

**EU INTEGRATION IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND THE  
SOMALIA CIVIL WAR**

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**EU INTEGRATION IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND THE  
SOMALIA CIVIL WAR**

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## ABSTRACT

### EU INTEGRATION IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND THE SOMALIA CIVIL WAR

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With the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the bipolar world, international organizations adopt different approaches to the new security challenges at the world order. EU has developed a uniquely comprehensive approach and established itself as a security actor. The establishment of CFSP and CSDP gradually made the EU an independent actor in world affairs. By harmonizing its institutions, cooperating with both national and international actors and coordinating civilian and military missions in the situation of crisis and conflicts, the EU has become a global security actor. One of the regions, where its security actorness is still ongoing is the Horn of Africa. This region hosts many radical Islamists, extremists, terrorists, pirates, and witnessed failed and corrupt governances. EU's role in the region has been critical in terms of keeping international waters secure from pirates for the benefit of international trade and international aid and ceasing regional terrorist group, Al Shabaab, and international terrorist groups Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The increase in terrorism is not only a threat to the countries of the region, but also mark Europe. This thesis attempts to answer the question of whether the EU can be considered as a security actor at the Horn of Africa, specifically in Somalia, and how its comprehensive approach structures its civilian and military missions and operations. While the literature on the development of EU's instruments, adoption of operations has assessed the EU's security actorness over different approaches; this thesis puts forward the comprehensive approach of EU in the field of security in HoA and Somalia.

## ÖZET

### AB'NİN GÜVENLİK ALANINDAKİ ENTEGRASYONU VE SOMALİ İÇ SAVAŞI

MERVE YILMAZ

AVRUPA ÇALIŞMALARI YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, AĞUSTOS 2020

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Anahtar Kelimeler: OGSP, AB, Afrika Boynuzu, Somali

Berlin duvarının yıkılması ve iki kutuplu dünyanın sona ermesiyle uluslararası kuruluşlar, dünya düzenindeki yeni güvenlik sorunlarına farklı yaklaşımlar benimsiyor. AB, benzersiz şekilde kapsamlı bir yaklaşım geliştirdi ve kendini bir güvenlik aktörü olarak belirledi. Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası ve Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası'nın kademeli olarak kurulması, AB'yi dünya meselelerinde bağımsız bir aktör haline getirmiştir. Kurumlarını uyumlu hale getirerek, hem ulusal hem de uluslararası aktörlerle işbirliği yaparak, kriz ve çatışma durumunda sivil ve askeri misyonları koordine ederek AB'nin küresel güvenlik aktör kimliği oluşmuştur. Güvenlik aktörlüğünün halen devam ettiği bölgelerden biri de Afrika Boynuzu'dur. Bu bölge birçok radikal İslamcıya, aşırıya, teröriste, korsanlara ev sahipliği yapıyor, başarısız ve yozlaşmış hükümetlere tanıklık ediyor. AB'nin bölgedeki rolü, uluslararası suları, uluslararası ticaretin ve uluslararası yardımın yararına korsanlardan güvenli tutmak ve bölgesel terör örgütü El Shabaab ile uluslararası terör örgütleri El Kaide ve IŞİD'i durdurmak açısından kritik olmuştur. Terörizmdeki artış, sadece bölge ülkelerine yönelik bir tehdit değil, aynı zamanda Avrupa'ya da işaret edilmiş durumdadır. Bu tez, AB'nin Afrika Boynuzu'nda özellikle Somali'de bir nasıl bir güvenlik aktörü olarak değerlendirildiğini ve kapsamlı yaklaşımının sivil ve askeri misyon ve operasyonlarını nasıl yapılandığı sorusuna cevap vermeye çalışmaktadır. AB araçlarının geliştirilmesine ve operasyonların benimsenmesine ilişkin literatür, AB'nin farklı yaklaşımlar üzerindeki güvenlik aktörlüğünü değerlendirirken; bu tez, Afrika Boynuzu ve Somali'de AB'nin güvenlik alanındaki kapsamlı yaklaşımını ortaya koymaktadır.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ACP</b> Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific .....	16
<b>ADA</b> Austrian Development Agency .....	42
<b>AMISOM</b> African Union Mission in Somalia .....	25
<b>APF</b> African Peace Facility .....	17
<b>ARS</b> Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia .....	35
<b>AU</b> African Union .....	17
<b>CIC</b> Center on International Cooperation .....	41
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<b>CiviPol</b> civil society organisations and Policy making in the EU .....	42
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<b>CPCC</b> Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability .....	12
<b>CSDP</b> Common Security and Defence Policy .....	3
<b>DG DEVCO</b> Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development 20	
<b>DRC</b> Democratic Republic of Congo .....	5
<b>EC</b> European Community .....	7
<b>ECHO</b> European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations .....	20
<b>ECSA</b> European Community Ship-owners Association .....	36
<b>EDA</b> European Defense Agency .....	10

<b>EDC</b> European Defense Community .....	7
<b>EDF</b> European Development Fund .....	17
<b>EEAS</b> European External Action Service .....	3
<b>EEC</b> European Economic Community .....	7
<b>EPC</b> European Political Community .....	7
<b>ESDI</b> European Security and Defense Identity .....	9
<b>ESDP</b> European Security and Defence Policy .....	8
<b>ESS</b> European Security Strategy .....	3
<b>EU</b> European Union .....	2
<b>EU CAP</b> European Union Capacity Building Mission .....	3
<b>EUMC</b> European Union Military Committee .....	11
<b>EUMS</b> European Union Military Staff .....	12
<b>EU NAVFOR</b> European Union Naval Force ATALANTA .....	3
<b>EUGS</b> European Union Global Strategy .....	3
<b>EUTM</b> European Union Training Mission .....	3
<b>FGS</b> Federal Government of Somalia .....	25
<b>FIBUA</b> Fighting in Built-Up Area .....	38
<b>FMS</b> Federal Member States .....	25
<b>GIZ</b> German Agency for International Cooperation .....	42
<b>GNSS</b> Global Navigation Satellite System .....	22
<b>HoA</b> Horn of Africa .....	2
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<b>SSR</b> Security Sector Reform.....	10
<b>TFG</b> Transitional Federal Government.....	25
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<b>UN</b> United Nations.....	2
<b>UNSOM</b> United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia.....	26
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**WFP** World Food Programme..... 36

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of security has expanded across time due to evolving understandings of threats. Primarily, it was about strategic concerns related to nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Following the introduction of five security sectors in the 1980s, preserving the autonomy of a state became no longer the sole meaning of security. These security sectors now included political, military, economic, societal and environmental dimensions (McSweeney, McSweeney, and Bill 1999). Economic threats are one of the most significant threats for a state, which might affect further cooperation with other states. Societal threat comprises the clashes in one state or within external actors because of different languages, religions, clans, and ethnicities or other traits. Risks at politics might be the result of the failure of government and coup d'états as well, which might lead a nation into the dead well. Military threats have become the major concerns of the international security actors and currently attract the security forces to eradicate any that come from the military faction. Thus the conception of security has been shaped across these threats (Buzan 1991).

The end of the Cold War led to many changes in the global political environment and international responsibilities were also challenged to a great extent. The international political atmosphere and the globe witnessed that not only civil wars, inter-state wars, and ideologies clash but threats might come from non-state actors, terrorism, mass destruction, brutal force, regional conflicts, organized crimes, migration, failed states, poverty, global warming, and climate change. Many states and international organizations started to adopt different roles to either provide peace and security or to prevent conflicts, defining and conceptualizing their actions under 'security actorness'.

To understand who is a security actor or what is security actorness, the literature puts forward several descriptions and focuses mainly on international organizations' actions. Sjöstedt defines actorness 'as the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system' (Cited in Niemann and Bretherton 2013). More contemporary approaches have stressed that this definition now comprises international recognition, internal unity, evaluation of opportunities

and constraints on taking action. While the literature assesses actorness, not only international recognition but also the organizations' ability to perform specific international roles are considered. Today, a security actor is the one who is able to identify the threats against its values or external reasons and diminish those threats either by itself or in cooperation with other actors (Niemann and Bretherton 2013).

The European Union (EU) as non state-like actor established a dense network of economic and humanitarian agreements with the rest of the world against new security threats. During the cold war, the Union was considered as a consumer rather than a provider of security (Duna, 2010). North Atlantic Treaty of Organization (NATO) and the United States (US) had the responsibility for the security of Western powers and the countries in Europe. Yet, the predominant strategy of the EU in the face of new security challenges have led the EU to question its position in this new international system (Allen and Smith 1990). EU was now concerning not only the conflicts that threaten its borders, territorial integrity of the Union and member states but also the no-border countries through treaties, declarations and tasks. It has adopted a comprehensive approach differently compared to other organizations as United Nations (UN) and NATO. Under the comprehensive approach, UN focuses on security reinforcement, strengthening of political institutions and economic and social recovery. NATO puts forward cooperation and coordination action on the ground but lacks civilian assets. The uniqueness of the EU derives from its inclusion of the action mechanisms of member states and the synchronization of the EU institutions, coordination of EU with international and national security actors for the peace, security, development and diplomacy. This thesis attempts to respond to the question of whether the EU can be considered as a security actor at the Horn of Africa (HoA), more specifically in Somalia and how its comprehensive approach structures its civilian and military missions and operations.

The EU puts great emphasis on the security threats not only within the internal borders of the member states but also at the international level. An increase in extremism, terrorism, piracy, and mass migrations has led the EU to go beyond traditional security measures (Solana 2008). Reducing and eradicating terrorism threat by counter-terrorism units, regulating the fluctuations in both national and international security, economy and politics and overall bringing peace and security are the primary goals of the EU's external action. The comprehensive approach of the EU defines the EU as an entity that is willing to be more decisive and operational in resolving the inner conflicts of the countries, which are in crisis. This approach includes the harmonization of the EU institutions, coordination with the international and national actors and cooperation of both civilian and military missions in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Thus, this thesis shall also cover how mechanism as

European External Action Service (EEAS) strategies as Counter-terrorism Strategy, European Security Strategy (ESS) European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), military committees, staff and planned directorates of member states act in the field of security and crisis management.

The EU's intergovernmental nature leads to differing goals and motivations of the member states, which are complementary vein of comprehensive approach. This nature has a great impact on the accomplishment and the realization of civilian missions and military operations. What attracts the EU member states and inter-governmental security cooperation are global issues threaten borders, the security of waters, trade and international prestige both the states and the Union.

The reason why this thesis concentrates on the region of HoA, which encompasses Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, South Sudan, Uganda and Somalia is to demonstrate that the EU' increasing desire to prevent regional and international threats. Since the local governors has failed to provide security and peace, the EU operates as a peacekeeper and major security actor to prevent the consolidation of extremist groups such as Al Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the region, keep the international waters secure from the pirates and conduct activities such as development cooperation, trade and humanitarian aid. As part of the comprehensive approach, the EU adopts triple nexus: conflict prevention, security, and peacekeeping and refers to integration with its own member states, institutions and external actors to launch EU missions and operations.

Under Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the EU undertakes peace and security operations: European Union Training Mission (EUTM), a military naval operation called EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) and EU Capacity Building Mission (EU CAP) Nestor. EU's response by all these missions has been considered as 'EU as a security actor in the external dimension of internal security of Somalia' (Zwolski and Kaunert 2013). Somalia has been through many state failures and under a catastrophic atmosphere of civil war; extremist groups have had strong desires to obtain the authority and spread their radical goals not only to the country but also to the region and international arena. Comprehensive approach among these missions helps EU to demonstrate its effective multilateralism and successful security actorness.

## 1.1 Debating EU's Actorness in the Academic Literature

The literature has hosted many definitions for the role of the EU in global affairs. During the Cold War, Duchene (1973) defined the sui-generis organization as civilian power, with the new millennium and critical changes at the globe; the Union was defined as normative power Manners (2002). The EU was able to become prominent with its exertion of norms and values in the international arena by not using military means. Eventually, a domino effect derives from its stance of economic integration and development cooperation to the external security actorness. The second chapter emphasizes the birth and rise of the EU's security actorness and how it becomes one of the key actors by coordinating regional peace and security, protecting human rights and resolving conflicts under CSDP that has carried 35 civilian and military operations. Numerous studies have analyzed the EU's security actorness in different regions and through different capabilities. Studies by Adamides (2014), and Amer, Swain and Öjendal (2013) focused on the EU's global security actor and examine the comprehensive approach and triple nexus of the security-development that the EU has adopted outside of its borders.

According to the Rehr's and Weissert's (2010) Handbook on CSDP, academics define EU missions as concerts and all these policy reforms, decisions, alterations at the institutional level as the basis of rehearsals. To form an orchestra, different instruments and players are needed and to form security and defense missions under EU's security actorness, the entire duration of the mission, incumbencies, the mission area, the reasoning behind the mission, the involvement of the member states, the initial phase of the arena, evolution of the missions, alterations during the mission and the completion of the operations are needed to be reviewed. Ginsberg and Penksa (2012) examined the reasoning and the aim of these missions under four different aspects. EU conducts its operations as a mission catalyst, mission mandate, mission launch, and mission evaluation. They contributed to academia through analyses of the comprehensive approach of the EU and demonstration of short, medium, and long-term perceptions of the EU.

Koops (2011), Biscop and Drieskens (2006) and Germond, McEnery and Marchi (2016) refined three strategic objectives of ESS: prevention, holistic approach and effective multilateralism. They outlined that effective multilateralism indicates that the EU needs to pursue its security objectives through cooperation with international organizations and third states. In their works, the acceleration of peacekeeping and securitization missions of the EU tied to reluctant commitment and failures of

international organizations such as the UN in Africa, more specifically in Somalia and Rwanda. Another scholar, Morsut (2009) noticed that the EU developed effective multilateralism for a solid and well-functioning international society in the context of crisis management and peacekeeping.

Under the changing external dynamics diverse techniques and strategies of the EU as a global security actor and an integrative power are covered. The EU's comprehensive approach and effective multilateralism in coordination with the international organizations applied to protect security beyond the EU's external boundary. Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) carries great importance as the EU's first external military mission that demonstrates EU's unique comprehensive approach and effective multilateralism at its foreign and security policy. Bailes (2004) discusses that these approaches and strategic objectives are not fully functioning by other international organizations or states. For instance, US National Security Strategy, which was released just a year before ESS, focused on a much grander role for military power and increased the use of force for its own purposes rather than proposing peaceful and diplomatic measures.

Subsequent studies in the primary and secondary literature made critiques towards the capability and accomplishment of the EU in security and peacekeeping missions. Academics questioned whether the civilian and military operations of the EU are conducted unconditionally or do the member states seek profits. Ahmad (2012) and Bailes (2008) emphasize the global prestige of the international organizations' and individual goals of member states' rank in priority. Thus for the external actions of the EU, intergovernmental nature is preponderated at the foreign, security and defence policies. This study will assess how the motivations and intentions of the EU member states and previous colonial powers such as France, UK, Italy Portugal and Belgium shape in the African continent and more specifically in the HoA region.

Somalia, which has been known with the long-term heritage of war and failed state, has also been at the center of piracy and terrorism. The regional and international terrorist groups as Al Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and ISIL has been highly active in the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. These extremists become a barrier in front of the humanitarian aid and international trade (Green and Ahmed 1998), elmi2006somali. EU's comprehensive approach over stabilizing Somalia comprises both regional and inner dynamics in Somalia, the conditions of the Civil War, the activeness of terrorist groups, external factors and factions such as funding mechanisms, supporters and competent authorities in Somalia (Ehrhart and Petretto 2014).

This thesis undertakes a qualitative analysis of both primary and secondary re-

sources that were obtained from Crisis Group interviews, official documents of the European Parliament, European Commission, and the Council of the European Union. The literature spans across several decades of scholarly research that have examined the changing nature of EU foreign and security policy and its global security actorness. Examining the EU relations with Africa and member states' perspectives on the crisis and conflict are substantial to understand and observe how the EU adopts a comprehensive approach. Chapter three reveals a great emphasis on the EU's security actorness in the Horn of Africa and in the following chapter, a case study aims to fill the scholarly gap by analyzing the EU's involvement in Somalia. This thesis will argue that both comprehensive and intergovernmental approaches are effective for taking civilian and military missions in the HoA and Somalia due to several dynamics: individual goals of the member states, security strategies of the EU, internal dynamics of the region and Somalia and external factors.

## 2. THE EVOLUTION OF EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR

After World War II, the European continent was devastated and individual states lacked armies or defence mechanisms. Europe was not unified and to form some kind of integration in the field of security and defence, former French Prime Minister, Pleven proposed creation of the European Defense Community (EDC) at the Treaty of Paris in 1952. Following the rejection of the establishment of EDC by French citizens because of French attitudes against German rearmament. The establishment of EDC, an independent, was rejected by French citizens because of French attitudes against German rearmament. Following, an independent institution called the Western European Union (WEU) was built in 1954 including the UK, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries to form European military alliance. Meanwhile, French President Charles de Gaulle wanted to relaunch a defense alliance and proposed Fouchet Plan to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961. This plan comprised the common foreign and defense policy in addition to the economic cooperation that the EEC enjoyed. The statesman, de Gaulle perceived the Union as third force, independent from Eastern and Western Power blocs, not only equipped with economic, political and military policies (Alistair Law 2009). As the preceding practice of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established in 1970 following the successful cooperation between members of European Community (EC).

Prior to the Treaty of the European Union, EC's role in foreign policy had been based on civilian diplomacy rather than military force in international affairs. With the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, EU moved its single pillar structure to three-pillar structure: The EC, CFSP, and Justice and Home Affairs and the three-pillar structure continued until 2007 Lisbon Treaty. CFSP as the 2nd pillar focused on security and shapes the security and defence policy which is currently active today (Carrapico and Barrinha 2017). Yet, the Maastricht Treaty had the 'bottom-up' coordination caused divergences of the member states in the implementation of EU foreign policy. A clash of intergovernmental politics over the external security policies, a clash of bureaucratic politics among the major institutions and a clash

of priorities between two major EU foreign policy goals: development and security policy (Smith 2013).

The WEU as an integral part of the development of the EU aimed to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union under the defense alliance (Maastricht Treaty 1992) In this direction, the ministers of WEU who constituted the defense arm of the EU adopted the Petersberg Declaration. As the predecessor of CSDP, so-called Petersberg Tasks determined limited sets of military actions, including humanitarian and rescue operations such as military evacuation of EU inhabitants from problematic scenes, peacekeeping, and crisis management. Ludlow discussed that *“Petersberg tasks were over 95 per cent of the security agenda after the Cold War and EU had chance to increase its visibility through WEU in the crises”* (Cited in Müftüler-Baç 2000b).

In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty has strengthened the EU’s liability for peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks by establishing the High Representative for Common and Security Policy. This was one of the substantial steps in the EU’s external action and placed a greater emphasis on protecting the EU’s values, interests, and asserting a greater role in the security field.

The core idea that the EU should have separate capabilities that allow the EU to act during times of crisis and solve security problems was formalized at the Saint-Malo Summit in 1998. The EU desired to consolidate its foreign, security, and defense policy and accumulate its troops and resources under the leadership of Britain and France. The creation of Franco-British deal was grounded on French assertiveness. The declaration of Saint-Malo under the leadership of Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac affirmed that Europe need to take control of its own security and defence measures. Even, their argument strengthened with the great loss of the importance of WEU. Since NATO was acting as major security actor and deploying its troops during the Cold War, the presence and the security actorness of the WEU was questioned. Specifically, basis on lack of capacity and very low amount of crisis management during Bosnian and Kosovo crises, the EU wanted to bring new approaches in security issues. Even though there were controversial thoughts on the military dimension, the French idea of being autonomous of NATO and the US had gained leverage.

The Helsinki Summit in 1999 strengthened the road map for the EU to be more independent in security and defense, including the official adaptation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and conducting its military actions if NATO is not involved in a specific area. It was designed in alignment with the headline goal: much stronger military capability. The idea of conducting operations outside

of NATO came into view with the 2002 Berlin Plus Agreement between NATO and the EU. Securing the guarantees of all capabilities and facilities allowed the EU to use assets of NATO for external operations. Therefore, NATO supported newly established institutions under the EU such as Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff as well as approving the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) (Cornish and Edwards 2001). The US also desired the EU to take responsibility and encouraged the member states even though it had concerns about the type of defense, which could be decoupled from NATO. Eventually, in 1999 at the EU-US Summit in Bonn, the US declared: “We welcome the enhancement of European capacity to respond to crises” (Müftüler-Baç 2000*b*).

## **2.1 The Emergence of the EU as Global Security Actor**

As the world order undergoes changes with the emergence of new security risks, threats and challenges have emerged and the visibility and liability of the EU have started to change. The creation of ESDP along with CFSP represented evolving capacity of armament and defense mechanism of the member states of the union and also became a model to other regional or international organizations such as AU and ASEAN for intervention into crises (Bailes 2008). Council of the EU stated a great degree of military ambition: “to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50 000-60 000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks” (European Council 1999). Yet, national interests political will and military capabilities of the member states have been highly effective in demonstrating EU’s military capacity. Along with the substantial development regarding the NATO-WEU-EU relations in the field of security, EU proposed NATO the establishment of four ad hoc working groups comprising the members from both NATO and the EU (Muftuler-Bac 2000*a*), so that EU could benefit from military expertise of the NATO. The NATO Secretary General at the time has depicted this situation as ‘we can make the European security real or it can break us. Everyone here realizes that we need to be part of a much sharper, a much more focused set of institutions’ (Walker 1999). The first operations following the establishment of ESDP were towards the Western Balkans where many of the European states were already operating under the NATO and WEU.

The High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, regarded that strategic and security-based disputes harm the EU and decreases its credibility as a united global

security actor, he agreed to form a conceptual guidebook for the meaning of security. Thus, under the title of “A secure Europe in a Better World”, ESS, the ground strategy of the EU Council was replaced by the EUGS in 2016. These two grand strategies demonstrate EU’s decisiveness as global actor in security sector reform (SSR). OECD/DAC, which developed the extensive policy guidelines, claims that ultimate goals of SSR are to “create a secure environment which is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy” (Publishing, Committee, and service) 2007).

At the Report on the Implementation of ESS in 2008, the statement expressed the importance of security and development nexus that ‘there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’(Amer, Swain, and Öjendal 2013). At the report, promises on dealing with the global challenges and threats against the international and European order was given under the subtitle of “Providing Security in a Changing World” (Solana 2008).

Along with the grand strategies, supplementary establishments EU to urge member states to embark on united solutions. As setting a precedent, the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004 by the Council of Europe aimed to provide military cooperation and monitor the development of military capabilities and operations based on the Petersberg Tasks and this Agency demonstrated the passion of the EU to legitimize its foreign policy and actions. In 2005, European Consensus on Development was made between the European Commission, European Parliament and member states. Under this consensus, security was indicated as a prerequisite for development and both civilian and military presence of the EU and the Union needed to promote a peace, security and sustainable development.

In an atmosphere where convergence among the member states was seen unlikely, the establishment of the EEAS with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 brought greater harmonization in the EU’s external action. This treaty discloses a pivotal step for more inclusive, multilateral and coherent external action of the EU (Pirozzi 2013). The creation of EEAS represented one of the most far-reaching attempts to reform EU’s security actorness through different types of actions: diplomatic, civilian, military, developmental, political and economic. The High Representative and Vice-President of 2014-2019 term, Federica Mogherini, has defined the goal of EEAS as “to make external action more consistent, more effective, and more strategic” (Furness and Gänzle 2017). Its role is to move beyond the limits of development and humanitarian aid. The three tasks that were shaped under Petersberg Tasks have now been extended to include, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention,

post conflict stabilization and joint disarmament.

## **2.2 The EU military operations and levels of analysis**

Deployment of EU military operations can be studied on three different levels of analysis: international, the EU and the state level. At first, the EU might directly have a military mission on a territory where there is a crisis type of struggle, which causes or will cause humanitarian issues both for that specific state and for the globe. A failed or a troubled state would easily create negative externalities such as terrorism, piracy, regional disagreements, and wars. Regarding this international level of analysis, the EU adopts CFSP and CSDP to prevent and solve possible and multifaceted problems for state in distress. A third state and an international organization may also request EU deployment of military operations to ensure security on specific areas or regions on top of an insurgency. Since third states remain inadequate in terms of military troops or personnel or efficient policies, they may require an external security provider for unexpected or flaming conflict. It can be exemplified regarding the conflict in the HoA, where both AU and UN have required the security assistance of the EU through external actions on CAR, Mali, and Somalia. EU assistance is not regarded as permanent but temporary assistance until the conflictual atmosphere gets stabilized, secured and measures are taken for peacekeeping (Major and Molling 2013).

Not only launching the operations is significant for the EU and the member states but the planning procedure is also precisely important while taking political and military based decisions. Stabilizing a country requires strong cooperation and communication with other external actors. Bridging with international organizations, clarifying the role distribution not only between member states but also with these organizations is vital to conduct successful and effective operations. It is also not possible for the EU to formulate its foreign and security policy without knowing which or when other organizations such as the UN, NATO, or AU will reinforce its operations.

The second level of analysis is the EU level where member states negotiate among each other by bringing forth their own initial positions regarding the operations and compromise. It focuses on unanimous Council decisions and the components of Political and Security Committee (PSC): European Union Military Committee (EUMC),

European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) (Grant and Keohane 2013). All these mechanisms are part of a comprehensive approach in terms of sharing information, getting directions and managing the conflict cycle from civilian, military, and strategic perspectives. For instance, EUMC controls and commands the EUMS by guiding them with the know-how for any kind of military action. EUMS is responsible for developing applicable approaches for both the EU and the local population (Gross 2008). To understand how the CFSP and CSDP are formulated regarding crisis management at the Union level, the process of the deployment of military missions need to be analyzed in two stages. The first stage includes the agenda setting regarding the possible deployment before the EU has taken certain decisions and committed to doing it. At this stage, member states bargain with each other over the external action in the field of security regarding their national interests. If they agree upon, they pass through the second stage, which is planning and launching the missions (Nováky 2018).

Lastly at the state level, member states shape their national interests and preferences that they seek to further and protect. Regarding Hoffman's high and low politics, EU military operations that are responding to the preservation of international security are at the horns of a dilemma. He put forward the 'logic of diversity' for foreign policy, which reveals that integration, or harmonization of member state decisions are avoided at high politics (Hill 1997). The more threats become visible, the more foreign policies, strategies and approach to the missions diverge. Intergovernmental nature becomes the core driver of foreign, security and defence policies.

Member states as the key actors are grounded from Moravcsik's and Hoffman's theoretical insights. According to liberal intergovernmentalism by Andrew Moravcsik, national governments are the key actors instead of supranational institutions and their national interests can differ (Moravcsik 1993). Every state has its national preferences regarding domestic politics and these national interests are the core drivers of CFSP and ESDP/CSDP. Through bargaining between other nations, decisions are transferred to the EU level and foreign policy is established. Under this intergovernmental nature of the foreign policy, decisions are made by unanimity. Yet habits of cooperation and harmonization of the views and decisions have developed over time. As such, Copenhagen Report in 1973 noted and tried to ensure the conformity of the national policies to the common positions in order to seek joint action if it seems desirable and reachable (Øhrgaard 1997).

## 2.3 The EU military operations and levels of analysis

The comprehensive approach of the EU in the field of security is designed as grand policy response that has coherent, inclusive and multilateral structure. Regarding the transition from bipolar to multipolar world, this approach evolved beyond the traditional and state-centric terms and it basis on the ideology of triple nexus comprising conflict prevention, security, and peacekeeping (Pirozzi 2013). In the field of security and crisis management, this approach gradually renews itself as “it reflects widening (new security threats) and deepening (new referent objects of security) of the international security agenda. It frames preserving peace, sustaining humanitarian aid to save lives, and relieving suffering civilians in the conflict zones (Furness and Ganzle 2016). Peacekeeping and development are reflective since there would not be the sustainability of one without the other.

Prior to Lisbon Treaty the question was towards how to coordinate the tools and efforts for the ESDP missions but in the post-Lisbon, now the EU includes more broader questions as how to combine crisis management of EEAS and CSDP centered outlook with the other EU tools such as diplomatic, economic, developmental and humanitarian (Pirozzi 2013). Since EEAS brought division of competences and budgetary responsibilities. In the context of comprehensive approach, Catherine Ashton, HR/VP at the time, stated that “at the highest political level, . . . on a set of actions which, in a country in crisis, will deliver a solution to that crisis, and a long-term commitment to the political and economic development of that country.” As well she signified that the EU will operationalize “by better linking our conflict prevention, mediation, development and conflict resolution" (EC 2013). So that both hard power and soft power of the EU’s external action and CSDP missions aimed to reinforce by military ad civilian missions, engaging with partners, planning and conducting operations.

The intergovernmental nature of the EU led governments of member states to deliberate two things while conducting CSDP missions and deploying their troops: seeking a political benefit out of demonstrating their capability at the international arena and facilitating the production of public good (Green and Ahmed 1998). In the report authored by Michel Barnier to the European Commission, Petersberg Tasks including the rescue missions are mentioned as clearly self-regarding tasks, which only focus on the goodness of Europe and the protection of European citizens. Also he referred to possibilities of the usage of military capacities and ESDP resources in order to keep the international trade routes safe for Europeans to sustain business

as ‘selfish’ and inappropriate (Barnier 2006). ESDP missions are designed to cure the weak states through security-oriented missions yet deciding or preferring which operations need to be activated, where to use minimized force questions the morality of the EU. This can be exemplified through ignoring international crimes, genocide in Darfur and human rights violations and abuses in Palestine (Nalli 2018).

National actors such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Prime Minister, President, or both play the main role in having the decision on external action of the EU. Government offices are fundamental in demonstrating the national interests of that specific country and why they involved or not involved with the military operations. Thus they are the key actors of formulating EU’s comprehensive approach and intergovernmental nature (Rintakoski and Autti 2008). In the absence of clear external security threats, foreign policy decisions of the EU are made regarding the domestic opportunities and constraints. The member states of the EU may not have similar or identical military experience and training or the public might think against it. For instance, whereas member states of Nordic countries did not prefer high risks missions, Germany, Austria and Spain regarded that the ESDP missions need to be active only at the closer neighborhood to Europe as in the Balkans or the post-Soviet zone (Chappell 2009). Members as UK, France and Belgium focused on the principles of necessity, efficacy and justice and since they have close relationship with their former colonies, they preferred to be involved in the crisis management by deploying its troops (Cumming 2005). For instance, UK intervened in the Sierra Leone Civil War in 2000 with the Blair government, France strengthened the maritime dimension of the operations to obtain the fruit of maritime security and stability around the HoA (Pohl 2014).

Regarding the most violent global threat, terrorism, the EU has developed an external agenda and the Council of EU released the first Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005. According to that, the EU had pledged that “we must promote even more vigorously good governance, human rights, democracy as well as education and economic prosperity, and engage in conflict resolution” (Council of the European Union 2005). Also, the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism revised by addressing criminal law for terrorists (Council of the European Union 2015).

Change in the new security environment and the occurrence of new security threats led EU as many other international organizations to leave the traditional ways in crisis management and start to apply effective multilateralism and operationalism. The adoption of ESS and the establishment of EEAS brought new set of institutional framework to the comprehensive approach. The effective multilateralism is applied

in extensive spectrum in two different regions: The Sahel region and the Horn of Africa.

### **3. THE EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

From the decolonization period in the 1960s until the 1990s was a short time in which the EU was not involved in Africa. After the decolonization period, the continent of Africa has been through state failures, fragility between different clans, religions or long-term authoritarian rule. Most of the states in Saharan Africa remained unstable and insecure. Awareness towards fragile states expanded and the primary target line became the African continent and the HoA. EU has always depicted itself as a ‘post-colonial power of good’ in so much that it concentrates on geostrategic goals: ceasing transnational crimes, mainly piracy, human trafficking, illegal migration, and rebuilding and strengthening states in line with national interests and member states’ foreign policies besides geopolitical goals (Engberg 2013). From the 1990s onwards through civilian, military, supervisory and normative power, the EU aimed to promote Western and European ideals in the region: democracy, human rights, crisis management, and economic liberalization.

#### **3.1 The Africa-Europe Alliance**

The historical background of the EU’s engagement with Africa can be traced back to the Lome Convention, which was signed in 1975 between the EEC and Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries where the relationship over aid and trade, was initiated by integrating these countries into the global economy. The relationship between the EU and ACP extended with the Cotonou Partnership in 2000, which introduced Article 11 on conflict prevention and peace-building. Aggestam has argued that the primary objective was portrayed as “not to resolve all outstanding issues of disputes but rather to control and remove the imminent causes to violent escalation both within and between states” (Aggestam 2003). Cooperation

and collaboration brought along further partnerships such as regional trade bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which includes the countries from the HoA, Nile Valley and the African Great Lakes.

Following the Cold War, general instability at the international area exacerbated the conflicts in Africa, including sub-Saharan Africa, Sahel region and the HoA. Specifically the Rwandan genocide in 1994 triggered the EU to scrutinize the new security challenges and prevent the recurrence of similar tragedies. In 1997, at the European Council Meeting, a ‘Common Position’ was issued and the EU fronted its motivations and objectives on conflict prevention and crisis management in Africa (Landgraf 1998). ESDP as one of the Regional Security Arrangements (RSA) put great emphasis on the promotion of peace and security in the region (Faria 2004). Both RSAs, the EU and the African Union (AU), interpreted and localized Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which was declared at the UN summit in 2005 and aimed to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (Dembinski and Schott 2014). AU as an intergovernmental organization aims to ensure the peace and security among African states, preserve human rights, settle disputes and prevent extremists in the region. Still, Africa needed a broader and broader comprehensive approach and extensive CFSP and ESDP.

Encompassing a broad relationship with Africa was debated and therewith in 2000, the first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo was realized. At this Summit, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) was proposed, yet it was adopted in the second Summit in Lisbon in 2007 with European Development Fund (EDF) funding. This partnership endeavors to encourage peace and security by preventing conflicts, reconstruct post-conflict areas, promote prosperity and overall to have an active role in the sustainable development in Africa (Bank 2009). Also, African Peace Facility (APF) which was established in 2003 concerned peace and security and supported peace missions in the CAR, Sudan, Somalia and the Comoros.

The Commission started to play a more predominant role in terms of financial assistance in the field of security. and APF started to get funding by EDF as well as voluntary funding by member states (Mackie et al. 2006). All these partnerships and joint action plans carried the key issues onto the EU agenda: immigration, trade, human rights, and development. With all these facilities, partnerships, and strategies, the EU pledged to contribute the AU’s capacities to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts in the region. Also, the AU was encouraged by the EU to take more responsibilities in delivering policies and actions for a secure continent.

Figure 3.1 Actions approved by EUTF strategic objectives (EUR million)

	SAHEL/LAKE CHAD	HORN OF AFRICA	NORTH OF AFRICA	TOTAL	%
Greater economic and employment opportunities	464.58	310.42		775.00	22%
Strengthening resilience of communities	456.72	475.20		931.93	26%
Improved migration management	382.53	154.43	570.37	1,107.33	31%
Improved governance and conflict prevention	387.60	325.65		713.25	20%
Other/Cross-cutting	29.71	20.93	11.86	62.50	2%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,721.14</b>	<b>1,286.63</b>	<b>582.23</b>	<b>3,590.01</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: (European Commission 2018)

In the Figure 3.1, it was shown that the actions that was adopted by the EUTF with close cooperation with the member states, EU delegations, technical partners such as UN and other international organizations. With 31 per cent, it aimed to focus on migration management which refers to security issues: crisis management, peacekeeping, preventing illegal migration and human trafficking. 26 per cent belongs to strengthening resilience in which the civilian missions operate under this percentage. 22 per cent objected to have better economic conditions and employ the citizens to bring and sustain economic development, support the national security forces and shield the country with economic power. The rest percentage belongs to improved governance, conflict prevention and other cross-cutting.

### 3.2 The EU Action in the Horn of Africa

The HoA is a region of challenges such as forced displacement, demographic pressures, various forms of conflict, trafficking of human beings, organised and violent crime and environmental stresses. The region entails small open economies at the sidelines of the global economy. States and the people make their lives through the selling of oil, coffee and livestock to the global market. Having security threats endangers both the HoA and the Western world, which obtains cheap trade deals. Islamic fundamentalism, radicalism, piracy and the conflicting interests over resources resulted an unstable and insecure atmosphere. In addition, the lack of a consensual


security community in this region because of the tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, the problematic relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the competition over the management of the Nile waters make it impossible for states to reach agreements and adopt a common security policy. Therefore, a need for new approach and mechanism, namely effective multilateralism, was felt. The EU has taken an active role to demonstrate a wider and deeper multilateralism. Wider multilateralism refers to having collective security action by not only focusing on states in that specific region but also taking adjoining regions into consideration. Deepening of multilateralism denotes involving multi dimensions in EU foreign policy: security, economy, democratic governance and related agendas (Gabrielli 2016).

EU's international security actorness does not just include crisis management but also the issue of visibility and credibility. Through implementation of foreign policies and external actions, the EU gains leverage and reputation. Gegout states that the EU's primary role in Africa incorporates security, economy and prestige while the moral values and objectives come in second. So that European concerns and interests are the primary concerns whereas the concerns for Africa come after (Gegout 2009). Through the establishment of a secure and stable atmosphere member states and the EU can have consistent allies in the region and become more visible as both global security provider and economic partner. Through bilateral economic programmes and preferential trade agreements led EU to coordinate and sustain its regional trade and economic integration. (Council of the EU, 2007) under this context, Olsen presents the dilemma on whether ESDP was created for the sake of peace and security on the African continent or for the good of Europe (Olsen 2009). Africa became an arena and stage where different member states and the EU perform their interests, get appreciation and become visible for other actors. Significant threats that are posed to Europe from HoA are mainly mass migration, violent radicalism/terrorism, maritime piracy and conflict involving the Red Sea and the Gulf States. Gulf of Aden carries geostrategic importance for the international community, as well as the member states of the EU. Every year 50 per cent of the container ships passes from these waters for maritime trade and about 80 per cent of cargos come from Europe (Holzer and Jürgenliemk 2012). It has been argued that economic factors on obtaining secure trade relations with African and Asian states over the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean made the EU to focus on promoting peace via ESDP/CDSP missions (Gegout 2009). Since Africa is one of the largest providers of oil to the EU after Russia, a stronger and more stable continent benefits the EU and puts it in an advantageous position in competing with global powers, specifically with China in trade wars (Fox and Godement 2009).

To respond to the challenges of the region, EU adopted a comprehensive approach

which referred to the combination of instruments and capabilities and harmonization of national interests and international policies and strategies for peace and security, resilience building and durable solutions for the countries in crisis. In the Figure 3.2, the all-inclusive approach including policy, strategy, diplomacy and activities in the HoA with multiple actors is presented. Numerous amounts of meetings were held between Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), DG for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), the DG for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE), the DG Home Affairs (HOME) and CMPD (Pirozzi 2013).

Figure 3.2 The EU Comprehensive approach at the Horn of Africa



Source:(European Security and Defence College 2015)

With the 2011 initiative called the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, the presence of the EU became more pronounced in the region. In this strategic framework, there are 5 main significance that EU focused on: (1) assist all countries in the region to build robust and accountable political structures, (2) cooperate with the regional and international actors for the conflict resolution and crisis management, specifically in Somalia and Sudan, (3) prevent the insecurities and the issues that threatens the borders and international atmosphere such as piracy, terrorism and irregular migration, (4) promote economic growth, reduce poverty and to increase prosperity, (5) involve in economic and political cooperation and to strengthen the

role of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (Council of the European Union 2016). Through these strategic goals of EU under CSDP missions, both civilian and military capabilities are developed for crisis management and conflict prevention at the international level and used against radicalization which dangers civilian life, development cooperation, food security, and secure state-building (EEAS 2016).

In this context, EU’s comprehensive approach included many military, legal, political and diplomatic action against piracy, insecurity and instability in the region. Through CSDP missions: EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and the latest mission EUCAP Nestor, the EU adopted the principles of regional cooperation and responsibility to ensure peace and security. In Figure 3.3 the current military and civilian missions that are conducted in the HoA and Sahel region are given. All three missions in Somalia are still active both onshore and offshore to protect maritime security, thwart the threat of terrorism and overall to stabilize Somalia.

Figure 3.3 Current CSDP missions and operations in Africa

Mission/operation (country)	Type	Personnel <sup>b</sup>	Since
EUSEC DRC (DRC)	Civilian	40	2005
EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Somalia)	Military	1,200	2008
EUTM Somalia (Somalia) <sup>c</sup>	Military	155	2010
EUCAP Nestor (Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania)	Civilian/ military	100	2012
EUCAP Sahel (Niger)	Civilian	56	2012
EUTM Mali (Mali)	Military	550	2013
EUBAM Libya (Libya) <sup>d</sup>	Civilian	17	2013
EUCAP Sahel (Mali)	Civilian	80	2015
EUMAM CAR (CAR)	Military	60	2015

Source:(EU Institute for Security Studies 2015)

European Commission funds all these three large missions by EDF and the Instrument for Stability (IfS). Also many programmes and projects were developed to guarantee the strategic objectives of the EU in the region and in the Somalia. The regional Maritime Security Programme (MASE) was developed with 40 million Euro budget to find the causality of piracy, remove hem without evolving and cut the financial roots of them. Also, The Pilot project on Piracy, Maritime Awareness and Risks implemented to use satellite technologies countering piracy (Barrios 2013).

The release of cooperative space power and satellite technology, Europe’s Global

Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), so-called Galileo, in 2011 was also for provide security presence against piracy off the coast of the HoA and human trafficking. It provided intelligence for the EU about smuggling, human trafficking and piracy (European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency 2018). Another ongoing programme, The Critical Maritime Routes Programme (MARSIC) has 6 million Euro budget funded by IfS and responsible for maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean.

#### 4. SOMALIA AS AN AREA OF CONFLICT

Somalia has always been one of the earliest strategically important human settlements in the world and also a trading center since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Located at the intersection of Africa and Asia, Somalia did not go unnoticed in the West. In 1884, at a conference in which thirteen European powers shared the African continent among themselves, Somalia was partitioned into three: British Somali, Italian Somali and French Somalia. British and Italian Somali gained independence in 1960 and formed Greater Somalia whereas French Somalia voted to remain under French rule amid accusations of ballot rigging but later voted firmly for independence in 1977 and became Djibouti (Lewis et al. 2008). The country once labeled the ‘Switzerland of Africa’ due to its free and peaceful elections has suffered a tragic and steady decay in its economy and politics for several decades and struggled to maintain a semblance of normality (Al Jazeera 2016). After the declaration of independence, Somalia had no clear leadership or legitimate government, the gradual fragmentation of political views dragged Somalia into political instability. Taking advantage of this volatility, Siad Barre staged a military coup in 1969 and his reign of dictatorship began. Through the suspension of the constitution, dissolution of the parliament, ban on opposition parties, limitation on press freedom and detentions, Somalia became the epitome of the corrupt state. Barre’s authoritarianism was like an epidemic of patrimonialism through which he proceeded for greedy state action (Hansen 2003).

Procuring absolute power over the administrative bodies allowed his own clan to run the administration from the economy to the military, with the funding coming from the two superpowers: the USA and USSR. The US had two great intentions over the Horn of Africa including Somalia: thwart Soviet-Cuban expansionism and safeguarding the Persian Gulf oil routes (Schraeder and Rosati 1987). US goals over promoting regional stability in Somalia are in long run. Prior to Ogedan War, Somalia received great amount of military and financial aid from USSR (Adam 1992). Yet, during the war, Soviets abandoned Somalis in the Somalis turned against USSR.

In the case of pre-war Somalia, the rulers exploited the administrative resources and

manipulated Islam to establish absolute power rather than peace. Barre who was called the Big Man of Africa was barely distinguishable from the colonial powers that ruled Somali. His paroles were to build a socialist society that would bring health-care, collective teaching and restored infrastructure just like the British, French and Italian proclamations after colonization (Cawsey, A 2014). He encouraged his society with the following words:

“I would like to ask all Somalis to come out and build their nation, a strong nation, to use all their efforts, energy, wealth and brains in developing their country... The imperialists, who always want to see people in hunger, disease, and ignorance, will oppose us in order that we may beg them... let us join hands in crushing the enemy of our land” (Moe 2018).

Yet, the conservation of his rule could only be achieved through absolute and authoritarian power among state and non-state actors, which eventually paved the way for the civil war.

#### **4.1 Road to Somali Civil Wars and The Battles**

Somalia’s most significant turning point during the Barre regime was the Ogaden War in 1977-78 between Ethiopia and Somalia, which revitalized territorial demands and caused a massive degree of refugee flow. This war over the Ogedan region polarized domestic politics, society and security notions and devastated the credibility of the Barre regime. An important development in its aftermath was the formation of many non-state armed actors including paramilitaries, clan chiefs, extremists, Islamic defenders, terrorists, pirates, guerilla fighters and private security companies (Elmi and Barise 2006). Somalia conflict was not stemming from clans, tribes or different ethnic groups but between Muslim groups, parted in assuming extremism or not. Indeed, different clans and tribal people were allying against the formation of jihadist groups (Peterson 2014). The more the Barre regime suppressed the opposition groups, the closer they were drawn to the Ethiopian armed forces (Dagne 2002). The government had no intention of settling with the insurgency groups or stopping the guerilla warfare; rather, it responded in most rancorous ways.

After the collapse of the authoritarian Barre regime in 1991, re-establishing peace and security under the Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000 could not be possible because of fragility, conflicts and banditry (House 2017). This had continued during the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) between 2004-2012. Somalia witnessed poor ascendancy, economic malpractice, sidelining of certain clans, and prevalent exploitation of state resources. It fell under instability with an ongoing struggle of the government, Islamist rebellious groups, and the terrorists, which revealed a catastrophic humanitarian situation. Towards the beginning of the 21st century, the state was governed with a sharia law-based judicial system and Islamic courts took the main responsibility of governing. The supporters of the Islamic courts and other institutes decided to unify under the name of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006. ICU and TFG had been sharing executive and legislative powers. Yet the difference of their ideologies and governance styles caused a dispute between the two factions.

The ICU, which was established under the influence of radical Islamism and tribal interests, its militia desired to extend its control area. It mostly extended through southern Somalia, enclosed TFG controlled Baidoa and eventually threatened to spread its holy war to Ethiopia (Le Sage 2009). Ethiopia, as primary supportive actor of TFG responded to these threats of ICU by intervening into Somali Civil War between 2006 and 2009. The presence of Ethiopian troops inside Somalia turned into one of the major challenges for the conflict in Somalia (Elmi and Aynte, 2012). Despite the fact that the war paved the way to the countenance of TFG and Ethiopian alliance, ICU did not completely strike its flag (Dagne 2007).

The defense industry and security policies of TFG were unqualified, unorganized, and there was a lack of an effective combat management system. During TFG's eight years term, systemic problems of military and corrupt commanders were the biggest obstacles to security sector reform (Hills, 2014). Somalia Armed Forces (SAF) by itself did not have sufficient capability against heavy armaments and Islamist combats but together with aligned troops of international partners and allies, SAF had been trying to intensify its security presence. After the end of the TFG term in 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) came into power to control the capital Mogadishu. Yet it has had limited and ineffective governance over Federal Member States (FMS): Puntland, Somaliland, Galmudug, Jubaland, and Hirshabelle.

For Somalia, AU has undertaken many measures on counterterrorism and transnational crime by conducting military missions under the name of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). From 2007 to 2015 AMISOM led security and offensive

operations, deployed its troops and soldiers in the most disputing areas against the jihadist organization Al-Shabaab (Albrecht and Haenlein 2016). With 1.1 billion euro, it became a financial and logistical donor. According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) policy brief in 2010, AMISOM with an estimated 8,000 members troop capacity was supposed to be 20,000 members and thus there was a need for more expert tactical combat equipment (Williams 2018). There were constraints on budget and logistics as AMISOM had requested attack helicopters and weapons for more than one year. Ugandan led AMISOM was also problematic since there was not adequate guidance on its goals and Uganda lacked peacekeeping and peacekeeping experience. On top of it, Al-Shabaab had been urging Somalis to fight against AMISOM since Ethiopian forces withdrew.

Even though the deployment of AMISOM troops enabled the TFG to extend its control 14 districts out of 16 in Mogadishu, FGS remained fragile and could not thwart heavily equipped insurgent groups in Somalia. Through 2013, FGS with international actors combined their defence, judiciary, police forces and government institutions (Reno 2017). Both widening and deepening of the security led to improvements in onshore and offshore. Al-Shabaab lost significant amount of territory following the death of groups' leader Ahmed Abdi Godane at one of the joint military operations of SAF and AMISOM (Anzalone 2013).

The assistance of AU in Somalia was also aligned with the UNSC 2102 United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) that was established in 2013 (Reno 2018, 501). Both missions cap off the continued fighting between different factions of the civil war, to bring security to Somalia and protect humanitarian aid and assistance. The head of the UNSOM and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Nicholas Key stated that cooperation with FGS and the expulsion of Al-Shabaab was successful "Because it is firstly a Somali-led and owned process and the result of a unique partnership between the African Union, UN, and the Federal Government" (UN News Centre 2015, 501).

#### **4.2 Regional and Global Terrorism- Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and ISIL**

Somalia was forming an ideal environment for terrorism since there has been failed state, which poses a threat to national and international security. The ongoing civil war is not only conducted over Somalia but also affected the regional and

international dynamics. Al Shabaab as an insurgent and extremist group has risen from the splintered ICU in 2007. Many of the local clan partners and the ICU members joined because of parochial reasons, some believed that joining into Al Shabaab bring short term primacy in long-term struggles and some others joined due to the financial incentives of the Al Shabaab. It was promised 200 to 300 dollars for recruitment (Raghavan 2010). Al Shaabab militia was easily capitalized and extended its action through Puntland and Somaliland, which had authoritarian regimes (Swart 2009).

The power that comes from the sharia courts during the ICU period blazed a trail for the consolidation of Al Shabaab's supremacy. Meanwhile, it was forming alliances with newly emerging Somali insurgent groups such as Hizbul Islam which was an another faction against the TFG to takeover Mogadishu (Tar and Mustapha 2017). However, these alliances had the characteristic of turning into hostility over the territorial issues. For instance, Kismayo a southern part of the Somalia became focal part of the power-sharing conflict and it changed hands between TFG, ICU, Ethiopia, Al Shabaab, and Hizbul Islam. Al Shabaab has taken the previous ICU lands and the coastal areas, which gives the capability of preventing any military or civilian assistance from international actors (Kambere 2012).

Al Shabaab was eager to use the attrition strategy in which "terrorists seek to persuade the enemy that the terrorists are strong enough to impose considerable costs if the enemy continues a particular policy" (Kydd and Walter 2006). Hansen emphasized that Somalia's poverty and clanism were so strong that Al Shabaab could easily engender fragmentation within all groups, clans and parties to the Somali's battle (Hansen 2003). Even though SAF had retaken many lands from Al Shabaab throughout the Battle of Elwaq in 2011, Battle of Kismayo in 2012 and Operation Indian Ocean in 2014, Al Shabaab preserved its foreign support and their extremist motivation led their resurrection at the beginning of 2016 (Caulderwood 2014).

Regarding the fragmentations in Al Shabaab, fighters who get into an ideological clash between Al Qaeda have excavated and escalated the war by bringing the ISIL military group in 2015 to Somalia and Eastern Africa for the first time. While Al Qaeda was preserving its existence, a new ISIL-backed terrorist group was raging the unpeaceful and insecure environment. Somalia has been going through deadlock as it was hosting new insurgent foreign fighters such as Kenyan defense forces who aimed to protect its borders from ISIL by attacking ISIL captured Somali lands (Nkala 2015). Within 2 years of ISIL entry it has gained much legitimacy to achieve their secessionist goals. ISIL challenged Al-Shabaab's prolonged hegemony for land, legitimacy and influence. Warner and Weiss assessed the rivalry between two insur-

gent groups over the attacking to each other, types of their governance and future scenarios. Even though ISIL had unique attitude against Al-Shabaab by describing them “steadfast mountains” and “roaring lions” and the “new generation of the caliphate”, Al-Shabaab attacked to ISIL personnel and clashed with the ISIL front in southern Somalia (Warner and Weiss 2017). Long-standing Al-Shabaab also threatened the ones who join the ISIL with a death sentence (The Washington Post, 2015). On November 2017, UN report claimed that ISIL faction in Puntland receives money and guidance from ISIL officials in Syria and Iraq. Yet, the authors could not verify this report (Hourelid 2017).

In the Figure 4.1, Somalia Control Map in 2017 was given by ACLED. Violent presence of rebellious groups such as ISIL, AL-Shabaab and counterforces as AMISOM, UNSOM and administration of FGS were demonstrated. The blue region, Puntland, indicates the parts of the country under control of current SAF forces, and in the southern part heavily armed Al Shabaab, ISIL insurgents and counterterrorism units of AMISOM were found.


### **4.3 Recurrent failure of state-building and peacekeeping projects in**

#### **Somalia**

Somalia is an explicit case for state failure as a postcolonial state that has had protracted war for almost three decades. Considering all the primary and secondary literature, one can observe that there are multiple reasons for state failure. Somalia has not been a unique case in terms of hosting authoritarian and corrupt leaders as well as terrorist groups. However, through its governance without government it became a unique case. Barre’s totalitarianism played a major role in heartening guerilla groups to develop piracy in Somalia. Even though the opposition shared a single common goal, which was toppling the existing government, they were inwardly competing which made it hard to achieve peace and a secure environment. That power race kept going for the current terrorist groups.

Both the efforts and intentions of UN and US forces that tried to restructure the subverted and insecure atmosphere were criticized as incoherent (Rutherford 2008). The US military interventions during the 1990s and after the 9/11 attack were purely based on national interests and directed against Al Qaeda franchises and affiliated groups which was mainly Al-Shaabab. Its foreign and security strategies

Figure 4.1 Somalia Control Map



Source:(Somalia Control Map 2016)

were self-centered and retaliation oriented rather than focusing on the fight against terrorism for the peace and security of Somalia (Rollins 2010). The UN was involved through United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM I between 1992 and 1993, and UNOSOM II between 1993 and 1995. UN spent 1.68 billion dollars with the US expenditure reaching 2.2 billion dollars more (Hogendoorn 2017). Through these operations, the UN pledged to act as a peacekeeper and maintain arbitration between the clashing factions, disarm the extremist groups and also format control forces such as the police and regional representatives. Yet, withdrawal of UN forces left Somalia aid-dependent and politically fragmented. Hence, “Somalia becomes a stronger reminder to all western governments including the member states of the EU and organizations of how 1990s style of humanitarian intervention and the provision of peace and security techniques might go wrong” (Joseph 2014, 286) UN mission could not deliver results at the end of three years despite reconciliation conferences and intermediary agendas from neighboring countries. Various scholars in the literature have discussed that the reason of why the UN has failed to cease the separation of factions, bring peace and provide sustainable security is because of short and rapid solutions to a long-lasting problem (Kimenyi, Mbaku, and Moyo 2010). According to the secondary literature, which also evaluates the fiscal influence of international intervention in Somalia, UN budgetary contributions were more contributive to the war budget rather than to peacebuilding. Therefore, the monetary aid created ‘spoilers’ who devoted themselves to prevent any kind of rapprochement and to spread the warfare circumstances (Ahmad 2012, 314)

In 2004, through the Nairobi Peace Accords, TFG had agreed with external pressure on peacekeeping. However, there had been many disputes that the representatives of the Islamist movement held more power than the TFG (Menkhaus 2007). Under this framework, Somalia was not able to pursue state building. Stephen Stedman argued that the obstacles in front of domestic peacemaking and peacekeeping were individuals, clan groups and the spoilers who endangered the whole peacekeeping process (Stedman 1997). The scholars of secondary literature, who have analyzed the primary literature on the Battle of Mogadishu, have put forward the ‘spoiler problem’ as an explanation for the prolonged catastrophe (Ursing and Desai 2016). These spoilers have been categorized into two as the ones who have effectively sabotaged the peace settlements that involve international actors and the ones who acted to undercut the local efforts on improving the rule of law, bringing good governance and security. Somali leaders barely had the motivation to incur expenditure or to spend political capital to train and professionalize national security forces. Even though local entrepreneurs have endeavored to provide a safe, peaceful and secure environment to conduct their business; spoilers could suppress them, exploit their

resources and destroy trade. So, as long as there was fear, businessmen continued to be self-effacing on improving security among land and sea against the spoilers and groups like pirates.


Thirdly, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism at the beginning of 2006 made the revitalization of the absent central government exponentially problematic. ICU-led radicals consolidated their powers through many victories such as taking Mogadishu back from TFG and defeating the counter-terrorism unit assisted by US military forces. Resembling the Barre regime, ICU banned opposition organizations, political and civil society groups and excluding public leaders who did not belong to their Islamic community (Dagne 2007). Totalitarianism created a monotype governance, which led to the rise of regional terrorist group; Al Shabaab that consolidated itself and opened the road for Al Qaeda.

Lastly constraints on intervention to terrorism generate recurrence in state failure. Terrorist groups are weaker than the governments in most cases and, hereby, they are fenceless under government retaliation. The more constrained the government was in its use of force, the less costly the attrition strategy was, and the longer the terrorists could hold out in the hopes of achieving their goal. Al Shabaab benefitted from this position and framed a large scale of action to the target audience. Through press statements, Al Shabaab threatens the Middle East and the West besides the Somali audience (Hansen 2013, 14). Another reason regarding the constraints is related to the fragmentation of the Al Qaeda affiliate Al Shabaab and the formation of ISIL.

#### **4.4 Piracy in Somalia**


Piracy came into prominence as a global security threat in the waters off the HoA with motives base upon poverty, lack of employment, low incomes, drought, illegal fishing, and mainly unstable security and politics. Without a functioning government Somali was a perfect home for piracy, which exposed utterly organized violence. According to the International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau (ICC-IMB) Piracy Annual report in 2008, the number of piracy attacks in Somali doubled in 2008, accounting for an estimated 40 percent of the 293 pirate attacks reported worldwide. The following year, there had been 406 worldwide attacks and 217 of them pertained to the coast of Somalia (Middleton 2008).

Figure 4.2 Pirate Activities in Somalia



Source: IMB 2012.

Figure 4.3 Piracy in Somalia Compared with Other States



Sources: IMB 2012; UNODC-WB 2012.

Piracy in the HoA poses threats global trade and commercial shipping, humanitarian aid deliveries and raises concerns on the financing of regional conflict and terrorism. Pirates have conducted vicious operations and taken control of the vessels transiting at the High Risk Area (HRA), which lies to the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea known as the vital areas for ships (Ploch et al. 2011). According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, from 2011 to 2016, the volume of the crude oil and petroleum products that transited between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea per day increased from 3.3 to 4.6 million barrels which indicates a significant amount of oil transition from the war-risk zone (Cited in U.S Energy Information Administration 2017).

To cope with piracy, the TFG and the Puntland authorities agreed to a joint anti-piracy cooperation program in 2009. According to the ICG Report on Somalia, the program was successful in launching limited activities to prevent, restraint, and investigate piracy. Authorities signed a memorandum of understanding on counter-piracy issues in April 2010. Even though there has been strong cooperation between territorial authorities, equipment and capabilities were inadequate. So the government resorted to private security companies to train and equip its maritime force (Cited in Sterio 2011).

Growing threats and intimidation by the Somali piracy led the US, NATO, and the EU to take anti-piracy measures. UNSC has issued many resolutions since 2008 to facilitate response to Somali piracy and armed robbery at the sea. Resolution 1816, 1846 and 1851 are the main contributors for security efforts which enable states acting in cooperation with TFG, calling military capabilities and expanding a mandate by regional organizations and international actors gradually (Dalton, Roach, and Daley 2009). In 2008, NATO deployed anti-piracy operations under the name of Operation Allied Provider, which provides protection for WFP shipments. It later transmitted WFP responsibilities to the EU's new naval operation, which is called Operation ICC. Following the summer of 2009, NATO deployed Operation Ocean Shield with a principle of 'detering, defending against and disrupting pirate activities' The NATO mission lasted until 2016 and participated in capacity-building efforts with full complementarity to the relevant UNSC (Jopling 2010).

The failed state of Somalia was incapable of building operational and effectual national networks to control rebellious groups, terrorists and pirates. The EU has stepped into Somalia's domestic politics and governance with a strong intention to uphold peacekeeping operations against extremist groups, terrorized networks and international criminals, which imposed security threats in Somalia.

## 5. EU IN SOMALIA: COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH AND MAIN POLICIES

From the early 1990s, ESDP had a naval component yet the operations in the Balkan region and the sub-Saharan area were vastly limited. With the beginning of the 21st century, EUMC was established as a result of Helsinki Headline Goal and encouraged the Rapid Response Mechanism to undertake diverse missions. The Council of the EU mandated the ‘EU Maritime Dimension Study’ in 2005, which promotes the freedom and the security of the seas as a feature of diplomacy and as a quick response by deploying the troops. Some of the operations have been organized under the battle groups whereas others have been conducted under ESDP operations. EU has taken broader responsibilities while integrating its maritime forces and policies. Main concerns were over ‘illegal immigration, arms trafficking, drug smuggling, terrorism, piracy and robbery at sea, over exploitation of sea resources, and maritime contamination’ (European Commission 2006). Moreover, the Union distresses the security of the transportation of energy: oil and gas (European Commission 2007).

EU enhanced its dialogue on peace and security at the HoA and Somalia through APF by focusing on conflict resolution and peacekeeping. For Somalia, the EU has been the largest aid donor in terms of humanitarian assistance, security supply, and peacekeeping. In the early 2000s, the European Commission has launched the Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 2002-2007’ (Little, Peter D. 2008). Through Counterterrorism Strategy, it increased its willingness to initiate pragmatic exertions against Al-Shabaab. In 2007, since the EU was asked by the AU to monetarily aid the AMISOM which emerged with UNSC Resolution 1725, the security assistance of the EU has considerably increased. According to the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICTT),

“Since 2007, the EU has supported AMISOM under the APF with 1.3 billion euro and allocated 212 million euros in development support from 2008-2012 and pledged more than 486 million for 2014-2020, supplemented by additional bilateral aid from many European member states”

(Hogendoorn 2017).

UK and France also signed the Djibouti Peace Agreement between TFG and the opposition: The Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) as observer states in June 2008. The EU and the member states have promoted conflict resolution, securitization, and peacekeeping with 3 missions: EUNAVFOR, EUTM, EUCAP Nestor on the specific global issues of terrorism, piracy and humanitarian crisis.

### **5.1 EU Response by Operation ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR)**

The impact of organized piracy and seaborne terrorism on human rights, naval security, international trade, and manifold economic activities around that region had become non-negligible. Pirates had become the biggest obstacle to long-term sustainability by sabotaging the boats and shipment to jeopardize the supply of food, military and health aid. They conducted hijacking and robbery operations to international ships, seized heavy weapons and arms to support regional terrorist groups, as Al-Shabaab demanded. Numerous attacks were made against the merchant vessels on the line of International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) (West, Cooper, and Kachoyan 2010). The Gulf of Aden has been a strategic waterway that links Suez Canal as a trade route between Asia and the European continent, the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea (Tsvetkova 2009). Threats that come from pirates and terrorists endangered the international waters from multiple dimensions. Not only the security of countries, regions, humans and the environment were challenged but also international trade was affected. The alternative route for secure trade, Cape of Good Hope, which is highly expensive and long route compared to Suez. Thus, the imperilment of its transportation route accelerated the EU to take action, reduce, and efface this threat.

The political history in Somali posed a challenging atmosphere, because of corrupt leaders who focused on absolute power and did not spend any expenditure on the local security forces (Menkhaus 2007). Through anti-piracy military operations, the EU has been responding to security negligence at the maritime security, human rights violations, and economic concerns overseas at the HoA and the Western Indian Ocean. On December 2008, EU initiated a mission called EU NAVFOR under the CSDP framework. This mission was urged mainly by France and Spain and with the

authorization of UNSC Resolutions: Oceans and the Law of the Sea (Weldemichael, Schneider, and Winner 2017). As the first naval force of the EU, EU NAVFOR ensured a comprehensive approach in coordination with international and local forces and reverberated union level security concerns (Merlingen 2013). It endeavored to thwart piracy, protect maritime transit of international shipping and to guard the vessels of the World Food Program (WFP), which provided food ships for the HoA, Mogadishu.

The EU NAVFOR consisted of two major components. The first of them comprises warships, surveillance planes, and military capabilities of the EU member states. The second one includes an online platform that is called Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), which was established by the EU in assistance with the shipping industry (Zwolski and Kaunert 2013, 600). Since the authorities planned multifaceted operation, they conducted the mission from Somali, headquarter of MSCHOA and UK. Over different control centers, they monitored and patrolled civilian and military missions (Wendling 2010).

The operation anticipated facilitating the formation of various private goods. Fighting against piracy has not been the only concern and policy objective of the EU but the member states also had a strong desire to secure their own commercial, military and diplomatic interests. A result of bargaining between those states to take military missions in Somalia was to increase the visibility of member states and the EU.

Figure 5.1 Main contributors to EU NAVFOR (2009-2014)

Year	Main contributors (>10%)
2009	Germany, Sweden, France and Spain
2010	France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Greece
2011	Spain, Germany, France
2012	France, Spain, Germany, Italy
2013	Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands
2014	Germany, Spain, Netherlands, France

Source:(European Commission 2014)

In the Figure 5.1, major contributors to EU NAVFOR are given. Compared to other CSDP missions and deployments, Atalanta attracted parliaments' of member states to a great extent. "Some 16,000 ships that carries oil from the Middle East and goods from Asia to Europe and North America passes from Gulf of Aden per year" (Middleton, 2008). European Community Ship-owners Association (ECSA) claimed that 41 per cent of the global merchant fleet from the chaotic atmosphere of Somalia since they could not merchandise and called EU member states to take more forceful

action against piracy off Somalia (Rice and Gow 2008). Spain increased its security actorness under the umbrella of EU, due to hijakings of Spanish vessels in 2008-2009 in the Indian Ocean. Dutch government refrains from any military deployment in general if there is no common support of such a mission. Yet in 2008, the government informed parliament on sending guard for WFP ships to guard ships and Somalia coastal territory (Peters, Wagner, and Glahn 2014).

Germany was one of the countries that were affected worse by the maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden (Weber, 2009). To respond to this concern, Germany acted upon protecting vulnerable vessels and this mission was perceived as a chance that would enable it to engage in anti-piracy operations without changing its constitution. In doing that, it desired to balance its domestic political concern with its international obligations. France cooperated in missions due to several reasons; rescuing hostages kept by Somali pirates, providing assistance to WFP ships, securing the route for the commercial ships and reducing domestic opposition to its forthcoming reintegration into NATO in 2009 (Cizel and Von Hlatky 2014). French forces acted as a deterrent for future piracy attacks by rescuing yachts and sailors. All these major actors built intergovernmental security cooperation, responded to a common security threat and enhanced the EU's global role

However, regarding this military mission, there was a counterbalance problem in terms of demand and capacity of security integration. It can be deduced that even though the EU accomplished its anti-piracy strategies through active military missions, these were in short term. Thus sustainability of these missions could not be maintained as it was intended. So short-term strategies and missions gave its place to long-term development programs, provision of territorial controls by taking full responsibility for the security and development needs of Somalia and its people. This shift has rallied the international community and regional actors to adopt a comprehensive approach The discussion paper of ECDPM in 2019 argued,

“ Over the past decade, there has been a paradigm shift towards seeing Somalia as a fragile state-building project rather than as a textbook case of a perpetual humanitarian emergency” (Medinilla, Shiferaw, and Veron 2019).

## 5.2 EU Military Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia)

Under the framework of CSDP, out of civilian and military missions, there are only three SSR: EUSEC RD Congo, EUSSR Guinea-Bissau and EUTM Somalia. Out of three, EUTM Somalia is the first EU military training mission. The great diligence of the EU on putting Somalia on the recovery road and initiating military missions was actualized with intimate coordination with 15 member states and AU. Spanish Colonel led EUTM initiated the mission in 2010 first in Bihanga Camp Uganda and transferred to Irish Colonel in 2011. EU cooperated with several regional and international actors such as Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF), AU and US. SAF, current National Somalia Forces (NSF), got training by UPDF on behalf of AMISOM (Oksamytna 2011).

The initial mandate included logistical support, training military staff of the Somali National Army (SNA) consolidating TFG and the institutional structure of Somalia, and facilitating AMISOM's training duty. The EUTM trained TFG how to combat regional and international terrorist groups that are active in Somalia including Al-Shabaab, Al Qaeda, and ISIL. The trainings were conducted at the Jazeera Training Camp (JTC) in Mogadishu in collaboration with the national chief of the army, commanders, and local representatives.

In 2011, the mandate amended and focused more on to form a bridge between civilian and military missions to expand their foothold in Mogadishu and provide self training capacities (Skeppstrom, Hull Wiklund, and Jonsson 2015). So far, there have been 6 mandates in Somalia through the extensions by the EU Council. Military force has been strengthened through capability and capacity building within the Somalia Ministry of Defense (MoD). These efforts also comprised Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), Fighting in Built-Up Area (FIBUA) and the humanitarian aspects of conflict management (EU Council, 19).

Different EU Member States provided specific training in certain sectors. For instance, Germany was responsible for communication and Portuguese instructors taught the techniques for urban warfare. Currently, British Army deploys its troops to support 4 different organizations that are active in Somalia: UN, AU, EU, and SNA under the ideology of a 'more stable Somalia is a more stable Africa' (Ministry of Defence 2019). It was engaged in training activities including medics, logistics, human rights, and development, and the British navy aimed to implement soldier first policy to contribute to the formation of a consolidated and professional Somali army. Yet, the main objective of the UK can be interpreted as conducting

and leading the operation to endorse its old-fashioned character as a naval power (Nováky 2018).

### 5.3 EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Nestor)

EUCAP Nestor launched in 2012 as the first civilian CSDP mission that has regional focus with a 23 million euro budget for the first 12 months (Tejpar and Zetterlund 2013). The mission had three main objectives which are to strengthen the rule of law in the countries of operation, to strengthen the maritime piracy in the HoA and to support the development of coastal police and security forces and the judiciary in four countries: Somalia, Djibouti, Seychelles and Tanzania (Ejdus 2018). Nestor comprises both short and long-term action plans to reform the rule of law, eliminate the threat of piracy from the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean. Under the context of the comprehensive approach, the European Commission demonstrated a great amount of cooperation with the EEAS crisis management structures.

In 2015, the EU took a comprehensive review and decided to solely focus on Somalia. Thus the mission was renamed as EUCAP Somalia. This mission primarily focused on the autonomous regions: Puntland and Somaliland in Somalia to increase its capacity on fighting with piracy (Rodt et al. 2019). Retired French admiral, Jacques Launayhe and following Etienne de Ponchis, led the mission. The reason why France drew attention and supported the mission in Northwest and Southwest Indian Ocean is that direct threats that were posed to European and international security and trade. The greatest threat was maritime piracy in this region and to fight against, it integrated two overseas departments: La Reunion and Mayotte (Saint-Mezard, 2015). EU staff aimed to train the Somalia police and customs officers to increase their military capabilities and maintain personnel on the ground after the termination of EUCAP Somalia. The mission contributed to the Somali judicial system by establishing an extended and systematic mechanism that enables the prosecution of serious criminals by European evidence gathering techniques. The entire process of prosecuting acts of piracy was defined as “from crime to court” (EEAS, 2014). Just as in the EU NAVFOR, the EU has worked collaboratively with the shipping industry and the insurance companies as well with the political institutions in Somalia.

Under the context of the comprehensive approach, EUCAP Nestor cooperated with

the regional and international actors. Besides UNSOM and AMISOM, EU cooperated with Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) which is a non-profit organization that promotes long-term solutions onshore and offshore and International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is a UN agency that safeguards and secures international shipping (Rodt et al. 2019).

However, according to the some of the in-depth interviews that were conducted in the study of Ejodus in 2016, different stakeholders who were involved in EUCAP Nestor claimed that the mission was not launched in response to the local needs but to protect the interests of the EU:

“EUCAP Nestor is an ‘exit strategy’ of EU NAVFOR. There was a dilemma between the ideas about deploying missions “because it makes us feel good or because it saves lives. We are doing it because it became too expensive to send ships through the Somali Basin and the Gulf of Aden and that’s it” Ejodus (2018).

#### **5.4 Challenges for and of the EU’s security actorness**

Christopher Hill argues the problematic structure and gap inside the EU regarding peacekeeping and securitization with a bottom-up approach (Hill 1993). Even though global security donors are insistent on crisis management, improvement of humanitarian-development, security, and peacekeeping action as a cure-all in unstable countries like Somalia, there is an incongruity among goals and the circumstantial reality. Even though the training missions of EU puts forward the ideology of “give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime”, in practice there is a disconnection between policymakers and the ones who are on the field (Zwolski and Kaunert 2013). There are concerns about the implementation of triple nexus: crisis management, security, and peacekeeping. The nexus is perceived as the bureaucratic requirements that are imposed by the headquarters in Brussels or in more simplistic terms that it has no real contribution (Amer, Swain, and Öjendal 2013). Without close cooperation and engagement at the inner cycle of the EU, political dialogue becomes interrupted which makes it difficult to take taking legitimate and effective actions on behalf of peace and security.

The EU was also criticized, as it could not foresee the considerable strength of the regional group Al-Shabaab in the southern part of the country (Ingiriis 2018). The efforts of the EU to meet on the common ground with Al-Shabaab yielded no results since the terrorist front acridly became an obstacle to any kind of humanitarian or emergency aid despite the famine. Consequently, the EU has ended up with some form of deadlock, without reaching out to all over Somalia in an equal fashion. Yet, withdrawing from the area might leave the conflicting arena to the previous ringleaders who may find a way to get their commercial control back gluttonously (Etefa 2019). Significantly, without monetary aid and military help from the external organizations, domestic political culture and structure remains inadequate and forms one of the biggest blockages in front of a peaceful and secure Somalia.

Since Somalia is at the center of unsettled waters due to the ongoing Civil War, the timing for the EU to coordinate development cooperation was extended. Regarding the implementation of long lasting development projects, there were some challenges because of the administrative framework and the usage of instruments. According to Bayne's article, these can be aligned as the administrative delays in approving projects at the Headquarters level in Brussels, complex administrative procedures, the lack of capacity and institutional memory and non-adaptive pressures from Headquarters level in Brussels (Bayne 2001). Several scholars claimed that the commitment to approach is devious and the long term planning is not coordinated with the resources, assets, and eagerness required to operationalize it (Medinilla, Shiferaw, and Veron 2019).

## **5.5 Current Security Involvement of the EU in Somalia**

The NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) published a work analyzing Somali New Deal Compact, which was endorsed in 2013 in Brussels at the host conference of FGS and the EU. This deal comprises contemporary political and economic resilience, international security assistance and development planning and has promised 1.8 billion euros (Hearn and Zimmerman 2014, 4).

At the Council Conclusions on the EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, the EU decided to give priority to five areas in the region: regional security and stability, migration and forced displacement, counter-radicalization and violent extremism, youth and employment, and human rights, rule of law and democratic

governance (Council of the European Union 2015). Through the budget from European Development Fund, EU assured to spend 100 million for state-building and peacebuilding, 86 million for food security and building resilience, 60 million for education, and 14 million euros for civil society in the 2014-2020 period (European Commission 2014).

The comprehensive approach of the EU in Somalia preserved the five main peace and security goals in the new deal, which are building inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations, revenue collection, and provision of services. EU's involvement in the security field was focused on combating terrorism and piracy as well as reducing and stopping forced displacement, irregular migration, smugglers and traffickers and insecure food routes. Since 2016, the European Commission EUTF has conducted eight projects towards Somalia with a EUR 312 700 000 budget (European Court of Auditors 2018). These projects that are shown in the Table 5.1 aim to address insecurity, instability and the rising levels of radical extremism that arose from the weak state and fragile type of governance. EUTF deliberated these projects with partners such as the UNDP, IGAD, German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), Austrian Development Agency (ADA), civil society organisations and Policy making in the EU (CiviPol) to enhance primarily peace and security, provide better equipment against transnational threats, and bring greater awareness on conflict resolution and crisis management.

Table 5.1 EUTF funded missions in Horn of Africa and Somalia

Title	Project budget	Thematic contribution	Percentage	Implementing partners	Country	Adoption date
Enhancing security and the rule of law in Somalia	45000000	45000000	100 percent	The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	Somalia	12/12/17
Disrupting criminal trafficking and smuggling networks through increased anti-money laundering and financial investigation capacity in the Greater Horn of Africa	5000000	5000000	100 percent	Civipol	Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, Yemen	12/12/18
Somalia State Building and Resilience Contract	103000000	51500000	50 percent		Somalia	29/05/18
Inclusive Local and Economic Development - ILED	98200000	33388000	34 percent			29/05/18
IGAD Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa Region (IPPSHAR)	40000000	40000000	100 percent	Austrian Development Agency, Intergovernmental Authority on Development	Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda	01/10/17
Strengthening the ability of IGAD to promote resilience in the Horn of Africa	5000000	2500000	50 percent	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, South Sudan	28/04/16
Collaboration in Cross-Border Areas of the Horn of Africa Region	63500000	21590000	34 percent	GIZ, United Nations Development Programme, Intergovernmental Authority on Development	Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia	15/12/16

## 6. CONCLUSION

EU, which started as a peace project has always promoted peace and security even it has built its security mechanism after the Cold War. With the changing dynamics at the globe, key security threats emerged such as terrorism, regional conflicts, radical Islam failed states, piracy and more. EU increased its desire to adopt foreign, security and defence policy both inside and outside of the European borders. This study discusses how the EU adopted and implemented the comprehensive approach to crisis management and security prior and post-Lisbon in the Horn of Africa and specifically in Somalia. As a response to “how and what degree of autonomy that EU in the field of security?” question, 1998 Franco-British St-Malo Summit and Helsinki Summit were analyzed. At these summits, the scope of EU’s foreign and security policy ambitions and the presence of the military instruments in the EU external action come to the forefront. Through the developments of the European approach to security, it can be commented that the external actions were ad hoc but unique, multilateral and comprehensive.

The 9/11 attacks and the violent presence of several terrorist groups in the African continent activated the EU to become one of the key actors as a security provider in the continent of Africa along with the global war on terrorism. The adoption of ESS with the document ‘A secure Europe a better world’, revealed three main principles: prevention, holistic approach and multilateralism. These are the part of the comprehensive approach, in which the EU focuses on security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social well-being. These different dimensions led EU to develop better functioning international society, coordinate different mechanisms with EU institutions for security in a changing world.

Lisbon Treaty was the focal point for the EU in the field of security. To provide better organization and efficiency in crisis management, this treaty integrated many financial instruments such as EDF, IfS and ENPI with the strategic planning of EEAS. The establishment of EEAS, the EU followed a decisive path to bring peace and security into those regions and to stabilize the states and region for the sake of mutual interests. European Commission demonstrated close cooperation between

EEAS instruments in the field of CFSP/CSDP. This integrative approach increased the EU's credibility and visibility in a through humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping operations, crisis management and conflict resolution tasks.

EU member states never cut their ties between the African states due to the former colonization period and the extent of natural resources. The Africa-EU alliance started as an economic partnership that aims to develop the economies of the African states in the post-colonial period. Yet, because of corrupt politics, low level of economic management and the crises, Africa remained insecure and unstable until today. Regarding the priority regions and scenarios, the EU actively involves the crisis management and conflict resolution in Africa. The African continent has been in a catastrophic situation because of failed states, mass migration, poverty, terrorism, piracy, and other civil and external conflicts for decades. Through CSDP missions, the EU deployed troops to Sudan, Niger, Mali, Chad, Somalia, and to more African countries

EU and the member states appointed the Horn of Africa, which carries geostrategic importance as well as historical engagement. The region is at the center of international trade and EU concerns threats that are posed to commercial routes at this region. Maritime piracy has been predominating against the commercial and humanitarian aid vessels. To pinpoint the sources of piracy problems at international waters, and terrorism, the EU has prepared strategic frameworks, documents and taken measures at EU level to implement case by case. Regarding the HoA and Somalia, both military and civilian missions implemented comprehensive approach and triple nexus of the security-development. (crisis management, security, and peacekeeping)

In this study, Somali is taken as a case for EU's security engagement, through EU NAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor /EUCAP Somalia. The country has been known as a haven for international piracy and terrorist groups because of weak and failed state. Not only the geostrategic location affected the EU member states and the EU to take military and civilian missions in Somalia but also the rising terrorism threat to the globe and threat against international trade led the EU to adopt its comprehensive approach and take countermeasures on the land of conflict. The EU's unique comprehensive approach comprised close cooperation with the international organizations, their missions such as UNSOM, AMISOM and key states as US, solid integration of institutions among the EU and contributing economically for the securitization, stabilization and development of Somalia and HoA. All the security strategies such as ESS, EUGS and Counterterrorism Strategy put strategic goals to terminate the jihadist regional terrorist group Al-Shabaab and

member states of the EU deployed troops to autonomous regions in Somalia.

Meanwhile, piracy and its vicious attacks through hijackings led EU member states to involve protecting the international water, their military and civilian personnel as well as the commercial ships and humanitarian aid of WFP vessels. Through annual reports of the International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, discussion papers of ECDPM, both the situation regarding pirate attacks and the political and development response of the EU were provided. To operate in the field, the Union adopted a comprehensive approach, which is the product of a huge amount of intergovernmental security cooperation and integration of different actors. In essence, the EU can be considered as a security actor in the HoA as it accomplished to decline the activity of terrorists and pirates through great harmonization in its civilian and military operations.

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