

Who Wants Full Membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public Support for EU Membership

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The preferences of the Turkish public at large form the very background of and constitute the moving force behind Turkey's relations with the European Union. At different levels of interaction, ranging from the official diplomatic level to the unofficial and informal interactions between players of civil society on both sides, the intensity and direction of relations are molded by the legitimizing force of the public opinion about Turkey's bid for full membership of the EU. At the diplomatic level, the limits of various concessionary moves or possibilities of cooperation on different issues are determined and decided upon by referring to the preferences reflected in public opinion about the issues involved. At the grass-roots level of civil society, interaction efforts ultimately aim to influence the choices of various opinion constituencies. Looking at domestic or foreign policy issues, these opinion constituencies are quite heterogeneous and may hold quite a variety of preferences concerning the policy options available. Whether attempting to gather support for a policy or to counteract the legitimacy of a policy decision by using an unfavorable public opinion poll, the preferences of these different opinion constituencies must be carefully analyzed.¹

Turkey's candidacy for EU membership requires an extensive set of policy adjustments and legal, as well as institutional, changes—all of which ultimately derive their legitimacy from the support of various constituencies. Most of the issues involved are too technical and sophisticated for laymen to actually form an opinion about. However, they also constitute the basis of many highly sensitive issues that are debated in the public agenda. Politicians and other opinion leaders simplify and somewhat distort these issues for their convenience and present them for public consideration, ultimately using the resulting preferences for or against a given policy.

There are a number of critical points that need clarification in this process. Who might these opinion constituencies be? How can these constituencies be determined and their preferences diagnosed? How extensively can the policy issues be presented to the opinion constituencies? To what extent can their deliberations in the reality of the political world be duplicated within the superficial context of the public opinion measurement exercise? Once these questions are adequately addressed, a second set of questions concerning the linkage between public opinion and the actual policy carried out can be answered.

The results of an attempt to answer some of this first set of questions through a measurement experiment in a survey setting are presented below. The nationwide representative sample survey, from which the data analyzed below comes from, was conducted between May 18 and June 4, 2002.² The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with 3,060 voting-age citizens living in rural as well as urban dwellings. The respondents were asked whether they would vote for or against Turkey's bid for full membership in the EU if a referendum were to be held. The answers to this simple question form the center of attention in the ensuing sections. In order to determine variations across different public opinion constituencies I have devised various variables which help one to differentiate individuals on the basis of their political preferences, attitudes towards Europe in general, their religiosity and faith, and their degree of nationalism in their perceptions of various issues. Similarly, I have tested whether conventional demographic characteristics such as sex, age, geographic location, ethnicity, socio-economic status and economic wellbeing help one diagnose significant public opinion constituencies that differ from the population at large.

The following sections first describe EU support across different public opinion constituencies.³ The essay moves on to provide a multivariate statistical analysis of the support for EU membership followed by a series of interpretations and commentary for their implications concerning EU-Turkey relations.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE EU

General Observations

Despite long and arduous relations between Turkey and the EU, beginning with the 1959 application for associate membership of the European Economic Community, the bases of mass support for this relationship have not attracted much academic attention. Yılmaz Esmer reports results in provincial surveys conducted in 1993 for Istanbul (sample size of 434) and

another in 1994 for Konya and Istanbul (sample sizes [N] of 364 and 570 respectively).⁴ Although these samples are not representative of the country at large, they nevertheless provide first clues as to the bases of support for EU membership. Esmer notes that the percentage of those in Istanbul who prefer Turkey to be part of Europe are more than double those who prefer the Turkic or Islamic world. Esmer also reports in bivariate analyses that, while increasing education level has a positive impact, increasing religiosity has a negative impact on choice for Turkey to be part of Europe, which also significantly varies with respect to party choice.⁵

Another exception to the general neglect of this issue is the series of surveys conducted since 1994 by Necat Erder and associates.⁶ In these nationwide representative surveys the respondents were asked in 1996 (N=2,396) and 1998 (N=1,800) whether they "would like Turkey to be a member of the EU." Those who indicated that they would like EU membership were found to constitute 61.8 percent in 1998, up from 54.8 percent in 1996.⁷ For both surveys, cross tabulations with respect to education level, religiosity as reflected in support for a Shari'a rule (*seriat*) in Turkey and left-right ideological self-placement are given. Similar to Esmer's previous analyses, the Erder study observes that as education level increases support for EU membership increases. Approval of EU membership is significantly higher among those who do not support *seriat* in Turkey than among those who do. Along the conventional left-right ideological divide those who consider themselves to be leftists are significantly more inclined to support EU membership.⁸

These findings reflect supportive evidence regarding the character of support for EU membership in Turkey. More educated, thus less religious, and—not surprisingly—more leftist constituencies are supportive of EU membership. However, since all of these explanatory factors are correlated, it is unclear which one (or ones) constitutes the dominant and significant factor influencing the preference for EU membership. Answering such a question requires a multivariate analysis, to which I will turn following a description of the responses obtained in the sample survey that forms the basis of the ensuing analyses.

Support for EU Membership and Basic Demographic Characteristics

Table 1 demonstrates that those who would vote in favor of full EU membership at a referendum comprise 64 percent of the sample while 30 percent indicate they would vote against EU membership and six percent did not provide an answer or did not have an opinion. We observe from Table 1 that males, rather than females, are more supportive of joining the EU. While age differences do not seem to be of significance, as the number

TABLE 1
 IF THERE WERE TO BE A REFERENDUM ABOUT TURKEY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP TO THE EU,
 WOULD YOU VOTE IN FAVOR OF OR AGAINST FULL MEMBERSHIP?*

		I would vote in favour of Turkey's full membership in the EU	I would vote against Turkey's membership in the EU	DK/NA
<i>Sex</i>	Male	66	29	5
	Female	62	30	8
<i>Age</i>	18-24	65	30	4
	25-34	63	31	6
	35-44	64	30	5
	45-54	64	27	8
	55 +	63	27	10
<i>Education</i>	No formal schooling	56	29	15
	Primary + Junior high	60	33	7
	High school	68	27	4
	University +	74	20	6
<i>Dwelling type</i>	Shantytown dwellings	62	31	7
	Non-shantytown middle-range dwellings	64	30	6
	Non-shantytown luxurious dwellings	71	22	7
<i>Urban-rural</i>	Province center	65	29	6
	District center	67	27	6
	Village	61	32	7
<i>Socio-economic status</i>	Low	60	33	8
	Middle	65	30	5
	High	74	21	5
<i>Knowledge of Kurdish</i>	Yes	71	24	4
	No	63	30	7
<i>Party preferences</i>	ANAP	77	19	4
	CHP	79	17	3
	DSP	77	22	1
	DYP	65	28	7
	Saadet Partisi (SP)	38	58	3
	MHP	68	28	3
	HADEP	85	13	2
	Ak Parti	52	41	7
	Would not vote	70	26	4
	Would not vote for any one of the existing parties	61	31	7
	Undecided	63	23	14
	Would vote for one of the other minor parties	63	37	1
	Total	64	30	6

Notes: DK/NA = Don't know/Not available.

* All entries are row percentages.

of years under formal schooling increases the level of support for EU membership also rises. Poverty in general terms—as reflected in shanty town dwellings, low socio-economic status and rural habitation—brings about relatively low levels of support for EU membership. One exception to this observation comes with knowledge of Kurdish. Those who can speak Kurdish have significantly higher levels of support for joining the EU.


Geography of EU Support

Figure 1 shows the distribution of support for EU membership across clusters of provinces used in our sampling procedure.⁹ The respondents from Cluster 4, which comprises Eastern and Southeastern provinces, show the highest level of support, with about 72 percent of the respondents indicating they would vote for EU membership. The next highest support comes from the metropolitan cities, with approximately 71 percent supporting EU membership. Clusters 1 and 2, which comprise mostly the coastal provinces, plus the inner Aegean and a few central Anatolian provinces, have about the same level of support: approximately 60 percent favor EU membership. The lowest level of support for EU membership comes from Cluster 5, with only 52.5 percent supporting such a step.

There are a number of striking observations resulting from this picture. First, none of the clusters of provinces present a majority indicating they would not vote for EU membership if a referendum were to be held. Second, there are clues as to where the geographic bases of anti-EU sentiments might lie. Third, these province clusters largely reflect electoral patterns, which means that not only do we have a geographical pattern here but one that also reflects political predispositions.

The largest number of provinces in this map lies at the western, coastal and inner Aegean and at some central Anatolian provinces where, again, a comfortable majority of about 60 percent back EU membership (Clusters 1 and 2). Together with the metropolitan cities, these EU support clusters reflect high degrees of electoral fragmentation and levels of competition in the provincial party systems, reflected in a high number of effective parties—of mainly centrist ideological tendencies—and relatively low levels of volatility (see Table 2). The Southeastern provinces of Cluster 4 have high degrees of electoral fragmentation (a high number of effective parties), quite low electoral volatility and a high degree of ideological polarization. Since this region is dominated by the People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*—HADEP), which remains unrepresented in parliament for being below the nationwide electoral support threshold of ten percent, it also has the largest gap between mass preferences and parliamentary representation.

FIGURE 1
LEVEL OF SUPPORT FOR FULL EU MEMBERSHIP ACROSS CLUSTERS OF PROVINCES



1 Adana	31 Hatay	41 Kocaeli	51 Niğde	61 Trabzon	71 Kırıkkale
2 Adıyaman	32 Isparta	42 Konya	52 Ordu	62 Tunceli	72 Batman
3 Afyon	33 İğel	43 Kütahya	53 Rize	63 Ş. Urfa	73 Şırnak
4 Ağrı	34 İstanbul	44 Malatya	54 Sakarya	64 Uşak	74 Bartın
5 Amasya	35 İzmir	45 Manisa	55 Samsun	65 Van	75 Ardahan
6 Ankara	36 Kars	46 K. Maraş	56 Siirt	66 Yozgat	76 Iğdır
7 Antalya	37 Kastamonu	47 Mardin	57 Sinop	67 Zonguldak	77 Karabük
8 Artvin	38 Kayseri	48 Muğla	58 Sivas	68 Aksaray	78 Kilis
9 Aydın	39 Kırklareli	49 Muş	59 Tekirdağ	69 Bayburt	79 Yalova
10 Balıkesir	40 Kırşehir	50 Nevşehir	60 Tokat	70 Karaman	80 Osmaniye

TABLE 2
PARTY SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS IN DIFFERENT PROVINCE CLUSTERS

	Number of provinces	Population share (%)	ENP	Volatility	Center- right	Center- left	Pro- Islamist	Nationalist	Ethnic Kurdish
Cluster 1	22	16.6	3.3	21.1	32.5	35.9	8.6	15.5	2.5
Cluster 2	21	19.2	2.9	24.5	27.9	23.6	15.6	24.7	3.6
Cluster 3	7	35.5	3.2	23.0	24.2	37.3	14.0	17.8	3.5
Cluster 4	13	11.8	4.3	18.3	28.1	11.5	15.1	7.8	27.9
Cluster 5	17	16.9	2.6	26.6	20.5	18.3	21.3	32.4	1.8
	80	Country Average =	3.2	22.9	27.3	25.1	14.7	20.4	6.9

Notes: Center-right = ANAP, DYP.
Center-left = CHP, DSP.
Pro-Islamist = FP.
Nationalist = BBP, MHP.
Ethnic Kurdish = HADEP.

The *volatility index* (V) is calculated by using $i=1, \dots, N$ parties in the following formula:

$$V = \left\{ (1/2) \sum_N (| \text{Vote}_{i,t} - \text{Vote}_{i,t-1} |) \right\}$$

The index lies between 0 and 1. $V=1$ represents a completely unstable system whereas $V=0$ represents one where all parties obtained the same vote shares as they did in the previous election. (See Mogens N. Pedersen, "The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1979), pp. 1–26.

The *fractionalization index* (F) is calculated by using election outcomes for $i=1, \dots, N$ parties in the following formula:

$$F = \left\{ 1 - \sum_N (\text{Vote}_i)^2 \right\}$$

F also varies between 0 and 1. The fractionalization index reaches a minimum of zero when one party receives all of the popular vote. When too many parties receive relatively small electoral support the index will approach to zero; i.e. extreme vote concentration corresponds to zero fractionalization. As the number of parties with small shares of electoral support increases the index approaches 1. See Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967).

The effective number of parties (ENP) is calculated by using the fractionalization index $N = [1/(1-F)]$. See Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).

The core of resistance forces is likely to lie in Cluster 5 provinces where only a slim majority is supportive of EU membership. These provinces are typically the hotbeds of nationalist and pro-Islamist ideology. As Table 2 indicates, both nationalists as well as pro-Islamists receive the highest percentage of electoral support in Cluster 5. Electoral fragmentation and thus the level of competition—as reflected in the number of effective parties—are lowest compared to other clusters, but volatility of electoral support is highest while ideological polarization is

also relatively low. In short, the MPs from this cluster are more likely to be subjected to constituency pressures, which might not be too supportive of EU membership. The centrist parties in this region have little political clout and, accordingly, the competition is between the parties to the right of the center. Since the ideological and (for our purposes) anti-European predispositions of the electorate in this cluster of provinces are unfavorable towards the EU at large, any move that might be portrayed as being concessionary by the competitor might cost the other side dearly in this cluster. Moreover, the electorate is quite volatile here, thus the right-of-center parties need to be wary of the easily shifting support in case they find themselves at odds with the expectations of the electorate. Thus, the party system characteristics of the province cluster where EU support is lowest do not allow for a cooperative leadership on the part of political party elites towards the EU membership issue. Right of center elites cannot push the pro-EU argument in their core constituencies of Cluster 5, which most likely is going to hurt them in the next elections. For an in-depth understanding of the political considerations I now turn to party constituencies' perceptions of the EU membership issue.

Party Preferences and Support for EU Membership

Perhaps most interesting among the results presented in Table 1 concerns the levels of support for EU membership across different party constituencies. Among all major political parties only the pro-Islamist Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*—SP) has a majority of its voters against full membership in the EU. SP's major pro-Islamist contender, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—AKP), has a slight majority (52 percent) in favor of full EU membership. All other parties have clear majorities in favor of EU membership. It is interesting that the highest level of EU support comes from the Kurdish HADEP. Despite much open resistance by the party elite, the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*—MHP) voters are also in clear support of the EU membership (68 percent). However, when one looks at the MHP voters in Cluster 5 (Table 2), it is clear that support for EU membership drops there to about 59 percent while its biggest competitors, the pro-Islamist SP and AKP—who resist membership in EU, are more numerous. Accordingly, in Cluster 5, the most volatile, not only does the MHP find its lowest level of support for EU membership but also observes that its most serious competitors for that cluster—that is, AKP and SP—have most of their constituencies against EU membership. Finally, while those who declare that they will not vote in the next election are clearly supportive of the EU membership (70 percent), those who are uncertain or alienated

from the existing parties remain somewhat below the national average level of support, but still about 60 percent advocate EU membership.

Socio-Economic Status and Support for EU Membership

Among the variables in Table 1, those covering socio-economic data require slightly more detailed explanation. The three categories of social status are created by applying a series of statistical techniques.¹⁰ These categories primarily reflect a relative ranking of individuals' ownership of certain household items, their income, level of education, dwelling type, number of adults living in the household, employment status, whether or not they own their residence or simply pay rent and whether they would consider migrating to EU countries even if Turkey catches up with Europe in terms of living standards. We observe that EU membership is being supported by 60 percent of the low socio-economic status group while the countrywide support is 64 percent. As we move up the socio-economic status ladder, we observe that support for EU membership in these two higher socio-economic status groups also rises.

Nationalist/Patriotic Values and Support for EU Membership

Several other conceptual variables are expected to be of significant influence over the expressed support for EU membership. One such variable revolves around the nationalist and patriotic rhetoric in Turkey. Both of these concepts are quite complicated and present a difficult measurement challenge due primarily to conceptual lack of clarity and consensus as to their meanings. The simple measurement framework used in the ensuing sections relies on a mixture of the more emotional nature of patriotism and the more cognitive meaning attached to nationalism. I take *patriotism* to mean "love of country" or simple attachment to one's homeland. *Nationalism*, however, is taken as a relative evaluation of one's country with respect to other countries or international groups. Obviously, the two concepts are intensely related to one other. Emotional attachment or affection is certainly a significant component of nationalism. However, patriotism does not necessarily involve a belief in the natural superiority of one's country over others.¹¹ The nationalist on the other hand, unlike a typical patriot, advocates international policies in support of his or her country. The attitudes toward EU membership specifically may be inversely related to nationalism but need not necessarily have a significant relationship—inverse or positive in direction—with patriotism.

Although the two concepts differ from one another, the efforts to measure them may not always perfectly reflect the inherent conceptual differences. The measurement adopted here reflects traits of both of these

concepts in a single dimension since the main objective here was to define sub-groups of public opinion constituencies that significantly differ with respect to their preferences towards EU membership and related policies. The overlapping segments of patriots and nationalists were thus targeted here rather than the aspects differentiating one from the other. My expectation was that Turkish national interest advocates and those who promote love of the country on the basis of ethnic identity of the Turk (as opposed to ethnic separatists in Turkey) would, on the whole, be one and the same. In this case, the increased nationalist/patriotic attitudes would correlate negatively with support for EU membership. Obviously, this is not out of conceptual necessity but rather due to contextual circumstances in Turkey, where EU membership advocacy necessarily means acceptance of ethnic minority rights and concessions in the Aegean and Cyprus disputes—which obviously are not easily acceptable to nationalists. Patriots could accept concessions on these issues on grounds of love of country, perhaps seeing the fulfillment of possible long-term interests following these policies. However, in the Turkish context, high casualties—both in Cyprus and the Southeastern conflict—impede any differentiation between the nationalist and patriotic constituencies.

The idea of a united Europe free of national boundaries and united, not by shared cultural values, but by greater universal democratic ideals and shared interests in creating a cooperative transnational environment has not fared well with Turkish nationalist/patriotic circles. These circles have long taken the adversary of foreigners as the basis for mobilizing their support base. Traditionally, Turkish nationalists have used the communist threat of the cold war era as a mobilizing force for their supporters. In the aftermath of the cold war, the search for a mobilizing enemy was conveniently found in the ethnic separatist conflict in the southeast of the country. The open moral or material support of EU member states for ethnic separatism in Turkey was, in a sense, welcomed by the nationalists as a complement to the much needed evil “other” for building not only a sympathizer group but also a formidable electoral support base as proven in the 1999 elections.¹²

As Table 3 demonstrates, the composite scale of nationalist/patriotic attitudes conforms well to our *a priori* expectations. Those respondents who hold relatively more intense nationalist/patriotic attitudes towards others have a relatively low degree of support for EU membership whereas those who are relatively less nationalistic and patriotic tend to support EU membership well above the overall national levels of support. However, as previously observed with the nationalist MHP constituencies, even within the highest nationalist/patriotic attitudes group those who would vote for

TABLE 3
IF THERE WERE TO BE A REFERENDUM ABOUT TURKEY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP
TO THE EU, WOULD YOU VOTE IN FAVOR OF OR AGAINST FULL MEMBERSHIP?*

		I would vote in in favour of Turkey's full membership in the EU	I would vote against Turkey's full membership in the EU	DK/NA
<i>Nationalist attitudes</i>	Relatively low	77	20	3
	Middle	66	28	6
	Relatively high	57	36	7
<i>Euro-skepticism</i>	Relatively low	74	22	4
	Middle	68	27	6
	Relatively high	56	39	6
<i>Pro-EU attitudes</i>	Relatively low	39	53	8
	Middle	63	30	6
	Relatively high	86	12	2
<i>Religiosity</i>	Relatively low	80	16	4
	Middle	65	31	4
	Relatively high	51	42	7
<i>Anti-democratic attitudes</i>	Relatively low	75	22	4
	Middle	64	30	7
	Relatively high	55	41	5
<i>Total</i>		64	30	6

Note: * All entries are row percentages.

EU membership are in a clear majority. Therefore, it is hard to claim that the nationalist/patriotic predispositions of individuals act as a barrier against EU membership.

Euro-skepticism, Pro-EU Attitudes and Support for EU Membership

Skepticism towards the EU and Europeans in general is summarized in the *Euro-skepticism* variable.¹³ This variable is a weighted summary of attitudes on EU policy towards the Turkish bid for membership, Europeans' general failure to understand Turks, the perceived bias in the EU's evaluation of the Turkish application and the perceived threat of losing national identity when a country becomes a full member. The variable of pro-EU attitudes and predispositions is also a weighted scale of responses to questions concerning the EU's ability to resolve conflicts in the Aegean and Cyprus, whether one supports having Europeans work in Turkey, having a European marry one's daughter, or having Europeans as neighbors. Additional factors considered were whether one evaluates the Customs Union favorably and whether one approves of the policy adjustments and legal changes undertaken in order to conform to EU standards and satisfy the Copenhagen criteria.

As expected, Table 3 indicates that when the degree of skepticism towards EU and Europeans increases, the tendency to support EU membership declines. Similarly, when the degree of positive predispositions and supportive attitudes towards EU policies increase, the tendency to support EU membership rises. These categorizations of low, middle and high degrees of skepticism or pro-EU attitudes are all relative. Therefore, what is more important to note here is not the size of these groups within the sample but rather the changing character of support levels across them. In other words, do we observe the support level to be the lowest (highest) for the lowest category in a relationship that is expected to be positive (negative)? The expected tendency to support EU membership can be observed in both Euro-skeptics and those who have pro-EU attitudes. As we observed in previous sections, within the group considered the most skeptical of the EU, a majority of the respondents are not against EU membership for Turkey and the level of support rises as we move to lower levels of Euro-skepticism. However, in the group portraying the lowest pro-EU attitude, we observe that 53 percent oppose EU membership. As we move into the middle category and upwards on the pro-EU attitude scale, we observe clear majorities in support of EU membership.

Religiosity and Support for EU Membership

As previous works have already shown, there is a general expectation that support for EU membership will be inversely related to an individual's level of religiosity. Similar to previous measurement exercises, the religiosity variable used in Table 3 is based on a composite index of people's attitudes on certain issues of religious significance, such as the headscarf and turban ban, the necessity to provide freedom of conscience and religion, religious practices and the choice of using "Muslim" as a primary identity together with the perception of the EU as a "Christian club." We observe that religiosity is indeed inversely related with support for EU membership. However, once again—even in the highest religiosity group—a majority supports EU membership.

Attitudes toward Democracy and Support for EU Membership

Democratic principles are an integral part of the EU accession process. Many of the programmatic implications of the Copenhagen criteria for Turkey concern policy and legislation changes to ensure development of a democratic environment in the country. An extensive set of questions in our survey involved obtaining respondents' reactions to many assertions concerning democracy's ability to deal with various problems and whether

certain freedoms could be banned depending on circumstances or should be available under any conditions. The summary measure of all these evaluations about freedoms and democracy at large is grasped by the variable anti-democratic attitudes. As expected, those who are skeptical about democracy's ability to resolve pressing problems in Turkey approve of somewhat curtailing basic rights and freedoms—depending on circumstances—and have the lowest tendency to approve of full membership in the EU. As this skepticism towards democracy declines, support for EU membership increases (see Table 3).

An important observation at this juncture is that despite variation in the level of support for EU membership across different sub-groups of our sample in the expected direction, almost all sub-groups display clear majorities supporting the EU cause. Only among the supporters of SP and in the sub-group where pro-EU predispositions are lowest do we detect a majority opposed to EU membership. Given the fact that these sub-groups are not large, the hypothetical referendum result should be clear: the Turkish public at large approves of EU membership. However, since there is an undeniably influential resistance to the fulfilling of all of the Copenhagen criteria and even to beginning the accession negotiations, the real question should be how to discern the factors most influential in determining support for EU membership. Many of the variables used in the analyses above are correlated to one another, making it impossible to determine whether their singular impact on EU membership support would actually continue once the influences of various other variables are controlled for in a multivariate test. Once these tests are carried out, one would be able to analyze intervening factors that might be responsible for the obvious referendum paradox we might be faced with. The paradoxical nature of the problem is that despite clear majorities supporting the EU membership in sub-groups as well as within the electorate at large, representatives in parliament are reluctant to pass the necessary legislation for fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and to unambiguously support Turkey's bid for membership in the EU.¹⁴

A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN TURKEY

Table 4 reports the results of a binary logistic regression using the referendum question as the dependent variable, which is coded as 1 for those who indicated that they would vote for Turkey's full membership in the EU and 0 for those who would vote against it.¹⁵ Since the estimated model involves a number of categorical dummy variables as well as

regular interval ratio variables, it is necessary to note the reference category that is grasped by the model's constant term. The reference category here is the joint complement of all dummy variables in the equation. It represents women with no formal schooling, who do not know Kurdish, and who live in urban Metropolitan cities. These women are also undecided about their party of choice, did not have to take loans or use past savings in the past year and are also optimistic about the economic conditions of their families over the next year. The negative sign of the constant term implies that these women have a bias against voting in favor of Turkey's full membership in the EU. We see that party choice variables are all insignificant except for those who indicate they would vote for marginal parties not included in the list of parties; these marginal voters have a lower tendency to support membership in the EU. It is interesting to note that, disregarding SP voters, when the impacts of attitudinal, demographic and other variables are controlled, party choice ceases to be of significance in explaining vote choice in the EU referendum. This is despite the above observation of comfortable majorities in support of the EU in all party constituencies. In other words, if one does not control for the influences of other variables, the party choice might be taken to be of significance in explaining the referendum vote.

Attitudinal indicators discussed above appear to be the most influential of all variables in the model. As expected, the degree of Euro-skepticism has a significant negative impact while pro-EU attitudes have a significant positive impact on the likelihood of voting in support of EU membership. As an individual becomes more religious or more in support of anti-democratic assertions their likelihood of being supportive of the EU membership declines. Despite the fact that, in a categorical treatment, nationalistic/patriotic attitudes yielded an expected impact on EU support levels in the above analysis, when used in a multivariate setting this variable also ceases to be significant. This might be a reflection of the fact that in our measurement of this complex phenomenon of nationalist/patriotic attitudes it is the patriotism rather than nationalism that dominates our measurement. Being patriots rather than nationalists, Turkish voters are not negatively predisposed against the EU, so this factor is not influential in explaining their choice of support for EU membership.

Besides pro-EU attitudes, evaluations of individuals concerning the impact of EU membership on their personal lives and the likelihood of Turkey becoming a full EU member have the largest positive impacts on individuals' decisions concerning EU membership. In other words, as individuals become more convinced that they will personally benefit from membership and that it is more likely that Turkey will become a member

TABLE 4
DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN A REFERENDUM

	Coefficients	Standard Error	Significance level	
Constant	-2.72	0.55	0.00	
<i>Political preferences</i>				
ANAP	0.40	0.43	0.34	
CHP	0.01	0.31	0.97	
DSP	0.10	0.43	0.81	
DYP	0.10	0.33	0.76	
SP	-0.74	0.47	0.12	
MHP	0.07	0.33	0.83	
HADEP	-0.01	0.46	0.98	
AKP	-0.01	0.26	0.98	
Not going to cast a vote	-0.06	0.33	0.85	
Will vote for none of the presently available parties	-0.10	0.25	0.68	
Will vote for other smaller parties	-0.80	0.40	0.04	
<i>Attitudinal Indicators</i>				
Nationalist/patriotic attitudes	-0.02	0.08	0.84	
Euro-skepticism	-0.21	0.07	0.00	
Pro-EU attitudes	0.49	0.08	0.00	
Religiosity	-0.24	0.08	0.00	
Anti-Democratic attitudes	-0.21	0.07	0.00	
Not satisfied with the way Turkish democracy works	0.38	0.23	0.10	
Evaluation of the way personal life will change in case Turkey becomes a member in EU	0.46	0.03	0.00	
Evaluation of the possibility that Turkey becomes a full member in EU over the next ten years	0.06	0.03	0.01	
<i>Various Demographic Indicators</i>				
Age	0.01	0.01	0.03	
Male	0.09	0.14	0.49	
Knows Kurdish	0.38	0.22	0.09	
Living in a rural area	-0.08	0.15	0.58	
Number of adults working in the household	-0.05	0.06	0.42	
Cluster 1	-0.56	0.21	0.01	
Cluster 2	-0.54	0.18	0.00	
Cluster 4	0.12	0.26	0.64	
Cluster 5	-0.45	0.19	0.02	
Primary + junior high school graduate	0.37	0.31	0.23	
High school graduate	0.42	0.35	0.22	
University + graduate	0.68	0.41	0.10	
<i>Economic wellbeing and expectations</i>				
Socio-economic status	-0.09	0.09	0.31	
Pessimistic expectations for the family's economic situation over the next year	-0.19	0.13	0.15	
Condition of family's economic situation over the past year (had to take loans or used past savings)	-0.02	0.13	0.87	
		Predicted		
		Yes to EU	No to EU	% correctly predicted
Observed	Yes to EU	332	254	56.7
	No to EU	115	1180	91.1
			Overall	80.4
Nagelkerke R-square	0.45			

over the next ten years, they tend to support EU membership in a referendum setting.

Surprisingly, as people become older they tend to vote for EU membership. In other words, being younger does not mean that individuals will be more supportive of the EU membership. Although knowing Kurdish has a somewhat positive influence over the EU vote, it is not significant at the conventional levels. Neither does the urban/rural divide appear to be significant, nor the level of education. The fact that the level of education ceases to be significant is also surprising. Together with age being significant, this finding points to the fact that younger generations who are typically more educated are not inculcated with a pro-EU predisposition. In fact, after controlling for the influences of attitudinal variables, education level alone no longer significantly differentiates EU supporters from the rest.

Geographic location (as depicted in Figure 1) continues to remain significant in the multivariate model. Individuals living in the metropolitan provinces, the East and the Southeastern provinces are not significantly different from each other regarding their likelihood of support for EU membership. Individuals in all remaining clusters have a lower tendency to support EU membership. It is also worthwhile to note that having controlled for their nationalist/patriotic and anti-democratic attitudes together with their Euro-skepticism, individuals in Cluster 5 are not more likely to be against EU membership compared to Clusters 1 and 2.

The voting preference for EU membership in a referendum setting does not seem to be influenced by socio-economic status or retrospective or prospective evaluations of economic conditions. Overall, the multivariate model predicts 80 percent of the vote correctly.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of the above analyses are somewhat surprising. Despite increasingly polarized debates in public by the political elite of major parties, there exists very little significant difference in their constituencies' preferences concerning Turkey's bid for membership in the EU. In all major parties, except the pro-Islamist Felicity Party (SP), a clear majority supports Turkey joining the EU. However, general attitudinal bases of resistance to EU membership—religiosity, anti-democratic attitudes and Euro-skepticism—do form sources of EU refutation. The Turkish electorate at large has very high expectations from membership and as their expectations and optimism about the possible membership grow, their tendency to support membership also grows. Geographic position and generation gap also seem to inhibit consensus on EU membership.

From a policy perspective, there exist many so-called “sensitive” issues that can easily be used by groups and parties who choose to oppose EU membership. These issues are more likely to be publicly expressed, and thus conveniently exploited, within a nationalistic, Euro-skeptic and religious rhetoric so as to make them more palatable to the largely EU-supportive Turkish public. The choice of the rhetoric adopted may significantly change the level of support for or against policy modifications necessary for the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. A significant reason for such fragility of EU support in some constituencies is expected to be lack of information about the EU membership process and policy requirements of full membership. Accordingly, despite mass public support for EU membership, the polarized elite resistance to membership finds ample opportunities to manipulate the public agenda. Segments within the political elite can easily accomplish their objective of melting mass support for EU membership by providing misinformation to the public and strategically shaping their rhetoric around the sensitive issues; this is especially the case concerning the cultural rights of citizens of Kurdish origin and the abolition of the death penalty, which is linked to the Kurdish issue due to the fact that Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader, is currently on death row.¹⁶

Another surprising result derives from the fact that in all of the sub-constituencies devised to test EU support, excluding the segment of the electorate holding a low degree of pro-EU predispositions, a clear majority supports EU membership. How, then, is it possible that political elites manage to resist policy changes without losing electoral support or endangering their legitimacy within the Turkish political system? This question might be seen as somewhat unnecessary given the surprising passage of the EU package that lifted the ban on education in languages other than Turkish and the broadcasting of such languages (the most problematic being Kurdish) on television and radio and abolished the death penalty in the Turkish penal system along with many other pieces of sensitive legislation. However, since the implementation of these new legislative frameworks of cultural rights will now be the focus of attention, there is still room for political resistance and maneuvering that merits explanation. Moreover, since these pieces of legislation were passed when parliament had already decided on early elections, the resistance to EU membership is more likely now to take the form of a campaign issue by the nationalist parties and cadres.

One possible explanation of the persistent resistance of the political elite to policy changes necessary for EU membership could be the very nature of the Turkish representation system. Once the constituent bases of

representation are defined, it may so happen that while the majority at large in a referendum prefers to become a full member of the EU, without changing anybody's preferences sub-groups or sub-constituencies may be so distributed that a majority of them may contain majorities preferring the option of Turkey staying out of the EU, hence a referendum paradox may arise. Defined in either geographical or other functional or attitudinal terms, almost all sub-constituencies in Turkey have a majority that supports EU membership. The paradox, therefore, may lie in the Turkish representation system, which allows for the political elite to ignore and/or manipulate the preferences of the masses they face. Given the recent passage of the so-called "EU adjustment" legislation at the beginning of August 2002, it seems that a possible referendum paradox can be avoided in the Turkish system. However, pockets of resistance within the representation system will continue to be serious forces that will repeatedly surface as Euro-skepticism flares up in the country for many different reasons.

The potentially paradoxical nature of the Turkish representation system dissolves if one diagnoses that EU membership and related issues evolving around the process of accession to full membership are simply unimportant for the masses at large and thus politically non-salient, if not irrelevant. Such a diagnosis is quite difficult to produce. It is quite true that the layman in the street in Turkey cares more about daily economic difficulties than about complicated policy changes or legislation concerning cultural minority rights, especially within the context of the deep economic crisis that has gravely shaken the country. On the other hand, it is also clear that, before the summer of 2002, there had not been a single political leader from any of the political parties who supported EU membership openly and without reservations concerning the Copenhagen criteria. None of these leaders, therefore, linked the "bread-and-butter" issues of the current economic crisis to the prospect of EU membership or, more significantly, to the prospect of failing to meet the Copenhagen criteria before the end of the year 2002. It is understandable that such a cautionary position might not be easily adopted by the ruling party elites, nor would such a stand be credible, since the ruling parties have both the power, as well as the duty, to act if some precautionary measure needs to be taken. However, even the opposition parties that consistently repeat their support for EU membership did not link the likely failure to meet the Copenhagen criteria to a deepening economic crisis.

Besides the link to economic crisis there exist a number of other issues that could also be linked to EU criteria, thus helping to make the salience of the EU topics even greater. These include issues such as insufficient

public services and vast corruption. With the resignation of the largest partner in the DSP ruling coalition in summer 2002 and the resulting New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*—YTP) under the leadership of former Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem, EU and EU-related issues seem to be pushed to the forefront of political debate in the country. However, it remains to be seen how other political party leaders will deal with this issue in front of the electorate. Although, besides Cem, ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz seems ready to use this issue in his campaign, the MHP leadership now openly questions the worth of EU membership. In short, if the EU issue is going to shape the electoral agenda in the next general elections, the willingness of the political elites to raise the salience of the EU issues will be a major factor behind this development.

Another possible explanation for the failure of the political elites to meet mass preferences concerning EU membership pertains to the functioning of the Turkish party organization. A small ruling elite that keeps any opposition, together with any civil society influence, out of their parties, dominates the Turkish parties. Hence, it is not surprising that civil society preferences for EU membership has failed to penetrate the parties and thus pressure the party organizations and their leaders to reformulate their positions in support of the EU membership. Unless the parties open up to pro-EU interest groups' influence, their pro-EU reactions will remain limited in the future.

Alternatively, the answer may lie more in the geographical support bases of the parties and the distribution of support for membership in the EU. As noted above, while the highest degree of support for membership is observed in the metropolitan provinces as well as the Eastern and Southeastern provinces, the lowest level is observed in the central Anatolian provinces. The party system characteristics of these regions of EU support are such that they do not allow the dominant parties of these regions to push for much pro-EU policy initiatives if they want to maintain or build upon their previous levels of electoral support. More specifically, the nationalist and pro-Islamist parties compete for the core of their electoral support in the same provinces where we observe the lowest level of support for EU. These provinces also have the highest level of volatility and lowest effective number of parties; that is, the lowest levels of competition in their provincial party systems, which allow for 2.6 effective parties appearing within a highly volatile context. If they adopt an openly pro-EU stand they risk facing harsh opposition in these provinces by the only other real competitor. Since the volatility of electoral support is also the highest in the country, for these provinces the likelihood of serious electoral losses is quite high. In consequence, both the nationalists and the

pro-Islamists would be very timid in welcoming pro-EU changes if they act simply as rational representatives of their core constituencies and in expectation of campaign tactics that might be followed by their competitors. Such an explanation would not be valid, of course, if the pro-Islamist and nationalist parties can rationally hope to gain more votes somewhere else than the sums they lose in their core provinces. Such an expectation is perhaps more valid for the pro-Islamists than for the nationalists, since the most prominent pro-Islamist party (the Virtue Party, *Fazilet Partisi*—FP) has recently been split in two. Such divisions always have the potential to bring about the shifting basis of electoral constituencies and more entrepreneurial political spirit. The MHP has been in office for approximately the last three years and in the process has either committed itself more solidly to certain stands or chosen not to act on certain policies. The AKP, for instance, may feel less pressure against adopting a more liberal pro-EU stand than the MHP since such a position may attract more of the floating voters. In addition, on a cautionary note, one should keep in mind that no party is fully flexible in adopting certain policy stands due to past ideological commitments. From this perspective, being newly formed allows the AKP more flexibility. However, it is unclear as to what degree any of the new parties are truly new and thus less constrained.

I have consciously refrained from commenting on the ideological commitments of the parties concerning the EU membership issue. Obviously, parties' ideological predispositions effectively shape their stands. Given the fact that sovereignty as well as minority rights together with many commercial interests are at stake here, ideological baggage is likely to grow heavier as electoral pressures grow. However, the first round of battle seems to have been lost by the Euro-skeptic forces. The Turkish parliament avoided falling into the trap of a referendum paradox and pushed ahead with fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria necessary for the commencement of negotiations for full membership. However, the institutional shape of the Turkish party system and political dynamics of November 2002 general elections continue to feed significant resistance to EU membership. It remains to be seen whether such resistance will gain momentum in the heat of electoral campaign, as a result of developments in the Cyprus negotiations, or any other likely event that would flare up if terror began in Southeastern Turkey (for example, due to US intervention in Iraq). All of these necessitate a continued focus of attention on the popular bases of support for or opposition to EU membership among Turkish voters and elites.

POSTSCRIPT

Since the completion of this essay a number of important developments have taken place that deserve evaluation in light of the arguments made earlier. One such evaluation concerns the role of the EU related issues in the general elections of November 3, 2002.

Looking back, one suspects that it was the economic crisis, the consequent incompetence of the incumbent coalition, as well as the main opposition, that proved responsible for the defeat of almost all of the Turkish party establishment. However, elections are always more about the future than about the judgements of the past. From this perspective, only two parties, CHP (Republican People's Party—*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) and AKP seem to have convinced the institutionally relevant portion of the electorate—that is, more than ten percent of the nation-wide electorate—of their credibility.

To what degree then does the EU membership and the related reform process relate to the core economic worries of the electorate? Leaders of the major parties seem to have largely ignored EU-related discussions in their campaigns. However, short of a systematic evaluation of issues discussed during the 2002 elections, a reading of the election manifestoes of both AKP and CHP leads one to observe that EU-related issues played a critical role.¹⁷ In its election manifesto the AKP portrayed the EU as a catalyst of many different issues ranging from the obvious foreign policy discussions about Cyprus and Turkish-Greek relations to reform of the judicial system, expansion of basic citizens' rights, economic policy, municipal reform, foreign direct investment policies and transportation policy. The CHP's emphasis was more on the membership aspect of the debate. However, in a similar fashion to AKP's argument, the CHP manifesto intricately linked EU issues to a large number of policy areas. In short, economic crisis formed the backbone of election issues and prepared a fertile ground for the emphasis of reform in public policy. Reform discussions provided a convenient linkage to the debate about EU membership and the policy transformations that this necessitates.

Another observation worthy of note is the presence of two staunchly nationalistic, and thus Euro-skeptic, parties in the campaign, the Young Party (*Genç Parti*—GP) and the MHP. Although both parties had a majority of their supporters in favor of the EU, their rhetoric were potentially inflammatory and carried high doses of anti-Europeanism. Both seemed to prefer to be the only party of the Euro-skeptics and thus carry high enough support behind them to pass the ten percent threshold.

Ex-post facto, the support bases of GP and MHP is seen not to overlap.¹⁸ GP was a real threat to the centrist-left and -right establishments in the coastal provinces, whereas MHP was a force to be reckoned with in the central Anatolian provinces where AKP got most of its support. GP received around seven percent whereas MHP got about nine percent of support nationwide; enough to provide a serious threat since a slight increase in either one could have pushed them above the ten percent threshold and changed the seat distribution in the parliament substantially. In short, neither CHP facing GP, nor AKP facing MHP in their core constituencies in coastal or central Anatolian provinces respectively, could afford to push EU-related issues beyond subtle linkage to various reform debates. In consequence, the anti-European front was not confronted in any public debate and the two largest parties kept the EU issues at low salience. At the same time, the Euro-skeptic front was conveniently kept divided into smaller party constituencies, thus helping to waste their representation by keeping them out of the parliament since they were below the ten percent threshold.

NOTES

1. Putnam gives a well-rounded account of the dual nature of the policymaking context that involves many intricate sets of relations between the diplomatic negotiators (Level I) and the grass-roots interactions between non-official players like businesses, NGOs and other civil society groups (Level II). See Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organisation*, Vol.42, No.3 (1988), pp.427-60. For a more extensive treatment of the two-level games concept, see Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993).
2. The survey was undertaken by a team of Boğaziçi University scholars including the author, Refik Erzan, Kemal Kirişçi and Hakan Yılmaz. The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (*Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı*—TESEV) graciously provided the financial support. For details of the results, see <<http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng/>>.
3. A description of the sampling procedures followed can be found on the TESEV website (<<http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng/>>) or may be obtained from the author.
4. Yılmaz Esmer, "Türk Kamuoyu ve Avrupa" [Turkish Public Opinion and Europe], in *Türkiye Avrupa Birliğinin Neresinde? Gümrük Birliği Anlaşmasının Düşündürdükleri* [Where is Turkey in Europe? Thoughts on Customs Union with EU] (Ayraç Yayımevi, 1997), pp.124-35.
5. *Ibid.*, pp.134-5.
6. TÜSES (Turkish Social Economic and Political Studies Foundation), *Türkiye'de Siyasi Parti Seçmenleri ve Toplum Düzeni* [Political Party Constituencies and Social Order in Turkey] (Boyut Matbaacılık Aş, 1999).
7. *Ibid.*, p.79.
8. *Ibid.*, pp.79-83.

9. First, provinces were divided into clusters according to socio-economic characteristics and political preferences. Balıkesir, Denizli and Sinop were selected from Cluster 1, which comprises the coastal provinces of the Black Sea, Marmara and Aegean regions. Gaziantep, Samsun and Burdur were selected from Cluster 2, which comprises mostly the inner Aegean and some Black Sea and Southeastern provinces. Adana, Bursa, İzmir, Ankara and Istanbul were selected from the metropolitan provinces of Cluster 3. Diyarbakır, Kars and Şanlıurfa were selected to represent the Southeastern and Eastern provinces of Cluster 4. Finally Erzurum, Konya and Malatya, were selected to represent the Central and Eastern Anatolia provinces of Cluster 5. The EU membership support levels plotted on Figure 1 represent the percentage support observed in these provinces grouped according to their cluster membership and generalized across all provinces in their clusters.
10. First a factor analysis was applied to create a composite index of socio-economic status, then the factor scores that reflect a summary measure of all values of the index components for every individual are used in a cluster analysis. As a result, those individuals who belong to low socio-economic status can be differentiated from the middle and higher levels. A similar path of analysis was followed in all variables created below for analyzing nationalist/patriotic attitudes, Euro-skepticism, religiosity and attitudes toward democracy. The details of these analyses can be obtained from the author.
11. R. Kosterman, and S. Feshbach, "Toward a Measurement of Patriotic and Nationalist Attitudes," *Political Psychology*, Vol.10 (1989), pp.257–74.
12. See Ali Çarkoğlu, "Geography of April 1999 Turkish Elections," *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No.1 (2000), pp.149–71 and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The Shaping of Political Preferences in Turkey: Coping with the Post-Cold-War Era," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Vol.20, No.1 (1999), pp.47–76.
13. Discussions of Euro-skepticism have recently attracted intense academic interest. For a taste of the issues involved in these discussions, see Paul Taggart, "A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol.33 (1998), pp.363–88; Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, *Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation* (Falmer, Brighton: Sussex European Institute Working Paper No.36. Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No.1, Oct. 2000); Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, *Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe* (Falmer, Brighton: Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No.2, May 2001); Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, *The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States* (Falmer, Brighton: Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No.6, April 2002).
14. Hannu Nurmi defines the referendum paradox in the following way: "Suppose that a consultative referendum is arranged on an issue, say ... joining the European Union ... Suppose that 'yes' wins by a handsome margin. Then the issue is brought to the parliament, which makes the final decision. It may happen that the latter decision is 'no' despite the results of the referendum." See Hannu Nurmi, *Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them* (Berlin-Heidelberg: SpringerVerlag, 1999), p.76. See also Hannu Nurmi, "Referendum Design: An Exercise in Applied Social Choice Theory," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol.20 (1997), pp.33–52; Hannu Nurmi, "Compound Majority Paradoxes and Proportional Representation," *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol.13 (1997), pp.443–54. The referendum paradox occurs whenever the majority of a representative body reverts the majority decision of a referendum because the majority of the representatives may observe that a majority in the constituency they represent prefer the option against the majority decision of a referendum. Obviously, such an outcome depends on how constituencies in a representative body are defined—either in geographic terms, as it is usually done, or even non-overlapping functional bases of representation, which I use in some of the analyses below.
15. Since the dependent variable is a binary dummy variable the conventional regression

- methods are not appropriate here. For an accessible review of the methods used here, see John H. Aldrich and Forrest D. Nelson, *Linear Probability, Logit and Probit Models* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1984) and Alfred Demaris, *Logit Modelling, Practical Applications* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992).
16. Due to lack of space, a detailed analysis of these sensitive issues will have to be tackled elsewhere. However, the same survey from which the data used here originates contains questions that deal with these issues. This, and a descriptive analysis, can be found at <<http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng/>>.
 17. AKP's election manifesto, *Herşey Türkiye İçin* [Everything is for Turkey], is available at <<http://www.akparti.org.tr/>>. CHP's election manifesto, *Güzel Günler Göreceğiz!* [We'll See Good Days!], is available at <<http://secim2002.chp.org.tr/bildirge.asp>>.
 18. See Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish General Elections of 2002," *South European Society and Politics* (forthcoming).

