

**ESSAYS ON THE EFFECT OF EMOTIONS ON THE POLITICAL
DECISION AND JUDGMENT**

by
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is a combination of three studies on the relationship between emotions and political judgment and behavior. The overarching theme of the dissertation is the plurality in the emotional experience. In this regard, each substantive chapter will contemplate either the interaction of emotions with each other or emotions towards different objects/subjects in shaping political decisions and judgment. For this purpose, the first chapter analyzes the impact of interactions between different emotions on people's perception on the frequency of facing fake news. The case of the chapter is the renewal of the İstanbul metropolitan municipality elections of Turkey in 2019. By using survey data, the scholarly attention is diverted to the arousal of anxiety, anger, and hope in response to the High Electoral Court of Turkey's decision to renew the elections. The second chapter offers an experimental study assessing the effect of eliciting multiple emotions on the credibility of a frame. This chapter focuses on the impact of eliciting anger and compassion simultaneously on the credibility of the frame by using the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The last chapter scrutinizes in what ways people's emotions towards the parties alter their probability of strategic voting in the U.K's context. The results from these chapters provide varieties of evidence for plurality in emotional experience and its effects on different political decisions and judgments.

ÖZET

DUYGULARIN SİYASAL KARAR VE YARGILARA ETKİLERİ ÜZERİNE MAKALELER

FARUK AKSOY

SİYASET BİLİMİ DOKTORA TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2021

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Duygu, Türk Siyaseti, Stratejik Oy Verme Davranışı, Yalan
Haber, Çerçeveleme

Bu tez duyguların siyasal yargı ve davranışlar ile ilişkisine odaklanan üç çalışmanın bir araya gelmesinden oluşmaktadır. Tezin genel teması insanların duygusal deneyimindeki çoğulluk olarak çerçevelenebilir. Bu bağlamda tezin bölümleri, ya duyguların siyasal yargı ve davranışları etkilemede birbirleri ile olan etkileşimine, ya da çeşitli obje yada subjelere olan duyguların, siyasal yargı ve davranış üzerine olan muhtemel etkilerine odaklanmaktadır. İlk bölüm, çeşitli duygular arasındaki etkileşimlerin, insanların sahte haberlerle karşılaşma sıklığı algısı üzerindeki etkisini analiz etmektedir. Bu bölümde bir anket çalışması vasıtası ile vaka olarak ele alınan olay, 2019 yılında İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanlığı seçimlerinin yenilenmesi, ele alınan duygular ise Yüksek Seçim Kurulu'nun seçimlerin yenilenmesi kararı dolayısıyla hissedilen kaygı, öfke ve umuttur. Tezin ikinci bölümde ise birden fazla duygunun ortaya çıkarılmaya çalışılmasının, yapılan çerçevelemenin kredibilitesi üstüne etkisi deneysel yöntem ile incelenmektedir. Bu amaçla, Türkiye'deki Suriyeli mültecilere karşı öfke ve merhameti bir çerçeve (frame) ile aynı anda ortaya çıkarmaya çalışmanın, bu çerçevenin kredibilitesi üstüne etkisi araştırılmaktadır. Son olarak, üçüncü bölüm seçmenlerin sistemdeki siyasal partilere karşı hissettikleri duyguların, stratejik oy verme ihtimalleri üzerine etkisini Birleşik Krallık özelinden incelemektedir. Bu üç bölümde yapılan analizlerin ortaya koyduğu çeşitli sonuçlar, insanların duygusal deneyimindeki çoğulluğa ve bu çoğulluğun insanların siyasal yargı ve davranışları üzerine etkilerine dair önemli bulgular sunmaktadır.

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In memory of my grandfather(s)

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1. INTRODUCTION

Emotions are an inextricable part of individuals' political experiences and interactions. To observe, consider a voter who has supported the party in the government for more than a decade. However, the last years have drifted him to cast doubt on the competency and intentions of the incumbent. The economic and political conditions of the country have been falling head over heels. Further, he has witnessed the incremental skew of the playing field in favor of the incumbent, corruption scandals, and the moral meltdown in the governmental attitude and policies. Upon these incidences, he has felt the “anxiety in the air” affecting his expectations and future expectations. His fear from the apparent results of the current and expected problems is undeniable.

Nevertheless, he has a strong negative predisposition towards the opposition. This is accompanied by his anger stemming from his perception of oppositions' attitudes and actions, incompetence in the past, and even treason to the country. He does not feel safe in case of an opposition electoral victory. Also, an incumbent turnover might crumble the political efficacy that he has experienced throughout the years alongside causing the itchy feeling of changing the status quo. Nonetheless, he is well aware of the failure and misuse of the incumbent either by accepting or attempting to deny. Under these circumstances, he needs to decide whether he should vote to keep or evict the incumbent from the helm of the government in the upcoming elections.

He will be exposed to many news, comments, and political ads throughout the upcoming electoral process. Also, he will involve in political discussion, actively or passively, in the public sphere consists of commentators, experts, and his fellow citizens. YouTube channels, Instagram profiles, Twitch, and Tik Tok platforms will highly involve in politics; also used as a means for the electoral campaigns systematically, maybe for the first time in the country's electoral history. Meanwhile, most of the material he will encounter will be professionally designed. The primary cognitive elements that become the target will be his emotions. The campaign of

both sides will be devoted to eliciting anger towards their rival. Speeches in public meetings of opposition will attempt to inject hope in case the incumbent is toppled down. The songs of the incumbent's campaign will aim to disperse pride to the air for removing the anxiety. Also, many tweets and posts will be released from real or troll accounts that blame the incumbent or opposition by loading themselves with anger, contempt, and hatred towards their target. Nevertheless, the implicit target of all will be his voting decision.

Of course, all these stimuli will be filtered by webs of attitudes, beliefs, and emotions. His existing mental constructs will impact the resonance of the stimulus. The consonant message will increase its impact; a dissonant stimulus might even cause a backlash . Under ordinary circumstances, his cognitive shield can perfectly ignore or discredit most of the counter-attitudinal information, yet this time, "anxiety is in the air," and fear surrounds his thoughts. The voter's concerns regarding the future will unwillingly lead him to pay attention to what "others" say. Throughout the campaign process, an affective tipping point will be maybe reached, thereby minimizing his predispositions' effect .

Even though conventional and social media will consist of an important part of his perceptual landscape, the portion of the political discussion in his habitus will compete with them in a head horse race. The people who gather political arguments through their daily encounters with conventional and social media will reproduce them as their opinion . In the workplace, coffeehouses, family meetings, WhatsApp groups, Discord, and Club House conversations, the words will be loaded with emotions irrespective of whether the discussants agree or disagree on the subject matter.

Emotions will turn into handy tools; also, subject to the rhetoric of conversations in close relation with the identity, belief, and ideology. Under these settings, discussions will not primarily be mediums to share the information and opinion but will either consolidate opinions or persuade, blame, or irritate the other discussants . Maybe a close friend of our voter will accuse those who vote for the opposition with blindness towards or supporting the treason. While in another discussion, a family member will blame his ignorance and pronounce him as stupid for supporting the incumbent, while a bystander of discussion who is famous for his temper will respond harshly to this comment. The shadow of politics brings chill among the members of the family. During all these, emotions will arise and be perfect catalyzers to alter the impact of the arguments either positively and negatively.

Within all these interactions, the voter will strive to solve his dissonance . Since the threats are there and anxiety in the air, he must face the contradictions between

his voting intention, his values, and the hard facts of politics. In this process, the emotions he holds towards political issues, figures, and events will make his endeavor harder or easier. The anger towards the opposition might assist him in applying “the lesser evil” resolution mechanism. Alternatively, the prevailing “bolstering” strategy helps him discount the unsuccessful policies and mistakes of the incumbent party by highlighting their successes, material, and ideological perks. Or by using the “differentiation” strategy, he might blame other figures, for instance, those he defines as sycophants, instead of the leader or cadre of the party for the failure and mistakes of government. By doing so, he might redirect his anger from the government to these sycophants, which has been in the repertoire of the country’s political culture as a political strategy for more than a century. On the other hand, negative emotions towards the incumbent and the anxiety in the air may inhibit him from using any of these strategies. He might alleviate the dissonance by changing his voting intention. However, this time the voter will require to diminish the dissonance between his novel voting intention and his predispositions under the impact of the level of emotions that he feels.

After months of the electoral campaign, the day of the elections will fall due. He will get out of his home to attend the voting terminal if he has decided to turn out. His gaze probably hinges on the dismantling flags, posters, or banners of the political parties around the streets. Maybe, one of these materials has been irritating him throughout the campaign. Facing it on the way towards the ballot box will prime the emotions stored in his cognition and may help him to diminish the dissonance. At last, he will arrive at the school in which he will cast his vote. While he will be climbing upstairs to reach the classroom that he will cast his vote, he might earwitness a conversation among opposition party voters who insult the voters of the incumbent party. His anger towards the opposition will prime. Upon his arrival to the classroom, he will, maybe, encounter an argument about the violation of the voting procedures between the official observers of elections that the political parties appoint. In their appearance, he can easily distinguish their party affiliation. This confrontation might prime the anger towards the opposition and/or incumbent alongside anxiety about the future. Then, he will enter the voting cabinet. At long last, he will cast his vote.

This was a snapshot of a single voter’s emotional experiences from the album of many others. Regardless of the differences in their experiences, individuals’ political judgments and decisions are essentially surrounded by many facets of emotions. Even the evaluations of the plot of the above-told story and voter type selection are subjected to emotions of readers at least who live in the country “which must not be named.” Individuals encounter events, discussions, news causing emotional

arousal every day. These emotions are stored and affect their political judgments and decision-making in the future. Political actors, spin doctors, and their fellow citizens constantly, deliberately or not, elicit their emotions to increase the impact of the given messages. As Walter Benjamin (1996) once said for the people's fatigue upon the number of stimuli they encountered in cities of the 20th century, individuals of the internet age are occupied by countless emotionally loaded political stimuli and the shade of these stimuli in their cognition.

Amazed by this inflation and variety in the experience, this study attempts to investigate the impact of the emotion-related concepts' on political decisions and judgments. The overarching theme of the study will be the plurality in emotional experience. For this purpose, three independent chapters will explore the effect of this multiplicity in emotional experience on the subject under investigation.

The first chapter will focus on the effects of the interaction of various discrete emotions towards the same issue on a political judgment. More precisely, It will assess the relationship between people's perception of the frequency of facing fake news about a particular event and the interaction of different discrete emotions towards the reason for this event. The case will be the renewal of the İstanbul metropolitan municipality elections of Turkey in 2019.

The second chapter will present an experiment that aims to analyze the effect of arousal of multiple emotions towards a frame on a political judgment. The case will be Syrian refugees. The chapter will focus on the effect of eliciting anger and compassion simultaneously on the power of the frame.

The last chapter will delve into the effect of various emotions towards different objects on a political decision. The question will be how the emotions towards the parties in different status as the most preferred party, strategic party, and rival party alter the probability of strategic voting in the U.K. By doing so, the focus of the chapter will be a multitude of objects that emotions towards them affect a political decision.

At the end of this introductory chapter, each of the three substantial arguments will be presented in more detail. Before doing so, first will be visiting the theories of emotions for politics by following the historical trajectory followed by a scheme for conceptions and measurements of emotions and emotion-related concepts in the literature.

1.1 A Brief History for Theories of Emotion in Politics

Note that this will not be a literature review. Each chapter has different dependent variables and related scholarly work in the literature on emotions. Therefore, a review of relevant pieces of literature will be provided in the substantial chapters. Instead, in this section, the short historical review of the concept will build upon two main themes: The disappearance of the emotion-reason dichotomy and going beyond the valence in explaining the emotions and their role in politics. After that, a description of plurality in emotional experience and its relevance will be discussed at the end of the section.

From ancient to modern times, the perception regarding emotions' role and function has evolved; yet, the diagnosis for its central role in political decisions and judgment has never shrunk. As usual, the conceptual voyage starts with Plato and Aristotle. Even though Plato did not propose a clear-cut definition for emotions, he posited emotions as a threat to a rational decision. Emotions are impediments to the ideal polity led by the philosopher-king. So, emotions are absolute impediments to the ideal decision-making process.

On the other hand, a clear conceptualization of the concept can be found in the texts of Aristotle. In his works, the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Rhetoric*, he depicted a conceptual world by defining the term "pathe," which implies emotions. Aristotle's "pathe" refers to the animals' instinctive responses to the stimuli in the environment, the outside world, including feelings of pleasure or pain. He listed 14 emotions for a human being, including anger, fear, emulation, joy, envy. Further, he diverged from Plato by not categorically putting emotions as opposed to reason. Nevertheless, according to him, some of the emotions constitute obstacles for human reason. In this regard, he named anger and pleasure as disruptive emotions. However, the destructive effect of emotions depends on the virtue of the human. *Acratic* individuals are those subject to the destructive effects of these emotions, but *enkratics* are not.

Two more points in Aristotle's discussion on emotions are intriguing. The first one is his focus on the power of emotions in oratory. He proposed three sources of persuasion, namely trust in the speaker, audiences' passion, and proof in the speech. According to him, the audience's passion is where emotions play a role by affecting their judgment. He argued that emotions alter the persuasive power of oratory by distancing the audience from the subject matter. Especially he underlined the role of anger in persuasion. Secondly, he reserved a theoretical position to the emotional disposition of individuals alongside the *pathe*. According to Aristotle, people have

different dispositions to feel emotions. The point of discussion in Aristotle and Plato was the destructive clash between emotion and reason. This pattern continued in Stoicism, Roman political texts, and early Christian philosophy (Schmitter 2021).

Meanwhile, a point in history in which the conceptualizations of emotions took another form is the Renaissance. By all means, one of the political writers who discuss emotions was the untitled father of political psychology, Machiavelli. His conception of emotion was foremostly interested in the relationship between emotions and political behavior of individuals alongside outcomes of these behaviors. This theoretical lenience is probably related to his self-assigned duty to advise the leaders regarding how to govern the polity. In his “Prince” and “Discourse,” which provided commentaries to the selective events in Roman History, he gave propositions regarding the using emotions to keep the public under order and obedience. For instance, he argued that fear and envy motivate people to mobilize and keep them in order. People who fear the leader will be motivated to follow the orders to protect themselves from the leader’s fury. Also, people who feel envy towards particular figures in the political system will count favor to the leader for getting more perks from the political machine.

Also, a less known figure in Renaissance, who gave a complete account for emotions, is Juan Luis Vives (1553). His conception of emotion eluded from the dichotomy of reason and emotion by providing an account for the emotions, which does not depict emotions as an absolute impediment to reason. Furthermore, his account provided a full-fledged typology by getting beyond the valance of emotions. He distinguished three types of emotions as directed at the good, concerned with evil, and act to combat evil. Also, each of these categories includes present and future dimensions. He classifies several emotions by using these analytical tools. For instance, the “present good” category includes delight, whereas desire and hope are classified under the “future good” category. The present concern with the evil category includes grief, while the future concerned with the evil category is fear. Lastly, the present act to combat the evil category includes anger and indignation, whereas the future act to combat the evil category has faith and daring. Another intriguing part of his theory is his argument that emotions can interact. They can arise together, and their combination diminishes or strengthening their effect on people’s behavior.

The blurring of destructive conflict between emotion and reason has shaded away further with some of the social contract theories, utilitarianism, and social Darwinism in the 18th and 19th centuries. For instance, in his Discourse, Rousseau stressed that what ensures the state of nature as the best setting for the human

being is the inherent human capacity to feel “pity.” This feeling prevents an endless conflict under the anarchy of state of nature described by Hobbes’ famous phrase “Homo Hominem Lupus.” Especially after recognizing private property, which led to the emergence of the state, the people started to lose their capabilities to rely on pity, making relations in society unequal. In respect of Darwinism, emotions play a vital function in human history and societies. For instance, James (1890) proposes the evolutionary function of emotions, especially fear, by stressing the survival function of human being both in nature and in society. Upon facing a threat, fear arises, and it helps to respond to human beings to act against this threat by fight or flight. In this way, emotions help people to give fast responses to crucial changes in their environment.

Emotions are still under investigation in political philosophy, even though empirical works have been dominant after the behavioral revolution in social sciences. For instance, the two following accounts in more recent literature are reflections on the role of emotions in the ideal of a “good society.” The first one is by Judith Shklar (1996). Her account posits “cruelty” as the worst evil in societies. According to her, the flare of cruelty in a society is the citizens’ feeling of “fear that we fear.” Fear is evolutionary and necessary for the human organism to perceive threats. Nonetheless, it is temporal; when the threat is eliminated, fear will disappear. However, the “fear that we fear” is a constant feeling upon the possibility of the cruelty by the state apparatus or any other powerful actor compared to the individual under threat. For instance, a person who criticizes the government in discussion with trusted friends should not feel an apparent threat. Yet, she might feel “fear that we fear” for probable cruelty by the state due to her and others’ earlier experiences. In fact, just “mere possibility” stemming from the lack of institutions that constrain the state’s power might be enough to feel “fear that we fear.” According to Shklar, it should be minimized, if not eliminated, for a “good society.”

A more recent philosophical account is by Martha Nussbaum. In her book “Political Emotions” (2013), she also discussed the role of emotions in a good society. She argues that the cultivation of public emotions such as love, sympathy, and compassion is the way for constructing a society that is equal, just, and capable of critical thinking and dissent. Educating the people to reveal these emotions that they are already prone to feel has utmost importance. For this purpose, she gives a series of historical examples from Ancient Greek, the philosophers of the 18th and 19th centuries, and India. Also, she underlines a negative emotion, disgust projection of which to different segments of the society impedes societal peace.

Following the behavioral revolution in social sciences, the research on the nexus be-

tween emotions and politics cuts to a new avenue. The reason-emotions dichotomy lost its dominance, and scholars have focused on interactions of reason and emotions instead of their mutual destruction. Especially starting with the third quarter of the 20th century, various approaches have been flourished. In the following paragraphs, three dominant sets of theories in contemporary political psychology will be presented: valance theories of emotions, cognitive appraisals theories, and affective intelligence theory.

Among the named theories above, the valance theories are the ones that vanguard the modern research for emotions in political science literature. The valance theories conceptualize the emotions with regard to their negativity and positivity, so their valance (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Lodge and Taber 2005). People feel negative or positive emotions towards political objects and subjects that stem from an automatic process. This automatic process proceeds the deliberate thinking by informing the individual about the objects/subjects. These feelings are conceptualized as like and dislike on a fundamental level (Snidermann 1991). Thus, people who like, for instance, a political party approach this party without considered deliberately by getting more information, participating in its rallies, or voting for it.

In contrast, they avoid another political party because they do not like it. Upon these premises, there are a bunch of alternative theories such as Affect Transfer (Brader 2006) and Feeling as Information (Schwarz 1988, Schwarz and Clore 2012). In a similar vein, affective polarization theories analyze people's level of "like and dislike" towards the opposite sections of the society and how the polarization of the "affect" influence people's perception of the traits of "others" who have different partisan preferences (Iyengar et al. 2012, Hernandez et al. 2021).

Despite the valance approach's clear and strong prediction power, its theoretical contribution to political science is limited, especially for understanding democratic politics. Negative and positive feelings directly correspond to and alter according to the partisan predispositions, which is the primary determinant in any decision or judgment. Therefore, the difference between partisan dispositions and emotions towards a political subject/object is blurred by applying the valance theories.

Under these circumstances, what could be the ways of investigating the independent role of emotions in politics? Many alternatives might be spilled out, but the following two are preeminent in the literature. Firstly, the effect of discrete emotions, such as anger, fear, hope, on political behavior and judgment can be investigated instead of focusing on the valance of emotions. Observing the distinct effects of two different discrete emotions in the same valance on individuals' particular decisions or judg-

ments might provide evidence for the independent effect of emotions. For instance, if anger and fear have diverged effects on the voting behavior, such as increasing and decreasing the probability of turnout, respectively; then, one can argue that there is something beyond the valence of emotions. Secondly, if the discrete emotions transcendence from specific subjects/objects of politics, one can argue about an independent effect. For instance, if feeling a particular emotion towards the political progress rather than a specific object/subject alter individuals' demand for political information, the tie between this emotion and object/subject is loosened. In this regard, the following two leading theories in political psychology, namely cognitive appraisal theory and affective intelligence theory, corresponds to these arguments.

Even though its applications to politics have boosted with the new millennium, the foundational scholarly work of cognitive appraisal theories has dated back to the '60s (Arnold 1960, Lazarus 1966). The cognitive appraisal theory of emotions (CAT) proposes distinct appraisals for each discrete emotion instead of categorizing them only in their valence. The CAT suggests that emotions are responses to stimuli in an environment that have a probability of affecting a person's needs, attachments, value, current goals (Arnold 1960, Lazarus 1966, Smith and Ellsworth 1985, Lazarus 1991, Roseman 1996, Moors et al. 2013). The gatekeepers of emotional arousal in human cognition are appraisals that survey the environment to assess the conditions regarding the organism's well-being (Moors et al. 2013). In other words, as evaluation processes, appraisals assess encountered stimulus regarding its effect on an individual's goals, desires, needs, attachment, and beliefs. In this respect, arousal of each discrete emotion depends on several appraisals, and the arousal of each emotion has diverged consequences in people's behavior and attitudes (Smith and Ellsworth 1985, Clore and Antony 2000).

Different studies under the umbrella of cognitive appraisal theory propose different appraisal dimensions to differentiate discrete emotions. For instance, in their seminal study, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) set 8 appraisal dimensions: attention, novelty, certainty, control, pleasantness, perceived obstacle, responsibility/legitimacy, and anticipated effort. The arousal of each discrete emotion is explained by referencing several of these appraisals. For instance, anger and fear are both high in unpleasant dimensions; yet, anger is more likely to arise when the control of the event causes the anger under control of another human. On the other hand, fear is more likely to elicit when the occurrence of an event does not depend on the human agency, which means situational control is high. Similarly, anger is more likely to arise when the future is certain, whereas fear is more likely to arise when the future is less certain.

There are alternative appraisal dimensions by other scholars, but there are sim-

ilarities for most appraisal dimensions. For instance, Lerner and Keltner (2000) proposed six dimensions: certainty, pleasantness, attentional activity, anticipated effort, control, and responsibility. In another study, Scherer (2005) set dimensions of appraisals by adding goal conductive-goal obstructive and high power/control-low power/control dimensions to positive-negative and aroused-passive dimensions of Russell (2003). By using these appraisals as the reason for differences in arousal of emotions, CAT has expectations for each discrete emotion's effect on the various judgments and behaviors. The discussion on the relevant literature on consequences of arousal of discrete emotions is postponed in the relevant chapters.

Another leading theory in current political psychology literature is the Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) (Marcus et al. 2000). The difference of the AIT from other theories of emotions is that it originated in political psychology literature to explain the role of emotions in politics, even though the building blocks of the theory were borrowed from the neural theories of emotions. The theory proposes two cognitive systems as theoretical building blocks, borrowing from Gray (1990), namely disposition and surveillance systems, to explain the effect of emotions in the political domain. These systems are extrapolated from neuroscience studies to explain the effect of emotions on political behavior and judgment.

The disposition system represents the default. As far as the ordinary course of politics continues, people can and are willing to act as they used to. They feel enthusiasm if politics satisfies their desires and goals. The disposition system leads people to rely on their habits, stereotypes, and predispositions in their political judgments and decisions. People are more ready to use the available cognitive constructs instead of updating them by receiving new information (Marcus 2002, Marcus et al. 2011).

People's surveillance system turns on as an alert to the organism in case of perceiving a novel or unexpected threat to themselves or their goals and desires. The consequences of the activation of the surveillance system reflect itself as anxiety that warns an individual to alter her behaviors and judgments. As a result of this, individuals open themselves to new information by increasing their attention. This attentions lead them to abandon their habits, stereotypes, and heuristics. Furthermore, they are more likely to update their schema about political objects (Marcus et al. 2000). In other words, the uncertainty leads them to rely on available mental constructs, which might not be sufficient to survive in the novel conditions less. Additionally, even though anxiety is highlighted as the emotion in negative valance, the further development of the AIT acknowledges the importance of anger in response to a threat to shape political behavior and attitude. AIT persuasively added anger as

the aversion dimension (Marcus 2002, Marcus et al. 2011). The application of AIT is widespread to information-seeking to voting behavior. Each of these branches of literature will be discussed in the relevant chapters.

In this study, cognitive appraisal theories of emotions and affective intelligence theory will be primarily used to investigate the effect of emotions on various political behavior and judgment. Additionally, valance theory and several other theories of emotions will be consulted regarding the chapter's subject matter. All chapters will aim to elude the reason-emotion dichotomy and focus on discrete emotions by following the trajectory.

Beyond its relations with these developments and overarching theories in the literature, the plurality in emotional experience will be the focal point in each chapter. Affective Intelligence Theory and Cognitive Appraisal theories propose parallel cognitive processes that enable the arousal of multiple emotions towards an issue (Smith and Ellsworth 1985, Scherer 2005, Marcus et al. 2015, Bechara and D'amasio 2005). In this regard, the literature has formulated theoretical explanations for the arousal of multiple emotions towards an object/subject/issue (Marcus et al. 2000, Marcus et al. 2013, Civettini and Redlawsk 2009, Vasilopoulos and Wagner 2020). When facing an emotionally loaded stimulus or remembering an event, object, or subject which aroused particular emotions, people might experience more than one emotion. For instance, people who watch the news regarding the corruption of government might be angry because of norm violation and might feel hope in case of removing the incumbent at the helm of the government. On the other hand, they might feel anxiety because of the low probability of changing the government in upcoming elections.

Ultimately, the literature has acknowledged the plurality in emotional experience and assess the effect of multiple emotions towards the same event, object, or subject on the various dependent variables. Nevertheless, one aspect of plurality has been understudied. The gap presents itself in the effect of the interaction of multiple emotions for the dependent variable of interest. The vast majority of scholarly works focus on the single-headed effect of discrete emotions on the subject matter through comparing and contrasting their effect in conjunction with theoretical expectations. For instance, Valentino et al. (2011) analyzes the effect of anger, anxiety, and hope on political participation single-headedly.

Similarly, Groenendyk and Banks (2014) analyzed the effect of anger, fear, and enthusiasm on partisan identification. Or, Lamprianou and Ellinas (2019) compared the effect of anger and shame on political activism and sophistication. Yet, there is a shortage of studies regarding the effect of the interaction of emotions. In what

ways the interaction of various emotions towards the same event, subject, or object affects political judgment and behavior?

If we feel multiple emotions towards a political issue, the effect of these emotions might be depending on each other. In this regard, the expected theoretical directions of the potentially aroused emotions might give us a reason to consider the interaction of emotions. For instance, the theoretical direction of anger and anxiety disparate in information-seeking, as was discussed previously. An immense number of studies have focused on this relationship (Marcus et al. 2000, Lodge and Taber 2005, Redlawsk et al. 2007); nevertheless, the unattended question is in what ways the level of arousal of these emotions alters each other's effect. How does their combination shape political decisions and behavior? Whether they curbs each other's effect or one of them prevails over the other? In a related vein, accumulated evidence suggests that both anger and hope increase information-seeking (Just et al. 2007, Isbell et al. 2006). Nevertheless, how does their combination in different levels affect information-seeking? Does it boost people's urge for information more than their single-headed effect?

In this regard, empirical studies and theoretical discussion are weak in the literature, which focuses on Affective Intelligence Theory and Cognitive Appraisal Theories. Affective Intelligence Theory is powerful since it mentions the neuroscientific evidence by offering two systems, disposition and surveillance. Yet, these systems are ontologically separate. In other words, the surveillance system turns on when the disposition system is off. So, their relationship is binary. Therefore, it is hard to contemplate the interaction of enthusiasm and anxiety, which are the combination of negative and positive emotions, except for anger which is put under the disposition system. Yet, in literature, the relationship between the disposition system and the surveillance system is presented as a continuum since the models and research designs allow individuals to feel enthusiasm, anger, and anxiety at the same time. However, this theoretical gap stands still alongside neglecting the interactions between emotions. Also, since AIT focuses on three emotions, it might miss the potential impact of other discrete emotions. This problem presents itself in studies that employ AIT but also combine it with Cognitive Appraisal theories. This is a common practice in the literature, which investigates the effect of a discrete emotion other than enthusiasm, anxiety, and anger.

In this regard, Cognitive Appraisal Theories provide leverage by posing appraisals for each emotion. By using these appraisals, hypotheses can be derived for interactions of emotions. However, a problem of CAT might stem from the fact that appraisals of some emotions are opposite of each other. For instance, anger is more

likely to arise when the control of the event is under another human. On the other hand, fear is more likely to arise when the occurrence of an event does not depend on human agency. Therefore, their existence towards the same object/subject might be problematic, at least in some cases. Although this issue can be solved by conceptualizing and operationalizing human control as a continuum, there is a lack of theoretical discussion concerning this issue. Under these circumstances, two chapters that will focus on the interaction of emotions will use the different leverages of each theory, the neuroscientific background of AIT, and appraisals of CAT alongside the contemporary aspect of other theories of emotions.

In this regard, the first chapter will investigate the impact interactions of anger, anxiety, and hope on the perceived frequency of facing fake news. Additionally, the second chapter will focus on the interaction of anger and compassion regarding their impact on the credibility of the frame. Nevertheless, a few studies provided valuable evidence about the effect of the interactions of emotions. For instance, Jost (2019) reevaluated Vasilopoulos et al.(2019) findings regarding the effect of emotions towards Paris Attacks in 2015 on the voting for Front National. According to Just, the evidence provided by Vasilopoulos and his colleagues shows that anger towards the Paris attacks in 2015 mediates the effect of fear on support for far-right parties. Another example might be the positive compound effect of anger and compassion on support for moral action (Ahmad 2013, Clement et al. 2017). The chapters mentioned above aim to articulate this branch of the literature by offering empirical evidence for the interaction of discrete emotions on different dependent variables.

Another aspect of the plurality of emotions in this study will be the multiplicity of subjects that people feel emotion towards regarding an issue. Literature has widely recognized this aspect and is particularly important for and prevalent in the relationship between emotions and voting behavior. The emotions towards candidates and parties in the race potentially affect a single decision, voting. In conjunction with this, the literature focuses on the emotion towards different candidates, not only for their direct effect on voting behavior but also their effect on candidate evaluation. Emotions towards candidates/parties are sometimes evaluated single-headedly (Marcus et al. 2000); in other cases, comparative indexes for emotions, especially for enthusiasm and anxiety, are constructed by using the difference in the level of emotions towards the major presidential candidates (Marcus et al. 1993). The last chapter will attempt to articulate this branch of the literature by offering two intertwined novelty. Firstly, the effect of emotions will be investigated on a special type of voting behavior, strategic voting. Secondly, parties as to the objects of emotions will be given particular status as the most preferred, strategic, and rival, owing to the structure that potential strategic voters face.

Thus, three chapters of this study aim to investigate these two aspects of plurality. The details will be given at the end of this chapter for each substantial chapter. Before doing so, the next section will provide a review for the conceptualization and operationalization of emotions and emotion-related concepts in the contemporary literature of political psychology to finalize the overarching review.

1.2 Emotions and Emotion Related Concepts

In political psychology, the research on emotions sheds light on the same phenomenon regardless of their definitions, yet the conceptualizations of emotions and emotion-related concepts vary. Understanding these divergences is pivotal since the causal relationship and function that entails conceptualizations might differ. In this regard, the literature of psychology offers numerous classifications and typologies for emotions and emotion-related concepts. For instance, one of the classical ways of categorizing emotions is distinguishing them as basic and non-basic emotions. The various theorists have attempted to determine basic emotions as the linchpins of emotional experience. In most of the theories, their combinations consist of non-basic emotions (Moors 2009).

Nevertheless, the criteria to determine basic emotions varies. For instance, Darwin (1872) determined basic emotions by analyzing whether they have a unique neural signature or not. If there are unique changes in an individual's nervous system during the episode of experiencing a discrete emotion, it is categorized as basic. In another theory, Ekman (1993) signified emotions as basic when their arousal corresponds to unique facial expressions. If experiencing an emotion causes the same facial expression universally, then it is classified as basic emotion.

Another example for the classification of emotions might be utilitarian vs. aesthetic emotions. This distinction is primarily based on the role of emotions in the survival of an organism. In this regard, aesthetic emotions, in conjunction with the Kantian definition of aesthetic (1790), are not relevant to the needs of the individual, so they are not related to the survival of the organism. Examples are wonder, ecstasy, fascination. On the other hand, utilitarian emotions ensure the survival of an organism by signaling the threats, detecting the environment for goal and need relevance, and making the organism ready to take action. The examples might be anger, fear, hope (Scherer 2005).

Alongside emotions, emotion-related concepts are also categorized in particular di-

mensions. One of the most established classifications reflects the distinction of mood from emotions. To present the difference, scholars have applied three classifiers as duration, intensity, and presence or absence of a specific target. According to this categorization, the duration of emotions is short, more intense, and directed to a specific target. On the other hand, the mood has a longer span of existence than emotions, yet they are less intense and not directed to a specific target (Isbell et al. 2006, Moors 2009). The example list for classifications can be extended. Each classification for emotions and emotion-related concepts stands for a theoretical clarification and/or explanation by their own virtue. As a part of a literature review regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of emotions, this study will also attempt to classify the emotion-related concepts widely discussed in the literature. To clarify, the aim of this classification is a description rather than posing casual arguments.

For this purpose, the concepts that will be discussed are instant emotions, stored emotions, primed emotions, emotional disposition, mood, and incidental emotions. The overarching category is named “emotion-related concepts” since some of these concepts may not be defined as emotion. In this regard, instant and incidental emotions correspond to the core concept of emotion. On the other hand, stored and primed emotions may not be defined as emotions in all theories of emotions. Moreover, emotional disposition and mood are not defined as emotions in any theory. Nevertheless, all these concepts are necessary to understand and clarify the essence of plurality in emotional experience and the research on emotions in political science. Each of them will be discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.

This classification’s three building blocks will be endurance, relevance to a subject/object, and requirement of a new stimulus. Each concept will be discussed by putting them into categories according to these classifiers. This classification, firstly, will provide a synopsis of literature in terms of measures and conceptualizations of emotions and emotion-related concepts. The discussion will be on what these concepts stand for and in what ways they are measured. Secondly, all these emotion-related concepts might have different casual paths and mechanisms to affect political judgment and behavior. This typology might help our contemplation of these differences for further studies.

Endurance refers to the emotion-related concepts’ longevity and openness to change: To what extent does the emotion-related concept endure? The endurance here implies, firstly, the emotion-related concept’s time span of existence and, if it endures enough, its likelihood of change without disappearance. These two components might be separated for analytical clarity; yet, the reason behind merging longevity

and change into endurance is the following. If the longevity and openness to change would be set as separate classifiers, a classification according to openness to change for the emotion-related concepts that disappear in a short time span will be void. For instance, the expected longevity of instant emotions is few seconds. In few seconds, observation for a change does not seem plausible.

Therefore, classification in terms of endurance includes four categories: very weak, weak, strong, and very strong. If the emotion-related concept is classified as very weak or weak, its longevity is not enough to discuss its openness to change. On the other hand, classifying the concept as strong or very strong means, it can exist as long as one can observe its change.

Relevance to a subject/object refers to answers to two chained questions. The first question is whether there is a specific subject/object to which the emotion-related concept is associated? If the answer to the first question is yes, the following question is whether the emotion-related concept is associated with the subject/object under investigation or not. This classification includes three categories. An emotion-related concept is; not relevant to any subject/object if the answer to the first question is no, relevant to a random subject/object if the answer to the first question is yes. However, the second one is no, or relevant to a subject/object under investigation if the answer to both questions is yes.

Lastly, the requirement of a new stimulus refers to whether a new stimulus for the existence of the emotion-related concept is required. In other words, it corresponds to the need to use a new stimulus to elicit the emotion-related concept of participants for observing the effect of this concept. Two categories of this classification are required and not required.

Before going through, the point should be underlined that discussion on some of these categorizers can be found in the literature. Yet, none of these discussions provide a comprehensive typology regarding emotions and emotion-related concepts. For instance, literature provides a concept, affective tags in the structure of long-term memory, which refers to the affect attached to particular objects as positive or negative (Casino and Lodge 2007, Cassino et al. 2007). Mainly, they are attached to the objects and generally represented as like or dislike. Also, the affective tags vary according to their strength which determines their openness to change (Cassino and Lodge 2007). The strength of affective tags might correspond to the openness to change in the above-mentioned categorization; yet, endurance refers not only to the openness to change but also longevity. Affective tags are inherently referred the strong category but cannot encompass the very weak and weak categories.

Also, even though some scholars admitted that discrete emotions could be conceptualized like affective tag, and most of the scholarship has focused on emotions attached to different objects and subjects, lack of discussion about their difference from affect, so like or dislike, reveal itself in the literature (Cassino et al. 2007) which can be attempted by the above-mentioned classification.

Additionally, Cassino and Lodge (2007) differentiated affect and mood with their relevance to subjects. Affect is relevant with the subjects, but the mood is not. Therefore this distinction might correspond relevance to the subject/ object classifier. Nevertheless, this classifier is more comprehensive since it includes the aspect of whether the subject or object is the one under consideration or not. Now, we can turn to the explanation and classification of emotion-related concepts.

1.2.1 Instant Emotions

Instant emotions are “the” emotions. The concept stands as the answer for what emotion is. Nonetheless, the definition of the concept varies in different theories. In most of them, emotion is defined by referring to the “emotional episode,” which starts from facing the stimulus to consequences of emotional arousal (Moors 2009). Also, each theory adds and/or removes several components into episodes to define the emotions (Moors 2013). The following paragraphs will recall the definition of the concept in already discussed cognitive appraisal theories and somatic marker hypothesis, which is the backbone of affective intelligence theory.

With the definition of cognitive appraisal theories, as a response to encountering a stimulus, we feel discrete emotions regarding the importance of this stimulus for our goals and desires (Arnold 1960, Lazarus 1966, Smith and Ellsworth 1985, Lazarus 1991, Roseman 1996). CAT proposes five necessary components: cognitive, motivational, somatic, motor, and feeling, to define emotion. (Clore and Orthony 2000, Scherer 2005, Frijda 2007). As was already discussed, the type of discrete emotions depends on the defined appraisals such as novelty, certainty, and pleasantness. Similarly, as a neuroscientific approach and a linchpin for Affective Intelligence Theory, the Somatic marker hypothesis defines emotions as the changes in bodily and brain states in response to a stimulus, real or hypothetical, in relation with the one’s perception. The part that an individual perceives bodily and semantically is the feeling, which is conventionally called emotions (Damasio 1999). Also, the type of emotions depends on the primed brain structure accompanied by bodily changes (Bechara and Damasio 2005).

Instant emotions are temporal; they are last long until the removal of emotion eliciting stimuli. Also, their effect is temporal (Scherer, 2005). When a person faces a snake, she feels fear; but, when the snake, as a threat, is removed, the fear disappears as well. When a person faces news about the corruption of the government, she probably feels anger. However, after the news ends, her instant anger will diminish and eventually disappear. Therefore, they are very weak in endurance but relevant to the subject under investigation. Also, an emotionally loaded new stimulus is required to arouse them.

Naturally, this is the most studied concept of emotion in political psychology. The method to investigate the effect of instant emotions is the experiment. In most of the studies, by using an article, a frame, a picture, a video as manipulation, the participants' emotions are elicited to observe the effect of a discrete emotion on the subject matter. For instance, Clifford and Jerit (2018) used articles about a fictitious disease to elicit participants' anxiety in one group and disgust in another group to investigate the effect of anxiety and disgust on individuals seek information about this disease. Alternatively, Clement et al. (2017) used framed articles to investigate instant anger and compassion. Also, another way of manipulation is to ask the participants to write a short essay about an event/instance that they feel a particular emotion about the subject/object (Bower 1981, Lerner and Keltner 2001, Isbell and Ottati 2002). Nonetheless, I think this method elicits "primed emotions," which will be discussed in the section reserved for this concept.

1.2.2 Stored Emotions

Imagine again the above-mentioned person who faces the news about the corruption of the government. Her instant anger disappears, yet this news and the emotion that she felt towards the news are stored in her memory. Each experienced instant emotion above certain levels towards issues/events/actors is stored across the mental structures. (Redlawsk et al. 2010). All major theories of emotions, such as valance theories (Lodge and Taber 2006), cognitive appraisal theories (Clore and Orthony 2000, Scherer 2005), somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio 1993), network theories of emotions (Lang 1985, Berkowitz 1990), constructive theories of emotions (Vincent et al. 2008) offer a mechanism to explain how these instant emotions are stored, and how these stored emotions affect the behavior and judgment of the individuals. These theories will be discussed in the relevant chapters in detail to ensure consistency.

A voter might cast the ballot in a second, but her choice of the voting option depends

on her evaluations and experiences long before the election day. Stored emotions towards these events have an inevitable effect on given decisions and judgments. Suppose a person feels anger at the government because of the series of negative incidences in the governmental term. In that case, it might increase her likelihood of joining a protest or other forms of unconventional political participation. Or, if she feels hope towards a political party because of the policies they enact or propose, her likelihood to vote for this party will probably increase. Unsurprisingly, stored emotions have been investigated in the literature of political psychology on emotions. In this regard, the major political issue such as voting (Marcus et al. 2000), political participation (Groenendyk and Banks 2014), evaluations of the economic performance (Conover and Feldman 1986), support for populist political parties (Magni 2017, Rico et al. 2019) moral and polarize attitudes (Clifford 2019), reaction to terrorism (Small et al. 2006), have been under scholarly investigation.

To capture those emotions, the surveys ask questions regarding the emotions towards the concerned object/subject. For instance, American National Election Studies (ANES) applies the Affect checklist for candidates (Abelson et al. 1982). The questions in the ANES ask each respondent: "Has (presidential candidate) - because of the kind of person he is or because of something he has done, ever made you feel (angry/afraid/proud/hopeful)." Further, similar questions ask the respondents in a couple of waves in British Election Studies (BES). Moreover, other surveys and experiments measure the participants' emotions towards particular events/objects/subjects. For instance, Wagner (2014) used, "Which, if any, of the following words describe your feelings about the country's general economic situation?" (p.53) to measure the stored emotions towards the financial crisis. In a similar vein, Conover and Feldman (1986) asked about stored emotions about economic conditions by using the following wording: "I'd like to ask you about some of the feelings that you have when you think about the nation's economy-not your own personal economic situation. In the last six months, has the nation's economy made you feel angry/hopeful. . . ." (p.54).

Thus, stored emotions single or combined projection of each instant emotion directly or indirectly related to the object/subject. They are strong in the endurance category because their existence or effect is not dependent on removing the stimuli like instant emotions. Nevertheless, they are not very strong since they can change upon facing series of stimuli (Civettini and Redlawsk 2009). They are also relevant to the subject/object under investigation. Lastly, a new emotionally loaded stimulus is not required to measure them.

1.2.3 Primed Emotions

As was indicated earlier, there are two conventional ways to elicit instant emotions in the experiments. Firstly, a method to elicit particular emotion is to ask subjects to engage in emotionally loaded stimuli such as a framed article, video, or picture related to the subject matter. In this case, a subject faces a new stimulus; therefore, the measured emotion is instant. In another method, emotions are stirred up through emotion induction tasks. In that case, subjects write an essay about an event/issue or "general things" that felt them a particular emotion regarding the subject matter. In fact, this manipulation is executed by priming the stored emotions. The subjects do not face a new stimulus.

The second method is rightfully preferred over the second since by using the first one, eliciting a particular emotion is easier and more robust (Bower 1981, Isbell and Ottati 2002, Lerner and Keltner 2001, Valentino et al. 2011). Giving a material might elicit multiple emotions out of the control of the experimenter, which might make the causal analysis muddy (Valentino et al. 2009).

Despite this discussion on the measurement method, to my knowledge, there is no theoretical distinction between instant and primed emotions in the literature. Yet, there is a difference in these methods which presents itself in the requirement of a new stimulus to elicit emotions. With the second method, what the experimenter observes is the "primed emotions." Emotional arousal directly depends on the level of stored emotions. In other words, if the experiment asks the participants to write a short essay about a memory regarding the leader of the rival party, which makes the participants angry, the corresponding anger is subjects' stored feeling towards the leader of the rival party.

On the other hand, when a subject faces an article, a video, or a picture, which is emotionally loaded, the measured emotions are not the stored ones; they are the instant emotions elicited by the stimulus itself. It does not mean that the stored emotions do not play a role in the arousal of the instant emotions. The level of arousal of the instant emotion elicited by the stimulus probably depends on the stored emotions towards the subject matter. In other words, if a subject has stored anger towards the rival party leader, a stimulus that attempts to elicit anger towards the rival party leader might be more effective.

Therefore, the second method measures "the primed emotions." On the other hand, the first method measures instant emotional arousal, which indirectly depends on the effect of the stored emotions. Thus, primed emotions are similar to instant emotions in terms of their endurance; nevertheless, they correspond to stored emotions in

terms of the requirement of new stimuli. Meanwhile, all three are relevant to the subject under investigation

An example for the assessment of primed emotions might be Valentino et al.'s (2009) paper. They investigated the relationship between anxiety and information-seeking, mainly focusing on under which conditions anxiety boosts political information-seeking during the electoral campaign. As experimental manipulation, they asked subjects to write down things that made them angry, for the first group and anxious, for the second group during the electoral campaign. The introduction of the exact questions was: "Now we would like you to describe something during the current campaign that made you feel (angry/afraid /enthusiastic). Please describe how you felt as vividly and in as much detail as possible. Think about the candidates running for office, the issues in this year's election, and real-world events".(p.599). In this way, they primed the anger or anxiety related to the campaign to investigate these emotions' effect on information seeking.

1.2.4 Emotional Disposition

This term refers to what extent an individual is prone to feeling discrete emotions (Cassese and Hannagan 2014). How frequently a person feels anger? To what extent is an individual disposed to feel hope? The answers to these questions reveal a person's disposition to feel a particular discrete emotion. Emotional disposition is a less studied emotion-related concept in political psychology than the others, but a few scholarly works focus on it. As was discussed, the emotional disposition is one of the building blocks of Aristotle's theory. Also, the current literature offers findings regarding the relationship between the effect of emotional appeals and emotional dispositions (Cassese and Hannagan 2014, Clifford and Piston 2017). For instance, Hatemi et al. (2013) found evidence about the effect of emotional disposition towards fear on out-group attitudes by analyzing the differences in twins.

Emotional disposition might be position as not relevant to any object/subject and very strong endurance categories. An individual's disposition to feel a discrete emotion is not related to any object or subject as a personality trait. Furthermore, its endurance is very strong since the dispositions will endure as long as there is no significant change in the individual's personality. Lastly, the existence of emotional disposition does not depend on the appearance of the new stimulus. Therefore, it is under the not-required category in the requirement of a new stimulus classification.

1.2.5 Mood and Incidental Emotions

As was discussed earlier, mood refers to the general feeling state that is more endured than emotions. It is not related to any object; it is less intense than emotions (Isbell et al. 2006). In some studies, the mood is categorized as positive and negative; in some others, happy and sad, even sometimes angry or anxious depending on the context and definition (Schwarz et al. 1983, Bless 2001, Isbell et al. 2006). The concepts similar to mood are named as emotion in some cases, yet these emotions are not dependent on the subject/object that are under investigation. For instance, in Brader's (2005) experimental study on the relationship between emotions and voting behavior, the "emotions" were elicited by the music and cues that are not related to the subject matter, which was local elections. Also, to elicit the emotions in some studies, participants are asked to list or /and write a short essay about a random event in the past that they felt a particular emotion or "general things" that make them feel a particular emotion. Small and Lerner (2008) and Groenendyk (2016) defined this concept as "incidental emotions."

In general, the questions to measure incidental emotions are standard. For instance, Banks (2016) asks participants to write about the general things which make them feel angry/afraid while showing them a picture of a person whose facial expression corresponds to the given emotion. Thus, the object/subject which elicits a particular emotion is chosen by the participants. Also, in other studies, participants are asked to complete the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS), which asks them to report their current level of feeling for 24 different emotions (Watson Clark and Tellegen 1988). In this way, individuals' current levels of emotions because of unknown reasons are used instead of eliciting emotions. Nonetheless, it is not an easy task to theoretically differentiate the mood and incidental emotions.

Firstly, moods and incidental emotions are weak in endurance. Their longevity and their effect on decision and judgment have a short time span. Also, the appearance of a new stimulus is not a necessary condition for the arousal of either mood or incidental emotions. They can be elicited by emotion/mood induction tasks or the PANAS scale. Yet, studies also use materials that are not relevant to the subject matter. Maybe, their difference might be observed in their relevance to a subject/object; yet, the difference is still not clear-cut. In principle, the mood is not relevant to any subject/ object since it is a general affective state, whereas incidental emotions are relevant to a random subject/object. However, in some studies, the affective state is named "emotion" and elicited by using music and cues which are not relevant to the subject/object, as the study of Brader (2005) mentioned above, or by using the PANAS scale.

The following table illustrates the classification of each emotion-related concept. The categories of each emotion-related concept by three classifiers can be observed in the table.

Table 1.1 Categorization of Emotions and Emotion-related Concepts

	Endurance	Relevance to a subject/object	Requirement of a new stimulus
Instant Emotions	Very weak	Subject/object under investigation	Yes
Stored Emotions	Strong	Subject/object under investigation	No
Primed Emotions	Very weak	Subject/object under investigation	No
Emotional Disposition	Very strong	Not relevant to any subject/object	No
Mood	Weak	Relevant to random subject/object	Yes
Incidental Emotions	Very weak	Relevant to random subject/object	No

1.3 Chapters

Each chapter will be illustrated in the following paragraphs in terms of its research question, subject/object of emotions, type of emotion-related concept, aspect of plurality in emotional experience, dependent variable, and method for achieving a systematical explanation.

The research question of the first chapter will be in what ways the interaction of the emotions towards an emotionally loaded event affects the perception of people about the frequency of facing fake news related to this event. In this chapter, the subject of emotions will be the HEC's decision to renew İstanbul mayoral elections in 2019. Before going further, a brief explanation for an emotionally loaded event is necessary.

Arguably, realpolitik is a continuum of simultaneous and sequential events. These events have different potentials to elicit various discrete emotions of different subset of individuals. Some of these events are not sufficient to elicit emotions for any section of society. At the same time, some of them raise the emotions of a part of the public at a mediocre level. Among all, some events represent the node of climax for an emotional reaction. These might include a terrorist attack, a foreign intervention, a judicial case, a referendum, or an electoral victory. The literature rightly focuses on the impact of emotions of these emotionally loaded events on political judgment and behavior. For instance, emotions towards the actors and issues related to the Iraq war (Huddy et al. 2007), the 9/11 attack (Huddy et al. 2005); Paris attacks in 2015 (Vasilopoulos et al. 2019), the effect of Brexit (Vasilopoulos and Wagner 2020) are investigated regarding their effect on different behavior and judgments.

By following this literature, the first chapter will focus on an emotionally loaded

event in the Turkish context, the renewal of the Istanbul mayoral elections in 2019. For this purpose, statistical analyses will be employed to a data from a survey. The aspect of plurality in emotional experience will be the interaction of stored emotions towards this event. Meanwhile, the dependent variable will be the perception of people how frequently they have faced fake news about the renew elections.

The statistical analyses will be employed with the data from a survey conducted between 31 March and 23 June elections by İstanbul Policy Center of Sabancı University. The results of the analyses yield several important findings. Anger towards the incumbent and HEC increases the perceived frequency of facing incorrect news for opposition supporters. However, anxiety resulting from the HEC's decision does not have a single-headed effect on the subject matter. On the other hand, both hope to result from the HEC's decision, and anger towards the opposition increases the perceived frequency of facing incorrect news for the Cumhur alliance's supporters.

Regarding the interaction of emotions, the Cumhur alliance's supporters who feel high levels of anger towards the opposition and hope simultaneously perceive higher frequency about facing incorrect news. The effect of this combination is greater than the high level of single-headed anger and hope. On the other side, a high level of anger single-handedly increases opposition's supporters' perceived frequency of facing incorrect news. Also, the combination of anger towards HEC and anxiety has a positive and significant effect; yet, the effect is not different from the effect of single-headed anger. Additionally, anger towards the incumbent sweeps the negative effect of anxiety on the perceived frequency for facing incorrect news for opposition supporters.

The second chapter will ask how eliciting multiple instant emotions simultaneously alter the power of an emotionally loaded frame. In this chapter, the object of emotions will be framed texts. Frames highlight only one aspect of an issue, event, or policy while explaining them to the audience (Iyengar 1991, Druckman 2001) to shape their opinions and preferences. Alternatively, sometimes, it refers to presenting the numbers, statistics, or words so that the audience can comprehend more easily or in a biased way (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979, Druckman and McDermott 2008). While doing so, these techniques, one of the most effective ways of increasing the frame's power, is to load them emotionally (Iyengar 1991, Gross 2008). By a professional or amateur, or maybe sometimes unconsciously, the effect of the message of the material is increased by designing it to elicit specific instant emotions.

Moreover, the literature offers evidence for the positive effect of eliciting multiple emotions simultaneously; especially, for the combination of anger and compassion (Clement et al. 2017). In this respect, the chapter will analyze the effect of at-

tempting to elicit anger and compassion simultaneously, in comparison to attempt to elicit only compassion, on the credibility of the frame as the dependent variable. The credibility of the frame refers to what extends the message or argument in the frame has the quality of being trusted. The aspect of plurality in emotional experience will be the interaction of instant emotions towards different subjects. Data from an experiment will test the hypotheses. Despite its limitations in many respect, this chapter will yield promising results. Attempting to simultaneous elicitation of anger and compassion decreases the credibility of the frame in comparison to attempting to elicit only compassion.

The last chapter will investigate in what ways stored emotions towards political parties affect individuals' probability of strategic voting. The aspect of plurality in emotional experience will be emotions towards different subjects, which are the political parties that have a particular status in the choice set of voters. These parties will be the most preferred party, the strategic party, and the rival party. The statistical analyses will be utilized by using British Election Studies (BES) survey. The dependent variable will be political behavior, strategic voting. The chapter aims to investigate the independent impact of emotions on these parties, each of which might affect the strategic voting decision. Concomitantly, the effect of these emotions on the effect of widely accepted determinants of strategic voting on strategic voting will be investigated.

Series of statistical analyzes will yield several important findings. People angry towards their most preferred party are less likely to vote for their most preferred party even though their utility from voting for their sincere party increases compared to strategic options. On the other hand, people are more likely to vote for their most preferred party if they have felt pride in their MPP; even the utility from the sincere vote is low. Also, the results reveal that emotions do not affect the impact of the level of party preferences. However, they affect the impact of the winning expectations on the probability of strategic voting. If people are angry towards the rival party, they are more prone to voting strategically if the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the front runner and the winning expectation for the most preferred party is high. Nevertheless, a more substantive effect is observed in hope towards the strategic party. If people have felt hope towards the strategic party, the effect of the difference between respondents' winning expectations for the strategic party and the winning expectations for the rival party decreases.

To clarify the course of each chapter, the following table illustrates the concept of emotion, type of plurality, and dependent variable that chapters investigate.

Table 1.2 Summary of Chapters

Chapter	Concept of Emotion	Type of Plurality	Dependent Variable
Chapter 1	Stored Emotions	Interaction of emotions towards the same object/subject	Perception for frequency of facing fake news
Chapter 2	Instant Emotions	Interaction of emotions towards the same object/subject	Credibility of frame
Chapter 3	Stored Emotions	Emotions towards different object/subjects	Strategic voting

2. EMOTIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF FAKENESS OF NEWS

The relationship between emotions and information-seeking behavior has attracted a deserved scholarly attention in the literature on emotion due to the fact that democratic politics builds upon the citizens' processing of political information (Marcus et al., 2000). Arguably, the recent age of "post-truth" accompanied by the social media revolution increases the relevance of this relationship more. How do people deal with political information in a setting they require to weed out fake news, incidents, and claims? In what ways do emotions include this cognitive process? By sharing these scholarly interests, this chapter also digs into the relationship between stored emotions and people's assessment of the fakeness of information by empirically analyzing a particular event in the Turkish context. Before clarifying the research question and getting in details, the case needs to be explained.

Turkey held regular local elections in 2019 in a new playing field, a peculiar presidential system, installed by a referendum in 2017. One year before the local elections, general elections were held, and Turkish politics witnessed the formation of two pre-electoral coalitions for presidential candidates. AKP and MHP formed *Cumhur Alliance*, whereas CHP and İYİ Party formed *Millet Alliances* with SP and DP to compete in presidential elections. These pre-electoral coalitions (PEC) spilled over to local elections in which both PEC's nominated a significant amount of common candidates¹. Eventually, the 31 March local elections shrunk the position incumbent's Alliance in metropolitan municipalities. Especially the results in Ankara and İstanbul were victories for the *Millet Alliance*, which pro-Kurdish HDP supported.

Yet, the results of the mayoral elections for the metropolitan municipality in İstanbul were a head horse. The vote difference between the *Millet Alliance* candidate and the candidate of the *Cumhur Alliance* was approximately 22.000 out of the total valid votes, 8.547.074. Upon this result, the *Cumhur Alliance* brought a case to the High Electoral Court (HEC) on the grounds of electoral irregularities. After months

¹Only two main parties CHP and İYİ Party formed PEC in local elections.

of public discussion and recounting votes in several districts, HEC decided to renew only the mayoral election for the metropolitan municipality on 23 June 2019, but not elections for the mayor of district municipalities and elections for municipality assemblies. The decision of HEC sparked a fierce reaction in opposition parties, which argues that HEC's decision was taken under the government's pressure. In fact, the fairness of elections in Turkey had been one of the major grounds of the opposition for accusing the incumbent of authoritarianism. In a similar vein, the literature on Turkish Politics has been designated Turkey as a competitive authoritarian regime due to similar reasons (Özbudun 2011, Esen and Gümüşçü 2018).

This chapter will ask how people's emotions towards this decision of HEC affect their perception of how frequently they have been facing fake news about the reelection. While doing so, it attempts to contribute to the literature on several occasions. Firstly, instead of analyzing each discrete emotion's isolated effect, which is the orthodox practice in the political psychology literature, the effect of the interactions of emotions will be under investigation. In other words, instead of analyzing the effect of anger, anxiety, and hope single-headedly, this chapter focuses on the effect of arousal of multiple discrete emotions at a high level in response to the same event. While doing so, the interaction of emotions that have similar directions and which have opposite directions in terms of their effect on the dependent variable will be investigated by using the appraisals consistent with the affiliations as supporters of Cumhur Alliance and opposition. Also, emotions will be conceptualized as stored emotions instead of emotions that people feel due to experimental manipulation or their current emotional state irrespective of the issue under investigation. Furthermore, instead of the common practice of analyzing people's emotional reactions to particular news, the dependent variable will be people's perception about their frequency of facing fake news. By doing so, firstly, stored emotions can be measured. Also, the effect of the variance in the quality and the credibility of particular news that might affect people's evaluation for fakeness of news will be partly eliminated. In a similar vein, the status of news as genuine or fake will not be considered by focusing on people's overall perceptions.

For these purposes, there will be statistical analyses of a survey conducted between 31 March and 23 June elections by İstanbul Policy Center of Sabancı University. The results will show that anger towards the incumbent and HEC increases the perceived frequency of facing incorrect news for opposition supporters. Nevertheless, anxiety does not affect this perception single-headedly. On the other side, hope and anger towards the opposition alter the perceived frequency of facing incorrect news positively for the Cumhur Alliance's supporters.

Regarding the interaction of emotions, feeling high levels of anger towards the opposition and hope simultaneously leads to a perception of higher frequency about facing incorrect news among the Cumhur Alliance’s supporters. The impact of this combination is greater than the effects of the high level of single-headed anger and hope. On the other side, a high level of anger towards the incumbent and HEC single-handedly increases opposition’ supporters’ perceived frequency of facing incorrect news. Also, the combination of anger towards HEC and anxiety has a positive and significant effect; yet, the effect is not distinguishable from the effect of single-headed anger. Additionally, anger towards the incumbent sweeps the negative effect of anxiety on the perceived frequency for facing incorrect news for opposition supporters.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Firstly there will be a literature review to snapshot the studies related to emotions and the information’s correctness. Next, the theoretical argument will be explained with a discussion on the Turkish case. Data, analyses, and results follow this. Last will be a general discussion of the chapter.

2.1 Emotions and Information-Seeking

The framework that dominates the literature on emotions in political psychology is Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) (Vasilopoulos 2019, Marcus et al. 2019). AIT conceptualizes two cognitive systems, namely disposition and surveillance systems, by extrapolating from neuroscience studies to explain emotional arousal and its effect on political behavior and judgment. The disposition system is active when people live in a familiar setting, and they can get feedback from their environment regarding how well they progress to achieve their goal. Turned on the disposition system is a sign that politics is going on as they get used to it. Under these circumstances, the prevailing emotion is enthusiasm if the process satisfies one’s desires and goals. On the other hand, the surveillance system turns on under the alert situations. It turns to be active when people perceive a threat to themselves or their progress in the political realm. The emotion of the surveillance system is anxiety.

The activation of these systems has different consequences in the political judgments and behavior of individuals. The theory’s primary claim is that activation of the surveillance system produces anxiety, which alerts an individual to rearrange their behaviors and judgments. In conjunction with this, the central claim of AIT has been on information-seeking behavior. As expected from an alert situation, individuals

become more sensitive and open towards new information with increasing attention when their surveillance system is on. Also, they are more prone to giving up their habits and less prone to relying on their stereotype and heuristics (Marcus et al. 2000, Marcus et al. 2010, Marcus et al. 2011).

Furthermore, they are more likely to update their schema about political objects (Marcus et al. 2000). Within an unordinary setting, which creates uncertainty, they feel that the information that they have and their available mental constructs may not be sufficient to survive in the novel conditions. Additionally, even though anxiety is highlighted as the emotion in negative valance, the further development of the AIT acknowledges the importance of anger in response to a threat to shape political behavior and attitude. AIT persuasively added anger into the disposition system as the aversion dimension (Marcus 2002, Marcus et al. 2011). On the other hand, the disposition system, which is active in default, makes people rely on their habits, stereotypes, and predispositions. People are more ready to use the available cognitive constructs instead of updating them by receiving new information (Marcus 2002, Marcus et al. 2011).

The literature on emotion in political psychology has also relied on another theory, the cognitive appraisal theory of emotions (CAT), which provides various and distinct appraisals for discrete emotions. The CAT suggests that emotions are responses to stimuli in an environment that have a probability of affecting a person's needs, attachments, value, current goals (Arnold 1960 Lazarus 1966, Smith and Ellsworth 1985, Lazarus 1991, Roseman 1996, Moors et al. 2013). Each discrete emotions have separate appraisals in response to the impact of stimuli, and the appraisal of each emotion has diverged consequences in people's behavior and attitudes (Smith and Ellsworth 1985, Clore and Ontony 2000). The leverage of cognitive appraisal theory is to provide particular conditions for arousal (appraisals) of emotions alongside its predictions for the consequences of each emotion's arousal.

In light of AIT and cognitive appraisal theories of emotion, the literature has an abundance of studies about people's motivation to seek more information. Especially, the distinct consequences of arousal of anger and anxiety (and fear) in terms of the need for information is one of the most studied variances to understand the relationship between emotions and information seeking. The main findings of most of these studies in the literature seconded the AIT and cognitive appraisal theories by suggesting that anxiety increases the motivation of the people to gather information, whereas anger alleviates the people's urge for information (Lau and Redlawsk 1997, Brader 2006, Isbell et al. 2006, Weber and Johnson 2009, MacKuen et al. 2010, Valentino et al. 2011). Moreover, the literature contains studies that explore

the nuances of this relationship. For instance, scholars have raised questions about the quality of information-seeking in relation to emotions. Feldman and Huddy (2005) argue that even though anxiety increases the need for information, anxious individuals are less likely to retain information about the issue. Also, Valentino et al. (2008) argue that anxiety increases not the need for the quantity of information; but the need for quality information.

2.2 Fake News

Especially after the 2016 U.S presidential elections, the speed of diffusion of the fake information and peoples' susceptibility to believing in them have been trend topics in the academic and non-academic political analysis. Scholars have been asking what makes people believe in fake information and which factors increase its diffusion. In fact, the issue of fake information is not a new concern in politics. What makes the topic hot today is the vast increase in the speed of diffusion. Therefore, "diffusion" and "believing" inevitably tie together.

Consequently, emotions are usual suspects for both diffusion of and belief in fake information. In this respect, Vosoughi and his colleagues (2018) found by engaging a text analysis of tweets that false stories attempt to elicit fear, disgust, and surprise. In contrast, true stories are attempted to elicit anticipation, joy, sadness, and trust. These emotional appeals lead false stories to diffuse more in comparison to true stories. In another study, Peters et al. (2009) provide experimental evidence that social anecdotes that elicit surprise, disgust, and happiness are shared by participants more than other anecdotes. Also, urban legends that arouse a high level of disgust (Heath et al. 2001) and fear (Cotter 2008) are repeated more than other urban legends. In a similar vein, Brady et al. (2017) argue that the messages, which include moral-emotional words, diffuse more on Twitter in comparison to other news. On the supply side of the diffusion, Maier and Nai (2020) analyze the candidates' media coverage in 89 countries with respect to their usage of emotional appeals, particularly enthusiasm and fear. The results of the study suggest that media coverage is high for candidates who use negative tone and fear compared to candidates who use positive ones and enthusiasm.

Literature provides evidence regarding the role of emotions in beliefs in fake information/news as well. What we know primarily under the guidance of feeling as information theory (Schwarz 2012) is the information that feels people "good" is more likely to be perceived as true (Brashier and Marsh 2020). Beyond the sim-

ple feelings, discrete emotions shape the assessment of the news's fakeness as well (Martel et al. 2020). For instance, sad individuals are less likely to believe in fake news since sadness leads to analytical thinking more in comparison to happiness (Koch and Forgas 2012, Forgas 2019). Other research shows that people are less likely to believe information that appears beside an angry or fearful face (Brashier and Marsh 2020). The literature also contains a few studies that focus on political information. For instance, Weeks (2015) provides evidence that anger increases the partisanship bias more while evaluating misinformation compared to anxiety. Also, Suhay and Erişen (2018) found that anger increases people's likelihood of engaging in biased political information assimilation. On the other hand, increasing anxiety is a harbinger of the "affective tipping point," which shrinks people's reliance on their previous attitudes towards political subjects in the evaluation of information them (Redlawsk et al. 2010).

Influenced by these studies, this chapter investigates people's perception about how frequently they have faced incorrect news about a specific event, the reelection for mayor of İstanbul metropolitan municipality, in relation to their emotions towards the reason behind this event, HEC's decision. Alongside providing new evidence for an understudied topic, it also brings a new inside to the subject matter on several occasions.

A couple of these are regarding the concept of emotion. Firstly, this chapter focuses on the compound effect of emotions instead of the effect of emotions single-headedly. Individuals feel multiple emotions towards an object/subject or event (Marcus et al. 2019), and inevitably different combinations of discrete emotions lead to different consequences. Analyzing the effect of emotions without considering their interaction might miss the fundamental aspect of emotional arousal. Yet, we have a lack of enough evidence about in what ways the simultaneous arousal of emotions affects the dependent variable of interest. Including multiple emotions into the models single-headedly helps us differentiate the effect of each discrete emotion, but; it cannot explain the difference between feeling one of the emotions single-headedly and multiple emotions simultaneously. A few studies consider the possible compound effect. For instance, Jost (2019) argues that what Vasilopoulos et al.(2019) found in their research is that anger towards the Paris attacks in 2015 mediates the effect of fear on support for far-right parties. In another study, Clement et al.(2017) found that the combination of compassion and anger was strategically used to increase the power of the narrative for supporting the using force during the Iraq war. Following these studies, this chapter digs into the effect of a combination of emotions. By doing so, it attempts to contribute this understudied theoretical lens by particularly focusing on the interactions of stored emotions, which expected directions for effect

different and same.

Secondly, the "emotions" that will be analyzed in this study are not instant emotions that people feel due to experimental manipulation or their current emotional state, irrespective of the issue they are asked about. Most of the literature on fake news focuses on individuals' current emotional state, mood, or emotion elicited by given stimuli. In this study, emotions will be conceptualized as stored emotions. In other words, these are the "emotions" that are felt in various degrees towards a particular object (Marcus 2015, Erişen 2018), which are different in terms of their storage and the way of an effect than the original "emotions" that temporarily arouse and pass off. This issue will be elaborated on through a theoretical discussion in the next section.

Furthermore, this study also focuses on the emotions in response to a single event. The literature contains a few studies which focus on a single issue or event, for instance, the effect of emotions towards the actors and issues related to the Iraq war on the support for the war (Huddy et al. 2007), 9/11 attack (Huddy et al. 2005); Syrian issue in Turkey (Erişen 2013) and Paris attacks in 2015 on the support for far-right (Vasilopoulos et al. 2019), the effect of Brexit on the vote choice (Vasilopoulos and Wagner 2020) are investigated. This study aims to contribute by analyzing the emotionally loaded event's effect in a different context with a different dependent variable.

As a potential contribution for the dependent variable, news correctness assessment will be analyzed as a general state rather than upon encountering particular news or information. As was discussed, recent research focuses on people's evaluation of given fake or real news and which attributes of individuals or conditions they are under shape their evaluation. Yet, this chapter will focus on people's perception of how frequently they face fake news without referencing particular news, which also means that it does not look into whether the news is genuine or fake.

Also, this chapter includes the hope to understand the assessment of news fakeness. As one of the most studied emotions in positive valance, hope arises when people perceive that the unwanted current circumstances can be changed and particular goals can be achieved (Lazarus 1999). In the light of this definition of cognitive appraisal theories, literature offers evidence for various consequences of arousal of hope, such as an increase in cognitive task performance and problem-solving abilities (Snyder et al. 1996), increasing self-esteem (Marques et al. 2007), academic (Snyder 1996) and athletic success (Curry et al. 1999), and lower desire for retaliation. (Moeschberger et al. 2005). Upon these premises, the literature on political psychology has also paid attention to hope as a correlate of political attitude and

behavior. Hope is most prevalent in conflict resolution literature, which analyzes the many aspects of conflicts related to hope (Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006; Halperin et al. 2011; Cohen-Chen et al. 2014; Leshem and Halperin 2020). Also, some other studies found evidence that hope increases the desire for social change (Greenaway et al. 2016) and support for concession (Cohen-Che et al. 2014).

The literature related to information-seeking focuses on hope's function in increasing attention to politics. Brader (2006) argues that experimentally induced hope increases political interest and engagement in politics. In a similar vein, Civettini (2011) provides evidence regarding hope's positive effect on political attention, the volume of engaging in political discussion, and political participation, including the desire for running for and office; even though some scholars report a minute of dissent for some form of political participation such as turnout (Panagopoulos 2014). Furthermore, Just et al.'s (2007) 's study finds that hopeful individuals have a motivation to find the supporting information regarding the party or candidate that they support and ignore the disconfirming information. All these studies shed light on the effects of hope on different political behavior or judgment. This study investigates the effect of hope on another individual judgment, which is the assessment of the fakeness of news.

2.3 Theories of Emotions

As was discussed in the previous part of this section, AIT is the dominant theory in political psychology to explain the effect of emotions. Nevertheless, a considerable volume of research in political psychology applied cognitive appraisal theory (CAT) after mentioning the AIT in a saluting distance. Arguably, the primary reason for this practice is the handfullness of CAT to explain the distinct appraisals for various discrete emotions alongside the consequences of these arousals on judgment and behavior. However, there are incongruences between the theory of cognitive appraisal and its application in some studies due to the conceptualization of emotion. Some of these applications conceptualize emotions as persistent but changeable feelings towards an object or a subject, so as stored emotions.

Yet, the core literature of CAT defines emotions, or emotional episodes, as temporal arousals in response to encountering a stimulus (Scherer 2005). Also, CAT includes five necessary components, namely, cognitive, motivational, somatic, motor, and feeling, to define arousal as an emotion (Clore and Orthony 2000, Scherer 2005, Frjida 2007). However, the "stored emotions" held towards a particular object or

subject are not satisfied with all of these criteria. Above all, CAT does not classify discrete emotions as a part of the affective component of an attitude that is conceptualized as feelings of valuing, hating, liking (Scherer 2005).

In this regard, literature has employed various theories to handle this problem. For instance, Abelson's Hot cognition hypothesis (1982) has been utilized to depict the inevitable connection between every concept and information in the memory and affect towards them. Yet, "hot cognition" refers to positive and negative evaluations towards the subject or object, not discrete emotions. Studies applying motivated reasoning provided a more related explanation, which suggests that the new information is evaluated in the web of existing evaluations. Therefore, the people might discount incongruent new information to existing evaluations (Taber 2006). The emotions associated with these evaluations might affect the decision and judgments of the people (Redlawsk et al. 2010, Suhay and Erişen 2018).

Yet, still, there is a gap in the literature regarding the theoretical underpinnings of application CAT. These incompatibilities pose a challenge for this study as well. However, not the definition of emotion, but CAT's theorization for the processing of emotions might enable us to explain the existence and effect of emotions people stored towards an object or subject. Also, even though they do not elaborate appraisals for discrete emotions, the Network theories of emotion, somatic marker hypothesis, which is one of the neuroscientific theories that inspire AIT, and constructivist psychological theories of emotions offer us to explain the "emotions" that people stored towards objects and subjects which are most relevant with the political decisions and judgments. In the following paragraphs, these explanations will be presented and combined to consolidate the theoretical argument.

Most CAT versions propose two kinds of processing or forms of reasoning in emotional arousal, namely rule-based and associative processing. Rule-based processing is the mechanism that new emotional values are computed with respect to encountered stimuli (Clore and Orthony 2000). So, distinct emotions arise by interpreting the stimulus with respect to a set of appraisals such as goal congruence and relevance, novelty coping potential, certainty, blame (Smith and Ellsworth 1985, Scherer 1988, Lazarus 1991, Scherer 2005, Frijda 2007) On the other side, associative processing refers the mechanism that the previous emotional meanings that are set through the rule-based mechanism, are primed due to their similarity with the encountered stimuli (Clore and Orthony 2000). In this regard, the Network theories of emotions have a similar premise with associative processing of CAT (Lang 1985 Berkowitz, 1990). Network theories argue that only biologically relevant stimuli elicit emotions and responses due to emotional elicitation. Throughout the process, each experienced

emotional episode, which includes stimulus, responses, and emotional experience to the stimulus (discrete emotions), are coded in the memory as separate nodes; thus, enlarge the pool for each emotion. In doing so, these nodes constitute a network or schema for each emotion. When a new stimulus is encountered, it is interpreted concerning its resemblance to these networks (Leventhal 1982). For instance, when a person reads news about the rival party leader, the emotional schema, which is most resembles the stimulus related to previous events that the individual experienced about the rival leader, activates and affects her response and evaluation of the current news accordingly.

Furthermore, the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio 1991) offers similar mechanisms. It is a neuroscientific perspective to emotions that defines emotions as a "collection of changes in body and brain states triggered by a dedicated brain system that responds to specific contents of one's perceptions, actual or recalled, relative to a particular object or event" (Bechara and Damasio 2005, 339). The bodily responses, such as an increase in heart rate, endocrine release, as the consequence of facing an emotionally competent stimulus signal to the brain and enact a perception for the "feeling" (Damasio 1999), which is conventionally called emotion. The theory proposes that two types of inducers that elicit the somatic states so emotions and activate distinct brain mechanisms. The first one is the primary inducers which are innate or learned stimuli that elicit somatic states. So, when an individual faces primary inducers, emotions are aroused. The critical substrate in the neural system activated by primary inducers is the amygdala, one of the primitive parts of the human brain.

On the other hand, secondary inducers activate the ventromedial prefrontal cortex primarily. They refer to the remembrance of an emotional, real or hypothetical event enacted by primary inducers in the past. They are combined with primary inducers as a response to the same stimulus in parallel processing (Damasio 1999). For instance, when a person faces a piece of emotionally loaded news about the rival party leader, this news is a primary inducer, and the emotionality of its content affects the response of this person to the news. Meanwhile, her response to this news also depends on the secondary inducers, for instance, her responses and feelings, which were stored within the neural structure towards the news that she read previously or the events that she remembers about the leader of the rival party.

Also, the premises of constructivist psychological theories of emotions essentially underline previous emotional experiences' inevitable role. According to these theories, feelings that people perceive from emotional experience are socially constructed as well as evolutionary (Linguist et al. 2012). People produce mental constructs

for emotions during each emotional experience. When they face a stimulus, their emotional experience includes a conceptualization phase (Linguist et al. 2012) in which the cognitive system gives meaning to the stimulus emotionally by referencing the previously produced mental constructs through an emotional memory network (Vincent et al. 2008). These studies provide neuroimaging evidence for the conceptualization phase by specifying the brain's neural pathways and cortexes, namely the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, medial temporal lobe, and retrosplenial cortex (Linguist et al. 2012). Thus, as like Network studies, constructivist theories also highlight previous emotional experiences' functions on the perception of a given stimulus.

In sum, associative processing by CAT, network theories of emotions, secondary inducers from somatic marker hypothesis, and constructivist theories of emotions point out the relevance of the emotions that elicited towards the subject or object, or most similar with objects and subjects, in the past to explain the effect of emotions on the human judgment and behavior. These theoretical building blocks might help us explain the effect of emotions towards the decision of HEC on the people's perception of the frequency of facing incorrect news about the 23 June elections.

The emotions towards the HEC's decision are the most resembled emotional schema or constitute secondary inducers when people face news about the 23 June elections. The following example might depict the expected effect. Throughout the campaigning process, when people in İstanbul have been facing news about the upcoming reelections regardless of the source that they receive the news, their evaluation of the news in terms of its correctness is affected by the emotion that they hold towards the very reason of this election; the HEC's decision. For instance, consider that a supporter of opposition watched a news on the TV that, let's say, claims the Cumhur Alliance's candidate is ahead in the polls, irrespective of whether, in reality, this claim is valid or not. Upon this encounter, one of the first memory that this individual reach is the HEC's decision; hence, the emotions that she holds such as anger, anxiety, and a combination of anger and anxiety. Her evaluation of the HEC's decision, accompanied by the effects of emotions that she holds, might shape her assessment of this news fakeness. Eventually, these assessments' accumulation for each news's correctness will construct a sense of frequency for facing the incorrect news.

2.4 The Turkish Case: Theoretical Expectations


The previous section presented the theoretical underpinnings for how the emotions in response to HEC's decision might affect people's perception of how frequently they have faced incorrect news about the reelection. In this section, the hypotheses will be derived by specifying the effect of arousal of each emotion.

Turkish polity has experienced an episode in which a high ideological polarization with a concomitant emotional polarization. Climbing tension in politics has escalated people's emotional reactions and increased their awareness of the political realm's boundaries in their ordinary lives. Also, the authoritarian tendencies of the incumbent, accompanied by the *kulturkampf* between religious conservatives and secular, rational camps (Kalaycıoğlu 2012), have expanded the penetration of emotions in all political actors' judgments and decisions. In this regard, HEC's decision to repeat the election for mayor of Istanbul metropolitan municipality might represent a climax node irrespective of voters' affiliation with either the *Cumhur Alliance* or opposition. Nonetheless, since the affected goals, motivations, and standards might vary for the *Cumhur Alliance* and opposition voters regarding HEC's decision, now the discussion will continue by distinguishing voters in terms of their affiliation.

Let's start with the opposition voters. The *Millet Alliance*, which consists of two major opposition parties, *CHP* and *İYİ Party*, and the outside support given by *HDP* was able to topple down the 25 years of incumbency of *AKP* and national outlook tradition in *İstanbul*. Such an unfamiliar success of the opposition within a highly skewed electoral playing field was interrupted by HEC on the grounds of electoral irregularities. This decision arguably boosted opposition voters' sense of unfairness which had already been at a high level. Figure 1 depicts the answers to the survey question, which asks respondents to what extent the HEC's decision was fair. As can be observed, a qualified majority of respondents who do not support the *Cumhur Alliance* think that the decision was unfair. Nevertheless, supporters of the *Cumhur Alliance* think the opposite.²

²The question is "Yüksek Seçim Kurulu'nun almış olduğu bu karar sizce ne kadar adildir?"

Figure 2.1 Fairness of HEC's Decision



As cognitive appraisal theories suggest, a deliberate violation of a norm makes people, especially those harmed by this norm violation, angry (Smith and Ellsworth 1985, Lazarus 1991). In fact, people who support the opposition parties had already felt a high level of anger towards the government due to its authoritarian tendencies; yet, this time, the perceived norm violation was done by an institution supposed to protect the norm that was violated. Therefore, the expectation is that the salient emotional reaction of the people who support opposition is a high level of anger towards the decision of HEC to repeat the İstanbul metropolitan elections.

The echoes of HEC's decision on the cognition of opposition voters' in terms of their emotional reactions may affect their judgments. In this regard, opposition voters may reverberate the emotions that arose as a response to HEC's decision to the campaigning process of reelections. On the subject matter, opposition voters' perception of news regarding the reelections might be affected by their emotional reactions towards HEC's decision. Following the AIT and CAT, the expectation is that opposition voters who experienced anger towards HEC and the incumbent in response to HEC's decision might stick with their mental constructs, stereotypes, schemas, and existing attitudes. Therefore any new information or news inconsistent with their existing thoughts and opinions might be evaluated negatively and perceived as incorrect. In other words, anger boosts motivated reasoning and selectivity, which refers to people's evaluation of the new information in favor of and in

accordance with their current position (Taber and Lodge 2006). Thus, they might code more news as incorrect. Therefore;

H1: If an opposition voter is angry towards HEC/incumbent, their perceived frequency of facing fake news increases.

Even though anger is expected to be the prevalent emotion among opposition voters, HEC's decision might elicit anxiety as well. Especially those who worried about the loss of the candidate of the Millet Alliance or electoral irregularities in reelection might feel anxiety. As AIT and CAT set forth, anxiety increases attention, boosts the need for information, and motivates people to leave habits, predispositions, and partisanship in political judgment and action (Bodenhausen et al. 1994, Marcus et al. 2000). Anxious individuals consider the ideas that oppose their current judgments more (MacKuen et al. 2010), and they may evaluate the news more objectively. Therefore;

H2: If an opposition voter is anxious because of HEC's decision, their perceived frequency of facing fake news decreases.

As was discussed earlier, the central task of this chapter is to investigate the compound effect of emotions. Relating to the present case, anger and anxiety are relevant emotions contextually for the Cumhur Alliance's supporters. Additionally, the theoretical expectations for anger and anxiety regarding the effect of the combination of emotions on the same event might give us reasons to contemplate their combination. As was discussed earlier and in conjunction with earlier hypotheses, AIT expects the effects of these emotions in opposite directions. Anger increases people's perception of the frequency of facing incorrect news, whereas anxiety decreases it. By looking at the combination of two emotions which are expected to have opposite effects, we might have an insight when the casual directions of prevalent emotions collide. In this respect, if there is a combined effect, either one of them will prevail causally over the other, or they will cancel out each other's effects. In this regard, instead of posing a single hypothesis, the third hypothesis will have two alternatives:


H3a: Anger and anxiety cancel out each other's effect on the perception of facing the frequency of incorrect news about reelections.

H3b: The effect of anger/anxiety prevails over the effect of anxiety/anger on the perception of facing frequency of incorrect news about reelections.

The arousal of emotions was not peculiar to opposition voters. The elections result was a nasty surprise for Cumhur Alliance voters who probably had expected a win like earlier years. Also, in the early days of the campaigning process, due to the

"unknown" candidate of the Millet Alliance Ekrem İmamoğlu, who was the incumbent of a district municipality of İstanbul, they probably believed in the success of their very popular candidate, Binali Yıldırım, who served as minister in the cabinet, the president of the national assembly, and prime minister. Therefore this probable sense of loss, as one of the appraisal tendencies (Smith and Ellsworth 1985), might elicit anger. More importantly, HEC's decision might constitute proof for electoral irregularities and inflame the anger towards the opposition that was alleged for these irregularities among the incumbent supporters and media. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, a considerable amount of Cumhur Alliance voters think that there was electoral fraud in the 31 March elections.³

Figure 2.2 Electoral Fraud in 31 March Elections



Therefore, the effect of anger is expected to be similar on Cumhur Alliance voters :

H3: If a Cumhur Alliance voter is angry towards the opposition because of HEC's decision, their perceived frequency of facing fake news increases.

Another emotion for Cumhur Alliance voters that might be relevant to the case is hope. The narrow vote margin between the Cumhur Alliance candidate and Millet Alliance candidate might be sufficient to alive Cumhur Alliance's voters' expectation to win the 23 June election. Therefore, they have fair reasons to believe in a

³The question is "Yüksek Seçim Kurulu'nun almış olduğu bu karar sizce ne kadar adildir?"

win in the 23 June elections. In this regard, the consequences of arousal of hope are similar to anger for information-seeking. People who feel hope regarding an issue/actor/event are less likely to seek more information about this issue/actor/event (Civettini 2011). Also, hope increases the people's tendency to believe in information consistent with the beliefs and attitudes while diluting their probability of believing in inconsonant information (Just et al. 2007). In this respect, the Cumhur Alliance supporters who feel hope due to HEC's decision might perceive any news contrary to their expectations as incorrect. Therefore;

H4: If a Cumhur Alliance voter is hopeful in response to HEC's decision, their perceived frequency of facing fake news increases.

The prevalent emotions for opposition supporters, anger, and hope provide another aspect for the effect of the combination of emotions. Theoretically, unlike the expectations for supporters of the opposition's emotions, the prevalent emotions of the Cumhur Alliance's supporters, anger and hope, correspond to each other in terms of their expected effect direction, as was discussed in the previous paragraphs. By analyzing their combined effect, we can provide evidence for the effect of the combination of emotions in the same direction in terms of their effect on the subject matter. The expectation would be that since their individual effect is expected to increase the perceived frequency for facing incorrect news, their combination might have a greater increasing effect.

Therefore,

H5: Combination of anger and hope boosts their compound effect on the perception of facing more incorrect news about reelections.


After posing the hypotheses, the next part of this section will present the statistical analyses and discussion on these analyses' results.

2.5 Data and Analyses

The data utilized in this chapter is from a survey with a representative sample with 1019 respondents in İstanbul by the İstanbul Policy Center of Sabancı University between the 31 March 2019 local elections and 23 June 2019, repeated local elections for mayor of the Istanbul metropolitan municipality. In order to test the hypotheses, the dependent variable is constructed from the answers to the question, "When you think about the 23 June elections; how frequently do you encounter news that is

incorrect".⁴ Respondents answered this question on a 4 point Likert scale from "never" to "always." Figure 3 presents the distribution of the answer to this question by affiliation.


Figure 2.3 Distribution of Dependent Variable



Before going through, the distinction between Cumhur Alliance supporters and opposition supporters should be explained. Cumhur Alliances supporters are those who answer the question of which party you feel is close as AKP or MHP. All other respondents are categorized as opposition. Also, if the respondent does not indicate an affiliated party, they were categorized as opposition supporters unless they voted for Binali Yıldırım in the 31 March elections. The graph for the distribution of Cumhur Alliance supporters and opposition supporters can be found below.

⁴The exact wording of the question is “ 23 Haziran seçimleriyle ilgili düşündüğünüzde, ne sıklıkta yalan haberlere karşı karşıya kaldığınızı söyler misiniz? Hiç mi, seyrek mi, sık sık mı, sürekli mi? ” .


Figure 2.4 Distribution of Affiliation



The caveat of the dependent variable is its inability to measure whether the news that respondents perceive as incorrect are those that are inconsistent with their political position or not. Nevertheless, another question in the survey asked respondents which candidate's supporters have produced more incorrect news. Figure 2.5 below represents the distribution of the answer to this question regarding their affiliation. As can be seen, most of the respondents indicated that the rival candidate's supporters are more likely to publish incorrect news.⁵


⁵The question is "Pekiye, sizce 23 Haziran seçimleri sürecinde hangi tarafın destekçileri daha fazla yalan haber kullandı? Binali Yıldırım'ın destekçileri mi, Ekrem İmamoğlu'nun destekçileri mi yoksa her ikisi de eşit mi kullandı?"

Figure 2.5 Whose supporters disseminate more incorrect news



The main independent variables were constructed from the answers to questions about emotions. The questions ask respondents to what extent they felt a particular emotion regarding the HEC's decision when they heard about it. Figure 2.6 is a radar chart that depicts each question's mean by their affiliation with Cumhur Alliance or opposition. Respondents answered this question on a 4 point Likert scale from "never" to "always." All variables for emotions have five levels "not at all" to "so much." The graph shows that emotional polarization is evident for the Cumhur Alliance and opposition voters, especially in anger. Anger towards the HEC and incumbent is paramount among opposition voters, whereas anger towards opposition is remarkably high among the Cumhur Alliance voters. Nevertheless, even though anxiety as another negative emotion is polarized, the variable's distribution is flatter than the variables representing anger. Lastly, Cumhur Alliance supporters are much more hopeful compared to opposition voters, as expected.

Figure 2.6 Radar Chart: Emotions towards HEC's Decision



Distribution for variables standing for emotions can be found below. All these variables have five categories and will be independent variables of interest. Also, to test the conditional hypotheses of the chapter, interaction terms of anger towards opposition and hope for Cumhur Alliance's supporters will be included in the corresponding models. Meanwhile, an interaction term for anger towards the incumbent and anxiety and interaction terms for anger towards the HEC and anxiety will be included to separate models for opposition supporters.

Figure 2.7 Anger towards HEC




Figure 2.8 Anger towards Incumbent




Figure 2.9 Anger towards Opposition




Figure 2.10 Anxiety





Figure 2.11 Hope



As other independent variables are sex, the level of religiosity, the year of birth, income level, education level, and interest in politics are included in the models. Descriptives can be found in the appendix. Sex is a binary variable that takes the value 1 for male and 0 for female respondents. The level of religiosity was constructed from the question of how frequently the respondents are fasting. For non-Muslim respondents, the value of this variable is zero. The categories are “Never,” “Sometimes during Ramadan,” “All days of Ramadan,” and “All days in Ramadan and other religious days.” The variable was constructed as continuous from Non-Muslim to “All days in Ramadan and other religious days.” The year of birth is a continuous variable that represents the year that the respondent was born. Income levels have 16 ordinal categories with respect to the level of income of the participants. Education level includes eight categories from “No literacy” to “Master or Doctorate degree.” Interest in politics has four ordinal categories from “Not interested at all” to “Interested so much.” Lastly level of affiliation was constructed from the questions that asked respondents how close they feel towards their affiliated party. The answer to this question includes three ordinal categories from “Too close” to “Not too close.” If the respondents did not give any party affiliation, then their level of affiliation was coded as 0. Therefore, the variable has four levels from 0 to 3.

Below, the results of the OLS models are displayed. The first set of models, which represents the models without interaction terms, are displayed in the first table.

What follows, the second table displays the second set of models, including interaction variables. Model 3 and Model 6 were run by including only the Cumhur Alliance's supporters, whereas the remaining models were run by only the opposition's voters. The first set of models demonstrate that all anger(s) increases the respondent's likelihood of perceiving more news as incorrect. Also, an increase in hope boosts the likelihood of perceiving more news as incorrect for Cumhur Alliance's voters. On the other hand, the anxiety of opposition supporters does not significantly affect the probability of perceiving more news as incorrect.

Table 2.1 Model with Continuous Variables for Emotions

	Oppositon (Anger:HEC)	Oppositon (Anger:Incumbent)	CA (Anger:Opposition)
The year of birth	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
Religiosity	-0.078* (0.047)	-0.085* (0.047)	-0.003 (0.076)
Income level	0.009 (0.013)	0.011 (0.013)	0.035** (0.014)
Education level	-0.013 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.030)	0.011 (0.030)
Level of affiliation	0.080 (0.049)	0.105** (0.049)	0.089 (0.103)
Sex	-0.046 (0.084)	-0.037 (0.085)	-0.047 (0.092)
Interest in Politics	-0.166*** (0.052)	-0.158*** (0.052)	-0.214*** (0.056)
Anger: YSK	0.193*** (0.041)		
Anxiety	0.008 (0.030)	0.005 (0.031)	
Anger: Incumbent		0.181*** (0.040)	
Anger: Opposition			0.101*** (0.025)
Hope			0.123*** (0.034)
Constant	9.408 (6.360)	8.758 (6.406)	10.646 (6.848)
R2	0.168	0.165	0.187
N	404	405	337

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The second set of models (Table 2.2) include interaction terms. To crystallize the results of the interactions, the following conditional marginal effect graphs were drawn. The first graph represents the effect of anxiety on the perception of facing fake news conditional on the level of anger towards the HEC, whereas the second graph displays the effect of anxiety conditional on the level of anger towards the incumbent. The last graph represents the effect of hope conditional on the level of anger towards the opposition.


Table 2.2 Model with Continuous Interactions

	Opposition (Anger: HEC)	Opposition (Anger:Incumbent)	CA (Anger: Opposition)
The year of birth	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
Religiosity	-0.076 (0.047)	-0.090* (0.047)	-0.002 (0.076)
Income level	0.010 (0.013)	0.013 (0.013)	0.035** (0.014)
Education level	-0.007 (0.030)	0.003 (0.030)	0.010 (0.030)
Level of affiliation	0.087* (0.049)	0.114** (0.048)	0.090 (0.103)
Sex	-0.046 (0.084)	-0.043 (0.084)	-0.046 (0.092)
Interest in Politics	-0.157*** (0.052)	-0.150*** (0.052)	-0.214*** (0.056)
Anger: YSK	0.089 (0.074)		
Anxiety	-0.180 (0.114)	-0.303*** (0.113)	
Anger: YSK \times Anxiety	0.042* (0.025)		
Anger: Incumbent		0.001 (0.075)	
Anger: Incumbent \times Anxiety		0.069*** (0.024)	
Anger: Opposition			0.065 (0.082)
Hope			0.093 (0.073)
Anger: Opposition \times Hope			0.009 (0.019)
Constant	10.223 (6.362)	9.931 (6.363)	10.524 (6.861)
R2	0.174	0.182	0.188
N	404	405	337

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 2.12 Conditional Marginal Effects



The conditional marginal effect graphs show that anxiety affects the perception of fake news at a low level of anger towards the incumbent. Nevertheless, its effect turns to be insignificant at the higher level of anger. However, this conditional relationship does not exist for anger towards the HEC since the effect of anxiety is not different for any levels of anger towards HEC. Meanwhile, if respondents who support Cumhuriyet Alliance feel no anger, the effect of hope is indistinguishable from zero, whereas, at any other level of anger, the effect of hope is positive on the perception of more fake news.


As was displayed earlier, the number observation for no or low level of anger towards the incumbent and HEC for opposition voters and anger towards opposition for Cumhuriyet Alliance supporters are low. Since these variables are combined with anxiety and hope, the categories of combinations that stand for the low level of anger(s) have few observations. The cross-tabulation tables in the appendix show the distribution of the combination of anger towards opposition and hope for Cumhuriyet Alliance supporters, the interaction of anger towards HEC and anxiety, and the interaction of anger towards incumbent and anxiety.

Due to this skewed distribution within the Cumhuriyet Alliance and opposition voters converted to binary variables as a robustness check. For anger towards HEC and the incumbent, the first four categories were recoded as 0, whereas the 5th category

was recoded as 1. In other words, this binary variable represents a high level of anger towards HEC. Anger towards opposition was recorded in a similar vein. Note that anger towards HEC and incumbent will be used in the analysis for opposition supporters, whereas anger towards opposition will be included in the analysis for Cumhur Alliance supporters. Since the variables representing anxiety and hope are less skewed, the first three categories are recoded as 0, whereas the 4th and 5th categories were recoded as 1.

The independent variables that stand for emotions are constructed as categorical variables from these binary variables of discrete emotions and their possible combinations in response to the HEC's decision to repeat the elections. Three independent variables are generated for three models. These variables include four categories. For Cumhur Alliance's voters, the independent variable includes no emotion, single-headed anger, single-headed hope, and anger and hope categories. For opposition voters, there are two variants of the independent variable. The first one consists of no emotion, single-headed anger to HEC, single-headed anxiety, and anger to HEC and anxiety categories. On the other hand, instead of anger toward HEC, anger toward the incumbent represents anger in the second variant. Note that all categories include one or two emotions representing high levels for these emotions, as explained in the previous paragraph. Naturally, the "no emotion" category represents the condition of not feeling these emotions at a high level. The graph represents the distribution of the categorical variables for Cumhur Alliance's and opposition's supporters.

Figure 2.13 Categories for Emotions



Below, the results of the OLS models are displayed. The first one includes only the Cumhur Alliance's supporters, whereas the second and third models are run with the opposition's voters. The first model's results, in which only Cumhur Alliance's supporters have included, show that anger and a combination of a high level of anger and hope increase people's perception about facing incorrect news about the 23 June elections compared to the no emotion category. Also, the income level positively affects the dependent variable, whereas the effect of interest in politics is negative. On the other side, the second and third model includes only the opposition's supporters. The results show that a high level of single-headed anger towards HEC as well as incumbent and a combination of a high level of anger towards HEC (incumbent) and anxiety have a positive and significant effect on the perception of the frequency of facing incorrect news in comparison to no emotion condition. Also, interest in politics negatively affects the dependent variable.

The second table represents the results of the same model except for the change in the base level of the variable that stands for emotions—the base level set as the category of anger and hope.

To crystallize the results of models, the following graphs illustrate the linear predictions estimated from three models. Also, the bars lying behind predictions represent the distribution of categories of emotions in the model sample. For opposition voters,

Table 2.3 Models with Categorical Variable for Emotions (Base: No Emotion)

	Opposition (Anger HEC)	Opposition (Anger: Incumbent)	CA (Anger: Opposition)
The year of birth	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)
Religiosity	-0.087* (0.047)	-0.090* (0.047)	-0.021 (0.076)
Income level	0.011 (0.013)	0.013 (0.013)	0.032** (0.014)
Education level	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.030)	0.017 (0.030)
Level of affiliation	0.092* (0.049)	0.118** (0.049)	0.084 (0.104)
Sex	-0.019 (0.085)	-0.029 (0.085)	-0.048 (0.091)
Interest in Politics	-0.169*** (0.053)	-0.154*** (0.053)	-0.209*** (0.055)
Anxiety	0.242 (0.154)		
Anger	0.373*** (0.129)		
Anger and Anxiety	0.520*** (0.125)		
Anxiety		0.117 (0.148)	
Anger		0.329** (0.128)	
Anger and Anxiety		0.499*** (0.122)	
Hope			0.209* (0.118)
Anger			0.358** (0.153)
Anger and Hope			0.692*** (0.125)
Constant	9.272 (6.409)	9.611 (6.415)	11.558* (6.790)
R2	0.157	0.162	0.201
N	404	405	337

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 2.4 Models with Categorical Variable for Emotions (Base: Both Emotions)


	Opposition (Anger:HEC)	Opposition (Anger:Incumbent)	CA (Anger:Opposition)
The year of birth	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)
Religiosity	-0.087* (0.047)	-0.090* (0.047)	-0.021 (0.076)
Income level	0.011 (0.013)	0.013 (0.013)	0.032** (0.014)
Education level	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.030)	0.017 (0.030)
Level of affiliation	0.092* (0.049)	0.118** (0.049)	0.084 (0.104)
Sex	-0.019 (0.085)	-0.029 (0.085)	-0.048 (0.091)
Interest in Politics	-0.169*** (0.053)	-0.154*** (0.053)	-0.209*** (0.055)
Non	-0.520*** (0.125)		
Anxiety	-0.277** (0.137)		
Anger	-0.147 (0.108)		
Non		-0.499*** (0.122)	
Anxiety		-0.382*** (0.134)	
Anger		-0.170 (0.110)	
Non			-0.692*** (0.125)
Hope			-0.483*** (0.104)
Anger			-0.335** (0.151)
Constant	9.792 (6.407)	10.110 (6.415)	12.250* (6.791)
R2	0.157	0.162	0.201
N	404	405	337

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

single-headed anger towards either HEC or incumbent does not statistically differ from the combination of anger and anxiety. In contrast, single-headed anger and the combination of anger and anxiety are statistically different from the no emotion category. It means that individuals who fall into all these emotion categories are more likely to perceive more news as incorrect. For Cumhur Alliance's voters, the salient finding is about the combination of anger and hope. In comparison to single-headed anger and single-headed hope, the combination of these emotions increases the likelihood of perceiving more news as fake in comparison to single-headed anger and single-headed hope. Also, single-headed anger and a combination of anger and hope significantly differ from the no-emotion condition.

Figure 2.14 Predictions



2.6 Discussion

The results of the analyses provide evidence for some of the hypotheses. Firstly, all angers single-headedly affect the perceived frequency for facing incorrect news irrespective of their affiliation. Also, the effect of hope is positive and significant on the perceived frequency for facing incorrect news for opposition supporters. However, anxiety single-headedly does not affect the perceived frequency for facing incorrect news for opposition supporters.

Meanwhile, the combination of hope and anger increases the likelihood of the perception facing more incorrect news about reelections than high levels of single-handed anger or single-headed hope. The hypothesis has suggested that anger and hope boost each other's effect since they share the theoretical direction. Also, the conditional marginal effect graphs show that if people do not feel anger towards the opposition at all, the effect of hope is indistinguishable from zero.

On the other side, for opposition supporters, the expectations about single-headed anxiety have failed. Single-handed anxiety does not affect the perception of facing more incorrect news about reelections, neither as a continuous or binary variable. The expectation was that anxiety decreases the perception of facing more incorrect news about reelections. Yet, the first set of analyzes in which continuous interaction terms are included shows that the expected effect of anxiety can only be observed when the level of anger towards the incumbent is low.

These results provide us some evidence regarding the hypotheses, especially for the interaction of emotions. Firstly, as emotions are expected to affect the subject matter in the opposite direction, the anger of opposition supporters prevails over their anxiety in the case under investigation, as hypothesis 3a suggests. But still, there is much to discuss regarding these results. As was discussed earlier, the case under investigation is anger-driven since it depends on a perceived norm violation. This might be the reason behind the results. In another case that is driven by anxiety, the direction of results might change in favor of anxiety. More evidence should be accumulated to decide whether anger systematically prevails over anxiety or depends on the context's emotional disposition. Nevertheless, this chapter provides evidence that their interaction matters.

Also, regarding the interaction of anger and hope, this chapter provides evidence regarding how they boost each other effects. Since they share a similar direction for their effect, this was what we expected. Again we need more evidence to widen our perspective regarding the interaction of emotions that share the direction for effect.

Overall, this chapter offers evidence for the link between emotions and perception of news fakeness by focusing on the interaction of discrete emotions. Revealing the impact of feeling multiple emotions on the same issues requires comparative research and more cases in different contexts. This practice may help us understand the effect of emotions on individuals' political cognition, politics, and societies.

3. EMOTIONS AND CREDIBILITY OF FRAME

As the practice of highlighting a particular aspect of an issue vis-à-vis others (Gamson and Modigliani 1987), framing is a fruitful practice to elicit the target audience's discrete emotions (Iyengar 1991, Gross 2008). Also, in framing literature, the effects of attempting to elicit emotions simultaneously have diverted scholarly attention, especially in the case of anger and compassion (Ahmad 2013, Clement et al. 2017). However, even though the literature has been underlined the allegiant nature of these two emotions, no experimental study analyzes the effect of simultaneous elicitation of these emotions.

This chapter will test hypotheses derived from a theoretical discussion on the relationship between framing and emotions to close this gap. For this purpose, an online experiment was conducted on university students in which participants are randomly assigned one of the two groups to read a frame. The case of the experiment will be the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The difference between the frames that the two groups read will be the attempts to elicit emotions. The first group read a frame that attempted to elicit only compassion towards the Syrian refugees. In contrast, the second group read a frame that simultaneously attempted to elicit anger towards the Syrian government and other violent groups and compassion towards Syrian refugees. A series of logistic and first logistic regression results will offer weak but promising evidence that attempting to simultaneous elicitation of anger and compassion decreases the credibility of the frame in comparison to attempting to elicit only compassion.

Regarding the theme of the study, this chapter will focus on the effect of the interaction of instant emotions after evaluating the interaction of stored emotions in the previous part. The emotions, anger, and compassion will be under investigation to understand the effect of their interaction on the credibility of the information in a frame as the dependent variable.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First will be a definition

of framing, which is followed by a review of the literature on the nexus between framing and emotions. After that, the focus will be diverted to two emotions, anger and compassion. What follows will be deriving hypotheses from a theoretical discussion on emotions and framing. Before presenting the experimental procedure and results, a brief explanation of the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey, as the case of the chapter, will be provided. After elaborating experimental procedures and presenting results, the chapter will be finalized by discussing the results and especially the limitations of this chapter.

3.1 Framing

Years of scholarly works have provided evidence that framing as a practice matters in shaping perceptions and judgments of people (e.g., Kinder and Sander, 1990; Iyengar, 1991; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley, 1997; Druckman, 2001; Merolla et al., 2013; Kam and Simas, 2017; Pedersen, 2017). Before starting the discussion on the relationship between emotions and framing, the first task is to define framing as a concept. For this purpose, an essential distinction between the two main types of framing might picture the concept in a more clear manner and may prevent any probable confusion. Note that further distinction for framing practice will be provided, but the distinction between equivalency and emphasis framing is the essential one to clearly put the endeavor of this chapter.

Equivalence framing refers to the practice of using logically equivalent but semantically different words, phrases, or numbers to shape the decision and judgment of individuals (Druckman 2001). Many different ways and tactics for applying equivalence framing have been discussed in the literature. For instance, one of the most famous equivalency framing practices has been applied to test the premises of prospect theory and loss aversion (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979, Druckman and McDermott 2008). In these studies, equivalency framing has been used to alter the domain of the individuals as loss and gain by changing the reference point that determines the boundaries for loss and gain domain. Similarly, studies have investigated that without using prospect theory, given statistical ratios affect people's opinions about political issues (Petersen 2017). Furthermore, a change in the wording of a particular concept in terms of its connotation is another version of equivalency framing. This version heavily depends on playing with the router words. For instance, using either guerillas or terrorists for a rebel group is a type of equivalence framing.

On the other hand, emphasis framing or issue framing is "a central organizing idea or

storyline that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue" (Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 143). In other words, a frame aims to picture an issue's from a particular perspective. By doing so, a frame attempts to divert people's attention to a particular aspect, explanation, or commentary for an issue. It presents the issue by highlighting certain considerations more among others in terms of the relative importance of the aspect of an issue (Nelson et al. 1997). In this regard, framing looks at persuasion with a different lens. The central task of a frame is not to change the opinion or attitudes of individuals but to speak to congruent mental constructs, which might lead them to accept the argument of the frame by underlining this aspect of an issue vis-à-vis others. (Druckman 2001). For instance, to shape people's understanding of welfare policies, the reason for being poor might be framed as the fault of a person due to his/her laziness on the one hand or the duty of the society to handle discrepancies of the economic system on the other hand. Hence, these frames try to show in which respect people should evaluate welfare policies: As the fault of the poor or economic system.

Both framing methods have been widely discussed in the literature. Nevertheless, regarding emotion research, emphasis framing provides more appropriate grounds to measure the effect of emotions, although several studies investigated the relationship between emotions and equivalency framing (Druckman and McDermontt 2008). In this regard, this chapter will also focus on the emphasis/issue framing.

3.2 Emphasis Framing and Emotions

Ontologically, frames attempt to shape the opinion, judgment, and behavior of individuals. In politics, most of the time, they are professionally designed (Iyengar 1991, Brader 2006, Ridout and Searles 2011). Beyond this, political leaders' speeches, party programs, newspaper articles, commentary writings, tweets, internet posts deliberately or not frame the daily and chronic political issue in their occurrence in the public sphere. By doing so, they target the emotions of people as any other political stimulus does. These emotional appeals elicit instant emotions and shape the stored emotions towards the political figures. In this regard, the literature has not turned a blind eye to this relationship. The central task has been to analyze whether and in what ways emotions alter the persuasive power of framing or approval rates of the argument of the frame (Nabi 2003, Brewer 2001, Iyengar 2001). The overarching purpose has been to show the effect of emotional frames on various

dependent variables which represent political judgments and behavior.

One of the very first studies which dig into the relationship between emotions and framing is by Kinder and Sander (1990). Their findings were an anchor for the literature since they provided evidence that framing can elicit emotions. Further studies have complemented this finding by providing evidence about the effects of eliciting emotions by framing individuals' political judgments, decisions, and behavior. For instance, Gross and D'Ambrosio (2004) link the cognitive appraisal theory of emotions and the persuasive effect of framing. As was discussed earlier chapters, the theory argues emotions are products of appraisals that detect the environment in accordance with the goals, desires, and needs of individuals (Smith and Ellsworth 1985, Lazarus 1991, Scherer 2005). In this regard, framing might serve to present the issue in hand as such that corresponds to the appropriate appraisals. For instance, government misuse of power to undermine the opposition in a country might be presented as apparent democratic and liberal norm violation, which elicit anger. On the other hand, it might be illustrated as doom for the country, which is irreversible and unstoppable, which elicits anxiety or fear. Therefore, what framing might target are the appraisals by which the type of discrete emotions are determined. By doing so, they might aim to change the emotional responses of individuals (Kuhne and Schemer 2015)

In light of this connection, the extant literature has investigated the effect of discrete emotions on the power of framing to shape political judgments and decisions. For instance, Gross (2008) analyzed which type of framing is more effective for eliciting emotions. She reports that framing an issue episodically is a better choice than framing the same issue thematically in terms of evoking emotions.

The discrete emotion that she focused on was "pity" to analyze the support for mandatory minimum sentencing. In another study, Cassese and Hannagan (2014) report that eliciting anxiety by a frame boosts its power, which attempts to garner support for government funding for breast cancer research. Instead of focusing on a discrete emotion, literature offers comparisons of different discrete emotions as well. For instance, Nabi (2003) analyzes how frames about drunk driving and gun violence that elicit anger and fear affect the information-seeking of individuals. In another study, Clifford (2019) investigated the polarization effect of persuasive frames' on moralized issues by comparing elicited emotions like disgust and anger. He found that anger has a special role in polarization.

The more intriguing research is on the simultaneous arousal of discrete emotions by a single frame. In this regard, the most studied combination of discrete emotions is anger and compassion. Anger and compassion have similar appraisals in terms

of intentionality, which refers to the condition that norm violation by an actor did intentionally (Petersen 2010). Also, simultaneous elicitation of anger (outrage) and compassion increases the support for action to save the victim (Pronk et al. 2016). For instance, Clement et al. (2017) found that the combination of compassion and anger was strategically used to increase the power of the narrative for supporting the using force during the Iraq war.

In fact, the invention of the correspondence of anger and compassion has ancient roots. The practice of this invention has been integrated into the “hero-protective narrative,” which is a foundational element of the art of drama that goes back to the-aters in Ancient Greek, mythology, epopees, and even Ancient political texts. Hero-protective narrative constructs a storyline that blames the aggressor for their actions towards the victim. By doing so, anger towards the aggressor is elicited. Concomitantly, the narrative attempts to elicit compassion towards the victim (Alexander 2004, Propp 2010). Furthermore, the Hollywood movie industry has been heavily dependent on this hero-protective narrative and the journey of the hero plot structure (Anker 2005). Beyond the directors who are famous for using emotional appeals as a central element in their movies, such as Hitchcock techniques for elicitation fear and terror or Wes Andersen’s color palette to elicit emotions, most movies’ storyline reflects the calculus of hero-protective narrative.

Many examples can be given to the usage of appeals of anger and compassion in the movies. Maybe one of the best ones is *Braveheart* (1995) by Mel Gibson. The movie, which tells the epic story of William Wallace of Scotland, victimized the Scottish people by showing the revival of an ancient tradition that gives the local lords the right to spend the first night with the bride after the wedding. While doing so, it also underlines deliberate norm violation by presenting the reason behind this revival by the King of England. The tradition is reinstalled to give a “perk” to lords of Scotland under the dire economic circumstances before the war against France. By doing so, compassion towards the Scottish folk was accompanied by anger towards the King of England and local lords.

Even though this scholarly attention on the powerful effect of simultaneous elicitation of anger and compassion, there is no experimental study that investigates the claim. An empirical work might exemplify Clement et al. (2017) article, which investigating the speeches of political leaders in the U.S to legitimize the punitive action to the Iraqi government through computer-based discourse analysis. They found that the speeches which supported the punitive actions applied hero-protective narrative by eliciting anger and compassion.

Also, testing this ancient and popularly applied practical cooperation of two instant

emotions is well suited to the thesis's overall theme. In other words, this chapter will investigate the effect of the interaction of two instant emotions within one of the most established research fields in political psychology, which is framing. For these purposes, the following paragraphs will provide a theoretical discussion for deriving the hypotheses.

3.3 Anger, Compassion, and Framing Effect

The literature on the simultaneous elicitation of anger and compassion rightly focuses on the action, especially the action that helps victims. The argument is that the combination of anger and compassion increases the effect of the material in terms of support for the action against the aggressor. More specifically, anger is an appropriate complement to the arousal of compassion (Clement et al. 2017). Meanwhile, compassion arises when innocent victims suffer from unjustified actions of the aggressor against which victims do not have the capability to get themselves out of this situation (Ahmad 2013).

In this regard, we know from the literature that the combination of anger and compassion increases people's support for preventive or punitive action towards the aggressor. If simultaneously eliciting anger towards the aggressor and compassion towards the victim increases the support for the punitive action towards the aggressor, we might expect that the effect of the frames which attempt to elicit these emotions simultaneously is higher than frames that attempt to elicit the emotions single-headedly. However, there is no direct test for this interactive effect in the literature. Empirical studies mostly depend on the discourse analyses of speeches and declarations of the political leaders, especially for punitive action as known as the war on terror (see Clement et al. 2017).

In this respect, this study is a step back to understand the effect of simultaneous elicitation of compassion and anger. The dependent variable of the analysis will be the credibility of the frame instead of its effect on an action tendency. Credibility here is defined as to what extent individuals believe the information and argument that is given by the frame. In light of the literature, the expectation is that the subjective credibility of the frame is affected by the emotions that are attempted to elicit by the frame.

Nevertheless, beyond the effect of the interaction of anger and compassion, various scholarly works underline that attempting to elicit anger might decrease the credibil-

ity of the source. In fact, the target audience of any emotionally loaded material has the potential to decode the emotional elicitation process and make some inferences from the implicit attempts to elicit emotions about the credibility of this material (Frijda 1986). Too much and irrelevant emotional appeal decreases the effect of message of the material (Golding et al. 2003). In this regard, the feeling as information theory (Schwartz 1988) suggests that positive feelings make an argument more credible than negative feelings. More particularly, anger might have a negative differentiation since the essential aggression in anger as an emotion might be seen as socially undesirable (Parkinson 1999). In this respect, Hareli et al. (2009) found that anger increases the credibility of social complaints such as a broken refrigerator or misprinted poster, which have ambiguous justification since it signals goal obstruction. However, if the complaint is well justified, anger has a diminishing effect on the credibility of the complaint. Also, in their recent study, Brashier and Marsh (2020) found individuals are less prone to accepting the information as true when it appears beside an angry or fearful face.

In addition to these theoretical points, there is an important contextual difference in this study and studies in the literature which focuses on the war on terror. In this study, participants of the experiment were Turkish citizens, and the case was the Syrian refugees. The difference from other studies is that the action that U.S citizens potentially support took place miles away, but the Turkish citizens' insight has witnessed the issue of Syrian refugees. Any action or decision towards Syrian refugees directly affects the daily life of Turkish citizens. Also, the incidences and developments about Syrian refugees for several years have led people in Turkey to form strong preferences and hold stored emotions towards the issue itself.

Moreover, as was discussed earlier, blaming someone for violating the norms is an appraisal for anger (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). In our context, it is either the Syrian government or other violent groups which are responsible for the victimization of the Syrian refugees. In this regard, the people in Turkey got used to hearing this blaming process as a political argument from the political figures; therefore, hearing this argument again might connote the argument with specific political figures which people have felt stored anger, thereby decreasing the credibility of the arguments.

These arguments are context-specific. In another context or on a less loaded subject under investigation, anger towards the aggressor might increase information credibility since the probability of backlash of attempting to elicit anger might decline. Nevertheless, these context-specific expectations transcend to appraisals of anger and compassion out of context. Anger regarding an issue has more dimensions compared to compassion. Compassion is directed to a single set of the subject which

are victims, whereas anger regarding an issue might be related to the many subjects including the victims. Anger(s) towards the various subjects related to an issue are in relation to each other and might affect the arousal of each other as well. For instance, some people in Turkey might feel anger towards the Syrian refugees since they perceive that Syrian refugees steal their potential jobs. This anger towards Syrian refugees might curb the effect of attempts to elicit anger towards the Syrian government. Also, anger towards the Turkish government regarding the Syrian refugees might have a similar effect. Beyond this, it might cause a backlash in emotion elicitation attempts.

On the other hand, compassion is a victim-specific emotion in this context. Additionally, even though some other negative emotions towards the victim might affect the arousal of compassion, the most innocent among the victims, for instance, children, might be used as the subject of emotions. In other words, one may depict a refined innocence that can be accepted by most of the target audience. By doing so, the potential risk of negative attributions towards victims might be minimized, which helps in attempting to elicit compassion. For instance, in Turkey, people might feel negative emotions towards the Syrian refugees in the cities, which are perceived as stealing the job. On the other hand, they might feel compassion towards the children who faced the civil war. Thus, choosing the children as the subject for compassion might decrease the effect of negative emotions overall on the victims.

Thus, the following might be the summary of theoretical pathways. The literature on the relationship has provided us with the negative relationship between anger and credibility. Also, the immediate effect of Syrian refugees on the Turkish citizens relatedly strong negative attitudes towards them may cause a backlash while attempting to elicit anger towards the aggressor. These make the Turkish case different from the other contexts in which the relationship between anger and compassion has been studied. Concomitantly, the multi-facet nature of anger provides us out of context reasoning by anchoring the context itself. Anger towards different subjects related to the issue under investigation might cause a backlash for attempting to elicit anger towards the aggressor. Therefore;

H: Attempting to elicit anger and compassion simultaneously decreases the credibility of the frame compared to attempting to elicit compassion.

Before going through the explanation of the experiment which testing these two competing hypotheses and sharing its results, a brief explanation of the case of the study, Syrian refugees, will be provided in the following paragraphs.

3.4 Syrian Civil War and Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Syria has been facing a civil war since 2011 as the last domino of the Arab Spring. The popular uprising starting from Tunisia and spread to other countries such as Libya and Egypt ignited the well-grounded cleavages of ethnic identities such as Sunni-Nusayri, Kurdish-Arab. Bassar Assad regime's reluctance to introduce the democratic reforms, the historical tragedies in time of Hafız Assad's regime and the emerging threats of ISIS fuelled the intensity of civil war, which has continued for ten years. Refugees are a natural consequence like any other civil war. The country that has hosted the most of the refugees, 4 million approximately in number is Turkey, which has a 911 km border with Syria.

Syrian civil war has been a prominent foreign and domestic policy issue for Turkey since its first day. The most prominent concern of the Turkish government is the security due to the appearance of PKK. Their terrorist attacks since 1984 were perceived as the essential threat to the Turkish Republic and ISIS. Also, the aim of the Turkish government to spread its influence in the Middle East which also presented itself during the Arab Spring in Egypt and Libya, is probably another factor that increases the relevance of the Syrian civil war to Turkish foreign policy.

Beyond this, the Syrian civil war has evolved into a domestic political issue gradually. After the borders had been opened for Syrian refugees in 2014, millions of Syrian people officially migrated to Turkey. In upcoming years, the increasing number of Syrian refugees has entailed social problems. Economic aids and the cheap labor force created by Syrian refugees, cultural and social divergences, and the hardship to settle the refugees geographically have caused Turkish citizens unrest.

In relation to the aim of this chapter, anger and compassion are not only theoretically and practically related but also relevant emotions towards the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Alongside the possible compassion towards the Syrian refugees as a response to their victimization, many facets of anger might be a part of perceptions of Turkish citizens about the Syrian refugees. Deliberate violence towards the Syrian civilians might be a source of anger towards the Syrian government and other violent groups in Syria. The policies of the Turkish government to handle the refugee issue might be a source of anger towards the Turkish government. Also, the perceived and/or actual problems that have been caused by the Syrian refugees might be a source of anger towards the Syrian refugees.

What follows is the explanation of the experimental procedure and the results of the experiment.

3.5 The Experiment

An online experiment was designed to test the hypotheses. Participants were students from different universities in Turkey. The experiment was constructed by Qualtrics. To recruit the participants, a link to the experiment was shared with the students via e-mail. The number of participants in the experiment was 87.

The experiment consists of three parts. In the first part, participants are asked to answer several questions regarding their political interests, political participation, and preferred information sources. Also, the pre-test survey includes a question regarding the Syrian refugees. A set of the question was asked to participants regarding their emotions about Syrian issue. A set of these questions stand for anger towards various subjects related to the issue of Syrian refugees. Participants answered these questions on a 4-point Likert scale. Also, participants are provided an option that indicates “no answer” for each question.

Also, they are asked about their opinion regarding sending Syrian refugees back to Syria and the importance of the issue of Syrian refugees. Both questions were answered on a 5-point Likert scale. Also, participants were provided an option that indicates “ no answer.”

To induce the experimental manipulation, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two treatment groups. Both groups read a paragraph that discusses the concept “fear that we fear “ by Shklar, which was already discussed in the introduction chapter. Recall, According to Shklar (1996), fear is evolutionary and necessary for the human organism to perceive threats. Nonetheless, it is temporal; when the threat is eliminated, fear will disappear. However, the “fear that we fear” is a constant feeling upon the possibility of the cruelty by the state apparatus or any other powerful actor compared to the individual under threat.

The text that participants read including a brief definition of the “fear that we fear.” Also, it provided an interview with a Syrian refugee as an example of the concept. This interview was inspired by series of interviews with Syrian refugees, which was done by a doctoral researcher for his Ph.D. thesis project. In the interview, a woman whose husband was killed during a bombing was told her story. She explains how she migrated to Turkey. Also, she talks about the psychological problems of her children.

After the interview, a comment part about the concept and interview were included in both frames. The reason for using “fear that we fear” and an adapted interview

is to be able to ask the participant to evaluate something concrete to understand the credibility of the frame. “Fear that we fear” is a suitable concept for talking about any issues for the civil wars, and using an interview might help the reader imagine the feeling of “fear that we fear.” Also, telling a story of a woman and her children makes the frame “episodic,” which is more appropriate to elicit emotions (Gross, 2008). Episodic framing refers to giving the message by focusing on a single story instead of providing wider evidence, number, and statistics.

The difference in the frames that groups read was the attempts to elicit emotions. The first group read a text which only attempts to elicit instant compassion towards the Syrian refugees, whereas the frame that the second group read attempted to elicit both instant compassion for Syrian refugees and instant anger towards the Syrian government and other violent groups in Syria. In the first groups’ frame, the Syrian refugees were victimized in terms of feeling fear that we fear; yet any apparent group, the Syrian government or other violent groups, was not openly blamed. However, the second frame blames the Syrian government and other violent groups for the victimization of Syrian refugees by violating the fundamental norms of human rights. As was discussed, this practice follows the lead of cognitive appraisal theories of emotions. According to CAT, deliberate norm violation and human control of an event are appraisals for anger (Smith and Ellsworth 1985, Scherer 2005). The texts of the frame and all pre-test and post-test questions can be found in the appendix.

After reading the frames, the participant answered the post-test survey, which includes the dependent variables of interest. To understand the credibility of the frame, two questions were asked to the participants. The first question is regarding what extent the fear that we fear is serious as a psychological problem. The second question asked participants to what extent they believe the Syrian refugee whose interview was given. The participants were required to answer the questions on a 4-points Likert scale and an additional option for “no answer.”

The post-test questionnaire also included series of questions that asked participants to indicate the level of emotions that they felt towards the frame as the last questions. These emotions are anger towards the Syrian government, anger towards violent groups in Syria, anger towards Syrian refugees, compassion for Syrian refugees, and anxiety.

The dependent variables were constructed as continuous; yet, the answers’ distribution forced them to be binary. The figures below represent the distribution of variables. As can be observed, the categories for not convincing at all and not convincing enough almost have no observation. It is the same for not serious at all and not serious enough categories. Therefore, both variables were converted to binary

by adding the first three categories together as 0 and using the last category as 1 in the values of binary variables.

Figure 3.1 Distribution: Believe in Story





Figure 3.2 Distribution: Seriousness



The first step is to look at the emotions which participants felt in response to frames. The graph below represents the mean of each emotion by the group. There is no statistical difference between the two groups for any emotions. However, the mean for all emotions except for anger towards Syrian refugees is higher in the first group than the second group; yet the difference is not statistically significant. It means that the frame that attempts to elicit anger does not elicit anger more than the frame which only attempts to elicit compassion. In fact, this might be a sign of the effect of attempting to elicit anger.

It seems that the attempt backlash and decreases the arousal of expected emotions; yet, the only emotion that increases by adding anger to compassion is anger towards the Syrian refugees. In other words, adding anger towards the aggressor increases the anger towards the victim. A further discussion on the arousal of emotions as a result of experimental manipulation and their relationship between stored emotions can be found in the appendix.

Table 3.1 Emotions in response to Frames

	Group 1	Group 2	Difference (t-statistic)
Anger towards Syrian government	3.29	3.02	0.27 (1.35)
Anger towards Syrian opposition	2.62	2.44	0.18 (0.7)
Anger towards Syrian refugees	1.7	1.81	0.11 (0.54)
Compassion towards Syrian refugees	3.04	2.76	0.28 (1.48)

The table below represents the eight logistic regression models to test the hypotheses. In the first four models, the dependent variable stands for to what extend that “fear that we fear” is serious as a psychological problem. The first model is a logistic regression that includes only the variable that represents which group that the participant was assigned. The second model also includes only this variable, but the model is firth logistic regression. The firth logistic regression was utilized because it uses penalized log-likelihoods, thereby increasing the robustness of the experiment with a low number of participants (Russell et al. 2009).

Table 3.2 Logistic and Firth Logistic Regressions

	Model 1	Model 2 (FL)	Model 3	Model 4(FL)	Model 5	Model 6 (FL)	Model 7	Model 8(FL)
Group	-1.159** (0.579)	-1.099** (0.560)	-2.088** (0.977)	-1.640** (0.832)	-0.624 (0.440)	-0.609 (0.434)	-0.839 (0.621)	-0.732 (0.577)
Stored Anger towards Syrian Regime			0.623 (0.403)	0.500 (0.352)			0.111 (0.273)	0.095 (0.254)
Stored Compassion towards Syrian Refugees			0.068 (0.473)	0.063 (0.418)			0.088 (0.332)	0.081 (0.308)
Gender			-1.743* (0.951)	-1.379* (0.820)			-0.852 (0.603)	-0.735 (0.560)
Political Interest			-0.646 (0.526)	-0.487 (0.454)			-0.234 (0.361)	-0.197 (0.337)
Support for sending Syrian Refugees Back			-0.997** (0.485)	-0.767* (0.412)			-0.669** (0.289)	-0.576** (0.267)
Student of Sabancı Univeristy			0.556 (0.910)	0.431 (0.788)			-0.190 (0.638)	-0.167 (0.595)
Constant	3.187*** (1.007)	3.045*** (0.968)	16.984*** (6.150)	13.228** (5.184)	1.248* (0.707)	1.218* (0.698)	8.274** (3.492)	7.125** (3.232)
(Penalized)Log likelihood	-42.163	-40.294	-21.314	-16.258	-58.308	-55.968	-39.470	-31.603
N	87	87	68	68	87	87	69	69

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The third model includes not only the variable that represents the groups but also the variables that stand for anger towards the Syrian government, compassion towards Syrian refugees, gender of the participant, the support for sending Syrian refugees back, political interest, and whether the participant is a student of Sabanci University or not. The fourth model is a fifth logistic regression with the same variables. From 5 to 8, the remaining models utilize the same analyses and models in the exact same order for the dependent variable that represents to what extent they believe the story of the Syrian refugee whose interview was given.

The models show that the variable that stands for to what extent that “fear that we fear” is a serious psychological problem is significant across all models. It means facing the frame that attempted to elicit anger and compassion simultaneously decreases the probability of evaluating the “fear that we fear” as a serious problem. On the other hand, the variable which stands for to what extent participants believe the story of the Syrian refugee whose interview was given is not significant in any model. Also, an increase in participants’ support for sending Syrian refugees back decreases the probability of evaluating the “fear that we fear” as a serious problem and believe the story of the Syrian refugee whose interview was given. Nevertheless, this variable is significant in the fifth logistic regression model with the dependent variable of evaluating the “fear that we fear” as a serious problem at $p < 0.1$ level.

The following graphs represent the predicted probabilities for both dependent variables. The prediction and confidence intervals in the graphs were estimated from the first and the fifth model, respectively

Figure 3.3 Predicted Probabilities: Believe in Story





Figure 3.4 Predicted Probabilities: Seriousness



3.6 Discussion

This chapter focused on the effect of the interaction of two instant emotions, anger and compassion, on the credibility of the information in a frame. Even though the literature has been underlined the allegiant nature of these two emotions, no experimental study analyzes the effect of a combination of these emotions. To test two competing hypotheses, an online experiment was conducted on university students. In the experiment, participants are randomly assigned one of the two groups. As experimental manipulation, both groups read a paragraph discussing the concept “fear that we fear “ by Judith Shklar (1998), accompanied by an interview with a Syrian refugee to exemplify the concept. The difference between the text that the two groups read was the attempt to elicit emotions. The first group read a frame that attempted to elicit only compassion towards the Syrian refugees. In contrast, the second group read a frame that simultaneously attempted to elicit anger towards the Syrian government and other violent groups and compassion towards Syrian refugees. The credibility of information is operationalized with two questions. The first question asked participants to rate to what extend “fear that we fear” is serious as a psychological problem. The second question was to what extent they believe the story of the Syrian refugees in the frame. A series of logistic and firth logistic regression results provided weak but promising evidence that attempting to simultaneous elicitation of anger and compassion decreases the credibility of the frame in comparison to attempting to elicit only compassion for to what extend the participants perceived the seriousness of “fear that we fear.”

This chapter has important limitations. Firstly, the number of participants should be higher to provide more ample evidence regarding the subject matter. It might provide a better test of significance and predicted probabilities as estimates with a higher number of participants. Secondly, even though “attempting to elicit” was the main concern in the chapter, there was no question that directly measures whether participants were aware of the framer’s attempt, especially for attempting to elicit anger.

Nevertheless, adding such a question in the post-test after asking respondents the emotion they felt when they read the frame might motivate them to answer this question in conjunction with their answer to the question for their emotions in response to the frame. The vice versa is possible as well. In other words, to solve the dissonance between these questions, they might coordinate their answer, which essentially asks two different phenomena. Therefore, not to add such a question was a decision under this trade-off. Nevertheless, a solution for this problem might be

a systematic pilot study in which whether participants realize the attempt to elicit particular emotion is measured.

Also, even though they are not statistically significant, the differences in the means for the participants' emotions towards the frame showed that attempting to anger towards the Syrian government or other violent groups in opposition elicits less anger towards these subjects and less compassion towards them the Syrian refugees. On the other hand, attempting to elicit anger towards the Syrian regime or opposition elicits higher anger towards the Syrian refugees.

Even though the results of this chapter have strong limitations because of the problems mentioned above, it still gives us weak evidence for the effect of the interaction of instant emotions and motivation to continue to investigate the effects of arousal of multiple emotions.

4. EMOTIONS AND STRATEGIC VOTING

From what we know from the years of scholarly discussion, voters' choice to abandon their most preferred party for strategic reasons has a crucial role in politics in democracies. Some argue that strategic voting impedes elections without manipulation (Maskin and Sen 2014), whereas extant literature has mostly discussed the institutional setting that shapes individuals' strategic voting behavior (Duverger 1954, Cox 1997). Strategic voting might be evaluated as a drift of voters because of manipulations of game setters to shape the political system or as an alternative tool for voters to affect the political system. In light of this discussion, we now have a vast amount of studies on the concept.

This chapter will focus on an unexplored potential correlate of strategic voting: Stored emotions towards political parties to be articulated in this literature and contribute to the discussion of this study's general theme. The effect of four emotions, anger, fear, hope, pride towards the most preferred, the strategic, and the rival parties on casting a strategic vote, will be analyzed in the rest of the chapter. Alongside the direct effect of emotions on the probability of strategic voting, their possible effects on the impact of partisan predispositions and winning expectations for parties on the voting strategically will be assessed. For these purposes, there will be an investigation of the 2015 elections of the United Kingdom by analyzing the British Election Studies Wave 4 dataset. Concomitantly, this chapter proposes a method to designate a counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters. This concept refers to the party that a voter, who intends to vote for her most preferred party, would vote strategically. To do this, Naïve Bayes and k-NN classification algorithms will be constructed from the data from strategic voters and applied sincere voters to designate their counter-factual strategic party.

Series of statistical analyzes will yield several important findings. People who are angry towards their most preferred party are less likely to vote for their most preferred party even if their utility from voting for their sincere party increases compared to strategic options. On the other hand, people are more likely to vote for their most

preferred party if they have felt pride in their MPP; even the utility from the sincere vote is low. Also, the results reveal that emotions do not affect the impact of the level of party preferences, but they affect the impact of the winning expectations on the probability of strategic voting. If people are angry towards the rival party, they are more prone to voting strategically if the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the front runner and the winning expectation for the most preferred party is high. Nevertheless, a more substantive effect is observed in hope towards the strategic party. If people have felt hope towards the strategic party, the effect of the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the strategic party and the winning expectations for the rival party decreases alongside the direct effect of the hope on strategic voting.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First will be a literature review on strategic voting, followed by the literature on the nexus between voting behavior and emotions. After these, the hypotheses will be derived through a theoretical discussion. Next will be the clarification and operationalization of necessary concepts to measure strategic voting. What follows is the explanation and results of the application of Naïve Bayes and k-NN classifiers to predict the counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters. After that, the statistical analysis will be explained, and the result will be illustrated. Lastly, the chapter will be completed by discussing the section and its relevance to the thesis.

4.1 Strategic Voting as a Concept

The concept has been evolved throughout the years; nevertheless, the anchor study for the subject was published by Duverger in 1954. In this study, he argued that plurality systems tend to produce two-party systems, and the reason behind this outcome is strategic voting. The causal argument might be pictured using a concrete example for First past the post (FPTP) electoral systems, commonly applied forms of plurality systems. In FPTP electoral systems, the country is divided by the number of electoral districts equal to the number of available seats in the parliament. It entails that only one party/candidate who gains the highest number of votes can claim the member of this district. The remaining parties/candidates will be absolute losers of the election.

In this regard, this institutional consequence incentivizes individuals to reevaluate their voting behavior. If a voter expects that her most preferred party/candidate does not have a chance to finish the election as at least the runner-up in the electoral

district, she has an incentive to vote for another party/candidate that has a chance to win the elections. On the other hand, in case she insists on voting for her most preferred party, she wastes her vote since her vote is incapable of affecting the outcome of the elections. Therefore, she might abandon the most preferred party at the ballot box not to waste the vote. This phenomenon has been named strategic voting.

The effect of the plurality rule in elections by incentivizing a sub-set of individuals to vote strategically is not limited to the voting behavior. In the long run, the parties structurally and consistently hopeless to win the elections disappear from the party system. Voters strategically abandon these parties in each and every election. Meanwhile, political elites in these parties have to cooperate with the parties which have a realistic chance to win the MP's of the constituencies or with other weak parties to increase their chances to win MP. Thus, these parties have gradually eroded, the number of parties in the party system has diminished. Eventually, two-party which have a realistic chance to win the elections can survive.

Nevertheless, when the number of seats reserved to the constituencies is more than one, the incentives behind the erosion of parties that are not expected to be a front runner or runner up weaken. Proportional representation systems (PR) might be a suitable example to illustrate the difference. In PR systems, the electoral districts are allotted more than one seat in parliament. Also, these seats are distributed proportionally according to vote shares of the parties. Therefore, not only the party/candidate who has the highest number of votes wins but also the runner-up and other parties have a chance to win seats depending on the size of the district magnitude. In such a case, the probability of winning a seat for any voter's most preferred party increases. Concomitantly, fewer voters expect that their most preferred party will be the absolute loser; also, less voter thinks that voting for their most preferred party is a "waste." Therefore, the incentives for strategic voting decreases. Furthermore, since the volume of the strategic voting decreases, the expected number of political parties in the system increases.

The concept of strategic voting has been evolved since Duverger's formulation. The pioneering contribution to literature was made by Cox (1997) in his book named "Making Voting Count." He clarifies the concept of strategic voting and illustrates its mechanism in different electoral systems other than those using plurality rules. More recent studies in the literature supports this argument empirically. (Abrahamson et al. 2010, Rivera 2016). Also, he conceptualizes "Duvergian Equilibrium" by proposing necessary structural and psychological conditions for strategic voting. For instance, he argues that voters should be "myopic" to vote strategically. It means

that they need to focus on utility maximization in the current election instead of future consideration. Also, he clarifies the pattern that plurality systems produce regional two-party systems. Those parties that have strong regional support survive, even though they do not have enough support from other regions of the country (Cox 1997).

What follows, the strategic voting as a concept evolves in terms of the definition of "strategy" and the incentives that it entails. The classical literature has built upon Duverger's "not wasting the vote" incentive as the argument. To recap, the classical definition is "...a vote for a party (candidate) other than the most preferred one in order to avoid wasting the vote on hopeless candidacies in a district " (Lago 2012, 653). Nevertheless, the literature has evolved in alternative dimensions by arranging the definition of strategic voting. For instance, Abrahamson and his colleagues define strategic voting as "... the voter evaluates how his or her vote will influence the outcome and casts his or her vote so as to obtain as favorable an outcome as possible" (2010, 65). This type of definition changing the approach to the incentive for voting strategically. People may have strategic considerations other than not wasting their votes. Therefore, regardless of the type of incentives for voting strategically, their vote is strategic if they consider the best electoral outcome for themselves. Thus, even a vote for the most preferred party might be a strategic vote if it gives the best outcome, called a straightforward vote (Farquarson 1969). If the vote for the most preferred party depends only on party preferences without considering the outcome of the elections, then it is a sincere vote.

Before going further, a conceptual discussion of strategic voting might prevent confusion in terms of naming the phenomenon as "strategic" or "tactical" voting. The literature has preferred naming the phenomenon as "tactical" instead of "strategic" voting, especially for the last ten years. This practice underlines a critical theoretical discussion about the difference between "strategy" and "tactic." In this regard, the preference of the "tactical" over "strategic" has valid grounds. If strategic voting is defined as the vote for the option which gives you the highest utility concerning the electoral outcome, then tactical voting might be defined as voting for the specific party/candidate under the given strategic incentives. Also, the definition of the tactic is context-specific which well-suit the alternative voting behavior with respect to the incentives of the political settings.

Nevertheless, I will insist on using strategic voting instead of tactical voting in this chapter. The first reason is that this study focuses on the Duvergian incentive structure for strategic voting, reflecting the origin of the concept. Secondly, instead of naming the phenomenon as "tactical," I will attempt to integrate the "tactic" into

the conceptualization of strategic voting. In this regard, strategic voting will be conceptualized by constructing three components which are, 1) strategic structure, 2) strategic considerations, and 3) tactics. The following paragraphs are reserved for an explanation of these components.

Strategic structure refers to the "rules of the game," so institutions (North 1990). More specifically, it refers to primarily the electoral rules which incentivize voters to behave in a particular way. The strategic considerations refer to the voter's probable reasoning for voting, shaped by strategic structure incentives. Tactics refer to voting for one of the available options as a result of strategic considerations.

Let me clarify the conceptualization by explaining the Duvergian strategic voting with the three components above. The strategic structure in the Duvergian version stems from the FPTP electoral system, which allows only one winner in a constituency. These incentives of strategic structure lead voters whose most preferred party does not have a realistic chance to win elections to strategically consider not to waste their vote by voting for their most preferred party. Therefore, they might evaluate alternative tactics by voting for one of the parties other than their most preferred party, which they prefer over other contestants.

The logic in Duvergian strategic voting is straightforward. Nevertheless, literature has varieties of strategic (tactical) voting. Examples might be listed as policy-strategic voting, which aims to shape the parliament's composition to stack the legislation (Press 2008), strategic non-voting, which refers to strategically not to go the ballot box (Vinuela et al. 2012), to bandwagon the winner of the election under the PR (Riambau 2018), or to ensure a vote of confidence by forming a coalition (Lago 2018).

To clarify the components further, let me picture one other version of strategic voting, threshold insurance voting (Hobolt and Karp 2010), by applying each proposed component. Suppose that Party A is the most preferred party of a voter, whereas Party B is the party that the voter least prefers. Meanwhile, Party C and Party D are the parties that voters prefer over Party B. In this case of threshold-insurance voting, the strategic structure set by the electoral system is a national threshold. Failing to reach this threshold after the aggregation of the votes from all constituencies makes any party stay out of the parliament. This is the institution that paves the way the strategic considerations. In this regard, Party C and Party D are not the voter's most preferred party, but the voter's utility might increase if Party A will gain seats in the parliament. This might be because the voter may prefer Party A and Party C or Party D to form a coalition in a probable case of a hung parliament. Alternatively, Party B might lose seats from constituencies where Party C or Party

D has a solid electoral base, but Party A has not. If Party C and/or Party D cannot exceed the national threshold, any of these scenarios cannot exist. Thus, the voter has two apparent tactics: voting for Party C and voting for Party D.

4.2 Correlates of Strategic Voting

Beyond the definition and types of strategic voting, the literature contains studies that offer correlates of strategic voting. The central focus in the literature is on the election-related conditions and attributes such as party evaluations, differences in expected vote shares. The affiliation towards the most preferred party decreases the likelihood of strategic voting, whereas the closeness towards the strategic party increases it (Myatt 2007). Moreover, a decrease in the difference between the winning expectations for the strategic party and the rival increases the probability of strategic voting (Alvarez and Nagler 2000).

Also, scholarly works provide an abundance of correlates of strategic voting other than election-related conditions. For instance, Moser and Scheiner (2009) provides evidence that the volume of strategic voting is higher in consolidated democracies. On the other hand, in Mexico, which had a hybrid regime with a hegemonic party system, strategic voting towards the strongest opposition party is not a viable option since the hegemon party of the system is too strong to topple down (Magaloni 2008). This finding supports Cox's (1997) argument the increasing margin between the front runner and runner up decreases the incentives for strategic voting. Another systemic correlate of strategic voting is patronage politics. Voters have more incentives to vote strategically in countries where patronage dominates electoral politics. They have more incentives to bandwagon with the winner since perks that they can benefit from if they side with the winner are higher (Chandra 2009).

Furthermore, the power of the fourth branch of government in democracies affects the volume of strategic voting. People's belief about the power of media in citizens' decisions increases the volume of strategic voting. Since people believe that what they see in media about the prediction of elections will affect the voters' decision, they can estimate the voting behavior of other people, which makes their strategic behavior more beneficial to shape the election results (Cohen 2009). Lastly, the individual characteristics that shape strategic voting have been under investigation in the literature. For instance, Erişen and Blais (2014) found evidence about the impact of Big 5 personality traits, namely extroversion, agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism, on strategic voting. They found that the level

of openness to experience increases the probability of strategic voting while the level of agreeableness decreases it. Also, Eggers and Visyan (2020) assert that older voters are more inclined to vote for "the best insincere vote," which objectively gives them the highest utility.

So, many correlates of strategic voting have been discussed. Yet, the effect of emotions on strategic voting has lacked scholarly attention. This chapter will attempt to close this gap. Nevertheless, the literature offers evidence for the effect of emotions on voting behavior in general, and the following section is reserved for presenting these discussions.

4.3 Voting Behavior and Emotions

The effect of emotions on the voting behavior of citizens has attracted great scholarly attention. Nonetheless, it is the most contentious one compared to other research on emotions in political science. The milestone of the literature on the nexus between emotions and voting behavior is again the Affective intelligence theory. The theory was explained in the previous chapters. Yet, regarding the subject matter, Marcus et al. (2000) argue that anxiety improves the voting decision of individuals by making them less reliant on their partisan dispositions. Anxious individuals who face a threat or alarm situation heighten their attention to the environment, motivated to collect more information; thus, their level of affiliation to parties plays less role while casting a vote in the elections.

This argument is appealing in many respects. Firstly, it is a remarkable contribution to the literature on voting behavior by depicting the effect of anxiety on the most important determinant of voting behavior, the partisan predispositions. Also, it strengthens the block towards the argument that emotions downgrade the quality of decision-making. More importantly, it provides an edge to the normative democratic theory, which has tried to overcome the impediments of citizens' incompetence in terms of their maxims of voting decision and their ignorance of politics. If they become anxious, they pay attention to political information, give up their biased predispositions and make "better" democratic choices. So, upon the time that the vigilance is needed, they act as they are supposed to.

Yet, critics towards the findings have arisen and fall. Ladd and Lenz (2008) argued that the finding of Marcus and his colleagues are statistical "artifacts." They claimed that the effect of anxiety on the voting decision is direct instead of decreasing the

impact of partisan predisposition on the voting behavior. Marcus et al. (1993,2000) argued that enthusiasm is directly related to the candidate/party evaluation, but anxiety is not. Anxiety is something "in the air" and is associated weakly with evaluating the party that is intended to vote. Therefore, the effect of anxiety is indirect on voting behavior by heightening the need for information for the whole political landscape, curbs predispositions towards parties and candidates, decreases the reliance on heuristics.

Ladd and Lenz (2008,2011) proposed two established theories, namely, affect transfer and Endogenous effect, to explain the impact of anxiety on the voting decision. Affect transfer argues that anxiety, or any other emotion, shapes the voting decision by informing voters of their dislike about a candidate or a party. So, emotions alter the candidate evaluation. On the other hand, the Endogenous effect claims a reverse direction for the causal arrow. Since a voter dislikes a candidate or a party, she becomes anxious and votes accordingly. They replicated and reshaped the foundational statistical analyses and claimed that the results do not support to claims of AIT.

The parties elaborated their claim on the anxiety and validity of AIT by series of papers. After this theoretical and methodological discussion between Marcus et al. and Ladd and Lenz, the critics by Ladd and Lenz towards AIT have been cited in one sentence without a full-fledged discussion in the orthodox political psychology literature. AIT has maintained its claims as to the dominant theory in the nexus between voting behavior and emotions.

Beyond, but in relation to, this theoretical discussion, the extant literature has offered various evidence regarding the effect of emotions on voting behavior. Brader (2005, 2006) provided experimental evidence that fear induction through commercials increases the primacy of a candidate's trait and issues position in voting intentions of the individuals. In a related vein, other studies in the literature have seconded the findings for the effect of fear. Fear decreases the role of ideology and predispositions and increases the weight of the current evaluation of candidates, parties, and environment (MacKuen et al. 2007, Vasilopoulos et al. 2019). These studies contributed to support for AIT's claims. In another, Valentino et al. (2011) found that anger mobilizes people for political participation, including attendance at the ballot box. Also, Vasilopoulos and Wagner asserted that in the United Kingdom, people who feel anger are more likely to support leaving European Union, whereas people who feel fear are more opt to renegotiate the relationship of the UK with the EU. In another paper, Vasilopoulos and Wagner (2020) also analyzed the effect of emotional reactions towards Brexit on voting behavior in general elections.

They found that angry Remainers who vote for remaining in the EU and Leavers who are enthusiastic are more likely to switch their votes in the general elections.

Furthermore, the increasing scholarly attention to populism as the rising star of the literature has spilled over to research the nexus between emotions and voting behavior. For instance, Rico et al. (2017) found that anti-establishment parties attract the votes of angry individuals who have problems with the political system. Also, Vasilopoulos et al.'s (2019) emotions towards the terrorist attacks on Paris in 2015 shape the people's voting intention. Those who felt anger toward attacks are leaning toward voting for Front National, whereas those who felt fear are less prone to voting for the Front National.

Among all these studies, there is only one study by Dimitrescu and Blais (2014) that analyzes the relationship between strategic voting in the "winner takes all" elections and emotions. They conducted an experiment in which the collective vote of the participants determines the amount of money that should be given to environmentalist NGOs. They found that a moderate level of anxiety increases the defection from the preferred choice, whereas a high level of anxiety decreases it.

In fact, analyzing the effect of emotions on strategic voting might contribute to the literature beyond the regular relationship between voting behavior and emotions. As was discussed earlier, the main argument in the literature regarding the effect of emotions on political behavior and judgment is their influence on the reliance on predispositions. In this respect, analyzing the preferences and behavior of those who vote strategically, essentially who abandon the sincere preferences, which can be classified as the predisposition, is a good test for the relationship between emotions and voting behavior. In other words, analyzing the effect of emotions on strategic voting gives us leverage in understanding the role of emotions due to the well-framed strategic structure, which incentivizes people to underweight their partisan predispositions by weighting the electoral considerations in casting their votes. The following paragraphs will attempt to theorize upon this focal point.

4.4 Emotions and Strategic Voting

As discussed in the previous sections, only a sub-set of voters are incentivized to consider available tactics strategically. The strategic consideration, which is peculiar for voters in the strategic subset, might alter the effect of emotions on voting behavior. As was discussed earlier, voters in the strategic subset face a risk of wasting their

vote if they vote for their most preferred party. What the theory of strategic voting predicts is that this condition affects the voters' calculus of voting. Under these circumstances, voters' reliance on their predisposition is under test. The strategic considerations, mainly winning expectations for the parties, gain weight in their utility calculations for the electoral outcome. In other words, they are drifted by strategic structure to consider the electoral environment shaped by their winning expectations for the parties.

The intriguing correspondence between research on emotion and strategic voting appears at that point. According to Affective Intelligence Theory (Marcus 2000), a turned-on surveillance system signified by anxiety decreases the reliance on the predispositions. People become more responsive to their environment, seek more information, and rely less on their mental constructs. In contrast, the disposition system increases the reliance by arousing enthusiasm. In conjunction with this correspondence, emotions might alter the probability of strategic voting by affecting voters' reliance on predispositions vis-à-vis the information from the environment. In this respect, winning expectations might be evaluated as the information from the environment. Potential strategic voters' winning expectations for parties are in conflict with their predispositions regarding their voting decision since their most preferred party does not have a realistic chance to win elections. In this regard, discrete emotions towards the parties might affect to what extent voters rely on the partisan predispositions vis-à-vis winning expectation in conjunction with their expected effect on reliance on predispositions. In other words, they might catalyze voters' decisions by altering to weigh on predispositions and winning expectations for parties.

AIT's main claim regarding voting behavior is people who are anxious towards their candidates do not rely solely on partisan predispositions but also consider the personality and characteristics of the candidate (Marcus et al. 2011). In other words, they claimed that anxiety shapes the reliance on dispositions on voting behavior. A similar attempt was made by Vasilopoulos and his colleagues (2019) to investigate the effect of anger and fear in response to terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 on the voting propensity for Front Nationale in France. They assessed the interaction between emotions and predispositions, particularly conservative ideological identification and authoritarianism tendencies. They expected that anger and fear have not only a direct diverge effect on voting for FN, also an opposite indirect effect on the reliance on named dispositions. Particularly, they found that it is anger rather than fear in response to terrorist attacks that alter the reliance on predispositions in voting probability for FN even though their interpretation of the results is criticized by Just on the grounds that what the results suggest that anger mediates the effect

of anger on the voting behavior (2019).

In this regard, this chapter will focus on the effect of emotions towards the parties in different status for potential strategic voters on the reliance on the partisan predispositions in voting strategically. Therefore, the conditional effect of emotions not only for the most preferred party but also strategic and rival parties will be under investigation. The strategic structure which provides strategic considerations enables us to widen these probable conditional effects. ; In a similar vein, the effect of emotions on reliance on the winning expectations for parties which are an essential component of strategic considerations, will be analyzed.

In the light of these arguments, the following paragraphs will discuss the relationship between strategic voting and emotions in three aspects. Firstly, there will be a discussion on the direct effect of emotions. This section will investigate the effect of emotions of the potential strategic voters on their probability of strategic voting directly. Next, the focus will turn to the central interest of this chapter by discussing the impact of emotions on the effect of partisan predispositions on strategic voting. Relatedly, we will turn the effect of emotions on the effect of the winning expectations for parties that come into prominence under strategic consideration on strategic voting.

Any instance of strategic structure entitles its actors. In the Duvergian strategic structure, strategic voting relates to three main types of electoral actors, namely the most preferred party, the strategic party/parties, and the rival party/parties. The conceptualization and operationalization of these parties will be elaborated on later. Nonetheless, providing condensed definitions of these actors is necessary at this point. The most preferred party is the party that the voter sincerely prefers. The strategic party is the party that maximizes the utility of the voter regarding her preferences and vote share expectations. Lastly, the rival party is the one that has the highest perceived chance of winning the election among the parties other than the MPP and the strategic party; but its triumph gives less utility to the voter than winning of the strategic party.

Emotions towards these parties might affect the voter's decision directly. Let's start the discussion with the most preferred party (MPP). The negative emotions towards the MPP, namely anger and fear, as all types of voting behavior might increase the voter's likelihood of strategic voting. Those voters who feel anger and fear towards their MPP might turn their eye to the tactical options, which results from their expectation that their MPP cannot win the elections in their constituency. Therefore;

H1: Anger and fear towards the most preferred party increase voter's probability of vote strategically.

The remaining two emotions are positive emotions in terms of their valence. At first glance, hope and pride towards the most preferred party are expected to decrease the voter's likelihood to vote strategically. Nevertheless, there might be a difference in these two emotions regarding their effect on strategic voting. Feeling pride entails and requires a sense of belonging to an object or subject (Gerber et al. 2010). Therefore, even though the voter believes that her MPP cannot win the election in the constituency, if they feel pride resulting from a sense of belonging to her MPP, she may be less likely to inhibit her sincere preference. On the other hand, for feeling hope towards a party, the sense of belonging plays a minor role. Even though the voter is hopeful for the policies and position of her MPP, it might not surpass the appeals of strategic incentives. Under the circumstances that the MPP cannot win the elections, hope may be a less effective correlates inhibition of sincere voting. Therefore; , H2: Pride towards the MPP diminishes the voter's likelihood to vote strategically more than hope towards the MPP.

The second set of emotions are towards the strategic party. Like negative emotions towards the MPP, the negative emotions towards the strategic party might have a similar effect. The negative valence of these emotions decreases the probability of inhibition of sincere preferences. Therefore,

H3: Anger and fear towards the strategic party decrease the voter's probability of vote strategically.

Hope and pride towards the strategic party might also affect strategic voting. Both hope and pride might inhibit the sincere preferences of voters and make them likely to vote strategically since they are a sign of positive evaluations towards the strategic party. Note that the difference between hope and pride towards the most preferred party is less viable for the strategic party. Fewer voters might feel pride towards their strategic party since the sense of belonging to a strategic party might be lower. However, the effect of pride on voting for a party may still play a role in voting strategically. Because the strategic party is the option that voters assign a chance to win the election. Any positive evaluation increases her probability of voting strategically. Therefore.

H4: Pride and hope towards the strategic party increase the voter's probability of vote strategically.

Now we can turn to predispositions. As was discussed, people who expect that their most preferred party does not have a realistic chance to win the elections

in the constituency might have strategic consideration of not wasting their vote. Under these circumstances, they might reweigh their preferences towards parties. Alongside their preferences towards their most preferred party, they also need to designate a strategic option as the tactic of strategic voting. They need to evaluate their preferences and winning expectations of finding a tactic not to waste their vote. Concomitantly, they need to decide to vote sincerely or strategically. Their stored emotions towards the parties might affect this process. The expectation is that emotions towards parties might shape the reliance on the predispositions. In other words, alongside or aside from the direct effect of emotions, their effect might be conditional on reliance on the predisposition.

Naturally, the first predisposition is towards the most preferred party. Negative stored emotions towards the MPP might decrease the importance of the level of preference towards this party, whereas the positive emotions increase it. Also, the vice versa might be valid for the emotions of the strategic party. Furthermore, this effect might be observed on the level of preference towards the strategic party as well. Therefore,

H5: Negative/Positive emotions towards the MPP decrease/increase the effect of level of preference towards MPP/strategic on the probability of strategic voting.

H6: Negative/Positive emotions towards the strategic party decrease/increase the effect of level of preference towards MPP/strategic party on the probability of strategic voting.

The level of preferences for and emotions to the most preferred party and the strategic party is directly related to the parties in the choice set of voters. However, there is one more party that needs to be considered. It is the rival party. To remind, the rival party is the one that has the highest perceived chance of winning the election among the parties other than the MPP and the strategic party. However, its victory gives less utility to the voter than winning of the strategic party. The voter's attitudes and emotions towards rival parties might have an essential role in strategic voting. Any negative evaluation towards the rival party might encourage the voter to vote strategically. An increase in the volume of negative evaluations towards the rival party might motivate the voter to inhibit her sincere preference since her desire to decrease the rival party's probability of winning increases.

In this regard, fear and anger, among other emotions, might have a special role. As was discussed, anxiety decreases the reliance on predispositions in voting. In the case of strategic voting, the "anxiety" might be negative emotions towards the rival party. The best candidate for a threat that the voter perceives is the rival

party. The negative emotions towards this party might decrease the effect of party preferences, which is the most important correlate of sincere voting. Voters may prefer to strategic party instead of the MPP to decrease the winning probability of the rival party.

Therefore, the effect of negative emotions towards the rival party might be conditional. The rival party is not a viable voting option for the voters because of its very definition. Its effect might be conditional on the other preferences of the voters. The expected effects on emotions might be observed through the change in the importance of like towards the most preferred party on the voting strategically because of strategic reasons. Therefore, the hypothesis is;

H7: Negative emotions towards the rival party decrease the impact of partisan disposition towards the most preferred party on voting strategically.

As was indicated, strategic structure drifts voters in the strategic subset into strategic considerations. The primary properties of this consideration are voters' expectations for the winning chance of the parties in their constituencies. Firstly, voters' winning expectations for the parties determine the voters' inclusion into the strategic subset. Also, they are crucial correlates for the evaluation of the alternative tactics of strategic voting. They are one of the determinants for the evaluation of the available options in determining the strategic party.

Furthermore, they are directly related to the probability of strategic voting. For instance, the winning expectation between the front runner of the constituency and the most preferred party is a determinant of strategic voting. An increase in this expectation increases the probability of strategic voting (Alvarez et al. 2000, Myatt 2007, Stephanson et al. 2018). When the chance of their most preferred party to win the MP of the constituency decreases more, people are more inclined to abandon their sincere preferences. Another crucial difference in winning expectations is between the expected vote share of the strategic party and the rival party. When this difference increases in favor of the strategic party, the probability of the strategic voter increases; however, if this difference is too high, the probability of strategic voting might decrease compared to a head horse competition (Alvarez and Nagler 2000).

In this regard, emotions towards parties might alter the reliance of the strategic consideration, which is shaped by the winning expectations from parties. Therefore, the conditional effect of emotions towards parties on the probability of strategic voting is expected to be in the opposite direction in comparison to the level of preference towards the parties. Therefore:

H8. Emotions towards the MPP, the strategic and rival parties, affect the probability of strategic voting by altering the effect of the difference of winning expectations of the parties.

Before testing these hypotheses, a necessary intrusion to prepare data for measuring strategic voting is required. For this purpose, the next section will conceptualize and operationalize building blocks for strategic voting. These are potential strategic voters (sub-set of strategic voters), the most preferred party, the strategic party/vote, and the sincere vote. Furthermore, the definition and function of the counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters will be elaborated on in the next section.

4.5 Definitions of the Concepts

4.5.1 Designating Potential Strategic Voters

The first step is to define the potential strategic voters. Briefly, potential strategic voters are those who have an incentive to vote strategically. Therefore, this categorization of voters entails a proposal for strategic considerations for the voters. More precisely, why a voter abandons her most preferred party; so, why she deviates from her sincere preferences. The answer to this question reveals the strategic consideration. In this chapter, the strategic considerations refer to classical strategic voting, as was discussed before. This is; people do not want to waste their vote by casting a vote for a party they expect to lose. This consideration is the most relevant one for the British electorate (Cain 1978, Johnston and Pattie 1991, Aldrich et al. 2011, Stephanson et al. 2018) since UK's elections are held under FPTP rule, which produces only one winner in each constituency, as was discussed in the previous section.

Thus, potential strategic voters are those who expect that their most preferred party, so the party that they affiliate, does not have a chance to win the election in the constituency that the voters reside. So, in data terms, they are the voters whose winning expectation for their most preferred party is less than at least two of the parties in their constituency (Kselman and Niou 2010). Any respondents included in the analyses should satisfy this condition.

4.5.2 The Most Preferred Party

Even though "the most preferred part" sounds straightforward, it is not. The empirical strategy in the literature to decide the most preferred party of a voter is to construct preference ranking for each voter by their feeling thermometers for each party and designate the first among others as "the most preferred party" (Aldrich et al. 2011, Stephanson et al. 2018). Literally, it sounds well; yet a caveat regarding the issue needs to be emphasized. Alongside thermometer questions, almost all surveys ask respondents their party affiliation. For instance, in the British Election Studies survey, respondents are asked ". The concern here is whether the party that the most liked and the party that affiliated are the same. What if "the most preferred part" according to the preference ranking and according to the answer to affiliation question differs? Which one should be the most preferred party of the voter?

Theoretically, it might resonate; nevertheless, is this a relevant concern empirically? In this regard, the data might lead the further steps. The graph below represents the data from the respondents of BES Wave 4 who indicated they are affiliated with either Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, United Kingdom Independence Party, or Green Party. The graph illustrates the number of respondents whose "the most-liked" party and the party that they affiliate differ. As can be observed, 27% of the respondents indicated different "most-liked" and "affiliated" parties.

Figure 4.1 Correspondence of Affiliated and Most Liked Parties




Under these circumstances, this is a critical decision that primarily affects designating potential strategic voters and, secondarily, deciding on whether the vote is sincere or strategic. Both strategies have weaknesses compared to each other. Let me depict the situation of an actual voter in the dataset to clarify the problem. This voter's "affiliated party" is the UKIP, yet "the most-liked party" is Conservatives. Also, she intends to vote for Conservatives. Moreover, she expects that UKIP cannot win the election, but Conservatives can. If the most preferred party of this voter is decided as her "affiliated party," then she is a potential strategic voter, and her vote is strategic. Nonetheless, if the most preferred party of her is the most liked party, then she is not a potential strategic voter and will not be represented in the sample to analyze strategic voting. In other words, if the first strategy is applied in this scenario, the risk of the Type 1 error increases, whereas in the case of applying the second scenario, the risk of Type 2 error increases.

Also, theoretical problems stem from this issue. If the voters vote for the most liked party, and we designated this vote as a strategic vote, it means that we designate the affiliated party as the most preferred party. Then, this voter might vote for this party, not because of strategic reasons, but since she prefers the expected policies of this party more than her affiliated party's expected policies. On the other hand, if we designate the most liked party as the most preferred party, then the voter might indicate this party as the most liked since she intends to vote for this party.

To handle these issues, we can use the advantage of the BES panel design. The post-election survey of BES includes a question that asks respondents their reason for voting. Note that this question cannot be used directly by potential strategic voters because the research question indicates pre-election attributes. This issue will be elaborated on later. Turn back to the issue, a comparison of the answer to this question, preference rankings, and party affiliation might assist us in finalizing the decision for the strategy to decide the most preferred party.

The following will be the procedure. I will look at the number of respondents who indicated they vote strategically to their vote for "affiliate party," "most-liked party," or another party. To remind, strategic voters here are those who indicate that they voted strategically in the post-election survey. Yet, there might be a further concern. Respondents feeling thermometer for parties and their party affiliation might change after the elections. To solve the dissonance between their attitude and behavior because of their voting behavior (Bolstad et al. 2012), they might regulate their answers in the post-election survey. Or simply, other reasons might change their attitudes. Therefore, I excluded the respondents whose answers for the most liked to party and/or affiliated party change in two surveys to avoid this concern. The graph below represents the numbers for respondents who vote for "affiliated party," "most-liked party," or another party among those who said they voted strategically.

Figure 4.2 Self Claimed Strategic Vote



It seems that both operationalizations of potential strategic voters entail problems. There is no pattern for those who indicated that they vote strategically regarding the vote for the affiliated party and the most liked party. Therefore, the following procedure will be applied to designate the most preferred party. Those voters whose affiliated party and most liked party are different will be excluded from the sample. Nonetheless, if the respondent did not indicate a party affiliation, the most liked party will be designated as the most preferred party. Lastly, if the voter did not indicate a party affiliation and her feeling thermometer for the two parties at the top are the same, they will be excluded from the sample.

4.5.3 Necessary Conditions for a Strategic Vote:

As was discussed, those voters who expect their most preferred party does not have a realistic chance to win the election in their constituency have an incentive to vote strategically. However, vote for a party other than the most preferred party does not necessarily qualify this vote as strategic. In this regard, three conditions are set to define a strategic vote. The first one is that the voter should not plan to vote for her most preferred party as the obvious. In other words, her voting intention should be to a party than her most preferred party. Secondly, the party that she plans to vote for should be equally or more preferred than the front-runner in the constituency. That is to say, if the voter likes the leading party according to her winning expectations more than the party that she plans to vote for, then this is not a strategic vote. This vote might be defined as bandwagon voting (Artabe 2016) instead of classical strategic voting. The last necessary condition for the strategic vote is that the winning prospect of a voter for her most preferred party should be lower than the winning prospect for the party that she intends to vote for. It means that if the party that she plans to vote for has a lower chance to win the election than her most preferred party, then the mechanical condition of strategic voting is violated (Duverger 1954). Under these circumstances, voting for this party cannot avoid "wasting the vote" since it has a lower chance to win in the constituency compared to the most preferred party of the voter.

There might be other ways to designate strategic votes. As was mentioned earlier, British election studies offer panel data, so it was conducted before and after the elections with the same respondents. In the post-election survey (BES Wave 6), respondents were asked for their reason to vote, and the answers included an option that indicates strategic voting. A way to analyze the data might be by using the pre-election survey data for the independent variables, which will be used in predictions

and analyses, and determining the strategic vote with the question for a reason to vote in the post-election survey.

Nevertheless, the literature has not applied this type of practice for valid reasons. Firstly, the feeling thermometers, expectations, and emotions of the respondent might change from the date of their participation in the survey to the date of the election. Therefore, these independent variables might not reflect actual voting behavior. Also, controlling the correspondence of vote intention in Wave 4 and the vote recalling in Wave 6, there are problems about the quality of these responses as Alvarez and Nagler (2000) indicated and the discussion about the designation of the most preferred party in this study glimpse. Also, Alvarez and Nagler (2000) further criticized using post-election waves for voting behavior in general and strategic voting in particular by showing the increase in the self-declared strategic voting in panel studies in post-election. Furthermore, due to the missing values and change in the vote choices, the number of observations decreases significantly.

Lastly, special attention should be diverted to the pioneering study of Alvarez and Nagler (2000). They proposed an alternative specific multinomial probit model to estimate the strategic vote as an expansion from their model for voting behavior (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). They utilized alternative specific multinomial probit models, which allow estimating the effect of alternative specific and individual-specific variables at the same time. By doing so, the model allows voters to consider all parties in their choice set by matching party (alternative) specific variables to corresponding parties. Also, MNP models do not assume independence of irrelevant alternatives, which, according to the authors, cause biased estimates to understand voting behavior. They stated that the IIA premise, in which the ratio probability of choosing one option to the probability of choosing another option does not change when a third option is included in the choice set, does not reflect the essence of voting behavior.

In their model, they calculate party-specific variables with respect to each voter, such as the distance between the respondents' position and average party position for the available policies. They calculated these variables for each three viable party, Conservatives, Labour, and Alliance, in 1987 British Elections for each respondent by using survey data (Alvarez and Nagler 1998).

In their application to predict to strategic vote for the 1987 British elections (Alvarez and Nagler 2000), firstly, they add two variables and the interaction of these two variables, which reflect the strategic considerations of the voters into the model. The first variable is the difference between expected vote shares of the party of observation and the front-runner party in the constituency. The second one stands

for the closeness of the vote shares of two parties other than the observed party.

Then, they used the estimates of the model to predict two types of votes. The first one is the sincere vote. They set variables standing for strategic considerations at 0, which means that the vote shares of each of the three parties are approximately 33%. By doing so, they designated the sincere preference of a voter who does not have any strategic consideration. As the second vote, they use the estimates of the model to predict the vote of respondents without setting the strategic consideration at 0. Lastly, they compare these two predictions and designate each false prediction as a strategic vote. In other words, if the prediction of the full model for a respondent is different from the prediction, which reflects the sincere preferences of her without strategic consideration, this voter intends to vote strategically.

This linchpin contribution has improved the literature of voting behavior substantially. However, the aim of their model for strategic voting was to estimate the volume of the strategic vote. They did not designate either the most preferred or strategic party a priori or do not test any correlates of strategic voting. They predicted a strategic vote with the estimates of the model. Since the central task of this study analyzing the emotions towards the most preferred, strategic, and rival parties, this model does not suit well. Nevertheless, a conditional logistic regression model, which is different from alternative specific MNP model primarily in the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives, will be applied before other analyses to estimate the effect of emotions towards the most preferred party primarily. The details of the conditional logistic regression model will be explained and discussed later.

4.5.4 Defining the Counter-Factual Strategic Party

Defining potential strategic voters and conceptualizing strategic votes are requirements to measure strategic voting. Nevertheless, a more difficult impediment for scrutinizing the correlates of strategic voting is to come up with a party that the voter, who plans to vote for her most preferred party, would vote strategically. From now on, this phenomenon is called a "counter-factual strategic party for a sincere voter." Designating a counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters is necessary since the central aim of the chapter is to understand the effect of emotions towards not only the most preferred party, but also the party that the voter cast, or would cast, a strategic vote, and the potential rival party, which will be elaborated in the following sections.

The following example on emotions towards the most preferred party and the strategic party might illustrate the necessity to designate a counter-factual strategic vote for the second part of the analysis. To answer the research question of the chapter, the model requires to include emotions towards the most preferred party and the strategic party. To measure these emotions, one needs to determine the most preferred party and a strategic party for each respondent in the sample. Designating the most preferred party is the relatively easier one since the survey includes a question that asks the respondent their party affiliation and feeling thermometers for each party, as was discussed earlier.

However, the issue is more complicated for designating a strategic party for sincere voters. For the voters whose vote is classified as a strategic vote by the procedure explained above, the strategic party is the party they plan to vote for. Yet, the strategic party of those voters who intends to vote for their most preferred party cannot be determined by their voting intention. It is a counter-factual vote. These voters have an incentive to vote strategically, but they plan to vote sincerely. So, the question is which party they would vote for if they prefer to vote strategically. This party is named the "counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters."

Before going through further, a recap for each term that will be used in the remaining parts of the chapter might be fruitful:

Potential strategic voters: The voters who are incentivized to vote strategically, which means that they do not assign the highest chance of winning to their most preferred party.

Strategic voter: Those included in the potential strategic voter set and vote for a party other than their most preferred party. They must plan to vote for a party that they prefer equally or more than the front-runner, and her winning prospect for her most preferred party is lower than the winning prospect for the party that she intends to vote for.

Strategic vote: The voting intention of the strategic voter.

Sincere voter: Those voters who belong to the potential strategic voter set but vote for their most preferred party.

Sincere vote: The voting intention of the sincere voter.


Counter-factual strategic vote for sincere voters: The party that sincere voters would vote strategically.

If we turn back to the problem, without designated a counter-factual strategic party

for sincere voters, we can designate the emotions towards the most preferred party for both sincere and strategic voters. The anger towards the most preferred party is the anger toward the party, which is determined the most preferred party for voters. This is the same for both strategic and sincere voters. Also, we can designate the emotions towards a strategic party for strategic voters since the party they intend to vote for is their strategic party, and anger towards this party is the anger towards the strategic party. However, there is no question that asks respondents who intend to vote sincerely which party they vote for if they would decide to vote strategically. This is a counter-factual choice. Therefore, to be able to determine anger towards the strategic party for sincere voters, we need first to define a party they vote for if they would decide to vote strategically. In other words, a party should be designated that a sincere voter is the most likely to vote for strategically.

Of course, this is not a concern for only this study. Literature provides solutions to overcome this problem. The most used method to determine a counter-factual strategic party is to classify the voters according to their preferences and winning expectations and define the second most preferred party as the strategic party (Kselman and Niou 2010). Most of the studies which use this method include three-party voters into the analyses as Conservatives, Labour, and Liberal Democrats (Kselman and Niou 2010, Stephenson et al. 2018). However, especially the success of UKIP in the last two elections underlines the importance of including more party voters in the analyzes. In conjunction with this, another caveat of this method is that only the second most preferred party is defined as the strategic party. However, the graph below shows that only 76% of the respondents classified as a potential strategic voter plan to vote for their second most preferred party.

Figure 4.3 Feeling Thermometer and Strategic Vote



Another novel solution for a similar problem is published by Egger and Vivyan recently (2020). They offer a measure, strategic responsiveness, to calculate the voter's probability of vote tactically. This measure stands a scalar encompassing feeling thermometers for the parties and the expected outcome for the elections. Nevertheless, their solution is not perfectly applicable to this study. They attempt to designate "the best insincere vote," which depends on the objective expected electoral outcome instead of the voter's subjective expectations. In other words, they use the pre-election survey results instead of voters' perceptions for the winning chance of the parties. This is a plausible strategy if we consider what they seek. Their central aim is to understand the relationship between individual differences of the voters such as age, gender, income, position on the left-right scale, and whether they can choose the best insincere option among others (Egger and Vivyan 2020). Nevertheless, this chapter focuses on the party characteristics, the voters' perception about the winning chance of the parties, and not an objective "best" vote, but a subjective optimal vote.

Also, another method to determine counter-factual strategic vote for sincere voters might be using the likelihood to vote questions in the survey. BES W4 includes a set of questions that ask respondents their probability of voting for each party. This question might be used to determine the counter-factual strategic vote for sincere voters. The party that the respondents are most likely to vote for other

than the sincere party might be designated as the counter-factual strategic vote for sincere voters who are in the set of the potential strategic voters if it also satisfies the necessary conditions for the strategic vote. Yet, most of the respondents did not answer this question. Therefore, the number of missing values is high to make a prediction and statistical analysis. Also, the prediction by an algorithm that is trained by the decision of strategic voters might represent the "strategic mindset" instead of regular voting behavior.

Therefore, this chapter will utilize two machine learning algorithms to determine a counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters as an alternative. By using the Naïve Bayes and k-NN algorithms constructed from the preferences of strategic voters, the CFSP for sincere voters will be predicted. Briefly, the following is the procedure. First, the sincere party will be excluded from the choice set of respondents. In other words, the remaining choices will include four parties other than the respondents' most preferred party. Next, the respondents who plan to vote strategically are split into training and testing sets. The Naïve Bayes and k-NN algorithms will be set by using normalized feeling thermometers and subjective winning expectations for the parties in the training set. After that, these algorithms will be used to predict the vote choice of the remaining strategic voters. The reason behind this initial process is to calculate the accuracy rate of the algorithms representing the success of classification. After this initial process, the sample will be splitting into strategic, as the training set, and sincere voters, as the testing set. The algorithms constructed with the strategic voters will be applied to predict the counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters.

The details of the procedures, application, and results for classifications are explained in the appendix. Overall, since the accuracy rate of the k-NN classification is better than the Naïve Bayes classification, the prediction of k-NN will be employed to designate the counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters. The following section will explain the models and present the results of statistical analyses to test the hypotheses.

4.6 Data and Analyses

The dataset which will be used is the British Election Studies Wave 4, which was conducted before the 2015 elections in March. The reason for this selection is a set of questions for four emotions towards each party in Wave 4. These emotions are anger, fear, hope, and pride. Also, UK has been one of the most studied cases for

strategic voting because of its single-member electoral system. The most convenient electoral setting for the strategic voting for the Duvergian strategic structure is first past the post electoral systems since the district magnitude is one, as explained in the previous sections.

The two sets of analyses will be utilized to test the hypotheses. The first set includes the conditional logistic regression by which the choice level analysis for testing the hypothesis. The second set includes a series of logistic regression by the hypotheses tested at the respondents' level.

In the first set, Conditional logistic regression calculates estimates for each choice of respondents. Each respondent has five voting options as parties, and each of these options stands as observations. The dependent variable for analyses is binary, which takes the value of 1 for the party that respondents intend to vote for. For the remaining four observations of each respondent, the value of the dependent variable is 0.

Also, party-specific independent variables are matched with the observations that they correspond to. For instance, the variable that stands for anger is the anger towards the party that the observation corresponds to. Furthermore, the case/respondent-specific variables stand the same in each observation. Conditional logistic regression controls the estimates for each individual. Thus, the effect of emotions towards the parties on the probability of strategic voting will be estimated at the choice level by employing conditional logistic regression.

The main independent variables of the first set of analyses will be four emotions towards the party of observations, namely anger, fear, hope, and pride. The variables that stand for these emotions are binary since the question in the British Elections studies asks respondents whether they have felt these emotions towards each party. The distribution of this variable for the respondents in the sample by five parties included in the model can be found in the appendix. Note that the number of observations for the anger and fear towards the most preferred party is low, as can be seen in the figures in the next pages. Therefore, they will be added together as the negative emotions towards the most preferred party in the analyses in the second set. But, in conditional logistic regression models, fear and anger will be included models separately to see the difference between them at least in one model.

To differentiate the most preferred party of the voter, a binary variable was constructed. This variable takes the value of 1 if the party that corresponds to observation is the most preferred party of the respondents. So, this variable takes the value of 1 in one observation for each respondent. This variable is 0 for the remaining

four observations of each respondent. Also, feeling thermometer and winning expectation for each party stand as independent variables, alongside sex, age, interest in elections case-specific control variables in the models. Since conditional logistic regression does not estimate a constant for the model, these variables will be included in the models by interacting with a variable representing each observation. The distribution of these variables can be found in the appendix.

The conditional logistic regression model below includes series of interaction terms. Each emotion, anger, fear, hope, and pride, will be interacted with the feeling thermometers and the winning expectations to analyze whether emotions affect the voting calculus in general. As the third component of these interactions, the variable that will interact is whether the party of observation is the sincere party or not. Note that if the variable represents a sincere party is 1, then each interactive term represents the probability of voting for the sincere party. So this variable differentiates the probability of voting for the sincere party in given party-specific independent variables and case-specific controls. If the respondents do not intend to vote sincerely, it means that they intend to vote strategically. But, if this variable takes the value of 0, then the interaction term represents the probability of voting for one of the four remaining strategic options.

Below, the results of the conditional logistic regression analysis can be found. Recall, this model aims to analyze whether emotions affect voting calculus as a whole in voting behavior. The voting utility represents the interaction of normalized winning expectations for the party of observation and normalized feeling thermometer for this party.

The following predicted probability graphs were produced from the estimates of the model. The graph represents the estimates for the predicted probabilities for the sincere party. As the graph represents, for voting for the sincere party, if the respondent is angry towards her most preferred party, as the party of observation, the probability of voting does not significantly change when the utility increases. On the other hand, pride towards the most preferred party makes respondents more likely to vote for their most preferred party, even though the utility of voting for the most preferred party is low. The graph for the interaction of utility and emotions for voting for one of the strategic options can be found in the appendix.


Table 4.1 CL Regression: Utility

	Model 1
Not the Sincere Party	-3.250*** (0.267)
Utility	1.126* (0.604)
Not the Sincere Party \times Utility	2.748*** (0.654)
Anger	-1.634*** (0.570)
Not the Sincere Party \times Anger	0.684 (0.645)
Anger \times Utility	-6.260** (3.181)
Not the Sincere Party \times Anger \times Utility	7.025** (3.195)
Fear	0.189 (0.570)
Not the Sincere Party \times Fear	-0.804 (0.670)
Fear \times Utility	-1.265 (1.414)
Not the Sincere Party \times Fear \times Utility	1.094 (1.587)
Hope	0.765*** (0.204)
Not the Sincere Party \times Hope	1.543*** (0.308)
Hope \times Utility	-0.038 (0.651)
Not the Sincere Party \times Hope \times Utility	-1.390* (0.732)
Pride	1.495*** (0.246)
Not the Sincere Party \times Pride	-0.004 (0.520)
Pride \times Utility	-0.591 (0.785)
Not the Sincere Party \times Pride \times Utility	-0.585 (1.093)
Gender \times Labour	0.184 (0.229)
Gender \times LibDem	0.021 (0.232)
Gender \times UKIP	-0.472* (0.254)
Gender \times Green	-0.052 (0.254)
Age \times Labour	0.001 (0.006)
Age \times LibDem	-0.004 (0.006)
Age \times UKIP	0.015** (0.007)
Age \times Green	-0.019*** (0.007)
Interest in Elections \times Labour	0.015 (0.082)
Interest in Elections \times LibDem	-0.018 (0.089)
Interest in Elections \times UKIP	-0.272** (0.108)
Interest in Elections \times Green	-0.065 (0.089)
Log likelihood	-1034.802
N	8660

Standard errors in parentheses


* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 4.4 Predicted Probabilities: Sincere Party (Utility)



After investigating the effect of emotions on the voting calculus in general, the next set of analyses will investigate direct and indirect effects on the probability of strategic voting. For this purpose, the second set of analyses includes several logistic regressions to investigate the effect of emotions towards three types of parties, namely the most preferred, the strategic, and the rival party. The binary dependent variable of these analyses stands as 0 for the sincere voters and 1 for the strategic voters. The figure below illustrates the distribution of the variable.

Figure 4.5 Dependent Variable: Strategic Voting



As main independent variables, three sets of binary variables that stand for four emotions are constructed. The first set represents emotion towards the most preferred party, the second set stands for the strategic party, and the third set represents the emotions towards the rival party. Recall, the most preferred party is the party that the respondent is affiliated with. The strategic party is the party that the respondents plan to vote for if they are defined as strategic voters. If the voter is defined as a sincere voter, then the strategic party is the party that the k-NN classifier designated as the counter-factual strategic party.


Lastly, the rival party is defined as follows. It is the party that respondents assign the highest probability to win unless they plan to vote for this party. If they plan to vote for the party that they assign the highest chance to win in the constituency, then the rival party is the party that they have the second-highest winning expectations aside from their most preferred party.

The following example might illustrate the operationalization. Suppose that the most preferred party of a respondent is United Kingdom Independence Party. She is a voter in a district where her expectation of winning for UKIP is at the third rank among the other parties. Also, the party that she expects to win in the constituency is the Labour and the party that she expects to be in second place is the Conservatives.

Also, suppose that she is a strategic voter who plans to vote for Conservatives. Under these circumstances, her rival party is the Labour. On the other hand, if she plans to vote for Labour, her rival party is Conservatives. In case she is a sincere voter, if her counter-factual strategic party is Conservatives, her rival party is the Labour and vice versa. By using these party categories, binary variables for anger, fear, hope, and pride toward each party type were generated. The distribution of each of the 12 variables can be found in the figure below. Also, all models will include the feeling thermometer scales for most preferred, strategic, and rival parties in either single-headedly or into an interaction term.

The following graph represents the distribution of each variable that stands for emotions towards parties. As can be observed, anger and fear towards the most preferred party, alongside hope and pride towards the rival party, are low in observation. Therefore, models will include combined negative emotions towards the most preferred party and positive emotions towards the rival party. These binary variables were constructed as taking the value of 1 if one or both of the corresponding emotions have felt towards the given type of party.

Figure 4.6 Emotions towards Parties



Furthermore, other independent variables to test the effect of emotions on the impact of winning expectations of parties on the probability of strategic voting were generated. The first one is the variable which stands for the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the front runner of the constituency and the winning expectation for the most preferred party. Another one is the difference between respondents' winning expectations for the strategic party and the winning expectation for the rival party. Alongside these, sex, age, and level of interest in elections and whether the respondent indicated a party affiliation will be other control variables in the models.

To test the hypotheses, a series of logistic regression models were employed. The first logistic regression model includes ten variables for emotions without interactions to analyze their effect on the probability of strategic voting. The table below represents the results of the analysis. None of the emotions towards the rival party turn out to be significant. Nevertheless, the results show that anger and fear towards the strategic party decrease the probability of strategic voting, whereas hope towards the strategic party increases the likelihood of strategic voting. Furthermore, one of the emotions for the most preferred party has statistical significance. Pride towards the most preferred party diminishes the likelihood of voters casting a strategic vote. Also, the predicted probabilities for each statistically significant variable standing for emotions can be seen in the graph below. It seems that among the statistically


significant emotions, hope has a substantial effect on voting behavior. On the other hand, the effect of feeling pride towards MPP does not have a substantial effect on voting behavior.

Table 4.2 Logistic Regressions: Model Without Interactions

	Model 2
Age	-0.005 (0.004)
Gender	0.173 (0.136)
Interest in General Election	0.217** (0.103)
Affiliated	-0.501*** (0.150)
Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic	-0.861*** (0.164)
Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	0.545* (0.280)
Like: MPP Party	-0.399*** (0.059)
Like: Strategic Party	0.414*** (0.054)
Like: Rival Party	-0.062 (0.042)
Anger or Fear to MPP	0.300 (0.328)
Hope to MPP	-0.152 (0.184)
Pride to MPP	-0.408** (0.206)
Anger to RP	0.191 (0.170)
Fear to RP	-0.005 (0.157)
Hope or Pride to RP	-0.564* (0.303)
Anger to SP	-0.550** (0.266)
Fear to SP	-0.646** (0.300)
Hope to SP	0.975*** (0.167)
Pride to SP	0.374 (0.346)
Constant	-1.606*** (0.591)
Log likelihood	-700.755
N	1732
AIC	1442
BIC	1551

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 4.7 Predicted Probabilities: Emotions towards Parties



Other control variables regarding differences in parties' winning expectations turn out to be significant in expected directions. An increasing difference between respondents' winning expectation for the front runner of the constituency and the winning expectation for the most preferred party increases the likelihood of strategic voting. Also, an increase in the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the strategic party and the winning expectation for the rival party decreases the probability of strategic voting. Furthermore, the like towards strategic party increase, the most preferred party decreases the likelihood of strategic voting as expected.

Table 4.3 below represents the results of the nine models in which emotions towards interaction terms for parties in different status and feeling thermometer for most preferred party and differences in winning expectations are represented below. Also, Table 4.4 represents the results of the remaining four models. In Model 12, all emotions will have interacted with the feeling thermometer for the most preferred party and the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the front runner of the constituency and the winning expectation for the most preferred party separately. In Model 13, the object of the feeling thermometer was switched to strategic party. In Model 14, emotions have interacted with the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the front runner of the constituency and the winning expectation for the most preferred party alongside the feeling thermometer for the most preferred party. In Model 15, again, the feeling thermometer was

switched to the most preferred party.

Across all 13 models, two of the interaction terms turn to be significant persistently. The first one is the interaction of hope towards the strategic party and the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the strategic party and the winning expectation for the rival party. The second one is the interaction of the anger towards the rival party and the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the front runner of the constituency and the winning expectation for the most preferred party. In light of these findings, Model 16 is constructed by adding these two interaction terms into the base models. The table below represents the results of Model 2, the base model without interaction terms, and Model 16. Including these interaction terms slightly improves the models' power as the level of log-likelihood and AIC diminishes across the two models even though BIC does not change significantly.

To crystallize the interactions, the predicted probability and conditional marginal effect graphs for these interaction terms are represented below. The first and third graphs stand for estimation for hope towards the strategic party. The predicted probabilities show that respondents who feel hope towards their strategic party are more inclined to vote strategically compared to respondents who do not feel hope towards their strategic party. Also, both graphs show that the effect of winning expectation difference between rival party and strategic party affect the probability of strategic voting of respondents who feel hope towards their strategic party more than respondents who do not feel hope towards their strategic party.

Table 4.3 Logistic Regressions 1

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
Age	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Gender	0.182 (0.132)	0.162 (0.135)	0.178 (0.132)	0.176 (0.133)	0.169 (0.135)	0.173 (0.132)	0.180 (0.132)	0.165 (0.136)	0.188 (0.133)
Interest in General Election	0.220** (0.101)	0.227** (0.103)	0.231** (0.101)	0.231** (0.101)	0.230** (0.103)	0.228** (0.101)	0.233** (0.102)	0.235** (0.103)	0.227** (0.100)
Party: Yes	-0.446*** (0.144)	-0.525*** (0.149)	-0.468*** (0.146)	-0.456*** (0.144)	-0.532*** (0.149)	-0.473*** (0.145)	-0.452*** (0.144)	-0.551*** (0.149)	-0.480*** (0.145)
Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic	-0.749*** (0.159)	-0.841*** (0.162)	-0.745*** (0.159)	-0.748*** (0.160)	-0.828*** (0.162)	-0.736*** (0.159)	-0.742*** (0.293)	-0.436* (0.264)	-0.436 (0.337)
Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	0.575** (0.274)	0.494* (0.279)	0.581** (0.274)	0.284 (0.489)	0.883* (0.490)	0.419 (0.604)	0.594** (0.275)	0.548* (0.280)	0.601** (0.274)
Like: MPP Party	-0.535*** (0.085)	-0.499*** (0.078)	-0.567*** (0.092)	-0.509*** (0.052)	-0.451*** (0.053)	-0.485*** (0.057)	-0.515*** (0.052)	-0.453*** (0.053)	-0.482*** (0.058)
Like: Strategic Party	0.603*** (0.048)	0.437*** (0.054)	0.599*** (0.048)	0.602*** (0.048)	0.435*** (0.053)	0.597*** (0.048)	0.600*** (0.048)	0.434*** (0.053)	0.596*** (0.048)
Like: Rival Party	-0.090** (0.041)	-0.110*** (0.034)	-0.138*** (0.033)	-0.079* (0.041)	-0.108*** (0.034)	-0.135*** (0.033)	-0.079* (0.041)	-0.109*** (0.035)	-0.135*** (0.033)
Fear to RP	-0.178 (0.659)			0.567 (0.475)			0.086 (0.146)		
Fear to RP \times Like: MPP Party	0.034 (0.088)								
Anger to RP	0.267 (0.635)			-0.748 (0.473)			0.218 (0.160)		
Anger to RP \times Like: MPP Party	-0.008 (0.086)								
Hope or Pride to RP	-1.561 (1.103)			0.216 (0.875)			-0.372 (0.296)		
Hope or Pride to RP \times Like: MPP Party	0.156 (0.153)								
Anger to SP		-1.251 (0.948)			-0.703 (0.938)			-0.634** (0.279)	
Anger to SP \times Like: MPP Party		0.097 (0.130)							
Fear to SP		-1.163 (1.231)			-0.210 (0.834)			-0.577** (0.292)	
Fear to SP \times Like: MPP Party		0.077 (0.171)							
Hope to SP		0.530 (0.640)			1.299*** (0.488)			0.859*** (0.153)	
Hope to SP \times Like: MPP Party		0.051 (0.087)							
Pride to SP		0.038 (1.534)			1.792 (1.172)			0.296 (0.335)	
Pride to SP \times Like: MPP Party		0.031 (0.183)							
Anger or Fear to MPP			-0.702 (0.904)			0.479 (0.878)			0.241 (0.309)
Anger or Fear to MPP \times Like: MPP Party			0.162 (0.142)						
Hope to MPP			-0.679 (0.660)			-0.153 (0.548)			0.093 (0.169)
Hope to MPP \times Like: MPP Party			0.117 (0.093)						
Pride to MPP			0.549 (1.068)			0.102 (0.636)			-0.180 (0.195)
Pride to MPP \times Like: MPP Party			-0.077 (0.128)						
Fear to RP \times Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner				-0.640 (0.574)					
Anger to RP \times Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner				1.238** (0.567)					
Hope or Pride to RP \times Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner				-0.929 (1.101)					
Anger to SP \times Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner					0.156 (1.099)				
Fear to SP \times Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner					-0.562 (1.059)				
Hope to SP \times Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner					-0.513 (0.587)				
Pride to SP \times Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner					-1.894 (1.416)				
Anger or Fear to MPP \times Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner						-0.296 (1.096)			
Hope to MPP \times Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner						0.354 (0.653)			
Pride to MPP \times Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner						-0.311 (0.757)			
Fear to RP \times Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic							0.192 (0.321)		
Anger to RP \times Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic							-0.218 (0.323)		
Hope or Pride to RP \times Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic							0.796 (0.639)		
Anger to SP \times Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic								-0.416 (0.619)	
Fear to SP \times Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic								0.877 (0.654)	
Hope to SP \times Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic								-0.754** (0.329)	
Pride to SP \times Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic								-0.232 (0.693)	
Anger or Fear to MPP \times Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic									-0.002 (0.720)
Hope to MPP \times Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic									-0.297 (0.358)
Pride to MPP \times Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic									-0.486 (0.410)
Constant	-1.563** (0.716)	-0.969 (0.682)	-1.243* (0.711)	-1.589** (0.650)	-1.622** (0.652)	-1.589** (0.718)	-1.778*** (0.565)	-1.306** (0.569)	-1.744*** (0.563)
Log likelihood	-731.887	-706.018	-732.838	-728.450	-705.124	-733.794	-731.154	-702.025	-733.271
N	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732	1732

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 4.4 Logistic Regressions 2

	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Age	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Gender	0.172 (0.139)	0.184 (0.139)	0.166 (0.138)	0.176 (0.138)
Interest in General Election	0.237** (0.105)	0.247** (0.106)	0.236** (0.105)	0.246** (0.105)
Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic	-0.888*** (0.167)	-0.374 (0.383)	-0.871*** (0.166)	-0.330 (0.384)
Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	0.108 (0.675)	0.587** (0.285)	0.100 (0.676)	0.650** (0.285)
Like: Strategic Party	0.418*** (0.055)	0.419*** (0.055)	0.364*** (0.109)	0.372*** (0.108)
Like: Rival Party	-0.060 (0.043)	-0.060 (0.043)	-0.052 (0.043)	-0.050 (0.043)
Like: MPP Party	-0.527*** (0.106)	-0.530*** (0.105)	-0.389*** (0.061)	-0.400*** (0.061)
Affiliated	-0.498*** (0.153)	-0.516*** (0.154)	-0.493*** (0.151)	-0.514*** (0.153)
Fear to RP	0.279 (0.898)	-0.152 (0.753)	1.016 (0.763)	0.620 (0.541)
Fear to RP × Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	-0.344 (0.645)		-0.420 (0.641)	
Anger to RP	-1.177 (0.884)	0.206 (0.715)	-1.228 (0.755)	0.148 (0.535)
Anger to RP × Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	1.526** (0.631)		1.564** (0.630)	
Hope or Pride to RP	-1.447 (1.516)	-1.841 (1.211)	0.216 (1.411)	-0.135 (1.019)
Hope or Pride to RP × Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	-0.713 (1.211)		-0.740 (1.218)	
Anger or Fear to MPP	-1.544 (1.515)	-0.690 (1.093)	-0.185 (1.442)	0.696 (0.916)
Anger or Fear to MPP × Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	1.189 (1.294)		1.121 (1.291)	
Hope to MPP	-1.694* (1.017)	-1.094 (0.791)	-0.956 (0.894)	-0.350 (0.616)
Hope to MPP × Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	0.644 (0.754)		0.677 (0.755)	
Pride to MPP	-0.313 (1.392)	-0.039 (1.218)	-0.734 (1.022)	-0.356 (0.747)
Pride to MPP × Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	0.360 (0.842)		0.396 (0.845)	
Anger to SP	-0.509 (1.499)	-0.858 (1.058)	-1.247 (1.293)	-1.498** (0.729)
Anger to SP × Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	-0.433 (1.142)		-0.226 (1.180)	
Fear to SP	-0.347 (1.635)	-0.953 (1.334)	-1.888 (1.465)	-2.065** (0.976)
Fear to SP × Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	-0.881 (1.112)		-0.409 (1.172)	
Hope to SP	2.025** (0.989)	1.150 (0.794)	1.833** (0.842)	0.892 (0.593)
Hope to SP × Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	-1.008 (0.695)		-0.974 (0.694)	
Pride to SP	1.437 (1.949)	0.068 (1.678)	0.704 (2.008)	-1.038 (1.639)
Pride to SP × Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	-1.735 (1.532)		-1.836 (1.530)	
Fear to RP × Like: MPP Party	-0.002 (0.099)	0.021 (0.099)		
Anger to RP × Like: MPP Party	0.024 (0.096)	0.003 (0.096)		
Hope or Pride to RP × Like: MPP Party	0.206 (0.168)	0.201 (0.166)		
Anger or Fear to MPP × Like: MPP Party	0.137 (0.165)	0.157 (0.165)		
Hope to MPP × Like: MPP Party	0.144 (0.108)	0.135 (0.108)		
Pride to MPP × Like: MPP Party	-0.040 (0.145)	-0.039 (0.147)		
Anger to SP × Like: MPP Party	0.047 (0.145)	0.041 (0.144)		
Fear to SP × Like: MPP Party	0.051 (0.184)	0.050 (0.183)		
Hope to SP × Like: MPP Party	-0.026 (0.105)	-0.024 (0.105)		
Pride to SP × Like: MPP Party	0.041 (0.197)	0.043 (0.201)		
Fear to RP × Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic		0.304 (0.357)		0.332 (0.356)
Anger to RP × Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic		-0.097 (0.361)		-0.101 (0.361)
Hope or Pride to RP × Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic		1.073 (0.671)		1.196* (0.676)
Anger or Fear to MPP × Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic		0.138 (0.761)		0.156 (0.755)
Hope to MPP × Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic		-0.204 (0.416)		-0.248 (0.418)
Pride to MPP × Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic		-0.257 (0.457)		-0.274 (0.461)
Anger to SP × Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic		-0.378 (0.644)		-0.496 (0.670)
Fear to SP × Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic		0.872 (0.670)		0.721 (0.727)
Hope to SP × Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic		-0.841** (0.365)		-0.812** (0.363)
Pride to SP × Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic		-0.540 (0.771)		-0.516 (0.773)
Fear to RP × Like: Strategic Party			-0.118 (0.090)	-0.105 (0.091)
Anger to RP × Like: Strategic Party			0.030 (0.090)	0.011 (0.090)
Hope or Pride to RP × Like: Strategic Party			-0.045 (0.165)	-0.059 (0.162)
Anger or Fear to MPP × Like: Strategic Party			-0.084 (0.160)	-0.079 (0.157)
Hope to MPP × Like: Strategic Party			0.042 (0.106)	0.032 (0.106)
Pride to MPP × Like: Strategic Party			-0.005 (0.114)	-0.015 (0.118)
Anger to SP × Like: Strategic Party			0.191 (0.139)	0.188 (0.138)
Fear to SP × Like: Strategic Party			0.299* (0.177)	0.277 (0.173)
Hope to SP × Like: Strategic Party			-0.004 (0.100)	0.015 (0.101)
Pride to SP × Like: Strategic Party			0.171 (0.208)	0.213 (0.217)
Constant	-0.568 (0.947)	-0.962 (0.799)	-1.149 (0.917)	-1.575** (0.739)
Log likelihood	-692.020	-691.090	-690.934	-690.651
N	1732	1732	1732	1732

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 4.5 Comparison of Base and Interactive Models

	Model 2	Model 16
Age	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Gender	0.173 (0.136)	0.163 (0.138)
Interest in General Election	0.217** (0.103)	0.235** (0.103)
Affiliated	-0.501*** (0.150)	-0.517*** (0.152)
Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic	-0.861*** (0.164)	-0.439* (0.233)
Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner	0.545* (0.280)	-0.159 (0.387)
Like: MPP Party	-0.399*** (0.059)	-0.397*** (0.059)
Like: Strategic Party	0.414*** (0.054)	0.414*** (0.055)
Like: Rival Party	-0.062 (0.042)	-0.058 (0.042)
Anger or Fear to MPP	0.300 (0.328)	0.229 (0.330)
Hope to MPP	-0.152 (0.184)	-0.182 (0.184)
Pride to MPP	-0.408** (0.206)	-0.430** (0.209)
Anger to RP	0.191 (0.170)	-0.977** (0.468)
Fear to RP	-0.005 (0.157)	-0.017 (0.158)
Hope or Pride to RP	-0.564* (0.303)	-0.588* (0.306)
Anger to SP	-0.550** (0.266)	-0.565** (0.266)
Fear to SP	-0.646** (0.300)	-0.608** (0.302)
Hope to SP	0.975*** (0.167)	0.955*** (0.167)
Pride to SP	0.374 (0.346)	0.367 (0.346)
Anger to RP \times Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner		1.517*** (0.560)
Hope to SP \times Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic		-0.816*** (0.315)
Constant	-1.606*** (0.591)	-1.076* (0.621)
Log likelihood	-700.755	-693.646
N	1732	1732
AIC	1442	1431
BIC	1551	1551

Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 4.8 Conditional Marginal Effects: WE: Front Runner- MPP




Figure 4.9 Conditional Marginal Effects: WE: Rival-Strategic




Figure 4.10 Predicted Probabilities: Anger towards Rival




Figure 4.11 Predicted Probabilities: Hope Towards Strategic




Figure 4.8 and 4.10 represent the predicted probabilities and conditional marginal effects of anger towards the rival party respectively. As predicted probabilities il-

lustrate, there is no statistically significant effect of anger towards the rival party on strategic voting. On the other hand, the graph for conditional marginal effects shows the increasing difference between winning expectations for the front runner and the most preferred party increases the probability of strategic voting for respondents who are angry towards their rival party. This effect is not significant for those who do not feel anger towards their rival party.

4.7 Discussion

This chapter investigated in what ways emotion towards different parties, the most preferred, strategic, and rival parties, affects the probability of strategic voting. Also, it proposed an alternative approach to designate a counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters by applying the Naïve Bayes and k-NN algorithms. By using the choices of strategic voters from BES Wave 4, 11, and 17, the party that sincere voters in Wave 4 would vote for if they vote strategically was designated. Since the k-NN classification ensured an 87 % accuracy rate in initial analyzes to assess success rates, it was applied to determine the counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters. Furthermore, a discussion was provided about the designation of the most preferred party. By looking at the data, this chapter presented the problem of a non-correspondence between the affiliated and most liked party. To alleviate this problem, the respondents that have different most liked and affiliated parties were excluded from the sample of the analyzes.

The first part of the analysis is a test for whether the emotions affect the voting calculus of potential strategic voters. The conditional logistic regression analysis provided evidence that anger and pride towards the most preferred party affect the voting calculus. People who are angry towards their most preferred party are less likely to vote for their most preferred party even though the utility that they get from voting for their sincere party increases. On the other hand, people are more prone to voting for their most preferred party if they have felt pride towards their MPP when the utility from this vote is low. Results of the conditional logistic regression model also reveal that hope towards the strategic options increases a individuals' probability of voting for this option.

The second part analyzed the effect of emotions towards MPP, strategic and rival parties on the probability of strategic voting by employing series of logistic regressions. Results show that anger towards the strategic party increases the probability of strategic voting, whereas anger towards the most preferred party diminishes the

likelihood of voting strategically. Nevertheless, fear towards neither strategic nor the most preferred party affect the probability of strategic voting. Regarding positive emotions, as was expected, pride towards the most preferred party decreases the probability of strategic voting; yet, hope does not significantly affect the likelihood of strategic voting. This finding matches with the result of conditional logistic regression, which uses the utility as the interaction of normalized winning expectations and normalized feeling thermometers for parties. On the other hand, hope, but not pride, for a strategic party increases the probability of strategic voting. Among them, hope towards the strategic party is the one that has a substantial effect on the probability of strategic voting.

Furthermore, the second part investigated the conditional effects of emotions on the probability of strategic voting. The results reveal that emotions do not affect the impact of party preferences, but they might affect the impact of the winning expectations on the probability of strategic voting. The effect of the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the front runner and the winning expectation for the most preferred party on the probability of strategic voting increases if people are angry towards the rival party. In other words, people who are angry towards their rival party divert their attention to this difference more. Moreover, a more substantive effect is observed in hope towards the strategic party. If people have felt hope towards the strategic party, the effect of the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the strategic party and the winning expectation for the rival party is higher compared to those who do not feel hope towards their strategic party.

Overall, this chapter delved into a relationship that has diverted scant scholarly attention. Further studies may explore the relationship between strategic voting and emotions in different contexts where strategic structure, strategic consideration, and tactics differ. Furthermore, the turnout might be added to the choice set of individuals to understand the impact of emotions. For the theme of this study, this chapter provides us evidence about the effect of emotions towards multiple subjects on a political decision. Also, it attempted to contribute literature by analyzing the effect of stored emotions on political behavior. By doing so, it offers evidence for the multi-facet nature of emotional experience and the effect of these experiments on the political decisions of individuals

5. CONCLUSIONS

Across the chapters, the central task of this study is to attempt to explore individuals' plurality of emotional experience in the political landscape. Three chapters investigated the effect of this plurality on different dependent variables standing for political decisions and judgment. Also, they have dug into a different aspect of plurality in emotional experience. The table below is a summary of the chapters in accordance with the overarching theme of this study.

Table 5.1 Summary of Chapters

Chapter	Concept of Emotion	Type of Plurality	Dependent Variable
Chapter 1	Stored Emotions	Interaction of emotions towards the same object/subject	Perception for frequency of facing fake news
Chapter 2	Instant Emotions	Interaction of emotions towards the same object/subject	Credibility of frame
Chapter 3	Stored Emotions	Emotions towards different object/subjects	Strategic voting

The research question of the first chapter was in what ways the interaction of the emotions towards an emotionally loaded event affects the perception of people about the frequency of facing fake news related to this event. In this chapter, the subject of emotions was the High Electoral Court of Turkey's (HEC) decision to renew the İstanbul mayoral elections in 2019 due to electoral irregularities. The election, which was held on 31 March, was renewed on 23 June upon this decision of HEC. This decision of HEC was an emotionally loaded event for voters, irrespective of their party affiliation. As descriptives for stored emotions indicated, anger, anxiety, and hope aroused at high levels in response to the decision of HEC. The dependent variable of the chapter was the perception of the frequency of facing fake news. The plurality of emotional experience under investigation was the interaction of discrete emotions towards the same object/subject. More precisely, the interactions of stored anger, anxiety, and hope towards the decision of HEC were the focus in terms of the plurality of emotional experience.

As the contribution to the dependent variable, this chapter might provide several

insights. Instead of people's perception of particular news, the chapter focused on the general perception of people about the fakeness of the news related to a particular event. Also, it provides evidence for the effect of hope as discrete emotion on assessing the fakeness of the news.

The chapter employed the statistical analyses of a survey conducted between 31 March and 23 June elections by Istanbul Policy Center of Sabancı University to test the hypotheses. Cumhur alliance's supporters, whose anger towards the opposition and hope at high levels simultaneously result from HEC's decision, perceive higher frequency about facing incorrect news. This combination has a greater impact than the high level of single-headed anger and hope. On the other side, a high level of anger single-handedly increases opposition's supporters' perceived frequency of facing incorrect news. Also, the combination of anger towards HEC and anxiety has a positive and significant effect; yet, the effect is not distinguishable from the effect of single-headed anger. Additionally, anger towards the incumbent diminishes the negative effect of anxiety on the perceived frequency of facing incorrect news for opposition supporters. By these results, the chapter provided evidence for the interactions of the emotions in the same and opposite expected directions.

The second chapter asked in what ways eliciting instant emotions simultaneously alters the credibility of a frame. The plurality of emotional experience was investigated by focusing on instant emotions' interaction with different objects/subjects. In this regard, the case of the chapter was the Syrian refugees, and the instant emotions under investigation were anger and compassion. By following the good old interest towards simultaneous elicitation of these two emotions, this chapter provided the first experimental evidence, to my knowledge, for the subject matter. Despite its limitations in many respect, it provided weak but promising results. Attempting to simultaneous elicitation of anger and compassion decreases the credibility of the frame in comparison to attempting to elicit only compassion.

Alongside increasing the number of participants, a systematic pilot study, in which whether participants were aware of the framer's attempt, especially for attempting to elicit anger, might improve the validity and reliability of the experimental study. Although "attempting to elicit" was integrated as the empirical concern, there was no question directly measuring it. The reason is that such a question in the post-test after asking respondents the emotion they felt when they read the frame might motivate them to answer this question in conjunction with their answer to the question for their emotions in response to the frame. Thus, to solve the dissonance in their answers to these questions, they might coordinate their answers, asking two different phenomena. Therefore, not to add such a question was a decision under

this trade-off. Nevertheless, as was indicated, a pilot study would be a solution.

The last chapter delved into the question of in what ways stored emotions towards political parties affect individuals' probability of strategic voting. The plurality of emotional experience under investigation referred to the emotions towards different objects/subjects, which are the political parties that have a special status in the choice set of voters. These parties were the most preferred party, the strategic party, and the rival party. The statistical analyses were utilized by using British Election Studies (BES) survey.

Besides providing evidence for the plurality in emotional experience as a general theme of this study, this chapter also attempted to contribute the dependent variable by investigating a potential correlate of strategic voting. The chapter might also contribute to the literature on the nexus between voting behavior and emotions. As an instance of voting behavior, strategic voting implies the abandonment of focal predisposition, the affiliation towards the most preferred party. In conjunction with this, one of the backbones of research on emotions in political psychology is the relationship between emotions and reliance on predispositions. Also, this chapter proposes a potential solution for the problem of designating a counterfactual strategic party for the sincere voter, the party that a sincere voter votes for if she would decide to vote strategically, by applying two classification algorithms, namely Naïve Bayes and k-Nearest Neighbors.

Series of statistical analyses provided several important findings. When people are angry towards their most preferred party are less likely to vote for their most preferred party even though their utility from voting for their sincere party increases compared to strategic options. On the other hand, people are more likely to vote for their most preferred party if they have felt pride towards their MPP; when the utility from the sincere vote is low. Also, the results reveal that emotions do not affect the impact of the level of party preferences. However, they affect the impact of the winning expectations on the probability of strategic voting. If people are angry towards the rival party, they are more prone to voting strategically if the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the front runner and the winning expectation for the most preferred party is high. Nevertheless, a more substantive effect is observed in hope towards the strategic party. If people have felt hope towards the strategic party, the effect of the difference between respondents' winning expectation for the strategic party and the winning expectations for the rival party decreases.

Findings from three substantial chapters with different dependent variables standing for political decisions and judgments have given reason to contemplate the plurality

in emotional experiences. This plurality surrounds the political sphere of individuals, and there is much to explore. The effect of emotions on the arousal of each other and each others' effect on political decision and judgment are well beyond to be a backbencher in the literature. If people feel multiple emotions towards multiple subjects/objects regarding a political issue, not only each of these emotions but also their effect on each other and their combined effect on subject matter should be investigated. That's to say if we analyze the relationship between the probability of participating in a protest and emotions, the emotions towards major issues and parties in the party system, and the potential impact of the interaction of these emotions should be considered. Regarding this, the gap does not reveal itself only for empirical studies. There is also a scant theoretical discussion around the Affective Intelligence Theory and Cognitive Appraisal Theories. Therefore, to approach the empirical reality of emotions, theoretical contemplation supported by empirical investigations is required.

Additionally, the effect of interactions should be investigated for different dependent variables in different contexts, particularly under different structures, institutions, and cultures. For instance, a dependent variable that might be affected by the interaction of anger towards the aggressor and compassion towards the victim might be evaluating the status of or a policy for minorities in a country. Regarding the context, the impact of the interaction of anger and compassion might differ in a context where people are not directly affected by the status of immigrants, for example, in a country where the immigration level is low. In such a case, the negative effect of anger might be upside down. Or, in a context in which the welfare state provisions are well-structured and egalitarian, the effect of this interaction might change. Additionally, the level of ethnic heterogeneity of the country might change the impact of this interaction. In this regard, the effect of the interaction of emotions might be quadratic instead of linear, which might provide another aspect of the analysis of emotions.

The scope of exploration might not be limited to analyzing different dependent variables or combinations of emotions and the attributes of the context. Room for theoretical innovations may reveal by focusing on this plurality of the concepts of emotions. For instance, further studies might scrutinize the interaction of stored emotions and instant emotions on political decisions and judgment. There are intriguing questions to answer. In what ways stored emotions impact the arousal of instant emotions? Whether stored emotions alter the impact of instant emotions on political decisions and judgment? Similarly, the interaction between emotional disposition and instant emotions and emotional disposition and stored emotions might attract scholarly attention. Also, another intriguing issue that might give a more

theoretical understanding of emotions is the difference between primed emotions and instant emotions. Whether they are the same in their nature? Whether the causal mechanisms that ensure their effect on behavior and judgment are same? By asking these questions, a more comprehensive picture of individuals' emotional experiences in the political domain can be depicted as one of the primary determinants of political behavior and judgment.

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APPENDIX A

Descriptives

Figure A.1 Sex




Figure A.2 Religiosity




Figure A.3 Income Level




Figure A.4 Education Level




Figure A.5 Interest in Politics




Table A.1 Hope and Anger towards HEC: Supporters of Cumhur Alliance

		Hope					
Anger:HEC		Not at all	2	3	4	Too much	Total
	Not at all	15	23	37	80	157	312
	2	3	8	6	3	2	22
	3	4	4	9	5	3	25
	4	9	6	6	8	4	33
	Too much	9	5	0	1	8	23
	Total	40	46	58	97	174	415

Table A.2 Hope and Anger towards Incumbent: Supporters of Cumhur Alliance

		Hope					
Anger: Incumbent		Not at all	2	3	4	Too much	Total
	Not at all	18	25	40	85	163	331
	2	6	10	6	5	7	34
	3	3	2	10	2	1	18
	4	8	5	2	5	1	21
	Too much	6	5	0	0	3	14
	Total	41	47	58	97	175	418

Table A.3 Hope and Anger towards Opposition: Supporters of Cumhur Alliance

		Hope					
Anger: Opposition		Not at all	2	3	4	Too much	Total
	Not at all	13	9	4	35	53	114
	2	3	9	3	5	6	26
	3	5	5	11	11	2	34
	4	11	8	18	17	15	69
	Too much	9	16	22	29	99	175
	Total	41	47	58	97	175	418

Table A.4 Anxiety and Anger towards HEC: Supporters of Opposition

		Anxiety					
Anger: Incumbent		Not at all	2	3	4	Too much	Total
	Not at all	15	1	2	3	3	24
	2	1	1	2	0	1	5
	3	2	3	9	9	0	23
	4	14	16	15	35	7	87
	Too much	44	44	35	55	157	335
	Total	76	65	63	102	168	474

Table A.5 Anxiety and Anger towards Incumbent: Supporters of Opposition

		Anxiety					
Anger: Incumbent		Not at all	2	3	4	Too much	Total
	Not at all	13	3	1	3	3	23
	2	2	1	3	5	0	11
	3	5	4	11	6	3	29
	4	11	14	14	40	3	82
	Too much	45	43	34	48	159	329
	Total	76	65	63	102	168	474

Table A.6 Anxiety and Anger towards Opposition: Supporters of Opposition

		Anxiety					
Anger: Incumbent		Not at all	2	3	4	Too much	Total
	Not at all	39	28	27	42	103	239
	2	20	18	12	23	5	78
	3	4	6	11	6	8	35
	4	8	9	10	20	3	50
	Too much	5	4	3	11	49	72
	Total	76	65	63	102	168	474

APPENDIX B

Balance Tables

The mean of each variable in the analyzes by groups and the absolute value of the t-statistics for comparison of the means by groups can be found in the graph below.

Table B.1 Balance Table

	Group 1	Group 2	Difference (t-statistic)
Anger towards Syrian government	2.66	2.77	0.11 (0.42)
Anger towards Syrian opposition	2.97	2.68	0.29 (0.98)
Compassion towards Syrian refugees	2.39	2.57	0.18 (0.92)
Political Interest	2.95	2.81	0.14 (0.7)
Support for sending Syrian refugees back	3.55	3.88	0.33 (1.34)

The mean of each variable stands for the emotions in response to the frame by groups, and the absolute value of the t-statistics for comparison of these means by groups can be found in the graph below.

Table B.2 Emotions in response to Frames

	Group 1	Group 2	Difference (t-statistic)
Anger towards Syrian government	3.29	3.02	0.27 (1.35)
Anger towards Syrian opposition	2.62	2.44	0.18 (0.7)
Anger towards Syrian refugees	1.7	1.81	0.11 (0.54)
Compassion towards Syrian refugees	3.04	2.76	0.28 (1.48)

A Complementary Analysis: Differences in the Stored and Instant emotions:

The following bivariate OLS regressions are complementary analyses to investigate the difference between the level of stored emotion and the level of the same emotion in response to frame. More specifically, the first analysis investigates the difference between the level of stored anger towards the Syrian government the level of the same emotion in response to frame. In the second one, the emotion is compassion towards the Syrian refugees. The aim is to see to what extent the level of instant emotions in response to frame differs the level of stored emotions depending on the assigned group of participants. So the question is to what extent the experimental

manipulation elicits emotions if we consider the stored emotions as base levels. The relationship between the stored emotions and instant emotions can be analyzed by mediation analysis so by the interaction of these emotions. However, the low number of participants may cause biased estimates

Results of bivariate OLS regression reveal that the difference between stored compassion and instant compassion towards Syrian refugees is significantly higher for participants who are assigned to read the compassion frame. Also, the difference between stored anger and instant anger towards the Syrian government is significantly higher for participants who are assigned to read the compassion frame at $p < 0.1$ level. These results give weak but intriguing evidence that the second frame decreases the level of compassion that participants feel towards Syrian refugees as well as the level of anger towards the Syrian government if we consider the stored emotions as base levels for emotional experience.

Table B.3 OLS Regressions

	Model 1 (Difference: Anger towards Syrian Govenment)	Model 2 (Difference: Compassion towards Syrian Refugees)
Group	-0.426* (0.236)	-0.400** (0.190)
Constant	1.101*** (0.365)	1.050*** (0.301)
R2	0.046	0.054
N	69	80

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Experiment

Figure B.1 Experiment: Pre-test Questions(1)

Sabancı Üniversitesi Araştırma Projesine Katılım Onam Formu

Baş Araştırmacı: Özge Kemahlioğlu

Yardımcı Araştırmacı: Faruk Aksoy

Bu çalışmanın amacı: Bu çalışma Suriye meselesi ile ilgili duygularla bu konu hakkında bilgi alma isteği arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemek amacıyla yapılmaktadır.

Katılımcıdan beklenenler: Deney yaklaşık olarak 5 dakikanızı alacaktır ve üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölümde sizden beklenen yöneltilen soruları cevaplamanızdır. İkinci bölümde Suriyeli mültecilerle ilgili bir metni okumanız beklenmektedir. Son bölümde ise bir dizi soru daha cevaplamanız istenmektedir.

Deney sırasında katılımcılardan şu konular hakkındaki soruları cevaplamaları beklenmektedir.

Siyasete ilgi ve siyasi katılımları

Suriye meselesi ile ilgili duyguları

Bilgi alma istekleri

Okuyacakları bir metnin sonunda o metin hakkındaki fikirleri.

Çalışmada risk ve katılımcıları rahatsız edebilecek hususlar:

Deneyde öngörülen herhangi bir risk ya da rahatsızlık yaratması beklenen bir unsur bulunmamaktadır. Deney sırasında isim, soy isim, kimlik numarası gibi bilgilerinizi vermeniz gereken hiçbir soru ile karşılaşmayacaksınız. Ayrıca verileriniz anonim olarak toplanacak ve anonim olarak saklanacak, başka hiç bir kurum ya da kuruluşla paylaşılmayacaktır. Araştırmanın sonuçları bireysel değil toplu olarak değerlendirilerek kullanılacaktır.

Deneye katılım karşılığı herhangi bir ödeme yapılmayacaktır. Deney ile ilgili sorularınız için Faruk Aksoy ile 05355181622 numaralı telefondan ya da afaruk@sabanciuniv.edu e-posta adresinden, Özge Kemahlioğlu ile ozge.kemahlioglu@sabanciuniv.edu e-posta adresinden iletişime geçebilirsiniz. Eğer haklarınızın herhangi bir şekilde ihlal edildiğini düşünüyorsanız lütfen Sabancı Üniversitesi Araştırma Etik Kurulu Başkanı Prof. Mehmet Yıldız ile (216) 483-9010 numaralı telefondan ya da meyildiz@sabanciuniv.edu e-posta adresinden iletişime geçiniz.

Bu onam formunu doldurarak, bu çalışmaya katılmayı kabul ettiğinizi belirtmiş oluyorsunuz.

☐ Onaylıyorum (1)

☐ Onaylamıyorum (2)

Figure B.2 Experiment: Pre-test Questions(2)

Yaşınız ? Lütfen aşağıdaki kutucuğa yazınız



Cinsiyetiniz ?

- ☐ Kadın (4)
- ☐ Erkek (5)
- ☐ Belirtmek istemiyorum (6)

Şu an bir üniversitede öğrenci misiniz?

- ☐ Evet (1)
- ☐ Hayır (2)

Figure B.3 Experiment: Pre-test Questions(3)

Genel olarak aşağıdaki sosyal medya platformlarını ne sıklıkla kullanıyorsunuz?

	Hiç (1)	Nadiren (2)	Zaman zaman (3)	Genelde (4)	Çok sık (5)	Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (6)
Twitter (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Instagram (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Youtube (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Twitch (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
TikTok (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Genel olarak siyasetle ne derece ilgilisiniz?

- ☐ Hiç ilgili değilim (1)
- ☐ Pek ilgili değilim (2)
- ☐ Biraz ilgiliyim (3)
- ☐ Oldukça ilgiliyim (4)
- ☐ Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (6)



Figure B.4 Experiment: Pre-test Questions(4)

Genel olarak düřündüğünüzde aşağıdaki kaynaklardan ne sıklıkla siyasi haberleri takip edersiniz?

	Hiç (1)	Çok seyrek (2)	Zaman zaman (3)	Sıklıkla (4)	Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (5)
Televizyon (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Basılı Gazete/Dergi (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Radyo (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Online haber siteleri (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Twitter (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Instagram (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
YouTube (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Podcast (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Diğer (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Figure B.5 Experiment: Pre-test Questions(5)

Aşağıda toplumdaki farklı kesimlerce Türkiye'deki en büyük sorunlar arasında sayılan konular listelenmiş durumda. Siz bu sorunları ne kadar önemli buluyorsunuz ?

	Oldukça önemsiz (1)	Önemsiz (2)	Ne önemli ne önemsiz (3)	Önemli (4)	Oldukça önemli (5)	Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (6)
Ekonomik sorunlar, hayat pahalılığı (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Eğitim (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
İşsizlik (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Terör (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Kürt sorunu (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Uluslararası güçlerin Türkiye'ye müdahalesi (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suriyeli Mülteciler (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Pandemi (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Kadın cinayetleri (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dış Politika (10)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Diğer (11)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Figure B.6 Experiment: Pre-test Questions(6)

Türkiye'deki Suriyeli mültecilerin ülkelerine geri gönderilmesi ile ilgili kamuoyunda süregelen bir tartışma var. Siz Suriyeli mültecilerin ülkelerine geri gönderilmesini savunan görüş hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz ?

- ☐ Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum (1)
 - ☐ Katılmıyorum (2)
 - ☐ Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum (3)
 - ☐ Katılıyorum (4)
 - ☐ Kesinlikle Katılıyorum (5)
 - ☐ Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (6)
-

Figure B.7 Experiment: Pre-test Questions(7)

Genel olarak Suriyeli mülteciler meselesi/konusu ile ilgili aşağıda listelenmiş duyguları ne ölçüde hissettiğinizi belirtebilir misiniz?

	Hiç (1)	Biraz (2)	Fazla (3)	Çok fazla (4)	Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (5)
Suriye rejimine öfke (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suriye'deki muhaliflere öfke (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetine öfke (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Müdahil olan diğer ülkelere öfke (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suriyeli mültecilere öfke (10)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suriyeli mültecilere karşı acıma/merhamet (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suriyeli mültecilerden korku (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suriye meselesi ile ilgili endişe (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suriye meselesi ile ilgili umut (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Diğer (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Figure B.8 Experiment: Pre-test Questions(8)

2018 yılında yapılan genel seçimlerde oy kullanma şansınız oldu mu?

- ☐ Evet oy kullandım (1)
 - ☐ Hayır oy kullanmadım (2)
 - ☐ Geçersiz/Boş oy kullandım (3)
 - ☐ Seçmen değildim (4)
 - ☐ Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (5)
-

2019 yılında yapılan yerel seçimlerde oy kullanma şansınız oldu mu?

- ☐ Evet oy kullandım (1)
 - ☐ Hayır oy kullanmadım (2)
 - ☐ Geçersiz/ Boş oy kullandım (3)
 - ☐ Seçmen değildim (4)
 - ☐ Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (5)
-

Önümüzdeki genel seçimlerde oy kullanma ihtimalinizi aşağıdakilerden hangisi en iyi açıklar ?

- ☐ Kesinlikle oy kullanmayacağım (1)
- ☐ Muhtemelen oy kullanmayacağım (2)
- ☐ Belki kullanırım belki kullanmam (3)
- ☐ Muhtemelen kullanacağım (4)
- ☐ Kesinlikle kullanacağım (5)
- ☐ Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (6)

Figure B.9 Experiment: Group 1

Grup 1 metni

Aşağıdaki metin "korkudan korku" olarak adlandırılan bir kavram üzerine yazılmıştır. Metni okuduktan sonra lütfen aşağıdaki kutucukta bulunan ok işaretine tıklayınız.

İç savaşın insan psikolojisinde yarattığı uzun dönem tahribatlardan biri "korkudan korku" dur. Korku, insanlar kendilerini tehdit altında hissettiklerinde ortaya çıkar, bu tehdit ortadan kalktığına ise yok olur. Ancak korkudan korku, tehdit ortadan kalksa ya da azalsa dahi korkunun devam etmesi durumuna verilen isimdir.

Bu duyguyu daha iyi tarif edebilmek için, aşağıdaki metin, eşini iç savaşta bir bombalama sırasında kaybetmiş, 3 çocuğu ile Suriye'den kaçıp Türkiye'deki mülteci kamplarından birine sığınmış bir kadın ile yapılan röportajdan alınmıştır:

" Hissettiklerimi tarif etmek çok zor. Öyle çok şey yaşadık, etraftan o kadar çok şey duyduk ki. 2 yıl boyunca her an birileri gelip beni ve çocuklarımı öldürecek korkusuyla yaşadım. Komşularımdan biri Suriye'den çıkış için aracılık yapan bir adam tanıdığını, ona para verip Türkiye'ye gideceklerini söyledi. Allah onlardan razı olsun elimde kalan son paranın üstünü tamamladılar da Esad'ın zulmünden kaçıp Türkiye'ye geldik. Geldik ama çocuklarım hala çok kötü durumda. Ortanca olanı geceleri yatağını ıslatıyor ve titreyerek, baba diye haykırarak uyanıyor. Büyük olanı, kızım Leyla, bütün gün yataktan dışarı çıkmıyor, en ufak bir gürültüde yorganının altına girip ağlamaya başlıyor. Hama'dan (Suriye'de bir şehir) kurtulduk ama çocuklarım hala Suriye'de yaşıyor."

İç savaştan kaçıp Türkiye'ye sığınmış Suriyeli mültecilerle yapılan bunun gibi röportajlar, sorunun büyüklüğünü gözler önüne seriyor. Suriyeliler, içinde bulundukları iç savaş şartları dolayısı ile her an hissettikleri bu korku ile yaşamak zorundalar. Bu durum, tüm sivil Suriyelilerde, ama özellikle de çocuklarda, derin travmalara sebep oluyor. Bu çocuklar savaştan kurtulmuş olsalar da, şahit oldukları şiddetin izlerini hayat boyu taşımak zorunda kalacaklar.

Figure B.10 Experiment: Group 2

Grup 2 metni

Aşağıdaki metin "korkudan korku" olarak adlandırılan bir kavram üzerine yazılmıştır. Metni okuduktan sonra lütfen aşağıdaki kutucukta bulunan ok işaretine tıklayınız.

İç savaşın insan psikolojisinde yarattığı uzun dönem tahribatlardan biri "korkudan korku" dur. Korku, insanlar kendilerini tehdit altında hissettiklerinde ortaya çıkar, bu tehdit ortadan kalktığında ise yok olur. Ancak korkudan korku, tehdit ortadan kalksa ya da azalsa dahi korkunun devam etmesi durumuna verilen isimdir.

Bu duyguyu daha iyi tarif edebilmek için, aşağıdaki metin, eşinin iç savaşta bir bombalama sırasında kaybetmiş, 3 çocuğu ile Suriye'den kaçıp Türkiye'deki mülteci kamplarından birine sığınmış bir kadın ile yapılan röportajdan alınmıştır:

" Hissettiklerimi tarif etmek çok zor. Öyle çok şey yaşadık, etraftan o kadar çok şey duyduk ki. 2 yıl boyunca her an Esad'ın adamları ya da diğer gruplardan birileri gelip beni ve çocuklarımı öldürecek korkusuyla yaşadım. Komşularımdan biri Suriye'den çıkış için aracılık yapan bir adam tanıdığını, ona para verip Türkiye'ye gideceklerini söyledi. Allah onlardan razı olsun elimde kalan son paranın üstünü tamamladılar da Esad'ın zulmünden kaçıp Türkiye'ye geldik. Geldik ama çocuklarım hala çok kötü durumda. Ortanca olanı geceleri yatağını ıslatıyor ve titreyerek, baba diye haykırarak uyanıyor. Büyük olanı, kızım Leyla, bütün gün yataktan dışarı çıkmıyor, en ufak bir gürültüde yorganının altına girip ağlamaya başlıyor. Hama'dan (Suriye'de bir şehir) kurtulduk ama çocuklarım sanki hala Suriye'de yaşıyor."

İç savaştan kaçıp Türkiye'ye sığınmış Suriyeli mültecilerle yapılan bunun gibi röportajlar, Suriye rejiminin ve diğer grupların acımasızlığını gözler önüne seriyor. Esad rejimi ve diğer silahlı gruplar, tüm evrensel değerleri yok sayarak Suriyeli sivilleri acı ve korku içinde yaşamak zorunda bırakıyor. Yani savaş yine savaşa sebep olanların değil masumların canını yakıyor. Şiddet, işkence ve tecavüze maruz kalanların çektikleri acılar bir yana, tüm Suriyeliler, özellikle de çocuklar, derin psikolojik travmalar yaşıyorlar ve de yaşayamaya devam edecekler. Bu çocuklar savaştan kurtulmuş olsalar da, şahit edildikleri şiddetin izlerini hayat boyu taşımak zorundalar.

Figure B.11 Experiment: Post-test Questions(1)

Okuduđunuz metinde geen “korkudan korku” sizce bir birey iin ne derecede ciddi bir psikolojik sorundur ?

- ☐ Hi ciddi bir sorun deđildir (1)
 - ☐ Pek ciddi bir sorun deđildir (2)
 - ☐ Biraz ciddi bir sorundur (3)
 - ☐ ok ciddi bir sorundur (4)
 - ☐ Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (5)
-

Okuduđunuz mlakatta Suriyeli kadının anlattıkları size ne kadar inandırıcı geldi ?

- ☐ Hi inandırıcı gelmedi (1)
 - ☐ Pek inandırıcı gelmedi (2)
 - ☐ Biraz inandırıcı geldi (3)
 - ☐ ok inandırıcı geldi (4)
 - ☐ Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (5)
-

Okuduđunuz mlakat, Suriye i savaşı zerine doktora tezi yazan bir arařtırmacının alıřmasından uyarlanmıřtır. Tez hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak ve daha fazla mlakata ulařmak ister misiniz ?

- ☐ Evet isterim (1)
 - ☐ Hayır istemem (2)
 - ☐ Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (3)
-

Figure B.12 Experiment: Post-test Questions(2)

Metni okurken aşağıda listelenmiş duyguları ne ölçüde hissettiğinizi belirtebilir misiniz ?

	Hiç (1)	Biraz (2)	Fazla (3)	Çok fazla (4)	Cevap yok/Fikrim yok (5)
Suriye rejimine öfke (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suriye'deki muhaliflere öfke (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suriyeli mültecilere öfke (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suriyeli mültecilere acıma/merhamet (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suriye meselesi ile ilgili endişe (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Diğer (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

APPENDIX C

Descriptive

Figure C.1 Age




Figure C.2 Gender




Figure C.3 Affiliation




Figure C.4 Like: Most Preferred Party




Figure C.5 Like: Rival Party




Figure C.6 Like: Strategic Party




Figure C.7 Distance in WE: MPP-Front Runner






Figure C.8 Distance in WE: Rival-Strategic



Predicted Probabilities: Strategic Parties(Utility)

Figure C.9 Predicted Probabilities: Strategic Parties(Utility)



Predictions for Counter- Factual Strategic Party for Sincere Voters

This section is reserved for the explanation, procedures, and results of the counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters. By employing Naïve Bayes and k-NN classification algorithms, five-party voters, namely Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, United Kingdom Independence Party, and Green Party, will be included in the analysis. In fact, the dataset includes the voters of the Scottish National Party and Palyd Cumru. Yet, some questions in the survey were not asked by respondents in Scotland and Wales. Therefore, they will be excluded from the analyses. Also, all respondents from constituencies from Scotland and Wales were excluded from the data. Overall, by using the hypothetical mindset of strategic voters, the strategic party that the sincere voters would vote for will be determined.

Before explaining the details of Naïve Bayes and k-NN classifications, the predictors for the classifications should be elaborated. The winning expectations of voters for parties are generated from the question in the survey that asks respondents their expectations about the winning probability of each party in their constituency. So, respondents assigned the probability of winning for each major party in the elections. Their answers will be used as a proxy for their expectation for a chance for each party to win the election in their constituency. Nevertheless, the given probabilities for the parties by them rarely add up to the 1. To handle this issue, each respondents' winning expectations for parties will be normalized. As the second set of predictors, the feeling thermometers of respondents for parties will be used. In the survey, respondents answered a set of questions that asks them how much they like each party. The scale of the answer is 0 to 10. The answer to these questions will be used as their level of preference to the given party.

Turn to the algorithms. Naïve Bayes algorithms depend on the Bayes theorem. Bayes theorem uses the probability of events that have happened to estimate the probability of another event's occurrence. In sum, the Bayes formula is applied to find the probability of an event conditional on the probability of another event; so, the probability of B's occurrence is given the probability of A's occurrence. By using this formula, the Naïve Bayes algorithm classifies an event with given predictors. In our case, the algorithm uses the probabilities of a set of respondents winning expectations and feeling thermometers for the parties and their voting choices; the algorithm will attempt to predict another set of respondent's voting choices by given winning expectations and feeling thermometers for the parties.


The following is the procedure for the Naïve Bayes classification. First, the sincere party will be excluded from the choice set of respondents. Thus, the available choices

will include four parties other than the respondents' most preferred party. Then, the respondents who plan to vote strategically are split into training and testing sets. The Naïve Bayes algorithm will be constructed by using the training set. Next, this algorithm will be applied to the testing set consist of the remaining strategic voters. This initial process aims to determine the accuracy rate of the algorithm in terms of the success of classification. Since we already know the strategic party of strategic voters, we can compare the accuracy of classification by comparing the actual strategic party and predicted strategic party. After estimating the accuracy rate, the data will be splitting into strategic and sincere voters. Strategic voters will constitute the training set, and sincere voters will constitute the testing set. The algorithm will be constructed with the strategic voters and then will be applied to predict the counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters.

The second classification method to designate counter-factual strategic party is the k-Nearest Neighborhood (k-NN) algorithm. k-NN classifies the observations with respect to their similarity. The algorithm defines each observation as a data point and classifies it regarding its distance to the nearest neighbor data points with respect to the given predictors. In other words, the prediction for an observation is made by k-NN by comparing the similarity of a particular data point, let's say A, in the testing set with the data points in the training set. The class of A is determined as the class of the data point, which has the lowest Euclidean distance with A. The critical decision in the k-NN algorithm is the number of neighbor data points whose distance with the A will be calculated. In this regard, the k denotes the number of neighbor points that the algorithm search for. The best way to determine this number is the cross-validation method by which the k providing the highest accuracy can be found. The procedure for classification is the same as with Naïve Bayes.

Before going through predictions, an explanation regarding the sample of predictions should be noted. In the sample to assess the accuracy of the prediction and in training set for the algorithms to predict counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters, respondents in Wave 11 and Wave 17 of BES who intended to vote strategically will be included to increase the number of observations. BES Wave 11 was a pre-election survey that was conducted in 2017. BES Wave 17 is also a pre-election survey that was conducted in 2019. Strategic voters from these two waves are sampled with the exact same procedure explained above for Wave 4. The following graph illustrates the distribution of strategic votes by the waves.

Figure C.10 The Number of Respondents in Sample



The first set of predictions is made by using the Naïve Bayes classification. Before running the algorithm, the most preferred party of the respondents is excluded from the prediction as a voting option. Also, the fifth most preferred party was excluded because cast a vote for this party is a violation of necessary conditions for strategic voting. The predictors were the normalized feeling thermometers values and normalized winning expectations for three parties, namely the second most preferred party, third-most preferred party, and fourth most preferred party. The procedure for predictions is the following. Firstly, the strategic voters were split into training and testing as 70% to 30%. By constructing an algorithm from the training set, the aim is to predict the vote choice of the respondents in the testing set. Since the actual vote choice of the strategic voters corresponds to their strategic party, we can detect the accuracy rate of the classification. In this regard, the confusion matrix of the classification is pictured below.

A confusion matrix represents the prediction accuracy by illustrating correct and failed predictions. In this case, the rows represent the actual voting choice of the respondents, whereas the columns stand for the predictions for the voting choice. Meanwhile, the main diagonal of the matrix illustrates the number of correct predictions. The remaining cells show incorrect predictions for the given actual voting choice. The accuracy rate is equal to the number of correct predictions divided by the total number of predictions. Thus, the accuracy rate of the Naïve Bayes

prediction for vote choice of the strategic voters is 84 %.

Table C.1 Confusion Matrix: Naive Bayes

Prediction	Reference		
	Second MPP	Third MPP	Fourth MPP
Second MPP	732	64	13
Third MPP	47	184	18
Fourth MPP	13	20	10

After assessing the accuracy rate, the next step is to predict the counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters. For this purpose, all strategic voters were put into the training set, and all sincere voters were put into the testing set. The results of the predictions were saved and coded as the counter-factual strategic vote for sincere voters.

The second set of predictions were made by applying the k-Nearest Neighborhood method. Similar to the Naïve Bayes classification, the strategic voters are split into training and testing set in the first run to assess the accuracy rate of the prediction. The fifth most preferred party was excluded again because of the violation of necessary conditions for strategic voting. The predictors were again the normalized feeling thermometers values and normalized winning expectations for three parties. As was indicated earlier, the number of neighbors, the k, is better to be determined by the cross-validation, and the value of k should be set as the number which gives the highest accuracy rate. In this respect, the following graph represents the accuracy rates for each value of the "k." As can be observed, 13 is the value for the k that assures the highest prediction power. The accuracy rate of the prediction is approximately 87 %, and the confusion matrix is represented below.

Figure C.11 The Best "k"




Table C.2 Confusion Matrix: k-NN

		Reference		
Prediction		Second MPP	Third MPP	Fourth MPP
	Second MPP	743	67	15
	Third MPP	48	185	16
	Fourth MPP	1	15	10

After assessing the accuracy rate, the strategic voters and sincere voters split from each other. Strategic voters constitute the training set, whereas sincere voters include in the testing set. The algorithm estimated by the patterns of strategic voters was applied to predict the counter-factual vote choice of sincere voters. The results of the prediction are saved as another alternative for the counter-factual strategic party for sincere voters. Since k-NN has a higher accuracy rate, the predictions of it will be used in the models.