The Motherland Party:
The Challenge of Institutionalization in a
Charismatic Leader Party

ERSIN KALAYCIOĞLU

It was the decision of the military government that came to power in the wake of the September 1980 coup, to ban all the previously existing parties and their leaders from multi-party politics of the 1980s, which gave Turgut Özal the opportunity to establish a new political party. As well as working in the private sector, Özal had spent a lifetime in the highest echelons of the Turkish civilian bureaucracy, functioning as a technocrat working in electrification projects, in the directorship of the State Planning Organization (DPT), and finally as undersecretary of the prime minister's office in 1980.

The military coup of 1980 catapulted him to a position of political power. He was appointed as state minister in charge of the economy in the military government. His years in the public bureaucracy and at the helm of the state's economic affairs helped give him an image as an able technocrat. He had worked out the famous January 24, 1980 decisions to liberalize the Turkish economy under the leadership of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel. It was his technocratic performance and acumen in the winter and spring of 1980 that secured his place in the coup's military government. Özal also took credit for reducing the triple-digit inflation of 1979 down to 23 percent in three years as a cabinet minister of the military government. His credentials as an economic wizard were soundly established in the eyes of the public when he launched his campaign in spring 1983 to establish a new political party.

It was the determination of Özal and the tolerance of the military government, which enabled the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi—ANAP*) to establish itself and to participate in the national elections of 1983. It was Özal's civilian technocratic credentials, combined with the fact that only two other parties established by the military government were permitted to take part in the 1983 elections, that contributed to ANAP's stellar success at the polls. The other parties were seen by many

as the emanations of the military. In addition, Özal introduced a clear-cut economic program. By obtaining the plurality of the votes and the majority of the seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) through a pseudo-competitive and unfair transition election of 1983, Turgut Özal became prime minister, and ANAP became the governing party.[1]

For the next eight years ANAP governments ruled the country, making the party a major force in Turkish politics. It also provided a unique example of a brand new party which managed to establish a big enough niche among the previously established parties in the Turkish party system to rule the country alone or in coalition for most of the post-1983 period.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF A NEW PARTY

Each party organization has its own birthmarks. The genetic characteristics gained at the initiation of the party play a major role in determining how the party defines its political mission and identity, how it establishes its structures of political decisionmaking, and the style of leadership it develops.[2] Therefore, one variable that influences the shape and function of the party organization is its genetic code.

However, there is little evidence that all there is to analyze about a political party organization is determined by the genetic code alone. Every political party is ruled by a central decisionmaking body, which is usually led by the party leader. Such a central decisionmaking body often hosts a number of power holders (fraction leaders) in the party. Therefore, it has been suggested that it is plausible to assume that political parties are run by a coalition of sub-units which Giovanni Sartori calls "fractions."[3] Such a coalition is often reflected in the central decisionmaking organ(s) of the party, which Angelo Panebianco calls the "dominant coalition" of the party.[4] When we speak of party organization, we refer to fractions, their interactions among themselves, and the dominant coalition, which constitute the authority structure, and embody the power relations in the party. The structure and function of the "dominant coalition" that rules the party determines how the power relations between its fractions are shaped.

Corollary to the preceding argument is that the level of fractionaliza-tion constitutes another important defining characteristic of the party organization. Sartori argues that parties cannot be monoliths, and hence they are replete with fractions which take many shapes.[5] Parties with a single faction, which dominates the structure of opportunities in the party to the detriment of all others, are easily managed by a single leader alone,

and often have a compact and uniform dominant coalition. However, party organizations divided by fractions, factions, and cliques require that dominant coalitions are more sensitive and more responsive to the fractions.[6] Such party organizations are harder to govern by the single party leader, or even by a compact and uniform dominant coalition.

Creating a cohesive and coherent structure that will have stability over time in a complex organization is often more difficult than creating a coherent organization from one where there are few and relatively powerless fractions. Therefore, the methods of governance employed by the leader and the dominant coalition, the style of rule and the internal calm of the party organizations are influenced by the extent of fractionalization of the party organizations. Consequently, how coherent and stable a party organization becomes, and how the dominant coalition deals with the fractionalization of the party organization depends on the number and the power of the fractions in the organization.

Finally, it is the nature of the political environment in which a political party functions that determines its chances for institutionalization.[7] In the long run the survival of a political party, just like any other system, is dependent upon its environment. The number and nature of other political parties in the system, their vote shares, and their ideological positions have been among the most critical determinants of how a political party organization operates in the party system.[8]

This contribution examines how each of these factors have influenced ANAP as a political organization in the Turkish party system, and determined its chances of survival, or in short, the party organization's ordeal of institutionalization.

PARTIES AND THE GENETIC PHASE

It was Robert Michels who first emphasized that every party is destined to go through a genetic phase.[9] In turn, Panebianco has argued that "in the genetic phase the organization is entirely dedicated to the realization of its 'cause',"[10] and the party is eventually oriented "to a later phase in which (a) the growth of the party's size; (b) its bureaucratization; (c) the apathy of its supporters after their initial participatory enthusiasm; and (d) the leaders' interest in preserving their own power, transform the party into an organization in which the real end is organizational survival."[11] Hence, the ultimate goal of a political party organization becomes survival in a precarious environment of opponents and competitors. It is small wonder that Michels defines a political party as a fighting organization, or an army, constantly ready for battle.[12]

It is not only Michels, however, who has emphasized the importance of the role that the genetic phase of political parties plays in their survival and their long-term performance in the precarious environment of the party system. Maurice Duverger has argued about the direct and indirect origins of the political parties and the intra- and extra-parliamentary origins of the parties are also important as they leave indelible birthmarks that influence their performance or even survival in a competitive party system.[13] Direct parties are autonomous for they do not depend upon any other organization or social category that established them, whereas the indirect parties, such as the Labour Party in Britain, are fully dependent on the mother organizations that sponsor them. The latter tend to become weak institutions in the long run. Duverger has further argued that intra-parliamentary parties are moderate organizations, whereas the extra-parliamentary ones are radical organizations, for the latter usually fight their way into the system.[14]

The composition of the dominant coalition, and the status of the leader within the party organization, play a critical role in the genetic make-up of a political party organization. It makes a big difference whether a political party is established by a group of political elite, among whom there are some who control structures of opportunity in the party, or by an outside sponsor, such as a businessmen's association or a trade union, or simply by a charismatic leader. In the last case, the former two possibilities will be totally absent.

Charisma may come in various forms. It may be of a messianic quality possessed by the leader in the eyes of the members of the dominant coalition, as well as the rank-and-file members of the party organization. It may be charisma emerging out of a non-messianic personality, yet under the influence of the situation it may still be perceived as charisma; this is what Robert Tucker has called "situational charisma."[15] According to Tucker, "a leader-personality of a non-messianic tendency evokes a charismatic response simply because he offers, in a time of acute distress, leadership that is perceived as a source and means of salvation from distress."[16]

Panebianco argues that pure charisma has no autonomous existence apart from the leader, and the organization is at the mercy of the leader. Most such parties fail to survive beyond the lifetime of their leaders. However, a party established through situational charisma is not simply a leader's creation, but it is also the product of other forces. Other actors and conditions also maintain some influence over the organization, and it is not only dependent upon the charisma of the leader; hence, a change of leadership does not

necessarily lead to a severe existential crisis for the party, and it enjoys the chance of either routinizing the charisma of the leader, or changing its identity into some other form of party organization. Hence, such an organization has some chance of institutionalization after all.[17]

THE GENETIC CODE OF ANAP

ANAP is the brainchild of Turgut Özal. In fact, Özal established the party almost single-handedly, after experiencing difficulties in finding the necessary number of founding members.[18] In the beginning the party was tolerated by the military government,[19] but had no sponsors. Technically it was established externally, that is, outside of the parliament, but also prior to the re-establishment of parliamentary democracy in 1983. However, it experienced no hindrance or frustration in getting represented in the TBMM immediately after it was established. Therefore, there was little reason for it to become a radical movement. Nevertheless, Özal had espoused some radical ideas at the time of the initiation of ANAP, which will be examined shortly.

Özal as the founding leader symbolized the political party during his leadership, and his shadow remained cast over the party in the years that followed. It was Özal who often argued that ANAP was established to represent a new beginning in Turkish politics. In this sense, ANAP had no antecedents, and definitely no roots that extended into the past struggles of Turkish politics.[20]

Özal definitely believed that he had established a political party substantially different from any other party organization ever founded before.[21] Some critics mildly disagree and argue that ANAP was "both a continuation of the Democratic Party tradition of the 1950s and also a renewal of the conservative liberal legacy, attempting to synthesize market modernism and Muslim identity."[22] However, Özal was keen on stressing that ANAP represented the interests of the *Orta Direk* (the "main pillar" of society, broadly speaking the middle classes of society) as a social category, and hosted four different and seemingly irreconcilable ideological strands of conservatism (traditional Sunni) Islam, nationalism, economic liberalism, and social democracy within its ranks. Göle interpreted all that as a combination of "engineering pragmatism with cultural conservatism [and it] can be termed 'Islamic social engineering.'"[23] It was Özal's vision that was reflected in the party program, orientation, ideology and, once in government, on government policy. His vision was welcomed as a fresh start by the business

community, and was even labeled revolutionary by big business and some academics alike.[24]

During the formative years, from 1983 to 1987, ANAP's image was influenced by Özal's soft-spoken, cool arguments of an "engineer politician who calculates and then carries out projects,"[25] which promoted liberal economic rationality for rapid change through export-led growth in a globalizing world. He stood for opening up the Turkish markets to the challenges of free trade and foreign competition. He seemed to argue for a traditional society, a social structure that will still be dependent upon moral-religious (Sunni) values of the past, while simultaneously proposing dramatic changes to the economy and prosperity of the country. The majority would still be Allah-fearing, mosque-attending souls, taking pride in the competitive strength of their companies in the international market, and care for the downtrodden through charitable contributions to the newly established autonomous funds of the state. Özal wanted a *modern* society held together by conservative values.

These ideas were further corroborated by the policy behavior of the ANAP governments under Özal as prime minister. Most critical in this regard was the idea of reforming the public bureaucracy, diminishing the extensive entanglements of the state in the economy, and making the state apparatus smaller but more efficient.[26] Özal argued that this would necessitate privatization of the state enterprises and decentralization of the state services.[27]

Özal developed those ideas throughout his career as a high-ranking bureaucrat in the 1960s and 1970s, and as politician in the early 1980s and beyond. His personal charm attracted many from different walks of life to join his party. In fact, the very founders of the party were relative unknowns in Turkish politics. Kaya Erdem, who had served as Minister of Finance in the former military government, and Mehmet Keçeciler, who had been the Mayor of Konya from the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi* MSP) in the 1970s, were the only two founding members known to the public. The rest were young, mostly right-of-center politicians, who had started their political careers in the former Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*—AP) of the 1970s.[28] In the full sense of the term, ANAP was a brand-new party with a dominant coalition in which Özal, the leader, appeared to be the only political celebrity, projecting a new program and his credentials as an economic miracle worker. This form of a birthmark is a clear indication of a party built by one man according to his own image. Therefore, one refers to ANAP as a party that possessed the quality of being a "charismatic leader party" at its inception.

Initially ANAP functioned more as a charismatic leader party based on situational charisma. As noted, Özal made sure that the party displayed four different strands of ideas at the same time. He tried to strike a balance between the members of the dominant coalition who represented liberal, religious conservative, nationalist, or social democratic ideas and interests. Therefore, the party central administrative organs looked as if they were constructed out of multiple fractions, each controlling its turf in the party. It deceptively appeared as if there was not only the party leader, but also others who mattered in the party.

Appearance and reality did not match, and those who mistook one for the other paid a high price. Hasan Celal Güzel challenged the leadership and, as a result, found himself embroiled in a sex scandal, which constitutes the most certain cause of resignation from public office and even sudden political death for a member of the Turkish political class. No one seemed to have any countervailing power *vis-à-vis* Özal, or commanded enough autonomous resources, to challenge or contest the power of the leader.

FRACTIONS, FACTIONS, AND THE DOMINANT COALITION

The ANAP leadership tried to use the image of Özal as a visionary to reinforce the party's claim to the charismatic qualities of its founding leader, with increasing difficulty. As a charismatic leader party, ANAP was established at the national level and extended its local organizations throughout the country in less than six months (1983). Such a form of organization tends to emphasize the central organs over the local ones, and empowers the leadership over the local party organizations. Under such circumstances it has been argued that "The founding elites can control the form that organization takes from the start."[29] Such party organizations enjoy enhanced chances of evincing the coherent structures that contribute to organizational stability.

The dominant coalition of ANAP has tried to show strands that extended from moderate left to moderate right of the ideological spectrum in Turkey. Its main goal has always been to dominate the center of the Turkish left-right spectrum, as broadly as possible. Such an identity was relatively easy to project because at the time the only other parties were the Populist Party (*Halkı Parti*—HP) and the Nationalist Democracy Party (*Miliyet çi Demokrasi Partisi*—MDP), both of which had been established by the military government, and stood as stooges for the military. The results of the 1983 elections showed a party on the left (HP) and another on the right (MDP), and in between the winner of the competition

TABLE 1
ANAP AT THE POLLS AND IN THE TBMM (1983-99)

Parties	Elections				
	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999
ANAP					
Vote (%)	45.1	36.3	24.0	19.6	13.2
Seats (%)	52.8	64.9	25.7	24.0	15.6
DYP					
Vote (%)	0.0	19.9	27.2	19.2	12.0
Seats (%)	0.0	13.1	39.7	24.5	15.5
DSP					
Vote (%)	0.0	8.5	10.8	14.6	22.2
Seats (%)	0.0	0.0	0.2	14.6	24.7
HP/SHP/CHP					
Vote (%)	30.5	24.4	20.6	10.7	8.7
Seats (%)	29.5	22.0	19.7	8.9	0.0
RP/FP					
Vote (%)	0.0	7.2	16.7*	21.4	15.4
Seats (%)	0.0	0.0	13.1	28.7	20.2
MÇP/MHP					
Vote (%)	0.0	2.9	0.0*	8.2	18.0
Seats (%)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	23.5

Source: Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The Shaping of Party Preferences in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Vol.20 (Spring 1999), p.48; and Üstün Ergüder, "The Motherland Party 1983-1989," in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p.159.

Notes: "Vote" refers to the percentage of the national vote obtained by the parties in the corresponding year's general election in Turkey.
"Seats" refer to the percentage of seats the parties obtained in the TBMM immediately after the elections.
* RP and MÇP participated in the elections as an alliance, and had a single, joint list of candidates who ran on the RP ticket in every electoral district.

(ANAP). It fitted well with the identity of ANAP representing the center, the moderate-left, and the moderate-right voters of Turkey. The rhetoric of the "four strands" and the electoral outcome seemed to fully coincide. However, by 1987 it had become increasingly difficult to successfully project such an identity. Although the rhetoric continued to emphasize "the

four strands" in the party ideology, it became increasingly difficult to substantiate that claim, as desertions from the party elite as well as the rank and file started to occur after 1991.

By 1987 ANAP's electoral performance gave clear indications of a downward trend. The political ban imposed upon the political leaders of the pre-1980 era was lifted by means of a referendum. The national elections took place in that same year, and ANAP lost a sizable part of its mandate. However, it clung on to power thanks to the electoral law, which was amended before the 1987 election by the ANAP majority in the TBMM to favor the front-runner. ANAP received 36 percent of the vote, a fall from 45 percent in 1983, but thanks to the new electoral arrangements it managed to obtain a higher percentage of the seats in the TBMM (see Table 1).

The 1989 local elections further reinforced the downward trend of ANAP at the polls. The newly emerging political parties of the left and the right successfully challenged ANAP. It could no longer claim to be the power occupying the center that extended from the moderate left to the moderate right. An identity crisis started to deepen in the party as the rhetoric of the "four strands" and the reality of the diminishing national support became increasingly apparent. Announcing that he would never serve in the opposition, Özal declared his candidacy for the presidency of the country in 1989 in an unprecedented move.

The leadership succession process always contains the seeds of a crisis, and it is always more critical for a charismatic leader party. What complicated matters was that the charismatic leader himself was still around and continued to wield enormous political power despite the fact that he had resigned from the leadership as required by the Constitution. In fact, he personally picked his immediate successor, Yıldırım Akbulut, then speaker of the TBMM. Akbulut assumed the duties of ANAP leadership and prime ministry simultaneously. No one seriously challenged his role in the party, although he failed to appear powerful enough to control the dominant coalition in the party. Akbulut looked more like a caretaker fulfilling the necessary role in a transition.

The party simmered for another two years, during which time Mesut Yılmaz and other hopefuls vied for power. In the end, in June 1991, Yılmaz challenged Akbulut in the party convention, while Özal seemed to play a neutral role, as the president of the country legally should. He did not openly give his blessing to either of the candidates, although there were many rumors as to whom he "really" supported---Akbulut. The party convention voted for Yılmaz in 1991, and he has been the leader of ANAP

TABLE 2
POLARIZATION OF THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Country	Year	Polarization
Austria	1979	2.19
	1983	2.20
	1986	2.39
Belgium	1981	4.27
	1985	3.94
	1987	4.18
Denmark	1979	4.41
	1981	4.54
	1984	4.29
	1987	4.16
	1988	4.44
Italy	1979	4.31
	1983	4.73
	1987	4.29
Netherlands	1981	4.50
	1982	5.21
	1986	4.09
	1989	4.39
Spain	1979	3.69
	1982	5.04
	1986	5.15
	1989	5.23
Germany	1980	3.14
	1983	3.36
	1987	3.33
Turkey	1991	1.22 (2.55)
	1995	2.97 (3.86)
	1999	3.13 (4.27)

Source: Kalaycıoğlu (1999), pp.47–76; Reuven Y. Hazan, *Centre Parties: Polarization and Competition in European Parliamentary Democracies* (London and New York: Continuum, 1997), p.43. The figures in parentheses are polarization figures based upon the distribution of the national votes. All other polarization measures are based upon parliamentary seat distributions of the parties.

ever since. In the meantime, much before the non-renewable term of presidency was up, Özal suddenly died of a heart attack in spring 1993. Hence, another showdown between the charismatic leader/founder of ANAP, and his successor Yılmaz was avoided by divine intervention. The party survived the leadership transition from its charismatic founder to his successor—Yılmaz.

Nevertheless, the transition was only partially successful. The original identity of the party started to fade and no new one could be easily established. The "four strands" started to come apart at the seams. The traditional conservatives in the party started to think that the Welfare Party

(Refah Partisi—RP)-Nationalist Work Party *(Miliyetçi Çalışma Partisi*—MÇP) challenge was gaining momentum, as ANAP continued to slide at the polls in the early 1990s. Most of the religious conservative celebrities in ANAP started to desert the party, as did close friends and relatives of Özal, most of whom had belonged to the same fraction. In the meantime, by the mid-1990s Turkey was experiencing voter realignment as the center of the left-right spectrum started to give way and the voters shifted their preferences mainly toward the extreme right, thus increasingly polarizing the system[30] (see Table 2).

Bülent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party *(Demokratik Sol Partisi*—DSP) also managed to increase its vote share in the national elections during the 1990s. ANAP seemed to move towards a more right-wing position to follow the voters' trend and further distance itself from the moderate-left ideas. It is no wonder that students of Turkish politics continued to refer to it as a right-of-center or a moderate right party,[31] and the electorate seemed to concur with their perceptions.[32] It seemed as if those committed to free market capitalism and nationalism generally stayed in the party ranks of ANAP in the late 1990s.

However, those ideological positions were challenged, and even successfully hijacked by Süleyman Demirel's new party, the True Path Party *(Doğru Yol Partisi*—DYP). Especially under its new leader Tansu Çiller (who ascended to the party leadership when Demirel was elected as president of the country in spring 1993), the DYP tried to champion the cause of free market capitalism. Simultaneously, the Nationalist Action Party *(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*—MHP) and the DSP exploited nationalism in the late 1990s much more effectively than ANAP could.

The original pluralist outlook of the dominant coalition of ANAP began to lose its flair after the 1991 elections. It became much less plural in outlook as the liberals and nationalists were the only major fractions left in the party. The dominant coalition of Özal's time had been constructed upon his own image of the party, therefore it was only natural that Yılmaz's dominant coalition would also be constructed on his own image of the party. Unlike Özal, Yılmaz was not equidistant to all the fractions in the party. His image, a blend of liberalism and nationalism, led to the downfall or alienation of the notables of the other fractions, which failed to see the charisma of Özal reincarnated in Yılmaz.

The original pluralist dominant coalition fell apart in the 1990s, as the party dwindled in size both electorally and in the TBMM (see Table 1). The dominant coalition of ANAP seems to have moved from a multi-fractional structure to a bi-fractional one. However, in practice there was

no evidence of any member of the dominant coalition controlling resources autonomously enough to be reckoned with by the leader of the party. Neither Özal, nor Yılmaz had to deal with any fraction in the party that wielded any power independent of the leadership and that also controlled a constellation of "safe seats" or any other form of indispensable political resource. The "four strands" argument was an identity-defining myth, rather than the practiced reality in the party.

Under those circumstances, the party has been ruled with a style of "democratic centralist leadership"—a deliberative practice in decision-making, the aim of which is to reach the ear of the leader. There is frank debate in the dominant coalition over the political issues and choices facing the party, but the deliberation continues until the leader makes up his mind. Once the leader adopts a position, it becomes the party position. Once that position is announced it is converted into party policy, which is to be loyally carried by all, including the members of the dominant coalition. It was small wonder that a recent study by Ali Çarkoğlu, Tarhan Erdem, and Mehmet Kabasakal discovered that 44 percent of the local party elites of ANAP believed that their leader dominated the party organization.[33] The same response rate was 37 percent in the DYP, 30 percent in the DSP, and 33 percent in the Republican Peoples' Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*—CHP), and less in all the other parties. What is striking in these findings are not the results for ANAP, but for the DSP, the MHP, and the RP. Çarkoğlu *et al.* concluded that the local party elites of those parties did not even dare to admit the hegemonic role of the leader in the party.[34] According to the same study, only four percent of the local party elites of ANAP believed the party's leader should be replaced; the same response rate was one percent for the DYP, four percent for the DSP, three percent for the CHP, one percent for the MHP, and three percent for the RP.[35]

Furthermore, 31 percent of the local party elites in ANAP believed that their party failed to function as a democratic organization. The same rate was 27 percent in the DYP, 19 percent in the DSP, a mere nine percent in the MHP, and 11 percent in the RP.[36] Çarkoğlu *et al.* have argued that the meaning of "democracy" should vary dramatically across the political parties.[37] Another survey conducted on the party deputies in the TBMM yielded very similar results.[38] In short, both the local party elites and the deputies of ANAP were not disillusioned with the party leader, but they believed that he both dominated the organization and that it was managed democratically at the same time. Although those propositions sound irreconcilable, I consider them as another way of referring to the "democratic centralist leadership" of ANAP, which operates with the culture of a charismatic leader party.

Under those circumstances, the fractions played an important part in defining the identity of the party and clarifying its ideological position in the Turkish party system. However, in terms of power relations within the party, fractions, factions, and cliques have been dismally weak to challenge the leader. Unless, the leader opts to resign, as Özal did in order to become president, or becomes incapacitated, s/he is free from challenge by the opposing groups within the party. In fact, even when the party performed very poorly in every election from 1991 to 1999, there was no serious challenge to Yılmaz's status as leader.

ANAP AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

Finally, I would like to turn to the last defining characteristic of the party organization—its relations with its environment. I have noted above how easy it was for ANAP to project a powerful image of "four strands" in the 1983 elections and how difficult it became to market such an image in the 1987 elections and beyond. Indeed, by 1987 ANAP had begun to look more and more like the urban version of the rural party of Demirel (DYP). The left-of-center was fully claimed by the SHP and the DSP, and the right-of-center was occupied by the DYP. Thus ANAP began to be squeezed out of its own turf. By 1991 it had become apparent that the voters were presented with virtually duplicate parties at the polls.

Hence, the party system began to experience two different types of competition between the parties. Some parties occupied different ideological positions and hoped to attract the votes and allegiances of different kinds of voters. ANAP occupied a right-of-center position and vehemently defended free market capitalism. The Social Democratic People's Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*—SHP) and its successor after 1995—the Republican People's Party (CHP)—occupied a left-of-center position, and defended a mixed economy where the state continued to play a major role. Thus, ANAP and the SHP-CHP were ideological opponents. However, the CHP competed with the DSP for the votes of the secular-minded and the lower classes, and ANAP competed with the DYP for the votes of the conservative masses. Most voters failed to see how and why, for example, ANAP and the DYP opposed each other; after all they both shared the same liberal economic and social conservative ideological mix. For many there seemed to be no ideological difference, only the gender of their leaders and their characters seemed to have differed. ANAP and the DYP competed to control the same electoral turf, and thus they were no longer just *opponents*, but also *competitors*.

It is clear from survey research findings that the SHP/CHP-DSP, ANAP-DYP, the MÇP/MHP-RP/Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*—FP), and, in southeastern Turkey, the People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*—HADEP)-RP/FP act as competitor parties.[39] The environment of ANAP became increasingly complicated as the party system started to host both opponent and competitor parties, which turned competition into a two-dimensional game. As if such a complication were not enough, the voters started to vacate the center of the left-right spectrum and move toward the far right and also slightly to the left, increasingly polarizing the system.[40]

ANAP continued to champion the values that were targeted to attract the voters occupying the center of the ideological spectrum, yet was unable to deliver its promises. In the meantime, it seemed to have neglected its opponents to the far sides of the ideological spectrum, the electoral performance of the party took a nosedive in the 1990s (see Table 1). If the voters had stayed in the center, perhaps ANAP would have obtained more of the national vote.

In a sense, the carpet had moved from under the feet of ANAP. Loss of votes brought about a process of reckoning, which eventually brought about a leadership inquiry into the very identity of the party. The party went through many soul-searching activities, which nevertheless failed to clarify its new identity. In the meantime, it failed to cope with its competitor, opponents, and the changing tide of voting behavior, which combined to bring about an existential challenge to ANAP. Under those circumstances, in the 1990s, ANAP only succeeded at holding its competitor at bay in the national elections and dropped in the polls.

Indeed, a similar picture emerges when we turn our gaze to the party system in the Turkish parliament. ANAP was able to hold off the challenge of its competitor and control enough seats to bid for coalition partnership from 1991 to 1999. ANAP was in government from June 1991 until November 1991, and briefly in coalition with the DYP for three months in 1996, and with the DSP from June 1998 to November 1999 (while supported by the CHP from outside), and with the DSP and the MHP after May 1999. ANAP managed to participate in governments of the 1990s, and, during this period, served significantly longer than the DYP (see Table 3). However, in the same period the DSP, an opponent but also another charismatic leader party, experienced a stellar rise to power (see Table 1) as did the RP and MHP in the latter half of the 1990s. If those performances mean anything, ANAP's electoral performances *vis-à-vis* its opponents were dismal. ANAP now gives the impression of a small political party squeezed in a turf battle with another small party (DYP).

TABLE 3
GOVERNMENT POTENTIAL OF ANAP VERSUS THE COMPETITOR
AND THE OPPONENTS

Party of the Prime Minister	Number of Days in Office		Percent of Time	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ANAP	3515	1404	56.5	35.0
DYP	1185	1185	19.0	29.5
DSP	707	707	11.4	17.6
RP	367	367	5.9	9.1
Party in Coalition or Party Government				
ANAP	4088	1977	65.7	49.2
DYP	1552	1552	24.9	38.7
DSP	1259	1259	20.2	31.4
CHP	1034	1034	16.6	25.7
MHP	573	573	9.2	14.3
RP	367	367	5.9	9.1

Source: Calculations are made by the author from the data presented at <www.tbmm.gov.tr>.

Notes: (1) represents the number of days party spent in government during December 13, 1983 through December 31, 2000.
(2) represents the number of days party spent in government during January 1, 1990 through December 31, 2000.
(3) represents the percentage of time party spent in government in period (1).
(4) represents the percentage of time party spent in government in period (2).

Unfortunately for ANAP, that turf diminished in size as the 1990s progressed.

However, ANAP's parliamentary performance and government potential have been a completely different story. Neither its competitor, nor its opponents could come close to the remarkable performance of ANAP in participating in coalition governments or forming party governments (see Table 3). ANAP's leaders have occupied the prime ministry 56.5 percent of the time between December 1983 and December 2000. During that period ANAP's competitor, the DYP, occupied that office only about one-third as much. What ANAP lost in the electoral competition it compensated in government formation. However, there is a strict constraint to this strategy—the ten percent national threshold in the

elections. Any party that fails to obtain ten percent of the national vote is automatically eliminated from the TBMM and is therefore excluded from government formation. ANAP and its competitor dangerously approached that threshold in the 1999 national elections.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OR BUST?

ANAP has managed to replace its founding charismatic leader Özal for a successor without creating a breakdown of the organization. For a charismatic leader party this should be considered as a remarkable success of adaptability. However, in the process of leadership succession the party stumbled into an identity crisis from which it has never managed to recover. Indeed, a recent survey of the local party elite argued that the inability to inform them what the party program was about was the major impediment to success at the polls.[41] Hence, ANAP paid a very stiff price for the lack of clarity of its identity in the elections of the 1990s.

In recent years, ANAP has become a small party of Europhiles, believers of free market capitalism, and nationalism. However, at the elections all of those characteristics are shared or exploited by the competitor or the opponents, with no less effectiveness than ANAP. Hence, ANAP fails to provide a characteristic to differentiate itself from its competitor or opponents. When Demirel led the DYP, the youth of Yılmaz as the leader of ANAP and the party's urbane look (as opposed to the DYP's peasant roots) seemed to be a clear distinction between the two parties. However, with Çiller's ascendance to the leadership of the DYP, neither age difference nor urban credentials could function as the differentiating factor. The gender of their leaders emerged as the only remarkable difference between the two parties. If that factor had any impact, it probably contributed to sway more votes for a while away from ANAP to the female Prime Minister Çiller's party, the DYP. In short, ANAP could neither hang on to its previous identity, nor could it successfully demonstrate a new one, which would substantially differentiate it from its competitor and even some of its opponents in the electoral race.

In the meantime, ANAP has been charged with a long list of corruption activities by its competitor and opponents, from which it has never been able to successfully extricate itself. Actually, except for a few members such as İsmail Özdağlar of the first cabinet of Özal, no member of a parliamentary party group has been found guilty of corruption by the judiciary. Only some of the local party notables, especially the mayors,

have been charged with corruption, and the courts found only some of them guilty. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the public ANAP never managed to successfully remove doubts about its operations in government. Fortunately for ANAP, its competitor has not been in any better shape; yet that did not help ANAP to obtain more votes. Short of re-inspiring the masses by projecting a new identity, its chances of survival do not look very promising. If the voters realign themselves once more and shift away from the poles to the center of the left-right spectrum, ANAP's chances may improve, providing it polishes its corrupt image.

A coherent and stable organization, which verges on stagnation, has been established in ANAP. It is possible to argue that ANAP managed to survive the most stringent test of adaptability and went through two leadership succession processes. However, it failed to adapt to the changing environment of the party system and electoral behavior. Unless some dramatic changes occur in its relations with its environment, its future remains uncertain. Hence, we cannot conclude that ANAP has passed all tests of adaptability as an organization. It has established a stable and coherent national organization that works no worse than most other parties. The question is whether that performance is enough to alleviate the doubts about its survival. Its electoral performance must improve before we can plausibly conclude that stability and coherence of the national and local organizations of the party alone would insure its institutionalization.[42]

ANAP has managed to survive longer than its detractors predicted. It should also be considered as a relatively adaptable organization, which demonstrated some capability for survival and thus institutionalization. However, with the danger of losing some more votes and/or not winning enough to earn representation in the TBMM still looming large, it is uncertain whether ANAP's dominant coalition or the organization can manage to exist outside of the TBMM for a four-year period. If the organization survives such a crisis of adaptability, then it will be easier to argue that ANAP has taken solid strides in the direction of being institutionalized. Otherwise, it will provide another example of a political organization that fails to institutionalize in the Turkish party system.

CONCLUSION

ANAP provides an interesting and exceptional example of a new political party organization that made a significant impact on the Turkish political system for almost two decades. It showed a remarkable ability to participate in governments, although its mandate shrank dramatically over the course of five consecutive national elections. ANAP also managed to change its founding charismatic leader and endured a second leadership succession process between 1989 and 1991. All of that should have made the party adaptable to rapidly changing conditions, but it is hard to argue that point.

ANAP was able to establish a coherent and disciplined political party organization. A compact dominant coalition strictly controlled by its leader also led the party in the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, the dominant coalition and the leader seemed not to be challenged by any fraction, clique or group in the party. Hence, there was no history of fissure or internal strife among the ranks of the party organization, as it had been the case with other parties, such as the SHP.

ANAP has also managed to organize in all the provinces in Turkey and keep those organizations active most of the time, especially when they were critically needed. A recent survey indicates that ANAP was among those political parties most inclined to hold its local party congresses on time.[43] In convention and election times, the party has showed no less ability than its competitor. The diminishing success at the polls should not be taken as an indication that the central or local party organizations failed to perform as much as its competitor DYP, or the other charismatic leader party, the DSP, which seems not to have any more robust organization than ANAP. ANAP's vote loss is more to do with the failure of its dominant coalition to solve the identity problem or routinize the charisma of its founder. ANAP's failure to provide a clean image devoid of corruption and give the impression that it is able to fulfill its campaign promises while in government, also did not assist its performance in the elections.

ANAP failed to successfully routinize the charisma of Özal, or develop a new identity to successfully ignite the imagination and support of the voters. Instead it found itself surrounded by competing and opposing parties, and a volatile, fragmented, and polarized electorate. Under those circumstances, it failed to cope with the challenges of its environment, and failed to adapt to the changes in the party system and in the electoral behavior of the country. It demonstrated capabilities of adaptability in certain realms of the organization, yet failed to show any capability to adapt to the changing tide of its environment. Hence, as yet it has failed to solve its problem of survival.

ANAP has managed to establish a stable and coherent centralized, national, and local organization, which has failed to help it win elections, when and where it mattered. Such stability and coherence failed to contribute to its institutionalization, and led to lack of flexibility in dealing with changing environmental conditions of the party. Just like other political parties in Turkey, ANAP also failed to circulate elites in its dominant coalition. A leader who had not won a single election was neither challenged, nor faced with a serious threat of replacement.

As a charismatic leader party, ANAP seems to have institutionalized a personalistic leadership style, which enables one individual to govern both the dominant coalition and the organization. A "democratically centralized leadership" has become the *modus operandi* of the organization. In a charismatic leader party it is only natural to observe the leader playing an exaggerated role, far beyond the dominant coalition or the rank and file of the organization. The problem with ANAP is that the founding charismatic leader experienced a downfall when he failed to make his charisma deliver miracles, and suffered from a loss of credibility by 1989. The leaders who succeeded him had no direct claims to charisma. ANAP seems to have lost its identity because its identity was so closely linked to the charisma of its founding leader, who failed to prove that his charisma actually worked even when he was alive and leading the party.

Under those circumstances the party is faced with an obvious identity crisis. The various exercises of identity search carried out by the party produced a mass of literature, but little in the way of answers to questions. Short of a new call that does not fall on the deaf ears of the voters, and constructing an image that is "whiter than white," the party might receive even fewer votes in the next general election. It may even be sidelined for a while (like the CHP) if it fails to obtain ten percent of the national vote. Can it avoid such an electoral performance? Can it survive such a blow? Can it make a comeback? If so, how? The answers to these questions will determine whether or not ANAP will manage to survive and become a stable and valued political organization in the Turkish party system, and thus become a long-lasting political institution.

NOTES

1. The 1983 general elections were part of the transition process from military government to multi-party democracy. The military government of the time not only banned some politicians from participation in party politics, but also disapproved of all political parties (except for the Motherland, Populist, and National Democratic parties) fielding candidates in the 1983 elections. The military government screened the candidates and vetoed those who they thought were not fit to run in the elections. Consequently, the 1983 elections were neither free nor fair.

2. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (London: Methuen, 1954), pp.xxiv–xxv; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.50.
3. Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Volume 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p.75.
4. Panebianco (1988), p.37.
5. Sartori (1976), pp.104–6.
6. Panebianco (1988), pp.39–40.
7. Ibid., pp.114 and 205–12.
8. Ibid., pp.214–15.
9. Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), pp.365–92.
10. Panebianco (1988), p.17.
11. Ibid., p.17.
12. Michels (1959), pp.41–4.
13. Duverger (1954), pp.xxiv–xxxvii and 3–38.
14. Ibid., pp.xxxii–xxxvii.
15. Cited in Panebianco (1988), p.52.
16. Panebianco (1988), p.52.
17. Ibid., p.53.
18. Turgut Özal, "Welcoming Speech by Turgut Özal," in *Kuruluş Yıldönümünde Türk Siyasi Hayatında Siyasi Kültür ve Ekonomik Politika Bakımından Anavatan Partisi* (May 20–21) (Ankara: ANAP Propaganda ve Sosyal Faaliyetler Başkanlığı, 1989), p.10. As previously explained, the general elections of 1983 were transitional elections, where the military government screened each founding member of the newly established party. Özal also found himself faced with the same thorough screening process. In order to be accepted as a legal party organization and participate in the 1983 general elections, he needed many founding members and had to establish party organizations in 37 out of 67 provinces of the country in 1983. However, ANAP was not popularly perceived as one of the "favored" party organizations at the time. Furthermore, he tried not to alienate the "banned" leaders of the moderate right and create an image of a leader poaching on followers in a manner which can only perceived as unfair. Therefore, there was some timidity on the part of many people to join ANAP.
19. Özal's own account, Özal (1989), p.10.
20. Üstün Ergüder, "The Motherland Party, 1983–1989," in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p.153.
21. Özal (1989), p.6.
22. Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey," in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East* (New York: E.J. Brill, 1996), Vol.2, p.30.
23. Ibid., p.31.
24. Ergüder (1991), p.156.
25. Göle (1996), p.31.
26. Metin Heper, "Country Report: Motherland Party Governments and Bureaucracy in Turkey, 1983–1988," *Governance*, Vol.2, No.4 (Oct. 1989), pp.463–6.
27. Ibid., pp.463–8.
28. Ergüder (1991), pp.155–6.
29. Alan Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.99.
30. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The Shaping of Party Preferences in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Vol.20 (Spring 1999), pp.57–8 and 74–5.
31. Ergüder (1991), pp.155–6.
32. Kalaycıoğlu (1999), pp.57–9.
33. Ali Çarkoğlu, Tarhan Erdem, and Mehmet Kabasakal, "Türkiye'de Yeni Bir Parti Sistemine Doğru: Siyasi Partiler Kanunu, Parti Örgütleri ve Parti İçi Demokrasiden Beklentiler," in Ali Çarkoğlu (ed.), *Siyasi Partilerde Reform* (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2000), p.88.

34. Çarkoğlu *et al.* (2000), pp.87–9.
35. Ibid., p.91.
36. Ibid., p.80.
37. Ibid., pp.79–80.
38. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, "Siyasi Partilere ve Adaylara Devlet Desteği, Bağışlar ve Seçim Giderlerinin Sınırlandırılması," in Çarkoğlu (2000), pp.246–66.
39. Kalaycıoğlu (1999), pp.58 and 60.
40. Ibid., pp.58–9 and Table 2.
41. Çarkoğlu *et al.* (2000), p.91.
42. For the definition and analysis of institutionalization proposed by Samuel Huntington, see Samuel Huntington, *Political Order of Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), pp.12–90.
43. Gençkaya (2000), p.247.