ISLAM AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD: A MICRO LEVEL ANALYSIS OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

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ABSTRACT

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The impact of religion on forming attitudes toward democracy and specifically, whether Islam is fully compatible with democracy is still debated in academic works. Along with theoretical discussions pertaining to Islam and democracy, individual level studies also examine attitudes of Muslim devout toward democracy. Empirical analyses find that Muslims' support for democracy is positive and Islam does not contradict with democracy. What if Muslims' understanding of democracy is different? This study aims to explain Muslim's perception of democracy or the way they understand from democracy. Is what they understand from democracy liberal definition, electoral(procedural) perception or other perceptions? Do different groups of Muslims have different perceptions of democracy? Not only analyzing religious and non-religious Muslim's perceptions of democracy, this study also seeks to examine distinct religious categories of faithful Muslim and their perceptions of democracy. Do they have liberal perception of democracy in comparison to electoral(procedural) perception of democracy or the opposite? By testing predictions through applying multinomial logistic regressions, empirical analysis found that important variation exists regarding perceptions of democracy among non-religious and distinct religious categories of adherents of Islam. This study aims to contribute to the literature of religiosity and political attitudes.

ÖZET

ARAB DÜNYASINDA İSLAM VE DEMOKRATİKLEŞME: DEMOKRASİYE OLAN DESTEĞİN MİKRO DÜZEYDE ANALİZİ

MEHMET SEZGİN

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Dindarlık, İslam, Demokrasi Algıları, Arap Dünyası

Dinin demokrasiye yönelik tutumların oluşmasındaki etkisi ve özellikle İslam'ın demokrasi ile tam uyumlu olup olmadığı akademik çalışmalarda halen tartışılmaktadır. İslam ve demokrasi ile ilgili teorik tartışmaların yanı sıra, birey düzeyindeki çalışmalar da Müslüman dindarların demokrasiye yönelik tutumlarını incelemektedir. Ampirik analizin bulguları, Müslümanların demokrasiye desteğinin olumlu olduğu ve İslam'ın demokrasi ile çelişmediği yönündedir. Ya Müslümanların demokrasi anlayışı farklıysa? Bu çalışma, Müslümanların demokrasi algısını ya da demokrasiyi nasıl anladıklarını açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Demokrasiden anladıkları liberal tanım mı, seçim (prosedür) algısı mı yoksa diğer algılar mı? Farklı Müslüman gruplarının farklı demokrasi algıları var mı? Bu çalışma sadece dindar ve dindar olmayan Müslümanların demokrasi algılarını analiz etmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda dindar Müslümanların oluşturduğu farklı dini kategorileri ve onların demokrasi algılarını incelemeyi de amaçlamaktadır. Seçim (prosedür) demokrasisi algısına kıyasla liberal demokrasi algısına mı sahipler yoksa tam tersi mi? Ampirik analiz, çok terimli (multinomial) lojistik regresyonlar uygulayıp hipotezleri test ederek, dindar olmayan Müslümanlar ve farklı dindar Müslüman kategorileri arasında demokrasi algıları ile ilgili önemli farklılıkların olduğunu buldu. Bu çalışma dindarlık ve siyasi tutumlar literatürüne katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my family

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1.   INTRODUCTION

The compatibility of Islam and Democracy is still debated in academic works. Along with theoretical discussions pertaining for Islam and democracy such as Huntington's notion of cultural incompatibility of Islam with democracy(Huntington 1993a) or on the contrary and Esposito and Voll's arguments that some Islamic concepts have an ability to refer democracy(Esposito and Voll 1996), individual level studies provide significant insight regarding adherents of Islam and their views of democracy. The impact of religion on forming attitudes towards democracy in the Arab-Muslim world is emphasized and studied by many academics. In political science literature, most individual level studies indicate that Muslims' support for democracy is positive, and Islam is compatible with democracy. (Ciftci 2013; Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007; Spierings 2014; Tessler 2002; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012; Tessler and Gao 2005). However, the religious and non-religious Muslim's perception of democracy or the way in which they understand from democracy is not paid attention. Do different groups of Muslims have different perceptions of democracy? Do they really have liberal perception of democracy that emphasizes freedom and rights or do they have electoral perception of democracy that is only giving importance to elections and voting? Do non-religious Muslims, religious Muslims and even different categories within Muslim devout have different perception of democracy?

This study aims to find variation regarding perceptions of democracy among non-religious Muslims, religious Muslims and distinct categories among Muslim devout. Along with religious versus non-religious dichotomy, this study also concentrates on perceptions of democracy among only Muslim devout by using and building on Çiftçi and his colleague's data and categorization of different religious outlooks such as religious communitarians and religious individualists(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019) through applying social theories for instance, Davis and Robinson's Moral Cosmology theory(Davis and Robinson 1996, 2006). Çiftçi and his colleagues theorized these distinct religious outlooks and argues that these different categories

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provide significant inferences on attitudes towards democracy.

This study employs fifth wave of Arab Barometer survey datasets and applies several statistical models. To produce distinct religious categories, I used latent class analysis (LCA) that provides utilizing survey items tapping on individuals' views and uses responses from individuals and transfers them into unobserved groups or classes. For analysis section, I run multinomial logistic regressions to measure perceptions of democracy among Muslim individuals.

This study has found that there is a variation regarding perceptions of democracy among different groups of the Muslims. Individuals' understanding of democracy varies and different groups have different perceptions of democracy. Non-religious Muslims have less inclination towards liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than religious Muslims. Within religious categories, only post-Islamists have liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy.

Since the debates continues regarding compatibility of Islam and democracy, this study provides micro-level findings regarding Muslim's perceptions of democracy and demonstrates that it is important to delve into perceptions of democracy and understanding of democracy among the devout. Not only focusing on whether faithful individuals' support for democracy, but also what they understand from democracy is also important. For regions similar to Arab World where democracy is lacking and is under authoritarian regimes, this study aims to contribute the literature on role of religion on political attitudes and shaping different perceptions of democracy. The inferences of this study can be generalized and extended to other Muslim nations and other parts of the worlds where democracy is consolidated through analyzing distinct categories of faithful individuals and non-religious individuals' views about different perceptions of democracy.

2.   LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Literature Review of Definition of Democracy

Reaching a consensus regarding the definition of democracy is a difficult task due to the presence of various views. Describing or defining what exactly democracy is by someone may not convince others to. Gallie emphasizes the fact of contested uses of concepts in which democracy has also been mentioned(Gallie 1955). Scholars sometimes apply unique and distinct terms while defining democracy. Use of exclusive concepts to describe democracy created intricacy, which paved the way for the existence of democracy with its adjectives(Collier and Levitsky 1997).

Robert Dahl created a new term called polyarchy for referring to a fully democratized regime.(Dahl 1971) As suggested by Dahl, inclusiveness and contestation are necessary conditions for a democracy to survive. He emphasizes eight essential criteria such as the right to vote, free and fair elections, and alternative sources of information that are also regarded as a guarantee for institutional commitment to democracy(Dahl 1971).

Linz and Stepan point out that a vital standard for democracy is the inclusion of all political offices in a nonviolent competition, free and fair elections(J.Linz 1978). Schumpeter also suggest that democracy means:

> "the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions here the
> executive acquires the power to decide through a competitive struggle for
> the people's vote" competitive struggle for the people's vote(Schumpeter
> 2003)

that is regarded as minimalist, electoral or procedural definition of democracy.(Przeworski 2003). Huntington advocates Schumpeter's definition of democracy

regarding the free and fair election and supports Robert Dahl's essential characteristics of democracy that are contestation and participation(Huntington 1993*b*). Moreover, Schimitter and Karl support Dahl's crucial criteria for democracy; however, they also conclude that for a democracy to sustain, state managers or unelected officials should be monitored and should not challenge the elected politicians(Schmitter and Karl 1991).

Furthermore, democracy may also imply the presence of freedoms and liberal understanding. O'Donnell and Schmitter claim that liberalization does not have the same meaning as democratization despite having common historical relation(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). They also point that

> democracy's guiding principle is that of citizenship(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986),

which indicates people's support to democracy actively such as compulsory voting. However, they maintain that free elections, voting, and other essentials of democracy are not enough for a complete democracy if individual rights or freedoms are not protected(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Rueschemeyer and his colleagues also point out that free-fair elections and executive responsibility to parliament are essential characteristics of democracy(Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992). Along with this, they argue that the protection of human rights and freedoms should not be ignored since their functions in a democracy can balance and restrict the power of the state(Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992). Diamond maintains that human rights are protected well by liberal democracy that includes significant components such as citizens having freedom of expression, alternative sources of information and minority groups are protected(Diamond 2003).

Additionally, Coppedge and his colleagues identifies the six key models or conceptions of democracy that are electoral, liberal, majoritarian, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian(Coppedge et al. 2011). It is important to the point that these six perceptions have different understanding of democracy. However, Coppedge and his colleagues argue that these six concepts of democracy are complementary despite there might be some conflicts among some of them(Coppedge et al. 2011). The electoral conception of democracy implies Schumpeterian understanding of democracy that mainly emphasizes the role of contestation and competition. The existence of political parties and periodic elections are regarded as instrumental in this perception. The liberal understanding of democracy principally focuses on freedoms, civil rights, accountability, and the rule of law. The main concern for the liberal

perception is the repression of rights such as minority rights by political powers. To overcome this concern, rules and principles should be ensured and protected. The majoritarian perception of democracy is essentially about the rule by majority and sovereignty of it. According to the majoritarian view, power should be concentrated rather than dispersed. The participatory view of democracy emphasizes the importance of representativity in a democracy. Voting, political parties, citizen assemblies, and town hall meetings have a significant role for creation of direct model of democracy. Deliberative concept of democracy primarily concentrates on the process of making policies by simply deliberation that is primarily central to decision-making process trough reaching a consensus. It is also considered as direct democracy since ordinary demand to attend political decision-making process. Hearings, panels, and other deliberative institutions can provide environment for the dialogue and decision-making process. The Egalitarian view of democracy gives importance to achieving political equality such as equal representation and having equal resources(Coppedge et al. 2011). The Egalitarian view of democracy is also known as substantive conception of democracy that emphasizes to the role of socioeconomic benefits and social justice that democracy brings(Zhai 2019). According to this understanding, democracy includes egalitarian distribution of resources and requires economic development (Knutsen and Wegmann 2016). Economic well-being is also regarded as one of the significant components of democracy.(Sodaro 2008).

New concepts are created for some democratic regimes that have authoritarian characteristics. Zakaria conceptualizes illiberal democracy, that does not provide freedoms for citizens and prevents creation of an open society(Zakaria 1997). A regime holding free and fair elections may not sustain freedoms for not all and human rights. Diamond signifies the presence of pseudo democracies implying that democratic political institutions may play a role on masking the reality of authoritarian characteristics, that is also considered as semi-democracies(Diamond 2003). Moreover, there is also debate on hybrid regimes, that basically means a regime of neither fully democratic nor authoritarian. Levitsky and Way defines an example of hybrid regimes, competitive authoritarian regimes that do not meet minimum standards for democracy and even violate democratic characteristics through conducting of election fraud, harassing opposition and preventing having adequate media coverage(Levitsky and Way 2002). In such regimes or in electoral authoritarianism, the presence of multiparty electoral system may not imply holding free and fair elections and protection of freedoms. In brief, violation of essential characteristics of democracy are not tolerated by most of the definitions of democracy explained above, therefore, hybrid regimes, pseudo democracies and other terminologies are used for defining such regimes.

In brief, scholars have thought various key models or conceptions of democracy that are electoral, liberal, majoritarian, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian or substantive. In this research, electoral, liberal and substantive conception of democracy will be used for the main analysis.

2.2 Literature Review of Ordinary People's Definition of Democracy

As indicated in the previous chapter, scholars do not reach a consensus regarding definition of democracy. In this chapter, understanding of democracy by ordinary citizens will also be surveyed. It is expected that in similar to scholars, ordinary citizens also may not have a consensus regarding the definition of democracy. Doorenspleet aims to bring people back to the heart of democracy studies and emphasizes the role of people-centered concepts in measurements of democracy through criticizing the paradigm that only considers the measurement of democracy, as a domain of the state with its procedures, institutions, and political elites(Doorenspleet 2015). Along with macro-state level studies regarding the democratization process, a large and growing body of literature has investigated individuals' support to democracy by employing micro-level datasets. Those academic works also allow inclusion of citizens for perceptions of democracy and provide significant results regarding people's perception of democracy.

In recent years, much more information has become available on both support for and perception of democracy by ordinary citizens. According to a study, 80 percent population of the world is asserted to support democracy(Inglehart 2003). It can be questioned that whether citizens support and understand the same type of democracy? Citizens from different countries or even within the same countries may have a further understanding of democracy. Individual-level studies found that the meaning of democracy varies in different parts of the world(Quaranta 2016; Youngho 2013; Zagrebina 2019). Dalton and his colleagues identify common and different patterns of democratic conceptions across fifty countries within in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, and provides a significant comparison between Western and non-Western countries(Dalton, Sin, and Jou 2007). For example, even in established democracies, some citizens cannot provide any definition of democracy, in Africa, the number of individuals who understand democracy only conducting elections are the highest, individuals in Eastern Europe are more prone to freedoms that indicates defining democracy though emphasizing civil liberties and rights and lastly individuals in Latin America have more inclination to define democracy by

stressing social benefits such as economic development and justice(Dalton, Sin, and Jou 2007).

Bratton and Mattes by employing Afro-barometer survey datasets, indicated that the Africans have various understandings regarding the perception of democracy(Bratton and Mattes 2001). Despite the fact that most Africans espouse democracy by admitting universal terms, and giving importance to it, understanding of democratic principles by them is extremely vague. Intrinsic attachments and instrumental satisfaction to democracy vary among Africans. Individuals understand democracy not only in achieving procedural terms but also in substantive terms. Many Africans give meaning of socioeconomic transformation to democracy that could pave the way for economic development(Bratton and Mattes 2001). Similar to the Africa continent, meaning of democracy varies in Latin America as well. According to a study conducted in Mexico(Crow 2010), the way in which the Mexicans conceptualize democracy and expect it varies. Individuals who are least satisfied with democracy expects democracy to deliver economic progress, therefore, substantive view of democracy is more prevalent among Mexicans. This is an important indicator of people's socioeconomic expectations from democracy(Crow 2010).

Miller and his colleagues conducted personal interviews and found that among mass and elite in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, there is a significant variation regarding the conception of democracy(Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1997). Liberal understanding of democracy, that is mainly related to the freedoms, is more prevalent among citizens; however, elites are more akin to the institutional knowledge of democracy through emphasizing on legal institutions, order, and restraint. Miller and his colleagues finally stressed that there is no commonly shared understanding of democracy by various groups within the same countries, for instance while elites in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine are more akin to order, legal institutions and restraints, ordinary citizens have more inclination for protection of freedoms in their understanding of democracy(Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1997).

Furthermore, along with studies demonstrating Muslims' support for democracy (Ciftci 2013; Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007; Spierings 2014; Tessler 2002; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012; Tessler and Gao 2005), what Muslims understand from or define democracy is an important topic to survey. The religious and non-religious Muslim's perception of democracy should be taken into account. Do different groups of Muslims have different perceptions of democracy? Non-religious Muslims, religious Muslims and even different categories within Muslim devout might have different perception of democracy. The answer of whether the Muslims are prone to define

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democracy through minimalist, liberal or electoral perceptions can provide important inferences regarding the compatibility of Islam with democracy.

2.3 Literature Review of Islam and Democracy

Whether Islam is compatible with democratic values has been questioned and analyzed for decades. In particular, the period after the end of the Cold War and the September 11 attacks increased the attention to Islam and its values and adherents. A considerable amount of literature has been published on Islam and democracy, whether democracy can become a system of governance for Muslim majority countries. However, it is asserted that the main obstacle for democracy to survive in Muslim majority countries is an understanding of political power that receives its legitimacy from Sharia, religious law of Islam, that maintains a permanent and indistinguishable connection between politics and Islam. In brief, Sharia is considered not only a religious canon, and it comprises jurisdiction, legislation and all aspects of social life.

Having considered these realities, Huntington argues that the reason behind why democracy cannot work in Muslim majority countries is the incompatibility of Islamic culture with values of democracy, that almost has no resonance in Islamic tradition(Huntington 1993*a*). Fukuyama also asserts that Islamic values pose a threat to a liberal understanding of democracy thereby, even if democracy can be practiced in Muslim world, it would be a Muslim understanding of democracy, not a Western type(Fukuyama 2006). For instance, in Islamic Republic of Iran, holding elections regularly does not guarantee of free speech and protection of freedoms that are essential criteria of free and fair elections, and liberal perception of democracy(Fukuyama 2006). Moreover, Elie Kedourie, an important historian of the Middle East argues that key elements of democracy such as popular voting, representation, secular government, elections and other political institutions are alien to Islamic political traditions(Tessler 2002).

However, it is also asserted that within Sharia, some fundamental characteristics consist of democratic principles. Esposito and Voll argue that Islam can build its own democracy by referring to three Islamic concepts, consultation (shura), consensus (ijma), and independent interpretive judgement (ijtihad) which may imply kind of Islamic democracy(Esposito and Voll 1996). In particular, an Arabic term, Shura is expressed to practice consultation for state affairs that is also emphasized in Quran.

> "Those. . . who conduct their affairs through mutual consultation.
> 42:38"(*The Quran(Translation)* 2017)

Practically, throughout history, consultation is used, in particular for the election process of Caliph, ruler of Muslim land. As a result, the link between shura and democracy is mostly illustrated to claim that Islam is not against democratic principles. Therefore, Ayoob argues that Islam and democracy do not have an inherent irreconcilable contradiction(Ayoob 2008). Sachedina also emphasizes the role of religious pluralism, interpersonal and intercommunal relations within Muslim world to indicate Islam and democracy are compatible(Sachedina 2001).

Moreover, some modern Muslim intellectuals such as Muhammad Abduh, (1849-1905) argues that shura is equation of democracy and he supports the parliamentary system and pluralism, by arguing shura allows for consultation and debate of opinions, that are main indicator of practices in parliaments in democracies(Al-Jabri 2009). Furthermore, some political figures in the Muslim world, such as Rached Ghannouchi consider that Islam is not against democracy and admits that it has several common features with Western-type of democracy as an ideal model for progressive civilization(Tamimi 2001).

In general, the debate Islam and democracy is compatible or not is continuing. Along with theoretical arguments, it is better to question the Muslims' own views regarding Islam and democracy by asking such questions do non-religious or religious Muslims support more for democracy or do they differ regarding perceptions of democracy.

2.4 Literature Review of the Muslims and Democracy

Along with the theoretical debates regarding core values of Islam and democracy, there have been significant studies to indicate adherents of Islam and their support for, and perceptions of democracy. Individual-level studies play a significant role to contribute to the debate of whether Islam and democracy are compatible or not. In political science literature, there is a large volume of published academic describing Muslims and their attitudes towards democracy. Most individual level studies' findings show that Islam is compatible with democracy (Ciftci 2013; Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007; Spierings 2014; Tessler 2002; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012; Tessler and Gao 2005).

Tessler is known for his first micro-level study to indicate Islam does not contradict with democracy through employing survey datasets conducted to the Muslim individuals(Tessler 2002). Tessler's study statistically found that Islam does not discourage individuals from having positive attitudes towards democracy, and he found that individuals having a strong attachment to Islam, have also support for democracy(Tessler 2002). In a similar study, Spierings demonstrated that within Muslim community, individuals who have higher education and socio-economic status are more likely to support for democracy(Spierings 2014). However, it is important to question that what precisely Muslim individuals understood from democracy. Tessler and Gao found that support for democracy in the Middle East does not mean a support for a secular democracy, and individuals do not have a consensus regarding whether Islam should play an important role in political affairs or not(Tessler and Gao 2005). The findings also provides some differences regarding attitudes towards democracy across nations. In Palestine and Jordan, individuals are more likely to support for Islamic democracy over secular democracy, on the contrary, in Algeria, individuals are more prone to secular democracy and in Iraq, individuals are divided equally in terms of attitudes toward both models(Tessler and Gao 2005).

Furthermore, through admitting Muslim individuals' support for democracy, it is important to know what they understand from democracy. Rizzo and her colleagues found that that Muslim individuals' perception of democracy is linked to electoral procedures rather than freedoms and political rights by arguing that procedures of democracy such as elections and voting have been supported, while protection of minority rights and gender equality have been ignored(Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007). For instance, survey dataset Rizzo and her colleagues employed indicates that most of individuals believe that women have less rights to jobs than men, and men have more ability to become better political leaders than women. The presence of political parties and elections and only support for democracy are not enough to have inference about individuals' support for democracy, therefore support for gender equality and minority rights should also be surveyed in order to reveal individuals' understanding of democracy(Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007).

Inglehart also found that although individuals in Muslim-majority countries express favorable attitudes toward democracy as Western individuals, Muslims are much less tolerant concerning the issues such as gender equality(Inglehart 2017). Similar to Inglehart, Spiering argues that the Muslims' support for democracy might be somewhat superficial or instrumental, because most of the Muslims do not have tolerance towards other worldviews that is regarded as a crucial demo-

cratic civic value(Spierings 2014). Although there is a high support for democracy, lack of tolerance poses a threat to liberal democracy and sustainable democratic system(Spierings 2014). Additionally, Muslim individuals are more likely to have a perception of democracy through economic understanding(Şahin 2016). Jamal and Tessler found that Arab citizens are more likely to define democracy with economic consideration than political rights and freedoms. What the Arab Muslims expect and define democracy is resolving economic issues and development of economy(A.Jamal and Tessler 2008).

In Muslim majoritarian countries, Islam is dominantly active and plays a huge role on forming individuals' attitudes towards political issues. Therefore, it is expected that Islam have ability to impact individuals' understanding of governance and regime type. There is various level of religiosity within Muslim individuals that can be inferred to presence different attitudes towards politics. Çiftçi found that individuals holding secular and religious values have different attitudes toward democracy and sharia(Ciftci 2013). Non-secular individuals are more prone to support Sharia and less prone to support democracy. Individuals believing gender equality have less inclination to sharia, regardless of their tendency toward democracy. Interestingly, Individuals who favor democracy also simultaneously, support for sharia, demonstrating that they try to find middle ground between democracy and Islam(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019).

Apart from only distinction between secular and religious categorization, more recent attention has focused on the provision of a multilevel conceptualization of religiosity(Ciftci 2013; Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019; Karakoç and Başkan 2012). Does this conceptualization provide different worldviews regarding politics and governance? Çiftçi and his colleagues found that various religious outlooks exist among religious Muslims and this variation promotes important effects on individuals' opinions toward democracy(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019). They admit that there is no uniform religious outlook among the Muslims which can provide leverage to find out their preferences towards democracy(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019). In this study, I argue that along with religious and non-religious orientation, various categories within religious individuals can provide different perceptions of democracy. I expect that non-religious individuals have different perception of democracy than Muslim devout, while emphasizing that, distinct religious categories can reveal different understandings of democracy among faithful Muslims.

2.5 Literature Review of the Religiosity and Democracy

Religion is defined as individuals' institutionalized system of belief that are considered as holy, sacred and divine. Religions also provide human beings to create their own cultural identities. In addition to this, religions play a crucial role on shaping individuals' political, social and economic preferences(Ben Gaskins and Siegel 2013*a,b*; Huber and Stanig 2011; Torres and Rodden 2008). Religion still keeps its presence and has impact on politics in all around world. Even in most advanced democracies, religion did not disappear, and the importance of religious beliefs changed little among individual(Inglehart and Baker 2000). World Values Survey dataset indicates the presence of massive cultural change and simultaneously the resilience of distinctive traditional values. Along with rise of post material values, individuals also express the concerns regarding purpose and the meaning of life, that leads to durability of religious system(Inglehart and Baker 2000).

The presence of religious people in the modern world did not end. Within the context of modernity and values, religious people may still insist on their values and beliefs. This situation may leads to conflicts over values, however, it can be concluded that all values coexist together. In the modern world, a secular state provides freedom for religion and expects freedom from religion(Dreyer 2011). Moreover, Habermas argues that through the understanding of pluralism within political liberalism, both religious and secular citizens can coexist together and have their own respective interpretations of faith in political public sphere(Habermas 2005). However, it is true that tolerance towards different religions may not exist and understanding of pluralism may face obstacles to survive in some parts of the world. Feldman emphasizes the role of social conformity and argues that individuals who strongly value social conformity and social cohesion are more likely to denigrate other groups and support the government to restrict liberties(Feldman 2003). This brings to question why some religious groups prefer authoritarianism over pluralist understanding of political liberalism. As a result, people's preferences for social conformity and cohesion may decrease their support for liberal democratic regime.

Having considered effect of religiosity on political preferences, it is not sufficient to only distinguish religious and non-religious categories to find out the effect of religiosity on attitudes towards democracy. Çiftçi and his colleagues categorization of various religious outlooks provides better analysis and results for uncovering which group within religious Muslims support for democracy(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019).In their analysis of support for democracy, Çiftçi went beyond the religious non-religious dichotomy and differentiated religious Muslims along distinct

religious categories. They revealed four religious outlooks that are religious individualist, religious communitarian, post-Islamist and status quoists and they found that religious individualists and post-Islamists are more prone to support for democracy than status quoists, that was created for reference category. In this study, I am going to use the same categories to understand differences in terms of perceptions of democracy among religious outlooks.

Existing sociological theories have been applied by Çiftçi and his colleagues to create and define religious categories(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019). Davis and Robinson's Moral Cosmology theory contributes to delineate two distinct intra-denominational tendencies, orthodox and modernist, that have an impact on political and economic worldviews within religious communities(Davis and Robinson 1996, 2006). Orthodox religious individuals are more prone to social order that is established by God, who have a say in what is right and wrong in people's lives. Individuals gather under a single roof of moral guidance and obligation established by divine authority(Davis and Robinson 1996, 2006). As Çiftçi and his colleagues indicate, this terminology is referred to "religious communitarian"(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019) that also have been used in similar studies(Leege and Welch 1989). On the other hand, according to Davis and Robinson, modernist trend emphasized the role of individuals over choices, decisions, and responsibilities, therefore cultural individualism and individual freedom is espoused by modernist trend(Davis and Robinson 1996, 2006), which can refer to religious individualists who have more tendencies towards religious pluralism, tolerance and autonomous decision making(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019).

Along with intra-faith categories stressed by Moral Cosmology Theory(Davis and Robinson 1996, 2006), Bayat's significant study to create two distinct groups within the Muslim society(Bayat 2007) can be useful for this study. The distinction of Islamism and Post-Islamism(Bayat 2007) is important to take consider. The category of Islamist have many common grounds with religious communitarians who emphasizes the role of moral authority for social order. Post Islamism started to emerge as a result of state repression when Islamist notice that reordering and monopolizing the society cannot be achieved only by religious ideology alone(Bayat 2007). Such an understanding led them to reconceptualize their worldviews. Thus, although they still emphasize their religiosity and beliefs, they become to support pluralist views and demanded to contribute the political debates with their values. In brief, Post-Islamist continue to support Islamic values and they have also a tendency to support pluralism, tolerance towards other worldviews and individual autonomy.

Moreover, status-quoist category is defined to be used as a reference category(Ciftci,

Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019). Status-quoist do not have any inclination to either religious pluralism or religious authority in the public. They also give priority to social norms rather than religious norms(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019). Having distinct four categories, religious individualist, religious communitarians, post-Islamist and status-quoist, a better measurement of religiosity and diversity within religious individuals can be reached.

To summarize categories of religious outlooks:

Religious individualist have an inclination to support more religious pluralism and support less religious influence in the public space.

Religious communitarian have an inclination to support less religious pluralism in society but support more religious influence in the public space.

Post-Islamist have an inclination to support both religious pluralism and religious influence in the public space.

Status quoist have an inclination to support less religious pluralism in society and support less religious influence in the public space. They give priority to social order and social norms rather than religious norms.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

What we know about the effect of religiosity on democratic values is largely based upon empirical studies applying public opinion research. Thereby, studies indicate that religiosity contributes to the emergence of political intolerance and non-democratic values(Gibson 1992; Hunsberger 1995; Karpov 2002). Religiosity can form negative attitudes towards democracy and non-religiosity may increase the level of support for democracy. Thus, I argue that religious affiliation can limit sustaining democratic values, on the contrary non-religiosity increases the level of support for democracy. Traditional values and religious conservatism have a potential to challenge the freedoms that democracy guarantee and protect. Religiosity can express some concerns regarding some of the essentials of democracy. For instance, woman's suffrage and participation in politics are protected in democracies. Freedom of thought and expressions that include free speech, freedom of the media and freedom of political association are essentials of democracy. Religiosity can limit woman's to actively engage in politics and can restrict freedoms, especially regarding such as gender equality, LGBT rights, free speech, specifically regarding blasphemy and apostasy.

However, as Çiftçi and his colleagues maintains tha various outlooks or categories exist in the devout that provides implications about worldviews of different groups or categories regarding supports for democracy. They also found that within religious Muslims, religious individualists and religious communitarians are more likely to support democracy than status-quoist(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019). Findings provide that even within the devout, some individuals are not against democracy, at the same time, they practice their rituals and obey religious rules.

Regardless of individuals' support for democracy, it is better to question how they perceive democracy or what they understand from democracy. I argue that religious categories of Çiftçi and his colleagues have different perceptions of democracy. For instance, religious communitarians and post-Islamist differ about the way in which they understand democracy. Going back to minimalist-electoral, substantive, liberal

perceptions of democracy, I argue that religiosity shape individuals' perceptions of democracy as well, thereby religious affiliation causes limited understanding of liberal democracy that is mostly related to freedoms and human rights, while religious affiliation may not prevent to vote in elections. In several countries of the Middle East, various religious groups have formed political parties and run in the elections. While faithful individuals support these parties and vote for them in elections, that is the indication of commitment to democracy, however, it may not be inferred as all faithful individuals have liberal perception of democracy that is primarily about protection of freedoms and rights.

Even if religious affiliation does not contradict support for democracy, it may imply only support for minimalist or electoral understanding of democracy that is usually about elections and voting. Thus, I expect that, non-religiosity provides more inclination to liberal understanding of democracy than minimalist-electoral perception of democracy. Similar to Çiftçi and his colleagues findings, I argue that categories of religiosity also provide different understanding of democracy. Religious individualists and post-Islamists are prone to woman rights and having neighbor of different religion and sect of Islam. These two categories, as indicated by Çiftçi and his colleagues are more likely to support for democracy. Since religious individualist and post-Islamist have more tolerance and plurality, that is also shared by liberal understanding of democracy, I expect that both categories perceive more liberal understanding of democracy than minimalist-electoral definition of democracy. In this study, similar to (Ciftçi)' reservation, status quoist category is used for comparison and thus, it is considered as reference category.

H_1:Individuals who are non-religious are more likely to have liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than individuals who are religious.

H_2:Post-Islamists are more likely to have liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than status quoists.

H_3:Religious individualists are more likely to have liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than status quoists.

H_4:Religious communitarians are neither more nor less likely to have liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than status quoists.

4.   RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 Data

I employed Arab Barometer Survey Dataset(ABD) Wave V dataset for the analysis. The data were collected through face-to-face public opinion surveys in Arabic language. The sample includes representative probability of the population of Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen with more than ten thousand respondents.

Since the focus of the research is compatibility of Islam with democracy, the data firstly reduced to only the Arab- Muslim respondents. The fifth wave of ABD provides operationalization of religious categories and perception of democracy. Questions regarding role of sharia, political Islam, religious leaders and others are not available in other datasets that includes other non-Arab nations. Additionally, for the analysis, I created two samples. One is full sample (Muslims) and the secondly, I reduced sample for only religious respondents(Religious-Faithful Muslims) who answered the questions such as daily prayer, Friday prayer attendance, and listening to or reading the Quran. I dropped all respondents whose responses are never and rarely to daily-Friday prayer and reading Quran, so that a reduced sample of moderate and highly religious individuals can be created.

For categorization of religious outlooks, I applied latent class analysis (LCA) that provides utilizing survey items tapping on individuals' views about the role of religion in social, economic, and political life. LCA uses responses from individuals and transfers them into unobserved groups or classes by considering similarities and differences among the individuals. It revealed the religious outlooks that are religious individualist, status quoist, religious communitarian and post-Islamist, for which twelve questions were used to identify. The questions are about donating charity, preferring religious party, supporting sharia as law of the county, preferring religious leaders to interfere on election, influencing decisions of the government and holding

position on public offices, agreeing on religious practice is a private matter, preferring non-Muslims to have less rights, supporting woman to become prime-minister and have right to make the decision of divorce, liking neighbor of different religion and sect of Islam. These questions provide to distinguish individuals' position regarding how religion may shape the political and social preferences. As a result, individuals' perceptions of pluralism, tolerance, and role of religion on public space were revealed.

Figure 4.1 Responses to LCA Survey Questions Items

Figure 1 demonstrates the distribution of twelve questions among Muslim devout. Each histogram shows the responses to questions indicated above. There is a high support for Sharia to become law of the country and religious parties, while there is less support for religious leaders to interfere on elections and having neighbor of a different religion.

Latent Class Analysis provided four classes since the theoretical expectations of Çiftçi and his colleagues demanded such number of classes(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019). LCA does not suggest regarding how many classes are needed. The number of classes are created through theoretical considerations. In the analysis, I choose four class categorizations over other options with three or five and

other classes. Çiftçi and his colleagues maintains that posterior class probabilities estimations and other factors indicate that four-class categorization is the best fit for the datasets(Ciftci, Wuthrich, and Shamaileh 2019) that I also employed.

Figure 4.2 Distribution of Posterior Probabilities by Religious Outlooks

Posterior probabilities of four classes in accordance with response to twelve questions can be seen in Figure 2. Religious individualists are detected to be more supporter of pluralism and less supporter of role of religion in public sphere. They have more support for religious practice as private matter and neighbor of a different religion and a sect of Islam. On the contrary, religious communitarians demand more sharia as a law of the country and have less support for pluralism. They have less support for neighbor of a different religion and religious practice as a private matter. Post-Islamist are more prone to religious party and Sharia while having moderate support for religious pluralism. Status-quoists are in the middle position regarding pluralism and role of religion.

4.1.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is perceptions of democracy that is measured the way in which way individuals understand democracy. The question in Arab Barometer Survey Dataset Wave V asks, which one would you choose as the most essential characteristics of a democracy?

1.Government ensures law and order

2.Media is free to criticize the things government does.

3.Government ensures job opportunities for all.

4.Multiple parties compete fairly in the election.

I revealed individuals' perceptions of democracy based on the responses to the question above. Having covered minimalist-electoral, substantive, liberal perceptions of democracy, I can label the responses to the questions in accordance with the perceptions or definitions of democracy explained in previous chapters. Moreover, Canache provided six categories or perceptions of democracy from public opinion surveys(Canache 2012). The study reveals that participation, liberty and freedom, rule of law, economic and social outcomes, negative meaning and political equality definitions or perceptions of democracy(Canache 2012). Thereby, in this study economic concerns of individuals and, expectation of job opportunities provided by democracy led me to define it as substantive definition of democracy. Moreover, having a free media to criticize government is one of the important components of liberal understanding of democracy. The existence of free and fair elections is regarded as minimalist-electoral or procedural definition of democracy. Lastly, demanding government to ensure law and order can be considered individuals' stability perception of democracy. I admit that in democratic theory, there is no any definition or perception called stability. In this regard, demanding government to ensure law and order can even be considered as misunderstanding of democracy, which can also imply an authoritarian meaning.

Therefore, I labeled

Government ensures law and order as "stability understanding-perception"

Media is free to criticize the things government does as "liberal understanding-perception"

Government ensures job opportunities for all as "substantive understanding-perception"

Multiple parties compete fairly in the election as "electoral understanding-perception"

4.1.2 Independent Variables

Along with non-religious category, four outlooks that LCA provided, are main independent variables. Individuals who answered to daily-Friday prayer and reading Quran questions as rarely and never are considered as non-religious, unlike devout who always or moderately do religious practices. Four religious categories that LCA revealed are measured as a dichotomous variable.

Religious individualist is coded as 1 and others 0

Religious communitarian is coded as 1 and others 0

Post-Islamist is coded as one and others 0

Status quoist is coded as 1 and others 0, that is considered as the reference category.

4.1.3 Control variables

I included several control variables in the analysis. Individuals' self-reported level of interest in politics is ranging from not interested in politics (1) to very interested in politics (4), that is labeled as political interest. Moreover, interpersonal trust is coded as dichotomous variable and the value of 1 is given to individuals who believe that other people can be trusted while value of 0 is given to the opposite. Additionally, variable of political trust is an additive index that is created based on individuals' degree of trust on political institutions such as government, parliament, army and police. Variable of income is about individuals' views about net household income ranging from (1) household income does not cover expenses by facing significant difficulties to (4) household income covers expenses, and we are able to save.Moreover,variable of education level is coded from no education to having master degree(seven-point scale). Gender is recoded as a dummy variable by giving value of 1 to female and 0 to male. Age is not a grouping variable, but a continues variable from individuals who are 17-18 years old to individuals who are above 100 years old. All models also include country dummies for the robust check that are available in the appendix.

5.   RESULTS - EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The empirical analysis of this research is presented in Table 1 and Table 2. Tables are separated due to presence of two samples, that are full sample that includes non-religious individuals and reduced sample that includes only individuals that are religious. I employed multinomial logistic regressions that is used when more than two categories of the dependent variables exist through applying maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate the probability of categorical membership. Table 1 and Table 2 reports multinomial logistic regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. Due to my theoretical expectations, electoral perception of democracy is considered as reference category in empirical analysis. Multinomial logistic regression coefficients on liberal perception is interpreted as comparison to electoral perception of democracy.

The first hypotheses, that is about non-religious individuals' perception of democracy is presented in full sample. Table 1 indicates that non-religious individuals' perception of liberal democracy over electoral perception of democracy is not positive and not statistically significant at 99 % confidence level. It can be expressed as non-religious individuals do not have more inclination to liberal understanding of democracy, that is about freedoms and rights over electoral understanding of democracy, that is about elections and voting. Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of H1.

In hypotheses of 2 and 3, I expected that categories who are more prone to plurality, tolerance and freedoms have more liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception. Table 2 presents that post-Islamist's hypothesis is statistically significant at 99 % confidence level. It means that post-Islamist are more likely to have liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than status-quoists. Therefore, I can reject the null hypothesis of H2. However, another category that has more inclination toward pluralism and tolerance did not provide positive statistically significant result. Table 2 did not find any support to religious individualists' hypothesis and did not find a positive relationship. On the contrary, it found out

negative coefficient, which can be interpreted as religious individualists have less tendency to liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than status quoists, thereby I cannot reject the null hypothesis of H3.

In hypothesis of H4, I expected that religious communitarians that are less prone to pluralism and tolerance, are neither more nor less likely to have liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than status quoists. However, Table 2 demonstrates that statistically significant result at 99 % confidence level with negative coefficient. It means that there is a difference regarding liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy between religious communitarians and status-quoists. It can be interpreted that religious communitarian have less liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than status quoists, thus I cannot reject the null hypothesis of H4. The results regarding non-religious individuals and religious categories' perception of democracy are not different, except small changes in coefficients, when country dummies are included in the model that are available in appendix (Table A.9 and Table A.10). However, Table A.10 presents statistically significant result at 95 % confidence level with positive coefficient for non-religious hypothesis when country dummies are included in the religious categories' analysis. It means that non-religious individuals are more likely to have liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy only when country dummies are included in the model that religious categories are analyzed.

Table 5.1 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy

	Stability	Liberal	Substantive
Non-Religious	-0.071	-0.009	0.323***
	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.048)
Political Interest	-0.164***	-0.131***	-0.312***
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.085	-0.197**	-0.612***
	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.059)
Political Trust	-0.023***	-0.043***	-0.033***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Income	0.101***	0.106***	-0.098***
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)
Education Level	-0.085***	-0.075***	-0.131***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Female	0.125*	0.011	0.070
	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.048)
Age	0.007***	-0.002	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	1.135***	0.810***	2.322***
	(0.126)	(0.145)	(0.125)
Log lik.	-27282.095		
χ^2	1088.811		
N	21330		

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

Base Category is Electoral Perception

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy: Religious Categories

	Stability	Liberal	Substantive
Non-Religious	-0.021	0.049	0.329***
	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.049)
Religious Individualist	-0.009	-0.277***	-0.014
	(0.056)	(0.065)	(0.054)
Post-Islamist	0.348***	0.272***	0.062
	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.057)
Religious Communitarian	0.214**	-0.298***	-0.048
	(0.072)	(0.088)	(0.072)
Political Interest	-0.167***	-0.123***	-0.310***
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.094	-0.188**	-0.608***
	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.059)
Political Trust	-0.021**	-0.038***	-0.032***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Income	0.104***	0.108***	-0.097***
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)
Education Level	-0.079***	-0.073***	-0.131***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Female	0.092	-0.029	0.066
	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.048)
Age	0.007***	-0.002	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.967***	0.759***	2.300***
	(0.131)	(0.150)	(0.129)
Log lik.	-27197.670		
χ^2	1237.375		
N	21328		

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.
Base Category is Electoral Perception
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 5.1 and 5.2 present predicted probabilities of perceptions of democracy non-religious individuals and each religious category. When predicted probabilities are calculated, control variables, if they are continuous variables, they are fixed at their means and if they are categorical variables, they are fixed at their medians. Figure 5.1 indicates stability, liberal, substantive, and electoral perceptions of democracy for non-religious individuals and religious ones. When liberal perception of democracy is compared with electoral perception of democracy, it is seen that non-religious individuals have less tendency to liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception than religious individuals, as opposed to H1.

Figure 5.1 Predicted Probability of Perception of Democracy: Non-Religious vs Religious

Predicted Propabality of Perception of Democracy: Non-Religious vs Religious

When focusing on religious categories, Figure 5.2 presents stability, liberal, substantive, and electoral perceptions of democracy for religious individualists, religious communitarians, post-Islamists and status-quoists. While looking at the comparison of liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy, it is seen that post-Islamists have more inclination to liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception than status-quoists. Thereby, it supports my theoretical expectations of H2.

When it comes to religious individualists and religious communitarian categories, Figure 5.2 indicates that religious individualists and religious communitarians are more likely to have electoral perception of democracy over liberal perception of democracy as opposed to H3 and H4. In brief, the results provided by Figure 5.2 are only in line with only H2.

Figure 5.2 Predicted Probability of Perception of Democracy: Religious Categories

Predicted Propabality of Perception of Democracy: Religious Categories

95% Confidence interval

Outcomes

Moreover, control variables in Table 1 and Table 2 suggest that gender variable has no statistically significant findings. Education level and age variables have statistically significant result at 99 % confidence level with negative coefficient. When education level increases and individuals become older, inclination towards liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy decreases. For income variable, Table 1 and Table 2 indicates statistically significant result at 99 % confidence level with positive coefficient. Thereby, it can be inferred that when individuals have decent salary or good income, they become more prone to liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy. Political interest, interpersonal and political trust are statistically significant result with negative coefficients, thus it can be interpreted that when political interest, interpersonal and political trust increase, the tendency to liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy decreases. However, when country dummies are included (see appendix Table A.9 and Table A.10), different results are seen for some of the control variables such as political interest, interpersonal trust, political trust and income. Variation and different understanding or definitions of political interest, interpersonal trust, political trust exist in Arab countries. For instance, political

trust and level of income might have different implications in these countries.

Additionally, Table 1 and 2 provide more results regarding perceptions of democracy. Non-religious individuals have also more inclination to substantive perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy. Due to economic issues, individuals might have been prone to substantive definition of democracy over electoral perception of democracy. Lack of jobs, high level of unemployment rate, inflation, having less foreign direct investments and many other factors may lead non-religious individuals to have more substantive perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy. Therefore, their understanding of democracy is to expect government to ensure opportunities for all. Furthermore, post-Islamist have more inclination to stability perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy. The reason behind it could be ongoing conflicts and the presence of arbitrary regimes in the Arab world and individuals' reaction to them.

Overall, empirical findings present that variation exists regarding perceptions of democracy among the Muslims. There is difference between religious and non-religious individuals regarding inclination toward liberal perception of democracy. Non-religious individuals are less likely to have liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than faithful individuals. Moreover, religious categories differ regarding inclination towards liberal perception of democracy. Only post-Islamists are more prone to liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than status-quoists. However, religious individualists and religious communitarians are more likely to have electoral perception of democracy over liberal perception of democracy.

6. CONCLUSION

The effect of religion on forming attitudes towards democracy in the Arab-Muslim world has been examined and most individual level studies found that Muslims have support for democracy and Islam is compatible with democracy. (Tessler 2002, Inglehart and Norris 2003, Tessler and Gao 2005, Rizzo et al 2007 Spiering 2014, Robbins 2015 Ciftci et all 2019). However, apart from the level of support for democracy among the Muslims, there has been limited number of studies to explore religious and non-religious Muslim's perception of democracy or the way in which they understand from democracy. This study provides empirical findings that different groups of Muslims have different perceptions of democracy.

This study employed fifth wave of Arab Barometer survey datasets and applied several statistical models. Latent class analysis was applied to use responses from individuals and transfers them into unobserved groups or classes, and it revealed distinct religious categories that are religious individualists, religious communitarians, post-Islamists and status quoists. For analysis section, I run multinomial logistic regressions.

This study found the presence of different perceptions of democracy among non-religious Muslims, and distinct categories of Muslim devout. Not only analyzing religious versus non-religious dichotomy, this study also explored different perceptions of democracy among Muslim devout through building on Ciftci et al (2019)' categorization of different religious outlooks. Individuals in the Arab World differ regarding what they understand from democracy. Through surveying, minimalist-electoral, substantive, liberal perceptions of democracy, I argued that religiosity shape individuals' perceptions of democracy as well.

Even if religious affiliation does not prevent support for democracy, it may imply only support for minimalist or electoral understanding of democracy that is usually about elections and voting. Thus, I expected that, non-religiosity provides more inclination to liberal understanding of democracy than minimalist-electoral percep-

tion of democracy. Similar to Ciftci et al (2019)' findings, I argued that categories of religiosity also provide different understanding of democracy. Since religious individualists and post-Islamists have more support for woman rights and liking neighbor of different religion and sect of Islam, thus both categories have more tolerance and plurality, my theoretical expectation argued that religious individualists and post-Islamists perceive more liberal understanding of democracy than minimalist-electoral definition of democracy. They may see liberal democracy as protection of religious rights as well, therefore they might be more prone to liberal perception of democracy.

The analysis of this study indicate that non-religious individuals have less liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than faithful individuals. However, within faithful individuals, a category shares liberal perception of democracy. When focused on religious outlooks, only post-Islamists have liberal perception of democracy over electoral perception of democracy than status quoists.

The debate continues about compatibility of Islam and democracy. This study provided micro-level findings regarding Muslim's perceptions of democracy and demonstrates that it is important to give details of Muslim's perceptions of democracy among the devout and non-religious individuals. This study contributes the literature on role of religion on political attitudes and shaping different perceptions of democracy.

This study has some limitations such as due to lack of available data, the focus of the research was the Arab World consisting of twelve countries. In particular, survey questions to prepare religious categories may not be found in other datasets that include other Muslim majority countries such as Turkey and Indonesia. However, Arab Barometer survey datasets might have some problems regarding data collection process. Arab Barometer works with different research companies in different countries to conduct surveys. Local partners may have been created problems regarding sample design and sample frame. Country specific problems and existence of different ethnic groups might have been ignored, that have a potential to bias the results.

Since theory of this research aimed to find out individuals' perception of liberal democracy over electoral perception, forthcoming research can develop theories regarding individual's perception of substantive, stability and other perceptions of democracy. The reasons or factors behind why non-religious Muslims are more likely to define democracy in economic terms or have substantive definition of democracy can be analyzed by also employing macro-level datasets including GDP, employment ratio and gini coefficients. Moreover, by employing state capacity and conflict

datasets, new studies can reveal new findings regarding Muslim's stability perception of democracy.

The inferences of this study can be generalized and extended to other parts of the worlds where democracy is consolidated through analyzing religious and non-religious individuals' views about different perceptions of democracy. Not only faithful Muslims, but also perceptions of adherents of other religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism might be analyzed and findings can contribute to the literature of effect of religiosity on different perceptions of democracy.

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Table A.1 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy: Religious

	Stability	Liberal	Substantive
Religious	0.071	0.009	-0.323***
	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.048)
Political Interest	-0.164***	-0.131***	-0.312***
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.085	-0.197**	-0.612***
	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.059)
Political Trust	-0.023***	-0.043***	-0.033***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Income	0.101***	0.106***	-0.098***
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)
Education Level	-0.085***	-0.075***	-0.131***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Female	0.125*	0.011	0.070
	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.048)
Age	0.007***	-0.002	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	1.064***	0.802***	2.645***
	(0.124)	(0.141)	(0.122)
Log lik.	-27282.095		
χ^2	1088.811		
N	21330		

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. **Base Category is Electoral Perception**
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy: Status Quoist

	Stability	Liberal	Substantive
Status-Quoist	-0.178***	0.041	-0.000
	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.045)
Political Interest	-0.167***	-0.129***	-0.324***
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.022)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.088	-0.195**	-0.629***
	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.058)
Political Trust	-0.023***	-0.043***	-0.035***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Income	0.102***	0.106***	-0.105***
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)
Education Level	-0.082***	-0.076***	-0.136***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Female	0.093*	0.010	0.202***
	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.044)
Age	0.007***	-0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	1.153***	0.787***	2.570***
	(0.123)	(0.141)	(0.122)
Log lik.	-27325.374		
χ^2	1019.997		
N	21328		

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. **Base Category is Electoral Perception**
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.3 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy

	Liberal	Substantive	Electoral	
Non-Religious	0.062	0.394***	0.071	
	(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.048)	
Political Interest	0.033	-0.149***	0.164***	
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.022)	
Interpersonal Trust	-0.112	-0.526***	0.085	
	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.055)	
Political Trust	-0.021**	-0.010*	0.023***	
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	
Income	0.004	-0.199***	-0.101***	
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.023)	
Education Level	0.010	-0.046***	0.085***	
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.014)	
Female	-0.114*	-0.055	-0.125*	
	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.049)	
Age	-0.009***	-0.004***	-0.007***	
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	
Constant	-0.325**	1.187***	-1.135***	
	(0.124)	(0.100)	(0.126)	
Log lik.	-27282.095			
χ^2	1088.811			
N	21330			

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. **Base Category is Stability Perception**
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.4 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy: Religious Categories

	Liberal	Substantive	Electoral
Non-Religious	0.070	0.350***	0.021
	(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.049)
Religious Individualist	-0.268***	-0.005	0.009
	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.056)
Post-Islamist	-0.076	-0.286***	-0.348***
	(0.053)	(0.043)	(0.057)
Religious Communitarian	-0.512***	-0.262***	-0.214**
	(0.076)	(0.056)	(0.072)
Political Interest	0.044	-0.144***	0.167***
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.094	-0.514***	0.094
	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.055)
Political Trust	-0.017*	-0.011*	0.021**
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Income	0.003	-0.201***	-0.104***
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Education Level	0.006	-0.052***	0.079***
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Female	-0.121*	-0.026	-0.092
	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.049)
Age	-0.009***	-0.004***	-0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.208	1.334***	-0.967***
	(0.128)	(0.102)	(0.131)
Log lik.	-27197.670		
χ^2	1237.375		
N	21328		

Standard errors in parentheses

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. **Base Category is Stability Perception**

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy

	Stability	Substantive	Electoral
Non-Religious	-0.062	0.331***	0.009
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.057)
Political Interest	-0.033	-0.181***	0.131***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Interpersonal Trust	0.112	-0.415***	0.197**
	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.066)
Political Trust	0.021**	0.011	0.043***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Income	-0.004	-0.204***	-0.106***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.027)
Education Level	-0.010	-0.056***	0.075***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Female	0.114*	0.058	-0.011
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.057)
Age	0.009***	0.004**	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.325**	1.512***	-0.810***
	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.145)
Log lik.	-27282.095		
χ^2	1088.811		
N	21330		

Standard errors in parentheses

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. **Base Category is Liberal Perception**

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.6 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy: Religious Categories

	Stability	Substantive	Electoral	
Non-Religious	-0.070	0.280***	-0.049	
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.058)	
Religious Individualist	0.268***	0.263***	0.277***	
	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.065)	
Post-Islamist	0.076	-0.210***	-0.272***	
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.064)	
Religious Communitarian	0.512***	0.250**	0.298***	
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.088)	
Political Interest	-0.044	-0.187***	0.123***	
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)	
Interpersonal Trust	0.094	-0.420***	0.188**	
	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.066)	
Political Trust	0.017*	0.006	0.038***	
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	
Income	-0.003	-0.205***	-0.108***	
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.027)	
Education Level	-0.006	-0.058***	0.073***	
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	
Female	0.121*	0.094*	0.029	
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.057)	
Age	0.009***	0.005**	0.002	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Constant	0.208	1.541***	-0.759***	
	(0.128)	(0.126)	(0.150)	
Log lik.	-27197.670			
χ^2	1237.375			
N	21328			

Standard errors in parentheses

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. **Base Category is Liberal Perception**

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.7 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy

	Stability	Liberal	Electoral
Non-Religious	-0.394***	-0.331***	-0.323***
	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Political Interest	0.149***	0.181***	0.312***
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Interpersonal Trust	0.526***	0.415***	0.612***
	(0.048)	(0.061)	(0.059)
Political Trust	0.010*	-0.011	0.033***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Income	0.199***	0.204***	0.098***
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Education Level	0.046***	0.056***	0.131***
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Female	0.055	-0.058	-0.070
	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Age	0.004***	-0.004**	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-1.187***	-1.512***	-2.322***
	(0.100)	(0.123)	(0.125)
Log lik.	-27282.095		
χ^2	1088.811		
N	21330		

Standard errors in parentheses

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. **Base Category is Substantive Perception**

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.8 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy:Religious Categories

	Stability	Liberal	Electoral
Non-Religious	-0.350***	-0.280***	-0.329***
	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Religious Individualist	0.005	-0.263***	0.014
	(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Post-Islamist	0.286***	0.210***	-0.062
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.057)
Religious Communitarian	0.262***	-0.250**	0.048
	(0.056)	(0.077)	(0.072)
Political Interest	0.144***	0.187***	0.310***
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Interpersonal Trust	0.514***	0.420***	0.608***
	(0.049)	(0.061)	(0.059)
Political Trust	0.011*	-0.006	0.032***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Income	0.201***	0.205***	0.097***
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Education Level	0.052***	0.058***	0.131***
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Female	0.026	-0.094*	-0.066
	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Age	0.004***	-0.005**	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-1.334***	-1.541***	-2.300***
	(0.102)	(0.126)	(0.129)
Log lik.	-27197.670		
χ^2	1237.375		
N	21328		

Standard errors in parentheses

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. **Base Category is Substantive Perception**

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.9 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy: With Country Dummies

	Stability	Liberal	Electoral
Non-Religious	-0.017	0.071	0.105*
	(0.050)	(0.059)	(0.051)
Political Interest	-0.107***	-0.063*	-0.248***
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.019	-0.045	-0.209***
	(0.059)	(0.071)	(0.063)
Political Trust	0.004	-0.014	-0.036***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Income	0.045	0.032	-0.116***
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Education Level	-0.108***	-0.109***	-0.172***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Female	0.110*	-0.013	0.187***
	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.050)
Age	0.001	-0.009***	-0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Egypt	-0.173	-0.090	0.181
	(0.123)	(0.132)	(0.129)
Iraq	-0.632***	-0.817***	0.795***
	(0.119)	(0.132)	(0.120)
Jordan	0.146	0.333*	1.526***
	(0.139)	(0.149)	(0.140)
Lebanon	-1.232***	-0.356*	0.667***
	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.133)
Libya	0.024	-0.655***	0.916***
	(0.124)	(0.143)	(0.129)
Morocco	-0.350**	-0.807***	0.073
	(0.114)	(0.130)	(0.121)
Palestine	-0.911***	-1.000***	0.075
	(0.111)	(0.123)	(0.115)
Sudan	-1.097***	-1.102***	-0.974***
	(0.115)	(0.127)	(0.127)
Tunisia	-0.699***	-1.067***	0.854***
	(0.120)	(0.139)	(0.120)
Yemen	-1.261***	-1.987***	-1.008***
	(0.111)	(0.135)	(0.119)
Constant	1.845***	1.715***	2.545***
	(0.146)	(0.164)	(0.150)
Log lik.	-26181.011		
χ^2	3082.414		
N	21330		

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. Reference country is Algeria
Base Category is Electoral Perception
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.10 Multinomial Logistic Regression of Perception of Democracy: Religious Categories With Country Dummies

	Stability	Liberal	Substantive
Non-Religious	0.035	0.131*	0.151**
	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.051)
Religious Individualist	-0.027	-0.318***	-0.071
	(0.058)	(0.068)	(0.057)
Post-Islamist	0.452***	0.383***	0.371***
	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.061)
Religious Communitarian	0.418***	-0.039	0.295***
	(0.077)	(0.094)	(0.080)
Political Interest	-0.112***	-0.059*	-0.250***
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.021	-0.039	-0.210***
	(0.059)	(0.071)	(0.063)
Political Trust	0.004	-0.014	-0.036***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Income	0.043	0.027	-0.117***
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Education Level	-0.099***	-0.098***	-0.165***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Female	0.078	-0.051	0.159**
	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.050)
Age	0.000	-0.009***	-0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Egypt	-0.079	0.086	0.272*
	(0.124)	(0.134)	(0.131)
Iraq	-0.515***	-0.554***	0.916***
	(0.122)	(0.136)	(0.123)
Jordan	0.186	0.423**	1.567***
	(0.140)	(0.150)	(0.141)
Lebanon	-1.084***	-0.188	0.792***
	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.135)
Libya	0.097	-0.589***	0.975***
	(0.125)	(0.144)	(0.130)
Morocco	-0.272*	-0.647***	0.152
	(0.115)	(0.131)	(0.122)
Palestine	-0.894***	-0.972***	0.090
	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.115)
Sudan	-1.185***	-1.135***	-1.042***
	(0.115)	(0.128)	(0.128)
Tunisia	-0.563***	-0.897***	0.974***
	(0.122)	(0.141)	(0.122)
Yemen	-1.266***	-1.893***	-1.001***
	(0.113)	(0.136)	(0.121)
Constant	1.619***	1.544***	2.365***
	(0.150)	(0.168)	(0.153)
Log lik.	-26103.433		
χ^2	3181.678		
N	21328		

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. Base Category is Electoral Perception

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.11 Regression Analysis of Support for Democracy

	Model.1
Religious Individualist	0.231***
	(0.014)
Post-Islamist	0.052***
	(0.014)
Religious Communitarian	0.148***
	(0.019)
Political Interest	0.053***
	(0.006)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.164***
	(0.016)
Political Trust	0.005**
	(0.002)
Income	0.018**
	(0.006)
Age	0.001*
	(0.000)
Female	0.033**
	(0.011)
Constant	2.665***
	(0.028)
N	20949
R^2	0.023

Standard errors in parentheses. Two -Tailed Tests. Çiftçi and his Colleagues Analysis
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$