

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE TURKISH LEFT: AN UNFINISHED DREAM

by
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ABSTRACT

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One of the primary debates in Turkish political science literature is the surprisingly weak and rigid character of the center-left parties which caused social democracy to become a generic name for a progressive political culture and attitude instead of a fully-fledged ideology. This is more clearly seen when Turkish mainstream left parties are juxtaposed to their European counterparts. This is mainly an epistemological problem that revolves around the question of whether Turkish mainstream left ideology is compatible with the universal norms of social democracy.

The aim of this study is to examine the roots and parameters of the inability of Social Democratic Populist Party to reformulate its static organizational body in accordance with societal demands and reinvigorate its ideology and political programme to better address the contemporary problems. A comprehensive analysis of the intra-party debates that occurred in this period is conducted by linking them with the important developments in the Turkish political landscape to detect epistemological causes of the question at hand. The ideological crisis of Turkish social democracy during the early 1990s is thoroughly discussed to get a full account of the intra-party attempts for renewal and understand why they have failed.

The study has revealed that the failure of the SDPP leadership to more closely adopt the universal norms of social democracy is closely tied to the demise of statism that restrained the organizational structure and mission of the party, the crisis of Turkish modernity that distanced the party administration from the constituent groups and decline of Kemalism that challenged the ideological framework of Turkish center-left.

ÖZET

SOSYAL DEMOKRAT HALKÇI PARTİ VE TÜRK SOLUNUN DONÜŞÜMÜ: BİTMEYEN RÜYA

Berk Esen

Siyaset Bilimi, M. A Tezi, 2005

Doç. Dr. Hasan Bülent Kahraman

Anahtar sözcükler: Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Türk solu, Kemalizm, Sosyal Demokrasi

Türk siyaset bilimindeki ana tartışmalardan biri, merkez sol partilerinin zayıf ve kati karakterlerinin sosyal demokrasinin tam vücut bulmuş bir ideoloji olmak yerine, ilerici politik kültür ve tutumları genel olarak tanımlayan bir jenerik kavram haline gelmesine neden olmasındır. Bu durum Türkiye’deki merkez sol partilerin Avrupa’daki karşıtları ile yan yana konulmasıyla daha açık görülebilir. Bu Türk merkez sol düşüncesinin evrensel sosyal demokrasinin değerleri ile ne kadar uyduğu ile ilgili epistemolojik bir sorundur.

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Partisinin durağan/devletçi örgütünün toplumsal talepler ve sorunlar karşısında ideolojisini ve programını, bu beklentiler ve taleplerin doğrultusunda yenileyememesin altındaki sebepleri ve çerçeveyi açıklamaya çalışıyor. Bu esnada, parti içersinde olgunlaşan tartışmaları, güncel Türk siyasetinin ana noktaları ile kapsamlı bir şekilde inceleyip ve bağdaştırıp, epistemolojik nedenselleri gün ışığına çıkarılmaya çalışıldı. Türk sosyal demokrasininin 1990’larda girmiş olduğu ideolojik krizi, partiler arasında ve içersinde neden yenilenemediğini ve başarısızlığa uğradığını anlamak için, detaylı bir şekilde incelenmektedir.

Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, SHP yönetiminin evrensel sosyal demokrasi normlarını benimseyememesinin arkasında yatan temel faktörlerin başında, partinin ideolojik misyonunu ve örgütsel yapısını sınırlayan devletçi unsurların, parti yönetimini seçmen gruplarından uzaklaştıran Türk modernite krizinin ve Türk solunun ideolojik yapısını sarsan Kemalizmin gerilemesinin geldiğini göstermiştir.

*Yetiřmemde büyük katkıları olan, zamansız kaybettiđim
dedem, Mehmet etin ve anneannem, řerife etin'e*

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|----|
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| CHAPTER 1. GLOBAL CRISIS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: END OF HISTORY? | 6 |
| 1.1 Keynesianism and the Developmental State | 6 |
| 1.2 Emergence of New Right Hegemony | 10 |
| 1.3 The New Labor and the End of Class Politics | 13 |
| 1.4 The Collapse of the Centrally-Planned Economies | 16 |
| 1.5 Globalization Phenomenon and the End of History | 22 |
| 1.6 The Retreat of the Nation-State and the Global Crisis of Social Democracy | 27 |
| CHAPTER 2. THE CRISIS OF STATISM: A STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL | 30 |
| 2.1 The Disintegration of Import Substitution Model | 30 |
| 2.2 The Rise of the Turkish New-Right | 35 |
| 2.3 The Emergence of Civil Society | 40 |
| 2.4 Unorthodox Liberalism | 42 |
| 2.5 Turkish Left Triumphant | 50 |
| 2.6 New Politics for New Times | 54 |
| 2.7 The Struggle for Survival | 58 |
| CHAPTER 3: THE CRISIS OF TURKISH MODERNITY AND ATTEMPTS FOR RENEWAL | 63 |
| 3.1 Turkish Modernization | 63 |
| 3.2 1980 Coup as a Kemalist Restoration Project | 69 |
| 3.3 Identity Politics | 76 |
| 3.4 Kurdish Radicalism | 78 |
| 3.5 Alevi Revivalism | 88 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| CHAPTER 4: 1990s AND THE CRISIS OF KEMALISM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW PARADIGM | 95 |
| 4.1 Liberal Challenge | 96 |
| 4.2 Islamic Resurgence | 108 |
| 4.3 Kemalist Response | 117 |
| 4.4 The Return to Roots | 121 |
| CONCLUSION | 125 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 129 |

INTRODUCTION

One of the primary academic discussions in the Turkish political science literature is the surprisingly weak and rigid character of the mainstream left parties under whose control social democracy has become a generic name for a progressive political values and attitude instead of an ideology. This ideological poverty and lack of an authentic source of Turkish social democracy are clearly seen when Turkish center-left parties are juxtaposed to their European counterparts, which have found ways of resisting the New Right hegemony in the course of the 1990s by undertaking ideological openings with the discourses of the 'liberal left' and 'third way'.

Resting on the primary tenets of the founding ideology of the state, indeed Turkish social democracy significantly diverges from the universal social democratic norms and, therefore, lacks the pragmatic approach of the aforementioned ideology. And in this parochial nature, Turkish social democracy has resisted to the inner attempts of an ideological reconfiguration despite the rapid transformation of the society along the lines of economic development and politico-cultural change. In other words, Turkish social democracy continued to act and was seen by the masses, first and foremost, as a state ideology that could establish few ties with the existing social groups.

This relatively compact and uniform political culture, feeding of the Kemalist discourse of Turkish modernity and the state-centric Turkish political order could survive in the pre-1980 period by remaining apart from the society and acting in the name of transforming that body. Even the radical break with the past that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s by the left of center movement was a revision attempt within the hegemonic Kemalist paradigm. The recent political, economic and social changes, however, brought the problematic position of Turkish social democracy to light by challenging the three main pillars upon which its ideological framework is constructed. A full discussion of the crisis of Turkish social democracy, then, first requires the exploration of the symbiotic relationship of Turkish social democracy with these three sources, namely the Kemalist hegemonic discourse, state-led modernization and statism, as a political model.

In the immediate years following the 1980 coup, the former RPP ranks were disintegrated faced with the restrictions of the coup generals and the movement, left without its natural leader, was divided among, at one time, three different parties as

well as many opposing intra-party factions and small cliques. Nevertheless, it is in this period that the concept of social democracy was used in its own right by a political party, thereby creating much of a dispute within left-wing politics in the coming years. This attempt of seeking a clear break with the primordial tenets of Kemalism also entailing a separation from the state-led Turkish modernity with its authoritarian elements is unique in the republican history and, therefore, needs a more detailed analysis than it has so far received.

In contrast to many foreign researches and studies conducted on the function and significance as well as the history of political parties, there are only a limited number of credible and objective academic sources on Turkish parties in the political science literature. Nevertheless even by Turkish standards it is appalling to find that not a single book was written specifically on the social democratic parties in spite of the important role played by, first, SDP and, after the merger, SDPP which managed to gather most of the former RPP ranks under its body and represented the views, ideals and aspirations of the Turkish mainstream left even under the tight framework of the September 12 regime for a decade in the post-1980 Turkish politics. While the SDP-SDPP period is ignored and omitted from the history of the Turkish left, it is assumed that the sole purpose and mission of these parties were to become a temporary resting stop for the former RPP ranks and continue the RPP tradition when the natural bearer of this task was gone. Hence with the return of RPP to Turkish politics in early 1990s it was expected and, even, demanded by quite a substantial number of leftists that SDPP return to its roots and dissolve under the newly opened party.

It is in these conditions that the Turkish social democracy, despite some inner attempts and programmatic demands of some groups in SDPP, missed the opportunity of redesigning itself in light of the emergence of neo-liberal economic policies and development of alternative modernities and failed to challenge the hegemonic discourse of the state and carry the democratization demands of the society against the tight political framework envisaged by the coup architects. This is mainly an epistemological problem that needs to be explored in terms of disclosing the parameters of Turkish social democracy. A comprehensive analysis of the soul-searching process in SDPP during this period, significant for revealing the epistemological limits of the Turkish social democracy, would also entail us to better situate the ideological course of the Turkish left in the post-1965 period encompassed by RPP.

In this thesis the ideological crisis of Turkish social democracy in the early 1990s represented by SDPP will be analyzed by focusing on the background of these intra-party conflicts and ideological debates to demonstrate a full account of the attempt for renewal in the post-1980 period on the basis of the universal principles of social democracy. The scope of this debate could be followed from the large literature of theoretical books written by the prominent figures of the Turkish social democracy at the time with the purpose of altering the ongoing struggle and factional conflicts within SDPP. Focusing on the roots and parameters of the intra-party debates on the conditions of Turkish social democracy with its close ties to the state and its founding ideology from a micro-level by mainly limiting the scope of this study to a political party, namely SDPP, one could also reveal some important aspects of the general crisis of Turkish social democracy on a macro level and come closer to understand its failure in the Turkish context. This thesis, then, also covers in its background the political discourse prevalent in Turkish politics in the 1980s and early 1990s, covering a wide scope of events characterized by, first, a relative liberalization of the economic and the political system and, then, a resurgence of the nationalist tide.

The constant declines in the amount of popular support for the social democratic parties and the tendency of the Turkish electorate to vote for center-right parties could not provide us with adequate explanations as they are only the results rather than the causes of this problem. Moreover, as the political turn of events in the 1980s have shown, given the right conditions, even a center-left party could gain popularity with the masses and win an election. Alas, this crisis is mainly an epistemological problem whose roots are historically and organizationally established. My efforts in this thesis have focused on the roots of this epistemological crisis which have rendered all attempts of ideological renewal in SDPP futile.

The overall aim of this thesis is to analyze the roots and causes of the inability of SDPP to renew its static body in accordance with societal demands and reinvigorate its ideology to better address the contemporary problems. In doing so, however, this thesis explores the multi-dimensional crisis of the Turkish social democracy, experienced by SDPP in the post-1980 period. The thesis argues that the failure to break from RPP heritage and the Kemalist framework could neither be attributed to one dominant factor nor explained by pointing out the leadership and organizational problems experienced in the 1980s and early 1990s. It is for this reason that a comprehensive analysis of the Turkish social democracy in the post-1980 period

needs to be made by focusing on the demise of statism in light of the economic liberalization during Ozal era, the crisis of Turkish modernity with its state-centric model and the crisis of Kemalism which has lost its hegemonic control over the society.

In the first chapter a theoretic framework which explains the techno-economic developments in the last quarter of the 20th century is presented. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the multi-faceted changes, paving the way for the demise of Keynesianism accompanied by the rise of New Right politics. In addition a full account of the crisis of modernity and retreat of the nation-state model is given. The crisis originates from the major structural changes in the techno-economic realm which contributed to the restructuring of global capitalism and the collapse of centrally-planned economies as well as reflexive transformation of modernity that caused radicalization of democracy. Hence, it is indicated that with the exhaustion of the forces propelled by French and Bolshevik revolutions, social democratic ideology has undergone a transformation to break apart from its reliance on an authoritarian notion of modernity and its corporatist ties with the state, thereby appealing to the new social and political movements in the society and endorsing the rising multicultural and pluralistic views of the globalization process.

In the second chapter a detailed analysis of the economic developments in the post-1980 period is conducted to summarize the demise of statism in the Turkish context and the relative liberalization of the economic and, later, political spheres. This issue would be mainly explored taking into consideration the symbiotic relationship between the state and the Turkish social democracy. It will be shown that the rejection of a genuine social democratic ideology and reliance on a state-centric model disabled SDPP from presenting a credible alternative to the neo-liberal agenda of Motherland Party.

In the third chapter, the crisis of Turkish modernity in the post-1980 period with the recent economic changes in the society is explored. This period has witnessed the development of alternative modernity challenging the state-led process and the emergence of identity politics in accordance with the increasing social and economic power of ethnic, cultural and sectarian groups in the society. The central argument is that the rise of identity politics which have emancipated Alevi and Kurdish groups from their previous boundaries led many groups within SDPP to make demands from the party administration that could not be met. In consequence, SDPP would be

increasingly insulated from the societal demands and pressures as the ties with these groups were broken, thus paving the way for the melting of the party in terms of popular support.

In the fourth chapter, the main liberal and Islamic challenges to Kemalism in the early 1990s are analyzed from the point of view of the SDPP ranks. These debates which have been publicized to the society thanks to the emergence of private media had a profound impact on the intra-party debates in SDPP and some of these Kemalism criticisms were indeed shared by some party members. The concern of this chapter will be the results and repercussions of these debates for the soul-searching process in the party. It is argued that these criticisms, once voiced by many intellectuals with close ties to the party, are omitted, ignored and even resisted by the party ranks following the rise of the Welfare Party, political assassination of Ugur Mumcu and the rise of neo-Kemalism.

In the last, concluding, chapter of the thesis a very short summary of the arguments in the thesis would be provided from a general framework to underscore the connections between the three main causes of the crisis of Turkish social democracy. Hence, the unprepared status of the Turkish left with its idiosyncrasies, contradictions and paradoxes would be displayed by emphasizing the main political events that came to pave the way for the decline and collapse of SDPP. Doubtless the argument that the difficulties faced by SDPP in terms of adjusting to the economic, political and social changes are a result of the epistemological crisis of Turkish social democracy will be put forward.

In the thesis, a two-level analysis would be presented by first discussing the political, economic and social changes caused by the main element discussed in the chapter and then a detailed account of their effects on the conditions of SDPP would be given. Hence the thesis will provide an in-depth analysis of the changing nature of the Turkish society in the post-1980 period with an eye towards their consequences for SDPP. It is, however, important to note that the thesis is neither a political nor a historical analysis of the party itself, though there is a great need for academic studies on both topics. SDPP is mainly used to have a greater access to the Turkish social democracy at that period.

CHAPTER 1

GLOBAL CRISIS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: THE END OF HISTORY?

World economy is undergoing a process of restructuring that has profoundly reshaped capital-labor relations, socio-spatial contexts and the role of the state in an effort to overcome the structural crisis, prevalent since the early 1970s. This development has occurred simultaneously but also somewhat fueled by the revolution in the information technologies. The revolution in the techno-economic realm has profoundly changed the material foundation of the society by updating the scientific and technological framework of our civilization and, as a consequence, by bringing the demise of statism with the sudden collapse of Soviet Communism and China's incorporation into global capitalism and the disintegration of national development schemas of the developing countries with their shift from import substitution industrialization to export-oriented economic models and restructuring of capitalism in response to the erosion of economic Keynesianism and social welfarism to be replaced by informational or managerial capitalism. The rise of this new form of capitalism would connect the global financial markets through the internationalization of capital and prompt the globalization process in the 1990s. The restructuring of capitalism, however, have also taken place simultaneously with the rise of libertarian values and the emergence of new social movements since the late 1960s which, together with the economic developments, propel the completion of modernity and introduce a new politico-cultural phase of radical form of modernity, taken as far as post-modernity. Based upon these radical socio-economic changes and political transformations, the last few decades have witnessed the occurrence of three related developments which have profoundly shaken the primary roots of social democracy and triggered its structural crisis. Thus, this chapter aims to analyze these developments and explain how the demise of Keynesianism, retreat of the nation state model and the crisis of modernity came to have an impact on social democratic parties at large.

1.1 Keynesianism and the Developmental State

For nearly over thirty years after the Second World War, Keynesianism, based on the premise that capitalist economies are subject to structural weakness in generating sufficient demand which could only be resolved through public spending,

constituted the dominant paradigm in the field of economics.¹ Profoundly influenced by the disastrous experiences of the Great Depression and the Second World War, during which faith in the rationality of the markets stood at a historic low, a generation of economists, journalists and policymakers came to embrace Keynesian economics and supported the development of the welfare state.² The primary elements of Keynesianism have been the economic centrality of the mass production, the hierarchical and bureaucratic organization of capital and wage labor achieved by the socio-political compromise established among economic classes in the post-war period.³ This was the period in which governments have assumed a primary role in the management of economic policies to ensure the protection of citizens against social risks as a relief from the market forces.⁴

In the initial decades of the post-war period, state interventionism, in general, whether centrally planned economies in socialist countries, import-substitution models in the post-colonial and Third World countries,⁵ or export-promotion industrialization in East Asia,⁶ and Keynesianism in the European context, in particular, proved to be highly successful in building and expanding cities, developing new industries, undertaking large-scale development projects, managing social security, health care and education issues.⁷ However, this Keynesian era came to a halt in the mid 1970s, when the world economy, faced with economic dislocations associated with the Vietnam War and the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, resulting in the decline of the growth and profit rates, reached its historical limits.⁸

¹ John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, London: Harvest Book, 1994

² John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalisation*, London: William Heinemann, 2000 p. 16

³ Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, p. 140

⁴ Douglas E. Ashford, *The Emergence of the Welfare State*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986

⁵ Nigel Haris, *The End of the Third World*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986

⁶ Mohamed Arif and Hal Hill, *Export-Oriented Industrialization: the ASEAN Experience*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995

⁷ One of the most useful sources that analyze the history of the relationship between governments and markets is Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That is Remaking the Modern World* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998

⁸ Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy, *The Neoliberal Counter-Revolution*, in *Neoliberalism A Critical Reader*, Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnson (eds.), London: Pluto Press, 2005, p. 9-19

In response to the stagnant growth, spiraling inflation and balance-of-payments crises, only made worse by the practice of Keynesian fiscal methods, many governments have resorted to the strategy of shifting from fixed to floating exchange rates, signaling the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system. Due to its inability to deal with the stagflation of the 1970s, many have articulated that Keynesianism is the primary cause of the economic crisis.⁹ Faced with the prospect of declining profits and rising interest rates, many large-scale firms sought way to restructure their production processes and balance their accounts by better utilizing their technological capabilities and exploiting the ongoing scientific innovations. Indeed, as Manuel Castells notes, “in periods of crisis the logic of capitalist development tends towards the reorganization of the bases for accumulation such that better and indeed new opportunities for accumulation can become possible in the future”.¹⁰ As a result, simultaneously with the breakdown of the post-war financial system, converging set of technologies in microelectronics, computing, telecommunications and optic-electronics in the late 1960s and 1970s induced the eruption of an information technology revolution.¹¹

The drastic technological advances in the information, transportation and communication sectors have rapidly reduced the cost of information processing¹² and transformed the existing material culture with this new techno-economic paradigm. More importantly, these new developments have commercialized knowledge and increased the speed of its diffusion among various social groups, eroding the control of the state over their transfer channels.¹³ Altering the entire production mechanisms of the capitalist economies and the socio-economic and political relationship between capital and labor, information technology facilitated the transition from industrial to

⁹ Frans Buelens (ed.) *Globalisation and the Nation-State*, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2000 p. 103

¹⁰ Manuel Castells, *Techno-economic restructuring, socio-political processes and spatial transformation: A Global Perspective*, in Jeffrey Henderson and Manuel Castells (eds.), *Global Restructuring and Territorial Development*, London: Sage Publications, 1987, p. 9

¹¹ Manuel Castells, *End of Millennium, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, vol III, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2001, p.367

¹² Manuel Castells, *The Rise of Network Society*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1988, pp. 39

¹³ Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, in Malcolm Waters (ed.), *Modernity: Critical Concepts* (vol IV), London and New York: Routledge, 1999, p. 161-177

post-industrial society¹⁴ with the emergence of a new development mode of post-industrialism.¹⁵ Under this new mode of development, source of productivity lies in the technological development oriented towards knowledge generation and information processing and communication.¹⁶

In the coming two decades, economies undergoing the process of transition into post-industrial stage have experienced an expansion of the service sector at the expense of the manufacturing sector with an extraordinary rise of professional, technical and managerial employment. Moreover, labor theory of value was replaced by knowledge theory of value relying on the primacy of human capital.¹⁷ The surge in transnational capital movements, exchange rates and credit flows, coupled with growing technological opportunities and management techniques, precipitated capitalism to undergo a period of restructuring characterized by greater flexibility in the production stages, resurgence of entrepreneurship¹⁸, decentralization of economic units, strengthening of capital vis-à-vis labor and global integration of financial markets. Peter Drucker notes that the multi-faceted transformation of capitalist economies of the industrial countries have facilitated the uncoupling of the primary-products economy from the industrial economy, the uncoupling of the industrial production from employment and capital movements becoming the driving force of the economy.¹⁹ Moreover, the rise of a managerial or 'soft capitalism'²⁰ adopting a softer approach by taking advantage of the psychology literature to improve the management techniques,²¹ particularly based on the development of a management

¹⁴ Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, New York: Basic Books, 1973 and Alain Touraine, *The Post-Industrial Society*, London: Wildwood House, 1974

¹⁵ Analyzing the same processes in the techno-economic realm, Manuel Castells used the terms informationalism and network society. See Castells, *End of Millennium*, 8

¹⁶ G. J. Mulgan, *Communication and Control: Networks and the New Economics of Communication*, New York: Guilford Press, 1991

¹⁷ Daniel Bell, *The Axial Age of Technology* Foreword: 1999, in *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*, NY: Basic Books, 1999, xvi

¹⁸ On this issue, see Peter Drucker, *Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles*, New York: Harper & Row, 1985

¹⁹ Peter Drucker, *The Changed World Economy in International Politics*, in Robert Art and Robert Jervis (eds.) Harper Collins: New York, 1996 p. 436-448

²⁰ Nigel Thrift *State Sovereignty, Globalization and the Rise of Soft Capitalism* in Colin Hay and David Marsh (eds.) *Demystifying Globalization*, New York: Palgrave, 2000, p. 71-105

²¹ *Ibid.*, 74-75.

know-how by business schools, management consultants and gurus.²² This had symbolized the demise of Fordism replaced by a new form of ‘flexible specialization’²³ and altered the mass production system by decentralization.

The constructive and symbiotic relationship between the state and the market in the post-war period came under strain in accordance with the developments in the techno-economic realm that challenged the central and hierarchical economic units. It is inevitable that the dissolution of the central authority systems including the state agencies, and the erosion of the collective bargaining process between employers and employees through decentralization of all hierarchical political and social organizations loosened Keynesianism. This has paved the way for the emergence of monetarism with its claim that economies have a tendency for automatically self-adjusting to full employment, so that any use of monetary or fiscal policy to reduce the unemployment beyond its natural rate generates inflation.²⁴ Based primarily on the writings of Hayek in the post-war period and later popularized by neo-liberal economists of the Chicago School of Economics, among others Friedman and Buchanan, in the 1960s and 1970s, monetarism was more suitable to this period of capitalist restructuring,²⁵ thanks to its pro-market premises.

1.2 The Emergence of New Right Hegemony

The neo-liberal paradigm has gradually restored the confidence towards the rationality of the markets and, thereby, challenged the central tenet of the Keynesian economics that free markets have a tendency to fail more frequently than the governments. Moreover, questioning the notion that the state is primarily responsible for the social welfare of the society, neo-liberal economists and policymakers aspired to uncouple the political duties of the state from the economic tasks it assumed over

²² J. L. Alvarez, *The International Popularization of Entrepreneurial Ideas*, in S. Clegg, and G. Palmer (eds.) *The Politics of Management Knowledge*, London: Sage, 1996

²³ David Harvey, *The Condition of Modernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, p. 121-201

²⁴ Thomas Palley, *From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism: Shifting Paradigms in Economics*, in *Neoliberalism A Critical Reader*, Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnson (eds.), London: Pluto Press, 2005, p. 20-29

²⁵ For a discussion of the role of multinational corporations in the international system see Robert Walters and David Blake, *The Politics of Global Economic Relations*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, p. 103-152

the decades.²⁶ The political priorities of the state shifted from the maximization of welfare to the promotion of the free market enterprises and the capital markets. The individualist and rationalist market-based model centered on a program of macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization of trade and destatisation of the economy rendered competitiveness at all levels of the society supreme.

Politics of the neo-liberal project devalued democracy as a political currency following the retreat of the welfare and developmental state models because market functions increasingly disable the state from interfering with the economic affairs of the society. Indeed, despite the efforts of a diverse coalition of pressure groups and political organizations to oppose liberalization measures to maintain a degree of protectionism, multinational companies and international investors have mostly succeeded in overcoming these obstacles and managing to level the playing field as to ensure same level of treatment for domestic and international actors in the economy.²⁷ In order to survive in a world of increasing trade, governing parties, regardless of their political affiliations, had to resort to the political mantra of competitiveness and follow the neo-liberal agenda. State-business-labor relations underwent profound changes by the rapid increase of international economic agents in the domestic market so that domestic firms were faced with heightened competition from outside without the opportunity of enjoying protection of the high tariffs.²⁸

In conjunction with the new form of capitalism associated with the neo-liberal paradigm, United States and Europe have witnessed the rapid rise of the New Right politics, whose agenda has effectively developed a hegemonic discourse, stretching beyond the political sphere during the 1980s. The New Right ideology flourished in Western industrialized countries during the transition to post-Fordist model of production and came to fill the vacuum created by the hegemonic crisis of American liberalism²⁹ which could not be addressed by any other political ideology, including

²⁶ Stuart Hall, "The Meaning of New Times," in *New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s*, eds. Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, London: Verso Books, 1991

²⁷ Frans Buelens (ed.) *Globalization and the Nation-State*, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2000 p. 120

²⁸ Jeffrey Hart, *Rival Capitalists: International Competitiveness in the United States, Japan and Western Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992

²⁹ Norman Barry, *The New Right*, London: Routledge, 1987

social democracy.³⁰ New Right political movements sought to reverse the economic trend of the past thirty years by shrinking the role of the state in economic activities and transfer power from labor unions and political organizations sympathetic to their interests to corporations. The central political tenet of the new-right agenda is “the negative unity of the disempowerment of government” that stand on the way of the operation of the market by rolling back the frontiers of the welfare state and eliminate the institutions, ideas and practices which were put in place by the “post-war consensus”³¹ or, in Thatcher’s words, “the progressive consensus”³². Tracing their policies to the writings of influential neo-liberal thinkers such as F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, new right administrations aimed nothing short of limiting the state to the minimal and advocated extremely individualist and libertarian norms, sharply distinguishing them from the post-war conservatives. 1980s witnessed the emergence of a greater political space for free-market views and, indeed, have been the era of the conquest of conservatism by the ideas and doctrines of the New Right in a Gramscian fashion.³³ In fact, the Socialist Mitterrand government that came to power in France in 1981 aspired to go on with the classical Keynesian model one more time - the so-called "Keynesianism in one country" , which utterly failed and, even before going down, Mitterrand had to cut back on his economic policies. This last and instigating blow would suspend the electory road for most of the socialist parties in Europe in that decade.

The rapid growth in worldwide trade and growing mobility of capital has undermined the autonomy of the domestic economies by connecting them to the web of global financial networks. The ascendancy of the free market mechanisms, symbolized under the slogan that ‘there is no alternative’, voiced frequently by Thatcher, came to be gradually accepted by governments, competing against one another to preserve their level of competitiveness.³⁴ Hence, many industrial societies experienced a shift from the welfare state model to “competition state” which is

³⁰ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *The Making and the Crisis of Turkish Social Democracy: Roots, Discourses and Strategies*, unpublished PhD. Thesis, 1999, p. 182-84

³¹ Kerry Schott, *The Rise of Keynesian economics: Britain 1940-64*, Stuart Hall et. al. *States & Societies*, Martha Robertson & Company, Oxford, 1984, p. 338-363

³² Margareth Thatcher, *The Revival of Britain*, 1989, p. 3

³³ John Gray, *Siyasi Dusunce İncelemeleri*, Ankara: Dost, 2004, p. 295

³⁴ For an excellent article on the excesses of competitiveness as part of a political agenda, see P. Krugman, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 1994, p. 28-44

“aimed at making economic activities located within the national territory, or which otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international development terms”.³⁵ Under this model, states could enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms more by indirect and infrastructural intervention than by subsidy or trade protection which has many macroeconomic repercussions in a global market economy.³⁶ Welfare-state reform, deregulation of key sectors and recommodification³⁷ of the labor market climbed up the agenda of governments in their efforts to improve the macroeconomic conditions and attract foreign investment.³⁸ In light of these economic developments, public expenditures are not lowered to a great extent but the government resources are increasingly allocated to those services that enhance overall productivity and secure investment environment instead of the non-productive elements in social expenditure. The necessity of staying competitive in the world economy drew even the social democratic states into a race to the bottom in terms of social provision and the wages.³⁹

1.3 The New Labor and the End of Class Politics

The demise of Keynesianism and transition into a post-industrial mode of development signaled the disintegration of the rigid class structure and barriers of the industrial society and provided ample opportunities of social mobility. As a result, the dominant issues of the old political paradigm such as distribution, security and economic growth could no longer galvanize masses as in the 1960s and 1970s and came to be replaced by issues related to body, health and sexual identity, ethnic and cultural heritage and environment.⁴⁰ Hence, political actions and processes began to

³⁵ P. Cerny, Structuring the political arena: public goods, states and governance in a globalising world, in R. Palan (ed.) *Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories*, London: Routledge, 2000

³⁶ R. Rosecrance, *Rise of Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, New York: Basic Books, 1988

³⁷ Decommodification has become an important concept in the social democracy literature with Gosta Esping-Andersen's 1990 book. For more information, see G. Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990

³⁸ P. G. Cerny, *The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990

³⁹ Chris Pierson, Globalization and the End of Social Democracy, *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 47, number 4, 2001, p. 459-474

⁴⁰ Claus Offe, *New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics*, *Social Research* 52, 4, 1985, p. 817-868

be increasingly decoupled from the production relations of the economy and thereby lost their class appeal.⁴¹ Major segments of the new middle class grew uneasy with the continuous demands and the militancy of the labor unions since the 1970s⁴² and much preferred to tolerate some reductions in the welfare programs in return for experiencing a higher degree of economic instrumentalism and more economic opportunities. Moreover, welfare programs in the advanced industrialized societies achieved most of their objectives and provided masses with a decent standard of living, facilitating the emergence of a “culture of contentment”.⁴³ This led some to argue that welfare state has been undermined by its own successes because those rising to the middle class conditions were less disposed to support the continuation of these programs. In addition, the rise of a post-industrial economy required a fundamental restructuring of the manufacturing sector by relocating the manufacture production away from the advanced industrial states to the newly-industrialized economies,⁴⁴ while those jobs that were left were increasingly taken by immigrants. These changes in the techno-economic realm weakened the bargaining power of the trade unions, made it increasingly difficult to sustain solidarity among worker groups and thereby brought the era of electoral socialism to an end.⁴⁵

Traditional working class parties across Europe experienced serious difficulties in appealing to the ‘class-aware but not class-conscious’ segments of the new middle class and could not successfully compete with the neo-liberal parties that managed to base their campaign platforms on a popular version of this new middle class politics. These parties experienced successive election defeats against neo-liberal parties and removed from power in some countries for over a decade due to their failure to comprehend the complex changes in global economy and address the ensuing socio-economic problems. Relying on the New Right hegemonic discourse, right has

⁴¹ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005: p. 117-118

⁴² Paul Hirst, *From Statism to Pluralism*, London: University College London Press, 1997, p. 143

⁴³ John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Culture of Contentment*, London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992

⁴⁴ F. Froebel, J. Heinrichs and O. Kreile, *The New International Division of Labour*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980

⁴⁵ For a more detailed analysis of the decline of working class in industrialized countries see John Callaghan, *The retreat of social democracy*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 204-224

become radical while the left generally assumed a conservative position, mostly struggling to preserve some of the functions of the welfare state. Hence, by the late 1980s, it was clear that social democracy had to either revise its political program in accordance with the surmounting market challenges and the neo-liberal economic paradigm or face electoral defeat in successive elections to become relegated to the permanent opposition status.⁴⁶

Faced with the new-right challenge, social democratic parties came to the conclusion that old ways of doing politics by relying on a system of redistribution was no longer possible and maybe not even desirable.⁴⁷ As a consequence, during the course of the 1990s, social democratic parties across the globe began to revise their strategies, programs and political agendas to cope more effectively with the recent economic developments and emerge as a viable alternative to the neo-liberal parties.⁴⁸ Many social democratic parties began to distance social democracy from the Keynesian welfare state model and establish a compromise or, in other words, find a Third Way to recognize some unavoidable economic developments without surrounding all principles.

The economic slowdown that followed the disintegration of the Bretton Woods system has particularly harmed developing countries that employed national development strategies centered on import substitution industrialization. The potential drawbacks of the import substitution model i.e. production of costly and outdated goods, corruption, over-bureaucratization, inefficiency and high inflation could no longer be ignored by the governments faced with fiscal, financial, industrial crises and runaway inflation.⁴⁹ It is in this gloomy period characterized by devastating effects of the oil crisis in the 1970s and debt crisis in the 1980s that United States government together with IMF and World Bank, otherwise known as the Washington Consensus, advised these countries to adopt the neo-liberal agenda to integrate more closely into

⁴⁶ For more information on the transformation of the Labor Party see Joshua Muravchik, *Heaven and Earth The Rise and Fall of Socialism*, San Francisco: Encounter Books, p. 301-320

⁴⁷ John Gray, *After Social Democracy*, London: Demos, 1996

⁴⁸ D. Held, *Global Social Democracy*, in Giddens, A. (ed.) *The Progressive Manifesto*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003

⁴⁹ Tom Kemp, *Industrialization in the non-Western World*, Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1983

the global economic order.⁵⁰ To ensure a continuous flow of capital and service the outstanding debt, governments had to accept these reform demands of international finance institutions to introduce internal budget constraints, liberalize trade regime, ensure the convertibility of currency, and open the domestic market for foreign investment.⁵¹ Structural adjustment program they implemented under the aegis of IMF came to encourage policymakers in these countries to mitigate their economic problems such as budget deficits, imbalances in external accounts and high inflation by taking austerity measures, among them, including privatization and trade liberalization, which posed a counter-movement to the growth of the public sector in the post-World War II period.⁵² Moreover, as a condition of the grants they received from international monetary organizations, governments of developing countries were required to limit public spending on welfare programs, impose tight budgetary controls, privatization of services and tax cuts to shift the economy along the lines of neo-liberal economic doctrines.⁵³

1.4 The Collapse of the Centrally-Planned Economies

Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, state interventionism, whether in the form of centrally planned economies in Soviet Union and China or in the Keynesian model of social democratic system, was confronted with grave economic problems, as has already been mentioned, due to the demise of Fordist mass production process, escalating energy prices, stagflation and, labor militancy.⁵⁴ While the Western economies had responded to these grave structural problems with market flexibility, technological innovation to raise the profit margins and disciplining of the market, centrally planned economies could not manage to survive. Failure to adapt to the rapid and unprecedented innovations and developments ensued by the techno-

⁵⁰ Stephen Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrialized Countries*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990

⁵¹ David Lane, *The Rise and Fall of State Socialism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 113

⁵² Henry Bienen and John Waterbury, "The Political Economy of Privatization in Developing Countries", in Charles Wilber and Kenneth Jameson (eds.) *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992, pp. 376-402

⁵³ Deborah Johnston, *Poverty and Distribution: Back on the Neo-liberal Agenda?*, in *Neo-liberalism A Critical Reader*, Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnson (eds.), London: Pluto Press, 2005

⁵⁴ Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 81

economic realm inflicted a large blow to centrally planned economic structure and facilitated the collapse of socialist regimes around the globe.⁵⁵

Soviet system was based on a centrally planned economy that was primarily conducted by the administrative plans and decisions coordinated between planning agencies and ministries with no attention paid to the supply and demand relationship. The purpose of the planners was to undertake a very rapid economic growth based on the expansion of heavy industry and collectivization of agriculture which would squeeze the products of the peasants and ensure the flow of cheap products for the urban masses. Soviet economic policy-making was along the lines of Harrod-Domar model⁵⁶ with its emphasis on the saving level and the capital-output ratio to generate economic development. Granted that the economic growth was attributed to the function of the size of capital and labor inputs with little room for productivity gains and technology innovations, sustainable economic growth could only be possible with continuous increases in capital or labor supply.⁵⁷ Indeed, many economists have argued that the socialist experiment was doomed to collapse from the start due to the structural deficiencies of the economic model. Just three years after the October Revolution, in 1920, Ludwig von Mises, the Austrian neo-classical economist, argued that the system could not properly function because it lacked an adequate price mechanism necessary for generating knowledge and providing initiative to all the agents in the market.⁵⁸

Despite proving effective in mobilizing resources on key industrial projects and generating very high growth rates in the initial stages of the modernization, the centrally planned economy began to face systemic dysfunctions in carrying out its economic plan, arising from bureaucratic rigidities and difficulties. The “cybernetic model”⁵⁹ of economic planning and regulation implicit in socialism, as Giddens notes, worked very successfully in the initial stages of industrialization during which

⁵⁵ For an excellent historical study on the negative affects of the rise of information technology on Soviet Union, see Maier, *Dissolution*, 59-108

⁵⁶ Debraj Ray, *Development Economics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 51-63

⁵⁷ Castells, *End of Millennium*, p. 17

⁵⁸ Ludwig von Mises, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” in Alec Nove and D. Mario Nuti, eds., *Socialist Economics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 75-91 [1920] (1972)

⁵⁹ Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, p. 66-69

economic decisions of the state agencies could be effectively carried out. Theoretical objections developed by authors such as Mises and Hayek against the major limitations and dangers of central planning, centered on the importance of freely established monetary price for goods, as he notes, began to become valid following the information technology revolution which have restructured the entire production processes and, thereby, made successful planning an “epistemic impossibility”⁶⁰ from 1970s and onwards.⁶¹

By the beginning of the 1970s, Soviet economy had exhausted its labor and capital resources, experiencing declining productivity on both accounts; indeed, this had signaled the completion of the period of extensive economic growth. Abel Aganbegyan, the celebrated economic advisor of Gorbachev, attributes the slowdown in the economic growth, after three decades of rapid economic expansion, to the limitations of the industrialization program based entirely on the extensive use of capital and labor.⁶² As the economy became more complex and diversified, both in terms of organization and production⁶³ and a shift to intensive economic growth⁶⁴ was absolutely necessary to upgrade production processes and raise productivity level of inputs through scientific and technology advances. The structural crisis faced by the Soviet Union with its many political, social and, more importantly, economic consequences was triggered by the inability of the Soviet economy to manage the transition to the new mode of development based on advancing information technologies in accordance with the process taking place in the rest of the world.⁶⁵ While the bulk of the manufacture production of capitalist economies shifted towards the fields of electronics, biotechnology and chemical products, Soviet economy had totally missed the revolution in the information sector⁶⁶ and experienced an expansion

⁶⁰ John Gray, Bir Muhafazakar Olarak Hayek, in *Post-Liberalizm: Siyasi Dusunce Incelemeleri*, Ankara: Dost, 2004, p. 44-51

⁶¹ Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991 p. 68

⁶² Abel Aganbegyan, *The Economic Challenge of Perestroika*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988

⁶³ Castells, *End of Millennium*, p. 19

⁶⁴ Lane, *The Rise and Fall*, 154-55

⁶⁵ Castells, *End of Millennium*, 9

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 26

in the technology gap with the West. This mainly arose from the fact that its incentive structure was unable to encourage technological change and innovations.⁶⁷

Moreover, aside from the structural deficiencies of the centrally planned economic model, Soviet economy had to deal with a number of exogenous factors such as the demise of Fordism, European recession triggered by the two oil shocks, reducing the bilateral trade volume and the changing foreign policy of the capitalist countries⁶⁸, especially following the victory of Ronald Reagan in US presidential election in 1980. By adopting a more assertive and confrontational foreign policy and initiating an high-tech arms race, US president Ronald Reagan exposed the technological weakness of the Soviet Union and drained her economy by forcing her to increase military spending, which, according to David Lane, proved to be the “last straw that broke the back of the camel”.⁶⁹ After coming to power, Gorbachev sought ways to reform the Soviet socialist regime and alleviate some of the structural problems and deficiencies of the economic order without changing the political structure by partially introducing some of the principles of the market economy. Gorbachev⁷⁰ aimed to free the state enterprises from the heavy hand of government ministries, which plan every aspect of the production process, and give more autonomy to managers to encourage them to behave like private firms.⁷¹

Despite the introduction of the perestroika program and political liberalization, however, the stagnant Soviet economy failed to recover,⁷² plunging into a deep economic crisis with massive shortages, rising prices, and growing levels of unemployment,⁷³ for many reasons not least the lukewarm support given to the reforms by a considerable number of the party nomenclature, top state bureaucracy

⁶⁷ Anders Aslund, *Building Capitalism The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 42

⁶⁸ Marie Lavigne, *The Economics of Transition From Socialist Economy to Market Economy*, New York: St. Martin's Press pp. 92

⁶⁹ Lane, *The Rise and Fall*, 184

⁷⁰ Anders Aslund, *Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991

⁷¹ Robert Strayer, *Why did the Soviet Union Collapse? Understanding Historical Change*, London and New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, p. 115

⁷² Lavigne, *The Economics*, 95

⁷³ William Moskof, *Hard Times: Impoverishment and Protest in Perestroika Years*, New York: Sharpe, 1993

and state company managers, retrenching themselves in the state agencies.⁷⁴ The relative liberalization of the economy has expanded the shadow economy with its cohort of mafia and corrupt officials, taking advantage of the new opportunities, and disorganized the planned economy even further.⁷⁵ As a result, while the economic rationale of the socialist system was delegitimized,⁷⁶ the perestroika created “a kind of limbo economy” which worked neither like a functioning market system nor like a planned economy.⁷⁷

Gorbachev’s political and economic reforms, entailing to provide development of a more pluralistic structure and the growth of markets, undermined the leading role of the party together with the system of central planning.⁷⁸ Public dissatisfaction with the standard of living and deteriorating economic conditions has already paved the way for the legitimacy crisis of the socialist rule. This had encouraged the radical reformers to openly challenge Gorbachev administration and use the relatively liberal political environment to seek support of the people and even come to power through popular elections.⁷⁹ Counter-culture against socialism, especially among the young generation, disillusioned with the increasing gap between the West and their countries and in search of a more democratic and pluralistic society led to the growth of civil society emerging to challenge the leadership of the communist party based on popular support and aim for the overthrow of the authoritarian regime.⁸⁰ The centrifugal pressures paved the way for the rise of the national awakenings across the Soviet Union, as primordial ethnic identities and national heritages have reemerged after decades of repression.⁸¹ The collapse of the communist party as an organization together with the disintegration of the Soviet Union⁸² have been triggered by the collapse of the centrally planned economy, which, as the proudest and most

⁷⁴ Manuel Castells, *End of Millennium, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, vol III, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2001, p. 54

⁷⁵ Stephen Handelman, *Comrade Criminal: Russia’s New Mafia*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995

⁷⁶ Aslund, *Building Capitalism*, 40

⁷⁷ Strayer, *Why did the Soviet Union*, 116

⁷⁸ Lane, *The Rise and Fall of State Socialism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 170

⁷⁹ For an excellent overview of the political events of this era, see Stephen White, *Gorbachev and After*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993

⁸⁰ Hirst, *From Statism*, 156-182

⁸¹ Strayer, *Why did the Soviet Union Collapse*, 149-171

⁸² Alexander Dallin, “Causes of the Collapse of the USSR,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 8:4 (1992), p. 279-302

impressive achievement of the communist party, was initially designated to avoid the chaotic, wasteful and dangerous competition of capitalism and facilitate rapid development of industrial production.⁸³

The collapse of the Soviet Union came to affect politics at large as it signified that the recent socio-economic developments led the propelling forces of the French Revolution to worn itself out and bring about the end of organized, bureaucratic and centralized ideological movements. Moreover, the political events surrounding the demise of the Soviet regime signaled the end of Leninist party model designed around a hierarchical organizational structure and authoritarian decision-making process. Hence, the revival of the left depended on a new formulation of its ideological framework and political premises after the collapse of the “actually existing socialism”.⁸⁴ Left political identity has been associated so far with homogeneity, equality and harmony but the coming challenge would be to transform these values to pluralism, difference and heterogeneity in the struggle against the ills of capitalism.⁸⁵ One proposed solution has been to redefine the left project as the extension of democracy not only limited to political relations but also incorporating demands of the new social movements and assume the function of an emancipator. This would give rise to a project of plural and radical democracy which is well suited to solve some of the newly emerging problems facing humanity.⁸⁶ In other words, what is needed is to inherit a tradition of associational socialism linked with democratic and communitarian values.⁸⁷ There is a growing need for socialist and social democrat parties to place more emphasis on preserving their differences and to adopt a more horizontal and pluralistic organization structures, enabling them to incorporate new issue groups to their membership profile. The most dramatic change has taken place in Spanish, Italian and French communist parties which have declared in the early 1980s that they will no longer pursue attainment of the dictatorship of the proletariat

⁸³ Strayer, *Why did the Soviet Union*, 10

⁸⁴ Chantal Mouffe, *Pluralism and the Left Identity*, in Michael Walzer (ed.) *Toward a Global Civil Society*, Oxford: Berghahn Books, p. 295

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 296.

⁸⁶ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso, 2001

⁸⁷ Paul Hirst, “Associated Socialism in a Pluralist State” in *Journal of Law and Society*, vol. 15, No. 1, Spring 1988

as a policy and target democratic stabilization,⁸⁸ which gradually evolved in a new model called Mediterranean socialism.

1.5 Globalization Phenomenon and the End of History

The collapse of the Soviet Union following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the erosion of the post-war consensus based on the notion of state interventionism and principle of national sufficiency in the early 1990s removed the two main barriers that have prevented further integration of world markets. The internationalization of capital and production processes were not only the driving mechanisms behind the drastic socio-economic and political changes of this coming era but also the constitutive element of globalization, otherwise known as ‘the new world order’. Catching the mood of this period, Francis Fukuyama, in his widely discussed article, relying on a Hegelian dialectic notion of social mechanisms, argued the ‘end of history’⁸⁹ in which liberal democracy based upon capitalism is considered to have prevailed over its alternatives. The most radical aspect of globalization, however, as inherent in the following definition given by Giddens, is the new configuration it brought to the time-space relationship carried out by the significant advances in the transportation and communication sectors:

Globalization is “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”.⁹⁰

This definition given for globalization closely resembles the one put forward by David Held who argues that globalization arises the speeding up of worldwide patterns of interconnectedness and stretching of connections, relations and networks between communities.⁹¹ It is no wonder that in both definitions the primary element of the globalization process is caused by the lowering of the unit cost and time of information transfer with respect to distance as a consequence of ‘time-space compression’. This “perpetual search to annihilate space through time”⁹² precipitated

⁸⁸ Gianfranco Pasquino, Party Elites and Democratic Consolidation: Cross National Comparison of Southern European Experience, in Geoffrey Priadham (ed.), *Securing Democracy. Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe*, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 42-61

⁸⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History?*, *The National Interest* 19, 3-18, 1989

⁹⁰ Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, 64

⁹¹ David Held (ed.) *A Globalizing World: Culture, Economics, Politics*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 169-170

⁹² Harvey, *The Condition of Modernity*, 307

globalization to denote universalizing properties to modernity in its encounters with institutions, beliefs systems and practices of not only the traditional society but also those of the modern society, containing a plethora of secular dogmas arising from the invention and reinvention of mass-mobilizing grand traditions.⁹³ Granted that modern world is configured through the combination of capitalism, industrialism and the nation-state model,⁹⁴ also considering Marxism as a distinct version of modernity,⁹⁵ globalization, as will be explained further in this chapter, represents the completion of modernity.⁹⁶

This notion of globalization represents a break with the basic elements of modernity, structured around the intellectual premises of the Enlightenment project and implies the transformation of modernity either into the phase of post-modernity,⁹⁷ as argued by many critical theorists and post-structuralists, or into a new phase of modernity, albeit in a more complex and radical form,⁹⁸ defined by Beck and Giddens as the reflexive modernity.⁹⁹ Undertaken by a process of creative self-destruction, dissolving the contours of industrial society, reflexive modernization aspires to mobilize new socio-political groups affected by the individualization process and transforms modernity to better adapt the multi-faceted consequences of the globalization.¹⁰⁰ Radicalization of modernity assumes the dynamism of modern institutions and shares the notion of human emancipation promoted by the early phases of modernity but not only to move away from the dogmatic aspects of tradition but also to become free of the existing constraints and rigidities of the modern age.¹⁰¹ As the foundation of modernity, based upon the industrial-military complex and

⁹³ Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, 21

⁹⁴ Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985

⁹⁵ Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986

⁹⁶ Kahraman, *The Making and the Crisis*, p. 247-249

⁹⁷ Harvey, *The Condition of Modernity*, 141-72

⁹⁸ Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization: The Aesthetic Dimension*, *Theory, Culture & Society* 10, 1, 1993, p. 2

⁹⁹ Ulrich Beck, *The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization*, in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994: 1-55 and Anthony Giddens, *Living in a Post-Traditional Society*, in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, 56-109

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

¹⁰¹ Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, 210

concentrated organization of the labor force, is gradually replaced by more flexible and decentralized ties of the information age,¹⁰² old bureaucratic systems which have come to symbolize the rigidity and routinization of the modern age began to disappear. This makes room for more imaginative and creative social structures¹⁰³ in a process characterized as “modernization coming to understand itself and the reflexivity inherent itself”.¹⁰⁴ Although no single date could be given to mark the beginning of the processes of change redefining modernity and producing new social forms, the early phase of the transformation, according to Lash and Urry, began in Britain and USA around the end of 1960s, in France and Germany around the early 1970s and in Sweden around the late 1970s and early 1980s.¹⁰⁵

In the simple phase of the modern era, the primary function of the modern institutions has been to emancipate various groups from the dogmatic imperatives of pre-existing constraints such as tradition and religion; in other words, it has meant overcoming oppressive social relations through the use of a hierarchical notion of power.¹⁰⁶ In a reflexively ordered environment, emancipation comes to mean autonomy, in a larger sense, both from the constraints of the tradition and the conditions of hierarchical domination, involving a politics of self-actualization and choice.¹⁰⁷ This can only be provided by a shift from emancipatory politics to life politics referring to “radical engagements which seek to further the possibility of a fulfilling and satisfying life for all, and in respect of which there are no others”.¹⁰⁸ This effectively transforms modernization project into a process of human development.¹⁰⁹

As the foundational grounds on which modernity managed to develop its sense of certainty and hegemony began to break down in response to the complex changes in

¹⁰² Daniel Bell, *The Axial Age of Technology* Foreword in Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. [1973] 1999. NY: Basic Books, ix-cv

¹⁰³ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*, 29-32

¹⁰⁴ Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, 48

¹⁰⁵ S. Lash and J. Urry, *The End of Organized Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity, 1987, p. 7

¹⁰⁶ Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, 210-213

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 214-215

¹⁰⁸ Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, 156

¹⁰⁹ Christian Welzel, *Individual Modernity*, in Dalton, Russell J. And Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 (forthcoming)

the techno-economic realm, a notion of ambivalence related to the emergence of a discursive void emerged to make room for the particularistic conflictualities¹¹⁰ to increasingly determine the political agenda and discourse of the late modern era. This development paved the way for the emergence of politics of identity and culture wars during which constructed identities became the primary factor of conflict, as seen in the ethnic warfare in the Balkans, the rise of political Islam mainly in the Muslim countries and the citizenship debates of the West. The theoretical framework of identity politics was partially constructed by postmodern discourse that situated itself as a radical critique of modernity as an anti-humanist emancipation project and called for a radical democratization of social relations based on the recognition of difference.¹¹¹ On the other hand, feelings of powerlessness against an increasingly diverse and complicated world and the rapid value changes seek people to search for their roots in a transnational world in an attempt to find a place bound identity. This quest for security by the marginal segments of the population excluded from most of the benefits of the society need to be juxtaposed to the search of identity visible in the emerging social groups. It is only by a combination of two simultaneous social processes one can begin to understand the conflicts, risks and contradictions of the post-industrial society, which can no longer be resolved through political regulation, etatism and intervention of the bureaucratic authorities.

In this new era defined by increasing control of the market in daily life and weakening of the political systems engulfed in a structural crisis of legitimacy, a growing number of people feel disempowered, alienated and, more importantly, threatened by the coming challenges. This brave new world of uncontrolled and confusing change push many people to search for identity which becomes the fundamental source of social meaning as people increasingly organize their meaning around what they are rather than what they do.¹¹² Especially following the collapse of Soviet Union, there was a significant shift in focus on political issues from ideology to culture and identity, which became a source of conflict among various groups, demanding recognition by the state. This increasing need for a sense of belonging provide groups with an incentive to ask for recognition and establish avenues for

¹¹⁰ Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)*, London: Verso, 1996, 2

¹¹¹ F. Keyman, *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997, p. 124

¹¹² Manuel Castells, *Power of Identity*, Massachussettes: Blackwell, 1997

politics of identity.¹¹³ The globalization of the capital, increasing interdependency of world markets and the rise of a diversified labor force arising from new economic opportunities at informal sectors of the economy have improved the socioeconomic conditions of some marginal groups in the workforce such as women, racial minorities and immigrants and elevated their status in society.¹¹⁴ These groups have in return used their newly acquired positions in the society to strengthen their cultural and political identities and demand the state to recognize them as distinct groups with equal status.

During this new environment of globalization, new social movements began to act as political agents in pursuit of new issues not reflected in the party programs and thus have undertaken, what Beck terms, a reinvention of politics.¹¹⁵ These new social movements engaged in ‘unconventional political participation’ sought to politicize the institutions of civil society at times in defiance of the representative-bureaucratic political institutions and thereby organized elite-challenging mass activities through their loosely knit networks.¹¹⁶ Relying less on the communication channels of the current political institutions and mechanisms, these activists precipitated a rapid growth of civic action in many Western societies following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In response to the changing form of citizenship and notions of identity, the new social democrat ideology sought the recognition of cultural rights and active participation of these new groups in the political sphere. Hence through the accommodation of these diverse communities, social democratic parties managed to expand their electoral and social base and transformed the notion of social justice to gain a cultural component so that social democracy gradually evolved into participatory democracy with a commitment to the principles of multi-culturalism.¹¹⁷

Late modern era is characterized by a radical questioning of providential reason together with the recognition that the recent scientific and technological advances have reconfigured the parameters of risk and danger, while also offering new

¹¹³ Craig Calhoun, (ed.) *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996

¹¹⁴ M Featherstone, S. Lash, and R. Robertson, Roland (eds.) *Global Modernities*, London: Sage Publications, 2002

¹¹⁵ Beck, *The Reinvention of Politics*, 18-22

¹¹⁶ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*, 116-126

¹¹⁷ U. Beck, *The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997

opportunities for mankind.¹¹⁸ This sharply contrasts with simple stage of modernity during which reason had become the driving force of all social and political life and certainty arising from science was paramount.¹¹⁹ Social insurance mechanism of the welfare state, a security umbrella designed to alleviate risks arising from the market economy, can no longer address the hazards and risks of the new period in which the high-consequence dangers are not only human-made but also occur in a global scale. Thus, it is argued that in this new world order, global and uncontrollable systematic threats that are generated by people, firms, state agencies and politicians¹²⁰, transgressing national boundaries, pose a universal challenge which can no longer be contained or solved by nation-states, which are anyway losing their ability to remain as the primary locus of security¹²¹. Beck argues this process to signify the transition from” the industrial society with institutions, which can neither monitor nor solve the ensuing problems, to the risk society, characterized by the return of uncertainty¹²² or the recognition of ambivalence.¹²³ It is at this point necessary to relate the emergence of risk society in response to the rise of post-industrial mode of development to the crisis of the nation state due to its inability to embody institutions which provide ontological security to the individuals.

1.6 The Retreat of the Nation-State and the Global Crisis of Social Democracy

Globalization in the 1990s, as the ramification of a process initiated by post-modernist and post-structuralist arguments, has put the nation-state model developed as part of the modernization project by the 16th century¹²⁴ under a critical questioning and led many to reconsider alternative political designs for the new international regime. Their proponents of this view argue that nation-state has become an inadequate unit for organizing human activity and managing the complex and

¹¹⁸ Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, 28

¹¹⁹ Michael C. Williams, *Modernity, Postmodernity and the New World Order*, in Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (eds.) *The New World Order: Contrasting Theories* New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, p. 85

¹²⁰ Ulrich Beck, *From Industrial Society to the Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and Ecological Enlightenment*, *Theory, Culture & Society*, 9, 1, 1992, p. 98-99

¹²¹ Williams, *Modernity, Postmodernity and the New World Order*, 90-91

¹²² Beck, *The Reinvention of Politics*, 8

¹²³ Z. Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Cambridge: Polity, 1991

¹²⁴ Norbert Elias, *State and Civilization*, vol. 2 of *The Civilizing Process*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982

interdependent ties between societies.¹²⁵ While it is difficult to argue that nation-states will collapse in the existing world order, though there are many who would prefer a universal government to emerge, their sovereignty is considerably limited in accordance with the erosion of the centralizing state structure linked with the notions of citizenship, national culture and, even, territoriality. Hence, in light of the socio-economic developments and technological changes, the nation-state model, in charge of undertaking the welfare of the society, defending the borders, regulating the economy and managing the fiscal affairs, have begun to be transformed into post-sovereign state.¹²⁶ Although state agencies continue to regulate political, social and economic activities using all the resources at their disposal, they have to determine their policies within the rules of the new global order, taking into consideration the complex processes and transnational linkages of the rapidly globalizing financial markets.¹²⁷ Hence, governments are increasingly forced to cede some of their sovereignty¹²⁸ and share power with multinational companies, transnational bodies and non-governmental organizations which are struggling to fill the vacuum¹²⁹ at the heart of the international political economy.¹³⁰ This competition between inter-governmental institutions, multinational corporations and national governments is not yet determined, contributing to the gradual increase of the ungovernance, resulting in the “progressive loss of real authority” in international politics.¹³¹ Indeed, there has been a recent trend in international relations field to construct a new international system,¹³² which would move beyond the static nation-state model and thereby get

¹²⁵ Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy*, London: Harper Collins, 1994: 24

¹²⁶ Drucker, *Post-Capitalist Society*, 103-128

¹²⁷ P. G. Cerny, *Globalisation and the Changing logic of Collective Action*, *International Organisation*, 49, 4, p. 595-625

¹²⁸ Joseph Camileri and Jim Falk (eds.) *The End of Sovereignty? Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Brookfield: Elgar 1992

¹²⁹ Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 14

¹³⁰ There are many who still argue that the role of the nation-state under globalization is not changing as dramatically as people come to think. For more information on this debate, see John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge *A Future Perfect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalization*, London: William Heinemann, 2000

¹³¹ Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, 5

¹³² An interesting attempt was made by Alexander Wendt. See his *Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, *International Organization*, vol. 46, 1992, p. 391-425

out of the “philosophical discourse of modernity”¹³³ by demonstrating its historically constructed nature.

Indeed the fundamental problem for the social democrat parties has been the notion that nation state has lost its centrality as the political, cultural and economic regulator of societal affairs.¹³⁴ These parties have been negatively affected by this development as their post-war programs have relied on the practice of forging national settlements by which governments tie capital into corporatist arrangements with the trade unions in order to receive a favorable outcome for the working classes. The ability of the social democratic governments to control national economies and deliver an extensive system of social security to citizens is challenged by the heightening mobility of capital and growing interdependency between economic units. In response social democratic parties began to formulate the framework of an effective and democratic state which transcends the liberal minimal state and manages to regulate the market as much as removing some of its negative consequences.¹³⁵

In conclusion, the complex changes occurring in the techno-economic realm since the late 1960s exhausted the Keynesian model by revealing its deficiencies and paved the way for the rise of a new mode of development, gradually creating the foundations of post-industrial stage. This technological revolution, otherwise known as the Third Industrial Revolution, profoundly affected the social democratic ideology by challenging its premises based on the notion of modernity, Keynesian welfare model and nation-state system. This fundamental challenge weakened the traditional base of the social democratic parties, temporarily distanced them from the electorate and in many countries removed them from power. The prospect of social democracy was maintained only with a revisal of the ideological framework and political agenda of these parties in the 1990s.

¹³³ Jurgen Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Boston: MIT Pres, 1987

¹³⁴ Hirst, *From Statism*, 147

¹³⁵ F. Schuppert, ‘The Ensuring State’, in A. Giddens, (ed.) *The Progressive Manifesto*, Cambridge: Polity Pres, 2003

CHAPTER 2

THE CRISIS OF STATISM: A STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

A new model of capitalist development linked with a reorganization of the production processes have been put forward in the industrialized capitalist countries, as explained in the previous chapter, but rapidly transferred to the rest of the world through the global use of capital by means of transnational organizations. This global restructuring of the capitalist system revealed the weaknesses of import substitution strategy of the Turkish economy in accordance with the national development schema, exhausting the economic capabilities of the country in the late 1970s. These developments brought Turkish economy to the brink of collapse and rendered an economic policy change urgently necessary. Hence, January 24 structural adjustment program and the neo-liberal agenda put in place by the military administration and, later, followed by the Motherland governments in that decade brought the demise of statism, driving leftist politics into a deep-rooted political crisis. However, unlike its western counterparts, mainstream Turkish leftist parties failed to undertake a programmatic renewal of their ideology and could not revive alternative policies to the new-right hegemony prevailing in the government. Hence, this chapter explores the multi-faceted changes that have occurred in Turkey since the late 1970s and analyze the formation and development of the center-right parties under this new form of global capitalism. Moreover it explores the resulting developments within the left of the political spectrum and observes how social democrats, in general, and SDPP, in particular, reacted to these developments.

2.1 The Disintegration of Import Substitution Model

Statism corresponds to a socio-political system based on the allocation of the economic surplus produced in society by the power holders in the state apparatus with the goal of power-maximization.¹³⁶ Hence it promotes the state as an active agent of change and facilitates intervention to a great number of social, economic and cultural issues. Indeed many developing countries in the previous decades came to experience statist experiments with the purpose of filling the void caused by the weakness of the urban bourgeoisie and undertaking a rapid process of socioeconomic and political

¹³⁶ Manuel Castells, *End of Millennium, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, vol III, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2001, p. 8

development to ensure national sovereignty, industrial development, high literacy and alleviation of poverty.¹³⁷ The commanding position that the state enjoyed in the Turkish economy was a direct consequence of the statist¹³⁸ policies of the 1930s, when the republican leaders prepared an interventionist economic program in response to the growing recession¹³⁹ but statism in Ottoman-Turkish polity could be traced back to the bureaucratic coalition led by the modernizing Ottoman sultans in the Tanzimat period. The strength of the Ottoman bureaucracy, absorbed to the ranks of the republican elites, possessing a very strong ethos to command the fate of the nation and the absence of a bourgeoisie perpetuated the existence of vertical links between the state and the masses.¹⁴⁰

This strong, centralized and bureaucratic state¹⁴¹ inherited by the republican regime was kept intact to be used for the political and cultural reforms imposed to the society. Moreover, influenced by the writings of Friedrich List¹⁴² and the school of German national economy and the rapid economic development of Japan, the republican elites continued the economic policies of their predecessors who emphasized the necessity and importance of the creation of a Turko-Muslim commercial and industrial bourgeoisie.¹⁴³ Statist policies during this period were pursued in an instrumental fashion to strengthen the statist structure directed by the upper echelons of the military and civilian bureaucracy whose legitimacy was derived

¹³⁷ John Waterbury, *Exposed to innumerable delusions: public enterprise and state power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 31

¹³⁸ For a collection of essays that deal with the political, historical and economic aspects of Turkish statism in the early republican period, see Nevin Cosar (ed.) *Turkiye'de Devletcilik*, İstanbul: Balgam Yayinlari, 1995

¹³⁹ For an excellent study that articulates some of the economic problems faced by the republican elites in Ankara in the 1920s and their structural causes, see Caglar Keyder, *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey 1923–1929*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981

¹⁴⁰ Metin Heper and Fuat Keyman, 'Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey', in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Turkey Before and After Atatürk*, London: Routledge, 1999, p. 261

¹⁴¹ Ergun Özbudun *Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?* *Journal of Democracy*, 7, 3, 1996, p. 123-38

¹⁴² Zafer Toprak, *Turkiye'de Milli İktisat*, Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1982, p. 29-34

¹⁴³ The creation of an indigenous business class and the role played by bureaucratic elites in this process is meticulously analysed by Caglar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, London: Routledge, 1987

from their ability to ensure national development.¹⁴⁴ Statism in the Turkish context, however, should not be perceived solely in its capacity to determine the economic affairs but rather in its aim to construct a political framework which would establish the autonomy of the state against all political and social groups constrained by the will of the strong bureaucracy in the absence of a strong class structure.¹⁴⁵

State intervention in economic affairs became more pronounced and visible following 1960 coup with the adoption of a planned economy that financed import substitution industrialization. Under this model, the regulation of investment and distribution of resources were primarily organized by the State Planning Agency on the basis of popular consent around the goal of national development.¹⁴⁶ Serving as the primary component of etatism, import substitution policies targeted the goal of rapid industrialization and self-sufficiency in consumer durables. It was planned that the state economic enterprises would produce their way out of their initial debt and produce enough surplus to finance their investment scheme and, in due process, expand the overall economy by providing enough work opportunities for the masses and redistributing wealth to various social groups. This was conducted by an inter-class alliance between various socio-economic groups that benefit from economic growth, full employment and redistribution of resources to alleviate economic misery and poverty.

After high levels of growth experienced in 1960s and early 1970s, these enterprises¹⁴⁷ could no longer stay productive and competitive and as a result accumulated crippling debts which were assumed by the government.¹⁴⁸ One primary factor behind the low performance of these enterprises was the fact that they have become employment sources for political parties which, especially from 1973

¹⁴⁴ Ahmet Insel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1995, p. 188

¹⁴⁵ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *The Making and the Crisis of Turkish Social Democracy: Roots, Discourses and Strategies*, unpublished PhD. Thesis, 1999, p. 171

¹⁴⁶ For a comprehensive discussion of the history of Turkish statism and its relevance for national development, see Ahmet Insel *Düzen ve Kalkınma Kışkıracında Devletin Rolü* İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları 1996; Korkut Boratav *Yüz Soruda Türkiyede Devletçilik* İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi 1974 and Korkut Boratav *Türkiyede Devletçilik* Ankara: Savas Yayınları, 1982

¹⁴⁷ Waterbury, *Exposed*, 107-134

¹⁴⁸ For the subsequent problems faced by the state economic enterprises, see Bertil Walstadt, *State Manufacturing Enterprise in a Mixed Economy: The Turkish Case*, Baltimore, 1980

onwards, exercised unrestrained patronage and high levels of nepotism and filled the ranks of the bureaucracy with partisan members in a process Kalaycioglu described as “amoral partyism”¹⁴⁹. In addition, high-level civil servants were frequently replaced by the governing parties seeking to achieve closer control of the state apparatus.¹⁵⁰ Rapid growth of the industrial production required the import of large quantities of technological equipment and thereby raised the dependency on international markets for the continuous flow of these goods which exacerbated the trade balance and the value of the domestic currency. Faced with growing budget deficit and high levels of import bills, particularly aggravated by two oil shocks during the 1970s, Turkish economy experienced the most severe payment crisis of the Republican period¹⁵¹ followed by a collapse of its creditworthiness in international markets.¹⁵² Indeed this decade has been marked by all the signs of a systemic breakdown including political unrest, erosion of governmental authority, civil violence arising from sectarian and ideological differences, recession and drastic shortages. All the economic signs indicated the necessity of transforming the Turkish economy to solve the balance of payments crisis and reduce the overall national debt and the budget deficit before import-substitution model would totally collapse.¹⁵³

The turning point came with the adoption of the stabilization program¹⁵⁴, also known as the January 24 decisions, by the JP government under the aegis of IMF and World Bank¹⁵⁵ in order to address the problem of chronic shortages and fix the

¹⁴⁹ In Heper, *The State Tradition*, p. 114 cited from Ersin Kalaycioglu, *Elite Political Culture and Regime Stability: The Case of Turkey* (paper presented at the conference on ‘the Centennial of Mosca’s Theory of the Ruling Class’ at the Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, Illinois, September 7-9, 1981) p. 20.

¹⁵⁰ William Hale, *The political and economic development of modern Turkey*, London: Croom Hell, 1981, p. 200

¹⁵¹ Henry Barkey, *The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey*, Boulder: Westview, 1990

¹⁵² A. Cecen, S. Dogruel and F. Dogruel, *Economic Growth and Structural Change in Turkey 1960-88*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1994, p. 44

¹⁵³ Ziya Onis, Turgut Ozal and his Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-liberalism in Critical Perspective, unpublished paper, 2004, p. 9

¹⁵⁴ For a critical assesment of the stabilization program, see Korkut Boratav *Contradictions of Structural Adjustment: Capital and the State in Post-1980 Turkey*, in edited by Ayse Oncu, Caglar Keyder and Saad Edin Ibrahim, *The American UNiversity in Cairo Press*, Cairo, p 155-173

¹⁵⁵ For a more detailed discussion of the support given to the Turkish stabilization program by World Bank and IMF, see Peter Wolff, *Stabilization Policy and Structural*

structural deficiencies of the Turkish economy.¹⁵⁶ The primary essence of the program was to restructure Turkish economy by shifting from an import-substitution to a growth-led and export-oriented strategy.¹⁵⁷ The new economic model aimed to reduce the inflation rate and ease the balance of payment difficulties in the short run and restructure the economy to finance sustainable growth in the long run. However it also challenged primary aspects of the etatist model which has served as the driving force of the Kemalist modernization project and sought to reduce the scale of state intervention in the economy. The political implications of this new economic strategy, as Kahraman rightly argues, indicated that Justice Party has finally proclaimed its preference for the urban bourgeoisie instead of the provincial powers.¹⁵⁸ The new position of the Justice Party vis-à-vis the class structure of the Turkish society triggered a modest transition to economic liberalism replacing statism. However, this ambitious goal seemed difficult to be achieved under the contemporary power structure in the Grand Assembly and within the democratic political order due to popular backlash. And it is under these circumstances that the military stepped up to assume its new role.¹⁵⁹

The military authorities have undone the work of their predecessors and removed most of the socio-economic gains made by the masses which included smashing the domestic coalition arrangements taken under the import-substitution model.¹⁶⁰ Concerned with the excessive politicization of the citizen body that extended beyond the restrictive legal/constitutional and political/cultural environment, the generals assumed that task of reconstructing the transcendental state. Anti-democratic measures taken by the military administration removed all opposition groups to the January 24 adjustment program and restored the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis various segments of the society. Taking advantage of the stable political environment and the degree of autonomy, Ozal, Minister of Economics, undertook the difficult but

Adjustment in Turkey: 1980–1985: The Role of the IMF and World Bank in an Externally Supported Adjustment Process, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987

¹⁵⁶ Tosun Aricanli and Dani Rodrik (eds.), *The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability*, London: Macmillan, 1990; Fikret Senses, ed., *Recent Industrialization Experience of Turkey in a Global Context*, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994

¹⁵⁷ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class and Economic Development*, Boulder: Westview Pres, 1990, p. 246–249

¹⁵⁸ Kahraman, *The Making*, 173

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 179

¹⁶⁰ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1993

long-awaited task of disintegrating the corporatist elements of the state and was assisted by massive financial support from abroad¹⁶¹ and ranks of the military.¹⁶²

2.2 The Rise of the Turkish New-Right

The representative of the New Right movement in Turkey was the Motherland Party¹⁶³ which, in accordance with the global economic trends and relying on the political framework and constitutional structure imposed during the coup period, managed to stay in power between 1983 and 1991 and should be considered as the constitutive agent of the era.¹⁶⁴ MP, as the party of the New Right, initiated a political campaign to solve the ongoing hegemonic crisis of the Turkish economy characterized by the collapse of the political order in pre-1980 period, struggle between extreme right and left organization, growth of social democracy and the inability of parties to express the economic-corporate interests of the bourgeoisie.¹⁶⁵ In other words, MP administration sought to establish an expansive hegemony in Turkish politics by forging a coalition cutting across the fundamental cultural cleavages in Turkish society based on a synthesis of liberalism, far right nationalism, Islamism and social democracy. Due to the deteriorating economic conditions and ideological feebleness of the bourgeoisie no such hegemony could be formed by center-right parties before the implementation of the stabilization program in the previous decades.

Following the establishment of civilian politics and multi-party democracy in November 1983 elections, MP government continued to press for the reforms in the stabilization program and accelerated the pace of the transition to a market-oriented economy by undertaking trade and capital-account liberalization successively in

¹⁶¹ For more information on the issue of the 1980 program and the size of international financial support see Ziya Onis, *State and Market: The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective*, Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 1998, p. 125-148

¹⁶² For the political background of the 1980-1983 period, see Muammer Yasar Pasalar *Politikasi İstanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1990* and Yalcin Dogan *Dar Sokakta Siyaset (1980-1983) İstanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1985*

¹⁶³ For a detailed analysis of the MP and Ozal's personal dominance of the party in the 1980s, see Ersin Kalaycioglu, "The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Lederal Party", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2002, p 41-61.

¹⁶⁴ Kahraman, *The Making*, 191

¹⁶⁵ Muharrem Tunay, *The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony*, in A. Eralp, M. Tunay and B. Yesilada (eds.) *The Political and socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993, p. 17-8

December 1983 and January 1984.¹⁶⁶ The first term of the MP government in the 1983-87 period witnessed rapid economic development, generated by high levels of GDP growth and an export boom¹⁶⁷ thanks to repression of relative prices of agricultural goods and the disciplining of the labor market. The successful implementation of the structural adjustment program¹⁶⁸ was also ensured by the unique role played by Turgut Ozal¹⁶⁹ within the course of the 1980s, first serving as a technocrat under the Demirel minority government and the military administration until his resignation and later emerging as a charismatic politician after the transition to civilian politics.¹⁷⁰ His professional background, involving an exposure to public, private and international organizations enabled him to possess the necessary experience and know-how to undertake crucial reforms and proved highly essential in generating confidence among international as well as domestic financial community on behalf of his economic agenda. Indeed, Ozal¹⁷¹ with his effective leadership has been instrumental in directing the whole economic process, albeit a brief interval, generating the support of the international financial community and developing a high level of trust with a sizeable part of Turkish society.¹⁷² The electoral success of MP

¹⁶⁶ For evidence on the issue of trade liberalization during this period, see Subidey Togan Foreign Trade Regime and Trade Liberalization in Turkey during the 1980s Aldershot: Avebury Publishing, 1994

¹⁶⁷ Feroz Ahmad, Turkey The Quest for Identity, Oxford: Oneword Press, 2003, p. 159

¹⁶⁸ For a critical account of the 24 January economic decisions, see Emin Colasan 12 Eylül Ozal Ekonomisinin Perde Arkası İstanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari 1984 and Kepenek, Y. *12 Eylül'un Ekonomi Politigi ve Sosyal Demokrasi*, Verso Yayinlari, Ankara 1987. p.37-119

¹⁶⁹ A few credible biographical studies of Turgut Ozal have been written during the last years which have gone beyond the journalistic accounts of the 1980s and 1990s. For a few of these studies, see Ihsan Sezal and Ihsan Dagi (eds.), *Kim Bu Ozal? Siyaset, Iktisat, Zihniyet* (İstanbul: Boyut Yayincilik, 2001) and Feride Acar, 'Turgut Ozal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation', in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayari (eds.), *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002, p. 163-180

¹⁷⁰ Ziya Onis, Turgut Ozal and his Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-liberalism in Critical Perspective, unpublished paper, 2004, p. 1-2

¹⁷¹ For Ozal era economic policies see Boratav, K. *Turkiye Iktisat Tarihi 1908-2002*, Imge Yayinlari, İstanbul 2004. pp 145-169; Kepenek, Y. *12 Eylül'un Ekonomi Politigi ve Sosyal Demokrasi*, Verso Yayinlari, Ankara 1987. p.37-119 and Osman Ulagay Ozal Ekonomisinde Paramiz Pul Olurken Kim Kazandi Kim Kaybetti, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987

¹⁷² Ziya Onis, Turgut Ozal and his Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-liberalism in Critical Perspective, unpublished paper, 2004, p. 9

during this period was also due to the novel election system that was formulated, which favored the emergence of single party governments. Thus although the first signs of decline were coming after 1985, the MP, was able to secure its place by adding other new measures onto the system, such as the new local district threshold. The economic liberalism of the Turkish right is still replete with crony and illegal policy applications in market governance, putting an even harder burden on the Turkish economy. In other words, Turkish politics has yet to see a truly liberal party that also incorporates political liberalism next to market economy.

A number of holding companies which has accomplished a diversified grip on a range of commercial, financial and industrial activities in the 1970s stood to gain from the liberal economic environment and became the driving force of the export boom during this period.¹⁷³ Liberalization of trade and capital markets facilitated the strengthening of the bourgeoisie and witnessed the rise of a group of entrepreneurs with pragmatic values, benefiting from the liberal economic environment and relying on market opportunities to financially grow. Indeed, Turkish bourgeoisie, a creation of the Turkish state after a slow and ambivalent process, made a genuine attempt to achieve political and ideological emancipation from the control of the state. Furthermore, Turgut Ozal's moderate Islamic leanings enabled him to enjoy close relations with the small and middle size Anatolian businesses operating increasingly outside the control of the state and paved the way for the emergence of "a countercultural bourgeoisie class with Anatolian roots" by developing a synthesis between the pragmatism of the market order and their traditional and religious values.¹⁷⁴ The developments in post-1980 Turkey, according to Ahmet Evin, reflect the disappearance of the chief cultural cleavage between the center and periphery and witnessed the rise of a class-based society parallel with the replacement of the long tradition of distributive patrimonialism with market economy.¹⁷⁵ Hence, MP has managed to restructure center-right politics and change the parameters of Turkish politics through a combination of moderate political discourse, a pragmatic

¹⁷³ See Caglar Keyder *Agrarian Background and the Origins of the Turkish Bourgeoisie in Developmentalism and Beyond Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey* edited by Ayse Oncu, Caglar Keyder and Saad Edin Ibrahim, The American UNiversity in Cairo Press, Cairo, p 44-72

¹⁷⁴ J. Esposito and H. Yavuz, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: Gulen Movement*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003, xxv

¹⁷⁵ M. Heper and A. Evin (eds.), *State, democracy, and the military: Turkey in the 1980s*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, p. 213

engineering ideology, and conservative social values.¹⁷⁶ Thus liberalization remained on the political agenda for the rest of the decade and especially affected right wing politics in Turkey that has historically been statist, traditional and collectivist.

On the other hand, 1980 coup and the political events that followed fragmented left of the political spectrum and rendered a restructuring of the existing organizations necessary. Indeed in direct contrast to the mainstream right, the left entered the decade in catastrophic conditions, plagued with divisions and rupture between prominent politicians who were left without a party after the dissolving of RPP by the military junta. The situation became even more dramatic when Bulent Ecevit in the immediate aftermath of his resignation from the chairman of RPP told his Party Council members that RPP had completed its mission as a bourgeoisie party and that he feels responsibility neither for the party nor for its administrative bodies.¹⁷⁷ This statement signaled the beginning of a division among the ranks of the left as the two groups parted ways to go on their separate paths that were to never cross again. In addition Ecevit's decision to distance himself from the former members of RPP was interpreted as leaving the leftist cause in turmoil and put those who had taken place in the ranks of RPP in disarray.¹⁷⁸

The first party to be founded on the left by the consent and, probably, insistence of the Council members was the Populist Party headed by Necdet Calp, a former cabinet secretary of Ismet Inonu during his last prime minister term.¹⁷⁹ However PP was not able to gather most of the politicians, active in RPP during the pre-coup era to its ranks due to its conciliatory attitude towards the generals.¹⁸⁰ As a result most of the important politicians, cadres and grassroots activists of former RPP gathered together to form a new party under the title Social Democracy Party, embracing the legacy of

¹⁷⁶ Nilufer Gole, *Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey, in Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 220

¹⁷⁷ Yalcin Dogan, *Dar Sokakta Siyaset 1980-83*, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1985, p. 147

¹⁷⁸ Cezmi Kartay, 11 Eylül 1980'den Gunumuze Siyasal Anilar ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Oykusu, Ankara: Sanem Matbaacilik, 1997, p. 82

¹⁷⁹ For a brief survey of PP and the events surrounding its establishment, see Hikmet Bila, *CHP 1919-1999*, İstanbul: Dogan Yayınevi, 1999, p. 367-8

¹⁸⁰ For a journalistic account of the search taking place among leftist politicians, see Yalcin Dogan, *Dar Sokakta Siyaset 1980-83*, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1985, p. 237-73

RPP but also, for the first time in the history of Turkish left,¹⁸¹ emphasizing the principle of social democracy as a symbolic move to balance the hegemony of the neo-liberal agenda.¹⁸² However in the party program the references were rarely directed to the universal principles of social democracy but mostly to the parochial populist elements with the purpose of reflecting the bureaucratic opposition to MP parties. Banned from participating in the 1983 elections, SDPP made a very successful entry into Turkish politics in 1984 local elections in which it managed to receive 23,4 percent share of the votes against 8,8 percent of PP and won over two hundred municipalities mostly in the traditional strongholds of RPP. In the following months, due to the fact that it was not represented in the parliament, SDP focused on its local activities and ran a very active opposition campaign from the grassroots level by organizing publicized trips of chairman Erdal Inonu to SDP controlled municipalities across the country.¹⁸³

The effective political strategies of SDP and the declining popular support for PP made it easier for both parties, originating from the same ideological source and historical heritage, to unite for carrying out a stronger opposition movement against the Motherland government. The merging of the two parties took place on November 3, 1985 under the name of Social Democratic Populist Party,¹⁸⁴ thereby creating the main opposition party to MP both in national and local level, but only after serious opposition from some SDP politicians who considered PP to lack grassroots cadres and effective local organizations necessary for showing a real political character.¹⁸⁵ As the main opposition party, SDPP worked to normalize the political system, undertake a democratization movement and liberalization of the 1982 Constitution by seeking gradual improvements.¹⁸⁶ SDPP was further strengthened by the entry of a large number of former RPP politicians into the new party, contributing to the perception that SDPP was the successor of RPP in the new political landscape. The celebrated merger between the parties, however, proved to be an inhibiting factor for

¹⁸¹ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *Sosyal Demokrasi Turkiye ve Partileri*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1993, p. 19

¹⁸² For more information on the founding of SDP, see Hikmet Bila, *CHP 1919-1999*, İstanbul: Dogan Yayinevi, 1999, p. 368-370

¹⁸³ Erdal Inonu, *Anılar ve Dusunceler 3. cilt*, İstanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2001, p. 63-114

¹⁸⁴ For a personal account of the events occurring during this process, see Erdal Inonu, *Anılar ve Dusunceler 3. cilt*, İstanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2001, p. 197-228

¹⁸⁵ Kahraman, *The Making*, 208

¹⁸⁶ Erdal Inonu, *Kurultay Konusmalari*, İstanbul: Boyut Kitaplari, 1998, p. 61-70

the development of social democratic ideals within Turkish left since the new party had to inherit the principle of six arrows from the PP programme.¹⁸⁷ The establishment of SDPP, however, did not end the fragmented structure of leftist politics as Ecevit and his friends founded the Democratic Left Party on November 14, 1985 after more than three years of grassroots restructuring going back to his days in Arayis journal.¹⁸⁸ In sharp contrast to SDPP with its close relations with the intelligentsia and based on urban support, DLP was a sui generis party, hoping to depend upon the charisma and cult personality of Ecevit who, accusing the former RPP cadres for intervening between him and the masses, attempted to develop a new organizational model with a weak party organization.

2.3 The Emergence of Civil Society

Economic reforms associated with the structural adjustment program shifted the center of gravity from the state to the society by developing an autonomous social sphere¹⁸⁹ and contributed to the liberalization of socio-economic, political and cultural activities. MP,¹⁹⁰ as the initiator of this process, was more successful than its rivals in seizing the political opportunities of the post-1980 era and interpreting the complex socioeconomic and political changes taking place both in the domestic and international contexts. Among the new parties formed, as Ayşe Ayata notes, only MP could incorporate the new social and economic groups into its party network and rely upon the societal cleavages flourishing thanks to the liberal economic environment.¹⁹¹ In that sense, MP managed to mobilize a large part of the electorate in the 1980s in accordance with its search for a more civil oriented politics and developed a new discourse whose basic tenets consisted of decentralization, debureaucratization and

¹⁸⁷ Erdal Inonu, *Anılar ve Düşünceler 3. cilt*, İstanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2001, p. 220

¹⁸⁸ Nazmi Hanoglu, *Demokratik Sol Parti*, in *Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Donemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, v. 15 İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996, p. 1272-1275

¹⁸⁹ Nilufer Gole “Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey,” in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.) Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 214

¹⁹⁰ For a more detailed analysis of the Motherland Party see Ustun Erguder “The Motherland Party,” in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds., Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991, p. 152-169

¹⁹¹ Ayşe Ayata, *Ideology, social bases, and organizational structure of the post-1980 political parties*, in A. Eralp, M. Tunay and B. Yesilada (eds.) *The Political and socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993, p. 32

destatism.¹⁹² The destatism in Turkey, in spite of all its inadequacies and limitations managed to change the parameters of the Turkish right wing politics and provided it with a liberal basis.¹⁹³

In accordance with the anti-bureaucratic campaign linked with the smaller state demands of global capitalism, the liberal economic program of Ozal argued in favor of large scale privatization of state economic enterprises and decentralization of the state and made efforts to bolster civil society, representing a sharp break from the traditional Ottoman-Turkish polity. Many intellectuals in the post-1980 era accused this statist tradition as the main obstacle for democratization and began to consider civil society as a counterforce to the dominant authoritarian which could strengthen the democratic system by developing a civic culture in contrast to the dominant militaristic one.¹⁹⁴ In response to the September 12 period, which silenced and repressed an otherwise highly politicized and polarized society, social movements in the Turkish context saw the establishment of civic groups as the best way to organize against the illiberal regime within the strict limits of the undemocratic 1982 constitution. In the past, absence of associational organizations that could serve as a buffer zone between social classes and the state apparatus prevented the bureaucratic elites from their “lingering fear”¹⁹⁵ that particular interests of social classes and associative groups could threaten both the unity of the nation and the authority of the state.¹⁹⁶

Greater economic autonomy enjoyed by the liberalization of the economic system altered the power balances in the society and contributed to the emergence of new civil societal groups, among them women, veiled students, ecologists, feminists and homosexuals, bringing new issues into the public sphere.¹⁹⁷ What fueled this trend was paradoxically the decision of the military administration to dismantle the corporatist system and leave economic matters to the representatives of the civil

¹⁹² Hasan Bulent Kahraman, “Ozal Donemini Yeniden Degerlendirirken,” in *Sag, Turkiye ve Partileri*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1995, p. 201-212

¹⁹³ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *The Making and the Crisis of Turkish Social Democracy: Roots, Discourses and Strategies*, unpublished PhD. Thesis, 1999, p. 200

¹⁹⁴ Ali Yasar Saribay, *Postmodernite, sivil toplum ve Islam*, İstanbul: Alfa Yayinlari, 2001, p. 119

¹⁹⁵ Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 105

¹⁹⁶ Y. Yishai, *The guardian state: a comparative analysis of interest group regulation*, *Governance*, 11, 2, 1998, p. 153–176

¹⁹⁷ Gole “Toward an Autonomization”, 215

society.¹⁹⁸ Swift continuation of the structural adjustment program expanded the managerial and professional groups in society and strengthened the urban bourgeoisie in search of an autonomous public sphere separate from the state. Pragmatic approach of MP to economic and political affairs shifted the main focus of politics from ideology to policy so that in the 1980s the search for utopias that resulted in ideological combativeness and confrontation came to an end.¹⁹⁹ Shaken by the authoritarian practices of the September 12 coup period and the dramatic political events that followed, many political activists in these ideological movements came to embrace democracy and the importance of civilian rule.

2.4 Unorthodox Liberalism

Aiming to rapidly transform the Turkish economy into a full-fledged market economy along the lines of influential neo-liberal thinkers such as Buchanan and Hayek, advocating the limitation of the power of representative institutions in order to make addition room for the functioning of the free market, Ozal preferred to rule based on cabinet decrees even in very important policy matters.²⁰⁰ His government style, reminiscent of Latin American presidents, contained strong elements of personal rule through decrees based upon the use of populism and had the tendency to underestimate the necessity of developing a strong legal and institutional infrastructure for a well-functioning market economy.²⁰¹ His distaste for classical bureaucracy with its etatist mindset and anti-reformist bias²⁰² resulted in a high number of intra-bureaucratic conflicts and persuaded him to recruit US-trained Turkish specialists living abroad and appoint them to key positions in the public sector in an attempt to generate loyalty among bureaucrats.²⁰³ As a result, the reform process came to be associated with a weakening of the bureaucratic apparatus without substantially reducing the considerable control state had over economic affairs.

¹⁹⁸ Heper, *The State Tradition*, 140

¹⁹⁹ Gole "Toward an Autonomization", 213-222

²⁰⁰ Onis, *Turgut Ozal and his Economic Legacy*, 13

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 2-3

²⁰² On Ozal's criticisms of the Turkish bureaucracy, see Turgut Ozal, *Turgut Ozal'ın Anıları*, pp. 115-118 and AYTEKİN YILMAZ, 'Turk Bürokrasi Gelenegi ve Ozal', in Sezal and Dagi (eds.), *Kim Bu Ozal? Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, p. 89-101

²⁰³ Andrew Mango, *The Turks Today*, London: John Murray Publishers, 2004, p. 85

In contrast to the rhetoric of economic liberalism that dominated the political process in the 1980s, Ozal's policies contained a number of unorthodox elements²⁰⁴ such as weak commitment to democracy, rule of law and privatization. Instead of being constrained with the orthodox policies of the neo-liberal economic program, MP governments considered deregulation, privatization and market liberalization not as ends in themselves but primarily as means to strengthen the state fiscally and to revive the public sector enhancing their political objectives. Arising from the particular socio-economic and political conditions of Turkey in the 1980s, MP had failed to carry out all aspects of the new-right agenda and could only transform some elements of the Turkish polity. Destatism and debureaucratization were not taken to its natural limits and in fact state's power to create advantages and enhance the positions of individual business groups has been more extensive in this period than any other before under the protectionist/interventionist phase. Faced with a weak domestic capital²⁰⁵ market in the absence of small investors, Ozal could not resort to popular capitalism as in developed countries to promote privatization and rely on the electorate to carry out his neo-liberal agenda.²⁰⁶ Moreover, aside from the limitations of the Turkish economy, Ozal was possibly concerned with the social consequences of privatization as no theory of labor markets can predict the extent and length of unemployment following privatization programs.²⁰⁷

Some of the earlier cases of successfully implemented privatization programs were experienced in countries under military regimes such as Chile and Bangladesh but in the late 1980s that option was no longer viable in Turkey. Established during the early republic years, SEEs were highly popular among the bureaucratic elite, who saw them as a part of the broader project of national development and a heritage of

²⁰⁴ For a notion of the unorthodox liberalism, see Ziya Onis, *Political Economy of Turkey in the 1980s: The Anatomy of Unorthodox Liberalism*, in Metin Heper (ed.), *The Strong State and Economic Interest Groups. The Post-1980 Turkish Experience*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991

²⁰⁵ For some statistical data on the size of the capital market in Turkey in the early 1980s, see Isik Inselbag and Bulent Gultekin, "Financial Markets in Turkey," in Tefik Nas and Mehmet Odekon, eds., *Liberalization and the Turkish Economy* (New York, 1988) p. 129-40

²⁰⁶ For an informative study on Turkish privatization see Aykut Polatovlu (ed.) *Ozelleştirme Tartışmaları İstanbul: Balgam Yayinevi 1994* and Roger Leeds, *Turkey: Rhetoric and Reality*, in Raymond Vernon, ed., *The Promise of Privatization: A Challenge for US Policy*, New York, 1988, p. 149-78.

²⁰⁷ C. Azaridas and J. Stiglitz, *Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibrium*, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 98, 1983, p. 1-22

the Ataturk era. Hence, state enterprises were supported by a wide coalition that contained the organized labor, managerial and civil service elites and even some of the prominent members of the private sector. Members of the state-led import-substituting industrialization coalition whose entrenched interests were harmed by its replacement with a relatively liberal economic regime centered on the export-oriented strategy such as the established labor unions, state managers and civil servants were the primary supporters of SDPP and shaped the economic policies of the party. Nevertheless SDPP seen as the party of the state could not gain any momentum but instead seemed as the conservative party when compared with MP which under the leadership of Ozal used the motto of ‘skipping to a new age’ (cag atlamak) and gained the support of the masses by presenting a new vision. A passion for economic growth, rapid technological upgrading, new opportunities created within the society and the disdain towards the political polarization and ideological conflicts of the 1970s, summarized by Can Kozanoglu as “English, computer, fear and dream”,²⁰⁸ ensured the continuation of MP administration despite many allegations of corruption and patronage for nearly a decade. In other words, lacking this pragmatism necessary to come to power and unable to follow the techno-economic developments around the globe, SDPP could not achieve the opportunity of testing its ideology in practice and continued to be associated with the economic failure of the RPP-led government between 1978 and 1979. As a result it could be purported that SDPP in 1980s and even in 1990s was more cultural than ideological and more tactical than strategic.²⁰⁹ DLP, on the other hand, felt the need to differentiate itself from SDPP and moved away from the “old-fashioned” principles and views in economic policy.²¹⁰

While some minor programs often associated with privatization such as the liquidation of publicly owned assets, the sale of minority shares in private enterprises owned by the state and the deregulation of private activity were undertaken by MP governments, mostly at the insistence of Turgut Ozal himself, full scale privatization, translated as the transfer of ownership from the public sector to private hands of state companies, could not be accomplished. The primary achievements of the structural adjustment program was limited to reducing the budget deficits incurred by state

²⁰⁸ Can Kozanoglu, Future 2001 *Insansiz Bankacilik*, in *Birikim*, vol. 30, oct. 1991, p. 12

²⁰⁹ Kahraman, *The Making*, 221

²¹⁰ Seyfettin Gursel and Sahin Alpay, *DSP-SHP Nerede Birlesiyor, Nerede Ayiriliyor?*, İstanbul: AFA Yayinlari, 1986

enterprises in accordance with fiscal austerity measures and, thereby, restrain the heavy burden previously placed on the Turkish economy.²¹¹ Therefore, arguably there was no urgent need for leftist parties to fully adopt social democratic ideology in opposition to MP because full scale industrialization was only a very recent phenomenon and its exploitative aspects on working masses have been tamed by the legal requirements of the patrimonial state in the past.²¹² In other words, as Ismail Cem eloquently puts it, the socio-economic conditions of social democracy did not exist in Turkey at the time.²¹³ Thus the quest for developing a social democratic movement then could not be based on objective material conditions but instead on its moral and practical necessity. As a result RPP-SDPP tradition has been historically more concerned with the goal of preserving the superstructure, containing all the political and cultural reforms of the republican era but failed to materialize their socio-economic requirements.²¹⁴ This was a primary factor behind the orthodox attitude of these parties seen in their inability to develop pragmatism that came to characterize DP-JP-MP/TPP tradition.²¹⁵

The social costs of the stabilization program, which managed to reduce the inflation rate by slowing down the economic growth, turned out to be very severe for some segments of the society.²¹⁶ In the 1980s workers have experienced significant declines in their standard of living due to reductions in their real wages despite the fact that productivity level and interest payments rose proportionately similar to many other developing countries going through structural adjustment programs with the supervision of IMF.²¹⁷ Hence, thanks to the restrictive labor environment and MP government's pursuit of the neo-liberal paradigm which subscribe wage restraint to raise international competitiveness, the flourishing bourgeoisie scored large gains

²¹¹ Waterbury, Exposed, 151

²¹² Kahraman, Sosyal Demokrasi Turkiye, 46-53

²¹³ Ismail Cem, Sosyal Demokrasi ya da Demokratik Sosyalizm Nedir, Ne Degildir, İstanbul: Can Yayınevi, 1998, p. 275-289

²¹⁴ In fact this was the main source of disagreement between Ecevit's movement and the old guards such as Kemal Satir and Nihat Erim since Ecevit developed similar criticisms towards republican revolutions. For more information, see Bulent Ecevit, Ataturk ve Devrimcilik, Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi, 1973

²¹⁵ Rusen Cakir, Turkiye'de Sosyalistlerin Sagcilasma ve Dinozorlasma Ihtimalleri, Birikim, Oct. 1991, vol. 30, p. 35

²¹⁶ For a class-oriented analysis of the 1980s, see Korkut Boratav 1980li Yillarda Turkiyede Sosyal Siniflar ve Bolusum Istanbul: Gercek Yayınevi 1991

²¹⁷ Hulki Cevizoglu, Turkiyenin Gundemindeki Ozellestirme, İstanbul: Ilgi Yayıncılık, 1989, p. 100

against the workers. This was, as Boratav notes, “the counter-attack of the capital” long waited by the urban bourgeoisie.²¹⁸ Lacking the organizational resources to resist the neo-liberal policies of the government, most of the labor unions during this period resembled corrupt shells with their highly hierarchical and corporatist structures and, thus, have been noteworthy for their absence.²¹⁹ They were unable to protect the benefits of social pacts which were previously established without any serious confrontation with the private or public employers in the 1970s. Moreover, highly bureaucratized process of collective bargaining and the strike procedure as well as the restrictive environment overseen by the 1982 Constitution broke their resistance.²²⁰

The disintegration of import-substitution model did not by default reduce the dependency of the labor unions on the corporatist framework of the state, which, as the main employer of union members, could still distribute a huge array of benefits at its disposal. The commanding position enjoyed by the state in the economic arena furnished the governments with ample opportunities to secure the political support and loyalty of the working masses by offering them employment and wages higher than the level of the private sector.²²¹ Therefore labor unions could not easily tolerate opposing the government. This had stripped the unions from the possibility of developing radical tendencies and contributed to the continuation of bread and butter unionism which concentrate efforts on economic issues, namely job security and high wages, and hampered the development of the political consciousness of the working masses. This had created a labor sector which “was co-opted, controlled and induced to stay out of high politics, and which gave priority to job-unionism”.²²² Enjoying its dominance over the unionized workers thanks to legal and political restrictions on other unions, Turk-Is, for example, preserved its cordial relations with the MP cabinet following the 1983 elections, making special efforts to not exceed the boundaries of legalism in its activities.

²¹⁸ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 2003, p. 145-169

²¹⁹ Waterbury, *Exposed*, 259

²²⁰ S. Ketenci, “İsciler ve Çalışma Yasası, 1980lerde Sınırlar ve Sorunlar.” in B. Kuruc et al, *Birakiniz Yapsınlar Birakiniz Gecsinler-Türkiye Ekonomisi 1980-1985*, İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987, p. 187-8

²²¹ Cetin Uygur, *Dinazorların Krizi Değişim ve Sendikalar*, İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1993, p. 180-1

²²² Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, *Labour: the battered community*, in M. Heper (ed.) *Strong state and Economic Interest Groups: the post-1980 Turkish Experience*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991, p. 58

In that sense throughout the decade SDDP leadership sought the reversal of Ozal's policies that limited the political and economic functions of the state and aimed to recover the ground taken by the bourgeoisie at the expense of workers and civil servants. However due to the existence of the patronage system, which established dependency between, on one hand, the state and the unions and, on the other, the union leader and the workers,²²³ SDPP did not enjoy the full support of the labor unions and had to wait until the end of the 1980s to experience a huge inflow of workers into the ranks of the party. The close relationship enjoyed between RPP and the labor unions during Ecevit's term could not be repeated within SDPP. As a result, party elites tried to develop individual links with union leader and even incorporated some union leaders, such as Abdullah Basturk, Fehmi Isiklar and Cevdet Selvi to its ranks, hoping that this would raise the electoral chances of the party.

Following the early years of the Ozal period when economic decisions tended to be based on market signals²²⁴ and were not dictated by large degree of patronage²²⁵ and clientelist demands of the constituencies as in the previous decades of the multi-party era, visible from the weak link of MP to the localities,²²⁶ patronage politics inevitably returned in response to multi-party competition from the end of the 1980s onward. Indeed this was the general norm of Turkish politics characterized by party-directed patronage²²⁷ in which the success of the political elites, then, was primarily based on their ability to represent the particularistic demands of their constituencies²²⁸ and allocate public resources to keep them supportive of the governing coalition. Especially the return of the former party leaders to active politics and the growing mobilization of the trade unions in response to the high inflation level signaled to the

²²³ Altıparmak, A. *Türk Sendikacılığında Güven Bunalımı*, İsmat Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2001. p. 196-225

²²⁴ Ustun Erguder, 'The Motherland Party, 1983-1989', in Heper and Landau, *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, p. 156

²²⁵ E. Ozbudun, *Turkey: the politics of clientelism*. In S. N. Eisenstadt and R. Lemarchand (eds), *Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development*, London: Sage, 1981

²²⁶ İsin Celebi, Aykut Toros and Necati Aras, *Siyasette Kilitlenme ve Cozum*, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1996, p. 15

²²⁷ S. Sayari, *Political Patronage in Turkey*. In E. Gellner and J. Waterbury (eds), *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, London: Duckworth, 1977

²²⁸ Ayşe Gunes-Ayata, 'Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey', in Luis Roniger and Ayşe Gunes-Ayata (eds.), *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*, Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 53-61

MP that it could not survive for long with its current policies.²²⁹ Therefore Ozal began to increase the overall weight of the public sector in the economy²³⁰ which enabled him to incorporate a broad coalition of social classes and interest groups by offering trade²³¹ opportunities in the international markets to win the support of the business sector while simultaneously offering public discretionary funds to attract urban masses.²³² Thanks to this catchall strategy, MP had success among the urban migrants and in provinces where the percentage of wage earners and employees was highest.²³³ Thus in the 1980s MP was characterized as the party of the central column of the society, consisting of lower-middle and middle classes and burgeoning informal sector interests.²³⁴

Turkish version of popular capitalism through such measures as mass housing projects, sale of revenue sharing certificates and the politically motivated allocation of the extra-budgetary funds²³⁵ aimed to incorporate a broad segment of the population as stake-holders in the economic program.²³⁶ Apart from enhancing the domestic support for the emerging capitalistic economy, however, Ozal wanted develop compensatory programs and allocate public funds to neutralize broad segments of the population negatively affected by his economic policies. Onis describes such policies to be associated with the neo-liberal populism²³⁷ Ozal possessed that enabled him to instigate some elements of neo-liberal reform package while legitimizing it in a

²²⁹ Heper and Keyman, *Double-Faced State*, 267

²³⁰ Ziya Onis, 'The State and Economic Development in Contemporary Turkey: Etatism to Neoliberalism and Beyond', in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, p. 160-66

²³¹ For a detailed study on a successful use of domestic coalition of various interest groups by use of public spending, see Kent Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988

²³² For a more general discussion of the effects of trade on domestic interest groups and the resulting winning coalitions formed, see Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989

²³³ J. McFadden, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic" *Middle East Journal* Vol. 39. No. 1, 1985, p. 69-85

²³⁴ Taha Parla, *Türkiyenin Siyasal Rejimi*, Istanbul: Onur Yayinlari, 1986, p. 158-159

²³⁵ Oguz Oyan, *An Overall Evaluation of the Causes of the Use of Special Funds in Turkey and Their Place in Turkey and Their Place in the Economy*, *Yapi Kredi Economic Review* vol. 1 no. 4, 1987, p. 96

²³⁶ Onis, Turgut Ozal, 10

²³⁷ Kurt Weyland, 'Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 4, July, 1999, p. 379-401

populist fashion in the eyes of a broad segment of the society.²³⁸ This enabled MP to establish a minimal winning coalition consisting of approximately 35 % of the electorate by neutralizing some strategic blocks of organized labor, supplying key private-sector interests and providing them with economic incentives and distribute benefits to geographically disperse constituencies.²³⁹ According to this analysis, the center right coalition would pursue liberalization, privatization and export-drive to enhance economic growth, while, at the same time, borrowing heavily to finance large-scale public programs.²⁴⁰ Government's economic policy involved a mixture of opening up of the capital market, tariff reform and macroeconomic instability caused by expansionist public policies, which led political rationality to come progressively into conflict with market rationality. One major problem faced by the SDDP leadership was that MP pursued policies that succeeded in attracting the support of groups that were harmed from his adjustment program. This significantly reduced the chances of SDDP to effectively build a coalition of various sections of the society and challenge the MP government. This created a vicious cycle in left politics as SDDP was now left with no choice but to court the urban dwellers closely aligned with the state which in turn distanced it further from the masses.

By the end of the 1980s, after winning two successive elections, thanks to the unfair and disproportional electoral system, MP governments got into difficulties as they run out of resources to distribute to their supporters and deal with the enormous social and economic costs of the rising inflation rate which sabotaged the stabilization program. At first Ozal and his entourage did not fully realize the full effects of inflation for the society as well as its inhibiting consequences for the long-term economic growth and preferred to tolerate it in return for generating high growth rates in the short run.²⁴¹ Moreover MP was now being challenged not only by SDDP, becoming an increasing attraction for the workers, state officials, intellectuals and urban masses hurt by the liberalization of the Turkish economy but, more importantly, by True Path Party headed by Demirel who was determined to reassume his position as the leader of the center-right. Granted that TPP was coming from the DP-JP

²³⁸ Onis, Turgut Ozal, 23

²³⁹ John Waterbury, Turkish Center-Right and the Winning Coalition, in Tevfik Nas and Mehmet Odekon (eds.) Economics and politics of Turkish liberalization, Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1992, p. 45

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 49

²⁴¹ Onis, Turgut Ozal, p. 25

tradition, it enjoyed an advantage over MP in garnering the support of the provincial bourgeoisie and the peasants who were the losers of the new era. It seemed as if Ozal was to crumble in the coming years, it would be another center-right party that would pick up the pieces of this coalition and come to power.

In addition to the surmounting political challenges, MP had to manage some elements within the uneasy coalition which preserved its electoral chances. The cooperative relationship between the MP administration and Turk-Is, for example, began to break down in 1987 as Turk-Is became concerned about the economic policies of the government and the fact that none of their suggestions were taken seriously. What triggered the union leaders to reconsider their attitude were the high inflation and the inability of the government to compensate workers for their reduced purchasing power.²⁴² Faced with the danger of losing the support of majority of the members in the organization, the leadership realized that it could no longer ignore the enormous pressure coming from the rank-and-file to take an opposing stand against the MP government.²⁴³ Initiating a new round of activism including a general strike against the government, Turk-Is made it clear that it would not support MP in the coming elections which boosted the electoral chances of SDPP and improved its share of votes in 1987 general and 1989 local elections. Following the 1987 election, even the inner coalition formed within MP between Islamists, liberals and nationalists showed signs of disintegration since each group began to emphasize their own agendas and attempt to dominate the local organizations of the party. Against the will of Turgut Ozal, a coalition of nationalist and Islamist groups with an anti-liberal and anti-Western agenda, also known as the Holy Alliance, came close to winning most of the top administrative positions in the 1988 MP national convention.²⁴⁴ Faced with the challenges MP had to relinquish its goal of establishing an expansive hegemony and settled down with efforts to transform it into a passive revolution.²⁴⁵

2.5 Turkish Left Triumphant

The most important event following the formation of the party has been the come-back of the former RPP top rank officials after the lifting of the ban on their political activities in the 1987 referendum. The former RPP cadres quickly established

²⁴² Sakallioğlu, Labor, 65

²⁴³ Ibid., 66

²⁴⁴ Ayata, Ideology, 38

²⁴⁵ Tunay, The Turkish New Right, 24-25

a very strong faction within SDPP and ensured the election of their leader Deniz Baykal,²⁴⁶ a well known pre-1980 deputy and minister, as the Secretary General in the 1988 Party Congress. In the Congress, Inonu has rigorously criticized the government of failing to alleviate poverty, reducing income disparities and solving the inflation problem and linked policies of Ozal to the new-right politics in US and Great Britain.²⁴⁷ With this settlement, the ranks of SDPP seemed more united and energetic than ever, as the party officials turned their attention to the upcoming local elections and to the task of defeating the Motherland Party. In the following months, Inonu-Baykal team managed to receive support from the masses, as SDPP began its march to power thanks to those social classes that were concerned with the rapid changes in society. Growing public disenchantment with the management of the economy and numerous corruption allegations,²⁴⁸ involving some prominent bureaucrats and politicians associated with MP, harmed the electoral fortunes of the party especially in the 1989 municipality elections.²⁴⁹ Indeed, the dramatic setback of MP which received 21 percent of the votes and became the third party at the polls marked the end of Ozal era and contributed to the political fragmentation of the coming years.²⁵⁰

Despite the relatively good results obtained in 1989 local elections, SDPP has never really gained an increasing vote mass from center-right and win the support of the groups that were negatively affected by the neo-liberal policies of MP government.²⁵¹ 1989 election victory in which SDPP won more than 650 municipalities was more a punishment of MP by the voters at the polls than a success for SDPP and contains the early signs of the ideological crisis SDPP would face in the coming years.²⁵² This might be taken as the inadequacy of the SDPP ideology and

²⁴⁶ For a short biography of Deniz Baykal, see Oktay Pirim, Deniz Baykal, Istanbul: Boyut Kitaplari, 1999

²⁴⁷ Erdal Inonu, Kurultay Konusmalari, Boyut Kitaplari, 1998, p. 157-183

²⁴⁸ One of the primary criticism posed at the MP governments was the high number of fictitious exports in the 1980s. For a detailed explanation of fictitious exports during this period, see Ugur Mumcu, Serbest Piyasa ve Kemalizm, Ankara: Umag, 1997

²⁴⁹ Two very influential books were published on Ozal biography, see Emin Colasan Turgut Nereden Kosuyor, İstanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1989 and Hasan Cemal Ozal Hikayesi, İstanbul: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1989

²⁵⁰ See Dani Rodrik, 'Premature Liberalization, Incomplete Stabilization: The Ozal Decade in Turkey', in Michael Bruno (ed.) et al., Lessons of Economic Stabilization and its Aftermath, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991

²⁵¹ Kahraman, The Making, 217

²⁵² Ahmet Kardam and Sezgin Tuzun, Turkiye'de Siyasi Kutuplasmalar ve Secmen Davranislari, Ankara: Veri Arastirma, 1998, p. 56

should be attributed to three main reasons. First, as explained above, Ozal was able to put together a winning coalition consisting of those social groups which were mostly negatively affected by his policies and thereby should be expected to become the natural constituency of leftist parties. Second, faced with the new-right hegemony, it was difficult for center-left parties to resist the tide as seen in many other countries in this period. The lack of the existence of a Marxist historical background and ties to radical labor movements in the RPP-SDPP tradition left the party without the necessary ideological source to generate new strategies.²⁵³ The third was the insistence of SDPP to defend the neo-etatist principles instead of developing alternative economic policies and strategies that could more successfully address the developments in global economy since the 1970s. In that sense, after more than a decade of being away from power, social democrats, using Mannheim's terminology, held to a utopia rather than an ideology as they got more and more separated from the reality of Turkish politics in the post-1980 period.²⁵⁴

While the favorable election result was attributed to the compromise between Baykal followers and Inonu group, aiming to unite the old RPP cadres with the new grassroots SDPP activists before the coming local elections, it also dramatically proved to be the beginning of fragmentation in the party. Baykal's pseudo-authoritarian measures to control all the local organizations and his exclusionary approach, especially towards Kurdish and Alevi groups within the party generated serious resistance among party members and was a major faction behind the formation of the faction of Reformists.²⁵⁵ The latent conflict occurring between these factions came to surface in the aftermath of unsuccessful results of a local election in 1990 with the clash between the Chairman and the Secretary General. Following the election, Inonu has called the Party Congress to discuss the causes of the dramatic loss of vote in the recent election and re-elect the Chairman but the timing of the gathering was wisely picked for an early date to force a reluctant Baykal to become a candidate before getting any stronger. In his speech, Inonu accused Baykal of developing a very small clique and sabotaging the activities of the party administration for political ends.²⁵⁶ Hence Inonu was hoping to eliminate his rival in

²⁵³ Kahraman, *Sosyal Demokrasi Turkiye*, 17

²⁵⁴ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia Collected Works*, vol. 1, 1935, p. 1-53

²⁵⁵ Kahraman, *The Making*, 211-2

²⁵⁶ Erdal Inonu, *Kurultay Konusmalari*, İstanbul: Boyut Kitaplari, 1998, p. 285-315

this congress so that he could focus on the upcoming elections with a unified party organization behind him. The Congress elected Inonu though not with a substantial majority, encouraging Baykal for running against Inonu in the coming years for two more rounds.

In this polarizing environment of the party, gradually but surely a new group of Reformists, consisting of people such as Ercan Karakas,²⁵⁷ Ismail Cem²⁵⁸ and Asaf Savas Akat²⁵⁹ emerged in the political scene, seeking more voice in the party administration. Their common claim was the necessity of taking Turkish social democracy beyond its statist, centralist and anti-democratic origins and aligning SDPP more closely with the universal social democrat parties.²⁶⁰ Although they first gathered as a response to the anti-democratic policies of the Baykal-led party administration, beginning with the Fifth Small Congress of 1989, they were also motivated by the fall of the authoritarian regimes and centrally planned economies around the globe.²⁶¹ Their main aim was to address the structural and organization problems of social democracy in Turkey and manage to incorporate democratic and pluralistic elements to SDPP. However as a strategy they preferred to mostly ignore the ongoing Kemalism debates which will be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis and focus on technical issues such as membership structure, education and participation that were of primary importance for a social democrat party.

Deniz Baykal once again became a candidate against Inonu in the Third Party Congress held on July 27-28, 1991 but this time managed to devise a well-prepared program to supplement his leadership claims together with Ismail Cem, who joined Baykal forces shortly before the 6th Extraordinary Congress. Deniz Baykal and Ismail Cem, as the ideologue of the movement, made numerous speeches in the party meetings to situate the New Left on an ideological basis and generate support from the grassroots activists.²⁶² While Baykal developed the concept of organized market

²⁵⁷ Ercan Karakas, *Gelecek Sosyal Demokrasidir*, İstanbul: Sosyal Demokrasi Yayinlari, 1992

²⁵⁸ Ismail Cem, *Soldaki Arayis*, İstanbul: Can, 2000

²⁵⁹ Asaf Savas Akat, *Sosyal Demokrasi Gundemi*, İstanbul: Armoni, 1991

²⁶⁰ Ercan Karakas, *Sosyalizm Bizim icin Hep Somut bir Utopya*, in Rusen Cakir, Hidir Goktas, *Resmi Tarih Sivil Arayis: Sosyal Demokratlarda Ideoloji ve Politika*, İstanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1991, p. 133-147

²⁶¹ Kahraman, *The Making*, 261

²⁶² For a programme of the New Left movement, see Deniz Baykal and Ismail Cem, *Yeni Sol*, İstanbul: Cem Yayinlari, 1992, p. 84-92

economy to account for the changes brought by the hegemony of the new-right ideology, Ismail Cem, in the articles he wrote for Sabah daily, adopted the approach of the French Socialist Party and made some references to the left of center and democratic left debates in the 1970s.²⁶³ Indeed new left became the first ideological opening within the left politics in the post-1980 period.²⁶⁴ On the other hand, Inonu responded back by accusing the Baykal team to act like a second party administration to criticize and harm their party and split the party members with partisan politics.²⁶⁵ Inonu was hoping that this congress would finally settle the leadership challenge and enable him to concentrate his forces on the requirements of being the opposition leader and rally the party ranks for the next challenge. In order to manage this, he was willing to cooperate with some prominent members of the reformist wing of the party, particularly Ertugrul Gunay and offer them a few pragmatic concessions to gain their crucial votes during the congress. However, this did not amount to a policy change on behalf of Inonu who remained committed to the view that SDPP was the successor and inheritor of the legacy of RPP so that Turkish social democracy would continue to be shaped with the principles of the National Struggle period and the Kemalist reforms. Nevertheless Inonu managed to once again defeat Baykal by a small margin, thanks to the support he received from the reformist wing of the party, namely Ertugrul Gunay and Ercan Karakas who managed to tip the scales in favor of Inonu.

2.6 New Politics for New Times

In Turkish politics early 1990s became a period of rupture with the military coup and its political framework and witnessed the development of new coalitions and emergence of new political movements also in the right of the political spectrum. While center-right parties adopted pro-market policies and came to embrace democratic and pluralist principles to match the economic order that transformed them into pseudo-liberal parties, a romanticist and anti-capitalist response was being generated in the ultra-nationalist and Islamist parties against the neo-liberal agenda.²⁶⁶ MP's shift to the liberal territory, following the 1991 party congress that elected a liberal candidate, Mesut Yilmaz, to party leadership alienated the nationalist conservatives taking refuge in the party and paved the way for a new restructuring in

²⁶³ Ibid., 263-7

²⁶⁴ Fatih Dagistanli, *Sosyal Demokratlar*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1998, p. 189

²⁶⁵ Inonu, *Kurultay Konusmalari*, 345-6

²⁶⁶ Tanil Bora and Rusen Cakir, *RP'de birlesenler neye inaniyor? Magluplar, galipler – maglup sayilir by yolda galipler*, in *Birikim*, Oct. 1991, vol. 30, p. 16-18

radical right politics with the formation of the RP-MCP-IDP electoral coalition.²⁶⁷ It seemed as if despite the intra-party conflicts a totally new field was opening for the Turkish left, in general, and SDPP, in particular, as all parties situated themselves in the new political scale.

1991 national elections, however, turned out to be a major setback for SDPP as it could not retain even its vote share in the previous election let alone raise it to become the first party.²⁶⁸ First, it did not go unnoticed by the electorate that SDPP was running for the conventional statist model, a position that was becoming ever more obsolete with the electorate as a more liberal understanding of state was being put forward by other parties. This is related to the fact that SDPP relied on the classical RPP tradition with no concrete social democratic basis and ignored the universal social democratic culture that kept the party away from a real ideological opening.²⁶⁹ As the party associated with strong state just as center-right parties were surpassing the existing state model, the voting base of the party mostly consisted of white collar workers, bureaucrats, state officers, intellectuals, students and employers.²⁷⁰ Hence organic ties with the state precluded SDPP from demanding more liberalization and greater autonomy for social groups so that party elites have mostly stayed on the defensive while MP, in accordance with its goal of incorporating Turkish economy into world markets, managed to abolish the articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Penal Law, becoming champion of democratization.

In addition, TPP, under the leadership of Demirel, resorted to the strategy of appealing to the suburban vote by continuing liberal-urban based policies of MP and incorporated liberal and democratic promises to its campaign strategy by taking into consideration the global developments and the relative liberalization in domestic politics during the late 1980s. It is a remarkable phenomenon that with this election campaign center-right parties, not least TPP itself, began to at least rhetorically demand all the civil liberties and democratic conditions to a greater extent than the center-left parties. According to Ismail Cem, the poor election result for SDPP should

²⁶⁷ For a critical assesment of this coalition and its prospects, see Rusen Cakir and Tanil Bora, *Ittifak'in gelecegi*, Nov. 1991, vol. 31, p. 17-21

²⁶⁸ For a discussion of the causes of this result, see Ismail Cem, *Soldaki Arayis*, İstanbul: Can Yayinlari, 2000, p. 101-103

²⁶⁹ Kahraman, *The Making*, 222

²⁷⁰ TUSES, *Turkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Secmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Toplumsal Tabani*, Ankara: Tuses Vakfi, 1995, p. 43

be attributed to the fact that recent democratization proposals of center-right parties removed the major difference between the center-right and center-left parties, leading many voters to question the relevance of SDPP in Turkish politics since it lacked the tradition of being associated with the interests of labor, the fundamental criteria for a leftist party.²⁷¹ In addition to losing support among the urban bourgeoisie increasingly switching to center-right parties, SDPP did very poorly among the working masses and failed to achieve a satisfactory score in big cities two years after its victory in 1989 local elections. On the other hand SDPP's fall has played into the hands of DLP which gained some votes from SDPP especially among blue collar workers, unemployed and retired thanks to its populist rhetoric.²⁷²

Deniz Baykal has used the poor result received by SDPP in the 1991 national elections as an excuse to once again challenge Inonu and managed to collect enough signatures to convene the Party Congress for the third time in the last 14 months. This time, Baykal team managed to put together a new report which attributes the decline of SDPP to the fact that the party remained in the past by not being able to reconstruct its identity on the basis of new concepts and lack of an ideology.²⁷³ Instead he suggested an ideological renewal through transformation into a social party which would put individual in its center and argued that the choice in the upcoming chairman elections would be between the status quo and change.²⁷⁴ Some of their suggestions and the methods they used during the convention reminded of the left of center movement as Baykal team aimed to devise a new vision for the party and published and distributed a book among the delegates to publicize these views. In response to Baykal's attacks, Inonu mostly relied on the fact that despite the loss of votes SDPP was finally in power as part of a historical coalition that reached a mass support from both sides of the political spectrum.²⁷⁵ While admitting defeat in the recent elections when compared with the results obtained in 1987 national and 1989 local elections, he asked for an objective analysis of the outcome not losing track of the damage given to the party by the endless congress process caused by the

²⁷¹ Cem, *Soldaki Arayis*, 95-103

²⁷² TUSES, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin*, p. 43

²⁷³ *Tikanan Parti ve Çıkış Yolu: 20 Ekim 1991 Seçiminin Değerlendirilmesi ve Geleceğe Donuk Öneriler*, İstanbul: Filiz Yayıncılık, 1991, p. 7-36

²⁷⁴ Deniz Baykal and İsmail Cem, *Yeni Sol*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992, p. 157-162

²⁷⁵ Inonu, *Kurultay Konuşmaları*, 359-62

challenges of Baykal the previous year.²⁷⁶ Hence Inonu managed to defeat Baykal one more time mostly by exploiting the benefits of being in the government and accusing him with partisan behavior. The third clash between Inonu and Baykal turned out to be the final and decisive round as Baykal bowed out of the race and accepted the fact that he would not be able to defeat Inonu within SDPP.

The end of the Inonu-Baykal clash ironically put an end to the ideological debates that were taking place since most of the views put forward were addressing the delegates before the congresses. In sharp contrast to the left of center movement within RPP in late 1960s and early 1970s, the reformists could not attract a mass following among the grassroots activists of SDPP and failed to even unite amongst themselves. Arguably, reformist wing of the party was divided into three different groups, consisting of those who wanted to reject the RPP legacy and build a new ideological framework for SDPP base on universal social democratic principles, those who remained ambivalent on the issue and did not favor such a radical policy shift and those who remained indifferent to these debates and instead restructuring the party base on a new membership and organizational model under a new party name.²⁷⁷ This fragmentation within the reformist camp made it highly unlikely for them to exercise much influence in the party debates and reduced their power to determine the party policies. Instead they became relevant to the candidates only before the Party Congresses and diverted their cause to the pragmatic political calculations of the party elites.

The fortunes of SDPP did not fare any better once in government because of the deep-rooted socio-economic problems confronted by the party immediately after assuming power. Some of these problems were a direct consequence of the neo-liberal policies of the previous government but regardless came to haunt SDPP. The premature decision of the Motherland government to liberalize the capital account system²⁷⁸ rapidly integrated Turkish financial system into global markets and transformed the country into an attractive place for international investors willing to tolerate high risks in return for high returns in the short run. However it also exposed Turkish economy to the high level of risks and volatility experienced in the global

²⁷⁶ Ibid. 362-4

²⁷⁷ Kahraman, *Sosyal Demokrasi Turkiye*, 167-9

²⁷⁸ For an economic analysis of Ozal's decision to undertake this reform, see Hasan Ersel, 'The Timing of the Capital Account Liberalization: the Turkish Experience', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Vol. 15, 1996, p. 45-64

scale without precautions and instigated the country on the path towards a pattern of debt-led growth extremely vulnerable to speculative attacks and financial crises.²⁷⁹ Incorporation of the Turkish capital market into global financial networks had a profound impact on Turkish politics by raising the cost of pursuing populist and clientelist policies for the governments.²⁸⁰ Unable to make the long overdue reforms in the tax and social security, TPP-SDPP coalition governments resorted to borrowing from the domestic and international markets to finance costly public programs, which, in return, raised the level of interest rates and made it increasingly difficult for governments to sustain these policies in the long-run.²⁸¹ This kind of debt management based on short-term capital inflows became the primary reason for the high degree of instability experienced in the Turkish economy in the 1990s thanks to huge budget deficit, high interest and inflation rates and weak currency.²⁸² This economic policy however was nothing short of an income-transfer from wage-laborers and peasants to domestic rentiers and greatly damaged the very segments of the society close to SDPP.

2.7 The Struggle for Survival

Once in power it became clear that SDPP elites did not have a clear economic agenda and a new program. Prominent SDPP members and even the Chairman himself relied on a strategy of trying to reestablish a kind of statism under the cloak of social state taken together with social security within the market economy and put state-led industrialization as the first priority to solve the unemployment problem.²⁸³ Moreover, going back to Calp's famous stand against Ozal on the issue of privatization of the Bosphorus Bridge the social democrats ran against the privatization of the state economic enterprises and ignored the general direction of the world economy.²⁸⁴ These policies have relegated SDPP to the opposition status against the center-right dominated political climate in the past decade and prevented it from taking the initiative even after becoming a coalition partner. The economic

²⁷⁹ Onis, Turgut Ozal, 28-9

²⁸⁰ On the paradoxical developments in the Turkish economy in the 1980s, see Mine Eder, 'The Challenge of Globalization and Turkey's Changing Political Economy', in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds.), *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 189-215

²⁸¹ H. Tukul, "Waiting for Macroeconomic Stability", *Private View* 1(2) 1997, p. 27

²⁸² Onis, Turgut Ozal, 19

²⁸³ Inonu, *Kurultay Konusmalari*, 268, 310-1

²⁸⁴ Kahraman, *The Making*, 233-4

policymaking remained under the strict control of TPP under Ciller, first as the economic minister and later as the prime minister and SDPP had to bear the consequences of her economic policies without the chance of objection. In a matter of a few years, SDPP has eroded its popular support from all its constituencies as it lost its character within the government, accused of being skewed to the right.

The economic conditions of the low-income groups, particularly fixed-income earners, worsened even further with the 1994 economic crisis caused by the decision of Prime Minister Ciller to engineer a reduction in the interest rates through Central Bank operations which backfired and triggered a stock market crash followed by a massive capital flight. Hence, Ciller government's intervention on behalf of achieving a political objective resulted in the breakdown of the economic system and paved the way for the biggest recession since the WWII period. The mainstream political parties, in general, and the governing parties, especially after Demirel's rise to presidency, in particular, were not able to develop the necessary policies to tackle the economic problems and address public concerns. As a result of this period center parties became unresponsive to the societal demands and distanced from large segments of the electorate, contributing to the high levels of cynicism prevalent among the masses.²⁸⁵ The aforementioned policies have worsened income disparities already existing in the Turkish society and threatened the very basis of the political order by reinforcing sectarian and ethnic loyalties to become identities alternative to citizenship.²⁸⁶ The economic setting was ripe for populist politicians to flourish during this era, establishing vertical and unmediated relationships with atomized masses in this fragmented society.²⁸⁷

The inability of the successive governments to successfully manage the economic situation and address the Kurdish separatist terror and political Islam created a political vacuum, which was subsequently filled by hardliners in state security agencies and the military officials, seeking to defend the state.²⁸⁸ As the vision of Turkey, serving as a bridge between the capitalist world and the Central

²⁸⁵ Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 170

²⁸⁶ Z. Kasnakoglu, "Who Gets What", *Private View*, 1, 2, 1997 p. 56-62

²⁸⁷ Kenneth Robert, *Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case*, *World Politics*, vol. 48, No. 1, 1995, p. 113-115

²⁸⁸ Tanel Demirel, *Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Two Patterns of Civilian Behaviour Toward the Military*, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 4, No 3, 2003 p. 15

Asian republics and a model of prosperity and democracy to the Muslim states, gave way to the painful and stubborn reality of a country facing economic challenges and political problems, the pseudo-liberal political environment began to change. The optimism visible in the statements of prominent politicians only a few years ago were replaced by an official paranoia that considered Turkey to be threatened by a number of adversaries surrounding its borders such as Greece, Syria, Iran, Armenia and Cyprus and challenged by the growing Islamist and Kurdish separatist movements. As Stephen Kinzler rightly noted, PKK had come to embody the most terrifying Kemalist nightmare: the conspiracy of foreign powers that would organize local opposition groups to aim at dismembering the Turkish state.²⁸⁹ These threats have generated a counter response from the nationalists who gained a prominent place within the center-right parties, using public events and civil societal organizations to perpetuate the nationalist and state-centric discourse.²⁹⁰ With Ciller's rise to the prime ministry, TPP has adopted a hardline approach with regards to the Kurdish issue and let security officials close to the party, such as Unal Erkan, Mehmet Agar and Hayri Kozakcioglu to designate policies.

After Inonu's decision to not seek another term as the chairman of SDPP, Karayalcin, the successful mayor of Ankara Municipality, emerged as his successor in the Fourth Party Congress on September 11-12, 1993 by defeating the more conservative candidate and party loyalist, Aydin Guven Gurkan. The ascendancy of Karayalcin with his bureaucratic background to the top was a very symbolic and significant political development, partly because it signified the influence of the bureaucratic elements within the party and the Turkish social democracy at large. In order to strengthen his image as a new and young leader in leftist politics, Karayalcin asked his team of advisors from the municipality, including prestigious names like Yigit Gukoksuz, Ilhan Tekeli, Hursit Gunes, Yakup Kepenek and Hasan Bulent Kahraman, to prepare a manifesto that would stand as the basis of a new party program. The manifesto, titled as the Social Transformation Project, reminiscent of a section of the speech delivered by Inonu in the 1988 Party Congress,²⁹¹ addressed the effects of globalization and targeted the attainment of a total democracy, economic

²⁸⁹ Stephen Kinzler, *Crescent and Star*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001, p. 112

²⁹⁰ Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State*, 135

²⁹¹ Inonu, *Kurultay Konusmalari*, 166-9

growth and just income distribution.²⁹² As a document critical of the single-party era, the manifesto calls for a democratic solution to the deep rooted problems of the country and recommends a pluralistic social model for laicism and Kurdish issues.²⁹³ Moreover, it also suggests that the social groups and classes who vote for the social democratic parties should be reconsidered to observe the recent socio-economic developments and evaluate the emerging social groups.²⁹⁴

Karayalçin Manifesto reflected the attempts of a group of SDPP members to reshape the party in response to the recent changes occurring around the globe and once again reminded the intra-party debates on the necessity of situating social democracy on universal grounds, distancing it from its bureaucratic, centralist and elitist roots. However the rise of neo-nationalism within the center-left and center-right parties in response to growing Kurdish separatist terror attacks and the economic difficulties at the time reduced the popularity of Karayalçin within the party and prevented him from successfully make an ideological opening within SDPP. Faced with Gurkan's opposition at the SDPP parliamentary group, Karayalçin could not even secure much support even among his colleagues in parliament.²⁹⁵ Moreover the corruption scandals that plagued SDPP municipalities and the resulting defeat in the 1994 local elections pushed the party into a deep crisis from which it could not recover.

The post-1980 period witnessed the disintegration of the Turkish social democratic movement when faced with the rise of the New Right hegemony. SDPP, with its strong links to the intellectuals and urban elites, contained a growing faction of reformists who were willing to challenge the dominant party ideology and put together the premises of a new political agenda. However a programmatic revival that would develop the party as a credible alternative to the center-right parties as seen in other advanced industrialized societies did not take place. Theoretical arguments and ideological debates gained prominence within the party only during the leadership contests and, thus, was overshadowed by the Inonu-Baykal clashes. It became clear that both candidates were not interested in undertaking a renewal of the party ideology and were concerned only with these debates for pragmatic reasons. As a

²⁹² Kahraman, *The Making*, 293-4

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, 295

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 296

²⁹⁵ Dagistanli, *Sosyal Demokratlar*, 244-6

result, Turkish social democracy exhausted all chances of constructing itself on the universal principles of social democracy and transforming its ideological outlook in accordance with the changing state-society relationship. As will be further explained in the coming chapters, faced with the challenge of globalization, the social democratic left has returned to its origins with the reestablishment of RPP and adopted pro-state and nationalist policies with regards to the most discussed issues of the period, such as human rights, democracy, Customs Union, secularism etc. This however is not only a consequence of the symbiotic relationship between the state and the party going back to the RPP period but also a result of the strong connections between the party elites and the dominant understanding of modernity revolving around the primordial tenets of Kemalism.

CHAPTER 3

THE CRISIS OF TURKISH MODERNITY AND THE ATTEMPTS OF RENEWAL

In a country where modernity was introduced in the form of a project²⁹⁶ by the political elites searching ways to save the state, the demise of statism inevitably caused a radical questioning of the state-led modernization.²⁹⁷ The multi-dimensional changes brought by economic liberalization in the 1980s contributed to the rise of new social groups, seeking recognition for their ethno-cultural and sectarian differences not represented in the homogenous citizenship model. It was primarily by exploiting the socio-economic and political opportunities of the post-1980 period that these groups increasingly participated in the political sphere, social spaces and cultural zones. This led to the emergence of a more heterogeneous electorate which could not be addressed within the tight boundaries of the Turkish modernization project and the ensuing ethno-cultural and sectarian divides translated into daily politics in the form of *kulturkampfs*, urban, Alevi and secular versus Sunni and traditional and Turkish versus Kurdish nationalist voters in the early 1990s. This chapter explores the political dynamism of the post-1980 period, especially by focusing on Kurdish radicalism and Alevi revivalism and how their rise come to challenge SDPP which were unable to comprehend these changes, still being tied to the state-led modernization schema.

3.1 Turkish Modernization

The fundamental problem faced by the intellectuals in non-Western countries at the turn of 20th century was to find a systemic way to understand, analyze and, more importantly, relate to the rapid socioeconomic and political transformations taking place in the West. It was, they realized, only a matter of time that their local customs, traditions and values would be threatened by the Western supremacy either through war, conquest, trade or diplomacy. As a response, they have predominantly accepted the universal validity of the Western model and, in consequence, borrowed western

²⁹⁶ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *Türk Milliyetçi Romantizmin Sonu: Kurucu Modernist İdeolojinin Donusumu ve Yazinsal Soylem*, in Ahmet Oncu and Orhan Tekelioglu (eds.), *Serif Mardin'e Armagan*, İstanbul: İletisim, 2005, p. 107

²⁹⁷ Caglar Keyder, *Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s*, in Resat Kasaba, and Sibel Bozdogan (eds.) *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997, p. 37

institutions, ideas and manners in order to develop their societies. This was also the case for the Ottoman elites, for whom modernization became synonymous with Westernization.²⁹⁸ Turkish case indeed became an early and radical experiment with modernity in this fashion following the deliberate rejection of the Ottoman ruling elites some traditional aspects of the Ottoman legacy.²⁹⁹ Through their close links with the upper echelons of the Ottoman military and civilian bureaucracy, the republican elites inherited all the modernizing elements of the late Ottoman period and continued the reforms put in place and, in some areas, undertook more extensive projects, leaving a Kemalist imprint.³⁰⁰

Granted that the political, economic and ideological prerequisites of modernity were imposed from above by the Kemalist elites, modernization in the Turkish context took the form of a social engineering project, well designed in accordance with the purpose of reaching the contemporary level of civilization. The making of modern Turkey required establishing its political, economic and ideological prerequisites by creating a nation-state, undertaking economic development and constructing a secular national identity that would prove to be the backbone of a modern society.³⁰¹ The fundamental aim was to transform community-based and religiously-motivated traditional Ottoman society into a modern nation with a secular and national identity and supplement it with modern institutions. Road to progress, seen as attaining the level of the civilized world, could only be achieved by removing the traces of the traditional order from the political system and replacing it with institutions that would be congruent with reason. This is inherent from the fact that the republic emulated the educational institutions and cultural practices of the West without realizing that they were only a result of the complex effects of modernity rather than cause of Western development. The conceptual schema employed by Weber to analyze the complex patterns of change initiated by modernizing societies which emphasize the multi-faceted change in sources of authority with a shift from patriarchal to legal relations best captures the mindset of the political elites

²⁹⁸ Ilber Ortayli, *İmparatorlugun En Uzun Yuzyili*, İstanbul: İletisim, 1995

²⁹⁹ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, New York: Routledge, 1993

³⁰⁰ Emre Kongar, *Toplumsal Degisme Kuramlari ve Turkiye Gercegi*, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1985 and Ahmet Taner Kislali, *Bir Turk'un Olumu*, Ankara: Umit Yayincilik, 1999

³⁰¹ Fuat Keyman, *Global Modernity, Identity and Democracy: The Case of Turkey*, in *Redefining the Nation State and Citizen*, Gunay Goksu Ozdogan and Gul Tokay (eds.) p. 71

in this period.³⁰² The conceptualization of the Turkish modernization as the transition in the political system of authority from patrimonial rule to impersonal rules and regulations, the adoption of positivist and rational thinking replacing divine law and, as noted above, transition from a religious community to nation-state³⁰³ clearly indicates that Kemalist elites have accepted the Weberian answer to the riddle of the 'European miracle'.³⁰⁴

The formation of the nation-state proved to be the constitutive element of Turkish modernization because it enabled the political establishment to introduce national sovereignty distinct from the authority of the sultan and also facilitated the implementation of secular reforms by associating them with national identity. The goal of the leaders of the Turkish Republic was to create a national citizenship based on a single language by promoting and, at times, constructing a shared Turkish culture and identity³⁰⁵ so that alternative loyalties were mostly silenced or forced to relegate to the private realm.³⁰⁶ The elites had feared that the plural cultural legacy of the Ottoman society could threaten the national identity they aspired to construct around the republican ideal. This led them to ignore and, in some cases, even suppress the multiple identities visible in the Ottoman-Turkish polity and silence the alternate histories of various groups that were forced to only cherish their individual identities in the private sphere. This national identity, then, revolved around the organic unity of the secular non-class based society which clearly ignored the existence of alternative sub-cultures and socio-economic classes with their own goals of constructing identities.³⁰⁷ 1920s witnessed the implementation of wide-scale reforms, such as adoption of the Latin alphabet and a civil code, secularization of the education and legal systems, literacy drive, hat revolution, and measurement scales, which aimed at

³⁰² Max Weber, *The Types of Legitimate Domination*. [Originally Published in German in 1922] in Calhoun, C., Gerteis, J., Moody, J., Pfaff, S., Schmidt, K., and Virk, I. (Eds.) *Classical Sociological Theory*. New York: Blackwell Publishing, 1993 p. 215-222

³⁰³ Serif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994

³⁰⁴ Bobby Said, *The Fundamentalist Fear*, London: Zed, 1997, p. 269

³⁰⁵ Ayşe Kadioglu, *The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity*, in S. Kedourie (ed.) *Turkey: Identity, democracy, politics*, London: Frank Cass, p. 177-93

³⁰⁶ Leyla Neyzi, *Remembering to Forget: Sabbateanism, national identity and Subjectivity in Turkey*, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 44, p. 137-58, 2002

³⁰⁷ Indeed, for a critical review of this type of authoritarian modernization, see Levent Koker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990

enlightening the people and encouraging them to adopt a modern pattern of life.³⁰⁸ These reforms were derived from the two problems which Kemalist elites considered to be the key factors behind the collapse of the Ottoman Empire: arbitrary rule of the sultan and conservative Islamic identity, both acting as obstacles to progress in Ottoman society.³⁰⁹

At the end of three decades of elite-driven political reforms, Turkey was hailed by many Western students of Turkish politics as a successful example of rapid modernization that could be imitated by other developing countries. Two very influential books about Turkey written during late 1950s and early 1960s by two prominent Western scholars, namely Bernard Lewis³¹⁰ and David Lerner³¹¹ both described the Turkish modernization process in a very positive manner. The first crack, however, appeared in late 1960s and 1970s with the rise of Marxist intellectuals, especially in prestigious Turkish universities, who shifted their focus from the elites to the masses and analyzed economic structure of the society rather than political institutions.³¹² These intellectuals began to emphasize the deficiencies of Turkish modernization by arguing that its effects were mostly in political origin and had an impact on a very limited segment of the society.³¹³ In other words, the main driving force of social change has been political reforms that were confined to the cultural realm or, in other words, the superstructure, in a totally opposite fashion to the Marxist interpretation of historical change.³¹⁴ It is primarily through their contributions that negative aspects and limitations of elite-driven modernity were brought to the attention of students of Turkish politics. Deconstructing the monolithic understanding of modernity, they argued that the reforms of the mono-party regime were of cultural origin and played very little, if any, impact on the lives of the masses

³⁰⁸ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1993

³⁰⁹ Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, North Humberstone: The Eothen Press, 1985

³¹⁰ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968

³¹¹ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958

³¹² Resat Kasaba, and Sibel Bozdoğan (eds.) *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997, p. 4

³¹³ Interestingly Gellner who took an interest on Turkish modernization toward the end of his life made a similar observation. See, Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, p.83

³¹⁴ Kahraman, *Türk Milliyetçi*, 108

as the divide between the Turkish center and the periphery remained intact. Lacking the means to undertake a full-scale land reform and improve the conditions of the Anatolian peasants, the republican elites could only develop ties with local notables and landowners in the country. Without extensive links with the mass of civil society, the effects of the modernization project, however, could not spread to the peripheral groups that remained under the grip of conservative and traditional forces.³¹⁵ As a result, in its quest for reorganizing the Ottoman-Turkish society, the reforming elite got distanced from society at large and became a close-minded and inward-looking ruling class.³¹⁶

A full project of modernity, thus, could not arise because masses were sidelined during this reform process and remained passive throughout the early years of the republican era. This created a very ambiguous picture of the society as it experienced some effects of modernity in solidarity, especially in the political domain, while majority of the people as individuals remained mostly unchanged in their traditional settings.³¹⁷ As Tim Jaboby argues, these policies coupled with “continuing ideological pre-eminence of a loyally secular intelligentsia, led to a narrow, state-stipulated definition of modernization, a highly monist view of citizenship and an intensive brand of nationalism largely restricted to the urban professionals and large-estate farmers of western Anatolia”.³¹⁸ It was only after the 1950 election, signifying the transition to multi-party political rule, which enabled the mobilization and participation of the peasants in the political system en masse that a large segment of the Turkish society came to experience the substantive effects of modernization. Therefore, various scholars, not only of Marxist origin, began to distinguish between political modernization that occurred during Republican People’s Party administration between 1923 and 1950 and technological modernization which transformed the economic conditions of the peasants following the 1950 elections.³¹⁹

³¹⁵ Jacob Landau, *Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey*, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, p. 111

³¹⁶ Ergun Ozbudun, “State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey”, in L. Diamond ed. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynner Reiner, 1993 p. 247-268

³¹⁷ Keyder, Whither, 46

³¹⁸ Jacoby, T. *Social Power and the Turkish State* Frank Cass London and New York 2004, p. 82

³¹⁹ Tanel Demirel, *Adalet Partisi: Ideoloji ve Politika*. İstanbul: İletisim Yayinlari, 2004

Until the rise of the right-left political cleavage in the early 1960s, Turkish political landscape was defined on the basis of the secularist-anti-secularist axis,³²⁰ fully congruent with the center-periphery cultural cleavage of the Ottoman-Turkish polity. Indeed, during this period, even the radical elements of the Turkish left subscribed to Kemalism at least pragmatically, if not wholeheartedly, for its anti-imperialist, populist, etatist and, more importantly, modern aspects of the will of civilization inherent in Kemalism. Hence, many intellectuals within radical left gave tacit support to the Kemalist elites with the hope that their reforms would establish the foundations of a modern society and create the necessary conditions for a revolution.³²¹ However, this naive view led many Marxist and socialist groups to be assimilated among the Kemalist cadres and deprived the Turkish left from a Marxist tradition. In time, Kemalism has assumed a hegemonic control over the leftist ideology by managing to incorporate those radical elements that complied into its framework and eliminating and suppressing the others if necessary. Moreover being incorporated by Kemalism left the legacy of a Jacobinist, anti-democratic and authoritarian tradition that distrusts the organized struggle and mobilization of labor unions and peasants.³²² As late as 1960s, radical groups such as MDD and Yon movements were advocating a coalition between the progressive elements of the society and army officers as the best way to develop the country. Thus, Workers' Party of Turkey, Yon (Direction) and Milli Demokratik Devrim (National Democratic Revolution) movements, despite their differences, as Murat Belge notes, adopted a "left-Kemalist substitutionalism" that committed them to act for the people, in spite of the people.³²³

Only in the polarizing environment of the late 1970s with the emergence of Kurdish radicalism and ideological student movements together with the growing militancy of the labor unions, some radical elements of the Turkish left, especially those in academic circles, experienced a break with Kemalism if only for a short

³²⁰ Binnaz Toprak, *The Religious Right*, in I. C. Schick and A. E. Tonak, (eds) *Turkey in Transition*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 219

³²¹ Leven Koker, Sol, *Cagdaslasma adina Kemalizmi hep olumladi*, in Levent Cinemre and Rusen Cakir (ed.) *Sol Kemalizme Bakiyor*, İstanbul: Metis, 1991, p. 25-42

³²² Belge, Sol, 163

³²³ Murat Belge, Sol, in Irvin Cemil Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (eds.) *Gecis Surecinde Turkiye*, İstanbul: Belge, 1990, p. 162

period of time.³²⁴ However, during the tumultuous period of the 1970s, for many intellectuals, as the economic and social pressures caused by the rapid economic transformation outdated the conditions that defined the early years of the Republican era, the Kemalist paradigm began to be exhausted³²⁵ though not yet replaced, no longer serving as the main ideology that shaped the worldviews of the rising elites.³²⁶ The Six Arrows of the RPP came under considerable strain as various social and political groups made them the subject of political debate and fundamental disagreement³²⁷ and went so far as to make revisions to adopt them to their own particular political positions. Granted that Atatürkism remained as the official ideology of the state guarded by the civilian and military bureaucracy committed to uphold the orthodox version, every political group in the Turkish political context began to use it as a cover to their ideas and ideologies and interpreted and revised Atatürkism to suit their own purposes.³²⁸

The strong and authoritarian state tradition in Ottoman-Turkish polity together with the Kemalist tendency of preserving solidarist tendencies and a corporatist configuration of the society have led military officers remain alert towards the rise of social groups with autonomous demands from the society. The traditional coalition of bureaucrats, officers and intellectuals have previously organized coup d'états to restructure the political sphere whenever new social groups emerged to transcend the carefully designed boundaries of the system and effectively mobilize the masses, alarming the state elites. As already stated, rising social and political groups no longer limited themselves within the ideological framework of state-led modernization, relying upon the Kemalist will to civilization through its political, economic and cultural aspects. The continuation of the democratic rule, then, could have further severed the civil unrest and, moreover, challenge the very basis of the order which the military was decided to protect.

3.2 1980 Coup as a Kemalist Restoration Project

³²⁴ Belge, Sol, 162-6

³²⁵ Frey, Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey, p. 10

³²⁶ Serif Mardin, Youth and Violence in Turkey, European Journal of Sociology, 19, 1978, p. 246-247

³²⁷ Frank Tachau, Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy and Development, New York: Praeger, 1985

³²⁸ Metin Heper, The State, 110

Thus in the late 1970s the military officials, who have successfully managed to stay aloof from the cleavages of the society, came to the conclusion that they should act to assume their guardian role³²⁹ of preserving the state mechanisms against the growing autonomy of social groups and ensure peace and stability for the citizen body. Their primary goal, not surprisingly, was to de-politicize the entire society and limit the extent of mobilization and participation in social and political networks with the hope that this would end the debilitating pluralism of the multi-party period, particularly the late 1970s, and reorganize the political system along the lines of a corporatist framework.³³⁰ This would set the stage for the reproduction of the hegemony of the transcendental state vis-à-vis the interest groups and strengthen the solidarist understanding of national identity. It can then be argued that 1980 coup was the last attempt of the Kemalist elites to restore the state-led modernization model envisaged by the founding fathers and organize the society without much regard for ethnic, religious, class differences and sectional interests.

The 1980 coup, which came following a systemic crisis, containing elements of civil unrest, economic breakdown and challenges to the official ideology,³³¹ represented a radical rupture in republican period, more so than in any of the previous coups not only due to the dramatic shifts of the economic policy but more importantly for the political developments it triggered. One of the distinguishing features of this coup was the determination of the military to stay for a longer period of time compare to the previous coups and undertake a more comprehensive reconstruction of the political order. In order to accomplish the aforementioned goals, generals have radically de-politicized the society and eliminated any alternative power sources by banning all activities of political leaders, dissolving political parties and censoring all political activities. This proved to be relatively easy as the political parties had already lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the staff generals who accused them of no longer following Atatürkism and becoming hotbeds of strife instead of entailing the general

³²⁹ For a discussion of the historical role played by the military, see George Haris, *The Role of the Military in Turkey*, in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, p. 168-9

³³⁰ Kahraman, *Türk Milliyetçi*, 134

³³¹ Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, *The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey*, *Comparative Politics*, 1983, p. 17-33

will.³³² The generals embodied the conservative nature of the military that was first seen in the 12 March period³³³ and sought to undo the work of their predecessors in 1960 coup by curbing, revising and, even, eliminating what they considered as the excesses of the 1961 Constitution.³³⁴ In response to the widely shared view that social awakening superseded the economic conditions and potential of the country, they managed to reverse some of the key socio-economic and political gains experienced by the social groups, particularly the working classes.³³⁵

Unlike the previous coup, the generals aspired to fundamentally reconstruct the entire political system, economic order and the state mechanism to make them compatible with their determined agenda. In order to achieve this goal, they went to great lengths that included first closing down and then remaking important institutions which were associated with some leftist intellectual circles in the pre-1980 period such as Turkish Language Foundation and Turkish History Foundation.³³⁶ Moreover, granted that they considered the main weakness of the mentioned constitution to be the unnecessary rights and liberties given to citizens,³³⁷ the officers oversaw the creation of a new constitution which restricted the inalienable rights by references to national security and indivisible integrity of the state.

The pattern of military interventions in Turkey is determined by the vanguard role of the army in Turkish politics and its relations with the state bureaucracy in accordance with the traditional coalition of republican history.³³⁸ However, following the ascendancy of the democratic left movement in RPP, which was considered by the staff generals as a sign of the weakening of Atatürkist tenets in the party, there was a rupture in the aforementioned grand coalition between the military, bureaucracy and

³³² Kemal Karpat, *Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980*, eds., Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, p. 152-3

³³³ For a critical account of the 12 March period, see Ali Gevgili *Türkiye’de 1971 Rejimi*, İstanbul: Milliyet, 1973 and Ismail Cem, *Tarih Acısından 12 Mart*, İstanbul: Cem Yayinlari, 1993

³³⁴ Yuksel Taskin, *12 Eylül Atatürkcülüğü ya da Bir Kemalist Restorasyon Tesebbüsü Olarak 12 Eylül*, in Ahmet Insel (ed.) *Kemalizm*, 2002, p. 572

³³⁵ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 292 and Ahmad, *The Making*, 182

³³⁶ Taskin, *12 Eylül Atatürkcülüğü*, 577-8

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, 576

³³⁸ Umit Cizre Sakallioğlu, *The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy*, *Comparative Politics*, January 1997, p. 151-166

RPP.³³⁹ Therefore, coup leaders have undertaken the task of restoring Atatürkism to renew its hegemony in society and construct a new political ally that would prove to fill the void caused by RPP's ideological shift in the 1970s. This led the army to break its links with RPP and the civilian bureaucracy since they came to be seen as obstacles on the path to the economic development.³⁴⁰ The political ally is crucial for the effectiveness of military interventions because the military prefers to take action behind the scenes, staying away from active politics and direct involvement in the process. It was in this period that the ideological approach of the military officers came to resemble those of a new group of Kemalist bureaucrats who, in response to the rising socialist values among the intellectuals, came to think that the main premises of Kemalism was under attack. The growing activism of many leftist-oriented students, workers and intellectuals around the ideological framework of socialism and the success of the left of center movement within RPP in the late 1970s generated a counter-response from the bureaucratic elites whose conservative attitude came to overshadow their radical goals.³⁴¹

RPP's shift to the left was an alarming development as it radically altered the power configurations and led them to align themselves more closely with the state and become transformed into conservative ideologues with regards to progressive developments in the Turkish society. This group of "republican conservatives", such as Turhan Feyzioglu³⁴², Coskun Kirca³⁴³ and Aydin Yalcin, graduates of Istanbul and Ankara Law Faculties have personified themselves with the cherished goal of preserving the hegemonic power of the state and wanted to perpetuate the paternalist-elitist bureaucratic approach. In time they formed the right faction of RPP and later resigned from their posts when they were sidelined from the decision-making processes in successive party congresses during the late 1960s. They were instrumental in the formation of, first, the Trust Party and, after its merger with Republican Party, the Republican Trust Party in order to defend the corporatist and non-ideological elements of Kemalism.

³³⁹ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *The Making and the Crisis of Turkish Social Democracy: Roots, Discourses and Strategies*, unpublished PhD. Thesis, 1999, p. 162

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 165

³⁴¹ For some of the revisions envisioned in Atatürkism by the left of center movement, see Bulent Ecevit, *Atatürk ve Devrimcilik*, Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi, 1973

³⁴² Yuksel Taskin, Turhan Feyzioglu, in Ahmet Insel (ed.) *Kemalizm*, 2002, p. 534-9

³⁴³ *Ibid.* 574-7

It was mainly through the efforts of these ‘republican conservatives’ under the body of the Republican Trust Party that a rapprochement has taken place between the rightist parties taking part in the National Front governments and the military. This process became the backbone of the *modus vivendi* of the 1980 coup with which the nationalist and conservative aspects of right Kemalism were incorporated the neo-liberal policies and thereby constituted the primary political agenda of the era. Granted that in the Turkish context the army wanted to receive a wide coalition which support the coup and its policies, the September 12 generals realized that Republican Trust Party, aligned with the rest of the republicanist conservatives,³⁴⁴ had a little mass appeal and thereby felt the need to seek the cooperation of the nationalist conservatives associated with mainstream center-right parties and organizations subscribing to right Kemalism in the 1970s. In other words, the civilian wing of the new administration consisted of a synthesis of ‘nationalist conservatives’ and ‘republican conservatives’ who together devised new economic policies that introduced strong state and strong market economy aspects of the new-right hegemony to Turkish politics.³⁴⁵

In search of receiving broad political support from the masses, the generals began to use Islamic references and themes in their speeches to popularize their restoration project and replaced the militant secularism of the republican elites with a more conciliatory secularism.³⁴⁶ Moreover, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis developed by conservative members of the Hearth of Intellectual Association was adopted by generals³⁴⁷ who wanted to incorporate conservative segments of the society to the center and open up the domestic market to Islamic capital.³⁴⁸ During this period, the military administration approved greater religion instruction in the secular track system and integrated the new curriculum into its political agenda of seeking a closer

³⁴⁴ Taksin, 12 Eylül Atatürkçulüğü, 574-5

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 570-82

³⁴⁶ Suleyman Seyfi Ogun, *Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye*, Balgam Yayınları, İstanbul, 1995, p. 187

³⁴⁷ Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 71

³⁴⁸ Faruk Birtek and Binnaz Toprak, *The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Hazards of Rewriting Turkish Modernity*, Praxis International, 13, 1993, p. 119

interaction of Turkish nationalism with Islamic elements.³⁴⁹ This education system emphasized soldier-statesman aspects of Atatürk and contained a nationalist interpretation of Islam that has reached its climax during Vehbi Dincerler's term as Minister of Education. In response to the decline of Atatürkist ideology, coup leaders had begun a reconstruction process that revolved around the cult personality of Atatürk, using his centennial and promoted a pragmatic but yet nationalist attitude.³⁵⁰

The greatest damage in this period was inflicted on the leftist groups which were repressed, persecuted and disintegrated as a result of the authoritarian policies of the period.³⁵¹ In addition generals attempted to reverse the social and political awakening experienced within the RPP in the pre-1980 period by sidelining bureaucrats, policymakers and politicians associated with the left of the center movement. It was for example hoped that the new center left party formed with the auspices of the generals, Populist Party, reminiscent of the Trust Party, would be able to generate support among the traditional RPP factions for the policies of the military coup, while any other genuine leftist parties formed in this era were banned from participating in the elections. Their goal was to seek a synthesis of Kemalism with leftist views to tame the radical elements that came to surface with the rise of left of the center movement and thereby position Populist Party as the loyal opposition to the post-1980 political settlement. Social Democratic Party was formed as a response to this political plan and carried, at first, successfully the democratization and demilitarization demands of the leftists. However the legal framework of the post-1980 period significantly restricted the boundaries of the political system by limiting the political influence of civil associations and depoliticizing society and thus came to hinder the further development of social democratic parties. Due to the legal restrictions of the 1982 Constitution, for example, the very groups that would support a social democratic party such as university students, workers and civil servants were excluded from taking part in the political process.

This restoration attempt was, however, destined to fail from the beginning due to the contradictions inherent in the project designed by the coup leaders. The neo-

³⁴⁹ For an excellent ethnographic study conducted on the education policy of this period, see Sam Kaplan, *Din-u Devlet All Over Again? The Politics of Military Secularism and Religious Militarism in Turkey Following the 1980 Coup*, *Int. Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34, 2002, p. 113-127

³⁵⁰ Heper, *The State*, 144

³⁵¹ İsmail Cem, *Gecis Donemi Turkiyesi 1981-1984*, İstanbul: Cem, 1984

liberal economic policies pursued by the military administration and continued by MP governments were contradictory to the Kemalist understanding of the organic state because they have gradually but surely eroded the ability of the state mechanisms to determine power relations within the society.³⁵² By shifting the economic policymaking to the politicians and other economic agents along with the new-right hegemony around the globe, the generals contributed to a process that have not only increased the dynamism of the market forces but also strengthened civil society as an unintended consequence and thereby paved the way for the disintegration of the corporatist nature of the Turkish state. The possibility of preserving the state-led modernization was eliminated with the rise of a functioning market economy in which various social groups could find their own voice.

As the universal claims and aspirations of the modernization theory undergo significant criticism, the Turkish modernization project “with its singularity, austerity, and paternalism, appears woefully inadequate both as a source of inspiration and as a mechanism of control in economics, politics and cultural production”.³⁵³ Thus the locus of modernization rapidly shifted from the hands of the bureaucracy and the political elites to the rest of the society as individuals were no longer regarded as passive objects of a project but subject of their own history and capable of determining their individual lives.³⁵⁴ The aforementioned socio-economic developments have challenged the dominant state-centric discourse, undermining the Turkish modernization project but also caused a rupture within the constitutive period of the national culture in the early 1980s.³⁵⁵ The efforts of the Turkish intelligentsia of understanding the local traditions of the Anatolian masses and “retrieving a Turkish identity”³⁵⁶ from these folk elements³⁵⁷ were replaced by the post-modernist openings

³⁵² Fuat Keyman, *Global Modernity, Identity and Democracy: The Case of Turkey*, in *Redefining the Nation State and Citizen*, Gunay Goksu Ozdogan and Gul Tokay (eds.) p. 83

³⁵³ Resat Kasaba, and Sibel Bozdogan (eds.) *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997, p. 5

³⁵⁴ Keyder, Whither, 31

³⁵⁵ Kahraman, *Turk Milliyetci*, 139-153

³⁵⁶ Serif Mardin, “Playing Games with Names”, in Deniz Kandiyoti and Aysel Saktander (ed.) *Fragments of Culture The Everyday of Modern Turkey*, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002, p.115-128

³⁵⁷ One of the earlier Works of literature that emphasized the need to form this link with the masses is *Yaban*. See Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, *Yaban*, İstanbul: İletisim Yayinlari, 2003

of a new generation of authors.³⁵⁸ Deconstruction of the romanticist and modernist foundations of the national literature paved the way for the rise of new groups and new topics, associated with the emergence of identity politics in the political sphere, ranging from the underground poetry³⁵⁹ to feminist novels.³⁶⁰

3.3 Identity Politics

In light of the liberalization process, the Turkish political landscape in the 1990s witnessed a clash between the secular national identity as the bearer of the Turkish modernization project and the new social and political groups with their use of the language of difference to draw upon their identities.³⁶¹ The point of demarcation was the change of political agenda from the grand strategies of modernization to identity politics,³⁶² a process triggered by the rise of socio-political and religious groups with communitarian claims to identity.³⁶³ As the emerging private media managed to eliminate the state control on the flow of information and raise the power of public opinion in a matter of few years, alternative political, cultural and religious groups representing “the other but real Turkey”³⁶⁴ found opportunities of expressing their views and bringing to light issues previously considered to be unacceptable by the political elites, involving questions of ethnicity, religion, laicism, minority status, cultural rights and norms of citizenship.³⁶⁵

These groups began to create and develop their own definitions and versions of history and undertook the task of deconstructing the official legitimacy of the political order.³⁶⁶ The rediscovery of history in Turkish society in this period brought attention to the cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire and encouraged the study of the oral

³⁵⁸ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *Postmodernite Modernite Arasinda Turkiye: 1980 sonrasi*, İstanbul: Everest Yayinlari, 2002

³⁵⁹ For more information on this subject, see Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *Kucuk Iskender Siiri: Yeralti Edebiyatina Dogru*, Turk Siiri Modernizm Siir, İstanbul: Agora, 2004, 317-327

³⁶⁰ The most prominent feminist novel of this period is the famous book written by Duygu Asena in early 1980s. *Duygu Asena, Kadinin Adi Yok*, İstanbul: Afa, 1987

³⁶¹ Keyman, *Global Modernity*, 70

³⁶² *Ibid*, 87

³⁶³ Tanil Bora, *Milliyetçiligin Kara Bahari*, İstanbul: Birikim, 1995

³⁶⁴ K. Robins, *Interpreting Identities*, in S. Hall, ed., *The Question of Identity*, London: Sage Publications, 1996

³⁶⁵ Fuat Keyman, “On the Relation between Global Modernity and Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of Islamic Identity.” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 13: 1995, p. 93-120,

³⁶⁶ Omer Caha, *The Role of Media in the Revival of Alevi Identity in Turkey*, *Social Identities*, vol. 10, No. 3, 2004, p. 331

history of various different groups and facilitated the reemergence of their submerged identities. Many minority groups, even those ones which had initially supported the Kemalist modernization project, such as Alevis, women and non-Muslims, became increasingly disillusioned by their conditions in the society and detested the fact that they continued to be perceived as potential outsiders in Republican Turkey.³⁶⁷ As Keyman rightly notes, the tendency of Kemalism to develop, either a cultural or an ethnic-based understanding of national identity as part of its efforts to undertake modernization has ignored the multiplicity and relationality of the identity formation process³⁶⁸ and thereby excluded many groups whose identities were not deemed acceptable by the Kemalist elites who made modern Turkey in their own image.

The process of identity-formation in Turkey indeed encompasses a long time period whose origins could be traced back to the emergence of multi-party politics,³⁶⁹ which mobilized the latent ethno-cultural and sectarian solidarities through the multi-faceted interaction between the politicians and their voting base.³⁷⁰ It was however only with the 1980s that discourses of identity based on ethnic and religious distinctions have become more important than the economic struggle as the defining factor in the Turkish political context.³⁷¹ This political phenomenon occurred mainly as a result of the growing number of migrants who managed to strengthen their own authentic cultures as part of a contest perceived to be one of identity. Rapid migration provided primordial identities with a new breeding space in the metropolitan areas due to the extensive social networks established among particular groups. Rather than adopting the associational networks provided in the modern setting of the city, the newcomers have most developed their own value systems as they were distanced from

³⁶⁷ Rifat N. Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yillarinda Turkiye Yahudileri: Bir Turklestirme Seruveni (1923-1945)* Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1999

³⁶⁸ Keyman, *Global Modernity*, 74

³⁶⁹ Metin Heger and Ahmet Evin (eds) *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988

³⁷⁰ Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 66

³⁷¹ Binnaz Toprak, "Woman and fundamentalism: the Case of Turkey", in Valentine M. Moghadam (ed.), *Identity Politics and Women*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994 and Ayse Ayata, 'The emergence of identity politics in Turkey', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 17, Fall, 1997, p. 59-73

their traditional roots.³⁷² In the following sections, the emergence of identity politics in the Turkish political landscape tied to the Kurdish and Alevi movements are linked with the intra-party developments in SDPP during late 1980s and early 1990s, while the issue of resurgence of political Islam is more thoroughly discussed in the next chapter.

3.4 Kurdish Radicalism

The Kurdish community in Turkey have always had an uneasy relationship with the centralization and modernization efforts of, first, the Ottoman, then the Turkish state. Starting from the mid-19th century, the power and authority of decentralized social and political groups were seen as an obstacle to modernization and were tried to be curtailed through administrative reforms. However, as the power of these tribal elites couldn't be replaced by the state power, sheiks come to be the major political and social elite in the Kurdish regions. In reaction to the centralization efforts and partly with the effect of the emerging nationalism ideology and movements on the Ottoman territory, the emergence of Kurdish nationalism coincided with the demise of the Ottoman state, paving way to various rebellions and political movements led by tribal leaders and sheiks. Following the crush of these rebellions, Kurdish nationalist ideology survived particularly among the social elites and usually as an intellectual movement.³⁷³

Anytime the Turkish political elites sought to penetrate into the politics of the Kurdish region and ally with the political actors there, they did so through allying with the tribal leaders and sheiks in the region. This was also the case for Mustafa Kemal and his cadres leading the nationalist struggle. The temporary alliance between the Turkish and Kurdish political elites was broken right after the Independence War. This was primarily due to the changing character and ideology of the newly established nation-state. The transformation from the Empire to the nation-state implied the total destruction of the Ottoman "implicit contract"³⁷⁴ (zimni mukavele), a process which has been going on since the 19th century, and led to the politicization

³⁷² Tahire Erman, *The Politics of Squatter Studies in Turkey: The Changing Representations of Rural Migrants in the Academic Discourse*, *Urban Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 7, 2001, p. 983–1002

³⁷³ Hamitz Bozarlan, , *Kurt Milliyetçiliği ve Kurt Hareketi*, in Mehmet Alkan (ed.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletisim, 2002, p. 844

³⁷⁴ Serif Mardin “Freedom in an Ottoman perspective”, in Ahmet evin and metin heper (eds.) *State, democracy and the military: Turkey in the 1980s*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, p. 23-35

of the Kurdish nationalist movement, which was primarily a cultural movement to that date.

The earliest rebellions of the Turkish Republic, and particularly the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion alarmed the Republican elites against the threat of the Kurds and Kurdish nationalism to the new state and led to an intensification of the efforts to build a homogeneous Turkish national identity. Kurdish nationalism and identity was perceived as a threat to the Turkish state over the pre-modern character it was taken to represent, as a reactionary and fundamentalist movement which has close links with the tribal structure, provoked by foreign actors in an underdeveloped region.³⁷⁵ The perceived character of the Kurdish problem was particularly what the Kemalist Revolution wanted to eliminate through its modernization project. The ongoing latent conflict between Ankara and the Kurdish tribes in the eastern region, however, was gradually incorporated into the political system with the emergence of a multi-party regime. In order to win the elections, all the political parties, even the ultra-nationalist ones though to a limited extent, penetrated into the region and made considerable efforts to integrate Kurdish feudal leaders to the political networks of their parties. As the tribal ties was used for the integration of the Kurds into the Turkish political system, the tribal structure of the region remained intact.

Starting from the 1960s, Kurdish nationalist movement started to ally with leftist movements and to use a leftist discourse in line with the self-determination theory, which added a universal dimension to the nationalist ideology of the Kurdish intellectuals. In parallel with the polarization of the political environment, the Kurdish nationalist movement, which demanded the recognition of cultural, social and economic rights until the end of 1960s, became more politicized and started to use violence as a method for the fight to gain political rights for the Kurdish community.³⁷⁶ Primarily urban and educated, the Kurdish political elites also stressed the underdevelopment of the region, which can be overcome through the socialist system. Thus the Marxist intellectuals mostly perceived the issue from an economic perspective, arguing that the primary cause of the underdevelopment of the region is the feudal land structure worsened by the exploitative nature of capitalism and Turkish imperialism. The alliance with the Turkish left provided a political platform

³⁷⁵ Mesut Yegen, *Türk Soyleminde Kurt Sorunu*, İstanbul: İletisim, 1999, p. 266–7

³⁷⁶ Martin van Bruinessen, *Kurdistan Uzerine Yazilar*, İstanbul: İletisim, 1992, p. 346–

for the Kurdish nationalism to voice and to express the political demands of the Kurdish community during the era. Nevertheless, Kurdish issue was never directly addressed by the political parties, save some extreme left groups and organizations, among them Turkish Workers Party and Turkish Revolutionary Worker and Peasant Party,³⁷⁷ which felt the need to stay committed to the official policy of ignoring the issue of Kurdish ethnicity and considering the problems to be derived from feudal origin. Political mobilization of the Kurdish people, however, came to a halt during the September 12 era, when all political parties were closed down, and all civil, ethnic and leftist political activities were paralyzed. Despite many restrictions placed upon any forms of organized political activity by mainstream political associations, let alone Kurdish ones, the Kurdish mobilization proved to be enduring. The coercive policies implemented by the military administration along with deteriorating economic conditions, however, alienated the local population and increased local support for the PKK movement.³⁷⁸

The existence of traditional links between the political center and the Kurdish periphery, benefiting mostly the feudal and tribal elements of the region, were gradually undermined with Kurdish migration to the big cities and the creation of a micro-space for Kurdish politics in the Southeast Anatolia. While the early Kurdish migrants were already assimilated into the Turkish society and confined to the use of their cultural practices in their homes, many others began to place more emphasis on their ethnic and cultural identity based on their interactions with other groups. Coinciding with the dissolution of the Soviet Empire and the rise of identity politics in the world and in Turkey, this trend paved the way for a new urban and more radical Kurdish movement to flourish among the young generations whose members took more active roles in political, economic and cultural aspects of the urban context. On the other hand, the impact of the Kurdish intellectuals in the European countries in raising awareness about the Kurdish identity, both within the Kurdish community and among the European public, increased the political pressure on the Turkish state regarding human rights and particularly for more democratization to recognize the social, cultural and economic rights of the minorities.

³⁷⁷ Mehmet Bedri Guntekin, *İkbinlerin Esiginde Kurt Sorunu*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, 1993, p. 56-70

³⁷⁸ Ibrahim Ferhad and Gurbey Gulistan (eds.), *The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000

The greater awareness of the Kurdish identity can also be attributed to the size of the Kurdish population and the active efforts of various Kurdish groups that have taken advantage of the new political and cultural spaces offered to them in the urban context. The rising radicalism inevitably had a deep impact on Kurdish political actors by forcing them to take more active positions on the Kurdish issue and make demands from the Turkish governments. According to Bozarslan, urban radicalism created a junction with Kurdish political actors who were integrated into the political system. As the Kurdish radicalism gained dominance in the urban centers and spread to the various parts of the Kurdish electorate, the Kurdish politicians in mainstream political parties could no longer remain indifferent to pressures.³⁷⁹

Helped with the improvement in information technologies, both the PKK and the legal Kurdish parties could enjoy a level of support both in the urban and rural areas, that couldn't be gained by any other Kurdish movement before. Partly counting on this level of support, these movements could present themselves as the unified voice and even, at times, the sole representative of the Kurdish community in Turkey. Homogenization of the ethnic identity and centralization of the political and social networks, in this regard, imply a modernization process among the Kurdish population, alongside the Turkish modernization and in challenge to that. Indeed, these political movements have also stressed the underdevelopment of the region which is primarily due to the feudal structure of the Kurdish society, to them, that remained intact to date. Both the Turkish state and the tribal leaders allying with the mainstream Turkish political actors are held responsible for the continuation of this structure by them.

In response to the rising political activism of Kurdish groups in search of carving space for their movement in the Turkish political landscape, the Kurdish issue once again became an important element of Turkish politics in the late 1980s. The demands of these groups for more cultural rights and local democracy could no longer be controlled by the mainstream political parties in the tight boundaries of the 1982 Constitution. During this period some extreme-left groups occupied themselves with this issue, calling it a problem caused by the political restrictions introduced by the Turkish state and sought closer cooperation with the Kurdish movement to challenge

³⁷⁹ R. Olson, (ed.), *Kurdish National Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East*, Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996

the political status quo.³⁸⁰ Following these demands within leftist circles for lifting of the current restrictions and more democratization, SDPP gradually recognized the ethnic element in this problem³⁸¹ and thus became the first mainstream Turkish party to break apart from the state policy of attributing all opposition movements in the region to the pre-modern and tribal nature of its inhabitants.³⁸² An off the agenda speech in parliament concerning the conditions and status of Kurds in Turkey delivered by Mehmet Ali Eren, SDPP Istanbul deputy, who argued that laws were not applied equally in the western and eastern parts of the country was sufficient to generate a political crisis within SDPP. His statement actually matched with the party policy of seeking cultural and political rights and a democratic settlement for the Kurdish people, living in the south-east region and was at first defended by Inonu. However, later, the mounting criticisms led Inonu to switch his position and go as far as to recommend him to be sent to the disciplinary committee.³⁸³ His statement should be taken within the context of the emergence of a group of leftist and Kurdish SDPP deputies who began to oppose the language ban and other political restrictions imposed on the Kurdish citizens in the name of democracy and human rights, a position also accepted by the party leadership albeit in more moderate terms.

This position was endorsed by a group of leftist deputies within the party and somewhat tolerated by the Inonu administration which was seeking ways to develop a synthesis between the RPP tradition and the social democratic ideology. On the other hand, the former RPP cadres, organized around the leadership of Deniz Baykal aspired to return SDPP to its roots by transforming SDPP with the principles and tenets of Kemalism to look alike with the old RPP.³⁸⁴ Coming from the RPP tradition, SDPP had difficulty managing these radical elements³⁸⁵ among its rank and file, mostly associated with Kurdish and Alevi groups and came close to disintegration due to the emphasis of sectarian and ethnic differences that caused a counter-response among Baykal loyalists. As migrant Kurdish and Alevi groups began to increase their

³⁸⁰ Dogu Perincek, *Türk Sorunu Emekçiler Acısından Belgelerle Kurt Sorunu*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1993

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 190-5

³⁸² Mesut Yegen, *The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish National Identity*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 32, 2, 1996, p. 216

³⁸³ Teoman Ergul, *Sosyal Demokraside Bolusme Yillari*, Ankara: Gundogan Yayınları, 2000, p. 194

³⁸⁴ Ergul, *Sosyal Demokraside*, 183

³⁸⁵ Ogun, *Modernleşme*, 107

influence in the local organizations of the party, thanks to their cooperation and close bonds, there emerged, as Ayse Ayata observes, “a latent but serious conflict between groups representing old style clientele networks and those directly representing or collaborating with urban-based eastern ethnicity”.³⁸⁶ This group made its stand against Baykal loyalists in the 1988 party congress but failed to prevent Baykal from getting elected as the general secretary.

The more serious Kurdish crisis within SDPP, however, occurred in 1989 when seven Kurdish deputies were sent to the disciplinary board for going against the party discipline by attending an international conference on Kurdish national identity and human rights and, as a consequence, were expelled from the party. This was a controversial decision that polarized the party as a third of the SDPP came to the defense of these Kurdish deputies and urged the disciplinary committee to not give a punishment any severe than a simple warning. There were a lot of rumors that Baykal was behind the decision as those who favored the expulsion were all names close to him.³⁸⁷ Sensing a policy shift among the leadership cadre on the Kurdish issue, a group of leftist deputies³⁸⁸ had resigned in a defiant mood, protesting the party administration for resorting to anti-democratic means. The Kurdish deputies together with the leftist group who had also resigned from SDPP established the first-ever legal Kurdish party, People’s Labor Party, thereby creating a precedent for Kurdish political legalism and contributed to the development of a tradition of pro-Kurdish parties which would bring issues long silenced and ignored by the ruling elites to the political sphere.³⁸⁹

In an effort to renew ties with the Kurdish electorate and alleviate the damage experienced by the party in the aftermath of the Paris Conference incident, SDPP had issued a comprehensive policy report on the Kurdish problem which surpassed in its tone any of the previous documents written by a mainstream party. Referring to the ban on the use of Kurdish as primitive and a tool of assimilation, the report called for

³⁸⁶ Ayse Ayata, Ideology, social bases, and organizational structure of the post-1980 political parties, in A. Eralp, M. Tunay and B. Yesilada (eds.) *The Political and socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993, p. 45

³⁸⁷ Ergul, *Sosyal Demokraside*, 267-8

³⁸⁸ Cuneyt Canver, Abdullah Basturk, Fehmi Isiklar, Arif Sag, Kemal Anadol, Hunsu Okcuoglu, Ali Uyar, Omer Ciftci, Ismail Hakki Onal, Salih Sumer, Kenan Sonmez, Mehmet Kahraman and Ilhami Binici

³⁸⁹ Nicole Watts, *Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990-94*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1999, p. 631-656

rescinding the ban on Kurdish language, abolishing the village guard system and ending the state of emergency in the region.³⁹⁰ Though seen by some intellectuals as a pragmatic move by the leadership of SDPP to regain some of the support it lost in the region following the expulsion of Kurdish MPs,³⁹¹ many others have hailed this report as a very positive step in Turkish politics³⁹² and argued that it signified the admittance of SDPP of the failure of the military measures in the Kurdish question.³⁹³ Following these conciliatory steps taken by SDPP and the decision of the Turkey's Supreme Electoral Board to refuse to allow PLP to compete in the coming elections, leadership cadres of PLP and SDPP sought rapprochement and made an election coalition which would carry some pro-Kurdish politicians to the parliament. SDPP administration hoped that this deal would not only constitute a positive step in addressing the problems of the region but also gain them the necessary votes to substantially defeat DLP and possibly force Ecevit out of politics in the coming election. Inonu believed that this would not just be an electoral alliance but also give a clear message to the Kurdish citizens that SDPP was open to them.³⁹⁴

It should be noted that there were many within SDPP who opposed this merger lest it would generate a backlash among the voters in other parts of the country and come to harm the party in the long run. Fearing radical elements of the Kurdish movement to penetrate into the candidate lists of SDPP, many deputies in executive committee asked the party administration to exert more control over the candidate selection process and pick Kurdish candidates closer to the RPP tradition.³⁹⁵ Their fears turned out to be well founded as many PLP-origin candidates elected from the SDPP list were younger, more radical and less experienced than the old generation Kurdish politicians who were aware of the boundaries of the political system and were sensitive to the mainstream Turkish public opinion.³⁹⁶ The extensive ties between some of the Kurdish deputies, namely Hatip Dicle, Leyla Zana and Sirri

³⁹⁰ M. Gunter, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey*, London: Macmillan Press, 1997, p. 62

³⁹¹ Metin Sever, *Kurt Sorunu: Aydinlarimiz ne Dusunuyor*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992, p. 13-4

³⁹² *Ibid.*, 91-2

³⁹³ Mehmet Bedri Gultekin, *İkibinlerin Esiginde Kurt Sorunu*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1993, p. 137-40

³⁹⁴ Erdal Inonu, *Anılar ve Dusunceler*, İstanbul: İdea İletişim Hizmetleri, 1996, p. 271-4

³⁹⁵ Saban Sevinc, *Yenilmis Komutanlar Muzesi*, Ankara: Umit Yayıncılık, 2000, p. 49

³⁹⁶ Watts, *Allies and Enemies*, 637

Sakik and Kurdish radical movements, in particular PKK humiliated Inonu as the broker of the merger deal and harmed the party. The merger was skillfully exploited by Ecevit who accused SDPP leadership of harboring separatists and carrying their members to the parliament for political gain.³⁹⁷ Targeting the conservative and marginal segments of the society, Ecevit has juxtaposed his populist discourse to his nationalist views and emerged as the candidate in the left of the political spectrum which could develop similar positions to the official ideology. Especially, following the Gulf War, Ecevit began to perceive the Kurdish problem as the biggest threat to the Turkish state and began to openly challenge those favoring a democratic settlement to the issue on the basis of granting cultural rights to the Kurdish citizens.³⁹⁸

Post-Cold War years have witnessed a rapid increase in the number of ethnic conflicts some of which occurred in close proximity to Turkey and brought the salient issue of ethnicity, long ignored by the political elites in accordance with Atatürkist nationalism, to the attention of the public opinion. These conflicts that involved Turks living in other countries such as the refugee problem in Bulgaria and the violent ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan or Muslims such as the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and the civil war in Chechnya deeply affected a wide segment of the Turkish society. Media coverage of the conflicts coupled with the active foreign policy pursued by the Turkish statesmen, who began to make references to the greater Turkish world, exposed Turkish people to a different world and a new political discourse.³⁹⁹ Similarly, two waves of Kurdish refugees, fleeing from Saddam Hussein's brutal actions and policies in 1988 and 1991, facilitated open discussion in the media and the political circles of the Kurdish issue, which was a taboo subject in the immediate years after the 1980 military coup.

³⁹⁷ Fikret Bila, *Phoenix Ecevit'in Yeniden Dogusu*, İstanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2001, p. 269

³⁹⁸ Interestingly, right before the start of the Gulf War, Ecevit flew to Iraq to make an interview with Saddam as a reporter and indicated the importance he gave to the prevention of war in the region. For a journalistic account of this journey including a detailed summary by his accompanant, see Derya Sazak, *11 Eylül Golgesinde Saddam*, İstanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2002

³⁹⁹ Kemal Kirisci, *Minority/Majority Discourse: the Case of Kurds in Turkey*, Dru Gladney (ed), *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey and US*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 229

The social and demographic changes and the ongoing liberalization of the political system had prepared the conditions for a change of Turkish state's official position on Kurdish issue. Especially in early 1990s, there was a growing consensus among mainstream politicians that new policies needed to be formulated to address the concerns, problems and grievances of the local population. The decisive step came when Ozal, immediately after he was elected as the eighth president of Turkey, asserted that he had Kurdish blood, and later repealed the ban on the Kurdish language. There was willingness among the coalition partners to devise a new approach to the Kurdish issue and introduce democratic elements to the region, shifting from the official policy that perceived Kurdish question as a domestic security problem. The coalition had made a promising start as Prime Minister Demirel went on record to say that he recognized the reality of the Kurdish population and Deputy Prime Minister Inonu urged that cultural identity of Kurdish citizens should be recognized.

In sharp contrast to the hope generated by the coalition partners, the new government failed to take substantive steps in solving some of the severe political and socio-economic problems in the region. All the promises given by Demirel and Inonu for the creation of a new democratic era did not materialize to the dismay of many Kurds in the region which eventually played into the hands of the hardliners. This rising Kurdish sentiment has reached its peak under TPP-SDPP coalition government during the 1992 Nawruz celebrations during which harsh treatment of the security forces resulted in a general riot that left 92 dead and 341 wounded, serving as a final blow to the emerging relationship between moderate Kurdish nationalism and liberal political actors.⁴⁰⁰ In response to the surmounting challenge posed to his government, Demirel has decided to abandon the south-east policy to the military, removing the possibility of attaining a democratic settlement in the region. In response to its failure to reduce the tension in the region and develop ties with the Kurdish deputies who resigned in the aftermath of the Nawruz disaster in protest of the security forces, SDPP began to steadily lose support of the Kurdish groups. Inonu's plans of incorporating Kurdish political actors to the political system by giving them a legal space within his party to voice their views, suggestions and concerns over their problems had all but failed.

⁴⁰⁰ Philip Robins, *The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue*, *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 4, 1993, p. 667

The sudden death of Ozal in 1993 and Demirel's plans to become his successor followed by Inonu's decision to not seek leadership of SDPP for another term and bow out of politics left a vacuum in Turkish politics. During this transition period in Turkish politics, the escalating violence in the southeast and the harshness of the armed conflict that followed reinforced the exclusionary attitude of the Turkish political actors and facilitated the Turkish nationalist discourse to establish itself as hegemonic in the political arena.⁴⁰¹ In response to the strength of PKK which has grown to dangerous proportions and has become strong enough to challenge the governmental authority in the region, there was a wave of extra-judicial killings, especially during Ciller government, targeting no fewer than 64 Kurdish community leaders and activists⁴⁰² whose murders are believed to be carried out on the instruction and under the knowledge of the intelligent service of the gendarmie, JITEM, and carried out by confessants, village guards and Hizbullah guerrillas.⁴⁰³ In this dark period, some elements within the security forces resorted to illegal measures to counter the PKK forces and were gradually incorporated to the mafia-politics connections by taking part in casino and drug deals.⁴⁰⁴ These developments strengthened the power, influence and prestige of hardliners in Turkish politics; contributed to the rise of neo-nationalist movements and thereby inhibited the consolidation of legal and democratic policies towards the region within Turkish politics, advocated by some circles within SDPP.

Ciller's decision to lift the immunity of the Kurdish deputies and get them arrested with media coverage as part of her plans to boost the electoral chances of TPP by appealing to the nationalists was a disaster for SDPP as it decisively lost the support of the Kurdish constituencies who switched mostly to Kurdish parties in the

⁴⁰¹ Fuat Keyman, *Articulating Citizenship and Identity: the Kurdish Question in Turkey*, in Fuat Keyman and Ahmet Icduygu (eds.) *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 268

⁴⁰² For a full list of their names, see Osman Olmez, *Turkiye Siyasetinde DEP Depremi*, Ankara: Doruk Yayıncılık, 1995

⁴⁰³ Martin van Bruinessen, *Turkey's Death Squads*, *Middle East Report*, No. 199, 1996, p. 21-22

⁴⁰⁴ Some of these illegal connections came to light in the Susurluk Commission formed by Turkish Grand National Assembly following the Susurluk traffic accident in 1997 when an ex-nationalist mafia leader turned out to be in the same car with a police officer and MP. For more information on the issue, see Veli Ozdemir (yayına hazırlayan) *Ifade Tutanakları Susurluk Belgeleri*, İstanbul: Scala Yayıncılık, 1997 and *Susurluk Komisyonu Tutanakları: Doğu Perincek ve Mesut Yılmazın Açıklamaları*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1997

coming elections. More importantly the break of the Kurdish group within SDPP deprived the leftist group from a very crucial electoral base and facilitated the shift of the party policy by emphasizing a more nationalist discourse in line with the political developments. Thus the uneasy coalition between leftist intellectuals and union leaders and Alevi-Kurdish groups that made up SDPP came to disintegrate, thereby eliminating the plural elements of the rank and file. The paradox occurring from the coexistence of the bureaucracy oriented party members with close ties to the RPP legacy and ethnic, sectarian and cultural groups was finally settled by the exclusion of the latter but as will be clear in the coming pages this would not prove to be a solution to the deep rooted problems of SDPP.

3.5 Alevi Revivalism

Based on the religious traditions of Shiite Islam, Zoroastrianism and Shamanism, Alevism is a syncretistic heterodox identity that have eased the conversion process of Turcoman tribes to Islam in the initial period of Anatolian conquest and thereby reached a large following among Turkic tribes.⁴⁰⁵ Despite the fact that the eclectic and multi-layered beliefs and practices associated with Alevism is considered to be heterodox by some Sunni believers, the size of the community ranges from 15 to 25 percent⁴⁰⁶ and thereby constitutes a significant part of the Turkish Islamic community. Alevi groups constituted a counter-culture all throughout Ottoman history, as they resisted the sedentary life imposed by the Ottoman authorities and thereby preserved their cultural and religious identity, albeit in a parochial fashion.⁴⁰⁷ Their seclusion and alienation from state mechanisms in this period enabled Alevis to retain their cultural specificity and distinct form of Muslim practice. As a result, Alevi opposition against the urban, Orthodox Sunni and Ottomanist center based on a nomadic peripheral unit became the basis for the overwhelming support given to the Turkish Republic for breaking down the Sunni hegemony.⁴⁰⁸ The relationship of the Alevi groups with the state, however, is ambivalent due to the mixed results the Republican period has generated for the Alevi community. Alevis have been enthusiastic

⁴⁰⁵ For a history of the Alevi groups in Turkey, see C. Sener, *Alevilik Olayı*, İstanbul: Yon Yayincılık, 1982

⁴⁰⁶ T. Erman and F. Goker, *Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 36, No. 4, 2000, p. 99

⁴⁰⁷ Serif Mardin, *Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics*, Daedalus, Winter, 1973

⁴⁰⁸ Nur Vergin, *Din ve Muhlafi Olmak: Bir Hak Dini Olarak Alevilik*, *Türkiye Gunlugu*, Sayı 17, 1991

supporters of the republican reforms and in turn greatly benefited from them, as they had received an equal status with the Sunni groups and could live in peace away from state persecution.⁴⁰⁹ Moreover Turkish Alevis have been in sympathy with the secular culture and humanistic historiography developed in this period.⁴¹⁰ Nevertheless they have never been explicitly acknowledged in state policy which has skewed towards the Sunnis with the transition to multi-party democracy.⁴¹¹

Rapid migration into big cities since the early 1960s began to change the highly traditional and parochial culture of the Alevis, who have historically lived in distant and secluded Anatolian villages, secure from the reach of the Ottoman military forces. In time Alevis managed to form distinct cultural zones scattered across cities, developing a line of Alevi communities all the way from Turkey to European countries. While showing signs of politico-cultural and socio-economic dynamism, they have also witnessed the decline of the religious appeal of the traditional institutions and authorities such as dedes and pirs, especially among members of the younger generation, in response to growing levels of education and urbanization.⁴¹² In addition, it was no longer possible to avoid interaction with Sunni groups, as members of both communities entered a competition for jobs, houses, credits and all kinds of other necessary urban resources.⁴¹³

The ensuing enmities whose origins go back to centuries old hostilities and prejudice between members of the two groups came to correspond to the existing ideological cleavage that resurfaced in the liberal environment of the 1961

⁴⁰⁹ For a source that explores the role of the Alevis under the Ataturk period, see C. Sener, *Ataturk ve Aleviler*, İstanbul: Ant Yayinlari, 1991

⁴¹⁰ It is important to note that Kurdish Alevis do not share the same level of sympathy and enthusiasm towards the republican regime. There simply is a lack of ethnographic sources exploring this question. But I find it interesting that a great bulk of Kurdish Alevis were associated with Marxist movements. For a very good source that deal with this issue, see M. Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State*, London: Zed Boks, 1992

⁴¹¹ David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999, p.133

⁴¹² This transition from a traditional and mystical tradition into a urban and secular philosophy generated many contradictions discussed in Ayken Erdemir, *Tradition and Modernity: Alevi's Ambiguous Terms and Turkey's Ambivalent Subjects*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 41, no. 6, 2005, p. 937-51

⁴¹³ Ayse Gunes-Ayata, *Turkish Alevis*, *The European Journal of Social Sciences*, 1992, vol. 5, Issue 3

Constitution.⁴¹⁴ Especially during the polarizing environment of the 1970s, Alevis together with Kurds have mostly participated in the leftist movements and mostly associated themselves with RPP, following Ecevit's rise to power. Majority of the community, however, preferred to stay out of the political conflicts and sought better opportunities for education and greater access to wealth and power.⁴¹⁵ Many hometown associational networks were formed to function during this period as a protective safety net and enabled many Alevis to preserve their communal ties with their friends and relatives in the villages.

In terms of their political preferences, Alevis mainly associated themselves with the RPP-SDPP tradition out of loyalty to the republican reforms even though at times some overtly Alevi parties emerged to receive the support of the community, such as the Union Party in the 1970s and Peace Party in the 1990s. Both parties, however, failed to attract the support of majority of the Alevi community which remained committed to the tradition of Republican parties.⁴¹⁶ Following the 1980 coup, many former socialist activists within the Alevi groups took refuge in social democratic politics and participated in the democratization attempts of the SDPP opposition. In time, they came to be overrepresented among SDPP cadres, particularly in Ankara where they constitute a quarter of the population⁴¹⁷ and hold 4 out of 6 SDPP affiliated municipalities.⁴¹⁸ Apart from the sheer size of the Alevi community, this strong involvement and overrepresentation in SDPP politics could be attributed to the strong solidarity networks developed by Alevi migrants who prove highly effective in terms of using their organization skills and contacts to mobilize voters.

1990s witnessed an ever-growing number of publications covering diverse aspects of Alevi society, their cultural and religious beliefs, relations with the state and history. Though there have been previous attempts of discovering the Alevi identity, the significant feature of this period is that these works were mostly written and published by Alevis in an attempt to take advantage of the new environment for

⁴¹⁴ Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 67

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 67

⁴¹⁶ Omer Caha, *The Role of Media in the Revival of Alevi Identity in Turkey*, *Social Identities*, vol. 10, No. 3, 2004, p. 328

⁴¹⁷ Gunes-Ayata, *The Emergence*, 30

⁴¹⁸ Ayse Gunes-Ayata, *Turkish Alevis*, *The European Journal of Social Sciences*, 1992, vol. 5, Issue 3

expression of opinion and identity formation.⁴¹⁹ The past decade has also seen a rapid rise in the number of Alevi cultural associations, national, regional and local radio stations,⁴²⁰ periodicals, books, conferences and festivals organized by the Alevi community devoted to the exploration of Aleviness.⁴²¹ This phenomenon paralleled the revival of Alevi identity⁴²² and restoration of its cultural traditions within the urban space that carried this long persecuted group to the public sphere.

In accordance with these developments Alevi tradition became more openly celebrated and politicized in order to address and reflect upon the concerns of the members of the community.⁴²³ This has legitimized the Alevi identity with the development of a 'multi-public sphere'⁴²⁴ in which issues, values, people, institutions and ideologies that were considered unacceptable or illegitimate by official policy came to be represented. Mainstream Alevi associations such as Cem Vakfi, among others, presented some demands to the official authorities and successive governments not only asking for cultural recognition but also some changes in state policy. Furthermore, Alevis have greatly benefited from the secular media networks against the rise of Islamic groups and used them to publicize the demands of the community from Sunni groups.⁴²⁵ In fact as a response to the rise of Islamic movements in the 1990s, it has become an unofficial state policy to appeal to the Alevis who are especially courted by politicians from center-left parties. Haci Bektas Veli celebrations being held in Haci Bektas town of Kirsehir became a familiar site

⁴¹⁹ Omer Caha, *The Role of Media in the Revival of Alevi Identity in Turkey*, *Social Identities*, vol. 10, No. 3, 2004, p. 325-338

⁴²⁰ H. Yavuz, *Media Identities for Alevis and Kurds in Turkey*, in D. Eickelman and J. Andersen (eds.) *New Media in the Muslim World: the emerging public sphere*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 180-99

⁴²¹ Shankland, *Islam and Society*, 133

⁴²² For an excellent study on the Alevi identity, see Olsson, T., Ozdalga, E. And Raudvere, C. (eds.) *Alevi Identity*, İstanbul: Swedish Research Institute in İstanbul, 1998

⁴²³ R. Camuroglu, *Alevi Revivalism in Turkey*, in T. Olsson and E. Ozdalga and C. Raudvere (eds.) *Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives*, İstanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1998

⁴²⁴ N. Fraser, *Rethinking the Public Space: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy*, in C. Calhoun (ed.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992, p. 109-42

⁴²⁵ K. Vorhoff, *Academic and Journalistic Publications on the Alevi and Bektasi of Turkey*, in T. Olsson and E. Ozdalga and C. Raudvere (eds.) *Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives*, İstanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1998, p. 151-165

for party leaders, such as Deniz Baykal, Erdal Inonu, Mesut Yilmaz and Suleyman Demirel who have participated in the activities in the previous years. Thus, a substantial number of secular journalists, bureaucrats and politicians see Alevism as a life jacket to protect the secular and Kemalist image of the country.⁴²⁶ Indeed they were considered by Kemalist circles as a natural ally in their struggle against political Islam and a guarantee that Islamic parties would never gain majority support to reverse the contributions of the republican regime.⁴²⁷

As the power and influence of the left further eroded during TPP-SDPP, the cordial relations between the Alevis and the left-wing political parties became less prevalent. This decline of loyalty towards the RPP-SDPP tradition has been mainly a response to the ineffective policies pursued by this party in the aftermath of the Sivas incident and Gazi demonstrations. Sivas tragedy signaled Alevis not only the rising trend of Islamic movements in Turkey but more importantly the inability of SDPP to provide them relief and security from the hostile forces. While many Alevis continued to support SDPP and take active part in its activities, nevertheless DLP, thanks to its charismatic leader, emerged as a serious contender for their votes.⁴²⁸ This separation from the ranks of SDPP was more pronounced in the case of Alevi Kurds among whom there was a shift from religious to ethnic identity in 1980s so that there was a growing wave of support given to the People's Democracy Party since mid 1990s. As a result, following the Sivas events, Alevis became more assertive in pronouncing their cultural identity and increasingly disillusioned with the state authorities as well as the mainstream political parties, including the SDPP, which were unable to protect them against the resurging Sunni tide. This prevalent and growing Sunni mood led some state officials and officers to harshly treat Alevi peasants in Sivas and Tunceli by accusing them of collaborating with PKK terrorists and forced them to evacuate their villages.⁴²⁹

The recognition demands of the newly emerging groups could only be satisfied by instituting politics of difference and designing the institutions of the republic more flexible, democratic and pluralistic in accordance with the modernity critiques put

⁴²⁶ A. I. Ocak, *Türk Süfiligine Bakışlar* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996, p. 192)

⁴²⁷ For a critical view of this alliance, Ali Haydar Celasun, *Alevilik Bir Şir Degildir*, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1993, p. 33-41

⁴²⁸ Shankland, *Islam and Society*, 166

⁴²⁹ Mahmut Isik, *Memurdu kovuldu Milletvekili oldu*, Ankara: Plaka Yayıncılık, 1997

forward in the late-modern times.⁴³⁰ However the paradox is that modernity has not been yet a completed process in the Turkish context as the rural life and relations are not fully transformed into a properly urban dominant industrial society.⁴³¹ The project of modernity, if not in the Kemalist model, has still not been exhausted and therefore parties possessing the impetus of change have the only chance of winning elections. On the other hand, state-led modernization could no longer resume since the globalization process renders it impossible for particular social groups let alone the entire society to be kept under control by a state-centric and authoritarian regime. This however poses a significant challenge to the constitutive modernist discourse, which set the parameters of Turkish social democracy.⁴³² Modernity is not yet a completed process in this country as it did not fully manage to transform rural life and relations. If the elimination of peasantry is taken as the primary determinant for developing a liberal democratic regime,⁴³³ then, Turkish society is still far from achieving this goal.

The ideological boundaries of Turkish social democracy could never transcend beyond the romanticist and modernist understanding of the Enlightenment ideals and remained locked in a utopian episteme towards the rest of the society. Party elites continued to perceive members of the society as subjects who could and, more importantly, should be transformed in accordance with the progressive views. Mango is indeed right to conclude that even though class basis of SDPP was uncertain, its cultural identity resembled the free-thinkers in the 19th century context.⁴³⁴ The failure to admit that social groups were no longer in the infant stages of modernity prevented the party elites from fully noticing the socio-economic, political and cultural changes experienced in the 1980s, thus distancing them from the newly emerging and active segments of the society. As a consequence SDPP could not prevent the radicalization of these identity groups within its constituency due to its failure to develop multicultural and democratic policies that could satisfy their demands. This fettered SDPP's merging with the new social cleavages and constituted a roadblock in its efforts to become a social democratic party in its fullest sense.

⁴³⁰ Fuat Keyman, *Türkiye ve Radikal Demokrasi*, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2000, p. 188

⁴³¹ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *Turkish Conservatism*, unpublished paper, 2005, p. 9

⁴³² Kahraman, *Sosyal Demokrasi*, 179-300

⁴³³ Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world*, London: Penguin, 1967

⁴³⁴ Andrew Mango, *The Social Democratic Populist Party*, in M. Heper and J. Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1991, p. 172

In conclusion, the crisis of social democracy in early 1990s was caused by the impossibility of revising and transforming some of the structured aspects of modernization, particularly its nationalist and radical secularist components even though the newly emerging social groups were in the process of deconstructing this framework. Turkish social democracy has reached its epistemological limits by the turn of the century, arising from the crisis experienced by state-centric modernization model that served as the constitutive agent of center-left parties. Indeed in early 1990s SDPP would resemble a loose coalition of urban middle classes and union groups mobilized through ethnic and religious identities than a party, segmented among particular cliques and factions. Thus, in early 1990s social democratic movement has reached the epistemological boundaries of its parochial ideology and experienced structural limitations to generate a revival of its agenda; instead, as will be clear in the coming chapter, it became conservative in light of the recent development and more importantly reactionary towards these groups.

CHAPTER 4

1990s AND THE CRISIS OF KEMALISM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW PARADIGM

The growing inadequacy of the state to account for the complex politico-cultural and socio-economic developments in Turkish society, as discussed in the previous two chapters, eroded the particular formation of modernization, shifting the focus from the state to the society and, more importantly, put a heavy strain on the official ideology. Hence, the polarized debates on the Republican historiography and significance of the Turkish national identity facilitated various social groups to challenge and undermine Kemalism's traditional hold on society.⁴³⁵ The rapid social and economic developments caused by integration of Turkish economy into the international markets outdated the conditions which have defined the early decades of the Republican era and exhausted the Kemalist paradigm. Following the demise of statism as an effective economic model and the rupture of Turkish modernization contributed to the emergence of critical accounts of Kemalism in early 1990s, especially targeting its secularist, statist and nationalist tenets. The crisis experienced by Kemalism and the neo-Kemalist response it generated inevitably affected Turkish social democracy which considered Kemalism to be its constitutive variable. This chapter explores the liberal and Islamic challenges to Kemalism and analyze how they came to shape the ongoing ideological struggle within SDPP and social democratic politics at large.

Kemalism first emerged as a *Weltanschauung* par excellence, epitomizing the decision of the republican elites to yield to the idea of transformation and radical rupture with the past. In time, however, the charismatic rule of Atatürk was routinized⁴³⁶ and supplemented by the bureaucracy mainly under the İnönü administration and turned into an ideology to strengthen the dominance of the state vis-à-vis the weak social and economic groups.⁴³⁷ Kemalism was formulated in the

⁴³⁵ Ayşe Kadioglu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity", in S. Kedourie (ed.) *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics*, London: Frank Cass, 1998, p. 177-93

⁴³⁶ Osman Faruk Logoglu, *İsmet İnönü and the Modernization of Turkey*, 1997, p 40-70

⁴³⁷ Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, North HumberSide: Eothen Press, 1985, p. 71

conditions of the early republican period in order to rapidly modernize a largely peasant society, lacking means of participation and mobilization in the political order and thus it could only survive as long as this condition prevailed. Incorporation of the rural masses into the political process through free elections and, more importantly, urbanization have created practical problems for Kemalism and shifted its axis to the right of the political spectrum in the multi-party period. It managed to survive in the 1923-1980 period not rather but because of its hegemonic position over the society thanks to its acceptance by the state elites as the official ideology. As long as it retained this status in the eyes of the civilian and military bureaucracy, all political parties so far, even those claiming to be against Kemalism, interpreted it in a distinct manner to suit their own political agenda. However, arguably this was the main reason for its inability to adjust to changing conditions and become a conservative epistemology despite its initial progressive openings. Progressive elements of Kemalism gradually lost their pace and came to be interpreted as the preservation of the institutional arrangements and reforms enacted in the early years of the republic.⁴³⁸

4.1 Liberal Challenge

Turkey in the 1990s has begun to build up a new social discourse in line with the neo-liberal developments of the previous decade in an attempt to get out of the existing statist discourse, both with its political elements and economic implications.⁴³⁹ The prevalence of state on all aspects of the Turkish society and the content of the existing democracy were discussed, revolving around the debates known as the Second Republican debate in the early 1990s. Second Republican group, consisting of very prominent journalists, politicians and scholars, an uneasy coalition of mostly old Marxist revisionists and former socialists, but also some liberals and Islamists, united by their opposition to the Kemalist order, came to embody the liberalization and democratization demands of the era and proposed an alternative political agenda that was planned to complement the economic liberalization of the previous decade.⁴⁴⁰ On the other hand, some Islamist intellectuals and politicians who

⁴³⁸ As seen from the Kadro incident, Ataturk was careful to prevent the evolution of the state transcendentalism to move in a bureaucratic direction

⁴³⁹ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *The Making and the Crisis of Turkish Social Democracy: Roots, Discourses and Strategies*, unpublished PhD. Thesis, 1999, p. 259

⁴⁴⁰ Granted that the discussions have been carried out mainly by columnists in their columns of some of the prestigious Turkish newspapers, there is only a book written

sympathize with some of the second Republican criticisms refrained from associating closely with them due to their Western orientation.⁴⁴¹ Their political views and arguments with their emphasis on an Islamic identity will be discussed more thoroughly in this coming chapter. Suffice it to say here that search for new politics on a more liberal and democratic basis gained pace in the early 1990s and increasingly targeted the Kemalist character of the political regime in a unified fashion.

Second Republicans have depicted Kemalism with its elitist, Jacobin and authoritarian heritage that facilitated the state at the hands of “the triple bureaucracy” i.e. the affluent class, bureaucracy and the military to act in the name of its citizens as the main obstacle over the democratization process. Based on the priority given to republican values over democracy, elected bodies representing the will of the majority were always less powerful than the appointed official, not least the military enjoying an influence over politics unseen in democratic countries.⁴⁴² Moreover, the alleged threat posed by Kurdish nationalism and religious fundamentalism, which could be solved through democratic channels, according to the aforementioned group, has been manipulated by the republican elites over the decades to frighten the masses. They have directed their criticisms to various aspects of the regime, ranging from the condition of the State Economic Enterprises to education and health systems, pointing out the deficiencies and limitations of the current order mostly due to its low regard for individuals.

As an alternative to the Kemalist republican model, they proposed the creation of a new democratic constitution in a different fashion than the previous constitutions, all prepared by the military or under its control, and establish the socio-economic and legal framework for creating a more pluralist and democratic political structure in which popular sovereignty reflected in a properly functioning parliament would be the basis for the new regime. They opt for a liberal capitalist society with its individual oriented politics in a Lockean sense and emphasize the primacy of the

on the topic. However, from an academic point of view, the book lacks, clarity, organization and even consistency and is more a collection of interviews conducted by some second Republicans and their critics. See Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar (eds.) 2. Cumhuriyet Tartismalari, Ankara: Dizdar Yayinlari, 1993

⁴⁴¹ Recep Tayip Erdogan, Demokrasi amac degil, aractir in See Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar (eds.) 2. Cumhuriyet Tartismalari, Ankara: Dizdar Yayinlari, 1993, p. 427-28

⁴⁴² E. Burak Arikan, Second Republican Debates, unpublished MA thesis, Bilkent University, 1993, p. 26-29, 35

democratization process against the dominant republican features.⁴⁴³ Surmounting the existing regime deadlock could be achieved by sidelining the Kemalist heritage and setting the foundation of a pluralist democracy based on rule of law, decentralized political authority,⁴⁴⁴ liberal secularism similar to the British tradition and protection of civil liberties.⁴⁴⁵

The second Republican debates have found an echo among a group of leftist intellectuals, aspiring to bring a more liberal approach to Turkish social democratic tradition in the early 1990s. Their views are crucial not only to understand the relatively liberal environment at the time but also to analyze the intra-party discussions and the soul searching process taking place within SDPP.⁴⁴⁶ Some of the discussed ideas would repeatedly come up in the SDPP party meetings and conventions, mostly associated with the new left group and their attempts to create the framework of a post-Kemalist order. Aside from the socio-economic developments surrounding the Ozal era, these liberal leftists were deeply influenced by the rising liberal movements within the social-democratic parties in various European countries such as France, Sweden and England in response to the dominant new right agenda.⁴⁴⁷ While these liberal readings of leftist ideology⁴⁴⁸ have emerged most specifically to address the retreat of the social democracy against the new-right paradigm,⁴⁴⁹ in the Turkish context, the main purpose was to diminish the power of the state vis-à-vis the civil society and criticize the anti-democratic aspects of Kemalism.

The division between state and civil society constitute the primary political line of demarcation for the left intellectuals who have considered the strengthening of civil society as a necessary condition of the democratic regime and thus the basis for the

⁴⁴³ Ibid., 71-72

⁴⁴⁴ Mete Tuncay, Bolgenin sorunlarini Yakin Dogu Federasyonu cozer, in Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar (eds.) 2. Cumhuriyet Tartismalari, Ankara: Dizdar Yayinlari, 1993, p. 133-144

⁴⁴⁵ Arikan, Second Republican, 31-32

⁴⁴⁶ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, Turk Milliyetci Romantizmin Sonu: Kurucu Modernist Ideolojinin Donusumu ve Yazinsal Soylem, in Serif Mardin'e Armagan, Ahmet Oncu and Orhan Tekelioglu (eds.), İstanbul: Iletisim, 2005, p. 137-39

⁴⁴⁷ Sungur Savran, Sol Liberalizm: Maddeci Bir Elestiriye Dogru, in 11. Tez, İstanbul: Uluslararası Yayincilik, 1986, p. 10

⁴⁴⁸ For a socialist critique of this position, see Korkut Boratav, İktisat Politikası Alternatifleri, Bolusum İlişkileri ve Sol, in 11. Tez, p. 41-51

⁴⁴⁹ Savran, Sol Liberalizm, 12

continuation of liberalization and economic growth.⁴⁵⁰ Hence, at the center of their arguments is the notion of civil society as the embodiment of sectional interests of social groups and individuals, running counter to the corporatist and authoritarian tradition of the Ottoman-Turkish polity. They argued that the existence of a strong state tradition enhanced by the authoritarian and elitist principles of Kemalism hindered the development of civil society and limited the power of the civic associations against the state. The central importance given to the notion of civil society in the views of the leftist liberals could be traced back to the writings of Idris Kucukomer who managed to clearly show the limitations of the elitist approach to Turkish politics⁴⁵¹ and argued against the generic opposition towards civil society and democratic rule among the intelligentsia.⁴⁵²

Instead of criticizing Ozal administration as fashionable within the leftist political spectrum, these intellectuals have generally embraced the outward-oriented growth model enacted with the 24 January economic decisions and came to recognize its positive aspects. They realized the realities of the new globalization age that brings an end to economic sovereignty⁴⁵³ and autarchy and advocate new policies that differ from traditional leftist still loyal to the statist development model and etatist economic principles. When they did criticize the government, it was mainly on the grounds that it did not go far in eliminating the scale of state interventionism and protectionism inherent in Turkish economy but also emphasized the social costs and political risks of the growing poverty and income disparities.⁴⁵⁴ Leftist liberals supported economic liberalization despite its socially destructive results with the hope that the corporatist state structure that imposed its will on social groups would disintegrate. Moreover, they believed that democracy could only survive with a free market economy as long as the necessary political and legal framework is established.⁴⁵⁵

Although they went to great lengths to emphasize that they were neither a part of the Second Republicans nor directly cooperating with them, these leftist liberals

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid., 19-23

⁴⁵¹ Idris Kucukomer, *Duzenin Yabancilasmasi: Batilasma*, İstanbul: Baglam Yayinlari, 1994

⁴⁵² Idris Kucukomer, *Sivil Toplum Yazilari*, İstanbul: Balgam Yayinlari, 1994

⁴⁵³ Asaf Savas Akad, *Iktisadi Bagimsizlik Mumkun mu?*, in Mehmet Ali Aybar *Sempozyumlari: Ozgurlesmenin Sorunlari*, Gunduz Vassaf (ed.) İstanbul: Tarih Vakfi, 2003, p. 273-279

⁴⁵⁴ Boratav, *Iktisat Politikasi*, 44-45

⁴⁵⁵ Savran, *Sol Liberalizm*, 28

shared the basic arguments of the Second Republicans and openly called for further democratization of the political system.⁴⁵⁶ Their primary task was to continue the liberal reforms introduced by the Motherland governments and shift them mainly to the political sphere with the purpose of completing the economic revolution of the 1980s,⁴⁵⁷ albeit using a more leftist approach. Some of the policies proposed consisted of creating regional parliaments and elected mayor positions, strengthening the civil society, granting cultural rights and autonomy for minorities, undertaking privatization, and protecting civil liberties against the arbitrary control of the state.⁴⁵⁸ Rather than rejecting the Kemalist reforms implemented in the 1920s and renouncing the political legacy of founding elites, Akad, for example, argued the necessity of a social democratic party that would distance itself from the authoritarian measures of the era.⁴⁵⁹

The liberal leftist challenge against Kemalism was not only confined to the ideological debates concerning prominent intellectuals among the upper ranks of SDPP but also involved many other media outlets, political organizations and communities linked to the party. Probably the most well-publicized and provocative of these debates took place within the *Cumhuriyet*, a Kemalist daily, where a younger generation of journalists has attempted to reform the management and administration of the newspaper and revise some of its publishing policies. The liberal trio in *Cumhuriyet*, namely editor-in-chief Hasan Cemal, Okay Gonensin and Emine Usakligil, wanted to bring a less-ideological and more liberal and professional approach to journalism and refrain from too closely associating the daily with SDPP, especially its orthodox Kemalist wing.⁴⁶⁰ Over the recent years, old guards such as Ilhan Selcuk, Ali Sirmen and Ugur Mumcu have openly supported SDPP even though allegations of misconduct were surfacing in many SDPP controlled municipalities. This was indeed a daring attempt on behalf of the liberal faction, not only because

⁴⁵⁶ Kahraman, *The Making*, 239

⁴⁵⁷ Savran, *Sol Liberalizm*, 20

⁴⁵⁸ For a discussion of these suggestions, see Asaf Savas Akad, *Turkiye’de sivil toplum inanilmaz bir hizla guclenmektedir*, in 2. *Cumhuriyet Tartismalari*, Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar (eds.) Ankara: Basak Yayinlari, 1993, pp. 115-131 and Asaf Savas Akad, *Sosyal Demokrasi Gundemi*, İstanbul: Armoni Yayincilik, 1991, p. 32-142

⁴⁵⁹ Asaf Savas Akad, *Sosyal Demokrasi Gundemi*, İstanbul: Armoni Yayincilik, 1991, p. 197

⁴⁶⁰ Hasan Cemal, *Cumhuriyeti Cok Sevmistim*, İstanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2005

Cumhuriyet, from the first day of its publication, has been very closely associated with the Kemalist reforms and the republican ideal, going at times as far as to serve as the unofficial spokesperson for the regime, but also due to its unchanging opposition to liberalism over the decades. While its adoption of a leftist agenda was rather a recent phenomenon, going back only to the 1960s when left Kemalism was on the rise, its support for Westernization, national developmentalism, and anti-liberalism was unwavering since its establishment.

The disagreement that led to the liberal putsch against the Kemalist faction arose over a column written by Osman Ulagay who, unlike rest of the Cumhuriyet columnists, openly advocated a center-right grand coalition between True Path and Motherland Parties, following the 1991 general elections.⁴⁶¹ Ilhan Selcuk, relying on the support he received from other columnists, accused Ulagay of attempting to prevent the possibility of SDPP to come to power and accused him of being a spokesperson for the bourgeoisie.⁴⁶² When his column was not removed by Hasan Cemal as demanded by the Kemalist columnists, the traditional Kemalist cadre had decided to resign en masse, arguing that the policy of the newspaper is been skewed towards the interests of the bourgeoisie. This break caused the eruption of a long and heated debate that mostly resumed in newspaper columns, involving personal attacks and allegations going back and forth between Kemalists employed now in major dailies such as Hurriyet, Sabah and Milliyet and liberal leftists in Cumhuriyet. Following the resignation of the prominent Kemalist columnists, a number of leftist journalists and scholars mostly associated with the liberal faction of the Turkish left, such as Sahin Alpay, Ilter Turan, Caglar Keyder, Ilkay Sunar and Seyfettin Gursel, replaced the resigned columnists and joined the writing crew.⁴⁶³

Although the liberals seemed to have the upper hand in the beginning, since they gained the control of the newspaper and began to create a new team of columnists, their cause was not supported by a substantial number of the readers of the newspaper. Faced with a surprisingly successful embargo by its readers that reduced the circulation number to around 60,000 from its climax slightly over 110,000, Cumhuriyet went into serious financial problems; could not pay its dept and came

⁴⁶¹ Emin Karaca, Cumhuriyet Olayi, İstanbul: Altin Kitaplar, 1994, p. 199-200

⁴⁶² Ibid., 207

⁴⁶³ Kahraman, The Making, 272

close to bankruptcy.⁴⁶⁴ With the bleak financial situation and an unfavorable decision at the Board of Directors meeting, the liberals had no choice but to resign from the newspaper and make way for the return of the Kemalist columnists. Their come-back to the newspaper in triumph, following the resignations of the liberals in the administration, was clearly a dramatic victory for the Kemalists, who not only gained the control of the newspaper but also gained a free hand to shift the publishing policy in line with the rise of the neo-Kemalist movement, discussed more thoroughly in the coming section. Hence, in the coming years, the publishing policy of Cumhuriyet would begin to emphasize its statist and nationalist roots in response to the rise of Kurdish radicalism and Islamic fundamentalism, sometimes in a contradictory fashion with its leftist tendencies.

What is unique about this period is that for the first time in the history of Turkish social democracy, a growing number of intellectuals associated with RPP/SDDP tradition made efforts to reshape the ideology of the party to transform it along the lines of universal principles of its counterparts in European countries. Even during the climax of the left of the center movement within RPP in the 1970s, there was never an attempt to amalgamate the revolutionary aspects and the Kemalist principles of the party with Marxist ideas to develop a genuine leftist movement linked to the universal ideals of social democracy. Indeed, for this reason, emphasizing his opposition to Marxism on rather Popperian grounds,⁴⁶⁵ Ecevit frequently made use of the term democratic left instead of social democracy to describe the ideological position of RPP which accepted a democratic left program⁴⁶⁶ in its 1974 statute convention.⁴⁶⁷ Unable to break free from its populist, nationalist and republican roots,⁴⁶⁸ left of center movement, despite its revolutionary aspects in terms of reorganizing the party ranks, in practice, has become a futile attempt to combine

⁴⁶⁴ Karaca, Cumhuriyet Olayi, 212

⁴⁶⁵ For Ecevit's reasons of using terminology, see Bulent Ecevit, Demokratik Sol Dusunce Forumu, Ankara: Kalite Matbaasi, 1974, p. 3-4

⁴⁶⁶ Faruk Erginsoy, Demokratik Sol'a Baslangic, İstanbul: G Yayinlari, 1976

⁴⁶⁷ For a more detailed discussion of this convention and the democratic left program, see Hikmet Bila, CHP 1919–1999, İstanbul: Dogan Kitap, 1999, p. 287-290 and Suna Kili, 1960-1975 Doneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelimseler, İstanbul: Bogazici Universitesi Yayinlari, 1976, p. 409-428

⁴⁶⁸ Kahraman, The Making, 143-45

the statist/centralist/populist ideology with the Ahi/lonca tradition with no room for socialist openings.⁴⁶⁹

The Second Republic debates immediately resonated among leftist intellectuals linked with the social democrat movement and profoundly affected the course of the ongoing intra-party struggle for determining the political agenda and ideological framework of SDPP. In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, former cadres of RPP were divided on the question of the role of Kemalism in Turkish social democracy. After resigning from his post, Ecevit refused to act together with his former colleagues since he wanted to remove himself from the traditional RPP circles. Hence he has rejected the RPP heritage, arguing that RPP as a party failed to reach the masses because of its defects inherited from the single party era. Instead, he adopted a new organization structure by excluding the former cadres, politicians and intellectuals from his party and relied on his charisma to gather votes.⁴⁷⁰ This populist strategy, however, in time, led him to be prone to center-right and even conservatism⁴⁷¹ with his emphasis on a national left model.⁴⁷²

Most of the former RPP politicians, on the other hand, gathered around Inonu to establish Social Democratic Party, which served as an alternative to the pseudo-leftist Populist Party formed by the permission of the military administration. No party other than SDP had ever used the concept of social democracy alone to represent its political philosophy and agenda⁴⁷³ and in that sense the institutional character of the party represented an attempt, at least on the part of some of its rank and file, to distance from the RPP legacy and employ new ideas and concepts in its political journey. However after the merger with Populist Party, the party elites gradually returned back to the parochial character of social democracy and distance themselves from the activism observed in the early months of the party.⁴⁷⁴ From its founding SDPP identified with the basic tenets of Kemalism and came to endorse the principles

⁴⁶⁹ Ali Gevgili, *Yukselis ve Dusus*, İstanbul: Balgam Yayinlari, 1987, p. 354

⁴⁷⁰ *Sosyal Demokrasinin Krizi ve DSP*, in *Birikim*, Oct. 1990, vol. 18, p. 8

⁴⁷¹ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *Sosyal Demokrasi, Turkiye ve Partileri*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1993, p. 198-201

⁴⁷² Atilla Akar, *Oteki DSP Ecevitlerin Gayriresmi Oyukusu*, İstanbul: Metis, 2002, p. 42

⁴⁷³ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *Ucuncu Yol Politikolari, Kuresellesme ve Turk Sosyal Demokrasisi*, in Murat Yalcintan (ed.) *Ucuncu Yol Arayislari ve Turkiye*, İstanbul: Buke Yayinlari, 2000, p. 116

⁴⁷⁴ Hasan Bulent Kahrman, *Sosyal Demokrasi Dusuncesi ve Turkiye Pratigi*, İstanbul: SODEV Yayinlari, 2002, p. 390

of the Six Arrows in the absence of RPP. This is reflected in all the official party documents and programs in which the Six Arrows is mentioned as The Six Principles to be Followed in Achieving the Task and the historical legacy of RPP is incorporated under a section called Our Historical Piers that refer to the National Struggle Period and the War of Independence as well as Erzurum and Sivas Congress.⁴⁷⁵

In the aftermath of a few years of Motherland rule and neo-liberal hegemony, however, a growing faction within SDPP began to point out the necessity of their party to reconsider its Kemalist roots and advocated a renewal of the party agenda by breaking with the established principles of the RPP tradition. Indeed, the entire history of SDPP consisted of these endless intra-party debates, revolving around the issues of RPP heritage, Six Arrows and Kemalism, which split the party into two factions, namely the old guards in the party administration such as Inonu, Kumbarcibasi and Fikri Saglar but also Baykal and his RPP team versus a growing reformist group of party activists and union leaders, close to the aforementioned leftist intellectuals of the period. These reformers realized that due to the recent political changes and economic development, Kemalism could no longer serve as the basis of a political party faced with multi-faceted problems. Their goal was to disassociate the left ideology from its elitist, statist and anti-democratic roots and settle accounts with Kemalism through a rupture with the past.⁴⁷⁶ Only then, would the social democrats be able to become the driving force of democratization and catalyst for building a democratic consensus upon which a new political regime could be established.⁴⁷⁷

In order to manage this, some attempts were made to undertake the ambitious task of showing the incongruence of social democracy with Kemalism and create a new ideological base for strengthening the social democratic culture in Turkey.⁴⁷⁸ It was argued that the populist elements of Kemalism constitute a solidaristic formulation of social relations and organize the society through corporatist arrangements in a uniform fashion that leaves no room for a class structure.⁴⁷⁹ In that

⁴⁷⁵ Kahraman, *The Making*, 236-241

⁴⁷⁶ Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *Yeni Bir Sosyal Demokrasi Icin*, Ankara: Imge Yayınevi, 1993, p. 61-3 and 66-8

⁴⁷⁷ Asaf Savas Akad, 1923-50 arası sag bir diktatorluk, in *Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor*, Levent Cinemre and Rusen Cakir, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1991, p. 88

⁴⁷⁸ For an excellent work on this issue, see Hasan Bulent Kahraman, *Yeni Bir Sosyal Demokrasi Icin*, Ankara: Imge Yayınevi, 1993, p. 89-110; and Asaf Savas Akad, *Sosyal Demokrasi Gundemi*, İstanbul: Armoni Yayıncılık, 1991, p. 9-32

⁴⁷⁹ Kahraman, *Sosyal Demokrasi Dusuncesi*, 179-184

sense, historically, Turkish social democracy movement lacked a class element, thus remaining closed to the Marxist tradition which served as the main ideological source of universal social democracy. Hence, Turkish social democracy since its inception in 1965 with the rise of the left of center movement paid special attention to remaining within the confines of a strict legalism, refraining from challenging the legitimacy of the political order and remained closed to the radical elements. It was in this light that universal principles of the social democratic ideology and a Marxist tradition have been rejected, thereby never playing even a limited role in shaping the political process.⁴⁸⁰ In addition, the authoritarian and centrist structure developed during 1930s hinders the formation of a liberal democratic tradition and are inadequate to provide the basis of a social democratic party.

The reformist faction was opposed by many orthodox members who, building on the tradition of left Kemalism, insisted that Kemalism, not least with its modernist epistemology and revolutionary and anti-imperialist character, should be taken as an epiphenomenon in the development of social democracy which, they believed, could not be conceived without the satisfaction of this condition.⁴⁸¹ The radical modernization and anti-imperialist aspects of Kemalism, together with its solidaristic overtones, were taken as the constitutive variable of social democratic ideology, originating from petite bourgeoisie radicalism in the Turkish context. The party administration, especially Erdal Inonu was rather uneasy about this prolonged debate since he is of the opinion that Turkish social democracy has evolved from the Turkish national liberation movement so that there was no incompatibility between social democracy and Kemalism.⁴⁸²

The reformists wanted to transform SDPP into a mass party of labor with close ties to the progressive segments of the society and a defender of democratic principles for developing a pluralistic society. Against the authoritarian and restrictive political system created by the military administration, they thought SDPP should become the main agent of democratization, gathering all the liberal, pluralistic and democratic forces of the society behind its political agenda. Fearful of these attempts that sought

⁴⁸⁰ Sahin Alpay, Bizde Sosyal Demokrasi Marksizmden degil ona alternatif olarak dogdu, in Rusen Cakir and Hidir Goktas, Resmi Tarih Sivil Arayis Sosyal Demokratlarda Ideoloji ve Politika, İstanbul: Metis, 1991, p. 175

⁴⁸¹ Ahmet Taner Kislali, Ataturk'e Saldirmanin Dayanilmaz Hafifligi, Ankara: Imge, 1994

⁴⁸² Erdal Inonu, Kurultay Konusmalari, Istanbul: Boyut Yayinlari, 1998, p. 424-7

to reformulate a new social democratic model not resting on Kemalist tenets, which would clearly open into question their role and function in the party, members in the Baykal faction tried to situate SDPP on the RPP tradition and resume their mission which was interrupted by the 1980 coup.⁴⁸³ In the views expressed by some Baykal loyalists, who were also members of the party executive committee, such proposals would harm the unitary state and distance the party from its political and moral roots since social democracy is only one of the tenets of SDPP. The party administration was rather ambivalent on the topic as it attempted to reach a synthesis of the arguments of both groups, hoping to preserve stability and unity within SDPP. In spite of the fact that Inonu accepted the legacy of RPP without any objections, he also noted that each party must change; thus SDPP was a new version of RPP that went under transformation in light of the recent socio-economic developments.

The main difficulty for the reformist group arose from the fact that they could not reach a consensus among themselves let alone formulate a consistent and effective ideology to facilitate change in SDPP. While a group within the reformist faction, including, among others, names such as Ismail Cem, perceived Six Arrows as an obstacle for the development of a social democratic movement and called for a clear break with RPP tradition,⁴⁸⁴ another group, mostly organized around Ertugrul Gunay, emphasized the positive elements of Kemalism and wanted to take this period as the origin of their progressive movement.⁴⁸⁵ This view was supported by many close to the Inonu administration as well as Gurkan⁴⁸⁶ group. Remained somewhat out of these debates, another group, which has constituted the core intellectual body of SDP in early 1980s, represented by Karakas and his Istanbul team, found such discussions to be futile since a new social democrat party should mainly focus on its organizational structure, membership profile and ideological framework.⁴⁸⁷ Adopting a social democratic character could only be accomplished by establishing intra-party

⁴⁸³ Teoman Ergul, *Sosyal Demokraside Bolusme Yillari*, Ankara: Gundogan Yayinlari, 2000, p. 182-90

⁴⁸⁴ Ismail Cem, *Sosyal Demokrasi Nasil En Buyuk Olur?*, in Deniz Baykal and Ismail Cem, *Yenil Sol*, İstanbul: Cem, 1992, p. 133-42

⁴⁸⁵ Ertugrul Gunay, *Halka Ragmen Halk Hareketi Degiliz*, in Rusen Cakir and Hidir Goktas, *Resmi Tarih Sivil Arayis Sosyal Demokratlarda Ideoloji ve Politika*, İstanbul: Metis, 1991, p. 187-205

⁴⁸⁶ Aydin Guven Gurkan, *Tarihi Yargilamadan Asmak*, in Rusen Cakir and Hidir Goktas, *Resmi Tarih Sivil Arayis Sosyal Demokratlarda Ideoloji ve Politika*, İstanbul: Metis, 1991, p. 11-28

⁴⁸⁷ Kahraman, *Sosyal Demokrasi Turkiye*, 168

democracy and reforming the organizational identity of SDPP to make sure that its membership and cadre profiles would skew towards the working class instead of the petite bourgeoisie.⁴⁸⁸

In the first party congress following the lift of the ban on pre-1980 politicians, Deniz Baykal has formally returned to politics and assumed his prominent position within SDPP, thanks to the support of the former RPP cadres. Against the opposition of the reformist group, Baykal managed to get elected as the general secretary and rose to the second highest position in the party albeit with only a slight majority.⁴⁸⁹ As the general secretary of SDPP, Baykal was accused by many for his anti-democratic tactics with which he tried to remove local party branches close to the reformers. However after including Cem in his entourage before the 1990 Party Congress, Baykal changed his strategy and appealed to the reformist wing of the party by initiating the new left movement. The new left movement sought ways of reconstructing a different ideological model that rested on the primary principles of universal social democracy and wanted to create a more democratic and pluralist political system instead of the existing one.⁴⁹⁰ Hence, in time, Baykal would use some of the arguments of the reformists in his challenge against Inonu and come close to winning the leadership as the rank and file of the party was becoming increasingly open to new ideas and the notion of change. Nevertheless, arising from the fact that Baykal has placed the leadership issue to the center of his claim, the mandate for change became irrelevant once Inonu managed to defeat him. In that sense SDPP program has not undergone a drastic change despite the early demands of the leftist group to have a clear break with the RPP tradition. Overall, SDPP program has reflected an eclectic character by combining its tacit references to the liberal leftist ideas that were voiced by intellectuals closely linked to the party at the time and a New Left understanding with the Atatürkist principles and emphasis on Six Arrows.⁴⁹¹ This could also be attributed to the fact that the resurgence of Islamic groups after the Mumcu assassination, Sivas incident and Welfare victory in 1994

⁴⁸⁸ İsmail Cem, *Sosyal Demokrasi ya da Demokratik Sosyalizm nedir, ne değildir?*, İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 1998, pp. 299-301; Asaf Savas Akad, *Sosyal Demokrasi Gundemi*, İstanbul: Armoni Yayincilik, 1991, p. 157-182; and Ercan Karakas, *Gelecek Sosyal Demokrasidir*, İstanbul: SODEV Yayınları, 1992

⁴⁸⁹ Ergul, *Sosyal Demokraside*, 199-212

⁴⁹⁰ İsmail Cem, *Yeni Solun Türkiye Programı*, in Deniz Baykal and İsmail Cem, *Yeni Sol*, İstanbul: Cem, 1992 p. 78-96

⁴⁹¹ Kahraman, *The Making*, 242

local elections changed the parameters of Turkish politics. Therefore, it is at this point necessary to look at this process before returning to the issue of the intra-party factions of SDPP.

4.2 Islamic Resurgence

In many sociological studies, Turkish society is considered to consist of three sorts of people: a number of militant secularists who are mostly associated with leftist parties, a big size of moderates who preserve their faith while recognizing and accepting the secular character of the state and a much smaller group of clericals who call for a religious oriented political system.⁴⁹² Indeed, throughout republican history, Islam could only play an instrumental role in Turkish politics so that religiously-inspired political movements did not enjoy much success until the 1990s. Therefore the favorable election results achieved by the Welfare Party in local and national levels during the last decade is a very important academic phenomenon that needs to be explained for understanding the primary factors of Turkish politics, in general, and the recent developments within the social democratic movement, in particular.

Since the 1980s with the rise in the number of works on Islam, many scholars began to criticize the militant secularist policies of Kemalism for cutting off the non-institutional links between the elites and the masses provided by Islam and creating a cultural void that could no be filled by resorting to the Enlightenment ideas and secularism.⁴⁹³ Many social scientists indeed argue that the rise of Islamist groups is a response to the radical secularist policies of the Kemalist regime, which has perceived secularization to be a telos rather than a process.⁴⁹⁴ Failing to provide a “social ethos”⁴⁹⁵ or a “shared moral language”,⁴⁹⁶ Kemalism could not appeal to the hearts and minds of the masses and provide ontological security and thereby established the

⁴⁹² Rusen Cakir, *Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye’de Islami Olusumlar*, İstanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1993, p. 222-225

⁴⁹³ Omer Taspinar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey* Kemalist Identity in Transition, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 120

⁴⁹⁴ Ayse Kadioglu, *Civil Society, Islam and Democracy in Turkey: A Study of Three Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations*, *The Muslim World*, vol. 95, January 2005, p. 25

⁴⁹⁵ Serif Mardin, *Religion and politics in modern Turkey*, in James P. Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Process*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 139

⁴⁹⁶ Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, New York: Oxford University Pres 2003, p. 220

foundations of its own undoing in the coming decades.⁴⁹⁷ Therefore, resurgence of political Islam after decades of secularization process could only be understood within the particular context of the secularist discourse prevalent among Kemalists.⁴⁹⁸ However, these views do not take into account the very complicated and multidimensional interactions between the state and Islam achieved during the Republican era and the extent of the growing tacit support given to religious movements by state authorities. One cannot forget that even the RPP has not taken a very radical oppositional stance against the religion. It was taken for granted that the people had a religious practice and religious life was left outside the sphere of high politics, although, at the same time, controlled and directed by the ruling elites as they saw appropriate. A short discussion of the parameters of this interaction, then, is necessary before dwelling into the resurgence of political Islam and its effects on SDPP in the 1990s.

During the single-party era, religion was discredited in the eyes of the political elites; kept under close supervision and had lost the public and societal role it assumed during the Ottoman period. Kemalist elites distinguished between two Islams, namely a secular-official and a reactionary Islam, and did not restrict the practice of the former as long as it remained within the official control of the state institutions.⁴⁹⁹ Nevertheless, republican elites did not hesitate to make use of the official Islam represented by the Presidency of Religious Affairs to generate public support for their political and cultural reforms.⁵⁰⁰ With the transition to multi-party system in the late 1940s, religion regained its dominant cultural status, especially within the rural settings, providing the peasants with the political vocabulary necessary for mobilization. However, under Democrat Party rule, Islam did not become a primary component of Turkish politics not least due to strong support given by DP elites to the secular reforms of the republican regime.

Following the rise of Justice Party to power after the 27 May military coup, however, Islam once again assumed a new ideological role in the growing anti-

⁴⁹⁷ Serif Mardin, *Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science*, in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* Resat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdoğan (eds.), Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997, p. 71-77

⁴⁹⁸ Nuray Mert, *Laiklik tartismasinda kavramsal bir bakis: Cumhuriyet kurulurken laik dusunce*, İstanbul: Bgalem Yayinlari, 1994

⁴⁹⁹ Taspinar, *Kurdish Nationalism*, 129

⁵⁰⁰ Andrew Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, p. 151

communist sentiment in the country and became the mechanism with which masses were mobilized by successive center-right governments against the alleged threat of communism. Islamic movements proliferated in the 1960s as a response to the rapid socio-economic changes occurring in Turkey⁵⁰¹ but the functional cleavage between Islamists and secularists remained subordinate to the functional cleavage between the left and the right that polarized the society for the following two decades. Islam and Turkish nationalism were simultaneously used by the state elites in the struggle against communism but also exploited in the election campaigns against RPP, due to its disdain for religious populism.⁵⁰² Even the rise of MSP, despite its frequent use of Islamic references, could be contributed to its success in voicing the concerns and grievances and defending the interests of the Anatolian petite bourgeoisie⁵⁰³ against the rising commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in big cities. Indeed Erbakan's call for state-led heavy industrialization within an Islamic framework,⁵⁰⁴ especially in less developed Anatolian provinces has received more attention than his religious messages.⁵⁰⁵

The relatively insignificant role played by religion however began to change following 1980 coup as the policies in this period began the process of converting Islam from a convenient operational code into a political discourse. Perhaps the most striking development in Turkish politics following the 1980 military coup then has been the reassertion of the country's Islamic identity.⁵⁰⁶ This was mainly caused by "Islamization of secularism",⁵⁰⁷ through which coup leaders hoped to cement the Turkish nation and thereby put an end to the ethnic, sectarian and political differences in the society against the communist threat. Granted that Kurdish and Alevi groups were aligned closely with Marxist organizations, the generals combined Turkish

⁵⁰¹ Ilter Turan, *Religion and Political Culture in Turkey*, in *Islam Modern Turkey Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, Richard Tapper (ed.) London: I.B. Tauris, 1991, p. 45

⁵⁰² Feroz Ahmad, *Islamic Reassertion in Turkey*, *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 10, n. 2, April 1988, p. 761 and Taspinar, *Kurdish Nationalism*, 131

⁵⁰³ For an excellent article that deals with this issue from a comparative perspective, see Michael M. J. Fischer, "Islam and the revolt of the petite bourgeoisie", *Daedalus*, 111, 1982, pp. 101-25

⁵⁰⁴ Ali Yasar Saribay, *Turkiye'de Modernlesme Din ve Parti Politikasi "MSP Ornek Olayi"*, İstanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1985

⁵⁰⁵ Turan, *Religion and Political*, 46

⁵⁰⁶ Ahmad "Islamic Reassertion", 752

⁵⁰⁷ Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, *Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Turkey*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 28, 1996, p. 242

nationalism with Islam to create a Turkish-Islamic synthesis,⁵⁰⁸ as an alternative to militant secularism, reinforcing a version of right Kemalism.

Religious associations, foundations and orders in this period greatly benefited from the economic liberalization in a fashion reminiscent of the Protestant ethic and managed to establish their own firms, printing companies and media outlets with which they could carve out their own Islamic identities.⁵⁰⁹ Serving as informal networks for raising capital and promoting the business interests of its members, religious orders have also played a very important role in facilitating the rise of Islam as a political force within center-right parties.⁵¹⁰ These Islamic organizations effectively used their growing economic power to take advantage of the deregulation of the government-controlled media and developed the necessary communication networks through which they could spread their political and religious views. Hence, growing opportunities of education and communication, two powerful tools previously employed by the republican elites in accordance with the secularization process, began to be successfully manipulated by these groups to challenge the official ideology and, as Michael Meeker puts it, “to reinvent local and oral Islam in Turkish urban life”.⁵¹¹ The expansion of print Islam transformed the production and dissemination of the Islamic knowledge by freeing Islam from the control of religious officials on state payroll and precipitated the emergence of a new group of intellectuals who, using the aforementioned Islamic networks of communication, began to voice their ideas and concerns about the contemporary problems of the Turkish society to a large audience.⁵¹² The emerging Islamic media and schools, mainly through the use of printed text, were instrumental in transforming the primordial religious identity visible in traditional form and context into a modern political identity by shifting Islamic knowledge from the private to the public sphere. Largely through their efforts, an Islamic discourse came into existence that began to

⁵⁰⁸ Ibrahim Kafesoglu, *Türk-Islam Sentezi*, İstanbul: Otuken, 1999

⁵⁰⁹ Hakan Yavuz and John Esposito (eds.) *Turkish Islam and the Secular State The Gulen Movement*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003

⁵¹⁰ Taspinar, *Kurdish Nationalism*, 143

⁵¹¹ Michael Meeker, “Oral Culture, Media Culture and the Islamic Resurgence in Turkey”, in *Exploring the Written: Anthropology and the Multiplicity of Writing*, P. Archetti (ed.) Oslo: Scandavian University Press, 1994

⁵¹² Michael Meeker, “The Muslim Intellectual and His Audience: A New Configuration of Written and Reader Among Believers in the Republic of Turkey” in Serif Mardin (ed.) *Leiden*: E. J. Brill, 1994

influence the hearts and minds of especially the young high school and university students and paved the way for the development of an Islamic ideology that would be used by Islamist politicians in the coming decade.

This Islamic discourse is very critical of the Kemalist reforms, which was accused of weakening the authentic Islamic culture and submitting the Turkish society to the immoral and positivist practices of the West, a recurrent theme in the cultural debates between the modernists and Islamists in the late Ottoman period⁵¹³ and in MSP campaigns.⁵¹⁴ Reminiscent of the European conservative movements, these intellectuals criticize the Enlightenment tradition and its Kemalist interpretation for their devotion to progress and economic growth and ignoring the crucial moral and social issues.⁵¹⁵ The feeling of inferiority towards the West, stemming from the wrong practices of the political elites, they argued, could only be overcome by placing more emphasis on Islam. These intellectual works have led many young people with conservative backgrounds to become disillusioned by the political order and question, what they define as, the blind emulation of Western life styles. The growth of the Welfare Party was partially triggered by the quest of this Muslim community to form an identity separate and, in many ways, autonomous from the West as a result of their “search for an alternative Islamic life politics and new social order”.⁵¹⁶

After losing most of its electoral base to MP in early 1980s, Welfare Party began to regain its supporters with the return of the pre-coup cadre to active politics and the favorable political environment caused by the socio-economic consequences of shifting from a highly protectionist economy to an export-oriented model through neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s which intensified income disparities and increased the unemployment rate to unprecedented levels. The process of neo-liberal reforms, in accordance with global developments, undermined the foundations of the developmental state and limited the size and extent of public programs designed to meet the social state provision. The steady inflow of migrants from less developed central and eastern Anatolian provinces into metropolitan centers could not be

⁵¹³ Turan, *Religion and Political*, 34

⁵¹⁴ Taspinar, *Kurdish Nationalism*, 135

⁵¹⁵ İsmet Özel, *Uc Mesele: Teknik, Medeniyet ve Yabancılaşma*, İstanbul: Cidam Yayınları, 1992

⁵¹⁶ Ayşe Saktanber, ‘We pray like you have fun’: new Islamic youth in Turkey between intellectualism and popular culture, in A. Saktanber and D. Kandiyoti (eds.) *Fragments of culture: the everyday of modern Turkey*, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002, p. 257

adequately absorbed into official sectors of the economy and excluded from most aspects of the urban life in the slums, springing up across the major cities.⁵¹⁷ In addition, economic conditions of the masses, mostly earning fixed income, were further exacerbated by the chronically high rates of inflation, especially during the TPP-SDDP coalition government.⁵¹⁸ Intense alienation and helplessness caused by cultural shocks and socio-economic problems deeply affected the newcomers and made them a natural constituency for political movements and ideas critical of the neo-liberal socio-economic order which they considered as the cause of their multidimensional problems. Faced with these challenges, the new migrants continued to rely on their traditional contacts and associations to ease the difficult transition period and thus became excellent targets for the clientelist politics of the Welfare Party.⁵¹⁹ Nevertheless, it was only in 1991 national elections that the party managed to pass the electoral threshold and enter the parliament, thanks to the merger done with MCP and IDP.

In this manner, global and domestic developments in line with the growing hegemony of the neo-liberal economic policies and new right politics left little room for maneuver to the social democratic parties, already in a deep crisis for similar reasons, and increasingly made them look indistinguishable from center-right parties.⁵²⁰ Deteriorating economic conditions during TPP-SDPP government and its failure to cushion some of the socio-economic problems led many urban voters to become disillusioned with center parties. In that sense, Halul Gulalp rightly argues that Islamism is a consequence of the failure of the Westernist modernization to deliver its promises.⁵²¹ In this suitable environment, when center-right and center-left parties were unresponsive to the demands and needs of the masses but were instead plagued with allegations of corruption and political wrongdoing, Erbakan, thanks to

⁵¹⁷ Binnaz Toprak, *The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey*, in M. Heper and A. Evin, *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988

⁵¹⁸ Taspinar, *Kurdish Nationalism*, 146

⁵¹⁹ For a detailed ethnographic study focusing on Islamic politics, in general, and the political network of Welfare Party, in particular, see Jenny White, *Islamic Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002: p. 178-211

⁵²⁰ Taspinar, *Kurdish Nationalism*, 147

⁵²¹ Halul Gulalp, *Modernization Policies and Islamic Politics in Turkey*, in R. Kasaba and S. Bozdogan (eds.), *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, Seattle, University Washington Press, 1997, p. 54

his colorful yet effective rhetoric, could succeed in blaming the Kemalist order and all the systemic parties associated with the regime for the escalating problems and offer an alternative to the electorate within the framework of his Islamic program.⁵²² The ‘Just Economic Order’,⁵²³ possessing elements of capitalism and socialism, came to be associated with social justice and was considered as a third way between the two ideologies, promising communitarian solidarity and relief from the material concerns of the masses.⁵²⁴ The ensuing Islamic civic organizations worked to produce tangible results to indicate that Islam can better address the problems, needs and grievances of ordinary people than the secular institutions and organization of the state.⁵²⁵

In accordance with its long walk to power, Welfare Party began to approach to the political center and open its ranks to center-right and liberal candidates transferred from Motherland and True Path parties. In addition, reflecting the liberalization of the Islamic movement with the rise of Islamic intellectuals such as Mehmet Metiner⁵²⁶ and Ali Bulac,⁵²⁷ making efforts to open dialogue with other segments of the society, Bahri Zengin, leader of the liberal faction, has put together a new party program, more appealing to the electorate.⁵²⁸ In addition to this new strategy, beginning with the 1991 elections, campaign themes of the Welfare Party mostly focused on the issues and problems, involving the oppressed groups in the society such as veiled students, unemployed people, new migrants and workers⁵²⁹ and adopted a rhetoric that sounded very close to one that could be used by a traditional leftist party, especially with its emphasis on growing income disparities and poverty.⁵³⁰ These

⁵²² David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, Huntingdon. Eothen Press, 1999: p. 101

⁵²³ For a more detailed discussion of this economic system, see Rusen Cakir, *Ne Seriat Ne Demokrasi*, İstanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1994, p. 131-149

⁵²⁴ Hakan Yavuz, *Political Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey*, *Comparative Politics*, October 1997, p. 73-75

⁵²⁵ Sencer Ayata, *The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Framework*, in A. Eralp, M. Tunay and B. Yesilada (eds.) *The Political and socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993, p. 59

⁵²⁶ Mehmet Metiner, *Yemyesil Seriat Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, İstanbul: Dogan Kitap, p. 443-556

⁵²⁷ Ali Bulac, *Islam ve Demokrasi: Teokrasi-Totaliterizm*, İstanbul: Beyan Yayinlari, 1993, p. 167-180

⁵²⁸ Dogan Duman, *Demokrasi Surecinde Turkiye’de Islamcilik*, Izmir: Dokuz Eylul Universitesi, 1997, p. 109-10

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, 106

⁵³⁰ Taspinar, *Kurdish Nationalism*, 148

campaign themes resonated very strongly among the new migrants in large cities who were grappling with the difficulties caused by separation from collective entities.⁵³¹

Taking advantage of the new opportunities provided by the global communication network through the Internet, cable television, fax machines and the spread of telephones, the reformist faction in the party began to devise new strategies to attract new voters to the party and opposed the old guards with the goal of transforming Welfare Party into a mass party⁵³² from a cadre party status.⁵³³ Their effective campaign strategies based on a network of independent volunteer support groups, scattered across the country, spread the party's message to the urban masses and gained substantial support from poor districts of metropolitan areas. As a result of the growing Islamic movement and the highly organized and effective work of the party members, Welfare Party managed to capture 19.8 percent of the national vote in the 1994 local elections and won in 29 out of 76 municipalities as well as in around 300 towns. This was indeed a sociological shift in the voter base of the Welfare Party with a substantial increase in the amount of votes received from urban areas and the working classes, those groups that have traditionally voted from left-wing movements and social-democratic parties.⁵³⁴ In other words, while NSP drew most of its support from towns and small cities in the less developed eastern and central Anatolian provinces in the 1970s,⁵³⁵ the following two decades, especially 1990s, witnessed the growth of support given to the Welfare Party in major cities.

As a result, the party that was mostly severely affected from the rise of the Welfare Party was SDDP, as it lost a substantial part of its electorate that has delivered the party an impressive election victory in 1989 local elections. Ties that were developed between SDPP and the poor masses in squatter districts were damaged because of the mediocre service provided by many SDPP controlled municipalities and, more importantly, the increasing number of corruption scandals in

⁵³¹ Sabri Sayari, "Politicization of Islamic Re-traditionalism: Some Preliminary Notes," in *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East*, edited by Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, p. 119-128

⁵³² For a discussion of the theoretical distinction existing between cadre and mass parties, see Maurice Duverger, *Siyasi Partiler*, translated by Ergun Özbudun, Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1974, p. 106-138

⁵³³ Çakır, *Ne Seriat*, 77

⁵³⁴ Hasan Kirmanoglu, *Refah Partisinin Yükselişinin Ekonomi Politigi*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Araştırma Merkezi, 1997

⁵³⁵ Jacob M. Landau, 'The National Salvation Party in Turkey', *Asian and African Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1, 1976, p. 1-57

which SDPP members took a central role. Moreover, the recent economic reforms coupled with devolution of power from central authorities to local governments, following the municipality reform in early 1980s created new opportunities to local authorities, such as allocation of public lands and issuing construction permits. The growing influence of the local organizations within SDPP backed by a delegate system, which became highly corrupt during the intra-party conflicts and successive party congress fed the corruptive and clientelistic nature of politics.⁵³⁶

As already noted, the dissatisfaction of the urban masses excluded from the benefits of the economic liberalization of the last two decades was a major factor behind the rise of the Welfare Party. While social democrats refrained from directly challenging the economic order and failed to provide relief to the needy in the municipalities they controlled, plagued by corruption, political misconduct and embezzlement allegations, Islamists established social service organizations and clientelist networks funded by conservative businessmen.⁵³⁷ In their hopes of defending the achievements of the republican regime and the benefits of a modern life style, SDPP came to be associated with the rest of the center parties in the eyes of this electorate. In other words, social democrat politicians were so tied up to the modernist rhetoric that they could not relate to this constituency and assume a radical and highly critical discourse against the political and economic order.

On the other hand, Welfare politicians developed an anti-systemic rhetoric that managed to capture the hearts and minds of these voters and gave them hope for the future as well as a new discourse and promise for a new regime, 'just order'. This Islamic discourse attributed the grievances and miseries of the masses to the secular regime itself rather than the mediocre politicians and the overall direction of the economy. In their minds, god and society was on one side and the secular and corrupt state was on the other.⁵³⁸ The narratives of progress and prosperity in defense of the rising consumer culture used by the mainstream media sources was countered by the

⁵³⁶ Ayse Gunes-Ayata, *Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey*, in Luis Roniger and Ayse Gunes-Ayata (ed.), *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 60

⁵³⁷ Jenny White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003, p. 178-211

⁵³⁸ Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 143

Islamic media that focused on the growing inequality between rich and poor and various economic hardships that the masses had to overcome.⁵³⁹

A segment of the urban dwellers who tend to distinguish themselves from the newly migrants with a set of secular values and culturalized lifestyle choices⁵⁴⁰ reacted to the rise of the Welfare Party with growing fear and worry. These fears were crystallized immediately after 1994 local elections when they were confronted with the reality of being directly governed by Islamic politicians in their municipalities and was forced to recognize that Islam constituted an irreplaceable part of their fellow compatriots' life.⁵⁴¹ Considering the growing influence of Islam in society as reactionary and fanatical⁵⁴² in accordance with Kemalist tradition, they became highly sensitive and reactionary, especially after Mumcu assassination and 1994 local elections. These developments provoked the emergence of a *Kulturkampf* between the secularists and Islamists who began to use distinct discourses, images, representations and stories to oppose one another. Moreover there was a return to Kemalist laicism, as people united around the cult of Ataturk whose image became more visible and pronounced in the public sphere with hundreds of thousands of Ataturk framed posters, badges, pins, portraits, photographs and statues circulated around. Hence, growing influence of Islam in the political system generated a counter-response and paved the way for the subsequent rise of Kemalism but now in a more civic form.

4.3 Kemalist Response

The liberal, ethnic and religious challenges in the two decades following the 1980s coup, also discussed in the two chapters of this thesis, propelled Kemalism into a legitimacy crisis as a state-focused ideology and undermined the very basic foundations of the Turkish republic. Growing hegemony of the neo-liberal agenda and the ensuing globalization process in the 1990s with their reflections observed in the rising liberal challenges towards the state and the rise of Islamic revivalism together with Kurdish radicalism persuaded many Kemalist intellectuals that Kemalism was under serious threat. In addition, due to the high number of Islamists joining the ranks of the state bureaucracy, especially during the Motherland period, state officials could

⁵³⁹ Ibid., 91-2

⁵⁴⁰ Sencer Ayata, The new middle class and the joys of suburbia, D. Kandiyoti and A. Saktanber (eds.), *Fragments of Culture and the everyday of Modern Turkey*, New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 2002, p.30

⁵⁴¹ Ibid., 44-73

⁵⁴² Ahmad "Islamic Reassertion, 755

no longer be trusted to give overwhelming support to the Kemalist ideals.⁵⁴³ Moreover, recent ideological debates taking place within SDPP, indicating that many members were ready to abandon etatist policies discussed in the first section of this chapter, made them concerned about the ability of the social democrat parties to defend Kemalism.⁵⁴⁴ All of these developments led Kemalist intellectuals to organize a civilian initiative with which they could restore the hegemony of Kemalism by using the democratic mechanisms at hand, since the state was no longer willing to officially assume this task. Hence, 1990s witnessed the emergence of a civic version of Kemalism which have characterized Turkish politics in the 1990s, particularly for the mainstream leftist parties.

The first group, consisting of very prominent scholars with a legal background, developed a revisionist approach to Kemalism, arguing the possibility of establishing a democratic regime in Turkey with Kemalism-oriented values. These intellectuals share the view that Kemalism is not a totalitarian project in par with the socialist and fascist regimes occurring in the same time period as Kemalism; rather it is an authoritarian ideology that developed the necessary political, economic and social conditions for establishing a democratic regime.⁵⁴⁵ Indeed, they pointed out that the pragmatic and flexible policies of the period, coupled with a relative tolerance for pluralism⁵⁴⁶, though implemented in a monist and authoritarian fashion came to develop the modern and rational citizen model that would become the building block of a democratic order in the coming years.⁵⁴⁷ For those arguing that Kemalism is an elitist project, imposed from above to all segments of the society, Tanor selected the democratic aspects of the early stages of the National Struggle Period and emphasized the high level of participation and mobilization that surrounded the rise of Kemalism

⁵⁴³ Nemci Erdogan, Neo-Kemalizm, Organik Bunalim ve Hegemonya, in Ahmet Insel (ed.) Kemalizm, İstanbul: İletisim, 2002, p. 585

⁵⁴⁴ Ahmet Taner Kislali, Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi, Ankara: Imge Yayınevi, 1994

⁵⁴⁵ Bulent Tanor, Kurulus Kurtulus, İstanbul, Cumhuriyet Yayıncılık, 2000; Ergun Ozbudun, The nature of the Kemalist Political regime, in Ataturk Founder of a Modern State, London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981 and Sami Selcuk, Demokrasiye Dogru, Ankara: Yeni Turkiye Yayinlari, 1999

⁵⁴⁶ Ergun Ozbudun, The nature of the Kemalist Political regime, in Ataturk Founder of a Modern State, London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981

⁵⁴⁷ Sami Selcuk, Zorba Devletten Hukukun Ustunlugune, Ankara: Yeni Turkiye Yayinlari, 1998, p. 286

in this period of liberation.⁵⁴⁸ This was a civil society model absent in the Ottoman polity and a clear indication that only the democratic regime could solve the deep rooted socio-economic problems of the Turkish society.⁵⁴⁹

They were also highly critical of the oppressive, elitist and rigid policies of the single-party era, especially after the consolidation of the RPP rule in the early 1930s, and saw them as wrong examples that were set for the coming military coups in the following decades. They argued that Kemalism should be saved from the tutelage of the civil and military bureaucratic elites, who, distrustful of the masses, relies on a notion of statism adopted from 1930s. Ozbudun considers the corporatist character of the Turkish polity, inherited from Gokalp's populist tradition, as the fundamental obstacle over the development of a pluralist culture and a democratic regime.⁵⁵⁰ On the contrary, the consolidation of Turkish democracy depends upon a peaceful resolution of the existing dichotomies in society and recognition of alternative political, cultural and ethnic identities by means of abandoning the monolithic cultural policy of Kemalism.⁵⁵¹ Advocating adoption of a more liberal version of secularism, abandonment of tutelage of bureaucratic authorities in favor of civil society and full-scale democratization, they hoped that it would be possible to regain legitimacy of Kemalism on democratic grounds and thereby achieve Atatürk's goal of establishing a democratic regime in Turkey.⁵⁵² Indeed, these intellectuals have analyzed the responsibility of the Kemalist tradition in the poor conditions of democracy in Turkey in a critical manner unseen among mainstream Kemalists, though not personally dissociating from the ideology itself and took it upon themselves to reinvent Kemalism in accordance with the democratic paradigm.⁵⁵³ However these attempts of reframing Kemalism in a liberal and democratic manner did not generate much support among the Kemalist circles and were mostly shadowed by the rise of a more

⁵⁴⁸ Bulent Tanor, *Kurulus Kurtulus*, İstanbul, Cumhuriyet Yayıncılık, 2000

⁵⁴⁹ Bulent Tanor, *Yerel Kongre İktidarları*, İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1992

⁵⁵⁰ Ergun Ozbudun, *Türkiye'de Devlet Seckinleri ve Demokratik Siyasi Kultur*, Ergun Ozbudun et. al., *Türkiye'de Demokratik Siyasi Kultur*, Ankara: Turk Demokrasi Vakfi, 1995

⁵⁵¹ Ergun Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000

⁵⁵² Sami Selcuk, *Demokrasiye Dogru*, Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999

⁵⁵³ Omer Turan, *Son Donemde Kemalizme Demokratik Mesruiyet Arayışları*, in Ahmet Insel (ed.) *Kemalizm*, İstanbul: İlesitim, 2002, p. 592-600

conservative, nationalist and reactionary interpretation of Kemalism with, of course, serious consequences for the reformist and leftist elements within SDPP.

The second group however directly appealed to the society and engaged in civic activities to raise awareness for the growing threats facing Kemalism and generate support from the masses. Hence, a public call was made to the society, inviting all those who discovered the Mustafa Kemal in themselves to participate in this process and assume an active role in defending the achievements of the republican regime.⁵⁵⁴ A group of Kemalist intellectuals, headed by Muammer Aksoy, established the Association of Atatürkist Thought⁵⁵⁵ in Ankara in 1989 with a similar organization under the title the Association of Support for Contemporary Life being opened in Istanbul during the same period. Kemalists from all occupations and age groups, but especially Kemalist women, who considered Islamic revival as a fundamental threat to their status in society assumed a primary role in these organizations and took active part in their occasions.⁵⁵⁶ They argued that this is a continuation of the ‘Anatolian Enlightenment’ by civic associations, resuming the task of raising modern citizens, who would be ready and capable to defend the reformist and nationalist epistemology of the regime.

On political matters, a very cautious approach is taken towards Kurdish and Islamist groups and any liberal initiative is usually considered to play into the hands of these groups and thus passionately opposed. One country, one flag, one official language are the absolute boundaries for political and cultural freedoms that could be granted to political groups in society.⁵⁵⁷ It was argued that under no circumstances Islamist and Kurdish political associations could be tolerated as part of the civil society because they posed a significant threat to the republican regime and the democratic order. If formal rules of democracy call for such tolerance, then, they should not be considered as democrats.⁵⁵⁸ This is in fact a clear indication of the instrumental role denoted to the democratic regime by Kemalists who were ready to

⁵⁵⁴ Turkan Saylan, *Cumhuriyet’in Bireyi Olmak*, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Yayinlari, 1998, p. 340-1

⁵⁵⁵ Among the founders, there were many prominent people, who had achieved fame and success in their subsequent fields such as H. V. Velidedeoglu, A. Cecen, O. Ozankaya, I. Topaloglu, B. Ucok, C. Talas as well as several others.

⁵⁵⁶ Yesim Arat, *The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey*, in Resat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdogan (ed.) *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, p. 108

⁵⁵⁷ Ahmet Taner Kislali, *Ben Demokrat Degilim*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1999, p. 337

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 222-6

use authoritarian political and legal measures to defend the regime.⁵⁵⁹ Moreover, a “platonic love for the state” is eminent among members of these associations since they have not yet abandoned their emotional bonds with the state but also cannot openly express them due to the cold response most of the state authorities give to their cause.⁵⁶⁰ Members emphasize the importance of establishing organic ties between their associations and state mechanisms, arising from their “statolatry”.⁵⁶¹

Recent global developments have made it necessary for neo-Kemalists, as Kahraman puts it, to rejuvenate the Kemalist-Republican ideological roots and revitalize the nation-state model with the traditional Kemalist epistemology, overseeing a cohabitation of the party and the state.⁵⁶² Indeed, the emergence of neo-Kemalism has been largely a reaction to the retreat of the nation-state model and Keynesian version of developmental state propelled by the developments and concepts produced in the period of globalization. It should then not come as a surprise that an emphasis on the primacy of national sovereignty and anti-imperialism distinguish neo-Kemalism from its earlier forms.⁵⁶³ Nationalist left, aiming to amalgamate the Kuvayi Milliye spirit with egalitarian principles, developed as a response to the hegemonic crisis faced by Kemalism in the 1990s and became an ideological framework for the social democratic parties.⁵⁶⁴ This reactionary attitude has been one of the major obstacles for the postponement of the democratization and liberalization process in the early 1990s and has grown the influence of the conservative faction within the SDPP.

4.4 The Return to Roots

In the midst of heated Kemalism debates, those adhering to the Kemalist principles wanted a political party that could directly assume the task of defending Kemalist heritage. Indeed following the constitutional change that allowed pre-1980 parties to be reopened, RPP was reestablished by the former ranks of the party and initiated an aggressive strategy towards other center-left parties, especially SDPP, whose mission was argued to be completed with its return to Turkish politics. A

⁵⁵⁹ Vural Savas, *Irtica ve Boluluge Karsi Militan Demokrasi*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000

⁵⁶⁰ T. Bora and U. Kivanc, *Yeni Atatürkçülük, Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Cilt 13, 1996, p. 779

⁵⁶¹ Erdogan, *Neo-Kemalizm*, 588

⁵⁶² Kahraman, *The Making*, 246

⁵⁶³ Erdogan, *Neo-Kemalizm*, 586

⁵⁶⁴ Erkin Yurdakul, *Ataturk ve Ulusal Sol*, İstanbul: İleri Yayinlari, 2004

paradoxical situation was caused by the fact that the very group which was critical of the traditional ideological structure and the radical modernist discourse of RPP was also assuming the task of, first, reestablishing and, then, assuming the control of the party. An energetic and ambitious Baykal, eager to become the leader of the left, has passionately used the strategy of pushing the SDPP administration to the corner by inviting them to merger talks without any preconditions,⁵⁶⁵ knowing that the heritage of his party would constitute a source of attraction for those disappointed by policies pursued by SDPP after becoming a coalition partner. Indeed his entire strategy was based on the emphasis made by him on the importance and meaning of RPP which he thought would appeal the SDPP base not least the grassroots members. Inonu managed to resist to these demands by arguing that the roof of RPP existed within SDPP which contained many former RPP politicians as well as majority of its rank and file.⁵⁶⁶ Following Inonu's quit from politics, Karayalcin was unable to control his party ranks and when faced with mounting pressure coming from the leftist public opinion as well as many of his rivals, including, among others, Gurkan group, an uneasy Karayalcin realized that he could no longer ignore or delay the merger between the two parties.⁵⁶⁷

After the assassination of Ugur Mumcu in January 24, 1993 and in response to the resurgence of Islam and growing Kurdish nationalism, there was a spontaneous upsurge of the traditional Kemalist ideology albeit in a civic form. For Kemalist masses, the numerous political assassinations on Kemalist intellectuals was an indication of the inability of the political elites to preserve the secular character of the regime which gave them all the more reason to stand firm and hold on to their ideals. The prevailing mood among the urban and secular electorate, constituting the support base of SDPP-RPP tradition, contributed to the growing popularity of traditional Kemalist values and the return of SDPP to its roots, thereby eliminating the possibility of a social democratic transformation. In this environment, attempts of reviving Turkish social democracy by breaking with the RPP heritage and developing a new ideological framework that would incorporate the universal principles of social democracy lost their appeal for the rank and file of the party. There was a growing protest against those who favored opening into question the manner and style of the

⁵⁶⁵ Dagistanli, *Sosyal Demokratlar*, 249-58

⁵⁶⁶ Erdal Inonu, *Kurultay Konusmalari*, Istanbul: Boyut Yayinlari, 1998, p. 432-6

⁵⁶⁷ Saban Sevinc, *Yenilmis Komutanlar Muzesi*, Ankara: Umit Yayıncılık, 2000, p. 122-4

Kemalist reforms. Hence, second Republicans were accused of acting under the guidance and initiative of CIA with its own agenda over the region so that those affiliated with such ideas in leftist parties lost their hopes of generating support from the party members. Indeed, the growing concerns of the urban dwellers that the republican regime and their modern and secular life style was in danger which was being fueled by the civic-oriented activities and public campaigns of the neo-Kemalists made it highly unwise for the RPP leadership cadre to break with the Kemalist heritage and adopt the new left philosophy as the new party program. While the 1993 program of RPP contained an ambiguous ideological position going back and forth between the abandonment of the traditional ideology and its reinvigoration, Baykal team gradually assumed an increasingly traditional Kemalist, nationalist and radical secularist position.⁵⁶⁸ Republic and secularism assumed a more important role in the lives of the RPP voters in the period following the rise of Islamic politics and became the main priority of this constituency.⁵⁶⁹

As already shown in the second chapter, Karayalcin Manifesto revealed the intention of a part of the leadership cadres to shift to a more liberal and pluralistic understanding of politics breaking with the centralist and statist tradition in response to the emergence of new economic, political and social realities. However the dramatic turn of events would lead him to, first, tone down some important elements in his program and, later, pull the party under his hand during the merger talks, resulting in his political isolation. Indeed, come the merger, not only the institutional existence but also the ideological formulations of SDPP would be abolished. Moreover, after the unification of the two parties, prominent SDPP politicians who were already out of touch with their constituencies after numerous scandals in power would begin to lose their influence in the new party in what would follow as the capture of SDPP by RPP. The overwhelming victory of Baykal, who campaigned on the theme of devotion to the historical cult of RPP,⁵⁷⁰ against Karayalcin in the first congress after the RPP-SDPP merger on September 9, 1995 thus signaled the end of a chapter in Turkish politics, for the era of SDPP as well as SDPP originated politicians had come to an end.

⁵⁶⁸ Kahraman, *The Making*, 283

⁵⁶⁹ Omer Caha, *Secmen Davranisini Belirleyen Degerler*, in Omer Caha (ed.) *Secmen Davranisi ve Siyasal Partiler*, İstanbul: Fatih Universitesi Yayinlari, p. 5-46

⁵⁷⁰ Kahraman, *The Making*, 312

In this chapter, it is argued that rapid socio-economic and political changes in the post-1980 period brought a radical reevaluation of the constitutive ideology, namely Kemalism and, with it, the Kemalist-originated Turkish social democracy. The analysis showed that Kemalism was put under scrutiny by intellectuals from all segments of the society, including a newly reformist group within SDPP. There were indeed numerous attempts among SDPP ranks to reinvigorate the social democratic ideology by breaking with the Kemalist heritage and six Arrows, unseen in previous periods. However the rise of Islamic movements together with brutal attacks on secular intellectuals gave the impression that secularism and the republican order were under threat, precipitating a wave of Kemalist resurgence, overwhelmingly supported by the secular and urban communities. In response to the anti-Kemalist developments in the post-1980 period, many Kemalist intellectuals managed to revive the existing link between Turkish social democracy and Kemalism to reemphasize Kemalist elements within Turkish left. In other words, rank and file of SDPP have assumed the task of defending Kemalist reforms and principles at the expense of strengthening the importance of universal social democrat values within their party program. The reestablishment of RPP fueled this process as it generated a race among leftist politicians on the issue of who can best protect and preserve the secular character of the republican regime. Following the merger between SDPP and RPP, all previous attempts of the reformist faction to convince the party grassroots to undertake transformation along the lines of western social democracy had to be dropped in this new environment.

CONCLUSION

On the night of February 18, 1995 SDPP delegates gathered at a convention hall in Ankara to dissolve their party that has become the main representor of the social democratic movement for approximately a decade. Only a few hours ago, with around a three hundred vote margin, the majority of the SDPP delegates accepted RPP as their new home, following the merger between SDPP and RPP. A sad-looking and exhausted Karayalçin, as the last chairman of the party, made a dramatic speech, congratulating each and every one of the delegates for their services in SDPP and asked them to continue similar work in their new party. These words marked not only the end of SDPP but also a chapter in Turkish politics, since in the coming years RPP reemerged with its monist structure, putting an end to all attempts of the intra-party factions in realizing a social democratic transformation.

Social democracy is a concept that has emerged, rather lately in Turkish politics, in the early 1980s, pronounced politically and epistemologically by the leadership cadre of the new center-left party that was founded, namely Social Democratic Party. In the previous decades, even center-left or democratic left movements that challenged some of the policies of the single-party era did not aspire to use the social democratic discourse. Indeed, Turkish social democracy has never been closely tied to and influenced by the universal norms of the European social democratic and socialist parties but instead relied extensively on the Kemalist ideological framework.

In accordance with the liberalization of the political system and the rise of new social groups, however, according to the argument put forward in this thesis, a growing faction of reformists, consisting of the intellectuals, ethnic and sectarian groups and union leaders in SDPP managed to challenge the ideology of the party and argued in favor of its structural and ideological renewal. A number of intra-party factions developed new programs which carried the ambitious goal of transforming the traditional and parochial Turkish social democracy and breaking with its Kemalist origins to assume a more universal character. Given the popularity of these alternative programs and the publicity they generated in the media, it is surprising that such a programmatic revival failed to materialize. This thesis thus aims to explain this phenomenon by focusing on intra-party discussions as well as the socio-economic and political developments of the period.

Efforts of some intra-factions to seek ideological and structural renewal have, unfortunately, coincided with the rapid decline of SDPP due to the political conjecture and leadership and cadre problems. The mass support for SDPP significantly went down during the coalition years in response to ineffective government response to the Sivas and Gazi events, economic crisis and Kurdish issue. It is also the case that these debates mostly gained importance among delegates mainly during these leadership contests and, thus, were overshadowed by the Inonu-Baykal leadership race. Important as they may be, this thesis displayed that this inability to renew the ideological structure of the party must be attributed to the crisis of statism that challenged the source of legitimacy of the party, crisis of Turkish modernity that distanced the party elites from their constituent groups and crisis of Kemalism that hindered the search for universal norms of social democracy in SDPP.

The epistemological inadequacy of the Turkish social democracy, as already argued, mainly originates from the extensive ties developed between the state and SDPP, as the party of the old establishment, standing in direct line of descent from the RPP. This has precluded SDPP elites from directly challenging the state and accepting the wrongdoings of the ruling elites, even if that meant compromising on the goal of demilitarization. While the party elites were critical of the coup generals and their actions, they were surprisingly hesitant to challenge the authoritarian policies of the state in the issues of 1980 coup, Kurdish problem and economic and political discrimination. In its role as the main opposition party in the 1980s, therefore, SDPP could not fully possess and lead the democratization demands of the large body of the Turkish electorate.

In response to the neo-liberal and new right policies of the MP government, SDPP ranks instinctively rallied behind the cause of defending the state and continued to advocate the notion of the mixed economy, not least denoting a primary function for state interventionism. This was a major reason for the inability of SDPP to offer a credible economic program that could serve as an alternative to the government policies. In addition, debureaucratization of the Ozal era raised the influence of bureaucrats who acted in their self-interest to seek the reversal of these policies within SDPP. It should however be noted that unlike the Western countries where statism has been perceived as an economic model, Turkish statism, as explained in the thesis, has a political and cultural element, frequently used for part of a social engineering project. Therefore, the demise of statism has driven center-left parties, not least SDPP

itself, to an ideological crisis rather than constituting an incentive for change as seen in western social democratic and socialist parties.

Secondly, Turkish political parties are delimited by the constitutive modernist approach in politics, deriving its legitimacy from the will to civilization depicted by the founding fathers of the republican regime since the goal of social transformation has not yet succeeded in developing a properly industrialized modern society. While politicians from the right of the political spectrum focus on the technologist transformation of the society and emphasize economic growth, those in the left prioritize cultural aspects of modernity and with their policies imposed from above cause a cultural divide to be developed between them and the masses.

This approach continued to influence SDPP administration, which formulated policies in accordance with this will to modernization and, thereby, reduced politics to a kind of functionalism in which social groups play a side role. In such a case, politics for SDPP cadres no longer assumed the participatory and communicative framework in addressing the problems, demands and grievances of the electorate but instead became imbedded in a normative structure that lacks a strong ideological component. Overall SDPP ranks stayed indifferent to the transformation taking place in society, especially in terms of the new groups flourishing with the rise of identity politics, due to the constitutive discourse of modernity, which provided the basis of the Turkish social democracy. As a result, the social groups that were most likely to adopt the new ideological approaches and support the transformation of SDPP along the universal principles of social democracy have abandoned the party in disillusionment. This weakened the strength and size of the reformist wing of the party and generated a monist and uniform membership structure which was not sufficient for undertaking a transformation of the party from inside.

The third and most important reason for the inability of SDPP to generate a more universal ideology arose from the symbiotic relationship between social democracy and Kemalism, which is the major constitutive element of Turkish social democracy and, therefore, determined the epistemological limits of the center-left parties. As already argued in the thesis, Kemalism is an inadequate source for a genuine social democratic movement because the populist elements inherent in Kemalism constitute a solidaristic formulation of social relations and organize the society through corporatist arrangements that leaves no room for a class structure.

Only by disassociating the left ideology from its elitist, statist and anti-democratic roots and settle accounts with Kemalism through a rupture with the past can Turkish social democracy become the driving force of democratization and catalyst for building a democratic consensus upon which a new political regime could be established. However the rise of political Islam and the Islamic revivalism together with brutal attacks on secular intellectuals gave the impression that secularism and the republican order were under threat, precipitating a wave of Kemalist reaction overwhelmingly supported by the secular and urban groups. This have played into the hands of the orthodox members of the party and hindered the development of a genuine and valid social democratic movement.

It is not astonishing to state that SDPP was still in an infant stage in terms of becoming a fully-fledged and organized party, which remained as an uneasy coalition of various social, political and identity groups, not able to reach a consensus on its programme and, thus, experienced difficulty in persuading the masses. The grassroots activists and the membership of the party as well as its cadres remained unsure about the direction of the party and its mission. MP's adoption of a liberal political agenda and TPP's emphasis on politics of redistribution in the early 1990s coupled with the reestablishment of RPP, challenged the legitimacy of SDPP by eliminating its mission. Unable to renew itself or develop policies that would adjust to the changing conditions of Turkish politics, the electoral and social base of SDPP eroded, leaving the option of merger with RPP inevitable.

To sum it up, the main contribution of this thesis is that unless these three important issues are settled satisfactorily so that the traditional and historical ties between the left and the state, its funding ideology and state-led modernization project are broken, it is not possible to transform Turkish social democracy. Any attempts falling short of this would once again generate unfavorable results since the orthodox elements would once again prevail in preserving the traditional structure of the Turkish left.

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