BRILL

Political Participation from a Citizenship Perspective[1]

Ayşe Kadıoğlu
Sabancı University, Istanbul

Abstract

Conventional academic studies on political participation mostly focus on electoral politics including electoral systems, political party structures and their interaction with other governmental processes. These studies adopt an approach that presumes the existence of a pre-defined people (*demos*). Hence, existing literature on electoral politics and government structures take for granted a pre-defined *demos* and then survey participatory practices. Yet, there is another way to study political participation. It can be studied from the angle of citizenship. This involves an approach that does not rely on an *ex post facto* interest in the activities of a pre-defined demos but one that unravels the factors that go into its definition. Study of political participation from a citizenship perspective contains an effort to problematize the very notion of *demos*. Decoupling of national identity and participation empowers a vision of citizenship not as membership in a nation-state but as a set of rights that include multi-cultural rights. It is the contention of this article that European Union processes have the potential to contribute to the deepening of democratization by promoting diversity through introduction of denationalization of citizenship as well as processes of deliberation in member and candidate countries.

Introduction

In today's global world, participation can be problematized from two separate yet connected angles: First of all, in so far as participation serves the processes of democratization it is being divorced from the nation-state. Hence, one can

problematize participation by focusing on its denationalization. Second, as a result of the processes of globalization, participation has come to mean more than representation and hence voting in national elections. The rising importance of communicative processes involving civil societal organizations that function in and across nation-states signals the arrival of a new discourse of politics that is based less on power and zero-sum contests and more on reason and deliberation.

Political partcipation has recently been studied from a citizenship perspective especially within a literature that focuses on the organization of the European Union (EU). The first part of this article elaborates on the issue of denationalization of participation, using European examples as a prelude to the discussions about the Middle East. The second part of the article attempts to relate patterns of political participation from a citizenship perspective to government structures, and reviews the debates pertaining to entrusting the masses with political participation in the Middle East. The third part elaborates both the notion of denationalization in the Middle Eastern context and the notion of deliberative democracy. The growth of a literature on deliberative democracy points to the emergence of politics as above and beyond representative institutions. The denationalization of participation and its increasing perception as deliberation are connected processes. In the following pages, two questions accompany the discussions pertaining to participation: Who are the actors giving shape to the political realm and what type of activity does participation contain?

1. Denationalization of Participation: European Examples

1.1. *"We, the People . . .": What Constitutes the* Demos? *A Historical Account*

Modern reality is fragmented by nation-states. The political actors who participate in the shaping of modern liberal democracies are national citizens. Modern citizenship contains civil, political, and economic rights.[2] The civil

[2] For a description of the evolution of these three dimensions of citizenship, see the widely quoted works of T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950) and *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Chicago:

dimension of modern citizenship evolved in Europe in the course of the eighteenth century through the formation of courts and individual legal rights vis-a-vis the absolutist states. Political rights evolved in the course of the nineteenth century alongside the evolution of modern parliamentary systems. The social dimension of citizenship is a phenomenon of the twentieth century and is related to the welfare state practices. The political actors within the nation-states evolved alongside the civil, political, and social dimensions of citizenship, albeit not always in that order.

The sequence of the emergence of the three dimensions of citizenship accounts for the different trajectories of nation-state formation. In cases where democratization preceded bureaucratization, civil and legal rights acquired predominance to the detriment of social rights. In the United States, for instance, the notion of *social citizenship* became an oxymoron.[3] The United States citizens relate to the state either via contractual arrangements or aid they receive from the state as charity. As a result, it is not uncommon to view the recipients of welfare state benefits as lazy parasites who are unworthy of citizenship.[4] Despite the differences among the various trajectories followed towards nation-statehood, the citizens that emerged became the fundamental actors participating in modern politics.

Modern citizenship involves membership to a nation-state. It evolved along the evolution of various nationalisms in Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Various definitions of *us* and *them*, reflected in the concepts of *citizen* and *foreigner*, respectively, emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution. In England, for instance, the 1792 Aliens Bill was a direct response to the flight of French refugees from France.[5] In America and Switzerland, too, immigration control began as a reaction to French revolution and fears that Jacobin emissaries had infiltrated immigrant groups. The processes that converted *peasants* into *Frenchmen* were quickly being exported to the rest of the

---

University of Chicago Press, 1977). I discuss Marshall's rhetoric in relation to the evolution of Turkish citizenship in "Can We Envision Turkish Citizenship as Non-membership?" in *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, ed. E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet Içduygu (London: Routledge, 2005).

[3] Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, "Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship? On the Ideology of Contract-versus-charity," in *The Condition of Citizenship*, ed. Bart van Steenbergen (London: Sage, 1994).

[4] Typical statements reflecting this sentiment are presented in Murray B. Levin, *Talk Radio and the American Dream* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books/D. C. Heath and Co., 1987), 30–35.

[5] Richard Plender, *International Migration Law* (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972).

world and increasing levels of participation in ways that shaped the contours of modern politics.[6]

The French Revolution signalled a connection between the concepts of the *nation* and *people*. The nationalist ideology, in so far as it was based on the idea of self-determination as the supreme political good, went hand in hand with the notion of popular sovereignty. Immanuel Kant's (1724–1804) argument that individuals needed self-detemination in order to be truly human[7] was a great source of vitality for nationalism in that it paved the way to an understanding that the nations too aspired for autonomy and free will. The idea of national self-determination empowered the people who constituted the nations. As the notions of nationalism and popular sovereignity converged, nations became the source of sovereignity and the level of popular political particiation increased. Hence, at this point in history, the nation-state and political participation did not contradict each other, but rather national identity, and hence the nation-state, was a precondition for political participation.

Today, with the increasing importance of global processes, the notion of citizenship is becoming divorced from the nation-state. The nation-state, which once created the conditions for people to enter the political realm and determine their own destiny, began to fetter political participation. In fact, denationalization of power became necessary in order to widen the base of political participation.

The word *democracy* is derived from the Greek roots *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule). With the arrival of the age of the nation-states following the French Revolution, the subject of democracy, the *demos* began to be composed of national citizens, who acquired the rights to political participation associated with citizenship, principaly the right to vote in national elections. Today, there are various efforts to widen the boundaries of the *demos* in order to include those who are not passport-carrying members of the nation-states. These efforts are pursued by various international nongovernmental organizations, but are also kept on active political agendas of nation-states due to the policies of supranational and local administrations.

EU residents have the right to participate in elections that are local, regional, and Union-wide, but cannot participate in national elections of member

---

[6] Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

[7] *Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

countries of which they are not citizens. Hence, for member countries, while there is a decoupling of national identity and political participation at the local, regional, and Union-wide elections, political rights pertaining to national elections remain attached to national citizenship. Within the EU, the boundaries of the demos can best be analyzed by focusing on the legal status of immigrants from EU member states and those who are third (non-EU) country citizens.[8]

1.2. *Changing Conceptualization of* Demos*: Is* Demos *an* Ethnos*? The German Case*

In most countries, national citizenship and political participation are inherently connected. Hence, immigrants must become national citizens via naturalization in order to have the right to vote in national elections. As indicated above, EU residents can vote and run for and hold office at the local, regional, and Union-wide elections. Immigrants from countries that are not members of the EU (third-country citizens) have no participatory rights unless they become citizens via naturalization. EU states have different policies regarding naturalization that result in distinct models regarding the incorporation of immigrants from non-EU countries.

The distinction between the French and German nationalisms and respective policies regarding admission to citizenship has been widely studied.[9] At the annual meeting of the International Association of Middle Eastern Studies in Berlin (October 4-8, 2000), the keynote speaker Ali Mazrui made a rather remarkable observation on this matter. He maintained that in France, a person who is Arab is treated as the other regardless of whether he speaks excellent French and has internalized French culture. In Germany, on the other hand, an Arab is not even considered fit to speak excellent German and internalize German culture. Hence, he cannot even begin to integrate into the German society. This distinction sums up clearly the main difference between the

---

[8] Seyla Benhabib, in her powerfully argued and comparatively informative study, maintains that "there are three competing models of political incorporation of immigrants into the European Union: the German, the French, and the Dutch." *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 156.

[9] See, for instance, Hans Kohn, *Prelude to Nation-States, The French and German Experience, 1789–1815* (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967); Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Ayse Kadioglu, "Citizenship, Immigration and Racism in a Unified Germany with Special Reference to the Turkish Guestworkers," *Journal of Economics and Administrative Studies* 6, no. 1–2 (1992): 199–211.

French and the German policies regarding admission to citizenship: the former is assimilationist and inclusive, while the latter is nonassimilationist and exclusive. Accordingly, German citizenship was based on descent (*jus sanguinis*) until the Citizenship Law of 2000. The existing literature accounts for the root causes of such distinctions by focusing on France and Germany's respective routes to nation-statehood.[10]

In Germany, the feeling of nationalism emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century, about 50 years before the nation-state was built in 1870, and was expressed in a vast Romantic literature. This paved the way to an emergence of Germanness that is independent of a territory under a state sovereignity. The result was a deterritorial yet ethnic conception of citizenship. Rogers Brubaker refers to this as a "prepolitical German nation." He argues that "[o]n this understanding, ethnic or cultural unity is primary and constitutive of nationhood, while political unity is derivative."[11] In the French case, due to the absence of such a temporal distance between the emergence of nationalism and the nation-state, French citizenship evolved on the basis of a territorial conception. In sum, in the era of the nation-states, while French citizenship placed more emphasis on membership within the state entity, German citizenship involved membership within the nation, defined as the *Volk* on the basis of descent. While in France, *demos* acquired civic traits, in Germany it was defined via ethnic bonds, i.e., *ethnos*.

The efforts to adopt more civic citizenship legislation in Germany chiefly involved the provincial administration of Schleswig-Holstein. In 1989, the provincial assembly of Schleswig-Holstein adopted a law that all foreigners residing in the province for at least five years, who possessed a valid residency permit, and who were citizens of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, or Switzerland could vote in local and district elections. These six states were chosen on the basis of reciprocity. While this law represented a move toward decoupling nationality and political participation, the conservative Christian Democratic Party challenged its constitutionality.

On October 31, 1990, the German Constitutional Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. It held that "[a]ll state power (*Staatsgewalt*) proceeds from the people" and that "[t]he people (*das Volk*), which the Basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany recognizes to be the bearer of the authority (*Gewalt*) from which issues the constitution, as well as the people which is the subject of the legitimation and creation of the state, is the German people.

---

[10] See, for instance, Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*.

[11] "Introduction," in *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, ed. Rogers Brubaker (Lanham, NY: University Press of America, 1989), 8.

Foreigners do not belong to it."[12] The court's decision was based on the assumption that the foreigners do not have much at stake in the German homeland—"regardless of how long they may have resided in the territory of the state, [they] can always return to their homeland"[13]—and therefore should not be given the vote.

Interestingly, the efforts of the provincial assembly of Schleswig-Holstein that failed due to the ruling of the Constitutional Court became the common practice in 1993, when the Treaty of Maastricht, or the Treaty on the European Union, established European citizenship, with associated political rights in local and regional elections, to all citizens of the then fifteen signatory states who fulfilled residency requirements in the country in which they wished to vote. Of the six states included in the provincial assembly's initial legislation, the citizens of only two, Norway and Switzerland, could not benefit from the Maastricht Treaty since they did not join the EU.

This example shows how a decoupling of nationality and political participation was initiated by a provincial assembly, turned down by the German Constitutional Court and ultimately realized via an international treaty geared towards establishing political unity within the European Community. The decision about the members of the *demos* in local and regional elections in Germany was in the final analysis taken at the supranational level. As Benhabib notes: "In retrospect, this decision of the German Constitutional Court, written in 1990, appears as a swan song to a vanishing ideology of nationhood."[14] In the end, *demos* ceased to be defined as *ethnos*. What was important here was that the decision to widen the *demos* was not directly taken only by the German citizens. It was rather adopted in the form of practices that resulted from membership in a supranational entity.

In the midst of the debates, there was increasing recognition that Germany has become a country of immigration and that people were residing there for a long period of time who were neither members of the *ethnos* nor strangers. This recognition paved the way to the development of various forms of non-citizenship in Germany:

• EU residents: These are citizens of EU member states who—provided that they fulfill residency requirements—may enjoy political rights at the local and regional level.

---

[12] Cited in Benhabib, *The Rights of Others*, 203–4.

[13] Ibid., 204.

[14] Ibid., 207.

- Third-country citizens: These are citizens of non-EU member states. They enjoy no political rights in Germany although naturalization has become easier with the new citizenship law (2000)—provided that they forfeit the citizenship of their countries of origin. They have been called cohabitants (*Inlander*)[15] and "our co-citizens of foreign origin" (*auslandische Mitburger*).[16]

In Germany, the political participation of third-country immigrants at any level still depends on their acquisition of German citizenship. In contrast, political participation at the local and regional levels is possible for immigrants from EU countries provided that they fulfill residency requirements. Only German citizens have political rights at the national level.

1.3. Is Political Participation Possible in the Absence of National and Supranational Identity?

Political rights are important dimensions of modern citizenship and are generally dependent on membership to a nation-state. While in some cases, people who settle within the boundaries of nation-states other than their own can enjoy dual citizenship, in others, they must forfeit their former citizenship before being naturalized.[17] The Treaty on the European Union (1993) signifies a major step in the direction of denationalization of citizenship since it enables EU residents to participate in local and regional elections in the member countries. While this policy promises to denationalize participation at the local and regional levels, it also attaches primary importance to membership in a supranational entity, i.e. the EU. A similar trend can be observed in the United Kingdom where Commonwealth citizens are granted certain voting rights. Hence, while participation rights are being divorced from a national

---

[15] Ibid., 211.

[16] Ibid., 208.

[17] As I have indicated above, current and past naturalization laws in Germany require candidates to renounce their other citizenships before naturalization. This prevented many Turks from applying for naturalization in Germany since they did not want to lose their rights to reside, travel, work, and inherit and own property in Turkey. In Turkey, a new law was issued in 1995 to address this problem so that Turks who acquired Turkish citizenship by birth and who later forfeited their Turkish citizenship by the permission of the Council of Ministers in order to acquire citizenship of another country could continue to enjoy residency, travel, work, inheritance, and property rights in Turkey. See Ayse Kadioglu, "Is Racism Being Combated Effectively in Germany? The New Immigration Legislation," in *Encountering Strangers: Responses and Consequences*, ed. Goran Rystad (Lund: Lund University Press, 1996).

identity, they are simultaneously being attached to supranational entities. This practice excludes third-country nationals who are not from the countries that are members of these supranational entities. These people seem to be the "lowest of the low" in terms of political rights.

Still, there are some cases in Europe where third-country nationals can have access to political rights. Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden grant local and regional election rights to those who have fulfilled certain residency requirements. Dutch cities grant city citizenship to all foreigners after five years of residency, conferring on them rights to vote, run for office in city-wide elections, and form political parties. Benhabib argues that the acquisition of these political rights does not remove barriers to free movement within the EU.[18] Still, city-citizens become better represented at the municipal level compared to third-country nationals in other EU countries. Ireland and Italy grant local but not regional rights. Spain and Portugal grant local and regional rights to third-country nationals on a reciprocity basis.[19] These examples signify a different type of denationalization of participation in the sense that certain political rights are granted notwithstanding lack of membership of a supranational entity.

While regional and supranational agencies increasingly pressing for denationalization of participatory rights, the national content of *demos* is being lost. As the boundaries of the *demos* widen beyond *ethnos* in various countries, political reactions with nationalist content have become more visible. In Europe, every move towards broadening the *demos* has produced nationalist reaction. As the concept of the *demos* becomes more ecumenical and hollow, critics point out the dangers of unrestricted participation. The tendency of the political analysts and policymakers to underplay participation due to their mistrust in the people seems to increase in states in and near the Middle East.

2. Political Participation and Citizenship in the Middle East

2.1. Political Participation and Government Structures in the Middle East: Towards a Typology

There are at least two ways to study political participation in the Middle East. The first approach involves examining studies of electoral politics that focus

---

[18] Benhabib, *The Rights of Others*, 157.
[19] See the table in ibid., 158–62.

on electoral systems, political party structures, and their interaction with other governmental processes. It presumes the existence of a predefined people (*demos*) and surveys their participatory practices. This approach presumes congruence between the modern units of the nation and the state. A second approach to the study of political participation is firmly rooted in a citizenship perspective. Here, rather than an ex-post-facto interest in the activities of a predefined *demos*, the approach involves attempting to unravel the factors by which the *demos*— the actors within the democratic process—is defined. Models of political participation are seen as meaningful only when there is an agreement as to the identity of the participating actors. This problem of who is included/excluded in the *demos* is of particular relevance in contexts undergoing regime changes since the "point zero in the building of states is not a situation where you have a unified people ready to build a state as it sees fit."[20] In fact, the modus operandi of citizenship is the key analytical tool in understanding comparative government structures.

Problematizing political participation in the Middle East from a citizenship perspective involves examining the politics of citizenship as a tool in addressing the dynamics of regime formation. Hence, instead of highlighting the impact of government structures on levels of political participation, scholars following this approach study the citizenship practices that shape the conditions of political participation and thereby shape political regime outcomes. Accordingly, citizenship practices are analyzed as phenomena that accompany nation and state building processes.

Some of the most comprehensive analyses in the field of citizenship studies and government structures in the Middle East are contained in a volume edited by Nils A. Butenschon, Uri Davis, and Manuel Hassassian.[21] In the volume's introductory article, Butenschon maintains that citizenship as a contractual relationship "regulates the legal status of the inhabitants of a state (by implication including non-citizens) and sets the rules for participation in political institutions and access to public resources."[22] He attempts to produce a typology of political organization of states by juxtaposing principles of

---

[20] Nils A. Butenschon, "State, Power, and Citizenship in the Middle East: A Theoretical Introduction," in *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications*, ed. Nils A. Butenschon, Uri Davis, and Manuel Hassassian (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 4.

[21] *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000).

[22] Nils A. Butenschon, "State, Power, and Citizenship in the Middle East: A Theoretical Introduction" in ibid., 11.

citizenship and territorial principles. This typology is based on whether the organizational principle of the state institutions is based on collective or individual membership as well as whether the state allocates rights on a discriminatory or nondiscriminatory basis. This paves Butenschon's way to delineate three different ways of constituting a demos in the Middle East: singularism, pluralism, and universalism.

2.1.1. Singularism

In singularist political structures, the state community is constituted on the basis of a single and specific collective identity. This identity can be linguistic and ethnic as in the case of Turkish identity in Turkey. It can also be based on blood ties or descent as in the case of Jewish state building in Israel. The Iranian state, too, is based on the single identity of the Islamic *umma* (community of believers). When these singular identity cases become influential in the formation of unitary states, hegemonic systems result. In such systems, the existence and interests of the constituent community are considered to have superior moral value. The state is not neutral in the way it relates to group identities and intergroup conflicts but rather uplifts a singular identity. Butenschon identifies both the Turkish and the Israeli cases as *ethnocracies* despite the differences between them in terms of their methods of discrimination. He maintains that while the Turkish state seeks to integrate and homogenize the entire population of Turkey, the Israeli state is interested in gathering Jews in Israel. The difference bears a resemblance to Brubaker's distinction between two different conceptions of nationhood and citizenship: "It is one thing to want to make all citizens of Utopia speak Utopian, and quite another to want to make all Utophiphones citizens of Utopia."[23]

Hence, despite the fact that they both resort to discriminatory practices vis-à-vis individuals and groups who are not members of the singular group, their methods of discrimination are different. While the Turkish state is interested in the assimilation and homogenization, i.e., the Turkification of *others*, the Israeli state resorts to nonassimilationist, exclusionary practices. Despite significant moments of exclusion in Turkey (in the form of population exchange, dislocation, and massacre) of non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities at the beginning of the twentieth century, there was also room for assimilationist practices. The Zionist ethnocracy, on the other hand, paved the way to a segregationist policy which is eager to erect institutional, legal, and physical walls in order to prevent Palestinians from accessing to land and various other rights.

---

[23] Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 8.

It is important to acknowledge at this point that both nonassimilationist, exclusionary policies and assimilationist, homogenizing practices are discriminatory policies and that one type of discrimination is not necessarily better than the other.

2.1.2. Pluralism

According to Butenschøn's aforementioned delineation, in pluralist political structures, a national community is composed of separate subgroups, none of which are dominant. The notion of consociationalism comes to the forefront when a plurality of national identities exists in a unitary state. Arend Lijphart introduced the notion of consociationalism in 1969 when he maintained that a homogenous society was not a necessity in order to avoid instability.[24] He advanced this idea by looking at small continental democracies like Holland, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland that had socioculturally fragmented, plural structures and yet were stable. Consociationalism contained the idea that social stability depended on the management of pluralism. It involved power sharing on the part of the elite who represented the plurality of groups.

Consociationalism is based on the interplay of plurality of collective groups. The individuals are accorded a legal status by virtue of being a member of a specific group. Hence, their citizenship status is mitigated by the collective groups that they are affiliated with. Lebanon is the primary example of the utilization of a consociational idea of power sharing among the elite in the Middle East. According to Lijphart, the unwritten National Pact of 1943 between the Maronite president and the Sunni prime minister signaled the beginning of consociationalism in Lebanon.[25] Others argue that the very monitoring of membership in the state via such ethnic affiliations paved the way to the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in 1975. The Lebanese case seems to have debilitated the strength of the arguments pertaining to plurality coupled with stability. Perhaps it was Lijphart's preoccupation with stability rather than democracy that guided him in declaring the success of consociationalism in Lebanon for more than thirty years.[26] Rania Maktabi maintains that the principles underlying the National Pact, in fact, produced an ethnocracy rather than a consociational democracy in Lebanon:

---

[24] "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics* 21, no. 2 (1969): 207–25. See also Arendt Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Explanation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

[25] Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy."

[26] Arendt Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Explanation*, 149.

> As an ethnocracy, the Lebanese regime preferred to rely on control mechanisms – among them the politics of citizenship, which monitored membership in the Lebanese state along ethnic lines—in order to maintain the prerogatives of the Christian-dominated government. Under ethnocractic rule, there developed a peculiar group of stateless persons of predominantly Muslim background who were not welcomed as members of the state. Another expression of ethnocractic governance was the prevention of Muslim segments from acquiring political representation that corresponded to their relative size within the population. Governance in Lebanon was stable, yes, but it was not democratic, as Lijphart states.[27]

Maktabi maintains that the Lebanese *demos* were defined on the basis of a skewed proportionality based on the biased results of the 1932 census. The demographic changes that have occurred since then call for a political resolution of the definition of *demos* in Lebanon via new negotiations. She maintains: "The prospects for these negotiations are more fruitful—although not necessarily less violent—when the identity of the state is not defined by the ruling elite a priori as it was on the creation of the Lebanese state in 1920."[28]

There seems to be a criticism of the idea of a democracy after the definition of a *demos* in her analysis. The definition of a *demos* should accompany the process of state building rather than being a frozen phenomenon that precedes it. Hence, when a *demos* is defined prior to the creation of the state in singular terms, an ethnocracy inevitably results. The critical question that emerges from the analysis of political participation from a citizenship perspective then becomes the dire need to incorporate the definition of a *demos* or, better yet, a plural, multinational *demos* indicated as *demoi* into the state-building process.

2.1.3. Universalism
In Butenschon's delineation, the principle of universalism takes the individuals rather than the collectivity as the main actors within the demos. The individual is accorded no special rights due to membership in a specific group. Hence, every adult and sane individual is considered equal. When political communities are defined on the basis of universalist principles, this definition is done not ethnoculturally but in territorial terms. Accordingly, all people within the jurisdiction of a particular state enjoy equal rights before the law. Universalism essentially poses a challenge to the congruence between the modern units of the nation and the state.

---

[27] Rania Maktabi, "State Formation and Citizenship in Lebanon: The Politics of Membership and Exclusion in a Sectarian State," in *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East*, ed. Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian, 178.

[28] Ibid.

The definition of a demos or people, i.e. an analysis of who is included/excluded, is one of the most important questions that one encounters in tackling political participation from a citizenship perspective. The next crucial question involves the extent of power that is to be entrusted with the people.

2.2. *Trusting or Mistrusting the Masses: The Dilemma of Political Participation in the Middle East*

The fear of the uncontrolled masses has always concerned political theorists. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), fearing the life in a stateless society in which self-interested human beings are essentially power seeking, defended an absolutist govenment.[29] Any limit to the power of government would cause a descent to the state of nature and hence would be undesirable. Hobbes' reasoning had a major impact on conservative thought. The fundamental principles of classical conservatism stemmed from a disillusionment with the chaotic changes prompted by the French Revolution. Both the Hobbesian and the classical conservative tradition as expressed in the writings of Edmund Burke (1729–1797) contained an effort to manage and tame the actions of the masses.[30]

John Locke (1632–1704), on the other hand, envisaged a separation of powers of the state that would check and balance one another in order to protect the rights of the individuals.[31] In the American context, James Madison (1751–1836) became the leading proponent of pluralism since he hoped that ambition counteracting ambition would tame the unrestrained power of the masses.[32] He advocated federalism, bicameralism, and the separation of powers and checks and balances to prevent the tyranny of the majority. It seems that some of the other key inventions pertaining to modern forms of government, such as constitutionalism, separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and bicameralism, aimed at coping with the tyranny of the majority. It was on the basis of such inventions that the idea of representative government was produced.

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) argued that the idea of representative government was an impediment to the freedom of citizens. Rousseau was

---

[29] Thomas Hobbes. *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (New York: Penguin Books, 1981).

[30] Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. Conor Cruise O'Brien (London: Penguin Books, 1982).

[31] John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government*, ed. Thomas P. Peardon (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952).

[32] James Madison, *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961).

critical of the ideas of the French Enlightenment which sought to explore ways to advance liberty via the use of reason.[33] Rousseau thought that "the result of the Enlightenment was to make the pursuit of wealth and luxury more important than respect for those virtues that secure the common good of the whole community."[34] Rousseau became a staunch critique of the elections and representation and advocated direct participation of the citizens in political affairs. He thought that the populace rather than elected officials should be the author of the laws that govern them. Rousseau's views left no room for diversity of civil societal groups with different aims in the society, since common good and general will would prevail. His emphasis on participation rather than representation was accompanied by a staunch defense of the glue of common good-will and general will that would keep society intact. Hence, while those who advocated representative democracy could easily disregard the masses as actors in politics, the arguments uplifting participation were reduced by visions of a unified general will.

The duality between representative and participatory democracy has long been the major dilemma of democratic theory. While Hobbes, Locke, and Burke feared the unrestrained participation of the masses, Rousseau extolled participation only when the masses shared a common sense of purpose. Rousseau thought that "the tragedy of modern life, embellished by Locke and Hobbes, is that our natural moral sentiments are silenced in favor of the values that urge us to deny any importance to community and to civic virtue, as we extol wealth and self-interest."[35]

Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) built his ideas pertaining to the analysis of democracy on the experience of the United States.[36] He placed a lot of value on the element of egalitarianism in democracy. Yet he was skeptical of majoritarianism and elections yielding their desired outcome of putting power in the hands of the wise and the experienced. He warned against the ill-informed views and the prejudices of the masses. His thought had a major influence on John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), who argued that although participation should

---

[33] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The First and Second Discourses*, ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964); *The Social Contract*, ed. Charles M. Sherover (New York: New American Library, 1974).

[34] Steven M. DeLue, *Political Thinking, Political Theory, and Civil Society* (New York: Longman, 2002), 161.

[35] Ibid., 177.

[36] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. J. P. Mayer and Max Lerner (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

be wide, it should also be unequal.[37] He advocated a system of weighing rather than counting votes, in which people with greater abilities would have heavier votes. He also provides some examples as to how this would work: "For instance, an employer of labor, because he uses his mind, is more competent than a common laborer, whereas a foreman is more qualified than an ordinary worker, and a banker or merchant more qualified than a tradesman, and so on."[38]

The measures geared towards taming the masses by elevating the power of the wise rulers became the basis of a canon of thought known as conservatism. This canon became irresistably attractive for those who study the processes of democratization in the Middle East. One of the most recent, and well-known books that is based on such conservative assumptions was *The Future of Freedom*, by Fareed Zakaria.[39]

Zakaria argues, in line with Tocqueville, that too much democracy may harm freedoms just as too much food may harm your stomach. Although sharing the fears of Madison, Tocqueville and Mill of the unrestrained masses, he also argues that in the absence of a background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of democracy in divided societies can stir up nationalisms, ethnic conflict, and war. Hence, democracy can even be dangerous for the preservation of existing liberties in the absence of constitutional liberalism. In fact, he finds it odd that the United States so often advocates elections and plebiscitary democracy abroad. Instead, Zakaria thinks that the real challenge is to make the world safe for democracy prior to advocating it. This involves the development of not only free and fair elections but also the rule of law, separation of powers, and the protection of basic constitutional liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.

Zakaria thinks that the elements of constitutional liberalism and democracy have always been interwoven in the Western political fabric. However, they seem to come apart in other parts of the world. In fact, the pursuit of democracy, in the absence of constitutional liberalism paves the way to *illiberal democracies*. This unwanted result can be remedied by reintegrating constitutional liberalism into the practice of democracy. Zakaria is a fervent advocate of the idea expressed by James Madison in *The Federalist*: "You must first

---

[37] John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962).

[38] Ibid., 224.

[39] New York: W. W. Norton, 2003. See also Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (1997): 22–43.

enable—the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."[40]

Zakaria who is disappointed with the flourishing of illiberal democracies in the world looked at Iraq in the spring of 2003 and made the following remarks: "Order, then liberty. In Iraq today, first establish a stable security environment and create the institutions of limited government—a constitution with a bill of rights, an independent judiciary, a sound central bank. Then and only then, move to full-fledged democracy."[41]

Robert Kagan referred to Zakaria's views as an "attack on democracy."[42] Kagan argues that "the unique perils of democracy upon which Tocqueville long ago speculated—the 'tyranny of the majority,' the debasement of the culture, the tearing down of elites—are not abstractions for Zakaria, but phenomenon that he experienced first hand as an Indian Muslim growing up in Bombay in the 1960s and 1970s."[43] Kagan continues that, as far as Zakaria, the child of Indian elites was concerned, the movement of India away from a one-party regime "made India more democratic" but "also made it less liberal."[44] Kagan critically underlines how Zakaria refers to "the great unwashed," i.e. the simple-minded populist masses and short-sighted citizenry who pave the way to the dark side of democracy in the absence of the wisdom of the elite.

The different approaches of Zakaria and Kagan on the perils and benefits of political participation portray the long-unresolved dilemma of liberal democracy. Zakaria speaks positively of the experiences of countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, and Singapore. These are countries that first created a strong constitutional liberal infrastructure under an economically liberal authoritarian regime prior to holding elections.

Zakaria's views brought the old question of whether to trust or mistrust the masses into the center of the democratization processes in the Middle East. This issue becomes all the more pertinent when political culture and especially religion in the Middle East is sometimes viewed as an impediment to democracy. In fact, some analysts refer openly to an incompatibility between Islam and some of the preconditions of democratization such as civil society. Ernest Gellner, for instance, refers to Islam as the "rival" of civil society and maintains

---

[40] Cited in Fareed Zakaria, "How to Wage the Peace," *Newsweek*, April 21, 2003.

[41] Ibid.

[42] "Why Democracy Must Remain America's Goal Abroad," *New Republic Online*, July 7, 2003, http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030707&s=kagan_070703.

[43] Ibid., 1.

[44] Ibid., 1.

that Islam displays the unique characteristics as a religion in terms of its immunity to secularization. Since secularization is viewed as the only way to generate liberal individuals who are the *sine qua non* of civil society, this view rules out the possibility of democracy's existence in the absence of secularization. Therefore, Islam appears as the "other" or "rival" of civil society.[45]

Analyses that make religion their central tool in accounting for the democratic deficit bring to mind Karl Marx's well-known expression about religion being "the opium of the masses." In fact, it seems like, in the post-9/11 world, religion has become the opium not of the masses but of the elite who seem to find an easy relief in blaming Islam for problems of democratization in the Middle East.

While some refer to Islam as the main impediment to democratization, others refer to the political economy of oil and declare that "oil impedes democracy" in the region by leading to states that derive a large part of their national income and state revenue from oil production and export.[46] Samuel P. Huntington argued that the *third wave* of democratization bypassed the Middle East since most of the states in the region depend on oil exports which in turn enhances the control of state bureaucracy.[47] Other analyses of the Middle East focus not on the lack of democratization or the absence of democratic transition but rather on the authoritarian reproduction of regimes in the Middle East. Albrecht and Schlumberger, for instance, maintain that waiting for democratization in the Middle East is akin to "waiting for Godot" or waiting for expectations to materialize that were ill-founded from the beginning.[48] They rather argue that one should focus on the ability of the regimes to change without democratization in the Middle East. They maintain that one should focus not on the failures of democracy, but rather on the successes of authoritarianism via changes *in* regime in order to avoid a change *of* regime.

---

[45] *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994). For my critical assessment of Gellner's views *vis-a-vis* the civil society debates in Turkey, see "Civil Society, Islam and Democracy in Turkey: A Study of Three Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations," *Muslim World* 95, no. 1 (2005): 23–43.

[46] Lisa Anderson, "Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach," in *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, vol.1, *Theoretical Perspectives*, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

[47] *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

[48] Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, "'Waiting for Godot': Regime Change without Democratization in the Middle East," *International Political Science Review* 25, no. 4 (2004): 371–92.

The literature reviewed above point to the fact that political participation by itself cannot be the criterion for measuring democratization in the Middle East. Still, some argue that political participation via civil societal organizations can help inculcating democratic or civic norms of tolerance, trust, moderation, compromise, and accommodation.[49] Cross-national civil societal arrangements seem to bring out the *reason* in people without making them owe an allegiance to a national entity. Hence, they promise to pave the way to civic virtue in the absence of a Rousseauesque political community that sacrifices the individual for the sake of the common good. The key questions that emerge at this point are: Can there be civic virtue in the absence of an imposed common good and can civic virtue be attained via political participation itself?

For Rousseau, rights did not signify individual freedom in general but rather individual freedom within the context of civic virtue. Civic virtue was to be derived from the common good of the community that one lives in. Rousseau arrived at this notion of civic virtue since he was critical of self-serving individualism. He rather celebrated a civic virtue and the upholding of community via participation. Still, although he placed a lot of emphasis on participation as the basis of civic virtue, his participating citizen was not expected to reason and to challenge the common good of the community. Rather, a good citizen had the tough will to follow the requisites of the general will and was dedicated to the common good of the society. Hence, for Rousseau, common good and general will marked the boundaries of political participation. In order for political participation to be instrumental in going beyond the self-serving individual and in inculcating civic virtue beyond the common good of the community, first the power of reason and especially the public use of reason must be valorized.

At this point, it seems appropriate to turn to a new approach to democratic theory called "deliberative democracy" that is based on Immanuel Kant's views pertaining to the public use of reason.

3. From Representation to Political Participation

One of the early studies that emphasized participation over representation as the core of democracy was undertaken by Carole Pateman in 1970.[50] This was

---

[49] Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 3 (1994): 4–18.

[50] *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

followed by other studies focusing on the merits of social activism and civil society in transforming state activity.[51] Through this literature practices of citizenship became critical in democratic processes. In evaluating this change of focus in democratization studies, Jean Grugel maintains: "A range of theorists . . . has sought to hold up to the light how patterns of citizenship underpin the visible institutional arrangement of politics. In the process, democracy was defined as the establishment of democratic practices of citizenship, rather than the establishment of formal institutions. These debates on participation, equality and citizenship constitute a useful way forward for democratization studies. Conceptualizing democracy as citizenship avoids the reification of institutions that is inherent in empirical democratic theory."[52]

While on the one hand, democratic theory ventures into a realm that transcends the realm of the nation-state, at the same time it diverts attention away from representative institutions and towards "a network of fairly regulated bargaining processes and of various forms of argumentation."[53] Hence, there seems to be two key notions in unravelling new directions in theories of democracy: denationalization and deliberation.

3.1. *Denationalization of Political Participation: The Turkish Case*[54]

Most of the new debates on democratization share a fascination about reflecting beyond the borders of the nation-states. In a world in which the activities of global markets and transnational corporations prevail "even the most powerful governments appear impotent" and the "efficacy of national democracy is called into question."[55]

In 1997, after the East Asian financial crash, the International Monetary Fund asked both candidates for presidency in the South Korean national elections to sign a confidential declaration to stand by the conditions of a proposed

---

[51] See, for instance, C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

[52] Jean Grugel, "Democratization Studies," *Government and Opposition* 38, no. 2 (2003): 238–65.

[53] Jurgen Habermas, "Three Normative Models of Democracy," in *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 25.

[54] I further elaborate the information revealed in this section in "Denationalization of Citizenship: The Turkish Experience," *Citizenship Studies* 11, no. 3 (2007): 283–301.

[55] Anthony McGrew, "Transnational Democracy," in *Democratic Theory Today: Challenges for the 21st Century*, ed. April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 270.

financial rescue package.[56] Moments like these render Robert Dahl's classic question of democratic theory—who governs?—rather irrelevant.[57] The EU accession processes seem to be the bases of various legislative amendments including constitutional changes in various countries. The Turkish experience of denationalizing political participation seems to be largely prompted by EU processes rather than domestic politics. The concept of *denationalization* differs from *post-nationalism* by virtue of underlining the transformation of the national realm. According to Saskia Sassen, denationalization "has to do with the transformation of the national, specifically under the impact of globalization and several other dynamics, and will tend to instantiate inside the national."[58] Denationalization is still connected to the national realm albeit implying new forms of engagement with it whereas post-nationalism makes references to European and city citizenship as new forms of citizenship.

One of the most popular arguments in Turkey pertaining to the citizenship of various identities is that they are all granted citizenship irrespective of religious and ethnic differences. This is usually listed among the several "democratic" aspects of the Republic. What is implied here is that as long as they do not mind being under the all-embracing Turkish identity, then, all people of different religious and ethnic backgrounds, including the Alevis, Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Circassians, and Assyrians, are conferred the citizenship of the Turkish Republic. This is usually viewed as a right in itself. Since, citizenship is exclusively viewed as a membership, people who are given a ticket to this club are considered to have been decorated with rights. Yet, the acquisition of rights does not only involve voting in local, regional, and national elections. Participation in political life is above and beyond voting rights. It also involves exercising freedoms pertaining to the practice of minority religious rituals, languages, and cultures. In sum, these are rights about being different. Such rights are at the heart of the ongoing process of the denationalization of citizenship.

Some of the most important parliamentary reforms concerning the rights of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish Muslim minority groups in Turkey were realized as part of the effort to join the EU. After Turkey became an official candidate in the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the efforts to fulfill the

---

[56] Ibid., 270.

[57] R. A. Dahl, *Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

[58] Saskia Sassen, "Towards Post-national and Denationalized Citizenship" in *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, ed. Engin Isin and Bryan Turner (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage, 2003), 286.

promised reforms within the National Program which was made public in March 2001 were accelerated. There were significant constitutional amendments in 2001 and 2004, as well as various packages containing amendments of other legal codes.[59] These constitutional and other amendments broadened the scope of languages that people could use to express themselves in their daily lives. The amendments also lifted the barriers in front of teaching and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish.

These amendments in legislative processes point to the potential changes in the daily lives as well as freedom of expression of the minorities in Turkey. They opt for the integration of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish Muslim minorities rather than their assimilation into a uniform Turkish culture. They promise the adoption of a concept of citizenship that is above and beyond membership to a national unit and that embraces human rights. Still, there are various problems that are encountered in the course of the implementation of these legal changes. The difficulties that are encountered during implementation force the legislators to keep passing new laws on language education, broadcasting in minority languages in radio and televisions, and property rights of the non-Muslim religious foundations. The years 2002 to 2005 witnessed an ongoing war of the legislators and the bureaucrats about the implementation of the amendments. The bureaucratic establishment resorted to its own rules and procedures in order to delay the implementation of the amendments passed by the parliament. Still, the legal amendments laid the basis of the denationalization of citizenship in Turkey, as part of the EU accession processes.

Turkish experience on denationalization of citizenship, similar to the German case, is being accelerated by the EU accession processes. Both experiences portray the power of the EU processes in transforming citizenship and political participation practices despite the ongoing difficulties of implementation. The possibility of a nationalist backlash withstanding, the Turkish experience at passing legislation with a potential to decouple political participation and national identity provides a model for the Middle East in general.

3.2. Deliberation and Political Participation: "A 'Demoicracy' in the Making"

Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862) once decided to retreat into a cabin by Lake Walden, away from other people in order to "live deliberately" as an

---

[59] Such constitutional amendments and the packages containing amendments of other legal codes are reviewed in Baskin Oran, *Turkiye'de Azinliklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Ic Mevzuat, Ictihat, Uygulama* [Minorities in Turkey: concepts, Lausanne, internal regulations, interpretations,

observer of life around him. Today, "living deliberately" means more than that. It means participating in political processes rather than retreating into isolation. Deliberation has become a catchword in democratic theory that refers to democratic practices that promise to go beyond representation.

The notion of "deliberative or discursive democracy" was elaborated by Jurgen Habermas to describe his opposition to both the liberal and republican conceptions of democracy. Habermas argued that both the liberal and republican notions of democracy centered on a society that is attached to a state. He argued that deliberative democracy, on the other hand, is grounded in "the image of a decentred society."[60] Deliberative or discursive democrats are interested in creating a transnational public sphere of democratic deliberation. They uphold various principles towards that end, namely, "non-domination, participation, public deliberation, responsive governance, and the right of all affected to a voice in public decisions that impinge on their welfare or interests."[61]

Deliberative democracy involves an attempt to go beyond representative forms of democracy that presuppose a view of society centered on a state. In representative democracies, the *demos* is defined according to fixed territorial boundaries. The notion of deliberative democracy, on the other hand, presumes a notion of a *demos* that is uninhibited by preexisting territorial, cultural or human boundaries. In deliberative democracy, the focus is on the character of political interaction. Hence, deliberative democracy is more procedural and less substantive.

In a groundbreaking article that appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in the winter of 2004, Kalypso Nicolaidis put forward the notion of *demoi* rather than *demos* as the basis of political participation.[62] She maintains that there are two predominant views about the EU as an entity: on one hand, there are the intergovernmentalists who maintain that national sovereignty is the precondition of democracy. Hence EU should operate via politicians in Brussels who would ultimately be accountable to their electorate at home. The supranationalists, on the other hand, argue that it is possible to have a European *demos* that is above and beyond the nation-state. They think a European identity can be built on top of national ones. They think that "if civic education in the 1800s

---

implementation] (Istanbul: TESEV [Turkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etudler Vakfi], 2004), 94–111. See also Ergun Ozbudun and Serap Yazici, *Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1993–2004)* (Istanbul: TESEV, 2004).

[60] "Three Normative Models of Democracy," 27.

[61] McGrew, "Transnational Democracy," 278.

[62] "We, the Peoples of Europe . . ." *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 6 (2004): 97–111.

could turn peasants into Frenchmen, why could it not now turn them into Europeans, or at least into Europeans of French origin?"[63] Supranationalists call for a common European flag, passport, anthem, and European Prime Minister. They envisage a supranational Europe modeled after the nation-state.

Nicolaidis argues that both the intergovernmentalists and supranationalists owe allegiance to a version of the nation-state model. She maintains that there is a third way to understand Europe, "one that is defined not by a uniform identity—a *demos*—but by the persistent plurality of its peoples – its *demoi*."[64] Accordingly, she refers to the EU as "neither a union of democracies nor a union as democracy" but rather "a union of states and peoples—a '*demoicracy*' in the making."[65]

The "transnational" actors of democracy and the need for democracy's constant reproduction point to an intersection between denationalization and deliberation in democratic theory. Nicolaidis' analysis points to the increasing need to denationalize the *demos* while trying at the same time not to give in to borders delimited by rigidly defined identities. Identities should have porous borders. The notion of *demoicracy* involves an attempt to promote "a community of projects" rather than "a community of identity." Nicolaidis' notion of *demoicracy* makes it possible to problematize political participation from the angle of citizenship. Hence, denationalization of the *demos* and its subsequent involvement in deliberative processes are the distinguishing features of a participatory democracy that is not only transnational but also above and beyond representation. Today, questions of political participation have transcended modern nation-states. There is increasing need to reconceptualize political participation on the basis not of frozen identities but rather projects that could be deliberated across nationalities.

In conceptualizing political participation as transnational and beyond representation, one eventually ponders into the question of social unity in a society. If we answer, first of all, the question, Who are the people? by pointing in the direction of peoples or *demoi* that are constantly being defined and redefined, then, the second question becomes "What does the *demoi* do in order to participate?" The answer lies in the participation in deliberative processes within civil societal organizations and between them and governments. This promises to carry democratization beyond the election of representative institutions. The third logical concern to follow these arguments involves the

---

[63] Ibid., 100.

[64] Ibid., 101.

[65] Ibid.

nature of the glue that keeps the *demoi* together and prevents it from disintegrating into conflicting units. In analyzing the nature of organization within the EU, Nicolaidis, for instance, maintains that "the glue that binds the EU together is not a shared identity; it is rather shared projects and objectives. This distinction is enshrined in the constitution's very first article, in which member states give the EU the power 'to attain objectives they have in common'. The members' sense of belonging and commitment to the union is based on what they accomplish together, not what they are together."[66] These projects include the single market, the euro, expansion, the promotion of peace, social justice, gender equality, children's rights, sustainable development, a highly competitive social market economy, and full employment.

Nicolaidis thinks that what binds the peoples of the EU should not be a rigidly defined European identity such as that taught at schools but should rather be the projects that the peoples (*demoi*) share. It is participation via deliberation over these projects that will eventually bind the European *demoi* and prevent it from disintegrating.

This view contains a conceptualization of citizenship not as membership in a political community but rather as participation in that community. In other words, *rather than membership being the basis of participation, participation itself becomes the glue that maintains unity among transnational peoples*. This seems to be the very essence of deliberative democracy beyond national limits.

In an article that appeared in *Newsweek* in the aftermath of the riots in Paris in November 2005, Fareed Zakaria argued for the need to erect a new identity in Europe. He wrote: "Theory and practice diverge sharply. Europeans claim to have given up their old national identities, but have they really? France speaks of a republic of values, but scratch beneath the surface and it is a republic of cloistered communities . . . France and other European countries need to move closer to a national identity based on ideas and values."[67] Zakaria thinks it is possible to start from a predefined identity based on ideas and values. Nicolaidis, on the other hand argues for the "persistent plurality"—as expressed in the notion *demoi*—of the European peoples. This notion signifies a more fluid glue that should be constantly reproduced via deliberative processes.[68]

---

[66] Ibid., 103–4.

[67] "Europe Needs a New Identity," *Newsweek*, November 21, 2005.

[68] "We, the Peoples of Europe . . ." 101.

Conclusion

The notions of denationalization and deliberation are significant in debating prospects of political participation in a global world. Approaching political participation from a citizenship perspective paves the way to problematizing the definition of a *demos*, the activities that the *demos* would undertake, and the ways of maintaining the unity of a *demos* in the absence of a political arrangement based on a congruence of the nation and the state.

The definition of the *demos* in a global world not only requires knowledge about multinational conceptions of citizenship but also awareness of how supranational organizations are gradually rendering national citizenship obsolete. The German and Turkish examples of denationalization of citizenship outlined above point to the EU's ability to push legislative amendments that decouple political participation and national identity. There is still the danger that the recent developments in Turkey can be reversed by a nationalist backlash. The increasing tendency—accelerated by supranational organizations—towards a global view of citizenship based not on membership in a national unit but on a language of rights is countered by reactions of identity groups that are formed on the basis of closed notions of ethnicity and religion. We live in an era in which citizenship is quickly being divorced from national passports despite the fact that religious and ethnic types of discrimination are mushrooming everywhere. While the notion of *demos* is becoming more ecumenical and hollow, the accompanying feelings of powerlessness and political apathy point to the danger of a nationalist backlash. People who find it hard to function on such slippery ground fostered by globalization processes find themselves compelled to embrace closed identity groups.

The meaning of political participation has changed from voting in elections to participation in local, regional, national, and transnational organizations. The notion of participation via deliberation in transnational organizations is replacing the notion of participation via voting for representative institutions. This has paved the way to a conception of democracy based on the public use of reason as opposed to the zero-sum notions envisaged in power politics of representative democracy. One of the distinguishing features of Marxism was its exaltation of conflict. This had given Marxism its revolutionary potential. The post-Marxist world has become increasingly interested in the management of conflict. While this has led to the emergence of a discourse of deliberation, it has simultaneously given momentum to its own nemesis by generating closed religious and ethnic groups that exalt conflict and violence. The dialectical choreography of history still seems to linger.

As the meaning of *demos* becomes less grounded in national identities, questions pertaining to the nature of the glue that binds the people come to the forefront. In addition to the reemergence of civic republican arguments emphasizing a unified common good at the national and supranational levels, there also emerges the notion of a *demoi* (multicultural peoples) to be persistently reproduced via projects rather than questions of identity. Political participation is increasingly becoming deliberation over projects that are geared towards holding multinational peoples together.