ELITE RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL CAREER PATTERNS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY

by

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ELITE RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL CAREER PATTERNS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

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Keywords: political elites, political career, Turkish politics, political parties

This dissertation aims to explain the determinants of political elite recruitment and political career patterns in Turkey, with specific reference to deputies (MPs) of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), candidates running in general elections and local party elites. It provides answers to the questions of "what are the determinants of career patterns of political elite in Turkey?", "why and how do some individuals become first-ranked candidates even though they have never run in general elections prior to their candidacy?" and "why do some individuals become candidates in general elections even though their electability chances are low?". Questions are answered by the help of two unique datasets (MPs dataset and MP candidates dataset) consisting of data between 2002 and 2015, and in-depth interviews conducted with local party elites of four political parties in Turkey. Data were compiled from the official websites of the TBMM, Supreme Election Council of Turkey and political parties. MPs dataset includes socio-economic backgrounds, legislative, party, local politics and civil society experiences of the MPs, while MP candidates dataset contains information on candidates who ran in general elections, and election results (2002-2015). Results show that the composition of the MPs in the TBMM has changed through time; ideological stances of political parties affect the composition of their MPs; political parties strategically revise their party lists and specifically change first-ranked candidates in districts where they are electorally vulnerable; and ambitious politicians accept unwinnable candidacy ranks with the expectation of pushing their ranks to electable positions in future elections.

ÖZET

SİYASİ SEÇKİNLERİN PARTİLER TARAFINDAN SEÇİLMESİ VE SİYASİ KARİYER MODELLERİ: TÜRKİYE'DEKİ SİYASİ PARTİLERİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ

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Anahtar Kelimeler: siyasi seçkinler, siyasi kariyer, Türkiye siyaseti, siyasi partiler

Bu tez, Türkiye'deki siyasi seçkinlerin partiler tarafından seçilmesinin ve bu seçkinlerin izledikleri siyasi kariyer yollarının belirleyici unsurlarının neler olduğuna Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM)'ne seçilmiş olan milletvekilleri, genel seçim adayları ve yerel siyasi parti örgütlerinde görev alan parti seçkinleri özelinde açıklama getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tez, "Türkiye'deki siyasi seçkinlerin kariyer modellerinin belirleyici unsurları nelerdir?", "kimi adaylar daha önce genel seçimlerde aday olmamalarına rağmen neden ve nasıl birinci sıra adayı olmaktadır?" ve "seçilme şansı düşük olan kişiler genel seçimlerde neden aday olmaktadır?" sorularına, 2002 ve 2015 yıllarını kapsayan milletvekilleri veriseti ve milletvekili adayları veriseti ile dört siyasi partinin yerel örgütlerinde görev alan parti seçkinleri ile yapılmış derinlemesine görüşmeler yardımıyla cevaplar sunmaktadır. Verisetlerinde bulunan veriler, TBMM, Yüksek Seçim Kurulu ve siyasi partilerin resmi websitelerinden alınmıştır. Milletvekilleri veriseti, milletvekillerinin sosyoekonomik özellikleri ile yasama, parti, yerel siyaset ve sivil toplum örgütü tecrübelerini kapsarken, milletvekili adayları veriseti genel seçim adayları ve beş genel seçim (2002-2015) sonucu hakkında bilgi içermektedir. Bulgular, TBMM'nin milletvekili bileşiminin yıllar içinde değiştiğini, siyasi partilerin ideolojik pozisyonlarının bu partilerin milletvekili kompozisyonunu etkilediğini, siyasi partilerin düşük oy aldıkları seçim bölgelerinde aday listelerini yeniden yapılandırdığı ve özellikle birinci sıra adaylarını değiştirdiğini ve siyasi motivasyona sahip kişilerin gelecekteki seçimlerde aday listelerinin daha üst sıralarından aday gösterilebilecekleri beklentileri ile seçilme şansları düşük olan sıralardan aday olmayı kabul ettiklerini göstermektedir.

To my family

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Purpose of the Dissertation

In one of his books on Turkish political history, Altan Öymen mentioned a couple living next door to his family's house in Ankara:

> "They moved to our apartment after we started to live there. From time to time we might run across and greet each other on the stairs. After a while, I learned that the man was an engineer and serving as a public servant… But, I did not know his name, and learnt it afterwards. Indeed, in the future there would be no one who does not know their names in the country: Süleyman Demirel and Nazmiye Demirel. Of course, we could not know that one day our engineer neighbor will occupy the position of then Prime Minister (PM) Adnan Menderes. Neither could we know that he will be the president of the country after serving long years as PM. I have heard that he was quite successful in his job as public servant, and many people thought that his future was bright. Yet, obviously, those people were talking about his occupational career. Indeed, he was promoted to the highest level of his job through time. However, no one could imagine that he will occupy the highest political position in the future as the president."[1] (Öymen, 2009: 20).

Similar stories are available for other political actors as well. For example, Bülent Ecevit, who has been one of the major figures of Turkish politics just as Demirel, and who served as PM for long years, mentioned that entering politics was not his nor his wife Rahşan Ecevit's (who also played important roles in Turkish politics) primary goal in life. Actually, being very interested in literature, poetry and painting, they once said that they were planning to live in a small cabin in the meadows and spend their life creating art (Dündar and Akar, 2006). Nevertheless, they ended up with political careers not unlike

[1] The book is written in Turkish, and translation belongs to the author of this dissertation.

Demirels. Back in the time, Öymen and Ecevit were working at Ulus daily, and they were close friends. Öymen was suggesting that the Ecevits become members of the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* - CHP), but their life plans did not yet include a political career. However, Ulus was closed by the decision of Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti* – DP) government, and this incident, which Ecevits defined as quite an unfair decision, influenced them deeply and led them to register with the CHP as party members. Hence, with the impact of triggering factors, they started their engagement with politics (Dündar and Akar, 2006). Inferring from such stories, one may understand that some individuals who do not have any intention for entering politics may change their decisions and become politicians through time, as these individuals became politically ambitious with the emergence of specific motives and interests. Some individuals, conversely, may always have held interest in politics -sometimes starting from early childhood- and they desire to embark on political careers. However, not everyone with strong political interest and motivation can become a politician. Then, what determines who becomes a politician and why?

With regard to occupying political office, questions of who governs and who possesses power to rule have been examined in many different political systems. As a related question, who becomes a politician is also worth explaining, since politicians consist of one of the major components of political systems. More specifically, political systems are identified with three major elements: authorities, regimes, and community which consists of the people (Easton, 1953). Among these, authorities consist of various levels of elites, especially the political elite. The political career patterns of these elites help us to understand relationships within political systems, and to predict activities in a given legislature (Scarrow, 1997: 254).

Throughout time, from kings to elected presidents, many different types of rulers have possessed authority to govern states. As authority depends upon the legitimate right to rule politically, it has attracted the attention of social scientists who pondered and examined what exactly produces political legitimacy of the ruling authorities. Among those, Max Weber (1958), categorized legitimate authority into three broad types by analyzing the sources of legitimacy: traditional authority, charismatic authority, and legal-rational authority. Comparing these three types of authority, one may argue that it was easier to predict who would be the next ruler -and political elite in general- under traditional and charismatic authority. The most important reason for this argument is that

the pool of possible and eligible rulers was not broad under such circumstances. That is to say, the number of people who could be legitimate or eligible to occupy the office of a political authority is quite small. However, this has changed over time with the emergence of representative democracy, which brought about what Weber defined as "legal-rational authority".

More specifically, traditional authority pursues its legitimacy from long lived traditions. The rulers having this authority are believed to possess the right to rule, as those traditions provided a political legitimacy to their claim to authority. Kings, queens and sultans were categorized as constituting this type of political authority. Families of those rulers who possessed the right to legitimately govern and control the respective empires or kingdoms. Who could become the ruler, under these circumstances, was determined by kinship, and traditional authority was transferred from one family member to another, generally from father to son. Consequently, the number of eligible individuals who could be politicians was restricted to certain members of a family (dynasty). Although alternative political offices were available, which did not require a blood relationship to the dynasty, those offices were often occupied by a small number of people sharing similar backgrounds.

The second type, charismatic authority, takes its legitimacy from the charisma of the ruler or leader. This charisma can be defined in many ways, such as being a war hero or possessing extraordinary powers, even though they may not be real. Most crucially, if the people over who the ruler in question is assumed to have authority believed that the leader has that charisma. So, the ruler is believed to be ultra-powerful or victorious, and consequently possesses the legitimate right to control and rule the state. This authority cannot be easily transferred to another person, and would be hard to routinize as Weber (1958) called it. Usually totalitarian leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini were categorized as being this type. Under such circumstances, again, the characteristics of the eligible political actors would be quite similar to each other, as they would be recruited by the charismatic leader.

The third type, legal-rational authority, can however be differentiated from the others with regard to the eligibility of individuals to become politicians. The first two types were usually identified with non-democratic rules, but legal-rational authority can be observable generally in regimes with rule of law. This type gets its legitimacy from the citizens by elections. Hence, the likelihood of competition among possible politicians

before coming to political office is much higher, and the ones who win this competition get their legitimate power to rule for a certain period of time, i.e. until the next elections. Consequently, there emerges a broader group of eligible individuals -depending on the legal regulations-, the composition of the political elite may be more heterogeneous and alternation in political offices becomes more likely. That is to say, the number of people who *can* be politicians has increased tremendously over time, as many previously excluded groups such as non-aristocrats, women, and minorities gained the right to run for political office. Eventually, the number of politically ambitious individuals has increased as their opportunities expanded. However, not all of the eligible individuals have fulfilled their goals as the political positions to fill are scarce. This situation has created a more competitive environment for the individuals who would like to enter politics and actively work as politicians. Moreover, the motivations of individuals and their attitudes towards politics became more diverse over time:

> "Politics, just as economic pursuits, may be a man's avocation or his vocation. One may engage in politics, and hence seek to influence the distribution of power within and between political structures, as an 'occasional' politician. … The alternative is to make politics one's vocation: either one lives 'for' politics or one lives 'off' politics." (Weber, 1946: 83-84).

Today, in an age of political parties, many politicians engage with these organizations in order to be actively working in a political system. Political parties need to recruit personnel and politicians to function decently, and the individuals who would like to become politicians -usually- need to be selected and recruited by political parties. Although individuals who enter politics without a party ticket and continue as independent politicians are also present. (Ashiagbor, 2008), a sizable portion of individuals seek to be members of political parties for their political careers (see e.g., Turan, 2013). Hence, becoming a politician is not a unilateral decision taken only by these individuals. In other words, not everyone who desires to be a politician eventually fulfills that goal, as they need to be presented with certain opportunities, one of the most crucial of which is being recruited by political parties. The mechanism behind who becomes a politician and why, is usually composed of two general parts: supply side and demand side. The explanation of supply and demand side in the process of political elite recruitment and candidate selection is given its most importance by Norris and Lovenduski (1993). In terms of explaining political careers, this dissertation adopts this approach. According to this explanation, there are two sides of recruitment, in Norris and Lovenduski (1993)'s own words:

> "On the *demand side* selectors choose candidates depending upon their perceptions of the applicants' abilities, qualifications and experience. Since candidates are rarely well known to most selectors, these perceptions may be coloured by direct and indirect prejudice about certain types of applicant. The term 'prejudice' is used here in a neutral sense. Prejudice can be for or against certain groups, whether lawyers, farmers, trade unionists, southerners, women or Asians." (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 377).

So, demand side explanation is about the decisions of the party selectorate. This selectorate can be inclusive, consisting of a large group including local levels of party delegates, party members and national level leaders; or exclusive, which only includes a small group of people, usually the party leaders (Hazan and Rahat, 2006). Nevertheless, the demand side is not the only part of recruitment and individuals' political careers. Regarding supply-side explanation, the following paragraph is quite helpful:

> *"Supply side* explanations suggest the outcome reflects the supply of applicants wishing to pursue a political career. Constraints on resources (such as time, money and experience) and motivational factors (such as drive, ambition and interest) determine who aspires to Westminster. Most citizens, other than lunatics, traitors and peers, and a few other categories, are legally qualified to stand. Few do so. The narrow path leading to a political career is usually risky, gruelling and unglamorous. Nursing a hopeless seat for a couple of years -slogging up to the constituency every weekend, banging on unfriendly doors to drum up support, going to poorly attended party committees in draughty halls, helping to raise funds with whist drives, raffles and jumble sales, juggling work, party committees and constituency demands-requires stamina, optimism and dedication." (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 380).

Following their explanation, it is possible the argue that both the desires of the individuals to become politicians and the decisions of political parties to select among those individuals play major roles on political career patterns. The balance, or the lack of it, between these two sides of decisions is quite significant regarding political recruitment and eventual political careers. Knowing which side has the leverage shapes the strategies of these two actors, namely the party selectorate and the individuals pursuing political career. For example, if supply of possible politicians (e.g. the applicants for candidacy in elections) is in high levels in a certain district, the party which selects among them would have an upper hand as it has chance to find many possible candidates. However, if a political party faces problem of finding appropriate individuals desiring to become politicians to fill their candidate lists, then that party would need to select from only the possible ones, even if those individuals are not qualified enough. Of course, any party would choose not to select anyone to nominate as their candidate or to appoint as their

party elite, if there emerge no selectable candidates for these positions. But, parties, with vote maximizing goals, may also prefer to nominate at least several candidates rather than having no candidates in order to compete in as much electoral districts as possible.

It seems that, in many of the countries, the powerful part in the supply and demand side equation are the political parties. However, particular characteristics of individuals who would like to be recruited, or parties' power in certain constituencies matter a lot, and these will determine the characteristics of the political elite. About these, Norris and Lovenduski (1993) propose the following hypotheses: "(i) If demand-side factors are important, we would expect a significant difference in the characteristics of applicants and candidates; (ii) If supply-side factors are important, we would expect a significant difference in the characteristics of party members and applicants." (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 381). Hence, taking these points into consideration is helpful while examining the composition of political elite and political career patterns.

Figure 1.1 shows two major sides of becoming a politician, in other words, pursuing a political career regarding various explanations in the recruitment, nomination and political ambition literature. The first one is supply side as mentioned above. This side is basically related to the individuals' political ambition, opportunities and interests. Political ambition matters, because it is a vital driving factor that makes individuals to decide to enter politics and stay or leave the political arena. Opportunities matter, because, as Fox and Lawless (2005, 2011) underline, becoming a politician is a type of political participation, and it is actually the top level of that participation, rather than only voting in elections or becoming members of civil society organization. Deriving from this argument, it is vital to have certain opportunities which are also required for political participation. Additionally, an individual's interests' matter, because along with political ambition, these interests shape the decision of individuals to become politicians and stay in politics. Even if those individuals cannot be elected as representatives, or cannot become active politicians, their interests would be fulfilled depending on what they want. These interests may rely on economic gains, public offices or maybe forming networks. Regardless of their form, individual interests are also noteworthy for political careers. Moreover, resources such as flexible time and financial support also play important roles on the supply side explanation. These factors are not mutually exclusive, for example, interests and demands of individuals can also trigger or shape their political ambition. Or, political participation opportunities can shape the types of interests and ambition. Thus,

while explaining the supply side of political recruitment process, it is important to take those factors into consideration all together.

Figure 1.1: Determinants of becoming a politician



The second one is the demand side. This is about the political parties and their decisions on recruitment and candidate selection processes. Elite recruitment and candidate selection are quite closely related to each other. Nevertheless, the first one can be defined as a wider area, as it may include recruiting party elite in various levels of the party organization. Candidate selection for elections is usually defined as a more specific process: "The processes political parties use to select their candidates for public office constitute a crucial element of political recruitment in representative democracies…" (Cross and Gauja, 2014: 22). Hence, examining these processes provides a good opportunity to reveal political career patterns in a given country.

Political party organizations are composed of multiple levels, and party elites take roles in various offices. The roles of these party elites are not usually static, and political career mobility among different levels of the party is possible for them. Here, by political career mobility, one may refer to party elite's transfers amongst various positions, after they are

recruited in parties. These positions can be chairs of women or youth branches, local party branches, positions in party headquarters, party leadership, mayoral positions and legislative offices. A politician's movement alongside such positions show his or her career mobility, and it may show upward or downward movement, depending on the initial position and newly occupied position that the political actor gains. More specifically, if an individual starts with being a youth branch chairperson and then moves to local branch chair position, it means that this person experiences an upward political career mobility. Yet, not all party elites experience similar political career patterns, and more specifically, there is no one single political career pattern applicable to everyone. Similarly, candidates running in local and national elections may also have complex political careers. The reason for this is that political career mobility is not dependent on standard practices, and different parties may show different patterns with regard to this phenomenon. Then, what affects the political career patterns of political elites? Before answering such a question, it is important to remember that among the different levels of parties, recruitment of party elites –for both the higher levels and lower levels- and candidate selection in elections, are two of the most important parts of this decision making. These decisions affect a huge number of people within the parties, and those selected individuals will occupy pivotal positions.

This dissertation aims to unearth the practices behind the political elite recruitment and political career patterns within the Turkish political parties between 2002 and 2015, with specific reference to deputies (Milletvekili - MPs) of Turkish Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* – TBMM), candidates running in general elections, and local party elites. Several studies regarding recruitment patterns and career paths of political elites focus on party activists on the lower levels of the party organizations (Seligman 1961, 1964; Bowman and Boynton 1966; Eldersveld, 1989) while some analyze legislative and ministerial recruitment (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; De Almeida et al., 2003). In Turkey, socioeconomic backgrounds of the party elites, their interactions with the central party offices, and their motivations have been analyzed in a similar fashion (Frey, 1965, Tachau, 1973; Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010); and similar studies have also been done regarding legislative elites and ministerial recruitment patterns (Kışlalı, 1976; Kalaycıoğlu, 1995; Sayarı and Hasanov, 2008; Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 2011).

Being closely related to recruitment studies, candidate selection literature also provides information about political elites. As indicated above, such studies have been conducted both in national and local levels. These studies analyze "who selects" with regard to exclusiveness or inclusiveness of the selectorate and internal party democracy (Hazan and Rahat, 2006; Rahat, 2007; Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2015); "who gets selected" with regard to socioeconomic characteristics, political experience, incumbency and political motivation of the candidates (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Ballington, 2004; Rallings et al., 2008, 2010) and "what effects" those processes, such as political regime, party system, size of party, regional differences and party ideology (Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014; Kernell, 2015). Additionally, political ambition literature (Schlesinger, 1966; Prewitt and Nowlin, 1969; Black, 1972; Soskice et al., 1992; Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2010, 2011; Vanlangenakker, 2010; Kerevel, 2013) reflects significant clues about political careers.

Keeping the previous studies in mind, this dissertation seeks answers to the following questions: The main research question of the dissertation is "What are the determinants of political career patterns of political elite in Turkey?" While answering this question, two important factors will be analyzed: political recruitment and political ambition. Moreover, there emerges two sub research questions from the main question. The first one is related to political recruitment: "Why and how do some individuals become first-ranked candidates in general elections even though they have never run in elections prior to their candidacy?" The second one is related to political ambition: "Why do some individuals become candidates in general elections even though their electability chances are low?". Even though these two sub questions are introduced as being related to political recruitment and political ambition separately, they are not completely disconnected from one another. Hence, the interaction between political recruitment and political ambition is also worth taking into consideration while answering these questions. Detailed explanation and reasoning of research questions and hypotheses are available in Chapter 6; however, the following pages provide a summary of those.

Determinants of political career patterns may change over time. For example, a legislature may be dominated by legislators whose backgrounds are more homogeneous, but the composition of that legislature may alter by sociological changes in the society, emergence of new relevant parties or closures of existing parties. Moreover, the composition within party groups may show differences through time. Related to this, with

regard to general research question, the following hypotheses were tested in this dissertation:

Hypothesis 1a: Ideological differences of parties have impact on the socioeconomic composition of their MPs.

Hypothesis 1b: Acquiring party experience has a positive effect on re-nomination of the MPs in the next elections.

Legislative experience is important for being chosen by political parties to be nominated in general elections. A number of MPs serve for multiple terms in legislatures. One may expect that parties reward such MPs by nominating them from electable districts and ranks. Nevertheless, newcomers who do not have any prior legislative experience are also nominated by political parties. It is not surprising to observe new candidates nominated in party lists, even though they did not become MPs before. What is surprising it to see that such newcomers are ranked first on the party lists. Then, why and how do some individuals become first ranked candidates in general elections, even though they have never run in elections prior to their candidacy? One would expect that first-time, first-ranked candidates either have public appeal, or party experience in a given district. Nevertheless, being nominated as a first rank candidate on a party list does not always result in being rewarded. Depending on the party's electoral base and success in a given district, individuals who are ranked first would have even less electability chance compared to the ones who are nominated in districts with larger voter support, even though they are not first-ranked candidates. Under those circumstances, investing in politics is still not a rewarding act. Hence, in reference to the first sub research question, the following hypothesis is tested in this dissertation:

Hypothesis 2: Inadequate electoral support (i.e. insufficient vote share to win seats in a particular district) for political parties increases the number of first-time first-ranked candidates on party lists in general elections.

There may be two important reasons to see first-time first-ranked candidates in electorally flawed districts for parties: Individual politicians may not want to invest in that position anymore, or the parties may want to change those candidates, as they cannot increase their vote support.

Generally, many candidate nominees compete with each other to be selected by the parties and nominated on their lists. Not all candidate nominees can achieve this goal. Those who are selected by the parties as candidates become closer to legislative careers. Nevertheless, not all candidates among the selected ones enjoy the same chances of electability on the party lists either. Some are nominated on the higher ranks, which show higher likelihood of becoming an MP, while others need to compromise to be nominated as lower rank candidates. Then, why do some individuals become candidates even though their electability chance is low? With regard to this second sub research question, the following hypotheses are tested in this dissertation:

Hypothesis 3a: Party leadership change decreases the continuity of candidates on party lists in the elections following this change.

Hypothesis 3b: Candidates who accept to be ranked in non-electable positions expect to push their ranks to electable positions over time or be rewarded by other positions in the party.

These hypotheses are tested in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, "Elite Recruitment and Political Ambition by Empirics: The Turkish Case".

1.2. Relevance of the Dissertation

Eldersveld (1989: x) defined political elites in a broad term by including not only "those at the apex of the system who obviously have power" but also "those at the lower levels of the system who hold important positions, who have influential roles, and who exercise important functions in the polity". Thus, according to this definition, various actors, from party leaders on the top to party activists on the ground are identified as political elites. Similarly, the definition of party elites in this dissertation covers ones in all levels of the party organization, from top to bottom, including the ones in the parliamentary party groups in the TBMM.[2] Yet, within this broad term, it is important to remember that each position gives different roles and power to the person who occupies that position. Even the same levels within different districts may provide different powers to political actors. For example, being a local party chairperson in İstanbul, which is socioeconomically the

[2] Please see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of the dissertation for more details on the analyzed groups of political elites.

most developed city of the country, may enable one having more power within the party than being a local party chairperson in a less developed one.[3] Or, a provincial party chairperson may possess more power than an MP to affect decision making within the party if he or she occupies a position in particular districts which are given the most importance by political parties. Thus, although all the party actors are included in this definition of party elites, there is a certain differentiation among them. This also applies to relevant significance of different offices. Analyzing these differentiations has importance in order to explain political career patterns of these elites. Examination of these topics are provided in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

Researching the recruitment and candidate selection (both in national and local elections) literatures provides a good overview, in order to examine the recruitment and career mobility patterns of party elites. The studies on both recruitment patterns and candidate selection procedures usually employ the analysis of socioeconomic backgrounds of the political elites. Recruitment of political elite studies have mainly two strands which focus on national level recruitment and local level recruitment patterns. More specifically, a number of scholars focus on party activists on the lower levels of the party organizations (Seligman, 1961, 1964; Bowman and Boynton, 1966; Eldersveld, 1989) while some analyze legislative and ministerial recruitment (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; De Almeida et al., 2003). As mentioned previously, various scholars also focus on candidate selection strategies and methods of parties (see e.g., Hazan and Rahat, 2006; Rahat, 2007; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Ballington, 2004; Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014; Kernell, 2015). Although quite a number of recruitment studies are available for various countries, literature covering political career patterns in Turkey still needs to be developed. Thus, a recent and further research would contribute to the literature, and this further research can be carried out through analyzing political career patterns, including the political ambition characteristics of these elites, as in this dissertation.

What is the relevance of the Turkish case? The Turkish case provides a good opportunity to analyze political career patterns under a pre-dominant party system[4] (Gumuscu, 2013;

[3] For further information about the socioeconomic development of the provinces of Turkey, please see TÜİK's data such as urban-rural proportions of the provinces, energy consumption by provinces, GDP per capita by provinces, employment by provinces; and the report of Kalkınma Bakanlığı (2013) titled "İllerin ve Bölgelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması (SEGE-2011).

[4] Party system in Turkey has been also defined as hegemonic party system due to deficiencies in democracy and fairness of elections in the country (see e.g., Ayan Musil, 2015; Cinar, 2016).

Ayan Musil, 2015; Sayarı, 2016) in which one political party, Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* - AKP), have electoral hegemony and political dominance (Esen and Gumuscu, 2018), and other political parties having seats in the TBMM could not gain enough votes to form government by themselves since the 2002 General Elections. Although five political parties won seats in the TBMM after each election during 1990s (Turan, 2016: 113), only two political parties had chance to occupy seats. This was mostly due to the 10 percent electoral threshold which led to the elimination of political parties which were electorally more successful prior to these elections such as True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi* - DYP) and Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* - MHP); and the emergence of the AKP, which led to a change in voter behavior. After 2002 elections, in 2007 and 2011 there were three to four[5] political parties in the TBMM, and both June 2015 and November 2015 General Elections created a 4-party legislature. And, except in the June 2015 elections, the AKP won enough votes to form a party government by itself. Hence, opposition parties, the CHP, the MHP and People's Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi* – HDP) could not develop significant electoral competitiveness against the AKP. Moreover, these three parties' competition against each other was not significantly high as their ideological stances and vote bases are quite different from each other.[6] However, intra-party competition for particular offices seems to be utterly significant, especially in the incumbent party. For example, the number of candidate nominees (*aday adayları*), who are the applicants for candidacy positions in general elections, is quite high compared to the number of total candidates nominated in elections. To illustrate this, within the time frame of the analysis of this dissertation (2002-2015), each electoral district had different magnitude, and the number of candidates was determined accordingly varying between one (Bayburt in 2011 General Elections) and 31 (İstanbul District 1 and İstanbul District 3 in June 2015 General Elections). The number of seats in the TBMM was 550 in that time frame, and each party could have fielded 550 candidates in total. But, for example, the AKP received over

[5] Please see the following pages for a detailed explanation of the parties in the TBMM.

[6] Even though some CHP supporters seem to vote for the HDP in June 2015 and November 2015 General Elections, this does not create a real competition between these parties, but rather seem to a strategic voting for pushing the HDP to exceed the 10% threshold in the country. Moreover, from time to time there may be shifts of voters from the CHP to MHP or vice versa, but the portions are not significant to create an utter competition between these parties. Lastly, the vote shares of these three parties do not dramatically change from one election to another which implies that these parties more or less consolidated their voter basis. This, again, lowers the competition of those parties over particular groups of voters.

6,223[7] applications from candidate nominees for the June 2015 General Elections during this time frame, showing that a large group of people compete for a smaller number of seats. These numbers may imply that the highest level of competition is within the incumbent party; however, other parties do also have significant competition within themselves for candidate positions in general elections. For example, over 2,822 individuals applied to the CHP as candidate nominees for June 2015 General Elections.[8]

Moreover, the parties in the Parliament from 2002 to November 2015 position themselves on different points of the ideological spectrum. The AKP defines itself as a conservative democratic party and has significant religious sentiments, the CHP represents the secular democratic strand, the MHP has strong Turkish ethnic nationalist sentiments, and the HDP mainly represents Kurdish ethnic nationalist strand. Hence, selected four parties represent four main ideological stances in Turkey. This difference among them enables us to understand how various ideological attributes affect recruitment strategies of these parties, while controlling the structural characteristics.

Still, the significance of the Turkish case is not limited to the party system, party competition and ideologies. Regardless of their ideologies or electoral success, political party organizations are structurally quite similar to each other, due to legal regulations. Consequently, it provides a chance to compare the parliamentary parties in Turkey with regard to organizational structures.

Another reason to select Turkey as a case, is that the country implements a Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system with a 10% electoral threshold, which is one of the highest in the world, and the highest one among Council of Europe member countries. Although some of the other countries, such as Russia (7%), Germany (5%), Poland (5%), Austria (4%), Italy (4%), and Denmark (2%) implement electoral thresholds, Turkey presents a distinct case with 10% threshold.[9] The reason for that is that a high threshold

[7] Please see the following link for more details: http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/akpye-kac-kisi-aday-adayligi-icin-basvurdu-1428941/.

[8] Please see the following link for more details: http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/224941/CHP_den_aday_adayligi_icin_2_bin_822_kisi_basvurdu.html.

[9] For a detailed information on thresholds in Council of Europe member states, see the 2010 report of Venice Commission "Report on Thresholds and Other Features of Electoral Systems which Bar Parties from Access to Parliament (II)" adopted by the the Council for Democratic Elections at its 32nd meeting (Venice, 11 March 2010) and by the Venice Commission at its 82nd plenary session (Venice, 12-13 March 2010), from the link: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)007-e.

clearly changes the nature of competition among political parties, and consequently the likelihood of parties to win seats in legislature. According to official numbers, 84 political parties in total function actively in Turkey, as of July 2018.[10] Among those, only a small number of them can compete in elections, as the laws regulate that a party shall have local offices at least in half of the electoral districts in order to be able to run in elections. Not all political parties fulfil this requirement, hence, they are not eligible for of electoral competition. Nevertheless, the number of parties participating to general elections is still considerable. For example, 15 political parties competed in the November 2015 General Elections, even though all except the four main political parties would not expect to exceed 10% threshold and win any seats in the parliament. As a result of this election, only four (AKP, CHP, MHP, HDP) of those 15 parties gained enough votes to win seats in the TBMM. Similarly, the number of parties in the parliament was two in 2002 (AKP, CHP), three in 2007 (AKP, CHP, MHP), three[11] (AKP, CHP, MHP) in 2011 and four (AKP, CHP, MHP, HDP) in the 2015 June elections (Turan, 2016: 113). Under these circumstances, it is observable that real competition revolves around mainly three to four parties since 2007. This case provides a good opportunity to analyze continuities and changes in those parties' candidate selection strategies.

1.3. Data and Methodology of the Dissertation

In *Politics*, Aristotle (384-322 BC) argued that:

> "As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or at least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them."[12]

[10] Please see the following link for more details: https://www.yargitaycb.gov.tr/sayfa/faaliyette-olan-siyasi-partiler/documents/Spartiler19072018.pdf.

[11] This number shows the immediate election results. There were also independent elected candidates which were affiliated with Peace and Democracy Party (Barış and Demokrasi Partisi - BDP), and they form a party group in the TBMM after they got their seats. According to legal regulations in Turkey, at least 20 deputies can form a party group in the TBMM. Additionally, there was one deputy from Participatory Democracy Party (Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi – KDP) along with 6 other independents. For more details, please see the following source: TBMM. 2012. *24. Dönem TBMM Albümü*. Ankara: TBMM Basın, Yayın ve Halkla İlişkiler Başkanlığı Yayınları, p: xvii. Retrieved from: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/TBMM_Album/donem24/24_Donem_Album_20032013.pdf.

[12] Aristotle. 1996. "Politics". In *Aristotle: The Politics and The Constitution of Athens*, Stephen Everson (eds.), translated by B. Jowett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp: 9-208.

If we apply this to political parties, Sartori (1976)'s explanation comes to fore: "By studying political parties, we imply that the party is a meaningful unit of analysis. Yet we go above the party as a unit, for we also study the party system. By the same token we can go below the party as a unit and study, thereby, the party subunits." (Sartori, 1976: 71). These two significant arguments infer that studying individual politicians functioning in political parties yield helpful clues about those parties in general, and eventually about a country's politics on an upper level. Thus, it is noteworthy to analyze who becomes a politician and what the career paths are of these individuals.

This dissertation aims to explain political career patterns, hence, both elite recruitment and political ambition theories need to be included. For elite recruitment and candidate selection studies, Hazan and Rahat (2006: 110) suggest that the unit of analysis is a single party in a particular country at a specific time. From a similar perspective, the unit of analysis of political ambition studies can be identified as the individual politicians, more specifically, an individual politician in a particular country at a specific time. Moreover, "The study of political ambition is the study of motivations of politicians, and hence requires data on individuals." (Black, 1972: 145). Data on individuals both include biographical data such as date and place of birth, father's occupation, level and type of education, place of education, occupation, gender and political experience, and data compiled through interviews with these political actors. For example, some scholars employ variables such as "age, ideology, share of the vote in the previous election, district size and hierarchical position in committees, in an effort to explain the career decisions..." since "Institutional variables (such as type of electoral system, party system and nomination procedure) […] cannot explain all the variation in political career choices." (Leoni et al., 2004: 111).

Following the above-mentioned information, the unit of analysis of the dissertation is individual politicians, and analyses rely on two original datasets, and in-depth interviews with local party elites. More specifically, biographical data of political elites analyzed in this dissertation contain general elections candidates' data (9,350 of them) and members of the TBMM data (2,750 of them) for the AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP for five general elections (2002-2015).[13] The variables coded under biographical information are: age,

[13] These numbers show the total number of candidates and elected members for the mentioned elections. Although there are continuities across the elections both candidate-wise and MP-wise, each candidate and each elected MP at

birth place, gender, education, foreign language knowledge and occupational backgrounds of these individuals. Political experience contains number of served terms in the parliament, commission membership, bill initiation, other political office experience such as mayoral or municipal council membership experience, and party work experience of individuals. Demographical data consists of population, migration, education levels. In order to code biographical information of candidates and elected members, official candidate lists, and election results announced by Supreme Election Council of Turkey (*Yüksek Seçim Kurulu* - YSK) and Official Gazette (*Resmi Gazete*) were used. However, these sources do not provide all the necessary information for the analysis in this dissertation. Thus, biographies of the MPs provided on the official website of the TBMM, Albums of the TBMM (*TBMM Albümleri*), on the official party websites and MPs' personal websites were also used while compiling the data. National newspapers were also searched for additional information. Reasons for employing some of the above-mentioned variables are as follows, yet more comprehensive analyses of those variables are provided in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

1.3.1. Socioeconomic Backgrounds of the Political Elites

Age of the political elites. An analysis of the ages of party elites provide us with clues about the questions, such as 'At what age do they usually start their political career? Do younger ones have more prospective plans to experience an upward career mobility? Do older ones have necessarily more political experience? And, what are the differences among political parties with regard to the composition of their politicians?'

Gender of the political elites. Political parties in Turkey have different views on gender. Although there is no legally binding rule for gender quotas for national or local candidates in elections in Turkey, the CHP and HDP implement gender quota as stated in the party by-laws, whereas the AKP does not support it, arguing that it is an insult to the women, that they should start from the bottom and get higher positions by their own work. Yet, some AKP members are against this idea, and they argue that it is the local politics, not the parliament, who put certain barriers in front of the women, because it is significantly

an election stands for a unique observation. Details of the datasets are available in Chapter 6 on data analysis and findings.

more difficult for women to climb the ladders from bottom to top, and only an application of a gender quota would ease it (Tür and Çıtak, 2010: 619-620). Thus, analysis of this variable will enable us to answer questions such as, "Do we observe different patterns between different genders?" "Do women face more difficulties in recruitment and political career mobility?"

Birth place and localism characteristics of political elites. As Frey (1975) underlines, comparison of the birth and work places of political elites is a defining factor for localism. If the political elites (deputies in Frey's case) were born in the provinces which they represent, it is defined as localism. And if localism emerges, personal and proximate ties with the constituents can exist, which may provide us with important clues about their relationships with the electorate. Additionally, existing studies also focus on the fathers' birth places to understand whether their children (who are the political elites in these studies) have a connection with the same place, or whether these people have a rooted localism in that specific place.

Educational background of the political elites. Educational attainment is one of the most standardized measures that enable us to compare party elites. Although different countries have different understandings of educational attainment in terms of years to complete and quality of education, we can assume that a huge portion of the political elites have similar educational system background. Among these educational institutions, it is important to analyze whether those people attended religious schools, e.g. *İmam Hatip* Schools, which can be an indicator of conservatism and Islamic sentiments. Several studies unearthed that larger proportion of party elites have religious education in a conservative party (Sayarı and Hasanov, 2008), and similarly, a positive correlation between conservatism and religious education has been unearthed in other studies (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007). Thus, by analyzing their educational attainment, it is possible to observe which parties recruit party elites with what level of educational backgrounds, and whether religious school graduates tend to be recruited by conservative parties, and whether parties recruit party elites who have different overall educational backgrounds in different districts.

Occupational backgrounds of the political elites. Many studies reveal that occupational backgrounds which enable the elites with a certain amount of wealth (to spend to cover their party expenses and election campaigns) and flexible working hours are quite important factors to be successful and sustainable in politics (Norris and Lovenduski,

1993; Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Uysal and Topak, 2010). By analyzing the occupational backgrounds of the party elites, answers can be found for the questions like "What type of occupations do we observe in different parties", "Are there any clear patterns for political parties to select one occupational group over the others?", and "Do party elites believe that certain jobs ease the upward career mobility of party elite and candidates?

1.3.2. Political Experience and Motivation of Political Elites

Lawson (1976) unearthed why people become party members and what their interests are to do so. Some other scholars specify these questions by focusing on political elites (not only the members but also those who occupy particular positions) as the local party bosses, councilors, legislative elites and ministers (e.g. Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Rallings et al., 2008, 2010). One may infer that political experience and incumbency can ease upward career mobility, and motivation of the party elites can also be a triggering factor for this. With regard to motivation of the party elites, previous studies analyzed the influence of those party elites' families, especially their fathers, (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010) in order to understand how those politicians were influenced by their families to participate in politics. To illustrate, Uysal and Topak (2010: 59-78) conducted in-depth interviews with various local party actors, and unearthed that families, friends, residency and experiences do play a significant role on their party membership, and political road map in general. Yet, some party elites also indicate that they were asked by party leadership to run in elections or occupy particular offices (e.g. Rallings et al., 2009, Ayan, 2009), therefore invitation by parties also plays a major role for starting a political career. Thus, there can be different influential factors in terms of motivation of the party elites. One can observe by looking at the candidate lists in the National Elections, and some local party organizations' webpages, a number of those party elites that have been candidates for several times in general elections. Some have been occupying the same positions in local branches for years without climbing to a higher position. What can be their motivation behind this? Do they want to stay in their current position, or climb the ladder? Do they think that they themselves can gain another (preferably higher) position, or can the party's higher authorities enable them to do so? This dissertation also intends to find answers to such questions via conducted interviews.

Legislative experience, party experience and other elected office experience are added to dataset for the measurement of political experience in general. More specifically, three variables are used for legislative experience which are number of served term in the TBMM, committee membership and bill initiation. Along with these, previously occupied party seats and other elected offices such as mayoral positions are included.

Political experience is also closely related to being experienced with the constituents. In other words, the ones who have been interacting with the constituents and learning their interests or demands can have higher chances to remain in positions of influence in politics. In the Turkish case, the relationship between the political elite and the voters usually rely on clientelistic practices (Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Sayarı, 2011). Many legislative elites have been creating proximate relations with the voters and dealing with those voters' demands, such as finding jobs and providing health care. For example, Kalaycıoğlu (1995) analyzed the Turkish parliamentarians' "attitudes towards their parties and opponents," "political beliefs and values" and "social backgrounds" in 1984 and in 1988, and unearthed the relationship between the deputies and the constituents regarding clientelistic linkages. This finds that constituency demands from the deputies have been mostly personal ones. Concomitantly, a significant number of the deputies (more than a half) have been spending their time –as a regular activity- on "finding jobs and providing other services or benefits for constituents" (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 47, 49). Moreover, the constituents seem to be aware of the advantages of competitive political arena which provides them a chance to swap the "patrons" who will bring services (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001: 62-63). Both lower level party elites and legislative elites face quite a number of demands coming from the constituents, and if they cannot, or do not satisfy those demands, it can affect their political career negatively. So, it can be important to be aware of the practices in politics to gain a higher chance of upward mobility in the party. The information on these connections and networks was gathered by drawing upon a series of in-depth political elite interviews in this dissertation.

1.3.3. Party Ideology and Organization

One can argue that party ideologies and organizational structure may create a variance among parties with regard to elite recruitment and political career mobility patterns. Yet,

the organizational schema of Turkish political parties does not show major differences from each other. In other words, the organizational structures of the Turkish political parties are very similar to each other due to the regulations of the SPK (Bektaş, 1993: 39; Erdem, 2001: 85). The reason for this is that both the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and the SPK regulate political party structures in a strict and standardized way. Then, if not the organizational structures, what can constitute the difference between the parties with regard to relationship between different levels which may influence the recruitment and career mobility patterns? Does party ideology affect the way that the party elites occupy and change positions? Do the leftist or the rightist parties have differing composition of their elite? Such questions are also important to explain in order to understand political career patterns.

1.3.4. Electoral Results and Regional Characteristics

Political culture of regions can and do show differences in Turkey. A possible way to measure those differences is to look at the vote shares of the four political parties included in this research. As indicated above, these four parties represent four main ideological stances of the country, namely conservatism along with religiosity, secularism, Turkish nationalism and Kurdish nationalism. The number of votes and elected number of members are included for each party per each district between 2002 and 2015 to the MPs Dataset. Districts with the highest and the lowest vote shares for each party may reveal helpful clues with regard to party competition and its effect on career patterns.[14]

As explained, those two datasets were prepared to examine the research questions and test the hypotheses. However, the datasets are not the sole data to rely on in the dissertation.

According to Duverger (1964), those who are most knowledgeable about the power structure and organizational dynamics of parties are the experienced party members and activists. Therefore, in order to grasp the political ambition prospects of political actors, I conducted a series of in-depth interviews with 23 local party actors from four political

[14] The HDP constitues a special case in this analysis, as it run for elections as a party only in the last two general elections in 2015 within the time frame which analyzed in the dissertation. Nevertheless, depending on the precessors of this party which were closed down previously, we can find the districts where the HDP has its most and least power.

parties in Turkey, in İstanbul, Antalya, Adana, Kayseri and Denizli. These interviews provide complementary information about political ambitions and recruitment patterns of parties to explain career patterns. While preparing interview questions, previous research (see e.g., Kalaycıoğlu, 1995; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Ayan, 2009; Rallings et al., 2010; Uysal and Topak, 2010) provided important points to take into consideration. In order to compare the results in this dissertation with those previous studies conducted on parliamentary elites and recruitment patterns, several similar questions are included in the interview question list.

Ambition is identified as a "psychological predisposition" which makes a systematic analysis of it to be difficult and problematic (Hibbing, 1989: 28). Moreover, it is underlined that "It is easier to assert that career ambitions shape legislative behavior than it is to diagnose what those ambitions are. One way to do this is to study members' career routes to and from the assembly..." (Scarrow, 1997: 255). Nevertheless, it is still possible to categorize various political actors depending on their political ambition types. For example, Schlesinger (1966) opened the way of political ambition theories by classifying three main types of ambition: progressive, static and discrete. This assumed that an individual who seeks a higher office has progressive ambition, while one who seeks the same office (re-election) shows static ambition, and the one who seeks retirement after a certain period of time in a political office shows discrete ambition. Similarly, some assumptions show that "…everyone who seeks a higher office has progressive ambition, that members seeking leadership posts harbor intrainstitutional ambition, while those who remain in the house without moving on to another post have static ambition." (Herrick and Moore, 1993: 765). Details of these theories are available in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Depending on these explanations, a categorization of political elites in Turkey is present in Chapter 7.

As in other studies (see e.g., Dal Bo et al., 2017: 1878-79), this dissertation contains some data limitation due to difficulties in arranging interviews with party elite in different districts. Hence, although data on MPs and candidates are available to a large extent, interviews do not include members from all parties in a given district. Additionally, it is possible to find official data on candidates; however, data on applicants or candidate nominees are unfortunately not available to a large extent. Newspapers give information about the number of these candidates for nomination, but the political parties do not provide detailed lists of those individuals. Acquiring information about the pool of all

available candidates for nomination is crucial for a better analysis of who are selected among them and nominated as candidates by parties; however, unavailability of such data hinders doing so. Moreover, conducting in-depth interviews has not been easy, as many of the elite mention that they are not available for such an interview with their busy schedules. Although such limitations are present, the data compiled for this dissertation still provides considerable insight about political recruitment, ambition and career patterns in Turkey.

1.4. Plan of the Dissertation

As indicated in the previous pages, the aim of this dissertation is to explain political career patterns in Turkish political parties. This is achieved by analyzing the practices behind the political elite recruitment strategies of parties, and analyzing the political ambition of individuals engaging with these parties. To fulfil this goal, it is necessary to review first the recruitment and candidate selection, and the political ambition literature to understand the practices and theories. A detailed explanation of party politics in Turkey follows these chapters, and examination of respective literatures on Turkey is provided to better understand the peculiarities of this case. Specifics of data analysis and discussion on results comes after these chapters. The following paragraphs show how the dissertation is organized structurally more in detail.

Chapter 2 explains party recruitment and its importance on political careers. More specifically, details of party recruitment and candidate selection strategies of political parties are explained, with the aid of a review of respective literature. Additionally, various types of party recruitment and candidate selection, such as inclusive and exclusive methods are discussed. After an extensive analysis of these topics, candidate selection strategies under different settings (such as under different electoral systems or party systems) are studied and compared.

Chapter 3 explains political ambition and its significance on political careers. Various types of political ambition theories are explained with a broad literature review, and their reflections on political career patterns are examined in this chapter. Additionally, factors

influencing political ambition and eventual politicians' decisions to remain in or out of politics are discussed.

Chapter 4 provides information about party politics in Turkey. Before going through the specifics of party recruitment and political ambition in the country, this chapter explains the political culture, electoral system(s), party organization, legal regulations on political parties, party system(s) and party competition in the country. Additionally, two significant characteristics of Turkish political parties and their relations with the voters are explained under two different sub-sections, namely centralist structures of political parties and clientelism.

Chapter 5 explains elite recruitment patterns and political ambition in Turkey. More specifically, it identifies major characteristics of party strategies in recruitment and candidate selection. Reviewing the previously conducted studies, this chapter aims to explain past practices and their possible reflections to today. It also provides practices of previously active and electorally successful political parties in the country. Additionally, this chapter provides information on previous research on party elite and parliamentary elite, and their possible career choices with regard to political ambition in the country.

Chapter 6 presents a detailed explanation of proposed hypotheses, data analysis and findings with regard to determinants of career patters of political elite, first-time first-ranked candidates, and candidates with low chance of electability in Turkey. It provides a comparison of political parties in terms of the composition of their MPs, alternation in that composition over time and strategies about candidate selection.

Chapter 7 provides personal insights gathered via in-depth interviews with local party actors in the country regarding political ambition and career choices. More specifically, it explains individual politicians' interests, motivations and entrance to politics. This chapter also represents discussions on varying categories of political ambition in Turkey.

Chapter 8 presents the concluding remarks and prospects for future studies.

CHAPTER 2

ELITE RECRUITMENT BY PARTIES AND POLITICAL CAREER

2.1. What is Elite Recruitment by Political Parties?

Political parties are identified as organizations which reflect various ideas, interests, and can form governments with meaningful and coherent programs (Bale, 2005). Political parties also provide opportunities for political participation, representation of citizens and ideologies. Other organizations such as civil society organizations also provide channels for representation and political participation, yet Key (1942) argued that the interest groups try to influence the government, but these groups do not run for elections for forming a government. Political parties, on the other hand, nominate candidates and run in elections in order to control or become a part of the government, or at least to occupy some seats in legislatures. Consequently, "Parties are powerful policy makers, especially in parliamentary systems." (Detterbeck, 2011: 245), and they function as policy makers with the help of their recruited political actors.

Political parties are relatively recent organizations in the world's political history. Politicians, however, have been in politics much longer than political parties. Over time, the politicians started to need specific organizations in order to ease the coordination, policy making and candidate selection through elections times:

> "The very scale of the contemporary polities and the electoral and parliamentary dynamics of representative democracies have in turn prompted politicians to create or join electoral and legislative 'terms' of parties, that is, stable organizations through which politicians coordinate their political activity across electoral districts, in parliamentary assemblies, and in executive or governmental committees." (Boix: 2007: 499).

In fact, with the exception of a small number of countries, many countries contain political parties in the contemporary world, and all modern democracies contain "some type of political party" (Moser, 1999: 147). Moreover, "…there are a few small, traditional societies, especially in the Persian Gulf, that are still ruled by the families who were dominant … Then there are those regimes in which parties and party activities have been banned; these regimes are run either by the military or by authoritarian rulers who have the support of the military." (Ware, 1996: 1). Except such examples, many countries -democratic or not- have political parties. Hence, "…it is scarcely imaginable how democratic governance could function in nation-states with millions of inhabitants without political parties to frame electoral options, aggregate and articulate social demands, and translate them into public policy." (Moser, 1999: 147). Although they may show differences with regard to their organizational structures and functions, with the emergence of popular sovereignty and mass politics as the fount of political legitimacy for political systems, political parties have become central actors of both national and local politics.

Definitions of political parties reflect their organizational characteristics and their interface with the mass public. One of the oldest explanations is what Burke (1770: 372) once wrote: "Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular on which they are all agreed." From a rather similar perspective, but with a clear addition of competitive race, Schumpeter (1942: 283) described a political party as "a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power", while Aldrich (1995: 283-84) explained the political parties as "coalitions of elites to capture and use political office." Aldrich (1995: 283-84) also added that the party organizations are more than those coalitions, as "…a major political party is an institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms, and procedures." Definitions of political parties varied over time. Even though there is no one single definition of political parties, a common, extended and accepted explanation is that "A political party is an autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making nominations and contesting elections in the hope of gaining control over governmental power through the capture of public offices and the organization of the government." (Huckshorn, 1984: 10). Inferring from this definition, it is clear that political parties are organizations which are in need of human resources and financial resources in order to realize their goals. Among those necessities, human resources are perhaps the most

crucial one. For this reason, it is not a coincidence that "…Political parties are central participants in the recruitment of political personnel, both for the elective and appointive office..." (Katz, 2014: 204). More specifically, "…One classic function of political parties concerns their gatekeeping role in nominating candidates for office at all levels of government…" (Norris, 2006: 89).

But, how do those parties find their personnel to work and candidates to run in elections? From the individuals' perspective, why do people want to work for political parties and/or run in elections with their tickets? Such questions are vital while understanding party politics in general. Specifically, on party recruitment studies it is highlighted that "…The study of recruitment is of substantial interest to the political scientist who seek to understand and explain why an individual chooses to run for office rather than merely vote, contribute to a campaign or actively work to see a candidate other than himself elected" (Levine and Hyde, 1977: 959-960).

This explanation is not only about parties' decisions of who to recruit, but also about who -as individuals- would like to be recruited. As explained in the Introduction of this Dissertation, these processes are two major sides of political careers: supply side and demand side which together provide explanations about political recruitment and ambition. Thus, party recruitment is closely related to political ambition in that regard. However, before explaining political ambition, it is necessary that political recruitment be examined and explained. This chapter is dedicated to exploring this by building on the existing comparative politics literature on party recruitment and candidate selection.

Why does the analyzing of elite recruitment by parties matter? As being political organizations, political parties are composed of individual members, and knowing the characteristics of these people ease the understanding of the internal features of those organizations. Political elites have been analyzed by several scholars with regard to their positions that they occupy, their significance in decision making processes and their power relations (Michels, 1915; Mills, 1956; Pareto, 1968). Bendix (1953) once argued that "…a study of politics should be concerned with the social composition of the members and leaders of different political organizations…" According to Quandt (1969: 4), the rationale behind this argument is that such information will yield clues about the "political goals" of those politicians. For example, parties' prominent or established elites may have decisions to implement alternation in the organizational structures of parties

for their own interests (see e.g., Panebianco, 1988) which may imply the importance of their influence on decision making process. Thus, as we analyze elite recruitment patterns, we understand more about the composition of political parties. And as we understand that composition in bits and pieces by looking at individual politicians, we interpret more and more information about the political parties as a whole. Moreover, following Crotty's (1968) arguments, Cross (2008: 600) takes attention to the "relative significance of candidate nomination" by proposing that the process of candidate selection is crucial, as it has an effect on the group of politicians who will take place in decision-making, and indirectly influence the policy making decisions. Hence, studying elite recruitment and candidate selection also yields knowledge about who occupies pivotal offices with regard to decision-making processes. This is actually one of the most discussed issues in political history. Who rules and how, for whom, and who are the ruled questions raised by many philosophers, including Aristotle, and they are closely related to the recruitment process. Indeed, studies on political elites occupy a large room in the literature. The reason is that politicians have crucial roles in policy making and decision-making processes, and consequently, directly or indirectly affect the citizens' lives. "The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions..." (Mills, 1956: 3-4).

In addition, "The identity of politicians influences which policies get selected, how well they are implemented, and who benefits from them." (Dal Bo et al., 2017: 1877-1878), and according to these scholars, it is applicable both in authoritarian and representative regimes. If the politicians are autocrats, they are not really bound by checks and balances, thus, they may use their arbitrary power. Consequently, those politicians' personal characteristics determine the policy making and enacting processes to a large extent. Nevertheless, even if there are more constraints on political elite in democracies, the identities of the politicians under such regimes are also determinative in decision making.

Above-mentioned questions are also related to power relations and having opportunity for controlling the party -and if elected, state- resources. For this, not only party offices, but other offices would also be offered to the recruited politicians. The following quotation clearly explains how different types of appointments can be made:

> "Political recruitment is not just a matter of nominating elected representatives at local, regional, national, and subnational levels, the core focus of this chapter, but also of filling a wide range of patronage appointments to public office. This is exemplified by party nominations to the proliferation of non-governmental organizations in Britain, the thousands of positions in various government branches and federal agencies allocated by the patronage of the incoming American president, and the depth of patron–client relations in Brazil. The process of recruitment to elected and appointed office is widely regarded as one of the most important residual functions for parties, with potential consequences for the degree of intra-party conflict, the composition of parliaments and governments, and the accountability of elected members." (Norris, 2006: 89).

Thus, the process and consequence of recruitment are significant. But, how does the recruitment process work? It is obvious that party recruitment has a large number of different steps. For example, according to Norris (2006: 89), there are several factors influencing the candidate recruitment process:

> "Certification stage which involves electoral laws, party rules and informal social norms defines the eligibility of the candidates; nomination stage involves supply of eligibles seeking office and the demand from selectors when deciding who is nominated; and election stage as the final step determining which nominees win legislative office." In other words, a group of candidates are selected from a large pool of eligible individuals by the party selectorate, and then the electorate elects from that relatively narrowed pool of candidates in both local and national elections. A very clear way to explain this process is that "…many are eligible, few are nominated, and even fewer succeed." (Norris, 2006: 89).

Party recruitment does not operate in a similar way in each political setting. It is underlined that "There is substantial variance in the degree of democratization of candidate selection processes used by parties…" (Cross, 2008: 598). Moreover, as a significant factor, candidate selection processes may create power struggles among the party leaders within political parties (Michels, 1915). Two of the most well received categorizations of party recruitment depends on "Who recruits?" and "Who nominates?" questions. Basically, the size of the group of people (i.e. the selectorate) in the party which decide who to recruit is important. Hazan and Rahat (2001, 2007) use this categorization to differentiate between inclusive and exclusive party nomination, and candidate selection methods. Many scholars underline the significance of centralization with regard to inclusiveness and exclusiveness of candidate selection (see e.g., Epstein, 1980; Gallagher, 1988; Katz, 2001; Rahat and Hazan, 2001, 2007; Lundell, 2004). Across these studies, "…there is an implicit assumption that selection made at the local level is more

democratic, as the decision is decentralized to those who will be represented by the candidate, and that the more persons eligible to participate in the selection process the better, as this enfranchises more voters...” (Cross, 2008: 598). Thus, including the party members, delegates, and grassroots to the recruitment and nomination processes provide a good environment for an inclusive and more democratized candidate selection. Regarding this, some political parties implement primaries in order to expand their selectorate. However, primaries are not compulsory in every country, and parties may choose to implement an exclusive types of candidate selection method. Under those circumstances, what Hazan and Rahat (2001) explain about the inclusivity or exclusivity of selectorate in the process of party recruitment and candidate selection plays an important role. The reason behind this is that “…in some systems, the party selection part is most significant, as general election voters have little or no opportunity to influence the relative ranking of a party’s candidates, while in others general election voters have essentially unfettered choice in selecting which candidates, from a large pool, are elected...” (Cross, 2008: 601).

Elite recruitment and candidate nomination are affected by numerous factors. Among those factors, legal requirements or restrictions would play an important role in terms of eligibility of the candidates. A variety of regulations on this issue, such as age limit, citizenship, or residency requirements can be applicable in various countries (Massicotte et al., 2004). More specifically, “The main legal regulations include those relating to age, citizenship, residence, incompatibilities, monetary deposits, and the need to gather supporting signatures.” (Norris, 2006). Additionally, there emerges a second form of restrictions on candidacy: “…it may declare membership of parliament / legislature or the presidency incompatible with various offices, which caveat obliges candidates, once elected, to relinquish the other offices.” (Massicotte et al., 2004: 40).

Among the candidacy requirements in various countries, one of the most referenced examples is what once Obler (1974) presented and was then mentioned by several other scholars (Hazan and Rahat, 2006:111; Norris, 2006: 91) about the Belgian Socialist Party:

> “While the exact requirements vary from one constituency to another, they generally stipulate that to be placed on the primary ballot aspirants must (1) have been a member of the Socialist party, trade union, co-operative and insurance association for at least five years prior to the primary; (2) have made annual minimum purchases from the Socialist co-op; (3) have been a regular subscriber to the

> party's newspaper; (4) have sent his children to state rather than Catholic schools; and (5) have his wife and children enrolled in the appropriate women's and youth organizations. These conditions, in effect, require that a candidate serve as a member of an activist subculture before he becomes eligible to run for Parliament. They involve a form of enforced socialization during which it is assumed (or hoped) that the aspirant will absorb the appropriate values and attitudes as well as a keen commitment to the party." (Obler, 1974: 180).

Along with legal restrictions, the method of candidate selection, especially the composition of party selectorate, is also significant for the filtering of recruited personnel and nominated candidates. Previous paragraphs provide the definition of party recruitment in general. Eligibility of the candidates is identified as the first step of party recruitment process. As explained in the previous section, many legal regulations would occur which affect the candidacy process. Nevertheless, the second step -identified as nomination stage by Norris (2006)- has been one of the most significant processes about recruitment. Thus, focusing on nomination strategies of political parties is noteworthy while explaining career patterns.

Elite recruitment and candidate selection patterns differ from one country to another. For example, Samuels (2008) argued that political party leaders have a certain amount of control over candidate selection in national elections, allocation of campaign resources, patronage and politicians′ career advancement after legislative office holding. In Turkey, many party leaders exert high degrees of such control power over above mentioned issues (Hale, 2002; Ayan, 2014). However, Brazilian party leaders do not possess a control over those issues with regard to legislative careers of politicians (Samuels, 2008). Nevertheless, methods and strategies of elite recruitment and candidate selection do not differ only from one country to another, but they also vary among parties functioning in the same country. Several reasons may contribute to this difference. Along with the above-mentioned legal regulations, the electoral system, party system and candidate selection methods with regard to inclusiveness and exclusiveness are major determinants of recruitment. The following sections are organized to explain and understand these differing types of party recruitment.

2.2. Elite Recruitment, Candidate Selection and Re-nomination

Many studies have been conducted on the recruitment and nomination of political elite, more specifically legislative, local and party elites. Among those, deputies/MPs and cabinet ministers are defined as legislative elites. In democratic regimes, these politicians present themselves as possible candidates, run in elections, and are popularly elected. Legislative elites occupy significant offices in politics. For this reason, they are identified as "the core group of decision makers" (De Almeida and Pinto, 2005: 4). Since these politicians are identified as pinnacle in the decision-making and law-making process, there have been many studies which examine their characteristics, strategies and behavior. The recruitment patterns of these politicians and socioeconomic composition of legislative branch were frequently analyzed in order to explain politics in a given country from non-democracies to democracies. To illustrate, political elite's acts in Iran's patrimonial system (Bill, 1975), legislative elite's socioeconomic and biographical backgrounds in Iraq (Marr, 1975), the influence of social transformation on legislative elite recruitment and circulation patterns in Lebanon (Khalaf, 1980); and effects of political and social alternation on legislative elite turnout in Israel (Gutmann, 1980) are some of the studies conducted in rather non-democratic regimes. Studies also examined how regime change or various regime types affect the social backgrounds of ministerial elites in Spain (Linz et al., 2005); how "substantial control exercised by provincial-party bosses over the candidate recruitment and selection process in Argentina endows these bosses with considerable influence over national politics" (Jones, 2008: 73); how party leaders' choices for appointing "parachuting" candidates affects the composition of candidates and legislative behavior of the elected in Canada where parties usually have decentralized candidate selection methods (Koop and Bittner, 2011); what are the recruitment patterns of the political elite in the UK (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993), and how "generational, occupational and institutional" backgrounds of legislative elite have altered through time to create a new type of elite in Soviet Russia (Lane and Ross, 1994), and how socioeconomic composition of ministerial elites changed over time in Turkey (Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 2011). Along with the legislative elite, political party elite in general takes the attention of many scholars in various countries. From top to lower ranks, party elites in various levels have been studied. Especially party leadership (Martz, 1992), relationship between party headquarters and local offices (Biezen, 2000), significance and role of party grassroots and recruitment of local party officials (Bowman and

Boynton, 1966), party activists (Hirschfield et al., 1962), and professional staff of parties (Webb and Kolodny, 2006) have been examined under different settings.

Regarding the previous recruitment studies, it can be said that, parties do not only recruit their local and national office chairpersons and professional workers, but they also nominate their candidates in elections. Candidate nomination may be defined as one of the subsets of the recruitment process in that regard. Nevertheless, not all parties follow the same or similar manner for candidate nomination, and their strategies are shaped by various factors. First of all, parties' primary goals are important. Although in theory all parties pursue the goal of winning seats in legislative assemblies, and forming the government, or at least be a coalition member, these goals are not, in practice, always fulfilled. In fact, political parties with little chance of forming the government or being a part of it may be aware of their possible share of votes. Such parties may be seeking only votes rather than government office so that they can at least occupy seats in legislature. Regarding this issue, rational choice scholars suggest three types of party behavior: "(1) vote-seeking, (2) office-seeking, and (3) policy-seeking models…" (Strom, 1990: 566). Especially during elections, vote-seeking and office-seeking behaviors may influence each other and make parties nominate individuals who can attract the electorate and maximize the parties' votes, so that eventually they can occupy seats in legislative branch (Hobolt and Høyland, 2011; Pemstein et al., 2015).

However, parties cannot always find experienced and distinguishable candidates (Norris, 1997), and "…A party with visible, loyal, experienced, and knowledgeable candidates is likely to be successful at the polls and in government. However, not all available candidates have these desirable qualities. Parties must therefore manage their candidates as scarce resources during elections..." (Pemstein et al., 2015: 1422).

Thus, depending on their goals, parties may adopt different strategies in candidate nomination. They may even prefer not to nominate any candidates if the likelihood of being elected is low, or if they decide to support another party's candidate(s). For example, recently, the MHP leader Bahçeli signaled that his party will not nominate any candidates for İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality in the upcoming local elections which will be held in 31 March 2019. Bahçeli explained the rationale behind this decision is that the success of the parties which support the new government system (*Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sistemi*) in the country established after the 16 April 2017 Referendum, in the

2019 Local Elections is crucial, especially in the largest three provinces of the country, (İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir), to further strengthen the system. Thus, such parties like the AKP and MHP may prefer to form an alliance in some electoral districts in local elections.[15] Similar decisions may emerge in general elections of presidential elections while nominating the candidates. Several parties may form electoral alliances in accordance with legal regulations or may nominate the same candidate together. Such strategies may be shaped by electoral success and the available resources of political parties.

Both candidate selection and re-nomination literature reveal significant information about party recruitment processes. Such studies have been conducted both at national and local levels. These studies analyze "who selects" with regard to exclusiveness or inclusiveness of the selectorate and internal party democracy (Hazan and Rahat, 2006; Rahat, 2007; Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2015); "who gets selected" with regard to socioeconomic characteristics, political experience, incumbency and political motivation of the candidates (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Ballington, 2004; Rallings et al., 2008, 2010) and "what affects" those processes, such as political regime, party system, size of party, regional differences and party ideology (Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014; Kernell, 2015). Additionally, political ambition literature (Schlesinger, 1966; Prewitt and Nowlin, 1969; Black, 1972; Soskice et al., 1992; Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2010, 2011; Vanlangenakker, 2010; Kerevel, 2013) reflects significant clues about political careers.

Candidate selection has been identified as the "key stage" of recruitment by some scholars (Gallagher, 1988: 2; Hazan and Rahat, 2006). In a similar vein, some underlined that the significance of candidate selection is much higher, as this process is defined as the most crucial step in party and its recruitment process (Schattschneider, 1942; Czudnowski, 1975). Kirchheimer (1998: 198) revealed this importance even further, by arguing that "the nomination of candidates for popular legitimation as office holders thus emerges as the most important function of present day catch-all party." Similarly, it was proposed that, in the process of recruiting party candidates, selectorates shape the groups of decision makers, consequently, it will affect the party decisions in an indirect way, hence,

[15] For more details, please see the following link: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-bahceliden-yerel-secimler-icin-onemli-mesajlar-40962394.

"Candidate recruitment then represents one of the key linkages between the electorate and the policy-making process." (Crotty, 1968: 260).

Thus, candidate selection studies are significant for analyzing the recruitment patterns of political parties, and eventually, their internal relations. For example, Schattschneider (1942: 64) clearly underlined that "The nature of the nominating process determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party. This is therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party." Thus, it is expected that "…the most vital and hotly contested factional disputes in any party are the struggles that take place over the choice of its candidates…" (Ranney, 1981: 103). Cross (2008: 597) underlined that "…Candidate selection is examined within the context of better understanding both the dynamics of party organization and the changing distribution of power within a party in the cadre, mass catch-all, professional cartel and franchise party models..." This is also related to the opportunities of the members of the parties with regard to participating in the decision-making process. Which members can have what type of influence is quite crucial. Gallagher (1988: 3) highlights this concern that "…ordinary members cannot realistically expect to play a role in laying down party policy or formulating election manifestos […] Consequently, the contest over candidate selection is generally even more intense than the struggle for control over party manifestos."

As the improvements in the candidate selection studies and research relying on empirical findings, it is now clearer that candidate selection processes influence parties, their members, party leaders and democracy (Hazan and Rahat, 2006). It is further argued that party politics can be understand by candidate selection process,

> "First, candidate selection reflects and defines the character of a party and its internal power struggle. Second, it is relatively easy for parties to alter their candidate selection methods. Third, a change in candidate selection methods will affect party politics…" (Hazan and Rahat, 2006: 110).

Additionally, in another study, Rahat and Hazan (2001: 297) argue that "If we claim that the behaviour of parties is affected by the nature of electoral system, then the behaviour of individual politicians must be affected by the nature of the selection method." Thus, candidate selection processes and procedures are also quite influential on political ambition of individual politicians. Together, candidate selection and political ambition shape and explain political career patterns of elites. Details of the political ambition

theories and approaches are revealed and discussed in Chapter 3, titled "Political Ambition and Political Career" of this dissertation.

2.3. Elite Recruitment in Different Settings

Elite recruitment by political parties does not follow a single or common path in all settings. Parties develop varying strategies, depending on electoral systems, party systems, or nature of party competition. The following sections explain the variation amongst different settings on elite recruitment and candidate selection processes by political parties, and their consequences.

2.3.1. Electoral Systems, Elite Recruitment and Candidate Selection

Electoral systems matter for candidate selection strategies, the pool of possible candidates and consequently, representation. More specifically, when an open party list is used in a PR system, the voters are provided with the chance to use preference votes and re-rank the candidates, while closed party lists restrict the voters from doing this alternation by providing only a pre-ranked list of the candidates. Nevertheless, even if the lists are open, the voters may get the signal from the parties about the relative significance and value of the nominees by looking at the ranking of the candidates (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Thus, list construction presents parties with an opportunity to behave strategically, balancing vote, office, and policy-seeking incentives (Strom, 1990). Regarding these issues, the following sections explain the specifics of electoral systems, their impact on candidate selection, and consequently the political careers of individuals.

Elections are one of the conventional political participation ways (O'Neil, 2010), along with others, such as political party membership, civil society organizations and membership to them as conventional forms; protests and demonstrations as unconventional forms of participation. Elections have both symbolic and practical roles (Gallagher et al., 2011). Symbolic roles are that elections are legitimizing the system for the citizens, and enable these citizens to have the feeling that they are participating in politics with little cost and effort. Practical roles of the elections are to define the political elite, to identify who will form the government, and to govern the country. Thus, the main role of elections is to select the representatives, but the elections may have various

attributes as well. For example, elections may enable voters to reward or punish the existing representatives. If an incumbent government is doing well, the voters who support it may reward it by voting for them in the next elections, or in the contrary, if a government is not working properly or not satisfying the demands of the voters, they can punish it by not supporting it in the next election (this can be defined as retrospective voting as the voters decide how to vote by looking at the past success of the party or any candidate, and alternatively, people can also vote prospectively by looking at the future promises of parties and candidates). Thus, elections give voters the chance to reflect their ideas and demands with regard to selection of representatives. In some countries, such as Turkey, elections can give more opportunity to influence political decision making, if other participation channels are less influential, such as low levels of civil society organization membership (see e.g., Kalaycıoğlu, 2016). Conversely, in some countries, such as Switzerland, other methods of political participation to affect political decision making may be as significant as elections. Design of electoral systems is important in party recruitment. Electoral rules would shape the strategies of political parties while preparing their electoral lists.

In general, two types of electoral systems are mainly identified: (1) Single Member District Plurality Systems, (2) Proportional Representation (PR) Systems (O'Neil, 2010). Under plurality systems, the candidate who gains more votes than other candidates wins the elections, or as a specific case of it, under majority systems the candidate who gains more than half of the total available votes wins (Bale, 2005: 134). Plurality systems, thus, are identified as first-past-the-post. Electoral districts are shaped as single member districts under these systems, hence, only one seat is available to fill in each district. Under these circumstances, only one candidate enjoys being elected, and others cannot gain any seats, which is defined as winner-takes-all system. As an alternative to these settings, PR is an electoral system which distributes the seats to the parties proportionally, regarding their vote shares. Under PR systems, multi-member districts are usually employed, and the number of seats in a given district would vary. So, PR allows more than one candidate to be elected from a constituency. The rationale behind these two designs of electoral systems differ from one another.

Plurality systems are designed to create a simple electoral rule, make the government formation become easier, and increase the government accountability once it is formed. This system is simple, because it does not require the allocation of seats proportionally,

but rather it makes the candidate with more votes than the other candidates be the winner. For example, in the United Kingdom (UK) employing plurality system, the first-past-the-post rule is used and it enables the candidates who get the most votes to be elected. Due to single-member district in the UK case, there is only one seat to fill in each constituency, and there is only one candidate who will win that election in that specific electoral district. Differentiating from the majority/plurality rule, the main motivation behind the PR system is to increase proportionality between the votes and seats. So, eventually the number of parties in the parliament, inclusivity, representativeness, and fairness will increase, and the number of wasted votes will be decreased compared to plurality systems. In majority systems, votes given to the candidates other than the winner are usually defined as wasted votes since there is always only one winner (Heywood, 2007).

Electoral systems may affect the strategies of political parties while selecting their candidates. As plurality with single member district systems are usually identified as the systems in which winner-takes-all, or first past the post, the parties seem to be more cautious about their candidate selection. The rationale behind this argument is that such systems are defined as candidate-centered systems as the constituents are voting for the candidates rather than the political parties or party lists as a whole. The significance of the candidates is generally seen to be more significant compared to other electoral systems. PR systems with multi member district, on the other hand, seem to give more chances to the selectorate of the parties. However, with regard to party centrality, this system is usually defined as party centered, and the voters need to select among the parties rather than showing their choices about particular candidates (see e.g., Shugart, 2001). More specifically, "…Closed list proportional and SMP systems offer general election voters no say over which of their preferred party's candidates are elected … Voters' role in these systems is reduced to determining how many deputies are allocated to each party. The parties have full determination over who these deputies are…" (Cross, 2008: 604). In addition, "…When lists are open, voters can use preference votes to alter candidate ranks, but the list provides a default ordering and sends the electorate signals about the relative value that the party selectorate places on candidates..." (Carey and Shugart, 1995) This ranking does not send signals about their values given to a specific candidate only to voters, but also clearly to the candidate himself or herself. Consequently, some candidates who find their ranking on the list as dissatisfying, may take this as a sign to expend more effort so that his or her candidacy order will be better, or, one may think

that the party does not remunerate this individual, and may break up from the party. In the latter cases, some politicians prefer to switch parties to find better opportunities in terms of candidacy. Hence, party-central or candidate-central systems also create differentiating strategies for political parties with regard to candidate selection. Not only the strategies of political party selectorate but also the behaviors of politicians are influenced by such factors. For example, "Electoral rules, candidate selection mechanisms and patronage also constrain where federal deputies seek future office." (Kerevel, 2013: 2).

Electoral threshold, district magnitude, formula used to distribute seats in PR systems are the factors affecting the party competition and voter behavior, and eventually the outcome of the elections results. Some countries do not implement any electoral threshold, however, parties and voters in Germany need to keep 5% threshold in mind, while it is 10% threshold for Turkish voters and parties. Party and voter strategies may vary dramatically under such different cases. Voters may tend to vote for their second or third preferences, if they think or realize that first preference (the party) may not have enough votes to exceed the threshold. Eventually, this strategic voting will negatively affect that party, and it may lose its relevance in the system, and even disappear or die. Thus, such kind of a threshold affects the number of parties in the system, hence, the party system. When electoral threshold is abolished, the people may gradually start to give votes to their first preferences which will enable more party to have seats in the parliament. As another factor related to electoral rule, district magnitude can affect the party system: If district magnitude is small and if only one candidate wins, then the smaller parties will have little chance (although regional parties might have chance in such a set up even if they are relatively small). But if the district magnitude is large, proportional representation is used, and more than one candidate will win, then the chance of small parties to win seats is expected to increase. Additionally, the formula to distribute seats may affect the number of parties in the legislature. If these formulas favor larger parties, this can create a problem of disproportionality, and having smaller number of parties in the legislature. Lastly, election periods and time have an influence on party competition and eventually recruitment and candidate selection. For example, if the election date is set by the government, it can choose a date by calculating the effects of policy outcomes, and try to choose the best time to maximize its votes. If there is a set date for election, the parties arrange their campaigns and rallies accordingly, but if there is chance to call early

elections, some government parties may use this opportunity. For example, if the conditions are not going well for a government, and if it is expecting an economic crisis, it may call for an early election or a "snap election" in order to secure its position or minimize its losses. This would be more beneficial for that government party, rather than having elections after the crisis hit. Thus, such rules regarding the election time can affect the strategies of parties about candidate selection.

Keeping all these factors in mind, we can argue that party competition will eventually be affected by the electoral rules and election timing, which affect the party system. When the party competition is affected, the strategies of the parties with regard to candidate selection will also be influenced. Hence, one may argue that, electoral system and candidate selection processes are closely related to each other and parties may use different strategies under different electoral systems. Not only electoral systems, but also electoral rules in the parliaments may affect candidate selection: If parliamentary votes are cast openly, parties may have chance to observe their MPs' voting behavior. Thus, everyone may know who each deputy votes for. This visibility enables the parties to see whether their members are in line with the party policies. Thus, the electoral rules in the form of voting rules in the parliament will affect party discipline, which eventually influences party recruitment, as parties may punish some candidates if they break party discipline.

2.3.2. Party Systems, Party Competition and Candidate Selection

Party systems exert influence on elite recruitment, and more specifically, candidate selection strategies. One significant reason for this is that party systems shape inter-party competition. Before explaining possible repercussions of party systems on recruitment and candidate selection, providing brief details of party systems would be useful. Scholars have been identifying various criteria to define and classify party systems. Consequently, definitions of party systems vary in a broad range, yet, as a simplified explanation, one may argue that party systems are not only about the competition of various political parties, but also the cooperation among them (Caramani, 2014: 217). Discussions revolve around whether counting only the number of parties in the system is enough, or should we have other criteria to count parties in the party systems? This question is related to the decision of which parties should be included or excluded while defining the party

systems. The number of parties and competitiveness of the opposition parties (Dahl, 1966), the number of parties along with the relative sizes of parties (Blondel, 1968), and the number of parties along with the ideological stance of parties (Sartori, 1976) have been employed to classify party systems. One of the most accepted arguments about this topic is what Sartori (1976) proposed as counting the effective number of parties in a system. According to Sartori (1976)'s explanation, any party with a coalition potential or blackmail potential should be counted within the effective number of parties, and the party systems should be defined accordingly. Moreover, analyzing "mode of the alternation of government", "stability of governing alternatives", and looking at "who can and does govern" are also useful factors to identify and compare party systems (Mair, 2002). Ware (1996: 149) summarizes the generally accepted criteria for classifying the party systems as follows: "1) the extent to which parties penetrate to society, 2) the ideologies of parties, 3) the stance of the parties towards the legitimacy of the regime, and 4) the number of parties in the system…" Combining all these approaches and definitions, it is possible to explain party systems as follows: "…Party systems are sets of parties that compete and cooperate with the aim of increasing their power in controlling government … Interactions are determined by (1) which parties exist, (2) how many parties compose a system and how large they are, (3) the way in which they maximize their votes..." (Caramani, 2014: 2017).

Regarding these propositions, various types of party systems have been categorized both under non-democratic and democratic regimes. Under non-democratic regimes, only two types of party systems are defined: First, single party systems which consist of only one legal political party, and do not provide any space to any opposition. These systems are available both in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Some examples are National Socialist Party in Germany, Communist Party in the Soviet Union in the past and Baathist Party in Iraq until 1993 (Caramani, 2014: 222). The second type is hegemonic party systems, under which one hegemonic party dominates the party politics both electorally and politically, and, although there are other parties which are defined as legal, these are identified as "satellites" as they are strictly controlled by the hegemonic party (Sartori, 1976). Some examples of this party system have been Mexico's party system with the hegemony of PRI, and some communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the 1980s.

Other than those party systems under non-democratic regimes, there are mainly four other types in democracies. The first one is the pre-dominant party systems, in which one large

political party dominates the politics "with a majority above the absolute majority of 50 per cent of seats for protected periods of time (several decades)" (Caramani, 2014: 223). Sartori (1976) explains pre-dominant party system by saying that if the elections are free and fair, and if a political party wins three consecutive elections (such as in Japan's Liberal Democratic Party – LDP, and Sweden's Sweden Democrats - SD cases) the system becomes pre-dominant. Other political parties can freely operate and compete under this system, but usually they cannot gain enough votes to obtain the majority of the seats in the legislative assembly alone or in coalition with other parties. Therefore, they do not have much opportunity to form the government, or to be a coalition partner as the dominant party gets enough votes to form the party government by itself. Moreover, government alternation in such party systems is not frequent. The second is the multi-party system, in which one observes two or more political parties in the legislature after almost each election, and usually none of these parties can win 50% of the seats in the legislature. Consequently, the emergence of a coalition government is more likely under this party system which, can push parties to cooperate with one another during government formation. Depending on the vote shares of parties in this system, government alternation can occur from one election to another. Three to five parties would be the case generally identified as moderate pluralism, as in the German case; or six to ten parties would gain seats in the legislature, which is defined as extreme pluralism. Further still, 11 and more parties would occupy seats in legislature, which creates an atomistic system. Under 6-10 multi-party systems, parties usually show a large ideological distance, and some extremist parties may gain seats in the legislature. Thus, party competition would show differences from the first type. The third category of party systems under democracies is the two-party system, which is best depicted by the systems in the UK, US and Australia. In this system, two large parties usually get the highest amount of the votes (approaching jointly up to and sometimes above 80% of the total vote between themselves), and party government is the most likely outcome. The chance of forming the government usually changes hands between these two parties. Although there are other parties which compete in elections and would get some seats in the parliament, the largest two parties dominate the legislature. Lastly, the fourth is the bipolar party system, which consists of "two large coalitions composed of several parties sharing together around 80% of the votes and seats." (Caramani, 2014: 223). Under these systems, those coalitions are usually in similar sizes and they run in elections in a form of electoral

alliances. This system usually creates coalition governments, and it could be assumed that parties are more likely to cooperate at least within their own alliances.

Reasons for the emergence of those party systems vary. Historical background, social cleavage structure and legal framework are some of the factors shaping political party system. Specifically on party competition, various scholars propose differentiating ideas: Duverger (1964) explained party competition with reference to institutional effects (i.e. the impact of electoral rules), Lipset and Rokkan (1967) unearthed the influence of various social cleavages in the society, Ware (1996) brings attention to the influence of ideologies as earlier suggested by von Beyme, and Sartori (1976) underlined the characteristics of party systems and their effects, while explaining party competition. It is possible to categorize the analysis of effecting factors on party systems into two main segments: institutional approach and sociological approach. Institutional approach explains the impact of electoral system design on party systems while sociological approach mainly focuses on social cleavages and their reflections on politics and specifically parties and party systems.

Institutional approach explains the emergence of various party systems with the influence of electoral systems. One of the most prominent explanations of the causal relationship between electoral systems and party systems comes from Duverger (1964), and his exposition of this relationship is called as Duverger's Law in the literature. According to Duverger (1964), plurality electoral system with a single member district tends to favor a two-party system; and PR system with multi-member district usually favors or is more likely to create a multi-party system, in which many independent parties can exist. In addition to these, double ballot majority system is more likely to create a multi-party system in which the parties tend to form alliances (Gallagher et al., 2011: 390). To illustrate this argument, the UK implementing plurality rule with single member district and the Netherlands using PR system can be compared: Plurality electoral system created a two-party system in the UK, while PR system with multi-member districts in The Netherlands led to a multi-party system (Gallagher et al., 2011: 208). Although, more recently, the party system of the UK seems to change towards having more than two effective parties, a two-party system has been a characteristic of this country for a long period of time. From the perspective of Duverger's Law (1964), two main factors cause this: (1) mechanical effect which emerges from the electoral formula that translates the votes into seats in legislature, (2) psychological effect which influence voter and party

behavior. According to psychological effect explanation, voters decide to select between strategic voting and sincere voting, and parties try to find the best strategy among merging or forming alliances and running by their own in elections depending on the electoral design. This, at the end, affects the strategies of parties on candidate selection processes as well.

With regard to institutional approach, Duverger's Law proposes that majoritarian electoral rules tend to create two-party systems, as there will be one winner who gains the majority of the votes from each district, and this rule usually favors the powerful parties rather than the smaller ones, and eventually (and usually) two powerful parties become the relevant parties in the system. PR systems, on the other hand, tend to favor smaller parties along with the bigger ones, and thus usually create multiparty systems.

With regard to sociological approach, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) focus on sociological factors and propose that various cleavages emerge in societies, and their reflections are translated to political party systems which influence political competition. Specifically, with regard to competitiveness of party systems, these scholars argued that mainly four thresholds (legitimation, incorporation, representation and majority power)[16] are defining factors with regard to the characteristics of a party system. In other words, different combination of the levels of these four thresholds results in different party systems. For instance, if legitimation and incorporation show low levels whereas representation and majority power show high levels, the resulting party system will be a "competitive party system under universal and equal manhood suffrage but with high payoff for alliances and with a clear separation of legislative and executive powers." (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 26-29).

In addition to Lipset and Rokkan (1967)'s explanation, Sartori focused on centripetal and centrifugal competition while explaining how competitive a party system is:

> "If a political system obtains anti-system and bilateral oppositions, and if the system discourages centripetal competition by the fact that the center is

[16] "Legitimation: Are all protests rejected as conspiratorial, or is there some recognition for right of petition, criticism and opposition?
Incorporation: Are all or the most of the supporters of the movement denied status as participants in the choice of representatives, or are they given political citizenship rights on a par with their oppenents?
Representation: Must the new movement join to larger and older movements to ensure access to representative organs or can it gain representation on its own?
Majority power: Are these built-in checks and counterforces against numerical majority rule in the system, or will a victory at the polls give a party or an alliance power to bring about major structural changes in the national system?" (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 27).

> physically occupied, then we can have a polarized system. In such a system, the lateral poles are quite away from each other, and in fact, the distance between them covers a maximum spread of opinions. Thus, we can say that the ideologies seem to be significant, and the cleavages seem to be very deep in such a system. Here, the system is center-based as it is polarized –the center parties can be rewarded, thus there can be a centripetal behavior. In certain conditions, centrifugal drives can overcome the centripetal ones. The characteristic trend it such a system is the enfeeblement of the center, and a persistent loss of votes to one or two of the extreme ends on the political spectrum. In other words, we observe a trend of votes from center to extreme ends." (Sartori, 1976: 120).

Regarding this explanation, it is possible to argue that political party strategies with regard to candidate selection and election competition differs from one system to another. In other words, depending on the level of competitiveness and locus of competition, parties' choices may be shaped in different ways.

Lastly, Ware (1996) underlines the impact of ideologies with regard to party competition. As he mentions, the literature reveals mainly two types of approaches to understand and explain adaptation of a particular ideology, and the persistence or modification of that ideology: (1) a competitive approach and (2) an institutional approach. *Competitive Approach* can also be called as the adaptation approach, and parties are seen as actors who can adapt their ideologies to the opinions and values of their likely supporters in the electorate. Different from this approach, according to *Institutional Approach*, the history of the parties shapes their (ideology) adaptation process, usually the parties have their ideologies when they are founded, and this ideology does not change, but rather persists, even if the conditions change. Although the parties have an adaptation capacity, they do not change so quickly. Such differences may also shape party strategies in electoral competition. If a political party chooses to adapt a new ideology or new policies, elite recruitment and candidate selection strategies may change in this party, which eventually alter the composition of elite within this party.

Party systems and eventually party competition may change over time. Some political parties would have salience and occupy an important place in a country's politics for a certain period of time, but then those parties would lose their significance or vanish completely. Such chances also affect party competition. Examples of these arguments are explained in Chapter 4, which explains party politics in Turkey. However, before going through the peculiarities of the Turkish case, the next chapter explains political ambition and provide various approaches to it.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL AMBITION AND POLITICAL CAREER

3.1. What Determines Decisions to Embark on a Political Career?

Who becomes a politician? This question cannot be answered only by the party recruitment approach explained in the previous chapter. One need to understand "Who decides to become party elite?" and "Why do people decide to become politicians?" This is related to the second part, which determines becoming a politician: the supply side explanation. In general, quite different motivations, from ideological motives to economic or personal interests, from dissent to triggering individual experiences, may drive individuals to participate politics. Political participation has various ways such as voting in elections, working in electoral campaigns, membership to political parties or civil society organizations and petitioning (which are conventional forms) or protests, rallies and strikes (which are unconventional forms). Deciding to be a politician is also a specific form of political participation, and this form of participation requires much more effort, motivation and investment. Indeed, becoming one is defined as one of the highest levels of political participation (Fox and Lawless, 2005; 2010). More specifically, "Considering a candidacy for public office involves pondering the courageous step of going before an electorate and facing potential examination, scrutiny, and rejection." (Fox and Lawless, 2011: 443). Not everyone desires to be a politician even if they are politically mobilized. Some individuals choose only to vote during elections, some become members of civil society organizations, some would also prefer to be affiliated with political parties - but not become active politicians -, and some also want to be actively working politicians.

"Democratic legitimacy is a central justification for exploring all types of political participation" (Verba et al., 1995); and running for political office simply represents the ultimate act..." of political participation (Fox and Lawless, 2005: 643). Hence, one may argue that, if becoming a politician is the ultimate act of political participation, then one need to first understand what is needed for political participation. Political participation in general is usually analyzed with regard to behavior of the electorate, and it requires mainly three elements (Kalaycıoğlu, 2016: 194): The first one is the motives which are formed by knowledge and interest, attitudes, values, beliefs and perceptions of an individual about and towards politics. The second one is resources which are necessary for emergence of the motives and to make individuals to act with those motives. Political resources are the necessary social, economic and cultural ability of an individual to have specific knowledge, interest or skills. By the help of these, an individual can capture, understand and evaluate political phenomena, and can decide his or her acts for making a certain influence. The third one is opportunities which provide political chances to affect decision-making processes. An individual with certain political motives would use his or her resources by using the opportunities to have an influence on the decision-making process (Kalaycıoğlu, 2016: 194). This explanation of political participation is usually employed to analyze participation of ordinary citizens; however, regarding the argument of Fox and Lawless (2005, 2011), it seems possible to apply motives, resources and opportunities explanation to the ones who desire to be politicians.

Figure 3.1: Determinants of political participation



Figure 3.1 summarizes three major determinants of political participation which is explained in the previous paragraph. When we use this template for the individuals who prefer to be a political actor as a political participation form, it is important to explain

what the factors affecting those three elements are. For example, "The resources and motivation applicants bring to the role will vary according to their social background. Younger teachers from the Midlands, well-established middle-aged lawyers, self-employed company directors, experienced Scottish trade unionists and London women social workers will bring different skills, qualifications and assets to political life" (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 380).

Entering to political arena, requires an important examination of both personal attributes and current political situation in a given country. Nevertheless, entering into the political arena is not the end point for the individuals who would like to embark on a political career:

> "…although many people have resources, only a few choose a political career. The combination of resources plus motivation produces the necessary and sufficient conditions for candidacies. Motivational factors are defined as psychological predispositions to become involved in politics. Previous research has commonly explained activism by higher levels of political ambition, interest and confidence." (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 402).

Thus, career decisions of politicians would differ from one individual to another. The following paragraphs explain what drives political ambition, and eventually the decision of embarking on a political career.

Political parties are identified as a component of political opportunity structures provided for political career (Norris, 1997). Additionally,

> "Party organizations' leaders, elected officials, and activists serve as gatekeepers who groom eligible candidates to run for office. For many individuals, recruitment from political leaders serves as the key ingredient in fomenting their thoughts of running. Not only is political viability often conveyed by the suggestion to run from a party official, but party support also tends to bring the promise of an organization that will work on behalf of a candidate." (Fox and Lawless, 2011: 446).

Regarding this explanation, it is not a surprise that individual politicians who receive encouragement from the party gatekeepers reveal higher levels of ambition about being a candidate, compared to other who do not have such kind of a support coming from parties or leaders (Fox and Lawless, 2010; 2011), and such party encouragement may change the composition of candidates. Moreover, according to Broockman (2014: 109), "…having been asked to run [is] the modal explanation for candidacy or the factor most positively

associated with interest in running." One may associate this idea of being asked to run with a significant signal coming from one's party for the prospective politician. With such invitations, these individuals feel more supported, and to some extent more secure with regard to their candidacy process. Nevertheless, with regard to running for higher office, "signaling behaviour by the prospective candidate increases the likelihood of them entering the selection process for higher office, but does not affect the likelihood of them being successful in this endeavour…" (Allen and Cutts, 2017: 2).

Some scholars argue that individual politicians' calculation of cost and risks determines the political career choices rather than the nature of political ambition, and "…an incumbent's career choice is decisively influenced by the strategies they adopt to effectively use their resources." so, the expected utilities matter a lot in terms of this choice (Leoni et al., 2004: 109). For example, length of legislative terms influences the MPs behavior and decisions about running in elections (Carey, 2002).

> "…the strategic decision federal deputies make concerning the office for which he/she will run in the next election is mostly determined by a self-evaluation of performance in office and the estimated chance of re-election. In other words, federal deputies' choices of career are guided not only by the incentives of the position pursued, such as a higher stipend or a bigger staff, but also by the electoral viability of that choice. That is, the higher utility of being elected to these offices is weighed against the risks and costs one must incur. Three main factors that influence the probability of re-election and the potential costs are institutional position and performance in office, personal characteristics and electoral vulnerability." (Leoni et al., 2004: 111).

Depending on many issues, such as satisfaction with the current office, future goals and opportunities provided by certain offices may drive politicians to stay in their current offices, or may not. For example, "…the level of competition inside districts does affect incumbents' choice of which office to run for." (Leoni et al., 2004: 129). Figure 3.2 in the following page shows the simplified decision tree model of the politicians with regard to their career choices. This figure was prepared by the explanations of above-mentioned studies.

Figure 3.2: Decision tree of political career choices.



Note: This figure is adopted from Leoni et al. (2004: 118), with some additions and changes.

Another vital issue which determines the career choices is the relative significance of offices. Meaning that, not all offices would attract all politicians in the same way. For example, a municipal office would be considered as more important than a legislative office by some politicians. So, some may not necessarily define linear or vertically hierarchical understanding of upward mobility in politics. Similarly, political ambition would not be only for occupying elective offices. Some individuals with political ambition would be satisfied with other opportunities even if they cannot run for elective office. For example, occupying a particular party office, a promotion in their own job, or engaging with possible networks would be more important than occupying a political office for such individuals. Hence, regarding the above-mentioned factors, a large number of scholars explained the political career choices of individuals from rational choice paradigm (see e.g., Schlesinger, 1966; Black, 1972; Rohde, 1979; Stone and Maisel 2003).

Still, some politicians are far more appealing to the public both in national politics and local politics. Even if individuals are driven by rational choice, individuals' political career decisions are not only dependent upon their own discretion but also the decisions of parties and other politicians. Hence, the influence of parties cannot be denied; however, the effects of parties vary (Detterbeck, 2011). While some parties provide better opportunities for individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds, some choose to exclude particular groups from their candidate lists or party elite.

Which politicians try to converge with their political parties more deeply? How does the party and the politician benefits from the given decisions with regard to recruitment and candidate selection, and how do these benefits interact with each other? Which side will have the leverage in terms of shaping an individual's political career: parties or politicians? The following parts in this chapter are on explaining political ambition in greater detail and review the literature on different types of ambition. These varying types of political ambition are progressive ambition, hyper progressive ambition, static ambition, discrete ambition, intra-institutional ambition, dynamic ambition, and regressive ambition. Although the literature contains sub-forms of these political ambition types, mainly the above-mentioned ones will be examined, and employed in data analysis chapter.

3.2. What is Political Ambition?

If there were a tombstone of political ambition theory, the following sentence would be written on it: "Ambition lies at the heart of politics." (Schlesinger, 1966: 1). Obviously, this sentence lies at the heart of political ambition literature, as many scholars reference it in their research, and underline the importance of it. The following paragraphs explain the significance of this argument by referring to respective studies and examine the impact of various types of political ambition on political career decisions.

First of all, continuing with Schlesinger's theory, it can be underlined that "A politician's behaviour is a response to his office goals." (Schlesinger, 1966: 6). He argues that "the politician as office-seeker engages in political acts and makes decisions appropriate to gaining office." (1966: 6). Relatedly, "It makes little difference to the theory of ambition whether men adopt the ambitions suitable to the office or attain the office because of their ambitions. It is sufficient to conclude that governors of New York will behave as though they were Presidential candidates while governors of Mississippi or South Dakota will not." (Schlesinger, 1966: 9). This argument is not peculiar to New York and its governors. Similarities can be found in other cities or districts in other countries. For example, being a mayor of London may not be similar with being a mayor of Southampton in the UK as the political salience and population of, along with economic activities within these two cities differ. Similarly, a mayor's position in İstanbul is usually not comparable to other

mayors serving elsewhere in Turkey. Consequently, occupying a political office may provide different opportunities in different cities.

Thus, "Schlesinger finds considerable consistency in the career patterns that politicians follow from state to state. He finds that some offices are substantially more likely to promote political advancement than other offices, and he characterizes these differences as the 'opportunity structure' of the political system." (Black, 1972: 144). Black (1972: 144) then argues that "Although one cannot prove it with these data, I suspect that the ambitions of individuals are strongly shaped by the availability of opportunities, and that this effect is manifested in the probability estimates that politicians assign to various alternatives." Black's criticism on Schlesinger's (1966) argumentation is that "while Schlesinger can chart recruitment patterns, his data do not permit an examination of ambition directly. The study of political ambition is the study of motivations of politicians, and hence requires data on individuals…" (Black, 1972: 145).

Although political ambition studies need data on individuals, one needs to explain what kind of differences in those politicians' behavior can be measurable depending on the political context of a specific country. Laws, party bylaws or regulations and other criteria would affect the behaviors of the politicians. For example, if there are any limitations to candidates mentioned in the party bylaws -such as term limits-, it is not easy for those politicians who would like to seek reelection. Consequently, politicians' motivations with regard to staying in office or seeking for other offices may be affected. For example, it is underlined that "…term limits reduce the benefits of seeking reelection, even for state legislators who are eligible to run, and reduce the opportunity cost of running for other offices." (Lazarus, 2006: 357). Hence, such regulations are also noteworthy to take into consideration in political ambition studies.

Political ambition shows diversity within itself. Not all individuals or politicians show the same kind of political ambition. Then, what are diverse types of political ambition? How does political ambition differ from one political context to another? What are the reasons for these? Such questions are answered in the following sections of this chapter. To illustrate some differences among various countries, it is indicated that:

> "A majority of members of the six nations harbor ambitions beyond their current office. In the Third World parliaments more than one-half show progressive ambition […] The ambitions of the European parliamentary elites run even higher: those with progressive ambition are 83 percent in Belgium,

> 62 percent in Italy, and 82 percent in Switzerland. It is clear that the European elites generally have a better idea as to how far and to which office they could go from parliament and possess a well worked out plan to attain their career goals. In comparison, the Third World elites appear uncertain as to where their legislative service will ultimately lead them. During the interviews we found many hesitant to give us a decisive response because they were themselves unclear about their ultimate career goals. This uncertainty seems to stem from two sources. The first is a relatively low institutionalization of the political career structures in these nations; that is, the interconnections of various career paths are not sharply enough defined to be predictable. The second source is the risk and uncertainty associated with a political career due to the chronic instability of the political system in these nations." (Kim and Patterson, 1988: 389).

Deriving from these findings, it is arguable that political career paths do not show regularities within each political system. Hence, politicians may develop differing strategies in different contexts depending on the past experiences and common practices in various countries.

Political ambition literature's early stages contain progressive ambition, static ambition and discrete ambition theories in general. Throughout time, scholars researching political ambition added new types of political ambition to the respective literature. Those newly described types include hyper-progressive ambition (McCoy, 2014), dynamic ambition (Fox and Lawless, 2011) and intrainstitutional ambition (Herrick and Moore, 1993) and regressive ambition (Leoni et al., 2004).

Political ambition may affect career decisions in different ways under differing settings, such as different electoral and administrative systems and regimes. In the previous chapter, the relationship between electoral systems and party recruitment was examined.

Besides those, political opportunity structure matters a lot in political career decisions. Maestas et al. (2006) include with the previous argument that along with political opportunities structure, legislators will also take various personal and institutional factors into consideration. In other words, along with the political opportunities structure, there are other issues that the individuals consider while deciding to compete in elections (Rohde, 1979). Following the ideas of Schlesinger (1966), who underlined that political ambition affects the legislator's behavior, in a more specific way it was argued that political aims of the politicians affect their behavior:

> "For MEPs who aim to move to the state level, attendance and participation in legislative activities is substantively lower among legislators from candidate-centered systems. Importantly, the effect of career ambitions on

> legislative participation is stronger in candidate-centered systems than in party-centered systems. These findings suggest that the responsiveness associated with candidate-centered systems comes at the expense of legislative activity" (Hoyland et al., 2017: 1).

Similarly, types of electoral system seem to have influence on political ambition and consequently behavior of politicians. For example, we can discuss a hypothetical MP having static ambition, who wants to be re-nominated and re-elected in the next elections. If this MP operates in a candidate centered electoral environment in which his or her goal can be achieved mostly by satisfying the needs of and providing the necessary services to the respective constituency, his or her chances to occupy the current office does not only be determined by the party but mostly by the MP's own hard work. However, if the same MP with same degree of ambition operates in a party-centered system with PR electoral laws with a closed party list on which voters cannot make any changes, he may face a problem of not being elected, if not nominated by the party or placed higher up on the list. Under these circumstances, party discretion may override the individual politician's ambition and goals. It is not surprising, thus, that parties pursue a good opportunity to determine their candidate types in list-based PR systems (Gallagher, 1988). Nevertheless, politicians usually take such issues into consideration, and determine their acts and behavior appropriately. Various scholars analyze, for example, the relationship between legislative behavior, parliamentary performance and re-nomination of MPs in different countries, and find that parliamentary performance does affect re-nomination chances of MPs (Proksch and Slapin, 2010; Louwerse and Otjes, 2016; Fernandes et al., 2017; Yıldırım et al. 2017). One significant finding is that MPs signal their political ambition and career goals to the decision makers (e.g. party leaders) (Allen and Cutts, 2017).

Therefore, the decisions and behaviors of politicians would change from one electoral system to another. For example, candidate-centered or party-centered electoral systems activate different types of behavior:

> "In a 'candidate-centered' electoral system, such as open-list proportional representation, legislators who want to be re-elected need to devote greater attention to their constituency regardless of which office they are seeking. Once a high profile has been established locally, this lowers the cost of transferring from one political arena to another. In contrast, in a 'party-centered' electoral system, such as closed-list proportional representation, legislators primarily need to be on good terms with their party leaders, who control candidate selection. The effect of career ambition on legislative participation thus varies across electoral systems." (Hoyland et al, 2017).

Deciding whether the constituency or the party holds the most importance for their career paths is a crucial task for the politicians. If a politician cannot calculate the appropriate strategy, his or her nomination or re-nomination chance would decrease. Thus, the politicians and their ambition are shaped by the electoral systems to some extent. Electoral systems also provide important clues in order to understand political ambition's impact on politicians' behavior in legislature as electoral rules shape the campaigning strategies of ambitious individuals and "how they behave once elected, such as how responsive they are to legislative party leaders or which legislative committees they choose to join." (Hoyland et al., 2017: 4). Moreover, how parties select their candidates is also highly influential on legislators' behavior, which shows political career prospects of those individuals (see, e.g. Jun and Hix, 2010) Similarly, it was argued that:

> "Political career patterns also may provide clues about the nature of informal ties in the political system. Here the main question is whether legislators have good reason to hope for advancement moving to other political levels. Those who see their current positions as stepping-stones to higher office have particularly strong reasons cultivate ties with politicians elsewhere in the system (Schlesinger 1966, 1991). Conversely, those who pursue careers in a single politic level have fewer career-related incentives to cooperate with party colleagues in other tiers." (Scarrow, 1997: 254).

Lastly, political ambition and its effects on political career paths are conditioned by the regime of a state. In other word, emergence and types of political ambition under democratic regimes differ from the cases under non-democracies. In general, political ambition theories rely on the cases under democracies, and explain the variance depending on different institutional or administrative factors such as electoral rules, degree of (de)centralism, and so on. One important reason for this is that it is not easy to pursue political career under non-democratic regimes unless one person is not affiliated with the ruling party or other effective and powerful organizations which most probably have close relations with that party or the rulers. Moreover, opposition parties are usually weakened, limited, and even outlawed under non-democratic rules. Hence, the opportunities to become a politician may be much less, when compared to a democratic regime. Still, political ambition is not peculiar to the individuals living in democratic countries.

Many people are also driven by political ambition under authoritarian regimes. Elections, candidacy and eventually political ambition patterns under authoritarian regimes have

been also examined (see e.g., Lust-Okar, 2006), and these research usually focus on -in a similar vein with the ones conducted under democracies- who decides to be a candidate, what drives these individuals and how they run their electoral campaigns; and from another perspective, why some individuals decide to run as an opposition candidate although their chances to be elected are utterly low (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009: 409). Usually, "…candidates are encouraged to run by friends, family, and acquaintances who stand to benefit from having an elected official in their circle." (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009: 410). For example, a large portion of Jordanian candidates came to a decision to become a candidate relying to their families' or friends' support rather than parties' or government officials' suggestions (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). However, this is usually applicable in countries with relatively open nomination processes such as Jordan and Egypt, and it is not quite possible to run as a candidate based on personal supporters in countries like Mexico and Syria where party discipline is much stronger (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009: 410). It seems that some of the major reasons for running as candidates and becoming politicians under non-democratic regimes are for gaining proximity to government resources and government officials such as ministers (e.g. to be able to get necessary permits), benefitting from the mediating and service providing process to their constituency, and enjoying legislative immunity (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009: 410).

After these general remarks on political ambition, the following parts explain various categories of it. The first part starts with the original ambition theory of Schlesinger (1966) who categorizes political ambition into three areas: progressive, static and discrete. Then, other types of political ambition, which are identified and developed over time by alternative theories are examined.

3.2.1. Progressive Ambition Theory

Schlesinger (1966) argued that the legislative elites, who are aiming to occupy a higher office compared to their current office show different behavior compared to less ambitious politicians. For example, Maestas (2003) underlined that politicians who aim for higher political office and career take the voters' ideas more into consideration compared to the others who are not seeking to occupy a higher office. One assumption is that if there is an opportunity without any cost and risks for a politician to seek for a higher office, he or she will seek to run for that (Rohde, 1979). However, one can still

observe that some politicians would not run for higher office even given that opportunity. The rationale behind this is related to the significance of the particular offices. Meaning that, not all offices would give the same utility to all politicians. Or, politicians identify some offices as being better than the others, even though those offices are not of high rank. For example, an individual politician may believe that a mayoral position which is identified as a local office provides more opportunities and utilities to himself or herself. So, in this case, running for a mayoral position would be regarded as running for a lower level office compared to legislative one; however, that politician would benefit more from that office. Thus, Samuels (2000) also asserts that running for a municipal office as a mayoral candidate can be a sign of possessing progressive ambition. This shows that the significance of the office in the eyes of a politician matters in terms of political ambition and behavior. Similarly, it is argued that:

> "Schlesinger's approach should stress position-seeking rather than office-seeking. By not doing so he misses the fact that the numerous committee and party positions in the House make it possible for the entire gamut of position-seeking behavior to be demonstrated by just those people Schlesinger classifies as having static ambition. Progressive behavior can just as easily be displayed by running for party whip as by running for Senate (Hibbing, 1989: 28).

While mentioning the progressive ambition theory, it is quite crucial to refer its costs and risks. Compared to static ambition or discrete ambition (which will be examined in the following parts), progressive ambition may be identified as more cost and risk prone. For example,

> "…In Brazil, as in the United States, the costs and risks of progressive ambition are very high. Brazilian federal deputies, in this regard, are not at all different from their US counterparts, since the great majority of those who decide to run for an office adopt a risk-avoidance strategy and seek reelection. As a consequence, we argue, under the assumption that legislators are rational, that static ambition predominates in the United States and Brazil because of the high risks and costs entailed in the decision to run for higher office. These risks consequently constrain the career choices of incumbents, including those with meaningful electoral capital. In the Brazilian 1995–1998 legislature, of the 38 deputies running for higher offices, only seven succeeded. This only amounts to an 18.9 per cent success rate, whereas those running for re-election had a 64.9 per cent success rate. In light of high risks and costs an incumbent may face if he or she pursues higher office, many may be assumed to be risk-averse and likely to run for re-election, as is the case in the United States as well..." (Leoni, et al., 2004: 115).

Calculating the electoral success and electability appears to be of serious importance for political careers, but this is not the only cost and risk calculation. Other constraints may emerge with regard to risks and costs of progressive ambition. Some individuals are obliged to resign from their own offices if they want to run in elections. For example, a mayor must resign from his or her office to run in general elections in Turkey (Parliamentary Elections Act (Law no: 2839), 1983). Some of these individuals may be invited by party officials or other gatekeepers to run in elections; however, deals may not be necessarily stable in politics. Thus, those individuals need to also consider the possibility of not being nominated. Or, even if they are nominated, they may be ranked in an "unelectable" position on party list ballots, so, their chance to occupy the higher office may be shallow. Regarding these issues, how individuals with progressive ambition calculate the risks and costs of running fur a higher office plays a crucial role in their political careers. Wrong calculations might negatively affect their career due to competitive nature of politics.

One important issue about progressive ambition and wrong risk calculation, thus, is that fulfilling the goal of seeking higher office may not be easy, especially if political parties dominate the candidate nomination processes.

3.2.2. Static Ambition Theory

Progressive ambition makes politicians climb the career ladders towards the top by aiming for higher offices. However, not every political actor pursues such a desire. For some, staying where they are may be much beneficial and appealing. Such an impulse induces another form of political ambition: static ambition. Static ambition leads the individual politicians to seek to be re-elected for or re-appointed to their current offices (Schlesinger, 1966; Strom, 1997; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). That is to say, the politicians with static ambition do not seek for other -especially higher- offices, and they desire to make long-run careers out of a particular office. Several factors would determine static ambition. For example, if a politician is satisfied with his or her current office's incentives, that person would be seeking to keep that office. Or, one would seek to stay in the same office as a last step before retirement, so there is no need to work or aim for other offices. Samuels (2002) differentiates between politicians and their ambitions by arguing that if a politician feels that he or she is electorally vulnerable, this person seeks

re-election rather than running for a higher office; but if an incumbent sees that he or she has electoral safety, this person may run for a higher office.

Similar concerns (which are explained in the previous pages) may emerge with regard to re-nomination or re-appointment under this type of political ambition. In many countries, parties are identified as gatekeepers for accessing political office. Thus, one of the most important relationship between political ambition and re-nomination is the candidacy ranking in the party lists in general elections. "Recruitment to parliaments and governments is channeled through selection procedures within parties and through public elections which are conducted primarily along party lines. Party nomination for a 'safe seat' is next to equivalent to obtaining the public mandate." (Detterbeck, 2011: 245).

Moreover, "At election time, vote and office-seeking incentives reinforce one another. Parties focused on these goals should seek to elect candidates who will maximize votes, and thus control over seats in parliament." (Pempstein et al., 2015: 1424). However, if a party does not decide to re-nominate a politician for the same office, then the incentives of the party and the individual politician will not coincide each other. Hence, even if a politician has static ambition, he or she may need to step back if the party does not choose to re-nominate that individual. This may eventually force such an individual to seek other opportunities and offices, probably the lower ones.

Sometimes, a politician may prefer to run for the same office even if seeking for other offices would provide better opportunities. One explanation for such behavior is that politicians regard running for the same office as the safest decision, and likelihood of being elected for the same office is higher than being elected for another office (Pereira and Rennó, 2013: 73).

3.2.3. Discrete Ambition Theory

Along with progressive and static ambition theories, Schlesinger (1966) proposes one more type which he calls discrete ambition. Here, "…Politician wants the particular office for its specified term and then choses to withdraw from public office" (Schlesinger, 1966: 10). In other words, these individuals seek to retire or exit politics. Many factors may influence this decision of politicians such as loss of political interest, loss of feeling of political efficacy, age, family issues, economic interests and so forth.

3.2.4. Intrainstitutional Ambition Theory

Although the main categories of ambition theories have been progressive, static and discrete ones, various scholars propose new forms of ambition as the career decisions of political actors diversified: “Schlesinger’s typology of political ambition should be expanded to include intrainstitutional ambition – the members’ desire for leadership positions within their present institution.” (Herrick and Moore, 1993: 765). According to these scholars’ findings, this type of ambition differs from what Schlesinger (1966) defined progressive and static ambition categories explained in the previous pages. Mainly, some individuals may desire to occupy the leadership positions within their current institutions such as political parties, and such a desire is distinct from what is called progressive ambition to some extent. Herrick and Moore (1993: 766) found differentiating impacts of each ambition type on legislative behavior, thus a desire for leadership positions should be categorized as “a unique from of ambition”.

> “Members who left the House to run for higher offices at any juncture during their career, regardless of the success of their bid, were coded as having progressive ambition. These "higher" offices include vice president, senate, governor, other state-wide offices, and mayors of major metropolitan areas. Determining who runs for leadership positions within the House is more difficult. While party leadership positions within the House are formal, efforts to run for many posts tend to occur behind closed doors. To help compensate for this secrecy we treat individuals who hold a broad range of leadership positions as having intrainstitutional ambition.” (Herrick and Moore, 1993: 766).

Hence, intrainstitutional ambition refers to a specific type of progressive ambition, and examining it as a different form may yield more clues about career choice differences of individuals.

3.2.5. Dynamic Ambition Theory

As an extension to previous political ambition theories, Fox and Lawless (2011) propose another type which they call as dynamic ambition. According to Fox and Lawless (2011), “Existing research on candidate emergence, therefore, does not focus on, operationalize, or provide a systematic understanding of, the process by which an individual gains or loses political ambition over the course of a lifetime...” (Fox and Lawless, 2011: 443). Thus, mostly, these scholars bring attention to the fact that political ambition of an

individual would change from time to time depending on various reasons such as changes in political efficacy, political recruitment, life cycle, professional status, political engagement. Fox and Lawless (2011: 444) define dynamic political ambition as "the notion that myriad factors work systematically to encourage and suppress political ambition among potential candidates." Moreover, according to these scholars, political ambition "fluctuates widely" and "Changes in patterns of political recruitment, as well as in personal and professional circumstances, also contribute to the likelihood that potential candidates will gain or lose interest in seeking elective office."

In fact, Schlesinger (1966: 10) himself argues that "We can also assume that one type of ambition is unlikely to remain constant for any one politician over his lifetime." To illustrate, an MP may have static or progressive ambition for a certain amount of time, but then want to leave his or her legislative office and exit politics by developing discrete ambition. This person may lose his ambition due to negative experiences in politics, or some other factors such as old age or diseases. Nevertheless, Schlesinger (1966) does not find it concerning to try to understand or predict the future ambitions of a politicians. Rather, he argues that a theory of ambitions should focus on the current ambitions of a political actor, because policies of a political actor are not products of his or her future ambition, but the current one. Still, he adds that this explanation is not proposing that a politicians' ambition cannot bring together his or her long-term and short-term goals. Consequently, he does not provide another type of political ambition.

3.2.6. Regressive Ambition

Apparently, not all political actors aim higher offices or seek re-election to their current offices in their career paths. If a political actor does not believe that running for a higher office is possible, or if that person feels that continuing with the current office seems unlikely, but still has political ambition, he or she may prefer to run for a lower office. In other words, rather than risking their political career by aiming unlikely offices, they turn to lower level offices to stay in politics. For example, Brazilian deputies pursue the following strategies:

> "…federal deputies that believe the possibility of being re-elected is unlikely (and therefore have even less chance of being elected to a higher office) prefer

> to run for a lower, and safer, position. They still strive to hold an elected office, and are therefore ambitious, but opt for running for an office that they are more likely to win." (Leoni et al., 2004: 123).

Such a behavior was defined as "…an oxymoronic expression, regressive ambition" and, according to this definition this is actually a "survival strategy for those incumbents who are electorally vulnerable and who do not hold power positions in the Chamber." (Leoni et al., 2004: 123).

Nonetheless, running for a lower office does not always translate as an actual regression in one's political career path.

> "For ambitious politicians, climbing down the career ladder with regards to elected office may be more attractive based on one's particular circumstances given the higher rate of success. Moreover, many ambitious politicians seek non-elected office, and … most are successful at gaining positions in the bureaucracy or doing party work." (Kerevel, 2013: 27).

Regarding these arguments, it seems that the relative significance of the office matters for the politicians. In other words, the benefits provided by the targeted office shape the career decision of political actor, and regardless of the office's status (even if it is a lower one), that individual decides to run for it. Moreover, the newly targeted office does not necessarily need to be an elected office. For example, some MPs may prefer to seek party positions rather than re-election to legislative office. Even though party office is identified as a lower level office compared to a legislative one, this office may enable that politician a higher level of control and discretion power, or maybe more years to stay in politics.

3.3. Political Ambition and Political Career

According to Fox and Lawless (2011: 443), each and every person who wants to be a candidate in elections, would answer a variety of questions regarding their "personal, professional and political circumstances" which usually show differences through time and "undoubtedly affect the extent to which someone considers entering the electoral arena." It is not easy to compete in an environment full of other ambitious individuals trying to be nominated and re-nominated in elections. Among those individuals, the incumbents would have higher chances to be re-nominated compared to the new-comers. This is generally true both for the local and national elections.

Incumbency advantage is available not only for individual politicians but also political parties. Indeed, drawing on more than 500 elections across the world, Cuzan (2015: 416) proposes that the law of incumbency is one of the five laws of politics, and "In democracies, the governing party or coalition is returned to office more often than not." with an average of 60% incumbent re-election rate from around the world. This law is also a crucial point to take into consideration while shaping political career decisions. For example, it is evident that incumbency increases the chances of being re-nominated in local elections (Yıldırım and Kocapınar, 2018). Although individuals usually engage with political parties which they find ideologically closest or closer to their stance, they may re-evaluate their career decisions depending on the (electoral) success of the parties. Regarding this law mentioned by Cuzan (2015), it is possible to argue that individuals with political ambition may choose the incumbent parties to engage with even if it is not the closest one with regard to their ideological thinking.

Yet, the incumbency advantage can also turn into a disadvantage, which lead us to another law of politics: "the law of shrinking support" meaning that "all incumbents face growing opposition during their tenure." (Cuzan, 2015: 416). In other words, "It costs votes to rule" (Nannestad and Paldam, 1999). This applies for the individual politicians as well. Depending on negative evaluations of constituency and party selectorate, political career of an individual may be affected negatively. If voter support decreases, a party's support may also decrease, since that politician can no longer gain similar amounts of votes, which then has a negative effect on electoral success of the party as a whole. Thus, even if that individual was selected as a candidate, and elected as an MP, loss in his or her electoral support may decrease the likelihood of being re-nominated in the next set of elections. Moreover, depending on electoral rules, clientelist relations and opportunities in a particular system, politicians may shape their career choices. For example, "…federal deputies act strategically while in office to obtain particular types of future office. Deputies who seek future sub-national office engage in more pork-barreling while deputies who seek future legislative office sponsor more bills." (Kerevel, 2013: 2). Explanation of varying political ambition categories and political career choices of individuals by empirics are available in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 4

PARTY POLITICS IN TURKEY: A FRAMEWORK

In the following pages, Chapter 5 explains party recruitment and political ambition with regard to political careers specifically in Turkey. Right before that chapter, having a framework of political environment in Turkey is helpful to fully explain how party recruitment works and how political ambition influences political careers in the country. This chapter is written to explain the political culture, electoral system, state regulations/legal requirements on political parties, party system and party competition in Turkey. Along with these, deterministic social and political norms of the country such as clientelism and centralist party structures are additionally examined. Together, these factors shape politics in the country in general, and eventually have significant effects on how parties recruit their politicians, and how political ambition is revealed.

Sayarı (2016: 239-241) explains the development of party politics in Turkey (starting from Ottoman period) mainly in three phases: The first phase is the emergence of political parties in Ottoman period in the early 20th century, the second is the era right after the foundation of the Turkish Republic and emergence of the Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (which then called as Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican People's Party), and the third phase is the one which started right after the Second World War, with the emergence of multi-party period in the country. In order to better understand party politics in the country, examining certain characteristics of politics and political parties will be helpful.

To start with, Turkish political culture and the practice of centralism broadly shaped the party politics in the country. Political culture is important for understanding a country's politics. According to Almond (1956), "every political system is embedded in a particular

pattern of orientation to political actions...". Relying on this argument, Pye proposed that "A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the individuals who currently make up the system…" (Pye, 1965: 8). In a broader definition, Almond and Verba (1963) defined political culture as "political orientations, attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system." According to these two scholars' explanation, the system is internalized in cognitions (knowledge of the political system, whether one knows the type of system one has at home or the government people), feelings (affective orientation, alienation, or pride with the system) and evaluations (your judgements) of the population (Almond and Verba, 1963).

Regarding the political culture definitions, one may infer that those values, orientations and norms are transferrable from one generation to another. In other words, the current generation is affected by the past as it receives the knowledge, and affects the future generation, as the current one accumulates on the one that is received and passes that to the next one. Turkey, for example, has a political culture heritage originated from the Ottoman Empire. Certain values, norms and beliefs internalized throughout the Ottoman period continued to be embraced in Turkey after the foundation of the Republic. The Ottoman Empire has been identified with the characteristics of patrimonial absolute monarchy system, centralism, state cult, hostility towards political opposition, consisting of a rural society and relying on agricultural economy. Specifically, Turkish politics was affected by the traditional roots of the Ottoman Empire which had a central and patrimonial system, along with the practice of primacy of politics. In Ottoman political culture, the ideas of state centralism and patrimonialism have been two major characteristics. Moreover, the lack of tolerance to political opposition was another important factor in the Empire. Such characteristics continued to be influential even after the collapse of the Empire.

One of the most important historical legacies of Ottoman Empire is a strong state tradition (see, e.g. Heper, 1985). Relatedly, the primacy of politics has also been identified as a significant feature of Ottoman political culture. Another legacy is about political elites who have been seeking monopoly of power, and thus been hostile towards political opposition. As Frey (1975) underlined, political elites tend to centralize their power in the country, and they categorize others as friends and enemies. This is closely related to political culture of the country which involves 'in-group, out-group' mentality. In this

understanding, political elites prefer to trust to their in-group friends. Consequently, tolerance towards opposition is low, and compromise among political elite from opposing groups seems to be quite exceptional. For example, The Ottoman Empire experienced the bifurcation of elite (Turan, 1984) in a strict way in which the political elite divided as Islamist on the one hand, and seculars/Westernists on the other. Indeed, two different images of good society defined as the consequence of a culture divide: The first one relied on rational values and secularism, the second one adopted religious values and traditions (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012).

In order to analyze the Ottoman Empire's culture, many scholars employed the center periphery division as the major political cleavage. As Mardin (1975) argued, the Ottoman Empire consisted of two major cleavages which are the center and the periphery, and throughout time this division has been the decisive factor in social and political environment. According to this explanation, the center was the state which is so powerful, homogeneous and culturally compact, and was the main decision maker in politics with its elites. On the other hand, the periphery consists of the ruled people which are heterogeneous and ineligible for political decisions (Mardin, 1975: 171-173). It is not surprising, under these conditions, that there emerged a "rigid dichotomy between the ruler and ruled" (Özbudun, 1988: 2). More specifically, physical proximity to the center is to have power, and power in central cleavage is important for survival and welfare. In other worlds, there is a center with respect to power, legitimacy and authority.

Influenced from these characteristics, the state elite in the Republican period was identified as the center and the people who were outside this center were composing the Periphery. During the single party period between 1923 and 1950, and with the introduction of multiparty era such a division was still available in the country (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002). Both throughout this era, and after the multiparty period started, many politicians from the opposition had criticisms relating to this division and centralist structure of the politics. There have been various political parties promising that they might decrease the degree of centralism and apply more of a decentralized administration if they occupy the government office. Their decentralization promises were relying not only on administrative but also economic policies.

Hence, criticizing centralism and its negative effects on representativeness, democratization and liberty is an issue highly contested by political parties in Turkish

politics. With the emergence of the multiparty system, several political parties came to power by the claim of decentralization in politics. Starting with the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti* – DP), and continuing with the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi* - AP), Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi* - ANAP), DYP and the AKP, this practice was repeated. In general, these political parties are seen as representing the periphery rather than the secularist Center. The triggering idea has been defined as the replacement of the central elitism with the people's will and democracy; however, these parties generally became even more centralist while arguing to be democratic and decentralized throughout their incumbency. Other political parties which were/are opponents of centralism and supporting decentralization are the ones which have been placed on the left of the ideological spectrum and the Kurdish ethnicity movement, however, these political parties could not enter any government for a lengthy tenure.

Decentralization promises were frequently used for emphasizing democratization and providing people with greater involvement in politics and the decision-making process. By supporting the interests of Periphery, the above-mentioned political parties argued that differently from center-oriented political system, they can create more "people oriented" polity, which would be more democratic and representative. For example, the DP campaigning had the idea of representing the people's will and the motto of "*Yeter, söz milletindir!*" as opposed to the "oppression" of the single party, the CHP. Nevertheless, after coming to the power, the DP created even more centralist type of government (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). Especially due to the economic recession, the DP started to function as if it was ruling in one party regime (Kalaycıoğlu, 1997: 182). Also, Sunar (1985) mentioned that the DP used patronage system as an important factor for clientelism, helped by the economic resources which had earlier been accumulated. However, after 1954, by the declining of economic life, the DP could not find enough sources for continuing this clientelistic system. Since its popular support started to decline, the DP's populism became more and more authoritarian over time (Sunar, 1985: 2082) which brought higher degrees of centralism.

After the DP period, the AP -which eventually emerged as the heir of the DP- also adopt the idea of lowering the degree of centralism. "In the post-1960 era, the RPP[17] still continued to play the role of the party of the 'state = center,' and the then banned DP was

[17] The abbreviations of political parties are used in English in the cited source. Since this is a direct quotation, they are not changed.

replaced by the Justice Party (JP) as the party of the periphery." (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994:406). For example, economic development was a major aim of the AP, and it seemed to support more of a liberal economy. However, "...when the party (AP) came to power, the share of the governmental sector in the Turkish economy did not diminish and the state economic enterprises continued to exist." (Levi, 1991:141). Here, one can argue that in terms of decentralization, the AP could not achieve its promised aims about economic liberalization and it continued to use state control over market which is actually a more centralist idea. In addition to the practices of the DP and the AP,

> "The symbols and values of the periphery continue to emphasize religiosity and even religious (Islamic) orthodoxy, conservatism, decentralization of government, and a market economy devoid of the state control. 'Liberty' (hürriyet) was still a core campaign slogan for the TPP and MP in the 1980s, and it connoted opposition to the practice of the rule by the 'uncaring, and alien' public bureaucrats, or simply etatism. The values of the periphery since the beginning of the republic have followed a consistent pattern, and their antietatist core hardly lost its eminence." (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994: 409).

However, while criticizing the centralist model of the Republic, many of the political parties which then had opportunity to form government, generally constructed centralist structure similar to the previous eras. So, these political parties' promises for decentralized character for Turkish politics and consequences of their polity were not consistent with each other. Nevertheless, political parties in Turkey are not only identified as centralist within the party itself, but also within the government when they come to power.

Political parties in Turkey generally had and continue to have strong intra-party centralism by conferring a high importance to their party leader and this leader's ideas, and almost all political parties in Turkey operate according to this structure. For example, all of the political parties that defined themselves as representatives of the periphery which are mainly but not exclusively the DP, AP, DYP, ANAP and the AKP have been identified with strong leadership positions. Only the ANAP came close to have more democratic structure in the party which was "democratic centralism" (Heper, 2002: 145), yet, this case does not provide a decentralized party structure either. Moreover, Sayarı (2002) emphasized the personalistic style of leadership which makes the party organization to be highly stuck to the leader. "Empowered with their ability to control the candidate nomination process in the elections and access to sources of political patronage, leaders have acted with impunity in personalizing the exercise of power and party

leadership." (Sayarı, 2002: 25). More details on centralized party structure in Turkey are examined in Part 4.4 of this Chapter.

Since center-periphery division affected these parties in terms of constructing their ideological stance and specifying their aimed part of the society, the contradiction between the representatives of the center and the periphery generally clearly determined at the starting point of these parties. However, although these political parties gained their votes which helped them to come to power by their approaches to centralization and decentralization, they could not maintain these once they come to power. Consequently, the ongoing issue of centralism in Turkish political culture can be a deliberative decision taken by political parties -which are internally centralized- although a lot of them claim to support decentralization.

The following parts scrutinize the role of the electoral system, regulations on party organizations, party system, and party competition in general. In addition, two important determinants of party politics in Turkey are examined here: authoritarian party structures and clientelism. These characteristics of Turkish politics yield clues about elite recruitment and candidate nomination to a large extent.

4.1. Electoral System Design and Election Results in Turkey

Electoral systems play a major role in candidate selection and eventually political career patterns of politicians. The reason for that lies in how electoral systems shape party competition and strategies in candidate selection processes. Thus, it is noteworthy to investigate different electoral designs and consequences of them while examining the careers of politicians. Basically, if political parties compete only for one seat in electoral districts, such as single member district plurality systems, they need to nominate only one candidate, and there would be appeals to relevant criteria to select their candidates. For example, if those parties believe that nominating a female or a young -and relatively inexperienced- politician would decrease their chance to get votes, they would opt out of selecting such individuals. However, if there is more than one seat in an electoral district, those parties would strategically nominate those people in order to increase representation of different groups in the constituency in question.

The main characteristics of various types of electoral systems were explained in Chapter 2. Regarding those characteristics, Gallagher et al. (2011: 390) highlighted the criteria to evaluate electoral systems in terms of their advantages and disadvantages. When they compare majority or plurality systems with PR systems, they conclude that there is a trade-off: having more stable and effective government (brought by majority systems) vs. proportionality of votes and seats gained (thanks to PR system). Some of the advantages of the PR system are identified as follows: as the level of proportionality between votes and seats is higher than the plurality system, PR system tends to increase representativeness by enabling more parties to have seats in the parliament. To illustrate, in the UK under majoritarian electoral system, smaller or extreme parties such as far right or left are not really favored, as it is difficult for those parties to gain seats proportionally with their votes shares Meanwhile, the opposite is more likely in Austria or Norway, in which PR system creates better conditions of competition for such parties (Bale, 2005: 152). Hence, the chances of small or minor parties to be penalized is lowered under the PR system, thus, more parties, ideas and interests can take place/be represented in the decision-making processes in legislatures. However, the level of representativeness is not that high under majoritarian systems, as the system tends to eliminate the minor parties. This will raise the problem of disproportional distribution of seats regarding the votes, and can create over and under representation. Still, under PR systems, similar problems of disproportionality may occur depending on the level of electoral threshold and district magnitude. According to Gallagher et al. (2011: 390), the most proportional results can emerge under the PR with no electoral threshold and large district magnitude: If a threshold and/or small district magnitude are implemented, disproportional results are more likely to exist according to this explanation. For instance, in some countries such as Poland, Hungary and Latvia which implement 5% threshold, disproportional results can occur.

Nevertheless, proportionality and representativeness are not identified as the only objectives of electoral systems. From the point of effective and stable government, plurality systems generally create better results. As indicated above, one of the main motivations behind the plurality electoral system is to ease the government formation process. Due to the fact that many parties can get a similar number of votes, which is not enough for forming a government under PR systems, these parties can attempt to form coalition governments, which may take some time, due to discussions of who will be in

the coalition. On the contrary, it is more likely that the government will be formed by a single party which gets the majority of the votes under majority systems (Gallagher et al., 2011: 393). So, this can also create a more effective and a stable government formation process, and a more coherent government compared to the coalitions which emerge under PR systems. The majority system can provide clear results and mostly it is obvious which party will form the government (the one who gets majority of the votes). It also renders the accountability of government clear cut, for people will know who are responsible for the government, and this system generally promotes party government rather than coalition government. Thus, a specific party is accountable for the government decisions on its own. These tradeoffs between the consequences of different types of electoral systems have been discussed widely with regard to "representation of voter preferences and accountable governments" (Carey and Hix, 2011: 838).[18]

These comparisons of plurality and PR electoral systems have been made in Turkish politics since the beginning of the multi-party era. Hence, from one election to another, significant changes emerged through time. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, several electoral systems have been employed in Turkish politics in a broad range. From majoritarian system to national remainder (*milli bakiye*), from PR without a threshold to PR with a 10% electoral threshold, quite different forms of electoral systems have been implemented. In three general elections which took place between 1950 and 1960, a majoritarian electoral system was implemented in Turkey, while the PR system started to be used in 1961, and since then there have been various methods of PR system implemented in the country (Erdem, 2013: 55). The following paragraphs provide historical information about the electoral systems and their reflections to politics, parties and voter behavior in the country.

As it can be seen in Table 1, implementing majority system and PR with 10% threshold usually created a National Assembly with a small number of political parties, while PR with no threshold enabled more parties to gain seats. It seems that, when every other factor remains the same, changing only the electoral formula creates an extreme difference in the seat distribution in the legislature. This also affects the emergence of

[18] For more details on this comparison, please see Carey, J., M. And Hix, S. 2011. "The electoral Sweet Spot: Low Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2), 383-397. In this study, Carey and Hix (2011: 383) find that "Electoral systems that use low-magnitude multimember districts produce disproportionality indices almost on par with those of pure PR systems while limiting party system fragmentation and producing simpler government coalitions."

disproportionality in the National Assembly. Proportionality means that vote shares and seat shares of a party go hand in hand. In other words, if a political part gets 30% of the available votes, it will occupy approximately 30% of the seats in parliament. However, some electoral systems do not enable this, creating disproportionality. For example, if a party occupies 70% of the seats in a parliament even if it gets 50% of the all available votes, there emerge an over-representation problem. Such problems would occur both in majority systems or PR with a high threshold. As explained previously, under majoritarian systems only one party/candidate will win in each electoral district. If that party's vote share is slightly higher than the others, it will get the seat, but the others will get no seats even though they gain similar amounts of votes. If this case is applied to many electoral districts, the party with slightly more votes win seats in each of them, resulting in a huge percent of seats in parliament. However, once total available votes and their distribution to the parties are calculated, there may not emerge a huge difference between some parties. To illustrate, Turkey employed a majoritarian electoral system in 1950 General Elections, and there were three political parties which compete in these elections: DP, CHP and MP. Among these parties, the DP won 52.7% of the available votes, the CHP won 39.4%, and the MP won 3.1%. However, when it comes to translating those vote shares to seats, DP won 85.2% of all seats in the parliament, while the CHP won 14.2% and the MP won 0.2%. Similar results emerged in 1954 General Elections for which the same electoral system was implemented as in 1950: the DP won 57.6% of the votes, while the CHP won 35.4%, CMP won 4,9% and the TKP won 0.6% of the available votes. By these vote shares, the DP occupied 92,8% of all the seats in the parliament, while the CHP won only 5.7% and CMP 0.9%. The TKP could not gain any seats in these elections. 1957 General Elections were held with the same electoral system, and similar disproportionality was observed, yet the DP lost almost 10% of the votes compared to 1954. CHP and CMP increased their vote shares by approximately 5% to 2% respectively, and there emerged another party namely the HP which won 3.8% of the votes and 0.6% of the seats (Tuncer and Danacı, 2003). These results especially in 1950 and 1954 created an extreme overrepresentation of the DP and underrepresentation of both the CHP and MP. Kalaycıoğlu (2002: 58) calculated disproportionality in representation in Turkish National Elections between 1950 and 2002 by using various disproportionality indexes which are Loosemore-Hanby index, Douglas W. Rae index, Least squares index, Largest deviation index and Range index (which was suggested by Kalaycıoğlu himself), and for almost all of the calculations, either the 1950 or 1954 General Elections seem to have the

highest level of disproportionality. "…Such an imbalance, which was not ameliorated by any institutional, cultural, and traditional norms and structures, was inimical to opposition, freedoms, and human rights..." (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 91).

Evaluating these results, another electoral system, namely the PR system, with a district level threshold (*çevre barajı*) was implemented in the 1961 General Elections. Although the 1961 Constitution did not reveal any definition of a new electoral system, "the Election Act (*Seçim Kanunu*) to follow clearly stipulated that Proportional Representation (PR) would be used to convert votes to seats in the TGNA. Consequently, the majoritarian election practices of the 1946–1960 era were dropped in favor of a PR formula in converting votes to seats for the first time in 1961." (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 94).

This electoral system resulted in a more proportional distribution of seats in parliament. There were four political parties gaining seats: the CHP won 36,7% of the votes and 38,5% of the seats, the AP gained 34,8% of the votes and 35,1% of the seats, the CKMP got 14% with a 12% of the seats, and lastly the YTP occupied 14,4% of the seats with its 13,7% vote share. Although these results are more proportional when compared to the previous elections under majoritarian system, the most proportional elections had yet to be observed in 1965 when national remainder system (*milli bakiye*) was employed. 1965 General Elections were the most proportional and representative elections with the lowest level of wasted votes.[19] There was no electoral threshold, and many political parties which competed in the elections won seats in the parliament in parallel with their vote shares. The results of vote shares and seat shares were as follow respectively: AP 52.9% to 53.3%, CHP 28.7% to 29.8%, MP 6.3% to 6.9%, YTP 2.7% to 4.2 %, TİP 3% to 3.3% and lastly, CKMP 2.2% to 2.5%. So, the proportionality between the votes shares and seats shares was quite high which resulted in a better representation in the Parliament. In 1969, 1973 and 1977 General elections, PR with d'Hondt formula without any threshold was implemented, and proportionality was not such a problem. Even though those three elections created more disproportionality compared to 1965 elections, they worked better than the elections held between 1950 and 1957. However, this electoral system did not

[19] For further details of the proportionality of the 1965 Elections compared to others, please see Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. 2002. "Elections and Governance" in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* by Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.), London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 55-71. The table titled "Disproportionality in Parliamentary Elections, 1950-1999" in this book chapter shows the levels of disproportionality of each election calculated depending on various indexes.

last long. The military coup in 1980 resulted in many major changes, including electoral system design.

Although there have been radical electoral system amendments throughout time, no major changes occurred in the electoral system in Turkey within the time frame examined in this dissertation (2002-2015). Nevertheless, 2002 General Elections has been one of the turning points of Turkish politics. Hence, taking the 2002 General Elections as the starting point of a study would yield valuable information. First of all, the party system in the country started to change dramatically after this year. However, this change has been explained by the influence of voter behavior, rather than the effects of coups and military regimes (Sayarı, 2016: 248). PR with d'Hondt formula and 10% threshold implemented in that year which has also been in effect through 1990s, and as a result of 2002 General Elections, only two political parties, which are the AKP and the CHP, won enough votes to have seats in the National Assembly. Other political parties could not exceed the 10% threshold, and did not have any chance to occupy seats. More specifically, the AKP won 34.3% of the total available votes while the CHP won 19.4%. Among those which could not get enough votes to exceed the 10% threshold, the DYP won 9.5%, MHP won 8.4%, GP won 7.3%, DEHAP won 6.2%, ANAP won 5.1%, SP won 2.5% and DSP won 1.2% of the available votes. Other smaller parties won the remaining. A very obvious and interesting issue about these results is that many parties which could not even got 10% of the votes had been some of the most successful parties prior to this period. For example, in the previous elections which were held in 1999, the exact same electoral system was implemented, and the DSP won 22.2% of the votes, while the MHP won 18%, FP won 15.4%, ANAP won 13.2%, DYP won 12%. Another interesting point is that the CHP got only 8.7% of the votes, which hindered it from winning any seats in the National Assembly in the 1999 elections.

As mentioned, only two political parties gained seats in the Parliament after the 2002 General Elections in Turkey. Since many votes were wasted in this election, fairness of representation was affected seriously. Both the AKP and the CHP over-represented due to the electoral formula: the AKP got approximately 66% of the seats in the Parliament with 34.3% of the total available votes, and the CHP won approximately 32.4% of the seats with 19.4% of available votes. Some parties who were successful in the previous elections were clearly punished by the voters in 2002 General Elections. The DYP, ANAP and the MHP in particular lost a considerable amount of their supporters, and except the

MHP, both DYP and ANAP almost vanished as they lost their saliency and being an effective party in Turkish politics. With regard to such cases, Cuzan (2015) argued that one of the five empirical laws of politics is the law of shrinking support. The DYP and ANAP experienced this shrinking support in a way, by losing a significant part of their votes over time, which influenced party competition to a large extent. Nevertheless, the results of 2002 Elections are mostly explained by the effect of the electoral system. Both the DYP and ANAP were identified as main center-right political parties, and there emerged a vacuum in this ideological stance with their disappearance. Since then, only the AKP and the MHP have become relevant parties on the right, but these two parties were not identified as centerist parties. Indeed, throughout 2000s, both parties seemed to move further on the right wing of the ideological spectrum. Today, two of the effective parties (the AKP and MHP) occupy positions on the right of the ideological spectrum, while the other two effective parties (the CHP and HDP) are positioned on the left of center. Hence, party competition changed through time compared to previous eras. Consequently, party strategies with regard to candidate selection operates in a pre-dominant party system as explained in the Introduction of this Dissertation.

4.2. Party Organization, Regulations on Parties and Party System in Turkey

Many countries have legal regulations or laws on political parties, but in some countries, such as the U.S., the constitutions do not mention the political parties much, thus, such attitudes resemble to the uncodified arrangements in the UK (Janda, 2005: 6). On the contrary, various sources regulate political parties in a detailed way in Turkey.

To start with, the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey's article 68 regulates the formation of parties and (withdrawal from) membership, and article 69 demonstrates the principles to be observed by political parties. In the article 68, it is indicated that the parties shall pursue the provisions in the Constitution and law while organizing their activities. Moreover, along with the activities of the parties, their programs and statutes are required to follow several principles, e.g. they cannot be against the independence of the State, its integrity and territory; human rights, rule of law and secular republic. Furthermore, these two articles together show that the political parties can be closed by the decision of the Constitutional Court, if these parties do not follow the regulations about their activities, statutes and party programs. For example, since its foundation in

1961, the Constitutional Court decided to close down 24 parties in total, 6 parties while under the jurisdiction of the previous 1961 Constitution, and 18 parties under the current 1982 Constitution (Sayarı, 2016: 244). State control on political parties can be explained by the centralist tendency of the state administration as mention in the previous pages. More specifically, state control through constitutional regulations, party laws and financial aid provided by the state itself on party activities has been an important characteristic of Turkish party politics (Sayarı, 2016: 243). Nevertheless, the regulations on the political parties are not done only by the Constitution in Turkey. The principles and structures of the parties are also regulated by the Law on Political Parties (*Siyasi Partiler Kanunu* – SPK) and these parties also have their party by-laws (*içtüzük*) for intra-party regulations.

The first law on political parties in Turkey was enacted in 1965, then revised in 1983 and has had many amendments since then (Sayarı, 2016: 244). So, the current SPK (Act No: 2820) of Turkey was enacted in 1983 in accordance with the 1982 Constitution of Turkey. Along with the article 1, the article 2 reveals that the SPK covers the provisions for the foundation, organization, activities, mission, authority and responsibilities, property acquisition, income and expenses, auditing, closure and being closed down of the political parties. Besides the regulations on these topics, the SPK proposes a common and binding organizational form/method for all the parties, meaning that no party may found another organizational structure which is not in accordance with this law. This organizational method is parallel to the administrative organization of Turkey. Consequently, the organizational structures of the Turkish political parties are very similar to each other due to the regulations of the SPK (Bektaş, 1993: 39; Erdem, 2001: 85).

According to the Article 7 of the SPK in Turkey, organization of the political parties are composed of central bodies (headquarters) with provincial (*il*), district (*ilçe*) and municipality (*belde*) organizations; TBMM groups, provincial councils and municipal council groups as such. An additional sentence[20] shows that along with those parts, some other subsidiary bodies such as women's branches (*kadın kolları*) and youth branches (*gençlik kolları*) can be established.

[20] SPK, Article 7 – (Amended: 21/5/1987 - 3370/1): [Siyasi partilerin teşkilatı; merkez organları ile il, ilçe ve belde teşkilatlarından;Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Grubu ile il genel meclisi ve belediye meclisi gruplarından ibarettir. (Ek Cümle: 12/8/1999 - 4445/3 md.) Siyasi partilerin tüzüklerinde ayrıca kadın kolu, gençlik kolu ve benzeri yan kuruluşlarla, yabancı ülkelerde yurtdışı temsilciliği kurulması öngörülebilir.] Retrieved from: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2820.pdf.

According to the SPK, political parties cannot organize their offices (other than above-mentioned branches and offices) regarding age, occupation, gender, geography or institutions (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 107); thus, regardless of socioeconomic, ethnic and geographical differences between regions, only one organization model is allowed for the whole country (Erdem, 2001: 93). Depending on this information, one can argue that organizational structures of political parties are quite close to each other in Turkey. Yet, the relationship between those offices on different levels can show variance among parties. For example, Ayan (2011) reveals that despite the fact that authoritarian party structures are common practices for four main parties in Turkey (the author analyzes the AKP, CHP, MHP and the DTP, as the HDP had not yet been established when she conducted the study), they each employ different types of structures. For example, intra-party relationships between the party members rely on different ideologies, attitudes, motivations, and constellations of interests. Thus, although the structural organization shows clear similarities, the ties within each party structure can show differences.

As a primary task, political parties recruit politicians. With regard to recruitment, one of the best-known regulations on political parties around the world is to employ quotas, especially for under-represented citizens. The quotas could be gender based e.g. women quotas, or could target the minorities, youngsters or other specific groups in a particular country. Among those, gender quotas are the ones which have been applied in many countries, especially in democracies. The rationale behind applying such a quota is to provide women a higher chance to be represented in both national and local politics. For doing so, the women should be recruited and nominated as candidates in the elections. Thus, in order to increase the chances of women participation in politics, legislated gender quotas are implemented in certain countries, such as Argentina, Belgium, France and Mexico. Political party quotas are adopted by several parties in some countries such as Australia, Sweden, Turkey and the US.[21] However, gender quotas can also be optional, or non-existent. Some political parties can implement such practices by their own discretion. For example, HDP by-laws include 40% women quota in Turkey. Similarly, the CHP also employs gender quotas which were increased from 25% to 33% in 2012, and youth quotas to 20%.[22]

[21] Please see the followinf link for more details: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas.

[22] Please see the following link for more details: http://content.chp.org.tr/file/chp_tuzuk_10_03_2018.pdf.

The Turkish party system has experienced various changes starting from its birth, with regard to the number of parties, polarization and fragmentation levels among parties and government types (coalition or party) on a broad spectrum (Turan, 1988; Kalaycıoğlu, 1994; Çarkoğlu, 1998; Sayarı 2007; Sayarı, 2016). Turkey experienced various party system settings. The era from 1925 to 1945 is defined as single party period in the country. The CHP dominated the politics at the time. After this period, starting from 1945, the party system was defined as a multi-party system. Nevertheless, 1950-1961 period is specifically called as two-party system with party governments, and the number of parties represented in the parliament increased only after 1961 (Sayarı, 2016: 247). In addition, "…The turbulent developments of Turkish politics in the second half of the twentieth century resulted in the several disruptions in the party system and a simultaneous sprouting of new political parties as the old ones were either banned or faded away as they lost popular support at the polls." (Kalaycıoğlu, 2013: 483). Hence, it is clear that it has not been possible to observe a real continuity in party system in Turkey.

With the results of November 1, 2015 General Elections,

> "…party competition in Turkey continued to take place within a predominant party system. There has been no turnover in the government for more than a decade, the opposition is excluded from sharing power and the AKP dominates the country's electoral and party politics. In addition to its majority in parliament, the AKP also controls the presidency and most of the local and municipal administrations, including Turkey's two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara." (Sayarı, 2016: 277).

Hence, as Sartori explains, "For a predominant party to establish a predominant party system, it should take three consecutive absolute majorities, provided that the electorate appears stabilised, that the absolute majority threshold is clearly surpassed, and/or that the interval is wide." (Sartori, 2005: 177), Turkey now experiences a predominant party system in which the AKP has electoral hegemony and political dominance (Esen and Gumuscu, 2018). Under those circumstances, possible political career opportunities seem to revolve around four political parties, the AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP between 2002 and 2015.

4.3. Inter-Party Competition and Intra-Party Competition in Turkey

Factors affecting the party competition vary over a broad range. Some scholars explain the emergence of parties and the features of party competition by referring to the

institutional factors such as electoral rules, while others explain with reference to existence of certain cleavages in a society, ideologies, and characteristics of party systems. More specifically, Duverger (1964) explains party competition with reference to institutional effects (i.e. the impact of electoral rules), Lipset and Rokkan (1967) unearth the influence of various social cleavages in the society, Ware (1996) takes attention to the influence of ideologies as earlier suggested by von Beyme, and Sartori (1976) underlines the characteristics of party systems and their effects while explaining party competition. As explained in Chapter 2, party competition shapes parties' strategies about candidate selection and eventually the political career patterns of individuals:

> "The degree of inter-party competition influences the importance of candidate selection … Inter-party competition can be reduced by the presence of a dominant party whose general election candidates are all but certain winners. The real choice of deputies in these circumstances is made at the time of candidate selection in the dominant party, with the general election reduced to little more than a formality. It is rare in mature democracies for a single party to be so dominant that it can be said to dramatically and universally reduce voter choice in a general election. However, it is not uncommon to have a regionally dominant party that, within its area of geographic strength, essentially reduces the general election to a formality with the real contest for the legislative seat occurring at its candidate selection stage." (Cross, 2008: 605).

Inter-party competition is significant with regard to vote maximization and candidate nomination in accordance with that goal. Along with that intra-party competition is also important to mention. First of all, intra-party competition in an incumbent party and opposition party would be differ from each other. Especially in pre-dominant party systems in which one political party -which is the incumbent one- dominates the politics, candidate nominees may find a highly competitive environment within those incumbent parties. In some electoral districts, intra-party competition can be higher in comparison to others.

> "...it is the nature of the political environment in which a political party functions that determines its chances for institutionalization. In the long run the survival of a political party, just like any other system, is dependent upon its environment. The number and the nature of political parties in the system, their vote shares, and their ideological positions have been among the most critical determinants of how a political party organization operates in the party system." (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 43)

Political culture and the political party system have an important effect on the political parties' centralism. In Turkey, the political party system with its generally fragmented, polarized and competitive characteristics, makes political parties become highly aware of their possible competitors and their policies, and the consequences of losing elections. Thus, some political parties usually (re)position themselves in accordance with their competitors, especially if there is more than one party competing in a certain place on ideological spectrum.

> "In general, the parties have no significant internal democracy. Leaders who make bad mistakes in government or elections survive. Corruption does not lead to a political fall. Ideas are not generated within parties where debate is discouraged. Obedience rather than competition governs the parties' political culture. The centrist parties have done especially badly in these categories, encouraging activists and voters to migrate to the fringes of the system." (Rubin, 2002: 3).

"…over the last two decades, the peripheral forces of Islamist background, as well as those of Kurdish ethnicity, have increasingly challenged the 'centrist' status quo, both inside and outside the parliamentary political arena." (Çarkoğlu, 2008: 322). Among those, the Islamist parties have been some of the successful ones, and the path going to the establishment of the AKP may provide useful insights about the new type of party competition and system in Turkey today.

Until now, many parties which adopt Islamist orientations have been established in Turkey, yet, many of them are closed down by the Constitutional Court or after military coups. More specifically, in 1970, Necmettin Erbakan founded the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi* – MNP) which carried Islamic ideas. However, the Constitutional Court closed down this party by underlining the religious orientation of the party which was defined as a threat to secularism. After the closure of this party, the founders of it established a new party named Islamist National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi* – MSP), which supported the ideological framework of National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*). This ideological framework can be defined as "the basis for all the political Islamic parties that would succeed the MNP..." (Gümüşçü and Sert, 2009: 953), with the exception of the AKP. Due to the 1980 Military Coup, many parties were closed in the country, the MSP among them. After this period, a new party, Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi* – RP), which again carried the same ideological characteristics with *Milli Görüş* was established in 1983. This party had been successful in the municipal elections during the late 1980s

and eventually was also successful in the national elections in the 1990s. However, on 28 February 1997, while the RP was in a coalition government with the DYP, which was a center right party, and while Erbakan was the Prime Minister, he was given a document prepared by the generals in a National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*, MGK) meeting. This document revealed how to prevent the rise of political Islam in Turkey. Thus, it was directly related to the RP as its ideological framework was defined in an Islamic manner. This meeting of the MGK on 28 February has been defined as a showdown between the government and the military, and identified with a major crackdown by the secular establishment on the political Islam (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 158; Gümüşçü and Sert, 2009: 954). Within this era, the RP was closed by the Constitutional Court, whose decision was later upheld by the European Court of Human Rights, and many politicians including Erbakan were banned from politics.

After the closure of the RP, a new party which follows a very similar path was established under the name of Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi* – FP). Yet, this party adopted slightly different ideas from the *Milli Görüş* path, and, starting from this period, a new group emerged within the party, and called as *Yenilikçiler* (Modernists). This group was in search of a new line or opening (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: 8). When the Constitutional Court banned the FP from politics, this time two parties were established as successors to this Islamic party. One is the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi* – SP) which was established by the traditionalist group, and the other is the AKP, which was established by the *Yenilikçiler* group in the FP. After the establishment of the AKP, it seemed that the AKP founders abandoned the *Milli Görüş* path. There has been more or less a similar ideology shared among the successors of the MSP up until the establishment of the AKP. Nevertheless, "The AKP rejects any continuity with the 'national outlook' parties and describes itself as a 'conservative democratic' party, even refraining from using the 'Muslim democrat' label" (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: 20). Yet "conservative" in Turkish is "*Muhafazakar*", which is a concept that has often been used as a signal/symbol for "Muslim" credentials of political associations, organization and parties.

Still, there have been various breaks with the former tradition of Erbakan's heritage. Some argue that the AKP differentiates itself from its Islamist ancestors and does not associate itself with religion, due to the 28 September Process which ended up with the resignation of Erbakan and ban of his party (see e.g., Çınar, 2006: 474). Nevertheless, as a criticism to such arguments, Gümüşçü and Sert argued that explaining the split of the AKP from

the *Milli Görüş* path depending on the 28 February process does not provide a full explanation, because there was already a division within the *Milli Görüş* movement between the traditionalists and the reformists, and the 28 February Process was only influential on widening the gap between these two groups. According to the authors, the major factor that resulted in the AKP being founded was the birth of a new social base which started to emerge in the 1980s as a result of economic liberalization in the country. Eventually, when "...the emerging devout bourgeoisie equipped the *Yenilikciler* within the Milli Görüş with economic, social, and political power..." this group which established the AKP became more powerful compared to the traditionalists (Gümüşçü and Sert, 2009: 961).

As Hale argued, the AKP realized that it should focus on "what was practical," and abandoned the idea of just order (*adil düzen*) which was supported by Erbakan's party by promoting the small enterprises which will live in accordance with the state industrial sector. Erbakan supported such a just order for eliminating and abolishing the interest on capital, and thus severed ties to a capitalist system in Turkey. The AKP, on the other hand, underlined that the most important source of Turkey's economic development and progress is the "the strength of [our nation's] private enterprise," and the state's role is to ensure that the market will be suitable for free competition, and there will be no obstacles which potentially prevent the private enterprise to perform properly in the market. Along with these ideas, the AKP also promoted the idea to decrease the weight of state industrial sector and it supported privatization and Turkey's engagement with the global economy (Hale, 2005: 302). Right after its establishment in 2001, the AKP won enough seats in the 2002 General Elections to form the government, and this started a new era in party-competition in the country.

Yet another explanation can be made by focusing on the importance of the electorate and the parties' positioning of themselves regarding the voters. This is related to the adaptation approach which was explained by Ware (1996) with regard to revising party ideologies for adapting new political contexts. In Turkey, "…The right-wing movements and parties have been quite tempted to present themselves as possessing a conservative ideology that seems to host a relatively large number of different traits, preferences, likes, and dislikes…" (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007: 234). With a similar rationale, the AKP seems to adopt such a conservative framework to reach larger swaths of voters. Moreover, the AKP has been defined as a coalition which relied on the rural population, small traders and the

artisans, urban slum-dwellers, small and mid-range entrepreneurs, the Islamist bourgeoisie, young business executives and a working class (Özbudun, 2006: 547; Insel, 2003: 297-299). This coalition is clearly not a homogeneous one, and in order to preserve it, the party seems to have trekked a prudent route. This process requires rapid decision-making for continuous adaptation. Thus, a conservative framework on the one hand, which will appeal to a large part of the electorate, and a "change" driven decision-making process which eases the adaptation to the transforming ideas of the other, especially the business interests of the coalition of supporters. On the other hand, it seems to have been adopted by the AKP. For example, the AKP defines itself as conservative democrat (Hale, 2005: 307; Özbudun, 2006: 548), but conversely, it always touches upon to the importance of transformation and change by underlining the search and adoption of "new" ideas (The AKP Party Program). This enables the AKP to appeal to a larger electorate in the country and increase its political power supported by the votes.

Table 4.1. Percentage of votes of Islamist parties in parliamentary and local elections in Turkey (1973– 2015)

Year	Elections	Party	Votes (%)
1973	Parliamentary	MSP	11.8
1977	Parliamentary	MSP	8.6
1984	Local	RP	4.4
1987	Parliamentary	RP	7.2
1989	Local	RP	9.8
1991	Parliamentary	RP (in coalition with the MHP and IDP)	16.9
1994	Local	RP	19.1
1995	Parliamentary	RP	21.4
1999	Local	FP	18.4
1999	Parliamentary	FP	15.4
2002	Parliamentary	AKP	34.3
2004	Local	AKP	41.2
2007	Parliamentary	AKP	46.6
2009	Local	AKP	38.6
2011	Parliamentary	AKP	49.8
2014	Local	AKP	43.1
Jun-15	Parliamentary	AKP	40.9
Nov-15	Parliamentary	AKP	49.5

Source: Özbudun, E. 2006. From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.11, No.3-4, p. 545.Original table in the above-mentioned source ends in 2004. Elections held after 2004 were included by the results announced by the YSK. General elections results are available in the following link: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/milletvekili-genel-secim-arsivi/2644; and local elections results are available in the following link: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/mahalli-idareler-genel-secimleri-arsivi/2650.

Table 4.1 reveals the difference between the AKP's and its ancestors' vote share. Obviously, a drastic change appeared in 2002 with the AKP's victory in the elections. This is closely related to the main goals of the AKP, e.g. whether it is preserving an ideology and trying to implement the policies derived from that ideology, or simply increasing its vote share to continue its power in the political life, or not has been a continuing matter of contention.

Ware (1996) highlights the idea that we should place the ideological dimensions of the parties in context with regard to party competition: During the era of Europe's transformation to liberal democracy, "there were many parties whose sole *raison d'etre* was obtaining patronage through their control of political offices," and "the demands imposed by having to compete for the votes of a mass electorate may have entailed the embracing of an ideology..." but still, "non-ideological aspects of politics continued to infect many parties well into the twentieth century." (Ware, 1996: 17). Combining this with the fact that a large group of the voters in Turkey tend to vote for or support a conservative party like the AKP, with the motivation of expected economic benefits rather than voting for purely ideological beliefs (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007: 233), we can argue that the AKP seeks electoral victory which will keep it in power. This can be a major motivation for its split from the ideological path of *Milli Görüş*, which appealed to a narrow electorate by emphasizing the Islamist ideological credentials of the party.

Although the AKP increased its vote shares after 2002 elections, they also faced decreased support over time. With regard to the law of shrinking support, Cuzan argues that:

> "The erosion of support is not uniform across the ruling party's spell in office. In fact, in some cases, the incumbent party's vote share rises, even substantially, in their first reelection—especially if in the prior election, when it was elevated to office, the electorate had fractured in the midst of an economic or political crisis. This also may happen when a new democracy is experiencing a period of electoral sorting and consolidation, as Germany did in the 1950s." (Cuzan, 2015: 416).

A similar result emerged for the AKP starting from 2002. Following an economic crisis which started in 2001, the AKP won the highest amount of the votes compared to other parties in 2002, and then continued to increase its vote share until the 2011 elections, and experienced a big drop on June 7, 2015 elections. But right after this election, a repeat election was held on November 1, 2015 and the AKP was able to recover lost ground and

won enough votes to form the government by its own once again. Thus, the AKP continued to dominate politics in Turkey, even when it lost a general election (June 7, 2015). Regarding these circumstances, one may argue that the recruitment patterns and candidate selections strategies of parties are broadly influenced by the characteristics of party competition as well.

4.4. Centralist Structures of Turkish Political Parties

In Turkey,

> "…Political parties usually have oligarchic structures resulting in the concentration of power at the top and a decline in the influence of members at large. Party leaders end up with a disproportionately large number of resources compared to other party members, including access to information, control over formal communication channels and accumulation of know-how related to political activities..." (Kabasakal, 2014: 701).

Political parties are composed of multiple levels and branches, and the interactions among those different structures are regulated by various sources. This regulation is usually defined as "structural relationship" (*yapısal bağlantı*), and while some parties have clarified, detailed and definite rules in terms of the relations of various parts of the party, some others have not (Özbudun, 1974: 62). Turkish political parties are categorized in the first group as they practice strong structural relations with their detailed intra-party regulations; and depending on this categorization, the concentration of power at the central level of the parties has been recognized by many scholars (Özbudun, 1974: 63; Bektaş, 1993: 40; Hale, 2002; Ayan, 2010). Relationship between the party headquarters and local offices seems to be asymmetrical in favor of the headquarters; "In general, the parties have no significant internal democracy. … Ideas are not generated within parties where debate is discouraged. Obedience rather than competition governs the parties' political culture…" (Rubin, 2002: 3). To illustrate, Ulaş and Bayraktar (2013) explain the concentration of power in the hands of the party leadership by underlining the marginalization of local party offices. More specifically, the central offices of the parties penetrate and often control the decision-making procedures and the decisions made by the local branches which leaves small room for discretion in these local offices.

A number of factors such as genetic features, political culture and institutions can influence the organizational structure of political parties (see e.g., Kalaycıoğlu, 2002;

Ayan, 2010). More specifically, a party may initially organize its internal structure in a highly hierarchical manner and continue like that throughout time; or political culture of the country, in which dominant party leadership is a common feature, may influence the party structure as time passes and a strong leadership can emerge as a common practice; or various institutions such as laws and regulations on political parties may influence the internal structural relationships within a party organization. For example, strong leadership/leader-oriented rule within the political parties have been one of the major features in Turkey, and many important decisions, such as the changes in the status of many party members were usually taken by the leaders. Although some parties constituted more or less institutionalized recruitment patterns throughout time, the post-1983 parties especially have shown certain characteristics that the selection of the candidates, resolution of the problems among various party organs, and the management of the parliamentary party group that have been controlled by the central branch and sometimes specifically by the leader of the party in question; and by having the ability to control the candidate nomination, and access to the various sources of patronage, the leaders manage to personalize their leadership (Kalaycıoğlu, 1990: 196-197; Sayarı, 2002: 25).

Mainly, above-mentioned factors have been defined as the major sources of centralism in the parties in Turkey. But what has been the influence of the legal regulations on this structure? To what extent do the legal regulations affect the centralist party structure, and how? In order to answer such questions, it is best to turn to and analyze the regulations on the political parties in Turkey. Especially the SPK has been criticized by various scholars as causing a party structure which is hierarchically organized, thus, while the central levels are powerful, the local levels can find little room for decision-making (Çarkoğlu et al. 2000). It is also noteworthy to consider how the parties employ a flow of detailed regulations from top to lower levels in a hierarchical mechanism: The referred characteristics of the regulations give more place to the center, to further codify its rules, and widen its control capacity.

The regulations provided by the SPK seem strict by their nature. Yet, not only this characteristic *per se*, but also the indirect help of it for the survival of centralist administration matter. In other words, such regulations can be interpreted as building a hierarchical structure within the political parties: Very similar to the state administration structure, which empowers the center and makes the local levels such as district and

provincial administration bodies to be depended on the decisions of this center, these regulations provide a structure for the political parties which provide little room for decentralized relations within the parties.

Articles 19 and 20 of the SPK reveal the regulations on the structure of the provincial and district organizations of the political parties in detail. Nevertheless, the SPK provides some room for the political parties to regulate their local organizations in terms of certain issues. For example, in accordance with the Article 7 of the SPK, both the AKP and the CHP built up all referred organs and parts such as municipality organizations, district and provincial organizations, party headquarters and other organizations such as women's branches and youth branches, and street (*mahalle*) and village (*köy*) level representatives under the district branches. Yet, these lower level representatives are under the responsibility of the district branches. The reason for organizing such a structure is that the SPK does not allow local branch organizations at a lower level than the municipal level such as *bucaks* (sub-districts), but the parties need to have some representatives in other places in order to communicate with the electorate such as those living in villages as well. Thus, political parties also have representatives, but legally they have to put them under the control of the district branches. Such kind of a necessity –whether it suits the national party headquarters' purposes in the first place or not- creates a dependency of the lower levels to the higher levels of the party organization in the first place. This may further feed the hierarchical structure within the party.

Some of the regulations of the SPK seem to intend to create a rather democratic nature in the parties. For example, the SPK indicates that the parties will hold a national convention (*Büyük Kongre*) at least once in three years, and the party chairman (*Genel Başkan*) must nominate himself/herself for re-election. Additionally, there may be other contestants as well. Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that the party chairman can be outed from power in these conventions (Hale, 2002: 185). Meaning that, in many political parties, changing the leader of the party via intra-party elections is not a common practice in the country. On the contrary, the current party leaders sometimes point out his or her successors. Thus, we observe a tendency that the leaders decide and nominate, and the other members of the party usually accept this decision. At this point, the current leader of the party may be consolidating his or her power by gaining the re-approval of the members of the party. Consequently, such a practice can enable the national party headquarters to further

concentrate the control power in its hands. So, unintended consequences can emerge out of the regulations of the SPK, which further consolidates centralist structure of the parties.

Similarly, party by-laws may create several restrictions on the autonomy of the local branches. For example, both the AKP and the CHP have long, detailed party by-laws, and for instance, the election process and method of the district or provincial party bosses, their responsibilities, relations with different organizations within and without the party are regulated by these by-laws.[23] Some parties do impose election term limits such as in the case of the AKP: the by-law of the AKP limits the election of the same chairman (in district and provincial areas) with 3 ordinary successive periods at most.[24] All the branches of the party should act accordingly, and for example, even if a local branch thinks that a local party boss will be successful if he/she is elected one again (after 3 periods), the party by-laws restrict it. In other words, these local branches are bounded by these regulations. Similar regulations are also available for legislative candidates of the party. As another example, remembering the incentives referred by Ayan (2010), we can interpret that certain kinds of incentives can be used for consolidating the power of the center and increasing its control capacity. For example, the Article 43/F of the CHP by-laws allows the party headquarters/party's central actors to dismiss a local branch's members, if there emerges a vote loss compared to the previous elections in that specific area (province, district or smaller areas) (CHP, 2012: 60). Even if the center does not use this right so much, such kind of an article can make the local branches to feel under pressure of the center (see e.g., Ulaş and Bayraktar, 2013).

4.5. Clientelism and Its Patterns in Turkey

Along with the centralist tendencies and similar organizational structures of political parties, another common characteristic seems to be adopting clientelistic relations with the electorate. The literature provides various definitions of political clientelism. To start with, "…In a clientelistic relationship, the more powerful individual, or the patron, may

[23] For example, the AKP by-laws article 17 regulates different parts of the party organization. Please see the following link for more details: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu.

[24] AKP by-laws, Article 36. Retrieved from: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu.

or may not be someone who holds and official position such as local party boss or deputy in the parliament…" (Sayarı, 2011: 81). Similarly, patronage is defined as the "…distribution of state resources on a nonmeritocratic basis for political gain" (Mainwaring, 1999: 177). Other scholars define clientelistic relations as a "patronage based, voter-party linkage" and they underline that citizen-politician linkages are generally based on "direct material inducements targeted to individuals and small groups of citizens whom politicians know to be highly responsive to such side-payments and willing to surrender their vote for the right price." (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 10). Similarly, Stokes' definition of clientelism also focus on voting: "…Focusing on clientelism as a method of electoral mobilization, I define it as the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?" (Stokes, 2007: 604-605). In addition, according to Stokes (2007), the distributive criterion of electoral support is the factor that distinguishes clientelism from other materially-oriented political strategies such as pork barrel politics in the U.S. and the programmatic redistributive politics both of which rely on different criteria rather than electoral support.

With regard to clientelism in Turkish politics, literature also unearths the relations between political elites -especially the parliamentary elite- and constituents. Since the beginning of the multiparty era, political parties in Turkey are typically described as cadre or catch-all parties with strong clientelistic features (Kabasakal, 2014: 707). According to Sayarı (2011), we can observe political clientelism and party patronage in various aspects of Turkish political life. To illustrate, a considerable number of people who stop by the offices of the deputies for seeking personal assistance from these parliamentary elite are seen as a sign of the importance attached to the clientelistic relations (Sayarı, 2011: 88).[25] Similarly, Kalaycıoğlu (1995) examines the relationship between deputies and constituents regarding clientelistic linkages and finds out that constituency demands from the deputies have been mostly the personal ones. Concomitantly, a significant number of the deputies (more than a half) have been spending their time –as a regular activity- on "finding jobs and providing other services or benefits for constituents" (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 47, 49). More specifically, the demanded services and goods have

[25] Sayarı (2011: 88-89) also refers to a survey which was conducted on this issue and which reveals that more than half of the parliamentarians receive between 50 and 300 visitors every week. For more information please see: Turan, İ. 2000. Parlamentoların Etkinliği ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. In *Devlet Reformu: TBMM'nin Etkinliği*. İstanbul: TESEV.

been "jobs and employment, favorable treatment from the bureaucrats and state officials, assistance in finding medical care in Ankara, and influence peddling in a variety of different issues (Sayarı, 2011: 89).

Historically, clientelistic relations and patronage linkages have occupied a considerable place in Turkish political life, both in the Ottoman and Republican era (Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Özbudun, 2005; Sayarı, 2011). In the early 20th century, clientelistic linkages continued to be a significant factor in Turkish social and political life, and various political parties adopted such personal ties, including clientelism through the Republican time in Turkey: During the late Ottoman times, as the political parties started to emerge, e.g. the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası* - ITF), people from prominent notable families had a chance to enter into politics. Some of these people have become deputies in the parliament while some recruited as local party bosses of the ITF. In the provincial organizations of this party, influential notables have been recruited into the ranks through "systematic use of patronage and economic regulation" at late Ottoman times (Sayarı, 2011: 85).

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, similar to the previous recruitment patterns of the political parties, the Republican People's Party (CHP) which served as the single party through 1923-1946, recruited notables from the leading families in the Anatolia as the deputies or the local organization leaders of the party. This recruitment pattern of the CHP was regarded as serving the interests of both the (1) party/center –as having chance to control the periphery through the notables' clientelistic ties with the peasants, and the (2) notables –as having chance to maintain and even strengthen their social and economic influence in the local areas (Sayarı, 2011: 85). Nevertheless, after the transition to the multi-party era in Turkey, political clientelism and party patronage started to occupy a broader scope. As the party competition increased with the multi-party period, the competing parties regarded the clientelistic relations between the notables and the local constituents as one of the most prevailing tools for electoral mobilization, especially in the rural areas, which cover almost the two third of the electorate. With this recruitment pattern, there emerged

> "…a rapid extension of their organizational networks to the provincial towns and villages of Anatolia. Hence the formation of voter alignments among Turkey's predominantly rural electorate during the late 1940s and 1950s was accomplished largely through a process of vertical mobilization. Political parties concentrated their efforts in recruiting members of notable families

> and faction leaders who used their networks of clientelist relationships with the peasants to mobilize electoral support" (Sayarı, 2011: 86-87).

After the Ottoman times, clientelism has continued to be a significant issue affecting Turkish politics in various periods up to today. Especially after the 1970s, with the increased significance of local elections, the relationship between the parties and voters started to rely on more clientelistic ties:

> "…Given the large concentration of voters in urban areas, political parties have increasingly viewed local elections as crucial in expanding their electoral popularity in the national political arena. Control of the municipalities of sprawling metropolises such as Istanbul, Ankara, and İzmir provides a party with considerable political influence and visibility in national politics. It also enables the party to gain access to new sources of political patronage (through municipal jobs, zoning regulations, contracts for street repairs, etc.) that can be utilized to recruit new activists and supporters..." (İncioğlu, 2002: 73).

One of the reasons for the existence of clientelistic relations in the country is that the periphery has always had considerable dependency to the center in Turkey, and this in turn, created an environment in which the "personal dependencies in the form of patron-client relationships" proliferated and endured (Güneş-Ayata, 1994: 49). Thus, along with the clientelistic practices of political parties, electorate's perceptions about the political elite and voting in elections are other explanatory factors of clientelistic relations. "…voters have heterogeneous distributive preferences and that they develop expectations about the capacity of party elites and party activists to deliver excludable goods, such as handouts, public-sector jobs, and public works." (Calvo and Murillo, 2012: 854). Under these circumstances, distribution of goods seems to be one of the most observed practices. For example,

> "If the elected representative has the reputation of being good in party activities, it will be assumed that he will bring resources to the constituency –which is considered more important than being a good legislator. Similarly, municipal council members are considered to be intermediaries of resource allocation rather than decisionmakers on the patterns of resource distribution. They see effectiveness as having direct links with voters and party members, solving their problems and advising them; they are not interested in macro projects. Their primary target is to have an ample supply of resources for their own constituencies; thus, their scope is usually limited to daily activities." (Güneş-Ayata, 1994: 60).

Peculiarities of economic development process of the country, especially characteristics of industrialization also influenced the persistence of clientelism in the country. Industrialization had and has a significantly important role in terms of people's economic and social transformations, which may shape the relationships between political parties and voters. Consequences of unequal distribution of industrial areas lead to different socioeconomic development outcomes for citizens. Socioeconomic inequality, domestic immigration, formation of new groups such as urban poor seem to strengthen informal networks and clientelistic ties between parties and the electorate.

A historical background of industrialization in Turkey shows that the country is a relatively late industrialized one, compared to other developed countries. Due to the fact that Ottoman Empire could not become capable of achieving the level of industrial development of the capitalist Western countries, the Turkish Republic had to take more rapid changes in order to integrate into the world economic system. One of the main characteristics of the Turkish economy was the central power of the state and its bureaucracy over the market. The control and decisions of the state bureaucrats were significant factors in the Ottoman Empire period, and there was no presence of an autonomous bourgeoisie class. Keyder mentioned that "…The Turkish bourgeoisie is a creation of Turkish state- the product of a slow and ambivalent process..." but he mentions that the regime actually did not aim to create a bourgeoisie due to the bureaucrats' tendency to define themselves as the inheritors of the ruling class of the precapitalistic empire (Keyder, 1994:45). So, historically, there was a kind of struggle between the state bureaucracy and the early bourgeoisie. In the Republican period, which actually started with the idea of liberal economy, the 1929 Economic Depression caused the CHP to construct an étatist economic strategy, from which again emerged the state control over economy. But this time a mixed economy was applied differently from the Empire.

Although there were initiatives both in the late Ottoman and the early Republican period, the actual industrialization process, which is the transition from agricultural production to industrial was started in the early 1950s by the DP government. Keyder (1994:61) defined this period as a break of the formation of Turkish bourgeoisie which became more independent from the state. In this period, the state's control of the economy was as little as possible, in accordance with liberal economy prospects. After the DP period, from the beginning of the 1960's the government of the AP followed the import substitution method as the major industrial strategy. So, the state intervention in the market increased

again. This policy was employed until 1980, which was another turning point of Turkish industrialization, with the emergence of liberal economic policies. After the military coup of 1980, a new era started with liberal economy and rising Islamism in both social and political realms. Industrialization and economic developments related to the removal of import substitution, and trade levels were high in this period.

Characteristics of Turkish politics have been influenced by those industrialization processes both directly and indirectly. In particular, the unequal distribution of the industry among the different regions of Turkey and the causal relations of this with the social and economic transformation of the society. Although there were plans about equal allocation of the industrial institutions among different regions of the country in the agenda of the CHP during the single party period, the DP had no clear aim about this equality. As Tokgöz (1976:50) mentions, there were neither precautions about the underdeveloped region's improvements, nor a wholly national level development in the program of the DP, and it generally tended to build the factories in regard to political/partisan necessities rather than economic priorities.

As a result of unequal distribution of industrial areas in the country, in the 1970s the movements of the workers and the importance of unions was significantly important in terms of political participation. The community of these workers actually had a big impact on Turkish politics in terms of being a social democratic welfare state during those years. However, their effects could not have been long lasting. The imbalance of industrialization was creating an inequality between the regions, cities and even within cities, domestic migration of the people from less developed regions to much more industrialized ones started rapidly. Especially between the 1950s and 1980s, migration of the people was large scale since the industrialization process was rapid in those years. One of the most important issues about the migration waves of people has been the urbanization process. The people -by the triggering effects of the job opportunities at the industrialized cities and regions- moved to the urban areas from the rural ones. The main challenge at the first stage of these migration movements was the need for housing. It was mentioned about the problems of urban areas and housing of the people that "…since the early 1950's, the number of *gecekondu*s is steadily increasing in the country despite the fact that public and private sectors are doing their best to produce dwellings to meet the needs..." (Kano and Keleş, 1986: 65).

One reason for that practice may be that not all migrants had the chance to own publicly or privately built dwellings. Hence, many people migrated from rural to urban areas had to create their own living areas by their own opportunities. Urbanized cities became more and more multicultural with the variety of the people who come from different regions of the country. This mix in the cities created an important change in terms of solidarity of the groups in terms of living in the same area, or coming from similar regional parts. Regarding this, especially the living areas of these people which consist of *gecekondu*s can be defined as the new type of periphery in the actual city. The outcome of that situation can be related to the integration process of the newcomers with the urban area's members, and it can be said that the integration was not an easy one. Rather the group identity of these immigrants was much more effected by their life style, political participation and socioeconomic conditions. Thus, new social groups, classes and cleavages were observed.

Such developments led to an increased relationship between the urban poor and religious parties, which are mentioned in the previous pages, which included social aids to their policies. For example, RP underlined the idea of *adil düzen*, and was able to attract the votes of the citizens whose income levels were quite low. The result of this was the success of the RP, especially in local elections by winning a number of seats in several municipalities, and then its increased vote shares in general elections through the 1990s.

We can observe a similar pattern for the local party actors such as chairpersons and other members of administrative boards of the local branches as in the municipal council members' case. The interviews conducted for this dissertation reveal that the previous patterns of clientelistic relations somewhat continuous in Turkish politics. At least the perception of the people seems to continue. Especially, the previously mentioned "dependency to the center" idea is still in the minds of many voters. Several interviewees indicate that the people often visit their offices to find solutions for their problems, because these people think that if the local party bosses or other notable actors in the party engage with the solution process of the problems, the solutions will be found more quickly and efficiently. Thus, today, the local party elites seem to be another active actor in collecting the demands of the voters and distribute the sources. Yet, this is not only about their positions, but also about their proximity to the constituents. As the local party leaders are known by more people in their working area, their relations become closer. The voters feel themselves more comfortable while talking to these local party elites, and also reflect

their demands and interests more easily. Moreover, the people trust the local party elites as they know them more closely, e.g. if the local party chairperson in the child of that specific area and lives for long years in there, the voters constitute closer relations. The details of the interviews, interpretations and discussions are in the Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 5

ELITE RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL AMBITION IN TURKEY

5.1. Recruitment and Candidate Selection Patterns in Turkish Political Parties

Chapter 2 of this dissertation focused on party recruitment and candidate selection processes examined in relevant literature. Such processes and strategic decisions employed by political parties "provide important insights into how power is distributed within party organizations." (Cross and Gauja, 2014: 22). This chapter explains those processes and decisions specifically in Turkey, then continues with political ambition and career decisions of politicians in the country.

Various studies unearth the recruitment patterns within Turkish political parties by analyzing the socioeconomic backgrounds of local party elites in the country (Frey, 1965, Tachau, 1973; Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010). Similar studies have additionally been done with regard to legislative elites and ministerial recruitment patterns (Kışlalı, 1976; Kalaycıoğlu, 1995; Sayarı and Hasanov, 2008, Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 2011). In those studies, scholars generally focus on personal characteristics including socioeconomic backgrounds of the political elite, their relationship with the electorate, and their political experience. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this dissertation provide examinations of such characteristics and political ambition of politicians in the country in a detailed way. Before that, explaining several factors which influence elite recruitment and political ambition may be helpful.

Turkey has a party-centered political system with a tradition of centralist party structures. Not only do Turkish politics revolve around political parties, but the political parties

revolve around their own centers. Thus, studying the political parties would provide a beneficial understanding of Turkish politics in general. One significant difference between candidate selection processes of political parties in Turkey and various European countries is that "grassroots members in many European parties have gradually been given greater opportunities to nominate candidates." (Norris, 2006: 106) while "…the changes in laws that regulate party structures and nomination procedures have been in the direction of limiting members' input and enhancing the power of the party leaders and central organs" in Turkey (Kabasakal, 2014: 706). Nevertheless, it is possible to observe the dominance of party center in candidate selection process in some other parliamentary democracies such as New Zealand (Salmond, 2003) and the UK (Williams and Paun, 2011). In Turkey, a similar practice is observable: Party centers have considerable discretion on the decision-making process in recruitment and candidate selection.

As Schattschneider argued, whoever selects the candidates is the true owner of the party. It can be grassroots or the party leadership. For the Turkish case, although the leader-centered party structure has been a common and on-going characteristic, one cannot deny the existence of factors other than those pertinent to the decisions of leaders. The reason for this is that as Ayan (2009: 7-8) argued, "The authoritarian party leader at the national level must take into account the skills, perceptions and interests of the local party actors because the potential effectiveness of the party leader's power depends on these actors' interests, perceptions and skills…" So, party leaders' decisions may also be affected occasionally by the characteristics of the local party elites. Moreover, there have been primary election regulations for a large portion of the candidates. Between 1946 and 1960, political parties were nominating their candidates in elections in accordance with the rules and regulations indicated in their own by-laws, and both the CHP and the DP nominated their candidates with the decisions of their local level organization (Kabasakal, 2016: 241). According to previous Parliamentary Elections Act (Law no: 360) enacted in 25 May 1961, the political parties shall nominate their candidates and rank them on the party lists in accordance with their party by-laws by the decisions of local branches in respective electoral districts with democratic means. Moreover, nomination by the headquarters can be done if an enabling rule is written in their by-laws or if it is accepted by the general congress of the parties. Nevertheless, this law is limited the number of

candidates nominated by the central offices of the parties to only 10 percent.[26] Law on Political Parties (Law no: 648) which was enacted in 16 July 1965 limited the discretion of the central organs of the parties on nomination even further by indicating that the portion of the candidates nominated by the central organs is limited to 5% Two major parties, the AP and CHP nominated their candidates mostly by primaries from 1961 to 1980 (Kabasakal, 2016: 241, 243). Such regulations enable the local branches of the parties to be more active and influential on the candidate nomination processes. However, these practices did not last long. Although the current Law on Political Parties (Law no: 2820) which was enacted in 1983 after the 1980 military coup imposed compulsory primaries at its first stage, primaries became optional by the amendments made in 1986 (Kabasakal, 2016: 243). Thus, after this stage, party leaders had the opportunity to solely control the nomination processes. Among the parties analyzed in this dissertation, the CHP implements primaries, but to a limited extent. The party does not employ primaries in every electoral district. This may imply that political parties do not necessarily prefer inclusive selectorate methods in candidate selection processes. For example, Erdem (2013: 56) argues that, today, it is not possible to rank a candidate in the party list in an electable place without the consent of the party leaders. This tradition of leader-centered candidate nomination process had a negative effect on the participation of local branches of parties in decision making. It made them almost non-functional, thus, sometimes the votes gained by some parties are even less than their registered members in certain small districts (Kabasakal, 2016: 245). Hence, with regard to recruitment and candidate selection, demand side seems to play more major roles compared to supply side, thus the candidate characteristics and selection are determined by the party leaders.

5.2. Regulations on Candidate Nomination in Turkey

Political parties' candidate selection practices are also influenced by many other factors. What affects the candidate nomination processes? Electoral systems and party systems,

[26] Please see, previous Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 306), 25 May 1961, Article 15:
"Siyasi partiler aday listelerini ve adayların listedeki sıralarını kendi tüzükleri gereğince, seçim çevrelerinde demokratik usuller dairesinde yapacakları yoklamalarla, oy verme gününden önceki 35 inci gün tesbit ederler.
Siyasi partilerin merkezlerindeki yetkili organları tarafından aday tesbit edilmesi ve bu adayların listedeki sıralarının tayini, tüzüklerinde bu yetkinin bulunmasına veya genel kongrelerince bu husuta karar verilmiş olmasına bağlıdır. Ancak, bu suretle tesbit edilecek Merkez adaylarının sayısı, hiçbir suretle, o siyasi partinin seçime katıldığı illerde göstereceği adaylar toplamının yüzde 10 unu geçemez."

relative sizes of political parties functioning in the system, regionality of the parties, administrative system of the country and party ideologies are some of the mostly referenced factors which shape candidate selection (Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014; Kernell, 2015). Another element determining the candidate nomination is the composition of the selectorate. In other words, who selects and nominate candidates is important. As explained in Chapter 2, inclusive and exclusive selectorates would generate quite different consequences (Hazan and Rahat, 2006; Rahat, 2007; Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2015). In addition to that, internal relations in the parties, degrees of party discipline and internal democracy also have significant effects on nomination process (Rahat, 2007; Cross and Blais, 2012). As indicated in Chapter 2, some legal requirements are applied to candidacy processes in many countries. Hence, along with above-mentioned factors, legal regulations and party regulations also contribute to shaping the pool of eligible candidates.

Who can run as a candidate in elections? Determinants of the answer of this question do not only rely on party decisions or political ambition, but also legal regulation. In almost each country, there are such regulations to show who is eligible to be a candidate and who is not. Some factors such as age, education, residency or occupation would be included in these regulations. The Parliamentary Elections Act regulates the eligibility of individuals to be candidates in elections in Turkey.

According to the original Article 10 of the current Parliamentary Elections Act (Law no: 2839) enacted in June 10, 1983, every Turkish citizen who is 30+ years old can be elected as an MP.[27] However, this article amended in October 19, 2006 by lowering the age to 25 and older. Later in 25 April 2018, the age limit was again lowered to 18 with the Article 8 of Law 7140.[28] Nevertheless, this is not the only criterion for being eligible to be elected as an MP. Article 11 of the same law indicates who cannot be elected as MPs:

a) Those who are not at least primary school graduates,
b) Legally determined to be mentally incompetent,

[27] Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 2839), dated 10 June 1983, Article 10:
"Otuz yaşını dolduran her Türk vatandaşı milletvekili seçilebilir."

[28] Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 2839), dated 10 June 1983, Article 10:
"Onsekiz yaşını dolduran her Türk vatandaşı milletvekili seçilebilir."
*"Bu maddede geçen "Otuz yaşını" ibaresi, 19/10/2006 tarihli ve 5552 sayılı Kanunun 1 inci maddesiyle "Yirmibeş yaşını" olarak değiştirilmiş olup, daha sonra 25/4/2018 tarihli ve 7140 sayılı Kanunun 8 inci maddesiyle bu fıkrada yer alan "Yirmibeş" ibaresi "Onsekiz" şeklinde değiştirilmiştir."

c) Those who has unfinished relations with military service,
d) Those who are banned from public services,
e) Those who were sentenced to 1 year or more imprisonment, or heavy imprisonment, except involuntary crimes,
f) Those who committed certain crimes indicated in the subsections of this article.

After indicating the eligibility to be elected as an MP, Article 12 of the Parliamentary Elections Act (No: 2839) shows the eligibility for being a candidate in general elections. According to this article, every Turkish citizen with eligibility for being elected as an MP can be a candidate in general elections regardless of being a member of a political party.[29] Moreover, Article 16 regulates in more detail the nomination process and independent candidacies. According to this article, political parties cannot nominate their candidates in a joint or collective list. If a person is not a member of a party, but nomination will be done by a political party, there should be a written consent of that person. No one can be nominated as candidate (and be elected) by more than one political party, or in more than one electoral district in the same elections by the same party. Similarly, according to the same article, independent candidates cannot become candidates and be elected for more than one electoral district.[30]

When it comes to Local Elections, strategies of the parties would change. For mayoral positions, there is only one seat to be filled for each municipality. Thus, the electoral system works as if it is a plurality system. In Turkey, among all the candidates running for a certain mayoral position, the one who gets the highest vote will be elected as mayor. Thus, the individual characteristics of these candidates would be much more influential.

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[29] Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 2839), dated 10 June 1983, Article 12:
"Bir siyasi partiye mensup olsun veya olmasın seçilme yeterliğine sahip her Türk vatandaşı bu Kanun hükümlerine göre milletvekilliğine adaylığını koyabilir.
(Değişik : 28/3/1986 - 3270/28 md.) 298 sayılı Seçimlerin Temel Hükümleri ve Seçmen Kütükleri Hakkında Kanunun 14 üncü maddesinin 11 inci fıkrası gereğince Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun tespit ve ilan ettiği seçime katılabilecek siyasi partiler, 2820 sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu hükümlerine göre, bütün seçim çevrelerinde aday gösterebilirler. (Son cümle mülga: 27/10/1995-4125/21 md.)"

[30] Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 2839), dated 10 June 1983, Article 16:
"Siyasi partiler anlaşarak müşterek liste halinde aday gösteremezler.
Siyasi partilere kayıtlı olmayan kimselerin, herhangi bir siyasi parti tarafından aday gösterilmeleri, kendilerinin yazılı muvafakatlarına bağlıdır.
(Ek fıkra: 13/3/2018-7102/16 md.) Seçimlere katılma yeterliliği taşıyan siyasi partinin seçime katılmaması halinde, bu partinin üyesi, kendisinin ve üyesi olduğu siyasi partinin yazılı muvafakati alınarak, başka bir siyasi parti tarafından aday gösterilebilir.
Bir kimse aynı zamanda değişik siyasi partiden veya aynı partiden aynı seçim için birden fazla seçim çevresinden aday olamaz, aday gösterilemez ve seçilemez.
Bağımsız adaylar da, aynı seçim için birden fazla seçim çevresinde aday olamaz ve seçilemez."

Gender discrimination in the candidate nomination process in local elections is not exceptional. Several studies underline the fact that political parties refrain from nominating female candidates in the local elections in Turkey (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010; Tür and Çıtak, 2010). Nevertheless, this practice is not peculiar to Turkey, and research reveal that it is common even in consolidated democratic regimes (Ballington, 2004; O'Neill and Stewart, 2009).

Another important regulation on legislative candidacy is about required resignation of possible candidates form their current offices in Turkey. Articles 18 and 19 of the Parliamentary Elections Act (Law no: 2839) regulates this process. According to Article 18 of this law, if individuals with certain offices such as judges, public prosecutors, academicians, mayors, military officers, local party branch chairpersons and executive committee members, municipal council members do not resign from their offices prior to general elections, they cannot nominate themselves or be nominated by political parties as candidates.[31]

Along with legal regulations such as the rules written in the SPK, party regulations, party by-laws, and other documents also provide several requirements for eligibility of candidates in both local and national elections. For example, the CHP by-laws provide the methods of candidate selection procedures of the party; however, a detailed explanation and regulation is provided by another document on the regulations on selecting MP candidates. According to this regulation, for example, any person who would like to be a candidate of the party in elections must be a member of the party at least for one year, and must not have any party fee debt.[32] "…More common requirements are less demanding, such as minimal length of membership prior to the presentation of candidacy and pledges of loyalty to the party (Hazan and Rahat, 2006: 111). For example, the CHP by-laws indicate that an individual's candidacy in general elections is up to the

[31] Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 2839), dated 10 June 1983, Article 18:
"Hakimler ve savcılar, yüksek yargı organları mensupları, yüksek öğretim kurumlarındaki öğretim elemanları, Yükseköğretim Kurulu, Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu üyeleri, kamu kurumu ve kuruluşlarının memur statüsündeki görevlileri ile yaptıkları hizmet bakımından işçi niteliği taşımayan diğer kamu görevlileri, aday olmak isteyen belediye başkanları ve subaylar ile astsubaylar, aday olmak isteyen siyasi partilerin il ve ilçe yönetim kurulu başkan ve üyeleri ile belediye meclisi üyeleri, il genel meclisi üyeleri, kamu kurumu niteliğindeki meslek kuruluşları ile sendikalar, kamu bankaları ile üst birliklerin ve bunların üst kuruluşlarının ve katıldıkları teşebbüs veya ortaklıkların yönetim ve denetim kurullarında görev alanlar genel ve ara seçimlerin başlangıcından bir ay önce seçimin yenilenmesine karar verilmesi halinde yenileme kararının ilanından başlayarak yedi gün içinde görevlerinden ayrılma isteğinde bulunmadıkça adaylıklarını koyamazlar ve aday gösterilemezler."

[32] CHP, *Milletvekili Aday Saptama Yönetmeliği*, article 3.

decision of the party assembly (*parti meclisi*) if that person is not a member of the party.[33] However, AKP regulations do not require party membership prior to candidacy in local and national elections.[34] Requirements indicated by political parties may aim to secure a certain quality of candidates, their loyalty to the party, or their prior experience in politics. Moreover, such requirements may ease to selects candidates out of a large pool of candidate nominees or applicants. Nevertheless, "At times, parties will ignore their own candidacy regulations, largely due to electoral consideration..." (Hazan and Rahat, 2006: 111). Thus, some parties would lower their requirements if they think that it will bring electoral success. Wertman (1988) highlights that the Italian Communist Party nominated some candidates although they are not the members of the party, and although the party was an exclusive one with regard to its candidate selection process. Similar practices are observable in Turkish politics. For example, AKP by-laws regulate the term limit for parliamentary candidates, and any candidate can only be nominated for three successive terms only. Nevertheless, in certain elections, the party decided to stretch that regulation as the party leadership wanted to nominate long time serving or prominent members of the party as candidates, even if they meet the three-term limit.[35] Hence, parties may flex their own regulations for electoral gain. Such strategic decisions eventually affect candidate selection processes and composition of elected politicians.

5.3. Political Career Paths in Turkey

Some studies listed above also include analyses of political career paths of party elites (e.g. Rallings et al., 2008, 2010; Uysal and Topak, 2010). They generally focus on certain points, for example why people want to become party elites in the first place (Lawson 1976) and what kind of a political career path they draw. Within these studies, personal motivation and interests seem to be the triggering factors as well as "being asked to be a

[33] CHP party by-laws, article 53. Please see the following link for more details: http://content.chp.org.tr/file/chp_tuzuk_10_03_2018.pdf.

[34] AKP, *Seçim İşleri Adaylık İşlemleri Yönetmeliği*, article 12. Please see the following link for more details: http://m.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-yonetmelikleri#bolum_ .

[35] AKP, *Seçim İşleri Adaylık İşlemleri Yönetmeliği*, article 13. Please see the following link for more details: http://m.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-yonetmelikleri#bolum_ .

member or to occupy specific position" by the other party elites. Thus, it seems as if individuals do not have all the control on their recruitment and career mobility. In most of the cases, the upper level party elites have a significant impact on their recruitment and career mobility. Therefore, we can argue that "...recently the dominant method in all parties to select their national and local candidates has become an elite decision at the national level and on some occasions an elite decision at the local level for local candidates..." (Kemahlıoğlu, 2012: 51).

Additionally, competition within the party may have a special effect on political career mobility. As Kemahlıoğlu (2012: 7-8) explains, competition among the same party's elites (a lower-level politician and a higher-level politician in this case) can emerge as:

> "…The follower's ambitions to move up in the party hierarchy poses threats to the leader's position in the party. Since the leader and follower both need their party to be successful, they are in an interdependent position and the leader who is facing a potential challenger has to decide whether to support the follower symbolically or financially..."

We can infer that there can emerge a critical evaluation of the leaders to nominate someone as a legislative candidate, or to help this person to climb the political career ladder. Thus, we can also expect that as the gap between that lower level party elite and leader narrows down, the leader may try to find a way to make this person not to become a challenger, or, as that gap becomes wider, the leader may not spend that much attention to the upward political career mobility of the lower ranked party elite.

Figure 5.1 shows possible political offices one can hold, and simplified conceivable paths from one office to another for achieving higher level office. Transferring from one office to another may require satisfying several criteria. For example, the MHP by-laws indicate that, any party elite serving as provincial or district party branch chairperson or executive committee member have to resign from the respective party office prior to their candidacy in local and national elections.[36] Similar regulations are in effect for others who occupy public offices, mayoral positions or offices in some organizations such as chambers in Turkey.

[36] MHP party by-laws, article 94. Please see the following link for more details: https://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/_mhp2007/kitaplar/mhp_parti_tuzugu_2009_opt.pdf.

Figure 5.1: Possible ways of political career mobility in Turkey



Political career mobility does not always and necessarily follow linear patterns. In addition, occupying a national level political position (e.g. becoming an MP) may not be a step-by-step advancement for all political elites in different countries. Although in some countries, such as Belgium, Italy and Switzerland, political careers show clearer patterns such a path does not apply to some cases such as Kenya, Korea and Turkey since "…the European elites must pass through well-ordered career steps and thus more homogeneous pathways to parliament." (Kim and Patterson, 1988: 388), and since the politicians in European countries pursue their careers in a relatively more "well-ordered political world" (Kim and Patterson, 1988: 340). The case in Turkey is discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this dissertation. Before that, following sections provide previous studies conducted on political elite and career patterns in Turkey.

5.4. Political Elite in Turkey: Party and Parliamentary Elites

Political parties as organizations consist of individuals working together in various positions and levels within them. These individuals may be defined as the building blocks of these organizations, as each of them has specified tasks to fulfil. Thus, parties as organizations are affected by the characteristics of the individuals who work for them. Political party elites -both in local and national levels- occupy positions which are provided by certain decision-making power, and thus, their acts and attitudes would

influence parties' internal functions and relationship with other organizations (see Uysal and Topak, 2010: 12). This is also applicable for the interactions between the parties and the constituency. Hence, explaining who occupies those positions, or more specifically, revealing the characteristics of the party elite is quite an important task to fully understand politics.

A number of scholars have analyzed party elites in Turkey with specific reference to local party bosses (Tachau, 1973; Frey, 1975; Çarkoğlu, 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010; Kocapınar, 2018). More specifically, Tachau (1973) focus on biographical information of provincial party members in Turkey with regard to their age, place of birth, occupation and education which are helpful variables to reveal social changes between generation with regard to recruitment, social mobility, social diversification and modernization respectively. In her study conducted between 1977 and 1980, Ayata (1992) examined and explained the CHP's party structure and political stance by analyzing the attributes of delegates, members and chairpersons of the party. A similar study was conducted in the 1990s which includes above-mentioned variables as well as birth place of fathers of the party bosses, gender, years spent in the party and candidacy to other public office (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000). A relatively recent study also examines the socioeconomic backgrounds of local party elites by focusing on similar variables and by conducting in-depth interviews with those political actors of relevant parties in Turkey (Uysal and Topak, 2010). All these studies provide an examination of party elite in Turkey, and explain party organizations in different time periods.

Compared to party elites, parliamentary elites occupy a broader space in the literature of political elites' studies in Turkey. One of the most prominent studies on legislative elite in the country has been Frey's (1965) *The Turkish Political Elite,* in which he examined the characteristics of MPs who served between 1920 and 1957. Similar variables indicated above such as age, education, birth place and occupational backgrounds are used in his study to reveal the composition in the parliament. Not only the socioeconomic characteristics of political elite, but also the consequences of those were examined in this study. For example, both Tachau (1973) and Frey (1970) linked education levels of the political elite to modernization levels of politics. In order to understand who can occupy legislative seats, one important feature that Frey (1965) employs is "localism" which shows whether a political actor is serving in his or her birth place. Following Frey's study, Tachau (1977) conducted a study with similar variables on parliamentarians in Turkey

who got seats as a result of the 1973 General Elections. One of the most significant findings in this research is that the 1973 assembly's composition showed similarities with the 1920, 1950 and 1961 assemblies; yet, the level of ideological fragmentation surpassed the previous ones. In addition, the composition of MPs showed some changes, especially in terms of occupational diversity "with the appearance of sizeable contingents of teachers and religionists" (Tachau, 1977: 312). In accordance with Frey's examination of parliamentarians, Şaylan (1976) describes the occupational composition of the legislative elite who served from 1961 to 1976 in Turkey; Kışlalı (1976) explains the changes in the composition of these political elites between 1920 and 1973 with regard to education, gender and age; and Turhan (1991) identifies the alternation of legislative elites from 1876 to 1980 by analyzing age, education and occupation. Kalaycıoğlu (1995) analyzed the Turkish parliamentarians' "attitudes towards their parties and opponents," "political beliefs and values" and "social backgrounds" in 1984 and in 1988. The author unearthed the relationship between the deputies and the constituents regarding clientelistic linkages and found that constituency demands from the deputies have been mostly personal ones. Studies on parliamentary elites continued through the 2000s as well: Sayarı and Hasanov (2008) examine the results of 2007 General Elections and propose that there is a new political class of legislative elites; and some other studies analyze how composition of legislature alter through time and how this affects political development, power structures within parties and representation of different genders (see e.g., Arslan, 2004; Sesli and Demir, 2010; Gökçe, 2011). Moreover, studies on ministerial elite provide better understanding of top-level political composition in the country, such as Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin's (2011) research focuses on age, gender, education, locality, occupation, length of ministerial career, and parliamentary party affiliation of ministers in Turkey. These above-mentioned studies provide helpful information about the (changing) patterns of party recruitment in political parties, and relationship between social alternation and parliamentary composition in Turkey.

One of the most significant explanations, especially in national political elite studies is that there has been a broadening of the political elite in the country specifically after 1950 (see e.g., Tachau and Godd, 1973). Relying on the personal backgrounds, especially occupational and educational characteristics of the MPs served in the TBMM, Frey (1965), Dodd (1969) and Tachau and Good (1973) highlighted the visible alternation in the composition of the TBMM. More specifically, a considerable change occurred

through time with regard to occupational backgrounds of the MPs in the National Assembly (Tachau and Good, 1973).

This composition change in the TBMM was not only measured by the occupational backgrounds of the MPs, but also the birth places of the MPs and their localism levels. With regard to birth places, Tachau and Good (1973) underlined that large swaths of the MPs who served before 1950 were natives of the regions showing the highest levels of development, while this picture changed after this period, as large groups of MPs coming from less developed regions of the country won seats in the TBMM. For example, "…in 1943, close to one half were born in the Marmara and Aegean regions as against only 13 percent from the least developed eastern regions." while in 1969, 35% of the MPs came from eastern regions which are less developed (Tachau and Good, 1973: 555). With such changes, the levels of localism which indicated whether an MP is representing a district where he or she born increased as the number of MPs born in various regions occupied seats in the TBMM (Frey, 1965; Tachau and Good, 1973). Thus, previous studies on political elite in Turkey had similar methods to analyze the composition of these elites, and the consequences of their composition.

5.5. Political Ambition and Career Patterns in Turkey

Chapter 3 explains various theories of political ambition from static to dynamic, and from progressive to regressive ambition of political actors (Schlesinger, 1966; Prewitt and Nowlin, 1969; Black, 1972; Soskice et al., 1992; Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2010, 2011; Vanlangenakker, 2010; Kerevel, 2013). This Chapter inspects the main determinants and consequences of political ambition and career paths in Turkey, scrutinizes the nature and commonalities of top political elites, and ends with the case of independent politicians in a party-dominated political environment.

Turkish politics has been defined as party politics throughout time (Tachau, 1973; Sayarı, 2011). In a political environment lead by political parties, the party recruitment plays a major role in the fate of politicians' careers, as discussed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, even under such conditions, a politician's ambition is significant for their careers. Where is the balance between supply side and demand side? It is clear that the salience of party decisions on recruitment process is much higher than the political

ambition of individuals. Meaning that, even though a person has political ambition, if he or she is not selected or recruited by any political parties, it is quite difficult for that person to enter politics.

Although political ambition theories usually put emphasis on static or progressive ambition, it is not always possible for politicians to be re-elected in their current office, and not all political actors desire to run for a higher office (Kerevel, 2013: 2). According to this argument, non-linear career paths are possible. For example, among Mexican federal deputies, less experienced ones are seeking for lower office while higher offices are desired by more experienced deputies. Nevertheless, many other factors such as electoral rules, candidate selection and clientelistic relations with the voters would affect deputies' decisions for their careers (Kerevel, 2013: 2). To illustrate, one deputy serving in national parliament would then decide to run for a lower office such as a mayoral position in local politics. Is there such a practice in Turkey? Indeed. For example, one MP served as a deputy and a minister for several years, then ran for mayoral position and was elected. Does this mean that mayoral position provides lower salience? Not necessarily. It would depend on the relative significance or salience of the office, and, the importance of that office may change over time. Mayoral offices experienced this change which made them become more influential in politics in Turkey. İncioğlu (2002: 73) explains that this change which occurred during the 1970s with the increased migration from rural to urban regions resulted in "concentration of voters in urban areas" and expansion of the importance of local elections as follows:

> "The growing importance of local elections, especially those concerning municipal administrations, is further underscored by the fact that the mayors of large metropolises have become more influential in national politics than many legislators serving in the parliament in Ankara. In the past, becoming a mayor was generally viewed by many as a stepping stone for entry into the parliament. Today, aspiring leaders are likely to prefer the top political position in a city with millions of inhabitants to serving as a parliamentarian in Ankara—especially if the prospects of becoming a cabinet minister or entering into the party's executive organs appear to be limited..." (İncioğlu, 2002: 73-74).

In a similar fashion, "…It is sufficient to conclude that governors of New York will behave as though they were Presidential candidates while governors of Mississippi or South Dakota will not." (Schlesinger, 1966: 9). A quite similar practice is also observable in the Turkish case. Among all the 81 cities in the country, a few of them contain the majority of the population, and play an important role in the country's politics both

nationally and locally. İstanbul is the most populous and critical city in Turkey with its 15 million residents. Although it is not the capital city of the country, it is economically, socially and politically significant. Similar to what Schlesinger (1966) underlines, the local officials of İstanbul are given at most importance in Turkey.

It is evident that parties use their candidate lists as strategic tools in electoral competition (Ecevit and Kocapınar, 2018). Such power of the party headquarters on the candidate selection process shapes the behavior of parliamentary elites to signal that they would like to be re-nominated, and shape the career paths of these politicians. For example, parliamentary speeches of the MPs seem to be related to the likelihood of being re-nominated in the next elections (Yıldırım et al., 2017), and vote loss and seat loss in an electoral district decreases the continuity of candidate lists in Turkey (Ecevit and Kocapınar, 2018). Depending on these, political actors and parties may determine their strategies with regard to recruitment and nomination processes. So, if an MP wants to be re-nominated, being visible in the parliament may increase his or her chance to fulfil this goal. This visibility can be achieved by parliamentary speeches as mentioned above, but there can also be other forms of behavior, which, employed by the MPs reveal that they would like to be observed by the party leaders, and to signal that they want to be re-nominated. Kalaycıoğlu (1990: 193) shows that "…a deputy's unruly legislative conduct appears to have boosted his popularity rather than failing to decrease his chances of re-election. It seems as if unruly legislative behavior has been rationalized by the deputies and their constituents alike as symptomatic of uncompromising devotion to the interests and ideals of the latter." Thus, it seems that some political actors even adopt unruly behavior to increase their likelihood to be re-nominated.

Findings on varying political ambition of politicians in turkey are available in the Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

5.6. Independent Politicians

One important decision of the candidates is whether running on a party ticket or as an independent in elections. "Running as an independent candidate may appear to constitute an act of courage in an environment in which political parties are the main actors in electoral process..." (Turan, 2013: 158). In fact, particularly after 1980, laws in Turkey

are prepared so that not too many party groups are formed in the TBMM. Nevertheless, especially during the 1990s, the number of parties both run in elections and in parliament was not notably low. According to Turan (2013: 163), "if the number of parties increase in an election, so the fragmentation increase, then the number of independent candidates might increase as well." However, as he underlines, the data do not justify these expectations. So, one cannot observe many independent politicians and candidates in Turkey. One reason for this is that the possibilities of being elected are quite different for the candidates running on a party ticket and independents (Erdem, 2013:55).

Nonetheless, independent candidates are not exceptional in the Turkish case; but the way many independent candidates running as independents differ from a case where a candidate who does not have any membership or affiliation to any party. Since Turkey implements a 10% electoral threshold, and since it is not easy for some political parties to exceed this threshold, there emerged a practice that such parties would prefer to make their candidates to run as independents. Since especially the HADEP, BDP and DTP employed this method in order to eliminate the limitations brought by 10 percent threshold, many scholars argued that such independent candidates should be differentiated from the ones who do not have any affiliation with any political parties, and run on their own.

CHAPTER 6

ELITE RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL AMBITION BY EMPIRICS: THE TURKISH CASE

The main research question of this dissertation is "What are the determinants of career patterns of political elite in Turkey?", and in addition to that, there emerge two sub research questions. The first one is related to political recruitment patterns and strategies in general elections: "Why and how do some individuals become first-ranked candidates even though they have never run in general elections prior to their candidacy?" The second one is related to political ambition: "Why do some individuals become candidates in general elections even though their electability chances are low?" Although these two sub questions are mentioned to be related to political recruitment and political ambition separately, they are not completely disconnected to each other or mutually exclusive. Thus, while explaining these topics, both elite recruitment and political ambition theories are useful to mention in the following sections.

Determinants of political career patterns are not constant and may change over time. For example, a parliament may be dominated by legislators whose socioeconomic backgrounds are more homogeneous, but that composition may be altered by sociological changes in the society, emergence of new relevant parties in the political systems or closure of existing parties. Eventually, a change may also occur within the composition of party groups in legislature. Examining the composition of legislative elites and observing the variance among parties or change over time provide useful insight about a country's politics in general, recruitment patterns of parties and political ambition characteristics of those elites.

Turkish politics was defined as party politics (Sayarı, 2011), parties are centralist with leader-oriented tendencies (Hale, 2002; Ayan, 2010; Kabasakal 2014), and PR system with closed party lists is implemented in general elections in the country within the time frame examined in this dissertation. One may argue that in a political environment dominated by political parties and which implements closed party lists in elections, parties do not necessarily give that much importance to the individual candidates' attributes as electors are voting for the party lists as a whole rather than individual candidates which eventually decreases the significance of the personal qualities of these candidates (see e.g., Carey and Shugart, 1995). Nevertheless, the findings show that even under closed party list systems, parties tend to revise their candidate lists especially if they lose electoral support and seats in particular districts (Ecevit and Kocapınar, 2018). Thus, examining the party strategies in recruitment and nomination processes is still noteworthy even under closed party lists systems, and the following sections show that parties choose their candidates and party elites strategically.

With regard to the determinants of political career patterns in Turkey, five hypotheses will be tested in this Dissertation in the upcoming pages. The first one is about the effect of party ideologies on the composition of legislative elite in the country. First of all, the four parties included in the analysis, namely the AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP, are representing different ideological stances. The AKP defines itself as a conservative democratic party and has significant religious sentiments, the CHP represents the secular democratic strand, the MHP has strong Turkish ethnic nationalist sentiments, and the HDP is mainly representing Kurdish ethnic nationalist strand. One would expect that these ideological differences yield to differing strategies in terms of elite recruitment and candidate selection. For example, a political party with strong religious sentiments may have more MPs with religious educational background, or a political party which largely represent a certain ethnic group may have a considerable group of MPs who can speak the mother tongue of the represented. Similarly, parties pursuing liberal economic goals may have larger groups of businessmen as their legislative elite while leftist parties may have more MPs with labor backgrounds, or left-wing parties such as those internalize feminist ideology may have larger groups of women representatives. One reason to argue such an effect is that those characteristics hint about ideological stance of the candidates, and ideological proximity of those candidates to the parties desired by party selectorate. Another reason is that such characteristics may increase the public appeal of those parties,

hence party selectorate strategically select those individuals. Regarding these, the first hypothesis appears as follows:

Hypothesis 1a: Ideological differences of parties have impact on the socioeconomic composition of their MPs.

Besides the differences among political parties in terms of their elite recruitment, one may also expect to see some commonalities. Many individuals apply to political parties to run in elections as candidates. Since the number of candidacy positions are definite, it is not possible to nominate all those individuals on party lists. Even though there would be a possibility that all the applicants could be chosen, political parties might not select all of them since those parties may want to choose candidates with particular qualities or attributes. In other words, there should be specific factors which differentiate selected candidates from others. For example, a political party may select its candidates among those who spend time in any level of the party prior to the elections (see e.g., Fiers and Secker, 2007), or close connections to party leadership which may turn into an invited candidacy or appointment by those leaders (Koop and Bittner, 2011) may enable individuals to run in elections with party tickets. The latter was identified as "parachuting" candidacy (Koop and Bittner, 2011) or "parachutists" (Pedersen et al., 2007) which was usually differentiated from career politicians who have longer experience in other offices as well as legislative office. Hence, the former one is about individuals who worked in local party branches or occupied positions in party headquarters. In other words, those individuals hold "pre-parliamentary party experience" (Ohmura et el., 2018). Such individuals who have party experience may have higher chance of being re-selected and re-nominated by the respective parties compared to others who does not have any such experience. Regarding these, the second hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 1b: Acquiring party experience has a positive effect on re-nomination of the MPs in the next elections.[37]

Certain attributes of individuals such as legislative experience as well as party experience may be important factors for being chosen by political parties to be nominated in general elections. Although the number of newcomers (i.e. freshman MPs) is quite high in the

[37] The null hypothesis is as follows:
$H1b_0$: Acquiring party experience has no effect on re-nomination of the MPs in the next elections.

TBMM (see, e.g. Kalaycıoğlu), a number of MPs still serve for multiple terms. One might expect that parties reward such MPs by nominating them in electable districts (where the party has large swaths of supporters) and candidacy ranks (usually the top ranks). Nevertheless, newcomers who do not have any prior legislative experience are also nominated by political parties. The reason is that,

> "…parties may also make room on their lists for less accomplished candidates, including regional or local politicians, or even outright novices. This may give young talent opportunities to demonstrate their political acumen, or reward long-serving, but only moderately successful party members. The latter strategy serves the office-seeking motivations of party loyalists while the former develops the party's potential to meet broad vote, office, and policy goals in the long term…" (Pemstein et al., 2015: 1425).

Thus, it is not surprising to observe that new candidates are nominated in party lists even though they did not run in legislative elections or become MPs before. What is surprising is to see such newcomers to be ranked first on the party lists.[38] Hence it is noteworthy to examine the underlying factors which cause to this issue. Then, the question appears as "Why and how do some individuals become first-ranked candidates even though they have never run in general elections prior to their candidacy?" One reason may be public appeal of certain individuals: Political parties may nominate some candidates who can mobilize the voters and make the party gain more votes in a specific district regardless of these individuals' former candidacy experience. For example, publicly famous figures may be selected by parties; or star candidates may be appointed to party lists by party leaders (Koop and Bittner, 2011). If this is the case, those publicly known individuals may receive a request or an invitation from a political party -especially from the party leadership- to run in elections, even if they do not have any prior political experience or candidacy in general elections. There have been a few cases like this in various political parties in Turkey by the nomination of film directors, sportsmen, singers and artists; however, those individuals were not ranked first on candidate lists (they were though ranked in winnable places), and several of them had prior political experience such as mayoral candidacy or previously politically active father. Another reason may be selecting individuals who have proximity to leaders of the parties or other political experience even though they did not run in general elections before. While nominating such individuals, parties may prefer to nominate them as first-ranked candidates as a

[38] These candidates are defined as first-time first-ranked candidates through this dissertation.

reward and guarantee for electability; however, there may still be considerable competition for the first ranks as there will be other prominent members of the parties who additionally have legislative (candidacy) experience. Thus, there should be another explanation for the question above. One would expect that if there is no real or considerable competition over first ranks on party lists, individuals with no prior candidacy experience may directly occupy those positions. The reason for this argument is that being nominated as a first-ranked candidate on a party list does not always translate as being rewarded. Depending on the party's electoral base and success in a given district, individuals who are ranked first would have even less chance of electability compared to the ones who are nominated in districts with larger voter support even though they are not first-ranked candidates on the party list ballots. Under those circumstances, investing in politics does not seem to be a rewarding act for those individuals. Hence, there may be two important reasons to see first-time first-ranked candidates in electorally flawed districts for parties: Individual politicians who previously run in elections in such districts may be tempted not to invest to that position anymore, which opens those positions to newcomers; or the parties would be inclined to change previously competed candidates as they cannot increase the parties' vote support. Thus, parties strategically choose new candidates who have potential public appeal and has the highest chance to contribute to boosting the votes of the party. Then, with regard to this first sub research question, the following hypothesis occurs:

Hypothesis 2: Inadequate electoral support (i.e. insufficient vote share to win seats in a particular district) for political parties increases the number of first-time first-ranked candidates on party lists in general elections.

Becoming a candidate on party lists in general elections is not an easy task. It requires both individuals' devotion to politics and parties' decision to select those individuals as their candidates. Such a dual decision is repeated in each and every election. Hence, occupying a candidacy positions in one election does not automatically result in individuals' being transferred to the candidate list in future elections. This is also applicable to the elected individuals, i.e. the MPs. Once elected, not all MPs can make the candidate lists in the upcoming elections. That means being elected in one election does not necessarily secure the position of those politicians on the party list ballots in the next one. Both endogenous and exogenous factors may determine the appearance (or lack of it) of an MP's name on the candidacy lists in the next set of elections. For example, an

MP may resign from the party, choose another position (e.g. mayoral positions) or exit politics completely (endogenous factors); or the party may not choose to continue with that individual as their candidate; or that MP's position may be annulled by law (exogenous factor). Hence, the process of continuing as an MP over several legislative terms is a complex one. Besides those, one considerable factor is the leadership change in political parties which may shape the continuity of those MPs' legislative careers. As explained in Chapter 4, political parties in Turkey have centralist structures by which the leaders of those parties become the most powerful person in the party. Thus, any change in leadership position may be accompanied with a change in the composition of candidates and MPs of that party. Although leadership change is not easy or common in parties in Turkey[39], we may still observe a number of cases through 2002 to 2015. Regarding this, another hypothesis appears as follows:

Hypothesis 3a: Party leadership change decreases the continuity of candidates on party lists in the general elections following this change.[40]

Generally, many candidate nominees or applicants compete to be selected by the parties and be nominated on their lists. As indicated above, however, not all candidate nominees can achieve this goal. Those who are selected and nominated by the parties become closer to their legislative careers. Nevertheless, not all candidates among even the ones selected enjoy the same chances of electability on the party lists. Some are nominated on the higher ranks or safe positions which show higher likelihood of becoming an MP, while others need to compromise to be nominated as lower rank candidates. It is underlined for the Hypothesis 2 that first-ranked candidacy may secure electability to a large extent, but those candidacy positions are not necessarily winnable positions, especially for the candidates in districts with small electoral support for their parties. Nonetheless, candidates on those ranks still have possibility to be elected, even if it is a small chance. However, the ones who are nominated at the very end of the candidate lists usually do not have any chance to be elected even in districts with large swaths of supporters for their parties. Only in districts where a political party gain all the seats in previous

[39] Details of party leadership change in Turkey are examined and discussed under "Intrainstitutional Ambition in Turkey" section in Chapter 7.

[40] The null hypothesis is as follows:
$H3a_0$: Party leadership change has no effect on the continuity of candidates in the elections following this change.

elections, all candidates on that party's list may calculate their likelihood of electability as being high. However, there may not be many districts like that for many parties. Then, why do some individuals become candidates even though they know that their electability chance is quite low?

Political parties need to fill their candidacy positions to compete in elections; hence, they seek for possible candidates who can be placed on their lists. It may not be so difficult for political parties to find a sufficient number of candidates with large groups of applicants in Turkey. Still, requiring some candidates be on non-winnable positions and asking them to invest in campaign process is not an easy process without losing the motivation of those candidates. Hence, political parties may compromise with those low rank candidates by providing other promotions such as higher offices within the party organization, candidacy in local politics or another candidacy in future general elections. Depending of those expectations, candidates with low chance of electability may still accept candidacy regardless of the chance of electability. In other words, those individuals may believe that their investment in a candidacy rank which will not bring success in the current elections would bring other opportunities in future elections. Hence, with regard to second sub research question mentioned above, the following hypothesis emerges:

Hypothesis 3b: Candidates who accept to be ranked in non-electable positions expect to push their ranks to electable positions over time or be rewarded by other positions in the party.

Analyzing the candidate lists and alternation of candidate ranks furnishes helpful results to answer the above-mentioned question and test the Hypothesis 3b. Nevertheless, this hypothesis is more about the political ambition of individuals; thus, it requires some individual insights. For that reason, relying on the answers of interviewees also provide valuable information besides quantitative data. These are examined in Chapter 7.

As indicated before, the aim of this dissertation is to explain political career patterns of political elites in Turkey by detailed analyses of elite recruitment by parties and political ambitions of individual politicians. In order to explain political career patterns in the form of the above mentioned research questions, socioeconomic backgrounds of political elites including age, gender, education, foreign language, localism and occupation; political experience backgrounds including served terms in the TBMM, bill initiation and committee/commission membership; party experience including local branch

membership, chairmanship and women/youth branch memberships; local politics experience such as mayoral positions and municipal council membership; civil society organizations membership, public office experience, party ideology, district size and electoral results in districts were examined. Introduction of this dissertation provided the details of data collection, operationalization of variables and methods employed in this study. The following sections provide more detailed description and comprehensive analysis of the compiled data, and answers to research questions by testing the hypotheses listed above.

6.1. Data Analysis and Findings

In order to answer the main research question and test the hypotheses, a unique dataset on the socioeconomic backgrounds, legislative experience, party experience, local politics experience and civil society experience of the elected MPs between 2002 and November 2015 General Elections was created. This dataset (MPs Dataset) consists of information on 2,750 MPs served through 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th terms in the TBMM.[41] To answer the sub research questions, MP Candidate Dataset was compiled in addition to MPs Dataset. The total number of MPs in the TBMM has been 550 per each election between 2002 and November 2015 General Elections in Turkey. Thus, political parties running in the general elections fielded 550 candidates in each election. In 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections, data were compiled for three political parties namely the AKP, CHP and MHP, as the HDP was not formed back then, and a total of 1,650 candidates are available for each election. In addition to these three parties, the HDP competed in June 2015 and November 2015 General Elections, and for these two elections, there are 2,200 candidates in total for four political parties. Hence, the candidate data compiled from the official YSK website and Official Gazette (*Resmi Gazete*) add up to 9,350 candidates in total for five general elections. Although some individuals run in multiple elections as candidates and some of them have been elected as MPs more than once, each one of them was identified as a unique observation in these datasets. The reason for this is that through time, their political experience, legislative experience and several personal attributes such as occupation may change, resulting in different observations. For example, one of the

[41] 22nd Legislative Term corresponds with the period starting with 2002 General Elections, 23rd with 2007, 24th with 2011, 25th with June 2015 and 26th with November 2015 General Elections. These legislative terms and corresponding general elections are used interchangeable through the text.

legislative experience variables, namely the total served terms in the TBMM is a cumulative one, and changes from one legislative term to another for an individual depending on his or her presence in the TBMM as an MP. Thus, the duplicate MP names were not removed from the datasets resulting in the above-mentioned numbers.

The following sub-sections reveal the results of analyzed data. More specifically, subsection 6.1.1. explains the determinants of political career patterns of political elite in Turkey with specific reference to MPs served in the TBMM. This section provides information about the profiles of the MPs with regard to their socioeconomic backgrounds, legislative, party, local politics, civil society and public office experiences. Moreover, Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b are tested in this section. Following this, section 6.1.2. explains why some individuals are nominated as first-ranked candidates without any previous candidacy or legislative experience by testing the Hypothesis 2 and providing descriptive analysis of the MP candidate data. Finally, section 6.1.3. discusses the motivations of the candidates who compromise to be nominated in non-electable positions by specific reference to political ambition and tests the Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b.

6.1.1. Determinants of Career Patterns of Political Elite in Turkey

Various studies focused on socioeconomic backgrounds of MPs in order to better understand the composition of the legislatures in different countries (see e.g., Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Ballington, 2004; Shomer, 2014; Kernell, 2015; Fox and Lawless 2005, 2010, 2011) and in Turkey (see e.g. Frey, 1965; Tachau, 1973; Kışlalı, 1976; Kalaycıoğlu, 1995; Sayarı and Hasanov, 2008; Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 2011). One of the goals of this Dissertation is to expand the scope of the previous research by additional variables and by examining the candidates' attributes more in detail in order to understand and explain the political career patterns in the country. "Who are the MPs in Turkey?" Answers to this question yield clues about the determinants of political career patterns in the country. By the analysis of socioeconomic and political backgrounds of the MPs, one may understand which attributes increase the likelihood of becoming legislative elite in the country. According to the MPs Data compiled for this Dissertation, it seems that political parties show variance among each other with regard to certain characteristics of their MPs such as gender, education and knowledge of foreign language, while some

other attributes such as age, localism and professions seem to show commonalities among parties. Details of such analyses are provided in the following subsections.

6.1.1.1. Age

Many political elite studies examined the age distribution of the politicians in order to understand which age groups occupy larger amounts of seats in legislature or other levels of political offices. Quandt (1969), for example, proposed two main methods to analyze the age distribution of politicians: First one is calculating the portions of political elite by an age range of 5 years. In other words, showing the age distribution of the elite for each five-year age groups. The second one is simply indicating the average age of the political elite. Although the second method provides only a simplistic perspective of average age, analyzing the distribution of age groups might yield better understanding to compare various groups of political elites, e.g. MPs of different political parties.

Various levels of political parties provide opportunities for different age groups. For example, a young individual may choose to start his or her political career by becoming a member of a youth branch of a political party, or an elderly person may decide to enter politics as a local party branch member after his or her retirement. For legislative elites, legal regulations may put an age limit, thus the analyses should be done taking that issue into consideration. In Turkey, eligibility for running as a candidate in general elections requires various factors as explained in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Regarding the age regulations, according to the original Article 10 of the current Parliamentary Elections Act (Law no: 2839) enacted in 10 June 1983, every Turkish citizen who is 30+ years old can be elected as MP. However, this article was amended on 19 October 2006 by lowering the minimum age limit to 25. Later, on 25 April 2018, the minimum age limit was further lowered to 18 with the Article 8 of Law 7140. However, since this dissertation focuses on the time period between 2002 and 2015, this age limit implemented in 2018 is not taken into consideration in discussions of the analyses.

Graph 6.1 shows the average age of all MPs served in corresponding legislative terms following the general elections. The lowest average is in the 22nd Legislative Term, and the highest comes right after that in the 23rd Legislative Term. It seems that the average age of the legislators did not considerably change over time; however, there is still a slight

increase. One might expect that lowered minimum required age for legislative candidacy between 2002 and 2015 would decrease the overall average age of MPs. Yet, it seems that political parties do not necessarily recruit larger numbers of young individuals as their legislative candidates.

One may interpret from this graph that usually middle-aged MPs have been serving in the TBMM between 2002 and 2015. Nevertheless, this graph by itself is not sufficient to analyze the age distribution and differences (or similarities) among political parties in the TBMM.

Graph 6.1: Average age of MPs in the TBMM (2002-2015)



In order to compare political parties, Graph 6.2 provides the age distribution of MPs in different parties for the same legislative terms. It seems that the AKP, CHP and MHP MPs have a normal distribution with regard to age variable while the HDP has slightly different distribution. According to this graph, the number of MPs who fall in 25-34 age range is dismally low in almost all parties compared to the total level of MPs in the TBMM.

Graph 6.2: Age distribution of the MPs by parties (2002-2015)



Average age in the TBMM is 49.9 between the 22nd and the 26th legislative terms. Nevertheless, not all parties show the same results: Average age of the AKP MPs is 48.7 between the 22nd and the 26th legislative terms. It is 52.2 for the CHP, 53.0 for the MHP, and 46.4 for the HDP in the same time frame. These results show that the HDP, in average, had the youngest group of MPs, followed by the AKP. On the other hand, the CHP and MHP MPs are older on average. Regardless of these slight differences, broadly represented groups in the TBMM coincide with middle to upper age groups in the society. Considering the age distribution in Turkey, it may be interpreted that a large group of the society who drop in the age range of 20 to 35 are not sufficiently represented in the TBMM.

Going into further details, Table 6.1 reveals the minimum (Min), maximum (Max) and average (Avg) age of the MPs from different parties in different legislative terms. With

regard to maximum age, the CHP seems to tend to select the oldest MPs among others. Nevertheless, the number of such MPs is not very high.

Table 6.1: Minimum, maximum and average age of MPs (2002-2015)

	2002			2007			2011			Jun-15			Nov-15		
Parties	Min	Max	Avg	Min	Max	Avg	Min	Max	Avg	Min	Max	Avg	Min	Max	Avg
AKP	30	69	**46.2**	30	72	**49.3**	27	73	**48.7**	27	73	**49.4**	29	75	**50.1**
CHP	32	78	**51.7**	39	83	**55.0**	30	77	**53.0**	29	77	**51.0**	29	77	**51.0**
MHP	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	35	77	**52.0**	42	73	**54.0**	31	72	**53.0**	36	72	**54.0**
HDP	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	26	72	**46.8**	26	72	**46.0**

Note: Independent candidates are not included in this calculation.

Results on minimum age provide better insights about the recruitment strategies of political parties. Total number of MPs who are either 30 years old or younger between 2002[42] and November 2015 is 31 which is dismally low compared to total number of MPs. Many of these MPs are either from the AKP or the HDP, but a small group also appears in the CHP. Unique observations in the data show that only one MP (from the HDP) was 26 years old during the respective election year, and two MPs (both from the AKP) were 27 years old when they were elected. Four MPs from the CHP were either 29 or 30 years old when they were elected to legislative office during the time period analyzed in this Dissertation. As indicated above, considering the lowered required minimum age limit through time, one might expect that higher numbers of young MPs to appear in the TBMM. However, the results imply that the strategies of the parties generally revolve around middle-aged individuals rather than youngsters. Even if parties select young individuals as their candidates, they may be placing those in non-electable positions which eventually hinder those to occupy seats in the National Assembly. These findings also show that the parties tend to stick with relatively more experienced[43] individuals as their candidates and MPs. Hence, all in all, middle aged group dominated the TBMM between 2002 and 2015.

[42] Since the minimum required age limit was 30+ in 2002, the calculation includes only those who were 30 years old when they are elected in 2002 General Elections.

[43] Experience does not necessarily mean political experience here. Older individuals may also be preferred by the parties as they somehow show their life experiences with regard to their occupations, success in other areas rather than politics, or membership to other organizations.

6.1.1.2. Localism

Birth places of political elite have been a significant variable to analyze starting from Frey (1965)'s prominent work on political elite in Turkey. Localism refers to a case that a political actor was born in the district that he or she is serving in or representing. For example, if large groups of MPs were born in the electoral districts that they represent, we may say that there is high localism in those districts. In other words, if the percentages of the MPs born in the same constituency from where they are elected increases, the localism increases as well. Results revealed that localism has been high in the country both in the case of party elite and legislative elite. To illustrate, Tachau (1973) found that 87 out of 100 party elite were born either in the same province or the region where they serve. Similarly, on average, 79 percent of the local party chairpersons of the AKP and CHP served through 2012 were categorized as locally born which shows high localism (Kocapınar, 2018). The reason for calculating localism is to infer whether those politicians have close connections to their districts. Besides party elite's localism, legislative elite's birth places have been examined by various scholars.

One of the first and most prominent scholars who calculated and examined localism of MPs in Turkey was Frey, and he underlined the clear changes in localism over time as follows:

> "…the incidence of deputies born in their constituencies seems to reflect quite well the tendencies toward "localism," that is, having deep roots in the constituency and commitment to its interests and views. In the First Assembly, the incidence of "localism" was high. Over three-fifths of all deputies had been born in the provinces they represented. With the Kemalist consolidation of power, however, localism declined rather precipitously, reaching a nadir of 34 percent in the Fifth Assembly, during which Atatürk died. In the İnönü era it rose somewhat and then sharply accelerated with the advent of the multiparty system. That rise was interrupted in the Thirteenth Assembly, when a secure victory was gained by the Justice Party. But in the Fourteenth Assembly, "localism" climbed to a new high. Over three-quarters of all deputies were born in the provinces they represented. A major consequence of competitive party politics has apparently been strong pressure toward greater representation of local interests among elected political leaders." (Frey, 1975: 57).

Hence, localism increased over time in Turkey inferring that political parties tend to select their candidates who are children of their towns, who may have close connections with the electorate in the city or who know their districts well. This increasing trend of

localism were later revealed by other scholars as well which also coincide with the results of this dissertation. It was underlined that localism is notably high in many districts both in the case of MPs (Frey, 1975) and local party elites (see, e.g. Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Kocapınar, 2018). Nevertheless, there have been some differences among cities: "the more populous and well developed provinces of the West and South have lower proportions of locally born politicians" (Tachau, 1973: 278) and hence, migrant receiving cities have low localism compared to migrant sending ones (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000). For example, by a further analysis of political actors' fathers' birth places, it was explained that metropolitan areas such as Marmara, Ege and Akdeniz regions may show lower localism of political elite as these are migrant receiving places, while Karadeniz, Southeast Anatolia and East Anatolia regions are the migrant-sending places and have more party elite serving in the cities that they were born (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 60-61). Similarly, it was revealed that the lowest localism of local party elites was in migrant receiving cities such as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Bursa and Kocaeli, localism has been considerably high even in those cities with at least 50% localism (Kocapınar, 2018). Data analyzed in this dissertation also show similar patterns with regard to localism of the MPs.

Table 6.2: Localism of the MPs by parties (2002-2015)

Party	Local Born (%)	Local Resident (%)	Non-Local born (%)	Total
AKP	68	22	10	100
CHP	60	27	13	100
MHP	60	21	18	100
HDP	47	35	18	100

Table 6.2 shows localism of the MPs by parties. In this table, local born category shows the MPs who were born in the electoral districts where they are elected while non-local born category shows the ones who were born in another district rather than the one they represent. Nevertheless, measuring localism with only these two categories may not be sufficient, as it was also referred as to have close connections or deep roots in the constituency (Frey, 1975). Even though some MPs were born in different provinces rather than their constituencies, they have been living in those constituencies where they entered the election process, which enables them to construct a linkage with the population of that district. Hence, in addition to local-born category, a local resident category was also

calculated to show the percentages of the MPs who have spent long years in the constituencies they represent.[44] By the help of this addition, it is easier the recognize the strategies of the parties while selecting their MP candidates.

When we look at only the local born category, localism is high especially for the AKP, CHP and MHP. However, if we take both local born and local resident categories into consideration, we observe high localism for all parties. It seems that most of the parties tend to select MP candidates (and eventually MPs) who have public appeal, know the district well, or are publicly known in the constituency. Among those, the HDP seems to be an interesting case regarding the category of local born as it has the lowest percentage of MPs who drop in this group. MPs of the HDP who were neither born in nor become a resident of districts are from Adana, Ağrı, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Diyarbakır, İstanbul (all), İzmir, Mardin, Şanlıurfa, Van, Batman and Siirt. Many of these districts are either in the Southeast Anatolia or East Anatolia regions which provide large swaths of supporters of the HDP. Moreover, those MPs were born in electoral districts which are very close to the ones from where they are elected. Hence, one may interpret that these MPs were also publicly known figures in their constituencies.

Overall, no dramatic differences are observable among parties with regard to localism. Additionally, high localism patterns in the country seem to continue. Hence, it may be argued that political parties strategically select their candidates regarding their localism. As indicated in Chapter 4 of the dissertation, political parties previously recruited the "members of notable families and faction leaders who were able to use their networks of clientelist relationships with the peasants to mobilize electoral support" (Sayarı, 2011: 86-87). Today, political elites' proximity to the electorate still seems to be a significant factor for political parties even if they are not necessarily from notable families. A more detailed examination of this practice is available in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

[44] Those who were elected as MPs in particular districts (even though they were not born there) in previous elections are also included in local residents' category.

6.1.1.3. Education and foreign language

Data reveal that political parties do not show dramatic differences with regard to education levels (i.e. primary school, high school or university) of their MPs in the TBMM. More specifically, large swaths of MPs are university graduates in each legislative term analyzed in this Dissertation.

Table 6.3: Number of MPs with regard to education level (2002-2015)

Education Level	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP	Independent	Total
Primary School Graduate	7	9	1	6	1	24
High School Graduate	71	64	22	39	22	218
University Graduate	1528	618	221	94	47	2508
Total	1606	691	244	139	70	2750

As shown in Table 6.3 and Graph 6.3, primary school graduates compose the smallest group for each party, while the group of high school graduates is slightly larger than group of primary school graduates. For the AKP, CHP and MHP, university graduates compose at least 89 percent of all the MPs of those parties. Whereas, the HDP seems to have the lowest percentage of university graduates while recruiting more high school graduates. Nonetheless, university graduates still compose the largest group in this party, which is in line with the other parties.

Graph 6.3: Percentages of Education Levels of MPs (2002-2015)



Under the light of these results, it is possible to argue that the TBMM contains a considerably large group of university graduates in general. Hence, differentiating parties from each other is not that easy with regard to education levels of the MPs. Nevertheless, when we further analyze the details of the education attainment, there emerge significant differences among parties especially in terms of religious education and foreign language knowledge. Along with other personal attributes such as gender, age, education and occupation, the knowledge of foreign languages also provides some insights about the characteristics of MPs from different parties. For example, an examination of the foreign languages may give useful clues about the ideologies of parties (see e.g. Sayarı and Hasanov, 2008). Table 6.4, Graphs 6.4-6.6 and Figure 6.1 provide insights about how parties' MP compositions differ from each other depending on their ideological stance.

Increased electoral support of Islamist parties in Turkey in the recent times was explained in Chapter 4. Two important indicators of Islamic values and attributes of individuals in political elite studies have been Islamic education and knowledge of Arabic language. For example, it was found for the 23rd Legislative Term deputies that "…73 out of 341 AKP deputies know Arabic, presumably as a result of their training at the Imam-Hatip schools." (Sayarı and Hasanov, 2008: 345). Hence, analyzing those attributes is noteworthy to understand the variance among political parties. Table 6.4 shows the number of MPs who attended Islamic religious education schools including primary schools, high schools and university education (e.g. *İlahiyat Fakültesi*) between 2002 and 2015.

Table 6.4: MPs and religious education backgrounds (2002-2015)

Religious Education	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP	Independent	Total
Yes	260	6	7	6	0	279
No	774	675	228	128	68	1873
N.A.	572	10	9	5	2	598
Total	1606	691	244	139	70	2750

These data rely on the biographies of the MPs, and some MPs only indicate their education levels but do not provide details about what kind of school they had attended. Thus, data have some limitations at this point since no information is available for 598 out of 2750 MPs regarding their educational institutions. Still, the data provide insights as it compose a larger group for which those details are available. It is observed that the

AKP has the largest group of MPs with Islamic religious education background. Although we observe similar patterns in other parties, the numbers are quite low. Besides Islamic education background, Arabic Language knowledge which is closely related to Islamic education may also provide information about ideological differences among parties.

Graph 6.4: Number of MPs with Arabic language knowledge (2002-2015)



Graph 6.4 shows the change in number of MPs who speak Arabic as a foreign language by parties over five national elections as well as the increasing trend for the AKP as shown with dotted line. It is clear that the AKP MPs contain a larger group compared to the other MPs.

Number of MPs who indicated in their biographies that they both have religious education and Arabic Language knowledge is 188 out of available observations. Some MPs only indicated that they attended Islamic religious schools, yet they did not mention knowledge of Arabic. Even though Islamic religious education goes hand in hand with Arabic language, it seems that not all MPs with such education speak Arabic. Thus, religious education background was not automatically considered as an indicator of knowledge of Arabic in the dataset.

Although the number of MPs who attended religious schools and can speak Arabic is relatively low compared to the ones who indicate only religious education (but no knowledge of Arabic) background, it is even lower compared to the ones who indicated that they know Arabic. More specifically, 429 MPs indicated in their biographies that they know Arabic. Figure 6.1 shows the total number of MPs with regard to this issue. It is clear that the group of MPs who speak Arabic is larger than the one with religious

education background. One may argue that Arabic Language knowledge can be identified as a proxy for religious education, yet, since the MPs do not indicate this in their biographies, it is not regarded like that in this dissertation.

Figure 6.1: Number of MPs with religious education background and Arabic language knowledge



Moreover, knowledge of Arabic Language seems to have different importance for different parties. While the AKP MPs who indicate their foreign language knowledge as Arabic generally have Islamic education, the HDP and CHP members indicating Arabic language as their foreign language are usually from the districts in which Arabic can be spoken among residents. Hence, it may be an indication of selecting MPs with public appeal rather than an ideological strategy of candidate selection for the latter.

In addition to the fact that parties differ from each other with regard to Arabic language knowledge of their MPs; and increased number of MPs who can speak Arabic in the TBMM, trend in religious education is also noteworthy. Graph 6.5 shows the increasing trend of the number of MPs with religious education background (dotted line in the graph is the trend line).

Graph 6.5: Number of MPs with religious education background (2002-2015)



It is observable that the number of MPs with religious education background increased over time between 2002 and 2015. Although these numbers are only a small portion of all the MPs, this increasing trend may show that more individuals with religious education background seem to be winning seats in the TBMM compared to past legislative terms.

That increasing trend is not only observable for the MPs who attended religious schools. Change in the number of MPs who speak Kurdish also provide insights about how the composition of the TBMM changed with regard to language proficiency.

Graph 6.6: Number of MPs with Kurdish language knowledge (2002-2015)



It is clear that the number of MPs proficient in Kurdish increased over time from 2002 to November 2015. It reached its peak level in 2015, and data show that a large portion of those MPs are from the HDP. Hence, it can be interpreted that the presence of the HDP in the TBMM increased the number of MPs who speak Kurdish.

Overall, one may argue that ideological stance of political parties seems to affect their MPs composition with regard to educational backgrounds and foreign language knowledge in the TBMM.

6.1.1.4. Gender

In many early books and articles written on elite recruitment and political careers, scholars tend to refer politicians as men (see e.g., Weber, 1958; Schlesinger, 1966). This was not a coincidence as politics has been dominated by men both in local and national levels. However, starting especially from early 1990s, many studies conducted specifically on political careers of women in order to examine the politicians other than men. The results usually indicated the presence of gender gap both in local politics and national politics in various countries (see e.g., Fox and Lawless, 2010; Matthews, 2014; Butler and Preece, 2016). It is revealed that the political parties tend to filter women on their candidate lists which dramatically lowers the likelihood of the women to be elected (Kunovich and Paxton, 2005; Yıldırım and Kocapınar, 2018). Even some women with similar qualifications with their male counterparts seem to encounter the problem of being ignored in nomination processes to a broad extent even in most consolidated democracies:

> "Highly qualified and politically well-connected women from both major political parties are less likely than similarly situated men to be recruited to run for public office by all types of political actors … women's recruitment disadvantage depresses their political ambition and ultimately hinders their emergence as candidates." (Fox and Lawless, 2010: 310).

Gender gap in local and national level politics is observable in Turkey as well. In other words, gender distribution among MPs is dispersed in Turkey like in many other countries examined by various scholars (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Rallings et al., 2008; Fox and Lawless, 2010). One solution to eliminate gender gap in politics has been employing gender quotas. Although there is no legally binding rule for gender quotas for national or local candidates in elections in Turkey, the CHP and HDP implement quotas as stated in their party by-laws as explained in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.

Table 6.5 shows the gender distribution of MPs by parties between 2002 and 2015. It is clear that gender gap appears in favor of male MPs, and three out of four political parties dominantly have men as their legislative elite. Only one political party, namely the HDP,

shows a difference from the others with a relatively larger share of female MPs which is 32 percent in total between 2002 and 2015.

Table 6.5: Gender distribution of MPs in the TBMM (2002-2015)

Party	Male	Male (%)	Female	Female (%)	Total
AKP	1437	89	169	11	1606
CHP	617	89	74	11	691
MHP	232	95	12	5	244
HDP	139	68	66	32	205
Total	2423	88	321	12	2746

Note: The total number of MPs does not add up to 2750 as there are independent candidates elected through 2002 and 2015 general elections. Moreover, the HDP did not run as a party in elections prior to June 2015, however, there were independent candidates who were affiliated with the HDP's predecessors, and these independent candidates are also added to the HDP in calculations.

Although women representatives are still a small group in the TBMM, the percentages of nominated female candidates and elected women show an increasing trend over time even though there emerged a slight decline in November 2015 as shown in Graph 6.7.

Graph 6.7: Percentage of female MPs in the TBMM over elections (2002-2015)



Thus, one may argue that more women started to occupy seats in the TBMM from 2002 to 2015; however, this increase is still far away from closing the gender gap in the country. In order to better understand the strategies of parties on candidate selection with regard to gender, analyzing the candidate lists and number of women on those may provide useful insights. As Table 6.6 indicates, although the percentages of female candidates and elected women varied between 5 percent (AKP) to 8 percent (CHP) and 3 percent (AKP) to 5

percent (CHP) respectively in 2002 General Elections, parties tend to include more women on their candidate lists recently.

Table 6.6: Percentages of women candidates and elected MPs by Parties (2002 - 2015)*

Election Year	Nominated Women Candidates (%)				Elected Women MPs (%)			
	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP
2002	5	8	N.A.	N.A.	3	5	N.A.	N.A.
2007	12	10	7	N.A.	9	9	1	N.A.
2011	14	18	12	N.A.	14	13	6	N.A.
2015 (J)	18	19	12	43	17	16	5	40
2015 (N)	13	21	13	38	11	16	8	39
Total	12	15	11	40	10	11	4	40
Grand Total	16%				11%			

*This table does not include the independent candidates affiliated with the predecessors of the HDP who had run in elections prior to 2015.

Nevertheless, the percentage of women on those lists reveals that the gender gap is far from being closed in parallel to the previous analysis of MPs. Compared to the AKP, CHP and MHP, the HDP seems to be the one with the highest share of the females on the party list which consequently increases the percentage of women MPs elected from this party, an also in the composition of the TBMM. Graph 6.8 further illustrates the difference on the party list with regard to the gender of candidates.

Graph 6.8: Percentages of female candidates on Party Lists (2002-2015)



As indicated, electoral laws do not impose any compulsory quotas for women in Turkey, but some political parties include voluntary electoral quotas in their by-laws especially for women and youngsters. For example, the HDP by-laws depicts that at least 40 percent of

the candidates in elections shall be women. Similarly, according to the CHP by-laws, there are candidacy positions reserved specifically for women and young people in local elections (municipal council positions). The percentages of women candidates and elected MPs reveal that those regulations in the by-laws have positive affect on increasing the portions of women and decreasing the gender gap in national politics. The HDP has the largest portion of nominated women with 43 percent in June 2015 and 38 percent in November 2015 General Elections. It is followed by the CHP which increased its portion of nominated candidates through time from 8 percent in 2002 to 21 percent in November 2015; then comes the AKP with a similar trend to the CHP, but with a drop in November 2015. The MHP nominates relatively less women on their candidate lists compared to others.

Eventually, the percentages of elected women are in line with the nomination. However, it seems that the HDP has the highest proportionality between nominated and elected women percentages while the percentages are lower compared to nomination in other parties. This may be a signal of the women candidates' ranking on the party lists. If women are nominated in lower ranks rather than top ranks, or if they are generally nominated in non-electable positions (e.g. in districts with no sufficient electoral support for parties), then even though the women are selected as candidates, they may not make to the TBMM.

6.1.1.5. Occupation

Particular occupational backgrounds which provide political elite with certain amount of wealth (for spending to cover their party expenses and election campaigns) and flexible working hours have been identified as quite important factors to have more chances to be recruited and be sustainable in politics by various political actors (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993; Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Uysal and Topak, 2010). Hence, by analyzing the occupational backgrounds of the political elite, answers can be found for the questions of what type of occupations do we observe in different parties, and whether there is any clear pattern for political parties to select one occupational group over the others and identify whether the party elites believe that certain jobs ease developing political careers.

For example, with regard to legislative recruitment strategies in the UK, it was explained that "Observers of political elites have commonly noted that MPs tend to be drawn from

the better educated and more affluent sectors of society, with few women or racial minorities." (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995: 93). Consequently, parliaments have been thought to be unrepresentative with regard to particular groups in the societies, as some others are overrepresented. Regarding this, one important case is occupational backgrounds. Previous studies underlined that large groups of legislative elite have some particular occupations such as being teachers or lawyers in various countries (see e.g., Tachau, 1977; Norris, 1997; Cotta and Best, 2000). In a similar vein, it seems that lawyers consist the largest group within the TBMM in different legislative terms and overall between 2007 and 2015 in Turkey. Table 6.7 below shows the number of MPs in different occupational categories.

Composition of MPs' occupational backgrounds has not stayed unchanged over time in Turkey. For example, certain professions which dominated the National Assembly lost their salience especially after 1950:

> "The broadening of the Turkish political elite from 1950 on is indicated by data on the socioeconomic and political backgrounds of Members of Parliament. Prior to 1950, the largest single occupational group in the Parliament consisted of civilian government officials, who accounted for 20-25 percent of the membership. Military officials were the second largest group with 15-20 percent of the members, followed in turn by law (10-15 percent), commerce, trade, and banking (10-15 percent), and education (5-10 percent). After 1950, the largest single grouping was made up of lawyers (27-32 percent), followed by trade, commerce, and banking (16-20 percent); civil servants dropped below 10 percent, as did military officers (the latter two categories combined accounted for only 16 percent of the members in 1961 and 1965, and less than that in other sessions). Inasmuch as the civil and military bureaucracy represents the old, established Ottoman-Turkish elite, the decline in the proportion of parliamentary deputies with this type of background is notable." (Tachau and Good, 1973: 554).

Even broadened alternation is observable in recent legislative terms in the country as well. Data compiled for this Dissertation show that the percentage of MPs who formerly served as military officers is quite low which reveals the continued decline in the number of such MPs as formerly underlined by Tachau and Godd (1973). Moreover, a decline is also observable in civilian government officials category. For example, although MPs who occupied public offices are still observable, they no longer compose the largest group as in pre-1950 period. Indeed, between 2007 and 2015, the most crowded profession group

is composed of lawyers; then engineers/architects, academicians, medical doctors and businessmen dominated the most seats in the TBMM.

Table 6.7: Distribution of occupational categories in the TBMM (2007-2015)

Occupation	Number of MPs	Percentages (%)
Lawyer / Legal Expert (*Hukukçu*)	410	18.6
Engineer / Architect	302	13.7
Academician	215	9.8
Medical Doctor	170	7.7
Businessman/Trader	142	6.5
Executive	112	5.1
Economist	108	4.9
Teacher / Instructor	102	4.6
Self-employed	76	3.5
Public Office (including bureaucrats, diplomats and governors)	71	3.2
Pharmacist / Dentist / Veterinarian	61	2.8
Financial Advisor / Accountant	60	2.7
Journalist	49	2.2
Legislative Expert	43	2.0
Others	211	9.6
N.A.	68	3.1
TOTAL	**2200**	**100**

Alternation in the percentages of professional backgrounds of the MPs also brought more heterogeneous composition of occupations in the TBMM. In other words, today, the occupational backgrounds of the MPs in the TBMM is more diversified.

Although different political parties seem to recruit varying numbers of individuals from various professions, above mentioned most numerous groups (as seen in Table 6.7) seem to dominate in each of those parties with slight differences. For example, lawyers, engineers and academicians are respectively the largest top three profession groups in the AKP; while it is lawyers, medical doctors and engineers in the CHP; academicians, engineers, medical doctors in the MHP; and self-employed, lawyers and engineers in the HDP respectively. All in all, today lawyers seem to be a significant profession group for all political parties.

Above mentioned results (examined through age, education, foreign language, gender and occupation variables) show socioeconomic composition of the TBMM in general and

party groups in details. With regard to socioeconomic backgrounds of the MPs, the following hypothesis was indicated in the beginning of this chapter:

- *Hypothesis 1a*: Ideological differences of parties have impact on the socioeconomic composition of their MPs.

Overall, above mentioned results support Hypothesis 1.a, but partially. Although all parties show somewhat similar composition about age and localism characteristics of the MPs, a clear difference among parties' MP composition is observable especially with regard to gender, education and knowledge of foreign language. It seems that parties positioned more on the left of the ideological spectrum, namely the CHP and HDP tend to recruit and nominate more females in general elections in the country, and eventually have larger groups of female MPs; whereas parties on the right strand namely the AKP and MHP recruits less women compared to them. Moreover, parties with Islamic sentiments (e.g. the AKP) seem to recruit more MPs with Islamic religious education background while the number of such MPs is dismally low in other political parties. Lastly, party ideologies seem to affect the composition of MPs with regard to knowledge of foreign language. While parties with Islamic sentiments contains more MPs who can speak Arabic, parties with particular ethnic sentiments have more MPs who can speak the mother tongue of this ethnic group. For example, the HDP has the highest portion of the MPs who speak Kurdish whereas it is not applicable for the MHP which pursues ethnic Turkish sentiments.

Besides socioeconomic background of the MPs, political experience also delivers useful information about the determinants of career patterns of political elite in Turkey. The following section is dedicated to the analysis of such attributes.

6.1.1.6. Party, civil society organizations, public office and local politics experiences of MPs

Besides age, localism, education and foreign language attributes, gender and occupation, political experience is also vital to understand who can become members of the legislative elite in a country. Data on Turkey reveal that not many MPs are coming from local party offices, but rather, a significant portion of them are starting from the higher levels of party

offices, i.e. positions at party headquarters. Table 6.8 shows the percentages of MPs having prior particular experiences.

Table 6.8: Party, civil society organizations and public office experiences of MPs

	Local Party Organizations (%)					Party Headquarters (%)		Other Organizations (%)	
Party	Women or Youth Branch Membership	District Branch Member	District Chairperson	Provincial Branch Member	Provincial Chairperson	Headquarter Membership	Proximity to Leaders	Membership to Civil Society Organizations	Public Office
AKP	7	4	6	15	14	41	45	57	31
CHP	4	6	6	10	9	32	38	62	30
MHP	16	1	2	4	7	37	40	40	47
HDP	3	0	4	6	5	44	49	63	6

It seems that many MPs have membership in civil society organizations both prior to and during their legislative terms. In that regard, portion of MPs having membership to civil society organizations exceeds the portion of MPs having local party organization experience. Additionally, many MPs indicated in their biographies that they are members of multiple civil society organizations. So, some of the MPs did not hold a local party chair or other positions while they have been members -especially executive members- of various civil society organizations. This shows that the networks of those individuals within those organizations may ease their connectivity with parties and their chances to become MPs may be positively affected. One reason to argue this is that level of civil society membership in Turkey is not high. Although many civil society organizations are formed in the country, number of members of these organizations is less than 10 percent of the adult population of Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu, 2016: 232). Under these circumstances, members of those civil society organizations may be identified as small networks which may increase their chances to connect with other MPs, higher level party officials or prominent members of the parties who may have an influence in the candidate selection process.

Another important issue interpreted from the Table 6.8 is that one third of the MPs of the AKP and CHP occupied public office (or gained bureaucratic experience) prior to their legislative careers. The portion of such individuals are even higher among the MHP members with 47 percent. Nevertheless, it seems that the HDP MPs differ from others by the lowest level of public office experience. For many of the HDP MPs, having party

headquarter experience or civil society organization membership seem to be more common attributes rather than holding a local or national public office.

Besides above-mentioned attributes, local politics experience (mayoral positions and municipal council membership) may also give important clues about political career patterns. MPs Data show that MPs who formerly hold mayoral positions (5 percent in total) or municipal council membership (9.7 percent in total) seem to compose a small group, yet it is still important to see the presence of this group which shows a progressive ambition among those individuals from local to national level.[45] Nevertheless, the results suggest that individuals with local politics career seem to continue in local level rather than having a transition to national level politics in future.

For all the parties analyzed in this Dissertation, MPs' party headquarter experience and proximity to the party leadership seem to be a significant factor. Especially for the AKP and HDP, portion of MPs who served in the party headquarters and who had closer relations with the party leaders is noteworthy. This is also true for the CHP and MHP; however, the portion of such MPs in these parties are smaller compared the AKP and HDP.

Figure 6.2: Portions of MPs with specific experience



Figure 6.2 is an inverted pyramid showing the portions of MPs with specific experience without party differentiation. Although the portions are different from one party to

[45] However, data also show that some individuals prefer to become mayors even if they are already elected as MPs, and they resign from their legislative offices. Details of these cases are discussed in Chapter 7 of this Dissertation.

another, this depiction emerges when we analyze all MPs served between 2002 and 2015. It seems that a considerable amount of the MPs has civil society organization experience while little do have district party branch experience in general. Nevertheless, having party experience seem to play important roles in political career of the MPs.

Duration of party membership of MPs (including local and national party office experience) in Turkey has been analyzed by several scholars (see e.g., Tachau and Good, 1973; Gençkaya, 2000). The findings of such studies suggest that not many MPs have local party experience; however, holding an office in party headquarters seem to be playing an important role in becoming MPs.

> "…neither appointive offices nor local elective offices nor local party offices have been very important as channels of recruitment to the national political elite. This conclusion is surprising in view of the evidence of increasing localism and deconcentration of politics in the 1950s and 1960s. This apparent paradox suggests that, in fact, local party functionaries and locally elected officials are not very powerful or prominent and that these positions are often bypassed by those on the way up the ladder of political success. This is not to say that local party organizations play no significant role, nor that the individuals involved have no political ambitions. It is more likely either that large numbers of these people were unsuccessful in their bids, or that they simply failed to report this aspect of their careers after election. On the other hand, it is clear from other evidence that those who aspire to national political office expend great efforts to dominate or at least to have a voice in the provincial party organizations. Rather than staffing the organizations themselves, however, they tend to work through supporters, clients, or hangers-on upon whom they rely to protect and enhance their political career" (Tachau and Good, 1973; 556).

This argument is still applicable to the recent political career paths in the country once the data is analyzed with regard to the local party experience of the MPs. Nevertheless, although the number of MPs with local party experience is low, such attributes seems to be playing important roles in the candidacy processes of those MPs in future elections. In other words, having party experience in various levels seem to have positive effects on re-nomination of MPs in next general elections once they are elected in the previous ones. Regarding this argument, Hypothesis 1b was indicated in the previous section as follows:

- *Hypothesis 1b*: Acquiring party experience has a positive effect on re-nomination of the MPs in the next general elections.

In order to test this hypothesis a binary logistic regression analysis is done using the variables of party experience and re-nomination. More specifically, the dependent

variable is whether an MP elected in an election (t) is re-nominated in the next election (t+1). Hence, it is either 1 or 0. Thus, binary logistic regression is preferred for testing the Hypothesis 1b. Independent variables are party experience variables which are women or youth branch membership, district branch experience, provincial branch experience and party headquarters experience. These variables are grouped depending on a factor analysis of various independent variables.[46]

Table 6.9 shows the output of binary logistic regression with above mentioned variable (Model 1).

Table 6.9: Binary logistic regression output of re-nomination of the MPs

	Candidacy in Next Election (t+1)		
Independent Variables	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Women or Youth Branch Experience	0.450**	0.096	
	(0.227)	(0.304)	
District Branch Experience	0.420**	0.249	
	(0.162)	(0.214)	
Provincial Branch Experience	0.567***	0.501***	
	(0.102)	(0.136)	
Party HQ Experience	0.176***	0.298***	
	(0.031)	(0.045)	
Local Politics Experience		-0.055	
		(0.054)	
Candidate Rank (t)		-0.001	0.015
		(0.023)	(0.018)
Total Served Terms in the TBMM		-0.407***	-0.317***
		(0.072)	(0.065)
Ministerial Experience		0.223***	0.360***
		(0.078)	(0.070)
Number of Initiated Bills		0.016	0.015**
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Public Office Experience		-0.013	
		(0.040)	
Party Vote % in District (t-1)		-0.002	
		(0.003)	
Number of Elected MPs in District by Parties (t-1)		-0.013	
		(0.020)	
Education		0.238	
		(0.181)	
Constant	-0.179	-0.685	0.032
	(0.054)	(0.540)	(0.129)
Observation	2200	1574	1645
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.06	0.02

Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[46] Please see Appendix for details of the factor analysis and grouping of the variables.

It seems that party experience does have a positive effect on re-nomination of the MPs in the next elections. Hence, the Hypothesis 1b seems to be supported by the findings under these circumstances. More specifically, the effects of provincial branch experience and party headquarters experience are statistically significant on re-nomination of MPs in the next election, and these variables have positive correlation with the re-nomination variable. District branch experience also have positive effects on re-nomination chances of the MPs, but its significance level is lower than the other two variables. In a similar vein, women branch or youth branch experience also have positive correlation with candidacy in next elections, however, this variable's significance level is also lower than the provincial experience and party headquarters experience. Nevertheless, overall these results suggest that party experience in general increases the likelihood of an MP to be re-nominated in the next election.

Of course, party experience is not the only quality of the MPs. Along with that, legislative experience and behavior may play an important role in re-nomination processes of MPs. Several studies reveal that legislative behavior and activities of the MPs are some of the determinants of re-nomination and continuing legislative career (see e.g., Marangoni and Russo, 2016; Fernandes et al., 2017; Yıldırım et al., 2017). Regarding these, another binary logistic regression was run with additional variables which are local politics experience (mayoral positions and municipal council membership), public office experience, total served terms in the TBMM, ministerial experience, total initiated bill by MP, candidate order of the MPs during the elections, education level, parties' total number of seats in a given district and their vote percentages. When we add these new variables into logistic regression (in Model 2 in Table 6.9), provincial branch experience and party headquarters experience still have statistically significant effect on re-nomination of MPs in the next elections, but district branch experience loses its significance. Additionally, legislative experience (e.g. total served terms in the TBMM and ministerial positions) seems to play a major role in nomination in the next elections, but in opposing directions. While ministerial experience increases the likelihood of re-nomination, total served terms in the TBMM seem to decrease one's chance to be selected as candidate in the next set of elections.

Overall, one may argue that party experience as a pre-parliamentary experience enable the MPs to be seen as more outstanding by political party selectorates than those who do not have such experience. In a similar vein, holding a ministerial position increases an

MPs likelihood of being re-nominated in the next elections, and this show that incumbent parties tend to reward and re-nominate their prominent members in the future elections.

6.1.2. First-Ranked Candidates

As indicated in previous pages, PR system with closed party lists is the current electoral system in Turkey. Under such a system, being nominated as top candidates on the party list ballot papers during the elections usually increases the chance of being elected. Hence, competition over higher ranked candidacy positions is significant, and being ranked first on the party lists is a clear reward for many candidates. One may expect that those who enjoy such top rankings are the ones having the best qualities among the other candidates. Some of those qualities may be long term party experience, being legislative elite for a long time or having local politics experiences which enable the individual politicians to be more engaged and knowledgeable about politics.

Party leaders and some prominent members generally run as first-ranked candidates on party lists. For example, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ran as the first-ranked candidate in İstanbul District 1 in 2007 and 2011 General Elections. Since he was elected as the President of the country in August 2014, he did not run in general elections after 2011. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu became the CHP leader in May 2010. Previously he ran as CHP candidate in İstanbul District 2 in the third place in 2002 and in the fifth place in 2007. After becoming the party leader, he ran in the first rank in the CHP candidate list in İstanbul District 2, but then he became the only party leader with a candidate ranking other than 1 with his rankings in June 2015 (2^{nd} candidate in İzmir District 2) and November 2015 (2^{nd} candidate in İzmir District 2). Nevertheless, one may argue that there is practically no difference between being the first or second candidate in İzmir on the CHP ticket as the party has a large group of supporters there. Similarly, the MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli has been running as the first-ranked candidate in party list in Osmaniye - where he is from- since the 2002 General Elections while the leader of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş was nominated as first-ranked candidate in June 2015 and November 2015 Elections in İstanbul 1. Previously he ran as an independent candidate in Hakkari in 2011, and Diyarbakır in 2007 without any rank as ranking is not applicable to independents. Not only party leaders but also prominent party members (e.g. those who

served as ministers) seem to be nominated on top of the party lists signaling that those are the ones who are given at most importance in the parties for MP positions. Moreover, former legislative experience (i.e. serving as an MP) or candidacy experience in general elections may increase the chance of an individual to be nominated in the top ranks in party lists.

Nonetheless, one can still observe that some individuals without any prior candidacy and legislative experience may be ranked first in candidate lists in general elections. Then, why and how do some individuals become first-ranked candidates on party list ballots even though they had never run in general elections prior to their candidacy?

Table 6.10 shows the percentages of all first-ranked candidates between 2007 and November 2015 General Elections in Turkey. It seems that the AKP has the highest portion of the first-ranked candidates with previous legislative candidacy experience while the CHP shows the lowest percentage of such candidates. In other words, while the first ranks on party lists are occupied by previously experienced candidates in the AKP, the CHP tends to recruit new candidates for their first ranks in the party lists. The MHP and HDP show similar results with regard to first rank candidates, and more than half of their candidates occupying the first row on the lists are previously experienced ones. This picture may provide several insights: First, as the incumbent party, the AKP has higher intra-party competition for the party lists, and thus, the ones with more legislative experience (either as candidates or as MPs) are promoted more and selected as first-ranked candidates.[47] Second, the CHP tends to try new candidates over different elections regardless of their legislative experience or prior candidacy.

When we analyze the data in detail, it seems that these strategic decisions of parties while nominating their first-ranked candidates have connections with electoral success of parties in particular electoral districts. First time first-ranked candidates are usually nominated in electoral districts where political parties are electorally unsuccessful.

[47] This argument may be perceived as contradicting to the results in the previous section with regard to negative effects of total number of served terms in the TBMM on re-nomination. However, the analysis here only covers the first-ranked candidates, which is a quite smaller group compared to all candidates (85 candidates out of 550 per each party). As covered in the previous section, especially holding ministerial positions as a specific legislative experience increases the likelihood of re-nomination of an MP in the next elections. It seems that approximately 40 percent of the MPs in the first-ranked candidacies with previous legislative candidacy experience have served as ministers in single or multiple legislative terms. Hence, it is not actually contradicting with the above-mentioned results.

Table 6.10: Percentages of first-ranked candidates (2002-2015)

Election Years	First-ranked candidates with previous legislative candidacy experience (%)				First-ranked candidates with no prior legislative candidacy experience (%)			
	AKP	**CHP**	**MHP**	**HDP**	**AKP**	**CHP**	**MHP**	**HDP**
2007	64	34	47	N.A.	36	66	53	N.A.
2011	74	39	62	N.A.	26	61	38	N.A.
2015 (J)	76	58	55	38	24	42	45	62
2015 (N)	93	76	82	80	7	24	18	20
Total	**73**	**43**	**55**	**52**	**27**	**57**	**45**	**48**

Note: The percentages do not include the previous candidacy and legislative experience prior to 2002 General Elections.

In some cases, prominent members of the parties are nominated as first rank candidates even though they have never run in general elections before, but these candidates are generally nominated in the districts where parties have large swaths of supporters.

Table 6.11: Number of first-time first-ranked candidates by parties (2007-2015)

	2007	**2011**	**2015 (J)**	**2015 (N)**	**Total**
AKP	31	22	20	7	80
CHP	56	53	36	20	165
MHP	45	32	25	15	117
HDP	N.A.	N.A.	53	17	70
Total	132	107	134	59	432

Note: The HDP did not run as a party in general elections prior to June 2015. For this reason, data is not available for the party in 2007 and 2011. Although independent candidates who were affiliated with the HDP's predecessors run in 2007 and 2011 elections, there was no candidacy ranking for these independent candidates. Thus, they are not included in this calculation.

Still, not all parties share the same strategies in the same districts while nominating their candidates. Table 6.12 shows the number of total first-time first-ranked candidates along with the electoral districts which experienced the highest number of such candidates.

Table 6.12: Total number of first-time first-ranked candidates and their distribution to electoral districts (2007-2015)

Party Name	Total Number of First-Time First-Ranked Candidates	Total Number of Electoral Districts	Highest Number of First-Time First-Ranked Candidates by Electoral Districts
AKP	80	56	Ağrı (3), Hakkari (3), Tunceli (3), Bayburt (3)
CHP	165	81	Ağrı (4), Gümüşhane (4), Hakkari (4)
MHP	117	63	Bingöl (4), Erzincan (4), Hakkari (4), Iğdır (4), Kars (4), Kırklareli (4), Mardin (4)
HDP	70	60	Ankara 2 (2), Çorum (2), Erzincan (2), Eskişehir (2), Hatay (2), Isparta (2), Kastamonu (2), Kırıkkale (2), Kütahya (2), Ordu (2)

The AKP nominated 80 first-time first-ranked candidates between 2007 and November 2015 general elections in total. 12 out of these 80 candidates were nominated in districts where the party did not get any seats in the previous elections (t-1). By selecting those candidates, the party gained 5 seats in the current (t) elections, showing that their selection of new candidates increased their chance to win seats. Although there are several districts in which the party did not win any seats and nominated such candidates (12 candidates in total in 5 elections in Ağrı, Hakkari, Iğdır, Tunceli and Şırnak), this is not as common as in other parties. In other words, AKP nominates first-time first-ranked candidates even if the party gained seats in a given district in previous elections. One reason for this strategy may be the increased competition for candidacy among those districts.

The CHP nominated 165 first-time first-ranked candidates between 2007 and November 2015 general elections in total. Out of these candidates, 92 of them were nominated in districts where the party did not win any seats in the previous elections (t-1). In 2007, 2011 and November 2015 general elections, the CHP gained 3 seats in total out of these districts. This may show that in some of these districts, the strategical selection of candidates helps to improve electoral success for this party as well.

Table 6.13: Number of MPs elected in districts in (t-1) with first time first-ranked candidates in (t)

Number of MPs Elected in (t-1)	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
0	264	61.11	61.11
1	57	13.19	74.31
2	43	9.95	84.26
3	25	5.79	90.05
4	18	4.17	94.21
5	5	1.16	95.37
6	4	0.93	96.3
7	6	1.39	97.69
8	4	0.93	98.61
9	2	0.46	99.07
10	1	0.23	99.31
13	1	0.23	99.54
14	2	0.46	100.00
Total	432	100	

Table 6.14: Number of MPs elected in districts in (t-2) with first time first-ranked candidates in (t)

Number of MPs Elected in (t-1)	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
0	313	72.45	72.45
1	43	9.95	82.41
2	30	6.94	89.35
3	21	4.86	94.21
4	8	1.85	96.06
5	6	1.39	97.45
6	4	0.93	98.38
7	3	0.69	99.07
8	1	0.23	99.31
10	1	0.23	99.54
14	1	0.23	99.77
16	1	0.23	100
Total	432	100	

Table 6.13 reveals that more than 61% of the candidates with first-time first-ranked condition were nominated in districts where political parties could not gain any seats in the previous elections (t-1). As it seen in Table 6.14, it is even higher in districts where those parties could not win any seats in two elections before (t-2) the current one. In other words, if a party cannot win any seats in a particular district, it tends to revise its candidate list in that district in the future elections and replace the first-ranked candidate with another candidate even if the latter one does not have any general election candidacy before.

Between 2007 and November 2015 general elections, almost 39% of the first-time candidates are first-time first-ranked candidates. With respect to first-time first-ranked candidates, the following hypothesis was indicated in the beginning of this chapter:

- *Hypothesis 2*: Inadequate electoral support (i.e. insufficient vote share to win seats in a particular district) for political parties increases the number of first-time first rank candidates on party lists in general elections.

The results above reveal that Hypothesis 2 is supported especially for the opposition parties. In addition to those results, a binary logistic regression analysis was run to test the Hypothesis 2. For this analysis, data on all first-ranked candidates are used. Hence, data include all first-ranked candidates from four parties regardless of their previous candidacy or legislative experience. Dependent variable of the above-mentioned analysis is binary, and it shows whether a first-ranked candidate has previous experience or not. More specifically, if one candidate is first-time first-ranked candidate (who has no prior experience) dependent variable's value is 1, if a candidate already has candidacy experience, it gets 0. Table 6.15 shows the outcome of this binary logistic regression analysis.

It seems that party votes in the previous elections (t-1) negatively affect the emergence of first-time first-ranked candidates. In other words, as the number of votes for the party in question decreases in a district, likelihood of nomination of first-time first-ranked candidates increases. Hence, Hypothesis 2 seems to be accepted under these circumstances.

Table 6.15: Binary logistic regression outcome of first-time first-ranked candidates and electoral results

	Model 1	**Model 2**
Party Votes in District (t-1)	-5.07*** (1.14)	-2.44** (1.22)
% of Party Votes in District (t-1)	-0.032*** (0.005)	-0.023*** (0.006)
Party Seats in District (t-1)	0.181*** (0.067)	0.305*** (0.070)
District Magnitude		-0.072*** (0.022)
Rate of Continuity of Favorites		-3.506*** (0.344)
Constant	0.395*** (0.103)	0.955*** (0.170)
Observation	1120	1120
Pseudo R^2	0.08	0.22

Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

One may also interpret that likelihood of nomination of the first-time first-ranked candidates are higher in small size districts by looking at how number of votes affects the emergence of such candidates. Indeed, the data demonstrate that 60.5 percent of the first-time first-ranked candidates in total were nominated in small size districts: 12 percent of those candidates were nominated in four member districts, 27.5 percent of them in three member districts and 21 percent of them in two member districts. Hence, it also shows that likelihood of nominating first-time first-ranked candidates is lower in larger districts compared to smaller ones.

Above-mentioned results also reveal the strategies of parties with regard to recruitment patterns and nomination. It seems that the parties try to increase their votes by nominating new candidates other than the ones who already run as candidates but could not contribute to bringing any seats to the party in question. As being the incumbent party, the AKP only shows 8 first-time first-ranked candidates in districts where the party could not gain any seats in the previous elections. Since the number of such cases is low for the AKP, it is not easy to justify the Hypothesis 2 for the AKP case. Yet, it seems that many of the first-time first-ranked candidates of the opposition parties were nominated in districts where those parties could not gain any seats in the previous elections. 48 percent of the CHP's first-time first-ranked candidates were nominated in districts where this party had not won any seats in the previous elections (t-1). When we analyze this for the (t-2) elections, the numbers become even higher with 63 percent. The results are even higher for the MHP as 90 percent of first-time first-ranked candidates were nominated in districts with no

gained seats in previous elections (t-1). A large number of those who were nominated as first-time first-ranked candidates in districts in which the CHP and MHP already won seats in the previous elections is publicly known figures.

Between 2002 and November 2015, the CHP won seats in 5 districts in which it did not win any seats in (t-1) elections by nominating first-time first-ranked candidates. As an extended case, the MHP won 34 seats in 28 different districts even though it could not win any seats in those districts in the previous (t-1) elections. 19 out of these newly gained seats were in 2007 General Elections. Numbers are higher than the CHP's as the MHP could not win any seats in the previous elections (2002 General Elections). This shows that their strategy to nominate those first-time first-ranked candidates worked well at least in some electoral districts.

Table 6.16: Occupational backgrounds of first-time first-ranked candidates

Occupation	Number of Candidates	Percentage of Candidates (%)
Lawyer	58	13.1
Engineer	52	12.1
Doctor, Pharmacist, Veterinarian	50	12.1
Academician	28	6.1
Self-Employed	26	6.1
Businessman	26	6.1
Manager	25	6.1
Teacher, Educator	25	6.1
Economist	15	3.0
Trade	14	3.0
Governor, Public Officer	14	3.0
Retired	9	2.0
Contractor	8	2.0
Guilds	7	2.0
Worker	6	1.0
Journalist	6	1.0
Business Manager	5	1.0
Financial Consultant	4	1.0
Unionist	4	1.0
Technician	3	1.0
Public Servant	3	1.0
Farmer	3	1.0
Others	41	9.1

Lastly, besides electoral success and gained seats in districts, public appeal seems to be an important factor for first-time first-ranked candidates. One way to measure public appeal is to analyze the occupational background of these candidates. Table 6.16 shows the distribution of occupations of first-time first-ranked candidates of all parties.

Among those occupation groups, lawyers, engineers, doctors, pharmacists, veterinarians and teachers seem to have proximity to the public and can eventually build connections with the electorate more broadly. This may increase the public appeal of the individuals with those occupational backgrounds. Moreover, businessman and self-employed individuals may be significant for parties as those people have more flexible time and certain amount of wealth to spend for party expenses and more specifically for electoral campaign processes. Hence, parties which try to increase their vote shares and win at least one seat in a district may strategically choose such individuals as their candidates. Details of these are discussed in Chapter 7 by providing more insights from interviews.

6.1.3. Candidates with Low Chance to be Elected

As explained in Chapter 4, political parties show centralized and exclusive candidate selection characteristics in which the party lists are prepared and ranked by the party headquarter members, and finalized by the leadership in Turkey. Additionally, closed-party lists which do not enable voters to reflect their preferences directly about the candidates are used in general elections. Under those circumstances, the competition among eligible candidates for candidacy positions becomes quite significant, especially with regard to candidacy ranking. One would expect that, under open-party list systems, candidacy ranks will not be determinative on the chances of candidates' electability as the electorate vote for the candidates rather than the parties as a whole; however, close-part lists yield to the opposite case. If a candidate is ranked at the very end of the party list, and if the party does not have electoral support to win all the seats in a district, that candidate's chance to be elected would be almost zero.

As mentioned in the previous section, it is not only the lower ranks on the party lists which decrease the likelihood of a candidate's electability. Candidates with the first ranks may also lose elections if their party does not have enough votes from a district to win a seat. Especially for some parties which constantly lose elections in certain districts, it is

quite hard for a candidate to be elected even if he or she is on top of the list. Hence, it does not really matter to be nominated as the first-ranked or last-ranked candidate in such districts from electorally unsuccessful parties' lists. Nevertheless, all four of the political parties nominate candidates in all electoral districts; and for all of them, there are some candidates who accept to be nominated in lower ranks, or non-electable places determined by the parties' electoral success in particular districts. Then, why do some individuals become candidates even though their electability chance is low?

Starting with the continuity in the composition of the TBMM may provide useful insights about legislative politics and political career patterns in Turkey. The data on MPs between 2002 and November 2015 general elections show that even though some experienced members of the TBMM continue to serve through multiple legislative terms, the number of newcomers seems to be higher than those. Out of 2,750 MPs served between 22nd (2002) and 26th (November 2015) legislative terms, 1,632 unique MPs appear. Table 6.17 shows those unique MPs' total number of terms spent in the TBMM. It is obvious that the group of MPs who occupied seats in the TBMM only once is the most crowded one. More than half of the total numbers of MPs (53 percent) served through 22nd to 26th legislative terms are newcomers. The second largest group consist of the MPs with two terms experience; nevertheless, there is a considerable difference even with this group and the one covering the MPs with one term experience only. Legislatively most experienced MPs are those who served in each and every term between 22nd and 26th, and there are only 7 MPs in this group. This shows that the MP turnover is high in the TBMM.

Table 6.17: Total number of MPs by served terms in the TBMM (2002-2015)

Served Terms	Total number of MPs	% of MPs
1	863	52.9
2	500	30.6
3	196	12.0
4	66	4.0
5	7	0.4
Total	**1632**	**100.0**

Note: Although there are MPs who have been serving in the TBMM prior to 2002 General Elections, this table shows only the calculation within the time frame mentioned above.

Previous studies showed that institutionalization of the TBMM has been quite low (see e.g., Kalaycıoğlu, 1990). One of the most crucial factors for that was the high turnover rate of the MPs serving the TBMM and consequently the "scarcity of senior deputies"

(Kalaycıoğlu, 1990: 215). This trait seems to be continuing in the TBMM in the recent period. In other words, the number of newcomers is higher compared to the experienced members of the TBMM as the data on 22nd to 26th legislative terms also show that continuity of the MPs with legislative experience (two terms and more) is not higher than 47 percent.

Although 2002 General Elections can be seen as a breaking point for many political parties with large electoral support through 1990s such as the DYP and ANAP, as they could not win any seats in the TBMM and almost perished electorally afterwards, not all individual MPs who served prior to 2002 were eliminated from the TBMM. Among 2750 MPs, 142 of them have served as MPs prior to 2002 (any term before 22nd Legislative Term) and had chance to have legislative positions starting from 2002.[48] Table 6.18 reveals the number of MPs who previously served in the TBMM prior to 22nd Legislative Term and appeared again between 22nd and 26th legislative terms. Although their number was higher in 22nd and 23rd legislative terms, they occupied less seats over time and reached their lowest level in the 26th Legislative Term.

Table 6.18: Number of MPs who served prior to 22nd legislative term and afterwards

Election Year	Legislative Term	Number of MPs
2002	22nd	89
2007	23rd	82
2011	24th	33
2015 (J)	25th	18
2015 (N)	26th	14

Note: Although the total number of MPs adds up to 236 in this table, there are 143 MPs in total once the duplicate names in multiple legislative terms are removed.

Analysis of the legislative term experience by parties shows that the AKP has the highest number of MPs who previously served in the TBMM prior to 22nd Term. One may think that it is interesting as the AKP was founded in 2001, and the 2002 General Elections was the first competition for this party. Nevertheless, many MPs in this group had been MPs from RP and/or FP prior to 2002. As explained in Chapter 4, the FP was formed after the closure of the RP, and identified itself as a successor of this party to a large extent. Since the AKP was founded by the modernist group that had emerged within the FP, a group of

[48] Please see Table 6.18 and note attached to that for details.

people who previously served in the FP either as legislative elite or party elite took roles in the AKP's various levels over time. Some of those individuals became members of the group of founders of the AKP, some became founder chairpersons of local party offices and others run in elections with the AKP ticket starting from 2002. Nonetheless, the number of these MPs dropped throughout the 21st Century as shown in the Table 6.19. A similar declining trend is also available for the CHP and MHP. It is not surprising to observe this decrease as many of the MPs served prior to 2002 are now quite old and may become politically less ambitious over time. Moreover, new individual politicians are competing to get positions in candidacy lists and the TBMM, thus, those previously experienced members of the TBMM may face increased competition. In addition, especially the first drop between 22nd and 23rd legislative terms seems to be related to the resignation of several MPs from the AKP and CHP.[49]

Table 6.19: Number of MPs who served both prior to 22nd Legislative Term and afterwards by parties

	Number of MPs					
Party	**22nd Term**	**23rd Term**	**24th Term**	**25th Term**	**26th Term**	**Total**
AKP	55	37	17	5	7	121
CHP	29	23	4	6	5	67
MHP	N.A.	17	9	7	2	35
HDP	2	3	3	0	0	8
Total	86	80	33	18	14	231

Note: Total number of all MPs who served prior to 22nd Legislative Term and afterwards is 236; however, there were 5 independent candidates in total who did not have any affiliation with the party groups in the TBMM when they run in elections. They are not included in this table.

The CHP has the second highest number of pre-2002 experienced MPs in the 22nd Term. It is expectable for a party with a long history in the country's politics to observe many MPs to continue to serve in the TBMM; however, the number of such politicians is not high. One reason for the low levels of continuity in MPs served prior and post 2002 era in the CHP can be that the party could not occupy any seats in the 1999 General Elections right before the 2002 Elections. The party won 8.7 percent of the votes which did not enable it to exceed the 10 percent electoral threshold. Party's votes share was not high back in 1995 General Elections as well, it won 8.9 percent of the seats in the TBMM with 10.7 percent of the votes which is slightly higher than the 10 percent threshold. Hence,

[49] A considerable number of MPs resigned from their parties during the 22nd Legislative Term. These cases and their reflections on political ambition are examined in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. Please also see the following link for more details: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/2-partiyle-basladi-7-partiyle-bitti-6657172.

the loss of electoral support and seats from 1995 to 1999 elections might have demotivated many individual politicians not to continue with the CHP in the 2002 General Elections. Moreover, the DSP which has very close stance to the CHP ideologically, led by the former leader of the CHP, Bülent Ecevit, was more successful both in the 1995 and the 1999 general elections, and some politicians formerly engaged with the CHP shifted to the DSP through that period. Although the calculations in Table 6.19 were done including all MPs served prior to 2002 regardless of their parties, the low levels of continuity of such MPs in 2002 and afterwards may also reveal that not many MPs formerly served as DSP MPs were selected as candidates in 2002 by the CHP. Even though a number of previously elected MPs were elected as CHP MPs in 2002 and 2007 general elections, there is a dramatic decline in those MPs' number in the 24th Legislative Term. Additionally, as it can be understood from the Table 6.20 below, the lowest level of continuity of the candidates of the CHP in general elections was in 2011. These may be interpreted as consequences of leadership change in the CHP.[50] After a long Baykal leadership period in the party, Kılıçdaroğlu was elected as the leader of the party on 22 May 2010.[51] That was a new era for the CHP, and there emerged many changes in the composition of party headquarters as well as the party lists in general elections. Hence, formerly elected MPs from the Baykal era seem to be eliminated from the lists in 2011 General Elections in which the CHP competed for the first time under Kılıçdaroğlu leadership. Both the continuity of the candidates and MPs show that many of the former candidates either could not make to the party lists or were nominated to unelectable positions (e.g. low ranks on the party lists or districts with small electoral base which does not enable to gain any seats).

Since the MHP could not win any seats in the 2002 General Elections, calculation is not available for it for the 22nd Legislative Term; however, especially from the 23rd to the 24th legislative terms, it shows a clear decline in the number of MPs who occupied seats in the TBMM prior to 2002.

[50] Please see the following pages for more details on party leadership change and continuity in candidate lists.

[51] For more details on the political career path of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, please see the official webpage of the CHP: https://www.chp.org.tr/ozgecmis/kemal-kilicdaroglu.

Table 6.20: Continuity in candidate nomination (2002-2015)

Party	Continuity of Candidates (%)				
	2002	2007	2011	2015 (J)	2015 (N)
AKP	15	34	27	28	54
CHP	20	21	13	20	58
MHP	29	18	22	15	44
HDP	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	43

With regard to continuity of the candidates and MPs, the following hypothesis was proposed in the beginning of this chapter:

- *Hypothesis 3a*: Party leadership change decreases the continuity of candidates in the elections following this change.[52]

Regarding the above-mentioned results, it can be argued that this hypothesis can be falsified under certain conditions only. In other words, the process and characteristics of leadership change plays an important role in continuity of the candidates. If the newly elected leader of a party is personally close to the former leader, and/or if the heritage of the former leader is still influencing the party, no considerable or dramatic changes occur in the continuity of the candidates and eventually the MPs. For example, leadership change in the CHP seems to lower the continuity of candidates from 2002 to 2011, whereas no dramatic continuity drop is observable in the AKP from 2011 to 2015, through which the AKP faced a leadership change as Erdoğan was elected as President of Turkey in 2014 and leave his party leader position to Davutoğlu.[53] However, if the new party leader does not show that much of a proximity to the former leader of the party, both candidate list and consequently the MPs may be modified under this new leadership. Hence, it seems that not all leadership changes yield to a sizeable revision of the candidate lists or the composition of party group in the TBMM. Under some circumstances the usual levels of continuity may continue.

Continuity of candidates on party lists gives clues about the career patterns of the MPs. Lower levels of continuity mean that many of the MPs do not stay in their offices for long

[52] The null hypothesis is as follows:
$H1c_0$: Party leadership change has no effect on the continuity of candidates in the elections following this change.

[53] Please see the following link for more details: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ahmet-davutoglu-genel-baskan-secildi-27088866.

periods. If one MP is not nominated in the next set of elections, it is a clear indication that his or her legislative career ends at least for that term. Of course, such individuals may be nominated in another election, yet it still creates a break in their national level political careers.

Nevertheless, although the continuity in candidate lists is not very high, a group of MPs still continues to appear on the candidate lists in multiple elections. Hence, with regard to continuity of the candidates, reshuffles in the candidate lists are also noteworthy to analyze. Although some candidates run in multiple elections, their list rankings may change from one election to another, and such alternation in candidate rankings provides useful insights about career mobility of the legislative elites. Table 6.21 shows the candidate ranking change in consecutive general elections through 2002 and November 2015 in Turkey.[54]

Table 6.21: Candidate ranking change in consecutive general elections (2002-2015)

Candidate Ranking Change	Frequency	Percent (%)	Cumulative
-11	1	0.09	0.09
-10	2	0.17	0.26
-9	1	0.09	0.35
-8	2	0.17	0.52
-7	4	0.35	0.87
-6	4	0.35	1.22
-5	10	0.87	2.10
-4	17	1.49	3.59
-3	22	1.92	5.51
-2	61	5.34	10.85
-1	116	10.15	21.00
0	657	57.48	78.48
1	129	11.29	89.76
2	61	5.34	95.10
3	24	2.10	97.20
4	14	1.22	98.43
5	8	0.70	99.13
6	2	0.17	99.30
7	3	0.26	99.56
8	2	0.17	99.74
9	1	0.09	99.83
11	1	0.09	99.91
20	1	0.09	100.00
Total	**1143**	**100.00**	

Note: Candidates running in different districts in consecutive elections, and independent candidates are not included in the calculation.

[54] As the latest general elections is November 2015 General Elections included in the dataset, candidate ranking change is not calculated for the MPs who were selected in November 2015 General Elections and nominated as candidates in the next elections (June 2018).

Although no change occurred in the nomination rankings of over 57 percent of the MPs who were nominated in consecutive elections between 2002 and November 2015, there is still a significant number of MPs whose rankings have changed over time. Table 6.21 shows the frequency of ranking changes, i.e. how many MPs' rank changed with the specific number shown in the table. Candidate ranking change is calculated by subtracting the candidacy rank in current elections (t) from the candidacy rank in next elections (t+1). Negative results in the table mean that MPs climbed towards to top on the candidacy lists. In other words, they are better off with regard to their rankings. Positive results, on the other hand, mean that the MPs are given lower level ranks on the lists in current elections (t) even though they were nominated on the higher ranks in the previous elections (t-1).

Even though the numbers are not high, several MPs have jumped directly to the top of the candidate lists, while some others had to lose their positions in top ranks. There is even one MP who fell back by 20 ranks from one election to another (CHP candidate in İstanbul District 1 from 2011 to June 2015 elections). This MP was ranked second in 2011 General Elections and elected as an MP; however, nominated as 22nd in June 2015 General Elections. Back in that time, the CHP won 11 seats from İstanbul 1 in 2011, and regarding this fact, nominating the MP on 22nd rank was clearly placing him in a rank which is not likely to be elected. Not surprisingly, that individual was not elected in June 2015 General Elections as the CHP won 11 seats from that district again. As an opposite case, several MPs were granted by much better ranks on party lists compared to their previous ranks. For example, an MP from the AKP was nominated as the 13th candidate in 2002 in İstanbul District 2, then this individual jumped to 3rd rank in 2007 and to the 1st rank in 2011 General Elections. This illustrates a clear upward mobility on the candidate list for this MP. Another MP from the AKP had even a higher leap by being nominated as the 4th rank candidate in İstanbul District 1 while previously occupying 15th rank in the same district in 2011.

Graph 6.9: Change in candidacy from one election to another



Nonetheless, the number of MPs being rewarded or punished in such wide ranges is not high. As it can be understood from the Table 6.21, almost 79 percent of 1,143 MPs either did not experience a change in their ranks at all or moved only by 1 point upwards or downwards.

Graph 6.9 shows that most changes in candidacy happen in the first 5 or 6 ranks on candidate lists. Since there are not many electoral districts with more than 14 seats, it is expected that the graph will be skewed to the right. Inferring from above mentioned revisions and re-shuffles on candidate lists, high turnover rate in the TBMM may give a signal to individuals who would like to become MPs that the TBMM is open to newcomers as not many seats are constantly occupied by more experienced MPs. In other words, these individuals may interpret that parties tend to nominate legislatively unexperienced candidates as well as the experienced ones. Hence, a broad change in the composition of the TBMM is possible, and they themselves can have a seat in the legislature. This may make individuals to invest more in candidacy process. Even if they do not have chance to be elected by their initial candidate rankings, they may still believe that possibility of being nominated in upper ranks in the future is still prevalent. Moreover, it is also possible to observe that some candidates are nominated in different districts in different elections which may also increase their likelihood of being elected.

Figures 6.3 and 6.4 depict some examples on the re-shuffles on candidate lists in electoral districts of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. The reason to select these districts as cases is that

these three cities have the largest district magnitudes and hence the longest candidate lists. Examining the alternation within those lists is important to see how lower ranked candidates may become higher ranked candidates over time.

Figure 6.3: Alternation in candidacy lists (from June 2015 to November 2015)*



*Since the HDP did not compete in general elections as a party prior to June 2015, the favourite candidate category could not be applied to this party. Hence, "candidate in previous elections, favourite" category is not observable in the graph, and all previously nominated candidates are included in "candidate in previous elections, not favourite".

Figure 6.4: Alternation in candidacy lists (from 2011 to June 2015)



Figures 6.3 and 6.4 present the alternation within the party lists in general elections. It is evident that the composition of those lists may dramatically change in consecutive elections. This may happen in three ways: First, new candidates may be included in the lists; second, existing candidates may be reshuffled within the list; third, the amalgamation of these two. We usually observe the amalgamation of the first two possibilities especially in districts with large magnitudes such as İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir.

With regard to the candidates who have low chances to be elected, the following hypothesis was indicated in the beginning of this chapter:

- *Hypothesis 3b*: Candidates who accept to be ranked in non-electable positions expect to push their ranks to electable positions over time or rewarded by other positions in the party.

Inferring from the revisions of the lists, one may argue that the individuals who compromise to be nominated from non-electable positions expect to improve their standings on the party lists through time. From the perspective of political ambition theories, such individuals may be identified as possessing progressive ambition as they still aim for the higher positions.

As explained in the previous pages, candidacy ranking matters a lot for the electability chance of individuals in closed-party lists systems. Under those circumstances, politicians with progressive ambition (who would like to start their legislative career) or static ambition (who already started legislative career and would like to continue) try to compete for better candidacy ranks. Thus, such desires derive those individuals to push for increasing their candidacy rank. Nevertheless, an opposing case was also mentioned that candidacy ranking in general elections is not important for many individuals in some parties. Hence progressive ambition may not make those politicians to compete with other candidates to a large extent. For example,

> "I was a candidate both in June 2015 and November 2015 General Elections on lower ranks of the lists. However, being nominated as a lower ranked candidate did not bother me. We may accept to be candidates even if we know that our chance is quite low."[55]

Nevertheless, there may be other goals of those individuals. Some interviewees highlighted that being a candidate is not necessarily about winning the elections and getting seats in the TBMM. Candidacy may mean other valuable positions as well. This provides important clues about investing in politics: Accepting to become candidate in an unelectable position may be not only related to a political goal but also an economic goal, gaining public prominence and public attention. Hence, even being selected by a political party as a candidate means a lot for many individual politicians especially if intraparty competition is high in a party. Even if that candidate is nominated in non-electable positions, it is still signaling that this individual may eliminate others in candidacy process and may be regarded as more qualified and valuable by the party and the electorate. This makes that individual to be better recognized both in the electoral district and the party

[55] Interview with local party chairperson of the HDP in İstanbul, 11.11.2016.

organization. Hence, by the help of nomination process, perceptions about an individual political may change in favor of that person. In other words, more people may realize that this person is in a smaller political elite group which contains the ones with the likelihood of being selected and elected. This recognition may also ease the networking process of this individual both in the district and party, and possible connections may enable him or her to constitute ties with other groups. For example, as an interviewee explained, if this person has his or her private occupation, more opportunities may appear with the candidacy of that individual.

6.2. Concluding Remarks

Previously, it was argued that "If we ascend the political hierarchy, from the voters upwards, we find that at each level - the membership of political parties, party activists, local political leaders, MPs, National Leaders - the social character of the group is slightly less 'representative' and slightly more tilted in favour of those who belong to the middle and upper reaches of our society." (Guttsman, 1968). Indeed, other studies also represented similar findings: "…members of the British House of Commons are demographically unrepresentative of the British population in terms of gender, race, education and class." (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 373). Regarding the results of analyzed data in this Dissertation, similar arguments can be made especially in terms of age, gender, education and occupation. More specifically, the overall composition of the TBMM between 2002 and 2015 seem to be crowded by middle aged men with particular professions such as lawyers, engineers and businessmen.

Nevertheless, the data also provide some variance among the parties with regard to their MPs. While the parties do not show significant differences with regard to age, localism, education level and occupational backgrounds, there are noteworthy differences between parties in terms of their MPs educational backgrounds rather than the levels, foreign language knowledge and gender distribution. Above-mentioned results revealed that political parties' ideological stances do make an impact on their MPs composition. Hence, political party ideologies may be regarded as a determinative factor effecting the elite recruitment and candidate selection processes of parties in Turkey.

In addition, pre-parliamentary political experience in the form of local and national level political party experience increases the likelihood of MPs re-nomination in future set of elections. Similarly, specific forms of legislative experience seem to have positive effects on re-nomination chances: If MPs have ministerial posts, they seem to be more likely to be re-nominated by their parties. However, it seems that another variable on legislative experience, namely total served terms in the National Assembly, lowers the chance of an MP to be re-selected as a candidate in future elections.

Political party selectorates may also choose those who had no experience in general elections as their candidates. Even so, they nominate some of them as their first-ranked candidates on their party lists in general elections. Data revealed that such candidates are strategically selected by political parties especially in districts where they do not have large swaths of supporters. That is to say, it seems that political parties tend to prefer revising their candidates lists, especially the first ranks if they could not win any seat in a particular district. In fact, by such strategies, some political parties won seats in districts where they previously received no significant success. Hence, one may infer from those findings that, revisions on party lists may provide better electoral opportunities for political parties.

Related to the above-mentioned explanations, data also showed that continuity on candidate lists are not very high in the country. This practice seems to be an opportunity for those who were nominated in unwinnable places or ranks. In other words, revisions and reshuffles on candidate lists may enable individuals who were previously nominated as lower ranked candidates to occupy higher and electable ranks in future elections. More insights about this argument is available in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 7

VARIANCE AND ALTERNATION IN ELITE RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL AMBITION IN TURKEY

"In virtually all societies, no matter what the system of stratification, people from specific social backgrounds acquire a greater share of political power than do others. That is, the possession of certain attributes can yield decisive advantage (or disadvantage) in the pursuit of power." hence, "social conditions of rule" matter for occupying certain political positions and acquiring power in general (Smith, 1976: 65). Nevertheless, composition of political elite and political career patterns in a country may change over time. Social change and expanded social mobility can be identified as one of the most important reason of such alternation in the socioeconomic backgrounds of political elite. Many countries went through increased social mobility and urbanization with the effects of industrialization and developments in economy:

> "The disintegration of the traditional social and political structures in the nineteenth century and accelerated economic development in the form of industrialization and political independence, aided by high birth rates and low mortality after World War II, have caused a vast movement of rural migrants into cities in the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and South America." (Karpat, 1976: 2).

In Mexico, for example,

> "…the Revolution sharply expanded the range and frequency of social mobility. […] it is argued, the political system became open to people of talent, at least on a relative scale, and an even-larger share of the population has been able to aspire to (if not attain) political office. In other words, the social conditions of rule have been relaxed; the passports to power have become less restrictive than before." (Smith, 1979: 65).

Starting especially from 1950s onwards, social mobilization expanded in Turkey as well: migration from rural to urban areas increased, migrant receiving cities became more heterogeneous with regard to social composition, and more complex structures emerged (see e.g., Karpat, 1976, Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). Such changes also brought alternation to the composition of political elite as well as emergence of new political parties and developing alternative relationships with the electorate in the country.

It would be easier to expect and observe a small group of people who embark on political career when politicians are from similar and exclusive backgrounds. However, with social, economic and political changes comes a higher level of social mobility, and political arena becomes more open to individuals who desire to become politicians from different backgrounds. For example, many citizens would identify a specific type of an MP of the TBMM prior to 1960s in Turkey. Öymen (2009: 20-21) highlights that in the 1950s, people would think of an MP who resembles the MPs such as Fevzi Paşa, Rauf Bey, Fethi Bey, İsmet Paşa and Celal Bayar who served during Atatürk's Presidency, or Celal Bayar, Refik Saydam, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Recep Peker, Hasan Saka and Şemsettin Günaltan who served under İsmet İnönü's Presidency, or Adnan Menderes who served under Celal Bayar's Presidency up until that day. According to Öymen, many of these MP's, especially those served in the early periods of Republican Era, had military backgrounds: Celal Bayar was not a soldier, yet he had important tasks at the beginning of *Milli Mücadele*, and Saydam was also an officer, but also a medical doctor. Other MPs with civilian backgrounds showed a common characteristic which is serving as deputies for ten, fifteen years or occupied other political offices for a long period of time. Thus, all of those MPs were politically or militarily experienced. Öymen continues that common educational backgrounds of those MPs were economy, history or law. Until Demirel, who entered politics in 1962 with the AP and became an MP in 1965 and then PM, there was no PM who had an engineering background or something similar. Indeed, no engineer had the chance to become a PM or President of the country back in that time as the highest level in politics for engineers were ministerial positions. Also, their number was limited and not many ministers had engineering backgrounds. A bureaucrat-engineer becoming an MP (Demirel) changed this picture and opened the way of politics for engineer-politicians such as Turgut Özal and Necmettin Erbakan for the future (Öymen, 2009: 21). Similarly, Frey (1975: 54) underlined that "officials" such as "military men, bureaucrats, and teachers, all agents of the state" composed the largest groups in the

National Assembly during single party era while the "professionals" which are "doctors, engineers and especially lawyers" turned to be the largest profession groups in the multiparty era in Turkey. Moreover, another occupational group related to economic professions such as "businessmen, merchants, traders, bankers, and a few agriculturists, also improved its position slightly in this period." (Frey, 1975: 54). Hence, the composition of the TBMM had some clear changes over time.

For example, as explained in the Chapter 6 of this dissertation, composition of educational backgrounds, occupations, gender distribution and foreign language knowledge of the MPs also changed over time in Turkey: Although the change was not largely about the level of education as considerably large group of MPs is still composed of university graduates, backgrounds of educational institutions show more variety today. Additionally, although many MPs had military backgrounds with regard to their professions in the first period of the Republican era, then there emerged more MPs with engineering backgrounds and today some professional groups such as lawyers, engineers and businessmen are more crowded in the National Assembly. Moreover, percentage of female MPs increased over time, even though it is not sufficient to close the gender gap; and more MPs who speak Kurdish won seats in the TBMM through 2010s. Hence, more diverse groups of MPs emerged which are clearly different from the past composition of the TBMM.

Those changes provide important clues about the change in elite recruitment and political ambition of individuals in the country. Expansion of opportunities to run for office made more individuals to try their chances in political career. The following sections provide examination of career patterns of political elite in Turkey with specific references to various political ambition theories. Additionally, recruitment patterns and variance among parties are also discussed in these sections. Previous chapter focused on the elite recruitment patters by analyzing the determinants of recruitment patters, composition of MPs in the TBMM and alternation within it over time. In addition to those, this chapter (Chapter 7) provides more personal insights about political ambition to better understand political career choices of individual and political career patterns in the country in general.[56] In order to grasp political ambition types and political career prospects of

[56] In order to better examine political ambition, several scholars conduct surveys with the MPs and other politicians especially by asking whether they are planning to be candidates in elections in the future, aiming for other offices or exiting politics completely. Another way could be analyzing the candidate nominees or applicants lists before being selected or eliminated by the parties to see who continues to be candidate nominees or who decide to drop out.

political actors, a series of in-depth interviews with 23 local party actors from İstanbul, Antalya, Adana, Kayseri and Denizli in Turkey were conducted. The reason to conduct those interviews is that those who are most knowledgeable about the power structure and organizational dynamics of parties are the experienced party members and activists (Duverger, 1964). Hence, these interviews provide complementary information about political ambitions and recruitment patters of parties to further explain career patterns in addition to the analyses in the Chapter 6.

7.1. Political Ambition and Political Careers in Turkey

Being a politician requires significant amount of dedication in any level of political offices from local party branches to legislative ones. Thus, generally, many politicians underline the difficulties of embarking on political career: "When asked what advice they would give those considering a political career, many MPs stressed the life was not for everybody; hard work, time, energy and dedication were essential." (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 380). Similar arguments were provided by many of the interviewed party elite for this dissertation as well. Even though interviewees are not the MPs but local party actors such as local party chairs, women branch chairs and members, it still requires a huge amount of hard work. For example, some local party offices have time schedules to make sure that there will be at least one member in the party office during daytime. Not all parties seem to open their local offices each and every day in the country, but they are usually open six days a week. Hence, local party actors need to spend time in those offices to meet their visitors, citizens with demands and other members of the parties even if they also work for the party outside the office. Especially female interviewees emphasized that it is not easy to pursue a political career goal since one needs to spend long hours in party work and face difficulties with spending time with their children and family. Nonetheless, this is applicable not only for women but also men who need to stay at party offices or attend other meetings or occasions during day and night[57]. It is emphasized that:

Although the data have certain limitation since the pool of all candidate nominees are not available in this dissertation, it is still possible to interpret important insights from the candidate data compiled from the official candidate lists of four political parties, and the compiled dataset on the MPs.

[57] Several interviewees indicated that they need to spend time for the party even at night if there is an election campaign, or if it is election day as they stay around the ballot boxes during the election and till the ballots are carried

> "Dedication and self-devotion are very important in politics. For example, we spend a considerable amount of time for the party and sometimes we cannot even meet our relatives for a long period of time."[58]

Moreover, during specific periods, such as election campaigns, workload increases for many of those party elite as they need to organize meetings, home visits or other types of constituency visits. They usually have face to face meetings with the electorate both in party offices and in other places as well. Hence, one interviewee mentioned that they have important duties as being local party executive committee members,

> "If we occupy a position in a political party in any level, we need to regard this as a duty. I mean, our responsibilities start at the point where we accept to fulfil the requirements of our office. We act with a state of mind to fulfil our responsibilities in that regard."[59]

Not only effort and time, but also spending money for the expenses of the party seems to be a common thing to consider for many party members. For example, one interviewee underlined that:

> "If you would like to be an executive committee member in the local party branch, you should have time and money to spend for the party. Moreover, you should be able to attend to all meetings in the party."[60]

Similarly,

> "You should spend time both in the party office and outside to meet constituency. We work hard especially during election campaigns periods. We visit many public places such as city bazaar, households, talk to people by door to door visits, open stands to inform people about our party and so on…"[61]

Thus, those who would like to embark on a political career need to have a certain level of motivation and attributes to fulfil such requirements. The following subsections provide insights about such motivations and political derives of individuals.

Nevertheless, before going into details of political ambition and career choices of individuals, it may be helpful to have a framework for possible political career paths in

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to official electoral office. Similarly, during the month of Ramadan, parties organize *iftar* and *sahur* programs during which many party members spend their time during night for the party work to meet citizens.

[58] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Pamukkale, Denizli, 26.08.2016.

[59] Interview with local party executive committee member of the AKP, Ümraniye, İstanbul, 22.07.2014.

[60] Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Kayseri, in 21.10.2016.

[61] Interview with local women branch chair of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016.

Turkey. Career patterns may show difference from one country to another depending on the administrative system, government type or structural organizations of political parties. For example, federal systems may yield different possibilities for political elite compared to unitary systems as different levels of political offices may occur, or various types of offices may be available to be elected or appointed for politicians which may not be available in unitary systems, or vice versa. Moreover, political party structures may be affected by such differences which may produce varying elite recruitment patterns and eventually provide different paths for respective politicians. Not all countries have similarly structured political parties within themselves. If party organizations are not strictly regulated legally, parties may adopt different strategies to organize; however, if laws detailly regulate the parties, then the structures would resemble to each other.

In addition to elite recruitment strategies of political parties, political ambition of individuals influences the political career patterns. Table 7.1 below shows possible political career choices and paths of individual politicians in Turkey.

Table 7.1: Possible political career choices under different political ambition types

Static Ambition	**Progressive Ambition**	**Discrete Ambition**	**Intra-institutional Ambition**	**Dynamic Ambition**	**Regressive Ambition**
Seeking for re-election to the same position	Seeking for higher office	Seeking for retirement, Exiting politics, Resignation	Seeking for higher office within the party	Not having a linear line of political career	Seeking for a lower office
Any elective office (t) → same elective office (t+1) E.g.: MP (t) → MP (t+1) Mayor (t) → Mayor (t+1) Municipal council member (t) → municipal council member (t+1) Party position (t) → same party position (t+1)*	Any non-political office (t) → any political office (t+1)** Mayor (t) → MP (t+1) Local Party Member (t) → MP (t+1) CSO Member (t) → MP (t+1)	MP (t) → no political office (t+1) Party member (t) → no political office (t+1) Mayor (t) → no political office (t+1) Municipal council member (t) → no political office (t+1)	Local Party Member (t) → Party Headquarter Member (t+1) Party Headquarter Member (t) → Party Leader (t+1)	Any political position (t) → any political position (t+1) → any political position (t+2)…	MP (t) → Mayor (t+1) MP (t) → Party HQ member (t+1) MP (t) → Local Party Member (t+1) Minister (t) → MP (t+1)

*Static ambition is usually used to define the decision of seeking re-election. But this category in the table does not only include elective offices. Party offices which requires selection, appointment or election by members are also included here and in the following sections.

**This shows the initial decision of starting a political career. It can also be defined as nascent political ambition as proposed by Fox and Lawless (2005) especially for deciding to seek elective office. Nevertheless, the type in this table does not only include career decisions about elective offices but also party offices.

Although there can be other types of political paths, this table provides most common career choices. The possibilities are grouped under specific political ambition categories which are previously explained in the Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

Turkey provides a case in which all political parties share the same organizational structure regulated by the SPK as explained in detail in Chapter 4. As a reminder, Article 1 and Article 2 of this law reveal that the SPK covers the provisions for the foundation, organization, activities, mission, authority and responsibilities, property acquisition, income and expenses, auditing, dissolution and closure of the political parties.[62] Besides the regulations on these topics, the SPK proposes a common and binding organizational form/method for all the parties, meaning that no party may found another organizational structure which is not in accordance with this law. This organizational method is in line with the administrative organization of Turkey, and consequently, the organizational structures of the Turkish political parties are very similar to each other due to the regulations of the SPK (Bektaş, 1993: 39; Erdem, 2001: 85). This eases the comparison of those parties with regard to recruitment patterns.

With regard to political ambition, the following questions have been some important ones to answer: "Why do individuals enter politics?" "What motivates individuals to stay in politics?" or "When do individuals seek higher political offices?" Previous chapters provided review of research and theories on these topics. When we ask such questions to the local party chairs and members in Turkey, they usually indicate that they entered politics due to several deriving factors, by the influence of their friends or families, or by invitation from the parties. Hence, the reasons making individuals to be active politicians vary, yet commonalities also in the scene. The following sections explain those influential factors and career decisions of politicians more in detail.

7.1.1. Interest, Motivation and Entering Politics in Turkey

Becoming a politician is defined as the highest level and ultimate act of political participation (Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2011). Even though not all levels of political

[62] SPK, Article 2 – (Amended: 12/8/1999 - 4445/1): [Bu Kanun, siyasi partilerin kurulmaları, teşkilatlanmaları, faaliyetleri, görev, yetki ve sorumlulukları, mal edinimleri ile gelir ve giderleri, denetlenmeleri kapanma ve kapatılmalarıyla ilgili hükümleri kapsar.] Retrieved from: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2820.pdf.

offices have the same salience or opportunities for individuals, politicians in any level may be regarded under such type of a political participation. For example, although becoming an MP, PM or President of the country are top levels of political careers, becoming a local party chair may also be regarded as one of the highest levels of political participation for some people. Hence, regardless of the office, becoming an active politician can be defined as the highest level of political participation, and such a decision requires intense motivation. Motivations deriving individuals to decide to become politicians are identified on the supply-side explanation of political recruitment, but demand-side cannot be ignored while studying the determinants of decisions to enter politics:

> "In practice supply-side and demand-side factors interact. Perceived prejudice by party activists, complex application procedures, or anticipated failure, may discourage potential candidates from coming forward. The concept of hidden unemployment ('Why apply? I won't get the job') is a perfect analogy for the 'discouraged political aspirant'. […] Nevertheless, despite these qualifications, there remains an important distinction between the factors holding individuals back from applying for a position ('I'm not interested', 'I don't have the right experience', 'I can't afford to move') and the factors which mean that, if they apply, they are not accepted by selectors ('He's not locally known', 'She's not got the right speaking skills', 'He would not prove popular with voters'). The supply-side and demand-side distinction therefore provides a useful analytical framework to explore alternative explanations." (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 381).

What derives individuals to enter politics in Turkey? This question is not only about those who run in elections and become MPs or mayors but also about whether party elite working in local levels want to stay in their current position or climb the political career ladders. Do those individuals think that they themselves can gain another (preferably higher) position, or the party's higher authorities enable them to do so? Answers gathered from the interviews generally reveal that the discretion of higher-level party authorities matter a lot for the career decisions and path of the local party members. Hence, even if they have specified goals, they may be waiting for the decisions of the higher rank party officials. For instance, even if a person wants to be a candidate for local party chair, he or she may decide not to do so if they do not believe that the party headquarters will not support this candidacy. Such cases are similar to what Norris and Lovenduski (1993) mentioned as "discouraged political aspirant". One may argue that such feelings may be more commonly seen under exclusive candidate selection methods of political parties in which small and exclusive groups of selectorate will have the final decision about

candidate selection. Nevertheless, political careers are still not solely about the discretion of the party leadership or exclusive selectorate. Motivations and ambitions of individuals should also be taken into consideration.

To start with, about the initial decisions of individuals to enter politics (nascent political ambition) one may argue that individuals may be influenced by their families and/or friends in developing their political selves, and political stance of those individuals may eventually resemble to their parents' or friends' political views. For instance, Kalaycıoğlu (2010) underlined the parental party identification's impact on children. In a similar vein, other studies also showed fathers' influence on party elites' ideological stance and attendance to politics (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010).

Interviews conducted for this Dissertation unearth similar patterns for party elite. It seems that one of the most significant leading factors to start a political career, especially for the members of parties with long history such as the CHP and MHP, is socialization in the family. In other words, either their parents' ideological stance or party experience have an effect on the development of nascent political ambition. For example, one interviewee explained that,

> "My family has been supporting the CHP for long years. My granddad even got telegraphs from İsmet İnönü during his lifetime. Our lifestyle, worldview and idea of freedom were in line with the CHP's ideology. I became a supporter of the party with the influence of these. I became a member of the party in 1974, and started to work more actively after I retired from my job."[63]

Similarly, another interviewee underlined the impact of his father's (who formerly served as the district branch chairperson in the same party) political past on his decision to enter politics:

> "I believe that my motivation to enter politics is somewhat a genetic thing. My father has been in politics for many years, so I guess it was very influential for me. Of course, as a secondary factor, I was influenced by my desire to provide some useful services for the society. Others who do not have any other politicians in their families also become politicians, and I think they are motivated by their intention to provide something to the society as well."[64]

Many other party actors in the CHP gave similar answers about their motivation to start political careers. It seems that families' influence is not only about political party

[63] Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Kayseri, in 21.10.2016.

[64] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in İstanbul, Ümraniye, 17.07.2014.

membership, but also about participation to civil society organizations. For example, one said that,

> "I have been supporting the CHP since my childhood. My family identifies itself with the party. I have been interested in politics for many years, and for instance, back in my workplace and I was affiliated with labor unions."[65]

Similarly, another CHP party actor mentioned that his father was a supporter of Ecevit (*Ecevitçi*), and he had a left-wing past just as his father.[66] In addition to parents' influence, spouses may also influence each other with regard to become party members and politicians. Some interviewees mentioned that from time to time, spouses work for the same party as well.

Quite similar answers were given by the MHP party actors with regard to their families' influence on their motivation to start their political career. Since this party also have relatively longer history, parents of some of the current political elite were also identifying themselves with the MHP,

> "My family was the major factor for me to be a part of this party. I have a quite nationalist and *ülkücü* family. Rather than influenced by my friends, it was my family members. Actually, I have always been interested in politics."[67]

Just like they were influenced by their families, it was also indicated that they wish their children to be politically active, and one interviewee mentioned that her son also became a member of the MHP. Again from the MHP, another party actor mentioned that:

> "My father was an *ülkücü* and nationalist. He had been in the party organization previously, and he was sharing his experiences with me. I was not a member of *ülkü ocakları* but started my party career as a member of the MHP district branch."[68]

Both the CHP and MHP have been in Turkish political history for long years. Hence, it is possible for members of those parties to have parents or other relatives who formerly served for those parties, or had close ideological proximity to them. Compared to these two parties, foundation periods of the AKP and the HDP are more recent. Nevertheless,

[65] Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016.

[66] Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Acıpayam, Denizli, 26.08.2016.

[67] Interview with local women branch chairperson of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016.

[68] Interview with local women branch executive committee member of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016.

since both the AKP and the HDP had roots in the past and had their predecessor parties, several interviewees from those parties also indicated similar influence. Additionally, some also indicated that even if their parents were not politically active, they have been interested in politics since their childhood:

> "I am a member of a nationalist and conservative family. My father was not politically active, but I have been interested in politics starting from my primary school years. For example, once I answered our teacher's question about our plans when we grow up by saying that I would like to be a politician in the future."[69]

Nevertheless, not all politicians indicated that they started their political career early on. For example,

> "I started my political life with the AKP. Previously, I was elected to chairperson position of chamber of commerce in our district, and the idea of providing services to our district started back then. I thought that I owe to this city and should provide good services to that. Thus, I started to serve in chamber of commerce and after that I affiliated with the AKP to start my political life. But I did not have any prior political career."[70]

Still, interest in politics during childhood seems to be a rather common characteristic for many of the party members. In addition to the above-mentioned answers, an interviewee from the HDP mentioned that,

> "My father was a socialist and he was a member of TİP. I started to be interested in politics when I was in secondary school (*orta okul*), and I have been in various socialist parties."[71]

Besides the influence of family and political activity of parents, suggestions and influence coming from friends and party actors also motive individuals to enter politics. For example,

> "I entered politics in 1997 when I did not have any intention to do so. I was running a company where I hired 700-800 workers, became one of the highest tax payers in the district, had a bright economic future and many plans about my occupation. However, I was also familiar with the problems, difficulties and despair in the district which made people to had hard times. Back in 1997, members of the ANAP asked me to enter politics with the ticket of their party.

[69] Interview with local party chairperson of the AKP in Merkezefendi, Denizli, 27.08.2016.

[70] Interview with local party chairperson of the AKP in Alanya, Antalya, 24.07.2014.

[71] Interview with local party chairperson of the HDP in İstanbul, 11.11.2016.

> At first, I did not have such an intention to enter politics. However, they insisted. Hence, I started my political career with such a request."[72]

Thus, invitation by parties may also motivate individuals to start their political career. This may derive some people to actively participate in politics even though they did not have intentions before. A very similar story was told by another interviewee with regard to the beginning of his political career:

> "I started my political career as a local branch chairperson as I was asked by the party to run for that office. I have worked at public office for long years. Through my service, I visited many villages, and other parts of the city. I had interactions with many citizens, and we became familiar with each other. So, I became a person who is known by many residents of our district. I became a member of the party after my retirement, and then party members in the city invited me to run for district branch chair indicating that my experience with my occupation might create good opportunities both for me and the party. At first, I was not sure whether I can handle this, but eventually I decided to run for this office, and I won the race."[73]

Some individuals might need to consider their entrance to politics in greater detail. Even though they have required qualifications, motivation and even invitation from parties, they may opt out. The reason for such decisions was usually indicated by women, or about women and youth. First of all, the following quote reveals the possible problems that a woman may face in politics:

> "I believe that having women in politics is very vital. The attitude of the ones who occupy managerial positions matters with regard to gender issue. The number of women members is lower than men in our provincial branch, but we are trying to take attention to the importance of having more female members. It is not easy for a woman to be actively working in a party. No one told me to enter to politics, but after I decided to do so, my family supported me. It is very helpful and important for women to get the support of their spouses and families. I have a child and I do not want her to be apolitical. If my child wants to enter politics, I would support her."[74]

In order to tackle the difficulties and problems that women encounter in terms of political career, several party actors mentioned that they are trying to encourage women to participate more. Hence, they underlined the opportunities and encouragement provided by the parties:

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[72] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in İstanbul, Tuzla, 06.07.2014.

[73] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Denizli, Acıpayam, 26.08.2016.

[74] Interview with local women branch chairperson of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016.

> "We are in favor of full gender equality in the party and have gender quota to realize that goal. Moreover, we implement 20 percent youth quota to increase their chances of participation."[75]

Nevertheless, not only women but also young individuals seem to have concerns with regard to their entrance in politics. Many local party members underlined the importance of having young members in the parties, and indicated that starting from bottom as a young person and developing a political career with experiences in various levels of the party is valuable. Nevertheless, it was indicated by some interviewees that even though their local party branches have a number of women and young members, those who spend most of their times at the party office are mostly the middle aged men or retired people.[76] It seems that especially those who consider to be active members of the opposition parties feel that being affiliated with those parties may negatively affect their future with regard to finding jobs or staying in their current jobs. For example, it was mentioned that,

> "I did not start my political career from bottom, but of course it is a precious thing to start from the bottom and climb the ladders to top by gaining experience. This way you would have broad range of insights about politics. For example, it is very important for a young individual to start from the youth branch and aim for higher offices later. However, we do not have many young members nowadays. Because some of them mention their concerns about being members of an opposition party."[77]

Nonetheless, participation of women and youth shows diversity from one local branch in one district or province to another, even within same party. In other words, depending on geographical stance and demographical characteristics of the cities, the number of women and youngsters actively working for the parties change. For example, it seems that while it is not so easy to have female and young members in Sultanbeyli for the CHP, it is more likely to have more members in Kadıköy for this party.

Besides above-mentioned concerns, which may hinder individuals from entering politics, there may be other constraints such as legal regulations. One can also regard this as the lack of opportunity to start political career. According to the SPK, every Turkish citizen who is at least 18 years old and who has competence to use civil and political rights can become members of political parties in Turkey. However, there are certain limitations to that regulation. For example, public servants are not permitted to become party

[75] Interview with local party chairperson of the HDP in İstanbul, Mecidiyeköy, 11.11.2016.

[76] Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Kayseri, in 21.10.2016. Also, interview with local party chair of the CHP in İstanbul, Sultanbeyli, in 17.07.2014.

[77] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Denizli, Acıpayam, 26.08.2016.

members.[78] Hence, even if a public servant has political ambition he or she needs to wait until retirement or resignation from office before this individual becomes a card-carrying party member. Some interviewees mentioned this while explaining their entrance into politics:

> "While I was a university student, I thought that the CHP was the closest party to my ideological stance. However, I could not become a member of the party since I was a public servant. Hence, I became a member of the party after my retirement."[79]

Still, as it can be inferred from this answer, this individual did not lose his political ambition for several decades, and realized his goal eventually.

Above mentioned motivations are very important for the initial phase of becoming politicians. Moreover, one may argue that political ambition may continue to exist even if the opportunities are not yet provided to start a political career, as illustrated above. Nevertheless, one may still have difficulties to fulfil his or her political career aim even if such motivations derive that person. The reason for that is, along with motives and opportunities, there should be one more thing for realizing their political participation as a political party actor: resources. Although social mobility increased, and political offices became attractive to larger groups of people, and although the composition of legislative elite changed over time in the country, one thing still continues to be a differentiating factor among all aspirant individuals who desire to become politicians and who can attain political office: a certain amount of wealth and time to spend for politics. Significance of spare time and certain amount of money to spend for party and the electorate have been underlined by various studies (Güneş-Ayata, 1992; Schüler, 1999; Gençkaya, 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010). Interviewees also emphasized, as a common characteristic among the four parties, that having a certain amount of wealth and flexible time is quite important for being a party elite and a politician in general. To illustrate,

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[78] SPK (Law No: 2820)'s Article 11 regulates the membership to political parties in Turkey. According to this article, public servants cannot become members of political parties. Please see the Turkish version below:
*"*Madde 11 – (Değişik birinci fıkra: 12/8/1999 - 4445/4 md.) Onsekiz yaşını dolduran, medeni ve siyasi hakları kullanma ehliyetine sahip bulunan her Türk vatandaşı bir siyasi partiye üye olabilir.
Ancak; a) (Değişik: 12/8/1999 - 4445/4 md.) Hakimler ve savcılar, Sayıştay dahil yüksek yargı organları mensupları, kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarının memur statüsündeki görevlileri, yaptıkları hizmet bakımından işçi niteliği taşımayan diğer kamu görevlileri, Silahlı Kuvvetler mensupları ile yükseköğretim öncesi öğrencileri siyasi partilere üye olamazlar.*"*

[79] Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016.

> "The most important thing is time for providing services. […] Especially being a local party chairperson is like working non-stop, as if working 24 hours a day. […] it is all about voluntary act."[80]

In addition to this,

> "It requires too much time to occupy positions like local branch chairs. To be provincial party chair, for instance, you should definitely have a certain amount of time and money."[81]

Similarly, another interviewee underlined that, having no time constraint is quite useful to spend more time in party work, and having flexible working hours in professional occupations may be helpful especially during election campaign times."[82]

It seems that in order to have flexible time and a certain amount of wealth, some occupations provide better opportunities. For example, having your own business or a job with flexible hours enable individuals to focus more on party works. Even if some individuals work in companies owned by others, they may still find enough time to spend for the party, if their bosses are also supporters of the particular party. With regard to such issues, one interviewee emphasized that:

> "It is advantageous to engage with trade related jobs. You are less constrained with regard to the economy and time related issues. I mean, if you are working with fixed hours, it will be less flexible for you. Or you should be a retired person..."[83]

It seems that the importance of flexible time and having a certain amount of wealth is usually applicable in multiple levels of political offices from local branches to legislative positions, especially for working in election campaign processes, election campaign spending and party expenses. Moreover, other features such as high level of education and having party experience before candidacy seem to be an important factor for nomination.

> "Candidates in general elections are usually selected by the party headquarters. There are several important factors for those candidates to be

[80] Interview with local party chairperson of the AKP in Alanya, Antalya, 24.07.2014.

[81] Interview with local party chair of the CHP in Acıpayam, Denizli, 26.08.2016.

[82] Interview with local branch executive committee member of the AKP, Ümraniye, İstanbul, 22.07.2014.

[83] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Ümraniye, İstanbul, 17.07.2014.

selected: education (this is important for meritocracy) and coming from the grassroots."[84]

The importance of free or flexible time and wealth also appears with regard to clientelistic relations in the country which explained in Chapter 4. Section 7.2 of this Chapter also provides helpful insights about who are recruited by political parties by specific reference to clientelism in Turkey.

Above mentioned interests, motivations and decisions to enter politics generally explain nascent political ambition (Fox and Lawless, 2005). Nevertheless, entering politics is not the end point of realizing political career goals. Politicians develop differing desires, aims and future prospects after they start their political career. The following subsections provide examination of different types of ambitions and career choices of political elites in Turkey.

7.1.2. Static Ambition, Legislative and Party Careers in Turkey

Static ambition leads the politicians to seek to be re-elected for or re-appointed to their current offices (Schlesinger, 1966; Strom, 1997; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). In other words, the politicians with static ambition do not seek other -especially higher- offices, and they desire to make long-run career out of a particular office. For example, MPs who served through multiple legislative terms are identified as pursuing static ambition as they run in general elections more than once to occupy the same office. Hence, re-nomination is vital for such MPs. Such individuals have static ambition as they wanted to stay in their current office. At this point, their continuity in candidacy matters for inferring static ambition regardless of their chance of being elected. Nevertheless, as discussed in the Chapter 6 of this dissertation, re-nomination does not necessarily mean that they will be elected again, thus they need to be nominated in electable positions. Regarding this, it is possible to infer that the respective candidate nominees in general elections need to have certain qualities or attributes to raise themselves above the crowd and make themselves to be selected by the party selectorate.

Being re-nominated is not a hard task for party leaders and other prominent members; however, others need to show that they are worth to be re-nominated in future elections.

[84] Interview with local women branch chairperson of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016.

Hence, MPs who pursue static ambition (i.e. seek for re-election) try to be recognizable by the leaders, and their behavior may be shaped by this drive. For example, political elite may signal their loyalty to their parties and especially to leaders in order to secure their selection and re-nomination. Such politicians may use many ways to show their enthusiasm and ambition. From parliamentary speeches (Yıldırım et. al, 2017) to unruly behavior in the TBMM (Kalaycıoğlu, 1990), various tools have been used by the MPs in Turkey, and those indeed increased the chance of re-nomination of those individuals.

Other than parliamentary activities, one quite visible way to indicate their ambition to be re-nominated by showing their loyalty and hardworking characteristic is organizing personal webpages and updating their activities on them. For example, sharing many pictures with the party leaders, or pictures from electoral campaigns, local visits and constituency meetings clearly show those politicians' work both to the party leadership and electorate. This way, MPs have chance to show their diligence and dedication to the party work. Nevertheless, not all MPs have personal webpages, and not all party selectorate or voters visits those webpages. Hence, some politicians prefer to use social media accounts such as Facebook and Twitter to show their enthusiasm in politics and their parties. On these accounts, MPs not only share their individual thoughts but also their parties' stand points. They also share many photos from their constituency visits, party meetings and legislative activities. One may expect that MPs seeking re-election extensively use such accounts and other opportunities which make them to be visible.

Thus, the reason to broadly use such tools is that visibility and recognition may play significant role in political careers of individuals. Visibility means not only being recognized by party leadership but also by the constituency. Hence, politicians usually attend to crowded ceremonies organized by the constituents such as weddings, funerals and meeting organized for the individuals beginning military service (*asker uğurlama*) or who are preparing for Islamic pilgrimage. Moreover, appearance on media also influence the recognizability of those individuals. For example, one interviewee emphasized that,

> "MPs' visits to the city are quite important. For instance, they should attend weddings of our residents and make themselves to be more visible to the electorate. This also signal that those MPs work hard and spend time and effort for the district. However, people also follow news to see whether their representatives are active. Even if an MP is working hard for the constituency,

> people may not be informed about it if that MP is not on TV while they are naming the problems of our city."[85]

Hence, those politicians need to be quite active to be regarded as hardworking politicians both by the parties and the electorate, if they desire to be re-elected to their current elected offices.

Besides MPs, party elite may also pursue static ambition. Even though some individuals pursue progressive ambition in earlier periods of their political career, they may develop static ambition over time. One of the interviewees told that,

> "I started my political career at the youth branch of the party in Kayseri. Then I became a member of municipality council in one of the districts in the city, and member of executive committee of another district branch. Now I am serving as a member of provincial branch executive committee member. […] I am not planning to run for a higher office, but I would like to stay in my current position. I am spending a huge amount of my time in the party office, from 09:00 in the morning to 18:00 in the evening, 6 days a week."[86]

These individuals are still dedicated to politics, yet either do not expect to higher their political career even if they wanted or they do not have any motivation or will to aim any higher positions.

> "If someone wants to occupy a higher office in the party, that person should actively participate to election campaigns (should work throughout those activities). Such members will be evaluated regarding their hard work… I do not have any motivation to seek for a higher office, but I would like to stay in my current office. Nevertheless, we would like to open the way for our young members. I wish they would come and have these offices."[87]

It seems that especially the elderly party elite seem to have static ambition and their ambition eventually turns into a discrete one through time. In other words, individuals do not necessarily stick to one type of ambition:

> "Previously I was in a district branch of the party, then I had this position in provincial branch. However, I am not seeking a higher office. For me, all positions within the organization is important."[88]

[85] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Acıpayam, Denizli, 26.08.2016.

[86] Interview with local party executive committe member of the CHP in Kayseri, 21.10.216.

[87] Interview with local party executive committe member of the CHP in Kayseri, 21.10.216.

[88] Interview with local women branch executive committee member of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016.

Schlesinger (1966: 10) underlined the assumption that "…one type of ambition is unlikely to remain constant for any one politician over his lifetime." Answers mentioned above support this assumption. While initial type is progressive ambition for a politician, that may evolve into a static type of political ambition if that person chooses to stay in the current position and pursue a long-term political career there.

7.1.3. Progressive Ambition in Turkey

Schlesinger (1966) argued that the legislative elites who aim to occupy a higher office compared to their current office show different behaviors compared to the less ambitious politicians. A similar argument can be applied to other politicians operating in various levels of political offices, public offices or civil society organizations. Regarding this, aiming for any higher office may show progressive ambition. For example, individuals show their progressive ambition by running in elections (and becoming MPs or mayors) while previously working in non-political offices, serving as CSO members or party elite. Although CSO membership provide useful opportunities for political participation and influence in decision making process, such kind of membership may not be as salient as being an MP or a party elite with regard to political careers.

Moreover, being a party elite is quite an important political career step, but its level is not as high as legislative office or other elective offices. If any of those party elite who operates in lower levels of the party branch aims for any other level in the party organization, this can also be identified with progressive ambition.[89] As another example, data compiled for this dissertation reveal that municipal council members usually hold local party branch membership and positions such as women branch chairs or deputy chairs before their election. Eventually one may argue that they pursued progressive ambition by running in local elections while they were only operating in the party local branches. One example for progressive ambition is as follows:

[89] Seeking for leadership positions in a political party is identified as intrainstitutional ambition, and it is explained in Section 7.1.5 in this Chapter. Nevertheless, aiming any other higher position than the current position within the party organization is regarded as progressive ambition here.

> "I have been working in the party for 20-25 years. I started with youth branch membership and then I was elected to municipal council membership. I am now serving as deputy district branch chair."[90]

This person started from very bottom, and gradually increased the political position in the party by aiming higher levels of offices without losing his progressive ambition over time. A similar path prior to the current office was mentioned by another interviewee who started as a youth branch member of the party in the district, then served as a deputy chair of this branch, became a member of district branch executive committee and was nominated for the municipal council membership before serving in the current office."[91]

Many other similar cases were indicated by other interviewees as well. Hence, they were appreciating step by step promotion in local party offices. Still as it was explained, some others also occupy chairperson positions directly if the party believes that those individuals are suitable and noteworthy to appoint or elect to those positions.

Another indication of progressive ambition is resigning from or leaving the current offices, in order to run for higher political offices. Massicotte et al. (2004) explained such decisions as follows,

> "…in a federal country where membership in a state or provincial legislature is incompatible with membership in the national legislature, a state legislature, a state legislator may run for national office without resigning his or her present position, thus enjoying all the advantages of incumbency, including indemnity, throughout the election campaign. If state legislators are ineligible for the national parliament, they must resign prior to running for office and risk having seat at all in the end." (Massicotte et al., 2004: 40).

Similar to the latter case presented in the above quotation, public servants or bureaucrats need to resign from their office in Turkey in order to announce candidacy in national or local elections. Not only public servant or bureaucrats, but also mayors need to resign from their position if they want to run in general elections. With this decision, they show that they have progressive ambition, and they want to climb the ladders of political career. Regarding these, one may argue that pursuing progressive ambition goals is not always risk-free. The reason for this is that even if a mayor or a bureaucrat resigns from his or her office to become candidate nominees and declare enthusiasm for legislative career,

[90] Interview with local party deputy chairperson of the CHP in Acıpayam, Denizli, 26.08.2016.

[91] Interview with local party chairperson of the AKP in Merkezefendi, Denizli 27.08.2016.

this person may not be selected as a candidate by political parties. Under such circumstances, that would be a hard task for that person to continue the previous office. Thus, such decisions need to be given by careful calculations and considerations by those individuals. Nevertheless, it seems that many who decide to leave their current offices in order to run for legislative office usually have an insight that they can become candidates on party lists. Still, this does not guarantee their electability. Hence, among all political ambition types, progressive ambition can be regarded as one of the riskiest paths for many individuals, especially if there are party-centered elections rather than candidate-centered ones, closed-party lists rather than open-party lists, and centralized parties with exclusive selectorate rather than an inclusive group.

Once, Schlesinger (1966) argued that governors of New York and Mississippi or South Dakota would not be acting or behaving in similar ways: While those governors of New York may act like presidential candidates, the others will not show a similar behavior. We can argue that, this is related to the relative saliency of the same offices in different cities. Even though same offices with same structures are occupied with different individuals, specific features of the cities -such as socioeconomic development levels- where those offices are located may influence their significance. For example, being a provincial party branch chairperson in İstanbul would bring way better network opportunities, access to resources and interaction with a large group of electorate which increases the recognizability of that chairperson compared to a local party branch in a smaller province in Turkey.

Indeed, the data compiled for this dissertation show that a considerable number of the MPs who formerly served as provincial or district branch chairpersons or members are from largest and most developed cities of Turkey, such as İstanbul, Bursa, Antalya, Gaziantep and Kocaeli. Table 7.2 shows the electoral districts where MPs had local party experience, and where at least 5 observation occurred like that. It is clear that İstanbul as the largest, most populous and most developed city, has the largest number of MPs who previously worked in local party offices. This indicates that local party branch chairs and members in İstanbul enjoy more chance to be nominated in general elections and it is more likely for those party elite in İstanbul to embark on legislative careers.

Table 7.2: Cities with highest numbers of MPs with local party experience (2002-2015)

Provincial Branch Chairpersons		**Provincial Branch Members**		**District Branch Chairpersons**		**District Branch Members**	
District Name	Number of MPs	District Name	Number of MPs	District Name	Number of MPs	District Name	Number of MPs
İstanbul (2)	18	İstanbul (1)	24	İstanbul (1)	14	Bursa	10
İstanbul (1)	17	İstanbul (3)	22	İstanbul (3)	11	İstanbul (1)	9
Bursa	16	İstanbul (2)	20	İstanbul (2)	10	Aydın	8
İstanbul (3)	12	Antalya	16	Bolu	9	Bolu	6
Gaziantep	11	Bursa	15	Manisa	8	Adana, Mersin	5
Kocaeli, Ordu, Antalya	10	Kocaeli	13	Sakarya	7		
Malatya, Trabzon	9	Gaziantep	11	Bursa	6		
Adıyaman, Batman, Yalova	8	Aydın, Malatya, Samsun	9	Aydın	5		
Ankara (1), Aydın, Bolu, Samsun	7	Adıyaman, İzmir (2), Kahramanmaraş	8				
Denizli, Kırıkkkale, Konya	6	Bolu, Ordu, Yalova	7				
Isparta, İzmir (2), Kahramanmaraş, Mersin	5	Batman, Kırıkkale	6				
		Afyonkarahisar, Ankara (1), Balıkesir, Bitlis, Denizli, Sivas, Tokat, Trabzon	5				

Note: This table shows the cities with at least 5 MPs who formerly served in respective offices indicated in table. Each and every observation was regarded as a unique one, hence, repetitive names of same MPs were not removed from the calculation.

One interesting result here is that Ankara and İzmir, which are the second and third largest and also developed provinces have fewer MPs with party experience compared to others indicated in Table 7.2. This may be due to that MPs elected from these cities either have more top-level party elite jobs (i.e. in party headquarters), or have more proximity to the party leadership; hence even if they do not have local party experience, they can be nominated as candidates in legislative elections from electable places in the party list ballots. Moreover, all party headquarters are located in Ankara, and a number of party headquarters elite are also residents of that city. This may increase the level of competition over electable candidate ranks on party lists. Hence, even if local party elite may be nominated in general elections, they may get lower ranks while party headquarter members may be promoted by higher rank candidacy.

Shifting from one political office to another may not work in same patterns for every politician. For example, several interviewees indicated that being a lower level elite seems to be an important prerequisite prior to be a higher-level party actor.

> "I define becoming a party actor as a citizenship duty. I have been serving in various levels and positions of the party such as membership to provincial branch executive committee membership, district branch membership, party delegate position and so on. I believe that experiences gained through those positions are significant, and I think that higher level political actors should gradually climb political career ladders by starting from the bottom, so that they can be more experienced. I am planning to be active in politics in the future as today."[92]

Similarly, as explained in the Chapter 6 of this dissertation, once they were elected, local party experience increases the re-nomination chance of MPs in future elections. In other words, data reveal that there seems to be more people run for general elections coming from local party offices which are especially in more developed and migrant receiving cities; however, being a local party chairperson does not have a significant effect on mayoral candidacy (Yıldırım and Kocapınar, 2018). Hence, one may argue that once those politicians with local party experience develop progressive ambition, they aim for legislative office rather than municipal office, or political parties select those as general election candidates instead of mayoral candidates.

Although above mentioned career paths generally follow a road from lower levels to higher levels of local party offices, or from local party offices to legislative offices, there is a significant number of political elite who directly occupy higher levels of offices without prior experience in almost four parties. Several interviewees underline that this is because those elites have certain networks in the party, they use their family ties, or they have shown themselves in other works for the party -rather than working in the lower level offices such as youth branches or district branches.

While some interviewees indicated their past or current progressive ambition, others clearly mentioned that they do not pursue any higher offices anymore. In other words,

[92] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Pamukkale, Denizli, 26.08.2016
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even if they pursued higher office goals previously, they now lost their progressive ambition, and mostly developed either static ambition or discrete ambition:

> "I do not aim for any higher positions, because I do not have any kind of ambition to do so. I wish to see rather a younger person or a woman in this position (district branch chair). We should pave the wave for them."[93]

Political ambition does not necessarily be sufficient to achieve political career goals since parties' recruitment decisions play significant roles. Related to this issue, centralist party structures and exclusive candidate selection in Turkey were explained in Chapter 4. Several interviewees hint that working hard in the party is quite important for being recognized and evaluated. With such hard work, the superiors such as party chairpersons may evaluate those members and may reward them with other positions within the parties. Hence, those practices eventually shape political ambition of those individuals.

Under those circumstances, political ambition of individuals may be shaped by the signals or decisions of the higher-level party elite. For instance, even if a person wishes to occupy a higher office in the party, he or she may not necessarily pursue that goal:

> "I would like to be seeking higher office, but it is more important to make our party to reach higher levels of success."[94]

Other arguments revolve around the idea that education or hardworking may not always work positively in careers of some individuals. Such beliefs may also shape individuals' ambition type. Some choose to leave as they see that there are not appreciated, but some others continue to actively work for the party even though they think that they will not be promoted. It is indicated that, for example, if there are particular teams in the parties, they may favor those who are closer to such teams, and it is not always possible to occupy higher positions in the party for those who are not recognized by such teams."[95]

Such practices provide insights about exclusive recruitment patterns of parties, on the one hand. On the other hand, an opposing case was underlined by explaining the collective

[93] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Acıpayam, Denizli, 26.08.2016.

[94] Interview with local women branch executive committee member of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016.

[95] Interview with local party member of the CHP in Adana, 04.11.2016.

selection of MP candidates, indicating that the candidate selection process includes a broader group of people, in other words an inclusive selectorate:

> "We are trying to have candidates from various backgrounds such as *Alevi*s, Armenians, women, youngsters and so on. Of course, political experience is vital, yet our quotas in the party increases diversity in candidate composition. The party has various constituents (*bileşen*), and we are collecting their suggestions about candidates, and once they recommend candidates, we do not necessarily question their decisions and eventually prefer to nominate those candidates on our party lists. […] Since we have a pluralist structure, having different ideas or thoughts do not create serious problems in the party. […] For example, we use zipper method for our candidate lists. […] As we have many constituents, there are various recommendations coming from those with regard to candidates in elections. For example, women generally select female candidates, young members decide the names of young nominees on the candidacy lists or Armenians pick their own candidates in the party."[96]

This practice seems to be different from exclusive selection method. Still, it is indicated that candidate lists are finalized by the party headquarters and specifically by party leadership in all parties.

Chapter 6 examined the reasons of individuals' deal/compromise with parties to be nominated in non-electable positions. Electable positions are generally defined as safe or secure seats or winnable positions (Ashiagbor, 2008) or eligible positions (Put and Maddens, 2013) which almost guarantee the election of the candidates nominated in those. For example, "…if a party won four seats in a constituency at the previous election, the first four positions on the list are normally considered as eligible or realistic." (Put and Maddens, 2013: 55). The candidates who are nominated in those positions can be defined as "favourites" (Ecevit and Kocapınar, 2018). Those who are given other ranks, hence, will have less chance to be elected. Thus, progressive ambition is also shaped by the practices of parties' recruitment strategies.

Table 7.3. shows the number of candidates who had at least one candidacy experience in previous elections (regardless of their electability), and nominated in current elections as well. It is notable that number of such candidates are significantly high in November 2015 General Elections. The reason for this is that November 2015 General Elections were

[96] Interview with local party chairperson of the HDP in İstanbul, 11.11.2016.

snap elections, as it occurred within five months of the June 2015 General Election, and there was a very short time period to finalize the candidate lists. Not only that, but also especially opposition parties did not want to revise their candidate lists, as they did not feel necessity to do so. Thus, continuity of candidates was higher in the latest elections analyzed in this dissertation.

Table 7.3: Number of candidates with pervious candidacy experience (2007-2015)

Parties	2007	2011	June 2015	November 2015
AKP	196	208	199	387
CHP	111	127	156	365
MHP	101	180	151	308
HDP	N.A.	N.A.	55	302
Total	408	515	561	1362

Nevertheless, when we look at the other cases, we can see that the numbers are relatively low. Meaning that, winnable positions are occupied by the newcomers as well as the ones with previous candidacy experience, as they are not filled all by experienced politicians. Such candidates secure their electability to a great extent. Thus, one may argue that those safe seats are open to ones who would like to start their legislative career but did not have any candidacy before. It was explained in the Chapter 6 that candidates with low ranks expect to push their candidacy order to more electable places in future elections, hence they compromise with parties to be nominated in noneligible places in current elections. In addition to that, results in Table 7.3 signal for those individuals without any experience in legislative politics that their nomination in winnable positions is likely to some extent, as the numbers show that not all places are filled.

Moreover, Table 7.4 shows the number of candidates who have been nominated at least once in the previous elections, and nominated as favorites (in winnable positions) in current elections by parties.

Table 7.4: Number of candidates with previous candidacy experience and ranked in winnable positions in current elections (2007-2015)

Parties	2007	2011	June 2015	November 2015
AKP	169	177	147	239
CHP	59	44	66	129
MHP	N.A.	58	37	73
HDP	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	78
Total	228	279	250	519

Note: This table does not include the candidates nominated by the HDP in June 2015, because calculation of favorite candidates is not available as the party did not compete in elections prior to 2015.

In comparison to that, Table 7.5 reveals the number of candidates who also had previous candidacy experience at least once, but not nominated as favorites in current elections.

Table 7.5: Number of candidates with previous candidacy experience but not ranked in winnable positions in current elections (2007-2015)

Parties	2007	2011	June 2015	November 2015
AKP	27	31	52	148
CHP	52	83	90	236
MHP	N.A.	122	114	230
HDP	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	229
Total	79	236	256	843

Note: This table does not include the candidates nominated by the HDP in June 2015, because calculation of favorite candidates is not available as the party did not compete in elections prior to 2015.

The number of such candidates were 79 in 2007, 236 in 2011, 256 in June 2015 and 843 in November 2015 General Elections. Among those, the MHP seems to have the largest group of candidates who previously run in elections but not nominated in safe positions in the current elections.

Previous section showed that a considerable number of MPs pursue static ambition as they become candidates in multiple elections and seek for re-election. However, the tables above also show that there is a sizable group of individuals who have been candidates in multiple general elections. Some of those still appear on the lists even if they are not elected. Hence, they are still aiming for their legislative career goal which should be indicative of their progressive ambition.

As explained in the Chapter 6 of this dissertation, total served term in the TBMM has negative correlation with re-nomination, and its effect is statistically significant. In other words, as MPs serve longer terms in the TBMM their likelihood to be re-nominated in the next elections decreases. One reason for this may be the loss of interest of such long served MPs in running in elections who already spend long years in the TBMM. Moreover, one may interpret from this result that political parties tend to select newcomers or legislatively less experienced MPs to nominate in the upcoming elections. This may also explain the high turnover rate in the TBMM. Nevertheless, although total served terms negatively affect re-nomination chance, holding ministerial positions seem to have positive correlation with this variable. More specifically, if an MP occupy a ministerial position in current legislative term, his or her likelihood to be re-nominated in next elections increases.

7.1.4. Discrete Ambition and Resignation of MPs in Turkey

Political ambition is mostly identified with personal interest, and if that interest is no longer available, individuals may seek to retire from their office or exit politics. This is generally defined as the end of a political career. Under such circumstances, "…politician wants the particular office for its specified term and then choses to withdraw from public office." (Schlesinger, 1966: 10). Many factors may influence this decision of politicians such as loss of political interest, loss of political efficacy feeling, age, family issues, economic interests and so on. For example, one interviewee indicated that,

> "First, I became a member of the party, then served as executive committee member of a district branch of the CHP. Now, I am a member of executive committee of provincial branch. Due to my age, I am not planning to be a candidate for this position in the future."[97]

Such decisions are not peculiar to party elite only. MPs, mayors or other kind of political elite may choose not to run for office again. For example, municipal council membership seems to be a political career that it is more temporary compared to positions of local party chairs, mayors and MPs as several interviewees indicated. Similarly, some MPs or mayors may also prefer exiting politics by not running in future elections after their terms are over. Moreover, MPs may choose to resign from their offices while the legislative

[97] Interview with local party executive committe member of the CHP in Kayseri, 21.10.216.

term is not over. Although above mentioned activities imply the static or progressive ambition of MPs, not all MPs pursue the goal of being re-nominated by their parties and re-elected. Although this may not necessarily mean that they are completely exiting politics, it is at least clear that they are ending their legislative careers with this decision. Yet, as Table 7.6 shows, the number of MPs who resign from their offices is notably low in the country, and zero for many legislative terms. However, resignation is not limited to leaving legislative office.

Table 7.6: Number of MPs who resigned from their legislative office (2002-2015)

	22nd Term	**23rd Term**	**24th Term**	**25th Term**	**26th Term**
Number of MPs who Resigned from their office	2 (1 AKP, 1 CHP)	0	0	0	1 (CHP)

Note: This table does not include those who resigned for preferring other elective offices such as mayoral positions. Please see the following pages for details of such cases.

Besides resigning from the office, another important political career decision of the MPs is resignation from their parties but continuing as an independent MP in the TBMM. For instance, only two parties, namely the AKP and CHP won seats in the TBMM in 2002 General Elections along with 9 independent MPs[98]. Nevertheless, a number of MPs both from the AKP and CHP resigned in 22nd Legislative Term while still continuing their MP positions in the TBMM. Some of them continued as independent MPs while some shifted between those two parties and others engaged with political parties other than the AKP and CHP. Resignation from a party does not necessarily annul the title of MPs in Turkey. In other words, if an MP does not resign from his or her legislative office while resigning from his or her party, this MP can still continue to serve in the TBMM. Under such a case, the MP in question can either continue as an independent deputy or start a new affiliation with another party. As a result of this, the number of parties represented in the TBMM may increase even though they do not have party groups.

This was what happened throughout the 22nd Legislative Term in the TBMM. Although there were only two political parties represented in the TBMM as a result of the 2002 General Elections, seven political parties had MPs at the end of the term.[99] Increase in the represented number of parties in the TBMM was not only related to party shifts of MPs

[98] Please see the following link for more details: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/2002MilletvekiliSecimi/turkiye/milletvekilisayisi.pdf.

[99] Please see the following link for more details: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/2-partiyle-basladi-7-partiyle-bitti-6657172.

but also to initially independent MPs' engagement with parties after their election. Table 7.7 shows the number of status changes of MPs who switched between parties or became affiliated with parties while they were previously independent.

Table 7.7: Number of MPs who switched their status and party affiliation in the 22nd Legislative Term

	Number of MPs who switched their status			
	Once	**Twice**	**Three times**	**More than three times**
22nd Legislative Term	9	31	4	4

Note: This table includes each step of status change after the election. E.g., if an MP was elected with a party ticket, then resigned from the party and became an independent, it was calculated as one. However, if this MP ten became affiliated with another party, then it was calculated as two.

For example, one MP in 22nd Legislative Term was elected as an independent, then engaged with the ANAP in 2003, then resigned from the party, became an independent MP once again, and shifted to the AKP after a while (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. Cilt, 2010: 1483); several MPs were elected with the CHP ticket, then resigned and became independents, and then affiliated with the AKP (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. Cilt, 2010: 1457, 1458, 1460); several MPs were elected with the AKP ticket, then resigned and became independents, then joined to the DYP, resigned and served as independent MPs once again, and finally affiliated with the ANAP (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. Cilt, 2010: 1459, 1480); some even changed their status up to seven times like an MP who started with the AKP affiliation, resigned and served as independent, then joined to the LDP, became independent once again, shifted to the ANAP, resigned from this party, became independent and finally joined to the GP (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. Cilt, 2010: 1493). Moreover, some MPs founded new political parties through 22nd Legislative Term, and started to be affiliated with those (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. Cilt, 2010: 1459, 1492).[100]

Table 7.8 reveals the direction of party or status switching of MPs in the 22nd Legislative Term. It reveals that although there were no MPs who switched from the AKP to CHP, a number of MPs preferred to shift to the AKP even though they were elected with the CHP ticket.

[100] Please also see the following link for more details: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/yasar-nuri-ozturk-parti-kurdu-38696941.

Table 7.8: Direction of MPs' party or status switching in the 22nd Legislative Term

Direction of Switching	Number of MPs
From AKP to CHP	0
From CHP to AKP	7
From AKP to any party other than the CHP	12
From CHP to any party other than the AKP	11
From AKP to Independent	7
From CHP to Independent	7
From Independent to AKP	4
From Independent to CHP	0
From Independent to other parties, or independent again	2

Moreover, it is observable that a number of MPs who were elected with the AKP or CHP tickets then preferred to switch to other political parties which did not have a party group in the TBMM such as ANAP and DYP. Additionally, 14 MPs seem to leave their parties by resigning and they became independent MPs through that legislative term.

Such changes and shifts among parties were more common through the 22nd Legislative Term, yet the number of similar cases decreased over time. For example, although several shifts of MPs from the CHP to DSP, and from DTP to BDP (right after the foundation of the latter) were observed, and although a few MPs from the AKP became independents through 23rd Legislative Term, it seems that number of such party switches dramatically dropped, especially for the AKP MPs (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. Cilt, 2010: 1527-1602). This decline may show that party groups in the TBMM became more disciplined throughout time. Even though several incidents made some MPs to resign from their parties in various points of time in other legislative sessions, it seems that not many MPs pursued to goal of affiliating with other parties after their election to the TBMM. Hence, their political ambition differs from others who change their affiliation. Such resignations did not show any loss in political ambition, on the contrary, showed the enthusiasm of those MPs to improve their status or ambition to find closer parties to their ideological stance by engaging with other parties. Nevertheless, as indicated above, several MPs decided to resign from their office completely due to loss of ambition for that position.

Loss of interest or motivation is not the sole reason for ending a political career. Exogeneous factors may also shape political ambition and career patterns of individuals. For example, a number of MPs lost their right to continue their legislative careers due to legal regulations and laws in Turkey. More specifically, several MPs' titles were annulled

in accordance with the Constitution. Table 7.9 shows the number of MPs whose legislative career ended due to exogenous factors such as termination of their title or death.

Table 7.9: Number of MPs whose legislative career ended due to exogeneous factors

	22nd Term	**23rd Term**	**24th Term**	**25th Term**	**26th Term**
Number of MPs whose title was annulled on Constitutional grounds	0	2 (HDP)	0	0	11 (HDP)
Number of MPs who lost their lives during legislative terms	7 (3 AKP, 3 CHP, 1 ANAP)	6 (3 AKP, 2 MHP, 1 BBP)	4 (1 AKP, 1 CHP, 1 HDP, 1 KADEP)	0	1 (AKP)

Cancellation of MP titles are observable for the MPs who have been affiliated by either the DTP, BDP or HDP. Although such annulment cases did not occur in the 22nd, 24th and 25th terms, several MPs' titles were cancelled in the 23rd and 26th legislative terms. Indeed, the number of such cases reached the peak point in the 26th Legislative Term resulting in the termination of the office of 11 HDP MPs. These cases indicate the end of legislative careers of those individuals even if they did not have discrete ambition.

Moreover, terms limits may hinder individuals from continuing their legislative career, at least for certain amount of time as an exogenous factor. Such limits are not implemented by many parties in Turkey, but the AKP used that for one period for general elections. Additionally, by-laws of the AKP limit the election of the same chairman (in district and provincial areas) with 3 ordinary successive periods at most.[101] All the branches of the party should act accordingly, and for example, even if a local branch thinks that a local party boss will be successful if he/she is elected one again (after 3 periods), the party by-laws restrict it. Since the local branches are bounded by these regulations, political ambition of party elite may be influenced. Recently, in 2018, implementation of a similar practice is indicated for the mayors of the AKP which will limit mayors to serve three consecutive terms at most in the same district. This will be implemented in the upcoming Local Elections in March 2019, and 92 mayors in total cannot not be candidates in the districts where they have been serving as mayors for three consecutive terms.[102] Under

[101] AKP by-law, Article 31 and Article 36, retrieved from: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu.

[102] Please see the following link for more details about the three term rule for mayors of the AKP and mayors who cannot be nominated in the same districts in the 2019 Local Elections: https://www.ntv.com.tr/video/turkiye/ak-partide-3-donem-kuralina-takilan-belediye-baskanlari-kimler,rjCQ2JUZAkC6NuAQAUwutA.

those circumstances, those mayors need to leave their office even if they still have static ambition and desire to re-election to their position.

Another exogenous factor is the renewal of the elections in certain districts. Although this is not a common issue, it seems to affect the legislative careers of individuals. For example, 2002 General Elections were annulled and repeated in Siirt which had 3 seats, and all three MPs who were elected in the regular elections lost their MP title as a consequence of this decision of renewing elections in the district. Such cases may also put an end to legislative careers of individuals.

Thus, both exogenous and endogenous factors may make politicians to leave their office either during their term or after the term is over. Even though discrete ambition is seen to be related to endogenous factors, some of the above-mentioned exogenous factors may also make politicians to re-evaluate their political career choices.

7.1.5. Intrainstitutional Ambition in Turkey

Intrainstitutional ambition is defined as "members' desire for leadership positions within their present institution" (Herrick and Moore, 1993: 765). Hence, for political parties, one may identify the individuals who try to occupy the party leaders' office as pursuing intrainstitutional ambition.

Challenging party leaders to replace them has not been an unexpected act in political parties in Turkey, yet it is not very frequent. Moreover, there have been differing cases of leadership alternation in different parties in the country; however, one common observation has been that challengers to existing party leaders encounter various difficulties with regard to leadership change in many parties.

One important reason of difficulties to replace party leaders while they do not want to leave their office is the centralist and leader-oriented structures of parties, which is closely related to high levels of party discipline in Turkey. More specifically, parties in Turkey have been defined as having "…no significant internal democracy […] Ideas are not generated within parties where debate is discouraged. Obedience rather than competition governs the parties' political culture." (Rubin, 2002: 3). Thus, "oligarchic and top-heavy nature of internal party structures" of Turkish political parties have been underlined by

many scholars (Hale, 2002: 166). In order to increase internal democracy levels in the parties, several regulations of the SPK intended to develop a democratic nature in the parties with regard to elections within the parties and leadership change. For instance, the SPK indicates that the parties shall hold a National Convention (*Büyük Kongre*) at least once in three years, and the party leader (*Genel Başkan*) must nominate himself/herself for re-election. The intention is that, there may be other candidates running for this office in the party, and alternation may occur depending on the discretion of the party delegates. Nevertheless, it is very unlikely to change the party leader in these conventions (Hale, 2002: 185). Meaning that, in many political parties, changing the leader of the party via elections in national conventions is not a common practice of political parties in Turkey. On the contrary, there is either the current leader as the only candidate in those conventions or the party leaders sometimes point out their successors as the candidates. Thus, there is a tendency that the leaders decide and nominate through the conventions, and the other members of the party usually accepts this practice. Under such circumstances, the current leader of a party may be consolidating his or her power by getting re-approval of the members and delegates of the party. Consequently, such a practice can enable the center to further concentrate the control power in its hands.

Challenges against party leaders may have varying consequences. For example, if parties do not have internal democracy, attempts coming from any group or faction which try to replace top ranks of the parties would face either a party split or leadership change, however, this also depends on the "the level of power concentration within the dominant faction" because "If the power is concentrated in the hands of a small elite, the divisions within the elite can help the oppositional faction remove the party leader. If the power resides only with a single leader, the oppositional faction is likely to lose the struggle against the dominant faction and decide to exit" (Ayan Musil and Dikici Bilgin, 2014: 1). The following quote further explains the consequences of opposition to leadership in many parties in the country in details:

> "Another instrument frequently used to control party membership is that of activating the dismissal mechanism for members perceived as opposing the existing party administration with the claim that they are not acting in accordance with party discipline. This has been applied frequently since the beginning of the multiparty regime. Three members of the CHP, namely Adnan Menderes (future prime minister), Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü, were dismissed from their parties in 1945. They then established the DP, together with Celal Bayar. Later, the leadership of the DP dismissed some Parliamentarians of the party in 1948. In 1962, Kasım Gülek (former general

> secretary of the CHP), Nihat Erim (future prime minister) and Avni Doğan were debarred from the CHP for a year. The dismissal mechanism has been used as a tool routinely in Turkish political life. Even former Secretary General of the CHP (Ertuğrul Günay) was dismissed from his party in 1990s. During the past decade, some parliamentarians […] and party members […] who had active roles in their parties were dismissed from their parties. A recent search of the Turkish popular media over the one-year period January 2011 to January 2012 shows that all three parties (AKP, CHP and MHP) represented in the Parliament have dismissed several party members during this period." (Kabasakal, 2014: 708).

Hence, not only those who seek leadership positions in the parties but also those who reveal their opposing ideas to the existing leaders or to ranks of the parties may face punishment within political parties. Such practices eventually may discourage any individual with intrainstitutional ambition, and that person may need to revise or re-evaluate the political career decisions.

Although some parties constituted more or less institutionalized recruitment patterns throughout time, especially the post-1983 parties have shown certain characteristics that the selection of the candidates, resolution of the problems among various party organs and the management of the party group in the Parliament have been controlled by the central branch and sometimes specifically by the leader of the parties; and by having the ability to control the candidate nomination, and access to the various sources of patronage, these leaders personalized the leadership (Kalaycıoğlu, 1990: 196-197; Sayarı, 2002: 25). Hence, the party leaders enjoy a broad range of powers and it is not easy to challenge party leaders to replace them.

Through 2002 to November 2015, there have been a number of leadership changes in the AKP and the CHP, but not in the MHP. Moreover, there have been some challenges to the leaders of the CHP[103] and MHP which did not lead to any leadership change. For example, a severe dispute emerged between Deniz Baykal and Mustafa Sarıgül in 2007 as there emerged dissatisfaction with Baykal's policies in various levels of the party:

> "The delegate selection process for the national party convention had to take place following the CHP's defeat in the parliamentary elections on July 22, 2007, when several leaders of the provincial and district party organizations revealed their dissatisfaction with the central party policies and the Baykal administration. One of the most representative public opinion surveys on the parliamentary elections demonstrated that among the CHP voters the percentage of the people who recognized the need for a new party and the need for a new leader in solving Turkey's problems was 34.8 percent and 59.6

[103] Please see the following link for more details: https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/09/140905_chp.

> percent respectively.37 The distrust for the Baykal administration was therefore evident among voters. Following the outbreak of this distrust, a new faction within the party emerged under the leadership of the Şişli mayor, Mustafa Sarıgül, who, after the parliamentary elections, began making statements in the media about his intentions to be the next CHP party leader and sharply condemned the Baykal administration for the CHP's failure in elections.[38] He attempted to gather all the CHP opposition members under his leadership and organized backdoor meetings with the provincial and district party chairs whose roles had been marginalized in the party.39 However, Sarıgül soon was expelled from the party by decision of the party disciplinary committee." (Ayan, 2010: 204).

Hence, quite a similar case occurred to what explained by dismissal mechanism by Kabasakal (2014) during the competition and dispute period between Baykal and Sarıgül in the CHP.

Still, from time to time, several political party leaders encountered with severe disputes or competitive rivals in party leader elections which at the end led to leadership change. For example, İsmet İnönü was replaced by Bülent Ecevit as the leader of the CHP in May 1972 as Ecevit won the votes of 826 delegates out of 913 after severe disputes in the party and resignation of İnönü from the leadership position.[104] Nevertheless, a number of cases ended up without any change in leadership positions, but with a clear end of challengers' career in respective parties. For example, four candidates who indicated their will to run for the leadership position of the MHP to compete against Bahçeli were criticized by him, and all those four people left the party at the end of this process.[105] In some other cases, leadership alternation occurred but decision for that change was given by the existing leaders. For example, Erdoğan was elected as President of the country in August 2014, and he needed to leave the leadership position in the AKP. During that process only one candidate, Ahmet Davutoğlu, was nominated for this position with the support of Erdoğan, and he was elected as the party leader by the party delegates.[106] Since there were no other candidates who declared that they would compete against Davutoğlu, that alternation in leadership position did not create any disputes within the party.

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[104] Please see the following links for the details of this election and others in the CHP: http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/chpnin-bol-cekismeli-kurultaylari-998280/, and http://www.ismetinonu.org.tr/partiden-kopus/.

[105] Please see the following link for more details: https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/05/160512_mhp_muhalifler_karar.

[106] Please see the following link for more details: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ahmet-davutoglu-genel-baskan-secildi-27088866.

All in all, centralist structures of political parties in Turkey seem to hinder leadership change to a large extent, even if there emerge some groups or individuals who wish to realize this goal. Nevertheless, even under such circumstances, individuals show their intrainstitutional ambition by competing against the leaders in national conventions, or by indicating that they would be candidates (even if they cannot). Still, compared to other types of political ambition, this type is pursued by a considerably small number of politicians in the country.

7.1.6. Regressive Ambition and Preferring Lower Level Offices in Turkey

Not all politicians pursue a goal of staying in their current offices for long periods or occupying higher offices through their political career. From time to time, individuals may feel that running for a higher office is not possible, or continuing with the current office is unlikely. Those individuals may exit politics if they do not believe that they can go further in their political career paths. Nevertheless, such individuals may still have political ambition which make them to stay in politics. Under those circumstances, another option stands: he or she may prefer to run for a lower office. Of course, there may be other options such as preferring a non-elected office, yet when we focus on elected offices, selecting lower level ones may be the only option to select. This decision is defined as regressive ambition which is called as "…an oxymoronic expression" (Leoni et al., 2004: 123). However, this oxymoronic type of political ambition is not always for the ones who feel themselves electorally vulnerable or who do not believe that they can achieve a better office goal:

> "For ambitious politicians, climbing down the career ladder with regards to elected office may be more attractive based on one's particular circumstances given the higher rate of success. Moreover, many ambitious politicians seek non-elected office, and … most are successful at gaining positions in the bureaucracy or doing party work." (Kerevel, 2013: 27).

Hence, one may argue that aiming for lower level offices does not necessarily indicate a loss in political ambition. It is more expectable from politicians to seek election for lower level offices if they believe that they will lose any election to higher positions. What is interesting to see is politicians' decisions to leave their higher level offices for lower level ones even if they are already elected as in some cases in Turkey. We may argue that this is a more specific type of regressive ambition.

As explained in the Chapter 6 of this dissertation, a number of MPs in the TBMM formerly served as mayors or municipal council members for one term or longer. More specifically, data show that 5 percent of the MPs were previously mayors and 9.7 percent of the MPs had municipal council membership prior to their legislative career. Although the numbers are not high, it is still important to see the presence of this group to understand their progressive political ambition. In other words, such an experience provides good opportunities for a person to be recognized by the electorate which may increase his or her chance to be selected by a party as a candidate in general elections. Occupying a legislative office after municipal office is an upward political mobility from local level to national level politics. Hence, those who select a path like this are identified as pursuing progressive ambition.

Nevertheless, a number of individuals prefer a path which is the opposite case of above-mentioned pattern. In other words, some MPs prefer mayoral positions over MP positions after their legislative career or even while they are serving in the TBMM.

Three local elections were held in Turkey between 2002 and November 2015, one in 2004, other one in 2009, and another one in 2014. Hence, MPs with such paths (from legislative office to municipal office) may be observable in the 22nd Legislative Term (2002-2007), 23rd Legislative Term (2007-2011) and 24th Legislative Term (2011-2015). Table 7.10 shows the number of MPs who preferred to become mayors while they were MPs in the TBMM.

Table 7.10: Number of MPs preferring mayoral positions over MP positions (2002-2015)

	22nd Term	**23rd Term**	**24th Term**
Number of MPs Preferring Mayoral Positions over MP Positions	0	1 (CHP)	10 (4 AKP, 3 CHP, 3 BDP)

Although the numbers are quite low, and even though there were no MPs chose this downward mobility path in 22nd Legislative Term, it is still noteworthy that the number of such MPs dramatically increased from 23rd to 24th Legislative Term. It seems that more MPs were attracted by local politics even though they were elected to the national legislature. With regard to political ambition theories, this may be explained as regressive ambition as the preferred office is lower than the existing one. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean that municipal offices have lower salience for all politicians. Indeed,

such cases show that those mayoral positions provide better opportunities for the political careers of those who select them over their national politics career.

Regressive ambition can be defined as a survival strategy in politics. For Turkish case, staying in politics seem to be a harder task than entering to politics as several interviewees underlined which are explained in the previous pages. Many parties in Turkey have detailed party by-laws; the election process of the district or provincial party chairpersons, their responsibilities, relations with different organizations within and without the party are regulated by those. As another example, certain kinds of incentives can be used for consolidating the power of the center and increasing its control capacity (Ayan, 2010). For example, the Article 43/F of the CHP by-laws allows the party headquarters/party's central actors to dismiss a local branch's members, if there emerge a vote loss compared to the previous elections in the specific location under its jurisdiction (province, district or smaller areas) (CHP, 2012: 60). Even if the party headquarters do not use this right so much, such kind of an article can make the local branches to feel the pressure of the center. Hence, when such regulations are executed, some politicians, especially party actors, may need to pursue a regressive ambition even if they did not intend to do so. Regarding this, one interviewee indicated that,

> "There may be unexpected things to occur such as dismissal. For example, electoral defeat in a district may be regarded as your own fault. […] Being in politics requires motivation and will to struggle with problems and difficulties that you encounter. From time to time party members who served for long years in the party may not be selected as candidates even if they want to. So, there may emerge some problems with regard to political career. But one needs to continue to work hard to stay in politics."[107]

Under such circumstances, politicians may think that aiming for a higher office will not be the best option. Rather, they would compromise to stay in their current offices or to occupy even lower offices. Because, this may be their only chance to stay in politics. Above mentioned case (preferring mayoral positions over MP position) is more of an individual decision, and can be regarded as a progressive ambition as it bring better political career opportunities to those politicians. However, having a necessity to prefer lower level offices due to party decision is more related to recruitment and dismissal processes rather than sole individual discretion. Moreover, preferring a lower level office due to expected electoral vulnerability in other offices is a also a sign of regressive

[107] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Pamukkale, Denizli, 26.08.2016.

ambition. Thus, differentiating between those decisions may provide better insights about political career decisions of individuals. One may argue that not everyone who seek for lower level offices pursue regressive ambition. The saliency of the office and expected utilities may drive some politicians to select lower level offices over higher level ones.

7.2. Political Careers and Clientelism in Turkey

All types of political ambition that are mentioned in the previous sections can be observable in Turkish politics. Regarding these, individuals may develop different strategies and career path decisions. These decisions are shaped by parties' discretion and individual attributes of those politicians. With regard to individual attributes, pre-parliamentary political experience such as local party experience plays important roles. Nonetheless, other features seem to be also necessary to stay in politics. Chapter 4 of this Dissertation explained the history and broad practice of clientelism in Turkish politics. It seems that along with political ambition, proximity to the electorate and chance and will to provide certain services and goods for the constituency have positive effects on political careers in the country. It was argued that "…Where party competition focuses on the national parliament, long-standing national legislators will simultaneously stand near the pinnacle of the party hierarchy, visible to voters, and wield the knowledge and institutional connections to get things done in office…" (Pemstein et al., 2015: 1422). As explained in the beginning of this chapter, politicians' visibility to the party leaders play important roles in political career paths. In addition to that, being visible to the voters is also decisive in career success of those politicians.

First of all, being recognized by the constituents and having proximity to electorate is seen as a quite important attribute especially for local party chairpersons.

> "Your roots are very important in politics. When people wonder about a person, they first look at his or her past. […] If I go to another district (to run for a local party chairperson position), regardless of my hard work, I may not be a local party chairperson. The people would ask who I am, where I come from, who my father/mother is... The reason is that, it is not an easy task to build trust."[108]

[108] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Ümraniye, İstanbul, 17.07.2014.

It was also indicated that localism increases the chance of being familiar with the constituency and being more trusted by the electorate in particular districts.

> "Living here for long years is an advantageous factor for this position for sure. For example, in this district, almost 80 percent of the residents come from various parts of Turkey. You should be familiar with their culture. In the weddings, funerals, and other occasions, you should share feelings with these people. […] when we meet the people in public, they all can hug me."[109]

These issues are also closely related to party-voter relations. As a reminder, since the beginning of the multiparty period in Turkey, political parties had strong clientelistic relations with the electorate (Kabasakal, 2014: 707). Hence, clientelism and party patronage is observable in many aspects of Turkish politics: a significant number of citizens stop by the offices of the deputies for seeking personal assistance from these parliamentary elite which is a sign of the importance attached to the clientelistic relations (Sayarı, 2011: 88).[110] As a result of such practices, a significant number of the deputies (more than a half) have been spending their time –as a regular activity- on "finding jobs and providing other services or benefits for constituents" (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 47, 49). More specifically, the demanded services and goods have been "jobs and employment, favorable treatment from the bureaucrats and state officials, assistance in finding medical care in Ankara, and influence peddling in a variety of different issues." (Sayarı, 2011: 89). Thus, it is significant to find enough time and money to spend for such party works, and also will to deal with individuals' demands in order to continue political careers. Even though political parties have a certain amount of funds distributed to the local offices, almost all interviewees mentioned that those funds are not enough to cover all the expenses of the party. For example, they need to find additional sources to spend for electoral campaigns or other occasions, or promotions to distribute to the electorate.

With regard to distributed materials and goods, several interviewees indicated that they give some promotional products such as pens, perfumes and coffee. Nevertheless, it is also mentioned that the people will probably not vote for them by just considering the quality of those products.

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[109] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Tuzla, İstanbul, 06.07.2014.

[110] Sayarı (2011: 88-89) also refers to a survey which was conducted on this issue and which reveals that more than half of the parliamentarians receive between 50 and 300 visitors every week. For more information please see: Turan, İ. 2000. Parlamentoların Etkinliği ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. In *Devlet Reformu: TBMM'nin Etkinliği*. İstanbul: TESEV.

It was mentioned that some people stop by the local party offices with the demands of health payments or flat rents.[111] However, it was also indicated that local branch does not give cash money to the needy people, but rather help them in the form of food or free educational assistance. Similarly, others stop by the local party offices to raise their problems which require municipal solutions, especially if the mayor was elected from that party.[112]

The interviews reveal that many voters regard meeting with local party actors as a direct source of finding solutions to their problems, concerns and demands. These demands are generally located around finding jobs (especially in public sector and municipalities), reaching health service and educational assistance similar to the ones explained in previous studies with regard to voter and MP relations (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995; Sayarı, 2011). Nevertheless, the demands of the constituents vary in a wide range from lawyer assistance to finding accommodation. Moreover, problems and demands of the electorate also vary depending on the living area. To illustrate, issues about land title (*tapu*) and town planning (*imar*) are mentioned as one of the major problems during an interview while it was not necessarily mentioned to a large extent in other districts."[113] Additionally, there can be other complaints which are not related to material issues, but rather ideological. One interviewee underlined the complaints of the people saying that their thoughts cannot find a place in the municipality of the district. Meaning that, the events or activities organized by the municipality (which is run by another party) do not cover their needs, but rather the municipality party's ideas take place in organizing social events.[114]

Regardless of the content of the demand, it is usually hinted that local party offices are like intermediaries between the citizens and the state or party headquarters. Hence, it seems that patterns previously explained by other scholars (e.g. Güneş-Ayata, 1994) still continues in Turkish politics, and such practices have important implications on elite recruitment and political career paths of the individuals.

[111] Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Alanya, Antalya, 25.07.2014.

[112] Interview local party chairperson of the MHP in Alanya, Antalya, 25.07.2014.

[113] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Sultanbeyli, İstanbul, 17.07.2014.

[114] Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Ümraniye, İstanbul, 17.07.2014.

7.3. Concluding Remarks

Political ambition was defined as a personal thing. However, individuals shape their political ambition by evaluating their circumstances with regard to their chance of being recruited by parties, analyzing the availability of possible positions to occupy or offices to run, considering their competitiveness in nomination races and deciding the relative salience of various offices for themselves. Hence, individuals pursing political career goals need to take various exogenous and endogenous factors into consideration while determining their goals.

Data on MPs and legislative candidates in Turkey reveal that it is possible to detect at least a certain number of politicians pursuing each one of the political ambition types mentioned above. Nevertheless, not each ambition category contains same numbers of politicians. One may argue that the largest group of the MPs show static ambition as they prefer to run for legislative office in future elections. Moreover, as various interviewees mentioned, static ambition seems to be the most common type especially for the elderly in local party offices.

Regarding the previous research, it seems that seeking party leadership positions is discouraged to a large extent due to centralist tendencies of political parties in the country, hence, the number of politicians with Intrainstitutional ambition seem to be small compared to above mentioned categories.

Additionally, especially elderly politicians serving in local party offices seem to have discrete ambition, but the interview results also indicate that politicians with no discrete ambition may also need to leave their offices if the parties use their discretion in that direction.

Lastly, regressive ambition seems to be observable with the legislative politicians who would like to embark on local politics careers, or who already had mayoral experience prior to their legislative career. Although regressive ambition has been identified as a survival strategy by some scholars as indicated above, those politicians in Turkey seem to select local offices not as a survival strategy in politics, but as a more salient choice for their political careers.

Moreover, political context and political practices have important influence on political ambition and careers of individuals. Especially with regard to clientelism practices in the

country, localism, occupation and wealth seem to play important roles in the recruitment processes of political elites in general.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This dissertation aimed to explain the determinants of political career patterns of political elites in Turkey by detailed analyses of elite recruitment by parties and political ambitions of individual politicians. Literature provided two important explanations with regard to elite recruitment and candidate selection: supply-side and demand-side explanations. As indicated on the previous pages, various studies unearth the centralist and authoritarian structures of political parties in Turkey. This characteristic seems to one of the most influential factors on elite recruitment by political parties and political career mobility. More specifically, exclusive candidate selection methods seem to be employed in general by political parties in Turkey, and one may argue that this characteristic is emphasizing the importance of demand-side explanation of elite recruitment and candidate selection. Nevertheless, it seems that other factors may also influence these decisions, and career mobility of party elites. Thus, examining the effects of socioeconomic backgrounds, political experience and motivations of the party elites seemed to be useful. In order to explain political career patterns in terms of previously mentioned research questions of the dissertation, socioeconomic backgrounds of political elites including age, gender, education, foreign language, localism and occupation; political experience backgrounds including served terms in the TBMM and bill initiation; party experience including local branch membership, chairmanship and women/youth branch memberships; local politics experience such as mayoral positions and municipal council membership; civil society organizations membership, public office experience, party ideology, district size and electoral results in districts were examined.

More specifically, Chapter 2 explained elite recruitment by political parties and its influence on political careers. Details of different patterns of elite recruitment and candidate selection strategies of political parties were explained by reviewing respective literature. Additionally, various types of party recruitment and candidate selection, such as inclusive and exclusive methods, and candidate selection strategies under different settings were mentioned. Following that, Chapter 3 explained political ambition and its impact on political careers decisions. Different categories of political ambition theories were explained with relevant literature review, and their reflections on political career patterns were underlined. Additionally, factors influencing political ambition and eventually the politicians' decisions to remain in or exit politics were discussed in this chapter to reveal various theories on political ambition and strategical behavior of politicians.

With specific reference to the Turkish case, Chapter 4 provided information about party politics in Turkey regarding the political culture, electoral system(s), party organization, legal regulations on political parties, party system(s) and party competition in the country. This chapter also included the explanation of two noteworthy characteristics of Turkish political parties and their relations with the electorate which are centralist structures of political parties and clientelism. Following this, Chapter 5 explained previously examined elite recruitment patterns and political ambition of individuals in Turkey. This chapter provided main features of party strategies in recruitment and candidate selection by reviewing the respective literature to explain previous practices and their possible reflections to today. Additionally, it included previous research on party elite and parliamentary elite, and their possible career choices with regard to political ambition in the country.

After the examination of various categories of elite recruitment and political ambition provided by previously conducted research, and explanation of particular characteristics and past practices in Turkey, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 provided data analysis and evaluation of the findings.

More specifically, Chapter 6 presented a detailed explanation of proposed hypotheses, data analysis and findings with regard to determinants of career patters of political elite, first-time first-ranked candidates, and candidates with low chance of electability in

Turkey. This chapter also included a comparison of political parties regarding the composition of their MPs, alternation in that composition over time and strategies about candidate selection in Turkey. Results showed that the composition of the MPs in the TBMM has changed through time. For example, educational backgrounds, occupations, gender distribution and foreign language knowledge of the MPs seem to have alternation compared to previous legislative terms which were examined in previous studies. It was revealed in the Chapter 6 that, compared to previous studies, although the educational levels of the MPs do not show dramatic differences from past, attended educational institutions by those MPs show more variety today as more MPs with religious educational attainment occupy seats in the TBMM over time. Moreover, although large groups of MPs had military backgrounds regarding their professions especially in the initial period of the Republican Era, as indicated by previous studies, MPs with engineering backgrounds started to occupy more seats both as MPs, PMs and Presidents of the country. According to the results, lawyers, engineers, academicians, doctors and businessmen construct the most crowded profession groups in the TBMM between 2002 and 2015. As another change, percentage of female MPs increased over time which reveal a difference from the past composition of the TBMM which contained lower percentages of female MPs. Although the number of female MPs is still not sufficient to close the gender gap in politics in the country, at least the percentages seem to increase through time. Additionally, the data showed that the number of MPs who speak Arabic and Kurdish has increased between 2002 and 2015. Hence, more diverse groups of MPs emerged which are clearly different from the past composition of the TBMM explained in other research conducted on previous legislative terms as mentioned in the previous pages. Those changes provide important clues about the change in elite recruitment and political ambition of individuals in the country. Expansion of opportunities to run for office made more individuals to try their chances in political career. In the light of above-mentioned results, Hypothesis 1a (Ideological differences of parties have impact on the socioeconomic composition of their MPs.) seemed to be supported, yet, partially as political parties show both similarities (e.g. with regard to educational levels and occupations) and differences (e.g. with regard to gender distribution, educational backgrounds and foreign language knowledge).

It was also argued that, along with the socioeconomic backgrounds of the MPs, their political experience delivers insights about determinants of career patterns of political

elite in Turkey. The results showed that the party experience does have a positive effect on re-nomination of the MPs in the next elections. More specifically, results suggested that if an MP had local or national party office experience, his or her likelihood of being re-nominated in next elections increases. Hence, the Hypothesis 1b (Acquiring party experience has a positive effect on re-nomination of the MPs in the next general elections.) can be supported by the findings under these circumstances. Additionally, legislative experience (e.g. total served terms in the TBMM and ministerial positions) seems to play a major role in re-nomination chances, but they show opposing effects. While ministerial experience increases the likelihood of re-nomination, total served terms in the TBMM seem to decrease one's chance to be selected as candidate in the next set of elections. These results suggest that pre-parliamentary experience, especially in the form of party experience increases the likelihood of re-nomination in the future elections.

Political party selectorates may also choose those who had no experience in general elections as their candidates. Even so, they nominate some of them as their first-ranked candidates on their party lists in general elections. Data revealed that such candidates are strategically selected by political parties especially in districts where they do not have large swaths of supporters. That is to say, it seems that political parties tend to prefer revising their candidates lists, especially the first ranks if they could not win any seat in a particular district. In fact, by such strategies, some political parties won seats in districts where they previously received no significant success. Hence, one may infer from those findings that, revisions on party lists may provide better electoral opportunities for political parties. Data showed that between 2007 and November 2015 general elections, almost 39% of the first-time candidates are first-time first-ranked candidates. Moreover, it was revealed in the Chapter 6 that party votes in the previous elections (t-1) negatively affect the emergence of first time first rank candidates. In other words, as the number of votes for the party in question decreases in a district, likelihood of nomination of first time first ranked candidates increases. Hence, Hypothesis 2 (Inadequate electoral support (i.e. insufficient vote share to win seats in a particular district) for political parties increases the number of first-time first-ranked candidates on party lists in general elections.) seemed to be supported under these circumstances.

Additionally, with regard to continuity of the candidates and MPs, Hypothesis 3a (Party leadership change decreases the continuity of candidates in the elections following this change.) can be falsified under certain conditions only. It means that, the process and

characteristics of leadership change plays an important role in continuity of the candidates. If the newly elected leader of a party is personally close to the former leader, and/or if the heritage of the former leader is still influencing the party, no considerable or dramatic changes occur in the continuity of the candidates and eventually the MPs. Related to the above-mentioned explanations, data also showed that continuity on candidate lists are not very high in the country. This practice seems to be an opportunity for those who were nominated in unwinnable places or ranks. In other words, revisions and reshuffles on candidate lists may enable individuals who were previously nominated as lower ranked candidates to occupy higher and electable ranks in future elections. Hence, one may argue that Hypothesis 3b (Candidates who accept to be ranked in non-electable positions expect to push their ranks to electable positions over time or rewarded by other positions in the party) was also supported by the findings. Some interviewees also indicated similar explanations with regard to low rank candidacy which also provide support to such an argument.

Following Chapter 6, Chapter 7 revealed personal insights gathered through in-depth interviews conducted with local party elite in the country regarding political ambition and political career choices. More specifically, it provided information on individual politicians' nascent interests, motivations and entrance to politics; their future goals and their evaluation about the political careers. Additionally, this chapter represented discussions on different categories of political ambition in Turkey.

Political ambition seems to be personal issue. However, individuals shape their political ambition by evaluating their circumstances with regard to their chance of being recruited by parties, analyzing the availability of possible positions to occupy or offices to run, considering their competitiveness in nomination races and deciding the relative salience of various offices for themselves. Hence, individuals pursing political career goals need to take various exogenous and endogenous factors into consideration while determining their goals. Data on MPs and candidates in Turkey reveal that it is possible to detect at least a certain number of politicians pursuing each one of the political ambition types mentioned in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, not each ambition category has the same number of politicians. It seems that the largest group of the MPs show static ambition as they prefer to run for legislative office in next elections. Moreover, as many interviewees

mentioned, static ambition seems to be the most common type especially for the elderly in local party offices.

In addition, although a number of career decisions are observable which are driven by intrainstitutional ambition, this type of ambition is not as common as others. Moreover, it seems that challenging to the party leaders to occupy the leadership position is not easy or common in Turkish political parties. Hence, several factors mentioned above seem to be discouraging some individuals either from entering politics or from seeking leadership position in political parties. It is observable that centralist and authoritarian structure of the parties in Turkey are also accepted and/or internalized by many members in various levels of the parties. For example, several interviewees from different political parties mentioned during the interviews that they were eager to occupy certain positions in their respective parties, yet, this is not enough to do that. Only if the party leaders (these can be local branch leaders as well as the national level ones) are approving their position, then they can have that position.

Additionally, regressive ambition seems to be observable with the legislative politicians who would like to embark on local politics careers, or who already had mayoral experience prior to their legislative career. In the political ambition literature, regressive ambition has been identified as a survival strategy in general by some scholars as indicated in the previous chapter. However, in the case of MPs in Turkey, this kind of a decision seem to select local offices not as a survival strategy in politics, but as a more salient choice for their political careers.

Moreover, political context and political practices have important influence on political ambition and careers of individuals. Especially with regard to clientelism practices in the country; localism, occupation and wealth of politicians seem to play important roles in the recruitment processes. These issues were also explained with the insights received from the interviews.

To conclude, this dissertation provided answers to the questions of "What are the determinants of career patterns of political elite in Turkey?", "Why and how do some individuals become first-ranked candidates even though they have never run in general elections prior to their candidacy?", "Why do some individuals become candidates in general elections even though their electability chances are low?" by the help of two unique datasets compiled for this dissertation, and in-depth interviews conducted by local

party elites of four political parties, the AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP, in Turkey. Results show that the composition of the MPs in the TBMM has changed through time; ideological stances of political parties affect the composition of their MPs; political parties strategically revise their party lists and specifically change first-ranked candidates in districts where they are electorally vulnerable; and ambitious politicians accept unwinnable candidacy ranks with the expectation of pushing their ranks to electable positions in future elections.

For future studies, expansion of those datasets and conducting interviews and surveys with MPs in the TBMM may be noteworthy on elite recruitment, political ambition and political career patters in the country. In addition, future studies on elite recruitment and political career patterns may also focus more detailed examination of ministerial elite or municipal elite. Such studies may further present important explanation about political career patterns in Turkey. Similarly, comparative analysis of various countries with regard to political career patterns may provide helpful information to understand the similarities and differences in varying systems and contexts.

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APPENDIX

A.1. Electoral Districts and District Magnitude in Turkey

Turkey has 81 provinces, and the borders of electoral districts are defined in accordance with those provinces. Nevertheless, between 2002 and 2015, three provinces namely İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir contain more than one electoral district as these cities are the top three most populated ones. İstanbul is divided into three electoral districts whereas Ankara and İzmir has two electoral districts per each. Hence, there are 85 electoral districts in total within the time period which is analyzed in this dissertation. District magnitudes are calculated in accordance with the population sizes of the electoral districts, and Table A1 shows number of seats of specific districts.

Table A1: Electoral districts and district magnitude in Turkey (2002-2015)

Electoral District	District Magnitude	Electoral District	District Magnitude	Electoral District	District Magnitude
ADANA	14	ELAZIĞ	4	MALATYA	6
ADIYAMAN	5	ERZİNCAN	2	MANİSA	9
AFYONKARAHİSAR	5	ERZURUM	6	MARDİN	6
AĞRI	4	ESKİŞEHIR	6	MERSİN	11
AKSARAY	3	GAZİANTEP	12	MUĞLA	6
AMASYA	3	GİRESUN	4	MUŞ	3
ANKARA 1	18	GÜMÜŞHANE	2	NEVŞEHIR	3
ANKARA 2	14	HAKKARİ	3	NİĞDE	3
ANTALYA	14	HATAY	10	ORDU	5
ARDAHAN	2	IĞDIR	2	OSMANİYE	4
ARTVİN	2	ISPARTA	4	RİZE	3
AYDIN	7	İSTANBUL 1	31	SAKARYA	7
BALIKESİR	8	İSTANBUL 2	26	SAMSUN	9
BARTIN	2	İSTANBUL 3	31	ŞANLIURFA	12
BATMAN	4	İZMİR 1	13	SİİRT	3

BAYBURT	2	İZMİR 2	13	SİNOP	2
BİLECİK	2	KAHRAMANMARAŞ	8	ŞIRNAK	4
BİNGÖL	3	KARABÜK	2	SİVAS	5
BİTLİS	3	KARAMAN	2	TEKİRDAĞ	6
BOLU	3	KARS	3	TOKAT	5
BURDUR	3	KASTAMONU	3	TRABZON	6
BURSA	18	KAYSERİ	9	TUNCELİ	2
ÇANAKKALE	4	KİLİS	2	UŞAK	3
ÇANKIRI	2	KIRIKKALE	3	VAN	8
ÇORUM	4	KIRKLARELİ	3	YALOVA	2
DENİZLİ	7	KIRŞEHIR	2	YOZGAT	4
DİYARBAKIR	11	KOCAELİ	11	ZONGULDAK	5
DÜZCE	3	KONYA	14	TOTAL	550
EDİRNE	3	KÜTAHYA	4		

A.2. Factor Analysis of Independent Variables in MP Dataset

MPs Dataset contains various independent variables on the personal attributes and political experience of MPs. Political experience variables include women or youth branch membership, district office membership, district chairmanship, provincial office membership, provincial chairmanship, party headquarters membership, proximity to the party leaders, mayoral positions, municipal council membership and civil society organizations membership. Factor analysis was used in order to group these variables and create new independent variables. Table A2 shows the results of factors analysis without any limitation on the number of factors.

Table A2: Factor analysis of political experience variables

Factor analysis/correlation — Number of obs = 2750
Method: principal factors — Retained factors = 5
Rotation: (unrotated) — Number of params = 40

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	1.52230	0.41001	0.5902	0.5902
Factor2	1.11228	0.63060	0.4312	1.0214
Factor3	0.48169	0.17083	0.1867	1.2081
Factor4	0.31086	0.25949	0.1205	1.3286
Factor5	0.05137	0.05643	0.0199	1.3486
Factor6	-0.00506	0.16043	-0.0020	1.3466
Factor7	-0.16549	0.04581	-0.0642	1.2824
Factor8	-0.21131	0.02314	-0.0819	1.2005
Factor9	-0.23445	0.04830	-0.0909	1.1096
Factor10	-0.28275	.	-0.1096	1.0000

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(45) = 4596.13 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factorl	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5	Uniqueness
Women and Youth Branch Membership	0.3828	-0.0027	0.0009	-0.1414	0.1637	0.8067
District Party Membership	0.3945	-0.3363	-0.3739	0.0597	0.0272	0.5871
Provincial Party Membership	0.6118	-0.2215	0.2901	-0.1061	0.0228	0.4807
District Chairperson	0.4357	-0.2856	-0.3533	0.0947	-0.0576	0.5916
Provincial Chairperson	0.5561	-0.1984	0.2772	-0.0526	-0.1134	0.5590
Party HQ Member	0.3885	0.6371	-0.1060	-0.0117	-0.0075	0.4317
Proximity to Leaders	0.3868	0.6423	-0.0645	0.0157	-0.0304	0.4326
Mayor	0.0785	0.0688	0.1110	0.3674	0.0004	0.8418
Municipal Council Member	0.0988	-0.0602	0.1548	0.3416	0.0497	0.8435
Civil Society Organization Member	0.1742	0.0489	0.0665	0.1106	0.0606	0.9469

In order to determine the number of factors, scree plot analysis was done, and relying on the elbow rule as the rule of thumb in this analysis, the number of factors is determined as four.

Graph A1: Scree plot of eigenvalues after factor



Graph A2: Factor loadings of political experience variables



Depending on the factor analysis, there emerge groups of various variables. Women and youth branch membership variable seems to be one variable, while district party membership and district chairperson variables can be grouped into one variable named district party experience; provincial party membership and provincial chairperson in to provincial party experience; party headquarters membership and proximity to leaders into party headquarters experience; mayor, municipal council membership and civil society organization membership into local politics experience. Although the other groupings make more sense, the last one seems to be odd by including the civil society organizations membership. Thus, different types of analyses were done in Chapter 7 by treating these variables in different ways.

A.3. Interview Questions

As mentioned in the previous pages, in-dept interviews were conducted with local party (district and provincial) members and chairs of political parties. The interview questions are shown in Table A3. Some of the questions are gathered from previous research as indicated in the table. The reason for doing this is to catch whether there are any similarities or differences from previous studies.

Table A3: Interview questions asked to local party elite[115]

Question
A. Questions about Political Career
1. How many hours do you spend in party work in one week?
2. Do you think that certain jobs enable people to work more efficiently in the party with regard to their time to spend for the party?
3. Are you a member of another organization such as civil society organizations, business associations, trade unions and so on?
4. Have you ever been a member to another political party? If yes, why did you decide to change the parties?
5. Is there any other person who was/is a party member in your family? If yes, which party, and what was/is their roles?
6. When did you become a member of this party?
7. What are the three most important reasons that motivated you to be a party member?*
8. Why did you specifically prefer this party to become a member?*
9. What was your first work/job in the party when you become a member?
10. What is your current position in the party?
11. What kind of offices did you occupy until now?
12. How did you come up to this position (chair, activity coordinator, etc.) in the party? Can you please share your story with me?*
13. What are your most important roles in the party during ordinary times?
14. What are your most important roles in the party during election times?
15. What is your major source of funding for your party activities?*
16. Do you collect membership fees?*
17. Who do you think is the most powerful decision maker in the party about recruitment of new party actors?
18. Who do you think is the most powerful decision maker in the party about candidate selection in elections?
19. Do you want to stay in your current position or run for other offices?
20. Suppose that you are considering having a higher position in the party, or to be candidate in national or local elections, whose support would increase your chance to achieve that goal?
21. Do you think that a member should start from the bottom to get higher positions in the party? What are the common practices?
B. **Questions about Personal Information**
22. Date of Birth
23. Place of Birth
24. Father's Date of Birth
25. Father's Place of Birth
26. Gender
27. What is your educational attainment?
28. How many languages do you speak?
29. What is your occupational status?
30. How many hours do you spend for your professional occupation/job?

[115] The questions marked with (*) are retrieved from Ayan (2009: 300-302)'s study titled *Theorizing Authoritarian Party Structures: The Case of Turkey*.