ESSAYS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND PROTEST BEHAVIOR

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation examines the relationship between political representation and protest behavior with the aim of contributing to the broader literature on political participation. The central theme of this dissertation builds on the comparison of protesting as a form of political participation with voting. Thus, each of the three chapters of this dissertation refers to electoral behavior. In that regard, the dissertation offers a deeper understanding of the roles played by these distinct types of political action in achieving democratic equality, accountability, and responsiveness. While emphasizing the relationship between elections and protest, I pay particular attention to the representational inequality that election outcomes create. In the first chapter, I examine whether protesting can complement or substitute voting as a response to the inefficiency of elections in providing equal levels of representation for all citizens. I measure representational inequality with individuals' ideological distance from the government's position. The results show that protesting can both complement and substitute voting as a response to increasing representational deprivation. In the second chapter, I rely on the size of the parties in governments and opposition as an alternative measure of representational deprivation and find that voters of smaller government and opposition parties protest more than bigger parties. In the third chapter, I focus on the extent to which protesting is preferred to a better alternative to express political preferences

through voting. In that chapter, I manipulate individuals' protest potentials through a conjoint survey experiment by providing scenarios with different election times and chances of winning of respondents' preferred parties. The results indicate that the protest potential of the survey respondents is higher prior to elections, a finding that contradicts the hypotheses of the chapter.

ÖZET

SİYASİ TEMSİL VE PROTESTO DAVRANIŞI İLİŞKİSİ ÜZERİNE MAKALELER

YASEMİN TOSUN

SİYASET BİLİMİ DOKTORA TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2023

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi MERT MORAL

Anahtar Kelimeler: protesto davranışı, siyasi temsil, yakınma, oy verme, seçimler

Bu tez, siyasi temsil ile protesto arasındaki ilişkiyi inceleyerek daha geniş bir literatüre sahip olan siyasi katılıma katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Tezin genel teması, siyasi katılım biçimi olarak protestonun oy kullanma davranışı ile karşılaştırılması üzerine kurulmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, tezin üç ampirik bölümünden her biri seçmen davranışına atıfta bulunmaktadır. Böylelikle, bu tez, demokratik esitlik, hesap verebilirlik ve cevap verilebilirliğin saglamasında bu farklı türdeki siyasi eylemlerin oynadıgı roller hakkında daha derin bir anlayış ortaya koymaktadır. Seçimler ve protesto arasındaki iliskiye vurgu yapılırken, seçim sonuçlarının yarattıgı temsil esitsizligine büyük önem verilmektedir. İlk bölümde, protestonun, tüm vatandaslar için esit düzeyde temsil saglama konusundaki seçimlerin bir tamamlayacısı mı yoksa bir alternatifi mi olduğunu tartışmaktadır. Bu bölümde temsil esitsizligini bireylerin hükümetin pozisyonundan ideolojik uzaklıgıyla ölçülmektedir. Sonuçlar protestonun artan temsil yoksunluğuna yanıt olarak seçimlerin hem tamamlayacısı hem de alternatifi olabilieceğini göstermektedir. İkinci bölümde, temsiliyetteki eşitsizliğin alternatif bir ölçüsü olarak hükümet ve muhalefet partilerinin büyüklüğüne bakılmaktadır. Bu bölümde daha küçük hükümet ve muhalefet partisi seçmenlerinin daha büyük partilere göre daha fazla protestoya katıldığı gösterilmektedir. Üçüncü bölümde, protestoya katılmanın siyasi tercihleri ifade edebilmede daha iyi bir yol olan seçimlere göre ne ölçüde tercih edilebildiği tartışılmaktadır. Bu bölümde, bireylerin protesto potansiyelleri farklı seçim zamanları ve tercih ettikleri par-

tilerin seçimleri kazanma şansları farklı ülke senaryoları üzerinden sunularak birleşik bir anket deneyi aracılığıyla manipüle edilmektedir. Sonuçlar bölümün hipotezleriyle çelişen bir sonuç olarak ortaya çıkararak anket katılımcılarının protesto potansiyelinin seçimlerden önce daha yüksek olduğunu göstermektedir.

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In loving memory of my grandfather, Faik Tosun

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1. INTRODUCTION

The behavioral revolution in the 1950s and 60s sparked a significant expansion of scholarly interest in political participation. Nevertheless, although being considered a part of the so-called "repertoire of participation", studies on protest behavior have not flourished at the same pace. One possible explanation for such a lack of interest in protest participation is that protesting has long been viewed as unconventional and, perhaps more importantly, an action of political nature that is against the democratic process. It has instead been considered an option for individuals with fewer opportunities to make their demands heard by the political system (Lipsky 1968). Therefore, the potential of protesting to contribute to our understanding of political participation and representation has been mostly disregarded in early research.

Even though it had initially been seen as unconventional, different forms of political participation have become more ritualized and mainstream in Western democracies (Tilly 1988). There has also been a growing body of research on the "social movement society" (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Correspondingly, the behavioral patterns of protest participation have started to be studied more frequently in political science. Barnes and Kaase's (1979) seminal study on mass participation played a significant role in opening a new avenue for examining protest behavior as a form of political participation. This study was the first to analyze protest participation using survey data from five Western European democracies. The authors also classified different types of protest, such as signing petitions, joining boycotts, occupying buildings, participating in strikes, and attending peaceful demonstrations as unconventional. The study also highlighted the growing normalization of participation in protests by citizens of Western democracies.

The increasing attention to participation in protests can be attributed to the transformation of citizenship in advanced democratic countries (Dalton 2008). While voting is often considered a civic duty or an act of "dutiful citizenship", engaging in protests

can also be seen as a type of "engaged citizenship", following liberal or communitarian norms. However, having these values does not necessarily prevent individuals from participating in more conventional activities, primarily voting in elections. Previous research indicates that citizens protest and participate in elections rather than exclusively engaging in the former (Borbáth and Hutter 2022; Marco and Maria 2019; Oser 2017).

The findings in previous literature are consistent with the primary purpose of political participation. Political participation is the most fundamental requirement and sine qua non for a democracy. Participation in different political activities empowers citizens and makes them have a say in democratic governance, fostering inclusiveness and representation. It is the only mechanism that gives citizens a voice and enables them to participate in decision-making. In that regard, different types of participation, voting, and protesting should be studied from the same perspective as distinct media used to affect governmental policymaking. However, despite the growing interest in protest behavior, it should be noted that studies approaching protests from the same perspective as voting are relatively rare. In other words, previous research often disregards protest behavior's relationship with political representation. Instead, the literature focuses more on electoral participation, such as studying voter behavior, political campaigns, and party dynamics. As a result, studies of protest movements have long been at the "periphery" compared to the study of elections (Aytaç and Stokes 2019).

Considering the superiority of elections in providing democratic equality and their extent of institutionalization compared to protests, this relative negligence can be justifiable. In democracies, elections serve as the primary mechanism for political equality and representation by granting everyone the right to vote. Moreover, unlike protests, elections occur within the state's sphere (van Deth 2014). They are organized and conducted by state institutions and are realized periodically. Protests, on the other hand, often occur spontaneously, with the participation of a much smaller number of citizens, and as a response to political, economic, or social grievances. These distinctive but nonetheless interrelated modes of political participation have guided me in formulating the research questions I ask in this dissertation, which focus on the relationship between protest behavior and elections. In this dissertation, I aim to study protest and electoral behavior together by exploring the grievances that prompt citizens to protest, particularly regarding representational inequality. By considering the grievances arising from the electoral process, I seek to shed light on the motivations and dynamics behind protesting and their connection to the concept of representation.

This dissertation thus explores the relationship between political representation and protest, intending to contribute to the broader field of political participation. I seek to compare protesting as a form of political participation to the most conventional and widely employed form, electoral participation. Thus, each of the three chapters of this dissertation refers to elections. By examining the relationship between political representation and protest in this way, I hope to contribute to the literature by providing a deeper understanding of the role played by these distinct types of political action in realizing democratic equality, accountability, and responsiveness.

While placing significant emphasis on the relationship between elections and protests, this dissertation focuses on these two forms of political participation's roles in representation. Election outcomes can affect individuals' attitudes and behaviors and influence their incentives to engage in other forms of political participation. The reason is the unequal levels of policy responsiveness to distinct preferences. In that regard, in the first chapter, I examine whether protest can complement or substitute elections as a response to the inefficiency of elections in providing equal levels of representation to all distinct voices in conventional politics. In the second chapter, focusing on winning and losing status after elections, I look at the role of party size on protest behavior. The second empirical chapter suggests that party size is a critical determinant of political representation, particularly concerning the party's winning or losing status. The larger the party size, the greater its influence in decision-making processes, enhancing the political representation of its voters. In the third chapter, I aim to demonstrate the extent to which protesting can be preferable by citizens when they have a better alternative for their preferences to be represented: through voting. In that regard, I manipulate individuals' protest potentials through a conjoint survey experiment by providing them with scenarios with different election timings.

The general theoretical framework and the overarching theme of this dissertation will be presented in detail in the introductory sections of the said empirical scrutinies. Nevertheless, examining protest behavior requires first an overview of the main theoretical frameworks in the research on social movements and protest participation. After introducing these general perspectives, I will also touch upon the conceptualization of protest for the purposes of this dissertation.

1.1 Theories of Social Movements and Protest Behavior

Protest participation has been studied in various fields, including sociology, political science, and social psychology. Each brings a distinct perspective to our understanding of the factors that drive people to participate in protests. While sociologists have been mainly interested in the role of social networks, identity, and social embeddedness, political scientists have examined political attitudes, values, and socio-economic resources that increase the propensity of protesting. The literature on protest behavior has also flourished with the studies from social psychology, which explain protesting through grievances, identity, and emotions.[1]

Today, the studies on protest participation often incorporate various theoretical perspectives, including those that focus on grievances, resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, and political development. This chapter will review these four broad theoretical frameworks commonly used to understand social movements. By following the previous studies adopting interdisciplinary approach, I aim to benefit from all these theoretical frameworks in my empirical analyses.

The grievance-based explanations look at the inequalities and injustices in a society that make the aggrieved groups rebel against the governmental authorities (Gurr 1970; Muller 1979; Piven and Cloward 1978). Individuals protest when they feel that they are relatively deprived of the resources and opportunities compared to others. The motivation to protest as a response to the feeling of deprivation, perhaps, makes the protesting explanations from the perspective of grievances the most critical one, as described by Snow (2022, 288):

> *"Although there are various sets of conditions that contribute to the emergence and operation of social movements – such as some degree of perceived political opportunity, organization, and resource acquisition, none of these factors is more important than the generation of mobilizing grievances. After all, it is difficult to imagine most individuals engaging in social movement activity without feeling deeply aggrieved about some condition that is regarded as contrary to the interests, rights, moral principles, or well-being*

[1] For a comprehensive description of various perspectives on protest participation, see the Giugni and Grasso's (2022) study.

of themselves or others"

Ted Gurr's (1970) seminal study has been the archetype of the works produced within the framework of relative deprivation. In this book "Why Man Rebel?", prolonged frustration or aggression is suggested as the primary source of violence, which emerges from relative deprivation. If individuals feel a significant discrepancy between what they think they deserve and what they get, their probability of rebelling against the status quo increases.

Gurr's (1970) conceptualization of relative deprivation is indeed much broader than the later research in the topic. These following studies give importance to the "perceived discrepancy" rather than the reality because the feeling of deprivation does not have to depend on the reality itself (Wilson 1973). Indeed, according to Gurney and Tierney (1982), the relationship between objective and subjective discrepancies is never delineated in the literature. The authors criticize the Gurr's successors in their effort to separate types of relative deprivation, as these efforts lead to more confusion than clarification. For instance, Gurr's classification (1970) of the sources of relative deprivation as decremental, aspirational, and progressive makes the concept a "perceptual variable which explains the relationship between structural conditions and resultant social movement activity" (Gurney and Tierney 1982, 35).

The relative deprivation, although carrying a conceptually loaded baggage, is considered the touchstone of social movement research by giving importance to the relative comparisons in addition to absolute standards in explaining social judgments (Grasso et al. 2019). However, the criticism for various formulations of relative deprivation is not limited to their vagueness. Although the concept of relative deprivation has been studied broadly, there have also been problems with their level of analysis. According to Pettigrew (2016), the Gurr's (1970) explanation of deprivation as the source of rebellion suffers from ecological fallacy. Undoubtedly, relative deprivation is a condition individuals perceive; thus, macro-level findings cannot explain the micro-level behavior and attitudes. Therefore, it is suggested that relative deprivation should be studied at the individual level (Pettigrew 2016).

The findings from the literature further show that for relative deprivation to lead to a rebellion of individuals, there must be convenient conditions. Accordingly, absolute deprivation can decrease political activities such as turnout (Grasso et al. 2019; Lim and Laurence 2015; Putnam 2000; Skocpol 1979). For instance, Putnam (2000) shows that

civic participation of individuals was too limited during the Great Recession. Other studies also point the negative relationship between economic deprivation and political participation (Lim and Laurence 2015).

Early studies on relative deprivation are also criticized for their absoluteness. They rest on the idea that society is composed of various groups "which vie with each other for resources" (Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2004, 147). Therefore, when a group's resources are low than other groups, they demand change by protesting. Nevertheless, these explanations presume that social movements are outside of the political process and are an exception that is borne out to reorganize a society's disorientation (Tarrow 2011). The approach has also been criticized by scholars adopting resource mobilization explanations for protest participation. Accordingly, every society has a certain degree of deprivation, so it is not a sufficient condition for protesting (Kerbo 1982; Kitschelt 1986; McCarthy and Zald 1977).

Despite criticisms towards the relative deprivation thesis, recent studies have attempted to refine the concept to better capture its relationship of protesting with relative deprivation. Griffin and his coauthors (2021) underline the oversimplification of the group-level grievances to the society level to show why grievances do not explain protest participation in previous studies. The authors argue that the grievance approach fails to account for the polarization of grievance judgments in countries, which can have significant implications for the emergence of protest events. As a result, instead of only measuring the mean level of grievance, they also examine the distribution of grievances in a country.

According to resource mobilization theorists, there are always some inequalities that can cause grievances; however, without acknowledging social organizations, we cannot make sense of the mobilization of these grievances into social movements (e.g., Kerbo 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1973). Resource mobilization theory differ from relative deprivation on approaching social movements as "unnatural" or "problematic". Instead, these accounts consider social inequalities constant and focus on how specific individuals or groups use their power to achieve their self-interest (Kerbo 1982). The resource mobilization theory examines social movements with the mobilizing organization's success through human, financial, and informational resources that determine the size and saliency of movements (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2016). The studies commonly focus on the various attractions for individuals to be part of the collective action (DeNardo 1985; Mancur 1971). While examining how many people quickly mobilize, they also investigate urbanization, organizational structures, and international environ-

ment (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2016).

In contrast to theories on relative deprivation, studies adopting the resource mobilization framework emphasize the importance of organizational structures, strategies, and tactics in facilitating collective action. These studies also underline the necessity of understanding the broader social, economic, and political context in which movements take place. They also differ from the relative deprivation framework by focusing on the conditions that carry a movement to success. For example, according to Gamson (1989), a protest's success relies heavily on solid leadership and broader support. In one of the pioneering studies on the importance of resources, Lipsky (1959) discusses the challenging role that protests leaders should play by appealing to four constituencies simultaneously. Accordingly, these leaders should (1) sustain their organization composed of individuals, irrespective of sharing the same values with them (2) articulate their goals and increase their appearance in public through media; (3) attract third parties into conflict; (4) increase their chance of success among their target groups, which are capable of granting goals. McCarthy and Zald (1977) also underline the strategies of social movements as transforming the public into sympathizers and sustaining the mobilization of supporters. Tilly (1973), in discussing whether rapid social and economic transformation a society is sufficient to explain revolutions, also points to a combination of factors.[2] He acknowledges that revolutionary movements' success depends on their support bases. Only movements that can mobilize broad support can challenge existing power balances.

In his study probing the factors that contribute to revolutions, Tilly identifies another essential condition for the success of social movements that should be discussed here: "unwillingness or incapacity of the agents of the government to suppress the alternative coalition or the commitment to its claims" (1973, 441). This request highlights the state's essential role in shaping social movements' outcomes. While Tilly's focus on the state may seem tautological to readers who find Huntington's thesis on "Political Order in Changing Societies" convincing in explaining the revolutionary movements in Europe, mentioning the role of the state helps us open another critical discussion in the social movement and protest behavior explanations. The framework of "political opportunity structures" (POS) offers a valuable perspective for understanding the role of the state and state institutions play for protest behavior in different contexts.

[2]In this paper, Tilly shows the inefficiency of Huntington's (1968) thesis on the role of rapid modernization of the society and political institutions that lag behind the societal transformation of revolutionary movements in explaining other factors contributing to the emergence of these movements.

Theories of POS attach a significant importance to political institutions and contexts that either help social movements achieve success or constrain them. The institutional structures generally concern the level of democracy, degree of institutional openness, and availability of resources for collective action. Therefore, in POS, the political contexts in which protests occur are the main focus in explaining the factors helping protestors reach their targets. Tilly (1978) is one of the first sociologists that systematically examine the relationship between POS and social movements. Accordingly, the availability of political opportunities -such as alliance structures in the decision-making and favorable laws or policies- can make social mobilization easier for citizens. In contrast, the absence of these opportunities hinders participation in collective action and relatedly their success in reaching their goals.

Political opportunities should always be considered in the broader context, as these are the outcome of the complex relationship between agents, institutions, and social structures. Moreover, the POS framework also underlines the role of state repression in structuring the overall picture of the political context. The forms of repression are numerous; while there are more subtle forms, such as surveillance and harassment, more inflictive ones include police brutality, unlawful detention, and arrests. These significantly affect the openness of the political context, hindering citizens' ability to mobilize.

While Tilly (1988) provides one of the first examples of the POS framework in social movements, it should be noted that the concept was first introduced by Eisinger in 1973. This study focuses on the varying levels of protest activities across different cities in the United States and highlighted the role of political opportunities in shaping collective action. Eisinger (1971) argues that protest movements are more likely to occur in cities with a "mobilization potential". In explaining this potential, he highlights the importance of economic, social, and political contexts, which he called "political opportunities". Later, McAdam developed the "Political Process Model" (1985) to show the interactive relationship between structures institutions and actors in creating political opportunities. Other notable works that mainly focus on political opportunities in line with the political process model that show the reciprocal actions of institutional and temporal dimensions affecting social mobilization were of Kriesi and his coauthors (1995), Kitschelt (1986), Piwen and Cloward (1978), and Amenta (2010). All such studies focus on the role of opportunities in Western countries. Later, other studies have focused on countries outside of Western countries. Among them, Brocket's (1991), a study in which he examined the political mobilization of peasants in Central America,

constitutes one of the most comprehensive studies delineating the opportunity structures' role in mobilizing masses. Although providing one of the most comprehensive frameworks, only some scholars have drawn the boundaries of political opportunities. For instance, according to Tarrow (2011), political opportunities are composed of (1) political openness, which is understood as the extent of political rights, (2) instability of political realignment within the polity; (3) influential alliances; and (4) elite splits. These components of political opportunity structures focus on the political conditions of the moment.

Despite Tarrow's attempts to define the components of the concept, lacking conceptual clarity has been one of the valid criticisms raised for the POS framework. Additionally, many studies do not provide a conceptual framework for POS but only identify the variables to comply with this perspective (Meyer 2004). Concerning the lack of clarity, the POS framework has also been criticized for its expansion (della Porta 2013). The concept has been used by various scholars from different perspectives. Della Porta and Diani (2006, 96) underline this issue and argue that very few studies have explained which dimension in the complex set of political opportunities affected which characteristics of protest movements. Indeed, considering the political context, any variable can be deemed essential to explain a phenomenon from a POS perspective. Consequently, the concept turns into a "trash can" with many contextual dimensions which are rarely explained in sufficient detail (della Porta 2013).

Lastly, we must shape our theoretical expectations by examining our fourth primary theoretical approach to social movements: political development. In this framework, the economic growth in societies comes with social transformations (Lipset 1959). This social transformation is bringing value change in highly industrial communities. Studies on political development mainly focus on individual traits such as political interest, interpersonal trust, and level of education that increase postmaterialist values of individuals (Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2009; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel and Deutsch 2011).

The studies prioritizing the role of values and civic skills in democracies have also been called the "transformational" school of thought (Copeland 2014; Oser 2017). According to this school of thought, while citizen participation in election declined in advanced democracies, non-electoral forms of political participation has been more frequently used by citizens (Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2009; Norris 2002; Welzel 2012). These studies connect these changes in the participation trends to the transforming citizenship norms. Dalton dalton uses the term "engaged citizenship" for the individuals that use

non-electoral forms of political participation more often than voting, in contrast to "duty-based citizenship."

The lines of literature that were briefly examined above provide an outlook for the current state of the theoretical understanding of the protest movement literature. These theories help us to understand why some people are quickly mobilized, what kind of individual qualities increase mobilization, and what kind of movements become more successful in which countries by looking at their organizational structures.

This study benefits from all the theoretical explanations explained above for understanding protest movements. Political processes and their role in collective mobilization interact with individual traits. The grievances that the political structures create, the role of organizations in increasing the size and saliency of movements, and the outcomes of actions that create new opportunities can only be understood if we can provide a comprehensive picture with the help of a synthesis of all those main strands of literature.

A comprehensive undertaking of the literature on protest movements from various disciplines shows that different theoretical perspectives are integrated into building knowledge in social movements and protest behavior. In this dissertation, I will also synthesize the insights from various theoretical perspectives to gain a more nuanced understanding of how these factors play a role and interact with each other to shape the protest behavior of individuals.

The concept of relative deprivation constitutes the central pillar of this dissertation. There are various subjective grievance measures in the literature, different from the early studies that mainly establish their theories according to economic assessments (Griffin, de Jonge, and Velasco-Guachalla 2021). In all three chapters, deprivation is measured with the political representation of individuals. In that regard, Anderson and Guillory (1997) and Anderson and Mendes' (2006) winner and loser hypothesis can be considered as the precedent of this dissertation. Accordingly, since they are not equally represented as winners, electoral losers are less satisfied with how democracy works. Therefore, they are more likely to protest to change the status quo, which might better resolve their discontent.

In explaining the losers' behavior, the authors' point of departure is Easton's (1975) theory on political legitimacy. Accordingly, the legitimacy of democracies depends on citizens' trust in the regime and its institutions. The regime support, which can be expressed as "the belief that the political system (or some part of it) will generally

produce 'good' outcomes" (Anderson et al. 2005, 19) is the precondition for the loser's consent with the current system. In that regard, the relative deprivation of losers is not the only determinant for their rebellion. Indeed, Anderson and Mendes (2006) find that losers protest more in countries with shorter life of democracy with unstable democratic institutions in which regime support is comparatively low.

In addition to mainly building the theoretical arguments on relative deprivation theories, I also benefit from the frameworks of relative deprivation, political opportunity structures, and political development theories in all my chapters. By evaluating the previous studies, I include numerous control variables such as organizational membership, the adequate number of parties, the level of democracy, disproportionality, and party institutionalization. These control variables are explained in detail in the upcoming chapters regarding how these variables account for the critical frameworks of social movements.

1.2 The Puzzles

As briefly discussed above, citizens in democracies tend to engage in a combination of unconventional forms of political participation and voting rather than participating exclusively in the former. Correspondingly, the literature suggests that protesting can serve as a means of communicating political, economic, and social grievances for citizens in democracies rather than solely rejecting conventional policy-making processes (Borbáth and Hutter 2022; Marco and Maria 2019; Oser 2017).

Combining different forms of political participation to communicate with those in power signifies the need for more than just voting to achieve more equitable political representation. In other words, while voting is the primary mechanism for expressing one's political preferences and democratic equality, elections cannot produce equally favorable outcomes for all citizens.

Indeed, elections provide citizens a choice between policies put on offer by political parties. However, in addition to the different preferences of individuals among these policy positions, their distinctive policy priorities reflect their social class, cultural or ethnic cleavage, or economic expectations (Kim 2009; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Tufte 1978). All in all, elections are expected "to reveal the 'will' or the preferences of a majority on a set of issues " (Dahl 1956, 131). Although this expectation is only a vision

rather than reflecting a reality (Achen and Bartels 2016), the minority is often deprived of equal representation. This constitutes the foundation of the winner/loser hypothesis on democratic satisfaction. Accordingly, winners, or synonymously the majority, are more satisfied with how democracy works (Anderson and Guillory 1997). As being less happy with the democratic process, losers protest more than winners (Anderson and Mendes 2006).

According to Anderson and Mendes (2006), winners are defined as voters of the government party whose preferences assumably align more closely with the government's policies than those of the losers. Nevertheless, the literature's most often used method for measuring the degree of convergence rests on spatial voting. As the spatial voting model suggests, there is a single ideological dimension (usually between left and right) as the product of the aggregation of different political preferences (Downs 1957). When political parties and citizens' choices do not converge on this single dimension, these citizens' preferences are not efficiently represented in the legislature (Powell Jr and Vanberg 2000).

In the first chapter, I also measure the degree representation using the left-right ideological dimension. Those who tend to protest more are the ones whose ideological positions are further away from the governments in this single dimension. To this end, I calculate the absolute distance between the government's median position and the individuals' self-placement on the left-right scale. While looking into this relationship, I also consider electoral participation patterns in voting in elections to evaluate how much protest complements or substitutes electoral participation.

In the first chapter, differently from previous studies that show a complementary role of protesting, I argue for a substitutive role of protesting as a response to increasing ideological distance from the government for some individuals. Therefore, deprivation from equal representation drives both voters and non-voters to protest, albeit to differing extents. Examining protesting as complementary or substitutive of elections provides a different perspective for research protest behavior and contributes to the literature from different angles. First and foremost, although several examples look into the effect of political inequality on protest participation in the literature (Curini and Jou 2016; van der Meer, Van Deth, and Scheepers 2009; VanDusky-Allen 2017*a*), this chapter is the first one that uses political inequality to connect the two forms of political participation. Therefore, this chapter examines the functions of the two types of political involvement from the same perspective. I underline that both types of political action enhance political inclusiveness and equality while acknowledging their differences. To

put it differently, protests always take place as a response to a grievance. They are valuable as a form of political participation but also unnecessary if there are no grievances. Using the distance in ideological placements of governments formed after elections and individuals, I take elections as the source of the grievance. Therefore, rather than only looking at the participation patterns of individuals in these two distinct forms of political participation, protesting can be understood as the continuum of voting to evaluate its roles as a complement and substitute.

In the second part of the first chapter, I also differentiate voters according to their motivations to vote. Although the decreasing trend in turnout in democracies is considered a crisis in representation, most citizens in advanced democracies still vote in elections. Ultimately, individuals decide to vote in exchange for a small cost (Blais and Daoust 2020). However, not all people vote to express their preferences. Naturally, not all people care about election results to the same extent. Instead, many people vote as an act of civic duty (Aldrich 1993; Campbell et al. 1960; Clarke et al. 2004; Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2009; Riker and Ordeshook 1968).

For Blais and Daoust (2020) to care about the election results, individuals first should be aware of the main issues during the parties' campaign period before the elections. Secondly, they should believe that "the decisions that will be made about these issues depend to a good extent on who will be elected (Blais and Daoust 2020, 11)". Considering the two conditions provided by the authors as the signals of voting as an expressive act, for individuals who care about election results, the increasing ideological distance from the government should be more frustrating than others who vote without investing in the outcome equally.

To understand whether voting with a motivation of expressing preferences and choosing representatives with a preferable political choice affects the protest behavior, I differentiate voters according to their answers to the survey question asking whether they feel close to a particular party, which is the standard party identification question asked for comparative research (Blais, Feitosa, and Sevi 2019). Therefore, I take party identification as a signal for voting with political preferences. In paying attention to respondents' party affiliations, I do not give importance to whether respondents voted for parties they feel close to. Instead, I focus on the role of parties in integrating several issues into political dimensions and mobilizing voters to respond to their policy preferences after the elections (Mair 2002; Kim 2009). Being close to a party indicates that the individuals have a choice among these different policy offerings. Therefore, when the elected government is not responsive to their preferences, they should be more

motivated to protest. In that regard, the probability of protesting as complementing elections should increase. In contrast, I do not propose any difference for respondents who protest to substitute elections, as feeling close to a party does not motivate them to vote in elections.

The first chapter's central theoretical perspective builds on grievance theories, where relative deprivation is measured with the ideological distance from the government. I also consider party affiliation as part of measuring the extent of deprivation. Therefore, political parties are the main pillars of political representation, as voting is based on choosing among these parties. Their competition "tends to create one central ideological dimension of political discourse that organizes political conflict and shapes connections between citizens and political parties" (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 73). However, in organizing conflict and cooperation, their power is immanent on their support from people. In most parliamentary democracies, a single party's support base from people is insufficient to shape the policy agenda. Usually, governments are formed with the cooperation and compromise of political parties from their original position on specific issues. Therefore, in the second chapter, I evaluate representational deprivation by considering the parties' capability to implement their voter's policy preferences. While Anderson and Mendes (2006) hypothesize the relationship between winning/losing status and protest potential, they equate the level of grievance with satisfaction with democracy. However, the authors consider the winners and losers as the two homogenous camps in a society. They often interchangeably use majority-minority and the winner- losers status. Nevertheless, most of the time, neither electoral losers can be considered a minority nor the winners as the majority. While governments are often formed after a long process of cooperation and compromise between several parties, some parties with a good vote share can stay outside due to strategic, ideological, or issue-based considerations. The process also can bring smaller parties with a moderate vote share to governments.

The smaller parties in coalitions can give them credibility and political prestige (Klüver and Spoon 2020). However, research shows that with the increasing number of parties, the probability of compromise from the original issue position increases (Laver and Shepsle 1990). The smaller parties, with limited seat share to shape the decision-making, might be more vulnerable to compromising their priorities (Fortunato et al. 2021; Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008). In that regard, I hypothesize that junior coalition party voters protest more than senior coalition party voters, as their preferences are not equally represented in decision-making. The role that party size plays

in voters' probability to protest cannot be negligible for opposition parties as well. In contrast, the negative effect of party size is more substantial for opposition parties' voters since their preferred parties are not in government, making them potential veto players like junior parties in government coalitions.

In measuring the representational deprivation with the size of the parties, I attach importance to the phenomena that the micro-decision connects the macro-outcomes, which is described by Anderson and his coauthors (2015) as follows:

> *"Elections reward or punish individual voters' choices through the much-publicized consequences of the collective choice of all voters over competing political programs. That is, casting one's ballot for a party or candidate does not automatically turn voters into winners and losers; it is only through the compilation of all voters' choices on the basis of an agreed-upon formula that a president or legislators are elected and a government is thereafter formed, and that the electorate can be subsequently divided into those on the winning and those on the losing side. Political winning and losing thus directly connect micro-decisions and macro-outcomes; wins and losses are individually experienced but collectively determined. As importantly, we argue that the experience of winning and losing and becoming part of the majority and minority leads people to adopt a lens through which they view political life (Anderson et al. 2015, 3)."*

The micro decisions of voters to vote for smaller parties result in macro-outcomes as these individuals become part of the minority which is not equally represented in political decision-making. As the size of the group individuals belong to decreases, the probability of protesting increases. Therefore, I develop a better alternative to winner/loser status to account for the macro-outcomes, as these groups are not homogenous. Correspondingly, the real loser of politics is the voters of smaller parties, who are in the minority regarding their political preferences or party affiliations. The winner/loser status of parties can play a role in mediating these minorities' protest potential.

The size of the parties can be an alternative measure of their ability to represent their voters than their place in government or opposition. However, considering both factors provide a more nuanced explanation by touching upon the dynamic political competition in parliamentary democracies. Nevertheless, in highly polarized societies, where

the winners and losers are divided into two closed camps and where the compromise and consensus among parties to reach political decisions is limited, the parties' size might not as powerfully determine their voters' representation. Correspondingly, winners and losers can indeed be homogenous groups. In that regard, in the third chapter, I go back to the winner and loser dichotomy to epitomize the representational deprivation of losers as I focus on Turkey as a case study.

In the third chapter, I argue that as elections are the primary method of political participation by their ability to transform people's votes into seats in parliaments, their timing might be a factor in deterring individuals from protesting to raise their grievances. When elections are close, individuals must be less motivated to participate in any other political action as there is a chance to change the source of the grievance altogether with votes. Moreover, the protest should also be unnecessary for losers if there is a chance of winning in the upcoming elections. The expectation rests on the miracle of democracy that makes all conflicting forces obedient to the election results (Przeworski 2003). In contrast to the idea of a conflict or a rebellion, losers wait for the next elections to be the winners through elections.

To articulate the theoretical framework of the third empirical chapter, I refer to the opposition in Turkey. The recently held elections and political developments before these elections make Turkey a suitable case to examine. In the Turkish example, the main opposition party's hesitancy to be a part of or support a mass political movement to protest the government contributes to the chapter's theoretical development. To test my hypotheses, I conduct an online conjoint experiment with 1250 respondents from Turkey. This experiment asks the respondents to evaluate two hypothetical country profiles with four attributes and choose one of these countries where they would more likely participate in a demonstration to protest the worsening economic conditions. These attributes include election timing, the chance of winning, satisfaction with democracy, and winner or loser status. All these attributes consist of two levels.

The levels of the election timing are elections that will take place in two months or three years. The second attribute of these country profiles concerns the chance of winning for the party that the respondents support is either high or slim. The other two attributes are included to account for the previous findings in the literature. One of these is the winner or loser status. Respondents are asked to choose country profiles where they are either winners or losers. Lastly, for the attribute of democratic satisfaction, respondents are asked to choose from among the scenarios where they are either satisfied or dissatisfied with the democratic procedures in the country.

I rely on the political opportunity framework in choosing the countries to examine in the empirical chapters. The framework provides the necessary considerations to make in evaluating the countries. To build more coherent and clear arguments, I had to make some considerations and compromises at the beginning of this study. Therefore, in the first two chapters, I choose countries that resemble each other regarding their political openness to protest movements. As a result, I only study Western European countries where citizens have more suitable conditions to express their political demands outside conventional politics.

As I discuss in detail in the previous chapter, studies on social movements from the perspective of political opportunity structures emphasize the decision to participate in a protest as an outcome of a complex relationship between social structures, institutional mechanisms, and alliance formations (Eisinger 1971; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1985; Tarrow 2011). Tarrow describes them as "consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics (Tarrow 2011, 32)." Correspondingly, political institutions that provide political representation significantly contribute to individuals' political opportunities.

Previous studies focusing on protest behavior as a function of political inequalities do not dismiss the role of political institutions enhancing representation. For instance, Anderson and Mendes (2005) find that in new democracies, which was approximated using the time under democratic institutions, losers are more likely to protest because losing elections results in a more vital representation problem due to unstable democratic institutions increasing the uncertainty about the future. Arce (2010), focusing on Latin American countries, proposes that as the quality of representation increases through a more institutionalized party system, the probability of protest movements responding to economic liberalization decreases. Accordingly, institutionalized political parties successfully address discontent through electoral and legislative means.

Unlike new democracies, consolidated democracies provide their citizens with party options that are stable and legitimate as parties' effectiveness for ensuring democratic accountability depends on the acceptance of and trust in the political institutions of democracy by both elites and voters (Dalton and Weldon 2007). Stable and robust political parties enhance the political opportunities for citizens to protest. Therefore, choosing countries with more meaningful elections to provide political representation was also essential. As a result, I also exclude my observation of older European democracies. Correspondingly, Post-Communist European countries are excluded from the

estimation samples of the first chapters.

In contrast to the first two chapters' case selection, I examine Turkey as the country of interest in the last chapter. To reiterate, the motivation behind this selection is Turkey's suitability to demonstrate how the opposition party's attitude was negative to protest. In addition, there is practicality as I had the chance to test my hypothesis on Turkish citizens. However, when it comes to political opportunities for individuals, the selection of Turkey was in sharp contrast with the first two chapters. Increasing state repression and the limitations on rights and freedoms contributed to the cost of protest for the losers in Turkey. In addition, understanding protest as a form of political participation may not be possible in the Turkish context. Protests are considered more "transgressive" than "contained" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). These movements were considered to threaten the government's legitimacy rather than actions to influence policymaking. Complying with any demand from the protestors is considered a weakness of the government. Therefore, any attempt of a peaceful demonstration to protest a decision can have critical consequences for the losers in a country like Turkey.

Although Turkey differs from other advanced democracies in its openness to mass movements, elections remain the primary mechanism for changing the governments and providing peaceful power transition. The uneven playing field in political competition does not prevent elections from providing a certain degree of uncertainty. In that regard, elections still prevent a conflict between winners and losers, as both camps comply with the election outcomes. Therefore, despite the differences, I do not propose any difference in the role of elections to decrease the protest potential of individuals. As a result, the selection of Turkey does not prevent the generalizability of the findings to other contextual settings.[3]

In conclusion, all three chapters of this dissertation, briefly discussed above, aim to fill the gaps in the literature on protest behavior.

[3]Nevertheless, it is crucial to emphasize the necessity of observing extended timeframes to conduct a thorough and comprehensive examination of the complicated and intertwined dynamics that underlie the attitudes of both winners and losers toward the political process. In this dissertation, the distinctions between short-term and long-term losers could not be adequately addressed due to limitations in data availability as such data need access to comprehensive information concerning various countries' political contexts and electoral histories, as highlighted by Anderson and his coauthors (2005, 51). Similarly, it is essential to acknowledge the main limitation that could impact the interpretation of the findings. Specifically, the reader should consider the distinctiveness of Turkey's political landscape. While elections in Turkey help avoid direct conflicts between winners and losers, the winner-takes-all electoral system in Turkey might result in permanent losers holding more distinctive and negative attitudes than their counterparts in European democracies. This distinction can potentially introduce another complexity in understanding the attitudes of losers within the Turkish context.

1.3 The Dependent Variable: Attending Lawful Demonstrations

While the categorization of protest as an unconventional mode of participation has been losing prominence, the expansion of political participation has brought unanswered questions regarding the boundaries of different types of participation. Different forms of participation had different meanings depending on the context and the time when the study was conducted. In that regard, perhaps, defining the boundaries of different types of political participation may be more effectively done by first examining the meaning of political participation.

Political participation is an "action by ordinary citizens directed towards influencing political outcomes" (Brady et al. 1999, 737). However, acknowledging its abstractness due to different definitions covering more than voluntary activities by citizens, van Deth (2014) proposes an operational definition by distinguishing participation based on several decisions.[4] In this operational definition, several rules are applied to categorize types of participation. Protest movements are separated from the "minimalist definition" of political participation due to not being located in the sphere of the state. Instead, protestors in contentious politics (Tilly 2008) target the government or state to communicate their demands.

In addition to van Deth's (2014) operational definition, other approaches categorize its subtypes are present in the literature. For instance, in differentiating groups of political participation, Teorell, and his coauthors (2007) came up with five distinct types: voting, party activities, contacting with politicians, consumer participation, and protest activities. These types are identified with three main criteria: the activity's channel of expression (representational or extra- representational), its mechanism of influence (exit or voice-based), and its targeted versus non-targeted character. Accordingly, protests are extra-representational, voice-based, and non-targeted. The authors' principal component analysis shows that participating in demonstrations, joining strikes, and illegal protest activities correspond to category of protest. In the study, singing a petition loads onto consumer participation, which contradicts the study of Theorharis and van Deth The relevancy of the discussion for the meaning and types of political participation comes from deciding the kind of protest that will constitute the dependent variable of this dissertation. Considering one of the central points of this dissertation, comparing

[4]This operational definition has slightly changed in the study of Theocharis and van Deth (Theocharis and van Deth 2018).

protesting and voting as two forms of political participation, the type of protest should be the most important one to affect one's participatory decisions so that we can treat both types of participation as equals.

As van Deth (2014) shows in his study, voting belongs to the "minimalist definition" of political participation by being in the sphere of the state or government. Voting is the most popular and influential among other participation types that fall into the minimalist definition. On the other hand, there are blurred lines for the other side, as protests are often unpredictable. A petition campaign has the potential to evolve into a strike, while a peaceful demonstration can easily escalate into a violent riot and transcend legal boundaries.

Choosing a peculiar thus is a difficult task. Nevertheless, we can infer some ideas from the historical events as Tilly (1988) underlines that the repertoire of political action is contingent on history and culture. For most societies, when it comes to protesting, the first thing that comes to mind is demonstrations (Walgrave 2013). Demonstrations are the most symbolic social movements as well. In that regard, I choose attending lawful demonstrations as the dependent variable in examining protest behavior with voting.

As demonstrations are the first thing that comes to mind, choosing them as the type of protest allows one to reach comparability among different political cultures. Although signing a petition or boycotting a product can also be an act of protesting, they do not ring the same bell for individuals in different contexts. Instead, attending a lawful demonstration indicates a more costly action that targets an authority to negotiate.

Choosing to attend a lawful demonstration as an act of protest also provides consistency with the previous studies on social movements. In most social movement studies, protests are limited to public demonstrations. These studies often rely on protest event datasets to test their various hypotheses. These event datasets are coded from the records of public demonstrations from multiple media sources. The other forms of protests are often outside the scope of country-level studies.

Given our dependent variable, the first two chapters primarily concentrate on analyzing individuals' prior engagement in public demonstrations to measure their protest behavior. In the third chapter, rather than the respondents' past participation, their participation potential in demonstrations is used as the dependent variable, as the experiment iis based on hypothetical country profiles.

1.4 Chapters

This section will provide a short overview of each empirical chapter's design, acknowledging their theoretical underpinnings, independent variables, and research methodologies.

In Chapter 2, I examine the role of protests in addressing representational inequality for voters and non-voters by considering voting and protesting as two interconnected forms of political participation. Therefore, this chapter asks to what extent protests can complement and substitute elections as a response to increasing representational inequality, measured by the ideological distance from the government. It also explores how individuals' party attachments affect their motivations to protest as complementing elections, as these individuals care more about the election results than others. Using the European Social Survey data from 2012 to 2018, which includes 41 country-year observations from Western European democracies, I find that increasing ideological distance from government positions increases the probability of protests as both a complement and a substitute for elections. The effect of ideological distance is more substantial in the complementary role of protests. The chapter sheds light on the complexities of political participation and how individuals seek to express their preferences and address representational inequality.

In Chapter 3, I argue that the government status of individuals' preferred political parties does not solely define their level of representation. In most European democracies, where single parties cannot form governments, policymaking often requires a compromise of parties from their original issue position. The cooperation and compromise between political parties result in some parties' voters' preferences being better represented than others. Compared to the majority party in governments, the smaller coalition partners have less influence in decision-making. Thus, voters of junior parties in coalition governments are more likely to participate in protests to affect the policy agenda through unconstitutional means. Nevertheless, smaller parties in coalition governments still provide better representation channels than those in opposition. In that regard, party size, as the signal of parties' capability to represent their voters, shapes the motivations for protests in different degrees for government and opposition parties. Employing the dataset from the eight waves of the European Social Survey (2004-2018), I find that voters of junior coalition parties protest more than voters of senior coalition parties, while voters of opposition parties protest more than government parties. I also

find that as the party size of both government and opposition parties decreases, the possibility of their voters' protest participation increases. The effect of party size is more substantial for the voters of opposition parties.

In Chapter 4, I argue that the vitality of elections for Turkish politics hinders the motivations of losers to participate in an anti-government protest. Correspondingly, the different moments in the electoral cycles and the chance of winning elections decrease the protest potentials of individuals. I test my hypotheses using an online conjoint survey experiment conducted with over a thousand participants from Turkey. The findings reveal that the timing of elections positively affects individuals' protest potential. In other words, the opposition party voters in Turkey are more likely to protest during the election periods. The empirical analyses do not support the hypothesis that the higher chance of winning in the elections decreases the protest potential.

2. PROTESTING AS COMPLEMENTING OR SUBSTITUTING ELECTIONS AS A RESPONSE TO POLITICAL INEQUALITY

2.1 Introduction

Citizens' active political participation is necessary for ensuring democratic legitimacy, accountability, and representation. Nevertheless, different types of engagement in politics are less equally adopted than voting by individuals to affect political decisions. Considering the second most effective form of political action, protests, several salient characteristics might explain the different levels of participation in these two distinct forms. Voting is still the most important mechanism to ensure political equality, as democracies grant the right to every individual to vote to choose their representatives. Elections are organized by state institutions routinely, in which citizens participate as part of their "civic duty". On the other hand, protests are more spontaneous, smaller-scaled, and reactive to a particular issue. Despite the differences between the two forms of political action, there is considerable overlap between the participation patterns of individuals in these two modes of political participation. However, the lack of communication between the literature on voting and protesting behavior impedes the comparison of these two types of political participation in realizing the central premises of democratic government (Barnes, Kaase, and Allerbeck 1979; Norris 2002; van Deth 2014).

The growing body of research highlights the individual-level factors influencing voting and protesting behaviors (Aytaç and Stokes 2019; Borbáth and Hutter 2022; Oser 2017; Quaranta 2018). According to these studies, protesting can complement voting in specific ways. While elections bestow people perhaps the most remarkable political opportunity to be part of the decision-making process, protest can allow citizens to voice their concerns and grievances outside conventional politics.

To understand the complementary role of protest, it is crucial first to identify the ways in which voting may be insufficient in representing individuals' preferences. Although elections are the most effective way to serve political equality, they do not equally represent a society's diverse interests and preferences. On the contrary, they inherently create winners and losers due to the competition of different interests. As a result, the lack of adequate representation can stem from ideological differences between the elected government and individuals. When individuals feel that they are being deprived of political representation, protesting can be a means to express their dissatisfaction with how democracy works and draw attention to their problems.

Another way voting may be insufficient to provide representational equality is through the limited options available to citizens in electoral competition. For example, competing political parties in elections may only partially represent a society's diversity of opinions and ideological preferences. As a result, individuals alienated from the party competition may not go to the polls to vote. Instead, protests can allow citizens to express their dissatisfaction with specific policies. Correspondingly, protests can be a substitute for elections for citizens who do not vote in elections.

In this study, by taking voting and protesting as two sides of the same coin, I examine the relationship between these two forms of political participation and how protests play a role in addressing representational inequality. As representational inequality mainly revolves around different ideological preferences, I measure the ideological distance between governments and individuals. With the increasing distance, I expect the probability of participating in protest as both a complement and substitute for elections increases.

In this study, I also consider individuals' motivations to vote to understand the level of importance individuals place on election outcomes. While examining the substitute role of protest, I rely on the assumption that people who do not vote in elections are alienated from conventional politics, and they do not have strong preferences among candidate parties. However, although having a solid choice among candidates is one of the most important factors motivating many people to vote, it is not the only factor determining whether someone turns in elections. Voting is a less costly political action than different types of protest. Individuals may choose to vote as an act of civic duty even if they do not have a strong preference among candidates. Those who are not motivated to vote to express their party affiliation but vote as an act of civic duty would also be expected to be less interested in the outcome. Therefore, the ideological distance from the government should more substantially affect individuals with party

preferences in elections to protest as complementary to voting. In contrast, I cannot claim a role of existing party preferences of nonvoters' motivations to protest, as these preferences do not make them actively participate in politics by voting in elections.

This chapter seeks to test the hypotheses on the complementary and substitutive role of protest by examining the four waves of the European Social Survey (2012-2018) that provide 41 country-year observations and a sample of 64,807 survey respondents. The chapter thus contributes to the literature on political participation by systematically comparing the relationship between two forms of political participation. Furthermore, the study offers several implications for voting and protest behavior literature. Firstly, although other studies are bridging the two forms of political participation, this study is the first one to show the interconnectedness between them by showing both the complementary and substitute role that protesting plays in response to the inadequacy of elections in providing democratic equality. Secondly, the chapter also addresses the political participation preferences of individuals with party affiliations and those without. Correspondingly, the study also contributes to voting behavior literature by considering the role of one of the most important motivations to vote in protest.

2.2 The Relationship Between Voting and Protesting

The study of political behavior more frequently focuses on understanding the voting patterns than protesting, as it is the primary and the most common form of citizen participation. However, in recent years, there has been a growing interest in studying protest behavior as another important mode of political participation. Although studied in different research areas, the findings from these studies show overlapping personality traits among individuals who participate in elections and protests. These shared characteristics led scholars to explore the connections between conventional and unconventional political participation, seeking to comprehend how these different forms of political participation can complement each other in fostering democratic equality and accountability (Aytaç and Stokes 2019; Borbáth and Hutter 2022; Oser 2017; Quaranta 2018). By bridging these two types of participation, scholars shed light on the potential interactions between voting and protesting.

When protests are considered complementary to elections, it suggests that citizens who protest also participate in elections. In that regard, protest becomes an additional

mechanism for expressing political demands. On the other hand, when protests are viewed as a substitute for voting, it implies that protestors do not actively vote in elections. These protestors may feel alienated from conventional politics and perceive protesting as a more efficient way of expressing their political grievances. According to the findings from the previous literature, individuals who vote are more likely to be politically active and, therefore, more likely to engage in protests than those who do not vote (Borbáth and Hutter 2022; Oser 2017). However, a tiny part of the population still does not vote but engages in protest, particularly if they are alienated from the political process or do not feel that any available options represent their interests (Portos, Bosi, and Zamponi 2020). In these cases, grievances can motivate individuals to protest to make a difference, even if they exit from electoral participation (Hirschman 1970). Moreover, studies on protest participation often do not consider the reasons behind voting behavior. Just as there are many reasons why individuals may choose not to vote, there are also various motivations for those who do vote. One broad explanation is that people vote when they have strong preferences or beliefs. However, some voters may also see voting as a duty or responsibility.

By differentiating individuals based on their participation patterns involving a combination of voting and protesting, one can develop more comprehensive and nuanced theories that explain individuals' political behavior. Thus, we can build more accurate assumptions about individuals' decisions to vote or not to vote and understand the factors that might lead them to protest. Nevertheless, we should also acknowledge the differences between voting and protesting. While voting is more institutionalized and routine, protest is spontaneous and mobilized to raise grievances on a particular issue. In contrast with the previous literature, in examining protest participation as a complement or substitute for elections, we must first underline the importance of circumstances when elections fall short of providing democratic equality and representation. In cases where elections are insufficient or ineffective in addressing grievances or promoting democratic representation, individuals are more likely to participate in protests as a form of political representation.

For example, Quaranta (2018) looks at the role of macroeconomic conditions and socioeconomic resources on participation in elections and protests. By looking at the two common forms of political participation, voting and protesting, the author creates four forms of repertoires of participation: the "disengaged" (abstaining and not protesting), the "duty-based" (voting and not protesting), the "protest" (abstaining and protesting), and the "all-round" (voting and protesting). The complementary role of protest corre-

sponds to "all-round" individuals. However, macroeconomic conditions do not change the probability of engaging in that repertoire.

Oser (2017) builds on Dalton's (2008) argument on changing citizen norms and categorizes political participants as either "engaged" or "duty-based". According to the idea, engaged political participants tend to be less active in the electoral arena but more involved in protesting. On the other hand, duty-based participants are likelier to vote but less likely to protest. However, the findings do not support these expectations. Those who do not vote in elections are mostly disengaged in politics and do not participate in other forms of participation.

Borbáth and Hutter focus on both complementary and substitute roles of protests. According to their findings, protesting is complementary to voting at the individual level. Those who incorporate both participation types "resemble political insiders, well informed, and politically endowed citizens" (2022, 463). In addition, at the aggregate level, the findings show that countries with higher electoral turnout tend to have lower levels of protest participation and vice versa. This finding might indicate a substitute role of protest at the country level.

The studies of Oser's (2017) and Borbáth and Hutter (2022) show us that protesting is complementary to voting rather than a substitute. However, the literature does not provide answers for the complementary and substitute role of protests with the consideration of the motivations to participate in demonstrations. Elections give citizens a conventional and institutional option to vote according to their preferences. In contrast, protests help individuals to voice their concerns through unconventional means and draw attention to social and political issues that may not receive adequate attention through traditional electoral channels. They are not regular or routine events like elections, and they are typically organized by non-state actors or civil society groups rather than state institutions. The occurrence of protest, among other things, depend on the motivations of aggrieved citizens to raise their voice. The main protest driver is the relative deprivation of individuals from political, economic, or cultural resources. Although examining personality traits is essential to map the patterns of participating in voting and protest is a significant contribution to our understanding, in terms of seeing commonalities and differences between voting and protesting, understanding the role of demonstrations as complements or substitutes require further investigating in grievances. Such investigations can shed light on whether protests serve as complementary mechanisms to elections by addressing specific issues or whether they act as substitutes for those who feel disenchanted with the electoral process.

To comment on the relationship between voting and elections, we must also acknowledge the conditions where elections remain insufficient to provide political equality among citizens. Specifically, it is essential to investigate how protesting addresses elections' shortcomings in providing adequate political representation. In this dissertation chapter, I aim to explore this question by looking at the relative deprivation of political representation that elections create.

2.3 Political Inequality and Protest Participation

Elections inherently create winners and losers at individual and societal levels, as it is a competition between different parties for citizens' votes. They eventually fall short of providing everybody with an equal chance to control the workings of government. As a result, the most influential political participation mechanism to establish political equality become a source of political inequality. The literature on protest behavior has been interested in understanding how the political inequality that the election results create shapes the motivation to participate in protests (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Curini and Jou 2016; Sedziaka and Rose 2015; van der Meer, Van Deth, and Scheepers 2009; VanDusky-Allen 2017*a*). These studies concentrate on the effect of winning/losing status on protest participation because these two groups evaluate the extent of responsiveness of the political system to their preferences through different lenses. The first one in this perspective, Anderson and Mendes (2006) find that losers protest more than winners because they are less content with government responsiveness to their preferences since policy outcomes are closer to the majority's preferences which made up the government (Anderson and Guillory 1997).[1] With the degree of representation that elections provide, people's perspectives on evaluating the legitimacy of the political decision-making process differ, as do their motivations to participate in non-electoral political participation. Thus, losers protest more than winners to bring about a change either in government formation or government policy.

Winners and losers are generally categorized according to voting for the government parties. However, the ideological closeness between the government's position and individuals is also referred to in the literature to indicate representational inequality among citizens, as ideological differences usually deprive losers of equal representation of their

[1]See also Banducci and Karp's (2003) study that shows lower external efficacy of losers.

preferences in decision-making (Curini and Jou 2016; van der Meer, Van Deth, and Scheepers 2009).[2] Against the idea of a dichotomy between the winner and loser of a political system, these studies provide a continuum to measure the degree of citizens' deprivation from their preferred policy outcomes (See also Gurr 1970; Muller 1979).

Ideological distance from the government can be a better proxy to epitomize the relative representational inequality by providing a continuous scale. But, more importantly, a conceptual differentiation between winner/ loser status and ideological distance reveals other dimensions that add to the effect of winning and loser status on democratic satisfaction (Curini and Jou 2016). Ideological proximity is not individuals' only consideration in voting for government or opposition parties. For instance, party identification drives citizens to repeatedly support their preferred party despite changing issue stances (Dalton 2016). As the representational inequality's primary signal is the degree of policy responsiveness to citizens' preferences in democracies, I also use the ideological distance measure for representational deprivation.

In addition to its advantages, it is necessary to use ideological distance to epitomize representational inequality, as this study also explores the protest behavior of non-voters. Examining the protest participation of winners and losers limits our observation to individuals who vote in elections. Nevertheless, citizens who do not vote in elections may also participate in protests due to their distinctive policy preferences. According to studies on spatial voting, some may decide not to pay the cost of vote when parties are ideologically too distant from them (Adams, Dow, and Merrill 2006; Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011; Downs 1957; Zipp 1985). As a result, people are alienated from political competition because the parties too distant from themselves should also be considered losers. Although limited in numbers, a small part of the population who did not vote in elections may choose to participate in the protest as its substitute.

Alienation from party competition may not necessarily indicate less active citizens in politics, as there are several other forms of political participation outside conventional politics. For example, non-voters may participate in protests, especially when their policy preferences conflict with the government's. Although voting is substantially less costly and a mainly participated form of political action, which makes the share of the population who protest a substitute for elections considerably small, the increasing representational inequality may drive individuals to protest more than others. In other

[2]See also Torcal et al. (2016), Kostelka and Rovny (2019), Bernhagen and Marsh (2007) for the relationship between ideological extremism or proximity and protest participation

words, people who are alienated from party competition, as there are no parties with a chance of winning closer to their self-position in the ideological spectrum, can choose to participate in the protest more frequently to substitute elections. Therefore, the first hypothesis is:

> **H1:** Increasing distance from the government's ideological position increases the probability to protest to substitute elections.

As the ideological distance increases, the probability to protest in general, voters are no exception. However, voting in elections indicates more active political participation. In that regard, individuals who vote in elections should be expected to protest more than non-voters to respond to political inequality. In that regard, the second hypothesis can be formulated below:

> **H2:** The positive effect of ideological distance on protesting is higher for participating in protests to complement voting.

While citizens who vote in elections are likely to be politically more active, approaching all individuals as equally interested in the outcome of elections can be misleading. The voting literature finds that a substantial part of voters does not care about the outcome of elections. Instead, citizens vote as an act of "civic duty" (Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell 2006; Clarke et al. 2004; Riker and Ordeshook 1968) . In that regard, it should not be expected for individuals who vote in elections to be equally motivated to protest as a response to representational deprivation. Individuals more interested in their ideological differences from the government's ideological position should be the ones who vote with a motivation to affect political decision-making.

While rational explanations on voter turnout emphasize civic duty to answer the question of "why people vote at all?", there is another research tradition that approaches voting as an "expressive act" (Blais and Achen). Accordingly, people vote when they think the election is important. In other words, they vote when they are interested in the outcome. These people have a strong preference among the candidates competing in elections.

I borrow these two research traditions' explanations on voter turnout in this study.

Therefore, I differentiate voters according to their interest in the outcome by incorporating their party affiliation into their protest behavior equation. Those more interested in the outcome of elections vote to express their party preference. Correspondingly, the ideological distance of the formed government after the election would have more substantial consequences in evaluating democratic responsiveness for these individuals. Therefore, I argue that citizens who feel close to a party are more likely to vote expressively, which increases their probability of protesting due to representational deprivation. In that regard, the third hypothesis is:

> **H3:** The positive effect of ideological distance on protesting as complementing elections is stronger for voters who feel close to a party.

2.4 Research Design

The dataset used in this study consists of several individual and country-level datasets. I rely on the last four waves of the ESS (2012-2018) for individual-level variables.[3] ESS provides the most comprehensive dataset for our operationalization of the dependent variable by asking whether the respondent voted in the last elections and protested in the previous 12 months.[4] I combine this dataset with the ParlGov dataset for cabinet and party information, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) for party positions, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset for party institutionalization, the Gini Inequality Index for income inequality, and the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) for the effective number of parliamentary parties.

Testing the hypothesis require choosing a dependent variable that groups people according to their participation preferences in elections and protests. Hence, the dependent variable of this study consists of four mutually exclusive categories: not voting and not protesting, voting but not protesting, not voting but protesting, and voting and

[3]Data have been collected via face-to-face CAPI interviews in all countries.

[4]I examine the following nationally representative surveys in the ESS data: Austria (2014, 2016), Belgium (2012, 2016, 2018), Denmark (2012, 2014, 2018), Finland (2012, 2014, 2016, 2018), France (2014, 2016, 2018) Germany (2012, 2014, 2016, 2018), Ireland (2012, 2014, 2018), Italy (2016), the Netherlands (2012, 2014, 2016, 2018), Portugal (2012, 2014, 2016, 2018), Spain (2014, 2018), Sweden (2012, 2014, 2016, 2018), and the United Kingdom (2012, 2014, 2016, 2018).

protesting. In coding the dependent variable, I used four questions asked in all waves of the ESS to show respondents' electoral and protest participation. The first question asks whether the respondent voted in the last election for electoral participation. For protest participation, the questions ask whether individuals participated in a demonstration during the previous 12 months.

I created a binary variable for protest participation that scores 0 if the respondent answered no and 1 if the respondent answered yes to whether she participated in public demonstrations.

Table 2.1 The dependent variable

	Not Protested	Protested	Total
Not Voted	9,692	587	10,279
	94.29 %	5.71 %	100.00 %
Voted	49,693	4,835	54,528
	91.13 %	8.87 %	100.00 %
Total	59,385	5,422	64,807
	91.63 %	8.37 %	100.00 %

With this operationalization, I coded the dependent variable that scores 0 when both vote and protest variables are 0; 1 when the vote variable is 1, but protest is 0; 2 when the vote variable is 0, but protest is 1; 3 when both variables are 1.[5] Table 2.1 shows the number of respondents falling into these four categories. Figure 2.1 shows the percentages of individuals who protest to complement and substitute for each country-year observation.

As previous studies show, losers are more likely to protest than winners. By taking winning or losing status as a continuum rather than a binary distinction, I adopt van der Meer and his colleagues' (2009) approach to account for the effect of representational deprivation on protest participation. To operationalize the primary independent variable, political inequality, I calculated the distance between the ideological self-placement of respondents and the median party in governments.[6] For this, I firstly relied on the

[5]See Quaranta (2018), and Vrablikova and Linek (2015) for similar operationalizations of mine.

[6]As an alternative to the distance from the median party in government, distance from the mean position from the government is employed in the robustness check in Table A4

question in the ESS that asks respondents to place themselves on the same scale. For the ideological placement of the median party, I used the CHES dataset, which asks country experts to place parties on the 11-point left-right scale. The relevant CHES surveys for this study were conducted in 2010, 2014, and 2019. For these years, I obtained the information for the cabinet compositions of countries from the ParlGov dataset.[7]

Figure 2.1 The shares of the groups which "complements" and "substitutes" elections by each country- election year



Due to the lack of data availability, it is impossible to measure ideological distance by calculating the distance between left-right self-placement of individuals and their perceived ideological positions of parties on the same scale (Blais and Bodet 2006). Instead, the left-right positions of the individuals from the ESS are extracted from the left-right placements of parties by the country experts in the CHES. [8] Matching an expert survey with individuals' self-placement can lead to methodological problems

[7]To show which survey year coincides with which CHES wave, I include a two-way graph in Figure A.1.

[8]See Rossett and Stecker (2019) and Stecker and Tausendpfund (2016) for a similar approach on calculating ideological distance.

since the experts cannot know the perceived placement of parties by the individuals (Powell 2009). Individuals' perceptions may be inaccurate to reflect the actual positions of parties as well. For example, Adams and his coauthors (2011) find that voters do not change their placements of parties according to the policy shifts of parties when the authors compare the CMP's Party left-right positions and respondents' placements from the National Election Study of Germany.

This study answers these methodological concerns with two explanations to measure the distance with the help of an expert survey. First, this study is interested only in calculating the position of the median party in government but not all parties (e.g., Rosset and Stecker 2019). As parties in government have more influence to shape voters' information by their legislative behavior (Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011), people can place parties on the left-right scale more informedly. Therefore, the difference between individual and expert placements of parties is expected to be lower. Secondly, as this study chooses to match the individual placements with an expert survey, I acknowledge that country experts are more knowledgeable of the contextual factors in their countries. As a result, they can better evaluate the positions of parties in the eyes of the mass public.

To match the dates of elections and relevant years that the CHES was conducted, and lastly, the ESS survey periods, which considerably change across examined countries, I created a dataset providing the information on ESS fieldwork periods for each country, the previous election date from this fieldwork, and the relevant CHES year. As the question for protest participation asks whether respondents participated in demonstrations in the last 12 months, I ensure that there has been no government change in the previous 12 months by dropping countries where the ESS fieldwork were conducted less than 365 days from the last were elections. [9] Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of individuals' ideological distances for each country-year observation.

To account for the respondents' party affiliation, I use the question from the ESS, which asks respondents whether they fell close to a party. It is the generalized party identification question in comparative research (Blais, Feitosa, and Sevi 2019). Accordingly, the variable takes the value 1 if the respondent feels close to any party and 0 if otherwise.

[9] In Germany, ESS fieldwork for 2014 started to be performed 335 days after the 2013 elections, and fieldwork for 2018 started 339 days after the 2017 elections. However, Christian Democratic Union remained the government party after these elections. Therefore, I did not drop these observations as the position of the median party in government remains the same. In Austria, ESS fieldwork for 2018 started 338 days after the 2017 elections, because there has been a cabinet change, I dropped the observations belonging to that year.

In addition to the main independent variables, the literature on protest behavior provides a wealth of control variables at the individual and aggregate levels. First and foremost, ideological extremity increases protest participation (van der Meer, Van Deth, and Scheepers 2009). Therefore, although I use the distance from the government as the primary source of representational deprivation, I also control ideological extremity as the limited size of the extreme ideological groups impedes their preferences to be equally represented in policy making.

Regarding the individual resources for political participation (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995), I include the political interest variable that takes a value between 1 and 4. Regarding the positive effect of general trust on protest behavior (Braun and Hutter 2016), I use a variable operationalized by the question asking whether respondents trust political parties. This variable takes 0 for no trust and 10 for complete trust.

In their study, Anderson and Mendes (2006) emphasize the varying satisfaction levels from democracy depending on winning and losing status (see also Anderson and Guillory 1997; Griffin, de Jonge, and Velasco-Guachalla 2021). To account for the effect, I include the democratic satisfaction variable that takes a value between 0 and 10, in turn, for no satisfaction and extreme satisfaction.

In the political opportunity approach, more open structures increase the mobilization activity and recruitment capabilities of mobilizing organizations (Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 2011). However, from a comparative perspective, there are limited indicators to measure the interconnectedness of political opportunities, political organizations, and individual participation in non-electoral forms of political participation. In accounting for one facet of this relationship, Vrablikova (2014) focuses on organizational membership. In this study, I also account for the role of organizational resources with a binary variable that scores 0 when respondents are not a member and 1 if they are trade union members.

According to grievance theory, people's perceptions of the discrepancy between their value expectations and capabilities lead them to participate in mass protests (Gurr 1970). The main driver of the perception of disparity is observing others' better living conditions. In this study, following van der Meer and his coauthors' approach (2009), I used relative deprivation in political representation by looking at the distance from the median party in government. However, I also control for economic grievance, with one individual-level and another aggregate-level variable. I include a four-scale feeling about the income variable at the individual level. I benefit from the Gini inequality

index for countries in the study sample to also asses the effect of country-level inequality on protest participation[10].

Figure 2.2 The distribution of ideological distances from the median government position by each country-year



I include additional country-level variables in the models of the study. I use the effective number of parliamentary parties as a variable at the country level, indicating

[10]We lag the inequality index for a year to account for possible endogeneity.

elections' competitiveness and the legislation's diversity. I also account for the role of territorial decentralization with the federalism variable. Lastly, I control the effects of demographic variables, including age, education, and gender.

2.5 Empirical Findings

Table 2.2 reports multinomial logistic regression estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses for all three models.[11] In these models, the base category is voting but not protesting, which is, as Table 2.2 shows, the modal category. The regression coefficients thus show the probability of observing a particular outcome relative to the base category of voting but not protesting.

Model 1 includes only the individual-level variables, while country-level variables are also present in Model 2. Finally, Model 3 introduces the individual-level interaction between ideological distance from the median party in government and feeling close to a party.

To comment on the statistical significance of the coefficients in Model 2, I map coefficients onto the probability space by setting all other variables to their respective central values in the estimation. In Figure 2.3, I plot the predictions of different combinations of voting and protesting for increasing ideological distance with 95% confidence intervals.

Table 2.2 Multinomial logistic regression estimates

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Not Voted & Not Protested			
Distance	0.084***	0.071***	0.065***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Feeling Close to a Party			-0.727***
			(0.044)
Feeling Close to a Party × Distance			0.008
			(0.016)
Political Interest	-0.527***	-0.522***	-0.452***

[11] As an alternative estimator accounting for the hierarchical structure of our model, I employed a two-level multinomial logistic regression with random effects at the country level in Table A5. The estimation results from both models indicate a high degree of similarity.

	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.053***	-0.043***	-0.040***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Organizational Membership	-0.436***	-0.352***	-0.354***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Feeling About Household's Income	-0.253***	-0.239***	-0.238***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.063***	-0.051***	-0.039***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Ideological Extremity	-0.151***	-0.140***	-0.087***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Education	-0.150***	-0.149***	-0.155***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Gender	-0.135***	-0.140***	-0.152***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age	-0.025***	-0.026***	-0.025***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eff. Num. of Parl. Part.		-0.082***	-0.085***
		(0.009)	(0.009)
Income Inequality		0.000***	0.000***
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Federalism		-0.154***	-0.157***
		(0.016)	(0.016)
Liberal Democracy		-2.789***	-2.228***
		(0.413)	(0.417)
Constant	2.172***	4.672***	4.291***
	(0.065)	(0.317)	(0.321)
Not Voted & Protested			
Distance	0.175***	0.141***	0.114***
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Feeling Close to a Party			-0.587***
			(0.159)
Feeling Close to a Party × Distance			0.051
			(0.045)
Political Interest	-0.070	-0.079	-0.038

	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.055)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.144***	-0.118***	-0.116***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Organizational Membership	-0.323***	-0.057	-0.056
	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Feeling About Household's Income	-0.360***	-0.341***	-0.338***
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.133***	-0.082***	-0.074***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Ideological Extremity	0.057	0.098***	0.131***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Education	0.078**	0.061*	0.057
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Gender	-0.380***	-0.386***	-0.394***
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Age	-0.053***	-0.055***	-0.054***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Eff. Num. of Parl. Part.		-0.348***	-0.348***
		(0.041)	(0.041)
Income Inequality		-0.000	-0.000
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Federalism		0.023	0.022
		(0.052)	(0.052)
Liberal democracy index		-4.546***	-4.356***
		(1.605)	(1.615)
Constant	-0.476**	4.189***	4.137***
	(0.220)	(1.208)	(1.221)
Voted & Protested			
Distance	0.181***	0.162***	0.123***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.019)
Feeling Close to a Party			0.195***
			(0.061)
Feeling Close to a Party × Distance			0.050**
			(0.020)
Political Interest	0.555***	0.523***	0.494***

	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.077***	-0.059***	-0.059***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Organizational Membership	0.228***	0.442***	0.440***
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Feeling About Household's Income	-0.088***	-0.078***	-0.083***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.051***	-0.002	-0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Ideological Extremity	0.068***	0.100***	0.082***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Education	0.131***	0.122***	0.124***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Gender	0.010	0.027	0.031
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Age	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.023***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Eff. Num. of Parl. Part.		-0.260***	-0.260***
		(0.013)	(0.013)
Income Inequality		-0.001***	-0.001***
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Federalism		0.252***	0.252***
		(0.018)	(0.018)
Liberal democracy index		-2.276***	-2.379***
		(0.529)	(0.526)
Constant	-2.682***	-0.211	-0.094
	(0.093)	(0.403)	(0.403)
Log lik.	-41685.192	-41121.806	-40653.381
N	64807.000	64807.000	64807.000
AIC	83436	82334	81409
BIC	83736	82742	81872

Notes: Base Category is Voting but not Protesting. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Based on the estimates in the second model of Table 1, the predicted probabilities of

protesting as complementing elections support the first hypothesis that respondents are more likely to engage in protest to complement elections when they hold ideological positions farther away from the government's stance. The probability of respondents participating in elections and protests increases as their ideological distance from the government's position increases. At the lowest value of ideological distance, the predicted probability is 3 percent. However, as the ideological distance increases, the probability of participating in both elections and protests increases significantly. For the highest distance value, the predicted probability reaches nearly 16 percent. Comparing these probabilities to the baseline probability of protesting as complementing elections, which is 8 percent, we observe a substantial increase in the probabilities with the increasing ideological distance.

The predicted probabilities of protesting as a substitute for elections also support the second hypothesis. The probability of respondents not voting but protesting, indicating protest as a substitute for elections, increases as the ideological distance from the government's position increases.

Figure 2.3 Predicted probabilities of participation by distance from the median party



For the lowest values of ideological distance, the predicted probability of protesting as a substitute for elections is 0.2 percent. However, as the ideological distance increases, the probability of protesting instead of voting also increases. At the highest value of the independent variable, the predicted probability reaches 1 percent. When compared to the baseline probability of 0.6 percent, the observed increase in probability represents an important change of approximately 66 percent.

Based on the model estimates and the plotted predicted probabilities, the effect of ideological distance is more substantial for the category of voting and protesting compared to protesting as a substitute for elections. The change in probability of protesting as complementing elections is nearly 100 percent, indicating a substantial effect. This finding supports the third hypothesis, suggesting that protesting is more of a complement against increasing political inequality rather than a substitute. Furthermore, it means that as individuals' ideological distance from the government's position increases, they are more likely to vote and protest as complementary actions to address perceived political inequality. Nevertheless, protest's role in substituting elections is also observable for fewer respondents. The increasing probability of protesting as a substitute with increasing ideological distance is not at all negligible. To better illustrate the effect, the marginal effect estimates with 95% confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 2.4. The increasing uncertainty around the predictions results from a low level of observations for the higher numbers of respondents with higher ideological distance from the government in the category of not voting but protesting.

Figure 2.3 reveals significant findings for the category of voting but not protesting. The predicted probabilities for this category decrease similarly with the increasing probabilities of voting and protesting. This finding aligns with the argument that individuals tend to protest more as their ideological distance from the government increases. However, the observed change indicates a relatively minor effect than the other categories. With approximately a 10 percent change from the baseline probability, the probability of voting but not protesting decreases to 73 percent for the highest value of ideological distance. The finding suggests that for most people, voting remains the primary means of being represented in conventional politics, even if they have distinct political preferences from the government.

The plotted predictions indicate no discernible effect of ideological distance on individuals who neither vote nor participate in protests. This outcome is consistent with the expectation that most people who do not vote in elections are politically inactive and less likely to engage in protests. Increasing ideological distance from the government's

position does not influence their behavior.

Figure 2.4 Marginal effect of ideological distance for the categories not voting&protesting and voting&protesting



Although we find the positive effect of ideological distance on protesting as a substitute for elections, the share of the population of individuals who fall into this category is only 0.6 percent of the total population of our sample. However, what is noteworthy from the figure is the changing patterns of prevalent choices among individuals as the ideological distance increases. After a certain point, around a distance of 6, the predicted probabilities for voting and protesting exceed the probability of not voting and not protesting. The finding suggests that as individuals become more distanced from the government's position, their choices shift towards voting and protesting as means of political expression. All in all, 90 percent of individuals vote in elections irrespective of their ideological position relative to the government—additionally, 1 out of every six voters protest for the highest values of ideological distance.

In Figure 2.5, the plotted predictions are estimated based on Model 3, which includes the interaction term between feeling close to a party and ideological distance. The findings

support the third hypothesis, indicating that the effect of ideological distance on the probability of protesting as complementing elections is more substantial for respondents who feel attached to a party. The slope for respondents who feel close to a party is steeper than those who do not feel close to any party, suggesting that individuals with a party attachment are more responsive to increasing ideological distance when it comes to engaging in protest as a complement to elections.

Figure 2.5 Predicted probabilities of participation by distance from the median for respondents feeling/not feeling close to a party



The model estimations and plotted predictions show no relationship between protesting as a substitute and ideological distance in both plotted predictions. This result may be the limited number of observations for respondents in our sample who do not vote but protest. For example, I only have 37 observations from individuals who feel close to a party but are more than 6 points distant from the government. Further analysis with a larger sample size may require more conclusive evidence and make more conclusive comments regarding a possible relationship. Nevertheless, in this study, I do not propose any relationship between ideological distance and protesting as a substitute for individuals feeling close to a party, as having a party affiliation conflicts with the idea

of political alienation.

In addition to the main findings, Table 2.2 reveals remarkable results for other variables. For example, feeling close to a party by itself significantly reduces the probability of not voting but protesting and increasing the probability of voting and protesting. As one of the main motivations to vote is party affiliation, the findings are consistent with the literature. Nevertheless, its positive effect on protesting reveals that most of the individuals who protest are not alienated from party competition, nor are they more "engaged citizens", as the transformation theories suggest.

Political interest is essential to being politically active in conventional and unconventional actions. The findings reveal a substantively significant effect of political interest in all outcomes but one. The results are not statistically significant for not voting but protesting. To theorize about any effect of political interest on this category is more challenging, as politically interested people are expected to vote in elections in addition to protesting more frequently than others.

Another meaningful relationship that we can discuss is the effect of democratic satisfaction. It has a negative effect in all categories but not for the exclusive voters in our sample. The results are consistent with the literature that less satisfaction with democracy increases protest participation. In addition, it should be expected that democratic satisfaction increases voting.

2.6 Conclusion

While examining protest participation as a response to political inequality, previous studies did not consider the participation preferences of other types of political participation. However, approaching protest behavior as a complement or substitute for voting allows us to undertake protest as the equivalent of elections regarding their potential to affect political decisions. Correspondingly, this study's main objective is to show that protesting is not a deviant form of political participation. Instead, with increasing social movements and the importance of civil society in Western countries, participating in protests is becoming more routinized and normalized as voting for citizens.

In this study, I focus on the role of ideological distance from the government in voting and protesting while dividing citizens into groups based on their turnout in previous

elections and protest participation. I built on the idea that protests can compensate for the inefficiency of elections to provide equal representation. To test my hypotheses, I employ cross-national survey data to test our hypotheses and examine respondents' self-reported electoral and protest participation in 13 European democracies between 2012 and 2018. I use a discrete choice model where choices are categorized as not voting-not protesting, not protesting, not voting -protesting, and voting- testing. Multinomial logistic regression estimates provide empirical support for all three hypotheses.

The results indicate that the complementary role of protest is more substantive than its substitute role. This finding suggests that as individuals' ideological distance from the government increases, they are more likely to engage in both voting and protesting as complementary actions to address political grievances.

Furthermore, the results highlight that the probability of protesting as a complement to elections is higher for individuals who vote in elections and feel close to a party. This finding can be explained by the idea that individuals who feel close to a party are more invested in election results than voters who see voting as a civic duty. Their party attachment may make them more attuned to political problems and motivated to participate in protest activities. These results provide insights into the complex dynamics between elections, party affiliation, and protest behavior. Individuals' motivations and levels of engagement with political parties play a significant role in shaping their participation patterns.

In the Appendix, I provide several robustness checks with different operationalization of the ideological distance, further supporting the hypotheses. However, I should acknowledge the limitations of the study as the sample consists of only European countries. Although I examine 13 European countries, I must stress the importance of covering countries in Europe with less-stable democratic institutions. Therefore, further research may focus on other countries with competitive elections but different political cultures. [12]

This chapter emphasizes that the current state of research on protest behavior often treats protest as a distinct and separate form of political participation. By examining

[12] In countries with stable party systems with a set of parties that respond well to the voters' preferences, the preferences of individuals can be better channeled into the formal decision-making process. Strong institutions increase political opportunities, thus making protests another tool to influence policymaking. As a result, in institutionally less-developed countries, individuals may not protest as complements and substitutes as much as citizens of advanced democracies. Thus, in the Appendix, I employ the same model in Table 2.2 including Post-Communist European Democracies. To account for the level of institutionalization I use the party system institutionalization variable from the V-dem dataset. The findings of this model and plotted predictions are discussed in the conclusion of this dissertation.

protest as both a complement and a substitute for voting, this study takes a novel approach to the literature and highlights the different motivations underlying protest behavior. However, there is still much more to explore and understand regarding the participation patterns across various combinations of different types of political participation as a response to political, economic, and social grievances. Therefore, recognizing and delving into the diverse motivations that drive individuals to participate differently in politics is essential to improve our understanding of the role of conventional and unconventional types of political participation in political representation.

3. WINNER AND LOSER OR BIGGER AND SMALLER: THE ROLE OF PARTY SIZE ON PROTEST BEHAVIOR

3.1 Introduction

Losers – who voted for opposition parties – are more likely to participate in protests due to the unequal levels of representation of their preferences in policymaking (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Curini and Jou 2016; van der Meer, Van Deth, and Scheepers 2009; VanDusky-Allen 2017*b*). While winners and losers are identified by their party preferences in elections, they have also been remarked as the members of the political majority and minority groups. Nevertheless, most of the time, majority and minority status does not coincide with the winning and losing status.

While categorizing people as winners and losers according to their party preferences, other qualities of these parties are not addressed in the literature to understand their effect on protest behavior. Political parties have varying capabilities to represent their voters' preferences, apart from being in government or opposition. Most importantly, in European democracies, where multiparty governments are prevalent, being a senior or junior coalition partner determines how much the party plays a role in policymaking. Junior coalition party voters' preferences are not as equally represented as the senior coalition party voters. Although these junior parties in government signal their potential to govern to the voters and differentiate themselves from other parties that cannot find a seat in government, they usually do not have the same weight in producing policies. Therefore, not all winners are equally represented.

In addition to being a senior or junior coalition partner, the size of political parties decides the parties' bargaining power in government. With the increasing seat share in the government, the policy influence of parties increases. The size of political parties is

also an essential indicator of the government capacity of opposition parties. Although bigger opposition parties cannot be part of government policymaking, they have a large number of seats in parliaments. These parties may have also been the previous government parties. In that regard, compared to the smaller parties in opposition with no chance to have a substantive influence in the decision-making, these parties' voters are better represented in conventional politics.

In this study, following the previous literature, I differentiate parties according to their government status, as this status determines these parties' degree of representation of their voters' preferences. However, in addition to being in government or not, being a junior or senior coalition partner and the size of political parties play a role in contributing to the effect of political inequality on protest participation. I expect the probability of protesting to be higher for voters of junior coalition partners than those of senior coalition partners. We also expect an increasing probability of protesting with the decreasing party size since these parties have limited capability to influence the decision-making process. However, compared to the smaller parties in opposition, smaller parties in coalition better represent their voters, thanks to their part in government. Therefore, we expect that the size of political parties has a more substantial effect on the voters of opposition parties on their probability of protesting.

To test the chapter's hypotheses, I use the data from the eight rounds of the European Social Survey from 2004 to 2018 to provide me with 54 country-year observations of Western democracies. The chapters offer several implications for political representation, party politics, and protest behavior. Firstly, this study provides a novel perspective to understanding the role of political parties in representing their voters by focusing on their capacity to do so. While I take size as one of the most prominent qualities of power, I mainly focus on factors that contribute to representational inequality other than the government status of political parties. I differentiate parties according to their decision-making strengths, which may better capture their voters' majority and minority status in countries. Secondly, by touching upon the multiparty government phenomenon in Europe, this study becomes the first to point out a more dynamic party competition that influences protest participation.

3.2 Parties, Representation, and Protest

The idea of citizens voting for parties that will create the partisan composition of the legislature, which the policies will be produced, lies at the center of the democratic representation (Powell Jr and Vanberg 2000). Therefore, parties provide the primary mechanism for fulfilling the premise of democracy (Sartori 1976; Schattschneider 1960). Nevertheless, although all citizens are equal to vote for their preferred party, these parties can only represent them to the extent of their ability to influence decision-making. By designating these parties' vote shares, elections play the leading role in determining this capability.

Elections also determine the number of parties in the parliament and the composition of legislatures which are the factors that contribute to the representational inequality of citizens. Students of social movements attach importance to these factors, as the representational deprivation leads to dissatisfaction with the way democracy works, which increases the probability of protest (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2009; Griffin, de Jonge, and Velasco-Guachalla 2021; Gurr 1970; Nonnemacher 2022). [1] For instance, Kitschelt (1986) stresses the effect of the number of parties on the frequency of protest events. The number of parties increases the political openness for citizens to participate in politics. When people have more access points in decision-making with the abundance of parties representing different preferences, they can more easily participate in protests to raise their demands in conventional politics.

In contrast to the idea that the number of parties increases protest participation, İlgü-Özler (2013) concentrates explicitly on the conditional effect of the government system in this relationship. In presidential systems, the frequency of protest increases with the number of parties. Conversely, the study shows that increasing the number of parties decreases the number of demonstrations in parliamentary systems. Two factors explain the conditioning role of the government system: firstly, the fragility of presidential systems to deadlock increases with more fragmented legislative parties. As the number of parties increases in the legislative branch of the government, the coherence and cooperation between executive and legislative become harder (Linz 1990). Secondly, low party discipline in presidential systems and the absence of regular party

[1] These studies can be examined under the broader framework of political opportunity structures which mainly emphasize the dynamic relationship between social structures, institutional mechanisms, and alliance formations to increase and decrease the number, saliency, and effectiveness of social movements (Eisinger 1971; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1985; Tarrow 2011).

competition contribute to the difficulty in cooperation between the executive and legislation (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). As a result of these two factors aggravating the decision-making through the formal institutional mechanisms, people more frequently adopt alternative means to influence politics.

Individual-level studies also stress the importance of effective law-making in a country through parties. Machado and his coauthors (2011) find that people are less likely to participate in protests in countries with higher party institutionalization. Moreover, individuals with higher political efficacy in believing that there are parties that represent themselves in politics are less likely to protest. These results show that political parties contribute to the effectiveness of decision-making by increasing the quality of representation of citizens.

Machado and his coauthors (2011) and İlgü-Özler (2013) share a similar approach to the roles of political parties. Accordingly, by successfully representing their constituents, political parties reduce the probability of protest. Therefore, on the one side, parties provide opportunities for people to be part of the formal decision-making process that eventually make protest redundant. However, from the same point of view, parties increase political opportunities to protest by being an alliance of protestors in the legislative branches, increasing the chance of reaching a positive outcome for their demands.

The contrasting approach to parties' role in protest behavior can result from disregarded dynamics in political opportunities. Su (2015) touches upon these factors by focusing on the role of party size and coherence of opposition on frequency of protests. Accordingly, anti-government protests increase when the mobilization capacity of the opposition increases. In this study, the author focuses on the size of the opposition camp together with their unity. The author shows that in the context of democratization, the entrance of opposition elites to parliaments decreases their likelihood to support protest (Lee 2011). The study provides a more nuanced relationship between coalition size and protest frequency.

The size of the opposition signals its capability to take alternative measures against the decision of governments. However, Lee's (2015) study does not address the role of the size of political parties individually, according to their government status. The literature does not provide any information on the role of the representational capacity of parties on their voters' protest behavior.

3.3 Political Winners and Protest

The inequality in representation rises with a number of factors such as the government status of the preferred parties, these parties' issue positions, and the composition of parliaments. Studies examining the motivation to protest include variables that account for the factors that shape the power configuration in the party system (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Quaranta 2015; Su 2015; VanDusky-Allen 2017*b*).

One of the most prominent and apparent mechanisms that shape the power distribution in the parliament is political parties' winning or losing status. Anderson and Mendes (2005) look at the effect of electoral winning and losings status of individuals on their protest behavior. The authors argue that while elections allocate the majority and the minority, they correspondingly shape the perceptions toward political institutions. Losers, by being less represented compared to the winners, are less satisfied with how democracy works[2]. Likewise, as people want to be in the majority's position, losers will be more likely to protest to change politics through unconventional political action.

Anderson and Mendes (2005) separate the winning (majority) and losing (minority) status of individuals according to voting for the party in government or opposition, respectively. Since the political majority decides the public policy, the voters of parties that make up the government will be more satisfied with how democracy works, thus, protest less than the voters of opposition parties. However, the authors do not consider other properties of power balances in parliaments that may increase or decrease the extent of representation of both winners and losers. First and foremost, the composition of governments deserves a more detailed investigation as it makes some parties more/less powerful in affecting the policy outcome.

Vandusky-Allen (2017*b*) builds her research on the role of winner/loser distinction on protest participation by accounting for the effect of majoritarian and proportional representation as a conditioning factor in this relationship (VanDusky-Allen 2017*b*). In majoritarian systems, winning parties can more easily make policy decisions without getting into a bargaining process with other parties. As the winning parties in these systems have greater power, governments are less responsive to the demands of losers than in proportional systems. As a result, in single-party, majority governments, losers are more likely to protest than losers in coalition governments because the winning

[2]See also Anderson and Guillory (1997), and Banducci and Jeffrey (2003)

party has all the power to shape politics.

Vandusky-Allen (2017*b*) points out one of the dimensions that should be considered while looking at winning/losing status in protesting. As we underline, the composition of parliaments and cabinets should be considered when examining the motivations of protesting due to political inequality in terms of representation of preferences. This differentiation is also necessary to understand the varying levels of protest participation among those who voted for opposition parties. To reiterate, when the opposition parties become more coherent in their demands and unite to act against the government, the probability of an anti-government protest increases (Su 2015).

Some winners may be more willing to protest as they are less satisfied with how decisions are made. In most parliamentary democracies, the government is formed after a long process of cooperation and compromise between political parties. This process can bring smaller parties with a moderate vote share to governments while keeping out bigger parties. Being in government indeed can be a factor to be accepted as part of the majority as the decision-making in government requires the cooperation of smaller parties (Norris 2008). Also, the probability of compromise of parties increases with the diversity of issues from different party supporters (Laver and Shepsle 1990). However, although these coalition partners come out better off in this bargaining process as being in government gives them credibility and prestige in the political arena (Klüver and Spoon 2020), their power to shape the policy agenda remains limited compared to the senior coalition partners. Smaller parties often have less influence in the decision-making (Fortunato et al. 2021; Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008).

As a result, one should not expect junior coalition parties' voters to be politically equal to voters of parties that form most of the government, as these parties have limited power to shape the decision-makers. Voters of parties in government also face political inequality as the majority party constitutes the higher proportion of the government. Hence, although being identified as winners in the literature, voters of junior coalition partners should also be expected to be less satisfied with the democratic procedure. Dissatisfaction with how democracy works should increase the probability of protesting for the voters of junior coalition partners. Correspondingly, I can formulate the first hypothesis:

> **H1:** Junior coalition party voters participate in protests more than the senior coalition party voters.

Junior coalition partners cannot make policies as much as senior government parties, thus, depriving their voters of equal representation. However, we should also consider the size of the junior coalition partner to measure its representational capacity. Two different junior cabinet partners with varying shares of the seat in the parliament should not be expected to have an equal level of bargaining power. The size of parties affects the parties' bargaining capability with the help of a higher number of ministerial allocations and policy payoffs (Klüver and Spoon 2020). In this study, I also consider the size of the political parties affecting the protest behavior of voters as a response to the unequal levels of representation. In that regard, rather than the dichotomy of senior and junior coalition partners to show the political inequality among the government parties' voters, the size of the parties provides a continuum for the unequal levels of representation. Therefore, the second hypothesis is:

> **H2:** As the size of the party in coalition decreases, its voter's probability of protesting increases.

3.4 Political Losers and Protest

In differentiating the government parties according to their seat shares in parliaments, it is also essential to discuss the voters of opposition parties' protest behavior in response to their size. In expecting the higher protest potential of smaller parties in government, I rely on the proposition that political inequality drives politically less represented people to protest more. In that regard, we do not expect a different relationship in opposition party voters aside from the fact that losers generally protest more than winners. Irrespective of opposition status, voting for a minor party should increase protest participation as these parties have a weaker political influence. However, I should discuss the extent of change in the losers' protest potential to decide whether there is a conditioning effect of government status.

In the previous section, I put forward the advantages of being in government for smaller parties, as this status helps these parties to gain a considerable impact on decision-making, in addition to the increased public funding and media appearance (Dinas, Riera, and Roussias 2015; Klüver and Spoon 2020). Moreover, parties that enter the

parliament generally signal their organizational power and ideological positions more clearly (Dinas, Riera, and Roussias 2015). In contrast to the advantages of smaller parties when entering the government, voting for smaller parties is considered a way of protest voting in politics (Bélanger 2004; Bergh 2004; Bowler and Lanoue 1992). Voters who developed anti-party attitudes as a response to bad representational experiences chooses to manifest their discontent by voting for parties with no expected policy-making influence (Bélanger 2004). This behavior should signal that people who vote for these parties are alienated from party politics and vote for parties with no representational capacity to show their discontent.

For two reasons, voting for smaller opposition parties should indicate a higher protest potential. Firstly, voters of these parties are the least represented segment of citizens in politics due to the incapacity of their parties. Secondly, these people are alienated from party politics and keen to participate in unconventional methods.[3] Indeed, while citizens of advanced democracies are becoming more critical of how democracy works in their country, they tend to adopt alternative approaches to affect politics (Dalton, Van, and Steven 2009; Norris 2002).

As a result, the third hypothesis is:

> **H3:** The negative effect of the party size on protest participation is stronger for voters of opposition parties.

3.5 Research Design

Studies examining the relationship between political representation and protest participation often rely on country-level datasets to test their hypotheses (Arce 2010; İlgü Özler 2013; Kitschelt 1986; Su 2015). While the aggregate level studies provide information on the effects of the number of parties, party system, and strength of op-

[3] In this chapter, I also explore whether being a long-term loser or a winner affects protest behavior. According to Anderson and his coauthors (2015), being prominent losers might result in two attitudes: individuals may be more alienated from the party competition or more frustrated from constantly losing. Nevertheless, analyzing long-term losers' behavioral choices requires information containing individuals' party preferences in past elections. Although it might be a roadmap for future studies departed from this dissertation, a comprehensive dataset must be used to analyze individuals' behavior in constant loss. Instead, in this chapter, I test whether the parties' long-term winner or loser statuses affect their voter's protest behavior.

position on the frequency of protests, these studies do not arrive at behavioral patterns in different contextual settings. In this study, I aim to understand the relationship between individuals' party preferences, these parties' policy influence in politics, and individuals' motivations to protest. Therefore, I rely on an individual-level dataset to test our hypotheses in revealing the causal mechanism between party politics and protest behavior.

At the individual level, I use eight European Social Survey (ESS) waves for information on individuals' protest participation and voting preferences.[4] The chapter's propositions heavily rely on regular party competition supported by democratic institutions. Only in democratically advanced countries are citizens provided with party options that are stable and legitimate and ensure democratic accountability with the help of political institutionalization (Dalton and Weldon 2007). In contrast, in most Eastern European countries, the democratic transformation was not supported by democratic institutionalization with vigorous party competition (Norris 2002). Hence, in these countries, the political representation of citizens by parties is conditional on other factors beyond this study's scope. As a result, although the ESS provides datasets for most European countries, I limit our analysis to Western European countries. .[5]

In all waves of the ESS, the respondents were asked about their previous protest experiences. In a broader framework, respondents were asked about their participation in 7 different political actions in the past other than voting. Although the dataset provides information on respondents' participation in various protests, such as signing petitions and joining boycotts, we only use the question asking about respondents' previous participation in public demonstrations. In that regard, the dependent variable is a binary variable that coded 1 if an individual participated in public demonstrations in the last 12 months and 0 if otherwise.

In the sample of 66,578 respondents, only 8 percent of individuals answered yes to participation in a demonstration. Among the countries in the sample, France scored the highest, 20.2 percent, and Finland had the lowest, 1.1 percent. [6]

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[4]I examine the following nationally representative post-election surveys in the ESS data: Austria (2004, 2014, 2016, 2018), Belgium (2004, 2006, 2016), Denmark (2004, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2018), Finland (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2016, 2018), France (2006, 2008, 2010, 2016, 2018), Germany (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018), Greece (2008, 2010), Ireland (2004, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2018), Netherlands (2004, 2006, 2008, 2014, 2016), Portugal (2004, 2012, 2014), Sweden (2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018), UK (2012, 2014).

[5]In line with our theoretical framework, I also constrain our sample with countries that have coalition governments during the fieldwork of the ESS.

[6]Among the protest question batteries, the public demonstration is the one that requires the highest degree of organizational and mobilizational capacity. It is also the most suitable type of protest to account for parties'

The first independent variable of the study is a categorical variable that takes the value 0 for opposition parties, 1 for junior coalition partners, and 2 for senior coalition partners that the respondents voted for in the previous elections. To determine the statuses of parties that individuals voted for, I on the Parliament and Government (ParlyGov) dataset, which combines all European parties and cabinet information from the 1920s. With the related data operations to generate the primary independent variable, individuals who voted for the senior coalition partners constitute 33.2 percent of our sample. In contrast, junior coalition party voters remain at 19.7. Lastly, opposition party voters constitute 47.1 percent of our sample. The second independent variable is the binary version of the first independent variable that takes the value 0 if the respondent voted for an opposition party and one if the respondent voted for a government party. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of winners and losers in each country year observation.

Figure 3.1 Shares of winners and losers by each country-year



roles as representatives and alliances of people to achieve political preferences. In that regard, although the probability of participating in such an event is low, as suggested by the lower frequency of yes answers, I find participation in the public demonstration the most suitable measure of protest for this study.

The third independent variable of the chapter is a continuous variable measuring party size. I use the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and Wikipedia for information on the size of parties that individuals voted for in the previous elections. [7] For matching the party sizes on the CMP with individuals' voting preferences, I recode the parties in the ESS according to their respective party codes in the CMP. In the next step, I merge the ESS dataset with the CMP dataset corresponding to the previous election dates. With the help of the information provided by the CMP dataset, I calculate the simple majority in the country's parliament, which is the primary determinant in forming either a one-party or coalition government. After calculating the simple majority for each country, I calculate the proportion of each party's seat share to the simple majority. In this way, I calculate each party's size compared to their contextual settings by considering the simple majority number in each country.

After this operation, the value 0, the minimum value of the variable, naturally indicates that the party does not have any seats in the parliament, which comprises 3 percent of the observations. In contrast, 2 percent of the parties have a higher seat share than the simple majority. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of party sizes for each country-year observation.

I follow the same strategy from Chapter 2 to merge the election times, cabinet periods, and field dates in constructing our three primary independent variables. [8]

In addition to our primary variables, I include a few independent variables relevant to the literature and necessary to account for the compounding factors. In the literature, trust in people (Bernhagen and Marsh 2007) and political parties (Braun and Hutter 2016) are essential variables that positively affect protest participation. To account for trust, I include a question asking respondents' degree of trust in political parties ranging from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete confidence). For the role of individual resources on political participation (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995), I include the political interest variable that takes a value between 1("Not at all interested") and 4 ("Very interested").

[7] The CMP dataset does not provide the data for all parties that competed in elections. Therefore, some parties in the ESS do not have party codes. For these parties, I rely on Wikipedia to have the information on their seat share to calculate their party size.

[8] I exclude every country where the ESS fieldwork started less than 330 days after the previous elections. In Table A4, I exclude every country where the ESS fieldwork started less than 365 days after the previous elections.

Figure 3.2 Party size by each country-year



Also, I account for the role of ideology by including the question asking respondents to place themselves on an 11-point left-right scale between 0 and 10 (Barnes, Kaase, and Allerbeck 1979; Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Kostelka and Rovny 2019; van der Meer, Van Deth, and Scheepers 2009). [9]

[9]Furthermore, since the ideological distance from the government's ideological position serves as the primary independent variable for measuring representational deprivation in Chapter 2, I employ this variable as a control in the robustness checks, in Table B4. This variable is included with an alternative measure, distance from the mean government position.

As in Chapter 2, I control economic grievance with individual and country-level variables. I include a four-scale feeling about the income variable at the individual level and the Gini inequality score at the country level. [10] In this chapter, I again account for the role of organizational resources with a binary variable that takes a value of 0 when respondents are not a member and one if they are trade union members.

The disproportionality index has been one of the indicators of the quality of representation (Gallagher 1991; Lijphart 2012; Powell Jr and Vanberg 2000). As another indicator of the quality of representation at the country level, I include the disproportionality variable calculated in the CMP dataset by considering the difference between vote shares and seat shares of parties. Lastly, I include additional individual-level control variables of gender, age, and education.

3.6 Empirical Findings

All reported models in Table 3.1 employ logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. While Model 1 does not include any fixed effects, Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4 include country-fixed effects to account for unobserved contextual factors at the country level. [11] Model 1, presented in Table 1, includes only individual-level variables with party size and government variables, while Model 2 includes country-level variables, disproportionality, and income inequality. In addition to country-level variables, the junior/senior coalition partner variable is included in Model 3. Model 4 contains individual-level interaction between party size and government.

To show the effect of the junior/senior coalition partner variable in Model 3, I plot the predicted probabilities in Figure 1 by setting all other variables to their means and modes for the values of our primary independent variable.

Table 3.1 Logistic regression estimates

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Party Size	-0.175***	-0.606***		-0.724***

[10] This variable was also lagged for one year to account for a potential endogeneity effect.

[11] The unobserved characteristics among individuals and countries result in unobserved heterogeneity that needs to be addressed in the models. In this context, while I incorporate country-fixed effects into the model, I also employ conditional fixed effect logistic regression as an alternative estimator, as demonstrated in Table B3. The estimation results show a high degree of similarity.

	(0.063)	(0.062)		(0.083)
Junior Coalition Partner			-0.257***	
			(0.043)	
Senior Coalition Partner			-0.517***	
			(0.039)	
Government	-0.338***	-0.223***		-0.347***
	(0.034)	(0.037)		(0.070)
Government × Party Size				0.265**
				(0.126)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.013	0.034***	0.032***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Left-Right Self Placement	-0.257***	-0.239***	-0.240***	-0.239***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Feeling About Income	0.030	0.051**	0.054**	0.050**
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Political Interest	0.582***	0.570***	0.572***	0.570***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.080***	-0.042***	-0.045***	-0.042***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Gender	-0.028	0.012	0.012	0.011
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Age	-0.019***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.021***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.143***	0.120***	0.127***	0.120***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Organizational Membership	0.175***	0.429***	0.423***	0.429***
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Income Inequality		-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Mean Disproportionality		0.037***	0.040***	0.035***
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	-1.383***	-1.794***	-1.976***	-1.751***
	(0.109)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.124)
Log lik.	-16515.488	-15895.179	-15928.626	-15892.938
N	66578	66578	66578	66578

AIC	33055	31838	31905	31836
BIC	33164	32057	32124	32064

Notes: Country-fixed effects in Model 2 and Model 3 are omitted from the table.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The coefficient estimates and the plotted prediction shows the substantive effect of being a senior government partner on protest behavior. According to Figure 1, the probability of participating in a protest for opposition party voters is around 9 percent, while the probability decreases to 7 percent for junior coalition party voters. For the voters of the senior coalition partners, the probability decreases to less than 6 percent. The difference between opposition and senior coalition party voters is 3 percent, considering that the probability of 9 percent of voters, that chance shows that the probability of participating in a protest decreases around 35 percent. When ı compare the predicted probabilities between the junior and coalition party voters, the 1 percent decrease indicates around a 12,5 percent decrease in protest potential. This finding supports the hypothesis that junior coalition party voters protest more than senior coalition party voters. In addition, the predictions show that losers, the opposition party voters, protest more than government party voters, which supports the findings of previous studies on protest behavior.

To comment on the substantive significance of the logistic regression estimates in Model 4, I plot predicted probabilities by only allowing the primary independent variables to vary in Figure 3.4. Lastly, I include an overlaid histogram to display the distribution of the party size variable. While estimating the predictions, I allow the party size variable to vary between 0 and 85 percent. However, while the maximum size of a party in government is out of the scale at 1.26 percent, the maximum size for the opposition party remains only at 83 percent. Since excluding parties whose vote shares exceed the required size to obtain the simple majority in the predictions do not jeopardize the interpretations or findings, I choose to exclude them for having a uniform range between government and opposition parties. For opposition parties, predictions for the values that are out of the range of our variable by 2 percent.

Figure 3.3 Predicted probabilities of protest participation by opposition, junior coalition, and senior coalition party supporters



Calculated from the estimates of Model 4 in Table 3.1, the plotted predictions support the second and third hypotheses. For the individuals who voted for government parties in previous elections, the probability of participating in a protest is around 8 percent for the lowest value of the party size variable. The probability decreases with increasing party size. For the highest value of party size, where the party size meets the number of a simple majority, the protest participation is less than 6 percent. The two percent decrease from 8 to 6 percent indicates one-third- to one-fourth of the baseline probability of protesting for individuals who voted for a government party. In that regard, the findings are substantively significant to reject the null of our second hypothesis.

While the effect of party size is negative in protesting for both groups of voters, the plotted prediction shows that the effect of party size is more substantial for losers. This finding indicates that voters of smaller opposition parties are more likely to protest than voters of smaller government parties. In that regard, the results support that losers protest more than winners.

Figure 3.4 Predicted probabilities of protest participation by party size and for government and opposition parties



The plotted predictions for opposition parties provide strong support for our third hypothesis. While the probability of participating in a protest is at its highest when the party that the individual voted for has no seat in parliament, the probability decreases with the increasing size of the party. The effect of party size is substantively significant, considering a 5 percent decrease in the probability of protesting between the voters of smaller and bigger parties.[12]

[12]The plotted predictions reveal an essential pattern for the role of being in government on protest participation. While the probability of participating in protest is higher for individuals who voted for smaller opposition parties, the confidence intervals around the predictions for government and opposition parties start to overlap, starting with .65. This overlap may indicate that government status does not have a conditioning effect on protest behavior. To see the effect of government status conditionally on party size on protest, I plot the marginal effect estimations in Figure B.1. The estimations show that the negative effect of government status decreases with increasing party size. However, one must underline the small number of observations of opposition parties exceeding .8 in party size. Therefore, further studies should test whether government status only makes a difference for voters of smaller parties in their protest behavior. The decreasing effect of government status on protest participation might be essential for the distinction between majority and minority. The findings indicate that, although not in government, the parties that have a considerable place in politics, with their size and support, still provide channels for their voters to be part of political decision-making. However, for voters of smaller parties, their parties' government status makes a difference in their representation. Therefore, relying on the findings, I can state that the losers of politics are the voters of smaller parties with limited chances to represent their voters in conventional politics.

3.7 Conclusion

In studies of protest behavior, political parties have a considerably important place because their two functions affect motivations to participate in the protest. On the one hand, parties provide a channel between individuals and conventional politics, which decreases the protest potential according to the common perception. On the other hand, parties might increase protest participation by becoming potential allies of protestors in conventional politics to support their demands. These two contrasting roles are often performed together by parties, which in the end, might obscure the mechanism behind political representation and protest participation.

By showing the effect of party size on protest participation, I correspondingly touch upon the two parties' roles. While smaller parties in government might better represent their constituents than smaller parties in opposition to their strategic position in government formation, they remain short of representation due to their limited place in that government. However, these smaller parties may act as an alliance of their supporters in conventional politics, which increases these parties' voters to protest for their preferences to be heard in policymaking.

In this study, considering the contrasting roles of parties, ı aim to approach parties' roles in protest by considering their size. By differentiating parties according to senior, junior, and opposition parties, we show that voters of junior parties in a government protest more than senior coalition partners. I find that as the size of the party gets smaller, the voters' probability of participating in protests increases. While this effect is more substantial for voters of smaller opposition parties, we observe that the conditioning effect of government status decreases for the voters of bigger parties.

The decreasing effect of government status is in line with my argument about the importance of the party size of parties in political representation. As I have underline, although being in opposition, bigger parties have the capability to represent their voters in parliaments better. Moreover, these parties carry the potential to be the future government parties, or they might have been the previous government parties. Therefore, their voters are not alienated from the party competition as these individuals vote for parties with a chance of winning in elections. In that regard, in the appendix, I also look at the long-term winning and losing status of parties to show whether being currently in government has a conditional effect on protest behavior. The results show that being in the government does not have an effect on protest behavior for voters of

bigger parties if these parties at least govern one term in the previous 2 election circle.

I should underline certain limitations of our study. First and foremost, the dependent variable only asks respondents whether they participated in any public demonstration in the last 12 months. Although the wording of the question in the ESS indicates this political action has been done to improve things in the respondent's country, I do not know whether the protest that the individual participated in had policy-related demands in politics. Considering most of the demonstrations target the government, I assume these protests took place to influence decision-making. However, we acknowledge the need for a more detailed investigation of protest behavior in survey studies.

In this study, we look at the role of one of the first things that come to mind in understanding the capability of parties to influence policymaking: party size. Nevertheless, the strategic position of parties in coalition governments results from many considerations that should be thoroughly investigated in future studies. In that regard, one of the first things that could be done is to look through every other coalition possibility between parties that might strengthen or weaken the smaller party's hand in bargaining with bigger parties. In addition, these parties' party families and ideological positions might also be another direction to elaborate on the role of coalition dynamics on protest behavior.

Lastly, I should again underline the limited scope of the study by focusing on Western European democracies. Considering the differences and more complex dynamics, I do not construct the theoretical framework on democratically less institutionalized countries. However, further studies should be conducted with a sample covering more distinctive political settings to increase the generalizability of our findings.

4. LOSERS' AT THE DAWN OF THE BALLOT BOX: AN EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY

4.1 Introduction

In the previous two chapters, protests are examined as being on par with elections in terms of their potential to improve political representation. In that regard, they are the two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, specific attention is also paid to protests and elections' distinct characteristics and peculiarities. Protests are often spontaneous events emerging from people's social, economic, or political grievances. They do not occur routinely like elections. In addition, while elections are designed to represent the preferences of all citizens, protestors often constitute only a subset of the population. These differences make elections the primary and superior mechanism of political representation, with the help of citizens' equal right to vote.

The higher costs of participating in protests than voting also limit participation in various types of protests. Voting is a simple act compared to participation in demonstrations, riots, or strikes. Participating in protests requires more time and energy, in addition to the risks that individuals take in the face of a harsh response from the government, especially in authoritarian countries (Tarrow 2011; Tilly and Tarrow 2015). All in all, every society has a certain degree of deprivation, so it is not a sufficient condition for protests (Kerbo 1982; Kitschelt 1986; McCarthy and Zald 1977). Therefore, more than grievances may be needed to mobilize the masses to protest. The emergence and success of political movements depend on various factors, ranging from political resources, mobilization structures, and political opportunities.

Under specific conditions, protest potential of individuals can change independently from their grievances, resources, or opportunities. If there is an immediate opportunity

to switch the target of the protest, which is often the government, through voting, protesting may be considered less necessary or preferable. Within electoral terms, specific moments may be more advantageous to await the election outcomes for citizens rather than protest the government. Thus, in this chapter, I explore the extent to which protesting is preferred over voting by focusing on election timing and the chance of winning while paying particular attention to the Turkish case.

In contrast with the literature, showing that electoral losers protest more than winners (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Curini and Jou 2016; van der Meer, Van Deth, and Scheepers 2009; VanDusky-Allen 2017*a*), in Turkey, since the Gezi protests in 2013, the opposition refrained from mobilizing their voters to voice their grievances through mass demonstrations. The increasing repression from the government with the Gezi protests is often considered the main reason for the discouragement from participating in protest movements as individuals believe their safety and freedom are now at a higher risk, they may simply be less likely to protest than they used to (Arslanalp and Erkmen 2020; Kahvecioğlu and Patan 2022).

Turkey's transformation into competitive authoritarianism and restrictive measures taken proactively to prevent mass movements from emerging in the first place has indeed narrowed political opportunity structures for citizens to participate in unconventional modes of political participation. However, the reluctance to protest by voicing grievances cannot solely be attributed to the political opportunities' shortage. The government's portrayal of protests as transgressive actions against the state has successfully shaped the perceptions of their voters to see anti-government protests as illegal and against the stability and security of the state, which has made it easier for the government to consolidate their voters against any protest movement initiated by the losers. The government's ability to shape public perception has been aided by tightly controlled media and the language used by government officials that criminalizes any form of protest activity.

The opposition in Turkey was also hesitant to support non-electoral political participation to raise grievances because such actions, depicted by the government as transgressive, could work against their chances of winning the election. Losers recognized that elections remain the most viable participation channel, despite the unequal playing field for the opposition, elections continued to play a crucial role in changing the government in Turkey. The opposition's decision to prioritize voting over non-electoral political participation was driven by a desire to win the election and avoid potential protests that could undermine their chances of success. The degree of uncertainty of

the elections might have led to a decrease in individuals' protest potential, implying that people are less likely to engage in protests if they believe that elections offer a chance to change the government in a peaceful manner.

The two interrelated phenomena of the losers' expectation to win through elections and the proximity of elections constitute this study's main pillars to explain the protest behavior of individuals in Turkey. In this study, I argue that the vitality of elections for Turkish politics hinders the motivations to participate in an anti-government protest. Correspondingly, the different moments in the electoral cycles and the chance of winning elections decrease the protest potentials of individuals.

In this chapter, I test my hypotheses using an online conjoint survey experiment conducted with over a thousand participants from Turkey. Despite its many limitations explained below, the study provides several critical implications for the literature on protest behavior. The study is the first to test whether the chance of winning in elections and their proximity affect the protest potential of individuals to show the extent of the preferability of protest when there is a more peaceful and institutionalized way to change the target of the demonstrations altogether by voting. In that regard, the study compares voting and protesting as two distinct forms of political participation. It aims to show where protesting stands compared to voting as a political action that individuals can adopt to affect decision-making. In that regard, although the respondents in this survey consisted of Turkish citizens, the findings are likely to be generalizable to other settings. Secondly, this study is promising for future research by testing the variability of the same individuals' protesting preferences in different periods as it points to the possibility of alternative perspectives to explain protest behavior as a contribution to the existing literature, such as political opportunities, relative deprivation, and resource mobilization theories.

4.2 Proximity of Elections and Chance of Winning

Protesting, which covers various types of political action such as signing petitions, joining boycotts, and attending peaceful demonstrations, has been increasingly normalized in democracies as a form of political participation (Barnes, Kaase, and Allerbeck 1979). The findings from the previous literature suggest that citizens protest in addition to participating in elections rather than exclusively engaging in protests (Borbáth and

Hutter 2022; Marco and Maria 2019; Oser 2017). In that regard, most protestors are not political outsiders. They protest to voice their discontent and participate in political decision-making outside conventional politics.

In the previous two chapters, I study protest behavior with elections, focusing on the representational inequality that the outcome of elections creates. I ask how protests complement elections in addressing that inequality. Although protests are not the primary means of political representation, they are preferred by many to make their demands to the decision-makers. Serving the same purpose as elections, protesting can be considered equal to voting. However, although the normalization of protesting can open an avenue for citizens to voice their grievances, in democratic regimes, voting in elections is still the primary means of political representation and democratic equality. Protests, in contrast, are spontaneous, involve the participation of a smaller number of citizens, and are unpredictable as they are not routinely recurring events. In addition, they always occur as a response to economic, social, or political grievances.

Comparing the two forms of political participation and understanding their differences and similarities is essential for contributing to the political participation literature. However, despite the increasing normalization of protests, participation in protests is still rare. Grievances rarely amount to mass movements. Their emergence and success depend on individuals' resources, mobilization structures, and political opportunities.

Considering the cost of protesting and the difficulty of mobilizing the masses, certain preconditions may also work against participating in protests. Elections provide the primary mechanism for realizing political representation, so participating in protests might be unnecessary i some contexts. In this chapter, I inquire about the extent of the preferability of protests over voting. If there is an option to change the composition of the Parliament, by voting sooner, protesting to voice political grievances might not be preferable.

Examining the motivations to participate in a protest in the face of elections is conditioned with two considerations. Firstly, elections should be approaching. If voting in elections is an option, protesting can be considered unnecessary.[1] In that regard, the first hypothesis of this chapter is as follows:

[1]Some studies examine social movements explicitly protesting election results immediately after elections (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2018; Rød 2019). However, individuals' potential for participating in protests by election timing remains unanswered

H1: An individual's protest potential decreases when general elections are closer.

The second consideration should be the chances of one's preferred party of winning the elections. In describing the minimalist account of democracy, Przeworski indicates that:

> *"In the end, the miracle of democracy is that conflicting political forces obey the results of voting. People who have guns obey those without them. Incumbents risk their control of governmental offices by holding elections. Losers wait for their chance to win office. Conflicts are regulated, processed according to rules, and thus limited. This is not consensus, yet not mayhem either. Just limited conflict; conflict without killing. Ballots are "paper stones," as Engels once observed. " (Przeworski 2003, 16).*

Przeworski's minimalist account of democracy concentrates on the procedural aspects of democracy and its role in minimizing conflict and providing a peaceful means for political competition and power transition. The concept is valuable because of its mere capacity to prevent conflicts. Nevertheless, a later study by Anderson and Mendes (2006) find that losers protest more than winners to change the status quo as they are less content with it. Moreover, in new democracies, the loser's propensity to protest increases more substantially, as the legitimacy of the democratic institutions in losers' eyes plays an essential role in the system's functioning and maintenance (Anderson et al. 2005).

At its core, democracies are designed to be responsive to citizens' preferences. In that regard, elections are the primary mechanism that provides everyone with an equal right to express their preferences through the act of voting. Elections allow citizens to choose their representatives. In addition, elections determine the number of parties in parliaments, political alliances, and veto players. Correspondingly, they also shape political opportunities for individuals by directly or indirectly deciding people's motivation to protest. However, elections are ultimately a competition between political choices that eventually decide "who gets what, when, and how" (Lasswell 1953). The fact that elections determine winners and losers also makes them a source of political inequality, which contrasts with their very purpose of promoting equality.

The effect of political inequality as a result of election outcomes on protest participation has been widely discussed in the protest behavior literature (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Curini and Jou 2016; İlgü Özler 2013; van der Meer, Van Deth, and Scheepers 2009; van Deth 2014; VanDusky-Allen 2017*a*). The main argument rests on the idea that voters who are not equally represented by governments are less satisfied with the functioning of democracy. Correspondingly, these arguments are generally shaped by the expectation that the electoral losers, whose preferences are not equally represented in policymaking, will participate in protests at a higher rate to express political grievances (Anderson and Guillory 1997).

The level of satisfaction is also a confounding factor for the losers' consent to the political system. Their consent highly depends on their support for the institutions that produced the election results (Nadeau and Blais 1993). In other words, when electoral losers do not have a general level of trust and attachment to the political institutions, they might be less likely to consent to the government as a legitimate power source. According to Easton, this attachment to the political system and the established constitutional order can be experienced with "regime-based trust" rather than satisfaction with democracy (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Easton 1975). In that regard, consent requires a broader commitment to the underlying political order.

In light of Easton's (1975) conceptualization of the "regime-based trust," we might assert that the reason for losers to protest more in newer democracies is their lack of loyalty or attachment to the existing institutions of the political system that produced election outcomes. In that regard, Anderson and Mendes's (2005) study shows that the minimalist account of democracy proposed by Przeworski is not enough for losers to be content with the election outcomes.

The difference between the two arguments, of course, after assuming that protests are included in the types of conflicts mentioned in Przeworski's account might indicate that there is one ingredient that is necessary to understand the dynamics behind losers' consent with the functioning of the political system. Przeworski (2003) underlines one of the purposes of elections, which is informing citizens and elites about the preferences and choices of the electorate, including the relative strength of different political actors and parties. They show the existing power distribution of other preferences within a society. Correspondingly, the vote shares of government and opposition parties inform both parties of their chances of winning the next elections:

> *"Losers (both politicians and their followers) can likewise console themselves with the thought: 'Wait till the next election'. But once again this prospect is comforting to the losers only insofar as there is some reasonable prospect that the next election may produce a different outcome with different winners and losers (Miller 1983, 743)."*

As Miller briefly revealed the informative role of elections on losers' consent, the chance of winning elections may be the primary mechanism to deter losers from protesting because of the representational gap between winners and losers. Rather than protesting to challenge the status quo, elections might motivate losers to wait for a more conventional and legitimate power transition. In that regard, the second hypothesis of this study is:

> **H2:** An individual's protest potential decreases when there her preferred party has a good chance of winning in the next general elections.

4.3 The Turkish Example: Rejection of Protesting as a Possibility

The Gezi Park protests in May 2013 exhibited one of the broadest demonstrations in Turkey's history. The movement was ignited by the police's harsh response to a few environmental activists in Taksim Square, who were demonstrating against the government's plan to demolish Gezi Park to replace it with a shopping mall. The demonstrations spread quickly to other major cities nationwide by gaining momentum. The government repressively handled the problem, utilizing various repressive methods to disperse the crowds. In addition, the repressive policies were supported by the government's attempt to discredit the movement by criminalizing protestors and connecting these protests with "external forces" (Özen 2015). In one of the party meetings of the Justice and Development Party during the Gezi Park protests, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used these words [2]:

[2] https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2013/06/130615_erdogan_miting

> *"Behind the curtain of Gezi Park, very different accounts were put into action. Very different plays were staged. Some national media displayed all kinds of unprincipledness with fake news, slander, and provocation. The international press also showed all kinds of hypocrisy. With their actions, some politicians made all kinds of provocations to start a sectarian conflict by giving money to the activists, cursing our police on the street with their rhetoric, and spreading fake news through fake accounts on social media."*

After the Gezi Park protests, the government's rigid response to opposing voices continued. There have been pre-emptive measures to deter any potential dissent. In April 2015, a new National Security Council document was adopted in the parliament. [3] According to this document, the internal opposition actions have been notified as the most critical security threat. In response to this threat, the council adopted a security plan to discourage social media activism and civil disobedience (Esen and Gumuscu 2016).

In fact, the Gezi Park protests catalyzed several developments that contributed to the democratic backsliding in the country. These developments were not limited to the measures taken to deter dissent in the country. Beginning with its third term, the AKP government gradually diminished the checks and balances, deactivated the democratic institutions, and expanded the power of the executive (Öniş 2015).

The declaration of a state of emergency after the failed coup attempt in July 2016 worsened the atmosphere for the freedoms and rights of individuals in the country. According to Arslanalp and Erkmen (2020), the two-year state of emergency practices for suppressing the opposing voices entailed continuities regarding the limitations on freedom of expression and assembly. These measures were proactively used against smaller events against the danger of culminating any threat to the status quo.

The harsh repression of protestors and the continuing suppression of any possible action from different segments of society did not harm the popularity of the Prime Minister Erdoğan. In an intensely polarized society, the approaches to the Gezi protestors were sharply divided between winners and losers (Aytaç, Schiumerini, and Stokes 2017). Most AKP supporters adopted Erdoğan's rhetoric that the external forces were behind the movements. Correspondingly, the research shows that the Gezi Protests have been

[3] https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1062804-sivil-itaatsizlik-ve-kaosa-tesvik-kirmizi-kitapta

one of the significant factors that exacerbated the saliency of cultural cleavages.[4] In Aytaç and his coauthors' (2017) study conducted with 2629 respondents, 82 percent of AKP supporters responded to a question asking their opinions about the Gezi that it was a "plot against Turkey " (2017, 68).

In the 2017 Constitutional Referendum, 51 percent of the voters voted to replace the parliamentary system with a presidential one. This transformation has been recognized as the institutionalization of the winner-take-all system. In addition, Erdoğan's presidency was considered the catalyst for the transformation towards "hegemonic electoral authoritarianism" (Esen and Gumuscu 2018). The current regime is also called a form of sultanistic regime "that yearned to rule as a form of absolutist neo-patrimonial power, similar to the last version of that rule under Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1909) over a century ago" (Kalaycıoğlu 2023).

In addition to the system change, several developments were happening in the political arena. Following the July 15 coup attempt, the second largest opposition party, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) became the main partner of the AKP, which was followed by the formation of the Cumhur alliance. As opposed to this alliance, the main opposition party, Republican People's Party (CHP), formed the Millet alliance with the IYI Party, established under the leader of the former MHP member Meral Akşener. With the support of other smaller parties, these two sides first competed in the 2018 general election. President Erdoğan regained the presidential office in these elections by receiving 52,59 of the votes in the first round. However, in the 2019 local elections, the opposition successfully won 11 metropolitan municipalities. Especially the takeover of Istanbul and Ankara mayorships refreshed the opposition's hopes to succeed in the next general elections in 2023.

As Turkey is classified as a competitive authoritarian regime (Esen and Gumuscu 2016), the uneven playing field for political parties to compete in elections has been a critical barrier for the opposition (Levitsky and Way 2010). The cross-ideological cooperation under the Millet alliance was promising for future success, as it is a necessary strategy for democratizing through elections (Howard and Roessler 2006; Rakner and Svåsand 2005; Wahman 2014). Under the CHP's lead, the opposition alliance was comprised of nationalist, secular, Islamist, and pro-Kurdish political parties and showed extraordinary cooperation and coordination to compete against the incumbent party (Selçuk

[4]https://goc.bilgi.edu.tr/media/uploads/2018/02/05/bilgi-goc-merkezi-kutuplasmanin-boyutlari-2017-sunum.pdf

and Hekimci 2020).

The deteriorating economic conditions also created an opportunity for the opposition to campaign against the government policies. Indeed, a deepening financial crisis accompanying the 2019 local elections in Turkey played an important role in the opposition's success. Increasing inflation and unemployment became the most critical problems of the country. After many years in power, the government has been considered more fragile than ever.

Despite the increasing authoritarianism, inflation, and decreasing purchasing power, Turkey has not experienced any significant protest from any part of the society. The lack of protests after the Gezi contrasts with existing research. Accordingly, in competitive authoritarian regimes such as Turkey, the opposition's institutional resources and political grievances are expected to incentivize protests more than in other countries (Vladisavljević 2016). Nevertheless, the opposition refrained from escalating political grievances into any political action outside conventional politics. The opposition block has also been criticized for its such strategy by the opposition voters. For instance, after the Boğaziçi University protests started following the President's appointment of a pro-government figure as the university rector, the main opposition party, the CHP, was criticized for not being attentive enough to these protests. In a public speech, the leader of the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, commented on these protests as follows: [5]

> *"I respect the actions of Boğaziçi students and professors. They want to protect their universities; they do not want a trustee rector. I say this everywhere. We have no right to steal that resistance. We do not have the right to take away the rightful resistance of the students and say, 'This is a CHP resistance'. Erdogan wants to force us there. He is trying to turn the incident into a political fight. We do not enter the Bosphorus out of respect for it."*

Similarly, in January 2022, the large-scale anti-government protests in Kazakhstan as a response to the dramatic gas price increase stimulated discussions in Turkey on the relevance of protest movements. Kılıçdaroğlu regarded these debates: [6]

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[5] https://www.indyturk.com/node/315671/siyaset/kılıçdaroğlu-boğaziçi-direnişini-çalmaya-hakkımız-syok

[6] https://www.haberturk.com/kilicdaroglu-erdogan-sokaga-cikmamizi-istiyor-cikmayacagiz-3305097

> *"We say to our friends that you will not go out on the streets; you will wait for the ballot box with great patience. Since the gentleman (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) lives in a fantasy world, he talks as if we gave instructions to go out on the streets. We say you will wait at the ballot box; you will go, you will vote, replace the authoritarian government with your votes, period."*

The quote above reveals that the approaching elections were the primary motivation for not mobilizing their voters to demonstrate against the financial crisis. In addition, the only means to recover was seen as winning the elections.

Other considerations are also critical to understanding the factors contributing to the opposition's attitude toward the protesting. First and foremost, as I refer to at the beginning of this section, the harsh repression by the police forces increased the costs of participating in protests. The proactive measures by the government made it significantly harder for any political grievance to transform into a large-scale protest (Arslanalp and Erkmen 2020).

In addition to the increased state repression, the attitude of the opposition camp to protest has also been shaped by President Erdoğan's criminalization of political action for voicing grievances. The depiction of opposing voices as the voices of "external forces" against the national will of the people has been one of the methods to mobilize the AKP voters against the opposition. According to Kahvecioğlu and Patan (2022), the opposition did not see the protests as an option because it was considered counterproductive as the government might use this behavior to increase the already heightened polarization and accuse the opponent of threatening democracy.

The country's increased level of repression and polarization significantly influence the opposition's protest-averse behavior. Nevertheless, the increased optimism for winning the elections with the help of the cooperation of different parties and getting into the election atmosphere after the 2019 local elections caused the opposition to act carefully to jeopardize its legitimacy during the electoral campaign. The opposition's optimism about winning the elections, the past experiences and the vitality of elections seem to have shaped the motivations of individuals to wait for the ballot box to change government policies they have been discontent with.

4.4 Research Design, Sample, and the Conjoint Survey Experiment

The data for this study come from an online survey collected by a survey platform named "Ben Derim Ki" in Turkey between June 23 and June 25. The sample consists of 1260 completed surveys. In this survey, respondents are asked to choose from alternative country profiles with different attributes that they would be more likely to participate in a public demonstration. This conjoint survey experiment designed specifically for this chapter helps me present the respondents with country profiles with different attributional levels, which allows me to see the trade-offs between various variables their varying dimensions (Hix et al. 2023).

Survey experiments are critical for making causal inferences. They ensure that respondents' varying preferences are due to the experimental manipulations. Correspondingly, there is no requirement for the experimental subjects to be representative of the whole population as in survey studies. If the treatment's effect is expected to be homogenous, the findings from any convenient sample should be generalizable to the entire population. Instead, participants' random assignment to the treatment and groups is of utmost importance (Druckman and Kam 2011; Erişen, Erişen, and Özkeçeci Taner 2013).

In classical survey experiments, there are limited attributes of which researcher can examine their effects on randomly assigned respondents' preferences. In testing the effect of different characteristics between different scenarios on respondents' decisions, conjoint experiments differ from conventional factorial split-sample designs (Hedegaard 2022).

Conjoint experiments can measure multidimensional preferences by presenting respondents with a higher number of attributes on hypothetical choice sets (Bansak et al. 2018). Their ability to draw inferences for a larger number of attributes increased their popularity in political science (Eggers, Vivyan, and Wagner 2018; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).

This study's hypotheses which depend on multiple layers of attributes make the conjoint survey experiment one of the most suitable methods to examine these various factors' effects on one's propensity to protest. Respondents are asked to evaluate different profiles (scenarios) to choose among them in compliance with the typical conjoint design. Attributes pertaining to these scenarios constitute the independent variables of this

study. Lastly, the levels are the distinct values these variables take on.

In designing the conjoint survey experiments, the well-known trade-off between masking and satisficing was considered (Bansak et al. 2018, 2021). Accordingly, including too few attributes in the scenarios obstructs the substantive meaning of the average marginal effects of the attributes (Bansak et al. 2018, 25). Respondents might think of another factor associated with one of the attributes, leading to a common problem in the conjoint experiment of masking a potential explanatory variable's effect. In contrast, too many attributes increase the complexity of the choices, which might result in the respondent's satisficing (Kahneman 2003; Krosnick 1999).

As the online survey experiment conducted for this dissertation is intended as a pilot study for a later conjoint experiment embedded in representative field research, the attributes are limited to the main independent variables of this study, considering the difficulty of the application of a fully factorial design in a field survey. Therefore, satisficing has not been an issue while designing the choice sets. Nevertheless, considering the masking problem, two other attributes have been added to the scenarios.

The experiment asks the respondents to choose from two hypothetical country scenarios with randomly changing attribute levels. To increase the construct validity of the scenarios, a short two-sentence vignette about the countries was provided to the respondents (Steiner, Atzmüller, and Su 2016). The respondents were provided with the information that there was an ongoing economic crisis in both countries and legal demonstration to protest this problem was to be organized. After this information, respondents were asked in which of these countries would be more likely to participate in a public demonstration.

In this conjoint experiment, I use four attributes, all with binary outcomes. To test the hypothesis that the proximity of elections decreases protest potential, I use the attribute "election day." The attribute levels are given as "2 months later" and "3 years later". Secondly, to test whether the chance of one's preferred party winning the elections affects their protest potential, I generated another variable named "chance of winning", with two levels of "higher" and "lower". The third and fourth variables were introduced to account for the previous literature findings and the above-mentioned masking problem. To account for the winner/loser hypothesis, the third attribute of "winner/loser" was developed. However, as these statuses' role in individuals' protest potential is dependent on their democratic satisfaction, the respondents were also given low and high levels of democratic satisfaction levels. (Anderson and Guillory 1997;

Anderson and Mendes 2005; Curini and Jou 2016). All the attributes and levels are presented in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Attirubutes and levels

Attributes	**Level1**	**Level2**
Election Day	2 months	3 years
Chance of Winning	Low	High
Winner/Loser Status	Winner	Loser
Democratic Satisfaction	Low	High

The attribute levels are randomly varied in each scenario that is presented to survey respondents. Each respondent was presented with four comparison tables, which means, evaluated eight country scenarios in four pairs. As the attributional levels vary for each individual, they also randomly vary in these four comparison tables. Since the presentation order of the attributes might make the first attributes more salient than the others, the order of the attributes also vary across individuals to control the potential effect of the ordering. However, I follow the strategy of Bansak and his coauthors (2021) and fix the order of the attributes constant for everyone to decrease the cognitive burden in answering the questions. Table 4.2 presents a randomly generated example of one of the tasks used in the Qualtrics Survey. [7]

Table 4.2 An example task randomly generated by Qualtrics

	Country 1	**Country 2**
In the previous elections:	You voted for the opposition party.	You voted for the government party.
Scientific election polls show that:	According to reliable opinion polls, the political party you support is likely to win the next election.	According to reliable opinion polls, the political party the political party you support is likely to win the next election.
Democratic satisfaction:	You are extremely satisfied with the functioning of democracy in the country.	You are extremely satisfied with the functioning democracy in the country.
Next Elections:	Will be held in two months.	Will be held in three years.

At the end of the conjoint experiment, the respondents were asked whether they noticed any mention of election time in the presented scenarios as an attention check. Moreover, they were asked whether the levels of the election day affected their preference among the countries. An open-ended question was included in the questionnaire to explore respondents' reasonings for paying attention to the election day on making their decision.

[7]The question form of the survey is also presented in Section C.1.

Moreover, in one of the questions, respondents were asked about their past participation records and participation potential in various forms of protests. These include signing a petition, joining boycotts, attending public demonstrations, attending party meetings, and expressing political opinions on social media. The question is a traditional survey item asked in many international surveys such as the World Values Survey, European Social Survey, International Social Survey Program, and European Values Survey.

I rely on the Turkish Election Studies 2018 Post-Election Questionnaire for other conventional survey questions for Turkey. Among these, one of the most important questions is the party and president preferences in the May 14 and May 28, 2023, general and presidential elections. By asking about respondents' real-life party preferences, I want to learn their winner and loser statuses as these statuses can influence their decisions in choosing the country scenarios, especially given that the survey experiment was conducted shortly after an actual election. With the help of these questions, I can assess any differences between the two groups' evaluation of the scenarios.

Other questions included in the survey were selected from some of the behavior and attitude questions from the Turkish Election Studies to explore their effects on respondents' preferences. These questions range from political interest, individuals' like-dislike scores for parties, their party affiliations, and ideological placements. Demographic questions such as age, gender, education, and income are included to evaluate the representativeness of the survey.

4.5 Findings

Conjoint experiments allow researchers to observe the importance of factors as relative to each other in individuals' decisions. In these experiments, the "key quantity" is considered the "Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE)" to estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects (Hainmuller 2014). AMCE estimates show the effect of a particular attribute. While computing this quantity, the marginal effect of the attribute is averaged over the in-sample joint distribution of other variables in the model (Bansak 2021). In this section, I estimate the AMCEs on respondents' country profile choices.

Table 4.3 reports the AMCE estimate after excluding 368 respondents who failed the attention checks by answering 'no' to whether they noticed any mention of the timing of the elections in the presented scenarios. Moreover, respondents who answered only

some of the four tasks in the survey were also excluded from the analysis. In the end, 859 respondents' answers are included in the estimation sample. Following the literature (e.g., Hainmuller 2014) I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS, Linear Probability Model) regressions, with a dichotomous dependent variable that takes the value of 1 when the respondent choses the respected country profile.

Table 4.3 OLS estimates on choice probability of country profiles

		Parliamentary Election		Presidential Election	
	Full-Sample	Incumbent	Opposition	Incumbent	Opposition
Winner	-0.042***	0.182***	-0.203***	0.184***	-0.199***
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.018)
In 3 Yrs.	-0.025*	0.013	-0.053***	0.013	-0.051***
	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.017)
High Chance	0.047***	0.101***	0.014	0.094***	0.010
	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.017)
Satisfied	-0.076***	0.047**	-0.163***	0.051**	-0.151***
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Constant	0.549***	0.327***	0.701***	0.327***	0.696***
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.017)
R-Squared	0.010	0.045	0.071	0.045	0.065
N	6872	2536	3592	2656	3840

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The estimates from Model 1 in Table 4.3 are presented in Figure 4.1, with 95% confidence intervals around the coefficient estimates. As Figure 4.1 shows, being satisfied with how democracy works decreases the probability of choosing the country profile by about 8 percent. Being a winner also decreases the probability by 4 percent. Contrary to expectations, the probability of choosing a country decreases when the elections are more distant by 3 percent. Therefore, the findings from the first model do not support the first hypothesis. Figure 4.1 also shows a positive AMCE for a higher chance of winning on choosing the country profile. Therefore, the second hypothesis of this study cannot be supported by these findings as well.

The AMCE estimates are largely conflicting with the propositions of this study. Correspondingly, alternative accounts might exist for the respondents' choices on country

profiles. To examine the effects of attributes for the losers and winners in the Turkish context, other models' estimates are presented in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.

Figure 4.1 AMCE estimates of the treatments on the choice probability of country profiles



Figure 4.2 shows the AMCE estimates for the recent winners (the AKP and MHP) and losers (the CHP, İYİ, YSP, ZP, TİP, Invalid) after the May 2023 elections. The most important finding is the AMCEs' changing signs in the sample composed of the winner and loser parties' voters. The effects are nearly equal in absolute terms. While being a winner increases the probability of choosing a country profile by 18 percent for the government parties' voters, it decreases the probability by 17 percent for opposition parties' voters.

The finding might indicate that the respondents perceive the scenarios by taking into account their own realities. In that regard, although there is a positive AMCE for being a loser on choosing the scenario for the total sample, the respondents could not differentiate their winning or losing status from the presented country scenarios.

According to Figure 4.2, there is no statistically significant effect of election day for the AKP and MHP voters. However, there is a statistically significant negative AMCE

for losers, on the other hand, for the high chance of winning, there is a statistically significant positive effect for the winners. Lastly, democratic satisfaction decreases the probability of choosing the country profile by 14 percent for losers, while it increases the likelihood by 5 percent for winners.

Figure 4.2 AMCE estimates of the treatments on the choice probability of country profiles for the winners and losers (according to party preference)



Figure 4.3 plots the AMCE estimates for Erdoğan and other candidates' (Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, Sinan Oğan, Muharrem İnce, and Invalid Votes) voters. The plotted estimates are nearly similar to Figure 4.2.

In addition to the winner and loser's status, the estimates for the high chance of winning and democratic satisfaction indicate that the respondents answered the questions with their most recent experiences in mind. As the AKP and MHP party voters recently gained the majority in the May 2023 elections, their voters tend to choose country profiles with their party's high chance of winning. Similarly, the opposition voters in our sample, being less satisfied with the democracy, tend to choose the country profile where they are not satisfied with the democracy. In contrast, magnitudes of the positive effect is more negligible for winners.

Figure 4.3 AMCEs of the treatments on choosing probability of the country profile for the winners and losers (according to presidential vote choice)



An interactive model is also presented in the appendices to see the conditioning effects among the subsets of the attributes. In the model, all independent variables interact with each other. One of the most puzzling results is as follows: As Figure 4.4 shows, the marginal effect of elections being held in 3 years does not have any effect on winners, irrespective of their low and high chances of winning. However, the variable's effect is significant and negative for losers when there is a high chance of winning in the next elections. Correspondingly, the respondents were more likely to choose the scenario where elections are in two months and they are losers with a high chance of winning in the next elections. The possible explanations for these findings are beyond the scope of this study. However, the findings suggest that our respondents chose country profiles with different considerations not accounted for in the design. In the discussion section, other possible explanations and other problems with the design are discussed.

Figure 4.4 Marginal effect of election timing for winners and losers



4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I argue that losers' chances of winning the next elections and these elections' proximity hinder their motivation to participate in any protest to express their grievances. I derive my hypothesis from the extant literature on losers' behavior in democracies. Accordingly, rather than resorting to unconventional methods to change the status quo, losers often wait for future elections to express their dissatisfaction with democracy as there is a chance to win them. The opposition party's hesitance to be a part of a potential source of rebellion not to be subject to the government's defamation in Turkey provides us with an excellent case for this study.

I conducted an online conjoint analysis with 1260 survey respondents to test my hypotheses. Nevertheless, the findings do not provide any support for our expectations. Neither the closer election date nor the chance of winning has the expected negative effect on the protest potential. Instead, both variables positively affect the protest

potentials of the survey respondents.

Before discussing the alternative explanations for such unexpected outcomes, I should first discuss the potential problems in the experiment design that may decrease the validity of the findings. It has long been known that relying on self-reports can be fallible for researchers when deriving conclusions about behavior and attitudes, partly because individuals' answers may vary depending on the wording or structure of the questionnaire (Schwarz 1999). Correspondingly, one of the most critical design tasks should be ensuring that the respondent understands the question in a way that the researcher intends. In designing easily comprehensible questions, the researcher should be aware of the "pragmatic meaning" of the questions, which is explained that the respondents should be able to make inferences about the question before answering it. The questions should be informative, clear, and relevant (Schwarz 1999).

Preventing measurement error depends highly on respondents' understanding of the question, relying on their memory to retrieve information to form an opinion (Eifler and Petzold 2019). In our experiment, to not conflict with the respondent's memory and increase the construct validity (Steiner, Atzmüller, and Su 2016), the short vignette is provided above the tasks and this vignette is contextualized for Turkey. In that regard, respondents are given the information that in both hypothetical country profiles, there is an ongoing economic crisis that harms the living standards of the individuals. The decision to add the source of the demonstrations is also included in the text to minimize satisficing as it might have increased the attention to the question (Peterson, Westwood, and Iyengar 2021; Stolte 1994). However, there are some indications for satisficing in our data.

The plotted subgroup preferences among winners and losers, classified according to respondents' actual voting choices on May 14 general elections and May 28, 2023 presidential elections show that respondents were more likely to choose the profile that resembles their own attributes. The magnitude of winner/loser status' AMCE is the highest among all four variables. The effect is also positive for winners and negative for losers. Similarly, for losers, the high level of democratic satisfaction has the second highest AMCE, showing nearly 15 percentage points increase. In contrast, there is a more negligible and positive effect for winners. In addition, the higher chance of winning in the next elections' AMCE is significant and positive for winners, implying that winners tend to be more confident about their party's success as they recently won the last elections. In contrast, there is no distinguishable effect for the losers in our sample.

The last of the attributes, where respondents had to think outside of their own reality, was the timing of the elections. Both election days are currently irrelevant for the Turkish context. We cannot find any effect for winners. However, closer election day has a positive effect on the protest potential of the losers.

While the chapter produces null results for the hypotheses, it's crucial to acknowledge the distinctive nature of the Turkish context in order to interpret these findings meaningfully. These findings might shed light on the intricate relationship between being a long term-loser, engaging in political activities, and shaping perceptions of democracy within the country. The prolonged loser status of opposition party supporters, combined with the costs associated with expressing their grievances through mass protests, has created a political environment where effective communication channels with policymakers are lacking. The escalating polarization among opposing political camps has further widened this communication gap. Through the approach of asking respondents about their preferred scenario for protesting, the survey was able to capture protest participation preferences of the respondents in a country where actual protest involvement by citizens is relatively rare. As a result, the findings reveal a preference for timing such actions around election periods. This inclination can likely be attributed to the central role elections play in the country, as political parties often make ambitious promises during these times, leading individuals to believe that the government is more responsive to their concerns during electoral cycles.

5. CONCLUSION

The ritualization and normalization of unconventional forms of political participation in Western democracies pave the way for a rapidly growing number of studies aiming to understand individuals' attitudes and participation preferences to these activities. According to the transformational school of thought, changing citizen norms in Western countries has led to more engaged citizens who more frequently participate in protests and less frequently in elections. Nevertheless, previous research shows that individuals who participate in protests also vote in elections than exclusively participate in the protest. Correspondingly, neither protests are not outside of conventional politics, nor are the protestors, political outsiders. People participate in protests to complement elections, as elections are not sufficient to provide political equality and representation.

The complementary role of protests constitutes the point of departure of this dissertation. Assigning a complementary role to protest indicates that both types of political participation have different potentials to sustain democratic equality. While elections translate people's votes into seats, protests empower these people to raise their voices to communicate their grievances to the decision-makers. Nevertheless, I also point out the differences between these two forms of political participation, as studying them requires distinct perspectives. First and foremost, while elections are organized routinely for citizens to express their preferences through the act of voting, protests are spontaneous and occur in response to grievances that frustrate people. These differences make elections the primary form of political participation thanks to their ability to provide democratic equality for the more significant part of the mass public in an institutionalized manner.

Many people do not participate in protests for various reasons. Despite protests being more costly than elections, one fundamental reason is that individuals may not have the same grievances. In addition, people may have different issues to prioritize, which

can influence their decision to protest. More importantly, it is unnatural for protests to occur if there are no grievances. In that regard, studying protests and elections as the two sides of the same coin to enhance political representation provides one of the most informative ways to study protest behavior. In the three empirical chapters, I aim to show the value of protests compared to elections by providing the interconnectedness between these two forms of political participation. These two forms of political participation are interconnected by their roles in political representation. Therefore, I examine the protest behavior of individuals as a response to representational deprivation that election outcomes create.

In the first chapter, to assess whether people who protest are political outsiders or part of conventional politics, I ask whether protests complement or substitute elections. I use the ideological distance from the government's ideological position to measure the representational deprivation of individuals determined by the election outcomes. I show that increasing ideological distance increases the probability of protesting as complements for voters and as substitutes for nonvoters. While the two roles of protest are observable from the findings, the complementary role is more prevalent. All in all, less than one percent of the citizens in the European democracies do not vote in elections but participate in protests. In that regard, the findings also support the previous studies indicating that most protestors are not political outsiders.

In the second chapter, by measuring representational deprivation with the party size, I find that individuals who vote for smaller parties protest more than voters of larger parties. In this chapter, I argue that junior coalition party voters protest more than senior coalition party voters, as these voters' preferences are not equally represented in policymaking. However, the supporters of smaller opposition parties protest more than government parties. Correspondingly, I show that the real losers of politics are the voters of smaller parties in opposition.

In the third chapter, I test the preferability of protest when there is a more effective alternative to change the government through elections by focusing Turkish case. I argue that, when there are approaching elections, there is no need to rely on the complementary role of protests to raise grievances as the election results will potentially change the composition of the government. In building my argument, I refer to the literature examining the losers' consent in the political system in democracies. The existence of elections diminishes the possibility of conflict by giving a reason for the loser to wait. In that regard, I propose that the proximity of elections and the chance of winning decreases the protest potential of individuals. Although the findings do not

support my hypothesis, further studies will be conducted to test these arguments with different experimental designs.

All these three chapters talk to each other. They build on the well-established winner and loser hypothesis on protest behavior. Winners and losers in a democratic country have different lenses when evaluating how democracy functions, and as a result, their likelihood of participating in protests differs. The main factor contributing to this difference is the representational inequality between these groups. In the first chapter, while representational deprivation is measured through ideological distance, the second chapter proposes an alternative with party size to account for the dynamic competition in parliamentary democracies. In the third chapter, winners' and losers' protest potentials are measured in scenarios with different election circles and chances of winning.

Although the chapters are, to a considerable extent, talk to each other, the main limitation of this dissertation is the selection of cases that impairs the communication between chapters. In the first two chapters, I focus on European democracies. However, I examine Turkey as the case study in the third chapter. As I touch upon in the introduction, the boundaries of unconventional forms of political participation are unclear in the literature. Nevertheless, perhaps more importantly, the perceptions toward protests depend on cultural and historical differences. Answering a question on the probability to protest might require different considerations for respondents in different countries. In that regard, the decision to attend lawful demonstrations as a type of protest to increase the generalizability of the findings to different contexts does not entirely diminish the boundaries between the first chapters and the last one.

In the first two chapters, participating in protest is considered a form of political participation in which individuals increase their voices to the decision-makers. The cases are selected accordingly, which are composed of Western European countries. The societies of these countries have different citizen norms than countries such as Turkey. In more authoritarian countries, the relative deprivation of citizens cannot be easily transformed into public protests to negotiate with the decision-makers. In these countries, protests can be understood as a method to change the status quo through unconventional methods (Brancati 2016). In that regard, the protests in more authoritarian settings can be more "transgressive actions" that challenge the established state routines and practices (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). The criminalization of any attempt of mass protest by the government in Turkey is an excellent example of how protesting means different things in countries outside of Western democracies.

In Turkey, different considerations take place when an individual answers a question asking about her protest potential. In addition to higher costs, the perceptions about the type of protest, for example, peaceful demonstrations, can be very different from a citizen of a European country. She may perceive this political action as rebellion or undemocratic. These perceptions can change according to the party she supports in elections, as the government party successfully shapes the attitudes of their voters about protestors. In that regard, although the study's dependent variable remains the same for the three chapters, we cannot infer that they mean the same for all respondents. In the online survey experiment conducted for the third chapter, respondents were presented with different statements about protests to address the issue of different perceptions of protests. They are then asked to rate their consensus or disagreement with each statement using a Likert scale.

Table 5.1 Perceptions about attending peaceful demonstrations

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Such demonstrations are rebellion movements against the government elected by the votes of the people.					
Those who participate in such demonstrations harm social unity and integrity and the functioning of democracy.					
Those who organize such demonstrations have goals that are incompatible with the interests of the nation.					
Participating in such demonstrations is a constitutional right.					
Participating in such demonstrations is part of active citizenship.					

In Figure 5.1 the mean scores on protest perceptions of different party supporters show how these perceptions change among the government and opposition parties. In future studies, I aim to delve into the effects of these different perspectives on protest behaviors.

I should also discuss some gaps that lay the foundation for future studies. As discussed above, the first two studies only focus on Western democracies. In Figure A.2, I include post-European democracies in the estimation sample to see whether elections' complementary and substitute role is also discernible in these democracies. As these countries' differences come from their experience with democracy, I differentiate countries according to their strength of democratic institutions. I show a positive effect of party system institutionalization on protesting to complement or substitute elections. In countries with less stable institutions, the complementary role of protests is limited, and no substitute role of protests is observed.

Figure 5.1 Mean (negative) protest perceptions of party supporters



If we look at the second empirical chapter, in addition to party size, the policy positions of political parties compared to senior parties in coalitions should influence the political representation of their voters. Smaller parties in government cannot represent their voters as pledged in election campaigns since they cannot produce policies single-handedly (Kluver and Spoon 2020). The probability of a final decision on a particular issue to be reconciled with the preferences of small parties should be significantly low when these parties' political stance differs from the majority in the government. Figure B.3 in the appendix plots the ideological distance between the senior government party and other parties with their voters' probability to protest. Nevertheless, the findings do not show substantively distinctive patterns for government and opposition party voters' protest participation.

In the second chapter, I also look at the effect of parties' long-term winning and losing statuses on their voters' protest behavior. I find that the long-term winning status of the voted party significantly decreases the probability of protesting. As expected, the long-term losing status of parties voted in previous elections increases the probability of protesting.

In conclusion, this dissertation's limitations provide valuable insights and opportunities for future studies. By acknowledging these limitations, I identify areas that require further elaboration in the literature to advance our knowledge of political participation.

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APPENDIX A

Figure A.1 Countries participated in the ESS surveys and applicable CHES data on median party position



Table A.1 Descriptive statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Participation	1.01	0.68	0	3	64807
Distance	2.23	1.62	0	7.86	64807
Feeling Close to a Party	0.58	0.49	0	1	64807
Political Interest	1.65	0.88	0	3	64807
Democratic Satisfaction	5.63	2.39	0	10	64807
Organizational Membership	0.48	0.50	0	1	64807
Feeling about Household's Income	1.79	0.78	1	4	64807
Trust in Political Parties	3.93	2.29	0	10	64807
Education	3.42	1.39	1	5	64807
Gender	0.51	0.50	0.	1	64807
Age	51.82	17.37	18	101	64807
Effect. Numb. of Parl. Parties	4.23	1.55	2.36	8.31	64807
Income Inequality	50.80	120.84	0.28	377	64807
Federalism	0.56	0.87	0	2	64807
Liberal Democracy Index	0.79	0.03	0.73	0.86	64807
Distance (Mean)	2.03	1.59	0	7.33	64807

Table A.2 Mean values of the vote and protest variables across countries

	Voted in the Last Elections	Protested Within 12 Months
Austria	0.81	0.06
Belgium	0.90	0.07
Denmark	0.94	0.06
Finland	0.84	0.03
France	0.68	0.14
Germany	0.85	0.10
Ireland	0.77	0.11
Italy	0.75	0.09
Netherlands	0.82	0.03
Portugal	0.73	0.07
Spain	0.79	0.23
Sweden	0.93	0.10
UK	0.75	0.05
Total	0.82	0.09

Table A.3 Variable names and operationalizations

Variable Name	Question/Module	Operationalization
Dependent Variable		
not Voted and not Protested	vote, sgnptit, pbldmn, bctprd	1 if (R)espondent did not vote in the last elections and did not protest in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise
Voted and not Protested	vote, sgnptit, pbldmn, bctprd	1 if R voted in the last elections and did not protest in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise
not Voted and Protested	vote, sgnptit, pbldmn, bctprd	1 if R did not vote in the last elections and protested in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise
Voted and Protested	vote, sgnptit, pbldmn, bctprd	1 if R voted in the last elections and protested in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise
Independent Variables		
Distance from the Median Party in the Government	lrscale, LRGEN (from CHES)	The absolute distance between the left-right position of median party in government and R's self placement
Party Institutionalization	v2xps_party (VDem)	The standardized Party Institutionalization Variable
Political Interest	polintr	1 Not at all Interested, 2 Hardly Interested, 3 Quite Interested, 4 Very Interested
Satisfaction with Democracy	stfdem	0 Extremely dissatisfied, 10 Extremely Satisfied
Organizational Membership	mbtru	0 No Membership to a Trade Union, 1 Membership to a Trade Union
Feeling About Household's Income	hincfel	1 Living comfortably on present income 2 Coping on present income, 3 Difficult on present income 4 Very difficult on present income
Trust in Political Parties	trstprt	0 No Trust at all, 10 Complete Trust
Education	edulvla	1 Less than lower secondary 2 Lower secondary, 3 Upper secondary, 4 Post-secondary non-tertiary, 5 Tertiary education
Gender	gndr	0 if Male, 1 if Female
Age	year yrbrn	Age of the R's at the time of Interview
ENEP	eff_nr_parl_parties (CMP)	
Income Inequality	inequality(World Bank)	Lagged inequality Gini Index
Federalism	fed (CPDS)	

Variables employed in robustness checks		
Distance from the Mean Ideological Position of Government	lrscale, LRGEN (from CHES)	The absolute distance between the mean left-right position of government and R's self placement
Party Age	partyage (DPI)	Average Party Age for all Countries

Table A.4 Robustness checks

	Model 4
Not Voted & Not Protested	
Distance (Mean)	0.008
	(0.498)
Feeling Close to a Party	-0.740***
	(0.000)
Feeling Close to a Party× Distance (Mean)	-0.001
	(0.950)
Political Interest	-0.457***
	(0.016)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.042***
	(0.006)
Organizational Membership	-0.349***
	(0.027)
Feeling About Household's Income	-0.239***
	(0.016)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.039***
	(0.007)
Education	-0.156***
	(0.010)
Gender	-0.143***
	(0.024)
Age	-0.025***
	(0.001)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	-0.090***
	(0.009)
Income Inequality	0.000***
	(0.000)
Federalism	-0.156***
	(0.016)
Liberal democracy index	-2.463***
	(0.416)
Constant	4.548***
	(0.319)

Not Voted & Protested	
Distance (Mean)	0.208***
	(0.036)
Feeling Close to a Party	-0.479***
	(0.154)
Feeling Close to a Party × Distance (Mean)	0.025
	(0.594)
Political Interest	-0.028
	(0.055)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.117***
	(0.023)
Organizational Membership	-0.064
	(0.098)
Feeling About Household's Income	-0.342***
	(0.055)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.074***
	(0.026)
Education	0.055
	(0.037)
Gender	-0.397***
	(0.087)
Age	-0.054***
	(0.003)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	-0.329***
	(0.041)
Income Inequality	0.000
	(0.000)
Federalism	0.018
	(0.052)
Liberal democracy index	-4.146***
	(1.601)
Constant	3.907***
	(1.207)
Voted & Protested	
Distance (Mean)	0.179***

	(0.000)
Feeling Close to a Party	0.208***
	(0.000)
Feeling Close to a Party × Distance (Mean)	0.050**
	(0.014)
Political Interest	0.503***
	(0.022)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.058***
	(0.008)
Organizational Membership	0.432***
	(0.034)
Feeling About Household's Income	-0.085***
	(0.022)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.008
	(0.009)
Education	0.124***
	(0.013)
Gender	0.031
	(0.032)
Age	-0.023***
	(0.001)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	-0.252***
	(0.013)
Income Inequality	-0.001***
	(0.000)
Federalism	0.256***
	(0.018)
Liberal democracy index	-2.368***
	(0.517)
Constant	-0.148
	(0.394)
Log lik.	-40697.500
N	64807.000
AIC	81491
BIC	81927

Notes: Base Category is Voting but not Protesting.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.5 Multilevel multinomial logistic regression estimates

	Model 5
Not Voted & Not Protested	
Distance	0.007
	(0.011)
Feeling Close to a Party	-0.760***
	(0.043)
Feeling Close to a Party × Distance	0.006
	(0.686)
Political Interest	-0.468***
	(0.015)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.034***
	(0.006)
Organizational Membership	-0.270***
	(0.028)
Feeling about Household's Income	0.248***
	(0.016)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.038***
	(0.007)
Education	-0.169***
	(0.010)
Gender	-0.141***
	(0.024)
Age	-0.026***
	(0.001)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	-0.002
	(0.017)
Income Inequality	0.000***
	(0.000)
Federalism	-0.115
	(0.120)
Constant	1.247***
	(0.154)
Not Voted & Protested	
Distance	0.195***

	(0.000)
Feeling Close to a Party	-0.491***
	(0.002)
Feeling Close to a Party × Distance	0.031
	(0.496)
Political Interest	-0.041
	(0.051)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.115***
	(0.020)
Organizational Membership	0.008
	(0.096)
Feeling about Household's Income	0.351***
	(0.052)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.074***
	(0.024)
Education	0.041
	(0.036)
Gender	-0.396***
	(0.086)
Age	-0.055***
	(0.003)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	-0.245***
	(0.041)
Income Inequality	-0.000
	(0.000)
Federalism	0.046
	(0.134)
Constant	-1.071***
	(0.327)
Voted & Protested	
Distance	0.167***
	(0.000)
Feeling Close to a Party	0.253***
	(0.000)
Feeling Close to a Party × Distance	0.037
	(0.124)

Political Interest	0.496***
	(0.021)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.055***
	(0.008)
Organizational Membership	0.520***
	(0.034)
Feeling about Household's Income	0.088***
	(0.022)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.005
	(0.009)
Education	0.113***
	(0.013)
Gender	0.034
	(0.032)
Age	-0.024***
	(0.001)
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	-0.156***
	(0.020)
Income Inequality	-0.001***
	(0.000)
Federalism	0.270**
	(0.120)
Constant	-2.771***
	(0.171)
M1[Country]	0.104**
	(0.043)
Log lik.	-40487.349
N	64807.000
AIC	81067
BIC	81484

Notes: Base Category is Voting but not Protesting.

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.6 Multinomial logistic regression estimates with Post-Communist countries

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Not Voted & Not Protested			
Distance	-0.035***	-0.034***	-0.178***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.023)
Party Syst. Inst.		0.041	-0.336***
		(0.051)	(0.076)
Distance × Party Syst. Inst.			0.188***
			(0.029)
Political Interest	-0.652***	-0.640***	-0.640***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.051***	-0.050***	-0.050***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Organizational Membership	-0.306***	-0.308***	-0.306***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Feeling about Household's Income	0.242***	0.228***	0.229***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.058***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education	-0.153***	-0.156***	-0.156***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Gender	-0.130***	-0.130***	-0.130***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Age	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ENEP		-0.006	-0.007
		(0.007)	(0.007)
Income Inequality		0.001***	0.001***
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Federalism		-0.220***	-0.219***
		(0.014)	(0.014)
Constant	1.923***	1.985***	2.267***
	(0.060)	(0.078)	(0.088)
Not Voted & Protested			
Distance	0.155***	0.144***	-0.244**

	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.105)
Party Syst. Inst.		0.861***	-0.192
		(0.268)	(0.338)
Distance × Party Syst. Inst.			0.486***
			(0.128)
Political Interest	-0.105**	-0.130***	-0.133***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.119***	-0.116***	-0.117***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Organizational Membership	-0.146*	-0.087	-0.087
	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Feeling about Household's Income	0.245***	0.281***	0.283***
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.111***	-0.097***	-0.097***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Education	0.023	0.034	0.035
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Gender	-0.321***	-0.324***	-0.328***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.073)
Age	-0.051***	-0.050***	-0.050***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ENEP		-0.188***	-0.194***
		(0.030)	(0.030)
Income Inequality		0.001**	0.001**
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Federalism		-0.037	-0.047
		(0.054)	(0.054)
Constant	-1.672***	-1.758***	-0.913**
	(0.236)	(0.326)	(0.364)
Voted & Protested			
Distance	0.193***	0.189***	-0.122***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.038)
Party Syst. Inst.		0.565***	-0.377***
		(0.104)	(0.139)
Distance × Party Syst. Inst.			0.380***
			(0.045)

Political Interest	0.595***	0.546***	0.547***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.066***	-0.063***	-0.064***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Organizational Membership	0.278***	0.387***	0.387***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Feeling about Household's Income	0.003	0.045**	0.045**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Trust in Political Parties	-0.026***	0.000	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education	0.140***	0.147***	0.147***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Gender	-0.029	-0.020	-0.022
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Age	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.023***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ENEP		-0.208***	-0.213***
		(0.011)	(0.011)
Income Inequality		-0.000*	-0.000*
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Federalism		0.215***	0.214***
		(0.019)	(0.019)
Constant	-3.673***	-3.511***	-2.739***
	(0.098)	(0.129)	(0.151)
Log lik.	-66375.342	-65841.992	-65782.186
N	99928.000	99928.000	99928.000
AIC	132811	131768	131654
BIC	133096	132167	132082

Notes: Base Category is Voting but not Protesting.

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure A.2 Predicted probabilities of participation of distance from the median party and for low, median, and high party institutionalization



To comment on the statistical significance of the coefficients in Model 3 in Table A6, I map coefficients onto the probability space by setting all other variables to their respective central values in the estimation sample. In Figure A.2, I plot the predictions as a function of distance from the median party in government for low, medium, and high levels of party institutionalization and with an overlaid histograms. The low, medium, and high levels of party institutionalization are represented, in turn, by the 10^{th} (.51), 50^{th} (.84), and 90^{th} (.98) percentiles of the party institutionalization variable. Lastly, we hold all other variables constant at their means or modes.

The leftmost plot in Figure 1 shows the low-party institutionalization scenario. In our sample, this scenario corresponds to Slovakia in 2012. According to the country experts, the ideological placement of the median party on the 11-point ideological scale, the Slovakian Democratic and Christian Party, is at 6.64. The distance from this position was 6.64 at its highest when respondents placed themselves at 0 and 0.34 at its lowest when respondents put themselves at 7. While 51% of the respondents in Slovakia set themselves at 5 to 8 on the same left-right scale, making their distance to the median

party less than 2, 90% of the respondents' distances to the median party are lower than 5. The figure in the middle, showing median party institutionalization, corresponds to Finland in 2014 and 2018 and the United Kingdom in 2018. While the median party positions in the government are, in turn, 4.6 (Green League) and 5.6 (Center Party) in Finland, it is 7.12 (Conservative Party) in the UK. The distance from these positions was 0.12 at its lowest when respondents placed themselves at 7 in the UK and 7.12 at its highest when respondents placed themselves at 0 in the UK. The right-most graph plots the scenario for high-party institutionalization, which corresponds to Germany for 2012 and 2014. While the median party position was 5.92 in 2012 for Christian Democratic Union, it was 6.13 in 2014. Correspondingly, the largest distance is 6.13 when respondents placed themselves at 0; 0.08 when respondents put themselves at 6 in 2012.

Predicted probabilities show distinct patterns for the categories of voting and protesting for these three scenarios. While the slope is only slightly steeper for the low-party institutionalization scenario, we observe a greater increase in the predicted probabilities with increasing distance in the median and high-party institutionalization scenarios. For the median party institutionalization scenario, the probability increases from 0.29 to 1.1 percentage; while the probability increases from 0.28 to 1.4 percentage for the category of voting and protesting in the high party institutionalization scenario.

When party institutionalization is low, the predicted probabilities for voting but not protesting slightly increases as conditionally on the increasing ideological distance from the median party in government. However, the predicted probabilities decrease from 80 to 74 percent in the medium-party institutionalization scenario. When party system institutionalization is at its 90th percentile, the predicted probabilities decrease from 81 to 70 percent.

Predicted probabilities for not voting but protesting also show distinct patterns in the three scenarios of party institutionalization. In low party institutionalization scenario, the predicted probabilities increase from 0.37 percent to 0.40 percent and from 0.35 to 1 percent for medium-party institutionalization case. The predicted probabilities increase from 0.35 to 1.5 percent for the high party institutionalization. Although according to the graph, the slopes are almost constant for all three scenarios, the predicted probabilities increase three-fold for medium and four-fold for high-party institutionalization scenarios.

APPENDIX B

Table B.1 Descriptive statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Protest	0.08	0.27	0	1	66578
Party Size	0.47	0.29	0	1.26	66578
In Government	0.53	0.50	0	1	66578
Trust in Political Parties	4.34	2.18	0	10	66578
Left-Right Self Placement	5.09	2.14	0	10	66578
Feeling About Household's Income	1.71	0.73	1	4	66578
Political Interest	1.78	0.82	0	3	66578
Democratic Satisfaction	5.98	2.29	0	10	66578
Gender	0.50	0.50	0	1	66578
Age	52.24	16.84	18	100	66578
Education	3.46	1.35	1	5	66578
Organizational Membership	0.55	0.50	0	1	66578
Income Inequality	39.25	109.57	0.28	376	66578
Mean Disproportionality	5.40	5.77	0.37	24.08	66578

Table B.2 Mean values of the protest, party size, and the number of coalition parties in government across the examined election years

	Protest	Party Size	Number of Coalition Parties
Austria 2004	0.08	0.64	2
Austria 2014	0.07	0.44	2
Austria 2016	0.07	0.45	2
Austria 2018	0.08	0.53	2
Belgium 2004	0.07	0.26	4
Belgium 2006	0.08	0.26	4
Belgium 2016	0.10	0.24	4
Denmark 2004	0.04	0.43	2
Denmark 2006	0.06	0.41	2
Denmark 2010	0.07	0.38	2
Denmark 2012	0.04	0.35	3
Denmark 2018	0.08	0.33	3
Finland 2004	0.01	0.39	3
Finland 2006	0.02	0.41	3
Finland 2008	0.03	0.38	4
Finland 2010	0.01	0.37	4
Finland 2012	0.02	0.32	6
Finland 2016	0.04	0.32	3
Finland 2018	0.05	0.31	3
France 2006	0.16	0.51	2
France 2008	0.17	0.61	2
France 2010	0.20	0.55	2
France 2016	0.18	0.56	3
France 2018	0.18	0.38	3
Germany 2004	0.11	0.67	2
Germany 2006	0.09	0.61	2
Germany 2008	0.09	0.59	2
Germany 2010	0.09	0.52	2
Germany 2012	0.09	0.53	2
Germany 2014	0.10	0.63	2
Germany 2016	0.13	0.64	2
Germany 2018	0.11	0.46	2

Ireland 2004	0.06	0.63	2
Ireland 2006	0.06	0.62	2
Ireland 2008	0.10	0.66	3
Ireland 2012	0.12	0.57	2
Ireland 2014	0.15	0.53	2
Ireland 2018	0.10	0.49	2
Netherlands 2004	0.05	0.41	3
Netherlands 2006	0.04	0.39	3
Netherlands 2008	0.03	0.35	3
Netherlands 2014	0.02	0.30	2
Netherlands 2016	0.02	0.30	2
Portugal 2004	0.03	0.75	2
Portugal 2012	0.09	0.64	2
Portugal 2014	0.08	0.63	2
Sweden 2008	0.06	0.49	4
Sweden 2010	0.05	0.44	4
Sweden 2012	0.08	0.44	4
Sweden 2014	0.12	0.40	4
Sweden 2016	0.11	0.40	2
Sweden 2018	0.11	0.36	2
UK 2012	0.05	0.66	2
UK 2014	0.07	0.63	2

Table B.3 Conditional fixed- effect logistic regression estimates

	Model 5
Party Size	-0.576***
	(0.083)
Government	-0.608***
	(0.068)
In Government × Party Size	0.665***
	(0.121)
Trust in Political Parties	0.005
	(0.008)
Left-Right Self Placement	-0.255***
	(0.007)
Feeling About Household's Income	0.027
	(0.021)
Political Interest	0.586***
	(0.021)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.053***
	(0.008)
Gender	-0.018
	(0.031)
Age	-0.022***
	(0.001)
Education	0.115***
	(0.013)
Organizational Membership	0.319***
	(0.032)
Income Inequality	0.000
	(0.000)
Mean Disproportionality	0.055***
	(0.002)
Log lik.	-16156.889
N	66578
AIC	32342
BIC	32469

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.4 Robustness cheks

	365 Days	Distance
Party Size	-0.611***	-0.618***
	(0.069)	(0.072)
Government	-0.303***	-0.307***
	(0.069)	(0.069)
Government × Party Size	0.270**	0.276***
	(0.105)	(0.107)
Distance from the Mean Government Position		-0.017
		(0.012)
Trust in Political Parties	0.037***	0.036***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Left-Right Self Placement	-0.227***	-0.226***
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Feeling About Household's Income	0.073***	0.067***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Political Interest	0.588***	0.592***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.054***	-0.052***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Gender	0.047*	0.051*
	(0.028)	(0.029)
Age	-0.019***	-0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.130***	0.127***
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Organizational Membership	0.486***	0.495***
	(0.033)	(0.034)
Income Inequality	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Mean Disproportionality	0.022***	0.025***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	-2.112***	-2.084***
	(0.121)	(0.128)
Log lik.	-18515.331	-18017.627

N	77028	75725
Chi2	5858	5653

Notes: Country-fixed effects are omitted from the table.

Robust Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure B.1 Average marginal effect of government status conditional on party size



Table B.5 Logistic regression estimates for long-term losers and winners

	Model 1	Model 2
Party Size	-1.052***	
	(0.230)	
Government	-0.447***	
	(0.101)	
Government × Party Size	0.852***	
	(0.270)	
Long Term Winner	-0.026	-0.165***
	(0.071)	(0.040)
Long Term Winner × Party Size	0.354	
	(0.258)	
Government × Long Term Winner	0.133	
	(0.140)	
Government × Long Term Winner× Party Size	-0.744**	
	(0.318)	
Junior Coalition Partner		-0.280***
		(0.071)
Senior Coalition Partner		-0.457***
		(0.063)
Junior Coalition Partner × Long Term Winner		0.059
		(0.091)
Senior Coalition Partner ×Long Term Winner		-0.064
		(0.080)
Trust in Political Parties	0.035***	0.035***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Left-Right Self Placement	-0.240***	-0.238***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Feeling About Household's Income	0.048**	0.051**
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.042***	-0.042***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Political Interest	0.570***	0.569***
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Gender	0.012	0.014

	(0.031)	(0.031)
Age	-0.021***	-0.022***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.120***	0.125***
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Organizational Membership	0.430***	0.425***
	(0.035)	(0.035)
Income Inequality	-0.000**	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Mean Disproportionality	0.034***	0.036***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	-1.689***	-1.900***
	(0.128)	(0.122)
Log lik.	-15886.678	-15914.067
N	66578	66578
AIC	31831	31882
BIC	32095	32128

Notes: Country-fixed effects in Model 2 and Model 3 are omitted from the table.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure B.2 Predicted probabilities of protest participation for opposition, junior coalition, and senior coalition parties with and without previous government experience



Figure B.3 Predicted probabilities of party size and short and long-term losers, and winners



Table B.6 Logistic regression estimates with the ideological distance of parties for the senior government party

	Model 1
Party Size	-0.720***
	(0.090)
Government	-0.487***
	(0.097)
Government × Party Size	0.430***
	(0.140)
Party Rile Distance	0.149
	(0.110)
Government × Party Rile Distance	0.543***
	(0.199)
Trust in Political Parties	0.034***
	(0.009)
Left-Right Self Placement	-0.232***
	(0.008)
Feeling About Household's Income	0.040*
	(0.023)
Political Interest	0.571***
	(0.022)
Democratic Satisfaction	-0.041***
	(0.008)
Gender	0.013
	(0.031)
Age	-0.021***
	(0.001)
Education	0.117***
	(0.014)
Organizational Membership	0.410***
	(0.036)
Income Inequality	-0.000**
	(0.000)
Mean Disproportionality	0.031***
	(0.008)

Constant	-1.800***
	(0.136)
Log lik.	-15203.663
N	64674
AIC	30461
BIC	30706

Notes: Country-fixed effects are omitted from the table.

Robust Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure B.4 Predicted probabilities of protest participation of rile difference and for government and opposition parties



APPENDIX C

Table C.1 AMCE estimates (split-sample design)

	Incumbent C. Voters	Opposition C. Voters	Incumbent P. Supporters	Opposition P. Supporters
Winner	0.169***	-0.212***	0.190***	-0.215***
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.020)
In 3 Yrs.	0.015	-0.053***	0.022	-0.049**
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.020)
High Chance	0.079***	0.006	0.086***	0.021
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Satisfied	0.046*	-0.167***	0.067***	-0.161***
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.022)
Constant	0.344***	0.713***	0.315***	0.698***
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.020)
R-Squared	0.037	0.075	0.048	0.075
N	2712	3568	2336	2808

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure C.1 AMCEs of the treatments on the choice probability of country profile for winners and losers (according to president preference in the second round)



Figure C.2 AMCEs of the treatments on the choice probability of country profile for winners and losers (according to party preference in the first round)



Table C.2 Interactive linear model

	Model 1
Winner	-0.034
	(0.038)
In 3 Yrs.	-0.008
	(0.037)
Winner × In 3 Yrs.	-0.017
	(0.051)
High Chance	0.070**
	(0.035)
Winner × High Chance	-0.046
	(0.051)
In 3 Yrs. × High Chance	-0.074
	(0.050)
Winner × In 3 Yrs. × High Chance	0.054
	(0.072)
Satisfied	-0.118***
	(0.036)
Winner × Satisfied	0.016
	(0.051)
In 3 Yrs. × Satisfied	0.020
	(0.049)
Winner × In 3 Yrs. × Satisfied	0.004
	(0.069)
High Chance × Satisfied	0.039
	(0.049)
Winner × High Chance × Satisfied	0.003
	(0.071)
In 3 Yrs. × High Chance × Satisfied	0.014
	(0.068)
Winner × In 3 Yrs. × High Chance × Satisfied	-0.001
	(0.098)
Constant	0.553***
	(0.026)
R-squared	0.012

N	6872

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure C.3 Marginal effect of the winner status for low and high chance of winning and election timing



Table C.3 Logistic regression and linear probability model estimates

	Logistic Regression	Linear Probability Model
Winner	-0.111**	-0.028**
	(0.050)	(0.012)
In 3 Yrs.	-0.035	-0.009
	(0.061)	(0.015)
High Chance	0.228***	0.057***
	(0.061)	(0.015)
In 3 Yrs. × High Chance	-0.137	-0.034
	(0.084)	(0.021)
Satisfied	-0.274***	-0.068***
	(0.049)	(0.012)
Constant	0.132**	0.533***
	(0.053)	(0.013)
R-squared		0.008
Log lik.	-6818.454	-7141.393
N	9894	9894

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table C.4 Logistic regression estimates on attention check

	Attention Check
CHP	0.170
	(0.157)
İYİ	-0.062
	(0.312)
MHP	-0.343
	(0.336)
YSP	1.081
	(0.734)
ZP	0.599
	(0.475)
TİP	-0.113
	(0.587)
Invalid Vote	0.010
	(0.369)
Political Interest	0.337***
	(0.086)
Age	0.008
	(0.006)
Female	-0.030
	(0.151)
Education	0.321***
	(0.081)
Income	0.088***
	(0.029)
Constant	-2.414***
	(0.530)
Log lik.	-4876.540
N	8704

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Qualtrics survey

Consent block

Bu araştırma Sabancı Üniversitesi, Sanat Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi öğretim üyelerinden Doç. Dr. Mert Moral'ın sorumluluğunda bireylerin siyasi katılım davranışları hakkında bilgi toplamayı amaçlamaktadır. Araştırmaya katılım tamamıyla gönüllük esasına dayanmaktadır. Katılımcılar kişisel bilgilerini paylaşmadan soruları anonim olarak yanıtlayacaktır. Katılımcıların cevapları gizli tutulacak ve sadece araştırmacı tarafından bilimsel çalışmalarda kullanılacaktır. Katılımcı aksine izin vermediği surece görüşme kayıt altına alınmayacak ve ilgili rapor ve bilimsel çalışmalarda katılımcının kimliği gizli tutulacaktır. Paylaşılan bilgiler yalnızca öğretim üyesinin projesinde ve yapacağı bilimsel yayınlarda kullanılacaktır. Anket verileri güvenli bir ortamda saklanacaktır. Anket yaklaşık olarak 5 dakika sürmekte ve rahatsızlık verebilecek soruları içermemektedir. Ancak, sorulan sorulardan ya da herhangi başka bir nedenden ötürü rahatsız olmanız durumunda, istediğiniz zaman anketi tamamlamadan sayfayı terk edebilirsiniz. Çalışmayla ilgili sorularınız ya da endişeleriniz varsa lutfen yürütücüye 0216 483 9240 telefon numarasından ulaşınız.Eğer haklarınızın herhangi bir şekilde ihlal edildiğini düşünüyorsanız, lutfen Sabancı Üniversitesi Araştırma EtikKurulu Başkanı Prof. Dr. Mehmet Yıldız ile [0 216 483 9010] iletişime geçiniz.

Araştırma ile ilgili yukarıda belirtilen hususları okudum ve anladım. Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılıyorum ve istediğim zaman yarıda kesebileceğimi biliyorum.Verdiğim bilgilerin öğretim üyesinin siyasi katılım davranışları üzerine olan projesinde ve bilimsel amaçlı yayınlarında kullanmasını

- ❑ Kabul ediyorum
- ❑ Kabul etmiyorum

Conjoint block

Aşağıdaki tabloda farklı özellikleri listelenmiş 2 ayrı hayali ulke profili bulunmaktadır. Bu iki ulkede ekonomik kriz gun geçtikçe derinleşmekte ve alım gucu duşmektedir. Bu durumu protesto etmek amacıyla yasal bir gösteri yuruyuşu yapılacaktır.

Aşağıdaki hayali 2 ülkeden hangisinde düzenlenecek olan bir gösteri yürüyüşüne katılırdınız?

	Ülke 1	**Ülke 2**
Demokrasiden memnuniyet:	Ülkede demokrasinin işleyişinden hiç memnun değilsiniz.	Ülkede demokrasinin işleyişinden hiç memnun değilsiniz.
Bilimsel anket sonuçları:	Güvenilir kamuoyu araştırmalarına göre desteklediğiniz siyasi partinin önümüzdeki seçimi kazanma olasılığı yüksektir.	Güvenilir kamuoyu araştırmalarına göre desteklediğiniz siyasi partinin önümüzdeki seçimi kazanma olasılığı yüksektir.
Bir önceki seçimlerde:	Muhalefet partisine oy verdiniz.	İktidar partisine oy verdiniz.
Bir sonraki seçimler:	3 yıl sonra yapılacaktır.	2 ay sonra yapılacaktır.

- ❑ Ülke 1
- ❑ Ülke 2

Peki, aşağıdaki hayali 2 ülkeden hangisinde düzenlenecek olan bir gösteri yürüyüşüne katılırdınız?

	Ülke 1	**Ülke 2**
Demokrasiden memnuniyet:	Ülkede demokrasinin işleyişinden hiç memnun değilsiniz.	Ülkede demokrasinin işleyişinden hiç memnun değilsiniz.
Bilimsel anket sonuçları:	Güvenilir kamuoyu araştırmalarına göre desteklediğiniz siyasi partinin önümüzdeki seçimi kazanma olasılığı yüksektir.	Güvenilir kamuoyu araştırmalarına göre desteklediğiniz siyasi partinin önümüzdeki seçimi kazanma olasılığı düşüktür.
Bir önceki seçimlerde:	İktidar partisine oy verdiniz.	Muhalefet partisine oy verdiniz.
Bir sonraki seçimler:	2 ay sonra yapılacaktır.	3 yıl sonra yapılacaktır.

- ❑ Ülke 1
- ❑ Ülke 2

Peki, aşağıdaki hayali 2 ülkeden hangisinde düzenlenecek olan bir gösteri yürüyüşüne katılırdınız?

	Ülke 1	**Ülke 2**
Demokrasiden memnuniyet:	Ülkede demokrasinin işleyişinden hiç memnun değilsiniz.	Ülkede demokrasinin işleyişinden son derece memnunsunuz.
Bilimsel anket sonuçları:	Güvenilir kamuoyu araştırmalarına göre desteklediğiniz siyasi partinin önümüzdeki seçimi kazanma olasılığı düşüktür.	Güvenilir kamuoyu araştırmalarına göre desteklediğiniz siyasi partinin önümüzdeki seçimi kazanma olasılığı düşüktür.
Bir önceki seçimlerde:	Muhalefet partisine oy verdiniz.	Muhalefet partisine oy verdiniz.
Bir sonraki seçimler:	3 yıl sonra yapılacaktır.	3 yıl sonra yapılacaktır.

- ❑ Ülke 1

❑ Ülke 2

Peki, aşağıdaki hayali 2 ülkeden hangisinde düzenlenecek olan bir gösteri yürüyüşüne katılırdınız?

	Ülke 1	**Ülke 2**
Demokrasiden memnuniyet:	Ülkede demokrasinin işleyişinden hiç memnun değilsiniz.	Ülkede demokrasinin işleyişinden son derece memnunsunuz.
Bilimsel anket sonuçları:	Güvenilir kamuoyu araştırmalarına göre desteklediğiniz siyasi partinin önümzdeki seçimi kazanma olasılığı düşüktür.	Güvenilir kamuoyu araştırmalarına göre desteklediğiniz siyasi partinin önümüzdeki seçimi kazanma olasılığı düşüktür.
Bir önceki seçimlerde:	İktidar partisine oy verdiniz.	Muhalefet partisine oy verdiniz.
Bir sonraki seçimler:	2 ay sonra yapılacaktır.	3 yıl sonra yapılacaktır.

❑ Ülke 1

❑ Ülke 2

Attention and manipulation checks block

Bundan önceki 4 soruda bahsedilen hayali ülkelerde seçimlerin ne zaman gerçekleşeceği ile ilgili bir bilgi var mıdır?

- ❑ Evet
- ❑ Hayır

Peki, bu hayali ülkelerde seçimlere kalan zaman sizin ülke seçiminizi etkilemiş midir? Etkilediyse neden etkilediğini kısaca yazabilir misiniz?

- ❑ Evet

  .....

- ❑ Hayır

Protest perception and participation block

Aşağıda hukumeti protesto etmek amacıyla yasal olarak duzenlenen gösteri yürüyüşleri hakkında bazı ifadeler bulunmaktadır. Bu ifadelerin her birine ne derecede katıldığınızı işaretler misiniz?

	Hiç katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
Bu tür gösteri yürüyüşleri halkın oylarıyla seçilmiş hükümete karşı isyan hareketleridir.					
Bu tur gösteri yürüyüşlerine katılanlar toplumsal birlik ve bütünlüğe ve demokrasinin işleyişine zarar verir.					
Bu tür gösteri yürüyüşlerini düzenleyenlerin milletin çıkarlarıyla uyuşmayan amaçları vardır.					
Bu tür gösteri yürüyüşlerine katılmak anayasal bir haktır.					
Bu tür gösteri yüruyuşlerine katılmak aktif vatandaşlığın bir parçasıdır.					

Aşağıda çeşitli siyasal ve sosyal faaliyetler sıralanmıştır.Bunlardan her birini son bir yıl içinde yaptınız mı? Son bir yıl içinde olmasa bile daha önce yaptınız mı? Hiç yapmadınız ama yapabilir misiniz? Yoksa hiç yapmadınız ve hiçbir zaman da yapmaz mısınız?

	Son bir yıl içinde yaptım	Son bir yıl içinde olmasa da daha önce yaptım	Hiç yapmadım ama yapabilirim	Hiç yapmadım hiçbir zaman yapmam.
Toplu bir dilekçeye imza atmak				
Bir boykota katılmak				
Yasal bir gösteri yürüyüşüne katılmak				
Bir siyasi partinin mitingine katılmak				
Siyasi göruş ve fikirlerini Facebook, Twitter vb. sosyal medya platformlarında dile getirmek				

Voting preferences block

14 Mayıs 2023'te yapılan milletvekili ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerinde oy kullanma imkanınız oldu mu?

- ❑ Evet
- ❑ Hayır

Peki, 14 Mayıs 2023 milletvekili genel seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy verdiniz?

- ❑ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti)
- ❑ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)
- ❑ Yeşil Sol Parti (YSP)
- ❑ Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP)
- ❑ İYİ Parti
- ❑ Zafer Partisi
- ❑ Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP)
- ❑ Geçersiz/ Boş oy kullandım
- ❑ Diğer .....

Peki 14 Mayıs 2023 Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçiminde hangi adaya oy verdiniz?

- ❑ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
- ❑ Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu
- ❑ Sinan Oğan
- ❑ Muharrem İnce
- ❑ Geçersiz /Boş oy kullandım

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28 Mayıs 2023'te yapılan Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2. tur seçimlerinde oy kullandınız mı?

- ❑ Evet
- ❑ Hayır

28 Mayıs 2023'te yapılan Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2. tur seçimlerinde hangi adaya oy verdiniz?

- ❑ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
- ❑ Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu

Political behavior and attitudes block

Siyasi partilerimizin her biri hakkında ne duşunduğunuzu öğrenmek isteriz. Aşağıdaki partileri 0' ın "hiç beğenmediğiniz", 10'un un ise "çok beğendiğiniz" anlamına geldiği bir cetvele göre değerlendiriniz. Eğer partiyi hiç duymadıysanız veya yeterince fikir sahibi olmadığınızı duşunuyorsanız lutfen "Partiyi hiç duymadım/fikrim yok" seçeneğine tıklayınız.

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
Halkların Demokratik Partisi (YSP)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
İYİ Parti	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
Memleket Partisi	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok

Siyasi konularda "sağ" dan ve "sol" dan bahsedildiğini sık sık duyuyoruz. Aşağıda 10 puandan oluşan ve 0 puanın en solu, 10 puanın da en sağı gösterdiği bir cetvel var.

Siz kendinizi bu cetvelin neresine yerleştirirdiniz?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
Ya Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'ni (AK Parti)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'ni (CHP)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi'ni (MHP)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
Halkların Demokratik Partisi'ni (HDP)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
İYİ Parti'yi (İYİ Parti)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok

Turkiye'de seçimlerde oyunuza talip olan birçok siyasi parti var. Aşağıdaki partilere herhangi bir zamanda oy verme ihtimaliniz ne kadardır? 0'ın "asla oy vermem" 10'un ise "kuvvetle muhtemel oy veririm" anlamına geldiği bu cetvele göre yanıtlayınız.

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
Halkların Demokratik Partisi (YSP)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok
İYİ Parti	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Fikrim yok

Genel olarak siyasetle ne kadar ilgilisiniz? Siyasetle çok mu ilgilisiniz, biraz mı ilgilisiniz, pek ilgili değil misiniz, yoksa hiç ilgili değil misiniz?

❑ Çok ilgiliyim.

❑ Biraz ilgiliyim.

❑ Pek ilgili değilim.

❑ Hiç ilgili değilim.

Kendinizi herhangi bir siyasi partiye yakın görüyor musunuz?

❑ Evet

❑ Hayır

Kendinizi hangi partiye yakın hissediyorsunuz?

.....

Kendinizi bu partiye çok mu yakın hissediyorsunuz, biraz mı yakın hissediyorsunuz, ya da pek yakın değil mi?

❑ Pek yakın değil

❑ Biraz yakın

❑ Çok yakın

Demographics Block

Cinsiyetiniz?

- ❑ Kadın
- ❑ Erkek

Doğum yılınız?

.....

Sahip olduğunuz en yuksek eğitim seviyesi nedir?

- ❑ Okuryazar ancak diploması yok
- ❑ İlkokul mezunu (5 yıllık)
- ❑ Ortaokul mezunu/İlköğretim mezunu (8 yıllık ilköğretim ya da 5 yıl sonrası 3yıllık ortaokul mezunu)
- ❑ Lise mezunu
- ❑ Lise'den mezun olup yukseköğretime devam etmiş ama bitirememiş.
- ❑ Üniversite mezunu
- ❑ Yüksek lisans (master) mezunu
- ❑ Doktora

Şimdi sayacaklarımdan hangisi size en uygun olanıdır?

- ❑ Çalışıyor (memur, işçi, kendi işinin sahibi ya da aile işinde)
- ❑ Hasta, engelli, sakat
- ❑ İşsiz / İş arıyor, bulsa çalışmak istiyor
- ❑ Emekli
- ❑ Öğrenci
- ❑ Ev kadını
- ❑ Çırak, iş eğitimi alıyor

❑ Diğer

Geçtiğimiz altı ayı dikkate alırsanız, bütün aile fertlerinin maaş, kira, emekli aylığı v.b. gelirlerini göz önünde bulundurarak ortalama toplam aylık hane halkı geliriniz aşağıdaki gruplardan hangisinin içine girmektedir?

❑ 3.200 TL ve altı

❑ 3.201 – 4.500 TL

❑ 4.501 – 5.500 TL

❑ 5.501 – 6.500 TL

❑ 6.501 – 7.600 TL

❑ 7.601 – 9.000 TL

❑ 9.001 – 10.600 TL

❑ 10.601 – 13.100 TL

❑ 13.101 – 16.900 TL

❑ 16.901 - 32.200 TL

❑ 32.201 TL ve üstü

Aşağıdaki ifadelerden hangisi şu anki mali durumunuzu daha iyi tanımlar?

❑ Mevcut gelirimiz rahatça yaşamak için yeterli.

❑ Mevcut gelirimiz ile ancak idare edebiliyoruz.

❑ Mevcut gelirimiz ile yaşamakta biraz zorlanıyoruz.

❑ Mevcut gelirimiz ile yaşamakta çok zorlanıyoruz.

Accommodation Block

Hangi şehirde ikamet ediyorsunuz?

.....

Lütfen ikamet ettiğiniz ilçe ve mahalleyi (veya köyü) yazınız.

.....
