

DIFFERENT DESTINATIONS SIMILAR OUTCOMES: MIGRANTS IN  
THE BIGGEST LABOR MARKETS IN TURKEY

by

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IN THE BIGGEST LABOR MARKETS IN TURKEY**

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## **Abstract**

### **DIFFERENT DESTINATIONS SIMILAR OUTCOMES: MIGRANTS IN THE BIGGEST LABOR MARKETS IN TURKEY**

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**Keywords:** Internal Migration, Regional Labor Markets, Labor Market Outcomes,  
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Having been an important phenomenon for Turkey, migration has attracted Turkish scholars from different disciplines and a vast literature has been produced starting from 1970s. Most of economic works have taken the determinants of internal migration in Turkey as the core of their study benefitting from the existing migration literature in the world. However, economic literature in Turkey has been reluctant to conduct researches about the consequences of migration for migrants. Departing from this deficit, present study seeks answers to the following questions: 1) to what extent do the migrants having similar backgrounds obtain similar socio-economic rewards in four metropolitans (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana) in Turkey?; 2) Could migrants obtain the same job market outcomes with residents in Istanbul, Ankara Izmir and Adana?.

By using logit estimates for risk of unemployment, it concludes that risk of unemployment for migrants is lower than non-migrants in Istanbul, but higher in the other regions under consideration. OLS results reveal that migrants are mostly the ones earning more than the non-migrants in Izmir, Ankara and Adana, yet in Istanbul migrants are making less income than non-migrants. Study also notes that college graduate migrants are the most privileged ones in terms of earnings in each region. Finally, multinomial logit regressions show that migrants are less likely to be in the first classes in Istanbul and Izmir, whilst movers are more likely to stand on top of the social stratification in Adana and Ankara.

## Özet

### FARKLI İSTİKAMETLER BENZER SONUÇLAR: TÜRKİYE’NİN EN BÜYÜK EMEK PİYASALARINDA GÖÇMENLER

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**Anahtar Kelimeler:** İç Göç, Bölgesel Emek Piyasaları, Emek Piyasası Kazanımları,

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Ülke için oldukça önemli bir konu olması dolayısıyla, göç, farklı disiplinlerden birçok bilim insanının ilgisini çekmiş ve 1970’lerden bu yana geniş bir yazın ortaya konmuştur. İktisat disiplini kapsamında ortaya konulan çalışmaların hemen hepsi, dünyada var olan göç yazınından da faydalanılarak, göçün belirleyicilerini temel araştırma noktası almış; fakat bu disiplin göçün sonuçlarını göçmenler açısından değerlendirmede/araştırmada oldukça yetersiz kalmıştır. Bu çalışma, bahsedilen eksiklikten yola çıkarak izleyen sorulara cevap aramaya çalışmaktadır: 1) Türkiye’nin dört metropolünde (İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara ve Adana), benzer özelliklere sahip göçmenler, ne ölçüde benzer sosyo-ekonomik kazanımlar elde etmekte?; 2) göçmenler, göçmen olmayanların elde etmiş olduğu emek piyasası kazanımlarını elde etme şansına sahip midir?

İşsizlik riskini ölçmek için kullanılan logit regresyonlarıyla, İstanbul’daki göçmenlerin işsizlik risklerinin daha düşük; diğer bölgelerde ise daha yüksek olduğu saptanmıştır. OLS regresyonları kullanılarak göçmen statüsünün kazançlara etkisi araştırılmış; İzmir, Ankara ve Adana’da göçmenlerin, yerlilere göre, daha fazla kazanç elde ettiği saptanmış; İstanbul için ise bu durumun tam tersi olduğu ortaya konmuştur. Çalışmanın ortaya koyduğu bir diğer sonuç ise, üniversite mezunu göçmenlerin, elde edilen kazanç açısından, diğer gruplara göre daha imtiyazlı olduklarıdır. Multinomial regresyonları kullanılarak tahmin edilmeye çalışılan sosyal sınıf değişkeni bölgeler arasında farklılıklar göstermiştir. Bu regresyonların sonuçları ise, göçmenlerin İstanbul ve İzmir’de üst sınıflarda olma şanslarının yerlilere göre daha düşük olduğunu; Adana ve Ankara’da ise bu şansın daha yüksek olduğunu gözler önüne sermiştir.

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energy for the same purpose. I would like to devote each and every piece of my future work to them with the hope to at least partially meet their commitment. Kübra Öker, my little sister has always supported me materially and morally. Her life energy has always made me clutch onto the life and without her financial support I don't think I could graduate from METU and finish this thesis.

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*To my family and to those who will be a part of it...*



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# Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION

“Since 1975, every five years, 7-8 percent of the Turkish population has changed their place of residency. This rate was probably even higher during 1950-1975 for which no detailed migration statistics are available. This movement was essentially from the east, southeast and north towards the northwest, west and south, and from the less urbanized, less industrialized, and poorer regions of the country, to the more urbanized, more industrialized and richer regions”.<sup>1</sup> As a result of these flows, 28.75% of Turkish population counted as migrants<sup>2</sup> in 2011. Migration flows even become more important for metropolitans, such as Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara and Adana<sup>3</sup>, in Turkey such that nearly 62% of population in Istanbul, 45% of population in Izmir, 41% of population in Ankara and 29% of population in Adana are migrants recently.

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<sup>1</sup> Akarca & Tansel, p.2.

<sup>2</sup> Calculations are made from Household Labor Force Surveys (HLFS) of 2009, 2010 and 2011.

<sup>3</sup> Due to space concerns, instead of Adana-Mersin region, we will use only Adana which refers to both of the cities.

Having been such an important phenomenon for Turkey, migration has attracted Turkish scholars from different disciplines and a vast literature has been produced starting from 1970s.<sup>4</sup> Most of economic works have taken the determinants of internal migration in Turkey as the core of their study benefitting from the existing migration literature in the world<sup>5</sup>. The bottom lines of these studies are that determinants of internal migration in Turkey are income differentials, distance, probability of employment, personal characteristics; such as age and education levels, and social networks.<sup>6</sup> All of these inquiries have taken migrants as rational individuals trying to maximize their welfare by transferring their labor to more productive areas as it was demonstrated in the previous literature.<sup>7</sup> However, latest analyses have shown that realizations from migration might not always be positive.<sup>8</sup> To illustrate, by using data from 1963-1973 period Tunalı reveals that returns to migration were not positive for the migrants that migrated in that period.<sup>9</sup> To add, as Özmucur and Silber reported, internal migration from rural to urban areas increased the income inequality in Turkey.<sup>10</sup> As a proof to these findings, Keleş demonstrated that in 1995, “35% of Turkish urban population was living in shantytowns most of them lack even the most important fundamental infrastructure such as water and electricity”.<sup>11</sup> Hence, studying consequences of migration for migrants flourish to be as crucial as studying the reasons that push/pull them to migrate.

Taking this as a point of departure, this study seeks answers to the following questions: 1) to what extent do the migrants having similar backgrounds obtain similar socio-economic rewards in four metropolitans (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana) in Turkey?; 2) Could migrants obtain the same job market outcomes with residents in Istanbul, Ankara Izmir and

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<sup>4</sup> Munro, 1974; Akşit, 1997, Gedik, 1997; Gezici & Keskin; Evcil et. al 2006; Filiztekin & Gökhan 2008; Köymen, 1999; Peker, 1999.

<sup>5</sup> Ravenstein 1885; Sjaastad 1962; Harris & Todarro; Lewis, 1954; Lucas 1997; Mincer, 1978; Bauer and Zimmermann, 1995, 1997; Lee 1966; Wolpert 1965; Crawford 1973; Massey et. al 1990; Gang 1998 Chen et al. 2003

<sup>6</sup> Filiztekin & Gökhan, 2008, pp.39, 40.

<sup>7</sup> Ghatak 1991.

<sup>8</sup> Filiztekin & Gökhan, 2008, p.2

<sup>9</sup> Tunalı, 2000.

<sup>10</sup> Özmucur & Silber, 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Keleş, 1996 ; cited in Filiztekin & Gökhan, 2008, p.2

Adana? The questions have notable policy implications. If migrants are rewarded less as a result of lower skills brought to the labor market, reforming the labor market will have little effect on their well-being, whereas providing them with education and appropriate skills will enable them to exploit better labor market opportunities. However, if migrants have significantly lower rewards compared to residents with similar individual characteristics, the root of the gap may be discrimination. In that case, reforming the labor market with the objective of reducing unfair labor market practices would lead to an increase in the welfare of migrants.<sup>12</sup> In addition, if there is a flow of low or unskilled individuals, migration has the potential to increase polarization within the stated regions further giving way to increase in relative (or new urban) poverty; if this flow is mostly composed of more skilled and well-educated individuals this would end up with transfer of massive cultural capital from less developed regions to more developed regions which is going to increase the development gap between regions further. Another important point is that unskilled migrants are assumed to be ex-farmers mostly, meaning migration also has the potential to decrease/damage agricultural production especially in the Eastern part of Turkey. Increase in income inequality might also be another consequence of migration in Turkey as it was demonstrated in Özmucur and Silber.<sup>13</sup>

Trying to answer these questions, the present study focuses on three components of job outcomes: unemployment, earnings and Goldthorpe (EGP) social class of migrants who settled in Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara and Adana. EGP identifies eleven classes existing in the society based on the employment relations – according to the type of employment contracts offered by their employers.<sup>14</sup> As Erikson and Goldthorpe have noted, since their schema is designed to capture qualitative differences in employment relationships, ‘the classes are not consistently ordered according to some inherent hierarchical principle<sup>15</sup>’. Thus, EGP is a nominal measure. However, so far as overall economic status is concerned, upper classes are advantaged over the working class<sup>16</sup> in terms of greater long-term security of income, being less likely to be made redundant; less short-term fluctuation of income since they are

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<sup>12</sup> Gagnon, Xenogiani, Xing, 2011, p.3,4

<sup>13</sup> Özmucur & Silber, 2002.

<sup>14</sup> Goldthorpe, 2000, 2007; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992.

<sup>15</sup> Erikson & Goldthorpe, 2002, 33

<sup>16</sup> Elaboration on this class schema will be made in the following section.

not dependent on overtime pay, etc; and a better prospect of a rising income over the life course.<sup>17</sup> Main reasons to employ EGP social class schema to this inquiry is that firstly, it has been well-validated, *post-hoc* and *ex ante*, in both criterion and construct terms; secondly, schema is relatively easy to operationalise<sup>18</sup>; thirdly, it is widely used in studies of social class and it found wide appeal from many others<sup>19</sup>; finally utilizing an existing and widely used class schema provides readers an opportunity to compare results with the extant literature.<sup>20</sup>

The expectation is that migrants' attainment will vary across destinations because of disparities in the opportunity structure of receiving regions that would produce discrepancies in migration outcomes. For instance, unemployment would matter more in the cities where cost of living is higher; thus unemployment rates of migrants is expected to be less in those cities as migrants might not afford to remain unemployed as long as natives could, since they do not have the social networks that might help insure them against unemployment spells.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, since economic activities that are performed vary in the receiving regions EGP scores are also expected to be different. To illustrate, since skills of migrants migrated to Istanbul and Izmir are expected to be lower<sup>22</sup> than those migrated to Ankara, they are less likely to be a member of upper classes that are offered by EGP in comparison to migrants arrived to Ankara.

To explore these ideas, present inquiry uses a nationally representative dataset, Household Labor Force Surveys (HLFS) for the years of 2009, 2010 and 2011 offered by Turkish Institute of Statistics (TURKSTAT). It compares attainments of migrants and non-migrants by using three different statistical methods. First, in order to estimate risk of unemployment among migrants and non-migrants we run logit regressions for each of the regions separately. We found that except Istanbul, risk of unemployment is higher among migrants than non-migrants in the regions under consideration. Further, we divided migrants into

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<sup>17</sup> Rose, 2001, p.5.

<sup>18</sup> Rose, 2001, pp.5,6

<sup>19</sup> e.g. Evans, 1992; Evans & Mills, 1998

<sup>20</sup> Kaya, 2008, p.171

<sup>21</sup> Binatlı, Akdede, 2014, p. 129

<sup>22</sup> Istanbul and Izmir received migrants coming from East more than Ankara and skill level of those migrants is expected to be lower since education level is lower in the Eastern part of Turkey.

categories according to their time of arrival in order to figure out which migrant group has more risk of unemployment in the stated regions. We found out different patterns across different regions and intuitively we concluded that latest-comers in Adana are the ones who suffer more from the risk of unemployment. Second, to estimate differences in migrants' earnings we used simple Mincerian equation and run OLS regressions for each region separately. We revealed that migrants are mostly the ones earning more than the non-migrants in Izmir, Ankara and Adana, yet in Istanbul migrants are making less income than non-migrants. Estimating the earnings of migrants arrived in different periods, we reached the conclusion that migrants settled down to the aforementioned regions in 1990s are the ones making less income than other migrants. We reached more refine results after interacting migrant dummy and educational levels in the OLS estimates. Results of the estimates demonstrated that college graduates are the ones who are making more income than the non-migrants regardless of their period of arrival and region of destination. Finally, multinomial regressions were estimated in order to explore likelihood of migrants in different categories of EGP social class. When it is compared to non-migrants, migrants are less likely to be in the first classes in Istanbul and Izmir, whilst movers are more likely to stand on top of the social stratification in Adana and Ankara. The estimates were also made again by dividing migrants into different categories according to their period of arrivals: migrants arrived in the period of 1981-1989, 1990-1998, 1999-2001, and 2002-2011. Overall conclusion is that migrants arrived in 1990s, a period which is characterized as the 'lost decade' by IMF to the stated regions are more likely to be in the lower social classes.

The paper is organized as the following: In the next section, existing class literature will be revisited and also empirical work on Turkey is going to be presented. Third section contains the description of the dataset used in this study followed by descriptive analysis of geographic scales and migrants. Fourth section is employed for the empirical analysis and results. The final section is reserved for conclusions.



## Chapter 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW(S)

#### 2.1 Class Literature Revisited

“Few concepts are more contested in sociological theory than the concept of class.<sup>23</sup>” However, the word class used in the social theory with theoretical disputes about the proper elaboration of the concept stands confusing due to lack of clarity in the writings.<sup>24</sup> In order to overcome these confusions, Wright suggests five points that should be taken into consideration while analyzing the literature about the concept of class.<sup>25</sup> In other words, there are five different, and equally important, answers to the question of what class is. First answer to this question comes from the scholars perceiving class as subjective location. These works mainly focus on how people locate themselves within a social structure. In this case, class is defined as the following: “classes are social categories sharing subjectively salient attributes used by people to rank those categories within a system of economic stratification.”<sup>26</sup> Class in this regard, would be compared to other forms of assessment- ethnicity, gender, occupation, religion etc. - having economic dimensions but

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<sup>23</sup> Wright, 2003, p.1

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. pp. 1

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. pp. 1-4.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p.2

not defined in economic terms.<sup>27</sup> Second, class is grasped as objective positions within distribution. In this approach, class is central to the question of how people are objectively located in distributions of material inequality. In this sense, material standards of living, usually proxied by wealth or income; become the core of definition of classes. Parallel to this, people are objectively located to their class positions by their citizenships, their power or their subjection to industrialized forms of ascriptive discrimination.<sup>28</sup> Third, classes are realized as the relational explanation of economic life chances asking the question of what explains inequalities in economically defined life chances and material standards of living of individuals and families. Hence, class is defined considering the relationship of people to income-generating resources or assets of various sorts<sup>29</sup> which are the major elaboration points of both Marxist and Weberian approaches to class. Fourth, asking the question that how should we characterize and explain the variations across history in the social organization of inequalities, class is realized to be a dimension of historical variation in systems of inequality. By this way, a macro model that identifies the causal continuum of individual lives requiring a notion to understand macro-level variations across place and time is needed.<sup>30</sup> This approach is again as equally important as the former one for both Weberian and Marxist theorists. Final approach centered on the issue of emancipation which is the distinguishing point of Marxist analysis. In this perspective, class is realized as a foundation of economic oppression and exploitation asking the question that what sorts of transformations are needed to eliminate economic oppression and exploitation within capitalist societies. Hence, this approach promote a class concept that is not solely identified by social relations to economic resources, but that underlines a political project of emancipation.<sup>31</sup> An illustration of underlying characteristics of different class perspectives could be seen in Table 1.

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid, p.3

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, p.3

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p.4

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p5

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p.6

**Table 1: Anchoring questions in different traditions of class analysis<sup>32</sup>**

	<b>1 Subjective location</b>	<b>2 distributional location</b>	<b>3 life- chances</b>	<b>4 historical variation</b>	<b>5 emancipation</b>
Karl Marx	*	*	**	**	***
Max Weber	*	*	**	***	
Michael Mann	*	*	*	***	
J. Goldthorpe	*	*	***		
Pierre Bourdieu	*	*	***		
popular usage	*	***	*		
Lloyd Warner	***	*	*		

\*\*\* Primary anchoring question for concept of class

\*\* Secondary anchoring question

\* Additional questions engaged with concept of class, but not central to the definition

Recently; however, applicability of social class to understand contemporary societies has been the most debatable issue in the sociology literature. Some scholars<sup>33</sup> have been questioning the explanatory power of the concept in understanding the dynamics of modern societies. Post-modern critiques<sup>34</sup>, in addition, underlines that the societies are aggregates of individuals<sup>35</sup> rather than being entities divided into big classes. As responses to these criticisms, there have been several attempts to underline social stratification to defend the concept of social class. Scott asserts that class relations still exist and exert an effect on life chances and conditions of living, so there is still a role for appropriate forms of class analysis.<sup>36</sup> In this sense, Neo-Marxists, underline the validity of the concept of exploitation<sup>37</sup>, and ownership structures as well as immigration in contemporary societies.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Quoted from Wright, 2003, p. 14.

<sup>33</sup> Clark & Lipset, 2001; Kingston, 2000; Pakulski & Waters, 1996; Roberts, 2002, Pahl, 1989.

<sup>34</sup> See Grusky & Weeden 2005 for a review of criticisms raised against the social class literature.

<sup>35</sup> Kaya, 2007, p.1.

<sup>36</sup> Scott, 2002, p.23

<sup>37</sup> Wright, 1997, 2005

Other class analysts<sup>39</sup> have gravitated towards micro-classes and to assumptions of nominalist class schemas.<sup>40</sup> Hence operationalization of class gained importance such that Grusky and Weeden stated that weakness of explanatory power of the concept class lies under poor operationalization.<sup>41</sup> Their argument is that social classes which are perceived as occupational groups execute much better than conventional and ‘big classes’.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, several other references are made to work situation, social background, money, education or simply referring to something people have/don’t have while describing social classes.<sup>43</sup>

Regardless of these debates, this study still finds “a whole industry of researches preoccupied with class- and stratification analysis ...<sup>44</sup>” Why?

The simple answer is that social class, understood as systematic inequalities in opportunity- and power structures, still matters. Even if welfare capitalism has contributed to equalize the distribution of welfare and life chances this is still highly correlated to social class (c.f. Esping-Andersen 1999: 29-30). The more complex answer is that class- and stratification research is framed in alternative ‘research programs’ with alternative ontological, epistemological and methodological positions (c.f. Guba 1990). Class- and stratification researchers may share a number of common interests in terms of research issues, but they are also divided into different sub-fields and research traditions.<sup>45</sup>

Having said these, it is also possible to state that regarding the micro-level class analysis, with the data availability, both cross-national and national, statistical methods have become widespread in social class analysis since 1970s. In this context, several class schemas has been developed each stemming from different point of views. Since they are the most dominant and widely accepted ones in statistical social class analysis, class schemas developed by Esping-Andersen, Wright, and Erikson and Goldthorpe (EGP) will be discussed in this section. Thereafter, Wright’s class schema and EGP will be compared since they have both common and opposing points.

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<sup>38</sup> Potes, 2000

<sup>39</sup> Goldthorpe, 2000, 2007; Erickson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Ganzeboom, 1992 etc.

<sup>40</sup> Kaya, 2007, p.2.

<sup>41</sup> Grusky & Weeden, 2005.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> Marshall et al 1988; Skeggs 1997

<sup>44</sup> Leiulfstrud, Bison & Solheim, 2010, pp. 1, 2.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

### 2.1.1. Esping-Andersen's Class Schema

Synthesizing Weberian and Marxist class discussions, Esping-Andersen presents a relatively relaxed attitude while constructing his class schema.<sup>46</sup> In his model, regulatory institutions; such as collective wage bargaining systems, educational systems, family systems, firms and most importantly welfare states become core determinants of the classes and class relations in the society. "Contemporary class relations are, in his perspective, neither reducible to a traditional industrial society model (Fordism) nor to a service-society model, but represent a blend of alternative economic and social logics and schisms (including the issue of social closure and more or less excluded categories in the labor market)".<sup>47</sup>

Esping-Andersen claims that division of labor in contemporary societies 'may give birth to new axes of stratification'.<sup>48</sup> His main criticisms are directed to one-dimensional criteria of autonomy, human capital assets, hierarchy and trust as common attributes of the 'new class'.<sup>49</sup> In his alternative typology, Esping-Andersen underlines that distinctions between managers and experts/semi professionals should not get lost. To add, he also states that workers in manufacturing and workers in service sector should be counted as distinct categories<sup>50</sup> and the same distinction should also be made between unskilled workers in different kinds of work spheres. In his point of view, women, due to their overrepresentation in the service economy, do not have different opportunity structures, compared to men, traditionally favored by the idea of an 'adequate Fordist wage'.<sup>51</sup>

In this sense, as it can be seen in Table 2, he presents a class structure where command and human capital structures are the elements of both Fordist (industrial) and post-Fordist (Post-industrial) hierarchy; although the command structure in post-Fordist societies is perceived to be more floating when it is compared to Fordist societies. Delegation and division of

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<sup>46</sup> Esping-Andersen, 1993

<sup>47</sup> Leiulfstrud, Bison & Solheim, 2010, pp. 11

<sup>48</sup> Esping-Andersen, 1993, p.12

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p.13

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p.14

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, p.17

tasks rather than a Fordist command model is the basis of the distinction between professionals and semi-professionals/service workers in his model.<sup>52</sup>

**Table 2: Esping-Andersen’s post-industrial class scheme<sup>53</sup>**

<p><b>1. Primary sector occupations (farmers, etceteras)</b></p>
<p><b><u>2. Fordist hierarchy</u></b></p> <p>(a) Managers and proprietors (includes executive personnel and the ‘petit bourgeoisie).</p> <p>(b) Clerical, administrative (non managerial) and sales workers engaged in basically routine tasks of control, distribution and administration.</p> <p>(c) Skilled/crafts manual production workers, including low level ‘technical’ workers.</p> <p>(d) Unskilled and semi-skilled manual production workers, also including transport workers and other manual occupations engaged in manufacture and distribution, such as packers, truck drivers, haulers, etc.</p>
<p><b><u>3. Post-Industrial Hierarchy</u></b></p> <p>(a) Professionals and scientists.</p> <p>(b) Technicians and semi-professionals (school teachers, nurses, social workers, laboratory workers, technical designers, etc.</p> <p>(c) Skilled service workers (cooks, hairdressers, policemen, etc).</p> <p>(d) Unskilled service workers or service proletariat (cleaners, waitresses, bartenders, baggage porters, etc).</p>

Although this schema underlines important dynamics of hierarchical relations between employees it presents nothing about the shaping characteristics of the employer/owner - employee relations. Additionally, Esping-Andersen’s assertions about equal opportunity structures among genders are also questionable. Most of the studies about gender inequality in the labor markets argue against his claims by demonstrating that in labor markets women

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p.25

<sup>53</sup> Quoted from Leiulfstrud, Bison & Solheim, 2010.

face both job and wage discrimination.<sup>54</sup> Former underlines that females have more difficulties in finding jobs and latter indicates that even though women are in the equal positions with men they are paid less. Hence, formulations of Goldthorpe and Wright become more convenient for class analysis where men and women are analyzed separately.

### **2.1.2. Wright's Class Schemas**

Wright's model of social class could be labeled as a neo-Marxist and materialist conceptualization with several references to Weberian approach of social stratification.<sup>55</sup> According to Wright<sup>56</sup>, Marxists have been seeking ways to deal with middle class which impinge on one of the most central tenets of Marxian ideology: 1) the middle class as an ideological illusion; 2) as a segment of another class, the "new petty bourgeoisie or new working class; 3) as a new class distinct from the bourgeoisie; or 4) middle class as belonging to more than one class simultaneously.<sup>57</sup>

Referring to fourth approach, Wright presents two different class models. The first model, power/control (domination) model<sup>58</sup>, is based on production relations (ownership vs. non-ownership; management vs. non-management, high job-autonomy vs. low job autonomy). In his early writings particularly, Wright takes domination as a defining characteristic of relationship between classes since exploitation presumes domination.<sup>59</sup> In his second model, on the other hand, he rejects the power of domination as an explanatory mechanism of class relations and takes exploitation as the main point of reference. As Dahrendorf stresses rejection of domination by Wright as shaping attribute was based upon two perceptions: first, he acknowledged that domination does not necessarily mean exploitation, e.g. domination of parents over their children does not always yield exploitation; second, he realized that neo-Marxist patterns taking domination of one class over another as the main point of departure, become fractured, multifaceted, context-bound and entangled in

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<sup>54</sup> Adkins, 1995; Altanji & Blank, 1999; Wright & Ermich, 1991; Buchele, 2013; Neumark, 1999, Neumark & McLennan, 1995

<sup>55</sup> Bergman & Joye, 2001, p.18.

<sup>56</sup> Wright, 1985, 1988, 1997.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> Wright, 1978.

<sup>59</sup> Bergman & Joye, 2001, p.19

complex authority and power relations beyond materialist and realist perspectives.<sup>60</sup> However, he claims that Marxist and neo-Marxist class theories ought to rely on materialist and realist dynamics. Hence, they must focus on antagonistic commitments and exploitative relations of material interests, rather than domination<sup>61</sup>. Put it differently, “opposing material interests must remain at the heart of a Marxian conceptualization of modern capitalist societies”.<sup>62</sup> In short, Wright’s later class models are based on relations in the production domain; such as ownership vs. non-ownership, management vs. non-management, skill/experts vs. low-skill/workers.

In both of Wright’s schemas, self employed are perceived to be capitalists but a distinction is made regarding their number of employees. That is, self-employed with 10 or more workers are capitalists and those with 1-9 employees are small capitalists. In his first, power/control, model workers are identified as those with low degree of authority, low autonomy and with limited possibilities of influencing the work process.<sup>63</sup> In his second model which takes exploitation as explanatory dynamic, skill/organizational credentials are perceived to be more dominant than autonomy. The core working class consists of low-skilled workers in his second schema, so skilled workers have more market value than regular workers. In this sense, skilled workers are assumed to be either an intermediate class category or an extension of the working class. Managers; on the other hand, are realized to be the most privileged among the employees (see Table 3 below).

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<sup>60</sup> Dahrendorf, 1959

<sup>61</sup> Wright, 1985, 1997.

<sup>62</sup> Bergman & Joye, 2001, p.21

<sup>63</sup> Wright, 1978



**Table 3: Wright’s class schemes (early model based on power/control and later model based on exploitation of skill and organizational assets)<sup>64</sup>**

<b>Power/control model (Wright 1978)</b>	<b>Exploitation model (Wright 1985, 1997)</b>
Capitalists (10+ employees)	Capitalists (10+ employees)
Small capitalists (w. 2-9 employees)	Small capitalists (w. 2-9 employees)
Self-employed (no employees)	Self-employed (no employees)
Managers	Managers (expert, skilled unskilled)
Supervisors	Supervisors
Semi-autonomous employees (high autonomy/not mgr/superv.)	Experts (professionals, highly educated, not mgr/sup)
	Skilled workers (semi-professionals and skilled occupations, not mgr/superv).
Working class	Low-skilled workers (not mgr/superv).

### 2.1.3. EGP Class Schema

Since its conceptualization in 1970s EGP schema has been revised several times till 1997 when last version has been constructed. This sub-section consists of a summary and elaboration of EGP’s last version.

According to the authors (Erikson & Goldthorpe) of this class schema, stratification has flourished in industrial societies because of transformations of labor that gave rise to differentiation and net increase in education and training, multiplication of scarce, but desirable technical and professional skills.<sup>65</sup> These transformations have resulted in more complexities which increased the importance of management and administrative requirements. Increasing demand towards managerial and administrative skills; therefore, has changed the nature of employment relations and generated new hierarchies in industrialized societies.<sup>66</sup>

Based on these ideas, for more reliable and valid analysis, classes are categorized on the basis of employment relations – according to the type of employment contracts offered by their employers.<sup>67</sup> On one hand, there are workers who have signed a contract for a

<sup>64</sup> Quoted from Leifsrud, Bison & Solheim, 2010

<sup>65</sup> Bergman & Joye, 2001, p.11.

<sup>66</sup> Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992.

<sup>67</sup> Goldthorpe, 2000, 2007; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992.

particular position, and their relationship to the employer is to provide a service. On the other hand, there are employees that have a contract to do a specific job, and their relationship to their employer is defined through their job description.<sup>68</sup> While the first type of contract is widespread at the higher levels of bureaucratic organizations the second type of contract is typical for manual laborers. The service relationship is typical for all professionals, managers, trained technicians, and bureaucrats and according to the degree of education, extent of decision-making responsibility, and level of pay, we can further distinguish a higher class (class I) and a lower class (class II) within these occupation groups. The labor contract is typical for all laborers.<sup>69</sup>

The resulting class structure is not interpreted in strict hierarchical terms, however. As Erikson and Goldthorpe have noted, since their schema is designed to capture qualitative differences in employment relationships, ‘the classes are not consistently ordered according to some inherent hierarchical principle’; hence, EGP is a nominal measure.<sup>70</sup> Still, I<sup>st</sup> and II<sup>nd</sup> have the edge on classes IIIb, VI and VII (see table 4 below) since the matter of fact is economic status. First two classes’ advantage comes from the following: greater long-term security of income, being less likely to be made redundant; less short-term fluctuation of income since they are not dependent on overtime pay, etc; and a better prospect of a rising income over the life course.<sup>71</sup>

As can be seen in table 4, EGP class schema consists of 11 classes, which might be collapsed to 7, 5 or 3 categories as well. The seven-class version combines classes I and II (labeled as the service class or salariat), classes IVa and IVb (small businessmen), and classes V and VI (skilled laborers). Beyond that EGP could also be collapsed to 5 categories by combining I and II, and VI and VII or to three classes by labeling the classes as the following: I+II=1, IIIa, IV and V=2, IIIb, VI and VII=3.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Katrňák, 2012, p.682

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Goldthorpe, 2002, p.23

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Goldthorpe, 2000, 2007; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992. For further visualization see Appendix 1.

**Table 4: EGP Classes**<sup>73</sup>

<b>I</b>	<i>Service class I</i> (higher-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors). Salariat (top class).
<b>II</b>	<i>Service class II</i> (lower-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; higher grade technicians; managers in small industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual employees). Salariat (top class).
<b>IIIa</b>	<i>Routine non-manual</i> (routine non-manual employees, higher grade - administration and commerce). Intermediate class.
<b>IIIb</b>	<i>Routine non-manual employees</i> , lower grade (sales and services). Intermediate class in original EGP model. Modified labour contract and associated with the working class in Goldthorpe's contract theoretical model.
<b>IVa</b>	<i>Self-empl with employees</i> (small proprietors, artisans, etc, with employees). Intermediate class.
<b>IVb</b>	<i>Self-empl with no employees</i> (small proprietors, artisans, etc, with no employees). Intermediate class.
<b>IVc</b>	<i>Self-empl. Farmers etc</i> (farmers and small holders; other self-employed workers in primary production). Intermediate class. In some applications located in a separate agrarian strata with agricultural workers (VIIb).
<b>V</b>	<i>Manual supervisors/Lower grade technicians</i> (lower grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers). At the bottom of intermediate class. Sometimes merged together with the working class in the original model. Mixed contract relation in Goldthorpe's contract theory, albeit part of an intermediate class.
<b>VI</b>	<i>Skilled workers</i> . Working class.
<b>VIIa</b>	<i>Unskilled workers</i> (not in agriculture, etc). Working class.
<b>VIIb</b>	<i>Farm labours</i> (agricultural and other workers in primary production). Working class. In some applications located in separate agrarian strata with farmers (IVc).

#### 2.1.4 Comparison of EGP and Wright's Class Schemas

As stated above in Goldthorpe's analysis the distinguishing feature of classes are taken as job and market positions; on the other hand, Wright focuses on the importance of exploitation and possession of means of production. Even though they have different starting points, both of the schemas include job and market dimensions of individuals while categorizing them. Two reasons could be counted as crucial points which make these conceptualizations resemble to each other: 1) a stubborn commitment to the value and significance of systematically acquired, quantitatively measured, sociological data; and 2) a

<sup>73</sup> Quoted from Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992.

dawning recognition that many of the more fashionable nostrums in contemporary social theory are almost entirely at odds with the weight of the evidence produced by such data.<sup>74</sup>

Having stated theoretical similarities, diverging points (theoretical) of these schemas should also be underlined. In this sense, Wright emphasizes the existence of a separate capitalist class; however Goldthorpe tends to deny such a distinction while he is constructing his class schema based on non-manual and manual workers. Furthermore, unlike Wright, Goldthorpe and his colleagues reject any automatic link between class structure and class action, limiting the theoretical ambition of their class concept to the claim about the existence of social groupings that share particular sets of employment relations over time.<sup>75</sup> Erikson and Goldthorpe call the schema '*instrument de travail*' –, their class schema is based on a theoretical rationale. Its aim is 'to differentiate positions within labor markets and production units or, more specifically, to differentiate such positions in terms of the employment relations that they entail'.<sup>76</sup>

Beyond theoretical points, practical divergence/convergences of these schemas are other points attracting attention. First, in Wright's schema, among employees it could be observed that experts and expert/skilled, managers/supervisors correspond fairly well to Goldthorpe's upper service class.<sup>77</sup> In devising their class schema, Goldthorpe and his colleagues have a quite modest scope. Second, Routine non-manual employees (class IIIa and IIIb in EGP) are primarily regarded as working class in Wright's class scheme.<sup>78</sup> Third, a distinct difference regarding Class IV in the two class schemes, where almost half are labelled as skilled managers/supervisors and the remaining half is mainly skilled workers, also attracts attention. Fourth, there is a high degree of overlap between Wright's schema and EGP when it comes to skilled workers but unskilled workers (VIIa) in EGP end up in most cases as low-skilled workers in Wright's exploitation model.

In a nutshell, this suggests a picture where there is a high degree of overlap in the location of the top and bottom of the class structure (class I and class V, VI), but a significant

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<sup>74</sup> Milner, 1999, p.104

<sup>75</sup> Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992 p. 35

<sup>76</sup> Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992 p. 37

<sup>77</sup> Leiulfstrud, Bison & Solheim, 2010

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

discrepancy in the analyses of the lower service class (class II) and routine non-manual employees (class III). A considerable percentage of people who are counted as working class in EGP categorization are counted as managers and workers in Wright's schemes. Following Wright it also appears as if the service class is more heterogeneous than one might expect in terms of power resources at work.<sup>79</sup>

Regarding extent of data to operationalise these class categorizations, Wright's schema requires information about property, poverty and expertise which measure each form of asset are needed to be identified; therefore, data only about occupation and employment would not be enough to construct his schema; educational attainment, tasks performed at work, decision making and supervisory responsibility should also be known.<sup>80</sup> This makes Wright's class categorization more demanding; therefore,

“It is perhaps not surprising that those not committed to Wright's theoretical approach, but who wish to use a class schema, might prefer the more easily operationalised EGP schema. When we also consider that comparisons of the overall validity and predictive power of the two class schemas generally favor EGP, this is another reason for preferring the latter”<sup>81</sup>.

Discussion up to this point reveals the difficulty to employ Wright's class categorization in empirical analysis as well as the resemblance of these two different class schemas in several instances. Hence, it will not be surprising to choose EGP since it narrates the social class more or less in the same way Wright's categorization does and is more practical to apply to our data set. In addition, once again, followings should be noted: firstly, EGP has been well-validated, *post-hoc* and *ex ante*, in both criterion and construct terms; secondly, this schema is relatively easy to operationalise<sup>82</sup>; thirdly, it is widely used in studies of social class and it found wide appeal from many others<sup>83</sup>; fourthly utilizing an existing and widely used class schema provides readers an opportunity to compare results with the extant literature<sup>84</sup>; finally, we are aware of the fact that social class is more complex than

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Rose, 2001, p. 7.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Rose, 2001, pp.5,6

<sup>83</sup> E.g. Evans, 1992; Evans & Mills, 1998.

<sup>84</sup> Kaya, 2008, p.171

just employment relations, yet because of the limited data, using these relations as a proxy to understand this phenomena flourished to be the only way while we were proceeding in our analysis.

As discussed above, EGP social class schema is formed of 11 categories; however, again because of the data availability at hand full categorization of EGP could not be used in this analysis. Instead we employed the seven class schema (see Table 5 below) which also provides convincing results as it could also be observed in the literature.<sup>85</sup>

**Table 5: EGP Class Schema (Seven Class Version)**

<b>I</b>	High-grade professionals
<b>II</b>	Lower-level professionals and supervisors
<b>III</b>	Routine non-manual workers
<b>IV</b>	Self-employed (excluding farmers)
<b>V</b>	Skilled workers
<b>VI</b>	Non-skilled workers
<b>VII</b>	Farmers and farm workers

Concerning Turkey, it is not hard to claim that EGP social class analysis has not drawn the attention of Turkish scholars that much. We reached only one study in which EGP was used in the analysis. EGP social class (eight class version) schema was applied to Turkish case by Kaya in the context of proletarianization and polarization. He analyzed the social class structure of Turkey during the latest wave of economic globalization in four dimensions: by sector of employment, the EGP class schema, occupational group, and in terms of informal employment. In this study, he claimed that proletarianization occurred through a transition from Turkey's agrarian tradition, a relative decline of the public sector, and an expansion of classes who sell their labor without workplace authority. Moreover, he stressed that polarization entailed the growth of private-sector entrepreneurial, professional and managerial classes, and a simultaneous expansion of the informal sector.<sup>86</sup>An important

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<sup>85</sup>E.g. Bihagen et. al. 2010; Bihagen et. al. 2006; Ganzeboom et. al. 1989; Nieuwebeerta & Groof, 2000 etc.

<sup>86</sup> Kaya, 2000.

point to note in this study in terms of operationalization of EGP is that the author constructs eight class version of EGP deviating from the original schema in one instance because of his data constraints. He groups the entire employers, both small and big, in one class and gets eight different classifications<sup>87</sup>. Unlike him we are more loyal to the original EGP schema and we present seven classes for the analysis; only difference in our study comes from the farmers and farm workers class. That is, as Ganzeboom and Trieman we listed all agricultural categories at the extreme end since this gives us a more orderly set of categories.<sup>88</sup>

## **2.2 Economic Migration Literature on Turkey**

One of the earliest studies of migration in Turkey was presented by Munro.<sup>89</sup> He identified the determinants of internal migration in Turkey for the period of 1960 and 1965. Basically he set a model considering on pushing factors and made two strong assumptions. First, push factors arose from agricultural regions. Second, he assumed that migration occurs steadily. That is to say, Munro claimed that individuals move first to closer areas and then they move further to the centers of attraction. His findings reveal that migration from a province depends on the agricultural sector and non-agricultural employment opportunities and earnings. Moreover, education has also a role such that literacy both increases the chance for non-agricultural employment and creates an individual interest in change and improvement.

In another study, Gezici and Keskin<sup>90</sup> examined the impact of total population, estimated population growth, the rate of literate people, the number of schools, the number of doctors per 10.000 people, public investment, GNP, the number of agricultural workers, the number of industrial workers, agricultural product value, industrial electricity consumption and geographic location on migration level of provinces. According to results of their multi regression analysis, income and job opportunities founded as main cause of migration. In

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<sup>87</sup> Kaya, 2000, p.171

<sup>88</sup> Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996, p.212

<sup>89</sup> Munro, 1974.

<sup>90</sup> Gezici & Keskin, 2005

sum, properties of provinces such as income, workforce, growth of population and geographic location have impact on movements of internal migration.

Evcil et al.<sup>91</sup> showed the attribute of regional migration in Turkey. They compared the geographic regions to different migration directions. They used multivariate analysis of variance. According to their results, in the context of four different direction of migration, urban to urban- urban to rural- rural to urban- rural to rural, Marmara differs from the others. In addition, they found that common direction is urban to urban for each region. As a second step of study they run multiple regression analysis in order to determine the factors which are most related to net migration. They found that in general most relevant factors are economic factors. It is consistent with the other studies which are conducted for Turkey.

In a relatively recent study, Filiztekin and Gökhan<sup>92</sup> did empirical analysis about the determinants of internal migration in Turkey. Their data range covers the period between 1990 an 2000. They showed that economic factors like income differentials and unemployment rates have impact on migration decision. They also found that some social factors like social networks have significant effect on migration as well. They investigated genders separately and they realized that there are substantial differences between male and female migration decision. They also took uncertainty to the account. Their study conducted in province level. They run gravity model of migration which defines migration flows to be a function of origin and destination specifies unpleasant and attractive factors combined with some form of distance function as a correspondence of cost of migration. According to their findings, population of both receiving and origin province has positive effect on migration and effect of receiving province population increased over time. Positive effect of income in the destination province and the negative impact of income in the province of origin have become significantly less effective. Also the negative effect of the unemployment rate of the destination province has increased. In sum, they proved that characteristics of Turkish migrants in line with stylized facts about migrants.

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<sup>91</sup> Evcil et al., 2006.

<sup>92</sup> Filiztekin & Gökhan, 2008.



In addition, some recent analyses have shown that realizations from migration might not always be positive.<sup>93</sup> To illustrate, Tunalı<sup>94</sup> examined the qualitative and quantitative importance of the several factors behind the migration and remigration. He used data from 1963 to 1973. According to his findings, labor market conditions such as residence in rural area, lack of job related security and unemployment has substantial impact on migration decision. He analyzed the impact of regional and macroeconomic variables on migration decision. His structure of the data let him to examine past migration histories at the same time. Thus, determination of the relative significance of the forces that influence individual migration experience became possible for him. Furthermore he examined the remigration decisions as well. He also provides systematic study of the determinant of various types of migration and remigration. The main difference<sup>94</sup> of this study is data structure. It came from Survey of the Structure of Population and Population Problems conducted by Hacettepe Institute of Population Studies. The survey collected retrospective information on lifetime migration and employment histories of one male member from each household in the sample. Above mentioned studies are based on the data from Censuses. That is the reason why this study has structural differences from others. As a bottom line, Tunalı reveals that returns to migration were not positive for the migrants that migrated in that period in this study<sup>95</sup>. To add, as Özmucur and Silber reported that internal migration from rural to urban areas increased the income inequality in Turkey<sup>96</sup>. As a proof to these findings, Keleş (1996) demonstrated that in 1995, “35% of Turkish urban population was living in shantytowns most of them lack even the most important fundamental infrastructure such as water and electricity”<sup>97</sup>. Hence, studying consequences of migration for migrants flourishes to be as crucial as studying the reasons that push/pull them to migrate.

As it could be deduced from these studies, economic literature on migration in Turkey mostly focuses on the determinants, size and direction of migration flows. Their key prediction is that people migrate from low income regions to high income regions. Also they reached a consensus that certain groups of individuals, such as highly educated, are

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<sup>93</sup> Filiztekin & Gökhan, 2008, p.2

<sup>94</sup> Tunalı, 1996.

<sup>95</sup> Tunalı, 2000.

<sup>96</sup> Ozmucur & Silber, 2002.

<sup>97</sup> Keleş, 1996 ; cited in Filiztekin & Gökhan, 2008, p.2

more likely to migrate than others. However, consequences of migration for migrants in different labor markets have also not attracted the attention of Turkish scholars from the economics field. We found only two economic researches on this issue. One of them was conducted in Izmir by Binatlı and Akdede.<sup>98</sup> The purpose of their work was reported to be investigating the social status of migrants in a culturally liberal and historically cosmopolitan port city (Izmir) in Turkey. They used data set from Izmir Labor Market Household Survey. They measured social status by occupational status, wages and education. In addition, parents' education, as well as, duration of unemployment for migrants was analyzed. Occupational status and education analyses were based on ordered probit models. The probability that an individual with given characteristics would have an uneducated parent was estimated with a probit model. Weibull duration model was employed for the unemployment duration. By employing the stated data and methods, they found that 1) migrants in Izmir are likely to have occupations that claim a lower status; 2) migrants have higher wages so migrants are taking jobs of lower status but higher pay; 3) the probability of exiting unemployment for migrants is higher, that is the duration of unemployment for migrants is shorter; 4) parents' education for migrants is lower in general. Overall, they reached the conclusion that that the social status of migrant women is definitely lower than natives, male or female, and male migrants and the social status of migrant men also points to a disadvantage as even though the male migrant is more educated on average, he is likely to hold an occupation of lower status. The second research was conducted by Berker on the impacts of internal migration on natives' educational and labor market outcomes in the Turkish provinces by using 1990 and 2000 Censuses.<sup>99</sup> In this study he found that native males in provincial areas were harmed most by internal migration by lowering natives' employment-population ratio. Furthermore, less-skilled migrants have diminished the natives' labor market opportunities, regardless of natives' skill level and the inflow of migrants to a provincial labor market is more likely to displace permanent native males from their jobs than to displace male old migrants. Berker claims that the internal migrant ratio has the weakest effect on the labor market outcomes of male migrants. He further makes elaborations on the educational outcomes and concludes that

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<sup>98</sup> Binatlı & Akdede, 2014.

<sup>99</sup> Berker, 2013.

migrant ratio in a particular province only affects the middle income families. This study differs from ours in the sense that they are taking different measures of labor market outcomes. Berker takes employment-population, labor force-population and employment-labor force ratios as the labor market outcomes.

Taking these two works as the main products of limited economic literature on impact of migration on migrants and residents, our study contributes to the literature by making elaborations on social class distribution of migrants in different labor markets. As well as we contribute to the literature by presenting more refined results about the changing impact of migration on individuals by different educational degrees. Different from the stated two researches our study focuses only to labor market outcomes but not elaborates on educational outcomes of migrants.

Unlike Turkey, socio economic rewards of (im)migrants across destinations have been attracted the attention of scholars in different nations and this empirical research has developed in three axes: wage differentials between migrants and non-migrants, unemployment and social class. Chiswick; to illustrate, investigated the impact of cultural assimilation of (im)migrants on their wages in the USA<sup>100</sup>. Borjas and Aydemir<sup>101</sup>, and Skuterud<sup>102</sup> sought answers for how wages of new (im)migrants evolve over time for the USA and Canada, consequently. In addition to these works wage differences between the natives and (im)migrants studied a lot in the literature<sup>103</sup> in different countries and the bottom line of these studies is that migrants earn lower wages per hour than the natives, *ceteris paribus*.

Additionally, social class structure of (im)migrants across destinations has also studied and this literature has often been further supported with unemployment risks of migrants. Model investigated labor market outcomes of (im)migrants with different ethnic backgrounds in New York, Toronto and London in terms of unemployment, EGP social class and occupational status. She found that net effect of group membership on

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<sup>100</sup> Chiswick, 1978.

<sup>101</sup> Borjas 1995.

<sup>102</sup> Skuterud & Aydemir,, 2005.

<sup>103</sup> For further research on this topic refer to: Butcher and Dinardo, 2002; Aydemir and Skuterud, 2005; Frijters et al. 2005; Steinhardt, 2011.

unemployment is positive, meaning (im)migrants are more likely to be unemployed in the stated labor markets. In addition, she stated that being an (im)migrant in these labor markets decreases the likelihood of being in the first class identified by Goldhorpe and his colleagues. Similar results were also underlined for the ISIE scores of (im)migrants.<sup>104</sup> In another study Model also analyzed the UK labor market by using 1991 Census data in order to examine the economic positions of migrants and their children and again she reached the same results<sup>105</sup>. A similar study was made for Norwegian labor market by Birkelund et al. and they concluded that non-western (im)migrants have higher level of unemployment and are scarcely found in high-level positions, such as the service class which is the top class in the EGP schema<sup>106</sup>.

As it was discussed in the previous chapter, conducting parallel researches to these lately stated inquires in Turkey are also important for both policy implications and sociological research. Empirical research in Turkey has the consensus that mostly economic factors are the determinants of internal migration which is also crucial for policy implications. Supporting this literature by both economic and social consequences of migration is going to provide further suggestions for both policy makers and individuals prior to taking migration decision. That is, if migration is a social phenomenon increasing income inequality in the country than governments definitely ought to take some precautions to stop or slow migration flows. If migration increases polarization or relative poverty in the urban spaces or it declines agricultural and husbandry production again there are some deductions that both central and local governments should make. If migrants are suffering in the labor markets in the destination regions policies of reforming labor markets or increasing education levels of migrants have the potential to make migrants better off. If migration is a “head or tails game”<sup>107</sup> for migrants, individuals also should think twice while they are prior to take migration decision.

Concluding this chapter, our claim is that migration has varying effects on both migrants and non-migrants in the destination regions and this effect changes depending on time and region in Turkey. To test these ideas we present differing characteristics of important

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<sup>104</sup> Model, 2002.

<sup>105</sup> Model, 2010.

<sup>106</sup> Birkelund et al., 2007.

<sup>107</sup> Tuanli, 2000.

destination regions and migrants as well as our empirical estimations and their results in the following chapters.

## **Chapter 3**

### **DATA, GEOGRAPHIC SCALES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS**

#### **3.1 Data**

The data used in this study is from the Household Labor Force Surveys (HLFS) conducted between the years 2009 and 2011 by Turkish Institute of Statistics (TURKSTAT) covering over 1,500,000 individuals representing population in 26 NUTS II regions and the entire country with appropriate weights. The dataset consists of variables describing the social and economic characteristics of the whole population and migrants. Information on gender, marital status, schooling, age, wages, tenure on the current job as well as characteristics of the job such as two digit sector, firm size, employment status are available in the data set. A migrant in our dataset is defined to be an individual who was not born in the province that s/he is residing currently. As another important indicator for this study, the schooling variable is reported as the highest degree completed, which is converted to years of schooling using the appropriate number of years required to obtain the degree. Earnings are monthly wages net of tax and social security contributions and include overtime work and bonuses. They are converted to hourly wages using reported usual weekly hours (monthly

earnings/(4.33\*weekly work hours. Firm size is reported in the scales of <10, 10-24, 25-49, 50-249, 250-499 and 500+ in the data. As for the sector of workplaces, two digit classifications are available in parallel to European classification of Economic Activities (NACE). Formality of the sector is also available in our data and it is operationalized as the workers who are enrolled in the social security system. There is no one standard definition of informal employment in the literature, but social security enrollment is a commonly used and accepted measurement<sup>108</sup>. Potential experience of individuals is calculated by subtracting years of schooling and 6 as the age of school start age (age – years of schooling – 6). Occupational classification is also available at International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO 88) two digit level. Employment status of individuals is given by four categories in the data: wage earners, employer, self-employed and unpaid family workers.

### **3.2 Geographic Scales**

Geographic scales, Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara and Adana, used in this study correspond to the second level of Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics in Turkey (henceforth NUTS II)<sup>109</sup> and this section is employed to demonstrate how these regions are different from each other and to discuss why these differences are important for our research.

From 1985 to 2010 population of Turkey has increased around 18 million and Istanbul has been the most crowded region throughout the history of Turkish Republic. In 1985, population of Istanbul was around 5.640.000 that counted up almost 10% of Turkish total population. In 2010, population of this region increased to 13.255.735 reporting around 300 thousand annual growth and taking place at the top in terms of population again. Ankara followed Istanbul by having population over 3 million in 1985 which rise to 4.7 million in 2010, making up of around 6.5% of total population in 2010. Izmir and Adana regions have almost equal amount of population since 1985, which was around 2.5 million, and this increased to around 3.7-3.8 million people when it came to the year of 2010 (refer to Table 6 for more detailed information about the populations of stated regions).

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<sup>108</sup> McKeever, 1998; Portes & Schauffler, 1993

<sup>109</sup> For a detailed classification of statistical region units in Turkey we refer the reader to the Appendix.

In addition to population growth, urbanization rates of these regions have also increased since 1985, which reveals that provinces became more attractive for people. As it can be observed in Table 7 urbanization rate of Istanbul has always been more than 90% since 1985. However, it should be noted that in 1990 and 2000 there is around 3-4% decrease in urbanization rate respectively when it is compared to the year of 1985. In 2010, on the other hand, urbanization rate of Istanbul has increased to 99%. Reported 8% of increase is huge if this jump is from 91% to 99% because normally we expect less amount of increase when the share is already big.

As for the other regions under consideration, we observe more or less the same pattern that from 1985 onwards urbanization tends to increase. When it came to 2010, in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara regions more than 90% of the total population was living in urban spaces. For Adana, this rate is again close to 90%, yet for Mersin<sup>110</sup> urbanization rate is 78% which is again more than Turkey's average urbanization (76%). The reason why we emphasized urbanization this much lies under the suggestion that urbanization is crucial for regional development<sup>111</sup> that regions with higher urbanization rates are expected to be economically more developed which could be an important determinant of migration as it was discussed above.

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<sup>110</sup> Cities of Adana and Mersin are taken as one unit of analysis in NUTS II classification; however, as it was stated due to space concerns we are referring to this region only as Adana. But at this stage it is also important to note urbanization rates of these two cities separately to have clearer idea about this issue. For more detailed information about NUTS classifications refer to Appendix.

<sup>111</sup> Filiztekin, 2008, p. 89



**Table 6: Population of Regions**

	Istanbul				Izmir			
	1985	1990	2000	2010	1985	1990	2000	2010
<b>Population</b>	5.640.548	7.309.196	10.018.735	13.255.685	2.317.829	2.694.770	3.370.866	3.948.848
<b>Male</b>	3.041.847	3.798.761	5.097.535	6.655.094	1.198.236	1.379.778	1.698.819	1.985.368
<b>Female</b>	2.598.701	3.511.435	4.921.200	6.600.591	1.119.593	1.314.992	1.672.047	1.963.480
	Ankara				Adana			
	1985	1990	2000	2010	1985	1990	2000	2010
<b>Population</b>	3.306.327	3.236.626	4.007.860	4.771.716	2.760.025	3.201.906	3.500.878	3.733.124
<b>Male</b>	1.702.805	1.658.006	2.027.105	2.379.226	1.254.184	1.599.226	1.749.743	1.858.090
<b>Female</b>	1.603.522	1.578.620	1.980.755	2.392.490	1.505.841	1.602.680	1.751.135	1.875.034

Source: TURKSTAT, Population Censuses of 1985, 1990, 2000, and 2010

**Table 7: Urbanization Rate of the Regions**

	1985	1990	2000	2010
<b>Istanbul</b>	95	92	91	99
<b>Izmir</b>	77	79	81	91
<b>Ankara</b>	82	88	88	97
<b>Adana</b>	66	70	76	88
<b>Mersin</b>	54	62	61	78

Source: TURKSTAT, Population Censuses of 1985, 1990, and 2000, 2010)

When it comes to education levels of the aforementioned regions, two important patterns should be underlined. First is the literacy rate of regions which is presented in Table 8, second is education levels of regions present in Table 9. Literacy rate is highest in Istanbul which was increasing steadily since 1985 and reached to 96% in 2010. Again Ankara followed Istanbul having around 95% of literacy rate, and this ratio is 93% for Izmir and 90% for Adana.

**Table 8: Ratio of Population by Literacy (%)**

	1985	1990	2000	2010
<b>Istanbul</b>	85,5	90,2	93,3	95,7
<b>Izmir</b>	81,1	87,1	91,8	93,2
<b>Ankara</b>	82,3	89,5	93,2	94,6
<b>Adana</b>	70,9	79,4	86,8	89,7

*Source: TURKSTAT, Population Censuses of 1985, 1990, 2000, 2010)*

More detailed information about education levels of regions is presented in Table 9. As it can be inferred from this table, while the share of population with primary degree is decreasing in all regions since 1985 share of college is increasing in the same period. One of the striking points here is the rise of population with college degree in Adana after 1990. When it came to 2000 this share was around 6% which counts up to 5.4% of increase in ten years in this region. In the meantime share of employment in service sector, some occupations of which require more educational degrees, such as banking sector, also increased around 6% in the same region possibly giving way to stated growth reported in education levels of population in Adana. Another important point to note here is that education level of Ankara seems to be the highest in the population which might be an important determinant of wage and social class analysis in the following sections. As for Izmir and Istanbul the trend is again the same that education level of the population has been increasing since 1985.

**Table 9: Education Levels of Regions (%)**

	1985			1990		
	Primary	High Sch.	College	Primary	High Sch.	College
<b>Istanbul</b>	42,6	7,0	4,1	43,1	8,4	4,7
<b>Izmir</b>	42,5	5,6	3,3	44,1	6,6	4,4
<b>Ankara</b>	37,1	8,1	4,8	38,6	9,7	6,5
<b>Adana</b>	36,9	1,6	0,3	39,5	2,4	0,7
	2000			2010		
	Primary	High Sch.	College	Primary	High Sch.	College
<b>Istanbul</b>	37,1	12,1	7,0	39,3	17,7	7,8
<b>Izmir</b>	35,2	10,6	7,2	37,7	18,5	8,8
<b>Ankara</b>	39,4	14,2	10,1	37,3	21,2	11,4
<b>Adana</b>	40,7	9,9	4,3	40,9	15,9	5,7

*Source: TURKSTAT, Population Censuses of 1985, 1990, 2000, 2010)*

Steady increase in education level throughout the time in the regions under consideration could also be consequence of share of young in population as it is underlined in the theory that young tend to be more educated. To see this, referring to Table 10 presenting the age structures of the regions will be beneficial. A common tendency in the population is that while the share of children (age interval of 0-14) is decreasing over time, share of population in the labor force (15-64) has been growing. Note that children of one period become the young of the other period and when both share of children and old (65+) is considered it could be stated that share of young in the labor force is also increasing which in fact, could be another reason giving way to increase in education level of regions. At this point there might appear a counter argument underlying that the youngest population reside in Adana then why education level is the lowest in the same region. A possible answer to this might emerge either from the migration composition of this region that it has been taking migrants from regions in which the education level is relatively low or from the production structure, almost 30% of which is composed of agriculture that needs less educational attainment (Refer to table 13 below). Other than these, it could be stated that share of old is almost the same around 5-6% and proportion of children is around 21-24% for the regions under consideration; share of people in the labor force has been increasing throughout the time in the regions which is a common trend as well.

After stating the growing share in the age brackets of 15-64 which is considered to be age interval of population in the labor force it is worth to state how the labor force is changing over time in these regions. As it is expected, total labor force is the highest in Istanbul that over 2 million people were in the labor force in 1980 and this number was recorded as 4.604.000 in 2010, which reveals that in 30 years total labor force in Istanbul has increased almost 100%. The salient point here is that most of the stated increase happened between 1990 and 2000 that total employment in this period increased from 2.7 million to 4 million. Parallel to this, increase in total population and net migration in this region has also grown in the same period (refer to Table 6 above and Table 14 below) which might be a partial explanation for this huge growth.

By having over 1.1 million individuals in labor force, Ankara is ranked as the second region in Turkey in terms of total labor force in 1980 and this number raised to 1.65 million in 2010, which again makes Ankara the second biggest labor market in Turkey. For Izmir this amount went up by 600 thousand people in the same period and over 1.5 million people has been registered in the labor force according to 2010 Census. As for Adana, around 40% increase has been registered for total labor force between 1990 and 2000. Observing the huge increase in total labor force in this period loses its strikingness when the period of migration occurred after village evacuations is also considered. Although we do not have any reliable data on who migrated since they were forced after village evacuations in 1990s<sup>112</sup> the period of increase in population and the period of forced migration<sup>113</sup> (especially between 1987 and 1999) overlap and this could be a partial explanation for the amount of growth in total labor force in Adana.

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<sup>112</sup> More detailed discussion on this issue will take place in the next section.

<sup>113</sup> More detailed discussion will be about forced migration in the next sub-section.

**Table10: Age Structure of Regions (%)**

		Istanbul			Izmir			Ankara			Adana		
		0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+
1985	<b>Total</b>	30,5	66,9	3,9	29,6	65,4	4,8	33,4	63,1	3,5	39,6	57,0	3,4
	<b>Male</b>	31,1	65,6	3,1	29,4	66,4	4	33,4	63,6	3,0	37,9	60,6	1,5
	<b>Female</b>	34,1	68,5	4,3	30,0	64,2	5,6	33,4	62,6	4,0	39,3	56,5	4,2
1990	<b>Total</b>	29,7	66,4	3,9	28,1	66,7	4,2	29,5	66,2	4,3	37,2	59,7	3,1
	<b>Male</b>	29,5	67,2	3,3	28,1	67,4	4,3	30,2	66,7	3,7	38,1	60,1	1,7
	<b>Female</b>	27,6	66,5	4,9	28,1	66,0	5,8	30,0	65,8	5,2	35,9	59,2	4,9
2000	<b>Total</b>	26,3	68,9	4,8	23,6	69,5	6,9	25,2	69,5	4,3	31,7	63,9	4,4
	<b>Male</b>	26,7	69,3	4	24,1	70,0	5,9	25,6	69,9	3,5	32,7	63,3	4
	<b>Female</b>	25,9	68,8	5,3	23,2	69,0	7,2	24,8	69,2	6,0	30,7	64,5	4,8
2010	<b>Total</b>	23,8	70,6	5,4	21,8	71,7	6,5	22,3	70,9	6,8	26,4	67,3	6,3
	<b>Male</b>	24,5	70,8	4,7	22,3	72,4	5,3	22,9	71,2	5,9	27,2	67,3	5,5
	<b>Female</b>	23,2	70,3	6,3	21,3	70,9	7,8	21,7	70,7	7,6	25,6	67,4	7,0

Source: TURKSTAT, Population Censuses of 1985, 1990, 2000, 2010)

As for total employment, Istanbul is again at the first rank for the stated years and between 1980 and 2010 total employment has increased around 2 million. Ankara again comes second for each year and reports about 400 thousand increase in total employment. In 1980 and 2010 Izmir registers more total employment than Adana but for 1990 and 2000 there were 100-200 thousand more employed people in Adana.

When it came to employment in sectors which is presented in Table 13, the difference in the economic structures between the regions appears more clearly. As a general tendency we observe that share of employment in agriculture is declining and this share is increasing for service sector since 1980. Economic structure of Istanbul mostly consists of industry and services with share of 40% and 59% respectively. For Ankara, as it is expected since its being the 'city of bureaucrats', service sector is the most dominant with the share of 66% in 1980 and 73% in 2010. Having more employment in agriculture, Izmir also has almost the same economic structure with Istanbul. Its employment is mostly in service sector with the share of 58% and industry follows services by 31% share of total employment in this region. Economic structure of Adana, on the other side, is mostly dominated by agriculture (58%) in 1980 but this share declined more dramatically (28%) than the other regions when it came to 2010. Rapid increase of service sector in this region should also be noted since there has been 20% growth in 30 years.

The final information that is going to be provided in this sub-section is about migration in these regions. In this sense comparing net migration in these regions would be more appropriate to have an idea about migration taking place in the stated regions. For all of the years, as it is expected net migration is highest in Istanbul. However, we do not observe a steady increase in the net migration for each region. Only steady increase could be observed in Ankara as it is presented in Table14.

**Table 11: Total Labor Force**

	1980			1990			2000			2010		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
<b>Istanbul</b>	1,954,154	1,708,324	445,830	2,707,397	2,214,110	493,287	4,056,490	2,962,238	1,094,252	4,604,001	3,443,124	1,161,522
<b>Izmir</b>	952,936	702,923	250,103	1,145,300	824,182	321,118	1,436,185	968,725	467,460	1,534,010	1,042,854	492,006
<b>Ankara</b>	1,180,330	893,687	286,643	1,319,061	1,007,497	311,564	1,681,395	1,211,122	470,273	1,640,100	1,188,004	452,006
<b>Adana</b>	946,290	620,886	325,405	1,312,802	890,199	422,603	1,516,751	974,927	541,824	1,408,008	977,003	431,005

Source: TURKSTAT, Population Censuses of 1985, 1990, 2000, 2010)

**Table 12: Total Employment**

	1980			1990			2000			2010		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
<b>Istanbul</b>	1,873,597	1,566,108	307,489	2,076,455	2,020,325	330,322	3,544,200	2,621,936	922,264	3,947,554	2,988,478	959,086
<b>Izmir</b>	902,930	873,949	407,059	1,080,346	773,661	306,685	1,281,008	873,949	407,059	1,303,010	906,009	397,001
<b>Ankara</b>	1,090,330	820,157	270,173	1,219,043	929,695	289,348	1,494,415	1,089,487	404,928	1,442,050	1,063,025	379,025
<b>Adana</b>	894,222	578,435	315,787	1,185,741	791,280	394,461	1,327,042	840,654	486,388	1,173,040	828,02	345,02

Source: TURKSTAT, Population Censuses of 1985, 1990, 2000, 2010)

**Table 13: Employment in Sector (%)**

	1980			1990			2000			2010		
	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services
<b>Istanbul</b>	6,3	35,5	53,4	2,9	38,7	58,4	1,9	39,2	58,9	0,4	40,0	59,6
<b>Izmir</b>	27,5	23,7	49,8	23,5	26,3	50,2	16,7	28,9	54,4	11,7	30,5	57,8
<b>Ankara</b>	15,5	19,2	66,3	9,8	20,7	69,5	6,3	22,5	71,2	3,7	23,6	72,7
<b>Adana</b>	57,8	11,9	30,3	48,8	13,4	37,6	41,6	14,2	44,2	30,3	19,6	50,1

Source: TURKSTAT, Population Censuses of 1985, 1990, 2000, 2010)

For Istanbul we observe an increase between 1985 and 1990 when it is compared to the period of 1980-1985. After 1995 net migration starts to decline and in 2007-2010 period net migration approaches its least in Istanbul for the periods under consideration. For Izmir the migration pattern is more or less the same and again the lowest net migration is observed in the last period. After 1985-1990 period, Adana experienced negative net migration.

**Table 14: In-Migration, Out Migration, Net Migration of the Regions**

	1980-1985			1985-1990		
	In-mig.	Out-mig.	Net mig.	In-mig.	Out-mig.	Net mig.
<b>Istanbul</b>	576 782	279 184	297 598	995 717	339 040	656 677
<b>Izmir</b>	194 245	112 072	82 173	276 378	130 170	146 208
<b>Ankara</b>	257 516	220 885	36 631	326 301	256 790	69 511
<b>Adana</b>	189 014	115 592	73 422	256 052	154 401	101 651
	1995-2000			2007-2010		
	In-mig.	Out-mig.	Net mig.	In-mig.	Out-mig.	Net mig.
<b>Istanbul</b>	920 955	513 507	407 448	1,202,850	1,034,121	168,729
<b>Izmir</b>	306 387	186 012	120 375	344,712	279,111	65.601
<b>Ankara</b>	377 108	286 224	90 884	507,798	390,752	117,046
<b>Adana</b>	210 578	232 646	- 22 068	203,05	219,937	-16,887

Source: TURKSTAT, Population Censuses of 1985, 1990, 2000, 2010

Before concluding this sub-section, it should be noted that from the information provided up until this point two important lessons should be taken: 1) even though having some similar points each region has its unique characteristics which determine the social and economic conditions of people living in and migrating to there and; 2) stated structures of regions are important since they have impact on characteristics of migrants arriving to these places; to illustrate, more educated people would most probably prefer Ankara to Adana because of the fact that job composition in this region requires mostly educated people.

### 3.3 Migration and Migrants

As it was stated, this study aims to explore whether or not being migrant matters for unemployment, EGP social class and earnings across destinations in Turkey. Therefore, labor migration is the consideration point for the present inquiry, since the stated are job market outcomes. To achieve this end, two different points have been considered in order to



compare both migrants- non-migrants and migrants in different places of residence in terms of unemployment, EGP social class and earnings.

First, we consider males between age intervals of 15-64 who are not students and not public employees and migrated after graduation or the purpose of migration is not education. Note that by graduation we refer not only college graduation but also the other degrees completed; such as primary, high school etc. The reason why we did not consider public employees is that they do not give migration decisions individually but they change their place of residence by appointment or designation. Yet we are interested in individuals who take migration decision to more productive labor markets having the intention of being better off both economically and socially in the new region of settlement. Age intervals of 15-64 is also an intentional restriction that in Turkey individuals below 14 are considered to be children<sup>114</sup> who are mostly changed their place of residence because of family decisions, but as it is stated above our focus will be on those who take migration decision for labor market issues. In Turkey, almost 55% of females are also not the ones who take migration decisions to be a part of labor market in more productive areas. Family decisions and marriage is the most important determinants of female migration.<sup>115</sup> Hence, women are also excluded from our sample since the reason for migration is not directly about labor market issues for more than half of them<sup>116</sup> and this topic deserves a broader study for a future research. Students, since they are not active job seekers in the labor markets, are the other group that is not considered in our samples. Additionally and most importantly we

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<sup>114</sup> Child labor is also an important issue to study for Turkey, yet it deserves another coherent study focusing only on this topic so we are excluding children from our study. To add, there are studies focusing on child labor in Turkey and we refer the reader to Tor (2010), Tunçcan (2012), Durgun (2011), Gülçubuk (2012), Tunçomağ (2012) in case of curiosity.

<sup>115</sup> TURKSTAT, 2000.

<sup>116</sup> From remaining 45% of females, only 9.94% of them take migration decisions to involve in labor market; however by the data at hand we cannot identify the reason why females came to their final place of residence except whether they are appointed or not. However, there are comprehensive studies that underline discrimination towards women in Turkish labor market too and again we refer reader to Cudeville & Gürbüzler (2007), Selim & İlkaracan (2002), Kara (2006), Hoşgör & Smits (2008), İlkaracan, (2012), for gender discrimination in labor market in Turkey.

considered migrants who migrated to Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana-Mersin after graduation or without educational purposes. Aim of limiting our sample by doing so could be explained by the following rationales/assumptions: 1) if an individual is qualified enough for a job market in a region after graduation, migration would not take place if it is not a forced decision<sup>117</sup>, i.e. the individuals are not likely to change their residence if they have quality to survive in a particular labor market; 2) if an individual is over qualified for a particular job market after graduation then s/he will migrate to more productive regions; 3) comparing individuals in a job market by disregarding their backgrounds will not provide clear results and since the only information we have in the data at hand is educational attainment we defined a migrant as it is stated above; 4) by doing so we are also excluding the individuals moved for the purpose of education. More accurate results would be reached if we had information about individuals' and their families' total wealth. This has a great importance of individuals' well-being in several ways. To illustrate, as Bourdieu puts it "the scholastic yield from educational action depends on the cultural capital previously invested by the family"<sup>118</sup> and "the initial accumulation of cultural capital, the precondition for the fast, easy accumulation of every kind of useful cultural capital, starts at the outset, without delay, without wasted time, only for the offspring of families endowed with strong cultural capital."<sup>119</sup> Moreover, opportunity set of wealthier individuals or those coming from wealthier families are also expected to be better which might be resulting from more and stronger networks that could be explained by the social capital conceptualization of Bourdieu.<sup>120</sup> Wealth or economic capital of individuals and/or their families constitute great importance since all types of capital can be derived from economic capital through varying efforts of transformation.<sup>121</sup>

After the stated refinements because of the stated reasons, we left with 425.107 individuals, 26.2% of who changed their residency after graduation (refer to table 15 below). 8.1% of people are observed to be those who moved for educational purposes. Some reminders

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<sup>117</sup> These kinds of decisions will be elaborated.

<sup>118</sup> Bourdieu, 1986, 244.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, 246.

<sup>120</sup> Bourdieu defines social capital as, "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Ibid, 248).

<sup>121</sup> Ibid, 240.

about Table 15 and 16 should be underlined at this point. Below tables represent the amount and share of migrants who could survive in the population after they migrated. That is 47% of migrants corresponding around 3.8 million have clutch onto life in Istanbul after they arrived. For Izmir and Ankara this share is around 34% and 31% respectively. As for Adana the proportion of migrants survived after they arrived is about 24% which is much lower than the other regions under consideration.

Second, we analyzed migrants who migrated (definition of migrant is again the same as stated above the only difference is dividing them according to their period of arrival) in the periods of 1981-1989<sup>122</sup>, 1990-1998, 1999-2001, and 2002-2011 separately since duration after migration is also important for migrants to survive in the labor market of the region they migrated. Moreover, due to macro changes in the country, migration decisions are likely to change, which might affect the job market outcomes of the migrants. First period was underlined because till that date Turkey was considered to be predominantly an agrarian society with more than 50% of her labor force employed in agriculture.<sup>123</sup> After 1980; on the other hand, development and restructuring of the Turkish economy and society was observed. During the 1980s, Turkish economy was subjected to rapid liberalization and further privatization of sectors.

**Table 15: Amount of Migrants (Total)**

	<b>Non-Migrant</b>	<b>Migrant</b>	<b>Migrant (While Sch.)</b>	<b>Migrant (81-90)</b>	<b>Migrant (90-98)</b>	<b>Migrant (98-01)</b>	<b>Migrant (02-11)</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	24,381,320	11,119,222	3,846,080	1,579,565	3,007,386	1,082,588	4,660,821
<b>Istanbul</b>	2,453,157	3,839,298	1,661,774	691,729	1,297,916	395,777	1,085,628
<b>Izmir</b>	1,090,198	727,310	357,609	123,201	197,255	57,120	278,627
<b>Ankara</b>	1,243,330	747,058	348,941	97,477	178,284	70,747	337,500
<b>Adana</b>	1,368,717	471,548	196,720	87,860	125,884	35,122	175,886

*Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)*

<sup>122</sup> The year of 1980 is also not included in our analysis because in 1980 a military coup took place in Turkey and this extraordinary was likely to force people change their places. However, is it was underlined this study focuses on labor migration, decision of which have been taken individually.

<sup>123</sup> Kaya, 2000, p.171.

**Table 16: Shares of Migrants in Population (%)**

	Migrant	Migrant (While Sch.)	Migrant (81-90)	Migrant (90-98)	Migrant (98-01)	Migrant (02-11)
<b>Turkey</b>	26.21	8.13	15.24	27.57	10.07	47.12
<b>Istanbul</b>	47.97	20.14	21.39	37.03	11.06	30.51
<b>Izmir</b>	33.68	15.91	19.67	30.39	8.35	41.59
<b>Ankara</b>	31.36	14.27	14.84	26.13	10.21	48.82
<b>Adana</b>	23.78	9.51	21.11	29.95	7.68	41.26

*Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)*

There was a shift from the previous import substitute industrialization (ISI) policies to export-led growth model in the economy and Turkey achieved extensive growth rates through industrial production.<sup>124</sup> Reorganizing the social structure to promote liberal markets, open economy and modernization also transformed migration patterns. Individualization of social relations is reflected in the decision making processes of migrants. Decisions were taken at the micro-level after the 1980s as opposed to the prior periods of internal migration<sup>125</sup> which is important for present study because of the above stated reasons. In 2011, 15.24% of migrants reported that they have arrived to their place of residency between 1981 and 1989. 21.4% of migrants in Istanbul, 19.7% of migrants in Izmir, 14.8% of migrants in Ankara and 21.1% of migrants in Adana-Mersin region migrated to their new settlements between those years (refer to table 16).

The period between 1990 and 1998, on the other side, could be considered as another wave of migratory flows in Turkey because of security reasons and macroeconomic/political instability.<sup>126</sup> In other words, in this era, in addition to voluntary migration, forced

<sup>124</sup> Çoban, 2013, p.8

<sup>125</sup> Tekeli, 2008.

<sup>126</sup> Because of the following problems, political/economic instability is attributed to this period: 1) “between 1990 and 1999 the ratio of net public sector debt to GNP rose from 29% to 61%”; 2) “in the period of 1990-1994, while the annual average ratio of the primary deficit to GNP was 4.5% the operational deficit including the real interest payments, discounted for inflation amounted to 8.3% of GNP”; 3) “between 1992 and 1999, while the real annual growth rate averaged less than 4%, the real interest rate paid on domestic debt averaged 32%”; 4) “in 1990 out of every 100 Turkish Liras of tax revenue, 31 Turkish Liras was spent on interest payments, in 1999 this figure reached 72 Turkish Liras; 5) “while state banks’ share in bank deposits in Turkey was 40%, they only accounted for 26% of credit”; 6) “in 1990, government domestic securities were equivalent to 10% of total assets of deposit banks, in 1999 this figure had risen to 23%”; in addition,

migration also came to the agenda. Forced migration is a comprehensive concept including the individuals who reluctantly migrated to another region, either within or across the borders<sup>127</sup> of their country.<sup>128</sup> Hence, forced migration could be a consequence of security reasons and/or lack of economic activities to survive in a particular region.<sup>129</sup> Such kind of a migration was experienced in Turkey resulting from social unrest, political and economic uncertainty and almost-war environment<sup>130</sup> in East and South East in this period. Around 52% of migrants who moved from East and South East in the period of 1991 and 2000 stated security issues as the determining factors for their migration decision.<sup>131</sup> In the same period economic reasons, such as job seeking etc. constituted 32% of migration decisions for the stated migrants.<sup>132</sup> In addition, almost 36% of migration was occurred due to economic reasons in 1990s in Turkey in general.<sup>133</sup> This statistics, in a sense, shows that economic factors were important not only for the migrants moved from Eastern and South Eastern parts of Turkey but also they were important in shaping the migration flows all around the country. This could be a consequence of the fact that due to economic/political instability in Turkey, which was mostly resulted from ongoing armed conflict between

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“during the same period, the share of loans to the private sector in the total assets of the banks declined from 36% to 24%; thus the banks could not sufficiently support producers and the real economy” (TCMB, [http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/duyuru/eko\\_program/str\\_econ.pdf](http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/duyuru/eko_program/str_econ.pdf), pp. 1-8).

<sup>127</sup> We are limiting our forced migration definition only to those who reluctantly migrated within the borders of Turkey.

<sup>128</sup> Kurban et al., 2008, p.18.

<sup>129</sup> From now on whenever we say forced migration we will be referring to migration that is caused either by security issues or lack of economic activity to survive in a particular region.

<sup>130</sup> **Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan**, Kurdish Labor party. It is an armed organization having the intention to establish a Kurdish socialist and independent state, Kurdistan, within the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. PKK has been fighting with Turkish armed forces in order to have some of the land pieces in Eastern and South Eastern parts of Turkey. Clashes between Turkish Republic and PKK were accelerated especially in 1990s.

<sup>131</sup> TGYONA, 2006, p.59

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid*, p.59.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid*, p.59

Turkish Republic and PKK, regional disparities/imbances exacerbated by giving way to inequality in distribution of socio-economic and political resources.<sup>134</sup> Stated migration flows were ended mostly in the big provinces in Turkey; such as Istanbul, Izmir, Adana and Mersin.<sup>135</sup> In this way it is not surprising to observe an increase in migration rates in this period. As shown in Table 16, overall 11% of increase in migration rate has been recorded in this time period. Share of migrants who moved between 1990 and 1998, in the population in 2011 was 16% for Istanbul, 11% for Izmir, 12% for Ankara and 8% for Adana, more than the migrants arrived in 1981-1989 time interval.

Years of 1999, 2000 and 2001 are treated separately because of the 1999 earthquake which in a sense was a supply shock to the labor markets, mostly to labor market of Istanbul and migratory flows were also high in 2000 because of the same reason. Furthermore, following this natural disaster Turkey also faced with a serious financial crisis in 2001 and this crisis was perceived as one of the most serious economic crisis after 1994 economic crisis.<sup>136</sup> According to World Bank data<sup>137</sup>, the economy (measured by GDP in 2000 prices) shrank by nearly 10% in this crisis. Analyzing the migration rates in this period it could be asserted that migrants moved in this era consist of almost 10% of total migrants in Turkey in 2011. This ratio is about 11% for Istanbul, 8% for Izmir, 10% for Ankara and is almost 8% for Adana (refer to table 16). That is, the country experienced the same increase in share of migration within three years as she faced in ten-year long period before 1999. After this crisis, in 2002, Turkey achieved some political stability with the establishment of the first single party government since 1991 by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). As a consequence, Turkish economy has shown signs of stabilization and growth. Thereupon, outward orientation of the economy has increased even further in recent years with

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<sup>134</sup> Yeldan, 2000, p.492.

<sup>135</sup> As we stated we are interested in migrants who took migration decision for labor market issues but in these years the only decision of migration might be about where to migrate for those who left their villages after evacuations. This part might be confusing since the pushing factor was not to migrate to more productive regions but not treating this period separately had the potential to end up with biased results.

<sup>136</sup> Altuğ & Filiztekin, 2006.

<sup>137</sup> World Bank, 2007

international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) reaching historic rates<sup>138</sup> that from 2001 to 2005 the real GDP per capita increased from 2690 dollars to 3390 dollars.<sup>139</sup> In the same period, the per capita FDI stock increased to 35 billion dollars and to the 12% of GDP.<sup>140</sup> Stated FDIs could also be considered as a source increasing opportunities in labor markets, which could also be considered as a reason creating new patterns of internal migration. It is this reason that attracted the attention of the author to analyze migrants moved to their current places of residences in aforementioned period. When it comes to the shares of migrants moved in this period, it could be observed that 47.1% of migrants, i.e. 4.660.821 people, have changed their residencies in this period. The ratio is 30.5% for Istanbul, which is lower than the proportion of migrants in 1990-1998 period. Speaking by numbers, in 2002-2011 time interval Istanbul received 1.085.628 migrants while this was 1.297.916 in the previous time period. This is likely to be a consequence of high unemployment rate counting up to 10.66%, which is an important determinant of migration decisions of individuals. The share of migrants moved in this period tends to increase by around 11-12% for Izmir and Adana. On the other hand, almost 22% of increase in the share of migrants arrived to their new settlements has been reported for Ankara, seemingly this region has becoming more attractive recently than the other regions under consideration.

### **3.4 Characteristics of Migrants**

As we discussed, in our study migrant group to be compared with the non-migrants will be males between age intervals of 15-64 who are not public employees and not students. Table 17 presents the age structure of migrants in 2011. As a general trend in all around Turkey, share of migrants in population is lower than of non-migrants up until the age interval of 30-34. In addition, we observe that migrants between the ages of 30 and 44 constitute almost half the migrant population. Compared to entire population, the youngest and oldest age groups constitute a significantly lower percentage of migrants. As for the regions under consideration, the trend is more or less the same; i.e. middle-aged migrants compose almost

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<sup>138</sup> Kaya, 2007, p.167.

<sup>139</sup> World Bank, 2007.

<sup>140</sup> UNCTAD, 2007.

half of the migrant population of those regions. Important point to be emphasized here is that in Adana share of young migrants is less than the other regions; in contrast, Istanbul is the first in terms of containing young migrants (ages of 15-29). When this information is complemented with the age structure of migrants at the age of migration, clearer results can be observed. As seen in Table 18 share of migrants migrated between the ages of 15 and 19 has been decreasing; on the other hand, we could state that individuals in 25-29 age group are becoming more mobile. Age of migration in the regions under consideration also reflects the same pattern. For migrants between 15 and 19, Istanbul has been losing its popularity whilst, it is becoming more common to move to Istanbul for individuals who reported their age of arrival between 25 and 34. The same pattern could also be observed for the other regions as well, as shown in Table 18. To eliminate confusions it should be noted that although share of young migrants is declining over time those who migrated between the age intervals of 15 and 39 still constitute more than half of the migrant population both in Turkey and in aforementioned regions. This finding is partially in line with Ghatak et al.'s theory that migrants are mostly young and well-educated individuals.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Ghatak et al., 1996.



**Table 17: Age Structure of Non-Migrants and Migrants in 2011 (%)**

	Turkey		Istanbul		Izmir		Ankara		Adana	
	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant
<b>15-19</b>	7.0	1.2	6.6	1.4	6.2	1.0	5.5	0.9	7.6	1.3
<b>20-24</b>	9.9	4.1	13.1	4.3	8.9	3.4	9.2	4.0	10.1	3.1
<b>25-29</b>	16.8	12.9	23.7	14.0	17.4	12.0	21.5	13.8	16.4	10.1
<b>30-34</b>	16.5	17.5	22.2	18.5	18.8	17.1	19.7	19.1	15.4	13.6
<b>35-39</b>	13.5	17.5	14.6	18.6	13.7	16.8	15.0	16.5	13.2	17.1
<b>40-44</b>	11.7	15.9	9.5	16.5	11.1	16.0	13.0	16.9	12.2	18.8
<b>45-49</b>	9.2	13.0	5.3	13.0	8.4	15.2	8.0	13.2	10.3	14.8
<b>50-54</b>	6.8	8.9	2.8	7.8	7.1	9.5	4.2	7.9	6.9	11.1
<b>55-59</b>	4.9	5.6	1.1	3.9	5.3	5.4	2.3	4.6	4.6	6.1
<b>60-64</b>	3.3	3.0	0.8	1.5	2.7	3.2	1.2	2.6	3.0	3.4

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

**Table 18: Age Structure of Migrants at the Time They Arrived Their Current Residences (%)**

	Total			Istanbul			Izmir			Ankara			Adana		
	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011
<b>15-19</b>	35.6	26.4	12.3	43.5	33.7	18.6	32.4	23.3	14.9	36.4	21.8	10.0	29.8	18.1	8.8
<b>20-24</b>	35.8	32.5	31.4	36.5	33.5	36.8	42.1	34.2	29.9	37.5	37.5	31.9	37.0	33.2	28.7
<b>25-29</b>	17.9	19.8	22.7	14.2	17.5	20.6	15.2	20.8	21.6	19.3	23.3	25.7	21.0	22.7	21.1
<b>30-34</b>	7.9	10.3	12.7	4.4	8.2	9.2	7.6	11.3	13.6	4.3	7.9	14.6	10.0	12.0	16.7
<b>35-39</b>	2.2	6.0	8.5	1.0	4.0	6.1	2.4	6.4	8.5	1.9	5.6	9.5	1.6	6.7	9.8
<b>40-44</b>	0.3	3.4	5.7	0.1	2.2	3.9	0.1	3	6.3	0.3	2.8	4.1	0.2	4.3	8.5
<b>45-49</b>	0	1.2	3.7	0	0.5	3.0	0	0.7	3.3	0	0.7	2.2	0	2.6	3.5
<b>50-54</b>	0	0	1.9	0	0	1.1	0	0	1.0	0	0	1.0	0	0	1.5
<b>55-59</b>	0	0	0.6	0	0	0.3	0	0	0.3	0	0	0.5	0	0	0.9
<b>60-64</b>	0	0	0.1	0	0	0.1	0	0	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

In this sense, previous research about Turkey underlines that in parallel to the human capital framework, migrants in Turkey had higher educational attainment than did the non-migrant population from which they originated in the late 1960s.<sup>142</sup> Our data presents more or less the same results with the previous research that education level of migrants is higher than that of the non-migrant population.<sup>143</sup> In Turkey, share of migrant population with college degree is around 11% while this rate is about 6% among the non-migrant population. A striking and opposite picture comes from Istanbul that share of migrants with college degree is about two times less than the non-migrants with college degree. For high school and primary education the situation is again the same for Istanbul, but we observe that 57% of migrant population in Istanbul hold junior primary degree (refer to Table 19). For the other regions, the situation is more or less common: share of migrants graduated from college is higher when it is compared to non-migrant population with a college degree. Comparing migrants of different regions, it could be asserted that education level of migrants who moved to Ankara is the highest and lowest in Adana.

After discussing general trends, examining migrants of different periods will provide more comprehensive results to the reader. We observe dramatic decreases in the share of migrants with junior primary degree in 2000s, which results from the fact that in 1997 compulsory education law was changed in Turkey and duration of primary education was prolonged to eight years, which could also be inferred from the increase in the share of primary education in 2000s (refer to Table 20). As it can also be inferred from Table 20, share of migrants with college degree has been increasing both in Turkey and in the regions under consideration. However, the trend of this mentioned increase is different for Ankara than it is for other regions. That is, college share among migrants increased around 1-2% for Istanbul, Izmir and Adana between 1990 and 1998; on the other hand, we observe a dramatic jump in the migrants with college degree in Ankara (11%). Possible explanation to this situation comes from the discussion we made about forced migration in 1990s. Most of the migrants coming from eastern part of Turkey have settled down to Istanbul, Izmir and Adana; but Ankara had not received that many migrants who came after village

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<sup>142</sup> Tanfer, 1983, cited in Gökhan & Filiztekin, 2008, p.19

<sup>143</sup> Diverging points in terms of educational attainments of migrants and non-migrants in our data will be discussed in the following lines.

**Table 19: Education Levels of Non-Migrants and Migrants (%)**

	Illiterate		Literate		Junior Primary		Primary		High school		College	
	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant
<b>Total</b>	2.1	1.5	4.2	3.9	44.3	50.7	20.8	14.7	21.9	18.2	6.4	10.8
<b>Istanbul</b>	0.2	1	1.8	4.3	27.1	56.7	23.2	13.8	30	15.7	17.4	8.2
<b>Izmir</b>	0.5	1.2	1.7	5.1	43.4	47.3	19	12.6	22.7	19.3	12.5	14.2
<b>Ankara</b>	0.3	0.9	0.6	1.3	30.3	44.2	21.9	15.7	32.8	19.8	13.9	17.7
<b>Adana</b>	1.4	6.8	3.4	10	44.3	45.9	19.8	12.5	24.3	16.2	6.5	8.4

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

**Table 20: Education Levels of Migrants who Moved to their Current Residences in Different Time Periods (%)**

	Illiterate			Literate			Junior Primary		
	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011
<b>Population</b>	2	1.5	1	3.2	4.4	3.4	65.9	58.5	38.4
<b>Istanbul</b>	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.7	4.4	5.5	72.8	64.6	33.4
<b>Izmir</b>	1.5	1.7	1	3.3	6.7	4.6	64.9	52.4	31.9
<b>Ankara</b>	0.9	1.4	0.4	1.7	1	2.2	65.2	51.2	30.4
<b>Adana</b>	10.7	8.1	2.2	15.1	12.5	5.6	52.8	48.8	37.3
	Primary			High School			College		
	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011
<b>Population</b>	10.93	13.59	17.6	12.1	14.7	23.5	5.7	7.1	15.9
<b>Istanbul</b>	10.04	12.9	19	11.6	12.3	23.6	2.8	4.9	17.2
<b>Izmir</b>	10.59	12.16	14.8	11.7	18.1	22.6	7.7	8.7	21.8
<b>Ankara</b>	15.32	13.74	17.9	13.8	18	28.3	2.9	13.5	26.8
<b>Adana</b>	6.49	12.24	17.7	9.7	12.6	23.7	4.9	5.5	13.2

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

evacuations or due to lack of economic activities to survive in their settlements. Hence, observing most increase is not that surprising for this region. The jump in 2000s in all these regions, on the other hand, could be explained by increasing trend in college education in Turkey.

After elaborating on education levels, it is worthwhile in giving descriptive statistics about labor force participation status of migrants and non- migrants in these regions. As Harris and Todaro<sup>144</sup> and some research<sup>145</sup> on Turkey have demonstrated, employment is a key issue for migration. Parallel to this, Pissarides and Wadsworth<sup>146</sup> reveal that unemployment is a crucial determinant for migration, hence it is expected that unemployment rate of migrants across destinations, Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara and Adana for this study, should be less than unemployment among non-migrants in the same regions. Table 21 presents parallel results with these ideas except for Adana. Unemployment rate of migrants in Istanbul is about 9% while this rate is 14% among non-migrant population in the same region. In Izmir, we observe a difference of 2% regarding unemployment rates of migrants and non-migrants that unemployment is higher among non-migrants. Similar to Izmir, in Ankara, migrants report around 2% less unemployment rate than do the non-migrants in the same region. In Adana on the other side, unemployment rate of migrants is almost 2% higher than the unemployment rate among non-migrants. Two interesting points here are that rate of migrants that are not in the labor force is higher than those of non-migrants and that this ratio is the highest in Izmir and Ankara (for both this ratio is around 23%); Istanbul follows these regions by 20% and in Adana share of migrants who are not in the labor force is 18%.

When it comes to the migrants who moved in different time intervals, trends are not certain regarding unemployment rates. For Istanbul, unemployment rate among migrants who moved to this region has increased almost 1.5% in the time intervals of 1981 and 2011. In Izmir this rate counts to 10.8% for migrants of 1980s, 10% for 1990s and 2000s. For Ankara and Adana the trend is the same that first unemployment decreased among migrants who arrived to the regions in period of 1990-1998 and then increased among 2001-2011

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<sup>144</sup> Harris and Todaro, 1970.

<sup>145</sup> e.g. Gezici & Keskin; Evcil et. al 2006; Filiztekin & Gökhan 2008

<sup>146</sup> Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989

**Table 21: Labor Force Participation Status among Non-Migrants and Migrants (%)**

	Non-Migrant			Migrant		
	Employed	Unemployed	Not in LF	Employed	Unemployed	Not in LF
<b>Turkey</b>	73.1	9.5	17.3	71.3	8.8	19.8
<b>Istanbul</b>	72.4	14.0	13.5	70.4	9.1	20.4
<b>Izmir</b>	73.4	11.0	15.5	67.4	9.6	22.9
<b>Ankara</b>	72.8	9.6	17.4	70.4	7.6	22.9
<b>Adana</b>	73.4	11.6	14.9	68.6	13.3	17.9

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

**Table 22: Labor Force Participation of Migrants who Moved to their Current Residences in Different Time Periods**

	Turkey			Istanbul			Izmir			Ankara			Adana		
	1980-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1980-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1980-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1980-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1980-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011
<b>Employed</b>	70.1	78.2	74.3	72.9	79.9	75.4	65.0	75.2	72.7	70.1	79	75.8	65.3	75.9	72
<b>Unemployed</b>	8.5	8.4	10.1	8.9	9.4	10.6	10.7	10	9.9	7.9	6.4	7.8	13.8	10.7	15.1
<b>Not in LF</b>	21.3	13.2	15.4	18.1	10.5	13.9	24.1	14.6	17.3	22.8	15.5	16.2	20.8	13.2	12.8

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

movers (Table 22). This might be the consequence of forced migration that since population who came to those places had to accept each and every job that they were offered. Regarding the migrants who are not in the labor force, general trend is that this rate decreased in 1990s compared to 1980s and we observe a growth in this ratio in 2000s.

Table 23 reveals that a significant part of the population involved in trade, restaurant and hotel activities, especially in Istanbul. However, migrants are more likely to be a part of this sector in Izmir and Adana. This observation is not surprising since these regions are also destinations of tourism. For Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara regions, we observe that only a small proportion of migrants are a part of agriculture supporting the hypothesis that rural to urban movement of people involved with agriculture is slowing and giving way to another migration pattern.<sup>147</sup> Share of migrants in manufacturing sector in Istanbul is another striking point that is underlined in Table 23 that almost 36% of migrants are a part of manufacturing sector in this region. This rate is about 28% in Izmir, 21% in Ankara and 15% in Adana. Another crucial point that is observed in Table 22 is that share of migrants in construction sector is almost two times more than the non-migrant population in all four regions under consideration. Hence, construction is also a common economic activity among migrants.

Table 24 shows the economic activities of migrants that moved to the considered regions in different time intervals. As a general disposition, share of migrants involved in service sector has increased around 3-6% when it came to the period of 2002 and 2011 in the considered regions. Trade sector on the other hand attracts 2-5% less migrants across stated destinations but still around 30% of migrants are enrolled to trade affairs in these regions, displaying the changing nature of economy after 1980s when export-oriented policies began to be implemented. Last point standing up in Table 24 is that share of migrants in construction sector has increased around 5% in Ankara between 1980 and 2011 while this rate is almost the same in Istanbul and Izmir. In Adana, on the other side, we observe a decline around 4% in the share of migrants in construction sector.

In a nutshell, first, both tables below reveal that there is a strong relation between migration and ending up in employment in construction sector as well as the fact that this possibility

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<sup>147</sup> Gökhan & Filiztekin, 2008, p. 23

**Table 23: Economic Activity of Non-Migrants and Migrants (%)**

	Total		Istanbul		Izmir		Ankara		Adana-Mersin	
	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant
<b>Agr</b>	27.6	7.9	1.0	0.2	16.8	2.6	5.6	1.0	31.9	13.4
<b>Min</b>	0.6	0.5	0	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2
<b>Man</b>	19.4	27.9	31.8	35.8	28.1	27.6	21.9	21	15.2	15
<b>Egs</b>	0.7	1.0	0.5	0.9	0.6	1.0	1.2	1.18	0.6	1
<b>Constr</b>	8.8	13.8	5.9	12.1	6.6	15.4	8.1	17.4	8.6	16.4
<b>Trade</b>	24.7	26.6	32	26.5	28.2	28.9	32.8	27.9	24.2	31.8
<b>Trans</b>	6.4	6.7	8.3	7.4	6.6	7.8	8.5	6.4	6.2	7.6
<b>Communic</b>	0.7	0.9	2.3	1.1	0.7	0.7	1.7	2	0.6	0.6
<b>Finance</b>	1.1	1.7	3.6	2.1	1.1	1.9	2.1	2.8	1.0	1.7
<b>Services</b>	9.5	12.5	14.1	13.3	10.3	13.4	17.3	19.5	11.6	12.0

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

**Table 24: Economic Activity of Migrants who Moved to their Current Residences in Different Time Periods (%)**

	Total			Istanbul			Izmir			Ankara			Adana		
	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1981-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011
<b>Agr</b>	6.5	5.2	10.1	0.3	0.2	0.2	3.7	1.4	2.4	1.3	0.8	1.0	15.2	14.6	10.3
<b>Min</b>	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.2
<b>Man</b>	27.5	30.7	26.5	34.6	37.5	34.8	28.1	27.8	26.9	24.4	20.4	21.0	13.5	13.5	18.0
<b>Egs</b>	0.9	1.0	1.1	0.5	1.0	1.2	1.7	1.1	1.1	1.5	1.1	1.3	1.0	1.6	0.9
<b>Constr</b>	14.6	13.2	14.3	12.9	11.7	12.5	15.9	16.8	15.9	14.9	13.3	19.2	17.9	17.3	13.2
<b>Trade</b>	29	27.7	24.6	28.6	26.7	23.7	31.5	28.7	27.2	26.6	31.9	25.8	35.1	31.6	30.7
<b>Trans</b>	7.8	7.1	5.8	8.5	7.2	6.6	7.6	7.9	7.5	8.3	6.5	6.0	5.3	9.6	7.7
<b>Communic</b>	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.1	0.9	1.7	0.5	0.1	1.2	1.1	2.2	2.5	0.6	0.1	1.2
<b>Finance</b>	1.3	1.57	2.02	1.5	1.8	2.8	1.2	2.1	2.0	1.7	2.6	3.1	1.3	1.1	2.2
<b>Services</b>	10.9	12.0	13.4	11.5	12.5	15.8	9.3	13.4	15.2	19.6	20.3	19.1	9.7	10.0	15.2

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

is higher in Ankara. Second, manufacturing is also a good source for employment for migrants in all of the stated regions. Third, share of migrants in service sector is increasing. Fourth, share of migrants in agricultural affairs is more in Adana than the other regions which correspond to the lowest level of EGP. This will be important for our study in the next chapter.

In addition to distribution of population in various sectors in different labor markets, informality is also a matter of fact in those economies. In this regard, Table 25 demonstrates the results of formality of sectors that Turkish population is enrolled. According to results in this table, in Turkey almost 45% of the non-migrant and 33% of migrant population is employed in informal sector when it came to 2011. For non-migrants, share of individuals in agriculture (28%; refer to Table 23) might be a partial explanation to this situation. For migrants, on the other hand, this partial explanation might come from the share of individuals in construction sector (14%). When it comes to a different region under consideration, informality shows up to be a big problem in Adana that more than half of the population in this region is in informal economy. Having an informality rate around 90% among farm workers might be a partial explanation to this huge informal sector in Adana. 64% of informality among the self-employed could be the other side of the story. Izmir follows Adana in the context of informality by 32%. Partial explanations again come from farm workers, 85% of whom are in informal sector, and self-employed, 50% of whom are enrolled to informal economy in this region.<sup>148</sup> In Ankara, informal employment is around 26% and in Istanbul this rate is around 25%. Considering migrants, rate of informality among them is closer to the share of non-migrants in the informal economy in all of the regions. Only considerable difference is in Istanbul, which is around 5%.

As for migrants that arrived in their destinations in aforementioned time periods it is observed that from 1980s onwards share of migrants in informal economy has decreased by almost 7% in Izmir, we observe a 5% decrease in Ankara (Table 26). In Adana region, the decline is more dramatic: 11% in 30 years. In Istanbul, on the other hand share of informal sector has been increasing over years that from 1980s onwards, share of informal sector has increased around 5% in this region. From this finding we observe the truth of Sassen's

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<sup>148</sup> The statistics provided about informality comes from HLFSS of 2009, 2010 and 2011.



**Table 25: Formal/Informal Sector Among Non-Migrants and Migrants**

	Total		Istanbul		Izmir		Ankara		Adana	
	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant
<b>Formal</b>	54.5	66	77.3	72.7	67.7	68	74.1	74.5	48.2	48
<b>Informal</b>	45.4	33.9	22.6	27.2	32.3	31.9	25.8	25.5	51.7	52

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

**Table 26: Formal/Informal Sector Among Migrants who Moved to their Current Residences in Different Time Periods (%)**

	Total			Istanbul			Izmir			Ankara			Adana		
	1980-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1980-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1980-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1980-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011	1980-1989	1990-1998	2002-2011
<b>Formal</b>	66.1	70.1	65.4	76	74.2	71.7	65.9	68.8	72.6	72.7	78.2	77.7	43.2	48.8	54.2
<b>Informal</b>	33.8	29.8	34.5	23.9	25.7	28.3	34.1	31.2	27.4	27.3	21.8	22.3	56.8	51.2	45.7

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

argument that professionals and entrepreneurs running the world economy are emerging within the space of global cities in each society and the masses of informal and service workers in global cities that are disposably employed by these elites<sup>149</sup> holds for Istanbul and migration is deepening the problem of informality further in this region throughout the time.

After discussing main characteristics of migrants in different geographic scales it is worth highlighting their social classes in different regions. Table 27 shows the social class distribution of migrants and non-migrants. Except Istanbul, in other regions under consideration we observe that share of migrants belonging to 1<sup>st</sup> (high-grade professional) class is higher. Comparing migrants in different regions, we observe that migrants in Ankara do better than other regions in that almost 11% of migrants in Ankara are recorded in first class. Ending up as an unskilled worker in Istanbul is very likely for the migrants; on the other hand, if we consider the low share of migrants at the top class and a high share of low skilled class we could observe that migration increases the polarization in this region. In fact, in all regions we observe that around 30% of migrants are counted as unskilled workers.

Table 28 presents the social class distribution of migrants who arrived at their current place of residency in different time intervals. Some common points stand out in this table. Between 1990 and 1998 many unskilled workers had been transported to the labor markets under consideration. As underlined more than once in the previous sections, the possible explanation to this situation is that a forced migration was experienced in 1990s resulting from both security and economic reasons. This idea could also be supported by analyzing the decline in the share of unskilled migrants and increase of their share in first class simultaneously in 2000s. Stated increase again is more likely to result from the increase in the education levels of migrants which was stated above. A striking point emerging from this table is that although in other regions we observe a decline in 1990s, in Adana share of migrants in second and third classes has been increasing steadily since 1980s. This might be explained by the parallel and rapid increase in service sector, some occupations of which require educated individuals, that was underlined in the previous section. This result is

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<sup>149</sup> Sassen, 1991, 1994.

important for our analysis of social class in the next section. Last salient and common trend for the aforementioned regions is the decline in the share of migrants belonging to petty bourgeoisie (self-employed) class. For all regions we observe almost 100% of decrease in the share of migrants in this class. This result could be important in the sense that proletarianization process has been accelerated after 1980s.

**Table 27: EGP Social Class Shares of Migrants and Non-Migrants (%)**

	Turkey		Istanbul		Izmir		Ankara		Adana	
	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Non-Migrant	Migrant
<b>I</b>	2.9	5.8	9.3	6.1	4.8	7.3	6.5	11.02	1.8	4.1
<b>II</b>	4.1	5.7	11.3	5.6	7.7	6.7	7.2	6.3	3.2	4.3
<b>III</b>	13.9	14	24.2	16	16.4	14.4	23.3	15.8	14.9	12
<b>IV</b>	36.5	27.6	17.6	20.2	31.2	25.5	23.8	20.8	35	31.3
<b>V</b>	9.3	10.3	12.0	12.0	13.1	11.9	14	12.3	10.2	8
<b>VI</b>	24.3	34.0	25.0	39.4	22.3	32.5	23.4	32.8	22.4	31.6
<b>VII</b>	8.7	2.2	0.3	0.4	4.2	1.3	1.5	0.8	12.3	8.2

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

**Table 28: EGP Social Class of Migrants in Different Time Periods**

		<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>VI</b>	<b>VII</b>
		<b>Population</b>	<b>1981-1989</b>	4.5	4.2	11.7	34	9.7
<b>1990-1998</b>	4.4		4.5	13.2	26.8	11.5	37.7	1.6
<b>2002-2011</b>	7.4		7.5	15.6	23.5	10.2	32.6	2.9
<b>Istanbul</b>	<b>1981-1989</b>	4.6	4.7	13.7	26	11.2	39.1	0.3
	<b>1990-1998</b>	4.7	4.3	14.9	19.4	13.6	42.1	0.6
	<b>2002-2011</b>	9.3	8.4	19.5	12.8	11.7	37.8	0.3
<b>Izmir</b>	<b>1981-1989</b>	6.51	5.2	10.2	32.4	13.3	30.5	1.5
	<b>1990-1998</b>	3.7	4.2	15.5	24.9	11.5	38.5	1.4
	<b>2002-2011</b>	10.1	10.3	16.1	19.7	11.1	31.7	1.3
<b>Ankara</b>	<b>1981-1989</b>	6	3.2	15.8	24.9	15.7	31.8	2.3
	<b>1990-1998</b>	7.1	5	13.1	25.1	13.6	35	0.5
	<b>2002-2011</b>	15.4	8.6	18.1	14.7	10.5	31.7	0.6
<b>Adana</b>	<b>1981-1989</b>	2.9	0.9	8.3	40	4.6	33.2	9.9
	<b>1990-1998</b>	2.2	3.9	10.6	33.6	6.3	34.3	8.8
	<b>2002-2011</b>	6.4	7.4	16.4	22.8	11.8	28.8	6

Source: TURKSTAT, HLFS, (2009, 2010,2011)

## **Chapter 4**

### **ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATIONS AND RESULTS**

This section presents three different types of estimations and findings. It begins with predicting effect of migration on unemployment by using logit estimates. Two different models are specified and estimated. First, we estimated the logit model for all migrants present in the regions that are discussed above and then we tried to figure out the likelihood of unemployment among migrants who arrived to their current place of residence in different time periods. Then we estimated simple Mincerian wage equation, first for all migrants and then we estimated the same equation for migrants settled and survived in their residences in different time spans. We also presented OLS estimates after interacting different education levels (primary, junior primary, high school, college etc.) and migrant dummy to have more refine results. Lastly, multinomial logit models were estimated in order to figure out the social class differentials of migrants in Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara and Adana. This model is also estimated for migrants arrived in different time periods.

#### **4.1. Migration and Unemployment**

The numbers in Table 29 reflect the net (marginal) effect of migration on unemployment when such human capital factors; such as age, age squared, years of education marital status and years since migration are controlled. Note that the results presented in the

following two tables are the outcomes we observed in 2011. That is, for example, if it is stated that migrants of 1990s are less/more likely to be unemployed than are non-migrants, then it means that the migrants who arrived their place of residence in 1990s are less/more likely to be unemployed than were non-migrants in 2011, controlling for other characteristics. In these regressions the omitted group is non-migrants in the regions under consideration. Thus the numbers in the table represent the net difference on the dependent variable between migrants and non-migrants. Asterisks indicate statistical significance.

Looking at the results for overall Turkey, it is observed that in the total population, migrants suffer more from unemployment than non-migrants. As expected more educated are those who are less likely to be unemployed, which is observed to be common for all of the regions. Marital status is also another factor that reduces likelihood of unemployment; this trend is again the same for all of the regions. Location in the below table, stands for whether the observation was made in an urban or rural area and takes the values of 1 and 0 respectively. It is obvious that migrants in urban areas tend to suffer more from unemployment. The coefficient of location loses its significance in Istanbul because, as stated, in Istanbul there is no rural space.

When it comes to net effect of migration on unemployment in different regions, varying trends draw our attention. In Istanbul, migrants are less likely to be unemployed than are non-migrants. This finding is not that surprising because, as stressed, unemployment would matter more in the cities where cost of living is higher; thus unemployment rate of migrants is expected to be less in those cities as migrants might not afford to remain unemployed as long as natives could, since they do not have the social networks that might help insure them against unemployment spells.<sup>150</sup> Indeed, we observe that migrants are 2.2% less likely to be unemployed in Istanbul. In Izmir and Adana, risk of unemployment for migrants is higher than it is for non-migrants as it could be inferred from Table 29. In Izmir migrants are 4.5% more likely to be unemployed and in Adana this ratio goes up to 6.6%.

On the other hand, the coefficient of interest loses its significance in Ankara that status of migrant does not affect the risk of unemployment in this region. This situation could be explained as follows: most of the migrants in Ankara are public employees and as it was explained they are not considered in our analyses; hence it is not surprising to observe

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<sup>150</sup> Binatlı, Akdede, 2014, p. 129

insignificant results in an analysis where we pooled all the migrants. These results might change among migrants arrived in different periods.

**Table 29: Net Effect of Migration on Unemployment in Different Regions**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Turkey	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	Adana
<b>VARIABLES</b>					
Migrant	0.02020*** (0.02114)	-0.02168*** (0.05498)	0.04495*** (0.08264)	0.05434 (0.08918)	0.06607*** (0.08791)
Years of Schooling	-0.04160*** (0.00178)	-0.05683*** (0.00512)	-0.05321*** (0.00712)	-0.05727*** (0.00818)	-0.01877*** (0.00668)
Marital Status	-0.06697*** (0.01732)	-0.07414*** (0.04792)	-0.2771*** (0.06925)	0.1432*** (0.07644)	-0.0488*** (0.07166)
Location	0.00834*** (0.01416)	-0.07376 (0.05708)	0.07824*** (0.10612)	0.04002** (0.09320)	0.02045*** (0.07196)
Age	0.00167 (0.00353)	-0.02650** (0.01043)	-0.06140*** (0.01403)	-0.02565** (0.01622)	-0.0144** (0.01363)
Age Square	-0.00015*** (0.00004)	0.00050*** (0.00013)	0.00093*** (0.00017)	0.00035* (0.00021)	0.00028* (0.00017)
Years Since Migration	0.00037 (0.00123)	0.00058 (0.00273)	-0.00491 (0.00412)	0.00085 (0.00500)	-0.00491 (0.00445)
Constant	-1.18721*** (0.05948)	-0.30829* (0.18722)	-0.86392*** (0.26605)	-0.41544 (0.28491)	-1.47521*** (0.24139)
Observations	264,664	30,910	13,948	13,999	14,343

**Notes:**

a) Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

b) Weighted averages are presented.

c) Marginal effects are calculates.

In this sense, from Table 30 which presents the results of the logit regression run after dividing migrants according to their period of arrival, more reliable results can be reached. It was seen above that risk of unemployment among migrants in Istanbul was less than non-migrants controlling for other individual characteristics. When we divide migrants in terms of their period of arrival the picture is again the same but risk of unemployment differs among the migrants who arrived in different time intervals. Arrivers in the 1990-1998

period are less likely to be unemployed in Istanbul's labor market when compared to migrants who arrived in the period 1980-1989. This situation is likely to result from the fact that between those years a considerable amount, 42%<sup>151</sup>, of migrants came to Istanbul were unskilled, for whom job searches were costly. That is, since they were unskilled they had to accept all kinds of jobs regardless of suitability. Migrants of 2002-2011 period; on the other hand, are more likely to be unemployed in this region compared to 1990s' migrants. This finding is, in fact, parallel to the point we underlined in the previous section that unemployment rate in Istanbul has increased in 2000s and this has also affected the migrant population in this region. The lowest likelihood of unemployment among migrants arrived to Istanbul after 1999 earthquake in a sense supports our strategy of treating the migrants of that time interval separately. Still, it should be noted that period of migration does not change the result that residents are more likely to be unemployed than are migrants in Istanbul.

For Izmir it could be stated that risk of unemployment is highest among the migrants that arrived between 1981 and 1989. Also, looking at likelihood of unemployment among 2002-2011 arrivers, they are more likely to be unemployed in the labor market of Izmir compared to migrants of 1990s. This finding again could be justified the same reasons we stated for Istanbul.

Most striking results regarding Adana's labor market is insignificance of the coefficient of migrants who arrived in 1990s because we stated that Adana region was an important destination of forced migration. Before the analysis we expected that likelihood unemployment among the migrants of 1990s would be less than of the other arrivers; however the estimates showed that moving to Adana region in 1990s does not any affect on unemployment when it came to 2011. For the other migrants in this region, likelihood of unemployment among those who arrived between 2002 and 2011 is higher than those who settled in 1980s.

As for Ankara, we stated that coefficient of interest was insignificant, yet after estimating the model by dividing migrants according to their time intervals of arrival some results gain significance and the results are as follows: migrants who arrived in 1980s are more likely to

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<sup>151</sup> Refer to Table 17.



be unemployed than are non-migrants; this finding is also valid for migrants of 2000s but it should be noted that movers of 2000s are more likely to be unemployed when it is compared to migrants of 1980s. On the hand, we observe that migrants who arrived to Ankara in 1990s are less likely to be unemployed than are non-migrants.

**Table 30: Results of Logit Estimates for Migrants Arrived in Different Periods**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Turkey	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	Adana
1980-1989	0.29096*** (0.03067)	-0.14175** (0.06377)	0.41515*** (0.09826)	0.29168** (0.12499)	0.41546*** (0.10590)
1990-1998	0.11379*** (0.02416)	-0.19588*** (0.05260)	0.26932*** (0.08557)	-0.19448* (0.11533)	0.09355 (0.10002)
2002-2011	0.33742*** (0.01679)	-0.08027* (0.04846)	0.30026*** (0.06928)	0.21099*** (0.07135)	0.60010*** (0.07006)
1999-2001	0.00583 (0.03891)	-0.24741*** (0.08036)	0.16208 (0.15505)	0.17244 (0.15230)	0.49846*** (0.16283)
Before 1980	0.46826*** (0.03896)	-0.11635 (0.07934)	0.26258** (0.12125)	0.00879 (0.16335)	0.61002*** (0.12563)
Years of Schooling	-0.04276*** (0.00173)	-0.05480*** (0.00492)	-0.05323*** (0.00689)	-0.05935*** (0.00779)	-0.02069*** (0.00651)
Marital Status	-0.96320*** (0.01687)	-0.97011*** (0.04661)	-1.10608*** (0.06706)	-1.29834*** (0.07425)	-1.04993*** (0.06945)
Location	0.41269*** (0.01385)	-0.07551 (0.05605)	1.03020*** (0.10342)	0.25508*** (0.09175)	0.71453*** (0.07074)
Age	0.00481 (0.00346)	-0.02183** (0.01043)	-0.06492*** (0.01382)	-0.03203** (0.01588)	-0.00644 (0.01336)
Age Square	-0.00019*** (0.00004)	0.00044*** (0.00013)	0.00095*** (0.00017)	0.00046** (0.00020)	0.00018 (0.00017)
Constant	-1.23454*** (0.05854)	-0.39998** (0.18630)	-0.73343*** (0.26131)	-0.33890 (0.27998)	-1.59054*** (0.23782)
Observations	276,844	30,910	13,948	13,999	14,343

**Notes:**

a) Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

b) Weighted averages are presented

Before concluding this section it would be fruitful to make some intuitive comparisons between the regions. We have to make only intuitive comparisons across regions since there are no statistical tests for comparing coefficients of logistic regressions between models. In this sense it could be claimed that migrants are better off in Istanbul regarding

the risk of unemployment; Izmir follows Istanbul, Ankara is ranked after Izmir and Adana is counted to be the last providing job opportunities to migrants. The comparisons are only about unemployment risks; for the other dependent variables, these results might change.

## 4.2. Migration and Earnings

In order to compare the earnings of migrants and non-migrants in different labor markets, we used a simple Mincerian wage equation in line with the literature by inserting a migration dummy and some other controls.<sup>152</sup> The model estimated in this study is the following:

$$\ln W_i = \alpha + \beta Mig_i + \mu S_i + \delta_1 EXP_i + \delta_2 EXP_i^2 + \lambda X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Where;  $\ln W_i$  is log of hourly wages,  $Mig_i$  is migrant dummy,  $S$  is years of schooling,  $EXP$  is potential experience of individuals,  $X$  is controls for individual characteristics; such as marital status, formality of sector, age of migration, location (urban or rural), and industrial dummies, and  $\varepsilon$  is the error term.

Mincerian equation has some weaknesses and we would like to put these weaknesses as reminder. The model assumes that there are no varied trends for different educational levels. Rates of return are considered to be linear assuming each additional unit of education has the same returns. On the other hand years of schooling and potential work experience explain only some parts of individual earnings. For instance family characteristics have substantial impact. Varying skill levels of individuals could be counted as another factor affecting the earnings. Hence, the results are not the exact numbers for migrants and non-migrants but due to the lack of data this kind of bias cannot be eliminated. Still, the intuitive inference about cross-regional differences would be enough for this study since we are not seeking exact answers for the amount of returns to education or experience etc.

Having said these, we present OLS estimates in Table 31. The results indicate that in Turkey, earnings of migrants are about 11% higher than the non-migrants. As it is expected returns to education have positive impacts on earnings and in Turkey this rate is about 7%.

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<sup>152</sup> OLS regressions are run only for wage earners.

Experience also has a positive impact on wages, around 4%, and its square has a negative sign implying that return to experience is increasing at a decreasing rate. Formal sector is another variable effecting wages positively at a 26% level. The last positive impacts in our model come, first from the location dummy implying that urban residents are earning 9% more than rural residents; second from marital status that married men are making 3% more income than single men in Turkey.

As for the regions under consideration, except Istanbul, we observe that sign of migrant coefficient is positive meaning migrants are earning more; however, magnitude differs across destinations. In Izmir, migrants earn around 5% more than do non-migrants; this ratio is 10% for Ankara and about 6% for migrants in Adana. 4% of difference in wages of migrants between Ankara and Izmir-Adana regions could be partially explained by the different returns to education in these regions. That is, while return to education is around 10% in Ankara, for Adana and Izmir, this return is reported to be around 6-7%. Another important point to be stated here is that while likelihood of unemployment is higher among migrants in these three regions, once migrants are employed, they earn more than do non-migrants. This present a picture that migrants are ending up at the extremes; they either facing higher unemployment risks or enjoying higher earnings. Not being the ultimate goal of this study, again providing some possible explanations will be beneficial to understand the situation better or shed light on further research. As we stated earlier in this study, process of migration in Turkey had some unique characteristics in 1990s and some individuals were, in a sense, obliged to migrate either because of security reasons or lack economic activities in order to survive. Hence, some of the individuals came to their current place of residency without having proper networks that provide them with finding jobs in the stated labor markets. To illustrate, more than 90% of individuals who migrated since they were forced took migration decisions within seven days.<sup>153</sup> Hence these might be the individuals that are the extreme end in terms of labor market outcomes and those migrating after finding proper jobs could constitute the upper extreme in our analysis. Hence, the results presented in Table 32 have the potential to better explain the situation in these three regions.

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<sup>153</sup> TGYONA, 2006, p. 78.

In Istanbul, on the other hand, the situation is different in that wages of migrants are 1.3% less than the non-migrants. Again not having certain reasons for this in the present study, two possible explanations could be provided to this situation. Firstly, as stated above, migrants were less likely to be unemployed in Istanbul; this finding is supported by the idea that migrants are accepting the jobs that they were offered immediately since they cannot afford unemployment in this region. This idea might be further supported by this finding. That is, migrants also accept the low paid jobs once they arrived to Istanbul in order to at least survive and that is why their earnings are less than the non-migrant population in Istanbul. Secondly, there might be discrimination towards migrants in this labor market that requires policy action in Istanbul.

**Table 31: OLS Results: Log Hourly Wages**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Turkey	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	Adana
<b>VARIABLES</b>					
Migrant	0.11294*** (0.00024)	-0.01315*** (0.00047)	0.05345*** (0.00097)	0.10243*** (0.00084)	0.06687*** (0.00116)
Years of Schooling	0.07218*** (0.00004)	0.08845*** (0.00007)	0.07725*** (0.00014)	0.10141*** (0.00013)	0.06170*** (0.00016)
Marital Status	0.03397*** (0.00033)	0.08311*** (0.00060)	0.07553*** (0.00128)	0.05148*** (0.00120)	0.01930*** (0.00148)
Formality	0.26704*** (0.00026)	0.12376*** (0.00054)	0.24198*** (0.00120)	0.19875*** (0.00106)	0.33893*** (0.00109)
Location	0.09184*** (0.00028)	0.07144*** (0.00194)	0.07974*** (0.00166)	0.09175*** (0.00193)	0.06936*** (0.00149)
Pot. Experience	0.04215*** (0.00004)	0.04057*** (0.00009)	0.04422*** (0.00018)	0.04523*** (0.00016)	0.04471*** (0.00019)
Experience Square	-0.00063*** (0.00000)	-0.00061*** (0.00000)	-0.00069*** (0.00000)	-0.00062*** (0.00000)	-0.00068*** (0.00000)
Constant	-0.23459*** (0.00058)	-0.00976*** (0.00221)	-0.21303*** (0.00269)	-0.46025*** (0.00274)	-0.29838*** (0.00267)
Observations	126,336	19,592	7,154	8,407	6,317
R-squared	0.31167	0.33361	0.31551	0.37681	0.33184

**Notes:**

a) Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

b) Weighted averages are presented.

Bearing these in mind, more fruitful results could be reached by comparing migrants that arrived in different time intervals and non-migrants in the stated regions. Table 32 presents the OLS results obtained after grouping migrants according to their period of arrival. The reason why we have the group of 'before 1980' in the second model is not to lose observations might giving way to biased results, as was the case for our second model while estimating the likelihood of unemployment in the regions. However, because of the above stated reasons our main concern is 1980-1989, 1990-1998, and 2002-2011 periods; 1999-2001 time interval, on the other hand, will be elaborated only for Istanbul because of the possible shock created by 1999 earthquake. Analyzing the general trend in Turkey it could be expressed that individuals who migrated in the period of 2002-2011, are better off both than the non-migrants and migrants of 1981-1989 and 1990-1998 periods. This is most likely to be the consequence of increasing trend in extra training in addition to formal education. Between the migrants of 80s and 90s no difference is realized both earning 9% more than the non-migrants in Turkey.

When the subject is migrants who moved to the regions under consideration, varying trends are registered in our data set. Beginning with Istanbul, migrants who arrived in 80s and 90s are making less income than are the non-migrants in this region. 6% less income for the migrants of 80s and 4% less income for 90s' migrants is estimated in our model. This also implies that individuals arrived in 1980s are worse off than the 1990s arrivers by making 2% more income. Furthermore, migrants arrived in 2000s are making 5% more income than do migrants of 1990s. As it is expected for Istanbul's labor market, migrants settled down between 1999 and 2001 are earning 6% less when they are compared to other migrants moved in 2000s.

The results for Izmir are presented in the third column of Table 31. For the individuals migrated to Izmir in 1980s, almost no difference is observed between their wages and those of non-migrants. On the other side, migrants of 1990s are significantly earning 3% less than non-migrants. As was stated, this was the period of forced migration and in this period, Izmir was also a destination of this migration flow. When the discussion behind this information is considered again a partial explanation of this situation could be reached for migrants making less income than non-migrants as well as from the migrants who arrived in different time periods. As the general trend in Turkey, when it came to 2000s it is

observed that earnings of migrants moved in this period has considerably been increased that they are making 11% more from non-migrants, 12% more than migrants of 1990s and 10% more than the migrants arrived to Izmir in 1980s.

The same trend for the migrants of 1990s and 2000s is also observed in Ankara. That is, migrants settled down to Ankara in 1990s are earning less than both migrants who arrived in 1980s (5%) and 2000s (13%). The lower skill levels, the economic/political instability, the nature of the migration in 1990s are again valid for providing some partial explanations to this situation.

Last results of this estimation are presented in the fifth column of Table 31. Summary and comments regarding these findings are in order. First, migrants of each period are earning more than the non-migrants in Adana as it is the general trend in Turkey (except Istanbul). Second, magnitudes are changing depending on period of arrival among the migrants. 7% more earning levels are estimated for the arrivers of 1980s, this ratio has dropped to 2% for the migrants of 1900s and 9% more wages are recorded by the migrants who arrived in 2000s. Decline in the earnings of migrants who moved between 1990 and 1998 could be explained by the reason that we stated for Izmir. Adana was another and one of the most common destination of migration flow experienced in this period and a considerable amount of the new-comers in that period are recorded to be unskilled as it is shown in Table 27 (35%) and 15% of them are still employed in agriculture (refer to Table23) which is a less productive sector in the economy.

**Table 32: OLS Results: Log Hourly Wages of Migrants Arrived in Different Time Intervals**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Turkey	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	Adana
<b>VARIABLES</b>					
1980-1989	0.09719*** (0.00054)	-0.06402*** (0.00081)	0.00922*** (0.00199)	0.06285*** (0.00194)	0.07395*** (0.00251)
1990-1998	0.09400*** (0.00038)	-0.03475*** (0.00062)	-0.02665*** (0.00153)	0.01720*** (0.00146)	0.02005*** (0.00196)
2002-2011	0.12870*** (0.00031)	0.02041*** (0.00058)	0.10565*** (0.00124)	0.14912*** (0.00104)	0.09297*** (0.00155)
1999-2001	0.09423*** (0.00057)	-0.03859*** (0.00087)	0.05186*** (0.00244)	0.09329*** (0.00207)	0.06429*** (0.00337)
Before 1980	0.14104*** (0.00084)	0.00807*** (0.00122)	0.07258*** (0.00299)	0.06959*** (0.00287)	0.04911*** (0.00375)
Years of Schooling	0.07191*** (0.00004)	0.08790*** (0.00007)	0.07635*** (0.00014)	0.10055*** (0.00013)	0.06132*** (0.00016)
Marital Status	0.03384*** (0.00033)	0.08380*** (0.00060)	0.07399*** (0.00128)	0.04928*** (0.00120)	0.01847*** (0.00148)
Formality	0.26766*** (0.00026)	0.12657*** (0.00054)	0.24287*** (0.00120)	0.20138*** (0.00106)	0.33939*** (0.00109)
Location	0.09290*** (0.00028)	0.07202*** (0.00194)	0.08194*** (0.00166)	0.09561*** (0.00193)	0.07097*** (0.00149)
Experience	0.04270*** (0.00004)	0.04250*** (0.00009)	0.04619*** (0.00019)	0.04629*** (0.00017)	0.04499*** (0.00019)
Experience Square	-0.00064*** (0.00000)	-0.00064*** (0.00000)	-0.00072*** (0.00000)	-0.00062*** (0.00000)	-0.00068*** (0.00000)
Constant	-0.23871*** (0.00058)	-0.02790*** (0.00221)	-0.22881*** (0.00270)	-0.47175*** (0.00274)	-0.30044*** (0.00267)
Observations	126,336	19,592	7,154	8,407	6,317
R-squared	0.31201	0.33542	0.31930	0.37985	0.33255

**Notes:**

a) Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

b) Weighted averages are presented.

Throughout this point, we take the education variable as years of schooling and assumed that returns to each additional unit of education are the same. However, other than additional years of schooling, the returns might change according to education level (the

degree completed) of migrants. To test this idea we used an interaction term, education level variable<sup>154</sup> and migrant dummy, and present the results of estimation in Table 33. The magnitude and signs of the results are changing depending on region and period of migration, as expected. Starting from Istanbul, it can be claimed that the most privileged group is migrants with college degree. In each of the period, college graduate migrants are making more income than both non-migrant college graduates and the migrants reside in Istanbul in different periods. However, in the 30 years time period, college premium is declining for migrants that from 1980s onwards returns to college education has declined around 20% in Istanbul. This could be explained, by the share of individuals who hold a college degree in this labor market. That is, since the flow of individuals with college degree (supply of college graduates in the labor market) has been increasing in Istanbul throughout the time, college education might become less valuable for the employers anymore. To illustrate, holding a college degree in 1980s were much more valuable than it is in 2000s since the share of college graduates were much less. Other than the college graduates, migrants with different degrees are earning less than the non-migrant population in Istanbul. This might again be a consequence of varying skill levels as discussed earlier. Parallel results regarding the decline in college premium has also experienced in Adana's labor market. Decline in this premium is even more dramatic that in 2000s, returns to college education has declined by 56% in Adana. Still college graduate migrants are making more income than the non-migrants having the same degree. Although college education is less valuable in Adana 2000s; migrants settled down to Adana in this period are earning almost 7% more than the non migrants, *ceteris paribus*.

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<sup>154</sup>Our data present six different education levels: illiterate, literate, primary education, junior primary education, high school education, and college education. Since we are interested in degrees completed, we merged the literate and illiterates as the category including individuals with no degrees. The other degrees are estimated as it is presented in the data set.



**Table 33: OLS Results: Log Hourly Wages after Interacting Different Educational Levels and Migrant Dummy**

VARIABLES	(1) Turkey	(2) Istanbul	(3) Izmir	(4) Ankara	(5) Adana
1980-1989	-0.00014	-0.01361***	0.07189***	-0.07111***	-0.11128***
1990-1998	0.07376***	0.01268***	0.01892***	-0.11360***	-0.10615***
2002-2011	0.19432***	0.16676***	0.05547***	-0.01051	0.06738***
1999-2001	0.13479***	0.01621***	0.27733***	0.20539***	-0.06644***
Before 1980	0.12720***	0.15746***	0.12977***	0.00777	-0.07074***
Primary	0.07496***	0.09412***	0.12671***	0.07108***	0.07789***
Junior Primary	0.19143***	0.25755***	0.24806***	0.23387***	0.12955***
High School	0.38635***	0.47062***	0.45980***	0.45216***	0.33773***
College	0.96337***	1.14117***	0.94680***	1.05179***	0.78395***
1980-1989 & Primary	0.09692***	-0.04541***	-0.08652***	0.07294***	0.14390***
1980-1989 & Junior Primary	0.05518***	-0.12587***	-0.07636***	-0.01643	0.20452***
1980-1989 & High School	0.08810***	-0.13422***	-0.09225***	0.26769***	0.09555***
1980-1989 & College	0.23793***	0.22265***	0.03098**	0.77260***	0.78898***
1991-1998 & Primary	0.00474***	-0.07072***	-0.04824***	0.09876***	0.03212***
1991-1998 & Junior Primary	-0.04386***	-0.15118***	-0.14528***	0.02113**	0.01648**
1991-1998 & High School	-0.00991***	-0.11722***	-0.16346***	0.03005***	0.29568***
1991-1998 & College	0.18188***	0.18289***	0.17045***	0.29867***	0.54679***
2002-2011 & Primary	-0.10855***	-0.20397***	0.00455	0.04986***	-0.00649
2002-2011 & Junior Primary	-0.09388***	-0.19060***	0.00120	0.03479***	-0.00052
2002-2011 & High School	-0.15842***	-0.27218***	-0.05994***	0.01916**	-0.07524***
2002-2011 & College	0.05282***	0.01856***	0.22462***	0.37451***	0.22846***
1999-2001 & Primary	-0.05915***	-0.06692***	-0.24640***	-0.12312***	-0.09313***
1999-2001 & Junior Primary	-0.06366***	-0.06305***	-0.31291***	-0.22850***	0.22103***
1999-2001 & High School	-0.11830***	-0.21615***	-0.31607***	-0.17561***	0.22479***
1999-2001 & College	0.06147***	0.11663***	-0.07359***	-0.04426***	0.44547***
Before 1980 & Primary	0.01972***	-0.15820***	-0.02529**	0.05366***	0.11138***
Before 1980 & Junior Primary	-0.01316***	-0.19130***	-0.08527***	0.05739***	0.01571
Before 1980 & High School	0.01921***	-0.09236***	-0.55497***	-0.23342***	0.15509***
Before 1980 & College	0.02103***	-0.15045***	-0.08609***	0.12489***	
Observations	126,336	19,592	7,154	8,407	6,317
R-squared	0.35463	0.41919	0.35987	0.43422	0.36931

**Notes:**

a)\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

b) Weighted averages are presented.

c) All of the models are controlled for marital status, formality of the sector, location dummy, experience and its square and industrial dummies.

d) Omitted group in the analysis is non-migrants with no educational degree.

Other than these, it could be claimed that migrant education is more valuable in this region than it is in other regions because the results show that magnitude of the returns to different level of migrant education is higher in this region.

Contrary to Adana and Istanbul, in Izmir college premium for migrants has been increasing in the 30-years time period; almost 20% increase in college premium has been recorded. This could be a consequence of decreasing share of agriculture in the economy in this region. Earlier in Izmir, agriculture, a sector which does not require high educational degrees, was more important and the agricultural affairs were mostly hold by residents rather than migrants. However, with the changing face of the economy more skilled labor has been required, which might have met by migrant inflows, in this labor market and earning more than the non-migrants (again with the same degree) might be a consequence of skill composition of migrants that we cannot control by the data at hand.

For Ankara, similar results with Adana are reached. That is, migrants with different educational levels are earning more than the non-migrant population with again the same educational degrees. As expected, returns to college education is highest than returns to other education degrees but the change in this rate is not linear. That is, there is a dramatic decrease (around 50%) in the college premium for migrants settled in 1990s; however, this rate has increased by 8% for those settled 2000s.

Concluding this section, since we estimated OLS regressions, comparison across destinations becomes possible. Among the migrants in different regions, those in Ankara could be considered as the most privileged ones since magnitude of their earnings is more than both non-migrants in that region and premium to migration is higher than migrants in other regions. Migrants in Istanbul, on the other side, are at the bottom of the list while comparing these four regions in terms of earnings. As for migrants of different periods, the better off ones are the late comers and again they rewarded more in Ankara. The worse off migrants are those migrated in 1900s. However, all these results have the potential to vary depending on educational degree completed (together with region and time period of migration). That is, although 1990s movers are the worse off groups in stated regions, migrants with college degrees are earning more than non-migrants (with college degree), as well as they are earning more than the migrants with different educational levels.

### 4.3. Migration and Social Class

As it was stated, EGP social class will be used in the analysis of social class in this section. Before proceeding some reminders should be put at this stage. First, as it was stated EGP class schema does not present a hierarchical order in the society but its aim is ‘to differentiate positions within labor markets and production units or, more specifically, to differentiate such positions in terms of the employment relations that they entail’.<sup>155</sup> Still, the upper classes are more desirable and intuitively, individuals belonging to lower classes, skilled, unskilled and farm workers, are the ones who are at the bottom of the stratification in the society. Second, we used occupational groups and the employment status distribution within the occupational groups to construct EGP (seven) social class schema for Turkey. The occupational data is classified using ISCO 88 classification, and is available at the two digit level of classification in our data. The employment statuses for each occupational group are employee, employer, self-employed, and unpaid family worker. After tabulating all occupational groups according to employment status, we placed each of the over three hundred cells into an *EGP* class, following Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman<sup>156</sup>, and Ganzeboom and Treiman.<sup>157</sup> We present the social class distribution only for all males who are not public employees and not students because of the stated reasons in the previous sections. Third, to make the reader easily follow the tables below about EGP easier, once again we would like to underline that ‘I’ stands for ‘high-grade professionals’; ‘II’ presents ‘lower-level professionals and supervisors’; ‘III’ represent the ‘routine non-manual workers’, ‘IV’ is employed for ‘self-employed (excluding farmers)’, ‘V’ shows skilled workers, and ‘VII’ is standing for ‘farmers and farm workers’ classes. Fourth, in our analysis the omitted category is VI<sup>th</sup> class (non-skilled workers) and the comparison group is non-migrants in the specific region. The reason why we took the unskilled workers as base category is well-discussed in the literature: the lively debate on export processing zones in less developed countries has centered on the employment of ex-farmers ... in these locations.<sup>158</sup> In this case, the likelihood of ex-farmers, who began to move after mechanization of agriculture, in Turkey are expected to be unskilled workers mostly in

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<sup>155</sup> Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992 p. 37

<sup>156</sup> Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman, 1992.

<sup>157</sup> Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996.

<sup>158</sup> Fernandez-Kelley, 1983; Fox, 2002; Lee, 1998; McKay, 2006.

newly emerging export zones and biggest labor markets in Turkey (In this study we covered only Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara and Adana but we underline that cities like Kocaeli, Bursa and several other big labor markets should also be considered as an area of concern of another study.).

In order to get clearer ideas about the social class structure of migrants in different regional labor markets, we again presented two separate estimation results in Table 34 and 35. In Table 34 we observe the likelihood of migrants ending up in each class. In Turkey, migrants are more likely to belong the ‘higher-grade professionals’ class than are non-migrants and this difference could be explained by the theory that mostly well-educated and in parallel to this more skilled people are migrating. For the other classes, likelihood of migrants are observed to be less than non-migrants in Turkey, but for the ‘lower-level professionals and supervisors’ class, being migrant does not matter; in other words, coefficient of interest is statistically insignificant.

However, as we stated, focusing on different labor markets, might provide varying results as demonstrated in Table 34. In Istanbul, migrants are less likely to end up in all of the classes (except unskilled class, which is the comparison group in our analyses) when it is compared to non-migrants in this region. That is, likelihood of migrants ending up as unskilled workers is more than the non-migrants. From this, we can infer that migrants are the ones who are mostly deepening the polarization in Istanbul. When the results of other estimations presented above are also considered, facing with such a result loses its interestingness since as we stated that migrants in Istanbul are those for whom duration of job search is more costly and their skills are expected to be lower and they are earning less when it is compared to those of the non-migrant.

Similar patterns are also recorded for Izmir. Likelihood of being in the first class for migrants is lower than the non-migrants in this region. Likewise, being in the classes of lower-level professionals and supervisors, and routine non-manual workers are also less likely to be composed of mostly migrants. Being self-employed is more likely to be captured by the non-migrants again which means that migrants are more likely to be ones who are exposed to exploitation relations in Izmir’s labor market. In other words, migrants are exposed to proletarianization. Overall, when it is compared to non-migrants, migrants in Izmir are more likely to be at the bottom of the stratification in the society.

**Table 34: Results of Multinomial Logit Estimates for Migrants and Non-migrants Across Destinations**

	Turkey		Istanbul		Izmir		Ankara		Adana		
	Migrant	Years of Schooling	Migrant	Years of Schooling	Migrant	Years of Schooling	Migrant	Years of Schooling	Migrant	Years of Schooling	
<b>I</b>	0.0531***	0.4604***	-0.8552***	0.56733***	-0.6160**	0.4840***	0.5246***	0.5818***	1.0114***	0.4165***	
<b>II</b>	-0.0616	0.3637***	-0.9471***	0.3862***	-0.7116***	0.3569***	-0.5326***	0.4231***	0.4816**	0.3888***	
<b>III</b>	-0.3051***	0.1752***	-0.5649***	0.2359***	-0.4811***	0.1621***	-0.6962***	0.1632***	-0.2059	0.1986***	
<b>IV</b>	-0.7095***	0.0861***	-0.9336***	0.1411***	-0.9791***	0.1205***	-1.024***	0.1284***	-0.3973***	0.0778***	
<b>V</b>	-0.2746***	0.0263***	-0.4613***	0.0464***	-0.7093***	0.0072	-0.8358***	-0.0237**	-0.1622***	0.0043	
<b>VII</b>	-0.6703***	0.0398***	-0.7575***	0.01022	-0.8944***	-0.0536**	-0.6193***	-0.1208***	-0.1014	-0.0710	
N: 231.880		R-sq.: 0.17		N: 25.375		R-sq.: 0.12		N: 11.307		R-sq.: 0.12	
N: 11.602		R-sq.: 0.14		N: 11.611		R-sq.: 0.16					

**Notes:**

- a) Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1
- b) Multinomial logit models are estimated for each region separately.
- b) Weighted averages are presented.
- c) All models are controlled for age, age squared, years of education, marital status and years since migration. Years since migration variable is taken '0' for the non-migrants.
- d) Full stata output is available upon request

As for Ankara, it could be stated that migrants are more likely to end up in the higher-grade professional class when it is compared to non-migrants. This is most probably resulting from the higher education levels of migrants in this region. For the other classes, on the other side, likelihood of non-migrants is higher. From these two results, it could be inferred that migration is also a phenomenon for Ankara that is increasing the polarization in the society. Stated polarization is effected by migration in Ankara, in different patterns than Istanbul and Izmir, however. Migrants are ending up either in the first class or in the unskilled working class in Ankara, a phenomenon which is affecting the polarity from two sides; increasing the share of individuals who are at the top of stratification and augmenting the share of people at the bottom of the same stratification. Hence, it is not surprising to face with shanty houses and ‘gated residences’ in the same neighborhood in Ankara.

In Adana, on the other hand, migrants are more likely to be better off in the society, by placing themselves at the top of the hierarchy. As it was stated, migrants are also the ones making more income than the non-migrants in this region. Seemingly, migrants in Adana have won the lottery which is characterized by Tunalı regarding migration decisions in Turkey.<sup>159</sup>

However, as it was underlined for several times in this study, the situation is not the same for all of the migrants in the aforementioned labor markets and we claimed that this situation could vary depending on the period of migration. Thus, we also estimated social classes of migrants who moved in different periods; these results are presented in Table 35. Results are again supporting our assertion both having different signs and likelihoods for different regions and periods. In Turkey, in general, 1981 and 1989 movers are less likely than non-migrants to end up in the first classes defined in EGP. Moreover, likelihood of self-employment is also declining over time since 1980s when share of agriculture in the economy and employment in this sector began to decline, giving way for migrants to be proletariats anymore. When the decrease in the declining likelihood of migrants being in the farm workers class is considered, it is not wrong to claim that most of the farm workers have been transformed into unskilled individuals in the big labor markets in Turkey. When it comes to 2000s, we also obtained parallel results with the existing literature about migration that well-educated and highly skilled individuals are migrating to more

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<sup>159</sup> Tunalı, 2000.

productive labor markets that likelihood of belonging to upper classes is increasing for migrants. When the increasing education levels which might be a source increase in skill levels are considered in Turkey in 2000s, this idea becomes more robust.

Moving to different regions, in Istanbul, early comers are the ones who are enjoying the privileges of the first class more. That is movers of 1980s are more likely to end up in the upper classes when it is compared to the migrants of other periods. Less likelihood of being in the higher-grade professional class is recorded by the migrants arrived to Istanbul in 1990s. Moreover, less likelihood for all classes is recorded by the migrants arrived between 1999-2001, meaning after 1999 earthquake Istanbul received mostly unskilled individuals. Again as the general trend, likelihood of self-employment is declining in Istanbul too; meaning proletarianization is increasing in this region as it is the trend in all around Turkey. As we just discussed, migrants in Izmir are less likely to be in the first class and when this finding is combined by the results presented in Table 35 it could be claimed that recorded less likelihood mostly results from the migrants arrived to Izmir in the process of forced migration because coefficients of migrants of other periods are not statistically significant. Interestingly, migrants arrived in 1990s are more likely to be in the routine non-manual working class, subscribed by III in the above table. Another interesting finding regarding Izmir's labor market is that migrants arrived to this region between 1999 and 2001 are more likely to be in the first class both from non-migrants and migrants settled down in different periods.

In the labor market of Ankara, different trend stands out regarding the migrants arrived in the latest period that coefficient of arrivers settled down in 2000s is statistically insignificant. This could be resulting from the fact that latest arrivers are mostly public employees; bureaucrats who are excluded in this study. Other than that, migrants of 1980s are more likely to be in the higher-grade professional classes than both non-migrants and migrants of different periods. Examining the coefficients of other class categories, it could be stated that 258 thousand migrants who arrived in 1980s and still survives (refer to table 13) in Ankara's labor market are the most privileged ones in terms of social class. In parallel to general trend; on the other hand, migrants arrived in 1990s are less likely to be in the first class in this region and both coefficient of interest in Table 35 and data provided in table 27 underlines that lots of unskilled individuals migrated to Ankara in that period. In

this way, similar to other regions, migration is also deepening the polarization in the capital of Turkey.

Lastly for Adana, we stated that migrants have won the lottery in this region. However, Table 35 reveals that more careful elaboration should be made regarding this issue. If the likelihood of migrants came in different periods are analyzed, it could easily be observed that for 1980s and 1990s migrants' coefficient of interest is mostly insignificant, whilst this coefficient is positive and statistically significant only for the migrants came after 1999. This means that new comers of this region are mostly at the top of the stratification in the population in Adana. When the increased employment in the service sector (Table 12), some occupations of which requires higher levels of education and increased education levels of migrants (Table 19) are considered facing with this outcome is nothing more than presenting more robust results to the reader. An expected result also draws the attention in the latest findings.

Discussion up to this point reveals that migrants in Istanbul and Izmir are less likely to be in the upper classes and reverse is valid for Adana but being a migrant does not affect social class distribution in Ankara, mostly. Although seeking certain answers is not the main purpose of this study, providing possible explanations or partial answers might inspire further research in this area. As for Istanbul and Izmir, the main shortcomings of migrants could be the lack of networks for economic betterment. That is, since non-migrants are present in the labor market for long years and might have present family ties, their networks are expected to be more to provide them with better job market outcomes. In other words, the markets in those regions might not be enough to correct for network effect. For Adana, we presented that migrants are more likely to be in the upper classes of EGP and the positive impact is mostly stemming from the migrants arrived in 2000s. Such kind of a situation could be present in Adana because of the quality of education that migrants attained. In other words, even though controlling for years of schooling migrants are more likely to be at the upper classes in this region and this could be a consequence of better educational outcomes of migrants. For example, late comers to Adana might have more language skills which make them better off in the labor market. For Ankara, migration loses its significance and as we stated most of the migrants in this region are public employees who are excluded from the scope of this inquiry. This might be a possible explanation for



the insignificance of the coefficient of interest.

**Table 35: EGP Social Class of Migrants Arrived in Different Time Periods**

<b>Turkey</b>						
	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>VII</b>
<b>1980-1989</b>	-0.1126*	0.0249	-0.0710*	-0.5839***	-0.03893	-0.4162***
<b>1990-1998</b>	-0.1789***	-0.1840***	-0.1771***	-0.6109***	-0.1035***	-0.8288***
<b>2002-2011</b>	0.1786***	0.02827	-0.2664***	-0.61426***	-0.19226***	-0.69453***
<b>1999-2001</b>	-0.04434	-0.16318***	-0.1838***	-0.60507***	-0.13435***	-0.71488***
<b>Istanbul</b>						
	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>VII</b>
<b>1980-1989</b>	-0.44669***	-0.60007***	-0.16822**	-0.49902***	-0.16538**	-0.61153**
<b>1990-1998</b>	-0.66944***	-0.87306***	-0.29479***	-0.53673***	-0.17346***	-0.08032
<b>2002-2011</b>	-0.53498***	-0.62438***	-0.46415***	-0.78886***	-0.39591***	-0.51553**
<b>1999-2001</b>	-0.83459***	-1.04166***	-0.47146***	-0.78039***	-0.35429***	-0.96203**
<b>Izmir</b>						
	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>VII</b>
<b>1980-1989</b>	0.00726	-0.33964*	-0.38110***	-0.56185***	-0.07338	-0.52567*
<b>1990-1998</b>	-1.04956***	-1.07095***	-0.35999***	-0.83899***	-0.62138***	-0.94336***
<b>2002-2011</b>	-0.07159	-0.34042***	-0.40295***	-0.69369***	-0.51630***	-0.70743***
<b>1999-2001</b>	0.58201**	-0.54425*	-0.24887	-0.48044***	0.14364	-0.43512
<b>Ankara</b>						
	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>VII</b>
<b>1980-1989</b>	0.50690**	-0.03807	0.03207	-0.49485***	0.07238	0.81774***
<b>1990-1998</b>	-0.46456***	-0.43487**	-0.52255***	-0.47753***	-0.32551***	-0.85921**
<b>2002-2011</b>	0.16126	-0.28470***	-0.48846***	-0.77888***	-0.57970***	-0.67613***
<b>1999-2001</b>	-0.28117	-0.65446***	-0.65356***	-0.93737***	-0.66849***	-0.63834
<b>Adana</b>						
	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>VII</b>
<b>1980-1989</b>	-0.0502	-0.75701*	-0.06728	-0.18219*	-0.98620***	0.30700*
<b>1990-1998</b>	-0.16512	0.25576	-0.07345	-0.17236*	-0.71962***	0.10163
<b>2002-2011</b>	0.8102***	0.50435***	-0.09304	-0.44051***	-0.07296*	-0.35020**
<b>1999-2001</b>	0.80921**	0.1496	-0.17077	-0.49365**	-1.09324***	0.22049

**Notes:**

- Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1
- Multinomial logit models are estimated for each region separately.
- Weighted averages are presented.
- All models are controlled for age, age squared, years of education, and marital status. Before 1980 period is also included in order not to use observations giving way to biased results.
- Full stata output is available upon request.

## **Chapter 5**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

In this study, we seek answers for 1) to what extent do the migrants having similar backgrounds obtain similar socio-economic rewards in four metropolitan cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana) in Turkey?; 2) Could migrants obtain the same job market outcomes with residents in Istanbul, Ankara Izmir and Adana? To answer these questions, unemployment, wages and EGP social class are used since they are most commonly used measures for job market outcomes. In order to provide better and unbiased comparisons we defined a migrant to be a man between the age brackets of 15 and 64 (which the age interval of labor force participation in Turkey), who is not a student and public employee, and migrated after graduation or did not migrate for educational purposes. Latter are excluded from our sample since they are not active job seekers in the labor market. Exclusion of women stems from the information that more than half of the women in Turkey are not taking migration decisions individually and most of them are employed inside the house; in other words they might perceived to be “proletariat” of the family. Still with more detailed data, including women in analysis would provide better results while presenting the job market outcomes for migrants. This could be counted as the major shortcoming of this study. The reason for taking only the migrants who moved after graduation (or without educational purposes) is that education is the only initial endowment we could capture in the data. That is, the data we used do not provide any information on migrants’ previous occupation, wealth, and assets etc. which might have significant impact on our dependent variables. Moreover, migration after graduation is also important in the sense that the individuals are not likely to change their residency if they have quality to survive in a particular labor market after s/he graduated or if an individual is over qualified

for a particular job market after graduation then s/he will migrate to more productive regions.

To describe the stated regions and migrants, even non-migrants, we used seven different data sets. Firstly, we provided extensive descriptive statistics about characteristics of regions by using 1980, 1985, 1990, 2000 and 2010 Censuses. Conclusions of these statistics were uniqueness of regions regarding socio-economic structures and the possibility of varying effects of these unique characteristics on both population and migrants. Furthermore, we provided several different characteristics of migrants in our sample and share of migrants in different categories of EGP social class in different regions by using Household Labor Force Surveys between the years of 2009 and 2011. Regarding EGP social class, migrant population in Ankara have more share in the first class and this share is less in Adana, which is parallel to the structures of regions.

We claimed that socio-economic rewards of migrants will change according to region and period of migration. To test these claims, we used different statistical methods. First, we run logit regressions to predict risk of unemployment in the regions under consideration. Second, OLS regressions were employed based on Mincerian wage equation in order to predict earning differentials of migrants and non-migrants. To test the effect of migrants with different educational levels, we included an interaction term into our analysis. Finally, multinomial logit regressions are run to predict social class of migrants.

Findings and comments for each region are presented henceforward. We found that in Istanbul the unemployment risk among migrants is less and claimed that this might result from the difficulty to effort life because of the lack of networks for migrants. Furthermore, we revealed that migrants are earning less than the non-migrants and stated this situation might resulting from either migrants are accepting all kinds of jobs since cost of job search is high for them or there is discrimination towards migrants in Istanbul's labor market. However, we also found that college graduates are the ones who make more income than the others, both non-migrants and migrants with different educational degrees. As for social class, migrants are again the ones whose likelihood of being in the first classes of EGP is lower. We claimed that this situation could also be stemming from lack of appropriate networks among migrants to be mobilized upwards in the social stratification. Hence,

policies to end or at least minimize the discrimination in this labor market or minimizing the effect of networks on social well-being would increase the welfare of migrants in Istanbul. For the migrants arrived to Istanbul in different time periods, we found that the worse off ones are those who settled down in 1990s. Parallel to these we also showed that these migrants are the ones whose educational attainment much less than both non-migrants and migrants of other time intervals.

Our conclusions about Izmir were the following: firstly, risk of unemployment is higher among migrants compared to non-migrants. The underlying reason of high unemployment is actually the migration itself according to Gürsel and Acar. They stated that Izmir is one of the developed regions compared to the rest of Turkey but unemployment rate in this region is higher than Turkish average.<sup>160</sup> Hence, active labor market policies should be designed to help unemployed migrants find jobs in Izmir.<sup>161</sup> Secondly, although likelihood of unemployment for migrants in Izmir is higher once the migrants are employed their earnings are higher than the non-migrants. This could be a result of the quality of education that migrants have or different skills they brought to labor markets. Note that in our estimates we controlled for occupational dummies also. This means, if two men occupied in exactly the same job, the one who is a migrant is earning more than non-migrants in Izmir. We reached to more refine results after including an interaction term, migrant and education level, and concluded that college graduate migrants are the most privileged individuals in this region. So this finding should not confuse the reader while analyzing the social class of migrants in this region since the likelihood of migrants being in the first classes characterized by EGP is less than non-migrants'. Stated lower likelihood again could be resulting from the networks that migrants are lacking as we underlined in Istanbul's case. Lastly, as it is the case all around Turkey, migrants settled down in 1990s are the ones who are suffering more in Izmir in the context of unemployment, low wages from other migrants and social class.

Like Izmir, migrants in Adana are also suffering more from unemployment than non-migrants. This situation might be explained by the composition of migrants in this area.

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<sup>160</sup> Gürsel & Acar, 2012.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

That is, most of the arrivers are Kurdish-origin individuals that are expected to be less educated i.e. even though they have the same years of education by non-migrants the quality of education they received in Eastern parts of Turkey might not be enough to be employed in Adana. Moreover, in this region discrimination towards the stated Kurdish migrants might be high, and this situation might be explained by the dominance of rightist parties in this region. In the latest local elections around 33% of votes went to Nationalist Action Party (MHP) which is the basic figure for Turkish right. However, this situation turns upside down when the social class of the migrants is considered that migrants are better off in terms of social class in this region. However, it is beneficial to keep in mind that the coefficient of interest is not statistically significant for the migrants moved to this place in 1980s and 1990s; thus the positive impact of migration is stemming from the late-comers who might be better in terms of educational quality. The final finding about this region, in parallel to other findings and general trend in Turkey, reveals that migrants are earning more than the non-migrants in this region and the least wage-earners are again those who migrated in 1990s.

The last region we considered was Ankara. Pooling all the migrants together we again found that migrants are more likely to be unemployed in this region too. This might be the consequence of the fact that share of service sector, whose occupations might require well-educated individuals, is more than 70% and as we stated around 33% of the migrants are counted to be in the unskilled workers class; hence those unskilled and less educated migrants might not have found jobs in the capital of Turkey. Once the migrants are employed; on the other hand, they earn more than the non-migrants which could be stemming the same structure of this region that Ankara's economy is mostly dominated by service sector. Some occupations of the service sector require more well-educated individuals and as we presented educational attainment of migrants is higher than the non-migrant population in Ankara. Parallel to this, there might be a skill-match in Ankara's labor market for migrants. Moreover, this might be a consequence of high rate of returns to education in this region (around 10% which is the highest ratio among the regions under consideration). As for the social class in Ankara, migrant dummy was in most cases insignificant except for the migrants came to Ankara in 2000s. The late comers are better off than the non-migrants and the migrants arrived in different time spans.

Final caveats are in order. First, in both Izmir's and Istanbul's labor market discrimination might be the major problem making the migrants worse off than the non-migrants. Another possibility could be the strong networks of the non-migrant population disrupting the merit-based allocation; hence reforming the labor market should be a consideration point of policy makers. Second, migrants moved in 1990s are the ones experiencing harsher conditions and worse labor market outcomes in all of the labor markets; thus providing them with educational opportunities could make them exploit better job market outcomes. Third, the flow of unskilled population to the biggest labor markets in Turkey has the potential to increase polarization in the regions which has the potential to increase relative poverty in a particular region; and if these unskilled workers are ex-farmers agricultural production and husbandry might face wretcheder conditions which might harm Eastern parts more and deepen the inequality between regions further. Last, if less developed regions continue to lose cultural capital, i.e. well-educated people stated income gap could increase further.

# APPENDIX

## EGP Class Schema(s)<sup>162</sup>

Full version		Collapsed versions			
		Seven-class*	Five-class	Three-class	
I	Higher-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors	I+II	Service class: professionals, administrators and managers; higher-grade technicians; supervisors of non-manual workers	I-III	White-collar workers
II	Lower-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; higher-grade technicians; managers in small industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual employees				
IIIa	Routine non-manual employees, higher grade (administration and commerce)	III	Routine non-manual workers: routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce; sales personnel; other rank-and-file service workers		Non-manual workers
IIIb	Routine non-manual employees, lower grade (sales and services)				
IVa	Small proprietors, artisans, etc., with employees	IVa+b	Petty bourgeoisie: small proprietors and artisans, etc., with and without employees	IVa+b	Petty bourgeoisie
IVb	Small proprietors, artisans, etc., without employees				
IVc	Farmers and smallholders; other self-employed workers in primary production	IVc	Farmers: farmers and smallholders and other self-employed workers in primary production	IVc+VIIb	Farm workers
V	Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers	V+VI	Skilled workers: lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers; skilled manual workers		
VI	Skilled manual workers				
VIIa	Semi- and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture, etc.)	VIIa	Non-skilled workers: semi- and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture, etc.)	VIIa	Non-skilled workers
VIIb	Agricultural and other workers in primary production	VIIb	Agricultural labourers: agricultural and other workers in primary production		

<sup>162</sup> Quoted from Erikson & Goldhorpe, 1992 p.39.

<i>Classification of Statistical Region Units</i>					
Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3
TR	TURKEY				
TR1	Istanbul			TR72	
	TR10			TR721	Kayseri
	TR100	Istanbul		TR722	Sivas
TR2	West Marmara			TR723	Yozgat
	TR21		TR8	West Black Sea	
	TR211	Tekirdağ		TR81	
	TR212	Edirne		TR811	Zonguldak
	TR213	Kırklareli		TR812	Karabük
	TR22			TR813	Bartın
	TR221	Balıkesir		TR82	
	TR222	Çanakkale		TR821	Kastamonu
TR3	Aegean			TR822	Çankırı
	TR31			TR823	Sinop
	TR3110	Izmir		TR83	
	TR32			TR831	Samsun
	TR321	Aydın		TR832	Tokat
	TR322	Denizli		TR833	Çorum
	TR323	Muğla		TR834	Amasya
	TR33		TR9	East Black Sea	
	TR331	Manisa		TR90	
	TR332	Afyon		TR901	Trabzon
	TR333	Kütahya		TR902	Ordu
	TR334	Uşak		TR903	Giresun
TR4	East Marmara			TR904	Rize
	TR41			TR905	Artvin
	TR411	Bursa		TR906	Gümüşhane
	TR412	Eskişehir	TRA	Northeast Anatolia	
	TR413	Bilecik		TRA1	
	TR42			TRA11	Erzurum
	TR421	Kocaeli		TRA12	Erzincan
	TR422	Sakarya		TRA13	Bayburt
	TR423	Düzce		TRA2	
	TR424	Bolu		TRA21	Ağrı
	TR425	Yalova		TRA22	Kars
TR5	West Anatolia			TRA23	Iğdır
	TR51			TRA24	Ardahan
	TR510	Ankara	TRB	Central Anatolia	
	TR52			TRB1	
	TR521	Konya		TRB11	Malatya
	TR522	Karaman		TRB12	Elazığ
TR6	Medirerranean			TRB13	Bingöl
	TR61			TRB14	Tunceli
	TR611	Antalya		TRB2	
	TR612	Isparta		TRB21	Van
	TR613	Burdur		TRB22	Muş
	TR62			TRB23	Bitlis
	TR621	Adana		TRB24	Hakkari



	TR622	Mersin	TRC	Souteast Anatolia	
	TR63			TRC1	
	TR631	Hatay		TRC11	Gaziantep
	TR632	Kahramanmaraş		TRC12	Adıyaman
	TR633	Osmaniye		TRC13	Kilis
TR7	Central Anatolia			TRC2	
	TR71			TRC21	Şanlıurfa
	TR711	Kırıkkale		TRC22	Diyarbakır
	TR712	Aksaray		TRC3	
	TR713	Niğde		TRC31	Mardin
	TR714	Nevşehir		TRC32	Batman
	TR715	Kırşehir		TRC33	Şırnak
				TRC34	Siirt

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