THE ROLE OF REFUGEE FLOWS AND POROUS BORDERS IN SHAPING VOTING BEHAVIOR: AN ANALYSIS FROM TURKISH ELECTIONS

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF REFUGEE FLOWS AND POROUS BORDERS IN SHAPING VOTING BEHAVIOR: AN ANALYSIS FROM TURKISH ELECTIONS

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This study brings an alternative explanation to the repercussions of what is known as a refugee crisis. Despite hosting millions of refugees for years, the studies that analyze the Turkish case conclude that the refugee influx did not affect the voting behavior of citizens substantially. Examining the effect of refugees on the voting-behavior of local citizens in Turkey, the study supports the existing studies in the literature on immigration from the European countries by showing that governments are severely punished due to their failure in controlling cross-border mobilizations. However, this punishment mechanism might not be ubiquitous in a country. Borrowing from the literatures on spatial-proximity and border, this thesis argues that proximity to the Syrian border mitigates the detrimental effect of refugees. The salience of security issues alongside the border triggers a rally 'round-the flag effect and the absence of cultural-similarities with the refugees prevent increasing prejudice in the border-cities. As an outcome, the local citizens are more likely to side with the government. Moreover, this thesis confronts the one-size-fits-all approach in the theoretical framework of immigration effects. As suggested, local citizens do not always shift toward extreme-right wing parties. Taking advantage of the lack of alternative options, the Republican People's Party (CHP) has defended restrictive immigration policies since the eruption of the Syrian civil war. Surely, the consistent opposition to the government in other policy areas has been a determinant, but the policy stance of CHP in the migration issue has mobilized voters as well. Analyzing the vote shares of AKP and CHP in the electoral-district level, this thesis supports the above-explained trends. On the other hand, due to the possible ecological fallacy in aggregate-level analysis, using CSES Modules 4 and 5, the study tests the same hypotheses at an individual level. The individual-level findings support the aggregate-level findings such that increasing refugee rates are associated with a higher probability of voting for CHP in the distant cities whereas in the proximate cities refugees do not play a role in shaping citizens' voting behavior.

ÖZET

MÜLTECI AKINLARININ VE GEÇIRGEN SINIRLARIN OY VERME DAVRANIŞI ÜZERINDEKI ETKISI: TÜRKIYE SEÇIMLERI ANALIZI

SAMET APAYDON

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Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç

Anahtar Kelimeler: oy verme davranışı, mülteciler, Suriyeliler, mekansal yakınlık, Suriye sınırı

Bu çalışma, mülteci krizi olarak bilinen olayın sonuçlarına alternatif bir açıklama getirmektedir. Yıllardır milyonlarca mülteciye ev sahipliği yapmasına rağmen, Türkiye örneğini analiz eden çalışmalar mülteci akının vatandaşların oy davranışı üzerinde önemli derecede etkilemediği sonucuna varmışlardır. Mültecilerin, Türkiye'deki yerel vatandaşların oy verme davranışı üzerindeki etkisini araştırarak bu çalışma göçmen literatüründeki Avrupa ülkelerini araştıran çalışmalarını şu şekilde desteklemektedir: hükümetler sınır ötesi hareketliliği kontrol edemedikleri için ciddi biçimde cezalandırılır. Ancak bu cezalandırma mekanizması ülkenin her yerinde var olmayabilir. Mekânsal yakınlık ve sınır literatürlerinden yararlanarak, bu çalışma sınıra yakınlığın mültecilerin zararlı etkisini azalttığını savunmaktadır. Sınır şehirleri boyunca göze çarpan güvenlik endişeleri bayrak etrafına toplanma etkisini tetikler, bununla birlikte kültürel farklılıkların bulunmayışı da mültecilere göre önyargıların artmasını engeller. Bunun sonucu olarak, yerel vatandaşların hükümetin tarafını tutması daha muhtemeldir. Dahası, bu tez göçmenlerin etkileri teorisinde bulunan her konuya uygulanabilirlik yaklaşımına karşı çıkar. Önerildiği gibi yerel vatandaşlar her zaman aşırı-sağcı partilere yönelmezler. Alternatif eksikliğinden yararlanarak, Cumhuriyetçi Hareket Parti, Suriye İç Savaşı'nın başladığı günden beri göçmenleri sınırlayıcı politikaları desteklemiştir. Elbette, hükümete karşı diğer politika alanlarında da istikrarlı karşı çıkmak etkili olmuştur ancak CHP'nin mültecilere karşı duruşu da seçmen de karşılık bulmuştur. AKP ve CHP'nin seçim çevresindeki oy oranlarını analiz ederek, bu tez yukarıda açıklanan trendi desteklemektedir. Öte yandan, toplam düzey analizindeki olası ekolojik yanılgıdan dolayı, CSES Modül 4 ve 5 kullanarak, çalışma aynı hipotezleri bireysel seviyede de test etmektedir. Bireysel-seviye bulguları, toplam düzey analizindeki verileri şu şekilde desteklemektedir: artan mülteci oranı sınıra uzak şehirlerde daha yüksek olasılıkta CHP'ye oy verme ile ilişkilidir. Öte yandan sınıra yakın şehirlerde mülteciler vatandaşların oy davranışını şekillendirmede etkili olmamıştır.

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I cannot repay my lovely mother and brother for what they have done for years. Thank you for being with me in every instance and supporting my every decision. I would not be at this stage of my life without you, I owe you everything that I had.

To my Mother & Brother

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1. INTRODUCTION

This is the biggest refugee population from a single conflict in a generation.

– António Guterres, *UN General Secretary* [1]

The decades-long authoritarian rules marking the political systems of countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria were substantially challenged by the precipitous social movements of the late 2010s. These dynamics are now known as the Arab Spring and are currently regarded as a key factor in shaping the structure of the Middle East The escalation of these small-scale revolutions permeated into almost all of the MENA region and has a myriad of effects over each case. The ousting of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and the concomitant establishment of the basis of democratic credentials brought the fourth waves of democratization optimism. These positive trajectories were shadowed by the death of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and the imprisonment of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt which dragged the respective countries into unforeseen turmoil. In Syria, which can be argued to be on the receiving end of the darkest effects of the Arab Spring has resulted in a civil war when protests against President Assad were countered with asymmetric power towards civilians. In their response to the humanitarian peril within Syrian borders, the international community was neither able to properly diagnose the situation nor prescribe effective solutions; instead, international voices diverged into two camps- an echo of the cold war mentality which reflected the bipolarity of the international system. In this instance, however, the global order was far from the dichotomous distribution of power which guaranteed a certain level of stability due to conflicting interests over the region. This unstable system produced major cleavages in the appropriate responses to the crisis as well as how to establish such goals.

On the one hand, the US and Western partners along with several regional powers, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, supported the protesters and hindered any resolution that might leave Assad in power. On the other hand, actors such as Russia

[1] "More than Four Million Syrians have Now Fled War and Persecution," *The UN Refugee Agency*, July 9, 2015.

and Iran which perceived the 'democratization' as a Western interference, have enhanced their close military and economic cooperation with Syria. Along with these foreign actors, the emergence of the radical-Islamic terrorist organization, ISIL, and its taking advantage of the power vacuum, transformed Syrian territories into a battleground for a proxy war.

The Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War had serious consequences for international politics such as the informal establishment of alliances, the break-up of close relationships, and new debates on the international organizations' effectiveness. None of these debates on the practice of the international system directly infiltrate the daily lives of citizens. This proposition is not because these consequences do not affect citizens but rather because of their immediate consequences, mostly, not related to them. However, one consequence of these conflicts stands out for its effects on international politics as it has ubiquitously spread to the Western hemisphere and is still an issue of major contention in global governance with little hopes of resolution. As the problem stays unresolved, more and more citizens feel discontent with decision-makers.

The turmoil in the region caused the displacement of more than 26 million people.[2] The intensity of the displacement was such that the world has been witnessing the most drastic and unprecedented refugee influx during the last couple of years. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, depicts the situation as follows: *"Syria is the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time, a continuing cause of suffering for millions which should be garnering a groundswell of support around the world."* [3] While governments are busy with trying to stop or at least control cross-border mobilizations of the millions of refugees, a wide variety of non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies emphasize the atrocities that refugees suffer. Once those refugees are settled into the host countries, another critical phase of policy-process starts: integration. Despite not being invited to the policy-making process, the lives of local citizens change drastically as an outcome of this integration process.

The places where refugees settled have undergone a period of transition in the way that the local citizens become more and more aware of the existence of an outgroup. Despite a few existing counterexamples, the transition process includes

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[2] "Figure at a Glance," *The UN Refugees Agency*, June 18, 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html

[3] "Syria Conflict At 5 Years: The Biggest Refugee And Displacement Crisis Of Our Time Demands A Huge Surge In Solidarity," *The UN Refugees Agency*, March 15, 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2016/3/56e6e3249/syria-conflict-5-years-biggest-refugee-displacement-crisis-time-demands.html

trends such as increasing crime rates (Pinotti 2017; Piopiunik and Ruhose 2017), increasing house-prices (Saiz 2007; Tumen 2016) or decreasing internal migration (Borjas 2006). On top of these, increasing interaction with refugees triggers group-biases. Enos (2017, 65) depicts the situation as follows: coming across with an immigrant increases an individual's salience of group identity . As the number of refugees increases, salience scales up and reach to a level where the individual starts to identify refugees as 'others' or 'foreigners'. When these problems are supported by the demagogues, the refugee issue becomes more politicized and citizens become more supportive of restrictive policies (Hopkins 2010). For citizens, who are living in democracies, the best viable way to express their policy preferences and affect the decision-making process is by voting (Dahl 1998; Schumpeter 1947). Then, how would the local people react after the sudden and steady increasing interaction with refugees? The answer to this question might seem straightforward because the restrictive policies and anti-immigrant sentiments are the common points of all extreme-right parties (Fennema 1997).

As a prominent example, the increasing cross-border mobilization, which the EU has failed to stop, caused serious economic and social problems, particularly in Greece and Italy. According to UNHCR, by the end of 2016, more than 5 million refugees and migrants reached the European shores and the majority of them entered Europe through Greece and Italy due to the geographical proximity of those countries. While the refugee numbers were increasing each month, the European countries have also experienced the rise of the extreme-right parties, which share a common view on the anti-immigration policies. Consequently, scholarly attention has shifted towards explaining the possible association between these two phenomena.

One of the major research branches has gathered around the question of whether voting behavior of local citizens prone to change once they are exposed to refugees and if so, to what extent? Various studies on voting behavior and literature on immigration support that the presence and influx of refugees in their country is one of the main reasons for the increases in the vote share of extreme-right parties (Barone et al. 2016; Dinas et al. 2019; Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm 2016). Extreme-right parties seem appealing to the local citizens because of their frame on restrictive immigration policies (Arzheimer 2009; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002). Considering the fact that it is now hosting the largest number of refugees by far, Turkey is a fertile ground for analyzing the relationship and one of the best countries to check the validity of this theory. As of 2020, according to the records, Turkey is hosting more than 4.1 million refugees, while the second-ranked country

is merely hosting 1.6 million refugees.[4] In other words, Turkey hosts more refugees than the total amount of European countries host.

Findings of existing studies suggest a sharp increase in the vote shares of extreme-right parties in countries that experience an influx of refugees. Almost all studies in the literature highlight the European examples where the refugee crisis was in earnest. Testing the validity of the theory outside of Europe should not be problematic because the explanatory power of theory does not come from any particular characteristics of the European countries, such as the failure of the European Union in managing the cross-border mobilization or the contradictive political culture. The theoretical framework is based on the premise of how citizens, who are experiencing individual and cultural harm due to the increasing number of refugees, reveal their discontent with the national governments through prioritizing a relatively more restrictive party with regards to cross-border mobilization. Indeed, none of the studies have tested the same argument for the European Parliament elections, where repercussions of the refugee crisis might be distinguishable at other levels on top of the national level. Taking these premises into account, several studies tested the same theoretical arguments in the case of Turkey, but, conclude that the refugee crisis has not played a crucial role in shaping the voting decisions of the citizens (Altındağ and Kaushal 2020; Fisunoğlu and Sert 2019). These findings are intriguing and worthwhile to conduct further research since refugees are still one of the hottest debates in Turkish politics. Possibly the biggest shortcomings of these studies are controlling the external validity of the theory without considering the differences of the cases. If the institutional differences between the cases are disregarded, the findings would yield biased results.

Applying the same theory to Turkey requires certain alterations in the theoretical framework. The possible caveats in applying the existing causal relation in the European countries, do not deny the idea of local citizens reveal their dissatisfaction. Arguing that local citizens would reward the government because it agreed to host millions of refugees is unreasonable. Yet, there might be certain factors that play a mitigating role in the effect of refugees. Turkey is different compared to the European countries mainly because of two reasons. First of all, Turkey is a neighbor of Syria and played a direct role in the Syrian Civil War. While the European countries have put forward their preferences through the policy circles, mainly in the UN's organs, Turkey has actively participated in the conflict not just with the economic and military support to the factions in Syria but also conducted military operations. The policy decisions of the Turkish government have transformed the Syrian Civil

[4]"Figure at a Glance," *The UN Refugees Agency*, June 18, 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html

War and the refugee crisis in the eyes of Turkish citizens into a national issue and added an aspect of security concerns since the country was in confrontations with various groups. Secondly, socio-cultural differences of Turkey, particularly in the Southeastern part, are a crucial point for consideration. Putting it more delicately, the direct outcomes of the Syrian Civil War have infiltrated thoroughly in the lives of the citizens that are residing closer to the Syrian border. Additionally, a reasonable number of refugees would not cause the same negative attitudes such as prejudices or racism due to the very fact that local citizens do not differ utterly from those people culturally.

Borrowing from various literatures, I argue that these differences mitigate the negative effects of the refugee crisis. Hence the main research question of this thesis is whether and, to what extent, voting behavior of local citizens changes once they are exposed to refugees? Furthermore, whether and to what extent the change in voting behavior is related to distance to the Syrian border, where security concerns and cultural similarities play a mitigating role for the negative effect of refugees? Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that neither in this part of this study nor in the latter parts, I do not make any argument about why this factors mitigate the negative of effect refugees on the voting behavior. While literature on voting behavior contains multiple studies that analyze the reasons of people giving priority to some issues such as security (James and Rioux 1998; Kernell 1978; Schattschneider 1942) or economy (Fiorina 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck and Lobo 2017), the well-established literature on conflict deeply discusses the possible reasons for the formation of out-group attitudes such as social conflict or group-conflict theories (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Kehrberg 2007; Masso 2009; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). The main contribution of this thesis is built on the idea that how spatial proximity, in this case, distance to the Syrian border, plays a key role in shaping the voting decisions of local citizens as a reaction to the refugee crisis. All in all, the study is a synopsis of the existing situation in Turkey.

Last but not least, this thesis criticizes the argument that citizens necessarily shift towards extreme-right parties. Prior research argues that voters shift towards extreme-right parties due to their frame on anti-immigrant policy. The theory, mostly, finds empirical supports in the European countries such as Greece-Golden Dawn, Italy-Lega Nord, France-Front National, or Germany-Alternative for Germany. All of these exemplified right-wing parties have succeeded to present themselves as a viable option to the incumbent party. Yet, this is not the case for Turkey. The only effective right-wing party that is on the scene for decades is Nationalist Movement Party *(Millyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP)*. The nationalist-right MHP has harshly criticized the government until 2016. However, after the attempted coup in July 2016,

MHP has entered an alliance with the incumbent party, Justice and Development Party *(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP)*. Consequently, in the 2018 presidential elections, MHP has not nominated a presidential candidate, instead supported the current president Erdogan. Similarly, in the 2019 local elections, in most metropolitan cities, MHP decided to support AKP's candidates. In other words, since the establishment of the Public Alliance *(Cumhur İttifakı)*, MHP has presented itself as a partner rather than an alternative to the incumbent. The other right-wing party, Good Party *(İYİP Parti, İYİP)*, formed shortly after the alliance of MHP and AKP, mostly from the ex-members of MHP. However, İYİP is a newly established party that is still far from being an alternative for AKP, as the latest election results suggest. Thus, the party structure in Turkey is considerably different from the European countries, such that there is a lack of extreme-right party, which presents itself as an alternative to the government. Hence, arguing that increasing the refugee rate increases the vote-share of the right-wing party in Turkey is flawed. On the other hand, in this study, I argue that even though it is not a right-wing party, the main opposition party,Republican People's Party *(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP)*, has succeeded to present itself as an alternative for the incumbent party. In the later part of this study, I present and demonstrate that CHP has proposed anti-immigrant policies, though not as harsh as European extremist parties. Of course, the citizens who voted for CHP did not do so just because CHP has embraced anti-immigrant policies, but also because of its consistent opposition to the incumbent party in almost all policy areas. However, the restrictive policies towards refugees did also play a deterministic role in voters' decisions.

The findings of this study support the above-mentioned arguments. Testing the same theory in both electoral-district and individual levels, both empirical chapters suggest that citizens who reside closer to the border are less likely to punish the government, probably because of the salience of security issues or cultural similarities. On the contrary, while increasing the refugee rate has increased the vote share of CHP, the decision to support CHP is amplified as the distance to the Syrian border increases. The findings indicate that CHP has successfully filled the absence of an anti-immigrant party with its policy suggestions. However, in border cities where security concerns outweigh the refugee crisis, the local citizens continue to support or at least do not punish the incumbent party.

The organization of the study can be summarized as follows. In the next part, I start with reviewing the existing studies in the various literatures. The primary focus will be on discussing the results and research designs of the existing studies on the relationship between refugees and voting behavior. After reviewing that literature, to establish the basis of the theoretical arguments, two distinct literature

will be discussed. From the literature on the border, the possible characteristics of the border-cities; and from the spatial-proximity border, how proximity to a special event or location can shape the individual behavior will be summarized. In the theoretical section, I will present my theoretical. While doing that the above-mentioned caveats will be discussed further. The second chapter tests the proposed hypotheses, presents the results of electoral-district level data, and concludes with the main drawbacks of the research design. The second empirical chapter starts with discussing the flaws of using electoral-district level data for individual-level inferences. The third chapter analyzes the same hypotheses using individual-level data. That chapter concludes with reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of individual-level data compared to aggregate-level data, as well as discussing possible further studies with improved research designs. In the last part of this thesis, I will shortly discuss the results from the Turkish politics perspective before closing with the concluding remarks.

1.1 Literature Review

Borders are considered an indispensable part of international politics. Consequently, they have been discussed substantially in the literature for decades. On the one hand, the vast literature on political geography seeks to explain how borders are shaped and reshaped over time (e.g., Gottman 1952); on the other hand, the proportional amount of the studies focuses on what borders represent both internationally (e.g., Ruggie 1993) and in the minds of individuals (e.g., Newman and Paasi 1998). What makes border such an immense phenomenon in international politics is its characteristic of defining territories since the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Shimko (2015, 2)'s following depiction of the treaties as: *"Although 1648 is a convenient dividing point, the modern state system did not just appear overnight in that year: The world of 1647 did not look much different from the world of 1649"* is valid beyond any doubt. However, the international system forged by the treaties of Westphalia put forward the modern state system and to the concern of this study: that is the idea of a triple function of borders— demarcating state territory, public authority, and the 'nation' (Del Sarto 2010, 149). TThe well-developed literature on the importance of borders in international politics still draws scholarly attention in multiple ways. The scholars mainly discuss how the advancement of actors other than states, whether regional organizations such as EU, NAFTA (Anderson and O'Dowd 1999),

or transnational organizations including terrorists such as El-Qaeda (Guild 2003), alter the conceptualization of border and intensify cross-border relationships. Nevertheless, despite defining the boundaries of states' sovereignty, borders do not divide cultural, economic, or social relations between two states. Putting more delicately: "[borders are] *zones rather than lines*" (Hansen 1981, 19).

The lives in border cities are different: *"Of necessity, borderlanders have developed their own way of life and their own institutions. A sense of "otherness" and "separateness" is clearly detectable among people who live in the binational urban centers. . . "* (Martínez 1996, 19). Indeed, the authors argue that proximity to borders is a matter of inquiry and find empirical support in the literature. For instance, to understand border cities differ from non-border cities, Anderson (2003) look at census data from 1950 to 2000 in both the U.S. and Mexico. The author conclude that; firstly, the population growths in both sides of the border were above the national average (Anderson 2003, 540); secondly, quality of life indicators such as educational attainment, poverty, unemployment, and housing, have different characteristics in both countries' border cities compared to non-border cities (Anderson 2003, 553). Similarly, to grasp another distinctive aspect of border and non-border cities, several studies investigated how media coverage differ across those cities. Analyzing the contents of newspapers that were published between 2004 and 2005 in the U.S; Branton and Dunaway (2009*a*,*b*) find out that corporately owned newspapers are more likely to publish negative opinion pieces about immigrants, compared to privately. Above all, the coverages of those pieces are about 20% (from 0.51 to 0.76 for corporate newspapers, from 0.42 to 0.51 for private ones) more likely in the closest distance to the Mexican border compared to the furthest distance (Branton and Dunaway 2009*a*, 265). Along with that, the probability of publishing slanted pieces about immigrants shows the same pattern. Consequently, an increase in negative coverage of immigrants from minimum (i.e., non-border cities) to maximum (i.e., border cities) corresponds to 0.35% increase in the probability of local citizens defining immigrants as the most important problem (Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010). What is common in all these studies is the consideration of geographical distance (in this case it is the distance to a border) as a main explanatory variable.

The literature on geographical distance does not follow a one-size-fits-all approach. Instead, to a certain extent the literature can be divided into two camps, namely not in my backyard (NIMBY) and conditional on networks or ideology approaches (Cortina 2019, 2). NIMBY is a straightforward idea such that closer to an unwarranted facility or a project, citizens more likely to confront it (Dear 1992). For instance, the findings of Swofford and Slattery (2010) indicate that people who reside closer to planned wind-farms projects are more inclined to oppose it. On the

other hand, the studies that conditionalize public attitudes on networks and ideology argue that proximity to a political event, whether a candidate or an object such as a wall, characterized individuals' decisions more positively compared to those who are far from it (Cortina 2019, 2). The study that argues granting asylum-seeker status in the U.S border cities is 70% while it is 29% in non-border cities (Chand, Schreckhise, and Bowers 2017, 190), is a perfect illustration of the above-mentioned camp.

Taking into account of various studies in the literature on borders and geographical distance, it is not surprising to expect that all different characteristics of border cities should affect the political decisions of individuals. To investigate the border effect on voting behavior, one of the first research was conducted by Adkisson and Peach (1999). Being fully aware of the various characteristic of the border and non-border cities, the authors (Adkisson and Peach 1999) analyze the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections in the U.S by looking at 360 counties in four Mexican border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas). Controlling the common demographic, economic, and political variables, the authors concluded that there is a border effect that prioritizes the Democratic candidate (Adkisson and Peach 1999, 76), and also that effect even extends beyond the immediate border regions (Adkisson and Peach 1999, 77). Adkisson and Peach (1999)'s study was rudimentary in terms of their data and model estimations. Consequently, Adkisson and his colleague revisited that study in 2011 and tested the same hypotheses with more extended data and a more sophisticated model. The revising study in 2011 verified the study in 1999, such that local citizens in the border regions give Democratic presidential candidates approximately a four-percentage point higher margin over their Republican rivals (Adkisson and Saucedo 2011, 279). Related to the interest of this thesis, Adkisson and Saucedo (2011) discuss a vital point to understand why local citizens who live in border region favor Democratic candidates and argue that *"Obviously both parties are concerned about illegal immigration but, at least these brief passages, suggest softer rhetoric coming from the Democratic Party. Perhaps a bit of the Democratic favoring border effect comes from a closer alignment between border resident sentiments towards immigration and a softer sounding Democratic rhetoric"* (Adkisson and Saucedo 2011, 280) Although the authors preliminarily discuss the effect of illegal immigration on voting behavior, it is tempting to reconcile it theoretically with the border effect.

The studies examining people attitudes towards immigrants or 'outsiders' trace back to various studies in social psychology literatures. The long-lasting literature on perceptions towards immigrants can be divided into two theories, namely group-contact and group-conflict. The former theory argues that close contacts are likely to

process more positive information which in turn decreases prejudice (Allport 1954). The latter argues that increased contacts will create competition over ideological and material competition which in turn increases prejudice (LeVine and Campbell 1972). However, since the literature on out-group attitudes is well-developed, instead of focusing on out-group attitudes as a broad term, I will focus on immigrants and more specifically refugees that are studied impotently. Thus, instead of reviewing the literature on out-group attitudes, hereafter, the main inquiry will be the literature on voting behavior and immigrants.

The majority of the existing studies in the literature on immigrants use survey data to explain the effect of immigrants on individual political behavior. One of the advantages of surveys on the topic of immigration is being able to measure individual attitudes towards immigrants. A similar type of measurement can only be approximated in the aggregate-level and the results would not be very accurate, if not wrong. Benefiting from this advantage, multiple studies have examined the association between attitudes toward immigrants and voting for extreme-right parties. One of the most noteworthy studies was designed by Arzheimer (2009). Using Eurobarometer surveys in 18 countries between 1980 and 2002, Arzheimer (2009) investigates the contextual factors in Europe for extreme-right party voting. The findings of the study suggest the marginal effect of attitudes towards immigration on voting for extreme-right parties is positive. Yet, this effect is also conditional on unemployment such that if the unemployment is low or the benefits from unemployment rights are sufficient enough, anti-immigrant attitudes do not translate positively into the extreme-right party (Arzheimer 2009, 269). The outcomes were not surprising considering the extensive literature on how anti-immigrant attitudes are shaped by economic considerations of the local citizens (Mayda 250; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006, i.e.,). Relatedly, but also has been developed as a distinct research area as a ramification of an economic model called factor proportion theory, various studies find empirical support for how low skilled and less experienced immigrants fuel anti-immigrant attitudes (Scheve and Slaughter 2001).

The economic factors for anti-immigrant attitudes are only one side of the coin. Following the classification of Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014), the other side of the coin is composed of socio-psychological factors such as cultural consideration and prejudices. Socio-psychological factors find more empirical support compared to the economic ones (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, 225). As one of the latest and noteworthy examples of this literature, Bansak and Hangartner (2016) examine the relationship between socio-psychological factors and immigrants using a survey on sociotropic evaluations of asylum seekers by 18000 eligible voters in 15 European countries. The authors find out that certain characteristics of asylum seekers

are indicative of public preferences. Asylum seekers who have higher employability, have more consistent testimonies, and having severe vulnerabilities are associated with more positive public attitudes towards asylum seekers (Bansak and Hangartner 2016, 217). These attitudes do not significantly differ for varying individual characteristics such as ideology, education level, and income; which in return suggest a wider consensus on the type of asylum seekers that citizens prefer (Bansak and Hangartner 2016, 2018). Of course, those studies are directly related to the factors shaping anti-immigrant attitudes, though, they also indirectly approximate how the related factors affect the increase of vote shares of extreme-right parties or support for anti-immigrant policies. As an example of this connection, while Rydgren (2008, 747) argues that immigration skepticism, xenophobia, and racism should not be equated with each other, the author also checks their role on voting for right-wing parties. Using the first round of European Social Survey from six European countries, the study concludes that dissatisfaction with immigration policy is one of the primary determinant of voting for radical right parties while racist or xenophobic attitudes play only a secondary role (Rydgren 2008, 760).

The majority of the individual-level studies, unlike the aggregate-level studies, focuses on anti-immigrant policies rather than voting for extreme-right parties. Considering the advantage of survey data's ability to measure anti-immigrant attitudes, this trend is not surprising. For instance, Dinas and his colleagues (2018) investigate the effect of refugees in the Greek Islands on voting for an extreme-right party, Golden Dawn. Additionally, in another study (Hangartner et al. 2019), the scholars explain the association between being exposed to the refugees in the Greek Islands and anti-immigrant attitudes using survey data. The authors measure the contact with refugees using distance to the Turkish coast and conclude that the islands, which are closer to Turkey, host an immense amount of refugees that eventually led to an increase in hostility toward refugees and immigrants that in return increase the support for anti-immigrant policies increase (Hangartner et al. 2019, 8). The results confirm the aggregate-level study (Dinas et al. 2019) where Golden Dawn, which has fiercely defended restrictive policies, increased its vote share noticeably. In the studies which focus on European cases, the measurements of anti-immigrant supportive policies are based on survey questions such as *"Are immigrants are good for the national economy"*; whereas in the studies which focus the US, the studies are generally more policy-focused.

Existing studies in the literature on immigration in America have the advantage of investigating the long-debated the US-Mexico border wall. Though it has been debated for decades, the statements of President Trump in his campaign process has intensified the debates (Becker 2018, 2). Trump stated that: *"I would build a*

great wall, and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me, and I will build them very inexpensively, I will build a great, great wall on our southern border. And I will have Mexico pay for that wall"[5] and he justifies it as follows *"It is coming from more than Mexico. It is coming from all over South and Latin America, and it is coming probably— probably— from the Middle East. But we do not know. Because we have no protection and we have no competence, we do not know what is happening. And it is got to stop, and it is got to stop fast."*[6] Consequently, the focus of these studies has heavily shifted towards the wall issue. Both Gravelle (2018) and Cortina (2019) examine the effect of spatial proximity to the border on support for the wall or fence. However, their results conflict with each other. While the Gravelle (2018, 115) argues proximity to the border increases the support for a border wall for all types of partisanships, Cortina concludes that increasing distance makes Republicans more supportive towards the border wall (Cortina 2019, 10). Even though the results are not compatible, both studies show that partisanship and spatial proximity are effective determinants towards the border wall. It is also worth mentioning that the border wall is not a newborn debate. For instance, the Secure Fence Act of President Bush in 2006 also drew scholarly attention at that time. As a pioneer study, Branton and her colleagues (2007) examined the supports for Propositions 187 and 227 as an outcome of proximity to the border and partisanship. Their results suggest that on the one hand, Republicans are more likely to support these anti-immigrant policies compared to Democrats in all levels of distances; on the other hand, the support for these propositions increases among Democrats with an increase in proximity (Branton et al. 2007, 892). These results are in line with the study of Gravelle (2018). One of the caveats of existing studies with the focus of the border wall is equating border wall and anti-immigrations. In reality, this is not the case as *"the intensified border control campaign has transformed once a relatively simple illegal act of crossing the borders into a more complex system of illegal practices"* (Andreas 2000, 96). Nonetheless, as visible from Trump's justification, one of the main reasons is the unauthorized immigrants from Latin America.

Last but not least, without any doubt, anti-immigrant attitudes are context-dependent. The study of Hawley (2011) supports this argument from the US through merging National Annenberg Election Survey and country-level contextual data. Hawley (2011) finds empirical support for how the immigration levels in the US affect different partisan voters' decisions on restrictive migration policies. In states,

[5]Phillips, Amber. "'They're Rapists.' President Trump's Campaign Launch Speech Two Years Later, Annotated." , June 16, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/06/16/theyre-rapists-presidents-trump-campaign-launch-speech-two-years-later-annotated/

[6]Phillips, Amber. "'They're Rapists.' President Trump's Campaign Launch Speech Two Years Later, Annotated." , June 16, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/06/16/theyre-rapists-presidents-trump-campaign-launch-speech-two-years-later-annotated/

where immigration numbers are low, Republicans and Democrats do not differ from each other on anti-immigrant restriction policies. However, if the immigration levels or percentage of foreign-borns are high, Republicans are considerably more supportive of restrictive policies compared to Democrats (Hawley 2011, 416-417). On the other hand, the author hesitates to make definitive inferences due to the lack of empirical support for the total number of immigrants or unemployment rates, which contradict with the existing studies (Hawley 2011, 418). The study of Hawley (2011) portrays the part of the literature which proxies contact with immigrants through contextual factors such as the number of immigrants or level of immigration. Yet, the existing studies in that branch of the literature left the question of "which one is more important?" unanswered. To fill this gap in the literature, Gravelle (2016), controlling the individual characteristics as well as the level of contact with the immigrants, analyzes the effect of proximity to the US-Mexico border on anti-immigrant policies. The findings of the studies suggest that proximity to the border has an amplifying effect such that at the border and adjacent cities, the attitudes of Republicans and Democrats significantly differ from each other, while the latter one is more affirmative about immigrants (Gravelle 2016, 16). The gap between Republicans and Democrats narrows down with the increase in distance to the border (Gravelle 2016, 17). The study of Gravelle (2016) concludes context is a more effective factor compared to contact over anti-immigrant attitudes, as partly opposed to the group-contact theory. In the literature on immigration in America, it is clear that border wall or more general issues such as restrictive policies can be both a contextual explanation or a main variable of interest.

The question as to whether and what extent, voting behavior of local citizens, particularly those who live close to borders, incline to change once they are exposed to refugees, is a challenging one to answer. Indeed, the literature on the subject has noteworthy yet conflicting studies. What makes this literature even more challenging is the uncertainty about the direction and the extent of the effect. To be more precise, while some studies find that existence and proximity to refugees decrease the vote share of right-wing parties moderately (Steinmayr 2016; Vertier and Viskanic 2019), other studies find that it even increases the vote share of extreme-right parties (Dinas et al. 2019). Moreover, the varying extent of the causal effect in rural and urban settlements (Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm 2016) or on radical and moderate voters in settlements (Adkisson and Peach 2018) makes the literature an immensely intricate one. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that each of the studies in the literature tests their hypotheses in a single country without controlling their generalizability to other countries. Besides, almost none of them use the same measurement of refugees, let alone using the same method or model.

Yet, those differences do not express criticisms but rather a possible explanation of their confronting results. After all, one thing is crystal clear; being exposed to refugees affects citizens' voting behavior and this effect is conditional on proximity to borders. In line with the above observation and differences, it is worthwhile to review some of the well-designed studies.

The Syrian Civil War has caused an unprecedented refugee crisis. Consequently, it was not a surprise that the literature on refugees' effects on voting behavior swiftly has shifted towards Europe from the USA. As a part of this trend, Dinas and his colleagues (2019) tested their arguments of whether being exposed to the refugee crisis fuel support for extreme-right parties by focusing on Greece islands. The country was a perfect case to study not only because Greece, within the time period of the study (Dinas et al. 2019), received more than 80% of the sea arrivals of refugees to Europe,[7] but along with that, Greece also contains one of the most extreme-right party in Europe, Golden Dawn (GD). Using municipalities and towns as a unit of analysis the authors employ two different strategies to identify the causal effect. First, using the vote share of GD in 2015 January and 2015 September elections, the authors concluded that support for GD rose by 2 percentage points and considering that the average vote share of GD in the previous elections was 4.5 percentage it refers a 44 percent increase which is substantively significant (Dinas et al. 2019, 8). Furthermore, using data from towns to see within island variations, the authors show that: *"the increase in the party's vote share is not uniform within the affected islands, but rather more concentrated among those areas directly exposed to the refugee crisis"* (Dinas et al. 2019, 8). Secondly, using the proximity of islands to the Turkish coast, which played a crucial role on the number of refugee arrivals, Dinas and his colleagues (2019) conclude that an additional refugee per capita increases the vote share for GD by almost 1 percentage point and that effect disappears entirely as moving away from the Turkish coast (Dinas et al. 2019, 9).

Dinas and his colleagues (2019) believe the applicability of their research design to other EU countries, though, being cautious not to overestimate the external validity of their findings (SI Appendix, p.S3). Unfortunately, despite some remarkable studies in the literature on immigration and voting for right-wing parties in Italy (e.g., Barone et al. 2016), based on my research none of the existing studies isolate the causal effect of refugee immigration on voting behavior in Italy. However, Italy is a special case to a certain extent, because unlike other EU countries such as Germany and France, immigration to Italy is a new phenomenon that started in the early 2000s, and most of the immigrants are from non-EU countries and low-skilled

[7] UNHCR, Operational Portal Refugee Situations: Mediterranean Situation.

(Barone et al. 2016, 3). Keeping in mind the above-stressed differences, Barone and his colleagues' (2016) study can be considered as a validation of Dinas and his colleagues' arguments. The authors investigate voting behavior in 2001, 2005, and 2008 elections at the municipal level and find that immigrants increase the vote share of the center-right coalition and protest voting, but in return decrease the votes shares of center-left parties as well as voter turnout. (Barone et al. 2016, 12). The authors' conclusions are noteworthy, however, for the concern of this paper they might yield biased results. Distinguishing immigrants from refugees does not only affect their status as an actor in politics but it also affects the theoretical justifications. The point is that whether it is a refugee or immigrant, those people consider their settlement location beforehand. In other words, regardless of those people's status, it is less likely that they will move into an area where there will be a possible confrontation with the local people (Neumayer 2004). Barone and his colleagues (2016, 5) acknowledge this possible endogeneity issue and argue that: *"immigrants tend to move to areas where a group of immigrants with the same ethnicity has already settled in the past."* Consequently, they adopt an instrumental variable strategy to address this issue. Yet, this is not the case for refugees in most of the time. For instance, in Greece, the refugees did not aim to settle to Greek islands, rather used those islands as a gate to the European continent (Dinas et al. 2019, 4). Thus, those refugees were choosing these arrival points without considering their local status. Nonetheless, a similar study, applying the theory to Denmark, underscores the findings of Barone and his colleagues (2016). Taking advantage of quasi-random allocation of refugees across municipalities between 1986 and 1998 in Denmark, Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm (2016) find similar results. According to the authors, the increasing share of refugees in municipalities corresponds to an increase in vote shares of anti-immigrant parties as well as center-right parties, but decreases the center-left parties' vote shares. However, this effect is in opposite direction in the most urban cities such as Copenhagen; possible, because of the rhetoric of anti-immigrant parties deter people in those cities (Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm 2016, p.24). In other words, addressing the different characteristics of municipalities such as crime and unemployment rates, the authors find that the effects of refugees on the local citizens are not uniform across municipalities but conditional on the characteristics of the municipalities. On the other hand, Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm (2016) also find that an increase in the share of refugees boosts the voter turnout. This findings confronts Barone and his colleagues' study (2016), but confirms Dinas and his colleagues' study (2019).

Partialling out the causal effect of refugees on voting behavior is a challenging task. Apart from the problems in theoretical arguments and model specifications, it is also

hard to access the number of refugees in each municipality, since in most countries, it is not published regularly by governments. To overcome the data availability problem, unlike other studies (e.g., Dinas et al. 2019; Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm 2016), Vertier and Viskanic (2019) used hosting capacities of temporary migrant centers (CAOs) to infer the number of refugees in France during the 2017 presidential elections. The authors find that the vote share of the most extreme-right party (Front National) decreased until a specific threshold in CAOs (39 beds per 1000 inhabitants) but increased after the refugee number passes that point (Vertier and Viskanic 2019, 15). The impact weakly persists in the municipalities that are proximate to CAOs, yet, disappear as the distance increases (Vertier and Viskanic 2019, 13). Vertier and Viskanic (2019)'s findings reconcile partially with the existing literature. On the other hand, regarding France, the other studies also emphasize the increasing far-right parties with an increase in the number of immigrants (Edo et al. 2019).

Up until now, there is a partial trend that citizens vote for right-wing parties and this effect consolidates with the increase in the extent of exposure and proximity to the actual exposure . However, the study of Steinmayr (2016) finds 'surprising' results in Austria. Contrary to existing literature, the author's findings suggest that the far-right party's (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ) vote share in the 2015 election significantly decreased in the neighborhoods which hosted refugees, though, it increased in the macro-level. Taking into account of other studies that underline the hypothesis of an increasing number of immigrants gives advantages to the far-right party, FPÖ (Halla, Wagner, and Zweimüller 2017); it is unlikely that Austria is a unique case. Yet, it might be that case that since FPÖ has been one of the major parties in the Austrian politics for at least a decade, the results are biased. Because as mentioned above, Neumayer (2004, 171)'s findings suggest that: *"destination countries with electoral success by right-wing populist parties attract a lower share of asylum seekers."*

All in all, there is a vast amount of studies in the literature on immigration that use both individual-level and aggregate-level data. However, focal points for individual-level studies are mostly policy preferences or attitudes towards immigrants. On the other hand, studies that use aggregate-level data emphasize the voting-behavior instead of attitudes towards immigrants. Quantitative studies that examine the same relationships in Turkey are very rare. With this thesis, I aim to fill the gap in literatures on Turkish politics and migration by employing both electoral-district level and survey data to understand how political behavior, anti-immigrant attitudes, and an influx of refugees interact or affect each other. Furthermore, in this study, I will reconcile several literatures (border effect, voting behavior, and refugees) with

the aim of providing an explanation for conflicting results in the literature. In the next section, I will define my theories along with the possible solutions to the above-mentioned conflicting results.

1.2 Theoretical Overview

1.2.1 Borders and their impacts on citizens

Studying borders apart from their historical aspects has become a subject of fierce debate in the political science field. The roots of the debate reside on the question whether context matter on shaping political activities. In his article entitled *"Why Context Should Not Count,"* King (1996) argues that political scientists should not focus on contexts because the first aim of a scholar is to explain a phenomenon, such as political behavior, without counting the context that is hard to explain due to the complexity of the subject. I do not challenge the proposition of King (1996), though, within the aspect of this thesis, I argue that context (i.e., border), indeed, matters. On the one hand, the lives in the borders cities are extremely different compare with non-border cities. For instance, Okyay (2017, 831) emphasizes that: *"[Turkey's] pursuit of enhanced regional power through involvement in an external conflict via proxies might lead them to tolerate the blurring of their borders, even though this may seem to contradict an essential attribute of statehood and sovereignty."* Of course, the striking blurring of the borders has affected the daily lives of people who live closer to the borders. On the other hand, this effect is not unique on that matter just because the borders are geographically special locations. If there was a possibility to conduct an experiment that captures the different characteristics of the lives at the border, ranging from cultural characteristics to issues-salience, the same inferences would be made. Thus, I argue that there are some particularity at living closer to a border that heavily affects voting-behavior.

The southern border of Turkey with Syria, which is 911 km long, comprises of six cities: Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, and Şırnak. Those six cities have varying characteristics ranging from different predominant ethnicities to socio-cultural habits. After the spread of the Arab Spring to Syria, an enormous amount

of people who flee from the atrocities of the civil war escaped to Turkey. Naturally, most of those people entered Turkey through border-check points which are located in the border cities. From the beginning of the influx of refugees, the Turkish government has tried to control the flow through legal processes.

On the analysis of the legal processes, one-point needs clarification to move on. Turkey does not grant Syrian people, who flee from the war, refugee status because of legal regulations. The status of refugees and asylum seekers are defined mostly by the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Additional Protocol. However, even though Turkey is a signatory to them, she put geographic limitations that grants asylum rights only to the European citizens (İçduygu 2015). Consequently, people who flee from the war have been granted 'temporary protection' status. Because of this reservation, non-EU citizens are not eligible to resettle in Turkey even after UNCHR recognizes them as refugees (İçduygu 2015, 5). Nonetheless, keeping in mind the differences, in this paper, I interchangeably use refugee and Syrian words to define people who migrate to Turkey after 2011 because of the civil war in Syria. To be brief, Turkey has governed the refugee inflow process through the published legal documents. According to the legal documents, which were published and re-published with alterations during the last couple of years, Syrian refugees should apply to the local authorities to be registered (Regulations of Temporary Protection 2014, p.6204). After registrations, refugees are transferred to the temporary protection centers in order to be relocated to other cities by the authorities. Yet again, according to October 2017 data 15 out of 21 centers are located in the five border cities (except Şırnak).[8] Throughout the years, most of those centers have been closed, but still, according to the latest published data, 4 out of 7 centers are located in the border cities.[9] As a consequence, Turkish citizens who are living closer to the border cities have been continuously exposed to the refugees for the last couple of years. Looking at the literature on immigration, one can argue that since the Syrians are resettled to other cities after a certain amount of time, the contacts with the local people are short-lived which cannot affect political behavior. However, the study of Dinas and his colleagues (2019) showed that even short, but continuous, exposure to refugees can play a significant role in shaping political behavior. Of course, in the Greek islands, the flows of refugees were unauthorized by the local authorities unlike the ones in Turkey. However, it is not a black and white difference for the local people. Obviously, during the resettlement of the refugees, the lives of local people in border cities have changed significantly.

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[8] "Temporary Protection Centers," *AFAD*, September 10, 2017.

[9] "Temporary Protection," *Directorate General of Migration Management*, July 6, 2020.

Figure 1.1 Ratio of Syrian Refugees in Temporary Protection Centers by Years



Syrian refugees, after their registration in temporary protection centers, are resettled to the cities based on the decisions of the government. As mentioned above, the border cities have played a key role during the registration process, however, the inclusion of border-cities does not end there. The number of refugees who are residing in temporary protection centers constitutes only a small part of the total number. As visible in Figure 1.1, those numbers were always around 10% of the total number. Furthermore, for the interest of this thesis, the allocation process does not give priority to the cities that are far away from the border. Unfortunately, there is no clarification on which aspects the government has considered regarding the allocation of refugees to other cities. However, it is crystal clear that the ratio to the local population is not a prior consideration point. Without a doubt, the cultural and social characteristics of local people in border cities are relatively more similar to Syrian refuges, yet, this is only a speculation. Nonetheless, Figure 1.2 suggests that cities that are closer to the Syrian borders are given priority in the allocation process. In 2018, there were more than 130.000 Syrian refugees in Kilis that correspond to 92% of the local population. Kilis is a unique case with its ratio considering the average rate in the country was 3.5%. However, it is visible in Figure 1.2, rates of Syrian refugees to local people are higher in cities that are closer to the Syrian border. It must be noted that even though in 2018 the highest number of

refugees (more than 560.000) were residing in İstanbul, it only corresponds to 3.7% of the local population. Similarly, despite hosting almost equal number of refugees with Kilis, the ratio in Konya was 4.7%. The difference between an absolute number of refugees and the ratio of refugees to the local population is significant because a higher ratio suggests the local population more likely to be exposed to refugees.

Figure 1.2 Syrian Refugees Ratio to Local Citizens as June 21, 2018



Up until here, the refugee inflows suggest that citizens, which are living closer to the border, are psychically exposed to more refugees, that in return leads them to have different political behavior compared to other citizens in Turkey. However, political behavior is a complex phenomenon that is tied to multiple determinants; and without a doubt, changes in public opinion can affect it. Moreover, while some of those determinants are related directly to the refugees some are not. Hereafter, by borrowing from different literatures, I will argue that some other factors change public opinion as well.

One way to alter public opinion is through media coverage. Agenda-setting theory argues that giving priority and salience to a specific topic over others causes public opinion to perceive that issue as the vital one (Brown and Deegan 1998; McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver 2013). The existing studies in the literature (Branton and Dunaway 2009*a*,*b*; Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010) argue that immigration-related news are more salient in the border cities. Unfortunately, no study examines the different media-coverages between the border and non-border cities in Turkey. Nonetheless, regarding the number of refugees in the border cities, I assume that local newspapers have given priority to that issue. Consequently, citizens who are residing closer to the border are exposed to more refugee-related news. On the other hand, there is another aspect of the media coverage that affects local citizens in border-cities slightly more compared to other citizens in Turkey, which is the Syrian Civil War itself.

One of the main particularity of Turkey derives from her active role in the Syrian Civil War, unlike the European countries. On top of that, the well-established literature on geographic distance argues that distance to political events shapes the individual attitudes (Branton et al. 2007; Clarke et al. 2016; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa 2014). Naturally, change in distance to a border should affect the political behavior of the local citizens, but it is important to understand the direction of this effect. Before theorizing the effect of the civil war, it is worthwhile to shortly review prior events between Turkey and Syria.

The bilateral relationship between Turkey and Syria has exemplified an increasing amount of tension since the 1980s. On top of two decades-long issues: the province of Hatay and the water-sharing issue over the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, the intensity has escalated with the conflicts over issues such as the ban of the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria by Hafez Assad and the Syrian government's lack of enthusiasm to restrain the activities of PKK, which Turkey defines as a terrorist organization (Altunışık 2010). Two countries have come to the edge of war in the late 1990s, however, with the sign of the Adana Accords in 1998, which mainly prohibits activities of PKK in Northern Syria and caused the flee of the organization's leader Abdullah Ocalan, the bilateral relationship entered a detente period (Altunışık and Martin 2011). With the death of Hafez Assad and rise of AKP in Turkey, two countries started to cooperate in various areas; particularly tourism, trade, free movements of people, and military (Altunışık and Martin 2011, 576). The good bilateral relationship along with the 'brotherhood' between both countries' presidents came to such a level that it was loosely defined as Turkish-Syrian Spring (Özkan 2019, 397). However, after the eruption of Arab Spring, the foreign policy decisions of the AKP government have made Turkey one of the main actors in the Syrian Civil War against Assad (Egin 2013). The foreign policy of Turkey during the Arab Spring, which was primarily formulated by the erstwhile foreign minister and prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu and his book Strategic Depth (Stratejik Derinlik), was based on aim to bring the Muslim Brotherhood parties to power from Tunisia to Syria (Özkan 2019, 398). Syria was the keystone of the AKP government's desire to be a leader in the Muslim brotherhood peninsula (As cited in Özkan 2019, 398). With this aim, Turkey has pursued three related policies: allowing free transit of arms and fighters to anti-Assad factions, supporting the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and advocating international intervention to Syria (Stein 2014, 64-65). These foreign policy decisions have ultimately failed and created endanger of an autonomous or independent Kurdish state in Northern Syria along with the spillover of ISIL. These policy failures also had serious repercussions for the security of Turkey. For instance, the terrorist attack from the organizations in Northern Syria in 2013 to Reyhanlı

resulted with the death of 53 people and marked the first major spread of the Syrian Civil War directly onto the Turkish territory (Okyay 2017, 839). To resolve these security problems Turkey has consulted military operations as a last resort and conducted multiple operations to Northern Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield, August 2016-March 2017; Operation Olive Branch January-March 2018; Operation Peace Spring October 2019-November 2019) to fight with terrorism. Even though there was not any direct confrontation between the Turkish military and Syrian military forces, the decision of Turkish government to utilize anti-Assad factions in Syria as proxies created an environment where the majority of the citizens started to perceive the Syrian Civil War a national security issue (Hale 2016). The border-cities were not just the headquarters of those operations. More to the point, the border cities of Turkey had been targeted by various organizations from Northern Syria several times, and as an outcome these attacks dozens of Turkish citizens died. Consequently, Turkish citizens, particularly those who stay at the border-cities, directly experience the Syrian Civil War in their daily lives.

Putting all those factors together, it might be expected that citizens punish the government because of its policy failures as the civil war continues for years and significantly affected the Turkish economy. However, foreign policy decisions of governments might occasionally bring electoral success. For instance, the rally-round-the-flag effect emphasizes how foreign policy decisions increase the approval rates of governments even for a short time (Mueller 1970, 1973). Regarding the Turkish case, Hale (2016, 59) defines the situation as follow: *" Domestically, the idea of a resurgent Turkey in the Middle East bolstered the AKP's popularity and contributed to a growing perception amongst the party's base that Erdogan was a statesman capable of deftly managing global crises."* Consequently, I argue that citizens who are residing closer to the border are less likely to punish the government because of its role in the Syrian Civil War since this issue is more salient in the border-cities. This affirmative effect is likely to decrease with the increase in distance to the border because local citizens who are far away from the actual conflict will consider punishing the government.

In the first part of this section, I discussed how the refugee crisis affected the border-cities. Nonetheless, local people in those cities were not the only ones who have been exposed to the refugees, a considerable amount of the refugees have been living in non-border cities. In the next part, I will discuss how local people change their voting behavior after being exposed to the refugees.

1.2.2 Refugees and their impacts on citizens

In the last decade, the effect of immigrants on voting behavior has received substantial scholarly attention (Barone et al. 2016; Dinas et al. 2019; Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm 2016; Edo et al. 2019; Steinmayr 2016; Vertier and Viskanic 2019). As explained in the introduction, majority of the attention has focused on similar theoretical issues, namely public choice theory along with competing theories of social identity, group contact, and group conflict. The literature on public choice suggests that citizens consider their economic well-being such that they vote the candidate/party which will maximize their economic opportunities (Mueller 2003). Similarly, studies on economic voting literature argue that citizens tend to support a candidate/party which have benefited to their economic gains (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). In Turkey, the influx of particularly unskilled refugees created an informal labor market due to the refugees' willingness to work for lower wages (Balkan and Tumen 2016). Furthermore, as Altındağ and Kaushal (2020, 4) argue the government's welfare programs towards the Syrian refugees also provoke the local citizens. Concisely, because of economic considerations, citizens are likely to punish the incumbent as a reaction to the influx of refugees.

Apart from the economic considerations, being exposed to an influx of refugees might trigger the cultural sentiments among the local citizens as well. Both social identity and group conflict theories argue that the inclusion of outside groups into daily lives, increase prejudice, fear, and hatred towards those groups (Allport 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). These anti-immigrant/refugee attitudes might manifest themselves in political behavior as voting for anti-immigrant parties or candidates. Similarly, group contact theory also suggests that increasing perceptions of immigrants as threats with the increase in contact (Lahav 2004; Quillian 1995; Sidanius and Pratto 2001). However, unlike the other two theories, contact theory suggests that these perceptions might be mitigated by contacts. Last but not least, explaining how outgroup attitudes are shaped through proximity between local people and immigrants, Enos (2017, 67) argues that *"... because proximity increases the salience of categorizations and this increased salience increases the perceived difference between groups, as groups become closer in geographic space, the perceived difference- the psychological space between us- becomes larger."* In Turkey, since the beginning of the refugee influx, the citizens' attitudes towards refugees have changed such that anti-immigrant sentiments had become more and more salient among the citizens. Yet, the interest of this thesis is not to understand why those sentiments mobilized or on what ground they have been manifested. Instead, the main inquiry is how those attitudes translated into political preferences.

The studies that examined the effects of immigrants on voting behavior concluded that an influx of refugees increases the vote share of the extreme-right parties (Dinas et al. 2019; Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm 2016; Vertier and Viskanic 2019), except for few studies which concluded the opposite trend (Steinmayr 2016). However, in Turkey, it is hard to conduct research based on the same set of theoretical assumptions. As briefly mentioned in the introduction, Turkey has certain characteristics that should be taken into account while analyzing the effect of refugees on voting behavior.

Along with the first difference, active participation of Turkey to the Syrian Civil War, the socio-cultural structure creates another caveat. Despite being a constitutionally secular state, the majority of the citizens in Turkey are Sunni Muslims. Additionally, during the eighteen-years of AKP governance, the social lives and culture have heavily shifted towards more conservative and Islamic oriented lifestyles (Somer 2014, 246-247). The religious aspect is one side of the story.It is also well known that proportional amount of citizens in the border cities are also coming from descendant that is very similar to Syria. However, since it is legally prohibited to investigate the ethnicity of an individual, there are no updated numbers, but the recent estimations, based on the mother tongue analysis, suggests significant number of citizens are ethnically tied to Syrians (Mutlu 1996, 520). These socio-cultural differences are also one of the obstacles in Turkey's membership to the EU as declared by Helmut Kohl as follows: *"the European Union is a civilization project and within this civilization project, Turkey has no place in it"* (As cited in Müftüler-Baç 2000, 21). Taken into consideration of the socio-cultural differences, along with the resilience of security concerns; the citizens, who reside closer to the Syrian border, are less likely to differentiate refugees and consider punishing the incumbent party because of its open-door policy.

The final refinement in the existing theory is about the direction of the effect. It is still not clear which party citizens support on issue of restrictive immigration policies. As reviewed in detail in the earlier section, the existing theory suggest an increase in the vote-share of extreme-right parties. On the one hand, the only legislative party that can be considered as extreme-right is MHP. However, MHP has been in an alliance with the incumbent party since the failed coup in July 2016. The other alternative 'extreme' right-wing party, İYİP; was established with the ex-MHP members after MHP entered an alliance with AKP. However, the İYİP has run only in two elections that causes lack of observation for a comparison. On the other hand, just as importantly, the party structure in Turkey should somehow reconcile with the other parties in Europe. In other words, at least a party should be a viable choice for those who want to protest the incumbent party for

its policies with regards to refugees. Though much has been discussed regarding the definition of extreme-right parties, the defining criteria of being considered as an extreme-right party is still unclear. There are some theoretical categorizations such as one that had been developed by Fennema (1997) as protest parties, racist parties, and extreme-right parties. However, each of those categorizations fails to point out clear cut differentiation that leads to insufficient labeling of those parties. Nonetheless, compared to their definition, there is little room to discuss prerequisites to be a member of those families: *"we know who they are, even though we do not know exactly what they are"* (Mudde 1996, 233). As Fennema (1997, 474) clearly states, while defining extreme-right parties, *"one thing that they share in common is resentment against migrants and the immigration policy of their governments."* Surprisingly, since the beginning of the refugee crisis, CHP was the only party that has consistently criticized the government for its policies in the Syrian Civil War and proposed restrictive migration policies. It would be assertive and high likely faulty, to argue that CHP can be considered as an extreme-right party. However, on the issue of restrictive migration policies, there are visible resemblances between CHP and European extreme-right parties.

CHP's position on the migration issues has shifted towards negative compared to the party's prior position in 2014. Looking at the prominent surveys in party politics, supports the above-argued proposition. Possibly, one of the most prominent surveys to refer to is the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The survey provides information for various parties' positioning on various subjects such as political ideology, EU policies, and migration. The survey is administered with experts who specialize in political parties in the respective countries. Regarding parties' positions on immigration policies, Chapel Hill Expert Survey codes parties on an eleven-point scale, where 0 represents fully opposing a restrictive policy on immigration whereas 10 represents fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration. The experts locate AKP as 2.89, MHP as 7, and CHP as 4.5 in 2014; whereas in 2019, the parties' position on restrictive policies score 5, 8.12, and 8.12, respectively. Despite an increasing trend in support of restrictive policies, CHP is the political party in Turkey that has shifted most radically towards restrictive policies. The shift was at such a level that it is positioning CHP at the same place with MHP, even though it is not a right-wing party. Comparing CHP's positioning on restrictive policies with extreme-right parties in Europe, where the theory finds supports, also indicates a surprising level of similarity. In 2019, experts, in related countries, place Lega Nord to 9.5, Freedom Party of Austria to 9.8, Golden Dawn and National Rally to 9.8, Alternative for Germany to 9.9. Looking at the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, it can be argued that CHP has filled the policy area in Turkey, which has been left empty due

to the MHP's alliance with the incumbent party, as a viable alternative for citizens who are supporting the anti-immigrant policies. Yet, CHP's positioning has never reached to a degree where the party can be framed as an extremist-right party.

Hence, it might be the case that voters who are dissatisfied with the refugee policies of the incumbent government shift towards CHP because it was the only alternative party with strong favor of restrictive policies on immigration. Nonetheless, of course, there are other policy preferences of CHP that have attracted citizens, but it is highly likely that restrictive immigration policies were one of them.

All in all, marrying these two theoretical issues, there are two main hypotheses to be tested:

Hypothesis 1: The marginal effect of refugee rate on the incumbent vote share is negative and lowest when distance to the Syrian border is at its nearest level. This effect increases in magnitude as distance to the border increases.

Hypothesis 2: The marginal effect of refugee rate on the vote share of main-opposition party (CHP) is positive and lowest when distance to the Syrian border is at its nearest level. This effect increases in magnitude as distance to the border increases.

Regardless of the statistical and substantial findings in the electoral-district level, methodologically the first empirical chapter has a important drawback. I draw inferences about an individual behavior using an electoral-district level data. To be more precise, let us think about a city that experiences an influx of refugees and the share of refugees has increased year by year. In the dataset, Malatya is a good illustration of this scenario. In 2015, Malatya hosted 16753 refugees in total and the number constituted only 2.17 percent of the total population in Malatya. The number of refugees increased during three-years and reached 36341 in 2018 which correspond to 3.30% of the total population. Compared to the 2015 election, CHP increased its vote share by around 1.15%. However, we do not know exactly who voted for CHP and whether they have any interaction with refugees. Maybe the citizens who have voted for CHP has no interaction with refugees at all. This problem is known as an ecological fallacy and it is a common problem in geographical studies because most of the time reaching geographical information of individuals is not possible. Thus, aggregate-level data are employed.

To tackle this issue, I will test the same hypotheses at the individual-level. As Enos (2017, 39) argues: *"one way to avoid the ecological inference problem is to use surveys to look at what individuals actually say, rather than just aggregate totals."* However, with the available surveys, it is still not possible to solve the ecological

fallacy problem completely. The surveys do not share the individual's geographic location or the level of their daily interaction with refugees. Another alternative to solve this issue is turning into the smallest electoral level such as a neighborhood. Yet, there is no available data for the number of Syrians at the neighborhood level. Hence, it is worth mentioning that this thesis is not able to completely avoid the issue of ecological fallacy. Nevertheless, because decisions of citizens to vote for anti-immigrant parties is attached to the attitudes towards what he or she thinks about refugees is well known in the literature, controlling these attitudes would decrease the possibility of an ecological fallacy to a certain extent.

2. ELECTORAL-DISTRICT LEVEL ANALYSIS

2.1 Research Design

In this section, the main inquiry will be the overview of the data compilation process and the estimation strategies. To test the hypotheses, I used a generic dataset. The unit of analysis in this chapter is a district-election year and all the estimations were conducted in STATA version 15. Before moving into the model specifications, I will focus on the data gathering and compiling process.

The focus of this thesis is to understand the changes in the vote shares of the main political parties in Turkey. Naturally, the dependent variables are the vote shares of each parties at the electoral-district level. Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, six elections were held in Turkey. The time frames of the different models object to change because refugee data are available since 2015.[1]

All the election results come directly from the webpage of the Supreme Election Council.[2] For the parliamentary elections, I divided the number of valid votes to each parties' votes. After the constitutional changes, which transformed the parliamentary system into the presidential one, both parliamentary and presidential elections were jointly held in 2019. I use the results of the parliamentary elections to be able to compare it with the earlier elections. For the local elections, getting the viable results of the elections is relatively more complicated. In Turkey, there are thirty metropolises whom a local citizen casts vote in both municipality he or she lives and the mayoral election of the city. For those thirty metropolises, I use the results of the mayoral elections, considering that all the local citizens are able

[1] I excluded the June 2015 elections and use the results from the November 2015 elections.

[2] Supreme Election Council, https://www.ysk.gov.tr

to attend them. In the rest of the cities, I summed up all local municipalities' valid votes and the number of votes for the parties. Taken into consideration of electoral alliances in the 2019 local elections, I also created a dummy variable for the alliances (Cumhur and Millet). Because measuring the vote difference of a party through disregarding the other parties' supports would be biased, I excluded the local election results in 2019 where either AKP or MHP and either CHP orr IYI do not nominate a candidate. In the 2019 elections, in some cities, mainly İstanbul and Ankara, HDP also did not nominate a candidate, instead, unofficially supported CHP's candidates. Yet, because there was no official alliance declaration from either side, I have not considered that aspect of the elections. All in all, the dependent variable is the change in the vote-share of the parties in each district with respect to the last election.

Data for the number of Syrian refugees come from the Directorate General of Migration Management's website.[3] However, because the directorate deleted the older versions after each update, to access older refugee data, I used a website that can access the archives.[4] The directorate updates data each month and I used the closest data to the elections. The details about the dates of the refugee numbers can be found in the Appendix. Considering the immense fluctuations of population as well as the number of refugees from one city to another, the probability of local citizens, who are living in different cities, interacting with a refugee varies significantly. In order to fix this issue, I use the ratio of refugees to the local population. For the second main independent variable, proximity to the Syrian border, I use Stata 15 package *"shp2dta"*, which allows me to get the nearest distance between each city-center and the Syrian border. Taking the nearest distance between the border of each-city and the Syrian border would not alter the results substantively due to the small changes in the distances.

There are a series of control variables that are employed in estimations. The first set of control variables is related to the demography of the city; namely, the percentage of males and the share of sixty-years or older people. Research demonstrates these factors have significant effects on voting behavior. I used the Turkish Statistical Institute databases to reach these variables. The second set of variables mostly aims to control the welfare of the districts. I use two different variables to control economic welfare; unemployment rate and GDP per capita in the districts. The information for GDP per capita is taken from the Turkish Statistical Institute. Yet, because the government has stopped the publish unemployment rates at the city level since 2013,

[3]Directorate General of Migration Management, https://en.goc.gov.tr/

[4]Internet Archive Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/

I use the registered unemployment data from the Turkish Employment Organization (İŞKUR), which is an institution working under the Ministry of Labor, Social Services, and Family. The last set of control variables is about the socio-cultural status of the districts. To control the education level of a district I use illiteracy rates and following the center-periphery debates (Mardin 1973) in the Turkish Politics, I control the average household. Last but not least, I also controlled the crime rates in the districts. All of those data are taken from the Turkish Statistical Institute. The control variables are lagged for one year. The detailed summary statistics of the dataset can be found in the Appendix as well.

$$\Delta V_{n,i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 R_{i,t} + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 C_{it} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \tag{2.1}$$

$$\Delta V_{n,i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 R_{i,t} + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_4 R_{i,t} \times D_i + \beta_3 C_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \tag{2.2}$$

In this chapter, I will use two different methods to test my hypotheses. The first empirical strategy is ordinary least-square (OLS). I run series of multivariate OLS regressions with standard error clustered on cities. I will first present the additive model (Equation 2.1) and then the interactive model (Equation 2.2). $\Delta V_{n,i,t}$ represents the change in the vote share of party n in city i in election year t. $R_{i,t}$ represents refugee rate in city i in election year t. In some models, I replace $R_{i,t}$ with $\Delta R_{i,t}$, which measure the change in refugee rate in the respective city from election year $t-1$ to t. Using the change of refugee rate will allow me to explain whether any significant change in vote share is directly related to the refugee rate. In other words, it would allow me to control any possible endogeneity issue. D_i represents the distance to the Syrian border of city i. In Equation 2.2, the interaction term is included. Lastly, $C_{i,t}$ represents a series of economic, demographic, and socio-cultural control variables that are explained above. OLS is suitable for the data that I have since none of the assumptions of the model is violated.

$$V_{n,i,t} = \gamma_i + \lambda_t + \delta_{DID} \Delta R_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \tag{2.3}$$

The second empirical strategy is difference-in-difference. Equation 2.3 portrays the model. Similar to Equations 2.1 and 2.2, $V_{n,i,t}$ represents the vote share of party n

in city i in election year t, but without Δ since the main interest is the vote share. Similarly, $\Delta R_{i,t}$ represents change in refugee rate in city i from election year $t-1$ to t. Instead of $C_{i,t}$ in Equations 2.1 and 2.2, Equation 2.3 contain γ_i and λ_t which represent fixed effect of a city and fixed effect of an election, respectively. In other words, with the fixed effects, I ruled out possible omitted variables that are not included in the model. In Equation 2.3, the focus is δ_{DID} that capture the effect of refugee rate (R). As robustness check, I use Placebo tests where I relax the model through replacing $V_{n,i,t}$ with $V_{n,i,t-1}$. The idea is that since the refugee rate will be from the election year t, the vote share of party n in election year $t-1$ cannot be explained by the model. If I find any significance of δ_{DID} in Placebo tests, the Equation 2.3 would not be robust for party n.

2.2 Empirical Results and Analyses

In this section, the empirical results of the analyses will be presented. First, I will discuss the difference-and-difference model to understand whether there is any substantial shift in overall political behavior from the pre-refugee era to the post-refugee influx. Secondly, I will analyze the OLS results to investigate how Syrian refugees have changed the voting preferences in cities while controlling other determinants.

Before moving into main analyses, that is worth mentioning the settlement of refugees. I run OLS estimators on the refugee rate and the number of refugees using distance to the border as an explanatory variable (Appendix Table A.3). The findings suggest that the number of refugees, though the relationship is negative, is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Whereas 100 km increase in distance to the Syrian border, the share of Syrian refugees with respect to the local citizens decreases 1.4% and this effect is significant at the 95% confidence level. The results suggest that even though there is no statistically significant relationship between the number of refugees and distance to the Syrian border, the share of Syrian refugees is associated with the distance that in return might indicate a strong government role in the relocation process of the refugees. These preliminary findings are important because the existing studies in the literature (Altındağ and Kaushal 2020; Fisunoğlu and Sert 2019) emphasize a selection bias such that refugees chose districts where they will be less likely to be exposed to discrimination. If the government is controlling the resettlement process based on the rate of refugees, the results of estimations would be more robust due to the negligible nature of the selection bias.

Table 2.1 DID Estimates of the Impact of Refugee Rate on the Vote Share of the Parties[5]

	Model.1	Model.2	Model.3	Model.4	Model.5	Model.6
Outcome	AKP_t	AKP_{t-1}	MHP_t	MHP_{t-1}	CHP_t	CHP_{t-1}
Refugee Rate	0.001	0.041	-0.009	0.030	-0.007	-0.041**
	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.019)
Constant	50.917***	50.928***	13.897***	13.956***	20.804***	20.686***
	(0.678)	(0.691)	(0.448)	(0.362)	(0.529)	(0.488)
N	374	293	374	293	375	294
N of clusters	81	81	81	81	81	81
N of elections	5	4	5	4	5	4
Fixed Effects						
City	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by cities in parentheses.

Models 1, 3, and 5 show the effect on the election years.

Models 2, 4, and 6 are place outcomes using the party vote shares from the previous election.

Models 1, 3, and 5 include elections results from 2011, 2014, 2015, 2018, and 2019.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The existing studies in the literature emphasize how being exposed to an influx of refugees mobilizes people towards supporting right-wing parties. To understand how refugees have affected the local citizens voting behavior, I run a series of OLS estimator with robust standard errors clustered by cities along with unit and election fixed effects. The estimator would allow us to see the direct effect of refugees on local citizens. The models in Table 2.1 suggest that the fixed effect of the refugee rate on the vote share of any given party is not statistically distinguishable from 0 at any given conventional significance level. In the earlier sections, I have argued that CHP was the main party that has consistently sustain her opposition to AKP, particularly in policy failures and outcomes of the Syrian Civil War. Model 5 shows the effect of change in the refugee rate on the vote share of CHP. The results do not suggest a statistically significant relationship. The findings are not surprising, since the prior expectations are not to find a relationship in the countrywide. Instead, as explained in the theoretical overview, the citizens who are residing closer to the Syrian border are more likely to continue supporting the incumbent party regardless of the refugee rate. Furthermore, as visible in Figure 1.2 in the previous section, the refugee rate accelerates relatively more in cities that are closer to borders. If the cities that have supported CHP are further investigated, it is well noticeable that border cities are mostly voting for a conservative party. The same arguments run in the opposite direction for the incumbent party. Nonetheless, the results in Table 2.1 successfully

[5]In the Appendix, testing the same models for 2015 as the treatment year, which was the first election after the refugee crisis, are given. Similarly, the results do not yield any statistically significant results.

validate the existing studies even after extending analyzes with the inclusion of the 2018 and 2019 elections. Hence, we need to take into account distance to the border in the analyses as well. In the next part, I will discuss how the refugee rates have affected the voting behavior conditional on the distance to the border.

Table 2.2 Additive OLS Regressions on Party Vote Share

	Model.1 AKP	Model.2 AKP	Model.3 MHP	Model.4 MHP	Model.5 CHP	Model.6 CHP
Distance to the Border	-0.001	0.007	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Refugee Rate	-0.010		-0.033		0.039**	
	(0.036)		(0.036)		(0.019)	
Δ in Refugee Rate		0.843		0.208		0.984*
		(0.894)		(0.705)		(0.586)
Constant	75.390**	-246.613***	-48.379*	132.057***	28.924	34.052
	(34.469)	(44.979)	(28.171)	(42.386)	(19.353)	(29.729)
N	211	130	211	130	212	131
N of clusters	81	81	81	81	81	81
R^2	0.147	0.376	0.283	0.317	0.064	0.184

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by cities in parentheses. Control variables are omitted from the table.
Models 1, 3, and 5 include elections results from 2015, 2018, and 2019.
Model 2, 4, and 6 include the elections results from 2018 and 2019.
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 2.2 shows the OLS results for both refugee rate and change in refugee rate. All the models in Table 2.2 are additive where the effects of refugees do not conditional on the distance to the border. I present additive models in order to see how the substantive effect of refugees will change once the distance to the border is included in the model. In all the models in Table 2.2, there are a series of control variables that are statistically and substantively significant but for the focus of this thesis, I will only present the main independent variables. As usual, the detailed models can be found in the Appendix. For both AKP and MHP, there is no statistically significant relationship between the refugee rate or change in refugee rate and vote share as Models 1 to 4 show. However, for the main opposition party, both Models 5 and 6 suggest a statistically significant relationship between the refugee rate and change in refugee rate with the vote share of CHP. Substantively speaking, the findings suggest that for each standard deviation increase in the refugee rate and change in refugee rate, CHP gains 0.38 and 0.86 vote share, respectively. In other words, if the refugee rate keeps increasing, the local citizens are more willing to support an anti-immigrant party. However, whether the punishment is ubiquitous over the country is still not clear. To analyze this, Table 2.3 presents the results of the conditional relationship.

Table 2.3 Interactive OLS Regressions on Party Vote Share

	Model.1 AKP	Model.2 AKP	Model.3 MHP	Model.4 MHP	Model.5 CHP	Model.6 CHP
Distance to the Border	0.000	0.007	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Refugee Rate	0.031		-0.054		0.047**	
	(0.038)		(0.035)		(0.020)	
Distance to the Border × Refugee Rate	-0.004***		0.002*		-0.001	
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Δ in Refugee Rate		0.708		0.118		0.271
		(0.966)		(0.681)		(0.410)
Distance to the Border × Δ in Refugee Rate		0.001		0.001		0.005**
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
ln(Population)	-1.600*	0.080	1.298	-1.773	-1.500**	-2.817***
	(0.916)	(1.310)	(0.815)	(1.204)	(0.593)	(0.923)
Male	-168.461***	328.491***	104.519**	-132.070**	-44.385	-58.389
	(57.720)	(73.374)	(40.852)	(62.945)	(31.077)	(42.341)
60 Years or Older Citizens	20.386	115.042***	-31.371	-82.519**	24.044**	60.277***
	(29.172)	(32.093)	(21.388)	(36.627)	(12.034)	(20.900)
Illeteracy	245.081***	17.825	-84.746*	53.860	29.607	89.285*
	(61.249)	(78.705)	(43.249)	(83.126)	(32.835)	(46.187)
Number of Crimes	3259.824***	4406.046***	-3738.807***	-2713.455***	616.399	890.641
	(1097.904)	(1109.222)	(908.028)	(960.557)	(642.808)	(709.476)
Unemployment	109.849	42.198	-18.599	-52.885	-3.844	-19.202
	(68.768)	(48.570)	(50.469)	(60.371)	(23.672)	(27.133)
Existence of a Camp	-0.188	-3.030	0.497	2.094	0.256	2.003
	(2.603)	(2.695)	(1.907)	(1.519)	(1.047)	(1.252)
Local Election	-4.373*	0.700	11.714***	7.822***	0.789	1.783
	(2.267)	(2.407)	(2.005)	(1.970)	(1.644)	(1.518)
Average Household	3.378**	11.181***	-3.333***	-5.547**	2.350***	4.786***
	(1.631)	(2.011)	(1.220)	(2.170)	(0.793)	(1.421)
GDP Pc	0.002***	-0.000	-0.001***	-0.000	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	52.769	-247.217***	-36.634	131.655***	23.795	30.870
	(35.833)	(45.140)	(28.332)	(42.715)	(21.068)	(30.157)
N	211	130	211	130	212	131
N of clusters	81	81	81	81	81	81
R^2	0.162	0.376	0.289	0.317	0.067	0.207

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by cities in parentheses.
Models 1, 3, and 5 include elections results from 2015, 2018, and 2019.
Model 2, 4, and 6 include the elections results from 2018 and 2019.
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Similar to the previous table, I run a series of OLS for both refugee rate and change in the refugee rate. To start with the incumbent party, conditionality on the distance to the border alter the results substantially. Yet due to the complexity of interpreting a conditional relationship in regression model, before discussing the main independent variables, summarizing the control variables in Model 1 and 2 is beneficial. The results suggest that increasing male rates decrease the vote share of AKP. On the other hand, increasing GDP per capita also increases the vote share of AKP, however, the unemployment rate has no effect on the vote share of AKP. The results are not surprising because earlier studies in the literature emphasize how economic-voting theory fails to find empirical support in Turkey (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2018; Kalaycıoğlu 2018). Model 1 also supports the center-periphery debate such that increasing one-person in average household and one-percent illiteracy rate increase the vote share of AKP 3.3 and 2.4 points, respectively. Surprisingly, a one-percent increase in the number of crime rates to local citizens increases the vote share of AKP 3-points. Last but not least, population, and local election variables decrease

the vote share of AKP. Turning back to the focus of this thesis, to interpret the results, Figure 2.1 illustrates how the marginal effect of the refugee rate (distance to the Syrian border) varies across the in-sample range of distance to the border (refugee rate). To do this, in Figure 2.1, I set all the control variables to their representative values (means or medians).

Figure 2.1 The Average Marginal Effects of Refugee Rate (Distance to the Syrian Border) on the Δ Vote Share of AKP , Based on Model 1 in Table 2.3[6]



The first graph in Figure 2.1 shows that in the border cities even though the marginal effect of the refugee rate is very small, it is not statistically significant. After the 100 km, the marginal effect of refugees is increasing and affecting the vote share of AKP, substantively. The incumbent party has lost the highest vote share in cities that are most distant to the border. The results support the first hypothesis, such that the local citizens become more and more sensitive to the influx of refugees and punish the incumbent party as they live further away from the border whereas citizens who are residing at the border cities are less willing to punish the government. Looking at the overlaid histogram, which shows the distribution of cities' distances to the border, since the number of cities is decreasing confidence intervals become wider. However, in all distances, the marginal effect of the refugee rate is statistically significant. As explained in the earlier sections, the results point out two possible explanations.

[6]Top-encoding in the Appendix fixes the interpolation in the second figure, the results are robust.

First, socio-cultural similarities between the local citizens and the refugees are more similar in border cities which prevent prejudices to outgroup members. Secondly, the involvement of Turkey into the Syrian Civil War and the repercussions of it on the daily lives of the local citizens in the border cities have made those citizens less willing to punish the government.

The main motivation of this thesis was to understand how the influx of refugees has affected voting behavior. That is clear that increasing the refugee rate has cost the incumbent party a considerable amount of vote share especially in the cities that are distant to the Syrian border. The local citizens' punishment of the incumbent is one part of the story and another part is who is rewarded. The studies in the literature have emphasized parties that support restrictive migration policies succeed the mobilize local citizens. Models 3 and 4 in Table 2.3 show that the conditional relationship between the refugee rate and distance to the border has no statistically significant effect on the vote share of MHP.[7] In line with the prior expectations, the nonresponsive attitudes of MHP towards the refugee crisis on the top of entering an alliance with the incumbent party did hinder the opportunity of mobilizing the public.

On the other hand, Model 6 in Table 2.3 suggests that CHP has succeeded to find support for her anti-immigrant policies. Unlike the AKP case, as Model 5 suggests, there is no statistical relationship between the refugee rate and distance to the border with the vote share of CHP. However, what is more to the point, the change in the refugee rate has substantially increased the vote share of CHP. Similar to the earlier analyses, to start with the control variables; there are some intriguing results. Increasing the average household number and illiteracy ratio have statistically significant effects on CHP. An additional increase in average household and one- percent increase in the illiteracy rate increase the vote share of CHP 4.6 and 1 points, respectively. The results challenge the center-periphery argument and suggest that change in the refugee rate might have slightly altered the decades-long ideological and socio-cultural clashes. There is also support for 60-years or older people supporting CHP. However, none of the economy or welfare-related variables have a statistically significant effect on the vote share of CHP. This is interesting because as discussed earlier in the theoretical overview, one of the reasons for local citizens opposing refugees is their detrimental effect on the welfare of the population. The reason behind this novelty might derive from the model specification or the data, but further in-depth analyses are required to figure it out. For the main purpose of this thesis, Model 6 suggests the unconditional effects of refugee rate and distance

[7]The marginal effects are calculated for both models and they are not statistically distinguishable from zero. Hence, I excluded the graphs

to the border are not statistically significant. On the other hand, the conditional relationship is significant at 0.05% significance level. To interpret the conditional relationship, Figure 2.2 graphically illustrates how the marginal effect of the refugee rate (distance to the Syrian border) varies across the in-sample range of distance to the border (refugee rate).

Figure 2.2 The Average Marginal Effects of Δ in Refugee Rate (Distance to the Syrian Border) on the Δ Vote Share of CHP, Based on Model 6 in Table 2.3



The first graph in Figure 2.2 shows that similar to the AKP case, within the 100km distance to the Syrian border the marginal effect of the refugee rate is not statistically significant. At the 100 km distance, the marginal effect of the refugee rate on the vote share of CHP is less than 1%. An increase in distance to the border increases the marginal effect of the refugee rate. In the cities that are most distant to the border, CHP increases her vote share is almost 5%. In the effective sample size, which encompasses the 2018 and 2019 elections results for 131 cities, the average difference in the vote share of CHP is around -1%. Considering this average, a 5% increase in is substantively significant. The second graph in Figure 2.2 also has some noteworthy implications. As visible on the left side of the figure, in the cities where the refugee rate has decreased compared to the rate in the earlier election; CHP has lost votes. On the other hand, if the refugee rate has increased, CHP succeeded to increase her vote share. In the cities where the refugee rate has not changed significantly (increase or decrease 1-percent), the vote share of CHP is not

affected. The results support the second hypothesis. The estimation results of the overall effect of refugees on the vote share of CHP in Table 2.1 were not significant. The earlier studies also failed to conclude a relationship between the refugee rate and the vote share of CHP. However, as shown in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2, the political behavior of citizens is not same in all cities. Once the distance to the border is considered as a condition of voting for CHP due to the refugee crisis, the relationship becomes statistically and substantively significant.

2.3 Conclusion

Intending to contribute to the gap in the literature, I merge two theories: change in voting behavior as a reaction to refugees and spatial proximity. Using a generic data set on the aggregate level and analyzing the elections between 2015 and 2019, I have succeeded to find substantial empirical results in this chapter. To sum up the main findings: first, though accepted as a prior expectation, the number of refugees is not related to distance to the border, but the refugee rate is. This difference is important because the assumption comes from the idea that refugee chooses cities that are closer to the cities since they are less likely to discriminate in those areas. However, the results suggest that even though refugees mostly prefer cities that are closer to the border, their number is strictly controlled by the Turkish government. Second, change in refugee-rate has no statistically distinguishable and substantively minor effect on the incumbent party. However, the rate of refugees has affected the vote share of AKP negatively, and this effect is increasing with the increase in distance to the Syrian border. These findings indicate that citizens who are residing closer to the Syrian border have given priority security issue over the refugee crisis whereas other citizens have punished the AKP. The punishment was harsher in distant cities. Third, CHP has failed to find support for her anti-immigrant policies in all cities. However, more to the point, if refugee numbers are increasing, CHP has found a considerable amount of support. The extend of this support is increasing as the distance to the Syrian border-increases.

The first empirical chapter of this thesis is substantial in terms of the contributions. On the other hand, methodologically, the study suffers from a long-live problem in the social sciences. To be more specific, as the main focus, the thesis examines the effects of refugees on the voting behavior by using aggregate-level data. However, voting is an individual action. In other words, the study tries to draw inferences

about individual behavior from aggregate data. This disparity might result in some problems. Hence, in the next chapter, I will try to avoid this problem by testing the same set of hypotheses using individual-level data.

3. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

Refugees are currently one of the ongoing debates in Turkey and will likely be in foreseeable future. While understanding the problem of refugees having in their temporary settlements is an essential component of insightful solutions, from an alternative perspective examining their effects in the political structure of a hosting country is also important for both scholarly and policy purposes. With this aim, in the earlier chapter, I have examined the effect of refugees on the voting behavior of local citizens. The findings have suggested that there is an undeniable shift of voters from the incumbent party to the main opposition party. As contributions to the literature, I have argued that the case does not always end up with an extreme-right party succeeding to mobilize citizens. Instead, in some scenarios a party, which is located at the center of the political spectrum, takes the advantage of refugee influx due to its positioning on restrictive migration policies. Furthermore, this effect is subject to change with spatial-proximity to a special place or event. The theoretical arguments are supported by a quantitative analysis from Turkey in the earlier chapter, where the effect of refugees on voting behavior has understudied.

The contributions of the first empirical chapter are well-worthy. However, the employment of electoral-district level data for voting behavior makes the inferences suspicious. The problem of disparity between the level of analysis and level in which inferences are drawn is a long-lived problem in social sciences. There is a lot of solutions to the problem what is known as ecological fallacy such as special models (King, Tanner, and Rosen 2004). Nonetheless, due to the sophistication of these models and the lack of application of the models in the branches of social sciences, I prefer a simple strategy. One possible way to decrease the coverage of ecological fallacy is employing individual-level data. If similar inferences can be drawn from the individual-level, these inferences can support the findings of the aggregate-level study. Hence, in this chapter, using the latest two modules of CSES, I will test the same set of theories at the individual-level.

3.1 Research Design

In this empirical chapter, I will examine the effect of refugees on the voting behavior of citizens. As mentioned in the first chapter, the hypotheses are similar to those that are in the second chapter However, this chapter tests the hypotheses at the individual-level. The two main independent variables in the models are the same as those in the earlier models. Unlike the first chapter, considering this empirical chapter employs individual-level data, one can argue that calculating the nearest distance between the Syrian border and each respondent's place of residence would be more reliable. Aforementioned strategy would allow to see within-city variations as well. Unfortunately, the CSES data do not provide ZIP codes or open addresses due to individual privacy rights in Turkey. Thus, the second main independent variable, distance to the Syrian border, is not changed as well. The sample comprises of 47 different cities (the details of the sample can be found in the Appendix). Because some of the cities are excluded from the sample, distance to the border is highly skewed. Consequently, I log-transformed both the independent variables because of skewness.

The dependent variables come from CSES. CSES Modules do not include the same individual over years instead the survey is conducted with a new sample in each round. I used the latest two versions. CSES Modules 4 and 5 were conducted with 1086 respondents between 18 July 2015 and 10 September 2015 and with 1200 respondents between 23 July 2018 and 9 September 2018, respectively. All the data were collected by trained interviewers through the face-to-face method. Throughout this chapter, I will use three different dependent variables. The first two of them are directly related to hypotheses. Responses from the question of *"Which party did you cast a ballot for the parliamentary election on . . . ?"* were coded as a categorical variable in the original CSES. I recoded that variable into binary variables for both AKP and CHP such that the variables correspond to the question of: *"Did you cast a ballot for the respective party?"* One possible drawback of these variables is all the other party voters are coded as 0 in those variables due to the coding procedure. Hence, alternatively, I created a binary dependent variable where respondents who cast a ballot to AKP in the election are coded as 1, and those who voted for CHP are coded as 0. With the help of this variable comparing the voters of the two parties without considering the other party voters.

For the individual-level control variables, I use CSES data. However, I recode the original variable in order to conduct analysis. To calculate age, I directly subtract the

election year from the respondents' birth years. The variable for gender is coded as 1 for males and 2 for females, I recoded that into a binary male variable. To measure education level, a 7-scale categorical variable was created, where 0 corresponds no education and 6 corresponds to a doctoral or equivalent degree. The ordinal religion variable scores based on the attendance of respondent to religious service such that 1 never, 2 once a year, 3 two to eleven times a year, 4 once a month, 5 once or more than once in a week. The variable for the retrospective evaluation of the economy of the state scores 5 if the respondent thinks the economy has gotten better in the last 12 months and 1 has gotten much worse. The household income variable is based on the last six months and scores 1 if lower than 1600 TL, 2 if between 1601-2000, 3 if between 2001-2900, 4 if between 2901- 3500, and 5 if more than 3501. The residence status variable ranges from 1 to 4 based on rural area or village, small or middle-sized town, suburbs of large town or city, and large town or city, respectively. The last set of control variables is about attitudes towards immigrants. The three variables that capture: whether immigrants are bad for the economy, whether the culture is harmed by immigrants, and whether immigrants increase crime, are coded as five-point Likert scales. In order to make each of these variables on the same scale, I recoded the economy variable because it was reverse coded in the original CSES data. However, these three variables are only available for Module 5, thus, the models that the attitudes towards immigrants are controlled will be limited with 2018. Apart from the CSES data, I also include the ratio of Syrian refugees to the local population in the earlier elections in Turkey, which were held on June 12, 2011, and November 1, 2015, to control whether the individual decisions are affected or not by reactions of the government to the number of refugees. Last but not least, I also include knowledge of each respondent about the parties to control political sophistication. To do this, I subtract the parties' political positions in the ideological spectrum from each respondent's own subjective placements of the parties.

The existing studies that investigate the relationship between attitudes and spatial proximity mostly employ individual-level data. For the purpose of this study, employing data that grasp two variables: to what extent the individual interacts with a refugee in daily life and how far the individual resides to the Syrian border would be the ideal scenario. Unfortunately, due to the lack of available data, I use the rate of refugees in the district to capture the extent of interaction between a local citizen and refugees. Thus, the analyses disregard within city-variation. The research design allows me to approximate the relationship while also requires employing more sophisticated models. Putting it more delicately, there are both individual and aggregate-level variables in the variables such that the variables from CSES are at the individual-level but the share of refugees in the local population and geograph-

ical distance variables are at the electoral-district level. Mixing two levels causes disturbances in the error terms because while individual-level variables vary across observations within the electoral-districts, there is no variation in the district-level variables. More precisely, the effect of refugees varies from one district to another district because of certain characteristics of the district other than the distance of that district to the Syrian border. This varied effect of refugees in return affects the local citizens in the districts. In order to take into account the hierarchical structure of data, the existing studies in various literatures commonly use mixed-models (Aitkin and Longford 1986; Glasgow 2011; Goldstein and Spiegelhalter 1996). However, because mixed models are sophisticated both in terms of model assumptions and interpreting results, I will employ logistic regression in this empirical chapter (For further details of mixed models see Congdon 2005).

3.2 Empirical Results and Analyses

Similar to the last chapter, this section of the thesis starts with presenting the unconditional relationship between refugee rates and distance to the border, then, compare them with the conditional association of those variables.

Table 3.1 Addtive Logistic Regressions on Probability of Voting for Parties

	Model.1 AKP	Model.2 CHP	Model.3 AKP	Model.4 CHP
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	0.109	0.197	-0.077	0.443**
	(0.092)	(0.194)	(0.133)	(0.184)
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.128**	-0.088	-0.575	0.850**
	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.404)	(0.373)
Male	-0.513***	-0.057	-0.579*	0.030
	(0.174)	(0.207)	(0.334)	(0.362)
Education	-0.237***	0.215***	-0.129	0.086
	(0.087)	(0.067)	(0.126)	(0.088)
Religious Attendance	0.278***	-0.441***	0.320***	-0.526***
	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.087)	(0.074)
Retro. Ev. of Economy	0.880***	-0.704***	1.162***	-0.891***
	(0.077)	(0.123)	(0.137)	(0.185)
Income (TL)	-0.141**	0.139*	-0.109	0.151*

	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.089)	(0.081)
Age	-0.016***	0.029***	-0.018*	0.018*
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Residency Status	-0.077	0.056	0.001	0.268**
	(0.081)	(0.099)	(0.124)	(0.130)
Household Number	0.068	-0.038	0.078	0.015
	(0.077)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.135)
Unemployment	-0.378**	0.091	-0.369	0.420
	(0.153)	(0.181)	(0.228)	(0.361)
Year=2018	0.480*	0.173		
	(0.247)	(0.238)		
Refugee Rate$_{t-1}$	0.008	-0.024	0.578*	-0.871***
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.343)	(0.285)
Immigrants vs. Economy			-0.010	0.082
			(0.096)	(0.124)
Immigrants vs. Culture			-0.063	-0.110
			(0.138)	(0.167)
Immigrants vs. Crime			0.073	0.156
			(0.113)	(0.192)
Political Knowledge about AKP	0.079*		0.036	
	(0.045)		(0.053)	
District Level Voteshare (AKP)	0.018**		0.006	
	(0.007)		(0.013)	
Political Knowledge about CHP		0.045		0.071*
		(0.042)		(0.042)
District Level Voteshare (CHP)		0.032***		0.030*
		(0.012)		(0.017)
Constant	-3.062***	-2.187**	-1.862**	-4.014***
	(0.706)	(1.065)	(0.942)	(1.393)
N	1233	1255	594	595
N of clusters	53	53	40	40
Log Likelihood	-625.282	-522.206	-277.727	-228.449

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by cities in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Models 1 and 2 include responses from both the 2015 and 2018 elections.

Models 3 and 4 include responses from the 2018 election.

Table 3.1 presents the additive models of logistic regression estimates on the binary decisions to vote for AKP and CHP. Models 3 and 4 also control for attitudes towards immigrants. Since those variables are only available for the 2018 survey, Models 3 and 4 particularly analyzes the last general election in Turkey while the samples of Models 1 and 2 include responses from both the 2015 and 2018 elections. The sample sizes for the models range from 594 to 908 due to the missing variables. As expected, estimates in Models 1, 2, and 3 fail to suggest any statistically significant relationship. The lack of significance confirms the earlier studies that have not find any meaningful association between the refugee rate and the voting behavior of the local citizens (Altındağ and Kaushal 2020; Fisunoğlu and Sert 2019). Using electoral district-level data, the results in the earlier chapter do not suggest any statistically significant effect of refugee rate on the vote share of AKP. However, in the electoral-district level, the results for CHP have shown a statistically significant but substantially weak effect due to the minor extent. Testing the unconditional effect of refugee rate, estimates in Model 3 failed to confirm the relationship that I found at the electoral-district level. Due to the minor extent of the effect, it is not surprising that unconditional relationship does not reach a convenient significance level. On the other hand, the considerable amount of the existing studies in the literature focuses how attitudes on refugees have changed after daily interactions (Arzheimer 2009; Hangartner et al. 2019). Controlling three different perspectives of attitudes towards refugees; economic, cultural, and security, Model 4 shows that the refugee rate has gained a statistically significant effect on the probability of voting for CHP. The same effect, in Model 2, was negative but fail to reach any convenient significance level in the AKP case.

Starting with the control variables in Model 4, there are a series of statistically significant control variables. Both religious attendance and retrospective evaluation of the economy are negatively associated with the probability of voting for CHP. Substantively speaking, increasing attendance to religious services and evaluating the state of the economy in better terms, decreases the probability of voting for CHP. Even though I am not focusing due to the lack of significance in the results for the refugee rates, these both variables were positively associated with the probability of voting for AKP. Similarly, living in urban sites compared to rural villages has a certain effect on the decision of voters for considering the main opposition party as a preferable option. On the other hand, the findings also support that there is a considerable amount of old people who are likely to vote for CHP. Before turning back to the main point of this thesis, it must be worth emphasizing that the interpretation of change in log-transformed variables in the logistic link function is challenging. To do this first, I divided each non-log transformed variable to an

arbitrary number of intervals between its minimum and maximum value. Second, I take the natural logarithm of each of those values. Lastly, I plotted the predicted probabilities for each variable based on its logged values. Figure 1 shows the results of the estimates in Model 4 in Table 1.

Figure 3.1 The Average Adjusted Predictions of Refugee Rate and Distance to the Border on the Probability of Voting for CHP, Based on Model 4 in Table 3.1



Model 4 in Table 3.1 suggests that there is a statistically significant relationship between the refugee rate and the probability of voting for CHP at 99% confidence level. Increasing the decision to hosting refugees from not hosting at all (a standard deviation below the mean) to 10% of the total city population (a standard deviation above the mean) is associated with a 50% probability of voting for CHP. The associated marginal effect is non-linear and positive for all levels of refugee rates; however, the extent of the effect is gradually decreasing after a certain degree. The other independent variable, distance from the border, is also significant at 0.01% significance level. Moving from one standard deviation below the mean (250 km) to one standard deviation above the mean (790) associated with the increase of the probability of voting for CHP by almost 8%.

The last point worth mentioning in Table 3.1 is the failure to find significance for anti-immigrant attitudes. The prior expectations were negative attitudes should be associated with a high probability of voting for CHP due to the party's position

on anti-immigration policies. Surprisingly, except for cultural harm considerations, more positive attitudes towards immigrants suggest a positive but substantively small association with voting for CHP. Nonetheless, as pointed out in the last section, the question refers to immigrants, not the Syrians or refugees. The relationship should be further investigated with the questions that are asked in the form of *"attitudes towards Syrians."* All in all, the results support the findings in the first empirical chapter, though Model 4 includes only observations from the 2018 election. However, it is still yet to be explained to what extent the refugee rate affects individual voting behavior with a change in distance.

Table 3.2 Interactive Logistic Regressions on Probability of Voting for Parties

	Model.1 AKP	Model.2 CHP	Model.3 AKP	Model.4 CHP
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.660*	1.048*	-0.710	1.884**
	(0.365)	(0.543)	(0.825)	(0.919)
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	0.328**	0.666***	-0.131	0.864**
	(0.158)	(0.221)	(0.302)	(0.382)
ln(Refugee Rate) ×	-0.090	-0.187**	0.025	-0.165
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	(0.062)	(0.089)	(0.115)	(0.125)
Age	-0.017***	0.028***	-0.018*	0.018*
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Male	-0.455***	-0.044	-0.584*	0.034
	(0.176)	(0.215)	(0.341)	(0.367)
Education	-0.216**	0.235***	-0.130	0.102
	(0.089)	(0.070)	(0.125)	(0.087)
Religious Attendance	0.283***	-0.447***	0.320***	-0.538***
	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.087)	(0.080)
Retro. Ev. of Economy	0.898***	-0.699***	1.160***	-0.887***
	(0.075)	(0.121)	(0.135)	(0.185)
Income (TL)	-0.149**	0.123	-0.108	0.144*
	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.088)	(0.082)
Residency Status	-0.056	0.105	-0.002	0.307**
	(0.077)	(0.106)	(0.123)	(0.141)
Household Number	0.072	-0.036	0.074	0.021
	(0.075)	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.138)
Unemployment	-0.138	0.168	-0.373	0.439
	(0.144)	(0.211)	(0.232)	(0.372)
Refugee Rate$_{t-1}$	0.021	-0.028	0.565*	-0.889***
	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.331)	(0.284)

Immigrants vs. Economy			-0.008	0.074
			(0.099)	(0.128)
Immigrants vs. Culture			-0.066	-0.104
			(0.142)	(0.165)
Immigrants vs. Crime			0.075	0.148
			(0.113)	(0.187)
District Level Voteshare (AKP)	0.013**		0.006	
	(0.006)		(0.013)	
Political Knowledge about AKP	0.083*		0.037	
	(0.045)		(0.054)	
District Level Voteshare (CHP)		0.021**		0.018
		(0.010)		(0.020)
Political Knowledge about CHP		0.047		0.073*
		(0.043)		(0.043)
Constant	-4.207***	-4.904***	-1.529	-6.484**
	(1.026)	(1.331)	(1.831)	(2.554)
N	1233	1255	594	595
N of clusters	53	53	40	40
Log-likelihood	-626.977	-519.368	-277.692	-227.825

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by cities in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Models 1 and 2 include responses from both the 2015 and 2018 elections.

Models 3 and 4 include responses from the 2018 election.

To test whether the refugee rate affects the voting behavior to the specific party conditional on the distance to the border, multiple logistic regressions are estimated. Similar to Table 3.1, I also control anti-immigrant attitudes for both parties. To start with the incumbent party, in the earlier chapter, the findings of the estimates using the electoral-district level showed that the marginal effect of the refugee rate is increasing with the increase in the distance to the Syrian border and it was negatively associated with the vote share of AKP. Model 1 in Table 3.2 suggests that both the refugee rate and distance to border increase the probability of voting for AKP, but both terms are not statistically significant. However, it might be the case that the failure to achieve statistical significance is not related to the actual absence of an association but rather as an outcome of the inadequate sample size or more so the inadequate variation in both refugee rate and distance to the border variables. As explained in the last section, because data are hierarchical there is

no variation for independent variables within the different respondents in the same district. Nonetheless, due to the reliable expectations from a theoretical perspective and the findings from the earlier chapter, I will also interpret the marginal effect of the refuge rate. But before moving into the main independent variables, looking at the findings there are a series of important results for the control variables. The respondent's age, gender, income level, increasing education, and employment status are all statistically and negatively associated with the probability of voting for the incumbent party. On the other hand, retrospective evaluation of the economy in better terms and attending more religious services also related to the increased probability of the vote for AKP. Up until here, all the control variables in models, except for the economic ones, confirm the existing studies in the Turkish politics literature.

Figure 3.2 The Average Marginal Effect of Refugee Rate on the Probability of Voting for AKP, Based on Model 1 in Table 3.2



The findings in Model 1 in Table 3.2, suggest partial support for the electoral-district level data. To interpret the marginal effects of refugee rate on different levels of distance to the Syrian border, I use Figure 3.2. The linear line in Figure 3.2 shows that the marginal effect of the refugee rate on the probability of voting for AKP is strongest in the border cities. Yet, unlike the previous chapter, the effect is positive. The coverage of the effect is decreasing with the increase in the distance to the border and becomes weakest in the most distant cities though still

positively associated. On the other hand, there are not a lot of individual responses from border-cities, as it is possible to see from the overlaid histogram and wider confidence intervals. This in return indicates that the results are not very confident. Furthermore, in the most distant cities, which comprise most of the sample, the marginal effects of the refugee rate are not statistically distinguishable from zero even at 0.10% significance level.

Figure 3.3 The Average Marginal Effect of Refugee Rate on the Probability of Voting for CHP, Based on Model 4 in Table 3.2



Up until this point, the detailed analysis of the findings suggests that CHP has reaped the fruits of holding anti-refugee attitudes. In the following part, the question that to what extent these anti-refugee attitudes have succeeded to mobilize voters who are living closer to the border will be answered. Looking at Table 3.2, it is easy to grasp that Model 4 contains some valuable information. Starting with the control variables, similar to the additive estimate in Table 3.1, both increasing religious services and retrospective evaluation of the state of the economy in better terms are statistically and negatively associated with the probability of voting for CHP, while residency status is positively associated. In Model 4 similar to the additive model in Table 3.1, both refugee rate and distance to border are statistically and distinguishable from zero at 95% confidence level. To interpret to conditional relation more carefully, Figure B.2 depicts the marginal effect of the refugee rate on

the probability of voting for CHP conditional on the distance to the border. Figure B.2 suggests that the marginal effect of the refugee rate is statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.05% significance level for all distances to the border. The magnitude of the effect is increasing with the increase in the distance to the border and this effect is positively associated with voting for CHP. Moving from a border city to the most distant city to border is associated with around 15% increase in the probability of voting for the main opposition party. Considering that for the effective sample size of Model 4, only 22% percent of the respondents voted for CHP; a 15% increase is substantially significant. Theses findings partially support my second hypothesis. Yet, as in the case of the additive Model 4 in Table 3.1, this effect only holds for the 2018 elections.

The dependent variables Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are party-specific. In other words, for AKP (CHP) all the respondents who have voted for AKP (CHP) are coded as 1 whereas the rest of the respondents are coded as 0. To apply the same theory for only AKP and CHP voters, I generated a new binary variable where AKP voters are coded as 1 and CHP voters are coded as 0. This variable is not party-specific rather it directly compares the voters of the incumbent and the main opposition parties. The estimation results for both additive and interactive relationship for controlling anti-immigrant attitudes are given in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Logistic Regressions on AKP/CHP Voters

	Model.1	Model.2	Model.3	Model.4
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	-0.312	-0.913***	-0.591**	-1.101***
	(0.218)	(0.238)	(0.243)	(0.377)
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.091	-1.548***	-1.105**	-2.395**
	(0.069)	(0.589)	(0.533)	(0.975)
ln(Distance to the Border (km)) ×		0.270***		0.228*
ln(Refugee Rate)		(0.099)		(0.122)
Male	-0.291	-0.330	-0.556	-0.612
	(0.257)	(0.268)	(0.501)	(0.536)
Education	-0.327***	-0.331***	-0.151	-0.169
	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.144)	(0.138)
Religious Attendance	0.500***	0.512***	0.650***	0.648***
	(0.085)	(0.090)	(0.158)	(0.162)
Retrospective Evoluation of Economy	1.049***	1.054***	1.380***	1.386***
	(0.166)	(0.171)	(0.311)	(0.325)
Income (TL)	-0.190*	-0.181*	-0.252*	-0.237*
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.133)	(0.132)
Unemployment	-0.148	-0.184	-0.542	-0.593

	(0.193)	(0.200)	(0.369)	(0.396)
Age	-0.031***	-0.030***	-0.027**	-0.025**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Residency Status	-0.077	-0.119	-0.277*	-0.312*
	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.154)	(0.165)
Household Number	0.102	0.104	0.043	0.033
	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.154)	(0.158)
District Level Voteshare (AKP)	0.013	0.009	-0.000	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Political Knowledge about AKP	0.045	0.041	0.000	-0.004
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Year=2018	0.220	0.080		
	(0.249)	(0.252)		
Refugee Rate$_{t-1}$	-0.002	0.020	1.052**	0.975**
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.439)	(0.426)
Immigrants vs. Economy			-0.029	-0.020
			(0.140)	(0.146)
Immigrants vs. Culture			0.134	0.119
			(0.129)	(0.123)
Immigrants vs. Crime			-0.170	-0.138
			(0.189)	(0.175)
Constant	0.181	4.305***	2.976	6.152**
	(1.505)	(1.617)	(1.918)	(2.569)
N	921	921	465	465
N of clusters	52	52	39	39
Log-likelihood	-368.921	-363.888	-160.270	-159.022

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by cities in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Models 1 and 2 include responses from both the 2015 and 2018 elections.

Models 3 and 4 include responses from the 2018 election.

The findings in Model 1 in Table 3.3 suggest a positive but statistically non-significant relation between refugee rate and the probability of voting for AKP over CHP. Additionally, even though the unconditional effects are statistically significant in Model 2, the marginal effect of refugee rate conditional on the distance to the border is not significant. Hence, the findings in three different estimation strategies in Tables 3.1,3.2, and 3.3 suggest that without controlling anti-immigrant attitudes

the share of refugees in the local population does not explain the probability of voting for CHP. However, the same estimates particularly explain the probability of voting for AKP as the findings in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 suggest. Similar to Model 2, the marginal effect of the refugee rate in Model 4 is not distinguishable from zero at any given convenient significance level. All in all, the only significant results for the refugee rate are in Model 3, which presents the additive relationship between the main independent variables. Even though the hypotheses emphasize a conditional relationship between refugee rate and distance to the border, I will interpret the unconditional relationship as well.

Figure 3.4 The Average Adjusted Predictions of Refugee Rate and Distance to the Border on the Probability of Voting for AKP over CHP, Based on Model 3 in Table 3.3



Figure 3.4 presents the marginal effects of refugee rate and distance to the border on the respondents' probability of voting for AKP instead of CHP. On the left-hand side of Figure 3.4, it is visible that increasing the refugee rate is associated with a decrease in the probability of voting for AKP; in other words, increases the probability of voting for CHP. In the cities which host refugees that are equal to less than 1% of the total population, the model predicted a very high probability of voting for AKP instead of CHP. On the other hand, if a city hosts a considerable amount of refugees, the probability of voting for CHP is increasing while the probability of

voting for incumbents is decreasing. The right-hand side of Figure 3.4 suggest that local citizens in living distant to the Syrian border are less likely to vote for AKP, but the probability is higher than 50% for all level of distance. That is not intriguing because AKP has succeeded to mobilize all the conservative voters in Turkey not just in the Anatolian cities. Nonetheless, with the additive relationships, it is not possible to understand whether the extend of votes shifts differ from one city to another.

3.3 Conclusion

Solving the problem of ecological fallacy is a challenging task. However, as Achen and Shively (1995) argue: *"collapse of aggregate data analysis . . . and its replacement by individual survey analysis as the dominant method of quantitative social research"* (as cited in King 1997, 5), I have employed the survey to increase the reliability of the aggregate data analysis. To sum up, the marginal effect of the share of refugees is positively associated with the probability of voting for AKP. However, the positive association is decreasing in terms of its extent and almost becomes negative for distant cities. Hence, this finding partially supports the main hypothesis. Moreover, only for the 2018 election and after controlling anti-immigrant attitudes, the refugee rate is positively associated with the probability of voting for CHP. Unlike the AKP case, increasing distance to the Syrian border increases the extent of this marginal effect. The findings do not comprehensively support the results in the first empirical chapter. In the next part, I will discuss the reasoning behind the conservative stance about the results. After that, I will point out some further studies to increase the reliability of this study's results.

I refrain to make any definitive causal inferences for this empirical chapter because of several reasons. First of all, the research design of the study is not sufficient enough to fully engage with the topic. Using electoral-district level data for both independent variables have not solved the problem properly. Because of the lack of variation in the interested variables, there is little room to explain individual behavior from survey data. Secondly and relatedly, the findings of the estimators, which are using different variables, are not compatible with each other. Finding a meaningful association between refugee rate and the probability to vote for CHP in the 2018 election after controlling anti-immigrant attitudes is well-worthy. However, the same model could not reach any convenient significant level for the probabili-

ties of voting for AKP or voting for AKP over CHP. Hence, it is unknown whether the significances derive from any specialty to the 2018 election or anti-immigrant attitudes, because anti-immigrant attitudes are only available for the 2018 election. Thirdly, the observation numbers for MHP is so low to conduct a quantitative analysis. The findings in the first empirical chapter were substantial because contrary to existing studies in the literature on immigration, the influx of refugees in Turkey has decreased the vote share of the party which is located at the end of the political spectrum as right-wing. Last but not least, I have run the same model with a change in the refugee rate, as I have done in the earlier chapter. Yet, none of the results were statistically significant. Thus, for the individual-level analysis, it is only possible to conclude a correlation between the refugee rate on the probability of voting for AKP or CHP.

To sum up, in this empirical chapter, I have tested the same theory in individual-level data. The findings were suggesting partial support for the first chapter. On the other hand, further studies on the same subject with more developed research designs should be conducted. Using individual respondents' ZIP code if available or precinct names for more variation are one possible solution. Additionally, if the Syrian refugee numbers are published by the government or municipalities at the neighborhood level, this would also increase the reliability of the individual-level study.

In the end, the findings of both empirical chapters indicate that the topic of Syrian refugees is one of the main factors for the voting behavior in Turkey for the last elections, but this factor was not uniform over the cities. But there are still questions to be answered. For instance, what are the possible reasons for this disparity between the European countries and Turkey? How CHP has succeeded to mobilize citizens who are dissatisfied with the government, particularly because of the refugees? In the conclusion section, after summarizing the results in both chapters, I will discuss the results in more depth with reference to the Turkish politics literature and I will try to answer these questions.

4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

The refugee crisis that erupted after the Syrian civil war was detrimental for countries in Europe. Particularly, Greece and Italy have undergone into serious financial crisis and socio-cultural crisis. As a reaction to the refugee crisis along with the economic difficulties, right-wing populist parties have managed to frame themselves as viable options. However, the biggest bulk of the refugee was not on the shoulders of Europe. Turkey has been hosting the largest number of refugees in the world for almost a decade. Despite the focus of scholars has shifted towards explaining the effect of refugees on voting behavior in the European countries, the literature in Turkey has been underdeveloped. Even though numerous case-studies examine refugees, most of them were either focusing on the economic outcomes or socio-cultural problems that both refugees and local citizens are faced with. Only a few studies analyze the effect of refugees on voting behavior in-depth; yet, conclude either minor or statistically insignificant relationships between refugees and voting decisions of citizens in Turkey. However, it was intriguing to conclude that citizens are unconcerned with millions of refugees. Hence, this study emphasizes the effect of refugees is not observable in a routinized fashion for every citizen. Borrowing from the idea of contextual determinants on shaping voting behavior, this study argues that local citizens' priorities change with the distance to the border. In other words, citizens, who reside in the border-cities, are directly affected by the Syrian civil war; whereas these consequences of the conflict are absent in the distant cities. Instead, the citizens only observe refugees and reshape their political decisions accordingly. Thus, even though border-cities are hosting the majority of the refugees, security concerns and socio-cultural similarities play mitigating roles.

Using a generic and extended dataset about the topic, the first empirical chapter starts with showing that while the number of refugees is not associated with distance to the Syrian border, a 100 kilometers increase in distance to the Syrian border is related to a 1.5% decrease in the refugee rate. This indicates a clear government control in the settlement of the refugees. The study successfully replicates the prior studies in Turkey such that even after including the 2018 and 2019 elections, the

change in vote shares of AKP, MHP and CHP are not associated with the refugee rates. As the main argument of this thesis, the effect of refugee rates changes from one city to another. This variation is conditional on proximity to the Syrian borders. Thus, an increase in refugee rate decreases the vote share of the incumbent party as the distance to the border increases. While the marginal effect of refugee rate on the vote share of AKP is very minor and insignificant in the border cities, the extent of the negative effects of refugee rate increases in distant cities. On the other hand, confirming the prior expectations, CHP, which has continued to oppose the incumbent party in most of the policy areas particularly in immigration, succeed to mobilize local citizens who are dissatisfied with the refugees. In the cities where the refugee rate has not altered significantly, CHP could not mobilize any additional voters. But in the cities where the refugee rate increased each year, voters shifted towards CHP. Additionally, this shift was stronger in distant cities compared to border cities.

The first empirical chapter exhibit how the refugees affected the local citizens' voting decisions by using electoral district-level data. Because drawing inferences about individual behaviors from aggregate-level data might be faulty due to the disparity between analyzes and inferences levels, the second empirical chapter analyzes the same relationship using individual-level data. Employing CSES Modules 4 and 5 for individual-level variables, the second empirical chapter, partially, supports the electoral-district level data. Similar to the first chapter, the marginal effect of the refugee rate on the probability of voting for AKP is decreasing as the distance to the border increases. Furthermore, the estimations also support the first chapter such that the increase in the probability of voting for CHP is correlated with the refugee rate. However, unlike the first empirical chapter, the individual-level findings are less robust and causal. The estimations on a change in refugee rate fail to reach any convenience statistical significance. This in return restrains me to make any causal inferences.

Nonetheless, this study contributes to the literature on immigration as well as Turkish politics literature in a variety of ways. First of all, even though several studies explain the effect of refugees in Turkey, there are only a few studies that examine the relationship between refugees and voting behavior in Turkey. The existing studies mostly focus on the economic aspects of the refugees in Turkey. Secondly, the prior studies' findings suggest a lack of distinguishable effect of refugees on the voting behavior in Turkey. In addition to the 2014 and 2015 elections, I extended the sample with the 2018 and 2019 elections. Though the results do not alter significantly for the incumbent and the main opposition parties after the inclusion of the latest elections; for the right-wing party MHP, the findings suggest a considerable

amount of vote lost. Empirically supporting a right-wing party losing a vote share is well notable because this finding suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach in the theoretical arguments of immigrants' effects on voting behavior does not work. Neither the ideology of the party nor the extremism of this ideology is fully capable of explaining the political behavior of citizens. As the main inquiry of this study, the findings suggest that the voting behavior of local citizens is not uniform all over the country. I have explained in the introduction part why the existing studies cannot be replicated in Turkey because of three main reasons: being an actor in the Syrian civil war due to the geographical location, differences in party structures compared to the European countries, and the peculiarity of the Turkish socio-culture. All in all, increasing salience of security issues in border-cities mitigates the negative effect of refugees on voting behavior. On the other hand, due to the emphasis on anti-immigrant policies, though not as harshly as in the case of the European countries, CHP has succeeded to propose itself as an alternative party, particularly in non-border cities. As the findings suggest, CHP benefited from the refugee crisis considerably. To sum up, the main contribution of this study is to bring a new perspective to understanding the effect of refugees on voting behavior such that the issue-proximity plays a moderating factor.

However, it should be emphasized that the study has certain limitations. Starting with theoretical arguments, that is not clear whether the same theory can be applied in any other country. What makes proximity to the border a mitigative factor on the effect of refugees is due to the geographical location of Turkey. Hence, the external validity of the arguments is questionable for the latest refugee crisis. However, for instance, further studies should apply the same arguments to the US for the conflicts in Latin America. Additionally, from an alternative perspective, spatial-proximity arguments can bring more explanations to the recent refugee crisis. Investigating how individuals' voting behavior change as the distance to the settlements of refugees increases or decreases can contribute to the literature on immigration considerably. In terms of research design, the second empirical chapter requires further developed studies. Because of the data availability, explanatory variables that had been used were at the electoral-district level. Examining the same relationship with individuals' distance to the border and level of their interaction with refugees will have notable results that can support the findings of this study. Last but not least, as a contribution to Turkish politics literature, more qualitative and policy-oriented studies should investigate the outcomes. In the next pages, I will shortly discuss the two aspects of the outcomes: why AKP has followed this strategy of hosting refugees even though it has costed the incumbent harshly and how CHP has succeeded to present itself as an alternative to solve the refugee crisis?

The policy failures of AKP have caused serious consequences for the government. The latest and most drastic one was the results of the last election in 2019. The incumbent party has lost the biggest city, İstanbul, and the capital city, Ankara, which both have been ruled by AKP for the last twenty-five years. Of course, it would be quite assertive to argue that the sole reason for these defeats were the reactions of local citizens to the refugee problem that the government has created. Nonetheless, as the findings of both empirical chapters in this thesis suggest, refugees were one of the most crucial reasons, if not the most. Then, why the government is still unresponsive to the refugee crisis that citizens are discontented about? The most comprehensive, and to my opinion the plausible one, is the link between domestic politics and international relations.

The existence of the link between domestic and international is a debate among IR paradigms that goes further beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, for the topic of this thesis, the term *"migration diplomacy"* is well-suited. Adamson and Tsourapas (2019, 115-116) define the term as: *"states' use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility"*. The geographical location of Turkey locates her to a focal point for the EU migration policy agenda. As the EU has continued to grow, Turkey's borders have constituted the southeast land and sea external borders of the EU. (Üstübici and İçduygu 2015, 49). An ability to control the external borders of the EU as a neighboring country has given an upper hand to the Turkish government with the European countries (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019, 117). The EU-Turkey refugee deal, which was signed in 2016 to control unauthorized migration in the Aegean Sea, is one of the cornerstones on the pathway of the bilateral relation between EU and Turkey for the regulation of migration (Müftüler-Baç 2020, 16) On several occasions, Erdogan has used refugees as a bargaining chip. For instance, after the European Parliament votes for suspending the membership negotiation with Turkey, Erdoğan warned that: *"these border gates will be opened. Neither I nor my people will be affected by these dry threats. It wouldn't matter if all of you approved the vote."* Similarly, in late February, the Turkish government has decided not to control irregular immigration to the EU anymore. Eroğan stated that: "We will not close these doors in the coming period, and this will continue... Why? The European Union needs to keep its promises. We don't have to take care of this many refugees, to feed them." These are the perfect illustrations of how the Turkish government has utilized migration diplomacy. However, it is also worth emphasizing that the examples differ from each other such that in the latter case Erdogan gave those statements shortly after 33 Turkish soldiers were killed by the Assad supported forces in Syria. In other words, Erdogan framed the refugee issues due to Turkey's discontent about the European partners' lack of support in Syria.

Additionally, from an alternative perspective, the framing was an example of how a government can distract public opinion by putting forward another salient issue. But on the other hand, the Turkish government also has been justifying the military operations to Northern Syria with the aim to establish security zones for the millions of refugees that Turkey is hosting. All in all, while the AKP government has been suffering from the domestic consequences of refugees, the government also exploits this crisis in bilateral and multilateral relations with other countries.

The findings indicate a clear vote shift towards the main opposition party, CHP. The results are in line with my prior expectations. In the theoretical arguments of this thesis, I argued that local citizens, who are dissatisfied with refugees, voted for CHP because of her anti-immigrant stance. To reiterate, the main argument does not arrive from considering CHP as an extreme-right party but pointing out the similar anti-immigrant policies of CHP and extreme-right parties in Europe. In the end, as pointed out in the earlier sections, the most definable characteristic of extreme-right parties is their demonization of immigrants (Fennema 1997). The discourse analyzes in the parliament suggest that CHP has built its immigration policies on two pillars: economic problems and security concerns (Policy Papers)

To illustrate the story, looking at the discourses is helpful. For instance, one of the CHP members of the parliament, Tanju Özcan, expresses his dissatisfaction with refugees in a commission of investigation bill in 2017 by emphasizing how local citizens cannot benefit from social help services due to the volume of refugees, who also apply the government social services [1]. Özcan was the MoP of Bolu, a small city in the Black Sea region, and he was nominated as a mayor of the same city in the 2019 election. On the other hand, Bolu was hosting not a lot of refugees, however, the number of refugees has increased two-times by each year. The major promises of the CHP candidate were based on anti-refugee policies such as not to give any more financial help to refugees from the municipality budget or not to allow working licenses of refugee entrepreneurs. Özcan argued that refugees have stayed enough in Bolu and for them, it is time to leave. CHP received 53% of the votes in the 2019 election and won the municipality which was formerly ruled by AKP. The vote share of CHP in Bolu indicates a steady increase since in the earlier elections, on average, it was around thirty percent. Not surprisingly one of the first actions that were taken by the new mayor of the city was the stop of all the social help services to the refugees in Bolu. Of course, there are many other reasons for the outcomes in the elections of Bolu such as entering an alliance with İYİP party or economic crisis. The selective example is just an oversimplification of my arguments. Yet,

[1] "Grand National Assembly of Turkey Session Records." *TBMM*, 20 July, 2016. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/ham/b11601h.htm

it is an excellent illustration of the anti-immigration policies of CHP. To sum up, CHP has succeeded to present itself as an alternative to local citizens that can solve the refugee issue while the government was planning to nominate some cities for the Nobel Peace Prize because of their hospitality towards refugees.

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APPENDIX A

Table A.1 Refugee Information for the Elections

Election Date	June 7, 2015	June 24, 2018	March 31, 2019
Date of Information	January 1, 2016	June 21, 2018	May 23, 2019

Table A.2 Summary Statistics for the Variables in Table 1

Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
DID Models (1-3)					
Vote share of AKP (%)	46.258	13.579	4.324	82.723	374
Vote share of MHP (%)	15.617	10.567	0.202	53.247	374
Δ in Refugee Rate	0.746	5.371	-11.533	95.126	374
DID Model (5)					
Voteshare of CHP (%)	19.361	13.934	0.223	57.497	375
Δ in Refugee Rate	0.742	5.365	-11.533	95.126	375
Placebo Models (2-4)					
Vote share of AKP_{t-1} (%)	47.895	13.962	4.324	82.723	293
Vote share of MHP_{t-1} (%)	15.313	9.865	0.509	43.943	293
Δ in Refugee Rate	0.953	6.054	-11.533	95.126	293
Placebo Model (6)					
Vote share of CHP_{t-1} (%)	19.558	13.78	0.631	57.497	294
Δ in Refugee Rate	0.947	6.045	-11.533	95.126	294

Table A.3 OLS Estimates of Effect of Distance to the Border

	Model.1 Refugee Rate	Model.2 Refugee Number
Distance to the Border	-0.014**	-81.202
	(0.007)	(57.243)
Constant	8.986**	65833.346**
	(3.918)	(27962.883)
N	243	243
R^2	0.120	0.050

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.4 Additive OLS Regressions on Party Vote Share

	Model.1 AKP	Model.2 AKP	Model.3 MHP	Model.4 MHP	Model.5 CHP	Model.6 CHP
Distance to the Border	-0.001	0.007	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Refugee Rate	-0.010		-0.033		0.039**	
	(0.036)		(0.036)		(0.019)	
Δ in Refugee Rate		0.843		0.208		0.984*
		(0.894)		(0.705)		(0.586)
ln(Population)	-2.583***	0.122	1.808**	-1.745	-1.699***	-2.600***
	(0.804)	(1.265)	(0.777)	(1.194)	(0.513)	(0.910)
Male	-186.790***	326.303***	114.036***	-133.527**	-48.687	-69.865*
	(55.872)	(72.730)	(40.718)	(61.636)	(29.891)	(40.494)
60 Years or Older Citizens	20.569	113.876***	-31.466	-83.295**	23.558**	54.162***
	(29.811)	(31.331)	(21.577)	(36.102)	(11.810)	(19.840)
Illeteracy	254.835***	19.466	-89.811**	54.953	32.229	97.315**
	(62.967)	(78.037)	(44.066)	(82.354)	(32.113)	(45.769)
Number of Crimes	3033.335***	4388.990***	-3621.203***	-2724.816***	562.982	796.228
	(1101.143)	(1079.002)	(909.539)	(958.763)	(646.040)	(739.012)
Unemployment	123.696*	41.849	-25.788	-53.117	-1.736	-18.544
	(70.264)	(48.136)	(51.360)	(59.934)	(23.579)	(27.263)
Existence of a Camp	-0.445	-3.194	0.630	1.984	0.193	1.162
	(2.508)	(2.512)	(1.893)	(1.429)	(1.033)	(1.321)
Local Election	-4.898**	0.729	11.987***	7.841***	0.701	1.893
	(2.254)	(2.384)	(2.014)	(1.948)	(1.652)	(1.537)
Average Household	3.262*	11.141***	-3.272***	-5.574**	2.289***	4.570***
	(1.661)	(1.975)	(1.212)	(2.151)	(0.768)	(1.374)
GDP Pc	0.002***	-0.000	-0.001***	-0.000	0.000*	0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	75.390**	-246.613***	-48.379*	132.057***	28.924	34.052
	(34.469)	(44.979)	(28.171)	(42.386)	(19.353)	(29.729)
N	211	130	211	130	212	131
N of clusters	81	81	81	81	81	81
R^2	0.147	0.376	0.283	0.317	0.064	0.184

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by cities in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Models 1-3-5 include 2015,2018, and 2019 elections. Models 2-4-6 include 2018 and 2019 elections.

Table A.5 Summary Statistics for the Variables in Table 2

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Models 1 and 3					
Difference in Vote Share of AKP	-1.329	11.645	-52.817	37.904	211
Difference in Vote Share of MHP	-1.556	9.824	-26.229	25.233	211
Distance to the Border	425.413	255.443	6.843	1020.754	211
Refugee Rate	2.736	9.798	0.004	95.126	211
ln(Population)	13.123	0.899	11.271	16.528	211
Male	0.504	0.01	0.492	0.559	211
60 Years or Older Citizens	0.148	0.049	0.046	0.256	211
Illeteracy	0.039	0.017	0.01	0.083	211
Number of Crimes	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.005	211
Unemployment	0.04	0.013	0.019	0.118	211
Existence of a Camp	0.1	0.3	0	1	211
Local Election	0.232	0.423	0	1	211
Average Household	3.552	0.854	2.63	7.04	211
GDP Pc	8138.78	2925.824	3203.502	19957.251	211
Model 5					
Difference in Vote Share of CHP	-0.06	5.988	-20.597	21.257	212
Distance to the Border	423.687	255.913	6.843	1020.754	212
Refugee Rate	2.767	9.790	0.004	95.126	212
ln(Population)	13.135	0.897	11.271	16.528	212
Male	0.504	0.01	0.492	0.559	212
60 Years or Older Citizens	0.148	0.049	0.046	0.256	212
Illeteracy	0.039	0.017	0.01	0.083	212
Number of Crimes	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.005	212
Unemployment	0.041	0.014	0.019	0.16	212
Existence of a Camp	0.099	0.299	0	1	212
Local Election	0.236	0.426	0	1	212
Average Household	3.559	0.853	2.63	7.04	212
GDP Pc	8117.653	2935.757	3203.502	19957.251	212
Models 2 and 4					
Difference in Vote Share of AKP	-6.771	9.606	-52.817	36.148	130
Difference in Vote Share of MHP	2.439	8.043	-12.149	25.233	130
Distance to the Border	426.019	251.884	6.843	1020.754	130
Δ in Refugee Rate in Refugee Rate	0.369	0.87	-3.04	4.212	130
ln(Population)	13.058	0.859	11.318	16.528	130
Male	0.505	0.01	0.492	0.557	130

60 Years or Older Citizens	0.153	0.049	0.046	0.256	130
Illeteracy	0.036	0.016	0.01	0.072	130
Number of Crimes	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.005	130
Unemployment	0.042	0.015	0.022	0.118	130
Existence of a Camp	0.085	0.279	0	1	130
Local Election	0.377	0.486	0	1	130
Average Household	3.468	0.783	2.63	6.4	130
GDP Pc	7476.314	2508.574	3203.502	17869.701	130
	Model 6				
Difference in Vote Share of CHP	-0.847	5.959	-20.597	21.257	131
Distance to the Border	423.22	252.685	6.843	1020.754	131
Δ in Refugee Rate in Refugee Rate	0.36	0.873	-3.04	4.212	131
ln(Population)	13.078	0.858	11.318	16.528	131
Male	0.505	0.01	0.492	0.557	131
60 Years or Older Citizens	0.153	0.05	0.046	0.256	131
Illeteracy	0.036	0.016	0.01	0.072	131
Number of Crimes	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.005	131
Unemployment	0.042	0.017	0.022	0.16	131
Existence of a Camp	0.084	0.278	0	1	131
Local Election	0.382	0.488	0	1	131
Average Household	3.48	0.783	2.63	6.4	131
GDP Pc	7447.18	2522.395	3203.502	17869.701	131

Table A.6 Summary Statistics for the Variables in Table 3

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Models 1 and 3					
Difference in Vote Share of AKP	-1.329	11.645	-52.817	37.904	211
Difference in Vote Share of MHP	-1.556	9.824	-26.229	25.233	211
Distance to the Border	425.413	255.443	6.843	1020.754	211
Refugee Rate	2.736	9.798	0.004	95.126	211
ln(Population)	13.123	0.899	11.271	16.528	211
Male	0.504	0.01	0.492	0.559	211
60 Years or Older Citizens	0.148	0.049	0.046	0.256	211
Illeteracy	0.039	0.017	0.01	0.083	211
Number of Crimes	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.005	211
Unemployment	0.04	0.013	0.019	0.118	211
Existence of a Camp	0.1	0.3	0	1	211
Local Election	0.232	0.423	0	1	211
Average Household	3.552	0.854	2.63	7.04	211
GDP Pc	8138.78	2925.824	3203.502	19957.251	211
Model 5					
Difference in Vote Share of CHP	-0.06	5.988	-20.597	21.257	212
Distance to the Border	423.687	255.913	6.843	1020.754	212
Refugee Rate	2.767	9.790	0.004	95.126	212
ln(Population)	13.135	0.897	11.271	16.528	212
Male	0.504	0.01	0.492	0.559	212
60 Years or Older Citizens	0.148	0.049	0.046	0.256	212
Illeteracy	0.039	0.017	0.01	0.083	212
Number of Crimes	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.005	212
Unemployment	0.041	0.014	0.019	0.16	212
Existence of a Camp	0.099	0.299	0	1	212
Local Election	0.236	0.426	0	1	212
Average Household	3.559	0.853	2.63	7.04	212
GDP Pc	8117.653	2935.757	3203.502	19957.251	212
Models 2 and 4					
Difference in Vote Share of AKP	-6.771	9.606	-52.817	36.148	130
Difference in Vote Share of MHP	2.439	8.043	-12.149	25.233	130
Distance to the Border	425.413	255.443	6.843	1020.754	211
Δ in Refugee	0.369	0.87	-3.04	4.212	130
ln(Population)	13.058	0.859	11.318	16.528	130
Male	0.505	0.01	0.492	0.557	130

60 Years or Older Citizens	0.153	0.049	0.046	0.256	130
Illeteracy	0.036	0.016	0.01	0.072	130
Number of Crimes	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.005	130
Unemployment	0.042	0.015	0.022	0.118	130
Existence of a Camp	0.085	0.279	0	1	130
Local Election	0.377	0.486	0	1	130
Average Household	3.468	0.783	2.63	6.4	130
GDP Pc	7476.314	2508.574	3203.502	17869.701	130
Model 6					
Difference in Vote Share of CHP	-0.847	5.959	-20.597	21.257	131
Distance to the Border	423.22	252.685	6.843	1020.754	131
Δ in Refugee Rate	0.36	0.873	-3.04	4.212	131
ln(Population)	13.078	0.858	11.318	16.528	131
Male	0.505	0.01	0.492	0.557	131
60 Years or Older Citizens	0.153	0.05	0.046	0.256	131
Illeteracy	0.036	0.016	0.01	0.072	131
Number of Crimes	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.005	131
Unemployment	0.042	0.017	0.022	0.16	131
Existence of a Camp	0.084	0.278	0	1	131
Local Election	0.382	0.488	0	1	131
Average Household	3.48	0.783	2.63	6.4	131
GDP Pc	7447.18	2522.395	3203.502	17869.701	131

Figure A.1 The Average Marginal Effects of Change in Refugee Rate and Distance to the Syrian Border on the Vote Share of AKP



Figure A.2 The Average Marginal Effects of Refugee Rate and Distance to the Syrian Border on the Vote Share of CHP



Table 2.3 with Top Encoding

The refugee rate in Kilis is 95.12, 92.09, and 80.55 in 2015, 2018, and 2019 respectively which causes interpolation. The results are robust, even after re-coding the refugee rate in Kilis to the top value in the effective sample size.

Table A.7 Interactive OLS Regressions on Party Vote Share

	Model.1 AKP	Model.2 MHP	Model.3 CHP
Distance to the Border	0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Refugee Rate	0.199	0.028	-0.107
	(0.183)	(0.161)	(0.089)
Distance to the Border × Refugee Rate	-0.004***	0.002	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ln(Population)	-1.755*	1.398*	-1.541**
	(0.889)	(0.802)	(0.590)
Male	-173.085***	105.715**	-44.807
	(57.226)	(42.025)	(30.342)
60 Years or Older Citizens	16.361	-31.372	25.778**
	(29.989)	(21.805)	(12.221)
Illeteracy	255.368***	-77.301*	18.495
	(61.240)	(44.680)	(33.441)
Number of Crimes	3318.729***	-3798.327***	666.820
	(1071.856)	(882.508)	(638.880)
Unemployment	112.072	-18.480	-4.736
	(69.698)	(50.399)	(23.872)
Existence of a Camp	-1.465	-0.547	1.859
	(2.513)	(2.401)	(1.314)
Local Election	-4.447*	11.798***	0.757
	(2.274)	(1.989)	(1.647)
Average Household	3.098*	-3.449***	2.604***
	(1.677)	(1.228)	(0.797)
GDP Pc	0.002***	-0.001***	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	57.669	-38.489	24.099
	(35.760)	(29.197)	(20.969)
N	211	211	212
N of clusters	81	81	81
R^2	0.163	0.288	0.066

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by cities in parentheses.

Models include elections results from 2015, 2018, and 2019.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure A.3 The Average Marginal Effects of Refugee Rate (Distance to the Syrian Border) on the Δ Vote Share of AKP , Based on Model 1 in Table A.7[1]



APPENDIX B

Table B.1 Tabulate of Respondents by Cities

	2015		2018		Total	
City Name	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Adana	8	1.29	12	1.96	20	1.62
Afyon	2	0.32	-	-	2	0.16
Amasya	-	-	-	2.29	14	1.14
Ankara	63	10.13	59	9.66	122	9.89
Antalya	13	2.09	25	4.09	38	3.08
Ardahan	-	-	2	0.33	2	0.16
Aydin	3	0.48	11	1.80	14	1.14
Balikesir	10	1.61	17	2.78	27	2.19
Batman	3	0.48	4	0.65	7	0.57
Bitlis	-	-	6	0.98	6	0.49
Bolu	-	-	10	1.64	10	0.81
Burdur	1	0.16	-	-	1	0.08
Bursa	30	4.82	20	3.27	50	4.06
Canakkale	8	1.29	-	-	8	0.65
Denizli	5	0.80	18	2.95	23	1.87
Diyarbakir	13	2.09	15	2.45	28	2.27
Edirne	1	0.16	-	-	1	0.08
Elazig	4	0.64	-	-	4	0.32
Erzurum	9	1.45	5	0.82	14	1.14
Eskisehir	9	1.45	20	3.27	29	2.35
Gaziantep	29	4.66	21	3.44	50	4.06
Giresun	4	0.64	-	-	4	0.32
Hatay	17	2.73	14	2.29	31	2.51
Istanbul	113	18.17	99	16.20	212	17.19
Izmır	31	4.98	34	5.56	65	5.27
Kahramanmaras	6	0.96	4	0.65	10	0.81
Kars	-	-	1	0.16	1	0.08
Kastamonu	7	1.13	6	0.98	13	1.05
Kayseri	22	3.54	8	1.31	30	2.43
Kilis	5	0.80	-	-	5	0.41

Kirikkale	6	0.96	13	2.13	19	1.54
Kocaeli	13	2.09	9	1.47	22	1.78
Konya	23	3.70	30	4.91	53	4.30
Kutahya	4	0.64	24	3.93	28	2.27
Kırklareli	6	0.96	-	-	6	0.49
Malatya	9	1.45	7	1.15	16	1.30
Manisa	11	1.77	10	1.64	21	1.70
Mardin	4	0.64	8	1.31	12	0.97
Mersin	10	1.61	1	0.16	11	0.89
Mugla	11	1.77	-	-	11	0.89
Nevsehir	13	2.09	7	1.15	20	1.62
Ordu	-	-	7	1.15	7	0.57
Osmaniye	1	0.16	6	0.98	7	0.57
Rize	9	1.45	-	-	9	0.73
Sakarya	5	0.80	-	-	5	0.41
Samsun	14	2.25	15	2.45	29	2.35
Sanliurfa	6	0.96	4	0.65	10	0.81
Tekirdag	11	1.77	10	1.64	21	1.70
Trabzon	9	1.45	12	1.96	21	1.70
Van	22	3.54	9	1.47	31	2.51
Yalova	9	1.45	-	-	9	0.73
Yozgat	4	0.64	-	-	4	0.32
Zonguldak	6	0.96	14	2.29	20	1.62
Total	622	100.00	611	100.00	1,233	100.00

Table B.2 Summary Statistics for the Variables in Tables 1 and 2

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
	Models 1				
AKP Vote	0.502	0.5	0	1	1233
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.203	1.712	-5.495	4.555	1233
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	5.956	0.992	1.923	6.928	1233
Age	42.05	14.698	18	93	1233
Male	0.488	0.5	0	1	1233
Education	2.22	1.246	0	6	1233
Religious Attendance	4.251	1.615	1	6	1233
Retrospective Evoluation of Economy	2.417	1.36	1	5	1233
Income (TL)	2.993	1.394	1	5	1233
Residency Status	2.955	1.1	1	4	1233
Household Number	3.475	1.493	1	9	1233
Unemployment	0.322	0.467	0	1	1233
Ideological Distance to AKP	-0.006	1.955	-8.5	1.5	1233
District Level Voteshare (AKP)	48.195	14.409	20.518	82.723	1233
Refugee Rate$_{(t-1)}$	1.335	3.685	0	23.732	1233
	Models 2				
CHP Vote	0.25	0.433	0	1	1255
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.201	1.715	-5.495	4.555	1255
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	5.955	1.001	1.923	6.928	1255
Age	42.308	14.836	18	93	1255
Male	0.487	0.5	0	1	1255
Education	2.214	1.243	0	6	1255
Religious Attendance	4.257	1.619	1	6	1255
Retrospective Evoluation of Economy	2.386	1.356	1	5	1255
Income (TL)	2.99	1.396	1	5	1255
Residency Status	2.937	1.105	1	4	1255
Household Number	3.459	1.495	1	9	1255
Unemployment	0.318	0.466	0	1	1255
Ideological Distance to CHP	-0.03	2.007	-2.3	8	1255
District Level Voteshare (CHP)	24.815	12.542	1.193	57	1255
Refugee Rate$_{(t-1)}$ 1.302	3.652	0	23.732	1255	
	Models 3				
AKP Vote	0.544	0.499	0	1	594
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.262	1.674	-3.234	3.317	594
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	6.01	0.931	3.075	6.82	594

Age	41.261	14.448	18	78	594
Male	0.461	0.499	0	1	594
Education	2.328	1.237	0	5	594
Religious Attendance	4.056	1.404	1	5	594
Retrospective Evoluation of Economy	2.614	1.279	1	5	594
Income (TL)	2.896	1.419	1	5	594
Residency Status	3.037	1.027	1	4	594
Household Number	3.444	1.423	1	9	594
Immigrants vs. Economy	2.227	1.188	1	5	594
Immigrants vs. Culture	2.226	1.197	1	5	594
Immigrants vs. Crime	2.2	1.181	1	5	594
Unemployment	0.569	0.496	0	1	594
Ideological Distance to AKP	-0.091	1.987	-8.5	1.5	594
District Level Voteshare (AKP)	42.604	8.992	20.518	59.645	594
Refugee Rate$_{(t-1)}$	2.666	4.866	0.004	23.732	594
	Models 4				
CHP Vote	0.244	0.43	0	1	595
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.252	1.669	-3.234	3.317	595
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	6.015	0.928	3.075	6.82	595
Age	41.343	14.467	18	78	595
Male	0.457	0.499	0	1	595
Education	2.326	1.23	0	5	595
Religious Attendance	4.052	1.401	1	5	595
Retrospective Evoluation of Economy	2.602	1.274	1	5	595
Income (TL)	2.891	1.42	1	5	595
Residency Status	3.03	1.031	1	4	595
Household Number	3.437	1.427	1	9	595
Immigrants vs. Economy	2.232	1.189	1	5	595
Immigrants vs. Culture	2.229	1.201	1	5	595
Immigrants vs. Crime	2.2	1.18	1	5	595
Unemployment	0.570	0.496	0	1	595
Ideological Distance to CHP	0.036	2.125	-2.3	7.7	595
District Level Voteshare (CHP)	22.985	9.949	1.336	42.038	595
Refugee Rate$_{(t-1)}$	2.641	4.861	0.004	23.732	595

Table B.3 Summary Statistics for the Variables in Table 3

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
	Models 1				
Voting for AKP over CHP	0.672	0.47	0	1	921
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.207	1.689	-5.495	4.555	921
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	6.047	0.942	1.923	6.928	921
Age	42.502	14.836	18	93	921
Male	0.452	0.498	0	1	921
Education	2.188	1.239	0	6	921
Religious Attendance	4.175	1.653	1	6	921
Retrospective Evoluation of Economy	2.625	1.368	1	5	921
Income (TL)	3	1.385	1	5	921
Residency Status	2.98	1.101	1	4	921
Household Number	3.448	1.493	1	9	921
Unemployment	0.328	0.47	0	1	921
Ideological Distance to AKP	0.135	1.775	-8.5	1.5	921
District Level Voteshare (AKP)	48.99	14.012	20.518	82.723	921
Refugee Rate$_{(t-1)}$	1.301	3.563	0	23.732	921
	Models 2				
Voting for AKP over CHP	0.672	0.47	0	1	921
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.207	1.689	-5.495	4.555	921
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	6.047	0.942	1.923	6.928	921
Age	42.502	14.836	18	93	921
Male	0.452	0.498	0	1	921
Education	2.188	1.239	0	6	921
Religious Attendance	4.175	1.653	1	6	921
Retrospective Evoluation of Economy	2.625	1.368	1	5	921
Income (TL)	3	1.385	1	5	921
Residency Status	2.98	1.101	1	4	921
Household Number	3.448	1.493	1	9	921
Unemployment	0.328	0.47	0	1	921
Ideological Distance to AKP	0.135	1.775	-8.5	1.5	921
District Level Voteshare (AKP)	48.99	14.012	20.518	82.723	921
Refugee Rate$_{(t-1)}$	1.301	3.563	0	23.732	921
	Models 3				
Voting for AKP over CHP	0.695	0.461	0	1	465
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.257	1.646	-3.234	3.317	465
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	6.074	0.867	3.075	6.82	465

Age	41.185	14.459	18	78	465
Male	0.43	0.496	0	1	465
Education	2.305	1.234	0	5	465
Religious Attendance	4.024	1.427	1	5	465
Retrospective Evoluation of Economy	2.824	1.245	1	5	465
Income (TL)	2.908	1.415	1	5	465
Residency Status	3.103	1.01	1	4	465
Household Number	3.439	1.443	1	9	465
Immigrants vs. Economy	2.288	1.19	1	5	465
Immigrants vs. Culture	2.23	1.184	1	5	465
Immigrants vs. Crime	2.258	1.185	1	5	465
Unemployment	0.578	0.494	0	1	465
Ideological Distance to AKP	-0.001	1.85	-8.5	1.5	465
District Level Voteshare (AKP)	42.682	8.840	20.518	59.645	465
Refugee Rate$_{(t-1)}$	2.521	4.63	0.004	23.732	465
	Models 4				
Voting for AKP over CHP	0.695	0.461	0	1	465
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.257	1.646	-3.234	3.317	465
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	6.074	0.867	3.075	6.82	465
Age	41.185	14.459	18	78	465
Male	0.43	0.496	0	1	465
Education	2.305	1.234	0	5	465
Religious Attendance	4.024	1.427	1	5	465
Retrospective Evoluation of Economy	2.824	1.245	1	5	465
Income (TL)	2.908	1.415	1	5	465
Residency Status	3.103	1.01	1	4	465
Household Number	3.439	1.443	1	9	465
Immigrants vs. Economy	2.288	1.19	1	5	465
Immigrants vs. Culture	2.23	1.184	1	5	465
Immigrants vs. Crime	2.258	1.185	1	5	465
Unemployment	0.578	0.494	0	1	465
Ideological Distance to AKP	-0.001	1.85	-8.5	1.5	465
District Level Voteshare (AKP)	42.682	8.840	20.518	59.645	465
Refugee Rate$_{(t-1)}$	2.521	4.63	0.004	23.732	465

In case of any model dependence, the refugee information in Table 3.2 are changed from Janury 1, 2016 to March 31, 2016 and from June 21, 2018 to May 24, 2018. The results are robust.

Table B.4 Interactive Logistic Regressions on Probability of Voting for Parties

	Model.1 AKP	Model.2 CHP	Model.3 AKP	Model.4 CHP
ln(Refugee Rate)	0.618*	1.057*	-0.926	1.999**
	(0.350)	(0.555)	(0.893)	(0.966)
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	0.318**	0.677***	-0.139	0.912**
	(0.159)	(0.226)	(0.316)	(0.398)
ln(Refugee Rate) ×	-0.084	-0.190**	0.024	-0.179
ln(Distance to the Border (km))	(0.059)	(0.091)	(0.120)	(0.131)
Age	-0.016***	0.028***	-0.017*	0.017*
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Male	-0.458***	-0.045	-0.576*	0.021
	(0.175)	(0.215)	(0.338)	(0.358)
Education	-0.219**	0.233***	-0.123	0.096
	(0.089)	(0.069)	(0.127)	(0.087)
Religious Attendance	0.283***	-0.447***	0.314***	-0.532***
	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.087)	(0.078)
Retrospective Evoluation of Economy	0.900***	-0.700***	1.165***	-0.884***
	(0.076)	(0.121)	(0.137)	(0.183)
Income (TL)	-0.148**	0.124*	-0.111	0.139*
	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.089)	(0.082)
Residency Status	-0.056	0.105	0.001	0.323**
	(0.077)	(0.107)	(0.121)	(0.143)
Household Number	0.073	-0.036	0.081	0.009
	(0.075)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.132)
Unemployment	-0.138	0.163	-0.349	0.396
	(0.144)	(0.211)	(0.227)	(0.351)
Refugee Rate$_{t-1}$	0.026	-0.027	0.725**	-0.888***
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.326)	(0.302)
Immigrants vs. Economy			-0.009	0.077
			(0.096)	(0.126)
Immigrants vs. Culture			-0.062	-0.107
			(0.140)	(0.166)
Immigrants vs. Crime			0.062	0.152
			(0.111)	(0.190)
District Level Voteshare (AKP)	0.013**		0.008	
	(0.006)		(0.013)	
Political Knowledge about AKP	0.082*		0.033	
	(0.045)		(0.054)	
District Level Voteshare (CHP)		0.021**		0.019
		(0.010)		(0.020)
Political Knowledge about CHP		0.045		0.079*
		(0.043)		(0.044)
Constant	-4.167***	-4.957***	-1.421	-6.849***
	(1.043)	(1.370)	(1.912)	(2.658)
N	1233	1255	594	595
N of clusters	53	53	40	40
Log-likelihood	-627.385	-519.315	-277.009	-228.200

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by cities in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Models 1 and 2 include responses from both the 2015 and 2018 elections.

Models 3 and 4 include responses from the 2018 election.

Figure B.1 The Average Marginal Effect of Refugee Rate on the Probability of Voting for AKP, Based on Model 1 in Table B.4



Figure B.2 The Average Marginal Effect of Refugee Rate on the Probability of Voting for CHP, Based on Model 4 in Table B.4