

**EXPLAINING SECURITY INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
AN INTERGOVERNMENTALIST ACCOUNT**

by

ESİN ERTEK

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EXPLAINING SECURITY INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

.....

Assoc. Prof. Meltem Müftüler Baç
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

.....

Asst. Prof. Burak Arıkan

.....

Assoc. Prof. Bahri Yılmaz

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ABSTRACT

Security integration in the European Union is one of the most significant and contentious issues on the integration agenda. It is problematic because security lies directly at the core of state sovereignty (i.e. as part of high-politics) and the potential implications of its integration threaten the nation-state as the sole exerciser of sovereignty. On the other hand, security integration is necessary if the European Union is to close the gap between its economic power and political influence in international affairs. This dichotomy ensures that security is a recurrent theme in the discussions related to the deepening of European integration while it is being conspicuously prevented from taking a communitarian characteristic.

In order to account for the dynamics behind the state and development of European security integration, this study draws upon intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism as two theoretical frameworks offering competing interpretations of the possibility of integration in high-politics at the European level and of the relative role public opinion plays in shaping member state preferences towards security integration. An analysis of the Intergovernmental Conferences leading up to the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties together with Eurobarometer survey data reveals that intergovernmentalism has more explanatory power in accounting for the current state of European security integration.

Keywords: intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), security integration

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NDE GÜVENLİK ENTEGRASYONUNU AÇIKLAMAK: HÜKÜMETLERARASICI BİR BAKIŞ

ÖZET

Avrupa Birliği'nde güvenlik entegrasyonu, bütünleşme gündemindeki en önemli ve tartışmalı konulardan birisidir. Sorunlu olmasının nedeni, güvenlik kavramının devlet egemenliğinin çekirdeğinde yer alması ve bütünleşmesinin egemenliğin tek kullanıcısı olan milli-devleti tehdit etmesidir. Öte yandan, Avrupa Birliği'nin uluslararası ilişkilerde karşılaştığı ekonomik gücü ve siyasi nüfuzu arasındaki uçurumu kapatması için güvenlik entegrasyonu gereklidir. Bu ikilik, Avrupa Birliği bütünleşme sürecindeki derinleşme tartışmalarında güvenlik konseptinin sürekli gündemde bulunmasına karşın ortak mekanizmalar içinde yönetilmesine dikkat çekici bir biçimde engel olunması sonucunu doğurmaktadır.

Bu çalışma, güvenlik entegrasyonunun olasılığı ve kamuoyunun güvenlik entegrasyonu hususunda üye devlet tercihlerinin oluşmasındaki görece rolü konularında farklı yorumlar sunan hükümetlerarasıcılık ve yeni işlevselcilik kuramsal çerçevelerini kullanarak Avrupa güvenlik entegrasyonunun durumu ve gelişiminin arkasındaki dinamikleri açıklama amacını taşımaktadır. Bu bağlamda yapılan, Maastricht, Amsterdam ve Nice Anlaşmaları ile sonuçlanmış olan Hükümetlerarası Konferansların analizi ve Eurobarometer kamuoyu araştırmalarının çözümlenmesi neticesinde hükümetlerarasıcılığın Avrupa güvenlik entegrasyonunun güncel durumunu izah etmede daha çok açıklayıcı güce sahip olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: hükümetlerarasıcılık, yeni işlevselcilik, Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (AGSP), güvenlik entegrasyonu

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|----|
| Introduction | 1 |
| Chapter 1. The Evolution of European Security Integration | 6 |
| 1.1. Post-War Europe | 6 |
| 1.2. European Political Cooperation | 10 |
| 1.3. Common Foreign and Security Policy | 15 |
| 1.4. European Security and Defense Policy | 20 |
| 1.5. European Strategy Document | 22 |
| 1.6. The Constitutional Treaty | 23 |
| 1.7. Conclusions | 26 |
| Chapter 2. Theorizing Security Integration | 28 |
| 2.1. Established Integration Theories | 29 |
| 2.1.1. Neofunctionalism | 29 |
| 2.1.2. Intergovernmentalism | 31 |
| 2.2. Testing the Theories on Security Integration | 34 |
| 2.2.1. National Interests of Major Actors | 36 |
| 2.2.2. 1990 IGC and the Maastricht Treaty | 39 |
| 2.2.3. 1996 IGC and the Amsterdam Treaty | 41 |
| 2.2.4. 2000 IGC and the Nice Treaty | 42 |
| 2.3. Conclusions | 44 |
| Chapter 3. Public Opinion and Security Integration | 46 |
| 3.1. Support for EU Membership | 47 |
| 3.2. Support for CFSP | 51 |
| 3.3. Support for ESDP | 55 |
| 3.4. General Assessment | 58 |
| 3.5. Member States' Perspective | 61 |
| 3.6. Conclusions | 63 |
| Conclusion | 64 |
| Bibliography | 67 |

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Tables

| | | |
|------------|-----------------------------------|----|
| Table 3.1 | EU-wide support for EU membership | 47 |
| Table 3.2 | British support for EU membership | 48 |
| Table 3.3 | German support for EU membership | 49 |
| Table 3.4 | French support for EU membership | 50 |
| Table 3.5 | EU-wide support for CFSP | 51 |
| Table 3.6 | British support for CFSP | 52 |
| Table 3.7 | German support for CFSP | 53 |
| Table 3.8 | French support for CFSP | 54 |
| Table 3.9 | EU-wide support for ESDP | 55 |
| Table 3.10 | British support for ESDP | 56 |
| Table 3.11 | German support for ESDP | 57 |
| Table 3.12 | French support for ESDP | 58 |

Figures

| | | |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|----|
| Figure 3.1 | EU-wide support for EU membership | 47 |
| Figure 3.2 | British support for EU membership | 48 |
| Figure 3.3 | German support for EU membership | 49 |
| Figure 3.4 | French support for EU membership | 50 |
| Figure 3.5 | EU-wide support for CFSP | 51 |
| Figure 3.6 | British support for CFSP | 52 |
| Figure 3.7 | German support for CFSP | 53 |
| Figure 3.8 | French support for CFSP | 54 |
| Figure 3.9 | EU-wide support for ESDP | 55 |
| Figure 3.10 | British support for ESDP | 56 |
| Figure 3.11 | German support for ESDP | 57 |
| Figure 3.12 | French support for ESDP | 58 |

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) today stands as the pinnacle of transnational integration. Nowhere in the world are so many of the presumably vital functions of the nation-state transferred to the hands of a supranational organization having jurisdiction over national bodies. The EU, in this sense, is a *sui generis* case of successful regional cooperation, in which individuals irrespective of their nationality and residency enjoy common rights protected by the European Court of Justice (EJC), live in an internally border-free territory, hold a common passport and use a common currency. But there is one traditional function of the modern nation-state over which the member states of the EU have resolutely denied the supranational institutions any substantial power; namely, control over security policy.

The considerable discrepancy regarding the depth of integration among these different areas exposes a dilemma of European integration. Although building a 'security community' that would converge on key political and economic policies in order to prevent future wars within the continent was a, if not *the*, central impetus for post-World War II European unification, security integration has proved to be the most problematic area of all and lagged far behind virtually every other sector of integration. While the integration process has reached to a point where a European Constitution is drafted, giving the impression that the EU is transforming gradually into a state-like entity, the slow pace and lack of substance in foreign policy and security cooperation discredits these developments.

Taking its cue from this paradox of European unification, this thesis aims to account for the state and evolution of the European security integration, most recently embodied in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In order to achieve this objective, two traditional theories of European integration, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism will be utilized in the analysis of the specific cases of profound leaps in European security integration.

Discussion on foreign policy and security cooperation at the European level often involves these two competing theoretical frameworks of European integration. (Howorth 2001, Winn 2003) These two strands of thought reflect the competing visions over the kind

of Union to be achieved, namely, a federal Europe or an intergovernmental one. These opposing positions are most starkly contrasted in areas of high-politics, which cover areas that are directly related to the political integrity of the state and its legitimate use of power and coercion, signaling another dilemma for security integration: foreign and security policies are traditionally the nation-state's imperative as the highest locus of sovereign decision-making authority, and any level of security integration at the European level will pave the way towards a complete transfer of competencies from member states to the EU institutions.

In order to account for the possibility of integration in high-politics, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism offer these contrasting explanations:

Neofunctionalist proposition on security integration takes the role of supranational structures as the main force behind integration; and stresses the spillover from previous successes of integration, that is, the transformation and convergence of member states' interests through prior cooperation. So once integration gets under way in low-politics of economic and functional cooperation, such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), it creates pressure to extend cooperation in different but related issues; and once transnational institutions are set-up, they push to extend their authority in further areas of integration. Eventually, the spillover effects reach to high-politics, as in the case of European Political Cooperation (EPC); and once a competency for security and defense issues is transferred to the EU's institutional structure, such as it was the case with the CFSP, this moves the member states to the next level of integration, the ESDP being the case in point.

So the formation of European security procedures and institutions such as the EPC, the CFSP and ESDP all seem to imply a linear and gradual replacement of the nation-state units by the supranational institutions perpetuated by elite socialization at the EU-level, moving incrementally towards a complete transfer of the state's decision-making authority to supranational institutions. (Smith 1998, Collester 2000)

In such a framework emphasizing supranationality, neofunctionalists ascribe great importance to political elites and elite interaction in system-wide institutions in deepening transnational integration. This emphasis renders the role of public opinion in member states extraneous to how integration proceeds and, consequently, public attributes affecting

domestic dynamics are fundamentally ignored. Instead, neofunctionalists give the integration process a largely technocratic treatment, and focus on the elite socialization that leads to the development of common norms and interests transcending those particular to the nation-state.

From a neofunctionalist perspective, then, profound leaps in security integration occur as a result of quasi-automatic processes, operating under the influence of EU-institutions and outside of public involvement. Giving the Commission a central role in setting the integration agenda, the neofunctionalist approach predicts that with every Intergovernmental Conference, integration progressively expands through inclusion of new issues under the competency of common European institutions, eventually covering all of the functions of the nation-state.

The intergovernmentalist school, on the other hand, argues that high politics will remain unaffected by the forces of integration, given that the key actors in integration in foreign and security policy are the member states and not the EU institutions. And because sovereignty is the central concern of the state, cooperation and integration in high politics is strictly limited to the areas in which there is an overlapping of predefined national interests. More often than not, however, national preferences are divergent and conflictual, and any level supranational cooperation has to reflect the lowest common denominator of these preferences.

Moreover, the formation of these national preferences is not influenced by prior supranational cooperation, as neofunctional logic asserts. Instead, they are shaped at the domestic level as a result of bargaining processes involving the domestic public, interest groups and national governments. (Moravcsik 1993) Public opinion in this theoretical framework, then, plays a larger role than it does in neofunctionalism in setting the boundaries within which governments determine their national positions during intergovernmental negotiations.

Here, a particular intergovernmentalist distinction regarding security integration is that because security is not necessarily an area of direct daily concern to people, issues pertaining to security and defense do not usually come under public scrutiny and the public in general do not push their government towards further cooperation in these areas. In other words, because national governments face far less pressure from domestic actors to

delegate/pool their sovereignty in defense and security matters, as opposed to economic or trade policies, they are more averse to deepening of integration in high-politics. It is only when this seeming public apathy turns into concern, potentially in the light of an external event that prioritizes security in the public agenda, that public opinion becomes a variable in shaping member state preferences in security integration. In the lack of such an externality, although there is a level of security integration achieved at the EU level, be it with the CFSP or the ESDP, it is a direct consequence of overlapping state preferences at a given time and not the result of an automatic convergence of interests. (Moravcsik 1998, Bono 2002)

Following this logic, intergovernmentalism predicts that member states can consider pooling their sovereignty in security matters only when their respective national interests shaped at the domestic level converge to such a point that perceived gains of integration compensate for the loss of national sovereignty, or when an external event shifts public focus on security issues so that public opinion becomes a factor in domestic preference formation. Failing to find such a convergence and/or change in public attitude prevents a complete transfer of competencies of the nation-state to supranational institution, and any bargaining process represents the lowest common denominator of national interests.

A preliminary evaluation does not dismiss either of these theories; since although European security integration has been predominantly intergovernmental, it is also true that the EU institutions are gradually incorporated in the mechanisms of security cooperation. Nevertheless, taking the abovementioned paradoxically slow speed of security integration, the initial intuition is that an intergovernmentalist account would prove to be a better fit for the explanation of security integration. Consequently, the focus on the following pages will be on the validity of intergovernmentalist approach.

Outline of the Thesis

The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter covers the evolution of the idea and institutions of European foreign and security policy cooperation from a historical perspective. This analysis provides a compact overview of the extensive work available in

the CFSP literature, tracking the roots of security cooperation from its post-World War II roots up to the related articles in the present Constitutional Treaty, and introduces the major cleavage between intergovernmentalists and supranationalist positions, the issue of nation-state sovereignty, to be the main dynamic behind European security integration.

The second chapter deals with neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism as the two dominant theories of European integration. Their theoretical positions are laid down, followed by an analysis on the relevance of these theories for security integration. The chapter also tests the validity of intergovernmentalist hypotheses in explaining the CFSP and ESDP, as case studies of security integration, taking up the research question “intergovernmentalism explains security integration through the CFSP/ESDP by focusing on the member state preferences and the bargaining processes between them.”

The last chapter takes account of the role of public opinion in influencing security integration through its impact in shaping government and national preferences. While neofunctionalism does not make use of popular opinion as a variable in integration; the intergovernmentalist account, in so far as it integrates domestic dynamics in explaining shifts in national priorities, regards public opinion as a possible variable interacting with domestic governments. The chapter utilizes Eurobarometer survey data on support levels for the CFSP and the ESDP, along with the popular support for the EU membership for comparison purposes.

CHAPTER 1

THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION

This chapter provides a descriptive account of the foreign policy and defense aspects of the European integration from its roots in the European Political Cooperation (EPC) to the to-be-ratified European Constitution. The intention here is to highlight major developments on the course of the evolution of a Union-wide security and defense policy. A related aim is to provide an overview of the procedures and instruments available to common security and defense policy; rather than to offer a complete coverage of events leading up to the construction and implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, as an integral part of it, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The chapter evolves first with an analysis of post World War-II security structuring followed by an analysis of the EPC and proceeds onto the CFSP and ESDP.

The development of European security integration as detailed in the following pages reveal the perseverance on the sovereignty of the state came to be the major obstacle on the road towards integration. It also illustrates the constant conflict between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists, and that the divergence of the two approaches was typically reflected in security issues where the nation-state felt threatened the most.

1.1. Post-War Europe

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the continent was in ruins, both literally and figuratively. Basically, there were four main issues in Europe in 1945: reconstruction

of Europe, prevention of another war, dealing with the German problem and restoration of European power.

The devastating war had left much of Europe economically and politically destructed and socially dislocated, and this setting created a mood for political change. The common experience with nationalism and national rivalries that ended up with a catastrophic war lent support to federalist visions of a unified Europe, which would tie the futures of the peoples of Europe together in such a way that no further war would be possible. It was in this setting that the European countries, historically protective of their national independence, saw that it was in their respective interests to establish supranational links which would pool their sovereignty. At the core of the issue was the ‘German problem;’ namely, how to reconstruct Germany economically so that it would be an asset to its allies, while containing its military power so that it would not, under any circumstances, pose a threat to its neighbors in the continent. But more than anything, it was the changing international climate that fueled concrete attempts at change. The division of Europe as East and West after 1945 and the ensuing Cold War between the USA and USSR, as the new superpowers of the world, raised alarming security concerns for Western Europe. The previous ambitions to build a powerful Europe to balance the superpowers were crushed with the deterioration of relations with the Soviets. The war-torn European powers lacked strong defenses against the perceived territorial aspirations of the USSR. In this setting, the direct involvement of the US with its superior financial and military resources in Western Europe’s economic and security restructuring became inevitable. (Urwin 2003)

The central themes of post-war integration of Europe, then, included the safeguarding of peace in the continent, political reorganization and economic recovery, integration of Germany into the European system, problematic place of Europe in an emerging bipolar world and the eminent Soviet threat to the Western Europe. (Aybet 1997, Dedman 1996, George and Bache 2001) In response to these challenges, some predictable and some imaginative courses of action were introduced in the post-war setting of Europe. But the nature of these themes put the security restructuring of the continent at the core of the problem. There were three alternative routes introduced to cover the defense of Western Europe.

First of these was a European initiative. France and Britain signed the Treaty of Dunkirk of 1947. They were later joined by the Benelux countries 1948 to form the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) until it changed its name to Western European Union (WEU) with the addition of West Germany and Italy in 1954's Paris Agreements. With a guarantee to collective defense, the Brussels Treaty Organization was tellingly agreed upon within weeks of the rise of the Communist Party to power in Czechoslovakia and three months before the Soviet blockade of West Berlin started. But the main motivation behind these two treaties was the prevention of the reemergence of the German aggression more than an alliance against the looming Soviet threat.

The answer to the Soviet threat was found in the American willingness for a leadership role in Western security. The U.S. hegemony would benefit the Europeans in enabling them to take their focus away from security and the vast costs it would bring, and instead pay attention to other issues and utilize their scarce resources in integration and development of the continent.

The price they were to pay for transferring the defense costs to the U.S. was accepting Germany in the security arrangements. The Americans saw West Germany as an integral part of the defense of the Europe and pushed for the integration of a militarily potent Germany into the European system. This perspective led to the second path, namely, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 that would provide for the security of Western Europe. The organization was initiated and dominated by the US and so it was to provide a framework within which West Germany would be incorporated into the Western European security architecture.

Another European attempt for the new security arrangement was the preparations for a European Defense Community (EDC). Originally devised by the Schuman Committee headed by Jean Monnet, its main purpose was to protect the status quo and delay German rearmament. After the Korean War broke out in 1950, however, the U.S. pressure on France to include West Germany in NATO increased. France showed strong resistance to this design and instead proposed the Pleven Plan for a European Army, which would include German troops. The apparent aim of the plan was to create a European Defense Community, duplicating the institutional structure of ECSC. It was devised to be linked to a European Political Community that would provide for the democratic accountability of the

EDC. The plan was met with suspicion by the Dutch and British as a way to further French interests. In the end, the *raison d'être* of the Pleven Plan, which was to stop German rearmament rather than to create a supranational mechanism for European defense became its undoing when the French National Assembly rejected the EDC in 1954. Nevertheless, the failure of EDC was partly a success for the French for it successfully delayed German rearmament and entry into NATO for almost five years until the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) on the basis of the Brussels Treaty. (Dedman 1996)

In any case, after this failed attempt for the ratification of the EDC the issues of common European defense were effectively transferred to NATO under the US control. The NATO, in the end, provided a safeguard to Europe without channeling all of their scarce resources to military spending and eliminated the need for a separate European security structure. It was only after the end of the Cold War in 1989 that any significant inter-European development in this area could be achieved.

It was in this setting of acknowledged American hegemony that Western Europe could focus on functional and sectoral cooperation in order to make sure that there would not be any future wars within the continent. Specifically, the West Germany was experiencing a fast economic recovery at the time, rekindling the fears of the continental Europeans. The attempted French answer to the 'German problem' was integration in economic area, constructed around a supranational 'High Authority' in the key strategic resources of coal and steel with the Schuman Plan of 1950. Satisfying the interests of France, Germany and the U.S., and incorporating Italy and the Benelux countries into the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the 'Europe of the Six,' that would also make up the EEC six years later, was hence formed in 1951. (McAllister 1997)

But the coming years brought considerable opposition to European integration and national divisions began to emerge regarding the kind of integration advocated, most notably illustrated by Charles de Gaulle.

One year after the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, de Gaulle became the new president of France. With his outright resentment to supranationalism and dislike of any non-French hegemony over European affairs, de Gaulle put his stamp on European integration. In trying to reassert French influence, he proposed to the other members of the EEC a 'Union of States' that

would incorporate foreign policy and defense matters into the Community on strictly intergovernmental lines, all the while obstructing the accession negotiations of the British into the EEC. When the small EC states rejected the so-called Fouchet Plan amid the general impasse between the supranational and intergovernmental visions of Europe and after the French veto on British entry, de Gaulle sought for bilateral defense cooperation with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, with whom he had established a Franco-German axis on Community matters. Elysee Treaty of 1963 established a Franco-German partnership to promote cooperation in foreign policy, defense and culture. But the diverging German economic interests over the admission of Britain and its insistence on the inclusion of a reference to the Atlantic alliance in the Treaty would not allow the implementation of the provisions of the agreement. (McAllister 1997) The growing tensions between France and the rest of the EC eventually resulted in traumatic events such as the ‘empty chair crisis’¹ of 1965 and the withdrawal of France from NATO and expulsion of NATO Headquarters from France. The period suggested that not only foreign policy and security cooperation but the whole European integration was at stake.

1.2. European Political Cooperation

It was only after the resignation of Charles de Gaulle in 1969 that the road towards further European integration was opened. Indeed, changes of government in France and Germany, with Georges Pompidou in the former who declared that France would not object to British membership and Willy Brandt who confirmed that his pursuit of *Ostpolitik* would not entail a disregard of German obligations to the Community, paved the way for the Hague Summit of 1969, with the goals of ‘completion, widening and deepening.’ (George and Bache 2001) On the problem of deepening, the Hague Summit concluded that “Europe, as such, is absent from the world dialogue,” (Bronstone 2000) and asked for the preparation of a report on increasing political (foreign policy) cooperation. The next year’s Luxemburg

¹ In July 1965 Charles de Gaulle ordered a French boycott of the Council of Ministers and withdrew France's permanent representative to the Community.

Report² by proposing a framework within which member states could formulate ‘common positions’ on international issues paved the way for the European Political Cooperation (EPC).

The internal dynamics of the EC was the main force behind the EPC initiative. The aforementioned ‘deepening’ objective of the Hague Summit had specified the creation of a common European policy, as a concession to French for their compliance on the matters of ‘completion’ (enhancing the role of the Community institutions on the EC budget) and ‘widening’ (accepting the British accession). The insistence of French stemmed mostly from the Gaullist legacy and their traditional objective to secure West Germany within the European system. The smaller member-states also saw that they would gain from a common approach to foreign policy now that the Gaullist era ended and the British would provide a counter-force to the dominance aspirations of the French within the Community. (Aybet 1997) But it was also the need to counterweigh the growing economical power that was deemed necessary at a time when interests and preferences of the EC member states in Vietnam and the Middle East were neglected by their transatlantic ally. However, the issue of incorporating foreign policy into the Community was still a sensitive issue because of its negative repercussions on the sovereignty of the nation-state.

So the EPC was born as a procedure for consultation between the high-ranking officials of the EC member states and to coordinate national foreign policy positions. It was launched in 1970, albeit outside the framework of the treaties. This meant that the decisions agreed within the EPC were not binding on the member-states, the Commission was only associated with the EPC with no right to propose or vote, and the EPC was outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In parallel to the conception, the goals set were modest, as well. The EPC had a weak formal structure. Foreign Ministers of the member countries were to have meetings every six months to harmonize their positions on international issues, and a Political Committee, composed of the directors of political affairs, was established to assist the Ministers in their affairs. Similarly, the tools available to the EPC were limited to diplomatic declarations of ‘common positions’ on international issues. Basically, the EPC was an attempt to provide a mechanism through which member

² Also referred to as the “Davignon Report,” named after Etienne Davignon, the president of the Committee responsible for preparing the report.

states could consult one another on foreign policy decisions, rather than a setting for common European policy making.

The period between 1970 and 1973 saw the strengthening of EPC procedures. The Copenhagen Report now offered 'joint action' as well as 'common positions' as the aim of the consultations. The Foreign Ministers were to meet at least four times a year while the Political Committee would convene as many times as necessary. The report also recommended the creation of correspondents' and working groups and the establishment of COREU (CORrspondance EUropéenne), a telegram network for enhanced communication between member states. While the involvement of EPC with the EC remained "distinct," close contact between the Commission and EPC would be sustained "when EPC matters had an incidence on Community activities." So, although EPC remained intergovernmental there was also an acknowledgement that the political cooperation could not be developed without any connection with the communitarian aspects of the EC. As a result, the links between EPC and the institutions of the EC were established. (Bronstone 2000)

The first years of the decade also presented circumstances to test the ability of the evolving EPC to achieve its aspirations of coordinated action. Arguably the most significant of these were related to the Arab-Israeli relations centered on the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The decision of the Arab-dominated Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries to stop oil shipment to the US and other Western countries that supported Israel and the subsequent price rises devastated the Western economies. But instead of a concerted response certain EC member states, including France and Britain, opted for bilateral agreements with the oil-producing Arab countries to minimize the negative effects on their national economies; whereas others such as the Netherlands suffered an oil embargo because of its pro-Israeli stance. The US was pushing for a joint response against the OPEC countries, and Germans were also advocating an oil-consumers' cartel. The French, however, were once again suspicious of the role of the US as a hegemonic leader. But through the EPC meetings divergence among national perspectives narrowed towards a pro-Arab perspective and the EC issued a resolution on November 1973 that reaffirmed the Franco-British position on the issue, prompting the OPEC to lift its embargo from all of the Community members, even though it inevitably put further strains on transatlantic relations. Fitting with the intergovernmentalist approach, these

developments showed that when a common interest was threatened, a concerted response could be produced. Through subsequent EPC meetings and with the leadership of France, the EC initiated the Euro-Arab Dialogue in 1974 that enabled the Community to improve its trade relations with the Arab OPEC countries. This initiative eventually culminated in the Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980 that included a need for “recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.” This implied support of the Palestinians’ right to a homeland provided further tension in the relations with the US, but the EPC framework was not adequate to enable the EC in backing up its declaration with concrete action.

Still, together with the German-led initiative on alleviating East-West relations that resulted in the 1975’s Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation, a process the US perceived to open the way towards legitimizing the Communist rule in the East, the Euro-Arab Dialogue became one of the more successful instances of the EPC at work. (George and Bache 2001)

The changes brought up by the new decade, however, showed that the EPC had to be modified once again. In 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and the EC members failed to agree on a common position on the issue. While Britain wanted to follow the US lead in boycotting the Moscow Olympics, neither France nor West Germany was persuaded. The fact that the American response to the bellicose USSR policies was starting to get more aggressive heightened the fears of Western European security. It was in this background that 1981’s London Report was prepared. Rather than making it more supranational, the aim of the Report was to offer practical improvements to the EPC in order to “shape events and not merely react to them.” (Smith 2004) The Report recommended the coordination of political aspects of security while changing the goal of EPC to ‘joint action.’ To this end, procedural changes of strengthening the role of the EPC Presidency, full association of the EC Commission with EPC and the establishment of the Troika Secretariat to ensure continuity were introduced to the system. This marked the first time that security, though only with its political aspects, was mentioned in the Community context. (Bonvicini 1998)

The escalation of Soviet-U.S. tensions at the beginning of the new decade after a long period of *detente*, the EC’s inability to act internationally and the growing dissatisfaction with U.S policies also relaunched the Franco-German dialogue creating a lightly armed joint brigade and, with British involvement, revived the moribund WEU by reinstating

ministerial meetings; but a much more ambitious and premature attempt was the Genscher-Combo Draft European Act of 1982. The Draft Act, which sought to “make it possible for the member states to act in concert in world affairs so that Europe will increasingly be able to assume the international role incumbent upon it,” (Dinan 2004) and proposed to increase efficiency by formally integrating EPC into the Community structure, was rejected. It was only with the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 that the EPC was given a legal treaty basis under the ‘single’ framework of the European Council, without changing the basic nature and methods of its workings. Specifically, Title III of the SEA stated that EPC could discuss “political and economic aspects of security” and that “the external policies of the EC and the policies agreed in Political Cooperation must be consistent.”

So, the SEA gave the EPC a written basis for the first time but the fact that the EPC was firmly left out of the jurisdiction of the ECJ showed that this agreement was yet another instance of compromise between those, such as Germans and Italians, advocating further political integration and other states like Britain, or small states like Ireland, showing deep reservations regarding a possible shift in the locus of foreign policy-making.

In the end, the incremental but steady evolution of the Political Cooperation was a result of both the internal dynamics of the Community and the external developments that had direct impacts on altering the interests of the member states. The evolution of the EPC and its legitimization in the SEA demonstrated that security integration was left to the intergovernmental processes and was to be exclusively handled by the member states.

Although the EPC framework with its informal but regular meetings gradually resulted in what could be termed as a ‘consultation reflex’ among member states (Nuttall 2000), it firmly excluded the issues of defense and security; and the notions of national sovereignty, independent decision making, and the notion of *domaine reserve* preserved their prevalence in foreign policy in Europe. (Jorgensen 1992) And after twenty years of working practices, the EPC came to represent an example of intergovernmental cooperation without formal integration, whose mechanisms largely failed to promote convergence on national attitudes. (Forster and Wallace 2000)

1.3. Common Foreign and Security Policy

For nearly two decades, the Community members had been able to adapt their decentralized system of foreign policy cooperation to the changing international context through their shared experiences, all the while steering away from any weakening of its strict intergovernmental mechanics. Given that there was not any pressing need that called for further integration in foreign policy and security areas, the member states were naturally disinclined to do away with this significant bastion of national sovereignty. But two major factors; namely, the abrupt systemic transformation from the predictable Cold War system and the slow prior evolution of the foreign policy and security integration demonstrated that an informal system like the EPC with no permanent organization to administer its workings and back its decisions was very inadequate for the EC to face the security challenges posed by this new world.

Indeed, the radical geo-political transformations between 1989 and 1991, such as the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the USSR, the reunification of Germany and the rising tension in the Balkans had inevitable effects on the perceptions of the member states both of their own changing roles and that of the EC in the international arena, which in turn culminated in a formal Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as the second pillar of the new European Union (EU).

The fast and unexpected pace of developments across central Europe, the risk of destabilization in the region and, most importantly, the prospect of a reunified Germany³ in 1990 facilitated the joint support of Germany and France to the Belgium proposition for an IGC on Political Union together with the already scheduled one on economic and monetary cooperation. (Laursen, VanHoonacker and Wester 1992)

But as, one might expect, member states had different preferences and conflicting positions on whether they would benefit more from a supranational CFSP architecture or from keeping the intergovernmental line that shaped their final agreement on the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). In the background of negotiations leading up to the TEU were the Gulf War and Yugoslavia crisis (Dinan 1999) and the negotiations between the

³ Similar to developments up to the EDC Treaty (1952), mostly driven by the prospects of keeping Germany under control, this is yet another instance of how to keep Germany in check through European integration.

differing positions of the member states were affected by the involvement of the EC in them.

The inability of the EC in handling those crises lent some support to the view that the national perceptions and interests were too divergent to be accommodated within a single framework. Conversely, it was also used to show that the existing machinery was inadequate and ineffective and had to be integrated into the Community structure. (George and Bache 2001) These positions were favored by the British and Delors' French, respectively. So, on the question of foreign policy, the U.K-led the pack of Denmark, Greece and Portugal insisted on keeping the intergovernmental nature of the EPC while France and Germany, supported by the Benelux countries and Italy was in favor of a strong common policy; where in defense and security matters the split occurred mostly between the U.K, Netherlands and Portugal i.e. the Atlanticists, on the one hand, and the rest, headed by France, with Denmark, Greece and Portugal adopting distinct national policies. (Nuttall and Edwards 1994) In this respect, the role of WEU was also an important part of the negotiations. Where the Atlanticists saw WEU as a "permanent bridge" between NATO and the Union, the French supported the image of a "ferry" that would gradually transfer the defense functions of NATO to the EU. (Forster and Wallace 2000) After proposals including a British-led Rapid Reaction Corps within NATO and the upgrading of Franco-German brigade into EUROCORPS to form the core of a European army, the Rome Declaration after the NATO Summit of 1991 showed acceptance of a European Defense Identity, all the while acknowledging the primacy of NATO in defense cooperation.

In the end, the result of the IGC bargaining was more in favor of the minimalists, with their success at creating a separate intergovernmental pillar for the CFSP as the next incremental and logical step from the EPC and keeping it out of the Community pillar.

The TEU, signed on 7 February 1992, stated that it was among the goals of the Union "to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense." (Article B)⁴

⁴ The article numbers refer to the original version, prior to the amendments in the Amsterdam Treaty.

A number of compromises were reached between the intergovernmentalists and supranationalists in the EU. These were concerned with the objectives, institutionalisation, tools and decision-making mechanisms of the CFSP. The explicit objectives of the CFSP was set forth in Article J-1 and included defense of EU's common values and fundamental interests; strengthening the security of the Union; preserving peace and strengthening international security; promoting international cooperation; consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, the Commission was to be fully associated with the CFSP and could initiate proposals, sharing this right with the Council. (Article J-9) Nevertheless, it was only the Council that could direct the CFSP.

In coherence with EPC practices, the presidency and the troika would represent the CFSP externally, meaning that the EU was missing a single 'phone number.' But unlike the EPC, and although allocated a small portion, the CFSP could be financed by the Community budget. In a further attempt of strengthening institutionalization, the EPC Secretariat merged into Council Secretariat and the Commissioner for External Political Affairs was created.

In the implementation of CFSP, two major policy instruments were introduced. These were 'common positions' and 'joint actions,' although their distinctions were not clearly drawn in the Treaty. As one observer writes, though, common positions were conceived to facilitate "systematic cooperation," whereas joint actions were "to allow member states to act together in concrete ways based on a Council decision as to the specific scope of such actions, the EU's objectives in carrying them out, and the duration, means and procedures for their implementation." (Dinan 2004)

The decision making process was yet another instance of compromise between the intergovernmentalists and supranationalists. Qualified majority voting (QMV), where each member state is allocated a number of votes according to the size of its population, was introduced into the CFSP system. Normally this would be a strong advancement towards supranationalism, because it replaces the need for unanimity in reaching common decisions and the possibility of unilateral veto, through *pooling* of sovereignty. (Moravcsik 1998) But in this case, QMV was to be limited to decisions on joint actions that had to be adopted in the Council by consensus, and even in that case, all states had to agree to accept it in case

by case basis. This was a small victory for those states, such as Britain, keen on protecting their national sovereignty, and others, like Ireland, sensitive on keeping their neutrality. (Dinan 1999)

As for the relations with the WEU, any merger with the EU institutions was not possible because of the opposition of the Atlanticists. The compromise was that the Union identified the WEU as an “integral part of the development of the Union,” that would “elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications.” Even though WEU was recognized as the defense arm of the EU, there were two problems against such a scheme. The Petersberg Tasks declared in June 1992 limited the potential activity of WEU to peace-keeping, humanitarian and crisis-management tasks in Europe; excluding common defense. Subsequently, a Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) as a solution incorporating NATO was launched in 1996. The other problem stemmed from the attempt to accommodate the differing memberships in the EU, WEU and NATO. By introducing observers, associates and associate partners WEU totaled in 28 members with differing rights and obligations, which further complicated the issue of a possible WEU-EU merger. (Smith 2003)

The period until the 1996 IGC did not prove to be a good showcase for the CFSP and EU in general. The challenges of the Yugoslavian conflict and especially the situation of Bosnia, further complicated transatlantic relations. While demonstrating WEU and CFSP’s lack of competence in providing effective and rapid common initiatives and military action, this phase confirmed, more than anything, the predominance of national legacies in foreign policy. The variety of approaches within the EU further increased with the accession of the non-aligned Austria, Sweden and Finland, which, in turn, gave rise to a “northern perspective,” with a focus on Baltic region. (Forster and Wallace 2000)

In this background, the IGC convened “to address the effectiveness and potential reform of CFSP” and concluded with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which amended several provisions for increased coherence regarding the CFSP. (Articles 11-28)

Specifically, ‘common strategies’ were added to common positions and joint actions as a formal CFSP instrument. Common strategies were defined “to be implemented by the Union in areas where the member states have important interests in common” and they would “set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available to the Union

and the Member State.” (Article 13-2) The novelty here was that, once a common strategy was adopted by the Council, decisions, joint actions and common positions could be accepted by means of QMV. Still, this change would not apply to decisions with military and defense implications.

In an attempt to improve the effectiveness and visibility of the CFSP, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced two significant innovations. The first one was the so-called ‘constructive abstention.’ While the strong role of the Council in the decision making process was confirmed, for effective decision-making processes constructive abstention was incorporated into the Treaty in line with the larger-scale discussions on ‘flexibility’ of European integration. (George and Bache 2001) Constructive abstention allowed any member state to abstain from voting without blocking a decision; this was seen by the EU as a chance to offer states opposing a decision a way to stay away while enabling the others to go on with their collective decision.

The second innovation was the post of ‘High Representative for the CFSP.’ This position was created in an attempt to provide a ‘single number’ for the Union. The High Representative would assist the rotating Council presidency that was still responsible for the CFSP affairs. The Mr./Ms. CFSP was to replace the past presidency in the troika and would also head the new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which was to provide early warning crises and prepare policy papers. The first occupier of the post would be the well known Javier Solana, a former Spanish foreign minister and NATO Secretary General. Overall, his contributions to the Middle East peace process and a solution to the Macedonian conflict helped the new post to have visibility as the face of EU foreign policy.

As for the WEU, the EU could now ‘avail itself’ of WEU on defense issues, as opposed to ‘requesting’ WEU action. Additionally, the WEU “would provide the Union with access to an operational capability,” which, in effect, meant the initiation of the Petersberg Tasks. (Dashwood 2000) Although the Amsterdam Treaty paved the way for better adaptation to future developments by inscribing flexibility into the system, it was the sea change in the U.K that defined the future course of CFSP.

The increasing marginalization of the U.K from the Franco-German-led core of the Union, most strikingly seen in its absence from the Euro and Schengen zones, coupled with its disillusionment with the Bosnian experience and the impending Kosovo crisis combined

to result in the British u-turn in its stance towards a common European defense. (Missiroli 2000) In stating that the Union had to have “capacity for autonomous action” while “acting in conformity” with respective obligations in NATO, St Malo Declaration of December 1998 represented a compromise between the British and French together with American consent (Sloan 2000), and it opened the way for the prospect of adding a defense dimension to European integration.

1.4. European Security and Defense Policy

The previous development of the EPC/CFSP had demonstrated that institutionalization of cooperation in intergovernmental decision-making. But given that the security and defense realms were traditionally excluded from the supranational foreign policy making, any spillover pressures from the CFSP into a common defense policy outside the NATO framework would only be actualized in the face of another systemic change. The change, this time, was brought on by the Balkans, in the backyard of the EU.

The possibility of widespread chaos threatening the security of Europe, coupled with the fact that even at the end of the twentieth century crimes against humanity could be committed in Europe on such a scale while the EU members could not, once again, agree on a common position among themselves, let alone with the US, was truly a wake up call. What they also realized was that even when member state positions were in accord, the EU was not taken seriously by the Serbians since they lacked the military capabilities for joint action unless the reluctant Americans, who appeared to have an increasing desire for isolationism, entered into the equation.

So the Kosovo conflict and the perceived ambiguousness of the American position facilitated the rapid Europeanization of the St Malo agreement for a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). (Haine 2004) In June 1999, the European Council in Cologne laid the foundations for the ESDP: As part of the CFSP, the ESDP was to be developed to incorporate crisis management and conflict prevention. The member states declared that they were “resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and

capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defense... the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”

In line with this declaration, six months later in the Helsinki European Council the member states gave the ESDP a concrete substance, in an attempt to substantiate the capabilities part of the ‘capabilities/expectations gap.’ The agreed ‘headline goal’ was to prepare a self-sustaining military force of 15 brigades (50,000-60,000 persons), capable of the Petersberg Tasks, that could be organized in 60 days and maintained for at least one year, with the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) ready to be deployed far more quickly.

In December 2000, the Treaty of Nice formalized the Helsinki conclusions to establish the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) in the Council of the EU. Moreover, the defense part of the CFSP would now be structured not by the WEU but by the EU itself, effectively integrating WEU into the EU. Another important change was the evolution of flexibility into ‘enhanced cooperation’ for protecting “the values and serving the interests of the EU when asserting its identity as a coherent force on the international scene.” (Article 27) This concept could be applied towards the implementation of an action or of a common position; and if no member state opposed or requested a unanimous decision of the Council, the particular decision could be reached by QMV. But this enhanced cooperation would not include defense cooperation, as a result of the British fear that this would prevent the non-EU member states, such as Turkey, from participating in the RRF. (Smith 2004) The general problem Turkey posed by rejecting the Nice provisions of the ‘Berlin-plus’ framework, which was to provide the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, was eventually solved in December 2002 .(Gnesotto 2004)

On the whole, this new era in European defense and security produced successful EU civilian/military operations, which all contributed to building up the ability and a common approach on peacekeeping missions in the international context. Most notably, these missions included those in Bosnia, Macedonia and Congo. Specifically, the civilian EU Police Mission in Bosnia the EU took over from the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) in January 2003 was to develop police independence and accountability; the

military Operation *Concordia* in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia taking over NATO's Operation *Allied Harmony* in March 2003 was charged with patrolling, surveillance and reconnaissance in the region, while its immediate civilian follow-up Police Operation *Proxima* in December 2003 was to consolidate law and order; June 2003's military Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo aimed to stabilize security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation; and the transfer of peacekeeping mission in Bosnia from the NATO-led Stabilization Forces (SFOR) to the EU's RRF under Operation *Althea* in December 2004 was assigned with the task of monitoring compliance with the Dayton peace agreement.

1.5. European Strategy Document

The rapid progress made possible with the St Malo process faced a new challenge after the 11 September terrorist attacks. The proposals of St Malo had been prepared with the particular European experience in the Balkans, and could not be adequate in the face of a radically changed international environment. After 9/11, international terrorism replaced the post-Cold War era and became the new paradigm in international relations. Americans abandoned isolationism, and as the U.S foreign policy became more unilateral and the Bush administration decided to expand the operations from Afghanistan to Iraq, a serious crisis emerged within NATO and the EU at a time where talks for a constitutional treaty were proceeding.

It was in this context that June 2003's European Strategy Document entitled 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' was produced. This so-called Solana Doctrine marked the first time that EU produced a global approach to foreign and security policies in an effort "to define the EU's global interests and how the Union [was to] promote and defend them." (Haine 2004) Indeed, the document was the first concrete response to those critical of security integration citing lack of identifiable common European interests in this area. As a novelty, the document identified certain threats including international terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime. The document acknowledged that in countering these attacks the line of

defense would be set abroad. But unlike the preventive strike scheme of the U.S National Security Strategy of 2002, defense would be organized with a combination of political, economic, civil and military approaches. The document also elaborated on ‘preventive engagement’ to endorse stability through humanitarian operations, economic aid and the like, and ‘effective multilateralism’ that recognized the UN Charter as the main framework within which international relations would operate. The introduction of these two concepts, in the end, entails an awareness on the part of the Union of its need to upgrade its “civilian-only” approach to “soft-power-plus.” (Haine 2004) But in any case, the adoption of the strategy document is meaningful only to the extent that it is continuously backed by national political will.

1.6. The Constitutional Treaty

Along with the latest and largest wave of enlargement, the Constitutional Treaty represents the manifestation of the EU’s two major priorities: deepening and widening. The prospects of integrating ten new member states to the already cumbersome mechanisms of the EU, the perceived complexities and inadequacies of the previous treaties and the persistent ‘democratic deficit’ within the EU procedures culminated in efforts towards achieving the next step in supranational institutionalization, with the aim of gathering broader support from EU citizens and interest groups at large. It was evident that if the enlarged EU was to function effectively both domestically and in the international scene, making the integrated Europe more democratic, transparent and accessible towards its citizens was essential. (Forsberg 2004)

There were various debates as to how this process could evolve, including setting up an elected EU President post and doing away with the Commission. In the end, December 2001’s European Council meeting in Laeken, with the forthcoming enlargement to include CEECs, Malta and Cyprus in perspective and within weeks after 9/11, set out the process towards a European constitution. The Laeken Declaration offered that the citizens of Europe “... want[ed] to see Europe more involved in foreign affairs, security and defense, in other words, greater and better coordinated action to deal with trouble spots in and

around Europe and in the rest of the world.” It also mentioned the challenge of developing “a more coherent common foreign policy and defense policy.” On the whole, however, the CFSP and ESDP issues were only lightly touched upon; and it was a surprising feat at a time when Javier Solana had declared that ESDP would be the EU’s new principal integration objective after the success with the Euro. (Ehrhart 2002)

The Convention on the Future of Europe, taking the Declaration as a starting point for the discussions on the Constitutional Treaty, assembled in February 2002. It included representatives of the member state parliaments, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. For effective dealing with specific issues, Working Groups were organized including those on ‘External Action’ (WG VII) and ‘Defense’ (WG VIII). Working independently, these two groups presented their recommendations in their final reports in December 2002. (Haine 2003) The discussions on the draft Treaty, which included most of those recommendations, started with the IGC on the Future of Europe in October 2003. However, the governments could not agree on the draft at the December 2003 European Council in Brussels and a consensus could be reached only with the June 2004 European Council in Brussels. In the end, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 29 October 2004. Both the Constitutional Treaty and the 2003 IGC brought certain considerable changes to the CFSP and ESDP in some areas and reaffirmed the previous positions in others. Still, one should note that the intensity of debates within the Convention regarding the Union’s foreign policy and defense has been left far behind those that took place outside the Convention, meaning that the number and substance of the Treaty articles cannot be deemed as the only major restrictions on the role of the EU on the international politics. (Whitman 2003)

Regarding CFSP, the Constitutional Treaty puts down provisions in Title I, Articles 16, 40 and 41 and Title III, Articles 294 - 313. Specifically, the Constitutional Treaty proclaims that “the Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy that might lead to a common defense,” and that “the Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union’s common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area... [and] they shall refrain from action

contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its effectiveness." (Article I-16) The language here is evidently similar to the phrasing in the TEU.

In an attempt to further substantiate the CFSP, new institutions including the President of the European Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs and the European External Action Service are introduced to the system.

Indeed, perhaps one of the most important innovations of the Constitutional Treaty is the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. By effectively combining the responsibilities of the High Representative for the CFSP and the External Relations Commissioner, the post is intended to guarantee the consistency and coherence of the Union's external action by giving the Minister the responsibility of conducting the CFSP and ESDP.

The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is to be appointed by the European Council with qualified majority voting, be one of the vice-presidents of the European Commission and he/she is stipulated to take part in the work of the European Council. (Article I-28)

Apart from the other loosely mentioned roles of the Minister, on the whole, the Constitutional Treaty does not provide a detailed blueprint for the post. In this way, not only the existing differences between the member states on the roles of the Commission and the Council in shaping CFSP is acknowledged but a maneuver area for future revisions is created. This ambiguity also means the personality of the office holder will have significant effect on the development of the post, just as it was in the case of the High Representative. (Missiroli 2004)

Correspondingly, the Constitutional Treaty does not offer a clear position as to whom to call when trying to reach Europe. The Foreign Affairs Minister is not the sole figure representing the Union on external relations. Except for CFSP matters, it is the Commission that represents the EU. Even in the issues related to the CFSP, it is among the European Council President's duties to guarantee external representation albeit "without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Minister for Foreign Affairs." (Article I-22)

In addition to the Union Minister, two other important aspects of cohesion in foreign and security policy and in defense policy introduced by the Constitutional Treaty are related to mutual defense and solidarity, and cooperation in defense matters. The mutual defense clause included in the Constitutional Treaty states that "if a Member State is the

victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.” Nevertheless, the article ensures that the commitments in these situations “shall be consistent with commitments under the NATO, which for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation.” (Article I-41/7) It is worth noting that the first draft of the clause had emphasized the voluntary aspect of cooperation among “participating Member States” against armed aggression, and only “close cooperation” with NATO. Debate on this clause coincided with the controversy regarding an EU operations program set out by Germany, France, Belgium and Luxemburg in the spring of 2003 that would have an autonomous military headquarters near Brussels. Amid fears of creating divisions between Member States and also with the US, the clause was revised in the IGC as above. The solidarity clause, on the other hand, was prepared to oblige Member States to act jointly in the case of a terrorist attack against a Member State or a natural or man-made disaster. (Article I-43) Contrary to the debates on the mutual defense clause, this one did not, perhaps understandably, cause any controversy because it stressed the limitation of the action to the territory of the particular Member State. (Missiroli 2004)

The Constitutional Treaty expands ‘enhanced cooperation’ of the Treaty of Nice to include cooperation in defense, but in CFSP matters enhanced cooperation will only be possible in the existence of unanimity.

Overall, the new articles in the Constitutional Treaty, in line with the past experiences, try to provide for a more flexible and effective foreign and security policy. And, in the end, it is a step forward but only a small and incremental one since there are no changes to the prevalence of intergovernmentalism and unanimity in the CFSP/ESDP decision-making mechanisms.

1.7. Conclusions

The evolution of the foreign and security cooperation, from its pre-natal roots in the EPC to its incorporation of the ESDP, illustrate a gradual and incremental evolution of a

policy, whose institutional architecture and general trajectory are molded by internal and external challenges posed by the EU and its environment. It is true that CFSP has so far failed to be a *common* policy, but in spite of its bitter failures and obvious inadequacies (or perhaps because of them), foreign and security policy has never been out of the agenda of European integration, and its current direction reflects its slow but nevertheless positive evolution.

As this chapter illustrates, the main issue determining the speed and substance of security integration is the direct impact it entails, as a domain of high politics, on nation-state sovereignty. This is the reason behind the failure of earlier attempts such as the EDC and the very slow evolution of the EPC to the CFSP.

Next chapter deals with two different theories of integration and analyses the relevance of these theories to explain security integration in Europe. CFSP and ESDP are treated as case studies for the abovementioned aim.

CHAPTER 2

THEORIZING SECURITY INTEGRATION

There are two dominant theories of European integration: Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism⁵. In this chapter, I utilize these theories and investigate their relevance to the CFSP/ESDP framework in order to analyze whether the development of security integration in Europe through the CFSP/ESDP is a product of primarily intergovernmental processes or supranational forces.

Specifically, the neofunctionalist proposition is that integration initially starts with limited cooperation in given economic sectors and spills over to other policy areas, in time reaching to foreign policy and security for a complete transfer of national sovereignties to the EU level. Intergovernmentalists claim, on the other hand, that the integration process has its limits in foreign policy and security matters; reasoning that since these areas are located at the heart of the nation-state's sovereignty member states will ensure that any transfer of competencies to the EU-level will remain under the complete jurisdiction of the nation-state.

In the following pages, I first provide an overview of these established theories of European integration, lay out their main competing premises, and test their validity in the cases of CFSP and ESDP. This chapter argues that the CFSP is greatly impacted by the end of the Cold War which changed the preferences of the powerful actors in the EU towards security integration.

⁵ “By defining integration as cooperation that moves actors closer towards adopting or deepening supranational decision-making, one can apply existing theories of integration to explain how the current intergovernmental cooperation is moving EU member states toward eventually adopting supranational decision-making.” (Smith, Braden 2004)

2.1. Established Integration Theories

The gradual realization of the EU and its apparent threat to the state-centric theoretical constructions inevitably gave way to various accounts to make sense of this *sui generis* phenomenon, one that is “less than a federation, more than a regime” (Wallace 1983), combining intergovernmental and supranational qualities.

In offering different independent variables that propel the European integration process further, both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism attempt to coherently interpret the integration patterns as observed in the evolution of the EU and to provide their own explanations for the Member States’s surrendering parts of their sovereignty to the European level.

It is true that they are often labeled (and criticized) as the ‘grand theories’ of European integration⁶, in that they seek to detail the construction, development and the future of the European process at large, nevertheless, because of this very aspect of attempt to universal applicability, they are valuable tools to be able to account for the emerging European polity and to comprehend the evolution of the Community into the Union. (Rosamond 2000)

2.1.1. Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism was born as an attempt to give a formal explanation to what can be called the ‘Monnet Method’ of integration (Rosamond 2000). This included Jean Monnet’s pragmatic, incremental policies of starting with specific key sectors (e.g. steel and coal) and then building on the success of their integration, meaning that the unified Europe ‘...[would] not be built all at once, or as a single whole: it [would] be built by concrete achievements which first create *de facto* solidarity.’ (Tsakatika 2002)

⁶ The reason for referring to neofunctionalism as a ‘grand theory’ is contextual, that is, it is a result of the utilization of the concept ‘grand theory’ as restricted to the European level. When generalized at a higher level, neofunctionalism can only be considered as a partial theory.

As developed by Ernst Haas (1958, 1964), Leon Lindberg and Joseph Nye, the central focus of the theory was the European integration as a *process*, rather than to examine the necessary background conditions or the end-product of cooperation. Haas described this process “whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.” (Sutcliffe 1995) These political actors would be persuaded to shift their loyalties as a result of the positive effects of cooperation.

Neofunctionalism tried to develop a theory of regional integration tailored for the European experience, drawing premises from the more universalistic functionalist approach to international organization. (Jupille 2002) As reflected in the works of David Mitrany, in a quest to deter the nationalist threat to European and world peace, functionalism had proposed the delegation of political authority from national to supra-national bodies, or ‘High Institutions,’ in certain areas of technical competency such as transportation, agriculture and health sectors, leaving the decision-making competencies to technocrats. Specifically, this *technical/functional cooperation* would enable the “growth of new habits and interests” that in turn would weaken the territorial and ideological differences, leading to a shift of allegiance to a world community.

Neofunctionalism developed this concept developed within the functionalist framework, into the notion, or rather the process, of ‘spillover.’ Lindberg described this as “...a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth.” (Viola 2000) To put it another way, spillover implies that a successful experience of integrative cooperation in areas of low politics where there is a minimal possibility of political contention can lead to cooperation in other policy areas. In addition to this ‘functional’ spillover, neofunctionalists argue that actors involved in integration gradually socialize into the norms of the supranational setting, resulting in ‘political spillover.’ With a snowball effect this cycle of integration eventually creeps into high politics, resulting with a transformation of political allegiances, or, at least, political activities of national elites to a supranational level.

This incremental shift of functional authority from national to supranational level, neo-functionalists argued, could eventually result in the establishment of a central federal body. However, later developments in the European integration caused Haas and others to modify their views and admit that spillovers from economic to political sectors were not necessarily automatic or inevitable, and there could even be occurrences of ‘spillbacks’ (negative spillovers). Rather, spillover was dependent on a number of elements including national politics and governments as well as supra-national bodies, most importantly the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament.

But the underlying logic of neofunctionalism remained the same: the existence of a universal human motive for utility maximization, regarding the Community politics fundamentally as a technique to realize their economic interests. Instead of grand ideological aspirations, first and foremost, it was the material needs that needed to be satisfied. (Bellami and Castiglione 200, Streeck 1997) Suitably, Haas offered that ‘[t]he public is ... concerned with income, price stability, better working conditions, cleaner air, more recreational facilities ... [and] does not greatly care whether these amenities are provided by national government or by Brussels.’ (Bellamy and Warleigh 1998)

2.1.2. Intergovernmentalism

As the explanatory power of neofunctionalism seemed to deteriorate due to the failure of supranationalism in the integration process during the 1960s, most notably with the nationalist resurgence led by the French President Charles de Gaulle, intergovernmentalism established itself as the main contender against neo-functionalism. The so-called intergovernmentalist backlash, first conceptualized in Stanley Hoffmann’s work (1966), had specific critiques against the neofunctionalist/supranationalist paradigm.

Developing his critique from the insights of the realist tradition of international relations, Hoffmann emphasized the significance of the international environment as opposed to the neofunctionalist focus on the *process*, and took the central role of the nation-state given in the workings and evolution of the Union. The role of national governments was to promote the interests of their citizens in a hostile world, and it was,

above all, the 'national interest' that shaped and drove the politics of post-war Europe. In Hoffmann's words these interests were to do more than the balance of power between the states, rather, they were "constructs in which ideas and ideals, precedents and past experiences, and domestic forces and rulers all play a role." (1995) Contrary to neofunctionalist insistence, nation-state was obstinate rather than obsolete.

Another critique was targeted to the 'Monnet method' of integration. Specifically, it was argued, the neofunctionalist logic of integration that assumed automatic and unintended spill-over was flawed. Since national governments had prioritized issues of integration, in certain matters they were expected to be less willing to be compensated for their losses by gains in other areas, and they would want to retain their control over the decision-making procedures when they felt there were vital interests at stake. (Cram 1996) Hoffmann maintained that functional integration could have plausible success only if it "had sufficient potency to promise an excess of gains over losses... Theoretically, this may be true of economic integration. It is not true of political integration (in the sense of 'high politics')." (1966) This distinction between 'high politics' (foreign policy, security, defense policies) and 'low politics' (economic and welfare policies) was central to the critique of neofunctional/supranational approach. In the latter, issues were mainly of technocratic nature and states were willing to cooperate and integrate. But in the realm of high politics, where national identities and autonomy of the governments were perceived to be at stake, they were not prepared to compromise their sovereignty. Hoffman argued that the functional integration brought about by the expansion of tasks carried an increasing amount of uncertainty regarding the end result of the project. In the face of uncertainty, national governments were bound to get in conflict with each other because they derived their interests from different bases. So, because "nations preferred the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, over the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender," the area of high politics was resistant to integrative forces. (Rosamond 2000)

As a reformulation of this approach, 'liberal intergovernmentalism,' formulated by Moravscik (1991, 1993) adds domestic politics within the nation-state dynamics as the independent variable, where the former constrains the actions and the autonomy of the latter. Moravscik develops his case by analyzing the negotiations of the SEA and argues

that it was the interstate bargains between France, Germany and Britain that determined the outcome of the negotiations. Moreover, the eventual outcomes were “the lowest common denominator” solutions and they were possible only because of the convergence of national interests at certain points. (Moravscik 1991) His reformulation includes a two-level analysis, where the national government links the domestic and international levels. The preferences of member states, which determine their positions in EU-level negotiations, are in turn determined by domestic societal factors. But domestic forces do not simply have a dynamic of their own, national preferences also reflect ‘security externalities,’ major geopolitical events that reveal new information to the players. So, in Moravscik’s words “state behavior reflects the rational actions of governments constrained at home by domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment.” (1993)

Here, too, the integration process does not need to lead to the weakening of the nation-state. On the contrary, because the governments can take the controversial issues away from domestic politics, into the higher level of executive control, it may as well result in a stronger state in the face of the supranational threat. (Risse-Kappen 1996)

With these points in mind, the intergovernmentalists see the EU, as an example of “international organizations,” to be a creation to serve the purposes of the Member States, and its legitimacy lies in the agreement of national governments. The central dynamic of the integration (or its prevention), for intergovernmentalists, is ‘inter-state bargaining,’ which includes the interaction of the interests, relative bargaining powers, and bargaining strategies of these sovereign states. (Scharpf 2000) Through creation of various supranational institutions as a judiciary or a bureaucracy, the Member States are able to enforce and employ collective agreements so long as their interests overlap. The trick is that the supranational level is never allowed to be autonomous from the powers of the states. Where “neofunctionalism emphasizes the active role of supranational officials in shaping bargaining outcomes, liberal intergovernmentalism stresses instead passive institutions and the autonomy of national leaders.” (Moravscik 1993) Therefore, through the employment of various EU institutions such as the Council of Ministers, or the European Council, Member States pursue their own national interests. (Marks, Hooghe, Blank 1996) Naturally, this mechanism prevents the possibility of a federal body in the

future of Europe, and the hegemony of the sovereign nation-state in international relations does not dissolve.

2.2. Testing the Theories on Security Integration

In the light of the outlined points of the two integration theories, the evolution of CFSP can be explained in two different ways, one taking the predominance of supranational entities, the other the nation-state as the main determinant of integration in foreign and security policy. Utilization of a neofunctional/supranational approach could explain the development of CFSP structures as an unintended consequence of spillover from previous integration in related but separate areas. So once governments delegate powers to the EU institutions, such as with the inception of the Single Market, an irreversible momentum is created aided by creation of transnational elite not committed to national forms of allegiance, that leads to a monetary union, in turn, paving the way to a political union with a complete transfer of loyalties to the EU. Giving the Commission a central role in setting the integration agenda, a neofunctionalist approach would hold that with every IGC, integration progressively expands through inclusion of new issues, eventually covering all of the functions of the nation-state.

An intergovernmental explanation on the other hand, would treat CFSP as an entity designed to specifically improve the specific aspects of a common foreign and security policy useful to national interests, eliminating the need for the investigation of other policy areas. In this approach, because as rational and instrumental actors national governments face far less pressure from domestic actors to delegate/pool their sovereignty in foreign policy areas related to defense and security matters (as opposed to economic or trade policies), they are more averse to deepening of integration in high politics. Following this logic, member states can consider pooling their sovereignty only when their respective national interests converge to such a point that perceived gains of integration compensate for the loss of national sovereignty. Failing to find such a convergence prevents a complete transfer of the right to exercise sovereignty to supranational institution, and any bargaining process represents the lowest common denominator of national interests.

So, in order to investigate the proposition that “intergovernmentalism explains security integration through the CFSP/ESDP by focusing on the member state preferences and the bargaining processes between them,” I argue that an investigation of the validity of the below conditions are necessary:

Profound leaps in security/defense integration occur only when:

1- National preferences, determined by domestic/national priorities, converge sufficiently so that the perceived gains from integration compensate for sharing or losing national sovereignty,

2- Governments face domestic pressure to shift their preferences; which could be a result of security externalities, or

3- The bargaining process results in agreements/institutional arrangements reflecting the lowest common denominator of national preferences; and for those states with diverging interests, protecting opt-out/flexibility etc. arrangements are included.

These three statements are chosen because they reflect major and discernible dividing lines between intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist/supranationalist approaches.

(Gordon 1998)

Verification of these conditions will result in the affirmation of the primacy of state-centered over the Union-centered accounts in explaining the development of the CFSP.

In analyzing the above statements, I will investigate the three instances of intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) that are all ratified by the member states and that can be regarded as the milestones in the history of the foreign and security policy integration because of their concrete implications: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992), introducing the CFSP for the first time in the institutional structure of the EU; the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), convened partly to evaluate and strengthen the CFSP; and the Treaty of Nice (2000), as the formalization of the so-called St Malo process culminating in the ESDP.

But before looking at the specific cases, it is important to lay down the positions and preferences of the three major actors of European integration, since their interests are continuously reflected in the intergovernmental bargaining over the CFSP.

2.2.1. National Interests of Major Actors

The intergovernmentalist approach would argue that Britain, France and Germany, as the most powerful players in the Community, shape the development of the CFSP and this section analyses the preferences of these three key actors. (Keohane, Nye and Hoffman 1993, Pedersen 1998, Tiersky, 2004)

In the case of Britain, the central element for British attitude towards European integration had customarily been *independence*. This could be attributed to several factors. One was a “delusion of grandeur” about Britain’s role in the world. But this self-image also had tangible bases. As part of the winning side of the World War II, Britain was a chief architect of the post-War European order and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. During the Cold-War, through its legacy of empire, the Commonwealth ties, tradition of diplomacy, ‘special relations’ with the United States and independent nuclear force, Britain had managed to play a greater role in international arena than its power position would suggest and could fall back on an independent foreign policy. The British perception of being a (ex)great power isolated from the rest of the continent, also led to a lack of social and cultural affinity with the integration process on the part of the public and political leadership, such that these two are much closer together in their attitudes than is probably the case in other member states. (Mahncke 1993) Consequently, Britain was an “awkward partner,” not the most prone to European integration of any sort, let alone in high politics. (George 1998) This attitude was crystallized in defining the British interests in the EU as the preservation of national sovereignty and full power of member states. Specifically, this preference led to a strong inclination to retain the right to veto through the unanimity rules as opposed to expansion of QMV in foreign and security policy cooperation.

On defense issues, Britain traditionally supported reliance on NATO in assuring European security. Since the British attached a high value to transatlantic bond, both on a sentimental level and because of a more direct national interest from the special relationship with the leading economic and military power, they regarded NATO as a

means for ensuring the commitment of the United States to European defense even in the post-Cold War era.

France, arguably, the most influential of all three states in the development of the EU, was another state with aspirations to be a great power. It was also a member of the victorious side of the war and had a permanent seat in the Security Council, along with an independent nuclear capacity and, hence, had leverage for a viable unilateral foreign policy. But, unlike Britain, its national interests lied firmly in investing in the European integration, not least because of its direct experiences with the “German problem.” Although a leitmotif of European integration in general, keeping the German power under control and maintaining the French influence was a bigger priority for France than it was for Britain since it was the former who were defeated and occupied by German forces during World War II and had to find a way to live together, hence a need for reconciliation.

In any case, their insistence on integration had for the most part to do with de Gaulle setting the tone of French politics by reviving an old sense of national identity. In this context, the central element for France in conducting European affairs was *pre-eminence*. The French position showed the prevalence of the Gaullist legacy of seeing the Community as a means to enhance French resources and influence in world politics while securing control over the community structures via the European Council. Put in other way, France would use the European integration to transcend its middle-power position into a great-power in international affairs through leverage of the EU.

The French insistence on distinction between high and low politics and on intergovernmentalism, embodied in the conception of ‘l’Europe des Patries,’ coupled with the need to anchor Germany securely in the European system meant that France would be willing to opt for deeper integration in areas where Germany had a clear advantage (e.g. economic union) that called for the need to balance and control German strength, but would otherwise want to preserve her control over the Community decisions by guarding French predominance in the Commission. These French preferences resulted in a dual approach of both preserving unanimity and national veto in important decisions when national interests were at stake but also actively seeking coalitions to drive the integration process further, including the foreign and security policy cooperation. (Caporaso 2000)

A further element of the legacy of de Gaulle also included a rejection of Anglo-Saxon hegemony, most evident in the French outlook to defense matters. Traditionally suspicious of American involvement in European security, French disapproval of American security leadership resulted in a problematic relationship with NATO. Formally arguing that the American hegemony was inhibiting the Europeans from defending their own interests and hence achieving unity, France actively sought the revival of WEU as an autonomous entity from NATO, answerable only to the EU. (Mahncke 1996)

Lastly, Germany was both a rationale and, together with France, a source of European integration. But unlike France, or Britain, it did not possess the means (as a defeated country Germany lacked independent military capability, let alone nuclear force, or a seat in the UN Security Council) to pursue a unilateral foreign policy. At the end of the war Germany was a semi-sovereign and divided state and in order to be reaccepted into the international scene as a legitimate actor, it had to build up a “capital of trust.” (Pedersen 1998) This meant an apparent need for the perpetual manifestation of willingness to share power and sovereignty on the part of the German public and elite, which coincided with the post-war reconstruction of Europe with the twin structure of the EC and NATO as envisioned by the Allies. The German insecurity was so strong that, they often tried to identify their national interests as merging with that of the Europe, such that their “national interests were always to be ... covered ... by curtains marked ‘Europe’, ‘peace’, [and] ‘cooperation’...” (Pedersen 1998)

These post-war national interests of Germany were, for the most part, crystallized by the leadership of Adenauer, in a similar vein to the Gaullist predisposition of France. His legacy positioned Germany as completely loyal to the Western alliance and European integration. It also regarded the United States as a trusted and indispensable ally fulfilling the essential German security needs emerging from the proximity to the Soviet threat that Germany alone could not realize under the anxious and watchful eyes of its Western neighbors. These preferences culminated in a strong and, in principle, unqualified German commitment to the construction of a supranational European system, as reflected by the German constitution’s explicit authorization of the “transfer [of] sovereign powers to intergovernmental institutions,” (Welsh 2004) while refraining from actively pursuing leadership in areas with direct military implications. The reflection of these inclinations on

foreign and security policy was a consistent preference for QMV instead of unanimity rules, whereas in defense matters the conviction of the need for American involvement often put Germany as an arbitrator between France and Britain.

2.2.2. 1990 IGC and the Maastricht Treaty

As explained in the previous chapter, the construction of the CFSP as part of the new EU is widely seen as a reaction to the perceived inadequacy of the existing informal EPC machinery in dealing with the historic transformations Europe faced at the end of the 1980s. The European security climate had been completely altered both with the prospect of a reunited Germany and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact after the 1989 revolution. Gone was the Soviet military threat to Western Europe, which had long shaped the security architecture built strictly around NATO. It was in this setting that a joint Franco-German proposal opened the discussion of the political aspects of European integration. But, in the end, the disintegration of the simpler bipolar world in which national positions were placed under the overarching cloak of the Western block helped the reaffirmation of the division of foreign policy priorities of the European powers.

National Positions and Outcomes

During the negotiations, the bargaining positions of the three major actors regarding foreign policy and security cooperation were in line with their national preferences.

On the question of the formation of a common foreign policy, the national governments were divided into two camps. Germany, along with the Benelux countries, Italy and the Commission argued for an authentic *common* foreign policy embedded fully within the Community structures. Britain, on the other hand, led Denmark and Portugal, favoring foreign policy cooperation on existing intergovernmental lines of the EPC. France aligned with the British to propose a three-pillar structure that strictly limited the role of the Community institutions regarding foreign policy, as well as internal affairs, in favor of the Council. Here, the traditional French insistence of national sovereignty was reinforced

against the prospects of a reunified Germany as a restored great power, or as Europe's "alternative hegemon." This, in turn, paved the way for an Anglo-French alliance, who with viable unilateral policies, nuclear weapons, and seats in the UN Security Council opposed a strong common policy with supranational institutions championed by Germany. (Moravcsik 1998)

In defense policy, the camps were divided between the 'Atlanticists' and the 'Europeanists.' As expected, Britain led the pro-NATO camp of the Netherlands and Portugal to organize the WEU as subordinate to NATO; where France, backed by the Commission with the equivocal support of Germany, opted instead for the WEU to be a more direct alternative to NATO, answerable to the EU instead. The ambiguity of Germans was also understandable since their priorities lied not only in the strengthening of the EU but the preservation of the transatlantic alliance.

These diverging positions on the foreign and defense policies once again showed that the French take on what 'political union' stood for differentiated from the German interpretation. Where the former envisaged a more confederal structure dealing with foreign policy and security matters, the latter saw it as a means to strengthen Community competence with the expansion of QMV.

The outcome of the negotiations culminating in the TEU, as detailed in the previous chapter, favored the three-pillar structure (temple) as opposed to a single community framework (tree); opted strongly in favor of unanimity over QMV, with no formal role for the Commission; and refrained from a formal institutional linkage between WEU and the EU. Moreover, during the troubled ratification processes Denmark was granted a de facto opt-out from involvement in the implementation of foreign policy and defense decisions.

So in the end Maastricht provisions clearly showed that the political transformations in Europe could not provide adequate reasons for the Member States to change their traditional national perspectives, if not providing new reasons (not least the German unification) to stick with their existing priorities. As a result, the long-established national preferences of the three major actors of European integration, Germany, France and Britain, prevailed. And in the absence of convergence of interests that would rationalize for the national governments losing or even sharing of sovereignty, any integration in foreign and

security policy was a consequence of the bargaining process resulting in a lowest common denominator agreement.

2.2.3. 1996 IGC and the Amsterdam Treaty

The 1996 IGC was originally committed to by the member states as a revision of the Maastricht Treaty primarily in areas of security and defense,⁷ and convened at a time when the post-Cold War euphoria was swiftly waning and in mind with the disappointing track record of the CFSP most prominent in failing to come up with a common policy for dealing with the issues even at its backyard, most notably with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The 1995 reports prepared by the Council, Commission and Parliament all acknowledged that the pillar structure was not functioning well, with the Commission specifically advising for a simplification of the institutional structure, highlighting the need for CFSP reform.

National Positions and Outcomes

For the most part, the negotiations were centered on issues similar to the 1990 IGC. The positions of member states during negotiations leading to the Amsterdam Treaty showed, more than anything, the persistence of national preferences even in the light of dissatisfying results that the previously agreed institutional framework of the CFSP brought. (Moravcsik and Nikolaidis 1999)

On foreign policy discussions Germany, backed by the Commission, continued its support for a deeper binding common foreign policy structure. To this end, it advocated a greater reliance on QMV for crucial foreign policy decisions and was officially supported by all EU governments except Britain, Denmark, Portugal and the traditionally neutral 1995 entrants Sweden and Finland. Still, the French support to QMV was qualified in that they were only willing to expand its use in foreign policy as long as they could avoid putting national interests at stake. To this end, France promoted reweighting Council votes

⁷ “The calling of the IGC itself reflected the national interests of those governments dissatisfied with the Maastricht agreement” (Moravcsik, 1999)

so that they would have greater veto power if they wanted to prevent common action. (Caporaso 2000)

On defense negotiations, France once again led the pro-European camp for the deepening of WEU integration with the Union. Naturally, Atlanticists governments headed by Britain and the Netherlands resisted any defense integration autonomous of NATO structures. The new neutral members once again backed the British side in opposing the communitarization of defense policy, although their reasons differed with them.

But, on the whole, there was a general consensus among the powerful member states in the wake of the Bosnian experience on the need to find ways to avoid the vetoes of neutral countries in cases where they would want to act.

Still, the abovementioned national positions proved that the Yugoslav debacle did not reflect the same way with EU governments so as to provide for a shift in their respective preferences. Once again in the absence of any convergence of member state interests or of domestic pressure, the outcomes of the negotiations characterized lowest common denominator agreements that were extremely limited in substance. So, as detailed in the first chapter, while the end bargain extended QMV, included “constructive abstention” and “enhanced co-operation” for those more activist member states, every EU government retained the right to veto in the European Council at the triggering stage of strategies, effectively maintaining control over the decision. This extension of QMV, in requiring a de facto unanimity, represented not more than an illusion of strengthening the Community method. As for the defense issues, the compromise was such that a future WEU-EU linkage could be agreed upon without the need to convene another IGC as long as it was unanimously decided by the member states. Additionally, future military operations under the EU umbrella would be limited to the peace-keeping realm (Petersberg Tasks), a decision to assuage the Nordic neutrals.

2.2.4. 2000 IGC and the Nice Treaty

Although the 2000 IGC was mainly concerned about preparing the EU to enlargement, in the context of our discussion the Nice Treaty is significant in that it

concluded the 1998's St Malo initiative with the finalization of the agreement of member states on forging the ESDP. This was in and of itself a big step in CFSP integration, since its defense aspects had formerly faced a vehement British opposition stemming from their national interests. So, for our purposes it is more appropriate to investigate the motives behind the larger St Malo process starting an EU-centred joint defense initiative that eventually culminated in the adoption of the French Presidency Report on ESDP during the Nice Summit.

National Positions and Outcomes

In the two previous cases of 1990 and 1996 IGCs, external security events had very little influence over the member state preferences, failing to provide neither a convergence of national interests or exert domestic pressure to national governments to respond. But a conglomeration of factors led to a sea change in Britain, where any agenda of “autonomous action” outside the framework of NATO had once been a big no-no for their national interests, enabling the reappearance of defense integration on the EU menu. These factors were the government change, Kosovo war and public opinion.

Ending the eighteen years of uninterrupted Conservative government that fostered a strong Euroscepticism among its ranks, the new Labor government in Britain was the main actor of the transformation. Their party programme espoused a more constructive role towards the EU than the Tories while sustaining the national intergovernmentalist vision. In trying to reconcile the traditional British interests with the European integration process, they advocated the view that there was no need to make a definite choice between being European and being the closest ally of the US. (Gyarmati and Mathiopoulos 1999) In addition to the new government's priorities, the contrasting views of the British and the Americans on the Kosovo conflict and the strong shift of British public opinion in favor of taking military measures against the Belgrade government's provocations were the determinants of the British move. More specifically, the Kosovo incident did not just reveal the extent of military and leadership difference between the US and the Europeans; it also showed that the US and British interests did not necessarily overlap. Where the lessons drawn from the collective inability of the EU in the Bosnia episode were still fresh for the British, Kosovo was more of a “derivative interest,” and another military and fiscal burden

for the US, igniting discussions in the US Congress over how to get the European allies to engage in more burden-sharing. (Pond 1999) Consequently, the US was very reluctant to deploy ground forces in the region in contrast to the willingness of the British to do so.

In the end, the British concern over a possible US withdrawal from European defense and disillusionment with the unilateral US policy towards Serbia coupled with a climate in which the British public and political elite became more receptive to the idea of common defense just as did the rest of Europe,⁸ catered the St Malo process.

The main motivation behind St Malo, then, was an attempt to narrow the “capabilities-expectations gap,” (Hill 1993) in a situation where there was a desire to act that was hindered by the EU’s lack of joint capabilities.

The ESDP was the outcome of the process, formalized and substantiated through subsequent European Council meetings and the Nice Treaty, as detailed in the previous chapter, and with concrete implications like setting up of the RRF independent of NATO and the effective integration of WEU’s security and defense functions into EU institutions, it showed the British willingness to accept an autonomous European military capacity.

This episode displays that the drive towards integration was, as opposed to the previous two cases, stemming from domestic dynamics interacting with external security events. It was once again true that the underlying national interests had not converged, so ESDP was conceived within a strictly intergovernmental decision-making framework, but it was also more than a lowest common denominator agreement breaking the previous pattern of deadlock in defense integration.

2.3. Conclusions

The evaluation of the 1990, 1996 and 2000 IGCs reveals that in neither of the cases was there any meaningful convergence of national interests in foreign and security policies that would compensate for the loss or even pooling of sovereignty among member states. An intergovernmentalist explanation would suggest that, in the absence of such convergence, any integration in these areas is either as a result of domestic pressures on

⁸ It was claimed that “there are no neutrals any more.” (Pond 1999)

national governments, or a result of interstate bargaining with the outcome reflecting the lowest common denominator of national preferences. And since 'high politics' are not the usual domains of domestic conflicts, it is often the case that lowest common denominator agreements drive the security/defense integration. Indeed, both the 1990 and 1996 cases reveal the perseverance of lowest common denominator agreements, while the last case exposes the effect of domestic politics and pressure paving the way for a change in government preferences.

In the end, even the fact that 1990 and 1996 IGCs raised nearly identical issues with similar modest outcomes illustrates the predominance of stable national preferences over spillover effects of prior integration, devaluing a primarily neofunctionalist account of foreign policy and security integration. All three examples support, on the other hand, the premises of the state-centric approach, enabling us to conclude intergovernmentalism as the predominant explanation of the CFSP integration.

Next chapter deals with public opinion and its impact on security integration. More specifically, it seeks to find whether the intergovernmentalist explanation is still valid if the preferences of the domestic public are taken into account.

CHAPTER 3

PUBLIC OPINION AND SECURITY INTEGRATION

In the previous chapter, it was argued that the evolution of the CFSP/ESDP could be most appropriately explained by intergovernmentalism. A notable expectation of intergovernmentalism is that although national preferences in the areas of ‘low politics’ are susceptible to change as a result of domestic bargaining (involving the political elite, interest groups and public), public opinion is not a significant variable influencing member state preference formation in foreign policy and defense integration. The rationalization here is that since these areas are somewhat removed from people’s daily lives, it is expected that national governments do not face substantial pressure from the public to the extent that they are compelled to re-evaluate national interests. On the contrary, because of the nature of these issues governments are relatively autonomous from public opinion and have greater room to maneuver. In short, unless public priorities are altered by externalities such that foreign and security policy concerns increase, national preferences are not substantially affected by public opinion.

In the following pages, Eurobarometer data⁹ will be analyzed in order to investigate this assumption, that is to see whether there exists a pattern between public opinion and national positions, and, in particular, whether shifts in public opinion are reflected in the actual CFSP/ESDP integration. Following the previous chapter’s model, the countries are restricted to Britain, France and Germany along with the EU-15 aggregates.

⁹ Eurobarometer public opinion surveys (standard Eurobarometer surveys), available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm>

3.1. Support for EU Membership¹⁰

Figure 3.1 EU-wide support for EU membership




Table 3.1 EU-wide support for EU membership

| EU AGGREGATE | A good thing | A bad thing | Neither good nor bad | Don't Know |
|--------------|--------------|-------------|----------------------|------------|
| EB38.0 | 60.00 | 12.00 | 22.00 | 5.00 |
| EB39.0 | 60.00 | 12.00 | 23.00 | 5.00 |
| EB40 | 57.00 | 13.00 | 25.00 | 5.00 |
| EB41.0 | 54.00 | 12.00 | 28.00 | 5.00 |
| EB42 | 58.00 | 12.00 | 24.00 | 5.00 |
| EB43.0 | 56.00 | 12.00 | 25.00 | 6.00 |
| EB44.2 | 53.00 | 13.00 | 28.00 | 6.00 |
| EB45.1 | 48.00 | 15.00 | 28.00 | 9.00 |
| EB46.0 | 48.00 | 17.00 | 28.00 | 8.00 |
| EB47.1 | 46.00 | 15.00 | 30.00 | 9.00 |
| EB48.0 | 49.00 | 14.00 | 28.00 | 8.00 |
| EB49 | 51.00 | 12.00 | 28.00 | 8.00 |
| EB50.0 | 54.00 | 12.00 | 26.00 | 8.00 |
| EB51.0 | 48.00 | 12.00 | 27.00 | 12.00 |
| EB52.0 | 50.00 | 12.00 | 27.00 | 12.00 |
| EB53 | 49.00 | 14.00 | 27.00 | 9.00 |
| EB54.1 | 50.00 | 14.00 | 27.00 | 9.00 |
| EB55.1 | 48.00 | 13.00 | 29.00 | 10.00 |
| EB56.2 | 53.00 | 12.00 | 28.00 | 7.00 |
| EB57.1 | 53.00 | 11.00 | 28.00 | 8.00 |
| EB61 | 48.00 | 17.00 | 29.00 | 6.00 |

¹⁰ The exact wording of the question is: “Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is ...?” Available data compiled from the period: October 1992 (EB38.0) To April 2004 (EB61)

Figure 3.2 British support for EU membership




Table 3.2 British support for EU membership

| BRITAIN | A good thing | A bad thing | Neither good nor bad | Don't Know |
|---------|--------------|-------------|----------------------|------------|
| EB38.0 | 43.00 | 24.00 | 24.00 | 8.00 |
| EB39.0 | 47.00 | 22.00 | 25.00 | 5.00 |
| EB40 | 42.00 | 22.00 | 30.00 | 5.00 |
| EB41.0 | 43.00 | 21.00 | 29.00 | 7.00 |
| EB42 | 43.00 | 22.00 | 28.00 | 6.00 |
| EB43.0 | 44.00 | 20.00 | 31.00 | 5.00 |
| EB44.2 | 41.00 | 21.00 | 30.00 | 8.00 |
| EB45.1 | 35.00 | 26.00 | 27.00 | 13.00 |
| EB46.0 | 35.00 | 28.00 | 25.00 | 11.00 |
| EB47.1 | 35.00 | 26.00 | 27.00 | 11.00 |
| EB48.0 | 36.00 | 23.00 | 29.00 | 13.00 |
| EB49 | 41.00 | 19.00 | 30.00 | 11.00 |
| EB50.0 | 37.00 | 22.00 | 29.00 | 12.00 |
| EB51.0 | 31.00 | 23.00 | 26.00 | 20.00 |
| EB52.0 | 29.00 | 24.00 | 28.00 | 19.00 |
| EB53 | 25.00 | 24.00 | 29.00 | 22.00 |
| EB54.1 | 28.00 | 22.00 | 29.00 | 20.00 |
| EB55.1 | 29.00 | 24.00 | 27.00 | 20.00 |
| EB56.2 | 33.00 | 22.00 | 31.00 | 14.00 |
| EB57.1 | 32.00 | 21.00 | 32.00 | 15.00 |
| EB61 | 29.00 | 29.00 | 29.00 | 13.00 |

Figure 3.3 German support for EU membership




Table 3.3 German support for EU membership

| GERMANY | A good thing | A bad thing | Neither good nor bad | Don't Know |
|---------|--------------|-------------|----------------------|------------|
| EB38.0 | 60.00 | 10.00 | 24.00 | 5.00 |
| EB39.0 | 58.00 | 10.00 | 26.00 | 5.00 |
| EB40 | 53.00 | 12.00 | 29.00 | 5.00 |
| EB41.0 | 50.00 | 12.00 | 33.00 | 5.00 |
| EB42 | 61.00 | 10.00 | 25.00 | 4.00 |
| EB43.0 | 60.00 | 8.00 | 24.00 | 8.00 |
| EB44.2 | 46.00 | 12.00 | 35.00 | 7.00 |
| EB45.1 | 39.00 | 13.00 | 36.00 | 11.00 |
| EB46.0 | 39.00 | 16.00 | 37.00 | 8.00 |
| EB47.1 | 36.00 | 15.00 | 37.00 | 11.00 |
| EB48.0 | 38.00 | 15.00 | 37.00 | 10.00 |
| EB49 | 41.00 | 13.00 | 36.00 | 10.00 |
| EB50.0 | 48.00 | 11.00 | 30.00 | 10.00 |
| EB51.0 | 44.00 | 10.00 | 30.00 | 13.00 |
| EB52.0 | 47.00 | 12.00 | 30.00 | 10.00 |
| EB53 | 41.00 | 15.00 | 33.00 | 11.00 |
| EB54.1 | 48.00 | 14.00 | 30.00 | 8.00 |
| EB55.1 | 45.00 | 11.00 | 34.00 | 11.00 |
| EB56.2 | 54.00 | 11.00 | 28.00 | 7.00 |
| EB57.1 | 52.00 | 9.00 | 31.00 | 9.00 |
| EB61 | 45.00 | 14.00 | 35.00 | 7.00 |

Figure 3.4 French support for EU membership




Table 3.4 French support for EU membership

| FRANCE | A good thing | A bad thing | Neither good nor bad | Don't Know |
|--------|--------------|-------------|----------------------|------------|
| EB38.0 | 57.00 | 12.00 | 27.00 | 3.00 |
| EB39.0 | 56.00 | 13.00 | 27.00 | 4.00 |
| EB40 | 55.00 | 14.00 | 26.00 | 5.00 |
| EB41.0 | 50.00 | 13.00 | 33.00 | 4.00 |
| EB42 | 58.00 | 12.00 | 27.00 | 3.00 |
| EB43.0 | 52.00 | 12.00 | 30.00 | 5.00 |
| EB44.2 | 53.00 | 13.00 | 29.00 | 4.00 |
| EB45.1 | 48.00 | 14.00 | 33.00 | 5.00 |
| EB46.0 | 46.00 | 19.00 | 31.00 | 4.00 |
| EB47.1 | 47.00 | 12.00 | 36.00 | 4.00 |
| EB48.0 | 48.00 | 13.00 | 33.00 | 5.00 |
| EB49 | 50.00 | 13.00 | 30.00 | 7.00 |
| EB50.0 | 52.00 | 12.00 | 30.00 | 6.00 |
| EB51.0 | 47.00 | 14.00 | 30.00 | 9.00 |
| EB52.0 | 47.00 | 16.00 | 30.00 | 7.00 |
| EB53 | 49.00 | 14.00 | 32.00 | 5.00 |
| EB54.1 | 48.00 | 15.00 | 31.00 | 6.00 |
| EB55.1 | 49.00 | 12.00 | 33.00 | 6.00 |
| EB56.2 | 50.00 | 13.00 | 34.00 | 3.00 |
| EB57.1 | 47.00 | 14.00 | 35.00 | 5.00 |
| EB61 | 43.00 | 18.00 | 35.00 | 3.00 |

3.2. Support for CFSP¹¹

Figure 3.5 EU-wide support for CFSP




Table 3.5. EU-wide support for CFSP

| EU AGGREGATES | For | Against | Don't Know |
|---------------|-------|---------|------------|
| EB38.0 | 68.00 | 17.00 | 15.00 |
| EB39.0 | 66.00 | 19.00 | 15.00 |
| EB40 | 69.00 | 17.00 | 14.00 |
| EB41.0 | 68.00 | 17.00 | 15.00 |
| EB42 | 70.00 | 17.00 | 13.00 |
| EB43.1 | 66.00 | 18.00 | 16.00 |
| EB44.1 | 69.00 | 17.00 | 14.00 |
| EB44.2 | 66.00 | 19.00 | 15.00 |
| EB46.0 | 64.00 | 22.00 | 14.00 |
| EB47.1 | 63.00 | 20.00 | 16.00 |
| EB48.0 | 63.00 | 21.00 | 16.00 |
| EB49 | 63.00 | 16.00 | 20.00 |
| EB50.0 | 66.00 | 16.00 | 18.00 |
| EB51.0 | 63.00 | 16.00 | 21.00 |
| EB52.0 | 64.00 | 17.00 | 18.00 |
| EB53 | 64.00 | 17.00 | 19.00 |
| EB55.1 | 65.00 | 18.00 | 17.00 |
| EB56.2 | 66.00 | 20.00 | 14.00 |
| EB61 | 65.00 | 22.00 | 13.00 |

¹¹ The exact wording of the question is: “Irrespective of other details of the Maastricht Treaty, what is your opinion on each of the following proposals? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it. (Subquestion: One common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union, towards other countries.”) Available data compiled from the period: October 1992 (EB38.0) - April 2004 (EB61)

Figure 3.6 British support for CFSP




Table 3.6 British support for CFSP

| BRITAIN | For | Against | Don't Know |
|---------|-------|---------|------------|
| EB38.0 | 55.00 | 30.00 | 15.00 |
| EB39.0 | 53.00 | 31.00 | 15.00 |
| EB40 | 58.00 | 24.00 | 17.00 |
| EB41.0 | 55.00 | 28.00 | 16.00 |
| EB42 | 56.00 | 26.00 | 17.00 |
| EB43.1 | 56.00 | 28.00 | 15.00 |
| EB44.1 | 58.00 | 27.00 | 14.00 |
| EB44.2 | 51.00 | 32.00 | 17.00 |
| EB46.0 | 46.00 | 40.00 | 13.00 |
| EB47.1 | 43.00 | 35.00 | 22.00 |
| EB48.0 | 41.00 | 40.00 | 19.00 |
| EB49 | 49.00 | 26.00 | 25.00 |
| EB50.0 | 52.00 | 24.00 | 24.00 |
| EB51.0 | 43.00 | 25.00 | 32.00 |
| EB52.0 | 41.00 | 28.00 | 31.00 |
| EB53 | 40.00 | 29.00 | 31.00 |
| EB55.1 | 38.00 | 34.00 | 28.00 |
| EB56.2 | 40.00 | 35.00 | 25.00 |
| EB61 | 39.00 | 39.00 | 22.00 |

Figure 3.7 German support for CFSP




Table 3.7 German support for CFSP

| GERMANY | For | Against | Don't Know |
|---------|-------|---------|------------|
| EB38.0 | 75.00 | 13.00 | 12.00 |
| EB39.0 | 70.00 | 17.00 | 12.00 |
| EB40 | 73.00 | 16.00 | 11.00 |
| EB41.0 | 72.00 | 17.00 | 10.00 |
| EB42 | 75.00 | 17.00 | 7.00 |
| EB43.1 | 70.00 | 16.00 | 13.00 |
| EB44.1 | 72.00 | 16.00 | 12.00 |
| EB44.2 | 71.00 | 17.00 | 12.00 |
| EB46.0 | 68.00 | 19.00 | 12.00 |
| EB47.1 | 66.00 | 18.00 | 15.00 |
| EB48.0 | 67.00 | 17.00 | 16.00 |
| EB49 | 66.00 | 14.00 | 19.00 |
| EB50.0 | 70.00 | 13.00 | 16.00 |
| EB51.0 | 68.00 | 13.00 | 18.00 |
| EB52.0 | 71.00 | 13.00 | 16.00 |
| EB53 | 69.00 | 14.00 | 16.00 |
| EB55.1 | 70.00 | 12.00 | 17.00 |
| EB56.2 | 74.00 | 16.00 | 10.00 |
| EB61 | 74.00 | 16.00 | 9.00 |

Figure 3.8 French support for CFSP




Table 3.8 French support for CFSP

| FRANCE | | For | Against | Don't Know |
|--------|--|-------|---------|------------|
| | | | | |
| EB38.0 | | 70.00 | 17.00 | 12.00 |
| EB39.0 | | 67.00 | 21.00 | 12.00 |
| EB40 | | 70.00 | 19.00 | 11.00 |
| EB41.0 | | 72.00 | 15.00 | 12.00 |
| EB42 | | 71.00 | 17.00 | 11.00 |
| EB43.1 | | 70.00 | 19.00 | 11.00 |
| EB44.1 | | 76.00 | 14.00 | 10.00 |
| EB44.2 | | 69.00 | 18.00 | 12.00 |
| EB46.0 | | 69.00 | 22.00 | 9.00 |
| EB47.1 | | 69.00 | 19.00 | 12.00 |
| EB48.0 | | 74.00 | 17.00 | 9.00 |
| EB49 | | 70.00 | 15.00 | 14.00 |
| EB50.0 | | 71.00 | 17.00 | 12.00 |
| EB51.0 | | 67.00 | 15.00 | 18.00 |
| EB52.0 | | 65.00 | 23.00 | 12.00 |
| EB53 | | 70.00 | 15.00 | 14.00 |
| EB55.1 | | 74.00 | 15.00 | 10.00 |
| EB56.2 | | 62.00 | 28.00 | 10.00 |
| EB61 | | 66.00 | 22.00 | 12.00 |

3.3. Support for ESDP¹²

Figure 3.9 EU-wide support for ESDP




Table 3.9 EU-wide support for ESDP

| EU-AGGREGATE | For | Against | Don't Know |
|--------------|-------|---------|------------|
| EB38.0 | 76.00 | 14.00 | 10.00 |
| EB39.0 | 77.00 | 13.00 | 10.00 |
| EB40 | 77.00 | 14.00 | 9.00 |
| EB41.0 | 75.00 | 15.00 | 9.00 |
| EB42 | 79.00 | 11.00 | 9.00 |
| EB43.1 | 75.00 | 13.00 | 12.00 |
| EB44.1 | 73.00 | 16.00 | 11.00 |
| EB44.2 | 60.00 | 26.00 | 14.00 |
| EB46.0 | 68.00 | 20.00 | 11.00 |
| EB47.1 | 68.00 | 19.00 | 13.00 |
| EB48.0 | 69.00 | 19.00 | 12.00 |
| EB49 | 73.00 | 14.00 | 14.00 |
| EB50.0 | 75.00 | 13.00 | 12.00 |
| EB51.0 | 70.00 | 14.00 | 16.00 |
| EB52.0 | 73.00 | 14.00 | 13.00 |
| EB53 | 72.00 | 14.00 | 14.00 |
| EB56.2 | 73.00 | 17.00 | 11.00 |
| EB61 | 72.00 | 16.00 | 11.00 |

¹² The exact wording of the question is: “Irrespective of other details of the Maastricht Treaty, what is your opinion on each of the following proposals? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it. (Subquestion: A common defense and security/military policy among the European Union member states.) Available data compiled from the period: October 1992 (EB38.0) - April 2004 (EB61)

Figure 3.10 British support for ESDP




Table 3.10 British support for ESDP

| BRTAIN | For | Against | Don't Know |
|--------|-------|---------|------------|
| EB38.0 | 70.00 | 19.00 | 11.00 |
| EB39.0 | 77.00 | 15.00 | 7.00 |
| EB40 | 74.00 | 17.00 | 8.00 |
| EB41.0 | 70.00 | 20.00 | 10.00 |
| EB42 | 76.00 | 13.00 | 11.00 |
| EB43.1 | 79.00 | 14.00 | 7.00 |
| EB44.1 | 68.00 | 22.00 | 8.00 |
| EB44.2 | 48.00 | 38.00 | 14.00 |
| EB46.0 | 61.00 | 27.00 | 11.00 |
| EB47.1 | 57.00 | 26.00 | 16.00 |
| EB48.0 | 57.00 | 28.00 | 15.00 |
| EB49 | 61.00 | 21.00 | 17.00 |
| EB50.0 | 63.00 | 21.00 | 15.00 |
| EB51.0 | 58.00 | 19.00 | 23.00 |
| EB52.0 | 56.00 | 23.00 | 21.00 |
| EB53 | 49.00 | 26.00 | 25.00 |
| EB55.1 | 51.00 | 25.00 | 24.00 |
| EB56.2 | 53.00 | 27.00 | 20.00 |
| EB61 | 52.00 | 28.00 | 20.00 |

Figure 3.11 German support for ESDP




Table 3.11 German support for ESDP

| GERMANY | For | Against | Don't Know |
|---------|-------|---------|------------|
| EB38.0 | 81.00 | 12.00 | 7.00 |
| EB39.0 | 79.00 | 12.00 | 9.00 |
| EB40 | 82.00 | 11.00 | 7.00 |
| EB41.0 | 81.00 | 13.00 | 5.00 |
| EB42 | 84.00 | 11.00 | 4.00 |
| EB43.1 | 76.00 | 12.00 | 11.00 |
| EB44.1 | 79.00 | 11.00 | 9.00 |
| EB44.2 | 70.00 | 18.00 | 12.00 |
| EB46.0 | 75.00 | 16.00 | 9.00 |
| EB47.1 | 74.00 | 14.00 | 11.00 |
| EB48.0 | 76.00 | 13.00 | 11.00 |
| EB49 | 74.00 | 13.00 | 12.00 |
| EB50.0 | 79.00 | 9.00 | 11.00 |
| EB51.0 | 74.00 | 12.00 | 14.00 |
| EB52.0 | 76.00 | 12.00 | 12.00 |
| EB53 | 76.00 | 12.00 | 12.00 |
| EB55.1 | 79.00 | 9.00 | 11.00 |
| EB56.2 | 78.00 | 14.00 | 8.00 |
| EB61 | 80.00 | 12.00 | 8.00 |

Figure 3.12 French support for ESDP




Table 3.12 French support for ESDP

| FRANCE | For | Against | Don't Know |
|--------|-------|---------|------------|
| EB38.0 | 81.00 | 12.00 | 8.00 |
| EB39.0 | 78.00 | 14.00 | 8.00 |
| EB40 | 73.00 | 17.00 | 10.00 |
| EB41.0 | 79.00 | 13.00 | 8.00 |
| EB42 | 77.00 | 13.00 | 10.00 |
| EB43.1 | 81.00 | 12.00 | 7.00 |
| EB44.1 | 73.00 | 18.00 | 9.00 |
| EB44.2 | 60.00 | 28.00 | 12.00 |
| EB46.0 | 69.00 | 23.00 | 8.00 |
| EB47.1 | 71.00 | 19.00 | 10.00 |
| EB48.0 | 75.00 | 18.00 | 6.00 |
| EB49 | 80.00 | 12.00 | 7.00 |
| EB50.0 | 81.00 | 12.00 | 7.00 |
| EB51.0 | 77.00 | 13.00 | 10.00 |
| EB52.0 | 78.00 | 14.00 | 8.00 |
| EB53 | 82.00 | 9.00 | 9.00 |
| EB55.1 | 82.00 | 11.00 | 7.00 |
| EB56.2 | 75.00 | 17.00 | 8.00 |
| EB61 | 75.00 | 16.00 | 9.00 |

3.4. General Assessment

Looking at the Union-wide figures regarding public support for European Union membership and for CFSP, it emerges that people favor the development of a common foreign and security policy. With support levels consistently above 60 percent, CFSP enjoys even more affirmation than EU membership across the Union. The overall pattern suggests a 5 to 12 percent cushion in favor of CFSP. ESDP, on the other hand, has significantly higher levels of support among European citizens over both EU membership and CFSP. At least seven out of ten people favor a defense and security/military policy. This is a very surprising result, given that foreign policy and security sectors are the two areas where the EU achieved the least amount of integration.

An initial assessment of the numbers, therefore, suggests the following question. Why is it that although support for the idea of a common defense, and to a lesser extent of a common foreign and security policy, is quite considerable among Europeans, this seeming enthusiasm on the part of the public is, as we have seen, not reflected in the actual institutionalization of CFSP and ESDP? From an intergovernmentalist perspective, as explained above, the answer would take account of the supposition that public opinion is not a direct determinant of national preferences on security integration.

Indeed, once we take those who have no opinion on both of these matters into consideration, another aspect of the issue is revealed. People are either not informed about what these policies stand for and what their substances are. At least one out of ten Europeans when asked about ESDP and nearly 20 percent in the case of CFSP cannot give their opinion. This lack of knowledge cannot be rationalized as part of the general perspective towards the EU, since more than 95 percent of the EU public has something to say about the Union. Here, then, the respondents might be uninformed as a result of their lack of concern in foreign policy and defense issues and/or it might as well be a result of the inadequacy of information disclosed to the public. Although this particular component of the survey does not reveal enough information in support of either argument, they both point to an “information deficit” on the part of the public, enabling them to be influenced by national governments and their domestic political context. (Anderson 1998) This brings to mind a related question. Why does this information deficit lead to an increased support

rather than a decreased support? Again a possible intergovernmentalist explanation here would include the possibility that the public opinion is 'cued' by the national governments in a certain way that popular opinion sways to a more positive position.

So in order to understand the nature of this seeming support towards CFSP/ESDP, we have to look at the more specific questions regarding the public attitudes. In general, people cite foreign policy at the bottom of their list of EU topics they want more information on, along with TV and film policy, cultural policy and the like. This is evident even in Spring 1998 (Eurobarometer 49) results where CFSP was cited by 14 percent while the need for information on their citizenship rights, the European currency and employment policy were all mentioned by at least 40 percent of the respondents. It was significant in that the survey was conducted at a time when ground troops were being deployed in Macedonia and the Balkans were getting back on the European security agenda.

Moreover, when asked to prioritize a list of items on the EU program, people consistently put matters related to foreign policy, security and defense at the bottom of their lists, opting instead for issues concerning poverty, health and social policy, employment, education and the like. Indeed, the Spring 1996 survey (Eurobarometer 45), conducted months after the Dayton agreement temporarily stabilized the Balkans after five years of conflict, revealed that a "European army for common defense" was definitely not a key priority for the EU public. It was placed at the bottom of 33 issues, the top consisting of obvious daily concerns such as "joint programmes to fight unemployment."

On the whole, these numbers illustrate that even though the overall public support for the idea of a common European defense and foreign and security policy is quite considerable across the EU, this support seems to be somewhat superficial and vague, and directed towards an abstract concept which public have neither information on nor interest for. (Manigart 2001) And this lack of information and interest increases the member state governments' ability to maintain national preferences autonomous of the public opinion.

3.5. Member States' Perspective

National preferences and government positions of Britain, Germany and France are more or less reflected in their public attitudes towards EU membership and CFSP/ESDP. Support for membership has been the lowest in Britain with affirmation rates 15 to 20 percent lower and the opposition 5 to 10 percent higher than the EU average, whereas Germany and France are on or above EU figures. As expected from their national preferences, German and French support levels are consistently above the EU aggregates for both policies. As the most Euroskeptic of the three (or of the EU, for that matter) Britain, the “awkward partner” (George 1998), scores below the EU average on foreign policy and defense issues. It is also the only country whose support for CFSP has dropped below 50 percent of the population. One could attribute this opposition to a higher level of information on the part of the public, but the British perceive themselves to have the least amount of knowledge among Europeans.¹³ This lack of information could perhaps explain the considerable and somewhat surprising support for a common defense on the part of the British public up until the middle of the decade. But regardless of the reason of the support, foreign policy and defense issues are not top priorities for the British (or for Germans and French), following the larger EU-sample. These patterns, when juxtaposed to the official British stance in the first half of the 1990s towards the prospects of a common defense supports the argument that public opinion responds to a lead from the political elites rather than the other way around. (Brigid and Stubb 2003)

The consequent abrupt downfall of support levels for ESDP, most notably in Britain but also in France, on the other hand, can be interpreted in several ways. First of all, it is part of a general pattern where public opinion on ESDP in Britain and France seem to fluctuate more than Germany, where it enjoys a high and steady support. The explanation for this pattern involves the ability and willingness of the former two in conducting autonomous foreign policies outside the EU structure; whereas Germany, with a constitution that until recently prohibited sending troops outside its borders, has traditionally regarded the EU as the legitimate outlet for foreign policy. More specifically, the turn of the public opinion corresponds to the escalation of the Bosnian conflict and

¹³ Extensive results can be obtained from Eurobarometer 55.

support for ESDP hits a decade low in January 1996, immediately after the US-brokered Dayton agreement in December 1995. This can be construed as the disillusionment of the British and French public against the failed attempts at a common policy, as reflected in the phrase “the three years of humiliation of Europe in Bosnia,” (Pond 1999) at a time when they could have acted separately from the Union.

Perhaps more striking is the interplay between British domestic dynamics and their reflections in Britain’s u-turn in the last half of the decade in favor of the ESDP. The recovery of public support for a common defense overlapped with the ascension of the more pro-European Labour Party into power. The position of the Labour itself was a result of a mid 1980s switch between the party and the Conservatives, affecting the attitudes of their electorates. (George and Bache 2001)

This upturn of the public opinion reached its post-1996 peak in November 1998, and one month later the St Malo defense initiative was introduced by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. In the following spring when the Kosovo conflict was intensifying, British opposition to ESDP fell to pre-1996 levels and an ICM/Observer poll found that support for the bombing campaign reached over 70 percent. (Vickers 2000) The interaction between the new government’s pro-ESDP initiative and the shifts in public attitude can be explained to be a consequence of

a) a growing dissatisfaction on the part of the British public putting pressure on the Blair government to modify their preferences (Pond 1999), or b) a deliberate attempt by the British government to display that Britain was “a leader, not a follower” in order to persuade the public that British membership in the EU was indeed beneficial to the country. (Sjursen 2001)

In the end, irrespective of the accurate explanation, that is, whether a domestic pressure arose as a response to an external event (i.e. Kosovo) influencing the national position at the EU-level or the government was able to manipulate public opinion to justify its actions and to increase its domestic support, the intergovernmentalist rationale is not violated. For it was either because public priorities shifted because of externalities so that domestic pressure on the government for security integration increased or the national government utilized the domestic information deficit to raise their domestic support.

3.6. Conclusions

This general analysis of Eurobarometer data regarding the attitudes of the European public reveals interesting results and a seeming paradox: Although a considerable majority of the EU citizens support CFSP and ESDP, foreign/security and defense policies remain under the absolute control of national governments and European integration in these areas play the second-fiddle to economic and monetary union. While this contradiction does not go against the premises of the intergovernmentalist theory, the dynamics behind this overwhelming public support needs further investigation. Further research on the correlation between public support and security integration might be in order

CONCLUSION

The findings of this thesis suggest that an intergovernmentalist account is more relevant to understanding the state of European security integration and that it has more explanatory power in revealing its development and dynamics than the neofunctionalist theory of European integration offers.

Both of these traditional theories of European integration posit the fundamental assumption that security is an area that is qualitatively different from other areas of integration, in that it delineates the border between low-politics and high-politics. The opposing positions of the intergovernmentalist supremacy of nation-state interests and the neofunctionalist logic of a creeping supranationalism respectively distinguish security integration as a barrier and threshold to support their own explanations of European integration. Specifically, the intergovernmentalist account takes security as the point where the integration process shows its limits; whereas from a neofunctionalist perspective it is a threshold that the spillover effects of previous integration are bound to pass.

In investigating the validity of these positions, that is whether security is a barrier set up by the nation-states against further supranational integration that would endanger their existence or whether it is a boundary for the common European institutions to overcome, the study attempted to incorporate the historical dynamics into the analysis of the particular instances of European security integration.

An initial discussion of the evolution of post-World War II security integration exposed that this process has not been continuous and progressive as the neofunctionalist account would predict, rather it has been inconsistent and interrupted in its aims, procedures and dynamics. The development of a coherent and incisive common foreign and security policy have been and continue to be hindered by the conflicts and compromises between those favouring the status quo of intergovernmental Europe, on the one hand, and others opting for a supranational vision of Europe.

It was revealed that at the core of the conflict was the issue of where sovereignty would reside, that is, whether in its traditional locus the nation-state, or in the supranational Community institutions. The discussion showed that throughout the evolution of security integration, the balance between the member states and EU institutions has constantly been tipped in favour of the nation-state. The national interests have been dominant over those of the community interests, proving that nation-state still perceives security to be the ultimate bastion of its sovereignty and is not willing to cede its control over security and defense to EU institutions in the absence of any substantial pressure from the public.

The second chapter utilized the theories derived from the aforementioned competing visions of Europe to analyze the cases of the CFSP and the ESDP as examples of profound leaps in European security integration. Contrasting the neofunctionalist proposition that security integration is a quasi-automatic process led by EU-institutions, particularly the Commission, with the intergovernmentalist prediction that it is the perceived interests of the member states and the bargaining processes between them that determine the architecture of security integration, the Intergovernmental Conferences leading to the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties were analyzed. Testing the intergovernmentalist hypothesis that “security integration through the CFSP/ESDP can be explained by focusing on the member state preferences and the bargaining processes between them” for its applicability in these specific instances of integration, the chapter demonstrated that in each case the main propeller of security integration was the overlapping of national interests as displayed in the lowest common denominator agreements of the IGCs in the absence of substantial public pressure and sustainable convergence of member state interests.

Related to the premises of intergovernmentalism, the last chapter focused on public support for security integration in the member states. Relatively marginalized by the neofunctionalist explanations as a result of their emphasis on institutions and elite interaction, intergovernmentalism considers public opinion as a potential explanatory variable in domestic preference formation. Although the findings derived from the post-Maastricht Eurobarometer surveys did not violate the intergovernmentalist expectations, they revealed considerable and somewhat surprising levels of support for foreign policy and security integration. These results also lent credibility to the intergovernmentalist proposition of a possibility of a shift in national preferences affected by domestic pressure

on the governments in the face of an external security event, as it was the case with the Kosova conflict and its effects on British public opinion. In any case, since intergovernmentalism does not offer the theoretical tools to analyze the nature of the correlation between public opinion and security integration, further research regarding this particular link might be in order.

In the end, the thesis as a whole confirms the position of the intergovernmentalist account of security integration to a large extent. The post-1945 European security integration has been far from what the neofunctionalist propose: an automatic process by which power is gradually transferred to a new center following a linear evolutionary line. Rather, the leitmotif of the overall historical development and the specific cases of security integration presented in this study has been the constant and significant discrepancy between the rhetoric and substance in security integration. The aspirations of the original treaties have proved to be too visionary as a result of the inadequacy of the institutional arrangements agreed upon to reach them. The states have constantly worked to limit the competencies transferred to the community structures because of their concern over their perceived national interests, resulting in a capabilities-expectations gap in the Union. Although the construction of EU institutions initiated a socialization process that perpetuated a consultation reflex among the national governments, it has failed to provide substantial and sustainable convergence of national interests. The historical pattern suggests that unless member states are confident that this kind of convergence is attained, an institutional design that will transfer national competencies in security matters to the EU institutions cannot be realized.

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