THE CENTER-PERIPHERY STRUGGLES: THE CASE OF THE HOUSE OF MA^{C}N

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ABSTRACT

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Keywords: Istanbul and the Syrian Littoral, Maʿnids, Fakhr al-Din, Druze Community, Process of Bargaining and Negotiation

The prime objective of this thesis is to probe into the House of Maʿn(1516-1697) (also known as Maʿnids in English, and Maʿanoğulları, ʿAl-i Maʿn, Beni Maʿn in Turkish and Arabic), a Southern Syrian-based Druze (Duruz, Duruzi taʾifesi) power-holding family, as a case study in the context of Istanbul-periphery relations and political struggles. In light of new historical findings of Ottomanists in the Ottoman archives, this investigation, phase by phase, sifts through the Maʿnids' involvement with the Ottoman Empire. In particular, I focus on Fakhr al-Din ibn Maʿn(Fakhr al-Din II) (1572-1635), who was the most well-known local Druze leader of Southern Syria and Lebanon, and, in a broader context, the Druze rebellions (1516-1697). The focal point of the thesis is how the Ottoman Empire pragmatically utilized policies, including the process of bargaining and negotiation, to consolidate its imperial control over the Eastern Mediterranean. Equally significantly, the thesis explores the position of Fakhr al-Din ibn Maʿn in the context of the Jelali movement. Through a micro case study comparing Fakhr al-Din ibn Maʿn's rebellion with that of Janbulat ʿAli Pasha (1606), a Kurdish rebel based in Northern Syria, I address parallels and dissimilarities between the two. Last but not least, the thesis scrutinizes Ottoman perceptions of the periphery, and the Druze in particular.

ÖZET

MERKEZ-TAŞRA MÜCADELELERİ: MAʿAN HANEDANI ÖRNEĞİ

SAFFET ÖZTÜRK

TARİH YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, EYLÜL 2021

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Tülay Artan

Anahtar Kelimeler: İstanbul ve Suriye Kıyısı, Maʿanoğulları, Maʿanoğlu Fahreddin, Dürzi Cemaati, Pazarlık ve Müzakere Süreci

Bu tezin temel amacı, Güney Suriye merkezli yerel iktidar sahibi Dürzi (Duruz, Düruzi taʾifesi) bir aile olan Maʿan Hanedanını (1516-1697) (Maʿanoğulları, ʿAl-i Maʿn, Beni Maʿn olarak da bilinir), İstanbul-taşra ilişkileri ve siyasi mücadeleleri bağlamında örnek bir olay incelemesi olarak araştırmaktır. Bu çalışma, son nesil Osmanlı tarihçilerinin tespit ettiği arşiv kaynakları aracılığıyla sağlanan yeni tarihsel bulgular ışığında Maʿanoğullarının Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile olan ilişkisini aşama aşama inceliyor. Özellikle, Güney Suriye ve Lübnan'ın en çok tanınmış yerel Dürzi lideri olan Maʿanoğlu Fahreddin'e (1572-1635) ve daha geniş bağlamda Dürzi isyanlarına (1516-1697) odaklanarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun taşra üzerindeki emperyal denetimini sağlamlaştırmak için pazarlık ve müzakere süreci de dahil olmak üzere politikalarını pragmatik şekilde nasıl kullandığı araştırılmıştır. Aynı derecede önemli olarak, tez, Maʿanoğlu Fahreddin'in konumunu Celali hareketi kapsamında anlamlandırmaya çalışmaktadır. Fahreddin ibn Maʿn isyanını, Kuzey Suriye bölgesinde Kürt bir isyancı olan Canbolatoğlu ʿAli Paşa isyanıyla (1606) karşılaştırarak, aralarındaki paralelliklere ve uyuşmazlıklara değinilmiştir. Son olarak, tez, Osmanlı merkezinin taşra ve özellikle Dürzileri algılamasını irdelemektedir.

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Dedicated to
Two great women in my life, Selda and Bahar Öztürk

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In this investigation, for Arabic and Ottoman Turkish words, I have utilized the transliteration rules in the framework of the IJMES Transliteration System.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objective of the Thesis

The Maʿnids[1] (Table 1.1) were a Syrian-based Druze (*Durūz, Dürūzī ṭāʾifesi*) power-holding family. There were several other ascendant families in Southern Syria and Lebanon in the High Middle Ages (11th and 13th centuries), and one of whom were Tanūkhids. The Maʿnids ascended over the Tanūkhids and assumed the leadership of the Druze in the region.[2] Naturally, the Shūf region (Figure 1.1), the epicenter of Maʿnid power, came into prominence.[3] The Maʿnids allied with the Shihābs, another local family, which enabled the Maʿnids to later become a local power.[4] In the Mamlūk period, members of the Maʿn family were bestowed *ʾamīrship* (a military post)[5]. After the Ottoman conquest of Syria, relations between the Maʿnids and Ottoman administrations would continue until 1697.

To this day, the Maʿnids, having been a subject of much scholarly research and also myth-making, have not lost their popularity. This popularity is largely due to the Maʿnids' epitomizing a microhistory that can be directly attached to the

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[1] At first glance, the family name of Maʿn(based in Jabal al-Shūf, later known as Jabal al-Maʿn and then Jabal Lubnān) and the Maʿān region in Jordan might bring to mind a historical connection. However, upon my inquiry, Prof. Stefan Winter pointed out that there is no link between them. Email communication with Winter, Aug 11, 2021, 10:36 PM: "*There is no link between the town in Jordan and the Maʿn family. Both words of course come from the same Arabic root, but that doesn't mean very much. The Lebanese Maʿns, at least according to one 16th-century Arabic source, are in fact of Kurdish origin, and Fakhr al-Dīn Maʿn still kept in touch with extended family in the Kurdish regions of Anatolia, so it's very unlikely there is a link with Maʿān.*" The origins of the house of Maʿn remains unclear, what is related about it by the traditional Lebanese historians being without foundation. The first Maʿn whose historicity is proven was Fakhr al-Dīn ʿUthmān b. al-Ḥādjdj Yūnis who died in 912/1506: Kamal Salibi, "Maʿn," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, vol. 6 (Leiden: Brill, 1991): 343-344.

[2] Philip K. Hitti, *The Origins of the Druze People and Religion* (New York: BiblioBazaar, 2007), 21-22.

[3] Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1985), 67.

[4] M. Cavid Baysun, "Maʿn," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 7 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1997): 268.

[5] Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.

macrohistory, something that makes them exclusive. In addition to that, we see that as a research topic, the Maʿnids are open to the multidimensional approaches and perspectives, meaning that a researcher can probe deeply into them in terms of many contexts. Since the 1970s, the topic received well deserved attention in academic research published in English and Turkish over those that have been carried out in French and Arabic. My research, too, is limited to the secondary sources published in English and Turkish.

First among those Ottomanists is Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, recognized as a foremost authority on the history of Greater Syria in Ottoman times. In his 1985 book, he principally delves into the history of six dynasties in Ottoman Syria including Maʿns, Sayfās, Ḥarfūshes, Turābāys, Furaykhs, Qānṣūhs. He treats these regional powers in the context of the rural politics of Bilād al-Shām (Greater Syria) during the late 16th and early 17th centuries.[6] He points out that his book does not provide an overall picture of the region, meaning that novel investigations are necessary.[7] In a later study, Abu-Husayn elaborates on the Early Modern Druze history in the light of documents from the Ottoman Registers of Important Affairs (*Mühimme Defterleri*).[8] As a compilation of a wealth of select primary sources, this study bears a great importance for future students of the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean. In this thesis, I rely heavily both on the archival documents uncovered by Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, but also, more importantly, on his interpretations, assessments, and conclusions.

Abu-Husayn also published many articles on the subject. One of these articles pertains to the long-drawn out Druze rebellions.[9] A couple of others focus on Aḥmad ibn Maʿn, the last member of the Maʿnids.[10] Another article deals with the 17th

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[6] For Greater Syria: Peter Sluglett and Stefan Weber, eds., *Syria and Bilad Al-Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essay in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010).

[7] Abu-Husayn, 1-10. See also: Abdul-Karim Rafeq, review of "Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650," Journal of Near Eastern Studies* (April 1989): 131-135; Jon E. Mandaville, review of "Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650," The American Historical Review* (June 1986): 712–713; Jørgen S. Nielsen, review of "Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650," The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (1986): 105; William Ochsenwald, review of "Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650," International Journal of Middle East Studies* (1987): 371-372.

[8] Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *The View from Istanbul: Ottoman Lebanon and the Druze Emirate* (London, New York: Centre For Lebanese Studies In Association With I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2004), 1-10. The series of "Registers of Important Affairs", where the decisions of the Ottoman Imperial Council were recorded, are kept in the Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivi (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi), Istanbul. Two hundred and sixty-three registers are catalogued as Mühimme Defterleri (MD): Suraiya Faroqhi, "Mühimme Defterleri," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, vol. 7 (Leiden, New York: Brill, 1993): 470-472.

[9] Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "The Long Rebellion: The Druzes and The Ottomans, 1516-1697," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, no. 19 (2001): 165-191.

[10] Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "The Unknown Career of Ahmad Maʿn (1667-1697)," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 17 (1999): 241-247.

century Druze history.[11] He also wrote on the genealogy of the Maʿnids,[12] a critical reappraisal of the 1585 event,[13] and on administrative affairs in Ottoman Syria in the 16th and 17th centuries.[14]

Kamal S. Salibi, the mentor of Abu-Husayn and one of the most esteemed and world-renowned scholars of Lebanon, gives us a general framework in reference to Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn in his encyclopaedia entry.[15] Unlike other scholars, what is significant in his academic work is that Salibi, in the context of relations between Istanbul and the Syrian littoral, gives us partial clues into processes of bargaining and negotiation. He produced a large number of books on the Levant and published many articles, some of which are germane to regional elements in Lebanon, and which included the genealogy of the Maʿnids.[16]

In another encyclopaedia entry, Feridun Emecen points out how Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn carved out an extraordinary political and military career by deftly manipulating the once-in-a-lifetime opportunities in his lifetime.[17] Furthermore, he argues that it is inappropriate to characterize the Maʿnid Dynasty/House as an independent dynasty as is often the case in Western historiography. As a matter of fact, the family members, courtesy of the Ottoman governments, successively governed a *sanjak*, one of the fundamental administrative units in the Ottoman Empire. Decades earlier, M. Cavid Baysun provided an abridged account of the general history of the Maʿn family in his encyclopaedia entry.[18] Unlike later Ottomanists in Turkey, including Emecen, Baysun made insightful comments on the early history of the family. He gives insight into the relations of Istanbul and the Druzes; and he hints at the regional policies that the Ottoman governments pursued, which had, thus far, been overlooked. Also, in the 1940s, during the early Republican period in Turkey,

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[11] Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "Khalidi on Fakh al-Dīn Apology as History," *Al-Abḥāth* 41 (1993): 3-15.

[12] Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "The Korkmāz Question: A Maronite Historian's Plea for Maʿnid Legitimacy," *Al-Abḥāth* 34 (1986): 3-11.

[13] Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "The Ottoman Invasion of the Shūf in 1585: A Reconsideration," *Al-Abḥāth* 33 (1985): 13-21.

[14] Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "Problems in the Ottoman Administration in Syria during the 16th and 17th Centuries: The Case of the Sanjak of Sidon-Beirut," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 4 (November 1992): 665-675.

[15] Kamal Salibi, "Fak̲hr al-Dīn," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, vol. 2 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1991): 749-751.

[16] Kamal Salibi, "The Secret of the House of Maʿn," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 4, no. 3 (July 1973): 272-287.

[17] Feridun Emecen, "Fahreddin, Maʿnoğlu," *TDVİA*, vol. 12 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1995): 80-82. See also, J. Deny and M. Kunt, "San̲d̲jak̲," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, vol. 9 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1997): 11-13.

[18] M. Cavid Baysun, "Maʿn," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 7 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1955): 268-272.

he was, perhaps, the first historian who made a detailed analysis on the Maʿnids.

Stefan Winter scrutinizes Shiite communities in Ottoman Syria, particularly the Ḥarfūshes and the Ḥamādas.[19] Winter emphasizes that the Ottoman government, contrary to popular belief, did not pursue the deliberate persecution policies against the Shiites in general. On the contrary, the Empire pragmatically opted to cooperate with the Shiite communities in Syria by granting them the *mültezim*ships unless they were unable to serve Ottomans' regional interests. Immediately after, they were replaced by their regional counterparts, a strategy that the Empire established to control geographically far-off regions. Winter hints that Ottoman administrations implemented similar regional policies when dealing with the Maʿnids. Later, in an encyclopaedia entry, Winter draws attention to research which assesses Fakhr al-Dīn Maʿn as an *ʿayān*.[20]

Apart from the abovementioned academic studies on the political history of the dynasty, there are also thematically different historial treatments. For example, Hafez Chehab sifts through extant portraits of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn's life, scrutinizing details to find his most realistic biographical sketch.[21] Alessandro Olsaretti probes into the close liaison between Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn and the Medicis in first three decades of the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century.[22] He mainly deals with commercial and diplomatic issues from a more extensive framework in the Mediterranean Basin. He also specifies how Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn procured regional power in that period of time. Shimizu Yasuhisa investigates the activities of local notables, including Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn in Southern Syria in the framework of *iltizām* system.[23] In addition to that, he does not neglect have a closer look at the *village-level iltizām contracts*. Massoud Daher hones in on the local leadership that had great impacts on the for-

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[19] Stefan Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-6, 176-180. See also: Faruk Yaslıçimen, review of "Stefan Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788*," *Insight Turkey* (Winter 2011): 201-204; Pascal Abidor, review of "Stefan Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788*," *Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies* (2012): 505-510; James Grehan, review of "Stefan Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788*," *H-Levant, H-Net Reviews* (September 2015): 1-3; James A. Reilly, review of "Stefan Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788*," *Zeitschrift Der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (2013): 246-247.

[20] Stefan Winter, "Fakhr al-Dīn Maʿn," *Encyclopaedia of Islam Three*, vol. 2015-4 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2015): 127-129.

[21] Hafez Chehab, "Reconstructing the Medici Portrait of Fakhr al-Din al-Maʿani," *Muqarnas* 11 (1994): 117-124.

[22] Alessandro Olsaretti, "Trade, Diplomacy and State Formation in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Fakhr al-Dīn II, the Sublime Porte and the Court of Tuscany" (Master's Thesis, McGill University, 2005), 4, 9-18, 135-139.

[23] Shimizu Yasuhisa, "Practices of Tax Farming under the Ottoman Empire in Damascus Province," In *Tax Farm Register of Damascus Province in the Seventeenth Century: Archival and Historical Studies*, eds. Nagata Yuzo, Miura Toru and Shimizu Yasuhisa (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 2006), 23-52.

mation of the modern Lebanon.[24] He brings also Lebaneseness into the forefront. Ted J. Gorton provides biographical details with special reference to Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn (1572-1635).[25] He stresses Fakhr al-Dīn 's sojourn to Florence, Sicily and Naples between 1613 and 1618. Sandra A. Scham principally mentions Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn's ambitious building program in Lebanon, after her brief but personally influential sojourn to Italy.[26] She also points out that he synthesized the Late Renaissance Italian architecture (Tuscan style) and vernacular architecture of Lebanon by patronizing architectural projects, including a palace. This palace signifies his political ambitions for regional independence and transcendency.

In the scholarship on the family and its most prominent member, it was the strikingly different approaches to the Maʿnids' relationships with the central and provincial Ottoman administrations, identifying Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn either as a *Jelālī rebel* or not, which has attracted my curiosity. Hence, I was driven to explore the 17th century rebellions in the provinces. There are several historians who have defined the theoretical boundaries of my inquiry into Early Modern Ottoman rebellions.[27] Mustafa Akdağ takes the first significant step by classifying some Ottoman rebellions in the Early Modern period according to whether they were *integration-oriented* into the Ottoman imperial system or not. Thereafter, William J. Griswold solidifies Akdağ's arguments through the case of Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha (1606), a rebellion that epitomizes the category of *non-integration-oriented* rebellions. Griswold briefly points out that Fakhr al-Dīn, too, had the intention of founding a state in Syria –hence identifies the Maʿnid leader, too, into the category of *non-integration-oriented* rebels.[28]

Akdağ's arguments paved the way for Karen Barkey's arguments as well. As an

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[24] Massoud Daher, "The Lebanese Leadership at the Beginning of the Ottoman Period: A Case Study of the Maʿn Family," In *Syria and Bilad al-Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq*, eds. Peter Slugget and Stefan Winter (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 323-345.

[25] Ted J. Gorton, *Renaissance Emir: A Druze Warlord at the Court of the Medici* (Northampton and Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press, 2014), xiii-xvii. See also: Karl K. Barbir, review of "Ted J. Gorton, *Renaissance Emir: A Druze Warlord at the Court of the Medici*," *Review of Middle East Studies* 49, no. 2 (August 2015): 194-196; Ingrid D. Rowland, review of "Ted J. Gorton, *Renaissance Emir: A Druze Warlord at the Court of the Medici*," *Common Knowledge* 22 no. 2 (2016): 319.

[26] Sandra A. Scham, "The Legacy of Fakhreddine II—Renaissance Prince of Mount Lebanon," *Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology & Heritage Studies* 3, no. 4 (2015): 428-438.

[27] In Chapter I, I explore the secondary literature on Ottoman rebellions in the framework of our context. Therefore, I briefly explain the related theoretical approaches here.

[28] "*... That Ali's plan for a state had real possibilities of success proved attractive to his Syrian colleague, Maʿnoğlu Fahreddin, whose headquarters lay south in Beirut. A decade after Ali Pasha's execution, Fahreddin followed the same pattern — and succeeded to the point that some historians assert the Maʿnoğlu experience established the foundations of the modern state of Lebanon...*"; "*The possibility of a separate state in Syria, so vainly sought by Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha, grew in the mind of Fahreddin...*"; "*The armies of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha of Aleppo, followed close on by Maʿnoğlu Fahreddin, attempted to establish a state with the aid of European money and arms...*": William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000–1020/1591–1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), xix-xxii, 155, 217.

expert in comparative historical and political sociology, with special attention to the structure of state-"society" relations, Barkey repeats that the Ottoman administrations appointed the rebels as either *sanjak-bey* or *beylerbeyi* according to the perceived threat that they posed. Perhaps most significantly, Barkey points out that the Ottoman Empire was quite accomplished in coping with rebellions, and was able to integrate rebels into its imperial system with pragmatic policies such as bargaining and negotiations. In other words, appointment of threatening figures to high-ranking positions in the central administration was one of many policies that the Ottomans utilized to govern far away regions of the Empire. Dina Khoury, a historian specializing on early modern Ottoman Arab provinces, demonstrates how Ottoman administrations effectively employed the regional dynamics in Southern Syria and Lebanon to its own benefit. Last but not least, Oktay Özel, an Ottomanist studying demographic changes, fiscal-economic crises and social movements in the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century, emphasizes the dimension of violence in the *Jelālī* rebellions –as a condition of the "17$^{\text{th}}$ Century Crisis" that impelled the Ottoman administrations to carry out pragmatic policies.

As for more general inclinations in academic literature, most Arab scholars who have researched the Maʿnids brought Lebanese national identity and Lebaneseness into the forefront. With some exceptions, scholars have conceptualized the topic within the framework of nationalism, which hinders us from a critical assessment of Early Modern Ottoman Lebanese history. Unlike Abu-Husayn, most do not refer to Ottoman narrative sources at all or do not go beyond utilizing them to a certain extent –let alone diversify them. Furthermore, they insufficiently utilize Ottoman archival evidence, including the Registers of Important Affairs, into their work. This situation precludes us from identifying carefully the relations and struggles between the Ottoman administrations and the power-holders in Sidon and the Ottoman imperial perception *vis-à-vis* the Maʿnids and the Druze community.

Considering the state of scholarship today, it is clear that research on the Maʿnids and on the rebellion of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn (d. 1635) is still scanty. It is impossible to encounter any investigation on Early Modern Ottoman rebellion literature analyzing Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn as a rebel. Almost nothing, with the exception of William J. Griswold's and Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn's brief comments, has been written to posit the rebellion of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn in the context of Ottoman rebellions and how we should approach him in the context of *Jelālī* ones. Whereas Griswold and Abu-Husayn argue that Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn was not a *Jelālī* rebel[29] , Ottomanists such as Hathaway and Masters claim the opposite, but do not dwell on

[29] William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000–1020/1591–1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), xix-xxii, 155, 217; Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships*, 87.

a lenghty discussion.[30] The thesis sets out with the aim of discussing the argument whether Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn was a *Jelālī* or not.

At first glance, to question whether Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn was a *Jelālī* or not may sound as a pointless exercise. It has, however, the potential to set forth, state and describe Ottoman bargaining and negotiation policies which undoubtedly played a huge role in the endurance of the Empire. It is important to understand varying interpretations in the post-1970s Ottoman historiography of the actions of a rebellious *ʾamīr* on the Eastern Mediterranean. This exercise promises to be useful in the future studies of Ottoman center-periphery relations. It also sheds light into the greater picture about the "decline" and "collapse", and the "longevity" of the Ottoman Empire.

I adopt terminology coined by Birol Gündoğdu in his article "Problems in the Interpretations of Ottoman Rebellions in the Early Modern Period: An Analysis and Evaluation of Existing Literature on the Ottoman Rebellions between 1550 and 1821". The terms "semi-idealized approach" and "restricted approach" are based on Gündoğdu's arguments.[31] The "semi-idealized approach" is based on the argument that the Ottoman Empire practiced bargaining and negotiating with peripheral elements which challenged its authority. Meanwhile, the "restricted approach" hangs on the argument that a rebellion should be investigated through case studies.[32]

In this study, in which I emphasize the perspective of the Ottoman governments *vis-à-vis* the periphery, my investigation seeks answers as to where we can situate Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn's rebellion within the framework of the Early Modern

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[30] "*... Jelali governors emerged not only in Anatolia but in the Arab provinces as well... Fakhr al-Din fits the pattern of the Jelali governor... Later in his reign, Murad IV was less tolerant of Jelali governors and their equivalents...*": Jane Hathaway and Karl Barbir, *The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule: 1516-1800* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 70-71; "*... it is not at all clear that he had ambitions to found a nation. Significantly, he never claimed the title of sultan, being content with the traditional title of emir bestowed on the dominant Druze chieftain. Not daring to dream of independence, Fakhr al-Din sought to play various local competitors against one another while he deftly balanced the interests of the Ottoman state against those of various European parties were interested in gaining influence and trade in the eastern Mediterranean...*": Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 344.

[31] Birol Gündoğdu, "Problems in the Interpretations of Ottoman Rebellions in the Early Modern Period: An Analysis and Evaluation of Existing Literature on the Ottoman Rebellions between 1550 and 1821," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 51 (2018): 482-484. Gündoğdu, in his revisionist article, principally divides the existing "dominant perspectives" about the historiography about Ottoman rebellions between 1550 and 1821 into three parts: (i) the traditional approach, (ii) the idealized approach and (iii) the restricted approach. The first approach is based on the concept of the "*decline paradigm*". According to this perspective, the Ottoman Empire dwindled in its imperial competence in dealing with challenges resulting from rebellions unlike its counterparts in Europe. The second approach is predicated on the argument that the Empire was much more accomplished and rather moderate than we have thought by entering into negotiations unlike its counterparts in Europe. Gündoğdu argues that the Ottoman governemts were not hesitant to utilize all sorts of bargaining methods to strengthen their loose ties over the periphery. In response to the Empire's conciliatory stance, the periphery was becoming willing to be reintegrated into the Ottoman imperial system instead of dragging the process out. In other words, it was a reciprocal rather than one-sided condition or relationship. Thirdly, the restricted approach presents the complex and multidimensional essence of the rebellions at issue. It includes more limited assumptions in itself; hence being called, "*restricted*".

[32] Gündoğdu, 482-485.

Ottoman rebellions. Was he a *Jelālī*? Does this rebellion have any differentiating feature(s) from its Early Modern Ottoman counterparts? If so, what was/were it/they? Is it possible to categorize Fakhr al-Dīn 's rebellion as a separatist insubordination in terms of its characteristic features? Why or why not? What kinds of control mechanisms and the strategic maneuvers did the Ottoman governments utilize against the House of Maʿn? How did the Ottomans employ local dynamics to establish and consolidate their control over the regions remote from the capital and in Early Modern Lebanon in particular? Did orthodox and heterodox doctrines have any influence on the relationships between the Ottoman administrations and the Druzes? Why or why not? What does the Maʿnid dynasty's activities in the region make sense for the Ottoman Middle Eastern geography in the Early Modern period? This is perhaps one of the most significant questions which challenges the decline paradigm. Considering the case study of the House of Maʿn, was the Ottoman Empire as successful as its European counterparts with regard to coping with the rebellions/periphery challenging its authority? All of these questions, which set the ground for my inquiry, will be the focal point of this thesis.

1.2 Primary Sources

The scholars have based their investigations of the Maʿnids mostly on Arabic and Italian sources. When employing the Ottoman archival sources, such as the Registers of Important Affairs, scholars have generally underutilized the diversity of documentation, and mostly neglected narrative sources such as the *Tārīh-i Selānikī* (History of Selānikī written by Selānikī Muṣṭafā Efendi)[33] , the *Tārīh-i Naʿimā* (History of Naʿimā written by Muṣṭafā Naʿimā)[34] and the *Tārīh-i Feẕleke* (History of Feẕleke written by Kātib Chelebi) –all of which I utilize in my thesis, albeit in very limited fashion, in so far as to answer my primary questions, and only reference to secondary literature which have already explored the chronicles in question.[35] Likewise, there are several other Ottoman chronicles, produced at the capital, that still await to be explored extensively –included are the *Ḥasan Bey-Zāde Tārīhi* (His-

[33]Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Selânikî Mustafa Efendi Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)*, vol. 1, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999).

[34]Mustafa Naîmâ, *Târih-i Naʿîmâ*, vol. 2, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Ankara: AKDTYK Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007).

[35]Katip Çelebi, *Katip Çelebi Fezleke [Osmanlı Tarihi (1000-1065/1591-1655)]*, vol. 1, ed. Zeynep Aycibin (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım, 2016).

tory of Ḥassan Bey-Zāde written by Ḥassan Bey-Zāde Aḥmed Pasha (d. 1636-37)[36], the *Zübdetü't-Tevārīh* (Muṣṭafa Sāfī),[37] the *Topçular Kātibi ʿAbdü'l-Ḳadir Efendi Tārīhi* (History of Topçular Kātibi ʿAbd al-Qādir Efendi).[38] "*Koçi Bey Risāleleri*" (the Book of Advice) are among the narrative sources that I have encountered in the secondary literature and utilized in a limited way.[39]

Apart from the chronicles mentioned, no investigation has been conducted using the *telhīṣ*es, the summaries of orders/decrees about major events presented by the Grand Vizier to the sultan. A single register located at the Topkapı Palace, composing of 29 *folio*s or 58 pages in total, written in the *Naskhī* script, presents interesting documents.[40] By delving deeply into those *telhīṣ*es which bring the Maʿnids into the forefront, I intend to make a modest contribution to the existing body of literature.[41]

Moreover, I make use of Ottoman documents from several different archival fonds which have not been discussed before.[42] Documents emanating from the various offices of the Ottoman government not only reveal the relations and struggles between the Ottoman administrations and the Maʿnids, but also give us a definite notion as to how we can situate Fakhr al-Dīn 's rebellion in the framework of Early Modern Ottoman rebellions.

Apart from the narrative and archival sources that I have mentioned above, I consulted the already published documents from the Registers of Public Affairs (*The Documents of the Ottoman Umur-i Mühimme Defteri*)[43] on Early Modern Lebanon, the Registers of Important Affairs (*Mühimme Defterleri*) with special reference to Palestine,[44] a number of unpublished master's theses which analyze the registers

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[36]Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Paşa, *Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Paşa Hasan Bey-Zâde Târîhi (Tahlil-Kaynak Tenkidi)*, vol. 2, ed. Şevki Nezihi Aykut (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2004).

[37]Mustafa Sâfî, *Mustafa Sâfî'nin Zübdetü't-Tevârîh'i Çuhadar*, vol. 2, ed. İbrahim Hakkı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003).

[38]Topçular Kâtibi Abdülkâdir Efendi, *Topçular Kâtibi ʿAbdülkâdir (Kadrî) Efendi Tarihi (Metin ve Tahlil)*, vol. 1, ed. Ziya Yılmazer (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003).

[39]Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*, ed. Seda Çakmakcıoğlu (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2007).

[40]Single register, previously at Topkapı Palace, BOA, TS. MA.d, 7013, fol. 3a, 12a, 13a-b, 18b. This primary source has not been employed before in the context of Istanbul-Syrian littoral relations and struggles.

[41]Pál Fodor, "Sultan, Imperial Council, Grand Vizier: Changes in The Ottoman Ruling Elite and The Formation of The Grand Vizieral Telḫiṣ," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 47, no. 1/2 (1994): 67.

[42]BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 7/400, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 14.2/1668, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 31/801, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 33/761, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 40/536, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 46/854, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 44/337, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 50/321, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 50/354, BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 50/436.

[43]Abu-Husayn, *The View from Istanbul.*

[44]Uriel Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615: A Study of the Firman According to the*

in question[45] and the one dated to 1646.[46] Furthermore, a master's thesis which analyze registers of complaint (*ʿAtīḳ Şikāyet Defteri*)[47] in the 17th century. Hence, this study differs from prior studies because of the diversity of the primary sources it has located.

As I examine Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn's rebellion in the context of the *Jelālī* rebellions, I did not embark on an exhausting investigation of the local religious groups (Durzis, Marunis or the Qizilbāshes),[48] or systems of tax collecting,[49] or agrarian power relations and peasants, or rebellions named after pretenders (*düzme*), janissary-artisans and mountaineers. Likewise, this study chose not delve into the discussion of terms and concepts such as *fitna, vaḳʿa, bağy, isyan, ihtilal* and many others, usually translated into English as uprising, rebellion, revolt, incident etc.[50]

1.3 Layout of the Thesis

In the next chapter, I engage with the works of scholars whose approaches and perspectives enable me to establish the theoretical framework of my thesis in the context of ongoing historical debates in reference to the Early Modern Ottoman rebellion literature.

In the Chapter 3, I delve into relations and struggles in the Eastern Mediterranean

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Mühimme Defteri (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

[45] The related master's theses are as follows: H. Muharrem Bostancı, "19 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (Tahlil-Metin)" (Master's Thesis, Istanbul University, 2002); Yasemin Aydın, "27 Numaralı Mühimme Defterinin Transkripsiyonu ve Değerlendirilmesi (s. 280-408)" (Master's Thesis, Atatürk University, 2014); Murat Alanoğlu, "86 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri'nin Özetli Transkripsiyonu ve Değerlendirilmesi" (Master's Thesis, Atatürk University, 2010).

[46] Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *91 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (H. 1056) (Özet - Çeviri Yazı - Tıpkıbasım)* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2015).

[47] Mesut Demir, "1686-1687 (h. 1097-1098) Tarihli Atik Şikâyet Defteri'nin Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirilmesi" (Master's Thesis, Marmara University, 2010).

[48] Salih Akyel and Zülküf Şimşek, "Klasik Kaynaklara Göre XVI. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devletinde Meydana Gelen Kızılbaş Ayaklanmaları," *Journal of History School*, no. 19 (September 2014): 111-148.

[49] Hamit Çetin, "Osmanlı Devletinde Meydana Gelen Vergi İsyanları," *Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi* 10, no. 1 (2018): 18-34.

[50] A. Mevhibe Coşar and Emre Türkmen, "Bir 'Kavram Alanı' Belirlemesi: Devrim, İhtilal, İsyan," In *Zamanın İzleri: İlkeler, İdeolojiler ve İsyanlar*, ed. Temel Öztürk (Trabzon: Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2017), 11-28. See also: Mustafa Çağrıcı, "Fitne," *TDVİA*, vol. 13 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1996): 156-159; Ali Şafak, "Bağy," *TDVİA*, vol. 4 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1991): 451-452; Melikşah Aydın, "İslam Hukukuna Göre İsyan (Bağy) Suçu ve Cezası," *Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 23 (2015): 49-77.

in light of a concept that has been recently referred to as Ottoman pragmatism.[51] I investigate how the Ottoman Empire pragmatically carried out control mechanisms and peripheral policies such as bargaining and negotiation in the 17th century in an attempt to control its outlying *sanjak*s or provinces (*beylerbeylik*). What kinds of strategies did the Empire have recourse in Southern Syria and Lebanon where the House of Maʿn/the Maʿnids were intensely active?

In the Chapter 4, I explore how and where we can position the rebellion of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn in the context of the *Jelālī* rebellions. In other words, the matter of whether he was a *Jelālī* will constitute the prime theme of the chapter. I scrutinize the issue in a detailed way by comparing it with that of Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha's rebellion, which demonstrates strikingly similar patterns and was closely intertwined with that Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn's to further test my arguments. Moreover, I seek answer(s) as to where we can situate the Maʿnid rebellion in a broader framework of Early Modern Ottoman rebellions.

[51] Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon*, 1-6, 176-180.

Table 1.1 The Genealogy of Maʿn Family



Note 1: Sources: Philip K. Hitti, *The Origins of the Druze People and Religion* (New York: BiblioBazaar, 2007), 22; Kamal Salibi, "The Secret of the House of Maʿn," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 4, no. 3 (July 1973): 272-287; Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "The Korkmāz Question: A Maronite Historian's Plea for Maʿnid Legitimacy," *Al-Abḥāth* 34 (1986): 3-11; Alexander Hourani, *New Documents on the History of Mount Lebanon and Arabistan in the 10th and 11th Centuries H.* (Beirut, 2010), 915-942, 1169.

Figure 1.1 The Shūf Region

Source: Stefan Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 32.

2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Even though the Maʿnids have been investigated from several aspects, we see that the relations between Istanbul and the Druze power-holders in the Syrian littoral has not been studied in the context of the Early Modern Ottoman rebellion literature. As demonstrated by primary and secondary sources, notably by Barkey and Özel on the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century rebellions, the Ottoman Empire actively pursued a set of effective and pragmatic peripheral policies in order to strengthen its damaged imperial control over regions geographically remote from the capital. Although administrative courses or principles of action were often realistic and flexible in far away regions throughout the centuries, the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century conduct was still exclusive. In this period, the Empire had to cope with numerous rebellions in a wide geography along with highly acute and profound social, economic and cultural transformation processes; and within this context, pragmatic policies employed to deal with the rebellions took on a new meaning. Fortunately, a useful number of recent studies, both general and specific, have brought out new dimensions to the rebellion literature, and shed light on pragmatic policies, enabling younger generations of scholars to articulate and comprehend general patterns and dynamics of Early Modern Ottoman rebellions.

This chapter aims to examine the historiography of the rebellions produced by prominent Ottomanists, and to point out the problems related to approaches and conspicuous contributions in the field.[52] I set out to review the leading studies of a few scholars to present a general framework and to contextualize the major arguments of the thesis in a chronological way. In particular, I probe into *Celâlî İsyanları: (1550-1603)* by Mustafa Akdağ [1963]; *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası & "Celali İsyanları"* also by Mustafa Akdağ [1975]; *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020/1591-1611* by William J. Griswold [1983]; *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* by Karen Barkey [1994]; *The*

[52] Gündoğdu exclusively discusses the complex and intricate nature of the rebellions between 1550 and 1821. He presents various approaches to Ottoman rebellions, including those of Robert Olson and Jane Hathaway: Birol Gündoğdu, "Problems in the Interpretations of Ottoman Rebellions in the Early Modern Period: An Analysis and Evaluation of Existing Literature on the Ottoman Rebellions between 1550 and 1821," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 51 (2018): 459, 462, 471, 474, 484-485.

Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial Powerholders: An Analysis of the Historiography by Dina Rizk Khoury [2006]; and *The Reign of Violence: The Celâlis, c. 1550–1700* by Oktay Özel [2012].

One extensive study of the Early Modern Ottoman rebellions, inadvertently known as the *Jelālī* rebellions (1550-1603), was first introduced by Mustafa Akdağ. The *Jelālī* rebellions were basically Anatolia-based uprisings which took place against the Ottoman central administrations in the 16th and 17th centuries.[53] While he acknowledges that the *Jelālī* rebellions were particularly "*Anatolian Rebellions*", he prefers to identify them as "*struggles of the Jelālī* " (known as also "*Celālī Mücādelesi*").[54] Instead of utilizing the term "rebellion", Mustafa Akdağ advocates that "struggle" was more appropriate to define this historical phenomenon. If one explores the pre-17th century Ottoman narrative sources, principally the *Vaḳāyiʿnāme*s (the chronicles) says Akdağ (without specifying or referring to one), one can clearly see that any rebellion or a series of rebellions, which had different characteristics from one another and broke out among the Muslim subjects (*reʿāyā*), was called "*Jelālī*".[55] Furthermore, according to Akdağ, the Anatolian Rebellions were not restricted to the first half of the 16th century and the first decade of the 17th century. Rather, they were a historical phenomenon that continued well into the 18th and 19th centuries.[56]

The term "*Jelālī*" primarily originated from Bozoḳlu Sheikh Jalāl who rebelled against the Ottoman central administration in 1519 in Tokat, and *Jelālī* simply meant those who had a connection with him.[57] Interestingly, this utilization started to take on a new meaning and character during the reign of Meḥmed III (1595-1603).[58] Muslim subjects made a habit of describing particular uprisings as the "*Jelālī* rebellions" already at the time of the Ḳarayaziji Rebellion[59] (1598), the first

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[53] Mücteba İlgürel, "Celâlî isyanları," *TDVİA*, vol. 7 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1993): 252.

[54] Mustafa Akdağ, *Celâlî İsyanları: (1550-1603)* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1963), vii.

[55] Akdağ, 1-2.

[56] For the discussion of "*struggles of the Jelālī*", the "*Anatolian Rebellions*" and equally significantly, "*a span of almost three centuries, that is, 17th, 18th and even 19th centuries*": Akdağ, vii.

[57] İlgürel, loc.cit.

[58] The reign of Meḥmed III (1595-1603), a period that presaged dynastic and political crises, including the practice of fratricide, was one of the most critical periods in Ottoman history inasmuch as it betokened the gruelling transformation process that the Empire withstood. His reign coincided not only with the highly intensive, abiding and insurmountable wars in the East and the West but also with the *Jelālī* rebellions. For an introductory information about the general conditions in that period of time: Feridun Emecen, "Mehmed III," *TDVİA*, vol. 28 (Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 2003): 407-413.

[59] Mücteba İlgürel, "Karayazıcı Abdülhalim," *TDVİA*, vol. 24 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2001): 482-483; Meryem Kaçan Erdoğan, "Karayazıcı İsyanı," *Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 4, no. 2 (December 2003): 56-65; Mustafa Akdağ, "Kara-Yazıcı," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 6 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1997): 339-343; Anna S. Tveritinova, Türkiye'de Karayazıcı Deli Hasan İsyanı (1593-1603), trans. A. İnan (İstanbul: Aya Kitap, 2006), 35-114. See also: Anna S. Tveritinova, "Vosslanie Kara

great *Jelālī* rebellion.[60] If one scrutinizes *vaḳāyi῾nāme*s, however, for the pre-16th century rebellions such as the Bozoḳlu Sheikh Jalāl, Baba Ẓünnūn and Ḳalender Shāh rebellions, one sees that the term "*Jelālī*" was no longer employed since they had fundamentally distinctive characteristics. Mustafa Akdağ makes an interesting terminological distinction, similar to that of the *vaḳāyi῾nāme*s.[61] While characterizing the religious ideology-based uprisings as "rebellion", he describes the *Jelālī* phenomenon as a "struggle" on account of their typical differences from the ideologically motivated ones. These two types of uprisings were quite distinct from one another in terms of their natures and objectives. The former, the religious ideology-based rebellions, essentially set its sights on the destruction of the Ottoman Empire through the support of a mass of Shiite/Alawi people. On the other hand, the latter, the struggles with the imperial administrations, were motivated by self-interest rather than ravaging the imperial and political existence of both the Empire and the dynasty. According to Mustafa Akdağ, socio-economic factors were determinant in *Jelālī*s' actions. Hence, the rebels did not hesitate to change sides for the sake of their own interests.[62] Historiographically speaking, Akdağ argues that the Ḳarayaziji Rebellion (1598) was thought to be a starting point for the *Jelālī* rebellions (However, several *Vaḳāyi῾nāme*s point out to the year 1596, two years earlier than the uprising). In other words, he argues that they began in the 1550s, but reached a decisive turning point in the last decade of the 16th century.[63] Akdağ employs the term "*Interregnum of the Jelālī*" (also known as *Celālī Fetreti*).[64] According to him, this period began with the siege of Eger of 1596[65] and then gained acceleration over time in the first decade of the 17th century. Afterwards, he draws a clear division of period of hardships into two major phases: the first was a seven

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Yazıdji-Deli Hasan v Turtsii: Türkiye'de Karayazın Deli-Hasan İsyanı," *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1, no. 1 (Mayıs 1963): 297-309; Abdülkadir Özcan, "Altı Bölük," *TDVİA*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1989): 531; Mücteba İlgürel, "İl Erleri," *TDVİA*, vol. 22 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2000): 59-61; Mücteba İlgürel, "İl Erleri Hakkında," *Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 12 (December 2010): 125-140; Yücel Özkaya, "Kaymakam," *TDVİA*, vol. 25 (Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 2002): 84-85.

[60] Akdağ, op.cit, 1.

[61] Akdağ, 1-2. Mustafa Akdağ essentially refers to the *vaḳāyi῾nāme*s as primary sources, yet does not give specific examples.

[62] Akdağ, 1-3.

[63] Akdağ, 1-2.

[64] Mustafa Akdağ, "Celâlî Fetreti: A. 1596 Sırasında Osmanlı Devletinin Umumî Durumu 1- İran ve Avusturya Harblerinin Uzamasından Doğan Hoşnutsuzluk," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 16, no. 1-2 (1958): 62.

[65] Géza Dávid, "Eğri," *TDVİA*, vol. 10 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1994): 489-491; V. J. Parry, "Eğri," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, vol. 2 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1991): 689-691; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Eğri," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1997): 196-198; Mehmet İpşirli, "Beylerbeyi," *TDVİA*, vol. 6 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1992): 69-74.

year-period (1596-1603), while the second was a six year-period (1604-1610).[66] In spite of the shortness of these time periods, the Empire, perhaps, went through one of its challenging times and agonizing transformation processes. According to Akdağ, a major feature of Interregnum of the *Jelālī* was that impoverished villagers were led into the process of *sekbānization* by fierce pillaging of the rural areas.[67] As a consequence of this illegally uninterrupted military infringement, the *Sekbān*s displaced a slew of people, leading to large masses of people to emigrate from rural to urban areas and thus to the destruction of the rural economy. Their contraventional acts were not restricted only to such acts; the villages and even the biggest residential areas, such as towns and cities, sternly suffered from the *Sekbān*s' attack. According to Akdağ, this phase started in the year 1603, which referred to the Ottoman government's imperial compromise with Deli Ḥassan,[68] who had a consanguineous relation with Ḳarayaziji ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm. The year 1604 became a decisive turning point, referring to the second phase (1604-1610), also known as the "*Great*

[66] Akdağ, *Celâlî İsyanları*, 2.

[67] Akdağ, 2-3. Abdülkadir Özcan, "Sekban," *TDVİA*, vol. 36 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2009): 326-328; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Sekbân," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 10 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1997): 325-327; Virginia H. Aksan, "Segbān," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, Supplement*, vol. 12 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2004): 713-714; Kemal Beydilli, "Yeniçeri," *TDVİA*, vol. 43 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2013): 450-462; Abdülkadir Özcan, "Devşirme," *TDVİA*, vol. 9 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1994): 254-257; Bernard Lewis, "Dīwān-ı Humāyūn," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, vol. 2 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1991): 337-339; Mehmet İpşirli, "Kapı Halkı," *TDVİA*, vol. 24 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2001): 343-344.

[68] William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000–1020/1591–1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), 39-46; Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzensizlik Kavgası & "Celali Isyanları"* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2013), 23, 372-377. See also: Ercan Gümüş, *Tarihçi ve Asi: 16. Yüzyıl Celali İsyanları'nın Osmanlı Tarih Yazımına Yansıması* (İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2018), 80-86, 161-178. For the involvement of the members of the Crimean Khanate such as Meḥmed-Giray and Şahin-Giray in the rebellion of Deli Ḥassan: Vasiliy D. Smirnov, *Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı* (İstanbul: Selenge Yayınları, 2016), 278-301; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Hasan Paşa," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5/1 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1997): 325-329; Branislav Djurdjev, "Bosna," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, vol. 1 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1986): 1261-1275.

Flight"[69] (*Büyük Ḳaçgun* or *Büyük Firārī*).[70]

As Mustafa Akdağ focused on the social and economic motives of the rebellions, he particularized some foundations within a wide array of agricultural, industrial and fiscal determinants along with maladministration. According to him, each had an indelible stamp not only on the deepening crisis but also on the subsequent popular protests and disturbances.[71] In other words, he endeavours to explain the breakdown of the Ottoman system through these determinants, signalling that the Ottoman Empire could not adapt to the changing conditions from the 16th century onwards.[72] To him, the extant economic climate was not restricted only to the Ottoman realm. Instead, it was an economic downturn extending to a more wide-ranging geographical area, namely the Mediterranean Basin.[73] Mustafa Akdağ advocates that since the Empire was unable to cope with the peripheral elements defying its authority, it opted bargaining and negotiating with them. He evaluates this as a weakness and claims that the rebellions at the time were an indication of a decline.[74] He states that while European modernization took off in the 1650s, the Ottomans failed to keep up. That is to say, he advocates that the Ottoman decline began in the 16th century.[75] It needs to be added here that Mustafa Akdağ conducted his research in an academic environment where there was no criticism of

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[69] Mustafa Akdağ specifies that the period of the *Great Flight* (1604-1610) (also known as "*Celā-yı Vaṭan*") perhaps constituted the most terrifying stage of the *Jelālī* Rebellions. After analyzing the general economic conditions of this critical six year-period in detail, he demonstrates how devastated were the Central Anatolian, Southeastern Anatolian, and Aegean regions. He enumerates the fundamental reasons of the revolts as such: (i) over-taxation imposed by the imperial treasury and *dirlik*-holders; (ii) the intolerable financial burdens of various other taxes; (iii) a serious deterioration in the living conditions of almost totally poverty-stricken peasants originating from the widespread usury practiced by the state functionaries and the leading local notables engaging in business; and (iv) the emergence of the great *çiftlik*s as well as the severe and frequent attacks of the *sekbān*s, *levend*s, and *sūhte*s. Ultimately, all of these factors compelled the whole slew of peasants to emigrate *en masse*, resulting in a dramatic decline in agricultural production and tax revenues. They migrated to the relatively safeguarded cities/towns, the forestlands/highlands, and the Eastern *vilāyet*s of the Empire: Mustafa Akdağ, "Celali İsyanlarından Büyük Kaçgunluk (1603-1606)," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 2, no. 2-3 (1964): 1-51; Mücteba İlgürel, "Celâ-yi Vatan," *TDVİA*, vol. 7 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1993): 238-240. See also: Hrand D. Andreasyan, "Celâlîlerden Kaçan Anadolu Halkının Geri Gönderilmesi," In *Ord. Prof. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı'ya Armağan* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 45-53; Linda T. Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1560–1660* (Leiden, New York, Cologne: E. J. Brill, 1996), 246-306; David F. Burg, *A World History of Tax Rebellions: An Encyclopedia of Tax Rebels, Revolts, and Riots from Antiquity to the Present* (New York, London: Routledge, 2004), 189; Mustafa Cezar, Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013); Mustafa Alkan, "Softa," *TDVİA*, vol. 37 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2009): 342-343.

[70] Akdağ, *Celâlî İsyanları*, 2-3.

[71] Gündoğdu, op.cit., 460

[72] Gündoğdu, 463.

[73] Gündoğdu, 461.

[74] Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası & "Celali İsyanları"* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1975), 482-488.

[75] Gündoğdu, op.cit., 460-461, 463-465; Akdağ, *Celâlî İsyanları*, 44-48, 68-72.

the Ottoman decline paradigm.

Mustafa Akdağ specifies two different kinds of insubordinations, but opts to focus on only one, that is, the *Jelālī* rebellions which, he claims, were bounded by the recognition of the Ottoman imperial legitimacy as opposed to the religious ideology-based rebellions which were separatist. After stating his major principles and approaches with respect to this discussion, he emphatically states his intention to explore the time period between 1550 and 1603 and to narrate these "struggles".[76]

After a decade or so, Mustafa Akdağ appears again with an unheeded sub-argument, a certain part of which is directly related to my research. In his book entitled "*Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası & "Celali İsyanları"*" [1975][77], which was essentially a more sophisticated version of his preceding work entitled *Celâlî İsyanları (1550-1603)* [1963], he furnishes us with significant minutiae of the *Jelālī* rebellions.

Akdağ, in his later study, takes a very orthodox approach to the suppression of the *Jelālī* rebellions by the Ottoman governments. He assesses the imperial stance that the Empire adopted and the policies that it formulated for these authority-violators who dared its imperial authority in a very conservative and reductive way. According to him, the Ottoman trajectory of integration of the rebels was predominantly based on bargaining, which was clearly a concession and "an obvious sign of decline." Furthermore, he advocates that as the Ottoman state was unable to put down these rebellions, it entered into a process of negotiation; therefore, he principally sees such policies of the Empire as an absolute weakness.[78] From his academic stance, we clearly see that Akdağ contextualizes this sub-argument within the framework of the decline paradigm. Later, William J. Griswold also pursued this line. Later still, Karen Barkey, however, reevaluated and reformulated this approach and offered us a fresh point of view.

What is exactly germane to my research is what Mustafa Akdağ points out about the suppression of the *Jelālī* rebellions by the Ottoman governments. Akdağ indicates that the Ottoman governments designated the *Jelālī* rebels either as a *sanjak-bey* or a *beylerbeyi* according to circumstances, and this situation definitively depended on how perilous these authority-violators were. Considering the local dynamics, the

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[76] Akdağ, *Celâlî İsyanları*, 1-3; Gündoğdu, loc.cit.

[77] Both the preface and a blurb on the back cover of Mustafa Akdağ's "Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası & "Celali İsyanları"" claims that the book is a more elaborated version of the studies that he had produced so far and encompasses significant details as well as some disregarded sub-arguments: Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası*, 9.

[78] Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası*, 482-488.

governments generally appointed a *Jelālī* rebel to either his own home town or a surrounding *sanjak*, recognizing him very well; however, if the insubordinates were much tougher than previously believed, the governments, then, masterfully employed the integration policy and assigned them to a *beylerbeyi* in a remote province. In this way, the process of establishment and then the consolidation of their impaired imperial rules over the periphery became easier.[79] The central government, says Akdağ, appointed Ḳarayaziji, Ḳalenderoghli Meḥmed, Neslioghli, Ḳınalıoghli, Erzāde and Yularkasti to Amasya-Çorum, Ankara, Hamid (Isparta), Afyonkarahisar, Kırşehir and Kastamonu, respectively, as *sancakbeyi*s. Likewise, it designated Deli Ḥassan, Ṭavīl Meḥmed, and Ḳaraḳaş Aḥmed to Bosnia, Shahrizor (Iraq) and Çıldır, respectively, as *beylerbeyi*s.[80]

The direct relevance of this sub-argument with my research is that the adopted policies were restricted not only to the *Jelālī* rebellions. The Ottoman governments utilized similar kinds of integration policies against separatist rebels as well. There were, nevertheless, exceptions. To exemplify, when having a close look at the rebellions of both Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha and Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn in Syria, we can clearly see that the Ottoman administrations employed the same strategies for these two rebellions, both of which had the same characteristics (and qualify to be separatist rebellions).

Exactly two decades after, Mustafa Akdağ's approach and perspectives in reference to the *Jelālī* rebellions took on a more comprehensive, advanced, and quite distinct dimension through the contributions of William J. Griswold. Griswold broadens the theoretical purview of the prevailing discussion through his own interpretations. Notwithstanding having dissimilar opinions on a few central arguments propounded by Akdağ, he primarily validates Akdağ's orthodox approach as well as brings some new concepts to the discussion.

At the outset, in his book entitled "The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020/1591-1611 [1983]", Griswold specifies that three elemental determinants paralyzed the Ottoman imperial rule: the gradual dysfunctions in the *tīmār* system over time; the lack of leadership qualification and governmental skills of the sultans; and the ruinous impacts of the price revolution in Europe. He adds that population increase and the alterations in climatic conditions should not be underestimated, and these elements may consequently have determined the course of rebellions.[81]

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[79] Akdağ, 483-487.

[80] Akdağ, 484.

[81] William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000–1020/1591–1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), xix. Griswold introduced themes such as "*the general conditions in the early 17th century Ottoman*

Griswold begins by stating that he will set out a comprehensive investigation of the *Jelālī* rebellions from a political perspective. More specifically, with his own words, he conceptualizes this as "*Jelālī's internal Ottoman and interregional relations*".[82] He acknowledges the Battle of Mezőkeresztes (1596) as a watershed moment like Mustafa Akdağ earlier (and Oktay Özel much later). However, he marks the end of the rebellions in 1609, referring to the construction date of the Sulṭān Aḥmed Mosque (also known as the Blue Mosque), which is accepted as a harbinger of the end of the *Jelālī* rebellions on account of its symbolic significance. This interpretation leads to a dating which differs from that of Akdağ and, later, Oktay Özel. While Mustafa Akdağ accepts 1603 as a final year for the rebellions, Oktay Özel proposed 1700. Thus, opinions greatly differ among scholars in terms of the time interval. It seems to me that Özel's proposal of 1700, based on the findings in current secondary literature, is much more appropriate for the final years of the *Jelālī* rebellions.

Griswold presents a highly interesting title, "The Great Anatolian Rebellion", to his study as he narrowed down the vast geographical domains of the empire into a restricted one in order to identify the *Jelālī* rebellions. This approach is of utmost importance as he is the first scholar to clearly draw and strongly underline a particular geographical boundary to probe into the *Jelālī* rebellions. Even though it is not highlighted, the focus of Mustafa Akdağ, too, is Anatolia.

According to William J. Griswold, the *Jelālī* rebels had no intention other than the wish to be integrated into the Ottoman imperial system. They solely sought their own self-interests, primarily based on economic concerns, by fighting with their unmistakeable military forces against the well-armed Ottoman military forces. In other words, they were quite far from a state of mind aiming to establish an independent state. In this way, he lays absolute emphasis on both the non-separatist nature of the *Jelālī*s and the significance of the advancements in military technology.[83] We clearly see that he takes the same academic stance as Mustafa Akdağ, and, to some extent, Oktay Özel joins the two much later. However, while Griswold considers Yūsuf Pasha as the last great *Jelālī*,[84] Oktay Özel identifies Yeğen ʿOsmān Pasha as the last *Jelālī* rebel.[85]

Empire as well as the turn of the century," "*the Jelālī rebellions*," and "*the separatist rebellions*" in the preface of his book.

[82] Griswold, xx.

[83] Griswold, xx-xxi.

[84] Griswold, 206.

[85] Oktay Özel, "The Reign of Violence: The Celâlis, c. 1550–1700," In *The Ottoman World*, ed. Christine Woodhead (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 191.

Perhaps one of Griswold's most paramount points with regard to the early modern Ottoman rebellion literature is the existence of separatist rebellions setting their sights on tearing the Empire down. These were primarily the rebellions of Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha and, to use Griswold's own words, his "*Syrian*" colleague Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn. He compares the two rebellions to one another and brings a new and radical dimension to the discussion.[86]

In addition to the essential points that he specifies as above, it is also possible to read between the lines. To exemplify, he points out that the primary reason behind debilitating the political unity in Ottoman Anatolia was the battles against the Safavids;[87] this is why he attributes crucial importance to the Ottoman–Safavid Wars of 1578–1590/1603-1612 and 1603–1618.[88] After providing a summary account of the general situation until the early 17th century, he indicates that the Empire became a static power by losing its dynamic identity as a consequence of pyrrhic victories.[89] From this point of view, we clearly see that Griswold is fundamentally a declinist scholar like Mustafa Akdağ; however, Oktay Özel, advocating anti-declinist arguments, is in sharp contrast to both.

As for Griswold's attitude towards the Ottoman centers' reactions and the strategy that they utilized against any element challenging its authority, he absolutely assesses the Ottoman way of integrating the peripheral forces into their imperial body as a weakness. To put it differently, he acknowledges that due to the Empire's incapability of managing these kinds of authority-violators, the Empire entered into a process of bargaining and negotiation, and he places it in the context of the decline

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[86] See footnote 28 above.

[87] Griswold, op.cit, 1.

[88] For more information on the Ottoman-Safavid Wars: Alexander Mikaberidze, *Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia*, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2011): 697-699. See also: Şerafettin Turan, "Lala Mustafa Paşa Hakkında Notlar ve Vesikalar," *Belleten* XXII, no. 88 (1958): 551-593; Bekir Kütükoğlu, "Tahmasp I," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 11 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1997): 637-647; Ahmet Türk, "The Crimean Khanate under The Reign of Gazi Giray II" (Master's Thesis, Bilkent University, 2000), 14-19; Rudi Matthee, "The Ottoman-Safavid War of 986-998/1578-90: Motives and Causes," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* vol. 20, no: 1-2 (2014): 1-20; Peter Jackson and Lawrence Lockhart, *The Cambridge History of Iran: The Timurid and Safavid Periods* vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986), 262-278; Maeda Hirotake, "The Forced Migrations and Reorganisation of the Regional Order in the Caucasus by Safavid Iran: Preconditions and Developments Described by Fazli Khuzani," In *Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds*, eds. O. Ieda and T. Uyama, Sapporo, Slavic Research Centre (Hokkaido University, 2004), 237-271; Christian H. Heller, "Great Power Competition in the Age of Islam. Contemporary Lessons from the Ottoman–Safavid Rivalry," *MCU Journal* vol. 9, no. 2 (2018): 22-43; Martin Sicker, *The Islamic World in Decline: From the Treaty of Karlowitz to the Disintegration of the Ottoman Empire* (USA: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 1-19; Remzi Kılıç, *XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı-İran Siyasî Antlaşmaları* (İstanbul: Tez Yayınları, 2001), 85-173; Andrew J. Newman, *Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Bekir Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı - İran Siyasi Münasebetleri* (1578-1612) (İstanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1993); M. Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu, *Osmanlılar'ın Kafkas Elleri'ni Fethi (1451-1590)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1998).

[89] Griswold, loc.cit.

paradigm.[90]

After a decade or so, in opposition to the traditional Ottomanists, such as Mustafa Akdağ and William J. Griswold, Karen Barkey casts an unprecedented light on the *Jelālī* rebellions. With an understanding based on historical sociology, Barkey deftly synthesizes some major historical arguments inherited from Ottomanists before her, and to a certain extent, reformulates these contentions within a highly original context (i.e. the process of state formation and state centralization).

Although this approach has later been subjected to criticism, I chose to follow her analyses of the 17th Century Crisis in Europe. She also argues that the general pattern of state-society conflicts, predominantly prevalent in the Western European states, has been the model for the state formations, and paths to non-Western state formation has been neglected.[91] This is a valuable framework of discussion, promising to reveal on alternative modernities in the context of state's barganing and negotion policy, a major instrument of Ottomans' dealing with the rebels.

In her book entitled "Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization [1994]", Barkey principally scrutinizes the issue of how the Ottoman Empire was transformed in the early modern period. She pursues the argument by making comparisons with the Western mode of state-formation and particularly with the case of France, which has been taken as a universal pattern for the rest of the world, including the Ottoman Empire. According to this approach, the ideal Western trajectory of state formation is fundamentally predicated upon conflict(s) between the state and society. More precisely, different social classes, such as peasants and elites/aristocrats, who differ from one another on account of their grievously damaged class interests, begin cooperating against it, and rebelled against the state. They brought the very existence of the state almost to the brink of being torn down.[92]

Barkey first discusses Western European developments in general and then brings the French case into the forefront in her work.[93] The Western European states needed both military conscription and financial resources in order to maintain their armies' continuity and success in wars. For this purpose, she says, they felt the need

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[90] Griswold, 1-59.

[91] Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 1.

[92] Barkey, 229-230. See also: Çağlar Keyder, review of "Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*," *American Journal of Sociology* (July 1995): 249-251; Fatma Müge Göçek and Esra Özyürek, review of "Karen Barkey, B*andits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*," *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* (Fall 1996): 75-79.

[93] Barkey, op.cit., 1-23, 229-242.

to make direct and intense intervention on those factors threatening the resources of the society, which would be damaging not only the peasants' interests but also the regional autonomy of the elites. Barkey shows that when confronted with such threats, the peasants and the elites cooperated with one another[94] and this cooperation led to anti-tax and anti-state rebellions in the 17th century.[95] Consequently, the authorities of the Western European states violently reacted to such popular protests and rebellions.[96] As Barkey points out, the same was valid for France during the period of consolidation.[97] The majority of the rebellions were staged by the peasants who collaborated with the nobles, as both of those social groups were at the risk of being greatly damaged by the state's centralist inclinations.

Barkey also illustrates how Western European states set out to strengthen their authority over the society through some other mechanisms. Louis XIII, for example, took a significant step in centralizing France by castigating the duelings and the employment of firearms. Thus, he diminished the influence of the nobles in France. Additionally, France, having a feudal structure, found an opportunity to centralize more through the functionaries appointed by the state in the 17th century. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire, remarks Barkey, managed to centralize by bargaining with the peripheral elements defying its authority. This signifies that there were different paths to centralize.[98]

While they did not hesitate to suppress the opposition, at times, the authorities of the Western European states, too, opted to conduct negotiations with the elites. Barkey discusses that the Ottoman Empire, in contrast, took advantage of such conflicts time and again and resorted to negotiations and bargaining. That is to say, the violent supression was not the first option for the Ottomans, thus the Empire managed to eliminate the opposition challenging its imperial authority pragmatically.[99]

In the last two decades, many other historians, including the Ottomanists, have

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[94]Charles Tilly, *Coercion Capital and European States AD 990-1990* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 99-103; Barkey, op.cit., 4.

[95]These are the English Civil War (1642–1651), the Fronde (1648-1653), revolt in Naples (1647) and French intervention of Catalonia (1640s). Perez Zagorin, *Rebels and Rulers, 1500–1660*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 36-37; Roland Mousnier, "The Fronde," In *Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Robert Forster and Jack P. Greene (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 131-159.

[96]Barkey, op.cit., 1.

[97]Barkey, 11.

[98]Barkey, 1-2, 4, 11.

[99]Charles Tilly, 101-103; Barkey, op.cit., 2.

brought the non-Western trajectories of state centralization to discussion, and advocated that the employment of the Western forms of state consolidation are far from being adequate to explain the experiences of the remainder of the World.[100] In comparison, explorations of class structure in Ottoman society are totally neglected. The definitions and relationships of social classes, the way that they perceived one another as well as the control mechanism(s) that the Empire developed and deployed remain unexplored, and its ordinary subjects, *reʿāyā*, was almost definitively disparate from the social structure in the Western world. Barkey's discussion of the *tīmār* system, which I summarized below, sheds light on the provincial elites and those they were in control of. In her discussion of the central and peripheral power-holders, it is acknowledged that the patrimonial Ottoman Empire did not recognize any possible power other than itself between the appointed landowner (*tīmārlı sipāhī*), having only land tenure, and its subject. This is why it did not absolutely permit the flourishing of any possible local power which would challenge its authority. The empire, having the absolute authority on the land (*mīrī arāżī*), rendered the *tīmār* system non-hereditary, which explains the preclusion of the *tīmārlı sipāhī* who had a high potential to turn into an aristocratic structure.[101] This situation resulted not only in the Ottoman adoption of stringent centralization policies but also in the interception of any aristocratic structures to develop in the Empire.[102]

The other fundamental aspect of this structure is the presence of the written code, cushioning the subject from the abuse of any *tīmārlı sipāhī*s or provincial elites/governors and regulating the relationships between the *reʿāyā* and the central administrations at the local level. In other words, it is a kind of assurance for the Empire's subjects. In addition to the *tīmārlı sipāhī*s, such a contract holds also true for the provincial elites in some cases – for those who had limited authority over subjects and had no right to demand forced labor from them; it was not possible for them to contravene the boundary rigorously drawn between the subject and themselves. If they did otherwise, any individual subject had a chance to gripe

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[100] There is a huge literature on alternative modernities and state-formation in Europe. For a quantitative documentation of this process and empirical analysis of its determinants see: K. Kıvanç Karaman and Şevket Pamuk, "Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction between Warfare, Economic Structure, and Political Regime," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 3 (2013): 603-626. Karaman and Pamuk who compile "a new and comprehensive tax revenues dataset, review the patterns of fiscal capacity across the continent through the early modern era, examine and categorize various threads in the literature, and empirically investigate alternative hypotheses," argue that "warfare tended to have a greater impact on state-building under representative regimes in more urban economies, and under authoritarian regimes in more rural economies."

[101] Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Çiftçi Sınıfların Hukuki Statüsü," *Ülkü* 10, no. 56 (October, 1937): 147-159. Barkan argues that the Ottoman *tīmār* system was not patrimonial, indicating that it was not hereditary and that there was no sign of a structure that places strength in the hands of a small, privileged ruling class, the aristocrats. Moreover, he argues that Ottoman subject peasants were not serfs, by which he means that they were free, contrary to their counterparts in the Western world.

[102] Mehmet Emin Şen and Mehmet Ali Türkmenoğlu, "Avrupa Feodalitesi ile Osmanlı Tımar Sistemi Üzerine Bir Mukayese," *International Journal of Social Science* 5, no. 4 (2012): 200.

about the exploitative and arbitrary acts of the *sipāhī*s or any other elements of the provincial elites, by resorting to a *qādi*'s court or writing a petition to the *Dīvān-ı Humāyūn*.[103]

Further, Barkey points to the rotational (*münāvebeli*) appointment of the provincial elites, a strategy that the centre primarily utilized to obstruct any possible cooperation that would forge between them and the local elements, that is, peasants; in this way, it became decidedly very difficult for them to rebel against the Empire and the governments rendered both elements dependent on itself.[104] Therefore, Barkey remarks, the peasant rebellions did not occur in the Ottoman Empire unlike the Western European states.

In order to divide and rule, the Empire laid the appropriate groundwork for the elites endeavouring to attain high posts and maximum economic profit both in Istanbul and the periphery; in this way, the Ottoman administrations impeded any possible alliances that could be directed to themselves by taking advantage of intra-elite conflicts.[105] Taking all these into consideration, Barkey premediates that while the Western world followed feudal patterns, the Ottoman Empire pursued much more stringent centralized ones and bore a resemblance to the Chinese and Russian cases.[106]

According to Barkey, as the Empire blocked the possibility of any defiance of authority and refusal to obey orders that could be led by both elites and peasants, the banditry became the leading resistance to the Empire; however, the Empire also contrived to surmount this fundamental problem since it essentially incorporated these bandits, that is, the *Jelālī* rebels, into its imperial body through "*deals, bargains, and patronage*", to use her own words.[107] By deploying very efficacious manipulative strategies, the Empire was able to consolidate its central authority and grant them a chance to reintegrate into its imperial system: "*the Ottoman Empire presents itself as the sole center for rewards and privileges*".[108]

Barkey concludes that the Ottoman Empire became centralized in the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century through the exercise of a series of complex mechanisms of incorporation and strategic

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[103]Halil İnalcık, "Timar," *TDVİA*, vol. 41 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2012): 170.

[104]Barkey, op.cit., x.

[105]Barkey, 234-235.

[106]Barkey, 9.

[107]Gündoğdu, op.cit., 470.

[108]Barkey, op.cit, 13.

maneuvers that it wittingly and astutely devised, and then, managed to transform itself by adaptive imperial policies considering the changing conditions of the world in that period of time.[109] Hence, Barkey establishes that she is absolutely anti-declinist, unlike Akdağ and Griswold.

In addition to the Ottomanists whose approaches and perspectives that I reviewed with regard to the *Jelālī* rebellions so far, Dina Khoury, who essentially delves into the early modern power-holders in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Middle East, provides a stimulating insight into the relationships between Istanbul and the provincial elites progressively arising in the periphery. She investigates when these symbiotic ties commenced and how they evolved during the 17th and 18th centuries. Dina Khoury analyzes the notion of *ʿayān* in detail and provides significant clarifications, including the fluid nature of the *ʿayān*. All in all, Khoury is also an anti-declinist.

With a special emphasis on the grievous crisis period in her book chapter entitled "The Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial Power-holders: an Analysis of the Historiography", Khoury specifies that political, military and fiscal determinants as well as a set of rebellions that the Ottoman Empire confronted in the 17th century, compelled it to significantly modify its style of provincial administration. A century later, the Empire revamped its imperial organization in the periphery one more and systematized the exercise of tax-farming to attain possible economic resources.[110] From the 18th century onwards, she says, the bond between Istanbul and the peripheral elements, the local power-holders (the "*provincial elite*"), turned out to be much more problematic, but the Ottoman state managed to carry on this highly complex partnership –until the 19th century. Khoury remarks that, for all their serious threats/acts overshadowing the imperial image of the state, the power-holders mostly proved to be loyal. She questions and ruminates on how the Empire contrived a way of contending with this situation. In fact, she partially answers her own question, inasmuch as she points out that the Empire had "*resources and political capital to suppress and co-opt*" the peripheral elements in the early modern period.[111] As we shall see in the third chapter, I should also definitively add a series of complex mechanisms of incorporation and manipulative strategies devised by the Empire.

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[109] Barkey, ix-xii.

[110] Dina Rizk Khoury, "The Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial Power-holders: an Analysis of the Historiography," In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 135.

[111] Khoury., 136.

The other fundamental aspect of the continuous struggle is the fact that the peripheral figures began to construct not only political but also military identities on top of their preexisting local ones on the provincial level. As a result of the provincial postholders' occupation of high positions in the peripheries through illicit acquisitions, they found chances to integrate into the Ottoman imperial system; in this way, as Khoury points out, they rendered the Empire's sovereignty "*localized*" during the closing years of the 18th century. Even though this process has always been assessed by traditional Ottomanists as a "decentralization", some evaluate this development from a quite different angle. According to them, including Khoury, what happened in the provinces was principally the exact replication of the Ottoman political culture at the peripheral level; in other words, the local authority-violators experienced the provincial version of the imperial culture.[112]

The other prime facet of "recentralization", Khoury continues to argue, is that the process of systematic Ottoman infiltration and penetration into target territories, including the Middle Eastern region, predominantly hinged on strategic alliances, expediting the establishment and consolidation of imperial control over the territories. Given adequate control of these societies, having a rich ethnic composition or divergent elements in a particular territory, we can grasp why the Empire was not naturally hesitant to cooperate with the local elements, notwithstanding the known disadvantages. The Empire, therefore, employed a set of control mechanisms, varying from region to region.[113] To give a specific example, the Empire made use of cut-throat contention between local families, such as the Sayfās and the Ḥarfūshes in Lebanon and played them off against each other.[114] We see that, at this point, the remoteness to the imperial capital is a primary determinant. Khoury, in this regard, points out that while the Empire could easily reach regions closer to Istanbul, such as Anatolian province constituting the core element of the Ottoman realm, this was not possible for Mount Lebanon (also known as *Jabal Lubnān*), the Southern parts of Anatolia, and Arab provinces that were geographically much more far-flung from the capital.[115]

It should also be noted that in the 17th century Venetian naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean were much more intrusive, while the Ottomans were not as effective as they used to be and the sea routes and the ports on the Syrian littoral were not

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[112]Khoury, 136-137.

[113]Khoury, 137.

[114]Khoury, 141.

[115]Khoury, 137.

as safe as before.[116] Naturally, this situation directly affected Ottoman access and intervention in the region.

Khoury finds the nature of the Ottoman peripheral policies highly volatile, more precisely at the time of rebellions. In spite of being aware of the significance of working in collaboration with these power-holders, the Empire, at the same time, knew the fragility of these relationships. For this reason, perhaps, the Ottoman Empire formulated, as Khoury stated, both the "*policy of accommodation*" and "*policy of repression*".[117] The Ottoman trajectory of peripheral policies proceeded from the conditions of that period of time, not in the heat of the moment. The local elements, being aware of their power and influence that mainly originated from the erratic nature of the conditions, on the other hand, efficaciously exploited opportunities to enter into a process of negotiation within the framework of certain demarcation. [118]

The traditional form of administration in the periphery was not at all times exercised in the same manner in every part of the Ottoman realm. Whereas Anatolia, and the Balkan regions were subject to the *tīmār* system, the overwhelming majority of the Middle East, including Egypt, Basra, and Syria, pursued disparate patterns. Most significantly, the local rural figures/elements would come to be deliberately embodied into the Ottoman imperial system over time.[119]

Regarding the case of Mosul, Dina R. Khoury states that the Empire successfully deployed some strategies, including cooperating with local elements through the *iltizām* system to maintain its authority and earn its legitimacy in the periphery. In this way, the possibility that local elements turned into local intermediaries increasing.[120]

When the Ottoman government commenced the sale of offices and tax-revenues of the *iltizām* system from the closing years of the 16th century onwards, it culminated in a grievous erosion in the traditional style of administration; local elements took advantage of these changing conditions, and in the 18th century, decentralization of both "*military mobilization and tax collection*" strengthened their position

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[116]Selvinaz Mete, "The Ottoman Empire as Reflected to the Relazione of the Bailo Giorgio Giustinian: 1620-1627" (Master's Thesis, Fatih University, 2012), 29-30.

[117]Khoury, op.cit, 138.

[118]Khoury, 139.

[119]Khoury, 139-140.

[120]Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul*, 1540-1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 213-215.

further.[121]

The systematic changes incrementally attenuated the power of the provincial governors. For this reason, the janissaries and the local figures appeared as authority-violators in the major provincial cities over time. Khoury explores how much the military elements in the peripheries actually affected the imperial provinces and the seriousness of the situation.[122] According to her, the intense military activities of the Ottoman governments accelerated the process of the militarization of the rural parts of the Empire. In addition, whereas some of them engaged in economic activities, others, mostly their leaders turned into a local elite over time.[123] This situation obliged the Empire to seriously tackle newly arising peripheral elements in the provinces. Firstly, the Ottoman governments strove to extend the prerogatives of the governors at the provincial level and then enabled the local elites to benefit from the *mālikāne* system, a lifetime version of the *iltizām* system. Consequently, the Empire throve regarding its local policies as a result of the cooperation with the local elites remaining loyal to the Empire. At the end of the process, the Empire succeeded in incorporating these local figures into its imperial body by a set of local policies that it had employed.[124]

While Barkey and Khoury explored center-periphery relations in the context of their research agendas, some other historians made analyses with regard to state structures, within the framework of general debates but directly related to the Ottoman central authority's control mechanisms over the periphery. Samuel N. Eisenstadt, for example, known for investigating the political systems of the empires, compares some centralized and bureaucratic empires, including Ottoman, Roman and Spanish ones.[125] Specifically, he points out that unlike the Spanish, the Ottomans had much more in common with their Roman counterparts. To him, just like the Romans, the Ottomans employed a province (*eyālet*) system, but theirs were much more sophisticated in terms of bureaucratic organization, indicating that the Ottomans deployed similar strategies to keep a large mass of people living in the periphery under their control. In addition to these, the Ottomans endeavoured to tightly integrate a large mass of people in different parts of the Ottoman realm, that is, in the periphery into the Empire through *tīmār* and *muḳāṭaʿa* systems.[126] Likewise, William Mc-

[121]Khoury, *The Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial Power-holders*, 140.

[122]Khoury, 141.

[123]Khoury, 145.

[124]Khoury, 142-143.

[125]Samuel N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: Free Press, 1963), 4-5.

[126]Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*

Neil, a pioneer in the field of world history, analyzes the process whereby the thinly occupied grasslands of southeastern Europe were incorporated into the social bodies of three great empires, the Ottoman, the Austrian, and the Russian, and also underscores the significance of the Ottoman bureaucracy. He points out that the Ottomans fell within the category of Gunpowder Empires. To him, the fact that the Ottomans adopted and employed advanced military technology necessitated a serious and effective bureaucratic structure. Naturally, this situation enabled the Ottoman central authorities to have control over local powers in the periphery.[127]

A review of wide-ranging scholarship on world-wide center-periphery debates is not possible here because of my limited knowledge in the field.[128] Regarding more specific Ottoman-oriented center-periphery debates, the impetus has come from the works of sociologists, political scientists and historians such as Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper and Albert Hourani and mostly in the context of the late Ottoman history.[129] An exceptional study on early modern Ottoman history is Oktay Özel's *The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia: Amasya 1576–1643* where he asks the questions Did the "seventeenth-century crisis" visit the Ottoman Empire? How can we situate the explosion of rural violence and the rebellions of the turn of the seventeenth century in the Anatolian countryside?[130]

More than four decades after Mustafa Akdağ, Oktay Özel offers far-reaching perspectives on the *Jelālī* rebellions and center-periphery relations. Having different views on the few fundamental arguments put forward by Akdağ, he first clarifies Akdağ's orthodox approach in explaining the nature of Ottoman rebellions. In his

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(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 28-31, 144-148.

[127] William H. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500-1800* (Chicago: UCP, 1964); idem, "The Ottoman Empire in World History," In *Meletēmata Stē Mnēmē Basileiou [Vasileiou] Laourda: Essays in Memory of Basil Laourdas*, ed. Louisa B. Laourda (Athens: L. B. Laourda, 1975), 374-385 (reprint: "Dünya Tarihinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu", In *Osmanlı ve Dünya* , ed. Mustafa Armağan (İstanbul: Ufuk Kitap, 2000), 60-68. Yahya Koç also make some comments on these general debates. For more information: Yahya Koç, "Sayda Eyaleti'nde Osmanlı İktidarı ve Yerel Güçler (1700-1775)" (PhD Dissertation, Istanbul University, 2018), 16-20.

[128] For a recent review of the secondary literature: Rikard Waelenius, "Core and Periphery in the Early Modern World System: A Time-Space Appropriation Assessment," In *Methods in World History: A Critical Approach*, eds. Arne Jarrick, Janken Myrdal, and Maria Wallenberg Bondesson (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2016), 185-225.

[129] Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus* 102, no. 1 (1973): 169-190; Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century," *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique* 1, no. 1 (1980): 81-105; Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of The Modern Middle East* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 40-42. For the Balkans as the periphery: Frederick Anscombe, "Continuities in Ottoman Centre–Periphery Relations, 1787–1915," In *The Frontiers of the Ottoman World*, ed. Andrew Peacock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 235-252. For a review of center-periphery relations prior to the Tanzimat: Jens Hanssen, "Practices of Integration: Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire," In *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, eds. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber (Beirut: Ergon Verlag Würzburg in Kommission, 2002), 49-74.

[130] Oktay Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia: Amasya 1576–1643* (Leiden: Brill, 2016).

book chapter entitled "The Reign of Violence: The Celâlis, c. 1550–1700", Özel conveys modern historiography's latest perspectives and approaches centered on the agonizing crisis period (referring to the turn of the 17th century), correlating with the *Jelālī* rebellions. Even though principal focuses of scholarly attention have revolved around matters based on socio-economic and demographic characteristics in the "classical" period, the metamorphosis that the empire and its ordinary subjects underwent acutely together as well as climatic changes have also been debated recently. Özel reevaluates factors which have been long addressed in parallel with new findings. He outlines why the *Jelālī* rebellions had such a destructive character and explores their violence dimension as well as the primary reasons behind them.[131] He also lays stress on the inadequacy of political factors to explain the phenomenon at issue, as opposed to other parameters.

Similar to Akdağ, Oktay Özel points out that the Ottoman fiscal system/structure at the turn of the century began to be adversely affected by both internal and external factors. The Ottoman governments, therefore, pursued devaluation and debasement-based policies to rectify the problems. However, these policies directly triggered several riots which essentially embodied the salaried troops in Istanbul, and economic conditions of the *ḳapıḳulu* soldiers,[132] which was exponentially exacerbated during the Ottomans' Thirty Years War (1578–1611).[133]

The provincial cavalries also known as *tīmārlı sipāhī*s, says Özel, were fiercely affected by these policies. However, the problems were not confined only to these. *Tīmārlı sipāhī*s were also greatly affected because of the serious alterations in both financial and administrative structures with regard to the long-standing redistribution policies in the Empire. They were progressively subrogated by those of the *ḳapıḳulu* origin, which means that there existed a high number of extremely displeased and indignant *sipāhī*s in Anatolia.[134] Both military elements, the major components of the main Ottoman army, increasingly started to engage in such illegal activities such as brigandage, intensifying the violence in many parts of the Ottoman realm at the turn of the century.

According to Özel, economic and demographic drivers were also as paramount as

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[131] Oktay Özel, "The Reign of Violence," 184.

[132] Özel, 184-185.

[133] The Ottomans' Thirty Years War (1578–1611) is principally a denomination that Gábor Ágoston frequently employes in almost all of his academic works.

[134] Özel, op.cit., 185. Oktay Özel utilizes the term "*the reign of violence*" to accentuate the obliterating character and dimension of the violence of the *Jelālī* Rebellions and specifies that they profoundly left their marks on the 17th century. For more information: Özel, 184-202.

political and military factors.[135] Despite its advantages, the population growth in the 16th century gave rise to a "*surplus*" mass of people, exceeding the availability of plots of arable lands; in this way, population pressure, leading to a grievous subsistence crisis, came into existence.[136] As a consequence, a large mass of people endeavoured to find a means of livelihood.

When the peasants and other soldier-brigands intensely began to accumulate under the sway of provincial governors, the violence became more and more destructive. As most Ottomanists have agreed, Özel argues that the most explosive and ferocious moment was shortly after the Ottoman-Habsburg Long War of 1593-1606; most of the primary sources confirm that a large number of soldiers either evaded the battle or sent substitutes into the battle.[137] To give a specific example, as a consequence of the military roll-call, it was realized that a multitudinous number of soldiers including janissaries and almost 30,000 *sipāhī*s, were absent and fled to Anatolia.[138] In this way, the militarization of the urban areas accelerated and the *Jelālī* terror aggravated the situation much more. Oktay Özel suggests that the Long War was of utmost importance in terms of escalating violence and the devastating effects of the *Jelālī* rebellions. Mustafa Akdağ, at this point, merely advocates that the desertions in the war did not initiate the rebellions.[139] Otherwise, he, too, had acknowledged that the disasters in the post-war period strikingly spiked. Both Ottomanists more or less share the same opinions with reference to the primary reasons behind these rebellions, but the latter puts a great emphasis on the violent and destructive character of the *Jelālī* rebellions as well as the rebellions' transformative effects. These rebellions paved the way for an incremental termination of both the *tīmār* and *ḳul* systems, the primary and long-standing imperial institutions. While the *iltizām* system[140] gradually superseded the *tīmār* system, the latter lost its significance over

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[135] Özel, 186.

[136] Özel, 187.

[137] Özel, 188.

[138] Özel, 189.

[139] Akdağ, *Celâlî Fetreti*, 63.

[140] Mehmet Genç, "İltizam," *TDVİA*, vol. 22 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2000): 154-158; Mustafa Akdağ, "Timar Rejiminin Bozuluşu," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* vol. 3, no. 4 (1945): 419-431; G. David and P. Fodor, "Changes in the Structure and Strength of the Timariot Army From the Early Sixteenth to the End of the Seventeenth Century," *Eurasian Studies* vol. 4, no. 2 (2005): 157-188; Joseph E. Matuz, "Contributions to the Ottoman Institution of the İltizam," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* vol. 11, no. 11 (1991): 237-249; Murat Çizakça, "Taxfarming and Financial Decentralization in the Ottoman Economy, 1520-1697," *The Journal of European Economic History* vol. 13, no. 22 (1993): 219-250; Linda T. Darling, "Ottoman Fiscal Administration: Decline or Adaptation?," *Journal of European Economic History* vol. 26, no. 1 (1997): 157-179; Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics & Society* vol. 21, no. 4 (1993): 393-423; Eftal Batmaz, "İltizam Sisteminin XVIII. Yüzyıldaki Boyutları," *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* vol. 18, no. 29 (1996): 39-50.

time. In this way, serious modifications occurred in the Empire militarily, administratively, and financially.[141]

Both Ottomanists agree on the utilization of the term "*Jelālī* ". They acknowledge that the *reʿāyā* denominated almost every insubordination as *Jelālī*. Oktay Özel, simply points out that this situation must have stemmed from the fact that all insubordinations having different features were seen as almost the same in terms of their dimension of violence and obliterating nature.[142]

In addition to these, when a wide array of primary and secondary sources is taken into consideration, Özel specifies that the *Jelālī* rebellions were a much more protracted phenomenon than previously believed and that recent academic studies also corroborate this statement.[143] Hence, the time period of his article clearly refers to the time interval between 1550 and 1700. This also demonstrates that he stretches the time frame put forward by Mustafa Akdağ [(1596-1603) and (1604-1610)] since he indicates that the second stage of the *Jelālī*s was sparked by the rebellion of Abaza Meḥmed Pasha[144] in 1623. To Özel, the last stage terminates with the rebellion of Yeğen ʿOsmān Pasha, the last *Jelālī* rebel.[145]

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Below, I will discuss the theoretical boundaries of my inquiry based on what I have reviewed so far in order to contextualize my arguments in the next chapters. I will, in this context, formulate the theoretical body of my thesis by pointing out those historians' approaches and perspectives that I have agreed and repudiated.

First of all, Mustafa Akdağ's discussion on the way that we ponder on the categorization of the rebellions in general, making principal distinctions among those breaking out in various period of times in the "Ottoman realm" in terms of their features, merits praise. More precisely, if we are to have a closer look at his way of

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[141] Özel, op.cit., 195.

[142] Özel, 198.

[143] Özel, 191.

[144] Mücteba İlgürel, "Abaza Paşa," *TDVİA*, vol. 1 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1988): 11-12; Cl. Huart, "Ābāza Pasha," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, vol. 1 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1986): 4; Hrand D. Andreasyan, "Abaza Mehmed Paşa," *Tarih Dergisi* 17, no. 22 (1967): 131 – 142; Gabriel Piterberg, "The Alleged Rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Paşa. Historiography and the Ottoman State in the Seventeenth Century," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 8, no. 1–2 (2002): 13-24.

[145] Özel, "The Reign of Violence," 184, 190-191. Songül Çolak, "Macaristan Serdârlığında Bir Eşkıya: Yeğen Osman Paşa," In *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Eşkıyalık ve Terör*, eds. Osman Köse (Samsun: Samsun İlkadım Belediyesi, 2017): 121-134; Ali Karatay, "Tuna Boylarında Alacalı Bir Savaşçı: Yeğen Osman Paşa," In *Uluslararası Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Çorum Sempozyumu* (Çorum: Çorum Belediyesi Yayınları, November 2007): 263-275; Abdülkadir Özcan, "Bölük," *TDVİA*, vol. 6 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1992): 324-325.

classifications, we find that he essentially distinguishes the rebellions according to whether they were *integration-oriented*, meaning that rebels intented integration in the Ottoman imperial system. To give a specific example, while the *Jelālī* rebellions scrambled to integrate into the Ottoman imperial system, the religious ideology-based rebellions had no intention other than establishing a fully independent state. In other words, if we are to employ the sub-umbrella terms, we see that whereas the first one was principally *integration-oriented* insubordinations, the latter was *non-integration-oriented* ones. When viewed from this aspect, Akdağ has a leading role in term of enabling us to both comprehend the nature of the rebellions much better and to easily categorize them.

William J. Griswold widens both the conceptual and theoretical scope of the extant discussion since he not only deploys the term "*Great Anatolian Rebellion*" in order to properly describe the *Jelālī* rebellions but also emphasizes the existence of *separatist rebellions* such as Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha and Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn which were not ideology-based. If we are to analyze his standpoint, we see that he has a primarily "*geography-based*" approach to the matter of rebellions, as we see in his book's title. This perspective is of paramount importance in that I think that it might afford Ottomanists a helpful hint to coin the broad umbrella term, enabling them to classify the whole rebellions, which had different characteristics in a much more detailed way. Nevertheless, his denomination, the "*Great Anatolian Rebellion*", falls short of explaining the Early Modern Ottoman rebellions.

There were many insubordinations that erupted in various geographical regions of the Ottoman realm and were completely divergent from one another in terms of their basic features, ranging from the religious ideology-based motives, to the *Jelālī* rebellions, the separatist rebellions (having no ideology), the rebellion(s) by governor-general(s) in the province(s) and Istanbul-based rebellions (the *Ḳapıḳulu* rebellions, namely, the *Janissary* and the *Sipāhī* rebellions). Their multiple, sometimes overlapping characteristics bring along the difficulties to classify and probe into them in detail. However, at this point, Akdağ and Griswold give partial clues and opportunities to develop a term unifying these rebellions under a superordinate term.

I will argue that when we endeavour to classify the rebellions (with respect to whatever their motives and causes were), our litmus test, at the outset, should be whether they were *integration-oriented* or not. We should firstly determine whether the rebels associated with any rebellion aimed to be included in the Ottoman imperial system or they had other expectations.

Griswold restricted the extensive geographical area of the Empire to a relatively smaller region in order one to characterize describe the *Jelālī* rebellions much better

through the term "*Great Anatolian Rebellion*". However, in the case of Maʿnids (and many other rebellious families in the Balkans and the Middle East), we need to develop a more comprehensive term in order to both refer to the vast geographical area that hosted many different rebellions and to gather these rebellions along with their divergent natures under a single roof. Naturally, the most appropriate term should be the "*Ottoman Rebellions*". In other words, as it was the case in the expression the "*Ottoman realm*", if we emphatically ascribe a "*geographical*" connotation to this adjective and differentiate it from its other connotations currently employed, we can coin the superordinate term, that is, a broader umbrella term (defining all the rebellions that erupted in various geographical regions of the Empire), which has not been propounded by any Ottomanist in the context of the Early Modern Ottoman rebellion literature (see Table 2.1). This will help the insurrections, ranging from civil disobediences to revolutions (unrest, anarchy, riot, uprising, mutiny, sedition, coup, coup d'état and the like) to be easily classified and identified according to their Ottoman characteristics. This denomination might also enable them to look at the rebellions in a more extensive framework. Furthermore, it might be possible to utilize the term "*Great Ottoman Rebellions*" to comprehend the Early Modern Ottoman rebellions in the context of the transformation process in the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century. Another reason why I have made such a classification is that I would like to place my case study, the House of Maʿn, in this broad framework and to demonstrate its applicability.

Karen Barkey's significant argument that the Ottoman Empire displayed the great competence to integrate the rebellions challenging its authority into its imperial system through some manipulative mechanisms, such as "*deals, bargains, and patronage*", is an argument that she inherited from earlier scholars (Akdağ and Griswold) and reformulated, which constitutes the main pillar of my research. I will fundamentally demonstrate these imperial control mechanisms through a particular case, that is, the House of Maʿn in the chapters below. I will attempt to prove how much the Ottomans were successful in employing these pragmatist policies.

However, this does not mean that I totally agree with all of Barkey's arguments. For example, she points out that Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha was the "*only Jelālī rebel*" who had separatist tendencies.[146] I will rather follow the footsteps of those Ottomanists who differentiate between those rebels who had an intention to gain indepedence from the Empire and those who did not. Hence, Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha was not a *Jelālī*, since he was a *separatist*, that is, he was a *non-integration-oriented* rebel unlike his *Jelālī* counterparts. Barkey also ignores Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn in the context of

[146] Barkey, op.cit., 186.

non-integration-oriented rebellions even though one of her consultants, Griswold, had briefly pointed out that Fakhr al-Dīn also had the intention of founding a state in Syria.[147] Another point that I disagree with her is that she claims that the Empire transformed itself in the 17th century "thanks to these mechanisms"; however, these were just astute strategic maneuvers that the Empire pragmatically performed both before and after, and particularly in the 17th century.

Considering that political, military, fiscal, demographic and socio-economic turmoil coexisted, I agree with Oktay Özel with respect to the uses of extreme violence during the *Jelālī* rebellions. Escalating violent protests in the core lands of the Empire in the 17th century had a considerable influence on the Ottoman governments to pursue a set of pragmatic policies (varying from region to region) such as "frequent" recourse to "*deals, bargains, and patronage*"[148] in order to incorporate defiant peripheral elements into their imperial body. I will argue that these were one of the most effective ways to cope with the peripheral elements in a cut-throat environment. We see that the "*reign of violence*" (Özel's concept, perhaps, one of the perfect denominations identifying the century) did not give the Ottomans any elbow room particularly in the 17th century. For this reason, within the framework of the transformation process in the 17th century, Özel's conceptual approach and perspective constitute one of the most significant theoretical points that solidifies the mainstays of my investigation.

I also agree with Dina Khoury's description of the imperial policies that the Ottomans carried out in the Middle East, specifically speaking, the policies towards Lebanon, a part of the Greater Syria. In my inquiry, how the Empire efficaciously utilized regional dynamics in Lebanon in favor of the center will be explored. The primary sources that I have employed confirm Khoury's arguments.

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[147] Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion*, xix-xxii, 155, 217.

[148] Gündoğdu, loc. cit.

Table 2.1 Classification Trial of Early Modern Ottoman Rebellions (1450-1700)



Note 1: I prepared the related table according to the extant approaches and perspectives with regard to the Early Modern Ottoman Rebellions (1450-1700). I arranged the table, fundamentally a "trial", in an attempt to easily categorize the rebellions and to facilitate their careful and critical scrutinies. *Sources*: Mustafa Akdağ, *Celâlî İsyanları: (1550-1603)* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1963), 1-2, 243-250; William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000–1020/1591–1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), xix-xxii, 155, 206, 217; Birol Gündoğdu, "Problems in the Interpretations of Ottoman Rebellions in the Early Modern Period: An Analysis and Evaluation of Existing Literature on the Ottoman Rebellions between 1550 and 1821," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 51 (2018): 460-461, 463-465; Oktay Özel, "The Reign of Violence: The Celâlis, c. 1550–1700," In *The Ottoman World*, ed. Christine Woodhead (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 184-202.

3. OTTOMAN HEGEMONY IN THE GREATER SYRIA

3.0.1 Ottoman Domination in the Middle East

When Selīm I (r. 1512-1520) put up his *Otāğ-ı Hümāyūn* (Imperial Tent) in Üsküdar, locals made a good guess as to where the sultan was headed: he was going to assail either the Safavids to the east or the Mamlūks to the southeast. On the way to Iran, Selīm I made his way into Mamlūk Syria, to conquer the Mamlūk Sultanate.[149]

As Selīm I arrived in the region with his army, Yūnus Beg, the governor of the province of Antep under the Mamlūks, changed sides and assisted the Ottoman army in northern Syria. The Mamlūk sultan, al-Ashraf Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (r. 1501-1516), meanwhile, arrived in Marj Dābiq. Shortly after the outbreak of the battle, when prominent Mamlūk *nā'ib*s, Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī (d. 1521)[150] and Khā'ir Beg (d. 1522) fled from the batttle ground. Mamlūks were defeated in a few hours.[151] Selīm I conquered Aleppo, and made his way to Damascus (Şām). He captured Hama (Ḥamā), Homs (Ḥumṣ), and Tripoli (Ṭarābulus) on the way to Damascus.[152] Not long after, Damascus was conquered.

After a while, Selīm I dispatched Hādım Sinān Pasha (d. 1517) to Gaza to gather military intelligence with respect to the Mamlūks in Egypt. Meanwhile, al-Ashraf Ṭūmānbāy II (r. 1516-1517), new Mamlūk sultan, sent Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī to Gaza,

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[149] Jane Hathaway and Karl Barbir, *The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule: 1516-1800* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 39.

[150] In 1518, Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī, who was a Mamlūk *'amīr*, offered his services to the Ottoman Empire as a *beylerbey* of Damascus. However, shortly after Selīm I's death in 1520, Jānbirdī rebelled against Ottoman authorities to establish an independent state. See also: Feridun Emecen, "Canbirdi Gazâlî," *TDVİA*, vol. 7 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1993): 141-143; Osama M. Abu Nahel, "The Mamluk Jan Bardi al-Ghazali and the Ottoman Sultanate: A New Historical Outlook," *Journal of Islamic Research* 31, no. 2 (2020): 394-415; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Şah İsmail ve Canberdi Gazali İsyanı," trans. Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu, *Erdem* 5, no. 13 (January 1989): 227-237.

[151] Enver Çakar, "XVI. Yüzyılda Şam Beylerbeyiliğinin İdarî Taksimatı," *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 13, no. 1 (2003): 354.

[152] Çakar, 355.

where a battle broke out that resulted in the debacle of Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī. The Ottomans established their hold over both Gaza and Palestine.[153] They brought Safad (Ṣafad), Nablus (Nābulus), Jerusalem (al-Quds), and Ajlun (ʿAjlūn) under their control in the final months of 1516.[154] Notwithstanding the series of victories in the region, the Ottomans wavered in conquering Egypt.[155] Nevertheless, they set about seizing its control by taking account of the risks.

After the victory in Gaza, Selīm I permitted al-Ashraf Ṭūmānbāy II to remain as a *beylerbey* (governor-general) of Egypt provided he stroke coins and had the Friday sermon (also known as *khuṭbah*) read in the Sultan's name. Upon al-Ashraf Ṭūmānbāy II's refusal of the Ottoman's offer, Selīm I attacked Egypt by crossing the Sinai Desert and defeated the Egyptian Mamlūks in the Battle of Rīdāniya (1517).[156] Subsequently,[157] the Ottomans completed a significant part of the conquests of the Middle East. After Selīm I's death, the Ottomans continued their expansion into the East, South and North (North Africa) of the Middle East.[158]

3.0.2 Ottoman Administrative Regulations in the Region: Province of Damascus

As the Ottomans began their conquest of what is now called the Middle East, they arranged administrative zones in some parts of Bilād al-Shām (Greater Syria).[159] Selīm I rendered Aintab and Malatya as a *sanjak* even before the Battle of Marj

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[153] Halil İnalcık, *Devlet-i Aliyye & Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar – I* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), 142.

[154] İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 2 (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2011), 287.

[155] İnalcık, loc. cit.

[156] İnalcık., 142-143.

[157] For more information about the Ottoman administration in Egypt: Seyyid Muhammed es Seyyid Mahmud, *XVI. Asırda Mısır Eyâleti* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1990), 46-71.

[158] Bruce Masters, in his book, describes the process of the Ottomans' rapid expansion into the Middle East in a detailed manner. For more information: Bruce Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516–1918: A Social and Cultural History* (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 20-37. For more information about the Arab lands that were under the Ottoman control in the post-Selīm I period: Peter Malcolm Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922, A Political History* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 46-57; Vladimir Borisovich Lutsky, *Modern History of the Arab Countries* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), 9-37.

[159] Bilād al-Shām, also known as Greater Syria, was a historical region referring to the territory that encompasses modern-day Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria. Dimashḳ constituted one of the most significant settlements of the said region. After a while, it was replaced by the name "Damascus" (Şām) that had originally referred to the entire Syria in the Arabic sources. For more information: Cengiz Tomar and Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, "Şam," *TDVİA*, vol. 38 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2010): 311; 315-320; Henri Lammens, "Suriye," *İslam Ansiklopedisi* , vol. 11 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1997): 51-66.

Dābiq.[160] Shortly after the Ottoman capture of northern and central Syria in the post-1516 period, he organized also Aleppo (Ḥalab), Hama (Ḥamā), Homs (Ḥumṣ) and Tripoli (Ṭarābulus) as a *sanjak*.[161] In addition to these, Selīm I turned Damascus into a *beylerbeyilik* (also known as *vilāyet*, or province) and allowed Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī to govern the province of Damascus (Şām Eyāleti) as *beylerbeyi* (governor-general) (Figure 3.1).

From the modifications in the administrative structure of Ottoman Syria, it is understood that Selīm I endeavoured to rein the bedouins in and to encourage the local populace to become accustomed to the newly established Ottoman rule in the region through Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī's established reputation. We see that the same situation also held good for Khā'ir Beg, familiar to the region. For this reason, he was permitted to stay as a *beylerbeyi* in Egypt.

Figure 3.1 Province of Damascus in 16th Century



Source: Enver Çakar, "XVI. Yüzyılda Şam Beylerbeyiliğinin İdarî Taksimatı," *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 13, no. 1 (2003): 374.*

[160]Çakar, op.cit., 355-356.

[161]Çakar, 356.

Consequently, the Ottomans organized two separate *eyālet*s as provinces of Damascus (*Şām* = *ʿArab*) and Egypt in the region.[162] Moreover, two years after the Battle of Marj Dābiq, they established finance offices (*defterdārlık*) for ʿArab and ʿAjam provinces to administer the fiscal affairs of the region, which happens to be the third *defterdārlık* founded after those of *defterdārlık*s of Rumelia and Anatolia.[163]

Table 3.1 Administrative Divisions (*Sanjak*s) of the Damascus Province (1520-1565)

Sıra No	1520	1522	1527	1545	1550	1565
1	Haleb	Şam	Şam	Şam	Şam	Şam
2	Hama	Gazze (Remle ile birlikte)	Adana	Haleb	Kudüs	Trablus
3	Ayntâb (Antep)	Kudüs	Haleb	Trablus	Gazze	Safed
4	Trablus (Trablusşam)	Safed	Trablus	Safed	Nablûs	Kudüs
5	Malatya	Haleb	Kudüs ve Gazze	Kudüs	Safed	ʻAclûn
6	Hums	Trablus	Hama ve Hums	Hama	Trablus	Gazze
7	Tarsus	Hama ve Hums	Ayntâb	Hums	Salt-ʻAclûn	Nablûs
8	Divriği	Ayntâb	Sis	Birecik	Aktağ Tarabây-ı Arab (Leccûn)	Leccûn
9	Birecik	Antakya	Tarsus	Ekrâd	--	Kerek-i Şevbek
10	Darende	Birecik ve Rum-kal'a	Nablus ve Safed	Salt-ʻAclûn	--	Hums
11	Kâhta ve Gerger	Adana	Birecik	Gazze	--	--
12	Rum-kal'a	Tarsus	Deyr ve Rahba	Nablûs	--	--
13	Behisni (Besni)	Sis	Ekrâd	Leccûn	--	--
14	Sis	--	ʻÜzeyrili	--	--	--
15	Şam	--	Salt-Aclûn	--	--	--

Sources: Kürşat Çelik, "Osmanlı Hâkimiyetinde Beyrut (1839-1918)" (PhD Dissertation, Fırat University, 2010), 20.

Province of Damascus that was called *Eyālet-i ʿArab* and *Eyālet-i Şām* consisted of 13 *sanjak*s (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. respectively) and 47 *ḳażā*s according to the *Qānūn-nāme* issued in 1522 during the reign of Suleymān I (1520-1566).[164] In addition to these, there were 31 *ḳażā*s in the Arab regions (Diyār-ı ʿArab) including Egypt and the Ḥejāz in the same year.

[162] Çakar, 356.

[163] İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı* (Ankara: AKDTYK Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988), 327.

[164] Enver Çakar, "Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Kanun-nâmesine Göre 1522 Yılında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İdarî Taksimatı," *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 12, no. 1 (2002): 266-267, 281.

Table 3.2 Administrative Structure of Ottoman Syria (1521-1740)

TSAM 9772 (1521)	TSMA 5246 (1527)	BOA MMD 459 1570	BOA MAD 563 (1568-74)	BOA KK 262 (1578-88)	BOA Cev.D 6095; BOA KK 266 (1631-32)	Sofyalı Ali Çavuş Kanunname (1653)	BOA KK 593 Mülk. (1717-30)	BOA ARSK BOA NŞT (1700-40)
Şam	Şam	Şam	Şam	Şam	Kuds-i Şerif	Şam-ı Şerif	Kal'a-i Kerek	Şam
Gazze maa Remle	Adana	Gazze	Kuds-i Şerif	Trablus (müstakil beylerbeyilik)	Gazze	Leccun	Kuds-i Şerif	Kal'a-i Kerek
Kuds-i Şerif	Haleb	Nablus	Gazze	Safed	Safed ,Sayda ve Beyrut	Sayda	Gazze	Kuds-i Şerif
Safed	Tarablus	Safed	Trablus	Kudüs	Nablus	Safed	Leccun	Gazze
Haleb	Kuds-i Şerif ve Gazze	Trablus	Safed	Salt (ve) Aclun	(Cebel-i) Aclun	Gazze	Nablus	Leccun
Trablus	Hama ve Humus	Cebele	Nablus	Gazze	Leccun	Beyrut	-	Baalbek
Hama ve Humus	Anteb	Kuds-i Şerif	Aclun	Nablus	Tedmir	Kuds-i Şerif	-	-
Ayntab	Sis	Aclun Leccun	Kerek ve Şevbek	Leccun	Kerek-i Şevbek	Nablus	-	-
Antakya	Tarsus	Humus	Leccun	Kerek ve Şevbek	-	Kerek ve Şevbek		
Birecik	Nablus ve Safed	-	Humus	Cebele Trablusa ilhak olunmuştur	-	Aclun		
Adana ve Çukurabad	Birecik	-	Tedmür	Tedmür	-	Tedmür		
Tarsus	Deyr ve Rahbe	-	Salhat	Beyrut ve Sayda merfu'dur	-			-
Sis	Ekrad	-	Beyrut ve Sayda (sonradan ilave)	Humus (Trablus'a tabi'dir	-			-
Divriii	Üzeyli	-	Cebele	-	-			-
Malatya	Salt (ve) Aclun	-	-	-	-			-
Kâhta-Gerger Behisni ve Hısn-ı Mansur	-	-	-	-	-			-

Sources: Kenan Ziya Taş, "Suriye'nin (Şam) Osmanlı Hâkimiyetindeki İdari Yapısı," *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* 15 (2000): 84.

More specifically, in 1522, the *sanjak* of Damascus comprised six *ḳażā*'s such as Mahrūse-i Şām, Baʿalbek, Beyrūt, Ṣayda, Kerek-Nūh and Ḳārā; and a year later, the same *sanjak* had 19 *nāḥiye*s.[165] These *nāḥiye*s were: Baʿalbek, Beyrūt, Cürd-i Beyrūt, Cubbetü'l-ʿAssāl ve'l-Ḳārā, Dārānī ve'l-Billān, el-Metn, Garb-i Beyrūt, Gūṭa ve'l-Merc, Ḥammāre and Şūfü'l-Beyād, Ḥavrān, Kisrevān, Kerek-Nūḥ, Cizzīn and Şūfü'l-Harrādīn, Ṣayda, Şūf İbn Maʿan, Şaʿra and İḳlīmü'z-Zebīb, Vādīü'l-ʿAcem, Vādīü't-Taym and Hūla, Zebedānī and Vādī Beradā.[166]

We see that the province of Damascus encompassed a wide range of territory. The Ottomans, considering the regional dynamics of the Middle East, firstly organized the province of Aleppo in 1549, and later the province of Tripoli in 1579, to consolidate their imperial control over the regions geographically far-off from Istanbul.

3.0.3 Middle Eastern Geography, Religious Minorities and Druzes

As the geographical features of the Middle East region determined the Ottoman relations and struggles with peripheral elements to a certain extent, the physical geography of the Middle East have a special place in the context of this thesis. Extending to North Africa, the Middle East has a number of deserts, including the Ṣaḥārā, which is still considered the world's largest desert. Others are the Arabian, the Syrian and the Sinai deserts. The region is not restricted only to these four deserts. It is also home to three great and voluminous rivers giving life to a wide range of territory such as the Nile, the Tigris and the Euphrates. Last but not least, the mountain ranges, particularly those in central and southwestern Syria and Lebanon, played a pivotal role in our context. The Zagros and the Taurus are the largest mountain ranges, the Jabal al-Nusayriyya, the Jabal Druze, Mount Lebanon, and the Anti-Lebanon and the Shouf Mountains are other smaller mountain systems.

When the Ottomans conquested the Middle East, they encountered the various settled, nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples, a considerable number of which lived in the high mountains. These included Arabs, Kurds, Persians, and Turcomans along with the religious minorities including Alawis, Christians, Jews, Shiites (Ismaili,

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[165] Enver Çakar, "XVI. Yüzyılda Şam Beylerbeyiliğinin İdarî Taksimatı," 366.

[166] English versions of the *nāḥiye*s take place in the first two pages behind the front cover of Bakhit's book. These are as follows: Baʿlabakk, Bayrūt, Jurd Bayrūt, Jubbat al-ʿAssāl wa al-Qārā, Dārānī wa al-Billān, al-Matn, Gharb Bayrūt, Ghūṭa wa al-Marj, Ḥammāra and Shūf al-Bayād, Ḥawrān, Kisrawān, Karak Nūḥ, Jızzīn and Shūf al-Harādīn, Ṣaydā, Shūf Ibn Maʿn, al-Shaʿra and Iqlīm Zabīb, Wādī al-ʿAjam, Wādī al-Taym and al-Hūla, Zabadānī and Wādī Barad. For more information: Bakhit, *The Ottoman Province of Damascus*, 0-i. In this region, the Druzes, Alawis, Christians and Maronites lived together. The Maronites predominantly lived in Kisrawān and Batrūn.

Twelver and Zaydi Shiites) and Yazidis.[167] Certainly, there were also the Druzes[168], who were one of the most significant ethno-religious groups living in the highlands in the region. The mountainous regions played a considerably important role in defining the relationships between the Ottoman administrations and the Druzes.

As the Ottomans began consolidating their administrative power, they strove to establish a master-servant relationship with the local peoples, particularly the Druzes. Enduring Druze resistance in Lebanon and Southern Syria against Ottoman rule paved the way for almost two centuries of tension between Istanbul and the Syrian littoral.

3.1 Istanbul-Syrian Littoral: Struggles Phase I (1516-1590)

3.1.1 A Peripheral "Nuisance": The Early Maʿnids and the Druze Rebellions (1516-1697)

As we stive to analyze the Druze rebellions, we see not the Druze community's continued rebelliousness but the local activities of the leading Druze figures. The Maʿnids assumed the leadership of the Druze community together with several other families.[169] Nevertheless, the Maʿnids were the most pre-eminent Druze family. Their high status drove them to a position that went hand-in-hand with the Druze rebellions.

In his illuminating 2001 article, Abu-Husayn probes into the Druze rebellions and

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[167] Jane Hathaway and Karl Barbir, *The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule*, 25-34.

[168] Jane Hathaway and Karl Barbir, 33. In his book, Philip K. Hitti, offers an abridged account of the general history of the Druze community. He conveys the various discussions with reference to the racial origins of the Druzes in a detailed way, which has not still lost its currency until recently. Ultimately, based on the movements of migration to Southern Syria and Lebanon, religious vocabulary and the ethnic backgrounds of the missionaries, he draws a conclusion that the Druzes were strongly connected to both the Persians and a considerable number of people that were Persianized: Philip K. Hitti, *The Origins of the Druze People and Religion* (New York: BiblioBazaar, 2007), 21-37. In his article, M. C. Şehabeddin Tekindağ, also delves deeply into the discussion with regard to the ethnic background of the Druzes: M. C. Tekindağ, "Dürzî Tarihine Dâir Notlar," *İ.Ü.E.F. Tarih Dergisi* 7, no. 10 (September 1954): 143-156. M. C. Şihabeddin Tekindağ and M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, in their encyclopedia entries, furnish us a lengthy account of the general history of the Druzes from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century: M. C. Şihabeddin Tekindağ and M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Dürzîler," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1997): 665-680. From a religious studies standpoint, Tan points out how the Druze sect emerged, developed and spread while outlining the religious understanding and principals of the Druzes. Additionally, he describes the social values and norms of the Druze community: Muzaffer Tan, "Geçmişten Günümüze Dürzîlik," *e-Makâlât Mezhep Araştırmaları Dergisi* 5/2 (2012): 61-82; Aytekin Şenzeybek, "Dürziliğin Teşekkül Süreci," *e-Makâlât Mezhep Araştırmaları Dergisi* 8/1 (2015): 87-133; Ahmet Bağlıoğlu, *Orta Doğu Siyasi Tarihinde Dürziler* (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi Basımevi, 2006), 1-27; Aydın Çelik, *Fâtımîler Devleti Tarihi (909-1171)* (Ankara: AKDTYK Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2018), 251-292.

[169] Abu-Husayn, *The View from Istanbul*, 13.

determines the period between 1516-1697 as the period of their insubordinations.[170] I examine Abu-Husayn's proposed time period, but in three intervals in accordance with new evidence provided by the Ottoman archival sources, including the *Mühimme Register*s. I chose to analyze the period in question (1516-1697) in three consecutive intervals, 1516-1590, 1590-1635 and 1635-1697.

First interval, 1516-1590 refers to the Early Maʿnids and their relations with the Druze rebels and their rebellions. It begins in 1516, a year indicating the start of Ottoman conquests in the Middle East and continues until 1590, when Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn emerged as the leader of the Druze community.[171] The second phase, 1590-1635 principally covers Fakhr al-Dīn's regional activities and policies together with relationships with both the central Ottoman and provincial administrations. The final phase, 1635-1697 elaborates on the regional activities and policies of other members of Maʿnids following Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn's death in 1635. In this period, Aḥmad Maʿn, the last male member of the Maʿnids, appears as the most prominent Druze figure.

In the conventional historiography of early modern Lebanon, the relationships between the Ottoman administrations and Druzes have generally been portrayed as cordial. More specifically, the Druze rebels and the Druze chiefs in particular, were depicted as having being generously rewarded with important positions and with honours and titles.[172]

Some historians endeavoured to legitimate the abovementioned historical assertion through a suspicious historical event that is said to have occurred immediately after the Ottoman conquest of Damascus. It is claimed that when Selīm I was in Damascus, he allegedly entertained the local chieftains, among whom was Fakhr al-Dīn I, who had the control of Shūf, and later, the sultan bestowed him "*the title of ʾamīr al-barr (Lord of the Land)*", which meant that Selīm I acknowledged Fakhr al-Dīn I as a master of all pre-eminent local figures in the Druze Mountain.[173] Fakhr al-Dīn I remained in power until his assassination in 1544, and then Qorqmāz took his father's position.[174]

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[170] Abu-Husayn, "The Long Rebellion," 165-191.

[171] Abu-Husayn specifies that Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn took over the position of *muqaddam* from his father around 1590: Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships*, 74.

[172] Abu-Husayn, *The View from Istanbul*, 14.

[173] Salibi, "Fak̲h̲r al-Dīn," 749.

[174] Salibi, stating this suspicious historical event that has been accepted in the traditional historiography, clarifies that Fakhr al-Dīn I had already deceased in 1506, a decade prior to Ottoman domination in the Middle East. That is to say, he specifies that this historical event was invalid in the modern historiography: Salibi, "The Secret of the House of Ma'n," 277.

Shortly after establishing themselves in the Middle East and Syria, Ottoman administrators had to deal with a number of confrontations, including the rebellions of Jānbirdī Al-Ghazālī (1521) and Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha (1606). Furthermore, there were the bedouin tribes which pursued anti-Ottoman policies on a local level. The Ottomans managed to eliminate those elements which openly questioned their authority. These insurrections generally had a transient nature. But it was not true for the Druzes, who were going to rebel in the course of more than a hundred and fifty years. This situation not only alarmed Ottoman administrations and their functionaries in the provinces but also directly influenced the relations between the two parties, namely, Ottoman central administrations and the Druzes.[175]

As far as we know, in 1518, the first critical incident of insurrection in which several leading Druze figures, including three members of the Maʿnids, took place.[176] When the Ottoman administration detected that some *ʾamīr*s, such as Zayn al-Dīn , Suleimān, and Qorqmāz[177] took part in rebellion of Muhammad Ibn al-Ḥanash,[178] an *ʾamīr* of al-Biḳāʿ (that is the elongated plain commonly called the Bekaa, which lies between the mountains of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon at a mean altitude of 1,000 metres), the insurrection was violently crushed and Muhammad Ibn al-Ḥanash was eliminated. The Maʿnid *ʾamīr*s narrowly evaded sharing Ibn al-Ḥanash's fate and were fined a great amount of gold coins by Ottoman authorities.[179]

What makes this incident significant and unique is not only the Maʿnids' collaboration with Ibn al-Ḥanash, but also the Venetian's surveillance of the region, a situation that would portend the imminent Venetian intervention.[180] As a matter of fact, two years after Ibn al-Ḥanash's rebellion, the Venetians would launch a failed attack on Beirut.[181]

Five years after the Maʿnids' involvement in the rebellion of Ibn al-Ḥanash, in 1523, the Ottoman administration took a military action against the Druzes for the first

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[175] Abu-Husayn, "The Long Rebellion," 165-166.

[176] Abu-Husayn, 167.

[177] Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships*, 76.

[178] Tekindağ has discussed the regional activities of Muhammad Ibn al-Hanash and gives some interesting information with reference to Ibn al-Hanash's rebellion: M. C. Şehabeddin Tekindağ, "Biḳâʾ Emîri Nâsır Ad-Dîn Muhammad İbn Al-Hanaş'a Dâir Bir Vesîka," *Tarih Dergisi* 12 (2011): 107-116; Muhammad Adnan al-Bakhit, "The Role of the Ḥanash Family and the Tasks Assigned to It in the Countryside of Dimashq al-Shām, 790/1388–976/1568; A Documentary Study" In *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, ed. T. Khalidi (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1984), 257-289.

[179] Abu-Husayn, "The Long Rebellion," 167.

[180] Abu-Husayn, 167-168.

[181] Abu-Husayn, *The View from Istanbul*, 14-15.

time.[182] Hürrem Pasha, in his capacity as the *beylerbey* of Damascus, assaulted "*Shūf al-Hayṭī*"[183] and came back to Damascus by bringing "*four loads of Druze heads*"[184] with him along with religiously significant books that they captured, which was a situation that instigated the open hostilities between the Ottoman administrations and the Druze people and determined the course of their future struggles. He burned down the "*village of Bārūk*" together with other "*43 villages*" to ashes.[185] Subsequently, the Ottoman administration entrusted functionaries with the task of ensuring the regional security, specifically in Shūf, and these officials were killed by vengeance-seeking Druzes. The Ottoman administration then ordered Hürrem Pasha to reattack in 1524.[186] As a consequence of his bloody assault, "*another 30 village*"[187] were burned down and pillaged and a large number of people were captured.[188] On top of that, Hürrem Pasha brought another "*three loads of Druze heads*"[189] with him and returned to Damascus in the same year.[190] Meanwhile, the *ʿulemā* adopted a hostile attitude towards the Druze people, which is testified through the *fatwā*s and poems composed at the time.

Several decades would elapse until the post-1550 period, and then there was another series of Druze rebellions (which would be spanning almost two centuries) and would bring the struggles between the Ottoman administrations and the Druzes to an unbearable peak. This period is clearly reflected in a number of Ottoman archival sources. The new orders and decrees (*ḥükm*s) from the Registers of Important Affairs (*Mühimme Defterleri*) form the bases of Abu-Husayn's arguments about the early modern Druze rebellions.

Instead of narrating these *ḥükm*s, which focus primarily on Druze rebellions, I explore them chronologically and individually. The documents in question enable us to see the perspective of the Ottoman governments *vis-à-vis* the Druze but also to see how defiant the Druze were to Ottoman imperial orders dispatched. The documents also show that the rebels were able to obtain a great number of muskets in

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[182] Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships*, 76-77.

[183] Abu-Husayn, 77.

[184] Bakhit, *The Ottoman Province of Damascus*, 164.

[185] Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.; Bakhit, loc.cit.

[186] Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.

[187] Bakhit, op.cit., 165.

[188] Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.

[189] Bakhit, loc.cit.

[190] Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.

the region.

As far as we know, the initial critical event that triggered the insurrection was the hanging of Yūnus Maʿn by the Ottoman administration on a date that we do not know. More specifically, he was one of the ancestors of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn, the most well-known leader of the Maʿnids.[191] Abu-Husayn remarks that the said incident was related to the subsequent rebellions that took place in Southern Syria[192] as we shall see below. If we take a close look at these subsequent rebellions through the eleven *ḥükm*s, in addition to those uncovered and discussed by Abu-Husayn, it is easy to see that his statements are quite convincing. The *ḥükm*s that I would like to bring to attention are as follows:

On 22 Rabīʿ Al-ʾĀkhir (Rabīʿ Al-Thānī), 975/26 October 1567, the Ottoman sultan pointed out that the *sanjak-bey* of Bayrūt came to Istanbul and demanded a firman from him to confiscate muskets that *muqaddam*s possessed[193] and diffused among their people, *reʿāyā*, referring to the Druze community. Afterwards, he orders those to assist the afore-mentioned *sanjak-bey* to disarm whoever possessed muskets and deliver them to the Damascus fortress (*Şām Ḳalʿası*) after collecting them.[194]

On 7 Shawwāl, 978/4 March 1571, the Ottoman sultan stated, in preparation for his campaign in Cyprus, that his orders for an adequate supply of archers (*ḳavvās*) in the district of Bayrūt (*ḳażāʾ-yı Beyrūt*) was only partially fulfilled. Some local figures in the western *nāḥiye* (a subdivision of the *ḳażāʾ*) of Beyrūt, such as Sharaf ad-Dīn, *muqaddam* Sayf ad-Dīn, Badr al-Dīn and *muqaddam* Qāʾit Bāy did not dispatch a single person. They had been obligated to provide the requested 175, 47, 108 and 63 *ḳavvās*es, respectively. The sultan criticized *ʾamīr* Manṣūr, another *muqaddam*, owing to the fact that he gathered 50 *ḳavvās*es from the Muslim community despite not formally being commissioned for this task and then, took away them to Cyprus for the conquest. The sultan added that every *muqaddam* thwarted the *sanjak subashi*s and *ḳāḍi nāʾib*s from carrying out their offical duties in the *nāḥiye*s that they controlled. Furthermore, he suggested that they possessed more than 10.000 muskets. Thereafter, the sultan ordered the provincial governor of Damascus to provide the remaining *ḳavvās*es needed and to fine the *hāne*s who were liability to furnish and transfer *ḳavvās*es if they did not arrive. Finally, the sultan ordered *ḳāḍi*s

[191] Abu-Husayn, "The Korkmāz Question," 9-10.

[192] Abu-Husayn, "The Long Rebellion," 171.

[193] The term "*muqaddam*" in Arabic has a terminologically a wide array of definitions in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. Among others, it also denoted a leader. It fundamentally refers to a local leader in our context. Norman A. Stillman, "Muqaddam," *Encyclopedia of Jews in The Islamic World*, vol. 3 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010): 492-493.

[194] BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 7/400.

to flawlessly assist the men of Manṣūr in affording and transferring the *ḳavvāses*.[195]

A little over a year later, on 16 Rabīʿ Al-ʾĀkhir (Rabīʿ Al-Thānī), 980/26 August 1572, the Ottoman sultan specified that the Druze community possessed copious numbers of muskets in Damascus and its surrounding areas. Consequently, he ordered the provincial governor of Damascus to appoint functionaries who would confiscate any muskets, whether belonging to the Druze community or other Arabs and, to deliver them to Istanbul without delay.[196]

On 26 Dhū Al-Qaʿdah 983/26 February 1576, the Ottoman sultan pointed out that the provincial governor of Damascus sent a letter to Istanbul, which informed the sultan that, a large number of muskets that the Druze community possessed have to be collected for the state (*mīrī*). The sultan added that the previous provincial governor also collected some muskets. He ordered if the Druze community or anyone possessed muskets, those, too, should be collected for the state under the *beylerbey* of Damascus's watch until they could be delivered to Istanbul. Moreover, the sultan ordered the *beylerbey* to collect the muskets from both *sheikh*s and *muqaddam*s, and also instructed that 1-2 muskets from each *hāne* be collected through the practice of ʿ*avāriż*. He added if the Druze community opposed these directives, he ordered the *beylerbey* to not hesitate in utilizing military support from Dhū al-Qadr and Aleppo, where the Ottoman administration dispatched a related imperial decree to vanquish any resistance.[197]

In another *ḥükm*, the Ottoman sultan pointed out that Cafer Pasha, the provincial governor of Damascus, sent him a letter with reference to the Druze community's abundant number of muskets. *Sheikhe*s and *muqaddam*s were invited to help to confiscate 1-2 muskets from each *hāne* through the practice of ʿ*avāriż*. He ordered the provincial governor of Aleppo to assist Cafer Pasha by appointing functionaries from not only ʾ*amīr*s, *zuʿamāʾ* and *sipāhī*s, but also the officials from *umerāʾ* and then, to dispatch them to him so that Cafer Pasha could vanquish the villains.[198]

Over a year later, on 27 Rajab, 985/10 October 1577, the sultan noted that *sheikh*s and *muqaddam*s of the Druze community, in conjunction with more than 2000 bandits musketeers, assaulted the *ḫavāṣṣ-ı humāyūn* villages, murdered approximately 25-30 persons in each *ḳarye*, pillaged the properties and livestock, and inter-

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[195] BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 14.2/1668.

[196] H. Muharrem Bostancı, "19 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (Tahlil-Metin)" (Master's Thesis, Istanbul University, 2002), 487-488.

[197] Yasemin Aydın, "27 Numaralı Mühimme Defterinin Transkripsiyonu ve Değerlendirilmesi (s. 280-408)" (Master's Thesis, Atatürk University, 2014), 122.

[198] Aydın, 123.

cepted wayfarers. He added that the Maʿnids and the Shihābs, including a certain Mümerreddīn ("ممرالدين ?") and Bezo ("بزو ?") committed mass murder. The sultan had retrospectively reminded that the rebels (*ṭāʾife*) had been dealt with and their muskets had been dispatched to Istanbul. He ordered the provincial governor of Damascus to confiscate muskets belonging to rebels and loyal Ottomans and have them dispatched to Istanbul. Those responsible for *ḳatl-i nüfūs* and plunder of properties (*ġāret-i emvāl*) were to be vanquished in accordance with the imperial decree. From his statements, we evidently see that the sultan wanted the *beylerbey* to punish the rebels as a warning or deterrent to others.[199]

Not long thereafter, on 6 Muḥarram, 986/15 March 1578, the Ottoman sultan ordered the provincial governor of Damascus to exile Saleh (*Ṣāliḥ*), who held a large *zeāmet* in Damascus, to Cyprus after he sold muskets to the Druze community. However, considering some unignorable services of Ṣāliḥ, the sultan granted him the opportunity to remain in Damascus, nevertheless, this situation did not hold the sultan back from ordering the *beylerbey* to exile Ṣāliḥ to Cyprus.[200]

On 4 Ramaḍān, 987/25 October 1579, the Ottoman sultan stated that the Qaysis (*Red Flag, Ḳızıl Bayraḳlu*), the Yamanis (*White Flag, Āḳ Bayraḳlu*) and the Druze had large numbers of muskets in Ṭarābulus and those who went to the port of Ṭarābulus, Ṣaydā and Bayrūt sold muskets to the *ṭāʾife* for high prices. Thereafter, the sultan ordered that the provincial governor of Ṭarābulus have the said ports checked through some persons to capture the muskets of those who traded in firearm, and to confiscate the muskets that the *ṭāʾife* possessed.[201]

On 11 Ṣafar, 990/7 March 1582, the Ottoman sultan pointed out that the Druze were still being provided with muskets, a great variety of guns and ammunition as well as items as significant as the other guns. He also outlined that some leading figures who arrived the port of Acre (ʿAkkā) surreptitiously sold the muskets which fell into the category of guns, which were repeatedly issued in imperial decrees forbidding such activities. Thereafter, the sultan ordered the *bey* of Ṣafad and the *ḳāḍi* of Acre to have the ships checked by some trustworthy persons, to confiscate the muskets and to vanquish those who defied the orders (*. . . iṭāʿat-i emr eylemeyenlerin şerle ḥaḳlarından gelesiz. . .*).[202]

A year later, on 26 Ṣafar, 991/21 March 1583, the Ottoman sultan specified that the

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[199]BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 31/801.

[200]BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 33/761.

[201]BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 40/536.

[202]BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 46/854.

Druze employed guns and muskets (... *yarāḳ ve tüfeng ḳullanub...*), brought about disorder (... *fesād-u şenāʿat üzre olub...*) and did not obey the sharīʿah (... *şerʿ-i şerife iṭāʿat etmedikleri...*). Consequently, the sultan ordered Cafer, who was responsible for security of Ṭarābulus province, and the local *ḳāḍi*s to warn *ṭāʾife* not to utilize guns and muskets and to confiscate the firearms that they possessed. The sultan ordered them to vanquish those who refused.[203]

If we are to take a closer look at these *ḥükm*s, we can, albeit only partly, see the Ottoman administrations' perception *vis-à-vis* the Druze community. In the *ḥükm* from 7 Shawwāl, 978/4 March 1571, the Ottoman administration pointed out that the majority of the population of Gürün ("كرون / كرولن?") district, being Druze, were infidel (... *ehālīsinin ekṣerī "kāfir" olub...*).[204] At first glance, this Ottoman imperial statement might make no sense to some of us. However, it may also hint at the Ottoman perception of the periphery. If we consider the Ottomans' claim to be the sole and dominant representative of the Orthodox Islam (Sunni Islam) and their strict religious principles along with their centralist inclinations, it can be suggested that the Ottoman administrations took a dim view of the unruly acts of the Druzes. The Druze were openly disobedient to the Ottoman authority. They obtained large numbers of muskets, did not pay obligatory taxes, and obstructed functionaries who were in charge of collecting taxes. Their faith decidedly did not comply with the Ottomans' faith, which provoked open hostility and a deep sense of alienation between the Ottoman administrations and the Druze community. In the same *ḥükm*, the Ottoman administration utilized an expression "*hınzīr*"[205] (treacherous in English) and implied that the Druze were a dangerous and treacherous community that could not be trusted (... *laḥm-ı hınzīrlık idüb...*)[206] by referring to their openly defiant activities in the region.[207] Secondly, it is possible to view this description, *laḥm-ı hınzīr*[208] in terms of a religious connotation. The Ottomans were primarily monotheistic, that is, Sunni Muslims. On the other hand, the Druze community had many religious principles that completely clashed with those of the Ottomans. The Druze people, for example, accepted al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh (r.

[203] BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 44/337.

[204] BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 14.2/1668.

[205] In Kubbealtı Lugatı, the word "*hınzīr*" in Turkish principally has two meanings: (1) *domuz*, that is, pig in English and (2) *hāʾin*, or one who did treachery in English: İlhan Ayverdi, *Asırlar Boyu Târihî Seyri İçinde Misalli Büyük Türkçe Sözlük (Kubbealtı Lugatı)* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları-Kubbealtı, 2011): 502.

[206] Based on the definitions of the abovementioned word in the dictionary, we can translate "*laḥm-ı hınzīrlık idüb*" into both Turkish and English as *domuzluk/hāʾinlik etmek* and *to do treachery.*

[207] BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 14.2/1668.

[208] In Kubbealtı Lugatı, the phrase "*laḥm-ı hınzīr*" in both Turkish and English means *domuz eti*, that is, *pork meat.*

996-1021), a Fatimid caliph, as a God and Hamza ibn ʿAlī, a vizier of al-Ḥākim, as a prophet. They believed in *taqammuṣ* and *tajalli* (transmigration and theophany).[209] Their religious principles led them to be perceived as the most sinister heretics in the eyes of the Ottomans. Apart from those outlined above, it is also possible to see the various statements that hinted at the Ottoman perception of the periphery in the *ḥükm*s of other Registers of Important Affairs.[210] We can assume from the above-mentioned statements that the differences in the religious principles had a crucial role in influencing the struggles between the Ottoman administrators and the Druze and shaping the Ottoman imperial perception *vis-à-vis* the periphery, in the name of the Druze community. Consequently, we see that Ottoman administrations, for the most part, associated the Druze community with heresy over expressions such as "*kāfir and laḥm-ı hınzīr*".

There are clear indicators as to why the Druze were disinclined to readily accept Ottoman rule. First of all, as pointed above, the Druze community was associated with heresy over expressions such as "*kāfir and laḥm-ı hınzīr*", and considered to be infidels by both the Ottoman administrations and the foremost Sunni religious figures ever since the Ottomans started to dominate Greater Syria. Accordingly, this made the Druzes felt insecure, which drove them to a state of incessant protests and rebellion against Ottoman administrations. Secondly, Ottomans' restrictive regional trade policies was a destructive blow to the commercial and economic welfare of the Druzes in the region.[211] These impelled them to clandestinely cooperate with the Venetians. Last but not least, the characteristic features of the Druze community,[212] the topographical challenges of the mountain ranges in the region, and the easy accesses to fire-arms, were other significant determinants that gave rise to Druze rebellions.[213]

Undoubtedly, the matter of access to firearms (*tüfeng*), an indispensable component of an early modern rebellion, raises a key question. Considering the large number of

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[209] Mustafa Öz, "Dürzîlik," *TDVİA*, vol. 10 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1994): 39-48.

[210] These *ḥükm*s are M.D. 5, No. 565, M.D. 46, No. 30b and M.D. 49, No. 110: Abu-Husayn, *The View from Istanbul*, 24-25, 30, 31-32.

[211] Abu-Husayn, "The Long Rebellion," 178.

[212] Zinkeisen makes interesting comparisons on this matter. He points out that the Mardaites, who he accepts as the ancestors of the Druze people, bore striking resemblances to the Shqiptars (an ethnic denomination that the Albanians gave themselves) who protected the freedom of the Christendom from the Ottomans would-be Islamic despotism. According to him, the Mardaites, settled in mid south-western Greater Syria by the Byzantine emperors, who functioned as a protective shield against Arab and Turkish assaults. He implies that the same situation held for the Druze. Zinkeisen implies that the Druze were a tough warrior and refractory community like their ancestors. In this way, we can see that he alludes to the characteristic features of the Druze community: Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol. 4 (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011): 55-56.

[213] Abu-Husayn, loc. cit.

muskets provided in the region, instead of the question "who" - the question "which state(s) did furnish muskets for the Druze community?" stands out. It was the Venetians.[214]

When the Ottomans conquered Constantinople in 1453, they continued to extend their territorial acquisitions in Southeastern Europe, the Aegean and Black Seas, which resulting in Venice losing trading stations. Naturally, this situation seriously affected the Venetians' extant commercial networks. As a consequence, they were concentrated on their commercial activities in both Egypt and Syria. This meant the Venetians would create a monopoly in the region, and Bayrūt would become prominent seaport.[215] However, half a century later, Selīm I conquered significant parts of the Middle East, including Syria and Egypt. This reduced Venetian commercial activities and, on the local level, their beneficiaries, who included the Druze community. It was not a coincidence that some Druze figures took part in Ibn al-Ḥanash' rebellion (1518) and the Venetians' assault of Bayrūt in 1520.

From the 16$^{\text{th}}$ century onwards, the Venetians started to furnishing the Druzes with a great number of muskets from Cyprus, a Venetian base.[216] Through the *ḥükm*s listed above we can see that diffusion of the *tüfeng*s was one of the primary reasons for the struggles between the Ottoman administrations and the Druzes.[217]

What disturbed Ottoman administrations was the proliferation of muskets in the region. Ottoman administrations had extremely stringent principles about not permitting the *reʿāyā*, the ordinary subjects, to utilize firearms. This rule held for "*even the derbendci reʿāyā*"[218] (derbendji). Particularly, the *Qizilbāsh* activities in the 16$^{\text{th}}$ century prompted the Ottomans to periodically inspect whether the *reʿāyā* possessed muskets and adhered strictly to imperial decrees or not. The fact that possessing the large number of muskets could engender disturbances and enable brigandry and could inflame violence, played a prominent role in the Ottomans' rigid policy.[219] This is why, the Ottomans were keen on disarming their *reʿāyā*s without

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[214] Ibid.

[215] Abu-Husayn, *The View from Istanbul*, 17.

[216] Abu-Husayn, 17-18.

[217] Apart from those that I have utilized in this thesis, the *ḥükm*s in regard to a large number of musket acquisition, the rapid proliferation and diffusion of the muskets among the Druze people are also seen in M.D. 26, No. 101, M.D. 5, No. 565, M.D. 5, No. 1091, M.D. 26, No. 488, M.D. 27, No. 686, M.D. 46, No. 30b, M.D. 46, No. 518, M.D. 42, No. 273 and M.D. 49, No. 443: Abu-Husayn, 24-33.

[218] Halil İnalcık, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East," In *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, eds. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 195.

[219] Ibid.

discriminating against any region in the Empire. To give a specific example, the case of Kayseri proves that the Ottomans were quite determined to keep the *reʿāyā* in check through musket-controls in the first quarter of the 17th century.[220]

It is understood that the Ottoman administrations' disturbances concerning muskets was not solely focused on the Druze. These policies applied to other communities, such as Arabs, Christians living in Rumelia, Georgians, Kurds, Lazi and Turks living in Asia Minor, who seem to have possessed a great number of muskets.[221] We can also add the Bedouins to this list in that they were as active as other communities with regard to the muskets.[222] To make a long story short, the prohibitions were precautions that were taken by the Ottomans in the potential event of internal security concerns.

The other significant factor was that the Druze did not punctually pay their taxes and also seriously delayed the total sum that they were obligated to pay. To top it all off, they made the process of collecting the taxes unbearable for the officials appointed by the Ottoman administrations, a process including also the acquisition of muskets that greatly aggravated the struggles between the Ottoman administrations and the Druzes. The seriousness of the process was also demonstrated through the considerable number of the *ḥükm*s in the *Mühimme Registers*.[223]

These issues were not special to the first phase of Ottoman rule in Syria. As Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn (1572-1635), Aḥmad Maʿn (d. 1697) and their regional activities overwhelmingly dominated the second and third periods respectively, with the issues relating to the possession of muskets and tax evasion remained in the background almost until the closing of the 17th century. For example, in a *ḥükm* dated 25 Shaʿbān, 1056/6 October 1646, the Ottoman sultan pointed out that Shaʿbān, a functionary in Ṣafad, sent a letter to Istanbul saying that subjects living in Ṣafad did not pay their taxes, resisted collection efforts. Thereafter, the sultan ordered

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[220] Ronald C. Jennings, "Firearms, Bandits and Gun-Control: Some Evidence on Ottoman Policy towards Firearms in the Possession of Reaya from Judicial Records of Kayseri, 1600-1627," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 339-358.

[221] İnalcık, op.cit., 201. Mücteba İlgürel, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Ateşli Silahların Yayılışı," *Tarih Dergisi* (2011): 301-318.

[222] Uriel Heyd affords us a number of unanalyzed *ḥükm*s that treats the Bedouins in the context of both their rebellions and problems of musket acquisitions. These are M.D. 33, No. 316, M.D. 36, No. 798, M.D. 7, No. 34, M.D. 46, No. 518 and M.D. 44, No. 393, respectively: Uriel Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615: A Study of the Firman According to the Mühimme Defteri* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 81-83; 87-89.

[223] The *ḥükm*s in regard to this matter are M.D. 5, No. 565, M.D. 26, No. 488, M.D. 29, No. 70, M.D. 46, No. 30b, M.D. 46, No. 518, M.D. 52, No. 969: Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 24-31, 33-34. The rigid attitudes of the Ottoman administrations with reference to the policy of collecting the taxes were not restricted to the Druze community. We see that the Ottoman administrations bluntly and sometimes menacingly warned the *bey*s, the *ḳāḍi*s, the *defterdār*s and the *beylerbey*s with regard to carefully executing their duties. These *ḥükm*s are M.D. 7, No. 384, M.D. 23, No. 724, M.D. 26, No. 39, M.D. 31, No. 690, M.D. 6, No. 78, M.D. 3, No. 1659 and M.D. 59, No. 178: Heyd, op.cit., 118-125.

that the tax collector (*müteselli*m) of Damascus collect the said taxes.[224] Apart from this, we also encounter a considerable number of *ḥükm*s that completes the existing general picture of the Druze rebellions (1516-1697).

Some of the *ḥükm*s compiled in the *Mühimme Registers* in the period of 1516-1590 furnish critical historical data concerning the Maʿnids. In one of those *ḥükm*s, the sultan stressed that Qorqmāz ibn Maʿn (d. 1585), who was the father of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn, was the worst and the most dangerous rebel among his counterparts. Moreover, the sultan bluntly stated that Qorqmāz ibn Maʿn incited disorder.[225]

The Maʿnids were perceived by the Ottoman administrations as the most threatening local family who had damaged the Ottomans' regional authority. For the Ottoman administrations, the Druze rebellions had been far from controllable. The remoteness of the region from the imperial capital had a significant role in this. Naturally, this drove Ottoman administrators to embark on the punitive military actions or made administrative arrangements.

Ottoman administrators planned a military action against the Druze community in 1574.[226] The following *ḥükm* details the military operation: On 1 Jumādā Al-ʾĀkhirah (Jumādā Al-Thānī), 982/18 September 1574, the Ottoman sultan pointed out that the *beylerbey* of Damascus sent a detailed letter regarding the precaution and provision against the Druze community who were in the vicinity of the *sanjak* of Ṭarābulus, along the seaside and the mountain slope. The *ṭāʾife* wandered through and around the mountains. The sultan specified that the *beylerbey* stated in case that the Druze were assaulted by the sea, they would climb the mountain(s) and, at this exact point, a military force who utilized the muskets would be deployed. Moreover, he also stated when the grand vizier, Sinān Pasha, reached with the Ottoman imperial navy, they would arrive that side to vanquish the *ṭāʾife-i mezbūre*. However, the sultan ordered the *beylerbey* to prepare and to provide an adequate amount of grain from the areas around the seaport of Ṭrāblus and, to bring it to the seaport of Ṭrāblus until the aforesaid grand vizier would arrive. The sultan ordered that the grand vizier to lead the janissaries bearing muskets along the coast when the battle began, whereupon they should climb the mountain along with the infantry to capture and vanquish the Druze.[227]

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[224]Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *91 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (H. 1056) (Özet - Çeviri Yazı - Tıpkıbasım)* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2015), 239.

[225]The related *ḥükm* is M.D. 46, No. 30b: Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 30.

[226]Abu-Husayn, "The Long Rebellion," 172-173.

[227]BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 26/614.

Though the abovementioned *ḥükm*, dated 1574, offers precise details with regard to the intended military operation, we do not know whether it was executed or not. Abu-Husayn points out that the local sources are silent with regard to this planned expedition.[228] Moreover, he adds that even if the expedition had occurred, this military action - on the Ottoman administration's part - fell far short of the aims of eliminating the Druze problem. He corroborates his argument by explaining the Druze's regional activities that followed.[229]

Approximately a decade after the intended expedition, in 1585, the Ottoman administration embarked on a large-scaled military operation against the Druze. The Druze campaign of 1585 (known as *Dürūzī muḥārebesi*) has a prominent place not only in the context of struggles with the Syrian littoral but also in the Ottoman administration's perception of the Druze. It also casts light on the Early Modern history of the Ottoman Bilād al-Shām, Greater Syria.[230] Notwithstanding its mainspring had been ascribed to the robbery of a tribute in the traditional historiography until the 1980s[231], the Druze campaign of 1585, which we can also interpret as the sharpest one among all the military expeditions mounted against the long-drawn-out Druze rebellions, was fundamentally the upshot of the cumulative effects of the Druze's anti-Ottoman activities for almost 70 years such as their having smuggled muskets and avoided tax payments.[232] The process left the Ottoman administrations with no choice except to conduct military operations and making the regional arrangements on the administrative level.

As a consequence of the Druze campaign of 1585, Dāmād Ibrāhīm Pasha (d.

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[228] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 173.

[229] Abu-Husayn, "The Ottoman Invasion of the Shūf," 19-20.

[230] Abu-Husayn, 13.

[231] Ibid. See also: Kamal Salibi, "Fakẖr al-Dīn," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, vol. 2 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1991): 749. Before presenting his counter argument in a detail with regard to the matter of Jūn ʿAkkār, Abu-Husayn provides a part of the extant traditional narrative with a slightly different version. He points out that the tribute was securely transported to Istanbul by sea. The rapine of the tribute in Jūn ʿAkkār in no way transpired. He corroborates his argument by adducing the adequate historical evidence from the contemporary primary sources including the *Tārīh-i Selānikī* (History of Selānikī). He stresses that the root cause of the Druze campaign of 1585 was not the plunder of the tribute in Jūn ʿAkkār. According to him, the fundamental reason behind the Druze campaign of 1585 were that the Druze people held a great number of muskets and did not pay their taxes: Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Selânikî Mustafa Efendi Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1003/1563-1595)*, vol. 1, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), 159-160. Apart from Selānikī Muṣṭafā Effendi, Ḥassan Bey-Zāde Aḥmed Pasha (d. 1636-37), another Ottoman chronicler, verifies that the tribute was safely conveyed from Egypt to Istanbul. He states the related process in that way: "*... İbrāhīm Paşa-yı kişver-güşā... vālī-i vilāyet-i Mıṣır olub... ṭā'ife-i Dürūzī üzerine hücūm... ve maʿdûm eyledükden soñra... Ḳapudān Kılıc ʿAlī Paşa... İbrāhīm Paşa'yı rākib-i merākib-i baḥriyye idüb... Mıṣır hazīnesini... ḳadırgalara taḥmīl idüb... Dārü'l-hilāfe İstanbul'a getürdi...*" : Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Paşa, *Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Paşa Hasan Bey-Zâde Târîhi (Tahlil-Kaynak Tenkidi)*, vol. 2, ed. Şevki Nezihi Aykut (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2004), 321-322.

[232] Abu-Husayn, loc. cit.

1601),[233] a *beylerbey* of Egypt, managed to disarm the Druze community and to collect the taxes required, albeit with great difficulty.[234] Ḥassan Bey-Zāde Aḥmed Pasha (d. 1636-37), a member of the imperial chancery, a finance official and historian, hinted that Ibrāhīm Pasha delivered the taxes after returning to Istanbul.[235] Ibrāhīm Pasha also captured a considerable number of leading local Druze figures from Mount Lebanon.[236] Qorqmāz ibn Maʿn, father of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn, died during the campaign of 1585.[237]

Ottoman endeavours to bring the region under their absolute control were not restricted to military action. Later, the Ottoman administration implemented a number of administrative arrangements following military intervention. The Ottoman administration established the province of Druze (known as *vilāyet-i Dürūz*), subsequently to be called the province of Ṣayda, to consolidate its imperial control over the Druze community in the region.[238] We can see this administrative regulation through a *ḥükm* dated 28 Jumādā Al-ʾAwwal (Jumādā Al-ʾŪlā), 993/28 May 1585.

In this *ḥükm*, the Ottoman sultan ordered Muṣṭafā, one of the functionaries at the court, to govern the *vilāyet*s captured from the cursed Druzes (*Dürūzī melāʿīn*) and the Maʿnids owing to his services and usefulness. This meant that the governor-generalship (*beylerbeyilik*) of province of Druze (*Dürūz/Dürūzī beylerbeyliği*) was conferred on Muṣṭafā.[239]

For all the regional arrangements on the administrative level, the province of Druze did not live long. However, this situation did not hold the Ottoman administrations back from making other administrative regulations in the region in the subsequent periods.[240]

The Druze campaign of 1585 brought the tangible rewards of victory. In the post-campaign period, we see that the Ottoman administration granted those who fought against the Druze people rewards, including appointments from *beylerbeyilik* or

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[233] In his chronicle, Kātib Chelebi (1609-1657) provides a potted biography of Dāmād Ibrāhīm Pasha: Katip Çelebi, *Katip Çelebi Fezleke [Osmanlı Tarihi (1000-1065/1591-1655)]*, vol. 1, ed. Zeynep Aycibin (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım, 2016), 233.

[234] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 21.

[235] Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Paşa, *Hasan Bey-Zâde Ahmed Paşa Hasan Bey-Zâde Târîhi (Tahlil-Kaynak Tenkidi)*, vol. 2, ed. Şevki Nezihi Aykut (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2004), 322.

[236] Abu-Husayn, loc. cit.

[237] Abu-Husayn, 13.

[238] Abu-Husayn, "The Long Rebellion," 180.

[239] BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 50/321.

[240] Abu-Husayn, loc. cit.

sanjak-beyilik to *zeʿāmet/tīmār*. Promotions to higher ranks, salary increases, retirements (*teḳāʿüd*), and promotions to military or administrative positions were also among these imperial rewards. One of the most interesting points in the aforementioned *ḥükm*s are the promotions within the military class.[241] These imperial grants, too, were reflected in the *ḥükm*s in question.

As for the imperial perception of the Ottoman administration at the time, we see no differences compared to the preceding examples. In fact, when critically analyzing the *ḥükm*s, we encounter more stern expressions in them. We have some *ḥükm*s mentioned above that corroborate this statement. To give specific examples, in two *ḥükm*s, both of which are reward-themed, the Ottoman administration utilized the expressions "*ılgar*" or "*Dürūzī ılgarları*"[242] (incursion(s) made into an adversary's territory) and it granted some rewards to those who demonstrated the usefulnesses in the Druze incursion(s), that is, in the Druze campaign of 1585.[243] From the abovementioned imperial statements, we can see that the Ottoman administration identified the Druze not only as infidels but also as enemy. The prime reason why we infer such a meaning from these expressions is the definition of the term in the *ḥükm*s. This is why, the Ottoman administrations must have perceived the Druze community as a kind of adversary, which explicitly displays both the Ottoman perception of Druze. Differences in religious beliefs must have also played a paramount role in such a perception of what transpired in the region ever since the Ottomans conquested Greater Syria.

When all what scrutinized thus far is taken into account, we can comfortably point out that the Druze people were perhaps one of the most challenging communities or ethno-religious groups in the periphery. From the 1510s onwards, the Ottomans continually strove to disarm the Druze and to collect the taxes that the Druze community was obliged to pay. For this reason, the process of disarmament and of

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[241] If we are to have a close look at the Ottoman archive, we see that there are a large number of *ḥükm*s (more than 100) with special reference to rewards offered for those who participated the Druze campaign of 1585. As it is not possible to cite all these *ḥükm*s here, I have classified them according to their subjects and I have demonstrated only one *ḥükm* from each subject. In this way, I have thought that I can furnish the readers with the further interesting *ḥükm*s from many different subjects. The *ḥükm*s in regard to this matter are *M.D.* 50, No. 265, No. 305, No. 314, No. 321, No. 342, No. 354, No. 362, No. 423, No. 436, No. 439, No. 466, No. 477, No. 522, No. 529, No. 635, No. 696, No. 870, No. 905, No. 923, No. 957, No. 1015, No. 1145, respectively. In addition to these, Abu-Husayn provides us with other *ḥükm*s of a complementary nature with regard to this matter. These are M.D. 50, No. 121-123, No. 307, No. 310, No. 329, No. 332, No. 426, No. 428, No. 430, No. 432, No. 443, No. 445, No. 449, p. 85/No. 462, No. 521, No. 552, No. 610, No. 617, No. 654, No. 657, No. 659, No. 660, No. 667, No. 678, No. 685, No. 713-714, No. 719/719, No. 725, No. 735, No. 761, No. 763-764, No. 766, No. 768-769, No. 797-799, No. 818, No. 828, No. 972, No. 975, No. 978, No. 995, No. 1000-1001, No. 1003-1008, No. 1014, No. 1020, No. 1030, No. 1068, No. 1080: Abu-Husayn, *The View from Istanbul*, 175-189.

[242] In the Kubbealtı Lugatı, the word "*ılgar*" in Turkish has one meaning in the framework of our context and it means *akın, hücūm*, that is, *raid or incursion made into an adversary's territory* in English: Ayverdi, *Asırlar Boyu Târihî Seyri İçinde Misalli*, 526.

[243] BOA, A.{DVNSMHM. d., 50/354 and 436.

collecting the taxes, both of which influenced the struggles between the Ottoman administrations and the Druzes, became a prime concern for the Ottoman administrations. We should not forget that the ongoing struggles were fundamentally a conflict between the centralizing Ottoman state (at least until the closing years of the 16th century) and the periphery, which opposed the centralist policies and wished to act autonomously and to live under no custody. If we are to consider anti-Ottoman activities of the Druze community in Southern Syria and Lebanon, it is no wonder that almost all Ottoman administrations perceived the Druze people as a great "nuisance". As mentioned earlier, the phase of 1516-1590, was only a part of these age-old struggles that would proceed until the end of the 17th century.

3.2 Istanbul-Syrian Littoral: Struggles Phase II (1590-1635)

3.2.1 The Birth of the Maʿnid Domination: Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn (1572-1635)

Around 1590, when Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn took over the position of *muqaddam* from his father, he became a central figure of the region of Shūf. As he aspired to promote himself in a regionally ascendant position in Southern Syria from the very beginning, he commenced forming a set of regional alliances there and strengthened his military forces. He also pursued a conciliatory policy with the Ottoman provincial administrations[244], especially with the provincial authorities in the *eyālet* of Damascus.[245] Fakhr al-Dīn endeavoured to achieve his regional objectives by paying the taxes that he was obliged to pay on time. He, moreover, was lavish with his presents towards the authorities, which evidently reveals what kind of path that he followed in his relationships with the Ottoman provincial administrations. The relationship between Fakhr al-Dīn and Murād Pasha (d. 1611, also known as Ḳuyucu Murād)[246] perfectly epitomizes the way that he was connected with the Ottoman administrations. Ḳuyucu Murād Pasha, before becoming a grand vizier years between 1606 and 1611, was appointed either as a *sanjak-bey* or a *beylerbeyi* to major administrative centers. His appointment to Damascus in 1594 and his grandviziership in 1606

[244] Although Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn had such a policy, his real intention was known by the high-ranking statesmen such as Koçi Bey (d. 1650). In his *risāle*s, Koçi Bey mentions himself as such: "*... ve Maʿan oglı dahi ṣūret-i iṭāʿatle bir ʿāṣi olub...*" : Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*, ed. Seda Çakmakcıoğlu (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2007), 66, 233.

[245] Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships*, 80-81.

[246] Ömer İşbilir, "Kuyucu Murad Paşa," *TDVİA*, vol. 26 (Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 2002): 507-508.

allowed Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn to find the opportunities to pursue his plans.[247]

As soon as Murād Pasha was designated to govern the *eyālet* of Damascus, Fakhr al-Dīn immediately took action and strove to win the Pasha's good will.[248] In this context, Fakhr al-Dīn was granted the prerogative of governing the *sanjak* of Sidon, a situation which demonstrated that he was quite accomplished in conciliatory policy. In this way, he was elevated to a higher position, that is, to the rank of *sanjak-bey* from *muqaddam*ship, which marked a watershed in his political career. The cordial relationships between the two figures were particularly of paramount importance since they directly determined the course of the relations and struggles between the Ottoman administrations and Maʿnids. To put it differently, friendly relations enabled Fakhr al-Dīn to evade a military encounter with the Ottoman central administrations for a long time, which explicitly indicates the dynamics of these struggles. The other prime reason for the continuation of the cordial relationships was that Fakhr al-Dīn was also unquestionably lavish with bribery.[249]

This naturally brought along the abuse of these friendly relations by Fakhr al-Dīn. Between 1594-95, he endeavoured to eliminate the Furaykhs, one of his adversaries, by manipulating the good will of the Pasha. This was within the framework of his regional interests, and also served the Ottoman interests in Southern Syria.[250] Likewise, Fakhr al-Dīn and the Ottoman administration moved in concert in the case of Yūsuf ibn Sayfā in 1598 as part of the common regional interests. This collaboration evidently demonstrates that the Ottoman administration pragmatically cooperated with regional elements, the Maʿnids in our case, until their local interests, particularly in Southern Syria, were fulfilled.[251] In this way, while the Ottoman administrations found an opportunity to tighten their imperial control over the geographically far-off region, Fakhr al-Dīn was able to diffuse his regionally limited power into a more extended area. Their mutual interests led each to support the other's position.

Fakhr al-Dīn's regional activities along with his considerable military potential in the region gradually enabled him to be accepted as a central local figure in the eyes of the Ottoman administrations.[252] That his zone of influence spread to the *sanjak*

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[247] Ibid.

[248] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 81.

[249] Ibid.

[250] Abu-Husayn, 81-83.

[251] Abu-Husayn, 83.

[252] Ibid.

of Ṣafad[253] in 1602 demonstrates how influential he was, which administratively means that the Druze community and Shiʿites in the region were under his jurisdiction.[254] Considering his appointment to Ṣafad, the Ottoman administration must have contemplated that Fakhr al-Dīn would manage to keep the regional elements including the Shiʿites under the control, a situation that served the regional interests of the Ottoman Empire.[255]

Such an agreement, a reciprocal relationship binding each of two parties equally, constituted the backbone of the relations between the Ottoman administrations and the Maʿnids.[256] However, it should be underscored that these agreements did not primarily have a pattern of consistency. The maintenance of such a relationship primarily depended on the fact that the Ottoman regional interests were to be fulfilled to a considerable extent.

Perhaps, the most significant determinants that gave Fakhr al-Dīn some elbow room in Southern Syria were the Ottoman–Habsburg Long War of 1593–1606, and the Ottoman–Safavid War of 1603–1612 and 1603–1618. The Ottoman central preoccupation with two fronts in both West and East naturally did hold the Ottoman administrations back from taking the preventive measures against Fakhr al-Dīn's regional activities that were undermining the Ottoman imperial authority in the region. Equally significantly, the Ottoman administrations had to connive at his regional acts to a certain extent because of the conditions of that time.[257] Hence, this situation naturally enabled Fakhr al-Dīn to start to act semi-autonomously in the region that he governed. He established a military force known as *sekbān*s and gave importance to the fortification of the region, which was noticed by the Ottoman

[253]Ibid.

[254]Ibid.

[255]Ibid., 84.

[256]The Ottoman central administrations established reciprocal relations with the regional elements, one of which was the Maʿnids since the Empire dominated Greater Syria. Generally speaking, the Ottoman administrations made every endeavour to obtain taxes, and control the region, and wanted the periphery to fulfill its obligations including the financial ones; however, the Ottoman administrations, to a considerable extent, managed to do so through local elements or figures, the Maʿnids and Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn, in our case. In this way, the Empire was able to collect taxes and tighten its imperial control over the periphery, Southern Syria and Lebanon, which were the Ottoman regional interests. As for the regional elements, they were able to act more freely in their regions and make economic gains through *iltizām* contracts. Moreover, they even had a chance to hold administrative posts. In short, the reciprocal relations and the maintenance of these relationships principally depended on the fact that the Ottoman local interests were to be fulfilled to a considerable extent. At this point, in his chronicle, Topçular Kātibi ʿAbdü'l-Ḳadir Efendi furnishes with very precious information with special reference to the obligations of the periphery. He points out these obligations as such: "*... Maʿan-oğlu her gāh taʿyīn olunan hazīne[y]i Āsitāne'ye gönderüp... Maʿan-oğlu'na mīrī hazīne ṭalebi içün ādemler gönderdiler... Maʿan-oğlu... mīrī akça[y]ı hazīneye teslīm etdüğünde... Maʿan-oğlu ve Seyf-oğlu...ʿiṣyān eden... bir ferd ḳomayup... şaḳīleri der-bend edüp... ekserin... gönderirlerdi... Maʿan-oğlu'nun hazīnesin cemʿine ḳapucu-başı gönderdiler...*" : Topçular Kâtibi Abdülkâdir Efendi, *Topçular Kâtibi ʿAbdülkâdir (Kadrî) Efendi Tarihi (Metin ve Tahlil)*, vol. 1, ed. Ziya Yılmazer (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003), 180, 387, 512-513, 560.

[257]Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.

administrations at once. That Fakhr al-Dīn was lavish with bribery towards the high-ranking statesmen was also another significant determinant, which helped him to gradually become a local power.[258]

Another perfect opportunity for Fakhr al-Dīn emerged when Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha rebelled against the Ottoman imperial authority in 1606. Fakhr al-Dīn collaborated with ʿAlī Pasha[259] by looking after his regional and personal interests, including the position of his adversary, *ʾamīr* Yūsuf ibn Sayfā.[260]

Driving force behind Fakhr al-Dīn's acts was not only the concern of strictly guarding the region. He also principally aimed at extending his zone of influence in the region, and this was directly to the detriment of the Ottoman regional authority and interests. In fact, he would be successful in his regional ambitions and take control of both Bayrūt and Kisrawān – a success that demonstrated that he took advantages against Yūsuf ibn Sayfā in power struggles in the region.[261]

As soon as the Ottoman administration entrusted Ḳuyucu Murād Pasha the task of putting down the rebellion of ʿAlī Pasha, Fakhr al-Dīn, who joined the rebellion shortly after Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha won a victory against Yūsuf Sayfā, who was commanded to assist with the repression of the rebellion. However, Fakhr al-Dīn, in a similar way to his local counterparts, remained silent against the imperial orders. Shortly after the defeat of Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha, he immediately dispatched a large amount of money to Murād Pasha to be able to compensate his wrong doing what he had done before.[262]

As Fakhr al-Dīn and Murād Pasha had friendly relations, his collaboration with Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha did not pose any serious problem between them. Fakhr al-Dīn continued to have control over Kisrawān.[263] Most significantly, he enabled his son,

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[258] Ibid.

[259] Generally speaking, apart from Tārīh-i Naʿimā (History of Naʿimā), the Ottoman chronicles hardly mention the matter of Fakhr al-Dīn's involvement in the rebellion of Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha. Even Muṣṭafā Naʿimā (1655-1716) makes a mention of this event only in a short paragraph. He states the related process as such: "*... Menḳūldür ki serdār Canpolād-oğlu ile ḳıtāl eyledikte Maʿan-oğlu Fahreddīn dahi cümle Benī-kelbi ve Dürzī ʿaskeri ile Canpolād ḳolunda idi. Baʿde'l-inhizām Fahreddīn çöle firār edip anda Şaḳif Ḳalʿasında karār eyledi...*" : Mustafa Naîmâ, *Târih-i Naʿîmâ*, vol. 2, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 336.

[260] Abu-Husayn, loc.cit. For more information about the regional cooperation of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn with Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha: Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "The Revolt of Ali Pasha Janbulad (1605-1607) in the Contemporary Arabic Sources and its Significance," In *VIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler, 11-15 Ekim 1976*, vol. 3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983): 1523-1529.

[261] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 85.

[262] Ibid.

[263] Abu-Husayn, 86-87.

ʿAlī, to be granted the prerogative of governing *the sanjak of Sidon-Bayrūt*[264] as well as *Ghazīr*,[265] a situation that meant that Fakhr al-Dīn thoroughly established himself in the region.

However, when Ḳuyucu Murād Pasha died in 1611, the fast-growing political and military career of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn abruptly deteriorated. Naṣūḥ Pasha (d. 1614)[266], whose growing antipathy towards Fakhr al-Dīn was noted, was then promoted as the grand vizier.[267] Hence, Fakhr al-Dīn's relations with the Ottoman central administration became much more difficult.

Fakhr al-Dīn set out to pursue existing relationships with the Ottoman central administration. More precisely, he immediately sent a large amount of money to the grand vizier, yet the reaction of Naṣūḥ Pasha was not what he had expected.[268]

Naṣūḥ Pasha commanded Fakhr al-Dīn to disband the *sekbān*s at his disposal and to surrender some fortresses in the region. Elimination of Yūnus al-Ḥarfūsh was also among these orders. However, Fakhr al-Dīn in no way took heed of what he had been said.[269] He dispatched a military force to protect both Yūnus al-Ḥarfūsh and Aḥmad Shihāb against Ḥāfiẓ Aḥmed Pasha (d. 1632)[270], *Muḥāfiẓ* of Damascus, who was intending to eliminate them. Nevertheless, Fakhr al-Dīn performed what he had not been ordered. Upon the orders of Naṣūḥ Pasha, Fakhr al-Dīn dispatched a large amount of money to the grand vizier.[271]

At this point, the Ottoman central administration made a new provincial appointment and granted the prerogative of governing of the *sanjak*s of Nābulus, ʿAjlūn and

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[264] Abu-Husayn, 87.

[265] Ibid. In 1607, the Ottoman central administration did not punish Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn by killing him or dismissing him from *sanjak-bey*ship despite his involvement in the rebellion of Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha – which obviously made him a rebel. On the contrary, Istanbul allowed him to continue to hold the *sanjak* of Ṣafad. Fakhr al-Dīn received pardon thanks to his amicable relationship with Murād Pasha. However, it seems that the Ottoman administration preferred to pragmatically cooperate with him within the framework of its integration policies and regional interests. Istanbul presumably did not find him as dangerous as Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha (who was appointed as *beylerbey* to Temeşvar and sent far away.) Akdağ gives interesting information with regard to Ottoman integration policies: Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası*, 482-488; Mücteba İlgürel, "Canbolatoğulları," *TDVİA*, vol. 7 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1993): 145.

[266] M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Nasûh Paşa," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 9 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1997): 121-127.

[267] Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.

[268] Abu-Husayn, 87-88. In his chronicle, Aḥmad al-Khālidī gives information with regard to historical events between the 1610s and 1623/24: Abu-Husayn, "Khalidi on Fakh al-Dīn Apology," 3-15.

[269] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 88.

[270] Orhan F. Köprülü, "Hâfız Ahmed Paşa," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5/1 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1997): 71-77.

[271] Abu-Husayn, loc.cit.

Karak to Farrūkh Beg. This appointment aimed to balance the regional influence of Fakhr al-Dīn along with Ibn Qānṣūh. It is understood that the Ottoman administration closely watched the region and took administrative actions according to the changing dynamics in the region in order to be able to tighten its control.[272]

Meanwhile, Fakhr al-Dīn did not restrict himself only to his anti-Ottoman activities in Southern Syria. He, at the same time, entered into an agreement with Tuscany in a period when the Ottoman administration turned its attention to the region.[273] His cooperation with the Medicis meant that Fakhr al-Dīn's revolt evolved into a *non-integration-oriented* rebellion.

The tension in the region increased when Fakhr al-Dīn backed Ḥamdān Qānṣūh and *sheikh* ʿAmr Ibn Jabr upon the appointment of Farrūkh Beg by the Ottoman central administration. Notwithstanding managing to restore their former position in the region at the end, he could not evade from the imperial reactions of the Ottoman central administration. As a consequence of Fakhr al-Dīn's abovementioned anti-Ottoman policies in Southern Syria, Naṣūḥ Pasha entrusted the task of punishing Fakhr al-Dīn to Ḥāfıẓ Aḥmed Pasha.[274] Thereupon, Aḥmed Pasha instigated the military confrontation[275] between Fakhr al-Dīn and the Ottoman administration. Fakhr al-Dīn followed same patterns of relationships once more. More specifically, he not only took some military measures in the region but also dispatched his representatives to the authorities at the provincial level. In addition to these, he proposed sending a large amount of money to Ḥāfıẓ Aḥmed Pasha, who would decline to take it, later,[276] which evidently indicates the dynamics of the relations between the Ottoman administrations and the Maʿnids. Ḥāfıẓ Aḥmed Pasha advanced towards the Shūf region in 1613. The Ottoman fleet, too, was part of this military movement.[277]

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[272] Ibid.

[273] Abu-Husayn, 89.

[274] Abu-Husayn, 90-91.

[275] The military expedition of 1613 was the first military confrontation between the Maʿnids and the Ottoman administrations. Muṣṭafā Naʿimā specifies that Fakhr al-Dīn either postponed or did not fulfill his financial obligations. He also emphasizes that Fakhr al-Dīn intensely fortified the region against the Ottoman administrations and he had more than 1000 *sekbān*s from the Druze community (*Dürūzī ṭā'ifesi*), which were some of the determinants that gave rise to the expedition of 1613. Thereupon, Ḥāfıẓ Aḥmed Pasha embarked on military intervention in 1613: Mustafa Naîmâ, *Târih-i Naʿîmâ*, vol. 2, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 410-412. Similary, Muṣṭafa Sāfī and Kātib Chelebi (1609-1657) touch on the same points: Mustafa Sâfî, *Mustafa Sâfî'nin Zübdetü't-Tevârîh'i*, vol. 2, ed. İbrahim Hakkı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003), 311-316. Katip Çelebi, *Katip Çelebi Fezleke [Osmanlı Tarihi (1000-1065/1591-1655)]*, vol. 1, ed. Zeynep Aycibin (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım, 2016), 465-468.

[276] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 92.

[277] At this point, Muṣṭafā Naʿimā provides us with a quite interesting information with regard to this event. He points out that Meḥmed Pasha, a *Ḳapudān* Pasha at that time, arrived at Ṣaydā and Bayrūt since Fakhr al-Dīn followed anti-Ottoman policies in the region and did not fulfill his financial responsibilities. He states the process as such: "*... Meḥmed Paşa... donanma ile... Ṣaydā ve Beyrūt cāniblerine inip... Maʿan-oğlu*

Although every precaution was taken against the possibility of Fakhr al-Dīn's flight, he managed to reach Tuscany.

The military expedition of 1613 furnishes us with the significant details with special reference to these struggles.[278] A considerable number of local figures, including Yūnus al-Ḥarfūsh, the Sayfās, the Shihābs, the Turābāys and Ibn Qānṣūh joined the military operation of 1613 led by Ḥāfiẓ Aḥmed Pasha,[279] This operation shows that, when necessary, the Ottoman administrations and the peripheral elements could closely cooperate with one another against other regional elements.

Another significant detail with regard to the military expedition of 1613 is that it provides us with interesting details about negotiation and bargaining. For example, when the expedition started under the leadership of Ḥāfiẓ Aḥmed Pasha, some fortresses in the Shūf region were either captured or demolished.[280] In addition to that, the Ottoman administration dispatched the military forces of some *beylerbey*s and *pasha*s to the region. Thereupon, *ʾamīr* Yūnus Maʿn (d. 1633), the brother of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn, pleaded with Ḥāfiẓ Aḥmed Pasha not to punish him and dispatched his mother to him. Moreover, he pointed out that if the military forces withdrew from the region, he would remit 300.000 *quruş*es to the imperial treasury and surrender the fortresses of both Shaqīf and Bānyās to the pasha.

At this exact point, *telhīṣ*es, not only provide information about regional politics, but also demonstrate processes of bargaining and negotiation between Yūnus Maʿn and Ḥāfiẓ Aḥmed Pasha.[281] Thereupon, Ḥāfiẓ Aḥmed Pasha agreed to these conditions by considering that the capture of the rest of the fortresses would take approximately more than a year owing to the upcoming winter conditions. At this point, it is specified in the *telhīṣ*es that the Maʿnids would surrender the sum of money and the fortresses to the Ottoman central administration within a month.

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tevessüʿ ile baʿzı ḳılāʿ-ı ḥaṣīne bināʾ edip... vere geldiği emvāli noḳṣān üzre ve vaḳtinden soñra vermek ṣadedinde olup... Paşa... ele getirmek ṣadedinde olduğu Maʿan-oğlu'nun..." : Mustafa Naîmâ, *Târih-i Naʿîmâ*, vol. 2, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 390. Apart from Muṣṭafā Naʿimā, Muṣṭafa Sāfī (d. 1616), a yet another Ottoman chronicles, also mentions the same process: Mustafa Sâfî, *Mustafa Sâfî'nin Zübdetü't-Tevârîh'i*, vol. 2, ed. İbrahim Hakkı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003), 140-142.

[278] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 93.

[279] Ibid. Apart from the local figures, some *sanjak-bey*s in Anatolia were also summoned to participate in the military expedition of 1613. The *telhīṣ* compilation gives interesting information with regard to those who were rewarded for their participation: BOA, TS. MA.d, 7013, fol. 13a.

[280] BOA, TS. MA.d, 7013, fol. 3a.

[281] "...Ḳarındaşım (Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn) ʿāṣi olub gitdi ise biz ʿāṣi degilüz anıñ günāh ile bize cezāʾ olunursa emr-ü fermān saʿādetlü ve devletlü pādişāhındır... ẕikr olunan ʿasker geri döndürülürse hazīne-i ʿāmireye üç kere yüz biñ guruş teslīm etdigimizden mā-ʿadā... Şekīf ḳalʿasıyla Bānyās ḳalʿasın dahi boşaldub size teslīm idelüm... bir aya degin mühlet isteriz..."

Maʿnids' continuous anti-Ottoman policies overshadowed the empire's authority and control over the region. Therefore, Ḥāfıẓ Aḥmed Pasha's military intervention in Shūf was absolutely necessary and extremely important. The sultan's correspondence with the grandvizier sheds light on the background of this expedition.[282] At the same time, the Ottoman administration entered into the process of bargaining and negotiation with the Maʿnids. Both sides were willing to negotiate with each other, a situation which demonstrably displays that the process of the bargaining and negotiation was reciprocal rather than one-sided. Thus, while the Ottoman central administration, albeit partly, was able to tighten its control over the region with the military support of other local figures, the Maʿnids narrowly evaded total destruction.

The military potential of Fakhr al-Dīn in the region needs to be explored. He was able to threaten not only the local figures but also the provincial forces thanks to the *sekbān* forces that he had stationed in Southern Syria. However, these *sekbān*s, including Ḥussein Yaziji were also changing sides between Fakhr al-Dīn and the Ottoman administration.[283] Taking advantage of the struggles between the Ottoman administration and the Maʿnids, Ḥussein Yaziji was able to obtain the prerogative of governing the *sanjak* of Ṣafad in the absence of Fakhr al-Dīn, a situation which evidently shows that these struggles were multilayered and much more intricate.

A year later, in 1614, the Ottoman central administration had to embark on another administrative arrangement in the region. Beirut, Ṣafad and Sidon were united and became a *beylerbeyilik*. The Ottoman administration appointed Ḥasan Pasha as a *beylerbey*.[284] Such an arrangement was meant to enable Ḥasan Pasha to control the Druze community.[285] But *beylerbeyilik* did not prove to be operational and the Maʿnids were reestablished once again as the local administrators by the central government.[286]

One of the most deciding elements favour of the Ottomans was when the administrations implemented the *iltizām* system in the region.[287] The prime reason why

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[282] Afterwards, the Ottoman army would take control of the fortresses in the region: BOA, TS. MA.d, 7013, fol. 13a, 18b.

[283] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 94-95.

[284] Ünal Taşkın, *Osmanlı İdaresinde Safed (1516-1600)* (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi Basımevi, 2011), 59. The *Telhīṣ* compilation provides interesting information with regard to the appointment of Ḥasan Pasha to the newly formed *beylerbeyilik*: BOA, TS. MA.d, 7013, fol. 12a.

[285] Bakhit, *The Ottoman Province of Damascus*, 171.

[286] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 97.

[287] Prof. Stefan Winter, upon my inquiry, pointed out that the historians do not have enough of information with regard to this matter: "... *To the best of my knowledge, there was no real iltizām in the region before*

it was critical is that the *iltizām* contracts enabled the Maʿnids (at the individual level, Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn) to greatly extend their influence in the region. From the viewpoint of the central administrations, some members of the Maʿnids, particularly Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn, assumed some local responsibilities.[288] The cities that the Maʿnids were highly influential were Ṣafad, Ṣaydā, Bayrūt, ʿAjlūn, Ghazza, Nābulus, Tadmur; they also had control of geographical regions such as Biqāʿ, Shūf al-Bayād, Ḥammāra, Baʿlabakk, Karak Nūḥ, Ḥawlā, Shaʿrā.[289]

Yasuhisa shows that the first known *iltizām* contract was concluded in 1618, a year that indicates the termination of Fakhr al-Dīn's self-exile. The others were made in 1623 and 1633, respectively. The interesting point was that the Maʿnids sometimes offered a large amount of money to obtain the contracts. The Ottoman administrations also demanded tax revenues to be increased before negotiating for the next round of contracts. Generally speaking, the Maʿnids accepted the conditions laid down by Istanbul.[290] That is to say, both sides moved within the framework of their regional interests and had mutual relationships. After the battle of ʿAnjar (1623) and the defeat of Ottoman provincial forces led by Muṣṭafā Pasha, the governor of Damascus, against local families, such as the Ḥarfūshes and the Sayfās led by Fakhr al-Dīn, the Maʿnid leader, managed to get hold of *iltizām* rights. Fakhr al-Dīn was evidently at the peak of his political and military career and he had the opportunity to put pressure on the Ḥarfūshes until his fall in 1633 through the *iltizām* rights given by the Ottoman administrations.[291] However, when Fakhr al-Dīn was defeated in 1633 by Küçük Aḥmed Pasha (d. 1636), the Maʿnids naturally lost the privileges of holding the *iltizām* contract. Thereupon, the Ottoman central administration firstly granted some rights to ʿAbd al-Karīm Aga, one of the men of Aḥmed Pasha, and then to other local families such as the Shihābs and the Ḥarfūshes.[292] This is yet another demonstration of the Ottoman central administrations' pragmatical coop-

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the Ottomans-the main reason being there was no real money or even much of a commodity trade economy before the 16th century. So before the Ottomans, power was often left to local notables who controlled an area in return for providing some military service, but not in return for taxes. But we don't have a huge amount of information in this regard. As far as I know, however, iltizām never appears in Mamlūk sources for Syria..." Email communication with Winter, Aug 11, 2021, 10:36 PM.

[288] The liabilities allocated to the Maʿnids were to properly collect taxes, to handle the pilgrimage affairs and to fund the janissaries in the region. They were also responsible for dispatching tax revenues to the Ottoman central administrations. Apart from these, the Maʿnids were entrusted with the task of providing security in the region. As it is seen, there were reciprocal relationships between Istanbul and the Syrian littoral: Shimizu Yasuhisa, "Practices of Tax Farming under the Ottoman Empire in Damascus Province," In *Tax Farm Register of Damascus Province in the Seventeenth Century: Archival and Historical Studies*, eds. Nagata Yuzo, Miura Toru and Shimizu Yasuhisa (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 2006), 24-32.

[289] Yasuhisa, 24.

[290] Yasuhisa, 25.

[291] Yasuhisa, 25-27.

[292] Yasuhisa, 28.

eration with local families, if necessary –that is, when the local families in question were unable to serve the Ottoman regional interests, the center could replace them with their other regional powers.

During Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn's stay in Italy for five years (1613-1618), the regional opposition against the Maʿnid leadership in Southern Syria and Lebanon mainly came from the Druze community, the Shiʿites and then the Ḥarfūshes. Such challenges continued even after 1618, the year that Fakhr al-Dīn returned and brought the oppositions of local power groups, including the Sayfās, under the control.[293] He immediately started to extend his sphere of influence in the region, to the detriment of the Sayfās. Following Yūsuf Sayfā's death in 1625, Fakhr al-Dīn accelerated his expansionist policies in the area.[294] It should be emphasized that the most significant event was the battle of ʿAnjar in 1623 in this period.

3.2.2 The Fall of the Maʿnid Domination

Until his fall in 1633, Fakhr al-Dīn carefully carried out a conciliatory policy with the high-ranking Ottoman statesmen not only in the central but also in the provincial administrations. The preoccupation of the Ottomans with the Eastern provinces enabled him to move much more freely in his region.[295] As the Ottoman administrations and Maʿnids cooperated with each other, he managed to establish himself in Southern Syria and Lebanon. However, his career and strenghtened position in the region was endangered with the termination of the Ottoman preoccupation with the Eastern front. When the Ottomans solved the Safavid problem in the East, they found an opportunity to turn their attention to Fakhr al-Dīn. The Ottoman central administration dispatched an army led by Küçük Aḥmed Pasha (d. 1636) to the region. Fakhr al-Dīn, together with some family members and his two sons, Masʿūd and Ḥussein, was captured in a cave after a battle in 1633.[296] Thereafter, Aḥmed Pasha sent them to the imperial capital. Following Murad IV' (r. 1623-1640) order, Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn was decapitated and his son, Masʿūd was killed in 1635. Only Ḥussein's life was spared, and he came to hold a significant post as a *munejjim-bashi*

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[293] Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships*, 95-97, 100-118.

[294] Abu-Husayn, 110-111.

[295] Abu-Husayn, 124.

[296] At this point, Muṣṭafā Naʿimā affords a quite interesting information with special reference to the process of the capture of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn: Mustafa Naîmâ, *Târih-i Naʿîmâ*, vol. 2, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 761-763. See also: Hrand Der Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon'un Seyahatnâmesi (1608-1619)* (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2013), 218-222; Abu-Husayn, op.cit. 124-126.

in the palace.[297] Thus, the Ottoman central administration eliminated one of the most challenging notables of Southern Syria and Lebanon.

It appears that Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn punctually fulfilled his financial obligations and deliberately adopted a conciliatory policy with the Ottoman statesmen and resorted to presents and bribery in order to have good relationship with the Ottoman dignitaries since the very beginning. He, moreover, pursued his regional policies in accord with the continuously changing political structure in the Ottoman central administration and managed to be part of the Ottoman administrative system as a *sanjak-bey*. He is understood to have cooperated with the Ottoman offices in the administration of *iltizām* contracts and collecting taxes from local revenue sources. He was, therefore, able not only to spread his zone of influence but also to establish control over other local families in the region. He managed to create an appropriate environment to realize his regional ambitions. If it is considered from the viewpoint of the central administrations, Istanbul intentionally and pragmatically collaborated with Fakhr al-Dīn in that the Ottoman central administrations had also regional interests such as extracting tax revenues in the region and strengthening their control over there. Moreover, when necessary, they did not hesitate to bargain and negotiate with a local who often abused their authority, rebelled and fought ferociously at the battle ground. Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn carried out anti-Ottoman policies, and even received the support of foreign states. This, as suggested by a number of historians before, makes him essentially a *non-integration-oriented* rebel.

It should be emphasized that the Ottoman Empire was dealing with the *Jelālī* rebellions, and an overall violence wave in Anatolia at the time. Meanwhile, the Ottoman central administrations were preoccupied not only with domestic problems in Istanbul but also with several long wars such as the Ottoman–Habsburg Long War of 1593–1606, the Ottoman–Safavid Wars of 1603–1612 and 1603–1618. This is why, Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn was allowed to maintain his regional activities until the Ottoman central administration dealt a heavy blow to him in 1633. The 1590-1635 phase, during which I analyzed the reciprocal relationships between Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn and the Ottoman central administrations was only the second part of these age-old struggles that would continue until the end of the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century.

[297] Abu-Husayn, 126-127.

3.3 Istanbul-Syrian Littoral: Struggles Phase III (1635-1697)

3.3.1 Mulhim Maʿn (d. 1658)

Shortly after the elimination of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn in 1635 by the Ottoman central administration, Mulhim Maʿn (d. 1658) assumed the regional leadership of the Maʿnids. He was the most significant local figure left from the Maʿnids in the region. His son, Ḥussein Maʿn lived in the imperial capital as a *munejjim-bashi*.[298]

Despite what happened between 1590 and 1635, the Ottoman central administrations pragmatically continued to collaborate with the member(s) of the Maʿnids. As a matter of fact, Istanbul granted the prerogative of being *mültezim* to Mulhim Maʿn. More specifically, the central administration approved his establishment in Shūf, Gharb, Jurd, Matn and Kisrawān.[299]

Some regional disturbances, such as banditry or interception of wayfarers and Muslim pilgrims continued during the leadership of Mulhim Maʿn.[300] Moreover, Mulhim Maʿn, too, followed some anti-Ottoman policies. He joined other local families in seizing both Bayrūt and Ṣaydā.[301]

The most significant event in the Mulhim period was his 1642 defeat of Muṣṭafā Pasha, the *beylerbey* of Damascus. However, albeit the 1642 incident, it is argued that he was generally loyal to the imperial authority. When he died in 1658, Aḥmad (d. 1697) and Qorqmāz (d. 1662), the sons of Mulhim Maʿn, became the prominent figures in the region.[302] However, their leadership claims were strongly reacted by the Druze communities supported by the Ottoman central administration. During this internal strife, Qorqmāz died in 1662, making way to Aḥmad Maʿn to become the most significant local figure of the Maʿnids until his death in 1697.

Another significant event that Abu-Husayn draws our attention is that, once again, Ottoman central administration had recourse to some administrative arrangements in the region. In 1660, in order to tightly cement its imperial authority over the Druze community, Istanbul transformed the *sanjak*s of Sidon-Bayrūt and Ṣafad into

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[298] Abu-Husayn, *The View from Istanbul*, 21.

[299] Ibid.

[300] Murat Alanoğlu, "86 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri'nin Özetli Transkripsiyonu ve Değerlendirilmesi" (Master's Thesis, Atatürk University, 2010), 121-122, 210-211.

[301] Alanoğlu, 205-206, 209-210.

[302] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 21-22.

an *eyālet* of Sidon.[303] This shift was strongly reacted by the Druze people. In 1667, when Aḥmad Maʿn became the leader of the Maʿnids, another phase of struggle would continue until his death in 1697, began.

3.3.2 Aḥmad Maʿn (d. 1697)

Together with the death of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn in 1635, Maʿnid leadership in the region was significantly challenged. The Ottoman central administration had Fakhr al-Dīn killed since he endangered the territorial integrity of the Empire. Nevertheless, this situation did not hold Istanbul back from pragmatically cooperating with the later Maʿnids. When Aḥmad Maʿn (d. 1697) shouldered the leadership of the Maʿnids, like his predecessors, he held the *mültezim*ship of almost the same areas and same revenue sources in the region until 1697.[304]

Relations between 1667 and 1697 should be evaluated in the context of the Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1683-1699.[305] From 1689 onwards, the Ottoman central administrations intensively started to dispatch orders in order to provide a certain number of military forces to the governors in the periphery, including the ones in Damascus and Tripoli along with the officials in Syria. This applied also for Aḥmad Maʿn.[306] One of the "Register of Complaints" (*ʿAtīḳ Şikāyet Defteri*), dated 1686-1687, furnishes with an order which the Sultan demanded provisions and military force (500 musketeers) from Aḥmad Maʿn during the Hungarian campaign.[307]

As far as is known, Aḥmad Maʿn did not fulfill these imperial orders sent from Istanbul and did not obey the imperial authority. In 1691, the Ottoman central administration dispatched another order to Aḥmad Maʿn and asked him to help the officials put down the *Qizilbāsh* elements in the region. Four years later, in 1695, another order was sent to him.[308] Aḥmad Maʿn did not pay attention to any of these imperial orders. Although Istanbul got the upper hand for a while, a second rebellion broke out in the region in support of Aḥmad Maʿn.

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[303] Ibid.

[304] Abu-Husayn, "The Unknown Career of Ahmad Maʿn," 241-242.

[305] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 23.

[306] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 242-243.

[307] Mesut Demir, "1686-1687 (h. 1097-1098) Tarihli Atik Şikâyet Defteri'nin Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirilmesi" (Master's Thesis, Marmara University, 2010), 428.

[308] Abu-Husayn, op.cit., 243.

Finally, the Ottoman central administration announced Aḥmad Maʿn a rebel in 1695, and then decided to eliminate him.[309] Thereafter, Istanbul established Mūsā ʿAlam al-Dīn in the region and handed over to him the areas that were under the control of Aḥmad Maʿn. In the meantime, Aḥmad Maʿn took refuge with the Shihābs. In the subsequent years, Aḥmad Maʿn attempted to seize the region that was now under the control of Mūsā ʿAlam al-Dīn together with the support of the Shihābs, eventuating the removal of Mūsā ʿAlam al-Dīn in the region. Thereupon, the Ottoman central administration ordered the reestablishment of Mūsā ʿAlam al-Dīn in the region and the capture of Aḥmad Maʿn, which meant that the leadership of Aḥmad Maʿn, that is, the Maʿnid leadership in the region was no longer approved by the Ottoman administration.[310] This struggle continued until the death of Aḥmad Maʿn in 1697 and the Ottoman central administration established the Shihāb dynasty in the region over the Maʿnids.[311] This is a continuation of a policy that Istanbul cooperated with the local families until the regional elements were unable to serve its regional interests.

It can be stated that the Ottoman central administrations also continued to pursue their pragmatic peripheral policies in the period of 1635-1697. The governments in Istanbul entrusted the administration of the tax-farms (*iltizām*s) to the leading local figures in the region; hence these local figures collected the state taxes and made payments in fixed installments as *mültezim*s, keeping a part of the tax revenue for their own use. The *iltizām* system included the farming of land and urban taxes, the production of certain goods (such as wine, salt, or senna) and the provision of certain services. Finally, when Istanbul understood that it could not no longer cooperate with the Maʿnids, it decided to replace the Maʿnids with another local element, that is, the Shihāb dynasty (1697-1842), a Sunnite local family.

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[309] Abu-Husayn, 244-245.

[310] Abu-Husayn, 245-246.

[311] Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "The Shihab Succession (1697): A Reconsideration," *Archive Orientalni*, Supplementa VIII (1998): 9.

4. A *JELĀLĪ* OR NOT?

In this chapter, I analyze whether Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn's rebellion fits broader categories of insurrection when compared with the *Jelālī* rebellions. Was Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn a *Jelālī*? Did this rebellion have different feature(s) from its early modern counterparts? If so, what was/were this/these? Furthermore, is it possible to assert the related rebellion as a separatist insubordination in terms of its characteristic feature(s)? Why or why was it not? Another prime objective of this chapter asks: how can we frame this rebellion in a wider framework of Ottoman rebellions in early modernity? I will explore these questions by reflecting on another contemporary Syrian rebellion led by Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha, which was interlocked and shared the similar patterns.[312]

The contemporary Ottoman and Arab sources identify the Janbulāṭ[313] family (Table 2.1.) as ethnically Kurdish.[314] The ancestor of the Janbulāṭs was Qāsim whose preceding family members before him are unknown due to the scarcity of historical sources.[315] The family began to rise to prominence after his son, Janbulāṭ ibn Qāsim[316] (also known as al-Kurdi).[317] First of all, Janbulāṭ, who spent considerable part of his life at the Ottoman Court, purged northern Syria of elements, which

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[312]Suraiya Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," In *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 417.

[313]The name "Janbulāṭ" principally composes of two Persian words: "*cān*" and "*pūlād*", which means "*soul of steel*": Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "The Revolt of Ali Pasha Janbulad (1605-1607) in the Contemporary Arabic Sources and its Significance," In *VIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler, 11-15 Ekim 1976*, vol. 3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983): 1515.

[314]Philippe Rondot, "Ḏjānbulāṭ," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, vol. 2 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1991): 443, Rafeq, loc. cit. In addition to that, it has been said that the family had connection with the Ayyūbīds. The Janbulāṭs settled in the northern Syria, what is today known as Kilis and its surroundings in the 16th century.

[315]Mücteba İlgürel, "Canbolatoğulları," *TDVİA*, vol. 7 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1993): 144.

[316]Rafeq, op.cit., 1516.

[317]William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000–1020/1591–1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), 86.

challenged Ottoman authority and was of great service to conquest of Cyprus in 1571. However, his services did not end there. He also helped quashed the rebellion of the Son of ʿUlyan in Basra.[318] Thereupon, some *sanjak*s in the northern Syria, including Aʿzaz, Kilis and Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman,[319] were generously granted to him by the Ottoman government.[320]

When Janbulāṭ ibn Qāsim died in Kilis a year after the conquest of Cyprus in 1572,[321] Ḥussein Pasha, one of his four sons, inherited his father's *sanjak* of Kilis courtesy of the Ottoman government. Unlike his brothers who had been granted *tīmār*s by the Empire, upon his elevation to the post of *sanjak-bey*,[322] he was met with strong reaction of his brother, Ḥabīb. Consequently, Ḥussein Pasha had to alternately govern Kilis with Ḥabīb until his brother's death.[323] Ḥussein Pasha, in return for what had been granted by the Empire thus far, fulfilled his duties by assisting the Ottoman administration in the Ottoman–Safavid War of 1578-1590 and he was promoted to a higher post in Aleppo later.

Thereafter, we see that the tensions incrementally rose. To give specific examples, the *sanjak* of Kilis, for unknown reasons, was transferred from Ḥussein Pasha to a person known as Suleimān the Giant.[324] Additionally, Ḥussein Pasha, on account of his heavy debts, was imprisoned in Aleppo by the Ottoman administration, who wanted to reduce his growing power in the region. Once out of prison, Ḥussein Pasha immediately came back Kilis and displaced Suleimān the Giant with the aid of *sekbān*s. Thereupon, Ottoman administrators accepted that Kilis had changed hands. The Empire tolerated Ḥussein's illegal seizure of Kilis on the condition that he did not instigate regional troubles and assume his financial liabilities such as paying taxes.[325]

The existing tension elevated much more when conflicts between Ḥussein ibn Janbulāṭ and Naṣūḥ Pasha, the governor of Aleppo, broke out. The clash started after

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[318] İlgürel, loc. cit. See also: İbrahim Metin Kunt, "An Ottoman Imperial Campaign: Suppressing the Marsh Arabs, Central Power and Peripheral Rebellion in the 1560s," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 43 (2014): 1-18; Abdurrahman Sağırlı, "Cezâyir-i Irâk-ı Arab veya Şattü'l-Arab'ın Fethi - Ulyanoğlu Seferi - 1565-1571," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi* 41 (2005): 43-94.

[319] Rafeq, loc. cit.

[320] Griswold, loc. cit.

[321] M.C. Şahâbeddin Tekindağ, "Canbulat," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1997): 22.

[322] İlgürel, loc. cit.

[323] Rafeq, loc. cit.

[324] Griswold, op.cit., 87.

[325] Griswold., 87-88.

the janissaries oppressed the people in Damascus. Thereupon, the Ottoman government ordered Ḥussein Pasha to assist Naṣūḥ Pasha militarily in an attempt to put down this insurrection. He dispatched a sizable military force under the command of his nephew, Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha (also known as *Canbolāṭoğlu ʿAlī Paşa* in the Turkish historiography) who subjugated the Damascene janissaries. Even if a few janissary insubordinations recurred, the unrest was ultimately wiped out with the close cooperation of Ḥussein Pasha and Naṣūḥ Pasha.[326] Yet, shortly after suppressing the insubordinations of the Damascene janissaries with assistance of Ḥussein ibn Janbulāṭ, Naṣūḥ Pasha realized that the forces that were highly strong and effective under the command of Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha were only a small portion of Ḥussein Pasha's extant military forces. And, he explicitly saw that Ḥussein Pasha was the potential threat to the very existence of the Empire. For this reason, he attacked Ḥussein ibn Janbulāṭ in Kilis.[327] When Cigalazāde Yūsuf Sinān Pasha nominated Ḥussein Pasha for the governorship for Aleppo, Naṣūḥ Pasha objected on the grounds that an *ʾamīr*, according to the law, could not be appointed to a higher post such as an *eyālet*. It was also probable that the Ottoman government would not confirm the related order that had been already given.[328] Naṣūḥ Pasha refused to hand over Aleppo to Ḥussein Pasha. Though Naṣūḥ Pasha resisted relinquishing the city, Ḥussein ibn Janbulāṭ, after a three-month siege, managed to capture the city through the intervention of a *qādi* in Aleppo.[329]

Ḥussein Pasha was able to obtain the city on the condition that he would provide five-thousand soldiers to Cigalazāde Yūsuf Sinān Pasha and remit a large amount of gold pieces to the Ottoman administration. Thanks to the supports of Sinān Pasha, Ḥussein Pasha took the city. Not long after, Ḥussein ibn Janbulāṭ was duly summoned to the Ottoman-Safavid War with his forces – a situation that was a matter of life or death for the *serdār-ı ekrem*,[330] Sinān Pasha. Ḥussein Pasha was executed in Van for his tardiness at the orders of the *serdār*, who had already been vanquished in battle.[331]

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[326] Rafeq, op.cit., 1516-1517.

[327] Griswold, op.cit., 94-95.

[328] Griswold., 95-96.

[329] İlgürel, loc. cit.

[330] The term "serdār" derives from Persian, ser meaning "head" and dār "one who holds or possesses." It means a person who is ahead, a leader/head or a guide. Historically, the term was extensively employed by Turks, but later, the Arabs, moreover, utilized it and they ascribed a military connotation to the term. *Serdār-ı ekrem*, only one of the employments of the word "serdār", was a title bestowed upon a grandvizier by a sultan himself in the event that the sultan did not lead the army in a war. In this way, the grandvizier held the title of "commander-in-chief" and had many privileges granted to himself at his disposal: Abdülkadir Özcan, "Serdar," *TDVİA*, vol. 36 (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2009): 551-552.

[331] Rafeq, op.cit., 1517.

As soon as the news of his uncle's death reached Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha, the *sanjak-bey* of Kilis at the time, seized control of Aleppo and started to extend his zone of influence into Syria in 1606. The Ottoman administration, considering the internal and external problems such as wars with Safavids and Habsburgs, and the *Jelālī* rebellions, elevated Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha to the higher post in *eyālet* of Aleppo. The Ottoman government failed, however, to supress his rebellion.[332]

Afterward, ʿAlī Pasha would ally himself with Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn, who was the bitter enemy of ʾ*amīr* Yūsuf. He attacked his adversary, ʾ*amīr* Yūsuf ibn Sayfā, an Ottoman governor to the South, and defeated ʾ*amīr* Yūsuf in Ḥamā. The allies exerted their control over the region with their joint military forces and occupied many areas to the South. ʿAlī Pasha laid siege to Tripoli.[333] However, after extracting a large amount of money from ʾ*amīr* Yūsuf and normalizing the relationships with him through intermarriage, ʿAlī advanced on Aleppo where he would win two more victories.[334]

Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha emerged as a very serious threat to the Empire. He declared his independence soon after the territorial expansion. Firstly, he seized the treasury in Aleppo and established an army that was almost exactly modeled on the Ottoman army, being composed of both infantry and cavalry. His acts did not stop there. He also had his name read in the Friday sermons (also known as *khuṭbah*) and coined money with his name, all of which indicated his posturing of being a ruler. To add, he established connections not only with Tuscany, which strove to replace Venice in the East Mediterranean trade, but also other European states.

Shortly after the Treaty of Zvitsa Torok in 1606, when tasked with putting down the *Jelālī* rebellions breaking out in many other parts of Anatolia, Ḳuyucu Murād Pasha advanced on Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha the following year. In Oruç Ovası where the main conflicts transpired between Murād Pasha and ʿAlī Pasha backed by his joint ally, Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn, Ottoman forces claimed a decisive victory.[335]

While ʿAlī Pasha firstly fled to Kilis and then Aleppo, Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn ran away with his forces and later, went to Shaqif fortress. Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha knew that the only way to be forgiven for what he had done was to go immediately to Istanbul and apologize to Sultan Aḥmed I (r. 1603-1617). Shortly after, the Ottoman administration promoted him to Temeşvar (also known as *Tımışvar*), in

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[332] İlgürel, loc. cit.

[333] Rafeq, op.cit., 1523-1524.

[334] İlgürel, loc. cit.

[335] İlgürel., 144-145.

what is modern-day Romania, as a *beylerbeyi*. When encountering troubles with both the janissaries and the local people, he fled to Belgrade. Consequently, Ḳuyucu Murād Pasha ordered his execution in 1611.[336]

If you analyze all aspects of the brief account of the Janbulāṭ family that I have provided thus far, it is self-evident that the insubordination of Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha was fundamentally a *non-integration-oriented* rebellion. Unlike the *Jelālī* rebellions whose prime motivations were to be integrated into the Ottoman imperial system, ʿAlī Pasha over-eagerly wanted to establish his own state, meaning that his rebellion was completely disconnected from the *Jelālī* rebellions. He announced his independence. He created an army modeled after the Ottoman army. He utilized the *khuṭbah* as a way of declaring his separatism. He stroke coins in his name.[337] He also cooperated with Tuscany and made connections with other European countries.[338] That is to say, he refused to integrate into the Ottoman imperial system by what he had done. This is why, Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha demonstrates a stark contrast with the *Jelālī*s, meaning that he was absolutely not a *Jelālī* or he could not be a *Jelālī*.

The main reason why I highlight such a statement is that Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha has been portrayed as only separatist *Jelālī* and the last *Jelālī* rebel in some master's theses particularly by some researchers who have widely ignored the latest secondary sources but also opted to employ outdated ones in their scholarship.[339]

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[336] İlgürel, 145. Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Facts on File, 2009): 295-296; Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol. 3-4 (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011): 475-477, 59-60; Nicolea Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2009): 356, 358-359; Şinasi Çolakoğlu, *Kilis Tarihi Üzerine Deneme* (Ankara: Kilis Kültür Derneği Yayınları, 1995), 23-51; Avukat Kilisli Kadri, *Kilis Tarihi* (İstanbul: Bürhaneddin Matbaası, 1932).

[337] Both practices were the clear manifestations of announcing one's absolute sovereignty over the common people, the *reʿāyā* and they gave a one the right of royal privileges. These practices were not restricted only to them. In addition, *Otāg*, *tūğ*, *davul*, the *mehter* band, *sorguç*, which were ritual and symbolic sources of legitimacy were also other royal indications. Rhoads Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800* (London, England: Continuum UK, 2008): 71-72. As the symbols were of paramount importance in demonstrating one's imperial claims and enhancing one's imperial stature, the rulers of the first Turkish-Islamic states not only gave great significance to utilizing them but also invariably had recourse to the titulary grants of the Abbāsīd caliphs in an attempt to further cement their sovereignty. The Ottomans had inherited the aforesaid symbols/practices from their predecessors: İhsan Arslan, "İlk Türk-İslâm Devletlerinde Hükümdarlık ve Hakimiyet Sembolleri," *EKEV Akademi Dergisi* 51 (2012): 73-92.

[338] İlgürel, op.cit., 144.

[339] To give a specific example, in his master's thesis entitled "Celali İsyanları Örneğinde Canbuladoğlu Ali Paşa İsyanı", Süleyman Dural insistently specifies that Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha was only a *Jelālī* rebel who intended to establish an independent state. He also argues that ʿAlī Pasha was the last great *Jelālī*. Dural's main arguments were probably predicated on Barkey's arguments, and perhaps rests on an error in translation of "*Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*". Whereas Karen Barkey, in her own words, states that "*... the only Jelālī rebel leader who "could be seen" as a potential state maker was Canbolāṭoğlu ʿAlī Pasha of northern Syria...*" in her original book, the same sentence is exactly translated as "*... the only Jelālī leader who had a potential to establish a state was Canbolāṭoğlu ʿAlī Pasha of northern Syria...*" in the Turkish translation of her book (the exact equivalent of the latter statement is the sentence "*... Devlet kurma potansiyeli taşıyan tek celāli lideri Kuzey Suriyeli Canbolāṭoğlu ʿAlī Pasha*

Based on the primary and secondary sources that I have employed thus far, I suggest that Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn was equally not a *Jelālī* or he could not be a *Jelālī*. The pattern that Fakhr al-Dīn followed was not dissimilar from ʿAlī Pasha's, as I have previously pointed out in Chapter 3. Judging by Fakhr al-Dīn's actions, he is in sharp contrast with the *Jelālī*s. Just like ʿAlī Pasha, Fakhr al-Dīn actively collaborated with foreign countries, particularly, Tuscany. Yet, there was one particular dissimilarity between them. Fakhr al-Dīn had a long-standing relationship with Tuscany than his Syrian counterpart, ʿAlī Pasha, had. For this reason, just like the rebellion of Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha, we see that the insubordination of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn also was principally the *non-integration-oriented* rebellion. What led me to this conclusion is firstly his ambitious regional anti-Ottoman activities, policies, and equally significantly, the case of Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha's rebellion itself. Last but not least, if we are to position Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn's rebellion in the broader framework of Early Modern Ottoman rebellions, we explicitly see that his rebellion was one of the separatist rebellions that had no ideology, as opposed to the religious rebellions breaking out in the Early Modern period. In other words, whereas the religious rebellions not only had ideologies but were also separatist, Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn's rebellion had no particular ideology compared with other Early Modern separatist rebellions such as Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī (1521), Hāʾin Aḥmed Pasha (1524) and Janbulāṭ ʿAlī Pasha (1606).

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idi..."). While Karen Barkey eschews utilizing a definite statement (she employs the modal "could"), Dural unintentionally utilizes a more certain and misleading statement that derives from the mistake in the Turkish translation version of the book, a situation that directly affects the extant main arguments defended: Süleyman Dural, "Celali İsyanları Örneğinde Canbuladoğlu Ali Paşa İsyanı" (Master's Thesis, Mustafa Kemal University, 2011), i, iii-iv, 6, 25-27, 32, 42, 74, 76, 78, 98; Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 186; Karen Barkey, *Eşkıyalar ve Devlet: Osmanlı Tarzı Devlet Merkezileşmesi*, trans. Zeynep Altok (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), 192. Based on the ongoing researches about the *Jelālī* rebellions, Oktay Özel emphatically specifies that the *Jelālī* rebellions were a more drawn out phenomenon than previously accepted. He points out that the last *Jelālī* rebel was Yeğen ʿOsmān Pasha. From this viewpoint, it could be argued that Barkey misinterprets the last *Jelālī*: Oktay Özel, "The Reign of Violence," 191; Similarly, Hüseyin Demirtaş, too, makes the same mistake: Hüseyin Demirtaş, "Celali İsyanları ve Canboladoğlu Ali Paşa İsyanının Karşılaştırılması" (Master's Thesis, Gaziantep University, 2018), i-ii, 1-2, 70-72, 75-77, 83.

Table 4.1 The Genealogy of the Janbulāṭ Family



Note 1: The related table is prepared according to the genealogical chart inserted at the end of Abdul-Karim Rafeq's article. *Source*: Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "The Revolt of Ali Pasha," 1534.

5. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

In this investigation, I have endeavoured to probe into the Maʿnids in the context of approximately hundred and eighty years of relations and struggles (1516-1697) that I divided into three phases: 1516-1590, 1590-1635 and 1635-1697. With the conquest of a part of the Middle East in the 1510s, the Ottomans encountered the Druze people in Southern Syria and Lebanon, one of the most refractory communities within the empire. The Ottoman administrations strove to disarm the Druze people who had obtained a large number of muskets from the Venetians, and to collect the taxes until the end of the 16th century. However, the Druze people overreacted to the Ottoman domination by persistent rebelling and pursued anti-Ottoman activities in the region. Consequently, in the first phase of the struggles (1516-1590), the Ottomans resorted to administrative arrangements and the military interventions to control the Druze people, who had the close relationships with the Maʿnids in the region.

The Druze rebellions continued until the last decade of the 17th century. When Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn took over the *muqaddam*ship from his father in 1590, the relations between the Ottoman administrations and the Maʿnids started to take a different form. The Ottoman administrations began to deal with local figures instead of communities. Fakhr al-Dīn followed a conciliatory policy with Ottoman dignitaries and found a place for himself within the Ottoman administrative system as a *sanjak-bey*. Moreover, he became part of the *iltizām* system through the *iltizām* contracts, which enabled him to achieve his regional policies to a certain extent. On the other hand, Ottoman administrations pragmatically cooperated with him through the *iltizām*, for they aimed to collect taxes and to further establish their control over the periphery. That Fakhr al-Dīn abused his position and cooperated with Tuscany makes him a *non-integration-oriented* rebel instead of a *Jelālī*. The Ottoman administrations captured Fakhr al-Dīn later and executed him in 1635. His elimination signified the termination of the second phase of these struggles (1590-1635).

After Fakhr al-Dīn's death, the Ottoman administrations maintained their pragmatic policies towards the Maʿnids between 1635 and 1697. The center furnished Mulhim Maʿn and Aḥmad Maʿn with tax-farms, demonstrating that pattern of the relations did not change. However, the anti-Ottoman policies of Aḥmad Maʿn led Istanbul to prefer to cooperate with the Shihāb dynasty. The shift from the Maʿnids to the Shihābs demonstrates that the Ottoman administrations carried out policies in a realistic way to protect their regional interests. It also signifies that the termination of the third phase of these struggles (1635-1697).

The Ottoman primary sources indicate that the Ottoman administrations perceived the Druze people as heretics. It can be argued that orthodox and heterodox doctrines had a considerable effect on the relations between the Ottoman administrations and the Druzes. However, unless the Druzes did not rebel against the Ottoman administrations, the differences in the religious principles did not hold the Ottoman administrations back from pursuing the pragmatic policies against the Druzes. Last but not least, the Maʿnids and their local activities demonstrates that the Ottoman Empire did not have a strict control over Southern Syria and Lebanon unlike Anatolia and Balkans, which constituted the core lands of the Empire. Therefore, Istanbul resorted to control mechanisms and strategic maneuvers to solidify its control over the periphery. The Ottoman Empire was considerably accomplished in handling rebellions and peripheral elements, as it was the case of the Maʿnids.

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