SELIMIAN TIMES: A REFORMING GRAND ADMIRAL, ANXIETIES OF RE-POSSESSION, CHANGING RITES OF POWER

Tülay ARTAN
Halil BERKTAY

In the Topkapı Palace collections, there are two small water-colours that pose some intriguing problems.¹ They are by the same artist – a man who signed himself “Candy”. Like some other artists,² he, too, could have been so-called because he was from Candia, meaning either the island of Crete and/or the city of Iraklion. Both pictures have to do with naval themes, but one [henceforth PI; see PLATE 1] has a specifically Ottoman context. Celebrating an Ottoman grand admiral’s real or imagined fame and achievements, it makes use of a certain geographical setting, which it further populates with some old, but mostly new symbols of power.

The problem stated

Given its subject matter, it is perhaps understandable that PI has become the only one of the two to attract the attention of a few Turkish historians. Two separate publications, eight years apart, have suggested contrasting identifications of the scene that it depicts. In 1983, Tezel and Çalıkoğlu simply cited it as “An Excursion by Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha (1792-1803) in his Official Barge”.³ No further explanations or sources were provided. Then in 1991, a short article in a non-academic journal was devoted to what we think we can demonstrate to be a wholly mistaken interpretation.⁴ The author, Gül İrepoglu, appears to have been unaware of the first, the 1983, entry. Furthermore, neither Tezel and Çalıkoğlu in 1983 nor İrepoglu in 1991 give any sign of having seen the second picture [henceforth PIi; see PLATE 2].

1. Topkapı Palace Library, H. 1958 and H. 1960. Both are of the same dimensions: 45 x 60 cm.
2. See below, note 113.
3. H. TEZEL and M. E. ÇALIKOĞLU, Boğazıçi ve Saltanat Kayıtları, (Istanbul 1983) p. 70. Hayati Tezel appears to have been a naval officer-historian with the rank of colonel at the time this book was published.
In what follows, we are going to be making several interrelated points, mostly by taking off from the first painting [PI]. (a) İrepoğlu’s commentary of 1991 involves a historically inadmissible randomization, indeed trivialization, of the post and title of Kapudan Pasha. (b) Less gravely, Tezel and Çalıkoğlu’s caption of 1983 may leave the reader or viewer with the impression that this was a “real” excursion (gezinti) in a “real” place, though what is involved is an abstract, monumental representation. (c) In PI itself, virtually everything points to a celebration of the comprehensive military and naval reforms of the reign of Selim III, though this need not be to the exclusion of commemorating a single, specific victory. (d) This celebration or commemoration draws heavily upon a new “tradition” of symbolic representation that was in the process of being invented or constructed under Selim III. (e) In assessing the various elements of this new visuality, we should beware of anachronistically demanding from it the uniformity and consistency of a more fully achieved (industrial, 20th century type of) modernity. This can help evade a few false tracks in dating that could, albeit in a minor way, point away from the Seljuk era to a point much later in the 19th century. (f) This general approach is further borne out by the date given for the event depicted in PI, which points, emphatically and unambiguously, to the very end of the 18th or the beginning of the 19th century. (g) As against the İrepoğlu interpretation but in line with the Tezel-Çalıkoğlu entry, the grand admiral in question can hardly be anybody other than Kıcık Hüseyin Pasha. (h) If a specific victory is being commemorated (and put into the service of re-legitimating Selim and his reforms in general), the victory in question can only be the recovery of Egypt from the French in 1801. (i) Here and there, Kıcık Hüseyin is said to have been a Cretan, though this appears to be the outcome of carelessly conflating at least two different Hüseyins into a single person. (j) More probably, the setting may have been intended (at least partially or eclectically) as a visual representation of Crete, in fact of either Rethymnon or Candia (Iraklion). This might have been due to Kıcık Hüseyin’s Mediterranean or Crete-related operations, or because of the symbolic importance that Crete had somehow acquired. Then again, it might have had to do with the artist’s own origins – at least in the sense that when asked, perhaps, to place the grand admiral against some kind of monumental background, it was elements of a familiar terrain that readily came to (and were re-combined in) his mind.

A forest of images

The watercolour in question [PI; see PLATE 1] depicts a bay with a rather bare landscape, dotted with only a few trees and a solitary windmill, stretching into the distance. Against this background, there are three main points to which the spectator’s attention is (not very skillfully) directed. What immediately catches the eye is (1) the citadel to the right, from which our gaze travels downward to (2) the barge lying horizontally across the painting, and pointing like a giant arrow in its right-to-left movement, propelled by twelve pairs of oars, to (3) the stepped-
pedestal-and-column on the left, surrounded by an eclectic superabundance of all kinds of emblems of imperial authority.

Here, indeed, are both the traditional horse-hair plumes (tuğ), and crescent-and-star flags or banners that would have been of much more recent, perhaps even contemporary origin. With its crescent and five-point star, the larger flag to the left actually comes very close to the present flag of the Republic of Turkey. The smaller flag to the right carries a more traditional multi-rayed star with three visible (but actually, probably four, one being hidden) crescents facing outward from it. At the foot of the column is an astonishing lion that looks as if it might have jumped straight out of Venetian (or, if one wants to look for more distant examples, even British) heraldry into this painting. It is holding a curved shield decorated with a bifurcated zülfikär sword on the bottom and another crescent-and-star motif at the top. Here the star is five-pointed. Immediately above that, surrounded once more by both ancient and modern forms of cold steel (including halberds, cutlasses and falchions but also three bayonets), is a Sultan’s headgear on which the aigrette, starting from yet another crescent-and-star socket, takes the eye up the pillar to the capital, which also turns out to bear crescents and five-point stars on all sides surmounting its Greek-looking floral reliefs. The shield, the sultanic headgear above it, and the flagpoles, pikes, halberds and other weapons angling away from the shield on both sides are so arranged as to resemble a coat-of-arms. This is crucial. The stern flag on the barge, meanwhile, displays another zülfikär sword; other crescent-and-star motifs are to be found on the flag flying from the mast on top of the citadel’s oversize tower, and the gun barrel extending rightward from the shield to the sea.

From this last point, the eye starts back, this time along the curve of the rocky shoreline, on its way to the citadel, only to be partially halted at the bay’s innermost point by a fourth element that constitutes something of an anomaly. For here are what appear to be siege-works, surrounded by a log-and-earth parapet, with a gun emplacement (complete with gunner and cannonballs) directed at the citadel. In the middle, a neatly dug, log-bolstered shaft going down into the ground hints at a mine, in which case it would be a sapper that seems to be emerging from it. All four figures in this enclosure, including the one in a very Oriental posture to the left, sitting cross-legged smoking a pipe near a tree stump, are dressed in the same blue uniforms suggestive of a modern army. The sentry under the cypress tree, moreover, is standing in a rigidly correct “shoulder arms” position, carrying a musket-and-bayonet combination that is compatible with the three bayonets, already mentioned, visible to the right of the sultanic headgear. If everything is under Ottoman control, why do these soldiers inside the earthworks seem to be laying siege to a fortress that is also flying the Turkish flag? Or just what are they doing? This may not be easy to answer in “realistic” terms. But in any case, below the painting, lettered into the grey border that looks like a frame but is only a painted band, is an inscription which reads, in French: A L’IMMORTELLE GLOIRE DU GRAND HUSSEIN Cen PACHA. Slightly to the left of the lion’s rear paw, written in an impersonal, ornamental kind of hand along the left side of the pedestal, is the word “Candy”.
Too big a leap to the Barbary coast

After the early and unfortunately all-too-brief identification made by Tezel and Çalkoğlu in the context of a publication devoted to state boats and barges, nearly ten years ago this painting [PI] also attracted the attention of the art historian Irepoğlu, who without taking note of the previous caption about “An Excursion by Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha”, construed it as commemorating a victory by Koca Hüseyin Pasha, also known as Izmirli Hüseyin Pasha, who was the last dey of Algiers over 1818-1830. This Hüseyin Pasha, is said to have been born in Denizli (in south-west Anatolia) in 1779, and then to have moved with his brothers to the Maghreb, where he joined the local janissaries and rose through their ranks, being elected dey in 1818.

After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the European Powers intensified their efforts to eliminate piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the British undertook two unsuccessful expeditions against the Barbary States, one of which, led by Admiral Sir Harry Neale in 1824, Koca Hüseyin Pasha is particularly credited with repulsing. Then in 1827, an altercation arose between the dey and the French consul (over a claim by two Algerians for wheat delivered to France under the Directory, payment for which had been outstanding since the late-18th century). There took place a famous incident in which, exasperated at the consul’s rudeness, the dey flicked him with his fly whisk, whereupon the government of Charles X first instituted a blockade and then launched a naval and military expedition that resulted in the French conquest of Algeria in 1830.

Described in Mehmed Süreyya’s Sıtçıl-i Osmani as “a lazy spendthrift” who thereby met his ruin, depending on one’s perspective, Koca Hüseyin can, of course, be made into something of an anti-imperialist resistance hero, making it easier to postulate that the dey might have commissioned the painting to notify Istanbul, in an ambitious self-legitimizing way, of his “victory” of 1824. This overall contexting has also called for the edifice on the right (described as a lighthouse), to be identified as one of the fortresses guarding the port of Algiers (such as the Bab-il Vad or the Sahat-ı-şiheda); we are told that it consists of “walls built by the Ottomans on the same location as a former Spanish bastion, surrounding the lighthouse”.

From great to “Koca”? From glory to victory?

The faults in this argument are all too obvious. There is nothing that really points to a link between this picture and any Maghrebian dey, while the author has

5. İrepoğlu, op. cit., p. 32.
8. İrepoğlu, op. cit., p. 32.
overlooked other clues pointing emphatically in another direction. Thus to begin with, there is the assumption that this sort of painting has to revolve around a specific event. Virtually in the same breath, the French word “gloire” has been taken to mean not fame or glory, or a glorious reputation in a general sense, but more concretely as “victory”. This is how the inscription on the bottom has been translated as KOCA HÜSEYİN PAŞA'IN ÖLÜMSÜZ ZAHERI İÇİN (meaning: “for the immortal victory of Koca Hüseyin Pasha”). This is also why and how the author has chosen as her title “A Painting Symbolizing a Victory”.

But there is another and more important way in which unfamiliarity with French idiom (as with Western usage in general) has led to an erroneous interpretation: “le grand Hussein Pacha” has all too easily become Koca Hüseyin Pasha. The adjective “grand”, in other words, has been taken as the dey’s nickname, overlooking two things: such Ottoman nicknames were generally regarded as part of the proper name itself, and were therefore not translated into European languages; and even if they were, “Koca” might more plausibly have been rendered as vieux (le Vieux) or perhaps even gros (le Gros), though not as grand, which is likely to have been used here only to indicate greatness in general. The bottom line’s correct translation should therefore be more neutral, limited in scope and implication: TO THE IMMORTAL GLORY OF THE GREAT HUSSEIN Çain PACHA.

**Impermissible to trivialize the Kapudan Pasha**

We cannot, in other words, extract from this epithet any clue that might point us in the direction of this last dey of Algiers, which in any case is ruled out for not only linguistic but also historical reasons: he was never, ever the Ottoman grand admiral, the Kapudan Pasha. As already indicated, the abbreviation in the next-to-last term of the inscription is Cten, i.e. capitaine, so that the last two terms together can be read only and exclusively as Kapudan Pasha. So much is admitted in the 1991 article referred to (despite a typographical error which has caused the Cten to be replaced by just C.). Nevertheless, the implications of this observation are then dismissed by speculating that

Though the dey, Hüseyin Pasha, did not count kapudan among his titles, he must nevertheless have been regarded as fit to carry it on the grounds that his victory was related to the sea.9

This is not very convincing. The post of the grand admiral was not in the nature of a purely honorary title or degree; it could be neither claimed nor conferred in arbitrary fashion. Within the Ottoman military-political configuration, the army command, being directly under the hand of first the sultan and then his chief deputy the grand vizier, was not accorded terminological specificity. In contrast, it was the navy that was regarded as a special branch under its own command structure headed by the Kapudan Pasha – who was, after all, the third major figure in the empire and its second top dignitary. At the same time, like the grand vizier he,

9. İRPOĞLU, loc. cit.
too, was appointed at all times by the sultan, independently of whom he did not have any authority. This was recognized in the course of all Ottoman power struggles: opposing factions might group themselves around rival crown princes; short of a civil war situation, they might maneuver to put their own candidates in office; especially during the 17th and 18th centuries, local dynasts might make themselves indispensable as power-sharers in the provinces – but never ever did a situation arise in which some players, while remaining away from the capital, tried to stake rival claims for themselves to (only) the grand admiral’s or for that matter the grand vizier’s office. There was a very good reason for this: short of overthrowing the sultan himself, such acts of what we might call, to coin a phrase, “partial usurpation of central offices from below” were meaningless in the Ottoman context; they did not have any significance, and therefore were not a practical objective or instrument.

Furthermore, and particularly in the framework of the imperial center’s considerably weakened relations with the Maghreb in the 1820s, it is very difficult to see why the dey should have engaged in this whole exercise vis-à-vis Istanbul, or why Mahmud II of all people – famous for his authoritarianism and for ruthlessly putting down the gentry and notables that had presumed to impose the Sened-i İttişak, the Covenant of Union, on the royal house back in 1808 – should have so generously played along with it. Neither should we make too much of an Algerian incident of 1824; this was so minor as to cause hardly a ripple in the capital, which was trying to cope with far greater menaces, far closer to home, mainly in the form of the Greek revolution. That same year of 1824, in fact, was when the Sfakiot revolt that had been triggered by the mainland uprising of 1821 was finally crushed by Mohammed Ali of Egypt. Meanwhile the Kapudan Pasha’s office was neither vacant nor obsolete. It had ten distinct holders over 1818-30, who succeeded one another in such clearly identifiable fashion as to preclude all thoughts of a transitional confusion.10

But most decisively, it is the painting itself that carefully marks out the post’s real and ritual importance. In a society of ranks and status where all high offices went with a distinctive dress and headgear, a certain number of horse-hair plumes to display, and a particular size of mehter band to play the change of guard outside your tent or mansion, as well as a specific number of rowing seats (oturak) or pairs of oars (çiğte) to your boat – in this kind of society, a ceremonial barge of twelve pairs of oars, as shown here, was distinctively, indisputably, unmistakably

the grand admiral’s privilege. At the same time, this is the sort of ceremonial barge that the grand admiral would have had available only in Istanbul, for cruising along the Golden Horn or the Bosphorus. It is, in other words, a kind of placeless symbol that, by being superimposed on any local scene, underlines the office-holder as more important than wherever he happens to be at a given time. To put it in another way, his momentary geographical location is emphatically linked, purely through his person and his boat (i.e., even without the additional force of all the other flags, plumes and arms), to the imperial capital.

Flags with three crescents, furthermore, were for centuries more emblematic of the navy than of other branches of the Ottoman state. As for the zulfikar type of bifurcated sword, it, too, was strongly associated with Ottoman naval flags and banners in general, including giant ensigns which used to be hung from galleys’

11. Such rules, of course, were far from immutable. Occasionally, they could be changed in particularly drastic, dramatic fashion to suit the ambitions of certain dignitaries, sometimes purely by way of marking a departure from tradition. For example, Hayil Pasha, on his appointment as grand admiral in 1843, is said to have “directed his boots to be painted red, a derogation from ancient customs far from pleasing people, and out of character with the element”; see C. White, Three Years in Constantinople; or, Domestic Manners of the Turks in 1844, v. I. (London 1846) p. 40. White also notes that “the Kapudan Pasha’s water-conveyance consists of an eighteen-oared ship’s cutter, rowed by a picked crew of regular sailors”. Such dispersed innovations are one reason why modern authors with an unchanging, unvarying view of Ottoman usage may, on the basis of a group of documents from a particular era that provide us with relatively consistent examples of period practice, all too easily jump to the conclusion that it “was so” at all times (expressed through the naively exorbitant use of the Turkish simple present ending “-irdi” or “-irdi”, an observation that we owe to Cemal Kafadar). Uzunkarşıli, Bahriye, p. 417, for example, asserts that the ceremonial barges of the grand admirals “had” seven pairs of oars. Then, Tezel and Çalıkçıklı, op. cit., p. 37-44, simply repeat Uzunkarşıli (though evidence to the contrary is present in their own illustrations), while Çelik Gülersoy, limits himself to quoting (only) Charles White; see C. Gülersoy, The Caïque, (Istanbul 1991) p. 80. Such loose statements notwithstanding, sources contemporary with the reign of Selim III and the tenure of Küçük Hüsrev Pasha at the admiralty, such as engravings and travelers’ accounts from the late-18th and early-19th centuries, reveal the grand admiral’s barge to have been fitted with twelve pairs of oars at that time. See, for example, an engraving by L’ Espinasse (depicting a ceremony at the imperial Yahi Köşkti held to see the fleet off to the Mediterranean); M. D’Ohsson, Tableau Général de L’Empire Ottoman, v. III. (Paris 1819-1820) plate 172. In a few other sources, however, the grand admiral’s barge is not clearly identifiable. See, for example, A.-I. Melling, Voyage pittoresque de Constantinople et de rives du Bosphore, (Paris 1819) plate 18. Also see the engraving entitled “Nouvelle Caserne des Bombardiers et des Mineurs”; Mahmut Râif Efendi, Tableau des nouveaux réglemens de L’Empire Ottoman, (Constantinople 1798); republished as: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Yeni Nizamların Cedveli. İngilizce Kralığı nezdindeki Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Savaşları Başıtaibi Mahmut Râif Efendi tarafından tertip edilmişdir, eds A. Terzioğlu and H. Hâtemi, (Istanbul 1988); now also in a very recent, corrected edition: Mahmud Râif Efendi ve Nizâm Cedit’e Dâir Eseri, eds K. Beydilli – I. Şahin, (Ankara 2001).

or galleons’ yards or gaffs, as in a very fine example from the time of Mustafa III (r. 1757-74) that is in the Naval Museum. A bare arm holding a zülfi̇kâr aloft was a common emblem among the Barbary pirates; a zülfi̇kâr motif is prominently displayed on Barbarossa’s ensign, too, as also exhibited in the Naval Museum in Istanbul. As we shall see below, Selim III (r. 1789-1807) is known to have initiated the weaving of old symbols like tughras, crescents and stars into new visual formulae intended to re-define and re-legitimize the sultanate by reference to modernity and the European Great Powers. Zülfi̇kârs, too, were part of an existing repertory that found its way into the new emblems and expressions of dynastic power, and, strikingly, Selim III had incorporated a zülfi̇kâr sword into his own tughra[PLATE 3]. Color schemes may carry another key to following this transition. According to D’Ohsson, for example, who was writing at the end of the 18th century and in the reign of Selim III, kapudâne, patrona and riyale vessels of the imperial fleet carried two flags, one of which was green and the other red. The green flag carried a zülfi̇kâr sword and the red a crescent-and-star in the center. In our picture [PI], the stern flag on the barge is decorated with a zülfi̇kâr sword, which may be both because the grand admiral’s office was strongly associated with the zülfi̇kâr, and because the admiralty flag was required to carry the sultan’s tughra – which in the case of Selim would have displayed a zülfi̇kâr. Moreover, this stern flag has a red ground, and there are no green banners anywhere else in the picture. We have it on Fuad Köprülü’s authority that it was Küçük Hüseyin Pasha who was instrumental in promoting red over green naval flags from 1793 onward, that is to say from his second year as Kapudan Pasha.

A wealth of detail pointing to the Selimian era

Hence the picture is shot through and through with the abstractly monumentalized presence of the Kapudan Pasha, so much so that this figure of “le grand Hussein Çan Pacha” has to be sought among the several Hüseyin Pashas who actually held that office. Furthermore, the relevant time-frame – by which we mean the time-frame of the picture’s visual contents – has to be roughly centered on the turn of the 18th century, that is to say around the year 1800, right there in the middle of the Selimian era.

14. H. Uzunçarşılı, Bahriye, plate XL.
15. Zygułski, op. cit., p. 26, fig. 4.
17. See note 15 above.
18. M. F. Köprülü, IA, s.v. “Bayrak”.
This is attested to, first, by the sultanic headgear in the middle of the cluster of imperial insignia on the left, which is easily identifiable as one so peculiar to that unfortunate Sultan – as shown in two famous 19th century portraits [PLATES 4, 51] – that it has come to be known as selimi kavuk.19 It is further hinted at, second, by the special importance that Selim III appears to have attached to the zulfikar sword. But it is much more substantively demonstrated, third, by the soldiers in what we have described as the siege-works at the top of the bay [PLATE 1]. With their standard blue uniforms, with their muskets and bayonets of the type used in the Napoleonic Wars, and through the standing sentry’s formally correct “shoulder arms” position that belongs with Western-style drills and drillbooks, these point to Selim’s famous army reforms, starting with the creation of the first Nizam-i Cedid regiment in 1793 and the second in 1799.20 Mahmud Raif Efendi’s Tableau des nouveaux régemens de L’Empire Ottoman, published in 1798 (and again in 1802) with the aim of introducing the Nizam-i Cedid to the European public, includes engravings of various exercises and positions, as well as descriptions of some of the new uniforms.21 Now in this same context we also know that while initially both regiments wore red tops and blue bottoms, as shown in the picture of a first-ever parade in front of the Sultan [PLATE 6],22 in time it was decided to clothe the first entirely in red and the second entirely in blue, so that they also came to be known as the Red and the Blue Regiments.23 Furthermore, while the Reds were always kept in Istanbul, the Blues were to a large extent recruited from Anatolia and sent back there after they had completed their training to constitute provincial militia units [PLATE 7].24


21. See note 11 above. The first modern Turkish edition by TERZİOĞLU and HATEMI abounded in technical and translation mistakes; these have been corrected in the new BEYDILI and ŞAHIN edition. The Tableau includes 26 engravings comprising drawings of artillery pieces, warships and fortification systems, as well as views of the cannon foundry, the old and new powder works, and the naval dockyards. In the same vein, also see Diatribe de l’ingénieur Séid Moustapha, sur L’état actuel de l’art militaire, du génie et des sciences, à Constantinople. Imprimée dans la nouvelle typographie de Scutari fondée par le Sultan Sëlim III, 1803. Publié littéralement d’après l’édition originale, avec quelques notes qui ont paru nécessaires pour l’intelligence de L’ouvrage, par L. LANGLÉS, (Paris 1807). Republished in Turkish as: Sütluçe Matematik Okulu Öğretim Üyesi Mühendis Seyyid Mustafa, Istanbul’da Askerlik Sanatı, Yeteneklerin ve Bilimlerin Durumu Üzerine Rısaı, (Istanbul 1986).


23. AKŞIN, op. cit., p. 76; ÇATALTEPE, op. cit., p. 124.

24. AKŞIN, op. cit., p. 76-77. For some artistic representations of the uniforms concerned, see D. NICOLLE and A. McBRIE, Armies of the Ottoman Empire 1775-1820,
On the whole, the men in blue at the center of our picture, and the type of musket with fixed bayonet prominently featured look very much like the arms and uniforms that were typical of the Nizam-i Cedid regiments. Curiously, too, the red and blue of the new regiments seems to be echoed on that curved shield to the left that also brings the crescent-and-star together with the zülfikär sword. Let us also address a question of posting. It would have been utterly implausible to depict any of these Nizam-i Cedid men as serving in the Maghreb. In most other settings, their insertion could have served to convey how Selim’s reforms were (supposedly) taking root throughout the empire. And of course, they actually fought in Syria and Egypt—in defending Gaza under Cezzar Ahmed Pasha; again in defending Acre under Cezzar Ahmed Pasha and Sir Sidney Smith, the British admiral; in the joint British-Ottoman offensive to expel the French from Egypt, including a leading role in the capture of Rashid (Rosetta).25

_Banners, coats-of-arms, and the forging of a “Western” imperial identity_

Also of crucial importance among all the evidence leading to a Selimian time-frame, there is the matter of flags and banners, and of the closely related Ottoman coat-of-arms. The Ottoman establishment’s late-18th century turn to modernization from above entailed attempts to emulate Europe not only vis-à-vis the material instruments but also the rites of power. Sultans thereby began to engage in comprehensive exercises of inventing tradition in order to re-define themselves as Western(ized) monarchs and gain admission into the ranks of European royalty.26 And as already noted, it was Selim III who sanctioned experiments with the first embryonic forms of an Ottoman coat-of-arms,27 as well as with standardizing Ottoman flags and banners.28

With regard to the first, the coat-of-arms dimension, it is fascinating to pursue the extent to which the experiments in question coincided with efforts to import the European army.29 At around this time, three books were translated and

(Osprey Military, Men-at-Arms Series 1998) Plate D. Here, those in red and dark blue would be men and officers of the 1st regiment as originally constituted, while the one in blue at the back corresponds to the first, mostly blue version of the 2nd regiment’s uniform. The fourth figure in blue is mistakenly dated by David Nicolle to around 1795, when the second regiment did not yet exist.

25. NICOLLE and MACBRIDE, _op. cit._, p. 38.
27. ÖZDEMİR, _op. cit._, p. 76.
28. ÖZDEMİR, _op. cit._, p. 76-77ff. For early, confused and unsystematic accounts of the history of Turkish flags and banners, see Dr. R. NUR, L’Histoire du Croissant, _Revue de Turcologie_, 3 (1933) 232-410; F. KÜRTOĞLU, _Türk Bayrağı ve Ayıllıdız_, (Ankara 1938). Their scholarly defects notwithstanding, both are rich in terms of visual materials. For a subsequent and more comprehensive treatment, see M. F. KOPRÜÇE, _IA_, s.v. “Bayrak”. For a brief and derivative summary, also see “Bayrak”, _AnaBritannica_, v. III, p. 478-479.
29. See D. B. RALSTON, _Importing the European Army_, (Chicago 1990).
Pl. 4: Portrait of Selim III with a selimi kavuk.
THE NIZAM-ı CEDIT, NEW ARMY
1. Koljahan of the 1st Orta of Nizam-ı Cedid Infantry, c.1906
2. Milisbin Lieutenant of Nizam-ı Cedid Infantry, c.1908
3. Nizam-ı Cedid Neferi, c.1800
4. Neferi of the Nizam-ı Cedid 2nd Orta provincial militia, c.1795

Pl. 8: Plan de Foarteresse à cinq Bastions. From: Mâhmeud Reyf Ežendi, Tableau des nouveaux réglements de l'Empire Ottoman, Constantinople 1798 republished as: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yeni Nizamatara Çeledi, eds A. Terzioglu and H. Haemi, (Istanbul 1988) pl. XVI.

Pl. 15: Plans and drawings of the *trace italienne* type of fortification.
Pl. 14: Tanzimat Medallion.
From: K. Özdemir, Osmanlı Armastı, (İstanbul 1997) p. 87.

FIG. 1.—DIAGRAM OF A TYPICAL CROSS SECTION OF A FORT

Pl. 16: The bastion, moat and glacis type of fortification in cross-section.

published, clearly intended to be used in training the *Nizam-i Cedid* regiments. The first of these was by Bélidor, which appeared in 1793 as *Fenn-i Harp* (the Science of War). The second and third were by Louis IV’s famous military engineer Marshal Sébastien de Vauban. They, too, appeared in 1793 and 1794, as *Fenn-i Lağım* (the Science of Sapping) and *Fenn-i Muhasara* (the Science of Siege). All three volumes contained frontispieces or other plates devoted to primitive designs for an Ottoman coat-of-arms that did not yet exist. Copies of all three have been kept in the Topkapi Palace library, leading one author to suggest that Selim III might have inspected them in person prior to publication. It was Vauban who developed the “approach by parallel lines” system for attacking “star fortresses” with *trace italienne* perimeters – such as the lower level of the citadel in our picture [PLATE 1; also see PLATES 8, 9, 15, 16]. Vauban’s technique involved surrounding a strongpoint with ever-narrowing rings of approach trenches in smaller and smaller concentric circles [PLATE 9]. Its first use was in the siege of Maastricht in 1673, where Vauban completed the capture in only thirteen days after the first trenches began to be dug. This, incidentally, was just four years after the fall of Candia to the Ottomans. The parapets of these trenches, as well as the saps leading down and away from them toward weak points in the defensive walls, would have looked much like what we have termed the siege works at the center of our picture. These visual elements, in fact, including both the lower level of the fortress and the siege works, could very well have been “lifted” from these Bélidor and Vauban translations, as indeed from any other contemporary military treatise, including Mahmud Raif’s compendium [PLATE 8]; in all likelihood, they would also have fallen within the scope of the artist’s own, direct visual – and professional – experience.

Let us go back to imperial emblems, including coats-of-arms together with flags and banners. Modernization comprises all kinds of standardization processes. Weights and measures are universally defined; as fighters or warriors are made into soldiers, their motley attire is replaced by uniforms; specifications are introduced for tools, guns, ammunition, and flags and banners. But this does not happen everywhere and all at once, and particularly late (or delayed) modernization processes preclude instantaneous homogenization, virtually by definition. The state center may decide on something and implement it throughout its own machinery; this need not be translated immediately into universal practice at all levels, from the metropolitan down to the provincial and local. In western Europe, too, army modernization may be demonstrated to have proceeded ahead of the rest.

30. For the manuscript translated by Konstantin Ipsilanti, see Topkapı Palace Museum Library H. 615. Also see T. Küt and F. Türe, eds *Yazmadan Basmaya: Mütteferrika, Mühendishane, Üsküdar*, (İstanbul 1996) p. 79-80.
31. See, respectively, Topkapı Palace Museum Library H. 616 and H. 614. Both were translated by Konstantin Ipsilanti, while the drawings were made by two Armenian artists, Kapril and İstefan. Also see Küt and Türe, *op. cit.*, p. 81-87.
32. ÖZDEMIR, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
of society, and the gap between the two only grows bigger as one keeps moving east through successive semi-peripheries, peripheries and sub-peripheries of historical backwardness. Hence, although we can identify major thresholds at least in terms of reforms promulgated from above, in between these demarcation lines there also arise situations of de facto multi-culturalism, of a plurality of experimental, mixed or overlapping usages.

All this is amply demonstrated by the course of Ottoman modernization from the 1780s onwards. To repeat: when it comes to flags and banners, again it is Selim III who is credited with promoting the comprehensive use of the crescent-and-star motif over a red ground so as to replace a previous heterogeneity of patterns. This is not to say that it comes out of nowhere. We know that the crescent-and-star was already in use in the last years of Mustafa III and under Abdülhamid I. But fundamentally, it is during and after Selim’s reign that this centrally placed crescent-and-star motif becomes really dominant (from which, in many coats-of-arms applications, rays also begin to radiate upward; it is as if a crescent-and-star socket, of the sort that we see on the headgear in our picture, were surmounted by a wider aigrette not rising straight up but spreading its fan up and outward). Then, like so many others, Selim’s flag reforms, too, are said to have been taken further by Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839). It is accepted that at this stage, a crescent-and-eight-pointed-star design was officially adopted as the Ottoman state flag, where the eight-pointed star was derived from an ancient Solomon’s Seal (Mihr-i Süleyman) motif [PLATES 10, 11]. In a further step, the eight-pointed star of Selimian flags and emblems is held to have been replaced by a five-pointed star in the Mecidian era (1839-1861).

Surely there is nothing wrong with this as a basic account. The extent to which Selim is identified (and identified himself) with this movement of creating a new symbolism is reflected in that magnificent portrait of his by Konstantin Kapıdağlı [PLATE 5], showing another tughra of his now with a crescent-and-eight-pointed-star motif, surmounted by a coat-of-arms that is so Westernized as to actually incorporate a crown, though it was never used by the Ottomans. What is important is that the crown is situated centrally – just like the selim kavuk in our picture. The same crown and the crescent with an eight-pointed star is on the frontispiece of Seyyid Mustafa’s Sur l’état actuel de l’art militaire, and the crown as well as a slightly modified version of the same coat-of-arms are also there in two versions of Selim’s Imperial Seal (mihr-i hümayun) [PLATES 12, 13]. On one, the

33. This, indeed, is one of the implications of the “military revolution” literature, stated quite clearly in G. PARKER, The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, (Cambridge 1988). How late and how tortuously modernity percolated from the center down to local and rural levels may be gleaned, for example, from EUGEN WEBER, Peasants into Frenchmen, (Stanford 1976).

34. ÖZDEMİR, op. cit., p. 79.

35. KÖPRÜLO, IA, s.v. “Bayrak”.

36. RENDA, op. cit., p. 467.

crown does not taper down to a narrower neck, and the crescent faces a six-point star. On the other, the crown has a marked neck, and the star is five-pointed. And yet, both carry the date H. 1203 = 1798-9. Now if we move forward by half a century, the Tanzimat Medallion that was struck in 1850 [PLATE 14] has a shield on one side surmounted by a helmet (i.e. another type of headgear), with the shield and helmet standing in precisely the same relation to one another as the shield and kavuk in our picture. This Tanzimat Medallion is generally regarded as directly prefiguring the final definition of the Ottoman coat-of-arms in the Hamidian era. Rather predictably, cannon, too, feature strongly in all transitional coats-of-arms that constitute so many links in this whole chain of evolution from Selim III to Abdülhamid II. All this turns out to be in rather close conformity with the visual, symbolic, heraldic world of our picture.

What does not exactly fit is the matter of eight-pointed (or other multi-rayed) stars versus those with just five points. That is to say, it does not exactly fit if one takes the above account (including some quite categorical statements in encyclopaedia entries for the general public) to mean that (a) only eight-rayed stars must have existed under Selim and Mahmud, and that (b) we should be seeing only five-pointed stars from Abdulmecid onwards. One can create a lot of unnecessary problems for oneself by first accepting this kind of rigidity and then trying to get out of it. But of course, it goes against the grain of everything we have been saying – as well as against a lot of the empirical evidence. Yes, in a lot of the visual documentation from the Selimian era, including the examples mentioned above, the stars have more than five points. Thus the medallion struck in 1801 to commemorate victory in Egypt (on which, more below) has an eight-point star; Konstantin Kapıdağlı's 1803 portrait of Selim III displays a seven-point star; Seyyid Mustafa's Diāribe, published in 1803, has an eight-point star. Note, though, that this does not exactly add up to a uniformity of eight-point practice. The Sultan himself does not seem to have demanded such uniformity. At one point, artillery reforms appear to have required casting lighter field-pieces in order to bring Ottoman batteries up to the level of Austrian, British and French movements and rates of fire. In an undated note to his grand vizier, Selim III asked for gun barrels and carriages to be all of the same type, colour and polish; he also ordered the barrels to be decorated not just with his tughra but also with a crescent-and-star motif. (Hence the gun barrel in our PI is now revealed to be of directly Selimian origin.) The Sultan did not, however, indicate just what sort of star it should be; all he said was: "...let the shape of a crescent together with a star be depicted". It is

38. ÖZDEMIR, op. cit., p. 79.
39. KURTÇOĞLU, op. cit., p. 99, fig. 68.
40. ÖZDEMIR, op. cit., p. 87. The medallion is from the YKB Vedat Nedim Tör Museum Collections.
41. ÖZDEMIR, op. cit., p. 86.
42. ÖZDEMIR, op. cit., p. 79: "Benim vezirim, takdir mucibince Fransakari mistüllü isaga oluna [döküntüle] ve überlerine tugradaan mauda ağzına karip mahalle hitel şekli ile bir yıldız resmoluna. Arabaları dahi mukaddem verdiğiımız nizam gibi resimli ve renge gayet
this kind of under-specified mental space that must have allowed for a five-point as well as a six-point star on two versions of the Imperial Seal of 1798-1799, while in Mahmud Raif's *Tableau* of 1798, a seventy-gun ship-of-the-line also flies a banner with an unambiguously five-pointed star (and other plates that are not so clearly discernible nevertheless keep hinting at a similar usage). At the same time, another book by Mahmud Raif, *Icaleti‘l Coğrafiye*, a translation of the *Atlas Mineur (Cedid Atlas tercemesesi)* that was published in 1803, has numerous six-pointed stars on its cover. If the sultan could call for just any old star, and if the same author (or at least his illustrators and type-setters) could also see a star as a star regardless of how many points it had, perhaps we should only infer that their mental modernization had yet to arrive at the (Republican Flag Law) stage of specifying precise dimensions for their stars, rectangles or intersecting circles.

**Exploring the Spanish connection**

We should not, in other words, make too much of the fact that there are more five-pointed than multi-rayed stars in our picture. There is an enormous amount here that has to do with the Selimian era. Most fundamentally, we are faced with a panoply of signs and symbols that, far from having been chosen at random, seem to cover three or four main areas: military reforms; the grand admiral; attempts at building a new imperial identity; and staking out a strong claim to the place in question on behalf of this invented imperium.

And on top of all that, there is also the matter of the second picture [PII; PLATE 2], which previous investigators would seem to have overlooked. Filed in a large-size Topkapı Palace Library album which also includes numerous engravings of Versailles and various other European cities, scenes of European daily life, some portraits, and, most interestingly, two dozen lithographs showing Western (possibly German?) soldiers, it is obviously by the same crude hand, which alone would be enough to identify it, were it not for the additional fact that in its lower right-hand corner, too, one can read the same “Candy”. Hence, this word is now easily identifiable as the name of the artist and not the place in the first picture. (Or at least, not just the place, for as we noted at the outset, in these land-rooted, locally engrained centuries, personal names can be and frequently are derived from place-names).

intizamlı olsun ve ohra ile boyansın ve toplarn eğesi gayet ince olup cilalanı altın gibi parlasın”.

43. MAHMUD RAYF EFENDI, op. cit., plate XXI (Vaisseau de ligne de 70, construit à Metelin par le Capitaine Ahmet. Pics. 59 et demi) has a five-pointed star on the flag hanging from the transverse mizzen yard; the ships on plates XIX, XX, XXII and XXIII have similar crescents but the stars are not visible (being caught in the folds of the flag etc). These ships will be discussed further below.

44. KUT and TÜRE, op. cit., p. 113.

45. All twenty folios from H. 1994 to H. 2013 are signed: Lithogr. und zu haben bey Jos. Trenisensky in Wien. The existence of more such folios in other folders cannot be precluded.
“Candy” cannot, however, be conflated with the place in the second picture. For in this case, the name of that place is clearly and explicitly mentioned. So is the date for the event portrayed. Around this second picture, too, there is the same grey border that looks like a frame but is only a painted band, and along its base, in precisely the same location as the A L’IMMORTELLE GLOIRE DU GRAND HUSSEIN CÔME PACHA inscription in the first picture, there is another inscription which reads, again in French: VUE DE LA BAYE DE MACRIA LE, 5.9r. 1800. Á 7.11h. DU3ore. This is precisely translatable as: VIEW OF MACRIA BAY ON 5 SEPTEMBER [or NOVEMBER; see below] 1800, AT SEVEN O’CLOCK IN THE EVENING. At the top of the frame, however, there is another line in the Ottoman script which says something more than that: PICTURE SHOWING HOW, AT SEVEN O’CLOCK ON THE FIFTH DAY OF NOVEMBER 1800, AT THE ENTRANCE TO A HARBOR BY THE NAME OF MAGRIYA, A HUGE STORM BLEW UP AND THE SPANISH FLEET WAS STRUCK BY LIGHTNING (Bin sekiz yüz senesi tegrinisanin beşinci günü saat yedi Magriya nam liman pişgâhında azim fırtına olup İspanya donanmasına saika isabet eylediği resmidir). This, now, adds the further clarification that “9re” in the French text should be read not as September but as November, from novem in Latin and more veneto in the original sense.

This is interesting in a number of ways. Most immediately, it reveals the artist to have presented this PII picture (along with others, too, including PI ?) to some member(s) of the Ottoman elite, and then to have been interrogated as to its contents, so that the additional information he then provided came to be noted on the upper margin – perhaps prior to being passed further up the chain of authority. This was both an event and a place that the Ottomans were not readily familiar with (as intimated among other things by that turn of phrase about Magriya nam liman: “a harbour by the name of Magriya”), and just what was happening might not have been that obvious to household aghas or even the top dignitary for whom it was intended. Even today, it is not easy to locate Macria or Magriya.46 In the course of the French Revolutionary Wars, Spain had come to be forcibly allied to France from 1795 onwards – an alliance which was made progressively more binding in 1796 (through the first Treaty of San Ildefonso), in 1799 (when Napoleon rose to power), and in 1800 (with the second Treaty of San Ildefonso). The Spanish fleet in particular had come to be completely subordinated to the French naval command, to the point where they would be jointly destroyed off Cape Trafalgar by Nelson on 21 October 1805. Long before that, of course, the

46. In Heilprin’s geographical dictionary, there are two entries for Makri. They give:
“(1) A seaport of Asia Minor, in the vilayet of Smyrna and on the Gulf of Makri, 52 miles ENE of Rhodes. It has a good and well-sheltered port. Here are the remains of the ancient Telmessus. (2) A small seaport of Turkey, in Rumelia, on the Aegean Sea, 75 miles SW of Adrianople”. See A. HEILPRIN and L. HEILPRIN (eds), A Complete Pronouncing Gazetteer or Geographical Dictionary of the World, (Philadelphia and London 1935 [1905]) p. 1099. In Cohen’s dictionary we have the same references; see S. B. COHEN (ed.), The Columbia Gazetteer of the World, (New York 1998) v. II, (H to O) p. 1848, and v. I, (A to H) p. 997. We are grateful to our friend Andras Riedmayer of the Fogg Art Museum and Library at Harvard for helping us consult these dictionaries.
British were already maintaining a tight blockade all along the Atlantic coastline. This kept the French and Spanish squadrons holed up (and therefore out of sailing and fighting practice) in a few fortified harbors. Throughout 1800, for example, the majority of Spanish warships were in Brest (in France) and did not even attempt to break out. A few others were in El Ferrol, close to La Coruna on Spain’s north-west corner; several others were stationed much further to the south in Cadiz, as well as in the Mediterranean (in Cartagena and Mallorca). But a violent storm even in early November would still be most probable in more northerly latitudes on the Atlantic, i.e. to Brest or Ferrol.

It turns out that the fjord-like inlets around Ferrol are called “ria”, and the biggest among them was (is) Ria de El Ferrol, literally “Ferrol bay”, on a north shore headland on which the city was (is) located. Though the city is not shown in our second picture, this is nevertheless most likely to be the caption’s Macria or Great(er) Ria, reminiscent of the Ottoman-Turkish practice of calling the biggest inlet around a given headland or settlement Büyük Liman (as in the case of Çeşme or the Bosporus) or Büyük Deniz (as in Foça). According to histories of the Spanish navy, there were six ships in Ferrol in 1800, while in the following year only five were counted. Could the one missing ship have been lost to lightning? The British attacked and tried to enter the bay of Ferrol on 25 August 1800, but withdrew without a major fight. Later in Fall 1800, the British tested Cadiz, too, but because of an epidemic in the city, had to retreat again on 4 October. After that, there seems to have been no other naval action or incident for the remaining three months of the year. Meanwhile, official records of Spanish fleet losses indicate only one ship sunk in 1800, and that was on 7 November off Ecuador. It is possible, of course, that the stricken ship in Pill did not sink but was only damaged; less probably, it could be that its loss did not enter into the Spanish navy’s records.

**Following Candy to Istanbul**

But so, if Macria is Ferrol, the next three questions become: Who is the artist who would have observed or otherwise known of this incident, this striking natural catastrophe? What would he be doing in Istanbul? And how might such a presentation have arisen? In her commentary of 1991, Irepoglu has rightly taken note of PI’s various technical defects (including a faulty use of perspective, and a combination of various vantage points that is reminiscent of Ottoman miniatures); from this, and without seeing PI, she has inferred that the artist behind the work was probably a “native” who, moreover, was not trained in Europe but had only

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47. We are grateful to our friend Alber Sabanoğlu who consulted several sources in Spanish for this account. See especially C. Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*, v. VII, Museo de la Marina, (Madrid 1973) p. 199-213. For the record of ships anchored at Ferrol in 1800-1801, see p. 214, and for the records of ships that sank in those years, see the Appendix, p. 469.
acquired an outsider’s superficial understanding of Western art. 

But of course, given the presence of PII, there is another possibility that promptly suggests itself, which is that Candy might have been a European who was not really an artist; instead, he could have been just a sailor, a naval officer, engineer or technician who had somehow made his way to Istanbul. In this case, too, his name would not appear in dictionaries of artists of at least a certain degree of accomplishment or renown. But he still could have been, for example, a Frenchman (or a French-speaking Spaniard, Cretan Greek or Venetian, or indeed any other French speaker), who, disenchanted by the Revolution and/or by Napoleon, had decided to offer his services to the leaders of Ottoman military reform. There were, incidentally, several such experts in Istanbul at this time; Ali İhsan Gencer relies on Iorga for some, and himself adds the names of several others – French, Swedish and Venetian engineers, shipwrights, master craftsmen. Candy, too, might have been part of this crowd, and might have submitted his rather crude watercolours to his superiors either as he first sought employment, or at a slightly later point, by way of trying to get further into the good graces of, for example, the Kapudan Pasha. Probably seizing on some current excitement to try to make an impression, he might have picked on a recent and certainly quite sensational incident as a worthy companion piece [PII] for his main offering, i.e., PI, his personal eulogy for LE GRAND HUSSEIN ÇEM PACHA.

It is tempting to embark upon an imaginary reconstruction of the artist’s journey from the north-west corner of Spain to the shores of the Bosphorus. Lightning striking virtually anything, let alone something as grand in itself as a man-of-war, was and is a “marvel of nature”, something to fascinate direct and secondary viewers in all ages. Our Candy could easily have witnessed this storm as a traveling mariner, a mercenary on board this or that passing ship, or perhaps the patrolling British navy. A stronger possibility, intimated by his use of the term Macria and not Ferrol (if indeed Macria is Ferrol), is that he was a local, a Spaniard or a Cretan in Spanish employ (or maybe a prisoner of war) who then left (fled?) the place (in the confusion created by this very event?), eventually making his way to the Ottoman capital. If he had a regular and dry passage (if, for example, he was not picked up from the sea after jumping off the stricken, perhaps burning galleon), he would be likely to have at least a sketch of what he had witnessed in his portfolio. In an age without photography, virtually all artists sketched as rapidly as they could to capture

48. İREPÖGLU, op. cit., p. 34.
50. These are: Laffitte, St Remy, Monnier and Toussaint, Kauffer, Leray and Le Brun; see A. I. GENCER, Bahriyede Yapılan İstahat Hareketleri ve Bahriye Nezareti'nin Kuruluşu (1789-1867), (Istanbul 1985) p. 50.
51. These are, in Gencer’s spelling: Le Brun, Benoit, Yakom (all French); Klenberg, Lokrinini, Rhode, Kalgren, Velson, Ligren, Linmark (all Swedish); and Yuzup (Venice). See GENCER, op.cit., p. 49.
fleeting images, and then worked from sketches in the studio. Furthermore, while a genuine, fully trained professional would have ultimately worked with oils, our man used water-colours, and used them in a way which prompts one to think that he was merely imparting colour to his sketch — that, in other words, he was even more sketch-dependent than usual. This is precisely what one would expect of a technician or draughtsman — and which would hold good even if he had fled or escaped without a sketch, and then had had to reproduce the scene from memory. In this case, of course, the storm over Macria picture would involve not just a public but also a private message, though there is no telling it from its inscription.

One thing is impossible, though; there is no way he could have done PI, i.e., the Hüseyin Pasha picture anywhere else, that is to say anywhere other than Istanbul. PI is not the kind of thing that you sketch beforehand in Ferrol or while sailing somewhere in the Mediterranean; he would have had to be part of the habitus of the Ottoman capital to have the motivation for it and the cultural elements with which to do it. But also, the two pictures must have been done virtually simultaneously, or one right after the other, as part of the same presentation package — how else could they come to have virtually the same dimensions, the same grey frame-like border, the same type of lettering at the base? This could not have been earlier than the last quarter of the year 1800; it is more likely to have been 1801, or maybe 1802 at the latest.

Reformer, suppressor of piracy, "liberator" of Egypt

This is precisely when there would have been most reason to celebrate the fame of Selim III’s grand admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. Earlier, we have cited a host of reasons as to why the search has to be narrowed down to (i) the reign of Selim III, and (ii) some real occupant(s) of the Kapudan Pasha’s office. Without reiterating any of that, let us take another tack and simply note that given the name of Hüseyin Kapudan Pasha, there are not an infinite number of alternatives. On the contrary: from the 17th to the 19th centuries we are faced with only four possible candidates, three of whom could boast of a claim to historical greatness, three (though not the same three) had some connection with this island of Crete where we have had this conference, while two actually served under the Nizam-i Cedit sultan.

The earliest is the most heroic figure of all, with perhaps a better claim to "immortal glory", and Cretan glory, too, than the rest: Deli Hüseyin Pasha, so called both because of his courage and his frequent improprieties, who played a very prominent role in the Ottomans’ Cretan expedition over 1646-56 before his recall, and eventual arrest, execution and burial at Yedikule in January 1659, apparently as the result of a scheme hatched by his arch-enemy, the old grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha. Deli Hüseyin was grand admiral on three different occasions: (i) from 30 June 1634 to 21 October 1635; (ii) from 22 February to 9 September 1640; and finally (iii) from 14 July to 4 December 1658.52 We think we can agree

52. See I. PARMAKSIZOĞLU, IA, s.v. "Hüseyin Pasha (Deli ?)"; ÖZTUNA, op. cit., p. 994. Mehmed Süreyya gives somewhat differing dates for Hüseyin Pasha’s first two terms in office: (i) from June to August 1632, and (ii) over 1640-41; see SO, v. III, p. 720.
that this is much too early. Ditto for Mezzomorto Hacı Hüseyin Pasha, who earned his first and famous nickname by once being left for dead, and then recovering; Kapudan Pasha first from (i) 4 January to 8 February 1690, and then (ii) from 11 May 1695 to 21 July 1701, he too came along a century before Selim III (as well as the Macria storm of November 1800).\(^{53}\) And if we are thinking of retrospective legitimation, his genius notwithstanding, he would have been too much a part of that desperate crisis after Kahlenberg to be usefully rehabilitated as a heroic symbol in or on the threshold of the Tanzimat era.

In contrast, much more likely candidates, on these and other counts, are two later grand admirals who followed one another in the post in the last decade of the 18th century. One of them was actually of Cretan origin, but rather insignificant: Giritli Hüseyin Pasha, who commanded the navy from 24 April 1789 to 10 March 1792, though without really doing anything to earn “great”ness, let alone “immortal glory”.\(^{54}\) And eventually, he seems to have been removed from office – still a good eight years before the Macria storm-and-lightning of PII – on the grounds that as a traditional navy man, he was too conservative for the reforms that Selim III wanted to initiate.

That leaves only his successor Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, who proved more than equal to the task. There is a legend to the effect that he was Selim III’s foster-brother (on the grounds that they were breast-fed by the same nanny).\(^{55}\) This is discounted by most authorities, who trace his rise from entering the palace in the service of the Prince Mehmed (Selim’s brother), through serving in the Privy Chamber and the treasury department, to becoming chamberlain (mabeyinci) and then head valet (baş cukadar) after Selim III’s accession to the throne.\(^{56}\) As Hüseyin Agha, he is said to have attracted the sultan’s attention during discussions about the impending Nizam-ı Cedid reforms (with Sébastiani, the French ambassa-
dor, as well as Ishak Pasha). Emerging as one of Selim’s most trusted men, on 10 March 1792 he was promoted to vizieral rank and designated to take over the

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\(^{54}\) Thus there is no entry to his name in the Turkish Islam Ansiklopedisi. See: ÖZTUNA, op. cit., p. 995; SO, v. III, p. 715.

\(^{55}\) M. AKTEPE, EI\(^{3}\), s.v. “Husayn Pasha (Küçük Hüseyin Pasha)”, cites the Harita-ı Kapudanı-ı derya as the original source for this tradition, which he proceeds to discount. In contrast, ÖZTUNA, op. cit., p. 997, footnote (**), as well as GENCER, op. cit., p. 32, provide two examples of accepting the “süt kardeşliği” story at face value.

\(^{56}\) In addition to AKTEPE, op. cit., also see J. H. MORDTMANN, IA , s.v. “Hüseyin Paşa (Küçük)”; N. GOYUNG Kapudan-ı Derya Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, TD, 2 (1952) 35-50; ÖZTUNA, op. cit., p. 995; SO, v. III, p. 724. He is said to have been introduced to the court at a very early age (probably around 1767-1768) by Silahdar Ibrahim Pasha, and to have been assigned to Prince Mehmed’s (or in some versions, Mustafa’s, i.e., the future Mustafa III’s) service when he was nine or ten. The chronicler Câbi is emphatic on Hüseyin being a favourite of Selim III; see M. A. BEYHAN, Câbi Ömer Efendi. Câbi Tarihî. (Tarih-ı Sultan Selim-ı Sâîs ve Mahmûd-ı Sâîs), unpub. Ph. D. dissertation, Istanbul Üniversitesi, (Istanbul 1992) p. 223.
admiralty from Giridli Hüseyin Pasha. As was the custom, virtually simultaneously he became a royal damad, being married on 29 May to Abdüllahmid I’s daughter (and Selim’s sister) Esma Sultan.  

As kapudan-ı derya, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha’s claim to fame rests on three grounds. Most fundamentally, in his eleven years in office, he is said to have immersed himself in fitting, training and reorganizing the Ottoman galleons into an efficient fighting force. The Ottoman navy had seen no action from 1717 until 1770, when it was surprised, burned and destroyed by the Russians at the battle of Çeşme. Under Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha, it had begun to stir back to life, but only in piecemeal, haphazard fashion. The Ottomans were far from adapting to the latest level of ship-building and especially ship-handling (sailing and fighting) techniques. Thus it was that more than two decades after Çeşme,

Selim III entrusted his baş çukadar Küçük Hüseyin Pasha with imposing order on the navy [writes Enver Ziya Karal]. Hüseyin Pasha issued a code for regulating maritime affairs. Ship captains were subjected to examinations, and those found incompetent were dismissed. As for naval ratings, procedures were adopted for reviewing them at recruitment, and then subjecting them to proper training. Engineers were brought in from France and Sweden. Fifteen dockyards that were totally or partially decrepit were reactivated, and used to build forty-five vessels that were then staffed by 20,495 officers and men. In short, as the Selimian era was drawing to a close the Turkish navy had come to comprise twenty-seven ships of the line together with twenty-seven frigates. General Sébastiani rated this fleet as one of the best in Europe.

In a more extended summary of Küçük Hüseyin’s reforms, Gencer confirms the construction of forty-five ships over 1789-1796. Needless to say, these are no longer galleys but much bigger and enormously more expensive galleons. Technically accurate drawings for some of them may be found in Mahmud Rai’s Tableau of 1798. In the Règlement pour l’Amirauté (Bahriye Nizamnâmesi), of which Mahmud Rai雅 provides a full French translation, an early paragraph complains of an old technology in naval architecture that was resulting in ships being built too broad in the beam relative to their length, which then had an adverse

57. The match was arranged on 16 receb 1206 (= 10 March 1792), and the marriage took place on 7 şevval 1206 (= 29 May 1792). See S. Arıkan, III. Selim’in Sırkâti: Ahmed Efendi Tarafından Tutulan Râznâme, (Ankara 1993) p. 63, 75. For a letter by Selim III to the grand vizier, where the Sultan informs the grand vizier of the match and rather pointedly expresses his belief that the grand vizier, too, will approve of the arrangement since it is bound to be of benefit to him in keeping his office, see TSMA E. 7014 after M. Ç.Uluçay, Haremiden Mektuplar, (Istanbul 1956) p.120-121; for the conclusion of the marriage, see TSMA D. 230 again after Uluçay.

58. GENCER, op. cit., p. 22.


60. For another and quite detailed account of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha’s achievements, see GENCER, op. cit., p. 29-61.
effect on their maneuverability. In the original, right across from this comment was placed, by way of illustrating the point, a picture of a “ship-of-the-line of ancient construction”. Although it is impossible from this angle to compare the length with the beam, the “ancient construction” qualification sounds right on at least one other count, which is the crucial one of firepower and the throw-weight of a broadside. The ship shown here is a two-decker appearing to carry no more than fifty-six guns, whereas by 1750 in Europe, the smallest ships that were considered fit for the line-of-battle had to have sixty to sixty-four guns. On sub-

61. Here we come up against a telling case of a mistranslation and then a missed correction, which perhaps reveals something about historians’ persisting habits of knowing their documents but not being so familiar with the actual practices that they relate to. On p. 25 of the Terzioglu and Hatemi (1988) edition of Mahmut Raif Efendi’s Tableau, the editor-translators have at this point: “Uzun olmaktan çok geniş olan bu gemiler, borına iki (pupa yelken) gidemez ve düşman menzilinde kalırlar”. This means, literally, that being too broad in the beam relative to their length, they could not sail with the wind [behind them], as a result of which they could not get out of the range of the enemy’s guns. On several counts, this does not make any sense whatsoever. First, there is hardly any vessel of any kind that cannot sail with the wind; what constitutes a technical problem is to sail against the wind, or to sail as close into the wind as possible. Second, it is here that the length/beam ratio makes a real difference, ships with too broad a beam being difficult to sail against the wind. Third, in naval warfare there is no reason why getting out of the enemy’s range should be an end in itself (since then the enemy is also out of “our” range). In sea battles in the age of sail, in the typical tactical situation of two lines of battle sailing parallel to one another, what really mattered was to be able to get upwind of the enemy, or, if “we” had ended up downwind of the enemy, to turn and tack to get upwind of him – which would necessitate sailing against the wind. This, indeed, is what the French original, as given in Terzioglu and Hatemi, op. cit., p. 40, really says: “Ils étaient plus larges que longs et dès lors ne pouvaient aller à la boulne, ils restèrent toujours sous le vent de l’ennemi”. That is to say: They were too broad for their length, and not being able to go against the wind, always ended up downwind of the enemy; in Turkish, something like: “...ruzgârı orsalarlayamadıklarından, habire düşmannı rüzgârı altında kalyorlardı”. Aller à la boulne means “sailing against (or into) the wind”; boulîne(s) is French for bowline(s), which were the lines enabling square sails to be turned sideways in order to allow a square-rigged ship (such as a galleon) to sail as close to the wind as possible. Curiously, Beydilli and Şahin, who have drawn up a meticulous list of all the mistakes they have been able to find in the Terzioglu and Hatemi edition, have nothing on this point; see Beydilli and Şahin, op. cit., p. 14-15, where their table goes straight from Terzioglu and Hatemi’s p. 22 to their p. 27.

62. This refers to Mahmut Raif Efendi’s Plate XIX, which should have gone in between pages 40 and 41 in the Terzioglu and Hatemi edition, and which is inserted into its proper place on p. 217 of the Beydilli and Şahin edition. The caption reads: “Vaisseau de Ligne d’Ancienne Construction”. The proper translation of vaisseau de ligne (Eng. line-of-battle ship, or ship-of-the-line) should be “hattı harp gemisi” or “muharebe hatti gemisi”; Terzioglu and Hatemi render it as “sefer gemisi”, which is a non-existent term; Beydilli and Şahin simply say “kalyon” (galleon), which is in the nature of a non-technical popularisation but nevertheless acceptable.

63. See “Ship”, Encyclopædia Britannica, 1970, v. 20, p. 403b. All sections of this article up to the end of the 19th century (p. 398b-406a) were contributed by Roger Charles Anderson.
sequent pages, however, one also encounters a “seventy-gun ship-of-the-line, built at Metelin [Mitylene] by Ahmet Kaptan”, followed by a “forty-eight-gun frigate, built at Galas [Kalas] by Mustafa Hoca” and a “twenty-four-gun corvette, built at Sinab [Sinope] by Çavuşoğlu Mustafa”. Thus all are brand new (the Règlement de l’Amirauté specifically praises their blend of beautiful lines and maneuverability), and their armaments conform much more closely to the latest British or French standards, as do their lengths: 45 meters for the seventy-gun ship, 37.5 meters for the frigate, and 27.7 meters for the corvette; these measurements, furthermore, as well as their sites of construction are in total agreement with Gencer’s list of rehabilitated dockyards and naval arsenals, including the examples he relates of on-going work at these sites.

Mahmud Raif’s pictures and Gencer’s figures together bring home the immensity of the building effort launched at this time, making it much more tangible, more material. Going through period sources like Mahmud Raif Efendi’s Tableau also allows one to check the original formulations of all critical observations regarding the pre-1789 state of the Ottoman navy, as well as of the reform

64. See Plate XIX in Terzioğlu and Hatemi, 1992, also reproduced on p. 229 in Beydilli and Şahin, 2001. For corrections, see Beydilli and Şahin, op. cit., p. 16 bottom. For the dockyards and naval arsenals mentioned in these captions, also see Gencer, op. cit., p. 50-54.

65. See Plate XXII (misprinted as XVII) in Terzioğlu and Hatemi, 1992, also reproduced on p. 230 in Beydilli and Şahin, 2001. For corrections, see Beydilli and Şahin, op. cit., p. 17 top.

66. See Plate XXIII in Terzioğlu and Hatemi, 1992, also reproduced on p. 231 in Beydilli and Şahin, 2001. For corrections, see Beydilli and Şahin, op. cit., p. 17 top.

67. Terzioğlu and Hatemi, op. cit., given as p. 50 of the original, or Beydilli and Şahin, op. cit., p. 228: “La facilité des manœuvres et l’avantages d’aller à la boulne ajoutent à la beauté de ces pièces”. That is to say: Easy maneuverability plus the advantage(s) of being able to sail against the wind added to the beauty of these vessels. It should be noted that at this time, French naval engineers were particularly renowned for the beauty of line of the vessels they designed and constructed. This was because in France, greater attention was being paid to “the scientific side of naval architecture”, resulting in ships that were “more efficient, class for class, than any produced in England”, The Royal Navy’s superiority derived from seamanship and gunnery, not from ship design. See [Roger Charles Anderson] “Ship”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1970, v. 20, p. 403b.

68. Thus the 59.5 zira length that is mentioned again and again, and which is roughly 45 meters, was typical at that time for 70-gun three-deckers. By way of establishing a standard of comparison, let us note that the H.M.S. Victory, Nelson’s Trafalgar flagship, was a 100-gun ship measuring almost 57 meters. Before the age of steam and steel, the longest sailing man-of-war ever built was the USS Pennsylvania (1837) at 210 feet or approximately 64 metres, while 205 feet (or just over 62 metres) was usually the maximum. This was because of the tendency of long wooden ships with heavy guns all along their sides to “hog” or drop at both ends.

69. See Gencer, op. cit., p. 50-54.

70. To cite only a few of the most blatant improprieties or violations: venality of offices and commands, and a corresponding absenteeism among captains and commanders;
measures that were undertaken to counteract these defects and weaknesses.71 On all these points, we can see what Karal or Gencer are talking about in the original words of, for example, the Règlement pour l’Amirauté. Hence it becomes all the more interesting to note the strong and explicit emphasis this document places on the role not just of the sultan but also of the grand admiral in person (whose name is capitalized in the original):

Notre Auguste Souverain, convaincu de la nécessité d’une réforme, a bien voulu à son avénement au Trône, s’en occuper, avec ce zèle pour le bien public qui doit assurer ses sujets du bonheur dont ils jouiront sous son Règne. Cette sage réforme s’est opérée en très peu de temps et l’on ne craint point d’avancer que depuis l’existence de la Monarchie, jamais l’Amirauté Ottomane ne s’est vue sur un pied aussi brillant.

Du moment que SON EXCELLENCE HUSSEIN PACHA a été nommé Capoudan Pacha [Grand Amiral], jaloux de justifier le choix de son Auguste Souverain et la confiance dont il se trouve honoré, il s’est occupé avec une activité infatigable de toutes les parties de son Département.72

In a way, this textual accolade is stronger than all retrospective judgments by modern historians — stronger that Yiğmaz Öztuna noting that Hüseyin Pasha had become “the leader of the Nizam-i Čedid in the navy”,73 or Münir Aktepe adding that “he has been accounted the founder of the new Ottoman fleet”.74 Through all lack of order and neatness on board, which resulted in the gun decks being so cluttered with boxes and barrels that in an emergency these could not be cleared away quickly enough for the guns to be manned in less than two hours; general lack of training and discipline; utter disregard for fire safety, to the point where, in the absence of a centralized galley (kitchen), as many as thirty or forty fires were being lit up on board ship to cook food. All are mentioned in the Naval Regulations (Bahriye Nizamnâmesi) provided by Mahmud Raif Efendi. On the last point about cooking fires all over the ship, compare Terzioğlu and Hatemi, op. cit., p. 27, with Gencer, op. cit., p. 41.

71. To cite only a few of the reforms adopted: all ships were re-classified; all captains were reviewed and re-examined, and only those of proven competence were retained in their commands; all vacancies were filled; salaries were generally raised, and so fixed as to remove grounds for corruption; new rules for promotion and demotion were introduced; both absenteeism and the venality of offices were strictly prohibited; strict costing procedures were adopted for building, fitting, victualling, repairing and maintaining all vessels; all crew complements and positions were rendered permanent; naval arsenals, dockyards and powder-works were upgraded, including the introduction of a new pay scheme together with large numbers of skilled workers and technicians; as a result, large numbers of new ships were built, and with constant training under sail on the high seas, their crews were made to reach a high level of competence. This is what Mahmud Raif’s Tableau sets out, and what is echoed in Karal, Gencer, and elsewhere in the secondary literature.


73. Öztuna, op. cit, p. 997, footnote (**).

74. Aktepe, op. cit., p. 627b.
that, but also beyond all that, he is seen to have enjoyed a very special relationship with the reigning Sultan. This alone would be enough for him to stand head and shoulders above all other Ottoman captains or admirals in this era.

But secondly, unlike many other Ottoman Kapudan Pashas who were not corsairs to begin with, and when transferred to the admiralty as to any other administrative post, could not overcome their basic unfamiliarity with the sea, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha turned out to be no landlubber who contented himself with just building and organizing. He was also a tireless campaigner who led from the front, fighting as he modernized and testing his reforms in action. Soon after his appointment in Spring 1792, for example, he took the fleet out on a successful campaign against Greek (including Cretan) pirates in the Aegean, sailing to the vicinity of Milos and Hydra to fight and capture Kara Katzanis (Karakaçan), and then turning to pursue Lambro Canzian (Katsoni), destroying his fortified lair at Lagia (Portekale), blockading him on the coast of Maina in the Morea, and though unable to take him, eventually returning to Istanbul with some pirate ships in tow, as well as captured equipment and prisoners. Similar operations were launched year after year, and Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was a force to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean until fall 1797, when he was briefly removed from Istanbul and put in charge of the Vidin front in order to try and suppress the rebel Pazvandoğlu. After the Egyptian campaign, he was back patrolling the Mediterranean in 1802 and 1803, until illness forced him to return to the capital, where he died on 7 December, though he was only forty-six years old.

Finally, there was the fight for Egypt, which occupied him between the Vidin affair and his return to anti-piracy operations after 1801. It was Napoleon’s landing on the outskirts of Alexandria on 2 July 1798 that caused Küçük Hüseyin Pasha (who, incidentally, had been wounded while besieging Vidin and prior to receiving the submission of Pazvandoğlu) to be recalled to naval command. He refitted the fleet and sailed to Alexandria in the summer of 1799. By this time, of course, the French navy had been destroyed by Nelson at Aboukir (on 1 August 1798), and the British also played a key role in stopping Napoleon at Acre and pushing him back from Syria into Egypt, as well as in gradually overcoming

75. Aktepe, op. cit., p. 628a, provides the following account of the interesting social composition (blending gentry, bandits, and regulars) of the Ottoman forces allocated to this siege, as well as of the mixed fortunes enjoyed by the entire operation (including more than a few hints of obstruction by Hüseyin’s rivals in Istanbul): “Under his [Hüseyin Pasha’s] command on this expedition were some of the leading men of Anatolia, such as Kara Osmanoğlu and Cabbarzade, as well as the valis of Rumelia and Anatolia, and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha. Küçük Hüseyin Pasha first captured the places in the vicinity of Vidin which had fallen into the hands of Pazvandoğlu and then besieged Vidin itself, both by land and, with a small fleet, from the Danube. He met with unexpected resistance, however, and through lack of men and supplies and inability to receive money in time, he failed to bring the siege to a successful conclusion. Finally, when Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was himself wounded and no longer able to prosecute the siege of Vidin because of the French landing in Egypt, Pazvandoğlu Osman offered his submission to the Ottoman government”.
French resistance in the delta (led by Kléber, Menou and Belliard after Bonaparte’s flight back to France in late August 1799). But the Ottomans, too, found ways to distinguish themselves, even if in a supportive role. In 1799-1800, one squadron undertook joint operations with the British off the Syrian coast, i.e., on Napoleon’s flank and rear, while the main fleet joined the Russians in mopping up the French from the Ionian islands. The year 1800 saw Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and the British fleet patrolling the Egyptian coastline. Eventually, first Belliard and then Menou were forced to ask for terms in the summer of 1801, and Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was able to enter Cairo on 10 July 1801, reclaiming the city and the country by having the hutbe read in the name of Selim III.

*Medallions, flags, heroic verses: Eulogizing Hüseyin Pasha*

In history, there are numerous examples of the various sides to a successful alliance becoming rivals over the division of the spoils, even if only symbolically, by evolving different stories about just what had happened. In such situations, each party tries to overplay its own role while discounting the other’s; otherwise put, junior or weaker partners do not like to be reminded of the debts, real or imaginary, that their more powerful patrons may be fond of claiming. Thus for Greek nationalists, victory in 1821-1827 has to have been the fruit of local revolutionaries’ own efforts, while the British-French intervention at Navarino is accepted to have been dramatic but ultimately secondary; Russian, Romanian and Bulgarian textbooks provide diverging accounts of who fought most heroically in 1877-1878 (and therefore of external and internal causation in the birth of two new nation-states); similar South-eastern European controversies have raged even more strongly, if anything, over the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913; in Turkish narratives concerning Gallipoli, the role of German staff officers is virtually non-existent if not actually negative; in August 1944,

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76. The military historian David Nicolle regards these operations as “the Ottoman navy’s greatest success”; see NICOLLE and McBRIDE, *op. cit.*, p. 41.


78. This was clearly brought out in a Teacher Training Seminar held in Bucharest on 1-3 June 2001 as part of the Joint History Project run by the Thessaloniki-based Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-east Europe. Organized by Bogdan Murgescu and Mirela Lumineta Murgescu, the seminar focused on the contrasting treatment of the Russo-Turkish War of 1876-1877 (and its consequences for nation-state formation) in Bulgarian, Romanian and Turkish textbooks.

79. This, too, was clearly brought out in a Teacher Training Seminar held in Thessaloniki on 14-17 December 2000 as part of the Joint History Project run by the Thessaloniki-based Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-east Europe. Organized by Christina Koulouri, the seminar focused on the contrasting treatment of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 in Bulgarian, Greek, and Turkish textbooks. For numerous examples, also see R. C. HALL, *The Balkan Wars 1912-13* (Routledge 2000).

80. In contrast, British accounts emphasize the role of the German staff in planning the Gallipoli defences, and of Liman von Sanders, in particular, in recognizing Mustafa
General De Gaulle had the right political instincts, from his own point of view, when he walked through the Arc de Triomphe and down the Champs-Elysées to stage his own (Free French) ceremonial “liberation” of Paris.

The Ottoman reaction in 1801, therefore, was nothing unusual: having been taken totally by surprise in July 1798, and then having been unable to overcome the French in independent operations, it is understandable that they should have been quite sensitive to the success and the continuing presence of the British, with whom, moreover, they quickly came into conflict over imposing order on the country. In predictable but still rather amazing fashion, the range of possible (contrasting) attitudes can be traced through their legacies and reflections in modern scholarship. A Turkish historian, for example, is rather cryptic on this point: Kâşik Hüseyin Pasha was “active in the punishment of some Mamluk beys” and “this latter activity led to cooiness in his relations with some of the British admirals”, writes the late Münir Aktepe in the Encyclopaedia of Islam.\(^{\text{81}}\) We know Republican historiography to have grafted a nationalist onto an imperial tradition.\(^{\text{82}}\) In this vein, just how defensive Aktepe’s words are, emerges from their contrast with the following treatment by Richard Leslie Hill in the 1970 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica:

On the departure of the French, Egypt relapsed into anarchy as the Mameluke beys returned from hiding. The Ottoman sultan, Selim III, endeavoured to overthrow the beys by having their leaders massacred at Abu Qir where the Ottoman admiral had invited them to an entertainment. Some, including the Sudanese Mameluke Ibrahim Bey al-Sinnari, were killed; some, like Othman Bey al-Bardisi, were wounded. The survivors were rescued by the British who compelled the Ottoman governor at Cairo to release the beys whom he had arrested there.\(^{\text{83}}\)

But in turn, this is not only more explicit; it is also redolent of another ideology, an unreconstructed, pre-Saidian Eurocentrist outlook that subtly contraposes the virtues of British modernity (mercy, fairness, abiding by a régime of law) to the native/Oriental propensities for despotic intrigue, cruelty, and “anarchy”. Hill was a Lecturer in Modern Near Eastern History at the University of Durham over 1949-1966, and therefore a contemporary, more or less, of Münir Aktepe. Consciously or unconsciously, one writes from within a tradition of identifying with Kemal’s talent, and repeatedly protecting and reinstating him in the face of his jealous or resentful Turkish superiors’ reluctance. See, for example, N. Steel and P. Hart, Defeat at Gallipoli, (London 1994) p. 240; M. Hickey, Gallipoli, (London 1998) p. 103-104; R. R. James, Gallipoli, (London 1999 [1965]) p. 292.


83. “Egypt”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1970, v. VIII, p. 65b. The article is Hill’s up to the outbreak of World War I, see p. 72a, the end of the first paragraph.
the British and the other from an opposite tradition of identifying with the Ottomans in Egypt. Between the two of them, they span not only the attitudes of their own decades, but also the embryonic forms of that divide which had emerged, or were emerging, by the turn of the 18th century.

At that time, even if the Ottomans did not already suspect the British of coveting Egypt for themselves (as would emerge over the next three quarters of a century), perhaps it is not only their desire for reaffirmation after the nasty shock and humiliation that they had suffered in the hands of the hitherto friendly French, but, more broadly, this generalized defensiveness about their worldly possessions and in the face of the West, that we should bear in mind in order to understand how and to what extent they celebrated in 1801. To this, we must also add the peculiar vulnerability of a reforming sultan who ran the risk of being more comprehensively de-legitimized in defeat, and who therefore might have felt particularly vindicated by the ensuing victory.

In any case, celebrate they did, and a lot of it appears to have revolved around the person of the grand admiral, Kıcık Hüseyin Pasha, who stood at the junction of these multiple concerns. A special gold medal, the Vaka-i Mısırye madalyası, was struck to be distributed to “the British and Ottoman officers of the fleet that had liberated Egypt from the French”; it bore the Sultan’s tughra on one side, and a crescent with eight-pointed star on the other. “On the occasion of the recapture of Egypt from the French”, says Köprüülü, “Selim III presented Kıcık Hüseyin Pasha with a flag that carried an aigrette, a zulfikär, and a picture that appears to have represented the fortress of Alexandria, all on a red ground”. In his volume on the central administration and the navy, which first appeared in 1948, Ismail Hakkı Uzuncaşılı mentions an ode of praise (medhiye) that was composed in the Kapudan Pasha’s name; among his plates, he includes “the upper half of its decorations”, indicating that the work itself is in the Topkapı Palace Museum. Shown in this dark, murky reproduction is a three-masted, square-rigged ship that is rendered in technically accurate detail; Uzuncaşılı identifies it as “the galleon that Kıcık Hüseyin Pasha is likely to have sailed on during the Egyptian expedition”. Hanging from the virtually invisible gaff on the rear or mizzenmast is a huge flag with a crescent and an eight-pointed star, while the mainmast carries another flag with a zulfikär surmounting a second, blurred image. In the first volume of a recent collection of rather conventional chapters on “the Ottoman

84. On this attitude or posture in general, see DERINGIL, op.cit.
85. In Turkish: “III. Selim döneminde (1801) Fransızlardan kurtaran donanmanın İngiliz ve Osmanlı subaylarına verilmek üzere çıkarılan madalya”. Clearly this is a modern and not a contemporary expression. See p. 61 in the catalogue of the 7 October-5 November 1999 exhibition on Rare Ottoman Coins, Medals, and Medallions: Istanbul Arkeoloji Müzeleri Koleksiyonu, Nadir Osmanlı Sikke, Nişan ve Madalyaları, (Istanbul 1999). The Egyptian medal is listed with an inventory number of 786/1 in the Collections of the Archeological Museums.
86. KOPROLO, IA, s.v. “Bayrak”.
87. UZUNCAŞILI, Bahriye, plate XLIV.
state and Ottoman civilization", one comes across a color plate which is described, not very helpfully, as just "a galleon". Though the floral and curvilinear patterns of the original medhiye plate (as reproduced by Uzunçarşılı) have here been left out of the frame, it is immediately recognizable as the very same picture and the same vessel right down to the smallest detail: a three-decker with at least forty-two guns countable on its right side, which would make it an eighty-four-gun ship-of-the-line. We can now see that the large flag on the mizzenmast carries its crescent and eight-pointed star on a red ground; this is in conformity with the naval flag reform that Köprülü attributes to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. We can also see that what had looked like the mizzen gaff carrying this flag is actually the transverse yard of a lateen mizzen sail. This was somewhat obsolete at this time, though not by much. Back at the dawn of the Early Modern era, a lateen mizzen sail on the third mast was a legacy of caravel design, which was of southern origin. In the north, in the course of the 18th century the part of the lateen mizzen before the mast was done away with and, though the biggest ships kept the whole yard for a long time, it was gradually replaced by a gaff such as was carried in the 19th century; by 1800 the long mizzen yard was a thing of the past,
says one reference book. But clearly, for all their building effort over 1789-1796, this was not so with the Ottomans. Perhaps this was because the ship in this picture would have been one of "the biggest... [that] kept the whole yard for a long time"; it may also have been due a southern, Mediterranean reluctance to forego the lateen; more simply, it could be that while the Ottomans were modelling their new galleons on categories borrowed from the British or French navies, they were doing so with a certain design or technology gap, however slight. This impression is further borne out by the 1798 drawings in Mahmud Raif Efendi. For here, there is a lateen mizzen both on the aforementioned "ship-of-the-line of ancient construction" and on the newer "seventy-gun ship-of-the-line"; in con-

88. Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi, ed. E. İhsanoglu, v. I, (Istanbul 1994) Plate 104, facing p. 361; the caption says only "Bir kalyon".
89. In the British system of six "rates", this would have been a second-rate ship. First-rates had around 100 guns (or slightly less), while third-rates carried a maximum of around 70 guns. Ships of the top four rates, carrying 60-100 guns, were considered fit to be part of the line of battle; this excluded fifth-rate frigates and sixth-rate sloops of war. The Royal Navy in the late-17th century came to regard the 70-gun third-rater as the most usefully flexible of the larger types of ship. See The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, ed. J. R. Hill, (Oxford 1995) p. 58, 59, 123. Significantly, the biggest line-of-battle ships represented in Mahmud Raif Efendi's Tableau are of 70 guns.
90. Köprülü, IA, s.v. "Baynak".
93. Terzioğlu and Hatemi, op. cit., Plate XXI, intended to go between p. 50-51 of the French text; Beydilli and Şahin, op. cit., p. 229.
trast, the two smaller ships, the "forty-eight-gun frigate"\textsuperscript{94} and the "twenty-four-gun corvette"\textsuperscript{95} carry shorter gaffs and not long, transverse lateen yards on their mizzenmasts. This comparison with what is known about naval architecture at the time of the Napoleonic Wars is useful by way of tying several loose ends together, re-affirming the general picture, and also showing where the Ottomans stood in relation to it: abreast of developments in smaller warships; just a few years or perhaps one blueprint back when it came to the largest ships-of-the-line.

\textit{What is on a flag? What is on a plate? What is in a director's office?}

In passing, it also confirms the reliability of our visual evidence, which is why it becomes stunning to discover that the blurred image below the \textit{ziyafı̇kär} on the flag flying from the top of the mainmast is actually the picture of a walled town or fortress. This, then, purports to be the very flag that Köprülü says was presented by Selim III to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, and bore, together with an aigrette and a \textit{ziyafı̇kär} sword, "a picture that appears to have represented the fortress of Alexandria".\textsuperscript{96} This is immediately plausible; the picture on the flag, though crude, does bear a strong resemblance to present-day pictures of Kayıtbay's Fort in Alexandria. Even before arriving at the original of this \textit{medhiye} plate decorated with a galleon, or for that matter the flag itself, which may be impossible to recover, this is actually borne out by an eyewitness of an earlier generation. As we have seen, Uzunçarşı in 1948 does not tell us anything else about the \textit{medhiye} plate that he reproduces; Köprülü in his 1949 "Bayrak" entry does not disclose his specific source of information for the flag or banner that Selim III is said to have presented to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha; Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and his collaborators on the 1994 volume say virtually nothing about where their reproduction of "A Galleon" comes from. But in the final Bibliography section of his article, Köprülü does more than cite Fevzi Kurtoğlu's 1938 work on \textit{Türk Bayrağı ve Ayyıldız}; he actually devotes twenty lines to analyzing and assessing it. Rightly noting its lack of modern critical method, Köprülü nevertheless appreciates "the considerable richness of the materials it comprises on 16th - 20th century Ottoman flags, and on naval banners in particular".\textsuperscript{97}

This Fevzi Kurtoğlu was a history instructor in the Naval High School (\textit{Deniz Lisesi}) in the 1920s and 30s who may not be blamed for lacking proper academic

\textsuperscript{94} TERZIOĞLU and HATEMI, \textit{op. cit.}, Plate XXII, intended to go between p. 50-51 of the French text; BEYDILLI and ŞAHIN, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 230.

\textsuperscript{95} TERZIOĞLU and HATEMI, \textit{op. cit.}, Plate XXIII, intended to go between p. 50-51 of the French text; BEYDILLI and ŞAHIN, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{96} As in note 86 above.

\textsuperscript{97} KöPRÜLÜ, \textit{İA, s.v.} "Bayrak", p. 420a. Köprülü is also dismissive (and rightly so) about a spurious preface by H. R. Tankut proposing a Turkish Thesis of History and Sun Theory of Language etymology for the word \textit{bayrak}; he calls it "wholly fictive and baseless".
mic training at a time when such training did not exist in Turkey. Still, he appears to have been a tireless worker and prolific writer, turning out pamphlet after pamphlet on great naval battles in history, the Russo-Turkish wars of 1683-1768, 1853-1855 or 1877-1878, famous Turkish corsairs and admirals, or naval operations in World War I. Among his favorite subjects was the history of Turkish flags and banners, where he first produced Sancağımz in 1933/4 and then reworked it into the much more ambitious Türk Bayrağı ve Ay Yıldız that Köprülü mentions, and which has recently been reprinted by the Turkish Historical Society. Already in Sancağımz, Kurtoğlu lets us know that

There is a painted plate in the office of the director of the Topkapı Palace Museum that contains an ode of praise [kaside] penned by Enderunlu Vasi̇f for Küçük Hüseyin Pasha on the occasion of the liberation of Egypt from the French. The upper half of this plate displays a colourful painting of a ship, from the mainmast of which flies the flag presented to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha for having conquered Egypt, on which is portrayed a fort, an

98. Thus a list of his works given at the back of Sancağımz comprises (in addition to that work and its successor, Türk Bayrağı ve Ay Yıldız) the following: Naval Battles, 1793-1905; The Turco-Russian War or Crimean Expedition of 1853-1855; Naval Battles in the World War and the Battle of Jutland; Naval Battles in the World War and the Turkish Navy; Our Naval Heroes; Turkish Naval Battles; Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha; Turgut Pasha; Kılıç Ali Pasha; The History of Our Flag. In the same breath he promises (in 1934): Battles of the Crete War; The First Admirals of the Age of Sail: Baba Hasan, Mısırboğlu İbrahim, and Mezembur Hüseyin Pasha; The First Turco-Russian Expeditions (1683-1768) and Canım Hoca Mehmed Pasha; The North African Dominions (the Algerian, Tunisian, and Tripolitan Navies); Cezayirli Hasan Pasha; The Turco-Russian War of 1876-1877 and its Naval Operations; Memoirs of a Turkish Seaman, 1736-1737. Kurtoğlu did follow through on a lot of this. As a whole, these titles are quite representative of the military-patriotic inspiration behind his historical interests and preoccupations.

99. Sancağımz was published first as an annex to a 1933 issue of the Naval Journal (Deniz Memnuası), and then separately in an expanded and revised version in 1934. Over the next four years, it was further revised, somewhat refined and expanded into Türk Bayrağı ve Ay Yıldız in 1938.

100. What the TTK has published in 1987 and then again in 1992 is actually a facsimile of the original. But they have not seen fit to so inform the public. Thus the 1992 edition has “3. Baskı” (= 3rd Edition) on its title page, but a note about “İlkinci baskı: 1987 / Ikinci baskı: 1992” (according to which this would be only the second edition) on the back of the title page. Nowhere is there any reference to the original edition of 1938. Neither have they included any editorial note explaining the genealogy of this work (for that matter, we are not even told who did the editing or the preparation for publication). Among other things, this has the effect of entirely decontextualizing both the work itself and its author Kurtoğlu, and the preface (A Linguistic Study on the Word Bayrak) by H. R. Tankut that Köprülü takes so severely to task. How is the general reader supposed to know that all these are (were) products of the late 1930s? That, in other words, this work is today more of historiographical than of historical interest? Given that in its time, the TTK was created to promote and maintain universal standards of scholarship and publishing, such carelessness becomes all the more impermissible.
aigrette and a zulfikar, while hanging astern is a banner with a crescent and an eight-point star on it.  

There we have it, all three answers in ten lines: the kaside’s authorship; confirmation that the flag Selim III presented to the Kapudan Pasha was what was tacked on to the mainmast of the galley painted on the medhiye plate; and finally, the whereabouts of this plate in the early Republican era. At that time, the director of the Topkapı Museum was Tahsin Öz, who held that position from 1928 to 1952. The next piece of information is at least as sensational: four years later Kurutoğlu discloses, almost in passing, that there was more than one flag, and perhaps more than two, that were said to have been presented to the grand admiral. He takes this whole paragraph from Sancağımız and integrates into his 1938 volume, only adding that

Two of the flags presented to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha were discovered last year (i.e. in 1937) by Tahsin Öz, the director of the Topkapı Palace Museum, and exhibited in the armory museum, which probably means not the Military Museum at Harbiye but the arms and armor section of the Topkapı Palace. On the next page, we find a complete, full-length reproduction of the medhiye plate in question.

It is astounding that Uzunçarşılı, at least, should not have acknowledged Kurutoğlu’s finding, or otherwise identified this plate in his predecessor’s fashion. Kurutoğlu’s writings are quite unsystematic, as Köprülü noticed. He appears, however, to have been more meticulous than some of his contemporaries in one crucial regard: he gives inventory, directory or catalogue numbers for virtually everything that he lists or quotes. Curiously, though, he cites no such entry in this case. This gives one to think that he was not just being amateurishly anecdotal when he mentioned the director’s office; possibly he was providing the only “address” then available to him. Today, fortunately, this plate is part and parcel of the Topkapı inventories. As for the presentation flags, although they are not on display, in one condition or another they could still be in the storage rooms of the “Textiles and Costumes” or the “Armory” sections of the Topkapı Museum.

101. Kurutoğlu, Sancağımız, op. cit., p. 44. We have corrected the rather garbled expression in the original, with a few words missing at one point as a result of a typographical error, by comparing it with the full text as given in Türk Bayrağı ve Ay Yıldızı, see note 102 below.
103. Kurutoğlu, ibid., p. 124.
104. Topkapı Palace Library, Güzel Yazilar 427. The inventory entry contains the information that the 25 x 70 cm. plate was crafted to commemorate the Egyptian expedition of H.1216. The text is in Arabic, and the name of the calligrapher is given as Osman Vassif Kibari. We are grateful to Dr Filiz Çağman, the director of the Topkapı Palace Museum, for her help in locating the plate in the TSM’s records and collections.
Comparing bays, lighthouses, fortresses

Having arrived at this point, let us recapitulate what we know so far. PI’s hero and intended addressee can only be Kütükk Hüseyin Pasha. This is so for both general (leadership stature) and more specific reasons (i.e., the victory of the Egyptian expedition). PI must have been produced at virtually the same point in time as Selim’s presentation flags and the medhiye plate. Furthermore, PI obviously shares the same heraldic and emotional world with the flags on the medhiye plate’s galleon. And yet it is incomparably more intricate than the design on the mainmast flag, which is to say that it is much too intricate to be embroidered onto or otherwise applied to cloth. This seems to rule out the possibility that Candy, recognized as a capable foreigner, might have been specifically commissioned to prepare an alternative design for a ceremonial flag. Of course, it could have happened the other way around; that is to say, Candy might have seen the flag and been inspired to outdo it for his own watercolour. Finally, it might be nothing more than a coincidence: Candy’s paintings and Selim’s presentation flags (together with the Egyptian medal and the ode of praise) could have been just part of the whole atmosphere of jubilation. This is the simplest assumption, though not necessarily the most convincing. There are some intangibles about PI which suggest it was more than that. Perhaps it is that it is too “official”, too overloaded with symbols and emblems for all these to have been put in by a foreign artist acting on nothing but his own instincts and impulses. Perhaps it is that we cannot quite put our finger on its setting or location. Faced with the enigma of the galleon’s mainmast flag (whether he actually saw it or read about it), Köprülu wondered about whether it was really Alexandria. His doubts seem to foreshadow our own puzzle about PI. It seems so familiar, and yet so strange, not really like anything else we have seen. It certainly is not the Maghreb, not by a long shot. But what is it, or where is it? Is it any one thing or any one place? Or is it just a fantastic product of the artist’s imagination?

If we are looking for a “realistic” solution to these remaining problems, we have to accept that there are only two alternatives, one suggested by the chain of events and the other by the name of the artist (as well as some background knowledge of military architecture in the Mediterranean). It has to be either Alexandria or Candia. There are problems with both, though possibly more with the first than the second. Kaytibay’s Fort as it exists today or as it is (supposedly) represented on the medhiye plate galleon’s mainmast flag does not really look like the entirety of the strange construction in PI. What is particularly dissimilar is the curvilinear fortress that forms the first level of the PI edifice, and which Irepoglu describes as “walls built by the Ottomans on the same location as a former Spanish bastion, surrounding the lighthouse”. In point of fact, as we have already noted in talking of Vauban, this is the very embodiment of the “star fortress” that resulted from the original trace italienne of the so-called military revolution. In the

105. IREPÖGLU, op. cit., p. 32.
15th and 16th centuries, when it became increasingly clear that the flat curtain walls of medieval castles, built to put tall vertical obstacles in the face of scaling, storming attack, were presenting huge easy targets to siege artillery, a new type of fortification was gradually developed which with its lower profile would be much harder to hit, would be capable of deflecting a lot of the cannonballs that did reach it, and would also allow for counter-battery fire from its own (now flat and solid) parapets. It gradually acquired more and more intricate perimeters comprising a whole network of secondary structures called bastions, crownworks, hornworks and ravelins\textsuperscript{106} [PLATE 15], with each bastion complemented by a moat and glacis so as to provide a clear field of fire in various directions [PLATE 16]. By the second half of the 17th century, this \textit{trace italienne} type of fortification had spread all over Europe, as demonstrated by a modern aerial view of Charles Fort, Kinsale (in south-west Ireland).\textsuperscript{107} And by the late 18th century, as already indicated, simultaneously with the translations from Bélidor and Vauban, Mahmud Raif’s \textit{Tableau}, too, contained a magnificent “\textit{Plan de Forteresse à cinq Bastion}” [PLATE 8].

With its low, curving and undulating walls formed into five (perhaps six) bastions, each shaped like the ace of spades, and its solid masonry with a flat platform on top,\textsuperscript{108} the lower level of the central edifice in PI is obviously a fortress of this type; by the same token it is utterly unlike the high boxy shape, the straight curtain walls and cylindrical corner towers of Kaytibay’s Fort. In the \textit{Kitab-i Bahriyye} by Piri Reis, the portolan for Alexandria [PLATE 17] shows a C-shaped bay with two headlands turning inward and narrowing the entrance. Beyond the bay lies the walled city, while the two headlands are surrounded by two structures. We know the smaller one to the left to have been a new lighthouse built in the course of the 14th century to allow “for closer supervision of the eastern harbour”.\textsuperscript{109} The location to the right, on the other headland, was where the ancient Pharos, begun by Ptolemy Soter, used to stand. Damaged in various earthquakes, and in a state of complete decay by the early 15th century, it was finally destroyed by Sultan Kaytibay, who had his new fort built over the ruins in 1447.\textsuperscript{110} In Piri Reis’s portolan, the edifice on this point actually consists of two different eleva-


\textsuperscript{107} From PARKER, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{108} The upper level or what Irepoğlu has called a lighthouse actually stands on this platform, and is not “surrounded” by its outer masonry.

\textsuperscript{109} See S. LABIB, \textit{LT}, s.v. “Al-Iskandariyya”. Construction is said to have commenced under Kalavun and his son Muhammed bin Kalavun, and to have been completed in 1365. In the recent \textit{TDVIA}, the “Iskenderiyə” entry by E. F. ES-SEYYID insists that construction began under Muhammed bin Kalavun (in the location called Täbietüssilsile), but was completed only later.

\textsuperscript{110} LABIB, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 133a, gives the date as 882/1447. However, ES-SEYYID, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 576a, speaks of Sultan Kaytibay visiting the city on two different occasions in 882 (1477) and 884 (1479), and having a new fort, “lying to the north of the Re’sütün peninsula”, built over the ruins of the Pharos at around that time.
tions. With its square ground plan, boxy shape, rounded corner turrets and vertical curtain walls, the lower level is identifiable as Kaytbay’s Fort, as well as the fortress on the flag flying from the mainmast of the _mediye_ plate’s galleon (indeed, there is a stronger resemblance between the portolan fortress and the flag fortress, than between the flag fortress and modern photographs of Kaytbay’s Fort). But on the portolan, the fortress does not stand alone; it is surmounted by a tall lighthouse that bears a generic resemblance to the upper level of the edifice in our PI picture. These observations are summarized in the table below.

### TABLE 1

*Comparing structures and their levels*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kaytbay’s Fort (KF)</th>
<th>flag fortress (FF)</th>
<th>portolan fortress (PF)</th>
<th>PI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>upper level</td>
<td>tall tower (lighthouse ?)</td>
<td>tall tower (lighthouse ?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower level</td>
<td>tall, boxy (medieval)</td>
<td>like KF, like KF, more like PF, more like FF</td>
<td>star fortress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All in all, then, we cannot rule out certain correspondences between the setting depicted in PI and Alexandria’s eastern harbor as shown by Piri Reis. To recapitulate: there were plenty of ancient columns in and around Alexandria (as evidenced among other things by Piri Reis’s portolan); the PI column-and-coat-of-arms configuration is roughly in the same spot as the 14th century lighthouse; the PI edifice, too, is roughly in the same spot as the larger of the two portolan edifices; furthermore, it is roughly of the same overall composition, with a lighthouse rising on top of a fortress; the lighthouses, too, resemble each other. But there the similarities end. The bay could be any bay, since most Mediterranean bays are C-shaped with two protruding, protecting headlands at the mouth of the C, virtually by definition. The city has vanished. A column is not a lighthouse. There is that outstanding contrast, already mentioned, between a post-16th century “star fortress” and a late-medieval fort of the type built by Kaytbay. Last but not least, there is the countryside. In Piri Reis, palm trees dot what is distinctly recognizable as the desert. In PI, the terrain looks somewhat bare but not really like a desert. Most of the trees stretching across it, furthermore, are recognizable as olive trees (including especially the one in the upper left corner above the biggest flag), while an olive branch is draped around the pedestal. In addition, there is a cypress tree within the earthworks and a windmill in the distance. Taken together these disparate elements point not to Alexandria but elsewhere, and perhaps to an Aegean island.

111. IÜ Library, TY 6605, fol. 295a. There were several fortresses in Alexandria, namely Kaytbay, Ebûkîr, Reken and Burçüssîsîle (or Tâbiyettüssîsîle), all in medieval style.
If not Alexandria, then where? A hybrid?
An abstract setting modelled on Candia?

Let us cross the t’s and dot the i’s of the idea that is hereby taking shape:

It is as if features of Alexandria were taken, perhaps described to the artist, who then combined them with other features from Crete, and probably from Candia so as to end up with a “place” that we think we know but cannot quite identify. This, at least, is where the artist’s signature, too, seems to be leading, for as already noted, in addition to being a personal name, “Candy” may also be his birthplace, i.e., Candia. And it would have to be the city, not the island. For Venetians, of course, Candia signified not just the city but also the whole island. The verbal language of our painting [PI], however, is not Italian but French, and in French Crete has always been Crête, not Candia. Furthermore, Candia in French is Candie, which could easily have been written not with an –ie but with a –y in the 18th or 19th centuries. In pre-modern times, what mattered for very long was pronunciation, until at last, fairly recently and through universal education, spelling, too, came to be standardized. Candy would have the same pronunciation as Candie, and thus be acceptable for even a Frenchman. In the 15th and 16th centuries, indeed, there were a few artists, of ambiguous identity and some degree of international renown, whose names were emended in this way. As for an Ottoman subject, especially in times when no set method prevailed for shifts from the Latin to the Arabic alphabet and back, using the –ie and –y spellings interchangeably would if anything be more feasible or admissible.

So the artist is likely to have been of Cretan, more specifically of Candian origin, and this assumption is borne out by the various visual elements incorporated into PI that cannot possibly be related to Egypt or Alexandria. Neither do they haphazardly point in various directions. Instead, in fairly consistent, concentrated fashion, they all seem to point towards Candia/Iraklion. Thus first, there is

112. Thus a mid-17th century map of Crete by Marco Boschini, from a collection entitled Il regno tutto di Candia, has a decorated label where it says “Il Regno di Candia”; next to it is a medallion featuring a lion that is also embellished with a crown. Furthermore, the area to the north of the island is marked “Mare di Candia et Egeo”. Another engraving by Johannes Peeters, from the last quarter of the 17th century, is part of a collection called Diverse viste delle città in Candia, Malta come nell’Arcipelago: Various views of cities in Candia, Malta etc, reflecting the use of the word Candia to indicate the entire island. For both maps, see Rethymnon Under Venetian Rule. A Selection of drawings and maps by Francesco Basilicata, Marco Boschini, Ercole Nanni, Olfort Dapper, Johannes Peeters, G. Wilkinson, published by the Municipality of Rethymnon, 1998. We are grateful to Mr Dimitris Z. Archontakis, Mayor of Rethymnon, for providing us with this very useful publication, and to our colleague Dr Antonis Antonakis for his help in this regard.

113. For example, Anton von Candia, born in Basel in 1454, was also known as Anthony de Candy. Another case in point is Giovanni Candi, born in Venice in 1506; his last name was variously spelled as De Candi, Candij, Chandl, or Chandjs. For information on both, see U. Thieme, Allgemeines Lexikon der Bildenden Künstler von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, v. XV, (Leipzig 1911) p. 111-112.
the landscape, as already mentioned, which with its scattered trees and windmills, is really quite typical of northern Crete’s coastal plains that gradually rise away from the sea. The cypress tree, too, is characteristically Aegean (rather than north African/Egyptian). And if there is anything quintessentially Cretan, it is olive oil, which the Ottomans started obtaining in such quantities from the island after the long war’s end in 1669 that it literally changed their cuisine, as one of us has demonstrated elsewhere.\textsuperscript{114} The olive tree at the very left of PI [PLATE 1], just above the big red Turkish flag, plus six others to its right, as well as the olive branch to the right of the pedestal, are all emphatically emblematic of the island. So is, of course, the lion.

What about the tower or citadel in PI? Here, too, we have already established that the lower level represents a star fortress quite unlike anything that we know of in Alexandria. It could, however, be any of the major fortifications built and re-built on Crete under the direction of Renaissance military architects from the 16th century onward, with two prime candidates: the megalos kastro of Candia\textsuperscript{115}, and the fortezza of Rethymnon built after 1573 on top of the hill of Palaiokastro. Neither is an exact fit, of course: we are not shown any town that it encloses, so (if we momentarily digress from that word “Candy”) initially the Rethymnon fortezza [PLATE 18], shown here on a 17th century map in a private collection,\textsuperscript{116} seems more plausible both by virtue of its (smaller) size and its position (to the right of the city itself, and on a rocky promontory like the one in our picture). But this fortezza is not of the bastioned trace but of the tenaille trace type, which means that it has a more jagged type of outline, whereas the fortifications surrounding Candia, as shown on another period map in the Biblioteca Marciana in Venice\textsuperscript{117} [PLATE 19], or on a relief map from the façade of the Chiesa di Santa Maria del Giglio in the same city\textsuperscript{118} [PLATE 20], constitute perfect ace-of-spades bastions – identical with those on the lower level of the structure in PI. There is a further point. In this same relief map from the façade of the Chiesa di Santa Maria del Giglio [PLATE 20], to the left of the main perimeter, there appears to be a low hill topped by a much smaller fortification. This is the older Forte di S. Dimitri, labeled very clearly on the previous map [PLATE 19], which is roughly where, in PI, the mysterious enclosure with its gun emplacement happens to be relative to...


\textsuperscript{117} Kofou, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 75, plate 66 (from the Biblioteca Marciana, Venice).

the main fortress. As for the upper level, which we have shown to bear a certain resemblance to the "second storey" of the larger fortress (or what purports to be Kayırbay’s Fort) in Piri Reis’s Alexandria portolan, even that is not without its Cretan connections or connotations. In an anonymous 17th century engraving showing Rethymnon from the west, and in another one by Marco Boschini (1651) showing the town from the east, there is a centrally located tower inside the fortress which is depicted with a flag waving from its topmast. 119 This is not unlike the "lighthouse" component of the edifice in our picture.

The hero’s and the artist’s connections

But where does that leave us? Are we to believe, therefore, that the star-fortress-and-lighthouse construction in PI was actually intended as a recognizable representation of a Cretan town, probably Candia, less probably Rethymnon? We should stop short of arguing that the absence of a residential town (i.e., Alexandria) is one thing, an implied replacement of another residential town (i.e., Candia) with just a star fortress is another, the second jump being much too big to swallow. Furthermore, there are all the other aspects of PI (or of the story that we have begun to weave around it) that keep taking us back from Crete to Alexandria. Most crucially, having established that the hero has to be Kütük Hüseyin Pasha in his early 19th century moment of glory, we cannot suggest any logical reason why this visual celebration should have relocated him to Crete, away from the Nile delta. The Kapudan Pasha’s own ties with Crete are not strong enough for that purpose. His anti-piracy operations in Aegean and Cretan waters are both relatively minor, and too remote in time: nearly a decade would have elapsed since the Kara Katsanzis and Lambro Canziani incidents of 1792 when Candy painted his picture. True, there has been a minor narrative tradition of conflating Kütük Hüseyin Pasha with his predecessor Giridili Hüseyin Pasha. Enver Ziya Karal, for example, speaks of Selim III “appointing as Kapudan Pasha his childhood friend Giridili Kütük Hüseyin Pasha”, 120 and furthers the confusion in his Index, too, where he enters “Hüseyin Pasha, Kütük, Giridi”. 121 Most authorities, however, have remained united in referring to Kütük Hüseyin as Georgian (Gürcü). 122 Moreover, we cannot really expect the Kapudan Pasha’s contemporaries, including his direct associates or subordinates, to have suffered from the Karal type of 20th century illusions.

In short, then, there is no good case for anybody to have constructed, in 1801 or 1802, an unambiguously Cretan setting to eulogize Kütük Hüseyin Pasha – a

121. Ibid., p. 278.
setting that would have been *socially recognizable* as Cretan/Candian through its current references as much as through its visual contents, and to have based this choice on the hero’s supposed origins or subsequent connections. There is, however, a good case to be made for the artist’s insertion of his personal connections and recollections into a setting that contemporaries would still have accepted as referring primarily to the grand admiral’s last and greatest exploit of recapturing Egypt for the Ottomans.

This Candy might have easily done without conscious intent, particularly if, as seems likely, he himself had not been to Egypt, but was just sitting in Istanbul hearing accounts of the Egyptian campaign and being otherwise inspired to paint this picture. As has already been mentioned, it would have been easy for him to be inspired by a general atmosphere of celebration to try and outdo the commemorative flag(s) that he might have actually seen presented to the grand admiral (who might have been his mentor or patron in the first place). He could have taken a good long look at the rather crude representation of a fortress embroidered on to these flags; not being able to make much of it in terms of the types of military fortifications that he himself was familiar with in current time, and simultaneously hearing descriptions of a two-level edifice consisting of “a lighthouse” on top of “a fortress”, as an engineer or draughtsman given to professional accuracy, he might have been inclined to (re)interpret the “fortress” part as the *trace italienne* sort of star fortress that he was actually familiar with, both generically and through his Candian background. And once he had dragged in this one major link with the island of his probable origins, the rest (such as the olive trees, the lion, or the spatial relationship of the siege-works to the main fortress) could have followed by association. Led or compelled to the task of producing a commemorative piece, he would, after all, have needed to be able to paint in a setting or a landscape that came easily to him – a setting that was not entirely fictive (like a moonscape that nobody had seen yet) but plausible in the sense of belonging to a recognizable sphere of earthly experience. Thus it would have been a simple step for him to substitute the Cretan countryside for an Egyptian landscape that he had no firsthand sense of – with the added attraction that then at least a few people familiar with the incidents and exploits of the early 1790s might also be able to see in the picture, albeit only secondarily, a summation of the entire career of Küçük IIüseyin Pasha.

This, of course, is not a crucial or indispensable dimension. What is more fundamental is that with or without it, we have before us a composite piece comprising multiple layers of meaning and memory. Central to it are (1) state concerns of legitimation and re-possession. These are woven around the figure of (2) a reforming grand admiral who is very closely identified with the Sultan. (3) Scrim III’s agenda is represented by the panoply of symbols surrounding the column on the left, as well as by the blue uniforms of the soldiery, while (4) the Kapudan Pasha’s office is referred to by those “timeless” elements of the picture (such as his barge) that immediately connect him and his “excursion” to the imperial capital. At the same time, (5) the direct occasion has been provided by the success-
ful conclusion of the Egyptian campaign, which is signified by the dedication and the dating as well as by the fortress, the soldiery, and the siege-works.

Finally (6) the artist, of the details of whose identity we remain fairly ignorant, has infused his own personality and background into the painting via his choice of setting and terrain. He is there and not there; we see him and yet see him not – a shadow, a ghostly presence of indistinct features. He conjures up his natie, his birthplace. Reinforcing his signature and enhancing its associations, this becomes his signature tune.