

**TWO FIGURATIONS OF THE NOBLE LIE IN DYSTOPIAN
LITERATURE: *WE* AND *KALLOCAIN***

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ABSTRACT

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The goal of this thesis is to scrutinize whether Plato's noble lie, which one can find in the III Book of the *Republic*, is a recurring narrative framework in later utopian/dystopian works of literature. While criticizing the ideology that Greek mythological sources, most notably Hesiod and Homer, actualized, Plato adopted a similar method/theory to keep the state stable through concept noble lie that at the same time functions as a means of social control. I come to suggest that Plato develops an artificial/fictional ideological truth regarding the genealogy of the state by combining old mythic structures. Through a selective survey, I specify that there may exist a general outline regarding how the main political narrative is modeled in utopian works and I question the possibility of analogous ideological patterns among the books. Although one can rightly assert that many dystopian works utilize a founding/creation myth/narrative, I opted for Yevgeny Zamyatin's *We* and Karin Boye's *Kallocain* for the following reasons. Initially, when compared with books such as *Brave New World*, *1984*, and *Fahrenheit 451*, one finds fewer studies that are limited in scope on both works, which are especially examined from a different 'angle'. Secondly, both books not only meet the criteria for a successful dystopia but also better correspond to the primary narrative that Plato presented through the noble lie. For instance, while *We* appropriates the same class of guardians as one can come across in the *Republic*, possessing identical roles in the division of labour, the psychologist in *Kallocain* follows the steps of Platonic Socrates who delivers the method he is going to use for generating a falsehood, in stages.

ÖZET

DİSTOPYA EDEBİYATINDA ERDEMLİ YALANIN İKİ BİÇİMİ: *BİZ* VE *KALLOCAİN*

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Distopya, Ütopya, Devlet, Platon, Erdemli Yalan

Bu tezin ana amacı Plato'nun *Devlet* kitabının üçüncü bölümünde karşılaştığımız erdemli yalan kavramının distopya edebiyatında tekrar eden bir tema olup olmadığına izini sürmektir. Antik Yunan din ve mitolojisinin ana kaynakları olarak değerlendirilen Homeros ve Hesiodos'u eleştirirken, Platon onlar gibi benzer bir yol izleyerek teorisini ortaya koyduğu ideal devleti ayakta tutmak ve sosyal kontrolü sağlamak için erdemli yalan tezini ortaya atar. Buna dayanarak, bu tezde Plato'nun erdemli yalan kavramını bir ideolojik araç olarak nasıl eski mitik ve politik kaynakları kullanarak dönüştürdüğü irdelenmektedir. İlk olarak Aldous Huxley'in *Cesur Yeni Dünya* kitabından hareketle ortaya koymaya çalıştığım distopya ve erdemli yalan arasındaki organik bağı Yevgeny Zamyatin'in *Biz* ve Karin Boye'nin *Kallosain* distopyaları üzerinden, konu edilen felsefi kavramı başarılı bir şekilde yansıttıklarını düşündüğüm için, incelemeye çalıştım.

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1. CHAPTER 1

1.1 Introduction: On Utopia and Dystopia

Endeavors to understand utopia follow two courses. The first stems from an etymological account that essentially coincides with Thomas More's usage of the concept in 1516. Second, further conceptualizations that generate a myriad of manifestations that became analogous with the idea of utopia: (Social) dreaming, hope, desire, unfulfilled needs/wants, perfection and progress. Although there is no consensual definition that scholarship on utopianism has agreed upon, it became somewhat an imperative that one should start by defining utopia's etymological roots (possessions) to present an initial framework and proceed from there if one is writing on the subject. Fatima Vieira defines utopia initially as a neologism that "corresponds to the need to name what is new." (Claeys 2012, 3) This neologism we might add consists of bringing together two Greek words; *- ouk* (meaning not and is reduced to *u*) along with *topos* (place) and adding the suffix *- ia* to emphasize a place. Thus, the creation of no-place. However, More further complicated the issue by introducing another term *eutopia* in a poem found at the end of his work that is composed of Greek *eu* (good or better) and *topos* (place), which strangely is pronounced same in English with *utopia*, the former has replaced the latter and consequently *utopia* comes to evoke a place that is better in comparison with the one lives at present. Demonstrating *utopia* as a neologism that becomes the origin for the following concepts of *eutopia*, *dystopia*, *anti-utopia*, *alotopia*, *euchronia*, *heterotopia*, *ecotopia*, and *hyperutopia* (Claeys 2012, 3) is stimulating and aligns with Tom Moylan's discussion of the term in *Demand the Impossible*. In this particular utopian scholarship, starting with More's *Utopia*, Moylan shows that utopian writing is bound to several historical conditions that one can epitomize as "the growth of a new social-economic system" (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 2) The historical context in question is the early capitalism in which "the subsistence economy and self-contained social relations of feudal society" (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 2) is surpassed and turned into

more fluid nature especially concerning its forms of production and consumption. Considering the literary utopia developed within the mentioned period, its function became ideological both in terms of embodying “the capitalist dream” (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 2) of the dominant class who are recognized as the European explorers of the new world (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 2) and their oppositional ideologies. (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 2) The alteration within the socio-economic framework naturally affected the cultural hence provided a transition from old to new. Therefore, to interpret the new order needed a novel cultural form, that is why we can argue More invented a neologism, namely utopia.

Utopia as the prototype of the new narrative form carries another seemingly contradictory feature apart from containing both no-place and good-place as spatial qualities, that is to oversee justice and good life (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 2) of both the dominant class and the subordinate. The former consists of the newly rising bourgeoisie and “profit-oriented” landlords, whereas the latter are displaced peasants, unattached serfs, and craft workers. (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 2) Compatible with a humanism that sprang from Renaissance in his day, More “welcomed the new paradigm and described his ideal commonwealth in humanist terms.” (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 2) The paradigm change here denotes the early capitalist phase in which one observes a swift change in the social plane. Since another key term to define the nature of utopia, if such a thing exists, is a solution that provides alternatives to the current reality, in Utopia More proposes an alternative to the conflicting wishes of dominant and the subaltern through the act of imagination. Whether the given solution to the actual problem is a blueprint to be imposed upon quotidian reality or not is a subject of further debate.

Earlier in this part, we reflected on the spatial characteristic of utopia, interestingly Moylan furthers the discussion with respect to types of geographies as destinations that one strives to arrive in utopias. Here, the author distinguishes between the utopias of the ancient such as Hesiod’s Golden Age and Eden that are “myths of an earthly paradise” (Sargent 1994, 11), and More’s Utopia in terms of their placement of the alternative societies. Whereas the former could locate the alternative “at the beginning or end of time” in other words in time immemorial, in the 16th century “alternative societies were situated elsewhere on the globe that was being explored.” (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 3) An additional distinction is made between the utopias that spanned from the 16th century to 1890s and from 1890s to onwards regarding the location of alternative utopian societies. While the situation for the prior utopias is still valid in this specific comparison, the alternative societies in utopias, starting from 1890s, are situated “in a historical future.” (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 3) Hence, with the help from Moylan’s account, we can divide the

tradition of utopian literature into three distinct phases with respect to their spatial or temporal qualities: Myths that place alternative/ideal societies in time memorial, utopias as prose fiction that originated in the 16th century, which locate alternative/better societies in a different geography than one presently lives and utopias, starting from 1890s, ‘suspend’ alternative societies in a historical future. The new geographical explorations in More’s day proves to be useful in understanding why those specific utopias stress topos on a larger scale and once again illustrates the vitality of historical conditions. What Adam Stock claimed for dystopias as cultural texts that are “also historically aware, responding to present conditions and informed by knowledge of historical events and traumas” (Stock 2019, 14) we can adopt a similar approach concerning utopia as a literary genre especially in around 1516. Rightly, Moylan commented on the newly explored and reported-upon (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 3) space is one that is portrayed as “landscape untouched by history” (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 3), referring to Leo Marx. Specifying/marking the 1890s as the point of origin for the future-oriented utopias, a painting by John Gast called American Progress (1872, just before the third phase in literary utopia tradition) can be fruitful to demonstrate how cultural texts in More’s day prioritize topography in line with geographical expeditions in the new world. The artwork epitomizes the American ideal of the frontier, that is the desire to perpetuate expansion into the west. Emphasis on geographical progress as a significant characteristic of aforementioned utopias is put rather nicely by Oscar Wilde: “A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realization of utopias.” (Wilde 1910, 27)

Literary utopias consist of merely one face of utopianism, according to Lyman Tower Sargent who stresses a broader category. For Sargent, apart from the literary genre, there exists a *Weltanschauung* called utopianism that includes other manifestations or faces that are communitarianism/intentional communities and utopian social theory. In other words, rather than restricting utopia solely to a literary genre, Sargent asserts that utopia as a phenomenon is in possession of “complex fabric” that calls for a multi-dimensionality rather than one (Sargent 1994, 3) and encompasses a “constellation of ideas, concepts, and literary genres that hover around utopia” (Sargent 1994, 3) arising from the understanding that there exists such constellation though there is no consensus on the very definition of utopia. Following, the author suggests a general definition for utopianism as “social dreaming” (Sargent 1994, 3) in which groups of people organize their lives and contemplate a fundamentally distinct societal order than the one where the dreamers live. (Sargent 1994, 3) To illustrate,

taking social dreaming as a basis, we can argue that More's Utopia is an example of such a daydream in which the tenets of early capitalism find room in newly explored geographies. Although there is a greater affinity between the Christian West and utopia as a literary genre, because the very genre has come to be identified with Thomas More who is a member of the Christian West (Sargent 1994, 3), Sargent does not limit utopianism as an umbrella term solely to that part of the hemisphere. In other words, whereas Ruth Levitas in her work titled *The Concept of Utopia* 'desires' to refrain from the outcome that signals utopianism as a universal phenomenon (Sargent 1994, 3), Sargent tends to claim the opposite. It results from the commonsensical fact that a vast majority of people occasionally become discontent with their lives and search for numerous ways to improve it. (Sargent 1994, 3) In a nutshell, apart from (individually) dreaming a human condition where our daily personal instinctual needs are to be fulfilled, what aligns with utopianism as a general framework is (social) dreaming a better society in which our macro frustrations in the current community are corrected. To realize that wish, quoting Crane Brinton, "a plan must be developed and put into execution." (Baccolini and Moylan 2014, 4) Despite the fact that adopting a plan-based approach reminds one of the so-called plans that have gone wrong especially in the first half of the 20th century. Besides the spatial contradiction stressed before, Sargent notes another conflict; this time it stems from a dual propensity (Sargent 1994, 4) of utopia's political nature. The dual propensity is due to the idea of fantasy that is an integral part of utopia as a form of social dreaming. A dictionary definition of fantasy is "the power or process of creating especially unrealistic or improbable mental images in response to psychological need."¹ This very explanation of the word corresponds to Sargent's account of utopianism in various directions. Both utopia and fantasy derive from a psychological human need then translated into mental images, whether those visions are turned to implementations could be decisive in connecting utopian fantasy and totalitarian practices. Another alignment between Sargent's treatment of utopia and the given definition must be through the words "unrealistic" and "improbable" that indicate features of fantasy. Those words are the roots of the dual propensity embedded within the fantasy in which although "a degree of fantasy is necessary to human psychic health" (Sargent 1994, 4) it is more than possible to adrift in one's fantasy, which is a danger to psychological health. Once acted on those fantasies it becomes a tangible threat not only on the individual level but on a societal one as one can observe in historical incidents in Nazi Germany, Mussolini's fascist Italy, and the Stalinist regime. Therefore, unless those elements in a utopian project are reasoned upon, it well justifiably leads to devastating consequences as "the twentieth

¹<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fantasy>

century argument that utopianism necessarily leads to totalitarianism and violence” (Sargent 1994, 4) shows, most notably Karl Popper in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*.

Although in his work *The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited* Sargent explores other two expressions of utopianism, namely intentional communities, and utopian social theory, as far as the topic of this thesis is concerned, narrowing the discussion to utopian literature would prove more convenient. The author presents an initial distinction within the literary genre and claims that it consists of “body utopias or utopias of sensual gratification along with city utopias or utopias of human contrivance” (Sargent 1994, 4) One crucial criticism that Sargent brings is concerning the relationship between the notion of perfection and utopia. Even though some might share the conviction that “the utopian society must be perfect and therefore unrealizable” (Sargent 1994, 6), we come across the assertion that a utopian place in a work of literature is not inevitably perfect where everybody lives happily ever after, but significantly a ‘better’ society. Therefore, Sargent recognizes that perfection is not an aspect of utopian literature and the ‘alleged’ connection between the two is unjust. We can also suggest an analogous way of looking at dystopia through the adjective worse as we referred to the word better as an underlying concept behind the imagined society in utopia. In a concise glossary that Sargent included in the article, apart from renderings on utopianism, utopia, eutopia, utopian satire, anti-utopia and critical utopia, the definition of dystopia (or negative utopia) follows “a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as considerably worse than the society in which that reader lived.” (Sargent 1994, 9) In given description of dystopia, we can replace the word worse with better and attain the utopia. Hence, adopting Sargent’s understanding on utopian literature, neither utopia nor dystopia does not indicate a final perfect/best/worst societal state, but merely describe what could be done to achieve that particular better society or prevent the worse condition from happening. Besides the feasible totalitarian element in fantasy as a part of utopian imagination, the subject of perfect/perfection here coincides with again totalitarianism. Adversaries of the political system benefits from using the perfection as a label to accuse utopianism to justify their position that “a perfect society can only be achieved by force” (Sargent 1994, 9), thus they argue that violence and use of coercion as practices of totalitarianism could emanate from a utopian ideal. However, when the word perfection does not apply to utopia and is not considered to be one of the characteristics, the rationale supporting the ‘anti-utopian’ argument appears to diminish. (Sargent 1994, 10) Considering utopianism in its broadest sense as a way of social dreaming, we can claim that it already

existed in oral traditions in the form of myth and folk songs prior to taking shape in written media, which Sargent regards as “early examples of utopianism that provide a basic stratum of utopian literature and, in a more complex way, utopian social theory” (Sargent 1994, 10) Here, a distinction proposed earlier where one can specify basically two categories of utopian traditions, namely of sensual gratification or body utopias along with of human contrivance or the city utopia, needs further clarification. One can classify the former category through myths that coincide with Moylan’s classification of literary utopias because being the first eutopias “they look to the past of the human race or beyond death.” (Sargent 1994, 10) In other words, we can label them as time-oriented compared to the ones that began with Utopia that prioritize geography. These primary myths come in a myriad of names: “Golden ages, arcadias, earthly paradises, fortunate isles, and isles of the blest.” (Sargent 1994, 10) Recognizing those myths’ specific features, a theoretical tool by Jeremy Bentham called The Hedonic Calculus could prove to be useful that one can interpret as to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, we should calculate intensity, duration, and certainty of pleasure in a given situation to act in a specific manner. Because all those mythical eutopias retain shared characteristics such as “simplicity, unity, security, immortality or an easy death, unity with God or the gods, abundance without labor, and no enmity between homo sapiens and the other animals.” (Sargent 1994, 10) Most especially, in some instances when women are included, delivery without pain is the norm. (Sargent 1994, 10) Hence, the listed general similarities display inflation of hedone followed by curtailment of pain. Assuming Hesiod’s golden age and Eden as most notable eutopian examples, one crucial component appears to be the fact that hedonist societies in myths are “achieved with human effort.” (Sargent 1994, 10) They are either provided by nature or the deities. Because those mythical societies are governed by a profound balance of pleasure and pain, it becomes feasible to entitle them as sensual gratification or body utopias. Some consider them to be the basic form of social dreaming or utopianism establishing the foundation of the tradition that accentuates physical fulfillment. However, as the transition from mythos to logos occurred, taking control of one’s pleasure that is embedded in social dreaming became the case. Since “human beings do not like depending on the whims of nature or the gods” (Sargent 1994, 10), when such program of controlling dreams was intellectually possible, “identical imagery is put in the future and not after death.” (Sargent 1994, 10) Once again, the emphasis is on time, but this time-shifted into the near future rather than an eschatological moment. Sargent gives Virgil’s fourth Eclogue as the eminent instance for that particular category. (Sargent 1994, 10) The second group of utopias, namely the utopia of human contrivance or the city utopia has emerged after humans completely controlled social dreaming. This is striking because, within this second tradition of literary utopias,

the geographical perception of polis or city gains prominence in which the stress is spared precisely for planning and regulations of the city. Two significant examples are Plato's Republic and Laws where the philosopher contemplates how life in the city is to be governed, e.g., in the former there is the division of labor and social stratification along with allotting the three strata of the society their corresponding duties to the city, therefore a model to be achieved. Here, the positions of Moylan and Sargent become demarcated in terms of determining the role of topography and time in different phases of utopian tradition. Whereas Moylan appears to specify the geographical influence in the 16th-century utopianism, with the formation of the polis in speculative works such as Plato's, Sargent considers the city utopia that emphasizes geography as an originating way before More's Utopia. Nevertheless, while Utopia and alike would locate their alternative societies in another part of the globe, essentially in the new world, note that Plato places his version of an ideal society in a more refined Athens according to the philosopher's principles of regulation. Although under the proposed utopian taxonomy where literary utopias are distinguished into three general categories, i.e., Myth, Fiction, and Non-Fiction, Sargent identifies both eutopias and dystopias under the broad designation of fictional utopias, in the next section we will see how both differ from another in distinct ways.

Literature as an enterprise has the power to be critical and point out "existing or potential ills and injustices in society" through its imaginative perception. (Booker 1994*b*, 3) Relying on its imaginative aspect, literature is also a potential site where distinct cultures can explore novel paths of designating themselves along with investigating "alternatives to the social and political status quo." (Booker 1994*b*, 3) Utopian literature as characterized by its evergreen inquiry of the ideal society seems to be the apotheosis of this project. However, while specifying current conditions and potential abuses that might result from it, utopian literature mostly draws attention to how the present state of affairs could be improved upon. In contrast to utopian literature, dystopias seem to embrace literature's premise to a greater extent in which they call attention to either fatal conditions in a given society or claim that literary dystopia is soon to be realized. Although sometimes confused with anti-utopias, the dystopian genre opposes and criticizes societal orders that are built upon utopian premises. In other words, it is not the utopian project or impulse that a dystopian work of writing denounces, but by demonstrating the flaws and contradictions of how a utopian project is legitimized and justified through idealistic propositions, dystopia's main objective becomes a warning for a future disaster.

Although it is probable for one to presume the fact that "dystopian literature is not so much a specific genre as a particular kind of oppositional and critical en-

ergy or spirit” (Booker 1994*b*, 3) since one can argue that “any number of literary works (especially modern ones) can be seen to contain dystopian energies, and readings that emphasize these energies can reveal dystopian impulses in works that might not otherwise be considered clear examples of dystopian literature” (Booker 1994*b*, 3) Booker distinguishes a dystopian work of literature from any book that is concerned with social or political criticism via the strategy called ‘defamiliarization’. Besides its enduring conversation with utopian idealism and reveal how it might be exploited in certain cases, defamiliarization as the fundamental strategy for a dystopian undertaking operates through placing the present society, which is wielding utopian premises for its genesis and preservation, “on imaginatively distant settings”. (Booker 1994*b*, 3) Thereby, this method would provide newly minted outlooks on problematized social and political executions/applications that “might otherwise be taken for granted” (Booker 1994*b*, 4) or deemed legitimate and inescapable. Replacing the better part from his earlier definition of utopia/eutopia by integrating the ‘worse’, Lyman Tower Sargent defines dystopia or negative utopia as “a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as considerably worse than the society in which that reader lived.” (Sargent 1994, 9) Although the definition seems to resemble its counterpart and might suggest that both literary genres originated on similar dates, dystopia is a fresh literary composition. Tom Moylan, a well-known scholar in science fiction and utopia, defines dystopian narratives as “largely the product of the terrors of the twentieth century” (Moylan 2000, xi) in which “a hundred years of exploitation, repression, state violence, war, genocide, disease, famine, ecocide, depression, debt, and the steady depletion of humanity through the buying and selling of everyday life provided more than enough fertile ground for this fictive underside of the utopian imagination.” (Moylan 2000, xi) Therefore, we can pinpoint its first versions as early as the 1900s.

The state-related catastrophes listed above emerge from the ‘naïve’ judgment within the Enlightenment project that states “the judicious application of reason and rationality could result in the essentially unlimited improvement of human society.” (Booker 1994*a*, 4) However, though faith in science could be one of the igniters of utopian thinking, it is quite the opposite when it comes to dystopian world-building. Hope in building increasingly better societies resulted in what Adorno and Horkheimer called “an enlightened world” that causes emanation of a “disaster triumphant.” The buoyant project to centralize human’s rationality wound up instrumentalizing the very faculty of the mind that in turn allows it to objectify not only nature as an external substance but also humanity as part of that nature along with other people through work and discipline. Hence, since science has played a

vital role in the utopian record and its transformation to dystopia, it becomes sensible to identify how both dystopian literature and modern cultural criticism (as we have seen as in the case of Adorno and Horkheimer) “respond to the air of crisis that has pervaded much of the twentieth century thought.” (Booker 1994*b*, 4) The air of crisis, of course, stems from the fact that people have become skeptical both for science’s potential to alter the nature of things for the prosperity of humanity and subsequently utopia. Considering Nazism and Stalinism as disastrous experiences where a totalitarian government attempted to alter the level of subjectivities and turned them into ‘malleable’ objects, we should note that scientists carried out such experiments based on utopian premises. Therefore, what a dystopian work of literature warns us about is how scientific endeavors ran amok against humanity’s benefits and has the potential to intensify that progress in the near future if we do not intervene by reflecting on possible alternatives to avoid that. The modus operandi of dystopias, therefore, aligns once again with Booker’s assertion of defamiliarization: By defamiliarizing readers and allow them to imagine a distant setting, a dystopian work of art helps us to suspend our beliefs in the status quo and disentangle the conception that it is natural and legitimate. Since we can crudely define ideology as a specific way of seeing things, it is feasible for one to claim that a dystopia, by presenting a distinct thought experiment that refers to an isolated reality once it has been founded, presents new ways of seeing. Compared with our earlier treatment of utopia in the first chapter, it would suffice to point out a concise etymological account of the concept of dystopia so that we can spare more space for its underlying features, especially elaborated by Gregory Claeys. First coined in the 18th century, the term is similarly comprised of two Greek roots; -dys, which means bad, and topos meaning place, therefore a bad place. And, as we will see in the following chapters in a more extended fashion, dystopia came to bear a mutual association with totalitarian movements of the 20th century. In other words, it becomes “the predominant expression of the utopian ideal, mirroring the colossal failures of totalitarian collectivism.” (Claeys 2012, 108) This very disposition is furthered by figures such as Karl Popper through *The Open Society and its Enemies* (1950) and Jacob Talmon who partake in the idea that “the utopian impulse was itself inherently dystopian” (Claeys 2012, 108) To further explain, the desire to build such an enhanced societal order where humans’ social performance was effectively superior to what is considered to be normal displays an inherent lingering towards the method of disciplinary violence to control social performances and practices of citizens, which eventually produces some form of a police state. (Claeys 2012, 108) Therefore, according to the critics of utopia, it becomes a universal truth that any society which is raised upon utopian principles seems to culminate in a despotic rule that uses more or less similar techniques of controlling human behavior, therefore

results in a dystopia.

Here we will define totalitarianism and suggest ways to demarcate it from authoritarianism to add another layer to our discussion. The latter is a governmental/political system that accentuates strong, central power that pertains to a single dominant ideology. Individual and political freedom is very limited that stems from the fact that power is concentrated on one person, a party, a clique, or a group of people. Political mobilization is kept at a minimum and generally violently suppressed. The inception and later preservation of the political order are sustained through some version of a founding myth in the form of nationalism, identity, and race-based understanding that paves the way for conceptions such as internal and external threats. Therefore, its health rests upon the ideological dichotomy of We and Others. Apart from containing mentioned qualities, totalitarianism reinforces the degree of oppression by penetrating the private sphere where the former political regime did not or could not have such intention that leaves its domination merely in the public domain. This desire to infiltrate into the private realm(s) is what connects totalitarianism to the dystopian impulse in a work of art. Since a totalitarian rule is not limited to the political sphere and recognizes no restrictions to its ability to exercise power, as we will see in later sections through eugenics program(s), psychological manipulation through conditionings and either providing or denying pleasure and pain, a totalitarian power center endeavors to dominate both physical and mental aspects of its subjects. The term subject is crucial here because individuals are constantly bombarded with surveillance that interpellates them as subjects.

Since we have seen one peculiar characteristic of dystopia as a product of totalitarian rule, let us proceed to other two aspects: Mostly illustrated by authors like H.G. Wells, Aldous Huxley, and George Orwell, the dystopian government resorts to “the socialist engineering of human behavior via the reconstitution of society, and the eugenic engineering of human behavior via biological manipulation”. (Claeys 2012, 109) Following these methods of domination, the common theme binding those seminal works can be encapsulated as the rule of pseudo-all-seeing/knowing totalitarian state that requires solidified consent translated into absolute servility, which seldom challenged by rogue dissidents or systemic defects. (Claeys 2012, 109) These despotic administrative bodies confide in scientific and technological progress to assure social control. (Claeys 2012, 109) Following, I would like to further illustrate the aforementioned traits of dystopia through one eminent work that is *Brave New World*. The reason why *BNW* is more appealing for a supplementary reading is precisely that it is synchronous in foreshadowing “the scale and enormity of totalitarian brutality” in contrast to 1984 that was written after those phenomena took place. (Claeys 2012, 118) We can restate the synopsis of *BNW* (1932) as taking

place 632 years 'After Ford', therefore set in A.F. 632 (26th century), the World State preserves itself and its main tenets "Community, Identity and Stability" and we might also add 'harmony' by social molding: Sleep learning (hypnopedia), caste system, eugenics, and psychological manipulation. The World state consists of five castes that remind us of the tripartite formation of Plato's ideal polis: Alphas who wear grey as the intellectually superior class, Betas as wearing mulberry constitutes the second rank in the hierarchy who work as mechanics, later Gammas whose green dressed bodies are injected with alcohol while they were in birth chambers, working as butlers and low-risk professionals, Deltas as genetically created twins whose cloth is coded as khaki and tend to 'function' as menial workers, and lastly Epsilons dressed in black, they undertake posts such as liftmen and porters. As one can recognize, all classes are color-coded to be distinguished from one another, it once again resembles Plato's utopian project that claims an invented human nature in which citizens are distributed to three classes that are attributed mineral specifying their 'value' for the society: Gold, silver, and bronze/silver. The class division in BNW also implies the concept of justice that Plato introduced in the Republic that we can define as "minding one's own business" in other words yielding to one's given status: Gold to become philosopher-king(s)/guardians, silver to participate in the auxiliaries and bronze/iron to accept that they are producers to allow preceding two to have leisure time. The eugenics program consists of what is called the 'Bokanovsky process' in which humans are reproduced in accordance with their respective tasks. The amount of alcohol inserted into birth tubes determines both the physical and mental development of individuals. It is used either to disrupt development or to permit the natural course of growth. Through hypnopedia referred to as "the greatest moralizing and socializing force of all time" citizens are subjected to lessons that include recorded conditionings as to which specific behaviors should they embody, like, or dislike flowers and books. Hence, note that the division of labor, the eugenics program to attain a certain human nature, and psychological conditioning are what one can assert as main procedures of a totalitarian rule that desires not only to be able to control the physicality of its subjects but also their psychological 'facet'. With all its departments and institutions to maintain its well-being, the world state indicates an extended version of Plato's polis as a self-contained political unit.

1.2 A Post-Dystopia in the 1990s?

Disneyland and Disneyworld theme parks have become subjects of discussion for different branches of academic disciplines. Most notably, Jean Baudrillard scrutinized the Disney phenomenon through concepts of simulacrum and hyperreality where he argues that,

“Disneyland is there to conceal the fact that it is the “real” country, all of “real” America, which is Disneyland (just as prisons are there to conceal the fact that it is the social in its entirety, in its banal omnipresence, which is carceral). Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, when in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the order of the hyperreal and of simulation.” (Baudrillard 1988, 172)

In other words, simulacra (plural of simulacrum) is a concept through which a signifier becomes separated from a signified since the former does not represent and point to the latter that corresponds to a form of notion of reality but rather becomes the reality itself: Imitations and copies without the original. Following, Disneyland/world is merely a surface (an image) devoid of depth: hyperreal. We can consider Disneyland and its harbinger Disneyworld as examples of illustrating both utopian and dystopian energies that can help us to deliberate on one of the commonsensical conceptualizations on dystopia that is “one person’s utopia may very well be another’s dystopia.” M. Keith Booker is the person who introduced theme parks through the lens of utopia/dystopia and incorporated them into his discussion of ‘the dystopian impulse’. He defines Disneyworld as “a dazzling combination of magic and machinery, the double nature of which mirrors the nature of the utopian project itself, which takes its inspiration from both fantasy and technology.” (Booker 1994a, 1) Childhood fantasies and performing how technology possesses the potential to actualize a better tomorrow (Booker 1994, 1) are what constitute the double nature of the park. The reason why Booker opted for the world instead of the land we might argue stems from how both parks’ institutionalization varies, in other words, whereas the former covers 500 acres, the latter comprises 43 square miles that makes it possible to accommodate more sections. We can compare those sections to particular state institutions in for example 1984 where one observes The Ministry of Truth/Peace/Love/Plenty, which are further compartmentalized. Therefore, the structure of the Disneyworld greatly resembles a utopia or dystopia through distributing a myriad of a multifaceted network of buildings that help the

“visitors to the park themselves contribute to this utopian atmosphere.” (Booker 1994a, 1) Apart from having a specific structural reality that paves the way for a utopia, parks such as the Disneyworld maintains a kind of ‘allurement’ that indicates ‘utopian fantasies.’ (Booker 1994a, 1) There are two sides to this allurement; the first is ‘pure escapism’ in which an amusement park “represents the negative image of utopian dreaming as escape from reality” (Booker 1994a, 1). Secondly, a more positive image of utopian thought in which “the practical Aristotelian entelechy of the ideal Platonic potential that already lies in reality.” (Booker 1994a, 1) Hence, the park depicts what is hidden in potential becoming actualized. Although the park promises “an idealized mood of peace and harmony” (Booker 1994a, 2) through clockwork precision of its machines and operation of steering crowds from one sight to the next, Booker finds also “a sinister hint of dystopia” (Booker 1994a, 2) in the park precisely because “. . . these docile crowds mill antlike about the park under the watchful eyes of uniformed overseers—even if those uniforms disguise the overseers as loveable cartoon creatures.” (Booker 1994a, 2) Therefore, this mechanization process always signals a dark side in which “the fear of domination of humanity by its machines” (Booker 1994a, 2) becomes a prevailing effect. One striking feature of the park that adds another layer to its dystopian nature is how visitors turned into masses are conforming to conventions of the park: converting legal currency into “Disney dollars” to retain “the fantasy effect—the buying of goods become a mere simulation of the buying goods, and spending money becomes a game”. (Booker 1994a, 2) The visitors become a controlled, docile horde: They purchase what they are supposed to purchase such as useless plastic objects, wear what they are supposed to wear, “hats bearing plastic mouse ears” and abide by the directions meekly as to where is the next point of attraction. Hence, the park develops into “the idealization of the American dream and the ideal carceral society of consumer capitalism.” (Booker 1994a, 3) However, by now, it should be clear what propels/fuels the Disneyworld is namely pleasure that is coinciding with the case in Brave New World where people similarly are reduced to passivity through continuously inflicting pleasure. That is why whereas the creators of the park along with its visitors can acknowledge the existence of utopia at the Disneyworld, theoretically for an outsider, in line with the foreigner trope in utopian literature (such as Gulliver), the complex of pure entertainment becomes a dystopia. Therefore, while one person can recognize the American dream as the ultimate fantasy, for another it might be a nightmare in disguise. For international participants who come from the work and travel program, the park can symbolize the paramount lifestyle, which combines both works that seem to provide a higher paygrade than their location of residence and entertainment that will begin with their termination of work when they become travelers: therefore, resulting in a utopia where they can join the serene masses

as visitors and reap the fruits of their labor. Nevertheless, despite those transient workers, for people who permanently work at the park and being destitute of the pleasure opportunities, the place requires constant machine-like labor. Working for a fixed hourly wage, the park becomes a dystopian space in which employees need to perform automated gestures: wave your hands, let people take a photograph with you while you are in a cartoon character's uniform, exchange legal currency with the park's, and so on.

2. CHAPTER 2

2.1 The *Republic*: Plato's Utopia

A prominent British philosopher A.N. Whitehead famously asserted that

“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them”. (Whitehead 1979, 39)

Although the claim is subject to a dispute concerning whether the western tradition of philosophy is merely a reaction to Plato's philosophy and is in a constant attempt to further interpret and develop the philosopher's ideas, it is an irrefutable fact that Plato greatly affected philosophy as a vocation along with Aristotle. Some even argue that the history of philosophy is no other than shifts between Plato and Aristotle who stand for distinct philosophical worldviews, as supremely illustrated in The School of Athens by Raphael.

2.2 A Brief Sketch of Plato's Biography

Historians of philosophy believe that Plato's year of birth was 426 BCE or later and he died in 347 BCE. (Gerald A Press 2012, 8) Both parents' lineage traces back to the old Athenian aristocracy. Losing his father at an early age, along with his sisters and brothers, Plato “grew up with his mother's family in Athens.” (Gerald A Press 2012, 8) The family (Holger Thesleff calls them a ‘clan’) was ruined in the Pelopon-

nesian War together with other landed aristocratic citizens. The head of the family Critias, who was “a gifted sophist and dramatist” (Gerald A Press 2012, 8) and later one of the members of the Thirty Tyrants, pursued an accord with Sparta to “stop the Periclean democracy-based Athenian imperialism” (Gerald A Press 2012, 8) as an extension of the Delian League. During his early adolescence, Plato would observe that “prolonged war, poverty, political cynicism and ideological confusion” (Gerald A Press 2012, 8) prevailed in Athens. Yet, the conditions did not pose an obstacle for the cultural sphere to prosper. Before turning to philosophy, Plato appealed to poetry and drama to make amends regarding the overbearing circumstances that surrounded the city. Thesleff points out that despite at an earlier stage, Plato maintained an interest in Athenian politics, there is no evidence with regards to his political activity in public. (Gerald A Press 2012, 8) Besides, concerning his political views, it is possible to suggest a transition from being a sympathizer of the Thirty to the modest democrats who eventually executed Socrates. Hence, the transition ended in “deep disillusionment with human society.” (Gerald A Press 2012, 8) From the mid-380s onwards, he displayed further hostile attitudes towards practical politics and rather embraces “spirited philosophical elenchus and a private ‘being together’ (sunousia) (Gerald A Press 2012, 9) that reminds us of the Socratic circle or the esoteric Pythagorean cult. Apart from pre-Socratics and mathematicians before him, Socrates constitutes the principal source of inspiration for Plato. He embodied the ideal individual to be imitated who had “mastery over all bodily passions” (Russell 2004, 122), therefore was able to exert his rational faculty over his actions. To put it more elaborately, “he was the perfect Orphic saint: in the dualism of heavenly soul and earthly body, he had achieved the complete mastery of the soul over the body. His indifference to death at the last is the final proof of this mastery.” (Russell 2004, 122) Bertrand Russell emphasized a set of questions attributed to Socrates, resulting from the philosopher’s continuous occupation with the problem of getting competent men into positions of power. (Russell 2004, 115) Socrates asks: “If I wanted a shoe mended, whom should I employ?” (Russell 2004, 115) and followed by “Who should mend the Ship of State?” (Russell 2004, 115) The philosopher assumed that to mend an object or a body of people, one should pursue the corresponding studies. We learn from Russell that Socrates came across two young men who respectively wished to become a general and a tradesperson. Following, he sent them to learn the art of war and the principles of finance. Aside from forming the moral exemplar and giving “the dialectical frame to his thinking” (Gerald A Press 2012, 8), the approach is also evident in Plato’s corpus with a more written/systematic account that shows itself especially in the education reform within the Republic.

In addition to the political and moral discontentment that Plato possessed towards his fellow Athenians, another probable impetus of frustration for Plato becomes the case: “The lack of intellectual response in Athens” (Gerald A Press 2012, 9), which caused him to leave the city around 386 BCE. Following, Plato arrived in Sicily where at the court of Syracuse he made an acquaintance with the ruler’s younger relative Dion who became a life companion and greatly affected Plato’s political experiments (Gerald A Press 2012, 9) because Dion “had hopes for ‘philosophers’ rule’ in Syracuse.” (Gerald A Press 2012, 9) This can be illustrated in a historical event where after the death of Dionysus I (367 BCE) Dion invited the philosopher to help him establish a philosopher-ruled state. (Gerald A Press 2012, 9) It seems that the new ruler, Dionysus II, did not match the specific preconceptions that Dion and Plato had in mind. With the court’s manipulation, Dion was forced into exile, but Plato was able to stay in Syracuse. (Gerald A Press 2012, 9) This particular occasion demonstrates the following statement regarding the intersection of *theoria* (philosophy) with *praxis* (practical politics): It becomes a truth universally acknowledged that a Greek philosopher in possession of assumed theoretical knowledge, must be in want of a philosopher-king whom he should imitate the great Socrates. However, as the mentioned phenomenon indicates the philosopher’s idealism does not appear to correspond to life’s practicalities.

2.3 A Source of Inspiration

Since what most concerns us is the political philosophy of Plato, a brief account of Sparta as the major political influence in forming the Republic should be clarified. Russell proposed a distinction that calls for a double-sided concept regarding the Spartan phenomenon and how it affects Plato along with the Greek thought in general: Sparta through reality and Sparta through myth. (Russell 2004, 126) The former stems from the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War (431-405 BCE) while the latter is one of the underlying inspirations for Plato’s political philosophy. (Russell 2004, 126) The mythic version, we learn, in its fullest sense is found in Plutarch’s *Life of Lycurgus* that also influenced the doctrines of Rousseau, Nietzsche, and National Socialism. (Russell 2004, 126) Russell claims that the myth itself is of more vitality than the reality, thus here we will try to explicate why it is the case. One crucial aspect of Spartans is that they were the ruling race in Laconia, the conquered land during the Dorian invasion. Initially, they reduced the native population “to the condition of serfs” (Russell 2004, 126) who are called *helots*. Although the Spartans owned the land, it was forbidden for them to culti-

vate it themselves as the law imposed. The justifying ground for such prohibition arises from the comprehension that “such labour was degrading, and in order that they might always be free for military service.” (Russell 2004, 126) The preceding statement introduces us with two elements to consider in comparison with Plato’s philosophy: First, refraining from manual labor (in the form of craft or farming) is a necessity to either philosophize, as in the case of citizens who would-be philosopher-kings or only mind the war profession, as in the case of the auxiliaries. As we will see, both comprise of what Plato calls the guardians, and to mind their own business they should be able to avoid such labor so that leisure/surplus time to be provided. The labor in question is degrading because it does not befall their corresponding stations. Second, by now it should become clear that the cities of Sparta, Lacedaemon, and later Messenia consist of a rigid class stratification: Serfs in the slave condition and citizens as warriors. This is what Plato would build upon in the Republic when he subjected people to the division of labor according to their ‘merits.’ He specifies what a person’s sole business should be, as a Spartan citizen concerned himself with the profession of war. Another source of inspiration that Plato draws from the myth of the Spartans is the education system. The Spartan citizen was trained from birth:

”Sickly children were exposed after inspection by the heads of the tribe; only those judged vigorous were allowed to be reared. Up to the age of twenty, all the boys were trained in one big school; the purpose of the training was to make them hardy, indifferent to pain, and submissive to discipline. There was no nonsense about cultural or scientific education; the sole aim was to produce good soldiers, wholly devoted to the State.” (Russell 2004, 127)

Besides, until they turn the age of thirty, “a man had to live in the ‘men’s house.” (Russell 2004, 127) Only the currency made of iron was allowed as opposed to gold and silver, and therefore: “Spartan simplicity became proverbial.” (Russell 2004, 127) Here, two concepts that later Plato desired to implement in the ideal city strike us: Simplicity and communitarianism. Plato follows a similar train of thought for the guardians’ simplicity who would merely care for their own business and live a simple life. They cannot also possess gold or iron. They should live as a community, in common barracks. Indeed, this case is only applied to the guardians as the combinations of two classes that form the first rank in contrast to producers who could have such ‘metals.’ We will see in the Republic section how simplicity and communitarianism are further elaborated.

2.4 The *Republic* as the Embodiment of the Proto Dystopia/Utopian Motto of the State: Harmony, Unity, and Stability

We noted that Plato's birth (426-7 BCE) and his childhood coincides with the Peloponnesian War (431-405 BCE) And, later he also had to experience first-hand his teacher's death at the hand of the democrats that follow the Thirty. The transition from democracy to oligarchy and once again to democracy logically proves political instability. Therefore, it must be sensible to argue that affected greatly by the political turmoil in his age, Plato could seek to theorize and even strived to practice as in the case of Syracuse, such political regime so that any potential of instability could not permeate the walls of the 'polis'. This is why as we will see at the end of the Republic, other than the defense of justice in Plato's terms, the reader is left with three concepts that belong to the politeia that Plato aimed to design: Harmony, unity, and stability. Hence, in this section, we will try to explain those terms and their relation to the Republic. Let us go back to the question that we initially attributed, with the help of Russell, to Socrates. Socrates would ask the young people around him "who would mend the ship of the state?" The analogy between the city and ship seems to be a common thread that binds Greek political thought. In IV book of the Republic (Ed. John M. Cooper and Plato 1997, 488a-489d) we get to learn what the ship/state is composed of: Here we observe a tripartite division as it is a prevailing theme in Plato's Republic regarding the city-state as well as the soul. The ship consists of the shipowner whose sight and seafaring is limited that stands for the general public, the sailors who fight one another to capture the captainship although they are not suitable for the post since they did not go through navigation studies, are the politicians or rhetors in the Platonic language, and finally there is the navigator who epitomizes the philosopher who possesses knowledge of navigating and s/he is not struggling with others for power. S/he is merely a stargazer, who looks up. Hence, the answer of Plato to the primary that Socrates asked is the philosopher should be the one to mend the ship of the state since s/he only cares about the wholeness, in other words, the common benefit of the ship by gazing upwards. However, how can one make sure that the philosopher will be the sole ruler on the ship/state? How can it be maintained, and through which means? To put it crudely, how come the mass on the ship will accept the newly created classification and the reign of the philosopher(s)? The solution to this set of problems is Platonic justice that we will try to elaborate on in the following. It has become a crystallized reading among the scholars who study Plato, the Republic's main subject is justice (dikaiosune); "both as an individual virtue and a feature of political existence." (Gerald A Press 2012, 87) We should not understand the term in its modern connotation(s) that signals

‘equality’, rather one should stick to what Plato conveyed through the very concept. It is based not on equality but proportion, in a mathematical sense. The proportionate allotment is shown through the element of happiness (eudaimonia) Because philosophers possess the knowledge of the forms that is what Plato calls episteme knowing something is the fullest sense, following the auxiliaries will become happy because they are the protector of the city, and lastly the producers in the form of farmers, craftsperson, and tradesperson provide the basic needs of the state. Hence, from top to the bottom each class receives its proportionate share of happiness, knowing that they serve the city. Earlier, we tried to illustrate through the ship analogy that the tripartite division is somewhat a custom for Plato when it comes to the structural analysis of both the state and the psyche. To attain justice, the former division of labor should be transformed into a novel existence, while keeping the tripartite nature. All three classes should be content with their current stations. Therefore, the original question becomes for Plato as “who should we force to mend the ship? Naturally, followed by “who should we force to mend the shoes and to fight for the city?” The ability to mend becomes not a feature of tendency or skill, but a forced disposition according to one’s newly created class. Let us outline the overall structure of the text before moving onto Platonic justice in more detail. The Republic consists of ten chapters called books. Although this was not what Plato intended, but an invention of subsequent editors. The tonal change starting from the II Bk. led historians of philosophy that the I Bk. should have been written much earlier that makes it a part of what is called early dialogues precisely because as the rule of thumb, Socrates admits his ignorance regarding the matter of justice and gather explanations from three interlocutors: Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus. Similar to other Socratic dialogues, the I Bk concludes with an aporia, a further puzzlement. Nickolas Pappas claims that “The change after bk 1 separates its rendered scene and characters from the drier constructive argumentation that takes up bks 2-10.” (Gerald A Press 2012, 87) The text does not only encompass speculations of political subjects but a myriad of philosophical topics ranging from metaphysics, education to aesthetics. Albeit we can consider Plato as one of the first philosophers who systematized a philosophical worldview that contains different theoretical and interrelated subjects, here we should put aesthetics aside since it interests us the least in the utopian matter but should explicate the metaphysics as we can better connect it with the political subject at hand. This, we will realize through the doctrine of the forms/ideas. Apart from the political influence of Sparta, Plato was immensely affected by three figures in terms of pure philosophy (we already mentioned Socrates): From Pythagoras, he derived “the belief in immortality, the other worldliness and also his respect for mathematics.” (Russell 2004, 138) By way of Parmenides, he adopted “the belief that reality is eternal and time-

less, and that, on logical grounds, all change must be illusory.” (Russell 2004, 138) Heraclitus is the source who proposed “the negative doctrine that there is nothing permanent in the sensible world.” (Russell 2004, 138) Thus, Plato recognized the universe as having twofold existence; real and sensible. Whereas the former allows for through the faculty of the reason a certain kind of knowledge, episteme, from the latter we can merely receive doxa that is the knowledge based on the senses. Combining Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Pythagoras Plato reached a verdict that it is the intellect that is the true wellspring of knowledge since senses can only receive commonsensical knowledge from what is decaying, that is our surroundings. Let us try to illustrate the theory via the example of an object, such as a rectangular table. The table as a rectangular is not perfect, but a flawed object, since it is susceptible to decay and does not possess the ideal rectangular shape, although we appear to have the form of that specific shape in our minds while producing it. Therefore, the form is what we can call a universal such as rectangularness or tableness, and a table is a particular, which participates in the perfect shape by copying it, in an imperfect fashion. Albeit there seem to be countless forms, the real origin of all ideas is the Form of the Good. Hence, referring to earlier philosophers we have mentioned who influenced Plato, “Goodness and Reality being timeless, the best State will be the one which most nearly copies the heavenly model, by having a minimum change and a maximum static perfection, and its rulers should be those who best understand the eternal Good.” (Russell 2004, 138) This is what Plato wants to achieve in the Republic. Before the endeavor of copying the Good, indeed, the state should be able to educate its citizens about the idea of Good. This should be the main objective of the polis. Coming back to the principal outline of the text, according to Pappas, ten books is divided into three main sections to better explain ‘what justice is?’ and ‘is justice profitable?’ as its chief argument (Pappas 2013, 40): In the Foreword that consists of merely the first Bk the question of justice is raised, ranging from the II Bk to IX Bk the argument is exhibited: “Both the individual and the city comprise forces potentially at odds with one another: social classes in the city and parts of the soul in the person. Justice consists of both in harmony among those forces. But when they do not come into a harmonious relation, the result will be unhappiness; the greater anarchy, the greater the misery. Therefore, justice is profitable.” (Pappas 2013, 43) However, through the books V, VI, and VII there is what Pappas calls a digression that results in a distinct explanation for another philosophical subject(s): “The just city will differ from existing cities in its treatment of women, children, and property in the ruling class. The rulers will be philosophers because only philosophy can issue in the knowledge of the Forms and of what is good in itself.”(Pappas 2013, 43) The tenth Bk is classified as the Afterword in which subjects of poetry and immortality are introduced.

Since we outlined the general framework of the Republic, here we can dwell more on how Plato presents a blueprint for “harmony, unity and stability” to be achieved. This, we will demonstrate through the analogy between city and soul. Pappas claims that the Republic “as a whole is powered” (Gerald A Press 2012, 87) by the cited analogy. To defend the idea of justice, in Bk II Plato proposes that “A soul is like a city.” (368e-9a) However, because the potential manifestation of justice in one’s soul is small and therefore hard to detect, Platonic Socrates “will attempt to identify it in the larger form in which it appears in a just city” (Klosko 2012, 66):

“We are undertaking an investigation which, in my opinion, requires care and sharp eyesight. Now, we’re not experts, I pointed out, so I suggest we conduct the investigation as follows. Suppose we were rather short-sighted and had been told to read small writing from a long way off, and then one of us noticed the same letters written elsewhere in a larger size and on a larger surface: I am sure we’d regard this as a godsend and would read them there before examining the smaller ones, to see if they really were identical.” (368c-d)

Hence, the quoted excerpt suggests that soul and city both consist of analogous structures: Soul is a microcosmos whereas the city must be the macro version of the same phenomenon, only the size differs. The sketch of a just city here is used as a guide to identifying justice in the soul. (Klosko 2012, 66) The presentation of the analogy of soul and city must arise from a traditional understanding of ancient Greeks: “. . . people are decisively shaped by societies in which they live, while a particular city is the sort of city it is because of the kind of people it contains” (Klosko 2012, 67) The city becomes a place where a just soul can come into existence. The mutual relationship further indicates the fact that only through participating in his/her city’s public life one can fulfill him/herself. This is the way how a polis can actualize the potential of its citizens. Potentiality here in the Platonic sense is justice in which by being just one side affects the other.

As one would expect from a utopian society, in Bk II Plato introduces a primary feature of the just city, the “principle of specialization” to make it run as efficiently as possible. Principally, this is a “rigid differentiation of function” (Klosko 2012, 68) to people’s disparate natural capacities and skills; hence people should pursue the vocation that they are inherently suited to. (Klosko 2012, 68) Simultaneously, the true nature of citizens concerning economic activities is manipulated in Plato’s ideal city, namely Callipolis. It is the state through philosophers designate the innate capabilities of its citizens concerning a specific branch of work. As a consequence,

a tripartite division of labor that assigns functions/dispositions to classes becomes apparent: The philosopher-kings as the Rulers, the Auxiliaries who are the defenders of the city, and the Producers who are comprised of farmers, craftsmen, and traders who establish the financial base of the city. Previously, we commented on the fact that the principle of Platonic justice does not rest on mathematical equality but a proportionate distribution of happiness: Here we can see that although the third and the lowest class in the form of Producers are allowed to possess gold and iron currency, one can consider their share of happiness is solely material, whereas the first two classes who together constitute the Guardians serve the city on higher grounds that is keeping the relationship with the forms, therefore must be happier than the rest. As a result, one can argue for three types of monopolies of power in Callipolis: The monopolization of political power at the hands of the Philosophers, the Auxiliaries' monopoly of military/force, and lastly economic monopoly of the Producers. However, the desired tripartite division is the end product of a certain reform within the pre-existing city. Therefore, to accomplish such social structure, one should present a detailed program regarding the Guardians' education and training since Plato seems to prioritize them over the Producers. Because different power monopolies will be the case in the just city, their corresponding authorities would stay as unchecked. Plato's solution to prevent especially the Guardians from abusing their power and act according to their interests is not introducing balancing actors or institutions, but rather specific educational training that they should go through during childhood. This would also help their roles to be cemented. Only when the educational reform prevails, the city will have all the required virtues that make it function under the doctrine of justice. Since city and soul are analogous in morphology, they should contain identical virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. The first two correspond to the Guardians: "The city is wise because it has wise rulers, who can make intelligent decisions about its internal affairs and its relationship to other cities." (Klosko 2012, 68) And the city can become brave when "it has a courageous fighting force, who will abide by their convictions concerning what is good and bad in the face of danger and other temptations." (Klosko 2012, 69) George Klosko notes that courage as wisdom in the Platonic perception is recognized as "a sort of retention" (Klosko 2012, 69) that is similar to the phenomenon where certain cloths by nature can absorb the dye permanently, so it becomes bonded. (Klosko 2012, 69) The subsequent two virtues do not belong to a specific class but rather indicate relationships among the three: "willing acceptance on the part of all classes of their places in society." (Klosko 2012, 69) This should be a harmonious existence, according to Plato:

“Unlike courage and wisdom, both of which imbued the community with their respective qualities while being properties of only a part of the community, temperance literally spans the whole octaval spread of the community, and makes the weakest, the strongest, and the ones in between all sing in unison, whatever criterion you choose in order to assess their relative strength. . . . And the upshot is that we couldn’t go wrong if we claimed that temperance was this unanimity, a harmony between the naturally worse and naturally better elements of society as to which of them should rule both in a community and in every individual.” (431e-32a)

A dictionary definition of harmony is an “agreement of ideas, feelings, or actions, or a pleasing combination of different parts” along with “the combination of separate but related parts...” and lastly “an interweaving of different accounts into a single narrative.” Music is a vital element of both the educational reform (in addition to gymnastics together form the primary training) as a part of that Plato intended to realize in the just city and ancient Greek culture. Therefore, using a music-specific term is intelligible. The word connotes unity, agreement, and unanimity resulting from being a single entity. Although they are not equal in rank, and this is the goal of Plato, only through consenting (willingly) to their given/imposed positions in the society, different parts would be able to initiate a harmonious link. Justice in the form of a relationship among social strata is a complementary virtue to temperance. Klosko remarks that Plato recognizes it as “a variant of the principle of specialization of itself, the requirement that each person stays in his place in society and do his own job, for which he is naturally suited.” (Klosko 2012, 69) Therefore, the exact description of justice should be: “. . . to perform one’s own task and not to meddle with that of others.” (433a-b) In Callipolis, the principle of justice does not allow for vertical social mobility, but for Socrates switching jobs in the Producer class is not a problem who are permitted horizontal mobility. Hence, albeit appearing as identical, justice “is the principle according to which classes do their own jobs”, (Klosko 2012, 70) whereas we define temperance as a willing acceptance of one’s societal yet imposed role. Moving from the just existence that is greater in size to a miniature-like structure that is the soul, we observe parallel virtues in the latter as well. Although, this time a phenomenon called “psychological conflict” (Klosko 2012, 70) is what induces the tripartite division of the soul. Because there exists a constant conflict within the soul, for instance, desire to eat even though one’s belly is full, proves according to Plato there should be more than one part. Hence, Plato identifies three elements: Appetitive that is the (bodily) desiring part, rational which restrains animal-like desires in case of overseeing its negative consequences to the ‘host’ and thirdly the spirit that is “the ability to feel a certain

kind of anger.” (Klosko 2012, 70) The most obscure element of the soul appears to be the last, reveals itself “in the virtue of courage, and in honor.” (Klosko 2012, 71) Besides, there is another sharp distinction between a couple of rationality and spirit as its ally along and the appetitive. Because as is the case of the Auxiliaries who abide by the rules of the philosophers, the spirit also follows the rational faculty. Similar to the harmonious relationship between classes if they conform to their positions, Plato suggests another musical description of the three elements of the soul: “as if they were literally the three defining notes of an octave—low, high, and middle—... and however many notes there may be in between.” (433d) As one can presuppose, since there exists an analogy between the city and the soul, we can apply the aforementioned elements of the soul to the parts of the city: The Rulers as reason, Spirit as the Auxiliaries, and Appetite as in the form of the Producers. Hence, the corresponding potential virtues of the soul should be the following: A wise soul should act on the grounds of the reason that “deliberates for the good of the whole.” (Klosko 2012, 72) A brave soul is what balances the threat of appetites: “The spirited part of the soul possesses irrational energy and therefore the strength to resist desires, yet it stands near enough to reason to take instruction from it.” (Gerald A Press 2012, 89) Plato, apart from other visual theoretical demonstrations, presents a poetic metaphor for the tripartite structure in which he compares the rational faculty to a human in a smaller size, the appetitive part to an ancient creature such as “Chimera, Scylla, and Cerberus” that threatens to overpower the former part. However, since the soul consists of a tripartite form, there is also the spirit, which Plato depicts as a lion that tames and dodges the monster. (588b-9a) In Parallel with the city, temperance as a virtue should be pointed out as a specific relationship between the soul’s elements where all three parts willingly confirm their positions. Following, a just soul is the one in which all elements stay within the designated place and pursue their own jobs: Reason to rule, Spirit to be loyal to the rationality and keep desires at bay. As a result, a just city and soul are the ones that prioritize the overall interests of all parties, and this cannot be the case unless the order which Plato specified takes place within the double structure. This way, a unified structure would establish a harmonious relationship that serves the stability of the polis. This particular scheme is what can help us recognizing Plato as utopian since he strived to explore alternatives in which the de facto existence of earlier polis can be transformed into a stable political condition. We will try to explicate how Plato forms tripartite class division and seek to maintain their stable existence in the next chapter titled “Noble Lying”.

3. CHAPTER 3

3.1 A Few General Remarks on Lying

Lying is a notoriously compelling subject, especially in the realm of philosophical debates. This is most notably shown through the famous dichotomy of consequentialist and deontological ethical positions. Should someone, when asked where is his/her friend by a murderer, tell the location? Let us try to illustrate possible responses of two distinct moral stances. For a deontologist, the right thing to do is to tell the truth, in other words where the friend is, regardless of the consequences that would follow from that particular action. Greek word *deon* already gives us the hint of duty in which the term is translated into an ethical deed. On the other hand, a consequentialist would argue against telling the truth in that specific instance, since the result of the action would prove harmful. Whereas in the former the right and moral thing to do is encapsulated within certain actions in the form of duties, such as *do not lie!*, the latter asserts that the consequences of an act determine what is ethical. We can apply a similar etymological train of thought to the consequentialist position that includes the Greek root *telos*, which comes to mean “end” or “purpose”. We can assert that, as we will see, the rulers in dystopian states take sides with the consequentialist approach.

3.2 Lying and Deception Among Ancient Greeks

The conflict between Athens and Sparta, as it appears, does not merely entail the territorial, war-based arena, which resulted in the famous Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE). But also, expands on how both *poleis* viewed political lying. Although the Spartan side on the matter is silent due to the seemingly Athens-centric historical narrative, we can try to conceptualize at least how lying and deception are considered

in ancient Athens, since our focal point is precisely Plato. While aiming to pinpoint disparate possible influences on the philosopher, Bertrand Russell gives a historical example concerning Spartans and how they did ensure the helots, who are former inhabitants of the conquered lands of Laconia and being reduced to serf-condition, could not rebel through deception:

“The helots were Greeks, like the Spartans, and bitterly resented their servile condition. When they could, they rebelled. The Spartans had a body of secret police to deal with this danger, but to supplement this precaution they had another: once a year, they declared war on the helots, so that their young men could kill any who seemed insubordinate without incurring the legal guilt of homicide.” (Russell 2004, 126)

To avert the legal repercussions of brute killing with malicious forethought, the Spartans resorted to deception. Since deception and especially political lying target pure benefit with intentionality yet lacks ignorance, here we can assert that instead of lying in words, the Spartans opted for deception in action. The quotation that Jon Hesk included in the Prologue can help us further understand adverse worldviews on political lying. Hesk reports that a fourth-century Athenian politician Demosthenes who by nature frequently utilized rhetoric utters the following: “A man can do you no greater injustice than tell lies. For in a political system based on speeches, how can it be safely administered if the speeches are not true?” (Hesk 2000, 1) As Hesk remarks, Demosthenes’ position that condemns political deception is remarkably so on the grounds that “official deceit is relatively unproblematic for a tyranny or an oligarchy because those systems do not require mass debate and decision-making.” (Hesk 2000, 2) Hence, while the instance that Russell brings forth is an approximate stance of the Spartans with regards to lying and deception, the latter quote by Demosthenes summarizes the Athenian position. However, as Hesk expresses repeatedly throughout *Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens*, while Athenian rhetors and philosophers claim that political lying and deception is strictly unAthenian and is used as a descriptive criterion of Athenian identity along with the representation of the other, the author presents a myriad of cases when Athenians exercised such political strategies both in theory and practice that we can recognize as deceit. The only apparent distinction between Spartans and Athenians is through how the latter justify and legitimize such political use. Indeed, one of the most eminent instances is Plato’s noble lie, as we will try to explicate in the following.

John Hesk not only argues that “the theoretical denigration of rhetoric as a deceptive

technology and the conception of the political ‘noble lie’ cannot be characterised as a solely ‘totalitarian’ or purely Platonic strategy” (Hesk 2000, 3,4) but also locates emerging ideas regarding political deceit in the very discourses that characterized the Athenian democracy. (Hesk 2000, 4) In other words, he contends that political deception and lying are inherent within the institutions that constituted Athenian democracy and at the same time it is not limited to Platonic corpus. As a result, Hesk suggests: “the idea of ‘rhetoric’ was strategically reified and theorized as a mode of deceptive communication in the Athenian democracy’s very own competitive institutions of speech and performance.” (Hesk 2000, 4) Here, to better assimilate the specific Athenian stance on lying and deception, as Hesk does, we should not only refer to the examples of Athenian oratory but texts as well. Since texts also present themselves as feasible sources that reflect how the society in question views certain social conducts. Thus, we can proceed by giving a specific textual example from Homer’s *The Odyssey* where the protagonist Odysseus demonstrates behaviors that we can identify as instances of *metis* that encompass values such as cleverness, craft, wisdom but also strategies of deceit. One occasion where Odysseus, ‘the man of twists and turns’, encapsulates *metis* is when he and his crew encountered cyclops, especially Polyphemus. We can divide the hero’s deceitful actions into two: One is through physical activity that is after blinding the one-eyed giant, he along with his company hide under the sheep herd and the second is when Polyphemus asks Odysseus’ name, he replies as “no one”. Whereas the former is an example of a military tactic that aims at survival and therefore deception, the second is an instance that we can define as “lie in words”. Following, it is not surprising that when Homer introduces the characters and uses epithets to present their characteristics, among others the poet appeals to the epithets for Odysseus such as ‘deceitful’, ‘cunning’ and ‘resourceful’. Although one can rightly claim that Odysseus is the king of Ithaca and is not related to Athens, we can respond to the criticism by showing the influence of Homeric texts along with Hesiod’s in establishing the pantheon, genealogy of religion and morals of Greeks including Athens. In the *Republic*, even though Plato attacks both poets’ depiction of the gods that we can understand as anthropomorphic that resembles human behavior, he nevertheless accepts the religious accounts in those texts. The second example that we can use to convey the Athenian understanding of lying and deceit is given by John Hesk concerning an ancient text called *Sisyphus*. According to Hesk, this specific text is cited by Karl Popper “as a significant precursor the the ‘noble lie’”. (Hesk 2000, 179) Although is subject to ‘disputed authorship’ (Hesk 2000, 179), this play is crucial in discerning “the notion of an ethically and socially beneficial lie.” (Hesk 2000, 179) One of the attributed authors of the play is Critias who according to Sextus is “one of those who held tyrannical power at Athens.” (Hesk 2000, 180) This is the same Critias whom

we mentioned in earlier chapters; as Plato's uncle and one of the thirty-tyrants who overthrew democracy. I will simply reproduce the fragment in full, translated by Jon Hesk, and later try to demonstrate how lying and deception are reflected in the text, which is, in reality, a part of Athenian identity.

“There was a time when human life had no order
but like that of animals was ruled by force;
when there was no reward for the good
nor any punishment for the wicked
5 And then, I think, men enacted laws
as punishments so that justice would be tyrant
. . . and hubris would be its slave,
and whoever did wrong would be punished.

Next, since the laws
10 only prevented people from using force openly
but they continued to do so secretly, then I think
for the first time some shrewd and wise man
invented fear of the gods for mortals, so that
the wicked would have something to fear even if
15 they do, say or think something in secret.
In this way, then, he introduced the divine
saying ‘there is a divinity, strong with eternal life,
who in his mind hears, sees, thinks, and
attends to everything with his divine nature.
20 He will hear everything said amongst mortals
and will be able to see everything they do;
and if you silently plot evil,
this is not hidden from the gods, for our thoughts
are known to them.’ With such words as these
25 he introduced the most pleasant of lessons

concealing the truth with a false account.
And he claimed that the gods dwell in this place
which would particularly terrify humans;
for he knew that from there mortals have fears
30 and also benefits for their wretched lives –
from the revolving sky above, where he saw
there was lightning and terrible crashes
of thunder and the starry body of heaven,
the fine embroidery of Time, the skilled craftsman.
35 Thence too comes the bright mass of a star
and damp showers are sent down to earth.
With fears like these he surrounded humans,
and using them he established
the divinity well via discourse and in appropriate place
40 and extinguished lawlessness with laws.
[(there is a gap of a few lines)]
thus, I think, someone first persuaded
mortals to believe that there was a race of gods.” (Hesk 2000, 180,181)

Regardless of the specified authorship, from the verses, an interpretation becomes evident that is the “testimony to the atheism of their author”. (Hesk 2000, 180) Through the fragment, an unidentified speaker argues that crimes that are not committed openly would go unpunished unless some wise men invent a fear of the gods to deter humans from resorting to such violation. This part of the play clearly reminds us of both the Hobbesian state of nature and Rousseau’s social contract theory. Because of the initial disorder and chaos among humanity, some felt the urge to erect laws that limit the use of force and lends it to consensual authority. However, although on the surface people refrain from committing atrocities, it is observed that they still maintain to go astray. Hence, the necessity to produce an omniscient and omnipresent pantheon came into existence, provided by some unknown wise individuals. As it is visible from the fragment, the apparatus that those individuals employ is deliberate deception and lying that intend to persuade people. Indeed, there is a moral side to this intentional mendacity that is a false

account of deities that would help people to behave righteously and avoid committing crimes. That is why the speaker expresses that mythmaker(s) concealed the truth with a false account to introduce the most pleasant of lessons that are to direct people to act morally and could benefit them in the long run. Hence, both Odysseus as a celebrated Greek hero that embodies “twists and turns” and the play Sisyphus demonstrate that although deceiving the demos is not Athenian but belongs to the other, that is the Spartans, we see that lying both as a military tactic and as devising a religious account is apparent in the Athenian way of life and culture. Therefore, Athenians’ perspective on practical lying and mendacity is not of Pericles’ funeral speech in the second book of Thucydides who asserts “. . . This is because we rely, not on preparations and deceits but on our real courage with respect to deeds.” (Hesk 2000, 26) But it is the one that encapsulates “the specific notion of metis (which often involves the performance of deception)” (Hesk 2000, 10) as an important category of thought in Athenian culture. Furthermore, Hesk claims that “actions and achievements which come under the rubric of ‘cunning intelligence’ as identified by Detienne and Vernant were often represented as admirable.” (Hesk 2000, 10) The notion of cunning intelligence of course corresponds to metis. Consequently, since most authors epitomize their cultural habitat, it is an inevitable fact that Plato should emphasize lying and deception in his dialogues, whether through criticism or as an essential political-religious narrative to attain stability in the polis.

3.3 The Noble Lie

Although a myriad of uses is evident, e.g., mendacity, deception, insincerity, and falsehood, as far as what Plato possibly had in mind is concerned, I will adopt the term “lie” that I concur “as a statement intended to deceive others.” (Lionel Cliffe and Bartlett 2000, 3) One of the most recognized lies in the political arena is the noble lie that the philosopher proposes as the ideology of the ideal state to justify and legitimize the prospective status quo. This noble fiction bears similarities with the fragment that we have discussed in the previous part in terms of the fact that “it is sometimes necessary and justifiable to lie to the people”. (Hesk 2000, 2) The Socratic ideal polis will be the one that is governed by philosopher-kings who are endowed with the sole authority on lying. This is precisely the case because “the survival of this state is dependent on the dissemination of and universal belief in a ‘noble lie concerning the natural and biological basis of the state’s division of labour.” (Hesk 2000, 2) Therefore, the Athenian citizens will be persuaded whether they are to rule or to be ruled. As was the case with the Sisyphus fragment, it becomes

a part of a justification regarding political lying that the end justifies the means since it is administered for the benefit of the whole and good moral consequences. Although this legitimization of lying is accepted by some, a few political thinkers, such as most notably Karl Popper, considered the aforementioned justification “as a hallmark of totalitarian political thought and he indicted Plato as the originator of such beliefs.”(Hesk 2000, 2) Regarding the criticism of the noble lie, throughout the earlier part concerning lying and deception among ancient Greeks, we noted that lying and deceiving the demos in Athens is condemned and considered to be unAthenian. Therefore, we should deduce that the deliberate lie or fiction that Plato proposes as noble needs a further set of justification(s) by the philosopher. That is why before articulating the noble lie, Plato presents the first ‘apology’ for lying: Concerning the justice and injustice dichotomy, when speaking to Cephalus in the Bk I, he asks “speaking of this very thing itself, namely, justice, are we to say unconditionally that is speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred?” (331c) Following, Socrates gives an example:

“Everyone would surely agree that if a sane man lends weapons to a friend and then asks for them back when he is out of his mind, the friend shouldn’t return them, and wouldn’t be acting justly if he did. Nor should anyone be willing to tell the whole truth to someone who is out of his mind.” (331c)

Hence, from the argument, it follows that telling the truth is not always the necessary solution, but in some instances, to avoid harm, one should resort to lying and conceal the true state of things. The second reparation for necessary lying is through a relationship between a physician and his/her patient. The reason why Plato’s application of the noble lie is frequently considered as pharmaceutical, that connotes unilateral and asymmetric power relation where one is given a specific substance for his/her benefit, stems strictly from this analogy. This is the case because whether one is a captain or a doctor, both are considered as rulers who do not seek or order what is advantageous to himself/herself, “but what is advantageous to his subject, that on which he practices his craft. It is to his subject and what is advantageous and proper to it that he looks, and everything he says and does he says and does for it.” (342e) Because the doctor is the one who seeks not his profit but the benefit of his/her patient, he/she should be the one whom the authority of truth is endowed: Although for Socrates falsehoods are no use for the Gods, it “is useful to people as a form of drug and clearly we must allow only doctors to use it, not private citizens.” (389b) Thus, it follows that

“If it is appropriate for anyone to use falsehoods for the good of the city, because of the actions of either enemies or citizens, it is the rulers. But everyone else must keep away from them, because for a private citizen to lie to a ruler is just as bad a mistake as for a sick person or athlete not to tell the truth to his doctor or trainer about his physical condition or for a sailor not to tell the captain the facts about his condition or that of the ship and the rest of its crew—indeed it is a worse mistake than either of these.” (389c)

Therefore, neither a patient could deceive the doctor in believing that he/she is healthy nor a sailor to his/her captain about the current nature of the ship. Because, as the argument proceeds, they think merely of their present well-being(s) or morale. However, since both actors of power consider the best possible option for their ‘subjects’, they are allowed to lie: The doctor can lie that the patient is in a ‘robust’ state even if he/has a terminal illness and the captain to tell his/her crew that the ship will not sink although the bottom of it is leaking. This becomes the circumstance because “deception is the only available tactic for the achievement of a just or good outcome.” (Hesk 2000, 152) In other words, we can define what Plato claims concerning lying as paternalism in which the figure of authority pursues the welfare of the subjects.

The last justification that comprises a basis for the noble lie is the very division that introduces two categories of lying or falsehood as Plato asserts: The first is the ‘true falsehood’, which is “hated by all gods and humans.” (382a) The philosopher explains it as lying “to the most important part of himself about the most important things” (382a) Because it is the place in one’s body that he/she is most afraid to lie to. (382a) This is why true falsehood is also recognized throughout the dialogue as “to be false to one’s soul about the things that are.” (382b) The second falsehood or lie is the one that imitates the affection created by ignorance in one’s soul. Socrates construes this version of lying as ‘falsehood in words’. This is an after-image that comes into being after the genuine lie that stamps its mark in the soul. (382b) The specific falsehood in words, as opposed to the former variant, does not cause hatred and is recognized as useful, especially for the events that happened in time immemorial and there is no way to know what exactly occurred. As Socrates uttered: “. . . in the case stories we were just talking about, the ones we tell because we don’t know the truth about those ancient events involving gods. By making a falsehood as much like the truth as we can, don’t we also make it useful?” (382d) As we mentioned, this type of lie is furthermore convenient when a friend is attempting, through madness or ignorance, to hurt herself. At that very moment, the lie becomes like a drug to prevent such action. Therefore, when Plato tries to devise an instrument to further

better the stability of his Kallipolis-to-be, he indicates a lie in words that it becomes a noble lie. It is noble because it aims at the greater good and a lie because it is not authentic but an imitation. Creating fiction is not foreign neither to the ancient Greeks nor to us; especially through Homeric epic poems the Iliad and the Odyssey of ancient events it is said that the alleged sources of the texts are muses, rather than the poet's own imaginative faculty.

Plato introduces the lie as a Phoenician tale that combines two myths: Cadmean autochthony myth that tells men and women are fashioned by the god within the earth, and the Hesiodic Myth of Ages that describes the phases of people, classified by metals, such as the golden age, the silver age, and so on. This takes place near the end of book III where Socrates narrates:

“I'll first try to persuade the rulers and the soldiers and then the rest of the city that the upbringing and the education we gave them, and the experiences that went with them, were sort of a dream, that in fact they themselves, their weapons, and the other craftsmen's tools were at that time really being fashioned and nurtured inside the earth, and that when the work was completed, the earth, who is their mother, delivered up into the world. Therefore, if anyone attacks the land in which they live, they must plan on its behalf and defend it as their mother and nurse and think of other citizens as their earthborn brothers.” (414d-e)

We emphasized that the noble lie consists of two parts, Cadmean and Hesiodic, hence the first part corresponds to the former in which originally Cadmus as the founder of Thebes sowed the soil with the teeth of the dragon he defeated that results in the birth of armed men who are called Sparti (the sown). Thus, here Plato modifies the original myth in accordance with his ideal state's need of ideology in the form of religion. The second part of the lie follows:

“All of you in the city are brothers,” we'll say to them in telling our story, “but the God who made you mixed some gold into those who are adequately equipped to rule, because they are the most valuable. He put silver in those who are auxiliaries and iron and bronze in the farmers and other craftsmen. For the most part, you will produce children like yourselves, but, because you are all related, a silver child will occasionally be born from a golden parent, and vice versa, and all others from each other. So the first and most important command from the god to the rulers is that there is nothing that they must guard better or watch more carefully than the mixture of metals in the souls of the next generation.

If an offspring of theirs should be found to have a mixture of iron and bronze, they must not pity him in any way, but give him the rank appropriate to his nature and drive him out to join the craftsmen and farmers. But if an offspring of these people is found to have a mixture of gold and silver, they will honor him and take him up to join the guardians or the auxiliaries, for there is an oracle which says that the city will be ruined if it ever has an iron or a bronze guardian.” (415b-c)

In these lengthy passages, the ideology as the false consciousness that dictates people to see things in a particular way is asserted as sophisticated as possible by Platonic Socrates. The philosopher-king(s) who originate from the caste of the guardians as the sole possessors of the political authority will decide, during the education phase of citizens when they were children, whether they are made of gold, silver, or the composition of iron and bronze by subjecting them to certain tests. The lie appears to attain two aims: Whereas the first part would convince citizens to care for each other and see one another as brothers and sisters, the second Hesiodic part pre-determines the roles of citizens in the chain of a division of labor that justifies their positions by blocking the vertical social mobility, therefore cements the societal/economic order.

4. CHAPTER 4: TWO FIGURATIONS OF THE NOBLE LIE IN DYSTOPIAN LITERATURE: *WE* AND *KALLOCAIN*

4.1 Zamyatin's *We*

4.1.1 A Synopsis I

Written right after the Bolshevik Revolution, *We* is a warning of how such a historical/political event can descend into totalitarianism unless people refrain from considering the Revolution as the final and natural one. For Zamyatin, through the mouthpiece character I-330, the reader comes across a political message that there can be no ultimate revolution but rather revolutions are infinite, and people should restore the political metamorphosis through finding solutions for betterment. The action takes place in the thirtieth century, a thousand years after the single political rule called the One State, encircled by a glass wall, came to power that aims to regulate all human life according to the principle of scientific/instrumental reason. The protagonist of the novel is D-503, an engineer and the builder of the spaceship *Integral*, which operates as an apparatus that will carry the state ideology to distant places in the galaxy. As the novel progresses, we learn that I-330 is one of the higher officers of the new revolutionary movement called Mephi. The rebellion against the One State that the protagonist and others live, failed the subverters who could not manage to hijack the *Integral* and use it for their own use/purpose. As one already might recognize, all humans are attributed numbers rather than names that annihilates individuality: Apart from the two persons above, we meet O-90 as the sexual partner of D-503, U (without a number) is the controller at D-503's apartment, R-13 a poet and D-503 friend and lastly S-4711 a member of the Guardians who act as the secret police and military. Although D-503 betrays I-330 who became his lover along with his (rebel) friends who are tortured and killed by the ruler of the One State named the Benefactor, the novel ends with a silver lining: We learn that the once believed imperishable glass wall is breached.

4.2 The Book and the Noble Lie I

Yevgeny Zamyatin's *We* (written in 1921, published in English in 1924) and Karin Boye's *Kallosain* (1940) coincide with Malcolm Schofield's examination of both Republic and Laws that integrate 'recipes' to dispel political turmoil in Athens by introducing a variety of components: "tightly controlled institutional structures; a common education – at least for the ruling classes – designed to develop or control (as needed) every element in the human psyche for the promotion of virtue; government conducted with wisdom and an overriding concern for the public interest." (Schofield 2006, 282) Limiting ourselves with the reading of *We* for this chapter, we will see that the novel's One State relies on institutions that convey the idea of unison and singularity that the state ideology already manifests: The Office of Guardians functions as a hub for guardians as a class who operate both as secret police and military and spy on the numbers along with evaluating the intelligence reports collected by other numbers. The Medical Office works as a single health institution, which is responsible for standard medical provision to the numbers but also home to numerous physicians who are assigned to develop new curative procedures that would help crystallize the happiness of the whole, e.g., excision of imagination is one of them, as we will further explicate later. The Administrative Office is another state department, but its particular activity is not thoroughly emphasized, merely seen in joint action with the Medical Office and the Office of the Guardians concerning the procedure called the 'excision'. The Scientific Bureau is obligated to oversee scientific advancements, as they observed the first flight of the Integral, onboard. Lastly, the Sexual Bureau is the one that regulates the numbers' sexual activity: Upon request, they register numbers (one can be registered for more than one, therefore, disrupting 'ancient' and 'normal' family structure) one another according to evaluating the hormones of the partners and subsequently issue them a 'pink coupon' that is a bureaucratic certificate allowing the numbers to lower their curtain, hence the weekly sexual intercourse. Although, as opposed to the individual offices and bureaus working according to the division of specialization, there is not one named academic institution, rather it appears the (common) educational enterprise is merged into one and realized through 'auditoriums', 1500 in total. Here, the numbers go through training especially on mathematics when they were children, and during their adulthood, they keep joining in the lessons both in lecture and self-thought forms: For the former classes such as 'On child-breeding' is the case where the latter materializes in gymnastics; daily walks and physical exercises. All state departments serve one purpose in the form of 'virtue' that is happiness resulting from the perfect unison of the numbers, made possible by assignment of

the numbers according to their labor, in other words, specialization of labor. “The overriding concern for the public interest” is translated into a condition where “nobody is one, but one of.” (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 7) This is what constitutes the first conflict in the novel: While the Benefactor as the number of the numbers endeavors to maintain the status quo where “the source of right is might, that right is a function of power.” (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 115) aiming to create ideal numbers (subjects/citizens) who would assert the ideology as:

“We have the scales: on one side, a gram, on the other a ton; on one side “I”, on the other “We”, the One State. It is not clear, then, that to assume that “I” can have some rights in relation to the State is exactly like assuming that a gram can balance the against the ton? Hence the division: rights to the ton, duties to the gram. And the natural path from nonentity to greatness is to forget that you are a gram and feel yourself instead a millionth of a ton.” (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 115)

I-330 and the Mephi as a rebel organization aspire to counteract it through hijacking the Integral along with voting against the Benefactor on the Unanimity (Election) Day. I-330 as one of the leaders of the organization claims the opposite of what The One State encapsulates as perfection. After learning what the Mephi tries to achieve, the protagonist, D-503, utters the following: “Don’t you realize that what you’re planning is revolution? There can be no revolution. Our revolution was the final one. And there can be no others.” (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 174) In reply to the statement that approximately epitomizes the state ideology, I-330 answers: “Name a final number. Then, how can there be a final revolution? There is no final one; revolutions are infinite. The final one is for children: children are frightened by infinity, and it’s important that children sleep peacefully at night. . .” (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 174) Therefore, whereas we can pinpoint the first conflict of the book as the collision between perfection and statis/stability, the perpetual political antinomy also includes the opposition between the many/public and individual. As we tried to illustrate in the former blockquote, to maintain the happiness attained after the war, one should be melted into the great pot of the State by becoming a mere gram. The novel’s story revolves around the main character D-503, a subject of the One State, who lives in the post-revolutionary (roughly after a thousand-year) phase where “individuals are assigned numbers rather than names, are forced to dress similarly, and lead highly regimented lives supervised by ‘guardians.’” (Claeys 2012, 114) The novel adopts the form of a diary that is basically a manuscript that entitles the name of the book. The feature of self-reflectivity concerning writing indicates

a common feature among dystopian works of art: Writing as a tool of resistance against totalitarian politics. D-503 is both a mathematician and the chief designer of the spacecraft called the Integral that will carry the domination of the One state to the remaining parts of the galaxy. The evident similarity between the state in *We* and other dystopian states is that all seem to claim domination for the whole globe such as The World and Universal states in *Kallocain*. Identical to Plato's ideal state Kallipolis, the One State is also a self-sufficient political unit that indicates spatial qualities: Inside and outside. Even when presenting a history lesson about the battle, D-503 argues that it was the "war between the city and the village." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 21) While the state is enclosed with a seemingly indestructible glass, what outside encompasses is untamed nature that reminds us of the primary distinction between civilized and uncivilized that is originally presented in the Epic of Gilgamesh through Gilgamesh and Enkidu and in the *Odyssey* where Odysseus meets the one-eyed giant Polyphemus. As we tried to show in earlier chapters, the Platonic polis consists of three classes: The guardians (including philosopher-kings), auxiliaries and the producers each are subject to the principle of justice, which is minding and consenting to one's predetermined role of labor. A similar social division is evident in *We*. People are given a letter and number combination: For instance, D-503, I-330, and O-90. This designation seems to be random and arbitrary since there is no justification in the novel on why one is assigned a certain letter/number and why while one has three digits, another would have two. The only one who is free of this very combination is the Benefactor who suggests an analogous existence with the philosopher-king who has the authority and holds the political power: This is exemplified through a machine of the Benefactor's where 'the enemies of happiness' are punished and killed. He/she also maintains the flow of information regarding intelligence that comes through the guardians who are the second class in the pyramid. The members of the guardians undertake two roles: Secret police and the military. This way, they seem to correspond to the guardians and the auxiliary strata in the Republic. Except for the Benefactor, all numbers, scientists, builders, factory workers, even doctors Although sex is freely available to all citizens, it is strictly controlled through bureaucratic paperwork called pink coupons that people use to register for another number. All reside in glass apartments that allow complete visibility. The houses have curtains that are lowered merely during sex. This is the only case, for a limited time, people own privacy. Therefore, sexual intercourse becomes like an institutional entity where one needs to go through an administrative process that organizes the specific human activity in a certain way. History writing and common education in the One State are closely associated in a way that both determines the class consciousness of citizens. In line with the general dystopian framework, the constant reminder of the historical reality of war

is the decisive factor for the preservation of the status quo. Because after the war a limited number of people (0.2 of the world population) have survived, they erected the glass wall that divides between what is rational and irrational. The historical event is called the 200-year War that forced people to renounce basic desires or at least rigidly control them. Thus, human activity turned in to be mechanized and automated that drive people to behave as if they are cells of one organism:

“Why, it transforms each one of us into a figure of steel, a six wheeled precision, at the same hour and the same moment, we millions of us get up as one. At the same hour, in million headed unison, we start work; and in million-headed unison we end it. And, fused into a single headed body, at the same second, designated by the Table, we lift our spoons to our mouths. At the same second, we come out for our walk, go to auditorium, go to the hall for Taylor exercises, fall asleep. . . ” (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 12)

The revealed ‘Table’ is called the Table of Hours that supervises the daily activities of the numbers that even imposes “fifty prescribed chewing movements for each bite.” (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 102) It is a system that aims to help making incalculable to turn into calculable and so that everyone becomes identical to each other, in their mechanical movements: Everyone becomes like everyone else. This system is described as Taylorism, which is an industrialized regulation of humans that rationalizes “workflows aiming at increased efficiency, which at work makes them ‘machine-perfect.’” (Claeys 2017, 340) This results in a specific social existence where “No one is one, but one of.” The sexual bureau as an institution does not only issue pink coupons but also regulates maternal and paternal norms that are linked to child-breeding: Both parts must inform the Office of Guardians that they will ‘produce’ children. Although it seems that the biological father moves on with his life after birth and the fate of the mother is unknown, we learn that the protagonist’s partner O-90 is ten centimeters shorter than the Maternal Norm. Therefore, when they decided to bear children, it becomes illegal and would result in the death of the mother, because she does not match the physical and biological norms that the State established. Nevertheless, children are not the private property of the parents but become the state’s that defies the ancient notion of ‘mine.’ The children will be subjected to the same education that their ‘biological creators’ once have: After the foundation of the One State, the happiness is attained at the cost of repressing desires and to preserve stability, harmony, and unity one should enter under the rule of the state through the Benefactor who is elected in a yearly open and unanimously voting. All three classes comprise the state that as one organism, hence the system

aims at the public interest or rather for the collective benefit. Approaching the noble lie and how it is treated in the novel, we should note that in contrast with Plato's account of the lie narrated by Socrates in two parts as the mouthpiece of the writer, the case pertaining to *We* is that it is the disparate characters who explain by either affirming it or denying through presenting an alternative historical chronicle. Therefore, the lie is given to us in a myriad of chunks, but in the end, it becomes a coherent narrative: Representation of separate tales is feeding the ideology of the State. Although the Benefactor appears to resemble the philosopher-king in Plato, he/she is not the one that conveys the whole story. Hence, as the original noble lie is a bipartite entity, it is possible to argue that the *We*'s noble lie is scattered through numerous parts. We will try to start with the first account and follow the other puzzles to develop it into an overall chronological view. The statement that one can crudely summarize as "when chaos arises people would eventually conform to stability" appears to be the driving force both in the Republic and *We* in which one comes across similar methods of eliminating the initial turmoil. One of the characters of *We*, D-503, recaps it rather nicely in two parts as in the case of the noble lie:

"Love and Hunger rule the world. Ergo: to conquer the world, man must conquer its rulers. Our forebears succeeded at heavy cost, in conquering Hunger; I am speaking of the Great Two Hundred Years' War—the war between the city and the village. The primate peasants, prompted perhaps by religious prejudice, stubbornly clung to their "bread." But in the year 35 before the founding of the One State, our present food, a petroleum product, was developed. True, only 0.2 of the earth's population survived the war. But, cleansed of its millennial filth, how radiant the face of the earth has become! And those two tenths survived to taste the heights of bliss in the shining palace of the One State." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 20,21)

"Naturally, having conquered Hunger (algebraically, by the sum total of external welfare), the One State launched its attack against the other ruler of the world—Love. And finally this elemental force was also subjugated, i.e., organized and reduced to mathematical order. About three hundred years ago, our historic Lex Sexualis was proclaimed: "Each number has a right to any other number, as to a sexual commodity." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 21)

From both underlined passages, we, as readers, conceive several aspects regarding the historiography of the One State, internalized by the numbers: First of all, as Plato asserted too, the insistence on such reality as human nature and psychology is evident from which we come to deduce humans ‘operate’ on Love and Hunger that we can essentially call ‘instincts’ because both are considered as elemental forces. Therefore, this pseudo-fact appears to correspond to a perennial driving force in human history that if one pursues political stability and power, one should establish such a structure that both instincts come under control. Consequently, The One State emerged as the savior, which presented solutions to both ‘problems.’ The key to eradicating Hunger became merely technological through a synthetic petroleum product that is in consonance with the state politics, can be mass-produced, as opposed to the bread of the villagers. Secondly, here we have a nexus event called ‘The Great Two Hundred Years’ War’ between the rural and the ‘civilized’ city. The reality here does not seem to be compatible since the protagonist once mentions the existence of “warring states”. Hence, we can understand the specific standpoint of the numbers with regards to how they understand other states as villages that are irrational and their former city as the rational. Therefore, the food as the byproduct of the battle seems to offer solutions for not only the longstanding problem of edible material but also the probable shortage of food after the war, and as a result, could be able to justify and legitimize the political order that they will envisage. As the third alleged factual historical evidence that we assume from the following passage is that Love is the second instinct that is accepted as analogous to sexual intercourse, devoid of emotions. This is precisely the case because it is organized in such a way that it is reduced to a mathematical, reified commodity. What the numbers call Lex Sexualis functions through after the careful examinations of the subjects at the Medical Office, they receive the ‘right’ to register with others, in other words, allowed to have a pink coupon with the desired number on it. Thus, two mathematical solutions concerning the problems of human nature take us back to our initial statement that is “when chaos arises people would eventually conform to stability”. Regardless of the particular modus operandi, as far as there exists the possibility of abolishing chaos and alter it into an orderly condition, as the fictional reality of We illustrates, people would (un)willingly consent to such status quo. However, whereas some, although at the beginning approved the first revolution, resist the current state because they seem to believe in constant betterment of human conditions of endless revolutions, others comply and even protect it. We may ask, other than speeches among the individuals that solidify the state ideology, what are other sources of the historiography that embeds the ideology within it. The first one is the One State Gazette as the sole media outlet that also functions as an archive as D-503 tells us after reading the newspaper of the day: “By daily habit,

I stretch my hand (an instrument) to the bookshelf to add today's Gazette to the others, in binding stamped with the gold design." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 194) We can recognize the archival material of gazettes in binding, as one of the sources that helps to cement already taught, during the childhood and adulthood training, historiography. In the case of doubt, one can go and freshen the memory of what really happened. Through several instances where the main character describes what an apartment in the One State looks like, we learn that not only the walls but also the furniture is glass that urge us to observe the materiality of the golden binding as it stands out against its glass surrounding and therefore, we can deduce that it is a constant reminder of ideology, materialized. The second source that so-called nurtures the state ideology by providing historical accounts is two related phenomena: Museums/archaeologists and historians. At the very beginning of the book, we come across a depiction of a picture about an avenue that he saw at the museum treating the life before the Great War. As the conquer of Hunger and Love connotes order and stability, here the protagonist compares the ancient life to "... dazzlingly motley, a teeming crush of people, wheels, animals, posters, trees, colors, birds." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 6) Please note the emphasis on the adjectives 'motley' and 'teeming' that signify disharmony and commotion that are social condition(s) regarded as the exact opposite of the One State's ideal, since on avenues, the numbers walk in four abreast and depicted as ordered Assyrian ranks. As far as the historians are concerned, as the primary endorser(s) of the state's version of the past, D-503 claims to read and hear many things from them about the human condition before the war, in the 20th century:

"... About those times when people still lived in a free, i.e., unorganized, savage condition. But most incredible of all, it seems to me, is that the state authority at that time—no matter how rudimentary—could allow men to live without anything like our Table, without obligatory walks, without exact regulation of mealtimes, getting up and going to bed whenever they felt like it. Some historians even say that in those times the street lights burned all night, and people walked and drove around in the streets at all hours of the night." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 13)

What the ancients lacked is the Table of Hours that regulates the whole human activity and standardizes people's daily behaviors through 'obligatory' tasks such as personal hours where people can keep working for the State, walk or opt for sexual intercourse. But what do all these phenomena add up to? The answer is the state called 'happiness.' This ancient subject, also called eudaimonia by Plato

and Aristotle, is the focal point in the novel and explain why people subscribe to the order established after the war even if it reduced human activities in mechanical and mathematical to govern them to a greater degree since they become calculable and predictable as designated by the daily schedule. For the subject of happiness, two narrations become prominent: The first by D-503's poet friend R-13 and the second by the Benefactor himself, both occur during their conversations with the main character. After 'versifying' the sentence of another poet that is writing a poem not based on inspiration but mechanical vocation: "He harnessed fire in the machine, in steel, And bound chaos in the chains of Law." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 47) The versification functions as a justification; rather than the plain reading of the crime and corresponding sentence of the number, we can consider it as the glorification of the Benefactor's punishment, in words. The very ideology of the state is inserted within the couplet: Chaos bounded. The numberless poet is the one who got punished because after some time he thought himself above the law saying that he is a genius. But no one can become or declare being 'genuine' precisely because as D-503 tells us "To be original is to violate equality. And that which in the language of the ancients was called 'being banal' is with us merely the fulfillment of our duty." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 28) The conversation takes place after this pseudo-trial, at D-503's apartment. The subject of discussion is

"... that ancient legend about paradise... Those two, in paradise, were given a choice: happiness without freedom, or freedom without happiness. There was no third alternative. Those idiots chose freedom, and what came of it? Of course, for ages afterward they longed for the chains. The chains—you understand? That's what world sorrow was about. For ages! And only we have found way of restoring happiness... The ancient God and we—side by side at the same table. Yes! We have helped God ultimately to conquer the devil... Now everything is fine—we have paradise again. Again we are as innocent and simple-hearted as Adam and Eve. No more of that confusion about good and evil. Everything is simple—heavenly, childishly simple. The Benefactor, the Machine, the Cube, the Gas Bell, the Guardians—all this is good, all this is sublime, magnificent, noble, elevated, crystalline pure." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 61,62)

Here we should note another narrated historical reality in the form of chaos and creation. The poet R-13 assumes the religious reality of Adam and Eve ergo the creation, although the official ideology of the One State dictates that "The ancients knew that God—their greatest, bored skeptic—was there. We know that there is only a crystal-blue, naked, indecent nothing." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 59) The

reason why the poet relies on storytelling with religious motifs, we must find in D-503's own words: "You, my unknown readers, are most probably children compared to us, for we have been brought up by the One State and hence have reached the highest summits possible for man. And, like children, you will swallow without protest everything bitter I shall give you when it is carefully coated with the thick syrup of adventure." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 103) In addition, during the exchange between the protagonist and the Benefactor, after being taught a lesson on happiness, the former says: "How could I argue? When these were (formerly) my own ideas—except that I had never been able to clothe them in such brilliant, impenetrable armor." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 214) In both statements, we see two descriptive body of words that are "coating with the thick syrup of adventure" and "clothing the language in impenetrable armor." Those two descriptions should correspond to what we may call storytelling, literature or even mythology. Before delving into such oratory technique, we should remember that the initial purpose of writing a manuscript that later became *We* by D-503 was to include it to the first flight of *The Integral* as the carrier of state ideology, to the other parts of the galaxy. In other words, it was a manifesto that would explain the triumph of happiness in the State and how could it be translated into other 'primitive' and 'childish' cultures. However, the proclamation of ideology could not take the guise of plain factual account(s), but rather should be disguised as a story in the form of a diary. This, we recognize from the fragment of Sisyphus and Plato's preference of the "lie in words". Although the nihilist position is evident as the protagonist once asserted the nothingness beyond the sky, a lie in words taking the shape of storytelling becomes useful and necessary to convey a moral lesson that unfreedom is far convenient than the opposite while one is pursuing happiness, namely because it would cause chaos and instability. Hence, the thick syrup of adventure along with the impenetrable armor becomes a mode of literal rhetoric that speculates the fact that people better 'digest' ideologies through veiled narratives. Another assumption is the fact that the ones in power, whether a ruler or a writer, as opposed to subjects/readers, possesses episteme, that is the knowledge in true existence, such as the knowledge of the divine 'Forms' in Plato, whereas the latter solely possess doxa, which coincides with commonsensical information that is subject to distortion. Therefore, the lie in words stems from such endorsed phenomenon where it is thought that the latter can be manipulated while the former cannot, since it is the permanent truth. We mentioned that the question of happiness is revealed through two different conversations. One encounters the second instance right after I-330 and other "enemies of happiness" tried to hijack the *Integral*. The mission fails and D-503 is summoned by the Benefactor. Doubting that D-503 could be one of the co-conspirators and have the related information regarding who would be the

exact perpetrators of the plot, The Benefactor feels the urge to reproduce the One State's ideology in the event that the main character might lose his faith in the One State. The Benefactor learns that, through the intelligence of the guardians, rebels labeled him an executioner:

“Well? Why are you silent? Is this so, or is it not? An executioner? . . . Oh, well! You think I am afraid of this word? Have you ever tried to pull of its shell and see what is inside? I will show you. . . And what about the most merciful Christian God, slowly roasting in the fires of hell all who would not submit? Was he not an executioner? And was the number of those burned by the Christians on bonfires less than the number of burned Christians? Yet—you understand—this God was glorified for ages as the God of love. Absurd? No, on the contrary: it is testimony to the ineradicable wisdom of man, inscribed in blood. . . True, algebraic love of humanity is inevitably inhuman; and the inevitable mark of truth is—its cruelty.” (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 213)

D-503 listened to the Benefactor in awe and could not reply, hence the ‘executioner’ continues with the second part of the ‘lie’, assuming that the number re-approves the first segment:

“If this means that you agree with me, then let us talk like adults, after the children have gone to bed: let us say it all, to the very end. I ask you: what did people—from their very infancy—pray for, dream about, long for? They longed for some one to tell them, once and for all, the meaning of happiness, and then to bind them to it with a chain. What are we doing now, if not this very thing? The ancient dream of paradise. . . Remember: those in paradise no longer know desires, no longer know pity or love. There are only the blessed, with their imaginations excised (this is the only reason why they are blessed) –angels, obedient slaves of God. . . . And now, at the very moment when we have already caught up with the dream, when we have seized it so.” (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 214)

One thing that becomes striking during the speech of Benefactor is that he updates the latest medical operation called the “excision of imagination” via lobotomy and implements it into the very ideological narrative, pertaining to the notion of happiness. The officials of the State felt the need for such a surgical procedure because of the danger of disruption for the “infallible mathematical happiness.” Previously, we remarked that the existence of rebellion corresponding to the attempted hijack

of the spaceship, Integral. Prior to that incident, On the Unanimity Day that is in a nutshell the annual ritual where the Benefactor is re-elected, for the forty-eight time, a substantial number of the numbers vote against the host of the numbers, therefore, disturbed the status quo. Both events triggered the invention of a medical operation that would injure the human faculty of imagination that could form a tendency towards freedom, therefore, does not abide by the preference that the One State imposed in the first place: Happiness resulting from unhappiness contrary to freedom that is to think freely and consider oneself as a genuine individual. Returning to the overall argument of two ‘sermons’ of the Benefactor, we observe analogous clarity that of the poet R-13’s story regarding happiness and how it originated with Adam and Eve. In line with the former account, in the Benefactor’s oratory, the religious tone is also visible through literary devices such as forming analogies most notably with stories and figures from the religious past where the existence of the Christian God was reaffirmed. Considering himself and God as similar figures, he justifies and legitimizes the ideology, which makes him an executioner. In Plato’s Republic, we saw that only the philosopher-king possessed the accurate picture of reality that made him/her lie in words rather than in the soul. Being the sole authority on knowledge appeared to be the key to asymmetric power relations. Coming to the Benefactor’s case, we also observe a similar monopoly of power but this time it is more associated with the power to punish. It is the Benefactor who can order the arrests of the ‘deviants’ which are called “abductions” in the novel, and he is the sole authority of punishing/executing under the instrument called ‘the Benefactor’s Machine’, which electrocutes the criminal and turn him/her into a speck of dust. The very technique of storytelling that we come across is what D-503 describes as “impenetrable armor” since the factual reality is translated into parables as in the Abrahamic books, rather than mechanical/objective figures. Thus, drawing his strength from the religious history, he also wants others to love and glorify him as once Christians did towards their God although he treated them with cruelty. This very inhumane behavior is justified through the possession of happiness, therefore stability/order, through constant reminding of outside threats that are what lie behind the wall and the enemies of happiness. In conclusion, we have noted some essential notions embedded into the ideological narratives of the One State that are chaos, stability, order, and happiness that also pursued to bring specific justifications and legitimizations with them. Here, I would like to further explicate them in relation to the noble lie by referring to the Greek mythological sources on the creation. This will be the case because what Plato might have in mind while formulating the very fiction could possibly rely on mythological accounts. And since the noble lie is a recurring device in dystopian literature, as in *We* and *Kallocain*, it follows that they can imitate Plato’s theory of eliminating chaos and

turn it into ordered existence where the principle of justice prevails. In *The Greek Myths: The Complete and Definitive Edition*, apart from myths about Odysseus, Troy, Dionysus, and many more, Robert Graves compiles also the Greek myths of creation. These are respectively: “The Pelasgian Creation Myth, The Homeric and Orphic Creation Myths, The Olympian Creation Myth, Two Philosophical Creation Myths.” Despite the disparate sources, one element emerges: The primal existence of chaos (also called the void) in which eventually existence looms: “(In the Pelasgian Creation Myth) In the beginning, Eurynome, the Goddess of All Things, rose naked from Chaos, but found nothing substantial for her feet to rest upon, and therefore divided the sea from the sky, dancing lonely upon its waves.” (Graves 2011, 27) Or the Olympian Creation Myth narrates: “At the beginning of all things Mother Earth emerged from Chaos and bore her son Uranus as she slept.” (Graves 2011, 31) And lastly, a philosophical creation myth tells us a similar account of origination, as Graves recounts: “Some say that Darkness was first, and from Darkness sprang Chaos. From a union between Darkness and Chaos sprang Night, Day, Erebus and the Air.” (Graves 2011, 33) In each myth, the chaos that connotes nothingness and disorder, is what merely exists, since a deity transforms it into order and stability by either creating earth (or in the case of Gaia becomes it) and creates other gods and beings. This condition we will identify with the one in Plato’s Athens where the political unrest and instability, caused by the conflict between oligarchy and democracy, was underway. Also, as far as We is concerned, we have two options: The first one is about the narrative about happiness, and as the State ideology imposes humans always seek such mode of being throughout history as the characters, R-13 and the Benefactor, argue with regards to the initial stage of Adam and Eve. The second fiction corresponds to the historical account of the Two Hundred Years’ War and how the One State emerges by conquering Hunger and Love as the ruling forces of the earth. However, although how distinctive those two narratives may seem, they are in a way related and becomes a coherent body. This becomes the case precisely because the numbers and especially the Benefactor consider themselves as gods that for example as we have seen in the passage where the host of numbers calls himself an executioner similar to the Christian God: “Our gods are here, below, with us—in the office, the kitchen, the workshop, the toilet; the gods have become like us. Ergo, we have become as gods. And we shall come to you, my unknown readers on the distant planet, to make your life as divinely rational and precise as ours.” (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 69) Therefore, they furnish themselves with the task of a deity who commits oneself to bring order and stability. And that is when the noble lie comes in via its impenetrable armor, coated in fiction that conveys a moral message, as we have included with the speeches of D-503 about how by ‘successfully’ regulating Hunger and Love they were able to justify such

political order after the war that it is people's nature to seek for chains that bind their individualities to the whole by forfeiting freedom in the name of happiness. Along with R-13's narrative on paradise and the choice between again freedom and happiness. Lastly, the speech of the Benefactor where he articulates the ancient dream of paradise and the analogy of the Christian God to a ruler. In the second passage, the Benefactor argues that the people, until the Great War, looked for an answer about what happiness is. For the Benefactor as the ideal embodiment of the One State's ideology, happiness is the absence of chaos but in exchange requires unfreedom of the individual who should accept to be melted in the pot of the State. Because freedom would trigger that people go parting ways, but the State wants them to move along a single line: "To integrate the grandiose cosmic equation. Yes, to unbend the wild primitive curve and straighten it to a tangent—an asymptote—a straight line. For the line of the One State is the straight line. The great, divine, exact, wise straight line—the wisest of all lines." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 2) However, if one mainly lists the factual reality of ideology lucidly as 'scientific' as possible, its effect and imprint on one's psyche would not last as desired. Hence, a literary device that is supplied with impassable armor and coated in a thick syrup of fictive reality becomes a boon. Whereas the alleged events in the Christian paradise occurred in time immemorial and the War unfolded a thousand years ago, both make it virtually impossible for one to grasp the material reality. Comprehending such historical realities, therefore, would compel one to construct a narration that would make sense and persuade the audience. The noble lie, that Plato explained as the lie in words is what becomes useful in fabricating a historical actuality for there is no exact way of knowing what actually happened. Let us try to complete our discussion of the noble lie concerning We, with a parable called "Three Excused Ones" that all numbers are familiar with during their primary education: "It is a story of how three numbers were, by way of an experiment, excused from work for a month: do what you like, go where you wish." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 197) After wandering around the streets without a purpose but only randomly act, the numbers went crazy because they could not behave according to the Table of Hours that regulates every activity: "And, finally, on the tenth day, unable to endure it any longer, they linked hands, walked into the water, and to the sounds of the March, went deeper and deeper, until the water put an end to their misery. . . ." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 197) This allegorical story is a perfect example of the noble lie that is the lie in words. In the footnote concerning the story, the author adds that "this happened long ago, in the third century after the Introduction of the Table." (Zamyatin and Ginsburg 1987, 197) Here, we should speculate upon the function of a myth, since also the noble lie is one. Myths in general are stories that a specific group of people holds as an accurate portrayal of reality, therefore

help society to believe that they are connected in unison. By marking to a point of origin, especially in creation myths, people have attributed distinct identities and the reason for their very existence. Ergo, reflecting on the parable “Three Excused Ones”, we observe that the noble lie is not a singular myth per se, but a framework and a manual because it becomes imperative to ‘tell lies’ in the case of urgency. This case of emergency is when there arises a need to make the chaos confined and forcing it to yield a stable existence that means the very survival of the state, according to the ones in power. For the allegory in question that became a myth, the formula appears to operate the following: One should specify characters who would move against the ideology of the state that is considered as the ideal set of behaviors indicating the general good. Because they moved as opposed to the once acquired happiness that gave them meaning in life, losing such a condition results in eventual self-annihilation. Notice that the inevitable end we call death does not happen via the state’s iron fist, but it is self-made. This seems to be another way of justification authority of punishment that the state possesses. Hence, the noble lie is a pattern, which both Plato and We tailored according to the political needs at the time. Note that in the Republic, through the principle of justice, defined as conforming to one’s pre-determined occupation, there arose a need to fabricate a narrative that would correspond to such ideology. Both fictions apply a desired religious past: Plato appropriates the Phoenician/Cadmean autochthony myth that would reinforce the brotherhood/sisterhood among citizens along with Hesiodic the Ages of Men that aims to attain certain roles in the division of labor. As far as We is concerned, we have seen that for the discussions of happiness, the Benefactor adopted the references from the Christian tradition, such as the story of Adam and Eve. However, the myth that we have pointed out appears to invent its own religious past, since the narrator designated in the footnote that this event happened a long ago. Therefore, it somehow became meta-religious. As a result, we can argue that the noble lie is a guideline to secure alleged stability and is justified through good political ends.

4.3 Boye’s Excluded *Kallocaïn*

4.3.1 A Synopsis II

Written after overwhelming trips to Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia where Karin Boye witnessed “ice-cold reasoning” of Hitler and “merciless dialectics” of Stalin, *Kallocaïn* takes place in the 21st century in a world where two perpetually conflict-

ing political entities exist: The World and the Universal States. The protagonist Leo Kall is a scientist/chemist who resides in the World State that is further compartmentalized into cities and later in districts, such as the Chemistry City No.4 and laboratory district where Leo Kall with his family inhabits an underground apartment as other citizens. The book takes the form of a diary that narrates the events that lead up to his capture and imprisonment by the competing Universal State. Both countries aspire to “break open their citizens like tin cans” as Kall’s partner Linda once remarked. Therefore, as the case with *We*, people are subject to the instrumental reason of the state that in turn constantly aims to reify them. The most illustrative example of such stance is the invention of a truth serum called Kallocain, named after its maker Leo Kall. The World State designates the truth serum as the ultimate tool of interrogation so that citizens would have no secret to hide from the absolute repressive force.

4.4 The Book and the Noble Lie II

Karin Boye’s *Kallocain* (1940) subtitled *A novel from the 21st century* is a work that we can regard as an example of female-exclusion, since especially the literature in English is very limited, although the novel presents prevailing dystopian characteristics that one comes across in other works such as *We*, 1984 and *Brave New World*. Besides, the novel places writing as a vocation at the very core. Now, this time we have a book as a manuscript that the main character tries to write after he is captured as a prisoner by the adversary, the Universal state. We can argue that the book presents itself as a metafiction since at the end there is a censor, Hung Pai Fo, who finds the manuscript tells us that “the Censor’s Office has decided to add it to the collection of officially declared dangerous manuscripts in the Secret Archive of the Universal State.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 299) The main story revolves around the state scientist and bureaucrat Leo Kall who lives in the World State, similar to the state mathematician D-503, who recounts events that take place from finding the truth serum ‘Kallocain’ to his imprisonment by the rival the Universal State. Designation of the adjacent enemies who pursue to devour one another apparently stems from Karin Boye’s eye-opening trips to Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany approaching the Second World War where she went on a pilgrimage “between various state institutions, factories, and collective farms” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 12) in the former around 1928 and she “became disillusioned with Soviet life and politics” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 12) along with her trip to the latter in the early 1930s and most significantly witnessed

firsthand an election rally at the Sportpalast that became one of the signs of the rise of Nazism. (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 13) Kall resides in Chemical City No.4, which is analogous to other districts and cities, the citizens live and work underground, which we can consider as a specific influence of WWI and the coming second war where people were pushed underground into shelters. Going up requires special paperwork called “surface permit”. Every important state-building has an underground entrance; therefore, it appears one can be stuck underground and keep on living without any fresh air. Chemical substances are ubiquitous elements in dystopian worlds where the ruler elite use them to attain certain political ends. A reader might be familiar with soma that is a medical drug from Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World*. This free drug is allotted to ignite pleasure, therefore, prevents citizens from deviation from the state ideology. The main function of Kalloccain, the truth drug, is in Kall’s wife Linda’s words to break people open like a tin can, by force. (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 257) This very understanding towards the subjects was already evident in the World state, yet the means to achieve it was not available, until the invention of Kalloccain. Kall asks Linda “Have you denounce me?” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 256), which shows one of the sources of terror and fear that the state accumulates. Denunciation is what keeps checks and balances among the citizens to mind their own business. Even, from early on the education system of the state teaches children to spy on their parents and denounce them if they recognize something harmful to the state. People are already being watched by police eyes and ears that are placed all over buildings, except elevators. Aligning with the Republic and We, here too children undergo a common education, albeit there are three stages according to the specific age groups: The creche, the children camp, and the youth camp. In the creche, sometimes called the residents’ creche, the children are fetched by the home help (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 35) who is a temporary weekly employee working at houses of citizens, superior in the division of labor. Until the age of seven, children attend the creche where, as candidates to become future fellow soldiers, are taught to exercise a strict self-control and learn above all to obey orders. The secondary training is to “play in the play tank” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 43), making toy bombs, and organize a naval battle. Such education plan enables a “strategic vision” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 43) is “inculcated in the children by means of play, so that it became second nature to them, almost an instinct, and at the same time it was after all, fun of the first order.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 43) At the age of seven, they are taken to the children camp where “the exercises were more reminiscent of military training, and where they would stay both day and night.” (Boye and McDuff 2019, 44) The students are only allowed to visit their home twice a week that is also subject to change under war circumstances. The youth camp’s age

bracket is not exactly specified, and the earlier military training appears to continue. However, from this camp that psycho-technicians conduct the essential tests when the young people “are classified according to the various professions.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 189) Thus, the youth camp is established as the point of origin for the division of labor. However, there are some employments as exceptions, such as the transport service, whose members are “nearly always nursed into their vocation from infancy” in designated cities, e.g., transport education cities. From the very early on, it can be observed that the common education of the world state is a highly militarized one resulting from the constant danger of destabilization that is the defeat by the neighboring Universal State holding a similar totalitarian value system. The state regards a human being, from his/her inception, as “a shapeless lump of clay that... the State simply had to mould after some random pattern.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 263) Despite the seemingly common education, it is possible also to recognize a division in average education too, since while some, such as Leo Kall who becomes a chemist, complete all the stages of training others are stuck with elementary education. As Leo Kall, for the first time, meets the home help, in an internal monologue saying that he “recognized the wording of the very elementary textbooks... She had clearly not yet managed to acquire the general education of the chemistry cities.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 41) Hence, there appears to be also differentiation in training among cities according to the specialization. Apart from the ceaseless indoctrination for the danger of annihilation by the Universal State that justifies the extremely militarized education, there exists a state ideology that is supplemented by the instruction during all schooling that citizens undergo. This is strikingly resembling what we came across both in the Republic and We. After the first experiment on ‘human material’ that produced successful outcomes, and Kallocaïn’s acknowledgment as the new lawful interrogation technique is underway, Leo Kall further endeavors to legitimize his new truth-drug as the most significant discovery, claiming that the drug would always prove effective in exposing “the inner realm that people hitherto kept to themselves.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 98) This was a necessary step in establishing the long-dreamed-of security. By doing that, Kallocaïn will benefit the state, precisely because it “will make any person reveal their secrets, all that they previously kept to themselves in silence, out of shame or fear.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 40) Therefore, the truth-drug will become the ultimate shield that provides the State’s security. Following his assertion for the formula of perpetual security, Leo Kall re-declares the State’s ideology in completion, with an inner monologue during his discussion with Edo Rissen, the control chief who supervises the experiments:

“After all, he must have known what I meant; it was not a free invention of mine, what I had said about the community. From childhood onwards, every fellow soldier had to learn the difference between the lower and the higher forms of life: the lower form uncomplicated and undifferentiated – for example, the monocellular creatures and plants – the higher form complex, with multifaceted differentiation, for example, the human body in its refined and well-functioning composition. Each fellow soldier also had to learn that it was exactly the same with the forms of society: from an aimless horde the societal body had developed into the most highly organized and differentiated of all forms: our present World State. From individualism to collectivism – from isolation to community, that was the path that had been followed by this gigantic and sacred organism in which the individual was merely a cell with no other significance than to serve the organism as a whole. That much was known by every young person who attended the children’s camp.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 97,98)

In the earlier chapter concerning *We*, through presenting several ancient Greek creation myths that demonstrate the perennial conflict between order and chaos, along with speculating on various scenarios for bringing the former into controlled actuality or turning unstable existence into stable one, we claimed that Plato’s *Republic* and succeeding utopias/dystopias may very well be reproducing a similar understanding. We also suggested that the statement “when chaos arises people would eventually conform to stability” could be a formulation that summarizes the worldview that paves the way for the specific state ideology as the political emphasis is mostly on the terms such as “order, stability, and security.” Notice the analogous stress in the passage above on the way the state has come into existence: from an aimless uncontrolled swarm there arose an organized societal body. It is clear that the former existence indicates a chaos-like condition. At the beginning of the book, when Leo Kall introduces his truth drug, he underlines the fact that the power to use such chemical interrogation technique can only belong to the State, as was the case with the Benefactor in *We*, who had the sole authority to punish and exterminate under the ultimate machine of execution called the Benefactor’s Machine. If such power would not stay within the jurisdiction of the World State, says Kall, “the chaos would ensue” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 43) through ‘private hands.’ Hence, once again the status quo is considered to be the one and only bearer of order. Also, in the above passage, we observe a rigid biological outlook, which assumes two categories of being: Higher and lower that are further used to compare the current political existence with the unorganized and undifferentiated societal order by highlighting the first, reminding us of the Nazis’ racial hierarchy that claims to designate being human to certain types of persons, arbitrarily, therefore, should

be regarded as political fiction that assumes particular human nature. Following a similar chain of thought, as we did in the earlier chapter, we should scrutinize the very state institutions that generate a specific division of labor. This, of course, falls under the part in Malcolm Schofield's designation of tightly controlled institutional structures. The World State is divided into cities that in turn split into districts, both according to the specialization of labor: The city that Leo Kall inhabits is called Chemistry City No.4 but also accommodates districts such as the laboratory district or the Central laundry. Every district is made disconnected from one another by "the barbed-wire-crested district wall". (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 34) As mentioned, the other cities follow an identical rigid architectural plan according to their place in the division of labor. These cities as if made by Lego bricks are nominated as 'shoe' cities, 'mill' cities, 'textile' cities, or 'transport education' cities. Proceeding with the structure in the Chemistry City No.4 as an epitome of all, we observe an institution called the Voluntary Sacrifice Service whose members opt for such employment during their time in the youth's camp where they are subjected to certain propaganda, directing some to sign up for the Service to sacrifice their bodies to be used in scientific experiments, such as Kallocain. Previously, we referred to a profession called the home help whose location changes weekly and is responsible for keeping "track of what transpired in the family" (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 40) along with entitled to be "duty-bound to deliver a report on the family at the end of the week – a reform generally considered to have improved the ambience in many homes." (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 35) In other words, the home help is another asset that the state uses for the surveillance. We tried to explain that the education in the World State is highly militarized that aims to turn its citizens into fellow soldiers. That is why after they leave the youth camp and segregated according to their prospective professions, most of the 'comrades' undertake two roles: While during the day they carry on with their designated labor, but at the end of the day they also maintain their police/military roles in turn, either as police secretaries to observe/surveil a state organization or guards at the workplace, in turns. Even the uniforms are strictly tailored for the specified purpose: One for work, one for leisure and one for the military/police service. Whereas they work during the day according to their pre-determined professions via state conducted tests and commit themselves to the roles of superior(s) and subordinate(s), as is the case with Leo Kall (the chemist) and Edo Rissen (control chief/supervisor). But at night, when a subordinate becomes a police secretary and the superior as the attendant in an event, the former undertakes the authority to observe, hence all citizens in the Worlds State become subjects that are both observed and at the same time a means of surveillance since the denunciation is one of the sources of fear among people. As opposed to what we have discussed until now, we recognize

a clearer chain of command within a profession in the police department. Whereas Vay Karrek is one of the police chiefs in Chemistry City No.4, he directly is liable to the police president/minister in the capital's police palace, Tuareg. Therefore, while some of the subjects appear to encapsulate versatile roles, as the staircase of power heightens, one's profession appears to be solidified. The most crucial state department is the Ministry of Propaganda that hosts different bureaus, such as the Seventh Bureau that functions as the highest ethical authority by checking the citizens' official speeches and examine them whether they conform to the state ideology. If not, the speaker in question must alter his/her speech according to the bureau's guideline and apologize during the Radio Hour. Another bureau is called the Third that is responsible for filing the propaganda. The latter institutions are regarded as the most "rare and valuable instruments of the State" (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 81) and only those governmental structures in the capital all have underground entrances binding them together to maximize the security. The general role of the Ministry of Propaganda can be summarized through the motto that finds on posters in the whole state's cities: "No one can be certain! The person who is closest to you may be a traitor." (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 127) Hence, the specific role of the ministry is to perpetuate such understanding among people and check whether they abide by the political statement. Lastly, in contrast to *We*, it is rational to observe the existence of moving pictures and a state's branch dedicated to only that, since the events in the book take place during the rise of the cinema. Alas, the Film Studio Palace, where not only the propaganda films are projected but also made under strict rules, as we will see. Another matter, corresponding to a state organization that one can encounter in a considerable number of dystopian works, is the method(s) surveillance. We already noted the existence of home helps as one way of observation along with police eyes and ears (cameras and microphones) that are installed everywhere except the lift, due to technical reasons. Nevertheless, they are "equally effective in darkness and light" (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 66) to prevent espionage and conspiracy against the state. The apartments are also constituted by thin dividing walls enabling the neighbors to hear one another make sure everyone follows the same path the state already imposed. We defined the noble lie as a framework of narrative as you may remember from the earlier chapter. Although we observe a formulated ideology here in *Kallocain*, as is the case with the above lengthy passage, we should regard it as extremely factual, because it does not take the shape of storytelling practice. In other words, we cannot consider both the former and the following excerpts that are disguised in 'impenetrable armor' along with coated with the thick syrup of literary fiction. However, the only objective ideological formulation does not end there, we can continue with another identical account to further our argument. After witnessing an existence of a so-called secret

sect who defines themselves as organic, unorganized as opposed to the World State and claim that they “want to summon forth a new spirit” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 169) under the effect of Kalloccain, Rissen considers them a non-threat to the state, therefore, suggest that they should not be convicted. However, Leo Kall raises an objection concerning how they are a real danger to the state’s prosperity: “. . . do you think our World State stands in need of a totally new approach, a completely altered attitude to life? . . . Is that not an insult to the World State and the World State’s fellow soldiers? . . .” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 169) Describing the statement “We want to summon forth a new spirit” an ethos, yet not abstract as opposed to Karrek, Kall continues with his disagreements:

“On the contrary, I would say that it’s the only thing that is definitely not abstract. And the ethos of those fools is hostile to the State. One can see it most clearly in their own myths about a person called Reor, who seems to have been slightly ahead of the rest in mental deficiency, and has therefore become their special hero. . . . Personal ties that are stronger than one’s bond to the State – that is where they want to lead us! . . . They are images of an exaggerated trust between people, or at least between certain people. That alone I consider to be treasonable. . . . And was it not on this very foundation that the State was built? If there were reason for trust between people, no State would have arisen. The sacred and necessary foundation of the State’s existence is our mutual well-founded mistrust of each other. Those who cast suspicion on that foundation cast suspicion on the State!” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 170,171)

As it can be recognized, the ideological account that Leo Kall presents as the ideal state bureaucrat does not meet the criteria of the noble lie’s formation that utilizes a religious/historical past by either appropriating analogies, Adam/Eve and Christian God in *We* or combining the religious/mythological past to create a new literary narrative as in the *Republic*. On the contrary, what we can deduce from both excerpts concerning Kalloccain is that the ideological description is merely objective/rational/scientific that can only persuade and deceive people on the surface value but is not possible to be internalized, as the emergence of a new sect that has roots as early as fifty years ago with the mythical figure Reor shows. Therefore, the State’s ideology becomes a non-realized ethos that can only be accepted with brute force but causes people to conceal their true belief within, under the skin. Following, we can argue that the truth-drug Kalloccain becomes such an apparatus to expose ones who did not embrace this mechanical and scientific ideological account. We claimed that the above passages indicate a non-realized ethos because it is too ab-

stract reminding one of a scientific theorem, devoid of sentimental meaning as one can expect from a noble lie. The police chief Karrek too complies with our understanding as to the following: “My experience has taught me that the more abstract something is the less dangerous are its effects.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 170) Extending our argument with Karrek’s claim, the mythical person called Reor and his story as re-narrated numerous occasions is what propel people to believe in an ideology where unorganized and mutual-trusting parties are the prevailing features of the new spirit. Calling this specific story the Reor myth already hints at the existence of a noble lie in the form of storytelling. Here, we see a persuasion without force but with consent, as opposed to Kall’s version that would punish people if they would not show that they believe out of sheer fear of denunciation. In this case, referring to Karrek, it is the specific way in which the World State’s ideology is told becomes abstract but not an ethos since it lacks sensibility but is only scientific and mechanical. The coating of storytelling and impenetrable armor of the literary is missing. Therefore, as the already existent (deviant) community illustrates, such a method of treating/communication ideology does not prove as effective as desired. However, there is a specific reason why Kallocain as a dystopia applies the noble lie successfully to its limits. It does not only present an instance but also demonstrates how a noble lie is made, but this time through moving pictures in the form of anticipated propaganda films. After he visits the capital where he managed to persuade Kalipso Lavris who is the head of the Ministry of Propaganda’s Seventh Bureau, into helping pass a law that will enable Kallocain as the ultimate interrogation method, Leo Kall gains an admission because of the recommendations that he has, to the Film Studio Palace where proposals for a new propaganda movie will be discussed to restore the diminishing tanks of volunteers for the Voluntary Sacrifice Service and recruit more people. In other words, Kall would be present in a place where he normally has no access. A Psychologist by the name of Djin Kakumita leads the lecture along with the discussion on how to persuade (deceive) people in the youth’s camp to join the ranks of the Voluntary Sacrifice Service. For this propaganda campaign, it appears that three-hundred-and-seventy-two scripts were produced by the same number of screenwriters. However, “none of these underlings, the writers who had delivered the raw material, had been invited to part in the preparation of the finished text.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 190) In reality, Leo Kall is one of those subordinates who normally should not be there, because of this position in the division of labor, rather he is present in the discussion because of an exceptional case in which he is given recommendations by the police executives to avoid the probability to not being admitted to the Ministry of Propaganda to pass the law pertinent to Kallocain. Therefore, what Leo Kall had at the moment as far as power and authority are concerned, is solely a temporary one. In other words,

a momentary permit and admission to how a noble lie is fabricated: A transient gaze at ‘real’ political power, reserved for the guardians in a Platonic sense. Even Kall realized through the end of the meeting that he “was on outsider and could not, therefore, belong to any of the work groups” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 201) along with the epiphany that he defines as

“... it became quite clear to me that I should never really have gained admission to the Film Studio Palace. It was plain that a different disposition, perhaps a completely different education would have been required were I to have avoided the shock I now received, and consequently I was also certain that the right authority would have resolutely refused me entrance.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 187)

In the former chapter concerning political lying and its specific manifestations in ancient Greek culture, we observed that Plato, by reflecting his current environment, grants the authority to lie/deceive to certain societal classes, in asymmetric power relationships: Political pairs of Physician/patient, Captain/sailor, and Philosopher-king/citizen. Because of the understanding of the society, in line with utopian thinking, as “a collection of so many “problems” to be solved, as “nature” to be “controlled”, “mastered” and “improved” or “remade”, as a legitimate target for social engineering, and in general, a garden to be designed and kept in the planned shape by force.” (Schofield 2006, 195) It becomes discernible that “underlying that characteristically utopian conception is a presumption of knowledge: its proponents presumed a knowledge about the world and about what is best for other people that was no doubt always questionable and objectionable (every utopia arguably a dystopia) ...” (Schofield 2006, 195) In the above excerpt, we see identical circumstances in which a certain group of people is identified in the first part of the dichotomy, superior/underling, and restrain the access for the latter to the authority of lying and do not allow them to partake in the formation of a deception although they are the ones who brought the raw material in the form of screenplays in the first place. As one can expect, the prospective propaganda movies that correspond to the category of ‘fiction’ that the psychologists would pursue to bring into existence precisely because it will be “deployed for ‘good’ political ends.” (Hesk 2000, 2) Indeed, as we mentioned with respect to the difference between the home help and Leo Kall in terms of the level of sophistication concerning education that already categorized the former to have merely elementary training, a similar condition is apparent here between the profession of someone like Kall’s and the psychologists that we earlier recognized among philosopher-kings, guardians and the producers.

As is evident from the excerpt, both in the Republic and Kallocain, all parts in the specialization of labor are allotted specific disposition(s) resulting from distinctive training and education. It has been asserted that on the verge of leaving the youth's camp, people are categorized by psycho-technicians via conducting state-approved tests to divide people into professions. Hence, the shock that Kall experiences after witnessing the firsthand discussion of fabricating a noble lie demonstrates such inequality of power. Bearing that reality in mind, we should proceed with the guidelines and rules that the psychologist, Djin Kakumita, presented during his lecture, reminding us of Aristotle's Poetics. After remarking that he divided all scripts into two groups, those with happy and unhappy endings, "as the aim is to attract and encourage" (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 190) he continues:

"What kind of person is attracted by a happy ending? One who is slow to react, one who really, deep down, fears suffering and death – and they are not the people we are addressing. Psychological studies have shown that the Voluntary Sacrifice Service acquires few recruits from them. When such people get to the happy ending they gladly forget what the film was all about. They go home and sleep as soundly as dormice in the assurance that now both hero and heroine are safe. They do not go to the propaganda office to turn themselves in. Voluntary Sacrifice films with a happy ending are made for the interim period between the campaigns, not the campaigns themselves. They are made in order to reassure and encourage family members and other fellow soldiers, should they at some point turn their thoughts to children, siblings or associates who have vanished into the Voluntary Sacrifice Service. . . and if they are to have a truly positive effect they should not only have a happy ending but also contain strong elements of sunny humour, and droll escapades. They should have moving scenes, but not scenes that are heroic." (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 191)

Concluding that what they should be seeking are the ones with 'so-called' unhappy endings, the psychologist claims that they always prove to be the most effective to 'lure' new recruits in:

". . . I say so-called, as what may be viewed as the greatest happiness for the individual is always a matter of discretion – discretion and indifference, as strictly speaking nothing should be seen from the point of view of the individual. At any rate, I allude to films where the hero is defeated. We can always reckon on a certain percentage of fellow soldiers for whom, at root, this appears to be the greatest happiness, and especially if it happens for the State. . . Thus, it is merely a question of

arousing and encouraging tendencies that already exist, and of pushing them in the right direction.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 192)

Above, we observe that how the preceding mechanical/scientific narrative of ideology that Leo Kall conveyed carries striking similarities with the one that Djin Kakumita reveals. Essentially, they encapsulate the same ideology in the form of prioritizing the State (as an organized structure built on mutual distrust among its members) as opposed to the individual. In the chapter, concerning *We*, it has been asserted that both dystopian works mirror virtually the formulation of Schofield for the Republic: “tightly controlled institutional structures; a common education – at least for the ruling classes – designed to develop or control (as needed) every element in the human psyche for the promotion of virtue; government conducted with wisdom and an overriding concern for the public interest.” (Schofield 2006, 282) So far, we have been endeavoring to bring forth all the corresponding aspects in the interpretation, except the last one designated as “an overriding concern for the public interest.” As was the case with both Plato’s Republic and *We*, the public or the greater whole’s benefit is paramount, indicated by the greatest happiness becomes only attainable if it is for/with the State, in *Kallocain* too. Although the psychologist appropriates mathematical/statistical figures by including them in his speech, he will not apply them to the movies in the making, but merely presents us with so-called data mining and following analysis. Therefore, the first datum to be used in the final script will be an unhappy ending. The next step in the guideline in fabricating a ‘cinematic’ noble lie is to determine the ideal types of heroes:

“As a rule, however, the future heroes are rather picky in their choice of defeat. They want to portray someone who captivates. Above all, they must studiously avoid any illnesses and types of death that possess any laughable characteristics. Conditions in which the test subject becomes a piece of flotsam, unable to preserve his dignity, unable to control himself, unable to manage the most elementary biological needs, are to be avoided when it comes to films of this kind. For films of the interim period – yes, of course! And then with a happy ending and an emphasis on the comical aspect. But the sufferings that lure heroes must be a) dignified in appearance, and also b) expedient.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 193)

As one may remember, two of the primary aims of the World State’s education/training were to encourage people to obey orders and teaching them to exercise strict self-control, beginning with their infancy. Here, it is evident that the ideal

hero who would attract new subjects for the State's scientific endeavors would be the one who already internalized the training along with constituting a constant reminder of such education through his portrayal of actions in a movie. Such visual description of a hero would help the candidates to gratify "the yearning to feel that one is exclusively an instrument for a higher purpose" (Boye and McDuff 2019, 193) as "a driving force to be reckoned with far beyond the limits of the heroic type. . ." (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 193) Following that aspect, another rule arises:

"As a rule, no one can seriously believe that his life has a value in itself, as such. If we are to speak of the value of a life, it must clearly be a value for something that lies beyond the individual. What day, what hour of hour lives do we dare to perceive as a value in itself? Not one. And I would assert that this insight into the worthlessness of the individual life has its counterparts in an ever more powerful awareness of the all-overshadowing demands of the Higher Purpose, in other words the dawning of the State consciousness in the brains of the fellow soldiers. The suffering the film portrays must therefore have as its fruit a demonstrably hyper-individual advantage – it must not be one person who is saved by the hero's defeat, for then the person could have saved himself! – nor even a small number of people, but thousands, millions, preferably all the fellow soldiers in the World State." (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 193,194)

Again, there exists an antinomy between the individual and the State and how the latter is prioritized at the expense of the former to secure stability so that the current political order would stay undisturbed. All values are transferred to the entity of the State and are considered as the Higher Purpose than individualistic achievements that would pave the way for personal happiness. At the beginning of the previous chapter, as one may recall, we noted that the moral position in most dystopian states is a consequentialist one rather than a deontological stance. This is exactly the case due to the fact that the former denotes happiness/well-being/security/stability of the greater whole and does not base whether an action is ethical from an act itself, but the consequences that will arise from that particular deed, whereas the latter emphasizes the ethical aspect of an act within it, regardless of what positive/negative outcomes that it would produce. In this case, adopting a result-based position, the State claims that one crush of an individual would be regarded as morally right since it will boost the overall happiness of the organized community. Of course, this mechanical account of ideology is a mere subject of the current discussion but will be transferred to a film in the form of storytelling, rather than facts and figures that denote argument-based explanation. We have seen that the sufferings that one will see in a propaganda film will consist of two necessary

options; the portrayal of the heroes' dignity and show them as expedient. As the final criterion under the second category of expediency, the psychologist presents a third supplementary element:

“A subsidiary element of this expediency is c) the honourable nature of the defeat that is portrayed. By this I do not mean that the hero should reap positive honour; that would lower the film's level and instantly have a weaker effect on those whose natures are heroic, in the true sense of the word. No, he should be spared deep inner ignominy. For against the hero one pits the villain, who is asocial and has selfish motives, the man who falls to temptation and seeks to avoid pain and death. Downright ugly or unsympathetically sleek in appearance, slouching and undisciplined, cowardly and libidinous, he ought constantly to go through the action like a warning parallel, yet never portrayed more negatively than as a thorn which pricks the sensitive conscience. . . In fact, the fear of being cowardly, dishonourable, ugly in the inner sense of the word, is often a strong driving force in the heroic type I have described and which we must make the primary target of our propaganda campaign” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 194)

Etymologically, ideology is defined as a “systematic set of ideas, doctrines through which the world is interpreted.”¹ Conforming to that understanding, one of the tenets of the World State ideology through which the surrounding(s) come to be comprehended, is a human behavior called being “social” and “asocial”. Social behaving is defined as dissolving in the State's organized crucible and joining the common ecstasy mostly encountered in military celebrations. Hence, possession of private and sentimental feelings is considered asocial that in turn would harm the State's best interests. We asserted a specific definition of what an ideology might signify, therefore reached a point where we know approximately the general ideology of the World State, ergo the completion of the moral message that will be inculcated within the final propaganda movie. When it comes to the rules and guidelines on how that message would be conveyed seems to rest upon the ideal representation of a hero that Djin Kakumita will call later as the ‘passive heroic type’. Above, we emphasized the Reor myth that is founded on a depiction of a hero from fifty years ago and how it enabled some to internalize a direct opposite ideology of the State that would rely on the organic, unorganized mutual trust. Because we argued that the myth in question makes use of being coated with the thick syrup of storytelling and impenetrable armour of literature. This, although the point of origin is unknown, is realized through creating a Christ-like peripatetic figure who shared all of his bread

¹https://www.etymonline.com/word/ideologyetymonline_v1485

with others in the time of Hunger. (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 154) However, in the end “he was murdered by a robber who thought he had a loaf of bread in his knapsack.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 154) One of the first nameless subjects claimed that to understand Reor one should be initiated. But there are no guidelines or rules, “It’s something you notice... it’s something you either are or you aren’t – some people never are.” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 155) As it is evident from the Reor myth, the State psychologists would like to actualize a similar ideological narrative in the form of a propaganda film that would rely on a heroic figure that other people can identify. Hence, comes the ‘passive heroic type’, devised by the state bureaucrats. After a short discussion on the lecture that the psychologist presented among other participants, Leo Kall reproduces the last part of speech as much as he remembers, resulting from the shock he experienced because of eye witnessing on how a noble lie is generated:

“With every day that passes this, so to speak, passive heroic type, he said, is becoming more and more sought after in the life of the State. It is essential not only in the Voluntary Sacrifice Service, but also as the ordinary man and woman in the rank and file, the official subordinate post, the bearer and supplier of children to the State, and a thousand other positions. The need for it becomes especially strong in wartime, when each every fellow soldier should belong to this group. On the other hand, it will be clear to anyone that it is not desirable in a position of leadership, where a cold and objective gaze, swift enterprise and ruthless strength are required. Now the problem may be phrased like this: how, if necessary, could we further promote the emergence of this noblest types of all types, this desperate and solitary heroic soul, disappointed by life and turned towards suffering and death?” (Boye and by David McDuff 2019, 201)

The general framework through which a noble lie is produced carries analogous aspects with the Republic where Socrates articulates how he will form the noble lie by giving specific guidelines as the psychologist did. “How, then, could we devise one of those useful falsehoods we were talking about a while ago, one noble falsehood that would, in the best case, persuade even the rulers, but if that’s not possible, then the others in the city?” (414-c) says Socrates that the World State appears to imitate in not desiring that the leaders will not consist of the passive heroic type as the future citizens of Plato’s Kallipolis would internalize the falsehood, whereas the rulers will not, since they are the sole possessors of knowledge. The falsehood in question, for Socrates, will not be

“nothing new, but a Phoenician story which describes something that has happened in many places. At least, that’s what the poets say, and they’ve persuaded many people to believe it too. It hasn’t happened among us, and I don’t even know if it could. It would certainly take a lot of persuasion to get people to believe it” (414-c)

A similar case is also evident in the psychologist’s guidelines and rules to produce a propaganda reel in terms of using the hero archetype that has occurred in many places, as we also have seen through the Reor myth. Hence, taking both the Republic and Kallocaïn into consideration, we can deduce that both assume a certain human nature and disposition that can be persuaded by religious tropes and archetypes, stemming from the fact that they are universal patterns to be later copied. These copies are indeed literary in nature and can only be effective if coated with the thick syrup of adventure/storytelling and impenetrable armour of language that will generate a ‘sensational’ narrative. The translation of archetypes from literary to cinematic does not change the fact that a scientific and abstract ideological account is not more persuasive than a tangible and immediate ethos. It enables the figures of power to push people into the ‘right’ direction that is the useful and ideological meaning embedded in the storytelling practice.

4.5 Epilogue

In *Dystopian Fiction East and West: A Universe of Terror and Trial*, Erika Gottlieb suggests a set of patterns “underlying dystopian classics that warn against the possible emergence of a totalitarian state in the future.” (Gottlieb 2001, 1) Although as one can recognize, the treatment of dystopian literature that Gottlieb portrays relies on the East/West dichotomy, it helps to pinpoint an account of how two dystopian traditions employ different strategies. Claiming that the fear of the possible emanation of a totalitarian regime might be the principal component of the dystopian impulse (Gottlieb 2001, 8), the writer compares and contrasts how the literary genre of dystopia evolved according to the specific socio-political circumstances in both ‘hemispheres’. Whereas in the West, epitomized through writers such as Zamyatin, Huxley, Orwell, and Bradbury, dystopian writing functions as a warning of a looming totalitarian state by calling attention to the current ills and evils in the society, for the East (The USSR, after Zamyatin, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia), however, the dystopian society in question appears to be already realized. Gottlieb defines that condition as a dystopian fiction where

“the greatest fear so typical of this speculative, quasi-prophetic, exhortatory genre has already been fulfilled and become a fact of life, in the form of the State’s totalist control through censorship, propaganda, intimidation, and indoctrination.” (Gottlieb 2001, 8) Therefore, the writers in the East are the ones who write about and under the actualized dystopian/totalitarian states as opposed to the writers in the West who seem to merely concentrate on warning of a potentially totalitarian regime. Although Gottlieb presents also a myriad of paradigms that can characterize dystopian fiction in the East, I will limit the patterns to the Western literature since my focal point concerning dystopian works are ‘Western’ i.e. are Zamyatin, Huxley, Orwell, and Boye. The first characteristic for the author is “the push and pull between utopian and dystopian perspectives.” This is essentially illustrated by the fact that “each dystopian society contains within its seeds of a utopian dream.” (Gottlieb 2001, 8) It is a promise that later became a subject of manipulation by the ruling elite when the initial constitution of the new utopian order became available. The second feature is “the deliberate miscarriage of justice: The protagonist’s trial.” Demonstration of “the conflict between the elite’s original utopian promise to establish a just, lawful society and its subsequent deliberate miscarriage of justice, its conspiracy against its own people” (Gottlieb 2001, 10) is prevalent in the works of Zamyatin, Huxley, Orwell, and Boye. The dystopian state is an entity where a contradiction is evident in terms of a mingling of law/lawlessness along with advanced technology and its alienating repressive power that turns to its ‘creators’. “A barbaric state religion – nightmare vision” constitutes the third element that one can find in dystopian works in the West. The protagonist experiences an epiphany where the existence of primitive state religion that is built upon the practice of human sacrifice, as opposed to “the rule of civilized law and justice” (Gottlieb 2001, 10) becomes a sudden revelation during the protagonist’s encounter with the political elite that mostly results in a trial. As the fourth property, “the destruction of the individual’s private world” carries similarities with the comparison that we tried to draw in the former chapters concerning the divergence between authoritarianism and totalitarianism as the mindset of the political regimes in terms of their scrutiny on the individual. While the former solely encloses the public realm, the latter pursues to permeate also the private domain. Following, as far as the dystopian state is concerned, the presence of the totalitarian state becomes the rule, hence the private sphere is exterminated most notably through severe surveillance and bureaucratic administration of sexuality. “The protagonist’s pursuit of history: The vital importance of a record of the past” comprises the subsequent criterion of dystopias in question. The assertion that having “access to the records of the past is vital to the mental health of any society” (Gottlieb 2001, 12) that a dystopian work makes revolves around the discussion of possessing the knowledge to maintain

one's self-consciousness: Differentiation between past and present, cause and effect and lies and truth. All three categories of knowledge are ones that the protagonist is most keen to obtain that at the same time the ruling elite would like to distort or destroy altogether. That is why one comes across the vocation of writing at the very core of the Western dystopian literature, for instance, either in the form of keeping a diary (We) or a writing manuscript (Kallocain). "Dystopia as a no-man's land between satire and tragedy" conveys an idea in a more structural level of the genre. Gottlieb considers a dystopia a tragedy because "it deals with irrevocable loss on the personal level: he or she loses his position, his beloved, his freedom" (Gottlieb 2001, 13), and in some cases the protagonist "faces a loss possibly even worse than the loss of life: the loss of his private, individual identity." (Gottlieb 2001, 13) Besides the tragic aspect, the dystopian novel appears to employ strategies that are those of political satire: "The writer offers militant criticism of specific aberrations in our own, present social-political system by pointing out their potentially monstrous consequences in the future. The function of the message is that of a warning, an exhortation." (Gottlieb 2001, 13) Thus, we can deduce that the Western dystopian tradition is eminently political in nature since it incorporates a didactic concern and a need to convey a clear message of warning pertinent to the prevailing political order into its narration. "The protagonist's window on the past: Two time-planes" forms the last item on the list. We can explicate this two-dimensional time plane as the following: The timeline that we, as Ideal Readers, occupy differs greatly from the plane that the protagonist lives in. As Gottlieb asserts, the protagonist inhabits "our hypothetical future" (Gottlieb 2001, 15) in the sense that if we do not improve and remedy the ills and evils in our society, the totalitarian state would come into existence analogous to the one that the protagonist suffers. Therefore, "the protagonist's tragic fate is in the conditional mood only: how it plays out in reality depends on whether we come to understand the historical process that could destroy our society, so that we may break the impasse of the historical prediction" (Gottlieb 2001, 15) As it is recognized, the Western body of dystopias appear to call for a political action to reverse the predicted totalitarian outcome. One may very well ask the reason why we tried to list some of the patterns that Erika Gottlieb listed that the writer found recurrent among the Western dystopias in question. I intend to show that, although the scope of the study is limited to We and Kallocain for the time being, that we can also introduce the noble lie as another element that one can identify as one of the common characteristics among the Western dystopias. As I sought to show, the Platonic lie is a narrative framework that the ruler elites in dystopian/utopian states utilize to propel people into the desired direction that is essentially the preservation and stability of the political formation, which arose right after the chaos-like historical event that is mostly a war between different

conflicting parties. As Platonic Socrates argued that the original noble lie will be told in the veil of a storytelling practice, such as a creation myth that negates the chaos/void, the figures of authority in the dystopian state exploit the power of fiction to embed a 'fabricated' moral lesson into the story/myth itself. The use of fictive/literal accounts relies on the awareness that people would better internalize the political note if such oral/written descriptions of past events are coated with the thick syrup of adventure/storytelling and impenetrable armour of language that would play against the senses of an individual by forming an ethos. This aligns with what both works, *We* and *Kallocain*, endeavor to illustrate how political deception works through literary strategies. In *We* a reader recognizes a combination of two narratives: One regarding happiness as the State ideology emphasizes it as the perfect mode of being that humans have sought throughout history and comparing the current state of affairs with the initial stage of Adam and Eve. The second fiction emerges as the historical account of the Two Hundred Years' War and how the One State came into existence by conquering Hunger and Love as the ruling forces of the earth. For *Kallocain*, the reader encounters a similar assumption of a certain human nature and disposition that can be persuaded by religious tropes and archetypes, stemming from the fact that they are universal patterns to be later copied. This is conveyed through a discussion about several script proposals for a propaganda movie to convince/deceive people to willingly accept to be recruited for a sacrifice service that would later use them as test subjects in state's projects. As discussed above, the psychologist who oversees the enterprise recommends benefiting from what he calls 'a passive heroic type' that he argues people can identify with such a character who in turn could transfer his/her responsibilities to the voluntary candidate. Both works epitomize how a noble lie is produced by resorting to a mythical/religious past. Whereas in *We*, the Benefactor as the ruler uses tropes and parables from Christianity, concerning *Kallocain*, we see that the passive heroic type is best exemplified by the character named Reor whose existence is believed and whose memory is retained by the insurgents who resist the status quo. Here, Reor also belongs to the religious past via embodying a Christ archetype most notably through a disseminated recollection of sharing his bread with others. That is why I find it crucial to refer to the noble lie which spans a period from the ancient Greek text Sisyphus along with Plato's *Republic* to the dystopian literature in the 20th century, as a feasible element to better understand the way a dystopian political narrative might be construed.

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