

**POLITICAL PARTY ELITES IN TURKEY:
AN ANALYSIS OF BACKGROUND PROFILES**

by

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Zamansız giden Zeynep Ablam'a...

TÜRKİYE’DE SİYASİ PARTİ ELİTLERİ:

SOSYAL PROFİLLERİN BİR ANALİZİ

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ÖZET

Siyasi parti elitlerinin sosyal profillerini çeşitli demografik faktörler oluşturmaktadır. Bu faktörler, aynı zamanda siyasi partilerin karakteristik özelliklerinin ortaya çıkarılmasında da belirleyici olmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, parti elitlerinin sosyal profillerini içeren bilgiler; partilerin ideolojik duruşları, eleman seçme yöntemleri, teşkilat başarısı ve parti içi güç ilişkileri/dengeleri konularının araştırılmasını mümkün kılmaktadır. Siyasi parti elitleri arasında yerel siyasi parti elitlerinin sosyolojik profilleri de çeşitli partiler arasındaki benzerlik ve farklılıkların anlaşılması için karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenebilir. Yerel siyasi parti elitlerinin yaş, cinsiyet, doğum yeri, eğitim, meslek/iş durumlarının incelenmesi yoluyla içinde bulundukları partilerin sosyoekonomik kompozisyonunun analiz edilebilmesi mümkündür. Aynı zamanda, bu tarz çalışmalar sayesinde yerel parti elitleri ve seçmenler arasındaki bağlar, benzerlik ve farklılıklar da daha kapsamlı olarak anlaşılabilir. Bu nedenle, yerel parti elitlerinin sosyo kültürel ve ekonomik özelliklerinin araştırılması, parti tabanında seçmeni kimin temsil ettiğini gün ışığına çıkarmayı sağlayabilir.

Bu tez, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)’nin en son il ve ilçe teşkilat başkanlarının profillerinin temel özelliklerini analiz ederek “AKP ve CHP’nin yerel teşkilat başkanlarının sosyoekonomik profilleri arasındaki benzerlik ve farklılıkların Türkiye siyasi hayatındaki sonuçları nelerdir?” sorusuna cevaplar önermektedir. Bulgular, iki parti arasındaki gözle görünür en büyük farklılığı yerel parti başkanlarının meslek/iş durumlarının oluşturduğunu göstermektedir.

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ABSTRACT

Various demographical factors establish the profile of political party elites; these factors can, in turn, affect the characteristics of political parties. Information regarding the profiles of party elites thus enables the investigation of a party’s characteristics terms of its ideological stance, recruitment patterns, organizational success and internal power relations/balances. Among political party elites, the sociological profiles of the local party elites can also be comparatively studied for various political parties in order to understand the similarities and differences across the parties. By scrutinizing age, gender, place of birth, education, occupation/job of local party elites, analyzing the socioeconomic composition of the parties is possible. Moreover, such studies enable developing a more comprehensive understanding about the ties, similarities and differences between the party elites and the electorate. Thus, the examination of socio-cultural and economic characteristics of the local political party elites makes possible unearthing who is elected to represent the electorate at the grassroots level of party organizations as well.

By analyzing the main characteristics of personal profiles of the current leaders of the provincial and district branches of the Justice and Development Party [AKP] and the Republican People’s Party [CHP], this thesis suggests answers to the question of “What are the political consequences of the differences in the socio-economic profiles of the local party chairpersons for the AKP and the CHP in Turkish politics?” The findings show that, among other variables, occupation/job of the local chairpersons creates the most visible difference between these two parties.

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
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Elites have been subjects of a number studies in terms of their economic and political power relations, involvement in decision-making processes and positions that they occupy (Mosca, 1939; Mills, 1956; Michels, 1962; Rustow, 1966; Pareto, 1968; Parry, 1969). Depending on the sources and implementation of their power, their characteristics and the way the researchers approach them will differ. Among these, political elites may be defined as one of the subsets of a more broadly defined social elite group, and political party elites may be identified as a subset of the political elites.

Figure 1.1: Local party elites as a subset of national elites



One of the most crucial questions about the political elites has been the following: Do personal characteristics of the political elites influence the political system in a country? Depending on this question, various scholars have studied background characteristics of different political elite groups. Many scholars put effort in analyzing how political elites and their features affect politics (Edinger and Searing, 1967: 430; Quandt, 1969: 3). Previous research suggests and proves that the social backgrounds of the political elites give clues about the political environment of the

countries. Deducing from this argument, the following ideas rise: The political party elites and their social backgrounds may become one of the defining ideological characteristics of their political parties. More specifically, depending on the age, gender, birth place, education and occupation/job of the recruited political party elites, the political parties may shift on the ideological spectrum. For example, a party which is composed of relatively young, highly educated party elites may be defined as more modern than a party whose elites are far older and less educated. Also, socioeconomic characteristics of currently employed party elites may become one of the defining elements of recruitment patterns of the party. So, the analysis of these party elites' profiles may enable the researchers to predict future political characteristics of the parties. Thus, the positions of these party elites become crucial in understanding the party per se.

A fairly large body of research revealed that the social backgrounds of the Turkish political elites including parliamentarians and political party elites unearth the characteristics of the politics and political parties of Turkey (Frey, 1965; Tachau, 1973; Turhan, 1991; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak (2010). Comparing different parties in terms of the similarities and differences of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of their local party elites will yield interesting clues about why and how these political parties differ on policies as well as ideological positions on most political issues that Turkey faces. Thus, focusing on the features/personal profiles of the local party elites who occupy the provincial and district branches of the political parties, it would be possible to observe the socioeconomic composition of the parties which would help us to better understand and appraise the existing differences and similarities among the Turkish political parties.

The subjects of this thesis are specifically the provincial and district branch chairpersons of the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP] and the Republican People's Party [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP]. The main aim of this thesis is to analyze the social backgrounds of these party elites in terms of their age, gender, localism (birth places), education and job/occupation; and compare the two parties depending on the characteristics of their local party elites. Moreover, this thesis aims to reveal a comparison between these local party bosses and overall demographic characteristics of the Turkish society as well.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Political Elites in Comparative Perspective

Edinger and Searing argue that “The stated or implicit underlying assumption is that leadership, social background and recruitment patterns (*of elites*) will facilitate understanding of the political system because we can infer from them a good deal about the system's homogeneity and dominant values, about elite-elite relationships.” (Edinger and Searing, 1967: 430). Similarly, other goals of various researchers for studying the characteristics of political leaders have been explaining and predicting the attitudes and behaviors of these leaders (Quandt, 1969: 1).

As indicated above, large numbers of studies were conducted by social scientists on political elites. Among the classical studies, Pareto and Mosca seemed to have employed the term “political elite” to refer to a “governing class” as Pareto had done, or to a “political class” as Mosca had often done (Lenczowski, 1975: 1). Michels also considered the human society as divided into ruling and non-ruling groups, and he suggested an “iron law of oligarchy” that encompassed all social organizations under the leadership of the political elites existed. According to this perspective, elites occur in almost all organizations and they are the real decision-makers (Michels, 2005: 342-356). For Michels, the defining factor of being an elite is the positions that the individuals own in organizations and their use of power provided by these positions (Turhan, 1991: 32). Moreover, Mills underlined that:

“The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether

they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions...” (Mills, 1956: 3-4).

Thus, the chances of the political elites to influence many people via their decisions make these elites crucial and thus the subjects of research. Quandt highlighted that quite a number of studies of political institutions cover quantitative data on the backgrounds of the elites and again a significant amount of non-quantitative research deals with the experiences and social origins of the political leaders (Quandt, 1969: 3). Although the practice of background analysis of the political elites has been criticized by some authors (i.e. Schlesinger, 1966) arguing that the profile information does not work for predicting future behavior of these elites, many scholars and research have proven the opposite. For example, Matthews (1954) argued that the voting behavior of legislative elites has been predicted quite well on certain issues by analyzing their social backgrounds. Moreover, Bendix (1953) argued that “...a study of politics should be concerned with the social composition of the members and leaders of different political organizations...” because such kind of information will yield clues about the “political goals” of these leaders (Quandt, 1969: 4).

The research on Turkish political elite also circles around similar ideas. On the political elite features and their changes over time in Turkey, Tachau (1984) gave historical information and unearthed the significant roles of modernization supporters played among the political elites in the country. Also, Heper and Keyman examined how the state elite and its relations with the people are shaped by observing the political patronage linkages in the political tradition of Turkey (Heper, Keyman, 1998). Besides these studies, ones that examine Presidents, their characteristics and the reflections of these on the political culture of Turkey have been conducted. To illustrate, the study on President Kenan Evren which was conducted by Dodd (1994) in the book edited by Heper and Evin, and on President Turgut Özal which was studied by Heper (Heper, 1994) can be underlined. However, indeed, these studies on the presidents are somewhat different from the ones dealing with the deputies, party leaders and the professional officers of the parties as these studies are much more related to the internal party politics. Thus, beyond such studies, looking at the features and personal backgrounds of the party leaders can also enable researchers to build up an understanding about the existing power relations and internal party organizations. As an example, in terms of political party leadership, Payaslıoğlu examined the socio-political basis of party

leadership in Turkey (Payaslıoğlu, 1970). Since there is a leader-oriented and/or a leader dominated party structure in Turkey, the personal characteristics of the party leaders are significantly effective on both internal and national party politics.

Approaching the parliamentary elites in terms of their social backgrounds may yield the analysis of the local level political party elites, which are the chairmen of the local branches, to become even more competent. Thus, being knowledgeable about these parliamentary elite studies in Turkey may provide a better understanding.

2.2. Earlier works on Parliamentary Elites

Among parliamentary elites, deputies and cabinet ministers have been the primary subjects to various studies across countries. These elites have been given such importance since they are “the core group of decision makers” (De Almeida and Pinto, 2005: 4). The research generally covers the recruitment patterns of these elites and the changes in the composition of them (De Almeida, Pinto and Bermeo, 2005). For example, The Iranian political elite and its existence under patrimonial system of the country regarding the educational background of these elites (Bill, 1975); the political elite of Iraq and its educational, occupational, socioeconomic, and ethnic and religious backgrounds (Marr, 1975); the impact of socio-economic transformation on the process of parliamentary elite recruitment/circulation in Lebanon (Khalaf, 1980); and the nature of parliamentary elite turnout depending on social and political changes in Israel (Gutmann, 1980) have been analyzed. By the same token, the change of the social background profiles of ministerial elites depending on regime changes/types in Spain has been studied as well (Linz, Jerez and Corzo, 2005). Similar to this study, Lane and Ross investigated how “generational, occupational and institutional” backgrounds of the elites (i.e. the legislative elite) shifted during time and a new elite emerged in Supreme Soviet (Lane and Ross, 1994).

Studies about the members of Turkish Grand National Assembly [Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi – TBMM] and their social backgrounds prevail in the literature. In his book titled *The Turkish Political Elite*, Frey studied the personal backgrounds of the deputies in the TBMM (Frey, 1965). According to the existing literature, this study has been one of the most prominent and guiding studies. Frey dealt with the

occupational and educational backgrounds of the deputies from 1920 to 1957. In addition to this topic, he also looked at the birth place of the deputies, whether they were born in the provinces which they represented, and then approached the concept of “localism” in terms of the positioning of political elite by emphasizing the deputies’ relations with their constituencies per se (Frey, 1975: 59). Frey also focused on the educational backgrounds of the deputies and the reflections of these on the modernization of Turkey (Frey, 1970). By covering several of Frey’s ideas, in terms of the relationships between the deputies and local branches of the political parties, Dodd underlined Frey’s argument about the orientation of these deputies towards the provincial party organizations in order to be influential on them (Dodd, 1979: 64-65). In a similar vein, in Nieuwenhuijze’s book on the social ranking in the Middle East, Tachau conducted his study on the social backgrounds of Turkish parliamentarians and unearthed the fragmentation among the Turkish political elite in the National Assembly. In that study, Tachau specifically analyzed several social aspects of the parliamentarians -who were elected in 1973- such as their education, occupation, marital status, and birth place (Tachau, 1977). He concluded that the composition of 1973 Parliament resembled to the parliaments of 1920, 1950 and 1961 in several respects; however, ideological fragmentation was higher compared to previous parliaments, and especially the occupational background of the deputies have changed dramatically “with the appearance of sizeable contingents of teachers and religionists” (Tachau, 1977: 312).

Frey’s tradition has been influential through time, and several researchers continued to analyze Turkish parliamentarians regarding their social backgrounds that Frey covered. However, various scholars employed different elements of social backgrounds depending on their own selections in terms of the importance of these elements. For example, Şaylan (1976) approached the topic only from an occupational perspective and described the occupational composition of the parliamentary elite in Turkey between the years 1961 and 1976. From a different angle, Kışlalı (1976) examined the education, age, and gender dimensions of the parliamentarians in Turkey and unearthed the changes in the composition of these political elites between 1920 and 1973. Similarly to Kışlalı, Turhan (1991) drew attention to the social backgrounds of the parliamentary elites in terms of age, occupation and education, and using these criteria, explained the alternation of these elites from 1876 to 1980. Although these studies covered different aspects of the parliamentary elites, one commonality of them

is indicating the changes in the characteristics of Turkish parliamentarians as correspondent to recruitment patterns of Turkish political parties. Moreover, these studies concluded that the composition of the assembly during time differed accordingly to social alternation in Turkey. From a different aspect, Kalaycıoğlu (1995) analyzed the Turkish parliamentarians' "attitudes towards their parties and opponents," "political beliefs and values" and "social backgrounds" in 1984 and in 1988. The author unearthed the relationship between the deputies and the constituents regarding clientelistic linkages and found that constituency demands from the deputies have been mostly personal ones. Concomitantly, a significant number of the deputies (more than a half) have been spending their time –as a regular activity- on "finding jobs and providing other services or benefits for constituents" (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 47, 49).

A more recent study which is conducted by Sayarı and Hasanov, relying on the data about the deputies' social backgrounds and their turnover in the assembly, scrutinized the effects of the 2007 general elections in Turkey on the parliamentary elite structure. In this study, the authors analyzed similar elements of social backgrounds which are unearthed in the previous studies as well, and argued that a rise of a new political class of parliamentary elites in Turkey is observed. Unlike previous research, an important note to point out in this study is that Sayarı and Hasanov looked at the "knowledge of the Arabic language" among the deputies along with the gender, age, education and occupation (Sayarı, Hasanov, 2008). It seems as if that specific language knowledge of the deputies seems to be helpful in defining the ideology of the party to which they belong.

Similar to the studies of Sayarı and Hasanov and of Frey, Sesli and Demir also studied the deputies' social backgrounds in the Turkish National Assembly from 1920 to 1950 in order to demonstrate the link between the party and its elites. According to their findings, knowing the social profiles of the deputies gives us the chance to better understand—the power structures of Turkey. Moreover, an analysis of political development in Turkey may be done with the help of the data on changes in profiles of the deputies. (Sesli, Demir, 2010). Additionally, Gökçe's research on the deputies of the 23rd National Assembly showed that the social backgrounds of the political elites give information about the structures of the political parties and the political participation types/ways of the society (Gökçe, 2011). Arslan, in a separate study, also used elite theory to analyze power structure in Turkey (Arslan 2006); in his several

studies he also analyzed the social backgrounds of the Turkish deputies (Arslan, 2005). Moreover, Arslan also conducted a research on the representation of women among the Turkish political elites (Arslan, 2004). As it can be understood, the studies on the deputies cover a wide area in the literature on Turkey.

In a more recent study, Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin also shared this fact (emergence of the large body of parliamentary elite studies) but added that compared to deputy analysis, the number of studies analyzing ministerial elites -which are political elites as well- have been very few in Turkey. Thus, these scholars focused on ministerial elites and their social backgrounds covering “age, gender, education, locality, occupation, length of ministerial career, parliamentary party affiliation” (Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 2011: 739). Analyzing the demographical and political characteristics of the ministerial elites, the authors draw a socioeconomic and political composition of these elites, and revealed the visible changes/trends of this composition over time. At this point, the following argument can be supported: Since the ministers occupy very crucial positions and they have the chance to control significant resources, studying the personal backgrounds of these elites would provide the researchers to better understand their attitudes, and give chance to predict future acts of such elites. With a similar rationale and likewise to such research, political party elites of Turkey are analyzed in terms of their social backgrounds in various studies.

2.3. Earlier Works on Party Elites

As a subset of political elites, (political) party elites have been also specifically subjected to several studies. These studies have been conducted to explain the organizational structures, internal power relations of the parties, and the penetration of the party elites to the larger society in which they operate.

Party leadership and role of the party elites are some of the concentrated tasks in terms of party elites (Martz, 1992). In terms of party head quarters and the public/field offices of the party, Biezen analyzed the relations between these offices in the European parties and argued that the central office of a party is the dominant part although individuals in public offices also impact the central office (Biezen, 2000). Bowman and Boynton (1966) focused on and underlined the importance of the grassroots party

officials and their roles/activities in the party organization. Moreover, these researchers (1966) also studied the local officials of the parties in Massachusetts and focused on the recruitment of these officials. The authors also identified the importance of the backgrounds of the activists in order to explain party recruitment and political participation in the party organization.

Besides these studies, in terms of the party organization and the success of the parties, Webb and Kolodny underlined the importance and the significant effects of the party professionals/payroll professionals of the parties, especially in their central offices (Webb, Kolodny, 2006). Additionally, Hirschfield, Swanson and Blank (1962) focused on the profiles of the political activists (elected committeeman of the selected parties) in Manhattan and unearthed the differences and similarities between the three parties that operated in the politics of New York City. In above mentioned studies, one of the main points is that the relations between the party and the people in the local offices can be examined by looking at the personal backgrounds of the party elites who are in the local branches. When we consider the studies on Turkish party elites, we observe similar scenarios as in those above-mentioned studies.

2.3.1. Earlier Works on Turkish Party Elite

The specific literature on Turkish party elites points to, as a general statement, the political party elites (both the central and local ones) have a significant influence on the party, and social and political interactions of the party with the society and other organizations in the society (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 12). To illustrate, identifying with whom these party elites interact may unearth the ties between the party and nature of the electorate which will enlighten the characteristics of targeted voters of the party. Thus, the features/profiles/social backgrounds of these party elites do offer accurate evidence about Turkish politics.

In this juncture, one may hypothesize that characteristics of the party elite also affect internal party structure. Those characteristics of the elite enable us to define a party as authoritarian or democratic; traditional or modern; and conservative or liberal. In terms of these definitions, existing literature also focused on the local party elites alongside the party leaders, deputies and professional officials of different parties.

However, in comparison to the large body of research on parliamentary elites in Turkey, the research on local party elites has been limited. Nevertheless, the existing literature does provide helpful pathways for analyzing local party elites.

Tachau, in a research other than his parliamentary elite study, analyzed the provincial party organizations of major parties in Turkey. More specifically, Tachau examined the social and political backgrounds of the personnel of provincial party organizations including the local party chairmen. He indicated that the main dimensions to be analyzed are: age, so as to enable a better understanding of the process of recruitment and social change between generations; place of birth, for analyzing horizontal social mobility; occupation for unearthing social diversification; and education “as a general condition of modernization” (Tachau, 1973: 284-285). Tachau highlighted in his study that the Turkish political parties are modern ones. Similar to Frey’s study on Turkish political elite and the guiding spirit emanating from this research, the research of Tachau has become a path definer for the others.

In a similar vein, the research conducted by TESEV between 1996 and 1997 in Turkey also covered the analysis of social background of local party members of various political parties. By interviewing with 782 party members, the researchers describe the composition of the local party elite in terms of demographical characteristics such as birth place, age, education, gender and occupation; and political characteristics including the duration of membership to the parties, the old and new positions of the members, and their candidacy to public offices (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000). Although the study encapsulated other local party members along with provincial chairmen, it unearthed useful information about these chairmen. An interesting point focused in the study is the birth place of the fathers of the interviewed party members. The authors analyzed the information about paternal birth places and found that the fathers of the provincial party bosses in 17 metropolitan cities were born in a different area. The authors then concluded that in terms of partisan subjects (of the study), the metropolitan areas along with Marmara, Ege and Akdeniz regions are the migrant-receiving areas whereas Karadeniz, Doğu and Güneydoğu Anadolu regions are migrant-

sending places, and this fact gives clues about localism degrees depending on different regions (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 60-61).¹

In a more recent research conducted between 2007 and 2009, that employed interview and in-depth interview methods, Uysal and Topak (2010) also examined the social background of the local party elites of several major parties of Turkey. The authors mainly analyzed the following features: gender, age, education and occupation of the local party elites. However, they also included family relations of those elites, and the effect of these relations on the elites being in their political positions (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 59-116). In this study, the “fathers” again became an important point to analyze. But rather than birth place, the ideological stance of the fathers of the party elite has been analyzed by these scholars. They then concluded that the fathers of the party elites have been influential on the ideological position of these elites and their attendance into politics (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 60). Another research covering “parental party identification” of the voters conducted by Kalaycıoğlu (2010) also proves a similar impact of the parents on their children’s ideological stance. Thus, firstly as voters and then as party elites, there are enough reasons for us to suspect that the local party chairpersons may also be affected by their parents in developing their political selves and adopting political ideologies and affinities. So, along with the other demographical factors, analyzing the family backgrounds of these elites may also provide explanatory factors for future prediction about their attitudes.

Furthermore, Ayata (1992)’s research on the organizational structure and ideology of the CHP is parallel to above mentioned studies to a certain extent. Although Ayata has not analyzed the social backgrounds of the local party bosses directly, she gave helpful information about the ties between the members, delegates and party (local) leaders of the CHP in terms of various ways of political participation. While exploring those ties, Ayata specifically analyzed several political participation methods such as patronage, brokerage and clientelism which rely on personal linkages between the political elites and the society. As Kalaycıoğlu (1995) unearthed clientelistic relations between the deputies and the constituents, ties between the local party elites

¹ Although the birth places of the fathers of the local party bosses are not the subjects of this thesis, localism degrees of the local party bosses will be analyzed in the data analysis part with the help of their own birth places, and a comparison will be drawn in terms of migrant-receiving and migrant-sending areas of Turkey.

and the electorate may be analyzed for understanding the parties' attitude about these relations. These personal ties are shaped depending on the mutual interests of the politicians and the electorate; and generally political and economic interests may yield the emergence of such relations. Thus, Ayata explored the socioeconomic positions of those individuals who are dealing with the party as party elites. More specifically, Ayata investigated the socioeconomic and political characteristics of local organizations and members of the CHP in two towns (Kaleli and Taşlık). The author emphasized that in order to unearth the impacts of new social and political structures on the organization and ideology of the party, analyzing the differences between these two towns would be more helpful (Ayata, 1992: 16). Hence, Ayata made in-depth interviews with various party members (including two provincial chairpersons of the CHP) and conducted surveys for collecting data from delegates between 1977 and 1980. Likewise to other studies, this research specifically ascertained that analyzing the socioeconomic structures and characteristics of the party members, delegates and chairpersons may be helpful in order to understand a party's ideological stance and organizational structure.

Obviously, earlier works revealed the possible advantages of analyzing background profiles of Turkish local political party elites. Nonetheless, explaining the positions, rights and responsibilities of these local party elites of the AKP and the CHP before analyzing their social backgrounds may reveal that why these local party elites are noteworthy for research.

2.4. Regulations on the Organizational Structure of the Political Parties in Turkey

The regulations of the interactions between different organs and elements of political parties are defined as “structural relationship” [*yapısal bağlantı*], and while some parties have clarified, detailed and definite rules in terms of the relations of various parts of the party, some others do not (Özbudun, 1974: 62). Turkish political parties are defined as having strong structural relations with their detailed intra-party (internal) regulations (Özbudun, 1974: 63; Bektaş, 1993: 40). Political parties in Turkey have their party by-laws [*içtüzük*] for intra-party regulations; however, the political parties and their main principles are regulated by the Law on Political Parties [Siyasi Partiler Kanunu – SPK] in Turkey. The current SPK (Law No: 2820) of Turkey was enacted in 1983 depending on the 1982 Constitution of Turkey (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000:

104). Along with the Article 1, the Article 2 of this law reveals the aims of it. This second article demonstrates that the SPK covers the provisions for the foundation, organization, activities, mission, authority and responsibilities, property acquisition, income and expenses, auditing, closure and being closed down of the political parties.² Besides, SPK proposes a common and binding organizational form/method for all the parties, meaning that no party may found another organizational structure which is not in accordance with this law. This organizational method is parallel to the administrative organization of Turkey. Consequently, the organizational structures of the Turkish political parties are very similar to each other due to the regulations of the SPK (Bektaş, 1993: 39; Erdem, 2001: 85). According to the Article 7 of the SPK, the organization of the political parties are composed of central bodies (head quarters) with provincial [*il*], district [*ilçe*] and municipality [*belde*] organizations; TBMM groups, provincial councils and municipal council groups. With an additional sentence³, the article shows that establishment of several subsidiary organs such as women's branch and youth branch, and representatives in foreign countries may be provided by party by-laws. As it is evident, no other local organization below the municipality level is allowed in the law. Although the law enables the political parties to have representatives in city neighborhoods [*mahalle*]s and villages [*köy*] (Bektaş, 1993: 40), the political parties cannot found lower level local organizations, for example, in sub-districts [*bucak*]. In addition, according to this party law, the political parties cannot organize their offices (other than above mentioned ones) regarding age, occupation, gender, geography or institutions (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 107), thus, regardless of socioeconomic, ethnic and geographical differences between regions, only one organization model is allowed for the whole country (Erdem, 2001: 93). Such restrictions have been deeply criticized for disabling/limiting the political parties in sub-districts and lower levels, and creating

² SPK, Article 2 – (Amended: 12/8/1999 - 4445/1): [*Bu Kanun, siyasi partilerin kurulmaları, teşkilatlanmaları, faaliyetleri, görev, yetki ve sorumlulukları, mal edinimleri ile gelir ve giderleri, denetlenmeleri kapanma ve kapatılmalarıyla ilgili hükümleri kapsar.*] Retrieved from: <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2820.pdf>

³ SPK, Article 7 – (Amended: 21/5/1987 - 3370/1): [*Siyasi partilerin teşkilatı; merkez organları ile il, ilçe ve belde teşkilatlarından; Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Grubu ile il genel meclisi ve belediye meclisi gruplarından ibarettir. (Ek Cümle: 12/8/1999 - 4445/3 md.) Siyasi partilerin tüzüklerinde ayrıca kadın kolu, gençlik kolu ve benzeri yan kuruluşlarla, yabancı ülkelerde yurtdışı temsilciliği kurulması öngörülebilir.*] Retrieved from: <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2820.pdf>

difficulties for the parties while interacting with the society (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 105-106).

Nonetheless, in practice the local branches are “crucial in linking the party with civil society and collateral organizations” (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 128). Thus, it is noteworthy to explore the provincial and district branches of Turkish political parties since they are the “nearest” offices to the society.

2.4.1. Regulations on Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP

Articles 19 and 20 of the SPK reveal the regulations on the structure of the provincial and district organizations of the political parties in detail. Nevertheless, the SPK provides the political parties to regulate their local organizations in terms of certain issues. Regarding the SPK, party by-laws of the AKP and the CHP reveal and regulate the party organization. Parallel to the Article 7 of the SPK, both the AKP and the CHP have all mentioned organizations.

Table 2.1: Party organizations of the AKP and the CHP according to their party by- laws, modified by the amendments of 2012⁴

| The AKP Organization | The CHP Organization |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <i>1- Municipality Organization</i> | <i>1- District Organization</i> |
| a) Municipal Congress | a) District Congress |
| b) Municipal Chairman | b) District Chairman |
| c) Administrative Committee | c) Administrative Committee |
| d) Executive Committee | d) Municipal Chairman |
| <i>2- District Organization</i> | e) Administrative Committee |
| a) District Congress | <i>2- Provincial Organization</i> |
| b) District Chairman | a) Provincial Congress |
| c) Administrative Committee | b) Provincial Chairman |
| d) Executive Committee | c) Administrative Committee |
| <i>3- Provincial Organization</i> | d) Discipline Committee |
| a) Provincial Congress | <i>3- Party Headquarters</i> |
| b) Provincial Chairman | a) Grand Congress |
| c) Administrative Committee | b) Party Leader |

⁴ Table 2.1 has been established by the information given in the party by-laws of the AKP and the CHP with 2012 amendments. Moreover, Kumbaracıbaşı’s study on the AKP is noteworthy to refer (see, Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 127).

| | |
|---|---|
| d) Executive Committee | c) Party Assembly |
| 4- Party Headquarters | d) Central Administrative Committee |
| a) Grand Congress | e) Supreme Discipline Committee |
| b) Party Leader | 4- Additional Organizations |
| c) Central Administrative Committee | a) Women's branches |
| d) Central Executive Committee | b) Youth branches |
| 5- Additional Organizations | 5- Groups (and General Assemblies) |
| a) Women's branches | a) The TBMM party group |
| b) Youth branches | b) CHP Members of Provincial Assemblies |
| c) Other branches | c) CHP Members of Municipal Assemblies |
| 6- Groups (and General Assemblies) | |
| a) The TBMM party group | |
| b) AKP Members of Provincial Assemblies | |
| c) AKP Members of Municipal Assemblies | |

The AKP by-law reveals the levels of the party organization in its Article 17.⁵ Thus, the AKP by-law covers regulations of all of the above mentioned branches of the local party organizations. In addition to those organizations of the AKP, the by-law of that party regulates the village and neighborhood representatives as well.

Article 31 of the AKP by-law stipulates the regulations concerning the jurisdiction of the district chairpersons of the party. According to this article, the district chairman shall be directly elected by the district congress with secret ballot. The district chairman shall be responsible with the coordination, execution and monitoring of the district level activities and works. He/she represents the district organization of the party. Moreover, the regulation limits the election of the same chairman with 3 ordinary successive periods at most.⁶ Similarly to this one, Article 36 of the AKP by-law

⁵ AKP by-law, Article 17: [*Teşkilat Kademeleri: Ak Parti teşkilat kademeleri; belde, ilçe, il ve Genel Merkez teşkilatlarından, belediye meclisi grupları ve il genel meclisi grupları ile Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Parti Grubu'ndan ibarettir. Ayrıca parti teşkilat kademelerinde, kadın ve gençlik kolları ile diğer yan kuruluşlar ve yurt dışı temsilcilikleri oluşturulur.*] Retrieved from: <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu>

⁶ AKP by-law, Article 31: [*İlçe Başkanı: İlçe başkanı, ilçe kongresi tarafından gizli oylama ile tek derecede seçilir. Partinin ilçe düzeyindeki çalışma ve faaliyetlerinin koordinasyon ve yürütümünü sağlar, denetimini gerçekleştirir ve ilçe teşkilatını temsil eder. Aynı kişi, en fazla üç olağan dönem ilçe başkanı seçilebilir.*] Retrieved from: <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu>

regulates the election, duty and responsibilities of the provincial chairmen of the party. According to this article, the provincial chairman shall be directly elected by the provincial congress with secret ballot. The chairman shall be responsible with the coordination, execution and monitoring of the provincial level activities and works. He/she represents the provincial organization of the party. Moreover, the regulation limits the election of the same chairman with 3 ordinary successive periods at most.⁷ Both the district and provincial chairpersons may be re-elected if they lay off.

Parallel to the Article 7 of SPK, and similar to the AKP, the CHP also has all levels of organizations and branches indicated in this by-law. Moreover, the CHP by-law indicates that the party has working groups in neighborhood / village [*muhtar*] areas which are under the responsibility of the district branches. According to the Article 28 of the CHP by-law, the district chairman of the CHP shall be directly elected by the district congress with secret ballot. Moreover, the district chairperson is the direct representative of the party within the district borders. Additionally, he/she shall analyze the economic, social and local problems of the district, create solutions, and built up strong ties with various civil society organizations, trade unions, and local media.⁸ Article 32 of the CHP by-law demonstrates the responsibilities and rights of the provincial party bosses. The provincial chairman of the CHP shall be elected by the provincial congress with secret ballot directly. Moreover, the provincial chairperson is the direct representative of the party within the provincial borders. Additionally, s/he shall analyze the economic, social and local problems of the province, create solutions, and built up strong ties with various civil society organizations, trade unions, and local

⁷ AKP by-law, Article 36: [*İl Başkanı: İl Başkanı il kongresi tarafından gizli oylama ile tek derecede seçilir. Partinin il düzeyindeki çalışma ve faaliyetlerinin koordinasyon ve yürütümünü sağlar, denetimini gerçekleştirir ve il teşkilatını temsil eder. Aynı kişi, en fazla üç olağan dönem il başkanı seçilebilir.*]

Retrieved from: <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu>

⁸ CHP by-law, Article 28: [*İlçe Başkanı: İlçe başkanı, ilçe kongresince gizli oyla seçilir. İlçe çevresinde Partinin temsilcisidir. İlçe başkanı, başkanı olduğu ilçenin ekonomik, sosyal ve yöresel sorunlarını inceler, bunların çözümüne yardımcı olur, belde başkanlarıyla düzenli olarak toplanır, parti örgütüyle, meslek ve sivil toplum örgütleriyle, sendikalarla, yaygın ve yerel basınla ilişkileri sağlıklı tutar; onların sorunlarıyla ilgilenir; çözümlerine katkıda bulunur; bu kuruluşlarda partililerle işbirliği yaparak başarılı olmalarına yardımcı olur.*]

Retrieved from: http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=657

media.⁹ Furthermore, both the provincial and district chairpersons preside over the local party congresses and other meetings within their constituency.

The literature has indicted the importance of the political elites regarding their capability of controlling resources and power. Similarly and obviously, for both parties, the provincial and district chairpersons have remarkable positions which provide them with the opportunity of controlling the local resources of the party and being a key person in decision making processes. Due to this fact, these local party elites are worth a study due to their pivotal positions.

2.5. Research Question

“By studying political parties we imply that the party is a meaningful unit of analysis. Yet we go above the party as a unit, for we also study the party system. By the same token we can go below the party as a unit and study, thereby, the party subunits.”
(Sartori, 1976: 71)

In reviewing the literature, one can observe that although dozens of studies have been conducted on the above-mentioned political elites as party leaders, deputies in the national assemblies and the payroll professionals of the political parties, little is known about the characteristics of the party bosses at the provincial and district offices of the main parties in Turkey. Thus, investigating the social backgrounds of the provincial party chairpersons promises to fill a vacuum in the existing literature. The main rationale for such an analysis is that the features of these party elites can give us an important chance to compare different parties and their organizational, structural and ideological features. As previously indicated, the parliamentary elites have been given a significant importance for analyzing the parliamentary composition, recruitment

⁹ CHP by-law, Article 32: [*İl Başkanı: İl başkanı, il kongresince gizli oyla seçilir. İl çevresinde Partinin temsilcisidir. Başkanı olduğu ilin çevresindeki ilçelerin ekonomik, sosyal ve yöresel sorunlarını inceler. Bunların çözümüne yardımcı olur. İlçe başkanlarıyla düzenli olarak toplanır. Parti örgütüyle, meslek ve sivil toplum örgütleriyle, sendikalarla, yaygın ve yerel basınla ilişkileri sağlıklı tutar; onların sorunlarıyla ilgilenir; çözümlerine katkıda bulunur; bu kuruluşlarda görevli Partililerle işbirliği yaparak başarılı olmalarına yardımcı olur.*]

Retrieved from: http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=657

patterns of the parties and political consequences of these. Similar to deputies, the profiles of the provincial party bosses provide us with important clues about the characteristics of the political parties, but there are also differences between the deputies and these chairpersons.

Thus, at this point, it is important to raise the importance of the provincial and district party bosses in Turkey and the analysis of their socioeconomic characteristics. In order to unearth their importance, indicating the similarities and mainly the differences between these bosses and the deputies can be helpful.

Both deputies and the provincial bosses represent their party and its ideology. Also, both of these elites reveal the organizational success levels of the parties. These elites are seen as the “visible faces” of the parties and they built up linkages with electorate directly; however, the positions, duties, goals and interests of the deputies and the bosses of the provincial/district branches of the parties differ from each other at some point. First of all, the (offices of the) elites in the local branches are (geographically) closer to the electorate and they are usually more available than are the deputies of a political party in the TBMM. Although the deputies also meet with the electorate in local areas, local chairpersons may have more interaction with the electorate within their constituency. This difference is because the provincial bosses have the chance to show up more frequently than the deputies in the local areas and by the help of their local organization, their penetration into the society can be easier than the deputies. For example, organizing social activities in their provinces or districts can provide them with the chance of taking attention of the electorate and strengthening their linkages with the electorate.¹⁰

In addition, the people, who want to get information about a party, apply to the local branches of the party due to the fact that these branches are generally much more accessible than the party center or the deputies. Membership issues also affect the relationship between the individuals and the local branches of the parties. This effect is because, the people who would like to become a member of a party should apply to the

¹⁰ As mentioned in the previous section, the local chairpersons coordinate local activities and organize meetings with local electorate and/or other organizations according to the party by-laws.

local branches of that party.¹¹ In a similar context, the party elites are influential on public opinion. Meaning that the party leaders or party elite have chance to lead or alter voter preferences (Orriols and Lavezzolo, 2010). Furthermore, analyzing the social and political profiles of the local elites may give the clues about who governs the field organizations of the parties, and who are (how) represented in these organizations (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 13).

Unlike the responsibilities of the deputies, it can be said that these bosses have more responsibility to meet with the electorate to answer their questions *about the party* and to give accurate information since these local chairpersons are the representative of the party within their workplaces. Of course, the deputies also have such responsibilities; however, they are seen as more “individualistic” than the provincial party bosses who have the responsibility to act collectively in their branches and to control the organization. Tachau indicated that “The personnel in the provincial executive committees represent the highest level below the national organization” and they form the “formal rule between their local party organizations and the national center.” (Tachau, 1973: 284). Here, one can infer that the provincial party bosses are much more integrated to the organizational structure of the party and thus their social backgrounds can give accurate information about the features of this organization. So, these profiles can be indicators for explaining the internal party politics.

Another importance of the local party chairpersons is that they may climb the political stairs over time. To put in a different way, the positions of these party elites may enable them to become future deputies or occupy upper level positions in the future. For example, some members of the provincial executive committees may become -potential- future political leaders (Tachau, 1973: 284). Moreover, the position of local party elites is effective not only for their own careers but also for the other political elites. To illustrate, if they are decisive in determining/nominating the deputy candidates, or at least if their support is needed by these candidates, legislative careers of the deputies may depend on these local party elites (Jones et al, 2001: 1).

¹¹ The party by-laws regulate the membership conditions. According to the indicated procedures, the individuals who would like to become a member of a party should apply to the district organization of the party depending on their place of residence. For further information please see the Article 7 of the AKP by-law via the link: <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu> and the Article 8 of the CHP by-law via the link: <http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CHP-Tuzuk.pdf>

Regarding the above-mentioned topics, in order to study the linkages/relationships between the political party elite and the party as a whole and compare these links for different parties, the following question emerges as a plausible motive for investigation: “What are the main features of the political party elites in different parties?” In a similar but more specific context, by analyzing the main characteristics of personal profiles of the current leaders of the provincial and district branches of the AKP and the CHP, this thesis suggests answers to the following question: “What are the political consequences of the differences in the socio-economic profiles of the local party chairpersons for the AKP and the CHP in Turkish politics?”

2.6. Hypotheses

Along with the research question, this thesis suggests several hypotheses to be tested. As a prevailing theory on elites in general, the social characteristics of the elites, their recruitment patterns and the features of the society were defined/assumed as related to each other (Bottomore, 1964). Furthermore, “Changes in the criteria of elite recruitment and, hence the social characteristics of elites, are taken as indicators of social change, and vice versa (Hoffman-Lange, 1987: 27). Inferring from these ideas, background characteristics of party elites can be taken as indicators of party features. Thus, certain characteristics of the social backgrounds of the provincial and district party bosses can provide us with clues about the relevant features of the parties.

For example, several studies estimated to find more party elites who have religious education in a conservative party (Sayarı, Hasanov, 2008). The positive correlation between conservatism and religious education has been unearthed in other studies as well (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007). Not only the party elites but also the voters which have religious education background may be more prone to conservatism. In turn, the political parties which have such members may show conservative tendencies as well. Thus, it is possible to infer that in a conservative party which espouses Islamic values as part of its ideology, larger proportions of the local party elites would be expected to have a religious educational background, know some Arabic. Contrariwise, it is also plausible to posit that a social democratic party will provide greater opportunities for the working class members, trade unionists, intellectuals who pronounce social democratic values, and women to lead local party organizations of that party.

Tachau regarded the political parties as voluntary and “relatively stable and enduring” organizations which aim to attain political power with the help of mass support; pursue “public interest rather than private gain.” Depending on this definition, Tachau also regarded Turkish political parties as modern (in structure and form) instruments of questing for power and influence (Tachau, 1973: 282, 283). In addition to these features, a modern liberal party would be expected to provide greater political career opportunities for the young and secularly educated middle class members who affiliate with individual liberties, economic enterprise, freedom of expression and the like. Deducing from this idea, this thesis expects that in a modern liberal party, the average age of the local party elites is relatively lower and the university education levels to be higher than conservative local party elites. Related to this issue, one can also foresee that the occupations and/or jobs of the provincial party bosses differ from socialist and social democratic parties on the left to liberal and conservative parties on the right. To illustrate, in secular or social democratic or liberal parties, such professions as academicians, artists, architects and the like occupy a larger proportion than in a conservative party, where such jobs artisans/tradesmen have bigger proportions, instead.

Furthermore, conservative parties are generally less open to have female party elites. On the other hand, in social democratic and liberal parties the proportion of the female party elites would be higher, if they implement what their ideological messages preach. Additionally, it is expected that a party which particularly emphasizes secularism provides female party elites more opportunity to emerge in their local branches as chairpersons.

Depending on the localism degrees of the local party elites, one can analyze the various political ties between these elites and the electorate. If the local party chairpersons have their offices in the same province that they born (and live), they have the chance to interact with the local people, more than those who do not. Moreover, by growing up in the same area with their workplaces, the local chairpersons can observe the problems and understand the demands of the electorate of that area more easily compared to the ones who do not have such an experience. Additionally, the electorate and these local elites may know each other personally. Thus, a possible argument can be that in the areas where the localism is high, the personal ties between the local chairpersons and the electorate may be more visible. For example, from parliamentary elites perspective, Kalaycıoğlu unearthed the relationships between the parliamentary

representatives and constituents in Turkey by underlying that “in most rural districts the deputies are more visible and proximal, and ties between constituents and their representatives can be quite personal” whereas the opposite can be true for most metropolitan and urban constituencies (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 46). A similar approach can be employed while analyzing the local party chairpersons as well. These chairpersons can be more visible in their birth places, and if their offices are in the same place with their birth places a higher degree of personal ties can be expected. Furthermore, if a political party recruits such chairpersons whose birth and work places are same, this party’s relations with the electorate can rely on proximal and personal ties which increase the chance of clientelistic linkages.

A possible correlation may be found between the financial power of the local party chairpersons and the emergence of clientelistic relations as well. If the chairpersons have access to financial resources easily, or if they have wealth which they can spend for political purposes, the possibility of existence of the clientelistic ties may increase. At this point, the occupation and job of these local party elites become noteworthy. If a party’s local chairpersons have occupations or jobs which provide them with notable amount of material resources, that party may more prone to adopt clientelism.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS

3.1. Methodology

Various methods have been employed for compiling and analyzing background information on the political (party) elites. The literature covers dozens of quantitative and qualitative studies on the social background of political elites (Quandt, 1969: 3). Commonly used data collection methods have been interviews, surveys and biographical examinations. Besides these methods, data collection relied on several other sources as well. For example, official directories, newspapers, autobiographies, memoirs, and historical archives have become other primary sources for the researchers (De Almeida and Pinto, 2005: 16).

As it is indicated in the literature review section, similar background variables have been analyzed in the studies. These were age, gender, place of birth, education and occupation/job. Along with these, different scholars selected additional variables such as wealth, family background, imprisonment (Rustow, 1966). Several scholars have provided suggestions about the selections of these background variables. For example, Edinger and Searing (1967) analyzed the strength of the effect of various variables on the attitudinal features of the political elites and concluded that certain variables may provide better predictions about these elites' behavior.

In the studies conducted for analyzing the social backgrounds of the political (party) elites of Turkey, again mainly three forms of data collection have been employed: interviews, surveys and biographies. Among these three means, interviews, especially the in-depth interviews, and surveys provide expanded and detailed information about the social backgrounds of the political (party) elites. Thus, various researchers choose to use interviews and survey methods (Frey, 1965; Tachau, 1973;

Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010). For example, Ali Çarkoğlu et al. (2000) used face to face interviews for compiling information about the social backgrounds of the members of political party organizations including provincial chairmen in 36 provinces of six parties. In a similar vein, Uysal and Topak (2010) employed semi structured in-depth face to face interview method in order to gather information about social backgrounds of the local party elites. Their study covers both the chairmen and the executive members of the local party branch in 31 districts. The methods employed in such studies may provide detailed information about the provincial and district chairmen of the political parties for sure.

However, in both studies, the authors unearthed several problems they faced during interviews for compiling their data. The indicated experience is that some interviewees were reluctant to answer the questions and were uncomfortable to give personal information about themselves (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010). Similarly, Frey employed survey method in his book *The Turkish Political Elite* (1965), and presented/examined the sources of the background information about the deputies that he worked on. The survey method also seems to be fruitful while gathering personal information. However, Frey indicated that the direct questionnaires which were given to the deputies could not become successful due to weak response rates. He suggested that the responses are few; nevertheless, they may be would still be important for the study.

3.2. Data Collection and Analysis

The data is compiled about the chairpersons of the provincial and district branches of two political parties of Turkey, the government party AKP, and the main opposition party CHP, mainly from the central offices of these parties. Firstly by face to face meetings on July 2012 with the officers/authorized people for the local party members, then via e-mails and telephone calls the necessary data was compiled. For eliminating uncertain information, additional data was gathered from official web pages of the political parties (both central and local offices), newspapers, and other sources. The data lies on the biographic information of the local chairmen. Although no interview or survey method implemented, the data covers all the local chairmen of the AKP and the CHP (2034 chairpersons in total) without creating a sample. Thus,

statistically, data compiled for this study may provide better results than did sampled ones.

As indicated in the previous section, many scholars reported that possible obstacles in gathering information about political elites have arisen during their research (Frey, 1965; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010). Similar problems have emerged during the data collection of this thesis as well. Not only the reluctance of several chairpersons to give personal report but also the lack of information on different sources such as newspapers and official websites of the parties have been the causes of such difficulty. Although the personal information about these chairpersons is not secret, some of them were not willing to give information. Moreover, there are internet sites of the branches in which the personal backgrounds of these chair persons are revealed; however, especially in small provinces or districts, there is less or no information except the name of the chair person and the contact information of the offices. Thus, the data covers “not available” information to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the data covers a significant number of cases which may demonstrate the overall picture of the social composition of the party elites comparatively.

In order to create profiles of the party elite, the following variables will be employed and analyzed:

- Age (for revealing the represented age groups in the chairmanship levels)
- Gender (for understanding the composition of different genders)
- The place of birth (for analyzing localism levels of the chairpersons)
- Education (for analyzing the representation of different education levels)
- Occupation/Job (for creating a social and economic composition of the chairpersons)

Since previous works on the party elites cover similar types of information areas, analyzing these above-mentioned personal background data can give the chance to compare the findings of this thesis with the previous ones as well.

3.2.1. Age

Age of the political (party) elites has been the most employed and calculated variable. Since it may provide the information about which age groups occupy the local chair positions and which age groups are represented in these positions, the age variable has been given importance. Quandt (1969) indicated two types of ways for analyzing the age composition of the political elites. One of the ways is revealing “the percentage of the members of political body falling into each five year age group” which has been reported as providing the chance of understanding the “distribution of the cases”. The second way is indicating the average age of these political elites. Among these options, Quandt specifically emphasized the importance of the average age (Quandt, 1969: 7).

Relying on both ways, analyzing the following calculations will be helpful. Figure 3.1 shows the minimum, maximum and average ages of the local party chairpersons of the AKP. Similarly, Figure 3.2 reveals the minimum, maximum and average ages of the local chairpersons of the CHP.

Figure 3.1: The minimum, maximum and average age of the AKP local party chairpersons, 2012





Figure 3.2: The minimum, maximum and average age of the CHP local party chairpersons, 2012



According to the data, the standard deviation for the AKP chairpersons' age is 8,64 which means that a total 95,4% of these chairpersons are between the ages of 29,15 and 63,71. For the CHP, the standard deviation is 9,46 which indicates that the age of 95,4%

of the CHP local chairpersons is in between 32,74 and 70,58. Although the minimum age of the CHP is 21, with a 51,66 average, the CHP's local chairpersons seem to be older than the AKP's. Moreover, the distribution of the age reveals that more chairpersons drop in 61-70 age range in CHP than the AKP which may increase the average age of the CHP local party elites.¹²

Figure 3.3: Age distribution of the local party chairpersons of the AKP, 2012





Figure 3.4: Age distribution of the local party chairpersons of the CHP, 2012




Although the two parties show some difference, their overall picture is not so disparate in terms of the age of the chairpersons. The mostly represented age groups in both parties coincide with the middle ages (starting from 36 in this case) and older ages, though the CHP local party bosses are ten years or older than their counterparts in the AKP. However, the population of Turkey is much younger and thus youth seem to be less represented among the chairmanship levels of these parties. The age distribution of the population of Turkey in 2012 is shown in the Figure 3.5 as calculated by the Turkish

¹² In addition to the above mentioned calculations, a paired t-test was conducted to compare the age differences between the AKP and the CHP local party chairpersons. The test showed that the average age of these chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP are significantly different from each other (p-value < 0.0001). A confidence interval constructed on the mean age difference indicates that the AKP chairpersons are younger. This difference is between 5.2 and 5.3 years, with a confidence of 95%.

Statistical Institute [Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu – TÜİK]’s reports.¹³ Obviously, a significant portion of the population drops between 0-34 ages which contrasts with the situation of the chairpersons of the local party branches. This situation means that an important part of the society is under-represented in these levels of both parties. Furthermore, this case also provides some clues about the recruitment patterns of these parties. Inferring from the results, one tends to argue that these parties, (the CHP more so than the AKP), are more willing to recruit elderly and more senior members as chairpersons for their local branches.

Figure 3.5: Age distribution of the total population of Turkey, 2012



The results unearth not only the recruitment patterns but also the enthusiasm of the younger people for working as a local chairperson of these parties. Although both parties have some chairpersons whose ages are between 26 and 30, the proportion of this group is dramatically lower than the modal age category for the AKP and the CHP local party chairs. The local party members themselves may be skeptical about younger and relatively inexperienced candidates for the role of a chairperson, and such a proclivity could provide incentives for the more senior members to vie for leadership as the young as discouraged from taking part in leadership races.

¹³ The data is compiled from TÜİK’s statistics relying on Address Based Population Registration System in Turkey. Retrieved from: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=945 and <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=13425>

3.2.2. Gender

Gender has emerged as a central issue in the democratic politics of many countries in the last two decades. Turkish politics has also witnessed such a development as in 1993 Turkey had its first female politician elected as the leader of the True Path Party and by default as the Prime Minister as well. However not all studies of the party elites have been paying attention to the role of gender in party politics and politics of representation factor (i.e. Şaylan, 1976; Turhan, 1991). Nevertheless many studies of party elites have shown that the number of female party members seems to be dramatically low in Turkey (i.e. Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 60; Uysal and Topak, 2010: 34). Similarly this thesis also observes that the number of female chairpersons of the AKP and CHP seems to be dismally low. The Figures 3.6 and 3.7 shows the composition of male and female chairpersons of these parties. Among 999 chairpersons of the AKP, only 3 are female or just 3‰ of the total. Similarly, only 22 of the 1035 chairpersons of the CHP are females which constitutes about 21‰ of all the chairpersons of the CHP. Among these 25 local chairpersons out of 2034 party members only one of them, who is a CHP member, occupies a provincial chairmanship position.

Figure 3.6: Gender distribution of the local party chairpersons of the AKP, 2012






Figure 3.7: Gender distribution of the local party chairpersons of the CHP, 2012



In comparing these numbers, the CHP seems to have 7 times more female representation than the AKP at the level of the local party chairs. Relying on the hypothesis about the ideological stance of the parties, statistically, this may show that

the secular claims of the CHP may indeed be playing some role in the election of more female members as local chairpersons. Moreover, a social democratic party would be expected to provide greater opportunities for women to lead its local party organizations. Nevertheless, the numbers are still so low to assign a great weight to such a comparison.

Figure 3.8: Gender distribution of the local party chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP comparatively, 2012.



It seems as if in light of previous research findings the distribution of the male and female chairpersons seemed to have stayed similar. Not in a single study, the proportion of the female local party chairpersons builds a significant part of the total local party chairpersons. For example, Çarkoğlu et al. indicated that the females constituted only 4% of their sample (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 60). Similarly, Uysal and Topak's study revealed only two female representatives (which were from the AKP only) at chairmanship positions (Uysal and Topak, 2012: 34). Thus the findings of this thesis coincided with the earlier findings that the gender composition of the AKP and the CHP continued to be heavily biased against women.

As Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 illustrate, only 19 of the 81 provinces of Turkey have female local party chairpersons in total. Among these, İzmir has two female chairpersons from the AKP and Van has one. Antalya, İzmir and Kayseri have two (per each) female chairpersons from the CHP whereas Bolu, Aksaray, Balıkesir, Edirne,

İstanbul has only one female chairperson who serves at district level (from the CHP). These numbers may yield that the female members spreads regardless of socioeconomic development of the cities. Except for İzmir all other provinces have at most 2 female chairpersons serving at any local branch of the AKP or CHP. Thus, a possible interpretation can be the following: the local chairs of both the AKP and the CHP in İzmir are the most female friendly offices compared to other offices in other cities. This fact may indicate that females may find more chances to participate in the more secular and thus less gender biased politics in İzmir than the other provinces.

The findings may also give clues about the recruitment pattern of the parties. Obviously, neither the AKP nor the CHP has a tendency towards being sensitive to gender proportionality in the recruitment of local party chairpersons. TÜİK's reports reveal that the distribution of the male and female population of Turkey is almost equal to each other in 2012.¹⁴ While this is the case, an extremely low number of the female chairpersons demonstrates that almost half of the population is not represented in these positions.

Along with the recruitment patterns, another possible reason for these results may rise from the decisions of the female party members themselves. If the potential female candidates feel themselves under pressure of male dominated party organizations, they may lose their ambition to compete in an unfair election for such positions. In a similar vein, they may also take such male dominance as granted. Inferring from their interviews, Uysal and Topak have underlined that the female chairpersons accept and even internalize their marginalization within the party (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 35). The females are supposed to have higher educational degrees and be much more qualified than the male ones in order to attend politics (Tür and Çıtak, 2010: 619). Compared to male counterparts, the women are much more prone to face negative evaluation by party organizations when they fail to deliver certain services which are demanded by the party (O'Neill and Stewart, 2009). So, female leaders are

¹⁴ According to TÜİK's report, the total population of Turkey was 76.627.384 as of 31.12.2012; male population was 37.956.168 and female population was 37.671.216. Thus the proportion of male and female population was very close to each other. For further information, please see the population and demography statistics of TÜİK from the link: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist>

generally more likely to be punished compared to the male ones. Not only by the party itself but by the public at large, the female leaders can be -more easily- evaluated negatively. This disadvantage of the females is because the public and media are not gender neutral, and “Women seem to be treated much more harshly by the media and are much more susceptible to ‘scapegoating’ than their male counterparts.” (O’Neill and Stewart, 2009: 739, 753). Under such circumstances, compared to male ones, female leaders may choose either to be much more careful in the chair positions or avoid serving in such positions. Thus, these all together may demonstrate that neither the AKP nor the CHP creates an environment in which the females could find opportunities to run for any number of positions and a certain degree of enthusiasm to work as chairpersons. This result is parallel to the fact of low level female participation in politics in Turkey, especially in chair positions. For example, not only in local chair positions but also in provincial and district mayor positions the number of females are very low compared to their male counterparts. Table 3.1 reveals the numbers of male and female mayors and municipal council members in Turkey after 2009 Local Elections. Obviously, the female proportion is dramatically low in mayor positions. This fact unearths that the female participation in such positions is also not so encouraged. Going into details, among 27 female mayors, only 4 of them are from the CHP and 3 of them are from the AKP.

Table 3.1: Mayors and Municipal Council Members of Turkey by Gender (2009 Local Elections)

| Mayors and Alderman of Turkey by Gender (2009 Local Elections) | | | | |
|---|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------------|
| | Male | Female | Total | Female (%) |
| Mayors | 2923 | 27 | 2950 | %0,9 |
| Municipal Council Members | 30450 | 1340 | 31790 | %4,2 |

Source: <http://www.tbb.gov.tr/belediyelerimiz/istatistikler/genel-istatistikler/>

Thus, similarly to the local party chair positions, both parties seem not to provide opportunities for female participation in mayoral positions either.¹⁵ These findings together prove that female participation and representation in these positions are problematic in Turkish party politics, on the one hand. On the other hand, the

¹⁵ Most of the female mayors are the members of Peace and Democracy Party [Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi – BDP]. For more detailed information, please see Table A.1 which shows the female mayors of Turkey by province and district after 2009 Local Elections at the Appendix.

current situation creates a more suitable environment for the male members of the parties to play the game of party politics among themselves.

A notable point here is that unlike extremely low female portion of the local chair positions of the AKP, women's branches of this party attract many female activists. Several interviews with the members of the women's branches revealed that women participate in these branches in order to deal with problems of the women, create solutions to these problems, and reflect the women's emotions, abilities and organizational skills in conducting political activities (Tür and Çıtak, 2010: 617). Nevertheless, many of these members underlined that in the AKP a resistance against the female participation into politics is visible which may decrease the number of female members in the party. Moreover, some of the females have not preferred to work with the male counterparts of their own accord. However, some of the women also highlighted that this kind of a difficulty will be solved by time as working practice with the females improve (Tür and Çıtak, 2010: 617). In terms of female participation, mostly appreciated measure has been the party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's decision on compulsory attendance of both provincial women's branch and youth branch chairpersons to the meetings of provincial chairpersons of the party (Tür and Çıtak, 2010: 620). Thus, although the female provincial and district chairpersons are not high in number, several women can attend to the meetings of the provincial chairpersons. Nonetheless, other internal regulations of the party (emerging from *Teşkilat İç Yönetmeliği*) reveal that the provincial chairpersons have responsibilities for helping the organization of the provincial branches on feminine affairs, and making these branches work in accordance with the main units of the party. A similar regulation is available for the district branches as well. Thus, the local chairpersons seem to have more administrative power than these women who have offices in women's branches. This may yield that a male dominant administrative structure has control over the party.

3.2.3. Place of Birth

Starting with Frey (1965), the place of birth of the political elites including local party chairpersons has been a core variable of the studies. Comparing their places of birth and their places of work the levels of localism of these elites have been analyzed. Previous research on the political party elites reported a high level of localism of these elites. For example, in Tachau's study, 87 party elites out of 100 were born in the same province or region as their workplaces. The findings of this thesis somewhat support the previous results. The data show that 799 chairpersons of the AKP out of 999 were born within the same province in which their offices operate. Moreover, 812 chairpersons out of 1035 of the CHP were born in the borders of the provinces in which they work for the party.¹⁶ Thus, the degree of localism seems to be significantly high for both parties.

Table 3.2: Localism Degrees of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP, 2012.

| Localism Levels of the AKP and the CHP Local Party Chairpersons (2012) | | | |
|---|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| | Local-Born | Nonlocal-Born | Total |
| AKP | 799 | 200 | 999 |
| CHP | 812 | 223 | 1035 |

Literature also reveals that in the provinces and regions which are migrant-receiving ones, the degrees of localism are lower than those migrant-sending provinces and regions. To illustrate, Tachau's study showed that "the more populous and well developed provinces of the West and South have lower proportions of locally born politicians" compared to other cities (Tachau, 1973: 278). Moreover, analyzing the information about the birth places of the fathers of the local party elites, Çarkoğlu et al. indicated that, for these elites, the metropolitan areas, Marmara, Ege and Akdeniz regions are the migrant-receiving places whereas Karadeniz, Doğu and Güneydoğu Anadolu regions are the migrant-sending places (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 60-61).

¹⁶ For calculating the localism level, the birth place of the chairpersons, their work place and the provinces that cover these places compared. If the chairperson was born in anyplace in a province, and if he/she works within the borders of that province, it is calculated as "local-born," otherwise, "nonlocal-born" it is. Moreover, the nonlocal-born category covers the ones who were born abroad. For detailed list of the birth places, please see Table A.1 and Table A.2 at Appendix.

However, the findings of this thesis, while supporting some aspects of the previous research, offer different results.

Figure 3.11: Localism levels by provinces for AKP, 2012
(The darker the color, the greater the increase in localism.)



Figure 3.12: Localism levels by provinces for the CHP, 2012
(The darker the color, the greater the increase in localism.)



Figure 3.11 reveals the localism degrees by provinces for the AKP and the Figure 3.12 illustrates the same for the CHP. The localism degrees start from 50% with the lightest color and reaches 100% with darker colors. So, for each province, at least a

level of 50% localism is guaranteed. For both parties, İstanbul, which is a migration-receiving and developed city, has one of the lowest levels of localism as expected.

However, other migrant-receiving cities do not reflect the expected trend for both parties. According to TÜİK's report, between the year 2011 and 2012, İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Antalya, Bursa and Kocaeli have received the highest levels of migration, respectively. Relying on this fact and the previous findings, the expected localism levels in these places are lower than those in the others. However, no similar trend emerges for both parties. For example, Ankara shows different localism levels for the AKP and the CHP. In Ankara, 18 out of 19 chairpersons of the AKP were local-born whereas 4 out of 20 chairpersons of the CHP were local-born. Moreover, while localism level of the CHP in Antalya is high, it is lower for the AKP. Also, Mersin and Adana which are metropolitan cities show different localism levels for both parties as well. Nevertheless, in Batman, Şırnak, Van and Hakkari, localism level of the local party chairs is high for both parties.


As indicated in the previous sections, increase in localism may be an indicator for increased personal ties between the local party chairpersons and the constituents. The chairpersons who work in their birth places are children of that land (local boy) and thus they can build more proximal relations with the local social communities and their networks, and concomitantly, higher degree of personal ties can be expected in such places where localism is high. The findings of the thesis indicate that both the AKP and CHP have the same tendency to recruit those chairpersons whose place of birth is in the same province with their work places. This may indicate that potential personal relations may emerge with the help of such recruitment patterns. In turn, these parties may also be defined as employing clientelistic ties. In consequence of high localism levels for both parties, one can argue that both parties may be prone to establish personal ties with the electorate. Especially in the cities in which the localism degree reaches to very high levels, such ties may be observed more than often than not.

3.2.4. Education

Educational background seems to be more difficult to use in comparative studies (Quandt, 1969: 7). From country to country, the educational institutions and their features may especially differ from each other, which is a situation that may create comparison problems. However, since this thesis compares Turkish political party elites, no such problem occurs at least in terminology. Although it seems obvious that not all of the educational institutions provide similar knowledge in only one country, the problems arising from the major differences which occur between these institutions among countries lessen while analyzing intra-country characteristics.

The educational background of the local chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP have been analyzed by reference to mainly seven categories or types of formal education (after excluding missing cases).¹⁷ Data demonstrate that the educational background of the chairpersons seem to be similar for both parties. A significant amount of the chairpersons of both parties has high school or bachelor degrees. This situation implies that high level educational backgrounds are accorded importance when it comes to the provincial and district chair positions (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 44).

Figure 3.13: Education levels (educational backgrounds) of the local party chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP, 2012



¹⁷ Depending on the Turkish education system, the categories were defined as literate (*okur yazar*), primary education (*ilkokul*), secondary education (*ortaokul*), high school (*lise*), two-year university degree (*ön lisans*), bachelor (*lisans*), masters (*yüksek lisans* – excluding PhD degrees). Since data does not cover any illiterates or higher education beyond masters, no other category was defined.

Figure 3.14: Educational Backgrounds of the AKP local party chairpersons, 2012





Figure 3.15: Educational Backgrounds of the CHP local party chairpersons, 2012



Although the portions of the chairpersons who have masters' degrees are visibly small, the level of the education seems not to be low among these local elites. This fact is also in accordance with the previous studies which reveal an upper middle education level of the local party elites. According to these earlier studies, university graduates were high in number among local party elites (see, i.e., Tachau, 1973: 285; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 64; Uysal and Topak, 2010: 44-48). For example, among these studies, Tachau (1973)'s study revealed that 41% of the local party elites had university education. Çarkoğlu and others (2000) showed that over 32% (highest portion among other categories) of the local party elites had bachelor degrees. Similarly, Uysal and Topak (2010)'s study showed that 58% of the local chairpersons hold college (*yüksekokul*) and university degrees. Moreover, Tachau analyzed the educational background as a general condition of modernization (Tachau, 1973: 285). Regarding this view, it is possible to say that as educated local party chairpersons occupy higher proportions, the parties become more modernized. Relying on this relationship, both the AKP and the CHP may be defined as modern in terms of educational backgrounds of the chairpersons. Indeed, Tachau (1973) has defined the Turkish political parties as modern in his study as well (as mentioned previous sections). Although the AKP was

not in Turkish politics at that time, it has similar characteristics with some of the right wing parties investigated by Tachau in terms of education variable.

Several of the AKP local chairpersons indicated in their biographies that they had religious education (*İmam Hatip*) background which may yield conservative tendencies of these people. As Sayarı and Hasanov (2008) and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) mentioned, such educational background may be an indicator of conservative tendencies. For the CHP, no detailed biographical information is available for education except for the degrees earned, thus, it is not possible to observe whether there are any chairpersons who had any religious school experience or not. This situation may be a result of the data collection procedures followed by the party organization or no one had attended a religious school, or -if they had- they failed to indicate it.

Compared to education level of the population of Turkey, the local party TÜİK's reports, -excluding 6 and lower age groups- a bit more than 10% of the total population of Turkey hold college, university, master and doctorate degrees. Table 3.3 shows the educational background of Turkish society depending on the graduated educational institutions/levels for 2012.

Table 3.3: Educational background of the population of Turkey, 2012
(depending on the graduated educational levels)
(Foreigners were not included.)

| Educational Background of Turkey, 2012 (6 + age groups) | | |
|---|-------------------|-------------|
| Graduated Educational Level | Total | % |
| Illiterate | 2,788,757 | 4% |
| Literate but not graduated | 14,058,334 | 21% |
| Primary School (5 years) | 15,220,028 | 22% |
| Primary School (8 years) | 12,669,905 | 19% |
| Secondary School and/or Equivalent Schools | 2,849,999 | 4% |
| High School and/or Equivalent Schools | 12,096,830 | 18% |
| College and/or University | 5,913,187 | 9% |
| Masters Degree | 416,741 | 1% |
| PhD Degree | 122,619 | 0% |
| Not Available | 1,740,979 | 3% |
| Total | 67,877,379 | 100% |

Visibly, a big amount of the population is in between the categories of “literate but not graduated,” and “8 year compulsory primary school education.”¹⁸

This situation is an indicator for a significant educational difference between the society and the local chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP. For example, although the number of primary school graduates in Turkey is notably high, a small portion of the AKP and the CHP local party chairpersons are primary school graduates. Thus, it is possible to argue that the less educated individuals cannot generally occupy the local chairs of the two parties, and in turn, these people have little chance to be represented in those positions. Moreover, it is not contingent that these political parties tend to recruit chairpersons who are as educated as possible. The previous research has come up with some supportive statements with the help of the interviews done with party elites. The stated assumption is that these party elites generally think that for being a party chairperson, bachelor/university education is necessary. Thus, high level education, especially the university education is seen as an important benchmark in political competition (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 46).

In addition to the above mentioned points, the data reveals that the importance of university education becomes distinctive between the provincial and district chairpersons as well. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 show that most of the provincial chairpersons of both parties have bachelor degrees.

¹⁸ In Turkey, the 5 year compulsory primary education had been re-designed as 8 year compulsory primary education by the Law 4306 at 18.08.1997. Moreover, a gradual 12 year compulsory education had been adopted by the Law 6287 at 30.03.2012. For further information, please see National Education Statistics for Formal Education in Turkey (2012 – 2013) prepared by the Ministry of National Education of Turkish Republic via the link:

http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/istatistik/meb_istatistikleri_orgun_egitim_2012_2013.pdf

Table 3.4: Educational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP (2012)

| Educational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP (2012) | | | | |
|---|--|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Education Level | Provincial Chairperson (Number) | Provincial Chairperson (%) | District Chairperson (Number) | District Chairperson (%) |
| Primary Education | 2 | 3% | 72 | 8% |
| Secondary Education | 2 | 3% | 121 | 13% |
| High School (Lise) | 7 | 9% | 289 | 31% |
| Two-year University Degree | 4 | 5% | 100 | 11% |
| Bachelor | 52 | 65% | 245 | 27% |
| Masters | 6 | 8% | 26 | 3% |
| Not Available | 7 | 9% | 66 | 7% |
| Total | 80 | 100% | 919 | 100% |

Table 3.5: Educational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the CHP (2012)

| Educational Background of the Local Chairpersons of the CHP (2012) | | | | |
|---|--|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Education Level | Provincial Chairperson (Number) | Provincial Chairperson (%) | District Chairperson (Number) | District Chairperson (%) |
| Literate | 0 | 0% | 33 | 3% |
| Primary Education | 1 | 1% | 111 | 12% |
| Secondary Education | 3 | 4% | 110 | 12% |
| High School (Lise) | 23 | 28% | 276 | 29% |
| Two-year University Degree | 0 | 0% | 1 | 0% |
| Bachelor | 45 | 56% | 273 | 29% |
| Masters | 1 | 1% | 11 | 1% |
| Not Available | 8 | 10% | 139 | 15% |
| Total | 81 | 100% | 954 | 100% |

When it comes to district chairpersons, the importance of education still remains; however, high school graduates and the ones who have two year university degrees have also more chance to occupy district branches. Such findings may indicate that both parties have tendency to recruit university educated chairpersons for provincial positions whereas they have more tolerance in district chair positions by recruiting high school graduates and two year university graduates as well.

Last but not least, regional differences are observable in terms of educational backgrounds of the local party elites. Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 reveal the educational backgrounds of the local chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP by regions. According to the findings, Marmara region is the one with the highest number of local chairpersons who have bachelor degrees for both parties. In the AKP case, Doğu Anadolu and Karadeniz regions seems to have least university graduated chairpersons. On the other hand, in the CHP case, Güneydoğu Anadolu and Doğu Anadolu regions have the lowest number of university graduates.

Table 3.6: Educational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP by Region (2012)

| Educational Background of the AKP by Region (2012) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|---------|-----------|-------------|-----------------------|----------|---------|---------------|--------------|
| Region | Literate | Primary | Secondary | High School | Two-year Univ. Degree | Bachelor | Masters | Not Available | Per Cent (%) |
| Akdeniz (<i>Mediterranean</i>) | 0.00 | 8.49 | 13.21 | 17.92 | 13.21 | 38.68 | 3.77 | 4.72 | 100 |
| Doğu Anadolu (<i>Eastern Anatolia</i>) | 0.00 | 6.20 | 14.73 | 47.29 | 5.43 | 16.28 | 3.10 | 6.98 | 100 |
| Ege (<i>Aegean</i>) | 0.00 | 8.96 | 13.43 | 23.13 | 11.19 | 36.57 | 2.24 | 4.48 | 100 |
| Güneydoğu Anadolu (<i>Southeastern Anatolia</i>) | 0.00 | 8.14 | 17.44 | 20.93 | 6.98 | 30.23 | 2.33 | 13.95 | 100 |
| İç Anadolu (<i>Central Anatolia</i>) | 0.00 | 8.33 | 10.56 | 30.56 | 10.56 | 31.11 | 3.89 | 5.00 | 100 |
| Marmara (<i>Marmara</i>) | 0.00 | 7.36 | 7.98 | 24.54 | 12.27 | 41.10 | 4.29 | 2.45 | 100 |
| Karadeniz (<i>Black Sea</i>) | 0.00 | 5.47 | 12.44 | 35.82 | 11.44 | 18.41 | 2.49 | 13.93 | 100 |
| Total | 0.00 | 7.41 | 12.31 | 29.63 | 10.41 | 29.73 | 3.20 | 7.31 | 100 |

Table 3.7: Educational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the CHP by Region (2012)

| Educational Background of the CHP by Region (2012) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|---------|-----------|-------------|-----------------------|----------|---------|---------------|--------------|
| Region | Literate | Primary | Secondary | High School | Two-year Univ. Degree | Bachelor | Masters | Not Available | Per Cent (%) |
| Akdeniz (<i>Mediterranean</i>) | 0.93 | 12.96 | 12.04 | 30.56 | 0.00 | 36.11 | 0.93 | 6.48 | 100 |
| Doğu Anadolu (<i>Eastern Anatolia</i>) | 3.60 | 11.51 | 12.95 | 28.06 | 0.00 | 13.67 | 0.72 | 29.50 | 100 |
| Ege (<i>Aegean</i>) | 1.44 | 10.07 | 8.63 | 25.18 | 0.72 | 43.17 | 0.72 | 10.07 | 100 |
| Güneydoğu Anadolu (<i>Southeastern Anatolia</i>) | 4.55 | 15.91 | 18.18 | 30.68 | 0.00 | 13.64 | 0.00 | 17.05 | 100 |
| İç Anadolu (<i>Central Anatolia</i>) | 4.37 | 12.02 | 12.57 | 28.96 | 0.00 | 25.14 | 0.55 | 16.39 | 100 |
| Marmara (<i>Marmara</i>) | 1.81 | 7.23 | 6.63 | 28.92 | 0.00 | 45.78 | 1.20 | 8.43 | 100 |
| Karadeniz (<i>Black Sea</i>) | 5.19 | 9.43 | 8.49 | 30.19 | 0.00 | 31.60 | 2.83 | 12.26 | 100 |
| Total | 3.29 | 10.82 | 10.72 | 28.89 | 0.10 | 30.82 | 1.16 | 14.20 | 100 |

Differently from each other, the AKP has more university graduates in Güneydoğu Anadolu compared to the CHP does; however, the CHP has more chairpersons with bachelor degrees in Karadeniz region relatively to the AKP. Thus, a visible difference between parties rises in terms of Karadeniz and Güneydoğu Anadolu regions. Nevertheless, overall, Doğu Anadolu region seems to be the one with least university graduated chairpersons.

3.2.5. Occupation and Job

Among other studies, occupation and job variables seem to be the most difficult ones for comparative studies. Various occupations and jobs make the comparison problematic. In order to eliminate the problems faced while analyzing the occupational backgrounds, certain classifications have been created by different institutions. One of the most prevailing categorizations is ISCO88. According to this classification, the political party elites group drop under the category of “legislators, senior officials and managers” (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996: 221). However, for understanding the main similarities and differences between the AKP and CHP, analyzing the personal occupation and job background of the local elites will yield distinguishing elements.

Before calculating the results, certain categories have been defined in order to make generalizations among dozens of the occupations and jobs.¹⁹ Table 3.8 reveals these categories and the number of the chairpersons who drop in the categories for each party.

¹⁹ Categories of the occupations/jobs have been defined by a combination of different sources and the data. First of all, the main source has been the ISCO88 categories (see, e.g. Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). Along with this source, considering the data of the thesis, the categories defined in the previous studies on Turkish political elite (the relevant ones) has been included (see, e.g. Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 2011; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000). Finally, 23 occupation/job categories (including “other” and excluding “not available”) have been created in total.

Among the categories, “Professional Occupations” includes *serbest meslek* in Turkish as Çarkoğlu et al. (2000) suggested earlier. Moreover, “Business/Trade” is resembled the category of Corporate Managers and Small Enterprise General Managers of ISCO88; “Dentist, Pharmacy and Veterinary Medicine” is under the Health Professionals category of ISCO88, the doctors have been also included in this thesis; union and cooperative leaders have been included under the Senior Officials Special-Interest Organizations category of ISCO88; and lastly, mukhtars have been included in the Senior Local Government Officials of ISCO88.

Table 3.8: Occupational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP, 2012

| Occupational Background of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP (2012) | | | | |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Occupation/Job | AKP Local Chairpersons | AKP Local Chairpersons (%) | CHP Local Chairpersons | CHP Local Chairpersons (%) |
| Academic | 0 | 0% | 1 | 0% |
| Accountants | 33 | 3% | 30 | 3% |
| Agriculture | 9 | 1% | 70 | 7% |
| Art and Architecture | 6 | 1% | 4 | 0% |
| Artisan | 85 | 9% | 198 | 19% |
| Business/Trader | 112 | 11% | 13 | 1% |
| Constable (<i>Emniyet Mensubu</i>) | 54 | 5% | 0 | 0% |
| Dentist, Pharmacy and Veterinary Medicine (including medicine) | 25 | 3% | 21 | 2% |
| Engineering | 21 | 2% | 26 | 3% |
| Government | 4 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| Housewife | 0 | 0% | 6 | 1% |
| Journalism | 3 | 0% | 4 | 0% |
| Labor | 3 | 0% | 61 | 6% |
| Lawyer | 75 | 8% | 41 | 4% |
| Politician | 1 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| Professional Occupation | 52 | 5% | 130 | 13% |
| Religion | 2 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| Retired | 67 | 7% | 195 | 19% |
| Senior Local Government Official | 11 | 1% | 3 | 0% |
| Senior Official Special-Interest Organizations | 6 | 1% | 1 | 0% |
| Student | 0 | 0% | 3 | 0% |
| Teachers | 2 | 0% | 40 | 4% |
| Other | 16 | 2% | 25 | 2% |
| Not Available | 412 | 41% | 163 | 16% |
| Total | 999 | 100% | 1035 | 100% |

Distinctive from the other social background variables analyzed above, significant differences becomes visible in terms of occupational backgrounds of the chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP. The first difference arises from the Business/Trader (including corporate managers and small enterprise general managers) category. Although an important portion of the AKP local chairpersons occupy this category, an extremely small number of the CHP chairpersons do so. This case may yield that an economically powerful group is located among the AKP chairpersons. On the other hand, artisans (including *esnaf*) occupy a significant place in the CHP with 19% of the total which means traditional occupations cover an important part of the occupational backgrounds of the chairpersons. However, contrary to this, the CHP has

also an important proportion of laborers compared to the AKP. The amount of workers, who have been important elements of social democracy and left wing parties, could be the explaining factor here as CHP is generally perceived to be on the left side of the ideological spectrum. However, such occupations such as engineering and medicine (both reflect modernity as well) are very similar in number for both parties.

Another intriguing finding is that 5% of the AKP chairpersons are constables [*emniyet mensubu*]. While the CHP does not have a chairperson who is or has been a constable, the number of these people who work in the AKP is noteworthy. This emphasis is because the AKP seems to be prone to recruiting people from police forces while the CHP is not. On the other hand, the CHP override the AKP in terms of professional occupations and retired categories. Apparently the portion of the retired people in the CHP is almost same as are the artisans. Among these retired people, teachers are common for both parties. However, unlike each other, the AKP's retired people contain the religious functionaries (like *imam*) whereas the CHP's retired ones contain the military members.

With regard to retired members, analyzing the age range of these chairpersons may yield some clues about their future goals. As it is mentioned previously, the local chairpersons are potential upper level elites. Thus, in the future, they may occupy upper level positions than the provincial and district chair positions. Regarding this issue, one may expect that relatively younger chairpersons can be more prone to seek upper level positions in party politics compared to the older ones. This expectation is because; the younger ones have relatively more years to devote to politics than the older elites. Moreover, the younger ones may have more energy to consume in their upward political mobility and ambition for reaching their future goals. Although the older ones may also have such energy and ambition, they may have less motivation to climb the ladders for upper positions in politics after a certain age. Thus, the age of retired people may reveal some clues about their intentions. For example, if the average age of these people is high, one may expect that they will generally stay in those positions rather than try to reach higher political echelons. If the number of such people increases in a party, an accumulation of older people in those positions may emerge. This is because, if the younger ones seek to have upper positions and if they occupy provincial and district chairs in order to reach those places in the future, the circulation of these elites may be

faster than opposite one. Meaning that, the older ones may occupy their positions for more years compared to younger ones. Keeping these in mind, an analysis of the age of retired chairpersons may yield a helpful explanation. As Table 3.8 shows, the average age of the retired chairpersons of the AKP is 58,25 and the average age of the retired chairpersons of the CHP is 60 which is very near to the AKP's. However, the proportion of these people within the two parties differs from each other.

Table 3.9: Age Range of the Retired (from occupations) Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP (2012)

| Age Range of the Retired (from occupations) Local Party Chairpersons by Party | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------------------|
| Party | Retirees (in number) | Average Age | Min. Age | Max. Age | Std. Dev. (for age) |
| AKP | 67 | 58.25 | 49 | 71 | 8.57 |
| CHP | 195 | 60 | 43 | 79 | 9.46 |

As indicated before, the retired chair persons occupy fourth biggest portion within the AKP whereas they occupy the second biggest portion in the CHP. Combining this fact with the above - mentioned expectations, it is possible to say that the circulation of the chairpersons in the CHP is lower than in the AKP.

While analyzing the occupational backgrounds or jobs of the political party elites, one of the criteria has been “spare time” which enables the individuals to deal with politics in the harsh political competition. Earlier studies have revealed that the proportion of those chairpersons who are employers and/or work for themselves (free lances) at their own workplaces have been generally significant. To illustrate, Uysal and Topak's study unearthed that 77% of the local political party elites in Turkey between 2007 and 2009 were the members of these two groups mentioned in the previous sentence (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 48). Comparing the AKP and the CHP, the importance of the time to spend for politics seem to be noteworthy. The AKP has many businessmen and traders while the CHP has many retired individuals as local party chairpersons. Nonetheless, the AKP has also a considerable amount (7%) of retired individuals although it is much less than the CHP's. Thus, relying on Uysal and Topak's argument, it is possible to interpret that these two parties incorporate those who may have relatively more spare time compared to the ones who are permanent employees, workers or public servants.

Nevertheless, as these authors also argued, the spare time criterion is limited in explaining the political participation of these elites. Along with this criterion, considering the financing of the politics may also yield important clues about who (can) occupies the local chair position of the political parties (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 48-49). Financing of the political parties have been a crucial focus of discussions. Several studies have remarked different financial sources of Turkish political parties (Ayata, 1992; Schöler, 1999; Gençkaya, 2000; Uysal and Topak 2010) and the main financial resources of the political parties seem to be coming from donations. Although the SPK and the party by-laws regulate the possible and allowed financial resources, certain measures have been taken in order to gain financial support. For example, one of these alternative sources for the CHP has been the support of the wealthy members (other than party elites) of the party (Ayata, 1992: 262).

Along with such financial support, party elites' own support has been another undeniable source of party financing for both the AKP and the CHP. Previous research proves this situation. For example, Ayata indicated in her study that the district chairperson of Taşlık was bearing the routine expenses of the party (Ayata, 1992: 262). Likewise, Uysal and Topak came up with the fact that the expenses of the party in ordinary times (excluding the election periods) are covered by the local chairpersons, or at best by the members of the local executive branches of the parties (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 51). Since businessmen and traders are quite likely wealthier than workers and artisans, they can provide more financial resources for the parties by themselves. This, in turn, may create a tendency to recruit wealthier individuals as chairpersons by parties. The results of the data analysis remark that the AKP has such a tendency. On the other hand, the CHP as left wing party seems to be less prone or able to recruit businessmen and traders compared to the AKP.

As a last point, wealth of the local chairpersons may also be an important factor in terms of clientelistic ties along with the effects of localism degrees mentioned in previous sections. As the wealth of a local chairperson increases, his/her chance to provide financial/material support to the party and the electorate may increase as well. If the political parties want their local chairpersons to finance their own branches, then they may select wealthier people for chair positions. Moreover, political parties, which

are prone to recruit wealthier chairpersons, may build up more personal ties with the electorate with the help of these chairpersons. With regard to the results of this thesis, especially to the localism and occupational background findings, both the AKP and the CHP seem to have possible clientelistic tendencies. However, the AKP seem to be more prone to use such ties than the CHP with regard to occupational composition of the party.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Social backgrounds of political elites influence the political culture of the countries and vice versa. These elites occupy positions which enable them to control material and human resources, and be key factors in decision - making processes. Thus, their socioeconomic characteristics, attitudes and beliefs may shape these controlling and decision making processes. Regarding the importance of these elites, a fairly large body of researchers across various countries has conducted studies in order to unearth the impact of political elites on politics.

As a subset of political elites, political party elites have a big influence on the functioning and ideological positions of their political parties. Their socioeconomic backgrounds may become defining factors of the features of the political parties. More specifically, with the help of examining age, gender, place of birth, education, occupation/job of local party elites, analyzing the socioeconomic composition of the parties is possible. By studying the incumbents of these positions, many social, cultural and economic characteristics of party grassroots can be unearthed as well. Furthermore, such studies enable developing a more comprehensive understanding about the ties, similarities and differences between the party elites and the electorate. Thus, the examination of socio-cultural and economic characteristics of the local political party elites makes it possible to unearth who is elected to represent the electorate at the grassroots level of party organizations. Thus, comparing different parties in terms of the similarities and differences of the socioeconomic and demographical characteristics of their local party elites yield interesting clues about why and how these political parties differ on policies as well as ideological positions on most political issues that Turkey faces.

In Turkey, political party elites have been subject of several (yet few) studies. Each study dealing with the local party elites of Turkey has employed a sample of the elites for their analysis. Most of these studies depended on the information gathered from interviews with the local political elites, and surveys answered by these elites. Although these studies have been prominent, the samples may create certain problems in terms of generalizability of the findings. Thus, the data analyzed in this thesis consist of the biographical information about almost all local party chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP across Turkey, and the social backgrounds of 2034 chairpersons have been examined.

By analyzing the main characteristics of personal profiles of the current leaders of the provincial and district branches of the AKP and the CHP, this thesis suggested answers to the question of “What are the political consequences of similarities and differences in the socioeconomic profiles of the local party chairpersons for the these two parties in Turkey?” In order to answer this question; age, gender, place of birth, education, occupation/job of provincial and district chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP have been examined.

The data and findings showed that the composition of local party chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP slightly differ from each other in terms of age, gender and educational backgrounds. Firstly, the average age of the AKP local chairpersons is younger than the CHP’s age by 5 years. While 41-45 age groups cover the biggest amount of the AKP local party chairpersons, it becomes 51-55 for the CHP case. This fact suggests that the AKP has relatively younger chairpersons than CHP does; however, the difference between these parties is not so extreme. Nevertheless, both parties recruit older people as local chairpersons compared to the age composition of Turkish society which is much younger. Thus, the representation of the younger ones, who occupy a big proportion in Turkey, becomes limited and problematic. This is not a desired situation for a democratic system which requires the representation of different parts of a society as much as possible, thus, encouraging more participation and representation of the younger people may contribute to the consolidation of democratic elements for both the AKP and the CHP internally, and for Turkey as a whole.

Secondly, in terms of gender distribution, the composition of the chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP are almost the same. Data reveals that the AKP has only 3

females out of 999 chairpersons, and the CHP has 21 females out of 1035 chairpersons. Supporting the findings of previous studies, for both parties, the proportions of the females are extremely small. This means that neither of the parties shows effort for creating female friendly party structure in the provincial and district chair levels. Similar to the problems about the “representation of the younger part of the society” mentioned in previous paragraph, the low level of female participation may also create problems for a democratic system. As it is indicated, the number of females is dramatically low not only in local party chair positions but also in mayoral and municipal council membership positions in Turkey. This situation causes underrepresentation of women in these places. Meaning that, almost 50% of Turkish society fail to be represented in these local positions. Moreover, this affects the internal party democracy in a negative way as well. This seems to be because, only a few women can participate in the decision-making processes in both the AKP and the CHP. Thus, their voice is very limited in these processes. Although women enjoy the same rights with the male counterparts in terms of their positions, their low number may cause them to have less chance to highlight their interests, ideas and suggestions. Moreover, a male dominated party structure may cause these women not to reach upper levels as well. Especially for the parties which want their members to be experienced about grassroots politics before occupying the upper levels in the party, the chance of the women who seek to reach upper levels will be low compared to male party members. For example, previous research showed that for upper level positions the AKP has a tendency to recruit women who had experienced the working principles of lower level positions (Tür and Çıtak, 2010: 620). However, the data show that the women can find very few places in local party chair positions. Thus, the chance of women to be in the upper level positions is already limited which creates a gender based representation problem for internal party democracy. Encouraging (to participate) and recruiting more women for such positions may yield some solutions (as a first step) for eliminating such problems of both parties.

Thirdly, educational backgrounds of the local party chairpersons of the two parties resemble each other. Going along with the earlier studies and their results, the chairpersons tend to be university graduates. This may yield that both parties have more or less modernized elites in terms of educational backgrounds. Nevertheless, regional differences about educational backgrounds are obvious. As indicated, Marmara region

is the one with the highest levels of education of local party chairpersons of both the AKP and the CHP. However, Doğu Anadolu region has the least number of chairpersons with bachelors' degrees in total. For both parties, this fact may seem to be a point to focus on. Although both parties have higher educated chairpersons compared to the education level of Turkish society, low education levels of the parties in Doğu Anadolu region decrease the overall education levels. For both the AKP and the CHP, analyzing the reasons of such low levels in education in this region may build up helpful solutions for this problem. For examples, these parties may create regional policies in order to increase education levels for both themselves and the society as a whole.

With regard to the representation and recruitment of the young and women in local chair positions of the parties, an important common point is about the quality of the parties as institutions. Here, by quality, the proper and proportional representation of different parts of the society is meant. For example, Acemoğlu unearthed the importance of the role of political institutions in democratization processes and underlined that these “political institutions regulate the allocation of *de jure* political power” (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2006: 173). As institutions, political parties also regulate such an allocation within themselves. Thus, who and which groups will have such political power may be determined by the recruitment patterns of the parties. Thus, if the amount of young people and females is very limited among a party’s local chairs, these people cannot find enough chance to have political power and control it. Due to this reason, the quality of these institutions, specifically the parties, will be affected negatively in terms of representation. Although these parties seem to operate as democratic institutions, such problems about the emergence of different groups in the party would decrease the quality of democratic elements of them.

Fourthly, previous research remarked that localism degrees of the political party elites vary depending on the socioeconomic characteristics of the cities and regions. While localism is low in the migrant-receiving areas, it increases in migrant-sending places (Tachau, 1973; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000). However the data reveal that neither the AKP nor the CHP shows a similar trend with the previous findings in terms of localism. Only in İstanbul the localism degrees are low for both parties, but even in this city parties have at least 50% localism. Thus, the findings suggest that the localism degrees are high for both parties which, in turn, may enable these parties to build up proximal

and personal ties with the electorate or certain critical communities and segments of their local societies.

Last but definitely not the least, although the AKP and the CHP seem similar to each other in terms of age, gender and education variables, their composition dramatically differ in terms of occupational background of their local party elites. Thus, this thesis suggests that the occupational background of the local party chairpersons of the AKP and the CHP is the most distinctive factor for analyzing the differences between these two parties. This finding supports the previous research done by Uysal and Topak who concluded that the relation networks of the political parties in Turkey have been based on occupations and jobs (Uysal and Topak, 2010: 49). According to the data, while businessmen and traders have the biggest portion in the AKP local party chairpersons, a significant portion of the CHP local party chairpersons are consist of retired individuals and artisans. Moreover, the CHP seems to be more prone to recruiting workers as chairpersons than the AKP. Overall, these may yield that in terms of occupational compositions the AKP stands on the right side of the ideological spectrum with the help of capitalist characteristics of its local party chairpersons while the CHP reveals more social democratic characteristics. Beyond these, businessmen and traders generally seek opportunities nationally or even globally, thus they are not so locally oriented in terms of their interests. This may make them deal more with national tasks rather than local issues. Meaning that, their interests may rely on national politics. On the other hand, artisans (including *esnaf*) are generally much more locally oriented with regard to their interests. Thus, the domestic economic interests may be primary for artisans rather than national economic issues. Regarding these issues, the local chairpersons of the AKP seem to orient themselves less toward just the local interests per se, whereas the chairpersons of the CHP seems to be more locally oriented in terms of their political and career interests.

APPENDIX

**Table A.1: Female Mayors of Turkey by Province and District
(after 2009 Local Elections)**

| Female Mayors of Turkey by Province and District (after 2009 Local Elections) | | |
|--|-------------|-------------|
| Province | District | Party |
| Afyonkarahisar | Bolvadin | MHP |
| Ağrı | Doğubayazıt | BDP |
| Aydın | | CHP |
| Aydın | İncirliova | CHP |
| Diyarbakır | Bağlar | BDP |
| Diyarbakır | Bismil | BDP |
| Diyarbakır | Eğil | BDP |
| Diyarbakır | Lice | BDP |
| Edirne | Kurtbey | CHP |
| Eskişehir | Mahmudiye | AKP |
| Gaziantep | Islahiye | Independent |
| Giresun | Doğankent | AKP |
| Hakkari | Yüksekova | BDP |
| Hatay | Yeşilköy | AKP |
| Iğdır | Aralık | AKP |
| Iğdır | Melekli | CHP |
| Kırklareli | Kavaklı | CHP |
| Konya | Adıyaman | CHP |
| Mardin | Derik | BDP |
| Mardin | Nusaybin | BDP |
| Mardin | Yeşilalan | BDP |
| Muğla | Bafa | CHP |
| Muş | Varto | BDP |
| Tunceli | | BDP |
| Van | Bostaniçi | BDP |
| Şanlıurfa | Viranşehir | BDP |
| Şırnak | Uludere | BDP |

Sources: <http://www.tbb.gov.tr/online/baskanlar-albumu/>
<http://www.aralik.bel.tr/baskan.asp>
http://www.bolvadin.bel.tr/Belediye/Belediye_Baskani
<http://www.aralik.bel.tr/baskan.asp>

Table A.2: Birth Places of the Local Party Chairpersons of the AKP by Province (2012)

| Province | Nonlocal-Born | Local-Born | Total | Province | Nonlocal-Born | Local-Born | Total |
|----------------|---------------|------------|-------|------------|---------------|------------|-------|
| ADANA | 1 | 14 | 15 | KARAMAN | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| ADIYAMAN | 1 | 10 | 11 | KARS | 2 | 9 | 11 |
| AFYONKARAHİSAR | 3 | 15 | 18 | KASTAMONU | 1 | 21 | 22 |
| AĞRI | 1 | 6 | 7 | KAYSERİ | 2 | 10 | 12 |
| AKSARAY | 1 | 5 | 6 | KIRIKKALE | 0 | 7 | 7 |
| AMASYA | 0 | 8 | 8 | KIRKLARELİ | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| ANKARA | 1 | 18 | 19 | KİRŞEHİR | 1 | 7 | 8 |
| ANTALYA | 3 | 13 | 16 | KİLİS | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| ARDAHAN | 1 | 7 | 8 | KOCAELİ | 4 | 5 | 9 |
| ARTVİN | 1 | 6 | 7 | KONYA | 2 | 27 | 29 |
| AYDIN | 1 | 12 | 13 | KÜTAHYA | 2 | 13 | 15 |
| BALIKESİR | 3 | 13 | 16 | MALATYA | 7 | 14 | 21 |
| BARTIN | 2 | 3 | 5 | MANİSA | 2 | 15 | 17 |
| BATMAN | 0 | 5 | 5 | MARDİN | 0 | 11 | 11 |
| BAYBURT | 1 | 4 | 5 | MERSİN | 1 | 10 | 11 |
| BİLECİK | 1 | 4 | 5 | MUĞLA | 1 | 7 | 8 |
| BİNGÖL | 1 | 8 | 9 | MUŞ | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| BİTLİS | 3 | 6 | 9 | NEVŞEHİR | 2 | 7 | 9 |
| BOLU | 2 | 10 | 12 | NİĞDE | 1 | 6 | 7 |
| BURDUR | 2 | 6 | 8 | ORDU | 5 | 17 | 22 |
| BURSA | 1 | 9 | 10 | OSMANIYE | 2 | 7 | 9 |
| ÇANAKKALE | 4 | 10 | 14 | RİZE | 5 | 12 | 17 |
| ÇANKIRI | 1 | 10 | 11 | SAKARYA | 4 | 12 | 16 |
| ÇORUM | 2 | 14 | 16 | SAMSUN | 2 | 16 | 18 |
| DENİZLİ | 1 | 15 | 16 | SİİRT | 3 | 6 | 9 |
| DİYARBAKIR | 0 | 16 | 16 | SİNOP | 1 | 9 | 10 |
| DÜZCE | 2 | 8 | 10 | SİVAS | 3 | 18 | 21 |
| EDİRNE | 1 | 8 | 9 | ŞANLIURFA | 3 | 11 | 14 |
| ELAZIĞ | 0 | 7 | 7 | ŞIRNAK | 0 | 7 | 7 |
| ERZİNCAN | 3 | 8 | 11 | TEKİRDAĞ | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| ERZURUM | 5 | 19 | 24 | TOKAT | 0 | 10 | 10 |
| ESKİŞEHİR | 4 | 11 | 15 | TRABZON | 13 | 19 | 32 |
| GAZİANTEP | 1 | 9 | 10 | TUNCELİ | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| GİRESUN | 1 | 10 | 11 | UŞAK | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| GÜMÜŞHANE | 4 | 7 | 11 | VAN | 1 | 12 | 13 |
| HAKKARİ | 0 | 4 | 4 | YALOVA | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| HATAY | 1 | 12 | 13 | YOZGAT | 4 | 13 | 17 |
| IĞDIR | 1 | 5 | 6 | ZONGULDAK | 3 | 7 | 10 |
| ISPARTA | 1 | 9 | 10 | BELGIUM | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| İSTANBUL | 11 | 11 | 22 | GERMANY | 6 | 0 | 6 |
| İZMİR | 5 | 16 | 21 | N/A | 31 | 0 | 31 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---|----|----|--|--------------------|------------|------------|
| KAHRAMANMARAŞ | 3 | 10 | 13 | | | | |
| KARABÜK | 0 | 5 | 5 | | Grand Total | 203 | 796 |
| | | | | | | 999 | |

Table A.3: Birth Places of the Local Party Chairpersons of the CHP by Province (2012)

| Province | Nonlocal-Born | Local-Born | Total | Province | Nonlocal-Born | Local-Born | Total |
|----------------|---------------|------------|-------|------------|---------------|------------|-------|
| ADANA | 2 | 12 | 14 | KARABÜK | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| ADIYAMAN | 1 | 11 | 12 | KARAMAN | 1 | 7 | 8 |
| AFYONKARAHİSAR | 3 | 17 | 20 | KARS | 4 | 7 | 11 |
| AĞRI | 3 | 8 | 11 | KASTAMONU | 2 | 18 | 20 |
| AKSARAY | 0 | 7 | 7 | KAYSERİ | 1 | 13 | 14 |
| AMASYA | 1 | 6 | 7 | KIRIKKALE | 0 | 9 | 9 |
| ANKARA | 4 | 16 | 20 | KIRKLARELİ | 2 | 7 | 9 |
| ANTALYA | 1 | 14 | 15 | KİRŞEHİR | 1 | 7 | 8 |
| ARDAHAN | 4 | 7 | 11 | KİLİS | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| ARTVİN | 3 | 9 | 12 | KOCAELİ | 4 | 4 | 8 |
| AYDIN | 0 | 9 | 9 | KONYA | 3 | 27 | 30 |
| BALIKESİR | 3 | 15 | 18 | KÜTAHYA | 0 | 11 | 11 |
| BARTIN | 0 | 3 | 3 | MALATYA | 3 | 15 | 18 |
| BATMAN | 0 | 7 | 7 | MANİSA | 2 | 15 | 17 |
| BAYBURT | 0 | 4 | 4 | MARDİN | 2 | 9 | 11 |
| BİLECİK | 0 | 6 | 6 | MERSİN | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| BİNGÖL | 1 | 8 | 9 | MUĞLA | 0 | 9 | 9 |
| BİTLİS | 1 | 7 | 8 | MUŞ | 4 | 7 | 11 |
| BOLU | 2 | 8 | 10 | NEVŞEHİR | 1 | 6 | 7 |
| BURDUR | 0 | 9 | 9 | NİĞDE | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| BURSA | 1 | 14 | 15 | ORDU | 3 | 21 | 24 |
| ÇANAKKALE | 0 | 9 | 9 | OSMANİYE | 0 | 7 | 7 |
| ÇANKIRI | 1 | 9 | 10 | RİZE | 3 | 14 | 17 |
| ÇORUM | 2 | 15 | 17 | SAKARYA | 2 | 12 | 14 |
| DENİZLİ | 3 | 19 | 22 | SAMSUN | 2 | 16 | 18 |
| DIYARBAKIR | 3 | 11 | 14 | SIĞIRCI | 1 | 7 | 8 |
| DÜZCE | 0 | 7 | 7 | SINOP | 3 | 10 | 13 |
| EDİRNE | 0 | 8 | 8 | SİVAS | 1 | 16 | 17 |
| ELAZIĞ | 2 | 11 | 13 | ŞANLIURFA | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| ERZİNCAN | 6 | 8 | 14 | ŞIRNAK | 0 | 8 | 8 |
| ERZURUM | 4 | 19 | 23 | TEKİRDAĞ | 1 | 7 | 8 |
| ESKİŞEHİR | 1 | 15 | 16 | TOKAT | 1 | 10 | 11 |
| GAZİANTEP | 4 | 9 | 13 | TRABZON | 8 | 19 | 27 |
| GİRESUN | 1 | 11 | 12 | TUNCELİ | 8 | 9 | 17 |
| GÜMÜŞHANE | 1 | 7 | 8 | UŞAK | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| HAKKARİ | 0 | 3 | 3 | VAN | 0 | 11 | 11 |
| HATAY | 1 | 13 | 14 | YALOVA | 0 | 1 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---|----|----|--|--------------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| IĞDIR | 0 | 4 | 4 | | YOZGAT | 6 | 12 | 18 |
| ISPARTA | 1 | 12 | 13 | | ZONGULDAK | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| İSTANBUL | 8 | 8 | 16 | | GERMANY | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| İZMİR | 2 | 15 | 17 | | BULGARIA | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| KAHRAMANMARAŞ | 3 | 11 | 14 | | N/A | 74 | 0 | 74 |
| | | | | | Grand Total | 225 | 810 | 1035 |

Table A.4: Provinces of Turkey by Region

| Provinces of Turkey by Region | |
|--|---|
| Region | Provinces |
| Akdeniz (<i>Mediterranean</i>) | Adana, Antalya, Burdur, Hatay, Isparta, Kahramanmaraş, Mersin, Osmaniye |
| Doğu Anadolu (<i>Eastern Anatolia</i>) | Ağrı, Ardahan, Bingöl, Bitlis, Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Hakkari, Iğdır, Kars, Malatya, Muş, Tunceli, Van |
| Ege (<i>Aegean</i>) | Afyonkarahisar, Aydın, Denizli, İzmir, Kütahya, Manisa, Muğla, Uşak |
| Güneydoğu Anadolu (<i>Southeastern Anatolia</i>) | Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Kilis |
| İç Anadolu (<i>Central Anatolia</i>) | Aksaray, Ankara, Çankırı, Eskişehir, Karaman, Kayseri, Kırıkkale, Kırşehir, Konya, Nevşehir, Niğde, Sivas, Yozgat |
| Marmara (<i>Marmara</i>) | Balıkesir, Bilecik, Bursa, Çanakkale, Edirne, İstanbul, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Tekirdağ, Yalova |
| Karadeniz (<i>Black Sea</i>) | Amasya, Artvin, Bartın, Bayburt, Bolu, Çorum, Düzce, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Karabük, Kastamonu, Ordu, Rize, Samsun, Sinop, Tokat, Trabzon, Zonguldak |

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