

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS WEALTH DISTRIBUTION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN  
THE 18TH CENTURY: EXAMPLE OF KAYSERİ AND MANİSA

by

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*to my family*

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**Economics, MA Thesis, 2013**

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**ABSTRACT**

In this thesis we use tereke records of Manisa and Kayseri, and compare wealth distributions between 1700-1720 and 1780-1800 periods. We first checked whether rise in wealth of non-Muslims was more significant than of Muslims in both cities. We found that in Manisa, as is expected because it had strong commercial relationship with Europe, non-Muslims economically improved more than Muslims. However, a rapid economic decline of non-Muslims is observed in Kayseri. Then we tried to examine commercial activities of Muslims and non-Muslims through commercial properties in the tereke records. We observed that commercial activities of non-Muslims also expanded in comparison with commercial activities of Muslims in Manisa, and commercial activities of non-Muslims reduced in Kayseri. Therefore we rejected the claim that there was a general ascendance of non-Muslims in the 18th century. Non-Muslims seem to develop only in regions which had strong commercial relationship with Europe, but in regions like Kayseri, where domestic trade was strong, both general wealth level and vitality of commercial activities of non-Muslims left behind Muslims.

**Keywords:** Manisa, Kayseri, tereke, non-Muslim, Muslim, wealth, Ottoman Empire, 18th Century, trade, ethnic division of labor

# OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĐU'NDA 18. YÜZYILDA ETNİK SERVET DAĐILIMI: KAYSERİ VE MANİSA ÖRNEĐİ

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## ÖZET

Bu tezde, Manisa ve Kayseri tereke kayıtlarından faydalanarak, 1700-1720 ve 1780-1800 periodları arasındaki servet dağılımlarını karşılaştırdık. Öncelikle Gayrimüslimlerin servetlerindeki artışın her iki şehirde de Müslümanların servetindeki artıştan fazla olup olmadığını kontrol ettik. Manisa'da, bu şehrin Avrupa ile ticari ilişkilerinden ötürü beklendiği gibi, Gayrimüslimlerin, Müslümanlardan daha hızlı servet biriktirdiğini gördük. Ancak Kayseri'de Gayrimüslimlerin hızlı bir ekonomik gerileme içine girdiği gözlemlendi. Ardından tereke kayıtlarındaki ticari emtialar üzerinden ticari faaliyetleri incelemeye çalıştık. Manisa'da Gayrimüslimlerin ticari faaliyetlerinin de Müslümanlara nazaran geliştiğini, ancak Kayseri'de bu alanda da, Gayrimüslimler için, bir gerilemeden bahsedilebileceğini gördük. Bu durumda 18. Yüzyılda genel bir Gayrimüslim ekonomik yükselişi olduğu iddiasını redetmek durumunda kaldık. Gayrimüslimler sadece Avrupa ile ekonomik ilişkilerin güçlü olduğu bölgelerde ekonomik gelişim gösterirken, yerel ve bölgesel ticaretin hakim olduğu Kayseri gibi bölgelerde hem genel servet düzeyi itibari ile, hem de ticari faaliyetlerinin canlılığı itibari ile Müslümanların gerisine düşmüş görünmektedirler.

**Anahtar Sözcükler:** Manisa, Kayseri, tereke, Gayrimüslim, Müslüman, servet, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, 18. yüzyıl, ticaret, etnik işbölümü

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

According to most historical accounts of the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslim Ottomans occupied a pivotal position within the 18<sup>th</sup>-century networks of trade and commerce with European countries. Because it is often accepted that commercial relations between the Ottoman Empire and the West improved in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, these accounts provide a basis for the claim that the economic situation of the non-Muslims improved in this period. One of the most controversial theses in Ottoman historiography, which indeed supports this claim, is the “ethnic division of labor” thesis, based mainly on a 1917 article by Sussnitzki. According to this thesis, the empire’s trade belonged to non-Muslims, while Muslims concentrated mainly on agriculture and bureaucracy. If this is true, a natural result of the expansion of trade in the 18<sup>th</sup> century would have been a significant economic improvement for non-Muslims relative to Muslims. However, certain studies have shown that Muslims were not only active but even dominant in domestic trade and international trade with the countries to the east, and some studies also show that domestic trade and foreign trade towards the east improved, just as European trade did, in the same period. On this basis it would be expected that the economic rise of Muslims would have been steeper than that of non-Muslims in those regions where domestic and/or eastern markets were main targets of trade, with the opposite holding true for regions under the influence of European trade.

In the present analysis, we attempt to compare the wealth dynamics of Muslims and non-Muslims in two cities, Manisa and Kayseri. Neither of these cities seems to have been a trade hub in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, but both were commercially important. Both cities had had settled non-Muslim communities for a long time, which allows us to make relevant comparisons between Muslims and non-Muslims.<sup>1</sup> Manisa is a close hinterland of Izmir, one of the empire’s most important export points, and in the 18<sup>th</sup> century the distance between them would have taken ten to fifteen hours to traverse (Nagata, 1997, p. 17). It thus seems plausible to surmise that it had a close commercial relationship with Europe; but we cannot claim the same for Kayseri. According to

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<sup>1</sup> We are not claiming that the population was stable. There was always migration, by all groups, both in and out, as will be shown in detail in Section 4. What we mean is that in both cities, and for a long time, all religious groups (mainly Muslim, Armenian, Greek, and Jewish) had communities structured around their temples. Hence, we can compare the religious groups while bearing in mind the possible biases that may result from migration.

Faroqhi (1987), Kayseri's international trade was not very significant in the 18<sup>th</sup> century; yet various secondary trade routes did connect it with other commercial hubs, thus supporting the city's domestic trade (p. 42). Therefore, on the basis of the preceding considerations, we may expect to observe more significant economic improvements for non-Muslims than for Muslims in Manisa, and the opposite in Kayseri.

Our unit of comparison is individual wealth as counted after the death of the individual. In the Ottoman Empire, after a death, and if the involvement of the government was needed for the distribution of inheritance of the deceased, a record of the case was kept as a *tereke* record in the *kadı sicili*.<sup>2</sup> In each *tereke*, the identity<sup>3</sup> of the deceased was recorded, along with a detailed list of the items s/he left, often with their value. Unfortunately, though, these records have significant limitations. Women, rural populations, and non-Muslims are generally underrepresented. We do not possess information about the age of the deceased, but elders were probably overrepresented, as were the rich; and because of the nature of these records, those who died without leaving any inheritance (in terms of gross wealth) are also absent. In many studies based on probate inventories,<sup>4</sup> some of these problems are resolved by appealing to demographic data from secondary sources. In the present analysis, however, we do not use any secondary data, but rather we frame our conclusions while keeping in mind the possible magnitudes and directions of the biases induced by the data set. Another set of problems related to these records concerns the values of estates. To get a higher fee, court officials may have tried to record higher values than the market prices. In addition, heirs may well have hidden parts of their inheritance in order to escape tax. However, although this second set of problems could be misleading for static analyses

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<sup>2</sup> *Kadı Sicili*: Registers of the *kadı* (Islamic judge) in which all the judicial, administrative, and municipal judgments and decisions are recorded.

<sup>3</sup> His/her name, name of his/her father, title if s/he had one, often the religion (Muslim, Christian, or Jew), region (urban or rural), and sometimes the family name and occupation are recorded. Rarely do we get more detailed information about the identity of the deceased.

<sup>4</sup> The probate inventory is the European and American counterpart of the *tereke* records. They share many aspects, including the limitations, of *tereke* records, and are widely utilized in wealth studies on Western nations. In Ottoman studies this term is sometimes used instead of *tereke*. Therefore, when we need to refer to both the Western and the Ottoman inheritance records we use the term "probate inventories."

of a particular group at a given time, there is no reason to think that these trends would have changed across time and across the various religious groups.

We utilized the *tereke* records obtained by Hulya Canbakal, who collected them for her project “Distribution of Wealth in the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1840”.<sup>5</sup> She collected the records in twenty-year periods, which allowed her to draw together a meaningful sample size. In our analysis we compared two periods, 1700-1720 and 1780-1800. But these periods are not representative simply of conditions that obtained during the twenty years they cover. Because all records were kept after the individual’s death, and since a significant proportion of the individuals recorded were probably economically active for some years before their death, the values in our sets illuminate the economic developments of some years before beginning of the period.

The main question here is whether a religion-based wealth polarization occurred in the empire in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. One of the most crucial problems in comparing these two religious groups is the implicit acceptance of both groups as concrete entities. There are studies which set out the economic development of particular subgroups or individuals within non-Muslim confessional groups. Clogg (1982) and Barsoumian (1982) discuss the differences within the Greek and Armenian *millets*. Barsoumian focuses on the *amira* class of Armenians and shows how they were differentiated from other Armenians. Clogg shows that there were great differences among the nations constituting the *millet-i Rum*. He claims that the Greeks rose significantly compared to other ethnic groups, and suggests that the revolts of the Balkan nations in the 19<sup>th</sup> century were not only against the Ottoman government but also against the Greeks. Because our sets were already very small, we did not attempt to divide non-Muslims into smaller subsets.<sup>6</sup> However, we analyzed changes in intra-group inequalities, and checked if wealth was concentrated in the hands of a small group of non-Muslims, without concentrating on their ethnicity or church.

Similar concerns can also be raised for Muslims. Having a relationship with the government was among the most important sources of wealth in the Ottoman Empire before the 18<sup>th</sup> century, but we do not know if it remained so afterwards. Our sample

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<sup>5</sup> TUBİTAK Research Project No. 108K034.

<sup>6</sup> Because they are often recorded as either “Christians” or Jews, we can differentiate subgroups of Christians only through names, but this is not a very secure method.

sizes for Muslims are often large enough to divide in subgroups. As is mentioned above, sometimes the titles of the deceased are recorded in *tereke*. Based on these titles, we also tried to observe if having a relationship with the state continued to be an important source of capital accumulation.

As is well known, Ottoman society consisted of two groups, *reaya*<sup>7</sup> and *askeri*. The former was the productive class of peasants, merchants, and artisans. The latter constituted the ruling stratum of the empire before the 17<sup>th</sup> century and consisted of military commanders, administrators, and *ilmiyye*<sup>8</sup> (Somel, 2003, p. 189). This class was tax-exempt, although not always<sup>9</sup> and not necessarily from all taxes.

After the 17<sup>th</sup> century the borders between *reaya* and *askeri* became blurred. The main reason for these vanishing borders was the economic activities of soldiers who began to maintain garrisons in important cities in the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century (Inalcık, 1980; Karababa, 2012a).<sup>10</sup> They began entering guilds and getting higher posts. There was also a movement from the opposite side. Ordinary men were able to buy janissary pay tickets and gain income and tax-exemption (Findley, 2006). According to Pamuk (2009) this merging of local populations and janissaries was among the most significant trends of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

Because the advantages of those who had military titles continued, independent from their productive activities, *askeri* could still form an economically distinct subgroup.<sup>11</sup> According to Barkey (2008), *ulema* (members of the *ilmiyye*) were gaining

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<sup>7</sup> This distinction is problematic, especially for our purposes. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the term *reaya* increasingly applied to only non-Muslims (Kunt, 2005, p. 204; Somel, 2003, p. 239). Hence we preferred non-*askeri*, *askeri*, and non-Muslim as categories in our analysis. However, we continue to use *reaya* when we cite the literature.

<sup>8</sup> The *ilmiyye* was the class of government officials responsible for religion, justice, jurisprudence, and medrese education (Somel, 2003, p. 129).

<sup>9</sup> In some instances in the 18th century they also paid taxes. For example in 1795, under the İrad-ı Cedid Treasury, everyone was held responsible for tax (Anastasopoulos, 2007).

<sup>10</sup> There is considerable literature on the blurred lines between the *askeri* and *reaya*. Many of the “Mirrors for Princes” authors of the 17<sup>th</sup> century mentioned the vanishing lines as among the reasons for the loss of the empire’s previous glory.

<sup>11</sup> As mentioned by Canbakal (2007; 2012), this group consisted of different subgroups including *ilmiyye* and *seyfiyye* (as well as *kalemiyye* (bureaucracy), and other palace

power in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, consolidating their social and religious bases and reinforcing their own corporate-institutional structure (p. 210). It might well be expected that this gain in power would be reflected in economic terms. Besides, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century *askeri* could find various ways to escape from confiscations, and so protect their wealth (Salzmann, 1993). Titular inheritance could be another source of divergence of *askeri* from non-*askeri*; according to a decree in 1605 (Canbakal 2007, p. 65) children of *askeri* were also accepted as *askeri*. As well as this there was a process of “sadatization”; many Muslims claimed to be *seyyids*,<sup>12</sup> and so became *askeri*/tax exempt (Canbakal, 2005). This trend also shows the possible economic returns associated with this title.

It was more difficult for non-Muslims to obtain an *askeri*-related title. In our data set there are no non-Muslim *askeri*: therefore, this *askeri*–*reaya* separation divides the Muslim set alone. This means that if a relationship with the government really had economic value, inclusion of them in analysis would cause bias.

Therefore, because of the possibility of a positive effect of status on the wealth of Muslims, we separated *askeri* from *reaya* through titles and occupations.<sup>13</sup> However, this separation may be less reliable than onomastics for non-Muslims. In all likelihood, all *askeri* people had honorary titles, but not all such titles mean they had a relation with the government. For example, Gradeva (2005) mentions İbrahim Çelebi, *kethüda* (chamberlain) of İsmail Ağa in Sofia in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century (p. 185). This İbrahim Çelebi was probably not a member of the *ilmiyye*. However, if he was in our set, we would accept him as *askeri* because he was a *çelebi*. So, when we separate *askeri* and non-*askeri* we only clean non-*askeri* from the *askeri*, while also dropping some non-*askeri* from the set.

Therefore, we do not claim absolute separation of *askeri* and non-*askeri* as two distinct categories. First, we always compare non-Muslims with whole set of Muslims; then, we focus on *askeri* just to guard against possible bias resulting from their inclusion.

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figures who were not related with our two cities in the 18th century). Therefore it could also be segmented in itself.

<sup>12</sup> An honorific title for the descendants of the Prophet.

<sup>13</sup> For titles and occupational classification, see Appendix A.

During our analysis we first focused on the two cities as whole. It is often accepted that the period of approximately half a century after the devastating war against Russia (1768-1774) was a time of crisis in the Ottoman Empire. However, we observe a growth in terms of wealth in both cities in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, probably because our 1780-1800 set is not exclusively representative of the post-war period, but also of the wealth accumulation process before the war.

In the next step, we then ask how the wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims changed. In Manisa, the wealth of non-Muslims increased in the 18<sup>th</sup> century more than that of Muslims. While at the beginning non-Muslims and non-*askeri* Muslims had similar wealth levels, at the end of the century non-Muslims had more wealth. However, we cannot claim that they had more wealth than *askeri* at the end of the century.

In the third step we look at commercial activities and observe that the share of non-Muslims in commercial activities increased in Manisa. However, in Kayseri the share of Muslims in commercial activities increased, but that of non-Muslims decreased. Then we added the size of commercial activities to our analysis. In Manisa, the wealth of non-Muslims seems, like the general wealth level, to have increased more than that of Muslims. In Kayseri, the opposite is true.

In brief, one of the most important conclusions to be drawn from this analysis is that it is wrong to generalize a development in one region of the empire for all regions. As is expected, in Manisa the rise of the wealth of non-Muslims was more significant than that of the Muslims, while the opposite was the case in Kayseri. One of the possible explanations for this condition is the effect of European trade and the pivotal position of non-Muslims in this trade in Manisa, while Kayseri focused mainly on domestic trade, this being a sector where Muslims were more active than non-Muslims.

Our thesis proceeds as follows. The second section, a literature review, covers the studies which focus on particular religious groups, or which try to compare them, mainly for the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The third section is an overview of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In this section we focus only on certain administrative, fiscal, and economic changes in the 18<sup>th</sup> century which could affect our population. In the fourth section we introduce Manisa and Kayseri in detail. In the fifth section we introduce our data set, focusing on its

limitations and the ways these limitations may affect our conclusions. Then, in the sixth section, we examine our data and draw our conclusion.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In Ottoman historiography it is often accepted that non-Muslims were economically better off than Muslims in almost all sectors and in almost all regions, during the last century of the empire. Marouche and Sarantis show that in 1912 almost half of the Ottoman bankers were Greek while only two of the identifiable 130 bankers were Turkish<sup>14</sup> (cited in Issawi, 1998, p. 104). According to Tevfik Çavdar, in 1913 Turks had only a 15% share in industrial firms employing more than four workers and five-sixths of the remainder belonged to Ottoman non-Muslims (cited in Issawi, 1998, p. 105). Frangakis-Syrett (1999) claims that in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century around 50% of commerce of Izmir was in the hands of the Greeks (p. 19), and according to Kasaba (1988a), in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, the economic power of the non-Muslim merchants and bankers of Western Anatolia was so great that the Muslims potentates were dependent on the non-Muslims (p. 102).

Since Sussnitzki's article of 1917, a thesis has existed that there was an "ethnic division of labor" in the empire, which generalizes the mentioned conditions in the 19<sup>th</sup> century along with the records of Western travelers, councils, and merchants across periods and regions, and broadly claims that non-Muslims economically dominated profitable sectors while Muslims concentrated on bureaucracy, in some industries such as tanning and carpet weaving, and subsistence agriculture. According to Sussnitzki (1966), there was no great difference between Muslims<sup>15</sup> and non-Muslims in agriculture and industry. "But trade is characterized by a very significant absence of the largest of the Turkish ethnic groups" (p. 120). This sector was almost completely dominated by Greeks and Armenians. He claims that the possible reasons for this dominance were their networks across cities and country, and the protection they obtained from foreign powers (pp. 120-121). Lewis (1968), going further, points out that "the Ottoman Muslims knew only four professions—government, war, religion, and agriculture. Industry and trade were left in large measure to the non-Muslim subjects" (p. 35). He points to a lack of interest on the part of Muslims, and moreover the suspicions on the part of jurists, regarding traveling into the lands of non-Muslims, as a

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<sup>14</sup> In this context, an Ottoman Muslim.

<sup>15</sup> He uses the term "Turk" not "Muslim," and mentions other nationalities, which were predominantly Muslim (i.e. Kurds, Arabs), separately. However they displayed no great differences among themselves.



reason for the absence of Muslims in the international trade with Europe (2002, pp. 35-37). Grenet (2011) interprets the non-existence of Muslim traders in the European sources as a sign of the predominance of Ottoman non-Muslims in the Levantine trade, and according to Issawi (1982) the reason for the one-sided application of the Capitulations, which were on paper reciprocal, was that very few Muslims traveled to Europe for trade, and the ones who did were ineffective (p. 18).

Some more nuanced assertions related to the “ethnic division of labor” thesis emphasize not the absence of Muslims in commercial activities but the concentration of non-Muslims in certain, and mainly more profitable, sectors. According to Issawi (1998), Jews were dominant in banking, minting, and foreign trade due to their foreign contacts. They also adjusted to cash-cropping more quickly when commercial agricultural improved. Ginio (2000) claims that in Thessaloniki, brokers, loaners, money-exchangers, translators, and intermediaries between local traders and the Europeans were local non-Muslims. Goffman (2002) points out that most pastoralists were Muslim while Greeks were mariners, Armenians dominated international trade and brokerage, and textile manufacturers often were Jewish (p. 85). According to him, the reason for this situation was the specialization of certain ethno-religious groups in certain professions in which they had gained relative advantages centuries ago. Before the Turks entered Anatolia, Greeks were already mariners while immigrant Jews were good textile manufacturers, and they continued to dominate these sectors.

In some recent studies the “ethnic/religious division of labor” thesis is being questioned. Kabadayı (2009) points out that religion was not among the determinants of wages in the Imperial Fez Factory in the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and in the case of employment, probably for military/political reasons, male Orthodox Christians were not favored after the independence of the Greek State. But for Armenians and female Orthodox Christians we do not observe the same restrictions, and there is no manifest or significant inclination to employ members of specific certain religious community. In his analysis of approximately 7,500 people and 2,000 shops in early nineteenth-century Istanbul, Kırılı (2001) shows that Muslims were far from “humble rural labor” and that *not only* ethno-religious but also regional allegiances were effective in occupational specialization, along with other possible factors. Although we cannot observe a correlation in his analysis between the size and profitability of firms and type of

religion, and there are some sectors in which people from all confessional groups existed together, while the idea that some ethno-religious groups specialized in some particular sectors is not rejected (i.e. groceries and gardens were in the hands of Greeks; bakeries, mills, and pottery shops were dominated by Armenians; and bathhouses were managed by Muslims). Quataert (2004) also rejects the ethnic division of labor thesis as “an inaccurate stereotype”. However, like Kırılı, he does not deny that in particular regions of the empire certain ethno-religious groups dominated certain sectors. His objection is directed against attempts to generalize this situation for all industries in the empire as a whole (p. 14).

Some of the claims based on the “ethnic division of labor” thesis can be accepted in some measure for the last century of the empire, while their validity for previous centuries remains questionable. There are signs of Muslim dominance in some sectors, including trade, in some regions, at least until the last decades of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Jennings (1973) shows that credit relationships in Kayseri in the first quarter of the 17<sup>th</sup> century were dominated by Muslims, not by non-Muslims. In the Black Sea wheat trade, Muslims seem to have remained dominant until the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Panzac, 1992). Even in Thessaloniki in the 18<sup>th</sup> century Muslims were not completely absent from commercial activities. Ginio (2000) refers to the Muslim coffee merchants of Thessaloniki who were busy in their trade with Egypt. In Sarajevo, the majority of the merchants in the 17<sup>th</sup> century were Muslim (Koller, 2008).<sup>16</sup> According to Greene (2000), Muslim merchants (though many of them seem to be recent converts after the conquest of 1669) were dominant in commerce of Crete, and their dominance continued until the last decades of 18<sup>th</sup> century (ch. 5). Pedani (2008) claims that Muslim traders were active in Venice and Ancona until the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century. The foundation of the second Fondaco dei Turchi (Turkish inn) in 1636 shows increasing activity in Venice in the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. However, Pedani also claims that this activity halted after 1720s.

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<sup>16</sup> But we ought also to know the ratio of non-Muslims in Sarajevo. Stoianovich (1960) claims that, although their number was increasing, there was only a small number of non-Muslims in Sarajevo in the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

Despite the continued Muslim activity in trade, this was not very significant in international trade with the West.<sup>17</sup> Gilbar (2005) shows that even in the 19<sup>th</sup> century there were Muslim great *tüccar* (merchants) with significant networks. But these networks encompassed the Nile Valley, the Red Sea basin, the Levant and North Africa, the Thessaloniki-Egypt line and the Black Sea. The main European country with which they had commercial relations was Venice, and this was declining in the 18<sup>th</sup> century (it collapsed in 1797) while other European countries were gaining prominence. Also in Crete, when the Muslims became increasingly active in trade, the share of Egypt and other predominantly Muslim regions also increased in the total trade of the island (Greene, 2000, ch.5).

The static version of the ethnic division of labor thesis, which tends to generalize the relative economic conditions of Muslims and non-Muslims across time and regions, therefore seems misleading. But claims about a more active role for non-Muslims in the European trade, and their economic rise due to the European effect, have not to our knowledge been falsified.<sup>18</sup> There is a broad literature about the reasons for the economic ascendance of non-Muslims in comparison with Muslims, induced by the European trade, and especially for the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Protection from Europeans, the networks of non-Muslims all over the world and the empire, and the rise of naval activities by non-Muslims, are counted among the reasons for their economic ascendance. During the 18<sup>th</sup> century, non-Muslims obtained *berat*<sup>19</sup> in increasing numbers. These *berat* not only reduced their taxes, because of the Capitulations, but also allowed them to choose more efficient institutions (Kuran, 2004). However,

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<sup>17</sup> As will be shown in Section 3, trade with Europe was not very significant, but for the claim about the ascendance of the non-Muslim Ottomans it is important.

<sup>18</sup> We do not mean that there was no ascendance at all before the 18<sup>th</sup> century. According to Stoianovich (1960), trade in the Balkans had been developing for approximately three centuries before the 18<sup>th</sup>. The process of the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist world economy had begun in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and commercial relationships with Europe had been improving since then (Çizakça, 1985). Besides this, Kasaba (1988b) claims that the intermediary role of the non-Muslims between the Europeans and the locals was not a reason for their ascendance but rather a result of the economic power they gained before the Europeans entered the region. What we claim is that the literature points to a rise (and a more rapid rise than before) of non-Muslims in comparison with Muslims in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>19</sup> A *berat* was a patent which provided its owner with access to the legislation of the country which had issued it. Ottoman legal pluralism, which was based on Islamic law, offered such an option for non-Muslims.

Çizakça and Kenanoğlu (2008) claim, based on Boogert, that in the 18<sup>th</sup> century the number of *beratlı*<sup>20</sup> did not show any marked increase. As well as this, they reject Kuran, and claim that the European institutions were not much more efficient than the Ottoman ones.<sup>21</sup>

Another possible reason for a positive effect by the Europeans on Ottoman non-Muslims was the latter's networks, which have been mentioned by a great number of scholars who have worked on non-Muslim merchants. Braude (2000, p. 410) mentions that there was an "ethnic division of trade" and "ethnic trading networks" in Buda. Although he describes a lending–borrowing relationship between a Muslim and a Christian, Ginio (2000) also refers to co-religious networks (pp. 75-76). According to Issawi (1998), the Greek Diaspora helped their kin in the empire. He also emphasizes the clannishness of non-Muslims. According to Seirinidou (2008) their extensive family and kin networks helped the Greeks to settle in the Habsburg Empire. Faroqhi (1997) generalizes the case and claims that minorities in the pre-Industrial Era were usually engaged in creating an economy based on co-religious solidarity and trust, and Ottoman non-Muslims thus improved themselves through such ties.

As well as these factors, the maritime activities of the Greeks had been increasing since the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Papakonstantinaou, 2010). After the period of wars and revolutions began in Europe, Greek merchant marines enhanced their position in the Aegean Sea.

In conclusion, according to the literature it is to be expected that non-Muslims improved their economic situation more than Muslims did, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century in the regions open to the European trade, especially around the Aegean shores. However, because the role of non-Muslims was not very significant in domestic trade, and domestic trade increased as well in this century, the rise of Muslims as well as non-Muslims is to be expected in the inner regions of the empire.

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<sup>20</sup> *Beratlı* means someone who had obtained a *berat*.

<sup>21</sup> Kuran claims that the Islamic institutions were against corporations. Firms were dissolved after the death of a partner. Çizakça and Kenanoğlu (2008) claim that if there were more than two members, a firm could survive. Nevertheless, we think that the possibility of negative effects of Islamic law on corporations cannot be completely rejected.

### 3. The Ottoman Empire in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century: A Short Overview

According to the literature, some important institutional changes occurred in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, and these give this period its distinctive character (especially as regards the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century). We can combine the changes which may have affected wealth distribution between religious groups in Kayseri and Manisa under three titles; fiscal, administrative, and economic. Fiscal institutions became more monetized. Since the last decades of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the *tumar*, one of the most crucial fiscal (but also administrative and military) institutions, had been declining, while *iltizam* was replacing it. In the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century two radical changes occurred. The first was *malikane*, that namely life-time *iltizam*. The second was a change in the *cizye* (poll-tax from non-Muslims) system. Because only Muslims could obtain *malikane*, and under the new *cizye* collection system the fiscal burden of non-Muslims increased, it can be claimed that changes in fiscal institutions negatively affected non-Muslims in the provinces, at least in the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. This change also opened the way for administrative change in the provinces. Utilizing the new system, provincial elites obtained administrative authority. Although in Kayseri we do not observe the exclusive power of one elite family, in Manisa a dynasty arose which may have affected both the economic and social structures. We do not have information about the rise of provincial elites in Kayseri, but in Manisa it is likely that, successful or not, the rising family tried to suppress other Muslim families and to support non-Muslims. Therefore this change possibly had a positive effect on non-Muslims and increased inequality among the Muslims in Manisa. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century both the domestic and foreign trade of the empire improved. In Western Anatolia exports to Europe increased, and the traders of Kayseri became more active across northern and southern Anatolia. Hence, if the possible effect of European trade on non-Muslims is accepted, the economic improvement of non-Muslims in the western regions of the empire can be expected.

Land market institutions remained among the most rigid of the Ottoman institutions until the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century (Pamuk, 2009). However, one of the most crucial changes had occurred in the land reserve system. Although the Ottomans allowed different systems in different regions of their vast empire, in the core regions state ownership of agricultural lands (*miri*) was the dominant form. More than three quarters of the agricultural lands in these regions were estimated to be *miri* in the first half of the

16<sup>th</sup> century, and until the last years of the empire the government resisted accepting private property rights over agricultural lands.<sup>22</sup>

There were two systems which applied to *miri* lands: *timar* and *iltizam*. *Timar* was the core of the Ottoman military-administrative-agricultural complex in the core regions until the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century (Somel, 2003, p. 299). Under this system, a unit of cereal-growing land (*timar*) was assigned to the administration of a *sipahi*<sup>23</sup> who was often chosen for their wartime valor. They would collect taxes of their *timar* mostly through in-kind payment, and spending the proceeds locally. The most important obligation of a *sipahi* was to provide fully equipped mounted cavalymen, the number of which depended on the size of his *timar*. This system allowed the empire to have readily available cavalymen in times of war, that being the second great component of the Ottoman army in the classical period. *Sipahi* also prevented rising local powers from posing a threat to the central authority. Another benefit of the system was the avoidance of transaction costs which would emerge if tax had to be collected in the center and then redistributed. Unlike *timar*, the *iltizam* had no military aspect, and resembled the monetization of the economy. In this system a source of revenue called *mukataa* was assigned through an auction to a contractor (*mültezim*) to collect taxes for 1 to 3 years. This, we may say, functioned as a form of government borrowing without interest, the latter being ruled out as an Islamic institution (Pamuk, 2009).<sup>24</sup> State enterprises like

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<sup>22</sup> We do not mean that lands could not be private property. Vineyards and orchards could be. As well as this, wasteland was accepted as the private property of the first person to cultivate it. Also, after the 17<sup>th</sup> century some *miri* lands were treated like private property although legally they were still state-owned. *Waqf* were also used to change *miri* into private property. One of the most important developments on *miri* lands (but not only on *miri* lands) was *çiftlik* (big-farm) formation. These were also quasi-private organizations. For more information about *çiftlik* and changes in land regimes, see İnalçık (1991a), Veinstein (1991), and Nagata (1995, pp. 83-101).

<sup>23</sup> They are often Muslim but non-Muslims could also have *timar*. During the first three centuries of the empire, in some regions, especially the newly conquered lands, *sipahi* were Christian (former notables). For example, Zarinebaf (2005) shows that in 1489, 261 of 281 *sipahi* in Limnos (taken peacefully in 1458) were Christian. However after the 17<sup>th</sup> century the non-Muslim *sipahi* almost disappeared. Sons of previously non-Muslim *sipahi* also Islamized and remained in the ranks of the notables of their regions.

<sup>24</sup> This prohibition could be circumvented in many ways but as long as *iltizam* existed there was no need of an alternative. Besides, *iltizam* was not merely a substitute for interest-bearing loans. It was a widespread method of government finance in Europe, especially in France. Around the 1770s, as the *Ferme Générale*, it constituted a third of the ordinary budget of France (White, 1989, p. 552), and it was also combined with

mints and mines had been managed by this system throughout the empire in previous centuries. However, after the 17<sup>th</sup> century, because of changing military tactics and equipment,<sup>25</sup> population pressure, the Celali rebellions and the monetary crisis, the *timar* system gradually gave way to *iltizam*<sup>26</sup> as regards agricultural revenues as well (Darling, 2006).

Changing military tactics and equipment in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, which rendered *sipahi* obsolete and increased the need for infantry troops with firearms, was one of the most significant processes which effected the decline of the *timar*. *Sipahi* cavalymen used traditional weapons—bows, lances, and swords. Because they proved ineffective (especially against the Austrian musketeers) in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, the government tried to increase the number of units with firearms (Somel, 2003, p. 271-272). The number of the janissaries<sup>27</sup> increased threefold in the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century (Pamuk, 2001).

Besides this, the government also began hiring mercenaries<sup>28</sup> equipped with firearms in the form of *sekban-sarıca* and *levend* (Salzmann, 2004, p. 55). In the 16<sup>th</sup> century the population in the Mediterranean basin increased dramatically.<sup>29</sup> A significant migration to urban areas accompanied by high unemployment forced many to enter the ranks of mercenaries (White, 2011, p. 262). These mercenaries were paid only during wartime. In peacetimes they were discharged, and either participated in the

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interest bearing bonds there. For further information about the *Ferme Générale*, see White 2004.

<sup>25</sup> Only the military revolution seems to have one-way relationship with the decline of *timar*. The other events have a feed-back relationship, and there are debates about their effect on the decline of *timar*.

<sup>26</sup> The process was not linear and the *timar* system continued until the mid-19th century.

<sup>27</sup> Janissaries were salaried, standing infantry troops, under the direct command of the palace.

<sup>28</sup> Usage of the irregulars was not an invention of the late 16<sup>th</sup> century. The Ottomans had used them since their early campaigns in the 14<sup>th</sup> century. However, in this period the army became more dependent on the irregulars and in the second decade of the 17<sup>th</sup> century *sekban* and *sarıca* were incorporated into the regular army (Zens, 2011).

<sup>29</sup> White (2011) (using Barkan's results through *tahrir* registers) shows that in many regions in Anatolia and the Balkans the urban population increased dramatically. The smallest percentage increase in the 1520-80 period was in Manastır/Bitola with 27% (among 12 cities). In Sarajevo this increase was 316% (p. 251). As we will see, Kayseri followed a similar pattern but in Manisa we do not observe such a great rise.

*kapi*<sup>30</sup> of provincial governors, or became brigands and ravaged the countryside.<sup>31</sup> The conflict resulting from the rebellions and banditry caused further migration into towns, so a vicious cycle was set up which lasted more than a century. The first target of the migrants was generally the closest cities. For example, there was a migration from Tokat to Erzurum, and from countryside neighborhoods to Kayseri. However, there were also migrations further west, from Karaman to Bursa. One of the most crowded migrant groups was non-Muslims. There was a great Armenian migration to the west in the late 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, and, along with the Perso-Ottoman wars, the conflicts in the countryside are mentioned as among the reasons of this migration (İnalçık, 1994, p. 30; White, 2011, p. 255).

Flight from the countryside because of rebellions and demobilized mercenaries not only undermined the *timar* system (Salzmann, 2004) but also damaged tax sources.<sup>32</sup> Despite all efforts by the government to force them back to their original regions, a great part of the immigrants did not return. White (2011) shows that even in 1635 people who fled from Sivas did not return (p. 259). The greater part of the vacant farms, then, came to comprise the *çiftlik* (big-farm) of provincial notables in the next century.

Because of the decline of the tax base, mainly because of devastating migration and rebellions, and the rise in soldiers' pay, during the 17<sup>th</sup> century the government budget went into deficit. Especially during the War of the Holy League (1678-1699), excess demands forced an expansion of the economic claims on society. In 1695 an important fiscal institution, the *malikane*, was introduced to solve these fiscal problems. This system was similar to *iltizam* but the land was granted for not a short period but for a lifetime. At the beginning, 2 to 10 times the expected annual revenue was paid as *muaccele* (down payment), and, like the normal *iltizam*, a fixed (but higher than the

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<sup>30</sup> The *kapi* (or *kapu*) was the office of the governor but was more like a court. *Kapı halkı* (people belonging to the *kapi*) followed the officer if his place of duty changed. *Kapulu levend* were the mercenaries of governors (Somel, 2003, p. 148).

<sup>31</sup> These were not mutually exclusive. Many governors rebelled using the militia under their control (Pamuk, 2005, p. 141).

<sup>32</sup> A decree issued in 1567 points out that the flight harmed all the *sipahi*, the *miri* land, and the residents of the capital (White, 2011, p. 253).



*iltizam*) amount was paid annually.<sup>33</sup> The main expected benefit of the new system was a more efficient usage of the *mukataa*. In the *iltizam* system, because there was no government monitoring, the *mültezim* were not investing in and exploiting the land as much as would have been possible. However, in the *malikane* system such exploitation was more difficult. *Mültezim* could rent out their *mukataa* for short periods, so the initial condition could be repeated. However, because the lease-holders (*mütesellim* or *voyvoda*) were often local agents who had an interest in keeping the *mukataa* for as long as possible, it can be claimed that the new system was more efficient, although it could not solve the fiscal problems. In the beginning, only the elites in the capital were able to have *malikane*, but over time various partnerships were founded in order to get access to them. After 1714, non-Muslims were normally prohibited from having most *malikane* (Salzmann, 1993, p. 403), while they could have *mukataa*. However, as *sarraf*,<sup>34</sup> many non-Muslims played a very significant role in the distribution of *malikane* (Darling, 2006).

Partly as a result of the sultan's need for popular support after the deposition of Mehmed IV, the target of fiscal demands/pressure also changed in this period (Darling, 2006, p. 125), and tax from non-Muslims increased. In the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, *cizye*<sup>35</sup> income of the government quadrupled and yielded between 22% and 40% of the total direct taxes (Salzmann, 2004, p. 85). Therefore it can be claimed that the fiscal burden of non-Muslims increased, and thus that their wealth was suppressed in the first half of this century. However, there are also signs of a rise in non-Muslim wealth in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. After the devastating war against Russia (1768-1774), the *esham*<sup>36</sup> was introduced. In this system, *mukataa* were divided and sold to a large number of people.

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<sup>33</sup> For further information about the *malikane* system, see Genç 2000, pp. 99-152.

<sup>34</sup> The *sarraf* was a money-lender, banker, and/or money-changer. They had to obtain licenses, so their number was limited, and their role in the *iltizam* system was crucial. Any individual who wanted to obtain *iltizam* had to provide the guarantee of a *sarraf* (Kabadayı, 2008, p. 283).

<sup>35</sup> The *cizye* was the Islamic poll-tax collected from non-Muslims. There were two types of collection, as a lump sum (*cizye ber vech-i maktu*) from a community and as wealth-based per individual (*cizye 'ala'l-ru'us*). After 1691 the first of these was abolished, and *cizye* began to be collected from all non-Muslims per individual according to three wealth levels, poor, middle, and rich, the ratios of which were 1, 2, and 4 respectively. For a detailed account of the *cizye*, see İnalçık 1991b, pp. 562-566, and for the application of the new regulation of 1691 in Crete before 1691, see Sariyannis 2011.

<sup>36</sup> From the Arabic root *sehm* (share).

This time both non-Muslims and women could obtain the rights to a *mukataa*. This change may signify the increased wealth of these two groups, such that they were thought apt to participate in *mukataa*. It may in return have contributed to the wealth of non-Muslims and women, just as *malikane* contributed to the wealth of people who obtained them.

The spread of both the *iltizam* and irregular soldiers, and the flight from rural areas, contributed to the rise of *ayan* in provinces.<sup>37</sup> *Ayan* literally means “eyes” in Arabic, and denotes the notables, the respected and eminent people of a region. Their existence can be traced back to the formation phase of the empire: in some conquered regions there had already been notables who were then left intact by the Ottomans. In addition, to win the subjects over to the side of the empire, some respected residents of the conquered regions were given fiefs, which remained in the possession of their (mostly Islamized) offspring in the subsequent centuries (Adanır, 2006). Starting from the 16<sup>th</sup> century the *ayan* were officially recognized by the central government. Being people who were well-informed about the region and respected by the residents, until the 18<sup>th</sup> century the *ayan* were intermediaries between the provincial government and the population (Pamuk, 2005, p. 142). Many imperial prescripts and decrees are addressing to these notables, referring to them as *ayan*, *eşraf*, *ayan-ı vilayet*, or *ayan-ı memleket*, along with the official governor in matters concerning the region. Through this intermediary role, they assisted officials, though without any official duty, on behalf of the community, in alleviating administrative problems<sup>38</sup> (Neumann, 2006). While they were not necessarily drawn from the richest stratum and were mainly civil in the previous centuries, in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century there arose *ayan* families which were among the richest in their region and who held official posts. And after 1770, *ayanship* became an office which was usually held by the most powerful, but had to have consent of all (Yaycıoğlu 2008, pp. 121-4).

One of the most important reasons for the rise of *ayan* was the authority gap in the provinces<sup>39</sup> caused by the decline of the *timar* system and the absence of governors

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<sup>37</sup> The title of the relevant chapter in McGowan 1994, “The Age of *Ayans* 1699-1812,” signifies the importance of the *ayan* in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>38</sup> *Kadı* had to read edicts to people when *ayan* were there (Yaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 123).

<sup>39</sup> Probably because of this vacuum, the rise of the *ayan* was previously accepted by some scholars as a sign of decentralization (Akdağ, 1975). But in some recent literature

during long periods of war. Besides this, some governors themselves rebelled. In this period, the government demanded the help of *ayan* in provinces as militias against the rebels. In the course of time they became *mütesellim*.<sup>40</sup> In 1726, the government stopped assigning governors to the provinces from the capital (Akdağ, 1975), and this opened a way to the position of governorship for the *ayan* (Pamuk, 2005, p. 40). Some of them also gained *malikane* in the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Findley, 2006), which, over time, and along with the governorship, came to constitute the backbone of their economic and administrative power (İnalçık, 1991a).

*Ayan* equipped with the authority for tax-collection constituted an additional party which wanted a share from agricultural production. Besides this, they could collect the amount they spent on the region, or sent to the government (especially in wartime), from local people. This authority allowed them to overcharge (Faroqhi, 2004a, p. 63), and to show their expenditures as higher than their real spending, thus further increasing the pressure on ordinary people. However, there was a check-balance system in place that was intended to reduce the risk. They could be sued and changed by the community if their misbehavior or incapability was observed or if undue pressure was felt by the locals.<sup>41</sup> For the payment of *ayan*'s expenditures, local people had the power to assign share that each individual would pay (Yaycıoğlu, 2008, p.131), so they could arrange an optimal distribution for their society. Because *ayan* wanted to keep their authority, and posts such as the *mütesellimlik*, for as long as possible, and because their revenues from their posts were based mainly on the prosperity of their region, they often tried to improve their regions. However, this was only possible if there was no clash among the *ayan*, something which devastated rural areas in the first half of 18<sup>th</sup> century.

In the Arab provinces and Anatolia (unlike in the Balkans), *ayan* could found dynasties whose power surpassed other families and so provided order in their region

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(e.g. Khoury 2006), *ayan* are accepted as the backbone of Ottoman hegemony in the provincial setting.

<sup>40</sup> As mentioned, the holders of *mukataa* were often residents of the capital. *Mutesellim* (or *voyvoda*) was the deputy for the governors/*mültezim*/*muhasıl* in their provinces who engaged in tax-farming.

<sup>41</sup> Yaycıoğlu (2008, pp. 135-6) shows how both Muslim and non-Muslim people of Ankara sued their *ayan* because of overcharging in 1770.

for a long time. In Western Anatolia such a dynasty was the Karaosmanoğulları, whose seat was in Manisa. In Kayseri in the 18<sup>th</sup> century there was no single great dynasty, but four competing ones, Kalaycıoğulları, Emiroğulları, Zennecioğulları, and Cabbarzadeler. We do not have enough information about possible effects of the Kayseri *ayan* on non-Muslims. However, there are some signs that in Manisa, the Karaosmanoğulları tried to suppress the wealth of other Muslim families. It may thus have contributed to the wealth of non-Muslims, or at least improved their economic position compared to Muslims.

Along with fiscal and administrative institutions, some changes in economic structure were to be observed in the Ottoman provinces. Both domestic and foreign trade increased and underwent structural change. Regarding the empire's foreign trade, shifts can according to McGowan be collected under three titles: "a shift in the content of the export trade, a shift in its geographic distribution, and a shift in the relative rank of the trading partners" (1994, p. 727). All of these had possible effects on ethno-religious distribution of wealth in export cities, and thus in Manisa.

Raw agricultural products came to replace manufactured goods and Iran silk in the export market (Panzac, 1992; Quataert, 2005, p. 128). In Macedonia and Western Anatolia, between 1720 and 1800, cotton cultivation, mainly for export, expanded three times. In addition to cotton, especially in the second half of 18<sup>th</sup> century, maize, tobacco, grapes, livestock and commercial fibers were exported at an increasing rate (Kasaba, 1988a, p. 19). The increased importance of home-grown Ottoman products helped the port cities like Izmir and Thessaloniki to develop. In the decades following the treaty of Passarowitz (1718), new trade routes in the Balkans supplemented the traditional arteries of the Levantine trade through the Mediterranean (Adanır, 2006, p. 170, Katsiardi-Heiring, 2008; Seirinidou, 2008), and, in the literature, non-Muslims (especially Greeks) are often mentioned as among the main beneficiaries. In the second half of the century the Habsburgs were among the main importers of cotton from the Ottoman Empire through Macedonia and Izmir. Aside from the effects of Passarowitz, the foundation of the free ports of Trieste (1719) and Ancona helped the Habsburgs to become second after France in the share of the Ottoman exports in 1784. England ceased to be the Ottomans' leading trade partner in the 1720s, after a determined and successful trade campaign by the French, which was relying on textiles better adapted to

the Levantine trade. But probably this was not main reason. Their interest in other regions (colonies) may have reduced England's trade with the Ottomans. By 1784 it was fourth after the Dutch. The English, like the Dutch, became more dependent on trade intermediaries in this period, while the French continued to play directly and aggressively for approximately twenty years (McGowan, 1994, p. 728).<sup>42</sup>

The existence of intermediaries between the Europeans and the local people was one of the most significant aspects of the Ottoman Empire's international trade in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Foreigners needed native middlemen in order to access the interior. These intermediaries were almost exclusively recruited from among the non-Muslims of the empire, and they are claimed to be the main beneficiaries of the expanding commercial relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European countries. Masters (2001) shows that there was a great development of the local non-Muslims of Aleppo in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, as translators and agents of the Europeans (ch. 3). According to Faroqhi (1997), religious ties were effective in shaping the relationship between the Europeans and the locals. She claims that Jews could not benefit from expanding European trade as much as Christians. She also mentions converts to Catholicism. Similar trends are also mentioned by Masters (2001, ch. 3); however, this does not mean that there was general comprador behavior among the non-Muslims. According to Kasaba (1988b) there were also conflicts between non-Muslims and Europeans in Western Anatolia. He claims that their intermediary position was not a source of their wealth but rather the result of a position gained in the regional networks over previous centuries (he uses the term "classical period", so not only before the 19<sup>th</sup> but indeed before the 17<sup>th</sup> century). Indeed, over time the local non-Muslims undermined the Europeans. (It is likely that we cannot talk about the prior wealth of the Aleppine local non-Muslims in a similar way. Masters mentions reports of their poverty in the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.) Similarly, Kadı (2012) shows how in Ankara non-Muslims penetrated the Dutch mohair trade in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

In the second half of the century, economic and political trends in Europe changed in important ways, generating a strong pull that primarily affected the western

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<sup>42</sup> Colbert (French Prime Minister in 1665-83) founded the "Jeunes de Langues" (Youth of Languages), and sent children to the Levant to learn languages when they were 6-10. He also founded a network of French merchants abroad, and relied on them rather than the intermediaries (Grenet, 2011).

provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In this period grain prices increased dramatically, as did the demand generated for goods by the newly developing industries of Europe. At the same time, the period was dominated by almost uninterrupted wars and revolutions, i.e. the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), the American War of Independence (1775-82), and the French Revolution (1789). The American War of Independence increased the demand for Ottoman cotton. Similarly, the demand for wheat increased due to the French Revolution. This situation created an opportunity for contraband trade and speculative profiteering; and the profiteers were generally claimed to be Ottoman non-Muslims (Kasaba, 1988a, pp. 18, 19; McGowan, 1981, p. 134).

This period also saw the emergence of the Greek marine merchants. Although their existence can be traced back to the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Papakonstantinou, 2010), the Mediterranean trade was dominated until 1720 by England, and between 1720 and 1740 by the French fleet. However, France had to withdraw from the Mediterranean due to wars and revolutions, and for the same reasons other European countries also withdrew from the region. This created a vacuum, especially in the Aegean Sea, which lasted until the end of Napoleonic Wars in 1815, and which was filled by the Greek marines (Issawi, 1982, p. 46; Kasaba, 1988a, p. 29).

At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Izmir and Thessaloniki were reduced in importance as a cotton source (Issawi, 1982, p.121). With the Congress of Vienna (1815), two booms (grain and wheat) came to an end. American cotton again entered the market and gained dominance after a while. In addition, developments in transportation allowed the European merchants to penetrate the inner regions of the empire and form their own networks, so rendering intermediaries obsolete. However, this new condition only mildly shook the Ottoman non-Muslims. Their already established positions allowed them to resist the newcomers. In particular, as the Europeans gained economic ground, the Muslims were not the beneficiaries, and thus the economic superiority of non-Muslims over Muslims continued in the regions where this took place.

We can conclude that, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, trade with the European countries and the western regions of the Ottoman Empire increased—and especially so in the second

half of the century.<sup>43</sup> The Habsburgs and France gained dominance in trade with the Ottoman Empire. Until the end of the century, the empire continued to be a net exporter,<sup>44</sup> but the basket of exported goods changed. Instead of re-exportation, or the export of manufactured goods, the Ottoman Empire began exporting raw agricultural products such as cotton, tobacco, and maize. And the main beneficiaries of the process were non-Muslims, especially the Greeks in the western regions.

Because it was not well documented we do not know very much about domestic trade. However it seems that domestic trade exceeded international trade until the demise of the empire. Panzac (1992) shows that domestic trade comprised more than three-fourths of the total merchandise along the Mediterranean ports in 1783. Besides this, less than 4% of the Ottoman population was clothed in French textiles in 1759. This means that not less than 80% were clothed via domestic production (Quataert, 2005, pp. 128-129). Tabak (1988) claims that when Ottoman merchants found difficulties in competing with European merchants in maritime trade, they turned their faces towards the domestic trade of the vast imperial market. So the European pressure in international trade led to an increase in domestic trade, which was mainly carried out via caravans.

The nature of the respective dominant group seems to comprise one of the main differences between domestic and international trade in the Ottoman Empire. Despite the fact that the share of non-Muslims increased in international trade, Muslim merchants continued to dominate the trade of interior towns and often between the interior and the port cities on the coast. Panzac (1992) points out that only a fifth of the captains in the Black Sea wheat trade were non-Muslim and that all merchants were Muslims until the late decades of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In Erzurum there was no dominance in local trade in 1744. Based on customs registers, Erim (1991) shows that while Armenians were dominant in international trade, in local trade the Muslims had a similar share with them. Frangakis-Syrett (1985) claims that internal trade between

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<sup>43</sup> According to McGowan (1994) in the last decades of the century, the overall Ottoman trade was 290 million grams of silver and this was not higher than the previous century. However, one of the main sources of revenue for non-Muslims in the 18<sup>th</sup> century was contraband trade which is not reflected in this value (Kasaba 1988a, pp. 18-19).

<sup>44</sup> The empire was a net exporter to the whole of Europe, not to each country. The Ottomans were a net importer from France in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

Izmir and the rest of the Ottoman Empire, both by land and by sea, was dominated by Muslim merchants.

In conclusion, we can count three major changes in the empire which likely had differential effects on the wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims. Fiscal developments seem to have had effects which favored Muslims, at least in the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Another important result of fiscal changes was administrative change, or more specifically the rise of the *ayans* in the provinces. We do not know the effect of this in Kayseri, but in Manisa it is likely that the dominant *ayan* family supported non-Muslims more than Muslims. But probably one of the most important developments which could affect the wealth of two groups occurred in trade. Both domestic and international trade increased in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and non-Muslims dominated international trade with the West while the importance of Muslims was maintained in domestic trade. Therefore it is to be expected that non-Muslims economically improved in the regions under the effect of European trade, while in the regions where domestic trade was more significant Muslims improved as well.



#### 4. THE CITIES: MANISA & KAYSERI

In this analysis we compare two cities, Manisa and Kayseri, the first of which was more open to foreign trade with Europe while the latter focused on domestic trade. As was mentioned above, European trade is claimed to have a positive effect on non-Muslims. Similarly, improvement in domestic trade is expected to enhance the economic conditions of Muslims.

In this section we offer an analysis of the cities, beginning with their historical developments since their conquest by the Ottoman Empire. Then we give information about population structure. Because we do not have sufficient data for populations in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the populations of the previous and next centuries are offered to get idea for the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Lastly we describe the economic sectors, agriculture, industry, and trade in the cities.

##### i) Manisa

Manisa is a town in western Anatolia lying to the south of the Gediz River, and is separated from Izmir to the southwest by the calcic rocks of Manisa (Spilyos) Mountain.

##### i.a) A Historical Background

The city had been under Ottoman control since 1410 as a *kaza* of Saruhan *sancağı*, which was a *sancak* of the Anadolu Eyaleti.<sup>45</sup> Between 1437 and 1595 the city was governed by a *şehzade* (prince).<sup>46</sup> This provided for the development of the city. The construction of mosques, *medreses* (schools),<sup>47</sup> and palaces meant that there was an

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<sup>45</sup> The *eyalet* was a province, the *sancak* a sub-province, and the *kaza* a smaller region (city-like) under the legal and administrative jurisdiction of a *kadı*.

<sup>46</sup> There was no clear rule of succession in the empire. *Şehzade* were usually trained in a *sancak* as *sancakbeyi* before 1603. Along with Manisa, cities (*sancak*) such as Trabzon, Amasya, Antalya, Sivas, Kütahya, etc. were among the *sancak* chosen for training, and there was no clear ranking among these. After Selim II's reign, Manisa became the realm of the heir apparent.

<sup>47</sup> Although there was no exact rule, they were used mainly for religious education. Somel (2003) mentions three levels of *medrese*. The initial level (*hariç*: outer) was dedicated to both religious and positive sciences. But the upper two levels are completely for religious/judicial education (p. 178).

active economic sphere (Matthews 2000, Uluçay 1939, p. 45). Also, when *şehzade* were the rulers, the resources of adjacent regions flowed into Manisa.<sup>48</sup> In all likelihood, the enormous demand created by the palace also contributed to the economic development of the city overall. In addition, Manisa was exempted from certain taxes like the *avarız*.<sup>49</sup> During the reign of Ahmed I (1603-1617), the tradition of training *şehzade* in the provinces was abandoned. Therefore, although the tax exemption privilege of Manisa continued for some decades in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the city gradually lost its political importance and economic power (Uluçay, 1939, p.52). In this same period the neighboring port city, İzmir, was developing, and around the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century Manisa was overshadowed by İzmir.<sup>50</sup> The importance of this process as related to the interests of non-Muslims was the right of exemption from taxes. Normally, tax-exempt status was held by Muslims; non-Muslims could not get tax-exemption easily unless they worked in certain sectors which provided for it, or for the government, or for a member of the dynasty.<sup>51</sup> Therefore when the city lost its position as *şehzade* city, one source of tax-exemption and income for non-Muslims disappeared. Hence, the change may have had a deleterious effect on the economic conditions of non-Muslims.

In 1627 the *sancak* became an *arpalık*,<sup>52</sup> and rule of the *mutesellim* began (Emecen, 1997, p. 18; Goffman 1990, p. 82; Nagata, 1997, p. 23). Like almost all Anatolian cities, Manisa was affected by the Celali rebellions in the 17<sup>th</sup> and at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Even the town of Manisa, behind its wall, could not

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<sup>48</sup> Therefore the city functioned like a minor capital. According to Barkey (2008), Mustafa II's decision to reside in Edirne reduced economic activity and livelihoods in Istanbul and this contributed to the 1703 Rebellion (p. 207). Probably the residence of a *şehzade* was more vital for the economy of Manisa.

<sup>49</sup> In 984 (M. 1577) Manisa was given the right of exemption from *avarız* by Murad III (Uluçay 1955, p. 98).

<sup>50</sup> This does not necessarily mean a decline in its economic situation or in urbanization relative to 16<sup>th</sup>-century Manisa, but merely a greater rise of İzmir as compared to Manisa. Matthews (2000) claims that Manisa surpassed its former economic condition in the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>51</sup> After 1691, the *cizye* exemption of some non-Muslims, except for the ones fighting for the empire, was also abolished (İnalçık, 1991b).

<sup>52</sup> *Arpalık* was an allowance, which could be in the form of the grant of fiefs, made to the principal civil, military, and religious officers of state, either in addition to their salary when in office, or as a pension on retirement, or as an indemnity for unemployment (Mantran, 1986, p. 658).

escape plundering in 1637 (Emecen, 1988). Because rural areas were unprotected, the rural economy was devastated. Peasants left their lands in large numbers and the urban population increased. Another source of the rise in the urban population was the migration of non-Muslims from the east of the empire, mainly Armenians, and for similar reasons. Therefore, in this period the population structure of the city changed in favor of non-Muslims, and specifically of Armenians.

Another important event in the 17<sup>th</sup> century which affected non-Muslims (not only in Manisa, but throughout almost entire empire) was the Sabbatai Zevi movement (1626-1676).<sup>53</sup> According to Sir Paul Rycout, many Jews abandoned economic life because of this movement (cited in Stoianovich, 1960, p. 247). In addition, the movement shocked the center. Jews had been kept closer to the center than other non-Muslims until this event took place; however, afterwards they gradually lost this position to the Greeks (Issawi, 1998). According to Stoianovich (1960), by 1750, it seemed that the Ottoman Jews had “truly fallen”.

In the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century certain rebellious movements continued around Manisa. The main reason for the revolts were stray *levend* who lost their *kapu*. The greatest leaders of the rebellions were Şer Himmet, Cin Halil, Balçovalı İbrahim, Küçük Emir and Gördesli Ali, and all of them were *bölükbaşı*, the leader of fifty *levend* in a *kapu*. After the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century, the Karaosmanoğulları began to control the city, and until the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century no great uprisings are to be observed (Uluçay, 1955, pp. 76-78).

The rule of the Karaosmanoğulları dynasty in Manisa, which continued until 1813, began in 1743 when Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Mustafa Ağa was appointed as *mütesellim* of Saruhan. Like many other great *ayan* dynasties, the Karaosmanoğulları gained their power through the help they provided to the central government in the wars of the late 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> century. After a struggle with other *ayan* families such as

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<sup>53</sup> In 1648, in Izmir, he claimed to be the Messiah, and maintained this claim until 1666, when he embraced Islam with many of his followers. We do not claim that all Jews followed him. However the movement had a negative effect on a greater number of Jews than simply his followers alone, because of the change in attitude by the government (increased suspicion). According to Stoianovich (1960), recently-arrived Jews of Portuguese and Livorno origins under the protection of France continued to perpetuate the earlier traditions of Jewish wealth and enterprise.

Araboğulları and Hacı Şabanoğulları around the 1770s they subdued their rivals and consolidated their power in the Manisa region as *ayn 'ül-ayan* (notable of the notables) (Uluçay 1955, p. 17). Once there remained no great rival, there could be no clash of *ayans* which would (and in the first half of the century actually did) devastate the economy of the region (especially rural), and this relative peace contributed to the prosperity of the region<sup>54</sup> through *waqfs* and trade.

One of the significant aspects of the Karaosmanoğulları rule was their attitude towards non-Muslims, especially the Greeks. They welcomed them, especially those who had escaped from the Mora Revolt in 1770, and employed them in their great *çiftlik* (Nagata 1997, p. 22) and in domestic affairs (von Richter 1815). Their approach probably contributed towards the economic improvement of the non-Muslims. According to Nagata (1997) some of the non-Muslim shepherds and servants in the stockyards and *çiftliks* of the Karaosmanoğulları in the course of time became peasants (p. 179). After the revolt, the properties of those who were not forgiven were confiscated, and the property of a great part of the remainder was plundered by the Albanian mercenaries who had suppressed the revolt (Nagata, 1995, pp. 103-118). A great part of them therefore arrived in Manisa without any property. It is often accepted that until the end of the empire, peasants continued to enjoy freedom over their land, so they at least had control of a means of production. Hence, in comparison with their initial position, we may surmise that the economic conditions of at least the lowest segment of non-Muslims improved.<sup>55</sup> Although we do not know how they behaved to local non-Muslims, we may reasonably claim that they preferred the economic development of non-Muslims over Muslims because of fear of Muslim rivals. It is likely that, just as the Ottoman dynasty tried to prevent local Muslim powers from rising, so did provincial notables in their own region. Although we do not know exactly how successful they were, there are signs of their successes. We see in the *tereke* records that the *çiftlik* of some Karaosmanoğlu members previously belonged to other *ayan* families,

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<sup>54</sup> Because they were living in the region, they could govern the region better than the central authority, and because they had hereditary-like control, they did not exploit the region uncontrolled. Also, they could sometimes resist the excessive demands of the central authority.

<sup>55</sup> Because our main aim is to observe whether non-Muslims showed greater economic improvement than Muslims, the attitude of the Karaosmanoğulları towards newcomers merely reduces a possible downward bias that would result on the wealth of non-Muslims because of the migration.

such as the Seyfioğulları. And in the *tereke* of some of the leaders of Seyfioğulları we see that a great part of their property was bought by a Karaosmanoğlu under supervision of another Karaosmanoğlu (Telci, 2007). In this regard, Nagata (1997) also tends to accept the increase in the number of Muslims among the rich in the first decades of the 19th century as a sign of demise of the Karaosmanoğulları (p. 179).

### **i.b) Population**

We do not have complete data about the population of the city, especially for the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The first available set of population data is dated 1531. There were 1,396 *nefer* (individual male) (1,258 *hane* (household), approximately 6,496 people).<sup>56</sup> In 1575 there were 1,995 *nefer* (1,530 *hane*, 8,245 people). The most crowded non-Muslim group in the 16<sup>th</sup> century was Jews with 8 *hane* (500 people) in 1531, and 117 *hane* (700 people) in 1575. There was also small number of Greeks (7 *hane*, 22 *hane*, in 1531 and 1575 respectively). There is no sign of the Armenians in this century (Behar, 1996, p. 16; Emecen, 1988; Minorsky, 1986). Although Manisa was the greatest city of the Western Anatolia and still the last step before the throne, the rise of its population was modest compared to the general growth in the Mediterranean basin in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. This was probably because of migration to the newly flourishing port city, Izmir. The population of Izmir was 3,000 in 1570 and dramatically increased to 90,000 in the mid-1600s (White 2011, p. 256). This means that some tens of thousands migrated to Izmir in this period, and among them there were probably people of Manisa origin.

The population increased to approximately 18,000 (3,684 *hane*) in 1660. The proportion of non-Muslims in the city reduced in this century, but this was mainly due to the reduction of the Jewish population. The proportions of Armenians and Greeks increased, so the distribution of non-Muslim population also changed and Armenians became the most crowded non-Muslim group. There were 172 Armenian *hane*, 62 Greek *hane*, and 73 Jewish *hane*, who were represented in two Armenian, one Greek,

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<sup>56</sup> Approximate populations are quoted from Behar (1996) who used Emecen's "16. Asırda Manisa Kazası". *Nefer* numbers are taken from Minorsky (1986), and *hane* numbers from Emecen (1988). Behar's approximation mechanism is five times the *hane* number plus tax-exempt people.

and one Jewish *mahalle*<sup>57</sup> (district) among total 52 *mahalle*. Because there were no non-Muslim *mahalle* and just a small number of Greeks in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, we can assume that great part of Greeks and almost all Armenians migrated in the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, probably because of the Celali rebellions (Emecen 1988). Nagata (1997) claims that the Armenian migration from Eastern Anatolia and Northern Iran also contributed to this rise in their share of the population, because of the development of Izmir as an export center for silk trade connected with Iran (p. 21).

In the 18<sup>th</sup> century it seems that the population did not increase very much. Only two *mahalle* were added in this century and the population reached approximately 20,000 to 24,000. The distribution of non-Muslims again changed in the second half of the century, mainly because of immigrants after the Mora revolt in 1770s.<sup>58</sup> Jewish migration towards the centers of the expanding economies, Livorno, Trieste, Vienna, London, and Hamburg, also continued in this century (Stoianovich, 1960).

There were 11,859 *nefer* in 1834. The non-Muslim population (3,658 *nefer* (31%)) consisted of 2,079 (17.5%) Greeks, 1,235 (10.5%) Armenians, and 344 (3%) Jews. Thus from the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century to the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> the proportion of non-Muslims in the population increased from 10% to 30%.

### **i.c) Economy of Manisa**

The alluvial lands on which Manisa stands allowed agriculture to develop. Uluçay (1939) claims that the city was filled with vineyards, orchards, and vegetable gardens (p. 7). It is also evident that the city was active in grape (especially sultana) production (Goffman 1990, p. 80). Since the 16<sup>th</sup> century it had provided Istanbul with fruit (Goffman 1990, p. 34). In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, because of the loss of lands and

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<sup>57</sup> Names of *mahalle* related with a particular religion do not mean the existence of ghettos. Muslims could reside in non-Muslim *mahalle* and non-Muslims in Muslim *mahalle*.

<sup>58</sup> This event should have reduced the mean wealth of non-Muslims of Manisa, so causing a downward bias. After the revolt and its suppression, Mora was in a devastated economic condition. In fact, according to Zarinebaf (2005) Mora was already in a bad economic condition around 1725. Continuous wars with Venice (1668-1715) had damaged many properties. Beside, as was mentioned above, the migrants were generally used in the *çiftlik* of Karaosmanoğulları. That means that the Karaosmanoğulları had difficulty employing local people whether Muslim or non-Muslim. So we can surmise that the newcomers found themselves in a more miserable condition than local non-Muslims.

disorder in Rumelia, where the main sources of Istanbul's provisions were located, the burden in Western Anatolia increased. Therefore we may assume that it could not fully benefit from the increased European trade.<sup>59</sup> However, commercial agriculture still developed in the city during the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The European demand for cotton and tobacco helped the city to flourish.

Despite European pressure, the cotton textile industry continued to be the most important industry in the city and continued its development until the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century. Even at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, 950 weaving looms were counted. One of the reasons for this vitality was the European market. Manisa cotton was low quality (Frangakis-Syrett, 1991, p. 98), so was not greatly demanded by the European upper class. However, the demands of the lower-middle class in Italy and Southern France increased in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Manisa cotton fabrics were also preferred for clothing the plantations of European countries (Genç, 2000, p. 266, 268). Among the textile products, *Manisa alacası* was one of the most famous and had buyers in Istanbul and Anatolia throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>60</sup> Dying was another important industry in the city. There were 22 dyer shops in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, mainly Muslims (Yıldız 2006, p. 86). There is also evidence of well-established woolen cloth production, although not as extensive as cotton clothing. Another important industry in Manisa was the tannery, which used raw material provided by the nomads around Gediz River (Emecen, 1988). The name Tabakhane Deresi (the River of Tanners) indicates how important this industry was for Manisa.

Because of its position on the paths connecting Iran and inner parts of Anatolia to the coasts of Aegean Sea, Manisa was an active commercial center. Until the 17<sup>th</sup> century, when Izmir overshadowed it, Manisa continued its position as a trade hub of Western Anatolia (Goffman, 1990, p. 80; Nagata, 1997, p.11). The main commercial items in the city were agricultural products: cotton, tobacco, grapes, figs etc., and intermediate cotton products (Emecen, 1988).

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<sup>59</sup> Because of the system called *miri mübaya'*, Istanbul was buying at a lower price than the market price (Genç, 2000, p. 89).

<sup>60</sup> We can observe usage of *Manisa alacasi* in Kayseri through *tereke* records (Tok, 1996, pp. 310-1).

It is accepted that Muslim, Italian and Jewish traders were active in the city trade in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. However, this changed in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, when Armenian and Greek merchants seem to replace the others (Minorsky, 1986).

## ii) Kayseri

Kayseri is a city in the plain of the Karasu River, an affluent of the Kızılırmak, but just beyond the limits of the built-up area that begins the slopes of the Erciyes, an extinct volcano and the highest mountain of central Anatolia (3,916 m).

### ii.a) A Historical Background

Since the final decade of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Kayseri had been under Ottoman rule as a *sancak* of the Karaman *eyaleti*. Its development was hindered for some decades in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, because of the continuous wars between the Ottomans and the Safavids. After the frontier was pushed towards the east during the reign of Selim I, the city actively became part of the *Pax Ottomanica* and flourished. Until the 18<sup>th</sup> century the Ottoman armies continued to pass through Kayseri during the Iranian Wars. In 1730 Kayseri was among the nodes which supplied the army, and this situation continued until the end of the century, not only for the Iranian Wars but also for wars against Russia and Austria (Tok, 2009).<sup>61</sup> In the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, like Manisa, it was shaken by the Celali rebellions. Jennings (1978) claims that these revolts led to rural decline, and he suggests three possible consequences: migration of the rural population to the town, the walls of which stood up against two Celali sieges; migration of those further east (which possibly included Armenians) to the city or countryside; or flight toward Istanbul and Rumelia. Kayseri seems to have recovered even by the middle of the century. When Evliya Çelebi visited the city in 1649, he found it prosperous, though no longer any more so than Sivas or Maraş (cited in İpşirli, 2002).

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<sup>61</sup> This situation had two contradictory effects. First, the increase in demand helped the economy of the city to improve. However, because the government was paying under the market price, the overall effect could have been negative. Also some men were recruited into the army with a salary (this was not necessarily valid only for eastern wars of the empire; for the War of Candia (in Crete), in 1669, many *lağımçı* were recruited from Kayseri). Since in pre-modern periods the economic equilibrium was generally very sensitive, a decrease of manpower in some (economic) sectors could be devastating (Genç, 2000, pp. 46-51).



During the 18<sup>th</sup> century, like Manisa, Kayseri passed into the control of the *ayan*. However, contrary to the dominance of one distinguished family (Karaosmanoğulları) in Manisa, four different families controlled Kayseri in the 18<sup>th</sup> century: the Kalaycıoğulları, Emiroğulları, Zennecioğulları, and Cabbarzadeler. From 1720-41 the Kalaycıoğulları were *mutesellim* of Kayseri, from 1741-62 the Zennecioğulları, and between 1775 and 1820 the Cabbarzadeler.<sup>62</sup> *Mutesellim* status shows the strength of family in given period but was not the only source of power. Some decades after 1730s the Emiroğulları were struggling with the Kalaycıoğulları and Zennecioğulları. And the influence of the Zennecioğulları in the *Sancak* of Kayseri did not vanish with the rise of Cabbarzadeler, but continued until the centralist policies of Mahmud II (1808-1839) (Tok, 2009). It may be expected that their rivalry prevented the city from flourishing—contrary to the order provided by Karaosmanoğulları in Manisa.

#### **ii.b) Population**

Official population data about Kayseri are available only for the period 1500-1583 and for 1813. It seems that unlike Manisa, Kayseri observed a rapid population increase, as did the Mediterranean basin in the same period. According to Jennings (1976), the population was 2,287 *nefer* (1,579 *hane*<sup>63</sup>) in 1500—326 (14%, 330 *hane* (20%)) of which was non-Muslim<sup>64</sup> while 266 (82%) of the non-Muslims were Armenian. There then occurred a slow rise in population (3%) in the first quarter, followed by a rapid one (45%) in the second quarter of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The rise of population was tremendous in the third quarter (134%), reaching 8,251<sup>65</sup> *nefer* (6,015 *hane*) in 1583—1,816 (22%) of which was non-Muslim, while 1,612 (89%) of non-Muslims were Armenian. The rise of the non-Muslim population (457%, compared to 228% for Muslims), and especially of Armenians (506%), was significant. It was one of the highest non-Muslim population growth rates for the cities which already had significant non-Muslim communities.<sup>66</sup> While there were no *mahalle* for non-Muslims

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<sup>62</sup> These periods were not continuous and do not mean other families did not intervene, but just shows which family was most significant in a given period.

<sup>63</sup> We use Jennings 1976 for *nefer* numbers, and İpşirli 2002 for *hane* numbers.

<sup>64</sup> According to Jennings (1973), until mid-17<sup>th</sup> century there was no any sign of Jews. Therefore the non-Muslim population was composed of Armenian and Greeks.

<sup>65</sup> Jennings (1973) claims this is the highest number in Anatolia, after Bursa.

<sup>66</sup> Among the cities Jennings (1976) worked on, Karaman and Amasya observed a relatively slight rise (78%) in the non-Muslim population in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. In Trabzon

in 1500, there were fifty Muslim, thirteen Christian, and nine mixed *mahalle* in 1583. According to Jennings (1976), one of the reasons for the tremendous rise of the Armenian population was migration of Iranian Armenian traders, just as for Manisa in the next century.

We do not have official population data for the subsequent two centuries. Tuş (1999) argues that the non-Muslim ratio in the *kaza* was approximately 30% in the first three decades of the 18th century. The 1831 census records that there were 13,466 *nefer* in the city. According to Behar (1996), in the *sancak* there were 38,965 Muslims and 15,901 (29%) non-Muslims (p. 23). If we think that this resembles the ratio in *kaza*, we may claim that between the first three decades and the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century there was no significant change in the religious distribution of the population. This also means that there is no bias that we need to consider, as we should for Manisa.

### **ii.c) Economy of Kayseri**

Although it cannot be claimed that agriculture was as productive in Kayseri as it was in Egypt or the irrigable parts of Syria, for a long time large numbers of townsmen in Kayseri had made a living by tilling the land, so grain production was significant (Faroqhi, 1987, p. 50, 216, Tok, 2009). Jennings (1997) also mentions “gardens of extraordinarily abundant vegetables and fruits”. They were probably at the regions of the city close to the Karasu River or its affluent. However, the existence of irrigation problems—although the city was founded on the plain of a river—and the unrest which resulted from the activities of *aşiret* and *levend* in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, can be counted among the factors that prevented an optimum level of agricultural production (Tok, 2009).

Cotton cloths were being produced in the city. Sheep and cattle were raised for *pastırma* and sausage, and for leather industries. These sectors were still active in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The main market for sausage and *pastırma* was the capital (Jennings 1997, Somuncu 2004). Although the dye house closed after the Celali rebellions and did not recover for a long time, dyeing was another important industry in the city (İpşirli

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they declined. In Erzurum the number of non-Muslims increased but there were no non-Muslims at the beginning of the century. According to Behar (1996), the number of non-Muslim *hane* in Bayburt doubled, but the number of Muslim *hane* also doubled (p. 13).

2002).<sup>67</sup> There was also a well developed shoe-making industry in Kayseri. Tanning was also among the most significant industries, the importance of which can be understood from the existence of the Debbagin Mahallesi (Tanners District). Along with Konya and Diyarbakır, Kayseri was among the main centers of tanning. For Istanbul, *sahtiyani* (Morocco leather) was one of the most precious products of Kayseri tanners, and throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> and the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries decrees were regularly issued against the export of *sahtiyani*. Excess supply, after demand from Kayseri was fulfilled, was requested by Istanbul. However, as may be understood from the perpetuation of the decrees, the contraband trade in *sahtiyani* could not be prevented. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century this industry faced problems because *mazi*<sup>68</sup> (*quercus infectoria*) was not coming regularly from Diyarbakır, so the price increased. The general insensitivity of the Capital towards the rise in input prices probably led to contraband trade (Karagöz, 2009; Tok, 2009).

From the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century to the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century many travelers mention extensive caravanserais, *bedestens* (covered bazaars), shops and bazaars<sup>69</sup> in Kayseri. According to Paul Lucas, cotton bazaars were extensive in the first decades of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and J. M. Kinneir defines the city as the trade emporium of Anatolia and Syria in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (cited in Jennings, 1997). However, Faroqi (1987) claims that because Kayseri was not on the main trade routes<sup>70</sup> in Anatolia, its commercial activities remained at a local level, except for leather and cotton clothes, until the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>71</sup> She mentions two secondary paths

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<sup>67</sup> Until the 1730s there was only one *boyahane* which was a *malikane* (Karagöz, 2009).

<sup>68</sup> *Mazi* was one of the most important inputs of *sahtiyani* production.

<sup>69</sup> Karagöz (2009) mentions the name of the bazaars she found in the *sicils*, which may indicate active economic sectors in the city in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries; “*At* (horse) *pazari* (market), *araba* (cart) *pazari*, *iplik* (yarn) *pazari*, *koyun* (sheep) *pazari*, *buğday* (wheat) *pazari*, *debbag* (tanner) *pazari*, *penbeciler* (a kind of fabric) *pazari*, *haffaf* (shoe-maker) *pazari*, *saman* (straw) *pazari*, *samurcular* (weasel) *pazari*, and *pastirma pazari*.”

<sup>70</sup> Faroqi (1987) mentions two trade routes in Anatolia. The first was “the northern caravan route” which connected Istanbul with Iran through Ankara, Tokat, Sivas, and Erzurum. “The diagonal route” passed through Istanbul, Aleppo, Damascus, and Cidde (p. 42). Pamuk (2007b) mentions another route which connects Tebriz with Konya, then goes to Alanya.

<sup>71</sup> Somuncu (2004) claims that, despite the fact that cotton clothes lost their importance for exports in the subsequent centuries, leather was still an important export item even in 1880.

which connect Kayseri with the main trade routes, the northern route to Sivas, and the diagonal route to Ereğli. There was also a commercial link with Ankara, an international commercial center of the time, but she does not think these secondary paths were active enough for international trade (pp. 41-43). Unlike Faroqhi, Pamuk (2007b) points that development of Iranian trade benefited Kayseri in the late 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries. Therefore we may expect at least a sensibility towards developments as regards these routes. In addition, to provide income for the mosque and imaret he constructed in Nevşehir, İbrahim Paşa founded Vezir Hanı in Kayseri (Karagöz, 2009). Therefore it can be surmised that, even if not the trade emporium of Anatolia, Kayseri was at least an important business, commercial, and agricultural center, as pointed out by Jennings (1978).

European trade seems limited, at least as regards imports. According to Faroqhi (1987), major European penetration occurred in the nineteenth century (p. 219). Although we do find some Londra *çuka* (woolen stuffs<sup>72</sup>) in the *sicil* of Kayseri (Karagöz, 2009), even around the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century the clothes of Kayseri people resembled classical ones (Ozturk, 2000). However, there was contraband trade. We can read the repeated decrees not to sell saltpeter to foreigners as a sign that this was indeed happening (Tok, 2009). Around the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century certain raw agricultural products, like buckthorn and gallnut, were added to important export items (Jenning, 1997, Somuncu, 2004).

It seems clear that Muslims were active in trade before the 18<sup>th</sup> century. According to Jennings (1976), in the 16th century, all *mahalle*, the names of which indicate their commercial activities, such as *Eski Bezazistan* (Old Covered Market), were almost completely Muslim. However, according to Mordtmann, around 1850 trade was completely in the hands of the local Cappadocian Christians (cited in Jennings 1997). Therefore, signs of the ascendancy of non-Muslims can be expected in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, as was observed by Faroqhi (1987, p. 219) for the previous century.

To sum up, both cities were founded on the slopes of a mountain and were close to valleys, so had agricultural surpluses, even if they were not among the most

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<sup>72</sup> They were not necessarily from London; woolen items were also produced in France.

important agricultural centers of the empire. Similarly, certain industries such as cotton and leather developed in both cities. Both Manisa and Kayseri were once trade hubs of their regions but later lost their commercial vitality. However, still of them both seem to have had an important level of trade in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. One of the main differences between these cities was the direction of their trade. Manisa developed as an export city for Europe, but the *tüccar* of Kayseri were more active in the domestic trade on Black Sea–Mediterranean line. Therefore, differences and changes in the wealth levels of Muslims and non-Muslims in both cities can be attributed to the direction of their trade.

## 5. Dataset: *Tereke* Records

This study is based on information found in the *tereke* (probate inventories) in the court records of Manisa and Kayseri. A *tereke* is a document prepared by court officials after death or absence of a person. In case of death, government intervention was needed, irrespective of religious affiliation of deceased, to protect those in need, solve conflicts, or to get its own share. The existence of under-age heirs, including cases of pregnancy, or the absence of heirs, either because the deceased was in transit or the heirs were distant, necessitated government intervention. If the debt of deceased exceeded the value of the estate, or if there was a conflict over the estate among heirs and/or creditors, government was called upon for conflict resolution. In addition, if there was no heir of the deceased or existing heirs were to receive part of the estate (i.e. one spouse was the single heir), government would intervene to get its share (Gradeva, 2005, p. 155; Matthews, 2000).<sup>73</sup>

The records typically provide detailed information about the wealth possessed by an individual, comprising both tangible and intangible assets. Debts and money owed to the deceased were also included. Besides, especially in cases related to *waqfs* or manumission of slaves, provisos concerning the testament were included.<sup>74</sup> Apart from wealth, the name of the heirs and their inheritance shares, family names (if extant), and titles (if possessed) which show social status were included (Cosgel & Ergene, 2011; Faroqhi, 2004b, p. 56, 57).

**Table 1: Distribution of All Records Across Cities, Periods, Gender, Region, and Religion**

|        |       | Manisa    |           |            |           | Kayseri   |           |            |           |
|--------|-------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|
|        |       | Muslim    |           | non-Muslim |           | Muslim    |           | non-Muslim |           |
|        |       | 1700-1720 | 1780-1800 | 1700-1720  | 1780-1800 | 1700-1720 | 1780-1800 | 1700-1720  | 1780-1800 |
| Male   | Urban | 146       | 259       | 15         | 33        | 30        | 146       | 15         | 16        |
|        | Rural | 5         | 11        | 1          | 4         | 2         | 12        | 2          | 5         |
| Female | Urban | 56        | 117       | 2          | 4         | 8         | 36        | 3          | 1         |
|        | Rural | 0         | 3         | 0          | 0         | 1         | 0         | 1          | 1         |

<sup>73</sup> However, this does not mean in every case in which the abovementioned conditions were fulfilled, the *kadi* were involved.

<sup>74</sup> The value of a testament could not be more than one third of the total wealth left.

As is clearly pointed out in almost all studies based on *tereke* records, these are characterized by certain limitations which prevent us drawing strong conclusions. First, they over-represent or under-represent certain parts of the society. Elders are expected to be overrepresented because of the higher death rate in old age. Women, rural populations, and non-Muslims are thought to be underrepresented.<sup>75</sup> Therefore it is preferable to work with groups that are as homogenous as possible. In our dataset (Table 1) women and rural populations were small, especially for non-Muslims. Hence, to prevent possible biases because of different representation rates for these two groups between Muslims and non-Muslims, we excluded them from our dataset, and worked only with the urban male population. Because our main target is commercial activities, we think that this restriction will not affect our results in a way that was worse than their inclusion would.<sup>76</sup> For keeping the records, the court received certain taxes and service fees. The marginal effect of these was probably higher for the poor, so it is expected that heirs of the poor preferred to solve the issue among themselves.

**Table 1: Distribution of Urban Male Population across Cities and Periods**

|                                    | Manisa    |           | Kayseri   |           |
|------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
|                                    | 1700-1720 | 1780-1800 | 1700-1720 | 1780-1800 |
| Muslim                             | 146       | 259       | 30        | 146       |
| non-Muslim                         | 15        | 33        | 15        | 16        |
| Share of non-Muslims in the sample | 9,32      | 11,30     | 33,33     | 9,87      |

<sup>75</sup> Because we do not have other sources (except for some travel accounts) for the population in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, we do not know by how much non-Muslims are underrepresented. We have tried to estimate it via population values from before and after the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>76</sup> But we do not claim that rural people and women had no commercial interests. Jennings (1973) shows that almost all groups, independently of gender, religion, nobility, or region, had a commercial/mercantile mentality and a profit-seeking motivation in the first quarter of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. But, still, the inclusion of rural and female groups would cause problems because they are not equally distributed between the Muslim and non-Muslim subgroups.

As can be seen from Table 2, the share of non-Muslims in the data is close to their approximate share in the population in both cities. Because we do not know anything about the economic status of the deceased in their own community, we assumed that both Muslims and non-Muslims represent their communities with similar margin and direction of error in the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century in both cities. When we compare this ratios with ratios mentioned for populations (see Section 3), in both cities non-Muslims seem to be under-represented at the end of the century. For Manisa, this can be related to the enduring reluctance of the newcomers from Mora to use the *kadı* court. We assume that the existence of newcomers in our dataset at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century possibly causes a downward bias in the wealth of non-Muslims. Therefore we shall think about the results twice, first as downward biased and then as unbiased if necessary. Another possible reason would be the legal pluralism mentioned by Kuran (2004). Probability of the rich having a relationship with Europeans was higher. To benefit from legal pluralism, they had to be able to pay the price for the *berat*. Therefore, if non-Muslims began to apply to consular courts instead of *kadı* courts, and if this also applies to inheritance as well as economic disputes, we may, again, expect downward bias in the wealth of non-Muslims in the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. However, as was discussed above, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century this legal shift was not yet widespread. In addition, this European effect was not significant in Kayseri until mid-19<sup>th</sup> century.

Another problem of the probate inventories is that we do not know the relationship between prices in inventories and real market prices unless it is explicitly declared that the properties were sold in auction (Canbakal, 2010; Cosgel & Ergene, 2011; Faroqhi, 2003, p. 203; Faroqhi, 2004b, p. 57; Matthews, 2000). Because all items were second-hand, their valuation was difficult even with the best of intentions, and possible manipulations of the court officials makes the record yet more open to skepticism. Some small share of inheritance was given to court officials as wages. Therefore, to increase their incomes, court officials may have inflated appraisals, and because of the possible difference among motivations of different court officials there is a possibility of change in the real–observed price relationship over time. However, there is no reason to expect any difference in the attitudes of court officials towards different religious groups, or in different cities and periods. Therefore we may expect that wealth



of Muslims and non-Muslims is upward biased in both cities, and have no reason to assume different rates of bias.

Finally, we cannot be sure if real wealth is registered in its totality. Heirs may have shared some part of the inheritance, and thus not put it before the *kadı* (Canbakal, 2010; Matthews, 2000; Pamuk, 2007a). For example, Gradeva (2005) draws our attention to one person in Sofia whose wealth was at least 120,000 *akçe*, but whose *tereke* was less than 30,000 *akçe* (p. 162). Besides, according to Karababa (2012b), perishable items and entertainment expenses generally were not included in *tereke*. Through archeological investigations, Bedell (2000) claims that earthenware dishes, sewing gear and children toys were not included in the British probate inventories. Faroqhi's (2004c) study of the Bursa record shows that we have similar problems with *tereke* records. As we do not have any idea about the real magnitude of underrepresented estates, this could be a serious problem. But, like overrepresentation due to court officials, we cannot claim any difference between religious groups, periods or cities, and can assume that the wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims is underrepresented with the same ratio.

With these caveats in mind, *tereke* records constitute a unique data source concerning the economic conditions of common people in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

We are trying to analyze changes in the economic activities of different groups. Therefore, as suggested by Faroqhi (2004c) and Gradeva (2005, p. 164), we use gross wealth, which represents economic power and the standard of life of the deceased better than net wealth.<sup>77</sup> Net wealth would cause unrealized profits because of death, thus resulting in a downward bias to the economic condition of the deceased.

To get real wealth we first changed all other monetary values to *guruş*. In the first period we accepted one *guruş* as equal to 120 *akçe*, and one *para* to three *akçe*. In the second period *guruş* had the same *akçe* value but 1 *para* was accepted as equal to

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<sup>77</sup> Gross wealth is total wealth of a deceased before debts subtracted. Net wealth is gross wealth minus debt.

2.8 *akçe*. After conversion of all values to *guruş* we use the price indexes in Pamuk (2004)<sup>78</sup> with a base set of 1700.

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<sup>78</sup> Although we think that the index was probably different in Kayseri, we have used it because we do not have any other index for this city. However, we did not compare Kayseri and Manisa in one particular period.

## 6. Data Analysis

In this section we try to analyze the wealth levels of both cities, as well as the subgroups therein. For wealth comparison, our main statistics are the mean, and five percentile values; p90 (90<sup>th</sup> percentile), p75 (75<sup>th</sup> percentile), median (50<sup>th</sup> percentile), p25 (25<sup>th</sup> percentile), and p10 (10<sup>th</sup> percentile). Beside the numerical presentation of these statistics, we sometimes offered box plots for visualization. Typically, in a box plot we can see all three quartiles, the first and third constituting a box and the median stays inside. There are also two whiskers, above and below. The one above is the largest value which is below 1.5<sup>79</sup> times the inter quartile range (IQR: 3<sup>rd</sup> quartile – 1<sup>st</sup> quartile) plus the third quartile, and the lower one is the smallest value which is above the first quartile minus 1.5 times IQR. All values which are not in between the two whiskers are called outliers. These outliers often led to misleading results as is shown below. Therefore sometimes we trimmed them and then repeated the procedure.

As well as this we have tried to get a picture of levels of equality. To this end, the Gini coefficient, coefficient of variance (CV), and percentile ratios are presented.

First, we tried to compare Manisa and Kayseri as a whole. The welfare of both cities seems to have increased in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and a rise in inequality followed this development in both cities. If we do not consider outliers, one of which alone had around 70% of total wealth in Kayseri in the period of 1780-1800, wealth was more equally distributed in Kayseri than Manisa in both periods. However, the rise of Gini index was also more significant in Kayseri, standing at 26%<sup>80</sup> as opposed to 13% in Manisa.

Second, we compared the wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims in the two cities. In Manisa, the wealth of non-Muslims increased more than that of Muslims in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. While at the beginning non-Muslims and non-*askeri* Muslims had similar wealth levels, at the end of the century non-Muslims had more wealth. However, we still cannot claim that they had more wealth than *askeri* at the end of the century.

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<sup>79</sup> This “1.5” has no specific importance. We could change it, but there is no need for a different value.

<sup>80</sup> If we continue to consider abovementioned outlier, the Gini index almost doubles in Kayseri, from 0.46 to 0.88.

Then we focused on commercial activities. First we tried to count the number of people in commercial activities. Because we have only one *tacir* (merchant) in our data set, we had to add other occupations related to commerce. We also created some groups according to the estates left by the deceased. In Manisa, the interest of all groups in commercial activities seems to have increased. However, in Kayseri, bearing in mind that the size of the sample is very small, only the interest of Muslims has increased, while that of non-Muslims has decreased.

Last, we added the size of commercial activities. In Manisa, as with the general wealth level, non-Muslims seem to have increased more than Muslims. In Kayseri, the opposite is true. But this time we have a problem with the size of sample in both cities.

### i) General Wealth Distribution in Manisa and Kayseri

It is generally accepted that the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century was a general recovery period for the empire, while the second half saw an economic decline following military defeats (Faroqhi, 1997; Khoury, 2006<sup>81</sup>; McGowan, 1994; Neumann, 2006). As can be seen in Table 3, both cities economically improved. In Manisa, except for the p10 of our sample, the wealth of all segments increased. In Kayseri there is a complete improvement with no exceptions.

**Table 3: Real Wealth (as gurus) in Manisa and Kayseri in both Periods**

|            | Manisa  |         | Kayseri |         |
|------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|            | 1700-20 | 1780-00 | 1700-20 | 1780-00 |
| Population | 161     | 292     | 45      | 162     |
| Mean       | 761.08  | 1060.93 | 489.06  | 3014.83 |
| p90        | 1220.00 | 2473.77 | 1072.50 | 2239.44 |
| p75        | 516.00  | 795.07  | 702.00  | 997.18  |
| Median     | 200.00  | 284.05  | 381.50  | 399.89  |
| p25        | 93.50   | 104.23  | 155.95  | 197.54  |
| p10        | 51.10   | 49.30   | 99.50   | 129.51  |
| p90/p10    | 23.87   | 50.18   | 10.78   | 17.29   |
| p90/p50    | 6.10    | 8.71    | 2.81    | 5.60    |
| p50/p10    | 3.91    | 5.76    | 3.83    | 3.09    |
| p75/p25    | 5.52    | 7.63    | 4.50    | 5.05    |
| CV         | 2.96    | 2.43    | 0.95    | 8.94    |
| Gini Index | 0.75    | 0.74    | 0.46    | 0.88    |


However, in the box plot (Graph 1) we observe two outliers in Kayseri in the period of 1780-1800. We also have outliers in Manisa in both periods. When we drop these outliers, in order to see the common behavior, the results do not change too much. Still, except for p10 in Manisa, the welfare of all percentiles seems improved in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

One of the possible explanations for this observation is the nature of *tereke* records and our periodization. The decline mentioned above is often associated with the Russian War (1768-1774). In all likelihood, some of the people who died after 1780

<sup>81</sup> Notably, Khoury (2006) mentions prosperity in Western Anatolia in the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

were economically active before the war. Therefore they represent not only the claimed period of decline, but also the growth period preceding it. Similarly, there must be many people who died between 1700 and 1720, but their wealth represents the negative effects of the War with the Holy League (1683-1699).

**Graph 1: Box plot for Wealth in Kayseri and Manisa  
(Real wealth as *guruş* in log10)**



**Table 4: Real Wealth (as *guruş*) in Manisa and Kayseri in both Periods  
(Outliers trimmed)**

|            | Manisa  |         | Kayseri |         |
|------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|            | 1700-20 | 1780-00 | 1700-20 | 1780-00 |
| Population | 156     | 289     | 45      | 160     |
| Mean       | 450.43  | 856.44  | 489.06  | 811.11  |
| p90        | 1023.50 | 2303.70 | 1072.50 | 2182.47 |
| p75        | 474.47  | 781.11  | 702.00  | 951.60  |
| Median     | 198.78  | 282.30  | 381.50  | 396.49  |
| p25        | 93.50   | 104.23  | 155.95  | 196.98  |
| p10        | 51.10   | 48.89   | 99.50   | 126.48  |
| p90/p10    | 20.03   | 47.12   | 10.78   | 17.26   |
| p90/p50    | 5.15    | 8.16    | 2.81    | 5.50    |
| p50/p10    | 3.89    | 5.77    | 3.83    | 3.13    |
| p75/p25    | 5.07    | 7.49    | 4.50    | 4.83    |
| CV         | 1.58    | 1.89    | 3.31    | 2.00    |
| Gini Index | 0.62    | 0.70    | 0.46    | 0.58    |

The directions of the percentile values are also same for trimmed and untrimmed cases, for both cities. All segments diverge from each other in Manisa. The poor got poorer, and the rich got richer. However this situation was not reflected in the Gini indexes, and the reason for this is the outliers. Although all percentiles separated from each other, extreme values also disappeared, so, rather than a rise, a slight reduction in the Gini index is actually observed. When we trimmed the outliers, we observed a 13% rise in Gini index, from 0.62 to 0.7; and in Kayseri in the 18<sup>th</sup> century the Gini index increased by 26% even if we drop outliers at the end of the century. However, no process of complete dispersion is observed in Kayseri. The rich got richer at a greater rate; hence, inequality increased, but the welfare of the poor also increased and a greater share of the population below the median collected around the median, as can be seen from Graph 1.

To sum up, both cities improved economically in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, while inequality increased in both. In Manisa, a greater share of the wealth was dispersed across a wider range at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century in comparison with the beginning. In Kayseri we also observe an improvement in the condition of the poor.

## ii) Wealth Distributions of Muslims and non-Muslims in Manisa and Kayseri

In this section we analyze the wealth levels of Muslims and non-Muslims in both cities, for two periods. In Manisa we observe a relative rise for the non-Muslims in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In Kayseri the opposite pattern is observed. We may, therefore, claim that the economic rise of non-Muslims did not hold in general terms across the whole empire, but only in some regions. In other parts of the empire, non-Muslims were among the losers of the dynamics at play in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

### ii.a) Manisa

Table B1<sup>82</sup> shows that in Manisa non-Muslims seem to be less wealthy<sup>83</sup> than Muslims at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The mean wealth of the non-Muslims is one third of the Muslims. Besides this, not only the median value but all the percentiles over the fifth percentile of the Muslims are higher than of the non-Muslims, which means that almost all segments of the Muslims were wealthier than the same segment of the non-Muslims.

Quintile distributions show a similar situation.<sup>84</sup> Although 9.32% of all the population was non-Muslim, they represent only 3.13% (1/32) of the top quintile, and 15.15% (5/33) of the bottom quintile. Non-Muslims are almost equally distributed among the richer and poorer half (7 in the richer, 8 in the poorer), but, again, when we look at the quintiles, only 6.6% of them are in the top quintile while 33.3 are in the bottom.

Although it had higher values for almost all percentile values, as can be seen in Graph C1,<sup>85</sup> the wealth of Muslims was distributed in a more dispersed fashion. Not only the wealthiest,<sup>86</sup> but also the least wealthy<sup>87</sup> people were Muslim in the beginning

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<sup>82</sup> For tables of wealth distribution, see Appendix B.

<sup>83</sup> Except for Kayseri in the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, none of the mean differences in both cities in the three periods (Manisa 1700-1720, Manisa 1780-1800, Kayseri 1780-1800) are statistically significant. In Kayseri, non-Muslim dominance in the beginning of the century is significant with 1%.

<sup>84</sup> See Appendix D for quintile distributions.

<sup>85</sup> See Appendix C for box plots of wealth of sub-groups.

<sup>86</sup> The richest 14 people and 31 of the richest 32 people in the whole population are Muslim.



of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Therefore, inequality among the Muslims was higher. Their Gini index was 0.75, while the Gini index of non-Muslims was 0.57.

As was mentioned in the introduction, we divided Muslims in two groups: *askeri*, and non-*askeri*. It seems that in Manisa the *askeri* really did comprise an economically distinct group in the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. At the beginning of the century, nine of the fourteen wealthiest people were *askeri* while all three of the least wealthy were non-*askeri*. When we add *askeri* and non-*askeri* to our analysis separately, the difference between the non-Muslims and the (non-*askeri*) Muslims gets smaller, as can be observed both in Graph C2 and Table B1. But (non-*askeri*) Muslims still seem slightly wealthier, with higher mean and percentiles over the tenth. When we look only at the non-*askeri* population, the share of non-Muslims in the top quintile, despite still being smaller with 8.7%, gets close to the population value. Their distribution among the quintiles also changed positively. 26.6% is in the bottom, and 13.3% is in the top quintile.

Wealth distribution at the end of the 18th century is represented in Table B2. In this period, non-Muslims became wealthier than non-*askeri* Muslims in Manisa. The mean wealth of non-Muslims is one and a half times the mean of Muslims. However we cannot claim that non-Muslims were wealthier than Muslims. Although median and smaller percentiles of non-Muslims were higher than Muslims, the higher percentiles of Muslims, which are dominated by *askeri*, were bigger than for non-Muslims.

Still, the share of non-Muslims in the top quintile is smaller than its share in the whole population. In the last period of the century, non-Muslims were 11.22% of the population, but 8.62% of the top quintile. The difference from the beginning of the century is in the bottom quintile. While their share in the bottom quintile was higher than their share in the population in the first period, it is lower in the last period. 8.47% of the lowest quintile is non-Muslim.

If we compare only non-*askeri* and non-Muslims, mean of the non-Muslims is three times of the non-*askeri* Muslims. In addition, all percentile values of non-Muslims are higher. The share of non-Muslims in the top quintile of the non-*askeri* population is

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<sup>87</sup> The poorest three people were Muslim and one of them, as Graph 2 shows, was an outlier among Muslims.

higher than its share in the wider non-*askeri* population, and in the bottom quintile it is lower. Their distribution among the quintiles shows a radical difference. 12.12% is in the bottom quintile, and 24.24% is in the top quintile; and as the quintile number increases, their share increases. Two thirds (22/33) of the non-Muslims in this period are among the richer half of the non-*askeri* population, while being equally distributed in the beginning.

It seems that, as is pointed out in the literature, both non-Muslims and the *askeri* ascended economically in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and the non-*askeri*—despite real enrichment—fell behind these two groups. The rise of the non-Muslims was sharper than of the *askeri*.

To sum up, in Manisa Muslims were relatively wealthier than non-Muslims and this situation was more significant for *askeri* Muslim. There was a small difference between non-*askeri* Muslim and non-Muslims in the beginning of the century. At the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century we observe an improvement in the wealth of non-Muslims. For Muslims, the improvement was not as significant as for the non-Muslims and was not homogenous for all segments and subgroups. The poor Muslims got poorer in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

#### **ii.b) Kayseri**

In Kayseri the situation seems almost opposite. However, the sample size is very small for the period of 1700-1720: 15 non-Muslim and 30 Muslims. Therefore, none of our conclusions concerning Kayseri is strong as regards the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

In the beginning of the century non-Muslims seem richer than Muslims. Their mean wealth is two times higher than the mean wealth of Muslims, and all percentile values of non-Muslims are bigger than those of the Muslims. In this period the non-Muslims constituted one third of the population, but represent two thirds of the top quintile,<sup>88</sup> and one fifth of the bottom. 40% was in the top quintile of the whole population.

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<sup>88</sup> For quintile distribution, please see Appendix D.

Unlike Manisa, inequality in Kayseri was small in the beginning of the century and this was valid for both non-Muslims and Muslims. Non-Muslims had slightly higher inequality. The Gini index of non-Muslims was 0.43, and of Muslims it was 0.4.

Another important difference between the two cities is that *askeri* and non-*askeri* show no great difference at the beginning of the century<sup>89</sup> in Kayseri. Their box plots (Table C4) are almost the same. A difference only appears for the poorest and richest segments, where the whiskers of non-*askeri* are below the *askeri*'s whiskers. As can be seen in Table B3, not only the median but all percentile values between the ninetieth and the tenth are close.

By the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, this situation had changed. During the century, all groups economically improved, but Muslims improved more, and, among Muslims, non-*askeri* improved even more.

While their share in the population was 9.76%, they constituted only 3.13% of the top quintile. In addition, only 6.25% was in the top quintile. In this period, mean and inequality indexes do not mean a great deal because the richest person mentioned (Section 6i) had a great share of all the wealth. Still, because this person was an *askeri*, we can safely compare non-*askeri* Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims seem wealthier at all percentile values. The share of non-Muslims in non-*askeri* population is 21% in this period, but they represent only 13.3% of the top quintile. Again, a great proportion of the non-Muslims are in lower quintiles. Only 12.3% of them are in the top quintile.

To sum up, we observe two main developments in Kayseri during the 18<sup>th</sup> century. First, the non-Muslims became economically worse off. They not only fell behind the Muslims, but were impoverished in real terms. Their mean wealth reduced by one third. All percentile values are behind both their own values from the beginning of the century, and the values of the Muslims. Second, the *askeri* class dominated the city both numerically and economically. Although non-*askeri* improved more in the second half, the rise of the *askeri* in the first half was very significant. The reason for this may be the conflicts on the border with Iran in the first half of the century. Also,

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<sup>89</sup> According to Faroqhi (1987, p. 219), in the 17<sup>th</sup> century we cannot observe a difference between *askeri*/tax exempt and non-*askeri* townsmen.

*askerization* of non-*askeri* Muslims may have caused a decline in the gap in the second half of the century.

During the century inequality for all three groups increased, but the rise for the non-Muslims was the slightest. The Gini index of the non-Muslims increased from 0.43 to 0.51. For non-*askeri* Muslims, the Gini index doubled from 0.4 to 0.88. These values were more radical for *askeri*; from 0.4 to 0.91.

### iii) Commercial Activities

To analyze the commercial activities of the Muslims and the non-Muslims we decomposed their wealth according to the factors which constitute that wealth. We have the values of houses, shops, commercial properties, monetary assets, real estate, livestock/animals, slaves and luxury items of each of the deceased. We defined seven groups of items as a sign of commercial activity. First is the occupation mentioned in the *tereke*. Because these groups were very small, we added shops. In the third step we added commercial properties. Because all commercial properties were not to sell, we accepted the smallest value as the subsistence level, and accepted, first, five times this level, then ten times the level, as a sign of commercial activity. We also created another group by considering a break in the levels of aggregate values of commercial estates left by the deceased. We observed no important difference between the results of breaking points. It seems that the share of non-Muslims in commercial activities increased in Manisa but did not become more than that of the Muslims. In Kayseri their share declined, while in the beginning they were very active.

To be able to distinguish those who are involved in commercial activities, we first looked at their occupations. However, there are very few people who we could distinguish as tradesmen.<sup>90</sup> As Table 5 shows, according to the mentioned occupations there were only five tradesmen in Manisa, which constituted 3% of the population in the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and none of them was non-Muslim. The number increased to thirty five (12% of the population) by the end of the century, and seven of them were non-Muslim. Bearing in mind the lack of representativeness of this set, still we can draw insight concerning the increased interest of the non-Muslims of Manisa in commercial activities in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. At the end of the century 21.2% of the non-Muslims were involved with commerce. Albeit at smaller rates, the percentages of non-*askeri* and *askeri* Muslims in commercial activities also increased. The percentages of non-*askeri* Muslims in commercial activities increased from 2.8% to 13.4%, and that of *askeri* increased from 4.7% to 7.6%. Therefore we can also consider that there is a

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<sup>90</sup> By “tradesman” we do not mean merchant, which is “*tacir*” (plural *tüccar*) in Ottoman, and which occurs only once in our data set, but people whose occupation implies the possibility of commercial activity which is not restricted in its locality. To see all the occupations mentioned in our data set, and the ones accepted as commercial, see Appendix E.

correlation between the economic development of Manisa and its trade in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

In Kayseri it is very difficult to draw conclusions because we could distinguish only one person who was non-Muslim involved in commercial activities at the beginning of the century, while there were four, three of whom were non-Muslim, by the end.

**Table 5: Tradesmen1 (According to Occupations)**

|         |            | 1700-1720  |                              | 1780-1800  |                |
|---------|------------|------------|------------------------------|------------|----------------|
|         |            | Commercial | non-commercial <sup>91</sup> | Commercial | non-commercial |
| Manisa  | non-Muslim | 0          | 15                           | 7          | 26             |
|         | non-Askeri | 3          | 101                          | 19         | 122            |
|         | Askeri     | 2          | 40                           | 9          | 109            |
| Kayseri | non-Muslim | 1          | 14                           | 3          | 13             |
|         | non-Askeri | 0          | 18                           | 1          | 60             |
|         | Askeri     | 0          | 12                           | 0          | 85             |

**Table 6: Tradesmen2 (According to Occupations & Shops)**

|         |            | 1700-1720  |                | 1780-1800  |                |
|---------|------------|------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
|         |            | Commercial | non-commercial | Commercial | non-commercial |
| Manisa  | non-Muslim | 0          | 15             | 8          | 25             |
|         | non-Askeri | 6          | 98             | 22         | 119            |
|         | Askeri     | 5          | 37             | 32         | 86             |
| Kayseri | non-Muslim | 1          | 14             | 3          | 13             |
|         | non-Askeri | 0          | 18             | 2          | 59             |
|         | Askeri     | 0          | 12             | 2          | 83             |

In the second step we added shops to our analysis.<sup>92</sup> As can be seen from Table 6, despite some natural increase in the ratio of people engaged in commercial

<sup>91</sup> By “non-commercial” we mean an occupation which could not be distinguished as commercial.

activities, the results do not change radically, especially at the beginning of the century. However, its effect on *askeri* is significant, especially at the end of the century in Manisa. Because of the significance of their military/administrative titles, the occupations of *askeri* are rarely mentioned in *sicil*. Through our new set we can observe a general increase in commercial interests in Manisa, and the rise of the non-Muslims is more significant than of the Muslims. For Kayseri it is still difficult to draw a conclusion, but there seems to be a general increase in commercial interests in this city. After shops, we also considered tools, but this did not add anything.

**Table 7: Tradesmen3 (According to Full Commercial Property)**

|         |            | 1700-1720  |                | 1780-1800  |                |
|---------|------------|------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
|         |            | Commercial | non-commercial | Commercial | non-commercial |
| Manisa  | non-Muslim | 3          | 12             | 14         | 19             |
|         | non-Askeri | 47         | 57             | 92         | 49             |
|         | Askeri     | 23         | 19             | 79         | 39             |
| Kayseri | non-Muslim | 10         | 5              | 3          | 13             |
|         | non-Askeri | 7          | 11             | 21         | 40             |
|         | Askeri     | 7          | 5              | 42         | 43             |

In the third step we added commercial estates into our analysis. First we counted all people who left any commercial estate as investors in commerce. Because the probability of being involved in commercial activities is higher for those whose occupation is mentioned, and who left commercially related shops, we add them to all three new groups after we analyzed them separately, and accepted these merged sets as a new set of people in commercial activities. Table 7 shows people who left commercial property. Partly because of its broadness, the percentages of people in commercial activities according to this definition are high. 45.3% of people in Manisa were in commercial activities at the beginning of the century, and this ratio increased to 63.3%. In Kayseri we observe a movement in the opposite direction. While 53.3% of residents

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<sup>92</sup> For all the shops mentioned in the data and the ones accepted as related to commercial activities, see Appendix E.

of Kayseri were involved in commercial activity in the initial period, their ratio reduced to 40.7% in the later period. In Manisa, the rise is a general trend, but slightly more significant for the non-Muslims. The percentage of non-Muslims in commercial activities increased from 20% to 42.4%. The rise for the non-*askeri* was from 45.2% to 65.2, and for the *askeri* from 54.7% to 66.9%. In Kayseri, the non-Muslims seem to be main reason for the decline in the rate of people involved in commercial activities. The percentage of non-Muslims in commercial activities in the beginning of the century was 53.3%, and reduced to 18.7%. The change in non-*askeri* and *askeri* is small; from 38.8 to 34.4 for the non-*askeri*, and from 58.3% to 49.4% for *askeri*. The general change for Muslims was only from 46.6% to 43.1%. When we merge this group with the previous two, according to occupations, and according to shops, and except for some numbers, there is no significant change related to the trends. But the significance of the rise of non-Muslims in Manisa becomes more explicit.

**Table 8: Tradesmen4 (According to Commercial Property-5\* minimum)**

|         |            | 1700-1720  |                | 1780-1800  |                |
|---------|------------|------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
|         |            | Commercial | Non-commercial | Commercial | Non-commercial |
| Manisa  | non-Muslim | 3          | 12             | 10         | 23             |
|         | non-Askeri | 45         | 59             | 77         | 64             |
|         | Askeri     | 22         | 20             | 64         | 54             |
| Kayseri | non-Muslim | 9          | 6              | 3          | 13             |
|         | non-Askeri | 4          | 14             | 16         | 45             |
|         | Askeri     | 2          | 10             | 31         | 54             |

To narrow down our definition, we applied three restrictions. We can differentiate raw and processed commercial properties. Accepting the smallest values as subsistence level, and so not related with commerce, first we accepted over five times the minimum value as commercial material. In the second group we accepted ten times the minimum as commercial material. Our last definition, via commercial properties, comes from breaks in the levels of aggregate values of commercial estates left by the deceased. Table 8 shows the results for the initial restriction. For Manisa, the results are almost the same. The percentage of people in commercial activities increased for all groups, but with a higher rate for the non-Muslims. However, in Kayseri, despite the similarity in



the general ratio and of the non-Muslims, both of which declined, the direction of change for the Muslims is distinct from the result of all commercial property cases. The percentages of both *askeri* and non-*askeri* in commercial activities increased. Hence, this set implies a change in favor of the Muslims. When we add shops and occupations, as in all commercial property cases, the significance of the rise of the non-Muslim in Manisa and the Muslims in Kayseri increased, and in Kayseri we observe not a general decline but a slight general improvement from 33.3% to 34.5%.

Ten times the minimum gives similar results. As can be seen in Table 9, the percentage of all people in commercial activities increased from 43.4% to 50% in Manisa, but slightly reduced from 26.6% to 25.9% in Kayseri. In Kayseri a great decline in the percentage of the non-Muslims is the reason behind the general decline. The percentages of Muslims in commerce increased in this city from 10% to 27.4%. Adding shops and occupations did not change anything at the beginning of the century but increased the numbers in the end. Therefore, positive changes became more significant. As with five times the minimum case, in Kayseri we observe a positive general change when we add shops and occupations.

**Table 9: Tradesmen5 (According to Commercial Property-10\* minimum)**

|         |            | 1700-1720  |                | 1780-1800  |                |
|---------|------------|------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
|         |            | Commercial | Non-commercial | Commercial | Non-commercial |
| Manisa  | non-Muslim | 3          | 12             | 9          | 24             |
|         | non-Askeri | 45         | 59             | 73         | 68             |
|         | Askeri     | 22         | 20             | 64         | 54             |
| Kayseri | non-Muslim | 9          | 6              | 2          | 14             |
|         | non-Askeri | 1          | 17             | 14         | 47             |
|         | Askeri     | 2          | 10             | 26         | 59             |

When we focus on the break points (Table 10), again like two cases above, we observe a rise in the commercial activities of all groups in Manisa, and therefore a general increase in commercial interests. In Kayseri the percentage of both *askeri* and non-*askeri* Muslims in commercial activities increased, but for the non-Muslims it reduces radically. This results in a slight general reduction. However, as in both cases

above, when we add shops and occupations in Kayseri also we observe a general increase in commercial activities; but reduction of the non-Muslim interest is robust.

We can conclude that for all three definitions of commercial activity, in Manisa the interest of all groups seems to have increased. In Kayseri, according to the three restricted versions of commercial activity definitions, there was a slight increase in interest for commercial activity. However, we observed a reduction in the commercial activities of non-Muslims.

**Table 10: Tradesmen6 (According to Commercial Property-break)**

|         |            | 1700-1720  |                | 1780-1800  |                |
|---------|------------|------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
|         |            | Commercial | Non-commercial | Commercial | Non-commercial |
| Manisa  | non-Muslim | 3          | 12             | 10         | 23             |
|         | non-Askeri | 42         | 62             | 81         | 60             |
|         | Askeri     | 20         | 22             | 69         | 49             |
| Kayseri | non-Muslim | 9          | 6              | 3          | 13             |
|         | non-Askeri | 5          | 13             | 20         | 41             |
|         | Askeri     | 4          | 8              | 39         | 46             |

We observed very slight changes in Manisa in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In Kayseri, the interest of non-Muslims in commercial activities declined, and that of the non-*askeri* Muslims increased. For *askeri* Muslims we observed a slight decline. Therefore we can conclude that the improvement of non-Muslims in 18<sup>th</sup>-century Manisa was not completely related to their extra-visibility in commercial sphere. The commercial interests of all groups increased, and although the rise of the non-Muslims was more significant, the non-Muslims had a still smaller share in commercial activities. In Kayseri, as with their overall wealth, the commercial interest of the non-Muslims declined while that of both Muslim groups increased, if we focus on commercial properties left.

#### iv) Size in Commercial Activities

In this section we compare the size of three groups in commercial activities in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. We have very small sets for non-Muslims in Manisa at the beginning of the century, and in Kayseri at the end. Bearing this constraint in mind, it seems that the rise of non-Muslims was related to improvements in the size of their commercial activities in Manisa. In Kayseri, apart from decline in interest, we observe a decline in the size of commercial activities.

In Manisa, at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and as shown before, there were only three non-Muslims who left commercial estates. A comparison would therefore be problematic, but still we may claim that they had no great commercial property in contrast with the Muslims. The greatest among the non-Muslims (with 17.6 *guruş*) was almost half of the median of the Muslims (30.5 *guruş*, 28.5 *guruş* for non-*askeri*).

At the end of the century we observe a rise in all groups, as in the case of total wealth. Again the rise of the non-Muslims is more significant than others, but still they were behind the *askeri*. While non-Muslims had smaller wealth levels than non-*askeri* Muslims at the beginning of the century, they had more by the end. We can conclude that the commerce of non-Muslims increased in Manisa in the 18<sup>th</sup> century not through their spread in the commercial sphere but through an increase in their size.

**Table 11: Commercial Property Distribution in Manisa in 1780-1800**

|                         | non-Muslim | Muslim | non- <i>Askeri</i> Muslim | <i>Askeri</i> Muslim |
|-------------------------|------------|--------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| Population              | 14         | 171    | 92                        | 79                   |
| Mean                    | 152.71     | 152.87 | 107.01                    | 206.27               |
| Standard Deviation      | 195.14     | 261.32 | 194.76                    | 314.97               |
| Coefficient of variance | 1.28       | 1.71   | 1.82                      | 1.53                 |
| Mean/Median             | 2.50       | 3.44   | 2.89                      | 2.86                 |
| p90                     | 492.96     | 460.39 | 390.37                    | 570.42               |
| p75                     | 271.60     | 164.94 | 97.26                     | 227.16               |
| p50                     | 60.99      | 44.44  | 37.03                     | 72.18                |
| p25                     | 17.61      | 14.96  | 14.61                     | 14.96                |
| p10                     | 3.70       | 5.28   | 4.32                      | 5.93                 |
| p90/p10                 | 133.23     | 87.20  | 90.36                     | 42.50                |
| p90/p50                 | 8.08       | 10.36  | 10.54                     | 13.54                |
| p50/p10                 | 16.48      | 8.42   | 8.57                      | 3.14                 |
| p75/p25                 | 15.42      | 11.03  | 6.66                      | 7.29                 |

**Table 12: Commercial Property Distribution in Kayseri in 1700-1720**

|                         | non-Muslim | Muslim | non- <i>Askeri</i> Muslim | <i>Askeri</i> Muslim |
|-------------------------|------------|--------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| Population              | 10         | 14     | 7                         | 7                    |
| Mean                    | 324.07     | 52.73  | 76.06                     | 29.39                |
| Standard Deviation      | 195.14     | 96.59  | 134.78                    | 27.90                |
| Coefficient of variance | 0.60       | 1.83   | 1.77                      | 0.95                 |
| Mean/Median             | 1.57       | 2.11   | 2.54                      | 1.33                 |
| p90                     | 926.75     | 75.00  | 380.00                    | 75.00                |
| p75                     | 369.50     | 48.50  | 48.50                     | 61.67                |
| p50                     | 206.31     | 24.94  | 30.00                     | 22.02                |
| p25                     | 66.08      | 10.57  | 16.00                     | 5.72                 |
| p10                     | 49.25      | 5.73   | 2.20                      | 5.72                 |
| p90/p10                 | 18.82      | 13.09  | 172.73                    | 13.11                |
| p90/p50                 | 4.49       | 3.01   | 12.67                     | 3.41                 |
| p50/p10                 | 4.19       | 4.35   | 13.64                     | 3.85                 |
| p75/p25                 | 5.59       | 4.59   | 3.03                      | 10.78                |

In Kayseri, at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of the Muslims had less than half of the median of the non-Muslims. Only one (non-*askeri*) Muslim had property more than the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of the non-Muslims, while one (*askeri*) had more than the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile, and the others were below. Therefore we can conclude that the size for the non-Muslims was bigger than that for the Muslims at the beginning.

By the end of the century, as with Manisa at the beginning, we have only three non-Muslims who left commercial properties.<sup>93</sup> The greatest among them was around the median of the Muslims. Therefore we can conclude that in Kayseri, both the visibility and the size of the non-Muslims declined in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

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<sup>93</sup> They left 28.17, 30.86, and 83.98 gurus.

## 7. Conclusion

In this thesis we used *tereke* records to try to observe changes in wealth distribution for three groups in Kayseri and Manisa in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In this period, three institutional changes occurred which could have affected wealth and the ethno-religious wealth distribution; fiscal, administrative, and economic. Fiscal institutions were likely to affect non-Muslims negatively, increasing the burden on them. The administrative change was rise of *ayan*. The effect of this change was unclear but could have been positive for non-Muslims relative to non-*askeri* Muslims in Manisa. Lastly, both domestic and international trade expanded in this century. An important share of the literature claims that there is a positive correlation between the wealth of non-Muslims and the expansion of European trade. In domestic trade, Muslims are accepted as being the dominant group. Therefore any comparative rise of non-Muslim wealth over Muslim wealth in Manisa can be attributed to either the rise of the *ayans* or an expansion of the European trade. Similarly, in Kayseri we can relate the rise of Muslim wealth with the rise in domestic trade, and possibly with the rise of the *ayans*.

Our first observation about wealth in these cities supports the general claim about recovery in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, at least until the war with Russia (1768-1774). Both cities economically improved in this century.

After examining the general economic conditions of these cities, we focused on the religious distribution of wealth. The wealth of non-Muslims may be downward biased in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, because of migration from Mora and/or legal pluralism in Manisa. However, non-Muslims still seem to be improved relative to Muslims, especially compared to non-*askeri* Muslims, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

In Kayseri, we observed a decline of the non-Muslims relative to the Muslims. These results indicate a positive correlation between relationships with the Europeans and the economic conditions of non-Muslims. We might also think that, as Frangakis-Syrett (1985) has commented, non-Muslim merchant networks did not operate inside Anatolia, but only between Europe and the coastal cities and their hinterlands. We should also reject the assumption of a general economic rise of non-Muslims in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In Kayseri, that ascendance needs to be related with developments in the 19<sup>th</sup>

century, most probably the penetration of European powers into central Anatolia after mid-19<sup>th</sup>-century developments in transportation.

Alongside wealth levels, we tried to compare commercial activities. First we asked if a greater part of the non-Muslims were interested in commercial activities at the end of the century. In Manisa we could not observe a great relative change. At the end of the century, a still smaller share of the non-Muslims were engaged in commercial activities. In Kayseri, their share in commercial activities declined, while there was no great change in the share of the Muslims. Then we looked at their size in commercial activities. In Manisa, as with the general wealth level, non-Muslims improved. In Kayseri, again, we observed decline. Because we have very small data sets it is difficult to draw strong conclusions, but still we may accept the result at least as supportive of the idea that non-Muslims played a more active role in the commercial relations with Europeans.

## Appendix A: Askeri

Canbakal (2007) gives following list based on an order issued in 1628 which was still effective in the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century (p. 65):

a) all those who received stipends (*vazife*) no less than an akçe and a half, including preachers, prayer-leaders, scribes, waqf trustees, revenue collectors (*cabi*) and overseers (*nazır*), *shaikhs*, people who recited the Quran or read prayers in return for a stipend, and those who disposed of income from waqfs, *mezra'as*, dervish con-vents and the like;

b) semi-professional auxiliary troops;

c) descendants of the Prophet (*sadat*);

d) those who provided special services to the government, such as falcon-raisers, mountain pass guards, bridge-keepers, messengers, share-croppers on state land, rice cultivators, salt producers, sheep and cattle dealers, copper miners (*bakırcı*), deputy judges, and city wardens; and

e) those who were exempt (*mu'âf*) from royal taxes (*tekâlif-i 'örfiyye*).

Following this list and Cosgel & Ergene (2008) the titles we accepted as *askeri* are *seyyid* and *şerifs* as *sadat* (descendants of the Prophet), *ağa*, *beşe*, *bey*, and *çavuş* as *seyfiyye* (men of sword), and *efendi*, *çelebi*, *molla*, *dede*, *dervis*, *hoca*, and *halife* as *ilmiyye* (religious class).

Occupations accepted as *askeri* are; *Askeri*, *Bakırcı*, *Barutcu*, *Bayrakdar*, *Çavuş*, *Çeribaşı*, *Dersiam*, *Fenerci*, *İmam*, *Katip*, *Kethuda*, *Mühürdar*, *Mültezim*, *Mütesellim*, *Odabaşı*, *Serdengeçti*, *Sipahi*, *Solak*, *Sultaniye Hatibi*, *Vakıf katibi*, *Yazıcı*, *Yeniçeri*, *Zuema/Zaim*.

## APPENDIX B: Tables for Wealth Distributions in Both Cities, Manisa & Kayseri

**Table B1: Wealth Distribution in Manisa in 1700-1720**

|                         | non-Muslim | Muslim  | non-Askeri M. | Askeri Muslim |
|-------------------------|------------|---------|---------------|---------------|
| Population              | 15         | 146     | 102           | 44            |
| Mean                    | 271.80     | 811.35  | 364.90        | 1846.28       |
| Standard Deviation      | 355.67     | 2359.16 | 493.64        | 4077.58       |
| Coefficient of variance | 1.31       | 2.91    | 1.35          | 2.21          |
| Mean/Median             | 1.90       | 4.00    | 2.05          | 5.59          |
| p90                     | 664.32     | 1345.18 | 982.82        | 4475.77       |
| p75                     | 348.02     | 583.26  | 406.00        | 920.68        |
| Median                  | 142.80     | 202.62  | 178.27        | 330.56        |
| p25                     | 57.27      | 105.30  | 70.93         | 126.21        |
| p10                     | 20.56      | 52.86   | 50.26         | 105.30        |
| p90/p10                 | 32.31      | 25.45   | 19.55         | 42.50         |
| p90/p50                 | 4.65       | 6.64    | 5.51          | 13.54         |
| p50/p10                 | 6.95       | 3.83    | 3.55          | 3.14          |
| p75/p25                 | 6.08       | 5.54    | 5.72          | 7.29          |
| Gini Index              | 0.57       | 0.75    | 0.58          | 0.77          |

**Table B2: Wealth Distribution in Manisa in 1780-1800**

|                         | non-Muslim | Muslim  | non-Askeri M. | Askeri Muslim |
|-------------------------|------------|---------|---------------|---------------|
| Population              | 33         | 259     | 141           | 118           |
| Mean                    | 1496.37    | 1005.44 | 486.94        | 1625.01       |
| Standard Deviation      | 4198.90    | 2302.67 | 1061.02       | 3103.87       |
| Coefficient of variance | 2.81       | 2.29    | 2.18          | 1.91          |
| Mean/Median             | 3.91       | 3.56    | 2.36          | 3.96          |
| p90                     | 2303.70    | 2477.53 | 1017.04       | 4305.56       |
| p75                     | 639.75     | 797.53  | 430.49        | 1813.21       |
| p50                     | 383.10     | 282.30  | 206.54        | 410.25        |
| p25                     | 130.86     | 100.00  | 87.85         | 120.27        |
| p10                     | 69.63      | 48.89   | 47.56         | 56.42         |
| p90/p10                 | 33.09      | 50.68   | 21.38         | 76.31         |
| p90/p50                 | 6.01       | 8.78    | 4.92          | 10.50         |
| p50/p10                 | 5.50       | 5.77    | 4.34          | 7.27          |
| p75/p25                 | 4.89       | 7.98    | 4.90          | 15.08         |
| Gini Index              | 0.78       | 0.73    | 0.65          | 0.71          |



**Table B3: Wealth Distribution in Kayseri in 1700-1720**


|                         | non-Muslim | Muslim | non-Askeri M. | Askeri Muslim |
|-------------------------|------------|--------|---------------|---------------|
| Population              | 15         | 30     | 18            | 12            |
| Mean                    | 757.41     | 354.88 | 342.78        | 373.04        |
| Standard Deviation      | 643.84     | 265.52 | 244.68        | 304.54        |
| Coefficient of variance | 0.85       | 0.75   | 0.71          | 0.82          |
| Mean/Median             | 1.22       | 1.37   | 1.24          | 1.56          |
| p90                     | 1,436.30   | 751.13 | 757.00        | 745.25        |
| p75                     | 1,072.50   | 502.00 | 472.32        | 510.47        |
| p50                     | 622.47     | 259.46 | 277.46        | 239.63        |
| p25                     | 204.41     | 151.10 | 154.25        | 149.34        |
| p10                     | 124.00     | 84.53  | 77.00         | 115.64        |
| p90/p10                 | 11.58      | 8.89   | 9.83          | 6.44          |
| p90/p50                 | 2.31       | 2.90   | 2.73          | 3.11          |
| p50/p10                 | 5.02       | 3.07   | 3.60          | 2.07          |
| p75/p25                 | 5.25       | 3.32   | 3.06          | 3.42          |
| Gini Index              | 0.43       | 0.4    | 0.39          | 0.4           |

**Table B4: Wealth Distribution in Kayseri in 1780-1800**


|                         | non-Muslim | Muslim    | non-Askeri M. | Askeri Muslim |
|-------------------------|------------|-----------|---------------|---------------|
| Population              | 16         | 146       | 60            | 86            |
| Mean                    | 508.53     | 3,289.49  | 815.80        | 5015.32       |
| Standard Deviation      | 565.66     | 28,384.28 | 1442.41       | 36953.98      |
| Coefficient of variance | 1.11       | 8.63      | 1.77          | 7.36822       |
| Mean/Median             | 1.81       | 8.10      | 2.56          | 11.61357      |
| p90                     | 1,173.09   | 2,441.55  | 1996.91       | 2441.55       |
| p75                     | 688.17     | 1,013.73  | 951.60        | 1086.97       |
| p50                     | 280.56     | 406.17    | 318.25        | 431.85        |
| p25                     | 146.65     | 197.78    | 166.05        | 236.79        |
| p10                     | 80.28      | 133.46    | 113.05        | 149.14        |
| p90/p10                 | 14.61      | 18.29     | 17.66         | 16.37         |
| p90/p50                 | 4.18       | 6.01      | 6.27          | 5.65          |
| p50/p10                 | 3.49       | 3.04      | 2.82          | 2.90          |
| p75/p25                 | 4.69       | 5.13      | 5.73          | 4.59          |
| Gini Index              | 0.51       | 0.88      | 0.62          | 0.91          |

## Appendix C: Box plots for Wealth in both Cities: Manisa & Kayseri


Graph C1: Box plots for real wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims in Manisa




Graph C2: Box plots for real wealth of askeri and non-askeri Muslims and non-Muslims in Manisa



**Graph C3: Box plots for real wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims in Kayseri**



**Graph C4: Box plots for real wealth of askeri and non-askeri Muslims and non-Muslims in Kayseri**



## Appendix D: Muslims and Non-Muslims in Quintiles

### Manisa 1700-All Population

| Quintile | Muslim | non-Muslim | non-Muslim in Q. | Q. in non-Muslim |
|----------|--------|------------|------------------|------------------|
| 1        | 28     | 5          | 15.15            | 33.33            |
| 2        | 29     | 3          | 9.38             | 20.00            |
| 3        | 30     | 2          | 6.25             | 13.33            |
| 4        | 28     | 4          | 12.50            | 26.66            |
| 5        | 31     | 1          | 3.13             | 6.66             |
| Total    | 146    | 15         | 9.32             |                  |

### Manisa 1700-Askeri Subtracted

| Quintile | Muslim | non-Muslim | non-Muslim in Q. | Q. in non-Muslim |
|----------|--------|------------|------------------|------------------|
| 1        | 20     | 4          | 16.67            | 26.66            |
| 2        | 20     | 3          | 13.04            | 20.00            |
| 3        | 21     | 3          | 12.50            | 20.00            |
| 4        | 20     | 3          | 13.04            | 20.00            |
| 5        | 21     | 2          | 8.70             | 13.33            |
| Total    | 102    | 15         | 12.82            |                  |

### Manisa 1780-All Population

| Quintile | Muslim | non-Muslim | non-Muslim in Q. | Q. in non-Muslim |
|----------|--------|------------|------------------|------------------|
| 1        | 54     | 5          | 8.47             | 20.84            |
| 2        | 54     | 4          | 6.90             | 20.84            |
| 3        | 51     | 8          | 13.56            | 19.69            |
| 4        | 47     | 11         | 18.97            | 18.14            |
| 5        | 53     | 5          | 8.62             | 20.46            |
| Total    | 259    | 33         | 11.30            |                  |

### Manisa 1780-Askeri Subtracted

| Quintile | Muslim | non-Muslim | non-Muslim in Q. | Q. in non-Muslim |
|----------|--------|------------|------------------|------------------|
| 1        | 31     | 4          | 11.43            | 12.12            |
| 2        | 30     | 5          | 14.29            | 15.15            |
| 3        | 28     | 7          | 20.00            | 21.21            |
| 4        | 26     | 9          | 25.71            | 27.27            |
| 5        | 26     | 8          | 23.53            | 24.24            |
| Total    | 141    | 33         | 18.97            |                  |

**Kayseri 1700-All Population**

| Quintile | Muslim | non-Muslim | non-Muslim in Q. | Q. in non-Muslim |
|----------|--------|------------|------------------|------------------|
| 1        | 7      | 2          | 22.22            | 13.33            |
| 2        | 7      | 2          | 22.22            | 13.33            |
| 3        | 8      | 1          | 11.11            | 6.66             |
| 4        | 5      | 4          | 44.44            | 26.66            |
| 5        | 3      | 6          | 66.67            | 40.00            |
| Total    | 30     | 15         | 33.33            |                  |

**Kayseri 1700-Askeri Subtracted**

| Quintile | Muslim | Nonmuslim | Nonmuslim in Q. | Q. in Nonmuslim |
|----------|--------|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1        | 5      | 2         | 28.57           | 13.33           |
| 2        | 4      | 3         | 42.86           | 20.00           |
| 3        | 5      | 1         | 16.67           | 6.66            |
| 4        | 4      | 3         | 42.86           | 20.00           |
| 5        | 0      | 6         | 100.00          | 40.00           |
| Total    | 18     | 15        | 45.45           |                 |

**Kayseri 1780-All Population**

| Quintile | Muslim | Nonmuslim | Nonmuslim in Q. | Q. in Nonmuslim |
|----------|--------|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1        | 28     | 5         | 15.15           | 31.25           |
| 2        | 29     | 3         | 9.38            | 18.75           |
| 3        | 31     | 2         | 6.06            | 12.5            |
| 4        | 27     | 5         | 15.63           | 31.25           |
| 5        | 31     | 1         | 3.13            | 6.25            |
| Total    | 146    | 16        | 9.88            |                 |

**Kayseri 1780-Askeri Subtracted**

| Quintile | Muslim | Nonmuslim | Nonmuslim in Q. | Q. in Nonmuslim |
|----------|--------|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1        | 12     | 4         | 25.00           | 25              |
| 2        | 12     | 3         | 20.00           | 18.75           |
| 3        | 12     | 3         | 20.00           | 18.75           |
| 4        | 11     | 4         | 26.67           | 25              |
| 5        | 13     | 2         | 13.33           | 12.5            |
| Total    | 60     | 16        | 21.05           |                 |

## Appendix E: Occupations

In the following classification we benefited from Faroqhi (2009), Göçek (2000), Matthews (2000) and Kadi (2007). Where there is a conflict in their classification it is mentioned. Note that the two groups do not have to be exclusive. One can be both producer and seller, as is the case today.

### Craftsmen:

*Abacı*, *Ayakkabıcı* (shoe maker), *Babuçcu* (shoe maker), *Berber* (barber), *Boyacı* (dyer), *Börekçi* (pastry makers), *Camcı* (glass maker), *Cullah* (weaver), *Çanak/Çömlekçi* (potter), *Çıkrıkçı* (winder), *Çizmeci* (boot maker), *Çulha* (broadcloth maker), *Debbağ* (tanner), *Değirmenci* (miller), *Demirci* (ironmonger), *Etmekçi* (baker), *Fesçi* (fez maker), *Gazzaz* (silk manufacturer), *Haffaf* (shoe maker), *Helvacı* (Halva maker), *Kasab* (butcher), *Keçeci* (felt maker), *Kilimci* (carpet maker), *Nalbant* (blacksmith), *Nalçacı* (blacksmith), *Saatçi* (clock maker), *Sabancı* (plough maker), *Sarraf*, *Semerci* (packsaddle makers), *Serraç* (saddle maker), *Takyeci* (hat maker), *Terzi* (tailor), *Yapağıcı* (sword maker), *Yorgancı* (blanket makers), *Zıbıncı* (babygro maker)

### Tradesmen:

*Attar* (herbal shop), *bezzaz* (fabric merchant), *çamaşırcı* (cloth merchant), *deveci* (cameleer), *eskici* (old clothes man), *yemişçi* (fruit seller), *kürkçü* (fur seller), *kuyumcu* (goldsmith), *kömürcü* (coal seller), *saatçi* (clock maker), *sarraf* (banker), *iplikçi* (thread seller), *tacir* (merchant), *çekirdekçi* (cotton seed seller), *leblebici* (roasted chick pea seller), *tiftikçi* (mohair seller), *katırcı* (muleteer), *mintancı* (chainse seller), *macuncu* (paste seller), *mısırcı* (corn seller), *urgancı* (rope seller).

Shops accepted as commercial:

*Bakkal* (store), *bezzaz* (fabric seller), *kavuk* (quilted turban), *mağaza* (store), *kuyumcu* (goldsmith)

Tools accepted as commercial:

*Bakkal* (store), *bezzaz* (fabric seller), *kavuk* (quilted turban), *mağaza* (store), *kuyumcu* (goldsmith)

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