ARTICULATING AND AGGREGATING SECTARIAN INTERESTS: THE CASE OF ALEVIS IN TURKEY

by

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ARTICULATING AND AGGREGATING SECTARIAN INTERESTS:
THE CASE OF ALEVIS IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation provides insight into the dynamics of the inclusion of the Alevi community into the political processes in Turkey. By focusing on the actors and the strategies of Alevi interest politics in Turkey and Germany, the dissertation discusses how the changing political opportunity structures and the heterogeneous and fragmented collective identity of the Alevis shape the articulation and aggregation of their shared interests. Adopting a transnational perspective, it argues that the study of the networks established between the domestic Alevi interest groups, and the Alevi migrant communities and organizations located in Europe are just as important as the understanding of the relationship between the domestic Alevi organizations and political actors in Turkey. Through process tracing this dissertation demonstrates that Alevis present an interesting case in the study of political inclusion of minorities. Alevis reject minority status, although their demands include collective right claims, and their narratives emphasize discrimination on the basis of their collective identity. The interest groups established by Alevis seek recognition and respect for the community but have been unable to effectively mobilize due to the heterogeneity in framing Alevi identity. Finally, the regional organizations, which historically played a significant role in the diffusion of norms of individual and collective rights, contribute to the emergence of new patterns of exclusion for the Alevi community in Turkey.

ÖZET

MEZHEP KAYNAKLI ÇIKARLARIN EKLEMLENMESI VE TOPLAŞIMI: TÜRKİYE'DE ALEVILER ÖRNEĞI

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Anahtar kelimeler: Alevi, siyasi temsil, group temelli haklar, ulusaşırı destek ağları, çıkar grupları,

Bu doktora tezi, Alevi toplumunun Türkiye'deki siyasi süreçlere dahil olmasının dinamiklerinin kavranmasını sağlamaktadır. Türkiye ve Almanya'daki Alevi çıkar politikalarının aktörlerine ve stratejilerine odaklanmak suretiyle, bu tez değişen politik fırsat yapılarının ve Alevilerin heterojen ve parçalanmış kolektif kimliklerinin ortak çıkarların eklemlenmesi ve toplaşımını nasıl biçimlendirdiğini tartışmaktadır. Ulusaşırı bir bakış açısı benimseyerek yerel Alevi çıkar grupları ile Avrupa'daki Alevi Göçmen toplulukları ve örgütleri arasında kurulmuş ağların incelenmesinin, Türkiye'deki Alevi organizasyonları ve politik aktörlerin ilişkileri anlamak kadar önemli olduğunu savunur. Bu doktora tezi süreç izleme metoduyla azınlıkların siyasal katılmalarında Aleviler ilginç bir durum arz etmekte olduğunu göstermektedir. Her ne kadar talepleri kolektif hak isteklerini içermekte ve anlatıları kolektif kimlikleri bazında ayrımcılığa vurgu yapmakta ise de Aleviler azınlık statüsünü reddetmektedirler. Aleviler tarafından kurulmuş olan çıkar grupları kendi toplumları için tanınma ve saygınlık aramakta ama Alevilik kimliğinin çerçevelenmesindeki heterojenlikten dolayı etkin bir şekilde mobilize olamamaktadırlar. Son olarak, bireysel ve kolektif haklar üstüne normların yayılmasında etkin bir rol oynayan bölgesel kuruluşlar, Türkiye'de Aleviler için yeni tip dışlama modellerinin ortaya çıkmasında katkıda bulunmaktadır.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAKM	Culture Center of the Anatolian Alevis [*Anadolu Alevileri Kültür Merkezi*]
AABF	Federation of Alevi Unions of Germany [*Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu*]
AABK	Confederation of Alevi Unions of Europe [*Avrupa Alevi Birlikler Konfederasyonu*]
ABAF	Ehl-i Beyt Alevi Federation of Europe [*Avrupa Ehl-i Beyt Alevi Federasyonu*]
ABF	Alevi Bektashi Federation [*Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu*]
ABKB	Culture Associations of the Union of Alevi Bektasi Organizations [*Alevi-Bektaşi Kuruluşları Birliği Kültür Derneği*],
AİDHB	Directorate of Religious Services of Alevi Islam [*Alevi İslam Din Hizmetleri Başkanlığı*]
AKD	Alevi Culture Association [*Alevi Kültür Derneği*]
AKP	Justice and Development Party [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*]
ANAP	Motherland Party [*Anavatan Partisi*]
AP	Justice Party [*Adalet Partisi*]
AVF	Alevi Foundations Federation [*Alevi Vakıflar Federasyonu*]
ATÖF	Federation of Turkish Students in Germany [*Almanya Türk Öğrenci Federasyonu*]
BA	Federal Agency for Labor [*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*]
BP	Peace Party [*Barış Partisi*]
BfV	Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution [*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party [*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*]
CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany[*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*]

CSU	Christian Social Union in Bavaria [*Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern*]
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CEM	Center for Republican Education and Culture [*Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi*]
CHP	Republican People's Party [*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*]
CoE	Council of Europe
DBH	Democratic Peace Movement [*Demokratik Barış Hareketi*]
DEMSİAD	Association of Democratic Industrialists and Businessmen [*Demokrat Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*]
DGB	Federation of German Trade Unions [*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*]
DHKP-C	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front [*Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi*]
DİB	Directorate of Religious Affairs [*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*]
DİTİB	Turkish-Islam Union of Religious Affairs [*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*]
DİSK	Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey [*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederayonu*]
DP	Democratic Party [*Demokrat Parti*]
DSP	Democratic Left Party [*Demokratik Sol Parti*]
DYP	True Path Party [*Doğru Yol Partisi*]
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FCNM	Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
FDP	Free Democratic Party [*Die Freie Demokratische Partei*]
FEK	Federation of the Alevis of Kurdistan[*Federasyona Elewiyen Kurdistan*]

FRA	European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
FP	Virtue Party [*Fazilet Partisi*]
HAKG	Alevi Cultural Group of Hamburg [*Hamburg Alevi Kültür Grubu*]
HBTTD	Hacı Bektaş Tourism and Information Association [*Hacı Bektaşi Veli Turizm ve Tanıtma Derneği*]
HBVAKV	Haci Bektash Veli Anatolian Culture Foundation [*Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı*]
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
HDF	Popular Revolutionary Federation [*Halkçı Devrimci Federasyonu*]
HSKAD	Hubyar Sultan Alevi Culture Association [*Hubyar Sultan Alevi Kültür Derneği*]
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IFB	Islamic Federation of Berlin [*Islamische Föderation in Berlin*]
KÖR	Corporation of Public Law [*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*]
MDP	National Democracy Party [*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*]
MGK	National Security Council *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*],
MHP	Nationalist Action Party [*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*]
MNP	National Order Party [*Milli Nizam Partisi*]
MP	Nation Party [*Millet Partisi*]
MSP	National Salvation Party [*Milli Selamet Partisi*]
MÜSİAD	Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen [*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamlari Derneği*]
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party [*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*]
PRONASOL	National Solidarity Campaign [*El Programa Nacional de Solidaridad*]
PSAKD	Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association [*Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği*]

RP	Welfare Party [*Refah Partisi*]
SHP	Social Democratic People's Party [*Sosyal Demokrat Halk Partisi*]
SODEP	Social Democrat Party [*Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi*]
SPD	Social Democratic Party [*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*]
TALEB	Union of Workers of Turkey [*Türkiye Amele Birliği*]
TANs	Transnational Advocacy Networks
TBP	Union Party of Turkey [*Türkiye Birlik Partisi*]
TBMM	Turkish Grand National Assembly [*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*]
TEC	*Treaty Establishing the European Community*
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
THKP-C	Turkey' People's Liberation Party-Front [*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi*]
TIKKO	Liberation Army of Turkish Workers and Peasants [*Türkiye İşçi Köylüleri Kurtuluş Ordusu*
TİP	Turkish Labor Party [*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*]
TKP-ML	Communist Party of Turkey Marxist-Leninist [*Türkiye Komünist Partisi Marksist-Leninist*]
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television Institution [*Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu*]
YB	Patriots Peace Union [*Yurtseverler Barış Birliği*]
YBF	Federation of Patriots Union [*Yurtseverler Birliği Federasyonu*]
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNAC	United Nations Alliance of Civilizations
US	United States

INTRODUCTION

Are equal citizenship rights sufficient to ensure political inclusion of all? Or should preservation and promotion of distinct identities be a concern in ensuring inclusiveness of a political system? Liberal democratic norms presuppose that each member of a polity has a right to an equal say in the processes influencing political outcomes. Yet, only a few would dispute the proposition that not all within a society has the same resources or opportunities to exercise such basic rights. Particularly gender and sexual minorities, ethnic and racial groups, urban poor and religious minorities are subjected to powerful contradictions.[1] On the one hand, they are regaled with the principles of non-discrimination and promises of free and equal participation in the society as citizens; on the other hand, they are threatened by *de facto* (if not *de jure*) discrimination.

In the Turkish political context, as in any other democratic system, politics of democratic inclusion is central to an understanding of the quality of democracy. Unevenness and limitations in the *political incorporation*, *representation* and *influence* of traditionally underrepresented groups such as women, ethnic groups and religious minorities have been a persistent question and controversy. Yet, with the rise of identity politics of the 1980s, a rich body of scholarly research has emerged examining the activities and experiences of such groups. Among those studied, the research on religious communities laid the ground for the analytical puzzle this dissertation attempts to shed light on.

The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the dynamics of democratic inclusion of minorities in general and heterodox religious communities (i.e. Alevis) in

[1] John Dryzek, "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization," *American Political Science Review* 90, no.3, (September, 1996), 475; Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 52-4; Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady, *The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Turkey in particular. It claims that the research on religious communities in Turkish politics literature tacitly promotes a sectarian bias.[2] Most nomothetic[3] works in the literature question organization, intermediation or aggregation of (Sunni) Islamic religious interests. Even though the study of heterodox Islamic communities has been popular in the last three decades, systematic analysis of the political behavior of the group, as well as the state's strategies and attitudes towards their inclusion have been limited.[4] Most analyses of Alevis are either idiographic or prescriptive analysis of their relationship with the state. This gap in the Turkish politics literature inspired this dissertation to explore the ways in which the Alevi community is included in the political processes in Turkey.

Extant literature shows that political inclusion requires (i) favorable mechanisms enabling full access to participation, (ii) presence of instruments of representation in key institutions and decision-making processes, and finally (iii) capability to influence government decisions.[5] Additionally, studies indicate that the nature and characteristic of the groups shape the level of successful inclusion. However, these studies also demonstrate the significant disparities (i) between non-citizens and citizen minorities and (ii) between women and other minority groups on the issue of political inclusion.[6] Unfortunately, despite the multidimensionality of the phenomenon of political inclusion, most of this research focuses only on one of its aspects, namely political representation.

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[2] Ali Çarkoğlu, "Political Preferences of the Turkish Electorate: Reflections of an Alevi-Sunni Cleavage" *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 2 (2005): 273.

[3] Nomothetic is an approach to *explanation* which seeks understanding of a class of situations or events using a few explanatory factors (independent variables). Unlike idiographic explanations that seek to provide an exhaustive understanding of a particular condition or an event, nomothetic explanations seek generalizability See Earl R. Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 2012), 27 & 92-3.

[4] Some of the prominent works on political behavior of the Alevis include: Ali Çarkoğlu, and Binnaz Toprak, *Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey*, (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2000); Ali Çarkoğlu, and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, protest and stability in an Islamic society*, (London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007); Binnaz Toprak, et al. *Türkiye'de Farklı Olmak: Din ve Muhafazakarlık Ekseninde Ötekileştirilenler,* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Matbaası, 2008).

[5] The large body of work on democratic inclusion includes prominent works such as James A. Morone, *The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and Limits of American Government*, (New Haven: Yale University, 1998); Iris Marion Young, *Justice and Politics of Difference*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Anne Philips, *The Politics of Presence*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[6] See Joe Foweraker, and Todd Landman, *Citizenship Rights and Social Movements: A Comparative and Statistical Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Victor Asal, "Minimal Political Inclusion of Minorities at Risk: The Case of Americas 1870-2000" in *The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion: Identity Politics in Twenty-First Century America*, ed. David F. Ericson, (New York & Oxon: Routledge, 2011)

Since the understanding of democratic inclusion is highly dependent on (i) the features of the institutional frameworks, and (ii) the characteristics of the social actors excluded from the political processes, the question of democratic inclusion in this study is examined at two different levels: the state and the civil society. Inspired by the critique of liberal theories on democracy[7], this dissertation argues that if actors' basic political rights are restricted, then full incorporation of these actors into political processes of the state is an unlikely scenario. If the institutional design excludes or restricts groups' access to political processes of the state, then polity beyond the state – i.e. civil society, the transnational political and public sphere – provide new mechanisms to communicate the preferences and demands of the group in question. It is also argued that these new mechanisms can pressure the existing institutional arrangements to transform.

This dissertation does not view the processes of inclusion in instrumental terms. It argues that incorporation of groups is neither a mere tool that can be used to secure individual autonomy, nor an issue that can be reduced to successful exercise of basic rights.[8] It is aligned with the critique of the collectivist-individualist debate on rights of groups. Accordingly, the dissertation argues that the challenges to political inclusion of groups should not be considered merely as a problem of breach of 'rights of individuals belonging to a group', but as a problem of breach of 'rights of a group'. It rejects the idea that rights of groups can ultimately be reduced to the rights of their individual members. Particularly if the group in question is a 'natural' or 'involuntary' one, where people are born into them, then the survival of the group, redressing of the inequalities and non-assimilation of the community would require a different set of standards.[9]

In line with this perspective I chose the Alevis as the principle focus of my research because of their idiosyncratic characteristics. To begin with, the Alevis are the largest non-Sunni religious community in Turkey. However, there is no official census information about them. Since Turkey's census data does not include religious

[7] Vernon van Dyke, "The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory," *World Politics 29*, no.3 (1977): 343-69; Dryzek, "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization," 476-78.

[8] Dryzek, "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization," 475-476; John S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 10-3.

[9] For the debate on the necessity of 'group rights' see Darlene M. Johnston "Native Rights as Collective Rights: A Question of Group Self-Preservation" in *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, ed. Will Kymlicka, 179-201, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and Nathan Glazer, "Individual Rights vs. Group Rights," in *Rights of Minority Cultures*, ed. Kymlicka, 123-138.

affiliation, there is no reliable statistical information about the exact numbers of the Alevis. Most of the figures cited in the literature are projections ranging from 5 percent to 25 percent of the total population in Turkey.[10] More importantly, the Alevis are not a homogenous group either historically or culturally. There are Turkish, Kurdish and Arab Alevi communities that are geographically dispersed throughout Anatolia.[11] Historically, the Arab Alevis (Nusayris) were located in the southern provinces. However, one can also find Turkish Alevis in the rural areas of central Anatolia and Kurdish Alevis in the countries eastern and southeastern provinces. Even though the rites, practices, and languages of these groups vary, they share common religious traits – i.e. they do not follow the orthodox Sunni practices of Islam (such as fasting during the Ramadan, praying in the mosques, and making the pilgrimage to Mecca). As a result, they have faced public and political discrimination since the days of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the relationship between the Alevis and the state has traditionally been marked with distrust and occasionally with violent conflicts.[12]

The Alevis remained invisible in the public sphere in Turkey's large urban centres until the 1960s. Until then they remained largely as an endogamous rural community throughout Anatolia. The migration to cities that began in the 1950s marked the beginning of transformation of the rural Alevi community. As the old structures and relations deteriorated, new structures and networks of relations began to emerge in the urban areas. Migration also reshaped the population distribution in Turkey, leading to the emergence of new urban centers with significant Alevi population. At the same time labor migration to Europe also led to the rise of the Alevi diaspora in some of the major German cities. Although ideological polarization and political violence of the 1970s

[10] While the Alevi activists declare the number of Alevi population to be around 20 million, the latest research by KONDA (a private research company) in 2007 estimate the number around 4.5 million. See "'Aleviyim' diyenlerin sayısı 4.5 milyon," *Milliyet*, March 21, 2007.

[11] Elise Massicard, *The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and managing territorial diversity*, (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), 5

[12] A number of events stimulated emergence of a narrative of victimhood since the Ottoman era: (i) extermination of large portions of the Alevi community during the reign of Selim I, (ii) the *fetva*s by the Şeyhülislam Ebussuud between 1537 and 1548 that paved the way for mass killings of Alevis during the Süleyman I period, (iii) the *Hamidian* campaign to unify all Muslim subjects under a single religious identity, (iv) the violent clashes with Kurdish Alevi tribes between 1936 and 1938 in Dersim, (v) the traumatic attacks of right-wing radicals in Malatya, Sivas, and Kahramanmaraş in 1978 and in Çorum in 1980, (vi) the violent attacks by the Islamists in Sivas in 1993, (vii) the clashes between the Kurdish left-wing Alevi activists and police forces in Gazi district in 1994, etc. See Irene Melikoff, İlber Ortaylı and Hakan Yavuz, eds. *Tarihi ve Kültürel Boyutlarıyla Türkiye'de Aleviler, Bektaşiler, Nusayriler*, (Istanbul: Esar Neşriyat, 1999); Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire* 1876-1909, (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998).

reshaped the needs and narratives of the Alevi community, they did not voice their collective right claims until the late 1980s.

Following the historical trajectory of Alevi identity politics, my dissertation addresses the question of "Who speaks for the Alevis?" both at the domestic level and in transnational political contexts. I focus on the decade between 2002 and 2012, in which new domestic and transnational actors actively competed for the political representation of the Alevi community, and demanded the transformation of official policies and governmental institutions. Since the Alevis are a heterogeneous and geographically dispersed socio-religious group, it is also important to analyze the representation of Alevi interests in both domestic and transnational contexts. Additionally, the research presented here makes use of a broader understanding of representation that allows me to take into consideration the roles of governmental institutions, international organizations, transnational Alevi communities, political parties, and Alevi interest groups in Turkey.[13] The main question of my research project is: under what conditions and through which channels do the Alevi interests are represented in Turkish politics? The mediums of the communication of the Alevi interests and the level of success for interest aggregation are also discussed throughout the text.

The subsequent chapters raise crucial questions about dynamics of representation, organization and communication of group interests, and significance of domestic and transnational institutions and norms on groups' influence in policy-making. They put particular emphasis on institutional frameworks' role in bringing about or hindering the political inclusion of the Alevis in Turkey through divergent means (e.g., political parties, civil society organizations, courts, and so on). My analysis in this dissertation is based on several sources:

- the contemporary political science literature on minority rights regimes, political representation, transnational networks and interest group politics,
- semi-structured elite interviews conducted with representatives of Alevi interest groups, members of Republican People's Party [*CHP – Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*] organization and government officials,

[13] Here the term 'interest group' refers to the umbrella concept proposed by Gabriel Almond et al. It indicates a "form of interest articulation [that] occurs through activities of social or political groups that represent the interests of their constituents" emphasis added. See Gabriel A. Almond et al., eds. *Comparative Politics Today: A World View,* (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), 65.

- field research and observation in Istanbul, Ankara and Hacı Bektaş, Nevşehir,
- the publications and documents put out by the Alevi groups in Turkey and Germany,
- reports concerning the Alevi issue published in Turkish and German newspapers and weekly political magazines (1960-2012),
- the European Commission's progress reports on Turkey (2002-2012)
- European Court of Human Rights' proceeding and decisions concerning the Alevi issue,
- proceedings of the Alevi issue on the Turkish Grand National Assembly [TBMM – *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*],
- reports concerning the Alevi issue published by German governmental organizations.

Chapter 1 of this dissertation introduces the objectives, assumptions and rationale of my dissertation by highlighting the importance of political representation for Alevis. The chapter claims that the state-centric explanations are important but insufficient to explain the main research question, which is "under what conditions and through which channels do the Alevi interests are represented in Turkish politics?" The chapter also discusses to what extent the Alevi community in Turkey can be considered as a minority in Turkey, and provides an introduction to the role of Eruopean actors in transforing the Alevi-state relations in Turkey.

Chapters 2 and 3 focus on civil society and provide an overview of articulation of Alevi interests in Turkey and Germany, respectively. In Chapter 2 I argue that the socio-economic transformations of Turkish society, along with the political and ideological transformations, affected the organization and strategies of the Alevi interest groups. This chapter also focuses on the demands put forward by the Alevi interest groups, and analyzes the issues areas and policy suggestions of the post-1990 Alevi organizations.

In Chapter 3 I focus on the organizations founded by the Alevis in Germany, and examine whether these organizations provide an effective voice to the community at the transnational level or not. In this chapter I discuss the factors that affected the organization of the articulated Alevi interests. I also argue that in the absence of strong

elite allies at the domestic level, organized Alevi interests located in Germany became *pressure participants.*[14] They provide new networks, as well as material and ideational resources for the domestic Alevi organizations in Turkey. [15]

Chapters 4 and 5 deal with formal representation of the Alevi interests in the political processes. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the Alevi interest representation in the legislature, and shows how these interests are represented in the TBMM. The chapter focuses on the cases of Union Party of Turkey [TBP – *Türkiye Birlik Partisi*] in the 1960s, and the CHP between 2002 and 2012. The chapter claims the presence of the Alevi in TBMM is not a sufficient condition for achieving a substantive representation of Alevi minority interests due to institutional constraints, the limited number of Alevi deputies, and the fact that majority of them are members of the opposition party. Therefore, having Alevi MPs does not guarantee increased interest representation. Instead, the mechanisms and content of the representation of the Alevis are highly dependent on the political opportunity structures and the organization of political parties. The chapter focuses on the parliamentary questions and discusses how both the opposition MPs and the government officials use the written and oral questions to justify their attitude on the Alevi issues.

Chapter 5 focuses on the relationship between the Alevi interest groups, and the government. The chapter examines the nature of the inclusion and exclusion of the different Alevi interests in different government institutions. It focuses on the period between 2002 and 2012, and discusses the "Alevi Opening" [*Alevi Açılımı*] that began during the second term of the Justice and Development Party [AKP – *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*] and argues that the absence of harmonization in policy strategies of the Alevi interest groups weakens the likelihood of policy change and rule adoption by the government.

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[14] Here the term 'pressure participant' refers to an umbrella concept that includes narrower categories of interest groups, policy participants and policy-centered organizations. See Grant Jordan, Darren Halpen, and William Maloney, "Defining Interests: Disambiguation and the Need for New Distinctions?" *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 6, no. 2, (2004): 195-212.

[15] Material resouces include tangible resources that interest groups compete for and use to attain their goals. Throughout the dissertation both financial resources and human resources, i.e. allies and supporters are considered as material resources. Additionally, 'ideational resources' refers to symbols and information that interest groups can use to influence and mobilize individuals or other organized groups. They also include ideological resources, i.e. principles and postulates asserting values and attitudes, which set forth both the characteristics of the allies and supporters of an interest group, and its strategies of action.

Chapter 6 questions the role of opportunity structures in shaping the level of success of the organized Alevi interest groups. The debate revolves around the legal changes on the issue of religious education and the success of the Alevi interest groups in shaping policy-outcomes in both Germany and Turkey. Within this process the role of transnational actors are further analyzed. In the conclusion chapter I present a summary of my major findings of this dissertation and present some ideas for future research.

CHAPTER 1

THE ALEVI QUESTION IN TURKISH POLITICS AND SOCIETY

1.1. Introduction: Why Study Alevis?

Although their exact numbers are unknown, Alevis constitute the largest non-Sunni religious community in Turkey. They are of particular significance not only because they have a legitimate claim to underrepresentation, but also because their political inclusion has become both a national and international concern. The relationship between the Alevis and the Turkish state has become a topic of great interest as a result of both the activities of the Alevi interest groups and the applications of the Alevi citizens to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The main question of what conditions and channels are conducive to the representation of Alevi interests in Turkish politics requires the clarification of a number of inter-related issues.

This chapter provides an introduction to the debate surrounding political inclusion of religious groups, and argues that understanding the limits of the minority rights regimes of a country, as well as the scope and the instruments of the right-claims of a group can shed light on the dynamics of groups' inclusion in the political process. Close examination of the role of the state, while necessary, is not sufficient to comprehend the widespread problems in the field of minority political inclusion. This chapter argues that even though it is the legal framework of the state that guarantees inclusion, other actors in the domestic and transnational spaces[16] shape the scope and content of that inclusion. Consequently, it is important to not only determine how different states respond to the claims of Alevis, but also to identify how the claims are shaped and which of these claims is more likely to enter into the policy-decisions.

[16] Throughout the text, 'transnational spaces' refers to: "sustained ties of persons, networks and organizations across the borders across multiple nation-states, ranging from low to highly institutionalized forms." See Thomas Faist "Towards a Political Sociology of Transnationalization: The State of the Art in Migration Research," *European Journal of Sociology* 45, no. 3 (2004): 337.

1.2. Democracy and Inclusion Revisited

The power of the norm[17] of political inclusion lies in its capacity to legitimize political outcomes. Even if political actors disagree with an outcome, they have to accept the legitimacy of the results of the decision-making processes. For this purpose, democracies work to establish, protect, and improve mechanisms that enable interaction between individual(s), groups, and the political system. These mechanisms provide meaningful and continuous representation, and facilitate the expression of all sorts of reactions to the system through the mechanisms of the system.[18] The more firmly the legitimacy of political outcomes is established through these mechanisms, the less social actors involve in violent and illegal political activities to make their voice heard. However, not all actors are welcomed into the political processes of the state, nor do they all chose to be incorporated fully.

With regard to the political inclusion of groups, the state's responsibilities are ambiguous. Unlike the individual rights regimes, which at least have a uniform subject, the variety of groups in a society has made it impossible to establish universal guidelines guaranteeing the political participation and representation of groups. For this reason, states are left to adopt whatever mechanisms they deem appropriate to promote the inclusion of their population's relevant groups in formal political institutions. For instance, in Lebanon, participation and representation is organized along ethno-national, religious, or linguistic lines, i.e., confessionalism. Other countries have adopted mechanisms to promote participation and representation of linguistic, ethnic and religious groups through policies of affirmative action policies and institutional quotas.[19] There is, in fact, a lively debate in the literature as to how best to guarantee a certain level of representation of minorities in the political processes.

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[17] The concept of norm is borrowed from Finnemore and Sikkink and throughout the text refers to "a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity." See Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52 (1998): 891.

[18] See Samuel P. Huntington, and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries*, (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 7-10 & 126-32; Max Kaase, and Alan Marsh. "Political Action: A Theoretical Perspective" in *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*, eds. Samel H. Barnes, and Max Kaase. London: Sage Publications, 1979, 16-7, 22 & 28-9; and Lester W. Milbrath, and M. L. Goel, *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics*, (Boston: University Press of America, 1977), 18-9 & 147-8.

[19] For instance, in United States, *Voting Rights Act* guarantees representation of underrepresented and historically marginalized groups in the national legislature. Similarly, Italian and Hungarian minorities

Arendt Lijphart suggests that in a truly plural society different groups can be guaranteed a place in power-sharing institutions, and acquire veto power over the issues that affect their vital interests through proportional representation, as practiced in Germany.[20] In such a consociational democracy, basic fairness of the political system can be ensured and the tyranny of the majority[21] is prevented. Nonetheless, in this system recognition of non-majority groups is the decision of the governing majority. Consequently, not all minority groups are officially recognized. Even though participation and representation of underrepresented groups is valued and promoted, the "struggles over resources and power motivate efforts to exclude many affected people from decision-making processes."[22]

To shed further light on the variation among the states' relations with their minority groups, Dryzek divides regimes into four categories depending on their strategies of inclusion and exclusion of groups. States can be either passively inclusive "in the sense of accepting whatever groups emerge from society", or actively inclusive by taking steps to mobilize particular groups and guiding them into the state.[23] Categorizing a government as a 'passively inclusive state' implies the realization of a democratic pluralism in which the democracy is built and maintained through associational activity. In the latter case, the inclusion taking place is not so substantial that the rewards of participation remain symbolic. Even though the groups are allowed to participate in the decision-making processes, "the outcomes will be systematically skewed against them."[24] One such example of passive inclusion can be observed in Mexico between 1988 and 1994. Within years of its introduction, the Salinas administration's National Solidarity Campaign [PRONASOL – *El Programa Nacional*

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are granted a seat in the parliament in Slovenia. See Annelies Verstichel, "Understanding Minority Participation and Representation and the Issue of Citizenship," in *Political participation of minorities: A commentary on international standards and practice*, eds.Marc Weller, and Katherine Nobbs, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 73.

[20] Arend Lijphart, "Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power Sharing Systems," in *Rights of Minority Cultures*, ed. Kymlicka, 277-8.

[21] Coined by John Adams (1788) and further popularized by Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) and John Stuart Mill (1859), the 'tyranny of the majority' refers to a breach of the rights of the minorities in a democratic system as a result of the abuse of power by the dominant party, faction, or individual in decision-making positions. Accordingly, the dominant majority actively oppresses the linguistic, ethnic, racial or religious minority groups by use of the 'majority rules' principle.

[22] Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, 53.

[23] Dryzek, "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization," 482.

[24] Ibid., 480.

de Solidaridad] became an effective mechanism to assimilate oppositional forces and appeal to civil society actors' demands for autonomy. As PRONASOL gained control, it used this power to expand Salinas' political base and discipline the Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI – *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*].[25]

Like the strategies of inclusion, strategies of exclusion can be classified as either active or passive. In a passively exclusive state, even though the state resists integration of the disadvantaged groups in political processes, it neither officially promotes nor combats civil society actors. In contrast to the passively exclusive state, an actively exclusive state "attacks and undermines the conditions for public association in civil society."[26] Although the active exclusionary model is mostly associated with authoritarian regimes, in the West the authoritarian liberalism Britain experienced under Margaret Thatcher provides one of the chief examples of a state's active exclusion of trade unions and attacks on the working class. It is important to note here that exclusionary strategies of the state also have a dissimilar impact on different groups within civil society, due to the variation in the threat perceived by political actors towards the activities of groups. In Turkey, this selective exclusion of the state has been directed at religious and ethnic minorities.[27] Islamists revivalists and Kurdish nationalists in particular have been subjected to different levels of suppression.

In the study of inclusion, it is also important to take motivations of the underrepresented groups into account. Like states, the groups vary in their motivations for and strategies of gaining political inclusion. From the 'excluded' actors' point of view, the struggle for inclusion in the political arena involves a rational calculation: underrepresented groups in question seek full inclusion if the reward of entry into the political processes of the state surpasses the benefits of non-participation.[28]

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[25] For a detailed analysis of the strategies of the Mexican state see Dan la Botz, *Democracy in Mexico: Peasant Rebellion & Political Reform*, (Cambridge: South End Press, 1995), 105-9 & 131.

[26] Dryzek, "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization," 482.

[27] See Sabri Sayarı, "Turkey's Islamist Challenge," *The Middle East Quarterly*, (September, 1996), 35-43; Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Doğu Ergil, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey," *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 3 (2000): 122-135.

[28] Dryzek, "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization," 484-6.

1.3. Inclusion as a Minority Right

The absence of universal criteria for identification of minorities further complicates the issue of minority political inclusion. Since the notion of 'minority' refers to a political outsider, depending on the conceptualization of the political community in a country, generating a universal definition becomes difficult.[29] In the documents of international and regional organizations, defining "minority" has been avoided whenever possible,[30] leaving identification of the minorities to the states. For instance, the French government has repeatedly refused to acknowledge the existence of national minorities in France.[31] Similarly, Russian immigrants in Estonia and Latvia, and Turkish immigrants in Germany, despite being sizable interest groups, are not viewed by the State as minorities. Although there have been attempts to identify and protect the rights of the minority groups through charters and treaties, the intention and extension of the concept remains ambiguous. Additionally, the concept has been stretched so much that the boundaries have been blurred between individual rights, group rights and the collective rights of minorities. To have a better understanding of the state-minority relations it is vital to clarify what a minority is and what kind of rights they lay claim to.

1.3.1. What Constitutes a Minority?

There are many competing definitions of the term 'minority' in the literature. Most definitions imply the singling out of a numerically inferior group on the basis of idiosyncratic traits, such as differences in language, religion, ethnicity and race. The numerical inferiority of such groups, it is argued, leads to inferiority in political, social and economic status. However, numerical criteria fail to explain the dominant position

[29] Jennifer Jackson Preece, *Minority Rights: Between diversity and community*, (Cambridge & Malden: Polity Press, 2005), 10.

[30] Geoff Gilbert, "The Council of Europe and Minority Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (1996): 160-189.

[31] In 1991 the Constitutional Council evoked the Act on the "Status of the Territorial Unit of Corsica", which guarantees the communities right to preserve its culture, subjet to the overall French "national unity." The court found the Act unconstitutional for its recognition of another "people" within the French territory. In a similar vein, the Frenmch delegate refused to sign FRA, since it would be against the principle of "national unity." See Azar Gat, *Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 337-40.

of South African Afrikaners under apartheid, the European population of Kenya, or the Tutsis in the Republic of Rwanda. Even though there may be a correlation between the size of a group and its status in a regime, to be more numerious in the population does not necessarily guarantee higher status to a community in political, social and economic contexts. As such, groups that are in a dominant or co-dominant[32] position in a political community cannot be labeled minorities.

A further definitional element used in the identification of a minority group is citizenship. Whether or not a group has citizenship, while significant in understanding the impact of minority activities, is not sufficient to identify them. Citizenship status obviously makes a huge difference for minorities, since it grants leverage to pressure the policies and institutions of the dominant majority, and provides them with a certain amount of protection from abuse by the state. In the United States, the control of the Cuban-American vote in Florida plays a major role in both local and national politics. The major political parties likewise negotiate with leaders of the Irish, Italian, African-American, Hispanic and Asian blocks for support in elections, and elected officials frame their domestic and foreign policy objectives in accordance with the views of these groups.[33] However, adoption of citizenship as a definitional element places refugees, migrants, and transnational communities such as the Roma in a 'miscellaneous' category. [34]

In an attempt to provide a broader understanding of the concept of minority Dworkin and Dworkin proposed a definition characterized by four qualities: (i) identifiability, (ii) differential power, (iii) different and pejorative treatment, and (iv) group awareness.[35] First of all, it is crucial that groups are readily identifiable in order to be able to delineate boundaries of inclusion in the group. Without identifiable shared characteristics, the establishment of group solidarity and the recognition of differential

[32] Here 'co-dominant' refers to the status of groups that are put on an equal footing with the majority as regards the running of the State institutions, despite their slightly inferior numbers.

[33] See Stephen Castles, and Alastair Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the politics of belonging*, (London: MacMillian Press, 2000), 150-1.

[34] For more information on the status of the Roma community in Europe and the impact of Ramani movement on domestic and transnational policies, see Claudia Tavani, *Collective Rights and the Cultural Identity of the Roma: A Case Study of Italy*, (n.p.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012); Peter Vermeersch, *The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in Contemporary Central Europe*, (n.p.: Berghahn Books, 2007); Helen O'Nions, *Minority Rights Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe*, (Birlington: Antony Rowe Ltd., 2007).

[35] Gray Dworkin, and Rosalind Dworkin, eds., *The Minority Report: An Introduction to Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Relations*, (New York: Cengage Learning, 1999), 15.

treatment become difficult. The case of Alevis provides an interesting case since there are few (if any) external signs to identify an Alevi. The group's heterogeneity of language, ethnic origin and religious practices does not leave much room to establish identifiable Alevi characteristics.[36]

Secondly, difference in power underlines all majority-minority relations. When the majority in power controls resources, it also controls the life chances of the minority, from their access to jobs, education, wealth, to health care or food supplies, which in turn lays the foundations of differential and pejorative treatment of the minority. It is this differential treatment that most directly affects the life chances and lifestyles of the minority group members, and thereby becomes the focus of the minority interest groups.[37]

The final dimension in determining what constitutes a minority, group awareness, provides a particular challenge within the scope of this dissertation. Dworkin and Drowkin claim that if no one in a minority sees him or herself as *being* a minority, then minority status cannot exist.[38] However, I argue that if the group members acknowledge that they are being subjected to discrimination and assimilation as a group due to their shared traits, then adoption of the minority label by the group itself is not a necessary condition to identify a group as a minority.

1.3.2. Theoretical Approaches to Minority Rights

Various scholars have problematized the need for special rights for minority groups and explored the significance of granting such rights in hindering or promoting conflicts.[39] The debate between liberals and communitarians over the role of collective rights shape much of the literature on minority rights. Increasing recognition of the need

[36] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 5.

[37] Most activists in the Alevi identity movement feel that the Turkish government treats the Alevi population unfairly. They claim that Alevis are looked upon as "unwanted step-children." During the Fifth International Faith Leaders Meeting [*5. Uluslararası İnanç Önderleri Toplantısı*] (October 29, 2010), many speakers uttered the phrase "we are not step-children" [*Biz üvey evlat değiliz*], claiming that the Alevis were the true founding members of the Turkish Republic and culture.

[38] Dworkin, and Dworkin, *Minority Report*, 21.

[39] For an overview of the debate on minority rights theories see the works by Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), and Morigiwa Yasutomo, Ishiyama Fumihiko and Sakurai Tetsu, eds., *Universal Minority Rights: A Transnational Approach*, (Munich: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004)

for new norms and standards to protect the identity and lifestyles of the ethnic, religious, and racial groups and sexual and gender minorities has led to the questioning of regimes should recognize, accommodate and/or protect certain minorities within its population. As Douglas Sanders notes, much of these debates are "based on confused notions about the meaning of collective rights."[40] While the notion of 'individual right' is not contested, the conceptualization of 'collective rights' has been a problem.

So the question becomes: can collectivities or groups hold rights? If so, what are the conditions the groups must satisfy to become a right-holding unit? Are collective rights and group rights similar? Are individual rights and collective rights mutually exhaustive? Do the rights of the groups can be reduced to the sum of the individual rights of their members? Do states have to guarantee special rights for the groups? If so, how should these rights be framed? These questions and many more dominate the rights debates. Consequently, before exploring on the particular case of Alevis in Turkey, it is crucial to clarify the concept of collective rights to have a better understanding of the issue of minority inclusion.

1.3.2.1. Collective rights vs. group rights

Discussions around the scope and nature of group rights can be traced back to the work of Otto van Gierke,[41] the translation of which paved the way for the emergence of the English pluralist tradition, which in turn lay the foundations of the debates on the dynamics between the individual and group specific rights.[42] Different interpretations of the significance of the value of cultural membership led to the emergence of a debate between liberals and communitarians over the status of groups as rights-and-duty-bearing units. The more scholars focus on the individual-group relationship, the more the scope and content of rights is questioned. Proponents of group or collective rights highlight a number of definitional elements in their discussion of the subject. While some frame group or collective rights in a way analogous to that of individual rights, i.e.

[40] Douglas Sanders, "Collective Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (1991): 368.

[41] Through his works on the emergence and development of the German legal tradition of 'fellowship' (*Genossenschaft*), along with emergence of the notions of 'corporate body' (*Körperschaft*), and 'corporation' (*Korporation*) Gierke provides insight on the uniqueness and complexity of the German case. See Otto von Gierke, *Community in Historical Perspective*, ed. Antony Black, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[42] See Jacob T Levy "From liberal constitutionalism to pluralism," in *Modern Pluralism: Anglo-American Debates Since 1880*, ed. Mark Bevir, 21-39, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

as the sum total of the rights of the individual members of the group, others identified the concept as rights that are accorded to a specific group as a unit distinct from the individual.[43]

According to Sanders, the former approach derives from the principle of non-discrimination and seeks to protect members of a group from the practices and policies of the dominant majority, i.e. group rights. The latter view concerns the principle of non-assimilation and pursues preservation of the values, preferences, lifestyles, or culture of the group, i.e. collective rights.[44] The right-claims of the cultural, racial, and sexual minorities incorporate both the collective rights and the rights of the individual members of their groups. Although states are expected to promote and protect the rights of individuals, the development of a regime for collective rights poses a challenge.

1.3.2.2. The liberal vs. communitarian debate on rights

The liberal approach to minorities, rooted in John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*, adopts an individualist perspective. Aligning themselves with Rawls' society and justice conceptualizations,[45] most liberal theorists defend the idea that the basic rights of the individual is sufficient to secure the rights of the individual members of a group. Adoption of standards, norms, and regimes targeting specific groups in a society is considered problematic; however, the recognition of minority rights is considered to be inherently in conflict with the principles of equality and freedom.[46] Instead, minority groups are treated as Trojan horses that will gradually lead regimes to condone illiberal practices.[47] The critics of collective-rights argue that adoption and protection of rights based on group status threatens the rights of the individual, since it inevitably elevates a specific identity over a universal one. As Kymlika notes, such an approach:

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[43] For a review of the debate see Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 45-8, and Neus Torbisco Casals, *Group Rights as Human Rights: A Liberal Approach to Multiculturalism*, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 28-37.

[44] Sanders, "Collective Rights," 369-70.

[45] Rawls describes two principles on which to build the foundations of a well-ordered society – i.e. (i) principle of equal rights for all, and (ii) principle of permissible inequality – where the first have a 'lexical' priority over the latter. Accordingly, Rawls claims all primary social goods should be distributed equally, *unless* an unequal distribution is to the benefit of all or to the least advantaged in society. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, revised edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 54.

[46] Will Kymlicka, "Introduction," in *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13.

[47] See Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship, 35-6.*

> often invoke[s] the image of theocratic and patriarchal cultures where women are oppressed and religious orthodoxy legally enforced as an example of what can happen when alleged rights of the collectivity are given precedence over the rights of the individual.[48]

In contrast to the individualism of liberals, communitarians depict a more positive picture of recognition and protection of collective identities and rights.[49] Communitarian theorists such as Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel criticize the liberal view of the group as merely an aggregate of individuals. In his essay, 'The Politics of Recognition', Taylor emphasizes the dialogical character of the human beings, claiming that we human beings define "our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us.'[50] This dialogical understanding of the identity paves the way for the construction of a notion of 'dignity' relying on the universal egalitarian principles that uphold the equal worth of all human beings.[51] This idea of dignity lays the foundations of the formulation of the 'politics of equal dignity' (i.e. universalism), promoting equal treatment of all via acknowledgement of their common identity.[52] The danger of the politics of equal dignity lies in the formulation of said rights from the perspective of the dominant group. Taylor argues that "dominant groups tend to entrench their hegemony by inculcating an image of inferiority in the subjugated."[53] Alongside this dialogical understanding, a notion of 'authenticity' also emerges, emphasizing the uniqueness of the individual self. The recognition of this uniqueness promote of the 'politics of difference', which grants certain rights to specific groups.[54]

Similarly, Sandel argues that in the liberal theory persons are represented as isolated and unbounded individuals, and points out that individuals are constituted through groups or communities and embedded in a particular social infrastructure.[55]

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[48] Ibid., 36.

[49] See Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition." *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann, 25-74 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), and Michael Walzer, *On Toleration*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

[50] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 32-3.

[51] Ibid., 26-7.

[52] Ibid., 41-3.

[53] Ibid., 66.

[54] Ibid.

[55] See Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Unlike liberals, communitarians stress the significance of shared values. Consequently, collective rights are seen as tools for protecting the values and culture of communities from the destructive influence of liberal individualism.[56]

To get around the communitarian critique and strengthen the position of liberalism, liberal scholars like David Miller, Yael Tamir, Jeff Spinner and Will Kymlicka emphasize the value of cultural membership and try to incorporate minority rights into the liberal framework.[57] Among these attempts, Kymlicka proposes differentiating between *internal restrictions* and *external protections* in understanding minority rights. Internal restrictions involve the rights of a group to protect against internal dissent. Conversely, external protections are the rights of a group to protect it from external pressures.[58] Kymlicka further suggests distinguishing "between 'bad' minority rights that involve *restricting* individual rights, from the 'good' minority rights that can be seen as *supplementing* individual rights."[59] Consequently, providing means for the individual members of minorities to participate in social, economic and political spheres, i.e. affirmative action programs, protecting/providing freedom from language discrimination and access to state subsidies for cultural activities is expected to mitigate the effects of discrimination and assimilation.

The explanatory power of both camps is limited in the formulation and implication of rights. Both camps drew heavy criticisms for being one-dimensional. While the liberals isolate individuals and the communitarians overemphasize the role of communities, they both fail to capture a number of mechanisms of dominance and exclusion. The feminists drew particularly heavy criticisms for undermining the complexity of community dynamics.[60] Since individuals can be members of more than one community, the communitarian approach fails to thoroughly explain how collective elements and collective interests are constructed. Frazer observes that:

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[56] Vernon van Dyke, *Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination*, (Westport: Greenwood, 1985), 195.

[57] David Miller, *On Nationality*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Jeff Spinner, *The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), and Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001),

[58] Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 37.

[59] Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular*, 22.

[60] See Elizabeth Frazer, *The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and conflict*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

> communitarian theorists tend to emphasize the communal construction of social individuals and social formations, and of values and practices. A problem is that these constructive processes themselves need to be analyzed in terms of power – power which can account for when individuals manage to reconstruct their circumstances, when they move from context to context, when they get trapped, when they rest content.[61]

The explanatory power of both camps is also limited in understanding the problem of democratic inclusion of heterogeneous groups such the Alevis in Turkey. Although their members share common cultural and ethnic traits, the Alevis are not necessarily united by a strong common identity. Even though their members share interests, these interests are neither static nor homogenous.[62] The literature on the Alevi identity movement has shown that the right-claims of the Alevi community is based on and shaped by the diversity of organized Alevi interests.[63]

1.3.3. Legal Approaches to Minority Rights

The liberalist vs. communitarian debate on the status of groups as rights-and-duty-bearing units also finds its way into the legal framework of the international rights regime.[64] By the end of WWII, the more the emphasis shifted to the individual rights of groups rather than, the more the standards on minority rights were framed as basic human rights for all.[65] The standards gradually transformed to secure cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious identities. As a result, the institutionalization of norms and values regarding the rights of the minorities developed at a slower pace within the human rights standards. In most cases the rights of minorities were regarded as the extension of, or special cases within, the general standards of human rights. International and regional organizations dealt with the issues of minorities by using the language and provisions of individual rights.[66] However, the legal frameworks laid

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[61] Ibid, *1-2.*

[62] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 47-9.

[63] See chapter 2

[64] Sandel, *Liberalism*, 60-62; Joel E. Oestreich, "Liberal Theory and Minority Group Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 21, (February, 1999): 108-132.

[65] Gaetano Pentasuglia, *Minorities in International Law: an introductory study*, (Strasburg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2002), 29-30.

[66] For examples in its application in American legal rhetoric see Glazer, "Individual Rights against Group Rights."

down standards on the protection of minorities without identifying who or what constituted a minority.

Implementation of the already limited standards poses a further challenge. Even though international and regional organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE) are significant actors in the founding and diffusion of norms on individual and collective rights, they are mostly ineffective in their capability to force states to act. The signing and ratification of international documents on the protection of minority rights by the individual states depends on the costs of abandoning the existing minority rights regimes. However its boundaries are defined, the most significant aim of minority rights is to guarantee substantive justice to all members of society through genuine equality and non-discrimination. Therefore, in the last decade the debates on the scope of state's obligations regarding minority rights protections have taken into account four areas of concern: (1) the survival of the minority population, (2) the non-assimilation of the minority 'identity', (3) the maintenance of *de jure* and *de facto* non-discrimination, and (4) the promotion of effective and meaningful participation of minorities in the social, economic and political spheres.

1.3.3.1.Emergence of minority rights standards under the United Nations

Embedded in the liberal conceptions of the individual and the state, the list of standards identified in the documents of the UN constitutes the core of the international human rights regime of the post-WWII politics.[67] The founding document of the UN, the United Nations Charter, does not contain any references to minorities and minority rights. Instead, the emphasis is on individual human rights and the principle of non-discrimination. The Charter is concerned with identifying the rights of the individual, and protecting these rights from the state and other collectivities. Establishing non-discrimination of individuals on racial, ethnic, religious and other grounds is considered sufficient for the protection of the rights of the members of minorities.[68]

[67] Deidre Fottrell, and Bill Bowring, eds., *Minority and Group Rights in the New Millennium* (London: Martinus Nijholf Publishers, 1999).

[68] The *Article 1* of the Charter states that one of the aims of the UN is to be non-discriminative in nature "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"

Like the Charter, the famous Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has no references to minorities and minority rights. Nonetheless, the principles of non-discrimination and non-distinction are repeatedly emphasized throughout the document. Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter and Article 2 of the UDHR[69] contain similar provisions for the protection of minorities against discrimination. When these documents were drafted, it was assumed that an individual focus on the protection of the rights would be sufficient to protect the rights of minorities. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) further promoted the framing of the international standards on rights as universal and equally shared rights of the individual.[70] Among the provisions introduced by these documents, Article 27 of the ICCPR (1966) provides the blueprint for identifying and addressing minority issues.[71]

In the 1990s, as the international system and social and political environment changed, the UN started to emphasize specific minority rights. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of new nation-states brought new problems on to the agenda.[72] The results of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project indicates that early 1990s were marked with new violent communal conflicts. [73] Tedd Robert Gurr argues that even though the roots of these communal conflicts could be traced back to 1960s, they became more visible only after the end of the Cold War. In his view, while "some were provoked by

[69] *Article 2* of UDHR states: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty".

[70] Jack Donnelly**,** *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 19-21, 149-152 &156.

[71] Article 27 of ICCPR states that: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, *persons belonging to such minorities* shall not be denied the right, *in community with the other members of their group*, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." [Emphasis added]. The original document is available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art27

[72] Patrick Thornberry, "International and European Standards on Minority Rights," *in Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope for a Transnational Regime*, ed., Hugh Miall, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 19&24.

[73] Ted Robert Gurr, "Minorities, Nationalists and Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in the Twenty-First Century," in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 131-60, (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

contention for power in post-communist states; others were responses to democratic transitions in Africa."[74]

The emergence of movements for language and ethnic revival in Spain and Great Britain led to the reassessment of effective regulations on minority issues, and in December 1992, the UN ratified the Declaration on the Rights of the People Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. With the 1992 Declaration minorities were granted the rights (i) to develop their own culture, (ii) to use their language in both public and private spheres, (iii) to participate in economic, political and social life without any discrimination, and (iv) to form associations.

The new document is significant not only due to its recognition of the needs of the "individual as a member of a community", but also due to its emphasis on securitization. The driving assertion throughout the document is that this kind of protection leads to both the development and maintenance of international peace, and the political and social stability of a given state. With the ratification of the 1992 Declaration, both the rights of the individual (belonging to a minority) and the duties of the states have been clearly identified, and protection of the minority regime has been reinforced.[75] The 1992 Declaration provides the minimum standards for the protection of minority rights and paves the way for the development of regional and national standards.

1.3.3.2.European Standards on Minority Rights

In Europe the issue of minority rights protection was put forward by the CoE, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Through the development and promotion of standardized minority rights these institutions have sought to secure democratization processes and regional security.[76] However, like the UN, none of these institutions have established a general definition of minorities. As Galbreth and McEvoy note, "European organizations were limited in terms of their

[74] Ibid,134.

[75] With the document the states are held responsible for providing legal frameworks for the protection of minority rights (Article 2). They have to make people equal before the law without any discrimination (Article 4). Additionally, the states are required to provide favorable conditions for minorities to learn and to improve their mother languages and to have further education in this language.

[76] See David Galbreath, and Joanne McEvoy, "European organizations and minority Rights in Europe: On transforming the securitization dynamic," *Security Dialogue* 43, no. 3 (2012):267-84; Jane Wright, "The OSCE and the Protection of Minority Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (1996): 190-205.

norms and policy implementation mechanisms. This limitation was due to the state-centric nature of the relevant European organizations, as well as of international relations in general."[77]

No organization has attempted to define what constitutes a minority, although in the legal framework of these organizations, the definition proposed by Francesco Capotorti in 1979 continues to be a guideline. Following the principle of non-dominance in power and status, and the criteria for numerical inferiority, minority is defined as:

> A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members…possess …characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language. [78]

Similarly, there are also no explicit standards for minority rights protection in Europe, although through the introduction of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) (1995), the CoE has pioneered the framing of legally-binding standards for the minority rights protection regime. The OESC, through the establishment of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the introduction of a number of recommendations[79] has attempted to enhance a European standard on minority protection.[80]

Despite the ambiguity of the standards on minority rights, the treaties of the CoE on human rights provide legally enforceable judicial remedies to individuals belonging to minorities and marginalized groups whose rights had been violated. Both the adoption of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) on November 4, 1950 and the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 1959 enabled the CoE to scrutinize the laws and practices of the member states that historically have asserted different

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[77] Galbreath, and McEvoy, "European organizations and minority Rights in Europe,"268.

[78] Francesco Capotorti. *Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities*. *E/CN4/Sub2/384/Rev 1* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1979), 96.

[79] The Hague Recommendations on the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996), the Oslo Recommendations on the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities (1998), and the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (1999).

[80] Gwendolyn Sasse, "EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy" *EUI Working Paper* RSCAS no. 2005/16, 3

conceptions of rights.[81] The ECHR provides recourse to bring alleged rights violations before an international body; whereas, the ECtHR determines whether the rules and practices of a member state are compatible with the Convention or not.[82] In other words, both the Convention and the Court provide supervisory mechanisms.[83]

Unlike CoE and OSCE, the EU did not try to systematically institutionalize standardized minority rights; instead borrow the standards established by CoE and OSCE. While the CoE documents paved the way for the adoption of the link between democracy and human (and later minority) rights, the OSCE introduced a security-based justification in the protection of minorities.[84] In the context of EU, although the legal provisions highlight human rights as one of core values of the region, human rights were not incorporated into the Community framework for a long time,[85] only beginning to be developed in the 1960s.[86] The issue of rights of minorities did not emerge as a problem until the integration of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Consequently, the minority rights standards of the EU were framed in relation to the requirements of enlargement. The famous Copenhagen criteria of "respect for and protection of minorities"[87] is only binding in practice for the EU-candidate states. What is more, while political accession criteria were transferred into EU primary law with the

[81] Initially the CoE had three main instutions: the Convention, the Court and the European Commission on Human Rights. Due to the increasing caseload in the 1970s and the 1980s, the ECtHR was trasnformed and the Commission was bypasssed and a single, full-time Court was established via Protocol No. 11.

[82] The Court can also make the member states to compansate the pecuniary and/or nonpecuniary damages of the applicants.

[83] Fernand de Varennes, "Using the European Court of Human Rights to protect the rights of minorities," in *Mechanisms for the Implementation of Minority Rights*, ed. European Centre for Minority Issues, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004), 84-5.

[84] Sasse, "EU Conditionality and Minority Rights," 3; Bruno de Witt, "Politics Versus Law in the EU's Approach to Ethnic Minorities". *EUI Working Paper* No. RSC 2000/4. (Florence: European University Institute, 2000).

[85] When the Rome Treaty established the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, the primary concern was to maintain trade and economic stability in the region.

[86] The 1961 Birkelbach Report adopted by the European Parliament restricted the criteria for the eligibility for membership to those states which guarantee democratic practice and respect for human rights and freedoms in their territories. In similar vein, in the 1978 Session of European Council it was declared that the respect for and maintenance of human rights as well as representative democracy were essential elements of membership of the European Communities. See Willi Brikelbach, *Rapport fait au nom de la commission politique sur les aspects politiques et institutionnels de l'adhésion ou de l'association à la Communauté*, December 19, 1961, available at: http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/2d53201e-09db-43ee-9f80-552812d39c03/fr ; European Council, *Session of the European Council Copenhagen, 7 and 8 April 1978*, EC Bull 3-1978, 6.

[87] European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993, 'Conclusions of the Presidency', available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/copenhagen/default_en.htm,

Treaty of Amsterdam, the clauses covering minority protection were left out,[88] such that, it remained an accession criterion, and relevant only in external EU policy, leaving the member states to deal with the minority issues on their own.[89]

While with the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty further institutionalization of human rights standards were achieved, in none of the texts specific clauses for minorities were given emphasis. Nonetheless, the *Article 13* of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC)[90] introduced a provision for combating discrimination that expanded the listed grounds to include sex, sexual orientation disability, age, racial or ethnic origin and religion or belief.[91] While this was a significant development in expanding the non-discrimination principle, it remained limited as it did not make reference to non-assimilation. Equal treatment and non-discrimination, while is important, is not sufficient to guarantee and protect the diversity in a country.

It was not until the Treaty of Lisbon legal provisions specifically related to minorities were included in the treaties of EU. The *Article 1.a* was amended as:

> The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including *the rights of persons belonging to minorities*. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.[92]

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[88] Barbara Brandtner, and Allan Rosas "Human Rights and the External Relations of the European Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice" *European Journal of International Law* 9 (1998): 487-8.

[89] Even though the EU does not have legally binding standards, the dialogue between the European Commission and the institutions of both the OSCE and the CoE has generated *de facto* checks and balances mechanisms at the European level. The European Commission has cooperated with both the HCNM and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) to recommend changes on issues regarding minority protection. The HCNM continues to play a significant role in preparation of opinions and regular reports on the EU candidate countries and assessing their compliance with the Copenhagen criteria of minority protection. Additionally, the European Commission also consults the reports prepared by the Venice Commission and integrates reform suggestions from the Venice Commission into its policies towards European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries.

[90] Now the *Article 19* of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU].

[91] European Union, *Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, 13 December 2007, 2010/C 83/01, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML

[92] European Union, *Treaty of Lisbon: Amending the Treaty on European Union and the treaty establishing the community*, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML

Along with the legalization of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and establishment of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the post-Lisbon EU standards on protection of rights became more systematic and institutionalized.

However, though *Article 21* of the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights includes a non-discrimination clause for 'members of national minorities'[93] and *Articles 18-25* of TFEU deal with the non-discrimination principle, neither text deals with non-assimilation. Indeed, in both texts the legal framework is dominated by the language and law of individual rights, addressing the individual rights of the members of the minorities rather than minorities as collectivities. The legal texts are written as if the problem of discrimination is one affecting individuals rather than groups. The legal texts are written as if the problem of discrimination is one affecting individuals rather than groups.

The minority protection has yet to develop as a regional rule. Neither EU nor OSCE and CoE can identify the specifics of European minority rights protection standards. However, the more the European integration and identity became a priority for these organizations, the more the diffusion of these few norms on minority rights protection into the domestic policies and politics of the states in the region gain importance. To promote the protection of the minorities, the European institutions have been considering a variety of instruments ranging from traditional diplomacy and partnership agreements to providing subsidies to civil society actors to raise consciousness on the minority issues.

1.4 Issue of Inclusion of Minorities and Marginalized Groups in Turkey

Study of the political inclusion of the groups in Turkey requires understanding of the minority rights and citizenship regimes of the country rooted in both legal texts and political culture. During the Ottoman Empire, *millets* were constructed as tools to incorporate various religious/ethnic groups into Ottoman economic, political and administrative structures. The communal boundaries were defined first on the basis of

[93] European Union, "Charter of the Fundamental rights of the European Union", *Official Journal of the European Communities* (2000/C 364/01)

shared universal elements of faith, then on ethnic and linguistic differences.[94] Millet system first divided the Ottoman population as Muslims and non-Muslims, and further divided the latter as Jewish, Armenian Gregorian and Greek Orthodox. Yet, the Muslim population was treated as a unified entity.

This classification of the population later found its way to the interpretations of the legal framework of the minority treaty of the post-WW I period. Treaty of Lausanne 1923 similar to other League of Nations treaties acted as a corrective to solve the difficulties of the post-war era. Through *Articles 37-45* the treaty regulated the status of the specific minorities in Turkey, and aimed to secure equal civil and political rights with that of the 'majority' Muslim population.[95] Nonetheless, while the text put emphasis on to protection of the rights of the non-Muslim minorities, it does not specify any particular group of non-Muslim.[96] Hence, "the Baha'is, the Yezidis, and believers of the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Catholic United churches (the Chaldean Church and the Syrian Catholic Church), and the Roman Catholic Church were not included in the protectionist framework that emerged from the official interpretation of the Treaty."[97]

Moreover, through changes in domestic regulations (the Law on Capital Tax, [No. *4305*] issued in 1942) – 'rights' secured in the *Articles 39* and *40* for the non-Muslim minorities were restricted. Additionally, some securities that were included in the *Articles 40-2* have not been implemented until the last decade, i.e. until the last decade non-Muslim minorities could not establish new places of worship, could not purchase, acquire, or sell property.[98] The Muslim communities on the other hand were excluded from the minority rights debates. Neither in the *millet* system nor in the legal framework of Lausanne, the Alevis, Kurds, Laz, Arabs, Albanians, Roma and others, obtained legitimate recognition as a group. What is more, any attempt of these groups to seek collective rights was perceived as "threats" to the integrity of the state.

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[94] Ahmet İçduygu, and B. Ali Soner. "Turkish Minority Rights Regime: Between Difference and Equality," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 3, (2006): 449-50.

[95] See Appendix 1

[96] Şule Toktaş, and Bülent Aras. "EU and Minority Rights in Turkey," *Political Science Quarterly* 12, no. 40 (Winter 2009-2010): 699-702; Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece and Turkey," *Mediterranean Politics* 13, no.1 (2008): 31-2.

[97] Toktaş, and Aras, "EU and Minority Rights in Turkey," 700

[98] See İçduygu, and Soner, "Turkish Minority Rights Regime," 453-4.

1.4.1 Brief Overview of the State and Alevi Relations in Turkey

The dissolution of the late Ottoman Empire's formal and informal institutional arrangements in the early Republican period was a source of both distress and relief for the Alevi community. The new Republic "based its legal framework on positive law, where all citizens are equal before the law, while establishing a modern bureaucracy to provide services to all citizens."[99] The transition to democracy and the introduction of multiparty politics in the 1950s enabled the Alevi citizens to better communicate their interests in the National Assembly.[100] Since the Turkish citizenship regime put emphasis on the principle of equality, no formal restrictions were introduced on the political participation and representation of the Alevi individuals. Even though they could not formally establish a denominational party, Alevi notables were carried into the TBMM by the political parties.[101] The Alevis were "prepared to accept that the Republic did not recognize them as a religious community, as long as that same Republic would deny all forms of religion a place in the public sphere."[102] However, some policies adopted by the Republican state led to pressures for assimilation and discrimination.

The introduction of new reforms and laws in this period threatened Alevi cultural and religious institutions. In 1925, Law No. 677[103] decreed the closure and prohibition of lodges, shrines and other similar sites of religious organization. As the new regulation also outlawed the institutions of their syncretistic religion, the Bektashi

[99] Feyzi Baban, "Community, citizenship and identity in Turkey," in *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, eds. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, (New York, Taylor & Francis, 2005), 55.

[100] Since the establishment of the first National Assembly on April 23, 1920, the Alevi notabales has been taking part in the TBMM. The Bektashi *çelebi*s provided support for the Mustafa Kemal and the Republic during the war of liberation, and Cemalettin Çelebi entered into the National Assembly. Another religious notable Hüseyin Doğan was elected as a CHP representetive in the 1950 elections. But he defected and joined the ranks of DP in 1951. In the 1954 elections, the Democrat Party [DP - *Demokrat Party*] listed Yusuf Ulusoy as its top candidate from Tokat, and made him the second "Çelebi" to enter into the TBMM.

[101] The only Alevi party, TBP will be discussed in chapter 4.

[102] Erik Jan Zürcher and Harry van der Linden, *The European Union, Turkey and Islam* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004), 127.

[103] T.C., *Tekke ve Zaviyelerle Türbelerin Seddine ve Türbedarlıklar ile Bir Takım Unvanların Men ve İlgasına Dair Kanun* (Kanun no. 677) December 13, 1925 The original document is available at: http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/390.html

branch of was not the only Alevi group affected.[104] While Law No. 677 presented the most direct challenge to the Alevi community, the ratification of Law No. 442 along with the introduction of Directorate of Religious Affairs [DİB – *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*] as an agency paved the way for future problems of equal treatment and protection of minority identity.

The *Village Law*[105] (Law No. 442) of 1924, through the introduction of Section *14* of *Article 13*, forced Alevi villages to build a mosque despite the fact that the community did not follow orthodox Sunni practices of worship and thus did not require such a building. Additionally, *Articles 83-86* of the same law describe in detail the obligations of the village imams, who in Alevi communities did not fulfill a religious function. The basic language of the legal text reflects the assumptions of the era's minority rights regime that the needs of villages should be determined through orthodox interpretations of Islam. Even though noncompliance with the requirements of Law No. 442 was punishable by fines, the discourse it set challenged the non-assimilation principle. However, the most contested development in the early Republican period was the introduction of Law on the Abolition of the Ministry of Seriat, Pious Foundations and General Staff (Law No. 429) in 1924 and the foundation of DİB in 1924. Despite the Republic's secularization claims, the establishment of the DİB institutionalized favoritism towards a particular sect of religion (i.e. Sunni, Hanefi Islam).[106]

Rejection of differences as a marker of identity and preferred treatment of the Muslim continued throughout the 1950s. In the post-1961 period, new institutional arrangements promoted and expanded pluralism, clarifying and expanding the rights and liberties of individuals while continuing to reduce the principle of equality to

[104] Bektashis were the only branch organized around convents. In the Bektashi Order *baba* refers to the leadership position. Accordingly, the leadership structure in Bektashi tradition include *dede-baba* (the head of the order), *halife* (regional head), *baba* (head of a lodge), and *derviş* (monk). As the Bektashi Order has historical ties with the Alevi community, some Alevi organizations discuss the problems of Alevi *dede*s and Bektashi *babas* within the same policy frames. See Hülya Küçük, *The Role of the Bektashis in Turkey's National Struggle: A Historical and Critical Study,* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 2, 13-14 & 22.

[105] T.C., *Köy kanunu* (Kanun No. 442) March 18, 1924 The original document can be retrieved from http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/368.html

[106] See David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, (Cambridge: The Eothen Press, 1999), 64-65; Andrew Davison '*Turkey, a "Secular" State? The Challenge of Description*', *The South Atlantic Quarterly 102, no. 2-3* (2003): 334-350, and Paul Dumont "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology" in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacoub M. Landau, 25-44, **(**Colorado: Westview Press, 1984).

'uniform treatment' in terms of language and legal rights.[107] Although formal institutions remained blind to variation within the Muslim population, ideological disputes combined with major attacks on Alevi minorities in Malatya (17 April 1978), Sivas (3 September 1978), and Kahramanmaraş (19 December 1978) show the status of the non-Sunni population has been a problem at the civil society level.

Additionally, the aftermath of the 1980 military coup and the promotion of a new policy of 'Turkish–Islamic Synthesis', revived state favoritism of Sunni Islam in formal institutions and civil society[108]. However, by the mid-1980s the structural limits brought with the 1982 Constitution had been loosened through a series of amendments[109] and the non-Sunni communities gained more freedom to discuss and promote their identity in the public sphere. The deaths of thirty-five Alevi attending the annual *Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural* Festival in a fire started by fundamental demonstrators on 3 July 1993 in Sivas rekindled the survival concerns of the community. Alevis' trust in the state and its institutions was further shaken in 1995 by the events in Istanbul's Gazi neighborhood[110] which resulted in the death of two significant figures in the local Alevi community. It was in this context that the Alevi community transformed itself into a movement and later institutionalized its demands in the form of voluntary associations and organizations at the civil society level. [111]

[107] İçduygu, and Soner, "Turkish Minority Rights Regime," 456.

[108] Ali Çarkoğlu, and Nazlı Çağın Bilgili, "A Precarious Relationship: The Alevi Minority, the Turkish State and the EU," *South European Society and Politics* 16, no. 2. (2011): 354; Koçan Gürcan, and Ahmet Öncü, *"Citizen Alevi in Turkey: Beyond Confirmation and Denial," Journal of Historical Sociology* 17, no. 4, (2004): 474.

[109]The most significant of those during the early 1990s was the amendment to *Articles 141, 142,* and *163* of *Turkish Penal Law* [restricting any type of broadcasting of issues involve identity/culture difference] and to *Article 13* (restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms); *Article 26* (freedom of expression); *Article 30* (protection of printing facilities); *Article 33* (freedom of association); *Article 34* (freedom of assembly) and *Article 133* (radio and television broadcast) of the 1982 Constitution.

[110] On 12 March 1995 three gunmen in a taxi randomly shot at coffee houses in the Gazi neighborhood known to be populated by Alevis. In an attempt to protest the two killed in the attack, local Alevis gathered to demonstrate. The demonstrations spread as police responded with excessive use of force. At the end of the forth day of demonstrations, order was restored but by then 20 protestors had been shot dead. For more on the issue see chapter 2.

[111] Ömer Çaha "The Role of the Media in the Revival of Alevi Identity in Turkey" *Social Identities* 10, no. 3, (2004): 329; Bayram Ali Soner and Şule Toktaş, "Alevis and Alevism in the Changing Context of Turkish Politics: The Justice and Development Parties Alevi Opening," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 3 (2011): 419-34.

1.4.2 Regional Challenges to Rights Regime in Turkey

The challenge to the rights and citizenship regimes rooted in Laussane not only comes from domestic actors, but also from regional intergovernmental institutions.[112] The more the co-operation and dialogue increase between the Turkish state and the European states and intergovernmental organizations, the more compliance with international human and minority rights norms becomes an issue. Since it is a member of both the OSCE and the CoE, Turkey is expected to comply with the standards framed by these organizations. Additionally, because Turkey is a country who wishes to be a member of the EU, the transfer of the liberal European norms and values on rights reinforced through the EU membership negotiations.

The broadly defined Copenhagen criteria (1999) resulted in increasing demands for legal and attitudinal changes on political processes. Although the EU is generally criticized for not fully grasping the dynamics of minority issues in accession countries, in the Turkish case different dimensions of the minority issues have been subjected to conditionality.[113] In contrast to the CEECs, the conditionality relationship between the EU and Turkey was established long before the recent enlargements with the signing of the *Ankara Association Agreement* in 1963. The *Association Agreement* would eventually result in Turkey's full membership after the preparatory, transitional and final stages.[114] Since the signing of the agreement, the situation of the non-Muslim religious communities and ethnic minorities has been perceived as a hurdle to the achievement of this goal by the EU. In the short time that had passed between the recognition of Turkey's candidateship and the stagnation in accession talks, Turkey adopted far-reaching democratic reforms, including reforms regarding states relations with its minority groups and marginalized individuals.

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[112] Giuliano Amato and Judy Batt,"Minority Rights and EU Enlargement to the East: Report of the First Meeting of the Reflection Group on the Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border," *RSC Policy Paper*, No. 98/5, (1998).

[113] On the debate on EU influence on minority issues see Aimee Kanner Arias and Mehmet Gürses, "The complexities of minority rights in the European Union," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 16, no. 2, (2011): 321-36; Christos Kassimeris, and Lina Tsoumpanou, "The Impact of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on Turkey's EU Candidacy," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 12, no. 2 (2008): 329-45, and Twahida Ahmed, *Impact of European Union Law on Minority Rights*, (Oxford: Hart Publishing Limited, 2011).

[114] Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "The never-ending story: Turkey and the European Union", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34, no. 4 (1998): 240-58

It is important to note here that EU does not include religious rights and freedoms as a part of the accession conditions [*acquis communautaire*]. Nonetheless, the Union is not blind to the issue of religious diversity and the problems of the religious communities in the candidate states. Even though the religious freedoms and rights are not addressed as a separate issue in *acquis communautaire*, the Union's demands for compliance with regional and international standards on rights encourages the candidate states to revise their domestic policies and institutions.

Through its process of conditionality, candidacy process becomes a tool for advancing democratic governance, rule of law and collective and individual rights of the citizens in countries aspiring to EU membership. The negotiation framework pushes for (i) transformation of the candidate state's institutions and policies, (ii) the establishment of participatory governance mechanisms, and (iii) timetables to complete required reforms. In other words, the process of synchronization of the policies and instutions via condiationality not only facilitates the transformation of the institutional arrangements of the candidate states, but also generates opportunity structures for the domestic interest groups to aggregate their interests.[115]

Even though there is no internal standard on collective rights and religious freedoms within the EU, the Union urges the candidates to ratify legally-binding international documents on human rights.[116] Once a candidate ratifies the documents, the Union begins to monitor the candidates' ability to put the adopted laws into practice, and secure the rights of the individuals.

When Turkey ratified the Article 25 of the ECHR, which resulted in the recognition of the right of individual petition to the ECtHR, two months before its formal application to the Union in 1987, the ECtHR applications and decisions became

[115] See Frank Schimmelfenning, Stefan Engert, and Helko Knobel, "Cost, Commitment, and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey," Journal *of Common Market Studies* 41, no. 3 (2003): 495-518; and Frank Schimmelfenning, and Guido Schwellnus, "Political Conditionality and Convergence: The EU's Impact on Democracy, Human Rights, and Minority Protection in Central and Eastern Europe," paper prepared for the CEEISA Conference, Tartu Estonia, (June 25-27, 2006), accessed May 18, 2013, available at: http://www.ceeisaconf.ut.ee/orb.aw/class=file/action=preview/id=164447/Schimmelfennig_Schwellnus.pdf

[116] In 1998, EU pointed out the dismal rights record as the reason for excluding Turkey from the list of prospective members. On March 31, 1998, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker justified this decision by stating that: "It cannot be that a country where torture is still practiced has a place at the European Union table." See Human Rights Watch, *Report on Turkey: Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights*, 1999, accessed April 23, 2013, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/turkey/turkey993-03.htm.

a part of the negotiations between Turkey and the Union. Once the ECHR ratified, the ECtHR began to provide a supranational system of review of the human rights practices in Turkey. In the area of religious freedom, the ECtHR jurisprudence has a privotal role in protecting the rights of the individuals belonging to religious minorities.[117] Both the number and the content of the applications of the Turkish citizens, along with the compliance of the Turkish states to the decisions of the Court are monitored by the European Commission, and included in the annual progess reports.

Starting with the *Regular Report on Turkey* in 1998, the EU reports on Turkey assess the situation of minorities, cultural rights, and religious freedoms.[118] The 1998 Report deals with the Alevi issues under the freedom of religion section and demands for improvement of the situation of the Alevi community. Even though the issues of the Alevis were not addressed under the section on 'minority rights and protection of minorities', the Alevi community was still considered as a (religious) minority.[119]

The succeeding report on Turkey by the European Commission, rather than addressing Alevis and other non-Sunni groups in detail, highlighted the general problems on "freedom of religion." The 1999 Regular Report on Turkey just stated that: "as far as freedom of religion is concerned, there still exists a difference of treatment between those religious minorities recognised by the Lausanne Treaty and other religious minorities."[120]

Following the 1999 Helsinki Summit, where Turkey's status was elevated from an applicant to a candidate county, the issues of Alevis were granted more coverage. The Even though the reform efforts of the state were recognized in the *2000 Progress Report*, the limited scope of the initiatives were criticized. The Report noted that:

> The official approach towards the Alevis seems to remain unchanged. Alevi complaints notably concern compulsory religious instruction in schools and school books, which would not reflect the Alevi identity, as well as the fact that financial support is only available for the building of Sunni mosques and religious foundations….A positive approach seems to

[117] It is important to note here that the member states of the CoE have enjoyed autonomy in relation to religious matters between 1945 and 1993. Until 1993, the Court has not found violations of the article on religious freedoms.

[118] European Commission, *1998 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,* (1998): available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/turkey_en.pdf

[119] Ibid, 19

[120] European Commission, *1999 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,* (October 13, 1999), 13, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/turkey_en.pdf

> be adopted towards non-Muslim communities with regard to freedom of religion, but this should be developed for all religious communities, including non-Sunni Muslims.[121]

Starting with the 2002, issues of the Alevi community other than religion also began to be addressed. Reports start to assess a number of Alevi issues, such as the status of *cem* houses, the relationship of the community with DİB, the sectarian bias in religious education, the restrictions on the freedom of association, and ongoing law suits in both Turkish courts and ECtHR.

In comparison to the legally binding standards of CoE and the decisions of the ECtHR, the normative pressure put by EU bodies is insufficient. The power of the Union as an exporter of norms of minority rights and/or religious rights is limited, since it lacks clear and sustainable norms on these two issue areas. Consequently, the changes in state-Alevi relations cannot be considered as a direct result of the pressure put on Turkey by EU. However, by addressing to the problems and demands of the Alevi community in the Union keeps the Alevi issues on the Turkish political agenda. By monitoring the compliance of the Turkish state to the articles of the documents of the CoE it ratified, and addressing to the *de jure* and *de facto* restrictions on rights and liberties, the Union promotes the transformation of the laws and practices. In other words, even though a causal link cannot be drawn between the accession process and the changes in state-Alevi relations, the contribution of the EU in transforming the laws and practices in Turkey should not be undermined.

1.4.3. Alevis in Turkey: An Unwilling Minority?

Among various minorities of Turkey, this dissertation focuses on the curious case of the Alevis. Since the rise of the Alevi identity movement, Alevi community has repeatedly refused to be labeled as a minority, despite framing their rights demands parallel to the dimensions of minority rights standards. Additionally, state remains hesitant to include Alevis into its minority rights protection regime, despite the pressures from the transnational actors. Instead the accession process gave birth to a paradoxical situation in which "the privatization of religion as a norm has turned out to be the most explosive political problem in Turkey and came to the forefront in Turkish

[121] European Commission, *2000 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,* (November 8, 2000), 18 & 21 available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/tu_en.pdf

politics from 2007 onwards."[122] Even though there have been changes in the legal framework, the adopted reforms gave birth to new forms of exclusionary processes. The content and limits of these reforms will be discussed in detail in the remainder of the dissertation (particularly in Chapters 5 and 6)

Although common traits and historical misfortune led Alevis to form an underrepresented and victimized group identity, the status of 'minority' is strongly rejected both by the Alevi and non-Alevi statesmen, bureaucrats, intellectuals and activists because the notion of 'minority' is mostly operationalized in numerical terms, and remains aligned with the minority regime put forward by the Lausanne Treaty.[123] Instead, the emphasis is put on rough population estimates as a means of strengthening the position of the community.[124] Paradoxically, in both Turkey and Europe the right-claims of the Alevi identity movement revolve around principles of minority rights protection: (i) preservation of the Alevi population, (ii) *non-assimilation* of Alevi cultural 'identity' (iii) introduction and maintenance of the principles of *de jure* and *de facto* non-discrimination, and (iv) securing effective and meaningful participation of Alevi individuals in social, economic and political spheres.

Additionally, the ciziten action and the lobbying of the Alevi elites and the Alevi interest groups at the European level inadvertently transform the community into a *de facto* minority. The more the Alevi interest groups highlight the difference between them and the Sunnis in their lobbying and the more cases are submitted to the ECtHR to pressure the Turkish state to recognize this difference, the more the Alevis are percieved as a non-dominant, un-recognized, underrepresented and discriminated religious community, i.e. a religious minority, in Turkey.

[122] Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "The European Union and Turkey: Democracy, Multiculturalism and European Identity," *RECON Online Working Paper*, 2011/20, 3

[123] See Appendix 1 for the original document of the Lausanne Treaty.

[124] Shankland (2003) proposes that 15 per cent of Turkey's population is Alevi; whereas Koçan and Öncü (2004) give a rough estimate between 10 per cent and 30 per cent. Üzüm (1997) by cross examining the census data and the performance of the Alevi party TBU in the 1970s proposes that Alevis constitute only 10 per cent of the population. The numbers rise to 20 per cent in Güneş-Ayata (1982) and to 30 million in Yaman and Erdemir (2006). In the interviews and the meetings and rallies participated the status of the Alevis is demonstrated with the motto "Alevis are not a minority! We are….million."

1.5 How to Study Alevi Inclusion in Turkish Politics?

How does the Alevi community interact with the political system? How do they achieve meaningful and continuous representation in the political sphere? How do Alevis react to the system through the system? Once the question of inclusion is formulated through questions like these, then understanding of the dynamics of participation and representation becomes a necessity. However, conducting individual level large-N studies on the Alevi community for generalizable results is difficult.[125] Because census data collected in Turkey is blind to religious affiliation there is no data on the exact size of the Alevi population in Turkey; most numbers offered in the literature are projections ranging from 10 per cent to 30 per cent of the country's total population. Even though the highly contested results by KONDA[126] were to be taken as the starting point for determining an Alevi population universe for research, the problem of identification continues to place setbacks for the research question at hand. Since the extent of the Alevi population cannot be identified, valid and reliable data on party affiliation or the voting preferences of the Alevi electorate cannot be provided. Despite a growing number of researchers conducted surveys on Alevis in the last decade, respondent bias and sampling continues to be a problem. In most works identifying what Alevi is not (i.e. non-Sunni) is much easier than what it is.

Additionally, once the focus is shifted to formal mechanisms of representation and executive-legislative relations, designing a study targeting the relationship between the Alevi representatives and the Alevi electorate is equally challenging. For one, not all MPs of Alevi origin identify themselves as such publicly. As a further issue, there is a tendency both in the media and in the literature to label Alevis as supporters of certain ideologies and parties; Alevis have been identified with either Kemalism and support for CHP, or socialism and partisan support for left-wing parties, but given their heterogeneity, it is unlikely that they vote as a bloc.[127] What is more, the absence of a

[125] See Çarkoğlu, "Political Preferences of the Turkish Electorate," 273.

[126] According to the research by KONDA the number of people that publicly identify themselves as Alevis approximately is 5 million (4 million 587 thousand) See "'Aleviyim' diyenlerin sayısı 4.5 milyon," *Milliyet*, March 21, 2007.

[127] Ayşe Güneş-Ayata and Sencer Ayata "Ethnic and Religious Bases of Voting" in *Politics, Parties and Elections*, eds. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, 146-7, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); David Shankland, *The Alevis in Turkey: The emergence of a secular Islamic tradition,* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 10-1.

successful Alevi-oriented party combined with the legacies of Alevi-Bektashi contribution to nation-building in Turkey[128] further encourages this view. However, as Chapter 2 discusses, the Alevi community is very fragmented; some groups have ties with Islamic revivalism and Kurdish nationalism. Moreover, despite the correlation between cities with a stronger Alevi presence and the districts in which CHP and other center-left (or leftist) parties win election, there is no sufficient data to establish a causal mechanism, making it safe to assume that the alliance between the CHP and Alevis is not a matter of constant partisanship.[129] Additionally, since the 1960s there have been attempts to establish 'Alevi' parties, namely Union Party of Turkey [TBP - *Türkiye Birlik Partisi*] further indicating that there is no strong tie between the Alevis and any of the existing political parties.

Following those constraints, the focus shifts from individuals to groups and interests, and the question of by whom and how the interests of the Alevis as an underrepresented social group are represented and communicated. To that end, the dissertation claims that Alevis' political representation has evolved outside of conventional political arenas: Alevi mobilization and the creation of Alevi interest groups particularly in the last two decades necessitate the study of political representation in the domestic and transnational political contexts. This dissertation focuses on domestic and transnational case studies, in determining who represents them and in what forms of organizations articulation of Alevi interests takes place, focusing on the emergence of Alevi identity movement and how the interests of Alevis are outlined. The subsequent chapters address (i) the role and function of Alevi interest groups and how elites and groups articulated the interests of Alevis in the public sphere; (ii) the role and impact of transnational networks; (iii) the role of Alevi political parties and MPs on substantive political representation; (iv) the dynamics of State and Alevi interest group relations; and finally (v) the conditions for successful policy outcomes.

As discussed above, most analyses of minorities revolve around the study of their relationship with the state, focusing on how they adopt various right-based approaches

[128] See Hamit Bozarslan, "Alevism and the Myths of Research: The Need for a New Research Agenda,"in *Turkey's Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview*, eds. J. White Paul, and Joost Jongerden, 3-15, (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003).

[129] Both True Path Party (DP – *Doğru Yol Partisi*) in the 1950s and Motherland Party (ANAP – *Anavatan Partisi*) in the 1980s received electoral support of the community. See Harald Schüler, *Türkiye'de Sosyal Demokrasi: Particilik, Hemşerilik, Alevilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), 162-71.

and demand divergent prescriptions to 'solve' the problem. However, these studies fail to fully understand the dynamics of the relationship between dispersed and heterogeneous groups and the state, which is itself not a unitary actor. Different institutions deal with the right-claims of the groups in different ways. In the case of Alevis, the level of incorporation and representation of Alevi interests in incumbent and opposition parties and various state institutions cannot be considered as similar. The institutional frameworks not only determine who speaks for the Alevis, but also continuously shape the claims that are made.

The dissertation proposes that political opportunity structures[130] play a significant role in shaping the modes and levels of engagement of the Alevi community in their struggle for rights. Even if motives and resources are crucial in determining the capabilities and relative power of the Alevi community, it is political opportunity structures that generate openings for actors to interact meaningfully with the political system. They act as "filters" shaping the mobilization of the Alevi community and its choice of communication strategies, as well as its capacity to change the institutional arrangements.

The debate on minority issues implies that minority groups lack access to formal instruments of political participation and adequate representation. Consequently, one would expect the group to work towards the establishment of new instruments. Formation of domestic and transitional Alevi institutions affirms limitations of the community's political voice. These organizations act not only as institutions of Alevi interest articulation, but also as vehicles of communication and representation. Thus this dissertation also proposes that due to limitations of inadequate and legitimate representative Alevi institutions in the domestic arena, transnational Alevi representation increases to further the community's reach.

Additionally, the increasing proliferation of individuals, associations, and foundations claiming to represent the interests of the Alevi community has negatively affected Alevi political representation. As many researchers have already demonstrated,

[130] Here the notion of political opportunity structures are borrowed from Kitschelt (1986) and refer to "specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents." See Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movement in Four Democracies" *British Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 1, (1986): 57-85.

the group identity of the Alevi community is fragmented and contested.[131] This fragmentation paves the way for increasing actors laying claims to represent the 'true' interests of Alevis, consequently leading confusion surrounding legitimate representation of Alevis. The research presented here relies on process tracing and historical analysis to assess the issue of representation and canvass the inception, evolution and status of Alevi identity politics in Turkey and Germany. The data used to support the claims made in this dissertation is collected primarily from TBMM proceedings, press releases, party programs, official publications of the Alevi and non-Alevi associations, official publications of DİB and speeches of politicians and Alevi elites.

Discourse analysis is used in order to identify issue areas and position the demands and strategies of Alevi interest groups. Through identification of how the in-group and out-group is defined, how the basis of collective identity is explained and how threat perception is formulated by the Alevi elites, this dissertation demonstrates the dynamic relationship between the identity frames, political opportunity structures and right claims laid down by Alevi interest groups. Content analysis of TBMM proceedings is used to understand the scope of substantive representation of Alevi interests in the national assembly and to identify and explain to what extent communicated Alevi demands find their way into the individual MPs' legislative activities.

These documents are supplemented by semi-structured interviews with members of Alevi organizations in Turkey, DİB, and CHP[132] and by evidence acquired from rallies, lectures, meetings, press conferences and festivals between 2009 and 2012. Additionally, videos and other visual materials uploaded to social media outlets are used as a supplement in assessment of the framing of issue areas by Alevi actors, particularly of those in Germany.

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[131] See works of Martin Sökefeld, *Struggling for recognition: The Alevi movement in Germany and in transnational space*, (n.p.: Berghahn Books, 2008), Massicards, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe;* and Tord Olsson et al. eds. *Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives,* (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1998).

[132] Even though I try to keep my own interventions to a minimum during the interviews, in most cases I have little control over the environment the interviews took place. A general problem during fieldwork was that a number of interviews were taking place in the presence of gate keepers or witnesses; hence, increasing direct or indirect intervention from others. Due to respondent bias, not all interviews conducted made their way into the text, however the information gathered through this process are incorporated to the discussions. See Appendix 2 for the list of interviewees included in the dissertation.

Overall, the discussions in the following chapters rest on the information collected via process tracing. The data collected was used to identify the actors, content, and success of Alevi interest representation. Each chapter focuses on one dimension of representation and presents its own discussion on political representation literature and test hypotheses in an effort to clarify the causal mechanisms.

CHAPTER 2

REPRESENTING ALEVI INTERESTS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: ALEVI INTEREST GROUPS AND STRUGGLE FOR RIGHTS

2.1. Introduction

Even though many scholars put emphasis on elections, political parties and executive-legislative relations in understanding the dynamics of representation, civil society actors increasingly play an important role in political representation in contemporary democracies. As the conventional patterns of political participation underwent significant transformations, growing number of organized groups have started to shape the course of modern politics. Following the decline in voting participation and weakening of political parties, civil society organizations continue to communicate the values, identities and preferences of particular groups or individuals.[133] Associational activities have begun to offer supplementary (and sometimes alternate) instruments for representation that are interconnected with the classic institutions of representative democracy.

States, either directly or indirectly, contribute to organized group proliferation. Either through sponsorship or sanctions, states can promote organization of groups to represent interests of particular social or economic groups. Policy failures and dissatisfaction caused by the institutional frameworks can inadvertently contribute to formation of groups expressing specific interests and political demands. As Michael Saward notes, the very design of the institutional frameworks enable "the possibility for non-elective representative claims that can call on criteria of democratic legitimacy

[133] See Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. *Interest Group Politics*, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1986), 9-20; Grant Jordan and William A. Maloney, *Democracy and Interest Groups: Enhancing Participation*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2-7.

which in some ways echo but in important other ways are distinct from electoral criteria."[134]

Focusing on the actors and methods of articulation of sectarian interests in Turkey, this chapter addresses the question: who speaks for the Alevi community in its struggle for rights? The chapter argues that the right-claims of the group are related to the politics of group representation. It shows that various Alevi civil society actors facilitated the communication and representation of collective interests outside the formal political spheres and hence shaped the debate on Alevi rights. I argue that Alevi interest groups organized in the form of associations (*dernekler*) foundations (*vakıflar*) and federations (*federasyonlar*) play a vital role in framing the problem areas and proposing solutions. Based on the data that I have collected from various sources (i.e. newspaper reports, publications of Alevi intellectuals and organizations, elite interviews and fieldwork data collected in Istanbul, Ankara and Hacı Bektaş district of Nevşehir), I discuss the variations within the Alevi community and their effects on the representation of the Alevi interests.

2.2. Representing Alevi Interests in Non-electoral Domains

With the rise of the social movements in the 1960s and the 1970s, the proponents of identity politics have sought to obtain greater empowerment, representation and the recognition of inequalities in the relations between the majorities and minorities.[135] The religious, sexual, racial, linguistic or ethnic markers that have been used to discriminate against certain groups have provided the basis for organizing movements and institutions to change a group's place in society.[136] The advocates of identity movements have demanded greater social justice, based on the recognition of the differences in the public and political spheres. However, these struggles have also created their own paradoxes. The underrepresented and discriminated groups have sought both equal democratic inclusion and also the recognition of differences. In other

[134] Michael Saward, "Authorisation and authenticity: Representation and the unelected," *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 17, no. 1 (2009): 2-3.

[135] Phillips, *Politics of Presence*, 5-9

[136] See Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*; Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", and Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*.

words, they have demanded to be integrated into society and at the same time be able to enjoy full citizenship rights without necessarily being fully assimilated.

Although in democratic systems identity politics can become a tool for the improvement of the quality of democracy, they may also increase the deepening of societal, economic and political cleavages.[137] Identity groups can both aid and impede equal regard for their own members, as well as the members of the "other" groups. As discussed in Chapter 1, the right-claims of the collectivities can be perceived as a threat to the common-good and well-being of the majority. The response of the state to the needs and demands of the identity groups can involve different levels of inclusion/exclusion for different types of institutional arrangements.

It is important to note that interests are not treated here as a means to an end. Group interests do not exist out there in the public life; they are constructed and articulated into various forms. The groups do not immediately mobilize around specific interests to get their way.[138] They are vital tools to understand how a group is organized, and what they seek. The content, actors and strategies of the Alevi interest representation is the main focus of this chapter.

2.2.1.1. Political Representation Concept Revisited

It is true that in modern politics most of the representation is carried out by elected officials. Hence, in most studies the notion of political representation is confined to the representation of the individual through the electoral processes, which has clear accountability mechanisms.[139] Accordingly, the classical logic of representation

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[137] Seyla Benhabib eds. *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

[138] The literature on interest group theories emphasizes different dimensions of interest mobilization. In his *Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Mancur Olson (1965) criticized the assumptions about the natural inclination of citizens to take joint action in their collective interests. He suggests that most people would not join in collective action unless the benefits of joining are greater than the costs of non-participation. In response to Olson's individual-centered approach, Salisbury (1994) emphasize that not all groups are individual based that interest groups representing institutions have different incentives for mobilization. For more discussion on the mobilization of interests see Mancur Olson, *Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Robert Salisbury, "Interest Structures and Policy Domains: A Focus on Research," in *Representing Interests and Interest Group Representation*, eds. William J. Crotty, Mildred A. Schwartz, and John C. Green, 12-20. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994)

[139] Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes, "Elections and Representation" in *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, eds. Adam Przeworski et.al., 29-54 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Guillermo A. O'Donnell, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 3, (July, 1998): 112-26.

suggests that individuals are selected and authorized through formal mechanisms (i.e. elections) to make decisions on the people's behalf. Based on the characteristics of the political system, the representatives enjoy different degrees of discretion ranging from delegates to trustees. They can either act as delegates following the expressed preferences and demands of their constituents as James Madison claimed in *The Federalist Papers*, or they can follow their own judgment about the proper course of action, and become trustees as Edmund Burke depicted in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.[140]

Even though the delegate vs. trustee controversy in the study of political representation has long been discussed at the conceptual level, the notion of representation still refers to a principle-agent relationship. There is still no such thing as self-representation. As Pitkin argues, the logic of representation requires one to make oneself present.[141] Essentially, political representation occurs when political actors (i) stand for the *interests* of, (ii) authorized by, and (iii) are held accountable to the represented.[142] As the relationship between the represented and the representative is highly dependent on the institutional frameworks within which it takes place, the notion of representation is a highly dynamic and multilayered concept.

Since Warren and Castiglione (2004) put forward, the changes in the patterns of politics and the way people relate to their political community are further added to the multidimensionality of the concept. Study of representation and aggregation of the interests through territorially based electoral mechanisms is no longer sufficient.[143] Three new dimensions – i.e. territory, identity and function – are added to the conceptualization of political representation as a result of:

(i) the introduction of transnational decision-making arenas and powerful players with increasing control of the issues, at both the national and supranational levels,

[140] See Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, *The Federalist Papers*, No. 52 (New York: Cosimo Inc., 2006); Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, (London: Penguin Books, 1968).

[141] Hannah Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1967), 8.

[142] Ibid, 11

[143] Mark Warren and Dario Castiglione, "The Transformation of Democratic Representation," *Democracy and Society* 2, no. 1, (Fall, 2004): 5 - 20.

(ii) the rise of identity politics due to increasing dissatisfaction of groups with political egalitarianism principles, and

(iii) the "diffusion of more informal structures and opportunities for democratic representation and influence.[144]"

Given the empirical evidence about the participatory democracy mechanisms, it is no longer possible to identify a clear conceptual dichotomy between participation and representation. In other words, participation and representation often intersect. Political representation takes place alongside direct citizen participation in new and transformed institutions. Institutional innovations, as in participatory city budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil[145] or Panchayat reforms in West Bengal and Kerala, India,[146] do not only facilitate empowered citizen participation, but also enable new structures for representation of interests.[147] Many of participatory institutional designs target civil society actors or organized groups rather than individuals, and whenever individual participation is required in these participatory experiments, the participants also act for or spoke on behalf of particular groups. Additionally, the vast literature on interest groups and interest group politics further question monopoly of formal political institutions on legitimate representation of interests.[148] Therefore, it is crucial to recognize the political practice aspect of political representation.

As a subset of the previous dimension, one may think of institutional and associational groups of civil society as representatives. In principle, such a group can represent "shared interests" or "specific interests" of a collectivity. Additionally, interest groups in a democratic system can meet what Bartolini and Mair (2001) call the

[144] Ibid, 5

[145] The participatory budget in Brazil emerged as an experiment to transform clientelistic arrangements. It involves a multi-level administrative arrangement that enables residents of Porto Alegre to directly participate in forging city-budget and securing common goods like transportation or health care.

[146] Panchayat reforms involve democratization and empowerment of formally elected village councils (*gram panchayats*) to maintain all local public goods and implement local public projects.

[147] Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright "Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance" in *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*, eds. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, (New York: Verso, 2003), 10-14.

[148] See Graham K. Wilson, *Interest groups*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); David K. Ryden, Representation in Crisis: The Constitution, Interest Groups, and Political Parties (New York: University of New York Press, 1996); S.Laurel Weldon, *When Protest Makes Policy: How Social Movements Represent Disadvantaged Groups*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2011) .

political integration functions, i.e. articulating and aggregating interests and integrating and mobilizing citizens.[149]

However, the issues of accountability and authorization present a major challenge for recognizing interest groups as agents of representation. Unlike political parties, interest groups are not elected, and they do not always have the capability or the opportunity to be involved in the decision making processes directly. For that reason, many scholars are hesitant to use the term in explaining interest group activities.[150] While political parties can justify their role as representatives through their membership base and electoral success, such measurements are challenging for interest groups. For one, individual membership is not a necessary condition. Interest groups can be formed as "organization of organizations" and represent corporate interests, and some may have a few members, and exist only to influence policy (such as the Campaign for Lead Free Air / CLEAR in Britain).[151]

Particularly in the case of policy-centered groups, an interest group can lay claim to representation without the clear consent of the represented. As Rehfeld put it:

> Leaders of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the International Red Cross purportedly represent the interests of prisoners of war even when those individuals have had no say in the selection of their representatives. In other cases, like that of environmental groups, the interests represented are not even human ones.[152]

Public opinion and government recognition can be sufficient in identifying instances of representation. Therefore, following Rehfeld, I argue that representation can be justified whenever there is "an audience's judgment that some…rather than some other stands for a group in order to perform a specific function."[153] Either through *informal selection*[154] or *audience recognition*, civil society organizations can become *informal*

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[149] Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, "Challenges to Contemporary Political Parties," in *Political Parties and Democracy*, eds. Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 339, 341.

[150] Scott Mainwaring, "The Crisis of Representation in the Andes," *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 3 (July 2006): 13-27.

[151] See Grant Jordan, Darren Halpin, and William Maloney, "Defining Interests"

[152] John Rehfeld, "Towards a General Theory of Political Representation," *Journal of Politics* 68, no 1 (February, 2006): 1

[153] Ibid, 2

[154] Informal selection here occurs via individual membership base. Accordingly, if the articulated interests are organized in institutionalized forms and require individual membership, then some form of horizontal accountability can be established through peers answering to peers.

representatives of collective interests. Informal representation seeks to influence political processes by communicating information, demands and interests. Based on this conceptualization, I argue that the Alevi associations, foundations and federations established more recent years, are agents of representation. By "giving voice" to their "constituents", these groups try to aggregate support for economic, social or political claims of the collectivities that they represent.

2.2.1.2. "Frames": Tools of "giving voice"

Frames, rooted in Goffman's frame analytical perspective, are schemas of interpretation that enable individuals to come together by (i) diagnosing social ills, (ii) prognosing movement possibilities and outcomes, and (iii) motivating for collective social action.[155] As a result, frames can change perceptions of existing structures of power and inequality in order "to further undermine the legitimacy of the [political/social/cultural] system or its perceived mutability."[156] Through frames movements/groups can give 'claims' a specific content. They provide a core understanding of a problematic condition or situation, identify the actors at stake, and then call for specific action.[157] As Lowery and Brasher stated; "once an issue is defined as a policy problem, how it is framed may influence the support or opposition faced by a proposed solution." [158]

Yet, interest groups cannot frame and reframe issues to their liking. Framing efforts of groups can be curbed down by the opportunity structures and lack of (or limitation of) public interest above the issue at hand. However, if an interest group can "take the lead in identifying and discussing a problem, it can shape the public perceptions" and legislative responses.[159] Frames can be used to assign domestic issues

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[155] David A. Snow, "Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields", in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Haspeter Kriesi, 380-412. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment" in *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, (2000): 614-5.

[156] Doug McAdam,, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. *Comparative perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings, Cambridge studies in comparative politics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8.

[157] Sidney G. Tarrow *The New Transnational Activism,* (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 32-34.

[158]David Lowery, and Holly Brasher, *Organized Interests and American Government*, (Boston: McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2004).

[159] Ibid, 111.

a new international or transnational relevance or meaning.[160] Either by linking domestic issues to broader global frames, or by diffusing domestic frames across borders, actors move from domestic to international spheres. However, there are particular challenges of framing at the international level. Although global framing can "dignify and generalize claims that might otherwise remain narrow and parochial", it is hard to achieve because "activists must work within the power structures and political cultures of their own countries."[161]

In the specific context of the Alevi movement and its representative organizations, the frame of social and political claims is constructed along a number of dimensions. The socio-economic transformations, changes in the formal and informal institutional frameworks, introduction and diffusion of ideological movements, and emergence of new transnational networks have not only led to the transformation of the Alevi community, but they have also shaped the way in which the issue areas are determined and policy suggestions are made. The Alevi interest groups use a number of means to frame and communicate the issues. Among these, a popular method is conducting research on policy issues and then presenting them to the media, both to highlight the problems and the organization's position.[162]

2.2.1.3. Political Opportunity Structures

The concept of political opportunity structures refers to the institutional context which determines the degree of openness of a political system to challenges addressed by movements, organizations, groups or individuals.[163] Simply put, opportunity

[160] While this chapter, for the most part, deals with the issue of formation of the Alevi frames through the interaction of the domestic networks, chapter 3 presents the formation and use of the Alevi identity frames in the German transnational context.

[161] Tarrow, *New Transnational Activism* ,75

[162] See İnsan Hakları Araştırma Derneği, *Din ve Vicdan Özgürlüğü Hakkı İzleme Raporu,* (2009), accessed April 23, 2013, available at http://www.ihad.org.tr/dvo-raporlari.php*;* Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü *Alevi Raporu* (2010), accessed April 23, 2013, available at http://www.sde.org.tr/tr/haberler/859/sde-alevi-raporunu-basina-tanitti.aspx; Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği, *Alevi Olmak: Alevilerin Dilinden Ayrımcılık Hikâyeleri*, (Ankara: Pir Sultan Kültür Derneği, 2005); Alevi Kültür Dernekleri, *Türkiye'de Alevi Olmak*, (Ankara, 2010)

[163] Political opportunity structures are defined differently in the literature, emphasizing different aspects of institutional contexts. For an overall discussion see Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movement in Four Democracies" *British Journal of Political Science*, 16 (1986), 57-85; Donald McAdam. 'Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions' In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, eds. Donald McAdam et al., 23-40, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni, *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (St. Paul: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 26-8 & 34-5.

structures are determined by the regime of a given country. They can be expanded or constrained depending on (i) the level of inclusiveness of the institutionalized political system (i.e. level of access to institutions), (ii) the availability of influential allies, (iii) the stability and structure of alignments, and finally (iv) the state's capacity and propensity for repression (i.e. legal constraints).[164]

Political opportunity structures are not static, and do not lead to similar outcomes over time. What seems to be an opportunity structure that shapes claim-making process and organization and mobilization of an actor at one point may discourage it at another time. The opportunity structures in Turkey vary as the social, economic and political conditions change. They are of significance in shaping the way in which Alevi interest groups are formed, and how they act within a given period of time.

2.3. The Transformation of the Alevi Community: A Brief Historical Overview

The rise of the Alevi collective action has been discussed with reference to various theoretical frames. The literature on the Alevis employed numerous conceptual models both analytically and functionally to help uncover the transformation of the Alevi community as well as the scope and content of Alevi collective action.[165] Yet, it is clear that no single dimension is sufficient to explain the transformation of the community and the rise of the Alevi collective action. An overview of the period between 1950 and 1980 indicates that the Alevi movement was marked with conflicts between urban and rural, between traditional first generation migrants and the politicized and more urbanized second generation, between leftists and nationalists, and finally between the Alevis and the Islamists. However, the threat of political Islam, the attacks on the Alevis in Sivas and Istanbul, along with the transformative power of the transnational Alevi migrant communities, laid the ground for a new movement in the late 1980s.[166] Although as early as the 1960s Alevis began to 'go public'[167] to adjust

[164] Donald McAdam, 'Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions'

[165] A great wealth of perspectives dominates the literature on the Alevi identity movement. The transformation of the community and rise of collective action is explained with reference to: modernization (Shankland, 1993 & 2003; Subaşı, 2005; Erdemir, 2004); center-periphery relations (Ateş, 2006; Bozkurt, 1998, Dressler, 2005); urbanization (Bozkurt, 1998; Çamuroğlu, 1998 & 2004; Erman, and Göker, 2000); transnational social movements (Massicard, 2003, 2007 & 2013; Şahin, 2005; Sökefeld, 2003, 2004 & 2008); and media affect (Vorhoff, 1998; Yavuz, 1999; Çaha, 2004).

[166] Şehriban Şahin, "The Rise of Alevism as a Public Religion", *Current Sociology* Vol. 53, no. 3 (May, 2005): 465-85

themselves to the urban sphere, the Alevi movement of the post-1980 period increasingly became more transnational and rights-oriented.

2.3.1. Early Transformations: Effects of Migration and Social Change

Along with the social and political changes of the 1950s, the spatial marginalization of the Alevi community gradually came to an end. The spread of communication networks, introduction of compulsory schooling, increasing levels of industrialization, migration and urbanization that began in the 1950s had a tremendous impact on the Alevi community in Turkey, which was historically organized as a rural community.[168] The continuous population loss in the Alevi villages in Anatolia and the subsequent urbanization of the Alevi population led to the inevitable transformation of the religious institutions and practices and networks of relations of the community.[169] The immediate effect of the religious, ideological, economic, educational, and political conditions in the urban context was the re-construction of Alevism. Migration and urbanization forced the Alevis to interact with their urban Sunni "others", and push the community either to transform or to eliminate its institutions.

Musahiplik[170], the functional solidarity system of rural life, was unable to survive in the difficult economic conditions of the urban areas. The Alevi migrants, who

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[167] José Casanova argues that one of the reasons that a religion enters into the public sphere is first to "protect the traditional life-world from administrative or judicial state penetration." and then to open up "issues of norm and will formation to the public" See José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, (London & Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 58

[168] Although there is no nationwide data available to pinpoint the direction of the migration patterns, projections and regional researches on the issue indicate that Alevis villages are more likely to have higher outmigration rates than their Sunni neighbors. In the four major cities known to have Alevi majorities (Sivas, Tokat, Çorum and Kahramanmaraş) the Alevi populated districts experienced more population loss than other mixed or Sunni dominated ones. A similar trend can also be observed in the outmigration rates for Tunceli, which is another Alevi dominated province populated mostly by Kurdish (Zaza) Alevis. By 1985 the outmigration rate of the city reached 43 per cent. See Şehriban Şahin, "Transformation from Secret Oral to Public Written Culture in National and Transnational Social Spaces" *Unpublished PhD dissertation.* (New School, Department of Sociology, 2001).

[169] Extant literature on the Alevis confirm that the migration of the Alevis most commonly occurs as chain migration, through which, first the close-relatives of the pioneering migrant, then the village and in some cases the whole province engage in large scale migration. See David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, (Cambridge, The Eothen Press, 1999), 168; Shankland, "Alevi and Sunni in Rural Turkey", 1-19; Şehriban Şahin, "Transformation from Secret Oral to Public Written Culture in National and Transnational Social Spaces" *Unpublished PhD dissertation*. (New School, Department of Sociology, 2001), 97-100; Philip L. Martin, *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1991); Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, "The Turkish Alevis." *Innovation* 5, no. 3(1992): 109-114.

[170] *Musahiplik* refers to a fictive kinship uniting two men's families with a bond thicker than blood throughout their lives. Accordingly, *musahip*s are responsible for each others' actions and misconducts. If

competed with each other in the urban workforce, could no longer support their *musahip* economically. The responsibilities and the duties of the Alevi *dede*s[171] were redefined as the bond between the *dede*s and *talip*s (followers) were weakened. In the cities, the *dede*s had to compete with their *talip*s in the labour force and ceased to be the only authority figures for the community. When they migrated, their followers faced the challenge of keeping the religious knowledge and practices alive. The Alevis in towns and cities tried to perpetuate religious practices by organizing *cem*s. Nonetheless, due to the lack of Alevi worship places in large towns and cities, and increasing social pressures, religious practice declined.

An additional effect of migration and rapid urbanization was the level of social differentiation. Accordingly, many of the unskilled and uneducated first-generation Alevi migrants were employed in the factories and low prestige jobs of the booming public sector. It was the second-generation that enjoyed the benefits of education as a tool for upward social mobility. Yet, in both cases, many had to hide their religious identities to escape discrimination in the workplace and in their neighborhoods. Thus, labor union activism and left-wing political parties provided new grounds for organization of the urban (Alevi) interests.[172] The leftist movements and organizations provided an alternative source of visibility for the working-class Alevis and the second-generation Alevi migrants who were mostly students. The first generation migrants were more concerned with economic issues and survival in the cities. Consequently, faith-based and culture-based associational activities emerged only after a level of urban integration occurred.

As a result of the growing dissatisfaction with the political elites, and emergence of favorable opportunity structures, the visibility of the Alevi community increased with the rise of a lively associational life. Starting from the early 1960s, a number of solidarity (*hemşeri*) associations were founded in *gecekondu* neighborhoods. These

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one of them needs aid the other is required to help him, i.e. to feed his family, to pay his debts, etc. However, the Alevi migrants, who are competing with each other in the urban workforce, could no longer support their *musahip* economically. See Cemal Şener, *Alevilik Nedir*, (İstanbul: Karacaahmet Sultan Dergahı Yayınları, 2001), 66-67; Fuat Bozkurt, "State Community Relations in the Restructuring of Alevism" in *Alevi Identity* , Olsson et al , 87.

[171] The ideal functions of *dedes* in the traditional rural Alevi community can be summarized as being social and religious leaders in the community. They are expected to set an example for the congregation by their behavior and morality. Additionally, due to their sacred powers and charisma, they have greater authority and power in the community than any other type of leadership structure.

[172] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 25.

village and hometown networks helped the new immigrants in finding jobs and accommodations, and providing basic needs.[173] Yet, it was not until the mid-1960s that the first Alevi journals, *Cem* and *Ehli Beyt*, were published emphasizing Alevism, and Alevi problems, local radio stations established by Alevis started broadcasting, and Alevi gatherings and festivals began to flourish.[174] However, the Alevi elites were always careful not to adopt a discourse of difference in their speeches and publications. The Alevi community was always represented as a founding member of the modern state and the guardian of Kemalist principles.

2.3.2. First Alevi Identity Movement and the Road to Increased Alevi Associational Activity

While the 1960 military coup marked the first breakdown of Turkish democracy the relatively liberal 1961 Constitution paved the way to the emergence of dynamic and free press, as well as an increase in the number of political parties, and socio-economic and political associations. The changes in the institutional structures expanded both the conventional forms of political participation and protest behavior along.[175] In the post-1960 period, student revolts, trade union movements, clashes between ideological groups, and sectarian conflicts in society quickly became part of the Turkish political life.[176]

Between 1961 and 1963 a number of motions, commission reports and bills were concerning the religious sectarian issues submitted to the parliament. Additionally, the legislative meeting on the budget of the DİB turned into lengthy debates on Turkey's religious identity.[177] While no substantial changes took place, the debates on the organization of the DİB in TBMM and the media in the early 1960s underlined the need for representation of Alevi interests both in the National Assembly and the public sphere. In 1963 a directive from General Cemal Gürsel, the President of the Republic,

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[173] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 165; Fuat Bozkurt, *Çağdaşlaşma Sürecinde Alevilik* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2000), 81.

[174] Lütfi Kaleli, *Alevi Kimliği ve Alevi Örgütlenmeleri*, (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2000), 18.

[175] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and İlter Turan, "Measuring Political Participation: A Cross-Cultural Application," *Comparative Political Studies* 14, no.1, (1981) 123-35; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, 93-7.

[176] Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Dynamics, 103-5.

[177] *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, 1 session 22, (December 15, 1961), 313-4; volume 2 session 50, (February 19, 1962), 610-38, and volume 11, session 37 (January 30, 1963) 392.

requesting Alevi dignitaries to give their opinion on the planned establishment of a *mezhep* bureau (bureau of sects) within DİB, triggered another public debate.

The right-wing media was particularly critical of the proposal No. 1/392 that was submitted to the National Assembly by CHP concerning the establishment of a bureau of sects. Two conservative newspapers, *Yeni İstanbul*[178]and *Adalet*[179], claimed that Alevis has no religious basis. Their editors and writers argued that the boundaries of the sectarian relations were limited to Sunni vs. Shiite dichotomy, in which the syncretistic characteristic and oral tradition of the Alevi faith forced the Alevis to forfeit representation within DİB.

As the Alevi communal and religious identity was increasingly attacked by the right-wing media, and the political parties, the emerging radical student movements and the Alevi elites provided a counter-critique.[180] Among these, the declaration signed by the four students from Ankara University (Mustafa Timisi, Engin Dikmen, Seyfi Oktay and Ali İlhan) in 1963 marked the beginning of a movement, which organized itself to eventually become a political party.[181] This declaration was significant since it was the first (Alevi) document that used the term "Alevi" publicly. The declaration emphasized the necessity of the *Article 10* of the new proposed bill on DİB for equal representation and condemned the negative labeling of the Alevis in the media.

Awareness about the Alevis further increased with the beginning of the process of rapprochement between the Alevi and the Bektashi communities. The founding of Hacı Bektaş Tourism and Information Association [HBTTD - *Hacı Bektaşi Veli Turizm ve Tanıtma Derneği*] by Cemalettin Ulusoy, the *cem* ceremony that took place in Ankara in December of 1963, and the seminar series that began later in 1964 were all influential developments that increased the visibility of the Alevis in the public sphere.[182] The commemorative ceremonies of Hacı Bektaş Veli that began in 1964 followed the

[178] In the op-eds by M. Raif Ogan on March 23, 25 and 27, 1963, he claimed that there was no need for introduction of a new office to deal with sectarian relations since there were no sects in Turkey. Consequently, inclusion of Alevism into the DİB would lead to the justification of superstition rather than preventing them.

[179] Op-ed by Ali Ak and Abdülrezzak Öz, *Adalet*, March 23, 1963

[180] "Açık Oturum: Alevilik, Sünnilik," *Yarın*, May 9, 1963; "Alevi gençler bildiri yayınladı," *Milliyet*, May 1, 1963

[181] The formation of the TBP will be the subject matter of Chapter 4.

[182] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 26-7.

example of the Mevlevi ceremonies in Konya[183] and promoted itself as a tourist attraction.[184] In this early period the ceremonies were mostly organized as cultural events and they did not involve a political dimension.

HBTTD and other associations founded by the Alevis were crucial in maintaining the heritage of Alevism. The significance of associations (and later foundations) lied in their capacity to fund and promote religious activity. Once an association was established and officially approved, its members could raise money for a particular cause by collecting donations from door to door (or from their members). While most of the associations established by the Sunnis aimed at building mosques[185], the Alevis used associations to finance funeral costs to transport the body of the deceased to his/her village, to organize lessons for people interested learning how to play the *saz* (lute) and practice together, later to establish and fund the places for holding *cem* ceremonies. In other words, these associations were immensely important to those who wished to practice Alevism as a living religion.

The final factor that further stimulated the institutionalization of Alevi activism was the frustration of the Alevi elites with their political representatives regarding the beginning of violent conflicts between the Sunnis and the Alevis. The clashes began in early June 1966 in the Ortanca Village in Muğla and they rapidly escalated into an Alevi-Sunni conflict dominating the headlines in the press and the debates in TBMM. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and the incumbent Justice Party [AP - *Adalet Partisi*,] government labeled the attack as an individual event (*münferit vak'a*) and blamed the press for creating instability in the aftermath of the 1966 senate elections.[186] Although the newly-elected CHP senators called for the establishment of a commission to investigate the events, this proposal was declined. Instead CHP sent its Muğla deputy Turan Şahin to Ortanca to investigate this event.[187] Although a number of Alevi

[183] Mevlevis since 1953 are allowed an annual whirl in public as a tourist attraction.

[184] John D. Norton, "Bektashis in Turkey" in *Islam in the Modern World* eds. Denis MacEoin, and Ahmed al-Shahi (London&Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), 80

[185] Yücekök showed that the increasing use of associations to promote religious actives after Democratic Party [DP – *Demokrat Parti*] came to power. Among the associations with religious purposes the largest was that of associations formed with a view to building or maintaining a mosque. By 1968, 10730 of the 37806 associations in Turkey had a religious agenda, and 8419 of those were aimed at building mosques. See Ahmet N. Yücekök, *Türkiye'de Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı (1946-1968)* (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler, 1971).

[186] "Demirel: bütün Vatantaşlar eşittir," *Milliyet*, June 16, 1966, 7

[187] Ahmet Demirel, *Nihat Erim Günlükler: 1925-1979*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005), 829-30.

intellectuals urged the Alevi deputies in the opposition parties to submit a vote of confidence against the government, their effort did not succeed. [188]

The immediate result of their failure and also existence of favorable opportunity structures led to the establishment of an Alevi-based political party for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic. On June 18, 1966 Cemal Özbey declared that an Alevi party would be established to protect the interests of the Alevi community.[189] Even though Özbey had plans to form an Alevi-based party for some time, the Ortanca events and the absence of the legisture to discuss this issue gave further support for the formation of an Alevi party.[190] On October 17, 1966 Union Party of Turkey [TBP – *Türkiye Birlik Partisi*] was officially established by a number intellectuals and professionals, who had no or very little previous experience in politics.[191]

The foundation of TBP, the publication of Alevi journals such as *Cem* and *Ehl-i Beyt*, the emerging associations, the rapprochement between the Bektashis and the Alevis, along with the emerging labor activism, all contributed to both the creation of the collective identity and the institutionalization of the Alevi interests. Yet, political polarization and increasing political violence in the late 1970s led to the re-conceptualization of the Alevi identity and transformation the Alevi activism in the public sphere.

2.3.3. Polarization of Associational Activity in the 1970s

The flourishing levels and modes of participation in the 1960s and the 1970s created its own challenges for governance and stability in Turkey. Economic downturn in the country coupled with the effects of rapid urbanization and migration further promoted fragmentation of the society along ideological, sectarian and ethnic lines. By

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[188] Even though Hüseyin Balan from Nation Party (MP) submitted a motion of interpellation against Süleyman Demirel and Faruk Sükan (the Minister of Internal Affairs), he was forced to retrieve the motion two days later due to the request of his party's leader Osman Bölükbaşı.

[189] "Mezhepçiliğe karşı olan yeni bir parti kurulacağı açıklandı," *Milliyet* June 18, 1966, 1-7

[190] Kelime Ata, *Alevilerin ilk Siyasal Denemesi: Türkiye Birlik Partisi (1966-1980),* (Ankara: Kelime Yayınevi, 2007), 50-62.

[191] The founding members of the TBP were: Hasan Tahsin Berkman (retired general), Cemal Özbey (lawyer), Feyzullah Ulusoy (lawyer), Salim Delikanlı (retired officer), Tahsin Tosun Sevinç (trade union representative), Mustafa Geygel (contractor/land owner), Mehmet Güner (economist), Mehmet Ali Egeli (Economist), İbrahim Zerze (worker), Hüseyin Dedekargınoğlu (print owner), Hüseyin Günal (contractor), Mustafa Topal (doctor), Hüseyin Eren (Retired officer), Eli Kemal Eroğlu (worker), Hüseyin Erkanlı (lawyer), and Faruk Ergünsoy (lawyer). See Ata, *Alevilerin ilk Siyasal Denemesi*

the late 1970s, the political system in Turkey was characterized by a paralyzed National Assembly, and a major crisis stemming from spreading violence and instability.[192]

This period was also characterized by convergence between the Alevi community and the left. Among the newly emerging Alevi working class, the Kurdish-Zaza Alevis and the educated second-generation rural migrants, leftist views were considered as progressive ideals. These actors provided a new pool of support and membership for labor unions, especially left-wing Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey [DİSK - *Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederayonu*] and illegal radical left organizations [such as TIKKO, DHKP-C, DEVSOL, and TKP]. As the Alevi actors participated in and shaped left-wing movements, the movements began to be identified with its Alevi actors.[193] For the most part, the Alevis were welcomed by these radical movements as they provided a new social base for recruitment and mobilization.[194]

The Alevi actors, particularly the youth, reconstructed the historical figures and rebellions according to Marxism, and re-assessed the Alevi teachings as a revolutionary doctrine. Within this process, religious and mystic concepts were reformulated to match socialists' understanding of rights and justice, and the historic figures of the Alevi faith and culture were transformed into the symbols of revolutionary resistance.[195]

Additionally, Kurdish Alevis – who had been disproportionally excluded from political processes – began to articulate their interests through legal and illegal organizations. Although the TBP was formed as a sect-based party, it did not attract many followers from Turkey's Kurdish Alevi population. Instead, a significant portion of the Kurdish Alevis became a pool of support for radical political parties and their armed factions.[196]

Since ideological confrontations turned into social conflict and violence, particularly in the provinces with mixed ethnic and sectarian populations, such as

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[192] Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics*, 120-4

[193] Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 29.

[194] Sabri Sayarı, "Violence and terrorism in Turkey 1976-1980: a retrospective analysis" *Terrorism and political violence* 22, no. 2 (2010): 198-215; Sabri Sayarı, and Bruce Hoffman, "Urbanization and insurgency: The Turkish case 1976-1980," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 5, no. 2 (1994): 162-79.

[195] Among those, the figure of Pir Sultan Abdal transformed into revolutionary hero and his struggle with the (Sunni) Ottoman Governor Hızır Paşa presented as the model of resistance for justice. Illustrations of Pir Sultan Abdal, raising his lute (saz) in defiance, incorporated into the emblems of various left-wing Alevi organizations.

[196] Michiel Leezenbero, "Kurdish Alevis and the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s" in *Turkey's Alevi Enigma*, White, and Jorgerden, 198-199.

Kahramanmaraş, Sivas, Çorum, Malatya, Tokat and Erzincan, social cleavages were deepened and intensified. The more the Alevi-Sunni confrontations increased, the more the Alevis became major suspects and targets of political violence.[197] The rumors implicating the Alevi population as the culprit of (i) alleged mosque burning in Sivas, (ii) assassination of the mayor in Malatya, or (iii) bombing of a theater in Kahramanmaraş, led to the death and injury of thousands of inhabitants and the destruction of various shops and businesses in these cities.[198] The bloody and dramatic nature of the events was influential in reshaping the collective memory of the Alevi identity movement and the emergence of narratives of violent discrimination and victimization. The immediate impact of these events was distancing of Alevis from the processes and institutions of the Turkish politics. The police, local authorities and legal authorities were no longer seen by the Alevis as the neutral parties in these ongoing sectarian conflicts.

2.3.4. The Breakdown of the Regime and the Emergence of a New Alevi Identity Movement

The 1980 military coup was another landmark in the transformation of the Alevi community and the articulation of Alevi interests. The increased identification of the group with left-wing groups and movements that started in the late 1960s marginalized the community in the aftermath of the coup d'etat.[199] The new institutional design that was introduced in the 1982 Constitution displayed distrust towards civil society associations and political parties of all ideological convictions. The mistrust of the Alevi associations led to the closing down of many Alevi organizations, and the imprisonment of large numbers of Alevi activists. The institutional transformations introduced by the new military regime shattered the networks and ties that were established by the Alevi community during the past decades.

The 1982 Constitution revoked many rights that were secured by the 1961 Constitution. Restrictions on the formation of associations and political parties forced groups and communities to establish alternative networks to represent their interests.

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[197] Joost Jongerden, "Violation of Human Rights and the Alevis in Turkey" in *Turkey's Alevi Enigma*, White, and Jorgerden, 83-84.

[198] Emma Sinclair Webb, "Sectarian violence, the Alevi minority and the left: Kahramanmaraş 1978" in *Turkey's Alevi Enigma*, White, and Jorgerden, 215 -35.

[199] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*.

The elites of the previous Alevi identity movement was replaced with the new Alevi elites. These born-again second generation Alevi elites took up the role of 'identity entrepreneurs'[200] and claimed authority on their knowledge of Alevism. These new elites who were not limited to the *dede*s (who traditionally are considered as the sole authority on esoteric knowledge, beliefs, rituals and practices)[201] sought answers to the questions as to who an Alevi is and what constitutes Alevism. By publishing opinion pieces, books or periodicals, giving speeches in various panels and conferences, or appearing in the media, these new Alevi elites shape the scope and content of the new frame of the Alevi collective action.

Regarding these developments, Vorhoff emphasizes the significance of the press, and the new publishing houses.[202] As the restrictions on public broadcasting and the press gradually were lifted, this newly-emerging form of activism began to use the media and public representation channels to raise public awareness about Alevism and Alevi claims. Countless new books on Alevism were published, new publishing houses were founded, and series on the Alevis began to appear in almost all major newspapers in the 1990s. Even though the publications by the Alevis and the non-Alevis on Alevism and Alevi religious figures had been in circulation long before the 1980s, [203] the works of the post-1980 period were vital in formalization of Alevism as a 'public religion'. These new publications not only tried to systematically analyze and standardize Alevism, but they also sought to standardize the Alevi communal interests. These works both provided guidelines about the Alevi beliefs and worship, and presented solutions to the problems that the Alevi community faced.[204]

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[200] An identity entrepreneur is an individual, typically a charismatic voice, who finds it desirable to create or reinforce group identities. Either by highlighting the injustices the group in question faces or creating myths about the significance of the group, the identity entrepreneur tries to create or reinforce collective identities. See Barbara Ballis Lal, "Ethnic Identity Entrepreneurs: Their Role in Transracial and Intercountry Adoptions," *Asian and Pacific Migration Journa*l 6 (1997): 385-413

[201] Even though most authors of Alevism and Alevi movement are not from the dede/baba lineages as Şahin (2005) claims, there are some figures like Bedri Noyan *(dedebaba*) or Mehmet Yaman (*dede*) who have also written on Alevi/Bektashi faith and practices and issues of the community.

[202] Karin Vorhoff, "Academic and journalistic publications on the Alevi and Bektashi of Turkey" in *Alevi Identity*, eds. *Olsson, et.al.* 23-51.

[203] Such as Haydar Alkor, *Mevlevilik ve Bektaşilik*, (Konya: Yeni Kitap Basımevi, 1946); Hasan Bahri Er, *Tarih Boyunca Alevilik* (İstanbul: Varol Matbaası, 1954), and Cemal Özbey, *Alevilik Üzerine Tartışmalar* (Ankara: Emek Basım Evi, 1963).

[204] *Cumhuriyet* newspaper became a medium of the Alevi elites to educate the public on Alevi issues between 1990 and 1999. Additionally, a number of publications emerged during the 1990s, which diagnose and then propose solutions to the problems of the Alevis. See Rıza Zelyurt, *Aleviler Ne*

In addition to the standardization of the Alevi practices, the Alevi movement of the 1980s and the 1990s also involved the institutionalization of the Alevi ritual practices, through construction of the *cem* houses. In this way, Alevism was transformed into a 'congressional' religion. Unlike a mosque, the Alevi a *cem house* is not an architecturally distinct sacred building. However, in the urban context, as more and more Alevis migrated to the cities, the notion of the *cem* houses was re-defined in accordance to the changing needs of the community. In the 1960s and the 1970s, *cem* houses were established in the large cities, and they were "near the shrine of an Alevi saint", "in reopened old Bektashi convents", or in "nondescript buildings in urban neighborhoods with a heavy Alevi population".[205] It was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that these *cem* houses acquired institutional characteristics where members of the 'Alevi congregation' from different backgrounds came together.[206] The 'new' *cem* houses, in addition to being a sacred place for worship, were a space for funeral ceremonies, a communal kitchen to feed the poor, and a cultural centre where the Alevi community could learn its cultural heritage.

Along with these changes, the urban Alevi community required aid to educate and financially support its religious leaders (*dede*s), to fund its places of worship, and to educate the younger generations in the Alevi faith. The more the *cem* houses were institutionalized, the more their functions became an area for contestation with the state sponsored institutions. As the legitimacy of the Alevi faith and its institutions were not been recognized, the courtrooms became the place for challenging the role of state institutions and policies since 1998.[207]

In addition to the changes in the formal and informal institutions, transformation of the elites and the increased importance of the media, domestic third parties (who cannot be necessarily labeled as pro-Alevis) also need to be taken into account in

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Yapmalı?: Şehirlerdeki Alevilerin Sorunları-Çözümleri (İstanbul: Yön Yayınları, 1993) and Baki Öz, *Aleviliğe İftirağlara Cevaplar* (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 1996).

[205] Martin van Bruinessen *"Religious Practicess in the Turco-Iranian World: Continuity and Change"* Accessed December 21, 2012, available at: http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/religious_practices_in_the_turco.htm.

[206] Günkut Akın "Cem Evi Mimarisi Üzerine Notlar", *Cem Kültür Evi Mimari Proje Yarışması*, (İstanbul: Cem Vakfı Yayınları, 1996).

[207] Markus Dressler "Making Religion Through Secularist Legal Discourse: The Case of Turkish Alevism" in *Secularism and Religion Making*, eds. Markus Dressler, and Arvind S. Mandair, 187-208, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

understanding the dynamics of the Alevi identity politics. Depending on their own framework of interpretation on Alevis, these groups and movements seek alliances or further discrimination. The assessment of the stance of these actors is vital to have a better understanding of the formation / transformation of issue areas of Alevi politics, and strategies of Alevi organizations and associations in making demands. Among those, the role of Islamists revivalist *Kulturkampf*[208] and Kurdish nationalists will be assessed in the subsequent sections.[209]

2.4. Links with Other Movements in the post-1980 Period

In the early 1990s, the Alevi identity movement was marked with a series of significant events that included the hotel burning in Sivas (1993), the protests sparked by the derogatory comments of Güner Ümit, the host of the popular TV show *Turnike* (January, 1995)[210], and the Gazi riots in Istanbul (March, 1995). The rising levels of discrimination along with the prevailing threat of political violence increased the feelings of victimization among the Alevis. Even though the actors of the Islamist revivalist camp denied expressing anti-Alevi sentiments threat perception of the Alevi community became intensified following the Sivas events of 1993.

2.4.1. Links with the Islamic revivalists

The Sivas events of 1993, "The Sivas massacre" as it is called, marked the breaking point in the Alevi identity movement as it led to an increase in consciousness among the Alevis. Burning down of Madımak Hotel by a mob of Islamic revivalist on the second day of the Pir Sultan Abdal festivities on July 2, 1993 led to the death of 37

[208] Here the term is employed in line with Ersin Kalaycıoğlu (2005). Accordingly, it refers to a clash between two different images on how a good society is organized. The first camp put emphasis on the significance of science and progress as the key values of politics and society labeled as the secular *kulturkampf*. Praise of traditional lifestyles and gratitude [*şüküretmek*] to one's place in society marked the latter camp, which is labeled as the revivalist *kulturkampf* throughout the work.

[209] The transnational dimensions of these movements will not be discussed here. As the transnational dynamics is the subject matter of the next chapter, the chapter at hand will only focus on the domestic actors, strategies and effects of the movements.

[210] On January 10, 1995 Ümit made a joke implying incestuous relationships [*mum söndü*] among Alevis on a live show. Immediately after the unfortunate joke many Alevis all over Istanbul gathered around the building of the TV station to protest Ümit. Following the large protests and criticisms, Ümit had to resign from the program. Even though the event has no direct links to either Islamic revivalism or Kurdish nationalism, it is significant for showing the deepening desire of the Alevi masses for recognition and respect.

people. The footage of the brutal event was aired numerous times on TV stations, and the images of the helpless victims and the violent mob on TV and in the press traumatized the Alevi public. The failure of the police forces to repress the protestors and the length of the judicial process transformed the event into a symbol of Alevi repression.

The actions of the mayor, Temel Karamollaoğlu[211] during the events, and the representation of the detainees by Şevket Kazan[212] in court, strengthen the distrust of the Alevi community towards the Islamist revivalist camp. This distrust was deepened by a series of a derogatory expression made by the Welfare Party [RP – *Refah Partisi*] political elite. In 1997, the labeling of popular protest campaign "One Minute of Darkness for Eternal Light" [*Sürekli Aydınlık Için Bir Dakika Karanlık*][213] as a candle extinguishing (*mumsöndü*) game by Minister of Justice Şevket Kazan in a speech given in his visit to RP local branch in Gölcük, [214] responded with a public outcry and later a suit filed by the Alevi association Semah Culture Foundation [*Semah Kültür Vakfı*].[215]

While the actors of the revivalist camp and their actions are perceived as a threat by most of the Alevi actors, the revivalists deny anti-Alevi sentiments. Indeed, the mid-1990s was marked with increasing encounters between the Alevi notables and the Islamists. The political elites sought to reach out to Alevi community with the hope of normalizing the relations and mobilizing the Alevi constituents. Alevis were seen as a potential pool of voters, and prior to both the 1994 local elections and 1995 general elections, RP reached out to Alevi notables for support.[216] RP's successor Virtue Party [FP - *Fazilet Partisi*] continued this trend. To this end, Recai Kutan, the chair of FP, attended meetings organized by Ehl-i Beyt Foundation and Association of Democratic

[211] Who was a member of the Islamists RP and prosecuted for preventing rapid response of the fire department and for encouraging the mob, but was not charged during the trial period.

[212] Who later became the Minister of Justice under the Refah-Yol (RP and DYP [*Doğru Yol Partisi*, True Path Party]) coalition government during 1996-97).

[213] In order to protest the scandalous state-Mafia relations uncovered by a car crash in Susurluk, participants of the protest flickered the lights at 9p.m. every night.

[214] The debate can be traced through a review of major newspapers between February 11 and 24 of 1997. See "Kazan: Okyanusta mücadele ediyoruz," *Milliyet*, February 11, 1997; "Sönen her mum hükümeti tüketiyor," *Milliyet*, February 13, 1997; "Aleviler Kazan'ı mahkemeye veriyor," *Milliye*t, February 14, 1997; "Mumsöndü TBMM'de," *Milliyet*, February 21, 1997

[215] A detailed account of the case can be found in Kaleli (2000).

[216] "RP'nin gözü bile Alevilerde," *Milliyet*, September 6, 1991; "Alevi dedesi İzzettin Doğan Refah Partisi'yle neden görüştüğünü Cumhuryet'e anlattı: Darbeye Karşı RP ile işbirliği" *Cumhuriyet*, February 26, 1994.

Industrialists and Businessmen [DEMSİAD - *Demokrat Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*].[217] Additionally, in the 1999 elections, Alevi candidates were selected for Tunceli province, and Fermani Altun[218] was placed second in the electoral list for Mersin.

However, these attempts did not trigger significant electoral gain either for RP or FP. Their successor AKP incorporated Alevi elites into its ranks, and introduced projects for normalization of relationship between the Alevis and the state. Although the relationships and the policy proposals were short-lived and limited, the nomination and the election of Alevi MPs and the rapprochement project coined as "Alevi Açılımı" (Alevi Opening) in the second term of AKP demonstrated a significant change in attitudes and behavior. The more the Alevi issues became a concern at the European level due to the lobbying activities of the Alevi interest groups and the applications to the ECtHR, the more the state was pressured to recognize and meet the demands of the Alevi community. In 2007 the AKP government began to argue that there was an Alevi issue which needs resolution. Both the AKP notables and the other government officials, i.e. Director of Religious Affairs, started to highlight the importance of inclusion of the Alevis.[219]

Yet, the links between the revivalist camp and the Alevi identity movement are not limited to the relations between revivalist parties and the Alevi associations and foundations. Revivalist business associations and press also reached out to Alevi notables to establish networks. Among those, the evolving relationship between the devout Sunni bourgeois and some of the Alevi notables is of significance. Although most of the Alevi associations and foundations are divided along political lines and are more rigid in their activities and attitudes, there is a significant individual fluidity. It is individual networks that provide new spaces to connect different parties of conflicting camps. Such relationships can be detected over an analysis of participation of Alevi notables in activities sponsored by The Association of Independent Industrialists and

[217] "Kutan meydan okudu," *Milliyet*, December 14, 1998; "Ehl-i Beyt Birleştirdi," *Zaman*, March 14, 1999.

[218] Fermani Altun is the chair of *Dünya Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı* (World Ahlul Bayt Foundation) and founder of DEMSİAD. Since its creation, the World Ehl-i Beyt Foundation has promoted itself as a representative Alevi institution among circles of Islamic revivalism in Turkey. For this purpose it is also criticized by other Alevi organizations as *assimilationist*, and labeled as "Sunnified".

[219] Chapters 4 & 5 will provide more details on the linkages between the Alevi community and the political parties.

Businessmen[220] [MÜSİAD -*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamlari Derneği*]. MÜSİAD[221] not only provides networks of solidarity among its members, but also pave the way for the establishment of new networks between the (Sunni) devout bourgeois and the Alevi elites and entrepreneurs through its social and cultural activities.[222]

Additionally, the right-wing newspapers [*Zaman*, *Yeni Şafak*, and *Vakit*] also shaped the debates on the Alevi identity. Two associations, Ehl-i Beyt, and Center for Republican Education and Culture Foundation [CEM - *Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi*] enjoy significant levels of coverage right-wing media. The Alevi identity the publication of these newspapers was framed in accordance to the dominant Islamist view.[223] The Alevi associations and/or community are considered to be victims of manipulation [of the left] to promote *cem* houses to keep Alevis out of mosques.[224]

2.4.2. Links with Kurdish nationalism

Ethnic dimension is another important issue in understanding the dynamics of the Alevi politics of post-1980 period. Alevis, who are not limited to Turkish-speaking communities and they do not always align themselves with Kurdish nationalists. Historically, a certain level of animosity emerged between the Sunni Kurds and the Alevis due to Ottoman Empire's use of Sunni Kurds to suppress Alevi rebellions in the eastern regions.[225] van Bruinessen points out that the Kurdish Alevis living in far eastern provinces (Bingöl, Muş, Varto) "surrounded by Sunni Zaza and Kurmanci

[220] MÜSİAD is a businessman association founded by a group of young businessmen in 1990. It was founded to represent Anatolian based small and medium enterprises which did not qualify for membership to Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association [TÜSIAD – *Türk Sanayiciler ve İşadamları Derneği*] which accepted only the largest companies in its ranks a new responsive network to connect with the revivalist camp. For a detailed comparison of the two business associations, see Ayşe Buğra, "Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, no. 4 (1998): 521-39.

[221] MÜSİAD is associated with Islam because "1) it is affiliated with religious sects and communities, 2) Islam appears a significant point of reference in its activities, and 3) it has close ties with political Islam mainly represented in Turkey since 1980s by the Welfare Party, then the Virtue Party and finally the Justice and Development Party" See Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu, "Globalization, alternative modernities and the political economy of Turkey," *Review of International Political Economy 1*2, no. 1 (February 2005): 112.

[222] Such as the visits between the MÜSİAD and Dünya Ehl-i Beyt Vakfi (World Ahlul Beyt Foundation) Fermani Altun's participation in international fairs, award ceremonies and Ramadan and Muharram festivities organized by MÜSİAD.

[223] "Erbakan: Alevi-Sünni Kardeştir" *Zaman*, June 01, 1995.

[224] Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Hz. Ali cem house açmadı" *Zaman*, September 14, 1994;

[225] Bozarslan, "Alevism and the Myths of Research: The Need for a New Research Agenda,"

speakers with whom they had a long history of conflict, were less inclined to see themselves as Kurds.[226]"

Additionally, the PKK which was founded in 1978 to publisize Kurdish nationalist demands through violence and terrorism had a narrow focus that was based only on the Kurmanci-speaking Sunni Kurds. It faced serious difficulties in the Zaza-Alevi dominated regions such as Tunceli/Dersim. Particularly, the radical left-wing organization Liberation Army of Turkish Workers and Peasants [TIKKO - *Türkiye İşçi Köylüleri Kurtuluş Ordusu*] / Communist Party of Turkey Marxist-Leninist [TKP-ML - *Türkiye Komünist Partisi Marksist-Leninist*] and Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front [DHKP-C - *Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi*] and their sister factions compete with the PKK for resources and support.

Although since the late 1960s the people from Dersim province were more prone to the left-wing movements, Kurdish nationalism also gained a significant level of followers. Sait Kırmızıtoprak (a.k.a. Dr. Şıvan) Led the Kurdistan Democratic Party [KDP - *Partiya Demokrat Kurdistan*] and began the preparations for a prolonged guerrilla struggle in 1969. In the 1970s Freedom Path movement [*Özgürlük Yolu*] of Kemal Burkay also recruited people from Dersim among its founding cadre.[227]

Even though the Alevis were present in the Kurdish nationalist movement, there was no widespread support. The lack of emphasis given to religion inevitably led to rejection of Alevi belief and rituals and its "traditional enmity towards Sunnis". Consequently movements elevating religion to that of respectable tradition [TIKKO and later DHKPC] gained more support among Kurds who identify themselves as Alevis.[228]

By the late 1980s PKK accepted the need to integrate religion and promoted a rapprochement with Sunni Islam.[229] Yet, it was 1990s that led the PKK elites to establish ties in order to make-up for the Sunni emphasis. This change in attitude was linked to the change in strategy of organization. Starting in 1992, PKK sought to expand its activities in the Alevi dominated provinces of Tunceli, Malatya, Elazığ, Sivas and

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[226] Bruinessen, Martin van," 'Aslını inkar eden haramzadedir!':The Debate on the Ethnic Identity of Kurdish Alevis", in *Syncratistic Religious Communities in the Near East*, eds. Kriztina Kehl-Bodrogi, B. Kellner-Heinkele, and A Otter Beaujean, (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 13

[227] Ibid.

[228] Ibid, 15-6; Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 72-3.

[229] David Romano, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity*, (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 142-3.

Adıyaman.[230] The Sivas Events and the later Gazi riots provided a new opportunity for the organization to seek links with the alienated Alevi groups.

Three days after the Sivas Events, another tragic event took place inthe Sunni village of Başbağlar, in Erzincan. The village was raided by PKK and all 28 males in the village were killed. Later the village was burned and one child and four women also died in the fire. The organization declared that it was for the revenge of the "Sivas Massacre". However, despite the PKK's propaganda and attempts to use the Sivas Events to attract Alevis, many Alevis refused to support the PKK.

In the case of the Gazi neighborhood in Istanbul there was a tension between the residents and the police due to the death of a 35 year old man in police custody in January, 1995.[231] On March 12, one person died and numerous others were injured following the drive-by shooting at three coffeehouses, and a pastry shop. Although the coffeehouses were a few hundred meters away, the police were late on the scene.[232] As a result, protesters gathered in front of a nearby police station, and the crowd began to throw stones and petrol bombs at the police. The police responded by shooting at the crowd. The riots spread to the neighborhood and the rioters destroyed the shops and the workshops.[233]

What started as a local event soon spread to other Alevi populated neighborhoods in Istanbul. The Gazi Riots of 1995 were especially important for the manifestation of discontent and grievances in the Alevi neighborhoods of Istanbul.[234] Taking advantage of these grievances the militant left-wing organizations such as TIKKO, DHKP-C, and radical Kurdish nationalist PKK managed to establish their presence in these neighborhoods.

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[230] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe,*; Romano, *Kurdish Nationalist Movement*

[231] Aliza Marcus ""Should I shoot you?": An eyewitness account of an Alevi uprising in Gazi," *Middle East Report, 1996:* 24-6.

[232] Ibid.

[233] Bruinessen, "Aslını inkar eden haramzadedir!"

[234] Gazi is a neighborhood in Sultanbeyli, Istanbul (at the time of the events it was part of Gaziosmanpaşa), in which the residents are predominantly Alevi and Kurdish speakers.

2.5. Representing Alevi Interests at the Civil Society Level: Actors, Issues and Strategies of the post-1990 period

As the preceding analysis suggests the changes in the political institutional structures, ideological movements, social and economic transformations, along with the increasing activism of the other identity movements in Turkey shaped the form and scope of Alevi associational life. By late 1990s new actors has been introduced to Alevi identity politics. Since the identity frames and policy claims of these new actors vary, literature on the identity politics fails to provide a substantive tool to depict the in-group differentiation. The standard differentiation of Alevi identity along the lines of religious vs. cultural, and the classification of Alevi actors along the dimensions of ethnicity or ideology are insufficient to explain the heterogeneity of Alevi associational life. These constructs have limited use in understanding the instruments and strategies of the individual and collective, civil and uncivil; domestic and transnational actors.

2.5.1. Alevi Organizations of the 1990s

Following the tragic and deadly events in Sivas and Istanbul, a new type of associational activity began. While the village networks and solidarity associations along with cultural associations have continued to be a part of Alevi associational life, a number of local and nation-wide associations/foundations, promoting different Alevi identity frames emerged in the Turkish public sphere. These numerous organizations transformed and branched out at the national and supranational levels depending on (i) the amount of resources, and (ii) the level of restrictions that were imposed on them by the political authorities.

Following the violent events of Sivas (1993) and Gazi (1995), a new type association building emerged. While the village networks and solidarity associations along with cultural associations continued to be a part of Alevi associational life, with 1990s a number of local and nation-wide associations/foundations, promoting different Alevi identity frames emerged in the Turkish public sphere. These numerous organizations transformed and branched out to the national and supranational levels depending on (i) the amount of resources, and (ii) the level of restrictions social and political structures imposed.

As the resources of the founding elites increased and more Alevi organizations were established, a greater policy scope was adopted. During this time, there were four major types of Alevi identity organizations, each formulating and promoting a distinct identity discourse. Despite their broad influence, however, these were not the only actors in Alevi identity politics in the 1990s, and their dominion over public debates quickly diminished with the introduction of new actors in the form of associations or foundations. Nevertheless, the axes of religion, culture, and ideology around which they were organized continue to shape the structure of mobilization in later periods (See Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 The Major Alevi organizations in the 1990s[235]

	CEM	**Ehl-i Beyt**	**HBVAKV & AKD**	**PSAKD**
Major axis of organization	Religion	Religion	Culture	Ideology
Identity frame	Emphasis on religious heterodoxy (syncretism); Traditions encapsulated in the principle of *edep*[236]	Emphasis on religious orthodoxy (Shiism); Quran and Ehl-i Beyt (the Holy family) as the foundation of faith	Emphasis on the way of life; Anatolian and Turkish traditions; folklore	Emphasis on philosophy; Resistance to social, economic, and political orthodoxy
Leadership profile	Religious dignitaries	Businessmen/ Entrepreneurs	Businessmen/ Entrepreneurs	Left-wing activists
Resource	Religious authority	External support	Grassroots mobilization	Grassroots mobilization

The Hacı Bektaşi Veli Culture and Information Association [HBVAKD - *Hacı Bektaş Veli Kültür ve Tanıtma Derneği*], founded in 1991, had 86 local branches by 2008, and changed its name to Alevi Culture Association [AKD - *Alevi Kültür*

[235] Table is based on the analysis of the publications and press releases of the five Alevi organizations in the 1990s.

[236] The notion of *edep* (morality) is encapsulated in the saying "*Eline, diline, beline sahip ol*!", which is most frequently translated as "Do not take what is not yours, do not lie and do not commit adultery"

Derneği]. Aligning itself with Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Culture Foundation [*Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı*, HBVAKV], HBVAKD defines Alevism as a way of life, and has a particularly strong presence in the Alevi-dominated provinces and sub-provinces of the central Anatolia and Aegean regions. The organization was founded by businessmen with limited capital, and its activities were confined to the organization of cultural events.[237]

Another significant organization of the 1990s is the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association [PSAKD - *Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği*, hereafter], which was established in 1988 in Ankara as a solidarity association for immigrants from the village of Banaz, Sivas.[238] It gradually transformed into a major national player in the aftermath of the Sivas events in 1993 and expanded its membership base to between 20,000 and 30,000 by the mid-1990s. PSAKD increased its visibility through organizing street demonstrations, and consciousness rising efforts in the form of seminars and talks. Following the establishment of Alevi Bektashi Federation [ABF - *Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu*] in 2002, PSAKD began to align itself with ABF in the processes of claim making, as well as in other consciousness raising activities.[239]

The *Ehl-i Beyt* Foundation, based in Istanbul, was founded by Fermani Altun in 1994. Unlike the other Alevi organizations, this foundation put more emphasis on Quran as the basis of Alevi faith, specifically sectarian (Shiite) interpretations. Because *Ehl-i Beyt* Foundation maintained strong ties with right-wing nationalists and religious press, it does not enjoy much respect and recognition from Alevis outside of its own supporters.[240] Despite alienating other local/Turkish Alevis, the *Ehl-i Beyt* Foundation was primarily occupied with the organization of international conferences. Following the 1997 conference, it was transformed into the World Ahlul Bayt Foundation [*Dünya Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı*], a conglomerate of 127 Alevi-Bektashi organizations.

The CEM[241] Foundation, established in 1995 by a lawyer belonging to a leading *dede* lineage named İzzettin Doğan, is widely known to be a Kemalist, traditionalist and republican Alevi group. This foundation, which consists of 20 national branches, a

[237] See Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 47-8.

[238] Banaz is the birthplace of the legendary figure Pir Sultan Abdal.

[239] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 48.

[240] Ibid.

[241] The double meaning of the foundation's acronym allowed it to get around the ban on references to Alevi identity in the name of the organization, particularly in the early 1990s. CEM could be interpreted as the Center for Republican Education and Culture, or as a reference to the Alevi religious ritual.

number of sister associations, private television and radio stations and publication series, is one of the most well known Alevi organization. It is run by members of leading *dede* lineages, although these leaders are either intellectuals and/or businessmen themselves and do not necessarily practice *dedelik* as a profession. Under this leadership, the Foundation emphasized the research, promotion and protection of the Sufi tradition and culture. CEM foundation and Izzettin Doğan were both instrumental in the establishment of the Alevi Foundations Federation [AVF – *Alevi Vakıflar Federasyonu*] in 2005.[242]

In addition to CEM's scholarly efforts, it founded the Directorate of Religious Services of Alevi Islam [AİDHB - *Alevi İslam Din Hizmetleri Başkanlığı*]. AİDHB establishes its goals as follows:

> To carry out the duties related to belief, form of worship, historical development, philosophy, social and ethical principles, as well as communication and culture of Alevi Islam; to guarantee, through training in religion, belief, and practice the enlightenment of society and, according to [the Directorate's] aims, its application and supervision in the places of worship. The faith of Alevi Islam represents the Alevi-Bektaşi-Mevlevi-Nusayri as well as other belief groups based on this interpretation of Islam.[243]

To this end, AİDHB organizes seminars and talks, provides practical information on Alevi faith and practices, such as when to break fast for Hızır and Muharrem, and "vocational training" courses for the *dede*s and *baba*s.[244] The *dede*s working in AİDHB are responsible for leading the Thursday night *cem* ceremonies. In short, AİDB mimics the functions of Directorate of Religious Affairs [DİB] for Alevi congregation and clergy.

The four organizations introduced above are the largest/most significant players/actors in the complex associational organization of the Alevis. The three axes represented by these four organizations, i.e. religion, culture and ideology, are of particular significance due to their influence in shaping the discourses and policy

[242] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 49.

[243] Interview with the Director of the AIDHB in May, 2005.

[244] Baba refers to the leadership position in the Bektashi Order. Accordingly, the leadership structure in Bektashi tradition include *dede baba* (the head of the order), *halife* (regional head), *baba* (head of a lodge), and *derviş* (monk). As Bektashi Order has historical ties with the Alevi community, some Alevi organizations discuss the problems of Alevi *dede*s and Bektashi *babas* within the same policy frames. See Hülya Küçük, *The Role of the Bektashis in Turkey's National Struggle: A Historical and Critical Study,* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 2, 13-4 & 22.

demands of Alevism since the 1990s. However, not all actors of Alevi identity politics are associations. The associations and foundations with similar ideological and denominational demands co-operated and established Alevi federations, which compete among each other for legitimate respresentative status. By the mid-2000s, a number of umbrella organizations had been established both at the domestic and transnational levels. Each of these umbrealla organizations has been competing with the other Alevi organizations for official recognition and resources from both the state and the European intergovernmental organizations. Additionally, in the last two decades citizen action at the level of ECtHR became a powerful instrument to pressure the Turkish state for institutional and behavioral change.

2.6. Who says What? The Claims and Strategies of Alevi Organizations

2.6.1. Actors of Alevi Identity Politics in the 2000s

Parallel to the increase in new actors and opportunity structures introduced in the late 1990s, the actors and spheres representing Alevi interest likewise increased as talks with the EU began. These actors, made up of individuals, domestic Alevi civil society organizations, radical Alevi actors, and transnational Alevi organizations, began to determine the content and scope of Alevi interest communication.[245] As Kurban points out:

> The EU accession processes has been instrumental not only in strengthening the impact of the ECtHR jurisprudence on the protection of human rights in Turkey, but also in encouraging marginalized individuals and minorities other than the Kurds to litigate in Strasburg.[246]

The new opportunity structures emerging through Turkey's increased diplomatic efforts to join the EU were powerful tools for individuals to (i) communicate violations of their

[245] It is important to note here that the emphasis on Alevi actors does not stem from a desire to undermine the significance of MPs, political parties, media and other non-Alevi actors and institutions in transforming Alevi-state relations. Even though their role in the communication and aggregation of Alevi interests is significant, the source of the communicated interests is the activities of Alevi actors of civil society.

[246] Dilek Kurban "Protecting Marginalized Individuals and Minorities in the ECtHR: Litigation and Jurisprudence in Turkey," in *The European Court of Human Rights and the Rights of the Margianlized Individuals and Minorities in National Context* , eds. Dia Anagnostou and Evangelia Psychogiopoulou (Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 169.

rights in Turkey to European institutions, and (ii) seek leverage in transforming domestic practices through cases brought to the ECtHR. In principle, the legally binding character of the European Convention of Human Rights and emphasis on compliance with ECtHR court rulings in Turkey's EU accession process were expected increase pressure on the Turkish state, encouraging it to change policies that directly impacted the Alevi population/community. Among the cases communicated, those of *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey* and *Sinan Işık v. Turkey* are of significance for setting the precedent regarding issues of compulsory religion and morals courses and disclosure of religion on identity cards, respectively. Even though the Turkish state still does not comply with the rulings, non-compliance shapes the course of public and international debates on Alevi rights claims.

A second significant group of actors representing Alevi interests is the Alevi foundations and other umbrella organizations established in the late 1990s. Accordingly, unlike their predecessors established in the 1960s, these organizations are more politically oriented and oversee interest group activities. ABF, successor to the Culture Associations of the Union of Alevi Bektasi Organizations [ABKB - *Alevi-Bektaşi Kuruluşları Birliği Kültür Derneği*], was established following the passage of amendments to legal constraints on the formation of federations. When first established, ABF was composed of PSAKD, AKD and a number of local organizations, although once more firmly established, the significance of this organization came to lie in its relations with transnational Alevi organizations and in the cultural/ideological discourse shaping its right-claims. Opposing discourses on the Alevi identity and right-claims are represented by the AVF and *Dünya Ehl-i Beyt* Foundation. The variation in these organizations' demands, behavior, and attitudes paves the way for the emergence of an unheavenly chorus of Alevi representatives in civil society. Unlike in the Kurdish nationalist and Islamist movements articulated Alevi interests were not organized around a focal point.[247] Quite the opposite, the arena of Alevi identity politics was (and still is) filled with contesting actors, demands, and strategies.

In addition to civil actors, radical actors (i.e. violent, illegal groups) have also played a significant role in shaping the debates and strategies of Alevi rights claim making. The radical left (such as DHKPC) and Kurdish nationalist (i.e. PKK) organizations have, on occasion, been associated with Alevi issues. Even though these

[247] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*

groups lack *audience recognition* – i.e. are not considered representatives of Alevi interests– they can act as *policy participants* and supplement policy debates on Alevi issues. Even though these are not organizations of articulated Alevi-specific interests, the fact that their membership and leadership profiles often include some Alevi individuals helps to shape the content of the debate.

The birth of the Alevi social movement in Turkey coincided with the emergence of a strong transnational Alevi migration in Europe.[248] While the Turkish Alevi interest groups were forced to deal with the issues and problems emerging from the institutional and cultural constraints in Turkey, their transnational counterparts incorporated the issues of integration to the debates on Alevi rights claims. The significance of these transnational actors increased once Turkey gained formal EU candidacy status at the Helsinki summit of 1999. Particularly in the years between 1999 and 2005 these groups were vital in both strengthening the newly emerging Alevi civil society organizations and familiarizing these organizations with the cultural norms and socio-political institutions of Europe.

The Turkish accession process and the ongoing ECtHR cases provided an opportunity for the Alevi activitsts to market themselves as experts on issues related to the Alevi faith and community, to legitimize their activities and keep the spotlight on Alevi-State relations in Turkey. In other words, the EU and other European institutions provided an alternative arena for domestic Alevi organizations to communicate their issues and demands, and in which their identities could be recognized. The Alevi issues are brought to the attention of the ECtHR by the Alevi citizens and the members of the Alevi interest groups. The Alevi activists act as either counsel or adviser to the applicants during the trials.[249] Additionally, the major Alevi federations try to mobilize the Alevi associations and foundations to submit class action lawsuits to the ECtHR to further pressure the Turkish state to recognize and respect the Alevi community.

The alliances formed between the domestic and transnational Alevi organizations became pivotal in communicating Alevi demands and problems in Turkey to EU parliamentarians and officials. The domestic and European Alevi associations and foundations have been lobbying since the 2000s to pressure the Turkish state to

[248] Vorhoff, "Academic and journalistic publications on the Alevi and Bektashi of Turkey"

[249] During the *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v Turkey* trial Turgut Öker, Kazım Genç, the chair of PSAKD at the time and a member of ABF, was the counsel, and the chair of the Federation of Alevi Unions of Germany [AABF - *Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu*] acted as an advisor.

recognize and respect the Alevi community without addressing the Alevis as a minority.[250] Particularly, the co-operation between the ABF and the Confederation of the Alevi Unions of Europe [AABK – *Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu*] has been vital in increasing the information flow to the European Commission rapporteurs and the EU parliamentarians.[251] However, the lobbying activity is not continous and not done by professional lobbyists. The Alevi activists and groups tend to do their own lobbying and increase their activities before the finalization of the EU progress reports.

2.6.2. Issue Areas of Alevi Claims

The series of articles on Alevism in Turkey published between May 6 and May 12, 1990 in *Cumhuriyet* marked the beginning of a number of public declarations of the Alevi community. Of those, the Alevi Declaration of May 15, 1990[252] provided the blueprint for basic right claims of Alevi identity politics (Figure 2.1). The document, rooted in 1989 declaration of Hamburg, was a product of both transnational and national concerns regarding the problems of the Alevi community in Turkey. Despite the heterogeneity among the Alevi activists and the Alevi interest groups, the declaration diagnosed the common Alevi problems, provided prognoses of the issue areas, and proposed general solutions to existing problems.

The declaration catalyzed co-operation and dialogue between and within the domestic and transnational Alevi communities. Even though the 1989 Hamburg declaration was a product of an informal local initiative, the universality of the demands turned it into a manifesto. After it was revised a number of times, the final version was published in 1990 in Turkey. Following the publication a number of discussion programs, articles, radio shows, web sites, and chat rooms started to appear on Turkish media. Starting with 1990, Alevism ceased to be a private religion. Unlike the 1960s identity movement, the 1990s Alevi movement was more interested in familiarization of the non-Alevis with the needs and characteristics of the Alevi community. Starting with

[250] In 2004 the ABF submitted a pettion to the European Parliament including 150 450 signatures. 150 000 of which was from European Alevis. See "Alevilerden AB çıkarması," *Hürriyet*, December 15, 2004.

[251] See "Alevilik İslamiyet'in içinde değil," *Radikal* October 10, 2005; Turan Eser, "Avrupa Birliği İlerleme Raporları-Kopenhang Siyasi Kriterileri Açısından Alevilerin Türkiye'de Karşılaştıkları Hak İhlalleri," ABF and AABK report, April 16, 2007, available at: http://www.alevi-fuaf.com/yazi/1/12/avrupa-birligi-ilerleme-raporlari-kopenhang-siyasi-kriterleri-acisindan-alevilerin-turkiye-de-karsilastiklari-hak-ihlalleri/

[252] "Alevilik Bildirgesi" *Cumhuriyet*, May 15, 1990, 15

the mid-1990s, the Alevi interest groups began to demand substantial changes in the instutional framework.

Figure 2.1 Main articles of the 1990 Alevi declaration

(1) Oppression of Alevis should be acknowledged [by the state and public];

(2) Alevis should be able to state their identity freely;

(3) Sunni families should give up their prejudice towards Alevis and Alevilik;

(4) Intellectuals should support the existence of Alevilik on the Human Rights basis;

(5) Turkish press (newspapers) should also include Alevi culture in its publications;

(6) TRT should take Alevis into consideration in its broadcasts;

(7) State should quit constructing mosques in Alevi villages;

(8) Alevism should also be taught in schools. However, one should be aware of the fact that compulsory religion courses and existence of an institution like DİB are problematic practices in a secular country;

(9) Governments should abandon their negative attitude towards Alevis

(10) It should be remembered that Alevis are one of the guarantors of the "Secular State".

(11) *Dede*lik as an institution that should be reestablished as a modern institution

(12) Culture programs should be prepared for the Alevis inhabited in foreign countries

(13) It should be noted that there is no relation between Alevis and Shiites in Iran

The new Alevi interest groups tried to mobilize the urban Alevi community, and raise the consciousness of both the Alevi and non-Alevi population. The privatization of the media ended the monopoly of the Turkish Radio and Television Institution [TRT – Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu] on broadcasting. Following the establishment of the first private television station in 1990, a number of private television channels and radio stations emerged. The developments in the information technologies and the increase in the number of communication mediums enabled the Alevi interest groups to brough new issues into the public agenda. Through publications, seminars, and cem ceremonies held in stadiums the Alevi associations and foundations not only continued

to seek preservation of the essence of the Alevi culture, and religion in the urban settings, but also transformed Alevism into a public religion.[253]

In the last decade a number of studies have been published depicting the level and scope of discrimination of Alevis in Turkish society. While the method and design of these studies varies they all demostrate that the Alevi population is subject to discrimination tied to the general problem of the absence of recognition and respect for the Alevi community and Alevi faith. Individual narratives also indicate that Alevi citizens are subjected to discrimination both in institutions and in public life.[254] While the issues areas identified in the manuscript are still relevant, new issues were added in time due to changes in threat perception and preferences of the Alevi community.

It is important to note here that, except *Articles* 8 and 11, the articles of the 1990 declaration continue to be addressed by the contemporary Alevi interest groups. The Alevi organizations in the last two decades highlight the need for respect for and recognition of the Alevi community. Through media and lobbying they try to pressure the state and the public to end *de facto* discrimination of the Alevis. When the narratives of Alevi citizens are read in conjunction with the problems addressed by the Alevi notables, the following problems become apparent:

The status and organization of DİB: Even though DİB has been a subject of contestation between the Islamist revivalist and secular camps since the beginning of the multi-party period, its status since the 1990s has been crucial to the debate on Alevi assimilation. As Berkes notes the establishment of the DİB "did not yet separate state from religion and it did not let religion have its own autonomous existence."[255] The Alevi activists argue that the disproportional distribution of resources, and the absence of Alevis and Alevism in the activities of DİB, reinforces the discrimination and assimilation of the Alevi community.[256] Even though all Alevi actors agree on the need

[253] Şahin, "The Rise of Alevism as a Public Religion," 475-6.

[254] There are only a few individual level statistical analyses on the issue of recognition and respect for community. And the issue of sampling bias prevents finding generalizable conclusions. Therefore, qualitative works are more valuable in understanding the causal complexity. Binnaz Toprak, *Türkiye'de Farklı Olmak: Din ve Muhafazakarlık Ekseninde Ötekileştirilenler*, (İstanbul: Metis, 2009)

[255] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 479.

[256] Both the elite interviews and content analysis of press releases indicate that Alevi elites saw the organization and activities of DİB as breach of non-discrimination and non-assimilation principles. Accordingly, although citizens paid taxes to receive religious services and DİB was required to provide

for change, varying policy solutions have been put forward: the Dünya Ehl-i Beyt foundation calls for a more autonomous structure for DİB so that it will be free of state imposed interpretations of religion; the CEM foundation and AVF foundation call for integration of Alevism into DİB as the second best option.[257]

Status of Alevi dedes: One aspect of the discussion on the status and organization of DİB is some Alevi associations' and groups' call for the incorporation of Alevi religious institutions into the structure of DİB. However, the question of whether or not Alevi *dedes* should be incorporated into its organizational structure becomes an issue of concern only when Alevi identity is framed along the syncretistic religion axis. Groups that depict Alevism as a "way of life" or a part of orthodox interpretations of Islam lay no claims regarding the status of *dedes*.

Status of cem houses: While the role of the *dede*s is not an issue for all fractions of the Alevi identity movement, the legal framework limiting recognition of *cem* houses as a place of worship dominates both public debate and court cases. In addition to the conceptual constraints promoted by DİB, the legal framework set by the 1985 Zoning Law (Law No. 3194),[258] Article 2 of the Village Law of 1924, and the 1981 Law on Local Revenues (Law No. 2462, Article 36), challenge the legitimacy of designating *cem* houses as places of worship. From a legal perspective, *cem* houses could only be established as "culture centers", which means that they can neither enjoy the same privileges as mosques, nor receive financial support from DİB. The limited financial support available to *cem* houses under these restrictions either comes from Ministry of Culture or from municipalities. Consequently, the construction of most *cem* houses is funded by the Alevi 'congregation'. As with most problems addressed by the associations and the elites, this one hinges on the behavioral and attitudinal constrains set by the State.[259]

Religious education: State-sponsored religious education, consisting of compulsory religious and ethics courses for children in public schools is another contested issue for Alevis. While the aim of compulsory religious and moral education

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such religious services, the content and scope of the DİB activities ignore the needs of the Alevi community.

[257] See T.C. Devlet Bakanlığı, *1. Alevi Çalıştayı*, Ankara, January 3-4, 2009.

[258] In 2003 the law was amended and the term mosque was replaced with place of worship.

[259] Such as refusals to allocate land for construction of *cem* houses, attempts to demolish established *cem* houses, and more recent lawsuit calling for the closure of Çankaya Cem House Building Association [*Çankaya Cemevi Yaptırma Derneği*].

courses under the Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution was to protect the next generation from the ills of Islamic revivalism, the outcome was the creation of a new mechanism to exclude non-Sunni interpretations of religion.[260] While all Alevi organizations are critical of the practice, no consensus emerges on a specific solution.[261] ABF and its sister organizations (such as PSADK and HSAKD[262]) call for termination of the compulsory courses of religion and ethics, AVF and its sister organizations[263] have offered policies focusing on neutralizing the content. Compliance with the ECtHR's ruling on *Hasan Eylem Zengin v. Turkey* is considered as the first step to resolving the issue.[264] As a subset of the issue, the new education policy, known popularly as the 4+4+4 System is being criticized with increasing vehemence. Reports prepared by Alevi associations and foundations demonstrate that the three new elective courses on religion deepen *de facto* discrimination of Alevi students.[265]

Disclosure of religion on identity cards: Following the amendments to Population Services Law (Law No. 5490) on April 25, 2006, disclosure of religion in national identity cards sparked a debate among the Alevis that frame Alevism as a religion. The compliance with the ruling on the *Sinan Işık v. Turkey*[266] case dominated those debates and claims laid by Alevi interest groups on the issue. It is important to note here that not

[260] Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics*, 130-1.

[261] The fieldwork conducted in Istanbul, Ankara and Nevşehir between August 2012 and January 2013 showed that while some groups within the Alevi movement, PSAKD and ABF identify the issue as a breach of human rights and call for termination of compulsory courses on religion, others such as the CEM foundation adopt a more moderate position and argue that regardless of whether courses on religion continue to be compulsory, Alevism should be included in the curriculum.

[262] The whole list of membership can be found in ABF website. See http://www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=222&Itemid=258, last accessed on April 15, 2013.

[263] The whole list of membership can be found in AVF website. See http://www.avf.org.tr/uye_listesi.asp, last accessed on April 15, 2013.

[264] Chapter 6 will provide more detailed analysis on the issue.

[265] The latest report prepared by ABF member HSAKD (*Hubyar Sultan Alevi Kültür Derneği,* Hubyar Sultan Alevi Culture Association) indicates that Alevi children were forced to select courses on religion in the 2012-2013 education year. Accordingly, in some regions parents were threatened and told that their children would be expunged from school records if they did not comply. (*Hubyar Sultan Alevi Kültür Derneği 2012 Hak İhlalleri İzleme Raporu*, HSAKD press release, 30.01.2013) Sections of the document can be found in *Evrensel* newspaper dated January 31, 2013, where one of the authors is the chair of HSAKD. See http://www.evrensel.net/news.php?id=47689, last accessed April 2, 2013.

[266] The case originated from an application (no. 21924/05) against Turkey filed on 3 June 2005. Accordingly the applicant Sinan Işık alleged that the denial of his request to have the word "Islam" on his identity card replaced by "Alevi" violated *Article 9* of the Convention. He also claimed the denial by state authorities was a violation of *Articles 6* and *14* of the Convention. On 15 January 2008 the case was declared admissible and on 2 February 2010 the Court declared by six votes to one, that there had been a violation of *Article 9*. See ECtHR, *Sinan Işık v Turkey* (no. 21924/05) February 2, 2010, available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-97087#{"itemid":["001-97087"]}

all Alevi interest groups and activists consider the issue of disclosure of Alevism as a religion on identity cards as a priority even after the announcement of the ECtHR ruling.

2.6.3 The Challenge of Positioning Actors: Need for a New Framework

Starting with the late 1990s, both domestic and transnational actors sought to unify the Alevi movement. A number of umbrella organizations were formed during this period, each of which lay claim to legitimate representation of the Alevi community and Alevi interests. While these newly formed federations and foundations are in principle larger and more resourceful than their members, they have not always been successful in mobilizing their constituents to achieve policy objectives. They have only been able to achieve partial unification in the processes of political claim making; the more fragmented the Alevi movement, the more diversified the interests and policy strategies of the actors. Particularly, the Alevi activists and interest groups who have a sectarian understanding of Alevism refuse recognition of Alevism as a separate religion.

The diversity of strategies is apparent both within and between federations. Despite the shared desire to force the Turkish government and its institutions to recognize *cem* houses as places for worship, to date no widespread collaboration between or within the federations has been mobilized to achieve this goal. At the domestic level, while Alevi elites acknowledge the power of collaboration and highlight the significant role of regional institutions like ECtHR as opportunity structures to communicate Alevi claims and force policy changes, the federations fail to mobilize. According to Doğan Bermek, the chair of AVF, efforts to pressure government with class-action suits in ECtHR failed due to the heads of *cem* houses' failure to act collectively.

Following the amendment to Electricity Market Law (Law No. 5784) in 2008, which enabled places of worship to ask for subsidies for their electricity bills, AVF has been trying to mobilize the heads of *cem* houses to submit a class-action case to intensify the pressure exerted on the government. Because procedural requirements of the ECtHR necessitate exhaustion of all domestic options[267], cem houses' officials must

[267] Council of Europe European Court of Human Rights, "Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria", 2011, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/B5358231-79EF-4767-975F-524E0DCF2FBA/0/ENG_Guide_pratique.pdf

petition DİB and submit the answer to AVF before a court case can be filed. Unfortunately, a full two years after the introduction of the amendment, "Only one [petition] came…all they got to do was to write a petition [to Diyanet]… and gave the answer to us…but only one came." [268] An application was finally submitted in 2010, with CEM foundation being the only party in prosecution.

Alevi institutions' failure to mobilize for collective action or to agree on similar strategies is not only a concern for the individual organizations themselves, but also a major issue between federations. For instance, both the lack of representation for the Alevi faith in DİB and the content of the courses on religion and ethnics are acknowledged to be a problem by Alevi organizations, and yet they do not agree on the problems' causes, the relevant constituencies, or the particulars of the policy solutions.

During the 2012 commemorative festivities in Hacı Bektaş, all heads of the Alevi associations heralded a unified stance, the organization of a major rally on September 30 in Ankara in front of TBMM sponsored by the ABF, ADFE and AVF to condemn the State's attitudes and policies in dealing with Alevi issues. The rally was postponed as a result of the disagreements among the organizers, and when a new date was set for October, the rhetoric of the public meeting has been changed from "claims on freedom of belief" to "claims on equal citizenship." The title of the new rally was "*We want Equal Citizenship for a Laic Democratic Turkey!*"

The rally organizers sought support from various political parties, municipalities, MPs, labor unions, civil society groups and organizations, intellectuals and artists. Selahattin Özel, the director of ABF, in calling for support, explained the objective of the rally:

> In this rally we will raise our voice for recognition of *cem* houses as places of worship, abolition of practices of mosque building, elimination of Directorate of Religious Affairs, abolition of compulsory courses on religion, ending of 4+4+4 policies and introduction of laic and scientific education system, maintenance of peace in Turkey, prevention of a possible war with Syria.

[268] Doğan Bermek's speech at the roundtable talks in Hacı Bektaş Veli Commemorative Festival on 15.08.2012

The rally, which ultimately took place on October 7, 2012, was criticized by other organizations and in some cases was even boycotted.[269] The day before the rally, during a meeting with her branch leaders, CEM Foundation listed the reasons for not joining the October 7 rally, and later that night cancelled the buses from her Istanbul branches which had been organized to bring supporters to Ankara. Hıdır Akbayır of CEM foundation explained the basis of this decision as concern over the increasing politicization of the rhetoric of the rally and the increasing emphasis on human rights rather than rights on religion. Akbayır further explained:

> We try to solve the issues through legal and peaceful means. We are careful not to carry anything religious to the political arena. If you watched…from the televisions, the slogans [were]: end the war, end paid education, [paid] health care, unemployment, inflation, 10 percent threshold….they also said something on *cem* houses…We do not acknowledge this. We should not mix politic discourses with belief…people has many rights…what I say is belief rights. And the name of the belief is Alevism, and the basic problem is exclusion and breach of formal, constitutional rights.

This suggests that although actors agree on the Alevi issue topics, and macro-level claims such as recognition and respect, non-discrimination, non-assimilation, they cannot seem to agree upon the content of and strategies for dealing with specific issues. It is clear that of the remarkable diversity among Alevi organizations makes mapping and evaluating the actors and strategies very difficult, but even without such evaluation, it is clear that the variation cannot be thoroughly explained through/by the use of religion, culture and politics as basic axes of differentiation.

The standard categorization of Alevi organization based on the two dimensions of culture vs. religion and left vs. right ideologies is not enough to capture the complexity of relations and policy demands and strategies. The claims laid by Alevis vary in conjunction with (1) the manner of the interaction of the group with the other formal and informal groups especially in the struggle for resources, status or social position, and (2) the way in which the identity of the group is framed. For this purpose, the empirical reality of the Alevi demand-making processes calls for an alternate model of assessment. Like Massicard's adoption of Charles Tilly's (1978) tripartite classification

[269] HBVAKV, although critical of the participants and the content of the rally program, declared on its website that it will still participate. See "ABF'nin 7 Ekim 2012 tarihinde düzenleyeceği "LAİK DEMOKRATİK TÜRKİYE İÇİN EŞİTYURTTAŞLIK MİTİNGİ" ile ilgili düşüncelerimiz" (September 25, 2012) available at: http://www.hacibektasvakfi.web.tr/icerik/abf-nin-7-ekim-2012-tarihinde-duzenleyecegi-laik-demokratik-turkiye-icin-esit-yurttaslik

of forms of collective action as proactive, competitive or reactive,[270] this chapter seeks to classify and map the Alevi interest groups based on the type of claims they make and their policy strategies.

While Massicard used Tilly's framework to classify the demands generated by Alevi identity movement, the framework presented here takes both the issue area and framed identity into account. Based on this added complexity, contrary to Massicard's claims for harmonization of strategies for *reactive* (defensive) and *competitive* demands,[271] I argue that all strategies vary depending on the image of Alevi identity the interest groups formulate.

Accordingly, when groups maneuver for greater control over a certain position, advantage, or resource also claimed by other actors, they lay *competitive* claims. In the context of Alevi demands, competitive claims include call for demands similar to those of the Sunnis, and revolve around the principles of non-discrimination and equality. More specifically these include:

(ci) recognition of *cem houses* as places of worship (as opposed to recognition of mosques);

(cii) funding for Alevi places of worship (equal distribution of state funds)

(ciii) free practice of Alevi rituals [*cem* rituals] (as opposed to prayers [*namaz*]);

(civ) fair media coverage of issues related to Alevis (as oppose to Sunni dominant coverage);

(cv) fair coverage of Alevism in text-books.

(cvi) [if problem is framed in the axis of religion] equal distribution of DİB funds;

(cvii) [if problem is framed in the axis of religion] inclusion of Alevism in DİB (as opposed to dominant position of Sunni interpretation of Islam);

[270] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: McGraw-Hil Publishing Company, 1978), 144-7.

[271] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe* 52

(cviii) [if problem is framed in the axis of religion] inclusion of *dedes* in DİB (as opposed to dominant position of imams).[272]

The second category of *reactive* claims refers to demands formulated once one group is challenged by another. When making a reactive claim, the group is demanding to keep hold of resources, status or social position that it already has because some other group is threatening to claim those resources, that status or social position. In this sense, reactive claims are defensive claims and they seek policy changes, but not necessarily changes in the institutional design. In the case of Alevi demands, reactive claims revolve around the principles of non-assimilation and (physical) survival of the group. In particular, such claims will include:

(ri) termination of compulsory courses on religion whose design reflects Sunni, Hanefi interpretation of Islam;

(rii) abolition of DİB as an institution;

(riii) implementation of sanctions for derogatory remarks against Alevis;

(riv) implementation of sanctions for violence against Alevis.[273]

Finally, when a group rises to assert claims that have not previously been made, *proactive* claims are formulated. The group or groups in question formulate demands for resources, status or social position to obtain rights and privileges for the first time, rather than because of competition with the other groups or in defense of resources, status or social position. Since the Alevi community in Turkey already has formal rights of equal citizenship, the *proactive* claims revolves around recognition and respect for Alevi community. Additionally, since proactive claims would in principle require the transformation of the institutional relationship to actualize the demands, they seek either reform in institutions or regime changes.

The above classification of claims provides a valuable tool to position interest groups on Alevi issues of the post-2000s. The policy strategies of the Alevi interest groups rely primarily on the framing of the problem in question. Whether a group demands incorporation within existing institutions or seeks institutional change is

[272] The list is prepared based on the combination of the analysis of the demands addressed by the major Alevi organizations during the fieldwork, the policy suggessions of the Alevi activists published in the media, and the demands addressed during the Alevi workshops.

[273] Ibid.

dependent on what type of claim the interest group addresses. In other words, whether a group seeks reform (such as ABF's calls for termination of compulsory courses), integration (such as CEM foundations calls for integration of *dede*s into DİB structure), or revolt (such as the calls of Revolutionary Alevi Committee [*Devrimci Alevi Komitesi*] for system change) is a reflection of the relationship between demands and strategies. This framework will be used in the discussions regarding State-Alevi interest group relations on the issue of religious education in Chapter 6.

2.7. Concluding Remarks

This chapter illustrates the complex trajectory of the organization of the articulated Alevi interests. Until the 1950s the Alevis remained an endogamous rural community. The rural-urban migration of the 1950s and the 1960s paved the way for the emergence of an urban Alevi community. Additionally, the transformation of the opportunity structures with the 1961 Constitution enabled and encouraged the emergence of a more lively Alevi associational life in Turkey. The more the urban Alevis challenged by the social, economic and political factors, the more they establish associations and organizations to fulfill the emerging needs and demands.

While the first organizations established by the migrant Alevis were solidarity associations [*hemşeri*], the later organizations were more concerned with the identity demands of the community, i.e. the demands for recognition and respect for the Alevi community. However, in the 1960s the emphasis of the Alevi associations was on the protection of the Alevi culture, and religion, rather than familiarization of the non-Alevis with the institutions and the practices of Alevism. Consequently, the Alevi identity movement of the 1960s was mostly an inward-looking movement seeking to preserve the in-group identity of the urban Alevis.

Increasing ideological polarization in the 1970s not only paved the way for the emergence of new forms of Alevi organizations, but also did increase the Alevi membership of the trade unions, the left-wing political parties, and student organizations. In this period, neither the Alevi associations nor the Alevi political party [TBP] highlight the 'difference' of the Alevi community from their Sunni counterparts. Even though the highly polarized and the politicized environment enabled integration of

the second-generation rural migrants into the cities, the politicized Alevi actors did not seek Alevi-based demands.

The educational backgrounds, class feeling, economic and occupational characteristics of the Alevi immigrants played a vital role in shaping the form of the articulation and aggregation of the demands and preferences of the Alevi community in the 1970s. Although their denominational characterists were important, they mostly act as a supplement.[274] The most significant factor that laid the ground for the emergence of a new Alevi identity movement based on the Alevi denominational characteristics was the increasing hostility and violence against the Alevi community in the late 1970s. The events of Sivas, Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, and Çorum not only created new narratives of victimhood, and wore the trust of Alevis to the state officials out, but also did generate demands concerning solely the Alevi community.[275]

In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, the characteristics of the Alevi activists had changed since a significant number of activists were either arrested or had to seek asylum in the European countries. Additionally, the constraints introduced by the 1982 Constitution discouraged the Alevi associational activity. As a result of the changing economic and political environment, new Alevi actors were introduced. The more amendments were introduced to the institutional framework, the more the Alevi associational life increased. Additionally, the emerging Kurdish nationalism and the rise of Islamic revivalism influenced the demands framed by the newly emerging Alevi actors.

The emergence of new opportunity structures and the increase in material and ideational resources in the 1990s led to the emergence of a many-headed complex network of Alevi interest groups. This network has seen socio-economic transformations, ideological movements and transformation of political opportunity structures that have affected the emergence and transformation of Alevi identity politics. Within this process Alevis use their identity as the impetus to create diverse organizations to communicate their community's needs, demands and preferences. However, these diverse networks of associations and foundations do not always emerge

[274] Chapter 4 will discuss how the TBP did not sought and provide a substantial Alevi interest representation although recognized as an Alevi Party.

[275] Such as, the demands for the arrest and trial of the culprits, and/or the demands to hold a day of service to commemorate the victims of the events.

as a result of grassroots movements: Alevi elites and entrepreneurs, such as Fermani Altun or İzzettin Doğan, play a significant part in organization of these associations and foundations. These elites also have a crucial role in shaping the networks established between the community and other groups. The universe of Alevi interest groups is a multi-organizational field occupied by polarized camps, with no institution in place to settle intra-organizational conflicts and harmonize policy demands.

Even though all Alevi actors in the last two decades emphasize 'recognition and respect' as the ultimate goal, and highlight the need for a unified stand, they fail to build the necessary alliances. The domestic opportunity structures, along with the political stances and the denominational characteristics of the Alevi interest groups shape how the Alevi right-claims are framed. The policy demands of the Alevi groups, i.e. integration, institutional reform, or regime change, are determined by the nature of these claims. However, as the Chapter 3 will discuss in detail, the diagnosis of the Alevi problems and the strategies of the Alevi interest groups are also influenced by the activities of the transnational Alevi interest groups.

Rights policies of most states either have emerged or have transformed as a response to the pressure from networks of organizations and interest groups. In the case of Alevi-state relations the Alevi transnational networks generate such pressure. Additionally, through their activities targeting intergovernmental organizations, the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups seek to set the public agenda, and mobilize support for change. Like Keck and Sikkink note: "networks often have their greatest impact by working through governments and other powerful actors."[276] Having introduced the domestic actors in Alevi representation, the focus shifts to transnational actors in the subsequent chapter. Although Chapter 2 demonstrates how the Alevi elites and interest groups helped framing the issue areas, it was the transnational Alevi community that provided the ideational and material resources.[277]

[276] Margaret Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 102.

[277] The purchase of the headquarters of the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Associations in Ankara became possible only with the financial support provided by the Alevi association from Wunppertal, Germany. See chapter 3 for further discussion.

CHAPTER 3

ORGANIZING AND COMMUNICATING ALEVI INTERESTS IN EUROPE: THE CASE OF GERMANY

3.1. Introduction

The theoretical and historical aspects of Alevi identity politics in Turkey have been discussed in the previous chapter. Before moving on to the analysis of formal representation of the Alevi interests, this chapter seeks to analyze the inception, evolution and status of transnational actors of Alevi interest group politics. For this purpose, I focus on the Alevi identity movement in Europe with special reference to the case of Germany. The aim of this chapter is to explain different political opportunity structures shape actors and the content of Alevi right-claims. Rooted in the *transnational advocacy network* model, the chapter aims to unpack the dynamics of the relationship between the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups.

The case of Germany is selected primarily because it has the oldest, largest and politically the most active Alevi Diaspora.[278] Germany-based Alevi interest groups became significant actors in shaping the debates on and the tactics of the Alevi right-claims not only in Turkey, but also in other parts of Europe. Since the 1990s, these groups have also been providing material and ideational[279] support for the Alevi

[278] Throughout the text, the concept of diaspora is employed parallel to the definition put forward by Van Hear, Pieke and Vertovec (2004). It refers to "populations of migrant origin who are scattered among two or more destinations, between which there develop multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources: between the homeland and destination countries, and among destination countries." See Nicholas Van Hear, Frank Pieke and Steven Vertovec, *The contribution of UK-based diasporas to development and poverty reduction*, Report by COMPAS (April, 2004), 3. Complete text of the report is available at http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/papers/DfID%20diaspora%20report.pdf, last accessed May 20, 2013.

[279] By ideational support, I mostly refer to the contribution of Alevi elites and Alevi interest groups in Germany in identification and framing of issue areas in Alevi right-claims in Turkey.

community in Turkey. Even though their as representatives has been subject to controversy in Turkey, it is acknowledged and welcomed by the decision-makers in Germany. The organizations established by Alevi immigrants[280] in Germany played a vital role in the integration of the Alevi community into German social, political and economic structures and processes. These groups helped the Alevi immigrants to adapt to their host country by both cushioning the impact of a culture shock and by mediating between the German institutions and the Alevi immigrant community. Particularly, they played a crucial role in the process whereby the Alevis gained *Körperschaften des Öffentlichen Rechts* [KÖR][281] status.

The focus of this chapter is on activities of the German Alevi interest groups. By integrating theoretical concepts of political representation with the approaches of transnationalism, this chapter seeks to provide a deeper insight on the representation and communication of Alevi interests. Following the main assumptions of my dissertation, the chapter seeks to adress the following questions: How do political opportunity structures impact on the formation of the Alevi interest groups in Germany? What kind of relationships do the German Alevi interest groups have with their counterparts in Turkey?

3.2. Between Home and Host: Organizing and Communicating Migrants' Interests

The literature on migration and transnational networks has shown that the relationship between migrant sending and receiving countries is not static and linear.[282] International migration paves the way for the establishment of intense and relatively

[280] For the purpose of this research, the term "immigrant" is employed to identify all foreign born persons regardless of their citizenship status.

[281] Can be roughly translated as "corporations under public law"; KÖR status in Germany refers to the recognition of religious organizations/community bodies as public corporations.KÖR status grants autonomy from the state. Once officially recognized, religious corporations are entitled to offer instructions in the schools, receiving funding (i.e. public tithe), have a say in (public) cultural affairs etc. See Walter Krebs, "Verwaltungsorganisation" in *Handbuch des Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Volume 5, eds. Josef Isensee and Public Kirchhof, 457-520 (Berlin, C.F. Müller, 2007); and Bappenheim Stefano Testa, *Die Haftpflicht und die Religiösen Institute in Deutschland*, (Berlin: LIT VERLAG, 2006), 31-2 & 34.

[282] Ludger Pries, "(Grenzüberschreitende) Migrantenorganisationen als Gegenstand der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung: Klassische Problemstellungen und neuere Forschungsbefunde" in *Jenseits von "Identität oder Integration": Grenzen überspannende Migranteorganisationen*, eds. Ludger Pries and Zeynep Sezgin, 15-60, (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010), and Stephan Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, (Guildford Press, 2009), 7-8.

continuous networks between the countries of origin and destination.[283] The more migration becomes a phenomenon transforming the social, economic and political structures of home and host countries, the more migrants seek mechanisms to communicate their needs and preferences within and across borders. The complex interplay between the policies and the politics of migration highlights the role of transnational communities and transnational spaces[284] in the materialization of both the immigrant identities and their political demands.

Due to the social, economic and political transformations in the countries of origin and of destination, immigrants establish and maintain various formal and informal, organized and unorganized networks of relations (i.e. immigrant interest groups). These immigrant interest groups act as important instruments in the processes of integration and as a means of influencing the decision-making structures in the host countries. Consequently, understanding the dynamics of the networks and the form in which migrants articulate and communicate their interests is crucial.

Since many immigrants are excluded from the processes of participation and representation, these immigrant interest groups act as bridges between the immigrant community and the host country's institutions and decision-makers.[285] Within this context, articulation of the immigrant interests in the form of migrant associations and organizations becomes a mechanism for effective representation of the immigrant interests in their host country. In other words, they add a bottom-up dimension to the issue of inclusion of the immigrants (i.e. integration) - which, in principle, is considered as a state-centric process.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the kinds of immigrant associations that emerge at the different stages of migration. As Layton-Henry notes, "Associations initially established to preserve culture, religion, language and ethnic identity of migrant groups, are inevitably, over time, drawn into closer contact with the institutions and authorities of

[283] Thomas Faist "Towards a Political Sociology of Transnationalization: The State of the Art in Migration Research," *European Journal of Sociology* Volume 45, issue 3 (2004):331-66.

[284] Throughout the text, "transnational spaces" refers to "sustained ties of persons, networks and organizations across the borders across multiple nation-states, ranging from low to highly institutionalized forms." See Ibid, 337.

[285] Dirk Halm and Zeynep Sezgin, "Introduction: interplay between migrant organizations and their environment - conceptual and theoretical framework" in *Migration and Organized Civil Society: Rethinking National Policy* eds. Dirk Halm and Zeynep Sezgin, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 2.

the country of settlement."[286] During the early stages of migration immigrants' interests are mostly organized in the form of informal networks and solidarity associations that focusing on the needs and preferences of the community in the homeland. Immigrant interest groups, such as kinship groups, village-based or hometown (*hemşeri*) associations, are established upon arrival as a means to obtain social contacts, jobs, housing, etc. The more the migrant organizations focus shifts to their host country and the more their awareness of their rights (or lack of them) increase, the more stable the networks which aim to improve the quality of life and housing are established.

Figure 3.1 Typology of immigrant organizations by orientation



Source: Layton-Henry, "Immigrant Associations", 102.

[286] Zig Layton-Henry "Immigrant Associations" in *The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western Europe*, ed. Zig Layton-Henry, (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 102.

During the later periods, as the socio-economic integration of the immigrants increases, immigrant organizations start to act as mediators between the institutions of the host country and the immigrant community. It is important to note here that the stages of orientation are not necessarily linear in all countries due to differences in the migration processes (see Figure 3.1). Due to the different types of immigrant interest groups can co-exist simultaneously in the later stages. In relation to the nexus between the country of origin and country of destination, (i) timing of the migration flows, and (ii) immigration policies of the receiving country become important factors in shaping the organization of the migrant interest groups.

In addition to their role in the integration of immigrants to host countries, these interest groups play a significant role at home as well. Immigrant interest groups influence the country of origin by (i) providing material and ideational resources, and (ii) generating pressure in hindering/encouraging societal cleavages and conflicts. Migrants and their organizations can be "sources of important material resources through remittances they send back to the homeland state, in the form of diaspora-led investment or by offering the homeland state expanding markets for its exports, cultural output and even a temporary labour pool."[287] Political actors in the country of origin can encourage the establishment of ties with immigrant communities either to increase the flow of remittances or to better communicate (or legitimize) homeland state's policies in the international arena.[288] Yet, the relationship between the homeland country and the immigrant communities is not linear. As Østergaard-Nielsen states within this complex interaction;

> Emigrants want their country of origin to support their struggle for equal rights and against discrimination on the labour market. More established migrant and diaspora groups demand more transparency and good governance in order to feel that their remittances and foreign direct investment is spent in the best possible way. And if migrants are expected to be good representatives and do some lobbying for their country of origin abroad, then they would often like some influence on the policies that they are expected to represent.[289]

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[287] Myra A. Waterbury, "Bridging the divide: towards a comparative framework for understanding kin state and migrant-sending state diaspora politics" in *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts and Methods*, eds. Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 138.

[288] Ibid, 138-40.

[289] Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, "International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations," in *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations,* ed. Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 4-5.

However, homeland political actors might resist or hinder the formation of extensive ties, if they believe that the populations abroad can jeopardize domestic and/or foreign policy goals.[290]

To influence policies and shape institutional relations, organizations established by the immigrants in their host countries can work together across borders and form transnational advocacy networks (TANs).[291] TANs that are established between home and host countries provide mechanisms and resources (i) to shape political and societal incorporation of the immigrant communities in the host country, and (ii) to challenge the policies and institutional frameworks in their homeland. [292] It is equally important to note that not all TANs are byproducts of migration; TANs can emerge in a number of ways. Networks can either be engineered by like-minded activists and organizations or emerge from existing contacts that unite and intensify around a specific issue (such as the encouragement of the ethical treatment of animals worldwide, or non-proliferation of nuclear weapons). Yet, once formed, TANs are generally effective tools in the diffusion of international and regional norms.

In the case of the minorities, TANs are also significant in ethnic or religious boundary-making and maintenance. Through the exchange of (i) knowledge on the present status of the minority group, (ii) information on events and policies challenging the status of the minority, and (iii) symbols of cultural, ethnic and/or religious identity, TANs can shape the boundaries between minority group in question and its 'other' (Figure 3.2). Information exchange enables networks to call attention to the issues (or create the issues) that would otherwise not be heard.[293] Through emphasizing norms of

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[290] Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, "Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy and Security in Eurasia," *International Security* 24, no. 3(Winter 1999/2000): 108-38.

[291] TANs refer to "networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation" See Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 1. A detailed account of the impact of TANs on the transformation of the religious education policies will be the subject of Chapters 6.

[292] A proliferating literature in international relations theory now explores the emergence and impact of TANs. See Keck, and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*; Robert Rorschneider, and Russell J. Dalton, "A Global Network? Transnational Cooperation among Environmental Groups," *Journal of Politics* 64, no. 2 (2002): 510-33; Charli R. Carpenter, "Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Non-emergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks," *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 1, (2007): 99-120; Thomas Risse, and Kahryn Sikkink, "The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction," in *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, eds. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kahryn Sikkink, 1-38, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)

[293] Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*,18

individual rights and/or collective rights, TANs can try to aggregate support for domestic movements demanding institutional and policy changes at home. In other words, the interaction between the minority interest groups in the country of origin and in the country of destination influence the framing of in-group and out-group identities, and the way in which issue areas are diagnosed and prognosed.

Figure 3.2 Relationship between immigrant and domestic minority interest groups



Figure 3.3 Boomerang pattern



Source: Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders,* 13

As Keck and Sikkink argue that "a network's existence and its decision to focus on abuses in a particular country is a necessary but not sufficient condition for changing…practices."[294] Even though the pressure of TANs has its costs, it does not guarantee substantial improvement of policies and institutional arrangements. Effectiveness of TANs depends on the domestic (and transnational) opportunity structures and characteristics of the actors. By combining "pressure from below" with "pressure from above," TANs create what Keck and Sikkink label as *boomerang*

[294] Ibid., 117.

pattern, where domestic groups that are excluded from the political processes find allies to put pressure on the target state (Figure 3.3).

It is clear that states have few incentives to comply with the objectives of TAN campaigns. Unless the mechanisms to put pressure on a target state/actor exist, and target actor is vulnerable to incentives or sanctions, a TAN campaign cannot succeed. What is more, the issue areas are uneven since not all issues have mass appeal and generate the effective organization of transnational networks. TAN campaigns can fail, if there is no consensus on framing of the issue. In addition to the characteristics of the target actor, the availability of political entrepreneurs (i.e. members of advocacy networks) is vital both in the formation and effectiveness of TANs. As Keck and Sikkink states, "just as oppression and injustice do not themselves produce movements or revolutions, claims around issues amenable to international action do not produce transnational networks."[295] One needs entrepreneurs (i) to provide information that would not otherwise be available, (ii) to frame issues, which in turn would be used by networks to create awareness, and (iii) to seek material or moral leverage to pressure more powerful actors to comply with campaign objectives.[296]

In principle within a boomerang pattern, when the domestic opposition (which Keck and Sikkink label as "NGOs") is denied access to state institutions and decision-making processes, they can bypass the state and search allies to pressure their state in the international arena. While the domestic NGOs provide the information on the issue areas, the transnational NGOs put pressure either on the state in which they are located, or on an intergovernmental organization, so that they can put pressure on the target state. Although networks cannot directly change policies and transform institutions, they have the capability to persuade and bring pressure on target states. Networks can seek influence by (i) generating reliable information on an issue quickly and communicating it to an influential audience, (ii) calling upon symbols, actions and narratives to raise consciousness of the audience, (iii) finding more powerful actors to challenge the target states, and lastly by (iv) holding powerful actors to their previously stated policies accountable.[297]

[295] Ibid., 14.

[296] Ibid., 18 & 22-3.

[297] Ibid., 16

However, this model does not provide much insight on the dynamics of the relationship between the domestic and international organizations. While the motives of the domestic actors to establish contacts with international actors are shown clearly in the model, the motives of the international actors to promote domestic opposition's claims remain vague. Moreover, on issues involving the violation of individual and collective rights, the lack of access to the processes of the state does not require lack of access to the intergovernmental organizations. Domestic actors can simultaneously both provide information to intergovernmental organizations and also contribute to the generation of external pressure to the target state. In the study of the relationship between the domestic and international minority interest groups, motives can become less of an issue. Despite this, the model still fails to fully explain framing of issues and claims. As a final point, even though this model historically has been used effectively in the fields of human rights, women's rights and environmental rights, its capacity to explain the diffusion of ambiguous norms (such as collective/minority rights norms) poses a problem.

Once the focus shifts to the complex relationship between the immigrant interest groups, domestic interest groups, and states, and intergovernmental organizations, some clarification is required to capture the dynamics of influence. As Brysk noted, change can occur when social actors can codify new norms and alter state policies and institutions.[298] While domestic actors and structures provide a starting point for understanding the inception, evolution and status of networks, they are not sufficient to explain the activities and effectiveness of TANs. The organization of articulated immigrant minority interests is highly dependent on the structures and policies of the host country. Similarly, the level and scope of the impact of TANs as much influenced by the opportunity structures of the host country as those of home.

3.3. Policies of Migration in Germany and the Rise of the Alevi Diaspora

Other than universal individual rights, states are not expected to be held accountable for not granting political, social or cultural rights to their non-citizen populations. There are no universal standards that regulate the way in which states

[298] Alison Brysk, "From Above and Below: Social Movements, The International System and Human Rights in Argentina," *Comparative Political Studies* 26, no. 3 (October, 1993): 259- 85.

should deal with immigrants. Consequently, not all immigrants are treated equally and included in the political, economic and social processes of the countries they settle in.

Germany presents a particular case where the state tried to limit the rigid discrimination of economic, ethnic and political immigrants through a complex set of legal provisions. The questions "Who constitutes the foreigners/outsiders" and "what kinds of rights they have" are determined by a complex web of legal framework, operating with various status, permit and residence categories. Within this system neither are all immigrants automatically labeled as foreigners, nor are all foreigners considered as immigrants. The status and rights of each group (i.e. labor migrants, asylum seekers [*Asylbewerber*][299], war refugees [*Bürgerkriegsflüchtlinge*], immigrants of family reunifications [*Familiennachzug*] and repatriated ethnic Germans [*Aussidler*][300]) vary significantly.[301]

Additionally, an exclusionary citizenship regime based on *jus sanguinis*, combined with the long-term effects of the guest-worker program, has created a system where the entry of large number of immigrants was permitted. However, this has been done without introduction of adequate measures to incorporate the non-German immigrant population into the society and to represent their interests within the political processes. While the repatriated ethnic German immigrants[302] could exercise full citizenship rights upon arrival, the non-German immigrants have been actively excluded from the political processes of the German states [*Länder*]. From the introduction of the guest-worker [*Gastarbeiter*] system in the mid-1950s to the adoption of the Immigration

[299] As the *Article 16a* of the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz,* hereafter GG) guarantees the right of asylum of persons persecuted on political grounds, Germany has accepted a large number of asylum seekers over the years. See Lydia Morris, *Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrant's Rights* (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), 29-30 & 41-45.

[300] The German state tried to control (and reduce) the inflow of *Aussidler* through the war settlement Act (*Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz*, hereafter KFBG*)*. With the introduction of KFBG in 1993 people with an ethnic German background from other countries are only allowed access to Germany, only if they can prove that their ethnicity is the foundation of discrimination in their country of origin. Starting in 1993, these groups began to be referred as *Spätaussiedler.*

[301] Simon Green, *The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and immigration policy in contemporary Germany*, (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 1.

[302] The *Articles 16* and *116* of GG, enables the 'return' of ethnic Germans (*Aussidler*). Due to constitutional requirements, between 1945 and 1961 millions of 'ethnic' Germans migrated to Federal Republic of Germany. The number of entries reached 2.4 million between 1990 and 2003. Yet, the number of *Aussidler* immigration declined over the years, decreasing to its lowest rate in 2011 with 2,148 immigrants. For more information on the rates of Aussidler inflow see BMI, Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung, *Migrationsbericht 2004*, (2004), 34 & BMI, *Migrationsbericht 2011*, (2011), 7.

Act [*Zuwanderungsgesetz*] in 2005, the policies regarding immigrants and foreigners ignored the long-term effects and consequences of migration.

Although the issues related to ethnic German immigrants shape a significant portion of the politics and policies of migration in Germany, it is the history of labor migration that has the most effect on the transformation of the principle dimensions and legal basis of the policies on immigration, residence and citizenship rights of foreigners [*Ausländer*].[303] The migration and integration of the Turkish immigrants, which constitutes the largest non-German immigrant population, in general and the Alevis in particular, are of significance to trace the emergence, transformation and impact of the domestic policies and rights regimes in Germany. What is more, understanding the consequences of the uneven distribution of the Alevis among the Turkish immigrant population is important to explain the content of the Alevi rights networks.

3.3.1 From *Gastarbeiter* to *Ausländer*: Migration Debates and Issues between 1955 and 1973

The largest portion of the (legal) immigrants entered Germany through labor migration and subsequent family reunifications. In the post-WWII period, despite the large number of ethnic German migration, the needs of the agricultural and industrial sectors compelled the government to establish what is now known as the guest-worker [*Gastarbeiter*] system. All parties involved (workers, foreign governments, German political parties and bureaucrats) were aware that economic interests were the driving force behind this program.[304] In principle, through the introduction of short-term, temporary foreign labor force, the Germany was expected to (i) replace the manpower lost during WWII, (ii) hasten economic progress, and (iii) strengthen economic growth.[305] Other than the introduction of the Federal Agency for Labor [BA - *Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*], the immigration acts and the institutions of the pre-WWII

[303] Green, *Politics of Exclusion,* 1.

[304] In addition to achieving domestic economic goals, the *Gastarbeiter* program was used to meet foreign policy ends. German Labor Ministry considered the program as a supplement to economic collaboration. between anti-communist allies. See Deniz Göktürk, David Gramling and Anton Kaes, eds. *Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration 1955-2005,* (Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 2007), 9-10.

[305] Wesley D. Chapin, *Germany for Germans?: The Political Effects of International Migration*, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997), 9-10.

period[306] continued to dominate the way in which the Federal Republic of Germany [*Bundesrepublik Deutschland*] dealt with immigrants. Like its European counterparts, BA was to act as a medium between the interested and qualified potential workers and employee-seeking firms. Work and residence permits of the country were turned into clauses of job contracts between the employers and (individual) workers, as well as between (individual) workers and the Federal Republic of Germany. Between 1955 and 1973, around 14 million workers signed contracts and entered Federal Republic of Germany[307] through bilateral agreements.[308]

The guest-worker program, modeled after the 'return' migrant experience in Europe in the 19th and the early 20th centuries,[309] did not involve any institutions or mechanisms to incorporate foreigners into the German society and to aid them in coping with alienation problems. Contrary to other policy areas, the policies of the *Gastarbeiter* system were not society-centered and cooperative.[310] Neither the coalition under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's Christian Democrats [CDU – Christlich *Demokratische Union Deutschlands* / CSU – *Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern*], nor the opposition under Social Democratic Party [SPD – *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*][311] considered the possibility that the guest-workers could become long-term residents or permanent immigrants.[312] While migrants were initially recruited as seasonal workers, the needs of the metalwork and engineering industries compelled the government to abolish this practice in the 1960s.

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[306] Namely, the 1938 Foreigner Police Ordinance [*Ausländerpolizeiverordnung*] and the 1933 Ordinance on Foreign Workers[*Verordnung über ausländishe Arbeitnehmer*]

[307] Norbert Cyrus, *Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Germany*, country report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, (Oldenburg 2005), 50-51, accessed March 2, 2013, available at http://www.politis-europe.uni-oldenburg.de/download/Germany.pdf.

[308] Germany signed agreements with Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), Morocco (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968).

[309] Accordingly, in the 1870s 25 per cent and in the 1890s 45 per cent of the Europeans migrated to US estimated to return to their homelands. Similarly, a significant number of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese workers in South America returned to Europe throughout the 19th century. Between 1907 and 1914, return migration was a common phenomenon that 2 per cent of the Germans, 33 per cent of the Poles and Portuguese, around 48 per cent of English and North Italians, as well as 42% of South Italians returned to their countries of origin. See Leslie Moch, *Moving Europeans Migration in Western Europe since 1650*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 155-6.

[310] James F. Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe*, (Harward University Press, 1992), 60-1.

[311] SPD was critical of the plan due to unemployment rates. They claimed that recruitment of foreign workers would hinder the position of the German laborers. See "Hundertttausend italienische Arbeiter kommen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 21, 1955.

[312] Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States* 60.

Even though by 1960 immigrants became an integral part of the labor force, the absence of clear and substantive legislation regarding housing and workplace rights of the immigrants led to increasing deliberations and conflicts between the federal ministries.[313] The growing desire of the immigrants for family unifications and resulting accommodation and visa issues started to challenge the legal framework and attitudes on migration. Particularly, the pleas of the Italian guest-workers, who were the first group to be recruited, found support from the Catholic Church. As a group analists note "At the *Katholikentag* of 1962, its president, cabinet minister Paul Lübke, stated that Catholics had to protect the 'guestworkers' from 'moral and spiritual' degeneration."[314] While the Catholic Church and Christian Democrats put emphasis on the moral issues, the German employers perceived family unifications as a means to reduce the effects of alienation. In their view, the less distraction the workers had, the more motivated they would be, and hence, the more productive they would become.

Despite the pressures from the migrant-sending countries for improvements in the conditions of the guest-workers, little action was taken to meet their demands. Even though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared that this issue would deteriorate Germany's image in the international arena, the possibility of a new and permanent path for migration evoked more fear among the political elites. The shortage of housing in the early 1960s promoted even more fear. There were worries that by allowing more foreigners to enter Germany, tensions and conflicts would emerge between the local and immigrant populations.[315] Consequently, "German authorities did little to facilitate family reunion and still often refused permission, and housing programmes for the immigrant families remained negligible."[316]

The first change came with the introduction of the *1965 Ausländergesetz* (Foreigner Law). With this new law, the immigrants granted residence as long as they

[313] Anne von Oswald et al., "Einwanderungsland Deutschland: A New Look at its Post-war History" in *European Encounters: Migrants, Migration and European Societies Since 1945,* eds. Karen Schèonwèalder et al. (Wiltshire: Antony Rowe Ltd, 2005), 22.

[314] Ibid., 24.

[315] Ulrich Herbert and Karin Hunn, "Guest Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic: From the Beginning of Recruitment in 1955 until its halt in 1973," in *The miracle years: a cultural history of West Germany, 1949-1968,* ed. Hanna Schissler, 187-218 (Princeton: Princeton Univeristy Press, 2001).

[316] von Oswald et al., "Einwanderungsland Deutschland: A New Look at its Post-war History" 24.

had valid visas and did not hinder the 'needs' of the Federal Republic.[317] Yet, variance in the interpretation of the 'needs' by the local foreigner bureaus (*Ausländeramt*) fueled the general confusion about the status and rights of the labor migrants. The new law, contrary to expectations, had a destabilizing effect on the migrants and their families since it neither clarified the status of the immigrants nor guaranteed equal housing and labor rights for them.

3.3.2 Beginning of the Turkish Immigration to Germany and the Early Immigrant Organizations

Even though migration to Western Europe was considered as a means for financial improvement since the late 1950s, it was not until 1961 that emigration from Turkey underwent a significant structural change. Starting with the bilateral agreement between the Turkish and German governments (*No. 505-83 SZV/3-92-42*) on October 30, 1961, state-sponsored labor migration to the Federal Republic of Germany became an important trend in the 1960s.[318] At the end of 1961, 6,700 Turkish workers were recruited. Due to the increasing need for foreign labor in the Federal Republic the number of Turkish workers continued to grow with the exception of 1966-1967 recession. Their percentage within foreign population doubled in 1962, and reached 7.4 per cent by 1964.[319] By the time of the 1973 moratorium, the Turks had become the largest non-German (and non-citizen) community in Germany.

Between 1961 and 1973, the Turks were mostly recruited as unskilled or semi-skilled workers to work mostly in metalwork and engineering industries. In accordance to the requirements of the guest-worker program they were not allowed to bring their families with them, and were housed in dormitory type settlements. Even though with bilateral agreements social security rights were granted and Turkish workers were expected to receive similar wages and social benefits as their German colleagues, the absence of mechanisms of control led to the exploitation of the Turkish migrants.

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[317] *Bundesgesetzblatt* I (April 28, 1965), 353

[318] Nermin Abadan-Unat, *Turks in Europe, 1957-2007 From Guest Worker to Transnational Citizens*, (Berghahn Books, 2011), 11-2; Sabri Sayarı," Migration Policies of the Sending Countries: Perspectives on the Turkish experience," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciene* 485 (1986): 87-97.

[319] Gerhard Kade, "Die Bedeutung der Arbeitskräftewanderung für die planmäßige Entwicklungspolitik einiger Mittelmeerländer," in *Probleme der Ausländischen Arbeitskräfte in der Bundesrepublik,* ed. Albert Wissler (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1966), 134.

Particularly, the firms and landowners could take advantage the situation of the housing market and force the guest workers to live in inadequate and unsanitary conditions. In principle the labor unions and associations were expected to be the mediums for the communication of the needs and preferences of the immigrant workers. However, "Worker's Welfare Association [*Arbeiterwohlfahrt*], which had set up a special office for the consultation of Turkish guest workers –Turkish Advisory Center [*Türk Danış*] – in 1962, was unable to remedy this lack."[320] Since labor migration to Germany was expected to be a temporary arrangement the German governments was not particularly interested in improving the conditions of the Turkish workers. It was not until the 1970s that Turkish authorities began to pressure the German government for places of worship for Turkish immigrants, and schools for their children.[321] However, even after Turkish authorities were involved, Turkey's emphases was confined to keeping the Turkish immigrants in the Federal Republic of Germany 'Turkish at heart' rather than encouraging their successful integration.

In the absence of mechanisms and institutions to communicate their needs and preferences, Turkish workers in Germany began to organize early in the 1960s. Parallel to the labor union activities in Turkey, the Turkish workers in Germany sought to improve their situation through the establishment of unions/representative bodies and sometimes wildcat strikes.[322] Despite its problems, Turkish Advisory Center was instrumental in strengthening the cooperation between Turkish workers and the establishment of associations.[323] However, neither the German labor unions and workers, nor the employers acknowledged the claims made by the labor associations established by Turkish workers as legitimate. Since the guest-workers in Germany did not have labor rights or any specific social rights other than those specified in the bilateral agreements, the most conventional modes of civic participation was considered illegal and illegitimate by the German authorities.

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[320] Herbert and Hunn, "Guest Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic," 201.

[321] Ibid.

[322] Over the years, a number of labor activity news found their way into major newspapers of Turkey. Organization of wildcat strikes and 'brutal' response of the German authorities were subjects of many articles and opinion pieces throughout the 1960s and the 1970s. Such examples can be found in the highly circulated Milliyet newspaper: "Almanya'daki Türk İşçileri Eşit Haklar İstiyor," *Milliyet*, November 4, 1962, 3; "Almanya'daki 23 Türk İşçisi Grev Yapıyor," *Milliyet*, September 26, 1963.

[323] Nermin Abadan, *Batı Almanya'daki Türk İşçileri ve Sorunları*, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1964), 166-7.

The first Turkish association that was established by Turkish guest workers was in *Cologne*. The establishment of the Turkish Workers Association of Cologne and its surroundings [*Köln ve Çevresi Türk İşçileri Derneği*] was followed by a number of workers' associations in the cities which had high levels of Turkish immigrants.[324] Echoing Layton-Henry's typology, in addition to the worker associations, in the 1960s Turkish immigrants (guest-workers and other groups) in Germany established a number of organizations that retained their links to Turkey.[325] Among those groups, Federation of Turkish Students in Germany [ATÖF - *Almanya Türk Öğrenci Federasyonu*] was founded in 1962 and it was subsidized by the Turkish government until 1968. Additionally, by the late 1960s, political parties and left-wing and right-wing associations in Turkey began to establish networks and organizations in Germany and in other parts of Europe. Like the interest groups in Turkey, the immigrant interest groups increasingly politicized and polarized in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s.

The Alevi organizations in Germany and elsewhere in Europe were established in the late 1970s.[326] In the German cities, the Alevi migrants continued to hide their identity upon arrival, as they did in the urban contexts in Turkey. Hence, they were practically invisible in the public sphere. Similar to the experience of the Kurdish migrant workers from Turkey, the Alevis also tended to join the preexisting Turkish associations. Additionally, there were no religious markers to indicate their presence in the German cities. As Massicard notes: "Whereas the Sunnis set up mosques as soon as they realized they would be in Germany for a prolonged period of time…there was no organized [*Alevi*] religious life."[327]

3.3.3 Rotation vs. Integration: Debates and Policies between 1973 and 1982

The ambiguity regarding the status and the rights of the immigrants was further complicated when the global economic crisis and recession paved the way for a new economic context, where guest-workers were no longer needed. In this period, the

[324] Namely in Mönchengladbach, Wuppertal, Hannover, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Saarbrücken, Karlsruhe, Waiblingen, Zell, Esslingen, Reutlingen, Nürnberg, Aschaffenburg, Münch, and Altenbögge.

[325] Olivier Grojean, "Bringing the organization back in: Pro-Kurdish protest in Europe," in *Nationalism and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue*, eds. Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden, (Oxon: Routledge, 2001), 184.

[326] Nico Landman, *Van mat tot Minaret: De Institutionalisering van de Islam in Nederland*, (Amsterdam: VU-Uitheverij, 1992), 142-3.

[327] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 186, emphasis added.

composition of the labor migrants began to change, with the introduction of a moratorium on guest-worker recruitment. While most guest-workers from Southern Europe returned to their countries following the moratorium, the total population of the Turkish immigrants as well as other non-European immigrants continued to grow due to the changes in policies of the host country (i.e. family reunions). By 1974, 78 per cent of the Turkish labor force outside of Turkey was located in Federal Republic of Germany and Turks constituted the largest non-European immigrant population.[328]

Additionally, the non-European guest-workers, unlike their European counterparts, could not freely rotate in and out of Germany. Since they were subjected to additional requirements and conditions in their contracts, most non-European workers chose to remain in Federeal Republic of Germany fearing long term travels to their country would jeopardize their work and hence residence permits. In the absence of legitimate representation in the existing trade unions and workers' councils, guest-workers gradually mobilize for strike action and organize their own associations.[329]

The emergence of wildcat strikes in 1973 not only made it clear that new institutional and policy regulations are needed to fulfill the housing and education needs of the workers and their families, but also they alarmed the Federation of German Trade Unions [DGB - *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*] due to the potential threat of establishment of immigrant labor unions. Both the state and civil society actors in Germany as well as in other European countries receiving labor migrants realized that change was necessary, as workers were not as easily disposable as they thought it was the case. The willingness of the immigrants to mobilize and organize strikes turned DGB into an (unwilling) advocate of immigrant labor rights in this period. As Katzenstein suggests, DGB put pressure on SPD-led government to provide "stronger protection of free speech and free association, reforms in the rules governing residency

[328] Nermin Abadan-Unat, *Turkish Workers in Europe 1960-1975: A Socioeconomic Reappraisal*, (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 7.

[329] Such an example occurred at the Ford plant in Cologne in late August, 1973. Accordingly, the Ford factory officials fired 300 Turkish workers for returning late from vacation. As the Turkish workers were already dissatisfied with the poor sanitary conditions of the prewar buildings they were located and the double standards they receive in the work place, the layoffs fueled emergence of a wildcat strike, much to the dismay of their fellow German workers and the workers' council. See "Die Türken probten den Aufstand," *Die Zeit*, September 7, 1973.

permits, representation of foreign workers on government advisory boards, and improved access to language and vocational training."[330]

Despite the improvements in the condition of the immigrants, Germany continued to manage and limit migration throughout the 1970s. Since the number of the immigrants continued to increase with family reunifications and the inflow of refugees, the states [*Länder*] tried to manage the movement of the immigrants within Germany. As the population of the large cities increased with family unifications and began to threaten the employment opportunities of the natives, the Secretary of Work and Social Order initiated policy measures to prevent immigration to cities in April 1975.[331] Yet, the restrictions needed to be repealed in 1977 due to the pressures of the industry, which continued to seek cheap supply of foreign laborers.[332]

By the mid-1970s, integration became a major issue. In an attempt to develop a comprehensive integration policy strategy, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) introduced reforms in 1978. The legal status of the foreigners was strengthened through amendments in criteria for acquisition of unlimited residence permits and eligibility for naturalization. Additionally, a new federal office, i.e. Commissioner for Foreigner Affairs [*Ausländerbeauftragte*], was created to communicate and represent the needs and preferences of the immigrants.[333] In 1979, Heinz Kühn, the first Commissioner, issued a memorandum to that supported for full integration of the immigrant population.[334]

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[330] Peter J. Katzenstein, *Policy & Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 222-3.

[331] Accordingly, settlement of immigrants in a city was allowed only if the percentage of the foreigner population would not exceed 12%.

[332] Charles Chapin, *Germany for Germans: The Political Effects of International Migration* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), 17.

[333] Douglas B. Klusmeyer, *Immigration policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: negotiating membership and remaking the nation,* (n.p.: Berghahn Books, 2009), 100.

[334] His recommendations included (i) recognition of Germany as a land of de facto immigration; (ii) increasing integration measures; (iii) facilitation of unlimited work permits for foreign teenagers; (iv) granting of right to citizenship for those born (and raised) in Germany; (v) granting of right to vote in local elections for those living in Federal Republic of Germany for a long period of time; (vi) complete integration of education programs to eliminate the segregation between the German and non-German students; and (vii) recognition of full legal and de facto equality of foreigners in Germany. See Heinz Kühn, *Stand und Weiterentwicklung Der Integration der Auslandischen Arbeiternehmer und ihrer Familien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Memorandum des Beauftragten der Bundesregierung*. (Bonn, September 1979), 3-4, 10-11, 15, 18 & 37-44.

While the Kühn memorandum found support from the Catholic and Protestant churches and the DGB, most others were skeptical of the recommendations due to the high costs that integration policies would bring. Increasing wild strikes and the worsening of the economic conditions in the 1970s quickly transformed the public opinion against foreigners. The more the press evoked racial fears and the more the conditions of the labor market declined, the more the general public's views on labor immigrants deteriorated. Throughout 1970s, popular media depicted some West German cities, such as Berlin and Kreuzberg, in danger of becoming the new 'Harlem'. During this period the popular weekly news magazine *Der Spiegel*[335] published a number of articles that emphasized the increasingly unsafe conditions for the local German population in some cities.[336] For example, in the cover of its issue on July 31, 1973 *Der Spiegel* highlighted the transformation of the urban centers with the alarming slogan: 'The Turks are coming: save yourself, if you can' (*Die Türken kommen - rette sich, wer kann*). The magazine warned of the emerging Turkish ghetto threat, and drew public attention to an 'invasion' that was on the verge of becoming unmanageable. *Der Spiegel* continued its negative portrayal of the urban centers throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The opinion polls of this period revealed that migrants were blamed for increasing the unemployment rates. The results of the opinion polls conducted by *EMNID,*[337] and *Infas*[338] demonstrated that there was an increasing demand for sending the migrants back to their homeland.

Since the policies of 1970s failed to reduce the number of the immigrants and as the demand for the return of the labor immigrants increased (Table 3.1), the ruling coalition of SPD and Free Democratic Party [FDP - *Die Freie Demokratische Partei*] tried to solve the problem of migration through the introduction of material incentives. As Cooper notes due to the increasing inability "to compel foreigners to return their

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[335] First launched in 1947, *Der Spiegel* is one of the largest circulation (weekly) news magazines in Germany.

[336] See *Der Spiegel*, no. 31 (July 30, 1973), 24-31. The original issue is available at: http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/image/show.html?did=41955159&aref=image035/E0539/PPM-SP197303100240034.pdf&thumb=false

[337] EMNID is an acronym for *Erforschung der öffentlichen Meinung, Marktforschung und Meinungsforschung, Nachrichten, Informationen, Dienstleistungen (i.e. Institute for market research and market identification). It is* founded in 1945, and *considered* to be one of the largest polling institutes in Germany.

[338] Infas (*Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft*, Institute for Applied Social Sciences) is a private and independent institution for market and social research in Germany.

home countries, the issue of *Rückkehrpremien*, i.e. the payment of financial incentives to those foreigners willing to leave the Federal Republic, was brought into the discussion at the start of the 1980s."[339] However, contrary to the expectations of SPD/FDP coalition, the population of the foreigners continued to grow throughout the 1980s.

Table 3.1 Percentage of German citizens favoring the expulsion of immigrant workers



Source: "Ausländerfeindlichkeit: Exodus erwünscht," *Der Spiegel* no.18 (May 3, 1982), 37[340]

3.3.4. Rise of the Turkish Immigrant Organizations in the 1970s

Even though with the 1973 moratorium labor migration came to a halt, the number of Turks in Germany continued to grow through family unifications, asylum requests and illegal migration. Along with the changes in the composition of the Turkish immigrant population in Germany, networks began to emerge between political parties, trade unions and student associations in Turkey and the immigrant population in Germany. From 1970s onwards, the organization of the Turkish immigrants "mirrored…the divisions within Turkish society between rightists, leftists, Kurdish separatists and the various religious organizations."[341]

[339] Duncan Cooper, *Immigration and German Identity in the Federal Republic of Germany from 1945 to 2006*, (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2012), 154.

[340] The original *Der Spiegel* issue is available at http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/image/show.html?did=14348265&aref=image036/2006/06/20/cq-sp198201800370044.pdf&thumb=false

[341] Philip L. Martin, *The Unfinished Story*, 32.

During this period various 'boomerang patterns' were established between the banned or repressed political parties in Turkey and migrant worker associations in Germany. The Nationalist Action Party [MHP - *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*] was the first Turkish political party to establish organizational network with the aim of preserving the essence of the identity of the Turkish immigrant population. Through cultural institutions and mosque organizations the MHP tried to mobilize the Turkish immigrants according to its own ideological orientation.[342] To that end, the Federation of Democratic Idealist Turkish Associations in Europe was founded in Germany in 1978.[343] The activities of the MHP were soon followed by other domestic movements, namely Islamists, left-wing parties and Kurdish nationalists.

As Grojean argues Turkish political parties tried to mobilize the immigrant population to increase their support for their activities in the homeland either by infiltrating the existing immigrant interest groups or establishing new ones in Germany.[344] Following that trend, the political parties and left-wing associations were the first to mobilize Alevi migrants in Germany. Radical, left-wing organizations such as Revolutionary Path [*Dev Yol*][345] included Alevi activists within its ranks and sought support from the Alevis living in Germany.[346]

A more moderate left-wing organization was founded in 1977, under the name of Popular Revolutionary Federation [HDF - *Halkçı Devrimci Federasyonu*]. The HDF was significant for the networks it established between the migrants and the political parties (i.e. CHP in Turkey and in later periods SPD in Germany).[347] Yet, neither the radical nor the moderate left-wing organization made specific claims concerning the needs and preferences of the Alevi community. Instead, since the membership profile of

[342] Liza Mügge "Brussels calling: the European organization of migrants from Turkey," in *Migration and Organized Civil Society: Rethinking National Policy*, eds. Dirk Halm and Zeynep Sezgin, (New York: Routledge, 2013),162.

[343] Ibid.

[344] Grojean, "Bringing the organization back in," 184-185.

[345] The organization was considered as successor of Turkey' People's Liberation Party-Front [THKP-C - *Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi*] which in turn was preceded by Revolutionary Youth (*Dev Genç*)

[346] Even though Dev-Yol had many branches, not all sub-organization was named in a similar fashion. For instance, the branch in Hamburg was initially established as Youth Association (*Gençlik Derneği*), then changed its name to Turkish-German Friendship Association (*Türk-Alman Dostluk Derneği*), and finally transformed into Turkish-Kurdish-German Friendship Association (*Türk-Kürt-Alman Dostluk Derneği*).

[347] Sökefeld, *Struggling for recognition,*, 49-51.

the organizations was heterogeneous, occasional tensions emerged between the Alevis and the Sunnis.[348] The Alevi factions within the left-wing organizations were instrumental in the establishment of the Alevi interest groups in the late 1970s. For instance, the establishment of the Turkish Workers Peace Union [*Türk İşçileri Barış Birliği*] in May 1979 – which later changed its name to Patriots Peace Union [YB - *Yurtseverler Barış Birliği*] – was a direct result of increasing dissatisfaction with the activities of HDF in the aftermath of the 1978 attacks on Alevis in Kahramanmaraş.[349]

Even though many organizations in Federal Republic of Germany included Alevis since the late 1950s, no Alevi interest gourp was established until two decades later. Parallel to the pattern of organization of articulated migrant interests in Germany, the first Alevi interest groups were organized in the form of workers' associations in major cities. Among these, the Union of Workers of Turkey [TALEB - *Türkiye Amele Birliği*] was one of the first Alevi major dominant organizations. Even though it was referred to the Union of Alevis of Turkey [*Türkiye Aleviler Birliği*], TALEB was cautious about being labeling as an Alevi interest group. TALEB, which was composed of 34 associations, was significant due to the close ties it established with the TBP (Union Party of Turkey). In the late 1970s, TBP reached out to TALEB and other Alevi organizations to obtain financial and electoral support in local and general elections.[350] Following that, TALEB and its sister organizations acted as the unofficial branches of TBP.

By 1980, various Alevi organizations had been united under the umbrella of the Federation of Patriots Union [YBF - *Yurtseverler Birliği Federasyonu*]. YBF quickly began communicating the problem of the Alevi rights in Turkey, and protested against discrimination and defamation of the Alevis in Germany. To that end, YBF subsidized

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[348] In his autobiographical book, *Alevi Kimliğiyle Yaşamak*, Halis Tosun – an Alevi activist and political entrepreneur (i.e. member of advocacy networks) in Hamburg – describes expulsion of three members of HDF due to their derogatory remarks regarding Alevi members of HDF during a conversation with Besim Üstünel, former CHP Minister of Finance (June 21, 1977-July 21, 1977) in the summer of 1977. See Halis Tosun, *Alevi Kimliğiyle Yaşamak*, (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2002).

[349] Since CHP was in government during the events (and since HDF acted as the unofficial branch of CHP in GERMANY), the former chair of HDF, Ertekin Özcan, was hesitant to publicly criticize the local and national authorities. See Tosun, *Alevi Kimliğiyle Yaşamak* 34.

[350] Incidentally, Süleyman Cem, the founding member and director of TALEB, was listed as the TBP candidate of Ankara in 1977 elections. See "Süleyman Cem, 27 Mayıs 1977," 1977 Genel Seçimi Radyo Konuşmaları: Türkiye Birlik Partisi (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1977), 19-21; Sabır Güler, *Aleviliğin Siyasal Örgütlenmesi: Modernleşme, Çözülme ve Türkiye Birlik Partisi*, (Ankara, Dipnot Yayınları, 2008), 163

the production of plays of Ali Haydar Celasun narrating the violence that had taken place against Alevis in Kahramanmaraş in 1978. The Theater of the Reality of Kerbela in Turkey [*Türkiye Gerçeğinde Kerbela Tiyatrosu*] – which 32 players of Berlin branch of YBF and told the story of Kahramanmaraş Events staged in various cities in Germany.[351] The organization also communicated the specific demands of the Alevi living in Germany and highlighted the issues they face in the major German cities. YBF also pressured the Turkish broadcasting radio station in Cologne to include programs about the Alevi faith and music. While there were no similar broadcasts in Turkey's major media outlets, the Alevi interest groups in Germany gradually succeeded in transforming the programs in the media. As a result of the lobbying carried out by the YBF broadcasting on Alevi faith began to be aired furing the month of Muharrem in 1981. Further, the YBF raised protests against the Langenscheidt publication company, following the defamation of Alevis in the Turkish-German dictionary because of its association of the word incest [*blutschande*] with the Alevism [*kızılbaşlık*[352]]. The YBF subsequently sued publishing company, employed Bremen SDP parliamentarian Waldemar Klischies to communicate and represent its case, and the Langenscheidt publishing company agreed to drop *kızılbaşlık* from the dictionary.[353]

The YBF could not maintain its organizational structure for a long period of time and it was dissolved shortly after the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey. Similarly, Dev Yol also experienced a membership crisis in the 1980s, and it was closed down in 1986. As Massicard notes in the 1980s, "Political activity centered on the country of origin gradually petered out, due especially to the forced de-politicisation occurring in Turkey. After the coup…many feared reprisals against their family in Turkey."[354] Indeed the organizational characteristics and the activities of Alevi interest groups began to change in the mid-1980s parallel to the emerging multiculturalism discussions in Germany, and the structural changes happening in Turkey.

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[351] Güler, *Aleviliğin Siyasal Örgütlenmesi:* 62.

[352] Kızılbaş is a derogatory term used to identify Alevis since the Ottoman era.

[353] The initial goals of the YBF committee that was established to deal with the law suit were (i) to communicate the case to international domain and raise consciousness on the issue, and (ii) to recall all previous editions of the dictionary. However, the YBF administration settled with the Langenscheidt Company for not to antagonize the German public and elites against the Alevis. See Tosun, *Alevi Kimliğiyle Yaşamak*.

[354] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe* 187.

3.3.5 Towards Multiculturalism: Change in Germany between 1982 and 1990

The emerging problems concerning the immigrant population and the worsening economic conditions cost SDP its coalition partner (and then the 1983 elections) early in the 1980s. In 1982, the newly formed conservative coalition between FDP and the union parties CDU/CSU were instrumental in the election of Helmut Kohl as Chancellor. Kohl's election marked the change in prevailing politics and policies of migrants in Germany. The public support for the *Ausländer* policies of Kohl[355] aided the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition to return to government in 1983 and 1987.[356] In the early CDU/CSU and FDP coalition period, Germany adopted a rigid an exclusionary policy towards, naturalization and integration of its non-German immigrant population.

The exclusionary attitude towards immigrants peaked with the draft bill introduced by Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU), the Interior Minister. In an attempt to revise the *1965 Ausländergesetz*, Zimmermann's proposal aimed at restricting the access of families of immigrants residing in Germany. The proposal sought to restrict the inflow of immigrants through the introduction of (i) lower cut-off age for immigration of minor dependents [*Kindernachtzug*] (i.e. reduction of the age criteria to join their parents from 16 to 6) and (ii) stricter screening criteria for the immigration of the spouses of migrants to enter Federal Republic of Germany.[357] During this period the German government attempted to further restrict the inflow of migrants through strict screening processes for asylum seekers. at the same time there was also a notable increase of deportations from Germany

However, Zimmermann's policy to regulate and restrict entry and integration of foreigners drew heavy criticisms from both the political elites and the media. Butkard Hirsch, FDP's interior affairs spokesperson, criticized Zimmerman's policies, noting

[355] In his inauguration speech on October 13, 1982 Kohl put emphasis on the need for change in GERMANY's *Ausländerpolitik*. Throughout the speech, Kohl highlighted the problems that the *Gastarbeiter* system created, and identified 'implementation of a humane immigration policy' as one of the goals of the new CDU/CSU/FDP emergency program. Accordingly, Kohl argued that the solution of the problems lied in reduction of the rate of immigrants (and their subsequent integration to German society). Within this context, three objectives were identified: (i) integration of foreigners living in GERMANY, (ii) restriction on family reunifications to prevent further waves of migration, and (iii) reduction in the number of guest-workers through facilitation payments. See Kohl, Helmut. "Regierungklärung von Bundeskanzler Kohl in der 121. Sitzung des Deutchen Bundestages" (October 13, 1982), last accessed April 25, 2013, available at: http://helmut-kohl.kas.de/index.php?msg=1934.

[356] Cooper, *Immigration and German Identity* 156

[357] Green, *Politics of Exclusion* 52-53 & 59.

that the rights granted through the Basic Law applied to Germans and non-German residents alike.[358] Similarly, Liselotte Funcke, FDP's federal commissioner for foreigners' affairs, condemned Zimmerman's proposals as anti-family and unconstitutional.[359] The hard-line policies on family migration, residency, and deportation pushed by Zimmermann, were challenged not only by the opposition and government's coalition partners, but also by CDP/CSP members.[360] Ulf Fink, the federal chairman of the CDU's Committee on Social Affairs, called for more multicultural policies,[361] and strongly criticized Zimmermann for provoking panic among the German public. In addition to the activities of the political elites, the protests of the immigrants gradually transformed the public and media perception of the foreigners. Starting from the mid-1980s, more actors began to promote multicultural policies to facilitate the integration attempts.

Despite Zimmermann's attempts, the number of foreigners continued to grow. Even though the rate of the immigrant population slightly dropped in 1983 and 1984 (i.e. -2.8 per cent and -3.8 per cent respectively), the rates were quickly reversed in 1985. Indeed, from 1973 to 1989, the percentage of the immigrant population increased 22 per cent.[362] By 1988, the Turks made up 33.9 per cent of the entire *Ausländer* population, and they became the largest non-German immigrant group.[363] As the hostility towards the immigrant population increased and the family reunification and naturalization policies become more rigid, the Turkish immigrants approached their homeland to put pressure on the German government. Particularly, Selma Ertan's self-immolation in the Hamburg marketplace on May 26, 1982 to protest growing xenophobia,[364] and the suicide of asylum seeker Cemal Kemal Altun on August 30,

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[358] Triadafilos Triadafiopoulos, *Becoming Multicultural: Immigration and the Politics of Membership in Canada and Germany*, (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2012), 129.

[359] "Liselotte Funcke, Unbeirrt und hartnäckig: Die Beauftragte für Ausländerfragen hat einen scheweren Stand," *Die Zeit*, March 16, 1984; "Recht absonderlich," *Der Spiegel* no. 18, May 2, 1988

[360] Triadafiopoulos, *Becoming Multicultural* 129-30.

[361] See Ulf Fink, "Multikulturelle Gesellschaft – Realität heute," *Gewerkschaftlichen Monatshefte*, no. 7/89 (1989), 443-7

[362] Calculated based on changes in the proportion of foreigners to general public. See BMI, *Migrationsbericht 2001*, (2001), 118. The original document is available at http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Publikation/IB/Anlagen/themen-zuwanderung-migrationsbericht-2001.html

[363] Data retrieved from *Statistisches Jahnrbuch 1990 für die Bundesrespublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel Verlag, 1990) available at: http://www.digizeitschriften.de/en/startseite/.

[364] "Halefoğlu: Selma Ertan olayı düşündürücü" *Milliyet* August 31, 1982, 12.

1983 to avoid deportation to Turkey[365] was instrumental in shifting the attention of the media to the issues and problems of the foreigners in German.[366] Even though the problems of the Turkish immigrants were discussed in the talks between chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Özal in 1985, no significant results were achieved throughout the 1980s. It was not until 1990 that major changes occurred in the way in which the authorities dealt with the foreigner population in Germany.

3.3.6. Problems and Policies of the New Order: Germany after the Unification

By the end of 1980s, the legacy of the guest-worker migration, liberal asylum policies along with the increasing migration of repatriated Germans, turned Germany into the most open European country. Despite the refusal of the political elites to acknowledge Germany as a country of immigration, during 1990s the total population of foreigners reached 7.3 million.[367] Following the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, reunification of Germany, increasing xenophobia and violence targeting foreigners led to major discussions on policies of migration, integration and naturalization. Additionally, the exclusionary citizenship and rights regimes in Germany paved the way for the emergence of parallel societies in migrant dominated cities.[368] While the parallel societies helped migrants to overcome problems of alienation and preserve their identity, they evoked fears of multiculturalism in the German public.

As the political structure and the population composition of Germany changed in the 1990s, the policymakers acknowledged the need to reform the citizenship regime. The growing domestic unease with Zimmermann's policies eventually led emergence of a new coalition favoring liberal reforms. Subsequently, to maintain itself in pwoer in the upcoming elections, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition introduced a new draft bill (i.e. Schäuble draft) that excluded Zimmermann's draconian measures (i.e. the rules governing child migration and family unifications) in 1990. For the most part, the new

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[365] "Sazak cinayetinin sanığı intihar etti," *Milliyet*, August 31, 1983, 1.

[366] "Panik ist die falsche Antwort," *Die Zeit*, no. 31, July 25, 1986

[367] Andrew Geddes, *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*, (London: SAGE publications, 2005), 79.

[368] Among those, the Kreuzberg in Berlin is known to be one of the few urban areas in which the total number of foreigner population exceeds the natives. Particularly, Kreuzberg began to be known as "Little Istanbul" due to the high Turkish influence shaping the social life and culture of the neighborhood. See Ayhan Kaya, *Sicher in Kreuzberg: constructing diasporas: Turkish hip-hop youth in Berlin*, (Berlin: Transcript, 2001)

law just "ratified what constitutional court rules had long established."[369] Yet, it also introduced new categories and guarantees for migrants and their families and standardized practices across the German states.[370]

The new Foreigner Law was criticized by various domestic groups. As Triadafiopoulos notes:

> the opposition SPD and the Greens as well as… advocacy groups, including the DGB, the Protestant and Roman catholic churches, welfare organizations, and immigrant associations…demanded clearer and less complicated conditions for the conferral of unlimited residency permits, more expansive sponsorship rights, simplified naturalization procedures, dual citizenship, and explicit recognition of the Federal Republic's de facto status as an "immigration country".[371]

Within this context, the "Hot Autumn" protest chants of the East Germans – i.e. "We are the People" [*Wir sind das Volk*!] – replaced immigrants' call for acknowledgement of their rights for membership.[372] In the 1990s, there was a sharp increase of Turkish nationals seeking naturalization for full German citizenship, which in turn was expected to provide security of residence and political rights. While the immigrants were granted legal rights for naturalization by 1993, perceptions of citizenship as an exclusive category created new dilemmas and threats for the immigrant population.

Although there were legal changes, there were no attitudinal changes in the early 1990s. The CDU/CSU elites and the media continued to associate foreigners with 'false' asylum claims, 'welfare abuses' and 'criminal behavior'. Despite the warnings of the Commissioner Liselotte Funcke, no action was taken to stop defamatory remarks by some politicians, and to normalize the relations between the foreigners and the German citizens. What is more, the figures of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution [BfV - *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*][373] reports demonstrated that there was a significant increase in the number of right wing-extremist groups and their membership in comparison with the previous years. By 1992, BfV statistics indicated that there were 30 neo-Nazi groups and 46 other extreme right-wing organizations with

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[369] Christian Joppke, *Inmigration and the Nation-state: The United States, Germany and Great Britain*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 84

[370] See "Ausländergesetz", *Bundesgesetzblatt* I (July 9, 1990), 1354-56.

[371] Triadafiopoulos, *Becoming Multicultural*, 135.

[372] Ibid.

[373] Based at Cologne, BfV is specialized in intelligence gathering on right- and left-wing movements, as well as extremist/terrorist organizations of foreigner origin.

39,800 members operating in Germany.[374] Since these organizations promoted racist ideology and hatred towards the foreigners, the harassment and intimidation of, the foreigners increased.

In 1991, a weeklong arson attack on asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda marked the beginning of a series of violent attacks targeting foreigners. The total number of registered right-wing criminal activity (both violent and non-violent) almost doubled in 1992 compared to 1991.[375] Following the attacks in Hoyerswerda, the extreme right-wing groups began targeting the Turkish neighborhoods. In the first half of 1993, the number of recorded attacks reached 3,365. Following the infamous Mölln (1992) and Solingen (1993) attacks, there was a significant domestic and international support for the Turkish immigrant community.[376] Particularly, in the aftermath of Mölln a number of pro-Turkish night marches and vigils against racism – the so-called *lichterketten* (lighted candle) marches – were organized. Amids this continuing violence the crime prevention laws that targeted extremist organizations and anti-foreşner violence came in to affect in December 1, 1994. As the violence continued to increase, on December 1, 1994, "Crime Prevention Laws", targeting in large part against extremist organizations and anti-foreigner violence, took effect.

The increasing tensions between the Germans and the Turks, and the inability of the German authorities to provide security forits immigrant population, led the Turkish government to add its voice to the protests.[377] While the pressures from Turkey had little impact in changing the policies of Germany towards foreigners, the emerging European integration concerns contributed to the transformation of the debates on and organization of the migrants. The desire to strengthen the identity of Europe at the individual and state levels led to (i) the introduction of new standards to manage the inflow of migrants, and (ii) the improvement of the rights and conditions of migrants. As Geddes argues:

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[374] Bundesministerium des Innern, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1991* (Dortmund: Fritz Busche Druckergesellschart), 72

[375] There were 3,884 attacks in 1991; whereas the numbers reached to 7,121 in 1992.

[376] On November 22, 1992 three Turkish citizens – a woman, her daughter and niece – were killed in an arson attack in Mölln. Similarly, on May 29, 1993 Saime Genç (4), Hülya Genç (9), Gülüstan Öztürk (12), Hatice Genç (18), Gürsün Gürsün İnce (27) died in an arson attack at Lower Werner Street in Solingen.

[377] "Kohl'e açık mektup," Hürriyet, June 5, 1993

> The migrant inclusion agenda that developed at EU level in the 1990s had three main elements: EU citizenship rights for third country nationals; enhanced anti-discrimination provisions to cover race, ethnicity and religion; and treatment of asylum-seekers that accord with international standards.[378]

European Community presented a new opportunity structure for Germany to bypass the constraints laid down by domestic legal frameworks, (namely, the asylum rights described in the Basic Law). Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, Germany increasingly sought support to regulate and restrict migration through regional policies.[379] The emerging EU institutions also provided favorable conditions for non-discrimination of immigrants. The establishment of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in 1993 to monitor the phenomena of racism and racial discrimination marked the beginning of efforts to standardize foreigners' rights. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty further contributed to the development of standards for non-discrimination of immigrants.[380]

The dissatisfaction with the deepening cleavages between the citizens and the foreigners, and international pressures gradually led to demise of Chancellor Kohl's exclusionary policies, and the conservative-led coalition of the Christian Union. The new 1998 coalition between the SPD and the Greens [*Bündnis'90/Die Grüne*] was instrumental for aligning the debates and policies of migration and integration with those of multiculturalism. The reform of the citizenship law initiated in 1998-1999 (and the latter changes initiated with Süssmuth Commission in 2001 at the federal level) was successful in developing more inclusionary regimes for citizenship and migrant rights.

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[378] Geddes, *Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe* 144.

[379] *Schengen* initiative and the Maastricht had already made Germany's influence on the emergence of a European asylum and refugee policy visible.

[380] As discussed in chapter 1, while non-discrimination principle promoted by the EU institutions, no attempts were made to specifically identify and protect the rights of the collectivities residing in EU member states. Neither EU nor CoE (Council of Europe) legal provisions provided standards for securing meaningful participation of the migrants in social, economic and (particularly) political processes of Germany.

3.4. Alevism Goes Public:
A New Era for the Alevi Migrant Organizations in Germany (1990s)

As mentioned before, the initial stages of the Alevi interest group formation in Germany went hand-in-hand with the Alevi movement in Turkey. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the organizations established by the immigrants mirrored the debates and issues of their homeland. The overall tendency during this period was first to establish local organizations, then to create umbrella organizations representing smaller (and most often locally based) organizations. Once organizational growth and consolidation was achieved, these umbrella organizations competed for power to shape domestic policies.

Due to the social, economic and political changes taking place both in Germany and in Turkey and the rising identity politics around the world, the organization of the Alevi groups began to change in the late 1980s. Until then, no organization took the epithet Alevi. The transformation from organizations including Alevis to organizations of Alevis began with the Alevi Cultural Group of Hamburg [HAKG - *Hamburg Alevi Kültür Grubu*] in 1989.[381] The Alevi cultural festival (i.e. Alevi Culture Week) organized by HAKG, and the subsequent establishment of the Alevi Culture Center [*Alevi Kültür Merkezi*] triggered of the formation of Alevi interest groups in Germany and in other West European countries. Local Alevi groups quickly began to emerge in other cities like Hanover, Lübeck, Cologne, Mannheim and Berlin. In 1991 the increasing number of the Alevi associations established the Federation of Alevi Assemblies in Germany [*Almanya Alevi Cemaatleri Federasyonu*], which was later renamed as the Federation of Alevi Unions in Germany, [AABF - *Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu*].[382] These new local Alevi associations and their umbrella organizations ensured public visibility of Alevi community. Through organization of culture festivals, commemoration ceremonies, talks/meetings, and religious ceremonies (cem), the Alevi organizations of the 1990s transformed Alevism into a public religion.

In the early formative years, the axes of religion and culture were instrumental in shaping the identity of the organizations and led to the emergence of two competing

[381] Isabelle Rigoni, "Alevis in Europe: A Narrow Path towards Visibility," in *Turkey's Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview,* eds. Paul Joseph White and Joost Jongerden (Lediden: Brill, 2003), 162.

[382] Ibid. 163.

factions. The groups who perceived Alevism as a culture established Alevi Culture centers and associations, whereas those that considered Alevism as a religion were organized under the label of Hacı Bektaşi Veli associations in the 1990s. Both groups competed with one another for legitimate representation of Alevism in the public sphere. As Sökefeld notes:

> From the perspective of the Hacı Bektaş Veli associations the Alevi Culture Centers were strongholds of Marxism and atheism, whereas the Alevi Culture Centers tended to regard the others as almost fanatic Alevis that isolated themselves instead of opening up.[383]

In addition to their role in the representation of the Alevi interests in Germany, these new organizations were vital for the establishment of new networks of relations between Germany and Turkey. The 1989 Hamburg Manuscript by HAKG marked (i) adoption of a more right-centered rhetoric among Alevi activists and interest groups in Germany, and (ii) emergence of transnational advocacy networks (TAN) between the Alevi communities in Germany and in Turkey.[384] Echoing Keck and Sikking, following the announcement of Hamburg manuscript, the underrepresented and excluded Alevi organizations in Turkey found new allies in the German public sphere. These newly-emerging alliances between the domestic and transnational Alevi organizations were crucial in communicating the Alevi demands and problems in Turkey to German (and later to EU) parliamentarians and officials.[385]

Similar to the developments in Turkey the Alevi organizations and networks quickly became diversified starting with the mid-1990s. During this period, the Alevis in Germany could choose among more than 100 organizations.[386] The political and social freedoms guaranteed with the German rule of law, along with the changing composition of the Turkish immigrant population due to increasing inflow of asylum seeking activists, lay the ground for organization of Alevi left-wing and Alevi Kurdish-nationalist organizations. For instance, DHKP-C – similar to the earlier tendencies of the left-wing organizations of the 1970s – tried to infiltrate the existing Alevi

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[383] Sökefeld, *Struggling for recognition*, 82.

[384] Martin Sökefeld, "Difficult Identifications: The Debate on Alevism and Islam in Germany," in *Islam and Muslims in Germany*, eds. Ala Al-Hamarneh, Jörn Thielmann (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 271-2; Sökefeld, *Struggling for recognition*, 16-7.

[385] Gamze Avcı, and Ali Çarkoğlu "Taking Stock of the Dynamics that Shape EU Reforms in Turkey", *South European Society and Politics* 16, no. 2 (2011): 216

[386] Sökefeld, *Struggling for recognition.*

associations to take over its youth branches. [387] Even though a number of youth branches in Germany were established during the late 1990s, they were quickly dissolved.[388] In addition to DHKP-C, other radical organizations, i.e. The New Alevi Movement (*Yeni Alevi Hareketi*), calling for armed struggle also emerged in Berlin in 1996. However, these organizations failed to achieve recognition as actors of legitimate representation.

Parallel to the increasing number of asylum requests of Kurds in the 1980s and in 1990s, the Kurdish-Alevi activists also began to organize their interests in the form of associations in German cities. Following the publication of *Zülfikar* journal in 1994 by Kurdish activists, Federation of the Alevis of Kurdistan [FEK - *Federasyona Elewiyen Kurdistan*] was established in 1996. Upon its establishment FEK became the second largest Alevi umbrella organization, highlighting the discrimination that Alevis were facing in Germany and Turkey. FEK argued that Kurdish and Alevi issues were hitherto intertwined as half of the general Alevi population is Kurdish.[389] They criticized AABF for (i) the exclusion of Kurdish issues and demands from its policy proposals, and (ii) the underrepresentation of Kurds in administrative positions. However, due to its ties with PKK – which was outlawed in Germany in 1993 – FEK never obtained an official status.[390]

In addition to unofficial branches of the left-wing and Kurdish nationalist movements, the Alevi umbrella organizations in Turkey also established branches in the major German cities in the late 1990s and the 2000s. Among these the Ehl-i Beyt foundation established the Ehl-i Beyt Alevi Federation of Europe [ABAF - *Avrupa Ehl-i Beyt Alevi Federasyonu*] in 2001 which sought for the increase of the visibility of the Ehl-i Beyt foundation in transnational space. Similar to the homeland organization, the depiction of Alevi identity relied on the orthodox (Shia) interpretations of Islam. ABAF

[387] The most significant activity during this period was the publication of the Kerbela journal. Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe* 72.

[388] Even though DHKP-C activists continue to reside in Germany and other part of Europe, it remains to be an organization including Alevis (rather than an organization of Alevis).

[389] Sökefeld, *Struggling for recognition*, 88.

[390] Martin Sökefeld and Susanne Schwalgin, "Institutions and their Agents in Diaspora: A Comparison of Armenians in Athens and Alevis in Germany," Paper presented at the 6th European Association of Social Anthropologists Conference in Krakau, (26-29 July 2000), 18.

co-operated with the Sunni organization[391], such as the Turkish-Islam Union of Religious Affairs [DİTİB - *Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*],[392] in Germany; hence it did not enjoy much respect and recognition from other Alevi organizations.[393] Its main activity involves organization of international conferences; yet in comparison to AABF, it is not particularly active.[394]

As Sökefelt points out, following the establishment of a branch in Hesse in 1997, CEM Foundation became "the only Turkish Alevi organization that has a direct representation in Germany."[395] The foundation was represented by Halis Özkan, who belonged to a dede family and was a relative of İzzettin Doğan. Even though the organization established ties with local groups in Germany in the late 1990s, like ABAF, its influence in Germany remained limited. Particularly, AABF and CEM foundations clashed on occasion over the issues of "legitimate" representation of Alevis.

Among the above mentioned organizations, AABF emerged as (and continues to be) the largest Alevi representative organization in Germany. Since the 1990s, AABF has acted as the primary actor in communicating the needs and preferences of the Alevi community.[396] Since its founding, the organization lobbied for (i) recognition of the Alevis as a distinct ethnic and religious community both in Germany and in Turkey; (ii) changes in the legal framework on religious freedom, education and citizenship; and

[391] On January 16, 2008 DİTİB (along with ABAF, Cem Foundation's European Office coordinator and other Turkish (Sunni) organizations) published a press release criticizing the 2008 debate on youth-related criminal activities. See, DİTİB, "Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarından Basın Açıklaması," press release, last accessed May 5, 2013, available at: http://www.ditib.de/detail2.php?id=85&lang=en.

[392] Founded in 1982, DİTİB aims to control and minimize the extremist influences on Turkish Islam. To that end, it unites 896 organizations in Germany and provides religious services (along with educational and social). It was formed as a response to the non-state controlled developments in the religious organizing processes in Germany, namely to curb down the influence of *Islamische Gemianschaft* [Milli Görüş].

[393] On March 2008 March 10 the AABF issued a press release criticizing the DİTİB's methods and the signatory organizations for misrepresentation. Accordingly, AABF later sued the DİTİB for unauthorized use of its name. Later AABF claimed that the DİTİB had no rights or mandate to speak on the behalf of any Alevi community. For a detailed account of the issue and the law suit see "Köln Asliye Mahkemesi DİTİB'in oyununu bozdu," *Alevi Haber Ajansı*, March 13, 2008. Accessed May 16, 2013, available at: http://www.alevihaberajansi.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2837&Itemid=43

[394] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe* 189.

[395] Sökefeld, *Struggle for recognition,* 89.

[396] Ruşen Çakır, "Değişim sürecinde Alevi Hareketi," *Milliyet,* July 5, 1995, 22.

(iii) the adoption of non-discrimination principles in Turkey (along with ending the favoritism of Sunnis and abolition of the DİB [Directorate of Religious Affairs]).[397]

In its formative years under the leadership of Ali Rıza Gülçiçek[398] the primary goal of AABF was to (i) familiarize the German public with Alevi culture and belief, and (ii) lay the ground for political rights struggle.[399] Following the 1993 Sivas Events, AABF pioneered mobilization of the German Alevi community and organization of protest activities in the German public scene.[400] A week after the Sivas Event, a march was organized (i.e. Protest March against Sivas Slaughter) in Cologne that brought together 60,000 protesters condemning the violence towards Alevis. A year later similar protests also took place in the aftermath of the Gazi Events.

During the 1990s, the protest activity targeting the country of origin, and commemorative events aiming to raise consciousness of the German public, became the primary medium of the AABF Alevi activists to communicate the human rights breaches to transnational audiences in the subsequent years. The boomerang pattern emerged between AABF and the Alevi organizations and activist in Turkey in the 1990s initially involved transfer of funds – i.e. financial aid for the victims of Sivas,[401] and compensation of the litigation costs and expenses of the Alevi victims/defendants of Gazi riot trials.[402]

Şener and İlknur note that in 1994, AABF (with the support of SPD parliamentarians) lobbied the German parliamentarians to adopt a resolution calling for the protection of Alevis (as well as Assyrian and Yezidi) in Turkey.[403] In the AABF's search for leverage against the policies of Turkey the SPD and the Green

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[397] AABF, "Alevilere yönelik istemelerimiz," AABF press release, Cologne, November 5, 1996. Accessed May 16, 2013, available at http://alirizagulcicek.com/aabf/24.html

[398] Çiçek was the first chair of AABF and an active member of SPD. He later became a CHP MP between 2002 and 2007.

[399] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 190.

[400] The membership of the organization increased from 32 organizations in 1993 to 130 organizations in 1996.

[401] AABF raised money (141.593 DM) for the victims of the Sivas events and distributed them in a press conference at Çankaya Municipality's sports center in Ankara on November 21, 1993. See AABF press release November, 1993. Last accessed May 16, 2013, available at http://alirizagulcicek.com/aabf/1.html.

[402] A petition by the members of the Gazi-Ümraniye bar association (hukuk komisyonu) dated August 7, 1995 indicates that AABF agreed to send 50.000.000 TL for the litigation costs and expenses. A copy of the original is available at http://alirizagulcicek.com/aabf/5.html

[403] Cemal Şener and Miyase İlknur, *Alevilik ve Şeriat*, (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1995), 118-9.

parliamentarians became the primary allies of Alevi activists in the German legislature. The questions framed by the SPD, and the Green parliamentarians' plaid a key role in expression of the Alevi interests and issues in the legislature.[404] Among these Ursula "Ulla" Jelpke of the Greens became one of the most active supporters concerning the issues relating to migrants and human rights.

In the aftermath of Sivas Events, the AABF also played a significant role in strengthening the ties between the Alevi organizations across Europe particularly providing coordination between the movements in UK, France, Denmark, Sweden and Turkey. The TANs established by Alevi activists and organizations played a significant role in the establishment of the Assembly of Alevi-Bektashi Representatives [ABTM - *Alevi-Bektaşi Temsilciler Meclisi*] in mid-1990s.[405] This new organization was composed of the major Alevi associations both in Turkey and abroad. The aim of ABTM was to create a single body to communicate and represent the interests of the Alevi community – i.e. (i) recognition of Aleviness, (ii) abolition of the DİB, (iii) abolition of compulsory religious education, and (iv) the end of the 'war' in the South Eastern region (with the Kurdish nationalists).[406] Overall, ABTM mirrored the organizational structure and policy objectives of AABF.

The emergence of rival organizations as a result of the growing diversity within the Alevi identity movement weakened the claims of ABTM as the only representative organization. Additionally, the disagreements their elites on the issues of electoral support for independent Alevi candidates in Turkey's 1995 general elections further created problems for the coordination of different Alevi organizations. As Massicard argues "intense disagreements broke out between those who suggested that ABTM should field independent candidates and those who felt it should steer clear of any form of electoral involvement."[407]

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[404] Following the capture (and subsequent release) of Vahit Kaynar – a defendant in Sivas trials – in Germany on September 6, 2011, leftist parliamentarians were the first to draw attention on the issues of extradition requests of Turkey. See Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Memet Kilic, Ekin Deligöz, Claudia Roth (Augsburg), weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, "Aufenthalt von verurteilten Attentätern des Sivas-Massakers in Deutschland," 17/7585 (21.11.2011).

[405] "Alevi Meclisi Kuruluyor," *Milliyet*, January 6 1995, 24.

[406] Lütfü Kaleli, *Alevi Kimliği ve Alevi Örgütlenmeleri* , 88-89

[407] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 53.

With the growth of the TANs, the activists from Germany attempted to establish political ties between Turkey and Germany. Following the increasing demands of various groups to establish an Alevi party, in 1997 a new Alevi Party called the Peace Party [BP - *Barış Partisi*] was established.[408] Funded by Turkish-Alevi businessman Ali Haydar Veziroğlu, BP sought to mobilize the Alevi electorate similar to TBP (Union Party of Turkey) of 1960s.[409] In comparison to TBP, BP [previously DBH] lacked symbolic markers of Alevism and did not employ an Alevi lexicon in its program.[410] Instead, the party was more oriented towards the discussions of ethno-religious pluralism and multiculturalism. Even though the party drew support from European (i.e. German) Alevi activists, it lacked resources and personnel to branch out throughout Turkey. Unlike TBP, BP could not rally significant electoral support. Indeed, it only received 80,000 votes in 1999 elections, and dissolved itself on May 9, 1999.[411]

A final transnational organization emerged as a result of TANs was Cultural Association of the Union of Alevi-Bektashi Organizations [ABKB – Alevi-Bektaşi Kuruluşları Birliği Kültür Derneği]. Founded on May 30, 1999 ABKB quickly became the target of the state institutions. As ABKB's goal to "build cem houses and contribute to the cooperation of Alevi-Bektashi organizations" was considered as a breach of the *Articles 14* and *24* of the 1982 Constitution and *Article 5* of the Law on Associations (Law No. 2908), the ABKB was redefine its objectives. After the organization refused the demand, the organization was disbanded in 2002.[412] The establishment of ABKB (rather than its closure) drew criticisms from the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Culture and the Constitutional Court, for encouraging discrimination and separatism.[413]

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[408] The party was established with the name Democratic Peace Movement [DBH - *Demokratik Barış Hareketi*] on October 1996. However, as a result of the trial against the party, the party cadre resigned and instead established the BP on May 1997. See "DHP'den Barış Partisine," *Milliyet*, November 11, 1996, 18.

[409] "Aleviler Parti Kuruyor," *Milliyet*, November 11, 1995, 16

[410] For a detailed account of inception, evolution and dissolution of TBP see Chapter 4

[411] Kaleli, *Alevi Kimliği ve Alevi Örgütlenmeleri*, 95.

[412] TC Ankara 2. Asliye Hukuk Mahkemesi, "ABKB'nin Gerekçeli Kapatma Kararı," Karar No. 2002/59.

[413] "Aleviler'den Diyanet'e Tepki," *Hürriyet*, August 21, 2001; "Aleviler kızgın," *Milliyet*, February 17, 2002, 23; "Alevi ismiyle birlik kurmak bölücülük," *Milliyet*, April 2, 2003; "Alevi Kimliği anayasal bir haktır" ABKB press release, n.d. last accessed May 20, 2013, available at: http://www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=226:abkb--alevi-kimlinayasal-bir-hakt&catid=35:abf-tarihi&Itemid=261

To counter the growing hostility towards ABKB, in 2001 AABF launched a protest campaign to alert the press and decision makers in Germany and the rest of Europe.[414] The organization p sought support from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EU officials to put pressure on the Turkish government. As the protests grew, the case found its way into the *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession* in 2002 (and later in 2003).[415] While the court decision for closure of ABKB dropped in 2002, a new organization called ABF (Alevi Bektashi Federation) was founded with collaboration of AABF, PSDAK and HBVKD in 2002.

3.5. Concluding Remarks

The history of the organization of the articulated the Alevi interests in Germany resembles to the pattern of emergence of Alevi interest groups in Turkey. Similar to the case in Turkey, the challenges of migration and the shock of rapid urbanization were pivotal push factors for the emergence of the early German Alevi interest groups. Although the immigrants were granted certain civil and social rights, (i) the ambiguity of the arrangements between the labor migrants and the companies, (ii) the variation among the German states in dealing with immigrant issues, and (iii) the lack of representation of the immigrants in the German trade unions and workers' associations paved the way for the estabslihment of migrant organizations. Since most of the Alevi immigrants in Germany were labor migrants, the early Alevi migrant organizations of acted both as labor organizations and solidarity groups.

Nonetheless, until the 1970s the Alevi immigrants chose to remain invisible in the German public sphere. In the aftermath of the 1973 moratoriaum, in addition to the Alevi labor associations, the Alevi immigrants also began to establish branches of Turkish political parties and left-wing organizations in the cities and states they resided in. Starting from the 1970s the organizations of the Turkish immigrants in general and the Alevis in particular mirrored the existing divisions within the Turkish society. Since the German political opportunity structures were not inclusive of the non-German immigrants, most of the activies of the organizations established targeted homeland.

[414] At the time the director of AABF, Turgut Öker, was a member of ABKB and subsequently was summed to court hearings.

[415] European Commission, *2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,* (2002), 17; European Commission, *2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,* (2003), 36

The more inclusive the complex web of legal framework, operating with various status, permit and residence categories became, the more influence the Alevi interest groups sought.

This chapter showed the political and social transformations of the late 1980s, i.e. the unification of Germany, the increasing number of asylum seekers, the problem of the integration of the unified immigrant families, required revisions in the citizenship and rights regimes in Germany. Increasing hostility towards foreigners, and the Chancellor Kohl's and the Christian Democrats' tendency to exclude the immigrant populations from the decision-making processes pave the way for the rise of close-knit communities in Turkish dominant cities and districts. The attempts of the German Alevi community to preserve its Alevi culture and religious identity led to the emergence of a number of Alevi cultural associations.

A further outcome of the increasing Alevi associational life in Germany was the emergence of the solidarity and advocacy networks. The networks established between the Turkish and German Alevi associations, activists, intellectuals and religious notables contributed to the framing of the Alevi identity both in Germany and in Turkey. The exchange of information, revenues and symbols between the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups was pivotal in standardization of the Alevi demands, i.e. the Alevi declaration, in both realms. The networks were influencial because they challenged the rights and citizenship regimes in Turkey at a time when EU accession process was pressuring the Turkish state to comply with the regional and international norms on rights.

This chapter also indicates that the AABF is not the only Alevi umbrella organization in Germany. However, by the end of 1990s, it was transformed into a key player in the Alevi struggle for rights both in Germany and in Turkey. As the participation of Alevi migrants into social and political processes of the German state increased, the networks between the Alevi community and the German political parties strengthened. The characteristics of the activists paved the way for inception and evolution of ties between the migrant and domestic political actors in the German context. As Massicard notes "the political parties took up Alevi issue largely because of

the work of intermediaries who were party officials or elected politicians of Turkish or Alevi origin, or else who had pro-Alevi sympathies."[416]

Even though its position and activities were questioned and criticized by the Turkish authorities and right-wing/Islamic revivalist media, the AABF continues to be an ally for the Alevi organizations in Turkey that cannot access political decision making processes in the country. As the example of the inception of ABF [former ABKB] demonstrates, the alliances formed between the domestic and transnational Alevi organizations are also vital for leverage politics.[417] The co-operation between these domestic and transnational actors has continued in the last two decades through: (a) ideational cooperation (conceptualization of Alevi identity; organization of seminars and workshops), (b) cultural cooperation (organization of festivals), (c) institutional cooperation (lobbying in the European Parliament), (d) material aids (subsidizing local Alevi voluntary organizations), (e) religious cooperation (religious services), and (f) monitoring states practices and implementation of domestic and international standards on rights of individuals and groups (publications of reports).[418]

Additionally, while the corporatist tradition of the Germany pushed the German Alevi interest groups to become more central and hierarchical, the interest group system in Turkey led the Alevi interest groups to be fragmented. Since the interest groups, particularly non-economic interest groups, cannot directly influence policy outcomes in Turkey, the German Alevi interest groups provide potential alliences to pressure the Turkish state to comply with the rights-demands of the Alevi community.[419]

Having introduced the transnational actors of informal Alevi interest representation, the focus now shifts to formal representation of Alevi interests. The subsequent chapter focuses on the relationship between the political parties and Alevi community in Turkey, and discusses how the issues/claims of the Alevi activists and organizations are communicated in the legislature.

[416] Massicard, *Alevis in Turkey and Europe*, 192.

[417] Avcı, and Çarkoğlu "Taking Stock of the Dynamics that Shape EU Reforms in Turkey," 126

[418] See Chapters 5 and 6

[419] Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

ALEVI INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: LINKAGES WITH POLITICAL PARTIES

4.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the role of political parties in the communication and representation of Alevi interests. It relies on both political participation literature and political representation literature in its analysis of the interaction of the Alevi community, Alevi elites, and the political parties in TBMM. Two legacies – i.e. the legacy of TBP as the first Alevi party and the legacy of CHP as the hitherto ally of the Alevi electorate –are examined in an attempt to understand the dynamics of the inclusion of the Alevi interests and its representation within the political sphere.

The chapter discusses the implications of the *minority empowerment thesis* which claims that minority representation would encourage political participation and strengthen representational links. Following the analysis of the legislative activities of the TBP and CHP MPs, I argue that the descriptive representation of Alevis in TBMM is not a sufficient condition for achieving a substantive representation of Alevi minority interests. [420] The mechanisms and content of minority representation instead are highly dependent on political opportunity structures and the organization of political parties. In consequence, uninstitutionalized party organizations, strong leadership controls on

[420] Pitkin, *Concept of Representation* 89; Charles Cameron, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" *American Political Science Review 4* 90: 794-812; and Kenny Whitby, *The Color of Representation: Congressional Behavior and Black Interests* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 132-3.

MPs, along with high volatility in the TBMM made substantive representation of the constituents' interests in the legislature difficult.

4.2. 'Standing for' vs. 'Acting for' Groups

Does the election of ethnic, racial and religious minority group members enhance the representation of their respective groups in legislative bodies? The assertion that shared ascriptive identity between the representative and the represented begets better representation of interests was once widely accepted.[421] Membership in a particular group was expected to promote loyalty to the interests of the group represented. [422]Consequently, male representatives were assumed inadequate in representing women just as were whites in representing non-whites. Mansbridge states:

> Representatives who are female, African American, or of Polish ancestry, who have a child with a disability, or who have grown up on a farm, in a mining community or in a working-class neighborhood, often feel not only a particular sensitivity to issues relating to these experiences but also a particular responsibility for representing the interests and perspectives of these groups, even when members of these groups do not constitute a large fraction of their constituents. [423]

In principle, a marginalized group representative in a legislative assembly signals "to both dominant and marginalized groups that its perspectives matter." [424] With this view, the actions of a representative are less important than his or her identity. Representation is thought to "depend on the representative's characteristics, on what he is or is like, on being something rather than doing something." [425]

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[421] Eric M. Uslaner, and Ronald E. Weber, "Policy Congruence and American State Elites: Descriptive Representation versus Electoral Accountability", *The Journal of Politics* no. 1 (1983), 184

[422] A. Phillips Griffiths, and Richard Wollheim, "How Can One Person Represent Another?" *Aristotelian Society,* Supplementary Volumes *(1960):* 34

[423] Jane Mansbridge, "Rethinking Representation," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (2003), 523.

[424] Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld, and Andreas M. Wüst "Ethnic diversity, political participation and representation: a theoretical framework" in *The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies,* eds. Bird et al, , 1-21, (New York: Routledge, 2010),

[425] Pitkin, *Concept of Representation,* 61.

Young similarly proposes that "having such a relation of identity or similarity with constituents says nothing about what the representative does."[426] It is not important who the representatives are; it is much more important what they do. Additionally, such a conceptualization of representation promotes an essentialist understanding by not acknowledging cleavages within a minority group and undermining the existence of factions within dominant groups. Mansbridge states that "insisting that others cannot adequately represent the members of a descriptive group also implies that members of that group cannot adequately represent others." [427]

Such an assumption also undermines the significance of political opportunity structures, political culture, and the characteristics of executive-legislative relations. Political parties may reinforce the selection of female, ethnic or religious minority candidates prior to elections for the purpose of mobilizing electoral support of respective groups. However, once elected, the activities of the MPs are constrained by institutional frameworks and party policies.

Descriptive representation does not necessarily turn into substantive representation, if the level of institutionalization of a political system is low and political parties are characterized with leader dominance and patrimonial relations. Even though female and minority representatives in assemblies have symbolic value and can increase the communication of interests of a given group, their presence does not guarantee specific policy outcomes. As studies on American politics reveal, more descriptive representation does not necessarily generate better representation.[428] Research on women, blacks, and Latinos in the U.S. Congress shows the descriptive representation of these groups comes at the expense of their substantive representation, i.e. acting in the interest of the represented.

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[426] Iris Marion Young, "Deferring Group Representation," in *Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOSXXYIX*, eds. Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, *349-76*, (New York: New York University Press, 1997).

[427] Jane Mansbridge, "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent "Yes"," *The Journal of Politics*61, no. 3 (Aug., 1999): 637.

[428] Over a study on women legislators of New Hampshire, Irene Diamond (1977) demonstrated that the female legislators did not see themselves as representatives of women. Similarly, Swain (1993) concurred the insufficiency of descriptive representation in increasing tangible black interests over her study on Black members of the U.S. Congress. See Irene Diamond, *Sex Roles in the State House* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), and Carol M. Swain, *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress,* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

Chapter Four uses this perspective, to understand the dynamics of formal representation of Alevi interests in Turkey. The chapter elaborates the nature of the links that the Alevi minority has established with the political parties in Turkey. To that end, the analysis of the legislative activities of the MPs, the speeches of the political elites, and the elite interviews will be used to determine the extent to which the domestic and international political opportunity structures and resources affect representation of Alevi interests in TBMM.

4.3. Alevi Representation in the National Assembly

As mentioned in the previous section, the representation of marginalized groups (women, ethnic groups, religious minorities, etc.) have been a concern in the establishment of the legitimacy of the decisions of the legislative assemblies. Since the *Federalist Papers*, a significant portion of the literature expects legislative bodies to mirror the population from which it is drawn to acquire such legitimacy. While the demographic characteristics of those elected into the legislatures provide clues for the scope of the representation of a group, voting tendencies and party preferences of the target group provide insight as to who are the actors of representation in the political society.

In the analysis of the representation of Alevi groups in TBMM, the determination of indicators proves to be challenging. In the absence of demographic information on Alevi community, acquiring reliable data on the voting behavior of the Alevi electorate is an impossible task. Due to urban-rural transformations, no province other than Tunceli has Alevi population as the majority. Even though certain regions and provinces of central and eastern Anatolia and neighborhoods in Istanbul and Ankara are known to be dominated by Alevis, in the absence of reliable census information, determining the distribution of Alevis votes is not possible.

Additionally, acquiring information regarding the religious affiliation of the candidate MPs presents a further challenge. As the candidates are not required to declare their religious affiliation, information on the numbers of Alevi MPs by province cannot be obtained. Even though estimates can be drawn based on newspaper articles and former MPs autobiographies, the validity and reliability of the results cannot be guaranteed. As a further point, the election of Alevi MPs who publicly identify

themselves as Alevis is either from the same cities with which they have patrimonial ties with the electorate, or from cities which receive a higher number of seats in TBMM (i.e. Istanbul and Ankara).

In the absence of reliable data on the voting behavior of the Alevi electorate, scholars tend to rely on anecdotal explanations and aggregate electoral statistics to explain the content and scope of Alevi political representation. Within this context, a number of narratives regarding Alevi political behavior emerged in the literature. With the exception of TBP in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Alevi political representation is mostly associated with the activities of the center-left and left parties. The Alevi electorate is labeled as a devout supporter of either Kemalism or leftist ideologies; hence hitherto followers of CHP and the Turkish Labor Party [TİP - *Türkiye İşçi Partisi*,]. Alevi presence in cadres of other center and center-right parties, along with the rise of Alevi activism in the Kurdish nationalist movement, is mostly overlooked in discussions on Alevi political representation. Additionally, the discussion on TBP, as the first Alevi party, and CHP, as the hitherto ally of Alevis, does not deal with the specifics of the relationship between the Alevi community and the political elites. Questions remain unanswered as to how and by whom the Alevi claims are communicated in the legislatures and what results these claims achieve.

Following the discussion of political representation subsequent sections focus on the dynamics of formal political representation of the Alevi interests in the legislative assemblies. To that end, the national and local election results, the content of the motions and legislative bills proposed by the MPs in TBMM, and the speeches of the political elites are used to demonstrate how the domestic and international political opportunity structures shape the Alevi interest representation in the political sphere. The chapter claims that the alliance between CHP and the Alevis is not a matter of constant partisanship.[429] Alevi electoral support is (g)estimated to shift from center-left to center-right parties and vice versa from time to time. Similarly, as Chapter 3 briefly discusses, there have been attempts to establish 'Alevi' parties, i.e., the BP of 1997. Following that, in order to elaborate on the dynamics of the links the Alevi minority has established with political parties in Turkey, the sections below focus on the two legacies

[429] Both DP in the 1950s and Motherland Party [ANAP] in the 1980s received electoral support of the community. See Schüler, *Türkiye'de Sosyal Demokrasi,* 162-71.

dominating the literature on Alevis, i.e. the legacy of TBP as the sole Alevi party and the legacy of CHP as the "only" ally of the community in the political arena.

4.3.1. The Legacy of the TBP (1969-1980)

Although the two-party system[430] that began with the 1950 elections came to an end with the 1960 military *coup d'état*, the regime breakdown and introduction of the *1961 Constitution* paved the way for emergence of a new political system.[431] The *1961 Constitution* not only expanded civil liberties and granted social rights for citizens but also introduced a number of checks and balances to the political system to prevent the emergence of another tyranny of the parliamentary majority in TBMM. Starting with the 1961 elections,[432] proportional representation was introduced to convert votes to seats in the TBMM and inadvertently leading to fragmentation in the party system and introduction of coalition governments in the TBMM. In addition to political transformations, there have been significant changes in the composition of Turkish society. The Migration phenomenon that began in the 1950s had a tremendous impact on transforming the cleavage structures in Turkey. New forms of interest groups with political objectives – i.e. student movements, workers' associations, trade unions, ideology based associations, etc. – began to emerge in the urban settings following the transformations in the society and in politics.

[430] Political parties in Turkey have an older pedigree than does nation-state building. Starting with the formation of the *New Ottoman Society (1865)* the political life of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was marked with party activities. Parties played a significant role in shaping the debates and institutions of national politics. Yet, it was not until the 1940s and the introduction of democratic politics that the influence and effectiveness of the political parties increased. The infamous 1946 elections and the emergence of a legitimate opposition (DP) marked the beginning of the transformation of both the regime and party system in Turkey. See Dankward A. Rustow, "Political Parties in Turkey: An Overview" in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Metin Heper, and Jacob M. Landau, 10-23, (London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1991);;Tarık Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952* (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1952).

[431] Sabri Sayarı, "The Changing Party System" in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, eds. Sabri Sayarı, and Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002), 12-13; Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics*, 93-97

[432] Even though the Constitution did not specify the type of electoral system (*Article 55*), through Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter Registers [*Seçimlerin Temel Hükümleri ve Seçmen Kütükleri Hakkında Kanun*] (April 26, 1961) proportional representation mechanisms were specified. Original document retrieved from http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/SecmenKaydi/298.htm

While CHP and Justice Party [AP - *Adalet Partisi*][433] became the two leading parties in the parliament, the party system and the political debates in the 1960s were altered by the newly emerging parties. The changes in the electoral system before the 1965 elections [i.e. *milli bakiye systemi*][434] allowed smaller parties such as TİP to successfully convert votes to seats in TBMM. The newcomers[435] were vital to the functioning of the system as they held *coalition-bargaining* and *blackmail* potentials.[436]

Additionally, the 1960s and the 1970s were marked with the rising power of religious collective action. While AP gradually established bonds with the Nurcu movement and system-oriented Islamists in the 1960s, Erbakan's Islamic revivalist National Viewpoint [*Milli Görüş*] organizations challenged the political system and tried to incorporate traditional (Sunni) religious values, norms, and practices to political institutions.[437] The two political parties, the National Order Party [MNP – *Milli Nizam Partisi*] founded by Erbakan [and Mehmet Zahid Kotku[438]] and its heir, the National Salvation Party [MSP – *Milli Selamet Partisi*] emphasized the need for revival of an authentic identity through the reconstruction of Ottoman morality and mobilized

[433] The former DP's votes from the periphery were split between two parties, AP (34.8 per centper cent) and YTP (13.7 per cent in the 1961 elections. Yet, by 1965 AP declared itself as the sole heir of DP and won decisive electoral victories in 1965 and 1969 elections. See Avner Levi, "The Justice Party, 1961-1980," in Political *Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 136-40; Sayarı, "The Changing Party System,"13-4; Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics*, 95-6.

[434] The *Milli bakiye* system refers to the distribution of the remaining votes after the application of *d'Hondt* formula among political parties in terms of their share of the pooled surplus votes.

[435] As the electoral laws were amended before the 1965 elections and the pool of the national remainder [*milli bakiye*] was established, a number of smaller parties could access to the National Assembly. Among those, the leftist Turkish Workers Party (TİP), the extreme right-winged Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Alevi oriented Turkish Unity Party (TBP), Islamist-based National Order Party (MNP) and its successor the National Salvation Party (MSP) all became representatives of the expanding ideological and political spectrum.

[436] *Coalition-bargaining potential* and *blackmail potential* are applied throughout the work in line with Sartori's conceptualization. See Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, (Essex: ECPR Press, 2005) 107-9.

[437] Haldun Gülalp, "Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey's Welfare Party", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*33 (2001): 433-48. Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective", *Third World Quarterly*18, no. 4 (1997):743-66.

[438] Mehmet Zahid Kotku was the Sheikh of the Nakşibendi order; his objective was the restoration of morality and virtue. He became the leader of the group that was known as *İskenderpaşa cemaati* after he was appointed to the İskenderpaşa Mosque as an imam in 1958.

the periphery. Parallel to the organization of articulated Islamic revivalist interests in the form of political parties, the Alevi community also founded a political party.[439]

Overall, the interaction between the political parties of the early 1960s, coupled with the socio-economic transformation of both the Alevi elites and the community, paved the way for the emergence of an Alevi-based party in 1966. The emergence of an Alevi elite movement dedicated to organize the Alevi communal interests in the form of a party can be attributed to the following:

i. institutional opportunities, the 1961 Constitution, and the changes in the electoral system enabling the emergence of a fragmented and later ideologically polarized party system,
ii. institutional arrangements that enable more effective involvement by political opposition parties and deputies in legislative activities, such as framing questions and motions of interpellations, ,
iii. the 1961-1963 debates on the proposed bills on the organization and the budget of the Directorate of Religious Affairs [DİB] in the TBMM and the media,
iv. the perceived failure of the Alevi deputies and the existing parties to communicate the problems and demands of the community
v. the role of rising student movements paying special emphasis on issues regarding Alevis in Turkey.

4.3.1.1 Formative years of TBP

During the early formative periods, the party established bonds with the Alevi *dede*s.[440] The religious charismatic power of the Ulusoy family particularly contributed to the growth of the organizational capacity of the party. By 1967, TBP had begun to establish local party organizations in Istanbul, Ankara, Sivas, Erzincan, Tunceli, Maras,

[439] However, rather than challenging the control of religion by the state and seeking recognition of their difference, TBP called for strengthening secularization principles and equal treatment of citizenship under the law.

[440] Similar to the role played by Sunni religious leaders, dedes can mobilize the electorate and determine whether a candidate can gain a seat in TBMM. For instance, the Doğan family (the leaders of the Balıyan tribal confederation, and *dede*s near Malatya) and Ulusoy family (Çelebi family of Hacıbektaş) played a significant role in electoral mobilization in the 1950s. See Nedim Şahhüseyinoğlu, *Anadolu Kültür Mozaiğinden bir kesit: Balıyan* (Ankara: Ürün Yayınları, 1996), 190; Kelime Ata, *Alevilerin ilksiyasal denemesi*, 43-4.

Mersin, İskenderun, Çorum, and Yozgat. However, the founding elites could not control factions within the organization. The inexperienced leader Berkman and Secretary Özbey were soon challenged and replaced by the former deputy of Nation Party [MP - *Millet Partisi*], Hüseyin Balan, who during the Ortaca events of 1966[441] and in the Elbistan events[442] in 1967,[443] was the only active deputy to challenge AP policies.

The Berkman-Balan leadership struggle led the Ulusoy family to withdraw its support from TBP and created a vacuum, threatening the survival of the party organization. Furthermore, TBP under the leadership of Balan was marked with a series of conflicts. While some of the conflicts were limited to individual vendettas (i.e. the lawsuit filed by former secretary Özbey), others were based on the dissatisfaction of the factions adopting leftist ideologies with right-wing rhetoric and policies of leadership.[444]

In addition to the problem of fractions within the party, there was also a question of identity. Due to the institutional constraints preventing the establishment of denominational parties and the concern of some of the founders, TBP communicated its Alevi identity through symbols. The articles of the party program concerning religious freedom, the party flag, posters and slogans indicate that the party has a strong Alevi sentiment. The party flag which had the figure of a lion (symbolizing Ali) at the center surrounded by 12 stars (symbolizing 12 imams) became the most visible marker of the Alevi character of the new party.[445] By the end of 1960s, TBP was labeled as a sectarian (Alevi) party by the press.[446] Yet, the Party was hesitant to declare itself as an Alevi party. Party cadres refused identification of TBP as a denominational party. Instead, TBP was presented as a party *including* Alevis rather than a party *of* Alevis.[447]

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[441] Huseyin Balan's speeches regarding the events taking place in Ortanca (1966). See, *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi* 7, session 98, (June 17, 1966) 94-7; and session 99, (June 20, 1966) 139.

[442] It refers to the clashes between the Alevis and Sunnis triggered by a cultural event organized by *Ehli Beyt* journal editor Doğan Kılıç in Elbistan in 11 June 1967.

[443] Proposal for establishment of a commission to investigate the events took place in Elbistan (No. 10/19) Speeches regarding the issue in *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi* 22, session 16, 471-76

[444] Ata, *Alevilerin ilk Siyasal Denemesi*,122

[445] Ibid, 67

[446] *Akis*, no. 669 (April 15, 1967); *Cem* no. 8 (December, 1966);

[447] In an interview Berkman stated; "This party is not an Alevi party. Our door is open to Sunnis, Alevis, and Christians. As a Union Party we do not discriminate people. Unfortunately the press released the first news about the party under the Alevi party. This is not true. And it's our greatest affliction" See CEM, no. 10, (January, 1967), 17.

This tendency to reject a sectarian label continued with Mustafa Timisi.[448] Parallel to Bekman's and Balan's views, in an interview in 1969 Timisi stated:

> It disturbs me greatly that our party is known as an Alevi Party…The ones who voted for BP are indeed Alevis. However, it is not a sufficient indicator of electoral support for a sectarian party…The public should know that BP is not an Alevi Party. BP is the party of the people, and the two major parties (AP, CHP) that held the destiny of Turkey in their hands are responsible for this misrepresentation. BP is the true party of Ataturkism. It is a political organization rooted in the principles of Atatürk...[449]

Under the leadership of Timisi, the TBP did not formulate specific policy objectives targeting the needs of the Alevi community of the time.[450] The demands for non-discrimination and equal treatment were incorporated into the leftist lexicon of the party program.

4.3.1.2 1969 Elections and its aftermath

The 1969 elections were a turning point for TBP as for the first time an Alevi based party entered TBMM. The party received 2.8per cent of the total votes (See Table 4.1) and won 8 seats.[451] The results were seen as both a success and a failure. It was a disappointment for the opposing parties since they did not expect TBP to get significant votes or any number of seats. The analysis of the village and sub-province level election results indicate that the Alevi votes were distributed among CHP, TBP and independent candidates in the five cities with a significant number of Alevi population (i.e. Sivas, Tokat, Çorum, Kahramanmaraş, and Malatya).

[448] However, a comparison of press releases by Mustafa Timisi from the 1969 and 1977 period and from the last decade indicates a discrepancy in the way in which the BP was represented. In the later interviews Timisi recognized the party formation as a party of the Alevi movement emerging in the 1960s.

[449] "Adı: Mustafa Timisi İşi: BP Genel Başkanı" *Milliyet*, November 26, 1969, 1 & 11.

[450] *Birlik Partisi Program ve Tüzügü* Istanbul. 1967.4-5.

[451] The 8 seats of the BP were held by Kazım Ulusoy (Amasya), Yusuf Ulusoy (Tokat), Ali Naki Ulusoy (Çorum), Haydar Özdemir (İstanbul), Sami İlhan (Malatya), Hüseyin Balan (Ankara), and finally Mustafa Timisi and Hüseyin Çınar (Sivas). The party got no seats from Tunceli where Kurdish Alevis are dominant.

Table 4.1 The 1969 national election results in Turkey

Parties	Total votes (per cent)	Number of seats in the National Assembly
AP	46.5	256
GP	6.6	15
CHP	27.4	143
MP	3.2	6
MHP	3.0	1
TBP*	2.8	8
TİP	2.7	2
YTP	2.2	6
Independents	5.6	13

Notes:

* At the time, the name of the party was the Union Party [Birlik Partisi]

Source: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DIE), *Millet Vekili Seçim Sonuçları, 12 Ekim 1969*, (Ankara: DİE, 1970).

On the other hand, results were disappointing for the party elite due to their higher vote expectancy.[452] Despite the resources of the Ulusoy family, TBP could not mobilize Alevi votes in all of Turkey. For instance, in Tunceli, TBP did not show much electoral power with the exception of the district of Pülümür.[453] Even though the tribes did not always automatically rally behind their patron families, in the case of Tunceli, the tribal conflicts were decisive in shaping the electoral outcome. While the Kureyşan offered their votes *en bloc* to AP during the 1969 elections, the Hiran tribe rallied behind CHP. As different tribes support different parties, the Alevi votes were inevitably divided.[454] The limited electoral 'success' of the TBP in Tunceli (and in other parts of Turkey) was dependent on a number of factors: (i) absence of an institutionalized party organization, (ii) overdependence on personal networks and

[452] Bozkurt, *Çağdaşlaşma Sürecinde Alevilik* 83.

[453] In Sivas BP got 46.6per cent of the vote in Divriği and 32.6per cent of the vote in İmranlı. Similarly, in Tokat, Almus (42.5 per cent) and Çorum Alaca (32per cent) TBP emerge as the first party, whereas in Çorum, Mecitözü (32per cent) and Tunceli Pülümür (24.7per cent) came second.

[454] Ayşe Kudat, "Patron-client Relations: the State of the art and Research in Eastern Turkey," in Engin D. Akarlı and G. Ben Dor (eds.) Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Backgrounds and Present Problems, (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1975), 81 & 84-5.

mobilizing capacity of the candidates (or Alevi *dede*s in the provinces),[455] and (iii) the alienation of the Kurdish Alevi electorate as a result of TBP elites' emphasis on the Turkish-Alevi synthesis in conceptualization of the party identity.

What is more, in November 1969 Mustafa Timisi became the new leader of BP. During the Timisi period, the limited electoral success did not transform itself into an active and skilled opposition akin to TİP. In the third term of the National Assembly (22.10.1969-25.07.1973), none of the BP deputies had taken the role of effective and continued opposition communicating Alevi communal interests in the assembly.. Instead, they either followed case-works or put emphasis on broader issues, i.e. economy, in their legislative activities. Among the eight BP deputies, Amasya representative Kazım Ulusoy[456] proved to be a true "gentleman of the periphery"[457] for providing case work, ranging from infrastructure problems of the villages to personal inquiries, for a number of constituents.

Debates on Alevis and Alevism and sectarian relations that dominated the floor debates a term earlier were also missing in the activities of MPs in TBMM.[458] While the budget meetings regarding DİB continued to lead lengthy debates and speeches on the value of religion and DİB as an institution, the issue of sectarianism was absent from the agenda. Deputies from the opposition no longer framed questions about the protection of Alevi rights or discrimination of the community. In other words, echoing the identity claims of the party, BP did not act as an Alevi-based party in TBMM.

Lack of institutionalization continued to be a problem for TBP in the 1970s. The party had neither solved its internal problems nor was able to establish and activate local branches throughout the country. The problems with fractions reached to a

[455] As the party failed to get organized in at least 15 provinces, BP had to forfeit the 1968 senate elections and compete only in local municipal elections of cities with an Alevi majority. The biggest achievement for BP during 1968 elections was the 20.7per cent vote in the municipal elections of Amasya, where BP emerged as the third party behind CHP (24.45per cent).

[456] An analysis of the speeches of and motions proposed by Ulusoy indicate that in his three terms as an MP (i.e. 1965 MP representative, 1969 BP representative and 1991 SHP representative of Amasya), he remains to be a "gentleman of the periphery" who do continuous case work arising from his connections in Amasya.

[457] I employ the term as it was used in Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The Turkish Grand National Assembly: A brief Inquiry into the Politics of Representation in Turkey," in *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, ed. Çiğdem Balım et al., 42–60, (Leiden, New York, Köln: E. J. Brill, 1995)

[458] With the exception of the motions of Alevi deputies of CHP and AP proposing to put the widow of Aşık Veysel on a salary, i.e. Proposals No. 2/852 & 2/853.

breaking point when five MPs of TBP[459] gave vote of confidence for the AP government in March 15, 1970[460], contrary to the decision of the party group. Since MPs are hardly free agents in Turkish politics, the five was declared traitors and excluded from the party organization. Yet, support for AP was not only presented as an indicator of political disloyalty but also as a form of treason to the Alevi community. The party cadres ostracized these five MPs from the community[461] and declared all of them as outcasts/fallen [*düşkün*]. However, as three members of the Ulusoy family who held significant charismatic power over the Alevi community for being one of the oldest *dede/baba* lineages were among the outcasts, TBP suffered a tremendous decline in resources and support. Since the party was highly dependent on patrimonial networks of Ulusoy family, the result of the interparty conflict was drastic in the long run.

Timisi tried to transform the perception of TBP from an Alevi party to a more inclusive, leftist party in the aftermath of the 1971 military intervention. Timisi changed the name of the party from Unity Party to Turkish Unity Party in November 27, 1971 during the third party congress, and began to present the party as a follower of principles of Ataturkism and defender of social justice and economic equality, echoing both CHP and TİP of the time. Within this period, migrants residing in Germany[462] along with unions and worker movements in the domestic arena tried to provide new material sources and personnel for the party. However, the weak organization of TBP led to poor performances in the 1973 and 1977 elections. Additionally, institutional opportunity structures were not favorable for smaller parties. The party could only win one seat in 1973 from Sivas and remained insignificant in the 1977 elections, and finally was shut down after the coup d'état of 1980.

Despite TBP's low level of institutional organization, inter-party conflicts, limited electoral power and irreligious identity, the Party remained to be the first and only example of the organization of the articulated interests and resources of the Alevi community in the form of a political party. Even though the party elites were

[459] Yusuf Ulusoy, Kazım Ulusoy, Ali Naki Ulusoy, Hüseyin Balan and Hüseyin Çınar

[460] Cemal Şener, and Miyase İlknur, *Kırklar Meclisi'nden Günümüze Alevi Örgütlenmesi: Şeriat ve Alevilik* (Istanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1995) 70.

[461] According to Alevi faith, the intra-communal conflicts are mediated by *dede*s. As religious leaders of the community, they have the power to outcast/ex-communicate individuals found guilty of misdeeds for a certain period of time. Ex-communication [*Düşkünlük*] is considered as the ultimate form of punishment and evokes great fear in the village settings as no one is allowed to interact with the outcast in any form.

[462] See the discussions on TALEB and YBF in Chapter 3

unsuccessful at mobilizing the entirety of the Alevi community and establishing a stable party organization, their failure strengthened the spread and expansion of the Alevi associational life that began in the late 1980s. Additionally, the TBP case indicates that even though the descriptive representation of the Alevi community somewhat increased in the TBMM in the late 1960s and early 1970s, this increase did not pave the way for substantive representation. During the period they were in the legislature, the Party did not challenge the government on issues specifically related to the Alevi community or communal interests.

4.3.2 The Legacy of the Republican People's Party (CHP) (1923-onwards)

The Republican People's Party (CHP) is the oldest political party in the history of modern Turkey. Founded in 1923 by Atatürk, the founder of Turkish Republic, and later led by such prominent political personalities as Ismet Inönü, the party became the main political mechanism of the newly emerging republic. In transition to multi-party politics, CHP acted as "a model for organization and a school for the training of Turkey's future politicians."[463] Since all kinds of opposition to the dominant coalitions and the leadership were particularly discouraged, the leaders of the fractions within the Party eventually left to form their own parties. CHP has always been an important political actor in shaping the debates, issues and organizations in Turkish politics.[464]

Yet, ideological and structural change of the party that started in the 1960s led to significant electoral victories in 1970s and reconstructed the party image. The 'Left of the Center' perspective of the CHP emphasized humanitarianism, social security, value of labor, land reform and a nationalist outlook on foreign policy.[465] This transformation and attempts to become a mass party paid off during the 1973 and 1977 elections, CHP got plurality of the votes; hence, the biggest number of seats in TBMM.

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[463] Kemal Karpat "The Republican People's Party 1923-1945" in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, (New York: LB. Tauris, 1991), 53.

[464] Ayşe Güneş Ayata, *CHP: Örgüt ve İdeoloji* (Ankara Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992); ; Frank Tachau, "An Overview of Electoral Behavior: Toward Protest or Consolidation of Democracy?" in *Politics, Parties and Elections,* eds. Sayarı and Esmer, 33-54.

[465] Ayşe Güneş Ayata, "Ideology, Social Bases and Organizational Structure in the Post 1980 Political Parties" in *Political and Socio-economic Transformation of Turkey Since 1980, eds.* Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tunay, and Birol Yeşilada 31-50 (Westport: Preager Publishers, 1983),; Hikmet Bila, *CHP 1919-1999*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 1999).

The changes in the institutional framework with the 1980 coup affected the way in which CHP was organized and acted in the political sphere. The 1980 coup and the 1982 Constitution that followed aimed to (re)establish stability while holding a democratic façade. The new institutional design was suspicious of both the political elites and the civilian bureaucrats, and curbed down the Dahlian "procedural minimal" conditions.[466] The attitude of the new regime towards participation was selective. While voting in elections was promoted by the new regime, other forms of participation were discouraged or limited. For the sake of stability, political parties of the *ancient régime* were closed down, trade unions were weakened, freedom of association and expression was severely restricted, and the links between the political and civil society organizations were cut off.[467]

In 1982, CHP and other major political parties (AP, MHP, MSP, etc.) were banned. As both the parties and the leaders of the old order were banned by the new regime, their proponents reorganized under different names with different leaders. Indeed, the banned parties of the old order could not reestablish themselves until the amendments of 1995. With the initiative from the former CHP cadres in 1983, the Social Democrat Party [SODEP - *Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi*] was founded by Erdal İnönü (the son of İsmet Inönü). However, the party did not qualify for the 1983 elections, and most of its members were vetoed by the National Security Council [MGK - *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*], including İnönü. In 1983 only three parties were permitted to enter the elections: the Populist Party [*Halkçı Parti*], the National Democracy Party [MDP – *Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*], and Motherland Party [ANAP - *Anavatan Partisi*]. In the absence of a clear successor, most former CHP votes were channelized to HP in the 1983 elections.

After the 1983 elections, MGK lost its veto power. Subsequently, SODEP quickly qualified to run in the local elections of 1984. In the local elections of 1984, İnönü's SODEP received 23.4 per cent of the votes. After SODEP established itself as the heir of CHP, to avoid dividing votes, HP merged with SODEP in 1985 and established the

[466] That is "(1) the freedom to form and join organizations, (2) free and fair elections, (3) eligibility for public office, (4) the right of political leaders/elites to compete for votes and/or support, (5) right to vote, (6) freedom of expression, (7) availability of alternative sources of information, and (8) existence of institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference". See Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), 3.

[467] Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics* 57-9; Sayarı, "The Changing Party System", 15-8

Social Democrat People's Party [SHP - *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Party*]. Due to the ban on parties of the old era, CHP elites had to work under the newly formed SHP. In the 1987 elections, SHP came in second with 24.8per cent of the votes and received 99 seats in the parliament. The success of the party continued in local elections of 1989 as SHP got 33per cent of the votes. However, despite the electoral achievements of the new SHP, intra-party leadership struggles between Erdal İnönü, the SHP's president, and Deniz Baykal, who had served in pre-1980 governments, challenged stability within the party.[468] Baykal and 21 followers left to re-establish CHP, after the ban on party names was retrieved on September 9, 1992. While the left vs. right dichotomy in the ideological spectrum was vital in transformation of CHP in the 1970s, the Islamist vs. secular dichotomy was crucial in redefinition of the role and identity of the 'new' CHP in Turkish politics. With the rise of political Islam, CHP was transformed into a defender of secularism in the 1990s.

4.3.2.1 Question of electoral support and the enigma of the Alevi vote

Both in the literature and the popular media, the support of the Alevi community is recognized as a significant resource for the CHP electoral success. CHP as the founder of the Republic, defender of secularism and the mother of multipart-politics is considered as a natural ally for the Alevi community. However, there is no empirical evidence indicating that CHP ever had a monopoly on the mobilization of the Alevi votes or on the number of Alevi representatives in the TBMM.

Starting with the multi-party politics of the 1950s, depending on their economic preferences or ideological self-placement, the vote of the Alevi electorate is shared by a number of parties. While it is not possible to determine the magnitude and change of the Alevi electoral support, due to problems of sampling and measurements, one may still challenge the partisan support hypothesis based on the geographic distribution of the votes (Table 4.2).

Among the provinces with a high Alevi density, Tunceli province returned a 58.7 per cent vote for the DP in the 1950 elections. Although the vote distribution between DP and CHP gradually declined, it was not until 1973 election that CHP received 70per cent of the votes. The only address that created challenge for CHP in the province was

[468] İlter Turan, "Old Soldiers Never Die: The Republican People's Party of Turkey", *South European Society and Politics*11, no. 3-4, (2006): 559-78

the Malazgirt district, where CHP received 54.4per cent of the votes and the independent candidates got 34.8per cent.[469]

The role of ethnicity in shaping the preferences of the Alevi electorate has been weak.[470] The analysis of the 1995 election results in the Tunceli province indicate that at village level, the majority of the votes were distributed among HADEP, CHP, and the independents. Although HADEP received some of the Alevi votes from the villages with the exception of Pülümür district, CHP continued to be a significant party in the region.

Table 4.2 The number of seats won by the two major parties in the predominantly Alevi electoral districts in the National Assembly, 1950-1957

Provinces	1950		1954		1957	
	CHP	DP	CHP	DP	CHP	DP
Amasya	0	4	0	5	0	6
Çorum	0	8	0	9	0	10
Elazığ	0	5	0	5	6	0
Erzincan	5	0	1	4	6	0
Malatya	11	0	12	0	9	0
Maraş	0	7	0	7	9	0
Sivas	0	12	0	14	15	0
Tokat	1	8	0	9	10	0
Tunceli	0	2	2	1	3	0

Source: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DIE), *1950-1965 Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu üye seçim sonuçları* (Ankara: DİE, 1966)

Contrary to claims in the literature that associated the CHP's poor electorate performance in 1999 elections to declined Alevi support, the analysis of the village data from Sivas Alevi villages does not indicate a statistically significant shift to Democratic Left Party [DSP - *Demokratik Sol Parti*].[471] A significant increase in DSP

[469] T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DIE), *Millet Vekili Seçim Sonuçları, 14 Ekim 1973*, (Ankara DİE Yayınları, 1974).

[470] Güneş-Ayata, and Ayata, "Ethnic and Religious bases of voting," 146

[471] Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, . The Republican People's Party. *Turkish Studies* 3 , no. 1 (2002): 105-110.

votes in Alevi populated villages of Sivas would be expected if SHP/CHP's failure to "provide security to the fundamentalist threat" in the aftermath of the 1993 Sivas events[472]were to be a factor. The samples drawn out of 465 Alevi villages in Sivas do not provide enough evidence to support the claim that the CHP lost electoral support whereas the DSP gained support.

While one explanation can be that a sampling bias of the research exists, the other can be attributed to the different concerns and preferences of the Alevi villagers. Yet, because research relies on aggregate data, it cannot explain why such a trend does not exist. The problems related with data collection and interpretation on the issue of Alevi electoral participation shifts the focus of the research to the issues of representation in TBMM and the civil society to understand the dynamics of the Alevi – CHP bond. While the latter issue has been elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3, subsequent sections will focus on communication of Alevi interests in the legislative assembly.

4.3.3. Problem of Representation in the TBMM

The electoral districts are not single-member constituencies in the Turkish political system. The institutional design expects the MPs to be mandates rather than delegates. *Article 80* of the 1982 Constitution says the "members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly represent, not merely their own constituencies or constituents, but the Nation as a whole."[473] Parliamentary seats are filled according to the Electoral Act No. 2839, *Article 4*, which does not involve special quotas for women or ethnic and religious minorities. Additionally, within the non-insitutionalized political parties and the party system, candidate selection is not a transparent process. The party names tend to carry more weight than do the names of the candidates and independent candidates are generally elected if they have strong patrimonial ties that can mobilize masses.[474]

Yet, once elected, a Member of Parliament is a vital tool for groups to communicate their views and demands to the government. Even though individuals or groups can submit petitions and letters, they are replied to by civil servants. Despite the

[472] Ibid, 107.

[473] Constitution of the Republic of Turkey as amended on October 17, 2001, available at: http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURKEY.pdf

[474] Kalaycıoğlu, "The Turkish Grand National Assembly: A brief Inquiry into the Politics of Representation in Turkey," 45.

limited capacity to affect policies, the deputies enjoy a formal status denied to individuals and groups. Through speeches on the floor, framing questions, sponsored bills or parliamentary inquiry requests, the MPs can draw publicity for an issue or acquire formal responses from the members of the Cabinet.[475]

As far as representation of the Alevi community is concerned, all political parties had some level of descriptive representation of the Alevi community either in Parliament or at the organization level. As the exact number of Alevi representatives cannot be determined (since not all Alevi deputies reveal their identity), it is not possible to claim that CHP has a monopoly on Alevi representation. In the 1950s, DP had deputies with Alevi origin, such as Sivas representative Ercüment Damalı and former CHP representative of Malatya Hüseyin Doğan. Similarly, in the National Assembly of the 1960s AP, YTP and MP had Alevi MPs. Indeed former DP and AP Çorum representative İhsan Tombuş claimed in the early 1960s that these [right-wing] Alevi deputies who did not associate them with the policy claims and ideology of CHP and TIP constituted the base of the BP.[476] The 1991 elections also turned into a contestation for Alevi votes among political parties and right-wing, system oriented Alevi elites found their way into the party organizations of Motherland Party [ANAP].[477], the Welfare party is Similarly known to represent the interests of political Islam court Alevi notables in an attempt to receive votes from the revivalist Alevi community in both 1991 and 1995 elections.

During the fieldwork with the CHP activists in Ankara, many of the CHP members noted that the Alevis "came to CHP" since the other parties and government institutions were/are exclusive towards the community. In an interview, an (non-Alevi) official stated that:

> right now the only place the Alevis can find employment are the municipalities of CHP. There is no single Alevi governor [*vali*]; there is no single deputy governor; no single undersecretary…they are not in government[al posts] except the staff in minor departments…In Ankara

[475] İrfan Neziroğlu, Habip Kocaman, and Semra Gökçimen, *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Yasama El Kitabı*, (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2011)

[476] İhsan Tombuş, *Politikada 41 Yıl (1946-1987),* (Ankara: İzgi Yayınları, 1997), 166.

[477] Ali Doğdaş (dede) from the Ehli-Beyt association and founder of New Path Party[Yeni Düzen Partisi, 1983] and former True Path Party (DYP) member Vahap Esendağ joined to ANAP in 1991 with a public ceremony. See "250 Alevi ANAP'ta" *Milliyet*, October 30, 1991.

other than Çankaya and Yenimahalle municipalities they do not have a chance to be employed.[478]

The subsequent sections focuses on the 2002-2012 period, and tries to elaborate the mechanisms and scope of Alevi interest representation in the TBMM parallel to the influence of Alevi identity politics of the last decade.

4.3.3.1 Political context

The level and scope of representation of the Alevi minority in the legislature is not independent of the changes in the party system and the elite culture dominating the relationship between the deputies and the party. The 2002 elections marginalized the major players in the party system of the period between 1991 and 2002 and paved the way for a new player, i.e. AKP, to take over the government. The 2002 elections generated a new parliament controlled by the absolute majority of AKP. The proportional representation system with 10per cent national quota enabled this newcomer to capture 66 per cent of the seats (363 seats out of 550); after winning 34.2 per cent of the vote, the party captured 66per cent of the seats.

In the post-2002 elections, CHP was the only other party that could receive parliamentary seats. Within this new two-party parliamentary system CHP became the principal rival of the governing AKP in the parliamentary arena.[479] However, as AKP controlled more than the two-thirds of the seats, the legislative activities were marked with the power asymmetry between the government and the opposition. CHP, which won only 178 seats in the National Assembly had little effect on policy formation of the government. CHP was already labeled as a party of elite struggles and continuous party congresses, and it was further undermined and marginalized due to the increased factionalism and opposition to party leadership in the aftermath of 2002 elections.[480]

Among the 363 MPs of AKP, there were no Alevi MPs and during this period the government had little attempts to engage with the representatives of Alevi associations

[478] Interview, Ankara CHP headquarters, November 8, 2012.

[479] Sabri Sayarı, "Towards a New Turkish Party System," *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 2, (2007), 197-210; Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Rise of the New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey: the Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in November 2002 Elections in Turkey," *South European Society and Politics* 7, no3 (2002): 123-56.

[480] Güneş-Ayata, "The Republican People's Party,"115

and Alevi civil society institutions.[481] CHP deputies offered the only mechanisms to communicate the issues and concerns of the community. Yet, the legislative design and the internal conflict within CHP undermined the role of the party in Alevi interest representation.

The July 2007 elections reinforced the dominant position of AKP in TBMM. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) captured 347 of the 550 seats, and the power asymmetry continued in legislative relations. Even though in the aftermath of the 2007 elections MHP, DSP, and DTP gradually got seats, the Alevi interest representation within the opposition was continued to be performed mainly by the deputies of CHP. However, the governing AKP also had taken a number of steps, which were popularly coined as "the Alevi opening", to address the issues and concerns governing the Alevi identity movement that began in late 1980s. Through workshops and symbolic gestures by the Prime Minister and the cabinet, AKP became more inclusive towards the Alevi community.

4.3.3.2 The mediums of communication of Alevi interests in the legislature

Access to the legislative chamber floor for speeches tends to be controlled and restricted in TBMM, with the exception of the budget meeting discussion in December of each year; political parties strictly control access to the floor. Since the minutes are limited (hence very valuable), issues related to Alevi claims in most cases cannot get enough floor time as they are overshadowed by economic problems, foreign policy, and security issues. Therefore, communication of any issue to the other members of TBMM poses a challenge for the individual MPs, particularly if the content of their speech is not approved by the party elites.

Within this context, parliamentary questions became the most popular tools employed by MPs in TBMM as the content and the frequency of the questions are not restricted by the parties.[482] As Hazama, Gençkaya, and Gençkaya note, "Parliamentary questioning is a signal to both the government and extraparliamentary audiences to obtain or to give information on particular topics or to force a policy statement to be

[481] Chapter 5 will provide a detailed account on the topic.

[482] The Article 96/1 of the Rules of Procedure of the TBMM defines a question as 'a way of requesting information from the PM or ministers on certain matters excluding personal and private life without a reason of statement and personal opinion'.

made."[483] In principle, they are a mechanism at the disposal of MPs for holding the executive branch accountable, while strengthening their relations with their constituents. The questions addressed to Ministers and the Prime Minister, become the quickest means of eliciting information about matters within their official responsibility. Through oral[484] and written[485] questions, MPs can lay blame upon the government for policy failures or seek substantive answers to the problems of their constituents. The questions (and the answers to those questions) can also lay the foundations for drafting member sponsored bills. However, since the probability of an opposition party bill to pass is very low, "a question is the only significant weapon in the hands of an individual MP during his or her parliamentary life. Thus, when MPs fail to initiate policy and influence the content of legislation, they attempt to control 'the government's general conduct on affairs' [through submitting questions]. "[486]

An overview of the total number of oral and written questions submitted to TBMM indicates that there has been a significant increase over the years parallel to the increase in overall activities of the MPs. While the total number of oral and written questions was 3,313 in the 17th legislative period (1983–87), they were 3,457 in the 18th period (1987–91). The numbers continued to increase in each subsequent term reaching 9,374 in the 19th (1991-1995), 8,211 in the 20th (1996-1999), and 10,220 in the 21st (1999-2002) periods.[487] Paradoxically, the Alevi activists in general do not give much credit to parliamentary questions as they have no impact on the transformation of the government policies.[488] During the interview period, a former consultant to CHP's MP concurred with this perception of Alevi activists. He stated that even though question framing is popular among MPs, the activity has no real "value" since unlike a bill; question framing has no tangible impact.

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[483] Yasushi Hazama, Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, and Selma Gençkaya, "Parliamentary Questions in Turkey," The *Journal of Legislative Studies* 13, no.4, (December 2007): 539.

[484] Oral questions, which must usually contain fewer than 100 words, are put on the agenda after five days following the referral date to the relevant ministry.

[485] According to Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure written questions must contain fewer than 500 words and answered within 15 days (previously 20 days) following their referral to the relevant ministry. Then the answers are sent to the relevant MP, and the answer is published as an annex to the Minutes of the TBMM.

[486] Hazama et al, "Parliamentary Questions in Turkey," 544. Emphasis added.

[487] Ibid.

[488] During the fieldwork period some activists stated that the MPs sent a copy of their question (and if received the answers) to organizations. Yet, most activists considered them as unnecessary/ineffective as neither the questions nor the answers given can provide policy solutions.

In addition to question framing, the MPs speeches on the floor are vital mediums to draw the TBMM members' attention to the issues, needs, demands, or values of the Alevi community. However, since the access of MPs to floor is blocked, frequency of the off-the agenda speeches becomes more important (than their content) as they provide clues regarding the significance political parties attribute to the issues.

4.4.3.3. The Alevi representation in the National Assembly

During TBMM's 22nd term, representation of the Alevi interests by the CHP deputies was relatively substantial. In comparison to earlier terms, CHP elites were more sympatric towards the issues communicated by the Alevi activists and the Alevi organizations. During the data collection process in CHP offices in Ankara, one official – who used to act as a consultant to MPs in TBMM – stated that during the 1990s, CHP refused to acknowledge the status of Alevis in Turkey as a problem. Consequently, there was no significant floor activity on the issues involving Alevi claims.[489] As the public's familiarity with the Alevi issues increased as a result of the solidarity and advocacy networks established among the domestic and transnational Alevi actors (the last of which took place in 2001 with the beginning of the trial against ABKB), CHP tried to reach out to the Alevi communities.

In 2002, CHP managed to get the former AABF director and prominent Alevi figure Ali Rıza Gülçiçek elected for the National Assembly. While TAN's inflow of information and monetary aids had become a common phenomenon by 2000, Gülçiçek's election was significant as for the first time Alevi identity movement has a activist selected for TBMM. Contrary to the earlier generation of Alevi political elite, such as the Ulusoy family, Hüseyin Balan or Mustafa Timisi, Gülçiçek was not a "gentleman of the periphery." Instead he was a prominent figure in the German Alevi movement. During his term as an MP, he acted as a lobbyist for both the issues regarding the Alevi minority rights protection and the problems that the Turkish immigrants in Europe face in the home and host countries (See Table 4.3). The legislative activities of Gülçiçek indicate that he remained a broker for organized interest groups established by European and Turkish Alevis.

[489] Interview in CHP Ankara District quarters, on November 8, 2012.

Table 4.3 Ali Rıza Gülçiçek's activities as an MP 2002-2007

	#Speech in TBMM *		#Questions framed		#Sponsored Bills	#Proposals for inquiry	Activities in international and supranational assemblies	
	F	C	Oral	Written			Speaker	Norm Entrepreneur **
Issue Areas								
Breach of Non-Discrimination principle	2	0	2	6	1	0	0	0
DİB and its organs	2	3	1	4	0	0	0	0
Compulsory religion courses	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
Cem houses and their problems	2	0	1	6	1	0	0	0
Sivas Events of 1993 and legal process	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Problems of migrants residing in Europe	7	0	1	1	0	2	3	1
Alevi culture	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Other[490]	11	0	0	33	0	0	2	1

Notes:

* In the table F stands for speech given on the floor, and C stands for speech given in Commission.

** I am inclined to identify Gülçiçek as a norm entrepreneur whenever he is assigned as a consultant in reports of the CoE institutions.

Source: Based on the data retrieved from the TBMM minutes

[490] Other category refers to activities related to discussions on legislative bills not related directly to Alevi community, budget meetings, terror and issue of refugees in TBMM. Whereas the category refers to activities involving reintegration of convicts, marriage and child marriage issues, the practice of principle of equality in political participation in international and supranational assemblies.

Even though CHP was the opposition and had no control over the course and content of the policies of the government or legislative bills, the legislative activities regarding the Alevi community were crucial in transformation of the relationship between the Alevis and state institutions. Through framing questions, Gülçiçek forced the Ministers and AKP deputies to talk about the issues of worship, religious education, the status and funding for cem houses and bias in TRT broadcasts. Although the party had other MPs directly or indirectly involved in legislative activities, most of them remained passive representatives. They either continued to be involved in caseworks or remained as signatory to proposed bills and parliamentary inquiry proposals of the party.[491]

Other than Gülçiçek's legislative activities, the only other significant event in the 22nd term of TBMM was the bill sponsored by the CHP Istanbul representative Berhan Şimşek.[492] Following the campaign triggered by the Alevi Bektashi Federation in 2005, in 2006 Şimşek sponsored a bill to transform the Madımak Hotel, site of the1993 Sivas events, into a museum. Although the bill was rejected by the AKP majority, the rejection sparked new campaigns in the civil society and new member sponsored bills in the 23rd term of the TBMM.

However, in TBMM's 23rd term, CHP did not have another broker such as Gülçiçek, though 75 deputies directly or indirectly were involved in legislative activates regarding the Alevi community (Table 4.4). During this period, most participants were signature holders in party documents. Instead of the identity and minority issues related to the Alevi community in Turkey, the economics, ethnic problems, and relations to foreign and neighboring countries dominated the speeches of the opposition parties on the floor. Yet, this decline in activities involving representation of Alevi interest can be attributed to the willingness of the governing AKP to communicate and deal with the Alevi organizations and intellectuals. During the 2007-2011 legislative terms, the situation of the Alevis in Turkey was recognized as a problem by the government and

[491] Within the current legal framework 20 signatures are required to submit a proposal for opening a parliamentary inquiry commission.

[492] It is important to note here that other CHP MPs, including Ensar Öğüt, Erol Tınazepe and İsmail Değerli, brought Alevi issues into the agenda by framing questions. However, in comparison to Gülçiçek, their overall legislative activities were less Alevi oriented. In my interview with a former CHP secretary of the era confirmed also this difference between the MPs.

other state institutions for the first time. Subsequently there was more room for debate in the public sphere and more opportunities of interaction with the government.

Nonetheless, the themes that dominated the earlier term of TBMM continue to be brought up during this period. Off the agenda speeches regarding the importance of Muharrem (the holy month of the Alevi faith), and commemorative speeches on Alevi religious and cultural figures were still floor activities of some CHP members. Additionally, the organization and functioning of the Directorate of Religious Affairs continued to be an area of concern. However, of the 72 questions framed by the MPs regarding DİB, only 1 directly related to the Alevi concerns on Alevi worship and the status of cem houses; whereas, the rest directly or indirectly seek to investigate the level of corruption or role of patronage networks within DİB.

Table 4.4 Discussion of the Alevi-related issues in the National Assembly, 2007-2011

Legislative year	Oral questions	Written questions	Member sponsored bill	Proposal for parliamentary inquiry	Off schedule speech
(23/07/07-30/09/07)	0	1	0	0	0
(01/10/07-30/09/08)	3	11	1	1	1
(01/10/08-30/09/09)	1	0	1	0	0
(01/10/09-30/09/10)	0	5	0	4	5
(01/10/10-23/04/11)	0	4	1	0	1
	4	21	3	5	7

Source: Calculated by the author based on the data retrieved from TBMM minutes

Most activities regarding Alevis instead revolve around the breach of non-discrimination principle in state institutions and in media. Following the Alevi workshops of the governing AKP, the content of the speeches and questions addressed

by the opposing CHP deputies began to involve issues regarding the functioning and the outcomes of the organized workshops. While the Alevi rapprochement was a factor in the content of the Alevi related activities during the 23rd term, the lack of substantial policy changed by the government determined the content of the debates in the post-2011 period.

In the current parliament, CHP emerges as the only party among the opposition. A significant number of CHP MPs continuously conducts floor work on issues regarding the Alevi minority. Other than the annual sessions budget planning on December, other oppossion party MPs do not brought Alevi issues to the attention of the TBMM. While the other opposition MPs highlight Alevi issues to lay blame on the government and other state institutions, i.e. DİR, during budget meetings, CHP MPs continue to communicate the demands and preferences of the Alevi community remainder of the legislative year. The MPs' activities revolve around four issue areas – i.e. (i) the Sivas Massacre & its aftermath, (ii) elaboration of Dersim events, (ii) the breach of the non-discrimination principle, and (iv) the application of principles of international treaties.

THe issues related to *Dersim events* have been a concern for independents as well as CHP and Peace and Democracy Party [BDP - *Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*] MPs.With the exception of one question addressed to the office of Prime Minister, the language and content of the framed questions by the independent and BDP MPs highlight the effects or significance of the event on the Kurdish minority, history, and identity. What's more, when included in the texts, Alevi or Alevism appears as name dropping. BDP MPs do not provide substantial requests for Alevi minority rights. Additionally, the topic is far invisible in the legislative activities of the MHP deputies.

An analysis of the content of the questions show that (i) the situation regarding the suspects of the Sivas events, (ii) the issue of discrimination at school and public offices, (iii) the application of the decisions of ECtHR and (iv) the issues regarding the 1937-1938 *Dersim events* constitute core themes in the written questions were submitted. Even though CHP parliamentarians offered 41 questions regarding the structure and functioning of Directorate of Religious Affairs, only two particularly stressed issues related to the Alevi community. Like the findings of Hazama et al for the earlier legislative terms, the questions framed between 2002 and 2012 manifest a tone of blaming and have little success in receiving concrete answers from the relevant

Ministers or the Prime Minister.[493] On the other hand, constituency relevant issues, such as questions regarding the layoff of an "Alevi" from his/her workplace can draw more concrete answers. The answers of the blaming questions generally involve justifications of the prevailing policies and practices. For instance, whenever the MPs ask about the amount of subsidies the cem houses and/or Alevi associations receive from the state institutions, the emphasis of the relevant Minister remains on the non-discrimination principle upheld in distribution of the funds, followed by the total amounts distributed to association in general. In other words, while MPs particularly frame questions to compensate for their disadvantageous position to shape policy decisions, the Ministers (and the Prime Minister office) use it to (i) demonstrate their capabilities, and (ii) justify their policies.

Of the four proposed bills in the first legislative year of the 24th term, only one is a new motion and the remaining three are resubmissions of Tunceli representative Kamer Genç's proposed bills in the 23rd term. With the exception of the bill on foundation of a commission and determination of the damages of the Dersim events, the member sponsored bills offer amendments in the existing legal framework. They do not deal with substantive changes on religious rights, or differentiation individual rights of a citizen belonging to a minority and collective rights of the minority. Other than Kamer Genç's initiatives, CHP proposed only three more member sponsored bills in late 2011. While two of these member sponsored bills was focusing on recognition of cem houses, the third was seeking to establish July 2, the day of the Sivas events, as a commemorative holiday.

Through the new bill on the regulation of places of worship, the party seeks to expand the extension of the concept of "place of worship" to include Alevi *cem* houses. The emphasis is on the application of the requirements of international treaties or decisions of ECtRH[494] rather than reevaluating the institutional design. A similar tendency can also be seen in Genç's two proposed bills. While one of the bills seeks amendments to *Articles 2* and *91* of the *Village Law (1924)* to include cemevis, another

[493] Hazama et al, "Parliamentary Questions in Turkey," 553.

[494] Following the *Article 90* (on ratification and application of the international treaties) of *1982 Constitution*, proposed bill particularly seeks applications of the A*rticle 18* of the *Declaration of Human Rights (1948)* (on religious freedom), *Article 6* of the *UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981)* (on rights regarding worship and practice) and *Article 9* of Council of Europe's *ECHR* (on freedom of thought, conscience and religion)

put forward a series of amendments to the *Law on Organization of Higher Education Institutions No. 2809* to enable establishment of Alevism and Bektashism Research Institute at the universities of the country.

In the 24th legislative term, CHP MPs has continued to be the most active representatives of the TBMM on Alevi issues. Other than the three questions framed, and the speeches on the organization and activities of DİB during the budget sessions, Alevi issue areas BDP MPs has drawn little attention to the specific problems of the Alevis on the floor. However, the Dersim events of 1938 continue to be a source of tension between and within political parties. Particularly, CHP – the governing party of the era – continues to be hesitant even to make symbolic gestures. For instace, the address of Hüseyin Aygün, CHP MP for Tunceli (Dersim), to the National Assembly for restoration of the honor of Seyit Rıza, the leader of Dersim resistance, on November 2011 triggered a crisis within CHP.[495] The apology demand of Aygün from the state and CHP was heavely criticized by the cadres of the CHP. Additionally, the tensions within the CHP were used by the other opposition parties and the AKP to lay blame on CHP for its past and contemporary practices and rhetoric.[496]

4.5 Concluding Remarks

The Alevi MPs are expected to be more inclined than their Sunni collegues to conduct floor activities issues in the National Assembly to attend to the needs and demands of the Alevi constituents. From a theoretical perspective it is likely that Alevi MPs in the TBMM would share common understanding of which issues should be connected to the Alevi community in Turkey, and address these by framing questions, giving off-the-agenda speeches, sponsoring bills, and proposing inquiries. Despite the constraints of the formal institutions, the members of the parliament play a vital role in shaping the representation of the Alevi interests. By virtue of its status the debates in the TBMM attract publicity. As a result, most MPs employ parliamentary questions to

[495] See "Dersim krizi büyüyor," *Milliyet*, November 18, 2011.

[496] Another crisis was triggered by a speech of Onur Öymen, the vice-chair of the CHP at the time, on November 11, 2009. Öymen's justification of the heavy-handed repression of the Dersim riots in the late 1930s in his speech during the discussions on Kurdish rapprochement in the National Assembly drew heavey criticisms not only from the Kurdish Alevis of Dersim and the Alevi interest groups, but also from the CHP officials and MPs, such as Kemal Kılıçtaroğlu. See "Alevilerden CHP'li Onur Öymen'e Dersim isyanı," *Zaman*, November 12, 2009.

challenge or press the incumbent government over policy or personal/institutional conduct. By framing oral/written questions on issues related to Alevi claims, MPs contribute to the communication of Alevi interests to decision-making actors. If an issue is not already the subject of public debate, then National Assembly attention can help get it on to the political agenda [such as the 1963 debates on the organization of DİB].

One conclusion which logically follows from the TBP experience in the 1970s and the CHP-Alevi relations in the last two decades is that political opportunity structures matter in determining the scope and content of representation of the Alevis in the political sphere. The case of TBP also shows that establishment of an Alevi party and the entry of Alevi MPs into the National Assembly could not guarantee substantial representation of the Alevi interests. The preciding discussions indicate that even though TBP used Alevi symbols and select its candidates from Alevi notables and activists, the Party did not address itself as an Alevi Party. Both in 1969 and 1973, the TBP promoted its identity as a party with an Alevi base rather than a sectarian party.

Contrary to the expectations, the Alevi MPs of the TBP in 1969 did not address to the Alevi issues continuously. Instead, the MPs, like most of their colleques in the National Assembly spent their time on chasing case-work. Since, the patrimonial ties were pivotal in the success of the TBP in the 1969 general elections, the demands of the constituents dominated the questions framed by the TBP MPs. For instance, none of the 14 questions framed by Kazım Uluoy specifically drew attention to the problems of the Alevis as a community. The significance of the role of patrimonial ties between the TBP elites and the Alevi constituents became evident in the 1973 general elections. The more the TBP incorporated the premises and the demands of the established left-wing parties, the less it appealed to the Alevi masses. Additionally, the loss of the support of the Ulusoy family following the political crisis of the 1970 hindered the organization and mobilization capability of the TBP.

The analysis of the activities and characteristics of the CHP MPs in the last two decades indicates that there is no sufficient evidence to claim the CHP elites specially promote Alevi candidates and support the Alevi MPs works. Even though both at the local and national levels Alevi political activists are incorporated into the CHP cadres, CHP cannot be labled as an Alevi party. Many respondents during my fieldwork considered the relatively high number of Alevis in the party cadres as an unintended consequence. Neither the governing AKP, nor the other major political parties in the National Assembly are equally inclusive of Alevis.

Additionally, both my fieldwork and the discourse analysis of the releases of the CHP officials point out that the CHP promotes the principle of equal treatment. While this enables the promotion of competitive claims of the Alevis in the National Assembly – such as the demands for incorporation of the Alevi faith and institutions into the framework of DİB – by CHP MPs, it hinders the likelihood of the promotion of proactive or reactive Alevi claims – like the calls for apology from CHP for its role in the supression of the Dersim events, or amendments to the Law on lodges, shrines and other similar sites of religious organization, so that Alevi religious sites can be reopened as a place of worship. As a result, descriptive representation does not guarantee substantial representation of the Alevi interests. Other than Ali Rıza Gülçiçek, the known Alevi MPs tend to address a number of issue areas rather than focusing solely on Alevi specific ones.

Despite the increasing legislative activity regarding Alevi issues, the absence of concrete answers to the policy problems on Alevi demands provide little help to transform existing relations and institutions. Unless a question begs for help or pertains to particular constituencies, the opposition MPs receives little feedback. The Ministers and Prime Minister used the parliamentary questions to reinforce the official discourses on the issues and to justify their actions in their responses. The overall picture that emerged from the preceding analysis indicates that both the opposition MPs and the government officials use the floor activities to justify their positions on the Alevi issues.

The next chapter focuses on the governing AKP between 2002 and 2012, and analysis of the legislative and non-legislative activities of the government officials. In an attempt to provide more insight on the mediums of the communication of Alevi interests (and their relative success), the chapter focuses on the Alevi rapprochement project.

CHAPTER 5

NEW GOVERNMENT, OLD ISSUES: THE STATE-ALEVI RELATIONS BETWEEN 2002 AND 2012

5.1. Introduction

The meteoric rise of the AKP since its founding in 2000 has been a popular subject in the Turkish politics.[497] The reign of the AKP government has been marked by a number of domestic and international events, the effects of which also had a significant impact on the strategies of the Alevi interest groups as they sought non-discrimination and non-assimilation. Following the 2002 Copenhagen Summit, the newly elected AKP government, represented by the then Prime Minister Abdullah Gül was given "a date for a date" to start the Turkish accession talks for full membership to the EU. The EU's demands for policy change and institutional transformations before being considered for full membership, particularly in the aftermath of 2004 Brussels Summit that marked the official beginning of accession talks, paved the way for emergence of new inclusionary and exclusionary channels for the Alevi interest groups and networks.

This chapter builds on the previous chapters' discussions of the emergence of the Alevi interest groups in Turkey and Germany and the challenges these groups face in

[497] The reasons that facilitated the rise of AKP and the impact of their electoral success has been discussed by a number of scholars. See (on party systems) Sabri Sayarı, "Towards a New Turkish Party System?," *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 2 (2007): 197-210; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Justice and Development Party at the Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution of the Right-of-Center Predominant Party?, " *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 1 (2010): 29-44; (on democratizaton) William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy, and Liberalism in Turkey: The case of AKP*, (New York: Routledge, 2010); (on the role of the party in the processes of Europeanization and EU conditionality) Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, *Democratization and politics of constitution making in Turkey*, (New York: Center European University Press, 2009).

their struggle for rights, and analyzes the strategies of the Alevi TANs and the domestic Alevi advocacy networks. By combining the discussions on bottom-up and top-down approaches to Europeanization, this chapter questions the role of Alevi interest groups in the transformation of state policies and institutions.

5.2. Advocating for Policy Change: Theoretical Framework

"Europe takes the other, transforms it and makes it own"
Agnes Heller[498]

5.2.1. Identifying the Domestic Impact of the Regional Actors

Embedded in the "logic of appropriateness" the TAN model emphasizes the role of norm entrepreneurs, i.e. domestic change agents. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, TANs make new resources available to the domestic opposition by establishing ties among domestic and transnational actors, and create new channels for such groups to access to the international system so that they can pressure the states to change target domestic policies. These are powerful tools for pressuring states to make policy changes. Yet, as Thomas Risse-Kappen put forward, the ability of transnational actors to promote norms and influence state policy is dependent on domestic structures understood in terms of state-societal relations.[499] In a very oppressive state in which information flow is restricted, the emergence of TANs is an unlikely event: TANs can emerge only if the target state has some level of inclusiveness.

In states where information flows can be established between domestic and transnational actors, TANs engage in several tactics to influence and transform the policies and institutions of the state. Through their activities in the transnational space, such as meetings, seminars, and protests, TANs attract attention to the issue areas they mobilize around, for instance information politics. This first stage of influence, which

[498] Agnes Heller, "Europe: An Epilogue," in *The Idea of Europe: Problems of national and transnational identity*, eds. Brian Nelson, David Roberts, and Walter Veit, 12-25, (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992).

[499] Thomas Risse-Kappen: "Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction," in *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, ed., Thomas Risse-Kappen, 3-33, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

can be called agenda-setting, involves intense competition with other interest groups for the limited attention spans of the media and the public.[500] By providing facts and testimonies on issues, or identifying symbols to attract greater attention, networks try to secure a place in the public agenda long enough to attract the attention of policy-makers, at which point TANs seek to transform the position of the states and/or international organizations on the issue. As a further tactic, TANs seek leverage with which to change targeted policies and institutions by either "shaming" the target state for its violations, or reminding the potential 'ally' states or organizations in the international arena of their position and experiences on the issue area.[501]

Whatever tactic is adopted, empirical evidence indicates that *all else being equal, the likelihood of the TANs to gain greater leverage on the target states increases if the demands of the networks can be incorporated into the existing international discourses*.[502] In other words, the TANs' effectiveness in changing policy-outcomes depends on the framing of the issues by activists and interest groups. Additionally, the characteristics of the actors and the target state's level of vulnerability constitute the second dimension of a successful outcome for the TANs, such that, *all else being equal, the more vulnerable the target state is to external pressures, the higher the likelihood for policy change.*

Consequently, unless, the desired norms and institutions addressed by the European intergovernmental organizations are compatible with the 'national interests' of Turkey, and the costs for rule adoption and implementation is high, then the likelihood of state actors to act to transform the laws and practices increases. As Keck and Sikkink argues the TANs through their activities seek to transform the perception of 'national interests' and alter cost-benefit analysis of the political actors.[503]

Proponents of the transnational model emphasize different aspects of issues in determining the impact of the TANs. Finnemore and Sikkink, proposed various factors that make the adoption of norms and the transformation of policies more likely,

[500] Ibid, 22.

[501] Keck, and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 19-20.

[502] See Patrice C. McMahon, "Between Delight and Despair: The Effects of Transnational Women's Networks in the Balkans," in *Human rights and diversity: Area studies revisited*, eds. David P. Forsythe, and Patrice C. McMahon, 111-36 (n.p.: University of Nebraska Press, 2003); Jens Lerche, "Transnational Advocacy Networks and Affirmative Action for *Dalit*s in India," *Development and Change* 39, no. 2, (2008): 239-61.

[503] Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 203.

specifically legitimacy, prominence, intrinsic qualities, adjacency, and world-time.[504] They claim a norm is more likely to be adopted, hence the domestic policies more likely to change, if:

> (i) it will reduce domestic opposition by legitimating the state in the eyes of its citizens,
>
> (ii) there are successful examples of norm-adoption. The norm-violating states adopt the norms of the prominent states to improve their image.
>
> (iii) the norms to be followed are perceived by the target state as appropriate and transferrable to the domestic level. The norms that "fit" in existing frameworks of the target states are more likely to be adopted, i.e. path-dependence.
>
> (iv) the intrinsic characteristics of the norms are deemed appropriate for the policy-makers of the target state.[505]

In their discussion of human rights norms, Keck and Sikkink have advanced that norms involving bodily harm to innocent people are more likely to be effective due to the difficulty of legitimating the policy on any official grounds.[506] Risse-Kappen also discussed the role of the intrinsic characteristics of the norms, showing that economic and environmental issues are more likely to face opposition.[507] Following that, the ambiguity of the norms on collective rights, particularly on the rights of religious communities, poses a challenge of the Alevi TANs to successfully transform the state policies and institutions.

The process of policy change involves several 'boomerang patters'.[508] Risse and Sikkink transform the 'boomerang pattern' into a five-phase 'spiral model' focusing on the strategies of both target states and TANs (Table 5.1.). Following the establishment of the transnational advocacy networks in the first stage, TANs working at the domestic and international levels publicize the atrocities committed by the target state. The

[504] World-time refers to the adoption of norms following a shock, such as adoption of the victor's norms at the end of a war.

[505] Finnemore, and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,"

[506] Keck, and Sikkink, *Activitst Beyond Borders*

[507] Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Structures of governance and transnational relations: what have we learned?," in *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In,* Risse-Kappen, 280-313.

[508] Chapter 3, Figure 3.3.

reports, testimonies, and symbol created in this early stage later serve as evidence to pressure key stakeholders (such as states, international organizations) via 'shaming' schemes against the norm-violating state.[509] In the second stage, target states resist the pressures from the key stakeholders and refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the claims.

Table 5.1. The stages of the spiral model

PHASE	**ACTOR** (TANs)	**TARGET** (Norm violating state)
1. Activation of the networks	Agenda-setting	Repression
2. Denial	Leverage politics: moral-consciousness raising, persuasion: Shaming and lobbying activities	Refusal to accept the legitimacy of the agenda
3. Tactical concessions	Adjustments in the agenda and strategies	Cosmetic changes due to escalation in international pressures
4. Prescriptive status	Maintenance of the networks and its activities (if necessary) adjustment in the agenda and strategies	Acknowledgement of the validity of the norms / no or little rule adoption
5. Rule consistent behavior	Decline of the network	Policy change and internalization of the norms

Source: Risse and Sikkink, "Socialization of international human rights norms," 17-33.

The more the TANs expand and increase their activity spans, the more the target states "adopt cosmetic changes to pacify the international criticisms."[510] At this stage, a target state will try to improve its international reputation through gestures and initiatives reaching out to the domestic opposition. Even though these cosmetic changes do not create policy changes, they can provide new opportunity structures for the domestic opposition to mobilize and communicate their interests. If the TANS can keep their issues in the international and domestic agendas and put enough pressure on the target state, then they can transform the target state perception on the legitimacy of the norms on the targeted issues While recognition of the norms on an issue does not

[509] Risse, and Sikkink, "socialization of international human rights norms," 23.

[510] Ibid, 25.

guarantee rule-adoption on that particular issue, it can lay the foundation for the institutionalization and internalization of the desired norms.

In the case of Alevis' struggle for political representation, the activities of the networks for change in policies and institutions are intertwined with the processes of Europeanization. The collective and individual right norms emphasized by the domestic Alevi opposition and the transnational Alevi networks were already part of the human rights and minority rights standards laid down by the organizations of which Turkey is either already a member (i.e. CoE) or seek membership (EU). It is also important to note here that even though the *acquis communitare* has been a significant external factor facilitating domestic change in Turkey, it cannot be labeled as the sole reason for such transformations.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the EU neither has a legally-binding minority specific jurispuradence, nor considers freedom of religion as part of the *acquis*. Consequently, the EU has limited leverage on the candidate states to transform the institutional arrangements regarding both minority rights and religious freedoms. On the issue of rights, amendments in the institutional frameworks do not guarantee substantive change, and habituation of the norms on rights. Nonetheless, the issue of religion and minorities EU accession process acts as a supplement to the legally-binding processes of the ECtHR, since the process contributed to expanding the impact of the CoE's jurisprudence. By doing so, it also increases the visibility of the Alevi community and keeps the Alevi issues identified in Chapter 2 on the public and political agenda.

The following sections focus on the period between 2002 and 2012, and discuss the scope and nature of the relationship between Alevi interest groups and the governing AKP. Through analysis of the press releases, interviews with the Alevi and non-Alevi elites, EU progress reports and ECtHR documents, the chapter analyzes the dynamics of the policy change (or lack thereof) on Alevi issues.

5.3. The AKP and Alevi Relations between 2002 and 2007

By 2000, the domestic Alevi interest groups had already established strong ties with their European counterparts, and begun to challenge the policies and institutions of the state. Before the 2002 elections, the AABF and the other domestic Alevi foundations and activists already had a strong and continuous network engaging in

activities to set agendas in the domestic and the international spheres. Echoing Keck and Sikkink, the Alevi TANs of the 2000s were working to uncover and investigate the problems of the Alevi individuals and *cem* houses, and alert the media and the policy-makers for the solution of the issues (i.e. information politics). Additionally, the Alevi interest groups continued to lobby in the international sphere and sought allies to put pressure on the Turkish state.[511] In line with the increasing Alevi activism in the domestic and international arena, some new initiatives (i.e. tactical concessions) were also introduced by the new government in the early 2000s.

There were no Alevis among the 363 AKP MPs in TBMM, and the speeches of the Prime Minister Erdoğan did not highlight any Alevi agendas. The Alevi issues and demands, while some recognized, was not a major concern for the government. During this period, the demands highlighted by the Alevi activists were either considered threatening to the 'unity' of the nation, or as issues that can be incorporated into the existing policy agendas. Two issues: (i) the status and activities of the DİB, and (ii) the content and the structure of the religious education, dominated the debated on the early debates on the state-Alevi relations in Turkey. Additionally, even though in the summer of 2003, the TBMM ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR, Turkey continued its reservations on women and minority rights.

Despite the resistance of the government to officially acknowledge the issues framed by the Alevi interest groups as a problem, there were also individual initiatives to reach out to the problems of the Alevi constituents. Mehmet Aydın, Minister of State on Religious Issues, emphasized the importance of increasing the dialogue between the Sunnis and Alevis.[512] He suggested organizing an Alevi summit to discuss Alevism. He and argued that:

> Once scientific foundations are established, we can do something regarding Alevis. We do not know the depth of thought and knowledge in the Alevi world. One group of our Alevi friends say something, the other group denies it. They say very different things. This means, there is a richness of information. We need to sit down and talk about it.[513]

[511] The most significant activity of the Alevi TANs in this period was on the issue of religious education. Both the domestic Alevi opposition and the transnational Alevi groups played a significant role in making the *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey* case in ECtHR public.

[512] "Diyanet'e kısmi otonomi verilmeli ve başkanını da ilahiyatçılar seçmelei," Zaman, December 24, 2002.

[513] "Mehmet Aydın: Islam dünyasındaki akıl tutulmasını aşmak için dini düşüncede reform şart, AB'ye girmek bunu çabuklaştırır," *Hürriyet*, December 12, 2002.

However, dialogue suggestions of Aydın drew criticisms from his fellow AKP MPs. Mehmet Çiçek, former DİB vice-president and the AKP MP from Yozgat, criticize Aydın's suggestions for "creating diversity, where none [previously] existed"[514]

Starting with the 2003 annual budget planning sessions, the TBMM sessions on the budget of DİB turned into an area of contestation. Since the budget assigned to activities and personnel of the DİB increased drastically with the new budget proposal of the government, led various MPs to question the employment and wage figures of DİB, along with its criteria for employment.[515] During the budget sessions in 2003, in response to oral question framed by Ensar Öğüt (CHP MP from Ardahan) Mehmet Aydın addressed the issue of underrepresentation of Alevis in the DİB framework, and legitimized the requests for more funding as:

> I repeat again; while spending the contemporary budget…we take the take philosophy into consideration. I mean…if a service were to be provided to a village, we do not ask; we cannot ask whether that village is a Sunni village, town or Alevi village....For instance, the issue whether or not a particular cem house receive funding is brought to the agenda frequently….I as the Minister responsible from the Religious Affairs do not know; meaning… whether or not [these *cem* houses] get subsidies…if so when…and the amount…has nothing to do with the budget of the Religious Affairs….But we want to pay more attention to scientific research….we are aware of the negligence…we sincerely support publication of Alevi resources….by the Directorate of Religious Affairs starting from this year.[516]

In addition to the debates in the floor in TBMM, the Alevi interest groups also attracted the attention of the public and the media to limited and discriminatory activities of the DİB officials and institutions. The groups seeking competitive rights, i.e. the CEM foundation in Istanbul, mobilize Alevi and other heterodox religious group organizations to establish a religious representative organization that mirrors the activities of DİB. The establishment of Directorate of Religious Services of Alevi-Islam [AİDHB – *Alevi İslam Din Hizmetleri Başkanlığı*] in 2003 was criticized by both the DİB officials who considered the initiative as a threat to "unity", and the Alevi reactive and proactive claim-making groups. Particularly, groups who frame Alevism over cultural dimensions were critical of the establishment and the activities of the AİDHB,

[514] "Çiçek'ten bakana: Hepimiz Aleviyiz," Milliyet, December 11, 2002. Emphasis added

[515] In the 22nd term of the TBMM legislative assembly, Ali Rıza Gülçiçek was the most prominent Alevi figure that continuously communicate the issues and positions of the Alevi community/activists/interest groups on this issue area

[516] See *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 31, session 22 (December 2, 2003), 475

for *de facto* Sunnifying Alevism.[517] Instead, these domestic and transnational Alevi organizations, i.e. AABF, ABF, PSKAD and HAVAKV, called for the dissolution of the institution.

The European Commission's 2003 report on Turkey also included a reference to the violations of the rights of Alevis. The report noted that:

> as far as the situation of non-Sunni Moslem communities is concerned, there has been a change as regards the Alevis. The previously banned Union of Alevi and Bektashi Associations was granted legal status in April 2003 which allowed it to pursue its activities. However, concerns persist with regard to representation in the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and related to compulsory religious instruction in schools which fail to acknowledge the Alevi identity

However, no other references were made to the specifics of the situation of Alevis in the text. The framing of the Alevi issues in the 2003 Commission report, as well as in the other reports between 1998 and 2012, indicate a superficial analysis. In her analysis of the transformation of the state-military relations in Turkey, Cizre points out the bias in the reports and their tendency to ignore the ideological and historical dimensions in the analysis of the level of the domestic changes taking place in Turkey. The reports "occasionally show signs of recognizing the paucity of an approach that focuses exclusively on the design of institutions and the distribution of power between them." [518] Despite their limitations, the reports have been valuable sources of information to identify the place of the Alevi issues in the EU accession agenda.

The 6th EU harmonization package of July 2003, created a legal loophole for the construction of the *cem* houses. The Supplementary Article 2 to the Act on Construction was rewritten to take into consideration the needs for places of worship.[519] With this amendment, not only the freedom of religion expanded, but also a created new opportunity for to subsidize *cem* house constructions. However, since the 'place of worship' was not specifically identified in the Act, local *cem* houses and the major Alevi organizations submit petitions to receive subsidies. When their demands were

[517] An earlier fieldwork I conducted in PSAKD and HBVAKV in Ankara (2005) revealed that the organizations located in Ankara were particularly critical of the CEM Foundations' initiatives. The mimicry of the DİB framework and activities were considered dangerous and treated as another strategy to assimilate Alevis.

[518] Umit Cizre, "Problems of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey and the European enlargement zone," *European Journal of Political Research* 43, no. 1 (2004): 120.

[519] T.C. Başbakanlık Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Reform: Uyum Paketleri ve Güncel Gelişmeler*, (Ankara: n.p., 2007), 17.

declined, they took the cases to local courts. Since the law was ambiguous, the rulings of the court varied.

In 2004 the increasing criticisms highlighting the lack of Alevi representation in the DİB framework triggered new initiatives to transform the DİB. While the necessity to reform the organization and activities of the DİB was acknowledged, the scope of change was interpreted differently. In October 20-24, 2004 during the 3rd Religion Council [*Din Şurası*] of the DİB the role of the institution in EU accession processes, along with the need for new strategies to provide religious services to Turkish citizens residing abroad, were discussed. The most significant outcome of the meeting was the proposal to translate and publish Alevi-Bektashi classics.[520]

The comments of Ali Bardakçıoğlu, the Chair of DİB by the time, in an interview in November 2004 sparked a controversy on the position of the DİB on the Alevi issues. Both the Alevi activists and the opposition party MPs condemned Bardakçıoğlu's association of Alevis with Islamist revivalist tariqats. During the 2005 budget discussions Ali Rıza Gülçiçek, the former AABF chair and CHP MP from Istanbul, called for a reform in the organization of the DİB framework and criticized Bardakçıoğlu's earlier comments:

> On November 21, 2004 our Director of Religious Affairs gave a speech to the media stating that 'Alevis are not minority, they are sub-belief group; we cannot bring services to every group; in that case what happens if *Aczmendi*'s make demands'. My dear friends, religious interpretations are inconsequential for the essence, sprit and aim of our religion. In any case, this situation is understandable from their activities and this perverted interpretation is rejected by our society. However, Alevi and Sunni interpretations are accepted by the majority of our society. If Alevism is a sub-belief group of Islam, so does Sunnism[521]

In response to all criticisms directed at the DİB and the government in the 36th session of TBMM, Mehmet Aydın discussed the desire of the DİB officials to incorporate an Alevi dimension to its services, namely the publication of the Alevi-Bektashi classics.[522]

However, the actual publication did not take place until 2007, and after the series began to be published by the Turkish Religion Foundation [*Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı*] the

[520] Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, "III. Din Şurası Kararları," *Diyanet Aylık Dergisi Haber Bülteni 167*, (November, 2004): 3-23.

[521] See *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 70, session 36, (December 21, 2004), 71.

[522] Ibid, 100.

efforts were labeled as cosmetic changes. On the one hand, the selection of both the texts for publication and the reviewing committee has continued to be criticized by the Alevi activists. In comparison, to the enormous number of publications on Sunni Islam, the publication of a set of books was considered as another form of assimilation. On the other hand, these publications were significant for providing the only canonical documents published on Alevism by a state institution. Necdet Subaşı[523] emphasized the significance of the publication of the Alevi–Bektashi classics, and discussed the negative reaction of [some] Alevi organizations as:

> The famous sources of Alevis, which sometimes transmitted from mount-to-mount, or pass from hand-to-hand….was made available for the readers and simplified by researchers after a rigorous review processes….however the issue was perceived by the Alevis as Sunnis…Sunnis and Directorate are intertwined… began to alter our classics to distort Alevism….Why would Directorate do such a thing…if you continuously and increasingly identify Directorate in such a manner…then you cannot see anything positive.[524]

Contrary to the Alevi organizations tendency to label the publication of the series as an all-Sunni project, Subaşı noted that Alevis, i.e. Velayaettin Ulusoy and Osman Eğri[525], were also involved in preparation/editing of the texts for publication. These texts published by the Turkish Religion Foundation, whatever bias they involve, still valuable resources and remains to be the only state-sponsored publication on Alevi faith. These publications can also be treated as evidence for active inclusion of the Alevi community into the state institutions. In other words, rather than complying with the reactive and proactive claims of the Alevi interest groups, the DİB and its sister organizations incorporate the Alevi elements into the existing frameworks to counter the pressures put on the institution.

The relationship between the DİB and the Alevi community strengthened through providing aids for the Alevi *dede*s who wish to visit the Alevi congregation residing abroad. On February 5, 2007 various newspapers publish a story about 6 Alevi *dede*s from CEM foundation receiving subsidies from the DİB in their travel to Germany. The news report sparked harsh criticisms among the Alevi associations and foundations

[523] Subaşı was the organizer of the 7 Alevi workshops between 2009 and 2010, and was also appointed as the chair of the DİB's Strategy Development Unit [*Strateji Geliştirme Birimi*] in 2011.

[524] Interview with Necdet Subaşı, Ankara, January 18, 2013.

[525] In the Alevi forums and the Alevi news sites, Eğri has been accused of voluntarily engaging in activities to assimilate Alevism. For one such example see "Osman Eğri Assimilasyon memurluğuna devam ediyor," Alevi Haber Ajansı, November 11, 2007, accessed April 25, 2013 available at: http://www.alevihaberajansi.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=695&Itemid=45.

demanding the abolition of the DİB framework. Particularly, ABF and PSKAD criticized the CEM foundation and the DİB officials for trying to assimilate the Alevi values and institutions into the Sunni religious framework. In their websites these organizations published the response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as evidence of the 'treachery'. However, the response of the state officials was significant for identifying the bureaucratic loopholes that could be exploited by the Alevi activists.

By 2007 the DİB did not acknowledge the religion-based/faith-based demands of the Alevi community in general and Alevi interest groups in particular. Depending on the content and scope of the event, the Alevi initiatives were funded either by the Alevi congregation or by the local or national administrative bodies ranging from municipalities to the Ministry of Culture. Since the Alevi *dede*s as spiritual and religious leaders of the community could not be hired by the DİB, they did not automatically receive grey passports.[526] However, the individual Alevi *dede*s and/or the *dede*s of the associations could apply to Ministry of Foreign Affairs for to obtain a grey passport. In the specific case of 2007, upon the request of the officials of the European branch of the CEM Foundation, 6 Alevi *dede*s were asked to be subsidized. Following the correspondence between the DİB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs justifying the intended activity of the Alevi *dede*s as "service", 6 Alevi *dede*s were granted grey passports. In the following years this practice also continued, much to the dismay of the other major Alevi organizations residing in Europe and in Turkey.[527] Through this bureaucratic process, the organizations and individuals making competitive Alevi right-claims were *de facto* incorporated into the DİB.

Another significant event in the 2002-2007 period that brought the AKP government into conflict with the Alevi interest groups (and later with EU and CoE institutions) was Hasan Zengin's application to the ECtHR for breach of his parental right to choose the education of his daughter (January, 2004). The *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey* case was significant for attracting attention of both Turkish public, and international and domestic political actors to the issue of religious education in Turkey.

[526] Grey passports are aggined to individuals who (i) were sent abroad by the government, municipalities or other administrative units for official duty, (ii) in organizations the Turkish state is a member of , or (iii) are the members of the families of grey passport holders

[527] Necdet Subaşı noted the number of the applications received from Minsity of Foreign Affairs each year as 40-60.

During the trial period both the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups publicized the case, and tried to keep it in the agenda.[528]

The amendments to the legal framework continued in the second half of the 2000s. The new law on the Population Services in 2006 provided new legal justifications for identity claims of the Alevis. Since the Articles 82 of the new law enabled modification and deletion of the information in the national identity cards,[529] the Alevis were presented another opportunity to remove Islam from religious affiliation sections. Similar to the amendment in the Construction Act, the law on Population services introduced to the Turkish legal framework as a part of the policy harmonization process. This top-down policy change, while emerged independent than the activities of the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups, provided new channels to justify the right-claims of the Alevis in Turkey. More importantly, the successful implementation of these new rules adopted could be monitored through the response of the Turkish state to the demands of Alevi individuals and interest groups in said issue areas. The *Sinan Işık v. Turkey* case in ECtHR provided evidence for both the dynamics of the policy harmonization processes, and the fragmentation of the Alevi right-claims.

On May 9, 2004 Işık applied Izmir District Court to replace his religious affiliation from Islam with Alevi in his national identity card. Following the court's dismissal of the case, on the basis of the opinion of the legal adviser to the DİB, Işık applied to ECtHR claiming that his rights guaranteed under the Articles 6, 9 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) were violated by the Turkish state. Even though the 2006 amendments changed the some of the conditions regulating the registration of the religious affiliation of the Turkish citizens, it did not change the legal procedures about leaving this section blank or changing the affiliated religion. Instead, the law, while introduced new freedoms, generated new forms of exclusion. Additionally, the demand of Işık to identify his religion as Alevi drew criticisms not only from the official institutions, but also from the Alevi organizations. The groups that framed Alevism within Islam criticized Işık for filing the lawsuit. In contrast, the

[528] The process and implication of the case will be discussed in Chapter 6.

[529] "Nüfus Hizmetleri Kanunun Uygulanmasına İlişkin Yönetmelik, 2006/11081," Resmi Gazete, November 23, 2006, available at http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/11/20061123-2.htm.

groups, such as ABF, PSKAD, and AABF, who did not align Alevism with Islam, were supportive of the ECtHR lawsuit.[530]

5.4. AKP and the Alevi Rapprochement: Between 2007 and 2012

By 2007, increasing top-down and bottom up pressures led to acknowledgement of an "Alevi issue" in turkey. The constant information flow between the European and the Turkish Alevi interest groups, the trials in ECtHR of the Alevi citizens, the increasing references to Alevi right-claims in the EU accession reports and discussions, along with the increasing awareness of the public and the media about Alevi issues pave the way for significant changes in AKP-Alevi relations. The nomination and election of three Alevi MPs, i.e. Reha Çamuroğlu, İbrahim Yiğit, and Hüseyin Tuğcu, in the 2007 national elections marked the beginning of a series of initiatives and symbolic gestures between the AKP elites and (some) Alevi notables.

Outside TBMM, Çamuroğlu played a significant role in promotion of a new dialogue between the government and the Alevi interest groups who frame Alevism along the lines of/closer to the Sunni interpretations. To that end, a dinner event was organized by Çamuroğlu. Largely on his initiative; Prime Minister Erdoğan attended to the dinner and gave a speech. Yet, right after its announcement the event drew heavy criticisms from the major Alevi interest groups, the Alevi press and the opposition parties. In TBMM, Çamuroğlu had to defend the dinner event in the floor as:

> We are see that we are causing great distress and unfortunately we will continue to cause distress, because we are working for the good of our nation
>
> We organized this event as an Alevi initiative…and Prime Minister is a guest…This dinner…this fast-breaking-dinner is not a fast-breaking-dinner organized by the Justice and Development Party…we can invite whoever we want to this civil and private event[531]

Both the dinner event and the speech of Erdoğan on January 11, 2008, highlighted Alevism as embedded in Islamic tradition.[532] Yet, increasing criticisms and pressures led Çamuroğlu to distance himself from the Alevi rapprochement initiatives. In an

[530] The legal representative of Işık during the trial was Kazım Genç, who was a prominent figure in ABF and PSKAD. Genç was also the legal representative of the case of *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey* in ECtHR.

[531] *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 30, session 4 (December 5, 2007), 105.

[532] The low Alevi participation to the event was mocked by the Alevi press. See, "Alevisiz Alevi iftarı," *Evrensel*, January 13, 2008.

interview in late 2008 Çamuroğlu criticized the negative attitude of the Alevi interest groups and their attempts to impede democratization efforts.[533] He stated:

> We are talking about a 1000 year old problem. Are these friends mocking us? Reha Çamuroğlu holds a magic wand; Justice and development Parti holds a magic wand. We touch and voilá! We started a process and it is going well…What did the CHP … have ever done for them? They say they want the abolition of the Directorate. Fine, I want people to fly. In the near future it is not a possibility. What you say in practice is this: Do nothing until the Directorate is abolished…We didn't choose this path.[534]

The Muharram fast-breaking dinner repeated in 2009 attracted more attention from the Alevi interest groups. Before the second Alevi dinner, as a good-will gesture Ertuğrul Günay, the Minister of Culture, apologized from the Alevis on behalf of the state.[535]While Cem Foundation and World Ehl-i Beyth foundation joined the second dinner, the other major organizations continued to boycott the event. The second Alevi dinner held in Istanbul on January 7, 2009 was also aired on TV; the main state TV channel, TRT 1 broadcasted its primetime news from Karacaahmet Cemevi as a good-will gesture.[536] Such good-will gestures continued with programs on Karbala, Alevi faith, culture and rituals during the month of Muharram put on air by TRT 2.

In 2009 the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups became more vocal about their identity based right-claims. The Grand Alevi Rally – organized by ABF on November 9, 2009 in Kadıköy, Istanbul – was the second of the large-protests organized to voice the social and political concerns of the Alevi community. [537] The participants of the rally confronted the AKP government and its Alevi rapprochement policies, and demanded for 'equal citizenship rights'. While World Ehl-i Beyt Foundation, AVF/CEM Foundation and their sister organizations boycotted the rally, non-Alevi associations and groups – ranging from radical-left wing associations to trade unions.

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[533] In his recent interviews Çamuroğlu also criticized the AKP for not supporting him, when he was targeted by the radical Suni and radical Alevi groups. See "Yalnız bırakıldım," *Milliyet*, January 17, 2013.

[534] "AK Parti milletvekili Reha Çamuroğlu: Alevilerin meselesini gündeme getirmek istedik," *Radikal*, November 14, 2008.

[535] "Bakan Günay: Alevilerden devlet adına özür diledi," *Radikal*, December 23, 2008.

[536] The broadcast from Karacaahmet had a symbolic value, since Erdoğan was accused of trying to demolish the Karacaahmet *cem* house when he was the Mayor of Istanbul.

[537] A relatively smaller protest was held in Ankara in 2008, emphasizing similar endeavors.

In addition to these events, Ministry of State initiated an Alevi workshop series between 2009 and 2010. The workshops organized by Necdet Subaşı, upon request of the government, sought to enhance dialogue about the issues of the Alevi community in Turkey between the government and civil society actors. The workshops problematized (i) the conceptualization of Alevism, (ii) the status of the *cem* houses as places of worship, (iii) the structure of the DİB and its activities, (iv) the status and content of the compulsory lessons in religious culture and ethics, (v) the status of *dede*s as religious leaders, and (vi) *de facto* and *de jure* discrimination of Alevi citizens in the public and state-owned institutions. Additional topics were also discussed during the workshops: the ECtHR decisions on the two Alevi cases, and the preservation of the Madımak Hotel in Sivas as a symbol of violence.

The workshops were designed to facilitate information flow between state and non-state actors. Alevi notables, DİB officials, media representatives, academics, retired and incumbent MPs, trade union officials, and other civil society activists were invited to frame the issue areas of the Alevi question in Turkey. However, both the exclusion of transnational Alevi actors from the workshops and the inclusion of certain controversial figures[538] caused great distress. Indeed the workshops were accused of being biased. Subaşı refused the claims and instead argued that all major associations were invited to the workshops. He further stated:

> Nobody was forgotten…in the first workshop we called everyone…radicals, moderates….we also brought common Alevis…to understand the difference between the rhetoric of the common Alevis and the associations…to understand how the citizen Alevi and the representative Alevism happen to be….In the third workshop we invited the theology professors and the Directorate officials. Not a single Alevi was on that workshop because we didn't call. Because the topic of the 3rd was this: "how do you Sunnis look at the issue?"…they stretch this… when I told them this format they all agreed to it.

The final report of the workshops also acted as a catalysis for new interest group activities. None of theAlevi group participated in the workshops were satisfied with the result. While some criticized the workshops for being cosmetic changes, others accused them of being systematic efforts to create rival/state-sponsored Alevism. The failure of Alevi Workshops to produce substantive policy changes led the Alevi interest groups to readjust their agendas and strategies to communicate their interests and raise consciousness of the press and the public about the Alevi issues.

[538] Namely Ökkeş Şendiller (Kengir), one of the suspects of the 1978 Kahramanmaraş Events.

Since 2009 the EU Commission reports on Turkey's accession were increasingly portraying a positive picture of the AKP initiatives of rapprochement between the Alevis and the AKP. Both the workshops, fast-breaking dinners and the apology of Günay were addressed as positive developments. To counter the illusion created by these cosmetic changes in the summer of 2010 the Confederation of Alevi Unions of Europe [AABK – *Avrupa Alevi Birlikler Konfederasyonu*][539] chair Turgut Öker announced that the European Alevi federations would lobby to "fix the confusion AKP created".[540]

The lobbying and the protests of the AABF and ABF continued in the remainder of the second term of the AKP rule. The Alevi interest groups continued to accuse the government for trying to assimilate the Alevi community and establishing organizations labeled as "fake Alevi organizations" [*Çakma Alevi Organizasyonları*] by the major Alevi interest groups.[541] ABF and its sister organizations also continued to organize demonstrations to protest the government policies. In a press conference to announce the third rally for "Equal citizenship rights" "in 2011 Balkız (ABF) declared:

> In the previous two rallies we cried out the demands of the Alevi community. But AKP government refused to meet our demands, instead they called "opening" and exploited them in their policies and after the long "Alevi Workshop "series it has been understood that the "Alevi Opening" was a lie. We were too close in Ankara, they didn't hear us. They didn't hear the Istanbul crowd; we thought maybe…they would hear us better if we went to Izmir[542]

Other groups such as AVF, CEM Foundation and the World Ehl-i Beyt Foundation carried on their consciousness raising activities, i.e. organizing meetings, talks, seminars and workshops. Unlike the ABF representatives, these groups also continued to participate in the dinner events and other activities that brought the government and Alevi notables together. In other words, in line with the assumptions of

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[539] On November 25, 1997, during the AABF convention, a new transnational umbrella Alevi organization, titled Confederation of Alevi Unions of Europe, was agreed to be established.

[540] Turgut Öker, "Avrupalı Aleviler'den AB'ye sert tepki", press release, last accessed May 20, 2013 available at http://www.alevi.dk/BASIN%20ARSIV/Avrupali%20Alevilerden%20AB%20ye%20sert%20tepki%20.htm

[541] A number of Alevi associations were established during and shortly after the Alevi workshops. The Anadolu Alevi Bektashi Federation [*Anadolu Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu*] – founded by Cengiz Hortoğlu – drew harsh criticisms from the ABF and its sister organizations for its support of the policies of the governing AKP.

[542] "ABF Başkanı Ali Balkız: Alevi Açılımı kof çıkmıştır," Radikal March 4, 2011.

the spiral model, in this period in Turkish state's commitment to regional norms took place the form of tactical concessions, which facilitated the mobilization and empowerment of the domestic Alevi interest groups. While the first term of the AKP rule was subjected to increasing pressures from the transnational and domestic actors, the second term was marked with cosmetic changes. As Hale and Özbudun note even though the good-will gestures of the AKP between 2007 and 2010 "was meaningful, it has not been followed by any concrete steps to meet the Alevi demands. Just as in the case of its stand on the Kurdish question, the AKP government seems to have opted for a 'politics of avoidance.'"[543]

5.5. Towards a Conclusion

Since AKP came to power in 2002 the relationship between the state institutions and the Alevi community has been tense. The preceding discussions show that the first term of the AKP rule was marked with domestic and international law suits, rising Alevi activism in Europe, and increasing pressures from the CoE and the EU for compliance with the conditions of the ratified treaties. Blocked and/or limited channels of participation and representation led both Alevi citizens and interest groups to seek alliances and international linkages to pressure the Turkish government to transform the existing institutional arrangements. This chapter shows a boomerang pattern of Alevi TANs emerged as a result of:

(i) the exclusion of the Alevi population by various governmental organizations in Turkey,

(ii) the emergence of the Alevi TANs as a result of the inclusive opportunity structures in Germany, and

(iii) the establishment of linkages with the European organizations that can persuade the Turkish state to adopt and internalize the norms on collective and religious rights.

Even though the Turkish state has little incentives to fully co-operate with the European organizations, the second term of the AKP rule involved a number of initiatives and projects to enhance a dialogue with the Alevi community in Turkey.

[543] Hale and Özbudun, *Islamism,Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey*, 79.

Neither the symbolic gestures of the high ranking AKP notables and the DİB bureaucrats nor the Alevi workshops organized can be explained as a direct product of EU accession process. Both the characteristics of the Alevi TANs and the Turkish political actors played a role in increasing the dialogue between the Turkish state and the Alevi community. However, since the Alevi networks have not been dense and strong, and the Alevi right-claims have been highly heterogenous, the capability of the Alevi TANs to alter policies and institutions has been limited.

The 2011 elections confirmed the third consecutive victory for the AKP, which got the 49 per cent of the total valid votes and the majority of the seats in the TBMM. The gestures of Erdoğan and AKP notables that dominated the 2007-20011 period, gradually replaced with new initiatives and policies promoting discrimination against Alevis. Among the three Alevi MPs of the previous term, only İbrahim Yiğit was nominated and elected in this period. In addition to the decline in representation of Alevis in AKP cadres, the emphasis on dialogue in the speeches of both Prime Minister Erdoğan and other key AKP figures underwent a decline. Lack of substantive reforms and policy-changes to improve the conditions of Alevis in Turkey along with the introduction of bans on commemorative festivities in Kahramanmaraş, Sivas, and Çorum increased in the tensions between the AKP and the Alevi interest groups (except World Ehl-i Beyt foundation and its sister organizations). The transnational Alevi interest groups continued to organize rallies to protest the policies and institutions of the AKP era.

Even though the pressures of the EU for democratic consolidation and internazliation of human rights, combined with the ECtHR judgements have shaped the scope and content of the reforms in Turkey, the substance and the implementation of the reforms have been limited. The absence of initiatives to comply with the decisions of the ECtHR cases fuelled new discussions both in the National Assembly, and in the media. While during both the ECtHR's rulings on the *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey*, and *Sinan Işık v. Turkey* cases the Turkish decision-makers stressed the need for change of the institutional arrangements, the proposed reforms have yet to create a more inclusive system. The ECtHR can only identify the violations of rights, rather than propose and push for substantial solutions. As a result, the reforms continue to act as a mechanism to justify the exclusionary rules and practices.

The practice of compulsory cources on religion and morals still prevails. Even though the need for inclusion of the Alevi faith in the textbooks was recognized by the government officials since the mid-200s, the coverage of the Alevi issues have been criticized by the Alevi activists and the interest groups since it created a new mechanism for assimilation of the religious identity of the Alevi community. Particularly the discussion the compulsory religion courses and the introduction of a new education policy, coined as "4+4+4 system", further antagonize the Alevi and AKP actors. The following chapter by focusing on the debates on Alevi religious education in Germany and Turkey discusses how different policy demands and domestic and transnational opportunity structures shape the decisions of the political actors.

CHAPTER 6

ALEVI ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN ACTION: THE STRUGGLE OVER RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

6.1. Introduction

The previous chapters provided information on the Alevi interest groups' role in both framing and communicating the community's right-claims. This final chapter analyzes their impact in transforming the states' policies through the study of policy debates over religious education in Turkey's public schools. Analysis of this case study will also help us understand the role of external actors and processes in shaping the policy outcomes. Following the TAN model outlined in chapters 3 and 5, this chapter discusses how different opportunity structures determine the impact of Alevi advocacy networks' activities in the absence of clear international and regional standards on religious education. To that end, the chapter first introduces the perspectives of the key international and regional institutions, namely UN, OSCE, CoE and EU, on religious education, and then focuses on the activities of the Alevi TANs around the issue of Alevi religious education at public schools in Germany and Turkey.

I have chosen Alevi religious education as the focus of this study because it is the only issue area in which the Alevi TANs played a role in changing state policies in both countries. The scope of the Alevi advocacy networks' impact varied in the two countries, providing two outcomes for analysis. In Germany, starting in the early 2000s, the issue of the right to Alevi religious education has became a matter of integration, leading to the German Alevi interest groups to retain the right to give religious instructions at public schools in various federal states. In Turkey, while the activities of Alevi TANs around the content of religious instruction were effective in putting

pressures on the Turkish government, the subsequent changes did not lead to favorable policy outcomes for the Alevi community.

6.2. International Perspective on Religious Education

Religious Education is as much an international political issue as it is a domestic one. International norms in the field of education compel states to act neutrally to protect the rights of citizens and non-citizens to the religious education of their choice. The norms on citizens' right to religious education emerged in the mid-1960s, starting with the *1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR). Article 18 of the Covenant recognized the right to religious education as a human rights issue but addressed the issue only in the context of a parental right to choose for their children.[544] It was not until the 1980s that the protection of the right to religious education was accorded to groups and communities. With the *Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief* (1981) the UN acknowledged that protection of individual rights was not sufficient to protect and maintain the rights of the religious communities and groups.[545]

In 1993 the UN Human Rights Committee in its *General Comment No. 22* concluded that "article 18.4 permits public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics if it is given in a neutral and objective way." The Committee stated that:

> The liberty of parents or legal guardians to ensure that their children receive a religious and moral education in conformity with their own convictions, set forth in article 18.4, is related to the guarantees of the freedom to teach a religion or belief stated in article 18.1.[546]

As long as the content of religious education was compatible with human rights commitments, religious instruction at public schools was deemed acceptable.

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[544] Section 4 of the Article 18 of the 1966 Covenant declares that: "the States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions." The original document is available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf.

[545] UN, *Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief* (1981), available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm.

[546] UN Human Rights Committee, 48th session, *General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought*, conscience and religion (Art. 18) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 1993, available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15.

The reports of Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, brought the significant variation in religious education policies to the attention of the UN. The reports submitted indicated that many states had compulsory religious instruction in the religion of the majority, and that minority religious communities and groups experienced difficulty in establishing their own religious institutions for religious practice and religious education.[547]

Within this context, the *Dakar Framework for Action* (2000) emphasized the role of schools in general and religious education in particular in the promotion of tolerance and understanding among religious communities.[548] The issue of religious intolerance and religious education, and the need to protect the rights of religious communities gained further significance in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001 in the US (hereafter 9/11). The *International Consultative Conference on School Education in Relation to Freedom of Religion or Belief, Tolerance and Non-Discrimination* on 23-25 November 2001 further highlighted the importance of designing an international educational strategy focusing on the right to freedom of religion and belief among students at the primary and the secondary educational levels.[549]

Another UN initiative co-sponsored by Spain and Turkey called the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) was introduced in 2005 to counter increasing religious and cultural intolerance. Like other UN bodies, the High Level Group of the UNAOC stressed the significance of educating citizens about their own religion and the religion of others.[550] Since its establishment, the member states of UNAOC seek to raise the consciousness of its citizens living at home and abroad on the issues of religious rights and religious tolerance.[551] For instance, the Turkish

[547] The annual reports on religious freedom and religious intolerance from 1987 to 2012 and sub-commission reports on the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities are available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/Annual.aspx.

[548] *The Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments* (Paris: UNESCO, 2000), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001211/121147e.pdf.

[549] For more information on the subject see UN General Assembly, *Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on human Rights on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief*, A/56/253, July 31, 2001 available at: http://www.oslocoalition.org/html/project_school_education/final_document_madrid.html.

[550] UNAOC, *Report on Education*, Second High Level Group Meeting e-report, 26-28 February 2006, available at: http://www.unaoc.org/repository/8183Second%20Meeting%20of%20High-level%20Group%20Report%20on%20Education.doc.pdf.

[551] It is important to note here that religious rights and religious education constitute only a minor portion of the issue areas the UNAOC deals with. Women rights, youth issues, and cultural exchanges constitute the majority of its concerns.

government (the co-chair of UNAOC High Level Group) has been (i) organizing conferences, seminars, workshops and panels on intra- and inter-religious dialogue, (ii) funding and organizing vocational training programs for religious leaders (*imam*s) who will be appointed abroad, and (iii) organizing and encouraging student exchanges at different educational levels.[552]

In addition to these UN initiatives, the EU, CoE, and OSCE have been instrumental since the 1990s in promoting religious education not only as a basic right, but also as a means to strengthen social cohesion and tolerance. In the case of Alevi religious education, these regional bodies played a significant role first by framing standards on rights of religious communities which, despite their problems, helped Alevi activists and interest groups legitimize their policy demands. Second, the European institutions provided new opportunity structures to influence the state policies in Germany and Turkey both directly and indirectly.

6.3. Regional Perspectives on Religious Education

While the relationship between education and human rights has been an area of concern for the key European institutions, religious education rarely received attention. There are very few regional legally-binding provisions in the field of right to religious education. Within this context, Article 2 of the CoE Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights provided the founding legal provision in dealing with the demands for religious education. Regardless of the model of state-religion relations within a country, the role of states in protection of the right to religious education was noted as:

> No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.[553]

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[552] For more information on Turkey's national strategy see T.C., *Alliance of Civilizations National Strategy*, (2006), available at: http://www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/Turkey-National-Strategy1.pdf, and T. C., *Medeniyetler İttifakı İkinci Ulusal Eylem Planı*, (2013), available at: http://www.medeniyetlerittifaki.org.tr/images/stories/trkiye%20kinci%20ulusal%20eylem%20plan.pdf

[553] Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No.: 009, opened for signature by the Member States on 20 March 1952, entered into force on 18 May 1954 available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/.

It is important to note here that the legal provisions framed by the CoE do not compel member states to provide a system of education in accord with parental beliefs. It only recognizes the rights of parents to object to the content and structure of the education given to their children and withdraw their children from such forms of education should they disagree with the content.

In addition to parental rights, minorities and religious communities' rights to religious education, and the responsibilities of the states were also addressed in the legal framework of the European institutions. Article 12 of the CoE's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) stated that:

1. The Parties shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields of education and research to foster knowledge of the culture, history and religion of their national minorities and of the majority.
2. In this context the Parties shall *inter alia* provide adequate opportunities for teacher training and access to textbooks, and facilitate contacts among students and teachers of different communities.
3. The Parties undertake to promote equal opportunities for access to education at all levels for persons belonging to national minorities.[554]

Governing religious diversity and protecting the rights of the individuals and the religious communities has been a concern for the CoE since the late 1990s. In addition to the introduction of legally binding provisions, the CoE was involved in initiatives to promote tolerance for different religious groups and encourage principles of non-discrimination. In 2002 the CoE began its first project, entitled "the challenge of intercultural education today: religious diversity and dialogue in Europe," to address the issues emerging in the education system due to increasing religious diversity in Europe. As Cesar Bîrzéa , the general rapporteur of the CoE meetings on education in the 1900s, notes, the aim of the project was "to construct an approach to intercultural learning that promotes dialogue, mutual understanding and living together."[555]

In 2003, experts in religious and intercultural education met in Paris to identify the key issues in relation to the religious dimension of intercultural education, and to assess the pedagogical implications of policy changes. The working group, including

[554] Council of Europe, *The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report*, H(1995)010. The original document is available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_AtGlance/PDF_H(1995)010_FCNM_ExplanReport_en.pdf.

[555] Cesar Bîrzéa, "Introduction," in *Religious diversity and intercultural education: a reference book for schools*, John Keast, ed. (Paris: Council of Europe Publishing, 2007), 11.

the members from Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands and the UK, recommended that regardless of the model of religious education in a particular state, inclusion of education in religious diversity in school curriculums was necessary to counter rising religious intolerance.[556] Following the 2004 Oslo Conference, the CoE organized another working group to prepare a guide for teachers, teacher trainers, administrators and policy makers to deal with the issue of religious diversity in schools.

In addition to working groups and conferences, annual meetings begun in 2000 further contributed to discussions of the role of religious institutions in both the promotion of human rights and addressing social and cultural issues in member states.[557] In the 2004 meeting in Malta, the participants proposed establishing a regional program for teaching religion, along with a new CoE body focusing on education and religion, i.e. European Center for Religious Education.

These recommendations laid the groundwork for the 2005 recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly. In *Recommendation 1720*, the Parliamentary Assembly argued that introduction of religion in the curriculum of the primary and secondary schools would be beneficial in countering religious intolerance and discrimination. To that end, the Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers should "encourage the governments of member states to ensure that religious studies are taught at the primary and secondary levels of state education."[558] The Assembly also warned that the structure and the content of religious education should (i) increase students' knowledge of their own and other groups' religious views, (ii) provide information on the history of the main religions, as well as on having no religion, (iii) provide an educational environment that protects students from religious radicalism, (iv) not breach the principle of non-assimilation and impose the values of a certain faith, (v) include specific vocational training compatible with previously mentioned criteria for the

[556] For more information on the CoE Project See Robert Jackson, *Rethinking Religious Education and Plurality: Issues in Diversity and Pedagogy*, (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004); Robert Jackson, "Is diversity Changing Religious Education? Religion, Diversity and Education in Today's Europe," in *Religious Diversity and Education: Nordic Perspectives*, ed. Geir Skeie, 11-28 (Müster: Wasmann, 2009).

[557] Jackson, "Is diversity Changing Religious Education?," 17-8.

[558] Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1720 (REC_1720), (2005), available at: http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta05/erec1720.htm

teachers of religion, and member states should supervise the training of teachers and preparation of syllabi.[559]

The seminar on religious tolerance and dialogue in Kazan, Russia, held in February 2006, continued to address the needs for establishing regional centers and formulating regional strategies for the teaching of religion. In May of 2006, the Committee of Ministers discussed the 2005 recommendations made by the Parliamentary Assembly. Although they recognized the importance of instruction of religion in education, the policy recommendations of the Assembly were incorporated into the existing cultural and educational policy areas of the CoE rather than put under the purview of specially-established bodies and projects for religious education.[560]

In the field of religious education, rather than 'faith-based education' the CoE bodies continued to emphasize 'education about religions and beliefs'. Whether or not a member state provides faith-based education in public schools was considered to be a domestic issue, and member states were left to choose their own model for faith-based education. As long as the structure and content of the education did not breach the rights of individuals and groups, the CoE bodies saw no reason to get involved in national education strategies.

In addition to promoting education on religion and beliefs, the CoE bodies also emphasized strengthening the dialogue between different religious groups as a necessary measure to counteracting increasing religious intolerance. To that end, in May 2008, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs formulated the *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: Living Together as Equals in Dignity* to draw attention to the importance of inter-faith dialogue.[561] The White Paper argued that:

> Not to engage in dialogue makes it easy to develop a stereotypical perception of the other, build up a climate of mutual suspicion, tension and anxiety, use minorities as scapegoats, and generally foster intolerance and discrimination.[562]

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[559] See Article 14 of the Recommendation 1720.

[560] Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, *Reply to Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1720 (2005)*, Doc. 10944, 31 May 2006, available at: http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=11244&Language=EN.

[561] Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs, *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: Living Together as Equals in Dignity*, (Strasburg, 7 May 2008), available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf

[562] Ibid., 16.

Analysis of this and other documents launched by the CoE bodies in the last two decades indicates that the aim of the CoE is not to achieve homogeneity across European education systems. Rather than development of a single education model, the emphasis has been on the necessity of developing projects involving the promotion and application of human rights principles to education issues to develop models for policy and practice that can be adopted by member states.

In contrast to CoE, OSCE mostly adopted a security-based approach in assuring the individual's right to appropriate religious education in the region. Even though they were not legally binding, the documents of the OSCE in the field of religious education of minorities and religious communities contributed to the framing of standards and improvement of the rights protection regimes of the European states. The 1990, the OSCE *Document on the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimensions of the Conference on the Security and Co-operation in Europe* articulated a number of points related to the rights of minorities. Among those, Article 32 of the Copenhagen Document addressed the rights of national minorities to religious education, stating that "persons belonging to national minorities...have a right…to profess and practice their religion, including the acquisition, possession and use of religious materials, and to conduct religious educational activities in their mother tongue."[563]

Since the breach of rights has been a source of conflict in the region, the OSCE treated the issue of minority religious education as a security concern and in 1992 established the post of High Commissioner of National Minorities (HCNM) to strengthen states' awareness of minority rights.[564] The initiatives of the HCNM were instrumental in the development of a number of non-legally binding provisions on the issue. The *Hague Recommendation*, published in 1996, contributed to the framing of standards for the education of minorities. Although the document did not specifically deal with the issue of religious education, it began to clarify the extent of states' responsibilities. The education rights of minorities were noted in the *Hague Recommendation* as:

[563] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)*, 1990, 19, available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304.

[564] Max van der Stoel, the Netherlands Minister of State, was appointed as the first High Commissioner in December 1992, but began operations in January 1993.

> The right of national minorities to establish and manage their own institutions, including educational ones, is well grounded in international law and must be recognized as such. Although the State has the right to oversee this process from an administrative perspective and in conformity with its own legislation, it must not prevent the enjoyment of this right by imposing unreasonable administrative requirements which might render it practically impossible for national minorities to establish their own educational institutions.
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> Although there is no formal obligation for States to fund these private establishments, these institutions should not be prevented from seeking resources from all domestic and international sources.[565]

The OSCE did not specifically deal with religious education until the aftermath of 9/11. Within the post-9/11 context, recommendations and guidelines framed in the field of education were treated as early-warning and conflict prevention mechanisms. Among these, the Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools (2007) is of particular significance as it provides a blueprint for the member states to enhance religious freedom through religious education policies.[566] The *Toledo Guiding Principles* provided broad suggestions for the member states to reform their education policies, stressing (i) the importance of religion as a cultural factor, (ii) the role of education about the freedom of belief, and (ii) the promotion of mutual respect and tolerance between members of different religions and denominations.[567]

According to the provisions of CoE and OSCE, the development of policies regarding the structure and content of education is the responsibility of the member states. Similarly, the regulation of religion and religion related issues are considered primarily a matter of domestic politics. In other words, the principle of subsidiary regulates the EU law. Within this context, EU institutions and officials rely on the existing international and regional provisions and recommendations in dealing with the issues on religion and education.[568]

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[565] Organization for Security amd Co-operation in Europe, *The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities, High Commissioner on National Minorities,* October 1, 1996 available at: http://www.osce.org/hcnm/32180?download=true.

[566] Olga Schihalejev, *From Indifference to Dialogue? Estonian Young People, the School and Religious Diversity,* (Münster: Waxmann, 2010), 195.

[567] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Toledo Guiding Principles about Religion and Beliefs in Public Schools,* (2007), available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/29154.

[568] See Norman Doe, *Law and Religion in Europe: A Comparative Introduction*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Articles 14 and 165 of the TFEU provide more insight into the attitude of the EU in the field of religious education. In Article 14 the EU acknowledges the parental rights of the individuals, and states that:

> The freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of their children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions shall be respected, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of such freedom and right. [569]

With Article 165 TFEU defines its role in the field of education in general and agrees to:

> contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.[570]

Even though the legal provisions of the EU has references to the protection of religious freedom and rights, the EU has yet to develop mechanisms for the protection of the rights of individuals, minorities, and religious communities in religious education. The Union mostly adopts a non-interventionist policy towards her members, particularly in the field of religion in general.[571] Particularly on issues concerning minorities, the EU does not take action unless the proposed action can be achieved by the individual member state. With regards to the protection of the right to religious education, the EU has more leverage on the candidate states: if the existing domestic institutional arrangements threaten the rights of individuals and/or groups in a candidate country, the EU can demand policy and institutional changes as part of the accession process.[572]

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[569] European Union, *Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, 13 December 2007, 2010/C 83/01, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML.

[570] Ibid.

[571] The rulings the Court of Justice provide a number of examples for the application of the principle of subsidiary. Examples include the rejection of the court to provide ruling on the morality of abortion, and failed attempt to make Sunday a Union wide weekly rest day. See Case C-159/90 *Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) v Grogan* [1991] ECR I-4685 & Case C-84/94 *United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union* [1996] ECR I-5755.

[572] For more information on the transformative power of the EU on domestic policy change see Keith Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, eds., *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Frank Schimmelfenning, and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds. *The Europeanization of Central and*

Increasing cultural and religious diversity in Europe over the last two decades has generated new problems in the implementation of norms of the right to religious education particularly. The right of migrants or third country nationals to religious education has become a problem in debates on integration and democratic citizenship in Europe. A European consensus has emerged on the need for strengthening the role of religious education in public school education to strengthen in turn the intercultural and interfaith dialogue within and between the members of the European community and third country nationals.[573] Particularly in the aftermath of 9/11 all three institutions began to focus more on the issues of religious education in Europe. To strengthen the dialogue between different religions and between denominations, each European institution organized a number of initiatives focused on the recognition of religious diversity and encouragement of religious tolerance, rather than the harmonization of policies regulating religious education. Even though the three European institutions acknowledged the right to faith-based education, none of them forced their member or candidate states to adopt a specific model for religious education. As a result, the reforms and transformations in the religious education policies are mostly a product of domestic concerns and needs. Unless, serious rights violations, or security concerns emerge, the regional organizations do not deal with the issues of religious education in legal terms.

6.4. Right to Religious Education: Teaching of Alevi Issues in Germany

The religious instruction in schools is guaranteed by Article 7 of the Basic Law and it is the responsibility of the federal states (*Länder*). Even though there are slight variations in the organization of religious education between different states in Germany, religious education is treated as "an "ordinary school subject" to be taught in accordance with the principles of the respective religious community.[574]" While the

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Eastern Europe, (Ithaca and London: Cornel University Press. 2005), and Tanja Börzel, "The Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded: The Limits of External Europeanization," *Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) Working Paper Series*, No. 11, (February 2010).

[573] See Hans Günter Heimbrock, Christoph Th. Scheilke and Peter Schreiner, "Introduction," in *Towards Religious Competence: Diversity as a Challenge for Education in Europe*, eds. Hans Günter Heimbrock *et al.*, 9-20, (Münster: LIT, 2001).

[574] Dan-Paul Jozsa, "Islam and Education in Europe, with special reference to Austria, England, France, Germany and the Netherlands," *in Religion and Education in Europe: Developments, Contexts and Debates*, eds. Jackson, et al. (Münster: Waxmann, 2007), 75.

states provide funding for structural issues (i.e. financing teachers, funding schools), religious communities determine the content and nature of religious education. The rights of the religious communities to decide the training of teachers, and content of the textbooks and the syllabi, are secured in the Basic Law. Article 140 clarifies the rights and duties of the religious communities with corporation of public law [KÖR – *Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*] status.[575] Due to the religious heritage of the country, only the Protestant and Catholic Churches were granted the right and duty to organize the content and scope of religious education in accordance with the values and principles of their denomination. As a result, groups with non-corporate status do not have the right to determine the instruments and content of religious education. The legal framework regulating religious education poses a challenge particularly for Islamic communities.[576] Since KÖR status requires the religious communities to adopt/have a hierarchical organizational structure, which can negotiate with the state on behalf of the religious community; Islam with no church-like structure lacks the means to fulfill the criteria.[577]

The previously discussed provisions about religious education had two significant effects on incorporation of Muslim communities into the education framework of the European states: (i) equality and non-discrimination principles emphasized in the documents strengthen the Muslim individual's right to religious education, and (ii) the role attributed to religious education in integration provide Muslim communities/individuals with new opportunity structures.[578] The challenge in the German case has been not 'if' but 'how' the federal states would incorporate religious education of the German Muslim migrant communities.

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[575] Gerdien Jonker "Muslim Emancipation? Germany's Struggle over Religious Pluralism," in *Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: the Position of Islam in European Union,* eds. Wasif A.R. Shadid, and Pieter Sjoerd van Koningveld, (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2011), 39.

[576] The 2009 report by the Federal Office for Migrants and Refugees has shown that the Muslims were constituting approximately 5 per cent of the total German population. The expressed percentage of the Muslims ranged from 4,6 per cent to 5,2 per cent. Among these the Alevis account for 13 per cent of the Muslim population; whereas Sunnis constituted the majority (74 per cent). See Sonja Haug, Stephanie Mussig, and Anja Stichs, *Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland: im Auftrag der Deutschen ISlam Konferenz*, (n.p.: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge publication, June 25, 2009).

[577] Margrete Søvik, "Islamic Instruction in German Public Schools: The Case of North-Rhine-Westphalia," in *Islam and Muslims in Germany*, eds. Ala Al-hamarneh, and Jörn hielmann, 241-266 (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

[578] Matthias Koenig, "Europeanising the Governance of Religious Diversity: An Institutionalist Account of Muslim Struggles for Public Recognition" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33, no. 6 (2007): 911-32.

By the late 1990s, after generations of labor-migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, the population of Germany has become manifold. Starting with the 1998 coalition between SDP and the Greens a lively debate on the organization of German society dominated the political and public debates: "was German society able to consider itself as multicultural society, or was it still to learn how to become of such a society first?"[579] In the 2000s, Europeanization of the citizenship and immigration regimes acted as catalysis for transformation of the policies on education. The citizenship reform of 2000 was the first step to transform the old citizenship regime of Germany based on the norms of *ius sanguinis.* The change in the Citizenship Act facilitated an increase in the number of naturalizations. The second important step was the introduction of the 2005 *Law for Managing and Containing Immigration and for the Regulation of the Residence and Integration of EU Citizens and Foreigners*, also known as Immigration Act [*Zuwanderungsgesetz*].[580] The most significant outcome of the Immigration Act was the start of integration courses of the new immigrants.[581] The new reforms also introduced new opportunity structures for the migrant communities to communicate their interests.

To facilitate the integration of the Muslim immigrants, and enhance the dialogue between the German and non-German residents, education system and policies had to be revised. The increasing demands of the Muslim communities and organizations put further pressures on the federal states. The more the faith-based migrant interest groups spread and organized, the more they sought ways to aggregate their interests to policies. Since the right to control religious education is shaped by the neo-corporatist interest group system of Germany, the policy demands and strategies of each religious group (Sunni, Shiite, or Alevi) involve competitive right-claims. Rosenow-Williams notes that "to facilitate their activities, Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany seek recognition both as official cooperation partners of the German government and as

[579] Thorsten Knauth, "Religious Education in Germany: a Contribution to Dialogue or Source of Conflict? Historical and Contextual Analysis of the Development since the 1960s," *in Religion and Education in Europe*, Jackson, et al. 243-66

[580] Kerstin Rosenow-Williams, *Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam in Germany: New Developments in the 21st Century*, (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

[581] It is important to note here that the scope of the Act was limited, since it did not involve clauses for the 'old' minority groups. The focus of the integration classes were mostly remained on language and "culture" of Germany.

religious communities or corporations of public law (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*)."[582]

Since the late 1990s, the courts played a significant role in institutionalization of both orthodox and heterodox interpretations of Islam in the German states. By the mid-2000s, a number of court cases were communicated on the issue of religious education by the Muslim umbrella organizations. In Berlin, the integration projects were launched under the slogan "Promote diversity; Strengthen Cohesion", [*Vielfalt fördern; Zusammenhalt stärken*].[583] The emphasis on diversity made the experience of the Muslim immigrant communities was significantly different than the other German states.

The ruling of the case submitted by the Islamic Federation of Berlin [IFB – *Islamische Föderation in Berlin*] on religious education set the case law on integration of Muslim/Islamic communities into the Berlin's religious education framework.[584] Following the example of IFB in March 2002 Culture Center of the Anatolian Alevis [AAKM – *Anadolu Alevileri Kültür Merkezi*][585] submitted an application, and in April 2002 was granted permission to organize Alevi classes in public primary schools. [586] Since the right to teach is intertwined with acquisition of KÖR status, the decision of the Berlin court was significant for recognizing Alevism as a genuine religion. Starting with the 2002-2003 academic year, AAKM became responsible for Alevi religious education in Berlin.[587]

In North Rhine-Westphalia, the Alevi interest groups followed a different path to acquire right to organize Alevi religious courses. The Federal Court, while rejected the demands of the Council of Islam and Central Center of Muslims, granted AABF the right to organize classes. As a result, not only Alevism was recognized as a separate

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[582] Rosenow-Williams, *Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam,* 55.

[583] See Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, "*Vielfalt fördern; Zusammenhalt stärken: Das Berliner Integrationskonzept* - Handlungsfelder, *Ziele, Leitprojekte,"* printed paper 16/0715, July 3, 2007.

[584] "Allah an der Tafel," *Die Zeit*, June 9, 2004.

[585] The organization is later renamed as Berlin Alevi Society Cem House [*Berlin Alevi Toplumu Cemevi*]

[586] Jozsa, *Islam and Education in Europe*, 77.

[587] AAKM guidelines for the organization and content of the religion courses state that the students receive separate certificates/reports for the Alevi religious courses. The grades students are given grades, these do not affect whether or not the student passes a grade level. For more information on the subject see Berlin Alevi Toplumu Cemevi, *Berlin İlkokullarında Alevilik Dersleri*, 2001, available at: http://www.alevi.org/images/aru/ARU_Flyer_17112011.pdf?phpMyAdmin=wjZ3oP7TwJyroJWxwR2BcMefub6.

entity, but also unlike their Muslim counterparts, the AABF was granted a *de facto* religious corporation status.[588]

In Hamburg, the Alevi initiatives for religious education followed a different path. The control of the organization of the religious education in public schools was entirely left to the Protestant Church. Since, Catholics had private denominational schools and there were no other 'legally recognized religious communities'[589] the Alevi organizations established alliances with the Protestant Church. In the late 1990s, a project by the Protestant Church, aiming to enhance cooperation and dialogue between different religions, enabled introduction of Alevism into the school curriculum. Through the "Round Table for Interfaith Religious Classes" project, Alevism became part of the curriculum first in primary schools in 1998 and then in secondary schools in 2003.[590]

The most important development that secured the rights of the Alevi community in Hamburg was the signing and ratification of a contract between the Alevi religious community and the Hamburg Senate in August 15, 2012. With this unique contract, the Hamburg senate (i) recognized AABF as the official representative of the Alevi community in Hamburg, (ii) recognized Alevism as a separate denomination, and (iii) guaranteed faith-based rights of Alevis. The 11 page document declared the mutual rights and responsibilities of the AABF and the City of Hamburg. Hüseyin Mat, the current Chair of ABBF highlighted the significance of the document in his speech during the signature ceremony as:

> While Alevism and 800 000 Alevis are recognized by our new homeland, the 20 million Alevi residing in Turkey not only lack religious or minority rights, but also assimilated
>
> In Germany our *cem* houses are acknowledged as places of worship and officially recognized; whereas, the Turkish Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdoğan considers our cem houses as monstrosities.
>
> While our religious holidays are recognized in Germany, the state of Republic of Turkey does not recognize any of our holidays or sacred days.[591]

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[588] Sökefeld, *Struggling for recognition*; Søvik, "Islamic Instruction in German Public Schools"

[589] Folkert Doedens, and Wolfram Weisse "Religion underrichten in Hamburg," *Theo-Web. Zeitschrift für Religionspädagogik* 6, no. 1 (2007): 50-67; Folkert Doedens, and Wolfram Weisse, eds. *Religionsunterricht für alle. Hamburger Perspektiven zur Religionsdidaktik* (New York/München/Berlin: Waxmann, 1997), and Knauth, "Religious Education in Germany"

[590] Sökefeld, *Struggling for recognition* ,191

[591] AABF "AABF ile Hamburg Eyaleti arasında imzalanan 'Devlet Anlaşması' Aleviler açısından tarihi bir dönüm noktasıdır," press release November 14, 2012, available at http://alevi.com/TR/aabf-ile-hamburg-eyaleti-arasinda-imzalanan-%E2%80%9Edevlet-anlasmasi-aleviler-acisindan-tarihi-bir-donum-noktasidir/

The success of AABF in transformation of the policies on religious education,[592] and the increasing recognition of the German Alevis as a unique religious community in different states also had impact on the strategies and content of the right-claims of the domestic Alevi interest groups in Turkey.

6.5. The Right to Alevi Religious Education in Turkey: The Impact of European Actors

The education in general is highly centralized in Turkey. Unlike the case in Germany, the religious education in Turkey is organized and monitoted by the state institutions. The Constitutions, laws regulation education and instructions, government programmes, development plans and the National Education Councils shape the structure and the content of education in the schools.

In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the state began to re-emphasize the role of religion and the significance of religious educaion to secure the course of secularism, and to strengthen the bonds among the citizens through 'correct' instruction of religion (Islam). To that end, the new government introduced compulsory courses on religion and morals. Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution declared that "education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under the State supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools."[593]

Except the children of the minorities identified in the Laussane Treaty all students were expeced to attend the courses on religion and morals. However, since the aim of the law was to control and 'correct' the information flow on Islam for security reasons, the content of the curricula and the text-books include information only about the Sunni interpretations of Islam with little references to other world religions. Even after the re-transition to democracy, the organization and the content of these courses continued to be biased.

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[592] AABF through various initiatives secured the right to organize Alevi religion courses in 7 states. The total number of students attending to Alevi religion courses is around 1.200 as of 2013. See AABF "Internet Üzerinden Alevilik Dersleri (ARU) için Başvuru Bilgileri," press release February 25, 2013, available at http://alevi.com/TR/internet-uzerinden-alevilik-dersleri-aru-icin-basvuru-bilgileri/

[593] *Constitution of the Republic of Turkey as amended on October 17, 2001*, available at http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURKEY.pdf

Consequently, the compulsory nature of the courses on religion and morals has become one of the major concerns of the Alevi rights movement in Turkey. Starting with the 1990 Alevi declaration, the Alevi intellectuals and interest groups began to emphaze the need for a revision in Article 24 of the *1982 Constitution*. Even though some revisions were made in the text-books in 2001 to include some of the prominent figures of the Alevi faith, they were labeled as cosmetic changes.[594]

The more the domestic administrative courts declined the lawsuits of the Alevi citizens on the issue, the more ECtHR emerged as a new legal opportunity structure to justify the demands of the Alevi community, and put pressure on the Turkish state. The *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey* case in the ECtHR and the following law suits communicated to the local court in 2008 led to increasing pressures on government for policy-change on religious education. Following the Alevi rapprochement project of AKP, instruction of Alevi faith and practices became a part of the curriculum in 2011. The status and the content of religion education continued to be criticized by the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups following the introduction of the new education reform in 2012. Through an analysis of the interaction between the EU, ECtHR, Turkish State, Alevi community in Turkey and the transnational Alevi organizations in Europe, the sections below focus on these said events, and elaborate the multi-layered mechanism of impact.

6.5.1. ECtHR-ization of the Individual Citizen Action

Turkey's membership to CoE provided new opportunity structures for the individuals belonging to minorities to communicate violations of their rights in Turkey to European institutions, and seek leverage in transforming domestic practices through cases brought to the ECtHR. Most frequent cases brought to the attention of the court by the Alevi citizens are on the violations on Article *9* of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The pioneering case on the issue of religious education was the *Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey* case,[595] which set the case-law.

[594] Only the 9th grade text-books were including the revisions.

[595] *ECtHR, Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey* (no. 1448/04), October 9, 2007 available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-82580#{"itemid":["001-82580"]}.

In the law suit, Hasan Zengin accused Turkey for violating his parental rights on his daughter's education. The state representatives in their defense highlighted the "unbiased" nature of Turkish education, and claimed that the syllabus "did not take into consideration the vision of members of *mezhep* [a branch of Islam] or *tarikat* [a religious order] represented in the country." After the assessment of the case, ECtHR acknowledged that although 9th grade text book included some information on Alevi religious figures, the overall content of the text-books and the curriculum was insufficient to address the demands of Zengin. Additionally, the compulsory nature of the religious education was a further violation point. The ECHR ruled that "the exemption procedure is not an appropriate method and does not provide sufficient protection" since it required citizens to declare their religious affiliation.[596]

The decision was celebrated by both the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups. Even though the Turkish state did not comply with the ruling, non-compliance shape the course of the public and international debate on Alevi minority rights. The case also found its way to the EU's challenge on minority regime in Turkey. Starting from 2004 the development and outcomes of the case were used by the commission both to determine the problems, and monitor the particular issues regarding the protection of the rights of the Alevi community. The Commission reports monitored the progress of the case between 2004 and 2007, and continued to bring the non-compliance of the Turkish state to the court judgment.

6.5.2. Transnational and Domestic Linkages on the Issue of Religious Education

The ECtHR trial paved the way for emergence of a number of joint activities between the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups. The ABF and its sister organizations campaigned during the trial period both to attract the attention of the media to the ECtHR trial and raise consciousness on the issue. Since Kazım Genç, the legal representative of Hasan Zengin, was also an Alevi activist from PSAKD there was credible information flow on the progress of the case between organizations.

The progress of the case was also monitored by the CHP MPs in the TBMM. By framing questions on the issue the MPs tried to keep the issue of religious education on

[596] Ibid

the agenda. In this early period, the AKP officials did not consider the law suit as an issue. In response to Ali Rıza Gülçiçek's questions on religious education, Hussein Çelik, the Minister of Education, legitimized the position of the government on the issue as: "in accordance to our state's programme for alignment with the *aquis*, our Ministry is organizing education initiatives, and with respect to alignment with the *aquis* there is no problem with the content and structure of the Religious Culture and Ethics Knowledge courses."[597]

In 2005 to put more pressure on Turkish government ABF submitted a petition to EU Parliament including 1 million signatures asking for dissolution of compulsory religion courses in Turkey. The three major federations ABF, AVF and ADF also lobbied to include the Alevi demands and issues in the 2005 progress report. In this period, foundations of another lawsuit were laid by CEM Foundation, who sought a revision in the content of the religious education rather than its structure. On June 22, 2005, 14 applicants submitted a petition to the Ministry of National Education, demanding a revision in the content of religion education. The applicants demanded revisions in the curriculum in accordance to a consultation with officials of the Alevi faith, and asked Alevi culture and philosophy to be incorporated into the program. The applicants also called for revisions in the training of teachers of religious education. In its response, the Ministry emphasized the "supra-confessional approach" of the curriculum preparation process and declined the request. Following the response letter of the Ministry, a class-action suit was filed in the same year. After exhausting all domestic options, the case was introduced to ECtHR on February 2, 2011 and communicated on October 26, 2012.[598] Like the *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey* case the Turkish state is accused of violation of the Articles 9 and 14 and Protocol 1.2 of the ECHR.

The announcement of the judgment of the *Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey* case in 2007, led to a change in the way the law was interpreted in the local courts. While some courts continued to refuse to exempt students, others ruled in favor of the

[597] *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 50, session 94, (May 27, 2004), 500

[598] The case is still pending. During the interview with Hıdır Akbayır on October 10, 2012, I was informed the case was about to be communicated to the government and the court was waiting for the 'defense' of the Republic of Turkey on the issue. See also ECtHR , *Sofuoğlu and others v Turkey*, (application no. 21163/11) (October 26, 2012) available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"appno":["21163/11"],"itemid":["001-114805"]}.

applicants.[599] In March 2008, the Council of State issued a ruling aligning itself with the judgment of the ECtHR ruling in 2007.[600] Even though the Turkish state did not comply with the ruling, non-compliance shaped the course of the public and international debate on Alevi minority rights. The case also found its way to the EU's challenge on minority regime in Turkey. Starting from 2004 the development and outcomes of the case were used by the commission both to determine the problems, and monitor the particular issues regarding the protection of the rights of the Alevi community. The Commission reports monitor the progress of the case between 2004 and 2007, and continue to bring the non-compliance of the Turkish state to the court judgment.

6.5.3. AKP and the Reforms in the field of Religious Education

Increasing pressures from below, external pressures from the EU and the ECtHR, accompanied with increasingly lenient attitude of post-Islamist intellectuals emerged as a catalyst for the incumbent government to officially recognize 'Alevi situation' as a problem in 2007. In this period AKP promoted organization and maintenance of a dialogue between different state institutions, political parties, bureaucrats and (Alevi and non-Alevi) artists, civil society organizations, interest groups and academics to discuss the problems of the Alevi community in Turkey.

As previously discussed in chapter 5, the workshops particularly problematized (i) the demand for a definition for the community; hence determining its boundaries, (ii) the status of the *cem* houses, (iii) the status and organization of DİB, (iv) the status and content of the compulsory lessons in religious culture and ethics, (v) along with the status of *dede*s as religious leaders, and (vi) *de facto* and *de jure* discrimination of Alevi citizens in the public and state-owned institutions. Other issues, such as the status of *Madimak Hotel* as the symbol of violent discrimination against the Alevi community were discussed. The workshops were designed to facilitate to communicate the concerns, perceptions and recommendations of the domestic Alevi organizations to the state officials.

[599] Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 158.

[600] "Din dersi hukuka aykırı,"*Hürriyet*, March 4, 2008

The first workshop (June 3-4, 2009) was significant for identifying the variation among the Alevi actors on religious education. Even though each group emphasized the need for equal citizenship rights in their speeches, the interpretation of "equality" differedt significantly among the Alevi actors. While the groups with competitive claims asked transformation in the content of the religious education, the groups with reactive and proactive claims focused on the structure of the religious education in Turkey. In other words, while the former groups has stressed on the principles of non-discrimination, the latter has drawn the attention of the government to the principles of non-assimilation.

For instance, the representatives from CEM foundation, demanded neutrality in the content of the religious education text-books; and asked the government to conduct extensive revisions in the content of the curriculum. Fermani Altun, the chair of World Ehl-i Bayt Foundation, in his speeches emphasized the significance of faith-based knowledge, and inter-faith dialogue, and suggested that: "distorted, misrepresented knowledge on beliefs is a danger to humanity."[601] The representatives from ABF and ADF put emphasis on the on-compliance of Turkey with the decisions of the international courts and called for a change in the structure of religious education, rather than it's content. Tekin Özdil, the Chair of HBVAKT, emphasized the need for a policy change on the issue of compulsory religious education.[602]

The experience of Alevis in Germany particularly shaped the debate on reorganization of courses on religion.[603] The participants of the third workshop (August 19, 2009) also tried to propose solutions to the problem. By drawing lessons from the German experience the representatives called for a solution within the existing legal framework. The main discussion revolved around the content of the courses rather than their structure.[604] However, as the final report indicates, the workshops did not generate a consensus on the issue of religious education.

In response to the criticisms on the content of religious education text-books, the Ministry of education prepared new textbooks to be used in the 2011-2012 school year. Starting from the 4th grade books, the new material introduced concept and issues

[601] T.C. Devlet Bakanlığı, *1. Alevi Çalıştayı*, (Ankara, January 3-4, 2009), 70.

[602] Ibid, 95.

[603] Ibid, 32, 163

[604] Ibid. 64, 66-8 & 150

related to Alevi faith. Detailed accounts of Alevism were a subject of the books from 7th to 12th grade. However, in the new text-books Alevism was defined as a 'way of thought,' rather than a religion or a sect. The chapters on Alevism were placed under the "Sufi interpretations within Islam" section of the books.

Additionally, in the text-books an Alevi is defined as: "a person, who loves, respects and follows St. Ali." The definition also emphasized the intertwined nature of Islam and Alevism and claimed "Alevis are Muslims who believe the unity of God; accept Muhammed as the last prophet; accept Quran as the holly book and love Prophed Muhammed and his Ahl al-Bayt." The extension of the concept of Alevi and Alevism is so broad that it echoes the words of prime minster Erdoğan "If Alevism is the love of Ali, we all see ourselves as devoted Alevis."[605]

While the inclusion of other interpretations of Islam, i.e. Alevism, Caferism, Bektashim, into the textbooks could be taken as an indicator of increasing religious pluralism in religious education, the on-going emphasis on the Sunni interpretations of Islam made the revision initiatives of the AKP government nothing more that cosmetic changes. The content of the textbooks and curriculum in this period continued to be dominated by "education *of* a religion" rather "education *about* religions".[606]

On September 2011, the new initiatives on education were introduced with the legislative decree no. 625. The new education reform, popularly known as the "4+4+4 system", introduced new elective courses in the field of religious education. The absence of changes in the organization and content of the compulsory courses, the ambiguity in the criteria for selection of the new religious elective courses drew heavy criticisms in both TBMM and media. The Alevi interest groups feared the new electives would become *de facto* compulsory courses. In its criticism of the new education reform, ERG [Education Reform Initiative] highlighted the significance of making a differentiation between elective courses and courses given upon request. ERG argued that since the former is more binding than the latter (i.e. has an effect on passing a grade

[605] Ruşen Çakır, and Fehmi Çalmuk, *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Bir Dönüşüm Öyküsü*, (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001), 229–30.

[606] Education Reform Initiative's report on the 2011 policies and practices on education also highlighted the limited scope of revisions in the textbooks of the 2011-2012 academic year and claimed that the changes involved limited number of additions and re-editing of few sub-chapters in the books. See ERG, *Eğitim İzleme Raporu 2011,* (Istanbul: Sabanci University, 2012), 108-10.

level), introduction of new religion courses cannot secure the religious freedoms and rights of both parents and the students.[607]

The 2012 – 2013 academic year was marked with a number of interest group activism. In addition to the organization of rallies to protest the AKP policies, the Alevi interest groups by preparing reports on the new forms discrimination towards Alevis in the implementation of the 4+4+4 reform policies. Domestic interest groups collect testimonies of "forced election" of courses on Qur'an and the life of Prophet Muhammad. The reports prepared by the Alevi interest groups, by combining testimonial information with statistical information, tried to legitimize the concerns of the Alevi activists and raise consciousness of the media and the public. [608]

6.6. Conclusion

The preceding analysis indicates that there are no universal standards on religious education, and the European jurispuridance only deals with the right to religious education as part of the human rights. Despite the emphasis on the significance of the role of education on religionby the three European institutions, i.e. EU, CoE and OSCE, no regulations were introduced to standardize the right to religious education or religious freedoms in the states of the European Community. The link between religion and education is considered as a means to enchance the co-operation and dialogue between the religious communities. However, neither organization seeks to harmonize the content or the structure of the religious education.

Among the three European intergovernmental organizations, the CoE through ECHR and ECtHR provides mechanisms to supervise and pressure the member states to compy with the requirements of the treaties they ratified. Despite the legal leverage the CoE has, the power of the organization to transform the institutions and the policies in member states is limited. Nonetheless, the limited leverage of the ECtHR can be

[607] Ibid.

[608] The latest report prepared by ABF member Hubyar Sultan Alevi Culture Association [HSAKD – *Hubyar Sultan Alevi Kültür Derneği*] indicates in the 2012-2013 education year Alevi children were forced to select courses on religion. Accordingly, in some region the parents were threatened and told their children would be unsubscribed from school records in case of non-selection. Sections of the document can be found in Evrensel newspaper dated 31 January 2013, where the chair of HSAKD is also a writer. See Hubyar Sultan Alevi Kültür Derneği 2012 Hak İhlalleri İzleme Raporu, HSAKD press release, 30.01.2013 available at http://www.evrensel.net/news.php?id=47689

expanded through the EU accession process. The more the incentives to comply with the European norms on rights increase – i.e. the more the likelihood of membership to EU increases – the more the likelihood of the candidate states to amend and transform the institutional restrains expected to increase. However, the non-compliance of Turkey still reflects the limits of protection rights regimes in Europe.

In Turkey, the struggle on Alevi religious education led to emergence of several boomerang patterns. The *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey* case and increasing cooperation between ABF and AABF in transnational space were influential in attracting the attention of key European actors to the conditions of Alevis in Turkey. While the EU monitored the relationship between the Turkish state and the Alevi community through progress reports, the CoE put pressures on the Turkish government through the legally-binding rulings of the ECtHR. However, the absence of strict European standards to regulate states' behavior on religious education, provided room for the Turkish political actors to introduce enough reforms to counter the increasing international criticisms without making significant alterations to the existing structures. Additionally, the fragmentation within the Alevi demands for rights further provided room for the government to legitimize its tactical concessions on the subject matter.

The concessions introduced by the AKP government starting with 2007 accompanied by introduction of new mechanisms of exclusion and discrimination. The most recent '4+4+4' reform, while met the demands of Islamic revivalists by increasing the opportunities in instruction of religion, created new problems for the Alevi community. Both the groups seeking exemption from religious courses, and groups demanding transformation of religious education into education *about* religion have mobilized since 2012 to alert the media and the international actors.

In contrast, the German case depicts a successful inclusion/integration story. The absence of structures and policies blocking the access of the Alevi interest groups to the decision-making processes enabled the Alevi community in Germany to better communicate and aggregate its interests. In Germany, the transnational networks only had an indirect affect in Alevi organizations struggle for rights. The increasing emphasis on the significance of integration, along with the increasing improvements in the conditions of the migrants, enabled the German Alevi interest groups to better communicate and aggregate the Alevi demands. Since the conditions of the right to control/organize religious education differed in each state's legal framework, the speed

and manner of inclusion of Alevism varied in each German state. However, the most significant outcome of this process has been the gradual transformation of the AABF into a central and national level organization.

There are currently, 1,200 students enrolled in courses on Alevi religion, and the organization of the course is determined based on the legal framework of the German state [Länder]. The organization of the lectures, the preparation of the content of the text books, the enrollment procedures, and the education of the instructors are determined by the German states' legal frameworks. In this process, the right to Alevi religious education not only seen as a parental right, but also is considered as an individual right. The consent of the parents is only a requirement for the students younger than 14. Any student who is older than 14 and wants to enroll in the classes can do so by filling out a consent form granting AABF the right to organize a class on Alevism in his/her school.

The difference between the experiences of the German and Turkish Alevis shows that the emergence and the success of the 'boomerang patterns' depand primarily on the domestic institutional arrangements, and the leverage the intergovernmental organizations can exercise. Since neither the EU nor the CoE can force Turkey to adopt and implement policies to protect the rights of individuals and groups, the diffusion of the norms on rights remains shallow. Nonetheless, the Alevi TANs were successful in increasing the visibility of the community, and raising the consciousness of the public on Alevi issues. The networks established by the Alevi citizens and the Alevi interest groups (i) carry and re-frame the demands, and needs of the Alevi community on religious education, (ii) seek to insert the framed right-claims into the policy debates, and (iii) pressure for the transformation of the existing education policies from below.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has sought to provide a deeper insight on the inclusion of religious minorities into the political processes, by focusing on the specific case of Alevis in Turkey. What makes the Alevis such a fascinating case is their idiosyncrasy. They are geographically dispersed within and across borders, and linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous. More importantly, they possess divergent resources, motivations and opportunities to articulate and aggregate their interests.

To understand the dynamics of the political inclusion of the Alevis, the preceding chapters have provided discussions on (i) the dilemmas of the international and regional rights regimes in framing standards on rights of the individuals and groups, and the duties of the states, (ii) the role of opportunity structures in facilitating the emergence, organization and transformation of interest groups, (iii) the links between the identity and interests of Alevis, (iv) the relationship between the domestic and transnational the Alevi interest groups, (v) the limits of formal representative institutions in communication of the Alevi interests, and (vi) the impact of the transnational the Alevi advocacy networks on transforming domestic policies.

To that end, Chapter 1 focused on the Alevi question in Turkey and questioned the status of Alevis as a minority. Since recognition as a minority provides special measures to protect and preserve cultural identity. Over the analysis of the international and regional norms, it has thus been explained that the individualist bias in the human rights regimes and the ambiguity in regional and international minority rights pose a challenge to guarantee recognition and protection of rights of marginalized groups. The absence of clear and universal definition of minority enabled states to have the final say in their dealings with ethnic, religious, racial and linguistic groups. This, in turn has caused the non-recognition of the Alevis particularly in the context of Turkey.

Based on these observations, the remaining chapters focused on the actors and strategies of Alevi struggle for recognition of their identity and the channels they use to communicate and aggregate their identity-based interests. Since the analysis is based on the assumption that the Alevi community cannot rely on the Turkish state to establish representative bodies (i.e. there are no quotas or other affirmative action policies), this dissertation:

(i) clarified the link between identity and interests of Alevis, to understand how the heterogeneous and fragmented collective identity of Alevis shape formulation and aggregation of shared interests.

(ii) questioned the legitimacy of those who represent Alevis in public life (i.e. political parties, civil society organizations or international organizations), as most Alevi representative actors are self-appointed;

(iii) argued that the representation of Alevis can only be understood by examining both the domestic and transnational political contexts.

(iv) concluded that the transnational actors have limited impact in enhancing and maintaining domestic change.

The discussions on Germany and Turkey have shown that the opportunity structures have played a constitutive role in the emergence and transformation of right-seeking Alevi interest groups. In Germany the institutional frameworks encouraged framing of Alevi identity as a heterogeneous religious identity; and provided channels for Alevi groups to communicate their interests at the local and regional (*Länder*) levels. Particularly, neo-corporatism of Germany and the reforms in citizenship and immigrant regimes in the late 1990s enabled Alevi interest groups to transform themselves into 'religious corporations' from cultural associations. Since their founding in the late 1970s, the content and the scope of the German Alevi interest groups adapt to the social and political conditions of their host country. The gradual unification of various local and regional Alevi networks and organizations under AABF, and the acknowledgement of the organization as the representative of the Alevi congregation in Hamburg in 2012 are directly related to the institutional design in Germany.

In contrast, the Turkish institutional frameworks and opportunity structures discouraged the organization and unification of the Alevi organizations at the national or local levels. Additionally, the social, economic and political transformations in the country led to emergence of different Alevism interpretations, which in turn pave the

way for the development of a fragmented and heterogeneous Alevi associational life. The limited representation of the Alevi interests in TBMM and the absence of mechanisms facilitating direct access to the decision making processes, encouraged Alevi interest groups to seek allies either to coerce the Turkish state for policy and institutional change, or enhance dialogues so that they would receive incentives similar to those of their Sunni counterparts. However, the multiple and opposing demands of the Turkish Alevi interest groups reduce the likelihood of domestic policy change in favor of the Alevis. Unlike the German Alevi interest groups, the groups in Turkey have to compete with each other for support and resources.

The discussion on the strategies of the Alevi interest groups on the issue of Alevi religious education also provides insights on how the non-discrimination and equality principles could be used by a state to enhance the exclusion and assimilation of a marginalized group. Even though regional and international rights regimes recognize the right to religious education, it does not consider it as a collective right. Additionally, non-discrimination and equality tenets determine the content and scope of these standards. As a result, when incorporated into policies the notion of non-discrimination does not guarantee non-assimilation. Instead it implies 'equal treatment/opportunity', which can maintain, or strengthen *de facto* inequalities and discrimination in a country. In the Turkish case, the emphasis on undifferentiated citizenship and a general policy of equality leads all education reforms to be exclusionary. Both the compulsory courses on religious culture and ethics and the new elective courses introduced with the 4+4+4 reform are compatible with an overall strategy of equality, but not of non-assimilation.

The equality principle that dominates the regional and international provisions, can impede, rather than promote, adoption of institutions and policies compatible with rights regimes. While both the ruling of the ECtHR, and the EU progress reports monitoring the adoption and implementation of the European standards put pressures on the Turkish government for change, they do not guarantee (positive) rule adoption and implementation. Even though the ECtHR acknowledged the religious education in Turkey did not meet the criteria of objectivity and pluralism, the ruling of the *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v.Turkey* case only recognized the violations in parental rights. As result, while reform in religious education was expected and desired, the content and manner of change was left to Turkey's political actors. Similarly, while EU progress reports drew attention to the non-compliance of the Turkish state with the Court's

ruling, they did not call for specific policies. In other words, both organizations recognize the organization and instruction of religious courses as a domestic issue.

The ongoing stalemate in the state-Alevi relations in Turkey, the increasing success of Alevi interest groups to aggregate Alevi interests in Germany, and growing successful initiatives to integrate Alevis to social and political institutions in the European societies, call for further research on both on the representation of Alevi interests, and the implementation and internalization of norms on individual and collective rights.

This dissertation only dealt with the issues of the urban Alevis who are more visible, but also heterogenous in their policy demands, and focused on the nationwide activities. Whether or not the actors and strategies of the representation of the Alevis at the local level change needs further attention. To what extent the branches of the umbrella organizations in small towns and cities reflect the demands and preferences of their headquarters require clarification. Additionally, during the fieldwork period some Alevi activists implied that the relationship between the Alevis and the political parties at the local level did not always mirror their relationship at the national level. Instead, on occasion some dialogue and co-operation between the Alevi interest groups and the municipalities of AKP (or MHP) can be detected.

The heterogeneity of Alevi identity across Europe demands further research to understand the role and significance of networks in transforming domestic policies. The representation and participation dynamics of each state determines the legitimate actors and strategies in the Alevi struggle for rights. Therefore, the following questions need to be considered to have a deeper understanding of the transnational impact: To what extend the increasing rights granted to the Alevi communities in Europe can be attributed to the success of transnational networks, rather than domestic and legal frameworks? Can cooperation between different Alevi organizations be continued if each group in its host country frames the Alevi issues from a different perspective? Can the alliance between the AABF and ABF – who emphasized the cultural dimensions of Alevism more than religious – be maintained if AABF transforms itself into a Church-like entity by acquiring KÖR status at the national level?

APPENDIX 1

THE "PROTECTION OF MINORITIES" IN THE *TREATY OF LAUSANNE* (JUNE 24, 1923)

Article 37

Turkey undertakes that the stipulation's contained in Article 38 to 44 shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulation's, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them.

Article 38

The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.

Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order.

Article 39

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems.

All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political

rights, as, for instance, admission to public employment's, functions and honours, or the exarchate of professions and industries.

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.

Article 40

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

Article 41

As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned.

Article 42

The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.

These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are granted to other private institutions of that nature.

Article 43

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religions observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.

This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order.

Article 44

Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of

international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, he referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

Article 45

The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory

APPENDIX 2

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Name[609]	Place / Date	Position/Significance
Necdet Subaşı	Ankara, DİB / 18.1.2013	Organizer of Alevi Workshops & the current head of Strategy Development Unit in DİB
H. B.	Ankara / n.d. 11. 2012	CHP Alevi activist / TBMM undersecretary from
Z. E.	Istanbul / 10.12.2012	CHP and Alevi activist
H.A.	Istanbul / 10.12.2012	CHP and Alevi activist / Kurdish origin
Ş. K.	Ankara / 8.11.2012	CHP and Alevi activist / member of Tokat business and cultural associations
D. Ş.	Ankara / 8.11.2012	CHP and Alevi activist/ member of Kars Democratic Associations Federation [*Kars Demokrat Dernekler Federasyonu*]
Z. G.	Ankara / n.d. 11. 2012	CHP and Alevi Activist
K.K.	Ankara / 8.11.2012	CHP, non-Alevi
V.O.Ç	Ankara / 8.11.2012	CHP, non-Alevi
E. Ç.	Ankara /n.d. 11.2012	CHP activist
Hıdır Akbayır	Istanbul / 10.10.2012	Alevi activist/CEM
A. Y.	Istanbul / 10.10.2012	Alevi activist/AİDHB

[609] The list includes only those signed a consent form during my fieldwork. For ethical reasons the names of the interviewees from my earlier fieldwork in 2005-2007, and from the off-the-record interviews are excluded from the list.

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