

THE ISSUE OF OTTOMAN CENTRALISATION AND LOCAL REACTIONS:
POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF MOUNT LEBANON
BETWEEN 1858 AND 1900

by Tuğçe Kayaal

Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of History

Sabanci University

Spring 2013

THE ISSUE OF OTTOMAN CENTRALISATION AND LOCAL REACTIONS:
POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF MOUNT LEBANON
BETWEEN 1858 AND 1900

APPROVED BY:

Selçuk Akşin Somel

(Thesis Supervisor)

Y. Hakan Erdem

Alpay Filiztekin

DATE OF APPROVAL:

© Tuğçe Kayaal, 2013

All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

The reasons of the political, economical and ideological transformation in Mount Lebanon which began in the 19th century cannot be explained without taking into consideration the changes in the Ottoman centre. Although the 1858 Lebanese Civil War is seen as a breaking point in the political history of the Mountain, in essence it is only a byproduct of the political developments emerged in the region throughout the 19th century.

The occupation of Mount Lebanon by the governor of Egypt Muhammad Ali Pasha constituted the real beginning point of all the political transformation process in Mount Lebanon. Muhammad Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim Pasha had certain centralization attempts during their reign in the Mountain. However this situation caused the emergence and the rise of tension between Druzes and Maronites. This social tension even could not be moderated by the reform attempts of the Sublime Porte and by the Double Qaimaqamate system established by the center.

The *Mutasarrifiyat* regime in the Mountain which established in 1861 immediately after the end of the Civil War increased the autonomy of the Mountain and in addition to this it ended the feudal structure of the region. The emergence of the Ottomanist policies as the ideology of the Porte's centralization attempts caused the emergence of certain reactions in the Mountain.

This study will try to explain the political and the ideological transformation in Mount Lebanon during the Hamidian era in context of the centralization and Ottomanism policies of the Sublime Porte.

ÖZET

19. yüzyıl'da Cebel'i Lübnan'da meydana gelen siyasal, ekonomik ve ideolojik dönüşüm, Osmanlı Devleti'nin merkezinde yer alan gelişmeler göz önüne alınmadan açıklanamaz. Her ne kadar 1858 İç Savaşı Cebel-i Lübnan'ın siyasal tarihinde bir dönüm noktası olarak görülse de, esasında bu savaş 19. yüzyıl boyunca bölgede meydana gelen siyasal gelişmelerin bir yan ürünüdür.

Cebel'i Lübnan'ın Mısır valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa tarafından işgali bölgedeki siyasal dönüşümün esas başlangıç noktasını oluşturur. Cebel'deki saltanatları boyunca Mehmed Ali Paşa ve oğlu İbrahim Paşa'nın bazı merkezileşme denemeleri olmuştur. Fakat bu durum Dürzi ve Maruni mezhepler arasında bir gerilimin oluşmasına ve yükselmesine sebep olmuştur. Bu sosyal gerilim Bab-ı Ali'nin reform politikaları ve merkez tarafında kurulan Çifte Kaymakamlık sistemi ile dahi yatıştırılamamıştır.

1861 yılında İç Savaş'ın sona ermesinden hemen sonra kurulan Mutasarrıflık rejimi Cebel'in özerkliğini arttırmış ve bölgedeki feodal düzeni sona erdirmiştir. Bab-ı Ali'nin merkezileştirme çabalarının ideolojisi olarak ortaya çıkan Osmanlıcılık, Cebel'de bazı tepkilerin doğmasına yol açmıştır.

Bu çalışma Abdülhamid dönemi boyunca Cebel-i Lübnan'daki siyasal ve ideolojik dönüşümleri merkezileşme ve Osmanlıcılık politikaları bağlamında açıklamaya çalışacaktır.

<<To my beloved grandmother Saima Özpınar >>

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dr. Selçuk Akşin Somel. It is only with his support, guidance and encouragement that I have been able to complete this process, and I am grateful for all of the opportunities that he had provided me. He has shown me how research should be done and how an academician should be. He always supported me to express myself and helped me to put this study in a good shape. He taught me how to approach to an issue in various perspectives. It has been a great honor and privilege to study under his guidance.

I would like to express my special thanks to the members of the History departments and particularly to Yusuf Hakan Erdem and Halil Berktaş. The courses that I took from both of them helped me to enlarge my vision and encourage me to ask questions and find my own answers. I also would like express my special thanks to my Ottoman Turkish professor Sevim Yılmaz Önder for teaching me how to read archival documents.

I would like to thank İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi (İSAM) and Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi for all their help and support during the research process of my study.

I would like to especially thank to my dear mother Havva Muteber Özdal and my dear brother Barış Kayaal, for all the love and courage they gave me during this process. I am so grateful for all their support and understanding. I am so blessed to have you in my life.

Lastly, I would like to thank to my wonderful friends Ziya Kaya, Murat Gözoğlu, Zeynep Ekim Elbaşı, Elif Kalaycıoğlu, Önder Eren Akgül, Birce Özsviri, Nihan Kaya and Zozan Pehlivan for being there from the very beginning of this process and for always encouraging me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	Introduction.....	1
2.	Chapter I: A General Look at the pre-1860 Ottoman Lebanon.....	9
	2.1.Definition of Geography.....	9
	2.2.Ethnic Groups and Population.....	11
	2.3.PolitiOrganisation.....	13
	2.4.Effects of the 18th Century Ottoman Administration on Lebanon.....	16
	2.5.The Egyptian Interregnum.....	21
	2.6.Tanzimat Era and 1840 Crisis.....	26
3.	Chapter II: Lebanese Civil War, European Intervention and the Reglement Organique.....	32
	3.1.Political change after 1841.....	32
	3.2.1858 Lebanese Civil War.....	37
	3.3.The Kisrawan Revolt.....	39
	3.4.The Context of the Civil War.....	45
	3.5.The Era of Mutasarrifiyat.....	51
4.	Chapter III: The Mutasarrifs of Mount Lebanon.....	54
	4.1.New Policies in the Mountain and Mutasarrifs of Mount Lebanon.....	56
5.	Chapter IV: Reactions to the Centralist Policies: Ottomanism versus Lebanonism.....	68
	5.1. The Emergence and Development of Ottomanism.....	68
	5.2. The Era of Abdülhamid and Ideological Transformation.....	77
	5.3. Lebanonism and its Relation with the Idea of Ottomanism.....	79
6.	Conclusion.....	88
7.	Refenreces.....	94

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is examining the effects of the Ottomanist and the centralist policies of the Sublime Porte on one of the important peripheral regions of the Empire, Mount Lebanon, during the *Mutasarrifiyat* era. The study mainly covers the 1858 Lebanese Civil War and the *Mutasarrifiyat* regime between the years of 1861 and 1892.

My curiosity about the relations of the Ottoman center particularly with its Arabic periphery increased after my research about Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar and his governance in Acre. Although he was loyal to the center and he was not openly protesting orders of the Ottoman state, he was also able to take his own decisions in locality and he turned into a powerful local figure during his reign. After this research, I decided to focus on Syria geography and I furthered my readings about the region.

At the end of my readings, I noticed that the ethnic composition of Mount Lebanon and its long-lasting feudal structure is quite interesting. The interesting point about the ethnic composition of Mount Lebanon was that in addition to the existence of division between Greek, Arabic, Jewish and Armenian groups based on their religious beliefs, there was also a division among Arabic population as Christian and Muslim Arabs. Maronites were Arabic people who had Christian belief and they were living in Mount Lebanon. The Druzes' had a heterodox Islamic belief. Although this different groups succeeded to live together in stability until the 19th century under the rule of Ottoman Empire, in the 19th century this ongoing stability came to an end.

Before beginning the writing process of this thesis, the studies of Leila Fawaz and Ussama Makdisi became my inspiration to do a research about the social and ideological transformation of Mount Lebanon. In his well-known study which is named "The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon", Makdisi explains all the developments within the context of sectarianism¹. When it comes to Leila Fawaz,, in her study which is named "An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860", her main argument is that from 1861 to 1914 people of Mount Lebanon lived in peace and harmony as it had been for most of its history and in this perspective she sees the Civil

¹ Ussama Makdisi, "The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000)p.166.

War of 1858 as a particular exception between the years of 1840 and 1860. In addition to this, she prefers to explain the reasons of the Civil War via the conflicts between the local rulers and the peasants and also via foreign interventions rather than sectarianism².

This thesis aims to bring a new perception that is different from these two important studies. The common point in the studies of Makdisi and Fawaz is that both prefer to examine the Mount Lebanon independently from the Ottoman centre. The point that is missing in the studies of these two important scholars is that they do not examine the political and ideological changes of the Mountain in relationship with the Sublime Porte. It should not be forgotten that until 1920, Mount Lebanon was a part of the Ottoman territory. In this context, the important study of Engin Akarlı which is named “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920” breaks two existing prejudices about the Ottoman and Lebanese history. First of all, he refers to the era between 1861 and 1920 as an era where the stability could be provided by the Sublime Porte in Mount Lebanon. With this emphasis, he falsifies the existing decline paradigm about the 19th century of Ottoman Empire. By many historians, the 19th century referred as the era when Ottoman Empire was losing all its power and also it was losing control on its territories. However, Akarlı shows us that in this era, the Ottoman state showed an important success in providing a stable system in Mount Lebanon. Secondly, during his study Akarlı shows that all the administrative and social changes of Mount Lebanon cannot be understood without taking into consideration the developments in the Ottoman centre. Because of these two crucial reasons, Engin Akarlı’s study became my main inspiration to do a research about the Civil War and *Mutasarrifiyat* experiences of the Mountain.

In order to understand the political and social transformations of the late-19th century’s Mount Lebanon, in the first chapter which is titled as “*A General Look at the pre-1858 Ottoman Lebanon*” the social and political structure of the Mountain in pre-1851 era will be examined. Firstly the boundaries of Mount Lebanon in the earlier ages including the pre-Ottoman conquest era will be defined and the effect of the region’s territorial relation to Syria on the political history of the Mountain will be defined. Also,

² Leila Fawaz; “An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).47-78, 218.

the population issue which constitutes a crucial place in Mount Lebanon's history will be evaluated. As it is well-known, Mount Lebanon had a heterogeneous ethnic composition beginning with the ancient times and this situation proceeded during the Ottoman rule. Having brief information about the population of the Mountain will be helpful for examining the issue of when and how the two main ethnic and religious groups of the region, Maronites and Druzes, begin to feed a mutual hatred against each other. Another crucial issue of the first chapter will be the history of Mount Lebanon's political and administrative organization. After the Middle East conquest of Selim I in 1516 the region including Syria and Mount Lebanon came under the Ottoman rule. Before the Ottoman rule, both Syria and Mount Lebanon enjoyed a local feudal system. The administration of all the former Mamluk territories in Syria as one province came to an end as a result of the revolt of Janbirdi al-Ghazali in 1520-1521. So, the feudal structure of Mount Lebanon goes back to the Mamluk rule in the region. After the conquest, Selim I confirmed the already existing feudal order. The first chapter will try to discuss the reasons and effects of this continuation of the feudal system in the Mountain both on the local politics and also on the Sublime Porte's politics in a general sense.

The most crucial issue of the first chapter will be the discussions of the Egyptian Interregnum and the effects of the *Tanzimat* policies in the region. The Egyptian Interregnum will be used for defining the era which begins after the conquest of Syria and Mount Lebanon in 1831 by Muhammad Ali Pasha who was the governor of Egypt by then and his son Ibrahim Pasha. The first question about the era that is defined as Egyptian Interregnum is that how did the Egyptian rule influence the local political structure of Mount Lebanon? Because of the scarcity of economic sources, Mount Lebanon depended on neighboring Syrian provinces and it was divided into two administrative regions. According to this, the north of the Mountain was under the jurisdiction of the governor headquartered in Tripoli and the south was under the governor headquartered either in Acre or Sidon. Beginning with the governor Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar's era, Acre had an economic and political importance for the local rulers and this made Mount Lebanon another crucial region due to its crucial place particularly in terms of establishing economic relations with the important trade centers. Egyptian occupation began in Acre in 1831 and it lasted over Syria and Mount Lebanon between the years of 1831 and 1840. When it comes to the effects of the Egyptian interregnum

on Mount Lebanon, according to Dick Douwes, Egyptian rule in Syria and also in the Mountain can be considered as a clear, if not a radical departure from the preceding Ottoman administrative tradition³. One of the important questions that needs to be discussed about the Egyptian occupation era is that how did the political arrangements of Ibrahim Pasha in the region influence the relationship between the Druze and Maronite sects? This issue will be covered in details in this chapter.

The *Tanzimat* era which includes reformation movements related with the re-centralization attempts of the Sublime Porte had its repercussions on the peripheral regions of the Empire. The case of Mount Lebanon constitutes a good example to examine this issue. The first rescript of the *Tanzimat* era aimed to take both the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the Empire into consideration and emphasizes that the Sultan will let both his Muslim and non-Muslim subjects to benefit from his benevolence without any discrimination. The first rescript of the *Tanzimat* era different from the second one, *Islahat Rescript*, was not bringing radical changes in political sense. It was only aiming certain regulations on administration and it was providing a written guarantee to already existing rules in the Empire. Also the Imperial Edict of *Gülhane* emphasized that the Sultan provides his benevolence to all his subjects without any discrimination. In this way the Sublime Porte tried to be more inclusive in order realize the centralization policies. In Mount Lebanon, the *Tanzimat* declaration together with the arrival of France and Great Britain to the region spelled the end of the emirate system. However, the question of *Tanzimat* reforms reached to its aim or not and what kind of social and political affects it had on the region, are crucial questions that need to be discuss in this chapter.

In the second chapter which is titled as “*Lebanese Civil War, European Intervention and the Reglement Organique*”, I will try to evaluate the political changes after 1841. The way that the end of the Egyptian occupation affected the region will be discussed in details. The end of the Egyptian occupation in Mount Lebanon in 1841 caused the emergence of the Double Qaimaqamate system and this new administrative structure began with the appointment of Ömer Pasha in 1842 and it lasted until 1858. One of the important questions about this era is that did the Double Qaimaqamate

³ Dick Dowes, “The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression”, (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 191

system made any changes on the political and social arrangements of the previous Egyptian rule in the Mountain. Druze population in the Mountain had certain discontents about the political regulations of Ibrahim Pasha's regime. However, the success of Double Qaimaqamate regime about providing happiness and social stability to the people of the Mountain is a crucial issue that will be examined in details in this chapter.

1858 Civil War created a breaking point in the political and social history of Mount Lebanon. It caused the death of so many people particularly among the Maronite and also among the Druze people in the region. This study aims to bring a different perspective to the reasons of 1858 Lebanese Civil War and the *Mutasarrifiyat* regime which established by the Sublime Porte after the end of the war. This study questions the reasons led to the emergence of the Civil War in a wider perspective. It argues that examining the process led to the Civil War only with the issues of sectarianism and the struggle between the peasants and local rulers is not enough. The issue of Civil War and the *Mutasarrifiyat* regime should be examined with reference to the Sublime Porte since the region was an Ottoman territory during these years.

The *Mutasarrifiyat* regime in Mount Lebanon constitutes the main focus in the second part of this study. Different from the secondary sources which I have mentioned before, this study will not be restricted only with the social and administrative arrangements of the new regime; the *Mutasarrifiyat* era will be examined in relation to the centralist policies of the Sublime Porte. Different from the existing researches about the field, this study will try to find answers to the questions such as what was the role of the Sublime Porte and the European powers in the establishment and the preservation of the *Mutasarrifiyat* system and how did the local people and particularly the local notables who had the political and social control previously react to this new system? Could the *Mutasarrifiyat* regime help the Ottoman government to realize the centralist and Ottomanist policies? These questions will be tried to be covered during the second chapter.

On the third chapter, which will be titled as "*The Mutasarrifs of Mount Lebanon*" the articles of the *Reglement Organique*'s which were written in the *Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan* belonging to the year of 1305/1887-1888 will be mentioned and both administrative and political changes came together with the *Mutasarrifiyat* regime will

be discussed. In addition to this, in the same chapter, the context of the center-periphery relations will be the main focus point and the relations of the *mutasarrifs* to the center and the issue of how to define Mount Lebanon as an Ottoman “territory” will be discussed. Since the aim of this topic is trying to examine the *Mutasarrifiyat* experience during Abdulhamid II’s era, the centralization policies of the first four *mutasarrifs* of Mount Lebanon, who were Davud Pasha (r.1861-68), Franko Pasha (r.1868-1873), Rüstem Pasha (1873-1883) and Vasa Pasha (1883-1892) will be the focus point and the similarities and the differences between their policies and the relations with the Sublime Porte will be examined comparatively. The reason for restricting this study with these four names is that after 1892 the centralist policies of the *Hamidian* era enters to a new phase and in this new era it would not be possible to think the appointment of an Ottoman bureaucrat who was an Armenian in his ethnic origin as the *mutasarrif* of Mount Lebanon. Related with this radical break after 1892, this research will be restricted with the first four *mutasarrifs* of Mount Lebanon.

The fourth chapter which is titled as “*Reactions to the Centralist Policies: Ottomanism versus Lebanonism*” will begin with questioning the emergence and the development of the idea of Ottomanism. The reason for focusing on these two ideologies is that all the political transformation in Mount Lebanon cannot be clearly understood without examining the ideological transformation. When we talk about the centralist policies of the Sublime Porte, it is not possible to examine this issue clearly without understanding the ideological background. Also in case of Mount Lebanon, all the centralist policies and the establishment of the *Mutasarrifiyat* as a new administrative system caused the emergence of certain reactions. Those reactions also had an ideological background too, which was Lebanonism. In this context, the questions of this chapter will be such as what kind of an ideology was the Ottomanism in its nature and is it possible to talk about an idea of Ottomanism as a homogenous ideology? These questions will constitute the basic context of the arguments during this chapter and the important ideologues of the Ottomanist ideology such as Namık Kemal and Ziya Bey will be mentioned.

The second part of the fourth chapter will try to deal with the issue of Lebanonism and its relations to the Ottomanist ideology. In this study, both the Arabism and Lebanonism will be considered as the separatist movements that emerged as a reaction to the centralist discourse of the Ottomanism. At the beginning, the relation between

Arabism and Lebanonism will be discussed, the common points and the differences between these two ideologies will be shown but after that, since both ideologies can be considered as “separatist” movements; both Lebanonism and Arabism will be used interchangeably relying on their similarity in this context.

The primary sources of this study are *Salnames* of the *Hamidian* era, archival documents and newspapers. *Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan* belonging to the years of 1305/1887-1888, 1306/1888-1889 and 1307/1889-1990 will be used effectively to evaluate the articles of the *Reglement Organique* and also to examine the transformation of the ethnic composition and the integration of the local powers into the new system during the *Mutasarrifiyat* era. During this study, a problematic point with the *Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan* is recognized. These *salnames* are the documents which were submitted to Sultan Abdulhamid. When the articles of *Reglement Organique* in *Salnames* and the original version of the *Reglement* existing in another primary source belonging to Nouradoughian are compared, certain differences between two versions is noticed. However, since one of the aims of this study is focusing on the *Mutasarrifiyyat* experience during the *Hamidian* era, this issue will not be mentioned in this study. In addition to this, since the only available versions in the Turkish libraries are these three *salnames*, only the data of these years are used in discussions about the population and the administration issues during the *Mutasarrifiyat* regime.

The archival documents, especially the ones belonging to the *Yıldız Evrak Odası* constitute the basic primary source of this study. In the Ottomanism and Lebanonism chapter, the newspapers were planned to be used as the primary sources. It was possible to reach the newspapers belonging to Young Ottomans which were named as *Muhbir*, *Hürriyet* but unfortunately it was not the same for the *Beirut*, which published by the Lebanonist Arabs. Even though it was written as available in *Hakkı Tarık Us*, in the library it was told that there are no available versions of the newspaper. For this reason, *Beirut* could not be used in this study.

Secondary sources about the Ottoman Lebanon and the issue of Ottomanism constitute the backbone of this study. As I have previously mentioned, the studies of Ussama Makdisi and Leila Fawaz which have different perspectives about the causes of 1858 Lebanese Civil War, will be used comparatively. The data provided from these sources will also be bolstered with the chronicles belonging to names such as Colonel

Churchill and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. Chronicle of Colonel Churchill on Mount Lebanon's history and 1858 Civil War is open to discussion about its objectivity but still it is an important source since it was written by an eye-witness of the era. Colonel Churchill was married to the daughter of one of the notable Druze families of the Mountain and at the beginning he was one of the supporters of the Druze cause during the Civil War. Later on, he claims that he could not stand to witness all these violence that Maronites faced and decided to write his memoir⁴. In addition to this fact, certain overlapping between Churchill's memoir and Fawaz's study made his chronicle one of the main sources for this thesis, particularly in the chapter which discusses 1858 Civil War.

Engin Akarlı's well-known study which is named "*The Long Peace*" will be used as the main source to bolster the arguments which were derived from the primary sources. In addition to this, studies of Thomas Philipp, A.L. Tibawi, Ceasar Farah, Moshe Maoz, Kamal Salibi will be benefited quite effectively.

In the last chapter, about the issue of Ottomanism, Akşin Somel's and Şerif Mardin's studies will be used as the main sources. Somel's perspective on the Ottomanism and his methodology will be used excessively in this study for defining the Ottomanism as one of the most popular ideologies of the 19th century Ottoman Empire. Şerif Mardin's well-known study which is named "*Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*" provides answers to the questions about how this new ideology was considered by the Ottoman intellectuals of the era.

As it was said before, this study will try to bring an alternative perspective to the existing literature about the 1858 Lebanese Civil War and *Mutasarrıfıyat* experience. In order to do, it will be emphasized that when all these events were happening, Mount Lebanon was a part of the Ottoman territory. Since it is not possible to ignore the emergence of ideological transformation in parallel with the political events, both Ottomanist and Lebanonist ideologies will be examined in this context.

2. CHAPTER I

A GENERAL LOOK AT THE PRE-1861 OTTOMAN LEBANON

2.1. Definition of Geography

It is important to evaluate and explain the geographic characteristics of Mount Lebanon by taking into consideration Syria as a whole due to the impossibility to understand its geography in isolation from Syria.

The whole Syrian land includes the huge land mass extending from Cilicia to the “Holy Land”⁵. Jacques Eddé gives a general picture of Syria and Lebanon by indicating *kazas* and *vilayets* of these two geographies. According to that, in administrative sense Syria was divided into three main *vilayets* and they were also subdivided into *sandjaks* and *kazas*. These three *vilayets* were Aleppo, Beirut and Syria or Damascus. The *vilayet* of Aleppo was divided into three *sandjaks* which were Aleppo, Maraş and Urfa. The *vilayet* of Beirut was divided into five *sandjaks* as Beirut, Tripoli, Acre, Nablus and Latakia. Lastly the *vilayet* of Damascus was divided into four *sandjaks* which were Damascus, Hawran, Hama and Maan. In addition to these three *sandjaks*, there were two *müstakil sandjaks* which were Deir-Zor, Jerusalem and these two *sandjaks* could be able to enjoy independence more compare to others. These *sandjaks* where directly responsible to *Dahiliye Nezareti* and Lebanon was an autonomous *sandjak*.

This general administrative picture provided by Jacques Eddé belongs to the era between the years of 1914-1918 and it also started to be applied after 1888. However Lebanon acquired its particular status after a long historical process which took place during the 19th century. Though Lebanon became autonomous and later on fully independent from Syria, the division of *sandjaks* described by Eddé is quite ancient. As *Selim I* conquered Syria, he did not attempt to change the existing administrative order and geographical divisions. As Bruce Masters mentioned in his article, Syria was effectively divided into four separate provinces which were Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli

⁵Thomas Philipp, *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Centuries: The Common and the Specific in the Historical Experience*, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1992), p.1

and Sidon⁶. Even in 1800, these four provinces continued to exist with ill-defined boundaries.

When it comes to the geography of Lebanon specifically, the region is named as “Mount Lebanon” especially after the 19th century. The reason for using the attribute of “Mount” to this geography is that, it was the name of the northern ridges of mountains and the hills extending along the Mediterranean coast from the Barid River in the north to the Zahrani River in the south. The region was covered by the mountain range which is called as “Lebanon Mountains” today. As the special administrative regime which was named *mutasarrifiyat* established in Lebanon in 1861, the region started to be called as “Mount Lebanon” or simply “The Mountain”⁷.

Mount Lebanon has distinctive topographical features as Engin Akarlı mentioned in his book. Accordingly Mount Lebanon rises from a very thin coastal strip and reaches imposing heights within 25-33 kilometers of the coast, and falls to the plains of Ba’lbak and Biqa on the east⁸. Geographical features of the mountain separates and from time to time isolates Lebanon from the world around it, such as certain Mediterranean cities and trade centers along the coast, but also causes internal division; especially in social sense. For this reason it is crucial to say that, geographical features of Lebanon have had important effects on the social order of this former Ottoman province.

There has been also a connection between the geographical features and communication issue as I have just mentioned. As Akarlı states in his study, before the advent of the technology, the tortuous terrain of the Mountain limited the travel and transportation between the sub regions and neighboring lowland settlements⁹. As a result of these difficulties, economic activities remained limited in scope. This caused Lebanon to remain dependent on two neighboring Syrian provinces, Tripoli and Saida since 1516. On the other hand, the central location of the port of Beirut helped it to trade commodities from distant lands via Saida and Tripoli.

⁶ Ibid. 11.

⁷ Engin Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920*, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.7.

⁸ Ibid. 7.

⁹ Ibid. 8.

2.2. Ethnic Groups and Population

Mount Lebanon has been known for its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural features. Its historical roots go back to pre-Ottoman eras and we can even say that its grounds go to ancient times. However, this multi-ethnic characteristic of the Mountain became the main reason of political developments and social conflicts in the 19th century Ottoman Levant.

Two significant ethnic groups of Mount Lebanon have been the Druzes and the Maronites. However, there were other people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds which included Armenians, Greek Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Shiites and Jews. According to results of the population census of the Ottoman state which was realized in the years of 1877 and 1878, the overall population was 110.000 in Mount Lebanon and 120.000 in Beirut. The total number of households was 18.000 in the Mountain and 12.375 in Beirut¹⁰. In 1881-1882-1883 population census we see the total number of population in Mount Lebanon as 100.000¹¹.

Historically Maronites were the major religious group. Maronites were the descendants of an Arab, or Arabized Christian people whom the Byzantines drove out of the Orontes valley onto the highlands of Mount Lebanon in the late tenth century¹². The story of Maronites' itinerary to the Mountain is related to the historical division within Christianity. Due to the discussions on the human or divine nature of Christ, the churches of Rome and Constantinople split in 1054 and the Eastern Orthodox Church followed Constantinople, supporting the existence of both human and divine natures of Christ¹³. In seventh century, The Monothelete doctrine supported that Christ possessed both a divine and human nature but having only one divine will and they were condemned as heretics by the Council of Constantinople. However, this Monothelete

¹⁰ Kemal Karpat, *Osmanlı Nüfusu 1830-1914*, (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010), p. 255.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 314.

¹² Engin Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920*, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.10.

¹³ Leila Fawaz, "An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.10.

doctrine survived among Maronites¹⁴. Long before the first missionaries arrived to the Mountain, Christians had been living in the region, and Maronites settled in Mount Lebanon during the tenth and eleventh centuries following persecutions by the Byzantines because of the existing religious disagreements¹⁵. It is also important to note that, until the late thirteenth century, the majority of not only Lebanon's population but also generally Syria's population was Christian and mainly Eastern Orthodox¹⁶. Specifically in Mount Lebanon, during 1860s almost 60% of the Mountain's population consisted of Maronites¹⁷.

The second important and dominant religious belief in Lebanon and in Syria was Islam. After the Arab conquest of Syria in the seventh century; Islam began to spread all over the geography. Because of different reasons, ideological divisions also occurred within Muslims as it has been among Christian people. One of the sides of this ideological confrontation were the Sunnis, or Orthodox Muslims, who believe that the leadership of Islam had passed from the prophet Muhammad to the first four caliphs, rightly guided successor chosen by acclamation, then to Umayyad caliphs¹⁸. Sunnis consider caliphs as the temporary rulers and see the Quran, as well as the Prophetic Tradition, as the real source of the Islamic belief. However, in the first century of Islam, a controversy emerged over the succession to Prophet, leading to the formation of a group named as *Shi'is*, which means "partisans"¹⁹. According to Shiites, the prophet's successors should belong to the family of prophet's cousin and also son-in-law Ali. Because of the high importance given to the successors, a belief of a holy line of imams emerged which ended with the lost twelfth imam. The Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt (909-

¹⁴ Ibid. 10.

¹⁵Ussama Makdisi, "The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.29.

¹⁶ Leila Fawaz, "An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.12.

¹⁷ Engin Akarlı, "The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920", (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.11.

¹⁸Leila Fawaz, "An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.11.

¹⁹ Ibid. 11

1171) was the first major Shiite state in the Middle East. It also played a role in the emergence of the Druze sect. One of the Fatimid caliphs of Egypt, Hakim, declared himself as the reincarnation of God and spread this doctrine among the rural inhabitants of the Shuf Mountains in southern Lebanon and of Wadi Taym in Anti-Lebanon²⁰. The Druze sect in Lebanon came into being through this way. According to Akarlı, religious beliefs of Druzes can be seen as a combination of Hellenistic, Iranian and other pre-Islamic religious traditions²¹. This caused problems for the relations between the Sunni state and the rather heterodox Druzes.

In addition to these two dominant groups, there were Armenian, Jewish, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic populations. According to Akarlı, Greek Orthodox elements were the urban elements of the region, like the Sunnis, and they were generally living around Saida and Tripoli.

2.3. Political Organisation

The region of Syria came under the authority of the Ottoman Empire in 1516 by the conquest of Selim I. The administration of all the former Mamluk territories in Syria as one province came to an end as a result of the revolt of Janbirdi al-Ghazali in 1520-1521²². Before the Ottoman rule in the region, Syria and Lebanon enjoyed some kind of a feudal system in both political and economic senses.

According to Tibawi, after the conquest Selim I confirmed the already existing feudal order²³. It means that, the region did not become totally connected to the Ottoman centre even at the sixteenth century and the sultan was content with the acknowledgement of his authority by powerful local families. The Ottoman centre delegated their authority of collecting taxes in an organized manner and providing peace

²⁰ Ibid.12

²¹ Engin Akarlı, "The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920", (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.11

²² Thomas Philipp, "The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century: The Common and The Specific in the Historical Experience", (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1992), p. 12.

²³ A.L. Tibawi, "A Modern History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine", (London: Macmillan; New York, St. Martin's P., 1969), p.23.

and security in the region to the local rulers due to the existing tensions between different sects. About the same issue, Bruce Masters indicates that there can be little doubt that the Porte's primary expectations from its governors, especially from the ones in critical provinces such as Tripoli and Sidon was the control of the various religiously heterodox and often rebellious people of Syria's coastal mountains who were Alawis, Druzes and Maronites²⁴.

This attitude of the Ottoman center towards the region gave to Syria and Mount Lebanon quite autonomous characteristics compared to other peripheral regions of the Empire and local families were very effective in the governance of their towns or regions. Even in the early modern era, the Ottoman centre provided certain privileges to Mount Lebanon which implied rule by a native prince, preferably a Christian, governing according to traditionally acceptable codes of Mount Lebanon, which were unwritten²⁵. Between 1593 and 1633 we witness the long rule of Fakhr al'Din but after 1642 this privileged status supported by the unwritten code of the Mountain was interpreted as to mean the rule of Shihab emirs in the region. Under Fakhr al'Din's political authority; a group of chieftains had established themselves quite firmly as quasi-feudal tax collectors and administrators in the central and southern parts of the Mountain and the Wadi al-Taim²⁶. These chieftains were mostly Druze, but in different parts of the Mountain, in regions like Kisrawan, we witness the existence of influential families like the Maronite Khazins and Hubaishes. Power struggle between these local families continued for a long while and indeed shaped the political life of the region. However, it is important to say that, factors leading to these struggles in earlier centuries were related to issues of prestige and not related with religious beliefs or ethnic issues. As Ussama Makdisi indicates in his study, even in the same family it was possible to see family members belonging to different religious beliefs or sects. One of the most powerful families of the Mountain was Shihab family, and this family was divided into Christian and Sunni

²⁴ Thomas Philipp, "The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century: The Common and The Specific in the Historical Experience", (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1992), p.12

²⁵ Caesar Farah, "The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861", (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p.1

²⁶ Engin Akarlı, "The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920", (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.14

branches. Makdisi properly claims that rank rather than religion was the all important marker of elite status in rural Mount Lebanon²⁷. Different branches of this powerful family fought and competed with each other for the privilege to rule Mount Lebanon, not for the cause of “superiority” of their religious identity.

The institution of grand emirate, which was usually occupied by a member of one of the powerful local families of the Mountain, constituted an important position in the local policy since the Mountain was quite autonomous from the center compared to the other provinces under the Ottoman rule. However, later on the grand emirate became a rather exploitative and economically oppressive institution²⁸. Though the Grand Emir did not receive official salaries from the centre, he was totally free about collecting taxes from the people of the Mountain. Once he was elected, the Grand Emir would monopolize his political and economic hegemony over the region. For instance, the Shihab family who monopolized of the post since their elevation by the other local feudal families strove ruthlessly to maintain their political supremacy²⁹.

Another important point is that, in addition to Ottoman central state’s policy, the geographic characteristics of Mount Lebanon also determined its degree of political autonomy. The mountainous characteristics of Lebanon ensured its isolated situation and weakened the effect of the state authority. In addition to their political hegemony, local families were also acting as the tax farmers of the region. The strengthening of local feudal actors and the accumulation of power in the hands of the Grand Emir caused even more the increase of the level of autonomy of the Mountain. In addition to the rise of local rulers, international developments also led the Ottoman centre to the application of certain centralisation policies. In order to understand the local political system and place of the Ottoman centre in this context and also the beginning of centralisation policies towards the peripheral regions of the empire, it is a prominent necessary to look at the political and economic administration system of Ottoman state and its progress.

²⁷ Ussama Makdisi, “The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.31

²⁸ Caesar E. Farah, “The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-1861”, (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p.4.

²⁹ Ibid. 4

2.4. Effects of the 18th Century Ottoman Administration on Mount Lebanon

As many scholars of the field declared, 18th century Ottoman Empire underwent a relative decentralisation process of especially in its peripheral regions. Inevitably this process had major effects on the periphery of Ottoman Empire. For an autonomous region like Lebanon, the political and economic transformation of the Ottoman center was of great importance in terms of understanding the political evolution of the Mountain

Ottoman Empire was of course not isolated from the international developments and for this reason, the emergence of the “military revolution” in Europe in the 16th century affected Ottoman Empire both in political and economic senses. As Ottoman historians such as Halil İnalcık and Suraiya Faroqhi indicate, the last two decades of the sixteenth century were a period of financial, political, economic and demographic difficulties for the Ottoman Empire³⁰. Between the years of 1584 and 1586 there was the dramatic devaluation of the *akçe* and this devaluation had an important political repercussions like janissary revolt in 1589³¹. Depending on the introduction of new tactics in the European armies and development of new army organizations, Ottoman Empire began to lose its relatively military superiority over European states which existed in pre-sixteenth century era. In addition to the external military developments, Ottoman rulers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries engaged in a series of long wars like the ones on the Iranian and Habsburg frontiers³². Existing Ottoman military system could not provide military success to the state. As Ariel Salzman mentioned in her article about the political economy of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire; as a consequence of the demands of the new forms of warfare, Ottoman fiscal practices shifted dramatically³³. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the center decided to

³⁰ Suraiya Faroqhi, “The Age of Ayans, 1699-1812” in “An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914”, ed. Halil İnalcık, Donald Quatert, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.433.

³¹ Ibid. 433.

³² Ibid. 434.

³³ Ariel Salzman, “An Ancien Régime Revisited: ‘Privatization’ and Political Economy in the 18th Century Ottoman Empire”, *Politics & Society*, Vol. 21 No.4, December 1993, p.398.

convert agrarian taxes to lump-sum cash payments which is known as *maqtu* in Ottoman. This new economical policy was a result of the extensive usage of money in the Ottoman economy especially after 15th century. The state used the *muqataa* and the *iltizam* system to collect some of revenues in cash in order to pay salaries and meet other expenditures³⁴. These taxes were paid by villagers and town quarters to people who were appointed by the centre based on the three years contracts³⁵. These appointed *multazims* were generally chosen among the bureaucratic elites such as viziers, pashas. This method was named as *iltizam* and the contracts were signed for a short period of time and the centre aimed restricting the possible growth of these local elites.

In the seventeenth century, due to deterioration of already existing fiscal problems, short term taxing which could be seen as a way of internal borrowing system was in a state of crisis. The reasons behind this situation were the worsening of the conditions in many rural areas over the seventeenth century both in Middle Eastern provinces and Balkans, as well as the emergence of revolts and social upheavals such as the Jelali revolts. Between 1683 and 1699, following the Second Siege of Vienna, Ottomans became confronted with a major enemy known as the Holy Alliance, which resulted in critical defeats. As a result of all these reasons, the Ottoman state was forced to introduce a new form of tax collection system named *malikane-i divani* in 1695.

Malikane system was a contract on state revenues which gave the tax collector rights to collect taxes on the basis of established rates from the time of the award until the contractor's death³⁶. At first glance, *malikane* system can be seen as an economic privilege which was given to the local rulers. Because of this "economic privatization", eighteenth century Ottoman Empire has been defined as an era of decentralisation. In traditional history writing it used to be seen as the "era of decline". However, according to scholars such as Ariel Salzmann and Dina Rizk Khoury, the decline paradigm lost almost all of its plausibility. They convincingly argue that even if the eighteenth century can be defined as the era of the decentralisation policies, as it has been in many Middle

³⁴ Halil İnalcık and Donald Quatert: "An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914", (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 952.

³⁵ Ibid. 399.

³⁶ Ibid. 401.

Eastern provinces like Mosul and Acre; it did not prevent the Ottomanization of all these regions³⁷. Salzman states that, the decentralisation of fiscal agency encouraged the development of parallel institutions that channeled and contained competition and conflict between and among state and non-state elites³⁸. For the peripheral provinces, this means that rather than the total disappearance of the central authority in provinces, the *malikane* system provided emergence of parallel institutions supporting and trying to protect the existence of political control of the Ottoman state over its peripheral territories.

In the case of Syrian geography, I believe that fiscal transformation of Ottoman state strengthened the hand of the local rulers. As Salzman indicates, they provided the emergence of parallel institutions representing central authority. However, through the economic power that they have procured thanks to the *malikane* system, they also were able to create their own political authority spheres. Although they seemed obedient to the central state, they made independent decisions in many cases.

Therefore, the *muqataa* policy of the Ottoman center did not provide a strong political authority of the center over Lebanon. As Akarlı explains in his study, in the Mountain the tax-farming evolved in a rather peculiar way, and the so-called *muqataajis* or in other words “tax farmers” were able to establish themselves more firmly and autonomously than their colleagues elsewhere³⁹. The *malikane* system only strengthened the quasi-feudal structure of the mountain and the *muqataajis* even possessed the support of the peasants who were working in their lands and also living under their political authority.

In terms of Syria and Lebanon, it is also possible to say that both Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar (the butcher) at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century and Muhammad Ali Pasha and his son İbrahim Pasha constituted other

³⁷ Dina Rizk Khoury, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Taşra Toplumu: Musul 1540-1834”, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay, 1997), p.3

³⁸ Ariel Salzman, “An Ancien Régime Revisited: ‘Privatization’ and Political Economy in the 18th Century Ottoman Empire”, *Politics & Society*, Vol. 21 No.4, December 1993, p. 399

³⁹Engin Akarlı, “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.16.

significant examples for the level of autonomy that these Ottoman pashas were able to achieve in their localities.

Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar, was born in the late 1730s in Bosnia and into impoverished circumstances⁴⁰. From the day he was appointed as the governor of Sidon in 1776 and he remained in his position until his death in 1804. His itinerary for his career started in Egypt as a member of the household governor of Egypt Ali Pasha in 1756 and he worked in the citadel⁴¹. In 1770 he came to Deir al-Qamar in Lebanon as a poor man and the Druze Amir Yusuf took an interest in him and fed him⁴². After he stayed in Deir al-Qamar for a while, he went to Damascus to collect some valuable and money. After a while, when the Russian fleet emerged in Mediterranean as a consequence of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768 - 1774, Amir Yusuf asked the governor of Damascus, ‘Uthman Bey, to send him Ahmed and some troops in order to defend the region. In here Ahmed Pasha proved his military capabilities and skills⁴³. It can be said that, the career journey of this young adventurer reached to a successful peak point in 1776 as he became appointed as the governor of Sidon following the execution of Zahir al-‘Umar by the Ottoman state.

As an ambitious local governor, Ahmed Pasha continuously searched for the ways to widen his area of political influence and due to his past experiences in Deir al-Qamar, he had a foothold in the politics of the Mountain, especially among Druzes. This was something that his predecessor Zahir al-‘Umar could never obtain. As an ambitious ruler, he played the game according to its rules, which means that he never directly opposed the orders of the centre, nor did not give up to act autonomously in many political and economic issues. For instance, the sudden occupation of Egypt by the Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798 became an opportunity for Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar to prove his capabilities to Selim III. Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar showed an enormous success in the

⁴⁰ Thomas Philipp, “The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century: The Common and The Specific in the Historical Experience”, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1992), p.48.

⁴¹ Thomas Philipp, “Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City”, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2001), p.50.

⁴² Ibid. 51.

⁴³ Ibid. 51.

defense of Acre when he defeated the forces of Napoleon⁴⁴. However, the same pasha did not hesitate to act against the will of Kapudan-ı Derya Cezayirli Hasan Kapudan Pasha because of his ambitions over Mount Lebanon. To establish his authority as the *wali* of Sidon over Mount Lebanon, al-Jazzar demanded from Amir Yusuf the payment of taxes from the Mount Lebanon area, taxes which the Kapudan Pasha had just collected in the name of Ottoman government⁴⁵. The example of Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar clearly shows us that those appointed pashas of peripheral provinces had the ability to create their own political control at the local level.

When it comes to the policies of Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar over Mount Lebanon, he knew how to exploit existing *muqataa* system in Mount Lebanon which had created a hierarchic network of feudal relations. Every *muqataa* was accepted as the domain of the *muqataaji* family, so it was even possible to divide these lands among other members of the family⁴⁶. This situation caused certain conflicts among the different branches of the same family, or among different influential families. In order to realize his ambitions over Mount Lebanon, Ahmed Pasha played the rival factions of the competing families, especially Druzes, against one another. He also collected much higher sums from mountaineers than their normal tax burden⁴⁷.

The manipulations of Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar could be successful from time to time, however conflicts and higher tax burdens continued to be a problem for *muqataajis* of the Mountain, even under Abdullah Pasha, who was successor of Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar and the governor of Acre between 1818 and 1832.

Apart from the role of *muqataajis* families and pashas appointed from the center to the region, the era of Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt and the subsequent *Tanzimat* reforms had critical effects on the political organization and the system of Mount Lebanon and also of Syria.

⁴⁴ Enver Ziya, “Selim III’ün Hattı Hümayunları: Nizam-ı Cedit 1789-1807”, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), p.57.

⁴⁵ Thomas Philipp, “Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City”, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2001), p.63.

⁴⁶ Engin Akarlı, “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.17.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 19.

2.5. The Egyptian Interregnum

Muhammad Ali Pasha was a particular example for showing the strengthening of local authorities and creating alternative power fields against the central government.

The pattern of feudalism which emerged due to the special circumstances that I have already mentioned continued to remain in Mount Lebanon until 1830s. Due to the scarcity of economic sources, Mount Lebanon depended on neighboring Syrian provinces. For tax levying purposes, the Mountain was divided into two *mu'amalas*⁴⁸. The north was under the jurisdiction of the governor headquartered in Tripoli and the south was under that of the governor headquartered either in Acre or Sidon⁴⁹.

Until the occupation of Egypt in 1831 the region remained subjected to different levels of political and economic competition between the Grand Emirate, the governor of Sidon and the governor of Tripoli. Since 1804, Suleiman Pasha who succeeded Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar in Sidon supported Bashir II who remained in power between 1788 and 1840 as the Grand Emir of the Mountain following the war between the *valis* of Damascus and of Sidon, Suleiman Pasha, emerging victoriously, was rewarded with jurisdiction over the districts of Jubayl and Biqa⁵⁰. As 'Abdullah Pasha succeeded Suleiman Pasha in 1819, problems started to emerge between him and the Grand Emir of the Mountain⁵¹. Different from his predecessor, 'Abdullah Pasha was less favorably disposed towards Bashir. As he became the *vali* of Sidon, he demanded a million of *dirhams* for financing the cost of his office. The economic demands of 'Abdallah Pasha and his feud with the *vali* of Damascus became tenser as Bashir was reinstated as the grand emir after a short break. The reign of Amir Bashir as the grand emir is quite important because different from any of his predecessors except for Fakhr al-Din, Amir Bashir had become the focal point of the Mountain's political life⁵². Even Fakhr al-Din

⁴⁸ Caesar E. Farah, "The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-1861", (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p.2

⁴⁹ Ibid. 2

⁵⁰ Ibid.7.

⁵¹ Ibid.7.

⁵² Engin Akarlı, "The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920", (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.22.

was acting as the client of the governors and followed policies depended on them; however Amir Bashir was an ambitious political figure who searched for new ways to develop the Mountain's economy and tried to increase the amount of cash coming to Mount Lebanon. In addition to this, he also had centralisation attempts in the Mount Lebanon because rather than division of political power among different actors, Amir Bashir desired to monopolize all political power solemnly in his hands. For this reason, he looked for different alliance and tried to evaluate every single opportunity⁵³.

The conditions leading to Egyptian interregnum as a part of the political history of Mount Lebanon emerged as a consequence of the struggle between these three parties. The Damascus *vali's mutasallim* of Biqa attacked and robbed the flock of the town of 'Amiq, which was under the jurisdiction of the *vali* of Sidon⁵⁴. In words of Ceasar Farah, Vali Derviş Pasha of Damascus was ready to concede jurisdiction over the Biqa valley, which traditionally was under the *valiship* of Damascus⁵⁵. However, rather than accepting this peaceful solution, 'Abdullah Pasha insisted on Bashir retrieving these areas by force. Increasing tension between the local rulers of Southern Syria and the Mountain also had been heard from the centre; the Porte demanded Mustafa Pasha who was the *vali* of Aleppo during this period to go and help Derviş Pasha. Also a *buyruktu* was sent from Istanbul to the local people of Mount Lebanon which declared the deposition of Bashir as the grand emir.

Amir Bashir and 'Abdullah Pasha constituted two main obstacles on the way of regional hegemony of another ambitious local ruler, the governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha. These two political figures prevented Muhammad Ali Pasha from entering Syria. As a powerful ruler who established his own central state in Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha wanted to expand his political power to Syria because of the economical ties between two regions. Above all this, another reason behind Muhammad Ali Pasha's ambitious politics was his grievance against Sultan Mahmud II who turned to a deaf ear

⁵³ Ibid. 22

⁵⁴ Caesar E. Farah, "The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-1861", (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p 8.

⁵⁵ Ibid,8.

to the pasha's repeated petitions to grant him the Syrian provinces⁵⁶. Muhammad Ali Pasha previously assisted Mahmud II during the Greek War of Independence when the Sultan promised the Egyptian governor the provinces of Morea and Crete. When Greece became independent, Muhammad Ali Pasha demanded Syria as compensation. Eventually, Muhammad Ali Pasha decided to take by force what he could not possess by diplomacy.

On 1 October 1831, Muhammad Ali's armies who were commanded by his son Ibrahim Pasha, crossed the borders of the *pashalik* of Acre and on 11 November laid siege to the heavily fortified city of Acre that had once withstood the assaults of Napoleon Bonaparte, as I have formerly mentioned⁵⁷. This attack of Muhammad Ali was successful and Acre fell in May 1832. Ibrahim Pasha quickly established his authority both in coastal and inland regions of Syria, then he advanced over Konya to Kütahya following a series of battles. Though intending to march on Istanbul⁵⁸, Muhammad Ali restrained this attempt of his son as a consequence of the Russian support of the Ottoman Empire in February 1833, when a Russian naval squadron entered the Bosphorous and anchored at Büyükdere. As a result of this development, Ibrahim Pasha was forced to enter into negotiation with the Ottomans and the Kütahya Treaty signed between two sides on 8 April 1833. This treaty legalized Muhammad Ali Pasha's hold on Syria⁵⁹. Egyptian occupation over Syria and Lebanon lasted between the years of 1831 and 1840.

When it comes to the effects of the Egyptian interregnum on Lebanon, according to Dick Douwes, Egyptian rule in Syria is generally depicted as a clear, if not a radical departure from the preceding Ottoman administrative traditions⁶⁰. As an answer to the

⁵⁶ A.L. Tibawi, "A Modern History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine", (London: Macmillan; New York, St. Martin's P., 1969), p.65.

⁵⁷ Caesar E. Farah, "The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-1861", (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p 13.

⁵⁸ Engin Akarlı, "The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920", (Berkeley: University of California Press), p 23.

⁵⁹ Dick Dowes, "The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression", (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p.197.

⁶⁰Ibid.191.

question of in which fields the Egyptian administration in Syria and Mount Lebanon realized this radical change firstly, it shifted the center of political administration from Acre to Damascus. This can be seen as a consequence of centralization policies of Ibrahim Pasha. As Moshe Maoz indicates in his study, the former division of country into *pashaliks* was abolished and all provinces of Syria and also Palestine were put under a civil governor-general, the Egyptian Sharif Pasha, who resided in Damascus and was represented in each district town by a *mutesallim* who was generally a local Arab⁶¹.

Secondly, the Egyptians established in contrast to the traditional regime of the Ottoman system, a higher degree of control over finances⁶². This means that, the new regime aimed to abolish the monopoly of *multezims*, who constituted an obstacle to a strong local and centralized authority, in tax collection. The new regime began to employ salaried tax collectors.

When it comes to the issue of monopolizing political power, it is important to indicate that just like the Ottoman state, Muhammad Ali Pasha and his son tried to represent the role of a distinct household which claimed absolute power and, consequently, the disposal of the entire revenue of its domains. In the process of creation of a new hierarchical and strong authority by the Egyptian notables, they also tried to replace the Ottoman center in the role of providers of justice. Ottoman center tried to establish their understanding of ruling and justice around quite ancient perspective which was named as “*Circle of Justice*”. According to this idea, as the Ottoman scholar Hasan Kafi had defined in *Usulü'l Hikem fi Nizamı'l Alem*, justice is specifically defined the ruler’s personal benevolence towards the *re’aya*, people who are ruled, whom he protects from excessive taxation and the oppression of the military elite⁶³. In addition to this, the Kurdish scholar İdris-i Bitlisi considers justice with the virtues which the ruler has to possess and these are benevolence, devotion, fidelity and

⁶¹ Moshe Maoz, “Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society”, (London: Clarendon Press, 1968), p.12.

⁶² Dick Doves, “The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression”, (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p.193

⁶³ Boğaç Ergene, “On Ottoman Justice: Interpretations in Conflict 1600-1800”, *Islamic Law and Society*, Vol.8, No.1, 2001, p.58.

beneficence⁶⁴. In very general, the ruler should provide the happiness and well-being of tax-payers which is an essential duty of the ruler for providing justice. However, even the new Egyptian rulers tried to procure this understanding and applied it, they failed to be successful.

According to Tibawi, the cause of discontent which emerged two years after the invasion which later would cost the Egyptians in men and treasure more than defeating Ottoman armies was Muhammad Ali's persistence in applying in Syria measures he had easily applied in Egypt⁶⁵. He applied heavy taxation, *corveé* and ordered the confiscation of the property and burning of the houses belonging to those Druzes who rejected to support Egyptians and defected to the Ottoman side. In addition, Ibrahim Pasha introduced a new tax with his father's advice, which was named as *al-fardah*, and was a kind of income tax payable by all males of all communities between the ages of fifteen and sixty at the rate of 12 percent of the income⁶⁶. This additional tax created a general unrest in society and prevented the new Egyptian rule to apply the circle of justice in a real sense.

Druzes as a community felt huge discontent about the regime of Ibrahim Pasha. During the invasion, Druze community and notables did not support the action of the Egyptians in contrast to Maronites and Bashir Shihab. For this reason, after Muhammad Ali invaded Egypt, he broke the power of the *muqata'ajis* and compelled recognition of non-Muslims in local government⁶⁷. Ibrahim Pasha also abolished certain distinctions which had vexed Christian pilgrims while at the same time paying European consuls for more attention than they have ever received under Ottoman rule⁶⁸. In addition to this,

⁶⁴ Ibid. 58.

⁶⁵ A.L. Tibawi, "A Modern History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine", (London: Macmillan; New York, St. Martin's P., 1969), p 72.

⁶⁶ Ibid. 72.

⁶⁷ Caesar E. Farah, "The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-1861", (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p 15.

⁶⁸ Ussama Makdisi, "The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.52.

Egyptian government also confiscated lands and properties belonging to Druze families and notables in order to punish them.

This existing unrest of the Druzes turned into an uprising against the Egyptian rule. As Makdisi indicates; Muhammad Ali was aware of the existing threat and he urged Ibrahim Pasha to consider the possibility of using Maronite mountaineers against the Druzes⁶⁹. So, Ibrahim Pasha decided to unarm Druzes and used Maronite community to suppress and prevent the Druze uprising.

All together, Egyptian Interregnum inevitably had certain important political and social consequences. Ibrahim Pasha created an alliance with Bashir Shihab and recognized him as the Grand Amir of Mount Lebanon. He settled Maronite peasants on confiscated lands of Druze people. Because of these reasons, many scholars accept the Egyptian interregnum as a breaking point in terms of the emergence of sectarian conflicts. More than this, the additional taxations, especially *al-fardah*, and the general conscription policies caused the emergence of a discontent toward the Egyptian regimes both among Maronite and Druze peasants, and this caused the emergence of a general uprising in the 1840 which will be mentioned in coming chapters. Furthermore, the Egyptian regime in Syria and the Mountain caused certain developments in the Porte too and this became one of the main motivations behind the *Tanzimat* era.

2.6. Tanzimat Era and 1840 Crisis

The first reforming edict of the Tanzimat era was the *Hatt-ı Şerif Of Gülhane* (Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber), which was promulgated on 3 November 1839. Beside well known reasons, I assert that there were two specific reasons behind the process. One was the international issues and the other was the aim to gain the support of the European powers against the rebellious Pasha of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, who expanded his power over Syria and threatened the integrity of Empire⁷⁰.

⁶⁹ Ibid.54.

⁷⁰ Moshe Maoz, "Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society", (London: Clarendon Press, 1968), p.21.

The year of 1839 was the time when Sultan Abdülmecid found himself under tremendous military pressure coming from İbrahim Pasha⁷¹. Before Abdülmecid acceded the throne, the Ottomans received another catastrophic defeat from the Egyptians on 23 June 1839 at Nizip. For this reason, an immediate need to strengthen the central authority emerged, combined with the need to assure the support of European diplomacy promulgated the *Gülhane* decree⁷².

When it comes to the main objectives of the Noble Rescript, as Maoz indicates in his study, Mustafa Reşid Pasha's concerns for reforming the administration and government was in reality not the crux of this rescript⁷³. Rather than this, the rescript appeared as a charter of rights for the Ottoman subject with the aim of taking both the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the Empire into consideration.

This year was the peak point of the existing social unrest both among Maronite and Druze communities towards İbrahim Pasha's and his supporter Amir Bashir's regime. This unrest was related especially about the issues of disarmament of the local people and compulsory conscription. Under such an atmosphere, reformation policy of the Porte had different effects. As Makdisi argues, the Ottoman state obviously did not take into account the demographic character of Mount Lebanon. To show his point, he asks a very important question: How was the equality of treatment of religious communities going to be reconciled with demographic majorities and minorities, especially after the Maronite Patriarch declared the Maronites to be the "majority" of the population?⁷⁴ This attitude of Maronite Patriarch increased the tension which emerged especially with the era of Muhammed Ali between Druze and Maronite communities.

⁷¹ Ussama Makdisi, "The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.57

⁷² Ibid. 57.

⁷³ Moshe Maoz, "Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society", (London: Clarendon Press, 1968), p.22.

⁷⁴ Ussama Makdisi, "The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.60.

In Mount Lebanon, the arrival of France and Great Britain to the region and the declaration of the *Tanzimat* spelled the end of the emirate system. The *Gülhane* Rescript introduced a new principle of administrative equality between the empire's Muslim and non-Muslim populations and according to Fawaz, because of this the Muslims began to lose ground to non-Muslim population whom they began to perceive as "outsiders"⁷⁵. The emphasis on the equality between the subjects belonging to different sects negatively affected the already existing tensions between Maronites and Druzes stemming from the discriminative politics of Ibrahim Pasha. More crucial than this, the *Tanzimat* stressed principles of "liberty" and "legitimacy" in the person of Sultan, who underlined just rule irrespective of religious creed⁷⁶. In addition to this, the role of Sultan as the father figure he provides his benevolence to his entire subject without discrimination based on their religious beliefs indicated clearly in *Gülhane* Rescript. However, as I have already mentioned at the beginning, since the early ages, Mount Lebanon used to be a quite autonomous region where people had never felt the existence of the sultan in local politics. Even if they would have accepted his authority, it was quite late for providing equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the region since the Maronite Patriarch had already become politicized and declared the Maronites to be the biggest population of the Mountain⁷⁷.

In 1838 revolts broke out against the existing Egyptian regime. The revolt of Druze notables and Christian *ahali* first emerged in Dair al-Qamar. The reasons behind this revolt were the taxes and previous confiscation of lands belonging to Druze notables. As it happened, Druze people in exile also started to demand their confiscated properties. This was also the time when the *Gülhane* Rescript started to show its effect and both the British government and the Porte promised the returning back of the confiscated lands under the condition of obedience to the authority of the Sultan.

⁷⁵ Leila Fawaz, "An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.22.

⁷⁶ Ussama Makdisi, "The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p 60.

⁷⁷ Ibid.60.

In 1840, Ottoman state succeeded to terminate the Egyptian interregnum in Syria through the help of ally powers. Ibrahim Pasha left the region and also Amir Bashir II left the Mountain with them. Instead Bashir III, Qasim (r. 1840-1842) appointed as the new Grand Amir. However, the withdrawal of Egyptian army from Egypt created a power vacuum in the region. A violent struggle emerged between the Maronite and Druze people. Efforts of elite groups following the violence of 1841 to re-inscribe strict political and social boundaries reached their climax in December 1842⁷⁸.

With the *Tanzimat*, Ottoman centre was in an effort to rule Mount Lebanon directly by appointing a governor. After the Bashir III was removed, the Porte appointed Ömer Pasha from İstanbul, but he could not stop the unrest in the Mountain⁷⁹. As the new governor of Mount Lebanon, Ömer Pasha's main concern was strengthening the political control of the center. In order to succeed in his aim, the first thing he was supposed to do was to put an end to all thought of a Shihab restoration⁸⁰. As he established himself in the palace of Bayt al-Din, he began to rally around him all those elements in the country who were already opposed to the Shihabs. He aimed to winning their support by showing them special favour. As a part of his agenda, he focused on the Druze feudal chiefs who had been dispossessed during the rule of Bashir II and Bashir III, Ömer Pasha gave back their old estates and reconfirmed in their traditional prerogatives⁸¹. He also appointed some of Druze notables as his advisers and agents.

At the same time, Mount Lebanon had become internationalized. Existence of missionaries and the already well-developed relations of France with the Maronites and Britain with the Druzes contributed to this process. As Salibi indicates in his study, the special relations between the Maronites and France dated back to early Ottoman times; but it was only in 1841 that the Maronites began to seek advice and support exclusively from the French consuls, and that the Druzes began to look upon the French consulate in

⁷⁸ Ibid.67.

⁷⁹ Leila Fawaz, "An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.27.

⁸⁰ Kamal Salibi, "The Modern History of Lebanon", (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.53.

⁸¹ Ibid. 53.

Beirut with feelings of hostility⁸². The strengthening of relations between the Maronite community of the Mountain and French consulates was also a result of Ömer Pasha's policies which supported Druzes.

The reason behind Ömer Pasha's failure in his aim of stopping the unrest in the Mountain was the decline of the Anglo- Druze support of Ömer Pasha. The Druze leaders began to feel that it was by their own efforts that the Shihabs had been overthrown and the regime of direct Ottoman administration established and they were therefore unwilling to receive dictation from the Turks⁸³. As a result of this reaction of Druzes against his government, Ömer Pasha turned for support to the Maronites and he began to employ a number of them in his service as troops under their own leaders. This action of Ömer Pasha alienated the Druzes still further and by the time the petitions in praise of Ömer Pasha's administration were being circulated in the Mountain, especially among the Druzes. As a result of the emergence of this tension between the Druzes and Ömer Pasha, Britain was no longer bound to support the Pasha's position and she was now able to join the other European powers in protesting against the validity of the petitions⁸⁴.

In 1842 Ottoman foreign minister and the ambassadors of Great Powers came together in Istanbul to discuss about how to find a solution for filling the existing power vacuum and stop the conflict between Maronites and Druzes which emerged toward the end of Egyptian occupation. Different parties suggested different plans. To France the only proper solution for the Lebanese question was to restore the Emirate to the country, preferably with a Shihab as emir. Naturally, Ottoman state completely opposed to the French suggestion and instead, the Porte supported complete integration of the Mountain in the Ottoman Empire, the region would be administered directly by the Pasha of Sidon. Even though the Ottoman plan supported by Russia, both France and Britain opposed to this suggestion. The Austrian Chancellor Prince Metternich's plan was a sort of compromise between the French and Ottoman points of view and he proposed division

⁸² Ibid. 55.

⁸³ Ibid. 59.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 59.

of the Mount Lebanon into two administrative districts⁸⁵. As a result of this meeting, a new plan was introduced a new administration for the government of Mount Lebanon which was called the Double Qaimaqamate⁸⁶. This new system took effect in 1843 and, with a revision in 1845; it remained in place until 1861. When it comes to its logic, it divided the mountain into two self-governing districts, each under a district governor named *qaimaqam*⁸⁷. This division was determined according to the demographic weight of each of the ethnic groups in a specific region. For this reason the northern district was under the rule of a Maronite and the southern district was under the rule of a Druze. The *qaimaqams* were appointed directly by the Ottomans and these *qaimaqams* were accountable to the Ottoman governor in Sidon⁸⁸.

In theory, dividing the Mountain into two regions according to ethnic population seemed applicable to both the Ottoman centre and European powers. However, in practice the population of Lebanon was not divided homogenously into two distinct parts. For this reason it was inevitable to see Maronite peasants under the rule of Druze *qaimaqam* or the vice versa. In addition to this, the powers of the *qaimaqams* were restricted to their own districts, which created additional problems for the new system. In order to solve this issue, the Ottoman authorities decided to appoint one Christian and one Druze agent or *wakil* to exercise judicial and tax-collection taxes collection taxes on behalf of the landlords in the mixed south⁸⁹.

⁸⁵ Ibid.63.

⁸⁶ Leila Fawaz, “An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p 27

⁸⁷ Ibid. 27.

⁸⁸ Ibid. 28.

⁸⁹ Ibid. 29.

3. CHAPTER II

LEBANESE CIVIL WAR, EUROPEAN INTERVENTION AND THE REGLEMENT ORGANIQUE

The end of the Egyptian occupation in Mount Lebanon caused emergence of Double Qaimaqamate system as I have covered in the first chapter. Neither centralizing reforms of the Ottoman Empire via the *Gülhane* Rescript nor this new political system brought an end to the hostility between Druzes and Maronites which reached to a high level during the rule of Ibrahim Pasha. In order to understand the path that led to the emergence of the catastrophic civil strife which was tried to be solved by the *mutasarrıfıyat* system, it is a necessity to look at the political changes and social effects of the policies followed after 1841.

3.1. Political Change after 1841

The Double Qaimaqamate system officially began with the appointment of Ömer Pasha in 1842 and lasted until 1858. As a governor of Mount Lebanon, Ömer Pasha's main concern was to put an end to all hopes for a Shihab restoration period⁹⁰. It should be noted that the Maronite Church continued to remain loyal to the notion of a Shihabi emirate⁹¹. After Bashir II was sent to exile, the Maronite community in particular wanted him back and they were not happy to see Bashir Qasim in his place.

In order to make direct Ottoman rule of the Mountain applicable, Ömer Pasha tried to establish and strengthen his own authority in the region. At the beginning, he had the support of British Empire and Druze society. However, Ömer Pasha's short tenure between the years of 1841 and 1843 as governor came to an abrupt end and the Double Qaimaqamate did not work as it had been planned. The main reason behind the failure of the Double Qaimaqamate was that the elites of both Maronite and Druze communities were unhappy about the new system since one of the main aims of the new regime was the termination of the local feudal structure. Although rural elites were not

⁹⁰ Kamal Salibi, "The Modern History of Lebanon", (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.53.

⁹¹ Engin Akarlı, "The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920", (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.26.

happy about the system and the partition decision of the Mountain into two districts, they however quickly adapted to the *fait accompli* of the partition. They still maintained their old-regime rank and titles and they were aware of the importance of their sectarian identity. They began to struggle for convincing both the Sublime Porte and European Powers about the justice of their cause as a coherent community which has the right to win the political and economic control of the majority of lands and also the mixed villages⁹². Secondly, even though the Ottoman state aimed at abolishing the feudal structure and preventing emergence of the new conflicts between the two religious communities within the new system, the division of the Mountain into two did not work as it had been planned by the European powers and the Porte. In theory, the northern district was supposed to be a homogenous “Christian” area ruled by a Christian district governor and the southern district was to be a “distinctively” Druze region ruled by a Druze district governor⁹³. However, as Salibi states, from the very beginning the Double Qaimaqamate presented serious difficulties since it had been instituted on the false assumption that the Beirut-Damascus road divided the Mountain into two distinct and ethnically homogenous parts⁹⁴. Both northern and southern districts were not as much homogenous as it was thought to be. Significant numbers of Druze and Maronite people were living on both sides. As Leila Fawaz indicates, although the European powers and the Porte created the Double Qaimaqamate system, neither Druzes nor the Maronites of the Mountain acted on the assumption that the region had been divided into two. As a result, the new administrative units created more problems than they solved because they did not correspond to the social realities of the nineteenth century Mount Lebanon⁹⁵. Finally, the Druzes’ expectations could not be met by this new system. Due to their problems and sufferings during the ten-year reign of İbrahim Pasha, Druzes were the ones who provoked and started the revolt against Egyptian rule in the whole

⁹² Ussama Makdisi, “The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.80.

⁹³ *Ibid.* 79.

⁹⁴ Kamal Salibi, “The Modern History of Lebanon”, (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.63.

⁹⁵ Leila Fawaz, “An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p 28.

geography. Despite their successful struggle against İbrahim Pasha and his authority, especially Druze sheikhs claimed that their time-honored feudal superiority over the Christians was now denied by the Ottoman state and Ömer Pasha himself⁹⁶.

In order to understand better the discontent of Druze sheikhs, it is also important to look at the Ottoman state's policy over the region. With effect of the ideas about the political centralization, which was even more furthered by the *Tanzimat* ideology, the Porte and those Ottoman officials appointed administrators to the peripheral regions believed that reform and state authority should go hand in hand. Especially in the case of Mount Lebanon, according to the perspective of the center, public order and security could be guaranteed only by bringing local notables to heel and by removing their "stupid, silly and fickle" followers from the realm of politics⁹⁷. This understanding constituted the reason of the policy of the Porte for not returning the lands to the Druze notables who were their original owners which were previously confiscated by İbrahim Pasha. Significantly the Porte had made promises to Druze lords to turn back their lands during the civil strife against the Egyptian regime.

In spite all these existing discontents of elite groups in the Mountain, it was possible to see economic and social developments in different part of the region, such as Deir al-Qamar and Zahleh. Both Zahleh and Deir al-Qamar were two predominantly Christian towns and the number of Christian population and prosperity increased especially during the Double Qaimaqamate regime⁹⁸. Deir al-Qamar had been the administrative and economic center of the Mountain beginning with the seventeenth century. However, by the 1850s, Deir al-Qamar had established itself as the richest town in Mount Lebanon, as a Christian city in the heart of the Druze-dominated southern districts of the region. It also continued to protect its importance as an

⁹⁶Kamal Salibi, "The Modern History of Lebanon", (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.59.

⁹⁷ Ussama Makdisi, "The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p 75. Also see Musa Çadırcı, "Tanzimat Sürecinde Türkiye Ülker Yönetimi", (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 2007), p.273-285.

⁹⁸ Leila Fawaz, "Zahle and Dayr al-Qamar: Two Market Towns of Mount Lebanon during the Civil War of 1860" in "Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus", ed. Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffarlills, (London: The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992), p. 51.

administrative center also during the Double Qaimaqamate era⁹⁹. When it comes to Zahleh, it is crucial to say that, by the mid-nineteenth century, Zahleh had become Mount Lebanon's largest commercial center and trade was a natural outgrowth of the town due to its favorable geographical location¹⁰⁰. Due to their economical developments, both Zahleh and Deir al-Qamar's prosperity grew as reflected in their population figures. According to data which were provided by Leila Fawaz, at the end of the eighteenth century, Zahleh's population was less than a thousand people or two hundred households. When it comes to the beginning of the nineteenth century, Deir al-Qamar had a population of around 4.000 people. By the late 1850s, the population had reached a level of between 10.000 and 12.000 in Zahleh and between 7.000 and 10.000 in Deir al-Qamar¹⁰¹.

What do all these data about the population and prosperity of these important Christian cities of the Mountain show us? First of all, it is important to indicate that, the internationalization process of the issues related with this geography especially following the Egyptian invasion had an impact on the evolution of certain towns of the Mountain into new and crucial trade centers. Secondly, the rising prosperity of the Christian towns increased the discontent of the Druze notables about their conditions under the new system. It needs to be underlined that, starting with 1845; both in political and economic sense, a new Mount Lebanon was coming into being¹⁰². In the words of Youssef Choueiri, the Mountain's economic, political and social structures were entangled within the multiplex dynamism of Ottoman reform and European expansionism¹⁰³. This situation caused the emergence of a new social crisis.

The above-mentioned economic developments in the northern district of Mount Lebanon did not only cause the emergence of discontent among the Druze notables, it

⁹⁹ Ibid. 50-51.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 51.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.51.

¹⁰² Youssef M. Choueiri, "Ottoman Reform and Lebanese Patriotism" in "Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus", ed. Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffarlills, (London: The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992), p.67

¹⁰³ Ibid. 67.

caused the emergence of discontent among Maronite peasants of the northern district, too. The expansion of European trade and the consequent development of a new urban bourgeoisie and its strengthening weakened the stability of the feudal economy¹⁰⁴. This situation became one of the basic reasons of the Kisrawan revolt under the leadership of Tanyus Shahin which can be considered as the beginning point of the 1858 Civil War.

Looking at the previous disturbances, problems of political representation both in the southern and northern districts of the Mountain due to heterogeneous population as well as the changes in the political system and social structure of the region as a result of the post-1841 developments did ignite the fuse for the turning of existing tension between Druzes and Maronites sects into a physical strife. The Maronites in the southern district of the Mountain who suffered from the Druze hegemony attacked Druze villages in 1845. Different than the case in 1841, the Christians and the Druzes were equally prepared for violent action and this time it were the Christians who struck the first blow¹⁰⁵. As an eye-witness, Colonel Churchil describes the events of 1845 as in the following:

“In the month of April 1845, the long gathering storm burst, by a general attack, from the Maronites on all the Druze quarters. In the district of the Shoof, they were led on by their bishop, crufix in hand, after having obtained the sanction of the Turkish officer stationed there for the assault”¹⁰⁶.

In general, Churchil sees the Ottoman government as the supporter of Druzes against the Maronites and blames the Porte both for the 1845 and 1858 incidents. However, I think that, the main concern of the Ottoman state especially in the post-1841 era was to provide peace and stability in the region. In order to settle the conflict between the two sects, Istanbul sent Şekib Efendi who then was the Foreign Minister of the Empire to the region in 1845. Şekib Efendi’s first action was to place under arrest

¹⁰⁴ Samir Khalaf, “Lebanon’s Predicament”, (New York: Columbia University, 1987), p.39.

¹⁰⁵ Kamal Salibi, “The Modern History of Lebanon”, (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.68.

¹⁰⁶ Colonel Churchil, “Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860”, (London: Bernard Quatrach, 1862), p.91

the most important Lebanese leaders of both sects, including the Christian and Druze *qaimaqams* in order to prevent any resistance to the measures he intended to take¹⁰⁷.

Afterwards, the Ottoman Foreign Minister undertook negotiations with the local parties and foreign diplomats in order to reform the existing Double Qaimaqamate system and to determine a set of regulations for the administration of the two districts. Finally, on 29 October 1845, the *Reglement* prepared by Şekib Efendi was communicated to the European consuls and its provisions immediately became effective¹⁰⁸. According to this *Reglement*, Lebanon continued to remain divided into a Druze and a Christian *qaimaqamate* and each headed by a *qaimaqam* appointed and removable by the governor of Sidon. To assist them, each *qaimaqam* was to have a council which was going to be composed of a deputy *qaimaqam*, a judge and an adviser for each of the Sunnite, Druze, Maronite, Greek Orthodox and also Greek Catholic sects, and an adviser for the Shiites¹⁰⁹. It is possible to say that, this advisory council was the most significant measure of Şekib Efendi's *Reglement* since these advisors were representing the six major communities of the Mountain¹¹⁰. According to Akarlı, these regulations which were revised in 1850 were the first systematic attempt to provide the Mountain with a bureaucratic governmental structure; it also prepared the ground for establishment of the future *Mutasarrifiyat* regime¹¹¹.

3.2.1858 Lebanon Civil War

The revolt of 1840 and the involvement of peasants in the political events of the time might have contributed to putting an end to both the Egyptian occupation and to the reign of Bashir II. However, as I have previously mentioned, it did little to transform

¹⁰⁷ Kamal Salibi, "The Modern History of Lebanon", (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.68.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. 71.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.71.

¹¹⁰ Engin Akarlı, "The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920", (Berkeley: University of California Press), p 28.

¹¹¹ Ibid. 28.

the feudal system which was the source of grievances and oppression of the peasants of the Mountain¹¹².

However, it was again the feudal structure of Mount Lebanon which constituted one of the important factors leading to the emergence of the violent events of 1858; it is not true to describe the whole story only as a peasant revolt against the oppressor sheikhs. The Civil War was also a byproduct of the ideological transformation of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon in terms of their identities and its effect on the way they began to describe the land in which they were living. As Makdisi states, the process of sectarianizing identity was immensely complex. He continues as:

“...New sectarian fears and possibilities still had to contend with old-regime solidarities and geographies. For a sectarian politics to cohere, for it to become hegemonic in a Gramscian sense, it would have to become an expression of everyday life; it would have to stamp itself indelibly on geography and history. In this task, as with so much else in this era of reform, the interplay between local and foreign played an immeasurable role.”¹¹³

As can be seen in Makdisi’s statement, the Mountain was going into an ideological transformation and sectarianism was one of the crucial issues that should be taken into consideration. It is not possible to totally understand the changes in the Mountain and the way to the civil strife without examining factors such as international intervention, policies of the Ottoman state and existing social tension between the Maronites and the Druzes and division of both parties into two hostile camps. It is important to say that all these factors, partition and the violence which commenced as early as 1845 cleared the way for sectarian paths of development¹¹⁴.

All these transformations also caused the emergence of new ideological perspectives about the future of the Mountain both in Maronite and Druze community.

¹¹² Samir Khalaf, “Lebanon’s Predicament”, (New York: Columbia University, 1987), p.38

¹¹³ Ussama Makdisi, “The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.78.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. 81.

One of the examples to these new perspectives could be seen in the writings of Bishop Murad. Bishop Murad represented an idea of a Christian-dominated Mount Lebanon and in this social organization Druzes would be reduced into a subordination position¹¹⁵. In essence his aim was not to reform the social order of the Mountain and rather than that, he wanted to stamp a Christian identity on a new possible order¹¹⁶.

Inherently, Bishop Murad was not the only one who had a vision about any possible new political and social structure for the Mountain. For instance, Jesuits had efforts to reform local Christianity, however worked in precisely the opposite direction and promoted segregated Christian spaces rather than a heterogeneous social organization with a Druze minority. Another example was Butrus al-Bustani, son of a Maronite family in Mount Lebanon. Bustani had a solid educational background that was possible in Syria region due to the presence of missionary schools. Even though during 1840s Bustani experienced a conversion to Protestantism as a result of his long association with missionaries, in the mid 1850s he was converted to a political ideal which was Ottomanism¹¹⁷. For this reason, when the Ottoman state declared the Reform Edict (Hatt-i Hümayun) in February 1856, Bustani realized that it was an important step toward integrating the Empire's communities into the social and political structure of the state and establishing the political structure of the Empire in a new basis¹¹⁸.

3.3. The Kisrawan Revolt

It should be stated that, the issues related to sectarianism and transformation of the feudal system of Mount Lebanon cannot be examined separately from the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire and its periphery. So, it would be a big mistake to treat the sectarian policies and events of the Mountain as something related with the “backwardness” of the Mountain.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. 81.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.84

¹¹⁷ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Christians between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus Al-Bustani”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.11, No.3 (May, 1980), p.289

¹¹⁸ Ibid. 289

The main reason behind the Kisrawan Revolt was actually the desperate efforts of Druze and Maronite *muqatajis* in different parts of Mount Lebanon to safeguard their interests against the ever - increasing political and social transformations. For instance, they blocked an Ottoman attempt to conduct a cadastral survey as a basic step toward the proper registration of land and they while at the same time assuming full proprietorship of as many lands as possible within their reach¹¹⁹. In addition to this, as a result of the strengthening of the Jesuits in the northern district of the Mountain, Rome began to intervene in political and even everyday life of the Christian population in the region. Some Maronite bishops such as Bishop Bustani began to develop distrust towards the papal legate in Syria. These Maronite clergymen even claimed that “God became angry with the Christians of Lebanon and sought to punish them through the papal legate Bernoni then Padre Berzoli who served as the secretary of the papal legate in Syria”¹²⁰.

Calendar controversy constituted the peak point of the tension between Rome and the Christians of the Mountain. Especially the Greek population of Zahleh reacted to it. It is possible to say that even the Uniate Christians were equally exasperated but not so much over the issue of papal legate as over Rome insisting that they change their Eastern calendar for the Latin¹²¹. In short, both branches of the Greek Church reacted to this imposition of the Papal authority. The upheaval started when the Greek Catholic Patriarch issued a decree and accepted arranging the date of Easter according to Latin calendar¹²². In the eve of the Kisrawan revolt, this unrest caused the emergence of an inner division within the Christian community.

It is possible to say that, the conditions which caused the emergence of Kisrawan peasant revolt of 1858 actually began to be formed four years earlier than the revolt, i.e. in 1854, when Bashir Ahmad Abu'l-Lam succeeded his kinsman Haydar Abu'l-Lam as

¹¹⁹ Engin Akarlı, “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.29.

¹²⁰ Caesar E. Farah, “The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-1861”, (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p.528.

¹²¹ Ibid. 528.

¹²² Ibid. 528.

Christian *qaimaqam* of the northern district¹²³. *Qaimaqam* Haydar died in May 1854 after his eleven years of loyal service to the Sultan and his government. A struggle over his replacement started, leading to unrest in Maronite society¹²⁴. Haydar Abu'l Lam was temporarily replaced by his nephew Bashir Assaf. Assaf was young and he was well liked for his personal qualities. However, he did not have any interest in the office. From Abu Lam family, Amin Mansur showed open interest for this position. However, the governor appointed Bashir Ahmed of Brummana who was quite aggressive and a constant thorn in to the Haydar clan and more inclined to Islam than to Maronitism¹²⁵. In addition to Maronite suspicions about Bashir Ahmed's Christianity, he was known to be born as a Druze and the clergy were disturbed by his lack of attachment to the church¹²⁶. Bashir Ahmed's appointment as the new Christian *qaimaqam* only increased the existing tensions among the Maronites and consequently the Maronite community was divided into two as the supporters of Assaf (Assafis) and the supporters of Ahmed (Ahmedis)¹²⁷.

In addition to all these intra-communal and administrative problems, the Reform Edict of 1856 turned to be an additional source of general unrest in the whole region which inevitably affected the crises in Kisrawan specifically. The problems that Sublime Porte faced during 1853 Crimean War, showed the necessity of continuing centralisation policies by the centre in this peripheral region. To mention briefly, the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853 caused the emergence of a momentary surge of patriotic expressions of loyalty to the sultan. In order to show this loyalty, for instance Abu Lam emirs volunteered their services to the sultan for the war with Russia and they offered to recruit Christians for the army. Druze chieftains including representing families such as Arslan, Abu Nakad and Talhuq together with their *qaimaqam* Amin

¹²³ Kamal Salibi, "The Modern History of Lebanon", (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.80

¹²⁴ Caesar E. Farah, "The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-1861", (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p.501

¹²⁵ Ibid. 501.

¹²⁶ Kamal Salibi, "The Modern History of Lebanon", (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.120.

¹²⁷ Caesar E. Farah, "The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-1861", (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p.500.

Arslan also volunteered for service in the Ottoman army in order to fight in defense of the Ottoman state¹²⁸. Ottoman state also paid to these families for their preparations for the war. When the reporting time for soldiers arrived, only 912 men appeared and among them only one out of three was a Druze¹²⁹.

The Crimean War, led by an Ottoman-European alliance against Russia, resulted in an increase in the level of international intervention in politics of the Ottoman. As a consequence of international diplomatic pressure, the *Islahat* Reform Edict was issued. This new *Hatt-ı Hümayun*, among other issues, offered Christians exemption from military service in exchange for a fee which was named as *badal* of 5000 piasters per adult male¹³⁰. Christians opposed this new practice since they argued that this exemption fee was introduced the old *haraj* which the rescript abolished in a new guise¹³¹. In opposition to the Christian community, governors and local emirs supported this new policy since they perceived it as a new income.

Specifically in Kisrawan, in addition to all these developments and problems, local people were suffering under the rule of Khazin Shaikhs. Much of the land in Kisrawan was controlled by the shaykhs of the Khazin family and their relationship with their peasants was dictated by the *iqta* system¹³². The lease contract between the shaykh and the peasant was regulating the peasant's responsibilities such as the amount of land tax he was supposed to pay, deposit, etc. and the landlord had the right to dictate what the peasant was to cultivate on his parcel and also to extract other forms of *corveé* not only from the peasant who signed the lease but also from his family; for instance the women of peasant's family could be required to work in the shaykh's household¹³³. All these regulations caused significant suffering of Kisrawan peasants under the harsh rule of the Khazin family.

¹²⁸ Ibid.499.

¹²⁹ Ibid. 499.

¹³⁰ Ibid. 531.

¹³¹ Ibid. 531.

¹³² Leila Fawaz, "An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.43.

¹³³ Ibid. 43.

Even though the Khazin family continued their oppressive rule over Kisrawan, this did not mean that the mentality in the region was the same with the mentality of pre-1841 period. In addition to all its administrative regulations; reforms that came together with the *Tanzimat*, also promoted a secular Ottoman nationalism which we will go into details in the coming chapter and it proposed the safeguarding of the private property. Ussama Makdisi indicates that, as Selim Deringil also mention, *Tanzimat* modernization also produced a legitimacy crisis, a lag between the expectations of the empire's official elites and the absorption of the new ideology into society¹³⁴.

Ussama Makdisi properly evaluates the Kisrawan incident as a crisis in the communal representation unfolded in the Mountain and as a struggle over the meaning of community and geography in the post-partition world¹³⁵. This is an important point of view, because just to explain the whole event as “Kisrawani peasants rose against the Khazins and their allies” would not be enough. Class struggle certainly exists, but this confrontation was more than a physical struggle for the control of land. All these uprisings cannot be thought separately from the spread of sectarianism in the region.

Tanyus Shahin can be seen both in ideological and practical senses as the leader of the revolt. To mention briefly, Shahin's personal background facilitated his effort to present a subversive “Christian” alternative to the status quo. He was born into poverty and became a muleteer associated with the Lazarist missionary school in Rayfun¹³⁶. The case of Tanyus Shahin shows us the probable ideological effect of missionary schools in the Mountain. We know that, Lazarists obtained for him credentials from the French consulate in Beirut that allowed him to travel into cities and this allowed him to keep close company with village priests¹³⁷.

¹³⁴ Ussama Makdisi, “Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon”, *Comparative Studies in society and History*, Vol. 42, No.1, (January 2000), p.194

¹³⁵ Ussama Makdisi, “The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.96

¹³⁶ Ussama Makdisi, “Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon”, *Comparative Studies in society and History*, Vol. 42, No.1, (January 2000), p.194

¹³⁷ *Ibid.* 194

Tanyus Shahin's expectations from the Reform Edict were quite different; in fact he justified the revolt by the decree. As Makdisi claims, the Sultan and his reforming bureaucrats assumed that traditional social order which provides the separation of high and low and also elite and non-elite would remain unchanged by reform. This means that, Ottoman officials thought that the right to religious equality in a modernizing empire was possible and desirable only if all subjects preserved their station in life and in the social structure¹³⁸. However, there were also alternative ways of reading and interpreting the *Tanzimat* like those belonging to Tanyus Shahin. Shahin believed that the *Tanzimat* mandated equality not only between but also within religious communities¹³⁹. According to Shahin, the preservation of post-*Tanzimat* Christianity was dependent on the liberation of Kisrawan from Khazin domination and, soon enough, from the grip that the Druze landowners maintained over Christians in the mixed districts¹⁴⁰.

When the partisans of Bashir Assaf were busy with organizing their rallies and drafting their petitions against Bashir Ahmed, the peasants in different villages of Kisrawan held their own meetings to discuss their grievances against their landlords¹⁴¹. They even introduced their own administrative bodies and choose their own representatives. The young men of each village in Kisrawan assembled and organized themselves under the leadership of a *shaykh shabab*, which can be translated as young shaykh, in order to defend their community and interests against the feudal injustices and the oppression of Khazin family¹⁴². At the beginning Khazin shaykhs supported the political actions of peasants because they thought that this organized peasant

¹³⁸ Ussama Makdisi, "The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.105

¹³⁹ Ibid. 105.

¹⁴⁰ Ussama Makdisi, "Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon", *Comparative Studies in society and History*, Vol. 42, No.1, (January 2000), p.195

¹⁴¹ Kamal Salibi, "The Modern History of Lebanon", (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.84.

¹⁴² Ibid. 84.

community might be manipulated against the Christian *qaimaqam*. However, later on the Kisrawan uprising took a quite violent form¹⁴³.

On 3 January 1859, the peasants' spokesman declared the demands of the crowd and demanded equality in payment of taxes, abolition of extra legal recruitment and also right to elect their own representatives¹⁴⁴. These demands reflected clearly the interpretation of Kisrawani peasants of the provisions of the *Hatt-ı Hümayuns*¹⁴⁵. By April 1859, 600 members of the Khazin family, shaykhs, women and children had been chased out of their homes with only their wives' to show for themselves¹⁴⁶. Their fortunes consisted of land and payments in kind from the peasants. No one from the Khazin family lost their lives in this struggle.

3.4. The Context of the Civil War

As previously mentioned, the role of the Kisrawan Revolt is quite crucial in the way of the development of 1860 events. Because of this historical importance of the Kisrawan incident; Leila Fawaz sees it as the beginning point of the civil war and claims that even if it cannot be accepted as the beginning of the civil war, it is for sure that two Christian groups, Kisrawanis and Zahalnis, helped to unleash it¹⁴⁷.

Even though Leila Fawaz's argument is open to discussion, it is quite obvious that the rebellion which emerged in Kisrawan unsettled the rest of Mount Lebanon and especially in the mixed districts of the south, it increased the social tension and it was only a matter of time before existing political, social and economic grievances were channeled into sectarian fighting and the civil war of 1860¹⁴⁸.

¹⁴³ Ibid. 84

¹⁴⁴ Caesar E. Farah, "The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-1861", (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p 533

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. 533

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.534.

¹⁴⁷ Leila Fawaz, "An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860", (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.49

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. 45.

The success of Kisrawani peasants against the shaykhs of Khazin family raised the hopes of peasants throughout Mount Lebanon, especially among the peasants who inhabited Druze districts¹⁴⁹. However, as the sectarian hostilities were quite strong in the region, the Druze peasants were distrustful to their Christian neighbors and they were reluctant to join them in risings against the Druze shaykhs¹⁵⁰.

Accumulation of all these social and political tensions exploited and caused the turn of all these complaints and demands into a civil war in 1859 in Beit Meri. Two children, one of them a Maronite and the other a Druze, began to fight in a street of Beit Meri on 30 August 1859¹⁵¹. The parents of these children involved into the quarrel and this simple fight between two children became quite serious. The outraged father of the Maronite boy backed by three friends reprimanded the Druze and demanded punishment. The Druze father felt being insulted because of this counter attack from the Maronite side; he appealed to his relatives and his co-religionists and they came back the morning after in order to demand an apology from the Maronites¹⁵². According to the memoirs of Colonel Churchill, the Maronite side was mistook this action of Druzes for a challenge and they rushed to arms, and fired a general volley on the Druzes, following it up by a strong attack¹⁵³. According to the data provided by Churchill, the Druzes were driven out of the village with a huge loss at the end of the first attack of Maronites. And he continues:

“... The next day, a Sunday, the Druzes rallied; a desperate encounter, which lasted all the day, ensued between the two sects, and the Christians were in their turn

¹⁴⁹ Kamal Salibi, “The Modern History of Lebanon”, (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.87

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. 87

¹⁵¹ Leila Fawaz, “An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.45

¹⁵² Ibid.45.

¹⁵³ Colonel Churchil, “Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860”, (London: Bernard Quatrach, 1862), p.133.

defeated. On the whole, however, the Druzes had lost in killed twenty-eight more than the Christians, who on this occasion had displayed unusual bravery.”¹⁵⁴

At the same time, a Christian band which consisted of 260 to 300 men and led by Tanyus Shahin, who was then the *shaykh al-shahab* of Reifun and also the leader of Kisrawani revolt, came to Naccache which was a village half-way between Kisrawan and Beirut, to appropriate the silk crop of the Kisrawani shaykhs¹⁵⁵. To the Druzes, to see the presence of Kisrawanis in the plain of Beirut and so close to Matn region where the Druzes were living among the Christians, was equal to a provocation. On May 26, Hurşid Pasha who was the Ottoman governor general in Beirut, had established a military camp a mile away from Naccashe on the Damascus road¹⁵⁶. According to the memoirs of Churchill, he there summoned both the Druze and Maronite chiefs to his presence, and peremptorily enjoined them to keep the peace¹⁵⁷. At once order was re-established but Druzes did not remain silent to the Beit Meri attack of Maronites.

Hurşid Pasha has been considered as one of the political actors to blame for the occurrence of the Civil War. Churchill says that the action of Hurşid Pasha obviously showed the power of the Turks over the people of the Mountain to enforce obedience to their commands. However, later as the tension began to increase between two communities, the Porte proceeded to draw closer relations which already existed between them and the Druzes¹⁵⁸. Churchill also claims that, several Druze shaykhs took the unusual step of spending the winter of 1859-1860 at Beirut. Here their conferences with the Turkish authorities were long and quite frequent, and almost of daily occurrence¹⁵⁹.

After the Beit Meri attack and the march of the Kisrawanis, fighting between the two sects started to spread to the whole region. On May 31, fighting broke out in Arqub

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.133.

¹⁵⁵ Leila Fawaz, “An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.50

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. 50

¹⁵⁷ Colonel Churchil, “Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860”, (London: Bernard Quatrigh, 1862), p.50.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. 138

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. 138

and the region around Zahleh¹⁶⁰. Zahalnis were in rush to attack to the Druzes in retaliation for their attacks on the Christians of Arqub district. However, on their way to Zahleh, they were entrapped by the Druzes¹⁶¹.

All the attacks of the Druzes and the problems of Maronite community about their leaders and military organization caused the spread of panic among the Christian community of the Mountain. The condition of the Christians of Ba'abda and Gharb districts is clearly described by Henry Harris Jessup, who was an American missionary in Syria region and was living in 'Abay which was the seat of Abu Nakads, at the time¹⁶². He says that:

“On Saturday the 26th, we made an American flag to hoist over the mission premises as a protection in case the hordes from Hauran should invade this district, for we had no fear from the Lebanon Druzes. The whole population were in a state of apprehension. Bodies of armed Druzes, horse and foot, marched from village to village, singing their weird song, ‘How sweet, how sweet to kill the Christians’. ... At ten o'clock we went down to the little church under Mr. Calhoun's house. That church was an old tank or reservoir belonging to the Im Hassein house which was burned in 1845, and repaired and occupied by Mr. Calhoun. It was my turn to preach. I looked down on a company of anxious faces. I had begun the service and was reading the first verse of ‘My faith looks up to the Thee,’ when the report of a gun nearby, followed by a scream, startled the congregation. Just then a man ran by the church door shouting, ‘Abu Shehedan is killed. Rise and run for your lives!’ That church was emptied in a moment. ... The entire male Christian population fled, over walls, terraces, vineyards and through pine groves and the rocky slope, avoiding the roads.”¹⁶³

Druzes attacks on B'abda and its districts caused an important amount of destruction of property but little loss of life. Salibi says that a few Christian fugitives, fleeing their villages to Beirut were entrapped and killed by Druzes or by Turkish

¹⁶⁰ Leila Fawaz, “An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.51.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.51.

¹⁶² Kamal Salibi, “The Modern History of Lebanon”, (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.91.

¹⁶³ Henry Harris Jessup, “Fifty-Three Years in Syria”, (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1910), vol.1 p.168-169.

irregulars¹⁶⁴. As the fight continued between two communities, the European powers appealed for calm. European consuls visited Hurşid Pasha on June 1 at Hazmiyya offering help but also pressing him to put an end to the conflict¹⁶⁵. However, Hurşid Pasha responded that he was “exerting himself to the utmost to check the war”¹⁶⁶. For saving himself from the responsibility of all deaths and destruction, he blamed a small group of Maronites who were known as “Maronite Young Men’s League”¹⁶⁷. As the negotiations continued between European consuls, local authorities and the Ottoman centre, the situation continued to deteriorate. Towards the end of May, the Christians of Deir al-Qamar were shocked to find themselves blockaded by the Druzes¹⁶⁸. When they attempted to leave the region, Druze outposts met them at every turn. Colonel Churchill describes the condition of blockade in Deir al-Qamar clearly:

“... The roads were intercepted, and their supplies were cut off. The corn in the surrounding fields had been reaped and carried away. Credulously relying on Druze professions of friendship and on the protection of the Turks, they had made not the slightest preparations for war. They had even refused to listen to appeals sent to them from different quarters, and especially from the Maronite bishop, Toubyah, to join the common cause, to rise in general defence.”¹⁶⁹

So, under these terrible conditions, on June 1, the joint forces of the Janbalats, ‘Imads and Abu Nakads fell on the town. Salibi states that, the battle in Deir al-Qamar raged all day¹⁷⁰. Christians desperately tried to resist the Druze attack while the Ottoman governor, Hurşid Pasha and the town garrison refusing to interfere, stood by and watched the entire massacre. It is possible to say that, the total cleansing of conquered areas was not a shameful act from the viewpoint of the Druzes, since they

¹⁶⁴ Kamal Salibi, “The Modern History of Lebanon”, (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.92.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. 94.

¹⁶⁶ Leila Fawaz, “An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.50

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. 56

¹⁶⁸ Kamal Salibi, “The Modern History of Lebanon”, (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.94.

¹⁶⁹ Colonel Churchill, “Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860”, (London: Bernard Quartrich, 1862), p.151.

¹⁷⁰ Kamal Salibi, “The Modern History of Lebanon”, (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.95.

thought that the elimination of the Catholic and more generally the Christian other was the only way to guarantee their security for now and also for the future¹⁷¹. This is one reason why the massacres of Deir al-Qamar and Zahleh were that much violent.

Leila Fawaz explains the existing tensions culminating to a civil war mainly as a responsibility of the Maronites in Mount Lebanon. However, it is necessary to look at all these developments from a different context. According to Ussama Makdisi, the random acts of violence that preceded the war in the summer of 1860 were not simply indications of anarchy. It is more suitable to say that they amounted to cumulative blows against any notion of a nonsectarian geography; the intercommunal violence of 1860 actually reflected the desperate struggle to reconstitute society along pure and segregated sectarian lines¹⁷².

Failure of the Ottoman troops to stop the Druze massacres and the relative military weakness of the Maronites caused major losses of life in the Maronite side. According to the data provided by Engin Akarlı, when the Druzes had come to an end with the massacres, about 15.000 Maronites were dead and tens of thousands were homeless fugitives¹⁷³. This situation led to the intervention of the reformist in Istanbul and the European powers, especially France. Firstly, the Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha rushed to the region and began to arrest Druzes. About the issue of the punishment of the Druzes, in memoirs of Colonel Churchill, it is possible to witness quite interesting details about the policy that he followed. In his memoirs he describes the arrestment process as the following:

“Fuad Pasha now turned his attention to the punishment of the Druze commonalty. With this view he assembled the Christian bishops, and invoked their assistance to assist him in carrying out a measure so imperatively necessary. ... Fuad Pasha, after making them an impressive allocation, concluded by calling on them to

¹⁷¹ Ussama Makdisi, “The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.139.

¹⁷² Ibid.128.

¹⁷³ Engin Akarlı, “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.31.

furnish him with a list of those amongst the Druzes who were known to have been the “most barbarous”¹⁷⁴.

The list was provided by the Maronite Commission which was consisted of sixteen members. According to the data which was provided by Churchill, Christian deputies had asked for the heads of around 4600 Druzes¹⁷⁵. This was quite a huge number for Fuad Pasha and he asked from the deputies of the commission to review their lists and asked them to put the names of the criminally most deeply implicated of the Druzes. As a result of this revision, the new number was reduced to 1200¹⁷⁶. On the 8th of December, a court martial was established for the Druze prisoners who were arrested according to the list which was given to Fuad Pasha in Mukhtara. However, the number of Druze criminals in the list was even more reduced to 300 and only very few of them were actually punished as a result of these trials¹⁷⁷.

3.5. The Era of Mutasarrifiyat

The Civil War between Maronite and Druze sects ended with a major human cost for the Mountain. As Kamal Salibi mentioned, in less than four weeks, eleven thousand Maronites were killed by Druzes and irregular Ottoman soldiers in total, approximately four thousand people including many from the Druze sect had perished of destitution and nearly a hundred thousand had become homeless fugitives¹⁷⁸.

Almost one month later than Fuad Pasha, French forces arrived Beirut in order to intervene in the conflict between two sects, even though it was a little bit late for that after too many casualties. All the violence in Mount Lebanon also created a power vacuum in the political system and it was a necessity to do something to prevent the emergence of any possible confrontation in the near future. For this reason, the European ambassadors, which included Austria, Great Britain, France, Prussia and

¹⁷⁴ Colonel Churchil, “Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860”, (London: Bernard Quatrach, 1862), p. 233-234

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. 435

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. 237

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 244-247

¹⁷⁸ Kamal Salibi, “The Modern History of Lebanon”, (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.106.

Russia came together with the Ottoman representatives on 9 June 1861. The Double Qaimaqamate system of 1842 was replaced by the *Reglement Organique*, i.e. a new regulation for the administration of Mount Lebanon.

The new regulation was not totally different from the Double Qaimaqamate system, the *Reglement Organique* was also based on the sectarian division. However, certain changes were made especially in the administrative system. According to the article one of the protocol adopted by the Sublime Porte and the European Powers, “The Christian Governor entrusted with the administration of Lebanon shall be chosen by the Porte, to which he shall be directly responsible. He shall have the title of *Müşür*, and he shall reside normally at Deir-al-Qamar, which will again fall under his direct authority. Invested for a three year term, he will nevertheless be removable at pleasure, but his dismissal shall not take place without a trial. Three months prior to the expiration of his term, the Porte, before taking action, shall seek a new agreement with the representatives of the Great Powers”¹⁷⁹. As we can obviously see in the first article, the governor or the *mutasarrif* was directly responsible to the Porte even though he was appointed following a common decision of both European powers and the Ottoman State.

With the changes were done in the *Reglement*, in 1862, the parties of the regulation decided to establish an Administrative Council to provide counsel and assistance to the *mutasarrif*. The Council was to include twelve members: 3 Druzes, 4 Maronites, 2 Greek Orthodox, 1 Greek Catholic, 1 Shiite and 1 Sunni Muslim¹⁸⁰. When it comes to the issue of taxation and financial administration, according to the *Reglement*, the *mutasarrif* was responsible for collecting taxes and administering finances. The Administrative Council was obliged to distribute the tax burden among the people of the Mountain and also to supervise the administration of finances¹⁸¹. Even though the Porte promised to assist the economy of the Mountain until the new *Mutasarrifiyat* system would be able to run the economy of the region by its own,

¹⁷⁹ J.C Hurewitz, “Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record 1535-1956”, (New York: Archive Editions, 1987), vol.I, p.165.

¹⁸⁰ Engin Akarlı, “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.83.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.* 103.

between the years of 1877 and 1881, the central government was not able to pay the 2.1 million piasters of subsidy it had promised to the *Mutasarrifiyat*. Engin Akarlı indicates that in the following years the Porte again failed to fulfill its promise to cover the *Mutasarrifiyat*'s deficit of 852.000 piasters from the revenue of Ankara and Adana¹⁸².

Another crucial issue for strengthening the *Mutasarrifiyat* system was the question of justice. After the certain amendments in the *Reglement* in 1864, the powers of peace and justice were given to the village sheikhs, who were also called as “shaykh of peace”¹⁸³. When it came to the process of determining these shaykhs, Akarlı indicates that each shaykh was elected by the village community as a whole, regardless of its sectarian composition¹⁸⁴. However, the shayks were not the only judicial authority of the Mountain; they were only dealing with small crimes. Akarlı says that, civil cases involving sums over 200 piasters and violence were to be decided on by the courts of first instance and they were also allowed to review the appealable sentences of the justice of peace¹⁸⁵. The central court was including six official counsels representing the six major sects¹⁸⁶.

It is important to note that, in formation of justice and administration system the major priority of the European powers and the Ottoman state was to create a balance between the two sects and avoid any possible confrontation between the two parties in the future. For this reason, for the new *Mutasarrifiyat* regime, according to Article 3 of 1864 *Reglement*, Mount Lebanon was divided into seven districts and “each with an administrative head to be appointed by the governor from the different sect, either by virtue of numbers or virtue of territorial possession”¹⁸⁷.

¹⁸² Ibid. 112.

¹⁸³ Ibid. 134.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. 134.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. 134

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. 137

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. 149

4. CHAPTER III

THE MUTASARRIFS OF MOUNT LEBANON

As a result of the process which was triggered with the intervention in Lebanon by Muhammad Ali, a new development emerged in terms of state and identity formation of the region. As Hanna Ziadeh argues in his study, the history of Lebanese nation-building starts with the first reglementary texts and constitutes the first rupture if we examine the events happened since 1840 from a constitutional perspective¹⁸⁸. Even though it was not a constitution truly, the *Reglement* of Şekib Efendi is quite crucial in this sense, because as it has been mentioned in previous chapters, it was a significant attempt to weaken the political and economic authority of local noble families and it accelerated the process started with the reforms of Muhammad Ali Pasha that led to the modernization of state mechanisms. In other words, the *mutasarrifiyat* regime provided Mount Lebanon a strong basis of modern administration and as a byproduct of this process, a class of Lebanese civil officials began to be trained by the educational institutions newly established in the Mountain¹⁸⁹.

Specifically for the structuration of Lebanon as an entity separate from Greater Syria, which lasted between the years of 1861 to 1920, the *mutasarrifiyat* regime constitutes a huge importance. Even though it can be acknowledged as the era of peace as we can see in Engin Akarlı's study, it is important to indicate that this was the era when the ideological perspective of the region's intellectuals changed in terms of their own ethnic identities. Together with this process, Mount Lebanon became one of the regions in the Middle East where a lively press life developed and numerous newspapers emerged related to different issues ranging from literature to politics and to health was published by the intellectual names such as Butrus al-Bustani and his son

¹⁸⁸ Hanna Ziadeh, "Secterianism and Inter-Communal Nation-Building in Lebanon", (London: Hurst, 2006), p. 55.

¹⁸⁹ Kamal Salibi, "The Modern History of Lebanon", (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), p.117.

Salim. These conditions helped the acceleration of the spread of knowledge all over the region¹⁹⁰.

As it was seen in the previous chapter, with the beginning of the *mutasarrifyat* era, the Ottoman centre, together with the European commission, France and Britain in particular, continued to the modernization policies over the local administrative institutions. However, though the reform attempts continued with the new era, they encountered with certain objections and oppositions. First of all, like in the case of Yusuf Karam, important local political figures of the Mountain resisted to the authority of the new governor, Davud Pasha. In fact, there were still ongoing competitions for the political authority in the region between different actors¹⁹¹.

Although the main motivation behind the acceptance of the *Reglement Organique* was providing peace and political stability of the region, the Ottoman centre saw it as an opportunity to strengthen its own authority over one of its peripheral regions. However, the increasing political awareness and rising consciousness about ethnic identities became an important obstacle for realization of this intention of the Sublime Porte. Within this context, it is rather meaningful to look at the ideas of Ottomanism and Lebanonism prevalent in the region for this era in a comparative way. Also, the conflict between these two identity policies should be examined with relation to the centralization policies of the Ottoman state. For this reason, to understand the identity issues and crisis related with it, it is quite important to examine the policies of the appointed *mutasarrifs* and their ideological standpoints in this context.

In this chapter, the aim will be to analyze the centralization policies of the first four *mutasarrifs* of Mount Lebanon, who were Davud Pasha (r.1861-68), Franko Pasha (r.1868-73), Rüstem Pasha (1873-83), and Vasa Pasha (1883-92).¹⁹² While discussing administrative measures of these *mutasarrifs*, it will be tried to show the overlaps and contrasts as well as similarities and dissimilarities within the context of centralization

¹⁹⁰ Eliezer Tauber, "The Emergence of the Arab Movements", (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p.7-10.

¹⁹¹ Hanna Ziadeh, "Secterianism and Inter-Communal Nation-Building in Lebanon", (London: Hurst, 2006), p.75-78.

¹⁹² Engin Akarlı, "The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920", (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.194.

policies. Related with the augmentation of the centralization policies certain parts of the era of Abdulhamid (r.1876-1909) will be the main focus point of this chapter.

4.1. New Policies in the Mountain and Mutasarrifs of Mount Lebanon

The *Reglement Organique* came to the existence with the common decision of European Commission and Ottoman Empire. The first article states that, “Cebel-i Lübnan taraf-ı devlet-i aliyyeden mensub doğrudan doğruya Bab-ı Ali’ye merbut bir Hristiyan mutasarrıf ile idare olunacaktır”¹⁹³. The first condition was that the *mutasarrıf* was required to be a citizen of Ottoman Empire and secondly he was have to be chosen among the Christian members of the Bab-i Ali. In essence, this was an advantage for the Ottoman state because due to the newly ended tensions between the Maronite and Druze sects, any appointment of a *mutasarrıf* from one of these two would cause discontent and even revolt of the other group. Also the condition of that the *mutasarrıf* should be an Ottoman citizen raised the hopes of the Ottoman center about establishing its own central authority in the region.

In order to remember, the second issue which was indicated a lot in the document of *Reglement Organique* was the jurisdiction and justice issue. According to seventh article of the *Reglement Organique*, “Hakim-ül Sulh vazifesini ifa eden karye şeyhleri ikiyüz kuruşa kadar olan davalara bilistinaf hükm edeceklerdir. İki yüz kuruşdan yukarı olan davanın reviiyeti birinci derecede olan mahkeme meclislerine aid bulunacaktır”¹⁹⁴. This division between the peace courts and first degree jurisdiction courts shows that the powers that arranged the *Reglement Organique* did not want to see powerful shaykhs and local authorities because they had the probability of causing any uprisings or conflicts in their villages. Particularly this was very crucial for the Porte, because according to the sixth article that can be seen in the *Salname*, the *mutasarrıf* of Mount Lebanon was able to appoint the judges of the first degree jurisdiction courts¹⁹⁵. This article can be considered as quite important for the political motivations of the Porte over the Mountain, because as it was indicated in the first article, the Porte had the advantage of appointing one of the members of the Ottoman bureaucracy, therefore the

¹⁹³ Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan, 1305, p.6.

¹⁹⁴ Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan, 1305, p.6.

¹⁹⁵ Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan, 1305, p.7.

appointment of the judges by the *mutasarrif* who in turn was appointed by the Porte provided an important gain to the center for its centralization policies over the periphery.

Under the context of these administrative and political changes, the important issue that needs to be clarified is the situation of the upper class local families. As it was discussed in the first chapter, due to the feudal characteristics of Mount Lebanon, local families were quite affective in the administrative and political life of the Mountain. One of the main motivations of the new *mutasarrifiyat* administration was abolishing this political hegemony of shaykhs and noble families in the region. However, as it can be understood it was in fact not possible to abolish the feudal structure which lasted for many centuries in the region. Rather than establishing a central administrative political structure by force, the coordinating states of the new regime, Ottoman Empire and European Commission, decided to integrate those local leaders into the new system by giving them important administrative jobs. This policy is quite apparent in the *Salnames* of the region of the era. According to the *Salname-i Cebel-i Lebanon* that belongs to 1306/1888-89, during the era of Vasa Pasha, the *reis vekili* (deputy chair) of the *mutasarrifiyat*'s *Meclis-i Idare* (administrative council) was a certain Mir Efendi from the Shihab family¹⁹⁶. When we look at the local administrative units, in the canton (*nahiye*) of Garb-i Aks *nahiyesi*, we see Mir Şekib Aslan, as the director of this small administrative unit¹⁹⁷. Again in the district (*kaza*) of Cezin, we see Mir Said Şihab as the governor of the region¹⁹⁸. All these important names from Maronite and Druze families clearly demonstrate the integration of these families to the new central regime and this would be interpreted as the policy of eliminating their local influence as the feudal lords.

Under these circumstances, the Porte appointed to the new and important position of *mutasarrif* (subgovernor) of Mount Lebanon a suitable name, i.e. Davud Pasha as its first administrator in 1861. According to Philip Hitti, Davud Pasha was a talented and especially able man. One of the most important characteristics of Davud Pasha was his

¹⁹⁶ *Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan*, 1306, p.7.

¹⁹⁷ *Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan*, 1306, p.6.

¹⁹⁸ *Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan* 1306, p.6.

determined struggle against the feudal lords in the south and Maronite Patriarchate in the north. He also established a school for Druzes in ‘Abayh which still bears his name¹⁹⁹. At this point, it is crucial to give brief biographical information about Davud Pasha. He was of Catholic Armenian origin and his real name was *Karapet*. He was born in İstanbul in 1816 and he went to University of Berlin for his higher education. After he came back to Istanbul, he was employed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul. Later, he was appointed as an attaché at the Ottoman Embassy in Berlin. During his mission in Berlin, he also had a chance to study German law and he received an honorary doctorate for his remarkable study on this field by the Faculty of Law in Jena University. In 1856 he was appointed by an Imperial writ as the Ottoman General Consul at Vienna for a short time period and in 1858 he became the state printing director of Aleppo²⁰⁰. As can be seen in here, Davud Pasha was a well-educated Ottoman bureaucrat and his successful career as a loyal Ottoman bureaucrat made him the best fit for this new mission as the *mutasarrif* of the Mountain. He continued to show his talent and wisdom in Mount Lebanon too and this led to the prolongation of his office for five more years²⁰¹. So, he remained in the Mountain as the *mutasarrif* of this region between the years of 1861-1868.

In an ideological sense, it is possible to say that Davud Pasha like his superior Fuad Pasha was the Ottoman personification of the *Tanzimat*²⁰². This means that, as a bureaucrat he worked and studied in abroad, he believed in the reformation and centralization ideas that were proposed with the two main edicts of the *Tanzimat* era. He did his best to represent the political authority of the Ottoman center in this locality and to provide peace and stability. As can be seen in Hannah Ziadhe’s study, he tried to impress upon the people of Mount Lebanon the brand new spirit of the *mutasarrifiyat* and in one of his speech which included elements of Şekib Efendi’s tanzimat-rhetoric,

¹⁹⁹ Philip K. Hitti, “History of Syria: Including Lebanon and Palestine”, (London: the Macmillan Co., 1951), p.696.

²⁰⁰ Mesrob K. Krikorian, “Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1908”, (London; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977),p. 99.

²⁰¹ Ibid.99

²⁰² Ussama Makdisi, “The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.160.

he promised “calmness for the *ahali* ... and a system of justice and righteousness”²⁰³. This vision of Davud Pasha also supports the traditional Ottoman perspective which promises justice and calmness for the *ahali*. We learn from one of the archival documents that Davud Pasha, in the summer of 1279/July-August 1862, while visiting small villages of Mount Lebanon, hears some alarming news originating from one of the villages. When he and his military unit move there immediately, they see that the people of the village had no idea about the panic-producing news which eventually proves to be a wrong alert. All the villagers go down to the main road to meet the *mutasarraf*; after entering the village Davud Pasha publicly announces the righteousness and compassion of the sultan toward the population, which is received with thankfulness by the peasants.²⁰⁴ In fact, Davud Pasha gave huge importance to the preservation of stability and security in the region and also the happiness of people under his rule and their support to him and to the new *mutasarrafiyat* regime was quite crucial for him and in this document this situation is highly indicated. Another crucial point that can be seen in the same document is that, Davud Pasha provides justice “in the name of the Sultan”. As it will be talked about later, even though Davud Pasha also tries to create his own strong leader image, he also did not lose his loyalty to the sultan and the central authority. In order to provide the justice and security in the Mountain, Davud Pasha allotted additional funds to the Mountain in order to establish a regular law enforcement agency under the new administration which was called the *gendermarie* and he also ensured the payment of indemnities to the victims of civil war out of the central treasury²⁰⁵. The Porte not only provided assistance to Davud Pasha for establishing the new order but also granted tax exemptions to the Lebanese population.

²⁰³ Hanna Ziadeh, “Secterianism and Inter-Communal Nation-Building in Lebanon”, (London: Hurst, 2006), p.77.

²⁰⁴ “*Rivayet-i merkumenin aksi olarak cemi’ahalisi lahibü’l-istikbal yola çıkmış oldukları görülüb oradan birlikte içeriye gidilmiş*” “*her hususda meşhud çeşm-i cihan olan ma’delet ve merhamet-i seniyye-yi cenab-ı padişahi namıyla bunlara tebliğ ve ifham olunmuş olmak üzerine cümlesi müteşekkire nimet-i ma’adalet ve müteşebbis...*”İ.DH.492.33368.

²⁰⁵ Engin Akarlı, “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.37.

Furthermore, Davud Pasha created special credit opportunities in order to repair the economic damage done to the Mountain's economy by the years of civil war²⁰⁶.

Davud Pasha's personal attempts to ensure the establishment of a peaceful society and the support which was given by the Ottoman centre to these efforts did not find the necessary resonance among all segments of the Lebanese society. Though the Civil War was ended, this did not mean the end of the disappearance of existing division in the society and the struggle for power between different parties in Mount Lebanon. Firstly the Maronite Church opposed to the system of the *mutasarrifiyat* and it continued to demand the re-establishment of the Emirate because in the perception of the church the emirate system was the symbol of Great Christian Lebanon under an indigenous prince with a larger margin of independence from the Porte²⁰⁷. Davud Pasha's efforts of institute direct control of the Ottoman centre over the region was seen as a major threat by Maronite Church to its unrivalled position hitherto enjoyed. In addition to the threat of the possible Ottoman hegemony over the region, Maronites also were not happy about their "senior partner" position with the Druzes who were junior yet equally indispensable partner²⁰⁸. For this reason Maronite Church criticized the articles of *Reglement* and wanted to be acknowledged as a unique and separate institution of the Mountain.

The second important opposition to the new system came from Yusuf Karam. Karam was one of the populist leaders of Mount Lebanon like Tanyus Shahin. The local Maronite Christian population was quite open to the appeal of those leaders. He was an anti-clerical and anti-feudal leader from Ihden²⁰⁹. As Albert Hourani indicated, Yusuf Karam led the forlorn hope of the Maronite society to resist against the compromises involved in the *Reglement Organique*²¹⁰. Ideologically, Yusuf Karam did not only claim

²⁰⁶ Ibid. 37.

²⁰⁷ Hanna Ziadeh, "Secterianism and Inter-Communal Nation-Building in Lebanon", (London: Hurst, 2006), p 78.

²⁰⁸ Ibid. 78

²⁰⁹ Ibid. 78

²¹⁰ Albert Hourani, "The Emergence of the Modern Middle East", (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), p.175.

the autonomy and national representation of Mount Lebanon within the Ottoman Empire, but he also demanded equality for all the Arabs living within the boundaries of the Empire²¹¹. Karam's emphasis on the Arab element was actually one of the very important indicators of the emergence of a new ideological awareness concerning ethnic, national or religious identity among at least some of the regional population, particularly among intellectuals and educated people. As a part of his convictions Karam also began to a campaign with his supporters against the new governor which lasted for many years because of his ideas and personal ambitions, and he called his Lebanese patriots to be true patriots. In addition to his ideas, personal ambitions also played a role in his attitude. In one of his speeches, he called all his Lebanese patriots to be true patriots and to stand against the policies of division pursued by external powers, including also the Ottoman state²¹². The rejection of the *Reglement* in the northern parts of Mount Lebanon worked to the advantage of Yusuf Karam as he declared himself as the spokesman and leader of the unsatisfied Maronites²¹³. In this process Karam also looked for establishing good relations to gain support from powerful foreign actors. In fact, he established good relations with British government and also with some of the independent minded officers in the French Expeditionary Corporations which were acting together with the French government²¹⁴.

Davud Pasha tried to do his best in order to stop these opposition movements. First of all, he consulted to the leaders of the Lebanese communities about the issue of the appointment of representative officials at village level and to the Administrative Council. He had only a few difficulties with the Druze, Orthodox and Greek Catholic communities and fortunately for him, in the mixed districts feudal notables and at least two Maronite bishops who were Tubiya and Butrus al Bustani accepted to cooperate with Davud Pasha²¹⁵. However, it was not easy to end the uprisings under the command

²¹¹ Hanna Ziadeh, "Secterianism and Inter-Communal Nation-Building in Lebanon", (London: Hurst, 2006), p 78.

²¹² Ibid. 78.

²¹³ John Spagnolo, "France and Ottoman Lebanon: 1861-1914", (Oxford: St Antony's College, 1977), p.59.

²¹⁴ Ibid. 59.

²¹⁵ Ibid. 61.

of Yusuf Karam and the prevailing unhappiness of the Maronites in the northern region about the new system. The main reason of Davud Pasha's failure for his attempt to come into terms with Yusuf Karam was the uncooperative attitude of the Maronite Patriarchate. Karam was sent back to Ihdin but when he came back, he began to gather armed bands around him²¹⁶. Ottoman troops and also Davud Pasha avoided engaging in a battle with Karam's armed bands and as Yusuf Karam failed to inspire a massive revolt against the *mutasarrifiyat* regime, the Ottoman troops brought in March 1866 most of the strategic places in the northern part of the Mountain including Ihdin under Davud Pasha's control in March 1866 and Yusuf Karam was expelled to Beirut²¹⁷.

It is possible to say that, Davud Pasha supported the centralisation policies of the Ottoman state in comparison to other *mutasarrifs* except for Rüstem Pasha. The best indicator of this attitude has been his focus on the road building. Davud Pasha paid peculiar attention to building new roads to the every possible village or town of the Mountain. This policy provided a reliable transportation infrastructure to the every town and village of Mount Lebanon; this was one of the best ways to provide public services and also to ensure state authority at every single part of the region²¹⁸. According to Samir Khalaf, in essence all the *mutasarrifs* initiated their terms by declaring their intentions to guarantee public security and protect civil liberties and some of them, particularly Davud Pasha and Rüstem Pasha, took measures to control bribery and corruption and also punish crime²¹⁹. These measures also served as convenient tools to develop trust of people of the Mountain both towards the new system and also towards the Ottoman centre.

The issue of cooperation between the Ottoman center and *mutasarrif* Davud Pasha is quite crucial to be examined a little bit further. As it was said before, Davud Pasha tended to provide political stability in Mount Lebanon as a representative of the center.

²¹⁶ Engin Akarlı, "The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920", (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.38.

²¹⁷ Ibid.39.

²¹⁸ Samir Khalaf, "Persistence and Change in the 19th Century Ottoman Lebanon: A Sociological Essay", (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1979), p.98.

²¹⁹ Ibid. 101.

On the one hand, another important point is that, even though Ottoman Empire had the right to appoint one of its bureaucrats as the *mutasarrif* of the Mountain, the *Reglement Organique* was actually declaring an autonomous Mount Lebanon. On the other hand, as Akarlı indicated in his study, when we look at the correspondences between Davud Pasha and Ottoman centre it is clearly the case that the Porte considered Mount Lebanon still as one of the ordinary administrative units of the Ottoman territory²²⁰. There is no mistake in this perception of the Sublime Porte; Mount Lebanon was still an organic part of the Empire's territory. Under these circumstances, despite his loyalty, certain problems emerged between the Pasha and the Porte in terms of political centralization issue. A new political system and hegemony was to be created, but whose authority was it going to be? Was it to be exclusively the Sublime Porte's, European Commission's or the *Mutasarrif*'s? The persistence of this question caused inevitable tensions between the Porte and Davud Pasha. For instance, Davud Pasha was blamed for his inability to extend governmental authority into the northern districts of the Mountain and also for his style of statesmanship which was irreconcilable with Ottoman notions of statesmanship²²¹. The reason for this uneasiness of the center was the attempt of Davud Pasha to cultivate an image of himself as an ideal leader for the people of a self-sufficient and self-governing Mount Lebanon²²². Akarlı recognizes a profound difference between the earlier years of Davud Pasha's mission as a *mutasarrif* and the later years. According to Akarlı, although Mount Lebanon was an autonomous territory, the Porte continued to consider the Mountain still as a quasi-regular Ottoman territory, and its governor as an ordinary Ottoman bureaucrat²²³. As it was mentioned earlier, at the beginning Davud Pasha was quite cautious about acting as a representative of the central authority but later on, once he became deeply involved in the politics of Mount Lebanon, he gradually began to act in terms of new ambitions hitherto non-existent. He began to see himself as the "head of a project for the creation of a politically,

²²⁰ Engin Akarlı, "The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920", (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.40.

²²¹ Ibid. 40.

²²² Ibid. 40

²²³ Ibid. 40.

administratively and economically model autonomous enclave within the Ottoman state²²⁴.

After the end of Davud Pasha's term, Ali Pasha who was the grand vizier of the time, appointed in 1868 Franko Nasri Kusa Pasha. This new administrator was originally from Aleppo²²⁵. In contrast to Davud Pasha, who gained an ambitious character towards the end of his mission as *mutasarrif*, Franko Pasha remained completely loyal to the directives of the center and he avoided direct talks with the representatives of European powers. Instead of negotiating with the representatives of the great powers, he maintained cordial relationship with them and he also underlined that, since he is a governor appointed by the Porte and taking his orders from the center, the policy-oriented requests of the European Powers should be communicated through their ambassadors to the Porte²²⁶. During the governorship of Franko Pasha, good relationships between Istanbul and Deir al-Qamar did develop and this made the authority and sovereignty of Ottoman Empire more visible within the territories of Mount Lebanon²²⁷.

Rüstem Pasha was the third governor of Mount Lebanon between the years of 1873 and 1883. His full name was Rustem Mariani and he was an Italian in origin. This was also one of the troubled times of the Ottoman Empire both in internally and externally. When we look at the previous bureaucratic career of Rüstem Pasha, it was practically the same as his predecessors. Rüstem Pasha had previously served as an Ottoman ambassador to Florence and to St. Petersburg. So, like the previous *mutasarrifs*, he was a sophisticated and well-educated person and this made him suitable for such an important mission. From the beginning of his administration in Mount Lebanon, Rüstem Pasha made it clear that the best interests of the people of Mount Lebanon lay in the hands of its people and their willingness to work together with the *mutasarrifiyat* administration. As a byproduct of this political perspective of Rüstem Pasha, he established cordial but equidistant and formal relations with all basic

²²⁴ Ibid. 41.

²²⁵ Ibid. 41.

²²⁶ Ibid. 41.

²²⁷ Ibid. 41.

groups and institutions which were wielding influence in the Mountain, including the Maronite Church and French Consulate²²⁸. According to Ahmed Hamdi Pasha, the then governor of Syria, even though Rüstem Pasha was the ideal governor for Mount Lebanon, the determined position of France due to his distance in bilateral relations would preclude his reappointment as *mutasarrif*. What the French state was looking for was a governor whom they could induce to allow them to become directly involved in the administration of Mount Lebanon as a prelude to the realization of their ambitions concerning Syria²²⁹.

Vasa Pasha was the fourth governor of Mount Lebanon between the years of 1883 and 1892. He was Albanian in origin. In essence, Vasa Pasha came to the office independent from the interventions of the French Consul General of Beirut, Patrimonio²³⁰ but as a result of his successful political campaign against Rüstem. At the beginning of his mission Patrimonio established friendly relations with Vasa Pasha. Vasa Pasha was impressed by this positive attempt that came from Beirut, but he did not realize their demands about replacement of the administrative officers who were appointed by his predecessor, Rüstem Pasha. In response to the non-obedient attitude of Vasa Pasha, Patrimonio wanted to teach him a lesson and toured the Mountain pompously in virtual defiance of Ottoman sovereignty²³¹. Even though Vasa Pasha seemed unimpressed from the actions of Patrimonio, in reality he was rather disturbed and turned to Ahmed Hamdi Pasha for his advice. Ahmed Hamdi Pasha talked about all the complex internal struggles and relations in Mount Lebanon and in addition to this he also warned him about the intrigues of the French Consulate and the Maronite clergy²³².

It is possible to say that Vasa Pasha, as much as Davud Pasha, worked hard and did his best to realize the centralisation policies of the Porte in the Mountain. In an

²²⁸ Engin Akarlı, “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.42.

²²⁹ Ibid. 46.

²³⁰ *Patrimonio* is the French Consul General in Beirut.

²³¹ Engin Akarlı, “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.47.

²³² Ibid. 47.

official document from 1301/1883 and related to justice in Mount Lebanon, it has been claimed that the problems between the central authority (*hükümet-i merkeziyye*), the *Maruni Taifesi* and the population (*ahali*) could be solved since the justice of the central government succeed in reaching to the every single group and every single person in the Mountain, even to the poor (*fukara*) and destitute (*acize*)²³³. In addition to justice issue, with the era of Vasa Pasha, people of Mount Lebanon also had a chance to travel safely and also busy themselves with their work in peace without worries in their minds concerning their lives, rights and property²³⁴. As it had been in the era of Davud Pasha, Vasa Pasha also continued the policy of providing schools, roads and other opportunities to assist the people of the Mountain to become more “civilized”.

We know from at least one document that the central government and Vasa Pasha took steps to figure out the option of the population of the Mountain about the existing *mutasarrifiyat* system. Accordingly, a committee consisting of governmental officials was sent to the *kazas* of Mount Lebanon including Metn, Kesrewan, Cezn, Şuk and Küre. People of these *kazas* were asked about their ideas on the local government. This general survey and investigation reached the result, according to the document, that people of these districts were quite happy about the *mutasarrifiyat* administration that ruled them in the name of the Ottoman sultan²³⁵. Even as it can be seen in this simple example, Vasa Pasha was working in order to fulfill the Sultan’s decrees and instructions. Vasa Pasha believed that, if he could succeed in realizing the wishes of the Sultan, he would reinforce the respect toward Ottoman rule in Mount Lebanon and could make the certain groups of the Mountain forget about their searches for to solicit foreign support in pursuance of selfish interests²³⁶. Once the circumstances that divide the society into mutually hostile different section would disappear, Mount Lebanon would naturally become a more united region and perhaps a more integral part of the

²³³ Y.EE..104.116.

²³⁴ Engin Akarlı, “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 49.

²³⁵ Y.EE.104.176.

²³⁶ Engin Akarlı, “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 49.

Ottoman state. Just to summarize, it can be claimed that, as Engin Akarlı also indicated in his study, Vasa Pasha was convinced that with good administration, material progress and implementation of justice, the Lebanese could be integrated into the Ottomanist policies of the center and could start to define themselves as Ottoman citizens, rather than as a Maronite, Druze, Christian or Muslim²³⁷.

Vasa Pasha's attitude clearly shows us that, the policy of Ottomanism cannot be thought separately from the centralist policies of Ottoman Empire. However, would it be possible to say that successes of the local governors such as Vasa Pasha could really provide the acceptance of an "Ottoman" common identity in place of their sectarian identities? Until now, we could only see the centralisation and Ottomanism policies from eyes and practices of local governors. However, it is also important to ask that what kind of a process the people of Mount Lebanon were going through? How did they define themselves? In addition to this, it is also important and crucial to look at the definition of Ottomanism. Is it possible to talk about only one definition of the Ottomanism? These are the basic questions that should be examine and tried to be answered in order to have a clear idea about the identity and ideological transformation in Mount Lebanon.

²³⁷ Ibid. 49.

5. CHAPTER FOUR

REACTIONS TO THE CENTRALIST POLICIES: OTTOMANISM VERSUS LEBANONISM

5.1. The Emergence and Development of Ottomanism

The Ottomanism was an ideology which came into existence at the beginning of the 19th century and continued to exist as a quite decisive ideology until the final decade of Ottoman imperial existence. However, it went through certain transformations related to the changes in the political circumstances of the Ottoman Empire.

Before discussing and examining the definition of Ottomanism, it is important to understand the political conjecture of the 19th Century of Ottoman Empire, the era which was also defined as the “Long Century”²³⁸. As Ohannes Kılıçdağı argues in his article, at the beginning of the 19th century Sublime Porte had certain concerns about the future of the Empire and about the probability of its collapse. The traditional *Millet* System which meant the division of Ottoman subjects according to their religious identities into administrative units was not effective for administering the subjects of Ottoman Empire anymore. The main reason for this situation was the spread of the ideas of liberty, individualism, secularism and rationalism which first emerged in Western Europe and the USA and subsequently began to spread within the Ottoman lands, especially among the non-Muslim population²³⁹. The reason as to why these ideas expanded among some segments of the non-Muslim population at first was to a major extent related to the higher level of interaction of some of the non-Muslims with Western Europeans and Americans in comparison to the Ottoman Muslims. Commercial contacts constituted one early means for the expansion of new ideas. The foundation of missionary schools provided an institutional framework for the dissemination of European and American knowledge. Since Muslim children did not have the opportunity to become students of these schools, they could not have the opportunity be familiar with those new ideas as much as a non-Muslim Ottoman child

²³⁸ İlber Ortaylı, “İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı”, (Istanbul: Timas Yay, 2010), p. 13-37

²³⁹ Ohannes Kılıçdağı, “Milliyetçiliğin Emekleme Çağında Bir Kimlik Edinme Çabası: Osmanlılık”, in *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 162, (June, 2007), p.25.

could. Also, wealthy non-Muslim families preferred to send their children to abroad for higher education generally France, Northern Italy and Britain, which constituted another opportunity of interaction for non-Muslim children with the Western world. In the case of Young Ottomans, many upper- class Muslim families of the Ottoman Empire preferred to send their children to the Ottoman schools which provide both rational and modern education by covering variety of subjects. This modern education also transformed the ideological standpoint of Muslim Ottomans, but this was quite different than the way of it happened to the upper-class non-Muslim ones.

Non-Muslim children who enjoyed a western-style of education began to question the position of religious leaders and their huge impact on the community life; they increasingly began to demand to be a part of the political decision process within their respective communities and did not want to live under the absolute political authority of their religious leaders²⁴⁰. All these circumstances combined, when the traditional way of the political administration gradually began to be shakened, the reformist bureaucrats of the Sublime Porte promoted Ottomanism as a part of the reform movement which aimed to contain and channel this unrest toward a framework of imperial political integration²⁴¹.

In this context, it is a quite crucial issue of how to define this new ideology of the 19th century Ottoman Empire? First of all, it is not possible talk about the idea of Ottomanism as a homogenous ideology. Related to internal and external political and social developments, Ottomanism also underwent through certain changes and evolutions. So, in this point it is useful to discuss Ottomanism by using a methodology that divides it into certain time periods. According to the methodology of Akşin Somel, we can talk about four different eras of the Ottomanism between the years of 1839 and 1913. The first stage of the Ottomanism was in harmony with the centralising and autocratic policies of the Sublime Port and corresponds to the time interval of 1830-1875. The second stage or interpretation of Ottomanism emerged between the years of 1868 and 1878 through Young Ottoman Movement which developed as a reaction to the autocratic policies of the late *Tanzimat* statesmen. Third stage corresponds to the era of Sultan Abdülhamid II and Ottomanism becomes the ideology of Young Turk movement

²⁴⁰ Ibid.25

²⁴¹ Ibid.25.

which opposed to the despotic politics of Abdülhamid II. And the last stage is the idea of Ottomanism during the second constitutional era which demanded decentralization of the Empire²⁴². In the context of this study, first two stages of the Ottomanism will be those approaches that will be focused on.

According to the idea of Ottomanism of *Tanzimat* reformers, the Sultan is a father figure who stands in the center as a patriarchal authority, and the totality of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire (*tebaa*) is pictured as the equal children of the Sultan. The Ottoman Sultan is a patriarchal figure who loves all of his children with an unconditional love.²⁴³ The era of *Tanzimat* was also the time period when the Ottoman bureaucrat reached to the peak point of its political authority. To this version of the Ottomanism, the words of Sultan Mahmud II who could be considered as the first implementers of this policy can be a good example: “I realize among my subjects the Muslim ones within the mosque, the Christian ones within the church, and the Jewish ones within the synagogue. There is no other difference between them. My [feeling of] affection and equity for all of them is firm”²⁴⁴.

As stated above, the Ottoman bureaucracy represented by the Sublime Porte, was the carrier of this centralist ideology to the peripheral regions of the Empire. The mission of Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha in Mount Lebanon after the 1858 Civil War, as will be seen below, is a good indicator of this mission. According to Fuad Pasha, who came to the Mountain in order to punish those culprits responsible from the violence, the reason of the massacre was the ancient (*kadim*) mutual hatred of two sects, Druzes and Maronites. From this perspective it was only Ottomanism, being a part of the *Tanzimat* reforms had the ability to put an end this hatred because of its centralizing

²⁴² Selçuk Akşin Somel, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlılık Düşüncesi” in “Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce: Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi” ed. Murat Belge, (Istanbul: İletişim Yay, 2001), p.88.

²⁴³ Ohannes Kılıçdağı, “Milliyetçiliğin Emekleme Çağında Bir Kimlik Edinme Çabası: Osmanlılık”, in *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 162, (June, 2007), p.25.

²⁴⁴ “Ben tebaamın Müslümanını camide, Hristiyanını kilisede, Musevisini de havrada fark ederim. Aralarında başka guna yoktur. Cümlesi hakkındaki muhabbet ve adaletim kavidir”. Ibid. 26

aspect that promises equal treatment to the every subject of Ottoman Empire²⁴⁵. As Ussama Makdisi indicates, what happened in Mount Lebanon after the year of 1860 was a “*pek eski bir şey*” which means “a very old thing”²⁴⁶.

The task of Fuad Pasha in this mission was to oblige the people of Mount Lebanon to recognize the existence of the Sultan’s authority. This involved firstly; equal treatment of every subject regardless of their sects or religious belief, and secondly his ability to punish without mercy those individuals or groups who stood against the reforms that he imposed on the people of periphery. In his speech before he left Mount Lebanon for his return to Istanbul, Fuad Pasha shows this aspect of the earlier understanding of Ottomanism:

“... In return, all people should act in accordance with the Sultan’s benevolent wishes, and each class of the imperial subjects should embrace tightly the principles of unity, patriotism and service to the nation by obeying imperial orders and by zealously fulfilling humanitarian obligations. [The Ottoman authorities are] authorized to carry out swift and strict punishment of any individual or group who dares oppose the imperial will”²⁴⁷.

This authoritarian and centralist notion of *Tanzimat* Ottomanism, led to the emergence of the Young Ottoman reaction, resulting as a consequence in the emergence of a new approach toward the idea of Ottomanism. This first attempt of creating an organized opposition to the Sublime Porte articulated itself in the emergence of a secret committee known as the “Patriotic Pact” (İttifak-ı Hamiyyet). In the summer of 1865, six Ottoman intellectuals came together for a picnic at the Belgrad Forest; the main concern that brought these young people together was the possibility of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the near future.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ Ibid. 26.

²⁴⁶ Ussama Makdisi, “After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4, (Nov., 2002), p.603.

²⁴⁷ Ibid. 606.

²⁴⁸ Şerif Mardin, “Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu”, (Istanbul: İletişim, 2008), p.18.

When we look at the educational background and their profession of these people, it strikes that almost all of them worked at the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Ali Tercüme Odası*) for a while and for this reason they were knowledgeable about the way of international policy making of the Sublime Porte and also about the political systems which were existing then in Europe for a while. Those young Ottoman intellectuals who attended to that meeting decided to form a committee which would struggle for converting the existing absolutistic regime governance to a constitutional monarchy²⁴⁹.

Among the members of this committee, there were important names of the Young Ottoman community such as Namık Kemal and Ziya Bey. As the main figures of the *İttifak-ı Hamiyyet* left the country for Paris, the way for the foundation of the Young Ottoman community was opened. In the year of 1867, Namık Kemal, Ziya Bey, Ali Suavi, Mehmed Bey, Reşad Bey and Rıfat Bey came together in the Parisian mansion of Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, their financial supporter and benefactor. As a result of this meeting, the Young Ottoman Party (*Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti*) was founded and became an important actor of the Ottoman political history²⁵⁰.

As already mentioned above, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, in addition to his political contributions, was also supporting the Young Ottomans financially. He was one of the sons of the governor of Egypt Kavalalı İbrahim Pasha who was talked about previously in context of his governing position in Mount Lebanon and Syria. Mustafa Fazıl Pasha came to Istanbul in 1845 and began to work at the Secretarial Bureau of the Grand Vezirate (*Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi*). In the year of 1851, he joined to the High Council of the (*Meclis-i Ali-i Tanzimat*) as a vizier²⁵¹

When we look at the political ideas of Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, it is possible to assert that he was supporter of a constitutional monarchy system. In a letter which he wrote to Sultan Abdülaziz, he supported the necessity of a constitution which would provide the equality and harmony between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman

²⁴⁹ Ibid. 21.

²⁵⁰ Ibid. 54-55.

²⁵¹ Ana Britannica Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi, (Istanbul: Ana Yayıncılık, 1989), vol. 16, p. 390.

Empire. According to Mustafa Fazıl Pasha this constitution would also provide a moral superiority towards the European rivals of the Ottoman Empire²⁵². However, it is also conspicuous that the same person who supported the establishment of harmony and unity among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand indicated the existence of divine sentiments in the Turkish race (“*Türk ırkında yaratılışından gelen ulvi duygular*”) which is coming from its creation²⁵³. Although he emphasized the importance and indirectly the superiority of the Turkish race compared to the other ethnicities that were living in Ottoman territories, it is not possible to describe the Young Ottoman movement in general as a political reaction founded on a racist base. The Islamic tone was quite obvious in their writings; they were in fact Muslim intellectuals who had concerns for keeping the subjects of Ottoman Empire together. Even though they implied the importance of being Turkish subjects of the Sublime Porte, this did not lead them to design an administrative and political structure which would exclude other ethnic and religious groups.

The emphasis on the love of the fatherland (*vatan*) was distinctly apparent in the Ottomanism of Young Ottoman movement. Especially when we look at Namık Kemal, we see his strong emphasis on the importance of protecting the fatherland. Similar to Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, Namık Kemal was also originating from a bureaucrat and elite family. Kemal was born in Tekirdağ in 1840. He was educated at Bayezid and *Valide Rüşdiyes* and these schools were the examples of the ones that were founded in the *Tanzimat* era and they were providing modern education to their students. Being an orphan, he spent an important part of his youth together with his grandfather Abdüllatif Pasha, who was a governor, in the provinces. Around 1857-1858, when Namık Kemal was seventeen years old, he came to Istanbul and began to work first at the Translation Office of the Customs (*Gümrükler Tercüme Odası*) and later at the *Bab-ı Ali Tercüme Odası*²⁵⁴.

In order to identify the ideological perspective of Namık Kemal, his articles which were published at *Hürriyet* (“*Liberty*”) can serve as sound reference points. At the

²⁵² Şerif Mardin, “Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu”, (Istanbul: İletişim, 2008), p. 314.

²⁵³ Ibid. 313

²⁵⁴ Ibid.316-317.

beginning of one of his articles, which was titled as “*Hubb-ul Watan min el-İman*” (“*The Love for Fatherland Emanates from Belief*”), Namık Kemal states that “Everybody’s fatherland is the abode of the society which s/he belongs”²⁵⁵. In this context, it is possible to say that the concept of *vatan* or fatherland was of a high significance since it was considered as a kind of home for the people. In the rest of the article, Namık Kemal asserts that people should sacrifice their lives in order to protect it. This understanding of *vatan* that we see in Namık Kemal would be used by the future Kemalist cadres.

As it was mentioned earlier, Namık Kemal was the representative of the Islamic tone in the Young Ottoman movement. However, it is still possible to see some references in his writings concerning the importance of being of Turkish origin. For instance, again from the same article, we see the following line:

“If the bones of our ancestors who gave their lives for the sake the fatherland were excavated... each field would be filled by numerous pyramids and perhaps by fortifications which could protect all our sides from enemy attacks.”²⁵⁶.

Kemal wrote these lines to remember those Ottomans who did not hesitate to fight for their fatherland and to commemorate the huge number of martyrs in the past who fought for this sacred cause. The crucial point in this line is that, even though it is not possible to talk about a direct reference to Turkish subjects, when he uses a term such as “*ecdadımız*” which means our ancestors, it is quite obvious that he does not talk about the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire. It might refer to Muslim subjects as a whole, however the nature of the relations of the Arabic community with the center of the Empire and also Namık Kemal’s emphasis on the importance of fatherland, leads us to think that his reference was probably to the Muslim-Turkish community.

In *Hürriyet*, it is in fact possible to see an article that discusses the issues related to the Civil War of 1858 in Mount Lebanon. For our purposes this article is significant since it reveals us the perspective of the Young Ottoman community over the problem.

²⁵⁵ “*Herkesin vatanı ki mensub olduğu cemiyetin meskenidir.*” in *Hürriyet*, n.1, p.1

²⁵⁶ “*Bu uğurda (vatan) şehid olan ecdadımızın kemikleri topraktan çıkarılsa ... her sahrasında nice ihramlar ve belki her yanımızı düşman taaruzundan muhafaza edebilecek kadar istihkamlar yayılabilir*” in *Hürriyet*, n.1, p.1.

In the second issue of this newspaper, the article discusses the issue of mutual fear and hatred existing between the different sects of the Empire. The article claims that, existence of fear in an Empire which brings together so many ethnicities (*yetmiş iki millet*) is simply not right and logical²⁵⁷.

When it comes to the issue of the 1858 Civil War in Mount Lebanon, the article argues that:

“The privileges previously bestowed by the Sublime Porte to Mount subjected the Maronites to greed. A series of provocations from abroad was included to this. The Maronites tried to remove the Druzes from the Mountain. But the Druzes snatched their arms and resisted them.”²⁵⁸

According to the Young Ottoman perspective, the Ottoman bureaucracy was the one to blame about the violence that happened in Mount Lebanon between two sects of the region. What also strikes is that the Young Ottomans, rather than questioning the Druze side of the conflict, prefer to depict an image which shows Druzes as the innocent people who defended themselves against the avaricious Maronites. According to the Young Ottomans, the privileges provided to the non-Muslim community of peripheral regions such as Damascus and Mount Lebanon caused the emergence of this bloody conflict. This point shows us that even though the Young Ottoman idea of Ottomanism tried to create a common Ottoman identity which includes both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Porte, it could not be possible because of the apparent Islamic discourse in their ideological background.

Ali Suavi was one of the members of Young Ottoman movements who supported intensely the existence of an Islamic dimension within the idea of Ottomanism of the community. For this reason he conflicted with other members of the community and finally separated his way from the Young Ottomans. Different from the other members of Young Ottoman community, Ali Suavi was coming from a poor family and he was not educated in the *Tanzimat* era schools but he studied at *medreses* and mosques.

²⁵⁷ Hürriyet, n.2, p.1

²⁵⁸ *Cebel'e vaktiyle Bab-ı Âli'nin verdiği imtiyazlar Marunileri tam'aya düşürdü. Buna haricden dahi bir çok tahrikat münazzım oldu. Maruniler Dürziler'i dağdan çıkarmak istediler. Dürziler de silahlarına dayandılar onlara karşı durdular.*” in Hürriyet, n.2, p.1

Especially the difference of his ideological background appears to have formed the source his ideological differentiation from the other members of the Young Ottoman community. He worked as a teacher at various *medreses* and *rüşdiyes* and at the same time he worked as a bureaucrat for a while²⁵⁹.

Ali Suavi was against the attempt of Namık Kemal to put the concept of “sovereignty of people” into the Islamic literature. In his article called “*al-Hakimu Huvallah*” which was published in *Muhbir*, a newspaper published by himself, Ali Suavi argues that:

“There is now an assertion which has gained fame: They say ‘popular sovereignty’. This assertion is a translation from French... This word is thought to be originally from the Latin term ‘soprenos’, which means someone who does what he wants to do, who has power through his own personality, who is an independent authority. Very well, then who is the person who rules by himself and imposes his perfect power over everything existing? There is no one with such a qualification except for God Almighty who has a *souverainéte*”²⁶⁰.

As it can be seen, Ali Suavi was not supporting the liberal interpretation of Ottomanism and he did not wanted to see the creation of a synthesis between Islamist and Liberal ideas. According to one of his articles which was published at *Muhbir*, he also objected the use of common courts by Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Empire²⁶¹.

In order to summarize the discussions on Ottomanism, the Young Ottoman interpretation of this ideology constituted the ideological structure to oppose the centralist and authoritarian regime of the Ottoman bureaucracy during the *Tanzimat* era.

²⁵⁹ Ana Britannica Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi, p.390

²⁶⁰ “Şimdi şöhret bulmuş bir kazıyye var: ‘Hakimiyet-i halk diyorlar. Bu kazıyye Fransızca’dan tercümedir. ... Bu kelime fi’l-asl Latince ‘soprenos’ lafzından melhuzdur ki man’ası dediğini yapar, ‘hakim-i bi’n nefis’, ‘amir-i muhtar demektir. Peki kendiliğinden hükmeden ve bi’l-cümle eşya üzerine kudret-i kamilesini vaz eden kimdir? Cenab-ı Allah’tan gayri bu sıfatla muttasıf yoktur ki ‘soverainetesi’ olsun” in Şerif Mardin, “Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu”, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), p.406.

²⁶¹ Muhbir, n.43, p.1

Its difference from the future Ottomanist ideas was that the earlier idea of Ottomanism was established on a cultural ground. The aim of both Ottoman bureaucrat and Young Ottoman movement was the creation of a kind of a citizenship that gives equal right and duties to every single person living in the territory of the Empire, regardless of his ethnic and religious identity. In essence, the Ottomanism of the earlier era was not trying to define a nation, because there was still a hope for keeping those different sects together and saving the Empire from its future collapse. As it will be discussed in context of Arabism, the result was not what Muslim-elite intellectuals of the Ottoman center thought to be in the peripheral regions of the Empire.

5.2. The Era of Abdülhamid and Ideological Transformation

The coup of May 1876 and the deposition of Abdülaziz in favour of Murad V was a favorable development for the supporters of the Young Ottoman movement. In the same year the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire, the *Kanun-i Esasi* was declared. This constitution is noteworthy in terms of defining Ottoman citizenship for the first time in legal terms. According to the eight article of *Kanun-i Esasi*, being an Ottoman was defined as follows:

“The totality of those individuals who are the subjects of the Ottoman State are designated, irrespective of their religion and sect, [and] without exception, as Ottomans”²⁶².

As it can be seen, the subjects of Ottoman Empire were considered, without any discrimination based on sect or religion, as Ottomans. We know that Young Ottomans like Namık Kemal and Ziya Bey were among the team which formulated the draft text of the constitution. Thus Young Ottomans attained their basic aim with the declaration of this very important document and it was an important attempt to realize Ottomanism as a citizenship. However, the experiment of the First Constitutional era came to an end with the autocratic rule of Abdulhamid II.

²⁶² “*Devlet-i Osmaniyye tabiyetinde bulunan efradın cümlesine herhangi din ve mezhebten olur ise olsun bila istisna Osmanlı tabir olunur*”. See Selçuk Akşin Somel, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlılık Düşüncesi” in “Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce: Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi” ed. Murat Belge, (Istanbul: İletişim Yay, 2001), p.105.

The era of Abdülhamid began simultaneously with certain crucial political developments, which affected both the Porte's internal policy and the ideological perspective of Sultan Abdülhamid. He was enthroned on 31 August 1876 after the deposition of his elder brother Murad V due to mental health problems²⁶³. When we look at the political conjuncture of the period of Abdulhamid II's accession, the war with Serbia, the political challenge of Midhat Pasha to his rule, the international conference in Istanbul on the Balkan crisis, the opening of the first Ottoman parliament as well the disastrous Russo-Ottoman War altogether strengthened the young sultan's perception of external threats. These issues, combined with problems existing within the palace itself had certain effects on Abdulhamid's personal characteristics. In words of Georgeon, he was a complex and in some ways contradictory character and his most obvious feature was a morbid strain of insecurity and suspicious-mindedness which under pressure tended to express itself in persecutory ideas²⁶⁴.

In the era of Abdülhamid, the liberal Ottomanist ideas of the Young Ottoman movement with some Islamic tones lost their validity at the level of the government; the Hamidian state gradually shifted directly to the Islamist policies. From Yasemee's point of view, since we do not have so much information about Abdulhamid's religious belief, it is better to take his Islamist policies under the context of his conservatism. What it means is that, conservatism and Islamism served to his concern to stabilize the state by governing in accordance with the nature and characteristics of his subjects²⁶⁵. He was willing to keep the order and both in the centre and in the Arabic lands; Islamism was ideological glue that was assumed to be effective in keeping together the Muslim population. He was not only caring about the Muslim population under his own rule; he also thought that an Islamist perspective in foreign policy could be used as a threat against the British Empire in its colonies which included huge Muslim populations like India.

²⁶³ Enver Ziya Karal, "Osmanlı Tarihi: Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri", (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), Cilt VII, p.1.

²⁶⁴ François Georgeon, *Sultan Abdülhamid*, (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2006), p.19.

²⁶⁵ F.A.K. Yasemee, *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers*, (İstanbul: The ISIS Press, 1996), p.25.

In his personal terms, Abdulhamid was not in favor of a decentralised system. He conceded that decentralised administration might work in other states, but insisted that it would produce disastrous results for the Ottoman Empire²⁶⁶. The main reason behind his this way of thinking was that, due to the multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition of the Empire, any attempts that would open the way for a decentralised administration would give a good chance to Great Powers to intervene in internal politics of the Ottoman state and this inevitably would cause to the disintegration and eventually to the total collapse of the Empire. Because of such concerns for keeping the territorial integrity of the Empire, Abdulhamid turned into an autocratic ruler in a very harsh sense, especially in terms of internal politics and his rule in peripheral regions. It is possible to say that autocracy as a means of governance at the central level as well as within peripheral regions became his guiding principle.

Even though Abdulhamid II considered Islamism as an important device to be implemented for keeping together the Muslim subjects of the Empire, the issue of what he did to achieve his aim is a substantial question that is open to discussion. While Abdulhamid II was trying to rule the Empire by applying autocratic methods together with a high level of Islamic tone, in Arab lands, in Syria and Lebanon in particular, the byproduct of centralizing policies lasting since 1840s and effects of the Western ideas created its own dynamics, which will be discussed below.

5.3. Lebanonism and Its Relation with the Idea of Ottomanism

The development of Lebanonism as a nationalist idea in the region of Mount Lebanon cannot be comprehended without looking at the issue of Arabism from a wider perspective. This would enable us to understand the dynamics of this relatively local ideology.

There are still academically ongoing debates about the issue of Arabism, such as the time of its emergence, about the definition of this movement, and whether it was a reaction to the idea and policy of Ottomanism being imposed by the center of Empire. As it has been discussed in the previous chapter, Arabism and specifically Lebanonism should not be considered only as a nationalist movement, it was also an alternative attempt to define citizenship.

²⁶⁶ Ibid. 21.

The primary question to ask about Arabism is when it actually began. According to Hourani, it can be pursued back to seventeenth century, when the Ottoman Empire began to have problems with its central authority over the peripheral regions. Although during the seventeenth century, the Sublime Porte kept its control over its European provinces, semi-autonomous ruling groups began to emerge in Asia Minor, the Middle East and North Africa, as have been discussed in the first chapter when dealing with Sidon and Cairo²⁶⁷. When it comes to the case of Lebanon, local families were in control especially of internal politics. However, it is important to indicate that, development of these local power centers during the seventeenth century was affecting the Ottoman Empire's political structure but these local powers did not constitute a huge threat for the Empire's existence in the short run²⁶⁸.

Within the context of the discussions about the idea of Arabism, it is important to mention about the role of Ottoman Arabs in the administrative level. The discussion about the *millet* system which means the division of Ottoman subjects according to their religious identities into administrative units always claims the existing discrimination against the non-Muslim people. However, despite its Islamic character, Ottoman center was probably not very inclusive to its Arabic subjects either. For instance, according to the data provided by Hasan Kayalı, during the whole Ottoman history, there have been only few subjects of Arab origin who succeeded in rising to upper administrative positions. We see the continuation of this situation also during the *Tanzimat* era²⁶⁹. According to Danişmend, among 215 Ottoman grand viziers none was definitely known to be of Arabic ethnic origin and only three of them might be possibly suspected to have been Arabs²⁷⁰. Only this rather specific example is indicative to the position of the center toward the Arabic subjects of the peripheral regions despite the common religious identity.

²⁶⁷ Albert Hourani, "Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939", (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.36

²⁶⁸ Ibid. 37.

²⁶⁹ Hasan Kayalı, "Jön Türkler ve Araplar", (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), p.21.

²⁷⁰ Ibid. 21

The repercussions of the Ottomanist ideas and policies of the *Tanzimat* on the Arab periphery are important to be recognized. As it has been mentioned previously, the *Tanzimat* period created its own bureaucratic elites who were well aware of their own interests and becoming more independent from the centre in time. Also the legal equality discourse which was created by the center caused certain problems among the Muslim population, specifically among the Arabs. Although Arab subjects of the Empire were excluded from the central administration and they could not have a chance to be a part of the new-born bureaucratic elites, in social contexts they had certain superiorities over the non-Muslim population as a part of the millet system. However, the legal equality understanding came together with the *Tanzimat*, abolished those social privileges of Muslim population and this created some sort of a reaction to the new centralization policies of the Ottoman bureaucracy²⁷¹.

Looking at Syria, the emergence and expansion of the nationalist sentiments did not happen evenly if Muslim and non-Muslim Arabs are compared. The idea of Arabism spread rather slowly among the Muslim Arabs although the great families of Syria could not take a direct share in the central government of Ottoman Empire²⁷². However, when it comes to Christian Arabs, the situation was quite different. As Hourani indicates in his study, the educated sections of the Christian population of Syria and also of Mount Lebanon had always been in interaction with newly developing political ideas in Europe. In case of Mount Lebanon, one of the primary means that provided this interaction was the Missionary schools in the region. Here, since earlier eras it was possible to witness the establishment of numerous schools, especially belonging to Jesuit Missions. During the reign of Abdulhamid, the policy of France to establish new schools in Mount Lebanon became a source of serious concern for the Sublime Porte; Ottoman authorities tried to find effective means to prevent the influence of France especially over the Maronite community of the Mountain²⁷³. In addition to employing policies aiming to prevent the establishment of new missionary

²⁷¹ Hasan Kayalı, “Jön Türkler ve Araplar”, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay, 2003), p. 13-17

²⁷² Albert Hourani, “Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939”, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.54.

²⁷³ YEE.104.176.

schools, another measure included the creation of conditions which would curtail the influence of the already existing foreign schools. In one of the documents, from the *Yıldız Esas Evrak Fonds*, it is possible to see that the Director of Education of Beirut, requested from the Sublime Porte the establishment of a new government lycée (*Sultani Mektebi*) and a printing press; the aim was to prevent the influence of Jesuit schools and other missionary organizations located in Beirut and in Mount Lebanon²⁷⁴. An alternative to the prevailing problem of foreign educational influence was the idea of admitting children from Mount Lebanon to the *Mekteb-i Sultani* of Beirut. This government lycée founded around 1881. From another correspondence located in the *Yıldız Esas Evrak Fonds*, we acquire the information that due to budgetary problems, it was not possible to establish new schools in Mount Lebanon; an alternative solution to prevent children to be educated in the “*ecnebi*” schools; was to accept them to the *Mekteb-i Sultani*²⁷⁵.

Despite all these attempts of the Sublime Porte to promote Ottomanism, Arabism developed as an independent idea confronting Ottomanism. However, this does not mean that every Arab intellectual who was deeply aware of his/her ethnic identity was categorically against the discourse of Ottomanism. The case of Butrus el-Bustani is an important example for an Arab intellectual supporting Arabism as an ideology with the attempt of combining it with the Ottomanism. Before going into details of Bustani’s ideological standpoint, it is helpful to talk about his biography briefly in order to understand his discourse. Butrus al-Bustani was born into a Maronite family in Mount Lebanon in 1819 and he graduated from the Patriarchal School in Ayn Waraqa. This school in Ayn Waraqa at that time was possibly one of the best modern educational institutions in Syria for that time. This college was teaching Arabic, Latin, Syrian and Italian in addition to religious knowledge²⁷⁶. This kind of an educational background probably influenced a lot his political ideas. In 1840, Butrus al-Bustani came to Beirut and he was employed as a dragoman for the command of the British forces dispatched

²⁷⁴ MF.MKT.137.81

²⁷⁵ Y.EE..104.187

²⁷⁶ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Christians between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus Al-Bustani”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.11, No.3 (May, 1980), p. 289.

to help the Ottomans in evicting Ibrahim Pasha from Syria²⁷⁷. Later, he began to work as a teacher for a school of Protestant American Missions. In the same year, he left his Maronite faith and became Protestant²⁷⁸.

The events of 1858 became a breaking point for the ideological transformation of Butrus al-Bustani. The 1858 Civil War became a crucial development in the context of the Eastern Question. Bustani was supporting that 1860 represented the alternative to the European-centered modernity understanding and this was a point of view which was similar with Fuad Pasha²⁷⁹. However, their way of thinking was different about the lessons that should be drawn from the sectarian strife of 1858. According to Fuad Pasha, the violence of 1858 reflected the existence of sectarian strife which Ottoman Empire should prevent through disciplinary measures. Fuad Pasha also claimed that, this sectarian division had an ancient characteristic, reflecting the feudal and uncivilized aspect of the society inhabiting in Mount Lebanon. For this reason, reforms and modernization of the center was a crucial necessity and that would only be possible with the imposition of certain reforms from the center. That is the reason why, despite the claims of the Sublime Porte's Ottomanist idea's about creation of a common identity, it inevitably had a centralizing and imperial characteristics in its nature²⁸⁰. On the other hand, it should be indicated that despite his criticism towards the reform movement perspective of the Sublime Porte, Butrus al-Bustani was one of those Christian Arab intellectuals who thought that the interest and the future of his country lay in the stipulations of the 1856 Reform Edict which could be considered as an important step

²⁷⁷ Ibid.289

²⁷⁸ Eliezer Tauber, "The Emergence of the Arab Movements", (London; Portland, Or. : F. Cass, 1993) p.7.

²⁷⁹ Ussama Makdisi, "After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4, (Nov., 2002), p.602.

²⁸⁰ Ibid. 602

toward integrating Ottoman Empire's communities into the social and political structure of the state and establishing the latter on a totally new basis²⁸¹.

Butrus al-Bustani was thinking rather different from Fuad Pasha about the idea of imposing reformist rules from the center to the periphery. Bustani did not conceive about the idea of reformation in terms of an imperial project which had to be imposed on a "backward" and "traditional" periphery. In words of Ussama Makdisi, "He [Bustani] saw modernization as a process that recuperated putatively local traditions of religious coexistence from the dangers of 1860, not as a process that introduced coexistence after 1860, as the Ottomans and European powers assumed"²⁸². This means that Bustani analyzed the violence of 1860 as a significant distortion of the established *norm of coexistence* and considered it as a shocking but temporary madness of the Lebanese society²⁸³. In this perspective, Bustani created a historical image of a pre-1860 era when both Maronite and Druze sects lived in a peaceful coexistence. Even though Butrus al-Bustani's perspective of a harmonious Lebanon is to some extent more plausible compared to Fuad Pasha's "ancient hatred" fiction, Bustani's image of a purely peaceful Mount Lebanon does not reflect the reality at all. As it has been discussed and examined earlier, the problems between the Druze and Maronite sects go back to the era of Egyptian invasion; in other words the Civil War of 1858-1860 was not an event which came out of the blue.

Butrus al-Bustani was certainly not a proponent of the collapse of Ottoman Empire and he was also not completely against the ideology of Ottomanism. On the other hand, Butrus al-Bustani had his own notion of nationality. According to him, a nation consisted of people united by its *jinsiyya* ("kind", "sort", "nationality"), like the French or Germans, who fulfilled the commonly accepted criteria for nationhood. This

²⁸¹ Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Christians between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus Al-Bustani", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.11, No.3 (May, 1980), p 289.

²⁸² Ussama Makdisi, "After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4, (Nov., 2002), p. 602-603.

²⁸³ *Ibid.* 608-609

criterion was living in one land and speaking one language²⁸⁴. However, he also located this definition of Syrian nation within an overarching Ottoman imperial framework. In words of Ussama Makdisi, it is possible to define Bustani as a Protestant-inclined, reformed Maronite Syrian subject who aspired to become a modern citizen²⁸⁵. Butrus al-Bustani's educational background helped him to develop this secular idea of nationalism. In 1856 he began to publish the well-known newspaper named *Nafir Suriyya* ("Party of Syria"); the general theme in this newspaper was that the establishment of interaction between the center and periphery could be useful in the foundation of a modern state and also the understanding of the modern citizenship²⁸⁶.

When we compare the degree of national awareness of Bustani with the members of Young Ottoman community, it can be claimed that Bustani was one step further compared to them. As it has been discussed earlier, Young Ottomans and also the Sublime Porte's idea of Ottomanism did not contain any dominant ethnic discourse. Although it is possible to see certain implication especially in the articles of Namık Kemal, it is not possible to say that Young Ottomans' ideology had a secular aspect. Rather than a secular understanding of the "nation", they were indicating the importance of the Islam for the future of the Empire. Bustani was focusing on the importance of land and language for being described as a nation. For this reason, even though he was not in favor of the collapse of Ottoman Empire, he preferred to publish his newspaper *Nafir Suriyya* in Arabic. This shows us that, what he understands from the term of nation was not what the idea of Ottomanism proposed to be.

Bustani, was only one of the Arab and specifically Syrian intellectuals of the era who thought and discussed about the issues of identity and politics. There were different intellectual actors and organizations and the important point is that it is not possible to talk about existence of homogeneities among those actors. This means that, when we talk about "Arabism", "Syrianism" or "Lebanonism", they do not represent a

²⁸⁴ Eliezer Tauber, "The Emergence of the Arab Movements", (London; Portland, Or. : F. Cass, 1993) p.8.

²⁸⁵ Ussama Makdisi, "After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4, (Nov., 2002), p.608.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.* 608.

homogenous ideology. The same is applicable also for the Ottomanism as it has been discussed previously. Despite their exclusions from the upper administrative positions, the existence of the Ottoman Sultan as the “Caliphate of ‘Umma” diverged the Muslim Arabs from the Christian Arabs of the era. Somehow, Muslim Arabs continued to see the Islam as the factor that ties them to the central authority.

The intellectuals of Syria and Mount Lebanon were not the only ones who involved in political activities and who experienced an ideological transformation. At the same time, when we look at the number of population in *kazas* of Mount Lebanon, we see that despite all the massacres of 1858, the heterogeneity of population continues to exist. For instance, in Şuk, there were 10035 Druzes and 7217 Maronites and in Cezin, there were 16 Druzes and 2953 Maronites²⁸⁷. Even though the era of *Mutasarrıfiyat* regime provided a relative stable era, it was not possible to claim that it destroyed the political and social polarization among the two main sects of Mount Lebanon, Druzes and Maronites. In case of Maronites, their political activism was not only limited with Mount Lebanon, according to a document that belongs to the year of 1893, a Maronite community which was called as *Marmaron* was founded in Beirut. The person who wrote this document to inform the center, asserts the founder bishop of the community raped to a women before he came to Beirut and the main motivation for him for establishing this kind of a community was “Şu cemiyetin maksad-ı asliyesi Marunniyyet kilise ve manastırlarının idaresine ve varidat ve masarafatına papa hazretlerinin müdahalesine mani etmekten ibaret idi”²⁸⁸. The document continues quite interesting and asserts that the leading bishop of Marmaron community went to French Consulate and asked for the protection of French government for his community. In return, he proposed them to educate children in schools just as it has been in the French curriculum (... *mekteblerde tıpkı Fransız gibi terbiye ita’ ederek...*)²⁸⁹. Also as a promise to French government, when the Syria separates from Ottoman Empire and has its own independence, the bishop promises that they will not do see themselves separate from the French people, in other words the bishop promises the future friendship of two independent nations.

²⁸⁷ Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan, 1307, p.92

²⁸⁸ Y.PRK.TKM.26.37

²⁸⁹ Y.PRK.TKM.26.37

To summarize, after the 1858 Civil War, especially the Arab Christian intellectuals such as Butrus al-Bustani developed new ideas as becoming a nation who shares a common land (*watan*) and common language. Even the relative peaceful conditions provided by the *Mutasarrifiyat* regime could not prevent the establishment of political organizations which pursue separatist policies like Marmaron community. However, it is not possible to talk about the existence of a homogenous idea of Arabism, just like the Ottomanist ideology.

6. CONCLUSION

The 1858 Civil War and the following *Mutasarrifiyat* regime created a breaking point in the history of Mount Lebanon and it can be claimed that its effects also continued to shape the political life of the Mountain during the years of the establishment of modern Lebanese state.

First of all, the feudal system of Mount Lebanon which goes back to the era of Mamluk rule continued to exist after the Ottoman conquest in 1516. Under the conditions of the 16th century, Ottoman centre saw that preserving the existing feudal system in Syria and Mount Lebanon for its benefit and delegated their authority of collecting taxes in an organized manner and providing peace and security in these regions to the local rulers. Because of this continuity of the feudal system in the region, Mount Lebanon did not become totally depended on the Ottoman centre at the sixteenth century and the sultan was content with the acknowledgement of his authority by powerful local families. This attitude of the Ottoman centre towards the region gave Mount Lebanon quite autonomous characteristics compared to the other peripheral regions of the Empire and local families became quite effective in the administration of their towns or regions. Even though this existing balance between the centre and periphery was quite beneficial for the Ottoman state in the short term, it caused certain problems in the future, particularly during the nineteenth century.

Deteriorations in the local feudal system of Mount Lebanon did not have only one reason. During the political transformation of the Mountain, it is a necessity to take into consideration the changes that were happening in the Ottoman Empire in general. It is important to note that, until 1920 Mount Lebanon was a part of the Ottoman territory and for this reason it is not possible to understand the political transformation of the Mountain in isolation from the developments in the Ottoman centre. When we look at the process of the emergence of problems in the political and social structure of Mount Lebanon in this perspective; one of the reasons that led to the emergence of these problems is the relative decentralization process which Ottoman Empire underwent during the 18th century. This process had major effects on the periphery of Ottoman Empire. As a result of the military and economical changes in the post-16th century era, particularly as a consequence of the demands of the new forms of warfare, Ottoman fiscal practices shifted dramatically. In the seventeenth century due to deterioration of

already existing fiscal problems, short term taxing which could be seen as a way of internal borrowing systems was in a state of crisis. For this reason, the Ottoman state was forced to introduce a new form of tax collection system named as *Malikane-i Divani* in 1695. This new system can be accepted as an economic privilege which was given to the local rulers. Because of this “economic privatization” process, eighteenth century of the Ottoman Empire has been defined as an era of decentralization. This paved the way for the strengthening of local rulers and in the 18th century, the political and economic empowerment of local rulers led to the broke of the existing balance between the Sublime Porte and peripheral regions. Due to its already existing strong feudal characteristics, this transformation of the Empire in the 18th century deteriorated the existing political and social balance in Mount Lebanon and this led to the emergence of political developments in the Mountain which increased the social tension between Maronite and Druze sects.

The emergence Muhammad Ali as a strong local political figure in Egypt was a byproduct of this decentralization process of the 18th century in the Ottoman Empire. Egyptian occupation in the Mountain which began in 1831 and lasted until 1840 constituted the first break in the political structure of Mount Lebanon. Before I begin to the research about this study, one of my assumptions was that the break from the feudal past started to happen with the Double Qaimaqamate system in 1841 and reached to its peak point during the *Mutasarrifiyat* era. However, at the end of this study, one of the crucial conclusions that I have reached is that, the Egyptian occupation in Mount Lebanon depicted a clear, if not a radical departure from the past feudal structure of the Mountain and the existing social order in the region. In terms of the changes emerged in the political realm, emergence of a central administrative system in Mount Lebanon and generally in Syria region firstly began with the centralization policies of Ibrahim Pasha, as previously discussed in details. With the Egyptian occupation, it is important to note that Mount Lebanon became the peripheral region of the quite autonomous administration in Egypt. Until the end of the Egyptian interregnum in the Mountain, the central power over Mount Lebanon shifted from Sublime Porte to Egypt. When it comes to the changes in the social order, the support that provided by Maronite Sheikh Bashir Shihab to Egyptian regime provided a privileged position against the Druze subjects of the Mountain and the confiscated lands of the Druze people were given to Maronite notables. In this point, it is possible to claim that, the mutual hatred between

Maronite and Druze people did not immediately emerge before 1858; it was founded during the administration of Ibrahim Pasha in the Mountain. For this reason Druze peasants were the first to begin a revolt against Ibrahim Pasha's administration and later on due to the emerging discontent among Maronite locals for the confiscation of weapons and the attempt of the Egyptian ruler to establish a central army led Maronites to join Druzes.

The establishment of the Double Qaimaqamate system and the beginning of the *Tanzimat* era could not soothe the existing tension between Maronite and Druze locals of Mount Lebanon. The *Gülhane Rescript* aimed to emphasize the existence of Sultan in the center who approaches equally to both his Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. However, the emphasis on the judicial equality between the subjects belonging to different sects negatively affected the already existing tensions between Maronites and Druzes stemming from the discriminative policies of Ibrahim Pasha. At the beginning, Ottoman centre was in an effort to rule the Mountain directly by appointing a governor however the internationalization of Mount Lebanon related with the existing of missionary schools, international support behind Maronites and Druzes radicalized the both sects and this led to the failure of the appointed governor Ömer Pasha.

The Double Qaimaqamate system which proposed the division of Mount Lebanon into two distinct administrative regions; the northern district which was suppose to be a homogenous "Christian" area ruled by a Christian district governor and the southern part of the Mountain which was to be "distinctively" Druze region ruled by a Druze district governor could not be successful and could not prevent the emergence of the 1858 Lebanese Civil War. However, from the very beginning the Double Qaimaqamate system presented serious difficulties since it has been instituted on the false assumption that both the northern and southern districts of Mount Lebanon was consisted from homogenous societies. It was possible to see Druze villages in the Northern part under the Christian *qaimaqam*'s administration. More crucially, the new qaimaqamate system could not meet the expectations of Druze subjects of the Empire. Due to their problems and sufferings during the ten-year reign of Ibrahim Pasha, Druzes were the one who started and provoked the revolt against Egyptian rule in the whole geography. Despite their attempts Druze sheikhs claimed that their feudal superiority over the Christians denied by the Ottoman state. The ongoing administrative problems during the *Tanzimat* and Double Qaimaqamate era caused the increase in the already existing social tension

between Maronite and Druze population of the Empire. The new system also could not be successful in abolishing the ongoing characteristics of the local feudal system in Mount Lebanon. Beyond that, the Double Qaimaqamate system that established by the Sublime Porte in the Mountain also deteriorated the gains of Ibrahim Pasha's centralization attempts and local powers started to be influential in the politics of the Mountain again.

As we take into consideration all the developments emerged with the beginning of the Egyptian interregnum, Kisrawan revolt was only the end result of this long process and then turned into a catastrophic civil war in Mount Lebanon. The support of the Sublime Porte for the Druzes during the 1858 Civil War is also clearly indicated in the studies of the scholars such as Leila Fawaz. Even though it is not possible to ignore the casualties of the Druze side at the end of the war, the number of people who lost their lives during the war in the Maronite side was apparently higher. During the research for this study, I could not find a document that gives the exact data about the number of casualties from both sides, but according to the general information that I acquired from the memoirs of Colonel Churchill and about the other memoirs via the secondary sources, they all acknowledge the military superiority of the Druzes and massacres that applied to the Maronite people by Druzes.

The era of *Mutasarrifiyat* began with the declaration of the *Reglement Organique* as a result of the consensus reached between European powers and the Ottoman Empire. It is important to note that despite the contribution of European Powers in the formation of the *Mutasarrifiyat* regime, the Mountain was still a part of the Ottoman territory and the Sublime Porte was the one in charge to appoint the *mutasarrif* to the region. According to another principle of the *Reglement Organique* the *mutasarrif* of Mount Lebanon was have to be an Ottoman bureaucrat. For this reason, it is a necessity to examine the *mutasarrifiyat* regime within the context of the center-periphery relations. The *mutasarrifiyat* experience could not be understood by evaluating it separately from the centralist policies of the Sublime Porte. One of the most important point about the *mutasarrifiyat* regime is that it totally abolished the feudal structure of Mount Lebanon which succeeded to exist for long centuries. Since it was not possible to totally remove the powerful local families who were politically quite effective during the feudal era of the Mountain, the Sublime Porte tried to integrate local rulers into the new system by giving them important administrative missions.

The first four *mutasarrifs* of Mount Lebanon contributed a lot for providing the order and stability in the region. However, even though they remained loyal to the sublime Porte, this did not mean that they had no ambition to establish their local authority. This was quite obvious in the case of Davud Pasha. As it was discussed in details, although he did not lose his loyalty to the center, this did not prevent him to take his own decisions and also meet European representatives without the knowledge of the Sublime Porte. When we come to the reign of Abdulhamid II, despite his autocratic rule all over the Empire and the strict loyalty of the *mutasarrifs* in his era such as Vasa Pasha, this did not mean that those *mutasarrifs* also worked for establishing their personal authority. Despite these facts, the general conclusion we can reach about the first four *mutasarrifs* of Mount Lebanon is that, these successful bureaucrats of the Sublime Porte and who also had the experience in diplomacy, they acted as the good representatives of the Sublime Porte in the locality of Mount Lebanon.

All these political developments had its reflections on the Lebanese society. Even though the emergence of the sectarianism and the increasing awareness of Lebanese people about their ethnic identity did not mean the emergence of a nationalist movement for the time being, it caused the politicization of people via their identities. For this reason Arabism and Lebanonism emerged as a response to the centralist arguments of Ottomanism. The political transformation in Mount Lebanon cannot be understood without looking at the ideological transformation. As I have mentioned previously, Lebanonist and Arabist ideologies emerged as a reaction to the Ottomanist ideology of the center but in addition to this, the experience of 1858 Civil War also caused the emergence of this ideological awakening.

At the end of this study, it is noticed that it is not possible to describe Ottomanism as a monotype ideology. As it was discussed in details, Ottomanism had different claims and arguments in different eras. However, the centralization aspect remained as the core point of the Ottomanism during the Young Ottoman movement and Hamidian era. For this reason, Lebanonism and Arabism were the reflections of the politicization of people's ideologies in the Arabic periphery. As we can see in the Lebanonist intellectual Butrus al-Bustani, although in the nature he did not totally reject the Ottoman identity, he had his distance about the centralist aspect of this ideology. On the other side, the Ottomanist intellectuals of the center also failed to include the Christian Arabs of the Mountain in the common Ottoman identity that they established due to their high

emphasis on the Islam, particularly during the era of Young Ottomans and also the era of Abdulhamid II.

About the Arabism and Lebanonism discussion, both terms are used interchangeably for the purpose of this study since the main aim of this paper was showing the separatist reaction of Mount Lebanon as a peripheral region. However, the result of the research on the subject proved that the existence of a problem about my hypothesis. At the end of my research, I have found out that although both Arabism and Lebanonism have certain relations with each other, they also had their own particular characteristics and the same as the Ottomanism, they do not constitute homogeneity within themselves. In addition to this, when we look at the Arabic intellectuals who were supporters of these ideologies during the Hamidian era, it is possible to see that not all of them support the separation from the Empire.

This study tried to suggest an alternative perspective to the existing studies about the history of the 19th century Ottoman Lebanon and it tried to show that it is not possible to understand dynamics of the region without taking into consideration the political and economic transformations in the Ottoman center. It also tried to demonstrate the existence of a relation between the ideological transformations both in the center and in the Mountain as one of the peripheral regions of the Empire.

REFERENCES

Primary Sources

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi.

Churchill, Colonel; “Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860”, (London: Bernard Quatrich, 1862).

Hürriyet, Newspaper.

Jessup, Henry Harris; “Fifty-Three Years in Syria”, (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1910).

Muhbir, Newspaper.

Noradounghian, Gabriel Effendi; “Recueil D’Actes Internaux de L’Empire Ottoman”, vol. III, (Paris: Libraire Cotillon, 1902)

Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan, 1306, 1307, 1308.

Secondary Sources

Abu-Manneh, Butrus; “The Christians between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus Al-Bustani”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.11, No.3 (May, 1980).

Akarlı, Engin; “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: University of California Press).

Ana Britannica Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi, (Istanbul: Ana Yayıncılık, 1989).

Antonius, George; “The Arab Awakening: The Story of the National Arab Movement”, (London; New York: Kegan Paul International, 2000).

Azoury, Negib; “La Reveil de le Nation Arabe (1905)”, (Paris: Libraire Plon, 1905).

Baktıaya, Adil; “Osmanlı Suriyesi’nde Arapçılığın Doğuşu”, (Istanbul: Bengi Yay, 2009).

Çadırcı, Musa; “Tanzimat Sürecinde Türkiye Ülke Yönetimi”, (Ankara: Imge Kitapevi, 2007).

Douwes, Dick; “The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression”, (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000).

Ergene, Boğaç; “On Ottoman Justice: Interpretations in Conflict 1600-1800”, Islamic Law and Society, Vol.8, No.1, 2001.

Farah, Ceasar E.; “The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-1961”, (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000).

Fawaz, Leila; “An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

Gorgeon, François; “Sultan Abdülhamid”, (Istanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2006).

Hitti, Philipp K.; , “History of Syria: Including Lebanon and Palestine”, (London: the Macmillan Co., 1951).

Hourani, Albert; “Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939”, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Hourani, Albert; “The Emergence of the Modern Middle East”, (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981).

Hurewitz, J.C. ; “Diplomacy in the Near and Middle Eas: A Documentary Record 1535-1956”, (New York: Archive Editions, 1987).

Karal, Enver Ziya; “Osmanlı Tarihi: Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri”, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007),Cilt VII.

Kayalı, Hasan; “Jön Türkler ve Araplar”, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998).

Khalaf, Samir; “Lebanon’s Predicament”, (New York: Columbia University, 1987).

Khalaf, Samir; “Persistence and Change in the 19th Century Ottoman Lebanon: A Sociological Essay”, (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1979).

Kılıçdağı, Ohannes; “Milliyetçiliğin Emekleme Çağında Bir Kimlik Edinme Çabası: Osmanlıcılık”, in Toplumsal Tarih, no. 162, (June, 2007).

Krikorian, Mesrob K.; “Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1908”, (London; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977).

Makdisi, Ussama; “After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4, (Nov., 2002).

Makdisi, Ussama; “Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon”, Comparative Studies in society and History, Vol. 42, No.1, (January 2000).

Makdisi, Ussama; “The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

Maoz, Moshe; “Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society”, (London: Clarendon Press, 1968).

Mardin, Şerif; “Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu”, (Istanbul: İletişim, 2008).

Ortaylı, İlber; “İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı”, (Istanbul: Timaş Yay, 2010).

Salibi, Kamal; “The Modern History of Lebanon”, (New York: Caravan Books, 1993).

Shehadi, Nadim and Haffarlılls, Dana; Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus”, (London: The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992).

Somel, Selçuk Akşin; “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlıcılık Düşüncesi” in “Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce: Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi” ed. Murat Belge, (Istanbul: İletişim Yay, 2001).

Spagnolo, John; “France and Ottoman Lebanon: 1861-1914”, (Oxford: St Antony’s College, 1977)

Tauber, Eliezer; “The Emergence of the Arab Movements”, (London; Portland, Or. : F. Cass, 1993).

Tibawi, A.L.; “A Modern History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine”, (London: Macmillan; New York, St. Martin’s P., 1969).

Yaseme, F.A.K.; “Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers, (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1996).

Ziadeh, Hanna; “Secterianism and Inter-Communal Nation-Building in Lebanon”, (London: Hurst, 2006).