

LOCATING THE BIAS IN EMPATHY

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LOCATING THE BIAS IN EMPATHY

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ABSTRACT

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While empathy generally has a positive outlook, some researchers identified biases that might deem empathy a poor moral guide. One of the most prominent biases is the intergroup empathy bias. Some researchers have suggested that such biases are integral to empathy, meaning that higher empathy can come at the expense of less impartial moral judgments (the Inherent Bias Account). Other researchers disagree, and argue that empathy is regulated by higher-level beliefs, goals and motivations, therefore being more empathic will not cost us our moral integrity (the Higher-level Bias Accounts). Although there has been long theoretical discussions, no empirical work directly compared the two accounts. In the present work, I tried to fill this gap by compared the effects of empathy and higher-level biases on intergroup empathy bias and moral judgment biases. In Study 1 ($N = 191$), I used a correlational design, and found that higher-level biases predict intergroup empathy bias but empathy does not. Similarly, higher-level biases indirectly predicted moral judgment biases but empathy did not. In Study 2 ($N = 206$), I replicated the findings of Study 1, and attempted to experimentally test whether bias is inherent to empathy by increasing empathy, and looking at how this influences intergroup empathy bias. Although the experimental procedure did not increase empathy as expected, the replication was successful. Overall, the results largely supported the Higher-level Bias Account over the Inherent Bias Account. However, further research is needed to test alternative approaches to the debate and to as well as the more fine-grained details of both accounts.

ÖZET

EMPATİDEKİ YANLILIĞIN YERİNİ BULMAK

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PSİKOLOJİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2023

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Empati üzerine olumlu bir intiba olsa da, araştırmacılar, empatiyi kötü bir ahlaki pusula kılacak bazı yanlılıklar olduğunu belirlediler. Bu yanlılıkların arasında en öne çıkanlarından biri gruplararası empati yanlılığı. Bazı araştırmacılar bu tür yanlılıkların empatiye içkin olduğu görüşünü benimseyerek, fazla empati duymanın tarafsız ahlaki kararlar vermeye mal olacağını öne sürüyor (İçkin Yanlılık Görüşü). Başkaları bunu reddediyor ve empatinin bazı yüksek mertebe inançlar, hedefler ve motivasyonlar ile düzenlendiğini; dolayısıyla da fazla empati hissetmenin bizi ahlaken yanlış yönlendirmeyeceğini ileri sürüyorlar (Yüksek Mertebe Yanlılık Görüşü). Bu konuda şimdiye kadar uzun teorik tartışmalar yürütülmüş olsa da, hiçbir ampirik çalışma bu görüşü doğrudan karşılaştırmadı. Ben de, bu çalışmada, empati ve yüksek mertebe yanlılıkların, gruplararası empati yanlılığı ve ahlaki yargılardaki yanlılıklar üzerindeki etkilerini karşılaştırdım. Çalışma 1’de (N = 191), korelasyonel bir desen kullanıp, yüksek mertebe yanlılıkların gruplararası empati yanlılığını yordadığını, fakat empatinin yordamadığını buldum. Benzer şekilde, yüksek mertebe yanlılıklar, ahlaki yargılardaki yanlılıkları dolaylı şekilde yordadı ama empati yordayamadı. Çalışma 2’de (N = 206), Çalışma 1’in sonuçlarını tekrarladım ve empatiyi deneysel olarak artırıp bunun gruplararası empati yanlılığını nasıl etkilediğini inceledim. Deneysel prosedür beklendiği gibi empatiyi artırmadı, fakat tekrarlama çalışması başarılıydı. Sonunda, sonuçlar Yüksek Mertebe Yanlılık Görüşünü, İçkin Yanlılık Görüşünden daha fazla destekledi. Fakat, bu görüşlere alternatif yaklaşımların ve bu görüşlerin ileri detaylarının test edilebilmesi için daha çok araştırma yapılmalı.

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Most of all, I thank my family for everything they did for me. My parents made a lot of sacrifices so that I could get a good education. In a small town where it was considered absurd to spend money on education, they prioritized my education beyond anything. Also, they never used this to impose certain life and career choices on me, which is the standard among parents where I live—imagine a place where even

the principals of my high school tried to dictate my career choices. They are the most selfless and supportive people I know of. I wish them all good health, long life and happiness.

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*I dedicate this thesis
to the loving memory of
my dear friend
Ahmet Hulusi Bulut (1999-2021)
for teaching me to think fearlessly*

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1. INTRODUCTION

It's not a question we ask ourselves enough, I think; as a country, we seem to be suffering from an empathy deficit. We wouldn't tolerate schools that don't teach, that are chronically underfunded and understaffed and underinspired, if we thought that the children in them were like our children. It's hard to imagine the CEO of a company giving himself a multimillion-dollar bonus while cutting health-care coverage for his workers if he thought they were in some sense his equals. And it's safe to assume that those in power would think longer and harder about launching a war if they envisioned their own sons and daughters in harm's way.

The Audacity of Hope
Barack Obama

Lay understanding of empathy is often very positive, and there are a myriad of good reasons to think positively about empathy. It is associated with increased relationship satisfaction (Davis and Oathout 1987), social liking (Wang et al. 2019), having a larger friend network (Kardos et al. 2017; Morelli et al. 2017), and generally, higher subjective well-being (Grühn et al. 2008; Wei et al. 2011). Perhaps, however, the most studied consequence of empathy is altruism (defined as prosocial motivation, or the motivation to help others, see Sober and Wilson 1998; for a review Batson et al. 2015). Extensive reviews and decades of research on empathy have consistently shown that higher empathy is linked to increased helping intentions and behavior, even towards complete strangers (Davis 2015).

In the past decade or so, however, a considerable number of scholars began to argue that empathy suffers from a number of identifiable biases that result in undesirable moral outcomes, and therefore the unconditional positive stance on empathy may be too naive. For example, (Bloom 2017a, 2017b) argues that empathy suffers from “innumeracy bias”, that is, the tendency of empathy to be reserved for few, familiar individuals instead of unfamiliar groups of people. Research confirms that while

people are capable of empathizing with suffering individuals, they fail to empathize with the suffering of larger groups (Cameron and Payne 2011; Slovic 2007). Researchers consistently found that both the strength of empathic feelings and the amount of donations to help the suffering is inversely related to the group size in lab based studies (Kogut and Ritov 2005a; 2005b; Small et al. 2007). This may have serious real world consequences. Since it can motivate people to focus on reducing the suffering of the few, empathy may make us ignore the plight of a larger group of people and preclude us from helping them (e.g. a missing teenage girl garnering more attention than a genocide in the US as per Slovic 2007). This is in contrast with classical utilitarian principles of morality as maximizing the happiness of a large group of people is generally considered to be morally greater than maximizing the happiness of a single individual (Bloom 2017a). Hence, the innumeracy bias deems empathy a remarkably poor moral motivator.

Another well-known empathy bias that conflicts with moral norms relates to the spotlight nature of empathy. Bloom (2017a) contends that empathizing with an individual makes us focus on their suffering and ignore the pain of those we do not empathize with. Batson and colleagues (1995) first discovered this feature of empathy in a now classical study. In their experiment, they made a group of participants empathize with a certain patient who needs an organ by describing her dire condition. They found that the people in the empathy group were significantly more likely to move this person up in the organ transplant list compared to the control group. Participants did not have any information about other patients in the transplant list, so they did not make their decision based on a comparison of how terribly the patients are suffering. They just moved up the person they empathized with, regardless of how bad the conditions of other patients on the list may be. This finding demonstrated that empathy can make people prioritize the suffering of an individual while ignoring others, and that therefore empathy can motivate behavior that is not in line with a classical understanding of fairness.

The last, perhaps the most prominent bias of empathy that will also be the main focus of this dissertation concerns its parochiality (Prinz 2011; Bloom 2017a). In the context of empathy research, parochial empathy, or intergroup empathy bias, refers to feeling more empathy for the ingroup and less for the outgroup (Cikara et al. 2014). Research consistently confirmed an intergroup empathy bias (see Cikara et al. 2011; Han 2018; Vanman 2016 for reviews), and linked it to reduced prosocial motivation and behavior towards suffering outgroup members as well as wishing harm for the outgroup (Bruneau et al. 2017). Bloom (2017a) suggests that this feature of empathy goes against impartiality norms, and shows that empathy may not always be a moral force.

Considering aforementioned moral shortcomings of empathy, Bloom (2017a) and Decety (2021) developed a stance against relying on empathy particularly when making moral decisions. They argued that these biases make empathy a tool for doing more ‘bad’ than ‘good’ on the overall (Decety and Cowell 2014; Decety 2015, 2021; Prinz 2011). Since they also believe that these shortcomings are ingrained in the nature of empathy, Bloom (2017a) and Decety (2021) suggested that people should be less empathic if they want to make impartial moral decisions.

In this dissertation, I will mainly scrutinize the argument that empathy has biases ingrained in its nature and therefore reduced empathy can prevent moral biases in the context of intergroup empathy bias. Relying on findings from the literature on motivated emotion and empathy regulation as well as empathy studies in intergroup contexts, I argue that (a) intergroup empathy bias is likely to be a consequence of feelings about the ingroup and the outgroup, rather than being a consequence of general empathy level. This follows that being empathic is largely irrelevant to having intergroup empathy bias and making biased moral judgments. As a consequence, (b) biased moral judgments might be stemming from a biased regulation of empathy (intergroup bias) rather than general levels of empathy. If (a) and (b) is true, Bloom (2017a) and Decety’s (2021) recommendation to be less empathic might not be relevant to mitigating the consequences of empathy biases. In the following sections, I will first conceptualize empathy in the context of this thesis because the definition of empathy is a highly contentious issue in the literature (Cuff et al. 2016) and then construct two competing theoretical accounts on whether bias is inherent to empathy while discussing findings that support and contradict an inherent bias account.

1.1 Empathy in the Context of this Dissertation

Discussing what empathy is highly important. This is because the literature is rife with studies that imply that they refer to the same exact psychological construct while employing a wildly diverse set of definitions and operationalizations (Cuff et al. 2016). This requires researchers studying empathy to be especially careful while building an argument through the findings in the literature, operationalizing empathy and even just referring to it (Davis 2015). So, below I will discuss how I conceptualized empathy in this dissertation.

Although the literature on empathy abounds with disparate uses of the term (Cuff et al. 2016), researchers largely adopted a multi-componential view of empathy

(see Zaki and Ochsner 2012 for an example). Most of the recent scholarship on empathy converged on the idea that empathy is composed of at least two distinct components (Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2009): An affective component that involves the capacity of “feeling *as* the other” (Hein and Singer 2008) and a cognitive component that involves understanding others’ mental states. Some researchers also contend that a third, motivational component called “sympathy”, “empathic concern” or “compassion” exists (De Waal 2008; Weisz and Cikara, 2021; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). This component (henceforth “compassion”) involves a “tender feeling” for the other coupled with a motivation to care for the suffering. It is thought to be distinct from the affective component of empathy because it is assumed that the affective component of empathy requires emotional isomorphism with the target of empathy, in other words, feeling *as* the target of empathy. Empathic concern, however, only requires general emotional congruence with the target of empathy, or feeling *for* the target of empathy (Hein and Singer 2008).

This distinction of empathic concern from the affective component of empathy is not uncontested. Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) argue that the affective component of empathy is not confined to just feeling as the other. Instead, they propose, affective empathy is feeling an *appropriate emotion* (emphasis added by me) in response to the emotion displayed by the target of empathy. This definition combines Hein and Singer’s (2008) emotional isomorphism understanding of affective empathy and compassion, and indeed Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright’s (2004) view of compassion as a subcomponent of affective empathy.

In this dissertation, I will heavily rely on affective empathy and compassion because of the nature of the argument proposed against empathy (see the previous section). I will follow a stance close to that of Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright’s (2004) on the relation between affective empathy and compassion (that compassion is a subcomponent of empathy). There are two reasons behind why I treated affective empathy as largely indistinguishable emotion from compassion for two reasons. My first reason is theoretical, and it predicated on the evolution of empathy and the lack of empirical backing for separating affective empathy from compassion. Empathy is thought to have evolved to support care and incentivize altruistic behavior (de Waal 2008). If so, there is little to no need for an exact match between one’s emotions and another’s emotions. Instead, what is needed is an emotion that can motivate altruistic behavior, and so, just feeling *for* the other seems to be sufficient. Indeed, while the literature abounds with studies that dissociate affective from cognitive empathy (Dziobek et al. 2008; Harari et al. 2010; Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2009), but to the best of my knowledge, no studies clearly dissociate affective empathy from compassion. My second reason is methodological, and it perhaps follows from the


first one: Existing measures of affective empathy do not clearly dissociate affective empathy from compassion. It is even possible to say that their main focus is to measure compassion and the motivation to alleviate the suffering of the other rather than to measure the extent to which one exactly mirrors others' feelings (see Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004 for EQ; Davis, 1983 for IRI EC, and Vachon and Lynam 2016 for ACME RES) perhaps because feeling as the other is unnecessary if the point of empathy is to motivate caring behavior.

All in all, I will refer to compassion, or feeling *for* the other, when I refer to empathy in the context of this dissertation. Now, to evaluate the validity of the argument that biases are inherent in empathy so that avoiding empathy is morally better, I will review the literature on empathy bias. I will exclusively focus on intergroup empathy bias because (a) it is perhaps the most well-studied empathy bias out there (only intergroup empathy bias has dedicated reviews among the biases noted above, e.g. Cikara et al. 2011; Han 2018; Vanman 2016), allowing me to make a rich discussion, and (b) it is closer to my research interests than other biases.

1.2 The Clash of Two Accounts of Intergroup Empathy Bias

Below I reviewed the literature on intergroup empathy bias and separated my review into two sections, constructing opposing accounts. The first will review findings that suggest that, as per Decety (2021), intergroup bias is inherent to empathy and discuss the “Inherent Bias Account” (see Figure 1.1). The second will review the findings that suggest, on the contrary, that bias may not be inherent to empathy. Instead, biased beliefs, goals and motivations may regulate empathy to be biased. This will be my discussion of the “Higher-level Bias Account”.

Figure 1.1 Diagrams Depicting Two Competing Accounts of Intergroup Empathy Bias



1.2.1 The Inherent Bias Account

The theoretical core of the Inherent Bias Account is grounded in human evolution. Researchers who endorse this account of empathy argue that the function of empathy during human evolutionary history has been motivating exclusive caretaking for close others, particularly children. This evolutionary context imbued empathy with intergroup bias, such that, by default, humans became much more likely to empathize with the ingroup but not the outgroup (Decety and Cowell 2014; 2015; Decety 2021). Defenders of this account also acknowledge the possibility of extending empathy to outgroups (Bloom 2017a). Yet, since they also believe that empathy is largely an automatic process, their trust in the controllability of a built-in empathy bias is quite low (Bloom 2017a; Decety and Cowell 2014; Decety 2021).

Empathy being biased by default has important implications in the domain of moral judgments. This is because the ability to empathize encompasses the ability to perceive harm (in the form of pain), and moral judgments frequently revolve around harm (Schein and Gray 2018). For example, people may not punish an ingroup member who harmed an outgroup member as severely as an outgroup member who harmed an ingroup member, because they are tuned to the suffering of their ingroup. Recognizing this problem, Bloom (2017a) and Decety (2021) recommend people to reduce the extent to which they rely on their empathic tendencies while making moral judgments, and to rely on their reasoning instead.

In this section, I summarized the theoretical background of the Inherent Bias Account. It suggests that intergroup bias is an integral feature of empathy due to the nature of its evolutionary context. Also, controlling this bias in empathy may be highly difficult, given that empathy is mostly an automatic process. Lastly, empathy plays an important role in moral judgments and therefore relying on empathy while making moral decisions may bias those decisions. The solution researchers propose to this is to avoid using empathy while making moral decisions. In two of the following sections, I will review empirical evidence in support of this theoretical background.

1.2.1.1 Neuroimaging evidence

The first set of evidence I will present here essentially consists of neuroimaging studies that show intergroup empathy bias exists. Such studies provide the strongest support for the Inherent Bias Account because if intergroup empathy bias is detectable at the neural level, it could mean that empathy bias is also quick. This

could indicate a coupling between bias and empathic responses, supporting the Inherent Bias Account.

Indeed, there is considerable neural evidence of intergroup empathy bias. In fact, most of the earlier studies on intergroup empathy bias employed neuroimaging techniques (e.g. Avenanti et al. 2010; Azevedo et al. 2013; Bruneau et al. 2012, see Han 2018 for a review). In one of the first studies that directly investigated the neural basis of intergroup empathy bias, Xu and colleagues (2009) reported higher anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) response for ethnic ingroup's pain across Chinese and American participants. Similarly, Mathur and colleagues (2010) detected higher medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) activity in participants when they viewed ingroup members who experience pain in Black and White Americans. Importantly, MPFC activity in participants was highly correlated with their willingness to donate money to suffering individuals they viewed in the fMRI, suggesting the possibility that intergroup empathy bias may also have behavioral consequences. This finding was later replicated by Hein and colleagues (2015), who reported a similar pattern where activity in empathy related brain regions anterior insula (AI) and nucleus accumbens (NAcc) predicted increased altruism for ingroup and decreased altruism for outgroup, respectively.

All in all, a host of neuroimaging studies provide support for the Inherent Bias Account by showing that intergroup empathy bias is a fast process that is built into similarly fast processes of empathy. However, although the findings of these studies are robust, they share a common disadvantage: They are largely lab based studies that can only evaluate snapshots of brain activity. Empathy might be automatically, or by default, biased for the ingroup. But a considerable number of scholars have argued that individuals and external circumstances do exert an influence on empathy (Schumann et al. 2014; Zaki 2014, also see section 2.2). This could mean that, over time, individuals and circumstances can change who one empathizes with even though their initial feelings are biased.

1.2.1.2 Self-report evidence

Most self-report studies on empathy in the intergroup context report that empathy is inversely related to bias and prejudice. For example, Bäckström and Björklund (2007) developed a generalized prejudice construct based on ableist, racist, sexist and homophobic attitudes. They found that empathic concern was not only negatively related to generalized prejudice, but it was also strongly negatively correlated with each and every variable in the generalized prejudice construct. McFarland

(2010) and Levin and colleagues (2016) later replicated these findings using different measures of prejudice. Similarly, using a longitudinal design, Bobba and Crocetti (2022) found that empathic concern predicts positive evaluations, increased intergroup contact willingness, increased prosocial intentions and reduced prejudice in adolescents. It is worth noting, however, that the studies above treated prejudice as a trait rather than a psychological state. This raises the possibility that although empathy is generally inversely linked to prejudice, it may still be positively linked to certain (e.g. competing) outgroups.

Indeed, one study addresses the gap noted above, using a larger and more representative sample than the previously mentioned studies. Political scientists, Simas and colleagues (2020), found that increased empathic concern was linked to higher distancing from the political outgroup as well as higher desire to censor the opinions of the political outgroup. That increased empathy is associated with increased negativity towards the outgroup clearly feeds the Inherent Bias Account, increasing the likelihood that the Inherent Bias Account might have some truth in it.

Another strand of evidence for the Inherent Bias Account comes from the literature on pain perception. Albeit this literature is partly inconsistent about whether there is an intergroup bias in pain perception (Mathur et al. 2014), a larger portion of the studies find a clear bias (Cintron and Morrison 2006; Drwecki et al. 2011; Trawalter et al. 2012, see Chapman et al. 2013 for a broader review): People are less likely to accurately perceive the real extent of the pain experienced by outgroup members. For example, Hoffman and colleagues (2016) reported that Caucasian participants underestimated the pain experienced by Black patients, and the strength of their bias was positively associated with their beliefs in myths about the health status of Black people. However, bias in perceived pain was not observed among medical doctors.

These studies largely support the Inherent Bias Account in that unlike competitive settings where people have obvious motivations to be biased against the outgroup (Cikara et al. 2011), in medical settings where people judge how much pain each other are feeling, people have little to no motivation to demonstrate bias against the outgroup. Observing bias even in this setting could indicate that pain perception mechanisms that are at the core of empathic processes may be inherently biased. Yet it is still far from clear that a bias in pain perception may have downstream consequences on empathy as feeling *for* the other, and on behavior. The most pronounced behavioral outcome examined in these studies in the literature is pain-relief pill prescription, and they largely report that Black people receive less prescriptions than Caucasians (Chapman et al. 2013). But, these studies lack adequate control

variables (e.g. general bias towards Blacks, likelihood of drug addiction) that could change the narrative of these stories against the Inherent Bias Account. Therefore additional evidence is needed.

This concludes my review of the literature that supports the Inherent Bias Account. In the following section, I will introduce the Higher-level Bias account and present another literature review that supports it.

1.2.2 The Higher-level Bias Account

The rise of the Inherent Bias Account has prompted another school of empathy researchers to respond to the claims put forth by Bloom (2017a, 2017b) and Decety and Cowell (2014, 2015). Mainly, these researchers were subscribers of a “Motivated Empathy Account” (Zaki 2014) which basically suggested that while a substantial portion of empathic processes happen automatically, people still exert considerable control over their empathic processes in line with their existing goals and motivations. For example, although people immediately feel some pain when they watch the recording of a brutal accident, they can regulate how much empathy they will feel for the victim by regulating what they attend to. If they have an aversion to pain or if they would not like to feel that they should spend some effort to help the victim, they may downregulate their empathy by watching funny animal clips instead of rewatching the brutal accident.

To this end, in the context of empathy biases, Cameron and colleagues (2017) and Zaki (2017, 2018) argued for the Higher-level Bias Account and against the Inherent Bias Account. They pointed out that a number of internal factors (e.g. beliefs, goals and motivations) and internalized (e.g. social norms) can shape empathic tendencies. This implies that individuals’ empathic responses can reflect the content of their Higher-level beliefs, goals and motivations rather than the inherently parochial nature of empathy (Zaki 2014). If this is true, empathy by itself should not be considered a poor moral guide because what biases moral judgments would not be empathy, it would be the biased goals, beliefs and motivations.

In the following section, I will present empirical support for the Higher-level Bias Account. Since the empirical literature on Higher-level biases and intergroup empathy bias is practically non-existent, I will review the literature on top-down influences in cognition and emotion and link it to studies that demonstrate empathy regulation is a motivated process, and higher-level factors such as beliefs and expectations play a key role in how empathy will be regulated.

1.3 An Evaluation of Both Accounts and the Overview of Current Studies

As it may have already become obvious to the reader, both Inherent Bias and Higher-level Bias accounts enjoy considerable backing in the literature. However, the Higher-level Bias Account has two important advantages over the Inherent Bias Account: First, it can include the core message of its competing account. The Higher-level Bias Account presents an understanding of intergroup empathy bias that does not oppose the idea that empathy is, to some extent, an automatic process that is highly prone to intergroup empathy bias (Zaki 2018). The Inherent Bias account, on the other hand, does not recognize the possibility that beliefs, goals and motivations can shape how empathy works. Second, the Higher-level bias account is more consistent with our existing understanding of cognitive processes: The process described by the Higher-level Bias Account highly resembles the structure of other cognitive processes (e.g. top-down regulation of perception, attention, memory) (Cameron et al. 2018, Zaki 2018). The process suggested by the Inherent Bias Account, however, requires empathy and biases to work in a different way than other cognitive processes, reducing the likelihood of it being true.

Similar theoretical comparisons of the Inherent Bias account and the Higher-level bias account have been made previously (see Cameron et al. 2018, Bloom 2017b, Zaki 2017, Zaki 2018). Yet, a direct empirical comparison of both accounts does not exist in the literature. The main purpose of this dissertation is, then, to fill this gap in the literature and make direct empirical contributions on the debate on the nature of intergroup empathy bias and its downstream consequences on moral judgments. To this end, I will conduct two studies in which I will investigate empathy, intergroup empathy bias and a set of moral judgments in relation to each other in a straightforward manner. In the first study, using a correlational design, I will compare empathy with biased affect on their capacity to predict intergroup empathy bias, and biased moral judgment. The second study will be an extended replication of the first study where I will also try to experimentally manipulate empathy, and investigate the consequences of this manipulation on intergroup empathy bias as well as moral judgment. Below are the sets of hypotheses I will test in the aforementioned studies, the first set (H1 and H2) will assume the Inherent Bias Account to be true, while the second (H3 and H4) will assume the truth of the Higher-level Bias Account:

H1: As per the Inherent Bias Account, the tendency to be more empathic will positively predict the tendency to demonstrate intergroup empathy bias.

H2: As per the Inherent Bias Account, being more empathic and having more intergroup empathy bias will positively predict biased moral judgments.

H3: As per the Higher-level Bias Account, biased affect will positively predict the tendency to demonstrate intergroup empathy bias.

H4: As per the Higher-level Bias Account, biased affect and intergroup empathy bias will positively predict biased moral judgments.

2. STUDY 1

In this study, I aimed to take a first step into testing the four hypotheses presented above. I planned to do this by coming up with a straightforward correlational design where I planned to measure empathy, higher level biases, intergroup empathy bias and moral judgment biases using scales and vignettes. Then I utilized regression models, including two mediation models, to investigate the relationships between them.

2.1 Method

2.1.1 Participants

I calculated the number of participants needed for Study 1 based on the effect sizes found in the cross-cultural studies of Bruneau and colleagues (2017) on intergroup empathy bias. Their effect sizes ranged from ($d = 0.18$) to ($d = 0.68$). To avoid making false positive inferences, I aimed a conservative effect size of ($d = .20$) with .80 power. Using G*Power (Faul et al. 2007), I found that this required us to collect data from 199 participants.

I collected data from Sabanci University's SONA system, which allows students to participate in studies in exchange for course credit. After removing 20 participants from the dataset for failing to complete the study or finishing the study in shorter than 3 minutes, the final dataset consisted of data from 191 participants (107 Female, 82 Male, $M_{age} = 22.16$, $SD_{age} = 2.25$).

2.1.2 Materials and Procedure

Participants who digitally signed a consent form (see Appendix B) proceed to the study on Qualtrics. They were first asked to provide demographic information on their age and gender. They indicated their feelings about a set of ethnic, sexual and political groups on a slider and completed a self-report empathy scale. Subsequently, they were presented with six moral vignettes. three vignettes featured an ethnically ingroup main character while three featured an outgroup member. Participants answered a few questions about the vignettes that indicated their empathy levels and moral judgments about the actions described in the vignettes. Lastly, they viewed a debriefing statement (see Appendix B) and finished the study. Below, you will find a more detailed description of the measures and the vignettes I noted above.

2.1.2.1 Measures

2.1.2.1.1 Feeling thermometer

Feeling thermometers are good indicators of attitudes (Haddock et al. 1993), which could very well indicate that they encapsulate beliefs and emotions, or higher-level biases, about social groups in one slider. In this study, I measured feelings for Europeans and Americans, Women, Turks, Greek and Armenian minorities in Turkey, refugees and LGBTI. The sliders ranged from 0 to 100, where 0 indicated *Fully Negative* feelings while 100 indicated *Fully Positive* feelings. I later subtracted feeling scores for refugees from those of Turks to build a measure of Affect Bias.

2.1.2.1.2 Empathy

Empathy scores were measured via Vachon and Lynam's (2016) Affective Resonance (RES) subscale of the Affective and Cognitive Measure of Empathy (ACME). Most empathy studies opt for Davis' (1983) Empathic Concern (EC) subscale to measure empathy. However, Vachon and Lynam (2016) reported that the predictive power of ACME and RES is much higher than that of EC, prompting me to use it in this study.

It consists of twelve five-point items (e.g. *"Birisinin duygularını incittiğimde çok kötü hissederim./I feel awful when I hurt someone's feelings."* ranging from 1, *"Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum/Strongly Disagree"* to 5 *"Kesinlikle Katılıyorum/Strongly"*

Agree”). It yielded a Cronbach’s Alpha score of .85.

2.1.2.1.3 Vignette questions

Participants were presented with four seven-point items with each vignette, and were asked to respond in accordance with what they think about what happens in the vignette.

They first reported how much compassion they felt for the main character in the vignette (e.g. “*Amina’nın başına gelen bu olaylardan sonra, ona karşı ne kadar acıma/merhamet duyuyorsunuz?/How much compassion are you feeling towards Amina after all that happened to her?*” ranging from 1, “*Hiç Acıma/Merhamet Hissetmem/I do not feel any compassion*” to 7 “*Çok Acıma/Merhamet Hissederim/I feel a lot of compassion*”). Similarly, they indicated how much suffering they perceived in the main character (e.g. “*Sizce Amina, başına gelenlerden dolayı ne kadar acı çekiyor?/How much do you think Amina is suffering?*” ranging from 1, “*Hiç/Not at all*” to 7 “*Çok/A lot*”). Later, they reported their moral judgments. First, they reported the extent to which they approved the punishment for the character (e.g. “*Sizce firmanın, Amina’nın yaptıklarından sonra ona verdiği ceza ne kadar haklı?/To what extent do you think the firm’s punishment was justified*” ranging from 1, “*Tamamen haksız/Totally unjust*” to 7 “*Tamamen haklı/Totally right*”) and then they reported who was responsible for the punishment, the authority or the main character (e.g. “*Sizce Amina, kendi başına gelenlerden ne kadar sorumludur?/To what extent do you think Amina is responsible from all that happened to her?*” ranging from 1, “*Hiç Sorumlu Değildir/She is not at all responsible*” to 7 “*Tamamen Sorumludur/She is fully responsible*”).

I calculated Intergroup Empathy Bias scores by subtracting reported empathy for Syrian characters from reported empathy for Turkish characters. I calculated Biased Approval for Punishment scores by subtracting approvals for the punishment of the Turkish characters from the scores of the Syrian characters, as higher scores indicated perceived deservingness. Similarly, I calculated Biased Moral Responsibility Judgments by subtracting perceived moral responsibility for Turkish characters from the scores of Syrian characters.

2.1.2.1.4 The vignettes

I essentially prepared three morally ambiguous vignettes. The purpose behind this structure was to avoid floor and ceiling effects, and create some variability. Since

people are much less likely to feel little to no empathy for people who are responsible for a moral violation which later harmed them (Decety et al. 2010), a morally ambiguous structure was deemed necessary to observe some variability in empathic responses.

In these vignettes, target characters were initially in a disadvantaged position in the society. Then, to overcome the difficulties created by their position, they committed a moral violation. Later, authorities find out their violation and punish them perhaps too severely. One character was a child, one was an adult male and the other was an adult female. Also, three characters were ethnically Turkish, and the others were ethnically Syrian refugees in Turkey. Here is an example vignette (see the rest in Appendix A):

“Amina, 27 yaşında Suriyeli bir kadındır. Kendine zor da olsa Bursa’da, küçük bir tekstil atölyesinde iş bulmuştur. Günde 10 saat kadar yoğun bir şekilde çalışmakta ve asgari ücret kazanmaktadır. Bu parayla da eşi ve 2 çocuğundan oluşan ailesinin geçimine katkıda bulunmaya çalışmaktadır.

Bir gün, sürekli başkaları için kıyafet dikmesine rağmen kendisinin kıyafet alacak parası olmamasına ve eski püskü, yamalı kıyafetler giymesine içerlenmiştir. Ardından depodan 4-5 tane elbise, 2-3 tane de pantolon çalmıştır. Depoda envanter sayımlarının sık sık yapılmamasına güvenip görülmeyeceğini sanmıştır.

Fakat sonraki gün atölyede bir sayım yapılmasına karar verilmiş, eksikler fark edilince de güvenlik kamerasından Amina’nın elbise ve pantolon çaldığını görülmüştür. Ardından da firma Amina’yı kovup çevredeki esnafa onun güvenilmez biri olduğunu, iş verilmesi gerektiğini ilemiştir. Amina bundan dolayı uzunca bir süre iş aramak zorunda kalacaktır.”

“Amina is a 27 year old Syrian woman.

She found herself a job in a small textile workshop in Bursa, albeit with difficulty. She works 10 hours a day and earns minimum wage. She tries to contribute to the subsistence of her family of (a husband and) two children.

One day, sewing clothes for others while herself wearing old, patchy clothing got her frustrated. She then stole 4-5 tops and 2-3 trousers from the storage room of her workplace. She thought she was safe because inventory checks were done infrequently.

However, the next day an inventory check was made. Missing items from the inventory led to an investigation, and security cam footage made it obvious that Amina was the one who stole the missing items.

The firm then fired Amina, and notified the businesses around that she is untrustworthy, and does not deserve to be given a job. Amina will have to look for a job for a long time because of this.

After participants read all vignettes and answer all questions below them, the study came to an end. Participants were debriefed.

2.2 Results

I used Jamovi for the regressions, and JASP for mediation analyses. I first checked whether Intergroup Empathy Bias was observable in the sample. To this end, I ran a Paired Samples t-test, comparing empathy ratings for Turkish and Syrian main characters. Results revealed a significant difference: Indeed, participants showed more empathy for the Turkish characters, albeit the difference was relatively small ($M_{\text{EmpathyforTurkish}} = 4.57$, $SD_{\text{EmpathyforTurkish}} = 1.19$, $M_{\text{EmpathyforSyrian}} = 4.46$, $SD_{\text{EmpathyforSyrian}} = 1.25$, 95% CI = [.01, .29], $t(190) = 2.04$, $d = .15$, $p = .04$).¹

Table 2.1 Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations for Study 1

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Range	1	2	3	4	5
Empathy	4.08	.56	[1.83, 5.00]	-				
Affect Bias	30.38	26.98	[-45, 100]	.08	-			
Int. Emp. Bias	.11	.74	[-2.67, 3.67]	-.03	.21**	-		
Biased App. for Pun.	.05	.73	[-2.00, 2.67]	-.11	.20**	.24***	-	
Moral Res. Bias	.01	.58	[-2.67, 2.33]	-.06	.05	.15	.37***	-

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. for all the following tables and figures.

2.2.1 Testing H1 and H3

Since H1 and H3 make opposing predictions on the relation between empathy, higher-level biases and intergroup empathy, I tested them together. To this end, I regressed Intergroup Empathy Bias scores on Empathy, Affect Bias, and their interaction. I z-transformed the Affect Bias variable to increase its interpretability as it could range from -100 to 100. All reported coefficients are standardized regression scores. I also controlled for Age and Sex.

¹Unusually high SDs were observed in Affect Bias, indicating high skewness (see Table 2.1). Data was log transformed and all the following analyses were replicated. No differences from the original results were observed.

The analysis (see Table 2.2) showed that Empathy was not significantly related to Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = -.06$, $t(182) = -.74$, $p = .46$) but Affect Bias was: 1 SD increase in Affect Bias predicted .24 SD increase in Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = .24$, $t(182) = 3.22$, $p = .002$). The interaction between Empathy and Affect Bias was not significant ($\beta = .09$, $t(182) = .23$, $p = .82$). Also, female participants were significantly more likely to demonstrate Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = .15$, $t(182) = 2.07$, $p = .04$), and the effect of Affect Bias and Sex did not depend on each other ($\beta = .02$, $t(182) = .33$, $p = .74$).

Table 2.2 GLM Predicting Intergroup Empathy Bias

Predictor	β	SE	95% CI	df	t	p
Intercept	.00	.05	[.01, .22]	182	2.14	.03*
Empathy	-.06	.10	[-.27, .12]	182	-.74	.46
Affect Bias	.24	.05	[.07, .28]	182	3.22	.002**
Emp. * Aff. Bias	.09	.10	[-.08, .31]	182	1.14	.25
Age	.02	.02	[-.04, .05]	182	.23	.82
Sex	.15	.11	[.01, .45]	182	2.07	.04*
Sex * Aff. Bias	.02	.11	[-.18, .26]	182	.33	.74

2.2.2 Testing H2 and H4

Similarly, I regressed Biased Approval for Punishment and Moral Responsibility Bias scores on Empathy, Affect Bias and Intergroup Empathy Bias. This allowed me to test H2 and H4 together. Once again, I z-transformed Affect Bias scores to increase the interpretability of the data, and reported standardized regression coefficients.

2.2.2.1 Biased approval for punishment

The GLM for Biased Approval for Punishment (see Table 2.3) showed that Empathy was not a significant predictor of Biased Approval for Punishment ($\beta = -.09$, $t(182) = -1.16$, $p = .25$) but Affect Bias was: 1 SD increase in Affect Bias predicted .19 SD increase in Biased Approval for Punishment ($\beta = .19$, $t(182) = 2.56$, $p = .01$). The interaction between Empathy and Affect Bias was not significant ($\beta = .11$, $t(182) = 1.73$, $p = .09$). Also, Intergroup Empathy Bias predicted increased Biased Approval for Punishment ($\beta = .20$, $t(182) = 2.71$, $p = .007$). Age ($\beta = .11$, $t(182) = 1.50$, $p = .14$) and Sex ($\beta = .02$, $t(182) = .23$, $p = .82$) were not significant predictors.


H2 proposed the idea that Empathy could lead to biased moral judgment because it is biased, and H4 proposed the idea that Affect Bias may be influencing moral

Table 2.3 GLM Predicting Biased Approval for Punishment

Predictor	β	SE	95% CI	df	t	p
Intercept	.00	.05	[-.06, .14]	182	.79	.43
Empathy	-.09	.06	[-.17, .04]	182	-1.16	.25
Affect Bias	.19	.05	[.03, .23]	182	2.56	.01*
Emp. * Aff. Bias	.11	.05	[-.01, .19]	182	1.73	.09
Int. Emp. Bias	.20	.05	[.04, .24]	182	2.71	.01**
Age	.11	.02	[-.01, .08]	182	1.50	.14
Sex	.02	.11	[-.19, .24]	182	.23	.82

judgment biases by regulating empathy. To further test these hypotheses, I decided to construct a mediation model where Intergroup Empathy Bias mediated the effect of Empathy and Affect Bias on moral judgment biases. To this end, I first ran a mediation analysis with 5000 bootstraps (see Figure 2.1) as Biased Approval for Punishment as the outcome. Reported coefficients are standardized. This time, Affect Bias was not z-centered.

Figure 2.1 Mediation Diagram Depicting the Effects on Biased Approval for Punishment



2.2.2.2 Moral responsibility bias

The GLM for Moral Responsibility Bias, on the other hand, (see Table 2.4) provided a less straightforward picture. Empathy was not a significant predictor ($\beta = -.01$, $t(182) = -.18$, $p = .86$) as well as Affect Bias ($\beta = .06$, $t(182) = .82$, $p = .41$). However, their interaction was significant ($\beta = .17$, $t(182) = 2.31$, $p = .02$), such that on participants who are 1 SD below the mean in Affect Bias, increasing levels of Empathy were significantly associated with lower levels of Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = -.18$, $t(182) = -2.00$, $p = .05$). Among participants who scored around the

mean and 1 SD above the mean in Affect Bias, Empathy had no effect ($\beta = -.01$, $t(182) = -.18$ $p = .86$) and ($\beta = .15$, $t(182) = 1.28$ $p = .20$).


Also, Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = .20$, $t(182) = 2.71$, $p = .007$), Age ($\beta = .11$, $t(182) = 1.50$, $p = .14$) and Sex ($\beta = .02$, $t(182) = .23$, $p = .82$) did not significantly predict Bias in perceived responsibility.

Table 2.4 GLM Predicting Bias in Perceived Moral Responsibility

Predictor	β	SE	95% CI	df	t	p
Intercept	.00	.04	[-.09, .08]	182	-.07	.94
Empathy	-.01	.05	[-.10, .08]	182	-.18	.86
Affect Bias	.06	.04	[-.05, .12]	182	.82	.41
Emp. * Aff. Bias	.17	.04	[.01, .18]	182	2.31	.02*
Int. Emp. Bias	.12	.06	[-.02, .21]	182	1.59	.11
Age	.07	.02	[-.02, .05]	182	.93	.35
Sex	.03	.09	[-.14, .21]	182	.36	.72

Results suggested a more complicated mediation picture for Moral Responsibility Bias (see Figure 2.2). Affect Bias significantly predicted Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = .008$, $SE = .003$, $p = .003$) but not Moral Responsibility Bias ($\beta = .001$, $SE = .003$, $p = .42$). Once again, Empathy did not predict Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = -.09$, $SE = .13$, $p = .50$) and Moral Responsibility Bias ($\beta = -.10$, $SE = .13$, $p = .43$). Intergroup Empathy Bias marginally predicted Moral Responsibility Bias ($\beta = .14$, $SE = .07$, $p = .055$) and neither the indirect effect of Affect Bias ($\beta = .0006$, %95 CI = [.0002, .004], $p = .10$) nor that of Empathy ($\beta = -.01$, %95 CI = [-.10, .007], $p = .52$) were significant.

Figure 2.2 Mediation Diagram Depicting the Effects on Moral Responsibility Bias



2.3 Discussion

The Inherent Bias Account suggested that more empathic participants would also be more likely to show Intergroup Empathy Bias (H1). The Higher-level Bias Account, on the other hand, suggested that, representing higher level biases regulating empathy, Affect Bias would predict Intergroup Empathy Bias (H3). Results largely supported H3. Affect Bias but not Empathy predicted Intergroup Empathy Bias.

As for the moral judgment biases, the Inherent Bias Account predicted that increased levels of empathy would be linked to higher levels of moral judgment biases (H2). Findings did not support this prediction as Empathy was not related to Biased Approval for Punishment, and was negatively related to Moral Responsibility Bias only among participants with lower levels of Affect Bias. The Higher-level Bias Account, on the other hand, predicted that Affect Bias would be linked to moral judgment biases (H4). This was the case for Biased Approval for Punishment, higher levels of Affect Bias predicted higher levels of Biased Approval for Punishment. A mediation model (Figure 2) showed a partial mediation where Affect Bias both directly and indirectly, through Intergroup Empathy Bias, was related to Biased Approval for Punishment. Yet the evidence was considerably weaker for Moral Responsibility Bias since there was no clear direct relationship between Affect Bias and Moral Responsibility except for the interaction noted above. A mediation model (Figure 3) showed that Affect Bias predicted Intergroup Empathy Bias, which later marginally predicted Moral Responsibility Bias. However, bias-corrected estimations showed no indirect relationship between Affect Bias and Moral Responsibility Bias.

All in all, findings of Study 1 are more in line with the Higher-level Bias Account rather than the Inherent Bias Account. A considerable limitation of this study is that, as noted previously, it uses a correlational design. This makes it difficult to make causal inferences about whether higher levels of empathy could lead to increased intergroup empathy bias. Therefore, in Study 2, I used an experimental design.

3. STUDY 2

The purpose of Study 2 is twofold. First, it aims to replicate the findings of Study 1. So, the same measurements used in Study 1 will also be used in Study 2. Second, and more importantly, it aims to test the four hypotheses using an experimental design in which empathy will be manipulated among participants. This would allow me to better test H1 and H3 of the Inherent Bias Account, since they suggest that increased empathy could lead to increased intergroup empathy bias and moral judgment biases.

3.1 Methods

3.1.1 Participants

Following Study 1, once again I aimed to collect data from 199 participants. Data were collected through SONA and social media to find enough participants to conduct the study. At the end, I collected data from 282 participants. However, 76 participants were removed for not completing the study and failing the attention check. A total of 206 participants (129 Female, 75 Male, $M_{age} = 24.09$, $SD_{age} = 6.84$) were in the final dataset.

3.1.2 Materials and Procedure

Materials and procedures of Study 2 were almost identical to those of the first study. In this section, I will only describe the differences: First, participants were asked whether they participated in Study 1 or not, and asked them to leave if they participated. Second, attention checks were introduced. Third, participants were randomly assigned to experimental treatment ($N = 104$) and control groups ($N =$

102), and were asked to complete a strong empathy manipulation known to be as the Socio-Affective Video Task (henceforth, the task, Klimecki et al. 2013) on Qualtrics. Participants were asked to watch thirteen videos in total with headphones. Three of them were training videos (see the video links in the Appendix A) that allowed participants to practice playing the videos and answering the questions that came up with them. The videos watched by participants in the treatment condition had negative emotional content that elicited empathic feelings for the character depicted in the video. In contrast, the control group received random excerpts from documentaries that had little to no emotional content. Videos also came with a text that described the context. The version of the task with texts was validated by Fucci and colleagues (2021) and I translated them into Turkish.

Participants responded to two questions after these videos using sliders: First, they were asked about the valence of the content of the video (*“To what extent do you think the emotions in the video are positive or negative? 0, Completely Negative; 100, Completely Positive”*). Second, they indicated how emotional they became after watching the videos (*“To what extent this video made you emotional? 0, None; 100, Too Much”*). Also, participants in the treatment group watched positive mood inducing videos at the end of the study to reduce the effects of stressful videos they had to watch.

3.2 Results

As in Study 1, I used Jamovi for the regressions, and JASP for the mediation analyses.

Once again, I first examined whether Intergroup Empathy Bias was observable in the sample. A paired samples t-test comparing empathy ratings for Turkish and Syrian main characters did not yield a significant difference between the two this time: ($M_{\text{Empathy for Turkish}} = 4.29$, $SD_{\text{Empathy for Turkish}} = 1.29$, $M_{\text{Empathy for Syrian}} = 4.28$, $SD_{\text{Empathy for Syrian}} = 1.35$, 95% CI = [-.10, .11], $t(205) = .12$, $d = .01$, $p = .90$).

3.2.1 Testing H1 and H3

I first checked whether the Socio-affective Video Task increased empathy among participants. Welch’s t-tests suggested that although the task increased overall

Table 3.1 Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations for Study 2

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Range</i>	1	2	3	4	5
Empathy	4.12	.45	[2.58, 5.00]	-				
Affect Bias	33.02	30.46	[-38, 100]	-.01	-			
Int. Emp. Bias	.01	.76	[-2.00, 4.00]	-.15*	.26***	-		
Biased App. for Pun.	.00	.71	[-3.00, 3.33]	-.13	.09	.30***	-	
Moral Res. Bias	.00	.65	[-4.00, 2.00]	-.07	.14*	.30***	.41***	-

emotional arousal among participants ($M_{\text{Treatment}} = 66.15$, $SD_{\text{Treatment}} = 25.51$, $M_{\text{Control}} = 29.69$, $SD_{\text{Control}} = 20.37$, $t(192.85) = -11.32$, $d = -1.58$, $p < .001$), but it did not increase empathy ratings for the vignette characters ($M_{\text{Treatment}} = 4.35$, $SD_{\text{Treatment}} = 1.22$, $M_{\text{Control}} = 4.23$, $SD_{\text{Control}} = 1.30$, $t(202.60) = .68$, $d = .10$, $p = .50$). These results indicate that although the task was capable of inducing emotional arousal among participants, increased arousal did not translate into increased empathy in a different context. As a result, I directly proceed to the replication part of this study.

Table 3.2 GLM Predicting Intergroup Empathy Bias

Predictor	β	SE	95% CI	df	t	p
Intercept	.00	.05	[-.09, .11]	198	.17	.87
Empathy	-.17	.13	[-.55, -.05]	198	-2.38	.02*
Affect Bias	.25	.05	[.05, .09]	198	3.68	<.001***
Emp. * Aff. Bias	.09	.05	[-.02, .16]	198	1.46	.15
Exp. Manipulation	-.12	.10	[-.29, .11]	198	-.88	.38
Age	.04	.01	[-.01, .02]	198	.54	.59
Sex	-.07	.11	[-.33, .10]	198	-1.02	.31

After the t-tests, as part of the replication of the previous correlational study, I ran the same regression model I used in Table 1.2 except for the addition of Experimental Manipulation, as I wanted to control for its effects. I regressed Intergroup Empathy Bias on Empathy, Affect Bias and Experimental Manipulation while controlling for Age and Sex (see Table 3.2). In contrast with Study 1, Empathy scores significantly predicted Intergroup Empathy Bias: Empathy was negatively linked to Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = -.17$, $t(198) = -2.38$, $p = .02$). Affect Bias, on the other hand, once again positively predicted Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = .25$, $t(198) = 3.68$, $p < .001$). The effects of Affect Bias on Intergroup Empathy Bias did not depend on Empathy ($\beta = .17$, $t(198) = 1.46$, $p = .15$). Lastly, the Experimental Manipulation did not impact Intergroup Empathy Bias as participants in the treatment group did not significantly differ in Intergroup Empathy Bias from the participants in the control group ($\beta = -.12$, $t(198) = -.88$, $p = .38$).

3.2.2 Testing H2 and H4

3.2.2.1 Biased approval for punishment

The GLM for Biased Approval for Punishment (see Table 3.3) showed that neither Empathy ($\beta = -.06$, $t(197) = -.81$, $p = .42$) nor Affect Bias was significantly related to Biased Approval for Punishment ($\beta = .03$, $t(197) = .46$, $p = .65$). The interaction between Empathy and Affect Bias was not significant, either ($\beta = .05$, $t(197) = .73$, $p = .47$). Intergroup Empathy Bias, on the other hand, predicted increased Biased Approval for Punishment ($\beta = .27$, $t(197) = 3.86$, $p < .001$). Once again, the Experimental Manipulation did not have a significant effect ($\beta = -.04$, $t(198) = -.88$, $p = .38$).

Table 3.3 GLM Predicting Biased Approval for Punishment


Predictor	β	SE	95% CI	df	t	p
Intercept	.00	.05	[-.18, .01]	197	-1.76	.08
Empathy	-.06	.12	[-.36, .07]	197	-.81	.42
Affect Bias	.03	.05	[-.07, .12]	197	.46	.65
Emp. * Aff. Bias	.05	.10	[-.12, .27]	197	.73	.47
Int. Emp. Bias	.27	.05	[.09, .29]	197	3.86	<.001***
Exp. Manipulation	-.04	.10	[-.23, .14]	197	-.46	.64
Age	.12	.01	[-.00, .03]	197	1.74	.08
Sex	.09	.10	[-.08, .32]	197	1.18	.24

The results of the mediation, on the other hand (see Figure 3.1) suggested that Affect Bias significantly predicted Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = .006$, $SE = .002$, $p < .001$) but it did not directly predict Biased Approval for Punishment ($\beta = .0003$, $SE = .002$, $p = .81$). Empathy negatively predicted Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = -.24$, $p = .03$) but it did not predict Biased Approval for Punishment ($\beta = -.15$, $p = .17$). Intergroup Empathy Bias predicted Biased Approval for Punishment ($\beta = .27$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$). Overall, there was a significant indirect effect of Affect Bias ($\beta = .002$, $95\% \text{ CI} = [.0004, .003]$, $p = .006$) and Empathy had a marginal indirect effect on Biased Approval for Punishment ($\beta = -.06$, $95\% \text{ CI} = [-.13, .002]$, $p = .058$).

3.2.2.2 Moral responsibility bias

The GLM for Moral Responsibility Bias (see Table 3.4) showed that neither Empathy ($\beta = -.03$, $t(197) = -.45$, $p = .66$) nor Affect Bias was significantly related to Moral Responsibility Bias ($\beta = .05$, $t(197) = 1.01$, $p = .31$). The interaction between

Figure 3.1 Mediation Diagram Depicting the Effects on Biased Approval for Punishment




Empathy and Affect Bias was not significant, either ($\beta = .05$, $t(197) = .48$, $p = .63$). Intergroup Empathy Bias, on the other hand, predicted increased Moral Responsibility Bias ($\beta = .27$, $t(197) = 3.75$, $p < .001$). Once again, the Experimental Manipulation did not have a significant effect ($\beta = .03$, $t(198) = .28$, $p = .78$).

Table 3.4 GLM Predicting Moral Responsibility Bias

Predictor	β	SE	95% CI	df	t	p
Intercept	.00	.04	[-.20, -.02]	197	-2.45	.02*
Empathy	-.03	.11	[-.27, .17]	197	-.45	.66
Affect Bias	.05	.05	[-.04, .14]	197	1.01	.31
Emp. * Aff. Bias	.05	.09	[-.14, .23]	197	.48	.63
Int. Emp. Bias	.27	.05	[.08, .27]	197	3.75	<.001***
Exp. Manipulation	.03	.09	[-.15, .20]	197	.28	.78
Age	-.00	.01	[-.01, .01]	197	-.00	.99
Sex	-.03	.09	[-.14, .23]	197	-.44	.66

A mediation analysis (see Figure 3.2) once again suggested that Affect Bias significantly predicted Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = .006$, $SE = .002$, $p < .001$) but not Moral Responsibility Bias ($\beta = .002$, $SE = .001$, $p = .28$). Empathy negatively predicted Intergroup Empathy Bias ($\beta = -.24$, $SE = .11$, $p = .03$) but not Moral Responsibility Bias ($\beta = -.04$, $SE = .10$, $p = .71$). Intergroup Empathy Bias predicted Moral Responsibility Bias ($\beta = .24$, $p < .001$). Overall, there was a significant indirect effect of Affect Bias on Moral Responsibility Bias ($\beta = .002$, $95\% \text{ CI} = [.0004, .003]$, $p = .006$). On the other hand, Empathy also had a marginally significant indirect effect on Moral Responsibility Bias ($\beta = -.06$, $95\% \text{ CI} = [-.12, .002]$, $p = .06$).

Figure 3.2 Mediation Diagram Depicting the Effects on Moral Responsibility Bias



3.3 Discussion

Much like Study 1, the results of Study 2 were largely in support of the Higher-level Bias Account. This is because Affect Bias predicted Intergroup Empathy Bias, which, in turn, predicted moral judgment biases. However, the results of Study 2 diverted from Study 1 in two ways: First, this time Empathy was significantly linked to Intergroup Empathy Bias. In opposition to H1 of the Inherent Bias Account, there was an inverse relationship between Empathy and Intergroup Empathy Bias rather than a positive relationship. Second, in the previous study, Affect Bias only had a significant indirect effect on Biased Approval for Punishment but not Moral Responsibility Bias through Intergroup Empathy Bias. This time, this indirect effect held for both moral judgment biases, providing a stronger support for the Higher-level Bias Account.

The main purpose of this study was to experimentally induce empathy and investigate its downstream consequences on intergroup empathy biases and moral judgment biases. However, despite successfully inducing emotional arousal in participants, the Socio-affective Video Task failed to increase empathy for the vignette characters. This precludes me from using it to assess the Inherent Bias Account and the Higher-level Bias account. One reason for this null effect could be that I conducted this experiment online. This task was exclusively used in laboratory settings, and particularly in experiments that utilize fMRI. In such settings, it is much easier for participants to pay attention to the content of the video, and for the researchers to tailor the environment such that participants can easily focus on the content. As a result, although the videos seem to be capable of generating emotional arousal,

this arousal may not be powerful enough to carry over to vignettes and impact empathy judgments. Another reason could be the sheer amount of detail included in the vignettes. Such long and detailed vignettes could have immersed participants in the story told in them, effectively diverting participants' attention away from their emotional state, thereby neutralizing the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation.

4. GENERAL DISCUSSION

Empathy promotes prosocial behavior (Decety et al. 2016), and that is considered as morally good. Intergroup empathy bias, on the other hand, does the opposite: It predicts reduced support for humanitarian services that support suffering outgroups, and even wishing harm on the outgroup (Bruneau et al. 2017). In an attempt to prevent such consequences, researchers tried to better understand how intergroup empathy bias comes to be. However, they are currently divided on whether it is a consequence of higher-level beliefs, goals and motivations regulating otherwise impartial empathic resources in their direction (the Higher-level Bias Account) or is embedded in empathy itself (the Inherent Bias Account). To the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical work in the literature that compares these accounts, and the purpose of the present work is to fill this gap in the literature. As a consequence, Study 1 aimed to contribute to the resolution of this divide by comparing direct implications of the aforementioned accounts using a simple, correlational design. It found that higher-level biases predict intergroup empathy bias and moral judgment biases, but general empathy levels do not. Thus, the results of Study 1 lended support to the Higher-level Bias Account. Study 2 was an extended replication of Study 1 in which I aimed to experimentally test the claim of the Inherent Bias Account that increased levels of empathy can boost intergroup empathy bias and moral judgment biases by attempting to induce empathy in a group of participants. The experimental treatment failed to manipulate empathy among participants but it successfully replicated the findings of Study 1. Overall, the results of both studies support the Higher-level Bias Account but not the Inherent Bias Account.

To be more precise, results of both studies are in support of the “motivated emotion regulation” approach on empathy regulation (Cameron 2018; Zaki 2014, 2020). Participants regulated how much empathy they feel towards fictitious ingroup and outgroup members (intergroup empathy bias) in line with their general feelings about those groups (affect bias). This is parallel with a host of research in the motivated emotion regulation literature (Porat et al. 2020). For example, Porat

and colleagues (2016) conducted a study where they found that previous feelings about outgroups and emotional preferences about them such as wanting to be angry at them can deeply impact how participants will feel about a certain outgroup. In Study 1 and 2, participants similarly indicated the valence of their feelings about the ingroup and the outgroup, and the difference between them predicted the difference between how much empathy they felt for the ingroup and outgroup, and indirectly, the difference between their moral judgments about those groups. This suggests a possible top-down influence of biases on how empathy will be regulated, which is exactly what the Higher-level Bias Account suggests.

However, there is a finding that the Higher-level Bias Account may have substantial difficulty if it were to try to explain. In Study 2, higher empathy ratings predicted lower intergroup empathy bias, or in other words, a more impartial regulation of empathy. This finding sits well with a lot of studies that investigated empathy in intergroup settings (Bäckström and Björklund 2007, Bobba and Crocetti 2022, Levin et al. 2016; McFarland, 2010) in which participants' tendency to be empathic generally predicted lower levels of prejudice. This potentially indicates that how much empathic resources one has could influence how it will be regulated. If this is really the case, the Higher-level Bias Account does not offer any direct theoretical explanations as to why increased levels of empathy predicts lower levels of biased empathy regulation. It expects empathy to be impartial, only to be influenced by higher-level biases in a goal-directed manner.

One reason that might explain why empathy is negatively associated with intergroup empathy bias could be that we can read the relationship between them in reverse, as the results of both studies above were obtained through correlational methods. If, as per the Higher-level Bias Account, higher-level biases largely control how empathy will be regulated, people with higher levels of bias will demonstrate biased empathy regulation. As a result of this, some people could start feeling less-than-normal empathy for an outgroup. If reduced empathy for the outgroup does not always come with a compensation such as increased empathy for the ingroup, there will be a net reduction in overall empathy felt. If this explanation holds, the Higher-level Bias Account could be saved as both rely on the idea that although empathy itself can be neutral, it can also be influenced by biases. However, if this explanation is true, we would expect to see similar findings in Study 1 and Bruneau and colleagues' (2017) studies where empathy predicts reduced intergroup empathy bias. But, in those studies empathy does not predict intergroup empathy bias, casting doubt over this explanation.

Another explanation involves a possible dual influence where individual differences in

the tendency to feel empathy have an influence over how empathy will be regulated in intergroup settings. Increased tendency to feel empathy can be followed by reduced unwillingness to take outgroups' and ingroups' perspectives. It could also make this process easier because through learning (see Wang et al. 2013 for compassion training). Indeed, there are studies in which giving children a perspective taking training reduced the bias in their altruistic behavior (Sierksma et al. 2014), and similarly, compassion training reduced prejudice against Palestinians among Israeli children (Berger et al. 2018). Such findings increase the possibility that there might be a dual influence on empathy where how much empathic resources one has also influences how their empathy will be regulated. This thesis, however, does not provide direct and consistent evidence for or against such a dual influence claim, as in Study 1 we could not find a significant link between empathy and intergroup empathy bias, and the results of Study 2 is based on a correlational design. This requires further research to examine the veracity of the dual influence account.

The Inherent Bias Account, on the other hand, enjoyed no support from the findings at all. This is not too surprising, because, as reported in the introduction, there is no self-report empathy study that I know of that positively links general levels of empathy to any undesirable social or moral outcome with the notable exception of Simas and colleagues (2020). However, there are studies from neuroimaging (Han 2018) and medical pain (Chapman et al. 2013) literatures which conceptualize empathy as a fast, automatic perception of and response to others suffering. They suggest that empathy, in that form, could by default be biased. And the findings of the present work cannot rule this possibility out. It can be ruled out only when, as the Higher-level Bias Account argues, the effects of automatic components of empathy are shown to be relatively minor and can be overridden by consciously regulated, motivated empathy (Zaki 2014). To further inform the debate between the Inherent Bias Account and the Higher-level Bias Account, then, researchers should devise studies that compare the effects of automatic and implicit empathic responses with more explicit empathic responses in predicting intergroup empathy bias and moral judgment biases.

There are two important limitations of the studies in this dissertation that could require further investigation for clarification, aside from the correlational nature of both studies and the failed experimental manipulation of empathy discussed in previous sections. First, the detailed nature of vignettes in both studies could have influenced some of our results. Bruneau and colleagues (2015) reported that increased mental state content and contextual detail in vignettes reduced intergroup empathy bias by decreasing the salience of group membership and increasing the salience of the particular situation the main character is in. This effect was so

strong that in some tests, the difference between empathy felt for the ingroup and the outgroup became non-significant. In our first study, I found a small intergroup empathy bias, and in our second study, I could not detect any intergroup empathy bias at all. The reason for this could be the effect Bruneau and colleagues (2015) reported, because I gave a lot of background and contextual detail about the characters in the vignettes. This effect could also be partly responsible for the null effect I found in our experimental manipulation attempt as I discussed in the previous section. If the usage of detailed vignettes heavily concentrates participants' attention on the situation of the main character, the effect of Socio-affective Video Task may not have carried over to the empathy judgments participants had to make after reading highly detailed vignettes. To eliminate this possibility, researchers can run this experiment in a lab setting, and manipulate vignette content as well as length to see whether the presence of intergroup empathy bias and the effect of empathy manipulations depends on the contextual detail.

The second limitation is that the studies above did not attempt to manipulate bias levels in order to experimentally assess the Higher-level Bias account. This means that although the results seem to support the Higher-level Bias Account, the causal structure proposed by it is not corroborated, and therefore the validity of the account is not yet warranted. Due to time limitations and technical challenges, however, I could not conduct a study that could experimentally assess the Higher-level Bias Account. I opted for an empathy experiment first, because bias reduction interventions such as vicarious contact would require me to first ask people to read positive contact stories of a group that they are biased against, and then ask them to tell me how much they empathize with that outgroup. This could exacerbate demand effects too much. As a remedy, I could use different outgroups in the interventions. But generally, secondary transfer effects are relatively small (Pettigrew 2009), and so to detect the effects of such an intervention may require sample sizes that are too large to collect data from.

These challenges of the bias reduction intervention incentivized me to first run the empathy intervention, which had a very large effect size (Klimecki et al. 2013, Klimecki et al. 2014) and was not likely to create any additional demand effects. Consequently, Study 2 became an extended replication of Study 1, extension being the empathy manipulation. As a result, although highly supportive of the Higher-level Bias Account, the present work did not test it with an experiment, and therefore the causal structure of the Higher-level Bias Account is open to criticisms. To better assess the validity of the claims of the Higher-level Bias Account requires experimental testing but achieving that without increasing the likelihood of demand effects remains an important technical challenge for future research to deal with.

One way to circumvent these problems about demand effects could be to rely on a natural experiment: For example, a researcher could collect data from the members of anti-immigrant right-wing political parties and pro-immigrant NGOs. One would naturally expect pro-immigrant NGO members to have less bias against immigrant outgroups. In this case, if membership to these organizations predicts intergroup empathy bias as well as biased moral judgment, the causal structure that the Higher-level Bias Account proposes can be better supported.

5. CONCLUSION

This study aimed to fill the gap in the literature on whether intergroup empathy bias and its undesirable moral consequences emanate from a bias inherent to empathy or top-down influences of biased beliefs, goals and motivations on empathy. It therefore constitutes a first step in empirically comparing two major theoretical accounts on intergroup empathy bias. Both studies in the present work found support for the theoretical account that stipulated top-down influences, as affect bias but not empathy predicted intergroup empathy bias, and moral judgment biases. However, these findings should not be treated as a final verdict on the debate. Further, particularly experimental work is needed to better assess and understand the causal structures that both accounts put forward.

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APPENDIX A

A.1 Vignettes

A.1.1 Syrian Main Character 1

Amina, 27 yaşında Suriyeli bir kadındır.

Kendine zor da olsa Bursa'da, küçük bir tekstil atölyesinde iş bulmuştur. Günde 10 saat kadar yoğun bir şekilde çalışmakta ve asgari ücret kazanmaktadır. Bu parayla da eşi ve 2 çocuğundan oluşan ailesinin geçimine katkıda bulunmaya çalışmaktadır.

Bir gün, sürekli başkaları için kıyafet dikmesine rağmen kendisinin kıyafet alacak parası olmamasına ve eski püskü, yamalı kıyafetler giymesine içerlenmiştir. Ardından depodan 4-5 tane elbise, 2-3 tane de pantolon çalmıştır. Depoda envanter sayımlarının sık sık yapılmamasına güvenip görülmeyeceğini sanmıştır.

Fakat sonraki gün atölyede bir sayım yapılmasına karar verilmiş, eksikler fark edilince de güvenlik kamerasından Amina'nın elbise ve pantolon çaldığını görülmüştür. Ardından da firma Amina'yı kovup çevredeki esnafa onun güvenilmez biri olduğunu, iş verilmemesi gerektiğini iletmiştir. Amina bundan dolayı uzunca bir süre iş aramak zorunda kalacaktır.

A.1.2 Syrian Main Character 2

Tareq, 10 yaşında bir Suriyeli erkek çocuğudur.

Entegrasyon programı kapsamında bulunduğu mahalledeki bir okula gitmekte, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'nın müfredatındaki dersleri almaktadır. Tareq matematik derslerinde çok zorlanmaktadır. Ne kadar çalışsa da ilk yazılıdan oldukça düşük bir not almıştır. Sınıf arkadaşları onunla konuşmak istemediği için onlardan da not veya ödev yardımı alamamaktadır.

İkinci yazılıdan önceki günün çıkışında, sınıfın başarılı çocuklarından biri, matematik defteri sırasının üstünde olduğu halde arkadaşlarıyla konuşmak için dışarı çıkmıştır. Sınıfı geçemezse ailesinin onu okuldan alıp çalışmaya vereceğini düşünen Tareq, bu fırsatı değerlendirip arkadaşının defterini çalmış, o defterden hazırlanarak yazılıdan görece yüksek bir not almıştır.

Defteri çalınan çocuk düşük bir not alıp buna üzülmüş, ardından Tareq'in aldığı notu fark etmiş ve bunu öğretmene söylemiştir. Öğretmen, Tareq'in çantasında defteri bulmuştur. Okul idaresi Tareq aynı anda iki suç işlediği için 6 ay uzaklaştırma cezası verme kararı almıştır. Tareq, ailesinin bu durumda onu okuldan tamamen alacağını söylemiş, daha az ceza vermelerini istemiştir. Okul idaresinin kararı değişmemiş, uzaklaştırma cezası Tareq'in ailesine haber verildiğinde de ailesi Tareq'i okuldan almıştır.

A.1.3 Syrian Main Character 3

Mahmoud, 32 yaşında, İstanbul'da çalışan Suriyeli bir taksi sürücüsüdür. Kendisinin ve ailesinin geçimini zar zor sağlamaktadır.

Mahmoud'un gece taksisine çıktığı bir gün, arabasına aşırı miktarda alkol almış, sarhoş 2 kişi binmiştir. Bu kişiler koltukları tekmelemiş, birbirleriyle bağırarak konuşmuş, ara sıra pek de nedeni olmadığı halde Mahmoud'a birkaç kez kızıp hakaret etmiştir. Hatta yolculardan biri, varış noktasına yaklaşılınca arabaya kusmuştur. Varış noktasına gelindiğinde taksimetre yolcuların 250 Lira ödemesi gerektiğini göstermiştir. Mahmoud, yolcuların sarhoşluğundan yararlanıp 400 Lira talep etmiştir ve yolcular da durumu fark etmeyip bu parayı kredi kartlarıyla ödemişlerdir.

Bir sonraki gün, yolculardan biri gittikleri yolun 400 Lira tutamayacağını düşünüp internetten yolculuğun bedelini yeniden hesaplamıştır. Taksicinin 150 lira fazla para aldığını fark eden yolcu, Mahmoud'un bağlı olduğu taksi durağını arayıp bu durumu anlatmış, GPS kayıtlarını ve kredi kartı ödeme dökümlerini kullanarak durağı dava edebileceklerini söylemiştir. Dava açmamanın tek şartı olarak Mahmoud'un kovulmasını istemiştir. Taksi durağı bir davayı göze alamadığından Mahmoud'u işten çıkarıp bunu Taksiciler Odası'na bildirmiş, Mahmoud'un taksicilik lisansını iptal ettirmiştir. Bu yüzden Mahmoud artık taksicilik yapamayacaktır.

A.1.4 Turkish Main Character 1

Hatice, 27 yaşında bir kadındır.

Kendine zor da olsa Bursa'da, küçük bir tekstil atölyesinde iş bulmuştur. Günde 10 saat kadar yoğun bir şekilde çalışmakta ve asgari ücret kazanmaktadır. Bu parayla da eşi ve 2 çocuğundan oluşan ailesinin geçimine katkıda bulunmaya çalışmaktadır.

Bir gün, sürekli başkaları için kıyafet dikmesine rağmen kendisinin kıyafet alacak parası olmamasına ve eski püskü, yamalı kıyafetler giymesine içerlenmiştir. Ardından depodan 4-5 tane elbise, 2-3 tane de pantolon çalmıştır. Depoda envanter sayımlarının sık sık yapılmamasına güvenip görülmeyeceğini sanmıştır.

Fakat sonraki gün atölyede bir sayım yapılmasına karar verilmiş, eksikler fark edilince de güvenlik kamerasından Hatice'nin elbise ve pantolon çaldığı görülmüştür. Ardından da firma Hatice'yi kovmuş ve çevredeki esnafa onun güvenilmez biri olduğunu, iş verilmemesi gerektiğini iletmiştir. Hatice bundan dolayı uzunca bir süre iş aramak zorunda kalacaktır.

A.1.5 Turkish Main Character 2

Mehmet, 10 yaşında bir erkek çocuğudur.

Mehmet, mahallesindeki bir okula gitmekte ve matematik derslerinde çok zorlanmaktadır. Ne kadar çalışsa da ilk yazılıdan oldukça düşük bir not almıştır. Sınıf arkadaşları onunla konuşmak istemediği için onlardan da not veya ödev yardımı alamamaktadır.

İkinci yazılıdan önceki günün çıkışında, sınıfın başarılı çocuklarından biri, matematik defteri sırasının üstünde olduğu halde arkadaşlarıyla konuşmak için dışarı çıkmıştır. Sınıfı geçemezse ailesinin onu okuldan alıp çalışmaya vereceğini düşünen Mehmet, bu fırsatı değerlendirip arkadaşının defterini çalmış, o defterden hazırlanarak yazılıdan görece yüksek bir not almıştır.

Defteri çalınan çocuk düşük bir not alıp buna üzülmüş, ardından Mehmet'in aldığı notu fark etmiş ve bunu öğretmene söylemiştir. Öğretmen, Mehmet'in çantasında defteri bulmuştur. Okul idaresi, Mehmet aynı anda iki suç işlediği için 6 ay uzaklaştırma cezası verme kararı almıştır. Mehmet, ailesinin bu durumda onu okuldan tamamen alacağını söylemiş, daha az ceza vermelerini istemiştir. Okul idaresinin kararı değişmemiş, uzaklaştırma cezası Mehmet'in ailesine haber verildiğinde de ailesi Mehmet'i okuldan almıştır.

A.1.6 Turkish Main Character 3

Fehmi, 32 yaşında, İstanbul'da çalışan bir taksi sürücüsüdür. Kendisinin ve ailesinin geçimini zar zor sağlamaktadır.

Fehmi'nin gece taksisine çıktığı bir gün, arabasına aşırı miktarda alkol almış, sarhoş 2 kişi binmiştir. Bu kişiler koltukları tekmelememiş, birbirleriyle bağırarak konuşmuş, ara sıra pek de nedeni olmadığı halde Fehmi'ye birkaç kez kızıp hakaret etmiştir. Hatta yolculardan biri, varış noktasına yaklaşılınca arabaya kusmuştur. Varış noktasına gelindiğinde taksimetre yolcuların 250 Lira ödemesi gerektiğini göstermiştir. Fehmi, yolcuların sarhoşluğundan yararlanıp 400 Lira talep etmiştir ve yolcular da durumu fark etmeyip bu parayı kredi kartlarıyla ödemişlerdir.

Bir sonraki gün, yolculardan biri gittikleri yolun 400 Lira tutamayacağını düşünüp internetten yolculuğun bedelini yeniden hesaplamıştır. Taksicinin 150 lira fazla para aldığı fark eden yolcu, Fehmi'nin bağlı olduğu taksi durağını arayıp bu durumu anlatmış, GPS kayıtlarını ve kredi kartı ödeme dökümlerini kullanarak durağı dava edebileceklerini söylemiştir. Dava açmamanın tek şartı olarak Fehmi'nin kovulmasını istemiştir. Taksi durağı bir davayı göze alamadığından Fehmi'yi işten çıkarıp bunu Taksiciler Odası'na bildirmiş, Fehmi'nin taksicilik lisansını iptal ettirmiştir. Bu yüzden Fehmi artık taksicilik yapamayacaktır.

A.2 Links for the Videos in Study 2 and Their Descriptions

A.2.1 Training Set

1- Her Pazar sabahı, Mohamed'in ailesi pazara gider. Oradan 15 dakika uzakta yaşıyorlar. Alışveriş yaptıktan sonra öğlen yemeğini hazırlarlar. <https://youtu.be/FTtdR31AKjk>

2- Didier, kartını evde unutan kardeşine kartını verebilmek için arabayla kardeşinin okuluna gidiyor. Kütüphaneden kitap alabilmesi için bu kart ona lazım. <https://youtu.be/nhwQtKuW45s>

3- Bu video, bir köyün merkez pazarında çekilmiş. Sebzeler ve balıklar burada en çok bulabileceğiniz şeyler. <https://youtu.be/nhwQtKuW45s>

4- Bill bir araştırmacı gazeteci. İşi için sık sık dünyayı geziyor. 5 dil biliyor. <https://youtu.be/urRUNp6TWqk>

A.2.2 Treatment Set

- 1- Jasmina'ya polis karakolunda kayıp çocuklarının resmi gösteriliyor. Polis, çocukların, kaçırdıkları çocukları satan bir çetenin elinde olduğunu söylüyor. <https://youtu.be/a-3FH4zWzgc>
- 2- Fatıma ve ailesi, kaldıkları mülteci kampından, kapasite yetersizliği sebebiyle çıkarılıyorlar. <https://youtu.be/aVoqrdBfWTY>
- 3- Bu videoda, bir bölgede kullanılan zehirli tarım ilaçları sebebiyle sakat kalmış çocukların ebeveynlerinin protestosu görülüyor. Anita da mağdurların annelerinden biri. <https://youtu.be/fid-eRW7IPg>
- 4- Fernando, verem olan oğlunun üzerinde bir ilaç firmasının yeni geliştirdiği verem ilacını denemesine izin veriyor. Bu ilacın mide ve bağırsaklar üzerinde ciddi yan etkilerinin olduğu ve klinik deneylerin etik sınırlar içinde yapılmadığı daha sonra öğreniliyor. Fernando'nun oğlu da diğer çocuklar gibi bu yan etkilerden ötürü hastaneye kaldırılıyor. <https://youtu.be/d1137cuwTY4>
- 5- Elia, öğretmen olarak çalıştığı okula köktendinci teröristler tarafından yapılan bir saldırı sırasında yaralanıyor. Bu saldırı, 25 çocuğun ve 5 öğretmenin ölümüyle sonuçlanıyor. <https://youtu.be/19kN4LJgFtY>
- 6- Gloria, eve geldiğinde sarhoş olan kocası tarafından şiddete uğramış ve hastaneye kaldırılmış. <https://youtu.be/MpDr2nnkNbc>
- 7- Jamila'nın çocukları, evlerindeki kötü hijyenik şartlardan dolayı koleraya yakalandılar. Jamila'nın çocuğu, o yakınlarındaki bir sağlık ocağına yetişmeye çalıştıktan birkaç saat sonra hayatını kaybetti. <https://youtu.be/jEdplGGHPUA>
- 8- Bu video, askeri bir kampta birkaç ay boyunca tutulan bazı tutsakları gösteriyor. Bu tutsakların çoğu, ülkelerindeki totaliter rejimi protesto ederken tutuklanmış insanlar. <https://youtu.be/iwZpN4y-w9c>
- 9- Büyük bir sel, Marco'nun ve eşinin yaşadıkları köyü vurmuş. Marco, bu felaketten etkilenmeyen bir alanda çalıştığı için bu selden kurtulabilmiş. Fakat eşi, o sırada evde olduğu için hayatını kaybetmiş. <https://youtu.be/xdmdqu23nqo>

A.2.3 Control Set

1- Jenny ve iki arkadaşı, bir oyun alanının yanına oturup işleriyle ilgili projelerinden bahsetmeye başlayana kadar mahallelerinin parkında gezdiler. <https://youtu.be/UZdX7VpccYU>

2- Bu videoda, bölgenin çiftçileri, pazardaki tezgahlarını hazırlıyorlar. Hala erken bir vakitteler ve ilk müşterilerinin gelmesini bekliyorlar. <https://youtu.be/ya7fjDudH8U>

3- Bu videoda, Amara, komşu köylerindeki okula gidiyor. Günlerden Pazartesi. Bugün matematik ve coğrafya dersleri var. Onun arkasında, bir kadın Amara'nın okuluna su taşıyor. <https://youtu.be/VlyzuKjUcgA>

4- Bu videoda, bir aracı tamir eden üç tamirci ara verip birbirleriyle muhabbet ediyor, müşterilerine tavsiyeler veriyorlar. <https://youtu.be/ZdFnKevT-2w>

5- Bu videoda, Mathias, bahçede arkadaşlarıyla futbol oynarken kırıdığı bir şeyi tamir ediyor. <https://youtu.be/kVaalnEQwyg>

6- Bu videoda, Olivia akşam yemeğini masaya getiriyor. Oğlu, bir arkadaşını akşamı beraber geçirmek için eve davet etmiş. <https://youtu.be/jqX9EtiJZT0>

7- Bankta oturan Maya, işi hakkında konuşuyor. Kendisi, 2-5 yaş arasındaki çocuklara bakan bir anaokulu öğretmeni. <https://youtu.be/ya7fjDudH8U>

8- Bugün günlerden Pazar. Homar ve kardeşleri haftalık çamaşır işlerini yapıyorlar. <https://youtu.be/FYSwAVx7rCY>

9- Bu videoda Jeremiah ve kuzenleri ateş yakmaya hazırlanıyorlar. Jeremiah en küçükleri olduğu için, odun toplamakla görevli. <https://youtu.be/L5LqOe6I-qw>

APPENDIX B

B.1 Consent form for Study 1

Sabancı Üniversitesi

Çalışmaya Katılım için Onam Formu

Araştırmanın Başlığı: Ahlaki İkilemlerin Psikolojisi

Araştırmanın Yürütücüsü: Doç. Dr. Sabahat Çiğdem Bağcı

Sorumlu Master Öğrencisi: Faruk Tayyip Yalçın

Değerli Katılımcı,

Bu çalışma, Sabancı Üniversitesi Psikoloji Programı kapsamında ahlaki ikilemler üzerine yürütülen bir araştırmanın bir parçasıdır. Çalışmanın temel amacı, ahlaki ikilemlere bazı yanlılıkların içkin olup olmadığını anlamaktır. Çalışmaya katılımınızın çalışma kapsamında incelenen konuya katkı sağlayacağı düşünülmektedir. Sonuçlarının yalnız bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılacak olan bu çalışmaya katılımınız tamamen sizin isteğinize bağlıdır. Araştırmada yer almayı reddedebilir, herhangi bir aşamada çalışmadan çekilebilirsiniz. Çalışmaya katılımınız için size para verilmeyecek ya da karşılığında herhangi bir şey istenmeyecektir. Sizden herhangi bir kimlik bilgisi alınmayacak ve vereceğiniz bilgiler tamamen gizli kalacaktır. Çalışmadan elde edilen veriler grup olarak değerlendirilecek ve yalnızca bu çalışma kapsamında kullanılacaktır. Ayrıca, bütün bu veriler, şifreli bir bilgisayarda saklanacaktır. Çalışmaya katılımın öngörülen herhangi bir olumsuz etkisi yoktur.

Çalışmanın tamamlanması 10 dakika sürmektedir. Eğer Sabancı Üniversitesi öğrencisi iseniz, bu çalışmaya katılarak 0.5 SONA puanı (yani 0.25 ders puanı) kazanırsınız.

Anketlerde yer alan sorular için doğru ya da yanlış cevap yoktur. Araştırma sonuçlarının sağlıklı olması için soruları eksiksiz ve içtenlikle, sizi tam olarak yansıtan şekilde cevaplamamız çok önemlidir.

18 yaşında veya daha büyük olmak ve anadilinizin Türkçe olması bu çalışmaya katılımınızın ön şartlarıdır. Çalışmaya katıldığımızda bunu doğrulamış olursunuz.

Ařađıdaki butona basarak alıřmaya bařlayabilirsiniz.

Herhangi bir sorunuz varsa Faruk Tayyip Yalın ile f****@sabanciuniv.edu e-mail adresinden iletiřime geebilirsiniz. Eđer haklarınıza zarar verildiđini dűřünürseniz, lűtfen Sabancı niversitesi Arařtırma Etik Kurul Bařkanı Prof. Dr. Mehmet Yıldız ile telefonla (216) **** ya da e-mail ile m****@sabanciuniv.edu iletiřime geiniz. Katkılarınızdan dolayı teřekkűr ederiz.

B.2 Debriefing Statement for Study 1

Sabancı Üniversitesi

Çalışma için Açıklama Formu

Araştırmanın Başlığı: Empati Yanlı mıdır Yoksa Yanlılıkları Önler mi?

Araştırmanın Yürütücüsü: Doç. Dr. Sabahat Çiğdem Bağcı

Sorumlu Master Öğrencisi: Faruk Tayyip Yalçın

Değerli Katılımcı,

Bu çalışmada, grup temelli yanlılıkların (örneğin takım, milliyet vs. tutmak) kime ne kadar empati duyacağımızı etkileyip etkilemediğini anlamaya çalıştık. Bununla beraber, daha fazla empati hissetme kapasitesine sahip bireylerin daha fazla yanlılık sergileyip sergilemeyeceğini anlamaya çalıştık. Katılımınız bu çalışmaya önemli bir katkıda bulundu, çok teşekkür ederiz. Eğer f****@sabanciuniv.edu'ya mail adresinizi yazarsanız, çalışma tamamlanıp sonuçları elde edildiği zaman bu sonuçları size göndereceğiz!

Herhangi bir sorunuz ya da şikayetiniz varsa Faruk Tayyip Yalçın ile f****@sabanciuniv.edu@sabanciuniv.edu e-mail adresinden iletişime geçebilirsiniz. Eğer haklarımıza zarar verildiğini düşünürseniz, lütfen Sabancı Üniversitesi Araştırma Etik Kurul Başkanı Prof. Dr. Mehmet Yıldız ile telefonla (216) ***** ya da e-mail ile m****@sabanciuniv.edu iletişime geçiniz. Katkılarımızdan dolayı teşekkür ederiz.

B.3 Consent form for Study 2

Sabancı Üniversitesi

Çalışmaya Katılım için Onam Formu

Araştırmanın Başlığı: Ahlaki İkilemlerin Psikolojisi II

Araştırmanın Yürütücüsü: Doç. Dr. Sabahat Çiğdem Bağcı

Sorumlu Master Öğrencisi: Faruk Tayyip Yalçın

Değerli Katılımcı,

Bu çalışma, Sabancı Üniversitesi Psikoloji Programı kapsamında ahlaki ikilemler üzerine yürütülen bir araştırmanın bir parçasıdır. Çalışmanın temel amacı, ahlaki ikilemlere bazı yanlılıkların içkin olup olmadığını anlamaktır. Çalışmaya katılımınızın çalışma kapsamında incelenen konuya katkı sağlayacağı düşünülmektedir. Sonuçlarının yalnız bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılacak olan bu çalışmaya katılımınız tamamen sizin isteğinize bağlıdır. Araştırmada yer almayı reddedebilir, herhangi bir aşamada çalışmadan çekilebilirsiniz. Çalışmaya katılımınız için size para verilmeyecek ya da karşılığında herhangi bir şey istenmeyecektir. Sizden herhangi bir kimlik bilgisi alınmayacak ve vereceğiniz bilgiler tamamen gizli kalacaktır. Çalışmadan elde edilen veriler grup olarak değerlendirilecek ve yalnızca bu çalışma kapsamında kullanılacaktır. Ayrıca, bütün bu veriler, şifreli bir bilgisayarda saklanacaktır.

Çalışmanın tamamlanması yaklaşık 20 dakika sürmektedir. Eğer Sabancı Üniversitesi öğrencisi iseniz, bu çalışmaya katılarak 0.5 SONA puanı (yani 0.25 ders puanı) kazanırsınız.

Çalışma sırasında bazı videolar izlemenizi isteyeceğiz. Bu videoların içeriği size biraz rahatsızlık hissi verebilir. Fakat bu prosedürün bilinen herhangi bir zararı yoktur. İzleyeceğiniz videolardaki içerikler daha önce yayınlanmış birçok araştırmada kullanılmıştır.

Anketlerde yer alan sorular için doğru ya da yanlış cevap yoktur. Araştırma sonuçlarının sağlıklı olması için soruları eksiksiz ve içtenlikle, sizi tam olarak yansıtan şekilde cevaplamamız çok önemlidir.

18 yaşında veya daha büyük olmak ve anadilinizin Türkçe olması bu çalışmaya katılmanızın ön şartlarıdır. Çalışmaya katıldığınızda bunu doğrulamış olursunuz.

Aşağıdaki butona basarak çalışmaya katılmayı ve verilerinizin Qualtrics tarafından

kaydedileceğini kabul etmiş olacaksınız (Bu butona tıklamadığınız durumda çalışmaya devam edemezsiniz).

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B.4 Debriefing Statement for Study 2

Sabancı Üniversitesi

Çalışma için Açıklama Formu

Araştırmanın Başlığı: Empati Yanlı mıdır Yoksa Yanlılıkları Önler mi?

Araştırmanın Yürütücüsü: Doç. Dr. Sabahat Çiğdem Bağcı

Sorumlu Master Öğrencisi: Faruk Tayyip Yalçın

Değerli Katılımcı,

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Bu çalışmaya katılmış olsanız da verilerinizin analize dahil edilmemesini hala talep edebilirsiniz. Bu durumda dahi katılmak için aldığımız SONA puanını alabilirsiniz. Bunun için lütfen aşağıdaki kutucuğa verilerinizin işlenmesini istemediğinizi yazın.

Herhangi bir sorunuz ya da şikayetiniz varsa Faruk Tayyip Yalçın ile f****@sabanciuniv.edu e-mail adresinden iletişime geçebilirsiniz. Eğer haklarımıza zarar verildiğini düşünürseniz, lütfen Sabancı Üniversitesi Araştırma Etik Kurul Başkanı Prof. Dr. Mehmet Yıldız ile telefonla (216) ***** ya da e-mail ile m****@sabanciuniv.edu iletişime geçiniz. Katkılarınızdan dolayı teşekkür ederiz.