

**THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY IN
MEDITERRANEAN REGION**

By

İREM BULAT

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**THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY IN
MEDITERRANEAN REGION**

APPROVED BY:

Meltem Müftüler Baç

(Thesis Supervisor)

Emre Hatipođlu

Selin Türkeş Kılıç

DATE OF APPROVAL:

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ABSTRACT

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İREM BULAT

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Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç

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Association Agreements

Following the end of the Cold War, European Union followed a democracy promotion policy in its neighbourhood regions. The thesis aims to contribute to the external democratization literature by giving a detail analysis of the European Union's policy formation and instruments for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region. More specifically, I look at the dynamics underlying democracy promotion policies of the EU and explain why the EU adopts certain policies and employ certain instruments for Mediterranean countries. As such, this thesis does not focus on the success or failure of democratization policies per se, but rather how an external democratizer, like the EU, produces principal policies and employ instruments for democracy promotion. Namely, this thesis tries to explain the evaluation of the EU's foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region and within this process, how the EU's policies are intensified towards a comprehensive democracy promotion strategy in the Mediterranean region.

ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN AKDENİZ BÖLGESİNDE DEMOKRASİ TEŞVİKİ STRATEJİSİ

İREM BULAT

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Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesiyle birlikte, Avrupa Birliği çevresindeki bölgelerde demokrasinin teşviki politikası takip etmiştir. Bu tez, dışarıdan demokratikleştirme literatürüne, Avrupa Birliğinin Akdeniz bölgesindeki demokrasi teşviki için kullandığı politikanın yapılandırılması ve enstrümanlarını detaylı bir şekilde analiz ederek katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Özel olarak, Avrupa Birliğinin demokrasi teşviki politikalarının altında yatan dinamiklere ve Akdeniz ülkeleri için Avrupa Birliğinin neden bazı belirli politikaları ve enstrümanları kullandığına bakıyorum. Bu itibarla, bu tez demokratikleştirme politikalarının başarı veya başarısızlığından ziyade Avrupa Birliği gibi bir dışarıdan demokratikleştiricinin nasıl belli başlı politika ve enstrümanları ürettiğine ve kullandığına odaklanmaktadır. Yani, bu tez Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz bölgesine yönelik dış politikasının gelişimini ve bu süreçte Avrupa Birliği'nin politikalarının nasıl Akdeniz bölgesine karşı kapsamlı bir demokrasi teşviki stratejisine doğru yoğunlaştığını açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.

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LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAs	: Association Agreements
CEECs	: Central and East European Countries
CFSP	: Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC	: European Community
EEC	: European Economic Community
EIDHR	: European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EMP	: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENPI	: European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
ENP	: European Neighbourhood Policy
EPC	: European Political Cooperation
EP	: European Parliament
EU	: European Union
GMP	: Global Mediterranean Partnership
HRD	: Human Rights and Democracy
IGO	: Intergovernmental Organization
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
MEDA	: Mesures D'accompagnement Financières et Techniques - Financial and Technical Accompanying Measures
MED	: Mediterranean
OSCE	: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SEA	: Single European Act
UDHR	: Universal Declaration of Human Rights

INTRODUCTION

The role that external actors play on the countries' democratization processes has received increasing attention with the end of the Cold War (Whitehead 1996, Schimmelfenning 2004, Crawford 1997) however, studies on external democratization mostly accepted the modes of democracy promotion of the external actors and their strategy as given. For instance, Schmid (2003) analyzes the implementation of conditionality as an important instrument of the European Union (EU) for democracy promotion, without any emphasis on why the EU employs conditionality. The thesis aims to contribute to the external democratization literature by giving a detail analysis of the European Union's policy formation and instruments for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region. More specifically, I look at the dynamics underlying democracy promotion policies of the EU and explain "why the EU adopts certain policies and employ certain instruments for Mediterranean countries". As such, this thesis does not focus on the 'success' or 'failure' of democratization policies per se, but rather how an external democratizer, like the EU, produces principal policies and employ instruments for democracy promotion. Namely, this thesis tries to explain the evaluation of the EU's foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region and within this process, how the EU's policies are intensified towards a comprehensive democracy promotion strategy in the Mediterranean region.

The EU represents a special case in democracy promotion studies. While Samuel Huntington's theory of third wave of democratization dominantly influences the literature towards the understanding of external democratization as a process of regime change (i.e. US's coercive measures) (Huntington, 1991), the EU's external actorship on democratization is a case study for the liberal thought, emphasizing that external democratization can be induced through policy change in political, economical and social spheres (Hussain, 2007). Moreover, geographical proximity driven policies of the EU for democracy promotion is another factor to recognize the EU as a special actor in international arena for democracy promotion, since the EU does not seek to be global actor of democracy promotion in any part of the world regardless, but rather it focuses on its neighbourhood (i.e. Central Eastern and Mediterranean regions). Many studies point out to the EU's competencies in executing democracy promotion strategy (see Warkotsch 2008, Kamp 2007) and those studies focus on either certain dimensions of democracy promotion strategy such as effectiveness of one specific instrument that the EU employs, or the EU's competencies to react to non-democratic implications. Therefore, studying the EU's democracy promotion strategy based on policy

formation will contribute to the democratization literature. Also, my findings from this study can inform other areas where IGOs are seen as promoters of democracy such as Organization of Africa Unity in Africa (Hearn, 1999), Organization of American States in America and South-East Asia Treaty Organization in South-East Asia (Sisk, 2001)

The EU's democracy promotion strategy in Mediterranean is selected as a case in this thesis, because the EU's policies are dynamic and evolving in nature through the region as compared to the policies on post-Soviet states. Active political and social transformation in the region force the EU to make immediate revisions to its policy and adopt further policies (Joint Communication by the High Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy and the European Commission, 2011). Moreover, the EU already integrated with many independent post-Soviet states after the demise of the Soviet Union while there is not any enlargement perspective with the Mediterranean countries. The absence of enlargement perspective in Mediterranean policies of the EU ends up with certain differences in modes of democracy promotion (i.e. non-existence of coercive measures). Moreover, the EU has not been able to promote such norms with the same level of success that it achieved across its immediate vicinity, namely the Central and Eastern Europe. Promotion of political reforms for democratization in the Southern countries, which have a long relationship with the EU, became a difficult task in which many called as a failure (Kienle, Ambiguities and Misconceptions: European Policies towards Political Reform in the Southern Mediterranean, 2011). Therefore, assessment of the EU's democracy promotion strategy on Mediterranean would be attractive to test for the EU's competencies in external actorness on democratization.

The promotion of democracy has been a major aim of the European Union's foreign policy especially following the end of Cold War (Youngs, 2001). Mutual economic interests and security concerns have led the European Union to invest in its relations with the Mediterranean (MED) countries since 1970s. The political stability of these southern countries, on the other hand, gained paramount importance for the EU mostly following a number of interrelated issues that arose in the region. From the very beginning of the EU's establishment until today; the tensions in the region such as the long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict, Islamist extremism propaganda expanding to the region and the threat of terrorist migration into Europe prioritized the region into the EU's immediate foreign policy agenda. Therefore, the EU first attempted to develop cooperation with the region through Global Mediterranean Policy (formulated in 1970s) which could establish bilateral agreements until

1990s, and then followed by Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (1995-known also as Barcelona Process) and lastly integrated under European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (2004). However, the EU's interest in democracy promotion not only augmented due to the necessity to secure the EU's on-going economic relations with the Southern countries; but also since the EU has started to adopt a more active foreign policy in international arena for political issues. Therefore, exporting democratic norms has been a guiding principle for policy makers in Brussels (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, pp. 48-49). Democratization of the Mediterranean region, at the end, also became one of the main *raison d'être* of the EU and it emphasizes this logic in many platforms; as such declared in Joint Communication on March 2011:

“Movement towards full democracy is never an easy path - there are risks and uncertainties associated with these transitions. While acknowledging the difficulties the EU has to take the clear and strategic option of supporting the quest for the principles and values that it cherishes. For these reasons the EU must not be a passive spectator. It needs to support wholeheartedly the wish of the people in our neighbourhood to enjoy the same freedoms that we take as our right. European countries have their own experience of democratic transition. The European Union has a proud tradition of supporting countries in transition from autocratic regimes to democracy, first in the South and more recently in Central and Eastern Europe.” (European Commission, 2011)

The European Union's positioning itself as a democracy promoter rather than being a passive spectator brings the question that how democracy can be promoted actively. Which instruments an external actor could use to promote democracy in other countries? Which areas and through which means can an external actor intervene in another country's national process of transition to democracy? In order to understand the scope of external democratization; the first chapter of this thesis gives a general literature review of external democratization, main discussions in democracy promotion literature and make classification of the means in serving to the ends for democracy promotion of the external actor. In order to illustrate the EU's democracy promotion strategy and its external actorness, the evolution process of the EU's democracy promotion strategy in Mediterranean needs to be understood within the EU's internal political processes, therefore, in the second chapter, the EU's path to democracy promotion in Mediterranean region will be elaborated. The significance of the Mediterranean region for the EU; an historical overview of how the relationship is developed and lastly a summary of the EU's strategy and instruments for democracy promotion in Mediterranean region will be major parts of this chapter. A special focus on the EU's internal

weaknesses during and after the policy formulation will also be given; and the rhetoric of the EU in democratization of Mediterranean will be pointed out by referring to the major EU documents.

In the third chapter, the EU's credibility in implementing the instruments in support of democratization will be assessed through a number of comparisons based on the available data of the European Commission's assistance programming documents and the data retrieved from previous works in the field, in order to find out whether the EU occasionally fails to implement the democracy promotion instruments that it plans. Of course one may argue that implementation is a study of change where the external actor, due to a number of reasons, can change the means and pace of a policy in order to respond to the challenges which are not calculated during policy formation. Many of the canonical works on democratization, for instance, look at internal factors in democratizing countries (see *inter alia* O'Donnell and Schmitter 1987, Huntington 1997, Geddes 1999), and more specifically the capacity of these countries towards consolidating their regimes. While some other studies look at how international organizations effect democratization processes as suppliers (e.g. Pevehouse 2000), it is also significant to focus on to what extent these democratizers' policies are shaped from the feedback they get from the recipient countries and to what extent such democratization policies are resilient when faced with competing concerns such as trading ties, alliances, resistance by the recipient country, etc. because if such democratization measures are not implemented with critical decisiveness; it will not be reasonable to talk about their weaknesses during implementation by claiming a number of reasons from the recipient country's conditions. This thesis assumes that without considering firstly the competencies of the external democratizer in formulating and employing its democracy promotion strategy, without assessing the external democratizer's preferences; to study the assessment of the external democratization will not be persuasive. Therefore, this thesis will not look for the role of the EU in democratizing the recipient countries, but assess the supplier side, by looking into the evolution of its democracy promotion strategy and the consistency between the formulation and the implementation of the EU's own strategy. And finally, within this framework, how the EU increased its involvement in the Mediterranean region through its democracy promotion strategy will be pointed out in Chapter III to make a general assessment of the EU's external actorness in the region.

CHAPTER I: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES OF EXTERNAL ACTORS

This chapter will summarize the basic discussions on democratization literature about the policies of external actors in order to give an introductory background on the menu of options for democracy promotion. The key theoretical contributions in democratization such as Huntington (1991) and Whitehead (1996) will be the reference in understanding the essential elements that an external democratizer could consider. Two basic modellings will be drawn, one is for the essential elements that an external actor should consider in formulation of democracy promotion strategy, and one is for through which means an external actor employs the democracy promotion strategy.

1.1 External Actors in Democratization: How to formulate the Democracy Promotion Strategy

The literature offers a large variety for the definition of “democracy”. While Schmitter and Karl (1991), Vanhannen (1997) and Waale (1999) emphasized democracy as a system of governance where free and fair elections and accountability of the executive arm to the public exists; Huber, Rueschemeyer & Stephens (1997) considered democracy also as a guarantee for freedom of speech and expression of opinions, and social and economic equality. Democratization, on the other hand simply implies transition from non-democratic regimes to democracy. However, since there is a definitional variety on what democracy is and how it should be, the studies also varied in democratization literature. For instance, while the liberal thought defined the process of transition not solely about the constitutional political transformation such as establishment of a system where free and fair elections and accountability of leaders; rather democratization is a process where also the civil and political freedom to speak, publish and organize the political debate exists (Dahl, 1998), Huntington (1991) pointed out that open, free and fair elections are the sine qua non of democracy while he classified other elements such as ‘responsible’ government, ‘honesty and openness’ in politics as fuzzy norms which make a regime undesirable if those norms are absent, but not undemocratic.. Given the variety of the definition of democracy and the democratization process, this thesis will assess what the EU promotes; namely does the EU give a clear definition of democracy to promote in Mediterranean; whether the EU recognizes

democratization as dominantly transition for free and fair elections; or whether accountability and human rights are also essential.

The democratization concept has prominently started to be discussed after the widespread transition to democracy in the world in 1980s and 1990s. Especially following Samuel Huntington's (1991) classification of this process as 'third wave of democratization', the scholars focused on the countries' transition to democracy. It should be stated that many of those studies undermined international aspect of the democratic transformation and focused mainly on the domestic factors in explaining the nature and timing of democratization processes. Some scholars of democratization therefore addressed the legitimacy problem in countries by referring to the shifts in the balance of power between the moderates and dictator leaders in authoritarian regimes due to the decreasing legitimacy of a dictator to stay in power such as poor economic performance¹ (Przeworski, 1991). On the other hand, some pointed out the correlation between economic modernizations, which leads to changes in social and class structures, and democratization (see Barrington Moore 1996, D. Rueschemeyer; E. Stephens, and J. Stephens 1992).

It was during the late 1990s that scholars started to pay attention to the external actors' policies for democratization. Whitehead (1996) is one of the key scholars in literature who focuses on the actors, such as the United States (US) and the EU, who export democracy to the rest of the world especially after the structural changes in international arena following the end of Cold War. Whitehead classifies imposition of democracy under three main headings - contagion, control, and consent. Contagion means geographical proximity, implying that democratization in one country would spill-over into neighbouring countries (Whitehead, 1996); just like Huntington's identification of the key difference between the third wave of democratization from the previous ones as self-perpetuating "snowball momentum" (Huntington, 1991). The reason why scholars after 1990s referred to the contagion through geographical proximity was that the fall of communism in Eastern Europe was recognized as a reaction to the spread of information, and the motivation of the social actors through the means of communication and technology (see Kegley, 1992 and Kaldor,

¹ Legitimacy of a dictator to stay in power is significant since the authoritarian regime itself does not have a mechanism of self-renewal as it is in democratic regime through elections, and if a dictator does not perform well to sustain its power, then democratization in that country is more likely to occur (Huntington, 1991).

1999). From this point of view; if a country or region is at geographical proximity of the external democracy promoter, it is more likely a country imports the democratic values and norms. The second heading that Whitehead introduced, control, simply implies the direct intervention to a country by an external actor for regime-change such as US's invasion of Panama. Control is one of the direct and so influential type of external dimension of democratization. The third heading, consent, on the other hand, focuses on the internal socio-political willingness for democratization, and argues that if democratization is mostly internally driven, than the outer party's role is relegated to an indirect, supportive position.

Many researchers examined how best can democracy best be promoted by international actors recognized as sponsors of democracy (see Ethier 2003; Burnell 2004; Stetter 2004, Lawson 1999). Stetter (2004) for instance puts forward that the establishment of a democratic regime is primarily a domestic issue in which without the political will of the government or the political elites; democratization cannot be steered unilaterally by an external actor (Stetter, 2004, p. 153). Lawson (1999), also analyzes the linkage between external democracy promotion in Africa in late 1980s and domestic structural variables, by concluding that international community can influence reforms but cannot force for democratization and also it is not possible to preserve sustainable democratization in the absence of economic modernization, good governance and civil societies within the country. According to Lawson's conclusion, the international actor is a promoter rather than the one who imposes democratization; and the strength of the influence for sustainable democracy is linked to the liberalization in the economic sphere, good governance and existence of civil societies.

The relationship between liberalization in the economic sphere and political reform has long been one of the central issues of political theory going back to the classical theorists such as Smith and Hume who presented the link between political liberalization and economic development. When the third wave of democratization researches are reviewed, the considerable prominence given to the market reforms and liberal market economy as a precondition of democracy is apparent (Youngs, 2001) because one of the most effective legitimacy of authoritarian governments for justification of political restrictions is to develop economic performance and attain higher level of economic development (Linz & Stepan, 1996). The process of democratization is therefore claimed to be stronger when the economic freedom is extended.

Despite those studies are based on the dominant assessment of economic liberalization leading democratization, Huntington (1991) also puts forward a sensitive issue that should be recognized. He suggests that economic development with industrialization contributes to democratization; however, if a country's economy is getting better due to the sale of natural resources, such as oil, whose revenue goes to the state -not directly to the public- does not necessarily contribute to democratization. The reason is that the country is getting wealthier and the economic legitimacy of the authoritarian state continues; and also the emergence of middle class is not expected where the middle class' economic needs continue (Huntington, 1991). Most of the studies establishing a relationship between market economy liberalization and democratization is also emphasizing the correlation between civil society and economic liberalization. Such a correlation suggested that if authority of state removed from the economic activity, then the autonomous economic activity leads to the widespread autonomous civil society which in return restrains the power of state. While Huntington (1991) puts forward that increased economic well-being of public adds value to the emergence of middle class as against to the authoritarian regimes; Beetham (1997) asserts that the necessary civility of social relations in a democratic polity can be protected when the market forces are regulated in a way to enhance democratic participation and debate; because the core assumption of economic modernization theory is that people demand more forcibly their political rights just after their economic needs had been met. Therefore; it is essential for an external actor to consider to support economic liberalization through industrialization and open trade rather than direct economic gains to the state itself.


The third area of reform that external actors promote for democracy is good governance which is a context related to the transparency and accountability of public policy-making. Good governance first appeared in World Bank's terminology during the 1980s and since then the development policy of international donors including the EU promoted the political institutional reforms towards more transparency, accountability and rule of law (Carbone, 2010). As being main international reference point of donors, there were some constraints related to the concept, since the definition of the concept shifted sharply. While good governance was first perceived by World Bank as an apolitical concept in which the objective was the development of policy-making simply for economic development and civil society activism; the identification of problems in Africa's development as a crisis of governance lead the change in definition of good governance in Assessing Aid report (1998) as follows:

“As noted, many low-income countries fall into a gray area between good and poor management. Because implementing macroeconomic and trade reforms is technically easier than strengthening institutions (such as the civil service and the rule of law), these countries will often have relatively good macroeconomic policies but inefficient service delivery. Thus there will have to be more support for building institutions and implementing reforms in different sectors—more ideas, less money. A greater share of financing should come through projects whose value added is measured by the degree to which design and implementation helped improve performance in those sectors.” (World Bank, 1998)

Since the World Bank concluded that the governing systems and institutions, as being a significant complementary of economic reforms, need to be supported; many donors including the EU, recognized political aspects of good governance – accountability, transparency and rule of law- as a precondition of financial aid (Carbone, 2010). Therefore, good governance reforms based on liberalization of political governance and its institutions, started to be included in the democracy promotion policies.

After the general assessment of democracy promotion policies of an external actor, it is recognized that although little attention exists for the process of the external actors’ formation of their policies, a survey of canonical democratization literature suggests a number of propositions on what an external actor promotes towards democratization and how such policy should be formulated. As one of the key concern of this thesis, the formation of democracy promotion strategy of the EU for Mediterranean will be assessed based on testing which essential conditions are considered by the EU during the democracy policy formation towards Mediterranean. Figure I below summarizes those conditions to be considered.

Figure I: Conditions to be considered by the democracy promoter for formation of democracy promotion strategy



After formulating its democratization policy, the external actor needs to implement this policy through a set of instruments. The following part will address through which means the external actors promote democratization.

1.2 Means of External Actors to Promote Democratization

Classification of the instruments used for democracy promotion is a complex study due to the variety of the actors in international arena varying from countries having bilateral relations with developing countries (such as US, Germany, China) to intergovernmental organizations (IGO) (such as the EU, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) , the United Nations (UN)). While the countries’ instruments included financial aid, economic sanctions, military interventions or just through classical diplomacy (Schraeder, 2003),


intergovernmental institutions have focused on wider means for democracy promotion based on financial aid through development programs and democracy assistance (Youngs, 2001). The difference in the modes of democracy promotion of a country and inter-governmental organization is linked to the type of their formulation. A country could easily have direct bilateral relations as a state actor, while an intergovernmental organization such as the EU has multiple of actors even within itself which makes it difficult for direct decision-making towards a country and its recognition from a state actor's glance. While a country, for instance US, could unilaterally make pressure on a region or specific country for democracy imposition, the intergovernmental institutions such as the EU need to establish a convergence even within itself and with the partner countries. Therefore, it is more favourable for an IGO to act as a guarantor or underwriter of democracy, instead of being a direct exporter (Pevehouse, 2005).

Within this variety of actors and their instruments, the traditional and most common classification on the means of democracy promotion is done by many scholars based on the positive versus coercive approaches. The positive approaches consist of democracy assistance measures which means to fund the projects that would contribute to strengthening democratic institutions and practices. Likewise, such carrots, also relate the level of political pluralism and democratic institutionalization of governments as a precondition of continuation and development of trade and providing financial aid. In the same vein of logic, of course, negative sanctions refer to cases when a democratizer imposes pecuniary and/or political costs on the target country when such democracy targets are not met. Referring back to Whitehead's (1996) three reference modes of external democratization – contagion, control and consent – this classification is followed by scholars through adding up new measures, such as Schmitter (1996) as the one who adds the fourth category of 'conditionality' to Whitehead's classification through taking into consideration the cases of voluntary vs. coercive external influences. There are other sources making different classifications all actually based on these four basic headings of Whitehead, with additional sub-categories or through different terminologies (i.e. instead of 'consent' calling it as 'convergence' (Kubicek, 2003)

Given the huge collection of democratization studies in transition theories, international relations and also in political theory; the analysis of the means of external democratization will not be addressed here in detail. Rather, the conceptualization of Tanja Börzel and

Thomas Risse (2009) will be addressed, because Börzel and Risse introduces a list based on the underlying principles of democracy promotion instruments; rather than referring and labelling each and every type of instrument as sub-categories of another instrument (see Paul Kubicek 2003). This approach serves to the intention of this part which is to have a general overview of the instruments for external democratization which will follow by the detailed analysis of how the EU formulate its modes of democracy promotion towards Mediterranean and how they employed each instrument in following chapters.

Figure II: Modes of External Democratization²



1.2.1 Democratization through Coercion

Coercive democratization is defined by Ian Hurd as:

“Coercion refers to a relation of asymmetrical physical power among agents, where this asymmetry is applied to changing the behavior of the weaker agent. The operative mechanism is fear or simple “compellance”; fear produces acquiescence. An actor who obeys a rule because of coercion is motivated by the fear of punishment from a stronger power” (Hurd, 1999)

To put it simply, actors do not have any choice but have to accept the idea which is imposed by the external actor because they are threatened by the use of force or a considerable punishment. Within this scope of definition; achievement to sustainable democracy through the threat of war or use of physical force is controversial; because in history there are both

² The idea of this modelling is inspired from Börzel & Risse’s (2009) classification of the democracy promotion instruments and own illustration from the democratization literature. The paper of Börzel & Risse is available on URL: http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_1.pdf

success and failure stories based on different conditions and reasons. For example; US's occupation in Iraq (2003) for the aim of establishment of democracy did not end up with clear existence of democratization by all means of political and social liberalization; and could not go further than constitution-making by the role of American Actors (Beichelt, 2012). On the other hand Germany and Japan are the positive examples of coercive democratization by the destruction of old dictatorships by the end of World War II. The reasons of success or failure of coercive democratization however is not linked by scholars to the violent character of coercion. When Grimm (2009) related the failure to the endogenous factors such as internal social conflicts, internal state failure and continuing security problems; the success is linked to the homogenous population having a strong tradition for state formation.

Not only the use of physical threat but also the fear of punishment by a stronger actor would make the weaker ones to obey the imposition of democratization. For example, the national legislations of Member Countries in the European Union are subject to the supremacy of European Union Law and the Court of Justice; in which the non-adoption of the EU regulations in each and every Member Country is subject to jurisdiction. The strategy of the EU's diffusion of European values and democratic norms into the member states, which is called as the process of "Europeanization" by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2005), is classified under coercive democratization due to its legal enforcement mechanism. However, the criticisms for this mode emphasizes its underestimation of the mechanisms of social control and given emphasis more on policy making at state level. The normative content is related to the imposition through laws and regulations rather than diffusion through society. The EU did not aimed to employ a coercive strategy on the third Mediterranean countries for democracy promotion due to the belief that regime-change in Mediterranean can be induced through economic, social and political changes rather than direct imposition (Hussain, 2007). Moreover, coercion is costly not only related to the strength of democracy exporter's resources to support sustainable democratization; but also about the possibility of the collapse of the democratization process due to the loss of legitimacy of that top-down approach over time within the country/region itself (see Hurd 1999, Warkotsch 2008). However, the existence of the suspension clauses, which implies the political conditionality is recognized as coercive measure that the EU formulated under democracy promotion strategy towards Mediterranean partner countries (Warkotsch, 2008) because the clauses give emphasis on the change of rules and laws in recipient countries according to the universal principles.

1.2.2 Democratization through Conditionality

Conditionality is a terminology that entered into discussions on the external democratization by 1980s. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as the major donors to developing countries linked its development programs to the liberalization of policies in the recipient country. This strategy of IMF and World Bank is in general referred as ‘conditionality’ for development aid. The basis of this conditionality, as explained before, was the ‘good governance’ for reforms in recipient countries. However, the definition of good governance evolved in time shifting from apolitical means such as economic reforms (structural adjustment), towards political conditionality such as rule of law, human rights and so on. The dissemination of governance rules through conditionality is called as ‘political conditionality’. According to Schimmelfennig’s (2010) definition, the governance rules of the donor is disseminated by setting them as conditions that actors have to meet in order to obtain rewards and to avoid sanctions from the external actor.

Political conditionality is at the center of the EU’s instruments towards other countries. The EU, as becoming an active donor in international arena³; is considered as one of the external democracy promoters and referred very commonly in studies of political conditionality; because the EU’s strategy for enlargement the significant reference for how political conditionality works. Especially after the Cold War, new emerged post-socialist countries were in demand for closer relations with the EU. Since the EU had concerns about stability in the region and have an intention to deeper integration with eastern countries; the EU introduced a set of conditions that a potential accession candidate has to meet. Those conditions, known as Copenhagen Criteria (1993), were first introduced for potential accession candidates where a new member country has to develop stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities rights; as well as establish a functioning and competitive market economy and adopt the EU acquis (Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria)). The EU then started to insert those conditions in

³ The US reported 2.25 billion USD is spent for democratic assistance abroad as of 2008. The EU Member States on the other hand spent more than 1.6 billion EURO in 2006 and 2007. Moreover, the EU lent around 700 million EURO between 2000 and 2006 through EIDHR. Moreover, despite UNDP is also one of the major donors to support democracy around the World by financing 1.4 billion USD per year (Beichelt, 2012); the EU’s active involvement in the democracy promotion deserves to be pointed out.

Association Agreements that are signed with non-EU neighbour countries which the EU had ongoing economic relationship, assuming that conditionality would work for democratization and economic liberalization (Schimmelfennig, Europeanization beyond the member states, 2010)

Existing studies suggest that conditionality as a tool for democratization works better in recipient countries that already have some democratic institutions in place (Clapham 1995). In non-democratic states, political conditionality would lead establishment of a limited degree of political space, such as strengthening of opposition against authoritarian regime. On the other hand, if the recipient country is in post-transition process; the conditionality would work better for institution building and strengthening of political institutions through democracy such as voting procedures, constitutional strengthening, judiciary amendments etc. (Clapham, 1995). The consent of recipient country is therefore significant to make conditionality better work for democratization. Crawford (1997) on the other hand focuses on the donor side in assessing the effectiveness of conditionality. He assesses the seriousness of donor intent based on the consistency of their response to 29 country cases where aid sanctions had been taken by at least one of the four⁴ donors. Crawford concludes that effectiveness of political conditionality depends on the strength of measures imposed, where the strength of measures is defined as the rhetorical support for democracy and human rights and equal treatment to all nations regardless of economic self-interest (Crawford, 1997). This thesis will look for why and how the EU formulates conditionality in its policy towards the Mediterranean and whether the conditionality of the EU for Mediterranean is formulated and employed in an efficient way, based on the approach that in the absence of a positive consent (as against to imposition by pressure) political conditionality would not lead sustainable liberalization for a long time (see Jachtenfuchs 2001, Bicci 2006 and Beichelt 2012), and the rhetorical support is significant in making the conditionality better work for external democratization.

1.2.3 Democratization through Persuasion and Socialization

External democratization through persuasion and socialization refers to the normative basis of democracy promotion rather than material. Persuasion is the situation where actors try to

⁴ US, EU, UK and Sweden

persuade each other on a normative statement. The logic behind is the arguing the reasons behind the norms to be adopted and challenge to the counterarguments so that the external actor could teach the international norms to the recipient (Börzel & Risse, 2009). Socialization is also a course of normative diffusion approach. Socialization is the process where the recipient actors learn from the external actor how to internalize those new norms and rules to be integrated into international community; rather than maximizing their utilities, such as economic benefits or receiving financial aid (Börzel & Risse, 2009). The basic difference between persuasion and socialization; despite both is related to ideational change; persuasion is done through argument and discussions when socialization appears per se due to the external promoter's appearance as a role model to recipient country (Beichelt, 2012).

The European Union is a significant case for external diffusion of norms and rules to create ideational change. The EU's approach since the very beginning of the idea of democracy promotion emerged (namely 1990s) is based on creating an atmosphere to share ideas, discuss and negotiate them. Turkey is a good example in terms of a country's attitude change. Given their long history together (since 1963 when Turkey signed Association Agreement with the EU); share of ideational frames and acting along with the EU for a long time, ends up with Turkey's attitudes being similar to European style. For example; Turkey shares the European attitudes in the Middle East if political implications of Turkish attempts in the region is investigated. Aras and Bıçakcı (2006) makes an analysis of Turkish mediator role in Palestinian and Israeli conflict and Turkish inclusion in the Middle East, they conclude as follows:

“The EU action plans with Israel and Palestinians within the framework of ENP suggest developing, among others, social, political and economic cooperation schemes to secure peace and stability in the region. In this sense, Turkey leads an Iraqi neighbourhood forum, which resembles the European neighbourhood initiative. This attempt is a likely starter of a security regime in the Middle East... Turkey emerged as a potential mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These are initiatives that the EU was aiming to develop toward the region in the past several decades.” (Aras & Bıçakcı, 2006)

Turkey's inclusion in the Middle East peace and security processes are related to the adoption of Turkey the European approach towards the region. Turkey follows the EU's path not only due to its own interests; but also due to the adoption of the EU's ideational process that is

about serving as a mediator and regional player of peace and security. As it is discovered in Turkey-EU case, the long-term exposure of a country to an external actor's norms and rules ends up with ideational and so attitude changes, as it is discovered in Turkey-EU case.

This general overview of the external democratization literature gives significant insight for my analysis. It is obvious that a clear answer for what is the best democracy promotion strategy and how it should be formulated does not exist because there is a consensus that external democratization is significantly correlated to the domestic conditions and each mode of democracy promotion could end up with success or failure. However, some common conclusions in literature suggests that if the external actor clearly defines its expectations in the name of democratization, if the willingness of the recipient country is gathered, if the instruments are formulated in serving to the economic and social development as well as good governance and if external democratizer's rhetoric work with its practices, then it will be the time to look for the reasons of the failure of a democracy promotion strategy inside the recipient country. In other words, this thesis assumes that without considering firstly the competencies of the external democratizer in formulating and employing its democracy promotion strategy, without assessing the external democratizer's preferences; to study the assessment of the external democratization will not be persuasive. Therefore, this thesis will not look for the role of the EU in democratizing the recipient countries, but assess the supplier side, focusing on the consistency between the formulation and the implementation of the EU's own strategy. The following chapter will therefore look for the reasons of the basic research question on why the EU adopts certain policies

CHAPTER II: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

The “Mediterranean region” simply refers to the countries in North Africa (Maghreb) and Middle East (Mashreq) having been declared as the EU’s partner countries under Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the ones at the same time being in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood with no intention or foresight for membership. Maghreb countries are Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco; and Mashreq are composed of Syria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestinian Authority. The determination of these countries as the EU’s Mediterranean partner countries and the relationship that the EU developed for external democratization and political cooperation has a long historical root. This Chapter will illustrate the significance of the Mediterranean region for the EU and how democracy promotion comes to the EU’s agenda. Moreover, the evolution of the democracy promotion strategy will be assessed based on Figure I and Figure II.

2.1 The Significance of Mediterranean Region for the EU

The European Union’s appearance as an external actor towards the MED countries is not a result of a project appeared per se, but rather evolved as a result of external and internal political and economic necessities in a policy vacuum. With the Rome Treaties of 1957, the European Community (EC) was granted competences in external trade and concluded agreements with the third states, such as the framework of the Yaoundé Treaty which established relations with the member states’ former African colonies by 1963 (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 43). In 1966-67, the European Commission represented the six member states of the EC in the Kennedy Round negotiations of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The EC’s external relations led the member states to consider their relations with the third countries and the EC appeared as an important community in terms of its international presence. From 1970s onwards, the EC seeks for having foreign policy for its external presence in international arena.

The EC’s recognition by the other states as an international actor actually led a major problem within the Community; because the EC was becoming an international actor on the eyes of the others despite the fact that the Community itself did not yet have clear foreign policy competences (Müftüler-Baç, 2007). European Political Cooperation (EPC) (1970) was

the first formal attempt for intensifying political cooperation to have a clear foreign policy. Since the EPC appeared to the outside world as the EC's common voice, and became a reference for the third countries for EC's political opinion regarding the external issues. Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) (1972) was the first attempt of the EU for Mediterranean region in terms of its objectives to treat the southern countries in a uniform fashion, claiming to bringing Arabs and Israelis to a closer relationship for cooperation and peace (Calandri, Caviglia, & Varsori, 2012, p. 30). GMP remained as a dramatic misnomer in terms of political ends⁵ but led to bilateral financial protocols which enhanced trade relations between the Mediterranean region and the Member States.

The GMP remained as a dramatic misnomer since first of all it could not lead a uniform policy for the Mediterranean countries that had the different interests for political and economic ends. By December 1974, Council of Ministers abandoned the aim of a region-wide negotiation since an oil embargo against the West has started after Arab-Israeli War (1973). This energy crisis caused the non-oil-producing North countries to be vulnerable so the balance of power shifted towards the south, especially to the oil-producing countries (Tsoukalis, *The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is 'Global' Policy a Misnomer?*, 1977). As a result, the Community had to develop a Euro-Arab dialogue which created a division between the negotiated countries. At the very beginning of GMP the aim was having a common policy with one common agreement, but now the Community needed to develop differentiated policies especially towards the Middle-Eastern oil-producing countries. However, not only economic ties were sufficient to guarantee the good relations but also political objectives were demanded by Middle Eastern countries related to the Arab-Israeli War.

Oil crisis divided not only the regions, but also the Member States' preferences. The eight of the nine Community members (Britain, Denmark and Ireland became members in 1973 and the number increased from six to nine) joined the International Energy Agency (IEA) while France preferred to stay out of IEA by promoting the necessity of a more unified Community under these circumstances. While Greece, Turkey, Malta, Spain and Portugal were in demand

⁵ The reason is recognized as the heterogeneous interests of the Mediterranean countries for political ends. While Greece, Turkey, Malta, Spain and Portugal were in demand of membership to the Community; the Arabs wished to use this platform as a tool for bringing pressure on Israel rather than cooperation (Pierros, Meunier, & Abrams, 1999). For more information on GMP please see Pierros et.al. (1999)

of membership to the Community; the Arabs wished for bringing pressure on Israel under this platform rather than cooperation. The Mediterranean countries' interests were heterogeneous in this respect in which the uniformity became impossible. Moreover, the convergence of the member states' interests towards the Mediterranean in establishing a uniform GMP turned also into divergence of their preferences during the negotiations for free trade with the southern countries. Consumer-oriented Britain was interested in cheaper imports while France and Italy were feeling threatened by competing agricultural products of the Mediterranean countries. Therefore, GMP could not go forward than having signed bilateral financial protocols (Tsoukalis, *The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is 'Global' Policy a Misnomer?*, 1977).

Despite the GMP which remained bilateral mostly and regarded as deficient, unfruitful and weak in economic terms by the scholars (Dağdemir, 2008, p. 154); one can claim that GMP was a significant exercise for the EC foreign policy towards the region, in which the EU could learn for further policy formations. As Laschi points out, the memory of a dramatic history of the EC member countries and the MED marked a protean colonialism had a deep impact on the whole Mediterranean policy. Laschi claims that Europe has never experienced to fully enter the peace negotiations on the Middle-East and therefore the EC's MED policies have failed at a political level when Arab-Israeli crisis was on the table (Laschi, 2011, p. 41). On the other hand; the colonial memory of the EC was experienced not only for the political competencies of the EC over the region, but also made the traditional north-south distinction much apparent even within the EC itself. While the industrially well-developed Northern member states were interested in economic gains over the free trade privileges to be defined to the third MED countries⁶, the Southern member states were reluctant in terms of their agricultural advantages. Given the existence of north-south distinction as well as the EC's lack of competence on political issues and divergence of interests within the EU itself, the project to treat the Southern region in a uniform fashion was a failure.

The Cold War period's bipolar atmosphere also shaped the EC's priorities in the region where strategic importance of the MED countries gained a hierarchical structure on EC side. One of the strong drivers for the EPC was to safeguard democracy in southern Europe, to make the southern countries (such as Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Spain) closer to Europe

⁶ Albania, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia

rather than leaving them to increasing Anti-Americanism and to respond challenges to European democracy from Eastern and Southern countries (Calandri, Caviglia, & Varsori, 2012, pp. 28-29). Turkey and Greece, as countries first signed Association Agreements (AAs) -Greece in 1962 and Turkey in 1963-, which offers possibility of future enlargement, became the top of this hierarchy (Calandri, Caviglia, & Varsori, 2012). Their gradual accession to the common market is guaranteed by the AAs and EC's financial aid to prepare these key strategic countries to the common market conditions; while the third Mediterranean countries were positioned as the ones where integration is not highly necessary but rather their cooperation would be attained on their mutual interests.

By the end of Cold War, the end of stable bipolar world would shape the parameters of foreign policies of the EC/EU. The EC/EU faced with major problems arising from the third Mediterranean countries; such as the Gulf Crisis and oil embargo against Iraq, migration, Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and economic losses in return. The EC/EU's strategy to cope with the threats to the prosperity on the region was that to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and further integrate by Member States to have a common voice and credibility in international arena. Under this initiative, the Barcelona Process which leads to Euro-Mediterranean partnership is a cornerstone in terms of Euro-MED relations. Euro-Mediterranean partnership was a start of an initiative to through more cooperation, diplomatic atmosphere, more interaction and looking for common solutions through the promotion of democracy and the exercise of the EU's instruments for democracy promotion. According to the main conclusion of this section which is the EU failed in GMP in formulating a uniform policy with one general agreement for all, since when the political issues are integrated into discussion both the Member States' and MED countries' interests diverged. However, it should be pointed out that the emergence of the EPC and the attempts for an EU-wide foreign policy formation towards the region at the end contributed to the EU's presence in the region. For instance, in 1980 Venice Declaration, the EU has set out its policy on the Middle East by recognising the right to security and existence for all states in the region including Israel, and the need to fulfil the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in terms of self-governance (EEAS, 2009). Venice Declaration was a significant attempt as the EU's first common position on foreign policy towards the region and considerable in terms of its de-facto existence on the political concerns which proves the EU's interests to actively become involved in the region. The next section will focus on how the democracy promotion takes its roots within the process of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) formation and the birth of

the ‘partnership’ perspective towards the Mediterranean region contributing to the EU’s external actorness in the region.

2.2 Barcelona Process establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

“The Barcelona conference takes place at the exact same day when Pope Urban II, 900 years ago in the French town, Clermont, launched the first crusade. [...]”

Manuel Marin, November 1995

The European Union has been trying to establish a cooperation framework since the very beginning of its establishment, but the attempts until 1990s had concluded with dramatic failures as briefly summarized in the previous section. However, the significance of the region for the European Union is always tapped by the new emerging events, that did not let the EU to underestimate the region and give up to take further actions. The Gulf crisis⁷ in 1990 was a considerable reason for the Union to need the promotion of international cooperation and security through the far Southern neighbours. Traditionally, the EU’s energy supply was highly dependent on the oil transfer from the Middle East, and the energy transfer should be sustained through the EU. Moreover; 1990s were the times that the religious terrorist groups in Arab countries were becoming obviously active in their actions. Increase in instability and terrorist activities in some southern countries threatened Europe because of the possibility of terrorists’ immigration to Europe (Gillespie, 1997, p. 66). As a substantial point above all, the international community were being invited by the Group of Seven (the 7 biggest economies) at the time to ‘build new spirit of cooperation’ in the Middle East. The EU, however, was lack of competences on political issues to have a common voice towards the Gulf Crisis. When the Council by the proposal of France, issued an invitation to the Iraqi foreign minister; the Germans and the Dutch considered to have such a meeting after the US-Iraq one; while Italy and Spain suggested to act regardless (Kane, 2008, pp. 19-21) On the

⁷ Gulf Crisis is a confrontation between Iraq and Kuwait that began and intensified on oil policies in 1990s. Iraq’s national revenue was dependent on mostly oil exports and Iraq was in demand to maintain high oil prices for the repayment of its debts following Iran-Iraq war, however, the oil prices had dropped from \$18 to \$12 per barrel; in which Iraq blamed Kuwait for the decrease in oil prices and the conflict ends up with the Iraqi army’s invasion of Kuwait. For more details on the Gulf Crisis, please see <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-2-1.htm>

other hand, the UN Security Council's resolution (678) which authorized the use of force against Iraq as a response to the Iraq's invasion of Kuwait dramatically divided the member states' preferences. While the Netherlands and the UK by sharing the American position rigidly supported the coalition against Iraq; Belgium, Germany and Spain opposed to the operation and France and Italians were flexible (Kane, 2008, pp. 19-21). The divergence of foreign policies of Member States is a catalyst for the necessity to define a Common Foreign and Security Policy and to have an EU-wide existence on the international issues.

The European Council performed its functions just before the Maastricht Treaty came into effect, in the Lisbon European Council, regarding the agenda-setting on the 'essential European interests' on geographical and functional areas on the likelihood of development of CFSP (Smith M. E., 2004, p. 191). The Lisbon European Council and the Council of Ministers approved a report addressing the factors on important common interests and the specific objectives. Geographical proximity of the region or country, significance of the political and economic stability of the region for the EU and the existence of threats to the EU's security interests are those listed factors to determine areas open to joint action of the EU. Maghreb and the Middle East are the addressed regions with geographical proximity as the EU has strong interests both in terms of economy and security concerns (European Council Lisbon 1992, 1992).

In an unstable environment⁸, the EU's concerns to security in its region are a reflection to the objective of safeguarding the common values and fundamental interests of the Union and to preserve peace and international security (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, pp. 48-49). The objectives for the region are clearly stated in the Lisbon European Council as fighting against terrorism and drug trafficking, ensuring the compliance of the countries with disarmament and arms control which applies to both Maghreb (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco) and the Middle Eastern countries (Syria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority) (European Council Lisbon 1992, 1992). Moreover, promotion of a constructive dialogue, assuring the principles of international law, establishment of a framework of cooperation; aiming to reach an upgraded 'partnership' with Maghreb countries is demonstrated; on the other hand;

⁸ After the fall of Berlin Wall, Germany's reunification and the EU's concerns to embedding the German state in a stronger European entity; and moreover the Yugoslav crisis (1991) are the near neighbourhood security concerns, but were not emphasized in detail due to the purpose of the thesis concerning the Euro-MED relations.

regional integration, solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian issue by UN security council resolutions and active involvement in the peace process in Middle East is indicated.

Following the establishment of Common Foreign and Security Policy in Maastricht Treaty (1993); the European Council met in Corfu (June 1994) and Essen (December 1994) to prepare for a new route for MED policy based on the Commission proposals. In June 1994, the European Council in Corfu gave a mandate to the Council to evaluate, together with the Commission, the policy of the European Union in the MED region and possible initiatives to strengthen this policy in the short and medium term, bearing in mind the possibility of convening a conference attended by the European Union and its Mediterranean partners (Corfu European Council, 1994). As a response to this demand, the Commission prepared a proposal which offered cooperation with Mediterranean countries in the form of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, rather than continuation of bilateral engagement of the past. The Commission suggested the importance of having regional cooperation among Mediterranean countries with a sustained support not only economically but also promoting human rights, democracy and rule of law to sustain political stability (Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 1994).

2.2.1 Why ‘partnership’ rather than bilateral cooperation?

The risk for Greece and France is hard, but showing courage and imagination is worth for it.

This is, absolutely, in accordance with our tradition and mentality.

Mr. Javier Jiménez-Ugarte, Ambassador of Spain to Greece (2000)

The EU had a long-term experience since 1970s that getting Mediterranean countries together with a uniform fashion which have failed since the political and economic issues were linked to each other and the failure in political cooperation affected the sustainability and efficiency of economic cooperation as well. How did the new idea of partnership emerge and how it is formulated to sustain a successful cooperation with Mediterranean countries?

The campaign of Spain was effective in the idea of ‘partnership’ rather than bilateral engagements, in an environment of diverging interests of the Member States during the conferences (Lecha, 2008). Suspension of the electoral process in 1992 in Algeria and sign of

unrest in other Arab countries caused some northern Europeans to worry about the spread of Islamist fundamentalist groups and the ideology to the Europe (Gillespie, 1997). On the other hand, France was willing to lead political stability in the Mediterranean region since it has traditional interests in the region due to its colonial history. Spain, in contrast, was actively promoting strategic consultations in Mediterranean issues by inviting Italy and France as well (Gillespie, 1997) for a common perspective. British priorities, at that time, were shifting towards Central and Eastern Europe. Britain, Germany and Netherlands could be persuaded to partnership following the strong lobbying activities of especially Spain by the support of France and Italy. Spain was emphasizing the need to devise a credible and comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean policy⁹. Economic interests of all European countries in the Mediterranean region became a tool of Spanish and French for persuasion other Member states to partnership rather than pure bilateral engagements¹⁰.

At the end, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, for the aim of establishing a comprehensive common area of peace, security, shared prosperity and shared norms is declared as a common strategy for Mediterranean's peace and security (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). Barcelona Declaration introduced three main baskets for cooperation; political, economic and cultural partnership; in which each will be negotiated between each partner country for the conclusion of Association Agreements (AAs). The objective of the process is declared as follows:

“...the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995)

⁹ Spain was interested for a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean policy because the interest of Member States on Central and Eastern Europe made Spain's concerns that the EU would take Mediterranean region in a secondary position which at the end would harm Spain's economic interests. For more information please see Lecha (2008).

¹⁰ This does not necessarily mean that British, German or Dutch concerns were completely disregarded. It should be noted that Libya, for instance, had been excluded from a seat at the Barcelona Conference due to Britain and French authorities' sensitivity about Libya's responsibility for the Pan Am and UTA Plane bombings (Gillespie, 1997).

This general outlook on how the EU appeared in international arena and for the Mediterranean region as an external actor leads to certain conclusions. First of all, from the beginning of the EU's appearance as an external actor, there are attempts for securitizing the Union's economic and security interests. When the political issues (i.e. Arab-Israeli conflict) are recognized as a threat to the EU's interest, then the EU attempts for developing policies towards the region, as the case is Mediterranean, both GMP and EMP are not only structured for economic interests but also for political considerations. Secondly, the EU through Barcelona Process explicitly declared that strengthening democracy and human rights combined with economic interaction and social cooperation as an essential element of partnership. What does the 'essential element' suggest for the MPCs to do in the name of democracy? How does the EU define democracy and its expectations in terms of democratization of countries? The next section will elaborate on the EU's strategy on democracy promotion during Barcelona Process and explain why the EU selects certain instruments among the menu of options listed in Figure II.

2.2.2 Spread Democratic Values as the EU's Responsibility, not Necessarily Direct Regime Change in Mediterranean Partner Countries

“[...] the European Union's new Mediterranean initiative is expected to gain further momentum as negotiations are gradually concluded with all the Mediterranean partners”

Commissioner de Silguy, 28 April 1997

The question of “what the EU promotes”, namely how the EU defines democracy, is a difficult question to answer for Barcelona Process. The Barcelona Declaration's cautious sound of democracy clause suggest each Mediterranean Partner Country (MPC)

“to develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial systems” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995).

Ricardo Gomez (2003) who presents a case study of the EU's external Mediterranean policy in his book “Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” explains the concern of the EU

for democracy element by referring to the Spanish EU Commissioner Marin's (1992) statement: "There was no prior consultation between the EU and the Mediterranean states on what were the real needs. The concept of specificity is important. No structure can be adapted to countries with very different cultural heritages and social cleavages." (Gomez, *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, 2003) The EU was reluctant to directly involve the domestic processes of the Mediterranean countries through a clearly defined structure on what the EU expects from each country in the name of democratization; but rather emphasized the necessity for greater understanding between cultures through the establishment of a comprehensive partnership among the participants with a general reference to the requirement of respect for principles of human rights, fundamental freedoms and equality (Barcelona Declaration 1995). This means, the European Union did not formulate its strategy in a coercive manner to lead a direct regime change, due to the EU's reluctance to involve in domestic matters.

Axelrod's assessment for interaction of the actors has an explanatory power on the EU's decision:

"neither side in an economic interaction can eliminate the other or change the nature of the game decisively in a single move... but in security affairs; retaliation for defection will almost always be possible" (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985)

In economic relations, as a matter of fact, actors expect that their relationship will continue over an indefinite period of time, while the political issues are based on more slippery grounds and so a long-term cooperation will be more difficult to assure. The EU's strategy in this respect was less elaborate and more general than the economic and financial partnership that is negotiated in detail with each country. The concern among the EU officials was if the attempt to multilateralize the Mediterranean policy through over-emphasis on politico-security dimension threatens their special bilateral relationship established for many years. To put it more concrete; putting standards and sanctions for political and security objectives to some partners at the end might harm the economic ties as well. Moreover, coercion is costly not only related to the strength of democracy exporter's resources to support sustainable democratization; but also about the possibility of the collapse of the democratization process due to the loss of legitimacy of that top-down approach over time within the country/region itself (see Hurd 1999, Warkotsch 2008). Instead of directly referring each problem in each

country and referencing the EU's interests on each issue, the EU preferred to construct an international regime under the umbrella of partnership by referring to the international norms and rules. The EU did not act as a rule maker, instead around decentralized enforcement of general principles, assigned responsibility to each partner to apply the measures in their domestic politics. Instead of privatization to each partner for democratization clause; the EU preferred to multilateralize and simplify the political dimension (Youngs, 2001).

Moreover, in addition to the reluctance of the EU to enter into the region for democratization with lack of information, there are other reasons related to the EU's own competences to create a democracy promotion strategy in a coercive manner, namely injection of regime change. In speaking the period of the Euro-Med partnership, CFSP was completely a second pillar to the community structure. It means; the decision-making in CFSP belonged to the Member States (The Maastricht Treaty Treaty on European Union, 1992) that makes the CFSP intergovernmental where the role of the supranational institutions like the Commission was limited. Therefore, there was the atmosphere of institutional competition within the Union for the decisions on external relations that mostly varied according to the areas of foreign policy decision. Trade policy, for instance, remained within the Commission's exclusive competence on budgetary issues of the EU's external commercial decisions. However, even in the trade policy, if the Commission's proposals were at odds with the national interests –such as the agricultural policy- of the Member States; then consensus among the Member States was required¹¹. Despite the Member States' divergent interests as such some member states were demanding to continue with only their bilateral development programs for third countries (i.e. UK and Sweden), simplicity and over-generalization on political interests was recognized to achieve a smooth and fast negotiation process (Youngs, 2001). This simplicity and overgeneralization led the democracy concept not to be structured in the EU sources with clear propositions, such as accountability and transparency, free and fair elections, liberalization of political and economic institutions etc., but how the EU would support countries' democratization was much apparent in its instruments which are formulated to serve the core areas of external democratization (economic liberalization, good governance and civil activism). The next section will assess the formation of democracy

¹¹ For more information on the structure and evolution of the EU institutions and decision-making processes, please refer to McCormick (1999) and Bomberg and Stubb (2003).

promotion instruments of the EU with a special focus on the mode of democracy promotion as well.

2.2.3 How to Promote Democratization?

“The basic precept of the Barcelona Process is to exploit the deliberate linkage of political and economic policies and extract better performance on the former through the latter.”

Mona Yacoiban, 2004

Among the three baskets of partnership, the political basket aims to establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability based on common respect for human rights and democracy. Three instruments of the EU that are defined during the Barcelona Process serve to the purpose of democracy promotion: Association Agreements (AAs), MEDA (Mesures D'accompagnement Financières et Techniques - Financial and Technical Accompanying Measures) Program and Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

To begin with, the bilateral cooperation agreements that were signed since 1970s and most of which would expire in 1996 are replaced with new AAs (Pierros, Meunier, & Abrams, 1999, p. 198). The fundamental difference of the new AAs from the earlier bilateral agreements was that all agreements shared general common provisions. As of 1995, a human rights and democracy clause is included in every Association Agreements which means the EU equalized the conditions for all partners on the certain principles decided in Euro-med conference. The common provision regarding the democracy and human rights state that:

“Respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) shall inspire the domestic and international policies of the Parties and shall constitute an essential element of this Agreement.” (Leal & Deka, 2004).

Considering the AAs are the agreements serving to all partnership area - political, economic and social – and the common provision on democracy and human rights is inserted as the essential element of the Agreement as a whole; the mode of democracy promotion can be classified as conditionality where the Agreement depends on the respect to this essential element. The term ‘essential element’, according to the Article 60 of the Vienna Convention

on the Law of Treaties, lies the basis for the suspension or termination of the agreements in case of grave human rights violations or serious breaches of democratic process (United Nations, 1969). Therefore, mode of democracy promotion of the EU through AAs is a negative political conditionality which suggests if the democracy and human rights clause is violated, then the EU can suspend or terminate the agreement.

As the Figure I suggests, industrialization and economic development within society is a significant condition to be considered and promoted by the external democratizer, because it fosters civil society activism against authoritarian regime. Through MEDA; the job creation by financing and assisting the SMEs, private investments, economic infrastructure especially on energy and transport sectors as well as improvement of social services from health to education would be sustained. The financing of the wide area of coverage is done by allocation of the EU financial support with direct EU incentives and European Investment Bank (EIB) funds (ADE-EPU-NYUA-IBM, 2003). MEDA is a program in which the Commission manages and implements the budget allocations, since the program itself is based on commercial decisions where the European Commission has its autonomy on decision-making (ADE-EPU-NYUA-IBM, 2003).

Suspension clauses for democracy promotion are also included in the MEDA Program. The suspension clause states that

“this Regulation is based on respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and also for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which constitute an essential element thereof, the violation of which element will justify the adoption of appropriate measures” (EU Council).

The course of the European Union during the partnership negotiations was, as the Commission frequently claimed; not about imposing conditions but rather a positive and constructivist approach to share values and norms through dialogue (Crawford, 1997). Referring to such speeches; one would expect that the EU’s course of democracy promotion would be only based on persuasion and socialization through norm-diffusion strategy in serving to cooperation and partnership for peace and security. However, then the EU inserts negative political conditionality, which implies suspending or terminating the benefits if the recipient state violates the conditions. The overall positive sound of the EMP process is

conflicting with such negative conditionality. Therefore, how the idea of political conditionality emerged within the EU needs to be stated in order to understand the cause of positive and negative implications within the same strategy.

The evolution of the political conditionality towards third countries within the EU is first started to be talked within the European Parliament (EP) following the EP has gained the power to approve association agreements and membership applications in Single European Act (SEA) (1987). During the SEA negotiations, the EP desired to use this power to press on the countries for respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms and the EP's pressure gained some response within the Community. For instance, Dutch Presidency submitted a memorandum (1986) about the action taken in EPC regarding the human rights issues in the EU's neighbourhood, and the foreign ministers declared in a the annual written report to the EP that they are committed to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms (EPC Documentation Bulletin, 1986). In 1988-89, the Community first began to apply conditionality to Central and East European Countries (CEECs), with the claim that ensuring long term stability in Europe is based on transformation of those countries that are in near abroad of the EU. The implementation of conditionality began without a legal basis. The countries that were performing well in reform process are received more Community financial assistance (i.e. Hungary and Poland) where if human rights are violated in a country (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania) then the Community withheld the prospect of an agreement (Smith K. E., 1997) The financial aid is linked to the political and economic reforms without mentioned in financial aid regulations¹².

It was in June 1993, where the Copenhagen European Council agreed to enlarge with the CEECs only if certain accession criteria are met, including democracy, human rights, rule of law principles (Smith K. E., 2003). This political conditionality that links the political reforms to the economic benefits is then extended to the Community's relations towards other third countries, since it helped to the CEECs political transformation and the Community should use this tool in serving to stabilising other regions as well. On 29 May 1995, the Council agreed that all agreements of the Community with third countries should contain a suspension mechanism that enabling the Community to react if the essential elements are

¹² Regulations no. 3906/89 in OJ L 375, 23 December 1989 and no. 2698/90 in OJ L 257, 21 September 1990

violated. Since the political conditionality is formulated in a way that all agreements that the Community signs with third countries shall be based on respect for fundamental principles, then this applied for the Association Agreements of the EMP process as well (Smith K. E., 1997).

Actually, the human rights and democracy clause included in each Association Agreement provided persuasion measures also, that supports the Commission's positive rhetoric. Referring to the Article 5 of each AA, regular meetings at ministerial and official level provided to be coordinated on regular meetings for raising and discussing the issues of concern in the region as well as in creating a sense of ownership is formulated (Leal & Deka, 2004). However, the dialogue tool at the same time was not complemented by any identified measures outlining how democracy should be attained. The reluctance of the EU to explicitly define democracy and the EU's expectations limits the EU's discourse to discuss the genuine achievement for democracy through dialogue, which made the tool of dialogue vague at the end for the recipient countries (Molla, 2009). Moreover, as it was discussed in Chapter I, political conditionality is a successful experience of the EU where the EU used the enlargement carrot. In other words, enlargement is the biggest carrot in democratizing the countries since the expectations of the candidate for a full integration of the EU's free market at the end is encouraging to meet the political conditionality (Palombo, 2013). In the absence of such carrot, the EU aimed to encourage the MPCs to obey the essential element of democracy and human rights through dialogue, which has its own weaknesses; through the AAs itself encouraging the partner countries for trade opportunities and financial assistance such as through MEDA which is an encouraging tool for the recipient countries.

The MPCs in the region were composed of heterogeneous synthesis of various religious and ethnic groups, the region was characterized by unequal economic development and huge gaps between the countries' economic indicators¹³ and also the countries were coping with the problems related to the demographic explosion such as significant levels of unemployment. Above all, the Islamist fundamentalist movements in the region make the authorities to take certain actions towards the regime protection, but at the same time they were willing to get

¹³ GDP per capita in the region varies from 1.301 USD in Palestine authority to 17.310 in Israel as of 1995. The figure is available on World Bank Databank: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx>

the EU's financial assistance and free trade opportunity for economic development (Behr, 2010). Therefore; the developments for democratization in MPCs were remaining as on-paper initiatives in order to sustain relationship with the EU. Given this case; to commit those countries with suspension clauses would not lead material results but rather stimulate window dressing attempts of MPCs.

Egypt is one of the failures of Barcelona process in terms of reversing the trend towards the political de-liberalization due to the unwillingness of the authority. Before the Barcelona Declaration; by June 1992, Egypt's penal code and the law concerning the Supreme State Security are amended in an environment of increasing political violence by the dominant ruling party, NDP. The amendments were concerning any threats to the stability of the regime, namely the NDP's authority, would be punished through repressive measures as such the prison terms were replaced with forced labour, temporary sentences with life sentences, and life sentences with the death penalty (Kienle, More than a response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s, 2009, p. 222). Those harsh penalties are directed to the people or groups performing terrorist acts, however, the definition of terrorist in the amended penal code covered a wide range of activities of use of force and even any kind of threat of the use of force. Those measures in Egypt's laws were against the armed Islamist militants; but after coming into force, led to the increasing control of professional syndicates, organizations and even political parties to guarantee the survival of the authoritarian rule of NDP (Blaydes, 2011, p. 36).

The Barcelona process did not reverse the on-going political de-liberalization in Egypt. Just after the AA (signed in 2001) came into effect in 2005 the constitution is amended for more than one candidate to be stand for presidency. This is a good attempt through the fair elections and plurality as one of the principles of democracy. However, the oversight of the elections at the same time transferred from the courts to regime-appointed commissions which in return brought speculations on the weigh on election results. Moreover, as reported by the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights, 12 people were killed and 500 were injured in election related violence in 2005, compared to 8 killed and 64 injured in 2000 (Democracy Reporting International (DRI), 2007, p. 16). Another substantial observation states that the government has referred to the 'security' concerns in order to justify the creation of security cordons which prevent opposition voters from accessing polling stations (Democracy Reporting International (DRI), 2007, p. 16). The constitutional amendments in Egypt serves

to the democratization like a window dressing; what on paper seems like a certain development that in fact does not add value to the development of rule of law and democracy.

Egypt was a one but not only example to the political de-liberalization in shape of 'liberalization'. Jordan, for instance, faced with the dissolution of the parliament by the King Abdullah II four years later the AA is signed with the EU, and the legislative power to enact laws passed to the King's authority. A couple of amendments have been introduced to the electoral law which introduced small quota for women and minorities, that seemed a good step towards implementation of the principle of democracy; but the law in general derived from the manner favouring the rural voters over the urban voters in return for strengthening the King (Kienle, *Ambiguities and Misconceptions: European Policies towards Political Reform in the Southern Mediterranean*, 2011, p. 12). After considering such examples, the EU's economic tools are encouraging for the recipient states to get the advantage, but at the same time they had to obey the essential element, given the weaknesses of the EU in its dialogue tool which is vague in terms of defining the EU's expectations in the name of democracy at the end leads no substantial developments under political partnership for democracy promotion. The following section will assess the loopholes of the EU's strategy that might cause the failures.

2.2.4 More than a Policy, less than a Strategy

“For all that, must Barcelona be seen as a failure? Certainly not. For at least three reasons. We are working better together. We are working more together. We have already identified the future projects to be worked on.”

Javier Solana, 2003

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership is, as this Chapter assessed is a comprehensive democracy promotion formation. The EU does not define explicitly what it expects from democratization, but rather overgeneralize the concept on the international norms and values as such the respect for human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms. Moreover, all means of democracy promotion, except coercion, is apparent. The reason, as discussed, was that the EU first needed to recognize the real needs of the country through ministerial level conferences, to discuss the issues and develop cooperation and partnership rather than to appear as a rule maker. However, what the EU lacked was the existence of coordination

mechanisms for the instruments, namely the financial ones such as MEDA and EIDHR. Although a human rights and democratization unit was established within the Commission; it was given very limited powers where the geographical divisions within national foreign ministries dominantly remained in charge of human rights and democratization aids. This means the Member States separately funding the same area without having an exact figure on what the Commission or the other Member States were doing. This creates a simple lack of pooled information on what different actors within the EU funding in recipient countries; and therefore leading to the difficulties in the EU-wide assessment of democracy assistance (Youngs, 2001). The recipient countries were benefiting from the EU's sources but the EU itself was lack of competences to manage and follow up its own implementation. Moreover, there was a precise conflict between the Member States and the Commission regarding the division of responsibilities for the co-ordination of the funds for democracy and human rights promotion; since the Member States were criticizing the Commission about the quality of work in terms of slowness in implementation and complex bureaucratic procedures for the allocation of political aids¹⁴ (Youngs, 2001).

The European Commission after the five years of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership submits a general overview of the process to the Council and European Parliament before 4th ministerial Euro-Mediterranean meeting; and proposes 'reinvigorating the Barcelona Process'. The commission, in terms of the EU's weaknesses of EMP from the EU's side, assesses the process stating that:

“The spirit of partnership has not led to a sufficiently frank and serious dialogue on issues such as human rights...implementation of the MEDA programme has been hampered by complicated procedures both in EC and in partner countries...There is a need to draw a number of lessons from initial period and to reinvigorate the process...the programming and implementation of assistance must be improved in

¹⁴ It should also be emphasized that between 1996 and 1998, United Kingdom brought a number of suitcases before the European Court of Justice against the European Commission. The United Kingdom was claiming that the Commission's role for about 86 projects' funding abroad from the Commission's budget had no basis in the Community Law. The European Court's opinions to the judgments state that a regulation needs to be adopted for the Commission's competence in allocating EU funds. That is another reason for revising the MEDA regulation, following the Commission gets the power to be able to allocate funds from the EU budget in 1999 (Youngs, 2001). The related case numbers are C-106/96, C-239/96, C-240/96, C-305/96. The cases are available: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/

order to enhance strategic content, to sharpen its focus and increase its impact.”
(European Commission, 2000)

After the reinvigoration process, the EU establishes National Indicative Programs and Strategy Papers for the allocation of funds to each country according to their performance in political, economic and social spheres. Therefore, MEDA between 1995 and 1999 is called as MEDA I and since 2000 as MEDA II (ADE-EPU-NYUA-IBM, 2003).

After pointing out the limits of the EU in democracy promotion strategy during EMP, it can be concluded that monitoring and follow-up mechanisms would add up value to the EU’s democracy promotion strategy. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership became an experience for the EU to recognize its own abilities to become an external actor in international arena, and how it can deal with its internal limitations so that it could achieve its objectives abroad for democracy promotion.

The overall assessment of the EU’s strategy for democratization in the Mediterranean suggests that the formation of the democracy promotion strategy was less than a strategy in terms of coordination and management, but more than single policies since a comprehensive structure of different means are interrelated under one objective. Despite the existence of negative conditionality in AAs, the financial aid instruments such as MEDA are aimed to support to encourage the recipient countries to engage in the EMP process. Moreover, all MPC at the end signed the AAs (see Table I below) except Syria.

Table I: Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements				
Country	Start of Negotiations	Agreement Concluded	Agreement Signed	Entry into Force*
Algeria	June 1997	December 2001	April 2002	September 2005
Egypt	March 1995	June 1999	June 2001	June 2004
Israel	December 1993	September 1995	November 1995	June 2000
Jordan	July 1995	April 1997	November 1997	May 2002
Lebanon	November 1995	January 2002	June 2002	April 2006
Morocco	December 1993	November 1995	February 1996	March 2000
Palestine	May 1996	December 1996	February 1997	July 1997**
Syria	March 1998	October 2004/December 2008***		
Tunisia	December 1994	June 1995	July 1995	December 1997

*To enter into force, each Association Agreement must be ratified by the European Parliament, the Parliament of the Partner Country and the Parliaments of the Member States of the European Union.

**To the benefit of the Palestine Authority, Interim Agreement signed by the European Commission and the Palestinian National Authority on behalf of PLO, without the Member States' sign due to the legal status of PLO to sign international agreements. For more information please visit: <http://www.medeas.be/en/countries/occupied-palestinian-territories/eu-plo-agreement/>

***In 2008 the Association Agreement with Syria was revised. It was planned to be ratified on 26 October 2009. However, Syria indefinitely postponed signing the Association Agreement with the European Union.

Source: *The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements* : http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2010/aarticles/euomed_agreements_en.pdf

Javier Solana¹⁵ evaluates the process of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership during the 6th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference as:

“In less than ten years, Europe as a body has developed contractual relations with virtually all its Mediterranean partners. The cooperation projects accompanying these association agreements have given rise to frustrations. A review of their management, thanks to efforts by the Commission and the associated States, is now bearing fruit. In terms of both quantity and quality, there are few cases of bilateral cooperation which can claim to be doing better. Europe is assuming its natural role as a partner of the Mediterranean countries. (Solano, 2003)

In the following section; the EU’s further initiatives for democracy promotion will be assessed based on whether the EU took certain attempts to go further in its democracy promotion through a better monitored and coordinated strategy.

2.3 From EMP to ENP: A shift in Democracy Promotion Strategy to fill in the loopholes that are recognized in Euro-Mediterranean partnership

“Our neighbourhood policy goes beyond the horizon of the on-going enlargement. An enlarged European Union must be capable of speaking with one voice and acting credibly and efficiently in the world. A comprehensive neighbourhood policy is an important element of this project”

Günter Verheugen¹⁶, 2004

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a foreign policy initiative of the European Union which was launched on May, 2004 with a Strategy Paper of the Commission. The policy was first outlined in a Commission Communication paper in 2002 in which the Commission President, Romano Prodi, suggested a new neighbourhood policy to offer “more than partnership and less than membership...” (Prodi, 2002). The objective of ENP then had been endorsed at the European Council of 2003 as “...to make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood [and] to promote a ring of well

¹⁵ Secretary General of the Council of the European Union/High representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

¹⁶ Member of the European Commission

governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations" (European Commission, 2004).

The creation of good neighbourly relations with Eastern non-member countries became necessary for the Union's security and stability at home. Although accession agreements were seen as significant for the neighbour countries' economic and political transformation through European values, enlargements were actually costly for the EU in terms of further integration (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008). On the other hand, past experiences in external relations with the southern neighbours were not satisfactory to the EU. Experiences proved that the understanding of partnership based mostly on economic instruments but suspension clauses would not work for domestic transformation of countries (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008). Moreover; in the wake of September 11; the war in Iraq, Islamist extremism propaganda expanding to the region and the threat of terrorist migration into Europe and the security tensions such as long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict lead the EU to take further actions and put more emphasis on political and security cooperation which is introduced in Barcelona Process. During the ENP formulation process; the significance of the Southern neighbours were again emphasized as well as the Eastern countries.

According to the Commission Communication of December 2006, the EU aimed to create a single policy framework for all Eastern and Southern neighbouring countries (European Commission, 2006). However, under this single policy framework, the EU emphasizes that "Development and reform in our partner countries is primarily in their own interest, and it is their sovereign responsibility" (European Commission, 2006). This means that the EU would continue its strategy for not using coercive measures in terms of imposition of democracy through the threat of suspension clauses, but further would put emphasis on 'joint ownership' which was already expressed in 2004 Strategy paper as "Joint ownership of the process, based on the awareness of shared values and common interests is essential. The EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners." (European Commission, 2004)

The European Commission states in Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2013) and Regional Indicative Program (2007-2010) that:

"The political situation in many of the countries of the region is characterized by the need to further democratic reforms, including free and fair elections and respect for the rule of law and for fundamental freedoms and human rights. While constitutions in the region often provide for freedom of thought, opinion and association, legal

provisions may also stipulate numerous restrictions, in some cases under the pretext of safeguarding national security or national unity. In recent years several countries have made considerable progress in these areas. At the same time, the rapid rise of moderate and reformist political Islam movements as well as political extremism has put severe pressure on political regimes in the region and sometimes slowed down progress towards more political openness and pluralism. Unresolved conflicts are also perceived as obstacles to reforms.” (European Commission, 2007)

In comparison with the EMP, it is now clearer that the concept of democracy is upgraded during the European discourse within the context of the ENP. Now the EU adds up the expectation for reforms in addition to the political dialogue. Based on the broad consensus that political reform is positively correlated with achievement to sustainable security and stability in the region; the ‘more for more’ principle adds positive political conditionality to the AAs. Moreover, the EU needed to consider the political situation in each Mediterranean partner countries. In order to better coordinate the strategy with a focus on each country’s domestic situations, Action Plans were introduced by ENP as major difference from EMP process.

Action Plans are negotiated agreements that take into account the explicit needs of the partner countries based on the progress reports prepared by the Commission (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008). Action Plans are short-term instruments covering a timeframe of 5-years. The objective of Action Plans was not replacing the existing treaties (Association Agreements). In contrast, Action Plans cover a wide array of political, legal, economic and social objectives in the form of the previous agreements’ supplementation as a framework and work program for measures to be taken (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008). Those measures can be summarized as political dialogue and reform for democratization, economic development, cooperation on justice, freedom and security, cooperation on sectors such as energy, transport, environment, science and lastly people-to-people areas such as civil society, public health and cultural cooperation. By March 2007, Action Plans had been agreed on with Israel, Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008). The ENP Action Plans contained chapters with specific and agreed objectives for reforms on the rule of law, political democracy, basic human rights and fundamental freedom; which is defined as the principles of ‘good governance’ in international arena. The Table II below demonstrates the Action Plans that are signed with the Mediterranean ENP countries:

Table II: Adoption of the Action Plans, by Country

European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans									
Country	Israel	Jordan	Tunisia	Palestinian Authorities	Morocco	Egypt	Lebanon	Algeria	Libya
Adoption by the Country	April 2005	June 2005	July 2005	May 2005	July 2005	March 2007	January 2007	-	-
Source: The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements : http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2010/aarticles/euromed_agreements_en.pdf									

The Action Plans, despite they are tailor made, shares common outline and framework with a special section on democracy and rule of law under the Political Issues main heading in each country's Action Plans. This section includes the components for democracy and rule of law that are identified and jointly agreed by the EU and each partner country. Those components in general refer to the participation in political life, enhancing the role of the civil society, guaranteeing judicial independence, and promoting human rights, fundamental freedoms and respect for the rule of law¹⁷. Referring to this section, one can claim that it becomes more obvious that the EU now has a procedural definition of democracy in a liberal manner and also now the EU is on the way to have a democracy promotion 'strategy' with explicitly defining what it promotes and what it expects from the partner countries to follow in terms of democratization.

Moreover, in order to monitor the implementation progress of the chapters in Action Plans, a specific sub-committee is established under the European Commission called as Human Rights and Democracy (HRD). HRD sub-committee is established to assess the progress reports¹⁸ of the partner countries and in case any development through democratization; additional allocations to be disbursed under the new program called as European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) as a single management mechanism and with a single set of procedure (European Commission, 2004). ENPI is new in terms of being an allocation mechanism for all partners, regardless of their region (European Commission, 2007). MEDA Program is integrated under ENPI instrument as well. This approach also

¹⁷ The action plans are available in the European Commission's website through the link: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm

¹⁸ Progress reports are the follow-up mechanism of the European Commission which evaluates on a yearly basis the developments of the recipient countries in terms of the objectives of the agreements with the Community. The progress reports are available in the European Commission website through the link: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm

removes the bilateral and regional program division. As it was under MEDA there were two programs for financial aid; one is aimed for financing domestic political reforms and another one was for regional development projects. Now all budget allocations are under ENPI instrument. The objective is the simplification of procedures on the allocation of financial aids, and to directly focus on cross-border cooperation and related activities as differentiated from the internal procedures of the EU (Mahncke & Gstöhl, 2008). However, it should be emphasized that the clear figure for the conditions and procedures regarding the management and decision-making of funding again has not been determined (Lippert, 2007).

Table III: The EU’s Democracy Promotion Strategy (own collection)

EU'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY IN MEDITERRANEAN		
	BARCELONA PROCESS (1995-2004)	EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY (2004 onwards)
INSTRUMENTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Association Agreements - MEDA Program - EIDHR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Action Plans (monitored by National Indicative Programs and annual progress reports) - ENPI - EIDHR
MEANS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Negative political conditionality through suspension clauses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Positive political conditionality through reward by additional financial aid - Norm-diffusion strategy: shared prosperity, partnership etc.
CORE AREAS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic Liberalization - Civil society activism - Good governance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic Liberalization - Civil Society Activism - Good Governance

As a conclusion of this Chapter; the Table III above is a summary of the EU’s democracy promotion strategy and instruments demonstrating the development elaborated in this Chapter. It can also be concluded that the EU is well aware of the certain weaknesses of its strategy witnessed during the Barcelona Process and seems to develop its instruments to complement the loopholes in its strategy and instruments during ENP process. Well, how much the new strategy of the EU; with a more focus on each MPC through newly introduced Action Plans and progress reports, with a positive political conditionality rather than negative; and also with a more strategic approach in monitoring and evaluation of domestic

issues of the recipient countries would of the EU's democracy promotion? Chapter III will make the critical assessment of how the EU implements its democracy promotion strategy.

CHAPTER III: ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S CURRENT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY

The EU's foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region is an evolving and developing process where the EU experiences its own weaknesses and strengths to become an active democracy promoter, and that is how the policy formation is improved in a policy vacuum as a response to certain failures such as in the examples of Egypt and Lebanon and its own weaknesses such as lack of coordination and follow-up mechanisms. As a result of this evolving nature of the EU's strategy, the EU increased its involvement in the Mediterranean region as an external democratizer through the implementation of democracy promotion instruments. The chapter will follow by the most current developments within the EU towards the improvement of foreign policy coordination and the critical assessment of the EU's credibility. The current position of the EU's involvement in the region will also be touched upon.

This chapter will assess basically the Commission's financial aid instruments for democracy assistantship and state the increasing trend in both the commitments and payments of the aid, but with a critical assessment of the EU's own performance as well. Bicchi (2010) recommends that analysis of the impact of democracy assistance is not useful without taking into account whether it has actually been implemented. By taking this approach into account; and since the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the EU's strategy but not the effectiveness in making the countries more democratized, the following sections will assess whether the EU now performs in accordance with its strategy or regardless, more specifically whether the EU is credible with its policies in practice. In order to make this assessment, the financial aids under MEDA and the latter under the ENPI are selected as test cases.

Moreover, the EU's credibility in performing its strategy will be evaluated on its current political conditionality under ENP based on the progress reports and the trend of the allocation of funds. Such examples of comparisons can be applied to other instruments as well, such as EIDHR, but such a comprehensive analysis would better serve to the studies asking for the efficiency of the EU in implementing its instruments. This Chapter rather looks for the answer of the simple question of credibility implying in this thesis that whether the EU implemented the tools in a way they are formulated or act regardless. The answer might then lead to other questions such as whether the EU promotes one area of democratization more than others or whether the EU can efficiently employ its instruments in democratizing those recipient countries, that suggests further research beyond the objective of this thesis.

3.1 Lisbon Treaty's Implications for ENP

Treaty of Lisbon which came into force in 2009 has done significant reforms in the EU's external relations, especially on the blurred three pillar structure. The EU gains a legal personality in external relations with the establishment of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The difference of High Representative position is that now the position would not be held by the Secretary-General of the European Council, but appointed with the agreement of the President of the Commission by the QMV (qualified-majority voting) of the European Council. The appointed High Representative would also be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. In order to support the High Representative, European External Action Service (EEAS) consists of personnel from the Council General Secretariat, the Commission and staff from national diplomatic services would be established. Therefore, EEAS working for CFSP also¹⁹, did not fully left to the Member States' power but rather the significant supranational institution, Commission, is also given a role. In addition, since the appointed High Representative is also a Vice-President of the Commission, this means that his/her activities were bounded by the Commission procedures²⁰. As a last and significant point, the European Parliament (EP) had a role in CFSP indirectly, because EP has a power on the Commissioners' appointment in the way for giving consent to the whole Commission's appointment or dismissal. The High Representative as a Commission's Vice-President is subject to the EP's consent in his/her appointment. In brief, the current CFSP is organized through more cooperative policy integration with the existing supranational institutions but within its own structure the decision-making is still at the hands of the Member States. Despite there is not in practice a considerable change in this respect, the establishment of the High Representative position and the EEAS adds value to the presence of the EU in international arena in terms of formal EU-wide foreign policy existence.

Following this brief introduction to the Lisbon Treaty in terms of the institutional reforms for CFSP, it should be emphasized that certain implications for the ENP is apparent in the Lisbon

¹⁹ EEAS work not only for CFSP, but also for Common Security and Defence Policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy, but its overall objective is about supporting the Union's foreign policy activities coordinated by the Commission, staff from Member States and the European Council.

²⁰The paragraph is summarized from: (Directorate General External Policies of the European Union, 2008, s. 3-5) For the Article references of the Treaty please refer to this document.

Treaty. Referring to the Article 8 of the Treaty, the common values, differentiation and the strengthening the positive conditionality are the fundamentals of the ENP right now. Although the ENP was already structured on those listed objectives, the basic difference was that following the Lisbon Treaty, the strategy is explicitly defined in the Joint Communication of High Representative and the Commission as “incentive-based approach based on more differentiation (‘more for more’)” (European Commission & High Representative, 2011). Although in theory the Association Agreements implies negative conditionality, this instrument had never been visited by the EU, and also following the Lisbon Treaty, the Joint Communications referring to ENP revision explicitly emphasized for positive conditionality. However, some EU officials, such as the ENP Commissioner Stephen Füle, criticized the EU’s preference by stating that “commitments are unfortunately not always matched by action...in line with the conditionality principle, a clear and systematic link must be made between the outcome of the benchmarks assessment and EU support” (Maurer, 2012). Namely, Füle emphasizes the necessity to focus more on the actual implementation of the policies adopted. Moreover, the ENP review document also points out that there is not a necessity to change the principle of conditionality itself, but the EU should focus on how to “provide the mechanisms and instruments fit to deliver these objectives” (European Commission & High Representative, 2011). Based on the Lisbon Treaty and the ENP revisions afterwards, the implementation of what has been formulated is a significant concern of the EU. The following sections will assess the weaknesses in implementation of the policies from the beginning of the EU’s democracy promotion strategy and the developments in terms of implementation after the revision of ENP for this objective.

3.2 Democracy Assistance: Does the EU allocate more funds to good governance under ENP as compared to MEDA?

The EU became a major donor in the region following EMP. Between 1995-2006, around 7 billion Euro is allocated from the EU budget which would be disbursed both at bilateral and regional level to the partner countries. Except for Israel, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus²¹, all

²¹ Israel is not a beneficiary because of its high level economic development. Turkey was a beneficiary of MEDA until 2002; but due to the change of its position to becoming a ‘candidate’ to EU membership, Turkey benefits from a separate funding program. The same applied for Malta and Cyprus from the beginning of the program due to their special position towards membership.

Euro-Med partners were included for bilateral cooperation. While bilateral cooperation targeted the development of each partner's domestic development; regional cooperation aimed the MED partners' sub-regional initiatives through intensifying regional cooperation as well as cooperation of non-governmental entities.

The program had two phases until a new Mediterranean policy is launched under the European Neighbourhood Policy initiative. The first period of MEDA between 1995 and 1999, around 3.5 billion euros are committed from the EU budget and in the second phase between 2000 and 2006, around 4.3 billion euros are committed with a relatively more strategic approach by comprehensive overview of the projects with standardized programming (Estruch, 2007, pp. 11-17). For bilateral partnership, each country is allocated a portion of the budget according to the European Commission's decision; and each partner increasingly benefited from the EU investments for the improvement of government and civil institutions for political liberalization and socio-economic development. The table below demonstrates that the commitments of the EU budget for the partner countries did not demonstrate a high and considerable increase from MEDA I to MEDA II; but its payments over commitments almost tripled. This Table IV demonstrates increasing interest of partner countries for the EU funds.

Table IV: Financing from MEDA I to MEDA II in terms of Commitments and Payments

MEDA I to MEDA II, Commitments and Payments, by Countries, Million Euro								
		MEDA I (1995-1999)			MEDA II (2000-2006)			Total P/C
		Commitment	Payment	Payments-to-Commitments Ratio	Commitment	Payment	Payments-to-Commitments Ratio	
Bilateral	WBG	111	59	53%	522,3	486,4	93%	86%
	Jordan	254	108,4	43%	331,4	345,5	104%	78%
	Tunisia	428	168	39%	517,6	489,2	95%	70%
	Egypt	686	157	23%	592,5	695,4	117%	67%
	Morocco	656	127,5	19%	980,1	917,4	94%	64%
	Algeria	164	30,2	18%	338,8	142,3	42%	34%
	Turkey	375	15	4%	0	0	0%	4%
	Lebanon	182	1,2	1%	132,7	181,5	137%	58%
	Syria	101	0	0%	179,7	90,9	51%	32%
	Total	2957	666,3	23%	3595,1	3348,6	93%	61%
Regional	471	222,5	47%	739,8	477,8	65%	58%	
Grand Total	3428	888,8	26%	4335	3826	88%	61%	

Source: European External Action Service: http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/meda_figures_en.pdf

Although the commitments and payments explain on the partner countries' interest for cooperation in terms of financial aids; the problem with MEDA program in terms of

democracy promotion was that it is difficult to find out which portion of the increased amounts of financial aid was in the name of democracy assistance, namely the funds for development of democratic institution-building; in other words for ‘good governance’. According to Vera van Hüllen’s (2009) study, there had been virtually no related projects under MEDA I, not surprisingly since MEDA I provided financial aid only for economic development such as structural adjustment facilities, private sector development projects and institution building support for economic and environmental aspects (ADE-EPU-NYUA-IBM, 2003). During the MEDA II it was relatively easier to determine the projects funded directly for democracy assistance due to the approach that the EU funds are allocated based more on bilateral National Indicative Programs (NIP). Hüllen compiles the total aid figures for 7 countries’ projects related to the judiciary and penal systems, civil society and governance from the NIPs of European Commission. Table V below consolidates the data of total allocations in Table IV and the portions disbursed for democracy assistance based on Hüllen’s collection.

According to the figures, there has been a steady increase in funding for democracy assistance from MEDA I to MEDA II. One can claim that the EU’s relatively more strategic approach through bilateral focus for democracy assistance in MEDA II as compared to MEDA I suggests that the EU started to follow a strategy for democracy promotion towards giving emphasis on the democratic liberalization of recipient countries at institution building level. If this is the case; then one would also expect that democracy assistance under ENPI South would considerably increase in terms of its portion in overall financial aid to the countries; because the significance of good governance in partner countries is firstly and obviously stated during ENP process’ rhetoric and related documents of the policy²². In order to see the case; the amounts of payments under ENPI South are also added to the Table IV.


²² Please see again Chapter 2 of this thesis. You may also refer to ENP Strategy Paper (2004) for more details.

Table V: Payments for Democracy Assistance under MEDA I, MEDA II & ENPI South

MEDA I, MEDA II & ENPI South Payments, by Countries, Million Euro													
		MEDA I (1995-1999)				MEDA II (2000-2006)				ENPI South (2007-2010)			
		Total Payments	Payments to Democracy Assistance	Total Payments w/o Democracy Assistance	Democracy Assistance/Total Payments	Total Payments	Payments to Democracy Assistance	Total Payments w/o Democracy Assistance	Democracy Assistance/Total Payments	Total Payments	Payments to Democracy Assistance	Total Payments w/o Democracy Assistance	Democracy Assistance/Total Payments
Bilateral	Algeria	30,2	5	25,20	16,56%	142,3	48	94,10	34%	220	17	203	8%
	Egypt	157	0	157,00	0,00%	695,4	25	670,40	4%	558	40	518	7%
	Jordan	108,4	0	108,40	0,00%	345,5	7	338,50	2%	265	17	248	6%
	Lebanon	1,2	0	1,20	0,00%	181,5	10	171,50	6%	187	22	165	12%
	Morocco	127,5	4	123,50	3,14%	917,4	33	884,70	4%	654	28	626	4%
	Syria	0	0	0,00	0,00%	90,9	2	88,90	2%	130	30	100	23%
	Tunisia	168	0	168,00	0,00%	489,2	34	455,55	7%	300	0	300	0%
	WBG	59	-	-	-	486,4	-	-	-	632	-	-	-
	Total	651,3	9	583,30	1,38%	3348,6	159	2703,65	5%	2946	154	2792	5%
Regional	222,5	-	-	-	477,8	-	-	-	343,3	-	-	-	
Grand Total	873,8				3826,4				3289,3				

Source: European External Action Service: http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/meda_figures_en.pdf; Hüllen (2009) and Europa: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/0703_enpi_figures_en.pdf

Figure III: Democracy assistance portion in total payments



The figures demonstrate that there is not a significant change in the total amount of financial aid to the countries in sum, from MEDA II to ENPI South. The portion of financial aid for democracy assistance in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria increased while certainly decreased in Algeria and Tunisia. However, in the overall assessment there is not

any increase in the portion of the democracy assistance funds under ENPI as compared to MEDA II - it remains on 5% level - as against to the overall rhetoric and theory of the ENP suggesting to allocate more funds on the projects related to good governance. One can claim at this point that if there is no demand from the recipient country for aid to develop its institutions for good governance; the EU would not be able to disburse such funds. If so, then the EU's political conditionality which applies to all funding decisions comes to the front to be evaluated; since if there is not an intention of the recipient country for further democratization, then the theory of the EU's conditionality suggests for additional measures to be taken rather than continuation of financial assistance.

3.3 Political Conditionality: Does the EU consider conditionality in allocation of funds

In theory; disbursement of the EU aid is conditional on democracy, human rights and reforms for good governance in recipient countries. The more those countries demonstrate developments through democratization, the more financial aid they would get; and vice versa. Does the EU in reality demonstrate credibility to enforce political conditionality and allocate the funds accordingly? In order to find a solid answer to this question, the country progress reports, which the European Commission records the developments in each country that signed the Action Plans, would be helpful in comparing the findings with the funds allocated. Among the countries having signed Action Plans, the data is collected for Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan²³ from their annual progress reports, strategy papers and National Indicative Programs for the 2007-2010 and 2011-2013 periods.²⁴ Table IV below summarizes first the EU's²⁵ analysis on the political situation of the partner country and the strategy for the 2007-

²³ The progress reports for Tunisia and Morocco were available only in French. Scarpetta and Swidlicki (2011) summarized the 2010 progress reports of these two countries in their study; however was not enough for the scope of my study. If interested please see their work as cited (Scarpetta & Swidlicki, 2011). Palestinian Authority and Israel are intentionally not included since Israel already is not receiving any democracy assistance fund due to its mostly functioning democratic institutions; and comparison of Palestine with other countries in the region would not be valid since there is also the aspect of Middle East Peace Process which the EU has a special interest to support Palestine intensively.

²⁴ All European Commission's assistance programming documents are available on Web. Please see: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm

²⁵ The assistance programming under ENP is done by the European Commission and the "EU" especially implies the "Commission" in this part of the Chapter.

2010 periods including their allocated budget for the program. Second, the summaries of the progress that the EU recorded in each country towards political democratization during the period are included as well. Finally, the EU's average (for each year) allocations under MEDA II and ENPI are demonstrated, including the parts for democracy assistance.

Table VI: The EU Funding Trend vs. Progress on Democratization

Country	Strategy Paper	Progress Reports	Average Allocations of ENP Funds (in terms of Commitments)		
	2007-2013	2008 & 2009 & 2010	2000-2006	2007-2010	2011-2013
Lebanon	<p>1) The kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah armed militia triggered a 34-day conflict in July and August 2006. The political situation is still strained. Lebanon had been unable to avoid the structural problems at the root of the instability of the country.</p> <p>2) In a Ministerial Declaration of July, the Government outlined a broad agenda of essential political and economic reforms.</p> <p>3) While Lebanese laws and the Constitution are in general conducive to protecting human rights, concerns about infringements of human rights remain. Several sources have emphasized the need to reform the functioning of the judiciary, among others, as regards respecting international standards for fair trials and conditions in Lebanese prisons.</p> <p>4) An anti-corruption law was drafted in 2002, but is still waiting to be adopted.</p>	<p>Progress was achieved in the area of electoral reform and should be consolidated.</p> <p>The Constitutional Council was re-established just before the parliamentary elections in June 2009. Lebanon was one of only two countries in the ENP South region which invited, and received, an EU Election Observation Mission (EOM). The EOM praised the high voter turnout of 54%, an increase of 8% compared to 2005). Nonetheless, it repeated many of the recommendations of its 2005 predecessor and underlined its support for the proposals made by the National Commission on electoral law.</p> <p>In area of Judicial reform; procedures are lengthy and inefficient and the judicial system is perceived to lack credibility and transparency.</p> <p>No progress was achieved in the administrative reform strategy</p>	<p>22 million EURO</p> <p>of which 1.6 million EURO is disbursed for democracy assistance</p>	<p>33 million EURO</p> <p>of which 5,5 million EURO is committed (and all disbursed) for democracy assistance.</p>	<p>50 million EURO</p> <p>of which 8.3 million EURO is committed for democracy assistance</p>

Country	Strategy Paper	Progress Reports	Average Allocations of ENP Funds (in terms of Commitments)		
	2007-2013	2008 & 2009 & 2010	2000-2006	2007-2010	2011-2013
Egypt	<p>Structural Problems: Low participation in political life, the exclusion of certain political movements and groupings from the political arena, a fragile culture of democracy and of recognition of civil and political rights, centralisation of powers and decisions, continuation of the emergency law, guaranteeing the independence of the media, freedom of expression and assembly, and the independence of the judiciary are other key challenges for political reform.</p> <p>Human Rights: Issues of concern to the EU are the use of torture, poor prison conditions, corruption and gender-based discrimination.</p> <p>Judiciary: Lack of independence from the executive, the backlog of cases, delays in resolving disputes and the persistence of the Law on the State of Emergency. The general situation in a number of prisons and detention centres is poor.</p>	<p>Constitutional Reforms in 2007 for structural change are introduced but the results are limited. The State of Emergency is still in place as a major obstacle for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In May 2008 it is even extended for a further 2 years.</p> <p>No progress made until 2010 for independence of judiciary.</p> <p>Limited progress is recorded against torture and ill treatments; also for promotion of women's rights. The number of court actions against activists increased and many of them are tried under Emergency rather than civil law and sentenced to prison.</p>	<p>99 million EURO</p> <p>of which 4.1 million EURO is disbursed for democracy assistance</p>	<p>140 million EURO</p> <p>of which 10 million EURO is disbursed for democracy assistance</p>	<p>150 million EURO</p> <p>of which 13million EURO is committed for democracy assistance</p>
Jordan	<p>1) The Constitution gives the King a high degree of legislative and executive authority; the role of political parties needs to be reinvigorated.</p> <p>2) Jordan's rank in the 2006 Transparency International Index is 40, the best performance in the region, and has adopted an anti-corruption law in October 2006.</p> <p>3) One of the most advanced countries in the region for political reforms but the government is facing increasing difficulty in getting reforms through the current parliament.</p> <p>4) Violence against women and, in particular, crimes committed in the name of honour, remains a serious cultural issue.</p> <p>5) A municipal elections law is drafted, to allow for the direct election of mayors (currently appointed by the King).</p>	<p>The electoral system known as "single non-transferable vote" tends to result in votes being cast for individual candidates and is widely acknowledged to be disadvantageous towards the development of political parties. King Abdullah tasked the new Government (which took office in December 2009) to amend the "Elections Law" in view of the new parliamentary elections (expected no later than 2010), further to the dissolution of the Parliament in November 2009.</p> <p>Anti-Corruption Commission is not yet operational but Jordan was ranked performing far better than most countries in the region.</p> <p>It is now prohibited to arrest anybody for the expression of his opinion in oral, written or any other way, but heavy fines may still be imposed.</p>	<p>55 million EURO</p> <p>of which 1 million EURO is disbursed for democracy assistance</p>	<p>66 million EURO</p> <p>of which 4,3 million EURO is committed (and all disbursed) for democracy assistance</p>	<p>74 million EURO</p> <p>of which 15 million EURO is committed for democracy assistance</p>

The information gathered from the EU's sources suggests that from 2007 to 2010, Egypt and Lebanon showed almost no considerable progress for good governance and human rights. Moreover, Egypt is recorded as even getting worse in terms of continuing to protect existence of State of Emergency. Jordan, on the other hand, is recognized as one of the best countries in the region for political liberalization, despite some limitations its performance is considered as well in compared to other partner countries. The EU itself is more aware of the domestic conditions of recipient countries than as it was during EMP; therefore based on those records the EU could make the ENPI instrument in serving to the political conditionality as it is already in every country's signed Association Agreements. This conditionality is intended to work for positive approach under ENP, which means the more those countries demonstrate democratization, the more financial aid they would get; and vice versa. However, it is obvious that each country is increasingly benefiting from both overall ENPI budget allocated to them and for good governance part of it, despite being still a very small portion. The allocation of the funds seems to work regardless of the condition in the recipient country. As a conclusion of this overall analysis on the EU's funding actions for democracy assistance in recipient countries; the EU itself implements the instruments regardless of the policies that it formulated.

3.4 To what extent the EU's democratization policies are resilient when faced with competing concerns?

The formulation of the democracy promotion strategy within the EU is discussed in Chapter II. Regarding the suspension clauses, the EU's preference was to referring universal values instead of determining the way for democratization in each country; and the expectation that each country would adopt measures to respect for international norms and values, within their own governance systems. In order to achieve this objective the EU formulated the suspension clauses that are inserted in each Association Agreements and financial aid programs. The suspension clauses implied suspending or terminating the benefits if the state in question violates the conditions. This strategy is classified in literature as political conditionality where the linking of perceived benefits such as financial aid, trade concessions, to the fulfilment of conditions related to the democratic and human rights principles (Jepperson & Alexander Wendt, 1996).

As it is stated, one of the objectives of this thesis was to look not only for how the conditionality of the EU for Mediterranean is formulated within its internal political processes, but also to look for the EU's credibility in terms of implementing the policies as they are formulated. The popular Arab uprisings in the Arab world have led the EU to implement the instrument it had traditionally been reluctant to use in the region, that are the sanctions and suspension of relations.

The case of Syria and Libya are significant in terms of those two countries do not have an Association Agreement that is signed during and after Barcelona Process but they have relations with the EU based on trade cooperations. Libya is a specific case where the EU has strong interests on especially oil and gas contracts and trade relations but reluctant to develop more cooperation due to the UN sanctions on Libya and the member states' concerns about terrorist activities arose in the country (Koenig, 2011) Following the uprising in Libya, the EU applied a set of sanctions that are designed to interrupt the flow of weapons and money to the Gaddafi regime (Koenig, 2011) that are followed by multinational military operation under NATO that defeated the violent government forces. Currently the EU running a 30 million € program in Libya in order to support the regime formation based on democratic principles (European Union External Action).

In contrast to Libya case, Syria is a special case in the region since neither the protestors succeeded to ousting Bashar Al-Assad nor the international use of force is relevant. The relations of Syria and the European Union date back to the bilateral cooperation agreement signed in 1977 and during the EMP process, Syria was the only country which signed the Barcelona Declaration, the Association Agreement is negotiated, concluded but not ratified from Syrian side. However, Syria continued to benefit from financial aid. Trade relations, on the other hand, continued to be based on the existing cooperation agreement. Given the absence of Association Agreement, the EU continued to support Syria through financial aids for the aim of full participation of Syria to ENP since the EU recognized the Syrian government's efforts for reforms, although less in political area, through economic and social liberalization²⁶.

²⁶ In the strategy paper of Syria for 2007-2013 it is stated that "10th Five-Year Plan for 2006-2010 as the blueprint for comprehensive economic and social reform and transition from a centrally planned to a 'social market economy'. Political reform is at this stage less

The EU, despite long-term trade and investment relations with Syria, immediately during the Foreign Affairs Council of May 2011 announced the suspension of bilateral cooperation programs between the Syrian government and the EU under the financial aid instruments of ENPI and also declared that the EU will not take further steps on the Association Agreement with Syria, as a response to the ongoing violent repression of protests.

Another case that the EU applied sanctions is the case of Egypt. In early 2011 the anti-government protests started in Egypt, that is called as the Egyptian Revolution, against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek in demand for the end of emergency law, freedom, justice and non-military government (Portala, 2012). In return, a violent repression in mid-March 2011 a military junta took over the governance that ends up with a violent repression for the protestors (Portala, 2012). The EU's response is, according to the Council Decision in 2011 was "freezing of funds and economic resources of persons identified as being responsible for the misappropriation of Egyptian State funds, and natural or legal persons, entities and bodies associated with them" based on a list of natural and legal persons²⁷.

The suspension of all bilateral relations as a response from the EU side with Syria, given the absence of any legal agreement requiring to do so, and also referring to the Libya case where the EU allocate funds for democratic institution building; and lastly the EU's sanctions on Egypt are demonstrating that the EU is acting credible with its rhetoric that suggests to become an active promoter of democratization in the region, rather than staying a passive spectator.

3.5 The EU's Inclusion in Mediterranean Region

The active existence of the EU in MED region increased its involvement in the region and provided some mutual gains to both the EU and the MPCs, however remained very limited if

prominent on the government's agenda. However, the 10th Baath Party Congress of June 2005 has given some orientations in this area, so has the Euro-Mediterranean Work Programme endorsed by Syria and its regional partners at the Barcelona +10 Conference." Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_syria_en.pdf

²⁷ The Council Decision in 2011 and the list is available online via: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf#page=47

the ambitious objectives such as the creation of free trade area is considered. The initiatives of the EU developed the trade flows between regions, which at the end can be seen as a positive implication for the development of the region towards open and liberal economy. Despite the Association Agreements aimed to create a free trade zone by 2010, trade gains at the end remained at bilateral level but in speaking a region-wide development, intra-regional trade remained very limited. Trade with the Maghreb countries demonstrated over 4.4% of overall EU trade in 2008 and from 1995 to 2008, the increase in trade volume was around 3,5%. For the Mashreq, trade volume decreased from 1,45% of overall EU trade to 1,24% for the period between 1995-2008 and in 2011 it becomes 1,19% (Kirişçi, 2011). When compared with the EU's Eastern neighbours, the overall EU trade between 2004-2011 is increased by 50% with MED region while it is 156% with the Eastern ENP countries (Kirişçi, 2011). The reason of the limited progress on trade is explained by Kirişçi (2011) as follows:

“This meagre performance is partly caused by the inability of these countries to adopt and implement the EU acquis on the internal market. The reasons behind this inability are complex and numerous but the insufficiently valuable “carrots” offered by the EU to induce reforms is also a factor to be reckoned with. This, in turn, is closely related to the EU's considerable resistance to opening the internal market to agricultural imports from the southern Mediterranean. Instead, energy and related products have constituted the bulk of EU imports from the region perpetuating the “rentier state” nature of many Arab economies.”

The limited nature of the EU's inclusion in regional trade is critical for the democracy promotion strategy of the EU in terms of making this significant carrot to become ineffective at the end. More specifically, creating open and liberal economy, as discussed in Chapter I, is one of the core element considered to foster political liberalization towards democratization, but in the EU-MED case, this element became a weak achievement.

As it is recognized, to foster the EU's involvement in the region, the willingness and ability of the partner countries to adopt and implement the EU's acquis in their internal market and induce reforms. The EU's involvement in the MED region with a more differentiated approach, in this respect, would serve better in future to the EU's external actorness and its involvement in the region. The more for more strategy which is adopted during and after the Lisbon Treaty, in the long run, suggests “a much higher level of differentiation allowing each partner country to develop its links with the EU as far as its own aspirations, needs and capacities allow” (European Commission & High Representative, 2011). The EU's

differentiated approach allows each MPCs to integrate with the EU on different policy areas according to their willingness and ability to do so. The revised ENP suggests that “for those southern and eastern neighbours able and willing to take part...includes closer economic integration and stronger political co-operation on governance reforms, security, conflict-resolution matters, including joint initiatives in international fora on issues of common interest” (European Commission & High Representative, 2011).

To consider each country’s willingness to integrate on different areas with the EU is significant in terms of the EU’s democracy promotion strategy in the future, since the EU already experienced the long-term negotiations for the AAs and the Action Plans which demonstrate that the more a country is willing to democratization and integrate with the EU, the more they demonstrate progress on the certain initiatives to be concluded. For example, Jordan is a verification case for considering the EU’s differentiated approach to be effective in the region. Referring back to Table VI, Jordan is recognized, among all others in the region, as one of the most advanced countries in the region for political reforms, human rights and promotion of peace processes in the region. Jordan is also the partner country, among others, who concluded the AA and Action Plans negotiations faster than others in the region (please refer back to Table I and II). Therefore, the EU’s differentiated approach would better serve to its inclusion in democratization of the countries, as the common conclusion that the literature also suggested (please refer to Chapter I).

CONCLUSION

The EU experienced internal shortcomings from the very beginning of the formulation of its democracy promotion strategy towards the MED region, but attempted to develop its strategy in an evolving pattern in order to respond both to the internal and external challenges rather than giving up to employ the policies. At the end, the EU recorded certain achievements to promote the establishment of sustainable democracy, from a policy towards a comprehensive strategy through definitional support for the EU's expectations on democratization, formulation of supportive instruments, to make the rhetoric work in practice and finally through a differentiated approach work with each recipient based on their willingness and ability to integrate with the EU. The question of to what degree the EU as an external actor could democratize those countries was out of discussion for the thesis objective, but what needs to be considered is that the EU's inclusion in the region through implementation is improved over time.

As per the findings of this thesis, the European discourse on democracy promotion as a response to the political, economic and security issues arose in the Mediterranean region has its own limits due to its own competences. First of all, when the EU first attempted of a policy formation under EMP towards democracy promotion; the conclusion was a lack of clear message of what democracy is and how the EU expects from the partner countries for transition to democracy. Moreover, the instruments that the EU formulated to serve for the democratization policy were lack of certain coordination and management mechanisms. Those weaknesses were the reflection of the EU's member states' preference and inter-institutional competition, which at the end led to a general and simplified approach in external democratization rather than completely involving to the processes in recipient countries.

Members such as France, Italy or Spain enjoyed close relations with the Mediterranean counterparts, due to their security and trade interests, and therefore were reluctant to act in a coercive manner for a direct regime change. Germany and Britain, on the other hand, were interested more on the Eastern Europe where they were sensitive for an active policy towards Mediterranean through high pooling of resources to the Commission's budget. At the supranational level, the Commission was blamed by mismanagement of the process and moreover acting without any given role to allocate funds abroad by the European Community (referring to the 12th footnote). The reason why the EU did not ever employed coercive

measures, which implies in this thesis as a US's style of direct intervention or the EU's style of deepening processes with the Member States through supranationality of the laws and regulations over the national laws, was that at the beginning the Spain's strong lobbying activity among Member States for a more cooperative policy, claiming for not to threaten economic and trade gains. Afterwards, even the EU preferred non-coercive tools such as financial aid, trade and economic benefits based on the Association Agreements, the EU did not give emphasis on to evaluate the democracy promotion strategy on each country separately, that provided a basis for the recipient countries for window dressing of their domestic implementations in the name of democratization.

The EU was learning from its experiences though. The ENP process led to make the EU's strategy much apparent. Adopting a liberal thought the EU started to assess the developments in each partner country towards democratization based on participation in political life, enhancing the role of the civil society, guaranteeing judicial independence, and promoting human rights, fundamental freedoms and respect for the rule of law. However, when the current democracy promotion strategy is assessed on the financial aids through in comparison with EMP and also within itself; it seems that the EU still allocate funds regardless of the policies adopted during the formulation of the strategy, such as the non-existence of positive conditionality implications during ENP. The conclusion here is that if such democratization measures are not implemented with critical decisiveness; it will not be reasonable to talk about their weaknesses during implementation by claiming a number of reasons from the recipient country's conditions.

Finally, the most current attempt by the EU through a differentiation approach, suggesting more incentives for the countries having more willingness to integrate with the EU, is promising for the EU's external actorness in the region for democracy promotion. As recognized in Jordan case, the EU's inclusion in the region is faster when the country itself is willing to integrate with the EU. Based on those results, one can claim that the EU can still make a difference in the region in future since the democracy promotion strategy gained ground for years, and the EU is now more got used to be interacted with the Mediterranean countries through information gathering and negotiating for certain issues. Moreover, the EU after the Arab Spring started to act in more decisive manner, through direct sanctions and implementing suspension clauses if the democratic principles and human rights are violated. Given this environment of the EU's appearance as an active democracy promoter, as a concluding recommendation, the EU should synergize its own political discourse by

considering its external actorness in the region and based on the existing comprehensive democracy promotion strategy, the implementation of the strategy in a credible way should continue to be a major focus of the European Union.

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