

THE UNITED KINGDOM'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE INDO-PACIFIC AND CHINA

Bahri Yilmaz

EU Ad Personam Jean Monnet Professor in Economics

THE UNITED KINGDOM'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE INDO-PACIFIC AND CHINA¹

1. Introduction

The primary purpose of this study is to analyse the United Kingdom's (UK) trade relations with the Indo-Pacific region, especially with Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) members and India. The main focus of the study is trade between the United Kingdom and China & Hong Kong, followed by other RCEP countries and India, and to find out where the United Kingdom stands in the region. Finally, conclusions are drawn from the results of the study about the future of the United Kingdom and its relations with both China & Hong Kong and the Indo-Pacific as a whole.

2. A brief overview of the history of the British Empire in the Indo-Pacific

During the 19th and 20th centuries, the British Empire was the most dominant colonial power and a key player in the Indo-Pacific region.

The attention of European powers, particularly Great Britain, was drawn to the Indo-Pacific region with the start of the Industrial Revolution. In this process, the Chinese Empire inevitably attracted the attention of London, due to its geographical location and economic potential. Britain began to pose a serious threat to the Chinese Empire from the 19th century onwards.

The colonization process in the region was not only initiated and carried out by the British government but also by the well-known trading company the British East India Company. In order to protect the investments and economic interests of the company, the British set up colonial governments and introduced their own economic and administrative systems.

After the First Opium War, the Treaties of Nanking (1842) and Humen (1843) came into force. These treaties marked the beginning of Britain's growing dominance and

¹ Bahri Yilmaz is EU Ad Person am Jean Monnet Professor and Emeritus Professor in Economics at Sabanci University's Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. The author would like to thank Friedrich Ebert Stiftung for supporting the project at Faculty of Eastern Asian Studies, Ruhr-Universität- Bochum.

opened China's markets and harbours to the colonial powers of the West. The Qing government was obliged to open four other ports in Guangzhou and Hong Kong for the purpose of facilitating direct trade between foreigners and the Chinese population.

The Treaty of Tianjin of (1858) and the Convention of Beijing of 1860 extended the foreign privileges granted after the Second Opium War and approved or legalised innovations in the Chinese trading system.

The island of Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain. During the 19th and 20th centuries, most of the countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including India, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Brunei, were occupied by Great Britain. As a result of its long-standing colonial power in the Indo-Pacific region, London was the economic and politically dominant ruler until the independence of these colonies from the United Kingdom. After the end of the Chinese Civil War, the United Kingdom was the first Western state to recognise the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949.

London's close diplomatic and economic relations with the former colonial states in the Indo-Pacific continued after independence and during the Cold War. The United Kingdom was linked to these countries through the use of the English language and the cultural and historical ties forged during the colonial period. British governments have sought to maintain their historical and diplomatic ties with the region through membership in the Commonwealth, an organisation that was part of the former British Empire and today maintains diplomatic political and economic relations.

In his book *Empire*, Harvard University historian Niall Ferguson argues that the British Empire was extremely successful in introducing and implementing the English language, the banking system and common law, Protestantism, team sports, and governance in the region.²

² Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (Penguin Company, 2004).

3. Britain's current strategy for the Indo-Pacific region

In 2021, the Conservative government proposed that the UK should pursue a strategy it dubbed the 'Tilt to the Indo-Pacific', meaning that London should strengthen its defence, trade, and foreign policy relationships with the region.³

On 13 March 2023, the government published the 'Integrated Review Refresh', stating that the Indo-Pacific region is 'critical to the UK's economy and security, as well as to the maintenance of an open and stable international order'.⁴

The security aspects of London's relations with the Indo-Pacific are the first priority, with the main goal being to assess the UK's defence standing in the region, its regional relationships, and how to strengthen these further through defence.⁵

Additionally, the Conservative government announced in 2023 that it had met its original target for the tilt, citing several targets proposed in 2021. These included concluding free trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand, as well as an agreement to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP/TPP) trade bloc and admission as a dialogue partner in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In 2024, the new elected Labour government launched a strategic defence review, which is the latest in a series of reviews that have been conducted over the past few years.⁶ They confirmed that the government remains committed to the AUKUS partnership, the enhanced trilateral security partnership launched in September 2021 by the leaders of the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, which

⁵ Ibid.

³ The UK's 'tilt to the Indo-Pacific', as first set out in the 2021 Integrated Review under the Conservative government, is a policy that has been in place for some time. The goal of the tilt is to deepen the UK's defence, foreign policy, and trade relationships in the region.

⁴ The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 updates the government's security, defence, development, and foreign policy priorities to reflect changes in the global context since Integrated Review 2021.

⁶ Strategic Defence Review Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad 2025, Ministry of Defence, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/683d89f181deb72cce2680a5/The_Strategic_Defence_Review_202 5_-_Making_Britain_Safer_-secure_at_home_strong_abroad.pdf

aims to build on long-standing bilateral relationships and strengthen the three nations' ability to support security and defence interests.⁷

From this perspective, it seems that the British government is more concerned with security and defence policy in the Indo-Pacific region rather than with the economic policies related with the region.

4. What is Britain's role in the Indo-Pacific region today?

London's current Indo-Pacific policy gives the impression of a desire to return to the 'good old days' after Brexit under the banner of 'Global Britain'. The UK is seeking a fresh start and a breakthrough in foreign, security, trade, and economic policy on a global scale. Drawing on its colonial past in the region, the UK could, of course, leverage its historical experience and relationships to build an economic and security front and create a new economic and security order in the region.

In the context of the UK's strategic reorientation towards the Indo-Pacific, the country's approach to the region can be outlined as follows: The British government emphasised that more than 1.7 million British citizens live in the Indo-Pacific region and that the UK's trading relationship with the region was worth over GBP 250 billion in 2022. By 2030, the region is expected to account for over 40% of global GDP. The security of the region is directly linked to the well-being of UK households, given that 60% of global trade is transported via shipping routes in the Indo-Pacific.⁸

However, Britain is a military and nuclear power but not an economic superpower. This means it cannot, on its own, reshape the current political and economic structure of the region. The UK can only exert a great influence in the Indo-Pacific, if it may collaborate closely with Commonwealth members and Washington in the region.

This collaborative plan by London, Washington, and several other Commonwealth members would be the collective outcome of two significant advancements. First, to control the rise of China as a global superpower and the expansion of its economic

⁷ İbid.

⁸ "The UK's tilt to the Indo-Pacific and what's next for its policy to the region?" Research Briefing, of House of Commons Library, UK Parliament, Published March 28, 2025, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10052/.

and military influence in the region. Second, the formation of the Indo-Pacific region as a strong, economically dynamic bloc that holds great importance for the future international order.

The most important of these is the CPTPP/TPP trade bloc, which is a group of member countries that aim to promote free trade and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region. The United Kingdom officially joined the Asia-Pacific trade group on 16 July 2023. However, in a surprising turn of events, the Trump administration pulled out of the TPP in January 2017. Despite the vacuum created by the US withdrawal from the TPP, the UK tried to maintain unity in the absence of the US and defend the economic and security interests of both London and Washington against China's economic dominance in the region.

5. A brief overview of the British economy

The United Kingdom has the sixth-largest economy in the world. Per capita income is USD 55,000 (nominal, 2025). The population size is almost 68 million inhabitants.⁹ In 2023, The value of the UK's outward investment stock position abroad) was GBP1.9 trillion, and inward FDI the UK was GBP 2.1 trillion, behind the USA at USD 12.8 trillion, and China on USD 3.7 trillion.¹⁰ UK investments in EU countries accounted for 43.0% of the total stock of UK investments abroad, and EU countries accounted for 31% of the stock of FDI in the UK.¹¹

In 2022, the United Kingdom's major trading partners were the United States, the Netherlands, Germany, China, and Switzerland. The UK's largest import partners were China, the United States, Germany, Norway, and France.¹² The EU is the UK's largest trading partner, accounting for 40% of UK foreign trade in goods in 2022.The

⁹ "Foreign direct investment, net outflows (BoP, current US\$)," World Bank, Retrieved February 14, 2024. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.

¹⁰ Foreign Direct Investment Statistics, House of Commons Library, May 9, 2025. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8534/CBP-8534.pdf,

¹¹İbid.,

¹² "Official Statistics, Trade and investment core statistics book," Updated May 23, 2025, Gov.UK, Department for Business & Trade, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/trade-and-investment-core-statistics-book/trade-and-investment-core-statistics-book.

UK is the EU's third largest trading partner (9.8%), after the United States and $\rm China.^{13}$

On the one hand, London's position as the largest financial centre in Europe remains unchanged by Brexit, and the city is also centre of many multinational companies. Both the banking and tourism sectors have been driving economic forces, with tourism generating around 10% of GDP. There are over 370 monetary financial institutions in the UK. The retail sector is also one of the leading sectors.¹⁴

But also, on the other hand, The United Kingdom is one of the world's largest producing countries, with particularly important civil and military aerospace and pharmaceutical industries, and has considerable mineral resources. It was once the world's 10th-largest oil producer with huge natural gas reserves.¹⁵

6. Trade Relations of the United Kingdom with the RCEP countries and India¹⁶

With China, Japan, and the United States, the world's three largest economies have Pacific coastlines. The region is populated by both developed and developing countries. It is the residence of 65% of the world's population, occupies 44% of the world's landmass, produces 62% of the world's GDP, and contributes 46% of the world's merchandise trade.¹⁷

One of the most important determinants of the increased interest in this region is the implementation of the RCEP. On the other side, CPTPP/TPP has also increased interest in the region. The TPP currently has 12 members: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the

¹⁵ İbid.

¹³ European Commission, "EU trade relations with the United Kingdom. Facts, figures and latest developments," accessed June 4, 2025, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/united-

kingdom_en#:~:text=The%20EU%20is%20the%20UK's%20biggest%20trading%20partner%2C,goods%20with%20th e%20UK%20amounted%20to%20€113%20billion.

¹⁴United Kingdom: Economic and political outline, Santander Trade Market, https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/analyse-markets/united-kingdom/economic-political-outline

¹⁶ International Trade Center, Trade Map (www.trademap.org), author's own calculations.

¹⁷ Jis John Sebastian, "India and the Indo-Pacific," clear IAS, last updated November 1, 2022, https://www.clearias.com/india-indo-pacific/.

United Kingdom. It is noteworthy that Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam are also members of the RCEP.

As a result of all these developments, two intertwined free trade zones have formed in the Indo-Pacific region, TPP and RCEP. Over time, the countries of the region can move from one bloc to the other, considering the economic advantages offered by these forms of regional cooperation, and these two separate entities can transform into a single free trade area.

The macroeconomic indicators clearly show that the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership countries and India (RCEP+I) have been classified into three groups according to their GDP in 2023.¹⁸ The first group includes advanced and developed countries, which are large nations and members of the G20, such as China (the world's 2nd largest economy), Japan (5th), South Korea (13th), Australia (14th), Indonesia (17th), as well as India (4th). The second group consists of mediumsized but developed or semi-developed countries, namely Singapore (27th Thailand (29th), the Philippines (32th), Vietnam (33'th), Malaysia (35th), and New Zealand (52th); and the third group is developing countries, Myanmar (87th), Cambodia (93th), Laos (138th), and Brunei Darussalam (139th).

Table 1 shows that Britain's total trade volume with the RCEP+I amounted to USD 1.251 trillion in the period from 2020–2024. Britain's exports to the RCEP+I, including Hong Kong, amounted to USD 437 billion. In contrast, the UK's imports from RCEP+I countries, including Hong Kong, amounted to USD 814 billion. Britain's trade deficit with RCEP+I countries thus amounted to USD 377 billion, with USD 283 billion from China and Hong Kong alone, in the period from 2020 to 2024.

¹⁸ "World Bank's GDP ranging of countries in 2022," World Bank, July 1, 2023, <u>https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/GDP.pdf</u>. And List of countries by GDP (nominal), Wikipedia, 1923, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)

TABLE 1: The United Kingdom's Trade with the RCEP+I, including China and
Hong Kong (2020–2024) (USD in billion)

United Kingdom	TOTAL	(%)
	RCEP+I	
Trade Volume	1,250,493bn	100.0
China and Hong	723,302 bn	57.8
Kong		
Exports	436,792 bn	100.0
China and Hong	227,539 bn	52.1
Kong		
Imports	813,776 bn	100.0
China and Hong	495,763 bn	61.0
Kong		
Trade Balance	-377,054 bn	100.0
RCEP+I		
China	-311,731 bn	82.7
Trade Deficit	-283,058 bn	75.0
China+		
Hong Kong		

Source: International Trade Center, Trade Map (www.trademap.org), author's own calculations.

Table 2 in the appendix also demonstrates that Britain's main export partner among the RCEP+I countries is China, with a 36.0% share in all exports to the region (including Hong Kong 52.7%), followed by India (9.3%), Japan and Singapore (8.4%), South Korea (6.6%), Australia (6.4%), Malaysia (2.3%), Thailand (2.2%), Vietnam (1.1%), the Philippines (1.5%), and Indonesia (1.0%) from 2020 to 2024. Britain's exports to the other RCEP countries, such as Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, New Zealand, and Myanmar, are insignificant.

As far as the UK's import relations with the RCEP+I are concerned, the picture is the same as for export relations with the RCEP+I countries. The UK's main import partners are China and Hong Kong (61.6%), India (7.8%), Japan (7.6%), Vietnam (5.0%), South Korea (4.4%), Australia (3.6%) Thailand (2.8%), Malaysia (2.2%), and Singapore (1.7%). Other RCEP countries are insignificant. In short, the UK's main

trading partners are China and Hong Kong in the region, followed at a considerable distance by India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia in trade with RCEP+I.

Table 2 also indicates the UK's trade balance with the RCEP+I countries comparatively. Interestingly, Britain's total trade deficit with the RPEC countries was USD 377 billion between 2020 and 2024, distributed among the following countries: China (82.7%) with Hong Kong (75.0%), Vietnam (9.6%), Japan (6.5%), India (5.7%), Thailand (3.4%), and Malaysia (2.0%). On the other hand, the total amount of British trade surplus with RPEC countries is USD 68 billion. This is largely split between Hong Kong (64%) and Singapore (33%). The share of these two countries in UK's total trade surplus is almost 98%.

Special Cases: The UK's Trade Relations with China and Hong Kong

China

It is obvious that China and Hong Kong are the UK's most important trading partners in the Indo-Pacific. The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) is the first free trade agreement signed between the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom on 29 June 2003.¹⁹

The main components of economic relations between the UK and China can be summed up as follows:²⁰

In 2024, China was the UK's 5th largest trading partner (accounting for 5.5% of total UK trade); 3rd largest goods trading partner (8.6% of UK goods trade); 6th largest export market (accounting for 3.4% of total UK exports); 7th largest goods export market (4.6% of UK goods exports); 3rd largest import market (accounting for 7.6% of total UK imports); and 2nd largest goods import market (11.0% of UK goods imports).²¹

¹⁹ The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China, "Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA)," Trade and Industry Department, May 29, 2025, https://www.tid.gov.hk/en/index.html.

²⁰ UK Government Department for Business & Trade, "Trade and Investment Factsheet," May 2, 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6812449bc47c2060a91216dc/china-trade-and-investment-factsheet-2025-05-02.pdf.

The top five goods exported from the UK to China in 2024 were cars (25.5%), crude oil (8.6%), unspecified goods (8.1%), medicinal and pharmaceutical products (7.6%), and metal ores and scrap (4.4%).²²

The top five goods imported to the UK from China in 2024 were telecoms and sound equipment (capital) (11.3%)), other manufactured goods (consumer) (7.8%)), office machinery (capital) (7.7%), cars (4.3%), and miscellaneous electrical goods (intermediate (5.8%).²³

Hong Kong

Hong Kong was a British colony from 1842 to 1941. It was then again from 1945 to 1997. In 1997, China was granted sovereignty over the SAR.

Hong Kong is based on the principle of 'one country, two systems', and is home to around 2.9 million British citizens, of whom 350,000 have an active British passport, making it the third-largest jurisdiction in the world in 2022.²⁴ Due to historical and cultural factors, the UK maintains significant business and investment ties with Hong Kong. It is the UK's second largest market for goods in Asia-Pacific (after mainland China), and 13th largest trading partner. Hong Kong is a large export and import market for the UK, with GBP 18.2 billion of goods and services exported to Hong Kong and GBP 10.2 billion imported from Hong Kong in 2022—a trade surplus of GBP 8 billion in favour of Britain.²⁵ It was the destination for almost GBP 80 billion of UK Foreign Direct Investment in 2021.²⁶

22 Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/world-trade-organization-hong-kong-chinas-trade-policy-review-december-2023-uk-statement.

10.5900/SU_FASS_WP.2025.51940

²⁴ Giulia Interesse, "Hong Kong-UK relations," China Briefing, December 1, 2022, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-uk-trade-and-investment-ties/.

²⁵ Overseas business risk: Hong Kong, Trade and investment overview ,Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-business-risk-hong-kong/overseas-business-risk-hong-kong

²⁶ "World Trade Organization: Hong Kong, China's Trade Policy Review," UK Statement, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and Simon Manley CMG, December 6, 2023,

The top five goods exported from the UK to Hong Kong SAR are mechanical power generators (intermediate), jewellery, photographic and optical goods and clocks (consumer), general industrial machinery (intermediate), and unspecified goods.²⁷

The top five goods imported to the UK from Hong Kong SAR are telecoms and sound equipment (capital), office machinery (capital), miscellaneous electrical goods (intermediate), other manufactured goods (consumer), and clothing. Shortly, the trade in goods between Britain and China and Hongkong is largely characterized by intra-trade specialization,—meaning that both sides export and import mainly manufactured goods.²⁸

Conclusion

Notwithstanding a relative decline in its global dominance, the UK continues to assert its power and influence around the world in the 21st century. However, although the UK is one of the world's leading economies, it is currently facing serious structural problems,²⁹ including low business investment, weak productivity growth, structural decline in manufacturing and employment, structural trade and budget deficits, lack of competition in many markets, and underfunding of public services.³⁰ By 2025, the UK will have over 14 million people aged 65 and over, which is equal to one-fifth of the population and around a third of the working-age population.³¹ Furthermore, the UK economy is grappling with the impact of Brexit and other global economic challenges. A number of factors will shape the future of the UK economy. This includes correct government economic policy., adjustments to global trade changes and realisation of innovation investments and introduction of new technologies,

³⁰ Ibid.

²⁷ Hong Kong SAR. Trade and Investment Facsheets, 2 May 2025,

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6813846511b82a7ac0999ea5/hong-kong-sar-trade-and-investment-factsheet-2025-05-02.pdf

²⁸ İbid.

²⁹ "Ten Structural Problems Facing the UK Economy," Tutor2, https://www.tutor2u.net/economics/reference/tenstructural-problems-facing-the-uk-economy.

³¹ 10 PwC UK economic predictions for 2025: 'Subtle yet significant transformation' for the UK in 2025, published 27 Dec2024. https://www.pwc.co.uk/press-room/press-releases/research-commentary/2024/10-pwc-uk-economic-predictions-for-2025----subtle-yet-significan.html

One of the main structural problems is the tertiary sector (services), which is the backbone of the British economy, representing 72.5% of GDP and over 81% of employment. ³² Services exports reached half a trillion, c.20% of UK GDP. ³³ On the one hand, London's position as the largest financial centre in Europe remains unchanged by Brexit.

On the other hand, the industrial sector, which accounts for 17.5% of GDP and employs 18% of the working population, is not very competitive, mainly due to low productivity.³⁴

The manufacturing (or industrial sector) is a driving force of national economies with higher value added, making a greater contribution to GDP and increasing employment. A potential opportunity for the UK economy therefore lies in the possibility of reshoring part of the national manufacturing industry in Indo-Pacific countries, especially in the Commonwealth members, creating a dual economy: a service sector in the UK and Hong Kong, a manufacturing sector in and partly outside the UK.

If the UK economy wants to achieve higher growth rates, more jobs, and higher wages, it should expand and deepen its economic ties outside Europe and the United States with the Indo-Pacific region, with which it already has close trade relations. Such timely, correct decisions will enable the country to seize the opportunities that arise. It will also minimise the economic turmoil that would halt the outflow of financial institutions and multinational companies from London.

The British economy has the opportunity to conclude new trade agreements with countries outside the European Union, including countries in the Indo-Pacific. This could be a potential opportunity for them to increase the manufacturing sector's share of GDP, and it would allow the UK to shape its trade policy to open up new markets and pursue a more flexible and efficient economic policy.

³² "The economic context of the United Kingdom," Lloyds Bank, last updated March 2025, https://www.lloydsbanktrade.com/en/market-potential/united-kingdom/economical-context

³³ 10 PwC UK economic predictions for 2025, ibid

³⁴ United Kingdom: Economic and political outline, Santander Trade Market, Ibid.

APPENDIX

The United Kingdom's Trade Relations with the RCEP + India (2020–2024)

(Billion current USD)

UK's EXPORTS TO RCEP+I	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	TOTAL	Total (%)
							100.0
Australia							(%)
Trade						56,732	4.6
Volume							
Exports	5,220	5,789	5,443	5,845	5,559	27,856	6.4
Imports	10,118	3,578	2,859	4,678	7,643	28,876	3.6
Trade Balance	-4,899	2,211	2,585	1,168	-2,084	-1,020	0.0
Brunei							
Trade						1,085	0.0
Volume	10.1	50	50	750	17	1.0.10	
Exports	134	59	58	750	47	1,048	0.0
Imports	3	3	25	1	5	37M	0.0
Trade Balance	131	57	33	748	42	1,011	0.0
Cambodia							
Trade						6,129	0.0
Volume							
Exports	47	60	78	71	37	293 M	0.0
Imports	958	809	1,468	1,271	1,380	5,886	0.0
Trade Balance	- 911	-749	-1,390	-1,200	-1,343	- 5,593	0.0
China							

Trade						622,449	50,3
Volume							
Exports	18,579	20,797	35,415	34,087	46,481	155,359	36.0
Imports	75,299	91,109	102,521	99,085	99,076	467.090	58,0
Trade	-56,720	-70,312	-67,106	-64,998	-52,595	-311.731	
Balance	00,720	10,012	07,100	01,770	02,070		
Hong Kong							(%)
Trade						100,853	8.1
Volume							
Exports	10,609	9,834	23,649	16,159	11,929	72,180	16.7
Imports	14,755	6,092	2,430	2,174	3,222	28,673	3.6
Trade Balance	-4,146	3,742	21,219	13,985	8,707	43,507	
Indepede							
Indonesia						17 17/	1)
Trade volume						17,176	1.3
Exports	743	927	868	984	962	4,484	1.0
Imports	1,741	2,047	3,315	2,815	2,774	12,692	1.6
Trade	-998	-1,120	-2,447	-1,831	-1,812	-8,208	2.1
Balance	//0	1,120	$\Sigma_1 + 1$	1,001	1,012		
Japan							
Trade						97,788	7.9
Volume							
Exports	7,260,	7,550	7,202	6,851	7,588	36,451	8.4
Imports	10,173	9,588	13,255	14,832	13,489	61,337	7.6
Trade Balance	-2,913	-2,038	-6,053	-7,981	-5,901	-24,886	6.5
Laos							
Trade						281	0.0
Volume							
Exports	2	14	11	7	16	50	0.0
Imports	27	28	59	67	50	231	0.0

Trade Balance	-25	-14	-48	-60	34	-181	0.0
Malaysia							
Malaysia Trade						28,214	2.3
Volume	1 740		0 1 0 0	2.047	2 2 2 0	10 001	2.4
Exports	1,748	2,054 3,195	2,133 4,719	2,067 3,880	2,229 3,707	10,231 17,983	2.4
Imports Trade	2,482	5,190	4,/19	3,000	3,101		2.2
Balance	-734	-1,141	-2,586	-1,813	-1,478	-7,752	2.0
Myanmar							
Trade Volume						2,385	0.0
Exports	42	26	28	20	13	129	0.0
Imports	380	371	681	493	331	2,256	0.0
Trade Balance	-338	-345	-653	-473	-318	-2.127	0.0
New							
Zealand							
Trade Volume						10,664	0.0
Exports	905	1,145	1,083	1,242	1,163	5,538	0.0
Imports	1,040	1,011	979	963	1,133	5,126	0.0
Trade Balance	-135	134	104	279	30	412	0.0
Philippines	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	TOTAL	(%)
Trade	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	12,347	0.1
Volume							0.1
Exports	601	548	767	766	697	3,379	0.0
Imports	601	739	4,681	1,900	1,047	8,968	0.1
Trade Balance	0	-191	-3,914	-1,134	-350	-5,589	1.5

Singapore							
Trade						50,182	4.0
Volume							
Exports	5,683	7,142	7,865	7,494	8,064	36,248	8.4
Imports	2,561	1,891	2,495	2,828	4,159	13,934	1.7
Trade	3,122	5,251	5,370	4,666	3,905	22,314	
Balance	5,122	5,251	5,570	4,000	5,705		
Republic of							
Korea							
Trade						63,992	5.2
Volume Exports	5,230	6,426	6,072	6,116	4,806	28,650	6.6
Imports	4,681	6,250	8,677	8,018	7,716	35,342	4.4
Trade	4,001	0,230	0,077	0,010		-6,692	1.2
Balance	549	176	-2,605	-1,902	-2,910	-0,072	1.2
Bularioo							
Thailand							
Trade						31,842	2.6
Volume							
Exports	1,490	1,783	2,138	1,947	2,116	9,454	2.2
Imports	3,319	3,561	5,180	5,020	5,308	22,388	2.8
Trade Balance	-1,829	-1,778	-3,042	-3,073	-3,192	- 12,934	3.4
Dulurico							
Vietnam							
Trade						44.657	3.6
Volume							
Exports	692	800	872	909	1,024	4,297	0.1
Imports	5,029	6,286	8,928	9,225	10,892	40,360	5.0
Trade Balance	-4,337	-5,486	-8,056	-8,316	-9,868	-36,063	9.6
1						100 (70	
India						103,672	8.4
Exports	4,005	5,943	9,843	12,559	8, 725	41,075	9.3

Imports						62,597	7.8
	7,447	11,324	14,136	14,362	15,328		
Trade Balance	-3,442	-5,381	- 4,293	- 1,803	-6,603	-21,522	5.7
					Total	1.250.498	
					Trade		
					Volume		
					Total	436,722	
					Exports		
					Total	813,776	
					Imports		
					Trade	-377,054	
					deficit		