

**FROM TENSION TO ACTION: UNDERSTANDING THE
DYNAMICS OF ANTI-REFUGEE MOBILIZATION**

by
DUYGU YURT

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**FROM TENSION TO ACTION: UNDERSTANDING THE
DYNAMICS OF ANTI-REFUGEE MOBILIZATION**

Approved by:

Prof. SABAHAT ÇİĞDEM BAĞCI
(Thesis Supervisor)

Asst. Prof. KRİSTEN SARAH BİEHL ÖZTUZCU

Prof. MÜJDE PEKER BOOTH

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ABSTRACT

FROM TENSION TO ACTION: UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF ANTI-REFUGEE MOBILIZATION

DUYGU YURT

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Thesis Supervisor: Prof. SABAHAT ÇİĞDEM BAĞCI

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Collective action literature has long focused on mobilization for the rights of disadvantaged groups. However, with rising anti-minority sentiments, this focus has begun to shift toward mobilization against the disadvantaged. Refugees are one of these disadvantaged groups that advantaged members of host societies increasingly mobilize against. Given the growing number of refugees and the rising hostility directed at them, understanding the dynamics behind host society mobilization is necessary for effective intervention. In the present work, I examine the psychological background of anti-refugee mobilization in Türkiye across two studies using a mediation model. In Study 1 ($N = 2209$), I found that perceived threat and injustice predicted collective action intentions against Syrian refugees, through fear and anger, respectively. However, while anger predicted both traditional and online collective action intentions, for fear, this pattern was only significant for traditional collective action. In Study 2 ($N = 335$), I extended the model by adding dehumanization and found that perceived threat and injustice again indirectly predicted stronger collective action intentions, through fear and anger, and then dehumanization. Overall, the findings support the established predictors of collective action and highlight the additional role of dehumanization in anti-refugee mobilization. Further research is needed to establish causal pathways and explore the role of fear in more detail.

ÖZET

GERİLİMDEN EYLEME: MÜLTECİ KARŞITI MOBİLİZASYONUN DİNAMİKLERİNİ ANLAMAK

DUYGU YURT

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Anahtar Kelimeler: kolektif eylem, gruplararası tehdit, algılanan adaletsizlik, gruplararası duygular, insandışılştırma

Kolektif eylem literatürü uzun süredir dezavantajlı grupların hakları için gerçekleşen kolektif eylemlere odaklanmaktadır. Ancak artan azınlık karşıtı tutumlarla birlikte, bu odak dezavantajlı gruplara karşı gerçekleşen kolektif hareketlere kaymaya başlamıştır. Mülteciler, ev sahibi toplumların avantajlı konumdaki üyelerinin giderek daha çok karşıt yönde mobilize olduğu bu dezavantajlı gruplardan biridir. Artan mülteci sayısı ve mültecilere karşı düşmanlığın giderek yükselmesi, ev sahibi toplumdaki bu hareketlenmenin ardındaki dinamiklerin anlaşılmasını etkili müdahaleler için gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye bağlamında mülteci karşıtı mobilizasyonun psikolojik arka planı aracılık modeli kullanılan iki çalışma ile incelenmiştir. Çalışma 1’de ($N = 2209$), algılanan tehdit ve adaletsizliğin, sırasıyla korku ve öfke aracılığıyla Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik kolektif eylem niyetlerini yordadığı bulunmuştur. Ancak öfke hem geleneksel hem çevrimiçi eylem niyetlerini yordarken, korku yalnızca geleneksel eylem niyetleri için anlamlı bir yordayıcı olmuştur. Çalışma 2’de ($N = 335$) modele insandışılştırma değişkeni eklenmiş ve algılanan tehdit ile adaletsizliğin, yine korku ve öfke aracılığıyla ve ardından insandışılştırma üzerinden, dolaylı yoldan daha güçlü kolektif eylem niyetlerini yordadığı görülmüştür. Genel olarak bulgular, kolektif eylemin bilinen yordayıcılarını desteklemekte ve mülteci karşıtı mobilizasyonda insandışılştırmanın ek rolünü vurgulamaktadır. Nedensel çıkarımlar yapılabilmesi ve korkunun rolünün daha ayrıntılı incelenmesi için daha fazla araştırma yapılmasına ihtiyaç vardır.

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*to all first-generation graduates,
for paving the way*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

SEM	Structural Equation Modeling
SIMCA	Social Identity Model of Collective Action
the U.S.	the United States

1. INTRODUCTION

“The good times for illegal immigrants are over—get ready to pack your bags.”

(Matteo Salvini, 2018, regarding the refugees arriving at Italian ports)

Through these words, Italy’s then Minister of the Interior captures the growing anti-refugee sentiments across Europe, which have now turned into organized forms of action and hostility (Burns 2025). Anti-refugee collective action is emerging across the globe, including Germany (Al Jazeera 2016), the United Kingdom (Chauhan 2023), Greece (Carassava 2019), and Türkiye (YetkinReport 2024). As the number of refugees continues to grow in millions (UNHCR 2025), understanding the psychological foundations of these actions becomes increasingly important. Accordingly, in this thesis, I explore the dynamics of anti-refugee collective action by testing a model integrating established collective action predictors such as threat and perceived injustice (Almeida 2018; van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008), emotional mediators such as anger and fear, and dehumanization as a mechanism that may legitimize collective action. This model is tested in Türkiye, where Turkish citizens have been expressing negative sentiments towards Syrian refugees over the past decade (Yitmen and Verkuyten 2018*b*). This research, therefore, aims to contribute to the collective action literature and investigate the psychological processes behind this tension between host societies and refugees.

Understanding the anti-refugee collective action requires looking into the broader theoretical background of collective action first, which traditionally examines the group-based efforts to achieve social change (Louis and Taylor 1999; van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). Historically, collective action literature has focused more on the actions of the disadvantaged and marginalized groups who have mobilized to challenge inequality, resist oppression, and claim their rights. Women in feminist movements (Liss, Crawford, and Popp 2004), African Americans in the U.S.

civil rights movement (Morris 1999), or LGBTQ+ communities in pride campaigns (Ayoub 2017) are all important examples of people engaging in protests, strikes, and activism. While these groups organized to improve their conditions and fight against inequalities, collective action researchers followed them to understand the psychological and social dynamics behind this mobilization.

Building on these movements, researchers have developed theoretical frameworks to explain disadvantaged people’s motivations to engage in collective action. One of them is van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008)’s highly-cited work, where they conducted meta-analyses, integrated different perspectives, and developed the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA). In their model, van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) identify that group identification, perceived injustice, and collective efficacy are key factors for mobilization. Another influential model, the Dynamic Dual Pathway Model of Approach Coping With Collective Disadvantage (van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears 2012), proposes two distinct routes to collective action. Researchers suggest that individuals cope with group-based unfair treatments through an emotion-oriented or a problem-oriented pathway. They further suggest that these pathways often involve anger or efficacy for collective action, respectively. In addition to these frameworks, it has been proposed to integrate factors like moral convictions (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2011), which are based on strong beliefs about right and wrong, and politicized identities, which reflect a shared grievance and a collective goal within a political context.

Although collective action research has traditionally focused on the mobilization of minority or disadvantaged groups on behalf of their own rights, researchers later started to focus on non-targeted (and often advantaged) groups’ actions as well. More specifically, they examined how advantaged groups support and mobilize with the disadvantaged ones and defined it as solidarity-based collective action (Radke et al. 2020; Subašić, Reynolds, and Turner 2008). Some of the important examples of this type of action include heterosexuals’ allyship in support of same-sex marriage, White individuals’ participation in movements such as Black Lives Matter, and men’s support for the Women’s March. Including solidarity-based movements in the research agenda has expanded the understanding of collective action and shown that advantaged groups can mobilize on behalf of others.

Although there are some common factors that predict both forms of collective action, some social psychological drivers may be more specific to solidarity-based movements and the direction of the relationships might differ among collective action types. For example, Çakal et al. (2016) found intergroup threat as a positive mediator for Kurdish individuals’ collective action for their own group, whereas Gootjes et al. (2021) reported a negative association between intergroup threat and pro-refugee collective

action among Dutch participants. Meanwhile, outgroup empathy, which is more commonly examined within the solidarity-based mobilization, has been consistently and uniquely linked to solidarity-based collective action across four studies conducted in Greece, Thailand, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom (Özkan, Dhont, and Abrams 2024).

Recently, another form of collective action has gained attention in literature: ‘anti-minority collective action’ (Guvensoy, Bagci, and Yurt 2025), characterized by the mobilization of advantaged groups against disadvantaged ones. Groups that engage in this form of collective action often aim to react to social change (Selvanathan, Lickel, and Jetten 2021), maintain unequal sociopolitical systems (Jost et al. 2017; Osborne et al. 2019), or protect their privileged positions in society (Thomas and Osborne 2022). Movements like “White Lives Matter” (in reaction to Black Lives Matter) (Strickland 2016), #MenToo in reaction to the women’s #MeToo movement (Ayanian et al. 2024), and anti-LGBT protests across the globe (Euronews 2022; The Economist 2023) show how members of dominant groups are increasingly organizing to challenge, resist, or even reverse the progress made by marginalized groups.

While the literature of anti-minority collective action is still underdeveloped, researchers have started to explore the factors behind this form of mobilization. For instance, in a longitudinal study, Smeekes, Sedikides, and Wildschut (2023) found that collective nostalgia increased Dutch natives’ action intentions to limit immigration to the Netherlands. In another longitudinal study, Lilly et al. (2025) examined a range of intergroup factors and found that high levels of ethnic identification, social dominance orientation, and conservatism were positively linked to New Zealand Europeans’ collective action against Māori political mobilization. Interestingly, they also observed this pattern with low system justification and interpreted it as a reactionary response to New Zealand’s egalitarian system. This finding also highlighted the importance of context in understanding anti-minority collective action.

With the ever-increasing number of refugees around the world (UNHCR 2025) and the rise of right-wing authoritarian discourses (Castelli Gattinara 2018), recently, one of the most visible and widespread forms of anti-minority collective action has been anti-refugee collective action (Gootjes et al. 2021). Due to the scale of the issue, it ultimately resulted in the emergence of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, particularly in Europe and its surrounding regions (Dumont and Scarpetta 2015). Host societies have now started to express hostility towards refugees, participate in protests, and even use violence against them (Bianet 2024; Ekman 2018; Shubert, Schmidt, and Vonberg 2018). To this day, mobilization against refugees continues in many countries, including Germany (Al Jazeera 2025), Ireland (Amalaraj 2025), and Türkiye (Syed 2024).

Although this trend can be observed across many regions, Türkiye represents a particularly critical case. Türkiye is currently hosting the world’s largest population of Syrian refugees, with approximately 2.8 million people (UNHCR 2025). However, the country is witnessing a growing backlash against this population (Özdemir, Kaynak Malatyalı, and Sakallı 2023). Even though citizens’ initial responses were mostly positive, as refugees started to be portrayed as ‘guests who overstayed their welcome’ (Guzel and Fraser 2024; Koca 2016), reactions have substantially changed over time. Negative attitudes of both native citizens and political party leaders have become more openly expressed through public speeches, protests, and social media platforms (Aydemir 2023; Karakas 2021; Ozduzen, Korkut, and Ozduzen 2021). In some cases, this rising negativity even escalated into hate speech and violence (Bianet 2024; Sipahioğlu 2023). These developments highlight the urgent need to understand what drives mobilization against refugees, particularly within the Turkish context.

To explain the psychological background of anti-refugee mobilization, I used theories of collective action and intergroup emotions to propose an integrative model. This model includes perceived intergroup threat and perceived injustice as predictors of two important group-based emotions, fear and anger, respectively. These emotions are then expected to increase the level of refugee dehumanization, which may in turn legitimize collective action against them. In the following sections, I will elaborate on each of these constructs.

1.1 Intergroup Threat

A key construct in understanding collective responses to refugees is perceived intergroup threat. According to Intergroup Threat Theory (Stephan, Ybarra, and Morrison 2009), group members feel threatened when they see another group as posing a danger to their physical safety, economic resources, or cultural identity. Research shows that perceived threat plays an important role in the mobilization of both disadvantaged and advantaged groups. For instance, Chan et al. (2023) found that social threat had a positive indirect effect on both normative and violent collective action against mainland China among Hong Kong protestors. Meanwhile, in another study conducted across Estonia, Finland, and Norway, Celikkol et al. (2021) found that as the perceived threat from the outgroup increased, the majority group members’ willingness to engage in collective action on behalf of minority groups decreased. Considering the literature findings suggesting that advantaged

groups' reactions to outgroup threat are stronger (Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006; Stephan et al. 2002), examining this factor in the context of the host-refugee relationship becomes especially important. In addition, given that the threat emerges as an important factor that negatively influences native citizens' attitudes towards refugees in Türkiye, focusing on its impact on the Turkish population could offer a deeper perspective on this relationship (Çirakoğlu, Demirutku, and Karakaya 2021; Özdemir et al. 2024; Yitmen et al. 2022).

Consistent with these findings, several studies have consistently demonstrated the link between perceived threat and mobilization against immigrants and refugees among majority groups. Hasbún López et al. (2019) showed that perceived threat was directly associated with greater collective action intentions against refugees across 11 European countries. In another study, Gootjes et al. (2021) found similar results, showing that intergroup threat predicted higher anti-refugee collective action intentions among Dutch citizens. Similarly, Pollmanns and Asbrock (2023) demonstrated that perceived threat mediated the relationship between intergroup contact and support for anti-immigration movements. Supporting this pattern, Shepherd et al. (2018) found an indirect effect of distinctiveness threat on collective action intentions against immigrant groups, further reinforcing the relevance of threat in this form of collective action.

1.2 Perceived Injustice

Alongside the perceived threat, perceived injustice is another equally important factor that can motivate individuals to mobilize. Perceived injustice (or relative deprivation) refers to the perception that one's ingroup is not treated fairly or equally, and often stems from social comparison (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). As one of the core components of the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA), it has traditionally been studied among disadvantaged groups (Çakal et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 1987; Thomas et al. 2020). However, recent research has also shown its relation to solidarity-based movements and demonstrated that advantaged groups can act on injustices they perceive for others (Osborne et al. 2019; Szóstakowski and Besta 2024).

Intriguingly, findings suggest that nowadays advantaged groups themselves may feel disadvantaged and mobilize for their own group interests (Kleinert and Schlueter 2022; Thomas et al. 2020). For instance, Norton and Sommers (2011) showed that white people in the United States perceive racism as a zero-sum game and experience

‘reverse racism’. In another study, Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen (2007) found that in Australia, as non-Aborigines perceive themselves to be relatively deprived, they felt more anger. The increased anger then led them to take action against the government’s affirmation efforts for Aborigines. Osborne et al. (2019) later demonstrated that perceived injustice mediated the effects of both group identification and system justification on advantaged groups’ support for system-supporting collective action. Altogether, this body of research illustrates that perceiving one’s group as unfairly treated can serve as a powerful driver of mobilization for both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Furthermore, as the recent literature also suggests (Kayaoglu 2025), this factor is particularly relevant for understanding host society reactions to refugee populations.

1.3 Intergroup Emotions

While perceptions of threat and injustice may help explain why people are motivated to act, emotional responses often play a key role in turning these motivations into action. According to Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET), group-based evaluations can elicit emotional reactions, which in turn influence behaviors toward the outgroups (Mackie, Maimor, and Smith 2009; Mackie, Maitner, and Smith 2016). Therefore, in order to explain why and when people mobilize, researchers often include emotions in collective action models (van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). Furthermore, emotions have been found to contribute to the collective action intentions of both disadvantaged and advantaged group members (Shepherd et al. 2018; Tausch et al. 2011; van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears 2012). Researchers employ various emotions; for instance, anger has a well-established place in the collective action literature (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). In addition, emotions like fear (as an inhibitor) (Miller et al. 2009) and hope (Włodarczyk et al. 2017) are commonly studied within disadvantaged groups’ collective actions. Similarly, in the solidarity-based collective action literature, emotions like empathy, sympathy, and moral outrage are commonly linked to collective action among the majority group members (Saab et al. 2015; Tausch et al. 2011).

With the rise in anti-minority collective action, recent studies have also started to focus on what role emotions play in this form of mobilization. Particularly, anger and fear became significant emotions for anti-minority collective action (Stefaniak, Mallett, and Wohl 2020). For instance, Shepherd et al. (2018) conducted a study among British individuals and found that anger, fear, and angst played a mediating role

for collective action against immigrants. More specifically, these emotions mediated the relationship between perceived threat and collective action through increased prejudice. In another study, Osborne et al. (2019) showed that perceived injustice led to higher levels of anger, which in turn increased high-status group members' willingness for system-supporting collective action. Similarly, Stefaniak, Mallett, and Wohl (2020) found a positive association between fear and system-supporting collective action among advantaged group members. Given Turkish society's negative feelings towards Syrian refugees (Yitmen and Verkuyten 2018a), these findings suggest that examining how anger and fear contribute to anti-refugee mobilization in this context could provide crucial insights.

1.4 Dehumanization

In addition to becoming drivers of collective action, emotions like fear and anger may also contribute to moral disengagement mechanisms such as dehumanization (Giner-Sorolla and Russell 2019). A concept that is less examined within the collective action literature, dehumanization, can be defined as denying people their humanness (Haslam 2006). Different types of such denial include equating them to animals (e.g., cockroaches, apes) and equating them with other less-than-human entities (e.g., savages, barbarians) (Haslam et al. 2007). Dehumanization can have serious impacts on others, such as becoming grounds for human rights violations (Zlobina et al. 2023). In fact, in their study, Kteily et al. (2015) showed that blatant dehumanization predicts support for violent actions. Thus, dehumanization plays a central role in justifying intergroup harm and violence (Giner-Sorolla, Leidner, and Castano 2012; Waytz and Schroeder 2014).

However, only a few studies have explored dehumanization's influence on collective action. In one study, Kteily and Bruneau (2017) found that meta-dehumanization beliefs (i.e., people's beliefs that their own group is seen as less than human by another group) predicted support for both violent and non-violent collective action among minority group members. More recently, another study focusing on dehumanization in anti-minority mobilization showed that blatant dehumanization increased anti-LGBT collective action intentions in Poland (Górska and Tausch 2023). However, although dehumanization of refugees has been observed across the globe (Esses, Medianu, and Lawson 2013; Schulz 2015), its relevance for anti-refugee mobilization is still underexplored. A recent study by Çoksan et al. (2025) further demonstrated the degree of dehumanization in the Turkish context, showing that Syrian refugees

are more likely to be the subject of dehumanization (compared to Turkmen refugees), highlighting their marginalized position in society. Taken together with the previous research showing dehumanization's impact on outgroup attitudes and behaviors (Kteily et al. 2015), these findings suggest that dehumanization may serve as a mechanism that legitimizes anti-refugee collective action.

1.5 The Current Study

Building on the literature findings reviewed in the previous section, I aim to investigate the psychological dynamics of anti-refugee collective action, with a specific focus on Syrian refugees in Türkiye. In this study, anti-refugee collective action intentions are framed as both online and offline/traditional collective actions that are against Syrian refugees, like posting anti-Syrian refugee posts on social media (which could trigger larger movements) or signing petitions against them. Specifically, I propose a model in which perceived threat and perceived injustice increase fear and anger, respectively. I expect these emotional responses to then increase the dehumanization of refugees, which I expect to work as a legitimizing mechanism that leads to higher collective action intentions against refugees. This model is tested across two studies. In Study 1, using a nationally representative sample, I aim to test a partial version of the model (see Figure 1.1), focusing on more established predictors' influence on anti-refugee collective action. More specifically, I will examine whether perceived threat (through fear) and injustice (through anger) predict anti-refugee collective action intentions. Then, in Study 2, using data from the university and community samples, I aim to test the full model (see Figure 1.2), including dehumanization as a key mediating variable. By doing so, I will be integrating well-known predictors of collective action intentions like threat, injustice, and emotions like anger and fear with a less-studied intergroup notion like dehumanization. Through this research, I aim to offer a new insight into understanding why members of the host society may mobilize against refugee groups.

Figure 1.1 Study 1: Partial anti-refugee collective action model





Figure 1.2 Study 2: Full anti-refugee collective action model



2. STUDY 1

2.1 Method

2.1.1 Participants and Procedure

For Study 1, I collected data with the help of KONDA, a Türkiye-based research company. They agreed to collect data as part of the September 2024 issue of the Konda Barometer (KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık 2024), which is a monthly public opinion survey that tracks social and political trends in Türkiye. Items related to this study were added to their existing monthly survey. Data were collected from 32 cities across Türkiye through home visits conducted by trained field workers. All participation was voluntary and anonymous. The study was approved by the Sabancı University Research Ethics Council.

Since the data will be analyzed using a path analysis, the required sample size was determined based on the existing recommendation in the literature for a Structural Equation Model (SEM) (e.g., Kline 2016; Wolf et al. 2013). The path analysis included two predictor variables (perceived threat and perceived injustice), two mediators (fear and anger), and one outcome variable (collective action intentions). For a path analysis with this level of complexity and multiple mediation paths, a sample size between 200 and 300 is typically recommended to achieve adequate power ($> .80$) for detecting medium-sized indirect effects. In total, 2830 participants filled out the survey. Participants who were under 18 years old or not Turkish were excluded from the data. The final sample consisted of 2209 participants (1170 women, 1032 men, 7 did not report), which is an adequate number to test the model. The mean age of participants was 43.9 ($SD = 16.07$). Most of the participants (43.7%) defined their lifestyle as “traditional conservative”, followed by “modern” (35.8%) and “religious conservative” (20.5%).

2.1.2 Measures

Since the data for Study 1 were collected as part of a public opinion survey and added to KONDA's already existing questions for that month, the number of survey items was highly limited. Therefore, some scale items were combined in order to comply with the number of items that was allowed to add to KONDA's existing survey. Unless stated otherwise, all items were measured using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

2.1.2.1 Threat

Threat was measured using the following two items, tapping into realistic and symbolic threat: "Türkiye's cultural identity and existing values are threatened by the increasing number of Syrian refugees" and "Syrian refugees pose a threat to Türkiye's economy". The scale was adapted from Yitmen et al. (2022). Internal consistency was tested by using Pearson's correlation coefficient. The correlation between the two items was $r = .75$, $p < .001$, suggesting acceptable reliability for a two-item measure. It should be noted that due to the limited item capacity, these two items are combined versions of a larger scale. The full version will be used in Study 2.

2.1.2.2 Perceived injustice

Perceived injustice was assessed using a single item constructed for this study: "Turks are treated less fairly than Syrian refugees".

2.1.2.3 Anger and fear

Anger and fear were measured using a single item each: "I feel anger when I think about Syrian refugees" and "I feel fear when I think about Syrian refugees". Items were adapted from Bağcı, Verkuyten, and Canpolat (2023).

2.1.2.4 Collective action intentions

Collective action intentions was measured using the following two items, assessing online and traditional anti-refugee collective action intentions: "I would support

movements against Syrian refugees on social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.)”, and “I would sign a petition to restrict the number of Syrian refugees coming to Türkiye”. The scale was adapted from Hasbún López et al. (2019) and Acar and Uluğ (2022). The correlation between the two items was $r = .53$, $p < .001$, suggesting acceptable reliability for a two-item measure. It should be noted that due to the limited item capacity, these two items are combined versions of a larger scale. The full version will be used in Study 2.

2.2 Results

After the data collection was completed, I only extracted and analyzed the items that were added for this study from KONDA’s public opinion survey data.

2.2.0.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 2.1 Correlations and descriptive statistics for Study 1

	Range	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Threat	1–5	4.14	1.10	–					
2. Injustice	1–5	3.88	1.37	.628***	–				
3. Fear	1–5	3.04	1.55	.381***	.376***	–			
4. Anger	1–5	3.25	1.52	.497***	.44***	.596***	–		
5. Traditional CA	1–5	3.90	1.38	.549***	.447***	.353***	.449***	–	
6. Online CA	1–5	3.05	1.59	.391***	.374***	.33***	.49***	.527***	–

Note. CA = Collective Action.


* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 2.1. As expected from the literature findings, threat, injustice, anger, fear, traditional collective action against refugees, and online collective action against refugees are all positively correlated with each other.

2.2.0.2 Main analysis

In the hypothesized model, I expect perceived threat to predict greater fear, and perceived injustice to predict greater anger. For both traditional and online anti-refugee collective action, I expect these emotions to act as a mediator and predict more anti-refugee collective action intentions in turn. To test the hypothesized model, I conducted path analyses using JASP (JASP Team 2024)'s Structural Equation Model function.

Figure 2.1 Traditional anti-refugee collective action mediation model: Study 1



Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

The model was saturated (i.e., just-identified), with zero degrees of freedom; therefore, global model fit indices were not evaluated. As expected, perceived threat significantly predicted more fear ($\beta = .24$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$) and perceived injustice significantly predicted more anger ($\beta = .20$, $SE = .03$, $p < .001$). In turn, both fear ($\beta = .07$, $SE = .02$, $p < .001$) and anger ($\beta = .18$, $SE = .02$, $p < .001$) predicted higher traditional collective action intentions against refugees. In addition, cross-paths from threat to anger ($\beta = .37$, $SE = .03$, $p < .001$), and injustice to fear ($\beta = .22$, $SE = .03$, $p < .001$) were also significant. Figure 2.1 shows the standardized path coefficients; remaining direct effects can be found in Table 2.2.


As hypothesized, perceived threat had a significant indirect effect on traditional collective action against refugees through fear ($\beta = .02$, $SE = .01$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.008, .036]). In addition, perceived injustice also had a significant indirect effect on traditional collective action through anger ($\beta = .04$, $SE = .01$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.023, .051]). A full summary of the indirect effects can be found in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Path estimates for traditional anti-refugee collective action: Study 1

Effect	β	SE	Z	95% Confidence Interval		p
				Lower	Upper	
Direct Effects						
Threat $\rightarrow$ Traditional CA	.37	.03	15.45	.393	.534	< .001
Injustice $\rightarrow$ Traditional CA	.10	.02	4.27	.044	.154	< .001
Indirect Effects						
Threat $\rightarrow$ Fear $\rightarrow$ Traditional CA	.02	.01	3.30	.008	.036	< .001
Injustice $\rightarrow$ Anger $\rightarrow$ Traditional CA	.04	.01	6.06	.023	.051	< .001
Threat $\rightarrow$ Anger $\rightarrow$ Traditional CA	.07	.01	7.55	.058	.109	< .001
Injustice $\rightarrow$ Fear $\rightarrow$ Traditional CA	.02	.01	3.26	.006	.027	.001

Note. Indirect effects were tested using 5,000 bootstrap samples. Trad. CA = Traditional Collective Action. Beta values are standardized.

Figure 2.2 Online anti-refugee collective action mediation model: Study 1



Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

For online collective action intentions, as expected, perceived threat significantly predicted more fear ($\beta = .24$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$) and perceived injustice significantly predicted more anger ($\beta = .20$, $SE = .03$, $p < .001$). However, although anger ($\beta = .37$, $SE = .02$, $p < .001$) significantly predicted more online collective action intentions in turn, the path from fear to online collective action was not significant ($\beta = .02$, $SE = .02$, $p = .387$). Figure 2.2 shows the standardized path coefficients; remaining direct effects can be found in Table 2.3.

As hypothesized, perceived injustice had a significant indirect effect on online col-

Table 2.3 Path estimates for online anti-refugee collective action: Study 1

Effect	β	SE	Z	95% <i>Confidence Interval</i>		p
				Lower	Upper	
Direct Effects						
Threat $\rightarrow$ Online CA	.13	.04	4.90	.109	.257	< .001
Injustice $\rightarrow$ Online CA	.12	.03	4.89	.079	.202	< .001
Indirect Effects						
Threat $\rightarrow$ Fear $\rightarrow$ Online CA	.01	.01	.86	-.012	.023	.389
Injustice $\rightarrow$ Anger $\rightarrow$ Online CA	.07	.01	7.55	.062	.113	< .001
Threat $\rightarrow$ Anger $\rightarrow$ Online CA	.13	.02	11.36	.157	.235	< .001
Injustice $\rightarrow$ Fear $\rightarrow$ Online CA	.004	.01	.86	-.009	.018	.389

Note. Indirect effects were tested using 5,000 bootstrap samples. Online CA = Online Collective Action. Beta values are standardized.

lective action against refugees through anger ($\beta = .07$, $SE = .01$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.062, .113]). However, the indirect effect of threat on online collective action through fear was not significant ($\beta = .01$, $SE = .01$, $p = .389$, 95% CI [-.012, .023]). A full summary of the indirect effects can be found in Table 2.3.

2.3 Discussion

In summary, the results of Study 1 show that for both traditional and online collective action intentions, perceived threat predicts more fear, and perceived injustice predicts more anger. However, while anger predicts more anti-refugee collective action intentions for both traditional and online types of mobilization, fear only predicts more traditional anti-refugee collective action. Similarly, while anger mediates the relationship between perceived injustice and anti-refugee collective action intentions for both types, fear only mediates the relationship between perceived threat and traditional anti-refugee collective action. While the results are mostly in line with the hypothesized model and literature findings, inconsistencies regarding fear will be discussed in more detail.

3. STUDY 2

3.1 Method

3.1.1 Participants and Procedure

For Study 2, I recruited participants who were over 18 years old and fluent in Turkish. I collected data through both the university’s research credit pool (SONA) and the general community. Students received course credit in exchange for their participation in the study. To recruit community participants, I announced the study on social media platforms and distributed an online survey link to invite participants. All participation was voluntary and anonymous. The study was approved by the Sabancı University Research Ethics Council, and all participants provided consent before participating.

As in Study 1, the required sample size for the path analysis was determined based on the recommendations in the literature (e.g., Kline 2016; Wolf et al. 2013). Compared to Study 1, Study 2 incorporates an additional sequential mediator (dehumanization), alongside the original two predictor variables (perceived threat and perceived injustice), two mediators (fear and anger), and one outcome variable (collective action intentions). Although this model is more complex, a sample size of approximately 250–300 is still typically recommended to achieve sufficient power ($>.80$) for detecting medium-sized indirect effects.

A total of 447 participants completed the questionnaire. However, 41 participants were excluded for not completing the survey, 19 were excluded because their reported ethnicity was not Turkish, and 16 were excluded for failing the attention check. Additionally, 36 participants were excluded because they completed the survey after December 8, 2024, the day President Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed (Reuters 2024). Since the topic of the study focused on Syrian refugees, I reasoned that participants’ responses might have been influenced by such a significant event involving

Syrians. After these exclusions, the final sample consisted of 335 participants (184 women, 148 men, and 3 non-binary), which meets the recommended sample size for the tested path analysis. The mean age of participants was 27.49 ($SD = 12.31$). The mean socioeconomic status was reported as 4.66 ($SD = 1.12$), measured on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (*very low*) to 7 (*very high*). Participants also reported their political orientation on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*far left*) to 7 (*far right*), with a mean score of 3.05 ($SD = 1.3$).

3.1.2 Measures

Unless stated otherwise, all items were measured using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). All items can be found in Appendix A.¹

3.1.2.1 Threat

Threat was measured using a six-item survey, tapping into realistic and symbolic threat, adapted from Yitmen et al. (2022). Example items included: “Job opportunities are decreasing because of the Syrian refugees” and “Syrian refugees are undermining the culture of Türkiye”. The scale demonstrated high reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .93.

3.1.2.2 Perceived injustice

Perceived injustice was measured using a four-item survey constructed for this study. Example items include: “Syrian refugees are given preferential treatment compared to Turkish people” and “Compared to Syrian refugees, Turks are provided with fewer social and economic opportunities”. The scale demonstrated high reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .90.

1. In addition to the scales mentioned below, I measured national identification, anti- and pro-refugee identification, contact, and collective action support for exploratory purposes. However, they were not included in the analyses.

3.1.2.3 Anger and fear

Anger and fear were measured using a single-item format adapted from Bagci, Verkuyten, and Canpolat (2023). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they feel anger and fear toward Syrian refugees, using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*I don't feel at all*) to 7 (*I feel a lot*). The list of emotions included: “anger”, “fear”, “anxiety”, and “rage”². For the present study, fear was calculated as the average score of “fear” and “anxiety”, and anger was calculated as the average score of “anger” and “rage”. Internal consistency was tested by using Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The correlation between the two items was $r = .83$, $p < .001$ for anger and $r = .48$, $p < .001$ for fear, suggesting acceptable reliability for two-item measures.

3.1.2.4 Dehumanization

Dehumanization was measured using a trait-based scale adapted from Kteily and Bruneau (2017) and Bagci et al. (2023). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which a series of traits described Syrian refugees, using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*doesn't describe at all*) to 7 (*completely describes*). The list included nine traits: “lacking morals”, “scientifically/technologically advanced” (reverse coded), “capable of self-control” (reverse coded), “savage and aggressive”, “mature and responsible” (reverse coded), “barbaric and cold-hearted”, “backward and primitive”, “refined and cultured” (reverse coded), “rational and logical” (reverse coded). The scale demonstrated high reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .89

3.1.2.5 Collective action intentions

Collective action intentions was measured using a five-item survey, assessing both online and traditional anti-refugee collective action intentions, adapted from Hasbún López et al. (2019) and Acar and Uluğ (2022). However, an exploratory factor analysis showed that both online and traditional collective action intention items loaded onto a single factor. Therefore, they were combined into one composite scale representing overall collective action intentions. Example items include: “I would share posts against Syrian refugees on social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,

2. In order to create a more balanced response set and decrease the social desirability effect, the total list of emotions included eight emotions: “anxiety”, “admiration”, “anger”, “pity”, “fear”, “rage”, “respect”, and “compassion”. Only anger and fear related emotions were used in the analysis.

etc.)” and “I would participate in a demonstration against Syrian refugees”. The scale demonstrated high reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .88.

Demographic information included gender, socioeconomic status, education level, ethnicity, and political orientation. These demographic variables were not included in the main analyses but were collected for descriptive purposes.

3.2 Results

3.2.0.1 Descriptive statistics

Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 3.1. As expected from the literature findings, threat, injustice, anger, fear, dehumanization, and collective action intentions against refugees are all positively correlated with each other.

Table 3.1 Correlations and descriptive statistics for Study 2

	Range	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Threat	1–7	5.44	1.50	–					
2. Injustice	1–7	4.87	1.66	.714***	–				
3. Fear	1–7	4.72	1.58	.488***	.488***	–			
4. Anger	1–7	4.04	1.91	.674***	.618***	.494***	–		
5. Dehumanization	1–7	5.16	1.11	.667***	.610***	.458***	.690***	–	
6. Anti-Refugee CA	1–7	4.13	1.62	.733***	.613***	.343***	.642***	.621***	–


Note. CA = Collective Action.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

3.2.0.2 Main analysis

In the hypothesized model, I expect perceived threat to predict greater fear, and perceived injustice to predict greater anger. Then, I expect these emotions to predict higher levels of dehumanization towards refugees, and dehumanization to predict stronger anti-refugee collective action intentions in turn. Like Study 1, I conducted a path analysis using JASP (JASP Team 2024)’s Structural Equation Model function.

Figure 3.1 Anti-refugee collective action mediation model: Study 2



Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Same as Study 1, the model was saturated with zero degrees of freedom; therefore, global model fit indices were not evaluated. The direct paths were all in line with the hypothesized model. Perceived threat significantly predicted more fear ($\beta = .29$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$) and perceived injustice significantly predicted more anger ($\beta = .28$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$). Then, both fear ($\beta = .16$, $SE = .03$, $p < .001$) and anger ($\beta = .62$, $SE = .02$, $p < .001$) significantly predicted higher levels of dehumanization. Dehumanization ($\beta = .15$, $SE = .07$, $p < .01$) then significantly predicted greater anti-refugee collective action intentions.

In addition, cross-paths from threat to anger ($\beta = .48$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$), and injustice to fear ($\beta = .28$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$) were also significant. Figure 3.1 shows the standardized path coefficients; remaining direct effects can be found in Table 3.2.

Results showed that hypothesized indirect pathways from perceived threat and perceived injustice to anti-refugee collective action were supported as well. Perceived threat had a significant indirect effect on anti-refugee collective action intentions through fear and dehumanization ($\beta = .01$, $SE = .003$, $p = .041$, 95% CI [.002, .020]). Likewise, perceived injustice had a significant indirect effect on anti-refugee collective action through anger and dehumanization ($\beta = .03$, $SE = .01$, $p = .012$, 95% CI [.006, .054]). It should also be noted that cross indirect pathways to anti-refugee collective action were also significant for both threat (through anger and dehumanization) ($\beta = .04$, $SE = .02$, $p = .006$, 95% CI [.010, .094]), and injustice (through fear and dehumanization) ($\beta = .006$, $SE = .003$, $p = .041$, 95% CI [.001, .017]). A full summary of the indirect effects can be found in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Path estimates for anti-refugee collective action: Study 2

	β	SE	95% Confidence Interval		Z	p
			Lower	Upper		
Direct Effects						
Threat $\rightarrow$ CA	.47	.06	.344	.643	8.33	<.001
Injustice $\rightarrow$ CA	.12	.05	-.006	.231	2.23	.025
Fear $\rightarrow$ CA	-.11	.04	-.198	-.031	-2.70	.007
Anger $\rightarrow$ CA	.18	.05	.085	.274	3.71	<.001
Indirect Effects						
Threat $\rightarrow$ Fear $\rightarrow$ Dehumanization $\rightarrow$ CA	.01	.003	.002	.020	2.04	.041
Injustice $\rightarrow$ Anger $\rightarrow$ Dehumanization $\rightarrow$ CA	.03	.01	.006	.054	2.53	.012
Threat $\rightarrow$ Anger $\rightarrow$ Dehumanization $\rightarrow$ CA	.04	.02	.010	.094	2.77	.006
Injustice $\rightarrow$ Fear $\rightarrow$ Dehumanization $\rightarrow$ CA	.006	.003	.001	.017	2.04	.041
Fear $\rightarrow$ Dehumanization $\rightarrow$ CA	.02	.01	.004	.057	2.32	.020
Anger $\rightarrow$ Dehumanization $\rightarrow$ CA	.09	.03	.016	.154	2.92	.003

Note. Indirect effects were tested using 5,000 bootstrap samples. CA = anti-refugee collective action. Beta values are standardized.

3.3 Discussion

Overall, the results of Study 2 support the hypothesized model and Study 1's findings, showing that perceived threat predicts more fear, perceived injustice predicts more anger, and these emotions then predict greater dehumanization of refugees. Dehumanization, then, predicts higher anti-refugee collective action intentions. In addition, results showed that both perceived threat (through fear and then dehumanization) and perceived injustice (through anger and then dehumanization) indirectly predict stronger anti-refugee collective action intentions. Therefore, findings support the hypothesized mediation model.

4. GENERAL DISCUSSION

As the rising anti-refugee sentiments are turning into anti-refugee collective action across the globe (Burns 2025), the need to understand the processes behind host societies' mobilization becomes increasingly urgent. The current research examined these processes across two studies, using both affective and cognitive factors that could influence the collective action dynamics against Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Both studies supported the hypothesized model where established collective action predictors like perceived threat and injustice led to well-known negative intergroup emotions, such as anger and fear, which then translated into dehumanization (Study 2), and then predicted stronger anti-refugee collective action intentions. These findings were in line with the current literature showing that perceived threat and injustice play an important role in anti-minority mobilization (Gootjes et al. 2021; Hasbún López et al. 2019; Osborne et al. 2019), especially through emotions (Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen 2007). In addition, findings supported the Intergroup Emotions Theory (Mackie, Mainer, and Smith 2009; Mackie, Maitner, and Smith 2016), suggesting that intergroup emotions would transform into behavioral intentions towards the outgroup, which is also demonstrated in the anti-minority collective action literature (Shepherd et al. 2018; Stefaniak, Mallett, and Wohl 2020).

Furthermore, in Study 2, where dehumanization was added into the model, findings showed how emotional reactions could give rise to the dehumanization of refugees, then leading to stronger mobilization against them. Thus, the current study both supports the literature findings showing the influence of dehumanization on intergroup hostility (Kteily et al. 2015) and also aims to contribute to the anti-minority collective action research, where so far only a few studies have explored the role of dehumanization (Górska and Tausch 2023).

However, there were also inconsistencies across findings, more specifically, regarding the role of fear. In Study 1, fear predicted traditional collective action but not online collective action against refugees. Meanwhile, in Study 2, while its direct association with anti-refugee collective action was negative, it contributed positively

through an indirect pathway via dehumanization. One possible explanation for these inconsistent results might be fear’s avoidant nature (Miller et al. 2009). Although advantaged groups still feel fear in response to perceived threats, their advantaged group position in society may be reinforcing avoidance. At the same time, this combination can create tension that might lead some to respond with protective or exclusionary behaviors. Literature findings also show that although fear has an inhibitory effect on minority or solidarity-based collective action (Adra et al. 2020; Stefaniak, Mallett, and Wohl 2020), its role in eliciting negative reactions among majority groups is less consistent (e.g., defensive reactions and aggression) (Bagci, Verkuyten, and Canpolat 2023; Spanovic et al. 2010). Therefore, both the previous empirical research and this study’s findings suggest that fear’s role in anti-minority collective action might be more complex than it seems.

In addition, one explanation for why fear predicted traditional but not online collective action in Study 1 could be the Turkish context. Although online platforms might be perceived as less risky for collective action, in an authoritarian context, these platforms may also serve as a surveillance mechanism (Ruijgrok 2017). Furthermore, it is known that in the Turkish context, online posts can carry real consequences, including getting arrested (Kural 2021). Considering the government’s pro-refugee stance (Gündoğmuş 2023), people may avoid expressing their anti-refugee views online so that they could avoid these consequences. In contrast, some of the traditional collective action practices like protests may create a sense of anonymity or group protection, thereby providing a safer place to express those views.

Taken together, this study offers insight into both the theoretical and practical aspects of collective action. First, this study’s findings show that dehumanization should be focused more on the anti-minority collective action, since it could be an important driving factor. In addition, by examining both online and traditional forms of mobilization, this study hopes to contribute to our understanding of how the dynamics of collective action can vary, even within the same context.

Furthermore, this study focuses on Türkiye, which hosts a large number of refugees (UNHCR 2025) and is facing rising negativity against refugees among its citizens (Özdemir, Kaynak Malatyalı, and Sakallı 2023). Therefore, understanding how these negative views translate into behavioral intentions carries great importance for policymakers and practitioners who aim to protect refugees’ well-being and peace within the country. Benefiting from the findings of this research, those who plan interventions for anti-refugee hostility may focus on reducing perceptions of threat and unfairness among host citizens. Policymakers could communicate more openly about refugee policies, benefits, and their impact on citizens in order to address these concerns before they escalate into mobilization. Also, reducing negative in-

tergroup emotions and highlighting the shared humanity between refugees and host communities could be beneficial for intervention strategies.

While these findings offer meaningful implications for both theory and practice, it should also be considered that this research has some limitations. First, since both studies are cross-sectional, we can not infer causality from these findings. Future studies could employ an experimental or longitudinal design to test causal pathways that lead to anti-refugee collective action. Another limitation is that although this study focuses on different forms of collective action, it measures action intentions rather than actual behaviors, like in the majority of studies in collective action literature. Using measures that focus on the past mobilization behaviors, integrating actual behavioral indicators of collective action into the measurement (e.g., donating for the cause at the end of the survey), or conducting this study in the field during an anti-refugee protest could offer a more nuanced understanding of the behavioral aspect. Lastly, although Study 1 was based on a large and nationally representative sample, since the items for this study were added to an existing public opinion survey, the number of items for each variable was highly limited. In Study 2, we were able to use full versions of these scales, but the limited number of items in Study 1 may still have affected how well the variables were measured.

In addition to the aforementioned suggestions, future research could explore whether there are differences in how these anti-refugee collective action dynamics play out across different refugee groups (e.g., Ukrainian refugees vs. Syrian refugees) (Çoksan et al. 2025). Similarly, cross-cultural replication studies, as well as studies using this model with mobilization against various marginalized groups, could be meaningful contributions to the collective action literature. Furthermore, future research could explore dehumanization's role in anti-minority collective action in more depth by using an experimental design. Lastly, intervention studies could be conducted focusing on this study's predictors in order to determine which strategies are more effective in decreasing anti-refugee collective action.

5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this thesis examined the psychological background of anti-refugee mobilization in Türkiye across two studies. Focusing on the roles of perceived intergroup threat, perceived injustice, fear, anger, and, in Study 2, dehumanization, this research offers important insights into mobilization against refugees. Results showed that while perceived threat and injustice gave rise to intergroup emotions like fear and anger, respectively, the link between these emotions and behavioral intentions might be more complex. More specifically, while anger consistently predicted mobilization against refugees, the role of fear was less consistent. The findings also demonstrated that dehumanization may serve as a legitimizing factor for anti-refugee collective action, transforming these negative emotions into mobilization intentions. Overall, both the rising trend of anti-refugee collective action and the findings of this research highlight the need for more nuanced studies across different contexts to deepen our understanding of anti-minority mobilization and inform effective interventions.

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APPENDIX A

Consent Form for Study 2

Değerli katılımcımız, çalışmamıza hoş geldiniz!

15 dakika kadar sürecek bu araştırmaya katılmak üzere davet edilmiş bulunuyorsunuz. 18 yaşının üzerinde olan ve Türkçe konuşmayı bilen herkes çalışmaya katılabilir. Bu araştırma Sabancı Üniversitesi Psikoloji Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Duygu Yurt tarafından Doç. Dr. Çiğdem Bağcı danışmanlığındaki yüksek lisans tezi kapsamında yürütülmektedir. Bu araştırmada sizden çeşitli gruplara yönelik olan tutumlarınız, hisleriniz ve davranışlarınızla ilgili bazı soruları cevaplamanız istenecektir. Sonuçları yalnızca akademik amaçlarla kullanılacak olan bu araştırmaya katılımınız tamamen isteğe bağlıdır. Araştırmada çeşitli gruplara yönelik tutumların ölçülmesi katılımcılarda kısa vadeli hassasiyet yaratabilir, ancak çalışmanın katılımcılarda uzun vadeli ya da büyük çapta bir rahatsızlık yaratması beklenmemektedir. Çalışmanın herhangi bir noktasında hassasiyet hissedilmesi durumunda neden belirtmeksizin katılmayı reddedebilir ve çalışmadan istediğiniz zaman çekilebilirsiniz. Sizden kimlik belirleyici herhangi bir bilgi istenmeyecek ve cevaplarınız gizli tutulacaktır. Soruların doğru ya da yanlış cevaplarının olmadığını lütfen unutmayınız. Tüm soruların ‘Kesinlikle katılmıyorum’ ile ‘Kesinlikle katılıyorum’ arasında değişen cevapları bulunmaktadır; soruları kendi görüşlerinizi yansıtacak şekilde eksiksiz ve samimi bir şekilde yanıtlamanız araştırmanın sonuçları için önemlidir. Elde edilen veriler toplu olarak analiz edilecektir. Ayrıca, veriler anonim olarak Open Science Framework platformunda paylaşılacaktır. Katılımınız için teşekkür ederiz. Araştırma veya katılımınızla ilgili sorularınız olursa araştırmacı Duygu Yurt’a (duygu.yurt@sabanciuniv.edu) veya Doç. Dr. Çiğdem Bağcı’ya (cigdem.bagci@sabanciuniv.edu) ilgili e-mail adreslerine e-posta göndererek ulaşabilirsiniz. Haklarınızın ihlal edildiğini düşünüyorsanız Sabancı Üniversitesi Etik Kurul Başkanı Prof. Dr. Mehmet Yıldız’a e-posta (meyildiz@sabanciuniv.edu) veya telefon (+90 216 483 9010) yoluyla ulaşabilirsiniz.

Qualtrics’in verilerinizi anonim olarak saklamasını ve çalışmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorsanız, anket sorularına devam etmek için lütfen ‘Katılmayı kabul ediyorum’ düğmesine tıklayın. Kabul etmemeniz durumunda çalışma sonlanacaktır.

Katılmayı kabul ediyorum: ___ Katılmayı kabul etmiyorum: ___

Scale Items for Study 2

Yaşınız: ____

Cinsiyetiniz:

- ___ Kadın
- ___ Erkek
- ___ Non-binary (İkili olmayan)
- ___ Belirtmek istemiyorum

Genel olarak, sosyo-ekonomik durumunuzu nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

1-Oldukça düşük 2 3 4 5 6 7-Oldukça yüksek

Mezun olduğunuz son okul:

- ___ Okula gitmedim/Diplomam yok
- ___ İlkokul
- ___ Ortaokul
- ___ Lise
- ___ Lisans/Üniversite
- ___ Yüksek lisans ve üstü

Kendinizi hangi etnik gruba ait hissediyorsunuz?

- ___ Türk
- ___ Diğer (Lütfen belirtiniz): ____

Siyasi konularda “sol”dan ve “sağ”dan bahsedildiğini sık sık duyuyoruz. Aşağıda bir sol-sağ cetveli verilmiştir. Burada “1” en solu, “7” ise en sağ gösteriyor. Sizin kendi görüşleriniz bu cetvelin neresinde yer alır?

(Sol) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Sağ)

National Identification

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere ne kadar katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtiniz. (1. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 4. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum, 7. Kesinlikle katılıyorum)

1. Kendimi Türkiye vatandaşı olarak tanımlarım.
2. Kendimi Türkiye’ye ait hissediyorum.
3. Kendimi Türklere bağlı hissediyorum.

Contact

Aşağıdaki sorular Suriyeli mültecilerle temas/etkileşiminizi ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır, lütfen ölçeği kullanarak soruları cevaplayınız. (1. Hiçbir zaman, 4. Bazen, 7. Çok sık)

1. Suriyeli mültecilerle ne sıklıkla OLUMLU iletişim kuruyorsunuz?
2. Suriyeli mültecilerle ne sıklıkla OLUMSUZ iletişim kuruyorsunuz?

Anti and Pro Refugee Identification

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelerle ne kadar katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtiniz. (1. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 4. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum, 7. Kesinlikle katılıyorum)

1. Kendimi mülteci karşıtı bir birey olarak tanımlarım.
2. Mülteci karşıtı bireylerle birçok ortak noktam vardır.
3. Kendimi mülteci yanlısı bir birey olarak tanımlarım.
4. Mülteci yanlısı bireylerle birçok ortak noktam vardır.

Perceived Threat

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelerle ne kadar katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtiniz. (1. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 4. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum, 7. Kesinlikle katılıyorum)

1. Türkiye'nin kültürel kimliği artan Suriyeli mülteciler yüzünden tehdit altındadır.
2. Türkiye'nin norm ve değerleri Suriyeli mültecilerin varlığı nedeniyle tehdit altındadır.
3. Suriyeli mülteciler Türkiye'nin kültürünü baltalamaktadır.
4. Suriyeli mülteciler Türkiye ekonomisine tehdit oluşturmaktadır.
5. Bu cümleyi okuyorsanız lütfen 7- Kesinlikle katılıyorum seçeneğini işaretleyiniz.
6. Suriyeli mülteciler yüzünden iş imkanları azalmaktadır.
7. Şehirler Suriyeli mülteciler yüzünden daha güvensiz olmaktadır.

Perceived Injustice

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelerle ne kadar katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtiniz. (1. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 4. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum, 7. Kesinlikle katılıyorum)

1. Suriyeli mültecilerle karşılaştırıldığında Türklere daha az sosyal ve ekonomik imkan sağlanmaktadır.
2. Suriyeli mültecilere kıyasla Türklere daha az adil davranılmaktadır.
3. Suriyeli mülteciler Türklere kıyasla kayırılmaktadır.
4. Göç öncesi ile kıyaslandığında, son zamanlarda Türklerin bu ülkedeki konumu kötüleşmiştir.

Emotions

Lütfen Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik aşağıdaki duyguları ne derece hissettiğinizi belirtiniz. (1. Hiç hissetmiyorum, 4. Biraz hissediyorum, 7. Çok fazla hissediyorum)

1. Endişe
2. Hayranlık
3. Kızgınlık
4. Acıma
5. Korku
6. Öfke
7. Saygı
8. Merhamet

Dehumanization

Lütfen aşağıdaki özelliklerin Suriyeli mültecileri ne derece tanımladığını değerlendiriniz. (1. Hiç tanımlamıyor, 4. Ne tanımıyor ne tanımlamıyor, 7. Tamamen tanımıyor)

1. Ahlaktan yoksun
2. Bilimsel / teknolojik olarak gelişmiş
3. Kendini kontrol edebilen
4. Vahşi ve saldırgan
5. Olgun ve sorumluluk sahibi
6. Barbar ve soğuk kalpli
7. Geride kalmış ve ilkel
8. Zarif ve kültürlü
9. Rasyonel ve mantıklı

Collective Action Intentions

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelerle ne kadar katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtiniz. (1. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 4. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum, 7. Kesinlikle katılıyorum)

1. Türkiye'ye gelen Suriyeli mülteci sayısının kısıtlanması için bir imza kampanyasına katılırım.
2. Suriyeli mülteci karşıtı bir protestoya katılırım.
3. Suriyeli mültecilerin Türkiye'den sınır dışı edilmesini amaçlayan bir politikayı desteklerim.
4. Sosyal medyada (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram vb.) Suriyeli mülteci karşıtı hareketlere destek veririm.
5. Sosyal medyada (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram vb.) Suriyeli mülteci karşıtı

paylaşımlar yaparım.

Collective Action Support

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere ne kadar katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtiniz. (1. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 4. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum, 7. Kesinlikle katılıyorum)

1. Suriyeli mültecilerin yanında Türklerin de haklarının korunmasını sağlayacak organizasyonlara ihtiyaç vardır.
2. Ülkemizde Suriyeli mültecilerin yanında Türklerin de yaşadığı unutulmamalı ve haklarının gözetilmesi gereklidir.
3. Türklerin de Suriyeli mülteciler gibi yaşadıkları zorlukları göstermek için daha fazla çabalaması gereklidir.