

**THIRD-PARTY ATTITUDES ON CIVIL CONFLICTS: HOW THE  
EXTERNAL STATES REACT TO INTRASTATE CONFLICTS?**

by  
MELIKE AYŞE KOCACIK ŞENOL

Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences  
in partial fulfilment of  
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Sabancı University  
December 2020

**THIRD-PARTY ATTITUDES ON CIVIL CONFLICTS: HOW THE  
EXTERNAL STATES REACT TO INTRASTATE CONFLICTS?**

Approved by:

[Redacted signature]

[Redacted signature]

[Redacted signature]

[Redacted signature]

[Redacted signature]

Date of Approval: December 2, 2020

MELİKE AYŞE KOCACIK ŞENOL 2020 ©

All Rights Reserved

## ABSTRACT

### THIRD-PARTY ATTITUDES ON CIVIL CONFLICTS: HOW THE EXTERNAL STATES REACT TO INTRASTATE CONFLICTS?

MELIKE AYŞE KOCACIK ŞENOL

POLITICAL SCIENCE Ph.D DISSERTATION, DECEMBER 2020

Dissertation Supervisor: Prof. Meltem Müftüler-Baç

Keywords: third party intervention, third party attitudes, civil war, text-as-data, content analysis

This thesis aims to define and explore third party attitudes. Previous literature on third-party intervention that explores the motivations and methods of this phenomenon has overlooked the importance of the verbal clues and their impact on the civil war process. However, verbal indications are significant aspects that shape international relations; hence, the perceptions of conflicting actors depend on these external signals for their strategies in civil conflicts. This thesis, thus, bridges the gap between third party intervention and communication in international relations. Third-party attitude is the new measure that reflects how third parties position themselves towards an intrastate conflict. This dissertation introduces a novel definition and operationalization of this concept. This dissertation additionally analyzes the critical determinants which change third party attitudes. The first empirical chapter introduces a case comparison and in-depth analysis of German, British and American attitudes on Turkey's armed struggle with the PKK for the years between 2010-2019, which aims to detect the possible causal mechanisms. The second empirical chapter explores whether the hypotheses are supported with a time-series cross-sectional data covering American attitudes towards the European conflicts for the years between 1990-2019. The dissertation finds that the regional security dynamics and economic relations are the important factors that impact the likelihood of issuing involving and positive statements towards the conflicting states and non-state actors.

## ÖZET

### İÇ SAVAŞLARA İLİŞKİN ÜÇÜNCÜ TARAFLARIN TUTUMLARI: DIŞ DEVLETLER İÇ ÇATIŞMALARA NASIL TEPKI VERİYOR?

MELIKE AYŞE KOCACIK ŞENOL

SIYASET BİLİMİ DOKTORA TEZİ, ARALIK 2020

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç

Anahtar Kelimeler: üçüncü parti müdahalesi, üçüncü parti tutumları, iç savaşlar, metin verisi, içerik analizi

Bu tez, üçüncü parti tutumlarını tanımlamayı ve keşfetmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu üçüncü partilerin motivasyonlarını ve yöntemlerini araştıran önceki literatür, sözel ipuçlarının önemini ve bunların iç savaş sürecine olası etkilerini gözden kaçırmıştır. Bu sözel ipuçları uluslararası ilişkileri şekillendiren önemli unsurlardır ve bu nedenle çatışan aktörlerin algıları ve iç çatışmalardaki stratejileri bu sinyallere göre değişiklik gösterebilir. Bu tez, üçüncü parti müdahalesi ile uluslararası ilişkilerde iletişim konularını birbiriyle bağlamaktadır. Üçüncü parti tutumu, üçüncü tarafların kendilerini bir iç çatışmaya karşı nasıl konumlandıklarını yansıtan bir gösterge olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu tez, sivil çatışmalarla ilgili lider ifadelerinin içeriğini yansıtan bu kavramın tanımını ve işlevselleştirilmesini sunmaktadır. İkinci olarak, bu tez üçüncü parti tutumlarını değiştiren kritik belirleyicileri analiz ediyor olmasıdır. Birinci ampirik bölüm, olası nedensel mekanizmaları tespit etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. 2010-2019 yılları arasında Türkiye'nin PKK ile silahlı mücadelesine ilişkin Alman, İngiliz ve Amerikan tutumlarının bir vaka karşılaştırması ve derinlemesine analizini sunmaktadır. İkinci ampirik bölüm ise, hipotezlerin 1990-2019 yılları arasında Avrupa iç çatışmalarına yönelik Amerikan tutumlarını kapsayan bir zaman serisi kesitsel verilerle desteklenip desteklenmediğini araştırmaktadır. Tez, rekabet ve ittifak ilişkilerini etkileyen bölgesel güvenlik dinamiklerinin üçüncü parti tutumlarını şekillendiren en önemli değişken olduğunu desteklemektedir. Ekonomik ilişkiler, çatışan devlete yönelik kapsayıcı ve olumlu beyanlarda bulunmak açısından da önemlidir.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Throughout the three years this dissertation has been in work in progress which has been developed and shaped with the support of many distinguished people. First of all, I would like to express my most profound appreciation to my supervisor Prof. Meltem Müftüler Baç who provided full support during my academic life at Sabancı University, especially in my last year at Sabancı University. Her guidance and feedbacks illuminated my research ideas and helped me to complete my dissertation. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to Emre Hatipoğlu, my previous supervisor, who helped me to build the structure of my thesis, while he did not stop his unwavering support and encouragement after his leave from Sabancı University. I am very lucky to have the opportunity to work both with Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Emre Hatipoğlu and words will not be enough to express my gratefulness for their assistance.

I would also like to thank Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Yücel Saygın, Belgin Şan-Akca and Kerim Can Kavaklı for being in my thesis committee and providing me insightful feedbacks on my dissertation. Particularly I am extremely grateful to Kerim Can Kavaklı for his support and guidance not only for my thesis but for my development as a scholar.

I am indebted to Mert Moral who has been encouraging and supportive for the last four years at Sabancı University. I am grateful not only for his constant support for improving my teaching skills but also for his assistance for becoming a political science scholar.

I would also like to express my sincere thanks to Kristian Skrede Gleditsch for accepting me as a visiting researcher to the University of Essex, and Babak RezaeeDaryakenari for being in my previous thesis committee and provide me insightful feedbacks during his time at Sabancı University.

Sabancı University has been my second home for the last 11 years and I believe along with the high academic standards, the support and kindness of the administration of Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of Sabancı University; Sumru Küçüka, Inci Ceydeli, Viket Galimidi, Ayse Ötenoglu, Tugcan Basara and Özlem Sen deserves a special thanks.

My dearest friends and colleagues Zeynep Özge Iğdır, Yasemin Tosun, Ayşe Büşra

Topal, and Faruk Aksoy also deserve a special acknowledgment, they made the PhD years to be remembered and missed. Aylin Ece iek particularly deserves a special thanks who has been provided her constant support and lovely foods.

Surviving the Ph.D is impossible with the support and encouragements of the loved ones. I feel very lucky to have a very crowded family who constantly supported me in this last five years. My beloved parents Meliha and Mehmet and my sister ule made this journey a lot easier. My nieces Beril, Sena, Ela and nephews Kerem and Selim were sources of joy and happiness. I cannot think to finish my dissertation without their endorsement and cheer.

Among all, my partner in crime, mer deserves most of the credit. The emotional support, sacrifice, and comfort that he provided created a pleasant environment which encouraged me to finish this thesis. This dissertation is dedicated to his constant support and patience. Thank you for being in my life!

Finally, I am grateful to Sabancı University and TBİTAK-BİDEB for assisting me financially during my Ph.D. study.

*To Ali Yahya Şenol*



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>LIST OF TABLES</b> .....	<b>xi</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES</b> .....	<b>xiii</b>
<b>1. INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1. Overview .....	9
<b>2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW</b> <b>12</b>	
2.1. A Brief Overview of Third Parties in Civil Conflicts .....	14
2.1.1. Motivations for Intervention .....	14
2.1.2. Means of Intervention .....	21
2.2. Attitudes versus Behavior: Distinguishing the Effect of Third Party Attitudes from Behavior in Civil Conflicts .....	23
2.3. Communication Matters: Theoretical Approaches on the Importance of Statements in International Relations.....	25
2.3.1. Theoretical Framework, Assumptions, and Propositions .....	33
2.4. Research Question and Hypotheses .....	36
2.5. Conclusion .....	41
<b>3. DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT OF THIRD PARTY ATTITUDES</b> .....	<b>43</b>
3.1. Texts-as-Data in Political Science and International Relations: A Brief Overview .....	43
3.1.1. Event Data and Texts in International Relations .....	44
3.1.2. Custom Made Data Using Texts in International Relations ...	46
3.2. Third Party Attitudes (TPA) Data: Data Collection, Generation and Measurement.....	48
3.2.1. Case Selection .....	49
3.2.2. Sources for Leader Statements .....	50
3.2.3. Coding Rules and Examples .....	52
3.3. Leader Statements on Civil Conflicts: A Text-as-Data Approach .....	58

3.4. Conclusion .....	74
<b>4. GERMAN, AMERICAN, AND BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS TURKEY'S ARMED STRUGGLE WITH THE PKK-(2010-2019))</b> .....	<b>75</b>
4.1. Comparative Case Study .....	75
4.2. Process tracing.....	81
4.3. Brief History of Turkey's armed struggle with the PKK.....	81
4.4. PKK as a Non-State Actor within Regional Dynamics: Other Kurdish Groups and the Kurdish Diaspora .....	85
4.4.1. The Regional Kurdish Groups and their specific Relations with the PKK .....	85
4.4.2. Kurdish Diaspora .....	87
4.5. The Effect of Syrian War over Dyadic Relationships of Turkey and PKK with the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany .....	88
4.6. Selecting Variables in Context: Implementation within Hypotheses...	93
4.7. Words Over Deeds: An Analysis on German, British and American Attitudes Towards PKK-Turkish Conflict .....	96
4.8. Conclusion .....	102
<b>5. AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS CIVIL CONFLICTS.....</b>	<b>104</b>
5.1. A Brief Overview of American Attitudes: Interventions and Civil Conflicts .....	105
5.2. Research Design and Variables .....	113
5.2.1. Dependent Variable .....	113
5.2.2. Independent Variables.....	115
5.3. Results .....	117
5.4. Conclusion .....	124
<b>6. CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>125</b>
6.1. A Brief Overview of Dissertation .....	125
6.2. Improvements and Future Research .....	127
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>130</b>
<b>APPENDIX A.....</b>	<b>139</b>
<b>APPENDIX B.....</b>	<b>141</b>
<b>APPENDIX C.....</b>	<b>148</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1. Conflict Locations, State and Nonstate Actors.....	50
Table 3.2. Number of Links, Paragraphs and Unique Paragraphs.....	51
Table 3.3. Keywords for Filtering Statements .....	51
Table 3.4. The Number of Paragraphs After Each Filtration Process- Turkish-PKK conflict .....	52
Table 3.5. The Number of Paragraphs After Each Filtration Process- Eu- ropean Civil Conflicts.....	52
Table 3.6. Domestic Politics and the Number of Paragraphs of Turkey ....	55
Table 3.7. Domestic Politics and the Number of Paragraphs of European Conflicts .....	56
Table 3.8. Number of Domestic and Bilateral Statements on Turkey .....	56
Table 3.9. Number of Domestic and Bilateral Statements on European Conflicts .....	57
Table 3.10. Number of Paragraphs in Different Levels of Involvement on Turkey-PKK Conflict .....	57
Table 3.11. Number of Paragraphs in Different Levels of Involvement on European Conflicts .....	57
Table 4.1. Summary Table of Bilateral Relations .....	80
Table 5.1. Measurement of Third Party Attitudes .....	114
Table 5.2. Summary Statistics.....	117
Table 5.3. Logistic regression analysis on the probability of issuing state- ments on civil conflicts with different alliance and rivalry variables ...	118
Table 5.4. The analysis on the level of involvement for positive statements towards the state – multivariate regression results .....	119
Table 5.5. The analysis on the level of involvement for negative statements towards the state – multivariate regression results .....	120
Table 5.6. Full models on the level of involvement towards the state and nonstate actors.....	121
Table 5.7. Two-part model .....	122

Table B.1. Bivariate Logistic Regression Results .....	143
Table B.2. Bivariate Regression Analysis on the Level of Involvement in Positive Statements Towards the State .....	144
Table B.3. Bivariate Regression Analysis on the Level of Involvement in Negative Statements Towards the State .....	145
Table B.4. Bivariate Regression Analysis on the Level of Involvement in Positive Statements Towards the NSA.....	146
Table B.5. Bivariate Regression Analysis on the Level of Involvement in Negative Statements Towards the NSA.....	147

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. The Strategies of Intervention Based on the Level of Costs . . . .	22
Figure 2.2. The Process of Third Party Involvement . . . . .	24
Figure 2.3. Deitelhoff’s Classification of Actions in Different Levels of Norm Density and Institutionalism . . . . .	32
Figure 2.4. The Aspects of Statements and Theoretical Expectations . . . .	35
Figure 2.5. Categories of Third Party Attitudes . . . . .	39
Figure 3.1. Coding Scheme . . . . .	53
Figure 3.2. Relative Frequencies of Words and Bigrams on European States	59
Figure 3.3. Relative Frequencies of Words and Bigrams on European Non- state Actors . . . . .	60
Figure 3.4. The Most Frequently Used Words Depending on the Involved- ness and Biasedness Categories About the Turkish-PKK Conflict . . . . .	61
Figure 3.5. Keywords Identified using RAKE on Bosnian Conflict and its Parties . . . . .	64
Figure 3.6. Keywords Identified using RAKE on Northern Ireland Conflict and its Parties . . . . .	65
Figure 3.7. Keywords Identified using RAKE on Kosovar Conflict and its Parties . . . . .	66
Figure 3.8. Keywords Identified using RAKE on Civilians . . . . .	67
Figure 3.9. Keywords Identified using RAKE on Turkish Conflict . . . . .	68
Figure 3.10. RAKE scores of different level of involvement statements about Bosnia . . . . .	70
Figure 3.11. RAKE scores of different level of involvement statements about Serbia . . . . .	71
Figure 3.12. RAKE scores of different level of involvement statements about Macedonia . . . . .	72
Figure 3.13. RAKE scores of different level of involvement statements about UK . . . . .	73

Figure 4.1. Export and Import Levels in Millions USD \$ between the United States and Turkey .....	77
Figure 4.2. Export and Import Levels in Millions USD \$ between Germany and Turkey.....	78
Figure 4.3. Export and Import Levels in Millions USD \$ between the United Kingdom and Turkey .....	79
Figure 4.4. Battle related deaths PKK-Turkey conflict. Source: TP-CONED by Kıbrıs (2020) .....	82
Figure 4.5. Some of the Kurdish factions. Source: Strategies of Resistance Data Project by Cunningham (2019) .....	83
Figure 4.6. Number of Mentions Kurdish/Kurd in Local German Newspapers Source: LexisNexis .....	88
Figure 4.7. Mean Level of Bias towards Turkey .....	97
Figure 4.8. Mean Level of Bias towards PKK and Terrorism .....	98
Figure 4.9. Mean Involvedness towards Turkey for Different Levels of Bias American Statements .....	100
Figure 4.10. Mean Involvedness towards Turkey for Different Levels of Bias of German Statements .....	101
Figure 4.11. Mean Involvedness towards Turkey for Different Levels of Bias of British Statements .....	102
Figure 5.1. The Number of Diplomatic Interventions by the United States, Source: Regan and Aydın (2009) .....	106
Figure 5.2. Total Number of Nonstate Actor Support by the United States	107
Figure 5.3. Total Number of Nonstate Actor Support by the United States in Different Regions .....	108
Figure 5.4. Ratio of Important Issues for the United States in UN Resolutions on Human Rights .....	110
Figure 5.5. Marginal Effect of Peace Scale on Issuing Involving Statements	123
Figure A.1. The Involvement Level in German and English Statements....	140
Figure A.2. The Biasedness towards the State in German and English Statements.....	140
Figure B.1. The Level of Involvement of Negative Statements towards the NSA.....	141
Figure B.2. The Level of Involvement of Negative Statements towards the State .....	142
Figure B.3. The Level of Involvement of Positive Statements towards the NSA.....	142

Figure B.4. The Level of Involvement of Positive Statements towards the  
State ..... 143  
Figure C.1. Naïve Bayes results for different training sets ..... 149

## 1. INTRODUCTION

On the 6th of April 1992, the Bosnian civil war -widely regarded as the most violent intrastate conflict- began. <sup>1</sup> The root cause of this tragedy is attributed to the ethnic divide between various groups within the borders of Yugoslavia. Initially, tensions between parties began in the 1980s however, the conflict escalated to encompass a violent dimension when the Bosnian government held a referendum for independence from Yugoslavia which resulted in two-thirds of the electorate supporting a potential separation. <sup>2</sup> What precipitated the crisis is the declaration of independence by the Bosnian presidency on March 3, 1992. After the United States recognized this declaration of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 6, 1992, the Bosnian Serb paramilitaries started to open fire and bombing in Sarajevo. <sup>3</sup> It was only two years later, in February 1994, the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) finally intervened in this bloody conflict, which lasted until 1995. The Bosnian conflict is a critical event to understand the role of third parties in civil conflicts and many scholars have introduced how international actors and external states become prominent actors shaping the intrastate conflict process (Hansen 2006).

The role of international actors in the region started with the declaration of independence by Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia in 1991. The European countries, particularly, were more responsive for the events in Yugoslavia; however, among the European Community (EC) countries there was a disagreement in supporting the independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia (Shrivastava and Agarwal 2003). Unlike Germany, who supported the independence of these countries, other states such as Britain, France, Italy, and Spain were critical for recognizing the independence. Even the European countries reflected diverging signals to the independence of these Balkan countries, their reactions escalated eventually and agreed on implementing trade embargo to Yugoslavia. The imposed trade embargo on Yugoslavia

---

<sup>1</sup><https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-War>

<sup>2</sup><https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-War>

<sup>3</sup><https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-War>



promoted the independence movements within Yugoslavia. The United Nations Security Council, on the other hand, called for a complete arms embargo towards Yugoslavia and on January 15, 1992 the United Nations sent 14000 UN peacekeeping force to stabilize the region (Shrivastava and Agarwal 2003).

The intensified tension in the region due to the separation of Slovenia, Macedonia and Croatia continued as the Bosnian conflict flared up and transformed into a violent conflict in the region. The attempts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to become independent by following the steps of the other Balkan countries created a rapid and big reaction by Serbia due to the high number of Serbians living in Bosnia. The very complex demographics in, thusn the region, challenged the Bosnian government to declare and gain independence from Yugoslavia.

Violence in Serbia started immediately after Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized as an independent state by the European Community (EC) and the United States in April 1992 (Shrivastava and Agarwal 2003). The tension between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs increased rapidly. While the highly forceful attacks by Serbia increased, the external states and international actors abstained to being a party in the initial stages of the conflict. While Bosnia demanded for the United States to step in, the US waited to follow the actions by the European Community (Shrivastava and Agarwal 2003). Despite the willingness of the United States to engage in the conflict militarily, the American Presidency implemented diplomatic sanctions and closed the Yugoslavia consulates within the nation and expelled the diplomats from the United States (Shrivastava and Agarwal 2003). Concomitantly, European Community extended the trade embargo due to the increased violence and repression by the Serbs, while the United Nations extended the area and limits of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The economic and diplomatic sanction by the United States, European Community and United Nations, however, did not diminish the violence or withdraw of the Serbian forces from massive killings.

While the international reactions were limited to diplomatic and economic sanctions, the peril of the Bosnian conflict was debated severely among the international platforms. The United States emphasized mostly the importance of the economic sanctions. In June 1992, George Bush commented on how the United States plans to react towards the conflict in Bosnia as the global leader and when the United States will lead the coalition to force Milosevic out of Bosnia. George Bush stated that:

I think the sanctions – I'm not prepared to give up on the sanctions at all. They've only been in effect for a few days. As you know, first on this

question of Yugoslavia, out in front was the United Nations. You had Cyrus Vance as a representative of the United Nations, did a superb job trying to negotiate, ably supplemented, I might say, by Peter Carrington. They tried to work that problem, had our full support.

The EC, which is right there in the neighborhood, tried to have an effective role. It now appears that a U.S. role, catalytic role, is important. Thus, we are moving forward. Secretary Baker made a very strong statement on this recently, has worked closely with the leaders of Europe. So we are united in this sanctions question. Let's see if it works. But I'm not prepared to say these sanctions will not work.

I think prudence and caution prevents military actions. If I decide to change my mind on that, I will do it in an inclusive way. But at this juncture I want to stay with these sanctions. <sup>4</sup>

The statement by George Bush reflects how the United States is positive on the effectiveness of the multilateral economic sanctions. Along with the economic sanctions, the President emphasized on how the diplomatic efforts are important attempts for the solution of Bosnian conflict. Introducing the European Community as the front-runner in the multilateral actions targeting the Bosnian conflict and assigning the catalyzer role to the US, who amasses the international actors together, George Bush signals that the economic and diplomatic means will be the actions that will be on the agenda in the near future.

These statements by Bush reflects how the United States being cautious on acting in Bosnian conflict, along with signaling that the European Community is in charge and the United States will follow their decisions. These verbal clues by President Bush, also reflects how the United States do not prioritize to engage and utilize costly actions which aim to terminate the conflict. While the diplomatic and economic actions by the external states show that the international players are engaging in the conflict, the statements by the United States reflect that the global hegemon is hesitant in becoming a party to the conflict at this stage.

While the economic and diplomatic sanctions were the initial attempts of the international community, external states also paid attention to provide humanitarian assistance. In August 1992, the UN Security Council managed to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Bosnian civilians. On August 7, 1992, President Bush, stated that:

Now let me turn to the subject I talked a little about yesterday, the ter-

---

<sup>4</sup><https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-8>

rifying violence that's occurring in Bosnia. The pictures of the prisoners rounded up by the Serbian forces and being held in these detention camps are stark evidence of the need to deal with this problem effectively. The world cannot shed its horror at the prospect of concentration camps. The shocking brutality of genocide in World War II in those concentration camps are burning memories for all of us. That can't happen again, and we will not rest until the international community has gained access to any and all detention camps.

As I said yesterday, let no one think there is an easy or simple solution for this tragedy. But we are taking the complex and strong steps necessary to bring humanitarian relief to the people of Bosnia and political resolution to the crisis in that country. <sup>5</sup>

The increase in mass killings and repression by the Bosnian Serbs, reflected how the economic and diplomatic sanctions, which were in effect, were not as efficient as the international community had expected. The clear depiction of the violence in Bosnia by President Bush, as well as, the decisive rhetoric to end the humanitarian crisis signals a different stance of the United States compared to the previous months.

While the conflict continued to escalate, diverging attitudes of international actors became clearly observable. While the United States rejected any military intervention, EC supported the UN to intervene (Shrivastava and Agarwal 2003). Also, it was argued that the armed embargo towards Bosnia created negative consequences and increased the severity of the conflict (Shrivastava and Agarwal 2003). While the United States wanted to lift the embargo from Bosnia, Britain and France rejected this idea since they were more concerned for their troops rather than the Bosnian civilians (Shrivastava and Agarwal 2003).

In November 1992, with the leadership change in the United States, Bill Clinton, the newly elected American president, commented tentatively on the Bosnian issue and suggested that the new government is open to every options.

Now, I think there are many options that we have in dealing with the problem in Bosnia and the potential problem on Kosovo that are short of sending troops in, but beyond where we have been now. And I don't want to foreclose any of those options by anything I say now. I won't become President until January, and I want to have those options available. <sup>6</sup>

The comments of Bill Clinton on the Bosnian conflict are important to show how the

---

<sup>5</sup><https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-6>

<sup>6</sup><https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/excerpts-the-president-elects-news-conference-little-rock-0>

new American government perceives the violent conflict and hints how they might be engaging in this event in the upcoming months as a newly elected office. The statement “not foreclosing any of the options” reflects how Bill Clinton is open to new forms of involvement to Bosnian conflict, which can be perceived as not having a planned strategy on terminating the Bosnian conflict. This vagueness that the United States reflects, addition to the lack of unity among the international actors, might be the cause of the ongoing violence by the Bosnian Serbs.

In January 1993, the diplomatic efforts to resolve the Bosnian conflict aimed to be improved by the Vance-Owen peace plan which, was started by the United Nations. UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance and EC representative Lord Owen took an initiative and started to mediate peace with the Bosnian leaders. However, the mediation attempts failed which led the United States to engage in mediation efforts by getting the support of Russia, as the natural ally to Serbia. On February 5, 1993 Clinton stated that:

If there is to be a diplomatic political solution to this over the long run, we very much need President Yeltsin involved and the support of Russia. He reaffirmed to me just a few days ago in our telephone conversation his general support for the policy that we have outlined. But I’m sure you can understand why with a problem this difficult, we would like a few days longer just to seriously review this to come up with what our policy is going to be. Then we’ll announce it as clearly and forcefully and follow it as strongly as we possibly can. <sup>7</sup>

Bill Clinton reflects that how Russia as the natural ally to Serbia has an important role and they will support the help of Russia to terminate the ongoing violence. The President also emphasized on the “clear” and “forceful” reactions towards the conflict. The stance of the United States explicitly shows how they are seeking new solutions and position themselves while the violence in Bosnian conflict continues. As diplomatic and economic sanctions fail, the United States try to create an image that the international actors are all working together and expecting that this strong and collective response will intimidate Serbia and withdraw from using violence.

Lifting the arms embargo from Bosnia was an issue on the agenda which the international actors could not agree on. While the United States in the Bush era intend to lift this embargo, European countries disagreed with this attempt. In the Clinton’s era, however, the President himself did not agree with this decision. Clinton commented on lifting the international arms embargo in August 1994 as follows:

---

<sup>7</sup><https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-with-prime-minister-brian-mulroney-canada-0>

At the same time, I believe lifting the embargo unilaterally would have serious implications going well beyond the conflict in Bosnia itself. It could end the current negotiating process, which is bringing new pressure to bear on the Bosnian Serbs. Our relations with our Western European allies would be seriously strained and the cohesiveness of NATO threatened. Our efforts to build a mature and cooperative relationship with Russia would be damaged. It would also greatly increase American responsibility for the outcome of the conflict. The likelihood of greater U.S. military involvement in Bosnia would be increased, not decreased.<sup>8</sup>

This statement is significant and informative from many aspects. First of all, the United States clearly indicates that they will not engage in any unilateral actions and the relations with the European countries are utmost important issue in the Bosnian conflict. Bill Clinton argues that the relations with Russia and cohesiveness of NATO would be challenged as a result of the unilateral action, therefore, they will not consider this option. This issued statement, thus, again reflects what the United States prioritize in the Bosnian conflict. As the member and one of the most important actors of the international community, the United States is interested to preserve the relations with the European countries and Russia, while they only intend to support the decisions of the European Community on the Bosnian conflict. The Bosnian Serbs and Serbia, therefore, read the situation as a very low probability of military intervention by the United States, which enable them to continue their violent attacks towards Bosnian civilians.

While the military intervention in which the United States did not take part for two years after the civil conflict started, the American Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton frequently issued statements and condemned the violent attacks in Bosnia and urged all parties to find peaceful solutions during this time as presented above. First, it should be noted that despite obvious indication that the situation in the region was heading towards a severe clash between different parties, the American Presidency did not acknowledge the situation until the declaration of independence of Bosnia and the formal start of the war in 1992.

As the violence started, immediate action by the international actors taken, and economic and diplomatic sanctions were utilized as means to terminate the conflict. However, the violence kept increasing over time while the international actions remained with the diplomatic and economic sanctions. The disagreement among the external states on starting a military intervention to Bosnian conflict has been sig-

---

<sup>8</sup><https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-the-chairman-the-senate-committee-armed-services-the-arms-embargo-bosnia>

naled through the verbal indications of external states. Particularly the Presidency of the United States signaled that they are not interested in military action and believe in the effectiveness of diplomatic channels in the first years of the conflict. Also, the change in the leadership and the failed diplomatic attempts (Vance-Owen peace plan) did not signal adequate threat towards the Bosnian Serbs for terminating violence. These signals by the global power, therefore, did not stop Serbs to kill civilians. After UN sent troops to Bosnia and utilized a military intervention, the conflicting parties accepted to terminate the conflict.

The Bosnian civil conflict is a case which illustrates the importance of external states and how the intervention decisions impact the civil war process. The empirical studies which are interested in explaining the role of external states in civil conflict explores the importance of different types of intervention. However, as this case shows, only exploring the actions by external states is necessary but not sufficient presenting the full story focusing on the effectiveness of third parties. The international actors only have involved to the Bosnian conflict by utilizing the failed diplomatic efforts along with economic sanction. While these decisions were made in the first years of the conflict and for the years 1993 and 1994 the international actors did not perform active involvement to the Bosnian conflict.

While diplomatic and economic sanctions by the external states were intact, verbal clues, particularly put forth by the United States, reflected the unwillingness and indetermination of international actors on forming a united decision on this conflict. Therefore, these signals have functioned as informative tools for the conflicting parties and had led them to decide on how to proceed in the conflict. In this case, the Bosnian Serbs did not terminate using violent means against the Bosnian Muslims and civilians, also, they have conducted massive killings which has become the most violent event in post-Cold War Europe and is still regarded as a major violation of human rights.

The Bosnian conflict and the engagement of external states also supports the studies and arguments on the importance of cheap signals in international environment. Many scholars focusing on the topic have suggested that the cheap signals, such as statements or different communication means, are strategically selected to change the course of actions in the international relations (Fearon 1994, 1995, Schultz 2001). Therefore, to comprehend how external states are affective and active actors in civil conflicts, the issued verbal indications must be explored thoroughly.

The main bulk of third-party intervention literature, however, does not consider the statements as intervention and instead these studies only examine the impact of military action (Aydm 2010, Fordham 2008, Lemke and Regan 2004, Gleditsch and

Salehyan 2011, Regan 1996, 2000, 2002, Şan-Akca 2009), diplomatic or economic interventions (Regan and Aydın, 2006). Therefore, the studies mainly focus on whether any of external states or international organizations employed any of these actions and determine these actions as their outcome variables. While these actions are important mechanisms that impact the civil war process, the true effect of these actions cannot be separated from the cheaper signals by third parties. In other words, the effectiveness of economic sanctions on the Bosnian conflict can be mixed with the signals that the United States provided in time. So the reason behind the probability of economic sanctions to fail can be due to the lack of unity among signals by the international actors, as well as the unwillingness for military action indicated by the United States. Such verbal clues, therefore, should be considered and explored as the tools, which set the expectations of conflicting parties, while the actions are the direct and observable outcomes of these perceptions of actors.

Additionally, focusing on cheap signals and verbal clues is critical in capturing the dynamic nature of interactions. While verbal indications can be stated more frequently by the external states, the actions are more rare and less dynamic than the statements. Observing the continuous and dynamic perceptions of external states on civil conflicts is not possible by exploring the intervention actions. Henceforth, examining the statements and signals by the external states is crucial for pinpointing the nuances behind the mechanisms and dynamic nature of the international aspect of civil war.

In the light of the discussion presented above, this dissertation intends to fill the lacuna in the third party intervention literature for furthering the discussions on the importance of external states in civil conflicts. The thesis will introduce the definition, operationalization and measurement of a new measure named third party attitudes. This new concept which identifies the position and stance of third party towards a civil conflict reflected through the leader statements, thus, will generate a new strand of literature to assess how verbal clues are important tools for civil conflict processes.

One of the novel aspects of this thesis is the introduction of third party attitudes as the new measure. Third party attitudes measure two aspects of leader statements on civil conflicts: (1) the level of involvedness of statements towards the civil conflict and conflicting parties; (2) the level of negativity and positivity of statements towards the conflicting parties (the orientation). Following the definition of third party attitudes, this study presents the operationalization procedures of third party attitudes filling another gap in the literature. The selection of sources, filtering the relevant statements as coding units, generating a thorough coding scheme are the

key procedures that this dissertation establishes. The coding scheme enables future development of dataset for the full population of civil conflicts and third parties.

The generated data for this investigation, on the other hand, introduces a new dataset which explores the German, British and American attitudes on the armed struggle of Turkey with PKK, along with the American attitudes on Europe based conflicts for the post-Cold War period. These two datasets which measure the level of involvement of third parties on civil conflicts, along with negative and positive sentiments of third parties towards the conflicting parties illustrates daily changes of third party attitudes on seven different civil conflicts.

Another important aspect of this inquiry is to explore the key factors which shape third party attitudes towards the civil conflicts. While the literature on third party intervention investigates the variables that explain the intervention decisions to understand the main motivations of external states, this thesis will also examine the possible motivations of external states on issuing involving and biased statements regarding the civil conflicts by incorporating the arguments developed in third party intervention literature. The analyses conclude that the security related issues are primarily affective factors that lead the external states to issue involving and biased statements towards the civil conflict actors.

## 1.1 Overview

Chapter 2 of this dissertation introduces the theoretical framework and literature review. This chapter, firstly, focuses on the studies on the international aspects of civil conflicts and presents propositions derived from third party intervention literature.

Third party intervention literature generally is interested in exploring the motivations and means of external states for civil conflicts. The motivations of third party intervention are mostly explained from the security perspective. In terms of the methods of intervention, the studies only focus on explaining the military, economic or diplomatic interventions and do not consider how verbal clues are formed. While the second part of this chapter explains how examining the verbal clues are important in international relations. Communication tools have been studied as an effective tool for international relations and the thesis assumes that the countries utilize statements as strategic tools which aim to impact the international relations in a certain manner. Therefore, this section concludes by highlighting the importance



of the need to improve the measurement of third-party intervention by proposing a dynamic variable.

Introducing leader statements as the source for the variable of interest is a crucial step to further the investigation on the effectiveness of the international actors, since the statements can be produced and changed rapidly over time. The chapter covers the theoretical framework to distinguish the importance of communicative matters in international interactions from the actions. Following this integration of theory and practice, namely theoretical discussions on the communication in international relations, hypotheses on third party attitudes are introduced.

Chapter 3 is about the data collection and generation process. The chapter starts with explaining the developments in content analysis which are being used as a quantitative tool. After a brief introduction, this section thoroughly explains the steps of the data collection process; including the definition of the variable of interest, the selection mechanisms of reliable sources, and the introduction of coding scheme. The chapter will conclude with the visualization of the content of collected data using the text-as-data approach. The content analysis of the collected statements on civil conflicts also reflects the validity of coding, along with introducing how third parties frame the conflicts.

Chapter 4 intends to seek whether the factors proposed in the third party intervention literature are suited to explain third party attitudes. To do so, this chapter will investigate the German, American and British attitudes towards Turkey's armed struggle with the PKK. The prominence of this chapter stems from the case studies. While the first part of Chapter 3 uses comparative case studies and process tracing to understand the importance of regional security issues and the power of diasporas, the qualitative analyses will be supported by using some statistical analysis. This chapter, thus, will propose a mixed method approach to validate the hypotheses derived from studies that have discussed the effects of behavior over attitudes.

Chapter 5 will test proposed hypotheses with a broader dataset which includes American attitudes on the Europe based conflicts between 1990-2019. This chapter will utilize a two-stage analysis and conclude whether the highlighted hypotheses hold with a broader data. The chapter is novel in introducing a time-series cross-sectional analysis and exploring the monthly changes in third party attitudes, along with exploring the American attitudes on European conflicts.

The conclusion chapter will provide a final overview the research question and hypotheses. This chapter summarizes the main findings of the dissertation and elaborates on possible ways to improve the data generation process and introduces some

suggestions for further refinements. The chapter also discusses and concludes on the possible research arenas which can use third party attitudes as an independent variable and explore different events.

## 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

How do external states decide to involve in other states' domestic issues? The question of whether third parties have an effect, if any, over the domestic affairs of the host country is an area of inquiry which has attracted the attention of both political scientists and international relations scholars alike. These different approaches highlight various aspects of the dynamic and explain the process through distinct causal chains and theoretical outputs. A particular attention has been on studies, which have derived from investigation over the impact of different external state actions, such as military intervention, economic sanctions, foreign aid on civil wars. These studies explore how and to what extent civil conflicts change their trajectories as a result. Therefore, it is important to introduce the importance of theoretic investigations of civil war, as instances the phenomenon has drastic humanitarian, economic, political, social and security effects over the host country, as well as the region, and international system as a whole.

In their groundbreaking study on civil wars, Small and Singer (1982) posit the three defining characteristics of the phenomena. According to the authors, "any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides". Furthering this definition Doyle and Sambanis (2000) put forth more narrow specifications by suggesting that civil wars "(a) causes more than one thousand deaths; (b) challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; (c) occurs within the recognized boundaries of that state; (d) involves the state or state-claimants as a principal combatant; and (e) involves rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the state". Although main bulk of studies regard civil wars as domestic events in which dissatisfied groups tend to rebel and use violence for achieving their demands from the government has been mostly emphasized as an intrastate issue, a group of scholars tend to explain the international aspects of civil conflicts (Cederman et al 2010, Florea 2012, Gleditsch 2007, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2006, Rasler 1983, Salehyan et al. 2008, Wimmer and Min 2006, Woodwell 2004).

As Florea (2012: p.89) indicates that states are not "isolated polities" and "embed-

ded in both regional and international structure”, for explaining civil conflicts the systematic and interstate relations have been the two important pillars for studying the international aspect of civil conflicts. Particularly, the rationalist theories have emphasized how state-to-state relations is a key factor for evaluating the civil conflict process. For example, external state support and sponsorship is a critical instrument for backing insurgent groups in the Cold War period (Byman et al, 1999); the dynamics of intervention decisions during this instance has changed as the international system shifted to a unipolar world with increased number of intrastate conflicts. On this issue, Gurr (1994) draws attention on the increasing number of ethnopolitical conflict, also emphasizing the importance of international strategies for preventing and solving such tensions. On this point, Gurr (1994) elaborates on the importance of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) over these new forms of conflicts suggesting how the UN should intervene to eliminate potentially serious consequences for international security. As the civil conflicts remained important cases for international and regional security, the international agenda on civil conflicts from an involvement perspective have been discussed in a more thorough manner in the post-Cold War period.

A seminal figure in the study of third parties in civil conflicts, Regan (1996, 2000) has defined and explored the causes and consequences empirically. Regan (2000) defines third party intervention for civil conflicts as the “international influence attempts” (p. 337) to change the course of actions within the civil strife between the state and a nonstate group, additionally stating that these attempts to influence the civil conflict can vary in different aspects. The motivations are the primary components which can influence how third parties can use different means to involve the conflict. This brings forth the following question: what are the main motivations of third parties to intervene in civil conflicts?

By the definitions put forth by both Small and Singer (1982), and Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and the studies which explore the importance of third parties, it is clear that civil conflicts have an international aspect which provides a basis to analyze the phenomena on the theoretical grounds of international relations. Therefore, this chapter presents a broad picture of the international aspects of the civil war process from the perspective of neorealism and neoliberalism along with their relative strengths and shortcomings from a paradigmatic outlook.

In a nutshell, this chapter will provide a review of international relations literature which will highlight the evolution of the investigations of civil conflicts from the international perspective. One major theory of international relations in interest, neorealism, puts emphasis on the unitary nature of the state and the anarchic na-

ture of the international system as the two main pillars of international politics. Concomitantly, systemic variables such as anarchy and the distribution of power would inevitably shape the likelihood of civil war. A second pillar of IR theory is neoliberalism which emphasizes on internal structures and their effects over state behavior both domestically and internationally. Also, the neoliberal paradigm emphasizes nonstate actors as influential parts of the conflict which turns process. This outlook studies legitimacy, nonstate networks, ideologies and motives to explain the complicated domestic situation solidified by the onset and duration of civil war, also known as the ethnic security dilemma (Brown 1993). After the groundwork has been presented, the chapter will continue by introducing the concept of the third party attitudes in general and how shifting from behavior to attitudes and exploring this concept is important will be discussed.

## **2.1 A Brief Overview of Third Parties in Civil Conflicts**

This section introduces and discusses on how the literature covers the role of external states in civil conflicts. This section aims to introduce and discuss on the arguments about the motivations and means of third parties utilize, which constitutes the bulk of the third party intervention literature. This section will conclude with propositions which will establish the grounds for the hypotheses of this thesis.

### **2.1.1 Motivations for Intervention**

When questioned on the American role in the most violent intra state conflicts of the 1990s- Rwanda in 1994-95 and Bosnia in 1992-95, the former American President Bill Clinton, in his interview with the New York Times on November 30, 2000, explained why the decision to intervene the conflict in Bosnia was slow as follows:

The problem in Bosnia was trying to develop enough of a consensus with our European allies to get something done. And lamentably, we were making progress and then—but the massacre of Srebrenica basically galvanized our NATO Allies, and they were willing to support a more aggressive approach that we and the British had favored all along. . . . But I think the important thing for me in Bosnia was that the United States should not be acting unilaterally there. We should be going with our

allies, and we should be doing everything we can to move. I wish it hadn't taken 2 years to put together a consensus, but it's worked out pretty well now, given how messed up it was when we started. <sup>1</sup>

As seen with this quote, the American role in such conflicts played a critical role in their resolution. The international intervention to the Bosnian conflict -the most violent conflict in the 20th century Europe- was a very late one which resulted with very high number of casualties recognized as a genocide. The Bosnian conflict is an important example for how the international actors acted late which most probably led to the high number of casualties. The above statements by Bill Clinton illustrate what external players could consider while involving in other states' domestic affairs and conflicts. The main motivation of the US was not to diminish the humanitarian crises but to fulfill the expectations and needs of their European allies. Since the US did not have any direct benefits (maybe expect international reputation) to intervene for this brutal crisis mainly the response of their allies. This statement by Clinton illustrates how the decision for third party intervention depends on the perceived material interests as the third party.

The 1994 Rwandan civil conflict is as dreadful and violent conflict as the Bosnian case resulted with another genocide. Rwanda is a country without any economic or military ties to the US and not a neighbor to any other politically relevant countries to the US. Bill Clinton elaborated on his line of thought on not intervening Rwanda is as follows:

In Rwanda, I think the real problem was that we didn't have a ready mechanism with which to deal with it, which is why after Rwanda, we started working on this Africa crisis response initiative and why we were working on training all these Africans to do—Sierra Leone—we were going to work with them and help them, and I also frankly think that it happened so fast. <sup>2</sup>

These statements by Bill Clinton exemplifies why the United States failed to intervene -or choose not to- these very deadly conflicts from two different aspects. The strategically important allies and their response for the Bosnian conflict, along with the lack of knowledge of the very dreadful humanitarian crisis in Rwanda were the barriers for the United States to intervene. These explanations of Bill Clinton, thus, demonstrate good examples on the possible motivations of the states for involving

---

<sup>1</sup><https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-the-new-york-times>, 11/23/2020

<sup>2</sup><https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-the-new-york-times>, 11/23/2020

intrastate conflicts.

On the international arena it is widely accepted that a key concern of states is to maximize their power while ensuring their relative gains from a wide variety of interactions. Third party literature approaches the subject from this point of view as well with the major area of inquiry revolving around the motivations of states and what they aim to achieve as a result of intervening in an intrastate conflict. As this perspective emphasizes the importance of relative gains, states formulate their foreign policies based on the potential increase of their relative power positions compared to other states (Waltz, 1959). Depending on what third parties want to achieve and change as a result of their interventions, they will choose either to intervene biased or neutral. From this causal logic, the first proposition of this study is as follows:

*Proposition 1: National interests shaping the strategic concerns of third parties determine the decision to intervene in the host countries' domestic tensions, ie: civil conflicts.*

This general proposition is a critical point of view and can be narrowed down since the components which shapes the national interests of third parties can be in various forms. Particularly, scholars put substantial emphasis on explaining how the relations between the conflicting state and others impact the decision to intervene (Akçınaroglu and Radzinevski 2005, Berkowitz 2017, Sambanis et al. 2007). The formal alliances between states can be an important determinant for third parties to engage in other countries domestic issues. While allies support each other in intrastate conflicts (Findlay and Teo 2006), the rival states are likely to support the nonstate actors (Salehyan et al. 2011, Şan-Akca 2009). The regional security concerns raised by the intrastate conflict, therefore, can also be another motivation where third parties might decide on intervention.

*Proposition 2: Regional security concerns, which are shaped by the existing rivalry and alliances of third parties, determine the decision to intervene in the host countries domestic tensions.*

The existing alliances or rivalries of third parties are the raised as key issues due to their national interests and strategic concerns of third parties. The interstate relations, however, are translated as different actions. For instance, interstate relations

can lead external states to utilize different strategies and involve the conflict over supporting the nonstate actor. The motivations of third parties behind supporting nonstate actors or insurgent groups is mainly to increase their relative power and benefits by increasing the probability of nonstate actor to challenge the conflicting state. For instance, according to Byman (2011) Greece supported Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) between 1981 and 1999 to destabilize and weaken Turkey, with whom Greece had a conflict of interest in the Aegean Sea . Another example is when Iran supported the Palestinian Islamist groups to project power over Israel by exporting and supporting Iran's Islamist ideology . These examples illustrate how states, who aim to achieve and increase their power through involving intrastate conflicts with different motivations, base their individual gains and goals through international interactions.

The principle-agent relation, hence, reflects how external states engage themselves with intrastate conflicts. Maoz and Şan-Akca (2012) explore the relationship between the external states with the nonstate armed groups and show empirical evidence for the rivals establishing the principle-agent relation with the nonstate armed groups. The principle-agent models, which are used to demonstrate transnationalization of civil conflicts, accept that the interstate relations lead third party to use rebel group as leverage to change and even control the course of events in the civil conflicts which aim to punish the warring state (Byman et al. 2001, Byman 2005, Crenshaw 1990, Findlay and Teo 2006, Gleditsch 2007, Saideman 2002, Salehyan 2007, Salehyan 2008, Şan-Akca 2009).

The studies presented above propose that the existing rivalries are the main factor which creates the regional security concerns and thus impact the national interests. This causal mechanism, which focuses on the existence of a rivalry, has been affecting third parties to intervene favoring the nonstate actor. Therefore, the following proposition contributes by narrowing the general argument Proposition 1.

*Proposition 3: Existing rivalries lead external states to decide on intervention in the favor of the nonstate actor.*

Military intervention, which constitutes military joint actions, military aids, and provisions of military advisors, is one of the most studied form of intervention and strategy used by external states over civil conflicts (Aydın 2010, Fordham 2008, Lemke and Regan 2004, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2011, Regan 1996, 2000, 2002, Regan and Aydın 2006, Şan-Akca 2009). Civil conflicts as the phenomenon which challenges the security provisions of the government and other countries, the secu-



rity and power balances become the very first issue to be explored by the scholars (Corbetta 2017). Military intervention is the costliest action that the third party can take, and therefore scholars emphasize the importance of military interventions.

The studies exploring military intervention focus on two main sets of variables to explain this decision: (1) the willingness and, (2) capability of the third party. Singer (1963) identifies the conditions which change the strategies that external states adopt to influence and change the course of events in other state. This framework has been articulated for third party intervention by Lemke and Regan (2004) by introducing the conditions which shape the likelihood of willingness of intervening in an intrastate conflict. The focus is on how external actors perceive civil conflict and the power and capability of its parties that eventually shape the likelihood of states to consider intervening.

These prominent studies that explore the main determinants for deciding on military intervention as a strategy show that the third party motivations are not necessarily the most important component for the intervention decision. Motivations act as a prior evaluation of cases to even consider the pros and cons to intervene the conflict. They show that the willingness and capability which sums up to the probability to be successful are the key explanatory aspects. Since military intervention, providing military equipment and other ways are the costly foreign policies, these states are more interested in to fulfill the conditions in which their likelihood to achieve their goal increase. Thus, when third parties believe that the gains are certain, they are more likely to choose military intervention as a strategy

*Proposition 4: The perceived power of third parties on conflicting parties impact their decision to intervene civil conflict.*

Besides the state and security-centric explanations, other scholars introduced the economic interests as the motivations of third parties to intervene in civil conflict (Aydin 2008, Bove et al. 2016, Stojek and Chacha 2015). The economy as a source of motivation have two different mechanisms on third party intervention: (1) avoiding costs and (2) gaining possible benefits. Trade, as one of the economic means, has been perceived as a “mutually beneficial interaction” for both parties, which increases their wellbeing (Oneal and Russett 1997). This economic interaction between states is vital for shaping their behavior when they disagree. Much of the research explored and showed that trade impacts the probability of interstate dispute onset, and thus, economic interdependency treated as one of the pacifist interactions among countries (Barbieri 1996). Scholars also acknowledge the pacifist nature

of trade for its power on states to support their trading partners and intervene in a militarized interstate dispute. The third-party as the trading partner of the conflicting state will want to continue the transactions with the conflicting state. However, the ongoing civil conflict can peril the ongoing economic relations and have diverse effects on other states as well. The destruction caused by the violent conflict will also alarm the investors due to the possible damage and political instability in the host country. These adverse effects of domestic violence on economy matters for both sides in terms of trade which permit third parties to consider intervening the conflict to terminate these problems. To avoid the economic challenges which arise from intrastate war, external states are more likely to support the state to help end the civil conflict. Stojek and Chacha (2015), and Aydin (2008, 2012) illustrate that the trading partners involve the ongoing conflicts of their trading partners and thus emphasize the importance of trade relations.

*Proposition 5: Economic interdependence is a primal factor in determining the involvement of the third party in another's domestic affairs, especially if the level of economic ties is strong.*

This proposition can also be another way to narrow down Proposition 1. Since economic power is considered as a trait to promote the national interest of a country, trade levels between countries can shape the motivations of third parties to involve an intrastate conflict.

Salehyan and his colleagues (2011) introduced the demand side of external support and explored why some rebel groups are funded and not others. According to the study the shared ethnic kin groups between third party and nonstate group is one of the triggering components shaping their relationship. The ethnic constituency in third party helps both the state and the nonstate actor to be able to satisfy their needs by meeting on a common ground with the help of the shared ethnic groups.

*Proposition 6: The demand of nonstate actor -which can be due to the ethnic, language, cultural or ideological ties with the third party- impacts the decision of third party to intervene civil conflict.*

Concomitant to the shared ethnic kin studies, diaspora has been explored as another form of ethnic constituencies and how this institution impacts the intrastate conflict. Shain (1994/1995) defines diaspora as follows:

I have defined a political diaspora as a people with common national origin who reside outside a claimed or an independent home territory. They regard themselves or are regarded by others as members or potential members of their country of origin (claimed or already existing), a status held regardless of their geographical location and citizen status outside their home country. Members of a political diaspora are called upon periodically by ethnonational elements inside or outside the home country's territory to subscribe to a particular cause or group as an expression of their ethnonational loyalty. (p. 814)

The diaspora is a group of people who are institutionalized and reflects their identity in the hosting country. Like sharing ethnic communities, diasporas are more likely to act as an actor by itself. The study by Petrova (2019) is a very fitting illustration on how diasporas can be influential on the civil conflict which take place in their home countries. She examines how diasporas as external nonstate actors impact the civil conflict comparing with the state as an intervener. The study results the intervention by a diaspora is more effective than the external state intervention to terminate the conflicts. Showing that diasporas can be as influential as (even more) the external actor for civil conflict process, leads scholars to pay more attention to explore the impact of diasporas on the motivations of third-party intervention.

The contribution of Petrova (2019), which shows the impact of individual contribution of the diasporas, should be related to diaspora's impact on the foreign policy making of third parties. Cederman et al. (2009) and Godwin (2018) explain how the existing diasporas impact the foreign policy of the third party towards an intrastate conflict. The forms of transnational constituencies impact the foreign policies of host country with their functional ability to pressure the government of the third party. Godwin (2018) shows that the Tamil diaspora could affect how UK and Canada approached the civil conflict in Sri Lanka. Therefore, evaluating the relationship between the host country and diaspora will demonstrate important mechanisms in the decision-making process of third party intervention.

*Proposition 7: Existing diaspora in the third party impacts the decision to become involved in intrastate conflict.*

The previous studies on the effectiveness of diaspora thus enable scholars to focus on the demand side of the intervention with a particular attention on the importance of diasporas. Proposition 7, therefore, narrows down Proposition 6 and introduces an

actor specific factor that might change the intervention decisions of external state.

This section proposes key arguments that have been molded from the third party intervention studies. Despite the studies which focus on explaining the how national interests shape the intervention decisions, the demand side of interventions also constitute critical aspects to explore the insights of third party intervention. The next section focuses on explaining the contributing factors for the decisions on using different means to intervene intrastate conflicts.


### **2.1.2 Means of Intervention**

Besides the decisions of third parties to consider intervening or not, third parties also contemplate about the tools and strategies and their effectiveness in achieving their goals in intrastate conflicts. The selection of strategies is another critical verdict both for the external state and the intrastate conflict. The decision on the appropriate strategy and means to utilize for involving a civil conflict depends on the capability of third parties and the level of credible information that the conflicting parties signal, which eventually measures the costs and benefits of external states.

As the previous section explained thoroughly, studies on third party intervention focus on exploring the motivations to engage in the civil conflict. The arguments mostly compare the intervention events with cases where there is no intervention. In other words, the counterfactual of the dependent variables are the cases where there are no intervention attempts by the third party. The shortcomings of existing works revolve around how these studies treat the non-military intervention or no mediation attempt as if there is no intervention at all. The studies measure military intervention in a dichotomous form which lead to model and explore the determinants to use the costliest action. The mediation studies like the military intervention studies focuses on the existence of the mediation or not. However, the proposed decision-making process does not reflect the true nature of the decision making process of the state. States are more likely to choose the best strategy and tactic out of a set of options. While external states do not decide to provide military equipment to the nonstate actor, the state can choose to sanction the state economically. Thus, the biased intervention, particularly, needs to be treated as if the states have different opportunities as appropriate and effective strategies.

Therefore, it is important and necessary to combine these two groups of works, on exploring how third parties intervene civil conflicts. A group of scholars, approach

Figure 2.1 The Strategies of Intervention Based on the Level of Costs



third party intervention as a foreign policy decision which has been arrived strategically out of many different options (Corbetta 2017, Melin 2010, 2011, Owsiak 2014) different than the third party intervention and mediation studies. Melin (2011) criticizes the mediation literature for approaching the mediation decision as an “exceptionally isolated process” from the other possible scenarios. This assumption has also led scholars to treat mediation as a strategy of conflict management, whereas the joining behavior treated as a conflict expanding strategies. This type of a holistic approach for civil war intervention provides a better understanding on the supply side of intervention decision.

The studies which approach the means of intervention as a “menu of choice”, introduces important findings on the determinants of choosing an intervention strategy over the other. Melin (2011) concludes that the close ties between the third party with conflicting state promotes the third party to utilize economic and diplomatic intervention strategies. Another study by Melin (2015) also aims to understand the impact of past decisions of third parties in intervention and shifting conflict dynamics, along with the ties between the states, are important in utilizing escalatory conflict management techniques. This study furthers the discussion on the previous experiences of third party’s addition to the conflict intensity which can influence how they will formulate their strategies of intervention. Corbetta (2017), on the other hand, discusses when third parties choose to utilize double intervention technique and concludes that the regime similarities and alliance ties are prominent factors that impact third party to intervene using every possible aspect. Overall, these studies conclude that the impact of alliance relations have been common argued to be critical points that third parties pay attention for selecting the appropriate measure as an intervention.

*Proposition 8: The alliance relations impact the selection of different means of intervention.*

These studies refer to a prominent deficiency of early third party intervention studies and intend to improve the studies by changing the measurement of intervention.

The measurement of intervention as a dichotomous variable limits scholars in understanding the terms for selecting one of the strategies over the other. Even these improvement (Corbetta 2017, Melin 2010, 2011, Owsiak 2014) in conflict management studies by treating intervention strategies as an ordinal variable eliminated this measurement problem, this new approach to intervention still misses the dynamic nature of interactions between the conflicting actors and third party.

Third party attitudes approach, henceforth, will provide a more through and dynamic perception on how external states react towards intrastate conflicts. Measuring the daily interactions or non-interactions provide how short-term dynamics shape the conflict process in general. The events, which are the main observable cases in third party intervention literature, are measures of a long-term process. For instance, Germany is a country which did not intervene in the Turkish conflict with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). However, the German Chancellor talks about this intrastate conflict and its parties, Turkey and PKK. While the Angela Merkel condemns the attacks by PKK, the Chancellor also issue negative and involving statements towards the PKK and stresses that Germany is ready to fight with terrorism side-by-side with Turkey. These statements by Germany, thus, can be treated as the position of Germany which can signal the probability of Germany to intervene the conflict or not. Based on the statements of Germany, the conflicting actors the Turkish government and the PKK can calculate their expectations and strategies accordingly. The third party attitudes, thus, can and should be considered as a critical aspect which can influence the course of events in a civil conflict as third party behavior.


## **2.2 Attitudes versus Behavior: Distinguishing the Effect of Third Party**

### **Attitudes from Behavior in Civil Conflicts**

Intrastate wars are conflicts between the government and the opposition forces which are dissatisfied and react violently to achieve their aims. Although such conflicts have been regarded and studied as a domestic phenomenon, it is overlooked that international actors can also be an influential party. Third parties in this manner are important actors for civil conflict process and a group of scholars explain how and why external states are becoming a part of these domestic phenomenon (Aydin 2008, 2010, Bove et al. 2016, Fordham 2008, Lemke and Regan 2004, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2011, Regan 1996, 2000, 2002, Regan and Aydin 2006, Stojeck and Chacha 2015, Şan-Akca 2009). The literature mostly evolves around third party

intervention; why and how external states decide on taking violent or non-violent actions towards either of the parties of the conflict. As Figure 2.2 suggests, the literature on third party intervention focuses both on explaining the motivations to intervene (Aydın 2008, 2010, , Bove et al. 2016, Fordham 2008, Lemke and Regan 2004, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2011, Regan 1996, 2000, 2002, Regan and Aydın 2006, Stojek and Chacha 2015, Şan-Akca 2009) as well as the factors on choosing different action types (Corbetta 2017, Melin 2010, 2011, Owsiak 2014).

Figure 2.2 The Process of Third Party Involvement



Third party intervention is “a convention-breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces" (Regan, 2000, p.10). Considering foreign countries as a counterpart in civil conflicts is an important mechanism for shaping and changing the power distribution among the conflicting parties. Therefore, exploring the role of external states in civil conflicts along with explaining the structural and relational attributes among the conflicting parties is one of the key elements to understand the civil war from a broader perspective. Empirical validations for the widely accepted definition, proposed by Regan (2000), has been through the actions taken by third parties. Mostly by focusing on the motivation and impact of military interventions, the studies elaborate on the actions. Due to the raised concerns in the previous section this thesis suggests another mechanism to explore the third party involvement in civil conflicts.

Third party attitude towards a civil conflict is the reflection of the third party on how the external state positions itself towards the conflicting parties. Third party attitude is a concept which has not been studied, despite some studies which formulate the diplomatic channels of intervention as cheap signals to impact the civil war process (Thyne 2009). However, exploring the timely reflections of external states has not attracted adequate attention. To understand the importance of attitudes,

firstly, one needs to understand the theoretical debates on the importance of statements in international relations. Thus, the next section will explain how statements as communication tools have been approached by different theoretical frameworks. This section will also draw the lines of the theoretical framework of this study by clarifying the assumptions.

### **2.3 Communication Matters: Theoretical Approaches on the Importance of Statements in International Relations**

Theoretical studies introduce how communication among states can be a vital tool for international interactions. Different international relations theories created different concepts of statements/attitudes such as cheap signals, public diplomacy, strategic narrative, statements of resolve, or speech act. These different concepts have diverging assumptions and thus different perceptions on how statements are important in international relations. In this section, I will summarize how statements as communication means has been approached by different theoretical lenses. By introducing the studies which examine the importance of statements in international interactions, this section intends to highlight the assumptions which will ground this study.

International relations theories are based on two main logic of action. March and Olsen (1998) in their study, which explores how international order has been created, explain the logic of consequences and appropriateness. First of all, there is an assumption that the international actors' behavior can be shaped by the logic of consequences meaning that "(t)hose who see actions as driven by expectations of consequences imagine that human actors choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise" (March and Olsen, 1998, p. 949). Therefore, the actions are the outcomes of calculated costs and benefits which international actors' foreign policies can be also interpreted in such a manner. This assumption creates the bases for the realist and liberal theories of international relations. The realist and liberal camps introduce the importance and impact of communication for interstate relations with different factors.

Thomas Schelling -who is one of the key scholars in the realist camp- in his prominent study "The Strategy of Conflict" (1960) defines conflict from the bargaining perspective. Similarly, Morrow (1989) defines "(b)argaining is a form of communication, and in crises, the parties communicate tacitly through the exchange of threats,



bluffs, and concessions” (p. 941). The bargaining models of war, thus, accepts the escalation of a war as a communicative process between the opposing states for settling the conflict in a Pareto optimal way. According to Schelling (1960) bargaining between the conflicting parties can be either tacit or explicit and concludes that, “it is possible to find limits to war without overt negotiation” (p. ). Imperfect information between the conflicting parties can be interpreted differently which lead them to predict different outcomes. This difference in the level of information, thus, is more prone to have possible different outcomes and hence decreases the probability of war escalation. This early work by Schelling (1960) thus introduces how existing communication can change the outcomes in which the author introduces the statements as random components.

Realist scholars, following Schelling’s (1960) steps, put emphasis on discovering and explaining the importance and the impact of communication for interstate relations. Jervis (1976), in his seminal book named “Perception and Misperception in International Politics”, focuses on the causes of misperception in interstate relations with a focus on the signals that shape the perception. By doing so, Jervis introduces the negative aspects of statements, and attitudes as the main source of misperception since the signals can be cheap, henceforth the effectiveness of these signals depend on the credibility of the sender.

Both Schelling (1960) and Jervis (1976) introduce important concepts for international interactions and put emphasis on how cheap signals can be used as effective tools in interstate relations. These works have created a lacuna for scholars such as Fearon (1994, 1995), Schultz (2001) and Sartori (1998) to explore how communication and cheap signals work. These studies by Schelling (1960) and Jervis (1976), as a result, underline two characteristics of communication and its possible impact on others’ actions: (1) level of information and (2) credibility of the information.

Building on these earlier works of bargaining and war, Fearon (1995) explains the rational causes of war with a particular attention on the conditions which have the probability to settle an interstate conflict peacefully in the existence of successful communication. Fearon (1995) claims that interstate communication is a strategic decision which can be used to “misrepresent the positions”, “miscalculation of resolve” or clarify unsuccessfully the disagreements about the relative power. Accordingly, states can use the information and these arguments to show that misrepresenting or providing full information to the opponent is the decision made by the state. Fearon (1995) also highlights and discusses the importance of the commitment problems which has been presented as another constraint for providing perfect information and hence increase the probability for an escalation. The sec-

and possible explanation unlocked an important venue for the liberal theories to argue that democracies reduce possible commitment problems which can be defined as the ability to convey the necessary information to the opponent.

The credibility of actors for reliable information has been one of the main strands in explaining the escalation of interstate wars. While some scholars theoretically clarify the importance of credibility mechanisms in the bargaining models of war (Fearon, 1994, 1995), other scholars aimed to find empirical evidence for the factors which can impact states' credibility. The studies which articulates the empirical evidence on the determinants for credibility have diverse measures for credibility which can be grouped as military capabilities (Morrow 1985, Morrow 1989, Morgan 1990), domestic institutions (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004, Gaubatz 1996, Kelley 2007, Leeds 1999, Tomz 2007) or the statement characteristics (McManus 2017).

In relatively early works of crisis bargaining, military capabilities are introduced as a proxy for measuring the resolve of states (Morrow 1985, Morrow 1989, Morgan 1990). Since the credibility of commitments, thus resolve of an actor, is a private information these early works build the extent to which the states signal their capabilities and thus their resolve by tangible means. Kertzner (2013), however, criticized these studies for equating capabilities and resolve which represent different concepts in international interactions. This measurement which represents the credibility of international actors, thus, has been replaced by introducing the regime type as another commitment mechanism.

Liberal scholars, accordingly, evolved into explaining the possible impact of the domestic institutions in foreign policy making decisions with more through studies (Fearon 1994, Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004, Gaubatz 1996, Kelley 2007, Leeds 1999, Schultz 2001, Tomz 2007). In the seminal article by Fearon (1994), who seeks to find how the existence of an audience with a power to punish the foreign policy makers can be an important signal for credible threats in the international arena. Fearon (1994) introduced a game theoretical model with a punishment mechanism by the electorate for backing down from the threat and as a result of this model Fearon (1994) concludes that the states with domestic institutions with the punishment mechanism is more likely to have credible threats. This seminal article is an important study which introduces that apart from the structural dynamics -such as anarchy as being the prominent indicator for the absence of credible commitments- domestic institutions matter and it is an important source for conveying the information in a believable way. Schultz (2001) also supports Fearon (1994) and opposes Wright (1965) who argued that democracies are not credible actors. Schultz (2001) argues that democracies are the primary actors in committing credible threats and

discusses the conditions for threats to transform into conflicts.

The audience cost argument thus has been an important concept for explaining the importance of statements/diplomacy. Studies focus on events other than civil conflicts have utilized the “audience cost” framework. Explaining military crises (Schultz 2001, Smith 1998), the formation and duration of alliances (Gaubatz 1996; and Smith 1996), ending the economic sanctions (Dorussen and Mo 2001 and Martin 1993), the formation of trade agreements and other economic matters ( Broz 2002, Jensen 2003, Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002), interstate bargaining (Leeds 1999, Leventoglu and Tarar 2005, Lipson 2003, McGillivray and Smith 2000). These large number of studies, which analyze how “audience cost” can be effective in international commitments in general, demonstrate how credibility is a key component of these actions, emphasizing communicative tools, in the international arena.

Among these studies, Baum (2004) takes an appealing approach and explores under which circumstances leaders go to public about an international issue. The author thus does not assume that all international interactions are publicly known, and the leader has the power to take the issue to the public attention. This study shows that when the national interests are in stake, leader is more likely to go public and accepts the political costs caused by the audience. The selectivity of leaders for going public, while the state faces an international crisis making the national interests to be at stake, is to assure the international audience and actors to get the true intention. While Baum (2004) emphasizes on the importance of long term attention of the audience for the risk reelection, he also suggests that going public may convey different signals for the international opponent. This dilemma between the international and domestic audience however created another line of research which is carried by Anne Sartori.

Sartori (2013) explains the credibility of commitments/statements over international reputation as opposed to domestic mechanisms introduced by the audience cost theorists. According to Sartori (2013) diplomacy as a kind of interstate communication is a way to influence the actions of other actors which has different aspects than the public diplomacy. Sartori (2013) explains that “(d)iplomacy is particularly necessary when states’ interests are not perfectly aligned, when leaders have something to “work out and often something to hide” (p. 5). The credibility, however, has been the major component for diplomacy to find peaceful resolutions. According to Sartori communication between countries can be “believable” which can be also accounted as the power of persuasion of diplomacy. Sartori (2013) emphasizes on the importance of credibility, however, the quality of the information also constitutes a significant aspect in credible statement. As Gibbons (1992) states “(t)he

only way the message can matter is through its informative content: by changing the Receiver's belief about Sender's type, a message can change a Receiver's action and thus indirectly change both player's payoffs" (Robert Gibbons, 1992 and also check Farrell and Gibbons (1989) article which is on cheap signals), where Sartori (2013) claims that "speakers choose their words carefully when it matters because even cheap talk can have repercussions." (p. 11).

Statements, from the rationalist point of view, thus, has been emphasized as a tool strategically utilized to change the information and bargaining structure with a possible tying hand and sinking costs. The empirical studies that shows statements as strategic decisions also supports Nye's (2008) soft power argument which is a theoretical piece emphasizing on different aspects of power in world politics. Nye (1998) suggests that the public as being the utmost important actor for making the signals by the government valuable is also the key for an effective public diplomacy. Nye argues that "governments compete with each other and with other organizations enhance their own credibility and weaken that of their opponents". Apart from the material capabilities, soft power, can be as effective as the material capabilities in enforcing actors to act in a certain way which motivates us to conclude that the credible talk can be considered as an act of power. The value of information and the using this power by foreign policy making reflects how countries can shape the agenda by statements.

These studies, which examine the effectiveness of statements through different mechanisms that leads statements to be credible or believable, have underrated the direct impact of the statements. For the proxy measures of credible commitments such as military capabilities, regime types and national interest to work as the theory predicts, however, depends on many assumptions. Therefore, instead of introducing proxies for measuring the believability of states in international commitments, exploring the statements directly will eliminate the assumptions and enable scholars to understand how the statements themselves are significant in international interactions. Examining the statements itself is a relatively new approach. In this category McManus's (2009, 2017) study fills an important lacuna for discerning the direct influence on interstate relations. In her study McManus (2017) empirically tested how different statement categories with different levels of resolve conveyed through leader statements change the perception of the receiver for resolve. The study concludes that the more involved and resolved the state is, the likelihood for signaling the intention for resolve or threat can be conveyed and restrain the escalation of conflict.

Studies which assume that the source of action is based on the possible conse-

quences and the rational calculations of actors considers statements as important sources for revealing information. The strategic statements of actors, thus, shape the expectations and perceptions of states which eventually influences the outcomes in international relations. The rational choice perspective highlights the strategic use of statements which is supported by the credibility of signals sent by leader statements.

March and Olsen's (1998) second source of action are based on the appropriateness. This logic includes the importance of identity, rules, and ethical concerns. According to March and Olsen, foreign policy can be explained "as the application of rules associated with particular identities to particular situations" (p. 951). The constructivist and critical theories can be related to this line of thought in which the actions of states are the result of their identity which has been also shaped by the international structure (Wendt 1992). These theoretical lenses treated communication tools different than the rational theorists and mainly understand and study language in two different aspects: (1) language as a tool to construct norms, which can be also referred as strategic narrative, and (2) language as a tool which reflects the norms already constructed.

Social constructivism is a theoretical framework which argues that "collective norms and understandings constitute the social identities of actors and also define the basic "rules of the game" in which actors find themselves in their interactions" (Risse p.5). Thus, constructivism challenges the realist and liberal frames for assuming that anarchy is the only factor to shape international relations. According to social constructivist scholars (Wendt 1992) international norms and understandings are important factors to enhance how states will react in the international environment. In such a framework, as stated previously, communication is the tool to reflect the identity of international actors.


Müller (2004) in his study which emphasizes on the importance of communicative action in international negotiations explained the aspects of constructivists. The author emphasizes on the how scholars approach communication from different theoretical aspects and differentiate arguing from bargaining, in which the latter belongs to the rational perspective. Constructivists posits that states use language to argue on international issues which aims to reflect the "right thing" to do in the international arena. As also Risse (2000) states "(r)ule-guided behavior differs from instrumentally rational behavior in that actors try to "do the right thing" rather than maximizing or optimizing their given preferences" (p.4).

Social constructivism and the rational choice theories, however, has been challenged by the critical theorists in theorizing the use of language in world politics. Risse

(2000) as the pioneering scholar who introduces the critical theory constructed under the Habermas's communication theory – which is to reach a “reasoned consensus” (Risse, 2000, p.12) - introduces arguing as a form of speech act in world politics. Arguing, as Müller (2004) defined, “proposes the truth of a factual, or the normative validity of a moral, proposition with a view to convince the target (listener, receiver) of the claim made by the speaker” (p.397). The argumentative rationality is significant in the negotiation process and also as Risse (2000) argues that it is “linked to the constitutive rather than the regulative role of norms and identities by providing actors with a mode of interaction that enables them to mutually challenge and explore the validity claims of those norms and identities” (p.2). This line of thought and the introduction of logic of arguing also enable scholars to define “discursive institutionalism” (Schmidt 2008, 2010) which reflects how language/communication is essential in conveying ideas and changing the international system.

Both bargaining and arguing separately are important means of speech act. However, there are critics on dichotomizing arguing and bargaining. Since arguing and bargaining have distinct purposes, international actors will assess the conditions in which they aim to regulate or construct norms. A plethora of studies present discussions on which of these communication means in international relations debates are preferred over the other (Risse 2000, Holzinger 2004, Müller 2004). Some argues that these two means of communication are two different forms and should be preferred over the other (Risse 2000), whereas the latter works emphasize on how these different forms of communication tools are complementary in international interactions (Holzinger 2004, Müller 2004). Müller (2004) and Holzinger (2004) state that arguing “almost always” takes place with strategic intentions. One other important contribution of both Müller (2004) and Risse (2000) is two formulate possible conditions of using these two different speech acts.

Figure 2.3 Deitelhoff's Classification of Actions in Different Levels of Norm Density and Institutionalism



Accordingly, utilizing different speech acts with different assumptions depends on norm density and the international institutionalization level. This approach is enriching the rationalists' perspectives by relaxing the assumption about the restrictive elements of the international environment. Since the realist camp assumes that the international system is anarchic which leads to problematic cooperation among states and increases the probability of war escalation. On the other hand, constructivists argue that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt 1998) and thus the anarchical nature of the international system does not impact how states act in the international arena unlike what realists and liberals argue since it is a constructed concept. As Müller (2004) identified the conditions proposed by Deitelhoff (mimeo) for different logics of actions, the normative density of an issue and institutionalism of the corresponding issue are the two strands of conditions which impact how states act in the international environment (see Figure 2.3).

When the norms are stable, but the institutionalism is low Deitelhoff (mimeo) suggests that strategic action applies. The contested norms with weak institutions, on the other hand, favor rhetorical action which is the strategic use of arguments. Deitelhoff (mimeo) suggests that the contested norms with strong institutions motivate communicative action for defining the appropriate norm. The stable norms with stable institutions lead to norm-regulated action which is equated for the logic of appropriateness. These four different scenarios help us to understand the state of different issues covered in the international arena. Therefore, before assuming the international system and the situations of the norms and institutions on specific issues, it should be clarified to theorize how international actors will act and use

communicative tools.

The debates of constructivists and critical theorists motivates us to not assume that the international system is in, an anarchical situation and to hypothesize about how states utilize communicative tools. As a result, norm construction and the level of institutionalization are important tools to assess states' actions in intervening in third countries.

### **2.3.1 Theoretical Framework, Assumptions, and Propositions**

Theoretical debates on the effectiveness of statements has been filled an important lacuna in international interactions along with an increasing number of empirical studies complementing and supporting the theoretical debates. As it is mentioned in the previous part, different theoretical lenses set different assumptions about statements which is important to create the framework of this study.

Realist and liberal scholars perceive statements and similarly other communicative tools as information changing signals strategically selected by the state. Statements, thus, are tools for each international actor to impact other state's decision. As Elster (1989) states "(r)ational choice is instrumental: it is guided by the outcome of action. Actions are valued and chosen not for themselves, but as more or less efficient means to a further end." (p. 22). Rational choice theories, thus, perceive statements as tools which may be less effective than the costly signals due to the information and credibility problems which lead them to explore possible factors that might minimize the credibility issues. The approach of McManus (2014) measures directly the resolve and measuring resolve through statements also proposes important insights for the credibility issue. As McManus (2014) states that when the statements are informative "then an adversary that hears statements of resolve should be more likely to believe that the issuer of the statements is actually resolved to stand firm" (p. 728).

Most of the studies on the effectiveness of statements examine when and by whom cheap signals are selected, while this study will explore these questions in a different context. This study will explore and evaluate whether third parties use statements on civil conflicts as cheap signals, if so when and how. This thesis argues that the statements acts as strategic communication tools with information and credibility problems. To compare credible and informative statements with the ones with less information and lower levels of credibility, this study will create an appropriate



measure. Yet, before assuming the international environment as an anarchy, the norm density in human rights issue and the level of institutionalization should be defined to assess the social constructivist and critical theorists' perspective.

Constructivists and critical theorists, who argue that the decisions of international actors are based on the "rule-guided behavior" of actors, emphasize on how statements are formed, along with exploring the identities of states through statements. Particularly the constructivists and post-structuralists base their theories on the importance of language and how the state discourses have constructed and shaped the norms, identities, and understandings. These theories have been established as an opposition to the mainstream theories such as realism and liberalism, and scholars take a shift to a different level of analysis and emphasize on the interaction between the agency and structure as dynamic forms. By this change in the level of analysis the anarchy as the main driving force for the international interaction has been challenged.

By challenging this prominent assumption for rationalist perspective, different actions by international players could be explained better. As Wendt (1992) states "anarchy is what states make from it" and thus, the international environment is a constructed concept in which we can understand the construction through the language and communicative tools. As Müller (2004) and Holzinger (2004) propose that choosing different communicative tools depends on the norm density and the level of institutionalization. The norm density and the level of institutionalization of human rights issue in international relations, thus, will set the grounds for the international environment and this will show us that how states will use communication tools as a third party to civil conflicts.

Newman (2001) explains how human security issue becomes to be acknowledged by decision makers as a form of security overtime. While the norm construction of human rights increased over time, the level of institutionalization of human rights is a different concept with the need of a further explanation.


Briefly human rights have been an international issue since the post- World War II period. However, the concept, norms changed drastically overtime. Morsink (1999) suggests that the Universal Declaration of Human rights signed in 1948 was "inspirational and hortatory" rather than "legally binding" (Morsink 1999). Followingly the European Convention on Human Rights signed in 1950 by the Council of Europe and went into force in 1953. This agreement which indicates the early steps of normative construction in human rights issue with a regional focus furthered in 1990s and early 2000s by making human rights as the issue of the global agenda. Thus, the norm construction in human rights issue has been increased in time, however

the level of institutionalization in human rights has been evolved relatively low.

Nickel (2002) provides a thorough examination of international institutions which intend to shape and further the agenda in human rights by evaluating institutions such as European Human Rights System, UN Human Rights Treaties, the UN Commission of Human Rights, the UN Security Council, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, international human rights NGOs and unilateral state efforts. According to Nickel (2002) “institutions for international promotion and protection of human rights in order to determine whether they are already sufficiently powerful, autonomous, and integrated to constitute a significant part of an emerging system of global governance” is almost established “but not quite” (p. 353). Depending on the international environment defined by the two dimensional definition, this thesis, thus, will assume that third parties will use communication as a strategic tool which enables us to treat statements as cheap signals as the rational choice theorists does.

Theoretical discussions, as presented above, conclude that third parties will use communication tools as strategic devices. Also, as the literature suggests evaluating statements directly will enable us to compare them within themselves for their level of information and credibility. Considering statements as primary sources for measuring cheap signals solves credibility and information problems and enable us to compare the effectiveness of each statement by the measured information and credibility level. As McManus (2014) indicates the statements are critical both for the conveyed information and the reflected credibility.

Figure 2.4 The Aspects of Statements and Theoretical Expectations



Another key issue for using statements is the impact duration of these third party policies. Behavior is a signal which both decision process and the affect is long in duration. Sending military troops to support a conflicting state against the insurgent will send a long lasting signal about the intentions of the third parties. Whereas the

statements of leaders are considered cheap since these signals can change in short terms and are not clear as actions in sending clear signals. However, acting is not as frequent as public statements which leads statements to be more effective to build some expectations or change the information among the actors. This difference between the action and attitude shows why studying statements is important.

These possible strengths of exploring bargaining, thus, can serve as an informational tool for the scholars who aim to understand the impact of third parties to civil conflicts along with increasing the ability to forecast the probability to intervene (see Figure 2.4). These possible results of exploring the third party attitudes with short term impact will shift our perception towards civil conflict and third party to a broader and better point of view.

## 2.4 Research Question and Hypotheses

From an international relations perspective which focuses on foreign policy, attitudes can be defined as the position of the state towards an international or domestic event. This position as the attitude, however, is different than the actions taken by the actor. Attitudes of third parties are more about the perception of the conflict, as well as its understanding of the process, especially with regards to its strategic distance or closeness to one group versus the other- in simpler terms its bias. More specifically, a third party attitude is defined as its intention to involve itself while supporting or hindering one of the conflicting actors.

The third-party attitude, thus, consists of three major components: (1) the level of involvedness reflected by the third party, (2) the orientation of support or opposition towards the host state, and (3) the orientation of support or opposition towards the non-state actor. These three components therefore create an overall third-party attitude towards an intrastate conflict and its actors.<sup>3</sup> For instance, Barack Obama and Angela Merkel respectively indicated the following official statements towards the PKK attack which took place in Suruç on July 20, 2015.<sup>4</sup>

Obama: The United States strongly condemns today's heinous terrorist attack in Suruç, Turkey. We extend our condolences to the families of the victims, many of whom had come to Suruç to assist reconstruction efforts

---

<sup>3</sup><https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-release-statement-national-security-council-spokesperson-ned-price-the-terrorist-3>, 11/23/2020

<sup>4</sup>, 11/23/2020

in Kobani. We also express our solidarity with the Turkish government and people and reaffirm our undeterred resolve to work with Turkey and other partners to combat the shared threat of terrorism .

Merkel: "Our thoughts are with the families of the victims," Merkel wrote to the Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu. Germany was joined in the fight against terrorism, on the side of Turkey.<sup>5</sup>

The condemnation of the terrorist attack and the support for Turkey is common in both statements.; the American statement includes more detailed introduction on how the US will fight along with Turkey against terrorism. "Reconstruction efforts", "undeterred resolve to work with Turkey" are very strong approaches to the issue. Whereas Merkel only stated that "Germany was joined in the fight against terrorism on the side of Turkey" which is less informative about the involvement of Germany. Both statements, however, clearly signal an involvement aligned with Turkey. The negative orientation towards the terrorist attack is also observable in both statements.

Leaders might also express distant statements and only show and express their demand and need from the conflicting parties.

Merkel: Psychological analysis is not my job. My role and the role of policy in general is to determine differences and explore commonalities. There's just Germany and Europe a clear interest in intensive cooperation with Turkey, and vice versa. In Germany live three million people of Turkish origin, Turkey is a neighboring country to the EU's external borders. She has had a remarkable economic rise in recent years. Not even the Turkish President has its share. But of course some developments in Turkey give us great concern. Thus, the process of rapprochement and reconciliation with the Kurds in the past year has been broken, instead there is again violent confrontations. The PKK is a terrorist organization, which is also our German point of view, but we want the Kurdish population has its equal place and a good future in Turkey.<sup>6</sup>

Merkel in this statement explains how Germany sees Turkey and at the same time criticize and reflect the concerns about the Kurdish-Turkish conflict. While Merkel expresses the negative orientation towards Turkey, PKK has been only mentioned while the Kurdish civilians were mentioned positively. Germany explains what they

---

<sup>5</sup><https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de//bkin-de/aktuelles/merkel-kondoliert-davuto%C4%9Flu-756328,11/23/2020>

<sup>6</sup><https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de//bkin-de/aktuelles/abkommen-im-interesse-beider-seiten-427564,11/23/2020>

think it would be good for solving the conflict while stands with the Kurdish population and confronting Turkish government. Thus, in this statement compared to the previous ones Germany emphasize on what should Turkey do, but does not indicate the role of Germany.

The following statement exemplifies the lowest level of involvement that we can observe. In this statement Merkel solely expresses a fact without placing Germany on the spectrum of support or opposition, and comments on the domestic issues within Turkey.

Secondly, Turkey is affected in a way by terrorism, both the PKK and via the IS and it has a neighborhood with Syria, where really the worst happens, what is really happening at the moment in the world. And when you see how closely Aleppo to the Turkish border, then we all know well what that means .<sup>7</sup>

Diverging from the previous examples, this statement is more about presenting a fact; therefore, these kinds of statements are also important to measure and show that the third parties are at least talking about the intrastate conflicts. Measuring these comments will also allow a distinction of cases in which leaders do not talk about the conflict.


Therefore, this study will categorize the level of involvement in three different groups following the McManus's (2009) categorization. The highest level of involvement reflects that third parties signal as if they are a part of the conflict. The statements with demands and refusals are categorized as the second category. The lowest level of involvement suggests that the statement proposes a fact on the conflicting actors. Figure 2.5 illustrates the categories including the level of bias in issued statements.

Based on the discussions on third party intervention and the importance of communication in international interactions, this dissertation explores the motivations to issue statements on civil conflicts and the factors behind issuing involving statements towards civil conflicts. Defining third party attitudes rather than focusing on the events occurred between the third party and conflicting state, enhances the scope of the interactions take place. Capturing small attempts of third parties, rather than focusing on the major events as military intervention or diplomacy effects, produces a more nuanced and dynamic approach to understand the how third parties are important or not for the civil conflict process.

---

<sup>7</sup><https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de//bkin-de/aktuelles/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-zum-europaeischen-rat-am-15-dezember-2016-842600>, 11/23/2020

Figure 2.5 Categories of Third Party Attitudes



The arguments on third party attitudes are stem from the realist, and liberal theories. However, these ideas are too broad to analyze in a comprehensive manner as the propositions focus on the actions and behaviors of third parties, therefore, the following hypotheses narrow the area of inquiry to adequately dissect the causal variables which determine third parties attitudes due to the explanatory power of statements. Based on the propositions derived from the studies on third party intervention, some preliminary hypotheses on the determinants of variant third-party attitudes.

Proposition 1 and 2 broadly argues the main motivations of third parties for intervening a civil conflict and states that the national interests are the main driving force for third parties to involve a civil conflict. Proposition 3 narrowed down these arguments and proposed that the existing rivalries are the main causal mechanisms for third party to involve civil conflicts. The following hypotheses are derived from Proposition 3.

*H1: Existing alliances between the host state and third party will increase the likelihood of issuing statements.*

*H2a: Existing rivalry between the host state and third party will increase the likelihood of issuing statements.*

*H2b: Existing rivalry between the host state and third party will increase the likelihood of issuing statement favoring the non-state actor.*

Proposition 4 which suggests that the perceived power by third parties are the main motivations to interfere a civil conflict, promotes another important causal mechanism. Based on this argument, hypothesis on third party attitudes is as follows:

*H3: The severity of civil conflict will increase the likelihood of issuing statements.*

Proposition 5 is about the economic relations and how these ties promote or hinder third party to interfere the civil conflict. Since strong economic ties between the conflicting state and third party will change the cost perception of third party, economic ties will also determine the likelihood of issuing statements.

*H4: Strong economic ties between the host and third party will increase the likelihood of issuing statements.*

The propositions on the demand side of intervention are about the ethnic or cultural ties between the nonstate actor with third party. Whether a strong diaspora exists is a critical component for some third parties to intervene civil conflict, which also allows third parties to issue statements on the conflicts and conflicting actors as well.

*H5: Existing diaspora within the third party will increase the likelihood for the third party to issuing statements on non-state actors.*

The section which explains the motivations for intervention is followed by explaining the determinants of choosing the appropriate strategy of involvement. Thus, the following hypotheses will propose the expectations on which type of statements will third parties choose to issue.

Proposition 8 suggests that the third parties choose how to intervene based on their existing alliance ties with the conflicting state. This argument also promotes the idea that third parties which are allies to the conflicting states will choose to issue involving and positive statements. Addition to the alliance relations, this thesis will also hypothesize on the third party attitudes when there is a rivalry between the third party and host state.

*H6a: Existing alliances between the host state and third party will increase the likelihood of involvement favoring the host country.*

*H6b: Existing alliances between the host state and third party will increase the likelihood that the third party refrains from issuing statements as well as increasing involvement against the non-state actor.*

*H7a: Existing rivalry between the host state and third party will increase the likelihood for high levels of involvement against the host country.*

*H7b: Existing rivalry between the host state and third party will increase the likelihood for high levels of involvement favoring the non-state actor.*

The hypotheses presented above mainly address the expectations of the realist and liberal theorists. While the first set of hypotheses presents the expectations for external states to issue statements on civil conflicts, the second set of hypotheses presents the expectations on the content of statements.

## 2.5 Conclusion

This section presents the literature and proposes the theoretical assumptions of the thesis. By exploring a wide array of studies on third party intervention and communication in international relations, this chapter listed the multiple hypotheses that the dissertation addresses, all derived from competing theories of international relations.

Studies on third party intervention mainly explore the causal mechanisms of intrastate security and economic relations on intervention decisions. The existence of rivalry or alliance has been one of the most important elements for third parties to involve in civil conflicts. The economic relations and the role of the diaspora, on the other hand, are argued to be critical for the decisions of external states. While the presented intervention decisions have been theorized under the realist and liberal assumptions, this chapter also builds the arguments on the motivations of third party attitudes around similar factors.

This chapter also presents why examining attitudes instead of the actions by external states on civil conflicts matter. The theoretical discussion on the importance of communication tools in international relations concludes that these cheap but dynamic tools are utilized as strategic devices and due to their content, they can change the information balances and expectations of conflicting parties in the interest of



external states. The dynamic nature of statements also creates an environment in which the conflicting actors update their beliefs in an active manner.

Chapter 3 will introduce the data generation process of third party attitudes which has been briefly defined in this chapter. After introducing a clear and thorough definition, the following chapter will introduce the operationalization procedures of this new measure.

### **3. DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT OF THIRD PARTY ATTITUDES**

This chapter intends to explain the definition, operationalization, and measurement of third party attitudes as a new concept theoretically explained in the previous section. Content analysis is the method employed for the formation of this new variable and a brief introduction on how this method was used in international relations is discussed. Following this brief introduction on content analysis the data collection and generation processes are introduced in detail below.

#### **3.1 Texts-as-Data in Political Science and International Relations: A Brief Overview**

Texts are one of the main sources of data in international relations, which enables scholars to empirically assess the theories on the international interactions. Content analysis is one of the methods which enables to code, classify and/or scale the texts according to a defined set of rules in a replicable way. This method which primarily leans on the manual coding, has been adapted to the technological improvements and currently enables IR scholars to take advantage of the computation power of computers to code these rich data sources. The automated data collection and text analysis (text-as-data or computational social science as a broader concept) has become one of the most salient methods for data creation and measurement.

Content analysis and the automated text analysis are used by the international relations scholars starting from the early 1980s and this mean for data generation has been developing rapidly even since. IR scholars mainly use text analysis to create event datasets to measure certain variables. In the following section a brief overview on how using content analysis in international relations has been improved will be discussed.

### 3.1.1 Event Data and Texts in International Relations

Event data in international relations has been one of the most important dataset forms which targets to classify the international actions as events. McClelland (1978) from University of California as the principle investigator of the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) project established the dataset of international interactions. The aim of the dataset was to predict the future events of international actors based on the assumption of the states are consistent and will act the same way under similar circumstances. As a result of this policy oriented project using the New York Times as the primary source created an event dataset for the years between 1966-1978. The author classified the events under 22 categories and formed a verb dictionary for representing each category.

Azar (1980) established another event data called The Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB). According to Azar (1980):

Events (or descriptors of the activities of international actors) contain useful information which permit a student of foreign policy to use events singularly or in the aggregate to study foreign policy outputs; and a student of international systems uses events singularly or in the aggregate to study patterns, structures, and transformation. (p. 145)

The events as the outputs of foreign policy are measured through different sources which is a distinguishing element from WEIS which only utilizes the New York Times as a source. These two datasets which aim to measure international interactions and record them as data points however reveal some different results due to the source selection. Vincent (1987) compares these two event datasets and concludes that different sources lead these datasets to have different emphasis on different regions. According to Vincent (1987) COBDAB and WEIS are either over or underrepresenting the events in different regions.

The challenge in creating a comprehensive event data in the early years was to attain the necessary sources for complete information as well as to create a comprehensive classification of events. Following these improvement ideas, a plethora of scholars endeavor to improve the existing event datasets. Some of them improved the measurement of events by introducing additional actors or measurement type (Goldstein Scale, PANDA, CAMEO) and some other scholars introduced new data collection techniques (KEDS and PANDA).

Clarifying the questions “who did what to whom” as the basis for event data has

become an intensive struggle in international politics. Goldstein (1992) elevated the event data by measuring the events in terms of a scale which ranks the events according to their level of conflict and cooperation in order to cope with the shortcomings of the categories which is problematic for statistical analysis. This scale which ranks the events enable us to not only classify the events into categories but also scale them according to a dimension. Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO), on the other hand, is a more nuanced dictionary to formulate event datasets on international interactions. The authors criticized the early event databases -WEIS and COBDAP- for including only the conflict and cooperation actions. Yet the authors argue that the verbal and diplomatic events should be included as a category of international interactions.

Besides the improvements in definition and operationalization of international interactions, Schrodtt (1994) introduced a program named Kansas Event Data System (KEDS). This machine readable format become an innovative advancement to include the computerized techniques for data collection and classification processes. Schrodtt and Gerner (1994) indicate that both the machine readable program and manual coding there are no significant difference, yet the cost of manual coding decreases with this new technique. Concomitantly, Schrodtt (1990) developed a machine learning technique to detect the events in texts by using the natural language processing. The inclusion of the computerized techniques, thus, elevated the number of events collected along with the development of a new technique in content analysis.

The Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) used the KEDS system and WEIS categories to include nonstate actors as well as the non-violent incidences into the framework. This adaptation of fully automated system, thus, has been used to enlarge the collection of different events (Bond et al. 1994).

These different examples of event datasets have been utilized to study different aspects of these events. While some of the studies intend to explore the factors that shape these events (Clark et al 2016, Manes and Valerino 2016, Oktay 2015, Wilson et al 2016,), a group of studies utilize events as foreign policy choices and explain how these decisions impact certain international components. While, Oktay (2014) and Clark and his colleagues (2016) focus on how domestic institutions are effective in deciding conflictual or cooperative international behavior, Wilson and his colleagues (2016) explores how international organizations change the conflictual behavior of states in the international arena.

Another group of studies employ event data are utilized as independent variables which argued to be influencing different events in the international arena (Davis

et al. 2019, Thyne 2009, Thyne et al 2018). Thyne (2009) utilized the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) and Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COBDAP) event datasets to distinguish the cheap and costly signals by external states and evaluate how these international interactions shape civil conflict processes. Thyne and his colleagues (2018) in another study examined how international interactions are important factors for the coup d'états. While event data used both as outcome and explanatory variables, recent studies use event data for forecasting purposes (Chiba and Gleditsch 2017).

The developments in creating event datasets in international relations are mostly made to improve two aspects: (1) the variety of sources to be able to capture the international interactions population and, (2) the efficiency in retrieving and classifying or scaling the events. These two aspects also show that in international relations, the purpose of scholars can be different than defining the international interactions or scaling them with respect to their conflictual and cooperative aspects. Since scholars desire to extract agenda specific information from the texts, they will use texts as their primary source of information to establish valid measures on international relations concepts.

### **3.1.2 Custom Made Data Using Texts in International Relations**

Apart from the event data in international relations, political texts have been used as a source to retract information on different concepts on the international issues. In international relations, therefore, texts are not only used for defining the international interactions, but also utilized to understand further information that the political texts provide. Discourse analysis and content analysis are the two qualitative methods used to understand how leader statements and the political texts regarding international relations are important for international interactions (Grimmer and Steward 2013). Following these methods in understanding the insight of the texts, quantitative text analysis has been introduced and improved as another mean to use texts. The custom-made datasets are important for the progress in the discipline. Employing different techniques to collect the relevant information, will enable studies to have valid measures. Thus, text-as-data approach is a convenient way and an invaluable asset to create valid measures for the issues on international interactions.

Text-as-data approach has been addressing two research objectives in general: (1) classification of texts, and (2) scaling texts (Grimmer and Steward 2013). Studies

aiming to classify texts according to a defined set of rules and concepts creates the bulk of the literature. Sentiment classification/analysis, for instance, is an approach that the texts are grouped according to the reflected negative or positive attitudes of statements (Young and Soroka, 2012). Sentiment analysis has been used mostly for exploring how different news frames impact the political arena or events (Burscher et al. 2016, Haselmayer and Jenny 2017).

Project based dictionaries are created to classify political texts. Statements of Resolve project by McManus (2009) classified the statements of the American presidents for their rivals/the states that might fight with. This project intends to conceptualize resolve and measure through the public statements of the United States leaders. McManus (2009) created a relevant dictionary and classified the official statements of the USA leaders towards the states that they are engaged in militarized disputes. The classification of the presidents of the United States aimed to measure the level of signal that the US leaders convey to possible rivals which she argues that will change the likelihood to engage in war. Since McManus's classification aims to differentiate US presidents' signals and assess the level of information that leader statements provide in the international arena, McManus's dictionary can be used when the scholars need to measure the level of resolve of statements.

While some studies focus on leader statements (McManus 2009, Brandon and Zhukov 2009), some other scholars utilize statements made in meetings of international organizations which enables scholars to define how states set and reflect their global agenda. Medzihorsky and his colleagues (2017) aim to understand and discuss on whether the positions of permanent members of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) converged or diverged on the Syrian Civil War over time. The speeches by the permanent members on the Syrian Conflict have been classified according to the intervention and human rights violations themes and compared overtime. The dictionary specifically created to understand the individual event. This study is critical, which demonstrate how creating valid measures using relevant texts proposes a good comparison over time and across different countries.

Scaling texts is another way for scholars to utilize text as data approach. Scaling texts to define the positions of states derived from the political texts is critical to understand the international policy positions of countries. The studies utilized the different scaling techniques measure the country positions in international organizations by using scaling techniques of text as data approach. Baturu et al. (2017), for instance, use UN General Debates as the source to position states on different policy dimensions. The study illustrates how countries have positioned themselves when the United States and Russia are considered as the two opposing countries in

the international system. Depending on the UN General Debates the authors are also able to track the change in the rhetoric of both the United States and Russia over time which enables to illustrate the state of art of the global agenda. EUSpeech project (Schumacher et al. 2020), on the other hand, is an important example on how sentiment analysis and scaling techniques are amalgamated to form a dataset to evaluate the EU elite positions towards different issues discussed in the European Union.

These techniques for the assessment of political texts as the primary source shows that to understand the international interactions texts constitutes a very rich source for information. Text-as-data techniques, also, enable scholars to assess this rich information. This thesis will use texts as a source to understand how third parties utilize issuing statements to change the course of actions in civil conflicts. The leader speeches are the primary political texts, which will be classified according to the level of involvedness and biasedness. The classification of the texts will produce a dataset which can be used to examine its determinants. The following sections will define third party attitudes and thoroughly explain the data collection and generation process.

### **3.2 Third Party Attitudes (TPA) Data: Data Collection, Generation and Measurement**

From international relations perspective, attitudes can be defined as the position and the stance of the state towards an international or domestic event. The attitude is different than the actions taken by the actor. Since the attitude can be equated to the opinion of the state, how the attitude is reflected is the critical point to understand in international relations. The state opinion on an international issue, is different than the behavior and actions taken by the state. Therefore, rather than examining actions of third parties, to fully understand the attitudes, the leader statements need to be explored in detail. States as third parties for civil conflicts can also reflect their ideas and opinions. Third party attitudes, thus, will be consisted of three major components: (1) the level of involvedness reflected by the third party, (2) the orientation towards the state and (3) the orientation towards the non-state actor. These three components will create an overall third party attitude towards an intrastate conflict and its actors.

The following sections introduce the data collection and generation process. The major components of the data, case and source selection, data collection and gen-

eration processes will be introduced. The coding scheme and operationalization of third party attitude will be introduced as the last step for data generation process.

### **3.2.1 Case Selection**

This thesis will examine the factors of third party intervention in two main empirical parts. The first one will explore different third parties and their attitudes towards the same conflict in a short period of time. American, British and German attitudes towards PKK-Turkey conflict will be the cases and third party attitudes for the years between 2010 and 2019 will be examined. The second empirical part, however, is interested in explaining third party attitudes to generalize the arguments and hypotheses. Therefore, this chapter will evaluate US attitudes on Europe based civil conflicts for the years between 1990-2019. This study will have a wider scope and thus will be able to consider the impact of different conflicts for third party attitudes.

Since the primary aim of the thesis is to clearly define third party attitudes, while showing that third party attitudes varies across different countries and over time, the thesis also focuses on to explore the key factors that shape third party attitudes. The case selection is a critical component in exploring the importance and effectiveness of third party attitudes as a concept. Therefore, this thesis focuses on two distinct case selection process to test and control for the causal mechanisms and external validity of the concept.

The first part of the empirical investigation of thesis target to explore the third party attitudes and its determinants with an in-depth study by comparing different third party attitudes towards the same civil conflict. The availability of sources and choosing a timely civil conflict were the two most critical points in choosing the relevant cases for an in-depth study. After deciding on the conflict -which is the Turkish-PKK conflict as a timely and relevant conflict- the relevant third parties were decided as the United States, Germany and United Kingdom.

The United States and Germany are chosen as third parties since they are two critical international and regional actors with important ties with Turkey. These two states who can be considered politically relevant international actors and as Maoz (1996) indicates they are the most likely external actors that have profound and immediate impact on national security. Choosing other relevant actors who has a probability to intervene civil conflict in Turkey, however, was constrained by the



lack of data. United Kingdom who may not be accounted as the PRIE country as Maoz (1996) suggests has been included for control purposes. It is also important to keep in mind that UK sources are also not rich and complete as US and German sources.

Besides the in-depth analysis, the second empirical investigation aims to test the hypotheses with a more vast and complete data to be able to form generalizable arguments. Henceforth, the second empirical part focuses on the US attitudes on Europe based conflicts for the years between 1990 and 2019. The US as the global international power has important ties with European countries and the likelihood of the United States to have influence over the national interests of European countries is high. Besides the United States being an influential international power, the leader statements are collected under the American Presidency Project including the statements by George Washington. The availability of the leader statements which are issues in various platforms is important to construct a dataset using the complete population and thus eliminate a possible selection bias.

The selection of Europe based conflicts starting from 1990s were determined based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset. The new and ongoing civil conflicts in 1990-2019 period took place in Europe were all included as civil conflicts.<sup>1</sup> Table 3.1 introduces the conflicts, dates, and the conflicting parties including the nonstate actors.

Table 3.1 Conflict Locations, State and Nonstate Actors

Conflict Location	Conflict Years	State	Nonstate Actor
Turkey	1984- continues	Turkish government	Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
UK	1971-2005	UK, Ireland	Provisional IRA
UK	1998	UK, Ireland	Real IRA
Yugoslavia	1998-1999	Serbia	Kosova Liberation Army (UCK)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992-1995	Bosnian government	Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1993-1995	Bosnian government	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1993-1994	Bosnian government	Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Macedonia	2001	Macedonia	National Liberation Army (UCK)
Moldova	1992-1997	Moldova government	Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR)
Spain	1978-2011	Spanish government	ETA

### 3.2.2 Sources for Leader Statements

The primary step of the data collection process is to define the sources. The official websites of head of government of Germany and United Kingdom utilized as the

<sup>1</sup>Ukraine and Russia as Eastern European countries should be included in the sample, however since the number of filtered paragraphs of Russia was only 15000, coding these two conflicts could not be achieved in a timely manner.

primary source for public statements of these countries. The earliest date of speeches was available starting from 2010. For the United States, the American Presidency Project by UC Santa Barbara used as the primary source for leader statements.

Every text in the links provided in Table ?? in the Appendix, were downloaded using R with the appropriate web scraping codes. Each text was downloaded in separate paragraphs. The code also retrieved the date, link, and unique identification numbers for each paragraph. As a result of this process a separate data sheet has been created including the texts and relevant information. Table 3.2 illustrates how many paragraphs were downloaded and how many unique links were retrieved from the American Presidency Project.

Table 3.2 Number of Links, Paragraphs and Unique Paragraphs

Leader	Date	Number of Links	Number of Paragraph	Unique Paragraphs
George Bush	1989-1993	14909	275406	248360
Bill Clinton	1993-2001	15993	513482	470235
George W. Bush	2001-2009	7231	106073	92915
Barack Obama	2009-2017	17184	325346	292400
Donald Trump	2017-2019	5020	134192	119957
Total	1990-2019	60337	1354499	1217989

The downloaded paragraphs include every statement issued by the leaders and provided in the web site. To narrow down the statements to the ones which are about the conflicts and conflicting countries, certain keywords are used to filter the paragraphs. The keywords used to filter the paragraphs are introduced in 3.3.

Table 3.3 Keywords for Filtering Statements

Conflict Location	Keywords
Turkey	Turk, Turkish, Turkey, Kurd, Kurdish, Kurdistan, PKK, YPG, PYD, TAK
Bosnia	Bosnia, Bosnian
Macedonia	Macedonia, Macedonian
Moldova	Moldova, Moldovian, Transnistria, Transdnestria, Pridnestrovie, Pridnestrovian
Serbia	Serbia, Yugoslavia, UCK, Kosovan, Kosova, Kosovo
Spain	Spain, ETA, Basque, Basques
UK	United Kingdom, UK, Britain, British, PIRA, RIRA, Ireland, Irish, IRA

This first filtering process creates an incomplete dataset in which some paragraphs are still irrelevant to the countries in interest. To eliminate the irrelevant statements, addition to the filtering process, the statements are manually coded as an additional process to filter the related statements. As a result of the keyword filtering process and manually eliminating the irrelevant paragraphs, the first version of the raw

data for coding the statements have been finalized and the number of paragraphs is introduced both in Table 3.4 and 3.5.

Table 3.4 The Number of Paragraphs After Each Filtration Process- Turkish-PKK conflict

	Without Filter	Relevant
USA (2010-2019)	1983	1213
UK (2010-2019)	768	479
Germany(2010-2019)	2886	2288

Another important point in the data collection process is the to collect the statements of the Chancellor Angela Merkel in German. The official website of the Chancellor’s office provides both the German statements and the translated version of Chancellor Merkel’s statements. Since the number of statements which are relevant to Turkey are less among the translated ones than the German statements, German statements are downloaded and the first phase of filtering by using the German translations of the keywords have been made. Afterwards, by the help of Google Translate the statements are translated from German to English. While in coding, some of the statements re-translated because the Google Translate in Excel (Google Sheet) did not perform as good as the online platform. As a result of this process the complete version of German statements could be retrieved in English. <sup>2</sup>

### 3.2.3 Coding Rules and Examples


After the raw dataset consisted of relevant official statements established, a set of rules has been defined in coding third party attitudes which are provided in Figure 3.1.

Table 3.5 The Number of Paragraphs After Each Filtration Process- European Civil Conflicts

	Without Filter	Relevant
Bosnia	6249	4030
Serbia	5482	3662
Moldova	239	140
Macedonia	628	419
UK	9496	5479
Spain	6717	589

<sup>2</sup>The difference between the German and English statements are illustrated in Appendix with Figure A.1 and Figure A.2

Figure 3.1 Coding Scheme



The statements by external states cover mainly two subject areas: (1) statements about the bilateral relations with the state or non-state actor and (2) the domestic issues of the conflicting states.

The subjects of statements which are about bilateral relations, economy, and trade, as well as EU/NATO, are coded as international matters. Although the focus of the thesis is to define attitudes of third parties in domestic issues (particularly civil conflict) with bilateral-domestic divide, the statements on bilateral issues are also coded according to the level of bias. For instance, in one of the statements of Barack Obama he mentioned Turkey as follows:

Turkey is a NATO ally. It is an extraordinarily important partner in our fight against ISIL. It is a country with whom we have a long and strategic relationship with. And President Erdogan is someone who I've dealt with since I came into office, and in a whole range of areas, we've had a productive partnership. (1 April 2006)

This statement refers how the US and Turkey are good partners and act coherently about the ISIS as the international threat. Thus, this statement is about the bilateral

relations of the US and Turkey where the orientation of Obama is positive. Examples of bilateral statements with negative orientation are as follows:

The Council also expressed serious concerns over Turkey's drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. (Theresa May, 24 June 2019).

Turkey's military offensive is endangering civilians and threatening peace, security, and stability in the region. I have been perfectly clear with President Erdogan: Turkey's action is precipitating a humanitarian crisis and setting conditions for possible war crimes. Turkey must ensure the safety of civilians, including religious and ethnic minorities, and is now, or may be in the future, responsible for the ongoing detention of ISIS terrorists in the region. Unfortunately, Turkey does not appear to be mitigating the humanitarian effects of its invasion. (Donald Trump, 14.10.2019)

Besides the statements with negative or positive orientation, some other statements which include the conflicting state can be neutral. In the following examples I introduce different forms of neutral statements.

President Obama spoke today by phone with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey to accept President Erdogan's condolences for the terrorist attack in Orlando, Florida on June 12. Both leaders reaffirmed their shared commitment to combat all forms of violent extremism. (Obama, 15 June 2016)

With the employment initiative in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq more than 60,000 jobs have already been created since last year. About 300,000 children to school could attend. More than 7,000 people were able to education and training, such as a craftsman to build a professional perspective.(Merkel 4 July 2017)

Perhaps once again to the issue of migration: We have discussed for a long time about how it is the Commission's proposals on the revision of the European asylum system. Here we have expressed our intent that political work should be completed during the Maltese presidency possible. That's a lot of work, because it goes once around both the internal matters as the distribution of refugees only one component, but because it is also about the redesign of the Dublin system to single asylum standards, and then of course in view on the issue of migration partnerships and the question of what possibilities we have to conclude similar agreements as between the European Union and Turkey with other countries. With regard to the EU-Turkey Agreement has also been discussed at some length, and here we have reiterated that this agreement will be implemented in all its facets. (Merkel, 15 December

Table 3.6 Domestic Politics and the Number of Paragraphs of Turkey

Non State Actor	Germany	UK	USA
Security Issues			
PKK	56	6	47
Refugees	26	4	0
Kurdish civilians / Solution process	23	2	5
Terrorism	84	10	40
Protests	7	2	1
Democratization			
Freedom of Speech	112	0	10
Coup	44	6	27
Natural Disasters and others			
Natural Disasters	2	0	3
Others	13	0	29

2016)

The first statement reflects that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called Barack Obama for the attack in Boston. This statement emphasizes on to stating an event. Regarding the other two statements, Turkey has been introduced as a country within a group with no specific direct emphasis.

If the statement is not about the bilateral issues of the conflicting state or non-state actor, the statement will be assessed on whether it is about a domestic issues of the conflicting state or not. The domestic issues of conflicting state can include many different subject areas mentioned by the external states. In general, the domestic issues can be about, (a) domestic security issues, (2) democracy/democratization, and (3) natural disasters.

Table 3.6 indicates that there are different sub-categories of the domestic issues of Turkey. As the domestic security matters, PKK related statements coded different than the statements which are about the Kurdish civilians and Solution Process. Terrorism coded as another category in which the statements did not identify who conducted the terrorist attack. Thus, both the attacks by PKK and ISIS is included in this category. To have such a category is important because with these statements the government's position themselves based on the attack.

In the security categories I separately coded the refugees and protests. The refugees are both bilateral and domestic issues of Turkey. I have coded the statements about the EU-Turkey agreement and the alliances made with other countries about the migration as a bilateral issue. The external states have statements about how Turkey deal with the migration issues, provide health and education for the Syrian

refugees as domestic issues of Turkey. The democratization related issues are also an important group which external states have statements on. Particularly the coup attempt on July 16 2016 and the arrested journalists, decrease in the level of some democracy attributes or elections are included in these categories.

Table 3.7 demonstrates the number of domestic issues covered in Europe based conflicts by the United States leaders. In this data generation process the number of domestic issues were coded under the general subject matters due to the large number of statements.

Table 3.7 Domestic Politics and the Number of Paragraphs of European Conflicts

	Conflict	Democracy
Bosnia	3353	21
Serbia	2940	49
Macedonia	203	4
Moldova	17	5
UK	1770	12
Spain	17	-

After defining the statement as it is about domestic matters, the three main aspects of the content of issued statements are coded : (1) the level of involvement of the external state, (2) the orientation towards the state and (3) the orientation towards the non-state actor defined.

The level of involvedness and level of biasedness are coded simultaneously. The level of involvedness as described previously coded from 1 to 3, while the level of biasedness coded as -1 as negative statements towards the actor, 0 as neutral statement towards the actor and 1 as indicating positive statement towards the actor. One other critical issue to mention is defining the actors. Every statement may or may not refer to actors of civil conflicts. To distinguish these statements not only relying to the filtering process, but the actors are also defined while the aspects of third party attitudes were coded. While the level of involvedness was coded as a component of the statement, the level of biasedness coded for each actor mentioned within the statement.

Table 3.8 Number of Domestic and Bilateral Statements on Turkey

Bilateral/Domestic	Germany	UK	USA
Domestic	459	39	181
Bilateral	1824	438	1030

Table 3.8 and 3.9 indicate the number of paragraphs which are either on bilateral relations or domestic events. Germany, United Kingdom and the United States

Table 3.9 Number of Domestic and Bilateral Statements on European Conflicts

Location	Domestic	Bilateral
Bosnia	3410	610
Serbia	3032	630
Macedonia	209	210
Moldova	24	116
UK	1800	3679
Spain	19	570

are more likely to talk about the bilateral relations with Turkey. Similarly, the United States talk about the bilateral relations with the United Kingdom, Spain and Moldova as host countries for civil conflicts. On the other hand, the issued statements by the United States about Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in greater extend are about the domestic events in these countries.

Table 3.10 Number of Paragraphs in Different Levels of Involvement on Turkey-PKK Conflict

Level of Involvement	Germany	UK	USA
0	203 (0.44)	18 (0.46)	63 (0.34)
1	181(0.39)	12 (0.30)	77 (0.42)
2	72 (0.17)	9 (0.24)	41 (0.24)

The ratio of the level of involvement the speeches which are about the domestic matters of conflicting countries is another important statistic. For the Turkish-PKK conflict third parties are more likely to state their demands or facts, while the number of paragraphs issued which are highly involved are around 20-25% among these external states.

The United States on the European conflicts, on the other hand, used mostly highly involved statements which can also be due to the intervention by the United States.

Table 3.11 Number of Paragraphs in Different Levels of Involvement on European Conflicts

Location / Level of Involvement	0	1	2
Bosnia	905	522	1983
Serbia	808	554	1670
Macedonia	61	24	124
Moldova	3	5	16
UK	468	395	937
Spain	4	6	9



### 3.3 Leader Statements on Civil Conflicts: A Text-as-Data Approach

This chapter intends to illustrate the content of the coded statements as well as propose an automated technique to help classifying the texts. This chapter thus, is valuable to show and visualize the content of statements which also enables to understand whether the coded texts measure what the theory suggests. Besides the description of the leader statements, the chapter also proposes a supervised classification method to increase the efficiency compared to the manual content coding. The first section will introduce the keywords and explore the content of leader statements on the civil conflicts and the second section explains and shows the results of the supervised classification methods.

Text-as-data approach developed methods to summarize and understand the content of texts in detail. This approach helps to distinguish the texts and compare how the word selections are made. Text-as-data considers texts as “bag of words” and thus rather than computing the meanings of texts, this method enables to compare and discuss texts over the word selection and its frequencies. Therefore, plotting the word frequencies of issued statements will illustrate the general topics discussed and propose a preliminary finding on the content of statements.

Figure 3.2 and 3.3 are simple word counts in issued statements by the United States for the years between 1990-2019 on different conflicting actors. Before counting the word frequencies, the statements have been pre-processed and irrelevant symbols, stop words and numbers were eliminated and the words have been stemmed. Also, along with counting unique words, the bigrams also accounted, and their frequencies calculated. After the pre-processing process, the count of words and bigram word groups in statements of conflicting states and nonstate actors are plotted.

Figure 3.2 Relative Frequencies of Words and Bigrams on European States





Figure 3.2 illustrates the statements about the conflicting states, which are Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia, Moldova, United Kingdom and Spain <sup>3</sup>, while Figure 3.3 introduces word frequencies in statements about the nonstate actors. These figures illustrate the overall themes of statements. First of all, the figures suggest that the most used words or word groups are mostly the names of the conflicting actors. The statements issued about the parties of Bosnian and Kosovar conflicts includes the “contact group”, “international community” and “united nations” which reflects the intervention took place in these conflicts. The most frequently used word groups in the statements on the conflict between Spain and ETA are “terrorist organization” and “fight terrorism”. Different from the Bosnian and Kosovar conflicts, the United States perceives and comments on the terrorist activities and attacks by ETA. The frequency plots can conclude that, these different conflicts have been framed and referred by the United States with their distinct characteristics. Thus, these figures illustrate how the United States approach different to civil conflicts in general.

<sup>3</sup>NA refers to the group which are the statements that conflicting state has not been mentioned.

Figure 3.3 Relative Frequencies of Words and Bigrams on European Nonstate Actors



To explore the words within these statements might also help us to understand the categories. Figure 3.4 is an overview of the most frequently used words in different involvement categories. The category 2 which includes the statements which the external states places themselves as a part of the conflict uses the word groups as “fight terrorism”, “work closely”, “condemns strongest” and “ally Turkey” which illustrates that the external states mostly declare their support of Turkey for dealing with the terrorism

In category 1, which includes the statements in which the external states are less likely to be directly involved but demand or suggest to the conflicting parties, the phrases such as “want Kurdish”, “great concern”, “stated view” were some of the frequent ones which show that the external states mostly explain their concerns or express their requests from Turkey.

The second graph in Figure 3.4 also illustrates the most frequent words in different categories of orientation towards the non-state actors in Turkish conflict. Regardless of the external states, the negative orientation towards non-state actors are mostly about the terrorist attacks and condemnation, whereas the positive attitudes are mostly about the freedom of speech and Armenian issue. “reconciliation kurds”, “good future” and “equal place” also suggest that the external states have positive attitude towards the Kurds and their position in Turkey.

The third graph of Figure 3.4 the frequency of words in positive and negative atti-



Figure 3.4 The Most Frequently Used Words Depending on the Involvement and Biasedness Categories About the Turkish-PKK Conflict

tudes towards the Turkish state has been plotted. The external states mostly utilize the phrases such as “Nato ally”, and “fight terrorism” when they have a positive attitude towards Turkey. On the other hand, Germany, the UK, and the United States have negative attitudes towards Turkish domestic issues when the subject is about freedom of speech and press. Thus, we can see that the external states criticize Turkey mostly about the underdevelopment in some democratic institutions.

While these figures hint the subject matters of issued statements on different conflicting actors, using word and bigram counts are criticized due to the limited information summarized about the content (Rose et al. 2010). In text analysis keywords are essential components to distinguish and understand the content of texts. As Rose et al. (2010) indicates keywords are sequences of words, which “provide a compact representation of a document’s content.” (p.3). To evaluate the content of issued statements on civil conflicts in general is a key starting point to assess whether the collected data is appropriate for establishing the measure of third party attitudes. Therefore, along with using n-grams and calculating their frequencies which is can be perceived as a defective way to establish keywords, the following figures will illustrate the keywords derived by using Rapid Automatic Keyword Extraction (RAKE).

RAKE is a keyword extraction tool which uses natural language process techniques and described as “an unsupervised, domain-independent, and language-independent method for extracting keywords from individual documents” (Rose et al. 2010). This technique has been one of the most effective and efficient tools compared to the other keyword extraction processes including n-grams (Rose et al. 2010). Therefore, comparing the keywords derived from statement using RAKE technique on different actors will be an important set of information to understand the content of the statements. The RAKE score measured through using the UDPipe R package. In order to, calculate the RAKE score first the issued statements have been separated into tokens and the lemmatize these words. The nouns and adjectives are utilized as word groups to form keywords as the most used dependencies within a sentence. After the dissemination process and a score for each word calculated. The calculation is made through looking how many times each word occurs and how many times it co-occurs with other words. Thus, every word is assigned with a ratio of word degree.

Figure 3.5 includes keywords identified by RAKE which are ranked according to the measured RAKE scores for the parties of Bosnian conflict. The issued statements about the Bosnian government mostly use “foreign force”, “air strike” and “humanitarian aid” which are the keywords correspond to the third party interven-

tion. “International community” as being one of the most frequently used keyword also reflects the international aspect of the Bosnian civil war and how the United States formulates the statements including the global actors.









Figure 3.5 Keywords Identified using RAKE on Bosnian Conflict and its Parties

Keywords identified by RAKE -UK



Keywords identified by RAKE - Ireland



Keywords identified by RAKE - IRA




Figure 3.6 Keywords Identified using RAKE on Northern Ireland Conflict and its Parties







Figure 3.7 Keywords Identified using RAKE on Kosovar Conflict and its Parties







Figure 3.8 Keywords Identified using RAKE on Civilians

**Keywords identified by RAKE - USA on Turkey**



**Keywords identified by RAKE - Germany on Turkey**



**Keywords identified by RAKE - UK on Turkey**




Figure 3.9 Keywords Identified using RAKE on Turkish Conflict

The content of IRA-UK conflict referred by the United States has been evolved around the peace agreement and Good Friday agreement in general as Figure 3.7 indicates. This shows that between 1990 and 2019 the most important incident on this conflict have been the referendum and peace talks and the United States has been framed the statements inline with the attempts in peace building efforts.

The issued statements on civilians in Bosnia and Kosovo is another important distinction how US approaches to the civilians differently. As Figure 3.8 suggests that the “innocent civilians” and “right thing” are the two important keywords define issued statements of the United States on both Bosnian and Kosovar conflicts. This finding suggests that when United States refer to the civilians in these conflicts also signal that they accept the role to improve humanitarian aspects, and they want to do the “right thing” to secure the “innocent civilians”.

These figures show that how the United States approach differently to different conflicts as well as different actors of the same conflict. The Bosnian and Kosovar conflicts as two major wars in Europe in the post-Cold War period share similar aspects, the United States has been framing these conflicts very differently. Framing the conflicts differently provides important insights on both the motivations and possible strategies in these conflicts. Therefore, these cheap signals can be utilized as informative tools to understand the external states and their possible strategies in civil conflicts.

The keywords defining the American, German, and British attitudes towards Turkey’s armed struggle with PKK also reflects how different external states approach to the same conflict. While the defining keywords of the American attitudes are “terrorist attack”, “heinous attack” or “speedy recovery”, the keywords of German statements are mainly “human rights” or “Kurdish populations”. These two different frames of the United States and Germany supports that different countries with diverging agendas will frame intrastate conflicts differently. Therefore, the issued statements by different external states are crucial in understanding their perceptions.

While Figure 3.5 to 3.9 illustrate the defining keywords for the statements issued about different conflicting actors, it is also important to understand how the keywords defines the content of statements with different levels of involvements. The Figures 3.10- 3.13 illustrates keywords defining different levels of involvement towards different conflicting states.

Figure 3.10 RAKE scores of different level of involvement statements about Bosnia






Figure 3.10 shows how the content of statements by the United States towards Bosnia with different levels of involvement. The statements in which the United States positions itself with close connections to the conflict, the keywords such as “air power”, “foreign force” and “diplomatic determination” are the defining keywords. These keywords show that the United States is an active party in the conflict. While the statements which are classified as demands by the United States contains the keywords such as “international community”, “terrible experience” or “military solution”, the group of statements which proposes facts about the conflict the keywords are mostly the names of the groups within the conflict. These two sets of keywords illustrate that these groups are different in context.

Figure 3.11 RAKE scores of different level of involvement statements about Serbia



The keywords of statements towards Serbia is similar to Bosnian keywords. The statements with high levels of involvement have been described with “defense system”, “international observer”, while the keyword “humanitarian disaster” indicates that the United States reflects the involvement from the humanitarian perspective. The demand category, on the other hand, shows that the demands of United States is mostly about the importance of the international community and force in the Kosovar war.

Figure 3.12 RAKE scores of different level of involvement statements about Macedonia



The keywords for Macedonia conflict propose that the United States signals its position through the Serbian aggression. The “grave concern”, “territorial integrity” and “substantial economic” keywords reflect the possible mechanism why the United States signal its interest towards the conflict in Macedonia. The demand and factual category the keywords which define the context of the United States statements are less due to the low numbers of statements in these categories. For the same reasons, the keywords exploring the content of statements towards Moldova and Spain are not plotted.

Figure 3.13 RAKE scores of different level of involvement statements about UK




Figure 3.13 introduces the keywords explaining the content of statements by the United States on IRA-UK conflict. The keywords in the highly involving statement category such as “brutal enemy”, “great deal”, “murderous ideology” and “close touch” expresses that the United States has been describing the destructive conflict with negative keywords which also expresses the position of the United States. The category which includes the demands of the United States is consisted from the keywords such as “universal condemnation”, and “ full implementation” which highlights that US demands the international attention and the conclusion of the conflict with the peace process and implementation of the agreement. The keyword with the highest RAKE score for the factual category is “telephone conversation”. This keyword indicates that the leader statements which does not propose any US position towards the conflict are mostly emphasizing the conversations between the United States and the UK. Thus, this keyword also hints the validity of the variable of interest.



### 3.4 Conclusion

This chapter intends to introduce a clear definition of third party attitudes and explain the data collection and generation process. The first section introduces the definition of third party attitudes. Followingly, the operationalization process has been introduced in a thorough manner. This section clarifies the case and source selection process, the filtering process, coding the irrelevant statements and content coding.

The second part of Chapter 3 introduces the content analysis of the relevant statements. This section is interested in showing that the novel dataset on Third Party Attitudes (TPA) is internally valid, along with describing the content of the statements. Although the figures which depict the word frequencies does not introduce the content of statements on civil conflicts clearly, the figures which utilize the Rapid Automatic Keyword Extraction (RAKE) technique for determining the content of statements show that third parties frame civil conflicts differently. While the United States has been approached to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland conflicts differently, the findings show that different third parties such as the United States and Germany approached the Turkey's armed struggle with the PKK diversely. Different keywords defining the issued statements of third parties, therefore, show that the motivations of third parties vary across different conflicts and this is observable through the leader statements.

While keywords defining the statements of third parties diverge, the keywords of statements with different levels of involvedness are also different. The defining keywords of statements which are more involved tend to reflect and signal the likelihood of intervention by these external states. These differences among different groups of statements indicates the validity of the coding results which is another significant finding of this chapter.

## 4. GERMAN, AMERICAN, AND BRITISH ATTITUDES

### TOWARDS TURKEY'S ARMED STRUGGLE WITH THE PKK- (2010-2019))

The literature on third party intervention has been the primary area of research in this dissertation. As it was indicated in the previous chapters this thesis intends to focus on defining and measuring third party attitudes and investigating the factors that shape this variable of interest. Although, the literature on third party intervention is an important source to detect how third party attitudes are shaped, a thorough examination of cases and investigation of casual dynamics on third party attitudes are necessary. This detailed examination enables to identify whether there is any undetected mechanism of third party attitudes.

The comparative and in-depth case analysis are the two methods used in this chapter. Particularly focusing on a small number of cases and create a most-similar systems design enables scholars to control certain important variables and analyze whether the only changing factor creates the outcome. The comparison of cases, therefore, is an important tool to detect causal mechanisms that might be missed in the empirical studies due to the large scale data unavailability. The in-depth study, on the other hand, is another powerful tool to detect new causal dynamics of the third-party attitudes. The following sections will explain the importance of these methods and the case selection process.

#### 4.1 Comparative Case Study

Comparative case study, a small-n research, is critical for exploratory purposes and can help to build the theoretical framework, as well as test them. Vannoni (2015) defined comparative case study which “aims to infer causal relationships between factors by systematically comparing instances of a phenomenon, namely, cases conceived as different configurations of variables or factors” (p.333). Compar-

ing instances, thus, give the researcher to have leverage to understand the causal relationship better with high levels of internal validity. As Sartori (1991) suggests “comparing is controlling”, comparing different external state attitudes on one civil conflict is a way to control for the impact of the conflict; hence, this chapter compares the attitudes of United Kingdom, the United States and Germany on the same conflict.

Selection of cases is an important aspect to consider while conducting comparative case study (Sartori 1991). The study will compare the United States, United Kingdom and Germany as third parties. Overall, the United States and Germany are global and regional powers who have important ties with Turkey. While United Kingdom is included for control purposes. Besides the presence and visibility of these actors in the international arena, the factors of Turkey’s armed struggle with the PKK are important to consider these cases for comparative purposes.


The bilateral relations of the United States, who is the global power since the end of World War II and the hegemon in the post-Cold War period, with Turkey dates back to the end of World War II. Since 1950s, Turkey and the US have been NATO allies and strategic partners with some ups and downs (Ergan 2006, Buhari-Sönmez 2020). Although these security ties are visible between the US and Turkey, economically these two countries are not strongly connected. While the United States does not have any bilateral trade agreement with Turkey <sup>1</sup>, the trade volume between the Turkey and the United States has been around 5% of Turkey’s economy. <sup>2</sup> Additionally, as Figure 4.1 indicates after 2008 the United States has become net exporter to Turkey with an increasing gap between the export and import levels, which illustrates that the US economy is not dependent on Turkey.

---

<sup>1</sup>Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) Dataset

<sup>2</sup>[https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree\\_map/hs92/export/tur/show/all/2018/](https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/tur/show/all/2018/), 11/24/2020

Figure 4.1 Export and Import Levels in Millions USD \$ between the United States and Turkey




Bilateral relations of Turkey with Germany, who can be considered as the regional power, dates back to the 1960s with the agreement of labor force which enabled Turkish workers to work in Germany.<sup>3</sup> The large migration wave to Germany from Turkey created an important link between these two countries. The European Union (EU) and the membership process of Turkey also has been another critical dimension in the relations of Germany and Turkey. Besides Turkey being a member in the Customs Union starting from 1995, Germany is also the most important trading partner of Turkey.<sup>4</sup> While, Turkey imported 11 percent of the total imported goods in 2018 from Germany, Turkey also has the highest levels of exports to Germany. As Figure 4.2 indicates, since 2001, Germany becomes net exporter to Turkey while Turkey is an important actor for German economy.

<sup>3</sup><http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-federal-republic-of-germany.en.mfa>

<sup>4</sup>OECD.world


Figure 4.2 Export and Import Levels in Millions USD \$ between Germany and Turkey



In general, the bilateral relations of Turkey and United Kingdom has been shaped around the issues of Cyprus issue and Turkey’s process in the European Union membership. The Strategic Partnership Agreement signed between Turkey and UK in 2010 aimed to develop the bilateral relations.<sup>5</sup> Economic ties also aimed to strengthen with this agreement. Although United Kingdom is the second country where Turkey exports its goods, the United Kingdom is also an important partner for Turkish import. Even UK is not dependent on Turkish import, Turkey is a net importer as Figure 4.3 illustrates.

<sup>5</sup><http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-united-kingdom.en.mfa>, 11/24/2020

Figure 4.3 Export and Import Levels in Millions USD \$ between the United Kingdom and Turkey



As a result of these short introductions on the bilateral relations of Turkey and third parties, Table 4.1 summarizes the variables of interest that can impact third party attitudes. The economic relations between Turkey and third parties are all similar. Due to the share and leverage of Turkey in the American, British and German economy can be considered as low, the dependency of these economies in Turkey is also small. The only noticeable difference of economic relations of Turkey and defined external states is UK being a net importer to Turkey. This relations in which the United Kingdom purchases more goods than selling to Turkey can be a critical issue while Britain considering the involvement to domestic conflict of Turkey. The level of trade between Turkey and UK thus can impact the decisions on to issue statements on Turkey’s domestic issues.

The existence of diaspora in these third parties also varies which will be explained in the following sections in detail. United Kingdom and Germany have an existing and influential Kurdish Diaspora, while the Kurdish Diaspora does not exist in the United States. As the literature suggests the relationship of third party with the nonstate actor is a critical point on how third parties can perceive the conflict as an external party. Therefore, this factor will impact how United Kingdom and Germany formulate their decision on issuing statements about the Turkish-PKK conflict

Table 4.1 Summary Table of Bilateral Relations

	Economic relations	Diaspora	Common IOs	Position in Syrian War
United States	Net importer, low dependency	No Diaspora	NATO	Alliance with Turkey
United Kingdom	Net exporter, low dependency	Kurdish Diaspora	NATO, EU (2017)	Alliance with Turkey
Germany	Net importer, low dependency	Kurdish Diaspora	NATO, EU	Alliance with Turkey

All third parties and Turkey are members to the same international organizations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN). This indicates that all these countries as international actors follow the same international rules which can shape their perception on third party intervention. Apart from these state-level factors, Syrian War -as a period specific incident which shapes the regional security dynamics- also should be considered as an important factor for forming appropriate case comparisons. United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany engaged with Turkey with different types of alliances for fighting against the Syrian government and ISIS. Therefore, Turkey and the external states positioned themselves on the same side in the most important regional security matter of 2010s.

Depending on these factors, the impact of economic relations and the existence of diaspora can be evaluated by comparing these third parties since these are the only factors that varies over different cases as it has been suggested in Table 4.1. Based on the presented variables in Table 4.1, comparing the United States and United Kingdom will enable to understand the impact of the existence of diaspora since these two cases are roughly alike in every factor except the diaspora variable. Comparing United Kingdom and Germany, on the other hand, enables to understand the impact of economic relations since except UK being a net exporter, all other variables are like the variables of interest of Germany.

However, this case comparison can be criticized for being rough and prone to problems. The most similar systems design can be challenged by the process of Syrian civil war since the way of these external states are involved in this regional security matter are different. While the United States formed a coalition including Turkey and UK and involve the conflict by joining the military force fighting against the Syrian government and ISIL, Germany is involved the conflict from a different aspect and pursue for a deal with Turkey on the migration issue. Therefore, the nature of alliance formed between the United States, United Kingdom and Germany with Turkey and critical junctures in these alliances are different. Since, a simple comparison of different countries cannot capture this dynamic relation and the change overtime, this chapter will also cover an in-depth case analysis and utilizing process tracing to overcome the shortcomings of case comparisons.

## 4.2 Process tracing

Process tracing is a method in which cases are explored in detail seeking to explore causal mechanisms. As Collier (2011) suggests process tracing and causal-process observations “gives greater attention to description as a key contribution and emphasizes the causal sequence in which process-tracing observations can be situated” (p. 823). Using this tool from qualitative methods will strengthen theories on third party attitudes which has not been covered in previous studies.

Process tracing will cover only how Syrian Civil Conflict and the relations developed under this event changed the American, British and German attitudes on Turkish-PKK conflict. Focusing only on the regional security aspects, which also covers the alliance and rival relations, is because the Syrian war is the upmost important incident shaping the regional security matters for the years between 2010 and 2019. Therefore, examining whether the key events in Syrian war lead any attitude changes on Turkish civil conflict will either support the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 2 or propose a new mechanism.

## 4.3 Brief History of Turkey’s armed struggle with the PKK

Tensions between the Turkish state and PKK has been one of the most defining and long-lasting regional conflict, tracing back to 1984. The establishment of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which advocated the formation of an independent Kurdish state, dates back to 1974 (Kıbrıs 2015, Jongerden and Akkaya 2016). The seeming inaction of the group lasted until the 1981 coup d’état in Turkey which resulted in the enactment of harsh measures against the Kurdish minority, especially those in Eastern Turkey. Adopting a Marxist-Leninist ideological position, the group resorted to violent measures following the harsh actions introduced in the newly formed Turkish Constitution banned the Kurdish language from being spoken (Çiçek 2018). Additionally, the Turkish military forces employed an asymmetric use of force against the Kurdish peoples in the eastern regions (Çiçek 2018). Such circumstances led to extremist Kurdish forces to surface and gather under the umbrella of the PKK, utilizing violent tactics to emphasize their demands of separation from mainland Turkey. Since 1984 Turkey has experienced a very intense and violent type of civil conflict.



Figure 4.4 Battle related deaths PKK-Turkey conflict. Source: TPCONED by Kıbrıs (2020)





Figure 4.4 illustrates the intensity of the conflict which drastically increases in the 1990s. In 1995 Turkey experienced the highest rates of casualties, approximately 7000, in a year. These violent acts continued until the unilateral ceasefire which PKK declared in 1999. After the leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured, the incentives of the group to continue their violent actions decreased. The main objective of the group advocating the formation of an independent Kurdish state changed (Çiçek 2018) as Ocalan made it clear that the PKK and its Kurdish supporters wanted autonomy and conciliation with the Turkish government for further political rights (Çiçek 2018). The unilateral ceasefire lasted until 2003. The second insurgency period started in 2004 and lasted for another 9 years until the peace process was started by the Turkish government.

The shift of the main motivation and aim of PKK from autonomy to secessionism altered the tactics of group as well. Figure 4.5 indicates the overtime change in the factions of PKK and how different groups with different tactics were formed overtime.

Figure 4.5 Some of the Kurdish factions. Source: Strategies of Resistance Data Project by Cunningham (2019)



While the PKK continued to engage in a rebellious struggle with the Turkish state, the group also formed a faction to organize political propaganda named Kurdistan National Liberation Front in 1991.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, the political propaganda faction, the People's Labor Party (HEP) was established to seek rights for the Kurdish people. After the dissolution of the HEP other political parties were formed to keep the salience of the Kurdish issue. HADEP was the first pro-Kurdish political party to be successful in elections. In the 1995 elections, HADEP received more than 1 million votes, with the addition to their success in the 1999 local elections where 37 local municipalities were won.<sup>7</sup>

On March 21st, 2013, the leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan declared another ceasefire with a letter which can be encountered as the beginning of the “solution process” between the PKK and Turkish government.<sup>8</sup> This was the first attempt of a bilateral ceasefire and the start of negotiations for peace between the conflicting parties.

The solution process included different attempts to improve the conditions of the Kurdish peoples as well as an effort acknowledge the needs of the minority. The Turkish state established Kurdish speaking national television, and the government invited various academics, journalists, businessmen and politicians to establish the “wise people committee”.<sup>9</sup>The aim of this group was to identify the main deter-

<sup>6</sup><https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/383>, 11/24/2020

<sup>7</sup><https://secim.haberler.com/1999/hadep-secim-sonucu/>, 11/24/2020

<sup>8</sup><https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/turkey-syria-and-saving-pkk-peace-process>, 11/24/2020

<sup>9</sup><https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/wise-men-committee-members-announced/258996>, 11/24/2020

minants of the conflict and formulate and propose possible solution policies for the conflict. However, these attempts failed after two years. While the tensions decreased with the solution process, the effectiveness of the Kurdish parties also increased overtime in Turkish politics and peaked in 2015 June elections, in which HDP surpassed the electoral threshold for the first time. HDP also got 80 seats out of 550 in the parliament.<sup>10</sup>

A turning point arrived in 2015 with a crisis involving Northern Syrian Kurds, the Kobani incident. The 2015 Kobani incident, in which the Turkish government refused to open a corridor for military support from the Iraqi Kurds to the Syrian Kurds under siege of ISIS, as well as the terrorist attack in Ceylanpınar, which resulted in the death of two Turkish soldiers, crippled the solution process (Goksel and Mandiracı 2016). The report by Demos also argued three other factors as an obstacle hindering the solution process; the rise of Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria as a powerful actor, the results of the 2015 elections, and the lack of trust between the Kurdish group and Turkish government.(Demos 2016). The steady political success of pro-Kurdish parties, thus, has been overshadowed by the links between the established political parties with PKK. Every attempt at forming a political party before HDP was closed by the decision of the Turkish constitutional court. Also, recently the leaders of HDP were arrested due to their alleged connections to the PKK.

This long lasting conflict has many negative externalities both for the society and the government. A plethora of studies (Bilgel and Karahasan 2013, Kıbrıs 2015, Kıbrıs and Metternich 2016) show how different the aspects of the progress of Turkey, particularly the south eastern regions, was interrupted by the ongoing civil conflict. Bilgel and Karahasan (2013) developed a synthetic control model for estimating the regional GDP to compare with a hypothetical case in which the region did not experience any conflict. The results show that the advancement would be higher than the current development in the absence of the PKK-Turkey conflict. Alongside the economic development, Kıbrıs (2015) and Kıbrıs and Matternich (2016) focused on the human development components and how education and health sectors were severely disturbed as a result of this conflict. The consequences show that the PKK-Turkey conflict has negative and detrimental effects which hinders any attempts to better the situation by imposing a concrete structure which has shaped both parties' perception of the circumstance as beyond the grasp of any potential solution.

---

<sup>10</sup><https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/781>, 11/24/2020

## **4.4 PKK as a Non-State Actor within Regional Dynamics: Other Kurdish Groups and the Kurdish Diaspora**

To understand the possible mechanisms that third parties engage within the conflict requires an in-depth analysis of the multiple external actors contributing to the PKK-Turkish conflict. This part of the study will first explain the regional dynamics to understand other possible aspects that can impact the third-party strategic calculations. Secondly, a discussion on the diaspora community will be presented in order to establish their critical role within third party attitudes.

### **4.4.1 The Regional Kurdish Groups and their specific Relations with the PKK**

The Kurdish group is an intertwined network connected to different Kurdish groups and foreign states. Of particular importance is the Kurdish population in neighboring countries such as Iraq, Iran and Syria. Concomitantly, this geographical proximity determines these states as salient actors shaping the PKK-Turkey conflict starting from the 1980s.

One of the critical events fueling the Kurdish issue in the Middle East is the Iran-Iraq war of 1980. Tension between Iraq and Iran also translated to the tension between the Kurdish groups as well. Even the Kurdish groups of Iraq, named PUK and KDP fought against the Iraq leadership, also advocating the formation of an independent Kurdish state directed by themselves. The civil war in Iraq between the Kurdish factions PUK and KDP impacted balances within the Middle East; Turkey's support of Barzani's KDP versus Iran's backing of Talabani's PUK created a "power vacuum" is argued as benefiting the PKK by solidifying their stances against the Turkish government (Gunter 1998).

The late 1980s and 1990s, thus, show that the balance and the relationship between Iran, Iraq and Turkey is the primary source for their attitudes and actions towards Kurdish groups. The deal between Iran and Turkey deal considered the PKK and Iranian extremist groups in early 1995. However, this relationship lasted until Turkey sent troops to Iraq to battle with PKK where Iran denounced this event (Gunter 1998). The primary reason for failure of the attempt of Turkey to eliminate the PKK was the support of Iran and Syria for the PKK.

Gerner (1998) suggests that the interstate conflicts and the relations among the

Middle Eastern countries, paved the way for Kurdish parties/factions to be utilized as proxies by USA, Turkey and Iran. The strategic importance of Kurdish groups as agents is high for balancing out the power dynamics in Middle East. According to Şan-Akca's (2009) dataset on Nonstate Armed Groups Syria has been an active supporter of the PKK for the years between 1984-1998. Syria was the safe haven both for the members and leaders of PKK and also provided training camps. Iran similarly supported PKK for being a safe haven and providing training camps. Different than Syria, Iran also delivered armament and logistic aid to PKK for the years between 1992-2000. Besides the eastern neighbors who helped PKK, Greece reinforced the group by opening offices and training camps for the years between 1994-1998. Iraq, Lebanon, Belgium, and the Netherlands are the countries who provided de-facto support for PKK.

The Turkish government on the other hand received support from the United States particularly after 2003 when Saddam Hussein was toppled down in Iraq. The United States provided intelligence about the PKK in Iraq and provided military equipment .<sup>11</sup>

The current Syrian civil war and the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) are also other key events for the PKK-Turkey conflict. The Syrian civil war was triggered on March 2011 by demonstrations demanding democratic reforms. The violent conflict started between the Bashar Al-Assad regime and the opponents which formed Free Syrian Army (FSA). As of 2011, the Syrian regime and the FSA started a fully-fledged civil war and continued even if there were mediation attempts by the UN. The conflict between the Ba'athist regime and opposition group escalated after 2012 and intensified. The Syrian conflict started to become an internationalized civil conflict, starting with the involvement of the United States in 2014 supporting the Kurdish groups to fight against ISIS. In 2015 Russia joined on the side of the Syrian regime following an official request from Assad.

Turkey was also an important party in the Syrian civil conflict which erupted in 2011. Turkey conducted several distinct cross border operations to secure the Syrian border (Operation Shah Euphrates, Operation Euphrates Shield, Afrin Operation Olive Branch and Operation Peace Spring). As Kaya and Whiting (2017) express Turkey conducted these operations since "Turkey remains deeply reluctant to see a continuous Kurdish belt along its border and has lobbied hard to restrict a self-governed Kurdish area from emerging in Syria in addition to the already existing one in northern Iraq" (p.13).

---

<sup>11</sup><https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/354>, 11/24/2020

#### 4.4.2 Kurdish Diaspora

Besides principle-agent theories which might shape the third party attitudes towards the non-state actors, diasporas can also be an affective agent for the process of an intrastate conflict. The diasporas which are based in different countries -host countries- may impact the perception of the external state and create a platform for the conflicting non-state actor. The existence of a strong diaspora thus can be a source for the intrastate conflict to become transnational.

Kurdish diaspora is one of the largest stateless diaspora groups in Europe (Baser 2015). The voice of the Kurdish issue in the European countries shaped by the Kurdish diaspora, along with the bilateral relations of these host countries with Turkey are important components of the PKK-Turkey conflict.

The Kurdish diaspora is the largest in Germany compared to the other European countries. The figures from the mid-90s estimate that approximately 600000 Kurdish people base in Germany <sup>12</sup>. Even the number of Kurdish people is living in Germany is high, the German-Kurd relations are not strong and positive. The clashes between the Kurdish and Turkish groups took the attention of the German government. The German government was also disturbed by these clashes and worried that these might challenge the security of the German society (Chapin 1996). Therefore, as Baser (2015) indicates, after the 1980s PKK declared that Germany was the “second front” of their war. As the president of a Kurdish organization in Germany close to PKK, stated in Baser’s (2015) interviews, the diaspora aimed to be visible and get the media attention. The aim for visibility was about the recognition of the Kurdish identity and to raise the awareness of conflict back in Turkey. The clashes of Kurdish and Turkish groups in Germany and increased violence of the group led Germany to prohibit PKK and ban its activities in 1993 (Baser, 2015).

A PKK supporter also stated that :

There was no other way in Germany. Even if you collect one million signatures, you cannot change Germany’s Turkish policy [...] what we did was to tell the Germans and the world: See us! We exist and we are dying everyday (Baser, 2015).


After the capture of Ocalan, the Kurdish diaspora started to underline the importance of dialogue and negotiation (Baser 2015). This tactical change also led to

---

<sup>12</sup><https://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/>, 11/24/2020

profile a different image of the Kurdish groups. As Baser (2015) suggests after the Kobani events the German public attitude might have been shifted in favor of the Kurdish people.

Figure 4.6 Number of Mentions Kurdish/Kurd in Local German Newspapers Source: LexisNexis



The 1990s illustrate how a powerful diaspora can impact foreign policies towards conflicting states. In 1990s Kurdish diaspora choose to act violently and therefore they could not get the support of the German government and society. However, as the PKK change their tactics and use more dialogue or nonviolent protests in Germany rather than using violent acts, they might be able to shift the German government's perception.

#### 4.5 The Effect of Syrian War over Dyadic Relationships of Turkey and PKK with the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany

The long-lasting conflict in Syria started on February 2011 with small scale anti-government protests. However, the protests spread around Syria and the Syrian government started to use strict measures to repress the spreading protests. In

April 2011, the human rights and opposition groups estimated casualties exceeding 500.<sup>13</sup>

The violent repressions by the Syrian government attracted attention by external states as the level of violence increased. On May 2011, the EU imposed sanctions on 13 senior officials excluding Assad.<sup>14</sup> The United States also showed its solidarity with the protesters with the visit of the US ambassador in Hamah.<sup>15</sup> The Syrian government condemned this visit and indicated this as US involvement.<sup>16</sup> In the following months, the UN Security Council furthered international condemnation of the Syrian government for the use of violence. While UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon urged to President Assad to terminate violent attacks; US President Barack Obama, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicholas Sarkozy, and UK Prime Minister David Cameron issued a statement for Assad to step down as president.<sup>17</sup> After the UN Human Rights officials estimated casualties more than 2200 in 5 months<sup>18</sup>, the EU strengthened sanctions and banned Syrian oil.<sup>19</sup> Besides the Western countries' reactions and threats, Iran, as the closest ally of Syria, called Assad to terminate the attacks against protesters. Arab League also denounced the Syrian government actions.<sup>20</sup>

The international presence of the violent repression of Syrian government on protesters also triggered the Syrian opposition to unite. Syrian Nation Council was formed to represent the Syrian opposition and they called the international community to defend the protests in Syria.<sup>21</sup>

While the death toll was increasing rapidly and exceeding 5000 in the last months of 2011, Syrian government signed a peace plan monitored by the Arab League.<sup>22</sup> The peace plan, however, did not stop the Syrian government repression. The UN Security Council wanted to confirm a resolution condemning Assad regime's violent attacks which was vetoed by Russia and China in February 2012. The

---

<sup>13</sup><https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-War/Uprising-in-Syria-2011>, 11/24/2020

<sup>14</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/world/europe/24sanctions.html>

<sup>15</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/world/middleeast/08syria.html>

<sup>16</sup><https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/08/syria-condemns-us-ambassador-visit-hama>

<sup>17</sup>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/obama-syrian-president-assad-must-step-down/2011/08/18/gIQAM75UNJ\\_blog.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/obama-syrian-president-assad-must-step-down/2011/08/18/gIQAM75UNJ_blog.html)

<sup>18</sup><https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-War/Uprising-in-Syria-2011>

<sup>19</sup><https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14759416>

<sup>20</sup><https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2011/nov/13/syria-reacts-after-arab-league-suspension>

<sup>21</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/world/middleeast/syrian-opposition-council-forms-in-istanbul.html>

<sup>22</sup>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle\\_east/arab-league-announces-peace-plan-for-syria/2011/11/02/gIQAKBm6fM\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/arab-league-announces-peace-plan-for-syria/2011/11/02/gIQAKBm6fM_story.html)



failed attempts of Arab League peace plan led Western countries to involve to this process. Kofi Annan was appointed as a joint UN and Arab League peace envoy and started to work on the peace plans in Syria. After discussions and meetings, Syrian government has agreed on the Kofi Annan peace plan. As a result, in April 2012 a deployment of a team of monitors went to Syria to observe the cease-fire. This international attempt by the UN and Arab League, however, failed with the continued attacks. House-to-house raids in Hulah resulted with killing of 100 people half of them being children led<sup>23</sup> Western countries to expel Syrian diplomats and stopped its monitoring operations in Syria. <sup>24</sup>

The increasing violence and repression in Syria resulted with the migration of Syrian civilians to the neighboring countries and Europe. As the UNHCR reported as of April 2013 1,387,806 Syrian nationals fled their countries. The civilians were forced to migrate to the neighboring countries such as Jordan (32%), Lebanon (31.2%), Turkey (22.6%), Iraq (9.8%), Egypt (3.6%) and other North African countries (0.7%) (Syria: Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration 2013 p.1).

While the casualties in Syria increased to 100.000 in July 2013, condemnations by the international actors were not successful to terminate the conflict. The United States, thus, announced the considerations to enter the conflict with military action due to the chemical attack by Syrian government. Russia, on the other hand, proposed putting Syrian chemical weapons stockpile under international control. <sup>25</sup> On September 14, 2013, the United States, Russia, and Syria reach an agreement on the international control of the chemical weapons. <sup>26</sup> The first months of 2014 continued seeking peace in Syria. In January 2014, international conference Geneva II was held, but progress could not be achieved. <sup>27</sup> In June 2014, the chemical weapons removed from the Syria under the terms of US-Russian agreement. <sup>28</sup>

The Syrian civil conflict which started in 2011 has been transformed in its nature in 2014 as the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) declared itself a caliphate and added to the equation as another party fighting with the sovereign states in the Middle East. This new actor in the region prolonged the war and disable the

---

<sup>23</sup><https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/killing-50-children-is-cruelty/365089>

<sup>24</sup><https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-War/Uprising-in-Syria-2011>

<sup>25</sup><https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/09/14/222397967/u-s-and-russia-form-a-plan-on-syria-s-chemical-weapons#:~:text=Secretary%20of%20State%20John%20Kerry%20and%20his%20Russian%20counterpart%20have,to%20detail%20its%20chemical%20arsenal>

<sup>26</sup><https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/09/14/222397967/u-s-and-russia-form-a-plan-on-syria-s-chemical-weapons#:~:text=Secretary%20of%20State%20John%20Kerry%20and%20his%20Russian%20counterpart%20have,to%20detail%20its%20chemical%20arsenal>

<sup>27</sup><https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24628442>

<sup>28</sup><https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-War/Uprising-in-Syria-2011>

Western countries to identify the enemy (Hale 2019). The US, who was providing non-lethal aid to the Free Syrian Army and support them against the Syrian government, started to train recruits from Syria against ISIL. The United States trained 15000 rebels and spent \$500 million.<sup>29</sup> The United States also started surveillance missions on ISIL. On September 22, 2014, the United States and a coalition of Arab countries started air strikes targeting ISIL.<sup>30</sup> By August 2017, in three years, the US and the allied states had flown 168.000 sorties against ISIL.<sup>31</sup> Also, in October 2015, the US supported group which included Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and a Kurdish-Syrian Arab Alliance with around 50.000 fighters was created.<sup>32</sup> According to some sources the first American ground troops enter Syria in late 2015.<sup>33</sup>

Kobane was where ISIS fought with the Kurdish groups starting in September 2014. The severe conflict between the ISIS and Kurdish group led an enormous migration flow which resulted with nearly 130,000 people to fled to Turkey in four days.<sup>34</sup> The international coalition joined the Kurdish fighters to defeat ISIS, however, the conflict have continued for four months. The siege by ISIS was able to be terminated in January 2015. This incidence is an important one that impacted the US-Turkey relations. Although, Turkey was a part of US led coalition in Syrian war, the Turkish state did not want to be a part for the coalition support for Kobane. This decision of Turkish government also triggered a group of violent protests by the Kurdish group supporters in October 2014.

“With the eventual defeat of ISIS in the autumn of 2015, in which the SDF played a major role, Turkish policy-makers had to face the fact that their main strategic ally in NATO was now allied with an organization close to the PKK, which in turn controlled territory along most of its southern frontier. As the main instrument in the defeat of ISIS, it was bound to enjoy support in Western capitals, whatever its reputation in Turkey.” (Hale, 2019).

On 20 April 2015, 600 people were drawn in Mediterranean<sup>35</sup> which directed the attention of the European countries on the humanitarian aspect of Syrian war. By September 2015, more than 300,000 people had risked their lives to reach Europe

---

<sup>29</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-syria-rebel-arm-train-trump.html>

<sup>30</sup><https://dod.defense.gov/OIR/>

<sup>31</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/world/middleeast/us-and-allies-hit-isis-targets-in-syria.html>

<sup>32</sup><https://dod.defense.gov/OIR/>

<sup>33</sup><https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/7/timeline-us-intervention-in-syrias-war-since-2011>

<sup>34</sup><https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29688108>

<sup>35</sup><https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html>

and over 2,600 had died in their attempts.<sup>36</sup> The large number of people aimed to migrate to Europe thus became one of the most important humanitarian crises in Europe.

European countries responded differently to the high levels of migration flows from Syria. While Hungary closed its Serbian borders, Germany and Austria kept open.<sup>37</sup> First responses by European countries, however, required further attention by the European Union. The European Commission projected a package of proposals by highlighting the importance of the emergency relocation for 120.000 people. The EC also stated that a permanent relocation mechanism, a common European list of safe countries of origin, effective return policy, a guide on public procurement rules for refugee support measures are needed to be decided.<sup>38</sup>

Following this proposed package, the EU leaders agreed on the cooperation with countries of origin and transit and welcomed the EU-Turkey joint action plan to achieve concrete operational measures on 15 October 2015 and signed on March 2016.<sup>39</sup> In February 2016, EC president Donald Tusk announced that the EU will contribute €3 million to the Syrian people in 2016.

While the EU was discussing the effective measures to deal with the refugee issue, violent war was continuing in several fronts. Syrian government and Russia also countered ISIL and conducted attack against the ISIL forces. Syrian troops with Hezbollah and Russian air support retake Palmyra from ISIL March 2016 after a year. While Pro-government Syrian troops expel ISIL from DAYR al Zawr in eastern Syria.

As the counterparts of the Syrian conflict and external states supporting them also fight against the ISIL, Turkey opened a third front against the YPG/PYD – Syrian Kurdish groups. The silence of Turkey on the Syrian Kurdish armed groups was changed in October 2015, when Turkish military hit the Kurdish forces.<sup>40</sup> Turkish government also reacted to the exclusion of YPG/PYD from the US-Russian joint ceasefire deal. The President Erdoğan stated that “The PYD and the YPG need to be out of the scope of the cease-fire, just like Daesh is”.<sup>41</sup> The United States stressed the importance of Turkey fighting against ISIL.

---

<sup>36</sup><https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html>

<sup>37</sup><https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html>

<sup>38</sup><https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/history-migratory-pressures>

<sup>39</sup><https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/history-migratory-pressures/>

<sup>40</sup><https://www.rt.com/news/332471-turkey-syria-azaz-kurds/>

<sup>41</sup><https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/keep-pyd-out-of-syria-truce-deal-erdogan-95635>

The proactive stance of Turkey has been furthered with direct military involvement to secure its southeastern borders. On 24 August 2016, with Operation Euphrates Shield fought with Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and ISIL which was supported by the US forces continued until March 2017.

Relations between Turkey and Russia is another key dynamic within the Syrian war. The Astana talks are one of the key events in the Syrian war which illustrates the very complex nature of relationships. In January 2017, Turkey, Russia, Iran and the representatives of UN agreed on a ceasefire and to set a monitoring process and formed de-escalation zones. Turkey, Russia and Iran also set another meeting called “Syrian Congress of National Dialogue” in January 2018. However, these attempts concluded with no clear progress for terminating the conflict (Hale, 2019).

In January 2018 Trump announced an “open-ended military presence” in Syria.<sup>42</sup> After the decisive results against ISIL and the defeat of the leader Bagdadi in October 2019, US withdraw from Syria. In October 2019, Turkey launches an offensive into the Kurdish region of northeastern Syria.

#### **4.6 Selecting Variables in Context: Implementation within Hypotheses**

The background sections summarized the elements to understand the complete picture of PKK-Turkey conflict, as well as introduced the key events for the 2010-2019 period. This section will introduce the expectations derived from these backgrounds and propose the hypotheses in case specific arguments.

Economic relations and the existence of diaspora are two variables that argued to be factors for third parties to decide on issuing statements or not. When the economic relations are high, then it is expected that a country is more likely to talk on the domestic affairs of its partner. The following hypothesis compares how the United Kingdom can act differently compared to Germany due to lower levels of trade and being net importer.

*H1: United Kingdom is less likely to issue statements on the domestic affairs compared to Germany.*

The existence of a diaspora is another critical factor which shapes the decision

---

<sup>42</sup><https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/17/us-military-syria-isis-iran-assad-tillerson>

on issuing statements on Turkish-PKK conflict. Since the United Kingdom has a Kurdish diaspora and the United States does not, United Kingdom is expected to issue more statements on the PKK or Kurdish groups.

*H2: United Kingdom is more likely to issue statements on PKK or Kurdish groups living in Turkey.*

As Chapter 2 concluded the importance of regional security relations, which is forming the alliance and rivalry between states, can be critical determinants for third parties to issue statements about others' domestic matters. When the United States, United Kingdom and Germany forms their decision on issuing statements about Turkish-PKK conflict, for the years between 2010 and 2019, they will also consider their relations to Turkey and PKK in the context of Syrian Civil War.

From the United States' perspective, the Syrian war can be evaluated in three separate periods, (1) pre-involvement (2011-2014), (2) the rise of ISIL and US involvement (2014-2018), (2) US withdraw from the conflict (2018-2019). Between 2011 and 2014 the United States partially involved by condemning Syrian government for the violent repressions against the Syrian civilians. This period, since the regional security matters are not severe and the United States and Turkey supported the same side in Syrian Civil War, the United States may issue statements on Turkish-PKK conflict more due to the existing alliance towards a common enemy.

*H3: The United States is likely to issue statements on Turkish-PKK conflict for the years between 2011-2014.*

In the first period the United States is expected to issue statement which can be defined as low levels of involvement favoring Turkey and threatening PKK. The level of involvement would not be high since the stakes for the United States in the region is not so much high as well.

*H4: The United States is likely to issue involving and supporting statements on Turkey.*

As the terrorist group ISIL established and the intensity of Syrian conflict increased, the United States decided to engage more with the Syrian Kurdish groups to be able

to fight successfully in the region. Therefore, starting from 2014, the United States will continue to support Turkey in its domestic conflict since these two countries have an ongoing and important partnership on defeating the Syrian government and ISIL. The condemnation of PKK in this period can be more visible in order to balance out the support by the United States of YPG/Syrian Kurds in Syria. So, the existing alliance between Turkey and the United States can be a critical issue to impact how the United States takes position against the PKK.

*H5: The United States is likely to issue involving and supporting statements towards Turkey for the years between 2014-2018.*

*H6: The United States is likely to issue involving and hindering statements towards the PKK for the years between 2014-2018.*

After the election of Donald Trump, the American attitude might shift due to the Brunson case and the withdraw of the United States from Syria. The defeat of ISIL in 2015 and the leadership change in the United States, will lead the United States to be less involved favoring Turkey but still supportive and less reactive towards PKK (no statement).

*H7: The United States is likely to issue less involving but supporting statements towards Turkey for the years between 2018-2019.*

*H8: The United States is likely to not issue statements on PKK.*

The migration crises, as one of the negative consequences of the Syrian War, will be the determinant of the timely reactions of Germany on Turkish-PKK conflict. The attitudes of Germany may shift to a more involved position in Turkey-PKK conflict favoring Turkey as Turkey becomes a critical actor for the migration crisis and an ally for the EU. After 2015 the change in German attitudes are expected.

*H9: Germany is likely to issue statements on Turkish-PKK conflict while after 2015 the statements will be more involved and supportive towards Turkey.*

The density of Turkey-PKK conflict in the years between 2010 and 2019 is lower compared to 1990s when it was at its peak. However, a considerable rise in the

number of PKK attacks after 2015 should lead to a change in the attitudes of external actors. Third parties will be more responsive and issue more statements about the conflict; however, there will be no arguments on the level of involvedness and biasedness of statements since they are determined by the interstate relations and the regional security matters.

*H10: As the Turkish-PKK conflict becomes more violent, the likelihood of third parties to issue statements will increase.*

The following section will introduce and interpret the statements issued by Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States. While this section aims to compare the frequency of issuing statements, the section will also analyze how the attitudes of statements across countries and over time.

#### **4.7 Words Over Deeds: An Analysis on German, British and American Attitudes Towards PKK-Turkish Conflict**

The first main aspect of this chapter is to compare the third party attitudes according to the existence of a diaspora and economic relations. In doing so this section will introduce two analyses (1) comparing the difference between the frequencies of issued statements between third parties and (2) the biasedness towards the Turkey and PKK.

Comparing the frequencies of issued statements by the United States, United Kingdom and Germany is a good measure to show how these countries intends to Turkey's domestic politics. To compare the frequencies of issued statements the ANOVA method compares these countries based on the rate of issuing statements on Turkey and PKK among the other domestic related statements. The country comparisons will also hint whether the economic relations and existence of diaspora matters for third party attitudes towards civil conflicts.


A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if the frequency in issuing statements on Turkey among the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany is different. There is a statistical difference between the countries determined by one-way ANOVA  $F(2,237) = 27.16p = .000$ . A Tukey post-hoc test also reveals that all country pairs are significantly different from each other except the United States and United Kingdom. While Germany is the country who issues the highest number

of statements, United Kingdom is the country with lowest number of issued statements.

Another one-way ANOVA conducted to determine if the frequency of statements on PKK or terrorism in general is different between the third parties. The results indicate that the frequency of statements which are about the PKK and terror attacks are significantly different within groups. However, similar to the findings for the frequency of statements on Turkey the issued statements of United Kingdom and the United States on PKK and terrorist attacks are not different.

Figure 4.7 compares the orientation of the United States and the United Kingdom towards Turkey which has been argued that the change depends on the existence of Kurdish diaspora while the economic and security relations are considered similar. The level of biasedness is measured through monthly mean value of statements about the civil conflict and its actors.

Figure 4.7 Mean Level of Bias towards Turkey




According to Figure 4.7, the United States and United Kingdom both reflect positive attitudes towards Turkey in conflict related statements. While UK comments less than the United States, they both speak more frequently after 2016, in some of the statements the United States refer to Turkey in a more neutral stance.

Figure 4.8 illustrates the orientation of the US and UK towards the terrorist group PKK.. Here it is important to clarify that the third party statements which clearly



identifies PKK or any terrorist attack as the statements towards the nonstate actor of this conflict. Therefore, while the PKK is the main actor in interest, some statements in which the nonstate actor has not been referred clearly are also included. This might create a bias in the descriptive inferences, however missing the statements on terrorism will have the similar consequences. Therefore, considering this coding issue is important while commenting on the following figure. Similar to Figure 4.7, United Kingdom issues low numbers of statements on PKK. Both the United States and United Kingdom comments negatively towards the terrorist group. The two country comparison however only shows that UK is more leaning towards not commenting on the issue, as oppose to the United States who clearly supports Turkey over PKK. The existence of Kurdish diaspora and good economic relations -but not dependent- with Turkey, might lead UK to be silent on the issue.

Figure 4.8 Mean Level of Bias towards PKK and Terrorism



The second comparative case analysis, Germany and UK, is to show whether there is any difference between these countries which might be due to the economic partnership. More versatile statements issued by Germany might be highlighting that the economic power of Germany facilitates the government to issue more statements with changing orientation.

As a result of these comparisons, weak economic ties and the existence of Kurdish diaspora might be differentiating United Kingdom from the United States and Ger-

many in the number of issuing statements as well as the orientation of statements. This comparison, however, as it was stated previously is a weak one and only hints that UK attitudes, as a country with different bilateral relations, are different as expected. However, concluding that the true effect of both the existence of Kurdish diaspora or economic ties needs further and detailed analysis. Also concluding that these are the factors shape the decisions on issuing statements is not a complete and strong argument due to the weakly formed most similar systems design and needs further improvements.


The level of involvement in attitudes is another dimension that these cases can be compared. The level of involvedness is the extent to which third parties positions themselves towards the conflict. If the third party expresses the full support by stating the option of fighting together or being a part of the conflict either for Turkey or PKK has been coded as the highest degree for the level of involvedness. Whereas stating a fact about the conflict or the parties has been coded as the lowest level of involvement.

Figure 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 illustrate over time change in the level of involvement which favors or hinders Turkey over PKK for the United States, Germany and United Kingdom respectively. The biasedness of attitudes are measured through the differences between the level of biasedness of Turkey and PKK or terrorism as nonstate actor. In these descriptive figures, the nonstate actors have been depicted with two different line plots which enables to understand whether any differences exist in statements when the PKK has not been clearly identified as the terrorist group. The negative attitude category consists from the statements in which third party refers to Turkey by issuing more negative statements than the PKK or terrorism. While positive attitudes indicates the statements are positive towards Turkey, the neutral statements include statements in which third parties express the same level of biasedness towards the conflicting parties. So, these sentiment measures are comparisons of sentiments and reflect the relative sentiment of the state and nonstate actors.

Statements of United States regarding the PKK-Turkey conflict and terrorism in general vary over time. While United States only once issued a positive statement towards the PKK, other issued statements regarding PKK and terrorism are statements with positive attitudes towards Turkey. Hence, the United States does not issue any statements to criticize Turkey on its domestic conflict. As it was argued in the previous section, the United States has been approached to Turkey-PKK conflict differently in time. While the United States has less benefits nested in Syrian war before 2014 as oppose to the period after 2014, the level of involvement favor-

ing Turkey increased after 2014, particularly after 2016. After 2018, the frequency of statements has decreased but still issued statements are involving and favoring Turkey. Figure 4.9, thus, supports the expectations that was introduced in the previous section. The changing security dynamics within the region and the role of Turkey affected US reactions towards Turkish domestic issue.

Figure 4.9 Mean Involvedness towards Turkey for Different Levels of Bias American Statements



Germany and Turkey experience different a path in their relations regarding the Syrian War. Germany is more interested in to deal with the migration crisis which impacted the European countries the most. As the in-depth overtime case analysis suggested, 2015 onwards the German attitudes can be different compared to the previous years due to the increasing refugee flows from Syria to Europe.

Figure 4.10 Mean Involvement towards Turkey for Different Levels of Bias of German Statements





Figure 4.10 illustrates three types of attitudes: negative, positive and neutral towards Turkey. Before 2015 German attitudes are in general not frequent and the frequency of issued statements increase after 2016. The number of statements, which clearly identifies PKK as a nonstate actor, however, are not frequent as the statements refer to terrorism. The level of involvement favoring Turkey as oppose to PKK do not change. The level of involvement of issued statements change between low and high levels of involvement. The level of involvement of statements, in which Germany refers to terrorism and do not define who they are, includes all levels of involvement. Germany also utilizes neutral statements. Statements referred to PKK and Turkey in similar attitudes are mostly demands, on the other hand, statements referred to terrorism and Turkey in similar attitudes are mostly commenting on the events. As the graphs in Figure 4.10 shows, German attitudes towards Turkey does not change when the EU-Turkey deal was on the table. Germany mostly has stabile and positive attitudes towards Turkey about its domestic conflict.

Figure 4.11 Mean Involvedness towards Turkey for Different Levels of Bias of British Statements



The overall attitudes of United Kingdom, as the control country of this case study, is favoring Turkey. While UK does not issue any negative or neutral statements about the Turkish state on the civil conflict; UK tends to support Turkey and issue highly involved statements. However, the frequency of statements is very low compared to the United States and Germany. It is also important to highlight that in most of the issued statements of United Kingdom does not refer directly to PKK and rather comment on the conflict as terrorist attacks unlike the United States and Germany. This issue is an important one which needs further analysis on why the United Kingdom frames the civil conflict in Turkey as such.

#### 4.8 Conclusion

This chapter illustrates and compares three different third party attitudes towards Turkey-PKK conflict. The importance of the chapter is to utilize comparative case study and an in-depth case analysis to understand the underlining causal mechanisms in different or changing third party attitudes on civil conflicts. After the

introduction of the backgrounds of Turkey-PKK conflict, the Syrian war as one of the most important event in the region for the years between 2010-2019 introduced regarding the roles of United States, Germany, Turkey and various Kurdish groups based in different countries. This in-depth case description enables the thesis to comment on how regional security dynamics change the alliance and rivalry relations and therefore impacts how third parties react towards a civil conflict.

This chapter suggests that the military alliance relations is one of the primary sources for the third party attitudes towards the civil conflict. While economic relations and diaspora may impact these attitudes, suggested by the comparative case analysis between United Kingdom, the United States and Germany, the state-to-state security relations are particularly critical aspects for third parties to shape their attitudes on intrastate conflicts.

## 5. AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS CIVIL CONFLICTS

The previous chapter aims to understand and further theorize about third party attitudes on civil conflicts by exploring the factors that shape the new measure generated to encompass the intricates of third-party attitude. As Chapter 4 concludes, the results presented on the analyses of American, British, and German attitudes towards the Turkish-PKK conflict propose that realist variables, such as regional security, are important for shaping third party attitudes. On the other hand, results suggest that liberal variables along with the dynamics of relations between the non-state actor and third party have less explanatory power over third party attitudes or could not be supported due to weak research design. Additionally, the previous chapter falls short in providing a generalizable argument due to the lack of external validity of the analysis. To deal with the limitations of Chapter 4, Chapter 5 intends to conduct an analysis for a broader time range as well as integrating different conflicts. This chapter, therefore, covers a more general picture on the determinants of third party attitudes.

This chapter examines American attitudes on European conflicts in the years between 1990-2019. Both extending the number of conflicts, as well as the temporal range will enable the testing of the hypotheses presented in the first chapter of the study. The next part of this chapter will discuss on the reasons behind the choice of the United States as a case, also introducing the puzzle that recent literature in this subject is debating with. This chapter also highlights how introducing and exploring the factors that shape American attitudes on civil conflicts are important to understand American foreign policy making.

## 5.1 A Brief Overview of American Attitudes: Interventions and Civil Conflicts

The ostensible failure of the United States' response and lack of action with regards to the Bosnian and Rwandan Genocides has influenced the harsh retort of the US in dealing with the humanitarian violations occurring in Libya almost two decades later (Pape, 2012). President Obama's main goal with this intervention in 2011 was perceived to be as preventative measure against mass killings by overthrowing Qaddafi. However, the intervention was criticized as a failure due to inadequate actions to establish and reconstruct Libya.<sup>1</sup> America neglecting to reform the country in the post conflict period which have led the country to a further turmoil has been commented as a successful and has concluded the war and prevented mass killings at the expense of peace.<sup>2</sup>

Pape (2012), on the other hand, interprets this "new strategy on intervention" as "meaningful" and effective with low cost action by the United States. Obama's refrained course of action in Libya was a product of the calculations which factored in the Bush administrations intervention in Iraq. Barack Obama criticized George W. Bush, as "a president who became tragically overextended in the Middle East, whose decisions filled the wards of Walter Reed with grievously wounded soldiers, who was helpless to stop the obliteration of his reputation, even when he recalibrated his policies in his second term."<sup>3</sup>

New attempts at understanding third party intervention of the United States depend on changing motivations that are rooted in the dynamics between domestic and international spheres and circumstances. Concomitantly, the line of inquiry presents yet another major question: which conflicts does the United States choose to intervene and which means are utilized in this effort.

The United States has been a prominent actor in the observances of civil conflicts. As Figure 1 illustrates, the United States intervenes most of the civil conflicts diplomatically, particularly in the Cold War period. The United States, however, intervened relatively less conflicts in the post-Cold War period while the total number of diplomatic interventions increased drastically.

---


<sup>1</sup><https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/obamas-worst-mistake-libya/478461/>

<sup>2</sup><https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/obamas-worst-mistake-libya/478461/>

<sup>3</sup><https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525>




Figure 5.1 The Number of Diplomatic Interventions by the United States, Source: Regan and Aydın (2009)



According to Şan-Akca's Nonstate Armed Groups (NAG) dataset, the United States has the highest number of supports towards the nonstate armed groups, approximately 5% of the total number of supports as Figure 2 illustrates.


Figure 5.2 Total Number of Nonstate Actor Support by the United States



Unlike the lower levels in the diplomatic intervention, the United States is an important external state who provides different means to support the nonstate actors. Even there is a slight decrease in supporting nonstate armed groups as the Cold War ended, the United States remain an important actor for the conflicting actors.

Since the 1990s America has supported or continued to support approximately fifteen nonstate armed groups each year. Most of this involvement has been in Asia; the conflicts in the Middle East follow closely. On the other hand, in Europe as the region in interest of this chapter, the United States involvement has occurred mostly after the late 1990s early 2000.

Figure 5.3 Total Number of Nonstate Actor Support by the United States in Different Regions



The American position towards and relative power in global politics directed scholarly attention to the dynamics of its intervention in intrastate conflicts. A particular attention to disseminate the factors that lead the superpower to intervene civil conflicts, thus, will reflect how the United States is different in considering third party intervention compared to the other external actors. The analysis on American intervention can also reflect and discuss on how the global agenda on human rights and intervention will be shaped.

Although the United States is an important actor for civil conflicts, the interest in factors explored and examined which frame intervention decisions are not rich. Early studies by - Regan (2000) and Yoon (1997) studied the US intervention from different perspectives. Yoon (1997) explored the US decision to intervene intrastate conflicts in the Cold War period. The focus was on whether economic and security matters hold an important effect on the decisions to intervene or not. The study concludes that the security relations are the primary variables that explains the US decisions to intervene in the Cold War period. The existence of the Soviet ally intervened, or a communist presence impacts USA decision. On the other hand, the economic and regional specifics do not impact the decisions of US to intervene intrastate conflicts in the Cold War period.

Regan (2000), on the other hand, explored a different aspect of the issue which focused on the conditions under which the USA is likely to choose different means to intervene intrastate conflicts. Risk perceptions of the United States has been introduced as the main mechanism by Regan (2000); he explores that relations of America with the target country, as well as the public attention to conflict measured through the media attention, are two critical sources for the choice and means to intervene.

These studies are important to show how the USA, as the hegemon and international actor who has the highest probabilities in engaging others' domestic issues, behaves from various aspects. The periods which these studies refer to, however, do not constitute the recent developments in the international environment, particularly on the human rights issue. The shift in the international environment, where human rights norms have been changed since the end of Cold War, creates another area of inquiry to understand whether the decisions on intervention of United States has been shifted as well.

After 1990s, in the post-Cold War period, the human rights issue in the global agenda shifted. As the Cold War ended, the common threat posed by the USSR had dissolved and new era in international arena started. Normand and Zaidi (2008) expressed that globalization and terrorism are considered as new threats to human rights developed in the post-Cold War period. 9/11 has been the critical event for the rise of global terrorism and terrorist organizations to become nonnegligible international actors of influence affecting the global agenda. Human rights issue has been shaped as terrorism changed the approaches, dynamics, and understanding of the concept of international security. The intention of supporting non-state actors in the Cold War period due to the bipolar world order, shifted to an international collective action and multilateral intervention towards civil conflicts.

Human rights issues in the global arena have been a critical influence concerning decision making with regards to considerations of third-party intervention. The Council of Human Rights was dissolved; in its place the Human Rights Council under the UN General Assembly reconstructed in 2006. The membership of 43 countries and the decision-making process which was revised to an absolute majority shaped how the human rights concerns was going to be deal with after 2006. The change in the global governance regarding the human rights issue, United States still played as an important international actor and utilize intervention to intrastate conflicts and apart from the international environment which acts like a constraint or incentive for unilateral action.

Figure 5.4 Ratio of Important Issues for the United States in UN Resolutions on Human Rights




Figure 5.4 illustrates the ratio of UN resolutions which are defined as important by the US State Department on human rights issue<sup>4</sup> to the total number of human rights resolutions passed in the UN council. Approximately around 40% of the UN resolutions on human rights were identified as important by the United States. This illustrates that the United States considers the a good amount of human rights issues as critical in the global agenda.

Choi (2013, 2015) argues that the “academic scholars and policy makers disagree on what type of leadership role the United States should assume to response to humanitarian crisis” (p.). While some scholars argue that the United States is more likely to intervene civil conflicts for humanitarian purposes (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). Particularly realist scholars are inclined to argue that strategic calculations of relative power of the United States is the primary source in its decision making. Choi (2013, 2015), in his both studies, concludes that the United States considers humanitarian aspects and preserve liberal norms instead of pursuing national interests.

The intervention decisions by the United States is only one of the aspects to examine

<sup>4</sup>Vote identified as important by U.S. State Department report Voting Practices in the United Nations.

how the United States behaves towards civil conflicts. As it was discussed in Chapter 1, third party attitudes are as important as third party intervention decisions. Third party attitudes as cheap signals can revert the process in civil conflicts similar to third party interventions. Particularly if we consider the American attitudes, they can reflect the possible US strategy towards the civil conflicts before intervention and change the conflict dynamics before even the military or diplomatic interventions. The issued statements of the United States on civil conflicts are cheap but strategic decisions which depends on their perception on the conflict and evaluate their possible means of intervention.

Detecting the early signs for American intervention, thus, will enable scholars to understand whether the United States has an overall shifting policy in humanitarian intervention or calculates depending on the conflicts. The question of interest of this chapter is “What motivates the United States to issue involving statements towards civil conflicts?”.

The hypotheses, which have been established in Chapter 2, is going to be evaluated. The hypotheses developed arguments on two sets of questions: (1) the motivations to issue statements on the conflicts, and (2) the determinants for involving and positive statements on conflicting actors.

The hypothesis on issuing statements are related to three major issues: (1) alliance and rivalry relations, (2) economic ties and, (3) conflict characteristics.

Whether the United States considers issuing statements on the European civil conflicts can depend on the regional security relations of the United States. An existing militarized interstate dispute between the United States and the conflicting country will show the tension between these two countries which will bolster the United States to issue statements on rival’s domestic matters. The existence of alliance between the conflicting country and the United States also increases the likelihood of issuing statements and the statements will favor the conflicting country. The related hypotheses are as follows:

*H1a: Existing alliances between the host state and the United States will increase the likelihood of issuing statements.*

*H2a: Existing rivalry between the host state and the United States will increase the likelihood of issuing statement.*

*H2b: Existing rivalry between the host state and the United States will increase the likelihood of issuing statement favoring the non-state actor.*

The civil conflict characteristic is another important determinant that can change the decision of the United States to issue statements on the conflict or not. The following hypothesis thus is another hypothesis that this section will examine.

*H3: The severity of civil conflict will increase the likelihood of issuing statement.*

While the economic ties have been argued as an important factor in the literature (\*\*), Chapter 4 could not support whether economic relations are determines the likelihood of third party to issue statements on the civil conflict. In this chapter the analysis will include the export levels as a proxy for the strong economic ties and evaluate whether this determinant has any impact on the likelihood of issuing statements.

*H4: Strong economic ties between the host and third party will increase the likelihood of issuing statement.*

The second question of interest is to explore the determinants of the level of involvement of issued statements. The theoretical chapter concluded that the regional security relations are primary variables that argued to be important for third parties to reflect their intentions. Thus, this chapter also hypothesize that the existence of rivalry and alliances will determine the American attitudes towards the conflicting actors. The hypotheses are as follows:

*H6a: Existing alliances between the host state and the United States will increase the likelihood of involvement favoring the host country.*

*H6b: Existing alliances between the host state and the United States will increase the likelihood that the third party refrains from issuing statements as well as increasing involvement against the non-state actor.*

*H7a: Existing rivalry between the host state and the United States will increase the likelihood for high levels of involvement against the host country.*

*H7b: Existing rivalry between the host state and the United States will increase the likelihood for high levels of involvement favoring the non-state actor.*

The next section will present the data and the variables which will be used to test the hypothesis in detail.

## 5.2 Research Design and Variables

The unit of analysis is host state- non armed group dyad month. There are 6 (UK, Moldova, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Spain, Macedonia) host countries with 12 different non-state groups. The data covering 1990-2019 period, is consisted of 4320 observations.

### 5.2.1 Dependent Variable

The analysis aims to understand two parts of third party attitudes: (1) whether the third party issues any statements or not, if so (2) how does the level of involvedness of positive or negative statements change.

This study will utilize two-part Model (2PM) suggested by Bartusevicius and Gleditchsh (2018) to analyze events with two stages. Bartusevicius and Gleditchsh (2018) utilize two-part model in explaining civil conflict onset by diverging the onset into two stages and differentiate the peace years from the non-conflict years in which the probability of experiencing civil conflict is higher. For exploring third party attitudes the dependent variable should distinguish into two stages: (1) existence of issued statement on the state or nonstate actor, and (2) the level of involvements of hindering or supportive statements on the state or nonstate actor. 2PM model is used over other two-stage models such as Heckman selection model because it has been argued that using 2PM outperforms other methods when “the correlation between the errors are modest” and “the model is natural when the focus is on actual rather than potential outcomes” (Bartusevicius and Gleditchsh 2008, p.8).

To conduct these analyses, a dummy variable whether any statement was issued in the given month about the host country and non-state actor will be used. The first



Table 5.1 Measurement of Third Party Attitudes

Dependent Variable	Range	Level of Involvedness	Bias-State	Bias-NSA
1 Positive State	0	1-3	=<0	Any value
	3=>x>0	1-3	>0	Any value
2 Negative State	0	1-3	=>0	Any value
	-3=<x<0	1-3	<0	Any value
3 Positive NSA	0	1-3	Any value	=<0
	3=>x>0	1-3	Any value	>0
4 Negative NSA	0	1-3	Any value	=>0
	-3=<x<0	1-3	Any value	<0

part will evaluate the conditions on issuing statements, while the second part of the model evaluates the determinants of the third party attitudes based on the issued statements. Among 4320 observations in 3465 of them there are no statements, while in 855 of them the United States issued statements.

The categorization of third party attitudes is in 2 folds for every conflicting parties: (1) the level of involvedness and (2) the biasedness/orientation towards the conflicting parties. These two components of categories also contain 3 different categories. Third party attitudes, thus, is a three dimensional measure. Since amalgamating these three dimensions into one index is complex, this study will evaluate the level of involvedness in four variables which changes on the orientation towards the host state and non-state actors.

The dependent variable for the second stage analysis is third party attitude, which has been defined and explained in Chapter 2, and thus measured as 4 different variables: (1) the level of involvedness of positive statements towards the host state, (2) the level of involvedness of negative statements towards the host state, (3) level of involvedness of positive statements towards the non-state actor, and (4) the level of involvedness of negative statements towards the non-state actor.

The three categories of the level of biasedness (coded as -1,0,1) towards the state or nonstate actor, first of all, is recoded as a dummy variable which as negative and positive statements towards the state or nonstate actor. This new dummy variables are multiplied with the corresponding involvement level which ranges from 1 to 3. Four different variables are created as a result of this stage and varies on the orientation towards the conflicting parties.

To be more clear, the dependent variable the level of involvedness of positive statements towards the host state the value 0 represents the negative and neutral comments on the state regardless of their level of involvement while the values above 0 represents the level of involvement towards the positive statements. Missing values means that there is no statement on the host state in that given month. Table 5.1 illustrates the measured values of the dependent variables in detail. <sup>5</sup>

### 5.2.2 Independent Variables

The variable on existing rivalry between the two countries can be measured through different aspects not only through “enduring rivalries” (Klein et al 2006). According to Klein et al (2006) existing rivalry is related to the military competition and existing conflicts. However, Diehl et al. (2019) disseminates the rivalry concept from event based operationalization to a more dynamic form. Diehl et al (2019) define peace as an ongoing relationship (p.3) and thus the rivalry and peace between states need to be referred in a holistic manner. The Peace Scale established by Diehl et al. (2019), thus measures the interstate relations as a peace continuum, ranged from severe rivalry to security community. Five categories defined by the authors – which are severe rivalry, lesser rivalry, negative peace, warm peace and security community – will be utilized as a variable to control for the existing rivalry and alliance.

As another indicator for existing rivalry between the United States and conflicting states can be measured through the militarized disputes between the host country and third party. Using the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset which covers the years between 1992 and 2010 will be converted into a dyad-month format and the highest level of action between the two states will measure the rivalry between the United States and conflicting states.<sup>6</sup>

The economic relations between the states will measured through using monthly data on the export and import levels between the conflicting country and third party. The monthly trade levels are downloaded from the United States Census Bureau website in which the bilateral Foreign Trade figures between the United States and partner countries are introduced. <sup>7</sup> All import and export variable are

---

<sup>5</sup>See Appendix for the distribution of the dependent variables.

<sup>6</sup>Whether any rivalry exists between any of the neighbors of the conflicting country with the third party is also important to assess the potential to interference of third party. However, the number of militarized interstate disputes with the neighboring countries of the conflicting country for the years between 1990 and 2019 does not exist. So this variable is not included in the regression.

<sup>7</sup>Retrieved in 08.11.2020 17:17. <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html>

introduced in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified.

The severity of civil conflict is another important measure for the assessment of American attitudes on civil conflicts. The maximum level of intensity of conflict, which has been measured by the number of deaths in a year, will be used as a variable to measure civil conflict violence. Additionally the war duration in monthly terms will be utilized as another control to analyze whether the longer civil conflicts impact the motivations of the United States to issue statements on the civil conflict.

The main discussions around the realist and liberal camps have been also challenged by the importance of the media and its impact on the US decisions to intervene. The “CNN effect” which bolsters the need to issue statements on important events due to the increased awareness in the public raised by the media attention, is measured through the number of news in the first page in the New York Times on the civil conflicts. The data is from the New York Times Front Page Dataset created by Amber Ellen Boydston (2014) covering stories between 1996 and 2006. Boydston (2014) grouped front-page stories into thirty-two major topics. To calculate the number of conflict related news, among the news categorized under the “Defense” and “International Affairs and Foreign aid” topics, the number of titles with appropriate keywords on civil conflicts has been computed.

The intervention is an important factor that will change the attitudes of third parties, thus, we need to control whether in a given month the third party have decided to intervene or not. Third party intervention -military or diplomatic- will be assessed through the dataset by Regan and Aydın (2009). However, the third party intervention measured in this dataset is related to the state related intervention. Belgin Şan-Akca (2009) in Nonstate Armed Groups (NAG) dataset formed variables to measure third parties support towards nonstate actors. The dataset offers information on different forms of support; henceforth, this study will measure a variable which calculates the number of different ways of support by the third party towards the nonstate actors. Both support and de facto support variables are measured.

The descriptive statistics of the variables are introduced in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2 Summary Statistics

	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Statement	4320	.20	.40	0	1
Positive State	855	.73	.99	0	3
Negative State	855	-.27	.68	-3	0
Positive NSA	855	.44	.84	0	3
Negative NSA	855	-.12	.47	-3	0
US involvement	4320	.02	.15	0	1
Support of NAG	2880	.002	.018	0	.2
De factor Support of NAG	2880	.016	.08	0	.44
High Intensity of Civil Conflict	4320	.06	.23	0	1
Export (Logged)	4037	3.62	3.12	0	8.83
# of News in NYT	4320	.69	2.88	0	32
Highest US-Host MID Level	4320	.14	.73	0	5
War Duration (monthly)	4320	148.30	114.19	0	321
Previous US intervention	4320	6.65	4.87	0	13

### 5.3 Results

The section is interested in explaining two inquiries: (1) exploring the factors for issuing statements on civil conflicts, and (2) exploring the factors for the level of involvement of statements which are either positive or negative towards the conflicting actors. Thus, the first part of the analysis is important to distinguish the factors that lead the United States to decide on issuing statements or not. The second part will explore the determinants of third party attitudes defined by four different dependent variables. Before introducing the two-part model, each stage will be performed separately.

Table 5.3 presents the multivariate logistic regression results with alternative rivalry variables. Model 2, in which the peace scale has been used as the variable for the existing rivalry and alliance has more explanatory power over Model 1 which uses the highest action between states as a measure for rivalry. Model 2 also presents that the US support of nonstate actors decreases the likelihood of issuing statements while the highly intense civil conflicts increases the probability of the US issuing statements. The civil war duration also effects the probability of the United States

to issue statements and the US is more likely to talk on long lasting intrastate conflicts.

Table 5.3 Logistic regression analysis on the probability of issuing statements on civil conflicts with different alliance and rivalry variables

	Model (1)	Model (2)
Statement		
L.Highest US-Host MID Level	1.171*** (0.107)	
L.Export (Logged)	-0.016 (0.074)	0.115 (0.105)
L.Support of NAG	-1.233 (1.081)	-14.287*** (3.993)
L.Highest Intensity	3.675*** (0.292)	4.142*** (0.382)
L.War Duration (monthly)	0.007* (0.003)	0.012** (0.004)
L.# of News in NYT	0.066 (0.054)	0.076 (0.063)
L.Peace Scale/ Rivalry		-7.522*** (1.523)
Constant	-3.149*** (0.456)	-0.348 (0.720)
Observations	2672	2672
<i>AIC</i>	1808.135	1794.793

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

The level of involvement and the orientation of the issued statements is another key question of interest. Table 5.4 to Table 5.6 introduce the analyses on the factors on the level of involvement among the issued statements and the OLS regression models are used to estimate the effect of these variables. The population of interest in these analyses is the issued statements, so it decreases to 855.

Table 5.4 The analysis on the level of involvement for positive statements towards the state – multivariate regression results

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
L.Export (Logged)	0.105*** (0.018)	0.127** (0.033)	0.138*** (0.017)	0.172*** (0.030)
L.Peace Scale/ Rivalry	1.631*** (0.315)		1.536* (0.462)	
L.Highest Intensity	0.062 (0.066)	0.151 (0.087)	0.119 (0.149)	0.261 (0.187)
L.War Duration (monthly)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
L.# of News in NYT	0.032*** (0.002)	0.030*** (0.003)	0.034*** (0.002)	0.034*** (0.002)
L.Highest US-Host MID Level		-0.152* (0.051)		-0.128+ (0.067)
L.Support of NAG			-1.701* (0.718)	-3.471*** (0.386)
Constant	-0.007 (0.057)	0.434+ (0.240)	0.067 (0.073)	0.529 (0.345)
Observations	799	799	427	427
$R^2$	0.204	0.178	0.207	0.183

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 5.4 shows results on explaining the level of involvement of positive statements towards the state. The models are different in exploring different measures of rivalry and alliance relations. All models show that the level of exports increases the US to issue positive and involving statements towards the state. The number of front page news in the New York Times also is an important variable which impacts the US attitude to be positive and involving. The peace scale variable which varies from 0 to 1 indicates that the existing alliance between the US and host country increases the likelihood of the US to issue positive and involving statements. The highest military action variable, on the other hand, shows that when there is any interstate dispute between the US and the host country, the likelihood of US issuing positive statements decreases.

As Table 5.5 indicates the export level, existing rivalry and high intensity of civil conflicts are the important determinants for US to issue involving and negative

statements towards the conflicting state. While the high levels of export increases the intensity level of negative statements towards the state, existing rivalry between the US and conflicting country which is measured through the militarized interstate dispute increases the level of involvement of negative statements issued by the United States. The peace scale also supports the alliance-rival hypothesis and suggests that the US is less likely to issue involving and negative statements towards the ally states. Other variables, however, do not have statistically significant impact on the dependent variable.

Table 5.5 The analysis on the level of involvement for negative statements towards the state – multivariate regression results

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
L.Export (Logged)	-0.058** (0.017)	-0.025+ (0.013)	-0.048+ (0.022)	-0.002 (0.018)
L.Peace Scale/ Rivalry	2.311*** (0.041)		2.042*** (0.031)	
L.Highest Intensity	-0.030** (0.009)	0.096 (0.054)	0.042 (0.070)	0.216 (0.167)
L.War Duration (monthly)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)
L.# of News in NYT	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
L.Highest US-Host MID Level		-0.225*** (0.039)		-0.192** (0.047)
L.Support of NAG			-1.757*** (0.251)	-3.830*** (0.531)
Constant	-1.063*** (0.027)	-0.425* (0.177)	-0.976*** (0.053)	-0.338 (0.245)
Observations	799	799	427	427
$R^2$	0.489	0.369	0.487	0.398

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 5.6 introduces the multivariate regression results which estimated the level of involvement of statements towards both state and nonstate actors. These full models include both of the rivalry and alliance measures which have been separately analyzed since they might be capturing different causal mechanisms to explain third party attitudes.

Table 5.6 Full models on the level of involvement towards the state and nonstate actors

	Negative State	Positive State	Posive NSA	Negative State
L.Export (Logged)	-0.041 <sup>+</sup> (0.019)	0.140 <sup>***</sup> (0.018)	-0.104 (0.055)	-0.029 (0.057)
L.Peace Scale/ Rivalry	1.784 <sup>***</sup> (0.034)	1.445 <sup>*</sup> (0.435)	0.097 (0.352)	-0.292 <sup>*</sup> (0.105)
L.Highest US-Host MID Level	-0.060 <sup>**</sup> (0.015)	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.053 <sup>***</sup> (0.009)	0.027 (0.022)
L.Support of NAG	-1.561 <sup>**</sup> (0.294)	-1.632 <sup>+</sup> (0.741)	4.090 <sup>***</sup> (0.596)	0.851 (0.771)
L.Highest Intensity	0.042 (0.067)	0.119 (0.149)	-0.128 (0.108)	-0.136 (0.179)
L.War Duration (monthly)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.004 <sup>*</sup> (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
L.# of News in NYT	0.001 (0.002)	0.034 <sup>***</sup> (0.002)	-0.010 (0.009)	0.014 <sup>**</sup> (0.004)
Constant	-0.858 <sup>***</sup> (0.077)	0.108 (0.097)	0.339 <sup>***</sup> (0.057)	-0.143 (0.113)
Observations	427	427	427	427
$R^2$	0.494	0.207	0.091	0.037

Standard errors in parentheses

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , <sup>\*</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.01$ , <sup>\*\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.001$

The results explaining the third party attitudes on the nonstate actors are different from the factors that shape third party attitudes towards conflicting states. While the level of exports, peace scale, and total news in the New York Times' front page are significant variables for explaining third party attitudes towards the state, number of front page news in New York Times is the only variable that change the United States' attitudes towards nonstate actors.

The two distinct analyses presented above can be considered as weak regression models. Concluding the results as presented above might not be appropriate since third party attitudes should be referred as two stage models. Therefore, the two part models will improve and control for the errors and following analyses better fit to the data for explaining the theoretical expectations.



Table 5.7 Two-part model

	Positive State	Negative State	Positive NAG	Negative NAG
L.Export (logged)	0.081 (0.107)	0.081 (0.107)	0.081 (0.107)	0.081 (0.107)
L.Peace Scale/Rivalry	-5.360* (2.210)	-5.360* (2.210)	-5.360* (2.210)	-5.360* (2.210)
L.Highest US-Host MID Level	0.619* (0.268)	0.619* (0.268)	0.619* (0.268)	0.619* (0.268)
L.Support of NAG	-13.651** (5.107)	-13.651** (5.107)	-13.651** (5.107)	-13.651** (5.107)
L.Highest Intensity	4.047*** (0.304)	4.047*** (0.304)	4.047*** (0.304)	4.047*** (0.304)
L.War Duration (monthly)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)
L.Total News	0.070 (0.058)	0.070 (0.058)	0.070 (0.058)	0.070 (0.058)
Constant	-1.220 (1.057)	-1.220 (1.057)	-1.220 (1.057)	-1.220 (1.057)
L.Export (logged)	0.140*** (0.018)	-0.041* (0.019)	-0.104+ (0.054)	-0.029 (0.056)
L.Peace Scale /Rivalry	1.445*** (0.432)	1.784*** (0.034)	0.097 (0.349)	-0.292** (0.104)
L.Highest US-Host MID Level	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.053*** (0.009)	0.027 (0.022)
L.Support of NAG	-1.632* (0.735)	-1.561*** (0.292)	4.090*** (0.591)	0.851 (0.765)
L.Highest Intensity	0.119 (0.147)	0.042 (0.066)	-0.128 (0.107)	-0.136 (0.177)
L.War Duration (monthly)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
L.Total News	0.034*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.010 (0.009)	0.014*** (0.004)
Constant	0.108 (0.096)	-0.858*** (0.076)	0.339*** (0.056)	-0.143 (0.112)
Logged DV	-0.265 (0.199)	-1.658+ (0.895)	-0.774* (0.385)	-0.889* (0.382)
<i>N</i>	2672	2672	2672	2672

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ 

According to the results of the two-part model (see Table 5.7), the United States is more likely to issue statements on the highly intense conflicts, while this variable does not impact the level of involvement of US statements. While the civil war duration increases the probability to issue statements, the existing support of the


United States on nonstate actors decreases the probability of issuing statements. Although the conflict characteristics are important factors that shape the likelihood for the US to talk on the conflicts, the factors defining the level of involvement of positive or negative statements are different.

The level of exports influences the level of involvement of US statements both to the state and nonstate actors. While high levels of exports increase the positive and involving statements towards state, it decreases the involving and positive statements towards the nonstate actors.

The existing alliance relationship between the United States and the conflicting state increases the involving and positive statements towards the state; however, this variable does not impact the statements towards the nonstate actors. Since this categorical variable, which represents the rivalry and alliance continuum, to disseminate the variable into its different values and compare the predicted values for each group.

Figure 5.5 illustrates the predicted values for the existing three groups, severe rivalry (0), negative peace (0.5), and warm peace (0.75). The predicted value of level of involvement of positive statements for the states who have severe rivalry with the United States is low and also includes 0 which is different from the other two groups. The United States is more likely to be positively involved to the countries which have negative and warm peace.

Figure 5.5 Marginal Effect of Peace Scale on Issuing Involving Statements



The second graph in Figure 5.5 illustrates the predictive values for the level of involvement of negative statements issued by the United States. While the level of involvement for the severe rivals is higher than -1, the United States issued less involving and negative statements towards the countries with negative peace. The United States does not issue negative and involving statements towards the countries who are the grouped as their allies. The graphs on the predictive values of the level

of involvement towards the nonstate actors, on the other hand, does not depend on the alliance-rivalry relations between the state and the United States.

The highest level of militarized action between the US and conflicting state impacts the intense and negative statements towards the state. It is also interesting that this variable decreases the level of involving and positive statements towards the nonstate actors. Thus, the military dispute is a key variable for the United States to issue positive statements towards the nonstate actors while they issue negative statements towards the state. Existing direct support of the United States towards a nonstate actor is another key variable for issuing involving positive statements towards the nonstate actor. The direct support also encourages the United States to issue negative and involving statements towards the conflicting state. The number of news articles in the front page of the New York Times is a significant indicator for involving and positive statements towards the state. This variable also decreases the level of involvement of negative statements towards the nonstate actors.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

The American attitudes towards civil conflicts in Europe starting from 1990s are explored in two stages, (1) the decision to issue statements, and (2) the level of involvement towards state and nonstate actors. Third party attitudes, thus, can be considered as a decision made in two parts. The results suggest that the factors that shape issuing statements and American attitudes are different.

While the intrastate conflict characteristics and the security relations between the United States and host country impact America to issue statements, the level of involvement of positive and negative statements towards the state or nonstate groups have been influenced by different variables. The intensity of statements depends on the media attention, while the security and economic factors play a role in the American attitudes towards the conflicting actors.

The chapter, thus, reiterates the importance of the security aspects for the third party to position itself towards a civil conflict. The security related dynamics between the third party and conflicting state is a prominent factor that shapes third party attitudes and how the external state reflects its position towards a domestic incident.

## 6. CONCLUSION

### 6.1 A Brief Overview of Dissertation

In the broadest terms, this dissertation is about third-party attitudes towards civil conflicts. The topic is especially relevant to the current dynamics of the world, as there is an undeniable increase in the occurrences of civil war around the globe. Literature covering the root causes, processes, and potential solutions to intrastate conflicts compose the majority of academically oriented studies. These investigations base their explanatory variables around domestic level factors, and focus extensively on economic development, horizontal accountability, poverty, ethnic heterogeneity. The international aspect of civil conflicts has also been another important domain that the scholars pay attention to explore the importance and impact of external states in civil conflicts.

The studies on third party intervention revolve around exploring two aspects: (1) the motivations of third parties intervening civil conflicts and (2) the decisions on choosing different means of intervention. The literature covers realist oriented explanations that narrowly focus on primarily important components shaping the motivations and means used by third parties, where existing rivalry or alliances are claimed to be key considerations for third parties in their decisions regarding the probabilities of military interventions. Such studies, however, are deficient in capturing the reactions of third parties in a comprehensive manner, decreasing explanatory power. Other scholars approach third party intervention as a menu that allows the investigations of how states choose among a set of options. Here, the addressing conflict management strategies as a set of choices, these studies are deficient in exploring the impact of statements as dynamic and informative tools for changing the international relations.

The role of communication in international relations has been proposed by different theoretical lenses with varying axioms. However, all of these approaches suggest

that communication tools can be effective and salient components for international relations. The theoretical discussions on the importance of verbal clues, therefore, bolster the idea that third party statements are critical factors that have the probability to alter the civil war process. This dissertation is situated within this lacuna and has aimed to bridge the gap between the communication in international relations and international aspects of third-party interventions by introducing a new measure which quantifies the positions of external states towards civil conflicts.

As a result of the discussion in the theoretical debate and literature review section, this dissertation mainly focuses on exploring the factors that shape third party attitudes. Following the arguments supported in third party intervention literature this dissertation tests seven main hypothesis. Three of the hypotheses, which are derived from the realist realm, focus on how the existence of rivalry and alliance change the likelihood of issuing positive and involving statements towards the conflicting state. In addition to these hypotheses intrastate economic relations is considered to constitute an important factor that might shape third party attitudes. The conflict characteristics, such as the severity of civil war, is suggested to be the major factor that has the potential to shape how external states position themselves towards a civil conflict.

One of the contributions of this dissertation is introducing and exploring third party attitudes. This thesis is novel in defining, operationalizing, and measuring this newly established concept. Third party attitudes (TPA) dataset is formed to measure the level of involvedness and biasedness of leader statements towards the parties in an intrastate conflict. Chapter 3 explains thoroughly the data collection and generation process and furthers the discussions on the third party attitudes and presents the content of leader statements. This chapter introduces two important findings. First of all, based on the descriptive illustrations, the content coding of leader statements on civil conflicts can be states as valid classifications. The statements with different levels of involvement are constructed by different keywords which also illustrates how third parties are involved to the conflicts. This is an important finding to back up the validity of the content coding and enables to further coding statements on different civil conflicts. Secondly, this chapter also suggests how the United States frames civil conflicts differently. While the defining keywords for the Bosnian war is constructed around the “international involvement”, the Kosovar conflict has been framed as a “humanitarian crisis”. To observe such differences in the American attitudes, thus, increases the attention on the factors that are prominent in shaping the third party attitudes.

The following two chapters are of empirical orientation, which analyze the deter-

minants of third party attitudes for different cases. Chapter 4 which analyzes the American, British, and German attitudes towards Turkey's armed struggle with the PKK employs an in-depth case study method to explore the factors that shape third party attitudes in a limited period. Particularly, the analysis emphasizes the impact of the Syrian Civil War on regional security relations, as a prime example. The complex alliance relations formed between the third parties with Turkey and the Kurdish factions are key factors that shape the attitudes of the United States and Germany on the Turkish armed struggle with PKK. However, this analysis can be improved by introducing proper control states in addition to the United Kingdom.

Chapter 5 analyses the same question for different intrastate conflicts. The United States as the major power in international relations has been introduced as the third party while the civil conflicts are restricted to the European region. Here, third-party attitudes on intrastate conflicts in Europe for the years between 1990-2019 has been studied. The prominence of regional security relations, which was covered in the end of chapter four, have also has been supported using a time series-cross sectional analysis. Additionally, the findings suggest that the economic ties and the support of nonstate actors by the external state are important determinants that change the level of involvement and biased statements towards the conflicting parties. This chapter also highlights the importance of analyzing the issued statements through two dimensions: (1) the probability of issuing statements, and (2) the level of involvement towards negative or positive statements towards the conflicting countries. The chapter concludes that the decision of issuing a statement depends on the severity of the civil conflict, while other variables do not have any statistical significance on the decision.

## **6.2 Improvements and Future Research**

Although the thesis introduces a novel dataset with significant findings that enriches the third party involvement literature there are several aspects to improve. The first area of improvement revolves around external validity concerns. The collected data is limited in both third parties and conflicts. The selection of third parties was limited because of the scarce sources for the leader statements for early years. The selection of conflicts, on the other hand, was constrained since the statements on both conflicts and parties were high in number which disable to code the statements correctly in a short period of time. Therefore, as an initial step, this thesis intends to limit both the third parties and the conflicts of interest to test whether the

theoretical expectations are met under a certain selection criterion. Therefore, this thesis does not suggest a generalizable argument on third party attitudes and needs improve the data on different conflicts and third parties.

The second area of improvement is about internal validity concerns. The data was coded manually by a single researcher and thus this method is prone to errors which can impact the measures to have internal validity. Although Chapter 4 suggests that the groups have coherent content and they refer to different groups of statements, the coding process can be improved. Increasing the number of experts is a good alternative to improve the validity of the data. After increasing the number of experts, a dictionary can be created, or the manually coded data can be used as a training set for automated classification techniques to automatically code other issued statements. This will both increase the validity and also decrease the cost of coding and time for a better data.<sup>1</sup>

These suggestions are necessary issues to improve the scope of a good data. However, there is also another critical discussion to be made, which is of possible avenues of future research. Firstly, predicting third party intervention and civil conflict processes is key in the development of the topic. As it was mentioned, third party attitudes are one of the most important international aspects of civil conflicts. The studies in general emphasize to explain the motivations and the different means used for better results (Ayđın 2008, 2010, , Bove et al. 2016, Fordham 2008, Lemke and Regan 2004, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2011, Regan 1996, 2000, 2002, Regan and Ayđın 2006, Stojek and Chacha 2015, Őan-Akca 2009). More recent studies (Owsiak 2014), however, are interested in predicting the events rather than explaining the effect of critical variables. Third party attitudes, therefore, can be a critical variable for predicting both civil conflict and third party intervention.

Secondly, understanding the shifts in the tactics and strategies of nonstate actors is another topic of interest which has been explored recently (Cunningham et al, 2017, Cunningham 2019). The tactics and strategies used by the nonstate actors has been another important line of research. As it was discussed in Chapter 2 in detail, third parties are critical in changing the information structure among the conflicting parties, which can be important for the civil conflict process. Third party attitudes as critical signals, thus, may shape how the nonstate actor decide on using different sets of tactics and prepare their strategies. Third party attitudes data is an important component to understand how the civil conflict process are

---

<sup>1</sup>In order to decrease the cost of coding and the time spent for manual coding, we need to utilize an automated classification method. The results of Naïve Bayes (see in the Appendix) produce a much better outcome than a random guess and, correctly predicts the two categories higher than 65%. However, this prediction power needs improvements to use the data in analyses. Therefore, for future research the Naïve Bayes and other techniques as SVM will be improved to predict the coded groups at least 90% correctly.

shaped.

As a result, this thesis suggests that communicative tools are important in shaping international interactions and the recent developments in the computerized methods using texts-as-data enable scholars to test the relevant theories with appropriate measures. This thesis attempts to define and measure a new variable and compute whether the third party attitudes vary overtime and across countries. This thesis, thus, contributes to the literature by focusing on an alternative third party intervention concept and also promotes to use the text as a critical source for understanding the importance of international interactions. While the proposed theoretical and methodological suggestions of this dissertation fill an important lacuna, further improvements are necessary.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akcinaroglu, Seden, and Elizabeth Radziszewski. 2005. "Expectations, rivalries, and civil war duration." *International Interactions* 31(4): 349–374.
- Aydin, Aysegul. 2008. "Choosing sides: Economic interdependence and interstate disputes." *The Journal of Politics* 70(4): 1098–1108.
- Aydin, Aysegul. 2010. "Where do states go? Strategy in civil war intervention." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27(1): 47–66.
- Aydin, Aysegul. 2012. *Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts*. Stanford University Press.
- Azar, Edward E. 1980. "The conflict and peace data bank (COPDAB) project." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24(1): 143–152.
- Başer, Bahar. 2015. *Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts: A Comparative Perspective*. Ashgate Publishing.
- Barbieri, Katherine. 1996. "Economic interdependence: A path to peace or a source of interstate conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 33(1): 29–49.
- Baturo, Alexander, Niheer Dasandi, and Slava J Mikhaylov. 2017. "Understanding state preferences with text as data: Introducing the UN General Debate corpus." *Research & Politics* 4(2): 2053168017712821.
- Baum, Matthew A. 2004. "Going private: Public opinion, presidential rhetoric, and the domestic politics of audience costs in US foreign policy crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(5): 603–631.
- Beardsley, Kyle, and Holger Schmidt. 2012. "Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises", 1945-2002." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 33–49.
- Beardsley, Kyle C. 2010. "Pain, pressure and political cover: Explaining mediation incidence." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4): 395–406.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, J Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L Wille. 1991. "Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in international relations." *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1): 7–17.
- Berkowitz, Jeremy M. 2018. "Delegating terror: Principal–agent based decision making in state sponsorship of terrorism." *International interactions* 44(4): 709–748.
- Bilgel, Firat, and Burhan Can Karahasan. 2013. "The economic costs of separatist terrorism in Turkey." *AQR–Working Papers, 2013, AQR13/14* .

- Bond, Doug, J Craig Jenkins, Charles L Taylor, and Kurt Schock. 1997. "Mapping mass political conflict and civil society: Issues and prospects for the automated development of event data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(4): 553–579.
- Bove, Vincenzo, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Petros G Sekeris. 2016. "Oil above Water" Economic Interdependence and Third-party Intervention." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60(7): 1251–1277.
- Brown, Michael E. 1993. *Ethnic conflict and international security*. Princeton University Press.
- Broz, J Lawrence. 2002. "Political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes." *International Organization* pp. 861–887.
- Buhari Gulmez, Didem. 2020. "The resilience of the US–Turkey alliance: divergent threat perceptions and worldviews." *Contemporary Politics* pp. 1–18.
- Burscher, Bjorn, Rens Vliegthart, and Claes H de Vreese. 2016. "Frames beyond words: Applying cluster and sentiment analysis to news coverage of the nuclear power issue." *Social Science Computer Review* 34(5): 530–545.
- Byman, Daniel. 2005. *Deadly connections: States that sponsor terrorism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. 2001. *Trends in outside support for insurgent movements*. Rand Corporation.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. 2010. "Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis." *World Politics* 62(1): 87–119.
- Chiba, Daina, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2017. "The shape of things to come? Expanding the inequality and grievance model for civil war forecasts with event data." *Journal of Peace Research* 54(2): 275–297.
- Choi, Seung-Whan. 2013. "What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?" *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30(2): 121–139.
- Choi, Seung-Whan, and Patrick James. 2016. "Why Does the United States Intervene Abroad? Democracy, Human Rights Violations and Terrorism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60(5): 899–926.
- Clark, David H, Benjamin O Fordham, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2016. "Political party and presidential decisions to use force: Explaining a puzzling nonfinding." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 46(4): 791–807.
- Collier, David. 2011. "Understanding process tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44(4): 823–830.
- Corbetta, Renato, and Molly M Melin. 2018. "Exploring the threshold between conflict management and joining in biased interventions." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62(10): 2205–2231.

- Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher, Marianne Dahl, and Anne Frugé. 2020. “Introducing the Strategies of Resistance Data Project.” *Journal of Peace Research* 57(3): 482–491.
- Davis, Christina L, Andreas Fuchs, and Kristina Johnson. 2019. “State control and the effects of foreign relations on bilateral trade.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(2): 405–438.
- DeRouen Jr, Karl, Jacob Bercovitch, and Paulina Pospieszna. 2011. “Introducing the civil wars mediation (CWM) dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 48(5): 663–672.
- Doyle, Michael W, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. “International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis.” *American political science review* pp. 779–801.
- Dür, Andreas, Leonardo Baccini, and Manfred Elsig. 2014. “The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset.” *The Review of International Organizations* 9(3): 353–375.
- Farrell, Joseph, and Robert Gibbons. 1989. “Cheap talk with two audiences.” *The American Economic Review* 79(5): 1214–1223.
- Fearon, James D. 1994. “Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes.” *American political science review* pp. 577–592.
- Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist explanations for war.” *International organization* 49(3): 379–414.
- Findley, Michael G, and Tze Kwang Teo. 2006. “Rethinking third-party interventions into civil wars: An actor-centric approach.” *The Journal of Politics* 68(4): 828–837.
- Florea, Adrian. 2012. “Where do we go from here? Conceptual, theoretical, and methodological gaps in the large-N civil war research program.” *International studies review* 14(1): 78–98.
- Fordham, Benjamin O. 2008. “Power or plenty? Economic interests, security concerns, and American intervention.” *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4): 737–758.
- Frazier, Derrick V, and William J Dixon. 2006. “Third-party intermediaries and negotiated settlements, 1946–2000.” *International Interactions* 32(4): 385–408.
- Gartzke, Erik, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2004. “Why democracies may actually be less reliable allies.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 775–795.
- Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1996. “Democratic states and commitment in international relations.” *International Organization* pp. 109–139.
- Gerner, Deborah J, Philip A Schrodtt, Omür Yilmaz, and Rajaa Abu-Jabr. 2002. “Conflict and mediation event observations (CAMEO): A new event data framework for the analysis of foreign policy interactions.” *International Studies Association, New Orleans* .

- Gibbons, Robert S. 1992. *Game theory for applied economists*. Princeton University Press.
- Göksel, Nigar, and Berkay Mandıracı. 2016. “New Turkey-PKK Peace Talks: An Inevitability Postponed.” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 14(4): 59–64.
- Gleditsch, Henrikas Bartusevičius, and Kristian Skrede. 2019. “A Two-Stage Approach to Civil Conflict: Contested Incompatibilities and Armed Violence.” *International Organization* 73(1): 225–248.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2007. “Transnational dimensions of civil war.” *Journal of Peace Research* 44(3): 293–309.
- Günter, Michael M. 1998. “Turkey and Iran Face off in Kurdistan.” *Middle East Quarterly* .
- Godwin, Matthew. 2018. “Winning, Westminster-style: Tamil diaspora interest group mobilisation in Canada and the UK.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44(8).
- Goldstein, Joshua S. 1992. “A conflict-cooperation scale for WEIS events data.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2): 369–385.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1994. “Peoples against states: Ethnopolitical conflict and the changing world system: 1994 presidential address.” *International studies quarterly* 38(3): 347–377.
- Hale, William. 2019. “Turkey, the US, Russia and the Syrian Civil War.” *Insight Turkey* 21(4): 25–40.
- Hansen, Lene. 2013. *Security as practice: discourse analysis and the Bosnian war*. Routledge.
- Haselmayer, Martin, and Marcelo Jenny. 2017. “Sentiment analysis of political communication: combining a dictionary approach with crowdcoding.” *Quality and Quantity* 51(6): 2623–2646.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 2000. *Ethnic groups in conflict, updated edition with a new preface*. Univ of California Press.
- Jensen, Nathan M. 2003. “Democratic governance and multinational corporations: Political regimes and inflows of foreign direct investment.” *International organization* pp. 587–616.
- Jervis, Robert. 2017. *Perception and misperception in international politics: New edition*. Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, Jaclyn, and Clayton L Thyne. 2018. “Squeaky wheels and troop loyalty: How domestic protests influence coups d’état, 1951–2005.” *Journal of conflict resolution* 62(3): 597–625.
- Jones, Daniel M, Stuart A Bremer, and J David Singer. 1996. “Militarized interstate disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, coding rules, and empirical patterns.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15(2): 163–213.

- Jongerden, Joost, and Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya. 2018. *The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Kurdish Political Parties in the 1970s*. Routledge pp. 270–282.
- Kaya, Zeynep, and Matthew Whiting. 2017. “Sowing Division: Kurds in the Syrian War.” *Middle East Policy* 24(1): 79–91.
- Kıbrıs, Arzu, and Nils Metternich. 2016. “The flight of white-collars: Civil conflict, availability of medical service providers and public health.” *Social Science & Medicine* 149: 93–103.
- Kelley, Judith. 2007. “Who keeps international commitments and why? The International Criminal Court and bilateral nonsurrender agreements.” *American Political Science Review* pp. 573–589.
- Kertzer, Joshua David. 2013. *Resolve in international politics* Thesis.
- Kıbrıs, Arzu. 2015. “The conflict trap revisited: Civil conflict and educational achievement.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(4): 645–670.
- Kıbrıs, Arzu. 2020a. “The geo-temporal evolution of violence in civil conflicts.” *Journal of Peace Research* .
- Kıbrıs, Arzu. 2020b. “TPCONED: The Turkish State-PKK Conflict Event Dataset.”
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. “Domestic political institutions, credible commitments, and international cooperation.” *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 979–1002.
- Lemke, Douglas, and Patrick M Regan. 2004. “Interventions as influence.” *The Scourge of War: New extensions on an old problem* pp. 145–168.
- Leventoğlu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. 2005. “Prenegotiation public commitment in domestic and international bargaining.” *American Political Science Review* pp. 419–433.
- Maness, Ryan C, and Brandon Valeriano. 2016. “The impact of cyber conflict on international interactions.” *Armed Forces & Society* 42(2): 301–323.
- Mansfield, Edward D, Helen V Milner, and B Peter Rosendorff. 2002. “Replication, realism, and robustness: Analyzing political regimes and international trade.” *American Political Science Review* pp. 167–169.
- Maoz, Zeev. 1996. *Domestic sources of global change*. University of Michigan Press.
- Maoz, Zeev, and Belgin San-Akca. 2012. “Rivalry and state support of non-state armed groups (NAGs), 1946–2001.” *International Studies Quarterly* 56(4): 720–734.
- March, James G, and Johan P Olsen. 1998. “The institutional dynamics of international political orders.” *International organization* pp. 943–969.
- McClelland, Charles A. 1984. *World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project, 1966-1978*. Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

- McManus, Roseanne W. 2014. "Fighting words: The effectiveness of statements of resolve in international conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 51(6): 726–740.
- McManus, Roseanne W, and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2017. "The logic of "offstage" signaling: Domestic politics, regime type, and major power-protégé relations." *International Organization* 71(4): 701–733.
- Medzihorsky, Juraj, Milos Popovic, and Erin K Jenne. 2017. "Rhetoric of civil conflict management: United Nations Security Council debates over the Syrian civil war." *Research & Politics* 4(2): 2053168017702982.
- Melin, Molly M. 2014. "Escalation in international conflict management: A foreign policy perspective." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32(1): 28–49.
- Melin, Molly M, and Michael T Koch. 2010. "Jumping into the fray: Alliances, power, institutions, and the timing of conflict expansion." *International interactions* 36(1): 1–27.
- Müller, Harald. 2004. "Arguing, bargaining and all that: Communicative action, rationalist theory and the logic of appropriateness in international relations." *European journal of international relations* 10(3): 395–435.
- Morgan, T Clifton. 1990. "Power, resolve and bargaining in international crises: A spatial theory." *International Interactions* 15(3-4): 279–302.
- Morrow, James D. 1985. "A continuous-outcome expected utility theory of war." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29(3): 473–502.
- Morrow, James D. 1989. "Capabilities, uncertainty, and resolve: A limited information model of crisis bargaining." *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 941–972.
- Newman, Edward. 2001. "Human security and constructivism." *International studies perspectives* 2(3): 239–251.
- Nickel, James W. 2002. "Is today's international human rights system a global governance regime?" *The journal of ethics* 6(4): 353–371.
- Normand, Roger, and Sarah Zaidi. 2008. *Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice*. Indiana University Press.
- Nye Jr, Joseph S. 2008. "Public diplomacy and soft power." *The annals of the American academy of political and social science* 616(1): 94–109.
- Oktay, Sibel. 2014. "Constraining or enabling? The effects of government composition on international commitments." *Journal of European Public Policy* 21(6): 860–884.
- Owsiak, Andrew P. 2014. "Conflict management trajectories in militarized interstate disputes: A conceptual framework and theoretical foundations." *International Studies Review* 16(1): 50–78.
- Pape, Robert A. 2012. "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention." *International Security* 37(1): 41–80.

- Petrova, Marina G. 2019. "What matters is who supports you: diaspora and foreign states as external supporters and militants' adoption of nonviolence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(9): 2155–2179.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International organization* pp. 427–460.
- Rasler, Karen. 1983. "Internationalized Civil War: A Dynamic Analysis of the Syrian Intervention in Lebanon." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27(3): 421–456.
- Regan, Patrick M. 1996. "Conditions of successful third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(2): 336–359.
- Regan, Patrick M. 2000. "Substituting policies during US interventions in internal conflicts: A little of this, a little of that." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(1): 90–106.
- Regan, Patrick M. 2002. "Third-party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 55–73.
- Regan, Patrick M, and Aysegul Aydin. 2006. "Diplomacy and other forms of intervention in civil wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(5): 736–756.
- Risse, Thomas. 2000. "'Let's argue!': communicative action in world politics." *International organization* 54(1): 1–39.
- Saideman, Stephen M. 2002. "The Power of the Small: The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on Foreign Policy." *SAIS Review* 22(2): 93–105.
- Salehyan, Idean. 2008. "The externalities of civil strife: Refugees as a source of international conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 787–801.
- Salehyan, Idean, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2006. "Refugees and the spread of civil war." *International Organization* 60(2): 335–366.
- Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David Cunningham. 2008. "Transnational Linkages and Civil War Interactions." *Typescript, University of Essex.[Online]: privatewww.essex.ac.uk/ksg/dscw2007/Gleditsch.pdf*.
- Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham. 2011. "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups." *International Organization* 65(4): 709–744.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2002. "A review of recent advances and future directions in the quantitative literature on civil war." *Defence and Peace Economics* 13(3): 215–243.
- Sambanis, Nicholas, Stergios Skaperdas, and William Wohlforth. 2017. "External Intervention, Identity and Civil War?."
- San Akca, Belgin. 2009. "Supporting non-state armed groups: a resort to illegality?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32(4): 589–613.
- Sartori, Anne E. 2013. *Deterrence by diplomacy*. Princeton University Press.

- Schelling, Thomas. 1980. "The Strategy of Conflict, 1960." *Harvard University* .
- Schmidt, Vivien A. 2008. "Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of ideas and discourse." *Annual review of political science* 11.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. 2010. "Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth 'new institutionalism'." *European political science review* 2(1): 1–25.
- Schrodt, Philip A, Shannon G Davis, and Judith L Weddle. 1994. "Political science: KEDS—a program for the machine coding of event data." *Social Science Computer Review* 12(4): 561–587.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. *Democracy and coercive diplomacy*. Vol. 76 Cambridge University Press.
- Schumacher, Gijs, Martijn Schoonvelde, Denise Traber, Tanushree Dahiya, and Erik De Vries. N.d. EUSpeech: A new dataset of EU elite speeches. In *Proceedings of the international conference on the advances in computational analysis of political text*. pp. 75–80.
- Shain, Yossi. 1994-1995. "Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 109(5): 811–841.
- Shrivastava, BK, and Manmohan Agarwal. 2003. "Politics of intervention and the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict." *International studies* 40(1): 69–84.
- Singer, J David. 1963. "Inter-nation influence: a formal model." *The American Political Science Review* 57(2): 420–430.
- Small, Melvin, and Joel David Singer. 1982. *Resort to arms: International and civil wars, 1816-1980*. Sage Publications, Inc.
- Smith, Alastair. 1996. "Diversionary foreign policy in democratic systems." *International Studies Quarterly* 40(1): 133–153.
- Smith, Alastair. 1998. "International crises and domestic politics." *American Political Science Review* pp. 623–638.
- Stewart, Brandon M, and Yuri M Zhukov. 2009. "Use of force and civil–military relations in Russia: an automated content analysis." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 20(2): 319–343.
- Stojek, Szymon M, and Mwita Chacha. 2015. "Adding trade to the equation: Multi-level modeling of biased civil war interventions." *Journal of Peace Research* 52(2): 228–242.
- T, Woolley John, and Peters Gerhard. 1999. "The American Presidency Project." *Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws> .*
- Thyne, Clayton L. 2009a. *How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict: Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences*. Rowman and Littlefield.



- Thyne, Clayton L. 2009b. *How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict: Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Todhunter, James P. 2013. "The domestic fruits of diplomacy: Mediation and presidential approval." *International Negotiation* 18(2): 195–217.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach." *International Organization* pp. 821–840.
- Vannoni, Matia. 2015. "What are case studies good for? Nesting comparative case study research into the lakatosian research program." *Cross-Cultural Research* 49(4): 331–357.
- Vincent, Jack E. 1983. "WEIS vs. COPDAB: Correspondence problems." *International Studies Quarterly* 27(2): 161–168.
- Waltz, Kenneth Neal. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Levels of analysis vs. agents and structures: part III." *Review of International Studies* 18(2): 181–185.
- Wilson, Maya, David R Davis, and Amanda Murdie. 2016. "The view from the bottom: Networks of conflict resolution organizations and international peace." *Journal of Peace Research* 53(3): 442–458.
- Wimmer, Andreas, and Brian Min. 2006. "From empire to nation-state: Explaining wars in the modern world, 1816–2001." *American sociological review* 71(6): 867–897.
- Wisniewski, Tomasz Piotr, and Andrea Moro. 2014. "When EU leaders speak, the markets listen." *European Accounting Review* 23(4): 519–551.
- Woodwell, Douglas. 2004. "Unwelcome neighbors: shared ethnicity and international conflict during the Cold War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48(1): 197–223.
- Wright, Quincy. 1965. "The escalation of international conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 9(4): 434–449.
- Yoon, Mi Yung. 1997. "Explaining US Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(4): 580–602.
- Young, Lori, and Stuart Soroka. 2012. "Affective news: The automated coding of sentiment in political texts." *Political Communication* 29(2): 205–231.

## APPENDIX A

- Germany: <https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles>
- UK: <https://www.gov.uk/search/news-and-communications?organisations%5B%5D=prime-ministers-office-10-downing-street&order=updated-newest>
- Barack Obama: [https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/advanced-search?field-keywords=&field-keywords2=&field-keywords3=&from%5Bdate%5D=&to%5Bdate%5D=&person2=200300&items\\_per\\_page=100](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/advanced-search?field-keywords=&field-keywords2=&field-keywords3=&from%5Bdate%5D=&to%5Bdate%5D=&person2=200300&items_per_page=100)
- Donald Trump: [https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/advanced-search?field-keywords=&field-keywords2=&field-keywords3=&from%5Bdate%5D=&to%5Bdate%5D=&person2=200301&items\\_per\\_page=100](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/advanced-search?field-keywords=&field-keywords2=&field-keywords3=&from%5Bdate%5D=&to%5Bdate%5D=&person2=200301&items_per_page=100)
- George Bush: [https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/advanced-search?field-keywords=&field-keywords2=&field-keywords3=&from%5Bdate%5D=&to%5Bdate%5D=&person2=200297&items\\_per\\_page=100](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/advanced-search?field-keywords=&field-keywords2=&field-keywords3=&from%5Bdate%5D=&to%5Bdate%5D=&person2=200297&items_per_page=100)
- Bill Clinton [https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/advanced-search?field-keywords=&field-keywords2=&field-keywords3=&from%5Bdate%5D=&to%5Bdate%5D=&person2=200298&items\\_per\\_page=100](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/advanced-search?field-keywords=&field-keywords2=&field-keywords3=&from%5Bdate%5D=&to%5Bdate%5D=&person2=200298&items_per_page=100)
- George W. Bush: [https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/advanced-search?field-keywords=&field-keywords2=&field-keywords3=&from%5Bdate%5D=&to%5Bdate%5D=&person2=200299&items\\_per\\_page=100](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/advanced-search?field-keywords=&field-keywords2=&field-keywords3=&from%5Bdate%5D=&to%5Bdate%5D=&person2=200299&items_per_page=100)

Figure A.1 The Involvement Level in German and English Statements





Figure A.2 The Biasedness towards the State in German and English Statements



## APPENDIX B

Figure B.1 The Level of Involvement of Negative Statements towards the NSA




Figure B.2 The Level of Involvement of Negative Statements towards the State




Figure B.3 The Level of Involvement of Positive Statements towards the NSA




Figure B.4 The Level of Involvement of Positive Statements towards the State




Table B.1 Bivariate Logistic Regression Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Statement	Statement	Statement	Statement	Statement	Statement	Statement	Statement
Statement								
L.Export (Logged)	0.080 (0.053)							
L.Highest US-Host MID Level		0.811*** (0.057)						
L.Peace Scale/ Rivalry			-1.572 (1.990)					
L.Support of NAG				16.586*** (1.522)				
L.De factor Support of NAG					2.687+ (1.474)			
L.# of News in NYT						0.088*** (0.027)		
L.War Duration (monthly)							0.003 (0.002)	
L.Previous US intervention								-0.020 (0.039)
Constant	-1.706*** (0.282)	-1.549*** (0.223)	-0.576 (0.973)	-1.708*** (0.304)	-1.722*** (0.338)	-1.471*** (0.218)	-1.850*** (0.454)	-1.264** (0.458)
Observations	4025	4308	4308	2872	2872	4308	4308	4308
AIC	3973.695	3992.386	4243.850	2467.113	2497.854	4237.490	4224.397	4290.471

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.2 Bivariate Regression Analysis on the Level of Involvement in Positive Statements Towards the State

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
L.Export (Logged)	0.108*** (0.018)						
L.Peace Scale/ Rivalry		1.497*** (0.082)					
L.Previous US intervention			-0.042** (0.014)				
L.Highest US-Host MID Level				-0.208*** (0.031)			
L.Support of NAG					-3.525* (1.030)		
L.De factor Support of NAG						0.520 (0.641)	
L.# of News in NYT							0.048*** (0.004)
Constant	0.305+ (0.142)	-0.012 (0.036)	0.996** (0.230)	0.854*** (0.125)	0.705* (0.206)	0.657* (0.237)	0.660** (0.159)
Observations	799	855	855	855	457	457	855
$R^2$	0.135	0.180	0.033	0.090	0.022	0.004	0.038

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.3 Bivariate Regression Analysis on the Level of Involvement in Negative Statements Towards the State

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
L.Export (Logged)	0.059 (0.034)						
L.Peace Scale/ Rivalry		1.600*** (0.169)					
L.Previous US intervention			0.005 (0.015)				
L.Highest US-Host MID Level				-0.285*** (0.018)			
L.Support of NAG					-5.941*** (0.935)		
L.De factor Support of NAG						0.658 (0.580)	
L.# of News in NYT							0.010 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)
Constant	-0.471 (0.267)	-1.064*** (0.101)	-0.302 (0.216)	-0.102 (0.074)	-0.201 (0.187)	-0.275 (0.240)	-0.285 (0.173)
Observations	799	855	855	855	457	457	855
$R^2$	0.100	0.432	0.001	0.356	0.135	0.013	0.003

Standard errors in parentheses

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



Table B.4 Bivariate Regression Analysis on the Level of Involvement in Positive Statements Towards the NSA

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
L.Export (Logged)	-0.008 (0.043)						
L.Peace Scale/ Rivalry		0.149 (0.373)					
L.Previous US intervention			0.033 (0.025)				
L.Highest US-Host MID Level				-0.032 (0.043)			
L.Support of NAG					2.334** (0.618)		
L.De factor Support of NAG						-0.119 (0.350)	
L.# of News in NYT							0.009 (0.018)
Constant	0.494** (0.153)	0.363** (0.102)	0.233 (0.234)	0.456* (0.151)	0.282+ (0.124)	0.307* (0.128)	0.423** (0.116)
Observations	799	855	855	855	457	457	855
$R^2$	0.001	0.002	0.026	0.003	0.018	0.000	0.002

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.5 Bivariate Regression Analysis on the Level of Involvement in Negative Statements Towards the NSA

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
L.Export (Logged)	0.010 (0.020)						
L.Peace Scale/ Rivalry		-0.095 (0.123)					
L.Previous US intervention			-0.004 (0.015)				
L.Highest US-Host MID Level				0.035 <sup>+</sup> (0.019)			
L.Support of NAG					1.154 <sup>+</sup> (0.567)		
L.De factor Support of NAG						0.019 (0.378)	
L.# of News in NYT							0.008 (0.005)
Constant	-0.169 (0.137)	-0.072 (0.072)	-0.096 (0.083)	-0.140 <sup>+</sup> (0.075)	-0.231 <sup>+</sup> (0.113)	-0.221 (0.120)	-0.131 <sup>+</sup> (0.073)
Observations	799	855	855	855	457	457	855
$R^2$	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.011	0.006	0.000	0.005

Standard errors in parentheses

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## APPENDIX C

Innovations in machine learning enable scholars to utilize computerized techniques for content analysis which has also increased the efficiency and opportunity to use texts as primary sources. The increased efficiency in time and systematic categorization of texts thus elevated the use of texts as well as techniques to improve the automated content coding (Cordell et al. 2020).


As the examples briefly introduced in the previous section, different techniques for automated content coding and analysis are used to improve event data collection. Mainly this section will emphasize on the Naïve Bayes and compare the results to the manual coding. The analyses of the thesis mainly rely on the manual coding which has been introduced in the previous section and Chapter 2. However, for future research and to code third party attitudes on different civil conflicts, using automated techniques will decrease the cost and the human coding errors. Unsupervised and supervised automated classification techniques are mainly the two distinct means that the scholars use to classify the text objects and these techniques have different positive and negative aspects (Grimmer and Steward 2013).

Unsupervised classification technique, topic modelling, relies on the categorization of the computer and the expert does not interfere (Grimmer and Steward 2013). Based on the frequently used words and the assumption bag of words leads the computer to classify texts which share the similar word and word groups. This technique is beneficial for exploratory purposes, since the scholar only introduces a possible set of number of possible categories, the classification can introduce the scholar for the possible groups. While this method is weak and deficient for the lack of involvement of the scholar and theoretical expectations.

Supervised technique, on the other hand, is another method that has been utilized by the scholars to classify the texts (Grimmer and Steward 2013). Unlike the unsupervised technique, this method enables the experts to step in the decisions of classification and direct the automated process. Dictionary method, naïve bayes and support vector machine (SVM) are the widely used techniques (Grimmer and Steward 2013, Cordell et al 2020). The main idea behind the supervised technique is to train the unclassified texts by using a set of coded and classified texts. Based on the expert coding or dictionaries created by the experts, this technique enables to automatically classify the texts. Thus, this technique proposes a more valid automated classification than the unsupervised one.

This section will introduce the results of the supervised technique on classifying third party attitude variable.

Figure C.1 Naïve Bayes results for different training sets



The Naïve Bayes is a supervised machine learning algorithm which calculates the probability of each statement for being in defined groups. The Naïve Bayes classifier is “a simple generative classification algorithm that has reasonably good performance” (Shen and Yiang 2003, p.1). Therefore, as a starting point using Naïve Bayes classifier for the prediction of statements to different involving groups will be presented.

Figure C.1 introduces the prediction ratios for each involvement groups for different sizes of training sets. The *e1071* was used for using Naïve Bayes Classifier. Before the running the prediction, the texts are preprocessed. A subset of the data created which includes the domestic level statements. After encoding the texts to UTF-16, the corpus created. While all word initials transformed to a lower case and stemmed, numbers, stop words, white spaces and punctuation marks removed. After the preprocessing, different training sets created. Out of 25482 objects in the corpus 6 different training sets were created. The number of training sets are 14000 to 19000 with 1000 increments. Thus, the ratio of the training set varied approximately from 0.55 to 0.75.

As a result of the naïve bayes classifier the results are as in Figure C.1. The lowest number of misclassification is when the training set is below 65% of the data. Thus increasing the training set above 70% does not work in favor of predicting better.

While the training set is 0.549, the misclassification rate is 0.407 with the lowest classification rate. While the correct prediction rates for the groups 0,1, 2 respectively are 0.463, 0.725 and 0.611. Thus, while the category 0 has been predicted less, category 1 and 2 are correctly predicted over 60%.

Correctly predicting the 60% of the texts is an important finding, yet it needs further improvements. As Watanabe and Zhou (2020) suggests that generating a automated classification which 60% correct prediction is an important contribution when the time and cost spent is considered. However, it is also important to acknowledge that these results do not produce a well working dataset. When scholars use the dataset with a 40% error, the analysis which aim to explain these categories will also produce false outcomes. Therefore, a better classifier or ways to improve the correct automated classification needs to be developed.