

**ASSESSING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: SOMALIA AS A CASE STUDY**

by
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Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Sabanci University
June 2021

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Date of Approval: June 15, 2021

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ABSTRACT

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POLITICAL SCIENCE M.A. THESIS, JUNE 2021

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Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Africa, emerging powers, Somalia, analytic
eclecticism

As a country in pursuit of a role as a global power, Turkey has advanced its relations with Somalia, which serves as an arena for Turkey to project its influence. Turkey has recently geared its foreign policy towards advancing relations with Africa and the global south in general. This thesis as a single case study looks at what foreign policy tools Ankara employs to advance itself as an actor in Somalia. It investigates the dynamics that drive and shape TFP towards Somalia. The study builds on three theoretical perspectives—realism, liberal theory of international politics, and social constructivism. Taken together, the theories provide an eclectic analytical approach to Turkish foreign policy, rather than a competitive one. The realist perspective provides insights on Turkey's need to maintain security in the horn of Africa and south of the gulf region. It also explains how Somalia provides Turkey the opportunity to project power. Building on the liberal theory of international politics, the thesis tests the hypothesis that Turkey's interests is shaped by interests of powerful domestic actors and businessmen. Findings from this thesis corroborates this hypothesis. Finally, social constructivism explains Turkish foreign policy from the perspective of religious and cultural affinity. Findings from the study suggests that Turkey's interests in Somalia is driven by its cultural and religious affinity. Additionally, analysis of Turkey-Somalia bilateral reports indicate that Turkey has successfully emerged an important global actor by strategically devising foreign policy tools, such as health and humanitarian aid, that meet the needs and demands of Somalia.

ÖZET

SAHRA ALTI AFRIKA'YA YÖNELİK TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASININ DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ: BİR ÖRNEK OLAY OLARAK SOMALİ

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SİYASET BİLİMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, HAZİRAN 2021

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. MELTEM MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk dış politikası, Afrika, yükselen güçler, Somali, eklektik analitik

Küresel bir güç rolünün takibinde olan bir ülke olarak Türkiye, tesirini yansıması için bir arena görevi gören Somali ile ilişkilerini ilerletmiştir. Son dönemlerde Türkiye, dış politikasını Afrika ve genel olarak küresel güney ile ilişkilerini ilerletmeye yönelik olarak belirledi. Bu tez bir vaka çalışması olarak Ankara'nın Somali'deki aktörlüğünü geliştirmek için kullandığı dış politika araçlarını incelemektedir. Somali'ye yönelik TDP'yi sürükleyen ve şekillendiren dinamikleri araştırır. Bu çalışma, gerçekçilik(realist), liberal uluslararası siyaset teorisi ve sosyal inşacılık olmak üzere üç teorik perspektif üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Birlikte ele alındığında teoriler, Türk dış politikasına rekabetçi olmaktan ziyade eklektik analitik bir yaklaşım sağlar. Realist perspektif, Türkiye'nin Afrika boynuzunda ve Körfez bölgesinin güneyinde güvenliğini sağlama ihtiyacına dair içgörüler sağlıyor. Ayrıca, Somali'nin Türkiye'ye nasıl güç yansıtma fırsatı verdiğini de açıklıyor. Bu tez, liberal uluslararası siyaset teorisinin üzerine inşa ederek, Türkiye çıkarlarının güçlü yerel aktörler ve iş adamlarının çıkarları tarafından şekillendirildiği hipotezi test ediyor. Bu tezden elde edilen bulgular bu hipotezi onaylıyor. Son olarak sosyal inşacılık, Türk dış politikasını dini ve kültürel yakınlık perspektifinden açıklıyor. Çalışmadan elde edilen bulgular, Türkiye'nin Somali'deki çıkarlarının kültürel ve dini yakınlığından kaynaklandığını gösteriyor. Ek olarak, Türkiye-Somali ikili raporların analizi göstermektedir ki dış politika araçlarını stratejik olarak düzenlemesi, örneğin Somali'nin ihtiyaç ve taleplerini karşılayan sağlık ve insani yardımlar, Türkiye'yi başarıyla önemli bir küresel aktör olarak ortaya çıkarmıştır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing this thesis during a pandemic had several hurdles that I had to overcome. Thankfully, I had the support of a number of people who all made this experience less daunting.

I would like to extend the warm appreciations to Professor Meltem Müftüleri-Baç who supervised my research and guided me in this research amidst the pandemic. I also appreciate the feedback from my thesis jury members, Professor Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Asst. Professor Aylin Ece-Çiçek, whose feedback helped improve the quality of my study.

I also extend my appreciation to my family who have been a source of unwavering support, especially emotionally, throughout my academic journey. I couldn't have been any luckier to have the support of such amazing people.

*Dedication page
to Yaya, Dada, Babs, Kamil, and Muda*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP Justice and Development Party	6
ANAP Motherland Party	8
CHP Republican People's Party	8
DSP Democratic Left Party	8
EU European Union	1
FP Islamist Virtue Party	8
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country	36
IMF International Monetary Fund	36
LDC Least Developed Countries	11
MHP Nationalist Movement Party	8
MMR Maternal Mortality Rate	62
ODA Official Development Assistance	10
RP Welfare Party	8
TFP Turkish Foreign Policy	1
TGNA Turkish Grand National Assembly	2
TIKA Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency	4
UN United Nations	35
WHO World Health organisation	62

1. INTRODUCTION

International politics is a hierarchical game of power where actors (i.e., states) at different levels of the hierarchy compete with each other to emerge atop (Lemke 2002; Organski 1958). States are motivated to ascend the hierarchy because “the international system is decisively shaped by the dominant nation” (Kim and Gates 2015, 220). This understanding of the international system, also known as the power transition theory, allows room for emerging powers like Turkey to assert more power in the regional and/or global arena (Lemke 2002). Yet, an important is that remains is whether states are solely motivated by their desire for more power.

This thesis provides a case study of Turkey’s foreign policy endeavours, objectives and interests in Somalia. It unravels two drivers of Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) in Somalia in addition to the desire for gaining more regional and global power argument found in the current literature (Friedberg 2011; Gilpin 1981; Lemke 2002; Organski 1958). The central argument of this thesis is that Turkey is motivated not only by rational interests at the international/structural level to enhance its global standing, but also by domestic factors and at the ideational level. Thus, the thesis proposes that TFP is driven by both ideas and material interests. This thesis contributes to the literature by showing that structural level theories are not necessarily contradictory to domestic level or ideational theories. Rather, it shows that these theories, taken together, explain various drivers of foreign policy.

Chapter 2 traces the historical evolution of TFP in the last thirty years, following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire. The chapter shows that TFP have had different goals at different points in time: activism in post-cold war era to maintain peace in its region (Sayari 2000); attaining membership position at the European Union (EU) (Müftüleri-Baç 1996), focus on Euro-Asianism (Öniş and Yilmaz 2009) and finally Afro-EuroAsianism in recent times. In recent years, TFP has adopted a more global approach by extending its foreign policy beyond its immediate neighbourhood, particularly to Africa. I present empirical evidence on how Turkey employs various foreign policy tools such as trade and humanitarian aid

to deepen its relations with the region.

In chapter 3, the thesis presents three theoretical perspectives and a hypothesis from each of these perspectives in understanding Turkey as a rising power. The theories in focus are realism, liberal theory of IR and ideational theory. By employing these theories, the chapter teases out how various factors shape TFP. The realist perspective accounts for the structural and institutional elements of international system. Liberal theory of IR accounts for the domestic actors such as the interests of civilian groups and individual that push their agenda to the forefronts of foreign policy. Lastly, building on the social constructivism theory, a hypothesis that accounts for identity-related factors such religion and culture in shaping Turkey's interests in Somalia is devised.

Chapter 4 presents empirical evidence that examines the various aspects of Turkey-Somalia relations. This chapter relies on data from various sources to test the hypotheses developed in chapter 3. Using World Bank trade data, the chapter traces the advancement of Turkey-Somalia trade volume in the last two decades. It also compares the trade volume with the rest of the world to see how Turkey competes with other traditional global actors in the region. Similar analysis using development aid data from OECD's DAC data is also made. The data show a similar pattern of increment in Turkey's aid in the last decade making it one of the most important contributors to Somalia. The chapter also examines the development of diplomatic and security relations in Turkey's relations with Somalia.

Chapter 5 relies on reports of bilateral agreements between Turkey and Somalia submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) for ratification for empirical analysis. These reports show cooperation in various areas including economic and social development, investors and investment cooperation, health and medical sciences, security and defence cooperation, and cultural cooperation. The analyses reveal various elements of the theories discussed in the theoretical chapter.

1.1 A Case for Theoretical Eclecticism

Eclecticism in social science, particularly in the study of international relations and comparative politics, "is an intellectual stance that supports efforts to complement, engage, and selectively utilize theoretical constructs embedded in contending research traditions to build complex arguments that bear on substantive problems of interest to both scholars and practitioners" (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 411). Ana-

lytical eclecticism is particularly useful when we study phenomenon that does not fit neatly in a single theoretical framework. This virtue of this approach lies in the fact that political phenomena are often complicated and require various views to fully understand. For example, realism in explaining state interests ignores domestic factors such as democracy and domestic actors which are capture by the liberal theory of international relations. Similarly, constructivism includes ideational elements that could not be studied from the aforementioned theoretical perspectives. Hence, eclecticism demands viewing theories in a complementary fashion rather than a competitive one.

This approach does not aim to defend a single set of assumptions emerging from a theory. By so doing, eclecticism transcends limitations created by units of analyses that are often rigid in individual theories (Lake 2013). Put in the context of this thesis, analyses made borrow from various theories and levels of international relations to understand Turkish Foreign Policy. The findings therefore underscore that it is possible to approach TFP from various theoretical angles. This approach essentially rests on the claim that science, and for that matter theories, has no universal foundations and thus requires plurality and pragmatic approach (Cornut 2015; Kratochwil 2007). Following this logic, this master's thesis adopts an eclectic analytical approach to explain that it is possible to approach Turkish Foreign Policy from different but complementary theoretical angles.

1.2 Research Objectives

Though paradigms like realism have often defined state behaviour in terms of power, emerging actors like Turkey have exhibited the tendency to motivated by other factors as well. Hence, using Turkey-Somalia relations as a case, this thesis aims to revisit the question of what motivates state actions at the international arena. It attempts to evaluate how the interests of Turkey as an emerging actor are shaped in the post-Cold War period.

1.3 Main Argument

Using an eclectic theoretical approach, this thesis argues that Turkish foreign towards Somalia is shaped by factors at different levels—security, interests of domes-

tic actors, and Turkey's identity. This central argument draws on realism, liberal theory of international politics, and social constructivism respectively. Thence, the approach adopted in this master's thesis views the aforementioned theoretical standpoint as complementary rather rivalrous.

1.4 Data and Methodology

The research undertaken in this master's thesis provides a case study of Turkey's relations with Somalia. In understanding Turkey's role as an emerging power in Africa and especially in the world, Somalia is ideal for a number of reasons. First, Somalia provides an ideal avenue for Turkey to project its power as an emerging global actor. Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey's desire to find space for itself a global power has depended on the strategy to fill power vacuums in regions like Africa (Davutoğlu 2008; Wheeler 2011). Thus, Somalia became an opportunity for Turkey's aspirations as global power. Second, Somalia has one of the longest standing relations in Turkey in the African continent. Third, Turkey-Somalia relations is highly diverse compared to Turkey's relations with other countries in the African continent. In addition to economic and development aid relations which Turkey also has with other African countries, Turkey's relations with Somalia also includes diplomatic, security and defense cooperation. This means that Turkey's stakes in Somalia is higher and thus a case study of this relations would provide an insight to many aspects of TFP.

This case study employs a mixed methodology to understand Turkey's interests in Somalia. Quantitative data from the World Bank as well as the OECD DAC have been used to study how Turkey competes with the traditional actors in Africa. I also qualitatively analyse original reports of bilateral agreements from the TGNA websites in order to investigate the various areas of cooperation and Turkey's motivation in Somalia. Additionally, I consult Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) reports as secondary data source in understanding the evolution of TFP as well as Turkish aid to the world.

1.5 Limitations and Further Studies

As mentioned in the main argument sub-section, TFP is driven by various factors. But, the ideational factor, particularly, raises questions for future studies. TFP in recent years have focused mostly on Islamic countries, and this has proven successfully because of Turkey's Ottoman legacy and identity as an Islamic state. Yet, as an emerging global actor, Turkey would have to expand its relations to engulf non-Islamic African countries as well. This raises the question of the extent to which ideational factors like religion and culture will be effective when Turkey encounters non-Islamic countries like Ghana, Angola, etc.

2. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Two important factors—the end of the Cold War in 1990, and the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) into power in 2002—have played a significant role in the evolution of TFP (Aydın-Çakır and Arıkan Akdağ 2017; Kavaklı 2018; Sayari 2000; Tunander 1995). Overall, the trajectory of TFP has been determined by a strong desire to enter Europe at one point (Müftüler-Baç 1996; Yılmaz and Bilgin 2006) and the goal to make room for Turkey as an important actor in the new global order at another. This chapter of the thesis discusses the historical evolution of TFP. In line with the arguments of this thesis, this chapter shows that the evolution of TFP is influenced by elements from all three hypotheses developed in the theoretical chapter.

First, TFP has evolved as a result of Turkey’s desire to be seen as an important actor in the new global order (Donelli and Gonzalez-Levaggi 2016; Müftüler-Baç 1996; Sözen 2010), which conforms to the realist hypothesis. Second, viewed from the perspective of the liberal theory of international relations, the shifts in TFP during the AKP era have been greatly influenced by the interests of domestic actors. Third, ideational factors such as religion and culture have been influential in determining TFP especially in development and humanitarian assistance (Ipek 2015; Kavaklı 2018).

2.1 The Challenges in the Early Post-Cold War Period

For the better part of the 20th century, TFP was geared towards constructing a European Turkish identity, and these “efforts of Turkish policymakers to locate Turkey in the west as opposed to non-west can be traced back to the early republican era when westernization became one of the cornerstones of Kemal Atatürk’s foreign and domestic policies” (Yılmaz and Bilgin 2006, 41). The geostrategic importance of

Turkey meant that the question of whether or not Turkey bore a western identity was of little importance during the world war (Müftüler-Baç 1996). Turkey's ascension to NATO membership evidenced its importance to the Western bloc during the latter half of the 20th century (Sayari 2000; Tunander 1995).

Turkey's membership in NATO was mostly based on realpolitik rather than a normative notion of Turkey's Europeanness. For Turkey, it fulfilled a long-time desire of the founding father's aspiration to join the Western order. Indeed Turkey did not hesitate in deploying troops to Korea as a sign of its commitment to being a part of the West. From the Western perspective, Turkey was important because it served as a buffer that put Russia's expansion and influence in the region in check (Tunander 1995). However, the end of the cold war inevitably brought to the fore front new questions about Turkey's place in the West (Müftüler-Baç 1996).

Scholars and policy makers alike had new questions to think of. What will become of Turkey's role in the post-cold war era. In the aftermath of the Cold War, TFP makers saw the country's stability as an indicator that only Turkey could preserve Western interests in the region (Müftüler-Baç 1996). Rampant conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle coupled with newly independent post-soviet countries in Central Asia meant that Turkey was the only stable country in the region. For the European powers, Turkey's role was now less about it being a buffer on the "southern flank of Europe, but as a vital country to the Middle East—mainly linked to US responsibilities" (Tunander 1995, 416). Thus, Turkey from the European perspective was reduced to the Middle Eastern whose identity did not fit that of the European (Huntington 1993).

Davutoglu, former Turkish Prime Minister and academic, has challenged this reductionist view of Turkey's identity by contending that "Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country" (Davutoğlu 2008, 78). This multifaceted identity was crucial in the challenges that emerged after the end of the cold war. Post-Cold war dynamics had implications for both Turkey and the United States which created closer relationship between the two (Tunander 1995). The end of the USSR "created sensitive regions where there was a vacuum of power needed to control the strategic capabilities of the geopolitical core areas as well as the vast resource-production-trade capabilities of the international political economy and ethnic/sectarian confrontations" (Davutoğlu 2008, 88). Turkey became a country at the heart of this sensitive region whereas the US as the only remaining hegemon had to be wary of the vacuum in the region.

The Gulf war in the early half of the 1990s allowed Turkey to assert its geostrategic importance by pursuing foreign policy activism. Turkey sided its previous non-

interventionist foreign principles and prioritized the stability of the region (Sayari 2000). Whereas TFP during the cold war was characterized by an allegiance to Europe, the post-cold war era policy focused on regional stability to alleviate threats in the region. Nevertheless, Turkish policy makers, recognizing the importance of being part of the new Western order, maintained their desire to join Europe as well as maintain close ties with the US (Aydin 2000; Küçükcan 2004; Kuniholm 1991).

2.2 Transformation Under the AKP Rule from 2002 Onwards

A significant transformation in TFP came with the AKP's coming to power following November 2002 elections. Scholarly discussion on this transformation evolved around the question of whether the AKP government's policies would undermine or threaten secularism (Kemalism) in the country (Cinar 2006; Mecham 2004). The AKP government, though new and untested, had in its higher echelons familiar faces like Erdogan who were associated leaned towards Islamism. Many members of the AKP emerged from Fazilet Partisi (FP) and Refah Partisi (RP), both of had been Islamically-oriented (Şen 2010).

In addition to the election of a new and untested political party to the executive arm of government, this election also transformed the legislative arm in two ways. First, the AKP became the first party to win a parliamentary majority in 15 years. Second, AKP's parliamentary victory ousted many political parties' seats, leaving the AKP and CHP to be the only big parties in parliament (Mecham 2004).


The three parties that constituted the previous coalition government—Democratic Left Party (DSP), Motherland Party (ANAP), and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)—each failed to attain the 10 percent threshold needed to be represented in parliament (Açikel 2003). This essentially changed the composition of the parliament as AKP, Islamically-oriented, replaced a more secularist coalition government and thus changed the nature of government policies. Essentially, Turkish policy has transformed from the traditional secularist/Kemalist doctrine to a more Islamist and individualistic regime (Yavuz and Öztürk 2019).

Under the AKP government, TFP has undergone different phases and transformations. Europeanization as a focus of TFP in the early AKP era eventually allowed some room for Euro-Asianism (Öniş and Yilmaz 2009). An important feature of Turkey's Euro-Asianism, argue Öniş and Yilmaz (2009) is a shift from activism to "soft" policy. As of 2009, three phases of TFP had been identified in the lit-

erature of the transformation of TFP: phase one characterized by activism, phase two by Europeanisation, and phase three by tension between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism (Öniş and Yilmaz 2009).

This thesis extends Öniş and Yilmaz’s (2009) argument by positing that a fourth phase has emerged during which TFP pursues active engagements with other regions, specifically sub-Saharan Africa. This transformation emerged in the 2010s when “under the rule of the AKP, Turkey had high level of relations with the countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America” (Aydın-Çakır and Arıkan Akdağ 2017, 344). Figure 2.1 demonstrates the three phases identified by Öniş and Yilmaz (2009) plus a fourth phase contributed by this thesis. The fourth phase as argued by this thesis entails Turkey’s active engagement in East Africa.

Figure 2.1 Four Phases of Post-Cold War TFP



TFP during the AKP era is peculiar in that some five principles had been devised to govern it, at least in the normative sense. First, TFP in the early years of the AKP era was underscored by democracy and security. Internal dynamics such as the PKK problem as well as external problems from unstable countries in the neighbourhood made security a priority for the AKP government. However, the AKP government needed to find a balance where security provision did not compromise basic human rights. Second, Turkey aimed to maintain affable relations through its zero problems with neighbours principle. True to this principle, Turkey successfully established cordial relations with neighbours like Georgia, Syria, and Iran. Third, TFP in the AKP era began to look not only at its immediate neighbourhood but also beyond. Fourth, TFP employed a multi-dimensional approach based on complement rather than competition. Thus, Ankara could forge relations on different fronts, with the US, with the EU and with Russia. Finally, TFP relied on rhythmic diplomacy as part of foreign policy principles. Turkey became more active in international organizations and summits thereby elevating its status as a global actor (Davutoğlu 2008).


The extent to which these principles have materialized has been studied empirically. For example, democratic backsliding and waning of some freedom and liberties over the years puts into question Turkey’s ability to pursue its security without compromising basic human rights (Över 2021). Using original data collated on Turkey’s involvement in the international arena, Aydın-Çakır and Arıkan Akdağ (2017) have found that that post-cold war TFP has indeed been characterized by activism, espe-

cially after AKP's coming to office. Their study suggests that the new activism was underscored by "Turkey's desire to maintain its geo-strategic importance, ensuring regional stability and opening up to new markets", a finding in line with hypotheses 1 and 2 of this thesis: Security remains critical for Turkey and new markets provide favour Turkish businessmen and producers (Aydın-Çakır and Arıkan Akdağ 2017, 342).

TFP in recent years have transformed from the notion of Turkey as less involved regional power to more active actor. Indeed, Akpınar (2017) has studied Somalia as a case in which Turkey has moved from being a benign donor to an active security provider. Siradağ (2018) has also added to this discussion by arguing that the AKP government pursues a more active foreign policy in Africa by adapting an Afro-Eurasian identity. Kavaklı's (2018) quantitative analysis also reveals an active pattern in Ankara's engagement with its neighbourhood. The study suggests that the AKP government has successfully adhered to the third and fourth principle outlined by Davutoğlu (2008). The AKP government employs humanitarian and economic aids to foster its relations with countries in many regions (Kavaklı 2018). Turkey's aspirations to become an important global actor means that it needs to rely less on western actors and that explains the shift towards a foreign policy that seeks new markets and also foster relations with new regions like sub-Saharan Africa" (Aydın-Çakır and Arıkan Akdağ 2017).


Phase IV, this thesis argues started in the 2010s when the AKP government started to proactively employ aid as foreign policy tools. TIKA report (fig. 2.3) on Turkish official development assistance (ODA) to foreign countries corroborates this argument. Figure 2.2 shows that Turkish ODA grew exponentially, reaching over a billion dollars in 2011. Before this period, Turkish ODA had been mostly significantly lower than a billion. By 2017, the volume of Turkish ODA had surpassed 8 billion dollars. This evidence is indicative of the significant shift in TFP and how Turkey employs aid as an important foreign policy tool. Also significant is the fact that by 2019, Turkey had outranked every country (including the US, Germany and UK) and international institution such as the EU as the highest humanitarian aid donor (TIKA 2020a). This conforms with the central argument of this thesis that Turkey makes space for itself as a global actor by challenging the traditional actors in world politics.

Figure 2.2 Turkish ODA from 2003-2019



Empirical evidence also shows ideational motivations in Turkey’s active engagement in the world. From the ideational perspective, Turkey fosters active relationships with Islamic countries by providing more humanitarian aids to them due to their religious affinity, though material motivations also remain important ((Kavakli 2018; Robins 2007). Figure 2.3 from TIKA’s (2020a) report show the top beneficiaries of Turkish bilateral aid from the least developed countries (LDC). All top ten beneficiaries of in the chart are majority Muslim countries which is indicative of TFP’s inclination towards the religious identity. Another observation to be made is that seven of the ten countries are African countries which reflects Turkey’s recent activism its foreign policy towards Africa.

Figure 2.3 Top LDC beneficiaries of Turkish aid



Source: Turkish Development Assistance Report (TIKA 2019).

Robins (2007) describes this feature of TFP combining both ideational and material elements as a successful cohabitation between Kemalist ideals and post-Islamist ideals. Whereas Kemalist ideals dictate maintaining secularism and separating religion from the affairs of the state, post-Islamism entails religious factors in foreign policy and governance as a whole. While post-Islamism and Kemalism entail seemingly incompatible principles, the AKP government in its early years managed to find a balance that resulted in four possible outcomes in foreign policy decisions:

“convergence, policy areas where Kemalism and post-Islamism have dis-


tinct perspectives that have turned out to be proximate to one another, and where cooperation has been possible; contained disharmony, areas of policy disagreement, but where the policy competition has been contained rather than becoming destructively conflictual; ideological divergence, areas where perspectives have been clearly different, but where the qualitative change of foreign policy revisionism has not taken place, and Turkey's western vocation remains intact; and neutrality, areas where neither Kemalism nor post-Islamism has yielded distinct foreign policy perspectives" (Robins 2007, 83).

However, Ayata (2015) has cited Turkey's failure to effect regime change in Libya, Syria, and Egypt during the Arab uprisings as a signal of the incoherence in TFP. Whatever the limitations, this feature of convergence between Islamist and secular ideals makes it possible for Turkey to pursue its foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East. Ipek's (2015) constructivism model has shown that "ideas and material interests both matter" in analyzing TFP. Ipek (2015) finds a mutually constitutive relationship between ideational and material forces which implies that TFP making involves a dynamic where normative values like religion and rational benefits like economy and security affect each other. This multifaceted character of TFP can be observed in the way Turkey structures its aids (Aydın-Çakır and Arıkan Akdağ 2017). Turkey structures its aid based on the kind of relationship it has with the receiving partner. To satisfy its material goals, Turkey provides developmental aids to its biggest trade partners from the developing world to ensure the partner has a strong-enough economy to keep trading with Turkey. On the other hand, the AKP government uses its humanitarian aid to Islamic countries to gain the local support. Humanitarian aids are often politicised both locally and globally and the AKP government's overt aids contributes to its local image and popularity of the government ((Ipek 2015; Kavakli 2018).

The relation between the domestic public and TFP can be understood by examining another feature of TFP in the current wave—it incorporates both states and non-state actors. This analysis speaks to the argument of the liberal theory of IR that foreign policy is a product of various stakeholders within the country (Moravcsik 1993). Turkey is a diverse country with divergent stakeholders. It is little surprise, therefore, that its foreign policy is influenced by several civil societies. The AKP's humanitarian aids in Somalia and other parts of Africa have been greatly supported by Islamically-oriented/faith-based NGOs who view Turkey as the responsible and leader of the Muslim world (Çelik and İşeri 2016).

From the Turkish government’s perspective, NGOs are crucial vehicles in Turkey’s aspirations as a global actor. Figure 2.4 shows the contributions made by Turkish NGOs (in million dollars) over a span of a dozen years. As of 2008, Turkish NGO assistance amounted to roughly 72 million dollars. In the 2010s when several countries in Middle and Africa had been facing humanitarian crises, NGO contributions increased significantly, surpassing more than six times 2008’s figures in 2015. In 2018, the highest of all, 826 million dollars, was recorded as NGO contributions. Increased significance of NGOs in Turkey has been attributed to a “combination of economic liberalisation and an easing of social restrictions and laws as part of Turkey’s candidacy for the EU” and a decrease in the power of military and the state establishment (Achilles et al. 2015; Müüftüler-Baç 2011, 8). In addition to providing financial assistance, Turkish NGOs function as agenda setters and information providers. As agenda setters, NGOs engage in actions to draw the attention of policy makers towards particular issues whereas as information providers, they are able to use their resources on the ground through formal and informal channels (Turhan and Bahçecik 2021). These roles have made NGOs vital in the current phase of TFP.


Figure 2.4 Turkish NGOs assistance in million dollars



In terms of state actors, one agency, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), has become an integral part of current TFP. TIKA was established in 1992 during the phase I of Post-Cold War TFP to coordinate Turkish aid and TFP activism in post-Soviet Turkic countries in Central Asia. TIKA's mandates were extended to include the Balkans during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Thus, TIKA was involved in both the material interests as well as the ideational (cultural) dimensions of TFP from the onset.

Under the AKP, TIKA has transformed in a number of ways. In terms of size, it has expanded to many countries in regions beyond Central Asia and the Balkans. As of 2021, TIKA has offices in 60 countries and coordinates projects in 150 countries. Twenty-two of the offices are in Africa with a few also situated in farther regions like Latin America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. In terms of institutional structure, recent presidential decree in 2018 placed TIKA under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Originally, TIKA was established under the ministry of foreign affairs in 1992 until it was placed under the prime ministry by a presidential decree in 1999. Statutory Decree Law No. 656 in October 2011 allowed for more flexibility to reduce bureaucratic obstacles and improve the speed of decision-making to enable Turkey's "dynamic foreign policy initiatives" (TIKA 2021). To put this in perspective, the 2011 decree came less than a year after the Arab spring in the neighbouring countries. Thus, the decree allowed TIKA some autonomy to respond quickly through its own initiatives and decision-making process. Finally, in terms of projects, TIKA's scope has expanded under AKP especially after 2011. TIKA engages in projects related to economic infrastructure, health, education, food, transportation, etc. Figure 2.5 shows the various sectors TIKA projects have covered as of 2019.

Figure 2.5 Categories of TIKA projects




As seen in figure 2.5, TIKA’s projects and aids cover over 15 different areas at varying degrees. Emergency and humanitarian assistance however is the most prominent area of TIKA’s aid as this category accounted for almost 90% of all aids in 2019. Other important areas included education, social infrastructure and services, and development of administrative and civil infrastructure, which reflects Turkey’s commitment to helping development in recipient countries.

2.3 The Evolution of Turkey's Relations with African Countries

Under the AKP government, Turkey's involvement in Africa has increased (Aydın-Çakır and Arıkan Akdağ 2017). One evidence that corroborates this claim is the increasing trend of Turkish African trade in the last two decades (fig 2.6). Though Europe maintains its position as Turkey's largest trade partner, significant increase in Turkish-African trade cannot be ignored. As shown in figure 2.6, few years after the AKP government came to power, trade between Turkey and Africa increased with most of the trade volume being witnessed in Turkish export to Africa. Two significant patterns can be drawn from this pattern. First, since Turkish export exceeds its imports in virtually all years, balance of trade is in favour of the Turkish side. Second, the data presented in the graph also underscores the argument that Turkey seeks the African countries as potential new markets for its products.


Figure 2.6 Turkey-sub-Saharan African trade volume in Post-Cold War era



As discussed earlier, Turkey employs ODA as a crucial foreign policy tool to advance its relations. In this regard, Turkish ODA to sub-Saharan African has witnessed substantial increase during the AKP administration, especially in the second decade of the 21st century. For example, seven out of the top ten LDC recipient states are from the African country which reflects Turkey's interests in establishing cordial relationship with African countries (see fig. 2.3). TIKA has 22 offices on the African

continent to help coordinate Turkish ODA and projects. Figure 2.7 below shows the trend of Turkish ODA to sub-Saharan Africa. Turkish ODA to the continent was virtually non-existent prior to 2003, before the AKP administration. After AKP, ODA to Africa began to increase. Overall, the 2010s decade witnessed the highest increases which corroborates the claim that TFP has adopted a more active approach in recent years.

Figure 2.7 Turkish ODA to sub-Saharan Africa



Though Turkey-Africa relations has been much stronger in the recent decade, the foundation had been set up in 1998 but never institutionalized until the AKP government. In 1998, Turkey adopted the “Opening to Africa” with the hope of tightening its political, economic, diplomatic and cultural 9 relations with Africa. Nevertheless, it was not until 2005 that Ankara made more concrete advances to realize its aspirations in the African continent. Current President and Prime Minister at the time, Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared 2005 as the “year of Africa” (Özkan 2010). This declaration improved cordiality between Ankara and the continent, starting with Ankara gaining a seat an observer at the African Union.

In 2008, three years after PM Erdogan’s declaration of the year of Africa, the partnership was institutionalized in the form of a summit. At the end of the cooperation summit in August 2008, Turkey and the African countries agreed on a framework

that outlined the 8 areas of cooperation:

- i. Inter-governmental Cooperation
- ii. Trade and Investment
- iii. Agriculture, Agribusiness, Rural Development, Water Resources Management and Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs)
- iv. Health
- v. Peace and Security
- vi. Infrastructure, Energy and Transport
- vii. Culture, Tourism and Education
- viii. Media and Information and Communication Technology (ICT)

To maintain the perpetuality of the partnership, the signatories also agreed on several mechanisms:

1. The Africa-Turkey Summit will be held every five (5) years in Africa and in Turkey, on a rotational basis.
2. The second Africa-Turkey Summit will be held in Africa in the year 2013.
3. A Ministerial Review Conference that will meet every third year in the period between Summits to assess and evaluate the progress of implementation of the Programme of Action and prepare for the Summit meeting.
4. A meeting of Senior Officials that will take place twice in between two summits to review the progress of implementation of agreed programmes and projects, disseminate information about cooperation arrangements, propose new initiatives and report to and prepare for the Ministerial Review Conference.
5. The meetings both at Ministerial and Senior Officials levels shall be organized in Africa and in Turkey on an alternate basis within the framework laid out by the First Africa -Turkey Cooperation Summit.

6. These areas of cooperation shall be implemented in the context of a programme which we shall develop within the next one year and the follow-up Mechanism contained in this Framework of Cooperation (MFA 2008).

The second Turkey-African summit, held in October 2014, extended the scope of the partnership. In addition to previously stipulated eight areas of cooperation, the second summit increased the areas of the cooperation. Conflict resolution and mediation, Migration, Environment, and Youth & Sport were included to the areas of cooperation. This expansion reflects the primary interests of the parties. For example, conflict resolution and mediation were particularly handy for many African countries who were facing civil or international conflicts. It also allowed Turkey to have significant impact on the outcome of conflicts in the continent. The inclusion of migration was also strategic in that conflicts and poor economic conditions in Africa are likely to drive immigrants towards Turkey. By cooperating with the Africa countries, Turkey could protect its security.

All in all, the analysis of the historical evolution of TFP shows that Turkey is heading towards an active foreign policy to establish itself as a critical actor in world politics. Indeed Turkey hoped to join the EU in the first decade or two after the Cold War. However, after years of negotiation, Turkey has turned its focus towards establishing new alliances and finding new markets for its products. It is within this context that recent Turkish-African relations emerged. Security and material benefits account for Turkish interest in the region. Also, Turkish businessmen who seek new avenues for investment have partly driven this shift towards Africa. Lastly, religious identity has shaped Turkey's interaction with African countries in that most beneficiaries of Turkish aid in Africa are Muslim countries.

3. THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES

The discipline of International Relations has witnessed several debates and transformations over time. While these debates present new perspectives and dimensions of understanding international phenomena, one thing has remained constant, theories. Theories play central role in simplifying complex social and political world phenomena into understandable dynamics. They are lenses scholars put on to make sense of the world. Different lenses have different magnifications based on varying dimensions. Hence, IR has become a discipline where scholars can examine and analyse the same phenomena from varying and often times divergent theoretical standpoints.

The changing nature of global dynamics presents the student of international politics with some newer challenges, as argued Rosenau (2006). There is the need to jailbreak from the traditional understanding of nature of the state; we need to “recognize that it is no longer the predominant actor in world politics. It is, to be sure, still very much a key player and it still can give direction to the course of events in a number of ways” (Rosenau 2006, 17). The theories discussed in this chapter to analyse the rising powers in Africa are not restricted to state-centric and rationalist approaches, such as realism and neoliberalism but also to theories reflecting domestic factors as well as ideational factors.

While recognizing that states have had to share or relinquish some of their powers to NGOs and other non-state actors, many scholars accept that “it’s still a world of states” (Rosenau 2006). Though dynamics such as technological revolution, global division of labour, interconnection of global market and finance have elevated the powers of some non-state actors (Rosenau 2006; Wallerstein 2004), states continue to have the monopoly over use of force and coercive measures to attain goals. Given these dynamics, it is imperative to examine international dynamic from both state-centric and system-centric theoretical approaches.

Critiques of general theories like realism and liberalism refer to the state-centric

approach of such theories as limitations. However, such theories remain relevant in analysing global phenomenon in that the world as we know it, despite all the technological, economic, and political transformations, remains one in which states dominate. More importantly, rising powers like China and Turkey, while relatively new, have not been significantly different in terms of their state-interest approach employed by their governments.

“China has long been an actor in the international system and has thus been subject to the same dynamics and controls that are inherent in the system and that condition all states. Furthermore, even if one fully rejects the applicability of general theory, one would have to have a general theory from which the rejection is derived. To see China as different, as acting out of unique historical, strategic, and cultural circumstances, is to have a theory of the established and recurrent patterns from which China deviates. Inescapably, in other words, observers must fall back on some form of theory, crude and implicit as it may be, in order to identify those features of a country’s resources, processes, and dynamics that are judged to be relevant to its conduct on the world stage” (Rosenau 2006, 206).

Accordingly, this chapter develops hypotheses on emerging global powers from both state-centric theories such as realism as well as non-state-centric approaches.

3.1 Realism

The realist logic for all its criticism for focusing on material interests and state security provides a vital perspective for understanding rising powers like China and Turkey who aspire to expand their spheres of influence to include countries in the African continent. Historically, powerful and growing states have always looked elsewhere for material resources. The first Europeans to set foot on the African continent, the Portuguese in 1400s, were mercenaries who wanted to project power and also satisfy their economic interest. A relatively recent history can be drawn from the French and British colonial rivalry in Africa prior to the first world war, an occurrence which is often referred to as the “Scramble for Africa”.

From the realist standpoint, the Turkish awakened interest in Africa represents a

contemporary version of the scramble for Africa where emerging powers compete with the traditional actors. The competition in this wave of scramble lies not only in economic or military interests but also in strategic interests owing to the nature of the current global order.

Though Turkey's economic might is relatively low compared to that of China, UK, France, and the US, Turkey has been able to find a space for itself in the competition by targeting specific areas rather than all possible arenas of competition. Morgenthau (1948) has pointed out that the elements of power could originate from any or a combination of various elements—geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale and diplomacy. Despite relatively lower level of economic might compared to the traditional actors, emerging powers like Turkey can assert their power through some of the aforementioned elements such as national morale, diplomacy and population, and military preparedness.

Realist scholars generally contend that global competition is merely states' interests and desire to survive which inevitably births power struggle: "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim" (Morgenthau 1948, 13). This has been Morgenthau's opening statements in his chapter on power in *Politics Among Nations*, a book that has arguably become a classic realist handbook. What is peculiar about Morgenthau's perspective however is that he equates the interest of states with power.

The logic then follows that international politics is a global power play where powerful actors compete for dominance (Lemke 2002; Organski 1958). Because the global system is controlled by the dominant nation, emerging powers like Turkey inevitably compete each other for the position of dominance (Kim and Gates 2015). For Turkey, Somalia is a gateway to infiltrate Africa and in turn elevate Turkey's roles an important global actor. In this sense then, Turkey's interest in Africa is driven by the search for visibility as a global power and thus emerges the realist hypothesis for this thesis:

H1: Turkey's interest in Africa is driven by the need to strengthen Turkey's visibility as a global power.

This realist understanding of state motivation however begs the question of what interest entails. For classical realists like Morgenthau, this question requires no further examination in that interests equals power. By equating these two concepts, the logic follows then that states desire more power because it is in their interest.

This leads to one of the core assumptions of realism, that states are interest-based actors. They are the main actors of international politics and act rationally to maintain their priorities, national security and survival. Building on these assumptions, classical realists perceive state interests as constant though strategies employed to achieve these interests may change over time.

Placing Turkey in the calculus of this competition is an endeavour that requires careful examination to be teased out. For, even though Turkey has increased trade with Africa more than three-folds in the last couple of decades, the absolute figures of the volume of trade places Turkey in the lower ranks of the competition. This however does not warrant its dismissal as a crucial actor in the region. As Morgenthau warns of the fallacy of a single factor (Morgenthau 1948), it would be imprudent to disqualify Turkey from the analysis based on a single factor.

Like China and the European powers, Turkey pursues Africa to satisfy its economic and power related interests. Knowing its limitations, Turkey adopts other measures to stay relevant in the power politics in Africa. Bayer and Keyman (2012) have argued that Turkey has proven to be an important actor in Africa by following more realistic policies for Africa's development such as aids. This has been corroborated by a 2010 Chatham House report which singled out Turkey as a country following "pragmatic approaches" towards Africa (Cargill 2010, 34). The implication of this dynamic for the realist paradigm then is that by strategically selecting some issue areas, Turkey has become relevant in the power competition in Africa.

The other aspect of state interests that shapes the involvement of Turkey in Africa is the strategic goals to elevate its status in global power politics. Strategic interests have always been a motivation for foreign actors in Africa. Even after granting independence, France continued to exhibit its power by maintaining strong military presence in countries in Senegal and Ivory Coast. France's relationship with African countries after independent was far from a "state-to-state" relationship; by maintaining high degree of control over these countries, France could maintain a status and reputation as a powerful actor in global politics (Staniland 1987). The case of Turkey or China exemplify that of "a nation whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually has through expansion of its power beyond its frontiers, whose foreign policy, in other words, seeks a favourable change in power status, pursues a policy of imperialism" (Morgenthau 1948, 21).

Classical realists have been criticized for adopting strictly state interest approach that makes little or no room for factors relating to the international structure. Neo-realists/structural realists diverge from classical realists by incorporating the nature of international system in their analysis. For them, state behaviour can be best

understood in the context of anarchical global system rather than individual state behaviour: “in a system where there is no higher authority that sits above the great powers, and where there is no guarantee that one will not attack another, it makes eminently good sense for each state to be powerful enough to protect itself in the event it is attacked” (Mearsheimer 2013, 78).

Neorealists see states as actors “trapped in an iron cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive” (Mearsheimer 2013, 78). This understanding of the system employs either a zero-sum game or a relative gains perspective in which the rising powers compete with established powers for limited resources and power status. Thus, the rise of new actors will lead to an inevitable adversity according to some realists (Mearsheimer 2001; Zakaria 1999).

To what end do states aim to attain power? Classical realists have often appealed to this question by pointing out to human nature as brutal and insatiable. From this logic, we strive for more power in order to survive adversities and threats of other brutish actors. Alternatively, it has been argued that “the desire to dominate, in particular, is a constitutive element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local political organizations to the states” (Morgenthau 1948). Given this competitive nature of humans, argued Morgenthau, it comes as no surprise that international politics is characterised by the struggle for power.

Neorealists scholars often disagree with the outcome of this argument. From the theoretical standpoint of Organski (1958) for instance, the global anarchical structure birthed a power struggle that saw the emergence of a single hegemony who sets the agenda for the global order. In this sense, new actors such as China and Turkey aim to depose this actor by attaining more power, an outcome of which could be war. The “Mearsheimerian” perspective perceive the ambitions of these new actors as the desire to counter global hegemony which is only threatening if several hegemonies emerge. The existence of more than two powerful actors distorts actors’ ability to properly assess each other’s intentions, an uncertainty which can lead to war.

3.2 Liberal Theory of International Politics

Though scholars have longed discussed the relationship between domestic dynamics and international politics, these theories have traditionally been confined to war

literature (Buono de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Fearon 1994, 1995) and European integration literature (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Moravcsik 1993, 1997). In the grand scheme of international politics, mainstream international relations theories have the tendency of treating states as unitary actors. Yet, decades of scholarship have established linkages between the domestic and the international (Iida 1993; Putnam 1988; Rosenau 1969). Building on Moravcsik's liberal theory of international politics, I develop a second hypothesis for this thesis based on the role of the domestic public on Turkish foreign policy.

A starting point in building this theory is to examine how the domestic dynamics matter for international politics. Three core assumptions underline the liberal theory of international politics.

“Assumption 1: The Primacy of Societal Actors

The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence.

Assumption 2: Representation and State Preferences

States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics.

Assumption 3: Interdependence and the International System

The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior” (Moravcsik 1997, 517-521).

The first assumption challenges the mainstream perspective that states are unitary actors that act as the most important actors in international politics. On the contrary, the liberal theory of IR suggests that states are only there to convey the interests of rational individual and independent actors within the country. These individuals and civil societies with their private and autonomous interests amass their resources to promote their interests at the forefront of foreign policy making. In the context of this thesis, individuals like Turkish businessmen as well as groups like labor unions accordingly serve as crucial societal actors in Turkish foreign policy towards Africa. As rational actors, they can be expected to be driven by the

economic gains of trading and investing in Africa.

But, amidst several autonomous and sometimes divergent interests, how do foreign policy makers decide on state preferences? Assumption 2 answers this question by positing that the state's preference is often a reflection of a subset of the society. The state does not act on its own because "the state is not an actor but a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors" (Moravcsik 1997, 518). The state is the platform where individuals or social groups try to advance their interests that they otherwise could not get done. Hence, within the society, bargaining, lobbying and negotiation is important in the sense that the stance of the state only represents the interests of a few rather than all. Thus, the first two assumptions suggest that

"states do not automatically maximize fixed, homogeneous conceptions of security, sovereignty, or wealth per se, as realists and institutionalists tend to assume. Instead they are, in Waltzian terms, "functionally differentiated"; that is, they pursue particular interpretations and combinations of security, welfare, and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups enfranchised by representative institutions and practices" (Moravcsik 1997, 520).

The third assumption adds to the theory by rejecting realist claims of states being naturally conflictual as a result of their interests as well as the institutionalist attempt to treat states as entities mostly inclined to cooperate with each other. Instead, state interests are relative; they vary in different circumstances in the international level.

"National interests are, therefore, neither invariant nor unimportant, but emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions form, and new policy alternatives are recognized by governments. An understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the analysis of the strategic interaction among states" (Moravcsik 1993, 481)

Thus, Turkey's interests in Somalia, or Africa in general, could not be treated with a fixed understanding of Turkey's interests. Instead, the merits of the Somali case would be important in understanding Turkish foreign policy in Somalia. The Turk-

ish state while pushing its agenda in Somalia is also met by the Somali state whose influential social groups also push their agenda to the forefront of foreign policy. This creates three potential situations: first, a situation where preferences of domestic actors in Turkey and Somalia mutually align and naturally harmonious. Second, the scenario the interests of the respective social groups conflict. Third, mutually beneficial outcomes could be achieved through negotiations and coordination. Whatever the case, the preferences of these internal actors determine whether states will make concessions, negotiate or use forceful measures.

Turkish businessmen who are looking to enter the African market see Somalia as a window reach this goal and hence push for their interests at the state level. Collating all three assumptions of the liberal theory of international politics, I develop a second hypothesis to be tested in this thesis:

H2: TFP in shaped by businessmen/stakeholders who are investing in Africa.

For so long, the grand theories of IR rarely questioned the role of domestic actors, or why they are important for that matter. The Liberal theory of International Relations puts domestic actors and factors at the heart of foreign policy making. As Moravcsik puts it

“Groups articulate preferences; governments aggregate them. For liberals, the relationship between society and the government is assumed to be one of principal-agent; societal principals delegate power to (or otherwise constrain) governmental agents. The primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office; in democratic societies, this requires the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, whose views are transmitted, directly or indirectly, through domestic institutions and practices of political representation. Through this process emerges the set of national interests or goals that states bring to international negotiations” (Moravcsik 1993, 483).

Moravcsik’s logic of political elites being driven by the desire to stay in power has been corroborated by several empirical studies, especially in conflict and audience cost literature. Among the earliest debate in the literature is the stance that democratic institutions ensure that leaders formulate foreign policy according to the interests of the public. In a functioning democracy, the audience are institutionally equipped to punish leaders by voting them out of office should foreign policy go awry

(Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Fearon 1994, 1995). Yet, these studies seem to account mostly for democracies which begs the question of the role of audience in nondemocracies in shaping foreign policy making.

Emerging powers such as China and Turkey may not necessarily have vibrant democratic institutions but yet have also been observed to have domestic influence on foreign policy outcomes (Downes and Sechser 2012; Weiss 2013). Even in authoritarian regimes, small social groups have been known to influence foreign policy made by elites (Weeks 2008). In line with the liberal theory, what really matters for states' interests are the international level is the preferences of the most influential domestic actors. Turkish businessmen while not comprising the majority of the Turkey have the highest stakes in Somalia and are able to use the economic power to push their preferences to forefront of TFP in Africa.

3.3 Social Constructivism

Debates over whether states' behaviour in the international arena is motivated by material interests or ideational factors have become redundant. Indeed, states preferences are shaped by both ideational and rational factors (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). Constructivists adopt an approach that relies on three premises: (a). humans are shaped by ideational factors (b) shared or collective beliefs are the most vital ideational factors and (c) these beliefs shape our interests and identities (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999). Early constructivists like Wendt quite radically disregard institutionalists arguments rooted in anarchy and rationalism and instead argue that beliefs/ideas shape interests as interests are after all socially constructed: (1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (Wendt 1999, 1).

Borrowing from the social constructivist perspective, this thesis argues that cultural and religious affinity shapes TFP towards Somalia. The European Union is an empirical example of how ideas coincide with the rationalist material interests. Though the EU today stands as an economic giant whose economic wellbeing is equivalent to the material wellbeing of the member states, the EU could hardly survive without a sense or idea of a European identity. As argued Parsons (2002),

“Within vague structural and institutional pressures, only certain ideas led Europeans to the EEC rather than to less extensive cooperation in much weaker international institutions (or without formal institutions at all). Only advocates of a new ideology of integration-what I call the "community model"-perceived interests in the unprecedented institutional project showcased in the ECSC and EEC” (Parsons 2002, 47-48).

Thus, the standpoint taken by this thesis is that of the scholarly perspective that ideas matter at all levels of politics. At the domestic level, Ipek (2015) has noted the interconnection between values and interests in shaping TFP, for example. It seems imprudent to study TFP without making room for a theory exploring culture and religion in TFP making. As political actors, “human beings have values but... they are equally purposive calculators” (Hall 1993, 42). This suggests that one cannot fully understand state behaviour by isolating it from ideas and norms, which initially had been thought of as exogenous factors.

Rumelili has contributed to the social constructivist approach by positing that “identities in the modern nation-state system rest on the construction of clear and unambiguous inside/outside and self/other distinctions” (Rumelili 2004, 27). What this implies is that a sense of identity clarifies that course of action for modern nation states. The AKP’s Islamist regime accordingly allows it to view Somalia in the self/other spectrum. In this regard, countries with similar religious identity fall within the “self” category. This facilitates the establishment of amicable relations and thus explains why TFP elites often refer to Somalia as their Muslim brothers.

Turkey’s identity is however more complicated and sophisticated: the history, demography, and geography have all conflate to create Turkey’s identity. This hybrid identity allows Turkey the room to identify as Asian, Middle Eastern, Western, and Islamic (Rumelili 2011). As per the constructivist logic, identities are “socially constructed, negotiated, and contested” (Kösebalaban 2008; Rumelili 2008, 98). This allows Turkey to tap into its religious identity when interacting with Somalia.

A major challenge in ideational theory is defining what ideas are. Parsons (2002) has defined ideas as “subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions” (49). Jobert (1989) has defined ideas in terms of social interactions that are “structured by frames of reference and that these frames can be enriched, adapted and changed when the policy communities face new situations or the unintended effects of previous policies” (377). Others still define idea in terms of shared or collective memories (Rothstein 2005; Smith 1992). While these conceptualizations seem to understand idea from different stand-

points, a common element among them all is change. Ideas are shaped by social phenomenon and while they may be the cause of change or specific policy goal at a point in time, they are subject to change based on the situation.

The debate surrounding ideas in foreign policy making centred around agent-structure problem (Carlsnaes 1992; Wendt 1987). Scholarly discussion on this issue treated this dichotomy as conflictual relations that could exist in many forms: action and structure; part and whole; individual and society; actor and system; micro and macro (Carlsnaes 1992, 246). Structuralists often focus on the structure of international politics to arrive at conclusions suggesting a rational behaviour of state. However, this line of thought side-lines the role played by individuals and their ideas in foreign policy making. The agency of individuals could be ignored because “even if we accept the rationality premise, actions taken by human beings depend on the substantive quality of available ideas, since such ideas help to clarify principles and conceptions of causal relationships, and to coordinate individual behaviour (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 5).

Blyth’s (2003) famous criticism of the rational choice theory, “structures do not come with an instruction sheet”, quite succinctly captures the need to make room for ideational theories in understanding state behaviour. Individuals shape outcomes because they have the ability to choose what course of action to pursue even if they act in a confined structure. Hence, foreign policy making according to this conceptualization of agency cannot be reduced to individuals acting mainly if not solely based on restraints set up by the system/structure (Cohen 1989).

In the context of this thesis, ideations in TFP can be especially examined in terms of religion and culture. TFP is made by individuals and these individuals/elites act in accordance to their values. The AKP has been able to weave Islamism as part of its governance and this islamist identity inevitably has bearings on TFP. Indeed Islamism in the AKP era has been very much embedded in Turkish politics so much so that there have been scholarly discussions on “the potential exportability of the Turkish Islamist "model”” to other countries in the region. The Turkish model (Çavdar 2006, 477). Arguably however, the success of political Islam in Turkey is partly due to the AKP elites’ awareness of the need to maintain balance between Islamism and secularism.

“... the leaders of the AKP refused to define their new Party in any religious terms. Their previous experiences in the Islamist movement, in general and during the RP and FP periods in particular, made them cognizant that confrontation with the secular establishment is not wel-

comed by the Turkish population. They further came to acknowledge that any attempt to increase the influence of Islam in Turkish politics, let alone any radical changes in domestic or foreign policy, were bound to be blocked by the secular establishment, that is, the military and the civilian bureaucracy. Thus, the top Party leadership, particularly Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül, concluded that a radical transformation of the state was impossible. Instead, what was desirable and feasible, they believed, was to seek greater religious freedoms within the parameters of a secular and democratic political system” (Çavdar 2006, 481).

Certainly, I do not purport to argue that religion and culture are the sole drivers of TFP in the AKP era. Evidence in this thesis corroborates the theoretical expectation that ideas as well as interests drive state behaviour. Ideas shape foreign policy by serving as road map to achieve the end goals.

“Ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political institutions” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 3) (Goldstein and Keohane 1993).

Accordingly, ideas are not necessarily effective on their own unless they matter for foreign policy. In the case of Turkey, religion and culture have been integral part of TFP to the Middle East as well as Africa. Indeed, Diyanet, the directorate of religious affairs, is a state institution that has often played a role in humanitarian issues in third countries. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism has also been active in bilateral agreements concerning cultural exchange and advancement. The Islamist regimes by the AKP coupled with the involvement of religion in political institutions directs foreign policy elites to pursue relations with countries with similar cultural backgrounds. It therefore comes as no surprise that Turkey-African relations is most advanced with the Islamic countries. Ideational factors therefore matter for TFP, thence leading to the third hypothesis:

H3: Turkish foreign Policy is influenced and shaped by feelings of cultural affinity.

Turkey’s cultural affinity essentially rests on its history with Islam and the Ot-

toman's role as the biggest Islamic empire to have existed. For Turkey, Islam remains a shared or collective cultural identity that ties it to the Muslim countries. Smith has defined collective cultural identity as a phenomenon that "refers not to some fixed pattern or uniformity of elements over time, but rather to a sense of shared continuity on the part of successive generations of a given unit of population, and to shared memories of earlier periods, event and personages in the history of the unit" (Smith 1992, 58).

Though Smith develops his theoretical framework to explain the EU, parallels could be drawn in the Turkish case in the sense of Islam as a shared continuity and shared memories of earlier periods (a la Ottoman period). Kucukcan (2003) has also argued along similar lines that "the Ottoman dynastic rule created a legacy that no successor regime could afford to disregard, a consideration of how modern ideas entered and shaped Turkish political culture during the Ottoman Empire is imperative to understanding the country's current attempts to reconcile religion and secularism" (476).

4. TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY ENDEAVOUR IN SOMALIA

4.1 A Background Information for Somalia

While the Horn of Africa has been a place of interest for Turkey in the last decade, Turkey is hardly the first foreign actors to set their eyes on the region. European powers during the colonial era had competed among themselves for control of the region. Colonial powers, namely UK, France, and Italy, divided the region among themselves by the second half of the 19th century under respective territories named British Somaliland, French Somaliland, and Italian Somaliland. French Somaliland became Djibouti following independence from their colonizers. Modern day Somalia is an amalgamation of the British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland.

Somalia gained independence from Italy and Britain in 1960. British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland joined to create Somalia as an independent state with a locally appointed president and prime minister. Somalia's statehood was short lived when it failed roughly 30 years after independence. In fact, the security and political atmosphere of the country was threatened in less than a decade after independence due to the assassination of President Shermarke in 1969 which was followed by General Barre-led military coup which sowed the seeds of instability that would persists up until the 21st century. Though military coups in post-independence Africa were not out of the norm, the Somali case stands out in the sense that struggle for power by the military and various factions within the country led to state failure. Today, Somalia ranks as the second most fragile states in the world, outranked only by Yemen, according to the fragile state index (Fund for Peace 2020).

Following the collapse of the democratic republic, Somalia became the subject of including academics, NGOs, and international institutions, most of whom have collaborated to mitigate the humanitarian crisis that emerged from the failed state. The Uppsala Conflict data reports that over 50 thousand deaths have emerged from internal conflicts in Somalia and most of them emanated from state-based violence

(UCDP 2020). Somalia's failure, resulting from fragmentation of the country, emergence of various factions, and the eventual collapse of the government was somewhat unexpected in that "it was one of Africa's few real nation-states, with a shared language and single ethnic culture" (Reno 2006, 147).

Currently, Somalia is administrated under a federal government established in 2012, following the collapse of preceding democratic republic of Somalia in early 1990s. The federal government was establishment as a means of ending the two-decade long state failure and fragmentation within the country. By establishing five federal states, regional actors could maintain some modicum of control while also recognizing the power of the central government.

To the north of the country however, Somaliland declared itself independent in 1991 after the state failure. Until then, Somaliland and current Somalia had merged to form the state of Somalia following the departure of British colonisers. Aiming to escape the state failure, Somaliland seceded in 1991 to establish its own government. However, in international scene, Somaliland continues to be viewed as an autonomous region within Somalia, thereby keeping Somaliland "shackled to a failed state" (Poore 2009). Though not recognised internationally, Somaliland deems itself a sovereign nation with an independent government. Unlike Somalia, Somaliland has had several competitive elections and enjoyed significantly higher levels of freedom and virtually no violence (Bradbury, Abokor, and Yusuf 2003; Kaplan 2008).

Geographically, Somalia is located to Africa's easternmost with a long coastline by the Indian ocean. Its strategic importance lies in its proximity to the Middle East, specifically Yemen which is separated from Somalia only by the Gulf of Aden. Evidently, the political and economic contexts of Somalia have been one that seemed inviting to international actors with political, economic and/or security interests in the regions. Somalia has received various humanitarian aids from states and nonstate actors alike and has been the destination for various EU and UN missions.

Economically, both pre-independence and post-independence dynamics have not been to the advantage of the Somali people. Scholars have often attributed the nation's weak economic system to its fledgling institutions. Menkhaus (2014) has concluded that

"external funding for institution-building at the national level in Somalia faces steep obstacles, mainly due to deeply entrenched political and economic interests in perpetuating a weak, de-institutionalized state. Where external aid has succeeded in Somalia, it has been with carefully cali-

brated support, primarily to local-level governance systems. These range from municipalities to seaport and airport authorities to the many hybrid governance arrangements that fuse informal and formal authorities in quasi-judicial, regulatory, conflict mediation, and other roles, and that often constitute the most responsive and effective source of governance for local communities” (Menkhaus 2014, 155).

Menkhaus’ analysis shows how deeply fragmented Somalia became after the failure of the government. This failure had a couple of implications on the Somalian society. First, it became the ultimate destination of virtually all international humanitarian donors and also served as a ground for emerging donors like Turkey to assert their global and regional goals. Secondly, the fragmentation weakened the usefulness of the donations and also made them difficult as there emerged several actors to deal with (Menkhaus 2014). Somalia has had to rely on external aids and loans for a protracted period. In March 2020, the country was approved for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) status which is a debt relief initiative by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for countries who “face an unsustainable debt burden that cannot be addressed through traditional debt relief mechanisms” (IMF 2021). The World Bank in June 2020 furnished Somalia with 55 million USD for economic reforms (World Bank 2020). Other than the IMF and the World Bank, Somalia has also been on the receiving end of humanitarian reliefs and donations from various actors such as the UK, Sweden, and Norway. But in the last decade, Turkey, as an “emerging donor”, has become an important partner to Somalia (Akpinar 2017; Kavakli 2018).

Weak states and institutions in Africa are mostly results of colonial strategies that divided the societies to prohibit uprisings against the colonizers. As a result, post-colonial states in Africa spent most of their early years fighting over control of the countries. Somalia suffered from such colonial strategies; the lack of consensus on who to rule left the country

“divided into deeply antagonistic clans that could not dominate one another. The power of one clan is constrained only by the guns of another. This distribution of power leads not to inclusive institutions but to chaos, and at the root of it is the Somali state’s lack of any kind of political centralization, or state centralization, and its inability to enforce even minimal amount of law and order to support economic activity, trade, or even the basic security of its citizens” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012,

80).

The political, security, economic and humanitarian crises that emerged following the failure of the Somali government had significant implications for external actors: Somalia became the “playground” where interested and emerging actors like Turkey could emerge as an important global economic and security actor for Somalia (Akpınar 2017).

4.2 Historical Development of Turkish-Somali Relations

Turkey-Somalia relationship has been a part of Ankara’s broader foreign policy agenda towards sub-Saharan Africa. The African continent has traditionally been the ‘playground’ of Western actors including France, Italy, Belgium, the UK, and the US. The developing trend of the Turkish-Somali relations in the last decade inevitably raises some new questions for rising actors vis-à-vis the traditional actors. How does Turkey, as an emerging actor, make room for itself in a region historically dominated by the aforementioned traditional actors? What foreign policy tools does Ankara employ to advance itself as an international actor in Somalia and the horn of Africa.

Turkey-Somalia relationship is fairly recent with the most significant advancement emerging in 2010, the year the first Istanbul Conference on Somalia was held (MFA 2010). A second Istanbul Conference on Somalia was held in 2012 to reflect on the past and discuss the future of the relationship (MFA 2012). Overall, the conferences aimed to devising “actions in the political, security and economic spheres that will enable a smooth end of transition and the establishment of an inclusive and broad-based political dispensation in Somalia” (MFA 2012).

This thesis argues that Turkey has successfully emerged an important global actor by strategically devising foreign policy tools that meet the needs and demands of Somalia. At a deeper level, Turkey’s involvement in Somalia cannot be understood from a single theoretical standpoint. From the liberal theoretical perspective, the development of Turkish-Somali relations was driven by local Turkish businessmen who saw an opportunity to penetrate the African market. But this hardly explains Turkey’s motives in the region. Insights from the realist perspectives informs us of benefits Turkey stands to gain as a state. Being militarily active in the region provides Turkey a base for control and proximity not only in Africa but also in the

Middle East. Additionally, Somalia serves as an ideal place for Turkey to project itself as global power. Finally, Turkey's Islamic identity creates a sense of cultural and religious affinity towards Somalia which in turn drives Turkey's interests.

This chapter of the thesis presents empirical evidence to understand the various factors that shape TFP towards Somalia. Empirical evidence employed in this chapter originates from primary sources such as the OECD DAC, World Bank, and conference reports as well as secondary sources such as previous studies. Combined, these pieces of evidence point to Turkey's 'renewed' interests in Somalia and its successful emergence as a vital economic, political and security actor for Somalia and the horn of Africa as a region.

In 2010, Friedman in his book, *The Next 100 years*, projected that Turkey would be among the most important global actors in the future (Friedman 2010). Friedman's assertion was far from a conjecture. The case for Turkey as a vital international actor in the next century is evidenced by Turkey "deviating from its historically passive role in international affairs" and placing "an increasingly active emphasis on Africa" (Wheeler 2011, 23). As to whether that would happen is for history to unfold. What is apparent however is that "Turkey is currently redefining its international identity from being a passive pro-Western state to an active and constructive global actor" (Özkan and Akgün 2010, 525).

For the most part of its history, the newly founded Turkish republic, established under the leadership of Atatürk, pursued a foreign policy centred around improving relations with neighbours. Thus, Turkey's interest in Africa is but a recent development that is a little over two decades (Baird 2016). Turkey's relations with the region were minimal and almost non-existent from 1923 until 1998, when Ankara adopted the African Action Plan (Özkan 2010). Even then, the 1998 action plan birthed no significant relations until 2005 when the ruling AKP government announced it as the "year of Africa". Turkey's strategy towards Africa had been greatly influenced and shaped by Ahmet Davutoglu who aimed to find a key role for Turkey as a regional and international actor (Aras 2009; Davutoğlu 2013).

Somalia's importance in Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa and the Middle East has been identified by a number of scholars. For one thing, "Turkey used Somalia as the first great display of virtuous power" (Harte 2012, 28). For another, Somalia serves as a 'litmus test' that allows scholars of Turkish politics and Turkey-Africa relations to understand the future of that relationship. As pointed by Ozkan, "the results and the consequences of Turkey's policy on Somalia will undoubtedly shape the view of other African countries towards Turkey. Although Turkey would like to strengthen its relations and policies in Africa, it is a two-way street and Africa

has to be receptive for cooperation to exist” (Özkan 2014, 11). Thus, Turkey’s relations with Somalia could potentially pave the way for deepening relations with other countries or potentially undermine future relations with them.

Turkey’s relations with Somalia can be examined under several umbrellas: economic/humanitarian aid, diplomacy, and diplomacy. While these categories are studied separately in the next subchapters, they are not exactly mutually exclusive. Turkey’s humanitarian aid, diplomatic relations, as well as security relations influence each other, if not directly intertwined. As argued Akpınar (2017), Turkey-Somali relations was initially dominated by economic assistance and then eventually saw the birth of security relations.

4.3 Trade and Development Aid

Turkey made itself an indispensable actor for Somalia through development assistance. Though empirical evidence from the OECD DAC data show that Turkey was a latecomer to Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Somalia, it has emerged to the ranks of most important donors. The US, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and other European states stood as the highest ODA providers in Somalia in the first decade of the 21st century (table 4.1). The second decade of the century saw Turkey emerging as a challenger to the status quo by outranking many of the traditional ODA providers to Somalia (table 4.2). As per the realist argument, Somalia serves as an arena where Turkey is able to assert a role as a global power by challenging the traditional powers.

Between 2001 and 2009, Turkey’s total donation amounted to only 14.06 million dollars compared to the average of amount of 230 million for the top 10 donors and 129 million for the top 20 donors. In the second decade however, Turkish aid to Somalia increased significantly. As shown in fig 4.1, Turkey’s ODA to Somalia between 2010 and 2019 came very close the average top 10 donor while also surpassing the average of the top 20 donors. Additionally, Turkey became the biggest donor among the emerging powers.

Turkey’s aid to Somalia in the 2010s was particularly handy at a time during which Somalia was facing an unprecedented level of famine. The famine in 2011 affected over 750,000 people in both rural and urban areas and resulted in many of them becoming Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) (Majid and McDowell 2012). The


Table 4.1 ODA donation to Somalia (2000-2009)

Rank	Country	Amount (million dollars)
1	United States	917.71
2	Norway	393.97
3	United Kingdom	214.72
4	Netherlands	160.9
5	Italy	153.24
6	Sweden	150.44
7	Canada	79.56
8	Germany	74.1
9	Denmark	69.88
10	Finland	69.88
11	Spain	63.2
12	United Arab Emirates	48.85
13	Ireland	46.31
14	Japan	44.72
15	Switzerland	30.63
16	France	23.82
17	Turkey	14.06
18	Belgium	10.22
19	Australia	8.77
20	New Zealand	7.92

Source: OECD DAC data.

social, political, and economic conditions of Somalia during that time made external aids even more crucial for the country. As pointed by Özkan (2014), the context was marked by Somalis' inability to sustain their livelihood in addition to a lack of access to state officials. Worse so, years of instability meant that the country lacked the economic means to overcome the consequences of the famine.

Figure 4.1 Turkey's ODA Compared to the Average Donor



The 2010s marks the period in Somali history with the highest amount of foreign aid, and Turkey's role as an important actor for the country became more pronounced during this period. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 depict foreign country's development assistance to Somalia in the 2000s and 2010s respectively, based on OECD DAC data. In table 4.1, Turkey ranks as the 17th highest assistance donor to Somalia with an amount of 14.06 million dollars. The 2010s however saw an elevation in Turkey's importance as a donor: Turkey became the 4th highest donor, surpassed only by the US, United Kingdom and Germany, while also overtaking traditional donors such as Norway, the Netherlands, and Italy. This evidence underscores the argument that Turkey as an emerging global actor, especially in Africa, challenges the traditional actors to strengthen its visibility. By showing to the African states and the world that it is capable of assuming the roles played by traditional actors in the continent, Turkey makes space for itself as a crucial actor in the region.

One way that Turkey has been able to achieve some level of success in its ODA policies is the use of diplomatic institutions and platforms specifically targeted towards countries where Turkey aims to establish power. These institutions are further discussed in the next subsection. Institutions such as TIKA and TUSIAD reflect Turkey's recognition of the importance and usefulness of soft power, à la Nye Nye (2004)(2004), as a foreign policy strategy. While most of Turkey's assistances have been in the form of money, it has also employed project-based development assistance. In the health sector for example, Turkey has established facilities that could

Table 4.2 ODA Donations to Somalia (2010-2019)

Rank	Country	Amount (million dollars)
1	United States	2556.11
2	United Kingdom	1922.36
3	Germany	1830.11
4	Turkey	649.01
5	Sweden	643.55
6	Norway	518.55
7	Denmark	321.17
8	Japan	285.07
9	United Arab Emirates	221.3
10	Canada	212.66
11	Switzerland	179.15
12	Finland	149.39
13	Netherlands	143.82
14	Italy	138
15	Australia	127.57
16	Ireland	82.16
17	Qatar	68.27
18	Spain	29.09
19	Belgium	21.8
20	France	18.9

Source: OECD DAC data.

meet the needs of over a 1000 patients per day and a capacity to bed a couple of hundreds of people. More prominent is also the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Teaching Hospital in Mogadishu that provides health care and also train doctors (TIKA 2020a). Other projects include construction of water wells to mitigate water shortage problems, and establishment of vocational educational institutions to train the youth in fields such as fishing (Özkan 2014).

Somalia ranks 2nd on the list of recipients of Turkish ODA (table 4.3). This ultimately sends across the message that Turkey cares about the progress and wellbeing of the country, a by-product of which is the strengthening of trust between the two parties. On the other hand, Somalia is a window that allows Turkey to improve on its relations with the rest of the African continent. Turkey's decision to prioritize Somalia among the list of ODA recipients is a calculated move from which Turkey hopes to benefit economically in the long run.

Indeed in 2008, Turkey's minister of foreign affairs, Ali Babacan, identified that while Turkey's economic relations with Africa had been increasing, it was less than the potential trade volume and thus Turkey expected trade to increase from 16 billion

Table 4.3 Top recipients of Turkish ODA (2015)


Rank	Country	Amount (million dollars)
1	Syria	2694
2	Somalia	314.8
3	Kyrgystan	91.4
4	Albania	85.7
5	Afghanistan	56.8

Source: TIKA 2015 Report.

usd to 30 billion usd over a period of 2 years (cited in Özkan (2010) 2010). As of 2012, the official report on the second Turkey-African summit indicated that Turkey signed Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements with 38 African countries in addition to establishing “commercial consulates” specifically for the purpose of trade between Turkey and the African countries (MFA 2014).

In the grand scheme of things, Somalia was an important actor in Turkey’s strategic goal of establishing amicable relations with African countries through trade. Data from the World Bank shows an increasing trend of trade volume between Turkey and Somalia (fig 4.2). Up until 2010, annual trade volume between Turkey and Somalia fell below 10 million usd. In the 2010s, trade volume increased exponentially reaching a peak of almost 190 million usd in 2018.


Figure 4.2 Turkey-Somalia Trade Volume



Source: World Bank Trade data

When compared to the rest of the world, this increase is significantly higher than the average increase in Somalia's trade volume with the rest of the world (fig. 4.3). Thus, Turkey specifically focuses on trade as a means to gain a foothold in Somalia. As shown in figure 4.3, the average of the world's trade volume with Somalia witnessed significantly lower percentage changes over the last two decades compared to the percent change in Turkey's trade with Somalia. In 2011, Turkey's trade volume with Somalia increased by almost 600 percent.

Figure 4.3 Percentage Change in Somalia Trade Volume: Global trend vs Turkish Trend



This increase in trade volume marked a significant turning point not only for the Turkish government but also for local Turkish businessmen. Increase in trade volume also reflects in the financial gains made by Turkish producers who export to Somalia. Accordingly, the evidence corresponds with liberal theory hypothesis.

4.4 Diplomatic Relations

The success of Turkey's ODA in Somalia has been partly due to its diplomatic relations with the country. Turkey has successfully tied all its dealings with Somalia and African countries at large to one of many of its state and non-state institutions. This approach can be best understood from the theoretical discussions on the changing nature of power in international politics. Turkish foreign policy has borrowed a

chapter from the liberal handbook of international politics: soft power (Nye 1990, 2004).

The role of soft power in Turkish foreign policy can be seen in various aspects including tourism, trade, and education. As argued Nye, soft power creates a sense of cultural attractiveness towards the country exercising the power (Nye 2004). Turkey has successfully made this an integral part of its diplomatic and political relations with Somalia. First, Turkey championed the global campaign to recognize the plight of Somalis in the aftermath of the 2011 hunger. The AKP government successfully mobilized support from the Turkish public including the opposition, the Republic People's Party (CHP) (Özkan and Orakci 2015). This success could be achieved because "the AKP government's goals of establishing new connections with African countries and creating new export markets correspond to the needs of small and medium-sized Anatolian businesses and faith-based Turkish NGO s endeavours to recreate links with Muslim communities in Africa" (Ipek and Biltekin 2013, 132).

The Turkish government has often relied on the support of its civil society as a means to obtain soft power (Atalay 2013). Turkey's practice of formulating foreign policy based on its internal dynamics is a reflection of Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist approach to international politics. This theoretical approach regards government's policy as a multilevel process that factors the needs and demands of civilians and civil societies (Moravcsik 1993). Turkey's policies towards Somalia were thus shaped to some extent by Turkish businessmen who saw an opportunity to access the African market. Over the years, Turkey's implementation of liberal policies has however been put into question, in light of the erosion of separation of powers and pluralism (Atalay 2018).

Atalay (2018) has invoked authoritarian neoliberalism as a term to describe Turkey: a nondemocracy with neoliberal policies. To "consolidate the authoritarian neoliberal regime, the government has restructured the state apparatus and incorporated loyalist nonstate actors, such as Islamic segments of civil society, into governance" (Atalay 2018, 176). The role of religion in the Turkish government's neoliberalism is also mirrored in its foreign policy. The AKP government has often employed Islamic religion in its rhetoric towards Somalia (Atalay 2013).

Internal support for Somalia gained by the Turkish government from religious institutions such as Diyanet was partly based on the notion that any support to Somalia is a support to their Muslim brethren (Atalay 2013). Ipek and Biltekin have observed that "faith-based NGO s utilize the language of religious duty and obligation when explaining their involvement" in support to Somalia 2013, 132. On the other hand, secular NGOs utilise a somewhat human rights rhetoric in explaining why

they support projects such as provision of potable water and construction of hospitals in Somalia (Atalay 2013). Whatever the language used by the NGOs, the success of Turkish foreign policy in Somalia in the 2010s was partly owed to the AKP government's ability to garner support from various civil societies and NGOs. Put together, the incorporation of civil societies as well as religious groups in TFP corroborates the second and third hypotheses of this thesis.

The Turkish government has promoted institutionalization of its relations with Somalia, and the continuation thereof. Naturally, the Turkish MFA has been a prolific actor in Turkey-Somali relations. It institutionalised the Istanbul Somalia conference to discuss solutions to the humanitarian crisis in the country. The international conference, conveyed on two occasions (2010 and 2012), would be key in improving Turkey's diplomatic relations with Somalia. The report by the Turkish MFA stipulated two main objectives of the conference:

“1. The Government of Turkey will hold an international conference on Somalia (“Istanbul II”) on 31 May-1 June under the theme: “Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015”. The conference will provide the international community with a unique opportunity to adopt common positions on the future of Somalia. It will aim to chart immediate concrete actions in the political, security and economic spheres that will enable a smooth end of transition and the establishment of an inclusive and broad-based political dispensation in Somalia after August 2012. The conference will also seek to build consensus on a long-term approach to state-building and economic development, including the evolution of an enabling environment for private investment in the post-transition period.

2. The conference will engage a wide range of regional and international actors, as well as the Somali business sector, civil society, women’s groups, diaspora and youth representatives. It will endeavor to include representation from all parts of Somalia in an effort to promote home-grown, Somali-led solutions to the Somali crisis” (MFA 2012a).

Another crucial body in Turkey's foreign Policy towards Somalia is the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). TIKA was originally founded in 1992 under the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism to support the newly emergent Turkic states that had been under Soviet rule. In the recent decade however, TIKA's mandate has expanded to include one critical responsibility: overseeing and coordi-

nating Turkish ODA. TİKA's role in Turkey-Somali relations has been applauded by former Somali President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who in an interview mentioned that:

“TİKA is not the agency that puts the most money in Somalia, according to statistics. But in terms of impact on the ground, on the life of ordinary Somalis, I can say there is no other agency we can compare, with the impact of the TİKA projects making on the Somalia people; in terms of their life, in terms of their economic recovery. So it is highly visible and the impact is very visible here in Somali. I can claim and I can say that no other development agency impacted Somalia more than TİKA” (TİKA 2016, 5).

President Mohamud's interview reflects the improved public image, and soft power, of Turkey in Somalia. Turkey's diplomatic strategies have made it a major foreign policy actor and contender in Somalia. By so doing, Turkey as an emerging actor makes room for itself to stay on par with traditional actors like the UK and Italy.

TİKA has overseen various projects including improvements of transport networks, health facilities and educational infrastructure. Turkish Scholarship Foundation (YTB) has also contributed to this development by awarding several scholarships to Somalis to pursue higher education in Turkish universities. A 2019 report by the Turkish Council of Higher Education (YÖK) lists Somalia among the top 10 countries with the highest number of international students enrolled in Turkish universities. Somalia is the only African country in the list, with a total of 2,310 students. This is a reflection of Somalia's strategic importance for Turkish policy in Africa (YÖK 2019).

A number of nonstate actors have also eventually become part of Turkey's strategies in Somalia. For example, Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) have actively engaged in investment plans to boost trade relations between Turkey and Somalia, and economic development in Somalia. The Turkish Red Crescent (KIZILAY) as well as the government agency called the Disaster and Emergency management Presidency (AFAD) have both been active in humanitarian reliefs for the many Somalis who were going through humanitarian crisis. Other NGOs who have been involved in a similar fashion include the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), Yardim Eli and Can Suyu.

4.5 Security Relations

Turkey's interests in Somalia extends also to the realms of security. Though Turkey's relationship with Somalia had started as Turkey being a benign donor, Turkey has in recent years transformed into a "self-assured security provider to Somalia" (Akpinar 2017). Ankara's strategy towards Mogadishu for the most part had involved elements of soft power. The Turkish side however recognizes that it requires some amount of hard power influence in Somalia as well, given the strategic position of Somalia. Somalia's geographical location (the horn of Africa) puts it in proximity to the ongoing instability in the region. In 2017, Turkey officially opened its largest military base outside Turkey in Mogadishu. Akpinar has noted the strategic importance of Turkey's decision to make Mogadishu home to its largest military base:

“although the establishment of a military base in Somalia may seem to be a shift in Turkey's policy, it is actually a reflection of its long-term goals, which depend significantly on stability in the country. Moreover, it is also a means to fill in the gap that will be created from the withdrawal of 22,000 African Union forces from Somalia at the end of 2018” (Akpinar 2017, 3).


Turkey's involvement was thus prompted by a potential power vacuum that emerged in the failure and instability of the Somali government. It was an opportunity for Turkey to become not only a security provider for Somalia but also a security actor in the horn of Africa as a region. Territorial conflicts in the region involving Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Sudan poses a threat to the stability of the region, and this instability threatens Turkey's economic and political interests. Turkey has invested immensely in Somalia and the region, both economically and politically, and is keen on protecting these investments. Thus, by having a military base close to the region, Turkey is better equipped to engage militarily to protect its interests if necessary.

Another implication of the military base can be understood in terms of Somalia's proximity to the Middle East, specifically Yemen (fig. 4.4). Aras and Akpinar have discussed Turkey's long-term goal of remaining militarily active in the Arabian Gulf all the way to the Gulf of Aden (Aras and Akpinar 2017). Turkey's military base in Somalia allows it to have a presence in the Gulf of Aden, the strip of sea bordered by Yemen to the north and Somalia to the South. Saudi Arabia and

United Arab Emirates' interests in opening respective military bases in Djibouti and Somaliland also made it critical for Turkey to obtain some military presence in the region (Akpinar 2017). Thus, Turkey competes not only with existing actors like the US and the UK but also with other emerging actors to gain influence in the region.

Establishing a military base in another sovereign state is often a challenging one. In this case however, Turkey faced little obstacle. First, the military base was much welcomed by the Somali counterpart because the Turkish side emphasised that the primary goal of the facility was to train the Somali military and equip them with the necessary skills to combat instability in the country (Rossiter and Cannon 2019). From the Somali perspective, "Turkey was contributing to the reconstruction of Somalia's organized "national" force and therefore helping it overcome clan-based division, which is often seen as one of the main drivers of conflict in Somalia" (Akpinar 2017, 5). Turkey's success in this sense is in part due to its positive image in the eyes of the Somali government.

Figure 4.4 Horn of Africa



Thiessen and Özerdem (2019) have noted that Turkey's strategy is not entirely different new and therefore cautioned against treating Turkey as though it were

different from the north/western actors in its interventionism in Somalia. Their findings showed that

“it is inaccurate to claim a comprehensive rejection of conventional North/Western intervention methodologies by Turkish organisations since modes of Turkish intervention sometimes look quite similar. However, prevailing North/Western approaches are, perhaps, facing an important, albeit limited, challenge from Turkish organisations” (Thiessen and Özerdem 2019, 1987).

Overall, Turkey’s relations with Somalia in terms of security is in the interest of Somalia as well as that of Turkey. Somalia as a state has internal security problems from rampant civil wars, albeit little military capability. Turkey’s establishment of the military base in Mogadishu equips Somalia with some level of capabilities. Additionally, as discussed earlier, Somaliland as a secessionist group has declared itself independent since 1991. Historically, there have been conflicts between Somaliland and Somalia, in late 1980s, leading to bombings to Somaliland cities like Hargeisa and Burcao and subsequent migration of hundreds of thousands of Somalilanders. But, currently, efforts by external actors like Turkey has maintained peaceful relations between Somalia and Somaliland.

Turkey has been keen on maintaining amicable relations by serving as a critical mediator as well as a donor to both parties. As an emerging actor competing for influence in the region, Turkey has become a partner to peace talks to end tension between the parties. The US as well as emerging actors like UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have all exhibited their desire to project power in the region as they continue to make significant strategic investments in the region (Townsend 2018). Rival powers like “Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are keen to ensure that none of their primary rivals – Qatar, Turkey and Iran – can gain access to the Red Sea coastline, of which Somaliland controls 850km” (International Crisis Group 2019, 12).

Turkey has strategically included Somaliland in its foreign policy by providing aids to the autonomous region. In November 2020, Turkey supported Somaliland bee farmers by donating 300 beehives to them (Mukami 2020). Somaliland farmers have also received aids in the form of irrigation equipment to help boost agriculture. More recently, Turkey’s aid to Somaliland was in the form of cleaning and hygiene supplies to help combat Covid-19 (TIKA 2020b). Turkey provides all these aids to ensure that peace remains in the region as tension between Somalia and Somaliland threatens Turkey’s interests. Thus, in addition to mediating peace talks, Turkey

provides support to both territories. Essentially, peace and progress in the horn of Africa is in Turkey's interests. Thus, Turkey has been highly involved in maintaining peaceful relations in the region.

4.6 Discussion

Evaluating TFP towards Somalia from a single theoretical standpoint provides only a limited insight to the dynamics of the relationship. The convergence of realism, liberal theory and ideational theory provides a deeper understanding of Turkey's foreign policy strategies not only to Somalia but towards Africa as a whole.

Turkey as an emerging power has successfully penetrated Somalia using trade and aid. Unlike previous colonizers such as the UK and France, Turkey has not used any forceful measures to gain leverage. Instead, TFP has prioritized diplomatic relations to improve its reputation. This evidently has made the Somalia welcoming towards Turkey. As discussed earlier, the Somali government deems Turkey an ally who is there to help. Indeed, Turkey has built on this perception as an ally to advance its interests with Somalia. The use of religious rhetoric such as "muslim brothers" presents Turkey as an actor who cares about helping the Somali people because they see them as brothers and equals. Internally, same religious rhetoric has been effective in gaining support from some religious NGOs. The AKP government has also successfully amassed support from non-religious groups involving businessmen, volunteers, etc. Ultimately, prioritization of diplomatic measures has been crucial in Turkey's approach to Somalia.

But like all other global actors, Turkey has its own interests as well. While Turkey's rhetoric may include a language of brotherhood and care for the Somali people, analysed from the standpoint of realism, Turkey is also motivated by material and security interests. For one thing, Somalia's geographical location makes it an ideal place for Turkey to operate from militarily and that explains Turkey's construction of a military facility in Mogadishu. For another, Turkey aspires to gain a strong foothold in sub-Saharan Africa and Somalia provides a window to achieve that. Turkey's economic and political investment in Somalia has given it a reputation that sends a message to the remaining African countries. It aspires to extend economic and security relations with the rest of the continent. Africa is still a developing continent with several resources to offer. Hence, both traditional and emerging actors continue to maintain their interests.

“Somalia may prove to be Turkey’s backdoor into the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey’s work in Somalia has earned it a reputation in Africa as a generous and effective rehabilitator of broken countries. The more Turkey accomplishes in Somalia, the greater its political capital will be throughout the region, improving its investment prospects and political alliances with countries from Mozambique to Gambia. This will be especially true in majority-Muslim nations, where the importance of Sunni Islam in everyday life gives Turkish investors and envoys an advantage over their non-Muslim counterparts, given their familiarity with Islamic finance, social mores, and shared holidays” (Harte 2012, 29).

Turkey as emerging actor however exploits the weakness of post-colonial Somalia. Post-colonial countries like Somalia find themselves in a world system designed to suit the needs and demands of developed countries. This has created a context where developing economies have to rely on others for survival. In this regard, Turkey has presented itself as a good Samaritan, unlike the previous colonizers. It has been able to establish trust and eventually instilled itself as a crucial actor for Somalia.

5. BILATERAL REPORTS AND LEGISLATIONS ON THE TURKISH-SOMALIA RELATIONS

5.1 Istanbul Conferences on Somalia, 2010 and 2012

Since the AKP government started to adopt active role in sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia has been at the forefront of TFP towards the region. Several bilateral agreements between the two countries have been presented and ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) which reflects Ankara's commitment to Somalia. This chapter analyzes these legislations ratified by the TGNA to tease out the dynamics of TFP towards Somalia. In line with the hypotheses of this thesis, the analysis presented herein shows that TFP is driven by both the interests of the Turkish states and those of civil groups within Turkey.

The first Istanbul Conference on Somalia in 2010 marked an important turning point for Somalia as well as Turkey-Somali relations. For the Somalian side,

“The Istanbul Conference reaffirmed the world's commitment to Somalia and its rejection of all efforts to sow violence and instability in the country. We send a clear and strong message to the people of Somalia that they are not alone in the search for peace, reconciliation and prosperity after so many years of poverty, hardship and suffering. With determined efforts by, the Transitional Federal Institutions, Somali civil society and the private sector, in partnership with the international community, a bright future for Somalia is possible” (OCHA 2010).

More importantly, this conference, co-organized and facilitated by Turkey, was important in reaffirming the interim federal system in Somalia enacted during the transition period. The success of this system became apparent when Somalia even-

tually adopted the Federal system permanently. For the Turkish side, the Conference had three implications. First, it signalled Turkish government's commitment to attaining international peace in the horn Africa. Second, it showed Turkey's potential and willingness to play a critical role in international peace and conflicts. Turkey's commitment was manifested focusing on diplomacy and mediation as critical foreign policy tools. Third, it signalled to Mogadishu that Turkey was in its corner and thus could be trusted as an ally. As indicated by the conference report, the conference

“reflected the strong determination of the United Nations, the Government of Turkey and the International Community to work with the Transitional Federal Institutions and the people of Somalia to defeat the cycle of lawlessness, violence and despair in the country and to build in its place a peaceful and prosperous future for the Somali people. The Conference reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia” (OCHA 2010).

Roughly two years after the conference in 2010, Turkey spearheaded a second Conference on Somalia in May 2012. During this conference, President Erdogan showed Turkey's support for Somalia by urging the international community to be active in the humanitarian crisis in the country: “Without living there you cannot devise the correct policies and you cannot help. I invite the international community to open representative offices” (Erdogan quoted in Burch (2012)). This second conference was important in drawing a timeline for Somalia to adopt a permanent government to replace the transition government. It also served as a platform to discuss long-term development goals of Somalia. As written in the Concept Note report released by the Turkish government ahead of the conference:

“Now is the time to address both the immediate and multifaceted challenges that confront Somalia, including in the humanitarian field, and to conceptualize and plan for the implementation of long-term solutions. The end of the transition and the new political dispensation should bring new economic opportunities, enabling Somalis to start building durable peace and stability. The TFG and other Somali stakeholders must now begin to create the conditions for social and economic development that can underpin a prosperous future and put an end to the cycle of famine and aid dependence. We should also aim for tangible progress by 2015 towards the Millennium Development Goals” (MFA 2012b).

This report hinted at Turkey's interest in the long-term dynamics of Somalia. In a way, Turkey presented itself as an actor genuinely interested in the long-term development of Somalia. The success of the second conference further advanced Turkish-Somali relations with implications that continue to exist today. Within a period of about a dozen years, the TGNA has been presented with bilateral agreements between Turkey and Somalia for ratification 19 times. The subsequent subsections analyze the details of these reports. These reports can be analysed from two dimensions: i. the scopes of the agreements and ii. the guiding principle of the agreements. The section discussing the scope of the bilateral reports presents a broader analysis that looks at the issue areas where the two parties reached an agreement and subsequently presented to the TGNA for ratification. The section on the principles of the reports delves into the local level details of the individual reports to understand the principles that drive Turkey's involvement in Somalia.

5.2 Scope of Turkey-Somalia Bilateral Reports

As discussed earlier, this chapter relies on 19 bilateral agreements between the Turkish government and the Somali government presented to the TGNA for ratification. Of the 19 agreements presented to the TGNA, nine had been passed and enacted as laws, seven were nullified, and the remaining three remain on the Grand National Assembly's agenda. Revised or updated versions of nullified reports were sometimes re-presented to the TGNA and gained approval. For the purpose of this thesis, all reports are considered in the analysis hereinafter. While TGNA's approval has higher implications for the Turkey-Somali relations, ratified or not, the reports are bilateral agreements signed by both the Turkish government as well as the Somali government, or their representatives thereof. Thus, the details of the reports provide insights on the various areas of cooperation between the parties.

Overall, the scopes of the reports can be placed under five categories: i. Economic and social development ii. Security, military and defense industry cooperation iii. Health and Medical sciences iv. Investment and investor protection v. Cultural cooperation. Though some of these categories overlap, I separate them because they warrant different attention. For example, though health and medical cooperation falls under social development, it is often treated with special attention by the Turkish government and thus require independent analysis.

5.2.1 Economic and Social Development Cooperation

Economic and social development have been integral to TFP towards Somalia. In fact, the first bilateral agreement report submitted to Parliament for ratification was based on economic and social development. The agreement stated that Turkish Party shall provide assistance to Somali Party on following areas within the bounds of technical and financial possibilities: a. Education b. Health c. Agriculture d. Development of administrative and civil infrastructures e. Humanitarian f. Other areas to be decided by the Parties (TGNA 2009, 3).

The issue areas identified by the agreement reflects the focus areas of economic and social development of the Turkish government. In terms economic development, agriculture and administrative and civil infrastructure would be critical whereas for social development, education, health, and humanitarian aid would be. As the agreement also entailed training of Somali personnel, the Turkish government agreed to undertake “costs of equipment and materials required for the implementation of the cooperation programs as agreed by the Parties and cost of training programs to be organized in Turkey for the Somali personnel” (TGNA 2009, 3).

Though the initial agreement received no parliamentary approval, a later version was again presented to parliament in 2011 which was approved into law. The 2011 agreement submitted to parliament had a validity period of five years. Thus, in 2016, the TGNA approved a new agreement that revised the areas of economic cooperation.

The Parties agreed, through appropriate measures to promote and facilitate trade and economic cooperation between their countries in accordance with their respective domestic law, and subject to obligations under international treaties, conventions and agreements to which they are Parties.

The Parties shall foster cooperation in the following fields:

- i. Trade and Investment
- ii. Energy and Natural Resources
- iii. Agriculture and Livestock Development
- iv. Education and Health
- v. Fisheries

vi. Science and Technology (TGNA 2016, 10).

A careful study of the 2016 agreement report reveals significant advancements in Turkey-Somali relations. In terms of the wording, the 2009 agreements stipulated that Turkey shall provide assistance. . . which implied a unidirectional relationship, but the 2016 agreement stated that the Parties. . . will facilitate economic cooperation between their countries suggesting mutual benefit. Additionally, both countries granted each other the Most Favored Nation Status which allowed them to adopt favorable tax policies only applicable to products imported from the parties. Thirdly, the Parties agreed on a mode of payment that allowed “freely convertible currencies.” Fourthly, to promote trade, the parties agreed to eliminate taxes on sample products imported for advertisement or promotion purposes:

“The Parties, in accordance with their national legislations in force, agree not to levy on customs duties and other charges on the goods and equipments imported temporarily for use in trade promotional events such as fairs, exhibition, missions and seminars, provided that such goods and equipment are not subject to commercial transaction and will be re-exported after the event” (TGNA 2016, 10).

This clause, in conformity with the liberal theory of IR hypothesis, reflects the interests of the local Turkish businessmen who hope to enter the Somali market. Overall, the development of the agreement to include benefits for Turkey corroborates the claim that Turkey is also driven by benefits it stands to gain in Africa. The latest agreement ratified by TGNA shows even further advancement in the areas of cooperation. Article 3 of the 2019 agreement identifies 14 areas of cooperation to be prioritized:

The Parties attach particular importance to the following fields;

1. Agriculture, agro-industry, food processing industry,
2. Rural and urban development plans and programs,
3. Health,
4. Poverty reduction,
5. Water, sanitation, forestry and geology,

6. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) development,
7. Infrastructure,
8. Energy,
9. Transportation,
10. Culture and tourism,
11. Education and scientific research,
12. Supporting and strengthening public and private administrative structures including the non-governmental organizations, associations, employers' associations and labor unions, universities,
13. Restoration,
14. Humanitarian relief (TGNA 2019a).

5.2.2 Investor and Investment Cooperation

Though investment and investors have been listed as one of the areas of cooperation under economic and social development, they have on a number of occasions been treated differently with different agreements focusing solely on investment promotion in Somalia. Thus, I accordingly analyze them separately as a category of Turkey-Somali relations. Two agreements between the Turkish government and the Somali government have found their way to the TGNA thrice. The first agreement prepared “for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income” could not initially get parliamentary approval in 2017 but was later ratified in 2019. The second agreement submitted to TGNA in 2018 was aimed at “reciprocal promotion and protection of investments”. Taken together, these agreements reflect the interests of Turkish businessman and thus serve as evidence of how foreign policy is driven by internal actors.

To promote investment, the former agreement incentivizes Turkish investors/workers who want to invest/work in Somalia and Somali investors/workers who want to invest/work in Turkey by eliminating double taxation from both the Turkish government and the Somali government. The agreement applied to immovable properties, business profits, shipping, air and land transports as well as associated enterprises.

“Income derived by a resident of a Contracting State from immovable property (including income from agriculture or forestry) situated in the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.

The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so much of them as is attributable to that permanent establishment” (TGNA 2017).

These above-quoted are exemplary articles that show how the interests of Turkish businessmen are considered in Turkish-Somali relations. The first article guarantees investors that investments they make on immobile items like agricultural machineries will be taxed only by the Somali government. The second article adds to that by guaranteeing that incomes from business investments resulting from this agreement will be subject to only one tax. The agreement essentially fulfils its aim of “avoiding double taxation with respect to taxes and income” (TGNA 2017, 25). The latter agreement in 2018 purported to further promote the interest of new investors:

“The Contracting Parties shall within the framework of their national legislation give favorable consideration for the entry and sojourn of nationals of either Contracting Party who wish to enter the territory of the other Contracting Party in connection with the making and carrying through of an investment.

Investor of either Contracting Party whose investments suffer losses in the territory of the Other Contracting Party owing to war, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar events shall be accorded such other Contracting Party treatment no less favorable than that accorded to its own investors of any third State, whichever is the most favorable treatment, as regards any measures it adopts in relation to such losses” (TGNA 2018).

Essentially, investors from either side looking to invest in the other country would receive favorable treatments with little obstacle. Additionally, given the history of instability in Somalia, the possibility of losses emerging from war and the likes does not seem unthinkable. Hence, the second article is a clause that ensures Turkish

investors that they will not be discriminated should the Somali government be put in a situation to bail out businesses in the country. Put together, the articles of these agreement corroborate hypothesis 2 of this thesis.

5.2.3 Health and Medical Sciences

Health and medical cooperation have provided one of the backbones of Turkey's engagement with Somalia. In particular, two agreements, both in 2013, related to health have been ratified by the TGNA. The first of the two agreements identified the areas and modes of cooperation between the Turkish government and the Somali government whereas the latter laid the foundation for the establishment of a teaching and research hospital. The focus on health as foreign policy tool for donors is relatively new with a history of about a decade and half. As pointed out,

“Every decade has brought new donor priorities and conditionalities—and none of these have been aligned with their own calls for developing the productive ‘supply side’ of their economies. In the 1980s donors pushed for stabilization and adjustment, with contractionary effects. In the 1990s the attention of donors turned to institution-building and poverty reduction strategies, and yet again aid-receiving governments found their arguments for investment and growth falling on deaf ears. More recently, donors have focused on health and social spending, an emphasis magnified by new institutions such as the Gates Foundation and other public–private partnerships” (Woods 2008, 1217).

Literature on aid has found that health aid impacts both public health and the economy, though the extent of the relation with the latter remains debated. Mishra and Newhouse's (2009) quantitative analysis showed that increased health aid positively correlated with infant mortality reduction. Other unquantified benefits include how foreign aid saves lives through vaccines and eradication of deadly diseases. On the economic front, some studies have shown positive relationship between aids and economic improvement (Rajan and Subramanian 2005). Turkish aid to Somalia has been crucial for the Somali health sector especially during the heights of its humanitarian crisis. The initial agreement identified seven health-related areas of cooperation:

- a. Strengthening healthcare systems,
- b. Fighting against communicable diseases and vaccination,
- c. Improvement of maternal-child health and reduction of the maternal-child mortality rate,
- d. Health education,
- e. Environmental health,
- f. Mental health services,
- g. Medicine, pharmaceuticals and medical devices,
- h. Management of emergency health services and management of health services in disasters (TGNA 2013a).

The scope of the agreement included exchange of information, experts, delegations and health personnel in addition to the training of Somali health personnel by Turkish experts. Moreover, respective health institutions from each Party would correspond and work on joint projects. The second agreement saw the establishment of training and Research hospital in Somalia,

“The scope of this Protocol consists of establishing the “Mogadishu Somalia-Turkey Training and Research Hospital” (hereinafter referred to as the “Hospital”) in Somalia Mogadishu with a capacity of 200 beds as well as the other affiliated units in Somalia, jointly operating for five years and transferring of the said hospital and the other affiliated units to the Somali party free of charge after the expiration of the set period with the completion of the necessary conditions. After the transfer of the said Hospital the monitoring/coordination activity shall continue for five years” (TGNA 2013b).

This agreement is peculiar in the sense that though it is an aid granted by Turkey, the Turkish party did not readily cede its control to the Somali government. Turkish representatives occupied administrative and advisory board seats at the Hospital. The agreement stated that “the Turkish Party shall establish and run a “Program Office” in Somalia for the operation of the hospital” (TGNA 2013b, 19). In essence, Turkish presence would remain active and felt in the first five years when it co-runs the hospital. Even when the Turkish government cedes control after 5 years, the

agreement allows Turkey to remain as monitor/coordinator. Hence, while Turkish health aid helps the public health system in Somalia, this conditionality allows Turkey to be active in Somalia and serve its interests for several years.

From the Somali perspective, health is very critical. Various health indicators suggest that health care system in Somalia is below par, and this dynamic makes Turkey's health aid valuable for Somalia. For example, a report on health spending in Somalia indicated that per capita health spending amounted to only \$33 dollars for that year compared to the average of \$120 for low-income countries (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2017). Fragmentation of the national health system and the absence of a unified health system governance has resulted in a costly health care where less than 30% of Somalis have access to health care (Gele 2020).

Data from the World Health Organisation (WHO) shows that Somalia has one of the highest maternal mortality rates (MMR), though the value has been decreasing over the years. As of 2000, MMR was 1210 out of every 100,000 births. The annual value remained above 1,000 until 2009 when it dropped to 994. Latest report shows that current MMR in Somalia is at 829 (WHO 2021a). Similarly, infant mortality remains high within the country, with some report indicating a rate of 74 per 1000 live births (WHO 2021b) and another showing 88 (CIA 2021). Whatever the metric used, Somalia ranks in the top 5 of highest infant mortality rate.

Evidently, health has always been important for Somalia and years of civil unrest within the country created more challenges for foreign health personnel who wanted to work in the country. The shooting and killing of Farah Warsame Diriye, a UN health personnel, in 2007 discouraged indicated that insecurity in the country was a problem for health care as well (?). Given these conditions, the health sector in Somalia is clearly lagging. This makes Turkey's commitment to support health care in the country via construction of hospitals and training of personnel particularly important for Somalia.

5.2.4 Security, Military Cooperation and Defense Industry

Security as part of Turkey-Somalia relationship has been critical from the onset of the relationship due to Somalia's geographic location. Hence, it comes as no surprise that security plays an important role in TFP towards Somalia. There are two sub-categories in the security realm of TFP towards Somalia— military training, and joint security operations.

In terms of military training, the Turkish counterpart as early as 2010 agreed to

offer trainings on military techniques to Somalian military to combat insurgencies and maintain national peace. Coordination in this regard also included cooperation between the defense industries of both countries. The 2010 agreement, ratified by the TGNA, identified as much as 16 fields of military cooperation with the possibility other areas being agreed upon later. The agreement allowed for exchange of military intelligence, cooperation in scientific and technological research and cooperation in the field of mapping and hydrography (TGNA 2010). However, the coordination of the defense industries and exchange of knowledge and intelligence inevitably raised questions related to intellectual and industrial property rights. To put this under check and protect the interests of local Turkish industries as well as the intelligence gathered by the Turkish military, the agreements stipulated that

“Rights and obligations of the Parties concerning their intellectual and industrial property rights, production rights within their own territories, issuance of the reproduction license, sales to Third Parties, preservation of patents on new product and inventions realized within the framework of joint projects and technology transfer shall be determined through the implementation agreement to be made for each joint project. The Parties, within the framework of their national legislation and international agreements to which they are party, shall effectively protect intellectual property rights to be established and transferred on the basis of this agreement. Within the scope of this Agreement, the concept of intellectual property shall be considered as it is defined in the Article II of the agreement which was signed in 14th of July 1967, in Stockholm, and established World Intellectual Property Organisation” (TGNA 2015).

“Release or publication of the defence industrial material and information exchanged between the Parties to a Third party shall only be possible upon the written consent of the Originating Party. The Parties shall mutually agree on information, documents and explanations to be extended to the public and the press within the scope of cooperation in the field defence industry” (TGNA 2015).

In terms of joint security cooperation, the agreements allowed Turkey to adapt active roles in Somalia to deal with various security threats, such as transboundary organized crime, illicit production, trafficking and smuggling of narcotics and other

substances, human and migrants trafficking, weapons and ammunitions trafficking, and forgery of money and documents (TGNA 2013c). Given Somalia's proximity to the Middle East and the Gulf of Aden leading up to the Suez Canal, issues such as drug and weapon trafficking in the region also pose threat to Turkish national security. As discussed in chapter 2, Turkey's geography places it in an unstable region where instability from terrorism and failed states threatens its national interest. By coordinating with Somalia to deal with such security issues, Turkey can serve its interest by reducing the possibility of weapons, drugs, money, and immigrants being smuggled to Turkey or neighbouring countries. Thus, Turkey's interests in Somalia are in part driven by Turkey's security objectives, as hypothesized in the theoretical chapter.

5.2.5 Cultural Cooperation

The agreement to establishment a cultural centre in Somalia appeals to the ideational motives behind TFP. Turkish elites have exhibited the ability to hold multiple identities in foreign policy making. This has been possible by "construction of a newfound national role that envisions Turkey as a global actor simultaneously fulfilling multiple roles in separate issue areas and geographical regions" (Aras and Gorener 2010, 74). These identities in some way shape Turkish foreign policy towards Africa. Indeed, the establishment of a cultural centre in Somalia facilitates Turkey's ability to spread its culture beyond its borders.

According to the agreement, the Cultural Centre will be named after Yunus Emre, a famous Turkish poet who lived in the 13th and 14th century (TGNA 2019b). In terms of the functions/activities to be carried out by the cultural centres, the agreement mentions

- Organising conferences and other similar meetings as well as cultural events like concerts, theatre performances and exhibitions except for those of historical heritage;
- Organising visits and exchanges programs between the countries of the Parties, including visits of artists, writers, scientists, researchers, academicians, students, journalists and public officials as well as exchange of academicians and students;
- Presentation to the public information on diverse aspects of the country of the Sending Party, such as its people, culture and history;

- Holding of language courses, seminars, contents and issuance of proficiency certificates on the language of the Sending Party through organization of examinations
- Supporting by means of providing financial assistance, teaching staff, books and other educational material, departments and programs in schools, universities and research organisations in the country of the Receiving Party aiming at teaching and holding researches on various aspects of the country of the Sending Party, such as its culture, history, language and literature” (TGNA 2019b).

Hence, through education, research and joint cultural activities, Turkey is able to spread its culture beyond the Middle East. Interestingly, the agreement generally focuses on “culture and history” without necessarily mentioning religion. Thus, while TFP towards Somalia may be partly motivated by its religious identity, religion does not explicitly form any component of Turkish-Somali agreements. Arguably, it could be implied that religion is automatically imbedded in culture and history and thus would be automatically form part of the cultural agreement. This provides somewhat a weak evidence for the third hypothesis of this thesis.

5.3 Principles and Patterns in Turkey-Somali Relations

Analysis of the reports reveals some guiding principles of Turkey’s model in Africa: i. Administrative conditionality instead of political conditionality ii. Equality and friendship iii. Perpetuity of relations and iv. Mutuality, Reciprocity and Coordination. Similar principles have been identified in China-African relation which suggests the preferability of this model by emerging donors (Manning 2006).

5.3.1 Administrative Conditionality instead of Political Conditionality

Though emerging donors like Turkey and China have some similarities with traditional donors (Sato et al. 2010), they differ significantly in terms of the principles that guide their aids and interactions with the global south (Woods 2008). One way that emerging donors differ is the absence of political conditionality. Earlier studies on political conditionality conceptualised the term in relation to punitive and reactive measures employed by donors to discourage human rights abuse and demo-

cratic backsliding (Baylies 1995; Crawford 1997). This definition was later revised to include conditionality as an incentive to promote democratization and not just discouraging backsliding: “Political conditionality refers to the allocation and use of financial resources to sanction or reward recipients in order to promote democratic governance and human rights” (Molenaers, Dellepiane, and Faust 2015, 2).

Woods (2005) has criticised conditionality by suggesting that in some cases it diminishes the capacity of the receiving state’s government. Moreover, from the receiving state’s perspective, conditionality appears as another form of political control and seemingly a continuation of colonization.

“Throughout this time western donors have treated criticisms of conditionality as the unwarranted complaints of patients unwilling to take medicine which is good for them. This attitude has magnified the resentment felt by aid recipients and made them all the more receptive to the different approach taken by emerging donors. In the recent words of the then President Festus Mogae of Botswana, ‘I find that the Chinese treat us as equals. The West treats us as former subjects’” (Woods 2008, 1217).

Though empirical evidence suggests that Turkey has employed “democratic assistance instruments” in dealing with Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey refrains from adding political conditionality clauses in its aids towards Africa and instead “strictly confine to state-building measures delivered through ODA” (Aydin-Düzgit 2020, 4). Analysis of the parliamentary reports on Turkey-Somali bilateral agreement indeed show no evidence of political conditionality. Instead, the evidence shows another type of conditionality, “administrative conditionality”. I employ administrative conditionality as a term to describe how the agreements require Turkey to control the administrative affairs of facilities such as hospitals that it donates to Somalia. Thus, whereas traditional donors prefer political conditions to place aid receivers in check, Turkey prefers to co-/manage the administrative affairs of facilities it donates. This was evident in the 2013 agreement to build a hospital in Mogadishu. The agreement required Turkish Officers in the Administrative board of the hospital.

5.3.2 Equality and Friendship

As discussed above, traditional donors have been criticized for being imposing in their relations to Africa. This creates some sort of hierarchy between the donors and the receivers whereby the receiving country feels like its authority or sovereignty is undermined. The Turkish model in Africa has avoided this by emphasizing in its agreements that the Government of Turkey regards the Somali government as an equal and that their nation's sovereignty would not be undermined by any Turkish aid or relation.

“The Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Republic of Somalia (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”), on the basis of friendly relations between the two countries, with a view to strengthen their relations through economic and technical cooperation and assistance, have agreed as follows:” (TGNA 2009)

“Emphasizing the fact that cooperation in various military fields on the basis of mutual respect for the sovereignty and equality of both parties will contribute to the common interests and economic efficiencies of both nations” (TGNA 2010).

The keywords or phrases that highlight the nature of the agreements are friendly relations, sovereignty, and equality. Further, the agreements assure that the laws of the receiving state would always be respected. Hence, any violation of by Turkish personnel in Somalia could lead to the termination of their activities.

“The activities of the Guest Personnel could be terminated if they violate the law of the receiving state” (TGNA 2010).

Evidence of Turkey's keenness to maintain amicability and non-hostile relations is reflected by the clause in almost all the agreements, that disputes shall be settled through diplomatic means involving consultations and negotiations rather than international tribunals.

“Any disputes arising out of the implementation or interpretation of this

Agreement shall be resolved by consultations and negotiations between the Parties at the possible lowest level and shall not be referred for settlement to any national or international tribunal or to any third party.

If the dispute is not resolved within 60 days, the Parties shall begin negotiations within 30 days. If no solution is achieved within the following 60 days, either Party may terminate this agreement by means of a prior written notice of 90 days, through diplomatic channels” (TGNA 2010).

Maintaining positive relations is important for Turkey’s long-term goals of engaging more with other sub-Saharan African countries. For the sub-Saharan African countries, Somalia is a litmus test of a kind that informs them of the nature of Turkey’s relations with Africa. Thus, a successful and amicable relation in Somalia characterised by equality and friendship may as well encourage them to further advance their relationship with Turkey (Harte 2012; Özkan 2014).

5.3.3 Perpetuity of Relations

Turkey has a long-term interest in Africa and the success of TFP towards Somalia is important in achieving this goal. To further its goal, Turkey counts of the reputation it builds in Somalia. This means that TFP cannot be on short-term basis because “the more Turkey accomplishes in Somalia, the greater its political capital will be throughout the region” which also helps it improve investments and trade prospects with the countries (Harte 2012, 29). TFP elites accordingly give importance to continuity of Turkey’s relations with Somalia. Almost all the agreements submitted to the TGNA have a five-year lifespan with automatic renewal after this period. A common article in the end of the agreements is that

“This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of 5 years. Any Party may notify the other Party at any time in writing through diplomatic channels of its intention to terminate the Agreement 6 months prior to its expiration. It shall be renewed automatically for the successive periods of 1 year, unless one of the Parties notifies the other in writing through diplomatic channels of its intention to terminate the Agreement 6 months prior to its expiration” (TGNA 2015).

This evidence shows that Turkish interest in Somalia, and Africa for that matter,

goes beyond helping Somalia's economy revive in the short-term. It suggests that Turkey aims to explore Africa as a new region to advance its interests and status as a global actor.

5.3.4 Mutuality, Reciprocity and Coordination

Though TFP towards Somalia has been dominated by Turkish ODA to Somalia, the relationship is hardly one-sided. In tandem to the principle of equality, mutual benefits have been central in the bilateral agreements signed by both sides. Turkey's narrative deviates from one that makes Turkey an external power coming to save Africa and instead builds on the rhetoric that cooperation is mutually beneficial for both Turkey and Somalia. Accordingly, the bilateral agreements often stress the need for cooperation between Turkey and Somalia for mutual benefits, and on several occasions includes a variant of a sentence about promoting economic and/or social development in both Turkey and Somalia.

“The Cooperation shall be realized by taking into consideration the mutual interests and needs of the Parties on the basis of reciprocity” (TGNA 2010).

By so doing, even if Turkey carries majority of the economic burden of projects and aids, the Somali counterpart does not necessarily feel like a burden/failure to be saved by the West. It feels as though it were a part of a relationship that is mutually beneficial to both Parties.

“Within both the framework of mutual respect and existing friendly relations between the two countries, wishing to strengthen to the mutual ties and develop a fruitful development cooperation, acknowledging the importance of this cooperation in terms of contributing to social and economic development of the Parties” (TGNA 2019a).

One important actor that has become important in coordinating Turkish ODA and projects in this sense is the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency, also known as TIKA.

“Cooperation programmes to be developed within the framework of this Agreement shall be coordinated by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as “TIKA”) on behalf of the Republic of Turkey and by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation of Somalia on behalf of the Republic of Somalia” (TGNA 2009).

With the exception of military-related projects, Turkey places TIKA at the heart of its projects in Somalia. This relates to the administrative conditionality discussed above. To ensure Turkish interests in Somalia are well-coordinated, the Turkish government makes TIKA the official agency in most of the agreements.

6. CONCLUSION

Turkey aims to become an important actor in the new global order and Somalia has proven to be a place for Turkey to project its capabilities as a global power. Lower prospects of Turkey becoming an EU member state signals to Turkey the West's hesitation in welcoming Turkey to the higher echelons of global politics and the need for Turkey to look elsewhere. Consequently, Turkish political elites have transformed TFP to allow Turkey to project itself as global power in other regions of the world. Over time, Turkey has shifted from Western-oriented foreign policy to Eurasianism and in recent times to Afro-Eurasianism. The Somali case, as a single case study for this master's thesis, allows to tease out the various dynamics that shape Turkey's pursuit for global power.

In addition to Somalia being a place where Turkey exhibits its capacity to be a crucial political and security actor, the country also serves as a window for Turkish businessmen to penetrate the African market, which doubles as a source of raw materials for Turkish industry and a market for Turkish products. This dynamic serves the material interests of domestic producers in Turkey. Somalia has also been ideal for TFP in that cultural and religious affinity facilitates this relationship.

This thesis has shown that international politics can hardly be explained by a single factor. The explanatory power of the findings of this thesis emerges from the combination of realist, ideational and liberal theoretical perspectives. Using complementary and eclectic theoretical approach, this thesis argues that TFP is driven by interests of both the Turkish state and domestic actors, as well as by ideational elements like culture and religious affinity.

The realist arguments stem from the expectation that states strive to increase their power in the international system as this serves their interests. Additionally, states are selfish actors whose main purpose is to survive in a hostile anarchical international system in which the sole guarantee of survival is a show of power. Hence, states are in constant search ways to satisfy their material and security needs. The

search for power and control over limited resources, according to this perspective, thus leads to competition between states. Hence, for Turkey, Somalia is a window that allows Turkey strengthen its position as a global power.

Indeed evidence presented in this thesis corroborates this theoretical expectation. Turkey's interest in Somalia is reflected by its desire to control security in the region. Additionally, Turkey has been vocal and critical in advancing Somalia's interest, especially during the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. In fact, Turkey organized two conferences that brought stakeholders from the international community to discuss solutions to the Somali crisis. By so doing, Turkey advanced its role and increased its recognition as a critical security actor in the world.

The findings of this thesis also corroborate the second hypothesis developed in chapter 2. While it is true that TFP towards Somalia has been shaped by Turkey's goal of strengthening its position as a global power in the realms of international politics, it can not be ignored that TFP is in part driven by stakeholders within Turkey. Building on Moravscik's liberal theory of IR, this thesis has shown that the interests of civil societies that represent Turkish businessmen and investors have been an integral part of Turkey-Somali relations. The TGNA has approved a couple of agreements that encourage and enhance Turkish investment in Somalia. The details of these agreements also protect the interests of these investor should there be any unforeseen crisis.

The third hypothesis, developed from ideational theory, accounts for the role of culture and religion in TFP. As shown in chapter 2, all top ten LDC recipients of Turkish developmental aid are majority muslim countries. This evidence coupled with Islamic narratives from some Turkish elite points to the fact that religion plays a role in TFP. Also, Islamically oriented NGO groups have been highly involved in coordinating aid together with TIKA in Somalia. Coupled with religion, a bilateral agreement ratified by TGNA to build a Turkish cultural center in Mogadishu corroborates the ideational hypothesis.

While analyses made in this suggest that Turkey as an emerging power differs from the traditional powers in a number of ways, further research is required to deeply investigate how Turkey differs. A starting point may be based on some of the findings of this master's thesis. First, TFP towards Somalia excluded political conditionality. Instead, TFP elites demand administrative roles in projects conducted by the Turkish government in Somalia. Second, Turkey's narrative is often based on equality and friendship which contradicts that of former colonizers and the traditional powers who tend to see the developing world as the white man's burden. Thirdly, evidence from the reports show that Turkey places importance in perpetuity of its relations

with Africa. Turkey hopes to establish a long-term relationship that is mutually beneficial to Turkey and the African countries. Altogether, these principles have shaped TFP towards Somalia.

A comparative study looking at Turkey vis-a-vis traditional actors like the US, the UK, etc. will provide a deeper insight of the logics behind these actors' strategies. Further, a study assessing these strategies in the long run is required to ascertain their effectiveness. As an emerging actor, Turkey will not be content with staying only in Somalia. This means that TFP will have to be re-crafted to accommodate other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the question of what elements of current TFP towards Somalia will be effective towards other African countries is relevant for both scholars and Turkish political elites. As Friedman (2010) projected, Turkey will join the rank of most important global actors in the next 100 years; as to how and how well it does so remain important for TFP makers and students alike.

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APPENDIX A

Table of Bilateral Reports Submitted to TGNA for Ratification

Date	Title	Status
26.10.2009	Technical Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the republic of Somalia	Void
30.07.2010	Framework Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of Somalia on Cooperation in the Field of Military Training, Technique and Science	Passed
22.09.2011	Technical Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the republic of Somalia	Passed
07.08.2013	Security Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the republic of Turkey and the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia	Void
25.11.2013	Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia on Cooperation in the Field of Health and Medical Sciences	Passed
11.12.2013	Hospital Operate-Transfer Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia	Passed
02.11.2015	Agreement on Defence Industry Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia	Passed
02.12.2015	Security Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia	Passed
02.06.2016	Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia	Passed

17.06.2016	Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia in the Field of Electricity	Void
20.03.2017	Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation	Void
14.07.2017	Agreement on Development Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia	Void
09.04.2018	Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments	Void
25.04.2018	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia on Cooperation in the Field of Energy and Mining	Void
17.01.2019	Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes and Income	Passed
17.01.2019	Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia on the Establishment, Functioning and Activities of Cultural Centres	In progress
25.01.2019	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia on Cooperation in the Field of Energy and Mining	In progress
25.01.2019	Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia in the Field of Electricity	In progress
12.04.2019	Agreement on Development Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia	Passed