

THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE ESDP, AND THE QUESTION OF TURKEY

by
Alistair H. Taylor

Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts

Sabanci University

July 2005

THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE ESDP, AND THE QUESTION OF TURKEY

APPROVED BY:

Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç
(Thesis Supervisor)

Dr. Ali Çarkoğlu

Dr. Esra Gurkaynak

DATE OF APPROVAL:

© Alistair H. Taylor 2005

All Rights Reserved

Abstract

THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE ESDP, AND THE QUESTION OF TURKEY

by

Alistair H. Taylor

MA Political Science 2005

Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç

(Thesis Supervisor)

Keywords: Turkey, EU, Turkish membership, ESDP, security.

This paper analyses the potential contribution in terms of crude capabilities that Turkey could bring to the European Union's ESDP security framework. The history of the European Union's security aspirations and the security policy preferences of the major actors in European security will also be examined as a way of framing the question of Turkey's potential role within the emerging European security and defense framework.

The second chapter will look at how European security has evolved from the American-led institutions of the Cold War era to a new post-Cold War dynamic which has opened a window of opportunity for European security realignment, development, and autonomy. The third chapter, on the security and defense preferences of the US and EU member states, makes use of rationalist theory to highlight how national security and defense preferences of the individual EU member states shape the ongoing dispute within the EU over the ultimate goals of the ESDP.

In the fourth chapter, the paper will examine Turkey's potential contributions to the European Union's ESDP and address Turkey's changing role in European security in the post-Cold War era. It posits that, as the EU has begun to develop an independent 'hard' security aspect through the ESDP, the strategic value of Turkish inclusion has

increased.

In concluding, it argues that, while Turkish incorporation into the ESDP would entail new security risks, it would also enhance the Union's military capabilities and role in a number of important regions on Europe's periphery. In essence, the inclusion of Turkey could make the EU's bid to become a more involved and independent world actor more feasible.

Özet

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ,
AVRUPA GÜVENLİK ve SAVUNMA POLİTİKASI
VE
TÜRKİYE

Alistair H. Taylor

Politik Bilimler Master Programı 2005

Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç
(Tez Danışmanı)

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, AB, Türkiye'nin AB'ye üyeliği, ASGP, güvenlik.

Bu tez Türkiye'nin temel imkanlarıyla, Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasına getireceği potansiyel katkıları analiz etmektedir. Türkiye'nin gelecekteki rolünü, Avrupa'nın gelişen güvenlik ve savunma anlayışı çerçevesine oturtmak için, Avrupa Birliği'nin tarihsel güvenlik endişeleri ve Avrupa güvenliğinde etkin ülkelerin milli güvenlik politikaları da incelenmiştir.

İkinci bölüm Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD önderliğindeki kurumlara bağlı kalan Avrupa güvenlik anlayışının, savaş bitimiyle birlikte değişen dinamiklerini ve bunun getirdiği yeni olanakları analiz edecektir. ABD ve Avrupa Birliği üye ülkelerinin güvenlik ve savunma tercihleri üçüncü bölümde incelenmektedir. AGSP'nin amacının tam olarak ne olduğu konusunda, AB ülkeleri arasında bir mutabakat olmadığından, birlik içinde ortaya çıkan bu anlaşmazlığa üye ülkelerin farklı milli güvenlik politikalarının sebep olduğu, rasyonalist teori ışığında bu bölümde gösterilecektir.

Dördüncü bölüm Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Türkiye'nin Avrupa güvenliğindeki değişen rolü üzerinedir ve, AB'nin Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasıyla birlikte gelişen bağımsız “sıkı güvenlik” anlayışı sebebiyle, Türkiye'nin birliğe kabulünün getireceği stratejik değerin arttığını ortaya koyacaktır.

Sonuç bölümü ise Türkiye'nin Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasına dahil edilmesinin, yeni güvenlik risklerini beraberinde getirecek olsa bile, birliğin askeri gücünü ve Avrupa çevresindeki önemli bölgelerde etkinliğini arttıracığını gösterecektir. Özet olarak, Türkiye'nin katılımı AB'nin daha etkili ve bağımsız bir dünya oyuncusu olma yolundaki hedefine güç katacaktır.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction	p.1
Chapter 2: History of the European Union's Security Aspirations	p.5
Chapter 3: Security Policy Preferences of the US and EU Member States	p.24
United States of America	p.26
The United Kingdom	p.32
France	p.35
Germany	p.38
Italy	p.41
Denmark	p.43
The Netherlands	p.44
Belgium and Luxembourg	p.45
The 'Neutral' States: Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland	p.45
The Mediterranean States: Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus	p.48
The Former Warsaw Pact States	p.51
The Debate Over the Iraq War	p.52
Chapter 4: Turkey's Potential Role in the EU's ESDP	p.56
Turkey and the Development of the ESDP in Post-Cold War Europe	p.60
Turkey, the US, and the EU in the Post-Cold War Era	p.70
Turkey's Contribution to Cold War European Security	p.74
Turkey's Geostrategic Value in the Post-Cold War World	p.75
Turkey's Military Capabilities	p.82
Chapter 5: Conclusion	p.88

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table of Potential Turkish Contributions and Costs to the ESDP

p.86

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Turkey's relations with the European Union have been complicated for almost as long as the Union, and the European Community before it, has been in existence. As Turkey's current rather dubious distinction of having the longest associational agreement (since 1963) with the EU of any candidate country in its history illustrates, there is a good bit of uncertainty within the Union as to what to do with Turkey. Unfortunately for the Turks, the issue of Turkish membership in the EU cuts to the core of a number of other questions regarding the future and scope of the Union that the EU has put off dealing with for years. If Turkey, with the vast majority of its landmass in Asia, can be considered as a candidate for the EU, the argument goes, where will the boundaries of Europe eventually be drawn? As *The Economist* points out, "It is hard to answer that question without deciding what the ultimate purpose of the EU is. But here there is no consensus: the habit of the EU has been to invent itself as it goes along."¹ As the recent EU Constitutional referendum debacle pointed out, the Union is presently undergoing something of a *crise d'identité*, trying to determine whether its future will be as a deeply integrated and geopolitically active European superpower or as a larger but looser union primarily concerned with economic integration. The question of Turkish EU membership has proved to be so controversial because it strikes directly at the heart of this ongoing and, as of yet, unresolved debate within the EU.

While Turkey's place in Europe during the Cold War years was established on the basis of its participation in European security and defense via its membership in NATO, it has found itself as something of an outsider following the post-Cold War European security realignment and restructuring. As Müftüler-Baç writes, following the end of the Cold War, "with the reduction of the level of military threat, Turkey was no longer recognized as European."² Unlike its European NATO allies, Turkey was one of the few states that found itself still in a largely unstable region at the end of the Cold War, and the country had to retain a tight focus on traditional 'hard' security. The EU, on the other hand, had the luxury of regional peace and stability and could afford to pursue integration, enlargement, and the process of developing itself as a new, 'soft,' 'civilian power.'

The EU's new focus on tools of 'soft power,' such as governance, cooperative regional forums, and enlargement, was a source of further divergence from the 'hard

¹*The Economist*, "Turkey belongs in Europe," 12/7/2002, Vol.365, Issue 8302, p.13.

²Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "Turkey's Roles in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies," *Security Dialogue*, 2000, Vol.31(4), p.489.

security' focus of its erstwhile ally Turkey. As an article from the New Defense Agenda points out, in the post-Cold War era, "for a significant number of EU-15 members, war is becoming an unacceptable tool of international relations."³ However, in recent years, as the EU seeks to develop the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) concept and bridge the gap between its role as an economic 'giant' and a political 'dwarf,'⁴ the EU has been increasingly comfortable developing a more traditional 'hard' security aspect to its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, although the EU has built up much of the institutional basis of the ESDP, it has been as of yet unwilling to take on the substantial financial resources necessary to bring its capabilities in line with its rhetoric. In light of this, Turkey's potential strategic contribution to the ESDP has become apparent.

As the EU has begun to take note of more recently, Turkey has important security assets in its geostrategic position and military capabilities, which could make a substantial contribution to the EU in its bid to play a larger international role in security and defense. The main arguments for Turkey's inclusion in the ESDP are four-fold: its long history as a contributor to European security during the Cold War; its geostrategic position as a Eurasian transregional actor bordering on the Balkans, Caucasus, Mediterranean, Middle East, and Caspian region; its contribution to tackling the EU's security goals as set out in the European Security Strategy (ESS); and its significant military capabilities. Turkey is a major regional power located in the midst of the region where the EU sees itself playing a more prominent security role. Furthermore, the Turkish military, Europe's largest, has significant experience in the sort of long-term, low intensity operations that the EU envisions in its Petersberg tasks.

Although Turkey could potentially play an important role in the EU's emerging bid to take on a greater role in regional and global security through the ESDP, the inclusion of Turkey could also entail serious new risks and challenges which must also be considered. With the addition of Turkey, the EU's security sphere would be extended to tense and unstable areas. In the Middle East, Turkey has uneasy relations with its Arab neighbors (Iran, Iraq, Syria), which could flare up over issues ranging from the Kurdish question to water rights. The Caucasus have been a serious source of instability in the post-Cold War period (e.g., Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, and Abkhazia) and involvement in the region could potentially bring the EU into conflict

³Tomas Valasek, "The 'Easternization' of ESDP after EU Enlargement," *Fresh Perspectives on Europe's Security*, The New Defense Agenda, Winter 2004, p.54.

⁴Esra Çayhan, "Turkey and the European Security and Defense Policy," *Turkey and the EU: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration, and International Dynamics*, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.35.

with Russia. Furthermore, while large in size, the Turkish military is built on a somewhat outmoded model of conscription and may not possess the training in peace-making and crisis management necessary to contribute effectively in EU-led Petersberg task missions. Turkey also has lingering security disputes with two EU member states, Greece and Cyprus, which may prove problematic for the EU as it strives to maintain an internally coherent security and foreign policy. Finally, Turkish inclusion may run the risk of simply exporting some of Turkey's domestic security problems (Kurdish question, drugs and people smuggling, etc) into the EU itself. These risks must be carefully considered when assessing the potential contribution of Turkey to European security and defense, as they are certainly not insignificant.

It is also worth noting here that there are a number of other reasons outside of the realm of security which would limit the desirability of Turkish inclusion in the European Union. The major arguments in this vein include Turkey's relative economic underdevelopment, its vast population (and corresponding potential voting share in the EU), the possibility of widespread Turkish immigration to the rest of Europe, its insufficient appreciation of European standards for human rights, as well as a host of other cultural, historical, and religious 'Turkey is different/foreign' explanations. While these are outside of the scope of this paper, with its focus on Turkey's potential security contributions to the EU and the ESDP, these arguments are, nonetheless, worth noting, as they play an important role in the overall assessment of Turkish membership for many in Europe.

This essay seeks mainly to address this one important question: what would be the potential impact of Turkish accession on the European Union's ESDP. While the analysis of cost and benefits of Turkey's inclusion as a member in the EU is clearly a complex and multifaceted question, this paper will only attempt to explain the security aspect of this overall dynamic in terms of the ESDP itself, with a particular focus on Turkey's contribution to the EU's crude power capabilities. As Turkey's inclusion in the European order and its perceived 'European' identity largely came about on the basis of its membership in NATO and contribution to European security during the Cold War, the issue of security is a crucial one for understanding Turkey's evolving relationship with the EU.

Moreover, it is also important to note that the EU is a multifaceted actor in the security arena, with a particular emphasis on 'soft' security issues. The EU has taken on a foreign and security policy, through its CFSP, that had increasingly made it something of a different foreign policy actor when compared to more a traditional state,

and particularly so when compared to the hegemonic role of the US in the current world system. Given the overwhelming superiority of the US in terms of both 'hard' security capabilities and the political willingness to sustain and use them, the EU has focused its energies on 'soft' security. This bifurcation in security orientation within the transatlantic relationship has also complicated the US-EU security relationship. This increasing divergence in security orientation, while significant, is, however, not the focus of this work, which will instead stress the potential impact of Turkey's inclusion on the ESDP in terms of more strict 'hard' security capabilities. While the distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' security is an increasingly important one, and it is difficult to truly separate the two often interlinked concepts, this paper will instead focus more on crude capacities.

The following three chapters will seek to establish the development of the EU's security aspirations and the security and defense preferences of the various EU member states, as well as those of the US, as a way of framing the question of Turkey's potential role within the emerging European security and defense framework. The second chapter, which covers the history of the European Union's security aspirations, will take a look at how European security has evolved from the American-led institutions of the Cold War era to a new post-Cold War dynamic which has opened a window of opportunity for European security realignment, development, and increasing autonomy. The third chapter, on the security and defense preferences of the US and EU member states, makes use of rationalist theory to highlight how national security and defense preferences of the individual EU member states shape the ongoing dispute within the EU over the ultimate goals of the ESDP.

The fourth chapter, on Turkey's potential contributions to European security and defense, covers Turkey's involvement in European security through its Cold War role with NATO, as well as how changes in the post-Cold War order have dramatically altered Turkey's relationship to Europe in the areas of security and defense. As it is only by understanding how European security has developed over the last fifty years and how the different EU actors perceived the ultimate aims of that development that the Turkish contribution to the EU's ESDP project can be properly evaluated, the fourth chapter will also make use of the context established in the previous two chapters to examine the benefits and costs of Turkish inclusion within the European security framework. The paper will then conclude in a final section by recapping the previous chapters and making some final remarks about Turkey and the EU's ESDP.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORY OF THE EU'S SECURITY ASPIRATIONS

This chapter will comprehensively chart the development of the EU's ongoing efforts to develop an autonomous security and defense component. It will examine the origins of European integration in the aftermath of the Second World War, as well as explain why the early attempts at European security cooperation failed. Placing a special emphasis on the role of the United States during the Cold War in fostering the European project, it will then move on to point out the transformation of the European security order in the post-Cold War era, as well as the opportunity that afforded the Europeans to begin to develop a new European security and defense framework. After examining the emergence of the EDSI, along with the debate over its relationship to NATO and the CJTF concept, and taking a look at the Petersberg tasks and the gradual shift to a more autonomous ESDP, this chapter will show how the EU finally resolved the operational hurdles necessary for it to become operational and take on its first security mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003. A brief discussion of the proposed changes to the EU's security framework covered in the EU Constitution, which may or may not come into force in the future, will follow. By establishing why and how the EU constructed an increasingly autonomous security and defense policy in the ESDP, this chapter will help provide a useful framework for assessing Turkey's potential contribution.

Ever since the proposal of the Hussite king of Bohemia, George of Podebrady, in 1464 to create a union of Christian European nations which would “prevent war among the members...and ensure their common defense,” the vision of a unified Europe has been inextricably linked to the cause of common defense and security.⁵ The shared dream of a Europe secure under one banner has compelled generations of politicians, *philosophes*, and luminaries as diverse as Napoleon, Abbé Charles de Saint-Pierre, and Immanuel Kant. However, it took carnage on a scale hitherto unknown for these ideas to begin to be translated into political reality. Out of the mass mayhem of the First and Second World Wars, a new opportunity arose for Europe to remake itself. In the aftermath of the Second World War, there was a new impetus in Western Europe to bring an end to the cycle of power politics, conflict, and destruction which had so devastated the Continent in the first half of the 20th century.

In March of 1948, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries signed the Treaty

⁵Vaclav Havel, Speech to the Council of Europe, May 10, 1990, from website, http://old/hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1990/1005_uk/htm.

of Brussels, a five-power alliance originally envisioned as a deterrent to future German aggression, which was seen at the time as the most pressing security concern on the Continent. However, during the very negotiation process for the Treaty, the European political situation was transformed virtually overnight, when, in February of 1948, the Czechoslovakian government capitulated to the 'liberating' Red Army. Facing the threat of Soviet expansionism across Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union quickly replaced a reborn Germany as the primary security threat in the minds of most Western Europeans. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June of 1948 brought the major Western European powers together with the United States in common cause against the USSR, spurring negotiations between the two for a mutual military treaty.

A traditionally isolationist United States found itself forced to make a strong, significant, and lasting commitment to Western European security, in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949 and the Mutual Assistance Act of October 1949. Similar in design to the Treaty of Brussels alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under Article V, provides for the collective self-defense of all of its members by declaring that an attack on any one of them will be construed as an attack on them all. With the establishment of NATO, the Treaty of Brussels military structures were merged into the NATO framework and its responsibilities were taken on by the North Atlantic Alliance. More than any other organization, NATO shaped the Western security system during the Cold War, providing collective protection to Western Europe and North America against its Soviet bloc counterpoint, the Warsaw Pact. Thus, in the aftermath of the Second World War, security integration and cooperation in Western Europe took on a decidedly transatlantic character, with the 'Western bloc' economically, politically, and militarily dominated by the American superpower. In turn, this meant that efforts at European integration would be largely confined to the realm of 'low politics,' while the US would continue to primarily deal with the 'high' political concerns of security and defense policy.

Despite the primacy of the Soviet threat in the late 1940s and early 50s, the ex-Allied powers of Western Europe were still concerned by the problem of how to reintegrate West Germany into the European security framework. This issue took on particular significance with the commencement of the Korean War in June of 1950, as West Germans realized the very real threat of a sudden surprise attack by their Eastern neighbor akin to that perpetrated by North Korea. German rearmament became a question of immediate importance, and Europe had to quickly find a way to ensure that West Germany could both rearm without threatening its neighbors and integrate into

the overall Western collective security framework. The significant potential German military contribution to Western security could no longer be forgone for fear of resurgent German military aggression.

French opposition to a rearmed German national military led them to suggest the creation of a fully integrated European Army, under the control of an organization called the 'European Defense Community' (EDC), which would be modeled along the lines of the then newly-created European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The 'Pleven Plan,' as it was known, however, was defeated in the French National Assembly largely due to British non-involvement and a shift in French priorities away from European integration.⁶ Thus, the first security and defense scheme to truly foster European integration fell to the wayside. While European economic integration would continue in the following years, principally through the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in Rome in 1957, European security and defense integration would be largely divorced from the integration process and superseded by NATO for the next forty years.

In light of the failure of the EDC and the still ever-present necessity of finding a mechanism by which Germany could be included in the Western security framework, Britain put forth the idea of expanding the 1948 Brussels Treaty to include both Germany and Italy. Under pressure from an increasingly irritated American Secretary of State Dulles, and lacking any other alternative proposals, the British plan was approved and later formalized during the Paris conference of October 1954. Thus, Germany and Italy were formally invited to join the Treaty of Brussels and all seven signatories came together to establish the Western European Union (WEU). Under the WEU agreement, each member was to contribute a national military contingent to serve in NATO, under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Through this rather backdoor route, Germany finally managed to join NATO proper in May of 1955.

While the creation of the WEU served its intended function of allowing German rearmament and the integration of Germany into the European security framework, the WEU was by no means as comprehensive, integrative, or bold a solution as the EDC had been. Although the WEU has long outlasted the, admittedly, rather limited rationale for its creation, it has been of more or less peripheral utility for much of that time, especially in comparison to the role the EDC was meant to play. The EDC was

⁶Gülnur Aybet, *The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-91*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p.81-82.

originally envisioned as one of the principal engines of integration in Europe, and in this aspect the WEU has fallen rather short: what integration of security and defense policy has taken place in the European context until recently has largely been accomplished through the NATO framework. In other words, with its task accomplished, having achieved German membership in NATO, the WEU was rendered effectively useless and the organization fell dormant for a number of years. Given American hegemony in security and defense and the effectiveness of American leadership through NATO, the WEU essentially had no room or reason to play an independent role and so it didn't. Accordingly, during this period of WEU dormancy, NATO served as the principal mechanism of European security and defense integration.

While there were further attempts to foster greater European integration in security and defense in the 1960s and 70s, the attempts ultimately also proved unsuccessful. In 1960, French President de Gaulle proposed the establishment of a loosely organized political community of the EC member states which would be subordinated to national governments, rather than supranational in character. This organization was to be headquartered in Paris and would include four commissions, most notably one devoted to defense. In so doing, de Gaulle's hoped to reestablish French leadership in Europe by creating a security apparatus parallel to that of the WEU, but which excluded Britain. Further, by organizing regular meetings between the six defense ministers, de Gaulle sought to distance the community from NATO and thereby weaken American military leadership in Europe.⁷ Despite several attempts by de Gaulle, the so-called 'Fouchet plan' was shot down by the other members of the EEC, principally the Benelux countries, for failing to protect them against Franco-German dominance by excluding Britain, as well as for attempting to fundamentally alter the basis of supranational European political integration that had been agreed upon in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Thus, the first attempt to introduce a security and defense dimension into the EC failed, cementing NATO's role as the primary framework of European security.

In the late 1960s, with the end of the Gaullist era and British (as well as Irish and Danish) accession to the EC, there was a greater impetus to coordinate foreign policy issues through the Community structure. The Davignon report of 1970, commissioned by The Hague summit of 1969, advocated, "cooperation in the matter of foreign policy...to reinforce solidarity in favor of a harmonization of points of

⁷Ibid, p.94-98.

view...and wherever possible and desirable, common action.”⁸ This led to the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process, which, although informal and devoid of structures or institutions, facilitated dialog, information exchange, and cooperation in foreign policy between the EC member states. The EPC was finally given a formal legal basis through the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. It is notable, however, that in the effort to bring about enhanced foreign policy cooperation through the EPC process, defense and security issues were left off the table, as the members were more comfortable with them being dealt with exclusively through the NATO forum.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, European leaders began to feel what has been described as the 'abandonment-entrapment dilemma.'⁹ According to this logic, EC leaders began to feel increasingly unable to make themselves heard in the bipolar US-USSR dialog, particularly over arms control negotiations (the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), while, at the same time, they doubted the extent to which the US was truly committed to the strategic nuclear guarantee of defending Europe against the USSR. This general sense of insecurity was exacerbated by the perceived inefficiency and inability of the EPC process to respond to the global crises of the early 80s, particularly in the cases of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Many in the EC felt as though they were unable to influence the dialog being carried out over their heads between the US and the USSR; they began to be acutely aware of the need for a new forum in which they could reassert their security and defense concerns. As the EPC process had proved itself unsuitable to the task, EC member states instead looked into their own past for viable alternatives and found the WEU.

The WEU was reactivated in 1984 under the Rome Declaration with an eye to finally establishing a “common European defense identity” within the North Atlantic Alliance framework, with the eventual goal in mind of solidifying the European pillar of NATO.¹⁰ The reactivation of the WEU was initiated by the French, who sought to make use of the organization as more of a forum for discussion and debate on matters of security and defense than as an actual decision-making body.¹¹ Notably, the Rome

⁸Le rapport du Luxembourg, Deuxieme partie, I, from website, <http://www.ellopos.net/politics/davignon.htm>, as translated by the author.

⁹Aybet, p.133-34.

¹⁰*NATO Handbook*, “Chapter 15: The Wider Institutional Framework for Security: the WEU,” from website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1504.htm>.

¹¹Sorin Lungu, “Attitudes Towards European Security, 1990-1997,” from website, www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_11/lungu.htm.

Declaration, under Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty, allowed for the WEU to consider the security implications for Europe of crises around the world. This new arrangement was brought to the test in August and October of 1987, when WEU meetings allowed for the coordination of a European military response to the threats of mining and attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. 'Operation Cleansweep' represented the first incidence of a coordinated European military activity taken through the WEU framework.

It was shortly thereafter, at the October 1987 Summit in The Hague, that members made the first organized effort to define the purpose of the WEU and its relationship with NATO, through the adoption of the 'Platform on European Security Interests.' In the 'Platform,' WEU foreign and defense ministers spelled out their commitment both to the development of a security and defense component to European integration and the unity of NATO through the strengthening of its European pillar.¹² This marked the true beginning of the creation of a permanent, independent, and comprehensive European defense identity and established the WEU as the European forum for security affairs. The WEU was further expanded in 1990 with the accession of both Spain and Portugal following ratification of the 1988 Treaty of Accession.

It is worth pausing here to note the crucial role played by the United States in enabling the project of European integration. by the United States. It was the American security commitment which provided Europe with a common conventional and nuclear 'umbrella' against the Soviet threat during the Cold War and allowed Western European nations to begin the process of political and economic integration which has culminated in today's European Union. As Schnabel writes, "First, the EU was able to develop because it profited from the nuclear shield and other protection offered by the United States, both against the threat posed by the Soviet Union and from fears that old European rivalries would be renewed."¹³ Free trade and economic cooperation and integration have a tendency to result in interdependence, which can be construed as a sign of national weakness or vulnerability. In the case of the European project, however, the role of the US as a kind of security guarantor and arbiter above the fray allowed the European states to overlook these concerns. As Art writes, "Through its provision of military protection to its allies, the United States mitigated these security externalities of interdependence."¹⁴ In short, the US security 'umbrella' during the Cold

12"Chapter 15: The Wider Institutional Framework for Security: the WEU."

13Rockwell Schnabel, "US View on the European CFSP," from website

<http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/9.2/EU/Schnabel.pdf>.

14Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International*

War helped to bind together the nations of Western Europe and allowed them to develop the European project by reducing interstate competition.

With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, there followed a period of political transition and strategic reassessment for both the world at large and the Atlantic Alliance. The end of the Cold War was a crucial turning point for European security, as it provided an essential stimulus for the development of a renewed role in security for the EC/EU. The systemic change that occurred with the downfall of the Soviet Union gave Europe a window of opportunity to restructure and realign the European security framework. Although no one was clear on how this 'brave new world' would pan out, many in Europe saw the end of the East-West rivalry as an opportunity for the elaboration of a more autonomous European security and defense framework. Given that the original *raison d'être* of NATO was to provide collective security for its members in the face of Soviet expansion, many in Europe, and especially in France, thought that NATO would either fade away or strictly limit itself to its Article V collective defense function.¹⁵ However, given NATO's remarkable adaptability to the post-Cold War world, its commitment to the continuing unity of the Alliance, and its expanding interests in collective security functions outside of Article V, those who sought a rebalancing of the US-European security relationship were forced to pursue it largely through the NATO framework.

One of the important motivations for the development of a more autonomous European security framework was the American's perennial complaint during the Cold War years of European 'free-riding' on the American conventional and nuclear security 'umbrella.' According to the 'free-rider' argument, NATO can be understood along economic lines as an organization devoted to the production of an international public good, collective security, for its constituent members. As Hartley and Sanders point out, this means NATO has two characteristics:

First, a nation's consumption of defense does not effect the amount still available for other nations to consume...Second, once these goods are provided, they are available to everyone...This characteristic provides the incentive for a nation to 'free-ride' when it knows that other nations will provide sufficient alliance defense for its needs.¹⁶

In American eyes, there was a major difference in defense spending, in terms of both

Security, Vol. 15, No. 4, (Spring 1991), p.37.

¹⁵David Yosh, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Role in International Security*, (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace Press, 1998), p.208-09.

¹⁶Keith Hartley and Todd Sander, "NATO Burden Sharing: Past and Future," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No.6, November 1999, p.668..

overall amounts and spending as a percentage of GDP, between the US and certain European allies, meaning that the US was effectively carrying more of costs of providing collective security while the Europeans reaped the benefit. The US sought to restore the balance to defense spending within NATO by pushing for greater 'burden-sharing' between the allies. The call for 'burden-sharing' became an even more common refrain with the end of the Cold War, as, with the rise of unchallenged worldwide American hegemony, it became unclear exactly who the Americans were protecting the Europeans against. This caused the US to question its rationale for continuing to incur the significant expenses involved in maintaining the American commitment to European security and provided more pressure on the Europeans to take an increased responsibility for their own defense.

The Maastricht Summit of December 1991, and the subsequent Treaty on European Union ('Treaty of Maastricht') signed in February of 1992, ushered in a new era for the European Union in matters of security and defense. The Treaty introduced a restructuring of the EU into three 'pillars': the Community pillar ('first pillar'), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar ('second pillar'), and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar ('third pillar'). The CFSP, although established on the foundation of the EPC process dating back to 1970, was significantly expanded through the Treaty of Maastricht. Importantly, the Treaty gives all EU member states the automatic right to join the WEU. Further, instead of simply trying to foster cooperation, as was the case under the EPC process, the CFSP is intended to generate and support common positions between the member states through unanimity. As the text indicates, once these common positions had been unanimously reached, member states have an obligation to, "support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity."¹⁷ Thus, once a common position has been agreed upon by all the member states through the European Council, they are enjoined by the Treaty to actively support the Union's consensus. This marks quite a significant departure from the weak language of the EPC process.

Furthermore, the CFSP is designed to move beyond just policy-making to policy implementation through the use of a new tool referred to as 'joint action.' This allows the EU to translate common positions into something more substantive by establishing the scope, means, and objectives in situations in which action is deemed necessary. Significantly, these then become commitments which the member states are

¹⁷Maastricht Treaty, Title V, Article J.1-4, from website, <http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entr2f.htm#16>.

obligated to honor. Further, Maastricht expands the scope of security cooperation from merely the economic aspects of security covered by the EPC process to all aspects of foreign policy related to security. However, the Treaty also distinguishes between the role of the CFSP and that of the WEU, in that the WEU remains the sole body accorded the responsibility to, “elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications.”¹⁸ Thus, the Treaty draws the distinction between foreign and security policy and direct defense and military action.

Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty, while expanding the scope of European security and defense integration through the CFSP, also recognizes the special importance of the long-established security relationship that many EU member states have with NATO. The Treaty states that, the Union, in framing the CFSP, “shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework.”¹⁹ This is to say, in other words, that the EU's CFSP is effectively superseded by NATO obligations and policies and its latitude for independent action is somewhat circumscribed by NATO-imposed limits. Given the present underdevelopment of European military capabilities and the continuing importance of the American contribution to European security through the NATO alliance, this is merely a practical reflection of reality. While the Treaty leaves room for the future development of, “a common defense policy, which may in time lead to a common defense,” it is clear that for the present this remains a distant prospect.²⁰ As some have noted, the vagueness of this phrase reflects an underlying compromise made by the member states at Maastricht, between those who sought a more explicit and expedited development of a defense role for the EU and those who opposed any mention of defense at all.²¹ This is a contentious issue within the CFSP that the Treaty left open for further discussion in the future.

The June 1992 WEU Council of Ministers meeting outside Bonn in Germany issued the 'Petersberg Declaration,' a document which spelled out the organization's future development along the guidelines established a year earlier with the Maastricht Treaty. The Declaration advanced practical WEU structural organization by creating the WEU Planning Cell to both plan for possible future missions and keep track of the

18Maastricht, Title V, Article J.4-2.

19Maastricht, Title V, Article J.4-4.

20Maastricht, Title V, Article J.4-1.

21Douglas Hurd, “Developing the CFSP,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944-)*, Vol. 70, No. 3, (Jul. 1994), p. 426.

operational forces made available to the WEU for missions by its members. Most importantly, however, the Petersberg Declaration established for the first time the types of operations that the WEU would involve itself with in the future, above and beyond its Article V common defense obligations under the Brussels Treaty. The WEU member states pledged to make forces available to pursue so-called 'Petersberg tasks,' involving humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis management, and peacemaking, either on an independent WEU basis or in conjunction with the CSCE or the UN Security Council. The Declaration is notable as a significant step forward in the organizational development of a European security and defense framework. Importantly, this step was taken through the WEU, and not NATO, framework, and was thus consequential as it was an independently-made European decision about the future of European security.

The experience of extensive dependency on American resources in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s convinced many of the European states of the painful need to increase their military capabilities, especially in crucial high-tech areas, such as satellite intelligence, lift capacity, and precision weapons.²² As one European general, in discussing the Europeans' experience in Bosnia, stated, "Kosovo was a real wake-up call. The EU members of NATO performed badly. They completely relied on the US."²³ Furthermore, the strong reluctance of the US to commit ground troops in Bosnia for 'Petersberg tasks' effectively ruled out the use of NATO in such situations, contributing to an increasing realization that Europe needed a capacity in which to act on its own if necessary. This was exacerbated with the onset of the Kosovo crisis in 1998, when Europe yet again remained dependent on the US and NATO to formulate a response. Most lastingly, however, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia began to cause many in Europe, including the British, to doubt the durability of the American security commitment to Europe. As *The Economist* wrote in the midst of the war in Bosnia, "the new impetus for strengthening the WEU comes partly from America's belief that Europe ought to shoulder more of the common defense burden, but more from a recent growth of doubt in Europe about the durability of America's military

22Richard Hatfield, "The Consequences of St. Malo," Speech April 28, 2000, Paris Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, from website, http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_speech.asp?newsItem_id=468.

23Judy Dempsey and Alexander Nicoll, "When push comes to shove: The European defence force has taken shape faster than even its supporters dared hope. But differences with Turkey over Nato stand in the way," [London edition], *Financial Times*, London (UK): Apr 30, 2001. p. 20.

commitment to Europe.”²⁴

The distinction drawn by the Petersberg Declaration between Article V tasks and non-Article V Petersburg tasks led some in Europe, and most especially in France, to argue that the two functions should be separated, with NATO focusing exclusively on matters of collective defense, leaving the WEU in charge of Petersberg tasks. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the US refusal to commit ground troops in Bosnia before the signing of a peace agreement added fuel to this fire. At the same time, increasing French *rapprochement* with NATO in the early 1990s provided a strong voice for the articulation of an independent European security and defense policy which could draw on NATO assets as necessary in dealing with non-Article V missions, like Yugoslavia, in which NATO wouldn't act.

However, despite their desires for increasing autonomy, the European NATO members remain heavily reliant on American military capabilities, especially in sea and air lift, communications, satellite intelligence, and power projection. Thus, although many wished to articulate a divergent security agenda, dependency on NATO, and especially American military capabilities, fostered the growth of European security and defense integration within the clearly NATO-linked framework of the WEU. As Eduardo Serra, Spain's former Defense Minister wrote, “The reality today is that we Europeans could do almost anything with the US; but without the US, we can do very little; and against the US, we can do absolutely nothing.”²⁵ For the Europeans to be able to accomplish anything at all, they had to accept the bargain of dominant American leadership in return for access to necessary US assets. Otherwise, without the Americans, the Europeans could not develop or deliver on their security goals at all. This has proved to be one of the central problems facing the development of a more autonomous European security and defense in the aftermath of the Cold War.

The Petersburg Declaration, along with the 'Document on Associate Membership' adopted at the Rome Ministerial in November of 1992, further extended associate membership in the WEU to NATO members which were not part of the European Union, including Turkey, Iceland, and Norway. These associate members could fully participate in both the meetings and the missions of the WEU, although they do not have full voting rights in the organization. At the same time in 1992, another class of WEU membership was also developed, observer status, for EU member states who, due to their neutral status, do not participate in NATO. Two years later, with the

²⁴ “Playing at Euro-soldiers,” *The Economist*, Nov. 26, 1994, p. 56.

²⁵Eduardo Serra, “Reinventing global security,” *Fresh Perspectives on Europe's Security*, p.45.

'Kirchberg Declaration' issued during the Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg in May 1994, a final WEU-affiliation status, associate partners, was created for countries, such as the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia, that were members of neither NATO nor the EU. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland also joined the WEU as associate members in 1999, short after becoming members of NATO in the same year. Within a relatively short time frame, the WEU managed to expand its organizational reach across much of the European continent through the extensive use of associational agreements.

The January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels significantly furthered NATO-WEU cooperation when all 16 Alliance member states unanimously approved the idea of creating an independent European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the NATO framework. The ESDI, it was hoped, would be a new mechanism by which the European allies could strengthen the European pillar of NATO and take on more responsibility for their own defense and security affairs while continuing to maintain the transatlantic ties at NATO's core. In order to avoid duplication of military capabilities and competition between NATO and the WEU, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Concept was developed to allow, in the event of a NATO decision not to take action in a particular situation, for the sharing of NATO assets with the WEU.

As the WEU envisions responding to a wide variety of unpredictable and distinctly different challenges in its Petersburg tasks (peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, etc), this modular CJTF framework will allow it to rapidly build mission-specific capabilities and resources by borrowing from NATO, as well as from WEU member states and non-NATO actors, to maximize a coherent and flexible response.²⁶ Principal among those assets that the WEU would need to borrow from NATO are those key to infrastructure, satellite intelligence, logistics, and communications. Furthermore, efficient pooling of European military capabilities is of particular importance for the WEU given the relatively low levels of defense spending among European member states as compared to the US. The CJTF enhances the utility of the WEU by allowing it to focus more of its energies and monies on preparing response strategies for Petersburg task missions while retaining the significant advantage of access to NATO resources and capabilities.

The NATO Berlin Meeting of June 1996 stressed the importance of locating the emerging ESDI concept squarely within a NATO framework. Through the CJTF

²⁶*NATO Handbook*, Chapter 12: "The Military Command Structure- CJTF Concept," from website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1204.htm>.

Concept, the WEU can make use of NATO resources and capabilities to develop a distinct ESDI. This nesting of the ESDI within NATO is what is referred to as making the WEU and NATO “separable but not separate.”²⁷ This concept would be applied to both resources as well as command structures. The meeting emphasized the idea that these new European command structures within NATO could be developed to run WEU-led missions through the 'double-hatting' of personnel, i.e., making certain individuals simultaneously responsible for roles in both NATO and WEU command structures.²⁸

The adoption of this new 'ESDI within NATO' concept marks a strong attempt by NATO to answer one of the longest standing dilemmas about transatlantic security relations: while the US has pressured the European allies to not be 'free riders' by enhancing their defense spending and developing their own capabilities, if they actually did so, what need would there be for NATO?²⁹ By binding the development of an ESDI to the NATO framework, and making its operational capability contingent on NATO resources, the Alliance seems to think that it has essentially found a way of having its cake and eating it, too. However, despite NATO's enthusiastic rhetoric about the ESDI-CJTF mechanism, there remains a good deal of ambiguity over its actual implementation.³⁰ Which assets NATO is willing to share and under what circumstances remain open questions, as the boundaries of this increased European autonomy and the 'more equal partnership' have yet to be clearly drawn.

The October 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam furthered development of both the CFSP and the the ESDI by introducing a number of important new modifications to the existing EU treaties. In order to facilitate the CFSP, Amsterdam effectively introduced the possibility of decision making by majority vote, through the creation of a new voting status, 'constructive abstention,' which would allow member states a third option aside from either an approval or a veto. Further, the Treaty added a third tool to the CFSP arsenal, alongside the established mechanisms of 'common positions' and 'joint action:' 'common strategies.' This new tool would allow the member states to adopt consensus decisions on common strategies in areas where they have significant common interests. Under Article 26, the Treaty establishes the new position of 'High

27NATO Ministerial Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63, #7, from website,
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm>.

28NATO Ministerial Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63, #7.

29Paul Cornish, “European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO,” *International Affairs* (The Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol.72, No.4, The Americas: European Security (Oct. 1996), p.756.

30Kirchner, p.51.

Representative for the CSFP,' to be filled by the Secretary-General of the European Council, in an effort to raise the profile of the CFSP as well as increase its coherence. This organizational change was meant to give 'a name and a face' to the EU's CFSP for both the European public and the wider world. These practical changes helped to enhance the capabilities and effectiveness of the CFSP.

But the changes enacted by the Treaty of Amsterdam also had significant ramifications for the development of ESDI. Although the concept of the 'Petersburg tasks' had been widely discussed in EU circles for several years (eg, the Petersburg Declaration), Amsterdam marked the formal inclusion of these tasks into Article V of the EU Treaty. Additionally, the Treaty opened the door to the possible future integration of the WEU directly into the EU framework. It states that, "The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide."³¹

Amsterdam also brought about the harmonization of the presidencies of the EU and the WEU, with a notable exception for the neutral EU member states (Sweden, Austria, Ireland, and Finland). While seemingly a minor transformation, this step was actually of significant importance because it allowed the EU to sidestep the question of which country would in effect take on the leadership of the WEU. Further, the Treaty expands the role of the CFSP in European security by stating that, "the European Council shall define the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defense implications."³² This marks a significant revision of the Maastricht Treaty, wherein matters 'with defense implication' were to be dealt with separately from the CFSP through the WEU forum. These changes illustrate how the Treaty of Amsterdam began the process of folding the WEU directly into the EU's second pillar.

The joint Franco-British St. Malo Declaration of December 1998 gave substance to the security goals spelled out in the Treaty of Amsterdam by forging a consensus between the EU's two largest military power on the need for a designated European military force to deal with Petersburg tasks. As the Declaration explains, "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to

³¹Treaty of Amsterdam, Declaration relating to the WEU, Article 17 (J.7)-1. From website, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html#0092010003>.

³²Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.3.1.

international crises.”³³ The Declaration marked a profound change in traditional British security policy towards the EU, as it effectively reversed their prior opposition to the establishment of an independent ESDI and paved the way for future practical steps to be taken within the EU. As Serfaty points out, “St. Malo was important because it signaled a change in traditional stances on the part of both Great Britain and France. Because Britain was now a leader in the effort, it also assuaged US concerns.”³⁴ At the European Council meeting in Cologne the following June, the Council took advantage of this new impetus and granted the EU, “the necessary means and capabilities necessary to assume its responsibilities regarding a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP).”³⁵ Given the British green light to proceed with European security integration, the EU was beginning to progressively assume the responsibilities previously held by the WEU.

The 50th anniversary NATO Summit in Washington, DC in April of 1999, while highlighting the continuing importance of the half-century old transatlantic alliance, fully endorsed the concrete steps that had been taken over the past five years to develop the ESDI within the NATO framework. This Summit marked another major turning point for the development of a more autonomous European security framework. As for particulars, at the meeting, the Alliance stressed the so-called 'Berlin-plus' arrangements that had been made for the sharing of NATO assets and capabilities, intelligence, and command structures with the WEU.³⁶ In NATO-WEU negotiations, it was determined that NATO would decide to aid to WEU-led missions operating outside of the North Atlantic framework on a case by case basis through the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This is noteworthy because by making such decisions through the NAC, the setup would preserve in all such cases the voice and vote of NATO members who were not members of the EU, including Iceland and Norway, the Central and Eastern European states, and Turkey.

The European Council Meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 furthered the Council's directive to develop autonomous operational capabilities for EU-led missions in situations of international crisis. Most significantly, it was agreed at Helsinki that, as the Presidency Conclusions states, “cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations,

33St. Malo Declaration, #2, from website, <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html>.

34Simon Serfaty, as quoted in James Kitfield, “Will Europe ruin NATO?,” *Air Force Magazine*, October 2000, Vol.83, No.10.

35Annexes to the Presidential Conclusions: Cologne European Council 3 and 4 June 1999, Annex III, from website, http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a3.

36Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, April 23-25 1999, Section 4, p. 65, from NATO website, www.nato.int.

Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersburg tasks.”³⁷ The actualization of this so-called 'Headline Goal' to create a European 'Rapid Reaction Force' (RRF) is highly important, as, when completed, it would finally give the EU the tangible and separate military capabilities to lead EU missions outside of a NATO context, a goal that many in Europe have worked towards for over three decades. To further this end, Helsinki also agreed to establish a host of new military and political bodies to direct and manage EU-led operations. Helsinki made it clear, however, that these new structures would not compromise the existing NATO framework and would be designed to continue full cooperation and collaboration between the EU and NATO.

The European Council Meeting at Nice in December of 2000 established several new EU bodies to help coordinate the developing CESDP: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The PSC is charged with the mission of taking charge of all aspects of the CFSP, including those related to the CESDP, as well as guiding the EU's response to international crises. The EUMC, composed of military representatives of the member states' Chiefs of Defense (CHODs), and is designed to offer advice and recommendations to the PSC and direction to the EUMS. The EUMS, drawn from the ranks of member states' national militaries, is tasked with the duty of monitoring and analyzing the global situation, planning Petersburg tasks, and implementing the directives of the EUMC. These interlocking bodies of advice, decision-making, and implementation, building on the prior model of the WEU's Planning Cell, were designed to offer the EU the full range of integrated multinational military planning capabilities for its envisioned future Petersburg tasks.

At the December 2001 meeting in Laeken, Belgium, the European Council declared that, “the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations...development of the means and capabilities at its disposal will enable the Union to take on more demanding operations.”³⁸ The Copenhagen European Council Meeting in December of 2002 declared that, with all 'Berlin-plus' permanent arrangements between the EU and NATO completed, the EU was now ready and willing to take over operational responsibilities for both Security Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the mission in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

³⁷Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, II-28.

³⁸Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, I.6, from website, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf.

(FYROM). The EU launched its first military operation, code name 'Concordia,' to FYROM in March of 2003, making use of NATO resources and capabilities as agreed under 'Berlin-plus.' In June of 2003 the EU also launched its first (albeit rather short) off continent mission, code name 'Artemis,' in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The EU's first truly sizable ESDP operation began in December of 2004, however, with the 7,000 troop EUFOR 'Althea' mission to replace the outgoing NATO SFOR. Thus, at present, it seems as though the EU, through both its continuing security and defense integration and its Berlin-plus cooperation with NATO, is beginning to develop the operational capabilities necessary to organize and carry out a truly common European security and defense policy.

The EU filled in a crucial gap in its CFSP-ESDP with the approval of the European Security Strategy at the European Council meeting in Brussels in December of 2003. As van Ham writes, it aims, "to address the weakest link in Europe's role as an emerging global power: the connection between its lofty objectives and its uncoordinated policy instruments."³⁹ This document, authored by EU High Representative Javier Solana, spells out the major foreseeable threats to European security, as well as the strategic objectives of the Union's CFSP in attempting to address these threats. The ESS establishes the key threats to EU security as terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (with an focus on drugs, arms, and people trafficking). The document also emphasizes the future potential for the EU and its CFSP to take on a larger role in world affairs, stating, "The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world."⁴⁰

Interestingly, in parts the ESS strikes a surprisingly similar chord to that of the current administration in Washington and its doctrine of 'pre-emption:'

With the new threats, the first line of defense will often be abroad. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.⁴¹

As Van Ham writes, "For the EU, [these statements] imply a remarkable shift towards accepting the conceptual underpinnings of the current US administration's

³⁹Peter van Ham, Europe Gets Real: The New Security Strategy Shows the Eu's Geopolitical Maturity," American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, from website, www.aicgs.org/c/vanham/htm.

⁴⁰Javier Solana, "A Secure Europe in a Better World," p.2, from ISS website, www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf.

⁴¹Solana, p.8.

worldview.”⁴² However, the document also emphasizes that the response to these new challenges should be comprehensive and not merely reliant on the use of the Union's developing military means. It states that, “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means... The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.”⁴³ Thus, while the EU is interested in taking on a more active and involved role in international affairs, including the use of more traditional 'hard' security means, it will not attempt to focus on their use exclusively and will instead try to strike a balance between 'hard' and 'soft' measures to create more comprehensive solutions to the challenges faced by European security today. The ESS marks a significant and necessary step in the elaboration of a European CFSP-ESDP and provides the EU with a solid framework for operationalizing its foreign and security policy goals.

Although it has not yet come into effect, it is also worth considering the potential impact on of the EU Constitution on the development of the CFSP-ESDP. The proposed European Union Constitution, which was released in June of 2004, makes two major changes to the existing structure of the Union's CFSP: it creates the new role of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and the European External Action Service. The Minister for Foreign Affairs would take on the responsibility for both helping to develop, coordinate, and implement the CFSP, as well as serving as an internationally recognizable 'name and a face' for the CFSP in external affairs. The European External Action Service would essentially be the EU's diplomatic corps, which would work to aid in the implementation of CFSP policies in conjunction with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁴ Under Article I-12 (4), the Constitution also reiterates the EU's, “competence to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy.”⁴⁵

In terms of the scope of the overall development of the CFSP, the changes in the Constitution are relatively minor, although the creation of a Minister for Foreign Affairs would probably provide a big boost in raising the public awareness of the CFSP. However, given rejections of the EU Constitution in major referendums in both France and the Netherlands in late May and early June this year has seriously called into question whether or not these policies will come into effect. For the moment at

42Van Ham.

43Solana, p.8.

44“Common Foreign and Security Policy,” A Constitution for Europe, from the EU's website, europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/foreignpolicy_en.htm.

45EU Constitution, Title III 'Union Competences,' Article I-12, 4, from EU website, europa.eu/int/constitution/en/ptoc4_en/htm.

least, the future implementation of these news measures for the CFSP remains uncertain.

The fifty year process of European security and defense integration has been a time of fitful starts and stops, of promising proposals that sputter out and amount to nothing, only to be tossed in the bin and replaced with something newer and better. While the present operational capabilities of the EU in the ESDP are still in their infancy, they nonetheless represent a remarkable triumph when held against the background of the post-War Europe of 1945. Furthermore, there is no standard against which we can compare their progress, as nothing like the EU project has ever been attempted before. The decade and a half since the end of the Cold War has seen impressive, if incomplete, progress towards the objectives of the CFSP and the ESDP, and the EU is just beginning to come into its own as an organization capable of carrying out the lofty goals of its Petersberg tasks.

While doubtless the EU's capabilities will remain in NATO's shadow for the foreseeable future, this should not be taken to mean that the EU cannot and will not play an increasingly important role in European and world security at large. For the present, however, the EU's efforts remain somewhat hampered by its lack of military capabilities; while it has focused intensively on the development of institutional structures and foreign and security policy objectives, this has not replaced the need for serious, long-term defense investment if the reality of the EU's CFSP-ESDP is to match its rhetoric. At a certain point, the EU must decide what kind of security role it truly sees itself playing in the future, be it local, regional, or global, and it must dedicate the necessary resources accordingly to seeing that vision through.

CHAPTER 3: SECURITY POLICY PREFERENCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND EU MEMBER STATES

This chapter will examine the emergence of the ESDP from the point of view of the preferences of the EU member states, as well as those of the US. The section will proceed using the framework of the rationalist school of political theory, which posits that nations are rational actors and that their foreign policy decisions are made on the basis of cost-benefit analysis of which of their preferred goals can be attained at a minimum cost. As Rittenberger explains, "Theories that rely on the model of *homo economicus* conceive of actors as self-interested (or more generally, goal oriented)...[whose] behavior results from rational calculations of costs and benefits. Actors consciously pursue goals which they strive to attain at a minimum of costs."⁴⁶ The version of rationalism employed in this case is as liberal intergovernmentalism, as laid out by Andrew Moravcsik, which posits that the EU is an intergovernmental institution in which policy experts from the individual member states, "formulate national bargaining positions matching their state national interests."⁴⁷ After looking at the security preferences of the EU-25 member states, the chapter will then close by examining the fierce debate in Europe over the US-led Iraq War, during which the different preferences of the EU member states could be clearly seen manifesting themselves in an unusually visible manner.

While Europe has come a long way in the past fifty years towards beginning to establish the skeletal framework for a common European security and defense policy, not all actors in the realm of European security have the same vision in mind. Despite the EU goals of compromise and cooperation, each state has its own national security and defense preferences which guide the positions they adopt on the issues of the ESDI/ESDP, NATO, and the future of European security and defense integration. Although it is something of a cliché, it nonetheless remains largely true that European preferences in security and defense can be seen as a spectrum from the 'Atlanticists' approach, represented by the UK, to the 'Europeanist' one, represented by France, with all other states falling somewhere in between.⁴⁸ While the EU has now expanded to 25

⁴⁶Volker Rittenberger, "Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International Relations Theory," Working Paper present at ISA Meeting March 2002.

⁴⁷Dorina Nastase, "The Merger of CFSP and the WEU: A Step Ahead in Integration?" From website, http://ro.crsg.ro/Lucrari/WE_EU.pdf.

⁴⁸As a note on definition: generally speaking, the term 'Atlanticist' refers to those who support, "a US-led American-European coalition that would continue to dominate the world scene," while 'Europeanist' describes those who wish to develop a more balanced world in which a unified Europe and an integrated

members, the primary actors in European security and defense are relatively few in number, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy (to a lesser extent), and, above all, the United States. While the United States is obviously not a European state geographically, its present hegemonic power in the world and its five plus decades of intimate involvement in European security mean that it casts a long shadow across the Continent in all such matters.

As the last chapter detailed, in recent years, European states have taken a number of steps towards the creation of a integrated European approach to security and defense through the EU framework. Although the tangible results of these efforts have so far been limited, this process represents an important new dynamic in European security. While Europe was largely confined to a secondary role in the Cold War era transatlantic security partnership, the end of the Cold War and systemic transformation has opened the door to the possibility of a more prominent and more independent European voice. However, if Europe is to play an increasingly significant role on the world stage through the EU framework, it must find ways of transcending the Continent's myriad national diversity to forge common European positions on matters of security and defense.

The European Union remains at its core an effort to develop a unipolar Europe from a multiplicity of constituent nation state actors. Driven by the Franco-German 'engine' and with the implicit security guarantee of the United States, EU member states have sought to make integration acceptable through policies of 'self-binding' and 'benign power employment.'⁴⁹ By limiting their own power through multilateralism, bargaining, and consensus politics, the major European powers have made it possible for the smaller states to be absorbed into the European order without fear of domination and subordination.⁵⁰ However, integration in the field of security and defense policy remains a more complex task than economic and political integration because it is so inextricably tied to the national level interests and preferences of individual states. Thus, an examination of the interests of the EU's principal powers, as well as those of the United States, should help shed some light on the parameters of the debate and the challenges facing the project of European security and defense integration. Although the United States is not by geography a European nation, its influence in European

European Union can play a more independent role in international affairs. Definition courtesy of Sourcewatch.org.

49Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Autumn 1998, p. 45.

50Kupchan, p. 45-55.

security and defense has been predominant since the Second World War and thus its preferences must be examined at length in any discussion on the subject.

The United States of America

The United States has played a crucial role in Europe defense and security since the end of the Second World War, helping to rebuild, rearm, and unify a war-torn Western Europe against the threat of Soviet expansionism. The explicit US military commitment to European security gave Europeans the sense of stability, predictability, and psychological reassurance necessary to rebuild their societies and economies in the uncertain and turbulent times following the war.⁵¹ Given its overwhelming military superiority, the active role played by the US in post-war security helped 'balance' the European inter-state system by assuaging concerns over German rearmament. The US made it 'safe' for other European nations to engage in security cooperation with Germany by restraining the German military threat through its own greater dominance within the alliance and on the ground military presence in Germany. The transatlantic collective security and defense framework was established through by the organization of NATO with the Treaty of Washington in April of 1949.

The American security commitment provided Europe with a common conventional and nuclear 'umbrella' against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. American hegemony and the American military commitment to Europe facilitated the process of economic and political integration by providing security guarantees against both traditional European interstate rivalry and the threat of Soviet military expansionism. In such a situation, the European states could proceed with the process of integration and bind themselves together without the risk of the project degenerating into a new form of domination by the Continent's major powers. In effect, the US Cold War-era security 'umbrella' helped to bring together the nations of Western Europe and allowed them to develop the European project that would become the EU by reducing interstate competition and helping to promote ties of economic interdependency.

In general, during the Cold War, the US maintained a 'hands off' approach to the process of European integration, with the perspective in mind both that, as they were free sovereign nations, the European states could pursue as they wish and that, facing the threat of the Soviet Union, an integrated Europe would be beneficial for both

⁵¹Art, p.36.

NATO and Western democracy in general.⁵² Accordingly, the United States has maintained diplomatic relations with the EU and its forerunners from the onset, beginning with its observers to the ECSC in 1953 and its first mission to the EC in 1961. Especially in the early years of the Cold War, the US viewed European integration as the best way of ensuring that the European nations would swiftly rebuild their defense capabilities and take on greater responsibility for balancing the Soviet Union in Europe.

This American focus on increasing the European contribution to Allied defense, the so-called 'burden-sharing debate,' was to become one of the hallmarks of the Cold War, as many American critics, correctly or not, derided the Europeans (especially, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, et al.) for 'free-riding' on the US security 'umbrella' by not doing their part in contributing to the military costs of deterring the Soviet Union.⁵³ At the same time, however, if the Europeans were to significantly increase their defense spending and enhance their military capabilities, they could potentially undermine the American leadership and dominance of NATO.⁵⁴ In essence, according to Cornish, the US wanted the Europeans to, “*do* more, not necessarily *be* more.”⁵⁵

Everything changed, however, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which brought about a radical transformation in the geopolitical dynamic and the emergence of a unipolar world with the US as the sole hegemonic power. As Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorably stated, “I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung.”⁵⁶ Many in Europe began to argue that, in the absence of the Soviet Union, the value of US military power would diminish and that there would no longer be a need for US protection.⁵⁷ The challenges in the post-Cold War world no longer involved a direct threat to the security of NATO states, but instead were concerned with more indirect threats from spread of WMDs, terrorism, refugees and migration, and regional conflicts on Europe's periphery.

Additionally, the French post-Cold War *rapprochement* with NATO interjected a powerful and divergent new voice into the dialogue and provided a strong impetus for

52Jeffrey Cimbalo, “Saving NATO from Europe,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2004.

53Yosh, p. 68-70.

54Cornish, “European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO,” p.756.

55Paul Cornish, *Partnership in Crisis: The US, Europe and the fall and rise of NATO*, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997),p.34. Italics are mine.

56“Communism’s Collapse Poses a Challenge to America’s Military,” *US. News and World Report*, Vol. 3, No. 16 (October 14, 1991), p.28. Incidentally, as of late, it seems as though the US has something of the opposite problem.

57Art, p.10.

change. This led to an increasing push among many European states for a 'Europeanization' of the Alliance and the creation of a distinctly 'Europeanist' approach to European security; while at the same time, more than ever before, France began to push for European security cooperation outside the NATO framework.⁵⁸ Among other measures, in February of 1991, France and Germany jointly submitted a proposal to the European Council's IGC supporting the development of the CFSP and the transformation of the WEU into Europe's primary security structure.⁵⁹ Further, following the definition of the so-called 'Petersberg tasks' in 1992, the French began to push for a distinction to be made between NATO-led Article V missions and ESDI non-Article V operations (e.g., crisis management or peace enforcement) which would draw on NATO resources without direct NATO (i.e. American) involvement.

The potential for the fracturing of the Alliance implicit in some of these post-Cold War French proposals motivated the US Undersecretary of State Bartholomew to send a 'note' in March of 1991 to European leaders, which made it clear that, although the US values a European voice in NATO, it would not accept unified and independent European 'caucus' on defense that would challenge Washington's leadership role.⁶⁰ Further, regarding France's proposed NATO-WEU Article V- Non-Article V mission distinction, Washington was less than thrilled by the prospect of being essentially sidelined in precisely the sorts of crises that are increasingly likely to occur in the post-Cold War world (non-Article V operations), while simultaneously being asked to hop to the European's defense in the event of a more serious threat to their security (Article V operations). As US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe stated, "It is essential from the US point of view not to foster a bifurcated NATO, in which, de facto if not explicitly, there are two systems, one for the US and Article V, and one for Europe and non-Article V operations." This stance has remained one of the major tenets of post-Cold War American security policy in Europe.

The United States has supported the creation of a ESDI/ESDP, so long as it takes place within the context of NATO and does not usurp the primacy or disrupt the unity of the NATO transatlantic security relationship. The Americans strongly favor strengthening the European pillar of NATO through the ESDP, especially if it will lead to greater development of European military capabilities and more burden-sharing

58Cornish, p.757.

59Cornish, p.758.

60Kenneth Waltz, "The Balance of Power and NATO Expansion," Working Paper 5.66, October 1998, from website, www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/europe4.doc.

within the Alliance.⁶¹ This is particularly necessary because, as the War in Afghanistan point out yet again in 2001, there still exists a substantial capabilities gap between the US and the EU. As Dempsey explains, “Citing the war in Afghanistan, where the EU could do little more than cheer the U.S. on from the sidelines, U.S. and NATO officials have been chiding the EU for its failure to back up its ambitions on the global stage with real military muscle.”⁶² While this may be starting to change somewhat since the War in Afghanistan, the EU will still be reliant on borrowing NATO and US assets for use in more challenging peace-making and crisis intervention missions for the foreseeable future.

At the same time, for the US, in developing the ESDP, the European states must be careful not to duplicate structures and capabilities already present within NATO. The 1994 NATO Brussels Summit and the 1996 'Berlin-plus' agreement approved the establishment of an independent ESDI within NATO and authorized the use of the CJTF Concept to allow NATO-WEU resource and capability sharing with precisely these concerns in mind. The ESDP-'Berlin-plus' arrangement will allow the EU to make use of NATO resources and capabilities to develop an independent European identity within a unified NATO without duplication, while ensuring that NATO and the EU remain 'separable, but not separate' entities. As Larrabee writes, “the US wants ESDI to evolve in a way that does not weaken NATO and the trans-Atlantic link.”⁶³ This was underlined in the agreement reached at the 1999 Washington, D.C. NATO Summit in which the Alliance endorsed the concept of European security autonomy such that the Europeans can, “take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance is not engaged.”⁶⁴ Again, this illustrates that the US is amenable to the development of the ESDP, provided that it is subordinate, as well as complementary, to NATO.

From the American perspective, however, it seems as though the EU frequently underestimates the challenges involved in establishing such a common policy: as the EU must take account of widely divergent security interests, ranging from its three major powers, four neutral states, to its recently added former Warsaw Pact members, in drawing up its ESDP/CFSP, the creation of commonly held positions and policies in the absence of clear leadership seems something of a difficult task at best. And, as the

61Schnabel, p. 6.

62Judy Dempsey, Turkey sees risks in EU deal to access NATO assets,” *The Financial Times*, June 9, 2001, p.14.

63Stephen Larrabee, “An American Perspective on the ESDI,” from website, <http://turkishstudies.org/reportsb.html>.

64NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)-64 24 April 1999, from website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>.

recent turbulence over the Iraq War illustrated, it is one in which the EU has yet to iron out all the kinks.⁶⁵ NATO works precisely because American dominance provides leadership in the Alliance, but the EU, with several competing major powers (Germany, UK, France), lacks this clearly established leadership, rendering decision-making difficult. While the lack of European capabilities has proved a challenge in the development of the ESDP concept, its primary hurdle has been and continues to remain the lack of clear leadership within the EU of the project. Despite these challenges, the US is favorable to the development of the ESDP, and particularly to the idea of Europeans doing more to provide for their own security, just as long as it unambiguously takes place through the established NATO framework.

Furthermore, by pursuing the ESDP through a NATO framework, the EU could retain the voice, insight, and contribution of the European NATO members that are not members of the Union (Turkey, Iceland, Norway, to which could be added Bulgaria and Romania after they joined NATO in 2004). By transitioning from the 'inclusive' WEU, which allowed for associate membership for non-WEU states, to the more 'exclusive' EU-centric ESDP, the EU runs the risks of duplicating assets and structures and widening fault lines within the Alliance. The US government has stressed that the EU must not discriminate against European non-EU member states within NATO in the development of the ESDP.⁶⁶ Moreover, down the line, the US government would like to see a greater convergence between the memberships of NATO and the European Union, with the goal in mind of bringing about greater complementarity between the two organizations.⁶⁷ Accordingly, the US government has publicly pushed for EU membership for non-EU NATO members who desire it, most notably in the case of Turkey.

It seems as though a great deal of the distinction between the US and EU approaches in foreign and security policy is dependent on the tenor of the administration in Washington, although the US is seemingly generally more willing to resort to the use of force than the Europeans. The previous administration, under President Clinton, was marked by a much greater concern for multilateralism and coalition building when it did intervene, as well as a focus on humanitarian intervention and crisis management in its chosen missions. The Clinton administration's policy of

⁶⁵Schnabel, p.6.

⁶⁶Larrabee.

⁶⁷Amb. Marc Grossman, Assistant Sec. State, Bureau of European Affairs, "NATO's Role in the Next Millennium: Constant and Emerging Goals," USIA, US Foreign Policy Agenda, March 1999, from website, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0399/ijpe/pj19gros.htm>.

'liberal internationalism' was much closer to the prevailing sentiment in the European Union, although it was roundly criticized by domestic conservative critics for, among other things, its "mania for treaties" and its desire to constrain American hegemony by tying "Gulliver with a thousand strings."⁶⁸ In the post 9/11 Bush White House, however, it seems as though the pendulum has swung the other direction, with the ascendancy of the neo-conservatives, a focus on building 'coalitions of the willing,' and a more unilateralist, value-centric foreign policy that Krauthammer has dubbed 'democratic globalism.'⁶⁹ Eduardo Serra, former Spanish Defense Minister, has labeled this the, "transformation...of the US from reluctant sheriff to interventionist global superpower."⁷⁰ However, it is worth noting here that there are those who see strong continuities in the substance, if not the style, of American foreign policy between the Clinton and Bush administrations and emphasize that the perceived differences are more of the nature of minor, and not revolutionary, adjustments.⁷¹

Moreover, the Washington consensus in the present administration is that the EU has a tendency to emphasize 'multilateralism' at the expense of developing true military capabilities in a misguided effort to foster global presence and authority on the cheap. In American eyes, the EU, the self-proclaimed 'civilian power,' simply cannot exercise 'soft' power without being able to resort to 'hard' power when the situation calls for it. While humanitarian aid, international organizations, and confidence building measures are all important, the US continues to emphasize the crucial role played by military power in resolving conflicts, especially those involving regimes that respect neither democracy, human rights, nor the rule of law.⁷² However much many in Washington may deride 'Old Europe' for its military shortcomings, one must keep in mind that these shortcomings are merely relative to an American power that exists on a scale never before seen, and, outside the US, the member states of the EU comprise some of the world's most powerful and capable militaries. Notably, Britain and France are both nuclear powers and the only two other nations in the world which can be said to have true 'power projection' capabilities, and they, thus, should not be

68Charles Krauthammer, "Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World," 2004 Irving Kristol Lecture, AEI Annual Dinner (Washington)Publication Date: February 10, 2004, from website, <http://www.aei.org/news19912>.

69Krauthammer.

70Eduardo Serra, "Reinventing Global Security," in NDADigital Discussion Paper "Fresh Perspectives on European Security," New Defense Agenda and Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estrategicos, from website, <http://www.forum-europe.com/publication/NDADigitalDiscussionPaper.pdf>, p.45.

71Melvyn Leffler, "9/11 and American Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History*, Vol.29, Issue 3, p.395-414.

72Schnabel, p.7.

underestimated.⁷³

This US-EU distinction between the 'hard' and 'soft' power approaches has been rather exacerbated as of late under the Bush administration, particularly over the issue of the Iraq War, which many Europeans saw as illegitimate because it lacked 'international' (i.e. UN) sanction. As Schnabel writes, summing up the Bush administration's logic, "Those seeking to rely on the rule of law must have some means of enforcing it."⁷⁴ Thus, under the current administration, the primary emphasis in transatlantic security relations seems to be on fostering the expansion of European military capabilities so that they can provide both more for their own defense and for greater burden-sharing in future NATO operations. But, above all else, it is crucial for the US that the process of European security integration does not lead to any sort of 'decoupling' from the primacy of transatlantic security ties and the NATO framework. However, as this section has established, the US is also intricately involved in all of the main problems which the EU faces in its efforts to bring about an autonomous CFSP-ESDP. The three main challenges to the development of the EU's role in European security, in short, are: the lack of clear leadership for the project within the EU, the shortcomings of European military capabilities, and the issue of the EU's increasing institutional overlap with NATO. The following sections will take a closer look at these problems, as well as examining the preferences of the EU members and their impact on the evolution of European security.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, with its long history of the 'special relationship' with the United States, is the principal European ally of the United States, and, as a result, Britain has a tendency to hew to a more 'Atlanticist' line in European security and defense matters than any of the continental European states. Generally, this places the British in opposition to the more 'Europeanist' approach of the French, their traditional rival for security and defense leadership in Europe, although, as was the case with St. Malo, the British and the French have proved that they can work together when the stakes are high enough. The US and UK also engage in an unparalleled level of defense cooperation including intelligence sharing, joint procurement, military basing, and

⁷³Barry Posen, "The Unipolar Moment and the ESDP," Working Draft, from website, www.yale.edu/irspeakers/Posen%20-%20EuropeTheoryessay.doc, p.5.

⁷⁴Schnabel, p.7.

nuclear weapons assistance and maintenance. For the UK, the primary concern above all is to maintain America's commitment to European security and defense through NATO and to prevent the taking of any steps towards the development an ESDP which could result in an lessened American commitment or withdrawal from Europe. As a result, the British favor the primacy of NATO in European defense and oppose the development of any European security framework designed to challenge or replace NATO's role in Europe.

Specifically, Britain has generally preferred a weak ESDI to ensure a lasting American commitment to European security, and this has traditionally meant that the UK is quite strident in its rejection of any measure designed to bring the WEU and the EU CFSP closer together. As the British Ministry of Defense states, "Multinational Defense Cooperation should be pursued when it...is compatible with, and does not threaten, our links to the US and NATO."⁷⁵ In European security and defense matters, Britain is a status quo power because, due to its close ties with the US, it benefits more than any other European power from the continuation of America's presence in Europe. For Britain, the US role in Europe serves as a counterbalancing force against the possible re-emergence of Germany or Russia as major powers in the region.⁷⁶ Britain generally tends to pursue a something of a policy of 'bandwagoning' *vis à vis* the US, in an effort to keep the US active and engaged in European security. As Posen writes, "Britain is driven more by fear that failure to support the U.S. will further reduce Europe's already slim influence on its policies."⁷⁷

The experience of European impotence in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, coupled with the approval of the ESDI and the 'Berlin-plus' arrangement in the 1994 and 1996 NATO Summits, moved the British to accept the need for greater EU security and defense cooperation and integration. As *The Economist* put it in 1998, "Mr. Blair is conscious that in defense matters, Britain, France, and Germany may have little choice but to work together more closely, given America's recent reluctance to commit any more ground troops to Europe's potential war zones."⁷⁸ Thus, America's perceived lack of solid commitment to European security forced the British to take on a more leadership role in elaborating the EU's security and defense role along the lines it desired. In many ways, it was this British decision to take part that made the project

⁷⁵"Paper No. 2: Multinational Defense Cooperation," British Ministry of Defense, from website, <http://www.mod.uk/issues/cooperation/multinational.htm>.

⁷⁶Kirchner, p.47.

⁷⁷Posen, p.16.

⁷⁸"Blair's defence offensive," *The Economist*, November 14, 1998, (Vol. 349, Iss. 8094) pp. 61-62.

viable, as any European defense framework build around France, Germany, and Belgium, and lacking the participation of the EU's largest military power, simply wouldn't be credible.⁷⁹

With the joint Anglo-French St. Malo Declaration in 1998, the British softened their longstanding opposition and agreed to the creation of a joint force to tackle 'Petersberg tasks,' thus paving the way for the creation of an independent ESDI within the EU. In many ways, the creation of the 'Rapid Reaction Force' at St. Malo was an effort to prepare for future Bosnia-type situations in which the US would be unwilling to participate. Furthermore, British participation at the head of the project also helped to reassure the US about the ultimate motivating goals behind the RRF. Since St. Malo, however, Britain has staunchly maintained that the primary framework for European security and defense should continue to be NATO, and any EU EDSP-creation should be largely ancillary and complementary in nature. As the UK Ministry of Defense puts it, the key British objective is, "to ensure that NATO and the defense dimension of the EU are mutually reinforcing."⁸⁰

British participation in the European security project is also a means of 'hedging its bets' against its possible future development, as the British are loathe to simply hand over European military leadership to the more proactively EU-oriented French. Particularly in the last decade, the British have significantly surpassed the French in military terms, largely on the basis on their greater defense spending, although recent budgetary increases in France have effectively eliminated the spending, if not the capability, gap.⁸¹ The UK is now keener on the ESDP as a means of increasing its power within the EU, balancing against possible French anti-NATO influence in EU security and defense matters, and enhancing its status in Washington by developing greater and more useful military capabilities that could be used within NATO.⁸² This is reason why Britain has been so favorable to the idea of Turkish membership in the EU: it sees Turkish inclusion as a way of ensuring that the Union will remain both largely oriented around economic integration as well as strongly Atlanticist in its foreign and security policy outlook.

In any event, the importance of British participation in the future development

79Laurent Cohen-Taguni, "The Outlook for CFSP after the Iraq War," *Fresh Perspectives on Europe's Security, New Defense Agenda*, from website, <http://www.forum-europe.com/publication/NDADigitalDiscussionPaper.pdf>.

80"Defense Policy 2001: Policy Priorities- National and European Security," from Ministry of Defense website, <http://www.mod.uk/issues/policy2001/priorities.htm>.

812004 Defense Spending: UK \$47.4 billion, France \$46.2 billion. From SIPRI Yearbook 2005,

Appendix 8A, from website, http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf.

82Posen, p.18.

of the EU ESDP cannot be overestimated. Britain is one of the only two EU-15 member states, along with France, which has significant global military capabilities, a nuclear arsenal, and in which public opinion remains relatively supportive of military action, due to its martial legacy as an imperial power.⁸³ While the success and credibility of any EU security and defense framework will be dependent on the active support and involvement of Europe's strongest military power, the British have complex motives and will doubtless continue to be prickly, difficult partners in the future.

France

France, on the other hand, has been the EU's most vocal and long standing supporter of the development of an independent European security and defense framework. France has traditionally championed a strongly 'Europeanist' approach to European security and defense matters that would minimize American and NATO leadership and leave more room for France to play a lead role. France effectively sidelined itself from playing such a role within NATO with President De Gaulle's decision to withdrawal from NATO's integrated command in 1966, and, ever since, France has looked to the development of an integrated European security and defense framework, outside of NATO, to exert greater influence. For France, the project of European integration serves two principal security functions: it lessens the possible threat of German resurgence by tying Germany more closely to the European order and fosters the development of the EU as a coherent balance to the current American hegemony.⁸⁴

With the end of the bipolar era of the Cold War, France no longer has room to maneuver in the face of American unipolarity. As the French see it, France is only capable of playing a role as an important power in a multipolar world system that prioritizes international law, multilateralism, and strong international bodies, such as the UN.⁸⁵ As President Chirac put it, "In an open world, no one can live in isolation, no one can act alone in the name of all, and no one can accept the anarchy of a society without rules. There is no alternative to the United Nations....Multilateralism is the

83Posen, p.1.

84Kirchner, p.47.

85Marcel H. van Herpen, "France: Champion of a Multipolar World," from website, <http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue19/vol2issue19vanherpen.html>.

key.”⁸⁶ The French particularly tend to emphasize the role of the UN, as the French Security Council seat, alongside its nuclear power status, remains one of the country's most potent trappings of its former Great Power status. For France, as a nation of middling capabilities with grand power ambitions, embracing multilateralism is an attempt to reign in and contain the power of the American *hyperpuissance* by subjecting it to international rules, norms, and procedures. However, as the ruckus over the Iraq War illustrated, this approach has its shortcomings, for the lack of UN approval did nothing to prevent the United States from going to war.

The French seek to restore multipolarity to the present system of American unipolar domination, and the development of 'Superpower Europe' though the EU is their means to that end. As Kupchan writes, “For France, the EU is more about amassing and projecting power, aggregating the Union's military and economic resources so that it can assert itself as a global player.”⁸⁷ While the individual European states, even the most powerful among them, are no longer capable of rivaling American hegemony on the global stage, the 25 member states of the EU acting together represent a formidable economic and (potential) military powerhouse. However, for Europe and France to have real influence in world affairs, the French firmly believe in the need to enhance European military capabilities: words must be backed up with means. France is thus a strong supporter of the ESDP and programs relating to joint military procurement, as they will allow the EU to develop its military capabilities more effectively and efficiently.

France was one of the original six members of what would become the EU, and French bureaucrats and statesmen, such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, played a crucial role in the development of the European project. France prioritized European integration in the 1950s and 60s, when it faced the loss of its colonial empire, as a means to reassert French power and international standing. While France, working in concert with an acquiescent Germany, was effectively able to run the project of European integration on its own terms for a number of years, expansion of the EU over time has led to a lessening of French power within the organization. While Germany remains the clear economic and industrial European power, France's leadership role in Europe has traditionally been based in part on its military power.⁸⁸ However, this

⁸⁶“Full text: Chirac UN speech,” 23 September, 2003, BBC News, from website, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3133902.stm>.

⁸⁷Kupchan, p.70.

⁸⁸Etienne de Durand, “French security policy under the new government,” The Brookings Institution US-France Analysis Series, November 2002, p.3.

power is waning. Rough Franco-British military parity has been overturned in the last decade as French defense spending waned, with the result that now, “Great Britain now sets the standard within Europe for military efficiency and deployability and is a standard of reference within French defense circles.”⁸⁹ The Chirac government has taken steps in the last several years to close the capability gap with increased defense spending under the *Loi de Programmation Militaire* (LPM).⁹⁰

While the French do not seek to replace NATO with the development of the ESDP, or at least not yet, they do seek a rebalancing in the transatlantic relationship on the basis of greater European leadership and capabilities.⁹¹ However, many in Europe, most especially the British, fear the French ultimately seek to replace NATO with a new European security and defense framework and remove the US from the Continent. This deep-seated distrust has led to a continuous jockeying for primacy between Britain and France in the battle to define the terms of the EU's ESDP. While the French and the British did come together in defense matters on a certain level with the St. Malo Declaration in 1998, the rift caused by the Iraq War seems to have made Franco-British cooperation a more tenuous process as of late, as it has made the two nations differing preferences explicit and visible.⁹²

Accordingly, France has sought to exclude Britain by looking to reconstitute the original six founding EU members around closer security integration under French leadership.⁹³ France held a 'mini-summit' in April 2003 with Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany to discuss, among other things, the creation of an independent EU planning and operations headquarters at Tervuren, in a seeming challenge to the planning structures of NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). While the proposal in and of itself is not earth-shattering, it remains politically important as a signal that there are those in Europe who seek to revive the idea of an independent European military at the expense of a NATO divided over the Iraq War.⁹⁴ As Champion notes, “it is an idea regarded in London and Washington as a small but symbolic step towards the rupturing of NATO,” to which the US ambassador to the NATO alliance has added, “‘Tervuren is a symbol of competition’ between the EU and

89De Durand, p.2.

90De Durand, p.1.

91Kirchner, p.47.

92De Durand, p.2.

93Julian Lindey-French, “State of the Union: France and UK are Destined to Compete,” *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, 18 September 2003.

94Annalisa Monaco, “NATO Looks at the Gang of Four's Proposal,” NATO Notes, Vol. 5, No.5, 28 May 2003. From ISIS website, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/download/nato%20gang4-%20nn%20v5n5.pdf>.

NATO.”⁹⁵ It is worth noting, however, that only four powers showed up to the 'mini-summit,' indicating a certain level of mistrust and opposition to French plans. In the end, while such French measures may advance security cooperation and integration between the 'Gang of Four,' they also run the long-term risk of further dividing the EU-25 by alienating 'Atlanticists' in the Union and rendering the establishment of a unified ESDP that much more difficult.

The French vision for the EU and the ESDP is one centered around conglomeration as a means to rectify Europe's waning power in the face of the vicissitudes of history. As Kupchan writes, “The EU is to do for Europe what the nation state is no longer strong enough to do for France.”⁹⁶ However, in an expanded EU-25, many of the new Eastern member states, with strong ties to the US and NATO, do not share France's vision of a 'Superpower Europe' in competition with America. Although France has recently tried to circumvent this by reconstituting 'core' Europe for security integration, the efforts have met with mixed success and a fair share of controversy. While French leadership has proved important in the development of the EU's ESDP as it stands today, it alone is no longer sufficient in the EU-25: France must learn to adapt itself, and its long-term goals, to the realities of the EU today.

Germany

Germany, for historical, political, and constitutional reasons, represents something of a unique case among the EU member states. Due to its military aggression in World Wars I and II, its period of rule by Hitler and the Nazi party, and its involvement in the greatest atrocity of the twentieth century, the Holocaust, Germany retains singular historical, moral, and emotional 'baggage'. It is the country that by all rights, as the world's third largest economy and the Continent's great industrial powerhouse, should be the dominant power in Europe, and, yet, it is also the country keenest to bind itself to the Western democratic community and prevent itself from ever again becoming a threat to regional stability.⁹⁷ With an eye to this end, the German Basic Law of 1949 expressly bans military aggression, stating, “Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to

⁹⁵Marc Champion, “Alliance- Blair, Chirac, and the Voters,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 14, 2003, p.A.1. Nick Burns, the US ambassador to NATO, quoted in same article.

⁹⁶Kupchan, p.70.

⁹⁷Thomas M. von Dubelndorf-Solenberger, “The Direction of German Security Policy in an Expanded NATO,” Speech delivered to the Atlantic Council of the US, September 1998, from website, <http://www.acus.org/publications/bulletins/nato/GermanSecurity.html>.

prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional.”⁹⁸ The two major pillars of German security policy since 1945 were about-face reactions to the lessons of pre-1945 German history: refraining from the use of military force and instinctive multilateralism.⁹⁹

Safeguarding Western Europe by tying Germany to its neighbors through a web of economic interdependency, especially in heavy industries linked to military production, was one of the primary motives for early European integration through the European Coal and Steel Community. But the ECSC was not simply an approach agreed upon in Paris and imposed on the Germans. The German Republic was effectively committed to a 'Europeanist' approach from its creation and, working in close collaboration with the French in the so-called 'Paris-Berlin axis,' Germany has been a primary driving force in the process of European integration up until the present. In fact, the idea that Germany should work towards European integration to enhance European stability is even included in the very foundational document of the modern German Republic, the Basic Law of 1949.¹⁰⁰ Thus, Germany played something of a unique role as both a motive and primary mover for European integration in the aftermath of WWII.

Due to the 'liberation' of Eastern Germany by the Soviet Red Army at the end of World War II, Germany was divided during the Cold War into the Communist-controlled East, the 'German Democratic Republic,' and the NATO-allied West, the 'Federal Republic of Germany.' During the Cold War, Germany was heavily reliant on NATO and American collective security guarantees, as it was on the front lines of the East-West showdown. As might be expected, Germany was one of NATO's staunchest supporters during the Cold War, happily hosting the largest American military force in Europe. Although, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, East and West Germany were formally reunited in October 1990, Germany was profoundly shaped by its past as the only EU-15 member state to have (partially) experienced Soviet rule during the Cold War. Germany has been strongly supportive of expanding both the NATO and EU to include the formerly Communist Warsaw Pact nations of Central and Eastern Europe, in the hopes of extending, “to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe the opportunity to achieve integration in the Western Alliance, thereby gaining the security and stability

⁹⁸Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 26, 1. From website, <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#23>.

⁹⁹Giegerich von Bastian, “Mugged by Reality: German Defense in Light of the 2003 Policy Guidelines,” Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, 12.10.2003, from website, www.diasonline.org.

¹⁰⁰Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 23, 1.

that supports political and economic development.”¹⁰¹

While it remains constitutionally hampered and militarily underdeveloped compared to its economic and industrial strength, Germany possesses Europe's third largest military and its involvement is crucial to the success and credibility of any project for European security and defense. At present levels, German annual defense spending amounts to only about seventy percent of Britain and France, and this disparity institutionalizes their capabilities gap.¹⁰² Germany, unlike Britain and France, is not nor wishes to be a nuclear power, it remains and will continue to remain dependent on the American 'nuclear umbrella' for protection for the foreseeable future. Despite this, however, in the aftermath of the Cold War and the end of the direct Soviet threat to its territorial integrity, Germany is beginning to take on a more active role in international affairs commensurate with its economic importance, evident, for example, in Chancellor Schröder's strong opposition to the Iraq War and the German bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Germany has quickly come to realize, however, that involvement in security matters is a necessary precursor to greater geopolitical clout.¹⁰³

German strategic military planning was re-evaluated in 2002 to prioritize international crisis management and make room for German participation in 'out of area' Petersberg task missions, as has been evident in German participation in operations ranging from SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina to ISAF in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁴ The 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines further transformed German security policy by stressing that the need for globally deployable rapid response units prepared for a full range of tasks (including 'high-intensity operations') was paramount to national security and should shape the capabilities and orientation of the German military.¹⁰⁵ In other words, Germany is effectively reshaping its military to suit the uncertainties of the post-Cold War world and the requirements of the Petersberg task missions envisioned by the EU. These strategic re-evaluations enabled German military capabilities to be used for foreign policy goals, not just territorial defense and deterrence, and has brought German security and defense policy more in line with the other EU major powers.

Germany's attitude towards questions of European security and defense has

101M. von Dubelndorf-Solenberger.

102Germany: \$33.9bn vs. UK \$47.4bn and France \$46.2bn in 2004. “The 15 Major Spenders in 2004,” from SIPRI Yearbook 2005.

103Von Bastian, p.2.

104Von Bastian, p.5-6.

105Von Bastian, p.9.

traditionally fallen somewhere in the middle of the British-French spectrum, favoring a stronger, more balanced, and more 'Europeanized' NATO and the development of an independent European military capability to work in cooperation, not competition, with NATO.¹⁰⁶ As Schröder said in 2004, “A strong NATO needs a strong European base. As such, we want to actively use and strengthen the strategic partnership that exists between NATO and the European Union.”¹⁰⁷ That being said, while Germany was one of the staunchest supporters of NATO during the Cold War, as of late, especially under the Social Democrats, it has drifted further from NATO. Germany, alongside EU featherweights Belgium and Luxembourg, has embraced the French concept of closer defense integration of 'core' EU countries, which, given France's significantly larger military capabilities, effectively means acquiescing to French military leadership in the project. This shift was evident in the German decision to join the French-led 'mini-defense summit' in Brussels in 2003.

Thus, while the German Republic is seeking to develop its military capabilities in line with the ESDP to contribute more to European security and defense and thereby play a greater geopolitical role more commensurate with its economic power, it is not as of yet playing a true leadership role in defining the European security and defense agenda. For the present it seems more comfortable tipping the UK-France leadership scales towards France and following the French lead in European security and defense integration. While this may have more to do with domestic budgetary constraints and a lack of desire to commit to the large defense spending increases that would be necessary to challenge French or British military leadership in Europe, the decision is not without consequences. As Boes writes, “If this is designed to escape from the overbearing power of the United States, it might turn out that Germany in fact has just exchanged one hegemony for the other.”¹⁰⁸

Italy

Italy is Europe's fourth largest military power and is the last EU member states that can be said to possess significant military capabilities. Italian Annual defense

¹⁰⁶Kirchner, p.48.

¹⁰⁷Speech by Chancellor Schroder at Opening of Federal College for Security Studies, 22.03.04, from German Embassy website, http://www.german-embassy.org.uk/speech_by_chancellor_schroder_.html.

¹⁰⁸Stefan A. Boes, “Germany, France, and the Difficulties of European Defense,” *Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de Weekly Digest*, 2005, from website, http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/digest/op-ed_05.php

spending of \$27.8bn in 2004 comprises some 13.5% of the total EU-25 spending on defense, compared to 23% for the UK, 22.5% for France, and 16.5% for Germany.¹⁰⁹ While it does not possess either power projection capabilities or a nuclear arsenal, Italy's military has proved itself to be capable of making significant contributions to European security and even initiating and leading independent missions, as it did in Operation Alba in Albania in the spring of 1997. Italian security policy since 1945 has been based on two pillars: the US as the guarantor of security and involvement in emerging European institutions.

During the Cold War, Italy, as a beneficiary of the American 'nuclear umbrella,' was a strong supporter of NATO and closely aligned to US positions of matters of defense and security policy.¹¹⁰ In the aftermath of the Cold War, with the rise of new security challenges, however, Italy, has begun to assert a more independent foreign and security policy based on addressing its national interests. Primary among these interests is enhancing cooperation between the EU, NATO, and the UN. As Croci puts it, "Italy's national security interest is no longer passively and vaguely defined by membership in these organizations but has come to be identified with the very pursuit of...policies that aim at reinforcing and functionally linking [them]."¹¹¹ Thus, for example, while Italy supports an increased NATO role in 'out of area' missions in crisis management and the like, it places significant importance on deriving legitimization for such missions from the UN.¹¹² However, preferences aside, this has not stopped Italy from participating in missions that lack UN approval, such as the NATO campaign in Kosovo or in post-conflict security in Iraq.

In the absence of the Soviet threat, Italy is now more focused on security challenges that may arise in its own neighborhood, principally from local and regional conflicts in the Balkans and North Africa, refugees and migration, and Middle Eastern terrorism. As Croci writes, "The Italian peninsula represents, in fact, the closest and most porous, and hence the favorite, point of access into Europe by political refugees and economic migrants as well as Islamic terrorists."¹¹³ While these are all challenges that effect Europe as a whole, they are ones that threaten Italy, due to its geography, much more directly. Consequently, Italy has explicitly supported the enhancement of

109Rough estimates based on totally EU-25 spending of \$205bn in 2004, total figure from Guy Anderson, "Discrepancy between US and ROW spending is highlighted agains," *Jane's Defense Industry*, June 07, 2005, from website, http://www.janes.com/regional_news/europe/news/jdi/jdi050607_1_n.shtml.

110Croci, p.1.

111Croci, p.3.

112Croci, p.10.

113Croci,p. 4.

the Mediterranean dimension of the EU's Neighborhood Policy, in line with the numerous potential security challenges for the EU which emanate from the region.¹¹⁴ Italy has also been a supporter of both EU and NATO expansion, but seeks to lessen the gap in membership between the two organizations through slower expansion in unison. Italy is concerned that eastward expansion will run the risk of shifting the center of gravity of the organizations north and eastwards, further away from Italy and the Southern Mediterranean region.

Italy has historically tended to be closer to the British pole of the European security spectrum and is generally moderately Atlanticist in outlook. The Berlusconi government has maintained a particularly strong pro-American stance and has been an important US ally, most notably, in the Iraq War, to which Italy contributed 2800 troops to post-conflict security. As Comelli notes, “in some important cases the Italian government and, in particular, the Prime Minister Berlusconi has preferred the relationship with the United States to other traditional European partners, such as France and Germany.”¹¹⁵ However, Italy has also been supportive of efforts to develop the EU's CFSP and ESDP, provided that they are clearly and completely designed to be complementary to the strengthening of NATO. Italy is opposed to any effort to develop the CFSP/ESDP as an alternative to NATO, due to, as Croci writes, “the fear that it might be excluded (as it has often happened) from a kind of French-English-German 'security directorate' that might be formed and take the lead in security matters, should ESDP ever emancipate from NATO.”¹¹⁶ NATO primacy remains a guarantee of Italian participation in major matters of European security and defense. Thus, while Italy is committed to the development of the CFSP/ESDP, it will only participate on its own terms to ensure that it is not a neo-Gaullist project to replace NATO in Europe and minimize Italy's voice.

Denmark

Denmark is an interesting and exceptional case within the EU in matters of security and defense. Although it is not a neutral state, and is a full member of NATO, Denmark has decided to opt-out of all EU defense matters, including the CFSP and the

¹¹⁴Michele Comelli, “CFSP Watch 2004- Italy,” p.2, from website, http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20WATCH%202004_Italy_2.pdf.

¹¹⁵Comelli, p.1.

¹¹⁶Oswaldo Croci, “Italian Security Policy in the 1990s,” Presentation at the 52nd Annual Conference of the UK Political Science Association, April 2002, p.14.

ESDP. Denmark was among the most devoted Atlanticists within NATO during the Cold War, and it continues to see NATO as the key and sole actor in maintaining collective defense guarantees in Europe. The Danish vision of the European Union is one based solely around economic integration, rejecting political and security and defense elements, and certainly without any aspirations of 'Superpower Europe.' The CFSP is perceived by many in Denmark as a policy driven by the major European power and characteristic of great power foreign policy, and, consequently, they want no part in it.¹¹⁷ Denmark has traditionally opposed the use of military force in foreign policy outside of national defense and peacekeeping, which should take place through either NATO or the UN. In recent years, however, Denmark has become increasingly comfortable with possible cooperation and participation with the EU in broader Petersberg task missions.¹¹⁸ For the foreseeable future, however, despite the potential for limited security cooperation with the EU in Petersberg tasks, Denmark will remain largely sidelined from European security and defense due to its opt-out.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands is a medium sized European state centrally located between the major European powers of France, Germany, and the UK, and, accordingly, it tends to favor multilateralism and the rule of law to protect its interests. Accordingly, it has been strongly favorable to the project of further European integration and was one of the original six founding members of the EU. The Dutch tend to fall somewhere in the middle of the European security spectrum, seeking to both expand the role of the EU in security, but not at the expense of the NATO Alliance. The Dutch have been strong proponents of developing the ESDP, which they see as a means to enhance the EU's contribution to transatlantic cooperation and bring more balance to the Alliance.¹¹⁹ The Dutch are engaged in a number of multinational cooperative military efforts within the EU, primarily working with the UK, Germany, and Belgium, most notably in the joint UK/NL Amphibious Landing Force.

However, as a nation with limited military resources, security policy in the Netherlands still relies primarily on its membership in NATO, which both provides a

¹¹⁷Henrik Larsen, "Denmark and the EU's defense dimension: Opt-out across the board?," from website, <http://www.ecsa.dk/larsen.pdf>

¹¹⁸Larsen, p.5.

¹¹⁹The Netherlands Ministry of Defense, "Facts and figures on Dutch security policy and armed forces," MOD Office of Information, July 2004, p.9.

defense guarantee and ensures Dutch participation in security and defense decisions. Over security and defense, as well as economic, matters, the Dutch have found themselves increasing in opposition to the EU in recent years¹²⁰, and the Dutch reacted in horror to the 'mini-defense summit' in Brussels in 2003, whose proposals provoked the Foreign Minister to declare that he, “cannot imagine a world order built against the United States.”¹²¹ While the Netherlands favors the further development of the ESDP, it seeks to do so to restore more parity to the Alliance, not undermine it.

Belgium and Luxembourg

Belgium and Luxembourg are both original founding members of the EU and close to the French in their strong 'Europeanist' outlook. Furthermore, both nations host major EU institutions within their borders. As they are small states with extremely limited military capabilities located in the center of Europe between the major European powers of France and Germany, they seek to ensure their security through EU multilateralism and peaceful integration. This orientation extends to the EU's CFSP and ESDP, which they both strongly support and where both nations have tended to follow the French lead. Both countries participated in the 'mini-defense summit' with France and Germany in Brussels in 2003 and have pushed for closer European security and defense integration. That being said, while Belgium's military is small, Luxembourg's is virtually non-existent, and they will add little, if anything, to overall EU capabilities. While both countries are generally supportive of NATO and the transatlantic partnership, they don't believe that it should impede the development of the ESDP or imply any degree of US dominance of their foreign and security policy.¹²² Despite their strong 'Europeanist' support for the CFSP/ESDP, neither one of these countries will have much impact on the overall tenor of the debate on European security and defense.

The 'Neutral' States: Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland

From its rebirth as an independent and sovereign Republic in 1955, following a period of occupation by the Allied Powers at the end of WWII, permanent neutrality

¹²⁰This trend has culminated recently in the Dutch electorate's 'Nee' to the EU Constitution.

¹²¹“Undermining NATO?,” *The Economist*, May 1, 2003.

¹²²Galia Glume, “CFSP Watch 2004 - Belgium,” p. 5, from Fonet website,
<http://www.fonet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Belgium.pdf>.

has formed the cornerstone of Austrian foreign policy, although this has been revised somewhat in recent years. Austria began cooperating with NATO in 1995, through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and has left the door open to possible future full NATO membership. Austria also strongly supports both NATO enlargement in its own region of Central and Eastern Europe and continued EU-NATO close cooperation. Moreover, with the Constitutional reforms of 1998, Austrian security policy has shifted from a focus on autonomous national security to one of “European solidarity.”¹²³ This means that Austria is now legally able contribute to Petersberg tasks in crisis prevention and management in support of the CFSP and ESDP, and it has in fact done so in all EU crisis management missions in Bosnia, the DRC, and FYROM. The Austrian government is supportive of efforts to further develop common European security and defense.¹²⁴ Austria seems to have accommodated its constitutional neutrality to allow it to participate in the EU's ESDP and CFSP and it should prove a useful, if smallish, contributor to Union security efforts.

Due to its geographical proximity, Finland fell into the Soviet orbit during the Cold War and was pressured into signing the 1948 Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the USSR, which stipulated that Finland was obliged to militarily oppose any attack on itself or the USSR by Germany and her allies. During the Cold War, Finland, always mindful of the Soviet threat lingering next door, was committed to a policy of strict neutrality. Finland abolished its policy of neutrality in the aftermath of the Cold War and has instead shifted to a policy of military non-alliance and self-sufficient national defense.¹²⁵ Although it is not a member of NATO, in the post-Cold War era Finland has cooperated with NATO through the PfP program and leaves the possibility of future membership on the table. Since joining the EU in 1995, Finland has had reservations about the development of the CFSP/ESDP, as it favors a broad consensus on security and defense matters involving all member states, not just the 'core' states or major powers.¹²⁶ Furthermore, any CFSP/ESDP framework that the EU develops must be manageable within the confines of Finnish policy of military non-alignment. That being said, Finland is keen to cooperate with the EU on matters related to crisis prevention and management, and,

123Dieter Farwick, “Interview with Austrian MoD Guenther Platter,” *The Washington Times*, Courtesy of UPI, May 29, 2005.

124David Rezac, “CFSP Watch 2004 Austria,” from Fonet website, <http://fonet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Austria.pdf>.

125Jaako Blomberg, “Finland's Evolving Security Policy,” *NATO Review*, April 22, 2002, from website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9301-3.htm>.

126Jukka-Pekka Strand, “CFSP Watch- 2004- Finland,” From Fonet website, <http://fonet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Finland.pdf>.

on the whole, despite its restrictions, Finland should be able to make some sort of contribution to the Union's security efforts.

Sweden, much like Finland, maintained a neutral stance during the Cold War, due to its relative geographical proximity to the Soviet Union. While Sweden still maintains a policy of non-participation in military alliances, it modified its stance somewhat in 2002 by authorizing cooperation with other states against threats to peace and security. Unlike some of the other neutral or non-aligned states, Sweden has a relatively high level of defense spending and has notable military capabilities. Although they have begun cooperating with NATO in recent years through the PfP program, the Swedes believe that NATO will become less important for them as the EU develops its security dimension.¹²⁷ Accordingly, Sweden actively supports the development of the CFSP/ESDP, and has a particular desire to see the EU take on a greater global role in international crisis prevention and management, working either independently or in conjunction with NATO.¹²⁸ Sweden sees effective and productive multilateral cooperation in this area as central to its security policy. While maintaining its policy of non-participation in alliances, Sweden strongly supports the development of the ESDP/CFSP, which will allow the EU to play a bigger role in resolving contemporary global challenges.

Since its independence from the UK in 1922, Ireland has maintained a policy of 'neutrality' in name, which is, in truth, guided more by the idea of non-participation in alliances. Ireland supports the development of the ESDP/CFSP with caveats and may participate in their military operations if the so-called 'triple lock'- the government, the parliament, and the UNSC- authorize the action.¹²⁹ However, Irish participation is also bounded by its relatively small military capabilities. Although Ireland has begun to cooperate recently with NATO through the PfP program, this remains controversial among much of the Irish public and Irish NATO membership seems highly unlikely for the present. Further, the Irish do not seek to develop the EU as a counterbalance to the US, as Ireland has strong ties to America and the Irish public finds playing international 'power politics' of this sort distasteful.¹³⁰ However, through the process of 'Europeanization,' Irish policy-makers have started to view security, defense, and

127Gunilla Herolf, "CFSP Watch 2004 Sweden," p.3-4, from Fonet website, <http://fonet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Sweden.pdf>.

128Swedish Defense Commission, "Swedish Security in Light of International Change," February 1998, p.4-6.

129"O'Dea reaffirms Ireland's commitment to Triple Lock," October 21, 2004. From Fianna Fail website, <http://www.willieodea.ie/natnews.asp?StoryID=294>.

130Campbell and Tonra, p.6.

foreign policy issues in a broader European context and they seek to address international security issues primarily through conflict resolution, including peacekeeping, and development cooperation.¹³¹ Provided that the 'triple lock' supports a given operation, Irish 'neutrality' seems compatible with involvement in the CFSP/ESDP and Ireland can make some sort of a contribution to European security through this framework.

The Mediterranean States: Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus

Greece, an EU member since 1981, is one of the leading 'Europeanist' proponents of further EU integration, and it is especially supportive of efforts to develop both the CFSP and the ESDP. Greece, like Spain and Portugal, as one of the later, poorer members to join the EU, has been a major beneficiary of EU Structural Funds, which have helped boost Greek economic development, as well as Greek public support for the EU. Despite its status as something of a middleweight European nation, Greece maintains comparatively high levels of defense spending for an EU member state, largely due to its perception of regional threats. To the north of Greece are a number of former Communist states that have had significant periods of instability in the post-Cold War period (Albania, FYROM, etc). More importantly, perhaps, is Greece's continuous 'on again, off again' tension with its much larger eastern neighbor, Turkey, over issues ranging from national minorities and Cyprus to claims over Aegean islands.

Despite fifty years of membership in NATO, Greece, and particularly Greek public opinion, remains wary of NATO, and the Iraq War did nothing but exacerbate this feeling. Further, the Greeks favor closer EU defense integration and a more European forum for addressing security and defense matters within the EU.¹³² The Greek government is supportive of Petersberg tasks and crisis management operations, but believes that the EU should focus these efforts closer to home, especially in the Balkan, Caucasus, and Mediterranean regions on Europe's (and Greece's) periphery.¹³³ While Greece is not a major military player within the EU, its strong support for the CFSP and the ESDP and its focus on furthering defense integration ensure that it will

131 Yvonne Campbell and Ben Tonra, "CFSP Watch 2003 Ireland," p.2, from Fonet website, <http://www.fonet.info/CFSPannualreports/IRELAND%202003.pdf>.

132 Nikos Frangakis, et al., "CFSP Watch 2004 Greece," p.4, from Fonet website, <http://fonet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Greece.pdf>.

133 Frangakis, p.12.

certainly have a role to play in the future of European security.

Following the death of its long-time military dictator, General Franco, in 1975, Spain moved rapidly to rejoin Western Europe, becoming a member of NATO in 1982 and of the EU in 1986. While not one of the major European military powers, Spain possesses the EU's fifth most capable military and can be considered as a significant secondary military actor in Europe. Spain has traditionally been strongly in favor of European integration, as EU Structural Funds have helped the country develop economically over the past twenty years. Spain, regardless of which government is in power, has also traditionally been quite supportive of the efforts to develop both the ESDP and the CFSP and seeks to turn them into a real, tangible European defense policy. At the same time, however, Spain remains somewhat wary of always playing 'second string' to the larger EU powers and favors developing European foreign and security policy in such a way that Spain can play a greater, and possibly even a leading, role.¹³⁴ Prior to 1996, Spain had a generally Europeanist outlook in foreign policy and had primarily worked in conjunction with the EU's driving Franco-German axis.

However, with the election of Jose Maria Aznar and his center-right People's Party in 1996, Spain's foreign policy outlook took a decided shift towards the Atlantic. Aznar quickly reoriented Spanish foreign policy along much more Atlanticist lines, shifting away from the Paris-Berlin axis and towards Britain, the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe, and, most of all, the United States. In his two terms, Aznar moved to establish a privileged bilateral relationship with the US, cultivated a more distant attitude towards the EU and integration, focused on the fight against terrorism, and, most controversially, provided support to the US War in Iraq.¹³⁵ However, everything shifted yet again in 2004, with the victory of the Socialist Party and Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, which saw a 'return to Europe' and a re-embrace of the Franco-German axis in foreign policy. Zapatero also immediately withdrew Spanish forces from Iraq and re-prioritized the EU as Spain's major foreign policy focus.¹³⁶ Thus, for the present at least, it seems as though Spain has again turned its focus back to Europe and is on track to make a significant contribution to European security.

As a small state on the periphery of the European Continent, Portugal has traditionally been very supportive of the project of European integration, including, as of late, the areas of common security, defense, and foreign policy. While the

134Esther Barbe and Laia Mestres, "CFSP Watch 2004 Spain," p.6, from Fonet website, <http://fonet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%202004%20Spain.pdf>.

135Barbe and Mestres, p.1.

136Barbe and Mestres, p.2-3.

Portuguese government was originally against the creation of a European security and defense dimension, the operationalization of the 'Berlin-plus' arrangement in the mid 1990s resulted in a framework which allows the Portuguese government to support European security development without competing with NATO.¹³⁷ The CFSP and ESDP serve Portuguese interests by increasing the international importance of Portuguese foreign policy and diplomacy and by addressing many of the key Portuguese foreign policy concerns in its areas of interest, such as Latin America, the Mediterranean, East Timor, and Africa.¹³⁸ Portugal is moderately Atlanticist in that, while it supports the ESDP, it seeks to develop it complementarity to NATO and to preserve the transatlantic ties. In this vein, the Portuguese government offered political support for the US War in Iraq not out of any particular conviction but to ensure strong long-term US ties to European security.¹³⁹ Portugal is somewhat opposed to further expansion of the EU as it runs the risk of lessening the voice that small states, such as Portugal, have within the Union. Portugal seeks a middle of the road Atlanticist strategy to maximize its foreign and security policy influence within the EU through the CFSP and ESDP, while maintaining its voice, and transatlantic security guarantees, with NATO.

The Republic of Cyprus, one of the ten candidate countries which accessed to the EU in May of 2004, is not a member of NATO and has traditionally maintained a non-aligned foreign policy, as well as close ties with its fellow Greeks in Greece. Due to its location in the eastern Mediterranean and its proximity to the Middle East, Cyprus has a strong interest in seeing the EU renew the Barcelona process and take on a greater role in Middle Eastern affairs. While it is a strong supporter of the CFSP-ESDP process and of the Union taking on a larger role in international affairs, Cyprus, as a small state, is also keen to ensure that the EU will ensure the equal participation of all members states, big and small, as the CFSP-ESDP develops.¹⁴⁰ Most significantly, of course, since 1974, Cyprus has experienced an ongoing territorial dispute with Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which occupies roughly the northern third of the island. Despite decades of negotiations and numerous referendums and proposed solutions, the dispute has not been resolved and only the Republic of Cyprus portion of the still-divided island of Cyprus was admitted to the EU as a member state in 2004.

137Pedro Courela, "CFSP Watch 2003 Portugal," p.3, from Fonet website,
<http://www.fonet.info/CFSPannualreports/PORTUGAL%202003.pdf>.

138Courela, p.1.

139Courela, p.2.

140Costas Melakopides, "CFSP Watch 2004 Cyprus," p.1, from Fonet website,
<http://www.fonet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Cyprus.pdf>.

However, in order to placate Turkish fears about its exclusion from the EU's security arrangements, an agreement on asset-sharing was reached between NATO and the EU in Copenhagen in December of 2002 which excludes Cyprus from participation in EU-led operations that make use of NATO assets. Somewhat understandably, Cyprus, despite its minimal military capabilities, has been nevertheless somewhat resentful of this exclusion. Due to this situation, the Cypriot contribution to the EU's ESDP will remain modest at best.

The Former Warsaw Pact States

Despite their cultural, geographical, economic, and political differences, the eight former Warsaw Pact Central and Eastern European states,¹⁴¹ that joined the EU in May of 2004 are a remarkably homogeneous lot when it comes to their security and defense policy preferences. At the time of their accession to the EU, all eight were members of NATO, with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland having joined in May of 1999 and the other five, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, in March of 2004. Having suffered through decades of Russian domination (with the exception of Slovenia, which, as part of Yugoslavia, was non-aligned with Moscow), all eight states are highly Atlanticist in outlook and strongly supportive of close ties to both NATO and the United States.¹⁴² NATO membership and its Article V guarantee of collective defense remains the cornerstone of security policy for all eight. The former Communist states are all committed to the long-term maintenance of an American security role in Europe as a balance against threats from a resurgent Russia. On the basis of their experience of occupation during the Cold War, this is a threat that they feel the EU naively underestimates.¹⁴³

While they have all more or less come around to the idea of the ESDP and a greater European dimension to their security policies, they are nonetheless vigorous in their insistence that it should neither duplicate NATO assets nor try to 'balance' against US hegemony. These states see the role of the ESDP as a value-adding complement to NATO that will be largely concerned with Petersberg tasks in situations where NATO

141N.B. Slovenia actually wasn't a member of the Warsaw Pact, as the former Yugoslavia, under Tito, was non-aligned with Moscow. However, for the sake of convenience, I'm simply going to call them the eight former Warsaw Pact states.

142Antonio Missiroli, "Occasional Papers No. 34: Bigger EU, Wider CFSP, Stronger ESDP?," April 2002, EU ISS, p.61-62.

143Radek Kohl, "CFSP Watch Czech Republic 2004," p.6, from Fonet website, <http://fonet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Czech%20Republic.pdf>.

itself is not involved. In envisioning these Petersberg crisis management situations, the eight, however, have a more localized geographical role in mind, with a focus on Eastern Europe (especially Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova), the Caucasus, and the Balkans.¹⁴⁴ Thus, while the eight former Warsaw Pact members have now mostly come around to supporting the idea of developing the ESDP as an independent European security capability, they will only do so on their own strictly Atlanticist and pro-NATO terms. These new eight member states are opinionated and numerous, and their accession may well represent a major turning point in the ongoing debate over European security within the EU.

The Debate Over the Iraq War

The lead-up to the War in Iraq in 2003 was a rather traumatic time for those who have sought to develop an 'ever closer' foreign and security policy consensus in the EU, as the fierce divide between those who supported and those who opposed the US-led war presented a stiff challenge to European unity. However, as it also made the different EU member states and then-candidate country's security preferences explicit and visible, it is worth taking a closer look at the debate to gain a better understanding of the underlying rift in Europe over matters of security policy.

In the diplomatic battle which raged in the United Nations, the US, and the EU, sharp battle lines were drawn between the Union's more Atlanticist and Europeanist members. Interestingly also, the Iraq War revealed a potential new shift in the balance within the EU with strong future consequences, as all of the then-soon-to-join Central and Eastern European candidate countries sided with the US over the War.

However, at the end of the day, as usual, it primarily came down to a struggle between the EU's two major diplomatic and military powers, Britain and France. As *The Economist* writes, "This is as much a crisis within Europe as it is between Europe and the U.S.," says Timothy Garton Ash, a professor of history at St. Antony's College, Oxford. "There is a struggle going on for Europe's soul between Atlanticists and Gaullists."¹⁴⁵ In the lead-up to the War, Britain remained closely allied to the American efforts, attempting to influence US policy through its strong support and by acting as a sort of intermediary between the US and Europe. It helped to convince the US to take its case to the United Nations, in a bid to obtain the sanction of the Security Council

¹⁴⁴Kohl, p.5.

¹⁴⁵*The Economist*, "Uncommon Disarray; Europe's foreign policy," February 22, 2003, Vol.366, No.8312, p.15.

before going to war, and when that failed, despite domestic public opinion opposition to the war, Tony Blair committed the largest non-American contingent to the US-led coalition in the Iraq War.

In supporting the US policy on Iraq, Britain lined up alongside the other NATO member signatories of the so-called 'Letter of Eight,' including Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. Not to be outdone, the Central and Eastern European nations responded with their own 'Letter of Ten,' with Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia also signaling their support for US policy. US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, famously replied to a reporter's question during a press conference about European opposition to the War in Iraq by stating, "'You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe.'" He then went on to add that those countries enumerated above, which had all actively supported the US War in Iraq, were in fact, "New Europe."¹⁴⁶ Whether it was an intentional slight or simply more of a *lapsus lingua*, Rumsfeld had drawn a new line in the sand across the Continent between those that the US saw as trusted allies and worthwhile partners, and those that it saw as nothing more than trifling obstructionists intent on opposing American leadership.

In the struggle over the Iraq War, France, as *The Economist* explains, "has tried to use the U.N. as a means to restrain America's freedom to act as it wishes. It has tried, too, to unite Europe as a counterbalance to U.S. power."¹⁴⁷ In its bid to curb the American effort in the UNSC, France fostered a new Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis to act as a sort of multipolar troika in balancing the American hegemony. As *The Economist* put it, "[Chirac] undoubtedly sees Russia as one of those poles, a point that became evident during the Iraq crisis, when French, German, and Russian leaders staged joint press conferences to oppose the war."¹⁴⁸ This new troika also served to confirm the worst American fears about the ultimate goals of the EU's CFSP-ESDP project as a thinly veiled effort to compete with the US across the spectrum and oppose American and NATO leadership.¹⁴⁹ Further, French President Jacques Chirac voiced his displeasure over the potential within the EU for increased future support for the US when he told a number of the Central and Eastern European EU candidate countries which voiced strong support for the US-led War in Iraq that they, "had missed a good

146"Old Europe' hits back at Rumsfeld, January 24, 2003, from CNN.com website, [www.cnn.com.
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/01/24/france.germany.rumsfeld/index.html](http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/01/24/france.germany.rumsfeld/index.html).

147"Uncommon Disarray, Europe's foreign policy."

148*The Economist*, "Charlemagne: Taking on the bear," May 7th, 2005, p.31.

149Cohen-Tanguni, p.14.

opportunity to shut up.”¹⁵⁰ He further scolded them, adding that they, “ have been not very well behaved and rather reckless of the danger of aligning themselves too rapidly with the American position.”¹⁵¹

Absurd as these comments may seem, they reflect the growing unease of the EU's Europeanists, who have traditionally steered the European project, with an EU that has grown beyond their ability to control. This feeling was particularly acute for Europeanists in an EU about to expand to 25 members, rendering the already tenuous balance between Atlanticists and Europeanists within the Union ever more precarious. Furthermore, another indication of the extent of Atlanticist-Europeanist rift in Europe was on display when, as one of the first measures undertaken after he won office in 2004 from Jose Maria Aznar, Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero removed his country's troops from Iraq, thereby underscoring his administrations shift away from an Atlanticist and towards a more Europeanist approach in foreign policy. For better or for worse, the rift within Europe over the Iraq War has taken on a symbolic value that transcends the debate over the merits of the War itself, as it serves as yet another battle in the ongoing struggle for Europe's political orientation in world affairs.

As the sections above have duly illustrated, the ongoing debate over European security within the EU is a complex and challenging one because it serves as a catalytic point of contention between states with fundamentally different visions for Europe. The battle rages on, as ever, between those polar opposites of Europe, the Atlanticist British and the Europeanist French, with the rest of Europe stuck closer, further, or just somewhere in the middle. While the driving leadership of the Franco-Germany axis has been able to accomplish much in the past, the recent tumult over the Iraq War revealed the underlying fault lines that still divide the EU. As Quaisser and Wood recently pointed out, one of the biggest threats to the EU in its bid to take on a global role, “may be its tendency to fracture over big foreign- policy issues, creating paralysis. That happened when Yugoslavia disintegrated into war in the 1990s and again over the U.S.- led invasion of Iraq in 2003.”¹⁵²

Furthermore, with the EU's eastern expansion in 2004, and the accession of eight strongly Atlanticist and pro-NATO nations, the debate has become all the further complicated. Whether these new member states will become Europeanized over time

150 William Horsley, “Analysis: Eastern Europe reborn,” April 26, 2004, from BBCNews website, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3231199.stm>.

151 “Chirac lashes out at 'new Europe,’” February 18, 2003, from CNN.com website, <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac/index.html>.

152 Wolfgang Quaisser and Steve Wood, *Intereconomics*, Nov/Dec 2004, Vol.39, Issue 6, p.297.

and shift their security and defense loyalties from the United States to the EU, or not, is something that remains to be seen. Regardless of the outcome, however, the eastward expansion of the EU will have profound and lasting consequences for the Union and its emerging project in security and defense. While the battles royale that rage in Europe over security and defense are complex and confusing, they are certainly never boring to observe. The fate of the world may no longer hang in the balance of Europe's struggles as it once did, but the outcome will certainly reverberate far beyond the shores of Europe.

CHAPTER 4: TURKEY'S POTENTIAL ROLE IN THE EU'S ESDP

This chapter will provide an overview of the potential impact of Turkish accession on the EU's 'hard' security power capabilities. This will entail a consideration of both the security costs and benefits of Turkish inclusion in the ESDP. It will place Turkey in the context of the post-Cold War debate on European security and highlight the challenges involved in the transition from the WEU to the ESDP, as well as the complex bargaining process over the question of NATO-EU asset sharing. Analyzing Turkey's security contributions, with an emphasis on Turkey's Cold War-era contribution to European security in NATO, its geostrategically important position, and its significant military capabilities, the section will also point out the possible future security challenges implicit in Turkish inclusion. Principally, however, the chapter will make the argument that, with the development of the ESDP concept and the EU's efforts to bridge the gap between its role as an economic 'giant' and a political 'dwarf',¹⁵³ Europe has gradually begun to appreciate the strategic contribution of Turkey once again. Finally, it will end by concluding that the Turkey would provide a number of important contributions to the power capabilities of the EU's emerging ESDP framework, although, at the same time, it would also entail significant new risks and challenges for European security.

While it is worth pausing to note that the EU has placed an increasingly important emphasis on its role as a multifaceted security and foreign policy actor, and particularly on its 'soft' security focus, this paper will treat the question of the impact of Turkish inclusion on the ESDP through a more 'hard' security lens, with a focus on the EU's crude power capabilities. The distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' security is an important one, especially as of late, and it is difficult to truly separate the two often interlinked concepts; nonetheless, this paper will instead focus more on crude capacities. While the 'hard' security provided by hegemonic US dominance in the current unipolar system has made it possible for the EU to focus on 'soft' security issues and approaches, the direction the EU has moved, as outlined in Chapter 2, to take on a larger and more active role in global affairs and security will most likely mean that the EU's role as a more traditional 'hard' security actor will become increasingly important in the future. It is in light of this that this paper will emphasize the impact of Turkish accession on the EU's 'hard' security power capabilities through the ESDP.

¹⁵³Cayhan, p.35.

Due to its geostrategically significant location at the crossroads between continents, Turkey has long played a crucial role in European security and defense. Well before the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, was integral in the balancing of Great Power alliances on the European Continent during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Beginning in 19th century, the Ottoman Empire can effectively be considered as an integrated part of the European order, participating in European security constructions from the Concert of Europe in 1815 through to its alliance with the Central Powers in the First World War.¹⁵⁴ With the foundation of the Republic in 1923, however, Turkey withdrew somewhat from the European security arena by pursuing a foreign policy of status quo and non-irredentism to focus its energies instead on the domestic tasks of rebuilding the nation and enacting the Kemalist project. However, the European security realignment at the end of the Second World War provided a window of opportunity for Turkey to take on a more active role in European affairs by expanding its security cooperation with the West.

Prompted by the threat of a resurgent and expansionary Soviet Union to its east, the Turkish Republic strengthened its ties to Western European security by joining NATO in 1952 as a full member. Turkey further solidified its ties to Europe by becoming a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 and the Council of Europe in 1949. Through the OEEC, Turkey received Marshall Plan money from the American government to bolster its economic development and help contain the spread of Communism in the region. Further, Turkey became an associate member to the European Economic Community (EEC), predecessor of today's European Union, under the Ankara Agreement in 1963. The Agreement was designed to tie Turkey closer to Western Europe by fostering trade and economic interdependency, the establishment of a customs union several years later, and the ultimate goal in mind of full Turkish membership in the EEC down the road. As Walter Hallstein, the EEC's then Commission President, said at the time, "One day the final step will be taken, and Turkey will become a full member of the European Economic Community."¹⁵⁵ Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey joined the reactivated Western European Union (WEU) as an associate member in 1992, to both take part in the emerging dialogue on the development of an ESDI and ensure its

154Meltem Müftüleri-Baç, *Europe in Change: Turkey's relations with a changing Europe*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p.15.

155Tobias Knahl, "Turkey: The long road to EU accession," Handelskammer Hamburg, 5/11/2003, from website, http://www.hk24.de/HK24/HK24/produktmarken/index.jsp?url=http%3A//www.hk24.de/HK24/HK24/servicemarken/ueber_uns/hamburger_wirtschaft/englische_artikel/Turkey.jsp.

involvement in all aspects of European security cooperation.

Turkish-European relations were shaped by the context of the Cold War era and the need for a strong, unified NATO to deter the threat of Soviet and Warsaw Pact expansionism from the east. To solidify the Western Alliance and NATO's collective strategic security framework, Turkey was increasingly both institutionally and economically linked to the West through military and economic aid, trade, and its associate membership in the developing EEC. According to this logic, the military alliance would be stronger, closer, and more long lasting if it could expand its basis from shared security concerns and perceived national security interests to more permanent patterns of trade economic interdependency, and mutual benefit. This is in a sense the same logic that inspired Jean Monnet to propose the ECSC as a way of preventing future wars on the European Continent: unity through shared economy. Turkey's Cold War-era strategic value and subsequent incorporation in NATO made the country part of the West's mental conception of 'Europe' to a greater extent than it had been before. While the decision to incorporate Turkey into the Atlantic Alliance probably had more to do with the necessities of Cold War security than identity politics, inclusion in NATO took on a greater symbolic value in Turkey as a sort of vindication of the Westernization project of its national founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.¹⁵⁶

This should by no means understate the contributions that Turkey made to Cold War European security and defense, however, as the country played a key role on the front lines of the Western Alliance as NATO's southern flank. With the second largest military in NATO and the largest military on the European Continent, Turkey significantly aided in Western deterrence of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Most important of all, however, was Turkey's geostrategic position, which was the country's most vital Cold War-era contribution to the NATO Alliance. As the guardian of the passage between the largely Soviet Black Sea and the wider Mediterranean, Turkey gave NATO a strong southern flank and blocked the USSR from advancing into the oil-rich Middle East. Turkey's Cold War contribution to European and Western security and defense cannot be underestimated: it was the basis on which, despite its location on Europe's periphery, the country was widely accepted into Europe and became a part of the European order.

With the end of the Cold War, the European security sphere underwent a period

¹⁵⁶Alan Makovsky, "Turkey's Faded European Dream," *Conference Report: The Parameters of the Partnership: Germany, the US, and Turkey*, October 1997, Johns Hopkins University, p.66, from AICGS website, <http://www.aicgs.org/Publications/PDF/turkey1.pdf>.

of significant transformation. This was particularly acute in the case of Turkey, which saw the number of states on its borders increase by 50 percent in two years- 1991 and 1992- alone.¹⁵⁷ The rise of these new states in place of the Soviet threat on its eastern border presented Turkey with important new foreign and security policy challenges and opportunities. While the basic tenets of Turkish foreign policy since the foundation of the Republic in 1923 have been 'peace at home, peace abroad' and a commitment to both regional stability and the status quo¹⁵⁸, the developments of the post-Cold War era both made it possible and necessary for Turkey to pursue a more active foreign policy. Turkey has begun to balance its Cold War era orientation towards the US and Western Europe with a greater regional role in the Balkans, Mediterranean, Caucasus, Middle East, and Central Asia. Although the orientation of Turkish foreign policy still remains the preservation of regional stability to ensure domestic security, the profound transformation of the region forced Turkey to adapt its policy to a new and different post-Cold War status quo. Rubin sees this shift as a fundamental realignment for Turkey and the harbinger of a new 'post-Ataturkist' period in Turkish foreign and security policy.¹⁵⁹

However, as European security has undergone significant transformation in the post-Cold War era, Turkey has been marginalized to a certain extent from both the project of European integration and the new European security arrangements operationalized through the EU. In the absence of the Soviet threat, Turkey was seen as more of a security 'consumer' than the key European security 'producer' it had been.¹⁶⁰ Accordingly, Turkey's European identity and inclusion in the European order were sharply questioned. As a EU non-member state, Turkey has a limited ability to influence security and defense developments that seem to be increasingly taking place exclusively through an EU framework. While recent back and forth negotiations with the US and the EU have given Turkey a more prominent role in the EU's security and defense dialogue, the country has still seen its level of guaranteed involvement in European security diminish from the arrangements it enjoyed through its associate membership in the WEU in the mid to late 1990s. Although Turkey is simply too big

157Şule Kat, "The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s," *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds.), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p.5.

158Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Synopsis of Turkish Foreign Policy," p.1, from www.mfa.gov.tr.

159Barry Rubin, "Turkey: A Transformed International Role," in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, p.3.

160Pinar Bilgin, "Turkey and the EU: Yesterday's Answers to Tomorrow's Security Problems?," EU Civilian Crisis Management Conflict Studies Research Centre, p. 38.

and too important to European security and defense to ignore entirely, it remains for the present somewhat peripheral to the EU's security and defense agenda.

Turkey had a clear role to play in European security during the Cold War, as an integral member of the NATO Alliance and a key ally in the Western camp of the bipolar political system. Turkish contributions to Western security gave Turkey a place in the European order and made it a part of Europe. However, the end of the Cold War brought about a dramatic change, as half the bipolar world fell apart, leaving only American hegemonic unipolarity. In this 'new world order,' Turkey's membership in NATO was no longer sufficient to ensure its perceived European identity, and Turkey became seen as an outsider on the periphery of the EU's European integration project. In the post-Cold War world, Turkey no longer had a clear cut role in European security, and consequently, it no longer had a clear cut role in Europe itself. It remained something of a vestige of the Cold War that Europe would neither explicitly embrace nor totally reject, and it was merely left standing on the sidelines.

While Turkey's acceptance as an official EU candidate country in December of 1999 has helped somewhat ease its sense of divorce from European affairs in the post-Cold War era, it has not entirely eliminated the sentiment. Despite the EU's claims that this shift is merely the result of its ongoing institutional reorganization, and not indicative of any EU anti-Turkish discrimination, Ankara remains unconvinced. Although Turkey's value as an ally in security and defense matters has increased in the post 9-11 world, its status within the emerging European framework has not yet fully reflected this. In the end, it remains to be seen whether Turkey's recent candidacy in the European Union is merely a result of American and Turkish pressure or of a more significant re-evaluation of Turkey's strategic importance on the part of the EU. While Turkey would bring to the European table security and defense assets that are undeniable, at the same time, the country's unique situation and geography is not without its own complications and the potential for new and uncertain challenges to the European security and defense project.

Turkey and the Development of the ESDP in Post-Cold War Europe

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkey found itself marginalized from a security and defense dialogue in Europe that was increasingly focused on closer integration through the European Union. As the first chapter illustrated, the post-Cold War era has been marked by the development of the ESDI/ESDP concept, which has

evolved in the past decade and a half from an effort to strengthen the European pillar of NATO to the creation of a institutionally distinct European security and defense entity outside of NATO. With the incorporation of the WEU into the EU following the Treaty of Amsterdam and the changes in the status of WEU associate membership for non-EU member states, Turkey has been left without a voice in the process of European security and defense integration at the exact time when the process is increasingly institutionally and operationally autonomous from NATO. Given its proximity to the very unstable regions where the EU would be likely to be involved, Turkey sees its active involvement in shaping European security arrangement as a vital national interest. But, as a continuing candidate for EU membership, Turkey has been effectively excluded from the arena of European security decision-making within the EU.

From the onset of the post-Cold War dialogue on European security, Turkey was supportive of the idea of strengthening the European pillar of NATO through the development of an ESDI. However, Turkey, as a traditionally Atlanticist nation in outlook, sought to ensure that the development of the ESDI would not seek to replace NATO or compromise the important role that it played in European security and collective defense. NATO had proved a useful mechanism for ensuring a Turkish voice in European security affairs and integrating Turkey into the European order, and the Turks were reluctant to mess with a good thing. As Park explains, the Turks sought to develop a NATO-oriented ESDI which would complement, not compete with, NATO:

In effect, the Turkish position is that all NATO's European members should formally constitute the European pillar of NATO. NATO, not the EU, should be the starting point for ESDI, and the WEU should remain as the bridge between the two institutions and the mechanism through which ESDI is expressed.¹⁶¹

Turkey signed off on the agreements reached at the Berlin Summit in 1996 for the creation of an 'ESDI within NATO' to help establish this new framework. Turkish associate membership in the WEU has become operational the previous year, in 1995, whereby Turkey gained privileged access and solid participatory rights in WEU planning, decision-making, and operations, although it could not vote and lacked an equal political role in the organization.¹⁶² While associate membership in the WEU fell short of the full prerogatives of membership Turkey enjoyed in NATO itself, Turkey saw it as an acceptable compromise which ensured that it had a voice and a seat at the table in the emerging European security and defense framework.

¹⁶¹Bill Park, "Turkey, Europe, and ESDI: Inclusion or Exclusion?," *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 16, No.3, p.318.

¹⁶²Antonio Missiroli, "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP," *Security Dialogue*, Vol.33 (1), 2002, p.12.

Unfortunately for Turkey, however, due to outside developments enumerated above in the first chapter, the consensus among EU member states regarding the ESDI began to change and the EU moved to merge the WEU directly into the EU under the Union's CFSP second pillar following the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Britain finally gave in and accepted the need for an independent EU military capability in the joint Franco-British St. Malo Declaration in 1998. In response to these developments, the Communique from the Washington NATO Summit in 1999 stated that, in EU operations, the EU should seek, “the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU.”¹⁶³

At the Washington Summit, the US used its influence to ensure the unanimous support for its proposition that any future sharing of NATO assets with the EU would be contingent on case by case approval through a vote in the NAC. At the time, uncertainty about future plans and a lack of clear leadership within the EU allowed the US to push the proposal through without opposition from the EU NATO members. Although this proposal had clear ramifications for the EU's proposed security role, the EU had not yet worked out how it was going to operationalize its ESDP in the aftermath of the sudden breakthrough at St. Malo, so the US proposal at Washington managed to pass unopposed. The proposal was also supported by the Turkish government, as it would allow Turkey to maintain a level of case by case control over EU-led missions via its veto in the NAC. This decision was particularly important for Turkey, due to its ambivalent relations with the European Union, and it gave the country a certain reassurance that the EU's developing role in European security wouldn't negatively impact its own national and regional security interests or entail its marginalization from European security.

Nonetheless, several months later, the Cologne European Council Summit approved the development of the ESDP through the EU framework on the basis of the Franco-British agreement reached at St. Malo.¹⁶⁴ As these developments gradually departed from the WEU framework and the rights that Turkey had enjoyed in it as an associate member, Turkey became increasingly concerned and saw the newly developed EU security arrangements as discriminatory against non-EU member states.

¹⁶³NATO Washington Summit Communique, Press Release NAC-S (99) 64, 1999, Paragraph 9D, from website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>.

¹⁶⁴It was at Cologne and Helsinki in 1999 that the ESDI became the ESDP. As the language suggests, the shift from a 'defense identity' to a 'defense policy' indicated that the EU had finally gotten serious about the idea.

As this followed the EU's rejection of Turkey's bid to officially join the EU's candidate countries at the Luxembourg summit in December 1997, it touched something of a raw Turkish nerve. The Cologne arrangements certainly did nothing to dissuade the Turks from the perception that they were on the verge of being excluded from both the European project and new EU-centered arrangements for European security and defense. As Turkey saw it, the CESDP framework effectively meant that non-EU European NATO members, some of whom had been integrally involved in European security for over a half century, were relegated to a secondary status, while neutral EU non-NATO members (Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Austria), who had made minimal, if any, contribution to European security during the Cold War, would take on a more prominent role.

Turkey opposed the elaboration of a European security and defense role for the EU that excluded its guaranteed involvement in the decision-making process. As an article in the *Financial Times* points out, "It also worries Turkey, a NATO member outside the EU, which fears that it will have less say over its own security."¹⁶⁵ Turkey was concerned that the EU could be taking on operations in its neighborhood without its inclusion in the decision-making process. Turkey has been particularly alert to the fact that EU-led operations could have an impact on Turkish security interests, as the areas in which the EU-led Petersberg task operations are likely to occur are within the Turkish sphere of influence. For example, in extraordinary circumstances, the EU could potentially, without Turkey having a say in the decision, intervene in Cyprus, the Balkans, or the Aegean in a manner favorable to Greek interests. However, more than just the potential impact on Turkey's vital interests, such a move would signal Turkey's definitive marginalization in European security and exclusion from its central decision-making processes.

Much like the United States, Turkey has also made the argument that EU-led operations could potentially develop into more serious Article V situations, which would then invoke the commitment of non-EU NATO allies to aid the 11 EU NATO members in situations which the non-EU NATO members had no initial involvement. Turkey has also pointed out that, since the EU-led operations will be making use of units assigned to both NATO and the EU, as well as NATO capabilities and assets, EU-led operations could potentially undermine NATO's ability to simultaneously respond

¹⁶⁵Judy Dempsey and Alexander Nicoll, "When push comes to shove: The European defense force has taken shape faster than even its supporters dared hope. But differences with Turkey over NATO stand in the way," *The Financial Times*, April 30, 2001, p.20.

to unforeseen events with its full capacity.¹⁶⁶ Despite these qualms, Turkey accepted the offer of EU candidacy during the Helsinki Summit in December of 1999, and this has allowed Turkey to participate in a more substantial way in the EU processes related to security and defense. It remains somewhat unclear, though, whether greater Turkish inclusion in the EU's emerging European security framework was merely the result of its candidate country status or whether it was Turkey's key contribution to European security that drove its candidacy for EU membership. It seems much more likely that it was the later, as Turkish official candidacy for the EU, 12 years after the first formal Turkish membership application in 1987, came at precisely the time (following St. Malo) when the EU was beginning to seriously elaborate the ESDP and when Turkey's potential contribution would have been of evidently significant value.

As the EU began to absorb the WEU in the late 1990s, a new debate arose over which group the EU's new PSC would prioritize meeting with on security and defense matters: the 13 EU candidate countries (to which Norway and Iceland are added, dubbed the '15+15' setup) or the 6 non-EU European NATO members (the '15+6'). As both a non-EU European NATO ally and a candidate country (following Helsinki in 1999), Turkey would enjoy participation in both the '15+15' and the '15+6' groups. To add to the confusion, however, the agreement reached at the EU Council meeting in Feira in June of 2000 accepted both formats: the full '15+15' would be the standard meeting group, while special meetings would be held with the '15+6' in situations in which the EU would call upon NATO assets.¹⁶⁷

At was at this time that the EU also began to develop a criteria for non-EU European NATO member involvement in EU-led missions: the EU offered the '6' automatic participatory rights in all missions using NATO assets and a possible invitation in all operations that used exclusively EU assets. In any mission in which they contributed, the '6' would then have equal rights and equal responsibilities. However, as these arrangements didn't ensure the non-EU European NATO allies any say in deciding when the EU RRF would be deployed, Ankara rejected the deal as a demotion from the participatory the rights it had under the WEU framework.¹⁶⁸ While it had not enjoyed a vote in final decision-making as an associate member in the WEU, Turkey had been allowed to participate on an equal basis in the decision-shaping process prior to final voting. One conservative American commentator summed up the

166Çayhan, p.47.

167Mark Webber, et al., "The Common European Security and Defense Policy and the 'Third Country' Issue," *European Security*, Vol. 11, No.2, (Summer 2002), p.81.

168Webber et al., 86.

Turkish concerns nicely when he wrote, “[it] has made the Turks fearful of being second-class allies who could be called upon to fight but excluded from a share in command.”¹⁶⁹

To safeguarded its security interests and maintain its participation in decision-making, Turkey pushed for the implementation of the consensus unanimously agreed upon in 1999 at the Washington Summit, which would have allowed for NATO-EU asset sharing on a case by case basis through a vote in the NAC (and thus would retain the potential for the Turkish use of its veto). The EU rejected this, as, having finally gotten its act together regarding the ESDP two months after Washington at the Cologne summit in 1999, it had no desire to see the ESDP's emergence stunted from the get-go, and it instead pushed for vote-free guaranteed access to NATO assets. At the Brussels NATO meeting in December 2000, this crisis came to a head when Turkey blocked a measure in the NAC to allow the EU to have automatic access to NATO planning capabilities (i.e., SHAPE).¹⁷⁰ Unfortunately, this position put Turkey increasingly at odds with the US and left it isolated within the Alliance at large. An obviously irritated US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright even went so far as to accuse the Turks of exploiting the situation in an attempt to get in the EU by the 'back door,' although Ismail Cem, Turkey's then Foreign Minister, staunchly denied that this was the case.¹⁷¹

The US wanted an agreement on EU-NATO capability sharing as soon as possible, for fear that a delay would spur the EU to develop its own, independent capabilities outside of NATO.¹⁷² Accordingly, a compromise was hastily engineered by American, British, and Turkish diplomats, providing assurances that the EU would not be involved in disputes with NATO allies and allowing for the '6' to periodically meet with the PSC, both normally and during crises, to provide input, although this deal was rejected by the Turkish military as insufficient. Turkish rigidity on this point began to cause serious concern and even outright hostility among the EU member states, and it also ran the risk of alienating the US by undoing larger EU-US plans for European security and defense. As Webber et al. note, “This point marked the nadir in Turkish-

169John O'Sullivan, “The Curse of Euro-Nationalism: Why the US should beware the EU,” *National Review*, August 6, 2001, p.33.

170Douglas Hamilton, “Turkey Blocks Deal to Share NATO Force,” *The Washington Post*, December 16, 2000, from www.washingtonpost.com.

171“NATO'da Türkiye ile AB restleşmesi,” *Hurriyet*, from website, <http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/00/12/15/dunya/35dun.htm>. Interestingly, this exchange went virtually unreported in the American press, although it certainly got its fair share of coverage in Turkey.

172Webber et. al., p.87.

EU deliberations over the CESDP.”¹⁷³

The events of September 11, 2001, however, quickly underscored the immediate necessity of working out an operational arrangement between the EU and NATO that would be acceptable to Turkey. As Webber et al. point out, Turkey's unique role within the Alliance took on new strategic significance as the world's gaze turned to Afghanistan and its environs:

As NATO's only Islamic member and a state with some influence in Central Asia, Turkey's strategic stock rose. Winning its agreement to- and thus potential participation and support for- CESDP operations consequently became even more important.

Thus, further negotiations between Turkey, the US, and Britain took place in November of 2001, in an attempt to work out an agreement that would facilitate NATO-EU asset sharing and allow the EU to take over command of Operation Amber Fox in FYROM from NATO as projected in September of 2002. As a report from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly points out, the debate centered around Turkey's concerns about,

an arrangement that would give the EU assured access to NATO capabilities without giving non-EU NATO members the right to participate fully in political and military decision-making for EU missions. The EU for its part has expressed unwillingness to grant non-EU members a veto on EU policies.¹⁷⁴

The Turkish, British, and American trio managed to work out another agreement, the so-called 'Ankara Document,' by the beginning of December 2001. The deal established that, in return for Turkey lifting its objections and allowing the EU access to NATO assets and planning capabilities, the EU would not involve itself in conflicts between NATO and EU members and that Turkey would be actively consulted whenever an EU-led operation would either affect Turkey's security interests or take place within Turkey's neighborhood.¹⁷⁵ The Ankara Document effectively assuaged Turkish concerns about its the loss of a voice in emerging EU security arrangements by offering explicit written guarantees involving Turkey's security and geographical interests in the event of the deployment of the EU's RRF in its region.¹⁷⁶

However, this was not the end of an already complicated story, as Greece

¹⁷³Webber et al., p.88.

¹⁷⁴Wim Van Eekelen, “The Transatlantic Defense Relationship After September 11, 2001,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Subcommittee on Transatlantic Defense and Security Cooperation, November, 2002, from NATO PA website, www.nato-pa.int, p.17.

¹⁷⁵Çayhan, p.48.

¹⁷⁶Judy Dempsey, “Greece Puts EU Defense Force Plans at Risk,” *The Financial Times*, May 11, 2002, Section: Europe, p.6.

blocked the agreement at the European Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001, claiming it needed more time to study the document.¹⁷⁷ In April of 2002, however, Greece vetoed an EU proposal to consult with Turkey regarding RRF deployment, because it gave Turkey an unfairly special status for a non-EU NATO member as well as an alarming role in EU decision-making in regions vital to Greek interests. By way of retaliation, at the Seville Summit in June 2002, Greece convinced the Spanish Presidency to give Greece the same security guarantees as Turkey in a newly rewritten version of the Ankara Document, which the Turks, naturally, rejected.¹⁷⁸ A deal needed to be worked out that would keep Turkey from exercising its veto in NATO and Greece from doing likewise in either NATO or the EU. Until such an agreement could be worked out, the EU could not make use of NATO assets and capabilities and would be effectively operationally impotent in FYROM.

Lacking an agreement, the EU was unable to take over NATO's Operation Amber Fox in FYROM in September of 2002, and the US had to extend NATO's tour of duty there until a compromise could be reached.¹⁷⁹ A mutually satisfactory compromise that both Turkey and Greece could accept was worked out shortly thereafter, and it was included in the Presidency Conclusions at the Copenhagen European Council in December of 2002. A last minute crisis flared up when Greece claimed that the arrangement would also have to be approved by Cyprus, but, under intense pressure from the EU, Cyprus quickly accepted the proposal without objections. As part of this agreement, the EU declared in the Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions that, "the 'Berlin plus' arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU Member States which are also either NATO members or parties to the 'Partnership for Peace', and which have consequently concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO."¹⁸⁰

What this means in plain English is that, when the EU operates a mission using NATO assets, only those EU member states that are also NATO members or associated to NATO via the PfP program can participate. This compromise has effectively excluded both Cyprus (by design) and Malta (by necessity- can't just ban Cyprus) from any EU-led operation making use of NATO assets, as these two countries are neither NATO members nor party to NATO's PfP program. Under this deal, the two will also

177Dempsey, p.6.

178Eekelen, p.17.

179Judy Dempsey and Leyla Boulton, "US rethinks NATO Macedonia mission," *The Financial Times*, November 15, 2002, Section: Europe.

180The Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002, Annex II-1, from website, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf.

be blocked from receiving classified NATO information. However, in all other respects, Malta and Cyprus will enjoy regular rights as EU members.

Thus, Turkey, the US, and the EU, through a process of intensive bargaining, finally worked out a deal that was sufficiently satisfactory that both Greece and Turkey removed the threat of a veto. Both sides came under intense pressure to accept the compromise arrangements, as their objections were the last hurdle preventing the EU from taking on its first mission. The EU assumption of command from NATO Operation Amber Fox in FYROM had already been delayed by several months, due to the difficulty in negotiating a compromise between Greece and Turkey. In exchange for security guarantees, Turkey removed its blockage in the NAC of the NATO-EU asset sharing formula, and this compromise represents a breakthrough of the utmost importance in the development of the ESDP. This step operationalized NATO-EU asset sharing and allowed the EU to finally take on its Petersberg tasks. In March of 2003, barely four years after the compromise was enshrined in the Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions, the EU took on its historic first independent security operation, the newly renamed 'EUFOR Concordia.'

The Turkish-Greece NATO-EU stalemate had represented the last major obstacle to the realization of the ESDP, which significantly raised the stakes for all bargainers involved and made compromise more difficult. Turkish intractability in the debate was a frustrated response to NATO's lack of follow through for not implementing the 'case by case' approval process unanimously agreed upon at the Washington Summit in 1999. Furthermore, Turkey was also responding to its sense of exclusion from the development of the EU's emerging security and defense framework. The EU, however, only raised the tenor of the debate by insisting that, as a non-member, Turkey should have no say in the debate, even though it is clear that the ESDP would have implications, perhaps even profound ones, for Turkish regional and national security interests. Thus, by effectively exploiting its veto power in NATO's NAC, Turkey used the issue of NATO-EU asset sharing to gain concessions from the EU to better protect its own security interests and temper its exclusion from the new European security arrangements operationalized through the EU.

Among the non-EU European NATO members, Turkey remains something of an exceptional case, which helps to explain its tough bargaining stance in the debate over NATO-EU asset sharing. Three of the '6,' Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, only became NATO members in 1999 and all three jumped ahead of Turkey's long-time bid by joining the EU in May of 2004. While this step helped to bring the

two organizations closer together by closing the EU-NATO membership gap within Europe to three, it did nothing to dispel Turkish notions about an anti-Turkish bias in the EU. Two of these remaining three non-EU European NATO members, Iceland and Norway, have made conscious decisions on the basis of national preferences to stay out of the EU and they would both most likely be expeditiously welcomed into the Union without controversy if public opinion were to sway in favor of joining. The same, however, cannot be said for Turkey.

There remains widespread public and political opposition to Turkish membership across Europe, and, even in the event that its bid is ultimately successful, Turkish accession to the Union is presently set for 2015 at the earliest. As Park writes, this presents Turkey with a unique problem among the dwindling number of non-EU European NATO members:

Any EU-based security arrangements that do not satisfy Turkey's desire to participate fully might have to be endured for a considerable time to come....the progress being made on ESDI has the potential to marginalize Turkey in this important aspect of Europe's "deepening" process well into the future.¹⁸¹

Furthermore, Turkey is also unique among the remaining three non-EU European NATO members in that it plays, and has played for over a half century, a substantial role in European security and defense. Iceland, on the other hand, has effectively no independent military force to speak of, and Norway, while it has a military and has actively contributed to NATO, does not possess military capabilities anywhere near the magnitude of Turkey's.

Additionally, much more so than in either Iceland or Norway, the military and security apparatus plays an especially important role in policy formation within the Turkish state. Due to its formative role in the foundation of the Turkish Republic and its position as guardian of the Atatürkist legacy, the Turkish military, via the National Security Council (NSC), is probably more involved in day to day politics than the military of any other NATO member state.¹⁸² Turkey suffers from something of a

¹⁸¹Park, p.325.

¹⁸²By way of explanation, the Turkish Republic was founded by military officers at the head of a nationalist movement fighting occupying European powers. Turkey was developed as a single party state until WWII, wherein the military was instilled with the official ideology of Kemalism. In the multiparty era, the military has briefly intervened three times (1960, 1971, 1980) to restore order in politics and make constitutional changes. Hale refers to this as the military as 'guardian regime,' dedicated to maintaining the ideology of Kemalism and Kemalist-defined limits within the Turkish political sphere. Under the 1980 Constitution, the NSC is the main tool of the military to keep an eye on political affairs. For more information, consult William Hale's classic *Turkish Politics and the Military*, (London: Routledge, 1994) or, for a more theoretical approach, Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).

national 'insecurity complex,' generally referred to as 'Sèvresphobia,' which gives rise to a securitized society and a particularly prominent national security culture.¹⁸³ Accordingly, the Turkish military's feelings of exclusion from EU security and defense arrangements have been strongly reflected in its diplomatic bargaining with the EU, as was evident in its rejection of the first 2001 compromise. Although the military has receded somewhat in recent years as a result of the reforms undertaken in line with Turkey's EU bid, the military still retains a central and powerful role in Turkish political and national life. Uniquely among the non-EU European NATO allies, Turkey remains deeply concerned about ramifications of the security and defense decisions taken within the EU while, simultaneously, it finds itself held at arms length from membership in the Union and, thus, lacks the ability to influence on an equal basis these decisions.

Turkey, the US, and the EU in the Post-Cold War Era

Following the end of the Cold War, the absence of the Soviet Union meant that Turkey's strategic value to the US and Europe was no longer assured, and it needed to find a new role to play which would re-confirm its value as an ally and a partner in strategic cooperation. A renewed partnership was particularly important to Turkey because, unlike virtually all of its NATO allies, it did not get any 'peace dividends' or an enhanced sense of national security in the aftermath of the Cold War, and it still sought the sort of guarantees that come with close security cooperation.¹⁸⁴ Due to Turkish contributions during the Gulf War in 1991, however, the US quickly came to appreciate Turkey's continuing post-Cold War strategic and geographical value. In the Gulf War, Turkey provided significant assistance to coalition efforts by closing the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline to the Mediterranean as part of the embargo on Iraq (the pipeline handled 54% of Iraq's oil exports), extending US access to Turkish military bases, deploying 100,000 troops to the Iraqi border (thereby threatening to open a second front), and allowing the coalition access to the NATO airbase at Incirlik for use in a sustained bombing campaign in central and northern Iraq.¹⁸⁵ Turkey also provided crucial power projection support for the US-led 'Operation Enduring Freedom' in

¹⁸³Pinar Bilgin, "Turkey and the EU: Yesterday's Answers to Tomorrow's Security Problems?," EU Civilian Crisis Management Conflict Studies Research Centre, p.41-43.

¹⁸⁴Bilgin, p.52.

¹⁸⁵Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991, Vol. 70, No. 2, p.38.

Afghanistan in 2001 by allowing the USAF to cross Turkish airspace in over 4,000 sorties and make use of Incirlik airbase for its mission-critical logistical purposes.¹⁸⁶ Through its substantial contributions in the Gulf War and Afghanistan, Turkey highlighted its important role in facilitating the projection of American power in the Middle East and Central Asia.

This is not to say, however, that the US-Turkish 'strategic partnership' has not had its ups and downs in recent years. There have been lingering tensions in the US-Turkish partnership due to the Gulf War's long-term economic and political ramifications for Turkey and , more recently, as a result of the Grand National Assembly's vote in March of 2003 to not allow US ground forces to open a 'second front' in the Iraq War by deploying from southern Turkey. Most of all, however, Turkish-US relations were damaged by a serious divergence over developments in Kurdish northern Iraq under the post-War US occupation, in which Turkey saw the potential emergence of an independent 'Kurdistan.' Although the US seems not to have appreciated the significance of this threat, it strikes to the very core of Turkish national security interests, given Turkey's large Kurdish minority and history of conflict with the PKK, a Kurdish separatist terror organization.

Since the Istanbul bombings in November 2003, however, the US and Turkey appear to have reached something of a limited *rapprochement*, with a focus on fighting terrorism (including the PKK in northern Iraq), an agreement to maintain the existing territorial borders of Iraq, and joint cooperation in both ISAF in Afghanistan and the American-led 'Greater Middle East Initiative.'¹⁸⁷ More generally, Turkey and the US retain strongly similar interests in promoting Middle East stability, opposing rogue states and the spread of WMDs in the region (especially Iran and Syria), and cooperating in 'the War on Terror.' As part of the 'Greater Middle East Initiative,' numerous American scholars and journalists as well as current US administration seem to view Turkey as a model state that is both Muslim and a secular democracy which will help "foster liberalization in the Islamic world," although Ankara soundly rejects this line of thinking.¹⁸⁸ The US strongly supports Turkey's increasing military and security cooperation with its other key ally in the region, Israel, as well as Turkey's new

186Meltem Müftüleri-Baç, "Turkey and the USA at the Crossroads: The Impact of the War in Iraq," Forthcoming *International Journal*, Vol.60, No.3, Summer 2005, p.9-10.

187Müftüleri-Baç, p.19-21.

188David Phillips, "Turkey's Dreams of Accession," *Foreign Affairs*, Sept/Oct 2004, Vol.83, Issue 5, p.98. The government rejects the idea of Turkey as an Islamic model of any sort, although it doesn't seem opposed to the idea of Turkey as a model for the democratic and economic development of newly independent countries.

roles as a force in the energy-rich Caspian and as a model for the Turkic states of Central Asia.¹⁸⁹ The US has also been a strong proponent of Turkish accession to the European Union as a way of anchoring Turkey firmly in the West. Despite occasional disagreements, the US sees Turkey as a key ally in several regions of the world of significant importance to American national and security interests.

With the end of the Cold War, Europe has undergone a period of reprioritization, with a focus on the 'deepening' of the European integration project and a 'widening' of the Union to welcome the formerly communist Central and Eastern European countries into the West.¹⁹⁰ These processes hurt Turkish-European relations, as they have enhanced the importance of shared 'European' values (human rights, democratization, etc) at the expense of common strategic concerns. As Turkey's relationship with Europe and its role in the West via its membership in NATO were strictly built around the 'hard' security concerns of the Cold War era, with the end of this era and a diminishing role in European security, Turkey has found its European identity called into question. This has been exacerbated by the rather late realization on the part of the Turks that NATO is not a monolithic body and good relations with the US would not necessarily translate into equivalently good ones with the EU.¹⁹¹ However, it is worth noting here that the EU's relationship with Turkey has always been more fraught with difficulty than the Turkish-US 'strategic partnership' due to Turkey's demand for membership in the organization, which has complicated post-Cold War Turkish-EU *rapprochement*.

For those who see the EU as something of a 'civilizational' project, Turkey doesn't quite fit with their vision of 'Europe:' it's somehow 'too foreign,' 'too Asian,' or 'too Muslim' to truly be considered for membership. In the words of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president, leader drafter of the EU Constitution, and Brussels insider *par excellence*, Turkey simply cannot be a member of the EU because it, "has a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life."¹⁹² For some ardent Europhiles, the EU takes on an almost strangely mystical quality, immune to functionalist arguments about Turkish 'geostrategic value' et cetera, as is evident in the words of one German MP: "The EU, as a community of nations and values, is too

189"Turkey Shoot," *National Review*, December 31, 1997, p.17.

190Atila Eralp, "Turkey and the EU in the post-Cold War Era," *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds.), (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p.175.

191Eralp, p.173.

192*The Economist*, "A Survey of Turkey," March 19, 2005, p.1.

important to be subjected to...merely strategic, functional reasoning.”¹⁹³ This sort of 'fuzzy' logic is particularly difficult for Turkey to argue against in its bid for EU membership as it seems to rely on an emotional, rather than logical, basis. As the author of the 'Charlemagne' column for *The Economist* pointed out in a rather timely article just recently, “Dry analysis is never quite enough when dealing with the EU. Most people who feel strongly about the subject start with a gut feeling- from which flow their subsequent arguments.”¹⁹⁴

Moreover, in the post-Cold War era, an inward-looking Europe preoccupied with its own project of integration has been slower to recognize Turkey's continuing post-Cold War geostrategic value. Traditionally, the EU, lacking a global agenda similar to America, has not placed importance on Turkey's role in the Middle East and has instead focused more directly on, “Turkey's European vocation and its implications for Turkey's role in and for Europe.”¹⁹⁵ This was on display in early 2003 in the lead-up to the Iraq War, when France, Germany, and Belgium, all ostensible European allies of Turkey in NATO, refused to let NATO consider deploying defensive assets (AWACs, Patriots, anti-WMD support, etc.) to Turkey to protect against any spillover from Iraq. The three opposed the consideration because the UN Security Council had not yet approved the US-led military action, arguing that, “this would lock NATO into a 'logic of war'.”¹⁹⁶ When war became imminent, the three backed down against intense American pressure, but only after Turkey had taken the unprecedented step of invoking Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that, “Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”¹⁹⁷ The three effectively held Turkish security captive to the transatlantic battle royale over the Iraq War, focusing on the Turkish deployment issue in a European context as a way of thwarting US unilateralism instead of seeing it in a broader context as a simple matter of a treaty obligation to a fellow NATO ally bordering on a potential future war zone.

With the development of the ESDP concept and the EU's efforts to bridge the gap between its economic and political roles in the world, Europe has gradually begun to reassess Turkey's potential strategic contributions. There are strong arguments for

193Wolfgang Schauble, *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec 2004, Vol.83, Issue 6, p.134.

194*The Economist*, “Charlemagne: Of head and heart,” July 30, 2005, p.31.

195Heinz Kramer and Friedemann Muller, “Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries,” in *Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East*, Robert Blackwill and Michael Strumer, (eds.), (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p.175.

196*The Economist*, “A fractured alliance,” 2/15/2003, Vol.366, Issue 8311, p.25.

197North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, April 4, 1949, Article IV, from website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>.

Turkish inclusion in European security and defense on the basis of its geostrategic position and significant military capabilities. In both of these areas, Turkey could make an important contribution to the EU in its bid to play a larger role in security and defense. Up until now, the EU's plans for an autonomous ESDP have been largely long on talk and institution building, which are relatively inexpensive exercises, while EU member states have not made the necessary financial commitments to enhance the Union's limited military capabilities. Turkey, as a strong regional military power with the largest armed forces in Europe, can advance both the EU's security and defense capabilities and give it a more substantial presence in precisely the geographical areas on Europe's periphery where it sees itself playing a greater future role.

Another part of Europe's reappraisal of the Turkish contribution to security, much like that of the United State, has had to do with the influence of 9/11 and the idea of Turkey as a model for the rest of the Islamic world. Germany's Interior Minister, Otto Schily, elaborated on this theme, stating that Turkish accession to the EU would, “show the world that it is possible for Muslims and the West to live together on the basis of the values of the enlightenment and the UN charter of human rights.”¹⁹⁸ As Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, has added, the events of 9/11 have convinced him that, “European integration also has a strategic dimension.”¹⁹⁹ The argument is made that the inclusion of a predominately Muslim country in the EU would help the EU and US to posit that Western values and Islam are not incompatible. According to the argument, this would allow the West to tackle the challenge of Islamic terrorism without provoking a Huntingtonian 'Clash of Civilizations' between Christianity and Islam. However, since this argument is one largely about identity and values, and the focus of this paper is more strictly security, it falls outside the scope of this discussion.

Turkey's Contribution to Cold War European Security

Since joining NATO in 1952, Turkey has been a key member of the Western Alliance and has made significant contributions to European security and defense. During the Cold War, as NATO's southern flank, Turkey was essential to European security as it helped deter the Soviet Union and served as an effective barrier to any Soviet effort to encroach on either the Middle East or the Mediterranean. Further,

¹⁹⁸*The Economist*, “Charlemagne: How terrorism trumped federalism,” October 2, 2004, p.31
¹⁹⁹*Ibid*.

through its control of the Dardanelles, the Marmara Sea, and the Bosphorus, the waterways linking the Mediterranean and the Aegean to the Black Sea, Turkey strictly limited the maneuverability the Soviet Navy based in the Black Sea. Allied access to Turkish airbases, most especially to Incirlik near Adana, gave NATO air strike capabilities deep into the Soviet Union. Turkey's significant military capabilities also forced the Warsaw Pact to deploy units away from the central East-West front line in Germany to the Turkish-Bulgaria border. Furthermore, in the event of a Soviet attack along the German front line, Turkey would serve as the ideal point of entry for a NATO counterstrike into the Soviet Union.²⁰⁰

Turkey's role in NATO was built upon a *quid pro quo* exchange: in return for helping to deter the USSR with its forces and granting Allied access to its bases, Turkey was given a collective security guarantee through Article V, economic and military aid, and a say in deliberations and decision making regarding European security through NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC). While the Turkish contribution to Western security during the Cold War was not selfless, it still constituted a significant risk for Turkey which deserves to be recognized, appreciated, and appropriately compensated. In the aftermath of the Cold War, many European allies seem oddly to have forgotten that Turkey was on the frontlines of the Cold War, helping to provide for their national security, when matters of expansion came up. As *The Economist* puts it, "As a longstanding NATO member, [Turkey] has been a crucial part of Europe's defenses. It has been a beacon of good sense in a combustible bit of the world."²⁰¹ It seems entirely illogical that a time-tested NATO ally, which has made substantial contributions to European security and defense for over fifty years, should be excluded from the EU's emerging security framework while militarily insignificant and neutral or non-aligned EU-member states are included. And what's more, Turkish inclusion in the European security and defense order could help ease competition between NATO and the EU by reducing their membership gap.

Turkey's Geostrategic Value in the Post-Cold War World

Turkey's geostrategic position at the crossroads between continents has given it a disproportionately important role in regional and international security. While not one of the world's major powers, Turkey's geostrategic value as a transregional actor gives

²⁰⁰Kuniholm, p.34.

²⁰¹*The Economist*, "Turkey belongs in Europe," 12/7/2002, Vol.365, No.8302, p.12.

it an importance almost unmatched by any other medium power.²⁰² One analyst, as quoted in *The Economist's* recent survey on Turkey, even went so far as to describe Turkey as, “the most geo-strategically important piece of real-estate in the world.”²⁰³ Further, Turkey's geostrategic significance has been particularly enhanced as of late with the fundamental regional transformation and realignment brought about by the end of the Cold War. Turkey is no longer geographically defined, as it was in the Cold War era, as a merely peripheral European security actor on NATO's southern flank. Moreover, the Turkish foreign and security policy agenda has widened significantly from its traditional core concerns of deterring Russia and managing crises with Greece.

As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains, the end of the Cold War brought about significant regional change and new opportunities for Turkish foreign policy:

In the post-Cold War period, Turkey found herself at the center of a large landscape, Eurasia, stretching from Europe to Central Asia...Turkey has woven an intricate web of peaceful relations in a multitude of geographies and can, as a secular pluralistic democracy, be a source of inspiration for other nations desiring reform in her extended region.²⁰⁴

Turkey found new opportunities to reconnect with distant cousins in Central Asia and neighbors closer to home in the Balkans and the Caucasus that had been walled off behind the Iron Curtain for decades. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has taken on a more significant and multidimensional role as a major transregional actor involved in the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean. As a result, as Rubin has noted, “Turkey has one of the most complicated foreign policy situations in the world.”²⁰⁵ Turkey's geostrategic position has taken on an even greater importance given the myriad and unpredictable challenges facing Western security in the aftermath of the Cold War, although it seems that the US has been quicker to acknowledge and exploit this than the European Union.

Nonetheless, Turkey's incorporation into the European security and defense framework would be geostrategically beneficial for the EU, as it would allow the Union to play a more comprehensive role in the Balkans, as well as a bigger role in the Caucasus, the Caspian, the Middle East, and Central Asia. However, with the inclusion of Turkey and the expansion of the EU's security and defense radar to include these

202Mustafa Aydın, “Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 3, No.2, (May 2003), p.163.

203*The Economist*, “A survey of Turkey,” March 19, 2005, p.5.

204MFA, p.2.

205Rubin, p.1.

new regions, there are a number of possible security problems that should not be overlooked when considering the Turkish security situation. It is also worth noting that Turkish and EU security priorities are not identical, principally in that many of Turkey's vital national security interests are in line only more generally with broader EU's goals. However, it is the contention of this paper that, considering both the benefits of its inclusion and the costs of its exclusion, Turkey would make an important contribution as a security provider in the EU's emerging security and defense framework. If the EU wants to foster long-term prosperity and stability on its eastern and southern periphery, Turkey could play a crucial role by working with the EU to tackle the sources of the increasing number of transregional security challenges that affect both Europe and its periphery.²⁰⁶ Turkey is a key player in Europe's southeastern periphery, and, if the EU wants to play an increasingly role in the region, it will need to find a way to fit Turkey into that framework, as Turkey is simply too big and too important an actor to be overlooked in any serious European security and defense scheme.

Turkish incorporation into the European security and defense framework would give the Union the ability to play a more active and involved role in the Middle East. Turkey possesses important power projection capabilities, most especially its NATO airbase at Incirlik, which would greatly aid the EU in rapid deployment to potential crisis points in the Middle East. As noted above, Incirlik proved vital in conducting the air campaign in the Gulf War in 1991 as well as maintaining the 'no fly zone' in northern Iraq in the subsequent years. This facet would be especially useful for the EU, as power projection is one of the major military capabilities that the Union lacks. As Müftüler-Baç adds, "it is not a far-fetched claim that access to Turkey's military bases (as well as Turkish participation) would be crucial for the success of any possible NATO/EU operation in the Middle East."²⁰⁷ Furthermore, Turkey's strategic ties with Israel, Jordan, and, to a lesser extent, Egypt would also be advantageous to the EU in helping to fight WMD proliferation and fundamentalist Islamic terrorism, as well as fostering a peace settlement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

There is also a counter argument these propositions that further EU involvement in the Middle East could also be a source of instability for the Union. Turkish inclusion would extend Europe's borders to the Middle East, to countries like Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Although this would provide the EU with incredible new opportunities to pursue

206H. Tarik Oguzlu, "An Analysis of Turkey's Prospective Membership in the European Union from a 'Security' Perspective, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 34 (3), p.297.

207Müftüler-Baç, p.497.

its 'European- Mediterranean Partnership' (aka Barcelona Process) to try and expand the halo of European stability and development, which has worked so well in Central and Eastern Europe over the past 15 years, to at least part of this troubled region. While an expansion towards the Middle East provides tantalizing opportunities, it certainly remains something of a risky development at the same time because of the vast political uncertainties.

Turkish integration into ESDP could also help the Union better ensure the security and diversity of its oil and gas imports. As Solana notes, “Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030.”²⁰⁸ At present, the three major sources of oil and gas for Europe are North Africa, Russia, and the Gulf. Inclusion of Turkey into the European security framework could help to better secure Gulf oil traveling to Europe through Turkish pipelines and Russian oil passing through the Turkish Straits. Furthermore, with Russia increasingly taking on the lion's share of the European energy market, Turkey's strategic role in the oil and gas producing regions of the Caspian and Central Asia could open up new opportunities for the EU to diversify its suppliers. In an era when the Russians are increasingly re-nationalizing control of energy corporations to exploit gas and oil as a tool of foreign policy, an active effort against over-reliance on Russian energy would only seem prudent. Diversification will contribute to improving the security and continuity of the oil supply to Europe. The recently opened Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the proposed Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum gas pipeline could possibly also help to ease rapidly increasing European reliance on Russian energy.²⁰⁹ However, it is worth noting that this aspect of Turkish inclusion could also run the risk of potentially increasing EU conflict with Russia over energy politics in the Caspian and Central Asian regions, where it still retains significant interests.

Turkey is in a position of both unique opportunity and remarkable vulnerability in respect to its geographical proximity to potentially unstable regions in the Balkans and the Caucasus. A significant number of conflicts have already taken place within Turkey's neighborhood in the post-Cold War period, including the Gulf War; the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo; and conflicts in Nagoro-Karabakh, Chechnya, and Abkhazia. Furthermore, thirteen of the 16 potential 'hot spots' of concern to European security as

208Solana, p.4.

209*The Economist*, “Oil over troubled waters,” May 28, 2005, p.34.

determined by NATO are in Turkey's immediate neighborhood.²¹⁰ Turkey's proximity to these unstable regions effectively illustrates how it could be of use to the EU in future crisis prevention, intervention, and management on Europe's periphery. Turkey has shown itself willing to contribute troops, police, civilian assistance, and humanitarian aid in crisis situations in the area, as has been evident in its participation in numerous NATO and UN peacekeeping missions in the region in recent years, including in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, and Georgia. Turkey can also aid the EU's crisis management role by facilitating access and deployment to 'hot spots' in its vicinity, as well contributing its own substantial local knowledge and assets within the region. Turkey has a keen interest to contribute to stability and security in the Balkans and the Caucasus, as these largely former Ottoman lands are of particular policy interest due to their numerous shared historical, cultural, and ethnic links with Turkey.

Of course, there is also a downside to Turkey's proximity to unstable regions, as it may drag the EU into security problems that it would not otherwise have been involved in. It is easier for the EU to ignore crises in such politically uncomfortable areas (say, Chechnya) as long as they're far away, but when they're suddenly right on the borders of the EU, that becomes much more difficult to do. This could prove especially tricky for the EU in cases having to do with crises in or nearby Russia, which could potentially have the impact of drawing the Union into conflict with Russia itself. For example, Chechen terrorists have staged small scale sieges in Turkey twice in recent years to gain publicity for their cause, provoking Turkish public opinion.²¹¹ Furthermore, Turkey's shared ties with Turkish and Muslim minority groups in the Balkans and Caucasus also have the potential to give the perception that the country is not an impartial actor. Thus, Turkish integration into European security and defense could have the consequence of increasing the number of crises, and especially uncomfortable ones involving Russia (one of the EU's major oil suppliers) or areas of Russian interest, that the Union could be forced to deal with, as well as potentially complicating the crisis management missions which the Union pursues in the region.

It is worth emphasizing that Turkey's geostrategic contribution to Europe's security is not merely a matter of its location next to troubled spots. New developments, as Lesser points out, are also crucial to understanding the importance of Turkey's role in the region:

²¹⁰Aydın, p. 182.

²¹¹"Country Profile 2005: Turkey," Economist Intelligence Unit, p.24.

Turkey is most directly affected by a key trend shaping Western security: the erosion of traditional distinctions between the European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian theaters...Turkey is at the center of this phenomenon and the country's future role will be strongly influenced by it.²¹²

As this statement indicates, in the uncertain post-Cold War world, issues affecting European regional security are becoming increasingly globalized. The new global terrorist threat of Al-Qaeda is a perfect example of this phenomenon: an elusive Saudi terrorist leader somewhere on the Afghani-Pakistani border provides direction, guidelines, or inspiration for attacks which are directed against targets all around the world, from US troops in Iraq and the British Consulate in Istanbul to Spanish trains and the London subway system. President Bush summed up this idea of the increasingly global interconnectivity of security quite well recently (or rather, he quoted someone who did), when he spoke at Ft. Bragg at the end of June, stating, “The commander in charge of coalition operations in Iraq, General John Vines, put it well the other day. He said, 'We either deal with terrorism and this extremism abroad, or we deal with it when it comes to us.’”²¹³

In this day and age, the major defining issues of European security stretch well beyond the Continent and concerns about conventional warfare. As Javier Solana, the EU's CFSP chief pointed out at the end of 2003, “The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked.”²¹⁴ In this same paper, Solana also highlighted the most important security challenges facing Europe, including terrorism, proliferation of WMDs (especially in the Middle East), regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (particularly drugs and people trafficking). While the end of the Cold War has drastically reduced the likelihood of a conventional war in Europe, the new security challenges of the post-Cold War era are unpredictable and will require new strategies and even greater cooperation. With these new challenges, as he states, “the integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean.”²¹⁵ Thus, as Solana notes, it is more

212Ilan O. Lesser, “Beyond 'Bride or Barrier': Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West,” *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds.), (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p.207.

213President G.W. Bush, “Transcript: We accept these burdens...,” June 28, 2005, from website, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/06/28/bush.transcript/index.html>.

214Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy,” December 12, 2003, p.3.

215Solana, p.9.

and more important in today's world that the EU actively engage in security cooperation with states on its periphery in order to preserve its own security.

Turkey is perfectly positioned to help the EU tackle these new security issues, as it is a strong, stable, and effective regional power increasingly interested in tackling transregional security issues within its troubled neighborhood. Turkey's dual role as both a European and Middle Eastern actor should help the EU bridge this cultural and geographical divide and expand into the Middle East region to tackle issues relating to terrorism and WMD proliferation. Furthermore, based on the experience of its long struggle against the PKK, Turkey could help the EU with its own fight against terrorism. As outlined above, Turkey's proximity to unstable areas on Europe's periphery could help the EU quickly and effectively respond to regional conflict and the threat of state failure. Turkey would also be a crucial contributor in the EU's struggle against organized crime, as, with EU assistance, it could help crack down on its large mafia-run drugs and people trafficking networks. It is estimated that as much as 75% of the heroin coming into Europe has either transited or been processed in Turkey²¹⁶, and Turkey is also an important link in the business of smuggling people into Europe, due to its close proximity by water to both Greece and Italy.²¹⁷ With better security cooperation within the EU framework, Turkey could play a key role in shutting this trade down and improving European security as a whole. On the very issues that Solana has pointed out as being the key future challenges to European security, Turkey could make a substantial and significant contribution. As these are challenges that by their very nature affect both the external and the internal security of the EU, the Turkish contribution in this case would be beneficial to the EU under both the second (CFSP) and third pillars (Home Affairs).

At the same time, however, a counter argument can be made that the inclusion of Turkey into the European security sphere could also be problematic in that it could facilitate the export of Turkey's domestic security problems into the European Union. While Turkish incorporation might help the EU tackle the new security challenges, such as drugs and people trafficking, envisioned in the its ESS, Turkey's substantial involvement in perpetuating both of these problems is something of a double-edged sword. While Turkish inclusion may help foster a more effective pan-European response to these problems, the expansion of the EU to Turkey's borders in the Middle East and the Caucasus could also exacerbate them in the short-term by making access

216“Country Survey 2005: Turkey,” p.25.

217Dorian Jones, “Turkey's booming people trade,” BBCNews, June 5, 2002, from website, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2024943.stm>.

to the EU easier for criminal elements. As the EU has eliminated internal borders within the Union and allows free movement for tourists and narco-mafia dons alike, the inclusion of Turkey would simply bring the Union several geographical steps closer to the sources of its troubles. In the long-run, however, the enhanced regional security, stability, and development fostered by EU expansion in the area might help to resolve the origins of these problems.

Finally, it is also worth noting that Turkey also has unresolved problems with two present members of the European Union, Cyprus and Greece, on issues relating to the Turkish military presence in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Cyprus) and ongoing disputes over the division of the underwater shelf and control of Aegean islands (Greece). Turkish inclusion in this case would not actually expose the Union to new security challenges per se, as it already faces these problems due to Greek and Cypriot membership, but Turkey could still further complicate these existing problems. On the other hand, though, the argument could also be made that Turkish inclusion in the EU could be beneficial in helping to resolve some of these problems either in the accession process itself or by gradually strengthening mutual economic interdependency and ties of political cooperation through the Union's activities.

Turkey's Military Capabilities

One of the strongest potential benefits of incorporating Turkey into the EU's security and defense framework remains the Turkish military contribution. Turkey has one of the highest levels of defense spending in the world, totaling some \$11.7 bn (4.9% of GDP) in 2003²¹⁸, which made it the 11th largest national spender on defense last year. Unlike virtually all of the rest of Europe, Turkey has actually been aggressively increasing its defense spending since the end of the Cold War. Since 1998, the Turkish military has undertaken a ten-year, \$30bn military modernization campaign (which may rise to \$150bn over 30 years), focusing on upgrading its battle tanks, attack helicopters, assault rifles, and advanced aircraft systems.²¹⁹ The CIA has deemed the project a success, and writes that Turkey now possesses, “highly mobile forces with greatly enhanced firepower in accordance with NATO's new strategic concept.”²²⁰

218“Country Profile 2005: Turkey,” p26.

219Elliot Hen-Tov, “The Political Economy of Turkish Military Modernization,” *MERIA*, Vol.8, No.4, Article 5, Dec.2004.

220The CIA World Fact Book 2004, “Turkey,” from website, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/tu.html>.

Furthermore, Turkey has the second largest military in NATO and the sixth largest standing military in the world, totaling some 1,043,550 total troops, with 514,850 on active duty, 378,700 in reserves, and 150,000 in the gendarmerie/national guard.²²¹ Turkey has a conscript-based military staffed largely through the 15 months of mandatory military services performed by all young men, although the officers, senior staff, and specialists are all professionals career soldiers. With its large number of troops, increasing levels of defense spending, and rapidly modernizing military capabilities, Turkey would be a vital contribution to any EU-led efforts to establish a truly independent military capacity.

However, since the end of the Cold War, the practice of warfare has changed significantly and Turkish military capabilities are no longer as relevant to today's challenges as they were in the past. Cold War era military strategy placed a strong emphasis on large conventional military forces (heavily armored tanks, artillery, etc) capable of fighting sustained ground battles, with the assistance of air support, along the NATO-Warsaw Pact front lines. In this dynamic, the enemy was a known state with conventional military capabilities which could be prepared for and effectively deterred. The end of the Cold War has seen a shift in the security environment to much greater unpredictability and uncertainty. In today's world, security challenges are unlikely to come exclusively from conventional state actors in such set battles, and the new priority is on combating emerging threats, like proliferation of WMDs, terrorism, organized crime, and spillover from regional conflicts. As the 'National Military Strategy of the United States' points out, threats today may, “range from states to non-state organizations to individuals.”²²²

Accordingly, strategies, threat-matrices, and military capabilities developed during the Cold War are no longer appropriate to respond to these new and unpredictable challenges. The US has pioneered new military tactics for the post-Cold War era, based around the use of overwhelming air superiority, special forces, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), high tech satellite intelligence, and seamlessly integrated battlefield command. The new focus is on lighter, more agile, more mobile, and quicker units, while heavy and slow military forces, and most especially large conscript-based armies, are decidedly less useful in waging modern war. As Lanier points out, Turkey is engaged in the process of modernizing its military along these lines: “Instead of a large, heavy, and cumbersome army, Turkey is transforming its

221“Country Profile 2005: Turkey.”

222“National Military Strategy of the US,” 2004, p.12, from website, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nms/nms2004.pdf>.

armed forces into a swift, mobile, flexible cadre with rapid deployment capabilities available for out of area operations.”²²³

While Turkey has undertaken a significant military modernization program in recent years, the program is still something of a work in progress and Turkish modernization lags behind other NATO allies. Furthermore, although it is slowly reducing the conscript element of its armed forces, with the eventual goal of shifting to an all-professional army, the Turkish military is still largely oriented around the outmoded conscript system.²²⁴ Thus, even in the area in which the argument for Turkey's inclusion seems the strongest, its potential military contribution, it still has the potential be something of a burden. Given that the EU seems to envision its role primarily in areas such as peacekeeping, crisis management, and humanitarian intervention, and not in waging full scale intense combat operations per se, however, it seems unlikely that Turkey's ongoing and incomplete process of military modernization would be a serious impediment.

Perhaps more importantly from the perspective of the EU, in line with the Petersberg tasks, the Turkish armed forces have also had significant peacekeeping experience in recent years. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out:

Turkey has participated in many peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations...such as those in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo and Georgia. Moreover, Turkey assumed the command of ISAF II in Afghanistan and contributed around 1400 troops ...between June 2002 and February 2003...[and]continues to provide support to ISAF with approximately 250 military personnel. Moreover, according to the rotation plan...the 3rd Corps stationed in Istanbul (NRDC-TU) will assume command of ISAF VII between February and August 2005.²²⁵

Due to its experience combating the PKK, the Turkish military also has substantial experience in long-term, low-intensity operations of the sort that might also be common in the Petersberg tasks.²²⁶ Even as a non-EU member state, Turkey has volunteered to contribute more troops to the EU's RRF than almost any other EU member: in November of 2000, Turkey promised to make available six thousand troops, 36 F-16s, two troop transports, and a number of ships available to the RRF, in return for a guaranteed role in security decision-making within the EU's ESDP, with the possibility of even more troops if the the arrangements were acceptable.²²⁷ Given that the EU's

223Stephen Lanier, “Military Trends in Turkey: Strengths and Weaknesses,” October 14, 2004, CSIS, p.17., from www.csis.org.

224Lanier, p.17.

225MFA, p. 3.

226Bilgin, p.47.

227Michael Gordon, “Turkey offers troops for new European force, with proviso,” *New York Times*,

own Headline Goals for the RRF only anticipated 50,000 to 60,000 total troops (plus reserves, due to rotation), this is a significant contribution. As Müftüler-Baç adds, “Turkey’s participation in the EU’s possible military operations could contribute significantly to their success and, maybe, could determine their feasibility.”²²⁸

However, even in this situation where the Turkish contribution to European security and defense might seem unassailable, it is worth noting that the Turkish military is somewhat out of step with the security philosophy of the EU. Although the EU has taken on a more traditional approach in seeking to build up its military power projection capabilities in recent years, it must not be overlooked that the Union still favors the exercise of 'soft' power to ensure security, largely through non-military measures like enlargement, second-track diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution, trade and economic links, and 'soft governance.'²²⁹ As Oğuzlu points out, “on balance, today’s EU is more of a normative–civilian actor than a global military one.”²³⁰ But Turkey doesn't have much in the way of experience in the use of this sort of 'soft' power, as its security policy, much like America's, is still largely oriented around the Cold War logic of 'hard' power. Thus, while even Turkey's significant capabilities would doubtless prove beneficial to the EU's efforts to assert itself more as a traditional security actor in international affairs, for Turkey to be truly integrated into the EU's security order it must make more of an effort to expand into something of a role in 'soft' security as well.

November 22, 2000.
228 Müftüler-Baç, p.496.
229 Bilgin, p.45-46.
230 Oğuzlu, p.286.

<i>Potential Contributions</i>	<i>Potential Costs</i>
History of contribution to European security	Not necessarily applicable now, and lingering security conflict with EU members Greece and Cyprus
Geostrategic role as transnational actor in Balkans, ME, Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mediterranean/S. Europe (key regions elaborated individually below)	Could draw the EU into more crises, especially in the ME and in the Caucasus (potential for conflict with Russia)
Could help and allow EU play more active role in ME (Incirlik, ties with Israel, Jordan, Egypt) and aid 'Barcelona Process'	EU borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran, new potential for getting caught up in very dangerous part of the world (WMDs, terrorism, etc)
Turkish role in Caspian and Central Asia could help secure and diversify EU energy needs	Could potentially increase conflict with Russia over its interests in Caspian and Central Asia
Turkish proximity could help EU spread regional security and stability to Balkans and Caucasus	Could draw the EU into more crises, especially in the Caucasus, with the potential for conflict with Russia
Could help EU tackle transregional threats (WMDs, terrorism, organized crime, etc) to Euro internal and external security, as outlined in ESS	Turkish inclusion could also facilitate export of these problems into the EU
Use of Turkey's significant military capabilities (including the largest military in Europe) in ESDP EU Petersberg tasks	Military still in process of modernizing, armed forces built around outmoded conscript system, and little prior focus on 'soft' security tools and some EU Petersberg tasks

Table 1.1: Potential Turkish Contributions and Costs to the ESDP

Turkey's inclusion in the EU's ESDP framework would be beneficial for the EU in a wide variety of capacities. In short, the Turkish assets can be summed up as: its

long history as a contributor to European security during the Cold War; its geostrategic position as a Eurasian transregional actor bordering on the Balkans, Caucasus, Mediterranean, Middle East, and Caspian region; its contribution to tackling the EU's security goals as set out in the ESS; and its significant military capabilities. However, none of these contributions is without a potential downside which could end up significantly complicating European security. Geostrategically, it would allow the Union to play a more comprehensive role in the Balkans, as well as a bigger role in the Caucasus, the Caspian, the Middle East, and Central Asia. However, it is worth noting that the expansion of the EU's security and defense sphere into these new regions entails a number of new risks and potential security problems that should not be ignored.

Furthermore, as Turkey possesses Europe's largest military, one of the most significant benefits of Turkish inclusion into the EU's security and defense framework remains the Turkish military contribution, although this, too, is not without its own potential drawbacks. If the EU wants to foster a secure, prosperous, and stable southern and eastern periphery, the inclusion of Turkey could facilitate that effort by helping the EU to take on the root causes of instability, poverty, crime, and other increasingly transregional issues that affect both the area and increasingly the EU itself. It is the contention of this paper, however, that Turkish inclusion would strongly complement the 'hard' security power capabilities of the European Union, as expressed through the ESDP framework.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Since the end of the Cold War, changing priorities have rendered Turkey something of an outsider in European affairs, and this shift has been reflected in Turkey's exclusion from the Continent's expanding European project and the new security and defense arrangements operationalized through the EU's ESDP framework. For a country that had enjoyed an important role in Europe during the Cold War through its membership in NATO, this rather sudden transformation came as something of a shock. While Turkey and the European Union have had somewhat difficult relations for a number of years, they have become even more strained in the post-Cold War era, as an inwardly-turned EU, concerned with its own institutional development and the processes of 'deepening' and 'widening,' has become increasingly unsure of Turkey's position, contribution, and even identity within Europe. As the EU shifted from the 'hard' security concerns of the Cold War period to a more expansive understanding of security, including a far greater emphasis on 'soft' security tools such as governance, enlargement, and economic development, Turkey has found its own 'hard' security contributions to be increasingly out of step with the EU.

Although Turkish-American ties have also gone through a rough patch in the years following the end of the Soviet Union, the United States has maintained a more continuous interest in fostering a variety of new roles for Turkey within both NATO and the context of their bilateral 'strategic partnership.' However, Turkey was rather belated in appreciating that, in the post-Cold War period, good relationship with the US would no longer ensure a similarly good one with the Europeans²³¹, and at times now it even seems to have the opposite effect. Although the US has strongly indicated its support for Turkish EU membership and inclusion in emerging European security and defense arrangements, US influence has its limits, and the efforts may even be construed by some in the EU as damaging to Turkey's chances, given broader US-European divergence in recent years.

Although the Europeans have pursued the project of elaborating a more 'European' component to the framework of European security, in the early 1990s, this effort was largely concerned with institution-building and increasing operational, as well as foreign and security policy, autonomy. However, following the humiliating experience of European impotence during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in

²³¹Eralp, p.173.

what Luxembourg's Prime Minister and then-EU foreign policy chief Jacques Poos called, "Europe's hour,"²³² the member states of the EU found their 'soft' security focus in need of a more substantial 'hard' component. While this may not have diminished their preference for 'soft' security approaches, the experience of being unable to stop genocide in their own 'backyard' without American assistance left the Europeans well aware of the need to increase their military capabilities or risk becoming geopolitical straw men. At the same time, however, both European governments and the public seem to be unwilling to take on the long-term fiscal investment necessary to bring their capabilities more in line with that of America's.

In the post-Cold War world, although the EU has aspired to play a greater role in international affairs, with all the military and operational responsibilities such a role entails, it has found itself in something of a bind. The gap between its lofty foreign and security policy goals and its military capabilities has left it with few options: either it must revise its goals, enhance its capabilities, or find some other, third way out. As the EU remains strongly committed to its foreign and security policy goals, and the member states remain just as committed to not increasing their defense spending in the manner necessary to seriously enhance the Union's military power, that leaves the EU with only the third choice: find some other way out of this mess. It is precisely in this context that Turkey, with its substantial potential contribution to European security, warranted reassessment by the Europeans. As Müftüler-Baç argues, the cost-benefit analysis of Turkish inclusion in the European security framework at this point was integral to the EU's decision to make Turkey an official candidate country at Helsinki in December of 1999.²³³

In light of the Europeans efforts to establish an operational CFSP with a strong ESDP element, the value of the potential Turkish contribution to European security took on an increasing luster. As the first chapter pointed out, Europeans have long sought to develop a security and defense policy autonomy that would allow them, outside the framework of US-dominated NATO, to make decisions, shape policies, and implement actions that reflect their own priorities and concerns. The potential Turkish contribution could actually allow the EU's ESDP to finally accomplish that end. Turkey's inclusion could also allow the ESDP to take on real teeth and aid in it playing an increasingly important role in shaping global security. Furthermore, Turkey could be particularly helpful in making the EU's threat of force more credible, given its

232Mark Steyn, "Eurovision dies a death," *The Daily Telegraph* (London), May 24, 2005.

233Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies," p.489.

willingness to actually use its military.

Although the Turkish security contribution has been enough to get Turkey out of the EU's hallway and into its waiting room, it is quite unclear at present if will be sufficient to ensure its eventual membership. When the EU set out the 'Copenhagen criteria' for Turkey in 1993 and made future negotiations on entry contingent on their fulfillment, many in Europe seem to have simply assumed that this represented something of an impossible burden and that the Turkish bid would somehow fade away in the night. However, this has proved not to be the case, and Turkey has been quite vigorous in pursuing reforms across the board in line with its bid for membership. These reforms, in a sense, illustrate the effectiveness and the power of the EU's enlargement policy, as the dangling carrot of membership has given impetus to an almost unparalleled period of transformation and reform within Turkey.

There are, of course, a whole host of other, non-security factors that come into play as the EU assesses the Turkish candidacy, including matters pertaining to Turkey's economic and political situation, and even domestic European factors, and these will surely also play an important role in determining Turkey's eventual status vis à vis the EU. As the recent EU Constitutional referendum fiasco illustrated, the EU is also in serious need of reconnecting with national public opinion in the member states and articulating a clearer and more comprehensible vision for the future of the European project. While these developments have little to do with Turkey per se, Turkey serves as something of a catalyst for discussion about the future of the EU for many in Europe, and, as such, the question of Turkish membership is a particularly complex one.

Nonetheless, as this paper has pointed out, Turkey has a strong case in arguing the value of its potential contribution to the EU's ESDP. While Turkish incorporation into the European framework would entail the EU taking on significant new security risks, it would also greatly enhance the Union's military capabilities and ability to play a greater role in a number of important regions on Europe's periphery. It must be emphasized, however, that Turkey retains something of a different understanding of security than the EU, with a more lingering focus on 'hard' security and military power. While the EU has come around to increasingly re-appreciating the necessity of 'hard' security in its foreign and security policy, there still remains something of a disconnect in the language and focus of security between Turkey and the EU, and Turkey will also need to adopt a greater orientation towards EU priorities in, for example, 'soft' power employment and Petersberg task missions. The EU could help introduce Turkey into its security dialogue by 'softening' it up a bit, and, vice versa, Turkey could help add some

'hard' security backbone to the EU's foreign and security policy project.

While it will be up to the Europeans to make the ultimate decision whether or not the potential Turkish military contribution to the ESDP is sufficient to warrant Turkish inclusion in the emerging EU order, Europe will nonetheless need to come to terms with the new post-Cold War Turkey through some sort of a cooperative arrangement. If this does not take on the form of membership, then the EU will have to find some other mechanism by which to incorporate Turkey into the European security framework. Given Turkey's increasing active foreign policy and role as a transregional actor on the European periphery, Turkish policy decisions and actions will have ramifications of ever more significance and importance for European security.²³⁴ This dynamic will continue to become more apparent in the coming years, as the center of gravity in the EU shifts eastward with the gradual institutionalization of the Union's new members and the EU's future expansion into the Balkans (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, etc). The impact of Turkey on security within the expanding European Union will only become more important in the future, and the Union will simply have to come to some sort of an arrangement with Turkey, for its own sake if nothing else.

Much depends, however, on what sort of security role the EU sees itself, and is capable of, taking on in the future. As the third chapter noted, in the absence of clear and undisputed leadership of the EU's security project akin to that provided by the US in NATO, this becomes a function of how the preferences of different EU member states evolve and align. This also makes it particularly difficult to assess the future trajectory of the ESDP. However, if the EU does decide to stay the course and concentrate on bridging the gap between its lofty foreign and security policy goals and its capabilities, as well as on playing a larger role in both regional and global security, then the significant nature of the potential Turkish contribution to European security will continue to enhance Turkey's candidacy for EU membership. On the other hand, if the EU decides to trim back its foreign and security policy goals and not undertake the significant political and economic costs associated with playing a global security role, then Turkey's potential contribution to the ESDP will no longer be of much use as its 'trump card' in the accession process and Turkish membership would seem to become an ever more distant dream.

²³⁴Kramer and Muller, p.182.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Anderson, Guy. "Discrepancy between US and ROW spending is highlighted agains," *Jane's Defense Industry*, June 07, 2005. From website, http://www.janes.com/regional_news/europe/news/jdi/jdi050607_1_n.shtml.
2. Art, Robert J. "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War." *International Security*. Vol. 15. No. 4. Spring 1991.
3. Aybet, Gülnur. *The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-91*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1997.
4. Aydın, Mustafa. "Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*. Vol. 3. No.2. May 2003.
5. Barbe, Esther and Laia Mestres. "CFSP Watch 2004 Spain." From Fornet website, <http://fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%202004%20Spain.pdf>.
6. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. From website, <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#23>.
7. Bilgin, Pinar. "Turkey and the EU: Yesterday's Answers to Tomorrow's Security Problems?," EU Civilian Crisis Management Conflict Studies Research Centre. From website, www.csrc.ac.uk.
8. Blomberg, Jakko. "Finland's Evolving Security Policy." *NATO Review*. April 22, 2002. From website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9301-3.htm>.
9. Boes, Stefan A. "Germany, France, and the Difficulties of European Defense." *Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de Weekly Digest*. From website, http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/digest/op-ed_05.php
10. Bush, G.W. "Transcript: We accept these burdens...." June 28, 2005. From website, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/06/28/bush.transcript/index.html>.
11. Campbell, Yvonne and Ben Tonra. "CFSP Watch 2003 Ireland." From Fornet website, <http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports/IRELAND%202003.pdf>.
12. Çarkoğlu, Ali and Barry Rubin (eds.). *Turkey and EU: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration, and International Dynamics*. Frank Cass: London, 2003.
13. Çayhan, Esra. "Turkey and the European Security and Defense Policy." *Turkey and the EU: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration, and International Dynamics*. Barry Rubin and Ali Çarkoğlu (eds.). London: Frank Cass. 2003.
14. Champion, Marc. "Alliance- Blair, Chirac, and the Voters." *Wall Street Journal*. March 14, 2003. p.A.1

15. Chirac, Jacques. "Full text: Chirac UN speech." 23 September, 2003. BBC News. From website, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3133902.stm>.
16. The CIA. "Turkey." The CIA World Fact Book 2004. From website, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/tu.html>.
17. Cimbalò, Jeffrey. "Saving NATO from Europe." *Foreign Affairs*. November/December 2004.
18. CNN. "Chirac lashes out at 'new Europe.'" February 18, 2003. From CNN.com website, <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac/index.html>.
19. CNN. "Old Europe' hits back at Rumsfeld." January 24, 2003. From CNN.com website, www.cnn.com.
20. Cohen-Taguni, Laurent. "The Outlook for CFSP after the Iraq War." In "Fresh Perspectives on Europe's Security."
21. Comelli, Michele. "CFSP Watch 2004- Italy," p.2, from website, http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20WATCH%202004_Italy_2.pdf.
22. Cornish, Paul. *Partnership in Crisis: The US, Europe and the fall and rise of NATO*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1997.
23. Cornish, Paul. "European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO." *International Affairs (The Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*. Vol.72. No.4. The Americas: European Security (Oct. 1996).
24. Courela, Pedro. "CFSP Watch 2003 Portugal," From Fornet website, <http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports/PORTUGAL%202003.pdf>
25. Croci, Osvoldo. "Italian Security Policy in the 1990s." Working paper presented at the 52nd Annual Conference of the UK Political Science Association, April 2002. From website, www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2002/croci.pdf.
26. De Durand, Etienne. "French security policy under the new government." The Brookings Institution US-France Analysis Series. November 2002. Available online from Brookings Institute website, www.brook.edu.
27. Dempsey, Judy and Alexander Nicoll. "When push comes to shove: The European defence force has taken shape faster than even its supporters dared hope. But differences with Turkey over Nato stand in the way." *Financial Times*. London edition. London (UK). Apr 30, 2001.
28. Dempsey, Judy. "Turkey sees risks in EU deal to access NATO assets." *The Financial Times*. June 9, 2001. p.14.
29. Dempsey, Judy. "Greece Puts EU Defense Force Plans at Risk." *The Financial Times*. May 11, 2002. Section: Europe, p.6.
30. Dempsey, Judy and Leyla Boulton. "US rethinks NATO Macedonia mission." *The Financial Times*. November 15, 2002.

31. *The Economist*. "A fractured alliance." 2/15/2003. Vol.366. Issue 8311. p.25.
32. *The Economist*. "A Survey of Turkey." March 19, 2005. p.1.
33. *The Economist*. "Blair's defence offensive." November 14, 1998. Vol. 349. Iss. 8094. pp. 61-62.
34. *The Economist*. "Charlemagne: How terrorism trumped federalism." October 2, 2004. p.31
35. *The Economist*. "Charlemagne: Of head and heart." July 30, 2005. p.31.
36. *The Economist*. "Charlemagne: Taking on the bear." May 7th, 2005. p.31.
37. *The Economist*. "Playing at Euro-soldiers." Nov. 26, 1994. p. 56.
38. *The Economist*. "Oil over troubled waters." May 28, 2005. p.34.
39. *The Economist*. "Turkey belongs in Europe." 12/7/2002.Vol.365. Issue 8302. p.13.
40. *The Economist*. "Uncommon Disarray; Europe's foreign policy." February 22, 2003. Vol.366. No.8312. p.15.
41. *The Economist*. "Undermining NATO?" May 1, 2003.
42. Eralp, Atila. "Turkey and the EU in the post-Cold War Era." *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds.). Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2000.
43. European Council. Presidential Conclusions. Cologne European Council 3 and 4 June 1999. Available online from EU website, http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a3.
44. European Council. The Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002. From website, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf.
45. European Council. Presidency Conclusions. European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001. From website, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf.
46. European Council. Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999. Available online from EU website, www.europa.eu.int.
47. European Union. "A Constitution for Europe: Common Foreign and Security Policy." From the EU's website, europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/foreignpolicy_en.htm.
48. European Union. EU Constitution. From EU website, europa.eu.int/constitution/en/ptoc4_en.htm.
49. European Union. Treaty of Amsterdam. Available from EU website, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html#0092010003>.

50. European Union. Treaty of Maastricht. Available online from EU website, <http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entr2f.htm#16>.
51. Farwick, Dieter. "Interview with Austrian MoD Guenther Platter." *The Washington Times*. May 29, 2005.
52. Fianna Fail. "O'Dea reaffirms Ireland's commitment to Triple Lock." October 21, 2004. From Fianna Fail website, <http://www.willieodea.ie/natnews.asp?StoryID=294>.
53. Frangakis, Nikos, et al. "CFSP Watch 2004 Greece." From Fonet website, <http://fonet.info/CFSPAnnualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Greece.pdf>.
54. Gordon, Michael. "Turkey offers troops for new European force, with proviso." *The New York Times*. November 22, 2000.
55. Glume, Galia. "CFSP Watch 2004 – Belgium." From Fonet website, <http://www.fonet.info/CFSPAnnualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Belgium.pdf>.
56. Grossman, Marc. "NATO's Role in the Next Millennium: Constant and Emerging Goals." US Foreign Policy Agenda. March 1999. From website, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0399/ijpe/pj19gros.htm>.
57. Hamilton, Douglas. "Turkey Blocks Deal to Share NATO Force." *The Washington Post*. December 16, 2000. From www.washingtonpost.com.
58. Hartley, Keith and Todd Sander. "NATO Burden Sharing: Past and Future." *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 36. No.6. November 1999.
59. Hatfield, Richard. "The Consequences of St. Malo." Speech given on April 28, 2000 at the Paris Institut Francais des Relations Internationales. Available online from UK MoD website, http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_speech.asp?newsItem_id=468.
60. Havel, Vaclav. Speech to the Council of Europe. May 10, 1990. From website, http://old/hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1990/1005_uk/htm.
61. Hen-Tov, Eliot. "The Political Economy of Turkish Military Modernization." *MERIA*. Vol.8. No.4. Dec.2004.
62. Herolf, Gunilla. "CFSP Watch 2004 Sweden." From Fonet website, <http://fonet.info/CFSPAnnualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Sweden.pdf>.
63. Horsley, William. "Analysis: Eastern Europe reborn." April 26, 2004. From BBCNews website, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3231199.stm>.
64. Hurd, Douglas. "Developing the CFSP." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944-)*. Vol. 70. No. 3. Jul. 1994.
65. *Hurriyet*. "NATO'da Türkiye ile AB restleşmesi." From website, <http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/00/12/15/dunya/35dun.htm>.
66. Jones, Dorian. "Turkey's booming people trade," BBCNews, June 5, 2002, from website, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2024943.stm>.

67. Kat, Şule. "The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s." *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2001.
68. Kitfield, James. "Will Europe ruin NATO?." *Air Force Magazine*. October 2000. Vol.83. No.10.
69. Kohl, Radek. "CFSP Watch Czech Republic 2004." From Fornet website, <http://fornet.info/CFSPAnnualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Czech%20Republic.pdf>.
70. Knahl, Tobias. "Turkey: The long road to EU accession." *Handelskammer Hamburg*. 5/11/2003. From website, http://www.hk24.de/HK24/HK24/produktmarken/index.jsp?url=http%3A//www.hk24.de/HK24/HK24/servicemarken/ueber_uns/hamburger_wirtschaft/englische_artikel/Turkey.jsp.
71. Kramer, Heinz and Friedemann Muller. "Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries." *Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East*. Robert Blackwill and Michael Strumer, (eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,. 1997.
72. Krauthammer, Charles. "Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World." 2004 Irving Kristol Lecture. AEI Annual Dinner in Washington. February 10, 2004. From website, <http://www.aei.org/news19912>.
73. Kuniholm, Bruce. "Turkey and the West." *Foreign Affairs*. Spring 1991. Vol. 70. No. 2.
74. Kupchan, Charles A. "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity." *International Security*. Vol. 23. No. 2. Autumn 1998.
75. Lanier, Stephen. "Military Trends in Turkey: Strengths and Weaknesses." October 14, 2004. From www.csis.org.
76. Larrabee, Stephen. "An American Perspective on the ESDI." From website, <http://turkishstudies.org/reportsb.html>.
77. Larsen, Henrik. "Denmark and the EU's defense dimension: Opt-out across the board?" From website, <http://www.ecsa.dk/larsen.pdf>.
78. Leffler, Melvyn. "9/11 and American Foreign Policy." *Diplomatic History*. Vol.29. Issue 3.
79. Lesser, Ian O. "Beyond 'Bride or Barrier': Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West." *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*.
80. Lindey-French, Julian. "State of the Union: France and UK are Destined to Compete." *The Wall Street Journal Europe*. 18 September 2003.
81. Lungu, Sorin. "Attitudes Towards European Security, 1990-1997." Available from UNC website, www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_11/lungu.htm.

82. Luxembourg Report. Available from Leiden University website, <http://www.ellopos.net/politics/davignon.htm>,
83. Makovsky, Alan. "Turkey's Faded European Dream." Conference Report: "The Parameters of the Partnership: Germany, the US, and Turkey." October 1997. Johns Hopkins University. From AICGS website, <http://www.aicgs.org/Publications/PDF/turkey1.pdf>.
84. Melakopides, Costas. "CFSP Watch 2004 Cyprus." From Fonet website, <http://www.fonet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Cyprus.pdf>.
85. Missiroli, Antonio. "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP." *Security Dialogue*. Vol.33 (1). 2002.
86. Missiroli, Antonio. "Occasional Papers No. 34: Bigger EU, Wider CFSP, Stronger ESDP?" April 2002. From EU website, www.europe.eu.int.
87. Monaco, Annalisa. "NATO Looks at the Gang of Four's Proposal." *NATO Notes*. Vol. 5. No.5. 28. May 2003. From ISIS website, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/download/nato%20gang4-%20nn%20v5n5.pdf>
88. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. *Europe in Change: Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.
89. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. "Turkey's Roles in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies." *Security Dialogue*. 2000. Vol.31(4).
90. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. "Turkey and the USA at the Crossroads: The Impact of the War in Iraq." Forthcoming *International Journal*. Vol.60. No.3. Summer 2005.
91. Nastase, Dorina. "The Merger of the CFSP and the WEU: A Step Ahead in Integration?" From website, http://ro.crsg.ro/Lucrari/WE_EU.pdf.
92. *National Review*. "Turkey Shoot." December 31, 1997. p.17.
93. NATO. *NATO Handbook*. Chapter 12. "The Military Command Structure-CJTF Concept." Available online from NATO website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1204.htm>.
94. NATO. *NATO Handbook*. Chapter 15. "The Wider Institutional Framework for Security: the WEU." Available online at, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1504.htm>.
95. NATO. NATO Ministerial Communique M-NAC-1(96)63. Available from website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm>.
96. NATO. NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)-64 24 April 1999. From website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>.
97. NATO. NATO Washington Summit Communique. Press Release NAC-S (99) 64 1999. From website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>.
98. North Atlantic Treaty. From website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>.

99. The Netherlands Ministry of Defense. "Facts and figures on Dutch security policy and armed forces." MOD Office of Information, July 2004.
100. Oguzlu, H. Tarik. "An Analysis of Turkey's Prospective Membership in the European Union from a 'Security' Perspective." *Security Dialogue*. Vol. 34 (3).
101. O'Sullivan, John. "The Curse of Euro-Nationalism: Why the US should beware the EU." *National Review*. August 6, 2001. p.32-35.
102. "Paper No. 2: Multinational Defense Cooperation." British Ministry of Defense. From website, <http://www.mod.uk/issues/cooperation/multinational.htm>.
103. Park, Bill. "Turkey, Europe, and ESDI: Inclusion or Exclusion?" *Defense Analysis*. Vol. 16. No.3.
104. Phillips, David. "Turkey's Dreams of Accession." *Foreign Affairs*. Sept/Oct 2004. Vol.83. Issue 5.
105. Posen, Barry. "The Unipolar Moment and the ESDP." Working paper. From website, www.yale.edu/irspeakers/Posen%20-%20EuropeTheoryessay.doc.
106. Quaisser, Wolfgang and Steve Wood. *Intereconomics*. Nov/Dec 2004. Vol.39. Issue 6.
107. "Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, April 23-25 1999." Available online from NATO website, www.nato.int.
108. Rezac, David. "CFSP Watch 2004 Austria," from Fonet website, <http://fonet.info/CFSPAnnualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Austria.pdf>.
109. Rittenberger, Volker. "Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International Relations Theory." Working Paper presented at ISA Meeting March 2002.
110. Rubin, Barry. "Turkey: A Transformed International Role," *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*.
111. Schauble, Wolfgang. "Talking Turkey." *Foreign Affairs*. Nov/Dec 2004. Vol.83. Issue 6.
112. Schnabel, Rockwell. "US View on the European CFSP." Available online from the Watson Institute website, <http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/9.2/EU/Schnabel.pdf>.
113. Schroder, Gerhard. Speech at Opening of Federal College for Security Studies..22.03.04. From German Embassy website, http://www.german-embassy.org.uk/speech_by_chancellor_schroder.html.
114. Serra, Eduardo. "Reinventing global security." In "Fresh Perspectives on Europe's Security." *The New Defense Agenda*. Winter 2004.

115. SIPRI Yearbook 2005. Online at, http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf.
116. Solana, Javier. "A Secure Europe in a Better World." From ISS website, www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf.
117. St. Malo Declaration, From website, <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html>.
118. Steyn, Mark. "Eurovision dies a death." *The Daily Telegraph*. May 24, 2005.
119. Strand, Jukka-Pekka. "CFSP Watch- 2004- Finland." From Fonet website, <http://fonet.info/CFSPAnnualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Finland.pdf>.
120. The Swedish Defense Commission. "Swedish Security in Light of International Change." February 1998.
121. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Synopsis of Turkish Foreign Policy." From www.mfa.gov.tr.
122. UK Ministry of Defense. "Defense Policy 2001: Policy Priorities-National and European Security." From UK Ministry of Defense website, <http://www.mod.uk/issues/policy2001/priorities.htm>.
123. US Air Force. "National Military Strategy of the US." From website, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nms/nms2004.pdf>.
124. *US News and World Report*. "Communism's Collapse Poses a Challenge to America's Military." Vol. 3. No. 16. October 14, 1991. p.16.
125. Valasek, Tomas. "The 'Easternization' of ESDP after EU Enlargement." NDADigital Discussion Paper: "Fresh Perspectives on Europe's Security." The New Defense Agenda. Winter 2004.
126. Van Eekelen, Wim. "The Transatlantic Defense Relationship After September 11, 2001." NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Subcommittee on Transatlantic Defense and Security Cooperation. November, 2002. From NATO PA website, www.nato-pa.int.
127. Van Ham, Peter. "Europe Gets Real: The New Security Strategy Shows the EU's Geopolitical Maturity." From American Institute for Contemporary German Studies website, www.aicgs.org/c/vanham/htm.
128. Van Herpen, Marcel. "France: Champion of a Multipolar World." From website, <http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue19/vol2issue19vanherpen.html>.
129. Von Bastian, Giegerich. "Mugged by Reality: German Defense in Light of the 2003 Policy Guidelines." Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy. 12.10.2003. From website, www.diasonline.org.

130. Von Dubelndorf-Solenberger, Tomas M. "The Direction of German Security Policy in an Expanded NATO." Speech delivered to the Atlantic Council of the US, September 1998. From website, <http://www.acus.org/publications/bulletins/nato/GermanSecurity.html>.

131. Waltz, Kenneth. "The Balance of Power and NATO Expansion." Working Paper 5.66. October 1998. From website, www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/europe4.doc.

132. Webber, Mark et al. "The Common European Security and Defense Policy and the 'Third Country' Issue." *European Security*. Vol. 11. No.2. Summer 2002.

133. Yosh, David. *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Role in International Security*. Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace Press, 1998.