

COALITION POLITICS IN TURKEY: 1991-2002

by

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Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Sabancı University
Spring 2011

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ABSTRACT

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PhD Dissertation, Spring 2011

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Sabri Sayarı

Keywords: Coalition politics, cabinet durability, coalition formation processes, coalition bargaining, conflict management

Coalition government has been the dominant type of rule in Western Europe in the 20th century as countries increasingly reformed their electoral systems towards proportional representation. However, these governments are heavily criticized. They are argued to be difficult to form and govern, hence less durable compared to the majority party governments. This study aims to respond to these criticisms focusing on the Turkish coalition governments in the period between 1991 and 2002. It shows that the duration of party or coalition governments vary systematically between countries and within each country across time. Hence, the study mainly explores why some governments lasted long despite the political turmoil, economic crises and inter-party conflict, while others remained in power for merely a few months in Turkey. While discussing the dynamics of cabinet durability, it adopts a holistic approach in which all three phases of a government's life – formation, maintenance and termination, are analyzed in interaction. The study perceives coalition politics as a set of continuous bargaining processes protraction of which put an end to the governments. Therefore, it also focuses on the communication between the political actors, and attempts to explain the factors that increase the level of mistrust and information uncertainty in the bargaining environment. Finally, the analysis of the coalition politics in Turkey is located within the wider inquiry on the multiparty politics in Western European democracies.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’DE KOALİSYON SİYASETİ: 1991-2002

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Doktora Tezi, Bahar 2011

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Sabri Sayarı

Anahtar Sözcükler: Koalisyon siyaseti, hükümetin devamlılığı, koalisyon kurma süreçleri, koalisyon pazarlığı, uyuşmazlık yönetimi

Yirminci yüzyılda giderek daha çok ülkenin nisbi temsil sistemini benimsemesiyle birlikte koalisyon hükümetleri Batı Avrupa’da en yaygın yönetim biçimi haline gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte koalisyon hükümetleri ciddi şekilde eleştirilmektedir. Bu tür hükümetlerin kurulmasının ve yönetilmesinin güç olduğu dolayısıyla tek parti hükümetlerine kıyasla daha dayanıksız oldukları iddia edilmektedir. Bu çalışma 1991-2002 yılları arasında Türkiye’de kurulan koalisyon hükümetlerinden yola çıkarak bu eleştirilere yanıt vermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, tek parti hükümetlerinin ve koalisyon hükümetlerinin ömürlerinin ülkeden ülkeye ve aynı ülke içinde zaman içinde değiştiğini göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla, çalışmada temel olarak Türkiye’de siyasi çalkantılara, ekonomik krizlere ve partiler arası çatışmalara karşın neden bazı koalisyon hükümetlerinin uzun ömürlü olduğu buna karşın diğerlerinin neden sadece bir kaç iktidarda kalabildiği sorgulanmaktadır. Hükümetlerin dayanıklılığını belirleyen dinamikler tartışılırken, bir hükümet ömrünün her üç aşaması – kuruluş, yönetim ve bitiş- arasındaki etkileşim bütünlükçü bir yaklaşımla ele alınmaktadır. Çalışma koalisyon siyasetine kesintisiz müzakere süreçleri dizisi olarak yaklaşmaktadır. Hükümetlerin sona ermesi bu müzakerelerin tıkanmasıyla gerçekleşmektedir. Bu nedenle, çalışma siyasi aktörler arasındaki iletişime odaklanmaktadır ve müzakere ortamındaki güvensizliği ve bilgi belirsizliğini artıran etkenleri açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Son olarak, Türkiye’de koalisyon siyasetinin incelenmesi Batı Avrupa demokrasilerindeki çokpartili siyasetle ilgili daha geniş bir araştırmanın çerçevesine yerleştirilmektedir.

To Halil and Nehir...

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing this dissertation would be impossible without the support and mentorship of my advisor Prof. Sabri Sayarı. I am indebted to him for his constructive criticisms and encouragement throughout my graduate education. I would like to thank the members of my jury, Professors Ersin Kalaycıođlu, Bahri Yılmaz, Işık Özel and Yaprak Gürsoy for their time and invaluable comments. I am also grateful to Prof. Mehmet Baç, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Meltem Müftüler Baç, Özge Kemahlıođlu and Emre Hatipođlu for their help and guidance. İnci Ceydeli, Ayşe Ötenođlu, Tuđcan Bařara, Viket Galimidi, Sumru řatır and Mehmet Manyas gave their support generously whenever I needed. As a recipient of BİDEB scholarship, I also thank TÜBİTAK for providing me financial support throughout my doctoral study.

I have been working at the Okan University since 2009. I thank Professors řule Kut, Suat Teker, řükrü Sina Gürel, Mustafa and Ayşegül Kibarođlu, Mehmet Kabasakal, Zeynep Alemdar and Umut Azak for giving me the chance to develop my teaching skills, for their understanding and support in this challenging process.

I am also grateful to Prof. Mustafa Koçak, Mustafa Turhan, Mahmut Koçak, Mehmet Gök and Gaffar Yakın for helping me reach the politicians who served in the governments during the 1990s. I would like to extend my gratitude to the politicians I interviewed for their time and sharing unique information.

Erika Wilkens and Yunus Sözen were always ready to guide me whenever I needed. Their friendship helped me to cope with the difficulties of writing a dissertation.

I thank my parents for taking care of my family while I was writing the dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank my husband Halil and my daughter Nehir for their love and making my life meaningful.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
AP	Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
BBP	Büyük Birlik Partisi (Grand Unity Party)
CGP	Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Reliance Party)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples' Party)
CKMP	Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (Republican Peasants' Nation Party)
DP	Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)
DTP	Demokrat Türkiye Partisi (Democratic Turkey Party)
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)
FP	Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
HADEP	Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (People's Democracy Party)
HEP	Halkın Emek Partisi (People's Labor Party)
IDP	Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi (Reformist Democracy Party)
MÇP	Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (Nationalist Labor Party)
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)
MP	Millet Partisi (Nation Party)
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers' Party)

RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
SHP	Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party)
SİP	Sosyalist İktidar Partisi (Socialist Power Party)
SP	Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly)
YTP	Yeni Türkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party)

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INTRODUCTION

On May 6, 2010, British voters went to the polls. Pre-election surveys had shown that the general elections were very likely to return a hung parliament.¹ This outcome was preceded by the 1974 elections, in which no party was able to get the majority of the votes. What the experts did not predict was a coalition agreement in the best known model of the first-past-the-post election system that was concluded in only five days between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. As of June 2010, United Kingdom became one of the nearly thirty countries in Europe ruled by coalition governments. David Cameron, the leader of the Conservative Party, commented on the coalition deal; “It really does look and feel different. Indeed, many of us are sitting next to people that we’ve never sat next to before” (*The Guardian*, 18.08.2010). This quote implies that a coalition government is a major political puzzle. It brings together not only politicians with disparate political values and norms, but also potentially incompatible expectations for ruling a country. The co-existence of differences is, indeed, the crux of coalition politics. It offers opportunities for representation of different views and interests in the society. However, this defining characteristic of the coalition government is also perceived as a weakness by some of the political elites and voters. Accordingly, it is argued that coalition arrangements cannot be maintained for a long period of time due to the differences between the partners. This view is widely held in Turkey where coalition governments historically have had a very negative image.²

¹ The official election results are available on the web site of the UK Office for National Statistics at <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/government/central-and-local-government/elections--local--national-and-european-> (retrieved 08.05.2011).

² Part of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 2011 re-election campaign was based on the drawbacks of a potential coalition government for Turkey. He argued that Turkey

Similar to many misconceptions, there is an element of truth in this argument. A number of coalition governments dissolved in a few months while others ruled for years. In other words, the duration of a coalition government varies systematically between countries and within a country at different times. Within a certain country, some coalition arrangements survive extensive dissent between the political parties, strong criticisms from the opposition parties, and unexpected crises such as natural disasters and economic meltdowns. Others, which might be formed by ideologically adjacent parties in a relatively crisis-free political context, last not much more than a few months. For example, the most recent coalition government in Turkey was formed by three parties with different ideological orientations in 1999: the center-left DSP, the nationalist MHP and the center-right ANAP. Just a few months after the cabinet was inaugurated, a major earthquake hit three major cities. Moreover, serious corruption charges targeted a number of cabinet members. However, it was one of the longest-lasting cabinets in the Turkish history. On the other hand, the ANAP-DYP government, formed in 1996, perished through inter-party conflict in slightly more than three months despite the similarity in their policy platforms. The main research question of this dissertation focuses on this puzzle: what accounts for the variation in the duration of coalition governments?

Since its transition to multiparty politics in 1950, 42 governments took office in Turkey. 7 of them were supra-party governments, while the rest were democratically elected. 15 of these governments were coalition arrangements. The first group of coalition governments emerged in the immediate aftermath of 1961 elections. Four coalition governments were formed in the period between 1961 and 1965. Four more coalition governments ruled in the second half of the 1970s. The rest of the coalition governments took office in the 1990s (Appendix 3). Indeed, coalition politics was the defining characteristic of this decade, since Turkey was ruled with alternating multiparty cabinets during this period with the exception of two minority governments, one of which failed to satisfy the constitutional requirement for taking office. During the 1990s, majority of the Western European democracies were also ruled by coalition governments. Just as in Turkey, coalition politics prevailed in Italy, Finland, Belgium,

suffered extensively during the rule of the coalition governments as they have been unstable. “Koalisyon Geri Bırakır”, *Milliyet*, 26.01.2011.

Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg and Ireland. In France, Norway and Switzerland, the governments alternated between party and coalition cabinets. Durability of the coalition governments varied within Western Europe and Turkey in this period. Hence, taking a comparative approach, this study aims to analyze the dynamics of the variation in cabinet durability in Turkey within the wider European framework.

Chapter 1 starts with a literature review. I trace the rise of cabinet durability as an area of interest in the study of coalition politics. Then, I evaluate the factors which were indicated to be influential in either extending or shortening the life of coalition governments. The literature seems to reach a consensus that the dynamics of cabinet durability can be best understood with a holistic approach. This means that there is an interaction between the three phases of the lives of governments; namely, formation, governance and termination. This interaction has implications on the formation and maintenance of the next cabinet, since each government contributes to the learning process with respect to the politics of coalition. Hence, an analysis considering cabinet duration as a life-cycle is likely to produce more reliable results. Bargaining, where coalition behavior is shaped through the interplay of the structural and exogenous factors, emerges as another area in coalition research. Chapter 1 forms the basis of my research in three ways. Firstly, drawing on the existing research, I delineate a list of the factors I use in my analysis of the Turkish case. Accordingly, the attributes of a cabinet such as size, ideological composition and majority status are important in order to elucidate the cabinets which will last longer. These attributes are shaped by the characteristics of the party system, and the formal and informal rules. Secondly, as the bargaining processes reflect the influence of these factors on the relations between the political actors, I also focus on the strategies of the parties. This also draws attention to how the leaders of the political parties manage crises, and how new processes of bargaining proceed. I also review the studies on the Turkish coalition governments extensively. Thirdly, the extant literature suggests the need for more detailed research on individual countries, as country-specific factors appear to have strong explanatory power.

The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to design a process, which can yield detailed information on Turkey while maintaining a comparative perspective. This chapter draws on the hypotheses formulated on the basis of the literature review in Chapter 1. I begin with a discussion of the dominant research paradigm in the study of coalition politics. I, then, discuss the potential contributions of conducting a case-oriented approach with comparative concepts to a wider study of coalition politics and behavior. Lastly, I explain the stages of the research design conducted for this dissertation. In this context, after reviewing the literature for the potential factors that might have influenced cabinet durability in Turkey, I delved into the newspaper coverage on the coalition governments ruled between 1991 and 2002. In the daily newspapers, I mainly analyzed the accounts of the politicians, seeking any statements that might provide insight to the office and policy preferences, the interaction during the bargaining processes, the way they handled the relations between governing parties and their strategies to manage the crises. I constructed the question sheet for the in-depth interviews on the basis of these preliminary findings (Appendix 2). The content of the questions required interviewing the politicians who were actively involved throughout the period the cabinet was in power, especially during the bargaining process. Thus, I aimed to interview at least one minister from each party in each government, in order to exhibit diverse views on the factors that influenced the viability of the same cabinet.

The later Chapters 3 and 4 are built on the analysis of the in-depth interviews in addition to the secondary sources such as newspaper statements, memoirs, official coalition documents, relevant articles and books. In Chapter 3, I focus first on the factors that constrained the political actors when they were crafting the coalition deals. The characteristics of the party system and the institutional rules included in the constitution are emphasized. The party system which was increasingly fragmented and polarized, especially in the mid-1990s, led to fierce competition for the leadership of the center-right and center-left. It also prevented formation of ideologically compact governments. It increased mistrust³ and information uncertainty between the

³ In this dissertation, trust (and mistrust) refers to a conviction that others will act in our benefit or at least they do not intend to harm (Gambetti, 2000, p. 217). Ensuring a certain level of trust between politicians is important as it enhances cooperation and communication between the partners (Dekker and Uslaner, 2001, p. 2). In this context, the levels of trust and information uncertainty covary in an inverse direction.

prospective partners. Institutional rules pertaining to government formation, especially the investiture vote⁴ and the requirement of qualified majorities for legislation, resulted in an inclination towards forming oversized cabinets, which are more difficult to manage.

The tensions in the political agenda over the rise of political Islam increased the freedom of movement of the military establishment. This reflected on the governments through the intervention of the head of state occasionally, again in the mid-1990s. The viability of the cabinets, emanating from such a bargaining environment dominated by office considerations overwhelmingly, varied based on the degree of influence from these dynamics. In the second part of this chapter, I evaluate the distribution of cabinet posts, and assess the relations between the government parties with regard to the strategies they adopted vis-à-vis each other. Finally, I analyze the mechanisms devised by the political actors to manage the conflicts.

The impact of these mechanisms is pointed out in Chapter 4, where I specifically evaluate the dynamics underlying the variations in cabinet durability in Turkey throughout 1990s. Structural⁵ and institutional factors⁶ account for part of the variation. Contrary to the expectations derived from the literature, large coalitions which were formed with the support of more than two parties in Turkey tend to be more durable, as institutional rules would otherwise increase the likelihood of parliamentary defeat. As the characteristics of the party system mainly increased the competition between parties with similar ideological orientations, the ideologically heterogeneous cabinets tended to function more smoothly. One of the most interesting findings of this chapter is the dominance of institutional factors in the ways the governments ended. This suggests that counter-institutional mechanisms, which were devised to strengthen the acting

⁴ Investiture vote, also known as the vote of confidence, is a constitutional requirement for the prospective cabinets to take office. Accordingly, the cabinet has to succeed in getting the support of majority in the parliament.

⁵ “Structural factors” refer to the characteristics of the cabinets and the party system throughout the dissertation.

⁶ In this dissertation, “institutional factors” refer to the rules pertaining to government formation and termination in the legal documents as well as the conflict management mechanisms.

cabinet and will be explained in the next chapter with examples, could have balanced the detrimental effects of the initial institutional constraints. Another important finding is that institutionalization of the relations between the partners contributes to durability regardless of the initial viability of a government. In other words, enhanced communication between the actors can extend a government's life. The personal relations between the leaders of the I. DYP-SHP government (1991-1993) and the DSP-MHP-ANAP government (1999-2002) were sufficient and effective enough to resolve minor crises through communication. The DSP-MHP-ANAP government also adopted a mechanism; such that the leaders of the cabinet parties gathered to resolve the crises between the top party executives. This prevented the potential escalation of the crises, and rendered a rich legislation record.

In the Chapters 3 and 4, I focus mainly on the Turkish case giving occasional examples from the other democracies. However, Chapter 5 specifically locates the Turkish case within a wider European framework. I use the *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining Dataset* (2008) compiled by Strom, Müller and Bergman. It has blocks of variables including structural attributes, preferences, institutions, bargaining environment and critical events. In Chapter 5, I examine the trends in cabinet durability across 13 countries and 42 coalition governments in Western Europe, in addition to the seven coalition governments in Turkey formed during the 1990s. In this chapter, the attempt to verify the dynamics stated in the literature in Chapter 1 yields inconclusive results. Instead, the institutional rules that aim to strengthen the motivations to maintain incumbent governments emerge as one of the most important factors affecting cabinet durability. The fewer incentives of the governing and oppositional parties to dissolve the government strategically, the more viable the cabinets become. More importantly, in the countries where the communication between the partners was strengthened through functioning governing bodies and conflict management mechanisms, cabinets lasted longer despite the unfavorable conditions of the party systems and the assorted political agenda. The consolidation of these mechanisms evolved into a learning process and strengthened the politics of accommodation. This process explains the improvements in cabinet durability across Western Europe over time.

This research contributes to the literature on coalition politics, both in general and in Turkey, from a number of perspectives. Firstly, these findings verify that coalition

governments can be considerably durable. More specifically, this research provides substantial empirical findings to challenge the misconception that coalition governments in Turkey were predisposed to be merely short-term or weak. On the contrary, a number of governments survived longer than their counterparts in other countries such as Italy. Secondly, I concur with the institutionalist approaches to cabinet durability. Structural attributes might be influential in determining the initial type of the cabinet, and they certainly have implications on the partners once they agree on a coalition deal. However, maintaining the cabinet composition depends on the behavior of the political actors. This demonstrates the necessity to devise institutional mechanisms for increasing the communication between the parties, and to provide platforms in which they can resolve the crises. Finally, although this is a case-oriented study, it attempts to locate the Turkish case within a wider comparative perspective. It provides an analysis of whether the classical theories of coalition governments hold true in the Turkish case. I attempt to analyze the dynamics in Turkey by developing measures, which will be applicable in the analyses of coalition politics in other countries. Findings from my research with regard to the performance of the larger coalitions can also contribute to theory building.

CHAPTER 1

THE STUDY OF COALITION POLITICS

1.1. Development of the Study of Coalition Politics

The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics defines a coalition as "... a team of individuals or groups that unites for a common purpose" (Strøm and Nyblade, 2007, p. 782). As the definition suggests, there are different types of coalitions. Countries may ally and engage in a joint operation in a certain country, for example to support the democratic opposition. Political parties may craft a pre-election coalition to overthrow an incumbent government. Individuals and civil society organizations may coalesce to campaign on an issue or policy. Coalitions also play an important role in the bargaining between and within the political parties in presidential regimes (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004). Although there is a wide range of uses for a "coalition", the term mostly refers to the coalition governments formed by two or more political parties (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008, p. 6) in parliamentary democracies. From the end of World War II until the end of the 1990s, only 13 percent of the governments in Western Europe were formed by a single party as the rest was comprised of different forms of coalition governments (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008, p. 207).

The pioneering studies of coalition governments emerged in the United States. The rise of rational choice theory as a dominant paradigm in the social sciences aroused an interest in the coalitions, as the theory aimed to understand the interactions between the actors. *The Theory of Political Coalitions* by Riker (1962) broke new ground by analyzing the bargaining processes for sharing the coalition payoffs. Riker relied on Down's (1957) assumption that political actors are also rational actors, who try to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs. For this reason, political parties would

try to secure the parliamentary majority coalescing with the smallest possible number of parties, in order to have a larger share of the cabinet posts (Riker 1962, p. 32). Referring to this as the “size principle”, Riker presumed that the logical and rational result of the bargaining between the parties would thus be a minimal winning cabinet¹, which is composed of parties whose total number of seats is just enough to acquire majority status in the parliament. In *A Theory of Coalition Formation*, Gamson (1961) also focused on the negotiations, and argued that the distribution of cabinet posts would be very likely to reflect the ratio of the seat shares of the cabinet parties vis-à-vis each other. The first generation of the study of coalition governments in the 1960s relied on the rationality assumption and adopted a game-theoretic perspective. These two studies have been a starting point for further research in three directions. The first and most important hypothesis (the size hypothesis) about the coalition formation process originated from these studies. Ensuing research has been testing whether minimal winning cabinets emerge as the most common type of coalition arrangements and whether size of the cabinet (measured in the number of the parties in the cabinet) has any impact on the cabinet duration. Gamson’s proposition has been referred to as “Gamson’s Law” or the “proportionality norm” and it has been in the center of the research on the allocation of the ministerial posts. Researchers have been analyzing distribution of the cabinets and trying to explain the potential factors that violate this norm. Finally, the first generation studies have set the methodological grounds. Hence, development of the coalition literature has been a response to these studies.

Western European coalition governments continued to serve as the basis of research in the 1970s. Dodd (1976) tried to predict the types of coalition cabinets emanating from the communication and negotiations between the parties (undersized/minority, minimal winning, and surplus/oversize)² based on the characteristics of the party system. He further analyzed which cabinet types enhanced

¹ A minimal winning cabinet is composed of parties whose total number of seats is just enough to secure parliamentary majority (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 1995, pp. 305-309).

² A surplus or oversize majority cabinet includes parties defection of which will not result in loss of the parliamentary majority. Lastly, an undersized or a minority coalition cabinet is the one whose combined parliamentary strength is below the parliamentary majority (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 1995, pp. 305-309).

cabinet durability, defining it as the maintenance of party composition. In this sense, cabinet durability has moved to the center of the research since 1960s. Axelrod (1970); on the other hand, expanded the size principle by taking policy preferences into account. He predicted the bargaining processes to form coalitions between the smallest number of ideologically compatible parties such that loss of a member will render the coalition no longer minimal or ideologically connected. In this way, Axelrod made an adjustment to the classification of the cabinet types by including the minimal winning connected cabinet.³ He also demonstrated a new perspective by showing the importance of policy preferences in coalition behavior. Two further developments in this period are the proliferation of the case studies (Groennings, Kelley, and Leiserson, 1970), and the European scholars' enrollment to contribute to this field.

Building on policy-driven motivations in coalition behavior, De Swaan (1973) argued that minimal winning coalition governments were not as frequent as expected, since the actors aimed to realize their policy preferences in addition to office considerations. The debate on the main dynamics of coalition behavior engendered prolific research as the number of the case studies and as large-N comparative research increased, stemming from heightened interest of the European scholars. Bargaining patterns in the formation of governments as well as the distribution of coalition payoffs were initial concerns. However, as cabinet durability ascended to the center of research, the focus on cabinet attributes, including size (introduced by Riker), ideological compatibility (introduced by Axelrod and De Swaan) and cabinet type (introduced by Dodd), stimulated new debates.

The studies of the 1980s declared the beginning of a new divide in the literature. Traditional approaches pioneered by Dodd's study were analyzing cabinet durability, which is defined as the potential of a particular cabinet to survive the constitutional inter-election period, as a function of cabinet attributes (size, ideological composition and type) and the party system. This first school of thought was referred as the *structuralists* or *attributionalists*. However, a new school of thought led by Browne and his colleagues started to question the essence of the inquiry. This school was known as *the event process theorists*. First and foremost, they challenged the possibility of the

³ A minimal connected winning cabinet is a minimal winning cabinet whose member parties are also ideologically compatible.

inherent potential in a cabinet to endure. They argued that random shocks, such as political scandals and economic crises, might put an end to an acting cabinet regardless of the strength of a particular cabinet or the conditions of a political system. Similarly, weak governments might last for years in the absence of such critical events (Browne, Frensdreis, and Gleiber, 1984). The controversy began to heat up with the emergence of a third approach. This approach, known as the *strategic interaction approach*, unified these contending models by including all possible variables into analyses. Proponents of this approach argued that critical events have been highly detrimental to the minority governments as well as governments in countries with more fractionalized and polarized party systems (King et al. 1990).

The controversy dominating the literature in these two decades made a number of indispensable contributions to the ensuing literature in the 1990s and 2000s. The contending models of cabinet durability expanded the scope of the research,⁴ and led to the emergence of new studies (Warwick and Easton, 1992; Diermeier and Stevenson, 2000). The debate emphasized that conceptualization and measurement of cabinet durability needs elaboration. The duration of the cabinets and the maintenance of party composition continued to be important. However, new research also focused on the way cabinets terminated in order to assess the importance of critical events (Grofman and van Rozendaal, 1997; Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999; Laver, 2003; Lupia and Strøm, 1995). Cabinet stability, in addition to durability, came under scrutiny. Accordingly, not only a long cabinet duration, but also the ease of its formation denoted cabinet stability (Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2003, p. 63).

Three further developments characterized the 1990s aside from these issues. The implications of coalition governments for the wider political system aroused further interest. Lijphart updated his previous research entitled *Democracy in Plural Societies* (1977) in the *Patterns of Democracy* (1999). He challenged the traditional coalition theories, and argued that the level of information uncertainty stemming from the characteristics of the party system, the political system and the policy considerations rendered surplus majority coalitions more likely. Referring to the coalition systems as “consensus democracies”, he emphasized that these systems outperformed the

⁴ An article by Strøm, Browne, Frensdreis, and Gleiber (1988) outlines the main points of controversy.

majoritarian systems in many aspects and did not perform worse in the rest of performance indicators. The focus on government stability and performance generated a comprehensive sub-literature in the late 1990s and 2000s (Remarkable examples include: Huber, 1998; Huber and Arthur Lupia, 2001; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2004; Ireland and Gartner, 2001; Blais, Kim, and Foucault, 2010). These studies analyzed the relationship between the types of government (coalition versus party governments) and diverse indicators of stability such as democratization and economic performance.

A revival of neo-institutionalism in the study of coalition politics was another remarkable characteristic of the 1990s. Strøm (1984) was intrigued by the pervasiveness of minority governments in some countries, even though the traditional theories of coalition formation attributed an inherent weakness to this type of government. He concluded that certain institutional mechanisms might lower the potential for parliamentary defeats and strengthen the chances of survival for minority governments. The implications of Strøm's research reverberated in the 1990s with a renewed focus on the institutional rules pertaining to the coalition politics. These studies produced substantial empirical evidence pointing out the importance of cabinet formation rules in the emerging type of coalition cabinets. Existence or the absence of a vote of confidence (known as the investiture requirement) and the requirement of qualified majorities for constitutional amendments constituted the first set of rules pertaining to forming governments. A second group of rules aimed to balance the pressure of maintaining a majority. These included the constructive vote of no confidence⁵ and the rule of favoring the status quo government in case of a stalemate. Finally the powers of the heads of state and the prime minister set another set of institutional constraints in the analyses.⁶

The studies of the 1990s reflected the accumulation of research and knowledge in various aspects of coalition politics. Hence, studies of this period initiated a more holistic approach to coalition arrangements. On the one hand, research analyzing

⁵ “Constructive vote of no confidence” refers to a constitutional requirement of crafting an alternative cabinet composition for overthrowing an incumbent cabinet.

⁶ Cf. D. Diermeier et al. (2003) for a summary and review of the revival and development of neo-institutionalism in the study of coalition politics.

specific aspects of coalition governments continued to flourish. On the other hand, a number of books assembled the findings of the existing research to develop vast models which focused on the entire life-cycle of coalition governments all the way from formation to functioning, then to termination (Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Laver and Schofield, 1998; Warwick, 1994; Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994).

Contemporary research takes these articles and books as a reference point. *Coalition Governments in Western Europe* (Müller and Strøm, 2003) aims to combine the detailed information on the coalition governments in Western Europe with the holistic approach outlined above. Each chapter is devoted to a single country and analyses the institutional settings, characteristics of the party systems, bargaining patterns, coalition governance and cabinet durability together. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining* (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, 2008) is a companion to this study by analyzing various aspects of coalition politics in 17 countries. These two books are the products of the *Constitutional Change and Parliamentary Governments* program.⁷ Two vast datasets were compiled in the project process, allowing researchers across Europe to conduct comparative research in coalition politics. The efforts to clarify the concepts related to coalition behavior engendered further research on measurement issues in the 2000s (Horowitz, Hoff, and Milanovic, 2009; Conrad and Golder, 2010) as well. Hence, the accumulation of knowledge and development of research methodology characterized the 2000s. Currently, case studies become an area of interest once more as the large-N studies pointed to the importance of specific country effects in explaining the dynamics of coalition politics. Qualitative studies attract attention in this regard. Game-theoretic models continue to be applied to the bargaining processes. Finally, coalitions at the sub-national (local) and international levels become new venues of research (Bäck, 2003; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Kreppel, 2002). However, cabinet durability continues to be at the center of concerns in all of these studies. Research focusing on other aspects such as conflict management and the functioning of coalition governments embodies an implicit or an explicit affiliation of the research topics to the length of these cabinets.

⁷Details of this program is available at <http://www.erdda.se/ccpd/publications/coalition_governments_in_western_europe.php> (retrieved 15.01.2010).

1.2. The Study of Cabinet Durability

In my dissertation, I focus on the durability of coalition governments. Historically, the proponents of systems that render the emergence of majority party governments are more likely to accuse coalition governments of being inherently less durable. Accordingly, coalition governments are composed of political parties with diverse sets of policy preferences. Hence, the inherent risk of infighting between the partners characterizes coalition arrangements and renders them weak against challengers. As difficult as it is to form a coalition government, it is easy to break one up (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008, p. 12). In this context, coalition governments perform arguably worse compared to majority party governments as they suffer from inter-party conflicts which make legislation a daunting task.

On the contrary, more than half a century of research on coalition governments established that coalition governments can be maintained throughout the entire inter-election periods, and can perform as well as the majority party governments (Lijphart, 1999). The variation in the cabinet durability between and within countries suggests that the dynamics that render a coalition cabinet more or less durable need to be uncovered. The dynamics of cabinet durability has engendered extensive interest especially since the 1980s. The contending approaches finally acknowledged that an inquiry of cabinet durability has to take various factors into account that are influential in different stages of coalition politics. Cabinet durability as such recognizes the impact of shocks exogenous to the cabinet, such as political scandals and economic crises, on an unexpected and premature termination of a government. However, some governments manage to survive these challenges while others give up. Moreover, the same government can cope with a random shock while it succumbs to pressure in a later stage (Laver and Shepsle 1998). This suggests that certain factors may strengthen or weaken the viability of a government.

The oldest hypothesis in this regard is based on the size of a cabinet. It was argued that minimal winning cabinets are easier to manage and to limit the extent of conflict between the partners compared to surplus cabinets (Dodd 1976). Building on

the studies of Axelrod (1973) and de Swaan, the ideological compatibility of cabinet parties was explored (Warwick 1994, pp. 1-14). Even if the cabinet is oversized, the existence of similar policy preferences may decrease potential conflict, render legislation easier and possibly give the cabinet a defense against the criticisms of opposition parties. Enjoying the support of the majority of the parliament may obviously bolster a long life (Laver and Schofield 1998, pp. 150-151). These three characteristics of cabinets, referred to as the *cabinet attributes*, were considered to be the most important variables associated with durability (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 1995, p. 319). The importance of cabinet attributes was also supported by empirical evidence. However, an analysis of cabinet attributes may only be the beginning of a course of research mainly for two reasons; 1. Any research focusing on variations between and within countries may yield inconclusive results, 2. Cabinet attributes emerge as an outcome of the interaction between political parties.

The interaction and communication between parties before the formation of a government and during the cabinet is in power is referred as “bargaining” (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008, p. 59). In coalition politics, the bargaining environment is highly complex. Although the parties draw on their experience from past deals, if any, with regard to the credibility of the other parties, it is still characterized by high information uncertainty and mistrust. Each party considers the implications of a prospective alliance in the next election (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008, pp. 57-59). They also expect diverse benefits from joining a coalition government. The earlier approach to the main motivations of the actors, as mentioned before, emphasizes the importance of acquiring the highest number of cabinet posts. This school of thought, referred to as the *office-driven approach*, presumes that enjoying the rewards of the offices dominates coalition strategies (Riker 1962; Gamson 1961). The later proponents of this school explain this motivation with reference to patronage politics. Patronage refers to the distribution of public resources in exchange for votes (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, p. 83). Accordingly, in countries where the cabinet posts provide substantial discretionary access to public resources, office-seeking behavior will be predominant (Indridason, 2005, p. 462; Druckman and Warwick, 2005).

The other school of thought, known as the *policy-driven approach* focuses on policy preferences. The scholars who put emphasis on the preeminence of policy

preferences point to the fact that the cabinet posts are the main instruments for the parties to implement the policies (Axelrod, 1970; de Swaan, 1973). Therefore, according to these scholars, the fact that parties negotiate the cabinet posts in the first place does not necessarily mean that they downgrade the policy issues. Moreover, while policies might be more important in one country, the distribution of offices might be more important in another (Schofield and Laver, 1985, p. 163). Limiting the explanation of coalition behavior to office-driven motivations was empirically challenged (Laver and Shepsle, 1994, p. 4; Budge and Keman, 1993, pp. 13-15). Hence, currently, the study of the motivations of the parties while bargaining analyzes the office and policy goals together (Müller and Strøm, 2003; Laver and Schofield, 1998). Current datasets, such as the *Manifesto Research Dataset* (Budge, Volkens, Bara and Tanenbaum, 2001; Klingemann and Volkens, 2006) and *Comparative Political Datasets* (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008; Müller and Strøm, 2003), integrate information on cabinet posts, their distribution and the bargains on policy programs. Several other studies also focus on both types of motivations (Baron, 1991; 1993; Budge and Laver, 1986; Budge, 1994; Budge, 2001). These studies indicate that actors have complex motivations, which contribute to the complexity of the bargaining environment. In this complex environment, it is almost impossible to obtain accurate information about the intentions and strategies of the other parties. Therefore, they might try to expand their support base by including different parties whose share of seats are not necessary for maintaining the parliamentary majority. They might also move toward ideologically closer parties for easier legislation.

The motivations of prospective partners have been shaped by the characteristics of the party system, the institutional rules pertaining to government formation and political agendas. A polarized and fragmented party system exacerbates the information uncertainty inherent to the bargaining environment (Dodd, 1976; Laver and Schofield, 1998). The electoral considerations become more important as voters in these party systems change their minds more quickly from one election to another. Hence, parties face a dilemma in the type of cabinet they will seek to form. They might either pursue a coalition formula with ideologically closer allies to increase the chances for a better legislation record, or they might try to exclude their closest competitors with respect to their electoral bases, in which case, they would have to expand the cabinet to counteract the attacks of the opposition. The existence of anti-system parties in parliaments

further influences the coalition formulas (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 569). In this sense, the characteristics of the party systems have repercussions on the bargaining environment, the cabinet type that will emerge and consequently on cabinet durability (Grofman and van Roozendaal, 1997).

Similarly, institutional and decisional rules shape the considerations of parties during the bargaining process. Until the late 1980s, institutional settings were taken as given in the research of coalition governments. However, since this period, studies have emphasized that certain types of cabinets have become prerequisites of survival in some countries. Hence, constitutions have attracted increasing amounts of attention. The most important rule pertaining to government formation, in this sense, has been the investiture requirement. It stipulates getting a vote of confidence from the majority of the parliament. Consequently, minority governments have been rare and short-lived where this rule has been adopted (Strøm, 1990; Martin and Stevenson, 2001, p. 48). The pressure of maintaining a parliamentary majority also created a tendency towards forming surplus coalitions (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 100-102; Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994; Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Similarly, the requirement of qualified majorities increases the possibility of surplus coalitions. A constructive vote of confidence originated in Germany, and has been adopted by Belgium (in 1995) and Spain to balance the destabilizing effect of the investiture.

There have also been other formation rules rooted in the political agenda of some countries. The best example in this regard is the compulsory inclusion of parties representing language groups in Belgium. Among other rules, the prerogatives granting the heads of state to appoint the party leader for starting negotiations is very common. In some countries, the formation process is highly regulated by the position of the *informateur* and *formateur*. An *informateur* is responsible for communicating with the parliamentary parties to clarify their preferences to identify the points of agreement and the set of likely coalitions (De Winter, 1995, p. 120). He/she has often been selected among the retired bureaucrats, former ministers or party leaders so that the *informateur* may assume a certain degree of neutrality. He/she may consult with the heads of state about the optimal coalitions (Martin and Vanberg, 2003). The *informateur* may nominate a *formateur* or just report about the potential *formateurs* who may craft a cabinet which succeeds in getting the support of the majority of the parliament (Golder,

2010, p. 4). Whether the formateur prioritizes office or policy concerns, and also the position of his/her party in the political space shapes not only the type, but also the ideology of the government (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Baron 1991). By using his/her authority to appoint the formateur, the president tries to increase the chances for a government which is ideologically closer to himself/herself to be established and if possible, a government that includes the party that the president has been affiliated with, especially in the countries where the president is elected with popular vote (Kang, 2009, p. 563; Laver and Schofield, 1998). Legislative rules for constitutional amendments and the dissolution of parliament; on the other hand, might also influence stability (Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994, p. 319). Institutions are thus critical for government duration in the sense that they “can make two otherwise similar coalition systems as different as chalk and cheese” (Laver and Schofield, 1998, p. 214).

As the research on bargaining patterns expanded, scholars increasingly noticed that bargaining is not limited to the formation of governments. On the contrary, the entire politics of coalitional life-cycle is an ongoing bargaining process (Laver, 2008; Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, 1995, p. 302). The effects of the conditions of the party system impose constraints on the actions of parties. Moreover, constitutions also outline rules pertaining to coalition governance. In countries where rules enforce collective cabinet responsibilities, parties do their best to maintain the government to avoid losing votes (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). In addition to the party system and institutional constraints, coalition governments are subject to the vagaries of political agendas. The threat posed by a war might enforce durable coalition governments as was the case in the United Kingdom in the 1920s.

1.3. The Study of Coalition Politics and Cabinet Durability in Turkey

Coalition governments prevailed in the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s in Turkey. Nearly 40 percent of all governments have been multiparty arrangements since the first fair elections held in 1950. The reformation of the electoral system towards proportional representation in the early 1960s resulted in the fragmentation of the party system and the emergence of coalition governments. There have been 15 coalition governments in

three different decades in Turkey, which provides high variance that is conducive to detailed analysis. However, the cross-country studies excluded the Turkish coalitions, and the studies by Turkish scholars are few in number compared to the scope of the available data.

The most notable study to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Turkish coalition governments is the *Parlamentar Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri* (Coalition Governments in the Parliamentary Democracies) (Sayarı, 1980). The study focuses on the coalition arrangements in the 1960s and the 1970s. It aims to integrate the Turkish case with the wider coalition literature by testing the hypotheses set by the first generation coalition theorists. The characteristics of the party system, the ideological compatibility of the governing parties and the size of the cabinet are analyzed. Furthermore, the study provides empirical evidence to support the influence of intra-party politics, political culture, the constraints of the political agenda and the decision-making processes on cabinet duration. One of the most interesting findings of this study is the dominance of office considerations in the coalition behavior during these decades.

New studies emerged in the mid-1990s as a new decade of coalition governments started. Ilirjani modeled the coalition bargaining between 1995 and 1998 (Ilirjani, 2000) on the basis of Laver and Shepsle's model of government formation (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Another study focused on political decision making in coalition governance (Aleskerov, Ersel, and Sabuncu, 1999). The distribution of bargaining power between the parties and the stability of the party system during the 1990s was also analyzed (Aleskerov, Ersel and Sabuncu, 2000). The most notable studies took place towards the end of the 1990s and in the most recent decade. Heper and Başkan (2001) tested three main and two corollary hypotheses developed by Budge and Keman (1993) on the Turkish case. They analyzed the coalition governments from the 1960s to the late 1990s and found that the Turkish case differentiated from the European countries on all three of the hypotheses such that Turkish parties did not coalesce against threats to democratic regimes; they did not form the cabinets on the Left-Right cleavage when it is salient; they did not refrain from forming coalitions with anti-system parties unless threatened by the military, and they were predominantly office-oriented, unlike their European counterparts. The authors explained this situation on the

basis of unresolved regime issues around the divide between secularism and religiosity as well as strong state tradition that divided the elite. They also argue that both cleavages enhanced the operation of the political patronage (Heper and Başkan, 2001, pp. 80-83). There are also a number of studies that focused on the particular governments such as the DYP-SHP governments in the first half of the 1990s (Saybaşıllı, 1995) and the DSP-MHP-ANAP government (Beriş and Gürkan, 2001). Two books covered all of the coalition governments; from the first one formed by CHP and AP to the most recent one in 1999. *Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Koalisyon* (Coalitions in the Turkish Political Life) provides rich factual data (Kara, 2007). *Türkiye'de Koalisyon Hükümetleri: 1961-2002* (Coalition Governments in Turkey: 1961-2002) adopts a more analytical perspective. In a chronological order, it analyzes the formation, functioning and termination of the governments (Yalansız, 2006). The most important contribution of this book is that it devoted special importance to the interaction between the actors and found that a political culture characterized by conflict and the absence of accommodation motivations has been the primary factor that decreased cabinet durability. There are many other books written by journalists such as Arcayürek and Bildirici, which serve as memoirs and are helpful for gaining insight in to the details of the events.

There are also contributions by economists. These studies generally focus on the government performance and explore the relationship between the type of government (coalition vs. majority party) and stability. Tutar and Tansel (2000) inquired whether the coalition governments tended to increase budget deficits. In another study, Tutar and Tansel (2011) tested whether government type influenced the state's budget-to-GNP ratio. Other authors discussed the relation between government type and economic growth (Eren and Bildirici, 2001). Şanlısoy and Kök (2010), on the other hand, found that political instability impeded economic growth. These studies; however, tended to take being a coalition government as one of the four major sources of political instability for granted without questioning whether instability stems from government type or other factors. Moreover, they were inconclusive with regard to verifying the relation between the type of government and performance. They either focused on a single aspect of economic performance or used various types of economic data (quarterly, monthly etc.). Preferences for different measures of performance and types of data produced contradictory outcomes.

A particular study of the relationship between the type of government and stability has remedied this problem. It developed a comprehensive measure of economic performance based on major macroeconomic indicators. This study found that coalition governments performed poorly on management of the economy with respect to majority party government; nevertheless, the author admitted that majority party governments also remained far from being effective managers (Karaca, 2003). A political scientist, Kalaycıoğlu (2002) specifically focused on the relationship between government type and economic performance, and reached a similar conclusion. He found that coalition governments did not necessarily perform worse than party governments (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002, p. 65). More importantly, he also pointed out that although majority party governments have been more durable in general, a number of coalition governments have also been quite stable in the case of Turkish governments (Kalaycıoğlu 2002, p. 65). Besides, Kibritçioğlu (2007) found that the RP-DYP coalition government in the period between 1996 and 1997 was one of the governments which best improved bad indicators, providing evidence that short government duration did not necessarily mean bad performance.

1.4. The Trends in the Study of Cabinet Durability

Since the 1960s, a large body of literature emerged in the study of coalition politics, and cabinet durability has been at the center of research. Therefore, the sub-literature considering durability followed the general literary trends. Statistical techniques have been increasingly used in this period. The availability of new techniques has led to the emergence of large datasets, most of which have been public to aid in repeating the analyses. The most recent and notable dataset is the Comparative Political Dataset. Other than the large datasets specifically compiled for coalition research by scholars such as Strøm, Müller, Bergman, Warwick, Laver, Shepsle and Schofield, several studies have relied on specific datasets assembled on the basis of the information from the general data archives such as Keasing's World News Archive and Political Yearbooks of the European Journal of Political Research.

Another trend in the research methodology in the study of coalition politics has been the increasing popularity of game-theory. The centrality of bargaining to coalitions resulted in substantial research using game-theoretic methods for analyzing the bargaining processes. The game-theoretic model in coalition research was first developed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and the number of game-theoretic studies in the field increased, particularly in the most recent two decades parallel to the increased popularity of game theory in general (Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss and Ting, 2005). These studies either model the actual bargaining that took place during a certain government's establishment or design experimental coalition games to understand the actor behavior under a given set of conditions (e.g. Kaarbo and Lantis, 1997; Diermeier et al., 2008; Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2003; Budge and Herman, 1978; Anderson 1967; Albers, Crott, and Murnighan 1985). The scope of the research also expanded in time. There has been increasing interest in the coalitions at the local (Zariski, 1984; Bäck, 2003; Steunenber, 1992; Skjaeveland, Serritzlew, and Blom-Hansen, 2007) and supranational levels, such as the studies of coalition building in the European Parliament (Kreppel and Hix, 2003; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999).

The increased emphasis on research techniques indicates that the study of cabinet durability might need further methodological refinement. The measure used in the analysis might change the inferences that will emerge (Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999; Diermeier and Van Roozendaal, 1998, p. 615). For instance, many studies do not look at the days spent in forming a government. A government term is measured from the day it was installed to the day it officially delivered the mandate to its successor. However, sometimes the government formation process takes as long as months. This period is counted as the term of the already-existing one, which can cause the government life-spans to be miscalculated. Consequently, two governments appear similarly stable, but perhaps are not (Conrad and Golder, 2010). In relation to this point, the existing research is not conclusive about the factors that can shorten coalition governments' life. In other words, a factor which is influential in one country is not so in another (Warwick and Easton, 1992, p. 126). This point also suggests once more that short government duration is not an endemic characteristic of coalition governments.

As far as the literature on the Turkish coalition governments are concerned, the rich factual knowledge hailing mainly from the articles in the daily newspapers

provides a strong ground for detailed analysis. Moreover, these studies adopted a holistic approach. Although the majority of the studies have been journalistic and narrative, there are a small number of studies mentioned above which provide analytical insight. They reveal that many aspects of coalition politics still need elaboration in the light of the recent developments in the theories of coalition.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The primary goal of this dissertation is to analyze the dynamics of cabinet durability in the coalition governments, which were formed in Turkey in the period between the elections in 1991 and in 2002. It aims to locate the Turkish case within a wider inquiry on the multiparty politics. This chapter explains the design of the research carried out in this dissertation. I begin with discussing the development of the research on coalition politics from a methodological perspective. I, then, elaborate on the potential contributions of a within case analysis to the study of coalition politics. Lastly, I delineate the progress of my research.

The pioneering studies in the field of coalition politics emerged in the immediate aftermath of the behavioral revolution. During this period, a variety of statistical techniques was developed that enable the researchers to conduct analyses on large datasets. Quantitative approach has become the dominant research paradigm in the leading journals of political science since 1970s.¹ Cabinet durability has been a central inquiry in the initial studies of the field since 1960s, and the ensuing research design reflected the dominant methodological trend in the social sciences. Students of coalition politics collected information on the characteristics of the governments and the party systems in a number of countries in different time periods. More recent books and articles published in the last two decades indicate that this methodological trend still

¹ Bennett, Barth, and Rutherford (2003) review the methodological trends in the research in social sciences drawing on the articles published in the journals with a high level of impact factors. They find that over 60 percent of all the articles used statistics, while case study was used in less than 20 percent of the articles published in top seven journals in the field of Comparative Politics.

prevails.² The datasets have been expanded with the observations from the countries which were excluded in the previous studies. More recent studies focus on a larger set of independent variables and interpret the factors which fit best. Quantitative inference's empirical strength in the field of coalition politics stems from three main aspects. It enables the researchers to "predict" the factors which are likely to influence cabinet durability. Through the significance tests, we can eliminate alternative hypotheses. The effects of these factors can be isolated from each other as well. This provides information about the extent of the influence of a factor on the duration of the cabinets. Lastly, the gist of these studies is the comparative kernel. The high level of abstraction allows for better comparison.

The explanatory power of these cross-national studies is limited in understanding the dynamics of cabinet durability in individual countries. Most of the variation is explained by the variables which refer to the interaction of a factor within a country (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, 2008, p. 416). In other words, although the variables associated with cabinet attributes, party systems and institutional settings yield statistically significant results; cabinet durability is mostly determined by the interaction of these factors at the national level. Moreover, these studies mainly "predict" the causes rather than explain the causal mechanisms. Hence, they provide limited information as to how a factor interacts with the other characteristics of a political system and affects the duration of a cabinet. Coalition politics is multifaceted and highly complex. Even if the same factors seem to be influential in two factors, different operation of the causal mechanisms may result in different levels of durability. This indicates that despite the voluminous research on the coalition governments, it is still necessary to make in-depth research on the individual countries.

Deeper analysis of a class of cases within a country, in this sense, may improve conceptual validity and enable us to explore the causal mechanisms (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 19-21). Such analysis may still maintain a comparative merit by relying on the concepts which are applicable in the other countries (King, Keohane, and

² Warwick's study (1994, pp. 149-161) represents one of the earlier attempts to develop comprehensive models in the period. The research of Saalfeld (2008, pp. 340-341); on the other hand, is one of the most recent studies in this perspective. It integrates the critical events to the model and uses "cox proportional hazards" technique to predict the determinants of government termination.

Verba, 1994, p. 43; Ragin, 1989, p. 34).³ In this way, it may also contribute to testing and building theories (Lijphart, 1971, p. 692; Landman, 2008, pp. 34-35). Conducting a case-oriented research with a comparative merit requires a mixed methodology as its definition suggests. Indeed, in the course of time, the research projects have become more comprehensive focusing on the interactions of different dimensions of the same phenomenon. As aptly put in a study, “If we are to understand the rapidly changing social world, we will need to include information that cannot be easily quantified as well as that which can” (King et al., 1994, p. 5). Hence, the need for a mixed methodology has been increasingly recognized in comparative politics since mid-1980s (Bennett et al., 2003). In the field of coalition politics, the need for combining large-N and small-N research has become more widespread in the last decade as there is the need for explaining the “meditational processes” of how an event or an institution effect the decisions of the actors (Druckman, 2008, p. 480). In this context, for instance, Bäck and Dumont (2007, p. 468) proposed a two-stage analysis. A statistical analysis should be made to predict the causes in isolation as the first stage, and the deviant cases should be analyzed in detail to understand the causal mechanisms as the second one.

In this study, I follow a similar approach in a different way. I first develop measures to analyze the cases in Turkey, which may also be applicable in the other countries. Then, I compare the Turkish cases with the other countries which were ruled by coalition governments in the same time period. This way, this research design enables zooming in the operation of the causal mechanisms pertaining to durability within Turkish coalition governments. The within-case analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994) may also be used to seek patterns to see whether the cases fit the theories of coalition. The design is also useful in eliminating the rival explanations. Drawing on the similarities and differences in Turkey and the Western European democracies, it seeks the factors which appear in the countries with similar levels of average cabinet durability (Ragin, 1989).⁴ Throughout the research, I conceive Turkish coalition building dynamics not as idiosyncratic but as comparable cases that may help elaborate

³ This type of research design is increasingly referred as the “comparative case study” or the “case-oriented comparative method”.

⁴ This method is known as the Method of Agreement. It was first argued by John Stuart Mill in *A System of Logic* (1843).

on the existing theories in order to locate the Turkish case within a wider analysis on the variation in cabinet durability between and within the countries.

An extensive review of the literature allowed me to derive a set of hypotheses. After the literature review, I collected information from the newspaper coverage on the coalition governments in the period between 1991 and 2002.⁵ In my review of the daily newspapers, I specifically focused on the press speeches and declarations of the politicians who were actively involved in the formation and maintenance of the governments. At this stage, I aimed to find evidence with respect to the factors influencing perceptions of the actors about the strategies and motivations of each other. The newspaper review has been especially useful in shedding light on the dynamics of the interaction between the political actors. It provides fruitful insight into which threat perceptions have governed their decisions in preferring certain parties over the others for coalition partnerships. I also examined the written documents on the coalition governments such as the coalition protocols and government programs to observe the reflections of these perceptions.⁶ Furthermore, I read journalistic studies, memoirs and books on the coalition governments in Turkey.

Building on the review of the scholarly literature and aforementioned resources of information, I begin with questioning whether coalition governments in Turkey and in Western Europe are less durable compared to the majority party governments. In all countries including Turkey, cabinet duration varies with respect to the type of government between the countries and across time. Hence, my main research question is what accounts for the variation in the durability of coalition governments in Turkey assessing the dynamics in a wider comparative perspective. I argue that analyzing which types of coalition cabinets last longer may be a good point of departure. Therefore, I begin with examining the attributes or the characteristics of the cabinets. First, I suggest that *cabinets enjoying parliamentary majority have better survival chances*. However, securing parliamentary majority is not enough for functioning well, if the cabinet is too large to be managed, or the coalition partners have very different

⁵ I reviewed the daily *Milliyet*, *Hürriyet* and to a certain extent *Cumhuriyet* for this period.

⁶ Public versions of these documents are available at <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hukumetler.htm>> (retrieved on 18.01.2010).

policy platforms. Hence, I expect minimal winning cabinets to last longer than the minority and surplus majority cabinets. Similarly, I anticipate that the more mixed the governments are with respect to the positions of the cabinet parties in the policy space, the shorter they last.

A cabinet is more associated with the prime minister and his/her party affiliation than the government (Müller and Strøm, 2003); however, in this study as primary focus is not on these differences; the concepts of cabinet and government are used interchangeably. I count a new cabinet with each parliamentary election, change of party composition or change of the prime minister (Strøm, Müller, Bergman, 2008, p. 6). In this sense, there are nine cabinets in Turkey during the period between the 1991 elections and 2002 elections, seven of which are coalitions. The size of a cabinet, whether it is “large” or “small”, refers to the number of the political parties in the cabinet. The cabinet types are defined as follows: A minimal winning cabinet is composed of parties whose total number of seats is just enough to secure parliamentary majority. A minimal connected winning cabinet is a minimal winning cabinet whose member parties are also ideologically compatible. A surplus or oversize majority cabinet includes parties defection of which will not result in loss of the parliamentary majority. An undersized or a minority coalition cabinet is the one whose combined parliamentary strength is below the majority of the parliament (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 1995, pp. 305-309). Finally, the ideological distance between the cabinet parties reflects a general positioning on the left-right spectrum. In Turkey, while parties such as DSP, SHP and CHP as well as the pro-Kurdish parties have been located to the left of the center; ANAP, DYP, RP and MHP were situated to the right of the center. The positions of the parties in the policy space have been persistent across time (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, p. 117). Accordingly, except for two cabinets (ANAP-DYP and RP-DYP), the rest of the coalition governments were ideologically heterogeneous in this period. In determining the types of Turkish cabinets in the 1990s, I rely on the data from an ongoing project entitled *Party Switching in Turkey. 1991-2002* (Kemahlioğlu and Sayarı, 2011). It provides the information of the number of seats each party had per month.⁷

⁷ I am grateful to Özge Kemahlioğlu and Sabri Sayarı for allowing me to use their dataset although the project is still in progress.

I argue that the type of the cabinet emanates from the bargaining processes, and it is an outcome of the dynamics operated in the formation of the governments. I suggest that the behavior of the actors during the bargaining process is constrained by the characteristics of the party system and the institutional framework. As such, I expect that the higher the degree of fragmentation and polarization, the longer the durability of the governments. The characteristics of the party system have effects on the number of the parliamentary parties and the set of both available and “legitimate” coalition partners. In countries where a fragmented party system was plagued also by high electoral volatility and polarization, parties tend to prioritize future electoral considerations and competition over the leadership of the ideological blocks increases the level of mistrust and information uncertainty between the parties. I measure fragmentation as the effective number of political parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) and polarization as the seat share of the extremist parties. The formal institutions such as the vote of confidence and requirement of qualified majorities for constitutional requirement bolster the fears of the actors with regard to parliamentary defeat. Availability or absence of the institutions, which make overthrowing a government more difficult, also play a role in cabinet duration. In this sense, I expect that *in countries where institutional mechanisms render government formation easier and termination more difficult, the cabinets tend to last longer*. Similarly, *the wider the scope and number of conflict management mechanisms, the longer the cabinets tend to last*. I look at the institutions pertaining to the formation, maintenance and termination of the governments in this context. I explore whether the constitutions include articles on the vote of confidence, qualified majorities, motions of censure and other institutions. I further explore whether the parties devised platforms for resolving the inter-party problems. The different trajectories of the countries suggest that the issues on the political agenda and the extra-parliamentary actors also constrain the decisions of the government parties. Therefore, I examine the powers and roles of heads of state, business circles and the military establishment where applicable.

I aimed to verify or discard these arguments through in-depth interviews based on a semi-structured question form (Appendix 2). The content of the questions pertain to the details of the bargaining process in the formation of the governments and later during the crisis. Therefore, I tried to interview the individuals who served in the coalition governments between 1991 and 2002. Obviously, the nature of the research

does not allow a random sampling. However, I increased variation within the sample by targeting to interview at least one minister from each party of each cabinet (List of interviewees is available in Appendix 1). I also managed to interview a number of politicians who served in multiple cabinets. This allowed me to make a better comparison in understanding the transformation of the dynamics in consecutive cabinets. I conducted in-depth interviews in Ankara and İstanbul. Each one lasted around an hour and a half. I began with asking how the interviewee's party decided to begin negotiating with the prospective partner. In this part, I asked the details of bargains and motivations of the parties. In the second part, I gave specific examples from the events of the period and asked questions about how the parties solved the crises. In the final part, I tried to understand their perceptions as to the turning points in the life of the governments. I also asked about how they evaluated the powers of the heads of state, how they evaluate coalition governments with respect to main advantages and drawbacks and how they perceived the differences and similarities between the Turkish and Western European coalition governments. I assume that the politicians I interviewed with are rational actors who have tried to maximize their benefits while minimizing costs.

For the comparative analysis, I use the *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining Dataset* (Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 2008).⁸ This dataset includes both party and coalition governments from 1945 until January 1999 in seventeen Western European democracies. During the 1990s, coalition governments were formed in thirteen countries: Italy, Finland, Denmark, Austria, Norway, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Iceland. Therefore, I compare the dynamics only in these countries with those of Turkey. Since the period I analyze for Turkey ends in November 2002, I updated the dataset so as to include the governments formed between January and December 1999 regardless of the date the governments came to an end. In Chapter 5, I look at the period between 1990 and 2006.

⁸ I would like to thank Torbjörn Bergman for sharing the dataset before it was made public.

CHAPTER 3

COALITION FORMATION AND GOVERNANCE, 1991-2002

In this chapter, I analyze the coalition governments of the 1990s with respect to how they were formed and governed. The scholarly literature on coalition governments in Western democracies emphasizes the importance of the characteristics of party systems in the formation, maintenance and breakdown of coalition arrangements (Müller and Strøm, 2003; Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, 2008; Warwick, 1994; Budge and Keman, 1993; Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Consequently, my analysis in this chapter begins with exploring the major trends in Turkish party politics and party systems between the period of 1991 to 2002. The literature on coalition governments similarly focuses on the importance of formal (i.e. institutional rules) and informal (i.e. extra-parliamentary) constraints on the bargaining processes and functioning of the governments (Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2003; Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994). These issues are discussed in this chapter next, followed by the elaboration of the interaction between the governing parties during the governance.

3.1. Turkish Party System in the 1990s

Following the 1980 military coup, Turkey had majority party governments from 1983 to 1991. During this period, governments were formed by ANAP which enjoyed parliamentary majorities with ease until the 1991 parliamentary elections that did not produce a majority party in the parliament. Instead, five parties shared the seats. Two major parties of the center-right secured substantial number of deputies in the parliament (DYP, 178; ANAP, 115 seats) followed by the social democrats (SHP, 88


seats). A pro-Islamist party, RP, managed to enter the parliament as well and obtained 62 of the seats, while another center-left party, DSP, secured 7 seats (Table 3.1.). The 1995 elections highlighted the increasing amount of popular support for the pro-Islamist RP which had already proven that it had become, in Sartori's terms (1976), a "relevant party" in the 1991 elections. Parliamentary elections in 1995; on the other hand, signaled the decline of the center-right, namely DYP and ANAP, and demonstrated that electoral support for the center-left parties was further diminishing. The collapse of the center accelerated further in the 1999 elections. DSP came first largely due to the capture of Öcalan during its minority government. MHP doubled its vote share with respect to the previous election. FP, the successor of RP, could not reach RP's vote share in the previous elections and came third.

<i>1991 Elections</i>			<i>1995 Elections</i>			<i>1999 Elections</i>		
<i>Party</i>	<i>Vote Share (%)</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Vote Share (%)</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Vote Share (%)</i>	<i>Seats</i>
DYP	27.03	178	RP	21.38	158	DSP	22.19	136
ANAP	24.01	115	ANAP	19.65	132	MHP	17.98	129
SHP	20.75	88	DYP	19.18	135	FP	15.41	111
RP	16.88	62	DSP	14.64	76	ANAP	13.22	86
DSP	10.75	7	CHP	10.71	49	DYP	12.01	85
			MHP	8.18		CHP	8.71	
			HADEP	4.17		HADEP	4.75	
						BBP	1.46	
						Independents	0.87	3

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

Throughout the 1990s, the Turkish party system was characterized by high electoral volatility, ideological polarization and fragmentation. Although these major trends have been salient since the beginning of the multiparty period, each indicator peaked between 1991 and 2002 (Çarkoğlu, 1998). Among the features of the party system, fragmentation has been the most important trend, one that impinges upon the formation and functioning of governments (Figure 3.1.). Although several factors such as deepening social cleavages can be considered to explain the rise of fragmentation (Kalaycıoğlu, 1997; Hazama, 2003), concomitant splits within the center-right and the

center-left, as well as gradual erosion of electoral support to these parties, have been the primary sources (Sayarı, 2002). The way the party system was fragmented had major implications for the bargaining environment. Division within the center was the main cause of fragmentation, and it was accompanied by high electoral volatility. This prevented emergence of a dominant party which could have become a platform for alternative coalitions (Sayarı, 2007, p. 203) similar to the Christian Democratic parties in Italy and Luxembourg. Animosity between the party leaders rather than policy platform differences within the center parties increased fragmentation (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu and Şenatarlar, 2004, p. 310). This was also reflected in the relations between the party leaders in the bargaining process.



Another factor that increased the level of fragmentation in this period was party switching (Kemahlioğlu and Sayarı, 2011). Information uncertainty is one of the key factors that shape the interaction between the parties in the coalition governments (Dodd, 1976; Luebbert, 1983; Budge and Keman, 1993; Martin and Vanberg, 2004). In the Turkish case, switching to another party or establishing a new party reinforced mistrust within and between the parties, and changed the distribution of the bargaining power.¹ For instance, a considerable number of deputies switched from DYP to ANAP right before RP and DYP concluded the coalition agreement, which weakened DYP's

¹ Kemahlioğlu and Sayarı, (2011) and Turan, (1985) provide extensive empirical evidence on party switching in Turkey.

leverage in negotiations. Moreover, almost one third of SHP deputies defected to CHP in 1992 and 1993. This diminished SHP's power to pass legislation to which DYP had already been opposing (SHP Parti İçi Eğitim Semineri, 1993, pp. 11-12). Through all of these, party switching affected not only formation and functioning, but also the stability of the Turkish coalition governments in the 1990s.

Another characteristic of the Turkish party system which had implications for the coalition behavior was polarization. During the 1990s, the electorate disillusioned with the government parties gradually moved away from the center to the right. This transformation reverberated in the rising conservative tendencies characterized by elements of nationalism and political Islam (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; 2009). The previous type of polarization during the 1970s was based on the left-right cleavage, and it was moderated in 1990s in response to global developments. However, cleavages based on ethnic nationalism and the pro-Islamist versus secularist divide deepened. RP emerged as a far-right party with an alleged anti-systemic discourse during the mid-1990s, and came first in the 1995 elections.

In fragmented party systems, parties tend to prioritize electoral considerations over policies, and the bargaining environment is destabilized with the continuous tendency to renegotiate the coalition arrangements (Laver and Schofield, 1998, p. 158). However, in many multipolar party systems in Europe, such as the Netherlands and Finland, the dominant parties maintained their electoral strength in consecutive elections thereby limiting the destabilizing effect of fragmentation (Andeweg, 2000). Therefore, it became possible to form alternating coalitions including the dominant party. As mentioned before, the Turkish case was different though (Sayarı, 2007). In the absence of a dominant party, the bargaining environment tends to be more complex with a high number of parties. An anti-system party; on the other hand, is considered to be a destabilizing factor in the party system in general (Sartori, 1976). The existence of an anti-system party diminished the number of feasible government formulas as other parties refrained from coalescing with those parties, such as the communist parties of the Cold War (e.g. in Belgium, Italy and Austria), popular protest parties in Sweden and Norway, and, far-right parties in France, Italy and Belgium (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 569). Nevertheless, in some instances, parties also united against the anti-system parties

(Budge and Keman, 1993), and this ameliorated the confrontational bargaining environment (Warwick, 1994, p. 14). In the Turkish case, it is debatable whether there was an anti-system party. On the one hand, RP's landslide victory in the 1995 elections created the concern for many people that the party might be a threat to secular democracy. As a consequence, civil society groups as well as other political actors put pressure on the two major center right parties, ANAP and DYP, to form a coalition government although the two parties had persistently refrained from joining together in a government between 1991 and 1995.² In spite of these efforts, the centrist parties did not treat RP as an anti-system party they would never ally with. ANAP called off a cabinet with RP in the last minute (Şanlıtürk, 2004, 34-35), while the RP-DYP government under Erbakan lasted nearly a year. Similarly, this government was often characterized by compromise and retreat (Altunışık and Tür, 2005), which may not be expected from a genuine anti-system party. Nevertheless, the rise of RP created concern in the public opinion. This put pressure on the secularist parties in their communication with RP for prospective coalition arrangements. In this context, these characteristics of the Turkish party system during the 1990s increased uncertainty and mistrust first in the processes of coalition building, and then during the functioning of the governments. Its major impact was mostly in the form of bargaining failures between parties with similar policy platforms, and the prioritization of electoral considerations over policies in the absence of a dominant party.

3.2. Formal and Informal Constraints on the Coalition Governments

A constraint refers to any restriction on the behavior of political parties and their leaders during coalition bargaining processes beyond their short-term control (Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994, p. 308). The constraints encroach upon government formation as they limit the set of feasible coalitions through the constitution and electoral laws.

² The desire for a ANAP-DYP coalition has been salient in the newspapers in the aftermath of the 1995 elections. A notable business organization, TÜSİAD sent a page-long advertisement to the mainstream daily newspapers to encourage the two parties of the center-right for building a coalition government (Yalansız, 2006, p. 466).

Moreover, the rules pertaining to governance and termination phases also influence the actors' decisions in the bargaining process since they would try to avoid forging coalitions that would be relatively fragile in the long-term. In the Turkish case, there were both formal (institutional) and informal (extra-parliamentary) constraints. However, most of the time, they intertwined with each other.

Constitutions have been and still are the main documents which depict the basic institutional rules pertaining to government formation and functioning in Western European democracies as well as in Turkey. In the European democratic process, a head of state appoints a party leader to form the government; it does not matter if the head of state is a monarch or the president of the republic. Indeed, this is a ceremonial power in many parliamentary systems. Although heads of state usually appoint the leader of the largest party in the parliament (Andeweg, 2000), in some countries, presidents have far-reaching prerogatives in government formation. For instance, in Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland, heads of state appoint a *formateur* and/or *informateur* (De Winter, 1995, p. 123). The main difference between a party leader who is appointed to form the government in other countries and a *formateur/informateur* is that while the former simply pursues his own parties' interests, the latter has a responsibility to craft optimal coalition arrangements acceptable to all sides (Martin and Vanberg, 2003). In Finland, the head of state also has the right to suggest a set of instructions for inter-party negotiations (Nousiainen, 2000, p. 268).

Article 104/b of the Turkish constitution (1982) gives the power to select the prospective prime minister to the president. In this respect, Turkish institutional rules regarding government formation are similar to the majority of European democracies. Most of the time, presidents appoint the leader of the largest party. However, it should be noted that the 1982 constitution changed the balance of powers between government divisions in favor of the executive branch. Relying on the extended constitutional prerogatives, President Demirel appointed Yılmaz rather than Çiller in 1997 after the RP-DYP government resigned. Moreover, it is claimed that he attempted to break RP-DYP government up (Öke, Tirali and Akın, 2002). Certainly, these examples constitute a major departure from the accepted practice in parliamentary systems. There are also a few instances where Demirel reportedly recommended certain names for ministerial

posts after Prime Minister Ecevit submitted his list of names for the cabinet. For example, İsmail Cem argues that although he was originally named the minister of culture, on Demirel's demand he assumed the ministry of foreign affairs (Dündar, 2008, p. 200). In this sense, the extent of involvement of the president in the formation of Turkish governments is reminiscent of the Finnish, Italian and Portuguese practices (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 568).

A second institutional constraint on government formation and functioning pertains to the investiture requirement. In fact, an investiture requirement or vote of confidence is the most important institutional rule which influences coalition governance in Europe (Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2003, p. 28). It limits alternative coalition arrangements, and the bargaining environment becomes more complex as the investiture requirement reinforces the tendency for oversized governments. For example in Italy, Ireland and Portugal, a government has to get a vote of confidence to be inaugurated. Likewise, Article 110 of the Turkish constitution establishes an investiture requirement for taking office. Article 175; on the other hand, adds to the weight of the parliamentary arithmetic by requiring qualified majorities of three-fifths and two-thirds for constitutional amendments. It should be noted that the requirement of qualified majorities in legislation is common in Europe; even in some countries like Austria and Finland which did not adopt investiture requirements. Investiture requirements are important in understanding why minority governments are rare in Turkey, although almost one third of governments were minority governments in other European countries between 1945 and 1980 (Strøm, 1984). Only 5 out of 60 governments between 1923 and 2010 in Turkey were minority governments, 3 of which could not get a vote of confidence. Parties seek majorities in forming coalitions to secure investiture, but they have to consider obtaining qualified ones, if they have policy provisions that might require constitutional amendment.

Institutional rules emphasize the importance of the parliamentary strength of the government vis-à-vis the opposition. However, the parliamentary arithmetic is shaped by the electoral system, which is depicted in the 1983 Parliamentary Election Law. According to Article 33, parties have to pass the 10 percent national threshold to be

entitled to have seats in the parliament, making the votes-to-seats formula (d'Hondt)³ privilege larger parties. As such, the electoral system limits the number of parties that can enter the parliament. Moreover, smaller parties opt for pre-election alliances. This also adds to the complexities of the bargaining environment. For instance, because some HEP deputies entered the parliament on the lists of SHP in the 1991 elections, some DYP deputies and provincial branches hesitated to form a DYP-SHP coalition government (Milliyet, 23.10.1991). Likewise, the nationalist-Islamist BBP competed under ANAP in the 1995 elections. They bolstered conservative tendencies within ANAP towards forming a government with RP (Kara, 2007, p. 234). Finally, the Political Parties Law of 1983 in Turkey determined the kind of parties that can be formed, and the conditions for banning parties from political activities. In its content before the amendments, Article 96 implied that the republican establishment identifies not only radicalism (i.e. communism and fascism), but also pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist parties as a threat to political system.

Extra-parliamentary actors including the military, the presidents and the business circles declare their preferences in the government formation phases in a similar way. Among the extra-parliamentary actors, the military may be identified as the most influential institution in Turkey with regard to coalition politics. Those who emphasize the role of military in politics argue that the threat of a coup develops an understanding of permissible actions and behavior (Çarkoğlu, 1998; Ahmad, 1993, p. 137). However, apart from the exception of the February 28 process in 1997,⁴ whether the military establishment had direct impact on government formation and functioning in the 1990s or not is questionable. In my interviews, respondents who served in the ANAP-DYP,

³ The d'Hondt is a method used in list proportional systems to allocate the seats to the parties on the basis of their vote shares. Accordingly, seats are first distributed to parties on the basis of a set of divisors. For the calculation of seats on the basis of this formula, please see Lijphart and Aitkin (1994, p. 153).

⁴ The February 28 Process refers to the period that began with a National Security Council meeting on February 28, 1997. In this meeting, members of the military identified the rise of political Islam as one of the leading threats to the regime, accused the RP-DYP government of encouraging reactionary activities and outlined a set of policy suggestions to be applied by the current as well as prospective governments.

RP-DYP⁵ and the ANAP-DSP-DTP cabinets referred to the role of the military in the formation of the governments with varying degrees of emphasis. A former minister from RP identified the pressures from the military establishment as the key factor which deterred ANAP from a coalition with their party.⁶ Respondents from ANAP also confirmed this to be a key factor.⁷ Another minister from the ANAP-DSP-DTP cabinet argued that they formed this government so that the democratic regime would not be interrupted.⁸ Having said that, it should be noted that the overall analysis of the interviews indicates the role of the Turkish military during the formation of governments in the mid-1990s to be relatively indirect. The fact that skepticism of the military towards RP was salient played a powerful role in the perception of the leaders in terms of the permissive coalitions. As a notable minister of the period states: “No one from the military directly contacted me, but a number of my close friends have been warning me to refrain from a coalition with RP on the basis of potential reaction from the army.”⁹ In this context, even if the military wanted its preferences for coalition alternatives to be considered, the leading figures did not directly interfere. Instead, they relied on the politicians and civil society groups to exclude RP. It was also argued that it was rather through President Demirel that the military’s discontent and the popular skepticism against RP were finally taken into consideration (Donat, 1999).

⁵ Despite the alleged pressures from the pro-secular actors, DYP had to join a government with RP as Erbakan threatened to table new motions in the parliament referring to corruption charges against DYP’s leader, Çiller (Öke, Tirali and Akın, 2002).

⁶ Interview on April 8, 2011.

⁷ Interviews on April 22 and May 6, 2011.

⁸ Interview on April 27, 2011.

⁹ Interview on April 22, 2011.

3.3. Patterns of Coalition Government Formation and Bargaining

In the formation of governments, parties consider a number of factors. They aim to secure substantial support in the parliament to start with. However, as Riker (1962, p. 33) notes "... they seek to maximize only up to the point of subjective certainty of winning." In the 1990s, two out of the seven coalition governments (of DYP in 1996 and DSP in 1999) were minority coalitions, only one of which could take office. Two governments formed by DYP were minimal winning coalition governments while the rest were oversize or surplus majority governments (Table 3.2.). This was mainly due to the investiture requirement of the Turkish constitution which encouraged the parties for seeking larger majorities as a precaution against parliamentary defeat.

<i>Government</i>	<i>Party Composition</i>	<i>Type of Government</i>	<i>Nr of Seats in the Parliament*</i>
(49) VII. Demirel gov't	I. DYP-SHP	surplus majority	266
(50) I. Çiller gov't	II. DYP-SHP	minimal winning	235
(52) III. Çiller gov't	DYP-CHP	minimal winning	243
(53) II. Yılmaz gov't	ANAP-DYP	minority coalition	261
(54) Erbakan gov't	RP-DYP	surplus majority	293
(55) III. Yılmaz gov't	ANAP-DSP-DTP	minority coalition	204
(57) IV. Ecevit gov't	DSP-MHP-ANAP	surplus majority	352

* *Party Switching in Turkey Dataset (Kemahlioğlu and Sayarı, 2011).*

The academic literature on coalition governments also pays special attention to the ideological distance between parties (Axelrod, 1970; Laver and Schofield, 1998, p. 151). When we look at the Turkish case, we see that throughout the 1990s, political parties were located in the policy space with respect to the ethnicity cleavage and the secular versus pro-Islamist divide. These cleavages could also be evaluated as partial surrogates of the left-right divide (Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006). Hence, only two governments, DYP-ANAP and RP-DYP, were formed by parties on the same side of the left-right cleavage.

The characteristics of a coalition cabinet are influenced by whether the parties value being in the government. The oversized cabinets are more likely to emerge when the actors in general desire to join the government, which is the case in Turkey. Despite minor groups of dissidents, parties generally wanted to be in the government whenever it was possible in the 1990s. Two factors seem to increase the value of incumbency. First, opposition parties in Turkey had very little influence on governmental decisions as the incumbent parties did not necessarily seek their consent once they secured the necessary majority status. Second, incumbency through controlling ministries provided discretionary access to public resources in many countries (Druckman and Warwick, 2005). In the 1990s, privatization was more limited in Turkey compared to today, and the state owned more economic ventures. In other words, there were more public economic enterprises under the purview of certain ministries.¹⁰ This meant more pork-barrel opportunities and more potential for patronage and corruption. Combination of these two factors meant that parties which stay in opposition may face the risk of erosion, since they cannot vocalize the demands of their voters and distribute pork-barrel. A respondent refers to this point as “The wide range of economic opportunities emanating from having a seat in the cabinet is very attractive. Only those who are not on good terms with the leaders may abstain knowing that chances for being in the cabinet are very low, but those voices are generally ignored.”¹¹

Nevertheless, some parties refrained from joining the government from time to time. CHP, for instance, refrained from joining ANAP-DSP-DTP coalition. Strøm (2007, p. 792) argues that parties may refrain from becoming government members where a previous government is terminated by a critical event, electoral volatility is high; and, an early election seems a close possibility. The CHP example might be explained by the following factors as well. The RP-DYP government had come to an end by the *February 28 Process* and the political agenda was very turbulent. Both DSP and ANAP wanted to include CHP in the government to form a grand coalition after a quasi-coup. However, CHP devised its strategy on a potential negative effect of incumbency on the electoral outcomes, hoping that voters disappointed with DSP in

¹⁰ Interview on April 6, 2011.

¹¹ Interview on April 6, 2011.

such a government would prefer CHP instead.¹² In that period, polls indicated that DSP might not make it over the electoral threshold; hence, the CHP leader might have counted on its influence on DSP voters to vote strategically for the next party on the left of the center. It is also argued that the DSP leader wanted to include CHP in the government to share the responsibilities for the same reason.¹³ CHP's support party status in this respect resembles the Greens who preferred to remain as support parties both in New Zealand and Sweden (Bale and Bergman, 2006; Bale and Dann, 2002).

In the Turkish case, the existence of a party persistently in support status emphasizes the importance of the electoral system and the party system for who gets in the government. The characteristics of the party system further conditioned decisions of the political actors extensively. Similar to DSP and CHP, DYP and ANAP tried to avoid joining the same government as much as they could, not only in the ANAP-DSP-DTP government, but also throughout the entire period. This pattern was not unique to the 1990s. In the 1960s, smaller parties refrained from coalescing into larger parties with similar policy platforms, as the credit for success would be claimed by larger parties (Sayar, 1980, pp.169-171). Moreover, their deputies could switch to the larger party which, in turn, could result in an eventual disappearance from politics.

3.3.1. Bargaining

Bargaining is central for understanding coalition governments, as they are agreements reached after quite long negotiations, during which the parties give up on some of their demands and maintain others in order to devise a common policy program. As coalition governments are formed and maintained by multiple actors, bargaining is a continuous process starting from the government formation phase until its termination. Political parties bargain over government membership, policy programs and coalition payoffs. Parties negotiate policies and communicate during crises after a

¹² Interview on April 22, 2011.

¹³ Interview on April 22, 2011.

cabinet takes office. Governments come to an end when they cannot further bargain on a certain issue. In other words, government survival depends on successful bargaining.

In some countries such as Italy and Sweden and to a lesser extent Norway and Denmark, government formation is more regulated (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 567) than in most European countries including Turkey. Neither the constitution, nor any other legal documents provides specific rules or mechanisms pertaining to government formation or bargaining in Turkey, except the investiture requirement. There are pre-election pacts in some countries, which set rules for the actual bargaining process after a general election. In Turkey; on the other hand, pre-election alliances were made between the parties mostly in the form of smaller party candidates competing in the elections on the lists of the larger parties. Such alliances were specific to the 1990s since an absence of an electoral threshold did not require such alliances in the 1960s or 1970s. The pre-election pacts of this period were also quite different from the vocal and publicized pacts such as German *Koalitionsaussagen* (Decker and Best, 2010), being instead rather semi-concealed election alliances. In the 1991 elections, RP, MÇP and IDP made a pact under RP, while HEP and SHP made another one on the left. Although it was not made public, and its existence was denied from time to time, SHP and HEP signed a secret election protocol for determining the number of candidates in the southeast and eastern Anatolia for each party, agreeing that they would not reject the names identified by the other side (Sevinç, 2000, pp. 295-298). In the 1995 elections, the BBP candidates competed on the ANAP lists and the SİP candidates competed on the HADEP lists. These were again electoral alliances rather than pacts. Aside from these examples, review of the newspaper coverage indicates that a number of parties may have carried out negotiations before the elections or during the term of another cabinet for prospective options. There were two examples in this respect. DYP may be communicating with RP while the DYP-CHP was still in power in 1995.¹⁴ A

¹⁴ A newspaper footage argued that Baykal threatened to resign from the cabinet on the basis of increased rumours with respect to a prospective coalition between DYP and RP. "Hükümeti Bozarım", *Milliyet*, 20.11.1995.

rapprochement between DSP and ANAP was signaled even before the 1995 elections.¹⁵ This rapprochement was also confirmed by the respondents from the two parties in the interviews.¹⁶ As mentioned before, none of these were in the form of a series of bargaining processes in which the coalition agreement was designed before the elections and realized in its aftermath.

In the absence of the institutional mechanisms and rules, as well as explicit pre-election coalition pacts, government formation and bargaining is largely shaped by informal rules and practices as well as personal contributions, referred to as “free-style bargaining between elites” (Laver and Schofield, 1998). In my research, I searched for bargaining patterns and characteristics in in-depth interviews, secondary sources such as memoirs, and I also reviewed newspapers from the coalition government years of the 1990s.

Firstly, although government formation required the legal appointment of a party leader by the president to start negotiations, bargaining has been mostly informal in the Turkish context. Although there is no legal informateur position, Hüsametdin Özkan’s role in the negotiations before the ANAP-DSP-MHP coalition and the DSP minority government were formed resembled that of an informateur. He went back and forth between a number of parties so as to identify potential points of agreement and prospective coalitions. During the formation of ANAP-DSP-MHP government, the main purpose was to build a viable government formula which would exclude RP and function smoothly. During the formation of the DSP minority government, he mainly intended to get the support of ANAP and DYP to prevent lingering of bargaining processes and install a government in a short-time to restore the stability in the political system.¹⁷ Secondly, although the leaders needed the authorization of the central executive boards of the parties to start coalition talks, this did not mean that the issues

¹⁵ In a press statement, Yılmaz mentioned that the leader of DSP was positive for a coalition after the elections. “Mesut Yılmaz’ın Seçim Sonrası Planı: Çiller’siz Birleşme”, *Milliyet*, 06.12.1995.

¹⁶ Interviews on April 22 and May 3, 2011.

¹⁷ Interview on April 22, 2011.

were widely discussed within the parties, no matter whether a party was appointed for government formation or was just a prospective smaller coalition partner. For example, Sevinç (2000, p. 48) argues that only Erdal İnönü and Hikmet Çetin knew the content of the secret protocol between SHP and HEP. This might also be explained with the absence of an intraparty democracy to a certain extent. As the examples suggest, coalition bargaining has been mostly conducted during the talks between the inner circles of the parties in communication.

When a party was expected to preside over government, a small group of top party executives, usually of three or four people, started to discuss the prospects. Among these circles, some figures (such as Hikmet Çetin from SHP, Mustafa Kalemli from ANAP, and of course Hüsamettin Özkan from DSP) became prominent in coordinating talks between parties in the 1990s.¹⁸ The same groups usually designated their essential demands with respect to the ministries and policies. In practice, in all these governments, two separate teams were established once two or three parties decided to form a government.¹⁹ Both teams were composed of members from each party. The first team was the negotiation team, usually composed of the general secretaries and/or vice chairs in addition to the party leaders. Sides exchanged papers about the office and policy priorities that were prepared beforehand in their parties. Once they reached an agreement on these issues, a second team was formed for writing the coalition protocols and the government programs. This team was composed of politically less prominent figures who had advisory statuses in the parties, usually with law or academic backgrounds. On average, each team again included three or four members from each side. These teams were relatively small compared to the negotiation teams in other European countries. For example, negotiation teams were made up of 15-20 members in the German coalition bargaining processes (Saalfeld, 2003, p. 47). This is re-emphasizing the decisive role of the inner circles within the Turkish parties.

¹⁸ Interviews on April 22 and 29, 2011.

¹⁹ Interview on May 16, 2011.

There is a substantial debate over whether office or policy motivations prevail during the bargaining process ever since Riker's (1962) pioneering research and De Swaan's (1973) counter-arguments. Opponents criticize the school of thought which depict parties as mere office-seekers, arguing that there is no conclusive empirical evidence in support of this claim, and add that office-seeking parties also consider policies through controlling relevant ministries, even if the ultimate aim is to impress voters (Budge and Keman, 1993). However, the presence of patronage or clientelism in the form of distribution of public resources in exchange for votes (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, p. 86), might lead parties to act as office-seekers rather than policy-seekers. This, for instance, explains why parties behave as office-seekers in Iceland, although they tend to prioritize policy considerations in other Nordic countries (Indridason, 2005, p. 462).

The research on the Turkish coalition governments in the 1990s provided supporting evidence in this regard. Coalition bargaining in the 1990s seems to have taken place mostly for the offices, and there was relatively less debate on policies and programs in the negotiation teams' talks. This might partly be related to the fact that patronage was a characteristic feature of Turkish politics (Sayarı 1977; Kalaycıoğlu, 2001), which was probably the main factor that had prevented the parties from focusing mainly on policies (Heper and Başkan, 2001, p. 82). Heper and Keyman (1998, p. 259) further argue that even when policy considerations came to the forefront, they were not devoid of electoral prospects. The office dimension of the negotiations was a recurrent theme in the interviews as well. Interestingly, although the question pertaining to the coalition talks did not include any specific reference to the distribution of cabinet posts (Appendix 2), the respondents cited policy issues very rarely with the possible exceptions of the bargaining processes on the eve of the I. DYP-SHP and DSP-MHP-ANAP governments. DYP and SHP's main motivation to coalesce after the 1991 elections, as explicitly written in the coalition agreement and the government program, was to erase the ramifications of the 1980 coup and its "collaborator" ANAP's policies. Both parties had similar emphases on democratization and social welfare in their election manifestos. In the case of the DSP-MHP-ANAP government, both parties sought conciliation over the law on the status of the state security courts, discrimination in the public sphere and Quran courses in the summer months for students past than the

fifth grade (Tutar, 2006, p. 419). This was probably an initiative from the MHP side as it was the first time they joined a government, and they felt the need to act in advance as they knew that these issues would be on the political agenda. Other than the office-motivations, another reason as to why there was relatively less debate on policies in the bargaining process might be the declining salience of the left-right cleavage globally as often referred to in the interviews. However, this does not explain why DYP and RP or ANAP and RP did not have much controversy over the policy differences despite the rise and sharpening of the secular versus pro-Islamist cleavage in the 1990s. Thus, it might not be unrealistic to claim that another consideration was to speed up the bargaining process, and leave the policy debates to the later stages of governance.

As far as bargaining for coalition payoffs is considered, parties, as expected, negotiated with certain ministries and the deputies they nominated for the cabinet. In the Turkish Council of Ministers, there have been both state ministries and investor ministries (“yatırımcı bakanlıklar”). The negotiation teams first bargained over the distribution of investor ministries. Then, the state ministries were allocated. At this stage, parties tried to make the total distribution of ministries more or less in proportion to the seat shares of the parties. In terms of the investor ministries, two motivations seem to govern the bargaining process: the redistributive capacity and the size of the staff. More ideological or programmatic parties such as MHP, RP and SHP tended to insist on getting the ministry of education. MHP and RP were the successors of other nationalist and pro-Islamist parties respectively. In the 1960s and 1970s, when these parties were in governments, they became notorious for colonizing the ministries for ideological reasons. For this reason, their partners tended to insist on keeping the ministry of education under control.²⁰ In the case of the IDYP-SHP government, SHP was concerned about DYP’s candidate for the ministry of education and gave up on this ministry only after DYP reassured SHP’s worries by promising to appoint Köksal Toptan, a more moderate and liberal candidate. During the DSP-MHP-ANAP government’s formation process, this ministry became more important as an extension of the compulsory education to eight years was on the agenda. This change was designated previously in the National Security Council decisions during the February

²⁰ Interview on April 29, 2011.

28 process in 1997. Therefore, in addition to the colonization worries, DSP insisted on keeping the ministry of education under its control to oversee its implementation.²¹ The ministry of education also had material value, given that it had vast personnel which could be used by the parties to provide job opportunities to their supporters and garner votes in the next elections.

For the rest of the ministries in this period, clientelist motivations were also at work. In this respect, the state ministries which controlled the administration of the economy and certain banks such as Vakıfbank, Halkbankası, Ziraat Bankası and Emlak Bankası, as well as the ministries of finance and health had been subject to fierce controversy in the bargaining rounds. The ministry of agriculture and rural affairs had also been critical as it has had potential to increase votes in rural areas through distributing subsidies. Nevertheless, it should be noted that DSP refrained from assuming any of these ministries. They were prone to patronage, DSP did not want to face corruption allegations. A former cabinet member from ANAP recited this point as “Ecevit openly said that he did not want to get any of the investor ministries. He said that there was too much speculation in the public opinion about these ministries and that he did not want to be accused of corruption”.²² The ministry of the interior, along with the ministry of education; on the other hand, seems to have more policy value. The ministry of the interior was responsible for internal security and order, and its importance further increased in the 1990s as political violence escalated.

In the distribution of coalition payoffs, getting more “valuable” ministries indicated whether bargaining power between the parties was dispersed or concentrated in the hands of a party. As in the coalition governments of 1960s and 1970s (Sayarı 1980, p. 236), larger parties tended to get more critically important ministries in the 1990s. Larger parties almost always got the ministry of the interior as it was the most critical ministry of the time. There were two exceptions to this trend. In the RP-DYP government, presumably in order to avoid potential opposition from the military establishment, the president and other hard-liner secularist social actors, DYP rather

²¹ Interview on April 22, 2011.

²² Interview on April 22, 2011.

than RP assumed it.²³ In the DSP-MHP-ANAP government, although ANAP was the smallest party, it took control of the ministry of the interior. On behalf of MHP, this was reasoned with the party's over-sensitive electoral base; thus, they did not want to be in the position of controlling the ministry in charge of security and order in case they would be perceived as failing to maintain the peace.²⁴ The motivations of DSP were less clear. It has been argued that DSP was also concerned with electoral punishment since it was not known if the capture of Abdullah Öcalan would put an end to the terror. Moreover, allegedly the DSP leadership did not trust their deputies' competence in the area.²⁵

Larger parties controlled some other ministries such as the ministries of finance and energy, which had office-related values. Again in terms of both ministries, DSP was an exception presumably for the reasons mentioned above. A comparison of the trends in the distribution of critical ministries by decade reveals that the economic and political value of the ministries changed over time. Sayarı (1980, p. 236) states the importance of the ministries of foreign affairs and national defense among the offices larger parties insisted on getting, while they voluntarily gave the ministries of health and public works to the smaller parties in the previous decades of coalition governments. However, in the 1990s, the ministry of the interior became more important at the expense of national defense, and the strengthening of the office of prime ministry decreased the value of the foreign ministry. Ministries of health and public works, on the other hand, became important for pork-barrel opportunities.

²³ Interview on April 6, 2011.

²⁴ Interview on April 29, 2011.

²⁵ Interview on May 3, 2011.

Table 3.3.1. Distribution of Coalition Payoffs										
Cabinet	PM	Deputy PM	Justice	Defense	Interior	Foreign	Finance	Public Works	Education	Health
(49)I.DYP-SHP	DYP	SHP	SHP	DYP	DYP	SHP	DYP	SHP	DYP	DYP
(50)II.DYP-SHP	DYP	SHP	SHP	DYP	DYP	SHP	DYP	SHP	DYP	DYP
(52)DYP-CHP	DYP	CHP	DYP	DYP	DYP	CHP	DYP	CHP	DYP	DYP
(53)ANAP-DYP	ANAP	DYP	DYP	ANAP	ANAP	DYP	ANAP	ANAP	DYP	DYP
(54)RP-DYP	RP	DYP	RP	DYP	DYP	DYP	RP	RP	DYP	DYP
(55)ANAP-DSP-DTP	ANAP	DSP-DTP	ANAP	DTP	ANAP	DSP	DSP	ANAP	DSP	ANAP
(57)DSP-MHP-ANAP	DSP	DSP-MHP-ANAP	DSP	MHP	ANAP	DSP	ANAP	MHP	DSP	MHP

Table 3.3.2. Distribution of Coalition Payoffs (continued)									
Cabinet	Transport	Agriculture and Rural	Labor and Social Security	Industry	Energy	Culture	Tourism	Forestry	Environment
(49)I.DYP-SHP	DYP	DYP	SHP	SHP	DYP	SHP	SHP	DYP	DYP
(50)II.DYP-SHP	DYP	DYP	SHP	SHP	DYP	SHP	SHP	DYP	DYP
(52)DYP-CHP	DYP	DYP	CHP	CHP	DYP	CHP	CHP	DYP	DYP
(53)ANAP-DYP	DYP	DYP	ANAP	DYP	ANAP	ANAP	DYP	DYP	ANAP
(54)RP-DYP	DYP	DYP	RP	DYP	RP	RP	DYP	DYP	RP
(55)ANAP-DSP-DTP	DTP	ANAP	DSP	DSP	ANAP	DSP	ANAP	ANAP	ANAP
(57)DSP-MHP-ANAP	MHP	MHP	ANAP	MHP	ANAP	DSP	ANAP	DSP	DSP

Bargaining processes generally produced an equilibrium on the basis of a principle of heterogeneity (Tables 3.3.1. and 3.3.2.). As a rule, whenever the larger party got the ministry of interior, the smaller party assumed the ministry of foreign affairs. However, it should be noted that as prime ministers already supervised the foreign policy, this ministry did not have much autonomous jurisdiction and power. Given that the military was a relevant actor in the 1990s; those ministries that attended National Security Council meetings had relatively more political importance for the parties. Until 2001, only the prime minister, ministries of the interior, foreign affairs and national defense had the right to be present at these meetings. Therefore, despite the fact that power of the ministry of foreign affairs for distribution patronage might be relatively limited, it was still politically valuable for the parties. Although the ministry of the interior also assumed most of the critical areas that might concern the ministry of national defense, this ministry was also important for the same reason. In principle, the ministries of national defense and justice were divided up between different parties. The only exception was the DYP-CHP government formed by DYP and CHP. The heterogeneity principle had also been practiced in the ministries of industry versus energy and tourism versus environment.

Table 3.4. provides a summary of the bargaining processes of the Turkish coalitions in the 1990s. The fourth column shows the number of days that passed between the resignation of one cabinet and taking office of the next one. More than one party leader assumed the mission to build coalition in this period. The last column shows the bargaining duration since the leader who formed the new cabinet was appointed. A comparison of the two columns reveals that whenever they were not identical, the bargaining processes had been unsuccessful and governments were formed with difficulty. The table implies that government formation was particularly difficult and bargaining had become a daunting task between the parties in mid-1990s. During the negotiations for the DYP-CHP government, ANAP was becoming a viable option. However, DYP was reluctant to form a coalition with this party as they shared similar electoral base, and leaders of the two parties had personal conflict. CHP did not have another potential partner; however, CHP deputies had problematic relations with DYP during the previous governments. The two parties agreed to form a government on the condition of an early election to be held as soon as possible. The fact that allocation

of the cabinet posts remained more or less the same with the two previous governments implied that it was rather the policy differences and personal conflict that prolonged formation of the government. The ANAP-DYP government could only be formed after three inconclusive bargaining rounds presided by three different party leaders. Both governments communicated with RP, however, the political agenda of the time forced them to coalesce together instead.

Table 3.4. Government Formation				
Government	Effective Number of Parties*	Number of Previous Bargaining Rounds**	Number of Days Required for Government Formation***	Number of Days Required for Current Government's Formation****
I.DYP-SHP	4.68	0	13	13
II.DYP-SHP	4.68	0	12	12
DYP-CHP	4.68	0	39	12
ANAP-DYP	6.15	3	56	32
RP-DYP	6.15	0	21	21
ANAP-DSP-DTP	6.15	0	10	10
DSP-MHP-ANAP	6.78	0	25	25

* Effective number of parties is calculated on the basis of Laakso and Taagepera (1979)
 ** Including formation attempts by other party leaders
 *** It is measured as the time elapsed since the previous cabinet dissolved and a new one took office legally
 **** It is measured as the time elapsed between the president's appointing the party leader who formed the current government

There was an increased level of party system fragmentation in this period. The negotiations for the RP-DYP government took relatively shorter. On the one hand, DYP and RP had negotiations before the ANAP-DYP government was formed. Thus, we might assume that they were familiar with demands of each other. On the other hand, a government with RP was the only remaining alternative for DYP at that time. Shortest bargaining process was of the ANAP-DSP-DTP government. This was not only due to

the absence of other options, but also because the leaders of these parties in a way felt the need to coalesce immediately for maintaining the democratic order.²⁶

Table 3.5. Proportionality in Coalition Payoffs			
	<i>Number of the Seats (a)</i>	<i>Number of Offices (b)</i>	<i>b/a</i>
<i>I. DYP-SHP</i>			
DYP	178	21	0.12
SHP	88	13	0.15
<i>II. DYP-SHP</i>			
DYP	181	21	0.12
SHP	54	14	0.26
<i>DYP-CHP</i>			
DYP	183	23	0.13
CHP	60	12	0.20
<i>ANAP-DYP</i>			
ANAP	126	16	0.13
DYP	135	18	0.13
<i>RP-DYP</i>			
RP	158	19	0.12
DYP	135	19	0.14
<i>ANAP-DSP-DTP*</i>			
ANAP	129	21	0.16
DSP	68	12	0.18
DTP	7	6	0.86
<i>DSP-MHP-ANAP</i>			
DSP	136	16	0.12
MHP	130	13	0.10
ANAP	86	13	0.15
<i>Sources: Party Switching in Turkey Dataset (Kemahlioğlu and Sayarı, 2011); Turkish Statistical Institute</i>			
<i>*There is one office assumed by an extra-parliamentary minister.</i>			
<i>** Including the posts of PM and deputy PM</i>			

Bargaining processes also reflected the distribution of bargaining power among parties in the 1990s. Bargaining power refers to parliamentary strength as well as the

²⁶ Interviews on April 22 and 27, 2011.

position of the party in the political space (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 7). In the coalition governments, a general trend was proportionality which means that there exists a ratio between the seat share of a party in the cabinet and the number of offices it controls (Warwick and Druckman, 2001). A high correlation between the portfolio shares of the parties and the share they got from an allocation of the ministries indicates that proportionality was applied. It should be noted though, that small-parties tend to be privileged, which is referred to as small-party bias in the literature (Browne and Franklin, 1973). In the Turkish case, pairwise correlations between the parties' shares of the seats with respect to their share in the cabinet between 1991 and 2002 yields insignificant results ($p=0.0756$). In other words, coalition payoffs in the Turkish governments of 1990s were allocated so that small parties controlled more ministries than their parliamentary strength suggested (Table 3.5.). Presumably, this stemmed from the fact that the political situation was very turbulent, and options were limited. In other words, viable coalition partners were few and thus the walk away value of the smaller parties was higher. Walk away value basically refers to situations in which options are very limited and some parties have less to lose from termination of the negotiations (Lupia and Strøm, 2008, p. 63).

In the 1991-1995 period, in the governments between DYP and SHP/CHP, the number of the seats of DYP was twice as much as SHP/CHP's: In the I. DYP-SHP government, DYP had 178 while SHP had 88 members in the parliament. In the II. DYP-SHP government, seats of DYP rose to 181 while SHP's seats declined to 54. With the switching of deputies from SHP to CHP after CHP reopened, the ratio of the seats of the government parties increased to three times. SHP's number of ministries was disproportionately higher than its parliamentary strength. However, there were no other viable partners for DYP. ANAP was still seen as the representative of the September 12 regime within DYP, and governance problems between DYP and SHP/CHP had not yet come to the brink of deadlock and had not yet forced DYP to reconsider the ANAP option despite its drawbacks. In the governments between ANAP and DYP, as well as RP and DYP, proportionality norm more or less held. In this period, all three parties had the potential to preside by government formation, thus, each had similar bargaining power which reflected on the allocation of the cabinet posts. In the ANAP-DSP-DTP government, the minor DTP was highly favored because ANAP

and DSP could not secure a parliamentary majority, they had barely convinced CHP to support them from the outside, and this made DTP a key actor in the negotiations. In the only coalition government after the 1999 elections, ANAP disproportionately benefited from the office allocation mainly at the expense of MHP, which was probably the result of the lack of experience of the nationalist's negotiation team.

3.4. Coalition Governance

Similar to government formation, there are no rules or institutions in Turkey pertaining specifically to coalition governance. However, the main institution for devising and enforcing government policies is the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. The framework of the cabinet has been devised and regulated by two laws (Law on the Establishment of Ministeries, Nr. 3046 and Law on the Office of Prime Minister, Nr. 3056) in accordance with the 1982 constitution. Over time, the jurisdiction and power of the prime ministry strengthened and expanded. Moreover, an article was added putting the ministries under the purview of the prime ministry. In addition to these characteristics of governance, as the head of the executive branch, the President had the veto power over legislation.

In the 1990s, there were three important aspects of coalition governance: the relations between the prime minister and the president, the nature of the coalition protocols and relations between the larger and smaller partners of the government. As far as the first aspect was considered, uneasy relations between the government and the president have had limited effect on the functioning of governments. It displayed its influence usually in the form of vetoing and returning the draft bills back for parliamentary revision. For instance, Özal blocked a number of DYP-SHP bills in 1992 (Arcayürek, 2000, p. 84). Demirel also returned some bills; however, it was Ahmet Necdet Sezer who left his mark on this period. He returned numerous draft bills for reconsideration in the parliament and had tense relations with the DSP-MHP-ANAP government (Ahmad, 1993, p. 260). It should be noted that the influence of the returned

bills on governance is limited as parliament has legal power to pass a returned bill without revision for the second time.

A second aspect of coalition governments regarded the coalition protocols. Since the end of World War II until the late 1990s, more than half of the coalition arrangements were codified into written agreements in Europe, and countries which did not have such documents adopted them (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 573). Turkey has been one of the few countries which always had written protocols. However, a review and an analysis of the coalition protocols raise questions about the reliability, validity and authenticity of these documents. Specifically speaking, although these documents have been open to public access on TBMM's official web site, they may not be the authentic documents devised originally by the parties. Although interviews and secondary sources such as memoirs and print media mentioned certain rules and articles in coalition agreements, the public versions of the protocols did not include them. For example, in the interviews with both the ANAP and DSP sides of the DSP-MHP-ANAP government, it was mentioned that ANAP had to give the ministry of agriculture and village affairs to DSP on the condition that the village affairs branch would be abolished in a year and submitted to the provincial administration.²⁷ Moreover, the jurisdiction domains of the state ministries were not explained in any of the protocols. More importantly, one minister openly admitted that there were two versions of the coalition protocol of the DSP-MHP-ANAP government, and that portfolio allocations will be permanent across the entire term even if the parties' parliamentary strength changed.²⁸ All of the coalition governments in Luxembourg and Italy, and some of them in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Netherlands have kept their arrangements private (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 574). It is important to note that written coalition agreements might serve for reducing uncertainty and mistrust by laying ground rules for governance (Timmermans, 2006). However, whether they will make these arrangements public still remains unknown. In this respect, Turkish parties behaved in similar ways to their European counterparts. They had written documents,

²⁷ Interview on April 22, 2011.

²⁸ Interview on April 26, 2011.

and there is no evidence that they did not commit to the articles, at least in the protocols which were kept private.

Considering these aspects, it might be more convenient to discuss coalition governance in terms of the empirical patterns and practices rather than on the basis of written documents, which leads the debate to the relations between the larger and smaller parties in the government. There is substantial empirical evidence that the parties that preside over government formation have certain advantages in receiving office and policy payoffs (Debus, 2008; Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss, and Ting, 2005). It is possible to assume that they have greater leverage from this perspective. Therefore, we might expect them to be dominant in the government with respect to legislation and in determining government policies. In the Turkish coalition governments of the 1990s, there was a similar pattern. In general, the larger party tended to enforce its own policy provisions whenever there was divergence between the government parties. There were examples which indicate that whenever the larger party could do something with an executive order, it did not even consult with the smaller partner. For instance, DYP used this strategy in the I.DYP-SHP government (Heper and Başkan, 2001, p. 76). In the cases where the government was not ideologically connected, and the larger party could not enact with executive orders, sometimes the party looked for the support of another party in the parliament. For instance, DYP relied on ANAP's support to circumvent SHP opposition to certain laws as well as to forestall SHP's draft bills (Saybaşı, 1995, p. 52). Moreover, when the larger party needed to consult with the smaller party, the party leader tended to negotiate the issue with the other party's leader rather than contacting the relevant minister from the other side. From another perspective, the behavior of the largest party was also contingent upon the personality of the leaders and the personal relations between the party leaders. For instance, while Demirel and İnönü frequently consulted over the policies and issues, Çiller was notorious for being difficult to be reached by the SHP/CHP leaders and ministers and for giving decisions on her own. In the II.DYP-SHP and DYP-CHP governments led by Çiller, the SHP/CHP ministers complained about not being informed even when Çiller planned a cross-border operation into Syria.²⁹ Similar

²⁹ Interview on April 29, 2011.

problems of communication were also noted in the ANAP-DSP-DTP and DSP-MHP-ANAP governments (Tutar, 2006, p. 423).

Smaller parties tried to devise strategies to shove themselves through the Council of Ministers. SHP succeeded in this strategy during its first government with DYP both because of the good relations between Demirel and İnönü, and it tried to coordinate their policies between the ministers under their control. SHP's success in the local elections might have also increased its bargaining power. As SHP/CHP started to lose its power at the local level and party leaderships changed in mid-1992, it adopted another strategy. It tried to convince the larger partner to make certain changes in the draft bills in exchange for granting support. This was a common strategy on talks about privatization. In other cases, it tried to negotiate the voting of two draft bills simultaneously. For example, privatization with the democratization package, in an attempt to make sure that if the DYP deputies wanted to pass legislation they would also have to pass the SHP draft (Milliyet, 24.10.1994). DSP followed a similar strategy in the ANAP-DSP-DTP government. ANAP; on the other hand, tried to use personal relations with the key coordinator from DSP (Hüsamettin Özkan) in the DSP-MHP-ANAP government. Whenever the smaller party could not devise any other strategy, it threatened its resignation, and this strategy worked in the lack of outside options such as in the second DYP-SHP, DYP-CHP and ANAP-DSP-DTP governments. The nature of the relations between the larger and smaller parties in the governments might be explained partially on the basis of the prime ministers' institutional powers (Andeweg and Timmermans, 2003). In their comparative analysis of Ireland and Netherlands, Andeweg and Timmermans (2003) found that the internal environment of the cabinets was biased in favor of the larger party for this reason. The same logic might be used in understanding the behavior of Turkish parties in this period given that the laws pertaining to the prime ministry and ministries (Nos. 3046 and 3056) strengthened prime minister vis-à-vis the cabinet by making ministers responsible to the prime minister.

Crisis and conflict management mechanisms constituted another important dimension of coalition governance. Three main types of crises seemed to be common in the governments of 1990s. The first type of crises occurred in governments formed by

ideologically distant parties, when some legislation attempts turned into deadlocks. For example, privatization and the scope of the laws on terror were the main sources of conflict in the II.DYP-SHP and DYP-CHP governments. First Karayalçın, then Baykal refused to support these laws for ideological reasons. EU harmonization reforms became a source of problems in the DSP-MHP-ANAP government due to MHP's blockage. Yet, the biggest crisis which challenged this government was the debate on executing the death penalty decision of the court for the PKK leader (Akar and Dündar, 2008, p. 473). A second and more common crisis was about signing governmental decrees and bureaucratic appointments such as those in II.DYP-SHP, DYP-CHP, ANAP-DYP, RP-DYP and ANAP-DSP-DTP governments. In the interviews, this crisis was frequently associated with accessing the patronage benefits. Accordingly, certain parties such as DYP and ANAP tried to appoint their relatives or publicly evident supporters in the public sector to critical bureaucratic positions. The last major government crisis was corruption. RP continuously tabled motions of censure against DYP leader, and the ANAP leader let his party group loose in the voting which turned into a government crisis during ANAP-DYP government (Öke, Tirali and Akin, 2002, p. 138). On the other hand, there were corruption charges against several ANAP deputies and the party leaders, not only from DTP but also from MHP throughout the second half of the 1990s. The pattern of crisis indicates that electoral concerns forced parties to orient towards ideologically distant partners, and therefore, part of the crises had roots in the party system. The second aspect of the crises had roots in the political system as corruption allegations dominated the political agenda in this period.

As noted earlier, coalition governments involve continuous bargaining rounds from their establishment to their termination. The fact that there were various crises did not necessarily mean that coalitions were unstable by nature. Indeed, majority party governments also faced several crises in the parliament, albeit of different types. Coalition governments usually crafted certain mechanisms to resolve their conflicts. The main mechanism adopted by the governments of this period in Turkey was based on resorting to certain key coordinators and inner cabinets. For instance, Hikmet Çetin from SHP and Cavit Çağlar from DYP were two deputies, who tried to maintain a certain level of coordination between the parties. Hüsametdin Özkan was an eminent figure in the 1995-2002 period. He was not only known for his role in the government

formation process, but also identified as the key coordinator in the governments where DSP was a member (Tosun, 2003, p. 49) (Kuşçuoğlu, 2001). In an interview, the former Minister of Public Works, Koray Aydın argued that, whenever a crisis emerged, an issue specific commission was formed usually under the leadership of Özkan (Akar and Dündar, 2008, p. 482).

In one government, there was a variety of party summits. In the DSP-MHP-ANAP government, the “leaders’ summit” was established. Both DSP and MHP claimed credit for both the crafting and the success of this mechanism. Accordingly, the summit would meet at least once a month convening the leaders of the three parties as well as one minister from each party. The leaders agreed to discuss any matter first in the summits before escalating the crisis to their parties.³⁰ Moreover, all appointments would be made by joint decrees, and the allocation of the ministries would not be revised even if the seat distribution changes in the parliament (Tutar, 2006, p. 419). The presence of these mechanisms indicates that – contrary to the widely accepted view of the Turkish coalition governments as examples of discordant alliances – the parties tried to resolve the crises as much as possible. It was only when the relations between the leaders reached the level of animosity for various reasons or when they anticipated favorable electoral outcomes that the parties deliberately interrupted further bargaining.

³⁰ Interview on April 29, 2011.

CHAPTER 4

COALITIONS AND CABINET DURABILITY, 1991-2002

Short government life has far-reaching consequences for political systems. Such governments tend to have poor policy performance records (Huber, 1998, p. 588). In extreme cases where governments fail to survive for a considerable period of time repeatedly, political actors may begin to question the legitimacy of the democratic regime (Linz, 1978).¹ Hence, understanding the sources of cabinet durability is a major concern in the scholarly literature. As mentioned before, coalition governments have commonly been associated with instability. “As with many popular misconceptions,” note Laver and Schofield, “this contention has an element of truth in it, but can only be sustained on the basis of carefully selected examples” (1998, p. 144). The authors continue that the critics generally refer to the countries with less durable governments and ignore the successful examples from other countries. Indeed, the duration of coalition governments varies greatly between and within governments between different periods of time as will be illustrated in the next chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the issue of cabinet durability in the coalition governments that were formed in Turkey between 1991 and 2002. More specifically, my goal here is to examine why some governments lasted for a fairly long period while others turned out to be short-lived.

¹ Governments formed during the 1970s were notorious for the short duration of their cabinets. Hence, the leading military figures held the parliamentarians responsible for the turbulence and instability in the country. In his speech on national TV declaring martial law, Chief of Staff Kenan Evren mentioned this accusation. According to him, the military aimed “to place the democracy which cannot control itself on solid ground” [“... kendi kendini kontrol edemeyen demokrasiyi sağlam temeller üzerine oturtmak,”]. Available at <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxmeV2OyQQs>> (retrieved 20.05.2011).

4.1. Cabinet Duration in Turkey

Many people may be ready to accept that coalition governments do not and cannot last for long; however, depicting even the beginning and the end of a government is not as straightforward as it seems (Conrad and Golder, 2010). How should we consider the governments formed by DYP and SHP/CHP in the early 1990s for example? Were they three different governments or were they different cabinets of the same government?² What if the same cabinets continue to rule in consecutive inter-election periods? There have been several attempts to define precisely the transitions from one government to the other (Dodd, 1976; Lijphart, 1999). The most recent studies consider a new government to be formed each time the set of parties that constitute the government or the prime minister change, or if a general election takes place (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, 2008). This way, the cabinet rather than the government is considered to be the unit of analysis. Although estimations of cabinet duration often rely on average values, cabinets formed immediately after a general election – by definition – have higher life expectancies. A cabinet formed in the midst of the constitutional inter-election period (CIEP) has less time even if it rules for the entire period until the election. More recent studies assess the mean relative durations in addition to the average values to avoid this bias. The mean relative duration is “expressed as the percentage of the remainder of the CIEP (maximum potential duration)” (Saalfeld, 2008, p. 330).

² The popular view of these governments might be to consider the I. DYP-SHP, II. DYP-SHP and DYP-CHP governments as parts of a single government. For example, a daily newspaper in Turkey, declared that the coalition government had been in power more than a thousand days, being the most durable multiparty government in the republican era (“Koalisyon Rekor Kırdı”, *Milliyet*, 31.10.1994). However, in my interviews, respondents from the SHP/CHP indicated that these were three distinct governments.

Table 4.1. Cabinet Duration in Turkey by decade*				
	<i>Party Governments</i>		<i>Coalition Governments</i>	
	<i>mean duration (in days)</i>	<i>mean relative duration (%)</i>	<i>mean duration (in days)</i>	<i>mean relative duration (%)</i>
1950-1959	732	0.61	-	
1960-1969	796	0.55	359	0.57
1970-1979	156	0.31	488	0.44
1980-1989	916	0.58	-	
1990-1999	104	0.18	545	0.40
2000-2007	853	0.50	-	
Total	572	0.46	480	0.46
General mean duration		532		
General mean relative duration		0.46		
*1950-2007, excludes non-partisan cabinets				
<i>Source Turkish Statistical Institute</i>				

Since its transition to the multiparty system in 1950, Turkey had 35 democratically elected governments, nearly 40 percent (15) of which were coalition governments. Majority party governments in Turkey on average lasted longer than the coalition governments, which is also the case in Western European democracies. However, when the duration relative to the remaining time until the elections is considered, party and coalition governments are not meaningfully different (Table 4.1.). To be more specific, both types of governments lasted 46 percent of their maximum potential duration until the next election. This stems from the fact that cabinet duration varies across different types of party and coalition governments as well as over time. Minority party governments tend to be short-lived in Turkey just like in Western Europe (Laver and Schofield, 1998, p. 154). However, this finding is still important since it confirms that Turkish coalition governments are not necessarily short-lived arrangements in power until majority governments are established. The dynamics of governance that cause variation in duration regardless of the cabinet type should be analyzed carefully, taking various sources of selection bias into consideration.

4.2. Dynamics of Cabinet Durability

4.2.1. Events and Cabinet Duration

One way of inferring the dynamics of cabinet durability is to assess the events that undermined a government's functioning and the way that government ended. This is important not only for gaining better insight into governments' life-cycles, but also because there is substantial evidence which shows that formation of a government is highly influenced by how the previous one ended (Damgaard, 2008, p. 301). In the Turkish case, there were nine governments between 1991 and 2002. Of the two minority party governments, the one that was formed by Prime Minister Çiller (DYP government) could not satisfy the investiture requirement, and the other headed by Prime Minister Ecevit was formed with the explicit purpose of governing until the next election in 1999. The seven coalition governments ended for various reasons. However, except for the II. DYP-SHP and ANAP-DYP governments, they all ended as a result of institutional ways. The I. DYP-SHP government came to an end when Prime Minister Demirel resigned from his party to become president following his predecessor's death. Two governments (the DYP-CHP and DSP-MHP-ANAP governments) ended due to early elections. One government (ANAP-DSP-DTP government) was toppled by a motion of censure. Had fierce inter-party conflict not precipitated the demise of the ANAP-DYP government, it would still have come to an end since the constitutional court ruled as null and void its vote of confidence in the parliament.³ The most interesting case of termination was Prime Minister Erbakan's decision to resign in 1997, as the coalition protocol of the RP-DYP government set a rule for the rotation of prime ministry between the two parties every year. Erbakan's was not entirely a voluntary decision (Öke, Tirali, and Akın, 2002, p. 137); rather, it was a response to the pressures from the military as well as the opinion of a public skeptical to the RP's

³ The leader of DYP, Çiller referred to the decision of the constitutional court as one of the reasons for termination of the ANAP-DYP cabinet. "Hükümet Bitmiştir", *Milliyet*, 25.05.1996.

policy agenda (Table 4.2.). There are similar examples in other south European countries such as Portugal (Freire, 2005). Moreover, the president acted in discretion to appoint ANAP's leader, Yılmaz rather than the leader of DYP, Çiller as prime minister.

These “events” refer to the final incidents that terminated these governments, but the functioning of the coalition governments were weakened by a series of other critical events.⁴ It is possible to categorize them under two broad categories as “technical” and “discretionary” mechanisms. Technical sources of termination refer to those beyond the control of the government parties (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 585). In this context, the death of President Özal and the election of Demirel as the next president resulted in the dissolution of the I. DYP-SHP cabinet. On the other hand, a motion of censure tabled against the ANAP-DSP-DTP government by CHP, whose external support had secured the vote of confidence for the government's inauguration, put an end to this cabinet. Termination of this government and the ANAP-DYP government might also be related to the difficulties posed by the minority status of the cabinets.⁵

The rest of the sources of cabinet termination had been discretionary in the sense that they emerged as a result of the interaction between the parliamentary parties. Policy divergence in the parliamentary debates over the draft bills, as well as severe personal conflicts between leaders of the rival parties, prevented these governments from functioning effectively and for a long time. Moreover, several parties taking part in the coalitions were struggling with internal problems which were primarily inflicted by competition for the party leadership. As a result, party leaders usually called for early elections when further collective governance became unlikely.

⁴ The categories in Table 4.2. are formed from the answers to the question as to which events the respondents would depict as turning points in the course of governance in my interviews conducted between April and May 2011.

⁵ On the reasons for termination of the ANAP-DYP government, Çiller also declared that their government ended as a result of the court decision regarding the invalidity of the vote of confidence and the cabinet's minority status which paralyzed functioning of the government. “Hükümet Bitmiştir”, *Milliyet*, 25.05.1996.

Table 4.2. Terminal Events

<i>Cabinet</i>	<i>Discretionary</i>				<i>Technical</i>				<i>Mechanisms of termination</i>
	<i>Inter-party conflict</i>				<i>Institutional rules</i>				
	<i>Policy conflicts</i>	<i>Personal problems</i>	<i>Intra-party conflicts</i>	<i>Early elections</i>	<i>Regular elections</i>	<i>Motion of censure</i>	<i>Minority status</i>	<i>Death of the president</i>	
I.DYP-SHP								x	death of the president
II.DYP-SHP	x	X	x						internal conflict
DYP-CHP	x	X	x	X					early elections
ANAP-DYP		X	x				x		internal conflict, court decision regarding vote of confidence
RP-DYP			x						resignation, extra-parliamentary intervention
ANAP-DSP-DTP				X		x	x		motion of censure
DSP-MHP-ANAP	x		x	X					early elections

As it is seen in Table 4.2., none of the respondents in my interviews referred to the critical events or exogenous shocks as identified by the events process approaches (Browne et al., 1984; Warwick, 1992). Indeed, throughout the 1990s, there were several events which could neither be predicted nor controlled easily. Turkey faced several critical economic crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001. Political violence triggered by the conflict between the state security forces and the separatist Kurdish insurgency lasted until 1999 and peaked from 1992 to 1995. In 1999, Turkey was hit by a major earthquake which led to large-scale destruction and fatalities. There have been a number of political scandals involving corruption charges. After all, how did some of the coalitions, such as the DSP-MHP-ANAP government, manage to survive despite these critical events?

First, some events such as political violence can be traced back to the period before 1991. Yet, this does not explain why governments endured when its intensity increased dramatically in the mid-1990s. Secondly, as Warwick (1992) and Sayari (1980) suggest, events became detrimental when elections were closer and the incumbent government has been in power for a long time. For example, although the earthquake in 1999 did not result in the DSP-MHP-ANAP government's resignation, the quarrel between the president and the prime minister triggered a series of events which eventually resulted in the call for early elections. Thirdly, governments have varied in their vulnerability to critical events (Laver and Shepsle, 1998). While the II. DYP-SHP government endured both political violence and economic difficulties; the DYP-CHP government could not tackle the crisis over bureaucratic appointments. Finally, these events might rather be considered as intervening variables. Otherwise, arguing that coalition governments ended when government parties were in disagreement, or early elections terminated an incumbent government might be mere tautology without first explaining the factors that have led to these developments. Events might change the distribution of bargaining power between governing parties or can become a strategic tool for opposition parties.

In this respect, corruption is a good example. An element of patronage or clientelism has often been considered a part of the bargaining process in terms of sharing the coalition payoffs (Mershon, 2001). However, this aspect has often been considered to be one of the perks of government membership, and one which might be

used to garner votes in the next elections. When patronage turns into salient corruption, it might be treated as a political scandal which can terminate coalition governments serving as a critical event (Diermeier and Stevenson, 2000). However, in this study, I postulate that it might rather be considered a factor which had repercussions on inter-party relations as well as intra-party structure, eventually affecting cabinet durability in the 1990s. Corruption has been a major source of allegations leveled towards governments in Turkey in general (Altun, 2004). We do not have factual information on the extent of political corruption in the period between 1991 and 2002. However, there were several corruption allegations leveled in this period against targets as diverse as SHP and its deputies (İSKİ scandal) (Kartay, 1997, p. 361; Tokatlı, 2004, p. 151), the leader and deputies of DYP (Öke, Tirali, and Akın, 2002, pp. 138, 146) and ANAP (Bildirici, 2003) and deputies of MHP. The ANAP leader declared corruption as a reason of termination of the ANAP-DYP government,⁶ while the ANAP-DSP-DTP government was toppled as a result of an interpellation on the basis of corruption charges. Sezer's accusation to Ecevit for tolerating corruption was one of the crises that triggered the termination of the DSP-MHP-ANAP government (Ahmad, 2004, p. 260). Here, it should be clarified that none of these examples indicate a general tendency in coalition governments towards corruption. However, corruption charges in this period decreased the electoral support to these parties; and changed the distribution of bargaining power between the partners and provided a venue for political actors within or outside of the government for terminating them. The leader of DYP, for instance, was forced into a government with RP to avoid the Supreme Criminal Court (Zürcher, 2004, p. 299; Öke Tirali and Akın, 2002, p. 138).⁷ As Mershon (2002) aptly put, cabinet termination is a deliberate party choice, critical events rather influence interaction between the parties by changing the bargaining strategies.

⁶ Referring to the corruption charges against Çiller, Yılmaz declared that he would not tolerate corruption (“Çamurda Oturmam”, *Milliyet*, 10.04.1996). In addition, Yılmaz let his deputies choose how to vote, rather than voting as a block in the motions of censure against Çiller (Kara, 2007, p. 239).

⁷ Interestingly, in a book published by DYP while Çiller was still the party leader, it is stated that RP took Çiller hostage with motions considering the corruption allegations and as soon as she was cleared of charges, she started to fight against “reactionism” (Doğru Yol Partisi, 2002)

4.2.2. Cabinet Attributes

Empirical evidence suggests that certain characteristics including majority status, minimal winning status and ideological connectedness tend to make cabinets more durable (Laver and Schofield, 1998, pp. 150-151). To begin with, cabinets with a parliamentary majority have a better chance of survival. A majority decreases vulnerability to parliamentary defeats which might lead to a call for elections or a search for alternative coalitions. Secondly, minimal winning status is one of the most common hypotheses in the coalition literature (Dodd, 1976). Accordingly, larger governments have more potential for disagreement and find it to be more difficult to manage conflicts. Hence, minimal winning cabinets tend to last longer than minority and surplus majority cabinets. Finally, the more mixed the government is with respect to the positions of the cabinet parties in the policy space, the shorter it lasts. In other words, minimally connected winning cabinets which only have parties as few as those whose combined parliamentary strength brings parliamentary majority and which are composed of ideologically compatible parties are argued to last longer than other types of cabinets.

Throughout the multiparty period since 1950 in Turkey, as in Western European democracies, minority party governments in Turkey lasted the shortest among all types of government (126 days), while minority coalition governments have similarly been short-living among all types of coalition governments (366 days).⁸ Hence, majority status seems to be associated with longevity in general. In the 1990s, however, there were two minority coalition governments, one of which (ANAP-DSP-DTP government) lasted nearly two years (Table 4.3.) until it was toppled by a motion of censure. In other words, even when a minority coalition endured long, it does not necessarily mean that it was more durable. Among the coalition governments, in contradiction to the general expectations (Riker, 1984; Budge and Keman, 1993; Laver and Schofield, 1998), minimal winning coalition governments were not necessarily more durable than other types of coalition governments in Turkey in the 1990s. In fact, there were only three minimal winning coalition governments in the multiparty period (AP-MSP-MHP, II.

⁸ Computed by the author on the basis of data from Turkish Statistical Institute.

DYP-SHP, DYP-CHP governments). Among them, the AP-MSP-MHP and DYP-CHP cabinets survived merely for three to four months.

Table 4.3. Cabinet Attributes and Duration			
<i>Cabinet</i>	<i>Type of Government</i>	<i>Duration (in days)</i>	<i>Effective Government Size*</i>
I. DYP-SHP	surplus majority	543	0,81
II. DYP-SHP	minimal winning	832	0,82
DYP-CHP	minimal winning	128	0,82
ANAP-DYP	minority	114	0,89
RP-DYP	surplus majority	367	0,86
ANAP-DSP-DTP	minority	560	0,93
DSP-MHP-ANAP	surplus majority	1271	0,86

**It measures government size by incorporating relative size of the government parties as well as their numbers (Warwick 1994, p. 35)*

Sources: Party Switching in Turkey Dataset (Kemahlioğlu and Sayarı, 2011); Turkish Statistical Institute

Warwick (1994) argues that not only the number of parties, but also their relative strength in the parliament (ratio of the seats) complicates the relations within the government. Using the concept of effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979), he developed a measure called effective government size using the same formula for government parties (Warwick, 1994, p. 35). However, a positive or a negative covariance between duration and effective government size was not salient. Interestingly, when 15 coalition governments of the multiparty period were sorted with respect to duration, cabinet type and party composition, almost all of the cabinets that were more durable with respect to the country average (532 days) were the larger cabinets (cabinets with more than two parties) with the exception of the two DYP-SHP governments. Studies of coalition governments based on large-N datasets generally confirmed the positive relation between majority and minimal winning statuses and duration (Saalfeld, 2008, p. 363). However, variables that predicted between-country effects did not necessarily account for within-country effects (Grofman, 1989, p. 301). In Turkey, as in France, Iceland, the Netherlands and Israel, surplus majority cabinets lasted longer than minimal winning cabinets in the period between 1950 and 1983 (Budge and Keman, 1993, p. 170).

Finally, Turkish coalition governments of the 1990s tended to be ideologically heterogeneous. Longitudinal surveys have revealed that parties maintained their position on the left-right continuum across time. While parties such as DSP, SHP, CHP and pro-Kurdish parties were located to the left of center, ANAP, DYP, RP and MHP were situated to the right of center persistently across time (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, p. 117). Accordingly, except for two cabinets (ANAP-DYP and RP-DYP), coalitions between parties which were on the opposite sides of the left-right cleavage were in the majority during the period between 1991 and 2002. In the multiparty period, five out of eight cabinets that were below the average cabinet duration were ideologically homogenous.

4.2.3. Bargaining Environment Attributes

Findings from the 1990s as well as earlier decades of multiparty politics suggest that cabinet attributes such as majority status, the cabinet type and government size were related to cabinet duration, although the direction of influence (i.e. positive/negative) might be counter-intuitive. Size, majority status and party composition of the government emerge as outcomes of long bargaining processes. Therefore, analyzing the characteristics of the bargaining environment in Turkey in the 1990s is important for understanding the variance in cabinet duration. The party system and the institutions constitute the context in which bargaining takes place, hence they might have implications as to why one bargaining environment is conducive for the emergence of more durable cabinets while another engenders turbulence from the beginning (Budge and Keman, 1993).

The higher the degree of fragmentation and polarization, the shorter the life of a government. In a fragmented and polarized party system environment, the distribution of the bargaining power (walk-away values) is more dispersed; and, thus, the bargaining environment is more vulnerable to slight changes. Therefore, coalitions are expected to be less durable in these systems (King, Alt, Burns, and Laver, 1990). A considerable number of deputies changed their parties in this period (Kemahlioğlu and Sayarı, 2011). Moreover, increased electoral support to the two parties in the far-right, RP and MHP, revealed that the party system was increasingly polarized since mid-1990s as

polarization refers to the proportion of seats held by extremist parties in the parliament (Warwick, 1994, p. 39; Powell, 1984). After 1999, not only did the pro-Islamists lose considerable parliamentary strength with respect to the seat ratio, but also MHP changed its discourse by moving towards the center, which was simultaneously moving further to the right (Bora and Can, 2004, p. 470; Arıkan, 1991, p. 48). The existence of a dominant or a center party could stabilize the bargaining environment (Roozendaal, 1992); however, this was absent in the party system (Sayarı, 2007, p. 203). Hence, the party system was increasingly fragmented and polarized at the same time. Actually, as the party system grew increasingly more fragmented during the 1990s, (i.e. from 4.68 in 1991 to 6.15 in 1995 and then to 6.78 in 1999), and polarization peaked in the mid-1990s and returned to a moderate level in the 1999 elections, cabinet duration followed a similar trend, having the lowest values around the mid-1990s when the effective number of the parties increased dramatically.

In this fragmented party system, competition for the leadership of the center-left (between CHP and DSP) and the center-right (between ANAP and DYP, later including MHP) became decisive to the strategies of parties in the formation and maintenance of the governments.⁹ This was one of the reasons why there weren't any minimal connected winning cabinets in the 1990s. Instead, parties that targeted the electorate with similar ideological tendencies devised strategies of attrition. This partly explains why there was a tendency to form surplus governments, and why these were the most durable forms of coalition governments. However, the similarity or difference of policy platforms was only one aspect of the story. In a fragmented party system, the distribution of bargaining power becomes more important as it influences party behavior during governance. Hence, in such cases, where a government is formed with a party which has both a high walk-away value and a different policy platform, it is likely to be highly durable.

⁹ Competition for the leadership of the center-right and the center-left was identified in the interviews as the main reason of why parties did not consider coalescing with ideologically adjacent parties and instead brought the proposal to the parties on the other side of the left-right continuum.

Figure 4.1. Effects of the Party System Fragmentation on Cabinet Duration

	<i>Low walk-away value</i>	<i>High walk-away value</i>
<i>Similar policy platforms</i>	ANAP-DYP RP-DYP	
<i>Different policy platforms</i>	DYP-CHP	I. DYP-SHP II. DYP-SHP ANAP-DSP-DTP DSP-MHP-ANAP

In contrast, if parties have different policy platforms and outside options (i.e. low walk-away values), those cabinets might be less durable. We might expect governments formed by parties with similar policy platforms and outside options to be the least durable. Figure 4.1. supports my proposition in this regard. The parties in the three governments with the shortest duration in the 1990s had low walk-away values. During the DYP-CHP government, ANAP was an alternative outside option for DYP, and the fact that DYP did not give many concessions to CHP can be explained by that aspect.¹⁰ The RP-DYP coalition was under continuous pressure for a new government formula excluding RP. ANAP, on the other hand, was an outside option for RP. However, those four governments above the average cabinet duration were all ideologically heterogeneous that were relatively less concerned with losing the electoral base to the other parties within the government.¹¹ Moreover, the ANAP-DSP-DTP and DSP-MHP-ANAP governments were the only possible governments allowed by the parliamentary arithmetic without many outside options. As such, the way fragmentation influenced the formation and maintenance of governments seems to explain why ideologically disconnected and surplus cabinets tended to last longer in Turkey, in contrast to the

¹⁰ Partly in 1993 and throughout 1994 and 1995, there were several articles in the daily *Milliyet* indicating that DYP, ANAP and RP were in continuous contact about an alternative government (02.04.1994, 24.11.1994, 23.03.1994, 22.09.1995, 20.11.1995).

¹¹ The same reply was repeated for the question “what kind of coalition governments do you think might be more successful and durable in Turkey?”: governments composed of parties “supported by different ideological corridors” as they will have “fewer incentives to attempt to discredit its partners vis-a-vis the public opinion”.

general trends in Europe. Not only the level of fragmentation, but also the factors that shape the nature of fragmentation shed light on the variance in cabinet duration.

In fact, coalition governments could have been more durable within a more favorable institutional setting in Turkey. Since the 1990s, institutionalism has come into prominence in the coalition research (Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Diermeier, 2006). Institutions influence the bargaining environment. Cabinets tend to last shorter where votes of confidence are constitutional rules. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that countries with constitutions which do not set investiture requirement or have positive parliamentarism (i.e. constructive vote of no confidence, e.g. Belgium since 1995 and Germany); and, fixed inter-election periods, have the most durable coalition governments (Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2003, p. 63).

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, institutional mechanisms as diverse as early elections, motions of censure and court decisions invalidating votes of confidence dominated the way governments ended in this period (Table 4.2.). Termination of ANAP-DYP government may be affiliated with the court decisions. Likewise, when the leader of MHP called for an early election in 2002, the government was about to be dissolved as it was close to losing the parliamentary majority as a result of defections from DSP. Another impact of the institutions on cabinet duration was through increasing and decreasing the costs of making and breaking the coalition governments as Mershon elegantly illustrated in the Italian case (Mershon, 1996). In countries like Norway and Sweden, where the inter-election period has been fixed, parties had fewer incentives for terminating the government. In countries like Turkey and Italy, where the decision to call for elections was easy, the early election option became a strategic tool. In general, parties tried to call for an early election when they anticipated a favorable outcome whether they were within the government or not (Lupia and Strøm, 1995; Strøm and Swindle, 2002). For instance, the DYP-CHP government was formed in 1995 on the condition that the government would call for an early election (Yalansız, 2006, p. 465). In that period, both leaders expected to increase their votes in the next election. The leader of DYP was convinced that the voters would have appreciated her government's success in coping with the economic difficulties.¹² As another example,

¹² Interview on April 6, 2011.

the leader of CHP tabled a motion of censure against the ANAP-DSP-DTP government in 1999 hoping to benefit from the electoral volatility.¹³ The existence of the motion of censure as such was another aspect of the institutional setting.. Although FP was preparing to table another motion to censure for the DSP-MHP-ANAP government,¹⁴ it was used only once in the 1990s. In this respect, the constitutional rules of government formation and termination interacted with the characteristics of the party system decreasing the survival chances of the governments. In some countries, government formation has been regulated through institutions such as the position of informateur. The existence of such mechanisms could have contributed to decreasing the dearth of information and high levels of uncertainty, as well as increasing the possibility of the formation of tighter coalitions.

In a similar way, the existence of more conflict management mechanisms might have increased the survival chances for these governments. In European coalition systems several types of coalition management mechanisms have been established including inner cabinets, cabinet committees, coalition committees, committees of parliamentary leaders and party summits (Andeweg and Timmermans, 2003, pp. 270-272). Sometimes they are established for a specific issue or sometimes in order to deal with potential sources of crisis generally. Moreover, their level of institutionalization might vary from irregular and informal settings such as in Germany to being permanent bodies with a separate staff. In the Turkish coalitions of the 1970s, the level of communication between the parties was largely limited (Sayarı, 1980, p. 229). In the 1990s, inner cabinets similar to the German examples were usually active; however, the effectiveness of these mechanisms depended mostly on the personality of the leaders. As mentioned in the previous chapter, certain ministers have been renowned for acting as key communication figures between the parties. Although these deputies were also accused of pursuing personal interests, they obviously played some role in conflict management. The DSP-MHP-ANAP government constitutes a good example of the contribution of these mechanisms on the longevity of cabinet. “The Leaders’ Summit”, which met regularly and resolved the problems at the top executive level of the parties,

¹³ Interview on April 22, 2011.

¹⁴ Interview on April 29, 2011.

had been helpful in the government's survival despite ideological divergence as well as exogenous shocks including the earthquake and the economic crises.

A comparative study of the Netherlands and Belgium identifies coalition agreements among notable conflict management mechanisms. Accordingly, explicit articles might decrease the costs of bargaining in the later stages of governance, however, the existence of explicit commitments might not necessarily render their implementation easier (Timmermans, 2006, p. 268). As long as the Turkish party system remains fragmented and the 10 percent electoral threshold is maintained, it is debatable whether including explicit commitments might be better or not. However, establishing permanent institutions might enforce mutual communication in the Turkish governments to a certain extent. In my opinion, coalition committees might serve best for the requirements of the Turkish political system. This committee would include both ministers and party leaders outside the government, similar to the Italian system (Andeweg and Timmermans, 2003, pp. 271-272). Given that the electoral threshold causes representation problems, the existence of a similar mechanism might create an effective checks and balances system, which is itself the most important contribution of coalition governments to democracy.

In the Turkish case, as institutionalized coalition mechanisms were rare in the 1990s, personal attitudes became decisive from time to time in the functioning and durability of the governments. In general, as the literature on coalition governments suggests, low institutionalization brings about more discretionary interventions from the head of state as is the case in Italy and to a relatively limited extent in Finland (Strøm et al., 1994, p. 312). Turkish presidents have exerted influence for similar reasons. Did the intervention of the president have a positive or a negative effect on cabinet duration in the 1990s? My interviews with those party officials who served in the coalition governments yielded mixed results. Some respondents criticized Presidents Özal, Demirel and Sezer for impairing the natural course of governance by blocking some parliamentary bills and acting on behalf of extra-parliamentary actors including the military and social or economic interest groups. Others pointed to the fact that President Demirel brokered certain coalition arrangements and was helpful in overcoming some crises as well as preventing non-civilian interventions which could have been more detrimental to the political system. In my opinion, presidents might contribute to the

functioning of governments and thus contribute to cabinet durability in Turkey, if presidential powers are limited to the level as it should be in a classical parliamentary system.

Other than the presidents, the personality and behavior of party leaders influenced cabinet durability. Sayarı (1980, p. 213) indicates that cabinet durability in the 1960s and 1970s was influenced by the relations between the leaders of parties. One can observe a similar trend in the 1990s. Coalition governments in this period were often characterized by infighting. Realistically, this might be an overgeneralization of the 1990s. Inter-party conflict characterized the relations between ANAP and DYP, who formed a government only once that lasted slightly more than three months. Hence, this case cannot be generalized to the rest of the time period. On the contrary, there were counter examples in this period. Demirel and İnönü were in good terms and tried to resolve the conflicts as much as possible rather than increasing the tension (Arcayürek, 2000, p. 73; Tokatlı, 2004, p. 157). Ecevit and Yılmaz had a working relationship which contributed to the management of crises in both ANAP-DSP-DTP and DSP-MHP-ANAP governments. Bahçeli, on the other hand, despite his party's critical view of DSP for ideological reasons and toward ANAP due to its involvement with alleged corrupt practices, displayed accommodating behavior appreciated by both parties.¹⁵ Apparently, the moderate behavior of Bahçeli was surprising for two other parties in the coalition. "I got anything I wanted, and Bahçeli did not oppose", noted a minister from ANAP, "he was abnormally accommodating".¹⁶ Karayalçın's moderate personality might have ameliorated otherwise tense relations between DYP and SHP as well.¹⁷ Presumably, the conflict between the leaders of two center-right parties might have been less intense, if the party system was less fragmented. Moreover, if institutional settings had limited the strategic attempts of parliamentary dissolution, party leaders might have acted in a more reconciliatory fashion.

¹⁵ Interviews on April 22 and 29, May 3, 2001.

¹⁶ Interview on April 22, 2011.

¹⁷ Interview on April 6, 2011.

CHAPTER 5

COALITION POLITICS IN TURKEY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE TURKISH EXCEPTIONALISM?

What are the major similarities and differences between Western European countries and Turkey concerning some of the important characteristics of coalition politics and behavior? Do the trends concerning the durability of coalition governments, the way they are terminated, and their institutional context in Turkey during the 1990s deviate significantly from those observed in other democracies in the same time period? Is it possible to talk about “Turkish exceptionalism”, when coalitions are viewed in a comparative perspective? The purpose of this chapter is to address these and related questions utilizing the data I have collected on coalition governments in Western European democracies and Turkey. The chapter begins with comparing the trends in cabinet duration and termination across countries. Next, it examines the party systems and institutional settings in European democracies and Turkey to understand the context from which the governments emanate and function. In this section, the study mainly adopts the method of agreement to eliminate rival explanations. Finally, it analyzes the different practices and mechanisms used in coalition governments which are used to cope with the challenges of multiparty governance.

5.1. The Trends in Cabinet Duration and the Cabinet Attributes

During the nearly five decades between the 1940s and 1990s, 64 percent of European governments¹ and 40 percent of Turkish governments included more than one political party. Turkey, just as many other European countries, began to have coalition governments in the early 1960s as the change in the electoral system from a plurality to proportional representation increased political fragmentation. In these five decades, cabinet duration improved in Western Europe on average as both party and coalition governments became more durable. However, inferring the viability of European coalitions on the basis of this aggregate trend might be misleading as individual countries have had different trajectories. While the coalition cabinets in Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, Finland and Norway became more durable over time; those in Austria, Ireland, Germany and Italy followed a downward trend.² In Turkey, while the average duration decreased slightly, coalition governments definitely became more durable over time. Overall, cabinet duration by decade and by the type of government varied within the European countries.³

In the 1990s, Spain, the United Kingdom, Greece and Portugal were ruled solely by party governments. Similarly, three out of four governments in both Norway and Sweden were also formed by single parties. Turkey and France had both party and coalition governments, while the rest of the European countries alternated between different coalition cabinets. Cabinet duration improved in general; however, Italy and Finland maintained their places below the European average (Figure 5.1.). During this period, Turkey was among the less durable countries such as Italy and Finland. In other

¹ In this chapter, the terms “Europe” and “European countries” exclude Turkey for the sake of comparison. All figures and tables are based on the *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining Dataset* (2008), updated by adding the Turkish cases in the 1990s and completing the missing variables for those European governments which continued to rule after 1999.

² The average values of cabinet duration for the coalition governments by decade were computed. Then for each country, trendlines were observed in time.

³ Average cabinet duration in Europe is nearly 698.72 days while the standard deviation is 511.95. Standard deviation values are also high for the individual countries. This indicates that variation has been high between and within the countries across time.

words, not only Italian (405.2 days), but also Turkish (545 days) and Finnish (769.8 days) coalition governments lasted shorter than most of their counterparts in Europe (891.9 days) in the 1990s (Table 5.1.).

In this period, the majority of coalition governments were minimal winning cabinets (26 out of 42). On average, this type of cabinet tended to last longer than the other types. Also, all the minimal winning cabinets in Austria, France and Germany were ideologically connected. This indicates that in general, European parties aimed to forge coalitions which were easier to manage while sharing the coalition payoffs between the smallest number of parties. Besides, they intended to establish ideologically connected cabinets whose policy programs would be devised with relative ease; with legislation that would be less likely to be protracted. However, there were outliers. While surplus majority governments were both rare and short-lived in most of the countries, they were the most common type of coalition arrangements and also lasted quite long in both Turkey and Finland. Minority coalition cabinets have been extraordinarily common and durable in almost every country where they existed, contrary to the literature. They lasted even longer than the minimal winning coalition governments in Denmark and Ireland. Only in Turkey, were they relatively less durable.

The relation between the government size (number of parties in the cabinet) and duration has been inconsistent.⁴ Usually, more than two parties coalesced. Whether the government was small in size like Austria, Luxembourg and Turkey or large in size like Sweden and Italy does not reveal a clear pattern.⁵

⁴ Pairwise correlation test reveals a very weak negative relation, however, it is not significant at $p < 0.01$ ($p = 0.1973$).

⁵ The number of parties in the cabinet is used for testing the size hypothesis of Riker (1962). Riker argues that parties are predominantly office-seeking in their behavior. Therefore, they will try to forge a coalition with the smallest number of parties. The type of the cabinet and the number of parties in the cabinet were analyzed in the coalition literature in this context. Here, looking at the cabinet type gives clearer results while the relation between the size and duration of the cabinet remains inconclusive.

Figure 5.1. Cross-national Trends in Cabinet Duration in Europe (in days), 1990-2006




Table 5.1. Cabinet Duration by Cabinet Type in the 1990s (in days)									
Country	Minority Coalition Governments		Minimal Winning Coalition Governments**		Surplus Majority Governments		Total		
	Frequency	Average Duration	Frequency	Average Duration	Frequency	Average Duration	Frequency	Average Duration	Number of Parties in the Cabinet
Italy			4**	463.5	2	291.5	6	406.2	5
Turkey	2	337	2	480	3	727	7	545	2.28
Finland			1	264	3	938.3	4	769.8	3.75
Denmark	4	844.3	1**	604			5	796.2	2.6
Austria			4**	799.8			4	799.8	2
Norway	1	868					1	868	3
Belgium			2	1325	1	57	3	902.3	4
Ireland	2	1045	2	778.5			4	911.8	2.25
Luxembourg			2	922.5			2	922.5	2
France			3**	1047.7			3	1047.7	2.33
Germany			3**	1412	1	33	4	1067.3	2.25
Sweden	1	1081					1	1081	4
The Netherlands			1	1355	1	1449	2	1402	3
Iceland			3**	1466.7			3	1466.7	2
Europe*	8	927	26	965.7	8	617.1	42	891.9	2.95

* Excluding Turkey

** All four governments in Austria, three governments in Germany, three governments in France, one in Denmark, one in Italy and one government in Iceland were minimal winning connected cabinets.

Sources: Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining Dataset (2008), Turkish Statistical Institute

An analysis of the relation between the cabinet attributes of size, ideological compatibility, type and duration yields mixed results. In general, the prevalence and durability of minimal winning cabinets has been remarkable. Moreover, Austria, France and Germany had tight coalitions, all of which were both minimal and connected and, thus the size of the government (as in number of cabinet parties) was very small. For these countries, there is a high correlation between the cabinet attributes and duration. However, where they existed, minority coalition cabinets have also been very stable. In the least durable cluster of countries, Italy, Turkey and Finland, the relation between the cabinet attributes and durability did not yield meaningful results, although both Finland and Italy had large sized governments at that time, which probably made it more difficult to manage inter-party relations.

The way cabinets are terminated seems to vary according to the cabinet type. In countries where minimal winning and minimal connected winning cabinets prevailed, these cabinets survived the entire inter-election period. In Ireland and Denmark, minority coalitions have been common as well as durable; however, they were more vulnerable to inter-party conflict. Where surplus majority cabinets prevailed, the termination of a cabinet by resignation has been common. In Italy, Turkey and Finland, inter-party conflict stemming from both policy divergences and personal dissension weakened and eventually broke the governments.

In Turkey, France and Luxembourg, there have been instances where the opposition parties organized to defeat the acting cabinet in the parliament and used the institutions such as motions of censure and parliamentary queries to topple the government. However, political parties usually did not just resign and allow another party to form the new government. In fact, unless they expected a favorable electoral outcome they tried to stay in power. Therefore, when possible, cabinets ended through calling for early elections. In general, the main pattern of the way cabinets terminated was that discretionary types of termination were specific to the countries with less durable coalitions while technical reasons constituted the most common reasons in the more durable coalition systems.

Country*	Technical Sources of Termination		Discretionary Sources of Termination		
			Inter-party Conflict		
	Regular Elections	Other Technical Reasons	Policy	Personal	Early Elections
Italy	1		3	1	1
Turkey	0	3	1	1	2
Finland	3		1		
Denmark	0		1	1	3
Austria	2		1		1
Norway	1				
Belgium	2				1
Ireland	1			2	1
Luxembourg	1	1			
France	1	1			1
Germany	4				
Sweden	1				
The Netherlands	2				
Iceland	3				
Europe**	22	2	6	4	8

* Sorted in descending order with regard to durability of coalition cabinets
**Excluding Turkey
Sources: Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining Dataset (2008), Turkish Statistical Institute

5.2. The Context: Party Systems and Institutional Rules

Several studies have verified that cabinet duration varies systematically with the fractionalization of the party system (Damgaard, 2008; Laver and Schofield, 1998; Warwick, 1994). The more fragmented and polarized party systems are expected to be more inclined to produce less durable cabinets. Yet, this hypothesis might only be

verified by a large pooled time series cross-sectional data. As Laver and Schofield (1990, p. 149) warn, it is more difficult to infer the relation between durability and the party system when one considers the variation in durability within the countries and also the factor of less time.⁶ The characteristics of the party system influence durability by increasing the level of bargaining complexity (King, Alt, Burns, and Laver, 1990, p. 585). Hence, to get a more comprehensive view, rather than assessing each feature of the party system in isolation, fragmentation should be analyzed together with polarization (measured in the share of the extremist parties) and the number of issue dimensions (under the category of bargaining systems). For instance, in large party systems such as Norway and Sweden, the level of uncertainty would be lower since there was only one issue dimension and no relevant extremist party. On the other hand, although the Netherlands has been identified as a multipolar system (Laver and Shepsle, 1996, p. 159), country experts challenged this categorization on the basis of the fact that the Dutch bargaining system has been predominated by the Christian Democrats (Timmermans and Andeweg, 2003, p. 358). A dominant core party in a fragmented party system stabilizes the bargaining environment. Hence, more durable systems were either less fragmented or had other characteristics of the party system to ease the bargaining processes.

The cluster of the least durable coalitions involved; on the other hand, highly fractionalized and polarized party systems especially in Italy and Turkey.⁷ The Italian party system went through a major transformation in the 1990s. The Christian Democratic Party (DC) had been a core party, building coalitions with the other small center-right parties for a long time. In the 1990s, the party was weakened by severe factional splits and a series of corruption charges (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000, p. 443). However, it was the set of electoral reforms from a PR to a mixed system in 1992 and 1993 that led to the demise of the traditional parties (Morlino, 1996; Katz, 1996). Small parties started to coalesce before the elections within the ideological blocs, and the party system started to gain a bipolar character around center-left and center-right

⁶ A negative and weak correlation (-0.3323) between fragmentation and duration seems to exist; however, it is not significant at $p < 0.01$ ($p = 0.2458$).

⁷ The polarization level in Turkey was measured as the average seat share of the pro-Islamist RP and its successor FP in the 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections.

proto-coalitions. Nevertheless, transformation of the party system was not sufficient enough to lengthen cabinet life. The Turkish party system remained multipolar throughout the 1990s, especially during the mid-1990s, but the cabinets were relatively more durable compared to Italy. The ANAP-DSP-DTP government was large in size and did not have majority status. The DSP-MHP-ANAP government was also oversized and lacked ideological coherence. However, both governments lasted fairly long.

King et al (1990, p. 589) argue that governments formed with difficulty tended to be short-lived. Accordingly, the length of negotiations and the existence of fruitless bargaining rounds point out the difficulty in forging a coalition. The coalition arrangements in Italy and Turkey have been concluded in nearly three weeks on average, however, communication between the parties have generally taken even longer in more durable systems such the Netherlands, Austria and Germany. The length of bargaining processes stems from different reasons in these two clusters which also varied extensively in durability.⁸ The parties had fierce debates on the allocation of offices in Italy (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000, p. 456) and in Turkey,⁹ policy issues were largely left to the period after the government was inaugurated. In the cluster of the more durable systems, parties spent a fairly long time and expended intensive effort to reach a common policy agenda. Some bargaining rounds yielded inconclusive results in these countries, although the parties were ideologically adjacent. Hence, durability did not vary with long bargaining durations and the existence of inconclusive rounds in these cases (Table 5.3.). On the contrary, parties decided on a more detailed policy agenda had less conflict once the cabinet took office.

⁸ Pairwise correlation test for the relation between average country duration and average bargaining duration of individual countries yields insignificant at $p < 0.01$ ($p=0.3541$).

⁹ Interviews in April and May 2011.

Table 5.3. Bargaining Environment in Turkey and Europe, 1990-2006

<i>Country*</i>	<i>Effective Number of Parties</i>	<i>Extremist Party Seat Share</i>	<i>Bargaining System</i>	<i>List PR</i>	<i>Investiture**</i>	<i>Special Majority Requirement</i>	<i>Head of State Appoints Cabinet</i>	<i>Informateur</i>	<i>Continuation Rule</i>	<i>Bargaining Duration (in Days)****</i>	<i>Inconclusive Bargaining Round</i>
Italy	5.58	15.89	multipolar	x**	x					24.16	x
Turkey	5.87	20.89	multipolar	x	x	x	x			25.14	x
Finland	5.05	0	multipolar	x		x	x	x		20.25	
Denmark	4.50	0	multipolar	x					x	5.4	
Austria	3.42	0	bipolar	x		x				53	
Norway	4.36	0	unipolar	x					x	5	
Belgium	7.86	5.24	multipolar	x	x***	x		x		46.33	x
Ireland	3.26	0	unipolar		x				x	27	x
Luxembourg	3.90	0	unipolar	x	x	x		x	x	19	
France	3.03	4.73	unipolar				x		x	2.66	
Germany	2.87	0	bipolar	x	x	x				27.5	
Sweden	4.19	0	unipolar	x	x			x	x	19	
The Netherlands	5.12	1	multipolar	x				x	x	100	x
Iceland	3.74	0	unipolar						x	10.33	x

* Sorted in descending order with regard to durability of coalition cabinets

** Italy applies list PR partially

*** No investiture requirement in Belgium since 1995

**** Bargaining duration as the time elapsed between the resignation of a cabinet and inauguration of the new one

Source: Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining in Europe Dataset (2008)

The final aspect of the context in which governments were formed and functioned is the institutions. Since the 1990s, there has been substantial research pointing to the role of institutions in lengthening or shrinking cabinet duration (Diermeier, 2008). Specifically, many countries did not require their cabinets to secure the active support of the majority of the parliament (investiture requirement), putting the burden of the change of cabinet on the opposition. One type of the mechanisms that aimed to make the formation of a cabinet easier and termination of it more difficult is negative parliamentarism. In Finland, Iceland, Denmark and Norway, the opposition has to organize to show that the majority of the parliament is against a new cabinet (Bergman, 1993, p. 287). In this way, minority coalitions could be formed and maintained in Denmark, Ireland and Sweden. Another mechanism is the constructive vote of no confidence. It requires the opposition to form an alternative coalition so as to table a vote of no confidence. It originated in Germany, and then Belgium adopted it in the 1995 to enhance durability. A third mechanism has been developed in Finland and Ireland, where the incumbent government composition is favored in the case of a stalemate, and the laws continue to favor the status quo government during its governance (Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994, p. 320). Besides that, in many countries the acting prime ministers have an opportunity to continue after the elections unless the opposition is mobilized. Moreover, in Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden and the Netherlands, the heads of state appoint an informateur who has the task of assessing the potential coalitions. The informateur has usually been the leader of the largest party (De Winter, 1995, p. 123). In this sense, the informateur resembles the party leaders who were supposed to preside over government formation in other parliamentary systems. However, in the systems that use the informateur, negotiations have become more policy-dominated. Thus the prospective coalition government's policies are pre-designed. Therefore, it is the motivations of the actors rather than the institution of the informateur that decreases the uncertainty and mistrust stemming from the formation stage. Finally, the influence of the prerogatives of the heads of state in government formation on cabinet duration has also been mixed. It is argued that in Finland, involvement of the heads of state has been destabilizing as sometimes they have supported a small party and endorsed the formation of a minority government which had little chance of survival due to the investiture requirement (Nousiainen, 2000, pp. 268-269). Accordingly, the strengthening of the element of parliamentarianism was seen as a positive development. On the other hand, in Italy the heads of state had almost no

power in government formation, but this did not prevent the fragile nature of cabinets. Hence, the role of the head of state might depend on the conditions of the political system rather than being an influential dynamic. In Italy and Turkey, the main problem seemed to be that the investiture requirement has not been regulated and ameliorated by any major institutional mechanisms. The findings from Turkey and the other countries indicate that the cabinet attributes, the characteristics of the party system, the indicators of bargaining difficulty as well as the institutional rules pertaining to government formation and termination provide only a partial explanation with regard to the dynamics of durability. Coalition behavior and the mechanisms which regulate the behavior of the political parties should also be analyzed.

5.3. Maintaining Governments

Electoral volatility has been a persistent aspect of Turkish politics in the 1990s (Sayarı, 2007, p. 200; Şekercioglu and Arıkan, 2008, p. 218). It contributed to the controversial nature of the relations between the parties. Shifts in voter preferences fed mistrust between the parties. Competition over the leadership of the ideological blocs prevented the emergence of ideologically compatible governments. This also fostered an opportunistic type of coalition behavior. Parties resorted to calling for early elections whenever they expected to attract floating votes. Hence, electoral volatility has been a malady that resulted in premature termination in the Turkish case. However, electoral volatility has been rising across Europe in the same period. From the 1980s to the 1990s, it rose in all countries that are analyzed in this study, except in Iceland and Luxembourg. For instance, the percentage of electoral volatility doubled in the Netherlands. Yet, the majority of these countries enjoyed improved cabinet longevity.

Studies based on large datasets have concurred on the significance of country effects in explaining variance in duration. Strøm et al (2000, p. 416) emphasize that country specific factors have been determinant in both the formation and the governance phases. So far the analyses in this study suggest that a focus on the dynamics pertaining to the formation phase might be confounding various other influences. This study presumes that the characteristics of coalition governance

mutually reinforce the dynamics emanating from the cabinet attributes and the bargaining environment, determining the actual cabinet life-span. It was mentioned above that some countries have devised specific institutions for making government formation easier, for instance through making it more difficult to replace an incumbent government in the inter-election period. However, such mechanisms did not prevent the threats to survival originating from the conflicts between and within the parties. Even in the coalition systems where these mechanisms have been at play for a long time, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria, cabinets have not been oblivious to the inter-party conflict. Nevertheless, discretionary cabinet termination has become less frequent over time and has disappeared in the majority of the governments in more durable systems (Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge, 2000). This implies that governments survived the crises through building cooperation and responding to the challenges.

There is ample evidence with regard to the institutional framework of coalition building. However, institutions pertaining to government functioning have been rarely studied. This partly stems from the fact that communication between the parties has been private by and large. One way of analyzing the mechanisms of government maintenance is by assessing coalition agreements. These agreements have been rare and the bulk of the negotiations were not codified into written agreements until the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, Italy has been notable for the absence of such documents, while one government in Denmark and one in Germany kept the arrangements private. However, written coalition agreements have been increasingly common in other countries in this period. This might be considered a learning process. As one scholar notes, the behavior of the political actors are not only driven by greed but also by fear (Strøm, 2008, p. 539). Thus, over time, political parties gradually realized the role of written commitments in building trust and decreasing uncertainty. Overall, the available documents are the sources of information on the dynamics of the interaction between the governing partners. The agreements might produce smooth functioning as long as they include extensive and explicit policy provisions rather than being dominated by office sharing. More importantly, parties should be actually committed to keep their promises as outlined in these documents. Otherwise, explicit compromises might become a drawback and induce resignation.

A characteristic of the more durable systems has been intensive and time-consuming bargaining processes on the policies. Consequently, coalition agreements have been detailed with respect to the policy agendas and have reflected the compromises between the parties especially in Germany and Austria. This has enabled the parties to legislate and solve the disputes more easily (Miller and Müller, 2010, p. 349). All coalition agreements in Austria have further devised specific mechanisms of coordination and conflict management. Some coalition agreements also involved clauses which aim to enhance coalition discipline (Müller, 2003, p. 104). In Ireland, on the other hand, the agreements did not propose coalition discipline per se, but ad hoc meetings of the party leaders have been quite effective and coalition discipline became a typical aspect of these governments despite the challenging political agenda (Mitchell, 2003, p. 140). As a result, coalition governments have been relatively durable in Ireland. The fact that coalition governance in this country has evolved through ad hoc and informal mechanisms indicated that high coalition discipline might be influential for government survival. The study of these arrangements in Belgium and the Netherlands revealed that parties have been faithful to their commitments most of the time. Having resolved the disputes before the cabinet took office prevented renewed conflict during legislation. However, the failure to realize commitments resulted in the annulment of the coalition in a number of cases in Belgium (Timmermans, 2006, p. 270). There are also examples of certain mechanisms to prevent opportunistic behavior. In Austria, France and the Netherlands, several governments included a clause in the coalition arrangements which specified that the dissolution of the cabinet would automatically result in calling elections (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 574). Hence, it forced the coalition parties to maintain the agreed government unless they anticipated a favorable outcome. In Norway, the inter-election period is fixed, therefore, parties cannot resort to a strategic dissolution given that their parliamentary strength will remain constant (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 579).

In addition to the mechanisms mentioned above, four main types of conflict management mechanisms emerged in Europe during this period.¹⁰ Inner cabinets comprising the leaders of cabinet parties have been common in Belgium, Iceland, the

¹⁰ The debate in this part relies on the findings of the author from the *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining Dataset* (2008).

Netherlands, Norway and Iceland. Cabinet committees were formed from time to time for resolving disputes on specific issues in Denmark, Finland, France and Austria. Coalition committees which also included the opposition leaders existed in some governments in Germany, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg. They were widely used in the grand coalitions of Austria and Germany between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. These types of committees were convened more frequently during the crises. Party summits; on the other hand, gathered the leaders of the cabinet parties who were not on the cabinet in person in Germany, Ireland and Italy.

In Italy, the coalition agreements were largely oral unwritten and office considerations dominated the bargaining processes. Without extensive and explicit agreement on the policy program, legislation crises were common. Moreover, coalition discipline was so weak that almost half of the government bills did not pass in the parliament in this decade (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000, p. 460). In the absence of institutional rules that sanction the maintenance of the government, strategic parliamentary dissolution was not costly for the parties (Mershon, 2002). Moreover, the use of conflict management mechanisms was considerably rare. Majority summits as a variant of coalition committee were used in the 1990s, however, in a highly fragmented party system with numerous small-size parties and low coalition discipline. This had the negative side effect of further diminishing cabinet autonomy rather than contributing to durability (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000, p. 461).

The Turkish coalition agreements in this period traditionally started with outlining the general principles, the envisioned legislation with regard to economic policies, social welfare, democratization and security. Whether these articles were binding is questionable as from time to time legislative deadlocks emerged even on the projected legislation. In some cases, such as in the I. DYP-SHP government, parts of the provisions could not be realized as the political and economic turmoil impeded functioning. In the II. DYP-SHP, DYP-CHP and ANAP-DYP governments, inter-party conflicts over legislation were more common. The coalition agreements arguably reduced the transaction costs in the RP-DYP, ANAP-DSP-DTP and DSP-MHP-ANAP governments. The last government especially had a vibrant legislation record; however, as there is substantial evidence that the genuine protocol was kept private; it is not easy to assess its sources in the written public record. In three out of the seven public

protocols, there were clauses with regard to the legislation. In the II. DYP-SHP government, it was stated that the targeted legislation would be scheduled in a series of meetings that included the leaders of the party groups, and that the top level bureaucrats would be appointed by the nomination of the relevant minister and the consensus of the prime minister and deputy prime ministers. The protocol of the DYP-CHP cabinet prescribed passing governmental decrees with joint signatures of the prime minister and the deputy prime minister. It further stipulated for the collective use and management of public funds. The ANAP-DYP cabinet's protocol also involved similar clauses with regard to bureaucratic appointments and the management of public funds. It had also foreseen legislation which would strengthen the signature powers of the deputy prime minister. The fact that senior partners in all three governments continuously criticized the leader of the larger party in imposing government decisions suggests that the leaders were not committed to these explicit clauses. On the contrary, the leaders were more loyal to the DSP-MHP-ANAP government's agreements. This coalition government's agreement also specified that all cabinet decrees should be collectively signed. This increased the level of coalition discipline. Only in the critical voting of the EU harmonization laws package, MHP left its party group to decide freely, however, this was also negotiated in the leaders' summit before the party took action.

The inner cabinets were used in Turkey largely in the form of coalition formation teams; however, senior partners usually refrained from putting it into effect during the crises. The nature of relations between the party leaders determined the management of crises. In the 1990s, apart from the ANAP-DYP government and DYP-CHP government, leaders had considerable working relations which allowed these cabinets to survive a number of crises. The last cabinet, that of DSP-MHP-ANAP, used the inner cabinet to resolve the disputes before they escalated into government crises and hence, this cabinet was the most durable coalition arrangement despite the severe challenges posed by economic difficulties, policy differences and a detrimental earthquake.

5.4. Turkish Exceptionalism?

This chapter explored the dynamics of forming and maintaining governments in a comparative perspective. The major finding in this study is that rather than general attributes and characteristics of the party system, the interplay of several institutional mechanisms pertaining to the formation, functioning and termination of the governments created diverse trajectories. Hence, the country effects on the variance in cabinet duration were outcomes of interaction of a set of dynamics. In this sense, the Turkish experience with coalition politics in the 1990s does not constitute an exception. The case of Turkey has similarities with other countries as well as differences.

Turkey and Italy have had the lowest cabinet duration values among the European countries. A number of respondents in the interviews argued that Turkish political system has yet to resolve its basic disputes over the regime. Specifically, the nature of cleavages in that period - the ethnic cleavage and the divide between the pro-Islamists and secularists – made it more difficult to reach concessions in the Turkish governments. In Europe, on the other hand, the debates were argued to be limited to the left-right politics rather than the essential characteristics of the political regime. This conception certainly has some truth in it. Cultural cleavages might be more difficult to manage compared to the economic cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). I believe that the influence of the cleavage structure, if any, is rather limited to government formation as it limits the number of potential coalitions. The controversy over RP has been an example in this respect. Moreover, these cleavages were not applicable to the formation of the rest of the six governments. As part of the political agenda constraints, the cleavages might continue to play a role, however, once a government takes office, its duration is by and large contingent on the relations and communication between the parties.

Moreover, this study refutes the view that Turkish political culture has been responsible for the low level of cabinet durability in comparison to the majority of the European countries. This is not to deny the importance of cultural factors; however, I believe this argument confounds the fact that what is referred as the “coalition culture” in the interviews is rather a learning process engendered by certain practices and mechanisms. Therefore, rather than the absence or weakness of coalition culture, the

scope of political learning is more pertinent in the Turkish context. Political learning refers to reevaluation of ideas and attitudes by the political actors after severe crises and important social and political transformations (Bermeo, 1992, p. 274). Political learning may be an important source of political change in democracies (McCoy, 2000). Institutions may facilitate political learning. For example, the Netherlands was traditionally identified as a consociational democracy in which the leaders tended to cooperate (Lijphart, 1977; 1999). However, this was probably because the absence of the investiture requirement increased the freedom of movement and mechanisms were increasingly adopted to resolve the disputes between the government parties. Otherwise, inter-party conflict and mistrust was also common in Dutch politics until late 1970s (Timmermans and Moury, 2006).

Another aspect of durability concerns coalition behavior. In both Italy and Turkey, the costs of coalition breaking have been low, inducing politicians to behave in an opportunistic way (Mershon, 1996). High electoral volatility and the fractionalized party system increased the tendency to call for early elections more frequently. In the absence of institutions which make it more arduous for the governing and opposition parties to break a government, these elements of the political system contributed to the premature termination of governments. Moreover, in both countries, alleged corrupt practices prevailed in this period. If legislation which aimed at strict control of the use of public funds, decreasing the patronage opportunities in the cabinet ministries was written, and if direct economic initiatives of the state could be made, office motivations might not have dominated the bargaining rounds. Instead, parties might have to focus more on the policies. In this regard, it might have been more likely for the coalition agreements to operate as *modus vivendi* for the prospective governments. As mentioned above, conflicts between the party leaders were more frequent when cabinets had vague compromises. The proliferation of policy-based coalition agreements might have contributed to the cabinet lifespan. Equally important has been the absence of consolidated conflict management mechanisms. As the DSP-MHP-ANAP government illustrated, such mechanisms could have been helpful in responding to government crises. In the rare occasion of these practices, inter-party relations have largely been left to the individual wills.

CONCLUSION

A conservative cabinet member of the RP-DYP government articulated the skepticism of many Turkish voters towards the notion of the coalition government by saying “It is like a car with two drivers. One steps on the accelerator while the other puts his foot on the brake. This way or the other way, you crash in to the wall eventually”.¹ Indeed, coalition governments in Turkey have been held responsible for a variety of problems. According to the critics, coalition governments are plagued by inherent stability and infighting between the government parties, which resulted in a poor economic performance record. This criticism has been widely espoused by different segments of the society. For example, a week before the general elections in 2011, former Minister of Industry and Trade, Nihat Ergün argued that in the periods when the country was ruled predominantly by coalitions, the governments were short-lived and these periods were characterized by the high levels of inflation and budget deficits; while the periods of party governments were replete with accomplishments.² This was also the central motto of the election campaign of the incumbent AKP government. Stability and growth were the recurrent themes in the billboards. The business associations have been among the leading skeptics as well. In a recent interview, the former president of the İstanbul Chamber of Commerce accused the coalition governments of being susceptible to intervention of extra-parliamentary actors, notably the military, and, prone to triggering economic crises.³ Arguably, one of the reasons which united the liberal and conservative voters and led to the landslide

¹ Interview on April 8, 2011.

² Meeting notes disseminated on the official website of the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology, available at <<http://www.sanayi.gov.tr/NewsDetails.aspx?newsID=1963&lng=tr>>, (retrieved 09.07.2011).

³ “2001 Krizini Zayıf Koalisyon Hükümetleri Tetikledi – 2”, *Zaman*, 18.02.2011.

victory of AKP in the 2002 elections was the inaptitude of the coalition governments (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, p. 116).

It is difficult to infirm the allegations empirically, however, the criticisms against the coalition governments are problematic in two major ways. First, the alleged causal relation between the type of government and political and economic instability may be spurious. The political turmoil and violence plaguing the political system in the 1970s again limited the capability of any government to rule effectively (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 55). After all, two of the three military interventions (i.e. May 1960 and March 1971), came out after long periods of party governments in power. As far as the 1990s is concerned, high levels of inflation and unemployment along with the devaluated currency have been typical news in the daily newspapers. In these circumstances, it is questionable whether a majority party government could have performed better. Moreover, patronage has been a persistent characteristic of Turkish politics regardless of the ideological position and the type of government in power (Altun, 2004). In time, perpetrators of patronage and corruption, and, the social groups which enjoyed preferential access to the public resources changed; however, nepotism, favoritism and clientelism prevailed (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 66). There is also substantial empirical evidence on the spuriousness of the relation between the economic performance and the type of government (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002; Karaca, 2003; Tutar and Tansel, 2000; Eren and Bildirici, 2001). These studies confirm that the hypothesized relation cannot be verified. More importantly, the research emphasizes that party governments did not perform better than the coalition governments considering the macroeconomic indicators until recently. After all, the direction of causality is yet to be verified.

The other misconception concerns cabinet durability. The most common adjective accompanying the concept of coalition governments turns out to be “short-lived” in the review of media coverage of the 1990s. However, this study provides contradictory empirical evidence. In the period between the end of the World War II and late 1990s, average duration of both types of cabinets varied between the countries in Western Europe. Besides, average cabinet duration improved in time in both party and coalition governments especially since the 1970s. The indifference with regard to the type of government suggests that stabilization of the political systems across Europe reinforced durability in general. When the number of party and coalition governments is compared

by decade, in each decade since 1940s, coalition governments outnumbered the party governments which took office, however, both tended to last longer. Majority party governments lasted longer on average in 1940s, 1970s and 1990s. However, it is important to see that the coalition governments were more durable in the 1950s and 1960s although the two decades were quite turbulent and the countries were struggling with reconstruction after the World War II. Minimal winning coalitions tended to perform better with respect to duration compared to the surplus and minority cabinets in all decades. An interesting finding in this context concerns the minority coalitions. On average, frequency and duration of the minority coalition governments improved in European democracies since 1970s, although historically they have been the shortest-lived arrangements. This finding also concurs in the positive impact of stabilization of the political system in general.

Average cabinet duration also varied in Turkey across time. In general majority party governments were more durable compared to the coalition governments. However, coalition governments lasted longer in 1970s and 1990s as the party governments formed in these two decades did not enjoy the support of the majority in the parliament. Unlike the general trend in Western Europe, surplus governments performed better, followed by minimal winning and minority coalition governments with respect to duration. More interestingly, among the 15 coalition governments formed in the multiparty period, the cabinets made up of ideologically adjacent parties have been relatively short-lived. Severe competition between these parties for attracting the highly volatile electorate cultivated mistrust and prevented long-lasting collaboration. Nevertheless, duration of the coalition governments improved steadily from 1960s to 1970s and then to 1990s.

My research on the coalition governments in Turkey in the 1990s and the comparative analysis yield three major findings with respect to the dynamics of cabinet durability. First, durability of the governments is partly a function of the circumstances of the political system. In other words, the political agenda puts constraints on the governments. When the tensions and the problems reach a level that makes the system ungovernable in practice, any government may fail to rule effectively regardless of its formation. The 1960s and mid-1990s illustrate this situation. In the in-depth interviews, the politicians often cited the characteristics of the political system in response to a

question as to why the coalition governments have been more durable in Western Europe compared to Turkey. Accordingly, they argued that in the countries where the major political actors reached a consensus on the founding principles of the political regime, the rest of the problems may be resolved with relative ease increasing the survival chances of the governments.⁴ In relation to this, the cleavage structure influences the nature of the challenges posed against the parties. While it is easier to solve the conflicts rooted in the left-right divide, issues turn into government crises more often if they were affiliated with other types of cleavages (e.g. the ethnic cleavage and the widening divide between the secularists and the pro-Islamists in Turkey). In my interviews, a number of respondents also emphasized the importance of a certain level of the economic development and well-being of a country for smooth functioning of the coalition governments.⁵

Apart from these informal limitations, the political systems pose structural constraints as well. A highly fragmented party system might not be detrimental to durability in itself. The party systems of Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands were as fragmented as those of Turkey and Italy; however, the cabinets in these countries were more likely to survive the entire inter-election in the 1990s. It has been rather a combination of structural elements which influenced durability. In the fragmented party systems, where the level of polarization as well as electoral volatility were also high and a dominant core party around which alternative cabinets could be established did not exist, durable coalitions could not be built. This was the case in both Italy and Turkey in the 1990s. In Italy, the Christian Democratic Party (DC) served as a core party for coalitions in the period before the 1990s, however, transformation of the party system resulted in further fractionalization and emergence of smaller parties. In Turkey, absence of a core party around which alternative formulas may be developed contributed to the instability of the political system in the mid-1990s. In the first half of the 1990s, after the dissolution of the I. DYP-SHP cabinet, parties had difficulty in finding coalition partners. RP was an “illegitimate” actor in the eyes of many secularists; therefore, the coalition strategies aimed to exclude RP in the first place. The leaders of DYP and ANAP, Çiller and Yılmaz respectively, were in an intense

⁴ Interview on April 29, 2011.

⁵ Interviews on April 22 and May 11, 2011.

competition for the leadership of the center-right. They tried to discredit each other in the eyes of the voters and sought to force each other to resign from the party leadership in every possible instance. SHP/CHP had been losing popular support and struggling with internal conflict. Thus, the two cabinets of DYP and SHP/CHP, after Demirel and İnönü conveyed leadership to successors, were formed largely due to the bargaining failures for alternative cabinet compositions. Similarly, the ANAP-DYP and RP-DYP governments were also formed by necessity. However, partial stabilization of the political environment after 1997 was related to the rise of DSP as a viable and legitimate partner. Its electoral support base was different than ANAP, DYP and MHP. Moreover, personality of the leader of DSP, Ecevit, was respected by the leaders of these parties. In this period, DSP became the center of two coalition governments, and it was also one of the few minority governments which managed to get vote of confidence.

Secondly, my research confirms the importance of the institutional settings for the coalition governments. The vote of confidence, known also as the investiture vote, is the principal institutional rule pertaining to government formation. Its existence leads to a tendency for oversize cabinets, which are arguably more prone to intra-governmental crises. It also decreases the chances for establishing tighter coalitions between ideologically compatible parties. The requirement of qualified majorities has similar implications. The countries in Western Europe either did not enforce the investiture vote or adopted measures to balance the repercussions of this rule on cabinet durability. In the countries where bargaining traditionally lasted long and governments were formed with relative difficulty, the institutional framework was amended so that once inaugurated, it would be difficult to overthrow an acting cabinet. The mechanism used for this purpose varied. In Germany, Belgium (after 1995) and Spain, a constructive vote of no confidence was enforced. In Ireland, the acting cabinet is preferred in the cases signaling potential bargaining failure. In countries such as Norway and Sweden, the inter-election is fixed to discourage opportunistic behavior of the parties. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the prime minister did not have to resign after the elections. The ease of calling early elections, dissolving the cabinet and tabling interpellation in Italy and Turkey was remarkable considering relatively shorter durability compared to the other European democracies.

Apart from these rules pertaining to the formation and termination of the governments, one of the most important findings of this study is that governance mechanisms play a very important role in coalition maintenance. Despite the amplitude of the studies on the formation and termination of the governments, patterns of the interaction between the government parties were less analyzed. One of the main contributions of this study is its focus on the governance mechanisms in Turkey, an understudied aspect of coalition politics. It is in the nature of coalition politics that the senior partners of the cabinets attempt to impose their own decisions as the government policies. However, if this tendency reaches the level of ignoring the junior partner, it may become detrimental. The junior party may lose its motivation to maintain the cabinet as it cannot realize any of its expectations from joining the government. A number of mechanisms emerged in Western Europe to encourage intensive and continuous communication between the parties. These governing bodies have been active in Austria, Germany and the Nordic countries. Moreover, conflict management mechanisms were developed to prevent escalation of conflicts into deadlocks. It is noteworthy that both types of mechanisms were rare in Italy and Turkey. In Turkey, the coalition agreements were written, and included a number of clauses pertaining to the collective governance though sporadically. Working relations between the leaders of parties contributed to the functioning and durability in the I. DYP-SHP, ANAP-DSP-DTP, and DSP-MHP-ANAP governments. We know that at least in one instance (in the DSP-MHP-ANAP government) a semi-institutional mechanism convening periodically at the top executive level was active. In Italy, the repercussions of the fragmented and polarized party system combined with feeble coalition governance. This made the country having the least durable coalition system in Western Europe.

Thirdly, in relation to the second aspect mentioned above, coalition maintenance depends on the learning process. In my interviews, the respondents emphasized political culture as the most important factor which accounted for the variation in durability between the countries. A liberal conservative cabinet member, who served in three governments, associated underdevelopment of the “coalition culture” in Turkey with the general problems in the functioning of the democracy.⁶ He argued that interruption of the political system by the military interventions inhibited development of the

⁶ Interview on April 27, 2011.

coalition culture along with its repercussions on the democracy in general. However, I believe that an argument for the role of political culture in cabinet durability needs elaboration from another perspective. Just as the cultural dynamics are important in shaping the structures and institutions in a country, the infrastructure of a country impinge upon the characteristics of political culture. Existence of governing bodies and conflict management mechanisms contribute to building trust and communication networks, which in return, enhances the coalition discipline and unity. What is referred as the coalition culture may partly be the outcome of political learning in time.

This aspect of coalition politics, involving a learning process for the major political actors, suggests that coalition governments may contribute to democracy. All of the interviewees except for three former ministers,⁷ agreed on the potential of the coalition governments to develop the politics of accommodation in Turkey. In this context, they emphasized that coalition governments are especially important in building mutual understanding and peaceful co-existence in heterogeneous and polarized societies. They also argued that multiparty governance may serve as a checks and balances system curbing authoritarian tendencies. However, for coalition governments to contribute to the functioning of the democratic system, the electoral threshold needs to be lowered so that a wider range of diversity will be included in governance.⁸

I agree with the importance of these points and suggest that the capacity of coalition politics to contribute to the spread of democratic values in Turkey may be expanded, and durability of the coalition governments may be improved with a number of measures besides lowering the electoral threshold. As implied above, establishment and regulation of governing bodies and conflict management mechanisms may have a positive impact on building cooperation between the parties. The constitutional prerogatives of the head of state may be diminished to the level of classical parliamentary system so that s/he can play a more neutral role and have less freedom of movement while interfering in the affairs of the parliament. In its current status, Turkish presidents will be elected directly by popular vote which is a potential constraint on the

⁷ Interviews on April 6, 8; and May 6, 2011.

⁸ Interviews on May 3 and 13, 2011.

functioning of prospective coalition governments in the future as a stronger president may act as a supra-parliamentary actor. One of the most important soft spots of the coalition governments, which weakened the legitimacy and credibility of the government parties, was the corruption charges. Strict measures against corruption and patronage are important for both increasing the social support to the governments, and prioritization of policy motivations in the place of office considerations in the formation of governments. Prioritization of policy preferences is important as this may lead to the formation of tighter cabinets, with clearly designated government program. Such cabinets may have better chances of performance and durability. Finally, I believe that consolidation of intra-party democracy is important. Throughout the 1990s, SHP/CHP and DYP struggled with severe intra-party conflict. To a lower extent, internal divisions within ANAP, DSP, and MHP also put pressure on the leaders. Escalation of the competition for the party leadership was related to the fact that diverse opinions could not be vocalized in the party executive boards. From the point of view of the oppositional groups within the parties, frail intra-party democracy gave the impression that taking hold of the leadership was the only way to express their demands. In this way, the decisions taken by the leaders may be more committed by the rest of the party members as these decisions would be pre-discussed within the party before they are made public.

I believe in the potential of coalition politics for contributing to the functioning of the democratic system in Turkey; however, they have to be durable to enforce policies and to develop a politics of accommodation. In this study, I tried to understand the dynamics of cabinet durability in Turkey from a comparative perspective. In terms of its research question and its comparative framework, I believe it fills lacunae in the study of coalition politics in Turkey and in the wider literature.

APPENDIX 1

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interview No.	Position	Party Affiliation	Location	Date
1	Former Minister of Foreign Affairs	DYP	İstanbul	April 6, 2011
2	Former Minister of Culture	RP	İstanbul	April 8, 2011
3	Former PM	ANAP	İstanbul	April 22, 2011
4	Former Minister of Interior	MHP	via phone	April 26, 2011
5	Former Minister of National Defense, Former Deputy PM	DYP and DTP	Ankara	April 27, 2011
6	Former Minister of Justice	DSP	Ankara	April 27, 2011
7	Former Minister of Energy and Natural Resources	MHP	Ankara	April 29, 2011
8	Deputy PM, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs	SHP and CHP	Ankara	April 29, 2011
9	Former Minister of State	DYP	Ankara	April 30, 2011
10	Former MP	DYP and ANAP	Ankara	April 30, 2011

11	Former MP	MHP	Ankara	April 30, 2011
12	Former Minister of Foreign Affairs	DSP	İstanbul	May 3, 2011
13	Former Minister of Forestry	DYP	Ankara	May 6, 2011
14	Former Minister of National Defense; and Justice	ANAP	Ankara	May 6, 2011
15	Former Minister of State	SHP and CHP	İstanbul	May 11, 2011
16	Former Minister of Culture	SHP and CHP	İstanbul	May 13, 2011
17	Former Political Advisor	SHP	İstanbul	May 16, 2011

APPENDIX 2

SAMPLE QUESTION SHEET FROM THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

Görüşme Tarihi:

Görüşmenin Başlangıç Saati:

Öncelikle size kendimi tanıtayım. Benim ismim Hasret Dikici Bilgin. Bu çalışma doktora tezimin parçası. Tezimin konusu 1991–2002 dönemi koalisyon hükümetleri. Neden bazı koalisyon hükümetlerinin çıkan bütün krizlere karşın uzun yıllar sürerken diğerlerinin kısa sürede sona erdiğini anlamaya çalışıyorum. Bu kapsamda hükümetlerin kurulma süreçlerini, koalisyon müzakerelerini, kurulduktan sonra karşılaştıkları güçlükleri aşma çabalarını ve sona erişlerini inceliyorum. Bu gazeteciliğin ötesinde bir siyaset bilimi çalışmasıdır. Sorularımı bu şekilde değerlendirmenizi rica ediyorum. Görüşmemiz tezim dışında herhangi bir yerde kullanılmayacaktır. Görüşmemizi kaydedebilir miyim?

Sayın ..., partisinden ... milletvekili olarak ... hükümetinde görevinde bulundunuz. Size bu hükümetle ilgili sorular yönelteceğim.

Questions on the Bargaining and Government Formation

Sizin görev aldığınız dönemde seçimler şöyle sonuçlanmıştı: ... Partinizde genel eğilim kurulacak bir hükümette görev alma yönünde miydi, yoksa muhalefette kalma isteği var mıydı?

Siz kişisel olarak nasıl bir hükümet formülünü tercih ediyordunuz?

Hangi partilerle görüşüldü? Varsa önceki görüşmeler neden başarısız oldu?

Sizin de içinde yer aldığınız hükümet için teklif hangi partiden geldi?

Koalisyon görüşmelerine kimler katıldı?

Koalisyon müzakerelerinde neler görüşüldü? Hükümet programı ve koalisyon protokolü belirlenirken hangi konular çok tartışma konusu oldu? Uzlaşmazlık konuları nasıl aşıldı?

Bakanlık dağılımı nasıl kararlaştırıldı? Siz parti ve birey olarak burada hangi bakanlıkları istiyordunuz? Neden? Peki sandalye sayınız düşünüldüğünde adil bir dağılım oldu mu? Genel olarak bakanlıklar bu hükümette adil dağıldı mı?

Questions on Coalition Governance

Bu hükümette kararlar nasıl alınıyordu?

En çok hangi partiler arasında çatışma yaşandı?

Hangi konular ortaklar arasında kriz haline geldi? Bunlar nasıl aşıldı? Kriz çözmesiyle ünlü biri var mıdır?

Hükümet kurulduktan sonra bir dizi olay oldu. Bu olaylar karşısında hükümet nasıl hareket etti?

Sizce uyumlu bir hükümet miydi? Hükümet ortağınız olan parti hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

Questions on Governance and Termination

Sizce bu hükümeti sona götüren esas olaylar hangileriydi? Neler yapılabilsen hükümet sürebilirdi?

Hükümetin sona ermesinde parti örgütünden gelen baskılar oldu mu?

Medya hükümetin sona ermesinde sizce etkili oldu mu?

O dönemde RP/FP hükümete karşı nasıl tavır aldı? Bu partinin meclisteki varlığı sizce hükümeti etkiledi mi, etkilediyse ne şekilde etkiledi?

Genel olarak Milli Görüş çizgisinden gelen bir partinin ve ardıllarının mecliste bulunuşu bu hükümetler için istikrarsızlaştırıcı ya da ömür uzatıcı bir rol oynadı mı?

Genel olarak dahil olduğunuz bu hükümet dönemin diğer hükümetlerine göre, hele de çok önemli sorunlarla karşı karşıya kaldığı düşünülürse oldukça uzun ömürlü/kısa ömürlü oldu. Bunu neye bağlıyorsunuz?

Cumhurbaşkanının hükümeti kuracak lideri ataması, nitelikli çoğunluk vs hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

Sizce o dönemdeki siyasi ortam hükümetin kuruluşunu ve devamını ne şekilde etkiledi?

Sizce koalisyon hükümetleri kısa ömürlü olmaya mahkûm mudur? Neden?

Sizce Batı Avrupa'daki koalisyonlar Türkiye'dekilerden daha uzun ömürlü müdür?
Bunun nedeni nedir?

Son olarak Türkiye'de koalisyonlara karşı olumsuz bir tavır var. Kısa ömürlü olacakları, istikrarsızlığa yol açacakları düşünülüyor. Oysa Batı Avrupa'da halk koalisyonlara bu kadar olumsuz bakmıyor. Sizce neden böyle bir durum var?
Koalisyonlar demokrasiye katkıda bulunabilir mi?

Değerli görüşlerinizi benimle paylaştığınız için teşekkür ederim.

APPENDIX 3

<i>Name of the Cabinet</i>	<i>Cabinet Composition</i>	<i>Date of Inauguration</i>	<i>Date of Formal Resignation</i>	<i>Cabinet Type</i>	<i>Cabinet Duration.. (in days)</i>
VIII. İnönü	CHP-AP	20.11.1961	25.06.1962	surplus majority	217
IX. İnönü	CHP-YTP-CKMP	25.06.1962	25.12.1963	surplus majority	548
X. İnönü	CHP-independents	25.12.1963	20.02.1965	minority coalition	423
Ürgüplü	AP-CKMP-YTP-MP	20.02.1965	27.10.1965	surplus majority	249
I. Ecevit	CHP-MSP	26.01.1974	17.11.1974	surplus majority	295
IV. Demirel	AP-MSP-CGP-MHP	31.03.1975	21.06.1977	surplus majority	813
V. Demirel	AP-MSP-MHP	21.07.1977	05.01.1978	minimal winning	168
III. Ecevit	CHP-CGP-DP-independents	05.01.1978	12.11.1979	surplus majority	676
VII. Demirel	DYP-SHP	20.11.1991	16.05.1993	surplus majority	543
I. Çiller	DYP-SHP	25.06.1993	05.10.1995	minimal winning	832
III. Çiller	DYP-CHP	30.10.1995	06.03.1996	minimal winning	128
II. Yılmaz	ANAP-DYP	06.03.1996	28.06.1996	minority coalition	114

Erbakan	RP-DYP	28.06.1996	30.06.1997	surplus majority	367
III. Yılmaz	ANAP-DSP- DTP	30.06.1997	11.01.1999	minority coalition	560
V. Ecevit	DSP-MHP- ANAP	28.05.1999	19.11.2002	surplus majority	1271

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