ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF HISTORICAL CLEAVAGES AND MIGRATION: A GEOGRAPHIC DISCONTINUITY APPROACH

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ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF HISTORICAL CLEAVAGES AND MIGRATION: A GEOGRAPHIC DISCONTINUITY APPROACH

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ABSTRACT

ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF HISTORICAL CLEAVAGES AND MIGRATION: A GEOGRAPHIC DISCONTINUITY APPROACH

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This thesis examines the long-term effect of forced migrations and historical cleavages on electoral behavior by comparing the cases of Turkey and Poland. Employing aggregate-level historical census data, it seeks to explain the effect of population transfers after the First and Second World Wars on the relationship between forced migrations and electoral behavior, as well as historical cleavages. The findings suggest that a higher migrant population share decreases the probability of voting for conservative and right-wing populist parties in Turkey and Poland. The constituting mechanism behind the relationship between forced migrations and electoral behavior in both countries is related to the characteristics and preferences of migrant populations. The incoming migrant groups are more skilled/educated or tend to obtain portable assets such as education, which increases human capital accumulation and improves economic outcomes. The differences between the two cases are explained through the composition of migrant groups, historical accounts, and cleavages. While Poland experienced an imperial past under Prussia, Austria, and Russia, Turkey had a significant Greek population. Moreover, the destination of migrants is more homogenous in the Polish case, while Balkan migrants in Turkey are dispersed along the transportation lines and Greek settlements. Thus, the comparison reveals that the historical cleavages and composition of migrants have a modifying effect on the relationship between forced migrations and electoral behavior.

ÖZET

TARİHSEL KİMLİKLER VE GÖÇÜN SEÇİMSEL SONUÇLARI: COĞRAFİ SÜREKSİZLİK YAKLAŞIMI

BERK FİLCAN

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Zorunlu göçler, seçmen davranışı, etnik azınlıklar, Türkiye, Polonya

Bu tez, zorunlu göçlerin ve tarihsel kimliklerin seçmen davranışları üzerindeki uzun vadeli etkisini Türkiye ve Polonya örneklerini karşılaştırarak incelemektedir. İlçe düzeyince tarihi nüfus sayımı verilerini kullanarak, Birinci ve İkinci Dünya Savaşları sonrasındaki nüfus transferlerinin, zorunlu göçler ile seçmen davranışları ve tarihsel kimlikler arasındaki ilişki üzerindeki etkisini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bulgular, Türkiye ve Polonya'da daha yüksek göçmen nüfus payının muhafazakar ve sağ popülist partilere oy verme olasılığını azalttığını göstermektedir. Her iki ülkede de zorunlu göçler ile seçmen davranışları arasındaki ilişkinin ardındaki kurucu mekanizma, göçmen nüfusun özellikleri ve göç sonrası tercihleriyle ilgilidir. Göçmen gruplar yerel nüfusa nazaran daha vasıflı/eğitimlidir veya insan sermayesi birikimini artıran ve ekonomik çıktıları iyileştiren eğitim gibi taşınabilir varlıklar elde etme eğilimindedir. İki vaka arasındaki farklar göçmen gruplarının bileşimi, tarihsel etkenler ve kimlikler ile açıklanabilir. Polonya, Prusya, Avusturya ve Rusya'nın yönetimi altında bir imparatorluk geçmişine sahipken, Türkiye'de Osmanlı Devleti önemli bir Yunan nüfusu barındırmaktaydı. Ayrıca, Polonya örneğinde göçmenlerin varış noktaları daha homojen olup, Türkiye'deki Balkan göçmenleri ulaşım hatları ve Yunan yerleşimleri boyunca dağılmış durumdadır. Dolayısıyla karşılaştırma, göçmenlerin tarihsel bölünmeleri ve kompozisyonunun zorunlu göçler ile seçmen davranışları arasındaki ilişki üzerinde değiştirici bir etkiye sahip olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

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To my dear family
who always believed in me

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1. INTRODUCTION

Historical legacies often have a profound impact on contemporary political behavior. Just as one point in time is not disconnected from another, so are the ways with which we decide how to act, how to vote, how to think, and how we see others often depend on our past. A vast literature suggests that we should thus trace the origins of contemporary political behavior back to historical events, whether it be a longstanding institutional and social process or an abrupt change. As one of the main tenets of democracy, elections are a direct representation of the political attitudes that emerged from the combination of contemporary factors and historical experiences, which are transmitted to later generations (Charnysh and Peisakhin 2021; Neundorf and Pop-Eleches 2020). One part of these historical experiences is generated by longstanding historical processes and creates social cleavages. They are usually initiated and maintained by states toward a greater end (e.g, Haffert 2021; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Mardin 1973), or occasionally, they arose from clashing social norms (e.g., Bisin and Verdier 2001; Voigtländer and Voth 2012). The other part of these experiences is concerned with abrupt changes, such as religious wars (Hornung 2014), ethnic and religious violence (Haffert 2021; Hamilton 1982; Ross 1998), or forced migrations (Charnysh 2019; Mavrogordatos 1983). Therefore, investigating the long-term effect of historical legacies, especially that of forced migrations and cleavages, on contemporary political behavior provides a fertile ground for competitive research.

1.1 Forced Migrations and Historical Cleavages: Background

Forced migration is a transformative experience. Without any input from those who are subjected to it, hundreds of thousands of people are uprooted from their homes, usually leaving everything behind. It leaves irreparable scars on the souls of migrants, destroying their everyday lives and dismantling their social networks.

"Uprootedness" usually activates migrants' survival mechanisms, directing their efforts to ameliorate their conditions (e.g., Brenner and Kiefer 1981; Stigler and Becker 1977), at the same time, usually unconsciously, bettering the conditions of others.

Previous research has mainly focused on the long-term effects of forced migrations on economic development and human capital. It has commonly been shown that incoming migrant populations are robust determinants of educational attainment, increased economic outcomes, higher productivity, and innovation (e.g., Becker and Ferrara 2019; Charnysh 2019; Murard and Sakalli 2018; Peters 2022). Although the relationship between forced migrations and economic development, forced migrations and human capital, economic development and electoral behavior, and human capital and electoral behavior have all been studied widely, there are few studies on the theoretical mechanism that links these subjects together. The literature is thus quite limited when it comes to explaining the long-term effects of forced migrations on electoral behavior, which are likely to be mediated by economic development and human capital.

Economic development is commonly argued as one of the main prerequisites of the transition to democracy (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992) and is seen as an important determinant of maintaining democratic processes (Przeworski et al. 2000). Consequently, it affects electoral behavior. For example, the composition of the economy (Linz 1978), globalization (Colantone and Stanig 2019), economic and social insecurity (Gidron and Hall 2017), and income levels (Coffé, Heyndels, and Vermeir 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2016) are some of the important explanations of voting for conservative parties. Strongly linked with economic development, human capital is another important determinant of electoral behavior. As argued by Downs (1957), voting has a cost, which increases with the amount of knowledge needed to assess the actions of political actors. Voters with higher levels of human capital and better economic conditions are more likely to turn out to vote (Lijphart 1997). Moreover, more educated citizens are less likely to vote for right-wing parties (Inglehart and Norris 2016).

Then, what is the role of forced migrations in determining electoral behavior? Previous research on the topic demonstrates that forced migrations improve economic outcomes and increase the accumulation of human capital in three ways: introduction of newer techniques in industries and high-skilled migrants, increase in manpower and investment, and tendency toward portable assets (Becker 2019). Indeed, scholars find strong empirical support for the positive effect of the incoming migrant population on productivity and innovation (Arbatlı and Gökmen 2016; Hornung 2014; Moser, Voena, and Waldinger 2014). Also related to the incoming migrant popula-

tion, a similar positive effect is created through the so-called "agglomeration effect" (Becker and Ferrara 2019). Essentially, migrants provide much-needed manpower for developing industries and agriculture, populate vacant rural areas and stimulate investment in infrastructure and agriculture (e.g., Maystadt and Duranton 2018; Peters 2022). As the last channel, the tendency to obtain portable assets heavily depends on immigrants' individual experiences. Accordingly, there is vast empirical support for the tendency to obtain portable assets, mainly in the form of education. Scholars find strong evidence suggesting a significant and substantial positive effect of migration on obtaining higher levels of education among the descendants of migrants (Bauer, Braun, and Kvasnicka 2013; Becker et al. 2020; Sarvimäki, Uusitalo, and Jäntti 2022).

The long-term effect of historical cleavages in terms of religion and ethnicity on economic development and human capital has also attracted substantial scholarly attention. Religious and ethnic minorities were usually excluded from the public sector and sought their bread and butter in trade, artisanship, and later, manufacturing (Acemoglu, Hassan, and Robinson 2011; Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel 2015; Testa 2020). Preoccupied with relatively more skill-intense sectors, they stimulated long-term economic development (Arbatlı and Gökmen 2016; Hornung 2014). Aside from their impact on economic development, minorities are often politically salient. The salience of ethnic or religious identities is influenced by the social context, prompting individuals to prioritize specific identities based on their relevance and the perceived threats they face (Tajfel and Turner 2004). Accordingly, the oppression of minorities shapes the political behavior of both the majority and minority (Haffert 2021; Voigtländer and Voth 2012).

1.2 Forced Migrations and Historical Cleavages: The Cases of Turkey and Poland

As discussed above, higher economic development and human capital have negative effects on electoral support for conservative/right-wing parties and, furthermore, forced migrations have a positive effect on economic development and human capital accumulation. Nonetheless, the relationship between forced migrations and electoral behavior remains relatively unexplored in the literature. Similarly, as argued by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), cleavages are the main determinants of party systems in different societies. In the case of Turkey, the long-term effect of minorities on political behavior has so far lacked scholarly attention possibly due to the displacement

of minorities in the early 20th century. However, as discussed above, the long-term effects of minority populations on economic development and human capital stand as an important line of research, which would affect contemporary political behavior. This thesis thus seeks to explain the long-term effects of forced migration and historical cleavages on electoral behavior, considering their indisputable effects on economic development and human capital accumulation.

The first empirical chapter of this thesis on Turkey will examine the long-term effects of the Greek-Turkish population transfers and Greek minority population on electoral behavior. The temporal coverage of this chapter will be limited to the elections between 2015 and 2018, in which Turkey had a single-party government. To the best of our knowledge, there are no previous studies that examine the long-term effects of the Greek-Turkish population exchange on electoral behavior from a quantitative perspective. Although some previous studies examine the effect of this important historical population exchange on nation-building practices, their scope is mostly limited to the early Republican era. The findings of the first empirical chapter suggest that higher Balkan migrant and Greek population shares translate into lower electoral support for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Nevertheless, these arguments about historical persistence and the mechanisms through which they are transmitted to later generations, and possible endogeneity problems require a meticulous analysis. To address the transmission of historical experiences to later generations and endogeneity concerns, I also report non-recursive models and those with province dummies as the alternative specifications to our main models.

The second empirical chapter of this thesis is a case study on Poland, which focuses on the effect of the post-WWII population transfers on Andrej Duda's vote share, the populist leader of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). Poland stands as an exemplary case of the rise of right-wing populists in Europe. There are numerous similarities between the AKP and PiS, as well as between Erdoğan and Duda. One of the main differences between Turkey and Poland, on the other hand, is the imperial past of the latter under Prussia, Russia, and Austria. Therefore, in the second empirical chapter, I will refer to the imperial past of Poland, which had lasted more than a century. Moreover, the geographical distribution of post-WWII refugees in Poland is highly homogenous, which is not the case for Turkey. Hence, migrant diversity in Poland's so-called Western Territories, the destination of the post-WWII refugees, provides us with an important opportunity to investigate the long-term effect of forced migration on electoral behavior in Poland. The findings of the second empirical chapter suggest that a higher migrant share and migrant diversity have negative effects on electoral support for Andrej Duda, on top of the persistent

effects of Poland's imperial past.

The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: The next chapter focuses on the Turkish case and examines the long-term effects of the Turkish-Greek population exchange and the historical Greek population on electoral behavior. After presenting a survey of the literature on forced migrations and the Turkish-Greek population exchange, I provide the theoretical framework for this chapter. Finally, I interpret the empirical findings and discuss the limitations of this study. The third chapter examines the effect of post-WWII population transfers on electoral behavior, as well as their effects on economic development and human capital in Poland. I also review the literature on the rise of right-wing populism and describe its relevance to our theoretical framework. Then, I present the empirical findings and discuss the limitations of this study. The last chapter summarizes the theoretical expectations, empirical findings, and the significance of the comparison of the Turkish and Polish cases for our understanding of the effect of forced migrations on electoral behavior.

2. ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF HISTORICAL CLEAVAGES AND MIGRATION IN TURKEY

A blue magic between us
And this warm sea
We are two peoples on its shores
Equals in beauty

Through us, will restore
The golden age of the Aegean
Through the fire of the future, comes alive
The hearth of the past

- Bülent Ecevit, Turkish-Greek Poem, 1947

2.1 Introduction

In this thesis, I chose to examine the Turkish-Greek population exchange as a case study to explain the long-term effects of forced migrations on electoral behavior because Turkey, as a successor of the Ottoman Empire, received and sent out more than two million persons between 1923 and 1960 (Akgündüz 1998), and these migration inflows have repeatedly occurred in the 1990s with refugees from Bulgaria during Zhivkov era and in the 2010s with refugees from Syria due to the Syrian Civil War. Furthermore, Turkey has a long history of democratic elections, with numerous failed attempts to transition into multiparty democracy in the 1930s and a surprisingly smooth and exemplary transition into one in the 1950s thanks to İsmet İnönü. Although the democratic processes in the history of the Turkish Republic were halted by two coup d'états in 1960 and 1980, and constantly undermined during the AKP era (Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü 2016), elections are still the centerpiece of Turkish democracy, mostly free but not always fair. As the one of most impor-

tant milestones of the young Turkish Republic, the Turkish-Greek population is a valuable case to investigate the long-term effect of forced migrations on electoral behavior.

Founded in the Mediterranean basin, on the historic lands of the Balkans and Anatolia, Turkey has been not only a country of immigration but also a country of emigration throughout history (Akgündüz 1998). The reason behind the events of outward migration in the second half of the 20th century was sometimes economic such as the large-scale Turkish labor emigration to West Germany due to an agreement between German and Turkish governments in 1961 (Kirişçi 2007), but often political and based on ethnic grounds, such as the 6-7 September Riots in İstanbul (Kuyucu 2005) or asylum-seeking Kurds in the 1990s (Kirişçi 2007). In the first half of the 20th century, however, with the redrawn borders of the young nation-states after the First and Second World Wars, population transfers were usually the case for migration movements, which are initiated by the governments of newly founded regimes or international intervention (Becker and Ferrara 2019; Murard and Sakalli 2018; Schumann 2014). Turkey, as exemplified by the Turkish-Greek population exchange, was no exception. What is important in the case of population transfers is the long-term effect of historical cleavages. Religious and ethnic cleavages such as the Jewish people in Germany (Voigtländer and Voth 2012), the Huguenots in France (Hornung 2014), and Catholics in Prussia (Haffert 2021) have shaped economic, social, and political outcomes in the long run. In the context of the Ottoman Empire, Greeks and Armenians have long held key positions in the Ottoman trade, served the Palace, and most importantly dwelled in cities and villages since Roman times. Therefore, it is inevitable that they significantly affected the long-term development of Ottoman and Turkish societies, even after they left Anatolia in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Hence, I find it imperative to examine the long-term effect of minorities, focusing on the Greek people, on electoral behavior as it is inseparable from the long-term development of Turkey.

By employing aggregate-level election, migration, and socioeconomic data, this study seeks to answer how the magnitude of population transfers and the existence of minorities affects the AKP's and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's electoral support. Specifically, I examine the effects of the share of the Balkan migrant population in 1927 and the Greek population in 1914 on support for the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by analyzing the 2015 June and November, the 2018 general, and the 2018 presidential elections. To the extent of my knowledge, this is the first study that accounts for the long-term effects of the Turkish-Greek population exchange and Greek minorities on electoral behavior.

I find a negative relationship between the population share of Balkan migrants and the electoral support for the AKP and Erdoğan. I argue that this negative relationship is mainly caused by the initial educational and skill levels of the incoming Balkan population, and the fact that they brought in much-needed manpower to the war-torn Anatolia. This finding can be explained by the centuries-long Ottoman investment in the Balkans (Arbatlı and Gökmen 2016) and the so-called agglomeration effects caused by the considerable number of incoming refugees (Becker et al. 2020). The long-term relative increase in education levels among Balkan migrants and their descendants might explain the reluctance to vote for conservative parties and leaders, the AKP and Erdoğan in the case of Turkey (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2021). Similarly, I find a negative relationship between the Greek population share and the electoral support for the AKP and Erdoğan in the same elections. I argue that this negative relationship can be explained through the long-term effect of minorities on economic development (Hornung 2014; Murard and Sakalli 2018). Education and human capital as a proxy of economic development undermine the electoral support for the AKP and Erdoğan. After reviewing the literature on the long-term effect of forced migrations on various socioeconomic outcomes, the studies on the Turkish case will be discussed. Then, the theoretical framework will be described and detailed by referring to the relationship between human capital and the weakening of Turkish democracy under the AKP rule. The next section will describe the data and research design of this study. In the fifth section, the empirical findings will be discussed and I will comment on these empirical findings and discuss the limitations of this analysis.

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 The Long-Term Effects of Forced Displacements

Forced migrations vary widely in scale, permanence, causes, and consequences. From local communities affected by natural disasters to mass expulsions along the lines of ethnicity, race, and religion, the nature of forced displacement shows a substantive variation. Forced migration can be temporary, such as refugees finding temporary safe havens during conflicts, or permanent, such as the population transfers after the First World War and the Second World War.

Their causes and consequences are other important factors to consider. In general, voluntary migrations are usually motivated by socio-economic concerns; on the other

hand, the alternative to migration in the case of forced displacement is often the loss of life, violence, oppression, or detrimental economic loss. Whichever the reason people are displaced for, forced migrations have different consequences for receiving populations, those who were left behind, and most importantly those who had to migrate.

The literature mainly focuses on three significant themes regarding the long-term consequences of forced displacements. First, forced migrants often consist of a minority population with higher skill levels compared to both their origin and receiving populations. Consequently, their arrival in their new communities yields positive outcomes in terms of human capital and economic development. Second, the large-scale influx of migrants possesses the potential to generate economies of scale; and through network effects within their communities and infrastructure investments in their receiving countries, adverse consequences associated with significant migratory inflows can be mitigated. Lastly, the recent and lasting experience of forced displacement can have a persisting effect on the preferences of migrants and their descendants, leading to a greater emphasis on intangible and transferable assets such as education, which in turn increases human capital and lifetime earnings of migrants and most notably their descendants.

The first significant consequence of forced migrations is increased production, human capital, and long-term economic development instigated by an inflow of relatively high-skilled refugees. One of the important benefits of high-skilled migrants is innovation. The expulsion of Huguenots, a Protestant minority in predominantly Catholic France, stimulated Brandenburg-Prussia's emerging textile industry. Starting from St. Bartholomew's Day's Massacre in 1572, Huguenots constantly faced religious persecution, and in 1685, with the Edict of Fontainebleau, they were forced to either convert to Catholicism or leave France. Hornung (2014) examines the expulsion of nearly 43000 Huguenots, half of whom settled in Brandenburg-Prussia. Using firm-level data from 1802, Hornung (2014) demonstrates the positive effect of Huguenot inflow on the productivity of Prussia's textile sector. A more recent example of the positive impact of migration inflows on innovation and productivity is German Jewish émigrés to the United States. Moser, Voena, and Waldinger's (2014) analyses show a 71% increase in the number of patents obtained in the United States after 1933 and they conclude that German Jewish émigré academics positively impacted long-term innovation in the United States by extending and strengthening academic networks and training a new cohort of scientists. Yet, those who were 'left behind' face adverse consequences after forced migrations. Acemoğlu et al. (2011) argue that the expulsion and murder of the Jews in the Soviet Union under the Nazi occupation decreased per capita income and population growth in the long

term. A similar study by Akbulut-Yuksel ve Akbulut (2015) concludes that the pre-Holocaust removal of Jewish people from civil service decreased the probability of finishing school and going to college among the German youth due to the disruption of the education system. In terms of economic development, the void left by immigrants can cause a long-term decrease in skill-intense industries (Testa 2020) and trade (Alpan 2008), which are usually in the hands of the minorities who had to leave the country.

The second significant consequence is the so-called agglomeration effect; the sheer number of people relocated to predestined provinces makes up for the problems that arise from the accommodation of immigrants and benefit the local economy and productivity in the long run. Maystadt and Duranton (2018) study the long-run effects of migrant inflows from Burundi and Rwanda on the Tanzanian economy in 1993. They argue that, although a large number of incoming refugees created challenges that were hard to tackle in the short run, it also created a permanent increase in welfare for villages in the Kagala region, where local people were more exposed to refugee inflows.

Even after refugees return to their home countries or relocate to neighboring regions, this increase is permanent due to the sizeable investment in road infrastructure around the refugee camps, which decreased transportation costs and the price of consumer goods in the long run. In a similar vein, the expulsion of 8 million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe after the Second World War stimulated local growth and increased employment in manufacturing in the rural parts of West Germany, as argued by Peters (2022). German refugees from Poland and Czechia were not allowed to choose their destination and abundant houses in rural counties were allocated to them. Peters (2022) demonstrates that in the early 1950s, in counties that received a higher percentage of refugees, income per capita is 5% higher than in other rural counties and the difference was approximately 25% in the early 1960, pointing to the substantial long-term effect of refugee inflows. Moreover, a higher percentage of the incoming cohort was employed in manufacturing, an increase from 44% in 1939 to 57% in 1950.

The final significant consequence of forced displacement is in regard to refugees' preferences. Forced migration is often sudden and uncoordinated (Becker et al. 2020); migrants leave their homelands without most of their possessions, and more often than not, they cannot recuperate their losses or achieve insignificant gains due to either lack of state capacity stemming from economic problems (Polat 2020) or the policy preferences of states (Kochanowski 2010). For instance, migrants resettled from Eastern Poland to former German territories were given arable land in their new

villages and agricultural tools by the central government. It was, nonetheless, not sufficient without prior informal networks. Hence, migrants in these provinces heavily relied on the support of the state, which initially prevented private entrepreneurship and was confined to city centers after WWII. Experiencing uprootedness and expropriation, the comparative value of intangible assets increases in the eyes of migrants, especially that of education (Brenner and Kiefer 1981). Bauer et al. (2013) find that the descendants of the migrants are more likely to pursue higher education compared to their native peers. Becker et al. (2020) test this hypothesis in the context of post-WWII Poland. After the Second World War, Poland had to cede its eastern territories, named the Kresy region, to the Soviet Union in exchange for the German territories ceded to Poland. Becker et al. (2020) argue that Polish migrants from the Kresy region were less educated than their counterparts in Central Poland before the Second World War. Still, their descendants are now more educated than the Poles in Central Poland. Over time, less educated migrants surpass the rest of the population, demonstrating the shift in their preferences toward such intangible assets.

2.2.2 The Long-Term Effects of the Turkish-Greek Population Exchange

The population exchange between Turkey and Greece marks a critical turning in their shared history. Having gained independence in 1830 from the Ottoman Empire, Greece sought to expel the remaining Turkish people within her borders, while the Ottomans sought to send out those of Greek origin to Greece, especially during the pre-Balkan Wars era (Hirschon 2005). In the aftermath of the Mudanya Armistice in late 1922, Greeks in Western Anatolia started to flock to the other side of the Aegean Sea, imposing a burden on the already struggling Greek economy (Emgili 2017). Greek Prime Minister Venizelos wanted to send Greek immigrants back to Anatolia along with the Turkish population living in Greece to alleviate the cost of the population inflows (Ladas, of International Research of Harvard University, and College 1932). With the Lausanne Treaty signed in July 1923, Turkish and Greek governments agreed on a population exchange between the two countries, with the exception of the Turks in Western Thrace and the Greeks in İstanbul (Meray 2002).

The Greek immigrants displaced by the population exchange comprised 20 percent of the Greek population and 10 percent of the Turkish population, while incoming Turkish migrants constituted slightly below 4 percent of the population in their new home (Arı 1999). Nonetheless, the immediate and persistent effects of the forced displacement of Greek and Turkish populations were transformative in many re-

gards. Relatively higher skill levels of minorities, mentioned above in the previous section, caused a short-term regression in the Turkish economy, coupled with the war-torn industries. Alpan (2008) argues that the displacement of Greek minorities in Anatolia interrupted the modernization of Turkish agriculture, but newer techniques introduced by incoming Turkish migrants recompensated this interruption. In the context of Greece, Alpan's findings (2008) demonstrate that incoming Greek migrants helped diversify the Greek agricultural sector and stimulated a long-term productivity increase, similar to Murard and Sakallı's (2018) findings regarding the effect of Greek migrants on long-term economic growth.

Murard and Sakallı (2018) examine the short- and long-term benefits of not only the know-how brought by the immigrants but also the agglomeration effect they created. Similar to Särvimaki (2022) who demonstrated the reinforcing effect of migrant inflows on population and productivity growth in post-WWII Finland, the authors argue that incoming Greek migrants provided the much-needed cheap labor force in the stagnant agricultural sector in post-war Greece.

In terms of the preferences of migrants regarding education, Greek migrants have similarities with the Polish migrants from the Kresy region (Becker et al. 2020). Coming from Anatolia, the literacy rate and education levels were lower compared to that of the native Greeks in their destinations and Greek migrants in larger Ottoman cities but they were able to surpass the rest of the population over time (Murard and Sakalli 2018). On the other side of the coin, the educational attainment of incoming Turkish migrants and the Turkish population in provinces with an above-median percentage of minorities is higher than the rest of the population (Arbatlı and Gökmen 2016), demonstrating both the effects of incoming migrants, as well as the long-term preferences of minorities.

The long-term legacy of forced displacement on electoral behavior is relatively overlooked in previous research. The literature predominantly focuses on the effects of forced displacement after migration inflows to Western countries due to civil wars in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Syria, which are relatively recent events. In the context of the Turkish-Greek population exchange, research on electoral behavior is mostly limited to short-term political cleavages in Greece during the Inter-War Period. Pentzopoulos (1962) highlights the policies of the Liberal Party of Greece, led by then-prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos, who recognized the electoral importance of refugees and worked toward their integration into political processes. Without access to established patron-client networks, the refugees formed their own political organizations, led by pro-refugee politicians concentrated among the Liberal Party ranks. They "...justifiably saw the Venizelist Republic as 'their' regime, and the

Liberal Party as 'their' party" (Mavrogordatos 1983, 202), but the increasing political weight of refugees was met with a conservative backlash from native Greeks, who felt deprived of their legitimate political powers and demanded the exclusion of incoming Greeks from the political system. Mavrogordatos (1983) argues that the clash between native and refugee Greeks proved to be central to "the most salient cleavage in inter-war Greek society" and dictated the political scene of the period. On the other side of the Aegean, any political activity stemming from the refugee population is suppressed to prevent any hindrance against the ideal of the nation-state (Sapaz 2019). The Minister of Interior Affairs of the epoch, Recep Peker, stated that all refugee organizations were abolished due to their anti-state activities in a parliamentary meeting in 1924. Although refugees could not find any organizational pathway into the political system in the 1920s, the foundation of the Liberal Republican Party (SCF) provided an alternative to the Republican People's Party. After the Great Depression of 1929, refugees who were denied reparations enlisted into the SCF ranks to show their discontent with the CHP. In 1930, the SCF won the parliamentary elections in Aydın, Samsun, and İzmir, three major provinces with significant refugee populations (Yıldırım 2007).

2.3 Research Design

The historical data for this chapter are coded from the 1927 population census of the Turkish Republic and the 1914 population census of the Ottoman Empire. The 1927 census is the first census conducted by the Republic of Turkey, and it nonetheless presents invaluable information about many characteristics of citizens from their birthplaces to disabilities. Although the census does not cover the entire population exchange period, which continued until 1929, it provides a good approximation of the Balkan migrant population share. The 1914 census is the last census conducted by the Ottoman Empire. It was based on the 1905 population census, which established the census system that formed the basis of the population registration system that is still maintained (Behar 1996). Data on contemporary variables are on the other hand obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute's official statistics.

2.3.1 Dependent Variables

Ever since Turkey became a multi-party democracy with the 1946 elections, the country passed through many hurdles in its democracy journey. Even after the

coup d'états of 1960 and 1980, and the military memorandums of 1971 and 1997, Turkey succeeded in returning to the path of democratization with a few but important challenges, such as the National Security Council, which institutionalized the military tutelage over the affairs of state. Until the 2000s, Turkey was frequently described as a tutelary democracy (Akkoyunlu 2017; Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü 2016), and the 'guardianship' of the military had struck when the National Security Council issued a memorandum in 1997 that outlined the requests of the military from the Welfare Party government, under Necmettin Erbakan's leadership. After the memorandum, Prime Minister Erbakan was forced to resign and his party was closed by the Constitutional Court of Turkey, citing that Erbakan and his Welfare Party violated the separation of the state and religion clause in the Constitution. Soon after the memorandum, the Welfare Party's then Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was given a prison sentence of 5 years for reciting an Islamic poem at a meeting and was banned from politics.

The successor of the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party, was relatively unsuccessful compared to its predecessor and was also closed by the Constitutional Court of Turkey in 2001. Erbakan wanted the hardliner loyalists to keep leadership positions in the newly formed Felicity Party, but the reformists such as Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wanted to steer the party toward a moderate direction (Öniş 2016). After their expulsion, this reformist group founded the Justice and Development Party, which won the 2002 Parliamentary Elections, ending the coalitions era in Turkish politics. Under the AKP rule, military guardianship in Turkey weakened and slowly transformed into a competitive authoritarian regime, in contrast to the party's earlier commitment to democratic values (Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü 2016).

Hence, the main dependent variables of this study are the vote shares of the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the district level. The number of districts and their borders changed since the 1927 population census. While there were 391 districts in Turkey in 1927, it increased to 970 in 2015 and 972 in 2018. To operationalize vote shares of the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the votes cast for the party and Erdoğan are aggregated and divided by the total population of the merged district. The district changes were coded from the Official Gazette decisions. One shortcoming of this approach, however, merged districts do not precisely match the 1927 districts since it does not necessarily account for all neighborhood-level changes. Yet, we believe that it offers an appropriate approximation to the exact district borders as of 1927. The same procedure is repeated for the districts in 1914 where there are no available data regarding the population share of the Greek minority.

2.3.2 Independent Variables

The main independent variables are the Balkan migrant population share in 1927 and the Greek population share in 1914. The Balkan migrant rate is operationalized as the share of citizens who were born in either Greece or Bulgaria according to the 1927 population census. I chose to code the number of persons who were born in Bulgaria into the analysis due to their similarities with the migrants from Greece. This decision was based on the fact that a significant number of Bulgarian-born migrants arrived in Anatolia and Thrace following the Second Balkan War of 1913. Furthermore, it is worth noting that some of these migrants were born in provinces that were initially granted to Bulgaria after the First Balkan War but later ceded to Greece following the Second Balkan War. Moreover, the inclusion of Bulgaria-born migrants can account for the lack of inconsistencies between official censuses and reported numbers of incoming refugees. To construct a measure of the Balkan migrant population share, I first merged the districts according to 1927 borders, then aggregated migrant counts and district populations, and calculated the migrant population share.

The Greek population share is operationalized as the share of Greek citizens over the total population according to the 1914 population census. Originally, the first Ottoman census that accounted for females and different ethnic groups which is not solely based on religion was conducted in 1893. With the 1905 census, the central government did not actively survey the citizens but updated the numbers according to the reports coming from local governors. One possible shortcoming is, thus, the lack of reliable reporting. Since the state capacity of the Ottoman Empire was relatively weaker than the Turkish Republic, it is possible that public officers failed to keep track of the total population in a country constantly ravaged by rebellions, experienced migration inflows, and lacked the necessary funds to continually and reliably survey its citizens, especially living in peripheral and semi-autonomous provinces in the Levant and Arabian Peninsula. Nonetheless, the relatively higher state capacity of the Ottoman Empire in Rumelia and Anatolia, the provinces that are examined here, should provide us with reliable estimates for the Greek minorities. To construct the measure of the Greek population share, I merged the districts according to 1914 borders, aggregated Greek minority and district populations, and calculated a Greek population share.

Other independent variables include a set of historical, geographical, and socio-demographic controls. The historical controls include the female population share, Kurdish population share, widowed population share, literacy rate, and population share of the district, all as of 1927. All historical controls are coded from the 1927

Census and their equivalents that are used to calculate the change over time are obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute. The female population share is calculated by merging districts and dividing the women population by the district's total merged population. It is included because the literature suggests a divergence between men and women in terms of electoral behavior (e.g., Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2021; Inglehart and Norris 2000). To observe the effect of long-term changes in female population share, the difference between 1927 and examined election years is also added to the model.

Being the largest ethnic minority group in Turkey, Kurdish people hold an important place in Turkish politics. As argued by Posner (2004), the geographical concentration of ethnic groups has a positive effect on their political salience. Thus, the Kurdish population share and its change over time is expected to explain the electoral behavior of the Kurdish people, especially in Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia. Unfortunately, the most recent data regarding the ethnic composition of individuals in Turkey were collected in the 1965 general census. The reason behind this limitation is the prohibition of inquiry about a person's ethnic background, owing to a law that emphasizes the unified nature of the Turkish state. Fortunately, Baydar (2022) comes up with a solution that measures the Kurdish population share based on the Address Based Registration System of the TurkStat, assuming people who are registered in 17 provinces, Adıyaman, Ağrı, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Iğdır, Kars, Kilis, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Tunceli, and Van, are of Kurdish origin. Her calculations are similar to the findings of Aytaç and Çarkoğlu (2019) and Kıbrıs (2014), the Kurdish minority constituting approximately 16 percent of the total population. The literacy rate added to account for the human capital effect of the Greek minority and Balkan migrants and its change measures the difference between the literacy rate in 1927 and the population share of university graduates in the examined election years. This is to understand the long-term effect of the Greek minority and Balkan migrants on human capital. The urbanization rate was added to the model to show the center-periphery distinction, which is of great importance in Turkic politics (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006). The unemployment rate is an important economic measure and is calculated using the dependency ratio in districts since there were no available district-level data for this control. SEGE scores (Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Sıralaması, Socio-Economic Development Rank), an important measure of development created by the Ministry of Industry and Trades (2019), are calculated by weighting the most recent districts' scores by their respective populations for the merged districts that take into account the 1927 border. Two geographical dummies, distance to the coast and distance to the central district of the province in 1927, are added to the model since Turkey

lacked an extensive transportation infrastructure in 1927, and both are likely determinants of resource availability and production factors.

2.3.3 Alternative Model Specifications Accounting for Endogeneity and Selection Biases

This study, focusing on the long-term effects of population transfers on contemporary electoral behavior after nearly one hundred years, is likely to suffer from endogeneity, and relatedly, selection biases. Moreover, examining electoral behavior at the aggregate level may lead to ecological fallacy, decreasing the validity of our inferences. To address these problems, our analysis will be supplemented with two-stage least-squares regressions.

One of the primary sources of selection bias in our analysis is the selective relocation of Turkish migrants by the state. Turkish government settled the incoming population according to housing availability, agricultural practices in their origin towns, and ease of transportation (Alpan 2008; Hirschon 2005). After the population exchange, the Turkish government started to settle migrants to the evacuated Greek houses in the Western Aegean and Thrace Regions. This practice poses a critical problem, selection bias. Aside from Ceyhan and Cebelibereket provinces (modern-day Adana and Osmaniye Provinces), the destination of the Turkish migrants highly overlapped with Greek settlements in Anatolia. Therefore, addressing this potential endogeneity problem arising from selection bias is crucial. That is, the Balkan migrant population share in 1927 is likely affected by the Greek population share in 1914. To solve this problem, I employ a two-stage least-squares regression model with the Balkan population share as the independent variable and the Greek minority share and distance to coast as the instrumental variables. I report the results of the identification tests to assess the validity of instruments and the first-stage results of the analyses in the Appendix. Considering the fact that the effect of Greek minorities is less straightforward than that of Balkan migrants on the AKP's vote shares, the Greek population share in 1914 is a viable instrument, albeit a weak one. Another instrument, distance to the coast, is also employed to reflect the effect of transportation. This is important for two reasons. First, seaways and railways were the main modes of transportation in a country whose infrastructure was undeveloped, and as a result, the relocation of Turkish migrants was made along the existing railroads and ports at the time. Second, the ease of transportation might have stimulated the long-term economic development in the provinces that received a higher number of migrants, affecting the validity of our findings. Distance

to coast is also a viable instrument in the sense that it does not directly affect the electoral success of the AKP, but its effect on economic development as a proxy for transportation is substantial.

Moreover, as argued by Arbatli (2016), the presence of Greek and Armenian minorities stimulated the long-term economic development and human capital accumulation in their localities. For example, the literacy rate in Greek settlements might have resulted in a higher percentage of tertiary education attainment in the long run. To address the long-term effect of Greek minorities on human capital accumulation, I use the difference between the literacy rates in 1927 and the population share of higher education graduates as a control variable, similar to our other control variables of Kurdish and female population shares. Due to the lack of available historical data regarding various factors that affect long-term economic growth and human capital, another set of robustness checks introducing province dummies is also included in the appendix. Controlling for omitted province-level variation, we can observe intra-province variation between districts and avoid omitted variable bias in this way.

2.4 Empirical Findings

According to the dataset coded from the official population census of Turkey in 1927, there were 75,620 people who were born in Greece and 100,976 in Bulgaria. This drastic difference from the approximate official number of refugees 350,000 (Kayam 1993) can be attributed to two possible factors. First, the temporal coverage of the data does not include the years after 1927, but the population exchange between Greece and Turkey had continued until 1929. Therefore, a difference between the exact number of refugees in 1927 and 1929 would be inevitable, albeit limited when compared to the total number of the incoming migrant population. Second, it is likely that citizens did not provide any exact birth location and reported themselves as born within the borders of the Turkish Republic or the Ottoman Empire since their birthplaces were still within the Ottoman borders at the time of their birth. Figure 2.1 below shows the population shares of citizens who were born in either Bulgaria or Greece as of 1927. Unsurprisingly, Balkan migrants are concentrated in the districts that are closer to the shoreline, railroads, or the Greek border, i.e., the Thrace and Marmara regions.

Figure 2.1 Geographical distribution of the Balkan migrants in 1927



According to the dataset coded from the official population census of 1914, there were 1,279,878 Greeks in the Ottoman Empire in 1914[1]. By 1927, only 119,814 Greeks were living within the borders of the Turkish Republic, most of which in İstanbul, and were thus exempt from the population exchange between Greece and Turkey. Figure 2.2 below shows the distribution of the Greek population in 1914. Greeks were concentrated in the Thrace, Western Aegean, and Eastern Black Sea regions. It is striking that, unlike other districts that contained an equally high Greek population in 1914, the Eastern Black Sea region did not receive a similar number of Balkan migrants. Two possible explanations can shed light on this intriguing pattern. First, the lack of railroads and the relatively farther location of the ports in the Eastern Black Sea may have prevented the Balkan migrants from reaching to these districts. Second, to evade population exchange, Greeks in the Eastern Black Sea region may have converted to Islam or married local Muslims since the population exchange was primarily based on religion (Emgili 2017). Similarly, Karamanid Turks in Karaman and Niğde provinces, who used the Greek alphabet and practiced Christianity, were also subject to the population exchange, even though most define themselves as ethnic Turks (Ildeş 2011).

[1]Nevertheless, this figure does not include 13 districts that were present in 1927 since these were under Russian control at the time.These are Kars, Ardahan, Arpaçay, Çıldır, Göle, Kağızman, Posof, Sarıkamış, Artvin, Şavşat, Tuzluca, and Iğdır.

Figure 2.2 Geographical distribution of the citizens of Greek origins in 1914



Tables 2.1-2.3 present OLS regressions on the vote share of the AKP in the parliamentary elections in June 2015, November 2015, and June 2018. The effective sample size is 371 in Models b to d, compared to 391 in Models with a suffix of a, because there are no reliable data for seven districts in 1914 and, as noted above, thirteen districts were under Russian control in 1914, hence not included in the 1914 population census.

Table 2.1 shows that the coefficients of our main independent variables are both negative and distinguishable from zero, whether the measure is Greek population share in 1914 or Balkan migrant share in 1927. Nevertheless, when two main independents are introduced together in the analyses, the magnitude of these effects varies in different model specifications. Both the Balkan migrant and Greek population variables cancel out some of the explanatory power of the other main independent variable. These findings are in line with our expectations that the long-term effects of migrant inflows would be altered by the existing long-term effects of minorities.

Figure 2.3 shows that a larger Greek population share in 1914 of about 30%, would lead to a decrease in the effect of the Balkan migrant share on the AKP's vote share by approximately 0.5%. A standard deviation increase in Balkan population share translates into a decrease in the AKP's vote share by about 1.8% and a standard deviation increase in Greek population share decreases the AKP's vote share by about 2.25%.

As expected, a higher Kurdish population in 1927 and an increase in that between 1927 and 2015 translate into a decrease in the AKP's vote share. The effect of this population share change can be explained by the growing Kurdish population share in provinces that were not predominantly inhabited by Kurdish people but were

Table 2.1 OLS regression estimates on the effect of Balkan and Greek population shares on AKP vote share (June 2015)

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 1d
Balkan Pop. Share, 1927	-0.440***		-0.387***	-0.580*
	(0.145)		(0.144)	(0.341)
Greek Pop. Share, 1914		-0.136***	-0.105**	-0.117**
		(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Balkan × Greek				0.006
				(0.009)
Turnout Rate	-1.223***	-1.341***	-1.296***	-1.290***
	(0.161)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.158)
Female Pop. Share, 1927	2.243***	1.769***	1.644***	1.669***
	(0.507)	(0.509)	(0.507)	(0.509)
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	-0.342***	-0.373***	-0.373***	-0.372***
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	0.419	0.191	0.193	0.168
	(0.481)	(0.481)	(0.477)	(0.479)
Literacy Rate, 1927	-0.523**	-0.131	-0.315	-0.317
	(0.262)	(0.257)	(0.263)	(0.264)
Share of Population, 1927	9.971***	9.888***	9.431***	9.207***
	(3.398)	(3.372)	(3.347)	(3.369)
Δ Female Pop. Share	1.966***	1.534***	1.471***	1.488***
	(0.445)	(0.446)	(0.443)	(0.444)
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	-0.242***	-0.195***	-0.194***	-0.192***
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Δ Literacy-University	-0.203	0.168	-0.020	-0.032
	(0.265)	(0.254)	(0.262)	(0.263)
Δ Pop. Share	2.160	1.852	2.025	1.959
	(1.310)	(1.286)	(1.277)	(1.282)
Dist. to Central District	-0.010	0.003	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Distance to Coast	0.020**	0.019**	0.017*	0.017*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Urbanization Rate	-0.024	-0.029	-0.042	-0.041
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Dependent Pop. Share	-0.080	-0.024	-0.034	-0.034
	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.089)
SEGE Score	-2.318	-3.599*	-2.682	-2.482
	(2.009)	(1.950)	(1.963)	(1.991)
Constant	41.959	73.057**	79.483***	78.151***
	(29.253)	(29.644)	(29.485)	(29.587)
N	391	371	371	371
R^2	0.560	0.577	0.586	0.586

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses.Two-tailed tests.

since then either through forced displacement or voluntary migration. Moreover, some part of the effect of the Kurdish population share might be mediated by the Armenian population share in 1914, as argued by Arbatlı and Gökmen (2016). A higher female population share and the change in it over time also seem to benefit the AKP substantively. As Çavdar (2022) argued, women tend to support conservative parties through provision, volunteerism, and social networks. Another important

Figure 2.3 Marginal effect of Balkan migrant population share on AKP vote share (June 2015)



finding from these models is related to the effect of a district's population share in the country. A percentage point increase in the population share in 1927 increases the AKP's vote share by approximately 9.5%. This can be attributed to immigration from rural areas to more developed urban districts since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Although Kalaycıoğlu (2012) argues that the urban-rural divide does not create political cleavages as in Europe (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), empirical support for his *Kulturkampf* thesis that emphasizes the growing importance of the Sunni-secular and Turkish-Kurdish nationalist divides can be traced through migration to cities and the inclusion of peripheral actors into Turkish politics.

Similar to models in Table 2.1, the effects of Balkan and Greek share are statistically and substantively significant as both coefficients show a decrease in AKP's vote share by approximately 0.6% and 0.13%, respectively. The average marginal effect of the Balkan population share mediated by the Greek population share is about 0.5%, as shown in Figure 2.4.

Again, the effects of female and Kurdish population share variables are statistically and substantively significant. An interesting difference from the June 2015 election is related to the decreased substantive effect of Balkan and Greek population shares and the increased substantive effect of the SEGE score, a socio-economic development measure constructed by the Ministry of Industry and Trade (2019). This

Figure 2.4 Marginal effect of Balkan migrant population share on AKP vote share, November 2015



change might be attributed to decreasing vote shares of the AKP in metropolitan municipalities, as well as the fading effect of the impact of historical minorities and migration inflows in these elections.

In Models 1a and 1b in Table 2.3, we observe that the coefficients of our main independent variables are both negative and statistically distinguishable from zero. Their effect is similar to that of the 2015 June and November elections. The average marginal effect of the Balkan population share mediated by the Greek population share is about 0.5%, as shown in Figure 5. The effects of female and Kurdish population share variables are statistically and substantively still significant. Nonetheless, the effect of historical controls as well as contemporary controls is lower compared to previous elections.

This might point to a significant change in Turkish politics. Moral (2021) examines the change and continuity in electoral support for political parties in the 2018 election. In eight clusters of districts, the first three are mainly composed of AKP strongholds. Nonetheless, the AKP lost a considerable amount of electoral support to the MHP and the IYIP in the district of the second and third clusters, most of which are located in the Central Anatolia, Eastern Aegean, and Central Black Sea regions. This could explain the weaker explanatory power of other control variables; an increasing tendency toward the Turkish nationalist parties (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007; Kalaycıoğlu 2017; Özbudun 2014) might have undermined the effect of existing cleavages that divide the Turkish electorate, especially the Turkish-Kurdish ethnic divide (Çelik, Bilali, and Iqbal 2016) because, in those districts, the pop-

Table 2.2 OLS regression estimates on the effect of Balkan and Greek population shares on AKP vote share (November 2015)

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 1d
Balkan Pop. Share, 1927	-0.592***		-0.550***	-0.886**
	(0.182)		(0.184)	(0.436)
Greek Pop. Share, 1914		-0.132**	-0.087	-0.109*
		(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.064)
Balkan × Greek				0.010
				(0.012)
Turnout Rate	-0.517**	-0.817***	-0.749***	-0.740***
	(0.225)	(0.231)	(0.229)	(0.230)
Female Pop. Share, 1927	3.308***	2.886***	2.687***	2.727***
	(0.636)	(0.649)	(0.646)	(0.648)
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	-0.385***	-0.445***	-0.443***	-0.440***
	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	-0.301	-0.426	-0.431	-0.476
	(0.614)	(0.626)	(0.619)	(0.621)
Literacy Rate, 1927	-0.424	-0.013	-0.271	-0.275
	(0.331)	(0.332)	(0.339)	(0.339)
Share of Population, 1927	16.197***	16.654***	15.943***	15.537***
	(4.250)	(4.304)	(4.264)	(4.292)
Δ Female Pop. Share	2.775***	2.388***	2.278***	2.304***
	(0.563)	(0.573)	(0.568)	(0.569)
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	-0.201***	-0.155***	-0.154***	-0.151***
	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Δ Literacy-University	-0.034	0.380	0.114	0.092
	(0.334)	(0.328)	(0.336)	(0.338)
Δ Pop. Share	3.130*	2.895*	3.107*	2.986*
	(1.641)	(1.645)	(1.629)	(1.636)
Dist. to Center District	0.009	0.023	0.019	0.018
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Dist. to Coast	0.010	0.013	0.011	0.011
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Urbanization Rate	-0.027	-0.026	-0.045	-0.043
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Dependent Pop. Share	-0.226**	-0.181	-0.192*	-0.193*
	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.115)
SEGE Score	-6.173**	-7.702***	-6.359**	-6.000**
	(2.507)	(2.483)	(2.497)	(2.533)
Constant	-56.216	-14.088	-4.199	-6.236
	(35.614)	(37.409)	(37.146)	(37.238)
N	391	371	371	371
R^2	0.450	0.463	0.476	0.477

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses.Two-tailed tests.

ulation share of Balkan migrants, Greek and Kurdish minorities are significantly lower than the districts in other clusters where the AKP had garnered relatively less electoral support. Thus, the models in Table 3 might have fallen short of explaining the change in the vote shares of the AKP.

Then, is this the case for the vote shares of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan? Table 2.4 shows that the coefficients of our main independent variables are both negative and

Table 2.3 OLS regression estimates on the effect of the Balkan and Greek population shares on AKP vote share (2018)

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 1d
Balkan Pop. Share, 1927	-0.430***		-0.406***	-0.524
	(0.141)		(0.145)	(0.343)
Greek Pop. Share, 1914		-0.086*	-0.054	-0.062
		(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Balkan × Greek				0.004
				(0.009)
Turnout Rate	-0.335	-0.556***	-0.520**	-0.516**
	(0.204)	(0.213)	(0.211)	(0.212)
Female Pop. Share, 1927	1.988***	1.755***	1.593***	1.605***
	(0.472)	(0.485)	(0.484)	(0.486)
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	-0.264***	-0.302***	-0.300***	-0.298***
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	0.288	0.147	0.173	0.158
	(0.471)	(0.484)	(0.480)	(0.482)
Literacy Rate, 1927	-0.559**	-0.283	-0.475**	-0.475**
	(0.232)	(0.234)	(0.241)	(0.241)
Share of Population, 1927	11.852***	12.370***	11.710***	11.569***
	(3.275)	(3.347)	(3.323)	(3.348)
Δ Female Pop. Share	1.640***	1.399***	1.313***	1.321***
	(0.402)	(0.415)	(0.412)	(0.413)
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	-0.172***	-0.133***	-0.131***	-0.130***
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Δ Literacy-University	-0.330	-0.038	-0.235	-0.242
	(0.229)	(0.224)	(0.233)	(0.234)
Δ Pop. Share	2.304*	2.154*	2.285*	2.241*
	(1.280)	(1.296)	(1.284)	(1.291)
Dist. to Center District	-0.007	0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Dist. to Coast	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Urbanization Rate	-0.083***	-0.078***	-0.090***	-0.089***
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Dependent Pop. Share	-0.230**	-0.161	-0.175*	-0.176*
	(0.097)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.103)
SEGE Score	-5.313***	-6.357***	-5.239***	-5.117***
	(1.886)	(1.880)	(1.904)	(1.932)
Constant	-8.283	17.997	27.433	26.675
	(30.585)	(31.993)	(31.864)	(31.965)
N	391	371	371	371
R^2	0.432	0.435	0.448	0.448

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

distinguishable from zero and have a greater substantive effect on Erdoğan's vote share than that of the AKP. This can be attributed to two possible factors. First, while being in the same alliance, the voters of the MHP might not be loyal to the sole candidate of the People's Alliance. Second, as a political figure, Erdoğan might have a more polarizing effect on the Turkish electorate.

Furthermore, the explanatory power of relevant control variables increased com-

Figure 2.5 Marginal effect of Balkan migrant population share on AKP vote share (2018)



pared to the Parliamentary elections. First, the coefficient of turnout variable is negative, distinguishable from zero, and most importantly, substantively more effective on the vote share of Erdoğan than that of the AKP. This can be related to the 'alliance system', which allowed smaller parties to bypass the electoral threshold but decreased the importance of the vote shares of the parties in the alliance. Since the distribution of parliamentary members is decided first for alliances, then for parties in these alliances, increasing turnout might have a lower effect on the vote shares of the AKP.

Another important change is the increase in the substantive significance of the coefficient of the dependent population share variable. Previous literature suggests the importance of economic voting (see Çarkoğlu (2012) for a review) and long emphasizing economic stability, growth, and welfare policies, Erdoğan is now seen as the main responsible for the course of the Turkish economy (Moral 2021). Therefore, voters might have shown their preferences regarding the economic outcomes. Another important difference between the parliamentary and the presidential elections is related to the center-periphery divide. As discussed above, the center-periphery relation that is deeply rooted in Turkish society (Mardin 1973), and the increasing salience of the Kulturkampf argument (2012) might have shown itself in the urban-rural divide. As a result, the coefficient of the SEGE score, a development index, is negative, distinguishable from zero, and also substantively significant. A similar comment can be made for the urbanization rate variable, but we should tread carefully since all neighborhoods of metropolitan municipalities are now con-

Table 2.4 OLS regression estimates on the effect of Balkan and Greek population shares on Erdoğan's vote share (2018)

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model1d
Balkan Pop. Share, 1927	-0.635***		-0.611***	-0.876**
	(0.171)		(0.173)	(0.409)
Greek Pop. Share, 1914		-0.123**	-0.076	-0.093
		(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.060)
Balkan × Greek				0.008
				(0.011)
Turnout Rate	-0.446*	-0.742***	-0.688***	-0.678***
	(0.247)	(0.256)	(0.253)	(0.253)
Female Pop. Share, 1927	2.448***	2.146***	1.902***	1.931***
	(0.570)	(0.584)	(0.579)	(0.580)
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	-0.449***	-0.504***	-0.500***	-0.497***
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	-0.420	-0.745	-0.706	-0.739
	(0.569)	(0.583)	(0.574)	(0.576)
Literacy Rate, 1927	-0.518*	-0.084	-0.372	-0.374
	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.288)	(0.288)
Share of Population, 1927	15.662***	16.426***	15.434***	15.117***
	(3.956)	(4.027)	(3.973)	(4.001)
Δ Female Pop. Share	1.779***	1.469***	1.339***	1.356***
	(0.486)	(0.499)	(0.493)	(0.494)
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	-0.254***	-0.217***	-0.214***	-0.211***
	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Δ Literacy-University	-0.181	0.266	-0.031	-0.046
	(0.277)	(0.270)	(0.279)	(0.280)
Δ Pop. Share	2.945*	2.731*	2.928*	2.831*
	(1.546)	(1.559)	(1.535)	(1.542)
Dist. to Center District	-0.008	0.006	0.001	0.000
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Dist. to Coast	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.010
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Urbanization Rate	-0.087***	-0.085***	-0.103***	-0.101***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Dependent Pop. Share	-0.411***	-0.316**	-0.338***	-0.339***
	(0.117)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.123)
SEGE Score	-8.100***	-9.861***	-8.180***	-7.908***
	(2.278)	(2.261)	(2.276)	(2.309)
Constant	-1.004	34.563	48.699	46.992
	(36.960)	(38.505)	(38.106)	(38.208)
N	391	371	371	371
R^2	0.486	0.494	0.511	0.512

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

sidered urban areas, regardless of their previous composition as a village or an urban neighborhood.

Figure 2.6 below shows an average marginal effect of the population share of Balkan migrants, conditional on the share of the Greek population. The effect is statistically insignificant over 50% share of the Greek population, and it is already substantively insignificant.

Figure 2.6 Marginal effect of Balkan migrant population share on Erdoğan's vote share (2018)



2.4.1 Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimates

In Table 2.5[2], we observe that the coefficients of our main independent variable, the Balkan migrant population share, is both negative and statistically distinguishable from zero. Moreover, its substantive significance is significantly higher than the OLS estimates in Tables 2.1-2.4. The coefficients of the Kurdish and female population share variables and those of their change from 1927 to respective election years are still distinguishable from zero and substantively significant, similarly to those of urbanization and turnout rate variables.

Another important result is that Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics of 14.134, 14.095, and 12.775 are between Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values for 10% and 15%, 19.93 and 11.59, respectively. Therefore, our instrumental variables, Greek population share in 1914 and distance to the coast, are sufficiently strong according to the Stock-Yogo weak identification test and are valid for our analyses.

[2]First-stage estimates are presented in Table A.8 of Appendix A.

Table 2.5 Two-stage least-squares, second stage estimates

	June 2015	November 2015	2018
Balkan Pop. Share, 1927	-1.956***	-1.792***	-1.092**
	(0.576)	(0.677)	(0.542)
Turnout Rate	-1.084***	-0.575**	-0.461**
	(0.177)	(0.234)	(0.210)
Female Pop. Share, 1927	1.176*	2.254***	1.317**
	(0.641)	(0.760)	(0.570)
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	-0.351***	-0.423***	-0.296***
	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.037)
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	0.157	-0.474	0.219
	(0.538)	(0.639)	(0.485)
Literacy Rate, 1927	-1.005***	-0.820*	-0.799**
	(0.367)	(0.433)	(0.316)
Share of Population, 1927	7.658*	14.372***	10.593***
	(4.003)	(4.708)	(3.657)
Δ Female Pop. Share	1.255**	2.048***	1.166***
	(0.527)	(0.627)	(0.448)
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	-0.178***	-0.143***	-0.127***
	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.043)
Δ Literacy-University	-0.730*	-0.454	-0.570*
	(0.395)	(0.466)	(0.340)
Δ Pop. Share	2.720*	3.574**	2.505**
	(1.423)	(1.668)	(1.276)
Dist. to Center District	-0.012	0.010	-0.007
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Urbanization Rate	-0.093***	-0.087**	-0.111***
	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.031)
Dependent Pop. Share	-0.080	-0.222*	-0.200*
	(0.100)	(0.119)	(0.102)
SEGE Score	0.473	-3.669	-3.333
	(2.759)	(3.254)	(2.599)
Constant	102.245***	16.272	43.379
	(36.990)	(43.409)	(36.977)
N	371	371	371
R^2	0.444	0.408	0.413
Cragg-Donald Wald F	14.134	14.095	12.775

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses.Two-tailed tests.

2.5 Discussion and Conclusion

The analyses in the previous sections offer strong empirical support for the long-term effect of forced migrations and the historical presence of minorities on electoral behavior. The findings also suggest that the effect of the migrant population on electoral behavior is not conditional on the historical presence of minorities and, even when it is, this effect is negligible.

The population share of the Balkan migrants has a substantial but fading effect on the vote shares of the AKP. Between the June 2015 and November 2015 parliamentary elections, the substantive effect of the migrant population had decreased. A possible explanation for this change is the turbulent months that Turkey had experienced between these two elections. Explosions in Ankara, Ceylanpınar, and Suruç and increasing levels of ethnic conflict (Baydar 2022) might have changed the perceptions and preferences of voters, inclining the incumbent party to form a 'united front' against conflict. Aytaç and Çarkoğlu's (2019) findings also support this explanation. In fact, the effect is still statistically and substantively significant in the 2018 elections but even lower than that of November 2015. Another possible explanation is the enaction of the so-called 'Alliance Law'. The increased number of districts and members of the parliamentary, and the relatively lower cost of changing vote preferences within an alliance may have decreased the effect of Balkan population share. Another explanation can be the lack of cleavages among the Balkan migrants. Then-Prime Minister of Greece Eleftherios Venizelos and his Liberal Party channeled the political presence of Greek migrants into electoral support (Mavrogordatos 1983). On the other hand, the Turkish government actively suppressed any activity that could form long-term cleavages among the Balkan migrants to prevent any hindrance against the nation-state ideal (Sapaz 2019). Therefore, although the sheer presence of Balkan migrants created positive long-term socio-economic outcomes, its effect on electoral behavior and political outcomes does not directly stem from a new cleavage.

One of the main limitations of this study is related to the lack of neighborhood-level data. Since the majority of migrants are settled in villages that were previously inhabited by Greek citizens, it is hard to track local-level differences among neighborhoods and villages. Moreover, to the extent of my knowledge, there are no surveys asking about people's origins. Hence, ecological inference constitutes another limitation of this study, which is very hard, if not possible, to remedy.

Nonetheless, this chapter opens up many possibilities for a future research agenda.

Although there is a rich line of research that investigates the effects of cleavages on electoral behavior in Turkey (e.g., Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2021; Kalaycıoğlu 1994, 2012), there is a lack of studies on the long-term effects of the Turkish-Greek population exchange, especially its effect on electoral behavior. Further research should thus examine the causal mechanism between population transfers and political outcomes and the possible transmission of political values between migrant generations.

3. DIVIDED WE STAND: MIGRANT DIVERSITY AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN POLAND

3.1 Introduction

Why do some people vote for far-right parties whilst others do not? Why is the likelihood to vote for populists differ among people? Earlier studies argue that such differences emerge due to historical continuities (Cantoni, Hagemeister, and Westcott 2011; Haffert 2021C) while other studies emphasize the role of contemporary circumstances driven by economic or cultural incidences (Elff and Rossteutscher 2011; Gidron and Hall 2017; Inglehart and Norris 2016).

The rise of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) of Poland in 2015 is one of the most exemplary showings of the rise of right-wing populists in Europe (Destradi, Cadier, and Plagemann 2021; Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016). Poland, a country that was splintered into three pieces among the German, Austrian, and Russian Empires, had a turbulent past. After WWII, the country was moved to the 'West'; the integration of the Western Territories gained from Nazi Germany and the loss of the Kresy region to the USSR, eastern Poland, deeply affected Polish society. Over 2 million Poles were expelled from the Kresy region and transferred to the Western Territories. Before the Second World War, the Western Territories were inhabited by about 8 million ethnic Germans, who were forced to resettle without their possessions (Becker and Ferrara 2019). Although the leader of PiS, Andrej Duda, won the first round of the 2020 Polish presidential election by a 15% margin, he failed to garner electoral support in the provinces that are part of the Western Territories, which were the main destination of post-WWII Polish refugees.

In this study, I chose the examine the long-term effects of post-WWII Polish population transfers on electoral behavior. Coupled with the rise of right-wing populism, Poland constitutes an intriguing case study for the long-term political effects of forced migrations. Although Turkey under AKP rule is usually described as a com-

petitive authoritarian regime (Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü 2016), there are some commonalities between Turkey and Poland. Presidents of both countries constantly undermined established democratic processes (Csehi and Zgut 2020; Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü 2016)) and both countries experienced large-scale population transfers after the World Wars. Therefore, I believe, Turkey and Poland are invaluable cases to understand the long-term effect of forced migrations on electoral behavior.

This chapter is organized as follows: First, I will briefly discuss the findings of prior research on the emergence and rise of right-wing populism. Then, I will delineate the theoretical framework of the relationship between long-term population transfers and electoral behavior. To this end, I will first examine the effect of having an ancestor from the Kresy region on the vote shares of Andrej Duda in the 2020 presidential elections. Then, I will examine the migrant diversity to explore the variations in the vote shares of Andrej Duda in the Western Territories. Finally, I will comment on the empirical findings and describe the limitations of this analysis.

3.2 Literature Review

The surge of right-wing populism in Western democracies has captured the attention of a diverse group of social scientists. Extensive discussions and investigations have examined various factors associated with this sudden rise, primarily categorized into socio-economic and socio-cultural factors, across different contexts. The rise in unemployment, the influx of refugees especially after 2015, the shift in party politics towards post-material subjects, the increasing trade volume with China, religious and cultural attitudes were frequently employed to explain the success of rightwing populism. Among these right-wing populists, Poland's Law and Justice Party (PiS) holds a special place. In a former Eastern Bloc country that became a member of the European Union in 2004 and constantly rising in various economic and social indices, the PiS could garner electoral support that led them to the government in 2015 and deepened the divide between a sizeable group of pro-European citizens and the majority of Catholics in Poland (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016).

Among the sociocultural explanations, social status is consistently argued to be an important factor in explaining electoral outcomes. Gidron and Hall (2017) argued that perceptions of social status contributed to the voting behavior of right-wing populists. Gidron and Hall's findings indicate that populist voters are more likely to be middle-aged, blue-collared white men without tertiary education. These findings are consistent with other studies which employed age, gender, or occupation

(Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Mayer 2013), although Mayer (2013) argues that women in France are more likely to vote for right-wing populists than men, due to Marine Le Pen's stature, the leader of the Front National. The problem with Gidron and Hall's work is that they do not examine important populist parties, e.g., AfD in Germany, Swerigedemokraterna in Sweden, and UKIP in the United Kingdom. A similar problem appears in Arzheimer and Berning's work (2009). However, this is an honest mistake; the visibility of both parties was relatively less when those works were written. For a relatively earlier analysis of right-wing populists regarding social status, Coffé et al. (2007) propose social capital and the origins of migrants can be explanatory factors for the Vlaams Blok in Belgium. The presence of the Maghrebian and Turkish citizens, and high average-income districts with strong associational life have a positive correlation with their vote shares. This analysis challenges the 'losers of modernity' thesis in later works but the generalizability of Coffé et al.'s work is limited due to the peculiarity of their data and their models.

Inglehart and Norris (2016) divide competitive socioeconomic explanations of the success of right-wing populist parties into three categories. The first one is the institutional rules regarding the electoral market or party competition, such as electoral systems or effective thresholds of representation. The second is supply-side politics related to these parties and their leaders deciding whether "to emphasize either ideological or populist appeals within this institutional context" (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 9). The final one is the demand-side politics regarding the attitudes and preferences of voters. Inglehart and Norris suggest that the explanations in the last category emphasize either structural changes in economics and trade or changing cultural values. Their findings indicate that economic insecurity is only statistically significant when unemployment and subjective insecurity are examined. Colantone and Stanig (Colantone and Stanig 2019) seek to explain the economic aspect of voting via import competition which creates competitive import shocks due to the rising value of imports from China. Their study suggests that globalization with a lack of compensation to the 'losers of globalization' is not sustainable and the exposure to import shocks creates a shift to the right by increasing the salience of nationalist, isolationist, and authoritarian values, mainly due to economic insecurity experienced by blue-collared workers. Nonetheless, the temporal coverage of their study, which is limited between 1998-2007, can only be useful to explain the emergence of right-wing populists, and when they become viable alternatives to mainstream parties but falls short of explaining their continuous rise.

The work of Cantoni et al. (2011) can be considered complementary to Colantone and Stanig (2019) as they demonstrate how Alternative für Deutschland could garner

electoral support, unlike their previous counterparts in Germany. The party was originally founded by Bernd Lucke, an economics professor, and a former CDU politician, who called for opposition against the policies of the German government in the face of the Euro crisis and Greek bailout. His ideas attracted other fiscal conservatives and fostered the foundation of AfD. The party failed to pass the 5 percent threshold in September 2013 elections with 4.7 percent of votes but obtained 7.1 percent of votes in the European Parliamentary election in May 2014. The expansion of the party caused an influx of all kinds of conservatives, which in turn caused a shift toward the xenophobic and anti-immigrant PEGIDA movement. With this shift, the founders of the AfD left the party, effectively pushing it further to the right. This is in line with the 'supply-side politics' argument that activates respectable right-wing populist/far-right alternatives in the political area. Similarly, Arzheimer and Berning (2009) argue that the initial position of the AfD helped them gain support in low-level political representation and awareness in mainstream media and made them able to shift their position to further right against the refugee influx, providing the supply for the 'radical right' in Germany.

Religion, or religiosity is an important factor to explain electoral outcomes, and it helps us understand voter attitudes. Mayer (**?**) claims that the proximity of a voter to Catholic values is correlated with the vote for Marine Le Pen. Although the Catholic Church condemns Le Pen, the stronger ethnocentric identity of regular churchgoers contributes to her electoral success due to the fear of Islam. However, her explanation may not be plausible since she assumes that being atheist/secular equates to being friendly/more positive to Islam, while there is no clear explanation as to why regular churchgoers are considered to have a negative attitude toward Islam. Arzheimer and Carter (2009) point to this problem and argue that the voters of Front National are 'overwhelmingly attracted by the party's stance on immigration', not by their religious beliefs. They offer the term 'religiosity' as an alternative to religious participation. Their contribution is invaluable in examining the dynamics of religious voters who may shift their political stance towards right-wing populist parties, even when the core values of Christian democrat parties match theirs. Being a Christian does not automatically translate to a vote for Christian democrats or right-wing populists; it is the attitude shaping aspects of Christianity and the Church, through social networks or cultural values instituted by religion.

Although not scrutinized in the study of right-wing populism, ethnic diversity has the potential to be an important factor to explain electoral outcomes, especially for those that are influenced by historical accounts. Putnam (2007) claims that ethnic diversity is a serious obstacle to social cohesion, increasing political cynicism and disrupting trust among members of society. Heterogeneity in various contexts–e.g.,

ethnic, religious, and social–impairs the provision of public goods and undermines economic performance (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). Nevertheless, ethnic diversity, especially the diversity of migrants, can also enhance the individuals' willingness to engage with the state as a potential arbiter or enforcer of cooperation (Charnysh 2019). The engagement of individuals with the state that arose from ethnic diversity might have a positive effect on economic and social outcomes, which, in turn, might affect the attitude toward populist parties.

3.3 Theoretical Expectations

As described above, the aim of this chapter is to investigate the long-term effect of forced migrations on electoral behavior in Poland, a country characterized by one of the largest population displacements in modern history (Becker and Ferrara 2019). Considering the magnitude of refugee inflows after WWII, I expect the presence of refugees and the social networks to survive long after their displacement to have a negative effect on the propensity to vote for right-wing populists, in the Polish case, Andrej Duda and his party PiS.

I argue that the descendants of post-WWII refugees refrain from voting for Andrej Duda. The mechanism behind this relationship is quite straightforward. First, refugees who recently experienced the traumatic displacement process tend to obtain portable assets (Becker and Ferrara 2019) and are more likely to direct their children toward education (Brenner and Kiefer 1981) due to the possibility that this relocation might not be permanent. Then, the relatively higher education levels of the descendants of the refugees make them less likely to vote for right-wing populists since, as stated in previous research, higher education and human capital are negatively correlated with voting for right-wing populists. Therefore, in line with the findings from the previous chapter, I expect the vote shares of Andrej Duda to be lower in provinces with larger refugee populations.

H_1: *Forced displacement has a positive effect on human capital in the long term, such that a larger share of people of the Kresy origin in a province decreases Andrej Duda's vote share.*

Nonetheless, the majority of descendants of post-WWII refugees live in the Western Provinces. Then, what explains the differences in Andrej Duda's vote share between municipalities in the Western Provinces? As opposed to the scholarly consensus that social or cultural heterogeneity obstructs the provision of public goods or falters

economic performance (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Ashraf and Galor 2013), Charnysh (2019) argues that heterogeneity might actually improve overall economic performance. Migration has the potential to enhance individuals' inclination to cooperate with the state, as it weakens informal norms and networks while promoting cultural diversity. This can lead to a greater willingness to engage with the state, which serves as a potential enforcer of cooperation among its citizens. Over time, heterogeneity plays a crucial role in facilitating the accumulation of state capacity, thereby empowering the state to enforce regulations and govern economic activities effectively. As a result, the expanded scope of state influence enables the provision of public goods and contributes to improved economic outcomes (Dincecco et al. 2022). Therefore, with higher economic development caused by the long-term effect of migrant heterogeneity, I expect the vote share of the populist Duda to be lower in municipalities where migrant diversity is higher. Furthermore, I argue that this relationship is contingent on the proportion of migrants in a given municipality. While a larger migrant population is expected to reduce Duda's vote share, it is also likely to mitigate the effect of migrant diversity due to the heightened necessity for initial state assistance in accommodating refugees at their destinations.

H_{2a}: *Heterogeneity caused by forced displacements induce better economic outcomes through state engagement, such that a higher diversity of migrants decreases Andrej Duda's vote share in a municipality.*

H_{2b}: *A higher migrant population share decreases the effect of migrant diversity on Andrej Duda's vote share.*

3.4 Research Design

The data for this chapter come from various sources. Duda's vote share in the 2020 elections is obtained from the National Electoral Commission of Poland (2020). Historical data regarding the origins of post-WWII refugees are obtained from two different sources. The population share of migrants of the Kresy origin in the first part of the analyses is derived from the Diagnoza Survey. The Diagnoza ('Social Diagnosis') Survey is conducted by the Council of Social Monitoring (2015) and is a large-scale household survey with a representative sample of the Polish population. Thanks to Becker and Ferrera (2019), survey items asking the origins of respondents are introduced to the questionnaire. The origins of migrants that are used to code the migrant share and migrant diversity variables in the second part of the analyses are obtained from another survey study, the 'Ancestry Survey', conducted by Becker

et al. (2019). The authors also draw a representative sample of the population in the Western Territories, asking detailed questions about the respondents' ancestors. In total, 4069 respondents were surveyed, giving information about their 13223 ancestors. Other control variables are obtained from the National Statistics Office of Poland (2020).

In the first part of the analyses, I will examine the relationship between the migrant share of the population of Kresy origin and Duda's vote share at the province level. To complement these analyses, I will also specify another model that regresses a dummy of the Western Territories on Duda's vote share, to capture the long-term effect of migrant localities on electoral behavior. In the second part of the analysis, I will investigate the effect of heterogeneity on electoral behavior, focusing on the interactive effects of migrant diversity and migrant population share. By employing district-level data, I explore the association between migrant diversity and Duda's vote share, which I argue is mediated by the migrant share in a given district.

3.4.1 Dependent Variable

In this chapter, the dependent variable is Duda's vote share in the 2020 Presidential elections in Poland. Nonetheless, it is measured at different levels in the first and second parts of the empirical analyses. In the first part, it measured at the powiat level, i.e., the administrative level of Poland equivalent to provinces in Turkey. This operationalization is used to match election data to the available migration data at the province level. In the second part, the vote share variable is at the gmina level, i.e., districts. Thanks to the Ancestry Survey (Becker and Ferrara 2019), Charnysh (2019) was able to estimate district-level migrant shares not only for the migrants of the Kresy region but also from other origins such as Central Poland and the USSR. Therefore, in the second part, I can employ data at a lower-level of aggregation, and use Duda's vote share at the district-level as my dependent variable.

3.4.2 Independent Variables

Our main explanatory variables in the first part of the analyses are the population share of people with at least an ancestor from the Kresy region and whether a province is located in the Western Territories. The Kresy region, i.e., Eastern parts of Poland that were ceded to the USSR, was the main destination of the post-WWII Polish refugees. Although the Western Territories received migrants from Central

Poland and the USSR as well, the majority of them have voluntarily migrated due to abundant land and opportunities provided by the Polish government (Becker and Ferrara 2019; Charnysh 2019). Moreover, although their presence is likely to have a long-term effect, it is less likely to observe the long-term effect of forced displacement on migrants' preference for portable assets such as education since their migration is voluntary, or at least is not forced by the Polish and Soviet governments. Hence, regardless of the data being unavailable for migrants from other places, it is appropriate to use the population share of those of the Kresy origin to observe the long-term effects of forced migrations on electoral behavior. I thus operationalize the share of migrants by using the proportion of descendants with at least one ancestor originating from the Kresy region. This measure is derived from the 'Ancestry Survey' and represents the rate of respondents with such a heritage. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that while the population share of individuals with Kresy ancestors in Western Territories correlates positively with the numbers provided by Charnysh (2019), it still underestimates the precise proportion of migrants within the population. Therefore, our other main independent variable is a dummy for the Western Territories. Since Western Territories were the designated destinations for the post-WWII refugees, I believe it is more appropriate to show the long-term effects of forced migrations not just in terms of education, but also in terms of economic development in the provinces with higher migrant populations.

The control variables employed in the first part of the analyses are a Prussia dummy, female population share, the UNDP's Education and Local Human Development Indices, turnout rate in the 2020 Presidential Elections, urbanization rate, and unemployment rate. Prussia dummy is introduced to the models to capture the potential effect of the partition of Poland in the late 18^{th} century, eliminating the sovereignty of Poland and Lithuania for over a century. This should help us observe the effects of persistent imperial legacies that affect Poland (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013). It also captures the differences between former Prussian provinces ceded to Poland after the WWII and the Western Territories ceded after the WWII. As discussed above, the female population share is an important determinant of voting for a right-wing populist party (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Mayer 2013). The UNDP Education Index is introduced to capture the effect of education on electoral outcomes and without the availability of province-level education data, it is a good proxy accounting for the expected long-term differences in the education levels of migrant and autochthon populations. The UNDP Local Human Development Index is a good measure of human capital and economic development, encompassing different human development metrics such as health, culture, and income (UNDP 2014). Unfortunately, these two metrics are only available until 2014. Turnout is derived

from the 2020 Presidential Elections results, obtained from the National Electoral Commission of Poland. Unemployment rate is long considered an important metric of economic development, and urbanization rate would prove useful to capture the effects of the urban-rural divide.

In the secondary part of the analysis, our main independent variables are migrant population share and migrant diversity. Migrant population share is obtained from Charnysh (2019), coded from a census commissioned by the Ministry for the Recovered Territories in December 1948, conducted in the Western Territories after population transfers were largely completed. As noted above, the data are available at the district level. The census recorded four distinct groups, namely refugees from the USSR, settlers from Central Poland, migrants from other parts of Europe, and the autochthons. Migrant population share is thus calculated as the share of non-autochthons in the total population in a district. Smaller migrant groups from different regions usually settled in the same provinces, due to the composition of major railroads. Migrant diversity is calculated following in Alesina, Harnoss, Rapoport (2016), s_j being the migrant population share from region j from the total population of migrants, with the following formula:

$$\text{Div}_{mig} = \sum_{j=1}^{j} [s_j \times (1 - s_j)]$$

The control variables in the second part of the analysis are tertiary education share, female population share in 2020 and 1948, the urbanization rate in 1948, income tax per capita in Polish Zloty in 1989, distance to the Polish border in 1948, distance to the province center (powiat) in 1948, and distance to railroads in 1950. Tertiary education share is calculated by Charnysh (2019). Female population share in 1948 is obtained from the census conducted by the Ministry for the Recovered Territories in December 1948. Distance to post-1945 borders is a possible confounding variable since certain ethnic groups among migrants were not allowed to settle near the borders. Distance to the province center would capture the latent economic outcomes that arise from proximity to state control. Districts in the vicinity of railroads were easier to reach for migrants, regardless of their origin, and it can also account for higher state authority due to ease of transportation. The urbanization rate in 1948 is a measure of the initial development of districts. Finally, income tax per capita in 1989 can account for the level of economic development during the Communist era.

3.5 Empirical Analyses

Post-WWII border changes in Poland caused the country 'move' westward, as seen in Figure 1. The Curzon Line is the proposed demarcation line by the USSR during the Tehran Conference of 1943 (Terry 2014). It constituted the basis for the post-WWII Polish-USSR border. Provinces marked with red, the Western Territories, were ceded to Poland by Germans. Provinces marked with purple and gray were annexed by the USSR during the WWII and those that are marked with purple were ceded to Poland after the WWII. Nevertheless, those that are marked with gray, the Kresy region, were predominantly inhabited by the Poles and were never ceded to Poland. As a result, ethnic Poles were forced to migrate by the Polish government and settled in the Western Territories.

Figure 3.1 Polish border changes and the Curzon Line after WWII. Source: Wikimedia Commons



Figure 3.2 shows the predicted probabilities of tertiary education among respondents of the Diagnoza survey in 2015. I chose this to demonstrate the effect of forced displacement on the preferences of migrants, i.e., the tendency to prefer portable assets such as education, as argued by Becker and Ferrera (2019). The probability of getting tertiary education is approximately 7% higher among descendants of Kresy

migrants than the rest of the population.

Figure 3.2 Predicted probabilities of tertiary education for the Kresy origin



Table 3.1 presents the OLS regression estimates on the effect of the population share for those with the Kresy origin and the Western Territories on Duda's vote share in the 2020 Presidential Elections. In the first model, the effect of the population with the Kresy ancestry share appears to be negative and statistically distinguishable from zero. With one standard deviation change from the mean, the vote share of Andrej Duda decreases by about 2 percent. As expected, a percentage point increase in the female population share decreases Duda's vote share by about 4.3 percent. The coefficient of the education index variable is negative and distinguishable from zero and one standard deviation increase from the mean decreases Duda's vote share by 7.7 percent. What is intriguing here is the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the unemployment rate variable. Nonetheless, its substantively less significant since between the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles of the unemployment rate, the difference is 12.7 percent, translating into a 4.54 percent increase in Duda's vote share.

In the second model, a Prussian dummy is introduced to account for the effect of both refugee destinations in the Western Territories and the overall effect of the German imperial past in Poland. Unsurprisingly, the effect of population share with Kresy

Table 3.1 OLS estimates on the effect of the population share with the Kresy origin and Western Territories on Andrej Duda's vote share (2020)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Kresy Pop. Share	-0.121***	-0.009	0.016			0.023
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.028)			(0.024)
Western Territories			-9.425***	-9.047***	-2.483**	-2.976***
			(1.093)	(0.899)	(0.961)	(1.090)
Prussia		-12.720***			-11.265***	-11.348***
		(0.851)			(0.981)	(0.982)
Education Index	-0.512***	-0.198***	-0.425***	-0.424***	-0.205***	-0.204***
	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Turnout	0.652***	0.116	0.305**	0.311***	0.075	0.064
	(0.122)	(0.103)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Local HDI	-0.932***	-0.454***	-0.773***	-0.773***	-0.460***	-0.455***
	(0.088)	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Female Pop. Share	-4.230***	-5.517***	-3.923***	-3.871***	-5.219***	-5.281***
	(0.937)	(0.744)	(0.856)	(0.851)	(0.740)	(0.742)
Urbanization Rate	-0.053*	0.007	-0.056**	-0.056**	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Unemployment Rate	0.357***	0.028	0.346***	0.333***	0.046	0.060
	(0.128)	(0.104)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.102)	(0.103)
Constant	240.806***	338.591***	245.328***	242.537***	325.924***	329.468***
	(45.047)	(36.118)	(41.118)	(40.902)	(35.872)	(35.958)
N	374	374	374	376	376	374
R^2	0.576	0.737	0.648	0.647	0.740	0.742

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

origin is absorbed by the Prussia variable since the most of refugee destinations are located in former Prussian territories and the share of migrants is negligible outside the Western Territories. Moreover, the effect of the German imperial past seems to be still persistent as some of the explanatory power of the education index and local human development index variables are absorbed by the introduction of the Prussian dummy into the model. Moreover, in Model 3, we observe that the coefficient of the Western Territories variable is negative and distinguishable from zero, and substantively significant, while the Kresy ancestor share is statistically insignificant. This is mainly because the refugees were relocated to the Western Territories.

In Model 4, the coefficient of the Western Territories variable is negative, statistically distinguishable from zero, and substantively significant in line with our expectations. With the introduction of the Prussia dummy in Model 5, its effect weakens but remains significant. Being in a former Prussian province but not in the Western Territories is statistically and substantively significant, and being in the Western Territories increases the effect approximately by 2.5 percent. Thus, the effect of the German imperial past is still persistent but the post-WWII migration transfers to Poland continues to affect contemporary electoral behavior regardless of pre-existing factors.

Then, what determines the differences in the vote share of Andrej Duda among the Western Territories provinces, which already have higher migrant population shares? As Charnysh (2019) argues, heterogeneity would improve long-term economic outcomes and increase development. Table 3.2 presents the OLS regression estimates on the vote shares of Duda in the 2020 Presidential elections, at the district level. Province dummies are introduced in all models in Table 3.2 to account for the varying prevalence of each group by region, e.g., more migrants from the USSR settling in the south and from Central Poland in the north. In Model 1, the coefficient of migrant population share is significant but has a positive sign. Nevertheless, it is substantively insignificant, as 75 percent of districts have over 90 percent migrant population share. In Model 2, the coefficient of the migrant diversity variable is negative and distinguishable from zero. Nonetheless, we should look for the effect of migrant diversity mediated by migrant population share. The average marginal effect of migrant diversity on the vote share of Andrej Duda is approximately -10 percent, as shown in Figure 3. Therefore, we can conclude that migrant diversity has a negative effect on the vote share of Andrej Duda, in line with our expectations.

Figure 3.3 Marginal effect of migrant diversity on Andrej Duda's vote share (2020)



Table 3.2 OLS estimates on the effect of the migrant share and migrant diversity on Andrej Duda's vote share (2020)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Migrant Diversity		-6.270***	-5.478**	-14.500**
		(2.295)	(2.193)	(5.852)
Share of Migrants	0.146***		0.143***	0.093**
	(0.021)		(0.021)	(0.037)
Diversity × Migrants				0.112*
				(0.067)
Tertiary Education Share	-1.365***	-1.330***	-1.347***	-1.356***
	(0.167)	(0.174)	(0.166)	(0.166)
Female Pop. Share	-0.500*	-0.777**	-0.506*	-0.510*
	(0.297)	(0.306)	(0.295)	(0.294)
Total Expenditure on Powiat	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Income Tax per capita, USD	-0.018*	-0.015	-0.016*	-0.015
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Urbanization, 1948	0.024**	0.032***	0.022**	0.022**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Female Pop. Share, 1948	0.164*	0.015	0.165*	0.153*
	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Dist. to Border, 1948	0.055***	0.036*	0.049**	0.050***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Dist. to Railroads, 1948	0.033	0.033	0.022	0.022
	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Dist. to Powiat Centr.	0.054*	0.049	0.051	0.050
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Constant	55.442***	93.146***	58.285***	63.099***
	(15.733)	(15.540)	(15.685)	(15.920)
N	575	575	575	575
R^2	0.779	0.760	0.782	0.783

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses.

3.6 Discussion

This chapter investigates the long-term effects of forced displacement and migrant diversity on electoral behavior and economic development in Poland. In the first part of the analyses, I examined the relationship between forced displacements and Andrej Duda's vote share. Forced displacement has a notable effect on migrants' preferences for portable assets such as education. The descendants of the Kresy migrants are more likely to pursue tertiary education, reflecting the long-term impact of forced migration experiences. As a result of such an increase in human capital in

the Western Territories, I find a negative relationship between the migrant population share and the vote shares for Andrej Duda in the 2020 presidential elections. The mechanism behind this relationship is the transmission of political values and the migrants' preferences for portable assets such as education. In fact, Becker (2019) demonstrates that the descendants of migrants are likely to receive higher education. Charnysh and Peishakhin (2021) examine the transmission of political values of the migrants to their descendants in the Galicia region. In light of the findings of this chapter and these previous studies, we can conclude that migration inflows, caused by forced displacements, have a negative effect on the vote shares of right-wing populist parties.

In the second part of the analyses, I examined the mediating effect of migrant diversity in the Western Territories. The findings from the second part suggest that a more diverse migrant population in a district is associated with lower support for the right-wing populist candidate, i.e., Andrej Duda. Charynsh (2019) argues that heterogeneity in the form of migrant diversity can improve long-term economic outcomes due to better cooperation with the state. As an extension of improved economic outcomes and the migrants' preferences toward education as a portable asset, migrant diversity has a negative effect on the vote shares of Andrej Duda, conditionally on the number of migrants.

However, it is necessary to acknowledge the limitations of this study. The lack of available data for migrants from other regions for provinces outside the Western Territories limits our investigation to the Kresy population in the first part. In addition, the underestimation of the exact proportion of migrants within the population due to data constraints should be taken into account when interpreting the findings. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that examines the long-term effects of forced migration transfers on electoral behavior. Future research should extend this to the different components of electoral behavior and cleavage formation, which I did not investigate due to the limited scope of this study.

4. CONCLUSION

Previous studies suggest that population transfers are often a robust determinant of long-term economic development (Charnysh 2019; Hornung 2014; Peters 2022). The literature also suggests that, due to the social status of incoming refugees in their origin countries, they are likely to bring in newer techniques in manufacturing and agriculture (Alpan 2008; Hornung 2014) or tend to be more educated on average than their counterparts in their destination (Moser, Voena, and Waldinger 2014). Incoming migrants are also settled by the receiving governments to complement the lacking agricultural manpower (Murard and Sakalli 2018; Peters 2022; Sarvimäki, Uusitalo, and Jäntti 2022) and due to the so-called agglomeration effect, generate positive long-term economic outcomes.

Historical cleavages are another determinant of long-term economic development and human capital accumulation. Murard and Sakallı (2018) demonstrate the long-term human capital accumulation and economic development in the districts that were once inhabited by Greeks and Armenians before their expulsion throughout the 1910s and 1920s. The literature also emphasizes the effect of historical cleavages on electoral behavior. Haffert's (2021) findings show that Catholics living in former Prussian are less likely to vote for Alternative für Deutschland due to the oppression in the Kulturkampf era. Voigtländer and Voth (2012) seek the origins of anti-Semitic violence and voting for the Nazi Party of Germany. They argue that deeply-rooted anti-Semitic practices of local rulers in the Middle Ages had a persistent effect on how Jewish people were treated in Germany.

Nevertheless, the effect of the Turkish-Greek population transfers and the historical Greek population on contemporary electoral behavior is an unexplored research area. Furthermore, there is also a significant gap in the literature regarding the long-term effect of forced migrations on electoral behavior. This study sought to address these gaps by comparing the Turkish and Polish cases.

The first empirical chapter focuses on the long-term effects of the Turkish-Greek

population exchange and the historical Greek minorities on economic development and electoral behavior. I estimated interactive linear models using historical data on the distribution of Balkan migrant and Greek populations. I found that a higher population share of Balkan migrants and Greek minorities translates into lower vote shares for the AKP and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As discussed in the literature review section, the long-term effects of forced migration and minorities on economic development and human capital accumulation decrease the electoral support for conservative parties. Nevertheless, we observe that their effect has been fading. There are several possible reasons to that: First, any mechanism that can possibly form a cleavage among Balkan migrants is suppressed by the state to preserve national unity. Second, without political salience of migrant identity, contemporary politics undermine the long-term effects of the Turkish-Greek population exchange.

In the second empirical chapter, I analyzed the effect of post-WWII population transfers to Poland on electoral behavior. In the first part of the analysis, I examined the effect of Polish refugees on the vote shares of Andrej Duda. Due to higher education levels of the descendants of refugees of the Kresy region, higher population shares of Polish voters with at least one ancestor from this region translates into a lower vote share for Andrej Duda. Consequently, to understand the variation in Duda's vote shares in the Western Territories, I estimated an interactive linear model using the Polish ancestry survey data. The main conclusion is that higher migrant diversity decreases Andrej Duda's vote share, but a higher migrant share weakens this effect. Higher migrant diversity brings in better long-term economic outcomes due to the increased role of the state as the enforcer of rules. As a result, with increased development and educational attainment, Andrej Duda's vote shares tend to decrease.

Our comparison between the Turkish and Polish cases reveals that forced displacements have an important role in determining long-term economic development, human capital accumulation, and electoral behavior. The incoming migrant population increases future economic prosperity and migrants tend to educate their younger generations more. In the long run, it thus decreases the electoral support for conservative and populist parties. It should be noted that historical legacies of migrants have also a positive long-term effect on economic development. The imperial past of the Western Territories under Prussia and economic predominance of the Greek population have also contributed to the relatively higher development of examined provinces. Nevertheless, the relatively larger scale of the population transfers and the diversity of the Polish migrants constitute the main difference between the Polish and Turkish cases.

It should be highlighted that our study is not without its limitations. First, making individual-level inferences by employing aggregate-level data may lead to ecological fallacy. An ideal design should take account fore the salience of migrant cleavages in both cases. With the availability of individual-level data, future research might draw more valid inferences on the causal relationship between forced migrations and electoral behavior. Another limitation is, of course, the lack of available data regarding the exact number and destination of migrants. Future research might have higher validity of inferences by exploring archival data on official decisions made by the governments such as post-migration material reparations at the local level.

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APPENDIX A

Table A.1 Descriptive statistics (June 2015 Elections)

	N	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
AKP Vote Share	371	41.74	16.09	1.19	75.67
Balkan Pop. Share, 1927	371	1.37	4.40	0	39.64
Greek Pop. Share, 1914	371	8.77	16.53	0	98.74
Turnout	371	85.72	3.92	68.75	94.47
Pop. Share, 1927	371	0.26	0.22	0	2.22
Δ Pop. Share	371	0.01	0.56	-0.52	5.35
Female Pop. Share, 1927	371	51.95	3.79	10.57	60.77
Δ Female Pop. Share	371	-2.39	3.69	-14.71	39.03
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	371	15.38	29.89	0	99.36
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	371	3.10	16.21	-78.47	85.95
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	371	8.29	2.01	0.63	15.49
Literacy Rate, 1927	371	7.76	7.36	0	57.07
Δ Literacy	371	4.31	5.75	-29.70	23.06
Urbanization Rate	371	78.86	24.96	7.19	100
Dependent Pop. Share	371	19.40	9.54	4.25	53.45
SEGE Score	371	0.09	0.85	-1.73	3.65
Dist. to Center District	371	47.15	28.15	0	138.91
Dist. to Coast	371	111.48	110.61	0	511.89

Table A.2 Descriptive statistics (November 2015 Elections)

	N	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
AKP Vote Share	371	50.12	18.33	1.96	86.79
Balkan Pop. Share, 1927	371	1.37	4.40	0	39.64
Greek Pop. Share, 1914	371	8.77	16.53	0	98.74
Turnout	371	85.91	3.91	72.54	93.23
Pop. Share, 1927	371	0.26	0.22	0	2.22
Δ Pop. Share	371	0.01	0.56	-0.52	5.35
Female Pop. Share, 1927	371	51.95	3.79	10.57	60.77
Δ Female Pop. Share	371	-2.39	3.69	-14.71	39.03
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	371	15.38	29.89	0	99.36
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	371	3.10	16.21	-78.47	85.95
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	371	8.29	2.01	0.63	15.49
Literacy Rate, 1927	371	7.76	7.36	0	57.07
Δ Literacy	371	4.31	5.75	-29.70	23.06
Urbanization Rate	371	78.86	24.96	7.19	100
Dependent Pop. Share	371	19.40	9.54	4.25	53.45
SEGE Score	371	0.09	0.85	-1.73	3.65
Dist. to Center District	371	47.15	28.15	0	138.91
Dist. to Coast	371	111.48	110.61	0	511.89

Table A.3 Descriptive statistics (2018 Elections)

	N	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
AKP Vote Share	371	43.43	14.00	5.66	75.27
Balkan Pop. Share, 1927	371	1.37	4.40	0	39.64
Greek Pop. Share, 1914	371	8.77	16.53	0	98.74
Turnout	371	87.62	3.63	73.55	93.79
Pop. Share 1927	371	0.26	0.22	0	2.22
Δ Pop. Share	371	0.01	0.55	-0.52	5.33
Female Pop. Share, 1927	371	51.95	3.79	10.57	60.77
Δ Female Pop. Share	371	-2.62	3.83	-14.01	38.85
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	371	15.38	29.89	0	99.36
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	371	3.07	16.07	-78.29	86.06
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	371	8.29	2.01	0.63	15.49
Literacy Rate, 1927	371	7.76	7.36	0	57.07
Δ Literacy	371	6.29	5.91	-27.72	26.44
Urbanization Rate	371	78.67	25.20	7.74	100
Dependent Pop. Share	371	19.93	9.05	4.08	49.60
SEGE Score	371	0.09	0.85	-1.73	3.65
Dist. to Center District	371	47.15	28.15	0	138.91
Dist. to Coast	371	111.48	110.61	0	511.89

Table A.4 The effects of Balkan migrant population share on AKP vote share (with province dummies)

	June 2015	November 2015	2018
Balkan Pop. Share, 1927	-0.126	-0.126	-0.101
	(0.196)	(0.243)	(0.203)
Turnout	-1.065***	-0.394*	-0.309
	(0.175)	(0.231)	(0.237)
Female Pop. Share, 1927	1.932***	2.205***	1.530***
	(0.491)	(0.620)	(0.486)
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	-0.258***	-0.321***	-0.224***
	(0.051)	(0.063)	(0.053)
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	1.458**	1.799**	1.756***
	(0.582)	(0.721)	(0.603)
Literacy Rate, 1927	-0.540**	-0.655**	-0.655***
	(0.258)	(0.320)	(0.244)
Share of Population, 1927	5.630*	7.822**	6.384*
	(3.131)	(3.879)	(3.248)
Δ Female Pop. Share	2.208***	2.628***	1.846***
	(0.431)	(0.546)	(0.419)
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	-0.102**	-0.108*	-0.105**
	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.048)
Δ Literacy-University	-0.087	-0.147	-0.288
	(0.278)	(0.344)	(0.257)
Δ Pop. Share	0.388	0.221	0.439
	(1.163)	(1.441)	(1.214)
Dist. to Center District	-0.032	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Dist. to Coast	0.008	0.016	0.018
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Urbanization Rate	-0.029	-0.068	-0.116***
	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.043)
Dependent Pop. Share	-0.308***	-0.529***	-0.412***
	(0.096)	(0.120)	(0.106)
SEGE Score	-4.677**	-5.949**	-5.122**
	(2.158)	(2.674)	(2.187)
Constant	38.673	-19.316	6.956
	(27.577)	(33.354)	(31.481)
N	391	391	391
R^2	0.756	0.703	0.644

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

Table A.5 The effects of Greek population on AKP vote share (with province dummies)

	June 2015	November 2015	2018
Greek Pop. Share, 1914	-0.074	-0.045	-0.035
	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.049)
Turnout	-1.148***	-0.558**	-0.459*
	(0.176)	(0.240)	(0.247)
Female Pop. Share, 1927	1.484***	1.878***	1.276**
	(0.501)	(0.638)	(0.504)
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	-0.261***	-0.325***	-0.220***
	(0.057)	(0.073)	(0.062)
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	1.812***	2.249***	2.029***
	(0.606)	(0.762)	(0.637)
Literacy Rate, 1927	-0.482*	-0.669**	-0.678***
	(0.262)	(0.329)	(0.253)
Share of Population, 1927	5.143	7.768*	6.237*
	(3.157)	(3.972)	(3.347)
Δ Female Pop. Share	1.820***	2.365***	1.644***
	(0.439)	(0.560)	(0.435)
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	-0.038	-0.027	-0.034
	(0.057)	(0.072)	(0.062)
Δ Literacy-University	-0.018	-0.143	-0.275
	(0.278)	(0.349)	(0.261)
Δ Pop. Share	0.228	0.121	0.419
	(1.137)	(1.429)	(1.210)
Dist. to Center District	-0.022	0.002	-0.002
	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Dist. to Coast	0.012	0.019	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Urbanization Rate	-0.024	-0.056	-0.097**
	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.043)
Dependent Pop. Share	-0.294***	-0.548***	-0.373***
	(0.098)	(0.124)	(0.112)
SEGE Score	-4.405**	-5.745**	-4.691**
	(2.130)	(2.679)	(2.204)
Constant	63.476**	6.435	27.882
	(28.363)	(35.106)	(32.697)
N	371	371	371
R^2	0.765	0.714	0.655

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

Table A.6 The effects of Balkan and Greek population shares on AKP vote share (interactive models with province dummies)

	June 2015	November 2015	2018
Balkan Pop. Share, 1927	-0.387	-0.479	-0.339
	(0.361)	(0.454)	(0.381)
Greek Pop. Share, 1914	-0.094*	-0.072	-0.053
	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.056)
Balkan × Greek	0.008	0.010	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Turnout	-1.145***	-0.559**	-0.458*
	(0.176)	(0.241)	(0.247)
Female Pop. Share, 1927	1.524***	1.933***	1.308**
	(0.506)	(0.643)	(0.508)
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	-0.259***	-0.323***	-0.219***
	(0.058)	(0.073)	(0.062)
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	1.737***	2.153***	1.964***
	(0.612)	(0.769)	(0.643)
Literacy Rate, 1927	-0.491*	-0.677**	-0.682***
	(0.265)	(0.332)	(0.256)
Share of Population, 1927	476.711	729.872*	590.159*
	(318.094)	(400.240)	(337.520)
Δ Female Pop. Share	1.832***	2.383***	1.651***
	(0.440)	(0.561)	(0.437)
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	-0.036	-0.024	-0.032
	(0.058)	(0.072)	(0.062)
Δ Literacy-University	-0.054	-0.185	-0.304
	(0.281)	(0.353)	(0.265)
Δ Pop. Share	24.411	12.971	42.710
	(114.469)	(143.933)	(121.962)
Dist. to Center District	-0.020	0.004	-0.001
	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Dist. to Coast	0.011	0.018	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Urbanization Rate	-0.025	-0.056	-0.097**
	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.043)
Dependent Pop. Share	-0.297***	-0.551***	-0.376***
	(0.099)	(0.125)	(0.113)
SEGE Score	-3.985*	-5.218*	-4.336*
	(2.169)	(2.728)	(2.245)
Constant	62.262**	5.003	27.194
	(28.552)	(35.334)	(32.960)
N	371	371	371
R^2	0.766	0.715	0.655

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

Table A.7 The effects of Balkan and Greek population shares on AKP vote share (non-linear interactive models with province dummies)

	June 2015	November 2015	2018
Balkan Pop. Share, 1927	-1.476	-1.613	-0.959
	(1.044)	(1.336)	(1.116)
Greek Pop. Share, 1914	-0.182	-0.166	-0.097
	(0.131)	(0.168)	(0.140)
Balkan × Greek	0.075	0.102	0.059
	(0.056)	(0.072)	(0.060)
Turnout	-1.148***	-0.400	-0.531**
	(0.179)	(0.249)	(0.251)
Balkan^2	0.096	0.099	0.053
	(0.093)	(0.120)	(0.100)
Balkan^2 × Greek	-0.005	-0.006	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Greek^2	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Balkan × Greek^2	-0.001	-0.002*	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Balkan^2 × Greek^2	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female Pop. Share, 1927	1.677***	2.034***	1.538***
	(0.518)	(0.667)	(0.527)
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	-0.201***	-0.219***	-0.144**
	(0.056)	(0.071)	(0.061)
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	1.279**	1.392*	1.472**
	(0.619)	(0.792)	(0.660)
Literacy Rate, 1927	-0.706***	-0.898***	-0.982***
	(0.184)	(0.235)	(0.186)
Share of Population, 1927	389.111	702.565*	539.576*
	(302.840)	(387.410)	(323.009)
Δ Female Pop. Share	2.028***	2.581***	1.864***
	(0.459)	(0.592)	(0.455)
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	0.003	0.041	0.020
	(0.057)	(0.073)	(0.062)
Δ Literacy-University	-0.258	-0.347	-0.570***
	(0.170)	(0.216)	(0.163)
Δ Pop. Share	28.001	37.196	72.168
	(113.781)	(145.624)	(121.998)
Dist. to Center District	-0.023	0.005	-0.000
	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.025)
Dist. to Coast	0.020	0.034	0.025
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Constant	53.566*	-21.097	13.393
	(28.676)	(36.127)	(33.506)
N	371	371	371
R^2	0.762	0.699	0.641

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

Table A.8 First stage estimates (Table 2.5)

	June 2015	November 2015	2018
Greek Pop. Share, 1914	0.081***	0.081***	0.078***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Turnout	0.117**	0.125*	0.087
	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.077)
Dist. to Coast	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female Pop. Share, 1927	-0.322*	-0.362*	-0.400**
	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.176)
Kurdish Pop. Share, 1927	-0.001	0.004	0.006
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Widowed Pop. Share, 1927	0.007	-0.009	0.065
	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.176)
Literacy Rate, 1927	-0.475***	-0.469***	-0.471***
	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.085)
Share of Population, 1927	-1.180	-1.294	-1.625
	(1.234)	(1.228)	(1.217)
Δ Female Pop. Share	-0.162	-0.200	-0.213
	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.151)
Δ Kurdish Pop. Share	0.003	0.003	0.006
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Δ Literacy-University	-0.484***	-0.483***	-0.486***
	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.082)
Δ Pop. Share	0.446	0.386	0.322
	(0.471)	(0.469)	(0.471)
Dist. to Center District	-0.008	-0.007	-0.009
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Urbanization Rate	-0.033***	-0.035***	-0.030***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Dependent Pop. Share	-0.025	-0.021	-0.036
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.038)
SEGE Score	2.372***	2.441***	2.752***
	(0.714)	(0.708)	(0.684)
Constant	16.627	17.983*	23.225**
	(10.849)	(10.669)	(11.635)
N	371	371	371

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

Figure A.1 Diagnosis of the linearity of the marginal effect assumption for the migrant population on AKP vote share in the June 2015 Election



Figure A.2 Diagnosis of the linearity of the marginal effect assumption for the migrant population on AKP vote share in the November 2015 Election



Figure A.3 Diagnosis of the linearity of the marginal effect assumption for the migrant population on AKP vote share in the 2018 Election



APPENDIX B

Table B.1 Descriptive statistics for migrant share, Poland

	N	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Andrej Duda Vote Share	374	47.71	11.48	22.98	75.04
Kresy Pop. Share	374	12.03	16.38	0	82.14
Western Territories	374	0.30	0.46	0	1
Prussia	374	0.49	0.50	0	1
Turnout	374	61.77	4.87	50.27	74.97
Education Index	374	-44.26	14.94	-97.75	-16.82
Local HDI	374	41.10	11.62	17.91	87.63
Female Pop. Share	374	51.19	0.91	49.24	54.44
Urbanization Rate	374	50.74	27.16	2.02	100.00
Unemployment Rate	374	8.12	3.81	1.70	23.70

Table B.2 Descriptive statistics for migrant diversity, Poland

	N	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Andrej Duda Vote Share	575	42.24	8.12	20.32	65.31
Migrant Diversity	575	0.43	0.13	0.03	0.66
Share of Migrants	575	86.27	26.67	1.53	100.00
Female Pop. Share	575	50.60	1.21	47.81	54.63
Female Pop. Share, 1948	575	51.60	2.98	36.54	78.46
Urban Rate, 1948	575	21.89	32.45	0	100.00
Income Tax per capita, US Dollars	575	144.28	50.51	8.44	421.57
Distance to Powiat Cent., 1950	575	11.92	7.17	0.04	32.31
Distance to Railroad, 1948	575	3.95	6.09	0	53.80
Distance to Border, 1948	575	59.70	45.45	0.74	186.13

Figure B.1 Predicted values of tertiary education share



Figure B.2 Predicted values of Andrej Duda's vote share



Figure B.3 Diagnosis of the linearity of the marginal effect assumption for the migrant population on Andrej Duda's vote share