

WHY DO STATES APOLOGIZE? A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF INTER-STATE
APOLOGIES FOR WAR-CRIMES

by

MOHAMMAD MOHSIN HUSSAIN

Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Sabanci University,

June 2018


WHY DO STATES APOLOGIZE? A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF INTER-STATE
APOLOGIES FOR WAR-CRIMES

APPROVED BY:


Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Kerim Can Kavaklı
(Thesis Supervisor)



Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Oya Yeğen



Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Konstantinos Travlos



DATE OF APPROVAL: June 4, 2018

© Mohammad Mohsin Hussain 2018

All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

WHY DO STATES APOLOGIZE? A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF INTER-STATE APOLOGIES FOR WAR-CRIMES

MOHAMMAD MOHSIN HUSSAIN

Master's Thesis, June 2018

Supervisor: Dr. Fac.Mem. Kerim Can Kavaklı

There are many cases of historical crimes between countries that continue to hurt inter-state relations. Apologies for historical crimes is one such post-conflict phenomenon that has received a lot of attention by scholars from various fields. However, studies investigating the conditions under which states apologize for historical crimes have not moved beyond a few country-specific cases i.e. German and Japanese apologies for World War II. My thesis aims to address this gap using a new dataset on which states apologized for war-crimes committed in the 20th century, and when these apologies were offered. In particular, I focus on economic incentives, leader ideology and culpability to explain inter-state apologies. I find that states which commit the most severe violations are more likely to apologize, among other factors. However, factors, such as the prospect of bilateral trade and shared religious preferences between two states are not related to apologies. Overall, the goal of my thesis is to clarify the circumstances under which states are able to move beyond historical crimes that harm their bilateral relations.

Keywords: Economic incentives, Leader Ideology and Leader Culpability

ÖZET

DEVLETLER NEDEN ÖZÜR DİLER? SAVAŞ SUÇLARINDAN DOLAYI DEVLETLER ARASI DİLENEN ÖZÜRLERİN SİSTEMATİK ÇALIŞMASI

MOHAMMAD MOHSIN HUSSAIN

Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Haziran 2018

Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Öğr Uyesi Kerim Can Kavaklı

Tarihi pek çok suç, ülkelerin kendi aralarındaki ilişkileri kötü etkilemeye devam etmektedir. Tarihi suçlar için özür dilenmesi, çatışma sonrası dönemler için çeşitli alanlardan pek çok araştırmacının ilgisini çekmiştir. Ancak, hangi şartlar altında, hangi devletlerin işledikleri suçlar için özür dilemesinin araştırılması bir kaç vakaa çalışmasından (Almanya, ve Japonya'nın). Dünya Savaşı için diledikleri özürler) öteye geçmemiştir. Bu bağlamda '20. yüzyılda işlenen savaş suçlarından dolayı' dilenen özürler üzerine oluşturduğum yeni veri seti ile bu alandaki boşlukları doldurmayı amaçlıyorum. Özellikle, ekonomik teşvikler, lider ideolojisi, ve kabahat unsurlarına odaklanar devletler arası özrü incelemekteyim. Bulgularımdan birisi, özellikle en şiddetli savaş suçu ihlallerini uygulayan devletler, başka faktörlerin yanı sıra daha özür dilemeye yatkın olmalarıdır. Fakat, ikili ticaret ve iki devlet arasında paylaşılan dini tercihler özür dilenmesiyle ilişkilendirilememiştir. Genel itibariyle tezimin amacı hangi koşullarda ikili ilişkileri etkileyen tarihi savaş suçlardan özür dilendiğini tespit etmektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ekonomik teşvikler, Lider İdeolojisi ve Kabahat Unsurlarına Odaklanar

To my parents, who have supported all my endeavors, big or small. To my brother, for being strong despite all he has gone through. And, to my aunt Asma, who fed me books, and encouraged my passion for Political Science when others did not.

Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank my thesis adviser Prof. Kerim Can Kavaklı from Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Sabanci University. This thesis would not have been possible without his help, both as a mentor and a friend. He firmly believed in the viability of this project: political apologies and made sure that I saw the project's potential too. His door was always open when I had questions regarding my research or otherwise. For this project, Prof. Kavaklı offered several hypotheses, variables, and empirical measures for my study. Overall, Prof. Kavaklı has not just been an excellent supervisor; he has mentored me in the field of political science, and has offered me advice, which I believe will serve me in the years to come. I look forward to working with him on future projects.

I would also like to thank the jury members: Prof. Oya Yeğen and Prof. Konstantinos Travlos for taking their time to read and offer useful suggestions on my thesis.

Lastly, I would like to offer my special thanks to Prof. Emre Hatipoğlu, and Melike Ayse Koçacık, who have lent me their support, advice, and assistance whenever I asked for it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	4
2.1. POLITICAL APOLOGIES: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION.....	5
2.2. RESEARCH ON INTER-STATE CONFLICT	7
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES	9
3.1. SEVERITY OF VIOLATIONS AND APOLOGIES	10
3.2. ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF APOLOGIES	11
3.3. LEADER CULPABILITY AND THE DECISION TO APOLOGIZE.....	12
3.4. LEADER IDEOLOGY AND APOLOGIES	14
3.5. SHARED GEOPOLITICAL PREFERENCES AND APOLOGIES.....	16
3.6. DOMESTIC TRIALS AND APOLOGIES	17
3.7. TESTING FOR ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS	18
4. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN	21
4.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE.....	23
4.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES.....	23
4.3. CONTROL VARIABLES.....	26
4.4. METHOD	28
5. RESULTS.....	29
5.1. FINDINGS.....	31
5.2. LIMITATIONS.....	36
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS	37
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY	39

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures:

Figure 1: Average Marginal Effects of Balance of Violations.....33

Figure 2: Average Marginal Effects of Time since Last Leadership Transition.....34

Tables:

Table 1: Determinants of Inter-State Apologies for War Crimes.....29

1. INTRODUCTION

Massive human rights violations take place in almost every war. These atrocities create long-lasting grievances and, unless they are addressed, poison relations between states. Consider the case of Sino-Japanese relations, which remain tense as China holds grievances against Japan for the Nanking massacre. Chinese officials have regularly blamed Japan for rape during the Nanking massacre of 1938, where Japan committed several other mass atrocities. In 2012, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged complaints against Japanese politicians who denied the Nanking Massacre (BBC, 2012). As a result, Sino-Japanese relations remain tense to this day, as China demands acknowledgement, apologies, and reparations for past Japanese war crimes (BBC, 2012).

Sometimes, actors address grievances by apologizing for past crimes. For example, Germany has addressed grievances for its Nazi past by apologizing repeatedly to its victims. On the other hand, there are countries, such as USA, which refuse to apologize. U.S.A has never issued an apology for atrocities, such as the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan. Moreover, actors apologize to some actors, but not others. For instance, Germany apologized to Israel for the Holocaust, but not to Russia for World War-II crimes. There are also cases, where an actor apologized early to one victim, but much later to another victim. A good example is again Germany, which apologized to Poland in 1970, but apologized to Greece in 2015. These cases raise the question: What determines if and when a state apologizes to another state for past war crimes?

In my thesis, I ask these questions in relation to inter-state conflict. My main research question is, “When and why do states apologize for past crimes in inter-state wars?” This thesis intends to make two contributions; first, I offer a theoretical framework, which accounts for when states apologize for past crimes. Second, I conduct a statistical analysis of when inter-state apologies are offered. To my knowledge, no systematic study on inter-state apologies exists. My study investigates when and why states apologize both theoretically and empirically.

To investigate when states apologize, I theorize that leaders of perpetrator states compare the costs and benefits of apologizing and apologize when the benefits are relatively high. My theory of apologies invites discussion into possible benefits and costs of apologizing. Possible benefits include trade benefits, and reduced stigma for the perpetrator-state. On the other hand, possible costs include financial costs of reparations and the psychological or ideological burden of accepting responsibility for inter-state crimes. In my thesis, I create and use empirical measures of these associated costs and benefits and study their effect on a leader’s decision to apologize. In addition, I also consider several alternative explanations for why states apologize. One alternative explanation is that apologies are extracted from defeated states. Another alternative explanation for why states apologize is the existence of shared religious and cultural norms between the perpetrator-state and victim-state. Finally, I also explore the argument that democratic or jointly democratic states are more likely to apologize than others.

My findings show that leader characteristics, such as a leader’s ideology and his/her lack of association with war-crimes explain inter-state apologies in tandem with state and systemic-level characteristics. This suggests an interplay between domestic, state, and systemic-level characteristics for inter-state apologies. However, some state-level characteristics, such as shared religious values between states do not explain state apologies. I also observe some interesting state-level trends: I find that democratic states are less likely to apologize when the victim-state is not a democracy. I also find that states apologize to states with larger economies. At the systemic level, I find that during the Cold War era, states were more likely to apologize. Additionally, having common allies influences leaders’ decision to apologize, but only in the post-1990s’ era.

Why are these findings important? These findings hold implications for policy: knowing which leader incentives matter allows third-parties to find leverage, which can push actors towards reconciliation. In doing so, third parties can influence the incumbent's decision to apologize, and settle past grievances with other countries. My research also suggests that similarity of geopolitical preferences increases chances of an inter-state apology. Third-parties in international conflicts can influence leaders to recognize such similarities and encourage alliances by incentivizing bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

The thesis proceeds as follows. In the second chapter, I will conduct a literature review on political apologies. In the third chapter, I present my theory of inter-state apologies and introduce testable hypotheses. In the fourth chapter, I present my data and research design. Findings of my study are presented in the fifth chapter. Finally, the thesis concludes with a brief discussion on areas for future research.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

I use this section of my thesis to explore several streams of literature, which are relevant to my study on inter-state apologies for past crimes.¹ In doing so, I highlight the importance of studying political apologies, how the current literature has investigated political apologies, and why and how my study on inter-state apologies contributes to the relevant literature. This scholarly discussion enriches my theory and hypotheses for exploring inter-state apologies.

¹ There exists a huge literature on interpersonal apologies, which I exclude from the literature review. For a full review, see De Cremer et al, 2011.

2.1 POLITICAL APOLOGIES: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION

One such post-conflict phenomenon, which has contributed to reconciliation between states is political apologies. There exists a rich literature on political apologies, which spans across several fields of social science.² In the realm of International Relations, case studies on German and Japanese apologies have explored the consequences of apologies on diplomatic and economic relations (Lind, 2008; Wolfe, 2014). In the German case, these scholars found that the international community has welcomed their apologies for World War II atrocities. As a result, Germany's bilateral relations have improved (Lind, 2008). On the other hand, Japanese World War II apologies were met unfavorably by their recipients and resulted in a national backlash in Japan (Lind, 2008). However, these studies on state apologies do not go beyond a few country-specific cases, and therefore, cannot be generalized to other cases of interest.

Scholars have also studied the consequences of political apologies offered by leaders to their public (Cunningham, 1999). These studies contend that the 1990s was an era of 'national self-reflexivity', as leaders from various countries apologized to disenfranchised communities for past injustices. Cases which have received the most scholarly attention in this field are: Clinton's apology to African-Americans for slavery, and Canada's apology for crimes committed in Indian residential schools (Cunningham, 1999).

In sum, the existing literature on political apologies has not explored inter-state apologies for past crimes. Moreover, scholars studying these topics have focused on the consequences rather than causes behind political apologies.

Political apologies have also been discussed in the context of political philosophy and political theory, where scholars have discussed the power of political apologies, why states ought to apologize for past crimes, and the role state apologies can play for improving

² Scholars who have studied political apologies: Lind (2008), Gibney and Rostrom (2001), Nobles (2008), Ho (2005), Wolfe (2014), Rivera (2008), Adler-Nissen (2014), Penic et al (2016), Barkan (2006), Cunningham (1998; 2001), Espindola (2013), Corn-Tassel and Holder (2008), Zarakol (2010), Wenzel et al (2017), Smith (2008), Harris et al (2006), Mihai (2013), Mihai and Thaler (2014), Auerbach (2005), Borneman (2005) and Marrus (2007), Wagner and Stack (2012), Doosje et al (2006), Zaiser and Giner-Sorolla (2013), Frantz and Bennigson (2004), Leunissen et al (2011), Lewicki et al (2016) and De Cremer et al (2011).

treatment of disenfranchised communities (Mihai 2013; Wagner, 2000). While insightful, this scholarly discussion is about why states ought to apologize, rather than why states apologize. By investigating why states apologize empirically, I intend to bridge normative and empirical work on inter-state apologies.

Furthermore, some conflict scholars have investigated the circumstances in which groups affected by collective violence experience collective guilt (Penic et al, 2016). These scholars found that groups which experience collective violence, are more prone to guilt in the conflict's aftermath. Feelings of guilt can push people to apologize for atrocities. Nevertheless, findings from these studies on collective guilt are limited to communal conflict and offer no implications for apologies exchanged at the inter-state level. I thus explore ex-ante implications of inter-state apologies in my study. For instance, I explore the prospect of alleviating guilt via apologizing. I achieve this by exploring whether leaders from states, which have committed severe war crimes are more likely to apologize.

Recent work from the field of Political Psychology has proven relevant for our study, where scholars have explored collective apologies in experimental settings (Wenzel et al, 2017). Scholars from this field have found that timing of an apology affects how recipients evaluate the apology. These studies however, mainly explore the consequences of collective apologies and are limited to the individual level of analysis. My study explores apologies at the domestic, state and systemic level, and thus broadens the scope of analysis for apologies.

If there is one consensus shared by scholars studying political apologies, it is that when states apologize, they reap political benefits following their act of contrition (see Nobles, 2008). Political benefits, such as votes from disenfranchised groups have been identified by these scholars. However, not much has been said about which political benefits matter for leaders considering an inter-state apology. Moreover, the link between domestic incentives and foreign policy has not been explored for apologies. My study addresses this gap by exploring political benefits of apologies in a systematic matter. Also, I reveal how leader incentives at home influence apologizing for inter-state crimes.

Countries which do not apologize, also risk poisoning their international reputation. Indeed, some scholars of international relations have shown that countries which remain unapologetic for past crimes, risk stigmatization at the international level (Adler-Nissen,

2014). Previous literature on this issue has explored the Turkish case, where Turkey's unapologetic stance towards Armenian genocide has hurt its bilateral relations (Nobles, 2008). Scholars have also identified Turkey's refusal to apologize for the Armenian Genocide as an impediment to its EU accession process (Zarakol, 2010).³ Additionally, the literature stigmatization has also focused on which strategies states use to deal with their stigmatization. Rivera (2008) for example, found that Croatia deals with its stigmatization by feigning ignorance of its violent past. In contrast, others, such as Germany and Austria have dealt with their stigmatization by embracing their violent past and apologizing for their war crimes (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Lind, 2008; Rivera, 2008).

But, if stigmas are costly for international relations, why do some states address this stigma via apologizing, whereas others do not? In my study of interstate apologies, I address this puzzle by exploring material, psychological and reputational costs leaders of perpetrator-states of apologizing. In doing so, I intend to show that leaders which face these costs are less likely to apologize. Overall, this would explain why some states deal with stigma associated with international crimes via apologizing, whereas others choose not to.

2.2 RESEARCH OF INTER-STATE CONFLICT

My discussion of the political apologies' literature shows that the circumstances in which states apologize for past crimes remain unexplored. For our purpose, some studies on interstate conflict, offer insight into why states might be reluctant in admitting to inter-state crimes. In her study on why states no longer declare war, Fazal (2013) argued that states are subject to high material costs e.g. reparations when held accountable for war crimes. To avoid these costs, states in recent years have stopped declaring war to evade accountability

³ See also the European Commission's (2006) report, which lists an apology for Armenian Genocide as one of the requirements for Turkey's EU accession.

under international law (Fazal, 2013). In another study, Fazal (2013) found that the same material costs associated with accountability prevent states from concluding peace treaties in the aftermath of conflict. I find these studies useful for my investigation of inter-state apologies, as they suggest why states might find it difficult to offer apologies for past abuses. However, these studies offer no implications for why some states apologize for past crimes, despite the cost of accountability under international law.

Scholars have also shown that economic interdependence between states reduces conflict (Gartzke et al, 2001; Gasiorowski, 1986; Keohane, 1986). In addition, several studies have shown that democracies are less likely to risk conflict with each other (Gartzke, 1998; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Mesquita et al, 1999; Owen, 1994).

But, what makes states apologize for atrocities committed during inter-state conflict? I argue that this research on inter-state conflict has implications for not just peace, but also inter-state reconciliation. Currently, these explanations have not been used to investigate why states apologize. My study on inter-state apologies incorporates this research to study when and why states apologize for war crimes.

In sum, no comprehensive study on inter-state apologies exists, and therefore, my study is novel in that regard. Using my newly constructed dataset of 'Inter-State Apologies for Inter-State War Crimes', I explore the universe of inter-state apologies in a systematic manner. My main argument is that leaders of perpetrator-states apologize when the political and economic benefits are higher than the social and psychological costs of admitting to past atrocities. Overall, my thesis reveals the circumstances in which states are willing to move beyond past crimes and achieve reconciliation. The next chapter of my thesis presents my theory and hypotheses for investigating inter-state apologies for past crimes.

3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

In this section, I present the theoretical framework for exploring inter-state apologies. My theory states that leaders of perpetrator-states i.e. leaders of states responsible for the crimes, compare the costs and benefits of apologizing. Things that make benefits larger raise the likelihood of apologies. Conversely, things that make costs larger reduce the likelihood of apologies. Using this theory, I expect the leader to apologize when the benefits of apologizing outweigh the costs.

Why do leaders matter for apologies? Previous research on political linkages have shown that leader incentives matter in domestic and international politics. For instance, Croco (2011) has shown how a leader's association with war outcomes can influence his/her decision to continue unsuccessful inter-state wars. Similarly, Putnam (1998) revealed that leaders play a vital role in domestic and international negotiation. Other notable scholars, such as Mesquita and Siverson (1995) have revealed how leader dynamics, such as re-election prospects and presidential terms, influence a state's foreign policy.

In similar vein, I argue that leader incentives matter for apologizing. I produce testable hypotheses to explore my leader-centric theory of apologies. Each hypothesis explores either a benefit or a cost of apologizing for leaders.

3.1 SEVERITY OF VIOLATIONS AND APOLOGIES

Previous research on interpersonal apologies has shown that perpetrators often apologize when they feel guilty about their past transgressions (Zaiser and Giner-Sorolla, 2013). As such, feelings of shame become a psychological cost for the perpetrator, which is exacerbated when the crimes are severe (Nadler and Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009). Thus, the act of apologizing becomes the perpetrator's only means of restoring his/her dignity (Marrus, 2007).

Many German leaders have expressed how the Holocaust made them feel guilty (Barkan, 2013). For example, the German ambassador to Israel expressed how ashamed he felt for the severe violations Nazis committed against the Jewish community (Deseret News, 2000). On the other hand, leaders whose states have committed few or light violations feel less guilty. For instance, Polish leaders show reluctance in apologizing, as they shift the blame of severe war-crimes to their Nazi counterparts (Bloomberg, 2018).

Therefore, I argue that leaders whose states have committed worse violations will be more likely to apologize, as doing so would alleviate their psychological burden (i.e. feelings of guilt).⁴ My first hypothesis thus states:

Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, states that committed worse violations against their adversary in a war relative to the violations they suffered are more likely to apologize.

In the next chapter, I introduce an empirical measure for severity of violations.

⁴ This argument does not consider the causal mechanism linking severe violations with the perpetrator's feelings of guilt. Future research should explore this relationship between severe violations and personal guilt further.

3.2 ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF APOLOGIES

One of the benefits of apologizing would be the prospect of trade. Previous research on economic interdependence has suggested that states value economic gains, and pursue diplomacy aimed at enhancing their trade portfolio (Keohane, 1988). An example of this is Yeltsin's visit to Japan in 1995, where he apologized to Japan for World War II, and then discussed the undertaking of trade initiatives (LA Times, 1993).

The literature on conflict and trade interdependence is vast. This literature on 'trade promotes peace' maintains that states would not risk trade gains by initiating conflict. Often, political conflict is initiated with the intent to coerce the party into providing concessions to the initiator (Morrow, 1999). However, bilateral trade makes political conflict undesirable, as concessions gained from conflict are less appealing than trade benefits (Gartzke, 2003).

Similarly, I expect leaders to apologize ex-ante if prospective trade benefits are being lowered due to ongoing inter-state conflict. Morrow (1999) discusses how inter-state conflict is like a bargaining-situation, where actors risk conflict to receive concessions from the other. But, the prospect of trade reduces incentives for conflict, as more is gained from trade than playing a costly game (Morrow, 1999). Thus, my second hypothesis states that:

Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, leaders are more likely to apologize when trade lost due to hostilities is greater.

Another indicator of economic prospects would be the victim-state's economic size. A strong economy in the victim-state would incentivize apologizing, as cooperation with victim-state might include several material benefits: trade gains, financial and military aid. For example, Japan apologized for World War II to U.S in the wake of a new trans-pacific trade deal and the promise of military assistance (FP, 2015). My third hypothesis thus states:

Hypothesis 3: All else being equal, states are more likely to apologize when victim-state has a larger economy.

In contrast to Hypothesis 3, I expect the perpetrator-state's economic size to decrease the likelihood of an apology. This is because a perpetrator-state with vast economic resources would not have a strong incentive to trade with the victim-state. For example, Chinese leaders would be less inclined to seek economic cooperation with Turkey, as China already dominates the international market. On the other hand, Turkey would be more likely to consider Germany for economic cooperation, as Germany lacks economic resources, and is more likely to accommodate Turkey's goal for economic cooperation. Therefore, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 4: All else being equal, states with a larger economy are less likely to apologize.

Although prospects of bilateral trade are strong incentives for apologizing, I argue that they are not the only ones. In the next part of this chapter, I discuss how the lack of culpability also provides a good incentive for a leader to apologize. Afterwards, I discuss how certain ideological characteristics of a leader lower costs of apologizing. Several other benefits and costs of apologizing are discussed subsequently.

I introduce empirical measures for trade lost due to hostilities and economic size in the next chapter.

3.3. LEADER CULPABILITY AND THE DECISION OF APOLOGIZE

In recent work, leader culpability has been defined as a leader's association with an inter-state war, which risks domestic punishment if the war outcome is unfavorable (Croco, 2011). This research is important, as it reveals how leaders can suffer material and reputational costs

for being involved in an unfavorable conflict. Croco (2011) shows that leader culpability can lower the chances of re-election for those involved in a losing inter-state war. I argue that this research bears implications for inter-state apologies; just like leaders can be punished for costly wartime ventures, they can also suffer punishment at home for association with war crimes.

This threat of domestic punishment for culpable leaders introduces what Croco (2011) dubs as the “decider’s dilemma”, where culpable leaders wishing to apologize may hold back, fearing domestic backlash. For example, Tony Blair faced heavy domestic backlash in UK after apologizing for the invasion of Iraq, which he admitted was based on false information (The Telegraph, 2015). In addition to losing his reputation, Blair also turned the Conservative Party’s reputation unfavorable, which scholars believe pushed voters towards anti-EU parties, and thus caused Brexit (Global Research, 2016).

In addition to reputational and material costs, culpable leaders might also face psychological costs. Culpable leaders might experience cognitive dissonance, especially if they find theirs or the state’s war crimes as justified. Research on post-conflict societies has shown that perpetrators find it difficult to accept their crimes, as their mindset has justified those atrocities (Kingma, 2001). For example, Pakistani leaders refuse to apologize to Bangladesh for mass atrocities, as they find those justified due to Bengalis involvement with India during the war (Huffington Post, 2015).

In sum, leader culpability introduces psychological, material, and reputational costs for the leader, where apologizing for past crimes turns into a burden rather than relief. My fifth hypothesis thus states:

Hypothesis 5: All else being equal, culpable leaders are less likely to apologize for war crimes.

In contrast, I expect non-culpable leaders to apologize for atrocities, as their lack of association with such atrocities lowers the likelihood of domestic punishment. Moreover, their lack of association with the war-crime reduces guilt and increases likelihood of an apology.

Additionally, I argue that a new leadership is more likely to be unassociated with past inter-state war crimes. This is because new leaders can distance themselves from crimes committed by previous ruling-coalitions. Mesquita et al (2004)'s selectorate theory has explored how the characteristics of a leader's ruling-coalition influence his policymaking. In my study, I explore whether a leader unassociated with a guilty ruling-coalition is more likely to apologize. I conceptualize lack of culpability i.e. no association with a war crime, as a leader not being part of the ruling coalition with ties to war crimes. Separately, I test this hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6: All else being equal, new leaders are more likely to apologize.

3.4 LEADER'S IDEOLOGY AND APOLOGIES

Controversial policies, such as the policy to continue warring with a state, can incur domestic backlash from the public (Croco, 2011). In similar vein, apologizing for war-crimes can also be costly for the leader. Moreover, victim-states might find apologies offered by publicly accountable leaders as lacking commitment— domestic backlash could compel a leader to renege on their inter-state apology. For example, when pressed by the Argentinian media on his apology for Falklands war, the then Argentinian leader Carlos Menem retracted his statement (BBC, 1998).

However, I argue that a nationalist leader could evade domestic backlash for apologizing, thus increasing his/her incentive for saying sorry. My argument is inspired from the literature on the 'Nixon-goes-to-China-hypothesis', which states that nationalist leaders enjoy greater credibility and can thus proceed with policies deemed controversial by their counterparts (Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998). A great example of this is Trump being praised for his latest statement on reconciliation with North Korea. As a counterfactual, a similar reaction

from a democratic leader may not have been met with a positive response. Thus, if a leader can evade domestic backlash, he/she can find it less costly to apologize for past crimes.

Therefore, I predict that nationalist leaders are more likely to apologize. As such, I test whether ideology is related to inter-state apology:

Hypothesis 7: All else being equal, nationalist leaders are more likely to apologize for war crimes.

However, some research shows that nationalist ideology does not support negative criticism of the country. To elaborate, nationalists see their country as without any faults, and find past crimes against other countries as either justified or non-existent (Hart, 1999). For example, many Japanese nationalist politicians refuse to acknowledge blame for Japan's World War II crimes. These Japanese politicians visit shrines of those accused, and hail them as national heroes (The Guardian, 2016). Moreover, several Japanese politicians have called for re-writing of national history, so that a pro-Japanese narrative of World War II is supported (Lind, 2008)

This implies that nationalist leaders have a psychological cost associated with apologizing. Saying sorry for nationalists means accommodating a world view that their nation is imperfect. Due to nationalist ideology's incompatibility with such views, mental discomfort can occur. Thus, I test for this explanation via the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 8: All else being equal, nationalist leaders are less likely to apologize for war crimes.

In the next chapter, I discuss the empirical measure I use for leader's ideology.

3.5 SHARED GEO-POLITICAL PREFERENCES AND APOLOGIES

Leaders have political goals, which includes geopolitical preferences for their state. Until recently, South Korean leaders feared military threats from North Korea, and permitted U.S and UN troops to patrol the border between North and South Korea. Since U.S also considered North Korea as a threat, the geopolitical preferences of South Korea and U.S aligned and ensured cooperation in this issue.

Countries with similar preferences often build alliances to achieve their political goals. Alliances are an important foreign policy tool, which are used to serve a leader's political agenda. Many scholars from International Relations contend that states build alliances to achieve political goals, such as alleviating regional threats⁵. For example, Israel's alliance with the U.S ensured military assistance during its inter-state wars in the Middle East.

Similarly, I argue that leaders would apologize if they share similar geopolitical preferences with the victim-state. Leaders often promise certain foreign policy goals to their public and can face domestic backlash for reneging on them (Fearon, 1994). Given these commitments, leaders would realize that material benefits gained from cooperating on foreign policy goals would outweigh psychological and reputational costs associated with apologizing. For example, Japanese leader Shinzo Abe apologized to U.S for World War II during talks for an even closer military alliance, and trade ties via Trans-Pacific Partnership (FP, 2015). This is interesting, as Abe has been unapologetic about Japanese war crimes before. Thus, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 9: All else being equal, leaders with similar geopolitical preferences are more likely to apologize for war crimes

I introduce an empirical measure for similar geopolitical preferences in the next chapter.

⁵ For a complete discussion on the importance of inter-state alliances, see Palmer and Morgan (2006), p.139-142.

3.6 DOMESTIC TRIALS AND APOLOGIES

In extant literature on transitional justice, scholars have argued that justice could either be restorative i.e. address grievances of the victim or retributive i.e. punishment for the perpetrators. However, recent research has shown that these two components of justice can be complementary instead of contradictory (Powers and Proctor, 2017). For instance, Powers and Proctor (2017) have shown how countries, which implement transitional justice mechanisms are more likely to offer reparations for domestic and international crimes.⁶

Since reparations are often preceded by inter-state apologies, I argue that leaders pursuing transitional justice are more likely to apologize for inter-state war crimes. For example, transitional justice in Germany led to reparations for past crimes, which were then followed by many inter-state apologies.

Domestic trials are a mechanism of transitional justice and are indicative of the leadership's willingness to punish perpetrators. These trials are conducted with the intent to appease victims, who wish to see perpetrators held accountable for their crimes. Previous research has shown that transitional justice mechanisms, such as trials are often conducted by new leadership, which holds perpetrators from the previous regime accountable. Since these leaders are interested in holding perpetrators accountable, they might also deem it necessary to address grievances of their victims. Leaders pursue transitional justice for numerous reasons, such as out of moral obligation and winning international and domestic support. The presence of transitional justice mechanisms implies that the new leadership sees this process in its interests. Therefore, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 10: All else being equal, domestic trials increase the likelihood of an inter-state apology.

⁶ In their study, Power and Proctor (2017) explored reparations for all human rights' violations between 1969-2006. This differs from my study, as I study apologies for inter-state violations, as listed in Morrow (2006)'s Laws of War dataset. Moreover, my study covers a larger temporal domain: 1945-2016, where I explore domestic, state, and systemic factors for inter-state apologies.

3.7 TESTING FOR ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

So far, my theory of inter-state apologies has focused on leader incentives for apologizing. However, the giving of an apology could also be associated with regime-characteristics. Proponents of a regime-based explanation include scholars, who offer both normative and institutional explanations of regimes (Oneal and Russett, 1993). The extant literature on ‘democratic peace’ has discussed how democratic norms reduces inter-state conflict. Normative explanations of democratic peace contend that democratic regimes are based on political norms, which regulate competition through peaceful means (Doyle, 1986) This means that for democratic regimes, winning does not require elimination of your opponents. Thus, democratic norms allow for a “live and let live” atmosphere. In such an atmosphere, democratic regimes might be willing to compromise, and apologize if doing so alleviates political conflict, and leads to further cooperation. Thus, my eighth hypothesis states:

Hypothesis 11: All else being equal, democratic states are more likely to apologize than non-democratic states.

Proponents of ‘democratic peace’, however believe that democratic norms do not prevent conflict between a democratic and an authoritarian state. The argument is that authoritarian states are not expected to follow democratic norms, as they follow different ones. Thus, democratic peace is only possible between democratic states.

Hypothesis 12: All else being equal, the likelihood of apologies between jointly democratic states increases.

What about shared cultural and religious characteristics between the perpetrator-state and victim-state? Several studies at the individual and group-level show that actors with similar beliefs and practices find it easier to forgive each other (Auerbach, 2005; Doosje et al, 2006). In contrast, studies on ethno-religious conflicts show that ethnic groups find it easier to target and dehumanize groups, which are different from them (Druckman, 1994). Both these studies have implications for inter-state relations, as states sharing religious views might find

it easier to apologize and forgive each other. This is because states with similar religion as the victim would find themselves as members of the same in-group. Several psychological studies have explored the concept of an in-group bias, where in-group members view each other more favorably (Tajfel, 1982). Moreover, studies in political psychology have shown that members are more willing to forgive members of their own in-group (Doosie et al, 2006). Thus, the psychological cost of apologizing would be reduced when the victim-state shares similar religious views. On the other hand, states who have dissimilar religious characteristics with the victim-state may consider apologizing as a psychological cost, as they would then view the victim-state as an out-group member.

Hypothesis 13: All else being equal, the likelihood of apologies between states with shared religious characteristics increases.

Scholars have also argued that some cultures are more conducive to democratic norms than others (Huntington, 2008). This ‘cultural norms’ argument is related to the argument concerning democratic norms, as cultures supporting democracy would be more likely to apologize. Unfortunately, I was unable to find data on ‘shared cultural norms’ and was thus unable to control for this alternative argument. However, the data on religion was easily procured.

A popular explanation, which dominates the extant literature on political apologies is that apologies became more likely in the post-Cold War era. Cunningham (1999) dubs the post-Cold war era as an era of ‘national self-reflexivity’, when due to rapid democratization and spread of human rights’ norms, leaders became more likely to apologize for associated crimes (Cunningham, 1999). Examples of leaders apologizing in this era include Bill Clinton’s apology for U.S’ slavery, and Trudeau’s apology to Native Indians for past mistreatment (Nobles, 2008). Therefore, inter-state apologies should be more likely in the post-Cold War era.

Hypothesis 14: All else being equal, apologies are more likely in the post-Cold War era.

Some scholars studying the effect of human rights’ norms contend that over time, human rights’ norms get internalized by the society, and make states more committed to protecting human rights (Risse and Sikkink, 1999). These human rights’ norms are expected to

influence state and society following commitments to international human rights' treaties. For instance, Risse and Sikkink (1999) show that many of the basic rights present in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been internalized at the state and domestic level and have influenced many states to provide these basic rights. As discussed earlier, the extant literature on apologies has also discussed the impact of human rights' norms on political apologies (Cunningham, 1999). Scholars like Cunningham (1999) argue that human rights' norms in democratic states led to self-reflection in many political leaders, thus influencing their decision to apologize for past atrocities. The following hypothesis tests this human rights' norm-based explanation for apologies:

Hypothesis 15: All else being equal, states committed to human rights' norms should be more likely to apologize for war crimes.

Finally, there are past examples of victors forcibly extracting apologies from those whom they defeated in war. An oft-cited case of forced apologies is Germany, which under the Versailles treaty, accepted responsibility for World War I (Birdsall, 1962). Known famously as the 'war-guilt clause', Germany was also forced to pay heavy reparations to France per the treaty. Thus, I argue that defeated states should be more likely to apologize to victors for inter-state war crimes. My 14th hypothesis thus states:

Hypothesis 16: All else being equal, defeated states are more likely to apologize for war crimes.

4. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The unit of analysis is perpetrator-state-victim-state-year. I identify a perpetrator-state in my dataset as the state which committed the war crime. A victim-state is the target of the perpetrator-state's war crime. In my dataset, I only look at apologies offered for inter-state war crimes, which are crimes one state committed against another during a war. I have obtained the information on inter-state crimes from Morrow (2006)'s dataset on inter-state crimes. Morrow (2006)'s dataset lists inter-state crimes for 63 countries, which fought 48 wars during the years 1900-2000. The inter-state crimes listed in Morrow (2006)'s dataset cover nine issue-areas. These are, namely war-crimes against: *Civilians, Prisoners of Wars' abuse, Usage of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Aerial Bombing, Damage to Cultural Property, Conduct on High Seas, Armistice/Ceasefire, Treatment of Wounded Enemy and Declaration of War*. I use Morrow (2006)'s dataset as it holds information on specific inter-state war crimes, which I use to check if a state has offered an apology for a specific war crime. Thus, my universe of inter-state apologies is limited to apologies offered for inter-state war crimes, as presented in Morrow (2006)'s 'Laws of War' dataset.

For each perpetrator-state-victim-state-year dyad, I coded if and when an apology was offered by a high-ranking state official. I used data on inter-state war crimes from Morrow

(2006)'s dataset to code apologies offered by officials for a specific issue-area, such as POW abuse if available. In total, I have 382 perpetrator-state-victim-state-year dyads, which are the total number of violations in Morrow's dataset. Additionally, I also coded attributes of each apology offered, such as whether the apology offered was vague or specific in its wording. Each attribute of an apology was coded as a dichotomous variable, and the attributes measured were: 'specific vs broad', 'clear vs vague', and whether the apology was offered to multiple recipients or just one. I coded specificity of an apology as '1' if the apology was offered for a specific war-crime (e.g. POW abuse), and '0' if otherwise. Clearness of an apology was coded as '1' if the apology offered was clear i.e. the apology included the words 'I am sorry' or 'I apologize' and coded as '0' if the apology was vague or imprecise in its wording. An example of a vague apology would be, "I deeply regret...". If the apology was offered to multiple recipients, I code the multiple-recipients variable as '1', and '0' otherwise.

My dataset on 'Apologies for Inter-State Crimes' covers the years 1900-2016. However, due to missing observations for some key variables, such as *Presence of a Nationalist Executive*, my analysis is limited to years 1945-2016. My baseline model looks at apologies for all inter-state war violations.

Additionally, I include an alternative model, which analyzes apologies for inter-state war violations against an adversary's civilians. In Morrow (2006)'s *Laws of War* dataset, violations against civilians in an inter-state war are coded as: mistreatment or killing of non-combatants i.e. unarmed people by a state. An example of this would be Japan's bombing of Chinese civilians in a World War II raid. I use the alternative model as a robustness check; I explore whether my theory of inter-state apology also holds for specific inter-state war violations, such as crimes committed against civilians by a perpetrator-state.⁷

I have excluded inter-state apologies, which were offered to a state founded after a war (e.g. Israel). I have also excluded inter-state apologies not offered by people of high rank or authority, such as apologies offered by human rights' activists. My dataset also excludes repeated apologies i.e. apologies offered by a perpetrator repeatedly for an inter-state

⁷ I could not include models for other specific inter-state war violations, such as *POW abuse* as *Crimes against Civilians* was the only specific war-crime in Morrow (2006)'s *Laws of War* dataset with sufficient inter-state apologies for analysis.

violation. An example of a repeat apology would be Germany's apology to France for World War II every year after the apology was offered.

4.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable is 'Apology Offered', which is binary and is coded as 1 if a perpetrator has apologized to the victim in a given year for a specific war-crime; and is coded 0 otherwise. For example, Germany apologized to France for World War I for declaring war, and subsequently for World War II. The dependent variable is coded 1 for the year Germany apologized to France for World War I, and for the year Germany apologized to France for World War II. Overall, I have coded 20 apologies, which cover roughly 5 percent of inter-state violations in my dataset.

4.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

My information for independent variables comes from existing datasets, which I have merged with my dataset on inter-state apologies. Concepts measured by independent variables are related to my theory, which posits that leaders of a perpetrator-state compare the costs and benefits of apologizing. For instance, some independent variables in my dataset measure benefits of apologizing, whereas others measure the costs of apologizing

for an inter-state crime. In addition, I have also included control variables in my dataset, which test alternative explanations for inter-state apologies.

The data on the similarity of geopolitical preferences is obtained from the ‘United Nations General Assembly Voting’ dataset (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017) which measures similarity in geopolitical preferences between dyads as s-scores. I use these s-scores to check whether similar geopolitical preferences between perpetrator-state and their victim-state influence the likelihood of apologizing.

Trade lost due to hostilities is measured as the gap between actual and potential trade; if the gap between actual and potential trade is higher, then trade lost due to hostilities is indicated as being high.⁸

I use iron and steel production to measure economic power instead of GDP. It has been argued that GDP provides only a limited picture of economic power, whereas iron and steel production are good predictors of industrial strength. It is costly to produce these goods, but countries which have high iron and steel production, show greater industrial strength. Moreover, iron and steel production can also be used to make armament, and hence increase military power (Kadera et al, 2004). A victim state’s economic size is calculated using iron and steel production measures from Correlates of War’s National Capabilities Index (CINC).⁹ To measure the victim state’s economic size, I take a log of CINC’s iron and steel production measures. Using this measure, I then test whether the victim’s economic size determines the likelihood of an apology from the perpetrator. Similarly, my measure for the perpetrator’s economic size, also comes from Correlates of War’s CINC index. From CINC, I obtain variables measuring the perpetrator’s iron and steel production and log these variables to measure the perpetrator’s overall economic size. In doing so, I expect to observe that the perpetrator-state’s economic size in relation to the victim-state would influence the perpetrator’s decision to apologize.

The data on severe inter-state war-crime violations is obtained from Morrow’s ‘Laws of War’ dataset. I create an index variable titled as ‘balance of violations’, which measures the

⁸ This measure was created based on the gravity equation by my supervisor Prof. Kavakli.

⁹ The National Capabilities Index is a Correlates of War project, which was created by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972).

severity of violations in each perpetrator-state-victim-state-year dyad. If the perpetrator-state has committed worse violations against the victim-state, I code balance of violations as 1. But, if the victim-state has committed worse violations against the perpetrator-state, I code the balance of violations' variable as -1. If both states have committed equally severe violations against each other, the balance of violations' variable is coded as 0. After coding the balance of violations' variable separately, I then include this variable in my 'Inter-State Apologies' dataset.

Data on the culpability of a leader comes from the 'Change in Source of Leader Support' (CHISOLS) dataset (Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura, 2016). I use data on ruling coalitions, and study whether changes in ruling coalition of a state increase the likelihood of apologies. Using data on changes in ruling coalitions, leader culpability is measured as a dichotomous variable, which is coded as '1' if the leader belongs to the same ruling coalition as the perpetrators, and '0' otherwise. Using this measure for 'leader culpability', I check whether leader involvement or association with inter-state violations reduces the leader's likelihood to apologize.

The information on whether a leader is nationalist is obtained from the dataset on political institutions (2015), which has measures for party affiliation and party ideology. I merge this data on party affiliation and party ideology from DPI to my inter-state apologies dataset. The data on ideology from DPI is available from the year 1975 onwards. The independent variable, which is 'nationalist ideology' is dichotomous, and is coded '1' if the leader is nationalist, and '0' otherwise. Using this data, I analyze whether leader ideology i.e. leader being nationalist influences the leader's calculus for an apology.

Lastly, I obtain information on mechanisms of transitional justice from the 'Victim's Justice in the Aftermath of Conflict' dataset of Powers and Proctor (2017). I use their information on presence of domestic trials in a perpetrator-state to check whether this transitional justice mechanism influences the likelihood of an inter-state apology. Powers and Proctor (2017) present the presence of domestic trials as a dichotomous variable. This variable is coded 1 if domestic trials are conducted in the perpetrator-state, and 0 otherwise.

4.3 CONTROL VARIABLES

My theory on inter-state apologies posits that leaders weigh the costs and benefits of apologizing for inter-state crimes. However, alternative explanations might also account for inter-state apologies. I have identified several such alternative explanations for inter-state apologies, which I add as control variables in my dataset.

One alternative explanation as to why states apologize is the presence of democratic norms. Scholars have argued that democratic norms regulate cooperation via peaceful means (Oneal and Russett, 1993). These norms create an atmosphere where compromise between states is possible. As a means of compromise, states might apologize for past crimes. Scholars studying democratic peace have argued that these norms only apply to democratic countries, as they expect each other to compete in a peaceful manner (Doyle, 1986). Similarly, it can be argued that democracies would be more likely to apologize. To test this explanation, I find it conducive to use data on regimes from Polity-IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007) as it is readily available. Polity-IV is a comprehensive data on regimes and regime-change and includes several measures for a country's regime i.e. whether a country is democratic or authoritarian. After merging data on regimes and regime change from Polity-IV, I create dichotomous indicators for a country's democracy and joint democracy between the perpetrator-state and victim-state. I code a country as 1 if its democratic and 0 otherwise. Similarly, I code dyads as 1 if the dyad is 'jointly democratic' and 0 if they are not.

Shared religion and cultural norms can also be considered as variables, which influence the leader's decision to apologize. Scholars have shown that members of a group act more favorably towards people with similar characteristics as their group (Doosje et al, 2006; Tajfel, 1982). Similarly, it can be argued that states with similar religious and cultural characteristics as the victim-state would find it easier to apologize. While I could not find a reliable measure for cultural norms, I was able to obtain data on religion from the comprehensive 'Dataset on Religious Characteristics' (Davis and James, 2015). This dataset on religious characteristics includes variables measuring religious composition of a country

from circa. 1700 until 2015. Since my dataset covers only the years 1900-2017, I obtain religion data for those years, and merge this religion data with my dataset on inter-state apologies. Using this religion data, I create a dichotomous variable ‘shared religion’, which is coded as 1 if the perpetrator-state and victim-state have similar religion, and 0 otherwise.

Another alternative explanation as to why states apologize is that states apologize to victors after war, as victors can force losers to accept guilt. An oft-cited example is Germany after World War I, which was forced to apologize and pay reparations to France. I account for this alternative explanation by including a ‘defeated’ dummy, which is coded 1 if a state is defeated in an inter-state war and 0 otherwise. I obtain data on whether a country is defeated in a war from Correlates of War’s Inter-State War dataset. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, I am unable to test whether defeated states are more likely to apologize.

I also control for the effect of human rights’ norms on inter-state apologies. I measure a state’s commitment to human rights’ norms by checking how many human rights’ treaties a state has ratified. The argument is that if a state has ratified more than one human rights’ treaty, then the state is more committed to preserving human rights’ norms. This would imply that human rights’ norms have been internalized in these states, making them more likely to apologize for human rights’ violations.

Nielsen and Simmons (2014) have argued that four human rights’ agreements form the core of the multilateral legal apparatus. These four human rights’ agreements are, namely: The *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR), the *First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (OP 1), the *Convention Against Torture* (CAT), and the optional *22nd Article of the Convention Against Torture* (Nielsen and Simmons, 2014). I obtained data on all four treaties from United Nation’s Office of High Commissioner’s website. However, data on 22nd Article of CAT was included in the original CAT treaty. As a result, I had four treaties reduced to three. I then merged this data with my Inter-State Apologies dataset. If a country had ratified any of these human rights treaties, I code 1 for the ratification of that specific human rights treaty; 0 otherwise. Additionally, my dataset includes a variable, which holds information on whether a country has signed all three human rights’ treaties. If a country has signed all three human rights treaties, I code

the variable 3. But, if the country has signed only one or two treaties, I code them as 1 and 2 respectively.

I also check the effect of time after an inter-state violation on the likelihood of an inter-state apology. I create a logged version of 'time' using information on years in my panel dataset. I then create a variable 'time since last inter-state war violation', which is continuous and measures how much time has passed since the last inter-state war violation. Previous research is yet to discuss whether and how the passage of time influences a perpetrator-state's decision to apologize. My inclusion of 'time since last inter-state war violation' is to open scholarly discussion on the timing of an apology for the perpetrator-state.

Lastly, I check whether systemic variables, such as the presence of Cold War affect the likelihood of apologies. In other words, I check whether more apologies are offered in one era, such as Cold War, as opposed to other eras, such as post-Cold War. My dataset includes a Cold-War dummy, which is coded as 1 during Cold War years i.e. between 1945 and 1989, and 0 otherwise.

4.4 METHODS

I use the Logit-based estimator for my study, as my dependent variable 'Apology Offered' is dichotomous in nature; 1 if an apology is offered and 0 if not.

5. RESULTS

Table 1. Determinants of Inter-State Apologies for War Crimes

	(1) Post-1945 All Violations	(2) Post-1945 Viol's against Civilians	(3) Post-1990 All Violations	(4) Post-1990 Viol's against Civilians
Time since Leadership Transition in Perpetrator	-0.0206 (-0.37)	-0.138* (-1.75)	-0.0821* (-1.66)	-0.218** (-2.20)
Time since Leadership Transition in Victim	-0.00266 (-0.07)	0.0526 (1.06)	-0.0586 (-0.77)	-0.0980 (-1.09)
Changes in Ruling Coalition in Perpetrator	0.0227 (0.55)	0.0565* (1.68)	0.0100 (0.20)	0.0463 (1.27)
Non-Culpable Perpetrator	1.352 (1.07)	3.607* (1.95)	0.844 (0.74)	3.079 (1.17)
Non-Culpable Victim	-1.053 (-0.94)	0.770 (0.48)	-0.0261 (-0.01)	0.916 (0.15)
Presence of Nationalist Executive in Perpetrator			3.216* (1.86)	2.052 (0.34)

Balance of Violations	1.183* (1.71)	2.850** (2.98)	0.964 (0.92)	6.773** (2.12)
Perpetrator's Iron and Steel Prod.	0.206 (1.04)	0.941** (2.20)	0.239 (1.45)	1.741* (1.79)
Victim's Iron and Steel Prod.	0.198 (1.36)	0.774** (2.54)	0.141 (0.63)	1.177** (2.34)
Shared Geopolitical Preferences	0.747 (1.31)	1.078 (1.14)	1.112 (1.46)	2.995** (2.30)
Trade Lost Due to Hostilities	-0.0314 (-0.20)	-0.247 (-1.38)	0.0122 (0.04)	-0.162 (-0.28)
	(1) Post-1945 All Violations	(2) Post-1945 Viol's against Civilians	(3) Post-1990 All Violations	(4) Post-1990 Viol's against Civilians
Presence of Domestic Trials in Perpetrator			0.794 (0.54)	0.190 (0.16)
Shared Religious Characteristics	-0.956 (-1.17)	-1.916 (-1.58)	-1.007 (-1.04)	-4.887 (-1.21)
Cold War	4.223** (3.51)	4.703** (2.41)	0.0100 (0.20)	0.0463 (1.27)
Democratic Perpetrator x Democratic Victim	3.063 (1.38)	2.889 (0.98)	16.32** (6.63)	20.81** (3.19)
Time Since Last Violation	-0.0514 (-1.12)	-0.160** (-2.54)	-0.0262 (-0.66)	-0.180* (-1.86)
Constant	-11.14** (-4.40)	-24.88** (-4.68)	-6.707** (-2.89)	-31.48** (-2.69)
N	11763	11562	3809	3714

t statistics in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$

5.1 FINDINGS

Table 1 shows the results of the regression analysis, where I investigate which factors influence inter-state apologies. Each model represents a particular time-period; Models 1 and 2 observe the effect on apologies for post-1945 era; Models 3 and 4 display the effect on apologies for the post-1990 era. As a robustness check, I also limit Models 2 and 4 inter-state violations against civilians and observe the effect on apologies in those models.

Most of my hypotheses on leader incentives find strong support in models limited to civilian inter-state crimes. As shown in Table 1, most of the domestic factors, such as time since last leadership transition, changes in ruling coalition over time and balance of violations are all significant for civilian inter-state violations. *Time since last Leadership Transition in Perpetrator*, however, is significant for both violations against civilians and all inter-state violations. Only the *Presence of a Nationalist Executive in Perpetrator* is significant for all inter-state violations, but not for those against civilians.

Time since Last Leadership Transition in Perpetrator is a continuous variable and decreases the likelihood of apologies. This variable has a strong and negative effect on apologies offered in post-1990s for inter-state violations against civilians (Models 2 and 4). For all inter-state violations, *Time since Last Leadership Transition in Perpetrator* is only significant in the post-1990s era (Model 3). This relationship between *Time since Last Leadership Transition in Perpetrator* and inter-state apology is weaker in all cases of inter-state violations i.e. Model 3. Overall, these results support my hypothesis, which posits that late leaders in office would have little incentive to apologize for inter-state violations. For example, Putin apologized for Katyn Massacre in his earlier years in office but stopped apologizing afterwards. Thus, the coefficient is negative; as more time passes since a leadership transition, the likelihood of apologies decreases.

The independent variable measuring *Changes in Ruling Coalition in Perpetrator* is positive, but only for inter-state violations against civilians in post-1945 era (Model 2). This indicates that as ruling-coalitions change over time, the likelihood of inter-state apologies increases. I use this measure of ruling-coalition transitions in my analysis to create an indicator of culpability i.e. association with an inter-state violation. A non-culpable leader does not belong to a ruling coalition associated with an inter-state violation. My measure of leader non-culpability, which is dichotomous is also positive and significant in Model 2. This relationship between leader non-culpability and inter-state apologies is strong. Thus, I find some support for my hypothesis, which states that leaders not associated with an inter-state violation are more likely to apologize. A good example of this finding is Yeltsin's apologies to Japan for World War II. Yeltsin's leadership came after the collapse of the Soviet regime, which had been blamed from World War II war crimes. Thus, Yeltsin was able to apologize without bearing accountability to war crimes of Soviet regime.

The *Presence of a Nationalist Executive in Perpetrator* is only significant in Model 3, where the effect on apologies is observed for all inter-state violations in post-1990s era. This is a dichotomous variable, which indicates a nationalist executive as 1. The coefficient for *Presence of National Executive in Perpetrator* is positive and indicates that the presence of a nationalist executive increases the likelihood of an inter-state apology. Here, I find support for my 'Nixon-goes-to-China' hypothesis, which states that nationalist leaders are more likely to apologize. The argument here is that nationalist leaders enjoy greater credibility, as they are perceived as hawks who make tough, but right choices (Cuckierman and Tommasi, 1998). A recent example is that of Shinzo Abe, who apologized in front of U.S congress for World War II last year. Apologies by previous leaders resulted in domestic backlash in Japan (Lind, 2008). However, Abe as a nationalist leader was praised by critics back home for giving a general apology, which did not link Japan to severe crimes like Pearl Harbor (DW, 2016).

A fairly robust finding is that *Balance of Violations* increases the likelihood of apologies. This variable is significant in three specifications of my analysis: Model 1, 2 and 4. My *Balance of Violations* variable takes three values: -1, 0 and 1, where 1 indicates that the perpetrator-state has committed several severe violations against the victim-state. Thus, an

increase in balance of violations shows that worse perpetrator-states are more likely to apologize. The regression coefficient for *Balance of Violations* is larger for cases of inter-state violations against civilians (refer to Figure 1). Interestingly, the coefficient for *Balance of Violations* gets larger in post-1990s for civilian inter-state violations and is significant. This indicates that worse perpetrator-states were more likely to apologize in post-1990s era. My first hypothesis finds support, as it stated that leaders of states which commit severe violations are more likely to apologize. This finding is also supported by numerous examples of German leaders, such as Willy Brandt apologizing for severe crimes (e.g. Holocaust).

Additionally, I calculated average marginal effects of the variables: *Balance of Violations* and *Time since Last Leadership Transition in Perpetrator on Inter-State Apology* for Model 4 i.e. *Violations against Civilians in post-1990s*:




Figure 1: Average Marginal Effects of Balance of Violations



Figure 2: Average Marginal Effects of Time since Last Leadership Transition

Figures 1 and 2 show that the substantive effects of *Balance of Violations* and *Time since Last Leadership Transition in Perpetrator* on *Inter-State Apology* are small, but statistically significant in some cases.

Turning to my economic variables: The *Perpetrator and Victim-State's Iron and Steel Production* are also positively related to inter-state apologies but are statistically significant for only violations against civilians (Models 2 and 4). Note that the effect of these variables gets stronger in the post-1990s era (see Figure 1). My third hypothesis, which suggested that perpetrator-states are more likely to apologize if victim-state's economy is larger, finds support here. Surprisingly, my second hypothesis is not supported, as I expected a perpetrator-state's iron and steel production to be negatively associated with the likelihood of an apology. The sign is positive and indicates that this variable increases the likelihood of an apology. My theory is unable to account for this finding.

I also find that *Shared Geopolitical Preferences* increase the likelihood of an apology but achieve statistical significance in the post-1990s era for inter-state violations against civilians (Model 4). This provides some evidence for my hypothesis, which suggests that leaders with shared geopolitical preferences are more likely to apologize.

Two domestic factors: *Presence of Domestic Trials in Perpetrator* and *Trade Lost due to Hostilities* are unrelated to apologies. *Presence of Domestic Trials in Perpetrator* is

insignificant across all four models in my regression analysis (see Fig.1). Thus, my hypothesis that presence of domestic trials would increase likelihood of an apology is unsupported. Similarly, I find that prospects of trade, as indicated by *Trade Lost Due to Hostilities* is insignificant in my analysis.

Most of my control variables also find empirical support. This shows that state and systemic variables also effect the likelihood of apologizing. The only control variable unsupported in my analysis is *Shared Religious Preferences*. *Shared Religious Preferences* receives no statistical significance across all four models. In addition to being insignificant, Shared Religious Preferences also has the wrong sign. I had expected *Shared Religious Preferences* to have a positive effect on apologies. Instead, shared religious preferences seems to lower the chances of apologizing. Neither my theory nor does the extant literature accounts for this finding.

I find that the presence of *Cold War* increased the likelihood of an apology. This finding is statistically significant for all inter-state violations and cases limited to violations against civilians (Models 1 and 2). This challenges the extant literature on apologies, which posited that apologies were more likely in the post-Cold War era. The coefficient for *Cold War* is large and is positively related to apologies. In the next chapter, I discuss why my empirical finding contradicts the hypothesis, which states that apologies were more forthcoming after Cold War.

Some support is present for human rights' norms increasing the likelihood of an apology. I account for human rights' norms by testing whether countries with more ratified human rights' treaties are more likely to apologize. My results show that *Ratification of Human Right's Treaties by Perpetrator* increase the likelihood of apology, but only for civilian inter-state violations in the post 1990s. (Model 4). While the effect of human rights treaties is not significant in other specifications, I find it interesting that *Ratification of Human Right's Treaties by Perpetrator* has the wrong sign in those specifications.

Regime-based variables also enjoy some support in my analysis. I include an interaction term, which measures the joint effect of *Democratic Perpetrator and Democratic Victim-State* on the likelihood of apologizing. The components of this interaction term are two dichotomous variables; one identifies whether the perpetrator-state is a democracy, and the

other checks whether the victim-state is a democracy. My findings show that a democratic perpetrator-state is less likely to apologize when the victim-state is undemocratic. Similarly, the likelihood of apology decreases when the victim-state is democratic, and the perpetrator-state is not.

Lastly, I find that *Time Since Last Violation* decreases the likelihood of an apology, but only for inter-state violations against civilians (Models 2 and 4). This is a continuous variable, which indicates how much time has passed since the perpetrator-state last committed an inter-state war violation. My finding thus shows that as more time passes after the last inter-state violation, apologies becomes less likely for violations against civilians.

5.2 LIMITATIONS

My analysis of the effects on inter-state apologies suffers from several limitations. This is because I have a small sample size for my dependent variable (N=20), which leads to the separation problem in my regression model. Briefly, separation effect occurs when an independent variable perfectly predicts the outcome, and thus fails to capture any variation on the dependent variable. As a result, I am unable to explore the effects of a few key variables, such as *Defeat of Perpetrator-State*, *Defeat of Victim-State* and *Joint IGO Membership*, which get omitted because of the separation effect. Several other variables, such as *Presence of Reparations*, *Amnesty* and *Presence of Militarized Inter-State Disputes* are also omitted, which prevents me from exploring their effects on inter-state apologies.

Moreover, I have missing values for many of my independent variables, which fail to capture variation for the likelihood of apologies. For example, *Trade lost due to Hostilities* has several missing values, as I do not have trade data for the years 1900-1960. Similarly, I have missing observations for my *Presence of Nationalist Executive in Perpetrator* variable,

which includes observations from 1975 onwards. Missing values in nationalist executive explain why results for its effect on apologies is only limited to post-1990 era, as only inter-state apologies after 1990 are being explained. Initially, I had planned to study inter-state apologies for the entire period 1900-2016. However, due to missing observations for many independent variables, I had my analysis reduced to 1945-2016. As a result, important cases, such as Germany's apology to France for World War I got excluded from my statistical analysis.

Despite these limitations, I argue that conducting a systematic study of inter-state apologies was necessary, as my study explored a more comprehensive list of inter-state apologies than before. Also, I am able to test multiple explanations of apologies in addition to my own theory. My findings greatly reduce the multiplicity of explanations by revealing which explanations are relevant for when and why states apologize. In doing so, I show why, when, and how domestic, state, and systemic variables increase the likelihood of an inter-state apology.

I summarize and discuss the implications of my contributions in the final chapter.

6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

My thesis shows that states weigh the benefits and costs of apologizing for an inter-state war crime. I find that domestic factors, such as a leader's ideology and his/her lack of involvement with a war crime increase the likelihood of an inter-state apology. My strongest finding is that states who commit worse violations against the other are more likely to apologize. This finding indicates the presence of psychological costs (i.e. feelings of guilt), as states with worse violations alleviate their psychological burden by apologizing.

This study has also revealed the value of investigating several benefits and costs associated with inter-state apologies. In doing so, I find which factors reduce costs, and enlarge potential benefits of an inter-state apology. I find that non-culpability i.e. being unrelated to an inter-state war crime reduces psychological and reputational costs of apologizing. Shared geopolitical preferences also reduce the costs of apologizing, as they promise inter-state cooperation, which helps leaders achieve political goals. On the other hand, a victim-state's larger economy increases prospective benefits of an inter-state apology, as perpetrator-states expect material benefits, such as alliances from reconciliation with the victim-state.

My study also reveals domestic factors which are not related to inter-state apologies. Neither the promise of bilateral trade nor does the presence of domestic trials explains why states

apologize. This opens an avenue for exploring why some incentives are unattractive for apologies. Future research should investigate why the prospect of trade does not account for inter-state apology. Note however that I had missing observations for bilateral trade, which makes this finding unsubstantiated. More data is required to explore the effect of trade prospects on apologizing. Scholars should also investigate whether additional transitional mechanisms, such as reparations influence a state's decision to apologize. Additionally, future research should also investigate whether international trials influence inter-state apologies.

Overall, this research has demonstrated the importance of conducting a quantitative analysis. In addition to my own theory, I was able to test alternative explanations for inter-state apologies. A major claim in the literature was that apologies were a post-Cold War phenomenon. My study contradicted this claim, as I showed that inter-state apologies were more likely during Cold War. Why could this be the case? Previously, political apologies had not been classified into inter-state and intra-state apologies. Thus, it could be the case that intrastate apologies were more likely after Cold War. Therefore, future research should investigate intrastate apologies separately.

I do not claim to have uncovered all the determinants of an inter-state apology: there is a lot of room left for future research. Some of my findings invoke questions, which require further investigation. For example, I find that as time passes after an inter-state war crime, the perpetrator-state is less likely to apologize. To my knowledge, no study has explored the effect of timing on an inter-state apology. Therefore, future work should also investigate the effect of timing on a perpetrator-state's decision to apologize.

Finally, my study also opens an avenue for exploring which kinds of violations receive apologies. Interestingly, my theory of inter-state apologies found more empirical support in cases limited to civilian inter-state war crimes. Future research should investigate why leaders are more likely to apologize for some inter-state war crimes, but not others.

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adler-Nissen, Rebecca (2014). Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society. *International Organization* 68(1): 143-176.
- Auerbach, Yehudith (2005). Forgiveness and Reconciliation: The Religious Dimension. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17(3): 469-485.
- Bailey, Michael A., Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten (2017). Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(2): 430-456.
- Barkan, Elazar, and Alexander Karn (2006). Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation. *Stanford University Press*.
- Brown, Davis, and Patrick James (2015). Religious Characteristics of States Dataset, Phase 1: Demographics (RCS). *Association of Religion Data Archives*.
- Croco, Sarah E. (2011). The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment. *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 457-477.
- Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer, and Carlos Scartascini (2016). Database of Political Institutions Codebook, 2015 Update (DPI2015). *Inter-American Development Bank*.

- Cukierman, Alex, and Mariano Tommasi (1998). When Does it Take a Nixon to go to China? *American Economic Review*: 180-197.
- Cunningham, Michael. (1999). Saying Sorry: The Politics of Apology. *The Political Quarterly* 70(3): 285-293.
- De Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (2004). Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War. *World Politics*, 56(3), 363-388.
- De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, et al. (1999). An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review* 93 (4): 791-807.
- Dodds, Graham G. (2007) Political Apologies: Chronological list. Retrieved April 29 (2018).
- Doosje, Bertjan EJ, et al. (2006). Antecedents and Consequences of Group-based Guilt: The effects of ingroup identification. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 9(3): 325-338.
- Fearon, James D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577-592.
- Gartzke, Erik. (2001) Democracy and the Preparation for War: Does Regime Type Affect States' Anticipation of Casualties? *International Studies Quarterly* 45(3): 467-484.
- Gibney, Mark, and Erik Roxstrom. (2001). The Status of State Apologies. *Human Rights Quarterly*. 23: 911.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. (2002). Expanded Trade and GDP data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(5): 712-724.
- Kadera, K., & Sorokin, G. (2004). Measuring national power. *International Interactions*, 30(3), 211-230.
- Lind, Jennifer. (2008). Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics. *Cornell University Press*.
- MacLachlan, Alice. (2010). The State of "Sorry": Official Apologies and their Absence. *Journal of Human Rights* 9(3): 373-385.
- Marrus, Michael R. (2007). Official Apologies and the Quest for Historical Justice. *Journal of Human Rights* 6(1): 75-105.

- Mattes, Michaela, Brett Ashley Leeds, and Naoko Matsumura. (2017). Measuring Change in Source of Leader Support: The CHISOLS Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*.
- Mihai, Mihaela. (2013). When the State says “Sorry”: State Apologies as Exemplary Political Judgments. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 21(2): 200-220.
- Morrow, James D. (1999). How Could Trade Affect Conflict? *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4): 481-489.
- Morrow, James D., and Hyeran Jo. (2006). Compliance with the Laws of War: Dataset and coding rules. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 23(1): 91-113.
- Nielsen, Richard A., and Beth A. Simmons. (2015). Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime? *International Studies Quarterly* 59(2): 197-208.
- Oneal, John R., and Bruce M. Russett (1997). The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985. *International Studies Quarterly* 41(2): 267-294.
- Owen, John M. (1994). How Liberalism produces Democratic Peace. *International Security* 19(2): 87-125.
- Penic, Sandra, Guy Elcheroth, and Dario Spini. (2018). When is Collective Exposure to War Events Related to More Acceptance of Collective guilt? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62(1): 143-173.
- Powers, Kathy L., and Kim Proctor. (2016). Victim's Justice in the Aftermath of Political Violence: Why Do Countries Award Reparations? *Foreign Policy Analysis* 13(4): 787-810.
- Putnam, Robert D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization* 42(3): 427-460.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. (1999). The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic change. Vol. 66. *Cambridge University Press*.
- Rivera, Lauren A. (2008). Managing “Spoiled” National Identity: War, Tourism, and Memory in Croatia. *American Sociological Review* 73(4): 613-634.

- Seraphim, Franziska. (2017). A Japan that Cannot Say Sorry? Replicating Atonement. *Palgrave Macmillan*, Cham, 25-46.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965. in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: *Sage*, 19-48.
- Tajfel, Henri (1982). Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. *Annual Review of Psychology* 33(1): 1-39.
- Wallace, Michael, and J. David Singer. (1970). International Governmental Organization in the Global System, 1815-1964. *International Organization* 24: 239-87.
- Wenzel, Michael, et al. (2017). A Long Time Coming: Delays in Collective Apologies and their Effects on Sincerity and Forgiveness. *Political Psychology*.
- Wolfe, Stephanie. The Politics of Reparations and Apologies. (2013). Vol. 7. *Springer Science & Business Media*.
- Zaiser, Erica, and Roger Giner-Sorolla. (2013). Saying Sorry: Shifting Obligation after Conciliatory Acts satisfies Perpetrator Group Members. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 105(4): 585.
- Zarakol, Ayşe. (2010). Ontological (In) security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan. *International Relations* 24(1): 3-23.

