative political actors, however, was perceived as necessary by the regime to prolong its authority and implement the Kemalist principles. The violent events surrounding the uprising of opposition posed a critical threat to the stability of the regime and the low cost of repression enabled the suppression of such displays.

The Second World War was critical to mass discontent reaching the proverbial boiling point and the dismantling of the ruling coalition. Economic policies throughout the last decade were increasingly protectionist which reduced elite cohesion within the coalition; while the regime was able to avoid the war itself, the domestic situation was dire with generalized poverty among especially the working class. The various attempts of the regime in addressing discontent were counter-productive, as the Agricultural Products Tax, the Wealth Tax, and similar burdens placed upon the various segments of Turkey further reduced the support for the regime.

The shifting trajectory of the Republican People's Party regime was unable to cater to every segment of the ruling coalition, the economic elite, and the masses simultaneously. The party followed a strict strategy of empowerment and modernization of the peasantry, and nationalization and development of industry throughout the era of Atatürk. The aim of Atatürk was to construct a homogeneous society on the level of Western civilizations which valued Kemalist principles of progressivism, and the historical context allowed for the utilization of repression to this aim. The personal charisma of Atatürk as the benevolent leader of the regime can be argued to have had a large portion to play in the relative power of the regime against the accumulation of resentment, until the passing of Atatürk and the era of İnönü. Whether repression was necessary can be debated, although its result of resentment is fairly obvious in the public displays of mass resentment surrounding political alternatives. Hence the replacement of İnönü as the leader of the regime in 1938 weakened the invulnerability of the regime. The subsequent beginning of the Second World War worsened the conditions for the İnönü administration, bringing increased economic

discontent into the equation on the parts of both the elite and the masses. The contradictory nature of protectionism with the state-incentivized private sector provided the motivation for regime softliners to outright challenge the regime, utilizing mass resentment.

Based on the historical analysis of the Turkish case, this thesis proposes the essential nature of mass empowerment in regime transformation. The single-party regime constantly exerted and expanded pressure on the masses, incentivizing the rise of the Turkish bourgeoisie to the detriment of large segments of the population. The political, social, religious, and economic dimensions of discontent provided the political experience for the opposition voter base to amass mass resentment who became active at every opportunity to communicate their resentment for the RPP regime.

Formation of opposition as the Democrat Party in the Turkish case is supportive to the notion of the discontent framework, as the elite themselves were discontent with Kemalist etatism, criticizing and demanding alternatives against the imposition of the regime. The political experience of the opposition cadre were able to strategically utilize mass resentment against the regime, emphasizing concepts such as religious freedom in order to tap into every facet of the resentful segments. Furthermore, the example of the Progressive Republican Party advised the Democrat Party to adopt a centrist behavior as to not intimidate the Kemalist principles of the state and risk party closure.

Conclusively, the resentful masses were able to empower political opposition in initiating regime liberalization; the concessions of the regime to opposition demands and rapid liberalization of the entire political structure between 1945 and 1950 to be more diverse and equal can be considered the steps of pre-emptive democratization by the İnönü administration, who aimed utilize elite-pacts for the peaceful and moderate resolution of the multi-party transition process. While the experienced opposition cadre, the dissolution of the ruling coalition, and the global context were important factors in the result of regime transformation, the resentment of the masses was the main factor in increasing the cost of repression to unaffordable points.

The role of the masses in facilitating such a transition cannot be understated based on this case. Additive discontent caused by multiple generators of resentment from social and political problems to religious and economic ones was critical in the initiation and ultimate success of the transition process. While the opposition elite can be argued to have spearheaded the challenge against the regime, the pace and form of transition suggests the underlying resentment of the masses and their de facto power in forcing the regime to concede to the opposition.

The costs of repression and tolerance are crucial to putting forward this idea. The resentment of the masses radically influences the costs of repression for the regime, as the higher cost of repressing the masses against their accumulated discontent forces the authoritarian leader to concede opposition. In the Turkish case, the cost of tolerance does not necessarily decrease as the cost of repression goes up since most approaches to opposition throughout the single-party period have seen them as threatening for the revolution; it may be argued that the cost of tolerance was relatively high for the regime, but the cost of repression was higher.

To sum up and clarify the main research question of the thesis; the quick pace and democratic form of transition witnessed in the Turkish case may be argued to have been linked to the resentment of the masses indirectly. Prolonged and accumulative discontent of the majority of the population was suppressed in past iterations of political alternatives, multiplying the critiques of the regime. The dissolution of the ruling coalition gave the necessary political input for the masses to influence governance and the political challengers were in turn motivated by the potential of the majority segment of the population. The symbiotic relationship forged between the motivated political challengers in the form of ex-coalition members, and the socially and economically discontent masses, can be argued to have been a primary explanatory factor in the pace and form of transition for the Turkish case.

5.2 Further Research:

For future research, the oligarchic tendencies in democratic transition framework can provide a deeply interesting perspective. This theoretical framework evaluates the social background of the opposition under an authoritarian regime and establishes their interests as a variable in authoritarian exits (Tucker 2008, 127-147).

Examination of the framework can help identify the reasons behind the symbiotic relationship between the Democrat Party and the masses. High ranking individuals in the opposition ranks were large landowners and industrialists and the promotion of their interests, especially in relevance to the Land Reform Bill, contradicted the interests of the masses. Similarly, the hoarding strategy by the elite preceding the Great Depression showed the possible clashes between mass and elite interests, exemplifying the generally opposite nature of benefits for these social classes.

In this sense, investigating the oligarchic tendencies of the opposition cadre throughout the transitional period can produce interesting insights for authoritarianism

literature in general. The cooperation of the economic elite with the general population in ousting the authoritarian regime can present unique dynamics of regime transformation, expanding our understanding of authoritarian exits.

In addition to the oligarchic tendencies concept, the suggestion of mass empowerment of the opposition in facilitating regime transformation can be explored further. As stated before, the resentment-over-discontent concept is not necessarily applicable en masse and requires detailed examination of both the prelude of the period chosen, and the period itself. Democratic transitions that are propelled forward by mass agency as in the case of this study are exceptional due to their historical circumstances; one case that I may suggest to examine would be post-Pinochet Chile and the modern democratic transition process it seems to be going through. The case may be similar to Turkey in many regards, and benefit the framework of mass agency significantly.

5.2.1 Chapter V - Conclusion

The chapter emphasizes the role of mass resentment in regime transformation, especially from authoritarian single-party regimes to democratic multi-party systems. The first-half of the segment gives a brief overview of the concepts discussed throughout the study and links the theoretical framework of the thesis to the historical narrative to highlight the symbiotic relationship that may exist between the masses and the political opposition in facilitating regime transformation.

The latter-half discusses potential areas for further research into the field, specifically through the framework of the resentment-over-discontent framework. The study also informs of the oligarchic tendencies variable in democratic transition cases similar to that of Turkey, which may present further and more robust findings concerning transitions from authoritarian regimes.

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