DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONALIZATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE CASE
OF SAKARYA MUNICIPAL COUNCILS

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OF SAKARYA MUNICIPAL COUNCILS

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Political Science, M.A., 2013

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ABSTRACT

Realizing that most of the studies on local governments in Turkey take institutionalized municipal councils for granted, this thesis suggests some empirical insights into democratization of local politics. The literature on democratization seems to go beyond the classic definition of institutionalization provided by Samuel P. Huntington. Today, the term "democratic institutionalization" is widely used to refer to a proper legislative and executive conduct in politics. It is often emphasized that democratization requires the construction and institutionalization of local democratic organizations, procedures and norms that are founded on responsive and accountable principles. In this sense, the concept does have considerable implications for the actual and perceived roles of political actors, and certain practices which ultimately shape the nature of political decision making processes.

In order to make an empirical analysis of the level of institutionalization in local politics, the council profile in Sakarya metropolitan district municipalities are investigated in this study. The data collected through questionnaires including questions on the level of experience in and knowledge of political decision making processes among councilors, their political party affiliations, their perceptions of responsiveness and accountability, and their contacts with different local groups. The data have been analyzed basically with reference to seniority, autonomy and representation in municipal councils. The findings reveal a low level of institutionalization in municipal politics within the scope of this research.

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ÖZET

Bu tez, Türkiye'de yerel yönetimler üzerine yapılmış birçok çalışmanın belediye meclislerinin kurumsallaşmış olduklarını varsaydığını fark ederek, yerel yönetimlerin demokratikleşmesine ilişkin ampirik bir anlayış önermektedir. Demokratikleşme literatürü, Samuel P. Huntington'un klasik kurumsallaşma tanımının ötesine geçmiş görünmektedir. Bugün, "demokratik kurumsallaşma" terimi sıklıkla siyasette uygun bir yasama ve yürütme şekline işaret etmek için kullanılmaktadır. Demokratikleşmenin, duyarlılık ve hesap verebilirlik ilkeleri üzerine kurulu yerel demokratik örgütlerin, yöntemlerin ve normların inşasını ve kurumsallaşmasını gerektirdiği sıkça vurgulanmaktadır. Bu bakımdan kurumsallaşma kavramının, siyasi aktörlerin gerçek ve algılanan rolleri ile nihayetinde siyasi karar alma süreçlerini etkileyen belli pratikler için önemli etkileri vardır.

Bu çalışmada, yerel siyasette kurumsallaşma seviyesinin ampirik bir analizini yapmak için, Sakarya Büyükşehir Belediyesine bağlı ilçe belediyelerinin meclis üyelerinin profili incelenmiştir. Veriler, meclis üyeleri arasında siyasi karar alma süreçlerine dair deneyim ve bilgi seviyesi, meclis üyelerinin siyasi parti üyelikleri, duyarlılık ve hesap verebilirlik konularında algıları ve farklı yerel gruplarla ilişkileri üzerine sorular içeren anketlerle toplanmıştır. Veriler belediye meclislerinde kıdem, otonomi ve temsiliyet konularına ilişkin olarak incelenmiştir. Bulgular bu araştırmanın kapsamı içinde kurumsallaşma seviyesinin düşük olduğunu göstermektedir.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

Local politics is a fundamental element of democracy and democratization. Political entities with a large number of citizens evince the need for some intermediary institutions for not only participatory and deliberative but also representative democracy itself to be successfully performed. In this sense, local governments are important agents of a democratic political system as they underline a genuine relationship between citizens and political decision making processes. As such, this thesis focuses on the link between democracy and local governments, or, more precisely municipal councils which are elected decision making bodies at the local level.

Turkey has been experiencing an uneven process of democratization. This process is marked by the lack of a deep-rooted tradition of local level politics which is not dependent on and controlled by the central government so that a genuinely democratic representation and participation take place at local level (Heper 1989). A quick look at the relevant literature displays that conflicts between central and local governments, or between metropolitan and district municipalities, municipal bureaucracy, municipalities' financial supervision, the relationship between electorate and local representatives, and interest representation at the local level with a reference to patronage relationships and nepotism are of particular concern to the studies of local government in Turkey. However, municipal councils which are supposed to function in a very similar way to the legislature at national level seem to be underemphasized. Although the relationship between council and mayor, or municipalities' relationships with each other and central government are often studied, whether municipal councils themselves are institutionalized so that they are able to function properly remains to be a fundamental question.

This study raises the following question: To what extent are local councils institutionalized? This question underlines the concept of institutionalization in a very particular way which is to be clarified for the very purpose of this thesis. The term has been widely employed in democratization literature, yet it is poorly defined in the context of democratic consolidation. Although one of the clearest definitions of it is provided by Samuel P. Huntington (1968), institutionalization is commonly used in order to refer to the idea of proper legislative and executive conduct contributing to democratization (see, e.g., Frey 1975; Kalaycıoğlu 1990). Therefore, it inspires not only institutional but also individual level analysis through which the very leading actors of political decision making processes can be examined. In this sense, institutionalization is also about actual and perceived roles of these actors, and norms and common practices which ultimately shape the nature of a political decision making process.[1] An individual level analysis then promises empirical evidence for political accountability, responsiveness and professionalization in local politics.

1.2. Aim and Methodology

Municipalities in Turkey[2] are composed of three main bodies: A local council, an executive committee, i.e. *encümen*, of which members are partially chosen by council and partially appointed by mayor and treasurer, and mayor. Mayor and all councilors are elected by the votes of local people. A municipal council does have the legitimate legislative function which makes it a key local institution for democracy. As such, councilors' practices and beliefs with regard to their actual and ideal roles in municipal councils are worth to be scientifically analyzed.

The principal aim of this thesis is to provide some insights into democratic institutionalization of municipal councils in Turkey. Studying local governments brings about two basic frameworks with different perspectives and analytical tools. On the one hand, a study of local government requires the elaboration of the idea of governance as a process of governing. On the other hand, local politics has considerable implications for studies of democracy and democratization. Public policy literature provides us with

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[1]The concept "institutionalization" will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
[2] See Municipal Law No. 5393 for the latests details of municipal structure in Turkey.

a clear definition of governing as the management of social, economic and political resources of the society (Pierre and Peters 2000). As such, decentralization and local governance might be examined as an issue of effective management of local resources. However, such a perspective does not necessarily focus on the ways through which local policies are created. Politics is ultimately about the allocation of resources and benefits to some people and groups, and costs and burdens to other people and groups (Birkland 2001, 5). At this point, this thesis takes the very question of how political decisions are made at the local level into account with reference to a number of key democracy issues such as legitimacy, representation, accountability, and civil and political rights. In this way, it aims to fill the gap in the literature which has underestimated the democracy aspect of local politics in Turkey and lacked studies of intra municipal democracy.

Regarding municipalities as fundamental fields of democratization, the research for this thesis has targeted the members of municipal councils in Sakarya. Survey data were collected through the questionnaire given to councilors in Sakarya metropolitan district municipalities. Questions mainly emphasized the following major aspects of the scholarly debates on democracy: representation, accountability, responsiveness and professionalization in terms of councilors' possible contributions to legislative institutionalization at local level. Following the review of the literature on local governments and democracy, Turkish local governments, and the term institutionalization as an indicator of democratic consolidation, findings of the study are discussed with a reference to democratic institutionalization at the local level.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Local government: An agent of democracy and a field of democratization

For the purpose of this thesis, there are two interpenetrating aspects of the relationship between local politics and democracy: First, the potential of local governments to contribute to democratic consolidation and second, whether already existing local governments are democratic or not. Realization of such a potential obviously depends on the nature of local politics which is examined in the empirical part of this research. As such, a review of the literature on the relationship between local governments and democracy serves the rationale for this research on municipalities as it underlines the difference between the way public management and democracy literatures discuss local governments, and evinces the need for an empirical analysis of democratization at the local level.

While decentralization has always been a highly contentious issue, the local has become more salient with heated debates concerning globalization and democratization (see, e,g,. Alger 1999; Lyons 2006; Short et al. 2000; Wang 2005). The political arguments for local government have its roots partly in the arguments of John Stuart Mill (Clarke 2009). According to Mill, local political institutions are closer to people than national governments (Clarke 2009). Local institutions are further supposed to reflect the preferences of people under their jurisdiction better (Clarke 2009). They are at least structurally "more familiar" with local realities and "more accessible" to local demands (Diamond and Tsalik 1999). Dismissing the empirical evidence for such arguments for a while, the historical development of the role of local governments and municipalities as important political actors calls attention to some implications of decentralization as a political, economic and administrative phenomenon. At the end of 19th century, for example, Western Europe witnessed a new municipalism which marked the newly emerged regulatory processes by socialist demands for welfare state (Clarke 2009).

After World War II, establishment of some relationships among local governments and citizens around the world through sister cities has underlined the idea of a collective way of avoiding another war as well as fascist regimes (Clarke 2009). During the 1980's, "municipal foreign policy" was followed as a bottom-up localism in the U.S. and "municipal diplomacy" appeared as a response to problems such as "nuclear war, South African apartheid, economic decline and environmental problems" (Clarke 2009, 501). However, the recent understanding of local governments in terms of public administration places great emphasis on the efficiency of local services which is based on the capacity of municipalities to achieve scale economies, budget cuts and transaction cost decreases (Kadirbeyoğlu and Sümer 2012). As such, the New Public Management literature characterizes local governments as firm-like and regards accountability only as the proper legal enforcement of municipality contracts (Kadirbeyoğlu and Sümer 2012).

Despite "the depoliticization of the concepts and relations of local service delivery" (see Kadirbeyoğlu and Sümer 2012), this study focuses on municipalities as fundamental fields of democratization. Local governments are widely supposed to be fundamental elements of democratic consolidation. Dispersing political power to citizenry through greater deliberative and participatory elements can make political crises less likely in a country as it contributes to democratic consolidation (Bird 2000). Local level democracy provides citizens with greater chance to have an influence on decision making processes which directly concern their lives (Bird 2000, 2). As such, "the construction and institutionalization of local democratic institutions, procedures and norms that are founded on deliberative and participatory principles" is a fundamental stage of democratization (Bird 2000). At this point, it will be fair not to reduce the relationship between local governments and democracy to a matter of direct political participation of which practicality is still questionable in most liberal democracies. One should rather recognize that even representation itself is far from having a non-problematic relationship with democracy (Pitkin 2004). Where it is not possible to directly participate in the political decision making process, representation can make large-scale democracy possible only if there are participatory democratic politics at the local level (Pitkin 2004). In this sense, local government ideally serves as a legitimizing agent, promotes accountability and responsiveness, encourages active citizenship and political education, and reflects the needs of local populations (Yıldırım 1993).

Local government is and should be a critical object of studies of democracy since it can foster democracy in numerous ways. Increasing scale of a political system makes knowledge of public good less practical (Diamond and Tsalik 1999, 123). It further gives citizens, officials and representatives the chance to have direct contact with each other (Diamond and Tsalik 1999). Regarding the necessary participatory and deliberative elements in a well-functioning democracy, it has an "educational potential" providing all local actors with a field in which they can learn and develop democracy by practicing it (see, e.g., Diamond and Tsalik 1999; Pateman 1970). If localities' problems are really recognized, a responsive local government reinforces legitimacy and allows local politics to be more representative (Diamond and Tsalik 1999). Moreover, it provides the political system with a checks-and-balances structure at the local level (Diamond and Tsalik 1999).

The theoretical framework discussed above does have mainly two functions with regard to the significance of this study. First, it explains the rationale for a research on municipalities: There is at least a strong logical connection between local governments and democracy. Second, it raises the very basic research question in this thesis: Are local governments democratic so that they are expected to have a contribution to democratic consolidation? Democratization of local governments is potentially a first step of local governments' contribution to democratic consolidation in a political system. Local institutions and actors, and their roles and functions have considerable implications for democratization of local politics. In this regard, municipalities as elected decision making and implementing authorities at local level are the most salient units of analysis.

The structure of local governments points out two essential bodies. Local council, in general, is defined as "a supervisory-legislative body charged with such tasks as passing ordinances and approving budgets" (Hankla and Downs 2010, 760). As such, assuming that they are elected, local councilors engage in both "the management of service provision and representing local views and interests" (Rao 1998, 35). Local executive is "responsible for such functions as implementing council decisions and drafting budget proposals (Hankla and Downs 2010, 760). The existing literature on local governments suggests that the institutional design itself has considerable implications

for the success of decentralization (see, e.g., Hankla and Downs 2010). In this regard, similar to the old debate concerning advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and presidential systems, whether the executive or the council is stronger at the local level appear to be a fundamental question (Hankla and Downs 2010). For some scholars, strong executives may signal to weaken local democracy (see, e.g., Chandler 1993; Hankla and Downs 2010). The structure of local council itself is another area of scholarly interest. It evinces, for example, a trade-off between representation and efficiency which is a fundamental question for all kind of legislative institutions (Hankla and Downs 2010). The size of council, the electoral rule by which the members of council are elected and the national party influence over local elections are some of the factors that are supposed to have an influence on the functioning of local councils (see, e.g., Hankla and Downs 2010; Packel 2008). It follows then that some types of local councils are more democratic than others and whether a local government is democratic or not is a fundamental question on its own. As such, municipalities can realize their potential to contribute to further democratization of a country for the very first time when they are democratized.

2.2. Local governments in Turkey

Turkey's sub-national government system consists of three types of agencies each of which decision making organs are popularly elected: Provincial Special Administration, municipalities and villages. The term local government is used in order to refer to municipalities in this thesis. In Turkey, the development of local governments has been shaped by the initiative and control of the central government (see, e.g., Bayraktar 2007, Ergüder 1987, Göymen 2004, Heper 1989, Tekeli 1982). After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the time period until 1960's that is marked by the control of state over economics has witnessed rapid urbanization (Göymen 2004). This period was followed by the state-led regional and then city-based development plans (Göymen 2004). Recently, Turkey's relationship with the European Union which has led to the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* has resulted in a considerable emphasis on the function and value of local governments (Göymen 2004).

Although local governments and decentralization in Turkish politics have often been studied both as a part of political science and public management disciplines, municipal councils which are basic decision making bodies in local politics have been underemphasized. After the establishment metropolitan municipalities in 1984, conflicts between metropolitan and district municipalities with regard to coordination, communication, control over resources and realms of authority has become one of the most contentious issues in the literature (see, e.g., Ergüder 1989; Kalaycıoğlu 1989). The relationship between the central and local governments has been studied from a similar point of view (see, e.g., Esmer 1989). In this regard, the early literature on local governments in Turkey makes a very narrow sense out of checks-and-balances at the local level. Today, this viewpoint reveals itself to a certain extent by ignoring intra municipal democracy. While, Turkish municipal structure including elected executive and legislative bodies does suggest a set of roles which are to be properly performed for a functioning democracy, accountability, and checks and balances, for example, are still considered only a matter of financial audit of municipalities by state agencies (see, e.g., Ulusal Belediyelerde Denetim ve Beklentiler 2010). "The problems of power distribution, of political representation and participation" do not refer to the popular understanding local democracy in Turkey (Bayraktar 2007). As such, although Turkish municipal structure has evolved in a such way that it is no longer simply the subject of the central government, an understanding of local democracy beyond dimensions of "administrative tutelage, financial resources and functional limits" has not been totally adopted yet (Bayraktar 2007).

If decentralization is to be a successful step in the process of democratization and democratic consolidation, local governments should be regarded as tools not only for the effective management of resources but also for participation, deliberation, representation, checks and balances, and accountability which can contribute to the issues of management as well (Bird 2000). Without the development of such an understanding, local politics' potential to promote democracy cannot be realized. The relationship between local governments and key democracy issues mentioned above has been emphasized only in the very latest literature. The literature has recently been introduced by studies on representativeness of municipal councils, decision making processes in municipalities, participation and accountability in local politics (see, e.g., Arıkboğa 2007, Arıkboğa et al. 2007, Bulut and Tanıyıcı 2008, Kadirbeyoğlu and

Sümer 2012). This shift in the scholar focus has resulted also in a change in the objects of local government studies so that municipal entities themselves have finally become important units of analysis. As such, this research on democratic institutionalization of municipal councils is supposed to fill a gap in the literature by providing both an understanding of local governments as fields of democratization and empirical evidence for democratic institutionalization in local politics.

2.3. Democratic Institutionalization of Municipal Councils

2.3.1. Institutionalization

This thesis suggests that institutionalization is closely associated with democratic consolidation and it provides scholars with a very broad sense of a proper functioning of political organizations and procedures which inspires not only institutional but also individual level analysis. The classic and probably still the most popular definition of the concept is presented by Samuel P. Huntington (1968). This definition requires further elucidation for the very reason that, if the variety of studies built around the term is ignored, Huntington's conceptualization can mislead the reader in respect to the methodology of this study.

Huntington argues that the strength of political organizations and procedures relies upon two factors: "The scope of support" for the organizations and procedures, and "their level of institutionalization" (Huntington 1968, 12). Institutionalization simply refers to "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington 1968, 12). This process is supposed to be shaped by four different characteristics of the subject: Adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence (Huntington 1968). The more adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent an organization or procedure is, the more highly institutionalized it is (Huntington 1968). Adaptability, in a word, is the ability of successful adjustment in the face of different challenges throughout time (Huntington 1968). In this sense, its measurement by means of the age of organization, or procedure, does not imply an idea of stagnation, but, on the contrary, underlines stability and persistence achieved by constant modifications in accordance with changing conditions (see, e.g., Kalaycıoğlu 1999). Huntington (1968) further contends that complicated organizations are more likely to secure and maintain

the loyalties of its members since they have numerous and various subunits to do so. Likewise, institutionalized organizations and procedures are expected not to express the interests of only certain social groups but to articulate several actors' interests and also develop their own distinguished values (Huntington 1968, 20). Finally, high level of institutionalization is associated with a unified organization of which functional boundaries and dispute resolution procedures are clearly defined and adopted by the members of the organization (Huntington 1968, 22).

This detailed portray of institutionalized political organization seems at first glance to draw attention to the relationship between the organization, or procedure, in question and all other external elements in the political system such as other organizations or social groups with which the organization established a kind of relationship. However, if institutionalization is realized with stability and value, it is a phenomenon directly related to the very internal dynamics of organization, or procedure as well. Huntington partly alludes to this aspect of the concept as he suggests well established roles and relationships within the institutionalized organization. It follows then that institutionalization does also have considerable implications for all actors who have any relationship with the organization and, first and foremost, for the members of it. Regarding the internal structure of an organization, institutionalization brings about a well-developed set of rules, practices, norms and roles with regard to the functioning of the organization (Kalaycıoğlu 1999). In this sense, the institutionalization process is also a process of institutional socialization during which the number of new members decreases and the new members learn institutional rules and norms (Kalaycıoğlu 1999). As such, well-defined roles of the individual actors within an institutionalized organization are expected to acquire permanency and value in accordance with the organization itself (Kalaycıoğlu 1999).

At this point, it will help further discussion to specify what the organization in question might be. Although this research deals with municipal councils, the literature on local governments in Turkey, as discussed before, has not established an empirical link between institutionalization and municipal councils yet. This is exactly why this thesis has been inspired by and benefited from some studies on parliamentary institutionalization. The structure of local governments in Turkey already suggests a similarity between the ways through which the parliament and local councils function.

Councilors in both do have the very same identity as the representatives in political decision making processes. Therefore, it would not be a mistake to use the same terminology as studies on parliamentary politics use in terms of the implications of institutionalization for councilors.

Frequent circulation of the members of the parliament, for example, results in the lack of experienced members who have the adequate knowledge on the norms and rules of the legislature so that they perform their roles properly (Kalaycıoğlu 1999). It further undermines the function of legislature as a place where politics is learned and practiced as a profession instead of a subtask performed at leisure or of a short term electoral interest (Kalaycıoğlu 1999). In an institutionalized council, the role of being a councilor is professionalized, seniority becomes important and a merit system is secured (Kalaycıoğlu 1999). Scarcity of senior deputies and ever-changing memberships are indicators of a low-level institutionalization (Kalaycıoğlu 1990, Kalaycıoğlu 1999). As such, the ongoing political experience of actors of decision making processes not only plays an important role in building the internal structure of council but also provides the new comers with a learning process of proper legislative conduct (Kalaycıoğlu 1990, Kalaycıoğlu 1999). Indeed, experience in politics with regard to the knowledge of the established practices of a particular political organization is not limited to the experience within the organization after membership. In this sense, having any educational or occupational background related to politics may be decisive as well.

Considering an empirical analysis of institutionalization, yet another puzzling factor which infiltrates legislative bodies through party groups and councilors' identity as party members is political parties. Both political parties and party groups in councils interpose themselves between the electorate and their representatives which results in a three-way tension in local politics between the local councilor as an elected representative, the electorate he or she represents and the political party of which he or she is a member (Copus 2004, 14). Some scholars have already directed attention to the relationship between councilors, party groups which are "coherent, unified and disciplined blocs of councilors" and political parties (see, e.g., Copus 2004, Kalaycıoğlu 1990, Leonardi et al. 1978). If institutionalization is a problem of the autonomy of the representative assembly in the formulation of public policy vis-à-vis other political forces such as political parties and of the consensus of the assembly's decision making

rules and procedures, councilors' relationships with political parties of which they are a member inevitably matters (Leonardi et al. 1978). Partisan divisions within local councils might be ignored due to the idea that local issues are technical, not partisan, in nature (Trounstine 2010, 416). However, the real nature of local politics may tell us something different. For instance, several studies reported widespread popular distaste in the UK for party politics in local government and defense of local interests against the party mandate (see Rao 1998). At this point, whether political parties' interests correspond to the interests of local citizens cannot be taken as granted. Furthermore, overwhelming control of political parties on the local decision making processes leads councilors to view the world in terms of friend vs. foe and weakens the idea that councilor is a free agent (Kalaycıoğlu 1990).

In addition to Huntington's classic conceptualization, these various readings of institutionalization seem to justify an individual level analysis measuring the level of councilors' political experience through their membership terms and, in a broader sense, any past relationship with politics as well as the extent to which councilors identify themselves with their political parties and parties' interests. The following section then specifies the indicators of a democratic institutionalization by discussing how the term democracy qualifies a process of institutionalization.

2.3.2. Democratic Institutionalization

Institutionalization, as discussed above, attributes organizations and procedures certain characteristics which are not necessarily democratic as such. An institutionalization process, which ends with the establishment of an adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent structure, is also a democratic institutionalization only if it corresponds to the establishment of democratic rules, norms, roles and practices. Regarding the internal structure of a political decision making body, it follows then that councilors are expected to adapt and maintain democratic roles.

Representation is a good start for further discussion since it is a basic issue in municipal councils as is the case with all legislative bodies and it is the continuation of the preceding review of councilors' roles in a sense. It is also a term elaborating some other

key concepts of democracy with regard to councilors such as responsiveness and accountability. People authorize representatives to act on their behalf simply through elections. While representation commonly means "a relation between two persons, the representative and the represented, with the representative holding the authority to perform various actions that incorporate the agreement of the represented," political representation does have a procedural character resulting in "the acceptance of a general responsibility for the interests of a group" (Rao 1998, 20). However, electoral preferences expressing support for or opposition to the predetermined representative role of certain actors, i.e. candidates, provide us with a very narrow sense of representation. Even though, certain candidates are elected since they are expected to represent the interests of those who vote for them, the actual practices of councilors may not meet such expectations. As such, councilors' dual identities as representatives and political party members may lead to a crisis of representation when parties' interests challenge to those of the locality. For all these reasons, a genuine analysis of representation evinces the need for some other indicators beyond elections.

Resemblance in terms of councilors' personal and social characteristics has been commonly considered an important indicator of their representativeness (Rao 1998). A number of studies have revealed the underrepresentation of women or younger people through the tendency of councilors to be disproportionately male and elderly (Rao 1998). Such descriptive analyses have no doubt value, yet remain incapable of comprehending changing perceptions of representation (Rao 1998). Some studies[3] have demonstrated that "the symbolic projection of the elector's own self onto the representative has largely disappeared" (Rao 1998, 23). It seems that a much more fundamental relationship has been established between responsiveness, accountability and representation (see, e.g., Rao 1998; Trounstine 2010). This study does not problematize the factors that lead the realization of responsiveness and accountability. Instead, it focuses on the empirical analysis of reality: Whether these components of democratic representation exist in municipal councils or not. The idealized roles of councilors may be different from the actual pattern of representative activity and this makes "what councilors do and how they should act", rather than "who they are", a

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[3] The Maud Committee surveys in the UK is one of the most important basis for studies emphasizing the change in the public perceptions with regard to representation in local councils. See Rao (1998) and Copus (2004) for details.

central issue in municipal councils (Rao 1998). In this sense, how councilors act and how they perceive their roles are important indicators of what they represent in decision making processes. At this point, patterns of time allocation, i.e. how they divide their time concerning different activities, and of relationships with other actors, i.e. citizens, different social, ethnic and occupational groups, the political party of which they are a member, their political party group in the council, mayor, executive committee and commissions of municipality, bureaucrats and other councilors, appear to be substantive indicators of representation, responsiveness and accountability in local politics (see, e.g., Rao 1998).

Councilors may not follow the preferences of their electorate, yet decision making processes and policies should be explainable in a sense of transparency and be decessible to questioning so that voters are able to evaluate the performance of the local representatives. If democratization is concerned, institutionalization is expected to take place in accordance with the development of the role of responsive and accountable councilor independent from overwhelming control of political parties. As such, the extent to which councilors' consider their contacts and the information they share with citizens a fundamental part of their role as councilors does have a say in the institutionalization of democratic elements as the very basic dynamics of council.

However, it is impossible to expect the realization of a genuinely representative, responsive and accountable decision making process at the local level without the independence of councilors from the mandate for party representation. The relationship between councilors and their political parties is by definition a decisive element in local politics as it influences the very perceptions, preferences and behaviors of councilors. Therefore, autonomy appears to be an essential element for democratic institutionalization of municipal councils.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY: SAKARYA

3.1. Methodology

The goal of this study is to provide a descriptive empirical analysis of different dimensions of the concept "institutionalization" in local politics. The earlier literature review is supposed to help figuring out some indicators of institutionalization and qualifying the process of institutionalization by some indicators of democratization. As such, this thesis offers some insights into the commonly referred idea of democratic institutionalization through the measurement of the development of democratic roles in municipal councils.

The weakness of the identification of this idea with regard to institutionalization itself makes operationalization critical for this study. First, what institutionalization implies for the internal dynamics of municipal councils is an important question of which answer reveals the very indicators of the phenomenon. Second, the concept of democratic institutionalization requires further search for certain democratic characteristics attributed to councilors along with these indicators. Given the literature discussed so far, democratic institutionalization at the local level is measured through the following variables: Councilors' experience in and knowledge of political decision making processes, their attitude towards their role as councilors, political parties' influence over the role of councilors, councilors' perceptions and actual practices with regard to their role in representation, responsiveness and accountability in local politics. These variables are measured in Sakarya metropolitan district municipalities via the questionnaire given to councilors. The questionnaire consists of 27 multiple choice, rank order and open-ended questions.

The more experienced and knowledgeable the councilors, the more institutionalized the council. In an institutionalized council, the number of new members is low and seniority gains importance (Kalaycıoğlu 1999). In Turkey, data availability with regard to the composition of past municipal councils is a fundamental problem. The list of winning candidates for municipal councils is available basically for the last local elections held in 2009.[4] Without personal contacts, even demographic profiles of current councilors are hardly accessible in most of the municipalities. Although the vote shares of political parties are available for almost all elections, the candidate lists for past elections are hardly visible. For the very purpose of determining councilors' experience in political decision making processes of a municipality, this problem, i.e. inability to measure the change in memberships, resulted from the lack of information on previous councilors is solved by measuring membership terms of the current councilors.

As discussed before, experience in terms of seniority is an indicator of institutionalization, since it contributes to the establishment and consolidation of a clear set of rules, norms and practices within councils which are necessary for the proper performance of councilors as decision makers in local politics. In a general sense, improper behavior in a decision making process refers to unruly behaviors ranging from insult to physical fight, taking the floor without permission, exceeding one's speech time and violations of relevant rules of the organization (Kalaycıoğlu 1990). This being the case, the proper legislative conduct may be more or less guaranteed by the knowledge of and familiarity with it as well. This kind of knowledge or familiarity, then, can be acquired either theoretically through a proper education or practically through any past experience in politics. Therefore, educational and occupational background of councilors is yet another indicator of the level of institutionalization of municipal councils.

An institutionalized municipal council is also expected to secure the role of councilors as free agents in decision making processes. Councilors are not only representatives of local views and interests but also the shapers of local policies so that political parties do inevitably have a say in formulating and delivering such policies (Rao 1998). However, high levels of party affiliation by no means ensure a commitment to the locality in the

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[4] The basic statistics concerning local elections in Turkey are provided by the Supreme Election Board and the Turkish Statistical Institute.

case of a conflict between citizens' and party's interests. And such empirical evidence is meaningful particularly when it is observed with relatively low levels of contact with and responsiveness to the locality. In this sense, the questionnaire given to councilors has measured the influence of political parties over councilors through questions on councilors' preferences and actual practices in terms of representing and defending their parties' interests in council.

If local politics are to achieve democratic institutionalization, the internal structure of municipal councils underlying the role of councilors, rules, norms and practices with regard to decision making processes should secure that experienced, qualified and autonomous councilors having a good command of the way council functions establish a democratic relationship with their constituencies. For democracy to be institutionalized, a responsive and accountable councilor role is to be established and adopted by the members. In this sense, municipal council should be a place where local policies are formulated basically in accordance with the needs of local people and a consensus on councilors' representative roles which is independent from partisan ties exists. Furthermore, accountability requires councilors to inform citizens and explain their actions (Schmitter 2007). Leaving aside the debate on mechanisms ensuring accountability in politics, the concept itself refers to a relationship based on mutual exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions (Schmitter 2007). As such, a reasonable indicator of the existence of accountability in local politics is the existence of the sense of it for councilors. In this study, councilors have been asked questions on which actors they think that they should and do represent, how they perceive their roles as councilors with regard to their relations with other civil and political actors, and how frequently they have contact with these actors in order to obtain some clues about the nature of the established roles in municipal councils.

In the following section, the descriptive information of the municipal structure and the district profiles of Sakarya are presented. The data on the variables discussed above are then evaluated with a comparative analysis of councilors' relative preferences, perceptions and behaviors.

3.2. Sakarya Municipalities

Turkey has a multilayered municipal structure[5]. Municipalities are classified into five types: Metropolitan municipality, provincial municipality, metropolitan district municipality, district municipality and town municipality. Metropolitan municipalities are characterized by an urban settlement which is the central urban settlement of the province and of which population size is larger than 750,000. If the population size of the settlement is smaller than 750,000, it is called a provincial municipality. The criterion to categorize an urban settlement which is the central urban settlement of a district is its place vis-à-vis the boundaries of metropolitan municipality. If the district is within the boundaries of metropolitan municipality, it is called a metropolitan district municipality. And town municipalities are urban settlements which are neither the central urban settlements of a province nor a district.

Sakarya gained metropolitan status as Adapazarı metropolitan municipality in 2000, by the Decree Law numbered 593. Since Adapazarı was the name of both the metropolitan municipality and the central district municipality, the name of the former was changed as Sakarya metropolitan municipality by the Law numbered 5747 in 2008. Today, the city incorporates 32 district and town municipalities among which there are 10 metropolitan district municipalities as the following: Adapazarı, Akyazı, Arifiye, Erenler, Ferizli, Hendek, Karapürçek, Sapanca, Serdivan and Söğütlü municipalities (see Table 1).

The overall picture of local politics in Sakarya demonstrates that municipalities are dominated by two political parties: the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). A total of 344 municipal council seats were distributed so unevenly in the 2009 local elections that the AKP secured a majority in most of the municipal councils (see Figure 1). The general councilor profile of the city displays that this distribution is also highly disproportional in terms of gender and age. Out of 344 council members, there are only 19 female councilors and more than half of the councilors are 45 or older (see Figure 2).

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[5] A clear and well-prepared description of the municipal structure of Turkey is provided by the Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Local Authorities, available at <<http://www.migm.gov.tr/en/PDF/GeneralInformation.pdf>>

Table 1. District and town municipalities in Sakarya

Name	Type
Adapazarı	Metropolitan district municipality
Akyazı	Metropolitan district municipality
Altındere	Town municipality
Dokurcun	Town municipality
Kuzuluk	Town municipality
Küçücek	Town municipality
Arifiye	Metropolitan district municipality
Erenler	Metropolitan district municipality
Ferizli	Metropolitan district municipality
Gölkent	Town municipality
Sinanoğlu	Town municipality
Geyve	District municipality
Alifuatpaşa	Town municipality
Hendek	Metropolitan district municipality
Çamlıca	Town municipality
Yeşilyurt	Town municipality
Karapürçek	Metropolitan district municipality
Karasu	District municipality
Darıçayırı	Town municipality
Kurudere	Town municipality
Limandere	Town municipality
Yuvalıdere	Town municipality
Kaynarca	District municipality
Kocaali	District municipality
Ortaköy/ Lahna	Town municipality
Pamukova	District municipality
Sapanca	Metropolitan district municipality
Kırkpınar	Town municipality
Kurtköy	Town municipality
Serdivan	Metropolitan district municipality
Söğütlü	Metropolitan district municipality
Taraklı	District municipality

Figure 1. Distribution of municipal council seats* in Sakarya after the 2009 local elections

Council Members by Political Parties

- Nationalist Movement Party
- Democratic Left Party
- Republican People's Party
- Great Union Party
- Democratic Party
- Felicity Party
- Justice and Development Party

29.07%
0.29%
4.07%
0.58%
6.40%
3.20%
56.40%

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute
*Total = 344

Figure 2. Municipal councilors in Sakarya by age and gender

Councilors by age

Percent

25-29 35-39 45-49 55-59 65-69
Age

Councilors by gender

5.5%
94.5%

- male
- female

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

However, as discussed before, the level of democratic institutionalization in Sakarya municipal councils evinces the need for further inquiry for a detailed council profile. The level of professionalization, experience in and knowledge of political decision making processes, and representation capability of councils cannot be evident from this

simple data. As such, the data collected from metropolitan district municipalities of Sakarya are presented and evaluated with regard to democratic institutionalization in the following section.

3.3. Data Analysis: Sakarya Metropolitan District Municipalities

Sakarya does have ten metropolitan district municipalities today. More than half of the city population concentrates in metropolitan district centers, particularly in the central district, Adapazarı (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Sakarya metropolitan district municipalities by population (Only district centers, 2007-2011)


Source: Adapted from YerelNET Yerel Yönetimler Portalı, Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and Middle East

All of the metropolitan district municipalities are currently governed by the Justice Development Party (AKP) together with a majority in each district municipality council (see Table 2). The questionnaire sent to the councils of metropolitan district municipalities returned from 7 of them as the following: Adapazarı, Akyazı, Arifiye, Erenler, Hendek, Serdivan and Söğütlü of which councils totally have 135 seats. Ultimately, 72 replies were received.

Table 2. Distribution of seats in the councils of the metropolitan district municipalities (Results of the 2009 local elections)

	Adapazarı	Akyazı	Arifiye	Erenler	Ferizli	Hendek	Karapürçek	Sapanca	Serdivan	Söğütlü
Justice and Development Party	19	8	10	17	6	10	6	8	15	5
Nationalist Movement Party	12	3	5	8	3	4	0	3	10	2
Republican People's Party	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	3	0	2
Felicity Party	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Democratic Party	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Total	**31**	**15**	**15**	**25**	**11**	**15**	**9**	**15**	**25**	**9**

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

The general profile of the respondents reveals that 69 % of the councilors won the 2009 election as a member of the Justice and Development Party (see Figure 4). Councilors are predominantly male with 86 % and almost 62 % of them are older than 45 (see Figure 5). In this sense, it seems that the sample reflects pretty much the characteristics of the overall municipal portrait of Sakarya. Nevertheless, none of these characteristics of municipal councils lacking diversity in the very basic variables are sufficient to conclude about the level of democratic institutionalization of local politics in these districts. A quick look at the councilor profile does not give any clues about respondents' potential to establish and maintain proper roles within municipal decision making processes. A general profile in terms of classic descriptive variables such as age, gender and education level as such cannot test whether councilors behave as autonomous actors in council or not. Moreover, it may mislead one into thinking that people of whom characteristics are not mirrored by those of councilors are inevitably underrepresented.

Figure 4. Distribution of councilors in the sample by political parties from which they were candidates in the 2009 local election

Figure 5. Distribution of councilors in the sample by age and gender

The first requisite for institutionalization to take place is the existence of experienced councilors having the necessary knowledge on norms, rules and practices of municipal councils in order to perform their roles properly as representatives and policy makers in local politics. Apart from the frequency of the circulation of council members, a more important problem with this regard is the numbers of the new comers. If a municipal

council is composed mainly of new members who have a political experience as a councilor for the very first time, it is hardly expected that procedures and practices in that council are institutionalized.

Given the inter-election period in Turkey, councilors have typically a 5 year term in office. As such, it is reasonable to argue that even serving a second term in municipal council itself brings about a 10 years experience in local politics. However, the data collected from 72 members of Sakarya metropolitan district municipalities demonstrate that most of the councilors have been performing their roles for the first time (see Figure 6). The fact that 60 % of the councilors in the sample are newly elected members of the municipal councils means that a considerable number of local decision makers actually lack experience in municipal politics. Furthermore, if these actors are not distributed evenly among Adapazarı, Akyazı, Arifiye, Erenler, Hendek, Serdivan and Söğütlü municipalities, municipal councils dominated by the less experienced might fail to provide them with a learning process through which freshmen councilors benefit from senior ones.

Figure 6. Distribution of councilors by their term in office

The logic behind the search for experienced members is the fact that a proper legislative conduct at the local level can be achieved only when members do not lack the knowledge of established practices of municipal councils. For those who have been

performing their roles for a long time period, it is fair to conclude that they have experienced a fair learning process regardless of their occupational or educational backgrounds. When it comes to new members, they might have another kind of experience in politics which is provided as a part of their occupation or education.

For the purpose of this thesis, an educational past that is relevant to politics simply refers to the fields that are directly or indirectly, theoretically or practically related to the ways through which political decision making processes occur. In this sense, a university degree can contribute to councilors' familiarity with the established practices in political organizations only if it is in political science, public management, law and such. Likewise, professions linked to such fields can generate the experience that is quite relevant to municipal politics.

When the education level of councilors serving their first term is analyzed, 40 % of them appear to have a university degree which means that 60 % the respondents undeniably lack an educational experience with regard to politics (see Table 3). Given the modified educational profile of the new councilors in accordance with the type of education they received, the rate of the latter increases to 86 % including those who have a university degree but lack politics-related education (see Table 4).

Table 3. Education status of councilors serving their first term

Education level		Councilors	Percent
	Primary school	3	7.0
	Secondary school	10	23.3
	High school	13	30.2
	University	17	39.5
Total		43	100.0

Table 4. Distribution of councilors serving their first term by their educational background

Are the educational backgrounds of councilors serving their first term related to politics?	Councilors	Percent
No	37	86.0
Yes	2	4.7
Missing	4	9.3
Total	43	100.0

Regarding the detailed analysis of councilors serving their first term in the councils, a much more reliable portrait of the sample in terms of councilors' ability to adapt themselves to the political environment in municipal councils can be presented. The overall picture of the sample concerning councilors' terms of office raises the question of the level of experience and knowledge among the new members. New members are relatively less experienced, yet they have been performing their duties for almost 5 years since the last local elections. Therefore, a further category of experienced and knowledgeable actors can include relatively more experienced first-term councilors. At this point, the data demonstrates that, although 60 % of the councilors are still in their first term, 51 % of the sample can be safely considered less experienced and knowledgeable compared to the rest (see Figure 7). Nevertheless, it seems that seniority is still a problem for the councils within the scope of this research.

Figure 7. Distribution of councilors by their experience in and knowledge of politics

Given the negative impact of the lack of senior members upon institutionalization, the data also show quite surprisingly that 42 % of the new members have already planned to leave politics at the end of their terms (see Table 5). This is actually the case with the senior councilors as well so that future changes in memberships can undermine the institutionalization of councils. Leaving what the case will be aside, this kind of an attitude among councilors more importantly indicates that they do not consider being

councilor a long-term profession. For those serving for more than one term, it is self-evident that being councilor is not a temporary work in order to achieve short-term goals. As such, the future plans of new councilors with regard to their current roles have considerable implications for the value and permanency of municipal councils. According to the data, almost 21 % of first-term councilors are supposed to end their careers as councilors for the sake of a higher political office at the local or national level (see Table 5). And being a councilor seems to acquire value and permanency only for 33 % of the respondents experiencing their first term as a municipal council member (see Table 5).

Table 5. Future plans of first-term councilors for the end of present mandate

What are you planning to do at the end of present mandate?	Councilors	Percent
I would like to continue as a councillor	14	32.6
I would like to continue my political career in a higher political office at the local level	7	16.3
I would like to continue my political career in a higher political office at the regional or national level	2	4.7
I would like to quit politics	18	41.9
Missing	2	4.7
Total	43	100.0

In an institutionalized municipal council, members are also expected to behave as autonomous actors. Low level of party control over municipal decision making processes is another indicator of institutionalization. Depending on their attitudes, councilors' identities as political party members can enable political parties to have such a control. In this sense, preferences, perceptions and practices of councilors with regard to their role in council display whether they perform their duties as autonomous representatives or not.

Indeed, the data indicate that most of the respondents consider themselves and their counterparts pretty influential actors in local politics. Almost 72 % of councilors stated that they are highly influential over the local government on the basis of their experience as councilors in municipal councils (see Table 6).

Table 6. How influential the councilors consider themselves over the local government

How influential are you over local government?	Councilors	Percent
No influence	1	1.4
Little influence	5	6.9
Some influence	8	11.1
High influence	38	52.8
Very high influence	14	19.4
Missing	6	8.3
Total	72	100.0

This high level of belief in self-efficacy reflects also upon respondents' evaluation of their the role of their counterparts. Members of municipal councils are considered powerful actors to cause changes in local decision making processes by almost 72 % of the councilors (see Table 7).

However, the preliminary findings may be deceptive since they are isolated from the perceptions of councilors in terms of their proper roles. While the data show that political party leaders and organizations also appear to have more or less influence upon local politics (see Table 8), one can realize that the impact of such actors and that of councilors may not necessarily mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary, the possible overlaps are much more important for the purpose of this thesis. When a respondent state that he or she is an influential actor, he/she probably evaluates this influence in accordance with his/her perception of his/her role in council. As such, if the roles of councilors are shaped by their political party affiliations, this means that councilors serve not their autonomy but the control of political parties over municipal councils.

Table 7. How influential the respondents consider councilors over the local government

How influential are councilors over local government?	Councilors	Percent
Little influence	7	9.7
Some influence	11	15.3
High influence	36	50.0
Very high influence	16	22.2
Missing	2	2.8
Total	72	100.0

Table 8. How influential the councilors consider political party leaders over the local government

How influential are political party leaders over local government?	Councilors	Percent
No influence	3	4.2
Little influence	2	2.8
Some influence	13	18.1
High influence	26	36.1
Very high influence	19	26.4
Missing	9	12.5
Total	72	100.0

Therefore, what kind of roles councilors assign themselves and what they represent in council are more critical than their belief in their efficacy. Almost 60 % of respondents, for example, have expressed that implementing the program of their political parties is of very great importance to them as councilors (see Table 9).

Table 9. The importance of implementing the program of their political parties for councilors

How important is implementing your political party's program for you as a councilor?	Councilors	Percent
Little	2	2.8
Moderate	2	2.8
Great	25	34.7
Very great	42	58.3
Missing	1	1.4
Total	72	100.0

When councilors' perceptions that implementing their political parties' programs is a very important part of their work as councilors are analyzed on the basis of their political party affiliations, it seems that these are weak partisan differences among councilors (see Table 10). There is a very weak relationship between councilors' understandings of their role in achieving their party program in the council and their party identifications (X^2 = 11.319 with 6 degrees of freedom, P = .079, Cramer's V = .291).

Table 10. Crosstabulation of the importance of implementing their party program for councilors and their political party affiliations

			Were you elected as a candidate of			Total
			AKP	MHP	Other	
In your experience as a councilor, how important is implementing the program of your political party for you as a councilor?	Little	Count	1	1	0	2
		Column %	2.0%	7.1%	.0%	3.0%
	Moderate	Count	1	0	1	2
		Column %	2.0%	.0%	33.3%	3.0%
	Great	Count	17	5	1	23
		Column %	34.0%	35.7%	33.3%	34.3%
	Very great	Count	31	8	1	40
		Column %	62.0%	57.1%	33.3%	59.7%
Total		Count	50	14	3	67
		Column %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Indeed, not only the emphasis put on implementing party program but also councilors' actual practices support the idea that their roles are highly shaped by a commitment to their political parties. Nearly 83 % of the respondents define their contribution to the realization of their party programs in municipal councils as great (see Table 11). However, quite surprisingly, it appears that there is still a low, yet a relatively more significant association exists between councilors' definition of their contribution to the implementation of their party programs in practice and the political parties of which they are a member (X^2 = 15.953 with 8 degrees of freedom, P = .043, Cramer's V = .353). When we reanalyze the sample excluding the categories with no or few cases, the relationship appears to be more significant (X^2 = 14.772 with 4 degrees of freedom, P = .005, Cramer's V = .492) Although this is hardly an important finding to be considered, since it still fails to decrease the proportion of cells which have expected count less than 5, it raises some further questions with regard to the difference between perceptions and actual behaviors. On the one hand, 25 % of the members of the Nationalist Movement Party, for example, are distinguished within a category of moderate contribution (see Table 12). On the other hand, most of the members of the Justice and Development Party have reported that their contribution to the implementation of the program of the party is great or very great. Only 6 % of them expressed that they have little contribution or none. This difference between the members of two political parties may be a result of certain intra-party relationships and the structure of the political party

itself. Notwithstanding the similarity between councilors in terms of their perceptions of the importance of implementing their party programs as a part of their work in council, the MHP may be less successful in realizing such a belief in practice than the AKP. As such, party discipline, in its simplest sense, may be quite different between these parties.

Table 11. The contribution of councilors to the implementation of the program of their parties

In your experience as a councilor, how would you define your contribution to the implementation of your party's program?	Frequency	Percent
None	2	2.8
Little	2	2.8
Moderate	4	5.6
Great	32	44.4
Very great	28	38.9
Missing	4	5.6
Total	72	100.0

Table 12. Crosstabulation of the contribution of councilors to the implementation of the program of their political parties and their political party affiliations

			Were you elected as a candidate of			Total
			AKP	MHP	Other	
In your experience as a councilor, how would you define your contribution regarding implementing the program of your political party?	None	Count	2	0	0	2
		Column %	4.1%	.0%	.0%	3.1%
	Little	Count	1	0	0	1
		Column %	2.0%	.0%	.0%	1.6%
	Moderate	Count	0	3	0	3
		Column %	.0%	25.0%	.0%	4.7%
	Great	Count	26	3	2	31
		Column %	53.1%	25.0%	66.7%	48.4%
	Very great	Count	20	6	1	27
		Column %	40.8%	50.0%	33.3%	42.2%
Total		Count	49	12	3	64
		Column %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In addition to the apparent commitment of councilors to the implementation of their party programs in councils, their time allocation with regard to political parties also implies that they stay in close contact with the agencies of the party mandate. 60 % of

the councilors, for example, are supposed to meet the district heads of their parties a few times a week (see Table 13). However, the frequency of contact between these actors again seems to be quite independent from the effect of the political party of which a councilor is a member.

Table 13. The contact between councilors and the district heads of their parties

How frequently do you have contact with the district head of your political party?	Councilors	Percent
(Almost) never	2	2.8
A few times a year	2	2.8
A few times a month	24	33.3
A few times a week	43	59.7
Missing	1	1.4
Total	72	100.0

In an institutionalized council, members are free agents. Since it cannot be taken for granted that the goals of political parties correspond to those of citizens, working in the favor of party programs per se is not the role of councilors. A biased representation in local politics jeopardizes institutionalization. Emphasizing that party programs may satisfy only certain interests, councilors are expected to represent the locality in a broader sense. However, political parties can achieve overwhelming control over decision making processes in municipalities through councilors' attachment to their parties.

It is already asserted that councilors face with a representation dilemma resulted from their multiple identities as members of both political parties and municipal councils. As such, preferences of councilors in the cases of conflicts between citizens, political parties and councilors in terms of their interests seem to be a reasonable indicator of the level of commitment to political parties in municipal councils. Given the data, almost half of the respondents seem to favor their political parties in such a case. Considering a hypothetical situation in which they disagree with their party groups in the council or their constituents, only 17 % of the councilors stated that they would vote in accordance with the preferences of the constituents (see Table 14). That being the case, the data demonstrates beyond doubt that political parties do have a considerable influence over councilors' perceptions of their roles in municipalities. It appears that they consider themselves primarily political party members. When the replies were cross tabulated

with respondents' political party affiliations (see Table 15), a weak relationship was found between these two variables (X^2 = 9.201 with 6 degrees of freedom, P = .163, Cramer's V = .270).

Table 14. Councilors' voting preferences in the case of a conflict between their own opinions, the opinion of their party group in the council or the opinion of voters

If there is a conflict between a member's own opinion, the opinion of the party group in the council or the opinion of the voters, how should, in your opinion, a member of council vote?	Councilors	Percent
According to his/her own conviction	21	29.2
According to the opinion of the party group	32	44.4
According to the opinion of the voters	12	16.7
Other	2	2.8
Missing	5	6.9
Total	72	100.0

Table 15. Councilors' voting preferences and their political party affiliations

		Were you elected as a candidate of			Total
		AKP	MHP	Other	
His/her own conviction	Count	14	5	0	19
	Column %	29.8%	38.5%	.0%	30.2%
Party group	Count	26	3	2	31
	Column %	55.3%	23.1%	66.7%	49.2%
Voters	Count	5	5	1	11
	Column %	10.6%	38.5%	33.3%	17.5%
Other	Count	2	0	0	2
	Column %	4.3%	.0%	.0%	3.2%
Total	Count	47	13	3	63
	Column %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

As yet it seems that most of the councilors have been serving their first term in the council without an adequate educational background and more importantly lacking autonomy as a result of a deep commitment to their political parties. The following question then arises: What kind of relationship do councilors have with their constituents? Councilors are to adapt a genuinely representative role for democratic institutionalization of municipal councils. Such a role emphasizing responsiveness and

accountability have its roots partly in councilors' autonomy with regard to the decisiveness of their party identifications. It has already been indicated that councilors may tend to favor the interests of their political parties when party mandate challenges to the preferences of citizens. Nevertheless, councilors' perceptions and behaviors in terms of their relationship with citizens evince the need for further analysis.

The data underline that the great majority of the respondents consider explaining decisions of council to citizens an important part of their work. Almost 63 % of councilors have expressed that it is important, or very important, for them not only to explain the decisions of the council but also to publicize debates on local issues before decisions are taken (see Table 16). As such, it is fair to argue that most of the councilors have a sense of accountability which mainly shaped by their perceptions of their roles as councilors.

Table 16. Perceptions of councilors with regard to accountability

How important are the following tasks for you as a councilor?		Explaining decisions of the council to the citizens					Total
		None	Little	Moderate	Great	Very great	
Publicising the debate on local issues before decisions are taken	None	1	0	0	1	0	2
	Little	0	1	0	1	0	2
	Moderate	0	1	3	3	3	10
	Great	0	0	5	13	6	24
	Very great	0	1	0	8	18	27
Total		1	3	8	26	27	65

At first glance, a cross tabulation analysis of the responses for these two questions reveals that the relationship between the answers and councilors' political party affiliations is quite significant (see Table 17 & Table 18). Both publicizing the debate on local issues before decisions are taken (X^2 = 24.604 with 8 degrees of freedom, P = .002, Cramer's V = .442) and explaining decisions of the council to the citizens (X^2 = 26.077 with 8 degrees of freedom, P = .001, Cramer's V = .451) seem to be almost strongly associated with respondents' party affiliations. However, in both analyses, the criterion with regard to the expected frequencies in cells is not fulfilled so that these relationships are not reliable. Indeed, when only the members of the AKP and the MHP are compared, excluding the category of other which does have no or very few cases,

findings are already quite different than the previous ones. It appears that one can safely associate councilors' political party affiliations with the importance of neither publicizing debates (X^2 = 2.661 with 3 degrees of freedom, P = .447, Cramer's V = .211) nor explaining decisions to citizens (X^2 = 3.246 with 3 degrees of freedom, P = .355, Cramer's V = .231).

Table 17. The importance of publicising debate on local issues before decisions are taken for the councilors and their political party affiliations

			Were you elected as a candidate of			Total
			AKP	MHP	Other	
Publicising the debate on local issues before decisions are taken	None	Count	0	0	1	1
		Column %	.0%	.0%	33.3%	1.6%
	Little	Count	2	0	0	2
		Column %	4.3%	.0%	.0%	3.2%
	Moderate	Count	8	1	1	10
		Column %	17.0%	7.7%	33.3%	15.9%
	Great	Count	19	4	0	23
		Column %	40.4%	30.8%	.0%	36.5%
	Very great	Count	18	8	1	27
		Column %	38.3%	61.5%	33.3%	42.9%
Total		Count	47	13	3	63
		Column %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 18. The importance of explaining decisions of the council to the citizens for councilors and their political party affiliations

			Were you elected as a candidate of			Total
			AKP	MHP	Other	
Explaining decisions of the council to the citizens	None	Count	0	0	1	1
		Column %	.0%	.0%	33.3%	1.6%
	Little	Count	3	0	0	3
		Column %	6.3%	.0%	.0%	4.7%
	Moderate	Count	7	0	1	8
		Column %	14.6%	.0%	33.3%	12.5%
	Great	Count	20	7	0	27
		Column %	41.7%	53.8%	.0%	42.2%
	Very great	Count	18	6	1	25
		Column %	37.5%	46.2%	33.3%	39.1%
Total		Count	48	13	3	64
		Column %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

As can be seen in the cross-tabulation analyses used to compare responses by councilors' political party affiliations, the apparent differences between political parties in terms of their members' perceptions, preferences and practices in municipal decision making processes are not significant. However, all analyses based on political parties in this study reveal differences or similarities basically between the AKP and the MHP since they are the only available categories for such analyses. While only one respondent has been identified as a member of the Republican People's Party (CHP), he/she is included in the category of missing in each case mentioned above, for the respondent has answered almost no questions. The right-wing predominance over Sakarya local governments seems to have an inevitable impact on the characteristics of the sample. Respondents in this research are mainly composed of the members of the two most effective actors of right politics in Turkey, i.e. the AKP and the MHP. Therefore, the portrait of local politics presented by this research is exclusively a portrait of right-wing political parties.

This situation definitely has an impact on the results. On the one hand, it has the disadvantage of failing to generalize the results to the nature of local politics in Turkey since the sample does not represent all political parties functioning at the local level in the very first place. On the other hand, it may turn to an advantage as it provides us with some insights into the qualities of right-wing political parties in Turkey in terms of their role in democratic institutionalization of local governments. In this sense, the results suggesting no significant difference between the AKP and the MHP may lead us to focus on the lack of partisan divisions within the sample as a potential clue for the general tendencies of right-wing parties.

As for the data on representation, it has been revealed that most of the councilors define also the representation of various local groups ranging from ethnic minorities to businessmen as an important function of their engagement in local politics as councilors (see Figure 8). At this point, certain preferences favoring the representation of certain groups in local politics may be shaped also by occupational characteristics of councilors since councilors are supposed to be the very members of such groups as well. Within the sample, three occupational groups have been observed most frequently as the following: Private company owners, professionals and shopkeepers (see Table 19).

Figure 8. The importance of representing ethnic minorities, women, workers, middle class, businessmen and farmers for councilors

Table 19. Occupational distribution in the sample

Occupational groups	Councilors	Percent
Worker	3	4.2
Student	1	1.4
Retired	8	11.1
Private sector employee	2	2.8
Manager in public sector	3	4.2
Manager in private sector	3	4.2
Private company owner	10	13.9
Professional	9	12.5
Shopkeeper	15	20.8
Missing	18	25.0
Total	72	100.0

Nevertheless, any significant relationship between councilors' occupations and the importance they attach to the representation of different local groups has been found. Similarly, there is no evidence for an association between the latter and councilors' political party affiliations.

However, the data on the actual practices of councilors contradict with this representative portrait embracing a number of local interest groups. Local councilors can be truly representative only if they are responsive to their constituents. The first step for councilors to be responsive is probably having a kind of contact with local groups and interests. Even though local governments are closer to the people to be involved compared to national politics, there may be still some other representatives between citizens and their representatives at the local level. It follows then that, in addition to direct communication with citizens which is practically possible in many cases, local councilors should have some ties with different interest groups in order to achieve the bottom-up transfer of local needs and demands. Considering respondents' perceptions of the representation of different local groups as a part of their role as councilors, their actual practices hardly match up to this idealized portrait (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Frequency of contact between councilors and local groups

More than half of those who have expressed that it is important to represent women in local politics, for example, have contact with women organizations only a few times a year or almost never (see Table 20).

Table 20. Frequency of contact between councilors putting emphasis on the representation of women and women organizations

	Councilors	Percent
(Almost) never	7	10.6
A few times a year	29	43.9
A few times a month	20	30.3
A few times a week	4	6.1
Missing	6	9.1
Total	66	100.0

Actually, it seems that councilors do have relatively more contact with professional chambers. This may be the result, for councilors themselves are the members of such local groups. In Turkey, most professional chambers actually appeals to the occupational groups which have been frequently found in the sample, i.e. private company owners, professionals and shopkeepers.

When occupational groups are compared by cross tabulation, shopkeepers, for example, become prominent with a relatively high frequency of contact with professional chambers (see Table 21). However, the apparent differences among occupational groups have been found not to be significant even when the categories with few cases are excluded ($X^2 = 6.128$ with 9 degrees of freedom, P = .727, Cramer's V = .226).

Both responsiveness and accountability highlight the idea of interaction between representatives and citizens. In principle, it is still significant that councilors emphasize different local groups and interests since it is necessary to establish proper roles, rules and norms in municipal councils. However, the overall data support the idea that councilors mostly fail to realize a genuinely representative role in practice. While they mostly seem to glorify their role as political party members in local politics, councilors also lack consolidated practices which can secure the interests of the locality particularly when there is a conflict between the party mandate and citizens.

Table 21. Frequency of contact between councilors and professional chambers by occupational groups

		Private sector employee	Manager in public sector	Manager in private sector	Private company owner	Professional
(Almost) never	Count	0	0	0	0	1
	Column %	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	11.1%
A few times a year	Count	0	1	0	4	4
	Column %	.0%	33.3%	.0%	40.0%	44.4%
A few times a month	Count	1	2	2	5	3
	Column %	100.0%	66.7%	100.0%	50.0%	33.3%
A few times a week	Count	0	0	0	1	1
	Column %	.0%	.0%	.0%	10.0%	11.1%
Total	Count	1	3	2	10	9
	Column %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

		Shopkeeper	Worker	Student	Retired	Total
(Almost) never	Count	0	0	0	0	1
	Column%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	2.0%
A few times a year	Count	4	0	0	4	17
	Column%	28.6%	.0%	.0%	57.1%	34.7%
A few times a month	Count	8	1	1	3	26
	Column%	57.1%	50.0%	100.0%	42.9%	53.1%
A few times a week	Count	2	1	0	0	5
	Column%	14.3%	50.0%	.0%	.0%	10.2%
Total	Count	14	2	1	7	49
	Column%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Democratization is a highly debated topic in Turkey. Despite the fact that there are countless scholarly studies of the phenomenon with respect to Turkish context, it is quite surprising that local governments in Turkey have been poorly studied from such a perspective that focuses on the potential of local politics to contribute into democratic consolidation. This apparent gap in the literature seems to have been widened by ignoring the role of municipal councils as the elected decision making bodies at the local level.

Realizing that most of the studies on local governments in Turkey take an institutionalized municipal council for granted, this thesis suggests some empirical insights into democratization of local politics. The findings in this study may not be generalizable, yet it can contribute to further research particularly on Turkish local governance by providing a clear operationalization of the very poorly defined concept democratic institutionalization.

The questionnaires sent to Sakarya metropolitan district municipalities have been completed by 72 councilors from Adapazarı, Arifiye, Akyazı, Erenler, Hendek, Serdivan and Söğütlü municipalities. The data demonstrated that the Justice and Development Party and the Nationalist Movement Party dominate the sample by shares of 69 % and 19 % respectively. While 86 % of the respondents are male, 62 % of them are older than 45.

The data have been analyzed basically with reference to seniority, autonomy and representation in municipal councils. Given the interaction among these aspects of institutionalization, responses to the questions indicating the level of experience in and knowledge of political decision making processes among councilors, their political party affiliations, their perceptions of responsiveness and accountability, and their contacts with different local groups have been examined.

The findings showed that 60 % of the respondents have been serving their first term as a member of municipal council and 86 % of these first-term councilors lack an educational background that can provide them with the knowledge of political decision making processes. As such, 51 % of the councilors in the sample are relatively less experienced in and knowledgeable of the politics in municipal councils.

Despite having almost completed their first term and already started learning about local politics, the data revealed that 63 % of the first-term councilors have future plans different than continuing their careers as members of municipal councils. This means that a considerable number of new councilors have not adopted their roles within municipality as a long-term profession.

Indeed, almost 72 % of the councilors consider themselves and their counterparts highly influential actors in local government. However, when we look at the way they define their role as councilors, it is fair to argue that being a councilor has not yet been established as a category of autonomous representatives. While it is highly important to implement the program of their political parties for 93 % of the respondents, 84 % of them also define their contribution to the implementation of their party program as great.

Similarly, despite that more than half of the councilors emphasize accountability and responsiveness, the data revealed that they hardly realize a truly democratic representation in practice. Although councilors mostly seem to consider explaining decisions of the council to citizens and publicizing debate on local issues before decisions are taken an important part of their roles, only 17 % of them express that they would comply with the preferences of voters in the case of a conflict between their own opinion and those of their party group and voters. Furthermore, most of the respondents

fail to have contact with even the local groups to which they attach great importance in terms of representation.

As such, the low levels of seniority, autonomy, professionalization, responsiveness and accountability within the sample are the indicators of low level of institutionalization in municipal politics within the scope of this research. This conclusion may come up with generalization problems, yet it evinces the need for further research on municipal councils in Turkey. Whether or not a non-democratic local structure has already been established and generally adopted by local representatives remains to be a fundamental question. Factors that can contribute to democratization of local governments, then, can be further studied particularly with a reference to the perceptions and behaviors of local councilors. Moreover, the data informing us basically about the members of the AKP and the MHP suggest that problems of institutionalization may be related to general tendencies of right-wing political parties. The results presented by this study reflect the nature of local politics in one very particular city, Sakarya, where politics are quite dominated by such actors. Therefore, the right-wing predominance in Sakarya might have exposed, in this study, its certain characteristics supporting or blocking democratic institutionalization at the local level. Future studies, then, can evaluate the relationship between the perceptions, preferences and behaviors of decision makers in local governments, and their political party affiliations in detail.

APPENDIX
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Meclis üyeliğinin kaçıncı dönemindesiniz?

☐ 1. Dönem   ☐ 2. Dönem   ☐ 3. Dönem   ☐ 4. Dönem ve üstü

2. Belediye meclis üyeliğini hangi siyasi partinin adayı olarak kazandınız?

☐ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

☐ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi

☐ Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi

☐ Bağımsız

☐ Diğer (lütfen belirtiniz) ....

3. Kaç yıldır bir siyasi partiye mensupsunuz?

.... yıl

☐ Hiçbir zaman bir siyasi partiye mensup olmadım.

4. Meclis üyesi olarak görevlerinizi yerine getirebilmek için belediye yönetiminden yeterli bilgi alıyor musunuz?

Tamamen yeterli	Yeterli	Ne yeterli ne yetersiz	Yetersiz	Tamamen yetersiz
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

5. Aşağıdaki işler sizin için bir meclis üyesi olarak ne kadar önemli, lütfen belirtiniz.

	Çok önemli	Önemli	Ne önemli ne önemsiz	Önemsiz	Tamamen önemsiz
Belediye faaliyetlerinin hedeflerini belirlemek	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Belediye faaliyetlerini denetlemek	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel toplumun isteklerini ve sorunlarını temsil etmek	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel konularla ilgili tartışmaları kararlar alınmadan halka duyurmak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Çok önemli	Önemli	Ne önemli ne önemsiz	Önemsiz	Tamamen önemsiz
Meclis kararlarını vatandaşlara açıklamak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mensubu olduğum siyasi partinin programını uygulamak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Belediye Yönetimine destek olmak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel toplumdaki anlaşmazlıklarda arabuluculuk etmek	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel toplumdaki azınlıkların görüşlerini dikkate almak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel toplumdaki kadınların görüşlerini dikkate almak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

6. Aşağıdaki işler için <u>ayda ortalama kaç saat</u> ayırıyorsunuz?

Meclis ve komisyon toplantıları .... saat

Parti meclis grubuyla toplantı ve görüşmeler .... saat

Diğer parti toplantıları, görüşmeleri ve aktiviteleri .... saat

İdari personelle toplantı ve görüşmeler .... saat

Vatandaşlarla görüşmeler .... saat

Belediye kurumlarına saha gezileri .... saat

Meclisteki faaliyetlerimi hazırlamak için yaptığım masa başı çalışmalar .... saat

Meclis üyesi olarak diğer önemli işlerim (lütfen belirtiniz) .... saat

....

7. Aşağıdaki kişi ya da gruplarla ne kadar sıklıkta görüşüyorsunuz?

	Haftada birkaç kez	Ayda birkaç kez	Yılda birkaç kez	(Hemen hemen) hiç
Belediye başkanı	☐	☐	☐	☐
Encümen üyeleri	☐	☐	☐	☐
Komisyon üyeleri	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Haftada birkaç kez	Ayda birkaç kez	Yılda birkaç kez	(Hemen hemen) hiç
Mensubu olduğum siyasi partinin meclis grubu	☐	☐	☐	☐
Diğer siyasi partilerin meclis grupları	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mensubu olduğum siyasi partinin ilçe başkanı	☐	☐	☐	☐
Belediyede memurları	☐	☐	☐	☐
Sendika temsilcileri	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gönüllü derneklerin/ Sivil toplum Kuruluşlarının (İnsani yardım derneği, AKUT,Kızılay, Spor kulüpleri, Kültür ve Dayanışma dernekleri v.b.) temsilcileri	☐	☐	☐	☐
Meslek odaları temsilcileri	☐	☐	☐	☐
Kadın örgütleri	☐	☐	☐	☐
Etnik azınlık dernekleri	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel kamu idaresi temscilcileri	☐	☐	☐	☐
Üst düzey idare temsilcileri	☐	☐	☐	☐
Özel sektör temsilcileri	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gazeteciler	☐	☐	☐	☐
Vatandaşlar	☐	☐	☐	☐

8. Belediye meclis üyesi olarak tecrübelerinize dayanarak ve resmi olarak tanımlanan görevlerinden bağımsız olarak, aşağıdaki aktörlerin yerel yönetim üzerinde ne kadar etkili olduklarını lütfen belirtiniz.

	Çok etkili	Etkili	Biraz etkili	Çok az etkili	Etkili değil	İlgisi yok
Belediye başkanı	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Komisyon başkanları	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Çok etkili	Etkili	Biraz etkili	Çok az etkili	Etkili değil	İlgisi yok
Belediye Encümeni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Belediye meclis üyeleri	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ben	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Belediye Birim Amirleri	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Profesyonel danışman ve uzmanlar	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
İlinizin milletvekilleri veya varsa bakanları	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Sendikalar	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gazeteciler	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
İş adamları	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ulusal ve uluslararası firmalar	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Cemaatler	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel örgütler/dernekler	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Siyasi parti liderleri	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Belediye meclisindeki parti grupları	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Parti teşkilatları	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Bölgesel ve üst düzey kamu idaresi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

9. Belediye meclis üyesi olarak, aşağıdaki yerel grupları temsil etmek sizin için ne kadar önemli?

	Çok önemli	Önemli	Ne önemli ne önemsiz	Çok az önemli	Önemsiz
Temsilcisi olduğunuz bölgenin tamamı	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Çok önemli	Önemli	Ne önemli ne önemsiz	Çok az önemli	Önemsiz
Etnik azınlıklar	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Kadınlar	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
İşçiler	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Orta sınıf	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
İş adamları	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Çiftçiler	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Cemaatler	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Temsilcisi olduğunuz bölgenin belli bir coğrafi alanı	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

10. Eğer bir meclis üyesinin kendi fikri, meclisteki parti grubuyla ya da seçmenle uyuşmazsa, sizce oyunu nasıl kullanmalı?

☐ Kendi fikrine göre

☐ Parti grubunun fikrine göre

☐ Seçmenin fikrine göre

☐ Diğer

11. Bu meclis dönemi sona erdiğinde ne yapmayı planlıyorsunuz?

☐ Meclis üyesi olarak devam etmek istiyorum

☐ Kariyerimi yerel düzeyde daha üst bir siyasi makamda devam ettirmek istiyorum

☐ Kariyerimi ulusal düzeyde daha üst bir siyasi makamda devam ettirmek istiyorum

☐ Siyaseti bırakmak istiyorum

12. Meclis üyesi olarak tecrübenize dayanarak, aşağıdaki işler konusunda kendi katkınızı nasıl tanımlarsınız?

	Çok fazla	Fazla	Orta	Az	Hiç
Belediye faaliyetlerinin hedeflerini belirlemek	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Çok fazla	Fazla	Orta	Az	Hiç
Belediye faaliyetlerini denetlemek	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel toplumun isteklerini ve sorunlarını temsil etmek	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel konularla ilgili tartışmaları kararlar alınmadan halka duyurmak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Meclis kararlarını vatandaşlara açıklamak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mensubu olduğum siyasi partinin programını uygulamak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yürütmeye destek olmak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel toplumdaki anlaşmazlıklarda arabuluculuk etmek	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel toplumdaki azınlıkların görüşlerini dikkate almak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yerel toplumdaki kadınların görüşlerini dikkate almak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

13. Mensubu olduğunuz parti için aşağıdaki ifadeler hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

	Tamamen katılıyorum	Kısmen katılıyorum	Fikrim yok	Katılmıyorum	Hiç katıl- mıyorum
Parti il/ilçe teşkilatının parti meclis grubunun kararları üzerinde daha çok etkisi vardır	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Parti meclis grubunun il/ilçe teşkilatı üzerinde daha çok etkisi vardır	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Parti grup lideri kararlar alınırken genellikle parti meclis grubunu bilgilendirir ve desteklerini arar	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

14. Mensubu olduğunuz partinin teşkilatlarında herhangi bir göreviniz var mı / ya da geçmişte oldu mu? (Belediye meclis grubu hariç)

	Evet, şu anda	Evet, geçmişte	Hayır hiç	Parti üyesi değilim /partimin böyle bir teşkilatı yok
Genel merkez teşkilatı	☐	☐	☐	☐
İl/ İlçe/ Belde teşkilatı	☐	☐	☐	☐
Kadın/ Gençlik kolları	☐	☐	☐	☐

15. Eğitim durumunuz?

☐Okuryazar değilim

☐Okuryazarım

☐İlkokul

☐Ortaokul

☐Lise

☐Üniversite veya sonrası

16. En son bitirdiğiniz okul/yüksek okul/üniversite hangisidir?

....

☐Hiçbir resmi eğitim kurumuna devam etmedim

17. Doğum yılınız?

....

18. Doğum yeriniz?

....

19. Cinsiyetiniz?

☐Kadın   ☐Erkek

20. İkamet ettiğiniz yer (ilçe)?

....

21. Kaç yıldır burada ikamet etmektesiniz?

.... yıl ☐ 1 yıldan az

22. Belediye meclis üyesi olmadan önce kazanç karşılığı yaptığınız son iş neydi?

....

23. Mesleğiniz?

☐ Kamu görevlisi memur
☐ Özel sektör memur
☐ Kamu görevlisi yönetici
☐ Özel sektörde yönetici
☐ Özel sektörde firma sahibi
☐ Profesyonel meslek grupları (mühendis, mimar, avukat, doktor, öğretmen vb.)
☐ Silahlı kuvvetler mensubu
☐ Esnaf
☐ Zanaatkar
☐ İşçi
☐ Sendikacı
☐ Öğrenci
☐ Ev kadını
☐ Emekli
☐ Büyük tarım işletmesi sahibi
☐ Çiftçi
☐ İşsiz

24. Yurtdışında hiç bulundunuz mu?
☐ Evet   ☐ Hayır

25. Ne amaçla bulundunuz (Gezi, çalışma, eğitim vb.) ?

....

26. Yurtdışında uzun süre yaşadığınız bir yer oldu mu?

.........................(Lütfen belirtiniz)

☐Hayır olmadı

27. Yabancı dil biliyor musunuz?

☐Hayır

☐Evet ....(Lütfen belirtiniz).

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