

**CHANGE OR CONTINUITY? A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE IMMIGRANT
INTEGRATION MODELS OF TURKEY AND GERMANY
AFTER THE SYRIAN CRISIS**

by
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
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ABSTRACT

CHANGE OR CONTINUITY? A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION MODELS OF TURKEY AND GERMANY AFTER THE SYRIAN CRISIS

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Keywords: immigrant integration, Syrian crisis, Germany, Turkey, national models

This study aimed to explore the effects of the Syrian refugee crisis on the immigrant integration policies and hence the national models of Turkey and Germany. It tried to assess whether there is a continuity or divergence in the policies after 2011. It also tried to match the two countries with one of the immigrant integration models discussed in the literature. Accordingly, only legal measures were examined based on the immigrant integration indices. Laws and regulations were analysed in terms of eight main elements of integration and the indicators for each element. The results show that anti-discrimination and political participation rights are not covered by neither of the countries, suggesting a segregationist approach. German policies enacted after 2011 predominantly focus on access to labor market, language and cultural learning and partially health while Turkish policies address regulations on permanent residence, education and family reunion, more so than others. German immigrant integration policies seem to reflect assimilationism more explicitly, compared to other models due to the emphasis on cultural learning and cultural conformity. The Turkish case, too, reflects assimilationist elements as well as segregationist ones, due to policies favouring only certain types of immigrants. The new legal adjustments indicate both continuities and divergences with the past for both countries.

ÖZET

DEĞİŞİM YA DA DEVAMLILIK? SURIYE KRİZİ SONRASI TÜRKİYE VE ALMANYA’NIN GÖÇMEN ENTEGRASYON MODELLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI İNCELEMESİ

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Anahtar Kelimeler: göçmen entegrasyonu, Suriye krizi, Almanya, Türkiye, ulusal modeller

Bu çalışma Suriye mülteci krizinin, Türkiye ve Almanya’nın göçmen entegrasyon politikaları ve dolayısıyla da ulusal modelleri üzerindeki etkilerini araştırmayı amaçlamıştır. 2011 sonrası politikalarda devamlılık mı yoksa bir farklılaşma mı olduğunu belirlemeye çalışmıştır. Aynı zamanda, bu iki ülkeyi, literatürde tartışılan göçmen entegrasyon modellerinden biriyle eşleştirmeye çalışmıştır. Buna göre, göçmen entegrasyon endeksleri baz alınarak sadece yasal tedbirler incelenmiştir. Kanun ve yönetmelikler, sekiz temel entegrasyon unsuru ve her bir unsura işaret eden göstergeler bakımından analiz edilmiştir. Sonuçlar, ayrımcılıkla mücadele ve siyasal katılım haklarının iki ülke tarafından da bahsedilmediğini göstermekte, dolayısıyla ayrımcı bir yaklaşım ima etmektedir. 2011 sonrası çıkan Alman politikaları ağırlıklı iş piyasasına erişim, dil ve kültürel öğrenim ve kısmen sağlığa odaklanırken, Türk politikaları daha çok daimi ikametgâh, eğitim ve aile birleşimine değinmektedir. Alman göçmen entegrasyon politikaları, kültürel öğrenim ve kültürel uyuma yapılan vurgu dolayısıyla, diğer modellere oranla asimilasyonculuğu daha açık yansıtıyor görünmektedir. Türkiye’deki politikalar ise, asimilasyoncu unsurlar kadar, sadece belirli tipteki göçmenleri gözeten politikalar sebebiyle ayrımcı unsurları da yansıtmaktadır. Yeni yasal düzenlemeler her iki ülke için de, eskiye kıyasla hem devamlılık hem de farklılığa işaret etmektedir.

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Dedicated to my parents who have always been supportive...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD: Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency	35
BAMF: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees	42
BIBB: Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training	34
BMAS: Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs	45
BMBF: Federal Ministry of Education and Research	40
BMI: Federal Ministry of Interior.....	45
DGMM: Directorate General of Migration Management.....	35
EMN: European Migration Network	42
GIZ: German Society for International Cooperation	33
GMDAC: Global Migration Data Analysis Center	1
HWK: Chamber of Skilled Crafts.....	34
IHK: Chamber of Commerce and Industry.....	34
IOM: International Organization for Migration.....	1
İŞKUR: Turkish Employment Agency.....	36
MEB: Ministry of National Education.....	55
MIPEX: Migrant Integration Policy Index	4
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization.....	16
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.....	1
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	2
VET: Vocational Education Training	32
YÖK: Presidency of Council of Higher Education	55

1. INTRODUCTION

Migration is one of the biggest challenges faced by many countries in today's world. With the hyper-globalization that the world is going through, people are moving faster, further and, be it voluntary or involuntary, the line of where the habitat of one society ends and another begins starts to get more blurred. The latest numbers suggest that there are 258 million migrants all over the world, of which 150 million of them are in the labor market and 25 million are registered refugees (IOM 2018). Moreover, there is an exponential increase in migration, given that the number of migrants was around 173 million in 2000 while this number reached 220 million in 2010 (Migration Data Portal 2017). Increase in the number of people migrating, coupled with the problems of the 21st century, namely terrorism, increased violence, economic and political turmoil in different parts of the world indicates the urgency and importance of migrant integration policies, especially for the unity and harmony of the host-society.

It is repeatedly stated in different sources that integration of immigrants is very important for host-countries to facilitate social and cultural integrity and economic growth (Kaya and Kayaoğlu 2012; OECD/European Union 2015; Migration Policy Institute 2019; Migration Data Portal 2019). Immigrants' contribution to economy cannot be denied, with 9.4% share in the total GDP globally (IOM GMDAC 2018), which is an indicator of the importance of skill matching and labor market integration of immigrants for the long term economic benefits of the country. Integration is usually achieved in four dimensions: economic, social, cultural and political (Council of Europe 1997; Kaya 2014). Successful or unsuccessful integration illustrates itself in the differences between natives and non-natives in terms of

access to employment, education and health, social, civic and cultural inclusion, and also public opinion (Migration Data Portal 2019).


Yet, there are multiple ways or approaches states can take in order to get migrants integrated, ranging from assimilation to multiculturalism. Each approach lasting for some time are identified with the policies of particular countries and came to be known as immigrant integration models of those countries (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). The literature generally talks about three different models: (1) an assimilationist model based on the French and Swiss examples, (2) an exclusionist one observed in the German context until 2000s, and (3) a multiculturalist one based on the Dutch, British and Canadian experiences, with Swedish and Belgian policies partially resembling the multiculturalist model (Bloemraad 2007; Koopmans 2010; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). However, major crises following the millennium challenged these models and policies towards immigrants, leading, for instance, to the backlash of multiculturalist policies in the Netherlands or the perceived failure of both multiculturalism and republicanism (Bloemraad 2007; Kaya 2012).

The Syrian crisis is one such crisis that changed the balance of demographics, and economic and political agenda of many countries since its start in 2011. The repercussions were huge since hundreds of thousands of people were killed, around 6.6 million were displaced in the country, over 5.6 million were displaced in another country as refugees and billions of dollars were spent by different governments to settle, resettle or integrate those refugees (Human Rights Watch 2017; UNHCR 2018).

Data shows that by the end of 2018, there are 70.8 million people in total displaced all around the world (UNHCR 2019a). The distribution across categories of people is shown in Figure 1.1 below. Accordingly, there are more than 12 million Syrian people displaced, either within or outside their country and 6.7 million refugees from Syria dispersed in different countries, constituting almost 10% of the total amount of displaced people. Having the nationals of only one country for one-tenth of every displaced people and for one-fourth of every refugee shows the severity of the issue. According to UNHCR, the total number of displaced people globally has increased by 2.3 million in 2018, signaling an ever-increasing crisis. It has also

been reported that there has been 27.5 million increase in the number of displaced people within the last nine years, most of which coincides with the date range of 2012 and 2015 (UNHCR 2019a).

Figure 1.1. The Distribution of Displaced People by 2018 (in million)



While statistics may fall short of telling the whole story behind a crisis, they do indicate a snapshot of the reality. What they show in this case is that the Syrian crisis is a major global challenge, requiring solution at multiple levels. It is not possible to present all solutions in this study, mainly due to the complexity of the issue. Yet, what this study offers is a case study consisting of two cases, Turkey and Germany, through which it is possible to observe how they react to the same migratory pressure, the way that they deal with it and the effects that it has had on the immigrant integration models in both countries.

According to the Directorate General of Migration Management (2019), there are 3.626.820 Syrians in Turkey under temporary protection by July 2019, of which only 108.543 of them are living in the camps and the rest are scattered around the country. Those who acquired Turkish citizenship consist of 79.820 Syrians, including children. UNHCR (2019b) statistics suggest that there are 1.4 million refugees and asylum seekers in Germany, of which most of them arrived after 2015. These statistics imply that Turkey and Germany constitute the countries with the maximum number of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe.

Having considered this refugee influx to Europe, and the fact that a new generation of Syrians are born and raised within the host country since then, this study seeks to trace the change, if any, that was incurred in the immigrant integration policies and, in a broader perspective, models of Turkey and Germany after the Syrian refugee crisis by the new legal adjustments. By taking integration models as the dependent variable and the Syrian refugee crisis as an independent variable as well as a critical juncture, this study aims to put forward the change in the state policies, under such a crisis and pressure, by basing the argument on the elements of each immigrant integration model and indicators of integration.

For this purpose, this study benefits from the internationally accepted integration policy index, MIPEX, and examine how the new adjustments in the legal documents situate the two countries in terms of integration indicators. It only examines the legal measures offered in the laws and regulations of the countries since it is very hard to capture the indicators of integration and hence the integration model from perceptions and attitudes while they can be more helpful to understand social and cultural integration. Actual implementations of the legal documents, on the other hand, are hard to gather, requires more time investment and most of the time requires direct communication with the relevant federal and local institutions as well as with the immigrants. Therefore, this study is limited only to legal measures.

After the empirical analysis, the results are interpreted to identify the closest integration model for the two countries, based on the model classification of Koopmans et al.'s (2005) study. The current models are compared with the older versions and the influence of the Syrian refugee crisis on the change is observed. Finally, this study tries to illustrate how the models change by putting forth the continuity or divergence in the immigrant integration policies of Turkey and Germany. The direction models take in both countries reflects the reaction they give to the refugee crisis. Hence, it is also possible to observe and compare the coping strategies of them in the face of the mentioned crisis.

1.1. Methodology

While national models or approaches of immigrant integration reflect the reality of the given country, they are not stable forever and one should acknowledge the fact that they can change under certain conditions. The Syrian crisis constitutes such a condition where the models or national philosophies of countries towards immigrants and immigrant integration have started to change. A cross-case study allows to see the effects of the Syrian Crisis on two different countries, in terms of their immigration policy and integration model history, with the exposure to the same migratory pressure coming from outside. In contrast to Germany, which had a model associated with it before, ethnic-exclusionism according to some researchers and assimilationism to others, Turkey had no model or detailed and standardized policy before. Hence, Germany was ahead of Turkey in integration measures, already before the Syrian Crisis. Yet, it still needed some reforms, as demonstrated by the transformation Germany has in its policies Turkey, on the other hand, built something from scratch in the last decade. This study helps to identify the endpoint of Turkey and Germany in terms of integration policies and models.

This is why this study employs most different case study design, in other words, Method of Agreement approach put forward by Mill. Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) helps to explain the similar outcome at the end for the cases compared despite the differences. To be more specific, Turkey and Germany have a common outcome, new immigration policies, due to the common independent variable, that is the Syrian Crisis and the refugee flow coming with it. The reforms they have both gone through, regardless of the differences in the scope and depth, demonstrate the similarity in the outcomes while they are actually two different countries with two different pasts and experiences when it comes to immigrants and immigrant integration.

Having said that, it should be noted that the efforts of Turkey to change the (non)existing immigration policies had also been shaped by the experiences of Turkish immigrants in Germany. The challenges on the way to integration and adaptation of those immigrants were discussed by many international scholars since then. To name a couple of studies on this

subject, Chapin (1996), Ehrkamp (2006), Mueller (2006), Avcı (2007) and many others addressed this issue from various perspectives. Given that knowledge is accumulated in science, it is only natural for the German practices of the past towards Turkish immigrants to be the stimulus, guideline and reference point, for better or worse, for future policies of Turkey towards its immigrants, including Syrian refugees of today. Therefore, this comparison is also meaningful due to the concurrent experiences.

Due to the nature of the research question, the timeline of this study is limited to 2011 onwards, which coincides with the beginning of the Syrian Crisis. The legal documents, namely laws and regulations passed after this year are examined to observe whether and to what extent they include legal measures corresponding to each element and indicator of integration. Legal integration of immigrants or, put differently, legal measures offered by the state are referred to as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the well-being and societal integration of the immigrants (Niessen and Huddleston 2009). They rather work as a starting point, a basis for future opportunities for the immigrants. While perceptions, attitudes and actual implementations of the laws can create better insights for social and cultural integration, the scope of this study is only limited to legal measures. One reason for not including perceptions and attitudes is that it would require tools like surveys and interviews conducted with both immigrants and native populations, in both of the countries chosen. It would also be hard to observe the difference caused by the Syrian Crisis since it would require survey and interview research conducted at certain intervals, particularly before and after 2011. As for actual implementations, it would also require an extensive research, maybe even an ethnographic one, in which one would need to communicate with the relevant federal and local institutions and immigrants, would need to invest more time and money, especially given that one of the cases is Germany.

This study uses Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) for integration indicators and measures, and Koopmans et al.'s (2005) fourfold classification of immigrant integration models, as discussed in the literature review in the next chapter. Koopmans et al.'s typology of models is chosen because it is widely used by the researchers working in the field of migration and it is still a valid theory, since no other extensive classification of models was

made following the study of Koopmans et al. Studies of Jacobs and Rea (2007), Duyvendak and Scholten (2011), Bertossi (2011), Ersanilli and Koopmans (2011), Finotelli and Michalowski (2012), Bonjour and Lettinga (2012), Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel (2012) and Goodman (2015) all refer to the typology proposed by Koopmans et al. (2005) when they discuss immigrant integration policies and models.

MIPEX, on the other hand, is chosen over any other index because it is the most comprehensive one both in terms of indicators and countries included as well as in terms of its reliable data collection method. Mainly due to this coverage, it is also the one most widely used by researchers, as Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki (2015) suggest. The index is a great tool to “assess, compare and improve integration policy” and also to see “what governments are doing to promote the integration of migrants” in its own words (MIPEX 2015a). Hence, it has been a good fit for the aim of this research.

This study combines MIPEX indicators and the integration models suggested by Koopmans et al. (2005) to place Turkey and Germany on the fourfold typology of immigrant integration models, based on the analysis of integration indicators in the laws and regulations passed after 2011. The main logic behind this action is that while Koopmans et al.’s study creates an ideal universe of models where countries fit into one model, in reality, countries can act differently or they can change over time. The values given by MIPEX for each indicator of integration for every piece of legal document in time-series cross-sectional analysis draw the most realistic picture. However, a theoretical framework is also needed to make sense of it.

A study conducted by Ruedin (2015) combines the two of them by matching the indicators taking place in MIPEX and ones associated with each model by Koopmans et al. (2005). It uses MIPEX data for the years of 2007 and 2010 for all of the countries MIPEX covers and situates the countries in the fourfold graph of integration models separated by two dimensions based on the ethnic-civic and monistic-pluralistic score each country has. The results show that there are examples to all four models in reality. Most of the countries seem to have accumulated in two models: assimilationism and multiculturalism, while there are fewer examples of the other two models.

Ruedin's study carries three important inferences: (1) it is possible to use MIPEX indicators to determine countries' integration models, (2) models are definitely not static; they even change in three years as Ruedin's analysis demonstrates, and (3) Germany has been located in the dividing line between segregationism and multiculturalism while Turkey has been located in the assimilationist sphere, at least for the years of 2007 and 2010. Their positioning seems to be compatible with the literature, except maybe Germany's closeness to multiculturalism. The results are enlightening and inspiring, especially for a better comprehension of the reality. Nevertheless, it falls short of explaining the influence of the Syrian Crisis on integration policies, since the analysis stops at 2010, just before the refugee crisis.

With reference to Ruedin's research, this study aims to combine the same data (MIPEX indicators and Koopmans et al.'s typology of models) and make a qualitative analysis for Turkey and Germany to spot the differences in policies caused by the Syrian Crisis and to place them in the closest model of integration with their current state. Hence, theory (ideal models) and practice (real models) will be combined, as was the case with Ruedin's study.

MIPEX scores, however, have only been collected until the year of 2014. Therefore, it is not possible to replicate the same analysis Ruedin did by using MIPEX scores, due to the objective of this study. What this study does, instead, is to make use of the indicators of integration and legal measures determined by MIPEX and to look for them in the legal documents qualitatively. The next chapter will discuss the literature more in detail, before proceeding with the empirical analysis.

2. UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

The fact that immigration is the reality of today's political, social and economic agenda for almost all countries deepens the need for integration and measures designed for this purpose. Nevertheless, coming up with a common definition for migrants and integration that is accepted worldwide has not been an easy job. Measuring integration –the success or failure of it– has even been harder. Yet, it is well acknowledged today that integration is a two-sided process, where it requires effort from both the host-society and the migrants and that it takes time (Council of Europe 1997; OECD/European Union 2015; Huddleston, Niessen and Tjaden 2013).

Migrants are commonly defined as foreign-born people (OECD/European Union 2015). When considered in terms of specific groups of people, workers residing in another country, family members uniting with their relatives in the host-country, asylum seekers, refugees, those under subsidiary/humanitarian protection, colonial migrants and, for some definitions, even students and seasonal workers can be under the category of migrants (Council of Europe 1997; Bjerre et al. 2015). For integration, while there is no uniform definition for it, the Council of Europe (1997) defines it as the process where immigrants incorporate into the host-society, generally through legal rights and opportunities. Yet, there is no specific way to achieve that incorporation. It may be achieved via assimilationist policies as well as multiculturalism.

When measuring immigrant integration, four particular dimensions are observed for the incorporation of the migrants: economic, social, cultural and political (Council of Europe 1997; Kaya 2014). Economic integration mainly refers to access to the labor market as well

as migrants' economic rights and opportunities compared to the natives (Council of Europe 1997; Goodman 2015). While what is meant by social and cultural integration is not too clear, it predominantly refers to attitudes, feelings, perceptions of natives and non-natives to one another and cultural adaptation and co-existence of both sides, both language-wise and otherwise which might include religion, habits, traditions and the like (OECD/European Union 2015; Council of Europe 1997). Lastly, political integration means rights and opportunities for political participation, in which political trust, adoption of democratic values, voting and participating in the elections, participating in organizations and institutions, membership in political parties take place (Coussey and Christensen 1997; Council of Europe 1997; Tilly 2004; Goodman 2015). Yet, as the Council of Europe (1997) report suggests, political integration is usually achieved with naturalization since states are often reluctant to give political rights to people who possess other countries' nationality and who might go back.

Hence, based on those four dimensions, integration is identified with equal access to the labor market, education, health, housing and other public services (De Azevedo and Sannino 1997). In relation to this identification, several indicators have been associated with integration to assess the degree of success. However, as mentioned by Goodman (2015), there are a lot of indices that listed indicators to measure citizenship and immigrant integration. Since they overlap with each other on many aspects and a standard, common measure is needed, the next part will focus on a few and will mainly focus on Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX).

2.1. Elements and Indicators of Integration

As already mentioned, what integration means and how it is measured has been tackled differently by different institutions in different times. Goodman (2015) categorizes and compares each index created for immigration and integration policies. Accordingly, there are four indices addressing integration along with citizenship policies (Legal Obstacles to

Integration [LOI], Migrant Integration Policy Index [MIPEX], Multicultural Policy [MCP] and Indicators for Citizenship Rights of Immigrants [ICRI]) while four indices cover immigration policies (Ruhs, Peters, IMPALA and IMPIC), one examines both immigration and citizenship policies (Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets) and three examine only citizenship policies (CPI, BNI, CITLAW). What is common and salient among them is that almost all of the immigrant integration indices focus on Europe, while only MIPEX considers non-European countries yet still not so inclusively. Non-European countries in MIPEX include USA, Australia, South Korea, Japan, Canada and New Zealand.

A comparison of the four integration indices demonstrates that they diverge from one another in terms of what indicator they include and what not, even though they overlap in some aspects. For instance, while MIPEX, MCP and ICRI cover antidiscrimination, LOI does not, and while family unification has been covered by all but MCP, only MIPEX mentions political participation, and cultural and religious rights are mentioned only by MCP. Access to the labor market takes part in the indices of LOI and MIPEX and in ICRI only in form of public service, whereas education rights only appear in MIPEX and MCP (Goodman 2015).

Hofinger (1997) describes what the Legal Obstacles to Integration (LOI) Index covers in the Council of Europe report in detail. Accordingly, this index comprises of legal integration indicators, rather than social or cultural ones. That means that it is law-based and looks at the legal positions of immigrants. It examines the legal indicators of residence, labor market, family reunion, naturalization and second generation. To exemplify, it explores (1) conditions to acquire residence permit, to prolong it or to lose it; (2) any restrictions for access to labor market; (3) conditions for family reunion; (4) conditions to acquire citizenship of the host country; and (5) legal positions of the second generation, who are non-natives born in the host country, yet have not naturalized yet. A value is given to countries based on the waiting periods, number of conditions to meet, legal constraints, number of choices and opportunities given to migrants, and the easiness or hardness to lose a status or title earned by migrants.

Similar to what Hofinger describes, Muus (1997) classifies the position of migrants in the inclusion-exclusion line based on two dimensions, of which one is legal-political and the

second one is socio-economic. In the legal-political dimension, right to residence, citizenship and voting rights take place while in the socio-economic one, access to labor market, health, housing, social security, vocational training and language training take place.

In the same Council of Europe report, Coussey and Christensen (1997) describe another set of indicators to measure integration of immigrants. They divide integration into six main indicators: access to labor market; housing and social services; education; participation in political processes and in decision-making; mortality, fertility and demographic changes; and judicial indicators. To measure access to labor market, they suggest indicators to look at such as employment and unemployment rates, proportion in high-level professions, in vocational training, in professional qualifications gained by immigrants, in self-employment and a comparison of both income and working hours of immigrants and natives. To measure housing and social services, whether immigrants are concentrated in the same neighborhood with natives or they have been segregated, quality of housing, social security benefits, child benefits, state pensions given are investigated. In terms of education, whether immigrant children take part in pre-school education, whether they continue with higher-education and whether adults receive language training are among the indicators.

When it comes to political processes, indicators include voting and participating in local and national elections, number of candidates and success rates, participation in institutions, organizations or boards, and any possible ethnic polarization. Proportion of immigrants with major illnesses, deaths and birth rates, and inter-ethnic marriages describe any demographic changes, which, the authors suggest, indicate an increase or decrease in social integration (Coussey and Christensen 1997). Last but not least, criminal data, information on arrest, conviction and decisions of acquittal are taken as indicators for social inclusion or exclusion and for discriminatory attitudes.

Apart from the Council of Europe report, another well-known index is called *Zaragoza indicators*, which were introduced by the European Union in 2010 to observe and evaluate the outcomes of the immigrant integration policies (OECD/European Union 2015). These indicators were mostly oriented at integrating third country nationals. Five main elements (employment, education, social inclusion, active citizenship and welcoming society) were

identified under *Zaragoza indicators*, and each element was given its own indicators (Huddleston, Niessen and Tjaden 2013). Under the heading *employment*, employment and unemployment rate, activity rate, self-employment and over-qualification take place. Under *education*, highest educational attainment, tertiary attainment, early school leaving, low-achievers and language skills of non-natives take place. At-risk-of-poverty and social exclusion, income, self-reported health status and property ownership constitute indicators for *social inclusion*. In the element of *active citizenship*, indicators comprise of naturalization rate, share of long-term residence, share of elected representatives and voter turnout. Finally, to measure *welcoming society*, perceived experience of discrimination, trust in public institutions and sense of belonging are observed as indicators, as the European Commission report suggests.

Finally, MIPEX (2015a) identifies eight elements where integration policies are constructed: labor market mobility, education, political participation, access to nationality, family reunion, health, permanent residence, and anti-discrimination. *Labor market mobility* in itself has four sub-dimensions as indicators: access to labor market, access to general support, targeted support and workers' rights. MIPEX highlights the fact that not all migrants have equal access to the labor market. For instance, family members uniting with their relatives may have a harder time to find a job, as do humanitarian migrants (OECD/European Union 2015). As MIPEX puts forward, greater access to labor market and public sector might be the key to better integration.

The Index itself claims that most of the migrants now have access to public employment offices, higher education and vocational training; yet, OECD/European Union (2015) report as well as European Commission report (Huddleston, Niessen and Tjaden 2013) assert that one of the biggest problems awaiting immigrants with high-level education are over-qualification and unemployment, relatively high compared to those with lower-education. This problem is due to non-recognition of skills and qualifications gained abroad. MIPEX (2015a) states that only a handful of countries have programmes to recognize those skills and qualifications. It also talks about the need for targeted support for specific groups in the immigrant societies, namely those with very low level educations, youth, women or those

who were trained abroad. Measures proposed for this dimension include work-related trainings and bridging or work placement programmes. The last dimension of labor market mobility, as stated by MIPEX, includes equal working conditions and access to unions for both native and non-native workers. In this regard, non-inclusion or partial inclusion in the social security system becomes one of the problems on the way to integration, in particular in newly emerging immigration countries as well as in Anglo-Saxon countries (MIPEX 2015a).

The second element, *education*, has again four sub-dimensions: Access, targeting needs, new opportunities and intercultural education. MIPEX (2015a) calls education as “the greatest weakness in integration policies” that can be applied to the majority of the countries, since there is very little effort to assess the knowledge of newly migrated children, to encourage access and attendance to pre-primary, vocational and higher education. There is also little effort to adapt resources to the needs of the migrant children, their teachers or their parents. Support is merely beyond language classes for most of the countries. Communication problems and not very well equipped teachers in terms of preparation and diversity are other obstacles for educational integration. Lastly, given that schools are also a medium of cultural integration through acknowledgement, respect and co-existence of differences, they lag behind in teaching how to live together effectively. In line with both MIPEX and Zaragoza indicators, Huddleston, Niessen and Tjaden (2013) offer measures in the European Commission report they prepared that can increase integration through education and that can reduce socio-economic differences between native and non-native children. Those measures include increasing hours spent at school; improving the quality of teaching; providing support to children before, during and after entering higher education; giving education in smaller classroom and involving parents in children’s education.

The third element, *political participation*, includes sub-dimensions such as electoral rights, political liberties, consultative bodies and implementation policies. This element also has a weak place in integration efforts as both MIPEX (2015a) and Council of Europe (1997) reports mention. The logic behind this element is to involve the migrant in democratic life, to make non-natives participate in or even lead the political decisions that also affect them.

Therefore, provision of voting rights locally, regionally and nationally, basic political liberties (e.g. taking part in a political party or initiating an association), presence of local consultative bodies and funding opportunities for immigrant organizations are indicators of good political integration whereas restrictions of such rights, liberties and opportunities imply inadequate or exclusionist integration policies.

Policies promoting *access to nationality* revolve around four sub-dimensions: eligibility (number of years spent in the country or immediate right to citizenship upon the birth of a child in the given country), conditions (such as language, citizenship/integration tests or having a job/income level) to meet, security of status, or in other words how secure the citizenship right is after meeting all conditions, and possibility of dual nationality (MIPEX 2015a). Given the positive correlation between naturalization and social and political participation as well as better economic outcomes (OECD 2011; Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki 2015), one might say that the more open naturalization policies become, the more inclusive and successful integration becomes for the immigrants.

Similar to the above element, *permanent residence* is another important element in the integration process of immigrants. Accordingly, eligibility (e.g. number of years to spent in the country for being entitled to the right), conditions (language requirements, fees and other requirements), security of status (when to get or lose permanent residence) and rights associated (social and economic rights enjoyed as other nationals, especially in employment, education and living conditions) are identified as sub-dimensions of permanent residence as an integration policy area. Restriction or openness of such indicators and rights imply the perceptions of the host-society towards integration.

Family reunion constitutes the sixth element in MIPEX, in which almost the same dimensions with access to nationality and permanent residence take place: eligibility, conditions (basic legal income, housing, application fee and the like), security of status (possibility of rejection despite meeting all conditions, right to review and the like) and rights associated (equal rights with the sponsor, such as right to work or social benefits like training, social security, housing). While MIPEX states that most of the countries provide such rights

to family members, some countries, particularly Central European ones have quite restrictive policies. Therefore, the range of rights on family reunion may determine and affect the mode of immigrant integration.

Health is one other element of integration in the Migration Integration Policy Index, where entitlements, access policies, responsive services and mechanisms for change take place as sub-dimensions. According to MIPEX (2015a), migrants may not enjoy their rights to health system even though they are legally given, due to administrative procedures. Also, rules may differ for asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, which may limit the right or access to health care. Adaptation of the health services to the specific needs of migrants, language support, information provision and preparation of the staff according to the needs of the migrants are among the indicators of integration for this element.

Anti-discrimination is the last element of immigrant integration mentioned by MIPEX (2015a), in which definitions of discrimination, fields of application (minimum versus maximum field of application of discrimination laws), enforcement mechanisms and equality policies exist as sub-dimensions. Yet, as implied by the Index, it is not enough to have laws, but those laws should also be applied, with the help of equality bodies, NGOs and courts.

A summary of all the indicators and legal measures for immigrant integration can be found in Table 2.1 below. Accordingly, elements of integration have been taken and used directly from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Indicators and legal measures have been extracted from four different sources, MIPEX in particular. In the table, indicators refer to the gauges of the particular elements or in other words how to understand the end result of that particular policy (e.g. naturalization rates to measure access to nationality policies of a given country). Legal measures, on the other hand, refer to specific measures or initiatives that are designed to assess legal integration, as proposed in laws, regulations, programmes ran by the government and the like. The third chapter will search for presence or absence of all those measures in the legal documents to observe any change in the models of immigrant integration in Turkey and Germany, by taking Syrian crisis as a critical juncture. Yet, before

proceeding with the analysis, the next part will discuss models of immigrant integration in general, main characteristics of each model and how to identify a model.

Table 2.1. Indicators and Measures of Integration

Dimensions of Integration	Elements	Integration Indicators	Legal Measures
<i>Economic Integration</i>	Access to labor market	(1) Employment/unemployment rates (2) Equal opportunities in the labor market (3) Public sector employment (4) Access to public employment offices, higher education and vocational training (5) Targeted support for specific groups (6) (Equal) working conditions and access to unions, full access to social security system (7) Incidence of self-employment	(1) Employment protection legislation (2) Procedures to recognize skills and foreign qualifications - equivalence courses (3) Targeted work-related trainings (4) Bridging/work placement programmes (5) Affirmative action programmes towards promotion of migrant employment in the public and private sector
<i>Social and Cultural Integration</i>	Health	(1) Number of immigrant people reporting good health status (2) Number of immigrant people who report unmet medical needs (3) Number of immigrant people who report not to have seen a doctor	(1) Regulation on equal access to health care (2) Presence of cultural mediators or trained patient navigators (3) Provision of information about entitlements and the use of health services (4) Language support
	Permanent residence	(1) Share of long-term and permanent residence	(1) Number of years to spent/waiting periods for obtaining and prolonging residence permit (2) Conditions (language requirements, fees and other requirements) (3) Security of status (when to get or lose residence) (4) Rights associated (social and economic rights)
	Education	(1) Participation in pre-school education, higher education and vocational training (2) Early school leaving (3) Language skills of immigrants	(1) Assessment of prior knowledge (2) Support to access pre-primary, vocational and higher education (3) Programmes addressing specific needs of migrant students, their teachers and parents, programmes involving parents (4) Language and cultural learning for both migrants and natives
	Anti-discrimination	(1) Share of immigrants who feel to have been discriminated against	(1) Anti-discrimination legislation/laws (2) Equality policies (3) Discrimination awareness trainings

	Family reunion	(1) Share of foreign-born population who migrated due to family unification reasons	(1) Regulation on eligibility (2) Conditions (basic legal income, housing, application fee etc.) (3) Security of status (when to get or lose the right to family reunion) (4) Rights associated (equal rights with the sponsor)
Political Integration	Political Participation	(1) Voting rights in local and national elections - voter turnout (2) Political liberties (participation in institutions, organizations or boards) (3) Number of candidates and success rates (4) Ethnic polarization	(1) Regulation on political rights (2) Consultation bodies (3) Funding opportunities for immigrant organizations
	Access to nationality	(1) Naturalization rates	(1) Number of years to spent/waiting periods for obtaining nationality (2) Conditions (language requirements, citizenship/integration tests etc.) (3) Security of status (when to get or lose citizenship) (4) Dual citizenship right

Note: Information is extracted from MIPEX (2015a); Huddleston, Niessen and Tjaden (2013); OECD/European Union (2015); and Koopmans et al. (2005).

2.2. Models of Immigrant Integration

The functionality of models comes from their simplicity. While reality is often too complex, models help simplifying this complexity (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011) and offer a map. Their existence lies in the “need to systemize empirical reality” (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 232) and the need to “identify differences among countries” (Bertossi 2011, 1561; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012, 237). They are assumed to preserve their traits and existence in the long-term, to be stable since the context leading to the formation of a model is not expected to change frequently or without an internal or external shock (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011).

Models of immigrant integration are, by and large, defined as “different forms of national solidarity and citizenship” (Loch 2014, 624) while the term is also defined as “politics of

citizenship” (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 233), “conceptions of nationhood, polity and belonging” (Bonjour and Lettinga 2012, 261), “public philosophies” (Schain 2010, 206; Bertossi 2011, 1562) and “rights and constitutional guarantees accorded to migrants” (Jackson and Parkes 2008, 44). Differences in the policies of countries towards immigrants were found to be due to different normative value systems of each country (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). As referred by Bonjour and Lettinga (2012), these conceptions and systems can be traced back to the laws and institutions of a given country.


A national model is generally constructed based on policy outputs (legal regulations, laws, decisions) and then is used to explain policy outcomes (rates, numbers and the like suggesting the implications of a particular policy). However, when the model is used to explain the outcomes, it is transformed from being a model to being the reality (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011; Bonjour and Lettinga 2012). That is especially a risk when models start to change the understanding and beliefs of a society on policies and immigrants and when they are blamed for the success or failure of policies. One way to overcome such a risk is through the acceptance of the possibility of change, awareness that contextual shifts can happen and through taking national models of immigrant integration as an object of analysis, or in other words as dependent variables, rather than taking them as granted (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012).

Before moving on to the analysis of policies, the rest of this sub-section will introduce different national models of integration and then will continue with the historical analysis of the immigrant integration models of Turkey and Germany up until the Syrian crisis. The literature suggests three main models: republicanism/assimilationism, multiculturalism /pluralism and ethnic-differentialism (Brubaker 1992; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012; Bertossi 2011; Duyvendak and Scholten 2011; Loch 2014).

Yet Koopmans et al. (2005) suggest that there is a flaw in the classification of the models since there are two axes separating one model from the other: one defines the degree of individual access to citizenship (ethnic at one end and civic-territorial at the other end) and the other defines the cultural differences and group rights obtained by citizenship (cultural

monism at one end and cultural pluralism at the other end). This typology leaves the immigrant integration literature with four distinct models: assimilationism, universalism, multiculturalism and segregationism. How they are situated in the axes mentioned is shown in the figure below, with countries falling under each category.

Figure 2.1. Four-Fold Typology of the Immigrant Integration Models



Universalism, also called as Republicanism in the literature, has been largely identified with the philosophy of France, where perception to nationhood and citizenship revolves around a state-based and assimilationist understanding (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012; Koopmans et al. 2015). A *universalistic public philosophy*, in which the French notion of *laïcité* dominates, is reflected in the social and political spheres of life (Bertossi 2011). That philosophy finds itself a room in the way in which public and private spheres and state and the church are separated as well as how the French expects all their population to adopt Republican values (Jackson and Parkes 2008; Bertossi 2011). That understanding also brings a color-blind approach to anything related to race and ethnicity, which means that no specific

group can gain particular rights or privileges in the public sphere and policy (Bloemraad 2007; Schain 2010; Bertossi 2011).

The model of the French takes its roots from the notion of liberalism. In this model, civic citizenship comes into prominence, where residents' individual identities take precedence over their group identities, especially in their relationship with the state and where all citizens are equal before the law (Bloemraad 2007). Yet, as mentioned by Bloemraad, blindness to differences, particularly to religious and ethnic ones, causes an assimilationist take. Assimilation in the French model occurs through the adoption of cultural values and social behavior patterns of the natives by the immigrant communities (Tribalat 1997; Koopmans et al. 2005).

An assimilationist and republican manifestation of the French model can be illustrated with its stand towards veiled Muslim women and debate on the ban of burqa in public institutions (Bertossi 2011; Bonjour and Lettinga 2012). The reason for this stance lies with the French government's efforts to provide a neutral, equal and free public sphere. The debate on the use of headscarf in schools is due to the perception of schools as places where shared universal values can be adopted and due to the state committing itself as the protector of individual rights (Bonjour and Lettinga 2012). In this regard, the state tries to prevent any possible social pressure towards women to cover their heads. This republican notion of citizenship can also be found in the civic integration policies of France, where it requires participation in the courses (predominantly focusing on language and Republican values) but not passing an exam, as explicated by Bonjour and Lettinga (2012).

Multiculturalism has for long been identified with the policies of the Netherlands, Britain and Sweden. One of the most prominent characteristics of the multiculturalist approach lies in the acknowledgement of minorities, be it ethnic or racial, and the presence of anti-discrimination laws, as the British case illustrates (Loch 2014). Schain (2010) states that the multicultural immigration policies in Britain started with a policy change regulating race relations in 1965, where it formulated an antidiscrimination policy. Yet, the introduction of a civic integration program, in which a citizenship test and a ceremony were necessitated for

naturalization as of 2005, can be interpreted as a step back from multiculturalism even though the dominant policy for immigrant integration has still been acknowledged as multiculturalism (Schain 2010).

Contrary to the French republican model, differences are cherished in the multicultural understanding, where they are seen as motives behind ethnic-based mobilizations, and the objective of the integration policies is not to create a common citizenship, but to foster group-based identities (Koopmans et al. 2005; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). The assumption behind this notion is that the successful incorporation of the non-natives to society is only possible through providing freedom to cultural, religious and ethnic groups (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011). In this regard, concepts of *equal opportunity*, *cultural diversity* and *mutual tolerance* are highlighted in a multicultural immigrant integration model (Schain 2010).

In Netherlands, integration of immigrants has started to be discussed in 1970s when the Dutch government understood that most of the migrant workers of the time preferred to stay instead of going back to their country (Bertossi 2011; Duyvendak and Scholten 2011). The first policy which was oriented towards regulating immigrants' incorporation to the society was passed in the 1980s, with the name 'Ethnic Minorities Policy'. The composition of this policy was, in Bertossi's (2011) words, "close to the idea of Dutch multiculturalism" as suggested by the literature. The underlying effort behind this policy was embedded in the idea that one would need to advocate socio-cultural liberation of identities in order to succeed in the socio-economic integration of immigrants (Bertossi 2011; Duyvendak and Scholten 2011). For instance, liberty to wear headscarf in schools in the Netherlands is understood as the necessity for cultural pluralism and respect for familial values and decisions (Bonjour and Lettinga 2012).

This inclination for cultural pluralism in Dutch society has its roots in the pillarization system that was present between the 1920s and the 1960s, in which the society was divided based on particular religious or socio-cultural pillars (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). Even though pillarization is no longer applicable in today's Dutch society, its immigrant integration policies and philosophy are believed to inherit this practice and

reflect it in the institutional settings (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011). Yet, this multiculturalism has not lasted long. Starting with the 1990s and especially after the millennium, the national approach of the Netherlands towards immigrants has adopted more assimilationist components, which caused a debate on the compatibility and the usability of the models in general (Ibid.).

Besides the British and Dutch examples, Sweden, the U.S. and Canada constitute other examples of multicultural policies on immigrant integration. The Swedish model revolves around a Scandinavian understanding of universal welfare state (Loch 2014) while the American multiculturalism is based on a more *laissez-faire* policy and ethno-racial diversity and Canada is shaped around group-based rights and identities (Bloemraad 2007). A common theme for all former and current multicultural models of integration is cultural pluralism and racial, ethnic and religious diversity, as was mentioned as part of the characteristics of multiculturalism in Schain (2010).

One way to measure the degree of multiculturalism is to examine policies to see whether they include: (1) formal affirmation of multiculturalism in the constitution or the parliament, (2) multicultural school curriculum, (3) ethnic representation in the media or sensitivity, (4) dress code exemptions for ethnic or religious minorities, (5) dual citizenship, (6) state funding for minority activities, (7) funding for bilingual or mother-tongue language education, and (8) affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups (Koopmans et al. 2005; Banting et al. 2006; Bloemraad 2007; Goodman 2015).

In the three-fold typology of immigrant integration models, the last type is ethnic-differentialism, which is also called as ethno-nationalism (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012) or ethnic-exclusionism (Loch 2014; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012). This model includes an exclusive understanding of ethnic citizenship (Jackson and Parkes 2008) and has been traditionally identified with the national philosophy of Germany, at least until the late-1990s. Austria, Switzerland and Israel constitute other cases in the literature that fits this type of public philosophy (Koopmans et al. 2005).

In the four-fold typology of Koopmans et al. (2005), the closest to this philosophy is referred to as segregationism. In this specific model, migrants who are ethno-culturally different from most of the host society are excluded from the political community, therefore also from political integration. It, however, is not an assimilationist policy, which desires cultural conformity. It does not impose the migrants to give up their cultures. In Koopman et. al (2005, 72)'s words, it is also characterized by “unequal individual citizenship rights on the basis of ethnicity, race or religion”.

The historical examples of segregationist policies include *guest worker* models or approaches, as was the case in Germany (Koopmans et al. 2005; Loch 2014), where political rights as well as any expectation for cultural assimilation were absent. Today, there may not be any guest worker model left, but its traces are carried out in the policies towards asylum seekers and refugees in many European countries, as implied by Koopmans et al. The New Right ideologies of today are other ways in which segregationist notions take place, as seen in the philosophy of the extreme right parties of Europe, such as those in France, Germany or the Netherlands.

Indicators and legal measures of integration included by both MIPEX (2015a) and Koopmans et al. (2005) coincide with each other at certain points. For the individual access to citizenship dimension, three elements of integration taken from MIPEX data are found to be expressed in Koopmans et al.'s study: anti-discrimination, political participation and access to nationality. For the element of anti-discrimination, both sources refer to anti-discrimination laws or legislations as an indicator. In accordance with Koopmans et al.'s (2005) study, absence or insufficient anti-discrimination laws are associated with an ethnic-oriented citizenship. Existence of such laws is most visible in multiculturalist countries, followed by universalist ones. However, they do not exist in segregationist countries. The element of political participation finds a common ground for the indicators of voting/electoral rights and consultation/advisory bodies. Koopmans et al. (2005) refer to advisory bodies as a type of ‘special representation’ of cultural minorities, therefore link them to the multiculturalist model.

The last element under individual access to citizenship dimension includes access to nationality, where both MIPEX and Koopmans et al. address (i) number of years of residence to acquire citizenship, (ii) dual nationality, and (iii) conditions or cultural requirements for obtaining nationality, such as language requirement or the condition to be free of welfare or social security dependence. Having a high minimum years of residence to fulfill to get the right of citizenship means high barriers to naturalization, which can be read as reluctance towards acceptance of foreigners. Numerous cultural requirements in addition to basic language requirement, on the other hand, lead to an assimilationist understanding.

For the cultural differences and group rights dimension, Koopmans et al. (2005) define three elements of integration that can also be found in MIPEX: access to labor market, permanent residence and education. Under access to labor market, it is only possible to talk about targeted support in the form of affirmative action programs as an indicator shared by both sources. According to Koopmans et al. (2005), affirmative action programs have the purpose of both creating equal opportunities and representation of cultural diversity. Mainly because of this purpose, they imply multiculturalist models.

For the element of permanent residence, MIPEX and Koopmans et al. only have one common indicator: security of status, or to be more specific, the possibility of expulsion of foreigners. If the conditions for this are harsh and if there is a visible difference between natives and foreigners when it comes to the possibility of expulsion, then one can mention reluctance of the country towards naturalizing the foreigners. Thus, such conditions can be associated with segregationism.

The last element is education, where Koopmans et al. (2005) focus on the possibility of state recognition and funding of Islamic schools, religious classes in state schools and permission for teachers with hijab. What is highlighted with these indicators is an emphasis and respect for cultural differences in the education system. Therefore, these indicators can be examined under appreciation of cultural diversity and intercultural education, leading to a multiculturalist model in the case of their presence.

Hence, according to Koopmans et al.'s (2005) study, there are a couple of elements one can look for to determine models or approaches to immigrants. An understanding of ethnic-based nationhood can be associated with (1) harsh naturalization conditions with high barriers, (2) special regulations for those migrants who are considered as co-ethnics, (3) easier conditions on the cancellation of permanent residence, (4) absence of voting rights, and (5) absence of or insufficient anti-discrimination rights.

When it comes to cultural differences, models are distinguished from one another according to (i) whether they are against poly-ethnic rights (assimilationists), support them (multiculturalists) or are neutral, or in other words, whether they have states that give no privileges, rights or exemptions to any ethnic or religious group (universalists); (ii) whether they have civic integration policies such as language requirements or tests for knowledge on the culture of the host society (assimilationists), as the Swiss and French examples illustrate; (iii) whether they allow religious practices such as recognition of religious schools, religious media programs or allowing the use of headscarf in the schools (multiculturalism); and (iv) whether they have any affirmative action in the labor market, in other words, whether the state promotes migrant employees in the public as well as the private sector (multiculturalism).

In light of all the differences between models and countries, Koopmans et al. (2005) classify Switzerland and Germany as assimilationist countries while Germany proves to be a hard case to identify since it also carries some multiculturalist characteristics as well as ethnic identity. France falls under the universalistic understanding of citizenship and immigrant integration, with elements of republicanism and assimilationism. Finally, Britain and the Netherlands constitute multiculturalist countries. The cell for segregationism stays empty since they think no country represents such a policy. The next section will discuss German and Turkish immigrant integration models in the context of the typologies presented in the literature.

2.3. Germany and Turkey in Integrating Immigrants

National models of immigrant integration or citizenship have been largely associated with European countries since they were developed in Europe. (Loch 2014). This may be due to the European understanding of nationhood, ethnicity and cultural homogeneity or diversity as well as due to the fact that Europe became a place of attraction for immigrants rather unintentionally and involuntarily, particularly from the point of majority of the host society and political elites (Koopmans et al. 2005). Germany is a case in point where the official declarations in 1990s were stating that Germany was not an immigration country while it had quite a flow of immigrants at the time (Ibid.).

As stated in the former chapter, there are clear differences between each model. Yet, there are also similarities. Models are not constant, which means that they can change in time, as shown in Koopmans et al.'s (2005) study for five European countries. For Germany, there is some ambiguity in the literature with respect to where it currently stands. Koopmans et al.'s (2005) study places Germany on the assimilationist axis rather than the segregationist one while others identify it as an ethno-nationalist/ethnic-exclusionist model, and not as an assimilationist one (Jackson and Parkes 2008; Duyvendak and Scholten 2011; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012; Loch 2014). Only Ager and Strang's (2008) article supports Koopmans et al. in its classification due to the affiliation that ethno-cultural political exclusion has with assimilation. When Germany's policy transformation since the 1990s and current ambiguous stance in terms of its approach to immigrants and immigrant integration are taken into account, it constitutes an interesting case study.

Turkey, on the other hand, draws attention since it had not established an immigration and integration policy until very recently, mainly due to not being considered as an immigration country. It can be argued that the Syrian crisis has disturbed the balance of the policies of both countries, as a result of the refugees flowing into Europe, and Turkey and Germany being two countries which hosted the biggest numbers of Syrian refugees in Europe.

In light of this research interest, the next sub-sections will focus on the national models of immigrant integration in Germany and Turkey, any change of direction they have until 2011, and the challenges faced following the Syrian crisis, along with the new initiatives introduced by the two states. Then, the next chapter will continue with the analysis of the post-2011 legal regulations aimed at managing the refugee crisis as well as integrating newcomers.

2.3.1. German National Model of Integration

As mentioned in the former chapter, Germany is generally acknowledged as a country with an ethno-cultural national identity (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012), which means that until very recently, obtainment of citizenship depended on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, in other words on the right of blood as well as a shared understanding and bond of culture and language (Ager and Strang 2008; Duyvendak and Scholten 2011; Kaya and Kayaoğlu 2012; Choquet 2017). Therefore, citizenship was exclusive, along with the following rights (Goodman 2010). Among the migrants, only ethnic Germans could have access to citizenship without any restriction, even if their parents had left Germany long ago and they did not have citizenship (Koopmans et al. 2005).

Immigration policies of Germany as a guest-worker country starting from the 1960s till the end of the 1990s resulted in its labelling as exclusionist/segregationist and anti-immigrant. Germany was not defining itself as an immigration country for years and was even rejecting the possibility of it by affirming that “West Germany was (is) a country in which foreigners reside for varying lengths of time before they decide on their own accord to return to their home country” (Katzenstein 1987, 239–240). Nonetheless, the immigration flow into the country had begun after World War II. With the labor shortage unfolding in the country, Germany resorted to bilateral agreements with Italy first, then with Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia (Martin 2002; Borkert and Bosswick 2007).

One can look at two different groups of people in order to understand the approach of German policies at the time: one towards ethnic Germans and the other towards guest-workers. Ethnic

Germans immigrating to Germany following the war were legally acknowledged as Germans while they encountered problems in the social sphere, mostly regarding the tolerance and hospitality level of the society, leading to demonstrations of hostility. Despite such problems, they managed to integrate well into the society, particularly because of the citizenship rights they exercised (Borkert and Bosswick 2007).

Guest-workers were a totally different story. On the one hand, they were integrated into the social security system rather successfully. On the other hand, though, all doors to migration have been shut down in 1973, except one: family reunification. The effects of the Oil Crisis were also felt in migration policies, leading to the formation of policies promoting voluntary return to the home-country and consisting of defensive and restrictive measures (Martin 2002; Borkert and Bosswick 2007; Ellermann 2015). The second half of the 1980s saw controversies over asylum seekers, xenophobic attacks and an indecisiveness in matters of migration while there was also an effort to integrate the ones staying in the country.

The 1990s constituted yet another external shock, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Germany became a host to many refugees coming from Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union states. Starting with 1990, immigrants utilizing family reunion right gained legal status and foreigners who had obtained permanent residency before got the right to return to Germany. Nevertheless, restrictive nature of the immigration and integration policies continued throughout the '90s, particularly due to the (i) conditions for naturalization, requiring at least fifteen years of residence; (ii) debates on asylum; and (iii) restriction of the quota for asylum applications, which paved the way to illegal immigration. New adjustments such as visa requirement for unaccompanied children from several emigration countries and residence permit application requirement for children who were already living in the country also led to the belief that German policies were still carrying restrictive characteristics (Borkert and Bosswick 2007).

In 2000, this principle of *jus sanguinis* was officially replaced by the principle of *jus soli*, namely rights acquired based on the territorial claims, which gave a chance for newborn children to become a German citizen if they were born in German lands and if one of their

parents had been living in Germany for at least eight years (Koopmans et al. 2005; Kaya and Kayaoğlu 2012). If a migrant came to Germany at a later age, he or she still had the possibility to acquire citizenship if one resided in the country for at least eight years and took a test for citizenship (Kaya and Kayaoğlu 2012; Choquet 2017). As Kaya and Kayaoğlu highlight (2012), this change caused an increase in the number of naturalized migrants. Also, with the new legislation, the requirement for “identification with German culture” to naturalize has been replaced with language requirements (Koopmans et al. 2005). It was also observed that Germany started giving more cultural rights to Muslims than before (Ibid.).

When compared with the old immigration policy of Germany, in which the intention was not to include but rather to exclude immigrants, and where the expectation was for them to return to their country, this new principle was seen as progress towards more inclusive and integrationist policies. Koopmans et al. (2005) describe a transformation from a point similar to that of France and Switzerland to a point which adopts some assimilationist and multiculturalist elements. Yet, there is also this perception that the civic requirements that Germany expects from migrants make it almost as exclusive as before. The attitude test (Gesinnungstest), for instance, introduced by Baden-Württemberg in 2006 and later turned into a national test in 2007, can be interpreted as a policy with a restrictive aim towards migrants coming from Muslim countries, due to the nature of questions which try to assess whether immigrants have a good grasp of civic values by asking their opinion about sensitive subjects such as terrorism, religious freedom or domestic violence (Goodman 2010; Kaya and Kayaoğlu 2012).

Therefore, the segregationist attitude of German integration policies in between the 1960s and the 1990s has changed over time towards a more inclusive line. Hence the national model of immigrant integration of 21st century Germany may not be exclusive as before the 2000s; yet, it still carries the traces of exclusionist policies and the security discourse which emerged in the last two decades, especially when it comes to socio-cultural and political integration.

2.3.2. Turkish National Model of Integration

Turkey, unlike Germany, has not been identified with a specific immigrant integration model in the literature. Yet, it is possible to categorize the Turkish approach historically through the interpretation of attitudes, perceptions and regulations towards immigrants. Despite its Ottoman heritage where different cultures and religions were living together, the Turkish Republic defined a citizenship based on *Turkishness*, a “homogenous” unit from an “ethno-nationalist” perspective (Elitok 2013a; Elitok 2018; Kaya 2014; Memişoğlu and Ilgit 2017; Kirişçi 2014). For Kaiser and Kaya (2015), it could be summarized with three characteristics: being Sunni, being Muslim and being a Turk. For immigrants, that meant they could be assimilated into society only if they were Muslims but originally Turks or they were not Turks but Sunnis. If they did not belong to any of those ethnic or religious classifications, that meant they would be excluded (Ibid., 96; İçduygu and Aksel 2013). As a matter of fact, Kaya (2014) states that the roots of this exclusive understanding can be traced back to the millet system of the Ottoman Empire and the tolerance discourse directed towards different societies.

From a legal perspective, until recently there were three major documents regulating migration in Turkish Republican history. The first one was the Law on Settlement of 1934, in which the importance of belonging to a “Turkish descent and culture” was highlighted. The second was the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, which Turkey signed with a geographic limitation, which meant that only people from European countries could be granted the status of refugees (Kaiser and Kaya 2015; Memisoglu and Ilgit 2017; Elitok 2018; İçduygu and Aksel 2013; Kale et al. 2018). The third one was the Regulation on Asylum in 1994, which was mainly driven by the new flow of migrants since the 1980s, who were not from Turkish descent. Only in the 2000nds, due to Europeanization, globalization, the AKP experience and some particular global crises, there were some changes and new initiatives taken towards the acceptance and integration of immigrants (İçduygu and Aksel 2013; Kaiser and Kaya 2015).

Another way of looking at the immigration policies of Turkey is through real life examples. Refugee flow from Bulgaria in 1989 constitute such an example when hundreds of thousands

of Pomaks and Turks fled to Turkey. Since they were of Muslim and Turkish descent, the Turkish government of the time let them in and even paved the way for them to acquire citizenship (Kirişçi 2014; Elitok 2018). Yet, when Kurds started to flow into Turkey in 1991, running away from the terror created by Saddam Hussein, Turkey referred to the Geneva Convention it signed and excluded them from the refugee status. Most of the Kurds ended up returning to their country (Kirişçi 2014; Elitok 2018). These examples and the legal framework until the 2000nds, make it is possible to interpret Turkish migration policy and integration efforts as most similar to exclusionist and assimilationist models.

2.3.3. Challenges and New Initiatives After 2011

2.3.3.1. The German Experience

Degler and Liebig (2017) suggest that the Syrian crisis caused the biggest flow of migrants Germany ever experienced following World War II, with 1.2 million people seeking asylum in Germany in two years. In terms of challenges, lack of German language skills, vocational skills, different work cultures and ambiguity regarding their future, whether they will continue to stay or not, are listed as the major problems encountered by the employers in the labor market (Rietig 2016; Desiderio 2016; Degler and Liebig 2017). Gender gap was also mentioned since women were having a harder time to integrate into the labor market. Another issue was the doubtfulness on their claimed skills and qualifications, given that many of the asylum seekers and refugees did not have their documents with them. Over-qualification was stated as a problem in the German context, as well.

On top of those problems, Rietig (2016) addresses some others, such as the coordination problems in governance with reference to integration and coordination problems in deliverance of language and vocational education training (VET) courses, in that the demand is high, number of teachers are insufficient and access to VET is not easy. Hence, it is possible to say that most of the challenges that Germany faces are related with coordination problems and deficiencies in an existing system. However, it should also be kept in mind that the

literature on Germany is generally focused on labor market integration, since the legal measures predominantly address economic integration, leaving areas on socio-cultural and political integration mostly uncovered.

As the OECD report on the integration of Syrian refugees to German labor market indicates (Degler and Liebig 2017), unlike the Turkish system, there was already an established integration system in Germany, with all its good and bad. The Syrian refugee crisis put forward the flaws in the German system and led to some changes for the improvement of immigration policies. One of the most important changes was the introduction of the first Integration Law in 2016, in which the preference test was suspended, a new rule facilitating getting residence permit named 3+2 (3 years plus 2 more years of residence) was introduced for asylum seekers with vocational training; a chance to get permanent residency for those with a job and some level of German was given; and 100.000 jobs for asylum seekers with few or no skills was promised (Rietig 2016; Degler and Liebig 2017; Okyay 2017). Yet, one drawback of the new integration law, as stated by the OECD report is that it requires refugees to stay in the designated regions, unless they find a job or start an education somewhere else (Degler and Liebig 2017).

Other initiatives included (i) shortening of the waiting period for asylum seekers to have access to the labor market from nine to three months; (ii) the onset of introduction courses starting with late 2015, consisting of language instruction and civic orientation to asylum seekers from high recognition rates; and (iii) pilot programs that provide pre-departure training and credential recognition by the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) for highly educated migrants (Desiderio 2016; Rietig 2016; Degler and Liebig 2017). There were also initiatives for initial assessments of the asylum seekers in the reception centers, one organized at the federal level, known as Early Intervention Program and some organized at the state level, like the personalized introductory program in 2015 by the Baden-Württemberg Integration Ministry, which comprised of language classes with a mix of vocational training, bridging courses, apprenticeships and mentoring (Desiderio 2016; Rietig 2016; Okyay 2017).

In addition, there were programs for skills assessment, starting with the Recognition Act in 2012. A joint initiative by the Chambers of Industry and Trade (IHK and HWK) and the Federal Institute for Vocational and Professional Education (BIBB) in 2015 attempted to recognize the qualifications or skills of refugees who did not have enough documents to prove it. Yet it was in very small scale, in which only a handful of people benefited. To complement this, there were bridging courses as well, for those who had partial recognition (Desiderio 2016; Rietig 2016; Degler and Liebig 2017). Another action taken by IHK was to launch start-up classes to refugees in 2016 to promote entrepreneurship.

Lastly, there were programs specifically for female refugees, like the one Federal Employment Service undertook in 2016, which focused on vocational language teaching, visits to companies and counselling (Degler and Liebig 2017). Furthermore, mentorship programs were introduced at the local level to help them in bureaucratic issues, language-related problems and questions about daily life (Rietig 2016; Degler and Liebig 2017).

2.3.3.2. The Turkish Experience

It has almost been eight years since the Syrian civil war has started and refugees started to flow into neighboring countries and Europe. When Turkey first started to accept Syrian refugees in 2011, it was expecting that the crisis would soon be over and the Syrians would go home with an appreciation and a feeling of friendship to Turkey (Kirişçi and Ferris 2015; İçduygu and Millet 2016; Memisoglu and Ilgit 2017; Tören 2018). Now, all the signs tell that this war will not end any time soon and even if it does, it will leave such devastation behind that it will probably take many years to build the country back and most of the refugees will likely stay in their host-countries for the near future (Kirişçi 2014; Kirişçi and Ferris 2015; İçduygu and Millet 2016).

While Turkey's open door policy towards Syrians and the humanitarian approach it adopted is inspiring, it brought many challenges along with it and gave birth to many discussions in the political arena. The first problem encountered on the way to accommodating and

integrating Syrians concerned the label given to them in legal terms. They were first accepted in Turkey as *guests* (Tören 2018), which meant that they had very little rights and almost no chance of integration. The legal definition soon turned into temporary protection, yet regulations in working conditions and others required more time, since the new legal adjustments were not made until 2016. So in the first five years of their residence, they did not have a work permit.

Even though life standards in the refugee camps are above average, given that the vast majority of Syrians live in the urban areas, rather than the camps, meant that they had to work in the informal sector with bad working conditions, which included long hours, low wages, lack of insurance and security and employment below their qualifications (Kirişçi 2014; Kirişçi 2016; Çoban 2018; Tören 2018). There were also problems with child labor, education, that is school attendance by Syrian children and different curriculums, young marriages and increasing discomfort in the society towards Syrians. The financial burden shouldered by Turkey, especially in the early days of the Syrian crisis can be said to have aggravated this discomfort, along with the communication problems related with the language (Elitok 2013b; Kirişçi 2015; Kirişçi 2016). Language problems are also stated to cause Syrians not knowing their rights, how to access them, such as in health or social security, or how to solve their issues (Tören 2018; Çoban 2018).

The changes in Turkey started with the Law on Foreigners and International Protection in 2013. While the foundations for this law were laid before the Syrian crisis, it included clauses that touched upon issues like access to the labor market, family unification and residence permit of all migrants (Kaya 2014; Kirişçi 2015). The second attempt by Turkey has been the transfer of duty on migration and international protection from AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency) to DGMM (Directorate General of Migration Management), a unit that has specifically been created for migration issues, except the duty of the management of the refugee camps (Kirişçi 2014; Kirişçi 2015; Memişoğlu and Ilgıt 2017; Tören 2018).

Following these steps, in 2014, the Regulation on Temporary Protection has passed, which provided rights to people under temporary protection, such as access to health and education, labor market, social assistance and interpretation. Only in 2016, permission to work was given to refugees with the Regulation on Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection, with some requisites for employers (İçduygu and Millet 2016; Tören 2018). It was stated that the Syrian refugees can also participate in the vocational training programs of İŞKUR (Turkish Employment Agency), can register as job-seekers and can benefit from the employment support (Okyay 2017; Çoban 2018).

In terms of immigration policies in vocational training and education, refugees living in camps can access certificate programmes organized by AFAD while urban refugees do not have that kind of opportunity. Similarly, an education with a Syrian curriculum and Turkish classes are provided to the refugee children living in camps. In the case of urban refugees, children can either go to Turkish schools if their parents have residence permit or go to schools managed by Syrian or Turkish NGOs (Kirişçi 2014; Kirişçi 2015; Okyay 2017). However, a clash of curriculums, cultural settings, language problems and the possibility of discrimination towards Syrian children are some of the accompanying problems.

Also, the low number of migrants residing in camps compared to the ones spread over all Turkey shows that there has not been a unified government scheme towards education or labor market integration of refugees. Integration efforts are usually implemented either through NGOs, such as with projects to help women increase their vocational skills and learn Turkish (Kirişçi 2015) or through municipalities (Okyay 2017; Çoban 2018). It also means that there is no unity in action. As Okyay (2017) puts forward though, the actions municipalities take are more short-term oriented, such as support for poverty, rather than aiming for their long-term integration into the labor market or society.


Having considered these new initiatives towards the accommodation of refugees and integration of immigrants in general, the next chapter will analyze the legal measures taking place in each policy made by the state, including laws and regulations, for Turkey and Germany. Then, it will discuss indicators and legal measures of integration that are found in

those documents. In the light of the findings and elements falling under the category of each integration model explained in the prior chapter, the fourth chapter will evaluate how the results fit a model.

3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

When the MIPEX data are examined, it is seen that MIPEX assigns a score for each country for the elements of integration represented in Table 2.1. It then ranks countries based on their total integration scores. Accordingly, last evaluations were made in 2014, which resulted with Turkey being at the lowest rank among 38 countries with an average score of 25 out of 100 and Germany ranking 10th with an average score of 61 (MIPEX 2015b; MIPEX 2015c). Corresponding values for each element of integration for the two countries are illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 3.1. Immigrant Integration Scores of MIPEX in 2014



Accordingly, values of Turkey and Germany came closest for rights to family reunion and health while the disparity in values was at the furthest for labor market mobility, followed by political participation and education rights provided to immigrants. Statistics show that the

values for Turkey remained almost the same between 2010 and 2014 with a slight increase in the family reunion rights, probably due to the changes made in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection of 2013 (MIPEX 2015b). Germany, too, does not go through significant differences in the values, with the exception of labor market mobility, which jumps from 75 to 86 out of 100 in three years, and a slight increase in access to nationality (MIPEX 2015c).

However, 2014 was the year before Germany accepted a vast number of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers and before both Turkey and Germany went through changes in some of their laws and regulations oriented towards immigrants. Hence, the next sub-sections will talk about those changes in the legal documents of Turkey and Germany and will discuss the elements of integration found in those documents before interpreting the data.

3.1. Indicators of Integration in German Migration Policies After 2011

The regulations on immigrants implemented by the German government both as a need to change the half functioning system of integration and as a response to the Syrian crisis include the Recognition Act of 2012, the Asylum Package I and II enacted in 2015 and 2016 respectively, and finally the Integration Act of 2016. Their significance and how their content matches the elements of integration will be discussed below.

3.1.1. Recognition Act

As stated before, (non)recognition of the skills and qualifications gained abroad was one of the challenges that was faced by immigrants as well as employers. A regulation recognizing their skills and qualifications could signify a better utilization of the potential of immigrants and easier access of them to the labor market (Degler and Liebig 2017; BIBB 2019). *The Recognition Act*, or with the full name *The Assessment and Recognition of Foreign*

Professional Qualifications Act, which was passed in 2012, allowed a more standardized and objective recognition procedure for all immigrants (Fohrbeck 2013; Constant and Rinne 2013).

While the law was carrying the objective of attracting highly-skilled immigrants into the country, it also served the goal of facilitating the integration of those immigrants of whom the qualifications and skills were recognized as equivalent to the ones in Germany (Fohrbeck 2013; BMBF 2016). Yet, recognition of academic qualifications stayed outside of the scope of this law as well as school leaving certificates, since the regulation only focused on the recognition of well-defined occupations, in other words qualifications signaling a specific profession (Degler and Liebig 2017). When compared with the older regulations, the law can be considered as progress since it addresses all immigrants who meet the necessary conditions while the older versions had only referred to specific groups of immigrants, such as those coming from a European Union country (Ibid.).

The law can be divided into two major parts. In the first part, in Article 1, it examines how to assess foreign qualifications obtained abroad for regulated and non-regulated professions separately. In the second part, from Article 2 to 62, it includes amendments and new adjustments on some of the clauses of several professional and vocational laws, such as the Vocational Training Act of 2005 and the Crafts and Trades Code of 1998.

To begin with, it describes professional qualifications to be assessed as all sorts of training certificates, certificates of competence and relevant professional experiences as per Article 1 (Recognition Act 2012). Then, it sets out the eligibility conditions for foreign qualifications to gain equivalence with non-regulated professions, namely professions that do not require specific qualifications or titles to practice them. Accordingly, the certificate at hand should acknowledge that the person is qualified for the given profession, and both the information of qualification (content or duration) and profession should be quite similar to those in Germany. Conditions for regulated professions, have the same requisites with non-regulated professions, except one additional requirement: entitlement granted to the person to practice

the profession that is also regulated in Germany or entitlement to practice it in other countries even if it has been prevented in one's own country.

There are two clauses in the law that are particularly important for the regulation and integration of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers more so than others. One is about the compensation measures offered to immigrants who have substantial differences between the skills and qualifications proved by a certificate and those asked by Germany for a regulated profession. The law suggests that this difference can be compensated by two ways: either by completion of an adaptation period for at most three years or by passing an aptitude test. The other clause puts forth ways to deal with absence of documents or lack of information proving one's skills and qualifications obtained abroad and securing equivalence. Accordingly, the competent body can decide whether to recognize and provide equivalence for skills and qualifications of the person by asking for work samples, interviews, practical and theoretical examinations or expert opinions. Yet this procedure can only be followed in the case of situations beyond one's control or where it takes too much time and effort to reach the documents. This opportunity is especially crucial for refugees, who fled their countries in an emergency, to make their access to the labor market easier and more efficiently. The procedure on compensation for unmatching skills and qualifications, too, indicates efforts to promote economic integration of immigrants, especially of highly-skilled ones, and to avoid wasting talents.

Yet, one last point about recognition procedures that requires attention is that for both regulated and non-regulation professions, it asks for a document demonstrating one's intentions to work in Germany. The document asked can be the proof of contact with the employers, a business plan and the like. However, Germany does not ask for such a document for people coming from a European Union country, or European Economic Area or Switzerland. That means this rule is specifically for non-Europeans. The purpose behind this, though, remains unclear as to whether it is to control the flow of immigrants into the labor market or not.

3.1.2. Asylum Package I and II

2015 was the year when Germany was faced with a huge flow of refugees and asylum seekers. The number of asylum applications had doubled in that year compared to the former year, increasing up to more than 300.000 applications (Gesley 2015; EMN/BAMF 2015). This led Germany to come up with some adjustments, namely *Asylum Procedures Acceleration Act*, also known as Asylum Package I, to facilitate the application and integration process of asylum seekers. The law mainly focused on some amendments and adjustments to old asylum procedures, on issues like social assistance and benefits provided, integration classes, employment and safe countries of origin (Gesley 2015; Grote 2018). Later on, in 2016, Germany adopted another regulation with the name *the Act on the Introduction of Accelerated Asylum Procedures* (Grote 2018). This act has come to be known as Asylum Package II.

When the articles in the first package are examined, it is seen that three of the elements of integration can be found in the document: access to labor market, health and partially education. First of all, in terms of *access to labor market*, the law distinguishes asylum seekers according to whether they come from a safe country of origin or not. If they are in fact from a safe country of origin, then the law does not devise a permanent stay for those foreigners and asserts that it may not be possible for them to start employment during their asylum procedure.

In cases where there are inadequate number of doctors at the reception centers, asylum seekers who have studied medicine can practice their own occupation temporarily at the centers as doctors for other asylum seekers, as per Article 1 (Asylum Package I 2015). Yet, since those asylum seeker doctors cannot practice their profession outside of the centers, this initiative can be seen as a precaution or a solution to the issue of insufficient staff, more than an integration effort.

The act also introduces vocational German language courses to be given to asylum seekers. Since they are job-oriented, they serve as a means to facilitate their integration into the labor

market as early as possible. However, the possibility of getting benefits is tied to participation in the courses, which means one cannot get the other without attending the courses. It authorizes Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to provide detailed information on language courses, including the content, duration, general structure and selection of instructors.

In another clause, in Article 10, the law suggests that the Federal Employment Agency can encourage participation to German language classes when it is crucial for integration, especially for those who have their residence permits and are expected to stay legally and permanently. Accordingly, classes can be no more than eight weeks and institutions can bear the costs if that will make the possibility of participation higher. What can be deducted from this is that labor market integration of immigrants who are more likely to stay is more important and needs to be addressed at the federal level. Language courses are, apparently, one way to achieve it. In terms of integration measures, one might interpret this initiative of language courses as a targeted support and targeted work-related training for a specific group, that is the asylum seekers.

One last effort in the sphere of economic integration consists of a chance for refugees to participate in the Federal Voluntary Service. In this regard, they have two options: either to work in a place that supports asylum seekers and people with international protection, or work part-time if they are younger than 27 years old. This initiative, too, can be acknowledged as a targeted work-related training as well as a social and cultural integration effort to a certain extent.

In terms of *health services*, Article 2 states that health care is provided to all asylum seekers free of charge in the reception centers. For those outside of the centers, benefits are provided in the form of cash. Protective vaccinations and medical check-ups are offered as well to asylum seekers to detect the illnesses in their early stages and prevent them. The law dictates that language support should be provided for any communication deemed necessary during treatment. While the clauses try to ensure equal access to health care, yet only binding for asylum seekers, and promote language support for cases that are needed, they do not offer

information sessions on the use of health services and entitlements to asylum seekers, nor do they offer cultural mediators or patient navigators.

Finally, *educational* integration revolves around the clauses that offer provision of pedagogical support and relevant educational measures to asylum seekers and refugees who take part in the Federal Voluntary Service and participate in a refugee-related employment. Yet, it does not give any more information on what kind of educational measure could be offered. Moreover, it does not regulate any other educational service. Therefore, one might classify this type of integration as a partial one at most, lacking significant measures on educational needs of foreigners.

Aside from those main points, there are also clauses in the first asylum package that regulate social assistance and residence permits provided, even though they do not fit into any specific category of integration. Social assistance or benefits include food, accommodation, heating, clothing, health care and household needs for those who stay in the centers and cash or non-cash equivalents for those who stay outside of the centers. For both groups of people, the law also determines specific amounts of pocket money. For clauses regulating residence permits, they specifically highlight the situations when a residence permit would not be given, including conditions when a foreigner commits a crime or constitutes a danger to the public or the state. Since the law does not refer to any conditions for long-term and permanent residence, there is no need to identify this regulation to any element of integration.

A general interpretation of the Asylum Package I would be a progress towards labor-market integration of asylum seekers starting from the early stages of their application, especially for those who are more likely to stay. The initiatives proposed for this aim, however, are limited to vocational language courses and volunteer work opportunity, not including vocational training, bridging or work placement programmes. While this still can be acknowledged as a good sign illustrating the German government's desire to accept and integrate asylum seekers, the following law, Asylum Package II changes the perceptions once more and brings out a more pessimistic image for integration of foreigners.

As the name suggests for Asylum Package II, the main purpose was to accelerate the asylum application procedures. The time to process them was defined as a week in the new regulation. However, no clauses regulating or enabling integration could be found in the law. On the contrary, inclusion of clauses like the vague situation of asylum seekers coming from countries identified as safe origin, easier deportation possibility for certain groups of people, reduction of the amount of pocket money determined by the Asylum Package I for asylum seekers, and maybe most significantly, suspension of family reunification rights for foreigners with subsidiary protection for two years, until March 2018 drew reaction from various groups (European Commission 2016; Gesley 2016a; Grote 2018; BMI 2016).

Given the fact that one element of integration was named *family reunion*, depriving one of that right, even for a limited period of time, can be understood as deprivation of integration to a certain extent for those foreigners. This means while foreigners, particularly asylum seekers, are pushed forward to be better integrated in the labor market, they are pushed back in the social and cultural sphere of integration.

3.1.3. Integration Act

Just a couple of months later following the second asylum package, another piece of law was enacted in July 2016 with the name *Integration Act*. The philosophy of the law was rooted in the belief '*support and challenge*' (Gesley 2016b). It was reflecting the idea that a policy could only be strong when the integration support is merged with integration obligations (BMAS 2016). In other words, it was adopting a carrot and stick approach with the support it provides, as well as with the threat it carries to cut the support if the other side, the foreigner, did not play the game accordingly. Thereby, it was acknowledging that immigrant integration was indeed a two-sided process requiring both parties to get their hands dirty.

One feature of the act is that it allows more possibility for foreigners who are more likely to stay for long time to integrate, as was the case with the Asylum Package I (European Commission 2016; BAMF 2016; Gesley 2016b). When the act is examined, four major

elements of integration are found in the document: education, access to labor market, permanent residence and family reunion.

Educational integration is achieved by the integration courses offered. The integration courses consist of German language classes and classes that provide a general knowledge on the society, history, legal system and values of Germany as the Residence Act elaborates (Gesley 2016b). According to Article 5, if the foreigner knows very little German, then the relevant authority can oblige the person to attend the courses in order to provide a residence permit (Integration Act 2016). Attendance to integration courses brings some benefits to certain groups of people, who are over 18, done with compulsory education, eligible to work and are not employed, as per Article 4. Travel expenses are covered for those who will attend the integration courses. While it mentions no other education-related measures, the law signifies importance of language and cultural learning for migrants if they wish to adopt to host-society.

Access to labor market is regulated with particularly vocational training and work opportunities run by the Federal Employment Agency. There is the possibility of additional benefits offered to foreigners that are to be used from a labor market programme, which is named *Refugee Integration Measures*. While the programme does not create an official employment relationship, it offers a paid job, which is equivalent to 80 cents per hour, with additional expenses covered. If a foreigner refuses to attend the programme or the integration courses, benefits will not be provided to the person, unless one finds a job, starts a vocational training or education. Nevertheless, this programme excludes the possibility of attendance of the foreigners coming from safe countries of origin.

Vocational training opportunity also takes place in the law, with the statement that trainees will be paid during training. It provides the opportunity to get an additional two years of residence permit for foreigners if the person successfully completes one's vocational training and gets a job. This rule is usually referred to as 3+2. Trainees have six months to find a job, according to the law. If one's training is terminated earlier than its due date because of an

unexpected reason, the person is given a one-time six months to find another place to continue vocational training.

As the empirical data above demonstrates, the act itself puts forward measures to facilitate the labor market integration of foreigners, refugees and asylum seekers in particular. It specifically focuses on work-related training with the vocational training opportunity provided and work placement programmes with the Refugee Integration Measures introduced. Suspension of the priority test for employers stating why they wish to hire a foreigner over Germans and whether this has an effect on the German labor market suggests Germany's desire to integrate foreigners into the labor market. Nevertheless, the law lacks any employment protection regulation as well as any affirmative action towards promotion of employment of immigrants, especially in the public sector.

The law also regulates *permanent residence* rights for immigrants meeting necessary requirements. As per Article 5, there are two ways to acquire permanent residence or a settlement permit as Germans call it. The first one is when a foreigner (i) holds residence permit for five years, (ii) can provide for oneself, (iii) has sufficient knowledge of German, and (iv) when no notification regarding unmet conditions is issued by the BAMF. The second way is through having three years of residence permit, having a very good knowledge of German, being able to provide for oneself and fulfillment of some additional requirements mentioned in the Residence Act. While the law regulates the conditions under which a permanent residence is provided, it does not regulate the conditions under which it is lost and the economic and social rights coming along with it for the holders. The distinctive part about this regulation is that there are two possibilities of gaining permanent residence, in which one is a short cut if one has better German language skills. This can be interpreted as a way to facilitate integration through language skills.

The last element of integration taking place in the law concerns the right to *family reunion*. While the law itself does not refer to any specific regulation for eligibility or conditions to obtain the right, it can be understood from Article 5 that the spouse, registered partner or the minor child of the foreigner fall under the category of migrants who can benefit from the

right to family reunion. It does not define the rights associated with it, either. However, it states that if the foreigner has an obligation or assignment to do, this same obligation or assignment will also be applied to the family member benefiting the family reunion right. Therefore, it is likely that family members can benefit from the same rights provided to the foreigner since they are responsible for the same obligations.

3.2. Indicators of Integration in Turkish Migration Policies After 2011

Legal changes revolve around five main documents that have had an impact on the immigration and integration policies of Turkey throughout the last six years. They start with the Law on Foreigners and International Protection In 2013, followed by the Regulation on Temporary Protection in 2014, Regulation on Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection in 2016, Law on International Labor Force in again 2016, and finally some changes made in the Turkish Citizenship Law in 2017. The first two documents have emerged, by and large, to deal with the criticisms of the European Union. The law of 2013, in particular, has started to be prepared after a report of the Human Rights Watch in 2008, which focused on challenges irregular migrants and asylum seekers have experienced and criticized Turkey for that (Kirişçi 2014). Most of the criticisms were stemming from the geographical limitation condition of the Geneva Convention Turkey agreed to for the determination of the refugee status and lack of compliance with the international standards (Kibar 2013; Memisoglu and Ilgit 2017). Hence, it is possible to assert that the first two documents of 2013 and 2014 were the outcome of Europeanization efforts and attempts to meet the criticisms. The rest of them are the products of a mixture of domestic and international pressures. Each document will be discussed below in terms of the change of policies they bring and the elements of integration they include.

3.2.1. Law on Foreigners and International Protection

There were a couple of reasons behind the preparation and enactment of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection in 2013, including increased immigration into the

Turkish borders, increased Europeanization and need for standardization (Elitok 2013a; Kaiser and Kaya 2015; Kirişçi 2014; Memişoğlu and Ilgit 2017; Kale et al. 2018). According to Kale et al. (2018), both domestic and international needs and foreign policy objectives played a role in the emergence of this new law. One significance of this document is that many actors were involved in the decision-making process of the law, including the government, NGOs, academia and the like (Elitok 2018).

This new law defines statuses given to different categories of migrants in more detail and in a more systematic way than before. It specifies regulations for refugees, conditional refugees, subsidiary protection or temporary protection beneficiaries and humanitarian migrants. It consists of articles regulating the entry, stay and exit of migrants, conditions and rules on residence permit, family unification, labor market as well as rights provided to those under international protection and plans for harmonization (Law on Foreigners and International Protection 2013).

When the law is examined in terms of indicators and measures signaling integration of immigrants, some of the articles coincide with the elements listed in MIPEx (2015a), which can be found in Table 2.1 in the second chapter. They include *permanent residence*, *family reunification*, *access to labor market* and *education*. To begin with the clauses on *permanent residence*, while the law categorizes six different types of residence permit, it also provides the right to obtain permanent residence if the necessary conditions are met.

If a foreigner, with the exception of refugees, conditional refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and temporary protection and people with humanitarian residence permits, (i) lives in the country for at least eight years, (ii) has not get any social assistance in the last three years, (iii) has sufficient and stable income (yet the amount is not specified in the law), (iv) has valid medical insurance, and finally (v) does not constitute a threat to the public order or security, he or she can obtain the right to long-term and permanent residence. While there are no language requirements specified in the law to get the permanent residency, a minimum of eight years of residence as a pre-requisite might be considered as a disincentive for foreigners.

Once permanent residence is obtained, it comes with the same rights given to Turkish citizens unless otherwise is stated in other specific regulations. Nevertheless, immigrants, even if they hold permanent residency, are excluded from some rights, including compulsory military service, right to vote and be elected, entrance to public service and exemption from customs duties in times of vehicle importation, as Article 44 indicates (Law on Foreigners and International Protection 2013). Therefore, even though getting a residence permit lets the holder to acquire many rights, it leaves the possibility of political rights out of the scope for good. Furthermore, exclusion of refugees and migrants under protection from the right to obtain permanent residence means also exclusion from the rights associated with it and a status closest to citizenship.

When this right is analyzed in terms of security of status, in other words, the conditions under which it is lost, it is seen that right to permanent residence is only cancelled when the person constitutes a threat to the public order or security, or when the person stays out of country over a year without coming back, for reasons besides health, education and compulsory public service to the person's country, as expressed in Article 45. However, the vagueness of the conditions leading to public order or security threat, that is what is perceived as a threat can be said to create an uncertainty for the migrant's position in the country.

When this law is compared with the older versions of legislations regulating residence permits of immigrants, a change is observed from a more discretionary application of rules to more standardized, explicit and detailed application (Kibar 2013; Kaiser and Kaya 2015). There was no rule before regulating the conditions under which the long-term residence permit could be cancelled or not extended as well as the conditions under which permanent residence could be obtained (Kibar 2013). Residence permits were doomed to be extended for three or five years at most, depending on marital and employment status of the foreigner (Kaiser and Kaya 2015). Therefore, it is possible to interpret the changes in the new law as a progress even though there are still issues not well enlightened or excluded, such as the right to long-term and permanent residence permit for refugees and those under protection.

In relation to the regulations mentioned above, clauses on *family reunification* regulate the right to residence permit for family members of the immigrant living in Turkey. Accordingly, these rules apply to the foreign spouse, foreign children of the spouse or the foreign children of a Turkish citizen, a foreigner, refugee or those under subsidiary protection who hold any type of residence permit. The maximum duration of a family residence permit at each application time is limited to three years while it can also not exceed the duration of the sponsor's residence permit, as per Article 34.

For one to make one's family utilize the right to family reunification via obtainment of family residence permit, the sponsor should have (i) a monthly income which should be at least in the level of minimum wage and which at least amounts to one third of the minimum wage for each family member, (ii) accommodation in line with general health and safety standards and medical insurance for the whole family, (iii) criminal record certificate free of any crimes against family order in five years, (iv) residence in Turkey for at least one year with a residence permit, and (v) address based registration. This right to family residence permit is cancelled or not renewed when conditions no longer apply, there is a removal decision or entry ban, or when this family residence permit is understood to be used for other purposes.

Only one type of right given to the family members benefiting family residence permit is explained in the law, which is the education right of the children in primary and secondary schools until they turn eighteen, without the need of any student residence permit. No other right bestowed to family members is mentioned in the law. Nevertheless, children who turn eighteen and who have resided in Turkey for three years can get short-term residence permit upon request as well as foreign spouses who have divorced their partners or who have been widowed. Another point to make about this regulation is that conditions or requisites mentioned above to benefit this type of residence permit may not apply to those who are refugees or under subsidiary protection, which means it may be easier for them to reunite with their family members.

As was the case with the rules regulating residence permits, family reunification rules have changed, have become more standardized and explicit than before. Kaiser and Kaya (2015)

assert that before, these rules were regulated by the Ministry of Interior, were hard to access and could change anytime. With the new changes, even though social and economic rights provided to family members upon obtainment of family residence permit are not included in the law, it provides certain rules and benefits for those whose parents or spouses reside in the country.

In terms of *access to labor market*, the law regulates the right to work for two types of foreigners, as distinct from the former law on work permit: students and those under subsidiary protection as well as conditional refugees. It states that a formal associate and undergraduate foreign student obtains work permit or the right to work after a year while graduate and post-graduate students hold the right to work immediately after their arrival and start in education. The details are said to be regulated with the related legislations and are not included in this law.

The second type of regulations concerns those under international and subsidiary protection, refugees and conditional refugees who await to be replaced in a third country. Applicants for international protection or conditional refugees can get a work permit after six months following their application for protection. Refugees and those under subsidiary protection are stated to be able to work either as an employee or independently after their status is determined. The identity card provided to them can also be used as a work permit, upon the written verification of this permit on the card. Under certain conditions, though, their access to certain sectors, professions or locations can be restricted for a limited time, except for those who live in Turkey for three years, are married to a Turk or have Turkish children.

Compared to the old legislation regulating work permits of foreigners, in which only those who worked at least six years in the country could get an unlimited and permanent work permit (Kaiser and Kaya 2015), clauses in this law may seem as a step forward in the efforts to set equal and just conditions as well as to integrate immigrants. Yet, it is also clearly seen that there are no other regulations or initiatives about this matter in the law, be it work-related trainings, bridging programmes, recognition of skills and qualification, nor any promotion for migrant employment in either in the public or private sector.

The last element of immigrant integration that can be associated with the clauses in this law is *education*, specifically education rights of the applicants and beneficiaries of international protection and family members of foreigners benefiting from family residence permit, as well as cultural and language learning for migrants and natives alike. For the first entitlement, it offers access to education in primary and secondary schools for the classified groups of migrants above.

For the second part, the law encourages harmonization activities which can be organized by the Directorate General, by seeking the collaboration of public institutions, local governments, NGOs, universities and international organizations. These activities can be (i) courses on basic information about the country, such as the political structure, language, legal system, culture, history, rights and obligations of them, (ii) courses, introduction and information sessions about access to public and private goods and services, access to education and economic activities, social and cultural communication, access to primary health care services and the like, and (iii) any other activities to promote mutual adaptation of the immigrants and natives, in accordance with Article 96.

While all these rights and incentives on education and cultural learning the law touches upon are good signs for purposes of integration, one should also take notice that it lacks certain measures, including support to access pre-primary, vocational and higher education, assessment of prior knowledge, initiatives towards students with specific needs, educational programmes involving both parents and teachers besides students.

Aside from all those articles focusing on permanent residence, family reunification, access to labor market and education rights bestowed to immigrants, the law talks about access to social assistance and services for those in need as well as payment of the premiums for social security and medical insurance for applicants or beneficiaries of international protection who cannot afford. These clauses can partially be considered under the element of *health*, even though the law does not specify the conditions for other kinds of migrants, such as refugees, migrant students or those in the labor market, nor what the law means by social assistance

and services, that is whether it refers to health, education, financial support or any other kind. Therefore, it is not possible to fit them under certain categories of integration indicators.

3.2.2. Regulation on Temporary Protection

While the description of what a temporary protection is had been made in Article 91 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, no other information was mentioned regarding the rights, services, obligations and boundaries provided to those under temporary protection. In the law, temporary protection was determined as a status given to those who were forced to leave their country, could not go back or arrived at Turkey in a mass influx of migration which required immediate and temporary protection (Law on Foreigners and International Protection 2013).

With this regulation issued in 2014, rights such as access to social services, health, education, labor market, social aid, interpretation services and the like were provided to those under temporary protection (İçduygu and Millet 2016; Memişoğlu and Ilgit 2017). Since Syrians accepted to Turkey were not considered as refugees due to the geographical limitation condition of the Geneva Convention of 1951 (İçduygu and Millet 2016; Memişoğlu and Ilgit 2017; Yıldız and Uzgören 2016), they were in need of a legal status that would bestow them some kind of rights. Hence, this regulation became an important document for the legal position of Syrians taking refuge in Turkey while it does not provide a long-term solution since this status does not allow one to apply for a permanent residence permit nor for citizenship.

When this regulation was examined in accordance with the elements of immigrant integration put forward by MIPEX, traces of four elements are found in the document: health, education, access to labor market and family reunion. First of all, for the distribution of *health services*, the law proposes establishment of health services, provision of adequate number of ambulance and personnel. According to the regulations, contribution fee for primary and emergency health services is not taken from the migrants and the cost of health services is

paid by AFAD. For foreigners under temporary protection with special needs, services such as rehabilitation or psycho-social support are offered free of any cost and as a priority.

Pursuant to Article 27, policies on *health* towards beneficiaries of temporary protection are predominantly formed in the regulation with information transfer and support activities by the personnel on reproductive health, vaccination of children and necessary measures taken to cope with those who have drug addiction and psychological problems as well as provision of psycho-social services (Regulation on Temporary Protection 2014). These measures seem to have taken place for immediate and urgent health cases to ensure a healthy and stable community, which might be the way to integration in the long-run. Yet, while the provided services partially regulate equal access to health care for those under temporary protection and promote information sharing on the rights and entitlements, the document lacks any regulation on language support, cultural mediators or trained patient navigators.

The second indicator, *education*, is regulated in Article 28 (Regulation on Temporary Protection 2014). Accordingly, educational activities for migrants under temporary protection, both living in and outside of camps, are regulated by the Ministry of National Education. The document suggests various educational activities for different age groups, including (i) pre-primary education for children who are in the range of 36-66 months old, (ii) courses for language training, vocational training, skill development and hobbies upon request for each age group, (iii) primary, secondary, associate, undergraduate, graduate and doctorate education in line with the directions from the Ministry of National Education (MEB) and Presidency of Council of Higher Education (YÖK), and (iv) provision of a document demonstrating the content and period of the education received in Turkey and provision of equivalence for those who received an education elsewhere and who can document it. Conditions of equivalence, though, are not determined in the regulation; instead, they have been left to MEB or YÖK.

When these measures are compared with those listed in Chapter 2, it is observed that there are initiatives to facilitate access to pre-primary, vocational and higher education as well as partial assessment of prior knowledge due to the equivalence regulations. Nevertheless, it

does not provide a road map for any steps further. It does not specify what can be done for those who are eligible to equivalence, whether they can continue their education in Turkey or not and under what conditions. The regulation also provides the possibility of language learning, along with skill development, hobby courses and vocational training, even though there are no initiatives to develop programmes addressing specific educational needs of migrants.

Having considered the narrower explanation and regulation of education rights in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection of 2013 and the former clause on health services in the Regulation on Temporary Protection, one might say that there are more initiatives towards integration of immigrants, particularly of beneficiaries of temporary protection. Promotion of courses mentioned above can be an indicator of a demand for a more harmonious society while promotion of pre-primary education is especially significant for the younger generation to adapt to the culture of the host society. Overall, these adjustments can be interpreted as progress towards integration despite some deficiencies.

In terms of *access to labor market*, the regulation states that those who have a temporary protection identification document can apply to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to get a work permit. Yet, the Council of Ministers determines which sectors, areas or professions they can work in. With regard to the work permits, the document only regulates the duration of it, which cannot exceed the duration of the temporary protection and it remarks that the work permit provided cannot be considered or used as a residence permit, leaving all other adjustments and clarifications to the Regulation on Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection enacted in 2016.

While this clause gives immigrants permission to work, it lacks any other initiative or action promoting their integration into the labor market, including any equivalence course or procedures for those who acquired their skills and qualifications abroad, work-related trainings, bridging or work placement programmes, any affirmative action promoting their employment in public or private sector and maybe most importantly any regulation that would provide equal working conditions, with all their social security and monthly income

rights. Therefore, the clause on access to labor market in this regulation may not be seen anything beyond a permission to work under vague conditions, and to a large extent far from any integration effort.

Finally, *family reunion* can be examined as the fourth element of integration in this regulation. The eligibility of the family members who can benefit from this right is almost the same with the one stated in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, since this regulation too mentions the foreign spouse, children under eighteen or dependent children who are over eighteen of the migrant living in Turkey. Reunification proceeds with the application of the migrant, and cooperation with relevant institutions and organizations can be sought to achieve it. One point that was not mentioned in the law of 2013 is that actions for family reunification for unaccompanied children are stated to start immediately, before even waiting for the child to apply.

The regulation does not mention any conditions or rights associated with it, but since the conditions to obtain family residence permit and so to benefit from the family reunion right were already mentioned in the law passed in 2013, it might be understandable that the adjustments indicated are valid until otherwise is stated with a new regulation. Non-recognition of economic and social rights provided to family members upon their acquisition of the permit allowing them into Turkey once more in this regulation suggests the need for a more careful reading towards the intention of acceptance and integration of those family members into the society. Having said that, the regulation towards unaccompanied children illustrates the urgent, dire and humanitarian nature of the refugee flow and therefore acknowledges the need for family reunification for the good of the child. From this point of view, it might be taken as a humanitarian concern more than an act to integrate the migrant child in question. For others who are over eighteen, though, this right to family reunion can be acknowledged as both a human right and an indicator of integration.

Aside from these four main elements, there are also clauses which do not fit into any main heading as an indicator of integration but still contribute to the well-being of the immigrants and mutual understanding of both sides. In Article 19, it states that the foreigners coming to

Turkey to seek refuge under temporary protection should be informed in the referral centers of their rights and obligations as well as the process itself in a language that they know. Following this, in Article 24, it suggests that those refugees living outside of camps but who are in need can be accommodated in places determined by the governorate. This clause may be interpreted as a move towards their integration in terms of housing, since conditions of housing are also assumed to have an effect on other indicators, education and employment in particular (Huddleston, Niessen and Tjaden 2013; OECD/European Union 2015).

Later on, the regulation offers the possibility for beneficiaries of temporary protection in need to have access to social services and assistance. It provides the right to nutrition, accommodation, health, social assistance, education and the like to those living in the temporary accommodation centers and even if the refugees under temporary protection live outside of those centers, they can still benefit from those rights and services within the bounds of possibility. In addition, the regulation talks about the need for translation services in any communication with the migrant free of charge.

All in all, while this regulation provides rights and services to beneficiaries of temporary protection in several areas, it lacks significant indicators and measures for integration. On the one hand, it brings some legal adjustments that were not existent before, in particular towards access to labor market, education, health and family reunion. Especially educational rights for refugees under temporary protection have been explained more in detail compared to other clauses.

Yet, on the other hand, it falls quite short of creating equal conditions with natives and of providing opportunities to integrate well into the society. The temporary nature of the status given allows restrictions on access to regular and limitless employment, long-term and permanent residence and citizenship rights, which leaves them more open to exploitation (Rygiel, Baban and Ilcan 2016). The name of the regulation highlights the temporariness of the immigrants and therefore makes it harder for them to integrate.

3.2.3. Regulation on Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection

Following the regulation enacted in 2014 on the temporary protection regime for certain type of immigrants, Regulation on Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection came into existence in 2016. As the name suggests, this regulation is solely focused on refugees' access to labor market. It has clauses on the conditions to get a work permit, employment quota, monthly payment to be made, employment in associations, foundations and non-profit organizations, and vocational training.

To begin with, the regulation sets up conditions for a work permit. Accordingly, foreigners under temporary protection can apply to obtain a work permit after six months of getting the status of temporary protection. If the person will work as an employee, then the application is made online by the employer. If the person will work independently, then he or she has to do it on his or her own. If the application is for a profession or job that is only open to Turkish citizens, it is cancelled without any further evaluation. If the person wants to work in a ministry, one has to get a preliminary permission from the relevant ministry or the institution (such as Ministry of Health or YÖK).

Yet, no foreigner can work in a workplace where one wants. There is a regulation limiting the number of foreigners with temporary protection who can work in the given company. Normally, the number of refugees working in a place cannot be more than 10% of the total number of Turkish employees. If a workplace has ten or less employees, the regulation allows at most one foreigner to be hired. One exception to this rule can be when it is documented by the company that wishes to employ the foreigner that they could not find a Turkish citizen who was qualified to do the job in four weeks.

The regulation also states that foreigners under temporary protection cannot be paid less than the minimum income for a month. While this is a good development for equal and non-exploitative working conditions for immigrants, it has to be acknowledged that it came a bit late, given the first five years of Syrian refugees in the Turkish labor market under unjust, unequal, exploitative conditions with no legal documents regulating their rights. As İçduygu

and Şimşek (2016) state, this regulation on monthly payments and adjustments on employment quota for those with temporary protection can be considered as the two most important outcomes of this document.

In Article 11 (Regulation on Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection 2016), the regulation offers the possibility of employment of foreigners under temporary protection in the humanitarian assistance activities of associations working for public benefit and foundations exempted from taxes. For other kinds of associations and foundations, they can still apply to employ a foreigner, but these applications go through a preliminary review by the Ministry of Interior without moving forward. This clause can be interpreted as an affirmative action promoting the employment of foreigners, yet not in public nor in private sector, rather in non-governmental organizations and associations.

A last point on this regulation concerns vocational training for foreigners under temporary protection. Accordingly, if foreigners wish to take part in the courses and programmes provided by İŞKUR towards vocational and on-the-job trainings, they can do so upon application. Also, if employers wish to continue employing the foreigner upon completion of the course or training, they can do so by applying to the Ministry. This clause can be considered as an initiative by the state promoting work-related trainings and bridging or work placement programmes, which aim to facilitate the entry of the foreigner into the labor market by making use of one's skills and qualifications. Hence, it can be acknowledged as an indicator of integration while actions to recognize the skills and qualifications or equivalence policies for access to labor market are missing in the regulation.

To sum up, compared to the older regulations, in which a slow and complicated process was in place, this regulation signals progress and convenience to a certain extent (Kirişçi 2014). Some of the clauses in itself, especially the ones on minimum wage, affirmative action for employment in associations and non-profit organizations, and vocational training can be addressed as facilitators and indicators of integration.

3.2.4. Law on International Labor Force

This law, which was also enacted in 2016, works as a complementary regulation to the one on the work permit of refugees under temporary protection. The law focuses on the right to work and the right to obtain a work permit for all foreigners, not just for refugees. Therefore, it extends the regulations on access to labor market to all immigrants. As was the case with the former regulations, the law explains how to make an application to get a work permit, the details of preliminary permission where necessary, and conditions leading to the rejection of the application. What makes this law distinct from others is that it regulates the conditions under which a work permit is given and extended, rights associated with it, and also an initiative called the Turquoise Card.

According to Article 10 (Law on International Labor Force 2016), foreigners can only get a one-year work permit at most in their first application. If the person continues to work in the same place, a two-year and then a three-year work permit is provided to the foreigner upon request for extension. If the person wishes to change workplace, then this whole process starts over. If the foreigner holds a long-term residence or holds a work permit for eight years, one can apply for a permanent work permit, which allows the holder to have an access to almost all rights provided to Turkish citizens, with the exception of the right to vote and be elected, entrance to public service and compulsory military service. An independent work permit can also be provided to professionals, yet not in a permanent format, rather for a limited duration.

Another novelty regarding this law concerns the introduction of a card. As per Article 11, a Turquoise Card can be given to some foreigners based on the person's education level, professional experience, contribution to science and technology, the impact the person leaves on the Turkish economy and employment with the activities one carries out. It is first provided for three years and then provided permanently. The spouse and children of the foreigner holding the Turquoise Card are given a document equivalent to a residence permit and the holder of this card can benefit from all the rights provided to those with permanent work permits.

Introduction of indefinite work permits, either in its regular form or in the form of the turquoise card, and the rights coming along with it might be perceived as an effort towards integration of the holders. While the card can neither be categorized as a procedure to recognize skills and qualifications nor as a bridging program, it promotes the flow and integration of highly-skilled migrants into the country. One aim of this card is to protect and increase productivity (İçduygu and Şimşek 2016). The law in general, though, is aimed at finding the balance between protecting local employment and attracting highly-skilled migrants (Çizmeci 2016).

Exclusion of the beneficiaries of temporary protection from this initiative supports this presumed aim, based on the assumption that it is unlikely that those refugees will protect and increase productivity. This point also highlights the fact that the state does not wish these refugees under temporary protection to stay for an indefinite period of time in the country.

3.2.5. Changes on the Regulation of the Turkish Citizenship Law

While conditions and acquisition of Turkish citizenship were enacted by the law in 2009, a new adjustment was accepted in late 2016 and was published in the Official Gazette in 2017. According to the conditions set up by the law of 2009 for foreigners who wish to get Turkish citizenship, following qualifications were looked for: (i) being an adult and having the power of discernment, (ii) at least five years of continuous residency, (iii) an attitude indicating one's determination to settle in Turkey, (iv) not carrying any disease that could be a threat to public health, (v) a good morality, (vi) adequate level of Turkish, (vii) adequate level of income or profession for a living, and (viii) not posing an obstacle to the national security or public order. The law also stated that there was the possibility of a request to give up from one's own nationality to acquire Turkish nationality. Having no other regulation in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection of 2013 meant that the state did not seek any change in the rules of citizenship for foreigners.

Yet, with the adjustments made in 2016, new possibilities emerged to obtain Turkish citizenship. As per the changes made (Regulation on the Implementation of the Turkish Nationality Law 2017), a foreigner could gain Turkish citizenship if one made an investment in fixed capital in the amount of at least 2.000.000 dollars, bought an immovable property in the amount of at least 1.000.000 dollars, created employment for at least 100 people, deposited at least 3.000.000 dollars to a bank in Turkey and kept it for at least three years, or bought government bonds in the amount of at least 3.000.000 dollars and kept it for at least three years.

With the new changes made in 2018 with another regulation (Regulation on the Implementation of the Turkish Nationality Law 2018), these amounts were reduced to 500.000 dollars for fixed capital, 250.000 dollars for immovable properties, 50 employees for employment, 500.000 dollars for deposit, and 500.000 dollars for government bonds, respectively. What these changes in the citizenship law indicate is not directly integration-oriented efforts, but economy-oriented adjustments. Nevertheless, they present a chance for all immigrants with a decent deposit to be a citizen and so to benefit from all the rights provided to Turkish citizens. Therefore, they, directly or indirectly, imply a break with the understanding of a citizenship based on Turkish descent and culture, which in turn opens the door to looser naturalization conditions.

4. RESEARCH FINDINGS

A brief assessment of the empirical analysis above illustrates that neither of the countries have legal regulations in the fields of anti-discrimination and political participation rights. Germany has no regulation addressing access and rights to nationality in its laws passed after 2011. Turkey, on the other hand, has only a small change in the conditions of its citizenship law, which revolves around financial-based concerns. It therefore constitutes only a partial reference to the element of access to nationality without a major concern to integrate foreigners, particularly refugees. These deficiencies in the regulations suggest the lack of will of both countries to integrate immigrants in the political sphere and to a certain extent in the social sphere due to possible exposure to discrimination and exclusion.

Besides from the fifth document mentioned for Turkey, that is the changes in the Turkish Citizenship Law, every document passed after 2011 address access to labor market in their clauses while permanent residence, family reunion, education and health are other subjects dominating the rest of the regulations. Details of what the documents include in terms of elements of integration and legal measures offered can be found in Table 4.1 below. Accordingly, the regulations or laws examined are illustrated with the number of sequence. Therefore, the first document for Turkey, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection has been identified as D1 and the last one, changes in the Turkish Citizenship Law as D5 while the first one for Germany, The Recognition Act, has been identified as D1 and the last one, the Integration Act as D3. Only the cells of which the measures and documents correspond to each other are filled, with a green check mark if they match and with a red cross if they do not match.

Table 4.1. Summary of the Integration Measures Found in Turkey and Germany

Elements of Integration	Legal Measures	TURKEY					GERMANY		
		D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D1	D2	D3
<i>Access to labor market</i>	(1) Employment protection legislation	✓ (only work permit)	✓ (only work permit)	✓	✓ (only work permit and rights attached)		×	×	×
	(2) Procedures to recognize skills and foreign qualifications - equivalence courses	×	×	×	×		✓	×	×
	(3) Targeted work-related trainings	×	×	✓	×		×	✓	✓
	(4) Bridging/work placement programmes	×	×	✓	×		×	×	✓
	(5) Affirmative action programmes towards promotion of migrant employment in the public and private sector	×	×	✓ (yet only in the NGOs)	×		×	×	×
<i>Health</i>	(1) Regulation on equal access to healthcare		✓					✓	
	(2) Presence of cultural mediators or trained patient navigators		×					×	
	(3) Provision of information about entitlements and the use of health services	✓	✓					×	
	(4) Language support		×					✓	
<i>Permanent residence</i>	(1) Number of years to spent/waiting periods for obtaining and prolonging residence permit	✓							✓
	(2) Conditions (language requirements, fees and other requirements)	✓							✓
	(3) Security of status (when to get or lose residence)	✓							×
	(4) Rights associated (social and economic rights)	✓							×
<i>Education</i>	(1) Assessment of prior knowledge	×	✓					×	×
	(2) Support to access pre-primary, vocational and higher education	×	✓					×	×

	(3) Programmes addressing specific needs of migrant students, their teachers and parents, programmes involving parents	×	×					✓	×
	(4) Language and cultural learning for both migrants and natives	✓	✓					×	✓
<i>Family reunion</i>	(1) Regulation on eligibility	✓	✓						✓
	(2) Conditions (basic legal income, housing, application fee etc.)	✓	×						×
	(3) Security of status (when to get or lose the right to family reunion)	✓	×						×
	(4) Rights associated (equal rights with the sponsor)	✓	×						×
<i>Access to nationality</i>	(1) Number of years to spent/waiting periods for obtaining nationality					×	(specified in the law of 2009)		
	(2) Conditions (language requirements, citizenship/integration tests etc.)					✓			
	(3) Security of status (when to get or lose citizenship)					×			
	(4) Dual citizenship right					×			

A striking point on the elements found in the documents regarding Turkey is that labor market mobility and rights associated are only regulated in the third document, that is the Regulation on Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection, passed in 2016. All others only refer to the conditions to get a work permit in order to legally work in the country. However, they do not suggest any effort for labor market integration. The third document, on the other hand, puts forward a minimum wage rule, employment quota, incentive to work in foundations and associations and opportunity to participate in İŞKUR's vocational and on-the-job trainings. While all these regulations suggest good practices to integrate immigrants, the document only addresses refugees under temporary protection, which means such opportunities do not apply to all other immigrants.

Whereas in Germany, the emphasis is on facilitating the recognition of skills and qualifications, promotion of work-related trainings and bridging/work placement programmes. While no German law enacted after 2011 includes affirmative action programmes, the Asylum Package of 2015 allows the asylum seekers to work as volunteers and the Integration Act of 2016 allows job opportunities in the form of Refugee Integration Measures and paid vocational training opportunities for foreigners. The first document, the Recognition Act, implies the importance of equivalence regulations to attract and make use of medium and highly-skilled foreigners in the labor market while Turkey lacks such an initiative, aside from the Turquoise Card offered, which is a permanent work permit with rights associated for those who benefit the country most with their skills and insights.

Alternative recognition opportunity provided by Germany to those without or inadequate documents also suggests the desire to incorporate immigrants, particularly refugees and asylum seekers into the labor market and to benefit their expertise while indirectly helping them to integrate. In fact, one might suggest that the dominant form of integration measures in Germany is on access to labor market and therefore economic integration, above any other element.

On health, only the first two documents in Turkey (Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the Regulation on Temporary Protection) and the second document in Germany (the Asylum Package I) include clauses which regulate that right. While health is regulated in the first document of Turkey as part of the harmonization activities, which is solely information sessions on health services provided, the second document refers to both the information transfer and health measures on vaccination, drug use, psychological problems and the like. It provides equal access with costs covered. Germany, too, provides very similar services, which include free of charge health care, vaccinations and check-ups. Different from the Turkish regulation, it also highlights language support given whenever necessary. The similarity between the Turkish and German legislations is that both regulate the health services for specifically refugees and asylum seekers. They facilitate access of those particular foreigners to the health services without much attention to the rest of the immigrants, at least in the legal documents.

Permanent residence is regulated only in the first document of Turkey (Law on Foreigners and International Protection) and in the last document of Germany (Integration Act). When one compares the conditions to get permanent residency, it is seen that the number of years required is more in Turkey than in Germany while the condition for a stable livelihood is a common point for both countries. In Germany, sufficient knowledge of German language and five years of residence or advance knowledge of German language and three years of residence is enough to get permanent residence whereas in Turkey, it requires at least eight years. More years spent means harder conditions and consequently less number of immigrants integrated.

Having said that, the German law does not specify the conditions when the permanent residence right is lost and what kind of rights it brings to the holder while the Turkish law does. Since the Turkish regulations imply a status quite close to citizenship except certain rights, including political participation, it might be possible to interpret the case as it is hard to obtain, but also hard to lose and once obtained, it facilitates the integration of the foreigner quite a lot. Nevertheless, the rules in the Turkish document prove once more Turkey's reluctance to integrate refugees and those under protection. For the German case, it is only possible to assert that it is easier to get permanent residence compared to Turkey.

There are two pieces of documents for each country regulating the educational measures. For Turkey, education can be said to be one of the areas that take more place in the immigration laws and policies. It offers pre-primary, primary, secondary, associate, undergraduate, graduate and doctorate education opportunity for refugees and beneficiaries of the international protection in accordance with the first and second documents. It also offers language and cultural learning via courses suggested. It finally offers an educational recognition for those who have documents to prove it, yet does not offer any opportunity to recognize vocational qualifications.

Whilst, Germany does not mention any prior assessment of educational history, nor access to pre-primary and higher education. It, however, promotes language and cultural learning, just as the case with Turkey, through integration courses. It also offers possibility of

pedagogical support and other educational measures for refugees volunteering as part of Federal Voluntary Service. Even though Germany lacks some significant educational incentives, it is possible to say that both Turkey and Germany give particular importance to cultural learning, which might suggest that they see cultural adaptation as a departure point for better integration.

In matters of family reunion, first and second documents of Turkey and the third document of Germany include some regulations. Accordingly, both Turkish and German laws suggest the foreign spouse, minor or dependent children can benefit this right while the German law allows the registered partner as well. Turkey, as distinct from Germany, explicates the conditions to benefit this right, such as a necessary amount of income, life standards, and at least one year of residence.

Given that the family residence permit is not cancelled so easily, only when there are conditions no longer allowing the family members staying in the country or when it is understood that this right is used for something besides its intended use, one can assume Turkey has not much restrictive policies on family reunion and once obtained, it promotes the continuity of it, even though it does not address rights provided to the family members, except the education right. This absence creates an uncertainty towards the degree of their desire to accept and integrate the family members. Since Germany does not mention rights associated as well, it is possible to apply the same evaluation to it.

Finally, while the most comprehensive immigration and integration laws of Turkey and Germany passed after 2011 did not mention any conditions or new ways to access nationality, as per the fifth document, Turkey made new adjustments in late 2016 and then in 2018 that allowed acquisition of citizenship upon a fixed amount of investment made for the country. This can be interpreted as a short cut to get citizenship for those who have enough money, without paying attention to any of the conditions specified in the law of 2009, including the number of years to live in Turkey beforehand and language requirements. Even though this cannot be read as a direct means to integrate foreigners, it signals the change of perception towards citizenship, from a Turkishness-oriented approach to a benefit-oriented approach,

where usefulness for the country and society, in terms of economic, social and technological development takes precedence over any other ethnic concern, which in turn, means easier naturalization conditions.

In a nutshell, what all these measures indicate is that integration of those who are more likely to stay in Germany is given weight over integration of other types of immigrants. For Turkey, integration of highly-skilled immigrants and of those who are perceived to be most beneficial for the country is favored. Germany gives particular importance to policies that regulate access to labor market, language and cultural learning and partially health. Turkey, on the other hand, lays more emphasis on permanent residence, education and family reunion while it addresses cultural learning as well. Access to labor market is regulated predominantly for refugees under temporary protection as the third document of Turkey suggests. Political integration opportunities are not provided by neither of the countries in the laws examined, since both countries are still reluctant to give political participation rights to foreigners until they become citizens.

The transformation Turkey has gone through in migration policies suggests a more standardized and Europeanized policy-making and a more inclusive understanding of citizenship over formerly acknowledged exclusive understanding. Acquisition of citizenship and integration into the society are easier now, compared to the older regulations. However, one observes a difference of attitude towards more skilled foreigners on the one hand and refugees and asylum seekers on the other hand. While an initiative called the Turquoise Card provides permanent work permit for immigrants who can benefit the country most, and permanent residence opportunity is given for those who meet the conditions, refugees and beneficiaries of temporary protection are excluded from benefiting these opportunities, therefore can never get a permanent residence, nor such a permanent work permit.

The emphasis on the temporary admission of the Syrian refugees and the geographical condition of the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees still in operation sharpen this difference. Also, the existence of 10% employment quota and the requirement to present a document if the company wishes to hire more refugees than the quota, where it also has to

indicate that it was not possible to find an equivalent Turkish citizen for the job suggest an exclusionist approach. Given the fact that a similar policy named the priority test in the German context had been suspended during the refugee influx, by the Integration Act of 2016, this policy of Turkey creates a contrast with Germany. Since the suspension of the test had aimed to facilitate the access of Syrian refugees to the labor market, the opposite of this, having such a regulation and the employment quota hinders their access to labor market in Turkey. That being said, incentive for refugees to work in associations and foundations as well as to attend İŞKUR vocational and on-the-job programmes promote their access.

Germany is another story in the transformation it has gone through. The initiatives put forward illustrate their interest in labor market integration of immigrants. The recognition procedures introduced, not just for those with necessary documents but also for those who lack such documents for unexpected reasons, and all the work-related training and job opportunities provided for refugees demonstrate that Germany has realized the urgency of the situation of refugees and the need for integration with the most optimal outcomes for the country. The integration courses, on the other hand, and the benefits tied to participation to the courses suggest cultural learning and adaptation as well as learning the language of the host-country are key points in the immigration policy of Germany and on the way to integration. Yet, the suspension of family reunion rights for two years as proposed by the Asylum Package II is a step back from all these developments while it can be regarded as a security concern as well.

Since the aim of this paper was mainly to identify the current national models of immigrant integration of Turkey and Germany, particularly after the external shock and influence of the Syrian Crisis, and since they would not be possible to identify without a detailed analysis of all the legal documents regulating immigration policies as of 2011, the rest of this chapter will discuss appropriate models for each country in light of the findings mentioned above. As was already mentioned in the second chapter, there were four major models put forward in the literature, which were identified with the policies of several European countries. They were assimilationism, universalism, segregationism and multiculturalism. Indicators

necessary to identify each model can be found in Table 4.2 below, which were also discussed in Chapter 2.

Table 4.2. Indicators of Immigrant Integration Models

<i>Assimilationism</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opposition to poly-ethnic rights • Barriers to acquisition of nationality/cultural requirements for naturalization • Civic integration policies • Cultural conformity
<i>Universalism</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Neutral stance/no privileges, rights or exemptions to any ethnic or religious group • Civic citizenship • Easier delivery of individual citizenship rights
<i>Segregationism</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Harsh naturalization conditions • Special attitude to co-ethnics • Easier conditions to cancel the permanent residence • Absence of voting rights • Absence of or insufficient anti-discrimination rights
<i>Multiculturalism</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to poly-ethnic rights • Permission for ethnic and religious practices (in schools, media programmes etc.) • Affirmative action in the labor market • Formal affirmation in the constitution or the parliament • Dual citizenship • State funding for minority activities • Funding for bilingual or mother-tongue education

As it can be seen from the table above, possibility of universalism and multiculturalism for both countries are out of scope since indicators of those models are not found in the documents. Only the incentive the Regulation of Turkey on Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection gives to refugees to work in humanitarian assistance activities of relevant associations and foundations can be considered as an affirmative action in the labor market. Koopmans et al. (2005) were considering affirmative action programs as a clear sign of multiculturalist policies, due to their implicit aim to represent cultural diversity, along with efforts to create an equal environment. However, presence of only one indicator is not enough to assert that it is multiculturalist, considering that it lacks more important indicators, such

as support to poly-ethnic rights, promotion for ethnic and religious practices or permission for dual citizenship.

Both countries can be associated with two indicators of segregationism, which are the absence of voting rights and absence of or insufficient anti-discrimination rights. As mentioned in the second chapter, some of the political participation rights, such as the presence of consultation bodies, function as a way to represent cultural minorities, hence leads to multiculturalism, as put forth by Koopmans et al. (2005). As it was already discussed, these deficiencies, in other words lack of such initiatives, open the way or at least do not close the way to discrimination and exclusion. They also inhibit immigrants' political integration until their acquisition of citizenship. That is why they are linked to exclusionist policies.

Based on all these discussions and analysis made, assimilationism can arguably be the best match for Germany. It was already referred by Koopmans et al. (2005) that Germany had belonged to the assimilationist line. However, what makes today's policies different from the past is that they include additional policies that are started to be implemented recently. The impact of the Syrian crisis in shaping those policies cannot be overlooked, since two important documents, the Asylum Package of 2015 and the Integration Act of 2016, have emerged after big numbers of refugees entering Germany in 2015.

The keyword suggesting this model is cultural conformity, with cultural requirements for naturalization and opposition to poly-ethnic rights paving the way. In both Turkey and Germany, language and cultural learning has been emphasized, through harmonization activities for Turkey and integration courses for Germany. Permanent residency right being dependent on the level of German language more than other requirements, promotion of vocational and regular language classes for refugees and asylum seekers and existence of a naturalization test, assessing the civic knowledge of the foreigner and whether it is compatible with that of the country, as the Nationality Act with latest adjustments made in 2007 (BAMF 2011) puts forward Germany's position as assimilationist. Non-existence of any poly-ethnic rights in the legislations examined and further, disallowance of dual

citizenship (BAMF 2019), except certain special cases, fuel this assumption. Another way to evaluate the German model is through the common indicators taking place in both MIPEX and Koopmans et al., which were already mentioned in Chapter 2. As was stated by Koopmans et al. (2005), presence of numerous cultural requirements on the way to naturalization implies an assimilationist understanding. In this case, integration courses, vocational and regular language classes and naturalization test constitute the numerous requirements that demand more than just basic language knowledge. Hence, it is also possible to see the emphasis on cultural conformity from this perspective.

For Turkey, it can be said that it still does not have a comprehensive model of integration since the integration policies of Turkey are not enough to suggest a model. Both assimilationist and segregationist elements are encountered in the documents examined. Yet, assimilationist concerns are less explicit compared to the German case. The harmonization activities proposed and language classes offered as part of educational measures reflect this concern even though they are not obligatory as the German laws assert. Lack of civic integration policies, such as the naturalization test or obligatory attendance to integration courses of Germany, indicate only a partial conformity with the assimilationist model, since the number of cultural requirements besides basic language are considerably less when compared with the ones in Germany.

On the other hand, exclusion of refugees, asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international and subsidiary protection from some of the rights provided to other immigrants, such as the right to permanent residency and work permit as well as the right to acquire citizenship for those under temporary protection signal an exclusionist understanding of immigration and citizenship despite loosening of nationality conditions in the last two years. For Koopmans et al. (2005), conditions of many years of residence for the foreigners to be able to apply for citizenship were already seen as high barriers to naturalization and reluctance to include foreigners, therefore as segregationist. Not even giving that opportunity implies a certain direction towards segregationism. Moreover, having the possibility to be restricted to work in certain sectors, professions or locations if the conditions require so, but being also excluded from that restriction if one lives in Turkey for three years, is married to a Turk or

has Turkish children reflect a somewhat ethnic-oriented concern, that provides a special attitude to those who can be Turkified, either with the bond of marriage or with the bond of communion. Furthermore, inclusion of 10% employment quota rule for refugees and if the company wishes to hire more refugees than its 10% allowance, demand for a documentation stating that they could not find an equivalent Turkish citizen for the job reflect this ethnic-oriented concern once more that favors Turkish nationals over foreigners. Therefore, the Turkish approach can be evaluated as both assimilationist and segregationist at once.

A historical look-back suggests a continuity with the assimilationist elements of Germany's model of integration while language and cultural learning has been even more emphasized and a break with the exclusionist elements since it eased the way to obtain permanent residency, to be incorporated into the labor market and to make use of one's skills and qualifications. Absence of political participation rights and anti-discrimination laws, on the other hand, indicates a continuity with the segregationist elements.

Turkey's new legislations and regulations suggest more standardized and explicit immigration policies and a more inclusive understanding of citizenship towards those who are highly-skilled and can benefit the country while they also suggest an exclusive understanding of citizenship towards refugees, asylum seekers and beneficiaries of protection. Hence, they indicate both continuity and change in the perception of citizenship, depending on the type of immigrants. Implementation of the geographical limitation condition of the Geneva Convention to give the status of refugees to this day suggests a continuity, whereas inclusion of harmonization activities and more efforts to integrate non-Turkish immigrants imply a break and a desire for more openness to foreigners.

5. CONCLUSION

This paper pursued the changes the Syrian Crisis and the following refugee flow caused in the immigrant integration policies of Turkey and Germany, in contemplation of a possibility of an external shock that would change the whole national models of the countries towards citizenship and immigrants. To this end, this study examined all legal outputs, including laws and regulations passed after 2011 for both countries, and looked for the elements and measures of integration in accordance with the proposed indicators presented in the second chapter. The results of this study provide only a snapshot of the reasons of the change while it requires a more extensive analysis to understand all the reasons behind the transformation, due to the complex nature of the issue.

Comparisons, as MIPEX (2015d) suggests, provide opportunities for countries to learn and share, and thus to improve themselves in certain areas they see they lag. They also provide possibilities for collaboration and interaction. A cross-case study on Turkey and Germany based on Mill's Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) displays the reactions that both countries gave to the migratory pressure that the Syrian Crisis created.

Therefore, the comparison in this study presents a chance to observe how two different countries respond to the same critical juncture and how they shape their policies. It also presents a chance to compare the success and effectiveness of policies in terms of integration opportunities and the incentives they create. It finally presents a chance to observe any change or continuity in the immigrant integration models, or national approaches to nationhood and immigration, of Turkey and Germany, as of 2011.

With this purpose in mind, the theoretical framework was first put forward, in which indicators of integration and models were discussed based on two sources: MIPEX for indicators and legal measures of integration, and Koopmans et al. (2005) for classification of integration models. Through the indicators determined by MIPEX as well as by Koopmans et al., it was discussed how models can be identified with the existence or lack of specific indicators. Then, this analysis was applied to Turkey and Germany. After summarizing the national approaches of both countries towards immigrants before the Syrian crisis, five documents (Law on Foreigners and International Protection of 2013, Regulation on Temporary Protection of 2014, Regulation on Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection of 2016, Law on International Labor Force and new adjustments in the Turkish Citizenship Law in both 2016 and 2018) for Turkey and four documents (Recognition Act of 2012, Asylum Package I of 2015 and II of 2016, and finally Integration Act of 2016) for Germany were analyzed.

Results show that access to labor market is the most regulated element of integration while permanent residence, family reunion, education and health are mentioned as well. Political participation rights and anti-discrimination laws are not mentioned at all while access to nationality is as good as not mentioned, except the latest changes in the Turkish Citizenship Law. While both of the countries prepared regulations that would facilitate the entry of refugees and asylum seekers into the labor market and provided social assistance in various forms, including health, housing, food, clothing or in any other way, Germany prioritizes the integration of those who have residence permits and are likely to stay in the country permanently and Turkey excludes them from obtaining rights of permanent residency and permanent work permit. While both promote work-related trainings for foreigners, Germany ties benefits provided to them to attendance in language and cultural learning courses and Turkey brings out the possibility of limiting their access to certain sectors or jobs via employment quota and other regulations. Neither regulate new clauses that would enable them to have political rights, nor easier access to nationality. Turkey gives particular importance to the educational integration of refugees, by promoting their continuation in pre-primary, primary, secondary, associate, undergraduate, graduate and doctorate education and giving the opportunity of recognition and equivalence of educational qualifications gained

abroad, while the German laws lack a similar initiative. Germany, however, puts forward a very extensive vocational recognition procedure for skills and qualifications gained abroad and equivalence courses to make up for them.

Based on the findings, it is possible to associate the German national approach most appropriate with an assimilationist model due to the weight given to cultural conformity, obligatory integration courses, emphasis on benefits to learn German language and conditions to naturalize, as the laws enacted even before the Syrian Crisis suggest. In line with Koopmans et al. (2005), too many pieces of cultural requirements refer to the presence of an assimilationist model. These pieces, therefore, indicate a continuity of assimilationist elements in the national approach of Germany. A persisting absence of political integration and a well-acknowledged anti-discrimination regulation constitute another continuity in the German model, yet this time with segregationist elements. However, facilitation and encouragement to get permanent residence, to access labor market and recognize skills and qualifications lead to a break or a deviation from exclusionist understanding of immigration and citizenship to a more inclusive and integrative understanding.

Turkey, on the other hand, fits into both assimilationist and segregationist models of integration. Since it is assigned a very low integration score by MIPEx in 2014 and not a very well progress is observed since then despite some developments, it might be understandable that it still does not have one solid model of integration. Promotion of courses under the label of harmonization activities and promotion of language courses as part of educational measures provide general information to immigrants on the country, political structure, culture, history and provide opportunities for language learning. This specific content of the relevant policies mentioned above signifies the importance of knowledge on them –the country, culture, language and the like– for mutual adaptation, therefore paves the way to cultural assimilation. From this perspective, it implies a continuity with the assimilationist understanding of citizenship that was favoring naturalization of those with Turkish descent and culture. It, however, implies a break at the same time with the same understanding since it offers indefinite work permit opportunity for highly-skilled foreigners and offers obtainment of citizenship under conditions of certain investments. Its exclusionist

attitude to refugees and beneficiaries of temporary protection in matters of permanent residence, nationality and indefinite work permit reflect a continuity with the segregationist elements, due to absence of any opportunity of naturalization for beneficiaries of temporary protection, mostly Syrians. Similarly, its policies on who to give the status of refugee also reflect the preservation of segregationist elements.

The results are of significance since they reveal the outcome of Syrian Crisis on immigration and integration policies of Turkey and Germany, which are the two countries most affected in Europe, in terms of the number of refugees they received. They show where they get better and where they still lack, therefore pinpoint the areas that need improvement for a more successful integration. Germany, traditionally associated with exclusionist and segregationist policies, is observed to move towards an assimilationist model. Turkey was categorized as an assimilationist country in Ruedin's (2015) earlier study. With this study, though, it is seen that Turkey has moved towards a division point between assimilationism and segregationism. The results also put forward the opportunity to see better integration measures offered by regulations that allow more integration under the same model of integration. In other words, one can observe different ways of encouragement of integration in the same assimilationist stance, leaving the decision of which one achieves the best or offers most opportunities to the reader. Consequently, this study and the results contribute both to the migration studies and refugee studies literature by shedding light on the policies of integration of Turkey and Germany following the critical juncture of the Syrian Crisis.

Nevertheless, as with every piece of research, this study, too, comes along with some limitations. To begin with, the study is only confined within the boundaries of legal documents, leaving all perceptions, attitudes and actual implementations of laws out. That means it cannot measure the degree of welcomeness in the host society, and therefore lacks certain measures to comprehend social and cultural integration. Another limitation is due to the qualitative nature of the method this study relies on, which eliminates the possibility of an analysis consisting of all countries and observance of all changes in the immigrant integration policies of countries affected by the Syrian Crisis, extending the sample to the non-European countries as well. This way, it could be possible to see if the Syrian Crisis was

powerful and influential enough to divert policies and models of immigrant integration in other cases. Future research can construct such a study which includes a comprehensive quantitative study followed by a qualitative one and can include other variables, such as perceptions and attitudes as indicators of integration, which can be measured by an extensive survey analysis.

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