Introduction

The Ottoman Empire was the last great Muslim political entity to emerge in the later Middle Ages, and it continued its existence until the early 20th century. It was in a sense the last member of the lineage of Near Eastern and Mediterranean empires (i.e., the Persian Empire, the Hellenistic states, the Roman Empire, Byzantium, the Umayyad and the Abbasid Empires). All of these formations shared the characteristics of urban-based imperial power, self-centered world-civilization discourse, concentration of legitimate power in one center, delegation of authority to intermediary agencies, and multi-ethnicity. Among these empires it was only the Ottoman Empire which reached the modern times both in terms of world history and in terms of internal structure.

 There were several structural aspects which the Ottomans had in common with certain major imperial formations such as Byzantium, China, Mogul Empire, Habsburg Empire, and Russia. Among these empires it were only the Habsburgs and the Ottomans where there has been a continuous dynastic lineage, dating from the late medieval age lasting until the early 20th century. It is therefore not surprising that both empires were named after a ruling dynasty. It was the common denominator of the dynasty which ensured the legitimacy of state power and provided the necessary allegiance of various ethnic groups to the central authority.

 Both Byzantium and the Ottomans proudly regarded themselves as the continuation of a previous glorious imperial civilization. In the case of the Byzantines, it was the late Roman Empire, where Christianity had become a state religion and emerged as the global champion of this belief. For the Ottomans, it was the impressive tradition of the Umayyad and the Abbasid Empires, which elevated Islam to the rank of a world religion.

 As a consequence of this pride of being a part of an ancient civilizational lineage, the Byzantines, Ottomans, and China considered themselves as the only centers of orthodox belief and civilization. Thus these empires looked upon populations outside their borders as barbarians or *harbî*, i.e. infidels outside the protection of Muslim authority. However, this discrimination was mostly free from narrow racist prejudices. Quite the contrary, they were rather open to integrate barbarians to their imperial system provided that these individuals showed readiness for being proselytized and acculturated to their civilization.

 Within the imperial borders, the Mogul Empire as well as the Ottomans displayed the policy of religious toleration toward non-Muslim populations. Both empires provided for the preservation of non-Muslim religious communities and utilized their services for the imperial benefit. Unlike the Mogul Empire, however, the Ottomans did not allow non-Muslims to rise to higher political echelons – at least until the Reform Edict of 1856.

 The Ottoman Empire and China – particularly the Ming dynasty – shared the existence of central and nonhereditary bureaucracies. These highly institutionalized civil services, however, lacked corporate autonomy. As a consequence, members of these bureaucracies were often prone to arbitrary punishments and executions by emperors and sultans. At the same time, numerous Chinese and Ottoman rulers were just puppets in the hands of powerful oligarchies, and both Chinese and Ottoman politics in the capital suffered from occasional interferences from palace women and eunuchs.

 19th century Ottoman reform period displays striking similarities with those of 18th century Russia; while Peter the Great abolished the Streltsy units, which formed a major obstacle to modernization, Mahmud II dissolved the Janissary corps as a first step to initiate reforms. Both rulers took steps to centralize their empires in a ruthless way while establishing European-style government institutions. Both Peter and Mahmud introduced compulsory European-style uniforms for the civil service and the army. In the course of reform measures both the Orthodox clergy and the Islamic *ilmiyye* lost their former political power.

 However, the Ottomans, unlike Russia, were unable to transform their empire into a modern formidable power with the ability to compete against European great powers. In marked contrast to Russia, the Christian character of Europe was an obstacle for the Ottoman reformers to pursue a policy of wholesale Westernization. Islam was an essential identity of the Ottoman state and civilization, which required 19th century reformists to undertake selective modernization. The main items of reform were the armed forces, government institutions, provincial administration, and the material infrastructure, without however daring to pursue a radical cultural transformation. In the legal area the Islamic law preserved its monopoly over civil sphere.

 In addition, Peter the Great realized his reforms prior to the age of Industrial and French Revolutions. Russia of the early 19th century, after a century of modernizing steps, was ready to resist the challenges posed by these revolutions. The Ottoman Empire of the early 19th century, on the contrary, was unprepared to cope with economic expansionism of Western European countries as well as with emerging Balkan nationalisms. In fact, the long-term transforming effects of these two revolutions did not permit the preservation of antiquated multi-ethnic empires governed by obsolete monarchies; the end of World War I signified the collapse of the Habsburg, German, Russian, Chinese, and Ottoman Empires.

**Main Characteristics and Development**

 In Western languages the Ottoman Empire from the earliest times was called Turkey/Turquie/Türkei, a term that the Ottomans never used for themselves. For the Ottomans, their empire was the “Sublime State” (*Devlet-i Âliyye*), the “Well Protected Imperial Domains” (*Memâlik-i Mahrûse-i Şâhâne*), or the “Ottoman State” (*Devlet-i Osmaniyye*). These terms convey the apparent lack of an ethnic element in Ottoman self-perception. On the other hand, the founding dynasty and the ruling elite during the first century of the empire’s formation was of predominantly Oghuz Turkish ethnic origins. The Western notion of the “Turkishness” of the empire may be related either to the Turkishness of the founding element or perhaps to the fact that the term “Turk” had synonymous for “Muslim” or “Islam” until the 19th century.

 The Ottoman state was a Muslim institution from its begin-ning. The Ottoman expansion in the Christian Balkans and Central Europe can be traced in part to the religious motive of the “holy war” (*gazâ*). The first Ottoman rulers (Osman I; Orhan) bore the title *gazi* (“warrior on the behalf of Islam”). On the other hand, the Ottoman state emerged in a specific geographic context, as a frontier region between the Islamic and Christian world civilizations. The early Ottoman principality was a frontier state, where the Muslim and Christian populations of western Anatolia and the Balkans interacted on a daily basis. One characteristic of Anatolian Muslims has been the tendency to have an unorthodox religious outlook. Turcoman Islam bore elements derived from Shamanism, Buddhism, Christianity, and was strongly influenced by the Shia. There are indications that early Ottoman rulers themselves were part of this cultural milieu, which encouraged religious and cultural tolerance. These conditions also made it easier for the Ottoman state to integrate local traditions and customs into its administrative practices.

 Though some Ottoman rulers regarded the Ottoman state as the continuation of the Roman Empire (Mehmed II called himself *Kayser-i Rûm*, “Emperor of Rome”), their notions of state and sultanate were derived mainly from ancient Near Eastern, Islamic, and Central Asian models. As was the case in ancient Iranian practice, the state was regarded as the main agency of justice (*adâlet*). Justice was the guiding principle of statecraft, along with the incentive of wealth and military strength, both of which were indispensable pillars of the state and administration. The Imperial Council(*Divân-ı Hümâyûn*) was both the main organ of central administration and the supreme court of justice, where any Ottoman subject had the right to appeal.

 As an element of a Sunni Islamic empire, the Ottoman legal system was based to a great extent on Islamic law (*şeriat*). Islamic judges (*kadı*) were responsible for administering justice; they acted also as town mayors. Ottoman educational institutions, in a similar way, functioned within the framework of Islamic religion. Primary schools aimed at teaching the precepts of Islam; their students learned by memory the Quran. The *medrese*s (Islamic colleges) offered more specialized courses on Islamic and rational sciences. It was the social group known as the *ilmiyye*(Islamic scholars) that supplied the administration with Islamic jurists, judges, and professors (*müderris*).

 Another area where Islamic law applied was policy toward non-Muslims. Due to a shared Abrahamic tradition, monotheistic communities like Christians and Jews were considered to be “People of the Book” (*Ehli Kitâb*) and “Protected People” (*Ehli Zimma*). Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish, and later also Catholic, Protestant, and Bulgarian Orthodox people were acknowledged as legitimate communities (*millet*) under the jurisdiction of their respective ecclesiastical heads. Though their lives, beliefs, and properties were guaranteed, members of these communities had to pay a special poll-tax (*cizye*), were not allowed to perform military service, and could not enter the bureaucracy.

 The institution of the sultanate was based mainly on Turco-Mongol political traditions, which considered the absolute rule of a monarch a sign of God’s (or “heavenly”) approval. In this context, sultans had legitimate authority to formulate legal rules (*kanun*) independent of Islamic law. Thus, the Ottoman legal system consisted of two sets of laws, the şeriat and the *kanun*. Though in principle sultanic rules could not oppose Islamic law, this tradition of promulgating nonreligious legislation provided a useful precedent for the secularization of the legal system in the 19th-century reform era.

 Another aspect of the Central Asian notion of sultanate appeared within the context of the problem of succession. There was originally no settled rule of succession following the death of a ruler; all sons of the deceased sultan could make equally legitimate claims to the throne. Thus it happened that when a sultan died, the empire entered into a state of turmoil and armed struggle among the princes to secure the capital and the throne. Different sectors of the state and the administration (viziers, the *ilmiyye*, the palace, the Janissaries, the *sipahi*s, etc.), representing different interest groups, supported particular princes against the others. The success of one of the princes in dominating the capital provided the necessary legitimation of his sultanate. Such circumstances often led to the murder of the younger brothers by the newly acceded sultan. The public reaction against the murder of young princes, particularly in the late sixteenth century, and the institutionalization of central authority led from 1617 onwards to the introduction of succession based on *senioratus* – the accession of the oldest male member of the dynasty to the throne.

 The rapid expansion of the Ottoman Empire in Central Eu-rope, the Arab lands and Iran was enabled by a military-agricultural complex called the *timar*-system. State-owned cereal-producing lands in Anatolia and the Balkans were divided into *timar*s, which were cultivated by land-bound peasantry (the *Çift-Hâne* system). Each *timar* was administered by a cavalry-man (*sipahi*), who was appointed from Istanbul and had the authority to collect taxes. In wartime, *sipahi*s were expected to join the armyas fully equipped mounted cavalry, their number depending on the agricultural productivity of the *timar*. Until the mid-sixteenth century, cavalry constituted the main part of the Ottoman army. The *timar* system ensured both the constant maintenance of a sizable cavalry force and the centralization of administration in the core areas of the empire.

 A major pillar of Ottoman absolutism was the social group of sultanic slaves, called *kul*s, who were mostly recruited among Christian peasant boys. After initial selection the brighter ones were admitted to the palace for education in Islamic sciences, practical arts, and statescraft, while the remainder were trained as Janissary soldiers. In all *kul*s was inculcated the notion of absolute loyalty to the sultan. Though members of the ruling elite, they could be punished, even executed, at the will of the ruler, without formal trial. The increasing appointment of grand viziers and viziers from among *kul*s from the period of Mehmed II on encouraged the concentration of power in the person of the sultan. The Janissaries, on the other hand, constituted the actual striking force of the Ottoman army after the late sixteenth century. This infantry corps received special training and was equipped with firearms.

 The *kul*s (administrators, military commanders, Janissaries, *sipahi*s) and the *ilmiyye* (*kadı*s, *müderris*es and *mufti*s [interpreters of the Islamic law]) formed the ruling military class (*askerî*), which was exempted from taxation. The productive populations of the ruled – that is, the *reâyâ* (merchants, artisans, peasants, nomads) – were the taxpaying class. These two population groups were separated in terms of political status, and the administration did its best to prevent people of *reâyâ* origin from entering the ruling military class.

 Toward the end of the 16th century, Janissaries began to play a greater role in the wars in Central Europe, due to the ineffectiveness of the *sipahi* cavalry forces in the face of new firearms used in European armies. The inability of cavalry to adapt to the new weapons forced the Ottoman state to increase the number of Janissary troops, which were equipped with firearms. But the increase in these standing troops, who were paid in cash, necessitated the leasing of public *timar* lands to tax-farmers as a ready source of cash. This step brought about the effective disintegration of the basic military and administrative structure of the empire. The administrative, economic, and military functions of the *sipahi*s of the *timar* lands increasingly became obsolete. On the other hand, tax-farmers who had provincial connections emerged as local power groups and dominated the countryside. These developments led to a gradual decentralization of provincial administration.

 An additional way to increase the number of standing troops was recruitment of mercenaries (*sekban*), who were in fact landless peasants able to use firearms. They were paid by the state only during wartime; when peace returned, these mercenaries often turned into bandits, attacking villages and towns. The *sekban*s also provided ready backers for rebellious provincial governors.

 The great increase in Janissary manpower in the capital as well as in the provincial towns meant their increasing power as a political faction. From 1588 on, Janissary rebellions began to shake governments; between 1622 and 1807, Janissaries took active part in the deposition of sultans; political factions in the capital tried to keep the Janissaries on their sides. This development correlated with the weakening of the sultanic power. Political factions, such as members of the palace, or the *ilmiyye*, used Janissary commanders to manipulate sultans.

 The traumatic experience of major defeats at the hands of Christian powers following the second siege of Vienna (1683) shattered Ottoman self-confidence. It led Ottoman statesmen to recognize the superiority of European technology and to make partial technical adaptations for the strengthening of the Ottoman army. After 1699 the Ottoman administration was also forced to place greater importance on diplomacy as a means of solving international problems. This development strengthened the political position of the bureaucracy with respect to the military elite. Whereas it had been mostly Janissary commanders who were appointed grand viziers, after 1699 prominent members of the scribal service dominated the grand vizierate. During this period the Sublime Porte (*Bâb-ı Âlî*) emerged as the main power center of the empire. Reformers such as Koca Râgıb Pasha(1698-1763), Halil Hâmid Pasha (1736-85), and 19th-century statesmen like Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800-58), Fuad Pasha (1815-69), Âlî Pasha (1815-71), andMidhat Pasha (1822-84) rose among bureaucratic ranks.

 In the realm of provincial administration, the seventeenth-century tendency of administrative decentralization reached its peak in the eighteenth century. The tax-farming of public lands led to the emergence of a class of provincial notables (*âyân*) who, in addition to the collection of taxes, increasingly assumed other functions, such as the raising of troops or the enforcement of public order. During the second half of the 18th century, powerful families arose in the Balkans, Anatolia, and the Arabic provinces to control vast territories. These developments signified the effective disappearance of the traditional distinction between the ruling military class and the *reâyâ*.

 But the government, though bestowing official titles on the leading *âyân*s, almost never recognized these local authorities as separate powers. The Ottoman state only once agreed officially to share political power with the *âyân*s – when Alemdâr Mustafa Pasha (1765-1808), the *âyân* of Ruscuk (Ruse, Bulgaria), and supporter of reformers, occupied Istanbul in 1808 and became grand vizier. During his term of office Alemdâr Mustafa Pasha summoned some of the major *âyân*s to the capital, where they prepared a “Deed of Agreement” (*Sened-i İttifak*) that recognized the political power of the *âyân*s and acknowledged the right to resist unjust government decisions. But the Deed of Agreement, though signed by Mahmud II (ruled 1808-39), remained a dead letter, since this sultan succeeded in getting rid of Alemdâr Mustafa Pasha and thereafter pursued a policy of crushing the power of the *âyân*s.

 The 19th and the early 20th centuries were marked in general by the policy of reinforcing central power in order to preserve the empire. Administrative centralization brought about a weakening of such intermediate power groups as the *âyân*s, the *ilmiyye*, and nonorthodox Sufiorders in favor of central authority. The emergence of non-Muslim nationalism and the penetration of the ideals of the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution among the Ottoman subjects clearly displayed the futility of a rigid status distinction between Muslims and non-Muslim subjects. The implementation of economic liberalism for European merchants necessitated the modernization of the legal system. The expansion of communication and transportation links between Istanbul and the provinces supported the internal unification of the empire. The new class of civil servants, who received modern educations, introduced reform measures in the provinces. Some among the new civil servants emerged as an intelligentsia opposing the autocracy of the Sublime Porte in favor of a constitutional parliamentary regime. All of these developments together reflected the gradual transition of the empire from pre-modern conditions to modernity.

 The dissolution of the Janissary corps (1826) by Mahmud II signified the removal of the strongest opposition to the concentration of political power in the hands of the sultan. Thereafter the first steps were taken toward the creation of a modern state structure. A modern army was founded; the feudal *timar* system abolished; the financial power of the *ilmiyye* class was curbed, by taking control over pious foundations (*vakıf*); the first modern population census was undertaken; a bureaucracy based on a formal merit and rank system (*mülkiyye*) was established; ministries and a cabinet system were set up; and semilegislative administrative councils were founded. In addition, European-style dress became obligatory for the members of the civil serviceand the army.

 These steps lay the groundwork for more comprehensive reforms during the periods of rule of sultans Abdülmecid (r. 1839-61), Abdülaziz (r. 1861-76), and Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909). The “magna carta” of Ottoman reform was the Imperial Rescript of Gülhane (3 November 1839), also called the Imperial Rescript of the *Tanzimat* (“reorganizations”), a constitutional document that laid down certain basic principles. Its main precepts were: the guarantee of the life and property of all imperial subject; the prohibition of punishment without a fair trial; implicit recognition of the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects before the law; taxation in keeping with individual income; abolition of tax-farming; and settlement of the period of military service. This document formally annulled the already obsolete distinction between the ruling military class and the *reâyâ*.

 The modernizing reforms of the period between 1839 and 1876 were initiated mainly by the grand viziers Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Âlî Pasha, Fuad Pasha, and Midhat Pasha. Among these, the first three ensured the bureaucratic hegemony of the Sublime Porte over the sultans; took major steps toward the secularization of the legal and the court system; laid the foundation of modern public education; and set up a provincial administration that provided a certain degree of local participation. The Imperial Rescript of Reforms (28 February 1856) openly acknowledged equal rights for non-Muslims; this document also signified the beginning of the policy of Ottomanism – an effort to impose the notion of a united Ottoman nationhood consisting of different communities, all loyal to the state and the sultan. Though these measures provided the conditions for the establishment of a modern state apparatus, they did not bring democratic reforms.

 The domination of the sultans by the Sublime Porte between 1839 and 1871, continued in the arbitrary rule of Sultan Abdülaziz after 1871, triggered the emergence of an opposition movement – the Young Ottomans (*Yeni Osmanlılar*). Consisting of journalists and young civil servants, this early Ottoman intelligentsia, among them Namık Kemal (1840-88), ascribed for the first time a political meaning to the terms *hürriyet* (liberty) and *vatan* (motherland, *patria*). At a theoretical level, Namık Kemal attempted to combine the ideals of the European Enlightenment and Islamic values. The main political aim of the Young Ottomans was to introduce constitutional parliamentary rule. Though the Young Ottomans were suppressed between 1867 and 1876, their ideas were implemented for a short time by Midhat Pasha, who held similar views. Between 1877 and 1878 the first Ottoman parliament convened; it was then dissolved by Abdülhamid II.

 The Hamidian autocracy brought a period of both Islamic conservatism and reform. The Hamidian regime applied Islamism, with the aim of weakening nationalist trends among Albanians and Arabs and of strengthening the legitimacy of the central authority among tribal populations. On the other hand, institutional reforms like the modernization of the judicial system and professionalization of the civil service, and such infrastructural developments as expansion of public education in the provinces, extension of the railways and communication networks throughout the empire, and an increase in agricultural production provided an impetus for material progress.

 Despite the strict censorship measures and police surveillance, this period also witnessed certain cultural developments: the proliferation of the press and publications; the development of such modern literary genres as novels and short stories, and experimentation in poetry; simplification of the elaborate written chancery style into a more standardized prose; the opening of the School of Fine Arts (*Sanâyi-i Nefîse Mektebi*, 1883) for the promotion of the arts of painting, sculpture, and architecture; and the development of museology. Cultural Turkism began to be discussed in the newspapers.

 The Young Turks, a general category that grew to include various secret political groups, opposed the Hamidian police regime and shared the goal of restoring the parliamentary system. Of these groups the most significant was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which forced Abdülhamid II to convene the parliament (1908).

 The years between 1908 and 1913 were a period of un-precedented political freedom, pluralism, and cultural innova-tion. But the continuing disintegration of the empire and nationalist revolts in the provinces gradually strengthened the Turkist element in cultural life. At the political level, the revolts among non-Turkish populations and the loss of the Balkans demonstrated the failure of the Ottomanist and Islamist policies.

 The *coup d’état* of 30 January 1913, staged by the military wing of the CUP, terminated political pluralism in favor of a military dictatorship. Between 1913 and 1918, the Ottoman state assumed for the first time an openly Turkish nationalist and secularist attitude. Steps were taken to found a national economy and to support the emergence of a Turkish business class; the capitulations were annulled (1914); measures were introduced for the complete secularization of education; the family law of 1917 restricted polygamy; and Muslim *kadı* courts were placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. In a sense, these steps constituted precursors of the more radical reforms to be pursued after the foundation of the Turkish Republic.

**Political History**

The Ottomans emerged as a Turcoman principality in the north- western part of Anatolia following the Mongol invasion and the collapse of the Anatolian Seljuk sultanate. Although it counted among the smaller principalities of Anatolia, its first ruler, Osman I (r. 1289-1326), undertook a series of military campaigns against the neighboring Byzantine towns and forts and finally succeeded in conquering Bursa (1326).

 His son, Orhan (1326-62), increased the size of this princi-pality. During the early years of his rule the Ottomans took most of the remaining Byzantine territories in Anatolia, including Nicaea (İznik, 1331) and Nicomedia (İzmit, 1337). In 1345 Orhan incorporated the Turcoman principality of Karesi (present-day provinces of Balıkesir and Çanakkale into his dominion. This expansion put the Ottomans in a military position to attack the Balkans.

 Orhan became deeply involved in the internal politics of Byzantium when he supported John V Cantacuzenus, a claimant to the Byzantine throne (1346). On this occasion the Ottomans entered the Balkans and took Tzympe, a stronghold on the European shores of the Gallipoli (Gelibolu) Peninsula (1352). This was followed by the conquests of the fortresses of Gallipoli (1354), Tsourollos (Çorlu, 1359), Didymotychon (Dimetoka, 1359), and finally Adrianople (Edirne, 1361).

 The rule of Orhan brought the emergence of a bureaucracy, centralized administrative institutions, and *medrese* education. The first Ottoman coins were minted during his time. The increasing power of this principality led both Christian and Muslim neighbors to regard it as a serious threat for their futures.

 When Orhan's son Murad I (r. 1362-89) acceeded to the throne, an anti-Ottoman rebellion broke out in Ankara; it was swiftly suppressed. Until the death of Murad, the Ottoman state ceased to be a principality and became a great power, dominating the majority of the Anatolian principalities and the Balkan monarchies. Between 1363 and 1371 southern Bulgaria and Thrace were conquered. Though the pope proclaimed a crusade against the Ottomans (1366), none could be mounted. In 1371 a large Serbian army was defeated at Chermanon (Çirmen). After this date Byzantium and the kingdom of Bulgaria became Ottoman vassal territories.

 Between 1375 and 1380 the Ottomans expanded in Anatolia, annexing parts of the Turcoman principalities of Germiyan and Hamidili. In the Balkans, the Ottomans could legitimize their expansion in terms of the holy war against Christians; the issue was more difficult in the case of Muslim Anatolian principalities. Ottoman rulers tried to legitimize their actions by claiming that they had accepted certain territories of the principality of Germiyan as a dowry for the Ottoman prince Bayezid or that they had purchased parts of the principality of Hamidili. When the expansion in Anatolia threatened the interests of the major Turcoman principality of Karaman, Karaman launched a military offensive against the Ottomans. But this act provided the Ottomans with a pretext to declare the Karamanids traitors, to accuse them of attacking Ottoman lands “from the back” and thus harming the cause of the holy war and assisting the infidels. Therefore it would be a pious duty to annex them.

 The period of 1383-89 witnessed continuing Ottoman expansion in the Balkans and in Anatolia. In 1383 Serres was conquered, followed by Sofia (1385), Nish (1386), and Thessaloniki (1387). When Murad repulsed the Karamanid attack in 1387, the Turcoman principalities of Anatolia accepted the Ottomans as their suzerains. The steady rise of Ottoman power and increasing pressure on the Balkan states led the Serbs, Bosnians, and Bulgarians to form a coalition against the Ottomans. The ensuing first Battle of Kosovo (20 June 1389) resulted in an Ottoman victory, though Murad was killed on the battlefield.

 Murad’s son Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402) turned the Ottoman state into a centralized empire, bordering the Danube in the west and the Euphrates in the east. In Anatolia the Turcoman principalities on the Aegean coast were annexed (1389-90); Antalya and Alanya conquered (1391); Kastamonu and Amasya in northern Anatolia occupied (1393); the major principalities of Karaman and Kadı Burhaneddin (Sivas) dissolved (1397-98); and the Mamluk cities of Malatya and Elbistan annexed (1399).

 In the Balkans, Skopje in Macedonia was conquered (1391); the kingdom of Bulgaria dissolved (1393); Albania and Thessaly annexed (1394); and Wallachia made a vassal state (1395). Since the Ottoman domination in the Danube threatened the political interests of Hungary, this kingdom formed an alliance with Venice and Byzantium to expel the Ottomans from the Balkans. The coalition army and the Ottomans met at Nikopolis (Niğbolu) on 25 September 1396; Bayezid emerged victorious.

 This great victory marked the emergence of the Ottoman state as a major Islamic empire; Bayezid I was the first Ottoman ruler to use the title “sultan.” But the Turcoman princes who had lost their power turned to Timur (Tamerlane, 1336-1405), founder of a great Eurasian empire stretching from eastern Europe to India, for support against the Ottomans. Timur claimed to be the suzerain of Bayezid; the Ottoman sultan challenged him, and their armies met at Ankara (28 July 1402). The Ottomans were defeated, and Bayezid was taken captive by Timur. Timur restored the former Turcoman principalities annexed by Bayezid.

 The time between 1402 and 1413 is known as the Interregnum, when the sons of Bayezid fought each other for control over the remaining Ottoman lands. Finally Mehmed I (r. 1413-21) emerged as the sole ruler of the Ottoman state. Mehmed devoted himself to stabilizing central rule and regaining some of the territories of the Turcoman principalities. However, the territorial expansion in Anatolia that had existed during the reign of Bayezid I would be achieved again only toward the end of the reign of Mehmed II.

 Mehmed I’s son, Murad II (r. 1421-44 and 1446-51), faced aggressions from the Balkan vassal states as well as from the remaining Turcoman principalities, who feared the revival of Ottoman strength. Thus the reign of Murad II was a period of constant struggle, with warfare and rebellion in Anatolia as well as in the Balkans. During this time most of the Turcoman principalities were reconquered, and the Ottomans continued their expansion in the Balkans.

 One of the main issues was a power struggle with the Hungarians over Serbia, Bosnia, and Wallachia. Though Murad conquered Serbia and Bosnia became an Ottoman vassal state (1439), the Hungarian commander John Hunyadi defeated the Ottomans in Transylvania (1442). Constant Hungarian attacks forced Murad to sue for peace (in the Treaty of Edirne, 12 June 1444).

 Murad’s abdication in favor of his young and inexperienced son, Mehmed II (r. 1444-46, 1451-81), was considered by the Christian powers to be an opportunity to renew warfare. A combined army of Hungarians and Wallachians advanced as far as Varna, where it was defeated, with difficulty, by Murad (10 November 1444). Continuing power struggles among different factions of the state finally forced Murad to resume power (1446-51). Murad used this second period of rule to subdue the Balkan vassal states that had revolted in 1444 and to expel the Hungarians from the Balkans (second Battle of Kosovo, 17-19 October 1448).

 Mehmed II’s second period of rule, during which he became known as “the Conqueror,” brought the restoration of the empire of Bayezid I. His first action was the conquest of Constantinople and the elimination of Byzantium (29 May 1453), which had been a constant security threat and had attracted crusaders from the West. Until the death of Mehmed II, Anatolia west of the Euphrates, including the Pontic Greek empire and the Karamanid principality, was incorporated into the Ottoman lands; the Balkans south of the river Danube and Sava, including Bosnia and the Morea (the Pelopponese), but excluding Belgrade, became part of the empire; Moldavia and the khanate of the Crimea became Ottoman vassal states. During Mehmed II’s rule Ottoman administrative, social, and economic institutions became fully established.

 One of the major international issues during his reign was rivalry with Venice over the western Balkans, a contest that led to a series of wars. The war between 1460 and 1479 coincided with the rebellion of the Albanian prince George Kastrioti (Skanderbeg) against the Ottomans. The ruler of the Turcoman Akkoyunlu state in eastern Anatolia and Iran, Uzun Hasan, also collaborated with Venice, attacking the empire from the east. This campaign led to the Battle of Başkent (or Otlukbeli, 11 August 1473), where Mehmed II defeated Uzun Hasan. When an Ottoman-Venetian peace treaty was signed on 25 January 1479, the southern Adriatic shores of the Balkans with the exception of Durrës and Bar, became Ottoman.

 Mehmed II apparently planned to launch a campaign in the Italian Peninsula, but his sudden death (3 May 1481) brought a pause in Ottoman expansionism. The campaigns in the Balkans and in Anatolia, which had been funded by excessive taxation of the population and other harsh measures, had led to dissatisfaction among the people and also among the ruling circles. Mehmed’s son, Bayezid II (1481-1512), ushered in a period of relative peace, in which only limited warfare was waged.

 An important political development in these years was the emergence of the Safavid power in Iran, ruled by Shah Ismail (r.1500-1524). This new militant Shia state stirred up revolts among the Turcomans in the Ottoman Empire, leading in 1511 to a civil war in western Anatolia known as the Şahkulu Revolt. This insurrrection could be suppressed only with great difficulty.

 Selim I (r. 1512-1520) forced his father Bayezid II to abdicate and thereby opened a new era in Ottoman history. This ruler became known as a ruthless autocrat, “Selim the Terrible” (*Yavuz*). Under his rule all Turcoman unrest was suppressed by the harshest measures, and supporters of Shah Ismail had to flee the country.

 Selim, during his relatively short reign, turned the Ottoman Empire into the only great Islamic empire of his time. His first move was against Safavid Iran; he defeated Shah Ismail at the battle of Çaldıran (23 August 1514) and occupied eastern Anatolia, Azerbaijan, and western Iran. In the period 1516-17, Selim attacked the Mamluk sultanate and defeated its armies at the Battles of Mercdabık (Aleppo, 24 August 1516) and Reydaniyya (Cairo, 22 January 1517). The conquest of the Mamluk lands meant the inclusion of Syria, Mount Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, and the Hijaz into the Ottoman Empire.

 In all of these territories, which constituted the core of classical Islamic civilization – including the holy cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem – the Ottoman Empire now assumed the role of protector of the holy lands; the sultan adopted the title of “Protector of the Holy Places” (*Hâdimu Haremeynu’ş-Şerîfeyn*). These developments stabilized the religious identity of the Ottoman state as the main Islamic power in the world. In geostrategic terms, the Ottomans came to control the whole eastern Mediterranean Basin as well as the Red Sea, and their sphere of interest began to reach as far as the Indian Ocean.

 The reign of Süleyman I (“the Magnificient,” 1520-66) enhanced the position of the Ottoman Empire as a world power. During this period Rhodes, Belgrade, and most parts of Hungary became Ottoman. In 1529 the Ottomans undertook the first siege of Vienna. In the east, Iraq, Van, and Georgia were annexed. In North Africa, Algiers and Tripolis entered the Ottoman realm. Ottoman military operations stretched from Nice in southern France to Diu in India. The Ottoman grand admiral (*kapudân-ı deryâ*) Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha defeated a crusader fleet under the command of Andrea Doria at the Battle of Preveza (28 September 1538), achieving Ottoman naval superiority in the Mediterranean Sea.

 The empire’s international affairs of this period were determined by its relations with the Habsburg Empire and Iran. The Habsburg emperor, Charles V, claimed the Hungarian lands, leading to a series of wars. The Ottomans entered into an alliance with France against their common enemy and organized joint naval operations. Ottoman pressure between 1521 and 1555 caused Charles to make concessions to the Protestant princes in Central Europe and eventually to grant official recognition of Protestantism.

 The Habsburgs, on the other hand, established a diplomatic relationship with Iran, putting the Ottomans in the predicament of having to fight a war on two fronts. Süleyman did his best to prevent such a possibility, entering into conflict with Iran only at times of peace with the Habsburgs. After a series of wars with Iran, the peace of Amasya (29 May 1555) secured a definite border, and Iraq became firmly Ottoman.

 Süleyman I’s son, Selim II (r. 1566-74), continued his father’s policy of expansion, with the assistance of the able grand vizier Sokullu Mehmed Pasha. The major events of his reign were the conquests of Chios, Cyprus, and Tunisia. When the Ottomans seized from Venice the strategically important island of Cyprus, Christian powers formed a Holy League, defeating the Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Lepanto (7 October 1571). Though this defeat had no strategic significance, it showed the increasing vulnerability of the Ottoman naval forces in the Mediterranean.

 The reigns of Murad III (1574-95), Mehmed III (1595-1603), and Ahmed I (1603-17) marked the peak of Ottoman expansionism and revealed certain internal problems. Long and exhausting wars with Iran (1578-90; 1603-12; 1615-19) and with the Habsburgs (1593-1606) had depleted Ottoman financial resources. These wars, sometimes fought on two fronts, brought diplomatic losses and failed to secure significant territorial gains. The peace of Zsitvatorok (1606), for example, terminated Ottoman suzerainty over the Habsburgs. These wars, at the same time, led to internal changes and disorders within the empire.

 The wars in Central Europe proved the ineffectiveness of traditional *sipahi* cavalry in the face of firearms. The measures taken to increase the number of the armed Janissaries and *sekban* mercenary troops had long-lasting consequences for politics (through the weakening of the sultanic power), administration (decentralization), and the Ottoman economy (monetarization). In addition, Janissary-*sekban* rivalry – in essence a rivalry between members of the ruling military class and the ruled *reâyâ* – led to disorder in the countryside. When the Janissaries became the dominant power in the capital, especially following their execution of Osman II (r. 1618-22), the *sekban*s in Anatolia, under the leadership of rebellious governors, revolted against Istanbul. The Ottoman government ceased to control vast regions of Anatolia.

 Among a series of weak rulers of the seventeenth century, only Murad IV (r. 1623-40) was able to formulate policies independently. When he ascended to the throne at the age of 11, he was controlled by his mother, Kösem Sultan, who cooperated with the Janissaries. Only nine years later, in 1632, was he able to shake off the Janissary domination and the influence of his mother, and to establish his own rule. Murad secured the loyalty of the Janissaries to his person and applied harsh methods to establish public order in the capital. Then he launched military campaigns against Iran, which had occupied Baghdad in 1625. Murad took brutal measures for the elimination of administrators in Anatolia who had close relations with the *sekban*s. In 1635 he conquered the city of Erivan (Revan) from Iran and in 1639 took back Baghdad. Murad’s early death meant an end to a domestic reign of terror and brought peace in Anatolia.

 The following sultans, İbrahim (r. 1640-48), Mehmed IV (r. 1648-87), Süleyman II (r. 1687-91), and Ahmed II (r. 1691-95), were unable to impose their intentions on their governments. İbrahim’s neurotic and unbalanced character allowed his mother, Kösem Sultan, the courtiers, and the Janissaries to regain political control in the capital and to rule the empire according to their whims. Following the deposition of this sultan, a power struggle emerged between political factions and palace groups, leading to anarchy in Istanbul. The new sultan, Mehmed IV, was seven years old and unable to control events.

 This state of disorder, lasting for eight years, was finally terminated by Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, who was appointed grand vizier in 1656. At that time the Venetian fleet had blocked the Dardanelles, with the aim of forcing the Ottomans to abandon the conquest of Crete. By this blockade the Ottoman capital was cut off by sea from the Mediterranean. The first action of this grand vizier was to defeat the Venetians and to secure the southern sea route to Istanbul. Further steps of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha included the elimination of subversive Janissary officials in the capital, restoration of Ottoman hegemony over Transylvania, and suppression of revolts in Anatolia. Köprülü Mehmed Pasha used extremely harsh measures, like those of Murad IV, to restore central authority within the empire.

 After the death of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha in 1661, his son, Köprülüzâde Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, was appointed grand vizier. During his term of office, which ended with his death in 1676, Fazıl Ahmed Pasha managed to stabilize the Ottoman borders in Central Europe (1664), to conquer Crete (1669), and to annex Kamenec in Podolia (western Ukraine, 1672). In 1676 Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, the adopted son of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, became grand vizier.

 Kara Mustafa Pasha’s attempt to conquer Vienna (1683) marked the end of Ottoman presence in Central Europe. The ill-prepared siege of Vienna provided an opportunity for the formation of a Holy League, consisting of the Habsburgs, Poland, Venice, and Russia. This coalition was able to defeat the Ottomans in a long period of warfare, lasting from 1683 to 1699, and to expel them from Hungary, Transylvania, and the Morea. The Treaty of Karlowitz (26 January 1699) was the first international agreement wherein the Ottomans ceded considerable territory to Christian powers. The Ottoman Empire was never again able to expand in Europe.

 As in the seventeenth century, none of the eighteenth-century sultans – Mustafa II (r. 1695-1703), Ahmed III (r. 1703-30), Mahmud I (r. 1730-54), Osman III (r. 1754-57), Mustafa III (r. 1757-74), and Abdülhamid I (r. 1774-89) – were true autocrats. It was the grand viziers who put their stamps on the eighteenth century. Another feature of this century was the emergence of great provincial *âyân* families, which dominated whole provinces. In this century two sultans were deposed by Janissaries – in the Revolt of 1703 and the Patrona Halil Revolt (1730). The first broke out as a reaction to the political domination of *Şeyhülislâm* Feyzullah Efendi (the head of the religious hierarchy) and to Mustafa II’s personal dependence on him. The Patrona Halil Revolt erupted when the Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha and his associates aroused the discontent of the population through nepotism and an excessively luxurious lifestyle, combined with inability to respond to Iranian attacks in the east.

 International Ottoman affairs of the eighteenth century were marked by warfare with Russia, Austria, Venice, and Iran. Toward the end of this century, the Russians penetrated the Black Sea and became a major threat to the existence of the Ottoman Empire.

 During the Nordic War, the Swedish king Charles XII was forced by his defeat by the Russians at the Battle of Poltava (1709) to take refuge in Ottoman lands. The Russians demanded the extradition, and the Ottoman refusal led to a Russo-Ottoman war. The Russian army, led by Peter the Great, was surrounded by the Ottoman troops at the River Pruth (1711). The Russians capitulated and did abandon the fortress of Azov, which they had acquired by the Treaty of Istanbul (1700).

 Following this victory over the Russians, the Ottomans sought to regain the Morea, which had been ceded to Venice at the Treaty of Karlowitz. Ottoman troops attacked the Morean Peninsula (1714) and expelled the Venetians. In response, the Austrians declared war against the Ottomans (1716). The Ottomans were defeated, and Belgrade was lost to the Austrians (1717). The Treaty of Passarowitz (1718) acknowledged Ottoman reconquest of the Morea but left Serbia and Timişoara (Temeşvar) to the Austrians.

 In the east, the Ottomans saw an opportunity to attack Iran; the Afghans had eliminated the Safavid dynasty, and a state of internal strife reigned in the country (1722-23). Ottoman armies entered Iran, occupying Azerbaijan and western parts of Iran proper. But the Iranians, reorganized under the leadership of Nadir Ali, were able to take back all territories occupied by the Ottomans (1733). In 1743 Nadir Ali, who had become the shah of Iran, attacked Baghdad and Mossul, without success. Thereafter he moved to Kars (1744-45), where he defeated the Ottomans. The peace with Iran (1746) confirmed the border identified during the rule of Murad IV (1639).

 In 1736 Russia attacked the khanate of the Crimea and Bessarabia, with the intent of gaining access to the Black Sea. Shortly thereafter, Habsburg troops entered the Ottoman Balkans and moved on Bosnia, Nish, and northern Bulgaria. But both the Russians and Austrians were defeated in the Crimea and in the Balkans. In 1738 the Russians attacked for a second time the Crimea and Bendery (Moldavia) but were again unsuccessful. Meanwhile the Ottomans launched an offensive against the Austrians and finally reconquered Serbia and Belgrade (1739). The Treaty of Belgrade (4 September 1739), signed with the Habsburgs and Russia, recognized the Ottoman gains.

 The Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-74, which broke out due to Russo-Ottoman disagreement concerning the royal succession in Poland, resulted in disaster for the Ottomans and provoked wide-ranging political consequences. During this long conflict the Russian Baltic fleet reached the eastern Mediterranean and burned the Ottoman fleet in Çeşme (İzmir, 1770); Russians instigated a Greek revolt in the Morea (1770); the Crimea and the adjacent Black Sea shores were occupied (1771); and Russian troops penetrated as far south as Bulgaria (1774). The main points in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (21 July 1774) were recognition of the independence of the khanate of the Crimea; annexation of the northern Black Sea shores by Russia; increasing Russian influence in the Caucasus; freedom for Russian merchant vessels to enter the Black Sea ports; and acknowledgment of Russia as the protector of the Orthodox populations in Wallachia and Moldavia, and in the Aegean islands.

 This war clearly displayed Russia’s military superiority over the Ottomans, as well as its design to establish domination over the Balkans by establishing itself as the protector of the Ottoman Orthodox populations. The Balkan Christians realized the vulnerability of the Ottoman state and began to look upon Russia as a supporter of their separatist aims. The Ottoman Empire ceased to be a great power in Eastern Europe.

 A war declared in 1786 by the Ottomans against Russia in the hope of regaining the Crimea resulted in further territorial losses. The Austrians, perceiving an opportunity for expansion, attacked Bosnia, northern Bulgaria, and Moldavia but were pushed back to the Habsburg lands. The Russians, however, defeated the Ottomans both in Bessarabia and in the northern Caucasus (1788-90). Since by 1791 all sides sought peace – Austria and Russia had become worried about the effects of the French Revolution in Europe – the war came to an end the next year. The Ottoman-Habsburg peace of Sistova (Ziştovi, 1791) preserved the previous borders; the Russians acquired Bessarabia at the Peace of Yassy (Yaş, 1792).

 The history of the Ottoman Empire from 1792 until its dissolution was to a great extent determined by diplomacy and struggle among the great powers – Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, and Austria – to take control of parts of the Ottoman realm, and by Ottoman tactics to resist these ambitions. Ottoman reform measures in the 19th and the early 20th centuries to strengthen the administration and the army, in order to preserve the empire’s territorial integrity, must be understood within this context. Another feature of this period was the manifestation of non-Muslim (Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Armenian) and non-Turkish Muslim (Albanian, Arab) nationalism, movements that were supported to an extent by the great powers. Not surprisingly, to a considerable degree Ottoman reform was designed to strengthen the state’s legitimacy among subject populations.

 Mustafa III’s son Selim III (r. 1789-1807) was well aware of the general disorder of the Ottoman armies and the weakness of the empire vis-à-vis Christian Europe. Before his time, steps had been taken to strengthen the army, but Selim and some of his advisers realized the need to launch more comprehensive institutional reforms.

 Between 1792 and 1807 the *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* (“New Order”) reforms were undertaken, with the aim of modernizing the army and reforming the administrative system and the economic structure. An alternative military unit was set up, organized, and trained along European lines. But the Janissaries and parts of the *ilmiyye* and the bureaucracy, worried about the possibility of the dissolution of the Janissary corps and uninterested in the centralization of power in the hands of the sultan, instigated a revolt whereby Selim was deposed.

 His succcessor, Mustafa IV (r. 1807-08), was an advocate of conservatism. But supporters of reform headed by Alemdâr Mustafa Pasha succeeded in deposing Mustafa IV in favor of his younger brother, Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839). The conservative forces were still powerful, but in the years 1810-22 he was able to minimize the local power of the provincial notables and restore central authority. Only the abolition of the Janissary corps, a bulwark against centralizing reforms, could now open the way for far-reaching structural changes; the opportunity came in 1826, a time when the Janissaries proved ineffective against Greek rebels.

 The reign of Mahmud II witnessed a number of disasters – the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-12, leading to the complete loss of Bessarabia and the partial autonomy of Serbia; the Greek war of liberation of 1821-29, resulting in the independence of Greece; the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-29, which guaranteed the emergence of Greece, led to greater autonomy for Serbia, and secured additional Caucasian territories to Russia; and war between the rebellious governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali Pasha, and the Sublime Porte (1830-33, resumed in 1839) that brought the semi-independence of Egypt. On the other hand, the first steps toward the foundation of a modern state structure were made, followed by the Imperial Rescript of *Gülhane* (3 November 1839).

 Mahmud II was followed by his sons Abdülmecid (r. 1839-61) and Abdülaziz (r. 1861-76). The years between 1839 and 1871 witnessed domination by the Sublime Porte bureaucracy, headed by Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800-58), Âlî Pasha (1815-71), and Fuad Pasha (1815-69). During the grand vizierate of Mustafa Reşid Pasha the Ottomans moved closer to Great Britain, but the Crimean War (1853-56) and the ensuing period until the death of Âlî Pasha brought greater French diplomatic influence in the capital. The Crimean War, which originally broke out between Russia and the Ottoman Empire over the question of the Holy Places in Palestine, drew in France and Great Britain on the Ottoman side. The Treaty of Paris (30 March 1856) and the Imperial Rescript of Reforms secured the recognition of the Ottomans as part of the Concert of Europe.

 Although authoritarian, the hegemony of the Sublime Porte bureaucracy ensured a relatively orderly functioning of the administrative mechanism. After the death of Âlî Pasha, however, Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha (1818-83) tried after 1871 to revive sultanic absolutism, in the person of Abdülaziz. But these attempts led only to general chaos and political instability within the empire.

 An opposition movement known as the Young Ottomans, which had been active since 1865, aimed at introducing constitutional parliamentary rule. Between 1873 and 1876, members of this movement were banished to remote provinces. But Midhat Pasha, who believed in the parliamentary regime as a panacea for the empire, orchestrated in collaboration with the army and the *medrese* students a *coup d’état* that succeeded in deposing Abdülaziz in favor of Murad V (r. 1876). Murad V, suffering a nervous breakdown in the same year, was succeeded by his younger brother, Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909). Midhat Pasha and the Young Ottomans drafted the first Ottoman constitution and convened the first Ottoman parliament. This parliamentary experiment, also called the First Constitutional Period, lasted only from 1877 to 1878, when Abdülhamid II dissolved the assembly; it was not to be convened again until 1908.

 The constitutional experiment was launched under rather unfavorable domestic and international circumstances – the bankruptcy of the Ottoman state and the declaration of a moratorium (1875); Slavic revolt in Herzegovina (1875), a Bulgarian revolt (1876), and an Ottoman-Serbian war (1875-76); and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, leading to the Congress of Berlin (1878) and the loss of Bulgaria, Bosnia, Thessaly, and Cyprus in the west and of Kars and Batum in the east. These critical events gave Abdülhamid an opportunity to reestablish sultanic autocracy and prohibit independent political activity.

 The main opposition activities against the Hamidian police regime were the Young Turks and Armenian nationalist committees. The Young Turks consisted of various secret groups, which included members of various non-Turkish nationalities (Arabs, Albanians) as well as Turkish groupings. Though all of them shared the goal of restoring a parliamentary regime, there was no agreement on more specific political issues. The first Young Turk Congress (in Paris, 4-9 February 1902) provoked a fundamental breach between those who wanted to introduce a decentralized political system within the empire and those who were in favor of centralization. The former, mainly non-Turks and Turkish liberals like Prince Sabahaddin (1878-1948), believed in the need for foreign military intervention to depose Abdülhamid II. The latter, represented by Ahmed Rıza (1859-1930), opposed any foreign intervention. Of these groups, it was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), headed by Ahmed Rıza after 1906, that established itself among young army officers and forced Abdülhamid II to revive the parliament (1908).

 The Armenians, for their part, sought autonomy or an independent state in Anatolia. The Hamidian regime countered increasing nationalist activities in central and eastern Anatolia by using local Kurdish tribes against the Armenians. Wholesale massacres of Armenian communities between 1894 and 1896 were an outcome of this policy.

 The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 ushered a period of political pluralism. Though the CUP as the engineer of the revolution had a clear political advantage during the first parliamentary elections in November 1908, disagreements on the future structure of the empire produced opposition parties. While the Liberal Party (*Ahrâr Fırkası*) was close to Prince Sabahaddin, the Moderate Lovers of Freedom Party (*Mutedil Hürriyetperverân Fırkası*) represented the feudal interests of the tribal leaders of peripheral provinces. In contrast, the People’s Party (*Ahâli Fırkası*) of the *ilmiyye-*class and the Ottoman Democrat Party (*Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası*) were close to what is known as post-1945 social democratic ideals. However, the first serious challenge to the CUP government came from the Society of Muhammadan Union (*İttihâd-ı Muhammedî Cemiyyeti*), which emerged as a reaction to the increasingly authoritarian tendency of the CUP. This organization, together with the Liberal Party, instigated the Revolt of 31 March 1909, but was suppressed through army units from Thessaloniki.

 The CUP used the opportunity of suppressing this revolt to depose Abdülhamid II and provide the accession of his brother, Mehmed V Reşad (r. 1909-18). Ensuring the support of the army commander Mahmud Şevket Pasha, the CUP strengthened its grip over the imperial capital. When it became clear that individual oppositional parties were unable to compete with the CUP in elections, some of these parties came together and founded in November 1911 the Freedom and Friendship Party (*Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası*, FFP). However, quarrels between CUP and FFP led to the political destabilization of the empire, which encouraged Italy and the Balkan states to attack Ottoman lands.

 Though the Young Turk Revolution created high expectations about the future of the empire, subsequent events proved that the disintegration process did not stop. The early months of the Second Constitutional Period (1908-18) witnessed the complete separation of Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Crete. Revolts in Albania, southern Syria, and Yemen could not be suppressed (1910-11). Italy occupied the provinces of Tripolitany and Benghasi (present-day Libya, 1911-12). The Balkan Wars (1912-13) ended with the Ottoman retreat from all its Balkan possessions except Edirne and eastern Thrace.

 These events convinced the CUP, regarding itself as the main representative of the Turkish population, of the futility of a participatory political system. The *coup d’état* of 1913 estab-lished the domination of the “triumvirate” of Enver Pasha (1881-1922), Cemal Pasha (1872-1922), and Talât Pasha (1874-1921). Mehmed V acted merely as a puppet figure, ratifying the decisions of the government. All opposition parties, including the FFP, were outlawed; censorship was imposed upon the media.

 The accelerating disintegration of the empire and the alliance of the Ottoman archenemy Russia with Great Britain and France forced the CUP to take sides with Germany and Austria-Hungary. This power constellation also contributed to the Otto-man participation in World War I. Fighting in the Caucasus, the Dardanelles, and in Iraq and Palestine, with the Ottomans mostly on the defensive, did not prevent the ultimate collapse of the empire. During the warfare the Armenians of Anatolia, suspected by the CUP of collaborating with the Allies, were either massacred or forcibly deported from Anatolia to Syria, and many of them also died during the deportation (1915), leading to the physical annihilation of the Armenian people of Anatolia. When the Ottoman state surrendered on 30 October 1918, all Ottoman lands except for Anatolia were occupied by the Allies.

 The Allies planned to partition Anatolia, an intention that later found expression in the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920). Greece took advantage of the weakness of the empire to invade Anatolia. Since the new sultan, Mehmed VI Vahideddin (r. 1918-22), was inclined to yield to the pressures of the Allies, the overall situation encouraged the organization of a Turkish nationalist movement in Anatolia, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938). Domestic and international recognition of the Turkish government in Ankara brought a decline in importance of the Ottoman regime in Istanbul. Victory of the Anatolian forces over the Greeks (30 August 1922) symbolized the emergence of a new state in Turkey. Mehmed VI, denounced as a collaborator with the enemy, fled from Turkey. The Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923), which legally terminated the existence of the empire, and the formal declaration of the republic (29 October 1923), were the final steps in the dissolution of the Ottoman state. The successor of Mehmed VI, Abdülmecid II (1922-1924), held only the spiritual title of caliph and had to leave the country when the caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924. This last measure signified the end of the Ottoman dynasty in Turkey – and, in fact, the political history of the Ottoman Empire.

**Ottoman Economy: Decay and Resistance**

Ottoman economic history throughout its imperial existence can be roughly understood in terms of three main eras. The first era is characterized by the predominance of an agricultural system where exchange in kind was characteristic, liquidity limited to urban trade centers, and peasantry more or less bound to the soil. The following era, emerging toward the end of the 16th century, is signified by the expansion of monetarization in the agricultural sector, predominance of tax-farming, and disappearance of soil-bound peasantry. The final era, from the early 19th century onwards, indicates the integration of the Ottoman Empire into world market, economic liberalism, and domination of industrial nations over Ottoman markets. A late deviation from the latter pattern is the national economy policy of the CUP during the Second Constitutional Period.

 Early Ottomans inherited and incorporated ancient agricultural practices and traditions prevalent since the East Roman Empire, Byzantium as well as former Balkan kingdoms. Prior to the 16th century Ottoman lands were characterized by low population, presence of few urban centers, a clear status differentiation of ruling military class and the tax-paying population, prevalence of state control over cereal-growing agricultural lands, and a patrimonial understanding of the government concerning economy. The central authority perceived itself as the “generous state” (*kerîm devlet*), entitled to feed its population. Production was evaluated in traditional religious terms, where excessive profit was considered to be abominable. This attitude was supported by the political concern of preventing the emergence of autonomous socio-political groups threatening the monopoly of state authority. The rather rigidity of the agricultural *timar*-system (see above) was combined by the stiffness of the guild-structure in Ottoman towns, where competition was restricted through monopolistic regulations.

 However, domestic commercial life was widespread, and even some villages were a part of trade network. Cities such as Bursa, Amasya, and Istanbul were well-known centers of silk production and international trade, and marked by the presence of Florentine merchant communities. Due to patrimonial practices, the Ottoman state remained unable to develop the notion of state economy and pursue mercantilist policies. The army consisted mainly of *sipahi*s, fed by the *timar*s and therefore did not form a financial burden to the state. In addition Ottoman conquests from the 14th to the 16th centuries were a source of major financial income and served to fill the coffers of the state.

 Probably the most significant structural change of the 16th century constituted population growth. During the same period private and pious foundation (*vakıf*) lands increased at the expense of state lands. In this process peasantry became more independent and increasingly refused to obey the *sipahi*s, and the status differentiation between the ruling class and the productive masses began to lose its rigidity. Numerous peasants left their villages and either migrated to towns and entered medreses or became mercenaries and acquired the ability to use firearms.

 The increasing flow of cheap silver from the New World into the Ottoman lands constituted another crucial but critical structural event. Since imperial currency was based on silver *akçe*, the loss of its monetary value promoted an increase of trade deficit between mercantilist Europe and the empire. Capitulations, granted to major trade powers such as France and Britain, provided the growing import of manufactured goods. The presence of cheap silver also had inflationary consequences, leading to the impoverishment of the state and its agents such as the *sipahi*s. A major debasement of coins in 1584-86 led to a bloody uprising of the Janissaries in the capital.

 Meanwhile, the growing population of the late 16th century created an increasing demand for new land while formerly dismissed *sipahi*sexerted pressure on the administration for further conquests as a means of creating new *timar*s. These pressures compelled the empire to open exhausting campaigns against Iran (1578-90 and 1603-12) and the Habsburg Empire (1592-1606). However, conquest as a financial source had ceased to be profitable. Since warfare on the European front demanded troops equipped with firearms, the increasingly obsolete *sipahi-*cavalry had to be replaced by the Janissary corps as well as mercenaries of peasant origins (*levends*, *sekbans*). The rapid increase of these cash-paid troops created a major financial burden for the treasury. Furthermore, during periods of peace the *levends* and *sekbans*, when being dismissed from government service and devoid of payment, used to plunder villages and towns, thus becoming a source of insecurity in the provinces.

 One efficient means of providing ready cash money was tax-farming. While tax-farming was previously applied only at a limited extent, the late 16th century witnessed an expansion of this practice throughout state agricultural lands, resulting effectively in the bankcruptcy of the *timar*-system. Tax-farmers, leasing lands for a short period for one to three years, exploited the peasantry to an extreme degree. At the same time, existing taxes were dramatically raised, and a series of new taxes were introduced.

 The 17th century began with the social upheaval of Celâlî-rebellions where dismissed *sipahi*s, *sekban*s and *levend*s roamed the countryside as well as provincial towns. The combined conditions of Celâlî attacks, extortions of tax-farmers and the inability to pay drastically-raised taxes forced masses of Anatolian and Balkan peasants to flee from their villages for safety in remote locations. The immediate economic consequence was a sharp decrease in agricultural production. Overall insecurity in the provinces, combined with the climatic conditions of the Little Ice Age, led to the decline of the population of Anatolian towns, decrease in overall trade as well as in artisanal production.

 The Iranian wars stopped the import of raw materials for silk production in the Ottoman lands, which adversely influenced the silk industries of Bursa and the Morea. At the same time a general decline in purchasing power of the domestic markets weakened the demand for silk textiles as well as other manufactured goods.

 Conditions of economic decline reversed toward the middle of the 17th century, when trade and artisanal production began to increase. An overall expansion in raw wool textiles as well as *aba* (stout coarse woolen cloth) production could be observed. However, Ottoman lands increasingly became exporters of agricultural products. Izmir emerged as a new port of international trade. Despite the rising import of Western textiles, Ottoman artisanal production still competed with European goods. The value share of international transactions within general Ottoman trade remained limited, and Ottoman merchants maintained their autonomous trade networks. Ottoman economy was still outside world economy, preserving its internal dynamism.

 Since *akçe* as the main Ottoman currency lost its stability of value, foreign currencies such as the Dutch *thaler* (in Ottoman Turkish *esedi kuruş*), the Spanish *real* (in Ottoman Turkish *riyal kuruş*) or the Polish isolette (in Ottoman Turkish *zolota*) flooded domestic markets. This situation lasted until 1690 when the administration undertook a monetary reform by introducing the *kuruş*, again on the basis of silver standard.

 The warfare with the Holy Alliance (1683-99) created social disorder; the state again resorted to tax extortions, and a general decline of security in the countryside forced masses of peasants to flee their villages. In order to promote agricultural production, strengthen social stability and at the same time ensure cash flow, the Sublime Porte introduced the system of life lease of state lands (*malikâne*) to tax-farmers. This procedure encouraged the rise of the *âyâns* as a new economic and social force in the provinces. In correlation with this development big farms (*çiftlik*) emerged in regions such as Macedonia and West Anatolia, and Ottoman agriculture experienced increased commercialization.

 During the 18th century Ottoman-European commercial relations came to be dominated by France. Ottoman exports included raw materials such as cotton, tobacco as well as wool, while imports consisted of manufactured products. Meanwhile non-Muslims rose to prominence among those Ottoman merchants specialized in trade with Europe. Numerous merchants acquired European passports in order to gain extraterritoriality within the imperial borders and benefit from the capitulations. The Ottoman state, on the other hand, did not take any protective measures to support local merchants vis-à-vis their foreign competitors. The Sublime Porte failed to pursue, until the final quarter of the century, a policy directed at preserving Ottoman-foreign trade balance.

 While failing to take protective measures, the Ottoman state remained suspicious towards accumulation of wealth among individuals. Since the state did not give a guarantee for the inviolability of private property, even rich merchants could not form established commercial dynasties. This lack of a legal guarantee for property affected the development of Ottoman manufacturing. Until the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-74 Ottoman manufacturing did expand mainly through state investments. Factories for the production of items like glass, soap, sugar, paper, textiles, gun powder etc. were founded. However, the administration strongly distrusted private persons to invest in major manufacturing ventures due to the concern of disrupting the existing guild system. Since the state remained fixed in its patrimonial economic view and failed to value mercantilism, capital accumulation based on commercial activities could not be invested in manufacturing ventures.

 The Russo-Ottoman War constitutes a turning point in Ottoman economic history. A direct consequence was the opening of the Black Sea for Russian trade activities. However, the defeat, followed by a series of other wars with Russia and Austria, meant a major blow on Ottoman finances. The state was forced to resort to extraordinary taxes; another measure was a return to the ancient policy of the debasement of the hitherto relatively stable *kuruş*. Meanwhile, the apparent military weakness of the Ottoman state emboldened the *âyân*s to assert their autonomy vis-à-vis the central authority. As a consequence, power struggles among provincial *âyân*s as well as the inability of the Sublime Porte to ensure security on roads impaired domestic and international trade; numerous trade fairs in Balkan and Anatolian towns dwindled or disappeared.

 On the other hand, overall Ottoman trade with Europe increased significantly during the latter quarter of the 18th century. This increase was accompanied by a rise in the ratio of raw materials in overall exports and of manufactured goods in imports. At the same time, the role of Western merchants in Ottoman port cities became essential. However, the share of Ottoman trade within the general volume of world trade dwindled to a major extent; there was no Ottoman presence in the rapidly expanding markets outside the Mediterranean realm. The growing Ottoman dependency to Western trade signified the peripherisation of Ottoman economy.

 The Ottoman ruling elite began to consider seriously only after 1774 the notion of mercantilism, the importance of balanced trade as well as the protection of Ottoman merchant class. Administrators like Grand Vizier Halil Hâmid Pasha or Sultan Selim III supported policies to increase agricultural productivity, granted privileges to local merchants, promoted measures to decrease the import of manufactured goods and to open factories to produce some of these goods. However, political instability and constant warfare between 1774 and 1839 proved to be insurmountable obstacles to realize a significant transformation in Ottoman economic life.

 The invasion of cheap British products as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution meant a major blow on Ottoman artisanal production, particularly on textile manufacture. This development was combined with the destruction of the Janissary corps, which used to represent the economic interests of guilds. The subsequent Anglo-Ottoman trade agreement of 1838 stipulated the prohibition of state monopolies and guild privileges, ensuring a full freedom for foreign merchants to enter Ottoman markets. The Ottoman state effectively began to pursue a liberal economic policy.

 Recent research reveals that the integration of Ottoman markets into world economy did not result in a complete destruction of Ottoman manufacture. While production within the framework of guilds suffered serious setbacks, manufacturing sectors outside the guild system proved to be resilient to foreign competition. These mostly provincial workshops produced items such as carpets, lacework, various types of braids as well as silk textiles. Despite the fact that the production organization often did not exceed the scale of households, such production units adopted new but cheap and practical Western technologies and reduced the product prices. Such goods were destined to domestic as well as foreign markets.

 However, except for state plants serving the army and the civil service, major-scale production units were, until the 1870s, nearly non-existent. During the final quarter of the 19th century a light industry with a limited scope emerged in cities like Istanbul, Thessaloniki, Izmir, Bursa, Samsun, where items such as flour, spaghetti, beer, cigarettes were produced. Around the same time, textile workshops expanded in locations like Istanbul, Thessaloniki, Edirne, Bursa, Adana, Erzurum, Aleppo, and Mount Lebanon.

 Ottoman trade with Western Europe continued to expand in the course of the century. Main import items included various textiles, cotton goods as well as victuals like wheat, flour, sugar, tea, coffee, rice etc. Export items consisted of dry grapes and figs, opium, tobacco, animal skin, raw wool, raw cotton, raw silk. The only significant manufactured export item were carpets. However, Ottoman foreign trade still remained minor in comparison to the volume of domestic trade. Significantly, whereas foreign merchants dominated internal commerce in the first half of the century, they were increasingly replaced by non-Muslim Ottoman merchants during the second half. The expansion of railroad lines in the Balkan provinces, west Anatolia, Cilicia and Syria promoted the opening of these regions to world market.

 In order to comprehend overall structural changes in the Ottoman Empire in her final century, territorial as well as demographic parameters have to be considered. In 1800 the empire covered around 3 million km2 with a population of nearly 26 million. In 1914 the empire had decreased to 1.4 million km2 including a population of around 18.5 million. These figures imply that despite major territorial losses throughout the century and a decrease of population in terms of absolute numbers, the overall population density had risen to a certain extent, which in turn indicates some degree of population increase. The destruction of the political power of the *âyân*s in the first decades of the century, the promulgation of the Land Law of 1858 and the government-induced settlement of bedouin as well as Turcoman tribes in Anatolia and Syria strongly promoted the expansion of agricultural lands and production. The construction of the Anatolian railway in the 1890s boosted the export of Central Anatolian wheat. With the exception of the global financial crisis of 1873-96 the rise of world wheat prices was beneficial for Ottoman producers.

 Despite the growth of population, however, the relative population density still remained rather low. As a consequence intensive means of agricultural production did not develop, agricultural technologies in general remained primitive, and the level of productivity per farming unit remained stagnant. The emergence of new wheat-producing regions such as Canada and Australia in the early 20th century led to a relative marginalization of Ottoman agriculture.

 Throughout the 19th century Sublime Porte was plagued by financial shortcomings. Despite the fact that centralization provided a substantial rise in tax revenues, expenses of the growth of a new state apparatus and a new army, the increase of luxury imports due to Westernized lifestyle among urban upper classes, and difficulty in raising customs duties because of economic liberalization placed Ottoman state finances into dire straight. The currency reform of 1844 created a stable *kuruş*, *mecidiyye*, and a gold *lira*, which, however, obstructed the government to employ debasement strategies as a means of public financing. Increased borrowings from international markets after 1854 were not invested in productive sectors, and shortly after the beginning of the global financial crisis of 1873 the Sublime Porte declared its inability to pay the interests of its debts (1875). The Debt Administration, founded in 1881 by European creditors and the Ottoman state, took over significant parts of agricultural lands, mines and ports. The revenues of these lands and businesses were allocated to debt payment services. The regular payment of debts ensured the Sublime Porte to take new credits, mainly from Germany and France.

 The years following the Crimean War displayed a growing tendency among sections of the Ottoman state elite for interventionism and protectionism. Ottoman statesmen such as Âlî Pasha tried, without success, to abolish capitulations. From the 1860s onwards Sublime Porte undertook steps to protect Ottoman manufacture. Between 1867 and 1874 an Industrial Reform Commission adopted measures to revitalize Ottoman guilds. However, these endeavors to promote guilds proved to be a failure.

 Following the Young Turk Revolution the new regime initially supported liberal economic principles. The Balkan Wars and the military dictatorship of CUP, however, strengthened Turkish nationalist tendencies also in economic policies. The strong presence of foreign, Levantine, and local non-Muslim merchants and entrepreneurs, many of them being protected by foreign passports and capitulations, had been considered by the CUP as an outcome of semi-colonial dependency to European countries. From 1913 onwards Levantines as well as Greeks and Armenians were subjected to systematic expropriations, while the CUP-regime promoted the emergence of a Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie. When World War I broke out the Sublime Porte unilaterally abolished capitulations, and the national economy (*millî iktisad*) policy, inspired by Friedrich List’s ideas of protectionism, was applied in a systematic way. Though the Ottoman Empire disintegrated at the end of the war, the successor state, the Turkish Republic, continued a similar policy well until 1945.

**Ottoman Civilization**

The Ottomans formed the last great Mediterranean Muslim empire and civilization. A relationship arguably existed between the Abbasids and the Ottomans comparable to that between ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, wherein the former contributed in theoretical sciences and the latter emerged as a pragmatic civilization. The Ottomans took over the scientific and cultural achievements of the Abbasids, and making themselves mainly pragmatic contributions. Thus, Ottoman creativity appears mostly in areas closely connected with the organization and administration of the empire. In the heyday of the empire, the Ottoman ruling class regarded the state as the protector of the ideal order (*nizâm-ı âlem*, “world order”), a normative concept based on Islamic law and ancient Near Eastern as well as Central Asian political traditions. Here the Ottoman state assumed the function of the protector of religion, justice, and welfare.

 It is noteworthy that Ottoman scientific accomplishments in such fields as mathematics, astronomy, and medicine appeared mainly in the first two centuries of Ottoman political existence –

that is, before the institutional settlement of the empire in the mid-15th century. This was a period when the bureaucratization of the *ilmiyye* class was only beginning and Sunni Islamic scholasticism had not become an absolute norm in *medrese* life. A number of Anatolian scholars were originally from other Turcoman principalities or had close intellectual ties with Cairo (the Mamluk sultanate) or with Samarkand (Central Asia). Astronomers and mathematicians like Kadızâde-i Rûmî (1337-1412), Ali Kuşcu (?-1474), Sinan Pasha (1440?-86), and Mirim Çelebi (?-1525), physicians like Murad bin İshak (fourteenth century), Şeyh Cemâleddin Aksarayî (?-1388), Hacı Paşa (1334/35-1413?), and Sabuncuoğlu Şerefeddin Ali (1386-after 1468) belonged to this early period. After the sixteenth century, one encounters only sporadic scholars who dealt with the natural sciences and mathematics in an experimental or nonscholastic way. In mathematics, names like Matrakçı Nasuh (?-1564?) and Ali bin Veli bin Hamza el-Magribi (?- 1614), and in medicine those of Davud bin Ömer el-Antakî (1511-99) and Emir Çelebi (?-1638), could be mentioned.

 Apart from the above, knowledge and sciences were approached principally in an encyclopedic way. Natural sciences and mathematics were classified within the context of Islamic theology, and rational sciences were considered, together with Islamic sciences, as spiritual sciences. Under the influence of Hocazâde Muslihiddin Mustafa (?-1488), Ottoman *medrese*s adopted the theological approach of Imam Ghazali (1058-1111), which discredited pure philosophical thought. This development was one of the reasons why speculative thought did not flourish in Ottoman scholarly circles. One could mention among Ottoman encyclopedic scholars such figures as Molla Fenarî (?-1430-31), Lutfî Tokadî (?-1494), Taşköprülüzâde İsameddin Ahmed (1495-1561), Kâtib Çelebi (1608-1656), and İbrahim Hakkı Efendi (Erzurumlu) (1703-80).

 The military expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean Basin, Asia, and the Indian Ocean during the sixteenth century led to Ottoman contributions in the geographical sciences and cartography. Sailors like Pirî Reis (1470-1554) and Seydî Ali Reis (1498?-1563) are known to have written works on marine geography that were relatively accurate for their time. Pirî Reis in particular is remembered for his famous world map (1513), which showed the Atlantic ocean, the Antilles, and the eastern shores of South America. Matrakçı Nasuh made contributions with detailed geographical descriptions of Anatolia and Mesopotamia and with miniature maps of major towns of these regions. The traveler Evliyâ Çelebi (1611-after 1682?), with his elaborate accounts of the geography, history, and the cultural traditions of places he saw, was an anthropologist of his time. Even today linguists study the language examples recorded in his *Seyahatnâme* (“Travelbook”) for such regions as the Caucasus to understand the historical development of regional languages.

 As members of the ruling military class of a centralized bureau-cratic empire, numerous *ilmiyye* individuals distinguished them-selves in Sunni Hanefi jurisprudence. Scholars like Molla Fenarî, Molla Hüsrev (?-1480), Molla Gûrânî (1416-88), Kemal Paşazâde (1468-1534), and Ebussuud Efendi (1490-1575) wrote treatises and undertook legal interpretations that reconciled the imperial interests of the Ottoman state with Islamic law. These activities promoted the development of a rich literature of Islamic jurisprudence, one that was not matched by any other premodern Islamic state. However, the object of harmonizing theology with the interests of the state resulted in an increasing state-centered religious orthodoxy that often did not tolerate divergent religious ideas, either of Shii or of puritan character.

 The Ottoman traditional self-perception of political and social order understood the reason for existence in terms of the welfare of society. Within this context, pious foundations (*vakıf*) played a major role in the construction and maintenance of public works and services. Public institutions, called complexes (*imâret*) and supported by pious foundations, offered services in a multitude of areas, such as the maintenance of roads, passages, and bridges; the operation of caravanserails, covered markets, baths, mosques, primary schools, *medrese*s, libraries, and hospitals; and organization of food doles. Each former Ottoman town in the Balkans, Anatolia, or in Arab lands displays today ruins of such a complex in its center.

 Perhaps the most conspicuous visual symbol of Ottoman civili-zation appears in architectural style, particularly that of mosques. Even the early Muslim Turks of Central Asia and the Seljukids showed a tendency toward domes and slim minarets. The Hagia Sophia provided an important architectural example for the maturation of the classical Ottoman mosque style. With the work of Mimar Sinan (1490-1588), Ottoman architectural style reached its perfection. In contrast to the previous Seljukid and early Ottoman mosques, with their modest size, mosques from the late fifteenth century onwards became distinguished by the awe-inspiring spaciousness of their interiors, probably symbolizing imperial greatness. All major towns in the eastern Mediterranean, from Sarajevo to Cairo, reveal today their Ottoman past by mosques with main domes and slim minarets.

 The Ottomans also developed distinct styles in the visual arts. Many of the public buildings used *çini* tiles for the decoration of interior walls. These depicted, in contrast to the geometric designs in other Islamic civilizations, dominantly flower motifs, as well as ornamented writings of Quranic verses or prophetic sayings. Another branch of the visual arts, miniature painting, acquired a distinctive Ottoman character by its unpretentious style and realistic and detailed depictions of objects.

 As for literary arts, it was the Ottoman court literature (*divân edebiyatı*) that most closely reflected the aesthetic taste of the ruling military class and displayed the cosmopolitan character of the educated elite. Though the literary language was Ottoman Turkish, heavy vocabulary and stylistic borrowings from Arabic and Persian produced a rich and elaborate artificial language with the character of a “universal Islamic language,” symbolizing the claim of the Ottomans to govern a universal Islamic empire. Many Ottoman literary personalities were in fact bureaucrats and administrators, partly due to the fact that creativity in literary fields was regarded as a sign of refinement and gentlemanliness.

 An institutional factor contributing to the cultivation of literature and the fine arts was the *Mevlevî* order, with its convents. The readings of the mystical poems of Celâleddin Rûmî and the application of music to *Mevlevî* rituals underpinned the flourishing of Sufi poetry and Turkish classical music in this milieu. Many members of the urban population having intellectual inclinations were followers of this order.

 In contrast to Sunni orthodoxy, which was established among members of the *ilmiyye*, Sufi orders of various kinds were widely followed among the Muslim Ottoman population. Some of the orders were close to Sunni Islam, like the *Halvetî*s and the *Nakşbendî*s, which mostly did not form an opposition to the central authority. Other orders, which were closer to Shia, such as the *Bektaşî*s, the *Melâmî*s, and the *Kalenderî*s, were sources of popular discontent against the Ottoman state. The *Kalenderî*s and the *Kızılbaş* in particular fomented rebellions in Anatolia during the sixteenth century, and they suffered persecution. The *Bektaşî* order, though holding heterodox views, was closely connected with the Janissary corps and thus remained on good terms with the central authority until the dissolution of the corps in 1826.

 Ottoman self-confidence in its own technological abilities disappeared completely after the wars of 1683-99, when the Ottoman ruling elite was forced to acknowledge European military and technological superiority. From 1789 onward, Ottoman reformist circles considered limited military innovations insufficient and took steps toward more comprehensive institutional reforms. The 19th and early 20th centuries witnessed wide-ranging adaptations of European administrative and cultural institutions. Despite this, Ottoman civilization, even during the periods of extensive reforms, remained self-centered, and it was the Ottomans who determined the scope and extent of reforms. Such steps as were adopted were mostly undertaken on the basis of the information provided by Ottoman envoys to European capitals. The new Western-type administrative institutions were reshaped according to the needs of the central authority. In fact, Ottomans only sent very few students for education at European schools and universities; most of the later educated elite were graduates of government schools founded in Istanbul.

 Certain aspects of the classical self-perception of the Ottoman ruling elite seem to have continued in the 19th and the early 20th centuries. Though the traditional notion of the *nizâm-ı âlem* disappeared, the Ottoman state continued to regard itself as the agent of law and order. During the reform period the concept of material progress (*terakki*) in the sense of the European Enlightenment was applied in terms of the “reorganizations” (*Tanzimat*) of the internal order toward regularity, discipline, and efficiency. The ultimate object of these reorganizations remained basically pragmatic – administrative centralization, with the aim of saving the state and the empire.

 As in earlier periods, Ottoman intellectual thought in the 19th and early 20th centuries remained basically within the context of state-centered pragmatism, with no substantial theoretical or speculative approach. One significant exception was Namık Kemal, who attempted to formulate a theoretical synthesis. He, for the first time in Islamic history, contemplated the issue of the compatibility of Western types of reforms and Islam. A critic of the autocracy of the Sublime Porte, he supported the introduction of the parliamentary system into the empire. In so doing, Namık Kemal tried to formulate a political theory by synthesizing Enlightenment political notions and Islamic concepts. After Namık Kemal, the Islamic Modernists dealt with the issue of adapting Western institutions and technology without contradicting Islam, but they remained within the limits of pragmatism.

 Another speculative attempt was made by Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), an effort to establish the theory of Turkish nationalism and secularism. He analyzed pre-Islamic Turkish history, popular culture, and literature, and discussed the issues of education, Westernization, and religion in terms of the sociological theory of Émile Durkheim. Ziya Gökalp introduced the approach of “sociological Islamic jurisprudence” (*ictimâî usûl-i fıkıh*), by which he believed he could reconcile the requirements of Islam and the full secularization of the legal system.

 Aside from Namık Kemal, the Islamic Modernists, and Ziya Gökalp, late 19th-century and early 20th-century Ottomans imported two major schools of political thought from Europe. Members of the CUP adapted the French philosophical movement of Positivism, which suited both their secular aims and their centralist and authoritarian tendencies. Liberals, such as Prince Sabahaddin, on the other hand, believed that administrative decentralization and the promotion of individualism would neutralize the discontent of different ethnic groups, spark an economic boom, and thus guarantee the future of the empire. These approaches, though radically different, both sought the same pragmatic end of saving the empire.

 The founders of the Turkish Republic, some of whom were former members of the CUP, continued the positivistic legacy of the CUP by founding a secular republic.