PREDICTORS OF COMPETITIVE VICTIMHOOD BELIEFS IN TURKEY'S KURDISH CONFLICT: TURKISH AND KURDISH GROUP CONTEXT

by
CEREN KAVAL

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ABSTRACT

PREDICTORS OF COMPETITIVE VICTIMHOOD BELIEFS IN TURKEY'S KURDISH CONFLICT: TURKISH AND KURDISH GROUP CONTEXT

CEREN KAVAL

Conflict Analysis and Resolution M.A. THESIS, JULY 2021

Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Sabahat Çiğdem Bağcı

This study aims to contribute to the competitive victimhood literature by examining mechanisms that motivate groups with asymmetric relations to claim ingroup has suffered more than the outgroup. To that end, the research attempts to test outgroup trust, which has been tested as an antecedent of competitive victimhood in various conflict contexts, and relatively less studied drivers, which are moral defensiveness, narcissistic and non-narcissistic ingroup attachments as predictors of competitive victimhood. Further, the moderation effect of perceived intergroup conflict and group status on the association between the proposed predictors and competitive victimhood has been measured. An online survey was conducted with 381 respondents (Turkish= 230, Kurdish=151, 54% females, 44% males, M_{age}= 32.37, SD_{age}= 11.36). The findings suggest that collective narcissism and moral defensiveness predicted competitive victimhood while outgroup trust and ingroup satisfaction did not significantly predict competitive victimhood beliefs. Perceived intergroup conflict moderated only the association between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood. Further, Turks and Kurds in the sample reported different patterns of competitive victimhood. For Kurds, increased ingroup satisfaction was associated with lower levels of competitive victimhood, whereas competitive victimhood levels did not change in relation to ingroup satisfaction among Turks. The association between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood was stronger among Kurdish respondents. Moreover, Kurds who reported secure ingroup positivity reported lower levels of competitive victimhood, but this association was not significant for Turks. Lastly, higher moral defensiveness was associated with higher competitive victimhood among both groups, but for minorities, this association was more pronounced. The results were discussed in relation to social identity theory, collective victimhood, and competitive victimhood literature.

ÖZET

TÜRK VE KÜRT ETNİK GRUPLARI BAĞLAMINDA REKABETÇİ
MAĞDURİYETİN YORDAYICILARI

CEREN KAVAL

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Rekabetçi Mağduriyet, Kolektif Narsisizm, Gruplararası
Çatışma, Kürt Sorunu, Gruplararası Çatışma

Bu çalışma, asimetrik ilişkilere sahip grupları, iç grubun dış gruptan daha fazla zarar gördüğünü iddia etmeye motive eden mekanizmaları inceleyerek rekabetçi mağduriyet literatürüne katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla, araştırma, çeşitli çatışma bağlamlarında rekabetçi mağduriyetin öncülü olarak test edilen dış grup güvenini ve rekabetçi mağduriyetin yordayıcıları olarak ahlaki savunmacılık, narsisistik ve narsistik olmayan grup içi bağlılıklar gibi nispeten daha az çalışılmış etkenleri test etmeye çalışır. Ayrıca, algılanan gruplararası çatışmanın ve grup statüsünün önerilen öncüller ile rekabetçi mağduriyet arasındaki ilişki üzerindeki ılımlayıcı etkisi ölçülmüştür. 381 katılımcı ile çevrimiçi bir anket yapılmıştır. Bulgular, kolektif narsisizm ve ahlaki savunuculuğun rekabetçi mağduriyeti öngördüğünü, dış grup güveni ve iç grup memnuniyetinin rekabetçi mağduriyet inançlarını önemli ölçüde öngörmediğini göstermektedir. Algılanan gruplar arası çatışmanın ılımlayıcı rolü, yalnızca kolektif narsisizm ve rekabetçi mağduriyet arasındaki ilişkide görülmüştür. Kürtler için, artan iç grup memnuniyeti, rekabetçi mağduriyetin daha düşük seviyeleri ile ilişkilendirilirken, Türkler için benzer bir ilişkiye rastlanmamıştır. Kürt katılımcılar arasında, kolektif narsisizm rekabetçi mağduriyeti daha güçlü yordamıştır. Ayrıca, iç grup memnuniyeti yüksek olan Kürtler, daha düşük düzeyde rekabetçi mağduriyet bildirirken bu ilişkinin Türkler için anlamlı olmadığı görülmüştür. Son olarak, daha yüksek ahlaki savunmacılık, her iki grup arasında daha yüksek rekabetçi mağduriyet ile ilişkilendirilmiş, ancak azınlık etnik grup üyeleri için bu ilişkinin daha belirgin olduğu bulunmuştur. Sonuçlar, sosyal kimlik teorisi, toplu mağduriyet ve rekabetçi mağduriyet literatürü çerçevesinde tartışılmıştır.

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To those who fight extraordinary evil every day

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1.   INTRODUCTION

In the last 50 years, the world has witnessed a revival of armed conflicts in places where conflicts have been terminated or defined as 'frozen'. This trend has led to the re-investigation of the potential mechanisms and strategies involved in conflict resolution. A top-down approach to conflict resolution coupled with a negative interpretation of peace has led to the preservation of communal grievances. Therefore, especially in intra-state conflicts, the termination of violence may not heal the wounds of communities and may not provide a solid ground for reconciliation. Rubin and Kim (1994, 5) defined conflict as "perceived divergence of interest or a belief that the parties" current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously". In the same vein, Fisher (1990, 6) defined conflict as a "social situation involving perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two or more parties, attempts by the parties to control each other, and antagonistic feelings by the parties toward each other". Both definitions underline the subjective evaluations of the circumstances and emphasize the role of perceptual and cognitive functions in the conflict eruption, escalation, and continuation. Therefore, any effort of conflict resolution should particularly account for the transformation of the relational aspect of conflicts.

Although conflicts are an integral part of human life, destructive societal conflicts overshadow the possible positive social outcomes towards reconciliation (i.e., social change toward equality and justice). Especially, long-term conflicts alter how people understand, interpret, and act on specific situations (Bar-Tal 2011). Accordingly, individuals face loss of meaning and stressing stimulus in the context of prolonged conflicts (Bar-Tal 2011; Bar-Tal et al. 2009). It is rarely the case where parties and root causes of the conflict are unhindered to conflicting groups. Likewise, the duration and asperity of the conflict are uncontrollable components for the layperson (Fisher 1990). Therefore, individuals in these settings have to cope with stress, ambiguity, and meaning loss. In these contexts, individuals question the reasons for conflict eruption, intentions of the "enemy," and formulate societal beliefs to satisfy a cognitive need to give meaning to the world (Bar-Tal et al. 2009). Societal beliefs

construct a positive self-image for the group and delegitimize the adversary through negative labels and downward comparisons (Bar-Tal et al. 2009). Conflicting groups are influenced by the expectations of each other (Deutsch 1987) and reciprocate in terms of their perceptions and cognitions of each other (Fisher 1990). As a result, collectives that endure violence construct victimhood beliefs around the violent experiences. These victim beliefs underline that the harm inflicted by the adversary is intentional and targets the in-groups as a whole (Noor et al. 2017). Hence, the defensive position that originates from the experience of collective victimhood has negative ramifications for intergroup relations (Hirschberger and Ein-Dor 2020).

In this sense, competitive victimhood refers to each group's effort to claim that it has suffered more than the outgroup (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a, 483). This competitive behavior is associated with attitudes that may obstruct initiatives for co-existence and rapprochement in divided societies. These attitudes are; lower support for forgiveness (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a) and reconciliation (Shnabel and Nadler 2008), and greater tendency to deny ingroup responsibility (Noor et al. 2012). Competitive victimhood literature primarily focuses on the consequences of competitive victimhood (e.g., Hewstone et al. 2006; Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a) and intervention methods (e.g., Andrighetto et al. 2012; Shnabel and Nadler 2008; SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, and Halabi 2015). Only a few research papers have analyzed the role of ingroup identification, outgroup trust, empathy (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a), an accusation of ingroup harm doing (Sullivan et al. 2012), and power needs (Kahalon et al. 2018) as predictors of competitive victimhood.

This study seeks to contribute to this literature and extend it by shedding light on mechanisms that motivate groups to engage in competitive victimhood. Therefore, this thesis aims to contribute to competitive victimhood literature by analyzing individual-level precursors. Furthermore, it aims to examine whether groups with asymmetric relations experience competitive victimhood in a similar manner. To that end, it utilizes data from self-identified Turkish and Kurdish citizens of Turkey. The research proposes four factors that may motivate individuals to engage in competitive victimhood: trust in outgroup, narcissistic ingroup attachment (collective narcissism), secure ingroup attachment (ingroup satisfaction), and moral defensiveness. To the best of my knowledge, previous research has not looked yet into the link between these variables and competitive victimhood.

In order to understand the role of ingroup attachment and whether different kinds of ingroup attachments have various implications in terms of competitive victimhood endorsement, I have measured collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction. In ad-

dition, outgroup trust that the previous studies have accounted for is also included in the study. Different from previous studies, trust is measured within the context of conflict rather than generalized trust. Moreover, the association between moral defensiveness has been tested. With this variable, I aimed to explain the association between the group's moral self-evaluation and competitive victimhood, and secondly, the other perceived moral stance and competitive victimhood. Considering the findings of previous literature on the moderating effect of perceived intergroup conflict on the association between self-categorization and negative out-group behavior(Jackson 2002), this study analyzes the moderating role of perceived intergroup conflict on the relationship between proposed predictors and competitive victimhood. Lastly, previous literature on majority and minority status group relations suggests that minority status groups encounter stigmatization and negative attitudes toward the ingroup more than majority status groups in daily occurrences (Major and O'Brien 2005). Nevertheless, as demonstrated by competitive victimhood literature, majority status groups who are less willing to question their privileged position (Tropp and Pettigrew 2005), also often compete over the sufferings (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a; Sullivan et al. 2012). Thus, to understand whether majority and minority groups differ in their motivations of competition over sufferings, this study employs ethnic group as a moderator variable.

Therefore, the current research aims to find an answer to the following research questions: Which factors are associated with the majority and minority status groups' competitive victimhood beliefs in the context of Turkish- Kurdish relations? Do outgroup trust, moral defensiveness, ingroup satisfaction, and collective narcissism predict competitive victimhood? Does perceived intergroup conflict moderate the relationship between outgroup trust, moral defensiveness, ingroup satisfaction, collective narcissism, and competitive victimhood? Does the ethnic group moderate the effects of outgroup trust, moral defensiveness, ingroup satisfaction, and collective narcissism on competitive victimhood?

The thesis is composed of five main chapters. The first chapter aims to analyze the current literature on competitive victimhood and its possible predictors. Therefore, the chapter reviews the literature on, social identity approach to intergroup conflict, collective victimhood beliefs, and competitive victimhood studies. The last section of the literature review offers an insight into Turkey's Kurdish question. It presents the findings on Turkish-Kurdish intergroup relations within the framework of the three strands of literature mentioned. In chapter two, building on the literature, I state my theoretical expectations and propose a conceptual model on predictors of competitive victimhood. The following chapter outlines the survey design, participants, procedures, and the survey questionnaire in detail. This chapter is followed

by the empirical analysis of the data. The study's findings and limitations are discussed in the last chapter, and further research directions are suggested.

2.   LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Social Identity and Intergroup Conflict

In the 1960s and early 1970s, much of the work on intergroup relations in social psychology was focused on interpersonal and individual level processes such as frustration aggression (e.g., Dollard et al. 1939) and authoritarian personality to explain prejudice (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950) (Hornsey 2008). Further, critical intergroup processes were analyzed, emphasizing attitudes towards outgroup (e.g., Berkowitz 1965; Berkowitz and Rawlings 1963; Tajfel 1974). By criticizing previous literature, Tajfel (1974) underlined the need for a theory that accounts for the bidirectionality of a causal link between the ingroup and the outgroup. Tajfel (1974) argues that human behavior ranges on a spectrum from being purely interpersonal to purely intergroup, and adoption of social behavior at one end of the spectrum is bounded by the social conditions. In this respect, the group is defined as "a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and their membership of it" (Tajfel and Turner 2001[1979], 40). Thus, social identity is defined as "individual's self-image that derives from social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging" (Tajfel and Turner 2001[1979], 40). Thus, Tajfel and Turner (2001[1979]) argues that all social groups acquire meaning by comparing the ingroup to other groups. Tajfel and Turner (2001[1979]) identify the need for a positive and secure self-concept as the driving factor behind this competitive behavior (social comparison).

As underlined by Tajfel and Turner (2001[1979]), social identification is a twofold process in which first, one should define the self as a member of a group and secondly should be recognized by the others as part of a social category. Individuals may choose to identify with specific labels or minimize the importance of the label for

the self (Brewer 2001). Moreover, Brewer (2001, 21) underlines that, differently from ingroup membership, ingroup identification bares a degree of "sacrifice of an autonomous self-concept," and thus, identification is by far not an initial consequence of group membership. However, why people choose to identify with a group in the first place is one of the main questions widely analyzed in the literature. Tajfel and Turner (2001[1979]) propose that individuals derive self-image and emotional significance from membership to a social group. Thus, they argue that people aim to maintain and enhance self-esteem and a positive sense of self. Several other motivations have been addressed in the literature, such as maximal differentiation from outgroups (Turner 1982; Turner et al. 1987), the optimal distinction between assimilation and inclusion (Brewer 1993, 1991), uncertainty reduction (Hogg 1996; Hogg and Abrams 1993), ego protection, and ego enhancement (see six distinct motives listed by Clary et al. 1998).

2.1.1 Outgroup Trust

The literature on social identity also addresses trust and identity association. In intergroup conflicts, "trust is one of the first casualties" (Hauss 2017, 133), yet it is simultaneously essential to de-escalate the conflict. Rothbart and Park (1986) argue that considerably more actions were required to affirm trustworthiness, whereas considerably fewer were required to disprove it. Social psychology studies in this context suggest that individuals are more likely to trust members of an ingroup than outgroup (Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner 2002; Tropp 2006; Voci 2006). Individuals trust insiders more than outsiders when they perceive an ingroup/outgroup divide (Tajfel 1970; Yuki et al. 2005). In the same vein, Stolle (1998) demonstrated that members with strong ingroup trust hold low outgroup trust. When trust is only restricted to the ingroup, distrust may lead to competitive intergroup relations (Kelley and Stahelski 1970); thus, a "self-fulfilling cycle of competitiveness" originates (Brewer 2001, 31). Moreover, Tanis and Postmes (2005) demonstrated that trusting behavior is founded on group membership when individual attributions are not identifiable. Thus, group membership strongly and independently predicted trusting behavior (Tanis and Postmes 2005). Social categorization offers a mechanism to reduce risks of cooperation (Brewer 2001) and relevance of interpersonal distinction (Turner et al. 1987). Positive evaluations and expectations of the ingroup motivate cooperative behavior and trust among group members (Brewer 2001; Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000). Thus, social identity, clear group boundaries, and perceived ingroup homogeneity endorse positive attitude and trust toward ingroup (Brewer 1991, 2001). While this positive attitude does not always entail low trust in

the outgroup; (Brewer (2001) argues that outgroup attitudes are characterized by indifference), trust has been known to structure a variety of aspects of intergroup relationships.

2.2 Intergroup Conflict

Does "us" and "them" division necessitate conflict? The existing literature on social identity's role in intergroup relations varies in their answers to the matter. When Sumner's (2019) concept of ethnocentrism is analyzed under the ingroup-outgroup dimension, it is possible to see that Sumner also links ingroup with loyalty, pride and superiority while correlating these sentiments with outgroup hatred and hostility (Brewer 1999). Sherif's (1966) view of intergroup relations (i.e., Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT)) underlines a similar conflict expectation but adds an interest dimension to the equation. Thus, RCT proposes that conflicts are rational in a way that real threat and conflict of interest evoke outgroup hostility and ingroup solidarity (Fisher 2000). Tajfel and Turner (2001[1979]), on the other hand, proposed that the presence of an outgroup is merely enough to provoke competitive or discriminatory responses in the ingroup. For instance, Billig and Tajfel (1973) conducted an experiment in a small group context. Researchers demonstrated that when participants randomly allocated to groups and asked to assign points to members of the ingroup and outgroup, they tended to give more points to ingroup members. Diehl (1990) demonstrated that the bias is evident in a case in which participants know that the outgroup fairly treats ingroup. Thus, ingroup bias was salient even there was no prior conflict, competition, conflict of interest, hostility, frustration, or relative deprivation (Diehl 1990).

Whereas Allport (1954) and Brewer (1999) underline that the ingroup attachment and outgroup behavior are independent of each other, Allport also (1954) proposed that although the ingroup is central to one's identity formation and attitude development, ingroup positivity does not entail outgroup hostility. Similarly, Brewer (1999) argued that ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity are two distinct phenomena and do not systematically correlate (e.g., Brewer 1979; Hinkle and Brown 1990; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). Further, Brewer (2001) indicated that the positive evaluation of the ingroup is not an automatic by-product of encountering with the outgroup and vice versa, and intergroup conflict and ingroup identification are associated only under certain conditions (i.e., moral superiority, perceived threat, common goals, shared values, and social comparison) (Brewer 1999). In the

same vein, contrary to Tajfel et al. (1971) findings at minimal intergroup contexts, Mummendey et al. (1992) demonstrated that when group members were asked to allocate negative outcomes and costs, individuals were reluctant to harm the outgroup. In another study, participants were found to favor the outgroup if they think their share is allocated by the outgroup (see also Karp et al. 1993; Rabbie, Schot, and Visser 1989). From another perspective, Hinkle and Brown (1990) argued that low self-esteem predicts ingroup bias, and ingroup bias raises self-esteem (Rubin and Hewstone 1998). Ingroup bias may determine judgments and attitudes towards outgroup such that outgroup members are likely to be seen as aggressors (Rogers and Prentice-Dunn 1981) and less likely to be assisted in times of uncertainty (Frey and Gaertner 1986; Gaertner, Dovidio, and Johnson 1982).

Taken together, ingroup bias research based on minimal group paradigm has been criticized as overlooking the interdependent and dynamic aspect of social groups, unfit to capture the complexity of intergroup dynamics of real social categories (Hornsey 2008). Although there is an extensive literature on the relationship between ingroup positivity and outgroup hostility, (e.g., Frey and Gaertner 1986; Gaertner, Dovidio, and Johnson 1982; Hinkle and Brown 1990) studies offer contradictory findings on the significance, direction of the relationship, and whether the effect is positive or negative. Therefore, it can be inferred that not all forms of ingroup love are consistently associated with outgroup hate.

2.3 Collective Narcissism and Ingroup Satisfaction

Differently from prior concepts of ingroup positivity (e.g., Brewer 1999; Hinkle and Brown 1990; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989) collective narcissism aims to uncover a destructive form of ingroup love (Golec de Zavala 2011). Initially coined by Frankfurt School scholars who studied the conditions and processes that impel individuals to support right-wing populism and particularly the Nazi regime (e.g., Adorno 2005 [1963]; Fromm 1973), collective (group) narcissism has been introduced to resolve this inconsistency in the literature (Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, and Lantos 2019). Original work of Frankfurt school scholars equates collective narcissism with "national vanity" Adorno (2005 [1963], 171). Inspired by Freud's studies, Adorno (2005 [1963]) and Fromm (1973) argued that the loss of meaning and satisfaction at the individual level is compensated by the membership to a greater whole. Thus, collectively narcissist individuals are oriented to think on the power versus powerlessness axis and aim to avert threat to their image.

Golec de Zavala provides a contemporary definition of collective narcissism; "a belief that one's own group is exceptional and entitled to privileged treatment, but it is not sufficiently recognized by others" (Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, and Lantos 2019, 37). Consequently, collective narcissists constantly compare the ingroup with outgroups and experience a form of group-based affective relative deprivation (Golec de Zavala, Lantos, and Keenan 2021, 275). In contrast to Adorno's (1950) understanding, the recent definition of collective narcissism involves various social groups (i.e., small groups, ethnic groups, national groups, gender-based groups); the level of collective narcissism further depends on the specific intergroup context and ephemeral events (Golec de Zavala 2011). Therefore, the narcissistic group image, although viewed as superior to other groups, is context-dependent, fragile (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012), defensive in nature (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Iskra-Golec 2013), and requires acknowledgment and appreciation of others (Golec de Zavala 2011).

Collective narcissism characterized by hypersensitivity to signs of image threat (Golec de Zavala et al. 2016) and predicted by the interaction of a high private collective self-esteem (Golec de Zavala 2011; Golec de Zavala et al. 2009), low public self-esteem (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009), and defensive personal self-esteem Jordan et al. (2003). Perceived image threats surface and escalate collectively narcissistic beliefs. Thus, outgroup derogation may be stemming from symbolic (Guerra et al. 2020), real (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009), and distinctiveness threat (Golec de Zavala and Bierwiaczonek 2020), as well as an imagined threat (Golec de Zavala et al. 2016). Imagined threat refers to the cases in which hypersensitivity stemming from collective narcissism leads groups to perceive ambiguous acts and comments, otherwise debatable, as degrading and insulting (Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, and Lantos 2019). Bağcı et al. (2021) demonstrated that the association between threat and collective narcissism is significant in both ethnic majority-minority group status individuals. Moreover, this association, in turn, predicted greater intergroup bias. Golec de Zavala et al. (2016) demonstrated that cases in which an ingroup is denied membership to an international organization and face an unfavorable intergroup comparison, such as being reminded of an unpleasant moment in national history or a joke about their government, the situation is regarded as insulting by the respective groups and motivated them to support hostile actions.

Collective narcissists react to image threat with outgroup negativity (Cislak et al. 2020 [in press]). Thus, collective narcissism predicts outgroup hostility (Dyduch-Hazar, Mrozinski, and Golec de Zavala 2020, 2019; Golec de Zavala 2011; Golec de Zavala et al. 2009), enduring prejudice (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012; Lyons, Kenworthy, and Popan 2010), outgroup criticism (Golec de Zavala 2011; Golec de

Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, and Lantos 2019), outgroup derogation (Golec de Zavala and Lantos 2020), support for violence (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009), intergroup schadenfreude (Golec de Zavala et al. 2016), and direct retaliatory hostility (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Iskra-Golec 2013; Golec de Zavala et al. 2016) towards outgroup that is believed to threaten and undermine ingroup's image. Research has shown that collective narcissism motivates individuals to vote for populist parties (Golec de Zavala, Bierwiaczonek, Baran, Keenan, and Hase 2020; Marchlewska et al. 2018), being trapped into siege mentality (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012), and believing in conspiracy theories (Cichocka et al. 2016; Cichocka, Marchlewska, and De Zavala 2016; Golec de Zavala and Federico 2018). Groups that believe exaggerated greatness of their ingroup tend to vividly remember wrongdoings targeting the ingroup and oppose to forgive the outgroup (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012) that is perceived as the responsible party. Therefore, narcissistic ingroup love predicts hostile intergroup relations, and narcissistic beliefs may endure even when there is no active conflict between parties (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012).

Collective narcissism differs from other forms of ingroup attachment such as nationalism, ethnocentrism, blind patriotism, and ingroup glorification. Nationalistic belief underlines the supremacy of ingroup and refrains from seeking external validation (Kaufman 2020) and not necessarily conditions outgroup hostility. Unlike nationalist and ethnocentric beliefs, collective narcissist beliefs emphasize the vulnerability of their group image and target only those outgroups who threaten it (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012). Moreover, individuals can hold narcissistic beliefs about different social groups they belong to, yet only narcissistic attachment to one of them prevails (Golec de Zavala 2011). In the same vein, collective narcissism is similar to blind patriotism and ingroup glorification, in its focus on superiority and entitlement; however, unlike the two concepts, the fragility of public self-esteem increases outgroup hostility only for collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012).

More recent attention has focused on the mutually suppressing relationship between collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Iskra-Golec 2013). A number of studies showed that the two concepts have opposing effects on intergroup relations and especially when they are measured together - when their overlap is accounted for, a suppression effect occurs. Therefore, ingroup satisfaction, "a belief that the national ingroup and one's membership in it are of high value" (Federico, Golec de Zavala, and Baran 2020, 1), should be covaried out while analyzing the effects of collective narcissism and vice versa (Golec de Zavala 2011). Unlike narcissism, ingroup satisfaction is predicted by high self-esteem (Golec de Zavala, Federico, Sedikides, Guerra, Lantos, Mroziński, Cypryańska, and

Baran 2020) and is characterized by a non-narcissistic, secure ingroup positivity (Golecde Zavala, Cichocka, and Bilewicz 2013), positive affect (Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, and Lantos 2019), psychological well-being (Bağcı et al. 2021), and greater life-satisfaction (Golec de Zavala 2019*a*).

Moreover, ingroup satisfaction is associated with more positive attitudes towards outgroups such as; prosocial attitudes (Golec de Zavala 2011; Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, and Lantos 2019), solidarity with outgroup in cases of emergency (Federico, Golec de Zavala, and Baran 2020), tolerance towards refugees (Dyduch-Hazar, Mrozinski, and Golec de Zavala 2019), intergroup generosity (Golec de Zavala et al. 2016; Golecde Zavala, Cichocka, and Bilewicz 2013), and acknowledgment of past ingroup wrongdoings (Dyduch-Hazar, Mrozinski, and Golec de Zavala 2019). Hence, while collective narcissism represents the dark side of ingroup love, ingroup satisfaction is an ingroup positivity that does not necessarily harm outgroup attitudes and behaviors.

2.4 Collective Victimhood Beliefs

Experiences of World War II and crimes against humanity have heated the debates among social psychology scholars on prejudice and motives behind collective violence (Noor et al. 2017). Although the striking experiences of collective violence provoked the early research in the field, the studies were mainly centered around the perpetrator's perspective. Moreover, much of the early literature on victimhood was concerned with the moral aspect of victimhood (Burke 1955; Nietzsche 2004), characteristics of victimhood (Allport 1954), and consequences of collective violence on group entitativity (Staub 1989). Although these themes are still prominent in the field, more recent attention has focused on the psychological experience of the victim and the narratives around the victimhood (Green et al. 2017; Hirschberger and Ein-Dor 2020; Szabó 2020; Uluğ et al. 2020), trauma (Fassin and Rechtman 2009), acknowledgement (Bou Zeineddine and Pratto 2017; Twali and Vollhardt 2020; Vollhardt and Nair 2018) and other social-psychological consequences of victimhood such as effects of collective victimhood on cognition (Schori-Eyal, Klar, and Ben-Ami 2017), reconciliation and (Chapman 2007; Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008*a*), social justice (Klar, Schori-Eyal, and Tov 2020).

In the most general sense, "a victim is anyone who experiences an injury, loss, or misfortune as a result of some event or series of events" (Aquino and Byron 2002, 71). In addition to direct experiences of harm listed in Aquino and Byron's (2002)

definition, indirect (e.g., experiences of a community member, previous generation's experiences) and imperceptible experiences of violence such as structural violence (Galtung 1969) or psychological violence also provoke a sense of victimhood (Bar-Tal et al. 2009). Thus, Bar-Tal et al. (2009) argues that being a victim is accompanied by a lasting state of mind that reshapes affect, cognition, and behavior. Although the sense of victimhood is essentially a subjective experience, it requires social validation or sympathy of others to evolve into a status (Bar-Tal et al. 2009). Fundamentally, victims perceive the harmful actions of the perpetrator as unjust, unavoidable, and immoral. Therefore, the external locus of control (Bar-Tal et al. 2009) and moral superiority are prevalent in victimhood's ethos.

Collective victimhood can be defined as a subjective experience (Noor et al. 2017) and a social construal that emanates during or following collective violence that is "the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group—whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity—against another group or set of individuals, to achieve political, economic or social objectives" (Krug et al. 2002, 215).

Collective victimhood beliefs are rooted in and reinforced by different threat types; historical (e.g., Klar, Schori-Eyal, and Tov 2020; Klar, Schori-Eyal, and Klar 2013), future oriented-physical (e.g., Halperin, Porat, and Wohl 2013; Hirschberger, Pyszczynski, and Ein-Dor 2009), and future oriented-symbolic (e.g., Hirschberger, Pyszczynski, and Ein-Dor 2009; Pyszczynski et al. 2006). Similar to the individual level victimhood, collective victimhood does not require all members to be harmed or targeted evenly (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Krug et al. 2002). Moreover, victimhood beliefs are independent of the temporal (Mueller-Hirth 2017; Taylor et al. 2020; Vollhardt 2020*b*) or spatial proximity (Ahmed 2004; Vollhardt 2012) to the experience of harm. Indirect experiences and intangible right violations also form the basis of shared victimhood beliefs (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Vollhardt 2012). Victimhood beliefs can be dormant for a while or active throughout the history of the victimized group (Volkan 2001). All these aspects underline the intersectional nature of the victim's beliefs and experiences (Nair and Vollhardt 2019).

Regardless of the scope, dimension, or form of the violence, collective victimhood shapes intergroup relations (Schori-Eyal, Halperin, and Bar-Tal 2014). The empirical research on the effects of collective victimization can be categorized under positive (e.g., Cohrs, McNeill, and Vollhardt 2015; Klar, Schori-Eyal, and Tov 2020; McNeill and Vollhardt 2020; Szabó 2020; Vollhardt and Bilali 2015, inclusive victimhood;), and negative (e.g.,decreased outgroup trust; Hirschberger et al. 2017, 2016; Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008*a*; Schori-Eyal, Klar, and Ben-Ami 2017) ap-

proaches to the effects of collective victimhood. In the following section, the effects of collective victimhood are analyzed under three broad categories, which are effects on a)affect, b)behavior, and c)cognition.

2.4.1 Effects of Collective Victimhood on Affect

Several studies regarding the emotional consequences of self-perceived collective victimization reveal similar patterns of emotional reactions with individual-level victimization. Thus far, several studies have linked collective victimhood with increased vulnerability,and fear (Eidelson and Eidelson 2003; Wagner et al. 2003), hopelessness (Coleman and Lowe 2007), feeling of being trapped (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2006), feeling of inadequacy and shame (Rice and Benson 2005), anger toward outgroup (Pennekamp et al. 2007) and humiliation (Volkan 2001). For example, Rice and Benson (2005) argued that generations that inherit the collective humiliation of the Great Famine and its threat to self-esteem embraced rage and aggression as a shield. Although individuals reflect aggression as a defense mechanism, researchers note that the shame and rage cycle prone to feed and sustain chosen traumas.

Bar-Tal et al. (2009) indicated that group members tend to focus on the sufferings of the ingroup (i.e., egoism of victimhood); thus, there is a mutual endorsement between victimhood beliefs and lack of empathy towards the adversary group. Strikingly, Wohl and Branscombe (2008) have shown that group members who believe their ingroup have been victimized tend to feel less guilt about the harm-doings of the ingroup. Recognition of the victimhood status also affects the feelings towards other individuals and groups. Victimized groups express positive feelings towards those who acknowledge their victim status, empathize or support the ingroup, whereas they display negative feelings towards those who do not (Bar-Tal et al. 2009).

2.4.2 Effects of Collective Victimhood on Cognition

Collective victimhood has eminent implications on the collective's cognition (Bar-Tal et al. 2009). It provides a rigid perception of the self and the other (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Kaufman 2020) and aggravates perceived differences between the conflicting groups (Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Mijić 2020). The moral superiority of the status empowers victimized groups (Bar-Tal 2003; Bar-Tal et al. 2009). Therefore, victimized groups often act as less welcoming to outgroups (Sherif 1966). Collective victimization often heightens perceived collective threat among group members, di-

minishing cognitive capacity (Gordon and Arian 2001), increasing reliance on stereotypes (Pettigrew 2003; Stephan and Stephan 1985), increasing perceived outgroup homogeneity (Corneille et al. 2001) and intensified distrust, suspicion, and prejudice (Pettigrew 2003). Kramer and Messick (1998, 239) defined the distrust worldview as "collectively held beliefs, either false or exaggerated, that cluster around ideas of being harassed, threatened, harmed, subjugated, persecuted, accused, mistreated, wronged, tormented, disparaged, or vilified by a malevolent outgroup or out-groups". Thus, the roots of distrust among conflicting groups partly reflect the victimhood experiences and somewhat the antagonistic nature of intergroup relations. Coupled with victimization beliefs, distrust among conflicting groups may intensify the expectation that the adversary will deceive, mislead, manipulate or degrade the ingroup (Pettigrew 2003). Thus far, several studies have revealed a correlation between victimization and hostile worldview (Shamir and Shikaki 2002; Staub 1998). For instance, Palestinian and Israeli participants were asked to rate 11 historical events and judge whether the international community considers these events an act of terrorism. Shamir and Shikaki (2002) demonstrated that both communities believe that the international community is biased. Low-status participants hold higher levels of hostile world interpretation (Shamir and Shikaki 2002).

Concisely, experiences of collective victimization shape the group's perception of self and the other. These perceptions serve as funnels of information which group members evaluate new information and encounter with other groups (Schori-Eyal, Klar, and Ben-Ami 2017).

2.4.3 Effects of Collective Victimhood on Behavior

Previous studies have also explored the consequences of collective victimhood on individual and group behavior. Self-assigned victimhood status galvanizes the ingroup members and motivates them to take action (Bar-Tal 2003). This motivation might be originating from the fear of future harm, reoccurrence of a traumatic event, or clamor for revenge (Pettigrew 2003). The desire for retaliation and prevention of future harm can take many forms, such as organizing campaigns, protests, or support for political parties (Simon and Klandermans 2001), support for destructive policies (Maoz and Eidelson 2007), and disproportionate violence against the outgroup (e.g., vicarious retribution, Lickel et al. 2006; Maoz and Eidelson 2007; Stern et al. 1995). Additionally, victimhood beliefs excite displaced aggression (Eidelson and Eidelson 2003; Vollhardt 2009). In an experimental study, Wohl and Branscombe (2008) found that reminders of historical victimization perpetrated by another outgroup

increase the justification of violence against the current adversary group.

Moreover, framing ingroup violence as an act of retaliation legitimizes the ingroup's harm-doings, decreases collective guilt and threat to the group's morality (Branscombe and Miron 2004; Wohl and Branscombe 2008). In the same vein, Green et al. (2017) found that collective victimhood is positively associated with the social distance among both the ethnic minority Bulgarian Turks and the majority Bulgarians. This association is mediated by reduced collective guilt. On the other hand, acknowledgment of ingroup harm-doing decreases the social distance through heightened collective guilt (Green et al. 2017). Therefore, collective victimization unites the ingroup and motivates members to collaborate in the name of the collective. However, this consolidation is Janus-faced and might transform outgroup negativity into outgroup aggression, thus causing an escalation of an intergroup conflict.

2.4.4 Types of Collective Victimhood

The existing literature on the victimhood experiences and beliefs at the group level distinguishes three main types of collective victimhood beliefs: (1) inclusive victimhood beliefs, (2) exclusive victimhood beliefs, and (3) competitive victimhood beliefs.

2.4.4.1 Inclusive and Exclusive Victimhood Beliefs

There is a relatively small body of literature that is concerned with inclusive and exclusive victimhood beliefs. Bilali and Vollhardt (2019) defined inclusive victimhood beliefs as "consciousness, which entails acknowledging other groups' similar experiences of suffering" (98). Common victimhood identity, which is a re-categorization of ingroup's and outgroup's conflict experiences as a shared identity, refers to a similar phenomenon (Shnabel, Halabi, and Noor 2013).

Inclusive victimhood consciousness predicts positive intergroup outcomes such as prosocial actions (Vollhardt 2009), increased empathy (Eisenberg and Miller 1987; Klar, Schori-Eyal, and Klar 2013), sympathy (Karylowski 1976), emotional support (Yzerbyt et al. 2003) towards adversary group and perspective-taking with other groups (Galinsky, Ku, and Wang 2005; Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008*b*). Similar experiences of collective violence can motivate parties to acknowledge the outgroup's humanity (Staub et al. 2005), willingness to forgive, and reconciliation (González, Manzi, and Noor 2011; Noor et al. 2010). For instance, in their exper-

iment conducted with Jewish Israelis and Turkish Kurds, Adelman et al. (2016) have demonstrated that the inclusive victimhood narratives reduce perceived competitive victimhood, support for aggressive policies, and perceived conflict between the parties. Conversely, Cohrs, McNeill, and Vollhardt (2015) found no relation between inclusive victimhood and competitive victimhood in their study on conflict in Northern Ireland. Researchers argued that forms of inclusivity (i.e., selective and universal) play an essential role in this relationship (McNeill, Pehrson, and Stevenson 2017).

In contrast, exclusive victimhood beliefs are constructed upon the perceived distinctiveness of the ingroup's experiences (Bilali and Vollhardt 2013; Vollhardt 2009). Hence, members might compare the ingroup's conflict experiences with global scale sufferings or adversary's sufferings (e.g., competitive victimhood) to claim the uniqueness of their victimhood (Bilali and Vollhardt 2019). It is also important to note that inclusive and exclusive victimhood beliefs might coexist in a group context (Bilali and Vollhardt 2019). Thus, conflicting groups might perceive the outgroup as members of a greater victim group, while opposing the degree, nature, and extent of their suffering.

2.4.4.2 Competitive Victimhood Beliefs

As discussed in the previous section, conflicting groups construct different types of victimhood beliefs. In addition to inclusive and exclusive victimhood beliefs, groups may acknowledge the grievances of the outgroup and yet claim that the ingroup is 'the real' victim of the conflict. Competition in question can be over the extent, quantity of the victimhood, or the legitimacy of the suffering (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a,b). In the latter, groups might perceive their group has suffered the most, and their suffering is unfair due to the illegitimacy of acts of the outgroup. Hence in broad terms, competitive victimhood can be defined as the phenomenon in which parties in a conflict compete over the sufferings of their group. In other words, who has suffered most is contested (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a).

In the social psychology literature, several concepts similar to competitive victimhood have been coined, such as Bronfenbrenner's (1961) mirror image and Bar-Tal's (2003; 2007) societal beliefs in ingroup victimization. Coined by Noor and colleagues (2008), the concept of competitive victimhood contributes to the literature in several ways: a) combines two arguments which are inter-group relations are affected by competitive processes and prolonged conflicts shape group identities by a deep sense of victimhood; a) illustrates a shift in the meaning attached to victimhood

status; c) aims to highlight the motivation behind victimhood beliefs of high power groups in cases which outgroup is objectively suffered the most.

Competitive victimhood can function in several ways in ingroup and intergroup processes. Many recent studies have suggested that competitive victimhood is negatively associated with forgiveness, and positively associated with subjective evaluations of past violence (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a), ingroup cohesiveness (Volkan 2001) and ingroup mobilization (Bar-Tal et al. 2009). The strength of ingroup identification and outgroup trust mediates the relationship between competitive victimhood and group behavior (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a). It can be used to deny ingroup responsibility (Noor et al. 2012) and to gain moral-material support from third parties. In the same vein, Campbell and Manning (2018) argue that the victimhood culture brings about a tendency to seek the acknowledgment of a third party.

The antecedents and effects of competitive victimhood have been tested in several different conflict contexts such as Northern Ireland (Hewstone et al. 2006; Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a), Chile (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008b), Rwanda (Bilali and Vollhardt 2013), Israel-Palestine (Shnabel and Nadler 2008; SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, and Halabi 2015; Uluğ et al. 2020), USA (Saguy et al. 2013), Italy (Saguy et al. 2013), Indonesia (Mashuri et al. 2015), Kosovo (Andrighetto et al. 2012), Turkey-Armenia (Demirel and Eriksson 2020) and Turkey (Bağcı et al. [in press]; Uluğ et al. 2020) as well as different inter-group settings, including protracted conflicts, structural inequality and intra-minority intergroup relations (Young and Sullivan 2016).

Protracted conflicts have been characterized by ethnic or communal cleavages and lengthened nature (Azar 1985). Root causes of protracted conflicts involve denying fundamental human needs such as security, distinctive identity, and recognition (Azar 1985). Settlement of protracted conflicts are challenging if the involved parties have unequal power (Kriesberg 1993). Regardless of the power status, all groups involved in the conflict feel threatened by the adversary. Paradoxically, these groups live in close proximity to each other. The interactions between the parties are antagonistic, lack trust, and groups build up reciprocal negative images and a mutually exclusive sense of victimhood (Azar and Moon 1986). Bar-Tal (2013) lists prime examples of protracted conflicts, which are between Kurds and Turks in Turkey, Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, Israeli and Palestinians, Muslims and Hindus in Kashmir. In most of these prime examples, the presence of competitive victimhood has been demonstrated (see Bağcı et al. [in press]; Bilali and Vollhardt 2013; Hewstone et al. 2006; Uluğ et al. 2020). In this

context, the adversarial nature of the relations among the conflicting groups solidifies mutual negative images attributed to each side by the other (Azar and Moon 1986). Therefore, the sense of collective victimhood contributes to the vicious cycle of conflict and hinders any conflict resolution initiative.

Competitive victimhood beliefs may be stemming from different dimensions of suffering. Noor et al. (2012) list five dimensions: physical, material, cultural, psychological, and legitimacy. Groups may embrace one or more dimensions of suffering in their victimhood narratives and aim to gain acknowledgment as 'the real' victim of the conflict on the selected grounds.

In the first dimension, conflicting parties quantify suffering and compete over the severity and extent of ingroup suffering. Even groups that have committed large-scale atrocities tend to compete over the physical suffering (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a). For example, right-wing groups in Chile underline their physical suffering caused by leftist groups under Pinochet rule, even though the political Left was oppressed systematically and suffered extensively (Sznajder and Roniger 1999). Victimhood beliefs that entail material and cultural dimensions highlight structural violence (Galtung 1969) and ingroup's potential that could have been reached without the inequality, oppression, and deprivation. The former dimension underlines material discrepancies such as access to housing, education, and employment, while the latter focuses more on the loss of values, practices, and customs. Relative deprivation theory plays an essential role in understanding narratives constructed on this dimension (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a). As underlined in the collective victimhood section, collective victimization scars group members psychologically and alters their identity orientation. Competition over the psychological dimension of suffering may impact subsequent generations (Volkan 2001; Vollhardt 2020a). Lastly, groups may acknowledge the sufferings of the outgroup but insist on the legitimacy of the ingroup's suffering. Thus, groups frame adversaries' actions as criminal and unjust while claiming their acts as legal and well-grounded.

2.4.4.3 Motivations and Antecedents of Competitive Victimhood

Although victimhood, at both individual and group level, has been associated with face loss, shame, weakness, damaged honor (Campbell and Manning 2018), and negative stimulus on the identity needs (Bar-Tal 2003) in the literature, conflicting parties might claim the status of real victimhood. Moreover, high-status groups might also perceive the ingroup as the real victim of a conflict. They may claim victimhood, even in cases in which the high-status group perpetuates the majority

of conflict actions and systemically suppress minorities. Therefore, two questions emerge; Why do groups compete over a status that has been associated with threats to their identity? Why do high-status groups claim victimhood status when they are clearly identified as the perpetrators? The growing body of literature on competitive victimhood suggests four main factors respond to the stated questions. These factors are conflicting parties' understanding of morality, identity threat, distinct needs of conflicting groups, and lastly, the magnitude gap.

Morality and Competitive Victimhood

Killian (1985) traces the cultural transformation of group morality, which he refers to as stigma reversal. The concept highlights the perception shift in which high-status groups who are morally responsible for the victimization of low-status groups are no longer culturally exonerated. In the same vein, Campbell and Manning (2018) argued that a gradual shift in moral culture has contributed to the increasing embracement of victimhood status. The long-recognized culture of honor in which one's reputation has utmost importance, the culture of the face, and the culture of dignity based on social status have been challenged on the moral grounds by the higher virtue attributed to the victimhood (Campbell and Manning 2018). He summarizes the reversed roles as follows "if victimhood is a virtue, privilege is a vice" (Campbell and Manning 2018, 22).

The shift, as mentioned earlier, implies the moral inferiority of groups responsible for illegitimate harm doing and poses a social identity threat. The effects of accusations of ingroup harm on the threat perception of individuals were studied by Sullivan and colleagues (2012). Researchers have demonstrated that allegations of ingroup wrongdoing increase the threat perception of individuals, and among high-status groups, stigma reversal mediates this relationship. Several studies (e.g., Bar-Tal 2007; Noor et al. 2012) point out the rigid duality in moral judgments as an underlying mechanism of competitive victimhood. Gray and Wegner (2009) defined this cognitive process as moral typecasting. Hence, conflicting parties may be trapped into mutually exclusive classification agents and patients. The former possesses the capacity to do right or wrong while the latter is a passive recipient of any act (Gray and Wegner 2009). In this state of mind, only one group can be the actual victim or perpetrator of the conflict. The individuals and groups, in protracted conflicts, are closely intertwined, and perpetrator-victim division is not clear cut in most of the cases (Noor et al. 2017), and parties are inevitably stuck with mutually exclusive definitions of victim and perpetrator.

Bar-Tal et al. (2009) argued that ingroup moral entitlement and perceived collective victimhood are positively correlated. In this case, perceived collective victimization

can justify acts of the ingroup (Branscombe et al. 2015) and bring a moral upper hand to the low-status groups (Sullivan et al. 2012). Pettigrew (2003) stated that groups under threat or perceived threat often violate values upheld by their members. In this case, one method of normalizing value violations is to portray the ingroup as the historical and current victim of the outgroup, which is likely to 'swamp the ingroup from the homeland.'

Identity Threat and Upward Social Comparison

Victimhood constitutes a social identity threat that group members attempt to resist by upholding positive ingroup evaluations through social comparison (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008*a*). Noor et al. (2012) indicated that falling behind the outgroup regarding victimization creates a ground for upward comparison. For example, Pilecki and Hammack (2014) analysed Palestinian and Israeli youth discourses in a series of dialogue sessions and traced the social category construction. Their study is built on two themes, justification and victimization, which were predominant throughout the sessions. Palestinian participants constructed their community as victims while defining Israelis as aggressors to attain positive group and moral distinctiveness. In contrast, Israelis constructed two victim categories; in-group as the righteous victims and outgroup as justified victims to maintain positive ingroup identity (Pilecki and Hammack 2014).

On the contrary, Saguy et al. (2013) argued that groups' inclination to legitimize the status quo is not necessarily rooted in a feeling of relative deprivation or competition over suffering but instead in the perceived fairness of outgroup accusations. For example, when advantaged groups feel they are accused of ethnic and racial biases, group members legitimize the status quo. This attitude, in turn, hampers their willingness to address social inequality and increases competitive victimhood (Saguy et al. 2013).

Needs of Conflict Actors

Perpetrators and victims in a conflict face deprivation of different psychological resources, and thus they strive for different emotional needs (Shnabel and Nadler 2008). While victims' sense of power is deprived, perpetrators face the impairment of their public image. Hence, victims express the need for power while perpetrators carry a need for social acceptance. Restoration of these different needs increased the participant's willingness to reconcile (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008*b*; Shnabel and Nadler 2008; Shnabel et al. 2009).

Magnitude Gap

Perpetrators and victims diverge in their understanding of the severity of the aggression. This magnitude gap (Baumeister 1966 as cited in Noor et al. 2012) leads parties to construct different realities of the same matter. Thus, groups often minimize the pain of outgroups while overestimating the severity and legitimacy of their sufferings (Noor et al. 2012). In addition to the magnitude gap, individuals and groups tend to remember and narrate events that influenced them profoundly (Volkan 2001, 2002). Chosen traumas may fixate groups in a zero-sum understanding of the conflict. Thus, parties may prime emotional matters (e.g., face loss, honor, morality) over the material issues (e.g., political rights, economic reforms), seemingly admissible to negotiation (Volkan 2001). Under these conditions, parties are less likely to engage in prosocial behavior and empathy towards each other (Volkan 2001).

To summarize, the literature identifies four main factors that motivate conflicting groups to compete over victimhood status. These factors are views on morality and victimhood, identity threat originated from the need for a positive evaluation of ingroup, distinct needs of conflicting groups, and lastly, diverging construction of conflict narratives. Thus, groups may internalize victimhood as a distinct feature since it enables them to distance and differentiate themselves from their adversary. It offers a morally superior status; thus, the adversary is defined as inhuman and immoral. Moreover, victimhood status psychologically adapts groups to conflict conditions. Thus, groups may magnify experiences of ingroup and may perceive intergroup conflict more severe than its current conditions.

2.5 Turkish and Kurdish Intergroup Relations

The roots of the Kurdish Question can be traced back to the late Ottoman era (Kirişci and Winrow 1997), in which Kurds live under political entities with a considerable level of autonomy (Yeğen 1996). This autonomous status of Kurdish provinces was recognized until mid-1800, when the administrative reforms aimed to assert the center's dominance in the economy, politics, and administration (Yeğen 1996). The early republican approach to Kurdish identity can be divided into two eras. The first era was characterized by independence circumstances that aimed to mobilize all communities regardless of ethnic or religious identities. Thus, the first-era nationalism can be characterized as a mitigated version of Late Ottoman pan-Turkism. Throughout this period, a nation was defined as "people who share a common past,

desire to live together and willingness to uphold a common heritage" (Oran 1988, 130). Inspired by Renan (1990), this period's nationalism emphasized the spiritual and territorial view of the nation (Erimtan 2008). The second era that formulated the Turkish state's stance on Turkey's Kurdish problem for the future decades starts with mid-1920s and ends around the 1980s (Yeğen 1996). This period characterized by the denial of Kurdish identity, banning of cultural denominators of this identity (language, traditional clothing) (Ünver 2015), ethnic aspect of the Kurdish question, and framing the issue as the opposition of the periphery to modernization, tribal resistance and national integration (Güneş and Zeydanlıoğlu 2013; Yeğen 1996).

After the formation of PKK (*Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê*) in 1984 with demands to end bans and suppression that exponentially increased after the 1980 military coup, the conflict, and occasional rebellions, spiraled into an armed dimension. Several attempts to reach a negotiated settlement through unofficial talks (Özal 1990, Oslo Talks 2009) and ceasefires (one-sided ceasefires in 1993, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2005, 2006) (Çelik and Blum 2007; Çiçek 2017) resulted in re-escalation of the conflict each time. The most recent and officially announced attempt to resolve the conflict was initiated between 2013 and 2015. During the peace process, the tension between the primary parties increased due to a lack of agreement on; (1) the mechanisms of conflict resolution, (2) actors that will be involved, (3) agenda and issues to be addressed in the negotiations and lastly, (4) the extend and schedule of disarmament and withdrawal of PKK forces (Çiçek 2017). Turkey has witnessed the re-escalation of the conflict in South-Eastern Turkey and suppression of actors demanding societal peace (e.g., Academics for peace, banning of NGOs , restricted freedom of press and expression) once again after 2015 (Bayad and Aydemir 2020). Although the latest peace process was an essential step for the official recognition of the problem, creating a communication channel among parties and the formation of a legal structure (Çiçek 2017). However, multidimensional root causes of the Kurdish conflict have been hardly addressed by the political actors. Therefore, discussions and past peace initiatives did not address the societal and relational dimension of the conflict (Çelik 2015), where communities struggle with the past traumas and current violence.

The reflection traumas of the past and experiences of violence can be observed in the intergroup relation of Kurds and Turks (Bağcı et al. 2018). In addition to historical factors that affected the Kurdish-Turkish intergroup relations characterized by a psychological asymmetry stemming from the status of the groups (Bilali, Çelik, and Ok 2014). Psychological asymmetry between groups affects intergroup interactions (Tropp and Pettigrew 2005). The majority status groups believe in the legitimacy of their status and are often less willing to question their privilege (Tropp and Pettigrew 2005). In contrast, minority groups face devalued group positions daily

through discrimination, stereotypes, and stigmatization (Crocker and Steele 1998; Plant 2004; Shelton, Richeson, and Salvatore 2005). Thus, although the perception of discrimination increases the salience of ethnic identity, low-status groups have been demonstrated to hold a negative group appraisal (Major and O'Brien 2005).

In addition to power asymmetry (Icduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci 1999), ontological asymmetry (Rumelili and Çelik 2017), and material distance (KONDA 2010), perceived group asymmetry between Kurds and Turks is evident in existing studies(Bilali 2014). For example, relying on image theory, Bilali, Çelik, and Ok (2014) presented that Turks categorized Kurds as low power status image, namely rogue, which is inferior, weak, incapable, and incompetent. On the other hand, Kurds viewed Turks as barbarian image, which is high power status group, inferior culture, and threatening (Bilali, Çelik, and Ok 2014). In another study, Çelik, Bilali, and Iqbal (2017) have shown that Kurds are perceived as other and subordinate among various groups. This image was accompanied by lower social contact and high perceived threat levels (Çelik, Bilali, and Iqbal 2017).

Both Kurdish and Turkish group members hold low levels of outgroup trust (Çelebi et al. 2014), and associate outgroup with negative stereotypes (Bilali 2014). Moreover, due to the the intensity of conflict-affected intergroup attitudes between Kurds and Turks, both groups adopt higher social distance and lower support for minority rights (Bilali, Çelik, and Ok 2014). Nevertheless, Kurds report a much more flexible intergroup attitude than Turks (Bilali, Çelik, and Ok 2014).

Bağcı et al. ([in press]) have shown that Kurds feel higher levels of competitive victimhood when compared to Turks. Their research suggested that cross-group friendships were negatively associated with competitive victimhood and increased outgroup perspective-taking and decreased ingroup identification mediated this association. Uluğ et al. (2020) also tested competitive victimhood as a mediator between the endorsement of dominant conflict narratives and attitudes towards conflict and peace in Turkey's Kurdish conflict among majority status groups. Findings revealed that the self-identified Turks who endorse that the PKK is the main cause of the problem (i.e., terrorism narrative) reported more support for violence and less forgiveness through increased competitive victimhood. While these studies provide important information about the predictors of competitive victimhood in the Turkish-Kurdish intergroup setting, no research to date has examined ingroup identification (collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction), trust, and moral defensiveness as predictors of competitive victimhood and tested perception of conflict and ethnic group as potential moderators.

3.   THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

In conflict analysis and resolution, trust is a vital concept (Mitchell 2005). Expectations about the outgroup are considerably shaped by trust and distrust (Alon and Bar-Tal 2016). As described in the literature, trust requires vulnerability, flexibility, and enabling good feelings about the trustee (Lewicki 2000; Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies 1998). If intergroup trust exists or is achieved, it predicts cooperation, benevolence (Lewicki 2000), and harmonious relations between groups (Kramer and Carnevale 2000). On the other hand, distrust motivates negative feelings, caution, suspicion, stress, and fear of being harmed. Thus, a relationship characterized by distrust forces parties to avoid the benefit of the doubt while assessing the actions of others and empathize with the outgroup (Alon and Bar-Tal 2016). The absence of such emotions and expressions weakens the possibility of recognizing outgroup experiences for parties of a conflict (Noor et al. 2008). Outgroup trust has been found to be negatively associated with competitive victimhood, which, in turn, negatively predicted intergroup forgiveness in Northern Ireland (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a). In the context of Turkish-Kurdish relations, trust has been found to be associated with the evaluation of ingroup violence and responsibility attributions (Çelebi et al. 2014). The researchers found that across groups, justification of ingroup violence is negatively associated with outgroup trust.

Moreover, participants who strongly blame the other ethnic group reported lower levels of outgroup trust (Çelebi et al. 2014). Consequently, I expect lower levels of outgroup trust to be associated with higher levels of competitive victimhood. The underlying mechanism behind hypothesis 1 is straightforward: the lack of trust predicts the exchange of knowledge, increases perceived identity threat, and traps individuals in a trust dilemma. In the context of intergroup conflicts, when outgroup trust is low, parties may perceive gray areas as more costly and avoid acknowledging mutual victimization or empathizing with the outgroup.

Hypothesis 1: Outgroup trust would be associated negatively with competitive victimhood.

The literature provides strong empirical support for the positive association between collective narcissism and hypersensitivity to threat (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009; Golec de Zavala et al. 2016; Marchlewska, Cichocka, and Kossowska 2018). Group members with high collective narcissism are expected to hold a negative view of the outgroup (Marchlewska et al. 2020), tangled into siege mentality (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012), and hold vivid memories of harmdoing targeting the ingroup (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012). Collective narcissism is characterized by the vulnerability of an ingroup image (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012), stimulates constant comparison of ingroup with outgroups (Golec de Zavala et al. 2016), and leads to increased intergroup bias (Bağcı et al. [in press]). Moreover, Jordan et al. (2003) demonstrated the association between unstable and defensive self-esteem and collective narcissism. Motivated by protecting the positive image of the ingroup, collective narcissists may adapt competitive victimhood as a defensive mechanism. Therefore, I expect higher levels of collective narcissism to be associated with higher levels of competitive victimhood.

Hypothesis 2: Collective narcissism would be associated positively with competitive victimhood.

The opposite effects of collective narcissism and ingroup satisfaction on intergroup processes have attracted attention in previous studies (Dyduch-Hazar, Mrozinski, and Golec de Zavala 2019; Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, and Lantos 2019). Contrary to collective narcissism, a secure form of ingroup positivity predicts prosocial behavior and positive affectivity (Golec de Zavala 2011, 2019*b*; Golec de Zavala and Bierwiaczonek 2020). Being proud and happy to be a part of a valuable ingroup is essential to ingroup satisfaction (Leach et al. 2008). As underlined in the literature, parties in a conflict compete over the recognition of their sufferings and are less likely to engage in empathy if they hold competitive victimhood beliefs. Ingroup satisfaction is rooted in positive evaluations of the ingroup regardless of the acknowledgment of others and often associates with more positive outgroup attitudes (Federico, Golec de Zavala, and Baran 2020). Thus, contrary to collective narcissism, external recognition and acknowledgment are less likely to determine the ingroup's opinions, emotions, and behaviors towards the outgroup. Those satisfied with their ingroup may not seek to affirm strong competitive victimhood beliefs on the ingroup relative to the outgroup. Accordingly, respondents who score high on the ingroup satisfaction scale are expected to report lower levels of competitive victimhood.

*Hypothesis 3:*Ingroup satisfaction would be associated negatively with competitive victimhood.

Groups are motivated to protect their moral image. Also, intergroup boundaries are often linked with similarity and dissimilarity of moral codes (Obeid, Argo, and Ginges 2017). Existing research recognizes the critical role of morality in conflicts (Bar-Tal 2007; Noor et al. 2012; Volkan 2001). Studies in question underline that parties involved in prolonged conflicts tend to adopt rigid duality of conflict roles that are saddled with moral judgments. Therefore, belonging to a victimized or perpetrator group implies a superior or inferior moral status. The social and moral threat born out of this status increases moral defensiveness (Wenzel, Woodyatt, and McLean 2020). Moreover, several other studies (Schumann and Orehek 2019; Sullivan et al. 2012; Wenzel, Woodyatt, and McLean 2020) emphasize that people in a defensive state of mind tend to engage in self-justifying bias, which prevents them from recognizing the sufferings of the other, and harm doings of the ingroup. In that sense, born out of a need to justify or defend one's role in the conflict, moral defensiveness offers a "way out" from the negative image of immorality. Rather than moral entitlement which implies a license to act in line with the moral judgments of one's group, moral defensiveness indicates a less secure understanding of morality. To the best of my knowledge, no published studies have examined how moral defensiveness predicts competitive victimhood in a protracted conflict context and between majority and minority status groups. Thereupon, the following hypothesis adheres to the following logic, defending victimization of the ingroup and undermining the sufferings of the outgroup might be motivated by the need to justify the moral stance of the group. Therefore, I expect a positive association between moral defensiveness and competitive victimhood.

Hypothesis 4: Moral defensiveness would be positively associated with competitive victimhood.

I also hypothesized that the associations between the suggested predictors and competitive victimhood would be moderated by perception of conflict. First, I expected that trust would have stronger associations with competitive victimhood when perceived conflict is high. Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000) define trust as a positive bias in collecting and treating incomplete information about an outgroup. This processing bias is accompanied by expectations and risks, namely, non-exploitation of the vulnerability of ingroup (Kramer and Carnevale 2000). Mainly positive encounters facilitate a trusting intergroup relation (Worchel, Cooper, and Goethals 1991). Thus, bringing all together, in case of an increased level of perceived intergroup conflict, parties rely on the ingroup for information processing and expect a negative attitude against the ingroup. Also, during a protracted conflict, a tangled relationship of reciprocal violence destroys positive outgroup emotions; instead, the ingroup adopts a more defensive stance (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a). Therefore, I

expect perceived intergroup conflict to moderate the association between outgroup trust and competitive victimhood such that:

Hypothesis 5a: The association between outgroup trust and competitive victimhood would be stronger for respondents who report higher levels of perceived intergroup conflict.

I further hypothesized that collective narcissism would be also a stronger predictor of competitive victimhood among the ones who perceive greater conflict. In previous research, conflict perception has been found to significantly moderate the impact of the normative and cognitive components on group attitudes (Jackson 2002). For example, it has previously been observed that high perceived intergroup conflict increases the tendency to support negative outgroup behaviors (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009) and emotions (Canetti et al. 2013). Morover, previous research has shown that collective narcissism is characterized by hypersensitivity to different types of threat; symbolic (Guiler 2021), real (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009), distinctiveness threat (Golec de Zavala and Bierwiaczonek 2020), or an imagined threat (Golec de Zavala et al. 2016). Thus, regardless of the existence or the objective severity of intergroup conflict, increased subjective perception of conflict is expected to strenghten the relationship between collective narcissism and collective victimhood. Since ingroup satisfaction is often focused on one's view of the worthy qualities of the ingroup and relies less on the outgroup's appreciation, the associations between ingroup satisfaction and competitive victimhood are not expected to increase with greater conflict perception.

Hypothesis 5b: The relationship between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood would be stronger for respondents who report higher levels of perceived intergroup conflict.

Parties in conflict feel the need to justify their violent actions partly due to norms, values, and third-party pressures (Nelson 2010). As the perceived level of intergroup conflict increases, parties are expected to adhere more on their moral high grounds and justify their actions through moral defense. Thus, this need to be understood and to be morally righteous even in the case of conflict escalation is expected to increase the association between moral defensiveness and competitive victimhood.

Hypothesis 5c: The relationship between moral defensiveness and competitive victimhood would be stronger for respondents who report higher levels of perceived intergroup conflict.

I further argued that the associations between the suggested predictors and competitive victimhood beliefs would be moderated by ethnic group status. Minority

groups often encounter prejudice, negative stereotypes, and discrimination based on their relative status (Major and O'Brien 2005; Plant 2004; Shelton, Richeson, and Salvatore 2005). Especially for ethnic minorities ethnic identities are the more salient aspect of personal identities than for ethnic majorities (Phinney and Chavira 1992). Therefore, this stigmatization and being perceived as a member of a monolith group may influence how members of minority groups perceive themselves. Consequently, social identity can be a social curse (Jetten et al. 2017), shaping cognition, affect, and behavior (Crocker and Steele 1998). The majority status groups rarely question their position and privileges, whereas minority status groups tend to be aware of the devalued position of their group; thus, they often anticipate prejudice from the majority group (Tropp and Pettigrew 2005). Heightened awareness of prejudice and stigmatization may lead to increased sensitivity to a rigid asymmetry between majority and minority groups, as well as a social and moral threat. Building upon the previous studies on the moderator role of ethnic identity on perceived discrimination (Sellers et al. 2003; Whitbeck 2009); I expect group status to modify the strength of the association between competitive victimhood and proposed predictors that are outgroup trust, ingroup satisfaction, moral defensiveness, collective narcissism such that:

Hypothesis 6a: The relationship between outgroup trust and competitive victimhood would be stronger among Kurdish participants.

Hypothesis 6b: The relationship between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood would be stronger among Kurdish participants.

Hypothesis 6c: The relationship between ingroup satisfaction and competitive victimhood would be stronger among Kurdish participants.

Hypothesis 6d: The relationship between moral defensiveness and competitive victimhood would be stronger among Kurdish participants.

Figure 3.1 The Proposed Conceptual Model

4. RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 Participants

A total of 549 respondents took the online survey. Respondents were asked a screening question regarding which ethnic groups they identify with. Among 545 individuals who completed the survey, 44 participants identified themselves with other ethnic groups (e.g., Circassian, Zaza, Tatar, Pomak). Due to the scope of this thesis, the main focus was on the Kurdish-Turkish inter-ethnic relationships, and participants who identify with other ethnic groups were not included in data analysis.

Although the survey design required participants to answer all the questions on a given page before screening the others, participants had the option to leave at any point of the survey. Thus, there were answers with missing values. Surveys with less than 93 percent completion rate were dropped and 381 observations (54% females, 44% males, %2 other and prefer not to specify; M_{age}= 32.37, SD_{age}= 11.36) with non-missing data have been left in the estimation sample. Ethnic groups were coded as a binary variable, and the final sample was comprised of 151 Kurds (44% females, 54% males, 2% other and prefer not to specify; M_{age}= 33.67, SD_{age}= 11.84) and 230 Turks (61% females, 38% males, 1% other and prefer not to specify; M_{age}= 31.52, SD_{age}= 10.98).

The sample mainly involved respondents who reside in Ankara (23%), İstanbul (26%), Van (23%), and Hakkari (4%). A breakdown of the reported place of residence according to ethnic group demonstrated that the majority of the Kurdish participants live in Van (30.2%), Ankara (18.1%), İstanbul (13%), and Hakkari (10%), while Turkish participants live in Ankara (32%), İstanbul (31%), Antalya (6%) and Bursa (5%).

A post-hoc sensitivity power analysis for multiple linear regression was conducted using G*Power (Faul et al. 2009). The results indicated that the sample is sufficient

to detect an effect size of f = .15, α = .05, n = 381 and power obtained for a total 6 predictors is $1 - \beta$ = .99.

4.2 Procedure

Kurdish conflict is a politically sensitive research topic in Turkey (see also Bayad and Aydemir 2020). Groves et al. (2011) argued that respondents tend to guard their egos when they encounter questions on sensitive issues. Groves et al. (2011) suggest four ways of maximizing respondent honesty about sensitive topics. These include creating comfort and trust by offering a warm-up period with non-threatening questions, adapting question-wording to reduce the threat, desensitizing the context, and using methods that ensure the anonymity of the respondents. To that end, the order of the survey questionnaire followed a funnel sequence from less threatening and general demographic questions to relatively sensitive questions. Also, due to the sensitivity regarding the naming of the conflict in question, phrases such as 'Kurdish Issue' and 'Kurdish Problem' that undermine the experiences of both parties were avoided. Lastly, to ensure the anonymity of the participants and the likelihood of receiving honest answers, data were collected through an online survey. Although other modes of data collection, such as face-to-face interviews, and telephone interviews, decrease the cognitive burden and increase the reliability of the responses, they offer limited or no privacy and anonymity to the respondents (Tourangeau and Smith 1996). Therefore, considering the political controversies and polarization around the subject of interest and the stigmatization of minority communities, a self-administered online survey mitigates the risk of reliability with relatively lower levels of non-response rate (Groves et al. 2011).

Although scales remained identical, slight wording adaptations were required for each ethnic group. For that reason, two versions of the survey were prepared. Moreover, participants were asked a screening question regarding which ethnic group they identify with. Firstly, this question aimed to filter target respondents, and secondly, it functioned as a contingency question leading participants to relevant survey options prepared for their group. Finally, all questions were closed-ended standard-format questions that answer categories that did not include "do not know" or "unsure."

The study was conducted in Turkey between April 30 and May 10, 2021, after obtaining the approval of Sabancı University Research Ethics Council (SUREC) (see Appendix A). Respondents were informed about the subject and aims of the

study and the data anonymity and confidentiality (see Appendix B). Depending on the age and literacy level of the respondent, the survey took approximately 10-15 minutes. Participants were debriefed after the survey (see Appendix E) and asked to share their opinions and (if any) complaints. There are no official records on the population share of the Kurdish community in Turkey. Therefore, the sampling frame of this thesis follows the footsteps of the previous studies conducted in the context of the 'Kurdish question' and similar conflict settings (e.g., Bilali 2014; Bilali, Tropp, and Dasgupta 2012; Çelebi et al. 2014). In addition to lack of records, Kurdish participants might be reluctant to respond to surveys from unknown persons and institutions. Thus, data were collected through snowball sampling. Qualtrics was used as the intermediary to gather responses from participants. The anonymous survey link was disseminated through personal connections of the researcher and groups on social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram).

4.3 Questionnaire and Scales

In order to measure how majority and minority status groups experience competitive victimhood in the context of Turkey's Kurdish Issue, the association of out-group trust, moral defensiveness, in-group satisfaction, and collective narcissism on the competitive victimhood beliefs were assessed.

All constructs were rated on seven-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Items were averaged so that higher scores indicate a stronger endorsement of the relevant variable. Measures were adapted to Turkish through the translation-back-translation method. In this process, scales translated into Turkish by the writer were back-translated to English by another master's student. The final draft was reconciled and edited by the thesis advisor. The originals and the translations of the measures are presented in Appendix D and Appendix C, respectively [1]

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[1] The survey questionnaire included scales on in-group identification, zero-sum view of the conflict, out-group attitudes, and inclusive COVID-19 victimhood beliefs. However, due to the scope of this thesis, only the variables listed in the measure section of this chapter were included in the analysis. Details of the omitted scales can be found in Appendix D and C

4.3.1 Demographics

The questionnaire asked participants their gender, age, education, the city they reside in, socio-economic status, political orientation, and ethnic identity. Socio-economic Status (SES) was measured with a single subjective SES scale ranging from 1 (*very low*) to 7 (*very high*). Political orientation was assessed with a single-item scale ranging from 1 (*very left*) to 7 (*very right*). Lastly, sense of place was measured via a single-item scale ranging from 1 (*very rural*) to 7 (*very urban*).

Different approaches to the measurement of ethnicity exist in the literature and surveys administered by private companies. In the context of Turkey, one approach to ethnic identity measure is to ask three-step questions on language (i.e., *What language do you usually speak in your household? Which of the languages can you speak? What language or languages did you speak with your parents in your daily conversations and conversations in your childhood?* (CSES 2020)). Although this approach is convenient to decrease the discomfort of choosing mutually exclusive categories of identity groups and suitable for cross-national studies, it does not measure subjective attachment to the group. Moreover, considering language as a common denominator excludes a considerable portion of the young Kurdish population from the equation. Many young Kurds born or raised in the western provinces of Turkey rarely witness their parents speak Kurdish and are not exposed to Kurdish in their daily lives.

Therefore, an ideal measure in this context should not portray ethnicity as a static (Chandra 2001) or monolithic phenomenon (Smith 2005[1986]), which is quantifiable upon common denominators. Further, it should not overlook that the membership to a group is subjectively meaningful. Following the previous studies in the field Bağcı and Çelebi (2017), ethnic identification was asked through a single-item question (i.e., 'We are all citizens of the Republic of Turkey, but we may be of different ethnic origins. How do you know or feel yourself, your identity?') in this study. The response scale included self-defined aspect of the identity. The item enables participants to account for an emotional bond to a group as well as generational transmission of membership.

4.3.2 Independent Variables

In-group satisfaction

A four-item in-group satisfaction scale derived from Leach et al. (2008) assessed the contentment with membership to in-group (e.g., "I am glad to be (Turkish/Kurdish)", "I think that (Turks/Kurds) have a lot to be proud of", "It is pleasant to be (Turkish/Kurdish)", and "Being (Turkish/Kurdish) gives me a good feeling"). Several studies in the literature (e.g., Golec de Zavala 2011; Golecde Zavala, Cichocka, and Bilewicz 2013) underline a suppression effect between narcissistic and non-narcissistic forms of in-group attachment. Therefore, in this study also, in-group satisfaction and collective narcissism were measured together. The scale's reliability was satisfactory with Cronbach's Alpha value of .96 for Kurdish and .96 for Turkish samples for Turkish samples.

Collective Narcissism

A nine-item scale, adapted from Golec de Zavala et al. (2009), assessed the belief in exaggerated importance of in-group. Scale included several items on the authority (e.g., "I wish other groups would more quickly recognize the authority of my group."), distinctiveness, superiority, and need for recognition (e.g., "My group deserves special treatment", "Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my group", "I do not get upset when people do not notice achievements of my group"). The collective narcissism scale was found to be highly reliable in both the Kurdish and Turkish samples. Cronbach's alphas were .87 and .91, respectively [2].

Out-group Trust

Out-group trust was measured by a three-item scale adapted from Çelebi et al. (2014). One advantage of using the measure in question is that it allows framing trust within the context of conflict (i.e., "Most (Turks/Kurds) cannot be trusted to deliver on their promises", "'Despite everything that happened during the conflict, I trust (Turks/Kurds)", and "I think that the (Turks/Kurds) can be trusted in their promises in the conflict"). The scale was found to be reliable with Cronbach's alpha

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[2]An exploratory factor analysis was conducted to measure internal validity of the nine-item scale. Factor loadings and the regression analysis can be found in the Appendix F

of .68 for Kurdish and .75 for Turkish samples.

Moral Defensiveness

A two-item scale modified from Shnabel, Halabi, and Noor (2013) measured the need to protect the in-group's moral image. In the same vein with out-group trust items, this scale aimed to measure group members' level of conflict-related moral defensiveness. The items were "I want the world to understand that my in-group took part in atrocities because it had no choice" and "It is important for me to protect the moral integrity of my in-group". There was a statistically significant correlation of .60 between the items for the Kurdish and .60 for the Turkish sample.

4.3.3 Dependent Variable

Competitive Victimhood

To measure whether participants hold competitive victimhood beliefs, the scale of Noor, Brown, and Prentice (2008a) was adopted (e.g., "Over the last 30 years of the conflict, my community has not suffered more than the (Kurds/Turks)", "On average, the areas that have been most affected by the Kurdish conflict are those in which members of my community live", "Overall, victims in my community (Turks/Kurds) have not received adequate attention to their needs compared to victims in the other community"). Item-scale analysis indicated that the item "On average, the areas that have been most affected by the Kurdish conflict are those in which members of my community live" lowered the reliability of the scale (item $\alpha=$ .18, scale $\alpha=$ .55). Once this item was excluded, the scale's reliability was satisfactory with Cronbach's Alpha value of .84 for Kurdish and .71 for the Turkish sample.

4.3.4 Moderator Variable

Perceived Inter-group Conflict

To what extent respondents perceive the conflict between Turkish and Kurdish groups was measured by a single-item scale ranging from 1 (*There is no conflict*) to 7 (*There is conflict (higher level)*). The item was adopted from Bağcı and Çelebi (2017). The single-item measure was "To what extent do you think there is a conflict

between Turks and Kurds?".

4.3.5 Control Variables

Several control variables (e.g., age, gender, education, socio-economic status (SES)) have been included in the final analysis of the previous studies.

First, age was included as a control variable since studies regarding ethnic identity formation suggest that the salience of ethnic identity significantly changes over time (e.g., Phinney and Chavira 1992). Previous research has demonstrated that increased age is positively and significantly affect the negative out-group attitudes (Stewart, von Hippel, and Radvansky 2009). On the contrary recent findings of Uluğ and Uysal (2021) indicates that for both Turks and Kurds, older age was associated with support for minority rights.

The age and the date of birth often mismatch for older generations and a considerable portion of the Kurdish population. Therefore, participants were asked to report their age in years. Previous studies have also demonstrated that SES differences consolidate asymmetries between groups in the society and augment negative out-group bias (e.g., Halperin, Pedahzur, and Canetti-Nisim 2007). SES was measured through one self-reported perceived income level, *"How would you describe your socio-economic status?"* ranging from 1 *(very low)* to 7 *(very high)*. SES may also be important in the context of Turkish-Kurdish relationships because previous research has suggested that Turkish and Kurdish population differs significantly in their income level, possessions, education, and health (Icduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci 1999). Further, Kurds associate this lower status in economic context with conflict (KONDA 2010) and report lower-income and savings levels than Turks (KONDA 2010). Lastly, previous studies underlined the positive association between political orientation at extreme ends and negative out-group attitudes (e.g., Bağcı and Çelebi 2017; Duckitt 2006). Political orientation was measured by a bipolar scale (from 1 *very left* to 7 *very right*).

Lastly, participants were asked to report their current residence location to analyze their proximity to active conflict regions through proximity to conflict variables. Exposure to conflict and direct victimization experiences has been associated with increased enmity against an adversary (Balcells 2012; Canetti et al. 2013; Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015) and negative attitude towards reconciliation (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Canetti et al. 2013). Contrary findings suggest that conflict exposure might increase the support for peace (Tellez 2019) and pro-social behavior

(Bauer et al. 2016). Therefore, whether the proximity to conflict affects the attitudes towards victimhood will be controlled. To determine active conflict regions in Turkey, 2018-2021 data of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) were utilized (Raleigh et al. 2010). ACLED maps the conflict events, actors, location, and fatalities based on several media sources of the origin country. In line with the scope of this thesis, peaceful demonstrations were omitted from the dataset on Turkey. Thus, only the events that directly affect or harm members of conflicting parties were left in the data. These are battles, explosions, violent protests, and violence against civilians. Also, actors other than the primary parties of Turkey's Kurdish conflict were omitted from the data. The final 4,563 observations were categorized according to the province of occurrence. Among the provinces in which observation in both the main study data and ACLED data exist matched, and cities with more than 100 conflict events were coded as 1 to, other cities were coded as 0. Therefore, Batman, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mersin, İstanbul, İzmir, Mardin, Siirt, Şırnak and Van were coded as active conflict location.

5.   EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Descriptive Statistics

Table 5.1 presents the mean, standard deviation and range of the demographic variables for the Turkish and Kurdish samples. The mean age of the sample, 32.3, suggests that the majority of the sample was born after the escalation of conflict. The sample includes 230 female and 151 male participants. The majority of the female sample reported their education level as bachelor ($N=$ 128) and higher ($N=$ 48). Male respondents reported that they graduated from high school ($N=$ 30) and university with a bachelor's degree ($N=$ 107) by majority. The mean economic evaluation, 4.10, indicates that the majority of the sample describe their socio-economic status as mediocre. The majority of the Kurdish sample reported a relatively more negative evaluation of their socio-economic status ($M=$ 3.77) compared to the Turkish sample ($M=$ 5.80). The urban residence variable indicates that the majority of the sample resided in urban areas. A closer look into where the sample was clustered reveals that although the sample included participants from a variety of provinces of Turkey, the majority of the sample reported their place of residence as Ankara, İstanbul, and Van (27%, 24%, 13% respectively). The rural residence level was higher among the Kurdish respondents. The mean political orientation was three (from 1 *Extremely left*, 10 *Extremely right*), which means that participants placed themselves more on the left end of the spectrum. The Kurdish sample was more skewed towards left than the Turkish sample.

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 indicates means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables of interest for the Turkish and Kurdish sample. Table 5.2 presents that all predictors -except out-group trust and perceived intergroup conflict- are significantly correlated with the outcome variable. In the Kurdish sample, all four predictor variables and two moderator variables are correlated with competitive victimhood. Separate correlation analyses were performed by adding age, gender, political orientation, socio-economic status, and proximity to the conflict. Analyses

revealed no significant correlation between gender and dependent variable. Also, no significant correlation was observed between education level and competitive victimhood. Thus, only age, political orientation, SES, and proximity to the conflict were added to the regression model as covariates.

Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	N
Turkish					
Gender	1	0.52	1.00	3.00	230
Age	31.52	10.97	18.00	65.00	230
Education Level	4.07	0.62	1.00	5.00	230
Income Level	4.32	0.95	1.00	7.00	230
Urban-Rural Distribution	5.80	1.50	1.00	7.00	230
Left Right Spectrum	3.18	1.28	1.00	7.00	230
Proximity to Conflict	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00	230
Kurdish					
Gender	1	0.53	1.00	3.00	151
Age	33.66	11.84	18.00	70.00	151
Education Level	3.84	0.78	1.00	5.00	151
Income Level	3.77	1.21	1.00	6.00	151
Urban-Rural Distribution	4.55	1.76	1.00	7.00	151
Left Right Spectrum	2.74	1.41	1.00	7.00	151
Proximity to Conflict	0.70	0.46	0.00	1.00	151
Total					
Gender	1	0.53	1.00	3.00	381
Age	32.37	11.36	18.00	70.00	381
Education Level	3.98	0.69	1.00	5.00	381
Income Level	4.10	1.09	1.00	7.00	381
Urban-Rural Distribution	5.31	1.72	1.00	7.00	381
Left Right Spectrum	3.00	1.35	1.00	7.00	381
Proximity to Conflict	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00	381

In Figure 5.1, the distribution of the predictor, moderator, and dependent variables were presented. Scales with multiple items were averaged into single measures. In line with the questionnaire, higher numbers indicate stronger endorsements of the relevant construct. Therefore, the histogram of the dependent variable illustrates

around 19% of the cases were located around four which indicates a neutral stance, while 11% of the cases were clustered around the higher levels of competitive victimhood.

Figure 5.2 illustrates the means and standard deviations of the predictor, moderator and dependent variables. Series of independent sample t-tests were conducted to examine ethnic group differences. As reported in Table 5.4, mean comparisons of the variables of interest indicated that Kurds perceived a significantly higher level of competitive victimhood and intergroup conflict and reported a higher level of collective narcissism than Turks. Moreover, Kurds displayed higher levels of moral defensiveness and held higher levels of ingroup satisfaction than Turks. Lastly, the difference between Turks and Kurds was significant in terms of the out-group trust; Kurds reported a lower level of out-group trust than Turks.

Figure 5.1 Distribution of the Independent, Moderator, and Dependent Variables

Table 5.2 Range, Means and Standard Deviations of Main Study Variables and Correlations For Kurdish Sample

Variables	Range	Mean (SD)	Correlations					
			1	2	3	4	5	6
1.Competitive Victimhood	1-7	3.79 (0.70)	1.00					
2.In-Group Satisfaction	1-7	4.53 (1.92)	0.13*	1.00				
3.Collective Narcissism	1-7	3.18 (1.56)	0.14*	0.57**	1.00			
4.Perceived Inter-Group Conflict	1-7	4.57 (1.47)	0.00	-0.25**	-0.12	1.00		
5.Out-Group Trust	1-7	4.65 (1.48)	-0.09	-0.31**	-0.37**	0.05	1.00	
6.Moral Defensiveness	1-7	3.54 (1.99)	0.25**	0.57**	0.75**	-0.14*	-0.30**	1.00

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.3 Range, Means and Standard Deviations of Main Study Variables and Correlations For Turkish Sample

Variables	Range	Mean (SD)	Correlations					
			1	2	3	4	5	6
1.Competitive Victimhood	1-7	5.51 (1.40)	1.00					
2.In-Group Satisfaction	1-7	5.48 (1.80)	0.18*	1.00				
3.Collective Narcissism	1-7	4.95 (1.32)	0.46**	0.63**	1.00			
4.Perceived Inter-Group Conflict	1-7	5.11 (1.55)	0.47**	0.23**	0.33**	1.00		
5.Out-Group Trust	1-7	3.92 (1.52)	-0.29**	-0.12	-0.31**	-0.37**	1.00	
6.Moral Defensiveness	1-7	5.06 (1.54)	0.64**	0.39**	0.53**	0.35**	-0.20*	1.00

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.4 Independent Samples T-Test

Variables	Mean(SD) Kurds	Mean(SD) Turks	t	Variables	P	Cohen's d	95% CI
1.Competitive Victimhood	5.50 (1.40)	3.79 (.70)	200.31	-14,012	< .001	1.66	[-1.96, -1.47]
2.In-Group Satisfaction	5.48 (1.80)	4.53 (1.92)	335.02	-4,929	< .001	.51	[-1.34, -.57]
3.Collective Narcissism	4.96 (1.33)	3.19 (1.57)	355.62	11,885	< .001	1.2	[-2.06, -1.48]
4.Perceived Inter-Group Conflict	5.11(1.55)	4.57 (1.47)	308.77	-3,448	< .001	.36	[-.86, -.24]
5.Out-Group Trust	3.93 (1.52)	4.66 (1.49)	315.76	4,634	< .001	.48	[.42, 1.04]
6.Moral Defensiveness	5.06 (1.54)	3.55 (2.0)	369.05	-8,378	< .001	.83	[-1.88, -1.16]

Figure 5.2 Means and Standard Deviations of the Main Study Variables

Multiple Regression Analyses

To assess the association between variables in line with the conceptual model proposed in the hypothesis building section, I conducted two hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses testing each moderator in a separate analysis. Data analysis was performed using Stata SE 17.0 (2021). The main predictors were out-group trust, in-group satisfaction, collective narcissism, and moral defensiveness. Age, subjective SES, political orientation, and proximity to the armed conflict were added as covariates.

In the first step of the initial regression analysis (Table 5.5), predictor variables and control variables were introduced in the regression. Later, two-way interaction between out-group trust × perceived conflict (P.C.), in-group satisfaction × P.C, collective narcissism × P.C, and moral defensiveness × P.C were added one by one. The final step included all interactions together with predictors and controls. The second regression analysis (Table 5.6) is comprised of 5 steps which introduced the following two-way interactions one by one; ethnic group × out-group trust, ethnic group × in-group satisfaction, ethnic group × collective narcissism, and ethnic group × moral defensiveness to step 1. Estimates with an effective sample size of 381, robust standard errors are presented in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6. The Aiken and West(1991) approach was used to test simple slopes which were illustrated with -1 SD and +1 SD values of the moderator.

Table 5.5 Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Competitive Victimhood ‖ Perceived Intergroup Conflict

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6
In-Group Satisfaction	-0.027	-0.024	-0.001	-0.027	-0.021	0.099
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.096)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.114)
Collective Narcissism	0.177**	0.155**	0.161**	-0.002	0.160**	-0.210
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.120)	(0.051)	(0.163)
Out-Group Trust	-0.067	0.033	-0.054	-0.037	-0.055	0.004
	(0.038)	(0.115)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.117)
Moral Defensiveness	0.247**	0.241**	0.241**	0.241**	0.266**	0.413**
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.097)	(0.122)
Perceived Conflict (P.C)		0.227*	0.175	0.024	0.174*	0.181
		(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.093)	(0.085)	(0.161)
Out-Group Trust ×P.C		-0.017				-0.009
		(0.022)				(0.022)
In-Group Satisfaction × P.C			-0.005			-0.028
			(0.019)			(0.024)
Collective Narcissism ×P.C				0.033		0.078*
				(0.022)		(0.033)
Moral Defensiveness × P.C					-0.005	-0.036
					(0.019)	(0.024)
Left Right Spectrum	-0.176**	-0.122**	-0.123**	-0.119**	-0.124**	-0.123**
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Proximity to Conflict	0.535**	0.509**	0.519**	0.511**	0.517**	0.510**
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Age	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Income Level	-0.043	-0.053	-0.053	-0.047	-0.054	-0.062
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Constant	3.520**	2.252**	2.502**	3.152**	2.507**	2.476**
	(0.373)	(0.613)	(0.591)	(0.565)	(0.537)	(0.817)
N	381	381	381	381	381	381
R^2	0.419	0.446	0.445	0.448	0.445	0.454

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

The base step involved four proposed predictors (ingroup satisfaction, out-group trust, moral defensiveness, perceived intergroup conflict (P.C)) and control variables (political orientation, proximity to conflict, age and income) in Table 5.5. The base step was significant and explained 42% of the variance in the dependent variable, $F(8, 372) = 32.48$, $p < .01$. Collective narcissism was positively associated with competitive victimhood ($\beta = .18$, $p < .001$). Furthermore, respondents who reported higher levels of moral defensiveness also reported significantly higher levels of competitive victimhood ($\beta = .25$, $p < .01$). As Table 5.5 shows, the coefficients of out-group trust were not statistically distinguishable from zero. Similarly, in-group satisfaction was not significantly associated with competitive victimhood.

Among covariates, proximity to conflict and political orientation had a significant association with competitive victimhood ($\beta = .54$, $p < .001$, $\beta = -.18$, $p < .001$, respectively). For participants who lived in cities where more than 100 conflict events were reported between 2018-2021, the level of competitive victimhood beliefs was higher than participants who lived in cities with low levels or frozen conflict (less than 100 conflict events). Participants who placed themselves on the right-wing of the spectrum reported higher levels of competitive victimhood, while left-wing reported lower levels of competitive victimhood. Base step provided no empirical support for the association between the dependent variable and age. Similarly, the association between income and competitive victimhood was not statistically significant.

In Step 2 of Table 5.5 perceived intergroup conflict and interaction term for out-group trust and perceived intergroup conflict were added to the base model. Although perceived intergroup conflict was positively associated with competitive victimhood, its interaction with outgroup trust in Step 2 ($\beta = -.02$, $p = 0.391$) and ingroup satisfaction in Step 3 ($\beta = -.01$, $p = 0.788$) was not significantly associated with competitive victimhood. In Step 4 the moderating role of perceived intergroup conflict over the association between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood was added, but was not found to be significant ($\beta = .03$, $p = 0.129$). Moreover, the interaction term for moral defensiveness and perceived intergroup conflict ($\beta = .01$, $p = 0.912$) was not significant in the fifth step.

In Table 5.5 in Step 6, all interactions between predictor variables and perceived intergroup conflict was introduced to the base model. Step 6 explained 44% of the variance in the dependent variable, $F(13,367) = 23.52$, $p < .01$. Perceived intergroup conflict moderated the association between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood ($\beta = .08$, $p < .05$). Control variables political orientation ($\beta = -.12$, $p < .01$) and proximity to conflict ($\beta = .51$, $p < .01$) were also significant in this step.

Figure 5.3 Effect of Collective Narcissism on Competitive Victimhood at Varying Levels of Perceived Intergroup Conflict

To have a detailed understanding of the association, Figure 5.3 illustrates simple slope analyses. The simple slope analysis indicated that for respondents who perceived higher levels of intergroup conflict, the association between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood was positive and statistically significant ($\beta = .33$, $p < 0.01$). Whereas, for respondents who perceived lower levels of intergroup conflict, this association was not statistically significant ($\beta = -.13$, $p = .31$). Therefore, only for respondents who perceived higher levels of intergroup conflict, higher levels of collective narcissism were associated with higher levels of competitive victimhood [1]

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[1] An exploratory factor analysis was conducted for the collective narcissism variable, and regression analysis in Table F.3 presents that the association between the interaction term for collective narcissism and competitive victimhood was not significant in this regression. Moreover, the age variable was positively and significantly associated with competitive victimhood in line with previous research that suggests increased age to be positively and significantly associated with negative outgroup attitudes (Stewart, von Hippel, and Radvansky 2009).

Table 5.6 Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Competitive Victimhood || Ethnic Group

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5
In-Group Satisfaction	-0.018	-0.063	-0.059	-0.037	0.020
	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.038)
Collective Narcissism	0.017	0.009	-0.161**	0.054	-0.060
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.057)
Out-Group Trust	0.021	-0.067	-0.065*	-0.063*	-0.023
	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Moral Defensiveness	0.244**	0.252**	0.286**	0.087*	0.126**
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.044)
Ethnic Group	2.033**	0.643*	-0.887**	-0.902**	-0.677
	(0.317)	(0.302)	(0.320)	(0.277)	(0.491)
Ethnic Group × Out-Group Trust	-0.199**				-0.076
	(0.067)				(0.064)
Ethnic Group × In-Group Satisfaction		0.105			-0.191**
		(0.055)			(0.061)
Ethnic Group× Collective Narcissism			0.486**		0.338**
			(0.070)		(0.094)
Ethnic Group × Moral Defensiveness				0.464**	0.380**
				(0.057)	(0.069)
Left Right Spectrum	-0.110**	-0.121**	-0.077*	-0.070	-0.060
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Proximity to Conflict	0.216*	0.209	0.100	0.078	0.050
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.098)
Age	0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income Level	0.042	0.022	0.018	0.040	0.045
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Constant	2.936**	3.682**	3.952**	3.789**	3.494**
	(0.380)	(0.349)	(0.323)	(0.311)	(0.371)
N	381.000	381.000	381.000	381.000	381.000
R^2	0.543	0.537	0.586	0.604	0.624

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

In Table 5.6, the ethnic group variable was introduced as a moderator. It's interaction with outgroup trust, ingroup satisfaction, collective narcissism and moral defensiveness were added separately (Step 1, Step 2, Step 3 and Step 4, respectively) and conjointly (Step 5) to the base model of Table 5.5. Step 5 which included all interactions explained 62% of the variance in the dependent variable, $F(13,367)= 46.90$, $p< .01$. Among covariates, age, income, and proximity to conflict did not predict competitive victimhood. Political orientation significantly predicted competitive victimhood in Step 1 ($\beta= .12$, p< .01), Step 2 ($\beta= .85$, $p< .01$), Step 3 ($\beta= .85$, $p< .05$), and Step 4 ($\beta= .85$, $p< .05$). However, this association was not present in the last step, as demonstrated in Table 5.6. Proximity to conflict was not significantly associated with competitive victimhood. This lack of association might be due to the suppression effect of the ethnic group variable, which was significantly correlated with ethnic composition ($r= .33$). Although the interaction between outgroup trust and ethnic group was significant in Step 1 ($\beta= -.20$, $p< .01$), when it was introduced to regression with other interaction terms in Step 5, the significance in Step 1 disappeared.

Figure 5.4 Interaction Plot for In-Group Satisfaction and Ethnic Group on Competitive Victimhood

The interaction between ethnic group membership and ingroup satisfaction was also significant (β= -.19, p< .01). Simple slope analysis demonstrated that ingroup satisfaction was associated with lower levels of competitive victimhood when participants were minority status group members (β= -.17, p<.01). Conversely, for Turkish participants, this association was not statistically significant (β= .02, p=.60). This association is illustrated in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.5 Interaction Plot for Collective Narcissism and Ethnic Group on Competitive Victimhood

Furthermore, the association between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood was significantly moderated by ethnic group membership (β= .34, p< .01). The simple slope analysis indicated that for the Kurdish group; there seems to be a positive and significant association between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood (β= .22, p< .01), while this association was negative and not significant for the Turkish group (β= -.10, p= .30) (see Figure 5.5).

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Figure 5.6 Interaction Plot for Moral Defensiveness and Ethnic Group on Competitive Victimhood

Lastly, the association between moral defensiveness and competitive victimhood was significantly moderated by the ethnic group variable ($\beta = .38$, $p < .01$). As presented in Figure 5.6, the simple slope analysis presented that for the Kurdish group, moral defensiveness was associated with increases in competitive victimhood ($\beta = .51$, $p < .01$). This association was positive and significant for the Turkish group too ($\beta = .12$, $p < .01$), but to a lesser extent. Therefore, moral defensiveness predicted greater competitive victimhood among both groups, however these associations were stronger among the minority status group.

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter aims to discuss the supported and unsupported hypotheses, list the strengths and weaknesses of the research, and suggest future research directions. The last section of this chapter offers a conclusion to the thesis.

The aim of this study was to understand factors associated with majority and minority status groups' competitive victimhood beliefs in the context of Turkish- Kurdish relations. With that aim, outgroup trust, collective narcissism, ingroup satisfaction, and moral defensiveness were tested as predictors of competitive victimhood. I also intended to analyze whether perceived intergroup conflict and ethnic group membership moderated these associations. Findings indicated that competitive victimhood was predicted by greater collective narcissism and moral defensiveness, whereas outgroup trust and ingroup satisfaction did not significantly predict competitive victimhood. Among these associations, the relationship between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood was moderated by perceived intergroup conflict. Further, these associations were also moderated by ethnic group membership. Specifically, the association between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood was stronger among minority group members. Moreover, for the minority group, increased ingroup satisfaction was associated with low levels of competitive victimhood, whereas competitive victimhood levels did not change in relation to ingroup satisfaction among the majority group. Furthermore, ethnic group significantly moderated the moral defensiveness and competitive victimhood association. Among both groups, higher moral defensiveness was associated with higher competitive victimhood, but for minorities, this association was more pronounced.

The first hypothesis of this study (Hypothesis 1) stated that outgroup trust would be associated negatively with competitive victimhood. My analyses did not provide empirical support for Hypothesis 1. Similarly, the proposed moderation effect of intergroup conflict and ethnic group over the association between outgroup trust and competitive victimhood (Hypothesis 5a and 5b, respectively) was not supported by the analysis. Given that previous research demonstrated that outgroup trust

was significantly associated with competitive victimhood (Noor, Brown, and Prentice 2008a), it is necessary to discuss the reasons why outgroup trust was not a significant predictor of competitive victimhood in this study. The non-significant relationship in the context of Turkish-Kurdish relations might be stemming from the preferred scale for this context. Trust has been measured in the context of conflict rather than a general understanding of trust in intergroup processes (e.g., "Despite everything that happened during the conflict, I trust [Turks/Kurds]", which adapted in the Turkish context as "Türk-Kürt çatışma sürecinde olanlara rağmen Türklere güveniyorum."). This decision aimed to measure the bias and the risks calculations under the current political conflict context rather than trust that evolves through daily social relations. However, although the scale did not aim to indicate either of the dominant conflict frames, which are conflict between the Turkish state and PKK, Turkish state and Kurdish people, or between two ethnic groups, participants who interpret the scale's framing of conflict as intercommunal might have responded it with bias. Previous research also demonstrated ethnic group differences in supporting specific conflict frames (Bilali 2014; Çelebi et al. 2014). Çelebi et al. (2014), for example, demonstrated that the endorsement of the first frame is stronger among Turks, while Kurds supported the frame that sees the conflict between the Turkish state and Kurds. Since participants framed the conflict as shaping their views on the legitimacy of primary parties, root causes, and responsibility attributions (Çelik and Blum 2007; Çelebi et al. 2014), the outgroup trust scale could have been accompanied by the attribution of responsibility scale.

The second hypothesis was that collective narcissism would be associated positively with competitive victimhood. In line with this prediction, higher collective narcissism was related to higher levels of competitive victimhood. This finding is in line with the existing collective narcissism literature demonstrating this construct to be related to more negative outgroup attitudes such as outgroup criticism (Golec de Zavala 2011; Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, and Lantos 2019), outgroup derogation (Golec de Zavala and Lantos 2020), retaliation (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Iskra-Golec 2013; Golec de Zavala et al. 2016), and support for violence (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009).

I further predicted that ingroup satisfaction would be associated negatively with competitive victimhood (Hypothesis 3). This association was not empirically supported. This non-significant relationship could be due to a significant zero-order correlation between ingroup satisfaction and collective narcissism, which is also underlined by the previous literature (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Iskra-Golec 2013) that has shown suppression effects. Some studies have even suggested that ingroup satisfaction may predict greater bias towards outgroup in the context of

Turkish-Kurdish relationships (Bagci, Stathi, and Golec de Zavala, under review). Nevertheless, the two-way interaction with ingroup satisfaction and ethnic group was significant, explained in the following sections.

Hypothesis 4 stated that moral defensiveness would be positively associated with competitive victimhood. In line with this prediction, higher levels of moral defensiveness were related to higher competitive victimhood levels. Therefore, as Sullivan et al. (2012) argued, competitive victimhood was characterized by endeavors to defend the moral credential of the ingroup.

Moderator Role of Perceived Intergroup Conflict

I expected that the relationship between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood to be more robust due to the moderation effect of perceived intergroup conflict (Hypothesis 5b). Generally, empirical findings were in line with my expectations; thus, for people who perceived high levels of conflict between Kurds-Turks, increased collective narcissism was related to high levels of competitive victimhood. These findings are in line with the previous literature, which provides evidence for changing intergroup behavior under heightened conflict. Increased intergroup conflict triggers negative outgroup emotions (Canetti et al. 2013), increases nationalistic tendencies (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Huddy, Feldman, and Weber 2007), as well as prejudice and outgroup derogation (e.g., Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen 2004; Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999), and thereby is likely to accentuate the associations between competitive victimhood and collective narcissism.

Further, I predicted that the relationship between moral defensiveness and competitive victimhood would be stronger for respondents who reported higher levels of perceived intergroup conflict (Hypothesis 5c). However, the logic of this expectation was that the heightened perception of conflict would increase the conflicting parties' need to be understood by third parties. Thus, parties would engage in justifying ingroup stance in the conflict morally. However, the evidence did not support this prediction. Nevertheless, moral defensiveness seemed to relate to greater competitive victimhood regardless the perceived level of conflict, which suggests this variable to function as a robust predictor of competitive victimhood independent of the personal evaluation of the conflict.

Moderator Role of Ethnic Group

Lastly, I intended to analyze the relationships across ethnic groups by introducing this variable as a moderator. The findings suggested that the relationship between collective narcissism and competitive victimhood was stronger among Kurds, while for Turks, this association was not statistically significant. Thus, supporting Hypothesis 6b, higher levels of collective narcissism were associated with higher levels of competitive victimhood particularly for Kurds. These findings are in line with Bağcı et al. ([in press]), which suggested that collective narcissism may be even higher among minority status groups and may predict negative intergroup relationships to a greater extent.

Previous studies investigating the effects of collective narcissism rarely account for both majority and minority group perspectives (but see Bağcı et al. [in press]). Although collective narcissism literature has been mainly focused on the majority group perspective (Golec de Zavala and Bierwiaczonek 2020), these findings suggest that narcissistic ingroup attachment is beyond asymmetric relations. Thus, low-status groups might hold narcissistic views of their identity; this effect might be stemming from; firstly, the need for a positive sense of self and positive ingroup image (Tajfel and Turner 2001[1979]); secondly, the need for recognition (Sanchez-Mazas 2018) underlined in the definition of collective narcissism. As argued by Burton (1990, 62), "self-esteem implies a need for recognition, for an identity which one can feel good about." Kurds often underline that their group is undervalued. Even in the early writings of Kurdish literature, such as Mem u Zin written in 1695, the need to recognize the value and potential of Kurdish people is pronounced (Öpengin 2012). Thus, rather than the direct aim of superiority, the high collective narcissism of Kurds might be stemming from this deep-rooted grievances which may be reflected on competitive victimhood beliefs.

I also hypothesized that the relationship between ingroup satisfaction and competitive victimhood would be stronger among Kurdish participants (Hypothesis 6c). In line with this hypothesis, findings indicated that a high level of ingroup satisfaction was associated with low levels of collective victimhood. Further, Kurds who reported secure ingroup positivity reported lower levels of competitive victimhood, but this association was not significant for Turks. These findings are in line with previous research that demonstrated the association between ingroup satisfaction with prosocial attitudes (Golec de Zavala 2011; Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, and Lantos 2019) and acknowledging wrongdoings (Dyduch-Hazar, Mrozinski, and Golec de Zavala 2019). However other studies found that ingroup satisfaction, when

entered together with collective narcissism into the equation, is not related to out-group variables (Guerra et al. 2020). Several factors might have contributed to the mentioned non-significant association for Turks. One reason could be linked to the characteristics of the estimation sample. Turkish respondents reported left-leaning political orientation, which was also a significant covariate in the regression analysis for the interaction between ethnic group and ingroup satisfaction. Previous research suggests that leftists tend to report lower levels of national attachment when national identity is positively evaluated (Caricati 2019). Another factor might be the relatively lower attachment of majority status group members to their Turkish identity itself. Previous research has suggested that often ethnic identities are more central to minority group members' overall identities (Phinney and Chavira 1992). Lastly, the survey took place at the peak of the pandemic; due to the restrictions, social isolation, and economic recession, ethnic identities among Turks might have been devalued. For people who evaluated Turkishness as a national identity, the scale might not reflect ethnic group satisfaction.

Finally, I predicted that the relationship between moral defensiveness and competitive victimhood would be stronger among Kurdish participants. In line with the expectations, Kurdish participants who held high moral defensiveness reported higher levels of competitive victimhood. One explanation to this finding is that as underlined in the literature review section, after the re-escalation of conflict in South-Eastern Turkey in 2015, people and platforms that publish, transmit or support narratives contrary to official narratives have been persecuted (Bayad and Aydemir 2020; Çiçek 2017; Human Rights Watch 2020). Thus, for minorities, presenting another side other story and sharing their narratives became increasingly difficult. Moral defensiveness in this sense might be a reflection of the current context. On the other hand, Turks who were morally defensive also reported higher levels of competitive victimhood, albeit to a lesser extent. This finding is in line with the argument of Campbell and Manning (2018), which is that the gradual shift of victimhood status has challenged on moral grounds. Therefore, victimhood status brings a moral upper hand to the group rather than identity threat. Previous research has long demonstrated majority group members to also engage in collective victimhood beliefs for protecting their moral image (Bar-Tal et al. 2009). However, this effect might not be directly causal; thus, future research should account for the mediating role of conflict frames and perception towards victimhood status.

Limitations and Future Directions

Correlational studies offer a relatively swift and convenient way to measure whether there is an association between variables of interest compared to other descriptive research designs. However, the correlational association between variables of interest does not indicate a causal link. As such, competitive victimhood beliefs may also fuel the formation of the other relevant constructs I hypothesized as independent variables. Future research may adopt experimental or quasi-experimental methods to demonstrate the causal link between the proposed predictors and competitive victimhood. Various manipulations of identity relevance may be introduced with a differential focus on ingroup satisfaction and collective narcissism.

Moreover, the snowball sampling method does not meet the criteria of a generalizable sample (e.g., nationally representative random sample studies). Therefore, this study does not claim causality or generalizability. Further limitations concern the mode of data collection. Although the survey enabled anonymity and the majority of the people who received the survey questionnaire did not report any concern regarding their security, some of them underlined the fear of being blacklisted and tracked by authorities. The number of people who gave up completing the survey after seeing political orientation questions and questions on the perceived level of conflict between Kurds and Turks also partly reflect this concern. Another common response for Kurds who refused to participate was the disbelief in any kind of change in the current state of the conflict. Similar challenges of working in conflict settings in the context of academic research have been listed by Moss, Uluğ, and Acar (2019). Therefore, further research may combine the trusted network of snowball sampling with face-to-face interactions, populations who feel more stigmatized and threatened can be reached out.

A related downside of the survey mode was that sample was mainly comprised of young adults, well-educated, left-leaning and urban residing people. Therefore, opinions of people with no internet connection, older populations, lower income levels are not well represented in the sample. Moreover, although the population that I was able to reach is predominantly composed of female (N=206) participants, a closer look into data reveals that for the Kurdish sample, the number of female participants is 67. Among those 67, only 2 of them are primary school graduates, while the majority of the female participants who identify as Kurdish hold bachelor's degrees. Therefore, Kurdish-speaking females who experience intersectional discrimination could not be represented in this study. While, in general, I did not reveal gender differences on competitive victimhood beliefs, further research may

focus on gender as a potential driver of competitive victimhood and the intersectionality of collective victimization in Turkey. Also, future data collection material may adopt a multilingual approach to increase inclusivity.

Lastly, I formulated the proximity to conflict variable and based on an arbitrary threshold of 100 conflict events to define a location as an active conflict area. Although the measure captures a different angle to analyze approaches to conflict and involves western cities instead of ethnic composition variables, future studies may check the varying effects of the active conflict coded according to fatality rates, duration of the conflict, and the level of destruction. Further, this variable is based on the residence location of the participants; further research may analyze the effects of the city of birth considering that the conflict has caused mass mobilization and migration of minority population.

Conclusion

The present research aimed to understand the factors that give rise to competitive victimhood beliefs among majority and minority status groups and whether these factors function similarly in both group contexts. To that end, the study analyzed Turkish-Kurdish group relations within the context of Turkey's Kurdish conflict. In addition to outgroup trust, which is an antecedent of competitive victimhood that has been tested in various contexts, I have intended to test relatively less studied drivers such as narcissistic and non-narcissistic forms of ingroup love as well as moral defensiveness as antecedents of competitive victimhood. To the best of my knowledge, previous studies have not tested the association of these variables. Moreover, I also aimed to extend the existing literature by further testing the moderating role of perceived interethnic conflict and ethnic group.

The implications of these findings are crucial. This study addresses which individual level factors tend to be associated with competitive victimhood beliefs, which is one of the main inhibitor of intergroup reconciliation especially in conflict contexts. This study aimed to understand predictors of competitive victimhood at the grassroots level. Future research may focus on the track I and II due to their role in conflict transformation and decision-making processes. Researchers also propose several strategies to reduce competitive victimhood, such as re-categorization into a common identity (Shnabel, Halabi, and Noor 2013), promoting reconciliation engaged in less competitive victimhood narratives (SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, and Halabi 2015), intergroup contact (Andrighetto et al. 2012; Bağcı et al. [in press]).

An analysis of the common or inclusive victimhood narratives and the effectiveness of alternative narratives should be conducted in the context of Turkish-Kurdish relations. For example, previous research showed that COVID-19 pandemic may have functioned as an inclusive victimhood category that reconciled Turkish natives and Syrian refugees (Adam-Troian and Bağcı 2021). The same effect may also occur in the context of Turkish-Kurdish relationships whereby competitive victimhood beliefs may diminish as the COVID-19 inclusive victimhood beliefs are made salient. Nevertheless, my findings demonstrated a relatively high levels of competitive victimhood beliefs which are needed to be resolved in order to promote reconciliatory processes between the two groups.

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APPENDIX A

Sabancı University Research Ethics Council (SUREC)

Date: April 3, 2021

To: Assoc. Prof. Sabahat Çiğdem Hemşinlioğlu Bağcı (Thesis Advisor/PI), Ceren Kaval (Co-I)

From: Prof. Mehmet Yıldız, Chair of the Research Ethics Committee

Protocol Number: FASS-2021-34
Protocol Name: Predictors of Competitive Victimhood in Turkey's Kurdish Conflict :The Turkish and Kurdish Group Context

Subject: SUREC Approval
Official Approval Date: April 26th, 2021

Sabancı University Research Ethics Council has approved the above named and numbered protocol through expedited review. You are responsible for promptly reporting to the SUREC:

- any severe adverse effects
- any unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others;
- any proposed changes in the research activity

Enclosed you can find the below noted approved documents.

☒ Protocol Application

☒ Informed Consent Form (please double click on the box for check if you included Consent Form)

If you have any questions please feel free to contact me via phone at 216-483 9010 or via e-mail at meyildiz@sabanciuniv.edu

Best Regards,

Prof. Mehmet Yıldız
Chair of the Ethics Committee

Orta Mahalle, Üniversite Caddesi No: 27
34956 Tuzla / İSTANBUL
📞 +90 (216) 483 9000
🖨 +90 (216) 483 9005
✉ sabanciuniversitesi@hs03.kep.tr

www.sabanciuniv.edu

FRG-A410-01-02

SABANCI UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ETHICS COUNCIL
APPLICATION FOR RESEARCH STUDY

For SUREC Use Only	
Protocol No: **FASS-2021-34**	Approval Date: April 26th, 2021
Modification Requested Date:	Modification Approval Date:

1. **Title:** Predictors of competitive victimhood beliefs in Turkey's Kurdish Conflict:The Turkish and Kurdish Group Context

2. **Principal Investigator(s)** (The Principal Investigator must be a faculty member or equivalent); **Co-Investigator (s)** (The Co-Investigator must be Master's or Phd Student)

Principal Investigator	**E-mail**	**Phone**
Assoc. Prof. Sabahat Çiğdem Hemşinlioğlu Bağcı/FASS Thesis Advisor	cigdem.bagci@sabanciuniv.edu	+90 216 483 9275
Co-Investigator		
Ceren Kaval / MA Student	cerenkaval@sabanciuniv.edu	+905069330559

Note: This application must be submitted by the Principal Investigator, who assumes full responsibility for compliance with this research study.

3. Programme:

Conflict Analysis and Resolution MA /FASS
Psychology / FASS

Please answer all questions below:

4. Will this be funded by an external sponsor? ☐Yes ☒No

If yes, list sponsor/funding agency:
Proposal Number:

5. Proposed Start Date (actual date may not precede SUREC approval date)

(tentative) April 2021

6. Describe the purpose of the research

Competitive victimhood is a phenomenon that parties in a protracted conflict compete over the sufferings of their group in other words who has suffered most is contested (Noor, James Brown, and Prentice 2008). Competition can be over the extent and quantity of the victimhood as well as the legitimacy status of the suffering (ibid). 2013). The individuals and groups, in this case, are closely intertwined, and perpetrator-victim division is not clear cut in most of the cases (Noor et al. 2017) and parties are stuck with mutually exclusive definitions of victim and perpetrator. Protracted conflicts have been characterized by ethnic or communal cleavages and lengthened nature (Azar 1985). Antagonistic nature of the relations among the conflicting groups solidifies reciprocal negative images attributed to each side by the other (Azar and Moon 1986).

This research aims to test the predictors of competitive victimhood among majority and minoority status groups in the context of Turkey's Kurdish conflict. Furthermore, the study

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aims to contribute to the existing literature by analyzing mediating effects of collective narcissim and in-group satisfaction.

Additionally, we will include some questions about inclusive victimhood belief questions regarding COVID-19 experience exploratorily to test whether COVID-19 inclusive victimhood beliefs would relate to reduced competitive victimhood and incrased intergroup trust in a conflict context.

7. Describe procedures to be used and any associated risks or discomforts.

The survey's target population consists of citizens of Turkey who are 18 and above at the time of the survey. The study aims to understand the dynamics between majority (ethnic Turks) and minority (ethnic Kurds) population.To that end, participants will be asked a screening question regarding which ethnic groups they identify with and respondents who identify with other ethnic groups will not be included in the analyses. There would be two versions of the questionnaire, one targeting the Kurdish group and the other targeting the Turkish group.

Similar to other correlational studies conducted in Turkey in the context of 'Kurdish question' and similar conflict settings (e.g. Bilali,2012; Bilali et al.,2012), sample size is expected to be between 150-200 from each ethnic group. The proposed research addresses a deeply rooted conflict that is reflected in the inter-group relations in Turkey.

Data will be collected through convenience sampling. Therefore, the survey will be disseminated through personal connections of the Primary Investigator (PI) and Co-Investigator (Co-I) as well as groups on social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn). The survey is expected to take no longer than 15-20 minutes. Participants will be informed about the purpose and scope of the survey and data protection methods (*see: Appendix A*).

In line with the purpose of the study, in the first stage of the survey, participants will be asked demographic questions including their ethnic group identification (*see: Appendix B*). The remaining participants who are in the sampling frame will be asked to respond to demographic questions. In the last section of the survey, participants will be asked to evaluate their level of in-group (in-group identification, in-group satisfaction, collective narcissism, moral defensiveness) and out-group attitudes (feeling thermometers, out-group trust). Moreover they will be asked questions on their collective victimhood (competitive victimhood and inclusive victimhood) beliefs and the nature of the conflict (perceived intergroup conflict). Items and scales are attached at the end of the form. Items and sections will be arranged to eliminate ordering effect.

In the context of the proposed research, investigators will not collect personal information such as TC identification number, name and surname, signature or phone number. However, investigators will collect data on participants' ethnicity to identify the majority and minority status group members. A detailed description of the discomfort and risk reduction measures are covered in the following section.

8. Describe in detail any safeguards to minimize risks or discomforts, including any measures to render the data anonymous (you will not know the identity of the research subject) or confidential (subjects' identity or personal identifying information will not be disclosed).

Before taking the survey, participants will be informed and assured that the answers will only be used for research purposes, and participant anonymity will be protected at every stage of the research. Their consent will be asked at the end of the informed consent form. The informed consent form (*Appendix A*) clearly states the voluntary nature of the study. Contact information (e-mail and phone numbers) of the PI, Co-I and Research Ethics Committee will be shared with the participants at the beginning and the end of the survey (*Appendix C Debriefing Form*).

Together with the emphasis on anonymity, the survey mode is expected to decrease the discomfort of participants regarding sharing their group identification. Unlike face to face interviews, online surveys enable respondents to share sincere and straightforward answers.

Surveys such as that conducted by Konda (2011), Bağcı et al. (2020) have utilized the same phrasing of the screening question. Therefore, the investigators do not expect any discomfort regarding the questions.

Data will be collected through Qualtrics, a company compliant with the GDPR and ISO 270001 certified. Thus, the company abides by the international standards of information security and does not use or transmit personal data to a third-party. The data will be encrypted by the company in question before stored in their servers in the EU for 90 days under the Disaster Recovery Plan (precautionary back-up system to prevent data loss in the event of a disaster. In this case also, data will be available only to research personnel upon their request).

PI and Co-I will analyze/process the data in a password-protected computer. Data will be stored in a password protected hard-drive and cloud environment that is only available to the research personnel. PI and Co-I will store the data for at least five years. Data security and confidentiality are addressed in the attached informed consent form.

Data collected would be kept confidential and would be used for only academic purposes (research papers, conference presentations, etc.). As most of the data would be collected online, the principal investigator would be responsible for keeping copies of the online data for a minimum period of three years (mostly required by scientific journals). Moreover, the anonymous data would be uploaded at an online repository (if asked by the journal and with the removal of some demographic data).

9. Describe any financial compensation or other potential benefits to the subjects associated with this research activity.
There is no financial compensation or other potential benefits to the subjects associated with the proposed research. Participation will be voluntary.

10. Does the proposed human subject research pose a financial conflict of interest to the PI. ☐Yes ☒No If yes, please explain.

11. Is the consent form attached? ☒Yes ☐No If no, please justify the need to waive this requirement. (If subjects under the age of 18 are to participate in the study, a parental consent form will also be required.)

12. Benefits and Risks: Do the potential benefits to the subjects and/or the anticipated gain in research knowledge outweigh the risks to the subjects? Explain. (Be specific and succinct - do not "justify" the research.)

There is no foreseen psychological or physiological risk to participants (other than the ones listed above). In order to decrease participants' sensitivity to the questions around ethnicity, ethnic group, and victimhood beliefs, we will highlight in the informed consent that a) there is not right or wrong in the questions and participants can choose the most appropriate answer that suits their feelings, b) the scales we used have been previously used in different socio-cultural and intergroup contexts that involve more or less tension, and c) the aim of the studies is to ultimately design strategies towards the improvement of intergroup relationships between groups/communities and create societal harmony.

To minimize mentioned discomforts, the respondents will be also informed of their freedom not to complete the survey in question. There are no external risks resulting from participating in the study as the participant's confidentiality will be ensured through the

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methods listed above. The information gained as a result of the research will be confined to academic endeavours.

The potential benefits of the research outweigh the risks to the subjects because this study will contribute to the gaps in the literature and increase the academic representation of a minority status group.

13. If another institution(s) is involved in the proposed research, please list each institution, the protocol number, and SUREC approval date. ☐Yes ☒No
If the answer is Yes, then please share the Aporoval Form as an Annex.

14. After reviewing the University Research Ethics Council Instruction
http://mysu.sabanciuniv.edu/surecharitasi/tr/yonerge/irg-a410-02
I believe this protocol to be:

☐ Exempt from further SUREC review   ☒Expedited   ☐ Full Council review required.

Applicants Signature

For SUREC Use Only	
Protocol No:**FASS-2021-34**	Approval Date: April 26th, 2021
Modification Requested Date:	Modification Approval Date:

Title: Predictors of Competitive Victimhood in Turkey's Kurdish Conflict
Principal Investigator: Assoc. Prof. Sabahat Çiğdem Hemşinlioğlu Bağcı – FASS / Thesis Advisor
Co-Investigator: Ceren Kaval / MA Student

THIS SPACE FOR SUREC USE ONLY

☐ The protocol has been determined to be exempt from SUREC review in accordance with Sabancı University Research Ethics Council procedure.

☒ The protocol has been approved through expedited review in accordance with Sabancı University Research Ethics Council procedure.

☐ The Institutional Review Board has been approved the protocol through full review review in accordance with Sabancı University Research Ethics Council procedure.

The SUREC approval is valid for two years after the given approval date.

APPROVED BY THE SABANCI UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ETHICS COUNCIL

Prof. Mehmet Yıldız
SUREC Chair

Prof. S. Arzu Wasti
SUREC Member

Assist. Prof. Nedim Nomer
SUREC Member

Assist. Prof. Ogün Adebali
SUREC Member

Prof. Zafer Gedik
SUREC Member

APPENDIX B

Consent Form

Sabancı Üniversitesi

Araştırmaya Katılım Onam Formu

Araştırma Başlığı: Rekabetçi Mağduriyetin Yordayıcıları

Asli Araştırmacı: Doç.Dr. Sabahat Çiğdem Hemşinlioğlu Bağcı

Eş Araştırmacı ve Uygulayıcı: Ceren Kaval

Çalışmanın Amacı:

Bu çalışma Sabancı Üniversitesi, Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü programı yüksek lisans öğrencisi Ceren Kaval tarafından, Sanat ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Sabahat Çiğdem Hemşinoğlu Bağcı danışmanlığında yüksek lisans tez araştırması kapsamında yürütülmektedir. Bu form sizi araştırmanın kapsamı ve koşulları hakkında bilgilendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Araştırmanın çıktıları uzun süreli çatışmaların gruplar arası ilişkilere olan etkisini anlama ve analiz etmede kullanılacaktır. Araştırmanın 15-20 dakikada tamamlanması öngörülmektedir. Katılımınız, bu konuyu araştırmamıza büyük ölçüde katkı sağlayacaktır. Bu çalışmaya katılmak tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayanır. Çalışmaya katılmama veya katıldıktan sonra herhangi bir aşamada çalışmadan ayrılma hakkına sahipsiniz.

Çalışma Boyunca:

Karşılaşacağınız soruların doğru ya da yanlış bir cevabı yoktur. Vereceğiniz tüm cevaplarda sizin kendi görüşlerinizi dürüst ve açık bir şekilde ifade ediyor olmanız bizim için çok önemlidir.

Kişisel Veriler ve Gizlilik:

Araştırma süresince katılımcılardan kimlik bilgileri talep edilmeyecektir ve tüm cevaplarınız gizli tutulacaktır. Katılımcılardan toplanılan veriler cevapları veren kişiler ile eşleştirilmeyecektir ve veriler sayısal olarak kodlanarak saklanacaktır. Sizden başka hiç kimse hangi verinin size ait olduğunu bilmeyecektir. Veriler sadece bu çalışma içerisinde bilimsel amaçlı olarak kullanılacaktır. Araştırma sonuçlarının yayınlanması halinde dahi kimliğiniz gizli kalacaktır.

Kazanımlar ve Riskler:
Bu çalışmaya katılmanın herhangi bir riski öngörülmemektedir. Çalışmaya katılımınız karşılığında size maddi bir ödeme yapılmayacaktır.

Araştırmamız hakkında daha fazla bilgi edinmek ve sorularınız için Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Ceren Kaval (cerenkaval@sabanciuniv.edu) veya Sabancı Üniversitesi öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Sabahat Çiğdem Bağcı Hemşinlioğlu ile cigdem.bagci@sabanciuniv.edu adresinden iletişime geçebilirsiniz.

Haklarınızın herhangi bir şekilde ihlal edildiğine inanıyorsanız lütfen Sabancı Üniversitesi Araştırma Etik Kurulu Başkanı Prof. Mehmet Yıldız ile +90 216 483 9010 numaralı telefondan veya mehmet.yildiz@sabanciuniv.edu adresine e-posta göndererek iletişime geçiniz.

Çalışmamıza katılımınız için çok teşekkür ederiz. Eğer çalışmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorsanız, aşağıdaki 'Katılmayı onaylıyorum' seçeneğini işaretleyiniz.

- Katılmayı onaylıyorum

- Katılmayı onaylamıyorum

Survey Questionnaire (English)

We are all citizens of the Republic of Turkey, but we may be of different ethnic origins. How do you know or feel yourself, your identity?

__Turkish
__Kurdish
__Other (Please specify)

How old are you?

Please indicate your gender:

__Male
__Female
__Prefer not to report
__Other

Please indicate the highest level of education you have

__ Primary School Graduate
__ Secondary School Graduate
__ High School Graduate
__ Bachelor's Degree
__ Master's Degree or PhD

Which city are you living currently?

How would you describe your socio-economic status? *(1 Very Low to 7 Very High*

(Remaining questions measured in 7 point likert scale. Unless otherwise stated 1 indicates Strongly Disagree and 7 indicates Strongly Agree)

How would you describe your political view? *(1 Very Left to 7 Very Right)*

How would you describe where you live? *(1 Very Rural to 7 Very Urban)*

I identitfy myself as a Turk/Kurd.

Being a Turk/Kurd is a central aspect of who I am.

Belonging to my ethnic group is an important part of my identity.

Most [Turks, Kurds] cannot be trusted to deliver on their promises (reverse)

Despite everything that happened during the conflict, I trust [Turks, Kurds]

I think that the [Turks, Kurds] can be trusted in their promises in the conflict

How would you rate your feelings towards the following groups, ranging from 0 (extremely negative) to 100 (extremely positive)?

__Turks/Kurds
__Syrian Refugees
__Alevites

I am glad to be [Turkish/Kurdish].

I think that [Turks/Kurds] have a lot to be proud of.

It is pleasant to be [Turkish/Kurdish].

Being [Turkish/Kurdish] gives me a good feeling.

Please rate the Turks/Kurds according to the following characteristics. To what extent do you think the Turks are .....? Specify from 1 to 7.

__Negative / Positive
__Cold / Warm
__Hostile / Friendly

I wish other groups would more quickly recognize the authority of my group.

My group deserves special treatment.

Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my group.

I insist upon my group getting the respect that is due to it.

It really makes me angry when others criticize my group.

If my group had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place.

I do not get upset when people do not notice achievements of my group (reversed).

The true worth of my group is often misunderstood.

I will never be satisfied until my group gets the recognition it deserves.

In Turkey's Kurdish conflict, there is no place for compromise: either the Turks win or the Kurds win.

To what extent do think there is a conflict between Turks and Kurds?

Most [Turks, Kurds] cannot be trusted to deliver on their promises' (reverse).

Despite everything that happened during the conflict, I trust [Turks, Kurds].

I think that the [Turks, Kurds] can be trusted in their promises in the conflict.

I want the world to understand that my ingroup took part in atrocities because it had no choice.

It is important for me to protect the moral integrity of my ingroup.

Over the last 30 years of the conflict, my community has not suffered more than the Kurds/Turks (reverse).

On average, the areas that have been most affected by the Kurdish conflict are those in which members of my community live.

Overall, the proportion of trauma due to the Kurdish conflict has been more severe in my community (Turk/Kurd) than in the other community.

On average, throughout the conflict, more harm has been done to my community (Turk/Kurd) than to the other community.

Overall, victims in my community (Turks/Kurds) have not received adequate attention to their needs compared to victims in the other community.

Many groups have suffered from COVID-19 in ways similar to my group (Turks/Kurds).

The victimization of my group (Turks/Kurds) during COVID-19 happened according to general patterns that all over the world.

My group (Turks/Kurds) has a lot in common with other groups that have experienced COVID-19.

Turks and Kurds have suffered from COVID-19 in similar ways.

The victimization of Turks/Kurds during COVID-19 happened according to general patterns that repeat all over the world.

Turks and Kurds have a lot in common in terms of their COVID-19 experience.

Turkish and Kurdish victims of COVID-19 belong to two different groups.

Turkish and Kurdish victims of COVID-19 belong to a single victim group.

APPENDIX D

Survey Questionnaire (Turkish)

Hepimiz Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşıyız, ama değişik etnik kökenlerden olabiliriz. Siz kendinizi, kimliğinizi ne olarak biliyorsunuz veya hissediyorsunuz?
___Kürt
___Türk
___Diğer (Metin Kutusu)

Cinsiyetiniz
___Kadın
___Erkek
___Diğer (Metin Kutusu)
___Belirtmeyi tercih etmiyorum

Kaç yaşındasınız?

Sahip olduğunuz en yüksek eğitim seviyesini belirtiniz.
___İlkokul mezunu
___Ortaokul mezunu
___Lise Mezunu
___Üniversite (lisans) mezunu
___Yüksek lisans / Doktora

Hangi şehirde yaşıyorsunuz?

Yaşadığınız bölgeyi nasıl tanımlarsınız?

Sosyo-ekonomik durumunuzu nasıl tanımlarsınız?

Politik görüşünüzü nasıl tanımlarsınız?

Lütfen her maddeye bakarak ne derece katıldığınızı belirtiniz. "1= Kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 4 = Ne katılmıyorum ne katılıyorum, 7 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum seçeneklerini temsil eder."

Kendimi Kürt olarak tanımlıyorum.

Etnik kimliğim benliğimin önemli bir parçasıdır.

Etnik grubuma ait olmak kimliğimin önemli bir parçasıdır.

Aşağıda belirtilen gruplara karşı 0 derece (son derece olumsuz) ile 100 derece (son derece olumlu) arasında değişen duygularınızı nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?

Türklere/Kürtlere karşı duygularınızı nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?

Suriyeli göçmenlere karşı duygularınızı nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?

Alevilere karşı duygularınızı nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?

Kürt olmaktan memnunum.

Kürtlerin gurur duyacak çok şeyi olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Kürt olmak beni mutlu eder.

Kürt olmak bana iyi hisler verir.

Lütfen Türkleri /Kürtleri aşağıdaki özelliklere göre değerlendirin. Türklerin ne derecede ..... olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? 1 ile 7 arasında belirtiniz.

__Olumsuz / Olumlu
__Soğuk / Sıcak
__Düşman /Arkadaş Canlısı

Lütfen her maddeye bakarak ne derece katıldığınızı belirtiniz. "1= Kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 4 = Ne katılmıyorum ne katılıyorum, 7 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum seçeneklerini temsil eder."

Diğer grupların, etnik grubumun yetkisini daha çabuk tanımasını isterdim.

Etnik grubum özel muameleyi hak ediyor.

Pek çok insan etnik grubumun önemini tam olarak anlamıyor gibi.

Etnik grubumun hak ettiği saygıyı görmesi konusunda ısırarcıyım.

Başkaları etnik grubumu eleştirdiğinde bu beni gerçekten kızdırıyor.

Etnik grubum dünya çapında söz sahibi olsaydı, dünya çok daha iyi bir yer olurdu.

İnsanlar etnik grubumun başarılarını fark etmediğinde üzülmem.

Pek çok insan etnik grubumun gerçek değeri tam olarak anlayamıyor.

Etnik grubum hak ettiği itibarı kazanana kadar asla tatmin olmayacağım.

Türklerle Kürtler arasında çatışma seviyesinin ne derecede olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz?

Türk-Kürt ilişkilerinde uzlaşmaya yer yok: ya Türkler kazanır ya da Kürtler kazanır.

Çoğu Türk'ün, vaatlerine/sözlerine güvenilmez.

Türk-Kürt çatışma sürecinde olanlara rağmen Türklere güveniyorum.

Çatışmada Türklerin vaatlerine güvenilebileceğini düşünüyorum.

Etnik grubumun başka seçeneği olmadığı için çatışmaya dahil olduğunu dünyanı anlamasını istiyorum.

Etnik grubumun ahlaki bütünlüğünü korumak benim için önemlidir.

Çatışmanın son 30 yılı boyunca benim grubum Türklerden daha fazla acı çekmedi.

Ortalama olarak, çatışmadan en çok etkilenen bölgeler, benim etnik grubumun yaşadığı bölgelerdir.

Genel olarak, benim grubumda çatışmadan sonucu oluşan travmalar karşı grubun yaşadığından daha şiddetlidir.

Genel olarak bakıldığında, çatışma boyunca Kürtler karşı gruba göre daha fazla zarar görmüştür.

Genel olarak, etnik grubumdaki mağdurların ihtiyaçlarına, karşı grubun ihtiyaçlarına kıyasla, daha az ilgi gösterildi.

Diğer etnik gruplar da, benim grubuma benzer şekillerde COVID-19 mağduru olmuştur.

Grubumun COVID-19 sırasındaki mağduriyeti tüm dünyada görülen şekildedir.

Etnik grubumun COVID-19 salgınından etkilenen diğer etnik gruplarla birçok ortak noktası var.

Hem Türkler hem Kürtler benzer şekilde COVID-19 salgınından mağdurdur.

COVID-19 sırasında Kürtlerin mağduriyeti, dünya üzerindeki diğer gruplara benzer şekilde yaşandı.

COVID-19 mağduru Türkler ve COVID-19 mağduru Kürtler iki farklı gruba aittir.

COVID-19 kurbanı Türk ve Kürtler tek bir mağdur grubu oluşturmaktadır.

Debriefing Form

Araştırma Başlığı: Rekabetçi Mağduriyetin Yordayıcıları

Çalışmaya katılımız ve işbirliğiniz için teşekkürler.

Çalışmanın Amacı:
Bu çalışma Sabancı Üniversitesi, Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü programı yüksek lisans öğrencisi Ceren Kaval tarafından, Sanat ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Sabahat Çiğdem Hemşinoğlu danışmanlığında yüksek lisans tez araştırması kapsamında yürütülmektedir. Araştırmanın çıktıları uzun süreli çatışmaların gruplar arası ilişkilere olan etkisini anlama ve analiz etmede kullanılacaktır.

Geri Bildirim:
Çalışma hakındaki geri bildirim, şikayet ve önerilerinizi almaktan mutluluk duyarız. Geri bildirimlerinizi sayfanın sonundaki iletişim adresleri ya da aşağıdaki mesaj kutusu aracılığı ile araştırmacılara iletebilirsiniz.

İletişim Bilgileri:

Araştırmamız hakkında daha fazla bilgi edinmek ve sorularınız için Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Ceren Kaval (cerenkaval@sabanciuniv.edu) veya Sabancı Üniversitesi öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Sabahat Çiğdem Bağcı Hemşinlioğlu ile cigdem.bagci@sabanciuniv.edu adresinden iletişime geçebilirsiniz.

Haklarınızın herhangi bir şekilde ihlal edildiğine inanıyorsanız lütfen Sabancı Üniversitesi Araştırma Etik Kurulu Başkanı Prof. Mehmet Yıldız ile +90 216 483 9010 numaralı telefondan veya mehmet.yildiz@sabanciuniv.edu adresine e-posta göndererek iletişime geçiniz.Çalışmamıza katılımınız için çok teşekkür ederiz.

APPENDIX F

Explorotary Factor Analysis

Table F.1 Collective Narcissism Factor Loadings (For Turkish Sample)

	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Diğer grupların, etnik grubumun yetkisini daha çabuk tanımasını isterdim.	0.8035	0.3544
Etnik grubum özel muameleyi hak ediyor.	0.7980	0.3632
Pek çok insan etnik grubumun önemini tam olarak anlamıyor gibi.	0.7891	0.3773
Etnik grubumun hak ettiği saygıyı görmesi konusunda ısrarcıyım.	0.8494	0.2785
Başkaları etnik grubumu eleştirdiğinde bu beni gerçekten kızdırıyor.	0.8111	0.3420
Etnik grubum dünya çapında söz sahibi olsaydı, dünya çok daha iyi bir yer olurdu.	0.8657	0.2505
İnsanlar etnik grubumun başarılarını fark etmediğinde üzülmem.	0.2449	0.9400
Pek çok insan etnik grubumun gerçek değeri tam olarak anlayamıyor.	0.8194	0.3286
Etnik grubum hak ettiği itibarı kazanana kadar asla tatmin olmayacağım.	0.8749	0.2345

Table F.2 Collective Narcissism Factor Loadings (For Kurdish Sample)

	Factor 1	Factor2	Uniqueness
Diğer grupların, etnik grubumun yetkisini daha çabuk tanımasını isterdim.	0.7592	0.0703	0.4187
Etnik grubum özel muameleyi hak ediyor.	0.6508	0.1281	0.5601
Pek çok insan etnik grubumun önemini tam olarak anlamıyor gibi.	0.8566	0.0443	0.2643
Etnik grubumun hak ettiği saygıyı görmesi konusunda ısrarcıyım.	0.8547	0.0376	0.2680
Başkaları etnik grubumu eleştirdiğinde bu beni gerçekten kızdırıyor.	0.6599	-0.1949	0.2680
Etnik grubum dünya çapında söz sahibi olsaydı, dünya çok daha iyi bir yer olurdu.	0.7245	-0.0501	0.4726
İnsanlar etnik grubumun başarılarını fark etmediğinde üzülmem.	0.1781	0.9568	0.0528
Pek çok insan etnik grubumun gerçek değeri tam olarak anlayamıyor.	0.8244	-0.1086	0.3085
Etnik grubum hak ettiği itibarı kazanana kadar asla tatmin olmayacağım.	0.7838	-0.1568	0.3611

Table F.3 Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Competitive Victimhood || Perceived Intergroup Conflict

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6
In-Group Satisfaction	0.028	0.026	0.031	0.032	0.032	0.003
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.097)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.115)
Out-Group Trust	-0.129**	0.031	-0.110**	-0.112**	-0.111**	0.041
	(0.038)	(0.116)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.118)
Moral Defensiveness	0.364**	0.351**	0.353**	0.353**	0.362**	0.377**
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.099)	(0.116)
Collective Narcissim (EFA)	-0.176*	-0.200**	-0.195**	-0.169	-0.196**	-0.130
	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.180)	(0.074)	(0.231)
Perceived Conflict		0.289**	0.166	0.167**	0.174*	0.297
		(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.037)	(0.086)	(0.173)
Out-Group Trust × P.C.		-0.028				-0.031
		(0.022)				(0.022)
In-Group Satisfaction × P.C.			0.000			0.005
			(0.019)			(0.023)
Collective Narcissim (EFA) × P.C.				-0.006		-0.016
				(0.036)		(0.047)
Moral Defensiveness × P.C.					-0.002	-0.005
					(0.019)	(0.023)
Age	0.008	0.010*	0.010*	0.010*	0.010*	0.010*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Income Level	-0.050	-0.060	-0.058	-0.058	-0.058	-0.061
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Left Right Spectrum	-0.188**	-0.126**	-0.128**	-0.128**	-0.129**	-0.126**
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Proximity to Conflict	0.490**	0.448**	0.464**	0.464**	0.464**	0.443**
	(0.115)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.114)
Constant	3.645**	1.999**	2.586**	2.587**	2.550**	1.969*
	(0.388)	(0.633)	(0.601)	(0.447)	(0.560)	(0.894)
N	381.000	381.000	381.000	381.000	381.000	381.000
R^2	0.404	0.438	0.435	0.435	0.435	0.438

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table F.4 Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Competitive Victimhood || Ethnic Group

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5
In-Group Satisfaction	-0.045	-0.075	-0.081*	-0.059	0.015
	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.038)
Out-Group Trust	0.020	-0.077*	-0.080*	-0.079*	-0.022
	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.041)
Moral Defensiveness	0.234**	0.238**	0.285**	0.086*	0.120**
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.044)
Ethnic Group	2.174**	0.829*	1.206**	-0.820**	1.189*
	(0.318)	(0.322)	(0.120)	(0.277)	(0.507)
Collective Narcissism (EFA)	0.074	0.070	-0.238**	0.098	-0.082
	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.067)	(0.089)
Proximity to Conflict	0.178	0.182	0.067	0.041	0.014
	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.099)
Ethnic Group × Out-Group Trust	-0.227**				-0.110
	(0.068)				(0.064)
Ethnic Group × In-Group Satisfaction		0.071			-0.231**
		(0.057)			(0.062)
Ethnic Group × Collective Narcissism (EFA)			0.678**		0.476**
			(0.102)		(0.136)
Ethnic Group × Moral Defensiveness				0.460**	0.387**
				(0.057)	(0.070)
Age	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income Level	0.029	0.009	0.006	0.025	0.036
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Left Right Spectrum	-0.103*	-0.123**	-0.074	-0.068	-0.056
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Constant	3.154**	3.903**	3.628**	4.158**	3.340**
	(0.395)	(0.357)	(0.331)	(0.325)	(0.378)
N	381.000	381.000	381.000	381.000	381.000
R^2	0.534	0.522	0.572	0.591	0.617

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$