UNDERSTANDING ILLEGITIMACY: COGNITIVE, NORMATIVE, AND REGULATIVE DIMENSIONS

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Submitted to Sabancı Graduate School of Business
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Sabancı University
July 2023

ABSTRACT

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MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION Ph.D DISSERTATION, JULY 2023

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This dissertation explores the concept of illegitimacy, a significant yet overlooked phenomenon in organization theory (OT). Despite the growing interest in social evaluations over the past decade, research has predominantly focused on other macro-level assessments like organizational stigma and legitimacy, while illegitimacy has continued to receive limited attention. However, with an increasing number of studies conflating the concepts of illegitimacy and stigma, scholars have recently called for a more comprehensive examination of illegitimacy to clarify theoretical ambiguities. In response to these calls, this study attempts to develop a precise understanding of the processes behind cognitive, normative, and regulative illegitimacy evaluations. Specifically, through using an interpretative hermeneutical analysis, the dissertation investigates how arabesk, a cultural and commercial category emic to Turkey, evolved into a long-standing subject of contention among the country's intellectuals and became a target of the state-backed media company Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) during the period between 1968 and 1999. The findings suggest that contrary to the depictions in conceptual papers on legitimacy, the dimensions of illegitimacy follow their distinct trajectories and are largely influenced by contextual developments than each other. Further, the evaluations do not exhibit a linear progression where the intensity of illegitimacy gradually increases or decreases. Instead, the processes are irregular, fragmented, and disrupted by external factors. The study also indicates that the entanglement between stigma and normative illegitimacy might not be solely due to illegitimacy being an underexplored concept; OT's exclusive focus on morally sourced stigma may also be an amplifier of the conceptual confusion.

This dissertation contributes to the research on social evaluations by providing insights into the multi-level processes that lead to the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of cognitive, normative, and regulative illegitimacy judgments. It also reveals how these processes differ from models created for legitimacy evaluations. Additionally, the study acknowledges the overlaps between normative illegitimacy and stigma and presents potential avenues for distinguishing between these related concepts.

ÖZET

GAYRİMEŞRULUĞU ANLAMAK: BİLİŞSEL, NORMATİF VE DÜZENLEYİCİ BOYUTLAR

BETÜL ALTUNSU

YÖNETİM VE ORGANİZASYON DOKTORA TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2023

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Behlül Üsdiken

Anahtar Kelimeler: gayrimeşruluk, damgalanma, kültürel kategoriler, hermeneutik, arabesk

Bu tez, örgüt teorisi alanında önemli ancak göz ardı edilen bir fenomen olan gayrimeşruluk kavramını incelemektedir. Son yıllarda sosyal değerlendirmelere artan ilgiye rağmen araştırmalar genellikle örgütsel damgalanma ve meşruiyet gibi diğer makro düzeydeki değerlendirmelere odaklanmış ve gayrimeşruluğu ihmal etmeye devam etmiştir. Ancak, gayrimeşruluk ve damgalanma kavramlarının birbirleriyle giderek daha fazla karıştırılması sonucu, bilim insanları gayrimeşruluğun daha kapsamlı bir şekilde araştırılması ve konseptin netleştirilmesi için çağrıda bulunmuşlardır. Bu çağrılara cevap olarak, bu çalışma bilişsel, normatif (ahlaki) ve düzenleyici gayrimeşruluk değerlendirmeleri için kesin tanımlamalar ve kavramlaştırmalar geliştirmeye çalışmaktadır. İnterpretatif hermeneutik bir analiz metodu kullanarak, tez daha sonra Türkiye'ye özgü bir kültürel ve ticari kategori olan arabeskin 1968 ile 1999 yılları arasında ülkenin aydınları tarafından nasıl uzun süreli tartışma konusu haline getirildiğini ve devlet destekli medya şirketi Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu (TRT) tarafından nasıl hedef alındığını incelemektedir. Bulgular, meşruiyet konseptini çalışan kuramsal makalelerdeki tasvirlerin aksine, gayrimeşruluk boyutlarının kendilerine özgü yolları takip ettiğini ve büyük ölçüde birbirleri yerine bağlamsal gelişmelerden etkilendiğini göstermektedir. Ayrıca, gayrimeşruluk değerlendirmelerinin yoğunluğundaki değişimlerin kademeli olmadığı ve lineer bir yol izlemediği ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunun yerine, süreçler düzensiz, parçalı ve dışsal faktörler tarafından kesintiye uğrayan bir şekilde ilerlemiştir. Ek olarak, bu çalışma damgalanma ve normatif gayrimeşruluk arasındaki karışıklığın sadece gayrimeşru-

luğun yeterince araştırılmamış bir kavram olmasından kaynaklanmadığını, aynı zamanda örgüt teorisinin yalnızca ahlaki kaynaklı damgalanmaya odaklanmasının bu karışıklığa yol açmış olabileceğini ortaya koymuştur.

Sonuç olarak bu tez, kapsamlı bir kavramsal ve ampirik inceleme yaparak bilişsel, normatif ve düzenleyici gayrimeşruluk değerlendirmelerinin oluşmasına, devam etmesine ve yok olmasına yol açan çok seviyeli süreçlere ışık tutmaktadır. Aynı zamanda bu süreçlerin, meşruiyet değerlendirmeleri için oluşturulan modellerden farklılaştığı noktaları göstermektedir. Çalışma ayrıca normatif gayrimeşruluk ve damgalanma arasındaki örtüşmelere dikkat çekerek, bu ilişkili kavramları ayırmakta kullanılabilecek potansiyel yolları sunmaktadır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my parents,
Nursel and Raif Altunsu

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1.   INTRODUCTION

Illegitimacy is often cited in organization theory (OT) as a cause of numerous repercussions, such as resource deprivation, ostracism by industry members, attacks from the media and public at large, and legal punishment, that can seriously hurt or even threaten the survival of targeted organizations or categories (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse, Bundy, Tost & Suchman, 2017; Hudson, 2008; Suchman, 1995; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Zuckerman, 1999). Despite the recognition of these severe consequences, research on illegitimacy has been sporadic and rare, and the concept of illegitimacy has remained under-discovered (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Jensen, 2010; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Zuckerman, 1999).

Scholars have attributed the lack of studies on illegitimacy to the impracticality of the concept of legitimacy, which has accumulated substantial surplus meaning over the years, and to conflicting utilization of the term "illegitimacy" in earlier research (Helms, Patterson & Hudson, 2019; Hudson, 2008; Suddaby, Bitektine & Haack, 2017).

To address the gap created by the limited investigation of illegitimacy, researchers proposed the related, but allegedly more concise, concepts of "organizational stigma" and "categorical stigma" as alternative approaches to studying negative judgments directed at macro-level entities (Hudson, 2008; Vergne, 2012). Subsequently, both organizational and categorical stigma found immediate popularity in the OT literature, leading to the emergence of a cluster of research under the umbrella term of "negative social evaluations" (Devers, Dewett, Mishina & Belsito, 2009; Hudson, 2008; Paetzold, Dipboye & Elsbach, 2008; Vergne, 2012).

Negative social evaluations can be defined as unfavorable beliefs and opinions held by evaluators regarding the properties of organizations and categories (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine, Hill, Song & Vandenberghe, 2020; Devers et al., 2009; Hudson, 2008). As such, they are related to a newer research stream in OT called "legitimacy-as-perception" (Suddaby et al., 2017, p. 451), which advocates for conceptualizing legitimacy as an evaluation or judgment rather than a property owned by organi-

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zations or categories (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Bitektine et al., 2020).

Theoretically, negative social evaluations encompass both illegitimacy and stigma; however, in the past decade, organizational and categorical stigma have dominated the empirical domain Devers et al. (2009); Devers & Mishina (2019); Helms et al. (2019). Further, stigma research has used the term "illegitimacy" inconsistently and generally conflated illegitimacy and stigma (Aranda, Helms, Patterson, Roulet & Hudson, 2023; Devers & Mishina, 2019; Hampel & Tracey, 2019). As a result, scholars have recently emphasized the need for clarifying the definition and conceptual boundaries of illegitimacy and its position in the negative social evaluations literature (Aranda et al., 2023; Devers & Mishina, 2019; Hampel & Tracey, 2019; Helms et al., 2019).

This dissertation argues that the confusion around the concept of illegitimacy and between illegitimacy and stigma have stemmed from a preferential focus on different dimensions of illegitimacy under the same general label (Helms et al., 2019; Hudson, 2008). Legitimacy and its negative counterpart, illegitimacy, are complex constructs that have multiple dimensions, the most prominent ones being cognitive, normative, and regulative (il)legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse et al., 2017; Scott, 2014). However, existing research has primarily studied the normative dimension and ignored the other two (e.g., Anteby, 2010; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Jensen, 2010; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996). This selective focus has exacerbated the confusion of illegitimacy with stigma because organizational and categorical stigma research has also concentrated on negative judgments arising from observations of normative breaches (Devers & Mishina, 2019; Hampel & Tracey, 2019; Hudson, 2008; Vergne, 2012).

Beyond reinforcing the overlap between illegitimacy and stigma, the unbalanced focus on the normative dimension has limited research on illegitimacy in two ways. First, cognitive frameworks that organize social reality have been the central distinguishing contribution of neoinstitutional theory, the theoretical stream where the concept of legitimacy in OT originated (Deephouse et al., 2017; Devers et al., 2009; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Nonetheless, since the late 1990s, both legitimacy and illegitimacy research within neoinstitutional theory have largely overlooked the cognitive dimension (Cornelissen, Durand, Fiss, Lammers & Vaara, 2015; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017). This neglect has reduced the scope of insights generated by the already infrequent illegitimacy studies and disconnected illegitimacy from its traditional theoretical roots. Second, the neglect of the regulative dimension has led researchers to mistakenly equate illegitimacy to the narrower concept of illegality (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland & Sirmon, 2009). Moreover, certain studies have designated

legitimacy as the point at which a category, organization, or practice receives legal approval while depicting illegitimacy as the step before an entity or action becomes completely illegal (Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Webb et al., 2009).

Further, in attempts to differentiate between illegitimacy and stigma and to utilize these concepts clearly and distinctly, some works in negative social evaluations literature adapted the term "illegitimacy" to refer to only cognitive or regulative dimensions (Helms et al., 2019; Lashley & Pollock, 2020). Although such usages provided consistency to the particular studies they were employed by, they have aggravated the overall confusion around the subject.

In addition the conceptual challenges, research in the past decade has demonstrated that while illegitimate entities like chemical pesticides, abortion clinics, and e-cigarettes are struggling to stay afloat (Augustine & Piazza, 2022; Hsu & Grodal, 2021; Maguire & Hardy, 2009), other illegitimate organizations and categories such as the Mafia, terrorist organizations, erotic comedies, and light cigarettes, not only have survived for years but offered significant benefits to their adherents (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Hsu & Grodal, 2015; Jensen, 2010; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015). As a result, the literature on negative social evaluations has devoted substantial attention to how organizations and categories manage the consequences of negative evaluations or how they alleviate or challenge the evaluations themselves (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Helms & Patterson, 2014; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Jensen, 2010; Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Wolfe & Blithe, 2015).

These inquiries generated important insights on strategies that help manage the immense pressure faced by targets of illegitimacy evaluations. However, previous research has selectively focused on cases where target entities successfully improved their situation or even reversed negative judgments. Thus, the limitations of these strategies and the contexts in which they may be less effective are not well understood.

Based on these gaps and contradictions, this dissertation proposes a comprehensive and multidimensional study of illegitimacy, encompassing cognitive, normative, and regulative dimensions. In addition, it takes advantage of the opportunity provided by the empirical context of the study, an illegitimate category whose proponents were not able to change evaluations of inappropriateness for almost three decades, and investigates the conditions that prevent the members of illegitimate organizations or categories from successfully adapting tactics that could save their entity.

Overall, the research questions of this study are as follows:

1. How are cognitive, normative, and regulative illegitimacy evaluations pro-

duced, maintained, and challenged?

2. How do the three dimensions of illegitimacy relate to each other?

3. How do the concepts of illegitimacy and stigma differ from each other?

4. In what contexts do strategies used for managing negative social evaluations fail?

These questions are addressed through an interpretive hermeneutic analysis of the processes that led arabesk, a music and film genre and a market category, to become a symbol of "low-class" cultural, social, and political practices between 1968 and 1999.

Among various approaches to studying legitimacy (Suddaby et al., 2017), this dissertation chose to follow a multi-level linguistic methodology called "communicative institutionalism" (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016). In particular, this perspective argues that culturally shared phenomena, including legitimacy and illegitimacy evaluations, are formed through interactions among individuals, groups, and macro-level actors. As a result, it differs from other approaches in its focus on communicative and interactive processes that occur at the micro, meso, and macro levels (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Cornelissen et al., 2015; Haack, Schilke & Zucker, 2021; Hoefer & Green, 2016).

The specific analytical method of the dissertation is "hermeneutical analysis," which is a type of discourse analysis technique that emphasizes the interrelatedness between cultural and historical contexts and lower-level texts that constitute a discourse (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Phillips & Brown, 1993; Prasad, 2002). The hermeneutic approach aims to gradually knit the broader context and the immediate texts together by going back and forth between sets of focal data and contextual data in multiple iterations to eventually have a complete and nuanced understanding of the events (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Prasad, 2002).

Hermeneutics is considered an appropriate method for this study because of the profound influence of Turkey's historical, political, and social circumstances during the period under investigation on how evaluators perceived and interpreted arabesk music.

Specifically, from the 1960s through the 1970s, Turkey navigated a tumultuous era marked by intense political upheavals leading to a military coup on September 12, 1980. Following this coup, the country was governed by a military regime for three years until the election of a populist, conservative-liberal political party, which then quickly imposed fundamental social and economic changes that altered the trajectory

of cultural developments. Moreover, during this time, the entertainment and music industries were also transforming, with music genres being redefined and the spread of "cassettes" stimulating music production and distribution (Güngör, 1993). In addition, from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s, television (TV) transitioned from a single TRT channel broadcasting only a few hours a day to numerous private channels operating around the clock. These developments had a significant impact on arabesk music and taking them into account is essential for comprehending why arabesk was a target of cognitive, normative, and regulative illegitimacy evaluations for almost three decades.

"Arabesk" music itself was initiated in the late 1960s by singer, songwriter, and producer Orhan Gencebay, who, self-reportedly, created the first arabesk songs by synthesizing various elements from Eastern and Western musical traditions (Özbek, 1991). Gencebay's music quickly gained popularity among public transport drivers as well as in slum settlements, or shanty towns ("gecekondu mahallesi" in Turkish), that were located on the outskirts of metropolitan cities and predominantly inhabited by internal migrants who hailed from rural Anatolia.

The emergence of this new genre initially created confusion among evaluators and sparked the attention of the country's public intellectuals, a group of social commentators that consisted of well-educated journalists, cultural critics, sociologists, and musicians (Özgür, 2006). These intellectuals found Gencebay's music primitive, unpleasant, and depressing and labeled it "arabesk." They also framed the genre as a cultural or social issue that needs to be solved by the government, musicians, and the intellectuals themselves. Additionally, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), the state-backed broadcasting company, and, back then, the media regulator of Turkey, immediately banned Gencebay and his songs from the TV and radio (Güngör, 1993; Stokes, 1992). As such, arabesk was intertwined with each dimension of illegitimacy in one way or another, presenting an appropriate context to pursue answers to the research questions.

1.1 Outline of the Dissertation

The subsequent chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the major theoretical streams that have informed legitimacy and illegitimacy research and explains different approaches to the concept of legiti-

macy and its dimensions. Additionally, it compares other relevant social evaluations, that is, reputation, status, and stigma, to legitimacy and illegitimacy judgments. Chapter 3 delves into the methodology of the dissertation, introduces discourse and hermeneutic analyses, and discusses the empirical setting, data sources, and steps of analysis. Chapter 4 briefly outlines the relevant historical, political, and social developments that are necessary to understand arabesk and the reactions it garnered. Further, this chapter summarizes the state of the Turkish entertainment industry in the 1960s and 1970s and profiles the evaluators of this study. Chapter 5 presents the main findings of the hermeneutic analysis, which are chronologically organized into phases that consist of salient themes of each period. Chapter 6 integrates the findings and theoretical frameworks and explains the important patterns and insights found during the analysis in an attempt to answer the research questions. Chapter 7 highlights the specific contributions of the dissertation, addresses the limitations, offers suggestions for future directions, and concludes the study.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the legitimacy and social evaluations literature in OT as they relate to the objectives of this study. The chapter starts by briefly introducing the terminology and concepts of the significant theoretical streams that form the foundation of legitimacy research. The following section explains the cognitive, normative, and regulative dimensions of legitimacy by comparing the seminal typologies of Aldrich and Fiol (1994), Scott (1995), and Suchman (1995). Continuing, the chapter delves into the more recent developments in legitimacy literature and contrasts them with the traditional approaches. It then clarifies the distinctions between legitimacy and the related concepts of status and reputation. The next section introduces illegitimacy and attempts to identify the gaps and contradictions in the literature. Subsequently, the chapter defines the cognitive, normative, and regulative dimensions of illegitimacy and provides in-depth discussions on each. The section on normative illegitimacy also explores the concept of stigma and juxtaposes it with normative illegitimacy to ascertain the degree of overlap and divergence between these notions. The final section covers the strategies and tactics commonly used by negatively evaluated organizations and categories.

2.1 Major Theoretical Streams

As this study focuses on investigating an illegitimate category, it draws from three theoretical streams in OT that have contributed to the insights on legitimacy. These streams are neoinstitutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977), population (or organizational) ecology (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; 1984), and category research (Hannan, Pólos & Carroll, 2007; Negro, Koçak & Hsu, 2010; Zuckerman, 1999).

First, neoinstitutional theory was introduced by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and has been one of the central and long-running theoretical traditions in OT ever since (Deephouse et al., 2017; Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence & Meyer, 2017). Neoinstitutional theory was unique in that unlike previous theoretical traditions, e.g., the Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and the Contingency Perspective (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), it claimed that organizations were not only shaped by technical considerations but also by "institutions," i.e., widely accepted and rationalized beliefs, understandings, norms, and values (Greenwood et al., 2017; Scott, 2014). Specifically, institutions are taken-for-granted and internalized "social thought[s]" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341) that individuals and organizations use to give meaning to social life and guide action (Scott, 2014). As such, neoinstitutional theory puts its emphasis on shared meaning systems and cognition and mainly deals with how institutions are created, maintained, or dismantled and how institutions affect organizational structure and behavior (Greenwood et al., 2017; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017; Scott, 2014).

Neoinstitutional theory has also been concerned with legitimacy starting from its initiation. For example, Meyer and Rowan (1977) presented legitimacy as an essential tool for protecting organizations from external scrutiny and prescribed that legitimacy could be acquired through conforming to rules, standards, shared beliefs, and values. Meyer and Scott (1983) then offered the first explicit definition of legitimacy in contemporary OT as "the degree of cultural support for an organization − the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts provide explanations for its existence, functioning, and jurisdiction, and lack or deny alternatives," (p. 201) underlining the cultural and cognitive aspects of legitimacy judgments.

Subsequent neoinstitutional studies investigated legitimacy generally in relation to the essential concept of "isomorphism" or the homogeneity of organizations in a given institutional context (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Isomorphism was introduced by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who differentiated between mimetic, normative, and coercive institutional mechanisms that pushed organizations to become similar over time in terms of their goals, structures, and practices. Within this conceptual framework, legitimacy was portrayed as an outcome of isomorphic pressures, where organizations enhance their social acceptance by imitating others and following established norms and rules (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991).

Following DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) mimetic, normative, and coercive mechanisms, Scott (1995) argued that institutions were made up of three pillars, cognitive, normative, and regulative, which acted as "central building blocks of institutional

structures, providing the elastic fibers that guide behavior and resist change." (Scott, 2014, p. 57). For each pillar, Scott (1995) then presented a basis of legitimacy using the same labels. These bases have been commonly used in different legitimacy typologies (e.g., Deephouse et al., 2017; Tost, 2011) and also adopted by this dissertation. The following sections explain Scott's (1995; 2014) propositions on legitimacy in detail.

Another essential phenomenon that was offered by neoinstitutionalists and is related to legitimacy is "decoupling" which occurs when organizations adopt specific structures and practices on the surface to gain approval but engage in activities that may seem improper to some constituents under the façade (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Decoupling is significant because not only was it one of the initial legitimacy management strategies detected, but it also acknowledged the multiplicity and heterogeneity of audiences. Both strategies for managing legitimacy and the extent of similarity between audiences have been important concerns in social evaluation studies (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Deephouse et al., 2017; Haack et al., 2021; Oliver, 1991).

The final neoinstitutional concept that is frequently used in this chapter is "institutional fields." A field is defined as a "recognized area of institutional life" that consists of various constituents like firms, regulators, the government, suppliers, customers, associations, and social movements that are connected in that they must take each other into account on a regular basis (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148; Zietsma, Groenewegen, Logue & Hinings, 2017). Fields and the level of organizational fields are practical while talking about legitimacy because they allow researchers to directly refer to the group of actors whose legitimacy evaluations are likely to have a crucial influence on the target organization.

The second theoretical stream that has contributed to the development of legitimacy is population ecology (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; 1984). Population ecologists creatively applied evolutionary theory to organizational life to explain the variety they observed in existent organizational "forms." An organizational form can be defined as a "particular configuration of core properties and specific patterns of input-output activities" (Negro et al., 2010, p. 6) and is roughly interpreted as the organizational equivalent of biological species. Organizational populations then consist of organizations that share a similar form (Scott & Davis, 2007). Population ecology has been mainly concerned with the birth and death rates of different organizational forms and what makes certain forms thrive at the expense of others (Singh & Lumsden, 1990).

Reflecting this concern, this theoretical stream has studied legitimacy mostly in

its contribution to the survival and prosperity of new forms (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Freeman & Audia, 2006; Singh, Tucker & House, 1986). Organizational ecologists have emphasized that newer forms have higher mortality rates, a phenomenon that was named the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), because newer organizations are not able to accumulate the necessary resources due to their lack of legitimacy (Singh et al., 1986). Therefore, legitimacy studies conducted by population ecologists often have given entrepreneurs prescriptions to gain legitimacy so that exchange partners would engage with the new organization and provide them with the resources that enhance their survival.

Population ecologists of the 1990s defined legitimacy as taken-for-grantedness and measured it through a proxy called population density (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Hannan & Carroll, 1992). According to ecologists, as an organizational form successfully spread in an environment, more and more organizations emulated the said form, which meant that the form was becoming more legitimate (Hannan, Carroll, Dundon & Torres, 1995; Zucker, 1989). Legitimacy in this context could not be observed directly, but it was inferred by looking at the density of the population that the number of organizations adopting a particular form (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). However, increasing legitimacy was not always beneficial at the organizational level. As the number of organizations in the population grew, competition intensified and pushed some members to failure (Scott & Davis, 2007). The peak of legitimacy was designated as the point at which the number of organizations that adopt a form is at its highest (Suddaby et al., 2017).

Although population ecologists commonly used population density as a measure of legitimacy, others heavily criticized it. For instance, Zucker (1989) argued that measuring legitimacy and competition through the number of organizations in a population was not empirically grounded. Instead, she argued that the models used by population ecologists were "rather simplified models that seem to fit the data" (Zucker, 1989, p. 242). Zucker (1989) also claimed that ecologists ignored the social context and the intentions of the actors who could be motivated to adopt a form purely for economic reasons rather than its perceived taken-for-grantedness. In addition, Baum and Powell (1995) denounced population ecologists for solely focusing on cognitive legitimacy (i.e., taken-for-grantedness) and neglecting normative legitimacy and the relationship between the two.

Beyond the controversial measure of population density, population ecologists have contributed to legitimacy research by introducing the third theoretical stream, category research, to OT. Categories can be defined as socially constructed and shared cognitive schemas used to partition and organize reality (Glynn & Navis, 2013; Negro

et al., 2010). Categorization is then the process of uniting a group of organizations, movements, or products based on one or multiple features that are "regarded by audiences as similar enough to constitute a separate cognitive category" (Üsdiken & Kipping, 2020, p. 207-208). The basis of categorization in organizational contexts can be anything from products and services to structures, processes, activities, goals, quality, regulations, or anything else the audiences regard important in their interpretation of the world (Askin & Mauskapf, 2017; Durand & Khaire, 2017; Durand & Paolella, 2013; Glynn & Navis, 2013; Piazza & Perretti, 2015; Özcan & Gürses, 2018).

Although ecologists initially brought category research into OT, neoinstitutional theorists later got involved with categories as well (e.g., Navis & Glynn, 2010; Ruef & Patterson, 2009). Additionally, even though categorization was initially studied as a purely cognitive process, more recent studies have emphasized the sociopolitical and historical nature of categorization (Durand & Khaire, 2017; Glynn & Navis, 2013; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Navis & Glynn, 2010; Ruef & Patterson, 2009). These studies argued that cognitive processes are situated in a social context and that the meaning, content, and boundaries of the categories are negotiated and continuously reconstructed.

Categories are helpful cognitive tools because they render order to the endless stimuli the environment throws at the audiences and ease the cognitive load required to process reality (Lashley & Pollock, 2020). In addition, categories provide their members an identity, let stakeholders know what to expect from category members, and help both insiders and outsiders detect allies and competitors and find benchmarks for valuation, pricing, quality, and volume of production (Alexy & George, 2013; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Negro et al., 2010).

Implicitly, categories have always been a part of neoinstitutional theory and population ecology, as research that examines the field- or population-level phenomena essentially investigates groups of organizations that are similar in some way (Negro et al., 2010). Nonetheless, the explicit introduction of categories to organizational studies was through the works of Zuckerman (Zuckerman, 1999; 2000), who also tied legitimacy and category research (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Negro et al., 2010). Combining population ecology, theories on production markets (White, 1981), and neoinstitutional theory, Zuckerman (1999) proposed that audiences, including experts, critics, and consumers, preferred products that conform to the prototypes of recognized market categories and punished products that deviate from the market prototypes through ignoring them or depreciating their value (Alexy & George, 2013; Hannan et al., 2007; Zuckerman, 2000). Further, Zuckerman (1999) suggested that

conforming to prototypes is a method of gaining legitimacy and called the process of violating prototypes and being punished for this violation by audiences "illegitimacy discount" (p. 1398).

Since then, the popularity of categories as a research interest in OT has increased significantly (Durand & Khaire, 2017; Kennedy & Fiss, 2013; Üsdiken & Kipping, 2020). Besides, category research has given considerable attention to legitimacy and illegitimacy due to both legitimacy researchers' interest in categories and category scholars' interest in legitimacy (e.g., Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Piazza & Perretti, 2015; Vergne, 2012; Zuckerman, 1999). Legitimacy scholars resonated with category research because legitimacy and illegitimacy are essentially conceptualized as homogenizing, category-level evaluations, in the sense that, when audiences judge an entity as legitimate or illegitimate based on a structure or practice, the others who share those features are also passively granted the same judgment (Bitektine, 2011; Devers et al., 2009; Devers & Mishina, 2019; Hudson, 2008; Rossman, 2014; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). For example, disapproval of marijuana dispensaries or abortion clinics is directed not specifically at this or that dispensary or clinic but at the general category of marijuana and abortion (Augustine & Piazza, 2022; Hudson, 2008; Lashley & Pollock, 2020). Similarly, legitimacy is automatically granted to any new hospital, university, or restaurant independent of the actions of individual organizations, as these categories of organizations are already taken-for-granted (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011).

Additionally, because of the disdain targeted at them, illegitimate organizations keep relatively low profiles and prefer small and loose structures, which make collecting data on them difficult (Augustine & Piazza, 2022; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Hudson, 2008; Scott, 2013). Categories subsume clusters of organizations and actors; therefore, variables could be more detectable at the level of categories. Further, the efforts to challenge illegitimacy provide benefits for all members of the category, e.g., when brothels are normalized and legalized, these changes apply to all brothels in a geographically bounded area (Alexy & George, 2013; Wolfe & Blithe, 2015). Category research has been specifically interested in legitimacy and illegitimacy initially because of Zuckerman and colleagues' studies (Zuckerman, 1999; 2000, Zuckerman & Kim, 2003; Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa & von Rittmann, 2003) on illegitimacy discount. In these studies, categories and gaining legitimacy or illegitimacy were inherently tied in that the assessment of rendering cognitive legitimacy to a new product was carried out by comparing the evaluation target to existing categorical prototypes. The effects of the inability to place a new product into the categorical system on valuation and survival were mediated by legitimacy judgments.

More recently, scholars who were concerned with category emergence, i.e., the formation of novel, previously non-existent categories, and category creation, the formation of new categories by rearrangement and reinterpretation of existing categories, have contributed to the legitimacy literature (Alexy & George, 2013; Durand & Khaire, 2017; Jensen, 2010; Lashley & Pollock, 2020). Based on Zuckerman's (1999; 2000) ideas, this line of research suggested that new categories violate the taken-for-granted prototypes or frameworks by definition and, therefore, are seen as inappropriate and face backlash due to their deviance (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Alexy & George, 2013; Üsdiken & Kipping, 2020). As Durand and Khaire (2017) noted, "In category emergence, the cues and elements solicited to recombine, build, and narrate the story around the novelty belong to alien repertoires and vocabularies; as a result, the emergent category is more likely to be fought against, rejected, demoted, and vilified by incumbent actors that defend and benefit from existing orders and economic models" (p. 97). Nonetheless, they also pointed out that new categories can emerge and successfully create a space for themselves in the meaning systems (Alexy & George, 2013). Consequently, under which conditions illegitimacy discount does not occur and how the process of rejecting novel categories can be reversed or manipulated by category creators have been a central concern in recent category research (e.g., Alexy & George, 2013; Durand & Khaire, 2017; Hsu & Grodal, 2021; Lashley & Pollock, 2020).

Before continuing with the rest of the chapter, a disclaimer which should be made here is that the terminology related to categories entered into mainstream legitimacy research in the 2010s (Bitektine, 2011; Devers & Mishina, 2019). So, earlier research on legitimacy usually incorporated terms like organization, industry, or markets. As a result, the majority of the texts on legitimacy revolve around these entities, especially organizations. Nonetheless, most propositions presented below readily apply to categories and whenever there are distinctions, they are explicitly noted. In the rest of this chapter, for brevity and to avoid repetition, the word "entities" is used to encompass both categories and organizations (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Devers et al., 2009; Suddaby et al., 2017; Tost, 2011).

The following section gives an in-depth review of legitimacy as it has been present in organizational theory.

2.2 Fundamentals of Legitimacy

Legitimacy is one of the central concepts of OT, and as a result, it has received extensive scholarly attention (Deephouse et al., 2017; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2017). However, the plethora of research on legitimacy has been a source of complaint for some researchers as they argued that legitimacy literature is full of "fragile conceptual moorings" (Suchman, 1995, p. 572), has come to have "substantial plasticity" (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 49), and is piled with "considerable surplus meaning" (Haack et al., 2021; Suddaby et al., 2017, p. 451). In other words, the notion of legitimacy has lacked clarity, which led to frequent calls for clarification, refinement, and resetting of the concept (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Helms et al., 2019; Hudson, 2008; Suchman, 1995).

So far, legitimacy has gone through two significant phases of reformation. The first attempt was carried out by a group of scholars in the 1990s, upon the observation that earlier researchers were talking about different dimensions of legitimacy under the same umbrella term, causing a pile of research that is not directly commensurable (Suchman, 1995). As such, these scholars were mainly concerned with creating typologies for different dimensions of legitimacy (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Ruef & Patterson, 2009; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995). The research during this period was mostly shaped by neoinstitutionalism and population ecology.

The second stream of refinement is triggered by Deephouse and Suchman's (2008) review and has been going on since the early 2010s with contributions from various scholars (e.g., Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Haack, Pfarrer & Scherer, 2014; Haack et al., 2021; Hoefer & Green, 2016; Tost, 2011) who reconceptualized legitimacy as an evaluation made by individuals and collectives instead of a property owned and managed by organizations (Suddaby et al., 2017). The second group focuses on understanding the micro-foundations of legitimacy and connecting the individual-level evaluations to legitimacy judgments at higher levels. As a result, their approach to legitimacy is slightly different from but complementary to the earlier, purely macro-level theories.

Below, the dimensionalization efforts of scholars in the 1990s are first introduced by going over the three dimensions selected for this study in separate sections. Then, the newer perspectives and their contribution to this study are explained.

2.2.1 Dimensionalizing Legitimacy

The 1990s can be considered a formative period in the development of legitimacy, as it witnessed numerous significant contributions (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). First, the most enduring and widely used definition of legitimacy was put forth by Suchman (1995). Specifically, Suchman (1995) defined legitimacy as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (p. 574). Since then, this definition has been a fixture in scholarly articles on legitimacy (Deephouse et al., 2017).

Second, as noted above, scholars of this period were very interested in distinguishing between different types of legitimacy, and consequently, numerous dimensions were proposed (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Nonetheless, among the dimensionalization efforts, a few have emerged as particularly influential. In the rest of this section, the focus is on the work of Aldrich and Fiol (1994), Suchman (1995), and Scott (1995) and the three dimensions, namely cognitive or cultural-cognitive legitimacy, normative or moral legitimacy, and regulative or regulatory legitimacy, these scholars proposed. These dimensions are important not only because they are frequently used in subsequent studies on legitimacy (e.g., Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse et al., 2017; Hampel & Tracey, 2019; Lamertz & Baum, 1998; Tost, 2011), but also because they align with scattered propositions from earlier organizational and sociological research (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1986; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

The following subsections examine each dimension thoroughly.

2.2.1.1 Cognitive Legitimacy

Although the earlier studies in neoinstitutional theory and population ecology did not differentiate between dimensions of legitimacy, they implicitly focused on the cognitive dimension, as they were mainly concerned about conformance to existing meaning systems and cognitive frameworks (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017; Singh et al., 1986).

Nevertheless, the concept of "cognitive legitimacy" was first introduced by Aldrich and Fiol (1994), who were motivated to understand how emerging industry pioneers gained legitimacy in an environment where they were not acknowledged. They

argued that previous research on legitimacy in OT (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Hannan & Freeman, 1986; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) suggested conforming to existing, taken-for-granted forms or frameworks as the surest way of gaining legitimacy, but this was impossible for innovators in newly emerging industries who did not have any templates to conform. Moreover, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) stated that potential customers, suppliers, and other business partners might be skeptical of the new ventures or even avoid them entirely because they do not have any reason to trust these organizations (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). In such situations, what the entrepreneurs had to do was to gain "cognitive legitimacy," which was defined as "the spread of knowledge about a new venture" (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994, p. 648).

According to Aldrich and Fiol (1994), to acquire cognitive legitimacy, entrepreneurs first needed to develop a knowledge base encompassing the meaning, contribution, and features of their organizations. Then, the entrepreneurs had to build a plausible, coherent, and consistent story around this knowledge base and gradually disseminate it from industry insiders to competitors to inter-industry actors and to the government. The most crucial function of constructing a story for cognitive legitimacy was to present the emerging industry as a natural component of reality through using symbols and rhetoric so that it could eventually reach the status of taken-for-grantedness, or in other words become an unquestioned, organic part of the audiences' meaning systems. Although this process looks straightforward and simple, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) pointed out other elements entrepreneurs needed to be careful about while spreading the knowledge. For one, the stories had to overcome the "uniqueness paradox" (Martin, Feldman, Hatch & Sitkin, 1983, p. 438) by finding the balance between establishing the industry distinct from the others to signal necessity and drawing similarities between existing categories to signal legitimacy (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Webb et al., 2009). Moreover, the pioneers of the new industry also had to provide a replicable formula for the new entrants so that newer members would not introduce their own designs and sabotage the consistent dissemination of the knowledge base. If the entrepreneurs managed to spread plausible, coherent, and consistent stories to audiences on different levels, the industry and organizations in it were expected to become taken-for-granted and reach the highest level of cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Kennedy, Lo & Lounsbury, 2010). Once the new industry was taken-for-granted, new entrants that conformed to the templates of the industry were automatically seen as an as-is part of everyday life and awarded with legitimacy without being questioned (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Hannan & Freeman, 1986).

Cognitive legitimacy was also included in Suchman's (1995) typology of legitimacy dimensions. Suchman defined cognitive legitimacy as "mere acceptance of the orga-

nization as necessary or inevitable based on some taken-for-granted cultural account"
(p. 582) and further distinguished between the two types of cognitive legitimacy.
The first type was called "comprehensibility" and was reminiscent of Aldrich and
Fiol's (1994) creation of knowledge bases. Accordingly, legitimacy here stemmed
from the existence of coherent and plausible explanations about the meaning and
function of an organization. These explanations also had to be realistic in that
the "account must mesh both with larger belief systems and with the experienced
reality of the audience's daily life" (Suchman, 1995, p. 582). The second type of cog-
nitive legitimacy was called "taken-for-grantedness" and happened when the entity
was perceived as unquestionable or not having any imaginable alternatives. Like
Aldrich and Fiol (1994), Suchman (1995) interpreted taken-for-grantedness as the
highest level of legitimacy because the organization was perceived as a fixed, insep-
arable part of reality and became immune to any kind of questioning and scrutiny.
However, Suchman (1995) also added that this type of legitimacy was not very com-
mon as most organizations had their skeptics and went through questioning from
time to time.

Scott (1995; 2001; 2014) also included cognitive legitimacy in his comprehensive
framework of institutional pillars described previously. Accordingly, cognitive legiti-
macy was a component of the "cognitive pillar," or as revised later "cultural-cognitive
pillar" of institutions Scott, (1995; 2001). In particular, "the cognitive pillar" re-
ferred to the culturally shared and taken-for-granted mental schemas, templates,
and frameworks that made up the social reality of the actors. These frameworks
were shared because they were independent of single individuals and existed as ex-
ternal, objective facts, symbols, and materials. However, they were also internalized
as individuals unconsciously use them to give meaning to what they observe while
navigating life. Scott (2001) changed the label "cognitive" to "cultural-cognitive"
to emphasize both the internal and external elements of the pillar. Nonetheless,
although this dissertation acknowledges the duality of the cultural-cognitive pillar,
here the label "cognitive legitimacy" is adapted because legitimacy research has con-
tinued to use the term "cognitive" solely (e.g., Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse et al.,
2017; Tost, 2011) and also for brevity.

Scott (1995) put the notion of being a natural part of reality more simply. He
suggested that cognitive legitimacy was basically conforming to "the way we do
these things" in a given social system (Scott, 2014, p. 68). Consequently, as long
as actors kept doing things as they did, their cognitive legitimacy stayed intact.
In line with Aldrich and Fiol (1994) and Suchman (1995), Scott (1995; 2014) too
underlined the unquestioned rendering of cognitive legitimacy to those that simply
comply with the cognitive frameworks of the audiences.

Putting the propositions of these three texts and subsequent conceptual reviews (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse et al., 2017; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suddaby et al., 2017; Tost, 2011) together, the most important attribute of cognitive legitimacy is the protection it provides to the entity it is given. In other words, cognitive legitimacy is crucial because it functions as a cloak or insulation that shelters organizations and categories from surveillance (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Deephouse et al., 2017; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). The proposition here is that once the audiences perceive that the entity is an approximate fit to one of the templates in their cognitive repository, they categorize it as "one of those" (Bitektine, 2011, p. 160), assume that everything is as it is supposed to be, and do not question anything any further (Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011; Zucker, 1989). Moreover, this evaluation process is relatively "passive," "implicit," or "intuitive" in that the assessments of cognitive legitimacy are made based on shallow observations and heuristics; unless something suspicious ticks off an audience's "mental alarm" (Tost, 2011, p. 700), entities are merely accepted (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Suchman, 1995; Suddaby et al., 2017). Cognitive legitimacy is also sturdy, with a relatively high threshold of suspicion, as audiences often fail to notice or overlook minor and infrequent normative or regulative breaches (Tost, 2011). Therefore, cognitive legitimacy is a powerful evaluation that is relatively easy to acquire but has long-term and significant benefits for organizations and categories.

Research on decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), image management (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992), and clandestine organizations (Scott, 2013) confirmed this claim with empirical evidence. For example, structures and artifacts consistent with a cognitive frame can help an organization avoid scrutiny even if they do not reflect the entity's actual nature (Deephouse, 1996; Henisz & Zelner, 2005; Scott, 2013; Tost, 2011). Similarly, organizations that are illegitimate in normative or regulative domains, e.g., brothels, money launderers, the mafia, or drug dealers, can fly under the radar for extended periods just by putting up simple, ordinary fronts or by occupying dull, uninteresting buildings (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Scott, 2013).

The subtlety of cognitive legitimacy is also evident in the proposed indicators of the concept. Traditionally, cognitive legitimacy was detected through two measures or observations (Suddaby et al., 2017). The first one is the proxy of "population density" explained in the previous section. Population density suggests that as the knowledge about a form spreads, and the number of organizations adopting the form increases, the form becomes an appropriate, accepted, or "ordinary" part of the audiences' mental schemata. As a result, upcoming entrepreneurs adopt the form without thinking (Carroll & Hannan, 1989). Nonetheless, population density was criticized by other researchers (Baum & Powell, 1995; Zucker, 1989) and is not

a popular measure anymore.

A second method of detecting cognitive legitimacy is looking at the frequency of mentions in the media, usually in newspapers (Deephouse et al., 2017; Lamertz & Baum, 1998; Suddaby et al., 2017). Proponents of this method suggest that the frequency of appearance in the media shows that the audiences comprehend and accept the entity in question as they incorporate it into their vocabulary and daily conversations (Lamertz & Baum, 1998). However, others opposed this argument and stated that cognitive legitimacy is signaled by the absence of questions and debates or by "lack of content" (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Accordingly, when an entity is taken-for-granted, that is, when everything aligns with what they are supposed to be, nobody problematizes its existence; therefore, the organization or the category is not interrogated or conversed about. Connecting these two arguments, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) stated that the frequency in media is more appropriate for new ventures than established industries and categories because it shows they are being acknowledged and the knowledge is spreading (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). However, for mature industries or categories, frequent appearances in the media can signal problematization of their legitimacy because, usually, these entities are seen as business-as-usual and are not debated. Thus, increasing mentions of established entities may indicate that something about the entities has triggered the audience's scrutiny. Overall, the relationship between cognitive legitimacy and the media depends on the content of the conversation and the context of the evaluated entity (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017).

2.2.1.2 Normative Legitimacy

The normative dimension has also commonly appeared in Aldrich and Fiol (1994), Scott (1995), and Suchman (1995), albeit it was under the labels of sociopolitical legitimacy, normative legitimacy, and moral legitimacy, respectively.

To start with, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) combined normative legitimacy and regulative legitimacy under the label of "sociopolitical legitimacy" and defined sociopolitical legitimation as "the process by which key stakeholders, the general public, key opinion leaders, or government officials accept a venture as appropriate and right, given existing norms and laws" (p. 648). This section focuses on the normative part of sociopolitical legitimacy (i.e., the judgments of the general public and key opinion leaders), and the regulatory part (i.e., the government's judgment) is left to the

following section.

As they did for cognitive legitimacy, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) outlined the process entrepreneurs in an emerging industry had to follow to gain sociopolitical legitimacy. Accordingly, they claimed that acquiring sociopolitical legitimacy was mainly about showing goodwill and earning the trust of the relevant stakeholders, independent of the organizations' real intentions. To establish a trusting relationship with the key stakeholders, here, too, the entrepreneurs needed to create and spread stories. To successfully convince the stakeholders of the moral appropriateness of the industry, these narratives had to overplay the organization's future potential and expected contribution to society and, at the same time, disguise the parts that might be seen as threatening or improper by the stakeholders. Like the narratives built for cognitive legitimacy, the stories needed to be coherent and consistent to not alert the audiences that something could be "off" (Tost, 2011). It is important to note that Aldrich and Fiol (1994) described a hostile environment where stakeholders, including customers, suppliers, and competitors, were skeptical or afraid of the new industry because the industry was unknown, or in other words, lacked cognitive legitimacy. In their conceptualization, incumbents in competing industries were always on the verge of attack because they felt threatened by the new industry's uncertainty. Therefore, besides creating and spreading stories, the entrepreneurs had to organize the newcomers into collective action by creating professional associations and alliances to have a higher resistance power if such industry-level attacks were to get intense. Additionally, such associations kept the knowledge base coherent and facilitated the spread, helping the industry gain cognitive legitimacy.

Suchman (1995) coined the term "moral legitimacy" to describe the phenomenon of "positive normative evaluation of [an] organization and its activities" and further divided this dimension into four subtypes. The first subtype, consequential legitimacy, focused on assessing the appropriateness of the outcomes generated by the organization. However, Suchman (1995) argued that what constituted an appropriate outcome was socially constructed and varied across different contexts. For example, in the case of a hospital, consequential legitimacy could be associated with low mortality rates, while for a chemical factory, it could be the absence of toxic waste production (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Suchman, 1995). Second, procedural legitimacy was about whether an organization's processes were seen as appropriate or proper. As such, procedural legitimacy was demonstrated through being diligent, following important routines and rituals, and exhibiting that organizational activities conform to widely accepted logics like "science" and "ethics." Third, structural legitimacy judgments were rendered based on the existence of appropriate departments, features, or personnel that the audience saw as necessary to carry

out the tasks properly. Suchman (1995) also underlined that adopting appropriate structures signaled or bolstered cognitive legitimacy as it showed the organization had adopted the appropriate form or market prototype (Hannan & Freeman, 1986; Zuckerman, 2000). Finally, personal legitimacy was moral legitimacy sourced from the personal charisma of the targeted actors. Accordingly, the audiences believed the organization or category was morally appropriate because it was endorsed by a highly regarded or charismatic person.

Among these subtypes, consequential legitimacy was more prominent than the others. Suchman (1995) argued that the other three were usually used when the outcomes of the organization were not directly observable or measurable. Personal legitimacy also differed from the others in that it depended on the acts of a single individual who was more likely to waver and change than an outcome, procedure, or structure. Therefore, personal legitimacy was seen as more transient than the others.

While explaining moral legitimacy, Suchman (1995) frequently utilized terms like "prosocial" and "sociotropic" and emphasized the connection between moral legitimacy and "social welfare" (p. 579). The appropriateness of outcomes, procedures, structures, and personal charisma was ultimately judged according to the criteria of "whether a given activity is the right thing to do" (Suchman, 1995, p. 579).

Similar to Suchman (1995), Scott (1995) coined the term "normative legitimacy" to refer to the conformance to morals, ethics, and standards that brought order to social life and promoted the welfare of a social system (Scott & Davis, 2007; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Theoretically, normative legitimacy was sourced in the normative pillar of institutions, which differed from the cultural-cognitive pillar in its level of internalization and basis of compliance (Scott, 2014). Specifically, while the cognitive pillar constituted the meaning system of the audiences and influenced their actions through passively employed internalized cognitive frameworks, the normative pillar inserted its influence through moral obligations that were partly internalized and partly out there (Scott, 2014). The norms were out there because the audiences could tell what the others expected and adjusted their actions due to the fear of social sanction, e.g., shame, ostracization, or humiliation. Nonetheless, norms were also internalized since the individual members of the audience were conditioned to believe that these norms were "right," and thus, normative breaches caused deviant actors themselves to feel guilt and disgrace, separate from the attacks of the others.

Scott (1995; 2014) also differentiated between norms and values in a manner similar to Suchman's (1995) distinction of outcomes and procedures. In particular, Scott (2014, p. 64) argued that "values are conceptions of the preferred or the desirable

together with the construction of standards to which existing structures or behaviors can be compared and assessed. Norms specify how things should be done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends." So, while cognitive legitimacy was given to those that conform to the way things are usually done, normative legitimacy was granted to those that follow valuable goals and conform to the appropriate procedures in the pursuit.

Overall, although it is referred to by different labels, reviewed studies form a coherent narrative on the theoretical level, where normative legitimacy is the appropriateness of an entity to a given set of values and norms.

Paralleling cognitive legitimacy, normative legitimacy has been assessed by the following two indicators. The first set of indicators that are often employed by scholars, particularly neoinstitutionalists, to study normative legitimacy empirically is the presence or absence of approval from professional groups and associations, which usually manifest their verdict through providing symbols and materials like certifications, accreditations, and standardization labels (e.g., Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Green & Li, 2011; Ruef & Scott, 1998). Indeed, professionals are one of the most, if not the most, important groups of actors in the normative realm, and their approval is more influential than the "lay" audiences for various reasons. First, professionals and professional associations have higher credibility than random actors because the superordinate logics of rationality and science designate people with "technical expertise" as the most trustable source of information (Scott, 2014). Especially when individual audiences have a hard time interpreting the normative prospects of a category, organization, or procedure, they are inclined to look up to the professionals' decisions (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Scott, 2014). Second, professionals (e.g., doctors, lawyers, professors) are also more proactive than the other audiences in that they are motivated to work on building norms and standards to protect the properness and perceived quality of their fields (e.g., the field of medicine, the field of law, the field of higher education) as challenges to the identified field will directly threaten their power, position, and livelihood (Anteby, 2010). Third, when different groups in society conflict, professionals can have a distinct, impartial take on the issue at hand and act as an intermediary between the proponents and opponents of a category or organization (Helms & Patterson, 2014). Finally, focusing on professionals provides a pragmatic advantage to the researchers; certifications, accreditations, and industry standards and metrics provide relatively easy-to-access and consistent longitudinal data.

Nonetheless, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) criticized neoinstitutionalists' preoccupation with professional norms and standards for ignoring the richer sociological

meaning of norms as shared codes of conduct that designate right and wrong (Suchman, 1995) and limiting the scope of normative legitimacy. Further, they argued that this limitation created confusion and contradiction in the literature because others utilize the concept of norms in its original meaning (e.g., Barron, 1998; Jensen, 2010). In addition, they stated that professionals were only one group in society, and other audience groups could assess the normative legitimacy of organizations. This dissertation follows Deephouse and Suchman's (2008, p. 53) advice and defines norms as "the collective assessment of the good and the bad" and normative legitimacy as "appropriateness to social values and norms" (Deephouse et al., 2017; Jensen, 2010).

The second approach to examining normative legitimacy involves monitoring media accounts. However, instead of focusing on frequency counts, scholars study the content of mentions of the entity or practice of interest and try to understand whether it is morally approved or disapproved by audiences (Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Lamertz & Baum, 1998; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Vergne, 2012). Moreover, in contrast to the unclear relationship between cognitive legitimacy and media representation, the connection between normative legitimacy and the media is based on a more consistent theoretical foundation. Specifically, scholars argued that cognitive and normative legitimacy is granted through different mechanisms of evaluation (Bitektine, 2011; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). While the audiences make cognitive legitimacy judgments passively by using superficial symbols, cues, and heuristics, normative legitimacy necessitates a deliberate or "active" examination process where proponents and opponents get involved in debates to defend or undermine the normative legitimacy of the entity and persuade the others to their evaluations (Suchman, 1995, p. 3; Tost, 2011).

Additionally, particularly for new categories and inventions, the general public may not be interested in the technical side of the categorization of innovations but will likely be keener on debating its possible effects on society. For instance, Kennedy et al. (2010) showed how the definitional confusion around nanotechnology and its effects stayed primarily limited to the scientific community and how the public got involved once one of the misinterpreters wrote a book that created fear among members of society about a nano-robot takeover. Similarly, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) argued that industry incumbents carried their attacks to new entrants to the normative domain because the democracy logic of Western cultures prevented them from attacking the "generic rights to create business organizations" (p. 658).

Overall, public debates provide researchers with a wealth of empirical material to investigate the process of normative legitimation (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Suchman,

1995; Tost, 2011). Consequently, among the three dimensions, normative legitimacy is the most frequently studied dimension. In this stream, a common technique of examining the valence and level of normative legitimacy is coding the arguments used in debates, usually gathered through scanning newspapers, as positive, neutral, and negative, then comparing the number of positive and negative judgments or positive judgments to the overall mentions (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Vergne, 2012).

Regarding the relationship between cognitive and normative legitimacy, studies so far have shown that it is reciprocal. If the organization or the category fits cognitive frameworks, normative legitimacy is assumed, and no further questions are asked (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011). However, if the organization or category cannot be categorized within existing frameworks, or if the existent frameworks are challenged or problematized, the audience shifts to an active mode of evaluation that involves a more purposeful examination of the entity's normative and regulative attributes (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Deephouse et al., 2017; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). If the entity is found normatively appropriate, it can prosper freely, allowing the proponents to develop and spread a consistent knowledge base. Over time, the category is likely to gain cognitive approval through exposure and repetition (Piazza & Perretti, 2015; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015).

The last note on normative legitimacy could be that, once granted, normative legitimacy is also relatively permanent and protective. This phenomenon is called "corporate credit," by Madan (1985, as cited in Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990), which happens when an organization proves its appropriateness to the audiences and earns their goodwill, and therefore is given slack in following evaluations.

2.2.1.3 Regulative Legitimacy

As mentioned above, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) included regulative legitimacy in their typification as a part of sociopolitical legitimacy. Accordingly, regulative legitimacy stemmed from conforming to laws, as well as from the endorsement of the government and regulatory agencies. Sociopolitical legitimacy tied normative legitimacy to regulations in that entrepreneurs in emerging industries were advised to form coalitions and alliances so that they could have enough political power to lobby government agencies to pass regulations and laws that would protect their industry. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) also stated that laws and regulations could bring order to the disorganized and incomprehensible emerging industries by showing the appropriate ways of doing things through written rules and guidelines. They also emphasized

that regulations did not have to work to the advantage of the focal industry in that incumbent industries also had the opportunity to block the spread of emerging industries by convincing the government of their normative illegitimacy.

Like the other two types of legitimacy in his book, Scott's (1995) regulative legitimacy was based on the regulative pillar. This pillar referred to the explicit "rule-setting, monitoring and sanctioning activities" carried by agents with authority to punish (Scott, 2014, p. 59). The domain of the regulative pillar was distinct from the normative domain in its focus on "formal written rules," as opposed to the emphasis of the normative pillar on social obligations (North, 1990, p. 4; Scott, 1995, 2014). Instead of moral governance, the behavior was driven by coercion; various agents (government agencies, regulators, legislators, auditors) monitored the activities and structures of organizations and penalized the ones that did not conform to the rules and regulations (Scott & Davis, 2007; Scott, 1995; 2014). In addition, regulative legitimacy differed from normative legitimacy in its level of internalization; while the breachers of norms were expected to feel a sense of guilt and shame, legal breachers abided by the rules purely out of fear of coercion (Scott, 2014).

Different from the other two, Suchman's (1995) typology did not include the regulative dimension. He also did not give a specific reason for omitting the laws and regulations.

The inclusion of regulative legitimacy in newer studies is also inconsistent as the researchers usually follow one of the three typologies, and once they pledge their allegiance to one of them, they do not make further explanations on the choices of dimensions (e.g., Bitektine, 2011; Brown & Toyoki, 2013; Henisz & Zelner, 2005; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Sine, David & Mitsuhashi, 2007). Nonetheless, a couple of researchers explicitly discussed their decision on the regulative dimension. For example, while investigating how challenged organizations protected their legitimacy, Lamin and Zaheer (2012) stated that they excluded the regulative legitimacy because regulatory intervention limited the defense strategies at the organizations' disposal, narrowing the scope of their study. Additionally, Ruef and Scott (1998) argued that they did not include regulative legitimacy because, in the context of their research, the laws were aligned with the normative evaluations of professional associations, and the regulatory realm did not add much to their findings.

This idea of regulative legitimacy being a reflection of normative judgments was later echoed by conceptual papers on legitimacy in that scholars chose to leave the regulative dimension out because it simply reflected a solidified or materialized version of the majority's or a powerful group's normative evaluations (Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Tost, 2011). For example, Tost (2011) stated that regulative legitimacy does

not "establish a particular basis on which to judge an entity to be legitimate; rather, it merely provides evidence that others have judged it to be legitimate" (p. 692).

In contrast, those who included regulative legitimacy highlighted the state's and regulatory agencies' unique characteristics and powers. For example, Deephouse et al. (2017) described normative and regulative legitimacy as assessments of qualitatively different actors. While normative legitimacy was sourced in "the professions, licensing boards, public opinion, and the media," regulative legitimacy was sourced in the state, its regulatory agencies, and its judiciary (Deephouse et al., 2017, p. 36). Regulative actors essentially differed from others because they had coercive power. Others also emphasized that the processes of lobbying and acquiring the support of the government were crucial for newer entities or entities that were trying to contest their illegitimacy since regulatory support could be a make-or-break point for these entities that were already in a vulnerable state (Anteby, 2010; Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Ruef & Scott, 1998).

Further review of extant literature shows normative and regulative judgments are not necessarily aligned if multiple groups of audiences are considered (Anteby, 2010; Webb et al., 2009). For example, when different groups in a society adhere to different norms and standards, the laws and regulations are likely to align with the normative legitimacy judgments of only a single group. So, depending on whose perspective is taken, normative and regulative legitimacy may or may not be parallel.

Moreover, most laws and regulations are intentionally ambiguous and open to interpretation to allow the adaptation of the rules to the context at hand (Scott, 1995, 2014). Similarly, legislations that are established by different authorities (e.g., local laws versus federal laws) or sourced in different bodies of laws (e.g., privacy law versus criminal law) can give different prescriptions or even may be at odds (Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Scott, 2014; Webb et al., 2009). Therefore, legal decisions are often not black and white but open to the interpretations of different groups and individuals (LoPucki & Weyrauch, 2000).

Another source of disparity between norms and laws is the contexts where legislators and regulators are reluctant to monitor or pass laws (Anteby, 2010; Webb et al., 2009). The state and regulatory agencies are usually responsible for various issues and, thus, have to prioritize legislating, regulating, and monitoring specific organizations or categories at the expense of others (Anteby, 2010; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). For example, Anteby (2010) showed how the reluctance of the government and lawmakers helped the unethical cadaver trade flourish despite organized protests from professionals.

To summarize, despite being relatively weaker compared to the other two dimensions, the concept of regulative legitimacy is too complicated to be brushed under normative legitimacy judgments. Since the primary purpose of this study is to gain a comprehensive understanding of illegitimacy evaluations, it is included in this dissertation.

Regulative legitimacy is usually studied by investigating the processes that lead to making critical legal decisions (e.g., preparing and passing laws and acts, trials, and lobbying activities) and what happens to organizations, industries, or categories afterward (Lashley & Pollock, 2020; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Oliver, 1991). Others also studied how the endorsement by the government or ties to the government have influenced the entity's access to resources and survival (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Provan & Pfeffer, 1982; Walker, Schlosser & Deephouse, 2014).

Like the relationship between normative and cognitive legitimacy, regulative legitimacy is tied to the other dimensions through reciprocal relationships. Cognitive ambiguities and normative discussions may draw the attention of government officials and regulators to the entity, which could then take decisive actions that influence the future of the entity (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Deephouse et al., 2017; Vergne & Swain, 2017). Further, the earlier work in OT emphasized that regulative legitimacy could override the other dimensions (Suddaby et al., 2017). Accordingly, acknowledgment and endorsement of the government would promote appropriateness both normatively, i.e., it is legal, so it must be right, and cognitively, i.e., it is chartered or approved by the government, so it is a part of our society (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995). The influence of regulative legitimacy on other dimensions is especially prominent when audiences do not know what to think about an entity or when legislation on a relevant category can be readily applied to a newly emergent category (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Vergne & Swain, 2017). However, the influence of regulative legitimacy on other dimensions is correlated with the validity of the government and regulatory agencies (Webb et al., 2009). In contexts where the audiences do not trust the government, laws and regulations would have a limited influence on cognitive and normative judgments.

Before closing this section, a disclaimer should be made on pragmatic legitimacy, the third type of legitimacy Suchman (1995) included in his framework. Although less frequently used than the other three dimensions and rejected by population ecologists (Suddaby et al., 2017), this dimension occasionally comes up in the literature, especially in studies of ethics and individual-level legitimacy (Tost, 2011). Pragmatic legitimacy is based on instrumental expectations of self-interested audiences and is

made up of three types (Suchman, 1995). Exchange legitimacy occurs when individuals are getting a direct benefit from an organization, influence legitimacy is granted when the existence of an organization provides indirect or general benefits to an actor or a group of actors, and lastly, dispositional legitimacy is given in situations where individuals perceive the organization as an individual with good character and relate to it in terms of goals and achievements. Nonetheless, pragmatic legitimacy is excluded from this study because it is not transferable to the macro-level; therefore, it does not suit the multilevel nature of the dissertation. More specifically, on higher levels, pragmatic legitimacy turns into providing benefits to a large group or groups of audiences, making it equivalent to normative legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). For example, hiring undocumented workers provides an instrumental benefit for both employers (i.e., cheap labor) and employees (i.e., employment) individually. However, when this exchange is dragged to the societal level, it becomes an issue of morals and ethics in the sense of whether hiring undocumented immigrants is "right" (e.g., it provides employment opportunities to vulnerable communities) or "wrong" (e.g., the cost of labor is driven lower) based on this practice's larger benefit or harm to the society (Webb et al., 2009). Indeed, Suchman (1995) particularly emphasized that moral legitimacy is "social" and pragmatic legitimacy is "individual" to prevent the possible confusion that might occur between these two dimensions.

This section wraps the introduction to legitimacy and its dimensions. Below, more recent approaches to legitimacy are explained.

2.2.2 Alternative Approaches

In yet another attempt to organize and refine the concept of legitimacy, Suddaby et al. (2017) distinguished three approaches to legitimacy: legitimacy-as-property, legitimacy-as-process, and legitimacy-as-perception.

The legitimacy-as-property approach encompasses the studies of the 1990s (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995; Zuckerman, 1999) and most of the classical OT texts (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1986; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This perspective is distinguished from the others in its treatment of legitimacy as an asset or resource granted to an organization, usually by other organizational-level actors in the external environment (Suddaby et al., 2017). In these studies, legitimacy can be managed, acquired, increased, and even given to others like any other organizational resource. Another common characteristic of legitimacy-as-property studies is that they all take the contingency

perspective, which formulates legitimacy as an alignment, fit, or congruence between the attributes of the focal organization and the external environment (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Scott & Davis, 2007). Therefore, although Scott (1995, p. 45) explicitly stated that "Legitimacy is not a commodity to be possessed or exchanged," he was put under this perspective for saying "but a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules or laws."

Additionally, this approach is distinguished from the others in its particular interest in quantifying and measuring the amount of legitimacy organizations have. To achieve this, scholars have developed a variety of proxies, such as population density and frequency count mentioned above; however, most of these proxies were criticized for oversimplifying legitimacy and ignoring the social context organizations inhabit (Baum & Powell, 1995; Deephouse et al., 2017; Suddaby et al., 2017; Zucker, 1989).

Nonetheless, studies that belong to this approach were formative. The dimensions, proxies, and operationalizations proposed by the legitimacy-as-property perspective, while no longer widely employed, helped better understand and refine the concept of legitimacy (Suddaby et al., 2017).

The second approach, legitimacy-as-process, is a social constructivist approach that focuses on the negotiations and discussions of various actors in an institutional field over an organization, category, or practice and sees legitimacy as not the result of this process but as the process itself (e.g., Barron, 1998; Golant & Sillince, 2007; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). Stated differently, they conceptualize legitimacy as "legitimation" in that legitimacy is not an outcome but a process of negotiation and debate where actors in a field try to persuade each other. These studies usually focus on how influential individuals and macro-level actors, that is, firms, alliances and associations, or social movements, challenge an existing institution (the process of delegitimation) and replace it with a new one by convincing others (the process of legitimation) [1]. As such, legitimacy-as-process is generally interested in institutional change and presents delegitimation and legitimation as tools for breaking the existing institutions and replacing them with new ones (e.g., Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Maguire & Hardy, 2009).

Due to their emphasis on debates, negotiations, and change, scholars adhering to this perspective favor linguistic methodologies such as discourse analysis, rhetoric, and narrative analysis. Within this framework, language is seen as not only reflective but also constructive of social reality (Hoefer & Green, 2016; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017).

Another distinguishing point of the legitimacy-as-process perspective from the

legitimacy-as-property approach is that while the latter generally focuses on macro (i.e., organizational-, field-, or population-) levels, the former is multilevel in that it oscillates between individual-, meso-, and macro-levels (Suddaby et al., 2017).

Additionally, process researchers explicitly distanced themselves from the legitimacy-as-property approach and criticized them for relying solely on quantitative methods. They also underlined that legitimacy-as-property researchers used the same labels like "taken-for-grantedness" or "legitimacy" for entirely different processes and ignored what was going on under simple causal relationships (Zucker, 1989).

The legitimacy-as-process perspective was prevalent in the 2000s and provided new insights into legitimation and delegitimation processes as well as into institutional change and entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Sine & Lee, 2009).

Nonetheless, this approach was later criticized for its emphasis on hyper-muscular actors who single-handedly challenged institutions and manipulated the discourse in their interests while the rest of the field or society passively observed and accepted the grand institutional changes the active actors were making (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016; Suddaby et al., 2017). Studies using classical rhetorics were criticized for their fixation on speakers and intentional persuasion tactics and for ignoring the interpretative and communicative processes (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016). Additionally, critics pointed out that equating legitimacy to the process of "legitimation" created the impression that legitimacy was ever-changing and elusive and undermined the direct consequences of actors (both individuals and macro-level actors like the government and professional associations) acting on their assessments of appropriateness and inappropriateness (e.g., not buying a product, banning a genre, including or not including an organization in a professional directory).

Finally, the third approach, "legitimacy-as-perception," defines legitimacy "as [a] taste, assessment, or judgment of the appropriateness of an organizational product, practice, or characteristic" (Suddaby et al., 2017, p. 463). This perspective is similar to the legitimacy-as-process approach because it is also multilevel and social constructivist but differs from the process perspective because it argues that legitimacy is not a process but a social evaluation. Legitimacy-as-perception approach emphasizes individual-level processes (e.g., perception and judgment formation, expression of judgments), inter-individual-level dynamics (e.g., observing and influencing one another), and micro-to-macro transitions (e.g., how individual-level judgments turn into societal-level judgments). Put differently, the central goal of this perspective is

to understand the entire process of legitimacy evaluations, from individual perceptions to meso-level interactions to the formation of shared cultural understandings (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Haack et al., 2021; Suddaby et al., 2017).

Accordingly, the legitimacy-as-perception approach differentiates between individual or subjective assessments of appropriateness called "propriety" and macro-level, externalized, and objective evaluations of appropriateness called "validity" (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Haack et al., 2021; Tost, 2011). The propriety and validity judgments are in a cyclical relationship in that individuals form their propriety evaluations under the influence of symbols of validity (e.g., laws, certifications, endorsements, taken-for-granted structures, and everyday practices) and what they believe the others (e.g., the general public, their friend groups, the authorities, professionals, politicians, or intellectuals) in society think as acceptable. Then, they express, discuss, and negotiate their evaluations in public spheres. While doing this, as described by the legitimacy-as-process perspective, they reconstruct the validity or macro-level evaluations (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016; Suddaby et al., 2017).

The effect of validity on propriety is theorized to be strongest when the institutions are stable and the macro-level influencers are credible (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). In a stable institutional context, individuals are also more likely to believe everyone else is thinking in a certain way and less likely to express their propriety judgments if they come to a divergent conclusion. In contrast, individuals are inclined to stick to their personal judgments when the context is unstable and there is visible conflict. In such situations, they also tend to express opinions more comfortably (Bitektine & Haack, 2015).

Proponents of the legitimacy-as-perception perspective were among those who criticized the legitimacy-as-a-process approach for simplifying the social scene and reducing the majority of audiences who did the daily work of sustaining legitimacy beliefs into passive spectators (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009; Suddaby et al., 2017). Thus, the legitimacy-as-perception approach argues that legitimation is a collective process and emphasizes that all individuals are "evaluators" who have the capability of passively or actively assessing the appropriateness of an entity (Tost, 2011). However, it also underlines that not everyone's opinion is accounted for in shaping societal judgments, as individuals may choose not to express their evaluations due to unconscious suppression, fear of being divergent or ineffective, or simply because they do not care enough about the subject (Suddaby et al., 2017). Even when expressed loudly, opinions may not influence validity because the individuals who stated them do not have enough authority, power, or influence to affect the

collective judgments.

Recently, Haack et al. (2021) offered a meso-level legitimacy evaluation called "consensus" that consists of groups of individuals with similar propriety evaluations. Consensus is important because when individuals whose opinions diverge from validity realize that there is a group of others who think like them, they become more confident in challenging and changing collective legitimacy evaluations (Haack et al., 2021).

Another contribution of the legitimacy-as-perception perspective is their emphasis on contradictory evaluations and evaluator heterogeneity (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Suddaby et al., 2017). Though the previous approaches also drew attention to the heterogeneity of audiences and acknowledged that a complete agreement in society is near impossible (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995), proponents of the legitimacy-as-perception perspective reject the assumption of "microlevel isomorphism" (Suddaby et al., 2017, p. 465) and draw a more nuanced and chaotic picture for investigated contexts (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Haack et al., 2021).

In all, the legitimacy-as-perception approach is distinguished from the other two perspectives in its conceptualization of legitimacy as an evaluation and its belief in the formative effects of individual-level judgments on macro-level legitimacy evaluations.

However, the overemphasis of the legitimacy-as-perception perspective on individuals has provoked skepticism due to the possibility of reducing an essentially macro-level phenomenon to the aggregation of individual opinions (Cornelissen et al., 2015). Although the proponents of this approach claim that "they avoid the pitfalls of extreme individualism" and "not intend to psychologize the study of legitimacy" (Suddaby et al., 2017, p. 463), they do so by pushing experiments as the ideal method of studying legitimacy through idolizing prior studies that used experimentation (e.g., Zucker, 1977) and designating experiments as the future of legitimacy and even OT research (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Haack et al., 2021).

Acknowledging the shortcomings of both perspectives, this study takes an approach that is a mix of the legitimacy-as-process and the legitimacy-as-perception perspectives, following the developments in linguistic methods literature in OT (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017). Essentially, these approaches designate language as a gateway to study both individual- and societal-level evaluations without falling into methodological individualism (Hoefer & Green, 2016). The primary premise of these texts is that language reflects

both the cognitive and communicative processes of legitimacy and allows the detection of both micro- and macro-level legitimacy judgments and micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro transitions. So, instead of focusing on the psychological processes of how personal opinions are formed, the focus is on inter-individual interactions and collective debates and discussions where individuals express their evaluations and intentionally or unintentionally shape and reshape macro-, meso-, and micro- (including their own) level judgments through "meaningful interaction" (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017, p. 395). In addition, unlike the legitimacy-as-perception perspective, this approach does not isolate the individuals from the field-level institutions and sociopolitical histories they are socialized to (Gray, Purdy & Ansari, 2015).

The methodological shortcomings of the legitimacy-as-process and the legitimacy-as-perception approaches and the advantages of linguistic methods are discussed more thoroughly in the following chapter.

2.2.2.1 The Evaluators

So far, the parties who confer legitimacy or make legitimacy evaluations have been referred to by various labels like "constituents" (Suchman, 1995), "stakeholders" (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992), "sources" (Deephouse et al., 2017), "evaluators" (Bitektine, 2011), and most commonly "audiences" (Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Hudson, 2008; Suchman, 1995). As this study conceptualizes legitimacy as an evaluation, the term "evaluator" is adopted to refer to individuals or societal-level actors (e.g., the government, professional associations, organizations, and social movements) that actively or passively make assessments of appropriateness, express them publicly, and act on their evaluations (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015).

An important feature of evaluators on the societal level is that, although certain judgments eventually come to dominate others and "hijack" the discourse (Suchman, 1995), society is more often than not made up of heterogeneous groups of evaluators that have conflicting frameworks, value judgments, sense of justice, and means of coercion (Deephouse et al., 2017; Durand & Thornton, 2018; Scott, 2014).

The existence of heterogeneous groups in a given collective and what this means for legitimacy has been a concern in legitimacy studies since earlier years (e.g., Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Hsu, Hannan & Koçak, 2009; Suchman, 1995). In fact, the basis of decoupling was the observation of contradictory demands (i.e., tech-

nical versus institutional) coming from different stakeholders in an organization's environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Nonetheless, the legitimacy-as-perception perspective has provided a more sophisticated view of the heterogeneity of evaluators by re-introducing the concepts of propriety and validity, originally offered by Dornbusch and Scott (1975). Scholars who follow the legitimacy-as-perception perspective also theorized on where and how validity and propriety judgments diverge and under what conditions divergent individuals or collectives stay silent (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Haack et al., 2021).

Acknowledging propriety judgments and the possibility of them being different from visible, societal-level verdicts is especially important in the context of illegitimacy because many illegitimate categories, for instance, "sin industries" like porn and prostitution (Hudson, 2008, p. 263), survive for decades solely based on the profits that come from private consumption (Hudson, 2008; Jensen, 2010; Wolfe & Blithe, 2015). If the number of individuals who silently support a category is enough to provide critical resources, illegitimate categories can continue to exist even if the majority of the actors or powerful groups problematize their existence (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Wolfe & Blithe, 2015). This phenomenon of privately supporting a disapproved category was named "phantom acceptance" by Goffman (1963).

Scholars generally defined legitimacy as the opinions of the majority or large groups in society (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Consequently, phantom acceptance was initially assumed to occur because divergent evaluators were outnumbered, and there was an actual threat of coercion and social sanctioning (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995). However, the social movement literature (Snow & Benford, 1988) argues that it is not always the masses who monopolize the validity judgments because the structure of dominance changes from field to field in that some fields are dominated by the general public, while others by professional associations or by aristocrats and elites (Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Rao, Morrill & Zald, 2000). Similarly, category researchers often talked about "key audiences" (Özcan & Gürses, 2018, p. 1811) and "crucial audiences" (Alexy & George, 2013, p. 175) that have significantly more influence than other actors in assigning what is considered acceptable. Further, large groups themselves can engage in self-suppression when they think their evaluations conflict with what the majority thinks, even if the majority actually holds the same judgment as them, a phenomenon called "preference falsification" (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Kuran, 1987) or "pluralistic ignorance" (Zhu & Westphal, 2011).

If they believe everyone is thinking the opposite, individuals may self-censor themselves in public and continue to consume the products of illegitimate entities in

private. This is usually true for normatively illegitimate categories like the adult entertainment industry (Jensen, 2010; Suddaby et al., 2017) or recreational cannabis (Lashley & Pollock, 2020). Extreme cases where a category is "invalid" on the societal level even though everyone finds the category appropriate personally or where a category is considered valid even if nobody approves it can also happen in theory.

The following section goes over two other social evaluations closely related to and often confused with legitimacy, namely reputation and status, and points out the differences between these three concepts (Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Devers et al., 2009; Jensen, 2010).

2.3 Related Social Evaluations: Reputation and Status

Like legitimacy, reputation and status are also theoretically stretched and have a plethora of definitions (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Although efforts to differentiate these three phenomena have been going on since the mid-2000s, each is motivated by a different overarching goal; therefore, not every suggested distinction is compatible (Bitektine et al., 2020). The rest of this section compares and contrasts notable articles that distinguish legitimacy, reputation, and status (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine et al., 2020; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Devers et al., 2009; Jensen, 2010; Jensen & Roy, 2008; Rindova, Pollock & Hayward, 2006) and summarizes the commonly pointed out distinctions.

Reputation versus status: A standard definition used for reputation in the studies mentioned above is by Fombrun (1996) where he defined reputation as "a perceptual representation of a company's past actions and future prospects that describes the firm's overall appeal to all of its key constituents when compared with other leading rivals." (p. 72). As for status, the most frequently quoted definition is "a socially constructed, intersubjectively agreed-upon and accepted ordering or ranking of individuals, groups, organizations, or activities in a social system." (Washington & Zajac, 2005, p. 284). Based on these definitions, reputation and status are similar in that they compare and rank organizations in a given social context. Nonetheless, while reputation orders each organization on a continuum of best to worst on a given performance parameter, status creates a politically defined hierarchy of strata where actors are grouped into high-, middle-, and low-status tiers and these affiliations act as "a proxy for quality" of the entities in a given status

group (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Jensen, 2010; Rindova et al., 2006, p. 54).

Further, in their study of clients' selection processes of audit firms, Jensen and Roy (2008) differentiated reputation and status by defining the former as "the prestige accorded [actors] because of their prior performance" and the latter as "the prestige accorded actors because of their social positions" (p. 495). Accordingly, reputation differs from status in its emphasis on an organization's history or past behavior (Bitektine, 2011). In other words, reputation is granted when evaluators observe an organization's past performance, e.g., they always deliver on time, and then based on this judgment, make an anticipation for the future, e.g., they will deliver on time (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine et al., 2020). Consequently, reputation judgments are sourced from specific performances in a limited time frame such that yearly or even quarterly fluctuations in performance can influence reputational ranking (Bitektine et al., 2020). In contrast, while performance and quality influence how organizations are initially categorized into certain strata, status is more closely linked to affiliations and associations with certain groups or categories (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Therefore, once the status order is well established, "it is possible for a high-status actor to have a poor performance but still remain (at least for some time) in the high-status position." (Bitektine et al., 2020, p. 110). As a result, status is more enduring and encompassing than reputation.

Additionally, acquiring status is more political and problematic than reputation because while high performance will grant reputation automatically, status requires acceptance from incumbent members of the strata (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Therefore, organizations that want to be included in certain status groups need to negotiate their positions with insiders in addition to exhibiting specific characteristics (Bitektine et al., 2020; Rindova et al., 2006).

Lastly, there is also a functional difference between reputation and status in utilization for selecting exchange partners. In particular, Jensen and Roy (2008) showed that the evaluators used status as their initial criterion for selecting a group of organizations, and then, within that specific status group, they made their choices based on the reputation of individual organizations.

Reputation versus legitimacy: The point of overlap between reputation and legitimacy is their dependence on history (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). As described above, reputation is the anticipation of good performance based on past behavior. History is also important for legitimacy because legitimacy is granted to those that consistently exhibit that they are a proper part of the social system through spreading plausible stories and being good citizens (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Bitektine, 2011; Suchman, 1995). Entities that persistently underline that

they are a natural part of reality, collect certificates and accreditations, promote social welfare, and pass audits and inspections are evaluated as legitimate (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Scott, 1995). In contrast, those who present fluctuating or inconsistent explanations, morals, and compliance to authority draw suspicion and scrutiny, and as a result of close inspection, they are more likely to be evaluated as illegitimate by the evaluators (Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011).

Nonetheless, legitimacy differs from reputation in several ways. First, evaluations of reputation focus on a single target and aim to understand whether it is better or worse than the comparable others (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Dutton, Dukerich & Harquail, 1994). In other words, it is "individuating" or "differentiating" and asks questions such as "Is this organization more productive, creative, or efficient than the others?" (Devers et al., 2009, p. 155). In contrast, legitimacy focuses on similarity and conformity and tries to pile the target with accepted others (Bitektine, 2011; Devers et al., 2009; Devers & Mishina, 2019). Consequently, it is "non-individuating" or "homogenizing" and essentially asks if the entity is similar enough to be categorized as "one of those" (Bitektine, 2011, p. 160; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Devers et al., 2009, p. 155).

Second, legitimacy and reputation differ in their approaches to competition and rivalry (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). While reputation is about getting ahead of the competition and therefore sees similar others as a threat, legitimacy seeks similar others to prove that the entity is a regular, appropriate part of social reality (Suchman, 1995).

Third, once legitimacy is granted, i.e., entities are accepted as proper, their appropriateness is not questioned unless there is a specific reason to do so [2] (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tost, 2011). As noted above, legitimacy assessments act like a protective barrier that hides breaches, and further, even if these breaches are noticed, if the entity is highly legitimate, the evaluators may still give them a pass (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). In contrast, reputation is reassessed periodically, which makes it more fragile to one-time occurrences and minor changes. For example, a business school performing worse than the previous year and dropping a couple of ranks in a ranking system is unlikely to hurt the legitimacy of the organization, but it will affect its reputation.

Finally, legitimacy is more encompassing than reputation on the level of categories in that both illegitimate and legitimate categories can be objects of reputational evaluations (Bitektine et al., 2020; Hudson, 2008; Jensen, 2010). Like universities, hospitals, and film genres such as comedy or adventure, tobacco producers, arms manufacturers, brothels, and pornographic films can have high or low reputations

(Jensen, 2010; Vergne, 2012). For example, in the case of abortion clinics, Hudson (2008) talks about how both proponents and opponents of the normatively illegitimate category can make inferences about a specific clinic's reputation:

"Clients seeking an abortion may find that the reputation of the provider is one of efficiency and effectiveness, and even of a particularly warm, caring, and anxiety-reducing nature (Simonds, 1996). Yet other external audiences − those opposing abortions − while concurring with the pragmatic evaluation, may still evaluate the service provider negatively precisely because of these attributes of its core routines." (p. 256)

As such, the proponents of the illegitimate categories are inclined to prefer members with higher reputations due to their expected performance, however, there is currently limited information on the opponents' reaction to high- or low-performing members in illegitimate categories.

Status versus legitimacy: Like the distinction between reputation and legitimacy, status and legitimacy differ in their amalgamation and separation of similar others (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). As stated above, legitimacy is homogenizing or non-individating (Devers et al., 2009). In contrast, status is segregating or stratifying because it divides entities into ordinally ranked groups (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Devers et al., 2009). As a result, status only makes sense when the status group is compared to others and, like reputation, is closely related to rivalry and competition. High-status groups want to protect their position in the social order, while low-status groups aspire to enhance their standing (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Conversely, legitimacy benefits from the existence of similar others (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Alexy & George, 2013).

Additionally, the necessity of getting approval from the insiders separates status from legitimacy as well (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). When the category is legitimate, getting endorsed by high-status actors in that category is not likely to do much for legitimacy. For example, if a hospital fits the evaluators' cognitive, normative, and regulative criteria, it will be judged as legitimate regardless of the acceptance of high-status hospitals. However, depending on which group claims the focal hospital, the hospital's status will change. Further, when the category is illegitimate, endorsement from or affiliation with high-status members of the category is unlikely to decrease the illegitimacy of the supported actor; if anything, it may even increase its illegitimacy because the endorsed actor becomes more visible (Vergne, 2012). However, such an endorsement will increase the within-category status of

the endorsed actor. For example, a drug dealer endorsing another drug dealer is not likely to mean much to the evaluators who see drugs as normatively illegitimate. However, this behavior still increases the endorsed party's status in the eyes of the insiders and approving clients.

As hinted in the paragraph above, status and legitimacy have a very complicated relationship, especially at the level of categories (Bitektine et al., 2020). In market or cultural categories, having an established and clear status order bolsters cognitive legitimacy, as the stable member structure helps disseminate knowledge and decrease the cognitive load of making legitimacy assessments (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Podolny, 1993). Moreover, like reputation, status assignments can be made between and within categories. For example, in cultural categories such as film or music, genres themselves (e.g., comedy films, adventure movies, folk music, rock music) can have higher- or lower-status, and then within the genre, specific products (e.g., films, albums, songs), artists, producers, or directors can belong to higher-, mid-, or lower-status groups. Besides, these processes are independent of legitimacy judgments and can be made in both legitimate and illegitimate categories. For example, Jensen (2010) was specifically interested in how the status of actors played out in the illegitimate film category of pornographic comedy. He found that middle-status actors were more likely to be used in such films because they had more potential to increase the legitimacy of the genre than low-status actors and had more incentive to participate in such films than high-status actors who essentially did not have anything to gain from acting in porn-comedy, despite having a higher capacity to legitimize the genre (Davis & Greve, 1997; Jensen, 2010). Status also interacts with the severity of normative and regulative breaches such that compared to lower-status actors, high-status actors are less affected by minor scandals, but if the breach is significant, they get the harshest criticism (Bitektine et al., 2020; Davis & Greve, 1997).

Now that the meta-theories, fundamentals of legitimacy, and two of the related concepts are explained, the following sections focus on the negative version of legitimacy.

2.4 Understanding Illegitimacy

Despite numerous empirical and conceptual studies on legitimacy, illegitimacy has received very little attention (Devers et al., 2009; Devers & Mishina, 2019; Helms et al., 2019). Moreover, unlike the research on legitimacy that has followed Suchman's (1995) widely recognized definition in concurrence (Deephouse et al., 2017), the limited number of studies on illegitimacy (Anteby, 2010; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Zuckerman, 1999) failed to unite around a consistent conceptualization (Helms et al., 2019; Hudson, 2008). However, these studies were still impactful and contributed to our understanding of illegitimacy. Additionally, theoretical papers on legitimacy, which is the majority of the legitimacy literature (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008), usually spare some space, albeit short, for discussing the concept of "illegitimacy" (e.g., Deephouse et al., 2017; Tost, 2011). Based on these two lines of research, the rest of this section formulates a definition and conceptualization for illegitimacy.

In general, two attributes of illegitimate entities appear salient. First, the entity must be perceived as violating cognitive frameworks, norms, and/or rules and evaluated as inappropriate or improper according to the criteria used (Anteby, 2010; Deephouse et al., 2017). Second, after the evaluation, the entities are punished by the evaluators in various forms, including ignorance, low ratings, demands of change, questioning, policing, protests, media attacks, and ostracism (Alexy & George, 2013; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Helms & Patterson, 2014; Hudson, 2008; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011; Zuckerman, 1999).

For example, in their study of liberal arts schools establishing professional programs, Kraatz and Zajac (1996) described illegitimacy as the following:

> "For at least three reasons, a change toward professionalization or vocationalization can be considered illegitimate for liberal arts colleges. Such a change is: (1) fundamentally inconsistent with deeply institutionalized norms and values in this field, (2) widely viewed as a threat to the perpetuation of these norms and values, and (3) vehemently denounced by significant actors in the institutional environments of these colleges." (p. 817)

Similarly, Tost (2011) defined illegitimacy as being "inappropriate" (p. 695) and

"negative legitimacy judgments" (p. 711) and highlighted that judgments of illegitimacy would result in attempts of change by either the members of the entity or by the evaluators. Likewise, Suddaby et al. (2017, p. 454) stated that illegitimacy is "a negative form of legitimacy that constitutes a liability for organizations." Yet others defined legitimacy directly through the existence of comments or attacks. For instance, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) stated that "Legitimacy is known more readily when it is absent than when it is present. When activities of an organization are illegitimate, comments and attacks will occur" (p. 194). In the empirical domain, the majority of the illegitimacy research in OT implicitly (e.g., Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Zuckerman, 1999) or explicitly (e.g., Anteby, 2010; Jensen, 2010) limited illegitimacy to a single dimension.

As it is in the realm of legitimacy, most of the illegitimacy studies have focused on the moral sphere (e.g., Anteby, 2010; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Jensen, 2010; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015). Accordingly, these studies conceptualized illegitimacy as deviations from accepted norms and standards or engaging in immoral acts. For example, Elsbach and Sutton (1992) conceptualized illegitimacy as a violation of social norms and controversial activities that derive the disapproval of the stakeholders. Similarly, Haack et al. (2014) defined illegitimacy as "equivalent to 'negative legitimacy', which refers to the strong disapproval of a comprehensible yet undesired entity or activity (e.g., the Mafia or environmental pollution)" (p. 649).

Cognitive illegitimacy has been studied primarily by category researchers. Category literature has generally focused on the repercussions of illegitimacy discount and the process of gaining cognitive legitimacy (e.g., Hsu, 2006; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Navis & Glynn, 2010; Zuckerman, 1999), though there were attempts to reconcile cognitive illegitimacy with the normative domain via a concept called "valance" (Alexy & George, 2013; Kennedy et al., 2010). Valance was first offered by Kennedy et al. (2010) and is "the degree of appeal that category membership has in the eyes of a specific audience" (p. 375). Accordingly, new categories must not only build coherence and try to appear natural but also acquire positive appraisals based on their value. Moreover, they argued that when a category is cognitively illegitimate, tying it to positive valence categories would decrease the effects of illegitimacy discount and act as a gateway towards gaining complete legitimacy (Alexy & George, 2013).

Studies in the regulatory domain are rarer than the other two dimensions, but as mentioned earlier, the existent research often focused on the negotiations and lobbying activities between the categories in question and the government (e.g., Li, Xia, Zajac & Lin, 2023; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Özcan & Gürses, 2018). These

studies presented government support, or at least, government non-involvement, as a tool to legitimize the entity in question in other domains as well (Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Özcan & Gürses, 2018). Another area of interest related to regulative illegitimacy was illegal yet normatively legitimate entities (Cederström & Fleming, 2016; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015; Webb et al., 2009). This line of research, albeit few in number, focused on cases where criminal organizations benefited from public support or public indifference.

In all, this study accounts for all three lines of research described above and defines illegitimacy as *"an evaluation of inappropriateness or improperness of an entity to a social system in terms of cognitive frameworks, norms, and regulations"* (Deephouse et al., 2017; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011).

The following section addresses two critical issues that have led to criticisms of the concept of illegitimacy and then dives into each dimension of illegitimacy separately.

2.4.1 Further Clarifications

As research on negative social evaluations has become more prevalent in the last decade, the validity and usefulness of the concept of illegitimacy came under question (Devers & Mishina, 2019; Helms et al., 2019; Hudson, 2008; Piazza & Perretti, 2015). Specifically, two contradictions in existing illegitimacy research led to criticisms of the concept.

The first point of debate is whether illegitimacy is the absence or lack of legitimacy or the presence of negative legitimacy judgments (Devers et al., 2009; Hudson, 2008). The majority of the work on illegitimacy follows the "illegitimacy as the negative version of legitimacy" conceptualization in that they define illegitimacy as not only the lack of legitimacy but the existence of evaluations of inappropriateness (e.g., Anteby, 2010; Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse et al., 2017; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Tost, 2011). In contrast, the lack of legitimacy is called "nonlegitimacy" by Devers et al. (2009, p. 156) and refers to situations where an entity is not yet evaluated.

Scholars who critiqued illegitimacy for being confounded with nonlegitimacy usually point to Zuckerman's (1999) conceptualization of illegitimacy discount as the contradictory statement that portrays illegitimacy as "a lack of legitimacy, a lack of social recognition or approval, or the absence of legitimacy" (Helms et al., 2019; Hudson, 2008, p. 253).

Nevertheless, this confusion is primarily due to the different evaluation and punishment mechanisms underlying cognitive and normative/regulative illegitimacy evaluations (Scott, 2014; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). As cognitive legitimacy judgments are made passively based on heuristics and symbolic cues, the process of rendering cognitive illegitimacy is more subtle and intuitive, thus, harder to observe (Bitektine, 2011; Suchman, 1995; Suddaby et al., 2017; Tost, 2011).

Regardless, this does not mean the lack or absence of legitimacy because the entity in question is perceived, evaluated, and found inappropriate based on taken-for-granted cognitive frameworks and, as a result, gets punished by the audiences (Tost, 2011; Zuckerman, 1999; Zuckerman et al., 2003). In contrast, the lack of legitimacy is expected to occur when the evaluators do not judge a category, e.g., when they are not aware of it, or when they intentionally hold back their evaluations to gather more information before making their final evaluation (Devers et al., 2009; Hampel & Tracey, 2019; Pontikes, 2012).

Besides, because cognitive illegitimacy creates confusion, disorientation, and cognitive stress (Scott, 2014; Suchman, 1995), such entities are usually punished in some way; however, these punishments may be covert and quiet compared to the vehement discussions expected to accompany normative and regulative illegitimacy (Hudson, 2008; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996). Specifically, evaluators punish cognitively illegitimate entities by decreasing the monetary value of the products (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010), giving them lower ratings compared to the others (Hsu, 2006), making assumptions of lack of competency and low quality (Zuckerman & Kim, 2003), and scrutinizing it further until they find an obvious breach of norms or rules (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Hsu et al., 2009; Tost, 2011; Zuckerman, 1999).

To summarize, nonlegitimacy could be understood as point 0 of legitimacy or status of "pending evaluation." For instance, innovations that have not been recognized yet can be labeled as nonlegitimate (Alexy & George, 2013). In contrast, illegitimacy covers the negative end of the legitimacy spectrum. Here, entities are perceived and evaluated to be inappropriate or improper (Devers et al., 2009; Hampel & Tracey, 2019).

The second debate is about whether legitimacy and illegitimacy are dichotomous concepts or are the opposite ends of a single legitimacy continuum (Deephouse et al., 2017; Devers & Mishina, 2019; Suddaby et al., 2017).

Those on the dichotomy side argue that because of the high cognitive load of evaluating a variety of entities as having more or less legitimacy, evaluators are likely to categorize the target they are evaluating as legitimate or illegitimate without delving

deeper into the nuances of the evaluation (Deephouse et al., 2017; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Devers & Mishina, 2019). Additionally, they state that characterizing legitimacy as a dichotomous variable helps distinguish it from status and reputation as the latter two include ordering, e.g., performance ranks or high-middle-low strata, by definition (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). In contrast, those on the continuum side argue that factors such as disagreement between the evaluators, certainty, clarity, and firmness of judgments, and intensity and salience of questioning cause various degrees of (il)legitimacy to appear at the societal level (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Hampel & Tracey, 2019; Meyer & Scott, 1983). It is also argued that organizations could prefer different degrees of legitimacy in that some of them just want to be categorized as part of an appropriate category and get by without being scrutinized, while others seek active and continuous support from the evaluators (Suchman, 1995).

After arguing for dichotomous conceptualization in the 2000s, Deephouse and colleagues developed an ordinal scale that distinguished between four states of legitimacy, accepted, proper, debated, and illegitimate (Deephouse et al., 2017; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Accepted and proper labels are given to "legitimate" entities but differ from each other in the mode of evaluation employed to reach them. If the target is not being actively questioned or scrutinized, it is "accepted"; if there are active evaluations but these evaluations are routine, e.g., renewal of certificates, periodical audits, it is "proper." "Debated" occurs when the evaluations are active and visibly conflicting in that two or more groups negotiate to convince others of their opinions or if a group of evaluators is challenging a legitimate institution. Finally, "illegitimate" is "the assessment by the social system that the organization is inappropriate and that it should be radically reformed or cease to exist" (Deephouse et al., 2017, p. 33). Despite creating this framework, Deephouse et al. (2017) continued to emphasize the cognitive and emotional load of active and refined legitimacy judgments. They argued that debated organizations required too much effort, so the evaluators are inclined to close the case by either getting rid of them or somewhat finding a way to legitimize them. Additionally, they claimed that illegitimate organizations would not survive for long because the cognitive and emotional effort required by constant questioning would be too much for the evaluators.

Nonetheless, following the more recent theoretical work (e.g., Devers & Mishina, 2019; Hampel & Tracey, 2019), here legitimacy and illegitimacy are conceptualized as positive and negative sides of a single continuum. This continuum can be thought of as the number line where nonlegitimacy is the point zero; on the positive side lies different degrees of legitimacy, and on the negative side lies different degrees of illegitimacy. Figure 2.1 illustrates the conceptualization of legitimacy and illegitimacy

as the positive and negative sides of a single continuum.

Figure 2.1 The Legitimacy−Illegitimacy Continuum

Consequently, given a single dimension, i.e., cognitive, normative, or regulative, an entity cannot be evaluated as legitimate and illegitimate at the same time by a single group of evaluators (Hudson, 2008). However, because the audiences are heterogeneous, a target could be evaluated as illegitimate and legitimate by different evaluator groups that simultaneously exist within the larger community on any of the dimensions. Additionally, entities can be legitimate in one dimension and illegitimate in the other, e.g., cognitively legitimate but normatively illegitimate, especially if different groups of evaluators have authority over different dimensions (Scott, 2014). Such conflicts between dimensions of legitimacy are more common in contexts that are not yet institutionalized (Suchman, 1995; Zietsma et al., 2017).

At a given point, where an entity stands on this continuum depends on how much support or dissent the evaluated entity gets. Specifically, the degree of legitimacy or illegitimacy can be affected by the size of the market or community the entity belongs to (Anteby, 2010) and the relative power, motivation, organization, and persistence of the proponents and opponents (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Hudson, 2008). Relatedly, depending on the demographics, local laws, and political affiliation, the same organization or category can be illegitimate in one location and less illegitimate or legitimate in another. For example, in their study of gay bathhouses, Hudson and Okhuysen (2009) segregated the geographical locations the bathhouses were in as condemning, tolerant, or accepting based on laws, regulations, demographic characteristics, and voting records on legislations related to inclusivity and LGBT rights. Accordingly, they found that evaluators in different environments responded differently to the bathhouses, and the organizations adjusted how they presented themselves depending on the environment (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009). Similarly, Aldrich and Fiol (1994, p. 661) discussed how the level of "institutional tolerance" can render passive support or trigger negative responses, depending on the industry.

Overall, illegitimacy represents the negative side of the legitimacy continuum. The

degree of illegitimacy depends on various factors, such as the size and power of the proponents and opponents and the characteristics of evaluators whose perspective is chosen (Hampel & Tracey, 2019; Hudson, 2008).

The following three sections explain cognitive, normative, and regulative illegitimacy thoroughly.

2.4.1.1 Cognitive Illegitimacy

Cognitive illegitimacy can be defined as the evaluations of inappropriateness or improperness according to shared cognitive or categorical frameworks that are culturally embedded in the meaning system of a society (Deephouse et al., 2017; Lamertz & Baum, 1998; Scott, 1995; Tost, 2011).

Particularly, such inappropriateness can arise in two ways. First, entities can be judged cognitively illegitimate if they are based on a new cognitive framework (e.g., a new form, structure, practice, or product) that does not fit into taken-for-granted categorical structures (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Bitektine et al., 2020). Second, a previously accepted entity can be excluded from the meaning system or replaced by an alternative if the institutional pillars, cognitive, normative, and regulative, change in a way that shatters the alignment of the entity with accepted frameworks and brings its taken-for-grantedness into question (Devers & Mishina, 2019; Kennedy et al., 2010; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Tost, 2011).

Using Suchman's (1995) terminology, the first route can be called incomprehensibility. Here, the entity is judged cognitively illegitimate because the current frameworks do not provide a coherent and plausible explanation that situates the category or organization as a meaningful and natural part of reality (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Kennedy et al., 2010; Suchman, 1995). As such, the entity is seen as alien, and evaluators have "negative feelings of confusion or disorientation" (Durand & Khaire, 2017; Scott, 2014, p. 70; Suchman, 1995). As a result, unless the proponents of the entity manage to create stories that make sense according to the evaluators' cognitive frameworks, the entity is expected to be judged illegitimate and penalized by the audiences (Pardos-Prado & Dinas, 2010; Zuckerman, 1999). Meyer and Rowan (1977) were the first ones to offer this process, and they stated that:

> "Organizations that omit environmentally legitimated elements of structure or create unique structures lack acceptable legitimated accounts of

their activities. . . are more vulnerable to claims that they are negligent, irrational, or unnecessary. Claims of this kind, whether made by internal participants, external constituents, or the government, can cause organizations to incur real costs." (p. 349–350)

Nonetheless, since Meyer and Rowan (1977), neoinstitutional theory has been relatively silent about incomprehensibility and its costs to organizations and categories (Devers et al., 2009; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017). In contrast, starting with Zuckerman's (1999) illegitimacy discount, it has been population ecologists and category researchers who have provided valuable insights into this subtype of cognitive illegitimacy. Nevertheless, it should be noted that except for a few studies that directly tackled legitimacy (e.g., Hannan et al., 2007; Jensen, 2010; Kennedy et al., 2010; Zuckerman, 1999) the contribution of category literature to incomprehensibility was more of a side effect. Specifically, because categories themselves, defined as shared, taken-for-granted cognitive schemata, are cognitive frameworks, research on the processes of category emergence, creation, acceptance, or rejection has provided insights that are relevant to the cognitive dimension (Navis & Glynn, 2010). This connection is also demonstrated by more recent studies on legitimacy replacing the previously used terms "frameworks," "templates," or "prototypes" with categories. For instance, Bitektine et al. (2020) defined cognitive legitimacy as "how well the organization fits in established cognitive categories in evaluators' minds" (p. 109). Similarly, Devers and Mishina (2019) defined cognitive illegitimacy as the "inability to fit into clean categories" (p. 18).

In the 2000s, a commonly studied concept in category research was an antecedent of illegitimacy discount called "category spanning" (Cornelissen et al., 2015). Category spanning refers to a type of framework violation generated by products or organizations that mix multiple prototypes instead of adhering to the templates of a single category (Augustine & Piazza, 2022; Hsu, 2006; Hsu et al., 2009; Vergne, 2012). Category spanners, by definition, do not conform to the taken-for-granted frameworks, and the uncertainty and confusion caused by the inability to categorize spanners lead evaluators to become averse to the new category (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Suchman, 1995; Zuckerman, 1999). Evaluators then try to alleviate their discomfort by ignoring, ostracizing, undervaluing, or even vilifying the spanner (Durand & Khaire, 2017; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Suchman, 1995; Zuckerman, 1999). Supporting this view, empirical evidence showed that category spanners tended to be disregarded, received lower ratings compared to conformists, garnered less appeal in the eyes of consumers, and were often perceived as lacking skills and competence (Goldberg, Hannan & Kovács, 2016; Granqvist & Ritvala, 2016; Hsu, 2006; Hsu

et al., 2009; Zuckerman & Kim, 2003). The increased cognitive load required to comprehend category spanners and the identity ambiguity associated with unknown categories were noted as the prominent reasons behind the illegitimacy discount (Hsu, 2006).

Nevertheless, in the last decade, other category researchers have criticized the studies on illegitimacy discount and category spanning for being ignorant of the context and audience characteristics and simplifying the process of category emergence (Alexy & George, 2013; Durand & Khaire, 2017; Glynn & Navis, 2013; Kennedy & Fiss, 2013; Kennedy et al., 2010; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Paolella & Durand, 2016; Pontikes, 2012). Specifically, these scholars argued that categorical systems are embedded in larger social systems where different evaluators, or in their terminology, audiences, exist simultaneously and may react differently to an emergent category (Durand & Khaire, 2017; Glynn & Navis, 2013). They also demonstrated how audience characteristics such as expertise, interest, and expectations led different groups of evaluators to give out distinct reactions to emergent categories such that while certain evaluator groups rendered judgments of illegitimacy immediately, others waited in an indeterminate, nonlegitimate stage where they look for additional information (Durand & Paolella, 2013; Granqvist & Ritvala, 2016; Paolella & Durand, 2016; Pontikes, 2012). Further, the motivation, persistence, and storytelling abilities of category insiders had a great impact on whether emergent categories were evaluated as illegitimate and punished or tolerated enough to jump to the path of acquiring legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Durand & Khaire, 2017). Sector and industry characteristics such as industry maturity, tolerance to innovation, and presence or absence of salient prototypes influenced the degree of cognitive illegitimacy and the severity of penalties as well (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Durand & Khaire, 2017; Glynn & Navis, 2013; Suchman, 1995).

Additionally, Alexy and George (2013) argued that new products or categories are bound to violate the taken-for-granted frameworks in one way or another; therefore, if the principles of illegitimacy discount are applied as is, no innovation can ever be legitimate. Instead, they adopted the concept of valence from Kennedy et al. (2010) and showed that existing ties with incumbent categories in a meaning system provided novel categories a positive valence, which granted the new categories the tolerance and time necessary to create and spread stories to acquire cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Alexy & George, 2013; Kennedy et al., 2010; Tost, 2011).

One shortcoming of the recent studies is that they exclusively focused on categories that eventually managed to put plausible and coherent stories together and acquired

cognitive legitimacy (e.g., nanotechnology studied by Granqvist & Ritvala, 2016; Kennedy et al., 2010 or satellite radio studied by Navis & Glynn, 2010). Some of these categories, like nanotechnology, even inserted themselves as the dominant prototype and shaped the larger categorical system around their own properties (Kennedy et al., 2010). Regardless, as Khaire and Wadhwani (2010, p. 1283) state, "emergence is not always followed by stabilization," and categories can stay incomprehensible for years. For example, to bolster their claim, in their study of Modern Indian Art, Khaire and Wadhwani (2010) showed that before a group of activists decided to claim the value of Modern Indian Art in the 1990s, these paintings and artifacts had been traded in the market for decades, albeit in an undervalued and underappreciated fashion. Similarly, Jepperson (1991) theorized that incomprehensible entities not only exist, but if they persist enough, they can also be taken-for-granted without being backed by any plausible explanations. The limitations caused by the focus on success stories in illegitimacy research will be further examined in the concluding section of this chapter, as well as throughout the remainder of the dissertation.

In the empirical domain, incomprehensibility is generally studied through indicators like conflicting, incoherent, over-broad definitions given by the members and evaluators, fluctuations in price and value, inability to detect the category members, inability to identify the rivals, and incompetence to differentiate the category from related categories (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Kennedy et al., 2010; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Koçak, Hannan & Hsu, 2014; Navis & Glynn, 2010; Negro et al., 2010).

The second way cognitive illegitimacy can occur is by cracking the taken-for-grantedness of a legitimate category (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011). This type of cognitive illegitimacy is especially important for organizational theorists since they traditionally emphasize taken-for-grantedness, signaled by a lack of questions and the unimaginability of alternatives, as the ultimate state of legitimacy an organization can reach (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Meyer & Scott, 1983). Taken-for-grantedness is also salient in studies adopting the legitimacy-as-process perspective because questioning a category is seen as the first step of delegitimation, which is the initial phase of institutional change (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Tost, 2011).

The alignment of an incumbent and accepted entity with the cognitive frameworks is usually broken by normative and regulative contestation (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Discussions on moral and regulatory domains can bring the previously unconscious evaluations to the surface, push the evaluators to reassess their judgments, scrutinize the entity, and question its necessity and rel-

evance (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015). For example, the campaign to "defund the police" exemplifies how normative challenges towards the police and their loss of normative legitimacy eventually led opponents to protest the very existence of an essentially universally taken-for-granted and mature organization (Levine, 2021). Similarly, Vaccaro and Palazzo (Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015) showed how a group of activists used normative claims like reclaiming dignity to challenge the unquestioned acceptance of the Mafia in Sicily and re-alert the public who had become indifferent to the Mafia. Government intervention in categorical systems and implementation of new laws and regulations can also lead to taken-for-grantedness to collapse (Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Özcan & Gürses, 2018).

Another source of breaking taken-for-grantedness is the emergence and acceptance of new technologies and innovations in related fields (Kennedy et al., 2010). New products and practices can alter the taken-for-grantedness of an entity both directly by presenting themselves as alternatives and indirectly by changing the dominant frameworks (Kennedy et al., 2010).

Overall, the opposite of taken-for-grantedness is an entity being rejected from the social reality of an evaluator group, like in the police and the mafia examples provided above (Devers et al., 2009; Jepperson, 1991). This form of rejection becomes apparent through the proliferation of intense discussions that critically question the nature of the evaluated entity and spark protests against its very existence (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Tost, 2011).

2.4.1.2 Normative Illegitimacy

Normative illegitimacy, also called moral illegitimacy, can be defined as the evaluations of inappropriateness or improperness based on important social values, norms, and standards (Deephouse et al., 2017; Jensen, 2010; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011).

Like its positive counterpart, normative illegitimacy has been the most frequently studied dimension among illegitimacy evaluations, especially if stigma is counted as an extreme form of normative illegitimacy (Hampel & Tracey, 2019; Hudson, 2008). Research so far has addressed normative illegitimacy stemming from a variety of sources, including sexual deviation (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Jensen, 2010; Wolfe & Blithe, 2015), violence, terrorism, and death (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Helms &

Patterson, 2014; Vergne, 2012), associations with drugs (Cederström & Fleming, 2016; Lashley & Pollock, 2020), engaging in unethical procedures (Adams, 2012; Anteby, 2010), and environmental harm (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). These studies also investigate numerous different objects of analysis, such as market categories like cadaver trade (Anteby, 2010), organizational categories like arms manufacturers (Vergne, 2012) and marijuana dispensaries (Lashley & Pollock, 2020), single-standing organizations like Jamaican drug cartel (Cederström & Fleming, 2016), illegitimate actions like terrorist attacks (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992), and genres like pornographic movies (Jensen, 2010). Relatedly, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) partitioned normative illegitimacy according to the embeddedness of the immoral attribute to the entity. Specifically, they differentiated between performance and value challenges, where performance challenges were caused by one-time moral transgressions like corporate scandals and accidents, and value challenges problematized "the organization's very mission" (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990, p. 194). These studies also described several paths that may cause normative illegitimacy evaluations.

First, for new categories, incomprehensibility can lead evaluators to find the category normatively illegitimate as well (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Kennedy et al., 2010). Specifically, the uncertainty and ambiguity around incomprehensible categories are expected to cause the evaluators to shift to the active evaluation stage (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). These evaluators then collect more information on the category, follow its activities closely, and publicly debate its attributes and anticipated benefits or harms (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Lashley & Pollock, 2020). This is a tricky process because if the emergent category successfully passes the scrutiny period, the category gains normative legitimacy, and moral approval may lead to cognitive and regulative legitimation. However, scrutiny also increases the risk of detection of moral breaches that can provoke judgments of illegitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Tost, 2011). Therefore, if an entity is under scrutiny, members and proponents are advised to use various tactics to distract the audience from the negative parts of the entity and emphasize the appropriate attributes. These strategies are explored in detail under the section "Strategies for Managing Negative Social Evaluations."

Second, bans and increased attention of regulatory agencies can trigger normative illegitimacy evaluations. For example, Lashley and Pollock (2020) showed that although cannabis products were freely used in the 1800s and early 1900s as medical drugs, they became heavily stigmatized after the newly found Federal Bureau of Narcotics introduced regulations against them in the 1930s.

Third, normative illegitimacy can spread from one category to another through ille-

gitimacy spillovers where associations with a normatively illegitimate category, organization, or even an actor result in the focal entity being perceived as normatively illegitimate as well (Alexy & George, 2013; Haack et al., 2014; Suchman, 1995). For example, in their study of transnational governance schemes (TGSs), Haack et al. (2014) argued that the evaluators who have a hard time interpreting TGSs opt to use their feelings of negativeness or positiveness related to an affiliated organization in the TGS network as an "affect heuristic" to judge the TGS in question.

Fourth, for accepted categories, normative illegitimacy can be sourced in major or repetitive moral transgressions, scandals, accidents, availability of new information, or radical change in standards (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Ruef & Scott, 1998). In these cases, if the normative legitimacy is not repaired, moral challenges lead to a loss of cognitive legitimacy as well. For example, Maguire and Hardy (2009) showed the industry-wide delegitimation and, finally, the abandonment of a previously widespread pesticide called DDT after biologist Rachel Carson wrote a book on the negative effects of pesticides on the environment and human health.

Lastly, and again for previously taken-for-granted categories, the awakening of dormant opposition can lead to contestation and eventually normative illegitimacy judgments (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). This can happen when a disorganized majority gets more organized and motivated (Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015), members of rival or peripheral categories directly challenge the incumbents (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), or suppressed minorities reaching to the critical mass that is sufficient for initiating moral contestation (Centola, Becker, Brackbill & Baronchelli, 2018).

Nonetheless, in the last 15 years, normative illegitimacy was outshined by another concept called "stigma," which also deals with organizations and categories whose morality is protested by evaluators (Hampel & Tracey, 2019; Hudson, 2008; Wolfe & Blithe, 2015). The next section explains stigma and explores if and how stigma and illegitimacy are different from each other.

Stigma and Normative Illegitimacy

The term stigma was initially introduced by Goffman (1963), who defined it as "an attribute that is deeply discrediting" (p. 3). Goffman (1963) then described three different sources of stigma. The first one was called "abominations of the body" and originated from ancient Greeks who associated physical deformations with the morality of the bearers. Accordingly, physical deformation signaled that authorities punished the person who had it for engaging in bad conduct. The second one was called "blemishes of individual character" and included a variety of lousy personality

traits like laziness or dominance, habits like alcoholism, and preferences like homosexuality. The third one was "tribal stigma," which occurred when stigma equally contaminated all members of a group, such as family, race, or gender (Goffman, 1963; Paetzold et al., 2008). By marking, labeling, and outcasting individuals and groups that could possibly pose a danger, stigma served the functions of "stabilizing the environment" and creating a sense of "social control" (Augustine & Piazza, 2022; Devers et al., 2009, p. 161).

Stigma research first proliferated in psychology and social psychology, and consequently, it entered into organizational studies through research that focused on stigmatized individuals within organizations (Paetzold et al., 2008). Nonetheless, in his seminal paper, Hudson (2008) applied stigma to the organizational level and started a new line of research that has been very popular in the last decade (Devers & Mishina, 2019). Hudson (2008) defined stigma as "a strong or extreme form of illegitimacy" and pointed out that both illegitimacy and stigma are results of delegitimation processes (p. 253). However, he criticized the concept of illegitimacy for being imprecise and essentially introduced organizational stigma as an alternative option to illegitimacy.

Another contribution of Hudson (2008) was distinguishing between core- and event-stigma. Accordingly, core-stigma was a stigma caused by a perceived defect in a core, unremovable part of an organization and was different from event-stigma, which was a stigma caused by one-time accidents or scandals. As such, this differentiation was similar to Ashford and Gibbs's (1990) performance and value challenges.

Following Hudson (2008), Devers et al. (2009) compared stigma to other social evaluations, including reputation, status, celebrity [3], and legitimacy (defined as "normative fit," p. 155), and distinguished legitimacy and stigma on a variety of dimensions. First, they argued that these concepts have different theoretical origins. While legitimacy was based on neoinstitutional theory, stigma rested on labeling theory (Erikson, 1962; Kitsuse, 1962). Second, they stated that compared to the "non-individuating" legitimacy, stigma was "deindividuating" in that not only did it categorize the entity with similar others, but it also deprived the entity of its unique features and stereotyped it. Third, they argued that legitimacy did not necessarily evoke strong emotions, but stigma always triggered strong negative emotions like fear, disgust, and dislike, which led to a strong avoidance of stigmatized entities (Devers et al., 2009; Goffman, 1963). However, their comparison juxtaposed stigma to "positive" legitimacy, and illegitimacy was then presented as an antecedent of stigma. In their conceptualization, the process of stigmatization was initiated by the evaluated entity engaging in illegitimate activities.

Devers et al. (2009, p. 155) also developed the most commonly used definition of organizational stigma. Accordingly, stigma was "a label that evokes a collective stakeholder group-specific perception that an organization possesses a fundamental, deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and discredits the organization."

Another important conceptual development in stigma literature was Vergne's (2012, p. 1028) introduction of "categorical stigma," which was defined as "a vilifying label that contaminates a group of similar peers." Other stigma researchers also agreed that negative evaluations directed at an organization's core attributes were likely to be applied to all organizations that share the targeted attribute, thus conceptualizing core stigma as a categorical phenomenon (Devers et al., 2009; Lashley & Pollock, 2020). So far, most stigma research has focused on categories that suffer from core-stigma (e.g., Adams, 2012; Helms & Patterson, 2014; Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Piazza & Perretti, 2015; Wolfe & Blithe, 2015).

In the last decade, stigma literature has flourished, and numerous conceptual and empirical studies on stigma have been published (Hampel & Tracey, 2019). However, the relationship between illegitimacy and stigma is still not clear. To date, stigma was theorized as a cause of illegitimacy (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Paetzold et al., 2008), an extreme form of illegitimacy (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2017; Haack et al., 2014; Hudson, 2008), and as a consequence of illegitimacy (e.g., Devers et al., 2009; Jensen, 2010; Piazza & Perretti, 2015; Suddaby et al., 2017). For example, while Paetzold et al. (2008) stated that "victims of stigmatization (both individual and organizational) lose legitimacy and valued reputations," Jensen (2010) argued that individuals avoid illegitimate categories so they would not be stigmatized.

Yet others, especially those who study the process of stigma defiance, portrayed destigmatization and gaining normative legitimacy as processes that go hand in hand. Accordingly, organizations and actors engaged in strategies that reduce stigma and build legitimacy either at the same time or shortly after one another (Adams, 2012; Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Lashley & Pollock, 2020).

Moreover, both normative illegitimacy and stigma are expected to lead to protests, public debates, shaming, ostracization, avoidance of contact out of fear of illegitimacy spillovers and stigma transfers, problems with accessing resources, and increased scrutiny (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Deephouse et al., 2017; Devers et al., 2009; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Jensen, 2010; Piazza & Perretti, 2015; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995).

To clarify the relationship between illegitimacy and stigma, three papers were published in a special issue of the Journal of Management Inquiry by influential scholars

of stigma literature, Devers & Mishina (2019), Hampel & Tracey (2019), and Helms et al. (2019), accompanied by an introduction by Patterson, Hudson & Helms (2019) and a comprehensive critique of the articles by Ashforth (2019). These articles provided significant, but sometimes contradictory, arguments about the relationship between illegitimacy and stigma.

First, Helms et al. (2019) mainly argued the most significant difference between illegitimacy and stigma is the multidimensionality of illegitimacy, which makes illegitimacy a broader, more inclusive concept that can have a variety of sources. They then stated that this broadness of illegitimacy allowed organizations or categories to be stigmatized and legitimate at the same time. They gave Walmart and the Catholic Church as examples of this difference, stating that although certain groups of evaluators stigmatized them for being hyper-capitalistic and being involved in sexual abuse, respectively, these organizations are still taken-for-granted places to shop and worship for large groups of evaluators.

This claim is largely supported when cognitive (il)legitimacy and stigma are compared. For example, stigmatized organizations like tattoo parlors, mortuaries, strip clubs, and arms producers are "well-known" and easily categorized, i.e., they are comprehensible, and some audiences might even see them as taken-for-granted. In a similar vein, cognitively illegitimate categories can be non-stigmatized. For instance, new or complex technologies and innovations like nanotechnology, cryptocurrency, and AI, despite causing confusion and a certain amount of fear, are not necessarily stereotyped and disliked to the degree the other stigmatized categories are (Alexy & George, 2013; Hampel & Tracey, 2019; Kennedy et al., 2010).

In the case of normative illegitimacy, the difference between normative judgments and stigma is most apparent in the context of stigma sourced in bodily mutilations (Goffman, 1963). Evaluators can devalue, feel repulsed by, and even discriminate against disabled, sick, homeless people, or people of color. However, on the societal level, especially in Western countries, the "metanarratives" (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) of equality, human rights, and anti-discrimination stop these feelings from turning into reasons for debating the inappropriateness of such individuals or groups.

Nonetheless, normative illegitimacy and stigma are harder to differentiate on higher levels as organizations and categories cannot really have bodily mutilations. An example could be businesses and practices that are closely related to death and illness, such as funeral houses, cremation centers, and organ donation societies (Ashforth, Kreiner, Clark & Fugate, 2017; Vergne, 2012). Similarly, homeless shelters, rehabilitation centers, and psychiatric facilities are possibly stigmatized organizations, but they cannot be considered normatively illegitimate. These organizations are avoided

and devalued, but they are legitimate because they actually serve the well-being of society and are interpreted as necessary and functional. However, the majority of stigma research in OT investigates organizations and categories stigmatized due to perceived immorality or harm to society at large, including gay bathhouses (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009), brothels (Wolfe & Blithe, 2015), marijuana dispensaries (Lashley & Pollock, 2020), and arms producers (Vergne, 2012), all of which can be classified as normatively illegitimate as well.

Additionally, the measures used by hypo-deductive studies of stigma and normative illegitimacy overlap. For example, Piazza and Peretti (2015) and Vergne (2012) coded newspaper articles as positive, neutral, and negative and then measured the level of stigma by proportioning the number of negative articles to the total. This is also a widespread measure of normative legitimacy or illegitimacy (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). Therefore, Helms et al.'s (2019) distinguishing between illegitimacy and stigma by emphasizing the possible co-occurrences of stigma and legitimacy in its broad sense does not really clarify the situation. Although such an occurrence can happen in the cases of cognitive legitimacy, it is less likely in the domain of norms since moral breaches are likely to lead to both illegitimacy and stigma.

The second paper, Hampel and Tracey (2019), argued that normative legitimacy and stigma "essentially represent a normative evaluation of an organization" (p. 11) and attempted to clarify the overlap between normative illegitimacy and stigma by conceptualizing stigma and moral legitimacy as parts of the same spectrum. On this spectrum, while normative legitimacy represents the second most positive end called "approval," stigmatization is the farthest negative end, also called "profound disapproval." Between profound disapproval and approval, there is "lack of approval" and "disapproval," and the farthest positive end of the spectrum is called "elevation." Elevated organizations go beyond normative legitimacy in that evaluators designate them as the idols of virtue to be followed and imitated. As such, both normative legitimacy and stigmatization are given the opportunity to exist in multiple degrees. Like Hudson's (2008) initial definition, stigma represents an extreme form of moral illegitimacy where the stigmatized entity is seen as "evil" (Hampel & Tracey, 2019, p. 14).

However, the third paper, Devers and Mishina (2019), criticized Hampel and Tracey's (2019) moral spectrum because the authors found it unnecessary and forced. Reminding their earlier paper, Devers et al. (2009), they argued that these constructs are sourced in different theoretical traditions, i.e., labeling theory for stigma and neoinstitutional theory for illegitimacy, and are distinct enough to exist independently. Like Helms et al. (2019), they also emphasized that illegitimacy had

multiple dimensions that went beyond the moral domain. Additionally, they reiterated that emotions were more prevalent in stigma than illegitimacy.

Devers and Mishina (2019) also argued that stigma is harder to remove than illegitimacy. They stated that stigma is about the essence, core, or character of the organization and is not easily gotten rid of unless the beliefs of the evaluators are fundamentally changed (Devers et al., 2009; Devers & Mishina, 2019; Goffman, 1963; Hudson, 2008). Consequently, surface-level changes often get lost under the overriding deindividuating influence of stigma, and changing the "core" of the organization is essentially the equivalent of transforming into a completely different organization (e.g., tobacco companies stop selling tobacco). In contrast, illegitimacy is assumed to be eradicated or at least reduced through symbolic changes like impression management and decoupling (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991) or emphasizing other, more positive aspects of the entity (e.g., making donations, adhering to standards of production). Supporting this, a difference observed between studies of illegitimacy and stigma is the referral to stigmatized organizations as "tainted" (Adams, 2012; Goffman, 1963; Hudson, 2008), "marked out" or "stained" (Augustine & Piazza, 2022; Hampel & Tracey, 2017), and "labeled" (Devers et al., 2009). Such adjectives are usually not used in illegitimacy literature, which may indicate that permanence is not a central part of illegitimacy. However, it is important to note here that, while making these inferences, caution is needed to not confuse evaluations directed at peripheral practices and structures to those aimed at core aspects of a category or organization (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Hudson, 2008). Devers and Mishina's (2019) argument compared illegitimacy directed at separable parts of an entity to core stigma, and based on this comparison, suggested that illegitimacy is more manageable and less permanent than stigma. However, if the normative illegitimacy judgments are based on strongly held and salient norms, normative illegitimacy could also be very hard to remove, like in the case of sin industries, such as pornography and prostitution (Hudson, 2008). Similarly, empirical studies on stigma show that proponents of stigmatized organizations can alleviate disapproval and reverse the negative evaluations by using various management tactics (e.g., Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Helms & Patterson, 2014; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Vergne, 2012). As a result, it can be argued that both normative illegitimacy and stigma are manageable to a certain extent.

Overall, illegitimacy and stigma are different in their scope, theoretical origins, their suppression of the individuality of organizations (i.e., non-individuating versus deindividuting), and allegedly, the involvement of emotions and their manipulability.

2.4.1.3 Regulative Illegitimacy

Regulative illegitimacy can be defined as evaluations of inappropriateness or improperness in terms of laws, regulations, and the attitude and endorsement of regulatory agencies (Deephouse et al., 2017; Scott, 1995).

As such, regulative illegitimacy includes illegality, i.e., the fact that an entity is breaking a formalized and codified rule (North, 1990; Webb et al., 2009), but qualitatively, it goes beyond illegality in two ways.

First, as explained above, laws and regulations are fuzzy, contradictory, and open to interpretation (Scott, 2014). Consequently, different groups of evaluators can make different judgments on an entity's legal appropriateness and the coercion it deserves. In other words, a group of evaluators may believe an entity or practice is deserving of legal punishment even if others do not agree. Depending on the lobbying and persuasion capabilities of different groups, the same entity may end up being legal or illegal in a given context. Moreover, the status of being "sued" or "being under investigation" themselves can lead to illegitimacy judgments without the entity actually being illegal.

Second, besides laws and regulations, regulative illegitimacy evaluations can be made by examining the government's attitude and behavior against the entity being evaluated. This is important because the state's power is not limited to laws, rules, and legislation; it can also mobilize the police, censor or block media channels, and monitor, audit, and license organizations and categories. Further, the government and its agencies are likely to get the media and public attention more quickly, so they also have unequal power in shaping validity judgments (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Deephouse et al., 2017). As such, the attitude of the state and other regulatory agencies can influence the regulative illegitimacy of an entity even in the absence of relevant laws.

Specifically, when the authorities think that an entity is inappropriate but do not have the capacity to ban it directly, e.g., when there is a strong protest from the public, they can attempt to intervene through means of monitoring and policing. For example, in their study of regulatory categorization of dietary supplements, Özcan and Gürses (2018) exhibited how the government drove small supplement producers out of business by changing the category of supplements from food to drugs, raiding inventories, and confiscating products. Beyond their direct influence on survival, these acts indicate that the entity deserves punishment or that there is something wrong or shady about the entity, even if the entity is legal and not punishable by

law. By the same logic, the opponents of an entity can trigger regulative illegitimacy evaluations by calling the police on the entity, lobbying politicians and lawmakers, or suing member organizations or actors. For example, Helms and Patterson (2014) exhibited how the members of the mixed martial arts (MMA) category suffered from accusations of illegality and their opponents' insistent calls for legal intervention, even though initially the practice was legal and allowed on pay-per-view TV.

The last section of this chapter explains various strategies used by members and proponents of negatively evaluated entities.

2.5 Strategies for Managing Illegitimacy Evaluations

Both legitimacy and stigma research has devoted considerable attention to strategic moves and responses that the members of organizations and categories adopt to manage and manipulate the perceptions of the evaluators (Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Oliver, 1991). These strategies are highly critical to illegitimate categories, as not only do they enable them to defend themselves and eliminate or alleviate the evaluations of illegitimacy, but also they enable the members and stakeholders of the illegitimate entities to carry out their daily operations without getting attacked when they are unable or unwilling to revoke the negative evaluations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Devers et al., 2009; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Helms & Patterson, 2014; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Lashley & Pollock, 2020).

The strategies that are commonly mentioned in the literature can be very broadly categorized under three types, which are here called hiding, framing, and challenging strategies.

Hiding strategies: Hiding (or avoiding or shielding) strategies are based on the presumption that the more an illegitimate organization or category is known, the more disapproval, scrutiny, and attacks it will get (Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Hudson, 2008; Vergne, 2012). Consequently, the first and most obvious thing an illegitimate entity should do is to decrease the exposure by finding remote or hidden locations, choosing signs and advertisements that will only attract the interested, and using buildings with bland, uninteresting exteriors and secret entrances (Hudson, 2008; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Scott, 2013; Wolfe & Blithe, 2015). The most important reason for this is to make the building more accessible and safe to the customers, suppliers, and employees, i.e., the groups whose support is necessary for survival

(Hudson, 2008).

Additionally, having a flexible and loose organizational structure can allow members to deny involvement and avoid acquisitions and punishments (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Relatedly, Hudson (2008) proposed that sticking to a single or limited line(s) of business and keeping organizations small would be advantageous for disapproved organizations because diversification and size would increase exposure and aggravate the attacks. For instance, Elsbach and Sutton (1992) showed how radical NGOs kept a low profile and protected the identity of their members by adopting loose and small structures by dividing the organization into seemingly unrelated and independent local chapters.

Hiding can also be achieved by decoupling, where organizations or category members hide the parts they do not want the evaluators to know (Deephouse et al., 2017; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Suddaby et al., 2017). For example, the marijuana dispensaries in Lashley and Pollock's (2020) study divided their activities into a publicly visible "front stage," i.e., the shop floor, and a hidden "backstage," that is, the activities carried out in the inventory and during after hours. The backstage was used to carry out the inappropriate operations necessary for the dispensaries to get the needed resources. The front stage was then used to exhibit the features the evaluators wanted to see to grant their approval. This strategy enabled the dispensaries "to manage competing interests and accomplish conflicting tasks as firms balance stigma reduction with survival" (Lashley & Pollock, 2020, p. 468).

Another important hiding strategy members of illegitimate categories can adopt is category straddling (Negro, Hannan & Rao, 2011; Vergne, 2012). Category straddling is similar to category spanning in that organizations are essentially mixing a variety of different categories within a single entity (Zuckerman, 1999); however, it is different from category spanning because here, the managers and members of negatively evaluated entities are intentionally violating market prototypes to hide the inappropriate products or services they provide under the more legitimate ones (Alexy & George, 2013; Vergne, 2012). In his influential study, Vergne (2012) exposed how arms manufacturers involved in other industries, like aircraft production, got less disapproval from the media than those who solely dealt with weapons. As such, this study showed how going against existing categorical boundaries can be advantageous for actors involved in immoral businesses. The mechanism that lay between straddling and disapproval was named "stigma dilution," defined as "the process whereby category straddlers associated with a stigmatized category dilute stakeholder attention, moving it away from that stigmatized category by forming multiple categorical association" (Vergne, 2012, p. 1032).

The risk of hiding strategies is that if proponents cannot successfully hide the illegitimate operations or if they get exposed somehow, they risk stigma transfer or illegitimacy spillover, where the inappropriateness associated with one product or service spreads to other normally legitimate domains as well (Hudson, 2008). Another shortcoming of hiding strategies is that they block the spread of knowledge about the entity or a part of the entity, sabotaging cognitive legitimacy and the opportunity to gain new members or customers.

Framing strategies: Although some evaluators may believe that certain entities are pure evil and should not exist, most illegitimate organizations and categories have positive attributes, such as providing employment for marginalized communities and contributing to the economy (Webb et al., 2009; Wolfe & Blithe, 2015) and aspire to achieve higher-order goals like promoting equality, human rights, freedom of expression, or protecting the environment (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Lashley & Pollock, 2020). Nonetheless, negative evaluations have an overriding effect on positive judgments in the sense that evaluations of inappropriateness sourced in one feature of the entity are likely to dominate any positive qualities the organization or the category has, even when the positive judgments were made first (Devers et al., 2009; Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Voss, 2015). Framing strategies essentially target this inequality and advocate utilizing narratives and stories to emphasize the acceptable parts of the organization or category while playing down the unfavorable parts (Gray et al., 2015; Hudson, 2008; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Oliver, 1991).

Frames were also first introduced by Goffman (1975), who denoted them as frameworks that helped interpret and organize perceived reality in a certain way. In OT, though, frames and the act of creating frames, i.e., framing, is adopted initially by scholars who study social movement organizations (SMOs) (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988) who presented framing as a tool to be utilized to convince others to join a movement. Social evaluation literature also adopts a similar usage where framing is used by proponents of an organization or category to persuade critical evaluators of the appropriateness of the entity by making plausible and positive attributes more salient as well as by manipulating the criteria (i.e., prototypes, norms and standards, and laws and regulations) used by the evaluators (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Kennedy et al., 2010; Özcan & Gürses, 2018). Framing strategies can be used complementary to other strategies, but they are even more useful when hiding or decoupling from the adverse features is not possible. Framing allows the insiders to manipulate the general discourse to alleviate or even reverse the negative judgments without making any substantive changes (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Studies so far have demonstrated various ways actors use frames to decrease or eliminate illegitimacy judgments.

A common strategy is using normalizing accounts that portray the organization or category as a natural, typical, and inevitable part of the social reality (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). As emphasized by Aldrich and Fiol (1994), normalizing accounts are especially important for gaining and protecting cognitive legitimacy. Nonetheless, while spreading their story, proponents should not forcefully present their narratives and give too much detail (Suchman, 1995). Instead, Suchman (1995, p. 596) suggests that "accounts should be simple or even banal." Simple stories make the entity comprehensible for a wider variety of evaluators, facilitate re-telling and dissemination, and communicate a sense of naturalness by presenting the entity as not needing much explanation.

Another commonly used framing strategy is emphasizing the frameworks, norms, and rules that make the entity look more appropriate. Normatively illegitimate entities commonly use this strategy to manipulate which norms are chosen to judge the entity (Adams, 2012; Lashley & Pollock, 2020). In particular, what proponents do is refer to higher-level norms and values or "meta-narratives" (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Özcan & Gürses, 2018) like democracy, science, rationality, fairness, health, compassion, love, and authenticity that are widely accepted and internalized. These metanarratives make opposition harder and even self-contradictory for the opponents (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Negro et al., 2010; Oliver, 1991; Paetzold et al., 2008). Similarly, proponents can decouple from these values in that they can pick and choose what they present to a certain group of evaluators depending on the expected degree of resonance (Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015).

An appropriate framing strategy for organizations and categories that are evaluated as immoral because of their products/services (e.g., pornographic movies, drugs) or their customers (e.g., gay bathhouses) is demonstrating the appropriateness of structures, procedures, and persons (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Jensen, 2010; Suchman, 1995). For example, Adams (2012), Hudson and Okhuysen (2008), and Lashley and Pollock (2020) demonstrated how owners and employers of stigmatized organizations emphasized health, hygiene, cleanliness, and expertise in the contexts of tattoo studios, gay bathhouses, and marijuana dispensaries respectively.

Another way to use framing to manage illegitimacy judgments is by sacrificing a subcategory within a category to present another subcategory as the better option. This tactic starts with a group of members within an illegitimate category creating a niche for themselves where they have their own stories and narratives built on the larger category's appropriate features (Alexy & George, 2013; Lashley & Pollock, 2020). At the same time, they distance themselves from those they see as low status or more illegitimate than them and dump the inappropriate attributes associated

with the larger category on those that are now the outgroup. Alexy and George (2013) argued that once the better subgroup gained legitimacy, they represented a new prototype to follow and were likely to increase the legitimacy of the entire category.

In addition, the "better" subgroups within an illegitimate category can find a related and legitimate category and create associations with it through framing while disassociating from the old one (Lashley & Pollock, 2020). For example, Lashley and Pollock (2020) showed how marijuana dispensaries distanced themselves from recreational users and affiliated themselves with the field of medicine by abandoning the street slang that highlighted the criminal and recreational aspects of cannabis, such as "pot" or "potheads" and replacing them with more appropriate vocabulary like "medicine" and "patients" (Lashley & Pollock, 2020, p. 452). Adams (2012) also showed a similar framing used by tattoo artists who attempted to tie the entire category to the more legitimate visual arts field by replacing "tattooist" with "tattoo artist" and "parlor" with "tattoo studio" (p. 157).

Scholars who study propriety judgments also theorized that framing can be used to persuade evaluators that others are accepting the category even if it is not really the case (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). In other words, using framing, proponents can create a fake "phantom acceptance" (Goffman, 1963) through which they try to sell the idea of majority approval to the disapproving majority themselves.

Relatedly, framing can also be used to manipulate the perception of the intensity of the attacks and the character of the opponents in the sense that proponents can make the disapproval seem less than what it is and make the bad qualities (being elitist, selfish/self-serving, ignorant, outdated, anti-progressive, close-minded) or contradictions of the attackers more salient (Hampel & Tracey, 2017).

As these examples show, framing is very helpful for illegitimate entities but there are also two disadvantages. First, framing strategies are not exclusive to proponents of illegitimate entities; opponents can and do use framing tactics to delegitimize or further illegitimate their targets. For example, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) talked about how incumbents can actively try to undermine an emerging industry gaining cognitive legitimacy "through rumors and information suppression or inaccurate dissemination. . . they may try to block these new ventures at every turn, including questioning their compatibility with existing norms and values" (p. 657-658).

Second, if framing strategies are unsuccessful, they can start negative spirals of illegitimacy and trigger more disapproval and protests. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) argued that this scenario is very likely because managers of organizations that are

scrutinized by evaluators are under pressure and stress and are likely to give rushed, rigid, clumsy, or exaggerated responses that hurt the credibility of the organization even further. Deephouse et al. (2017) also argued that the choices of debated organizations are expected to be limited because they are closely monitored.

Besides, stigmatized actors are discredited by definition, and members of illegitimate categories are likely to be not seen as very reliable (Devers et al., 2009). An important phenomenon here is the "self-promoter's paradox" that occurs when members of an illegitimate entity attempt to salvage themselves by persuading the critics, but these attempts hurt the entity even further because the evaluators are aware that the members of the entity are trying to save themselves through manipulation (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). In such situations, the harder illegitimate entities try to justify themselves, the more they are scrutinized and the more they are seen as suspect and manipulative. These spirals of illegitimacy are called the "vicious circle of legitimation" by Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, p. 191) and "self-reinforcing feedback loops" and "retraction cascade" by Suchman (1995, p. 597). In such situations, everything an entity does to eliminate illegitimacy repulses evaluators even more. Retraction cascades also have direct material effects because once the entity starts to fall, stakeholders and sponsors abandon it out of fear of spillover (Singh et al., 1986; Suchman, 1995), cutting the entity's access to resources. The abandonment then can push the target to interact with other illegitimate actors, which again aggravates the degree of illegitimacy evaluations (Lashley & Pollock, 2020).

In such cases, illegitimate entities can directly fight back using challenging strategies instead of trying to manipulate the discourse.

Challenging strategies: When hiding and persuading the opponents are not possible, or when members do not want to give into the pressures of the opponents, proponents of illegitimate entities may switch to more direct, aggressive, and even militant strategies that push the opponents to accept the category as is. Proponents of illegitimate organizations and categories that adopt challenging strategies tackle the issue of illegitimacy heads-on instead of avoiding or trying to manage the narrative. For example, an influential study by Helms and Patterson (2014) investigated how members of the MMA community "actively use[d] stigma to gain attention or resources" (Hampel & Tracey, 2017, p. 2199). Helms and Patterson (2014) called this "strategic label cooptation" (p. 1467), where the members of the category used the controversial labels given to gain the attention of possible new members and customers as well as the authorities. Once they alerted the evaluators, they immediately corrected their misunderstandings, cleared the stereotypes, and created new

groups of supporters who were educated on MMA.

A more subtle way to challenge negative evaluations is by encouraging the category members to attend community events and go to city councils, hearings, and press conferences without concealing their identity. These acts not only signal that the proponents will not back down or hide, but they also serve as more direct normalizing accounts because the proponents show their faces, share their names, and present themselves as regular members of the community (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Lashley & Pollock, 2020). Such participation reduces the threat and fear associated with illegitimate categories and disseminates knowledge firsthand, clarifying the categorical boundaries and membership criteria.

Overall, all three strategies have various benefits and are usually used in combination or alternately depending on the life stage of the entity, the level of illegitimacy, and the evaluators' expectations.

For example, in their study of two radical NGOs, Earth First! and AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), Elsbach and Sutton (1992) showed an example of using hiding, challenging, and framing strategies in order. Accordingly, these organizations started by establishing small and loosely-structured local branches that eased movement and helped them hide and plan. After getting organized in the shadows, they acted out their "terrorist attacks" to announce their purposes and get attention (e.g., members of ACT UP invading St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York during Mass; Earth First! members injuring a lumber worker). Following the increased scrutiny, they quickly put forth their spokespersons and more presentable members to dissociate themselves from the attacks and promote their cause through more legitimate means.

3. METHODOLOGY

This chapter explains the methodological approach, empirical setting, data collection processes, and analytical stages of the dissertation. The first section introduces the linguistic methods literature in OT, with a specific emphasis on communicative institutionalism and two major types of linguistic methods: discourse and rhetorical analyses. The following section focuses on the method of this study, the hermeneutical approach, and provides a comprehensive review of the history, principles, and advantages of hermeneutics. The chapter then proceeds to the empirical context of the study, followed by an overview of the data collection process and the attributes of the data set. The next section explains the contributions of Atlas.ti, a computer-aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), to the data collection and analysis processes. Subsequently, the chapter defends the robustness of the study by employing Lincoln and Guba's (1985) trustworthiness framework. The final section details the steps of analysis and concludes.

3.1 Linguistic Methods

Linguistic methods gained importance in the early 2000s following the growing interest of organizational scholars in studying the role of language in organizational processes (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Phillips & Oswick, 2012; Prasad & Elmes, 2005). This surge of interest was labeled as the "linguistic turn" (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000, p. 136) and led to the introduction of various language-based theoretical frameworks and methodologies to OT (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Phillips & Oswick, 2012).

Linguistic methods essentially argue that language is not just a simple tool of expression; instead, it is a fundamental phenomenon constitutive of social reality (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008; 2017). Specifically, by using language in a certain way and not

in others, actors do not only express themselves but consciously or unconsciously sculpt the meaning of the "ideas and objects" (Munir & Phillips, 2005, p. 1666) that make up the perceived world (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Hoefer & Green, 2016; Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2004).

The process of language turning into ideas and objects happens through the creation and dissemination of texts (Munir & Phillips, 2005; Phillips & Oswick, 2012). In this context, texts are defined as "any kind of symbolic expression requiring a physical medium and permitting of permanent storage," and they constitute the unit of analysis in linguistic methods (Taylor & Van Every, 1993, p. 109; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017, p. 401). Texts can come in various forms, including written works like articles or books and visual artifacts like paintings or films.

As such, linguistic methods comprise analytical approaches that investigate texts to reveal the processes involved in the creation and maintenance of social reality (Munir & Phillips, 2005; Phillips & Oswick, 2012). The goal of linguistic analysts is to understand why a group of texts came to construct the world the way it is, among other possible ways it could have been built (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011; Cornelissen et al., 2015; Phillips et al., 2004). In this conceptualization, reality is subjective and non-deterministic, and it can only be understood through deep diving into texts (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011; Prasad, 2002; Vaara & Tienari, 2008).

Therefore, linguistic methods in the context of this dissertation belong to the interpretivist tradition in the sense that social reality is defined as not an objective fact to be discovered but a complex, interconnected web of socially constructed meanings that can only be interpreted (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011). Moreover, as much as researchers try to be reflexive, the process of extracting the meaning from texts is always somewhat distorted by the cultural-historical situatedness of the researchers (Prasad, 2002).

Consequently, the text analysis methods mentioned here differ fundamentally from positivist linguistic approaches that transform textual data to statistically analyzable forms (e.g., frequency counts, binary or ordered coding of emotions, mathematized sentence structures) to find causal relationships between language and organizational phenomena, such as quantitative content analysis (e.g., Bansal & Clelland, 2004) and psycholinguistics (e.g., Ocasio, Loewenstein & Nigam, 2015). In contrast, interpretive linguistic studies use methods like discourse analysis, rhetorical analysis, and narrative analysis that support the constitutive role of the language (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017).

Linguistic methods have been a part of OT for over two decades and currently have

a permanent place in literature (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017). Moreover, as the field has matured, several perspectives on linguistic methods have emerged. Relevant to this dissertation is an approach that originated within neoinstitutional theory, called "communicative institutionalism" (Cornelissen et al., 2015, p. 10).

The following section explains this approach and how it contributed to this dissertation.

3.1.1 Communicative Institutionalism

Communicative institutionalism was materialized in a special topic forum in the Academy of Management Review introduced and edited by Cornelissen et al. (2015) and included five other articles (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Clemente & Roulet, 2015; Gray et al., 2015; Harmon, Green & Goodnight, 2015; Ocasio et al., 2015). This approach was later enriched by Hoefer and Green (2016) and Phillips and Malhotra (2017).

Communicative institutionalists claim that both the mainstream macro-level theories (aligns with the legitimacy-as-property perspective) and the micro-foundational research (aligns with the legitimacy-as-perception perspective) fail at providing a comprehensive view of institutional processes. As a solution, they advocate for integrating communication into neoinstitutional research (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Gray et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017).

Specifically, communicative institutionalism criticizes mainstream neoinstitutional studies for excessively focusing on macro-level phenomena like isomorphism, fields, logics, and diffusion and ignoring the lower-level cognitive processes, even though cognition and cognitive frameworks were at the heart of neoinstitutional theory originally (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Cornelissen et al., 2015; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017). Further, they argue that macrolevel neoinstitutional research has had an asymmetrical interest in the consequences of institutional processes and neglected the processes themselves, leading to shallow explanations that do not provide any insights into the mechanisms of the relationships they are trying to explain (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008). Moreover, communicative institutionalists criticize the studies that focus on the cognitive side of institutions, i.e., the micro-foundationalist or micro-processes research (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Powell & Colyvas, 2008), for being too fixated on individuals. They state that although micro-foundationalist re-

search started with the aim of understanding the lower-level mechanisms that lead to macro-level results, they got stuck on the individual level and forgot what they were initially set to discover (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Jepperson & Meyer, 2011).

To find the medium between macro and micro theories, scholars of communicative institutionalism suggest integrating communication into linguistic methodologies (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017). In particular, Cornelissen et al. (2015) argue that except for studies of institutional translation (Czarniawska & Sevon, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 2001), neoinstitutional theory treated communication as a mere tool or "conduit" (p. 12) that smoothly disseminated ideas among actors in a field or from one field to another, without any intervention or changes. In contrast, communicative institutionalism rejects the conduit view and defines communication as "social interaction that builds on speech, gestures, texts, discourses, and other means ... where speech and other forms of symbolic interactions are not just seen as expressions or reflections of inner thoughts or collective intentions but as potentially formative of institutional reality." (Cornelissen et al., 2015, p. 11). Based on this definition, communicative institutionalists state that linguistic methods, at least in theory, are the most suitable approach for bringing cognition and macro-level organizational phenomena together. Regardless, they also argue that the methods used by earlier linguistic studies in OT, which largely coincides with the legitimacy-as-process approach described in Chapter 2, need to be adjusted to tone down the focus on hyper-muscular actors (Hoefer & Green, 2016; Suddaby et al., 2017).

The preoccupation of linguistic methods with the speakers, i.e., creators of texts, at the expense of the listeners, i.e., the audience, is called the "performative role of the language" (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016). The performative role also treats communication as a conduit; however, this time, the channel is not between field-level actors but between all-capable speakers and silenced listeners whose only function is to sit at the receiving end of the communication tunnel. As such, change or maintenance occurs through certain influential actors imposing their thoughts on others (Cornelissen et al., 2015).

On the contrary, communicative institutionalists emphasize that what is crucial is the conversations, debates, and negotiations between different speakers and listeners because it is these interactions that reveal how individual beliefs transform into shared meaning systems (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016). Specifically, the publication of texts by individual or collective actors triggers a series of reactions, talks, and discussions. During these interactions, speakers not only influence others' opinions but also adapt and change their own, such that, depending

on how listeners react or based on self-reflection, they may adjust their arguments or even change their positions (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015). Listeners can also react in various ways in that they can silently accept, show active support, quietly reject, or harshly protest what the speakers are suggesting (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Cornelissen et al., 2015; Suchman, 1995). Finally, shared cultural frameworks and understandings are constituted through these interactions, implicit and explicit negotiations, and mutual adjustments (Gray et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016).

Overall, this dissertation follows the "revised" version of linguistic methods that explicitly account for interactions, arguments, and micro-to-macro transitions. This particular perspective can also be considered a mix of the legitimacy-as-process and legitimacy-as-perception approaches in Chapter 2.

The following section explains why linguistic methods are suitable for studying legitimacy.

3.1.2 Linguistic Methods and Legitimacy Research

This paper conceptualizes legitimacy not as a concrete object or possession but as a cognitively shared and abstract social construct generated by comparing entities to cognitive frameworks, norms, and rules (Suddaby et al., 2017). Like other social constructs, illegitimacy evaluations are also closely intertwined with language and communication, as language plays a central role in creating, maintaining, and defying illegitimacy evaluations (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009; Vaara & Tienari, 2008). The rest of the section summarizes how researchers have utilized linguistic methods to study legitimacy judgments.

Language is crucial for legitimacy evaluations because propriety judgments turn into validity judgments through the communication between proponents, opponents, and impartial evaluators (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Haack et al., 2014; Tost, 2011). Individuals form their initial evaluations based on personal frameworks and morals, what they believe others would think, and validity cues and heuristics in their environment (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011). When these judgments are expressed, others can provide their own interpretations and either support or challenge these evaluations. If different groups of evaluators hold conflicting judgments, the interaction is carried to higher levels, where negotiations and adjustments determine judgments of validity (Haack et al., 2021; Tost, 2011).

Researchers then observe these processes of conversation and negotiations by looking at the collection of interrelated texts built around the subject (Phillips et al., 2004; Phillips & Oswick, 2012). Specifically, by examining the language used in certain texts, researchers can gain insights into why individuals think what they think, and by examining the reception and dissemination of these texts on meso- and macro-levels, they can identify the processes that help or hinder micro-to-macro transitions of legitimacy evaluations (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016). Juxtaposing text to contexts also helps understand the conditions under which illegitimacy management tactics work the best in alleviating or changing illegitimacy evaluations (Adams, 2012; Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Vaara & Tienari, 2008).

Linguistic methods are relevant to cognitive legitimacy evaluations because language provides gateway to individuals' minds and exposes shared meaning systems (Cornelissen et al., 2015). Researchers can detect cognitive illegitimacy of a category or organization by examining the consistency and coherence of the explanations in texts regarding the attributes of the entity, such as consensus on definitions and boundaries, the identity of the members, and the value of the products (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Navis & Glynn, 2010; Negro et al., 2010). For example, when speakers assume that others will not understand what they mean by a category label, they are likely to give extensive explanations. If such lengthy explanations are common, researchers can interpret that the category is suffering in the comprehensibility dimension (Deephouse et al., 2017; Suchman, 1995). In contrast, if the speakers use related terminology with ease and talk about the entity as a matter of fact, and the others respond to the speaker on the same frequency, this can indicate that the category is comprehensible (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). If an extensive collection of texts from different groups of evaluators consistently provides the same meaning, it could be derived that the entity is cognitively legitimate (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017).

Language is also important in detecting normative and regulative illegitimacy judgments. First, investigating written texts like certificates, accreditations, mentions in media, the content of these mentions, laws, regulations, and court orders can help researchers make inferences about legitimacy evaluations (Scott, 1995, 2014). Second, the content of daily conversations, debates, or negotiations, e.g., whether speakers are talking about an entity favorably or unfavorably or if they are emphasizing the flaws or breaches the entity makes, can be a direct indicator of illegitimacy evaluations.

More importantly, though, texts are also used to constitute cognitive, normative, and regulative legitimacy evaluations (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Suchman, 1995;

Tost, 2011). As described in Chapter 2, the multidimensional nature of organizations and categories provides considerable space for proponents and opponents to use language to convince others of their opinions (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Hudson, 2008). Proponents and opponents of an entity can manipulate the salience of frameworks, norms, and rules used to make legitimacy evaluations to their advantage by skillfully utilizing language. Further, these discussions are usually started by individuals at the micro level, discussed and negotiated at the meso-level, and then disseminated through another negotiation process on the macro level to eventually build, bolster, or challenge social reality. As a result, by using linguistic methods, researchers can explain the cross-level processes behind the legitimacy evaluations, including what kind of arguments succeed in influencing collective evaluations, what individuals do when others reject their arguments, how collectives decide on the set of norms and regulations to be used to make legitimacy judgments, and what inhibits or facilitates certain normative and regulative evaluations to take over others.

Overall, linguistic methods are suitable for this dissertation because they provide tools for analyzing how different dimensions of illegitimacy evolve from propriety judgments to validity evaluations (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Phillips et al., 2004; Vaara & Tienari, 2008).

The next section describes two different types of linguistic methods and introduces discourse analysis, which is the broader methodological approach of this study.

3.1.3 Types of Linguistic Methods

The most commonly used linguistic methods in OT literature are rhetorical analysis and discourse analysis (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017). Both these approaches actually constitute a theoretical framework and a methodology, and they are used to refer to specific interpretive research techniques as well (Munir & Phillips, 2005; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008).

Currently, the most popular linguistic method in OT, and the one adopted in this dissertation, is discourse analysis (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017). Discourses are defined as "linguistically mediated representations of the world" (Vaara & Tienari, 2008, p. 986) that are made up of "interrelated sets of texts and the associated practices of production, dissemination, and reception that bring a social object into being" (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017, p. 403). Accordingly, discourses construct social reality by providing meaning and scripts for various ideas and objects, and texts are the

material manifestations of these discourses (Hardy, Lawrence & Grant, 2005; Munir & Phillips, 2005; Phillips & Oswick, 2012). Consequently, the goal of discourse analysis is to reveal the discourses that create and maintain shared meaning systems by thoroughly examining texts (Munir & Phillips, 2005; Phillips et al., 2004; Phillips & Oswick, 2012; Vaara & Tienari, 2008).

Various types of discourse analysis exist (see Heracleous & Barrett, 2001), but the one that is especially prominent in OT is critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Vaara & Tienari, 2008). Critical theory sees the world as an arena where powerful groups in society continuously insert their dominance over others to maintain the power dynamics that serve their interests (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Phillips & Brown, 1993). As a result, CDA argues that discourses are never free of ideology and power struggles, and texts are tools to disseminate and reinforce the status quo. Therefore, the analysts must approach texts critically to reveal how language is used to oppress certain groups in society.

The second most used linguistic analysis method in OT is rhetorical analysis (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017). Rhetorics is defined as "the art of persuasion" (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005, p 39), and rhetorical analysis is "the study of the structure of arguments" that is adapted to expose the strategic use of language for furthering one's interests (Alvesson, 1993; Green & Li, 2011; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017, p 404). Rhetorical theory is distinguished by its portrayal of actors as agents that intentionally use language to build manipulative arguments and then skillfully persuade others to their opinion (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017; Suddaby et al., 2017). In other words, rhetorical analysis approaches every text as a manipulative move produced with the intent and capability of shaping reality according to some agenda. Relatedly, the characteristics and charisma of speakers are essential in rhetorical theory because actors with more influence and persuasive capabilities are more important in rhetoric (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017).

Studies of legitimacy generally preferred rhetorical analysis previously (e.g., Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Harmon et al., 2015; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Vaara & Tienari, 2008), which led to the abovementioned criticisms about the hyper-muscular actors (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Suddaby et al., 2017). In contrast, despite acknowledging that creators of texts always have an intention and purposefully choose to say some things and omit others, discourse analysis draws attention to the unintended consequences of texts (e.g., Maguire & Hardy, 2009). Put another way, discourse analysts argue that actors produce their texts to convey a particular message; however, no matter how purposeful the producer of a text is, the influence of the text depends

on the interpreters (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017).

Overall, discourse analysis aligns more closely with communicative institutionalism because it accounts for the listeners' reactions and eliminates the hyper-muscular actors (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016). Consequently, discourse analysis has been selected as the appropriate methodology for this dissertation.

The following section elaborates on the hermeneutical approach, the specific discourse analysis method utilized to conduct the empirical part of this study.

3.2 Hermeneutical Approach

Hermeneutics, or the hermeneutical approach, is a philosophical and methodological tradition that specializes in interpreting texts (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Prasad, 2002). The central premise of the hermeneutical approach asserts that the meaning of texts can be fully grasped only when the broader context, i.e., the historical background, cultural influences, and social conditions the texts were created in, is understood. At the same time, understanding the broader context is only possible when the texts that have shaped the context are comprehended (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Phillips & Brown, 1993; Prasad, 2002). Based on this argument, hermeneutics offers a particular reading and interpretation technique that requires researchers to go back and forth between texts and the broader context until the researchers gain a comprehensive understanding of both the details and the overarching environment (Gadamer, 1975; Prasad, 2002).

The roots of hermeneutics are traced back to theologians and students of the ancient literature of the Renaissance period. These theologians and scholars advocated that understanding an excerpt from a text was only possible if the context, which initially referred to the entirety of the parent text, the Bible or ancient classics, was understood (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Prasad, 2002).

The first identified figure of the hermeneutical approach is Schleiermacher (1768 – 1834), a German theologian and philosopher who was known for his lectures on what is now labeled as "classical hermeneutics" (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Prasad, 2002). According to Schleiermacher, hermeneutical analysis had to include both grammatical and psychological elements (Prasad, 2002). The grammatical aspect required examining the language used in a given text while keeping the limitations

and opportunities of the language in mind. The psychological side tried to understand the cognitive and affective processes the speakers, or as hermeneutic scholars call them, the "authors," had been through while creating the texts (Prasad, 2002). To this end, classical hermeneutics advised the researchers to reconstruct the experience the authors had while creating their text.

Another stream of hermeneutics was called "philosophical hermeneutics" and put forward by another German scholar Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Prasad, 2002). Gadamer rejected the idea that text creation and interpretation were separate, one-sided activities and conceptualized understanding the meaning of a text as a dialogue between the authors and the interpreters, i.e., the researchers or analysts. Consequently, in philosophical hermeneutics, the process of understanding requires researchers to be aware of the author's intentions, their own capacity to understand, and the clashes between the sociohistorical conditioning of themselves and the author (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Prasad, 2002). Further, this perspective argued that the interpreted meaning of a text changed according to the questions asked by the interpreter and what they wanted to extract from the text, as well as the prejudices that accrued due to the interpreters' sociohistorical connectedness to their own cultural and temporal Geist (Gadamer, 1975). Consequently, contrary to Schleiermacher's suggestions, as much as interpreters tried to empathize with the author and put themselves into the author's shoes, they were bound to misinterpret and skip things. As such, philosophical hermeneutics underlined that the text did not always convey the author's intended message, a perspective called "the non-author-intentional view" by Prasad (2002, p. 21).

After Gadamer, hermeneutics largely dropped the idea of reconstructing the author's creative process and instead turned into an interpretivist, anti-positivist methodology. Philosophical hermeneutics makes up the baseline ontology and epistemology of contemporary hermeneutics in OT (Prasad, 2002).

Finally, critical hermeneutics arose as the third stream in hermeneutics through the debates of famous critical theorists Habermas and Gadamer (Gadamer, 1975; Gadamer, 1985; Habermas, 1990b; Habermas, 1990a; Prasad, 2002). Critical hermeneutics kept the interpretivist perspective of philosophical hermeneutics and essentially added a critical twist to Gadamer's view (Phillips & Brown, 1993; Prasad, 2002). In line with the purposes of CDA, critical hermeneutics aims to reveal the true nature of the texts by looking for the symbols of domination and status quo maintenance (Phillips & Brown, 1993). Critical hermeneutics argues that the biases of the interpreters are not innocent sociohistorical accompaniers; instead, they are tools for protecting the existing power dynamics and structures of dominance.

Therefore, the interpreters must engage in critical self-reflection to free themselves, at least to some extent, from their biases. Moreover, critical hermeneutics argue that the interpreters' foremost duty must be exposing the symbols of domination and inequality within the texts they are interpreting.

Critical hermeneutics is important in OT because it was introduced to organizational studies by Phillips and Brown (1993) before the "linguistic turn" and the popularization of discourse analysis and other linguistic methods (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000). Moreover, through an exemplary study, Phillips and Brown (1993) explained the steps that could be taken during critical hermeneutic analysis in detail, which is not that common in other conceptual articles on linguistic methods. As a result, critical hermeneutics has influenced the subsequent hermeneutic research in organizational studies, even those that did not adopt the "critical theory" per se (e.g., Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010). This study also extensively benefited from Phillips and Brown (1993) both directly and indirectly through their effect on other publications.

Other types of hermeneutics, such as "objectivist" (Betti, 1990) and "alethic" hermeneutics (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000), also exist. However, contemporary hermeneutics in OT is primarily an amalgamation of philosophical and critical hermeneutics.

Another important thing to note about hermeneutics is that because the hermeneutical approach has a long legacy, there are various interpretations of it in the linguistic methods literature. While some articles (e.g., Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010) present it as a research technique in discourse analysis, others designate it as a stand-alone method that is separate from discourse analysis (e.g., Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017). As explained above, hermeneutics is, in fact, an extensive tradition that precedes discourse theory. However, management scholars have been using different streams in the hermeneutical approach eclectically, creating new types of hermeneutical reading adjusted for the research at hand (e.g., Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Prasad, 2002; Wasserman & Frenkel, 2011). Following the empirical papers that guide the steps of analysis of this dissertation (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Phillips & Brown, 1993), hermeneutics here is categorized as a type of discourse analysis that enables the examination of a collection of texts in relation to the sociohistorical contexts in which they were created.

Conceptualized this way, two elements of hermeneutic analysis are worth mentioning.

First, an important concept in hermeneutical tradition is the "hermeneutic circle."

The hermeneutic circle is essentially a symbolic representation of the epistemology and distinguishing principle of hermeneutic analysis, that is, "understand the parts to understand the whole, understand the whole to understand the parts." (Gadamer, 1985; Prasad, 2002). The parts and the whole are assumed to be connected to each other through the cultural Geist (i.e., the spirit in German) that is in the essence of both the parts and the whole (Ast, 1808, as quoted in Prasad, 2002).

The idea of not being able to comprehend the whole and the parts without understanding the other is paradoxical; however, hermeneutic analysts have resolved the problem by staying loyal to the circle in theory and replacing the circle analogy with a "spirals" (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000, p. 53) or "springboards" (McAuley, 2004, p. 195) in practice. Accordingly, the research starts at the narrowest level of interest, pointed out by the researchers' intuition and the literature. This level can include newspaper excerpts (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010), CEO letters to shareholders (Prasad & Mir, 2002), advertisements (Phillips & Brown, 1993), or interviews (Thompson, Locander & Pollio, 1990). From the narrowest level, the researchers progressively build up by iterating between the part and the whole, expanding their understanding with each iteration.

Second and relatedly, what is meant by context depends on the researchers' decision. For early hermeneutical analysts, the "parts" were excerpts from the texts, and the "whole" was the book the partial text was from. As the hermeneutical approach developed, the "context" has broadened from referring to the entirety of a book an excerpt is from to the other works, or the "oeuvre" of the author (Prasad, 2002), and then to including the circumstances these texts were written under, to the historical events that led to those circumstances (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010). The idea behind enlarging the context is that the broader the context included, the more comprehensive the understanding of the phenomena (Prasad, 2002). However, as the resources of researchers are limited, what is suggested here is, again, to start from the bottom and gradually build up the levels by constantly going back and forth between them until the researchers feel like they can answer the research questions properly.

The following subsection explains why hermeneutics is suitable for this study.

3.2.1 Hermeneutics and the Current Study

The hermeneutical approach is chosen in this study over other linguistics techniques for three reasons. First, classical discourse analysis has been criticized for being too focused on the text and ignoring the context's influence (Phillips & Brown, 1993). In contrast, hermeneutics is all about connecting texts to their broader context. Accounting for the broader context is vital for this study because, as explained in the following chapters, arabesk's journey was heavily influenced not only by the music and entertainment industry of its time but also by changes in societal dynamics created by internal mass migration, the weight of the cultural policies and ideologies of early 20th century Turkish Republic, confusion about Turkish identity as well as technological developments like introduction of cassettes and private, that is, not state-owned, broadcasting channels. As a result, studying arabesk would be incomplete and even misleading without situating the genre in its sociohistorical context.

Second, hermeneutics suits historical research, as it, by definition, requires including all historical elements relevant to understanding the texts (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010). Because history is central in hermeneutics, the method offers many techniques to make up for the drawbacks of working with historical or archival data. For example, the temporal distance and lack of storage options make historical data scattered, unstandardized, and inconsistent (Kipping, Wadhwani & Bucheli, 2014). As a solution, hermeneutics enables the incorporation of diverse data types throughout the study, adapting as research progresses to address any encountered gaps (Phillips & Brown, 1993; Prasad, 2002).

The last advantage that could also be considered as a limitation of this dissertation is the more structured nature of the hermeneutic analysis compared to other linguistic or, more generally, interpretive methods. Scholars of interpretivism usually do not provide prescriptions on purpose because they believe following predefined schemata limits the number of routes researchers can look at the data (Gehman, Glaser, Eisenhardt, Gioia, Langley & Corley, 2018). Nonetheless, interpretive analysis improves with practice, and considering I am a junior researcher who lacks experience, a bit of guidance and structure helped me find my footing when I was stuck during the data analysis (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Phillips et al., 2004).

Now that the dissertation's methodology is outlined, the following sections of this chapter move on to the empirical aspects of the study.

3.3 Empirical Context

The empirical context of this study, arabesk, is a cultural and commercial music and film category that emerged in Turkey in the late 1960s and stayed visible in popular culture until the late 1990s. The term "commercial music and film category" was adopted from Anand and Peterson (2000) who used the label "commercial music category" to refer to businesses that form around music, including producing and selling records, touring, concerts, radio and TV broadcasts, and publications. The commercial film category then encompasses the trades around feature films. In the context of arabesk, music and film categories were tied to each other in that most of the movies starring arabesk artists were basically elongated music videos that carried the same name as the title single and were primarily made to promote albums.

Further, the broader commercial music and film categories are typically made up of different genres (Anand & Peterson, 2000; Askin & Mauskapf, 2017). A genre is defined as a "kind" or "type" of art that lumps cultural products, e.g., songs, movies, paintings, together based on similar parameters like content, form, production technique, or identity of the producers (DiMaggio, 1987). Within the commercial music or film categories, genres are product sub-categories that are marked by a label (Anand & Peterson, 2000; Askin & Mauskapf, 2017). Overall, in the broader scope of this dissertation, "arabesk" is used to refer to a music and film genre and the businesses around it.

Arabesk offers an ideal empirical context for studying illegitimacy because, as discussed below, during its life of 30 or so years, the genre managed to fit all dimensions of illegitimacy at fluctuating levels.

Initially, though, my personal interest in arabesk stemmed from my experiences as someone who observed both the mockery and subsequent redemption of the genre. When I was in elementary and middle school in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it was very uncool to listen to arabesk; the music was associated with tastelessness and delinquents (serseri in Turkish) who did drugs and engaged in self-harm. Arabesk largely disappeared from popular culture in the mid-2000s, but after the death of a famous arabesk artist, Müslüm Gürses, in 2013, the discourse around the genre started to change, and arabesk has turned into a nostalgic, positively commemorated category. In 2018, a biopic depicting Gürses's life was released and became a huge hit. In 2022, the life of another arabesk artist, who was murdered in 1989, Bergen, was turned into a movie, which also did very well at the box office.

In the 1980s and 1990s, two other films depicting Bergen's life were produced, with one featuring Bergen herself. Ironically enough, these movies received harsh reviews from critics back then and were interpreted as cheap tearjerkers. So, it was these contradictions in evaluations and the changed attitude towards arabesk that made me wonder if arabesk was suitable to study the process of illegitimacy evaluations. Upon initial investigation, the story of arabesk proved to be even more fitting for studying illegitimacy.

First, relating to cognitive illegitimacy, although arabesk is 55 years old now, it still does not have a clear definition. This confusion became more obvious as I got familiar with the academic writings on arabesk (Güngör, 1993; Stokes, 1992; Özbek, 1991), where the authors quoted multiple other musicians and experts whose definitions did not really mesh well together. Based on this plethora of definitions, the authors formulated their own definitions but they were also very lengthy and confusing. Additionally, there were other terms like "taverna," "fantazi," and "aranjman" that were attached to the arabesk label but were not clearly differentiated from the genre. Further, I learned that some of the artists, e.g., İbrahim Tatlıses and Ahmet Kaya, whom I knew as representatives of other music genres, were known for their arabesk songs back in the 1980s. All of these signaled that arabesk suffered from a degree of incomprehensibility as the genre did not have consistent narratives explaining its features, members, and function (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995).

Second, relating to normative illegitimacy, arabesk was strongly associated with the large-scale rural-to-urban migration that started in the 1950s and continued through the 1990s and the negative developments that came with it, especially rapid, faulty urbanization and spread of slums or squatter towns. Arabesk was seen as the music of the uneducated, rural, and poor immigrants, and as a result, listening to arabesk was interpreted as a signal of low class and low taste. Also, some intellectuals and politicians perceived arabesk as a cultural issue that needed to be solved. To them, arabesk was a deviant, technically flawed genre that prevented the development of modern Turkish music. Additionally, arabesk was criticized for being melancholic and depressive. Some evaluators even blamed arabesk creators for romanticizing suffering and aggravating the stress and sadness of the lower classes.

Third, relating to regulative legitimacy, arabesk was immediately banned by TRT, and stayed banned from TV and TRT radios throughout the 1970s and 1980s with a couple of exceptions. It was not until the emergence of private TV channels in the 1990s that arabesk artists were finally able to freely participate in TV shows. In addition, the Ministry of Culture often intervened in the development of arabesk

and attempted to rehabilitate or replace the genre multiple times (see Chapter 5).

In all, arabesk appeared to be a promising research setting that held the potential to provide answers to the research questions of the dissertation.

The following section details the data collection process.

3.4 Data Collection

The data collection and analysis processes of this dissertation were shaped by hermeneutics and discourse analysis articles published in major organization studies and management journals. Some important references include Heracleous and Barrett (2001), Joutsenvirta and Vaara (2009), Khaire and Wadhwani (2010), Maguire and Hardy (2009), Phillips and Brown (1993), and Vaara and Tienari (2008).

Regarding data collection, a common aspect in these articles is that the research was based on consistent and neat data sets such as a "leading Finnish daily newspaper" (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009), or an "image advertising campaign" (Phillips & Brown, 1993). In addition, though, researchers had complementary data sets that were somewhat messier and consisted of data gathered from multiple sources. During the analysis, the researchers went back and forth between the base data set and the more crowded one to make their theoretical inferences. Finally, Khaire and Wadhwani (2010, p. 1285) explicitly emphasized this division by distinguishing between the "focal texts" and "contextual texts." In their study on the categorization of Modern Indian Art, the focal texts consisted of auction catalogs and auction webpages, while the contextual texts included 17 different sources, including blogs, critical reviews, textbooks, and industry reports.

Following these studies, the data in this research is also divided into focal and contextual texts. The focal data set consisted of articles from a daily newspaper called Cumhuriyet and its weekly supplements and was generated by using multiple keywords and phrases. The contextual data sources comprised a vast array of video and audio clips from broadcasts and concerts, articles and interviews from other newspapers and music magazines, albums, movies, documentaries, and various books. Table 3.1 summarizes the focal and contextual data sources.

Dividing the data this way was very helpful for three reasons. First, it allowed for the collection of an extensive pool of data and ensured that everything of significance was

included. Second, having a clear and "narrow" base was good for knowing where to locate back while iterating between the data sources. Specifically, since the broader context did not have a designated end, it was too easy to get lost in the context that was only peripherally related to the research questions or that was irrelevant. In such situations, grounding the analysis back in the focal data kept the analysis focused. Third, the newspaper was also a vital source in building the chronology of events. A lot of the video clips found on YouTube, as well as on TRT's archive, had wrong dates. Similarly, for some albums and films, different sources provided conflicting dates. Since the newspapers came with the date printed on each page, the focal data helped create a more reliable chronological narrative.

3.4.1 Focal Data

The focal data source of this research is a nationally distributed newspaper called Cumhuriyet. Newspapers have been a central, almost classic, data source in both legitimacy and discourse literature (Deephouse et al., 2017; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009). This significance is derived from the media's multiple roles in the constitution and dissemination of social evaluations. First, the media acts as a mirror that reflects public opinion. By looking at news, newspapers, magazines, and other media reports, researchers can see what is important for the public and have a general idea of what society thinks and feels about a given subject (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Deephouse, 1996; Lamertz & Baum, 1998). Second, the media acts as an intermediary or forum where opinion leaders and interested actors express and negotiate their opinions to initiate the processes of changing validity judgments (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011). Actors who are willing to disseminate their evaluations or find support present their propriety judgments in the media. These publications are called "judgment validation texts" by Bitektine and Haack (2015, p. 52). Third, the media influences and even controls the opinions of the evaluators. Specifically, Deephouse and colleagues (Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse et al., 2017) argued that the relationship between newspapers and legitimacy evaluations is reciprocal in that not only do newspapers help the evaluators reflect their judgments, but they also influence the judgments of the public at large. Critical theorists also emphasize the role of media as suppressors who help powerful parties like corporations and the government impose their narratives (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009). Similarly, although they are not in the critical tradition, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) characterized the media as gatekeepers that blocked the dissemination of knowledge about emerging industries. They argued that the media could

spread wrong or conflicting information and intentionally sabotage the cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy of an industry.

Additionally, from the methodological perspective of this dissertation, the media is important because it is where public communication and interaction occur. As such, communicative institutionalism and the legitimacy-as-perception perspective additionally underline the role of media in micro-to-macro transitions (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Cornelissen et al., 2015).

Among other media, newspapers are utilized more because they are more accessible and reliable (Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse et al., 2017; Vergne, 2012). Specifically, at least in the US, many newspapers are electronically available (Deephouse et al., 2017). Additionally, newspapers come in written format, eliminating the need for transcribing from audio or video; thus, they are easier to use compared to video or audio records. Relative to weekly or monthly magazines, daily newspapers also offer more data.

Indeed, compared to other media sources like the news, TV shows, radio programs, and popular culture magazines, newspapers were the easiest to find in the context of this dissertation. Among the nationally distributed newspapers in Turkey, Cumhuriyet was chosen mostly due to availability and convention.

Throughout the period of the study, only four nationally distributed newspapers, Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, Milliyet, and Türkiye, continued to be published without any major interruptions or alterations. [4] Hürriyet and Türkiye do not have official and consistent online archives, and manually searching physical copies for the extensive time period covered by the study would not be possible given the time limits. Milliyet does have an online archive, but it is dysfunctional, as articles can be located but not accessed without a physical order.

Beyond the conventional aspects, though, Cumhuriyet is an important and prestigious newspaper as it is the oldest newspaper of modern Turkey and had a prominent role in distributing the ideologies and logics of the new republic (Emre-Kaya, 2010). In addition, the newspaper hosted many prominent intellectuals that had influenced not only the Turkish cultural and political discourse but also the discussions on arabesk to a great extent, including Atilla Dorsay, Uğur Mumcu, and Zülfü Livaneli, during the period of this study. The authors' profile is important in linguistic methods in general. This is because, in order for texts to exert an influence on social reality, texts need to be read and acted upon or, as Taylor and Van Every (2000) point out, "[a] text that is not read, cited or used, is not yet a text" (p. 292).

Table 3.1 Summary of Data Sources Examined in the Hermeneutical Analysis (1968-1999)

	Text Description	Quantity	Details
Focal Texts	Cumhuriyet archives	2331 articles	Consist of the meaningful search results of the following keywords: arabesk, minivan music, minibus music, commercial music, degenerate music, drivers' songs, drivers' music, Orhan Gencebay, Ferdi Tayfur
Contextual Texts	Music/popular culture magazines	51 issues	Relevant issues of Hey, Gong, Milliyet Sanat, Nokta, Sanat Emeği, and Ses Magazines
	Additional newspaper articles	102 articles	Supplementary articles from Milliyet, Hürriyet, and unknown sources, additional articles from Cumhuriyet's online archives that were about the Turkish music sector
	Documentaries and panels	4 productions	App. 430 minutes of footage, including a 4-episode documentary on arabesk in the 1980s and 1990s, a documentary on Müslüm Gürses's fans, an approximately 100-minute panel attended by Orhan Gencebay, a 110-minute panel attended by Hakkı Bulut, Ümit Besen, and various other pop and arabesk artists
	Other video footage	34 separate video footage	App. 720 minutes of footage, ranging from 4-minute to 90-minute interviews with arabesk singers like Orhan Gencebay, Ferdi Tayfur, Gökhan Güney, and Emrah, a full concert of Emrah, 2 New Year's Eve Specials, 20-30-minute-long fan made documentaries

Cumhuriyet was influential in that many of the articles were later cited in academic books, arabesk artists specifically chose Cumhuriyet to give interviews, and it was taken seriously by the government and politicians (see Chapter 5). Cumhuriyet also had a core reader base that was active and involved and participated in the discourse through sending letters and publishing in the guest writer sections. More information about Cumhuriyet's history, ideology, and place in the Turkish press will be explained in the following chapter.

After deciding on the focal data source, I started collecting data by searching "arabesk" in the entirety of Cumhuriyet's archive without putting any temporal restrictions. The online archival records of Cumhuriyet go back to January 1st, 1930, and the first mention of the word "arabesk" appeared in the newspaper as early as January 2nd of the same year.

Nonetheless, between the 1930s and 1960s, search results mostly consisted of advertisements for furniture auctions that employed the term "arabesk" to describe the style of the furniture that was on sale. Although the advertisements did not include any illustrations or pictures, it is assumed that in this context, the term arabesk was employed in reference to the "arabesque" motifs, i.e., patterns of intricate and continuous interweavings of lines, branches, or leaves, that were commonly used Islamic visual arts (Khazâie, 2005), on the items that were being sold. Additionally, mentions of Debussy's "Arabesque no.1" and "Arabesque no.2" and Schumann's "Arabesque" appeared on occasion in the 1960s.

In the early 1970s, the reference to "arabesque motifs" had continued; however, the auction advertisements of the previous 30 years were mostly replaced by crossword puzzles which either asked for the name of "A style of decoration or ornamentation with intertwined branches and leaves" or described historical buildings with arabesque architectural decor and asked for the buildings' name. These puzzles continued to appear till the mid-1980s.

The first ever mention of the word "arabesk" in Cumhuriyet as a music genre was recorded on October 14th, 1974, in an interview with a TRT official. Nonetheless, the initiation of arabesk is traced to 1968 by scholars (Güngör, 1993; Özbek, 1991), so to find further support, I also searched "arabesk" in Milliyet's archive between January 1st, 1968, and December 31st, 1974. Out of the 50 results, 48 were either crossword puzzles or architectural references. Arabesk as a music genre only appeared in two articles, one published in 1972 and the other in 1974. Considering that none of the contextual sources prior to 1972 include the word "arabesk," it can be assumed that the word was "coined" around 1972. Further, the search results showed that it was not until the 1980s that arabesk became a commonly used term. Figure 3.1 shows

the number of meaningful articles arabesk keyword search generated each year.

Figure 3.1 Number of Articles Containing the Keyword "Arabesk" Over the Years

Next, to investigate whether there were any debates and discussions on arabesk before the term was coined, I conducted an additional search using the phrases that appeared in the focal and contextual data in reference to arabesk and arabesk singers. These phrases included "dolmuş müziği" (minivan music), "minibüs müziği" (minibus music), "piyasa müziği" (commercial music), and "yoz müzik" (degenerate music). Additionally, I searched the names of two of the most prominent arabesk singers of the 1970s, "Orhan Gencebay" and "Ferdi Tayfur." While searching for dolmuş müziği, I came across an artist referring to arabesk as "şoför şarkıları" (drivers' songs), a phrase I had not seen in the initial readings, so I also conducted "şoför şarkıları" and "şoför müziği" (drivers' music) searches. These additional searches were conducted by using the "containing all of the following words" filter instead of "containing the following words in order" to get a broader set of results. So, if both "minivan" and "music" appeared in an article and other elements of the article insinuated that the author was talking about arabesk, the text was included in the focal data, even if the phrases were not in the exact formats above. Articles that included these phrases but talked about other genres were included in the contextual data. I kept the additional searches between 1968 and 1979 because the use of the word arabesk suddenly increased in the 1980s, and the additional searches were not needed.

In all, through the additional keyword search, 37 new data points were added to the 1968-1979 focal data, and around 45 articles were added to the contextual data.

Starting in the mid-1990s, the debates around arabesk had gradually lost steam, and the additional data's contributions decreased sharply. After not getting much out of the data from 1998 and 1999, I stopped collecting focal data. Overall, the focal data set included 2331 articles, all of which talked about the arabesk genre in one way or another. The search results that are not related to the music or film genres (e.g., those related to arabesque motifs) and movie theater schedules that included the artists' names were not included in the data.

3.4.2 Contextual Data

The initial contextual data set consisted of three books on arabesk written by sociologists and musicologists (Güngör, 1993; Stokes, 1992; Özbek, 1991), two documentaries, and various newspaper and magazine articles on arabesk and Turkish music and film industry. After getting familiar with these sources and focal texts, other contextual sources were added.

First, to follow the most immediate context, the front pages of the issues focal articles appeared in, and the articles that were on the same page with the focal article were scanned. The titles of relevant (e.g., news about music and entertainment, TRT, technological developments) and historically significant (i.e., news about presidential elections, major catastrophes like earthquakes, terrorist attacks, or economic crushes) articles were recorded in a separate document.

Another contextual data expansion was carried out by searching for and collecting music and pop culture magazines. These magazines were crucial because they were the first to introduce arabesk artists to the public. Additionally, although Cumhuriyet conducted multiple interviews with many important arabesk singers like Orhan Gencebay, İbrahim Tatlıses, Emrah, and Ahmet Kaya, it was a serious newspaper that did not get involved with scandals and sensational news. In contrast, magazines generally used a more joyful, lighter, and, in a sense, teasing tone, and they did not shy away from exposing the private lives of the artists. Consequently, the magazine interviews were qualitatively different from those on Cumhuriyet and showed a different side of the artists. Additionally, magazines provided a good check as to whether Cumhuriyet reflected the general sentiment.

I started collecting magazines by listing the names of magazines I came across in advertisements on Cumhuriyet and within articles while collecting the focal data. This list included six weekly or monthly releases: Hey, Gong, Milliyet Sanat, Nokta,

Sanat Emeği, and Ses Magazines. Then, I scanned the biggest online second-hand bookseller in Turkey, www.nadirkitap.com, looking for issues of these magazines that either had arabesk artists on the cover or "arabesk" on the headline. From this pool, I first bought those that were directly mentioned in Cumhuriyet and other data sources. Then, I prioritized those with artists on the cover over those with arabesk in the title. For example, if two issues of magazines were available for the same month of the same year, I chose the one with the artist on the cover over the one that only had the word "arabesk." Like the additional keyword searches, as the articles coming from Cumhuriyet increased in number, magazines started not adding much to the data. Consequently, after 1985, I bought only one magazine per year. In addition, I got free access to almost all 1980 issues of Gong Magazine, and they were included in the contextual data. Hey, Gong, Ses, and Sanat Emeği were all shut down by the end of the 1980s. The last relevant issue of Nokta appeared in 1990, followed by Milliyet Sanat in 1991. In total, the contextual data set had 51 issues of various magazines from 1970 to 1991.

To collect TV and radio data, I followed a similar approach. I started by noting the music and entertainment shows often appearing in Cumhuriyet's TV/Radio section. These programs generally did not include arabesk artists, but they helped understand the Turkish broadcasting sector and observe the style and attitude of non-arabesk artists. I also tried to find the New Year's Eve and Eid special shows (see Chapter 5) where arabesk artists occasionally appeared. Additionally, there was a forum on arabesk that was broadcasted on TRT and joined by Orhan Gencebay. Lastly, I searched the names of important arabesk artists with keywords like "interview," "concert," and "on TV" on YouTube.

Finally, three other books, one book on Turkish pop culture (Kozanoğlu, 1992), one sociology book on Turkish society and politics (Akay, 1991), and an autobiography of an arabesk artist (Tayfur, 2003) were added to the data along various academic articles and news snippets from other newspapers found on the internet (see Table 3.1).

The next section goes over how CAQDAS, that is, Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software was utilized in this dissertation.

3.5 CAQDAS

Initially, I planned to analyze the data using traditional tools like Excel and notebook-keeping; however, as the analysis progressed, these tools proved inefficient. This inefficiency was primarily due to the massive amount of data and the varied formats (e.g., texts, videos, pictures, audio recordings) the texts were in. Additionally, the PDFs bought from the newspaper were challenging to analyze because they were in image format, and some of the texts were distorted in that not all the words were readable by the computer. This inhibited reliable text search within a single PDF file or a folder of PDFs. Further, storing, organizing, and labeling contextual data was difficult, especially for video and audio clips and pictures. This disorganization made retrieving data, revising, and comparing codes extremely difficult. Sometimes, I had to spend hours finding a single video snippet or changing a code. To ameliorate the difficulty of organizing, searching, and retrieving the data, I decided to try out the CAQDAS software. After attending a four-day workshop, researching further, and consulting with others who had similar problems, I opted to use a CAQDAS program. Among various software, I chose Atlas.ti over others mainly because Atlas.ti was known for working better with non-English data.

It is important to note here that in line with the advice of scholars who are in the interpretivist tradition (e.g., Kimmel, 2012; O'Kane, 2020; Paulus, Lester & Britt, 2013), I solely benefited from CAQDAS as a supporting tool and did not utilize any of the features that use AI to detect occurrences or sentiments or auto-code the data. I carried out all creative and interpretive steps, such as coding and finding patterns myself. The rest of this section details how CAQDAS was utilized in this dissertation.

First, CAQDAS helped organize and manage the data. Atlas.ti allows multi-foldering, so the data was first divided into folders by year, general topic (e.g., music, film, politics), and author. Additionally, many articles were directly connected to other articles previously published in or outside of Cumhuriyet in that authors replied and re-replied to other authors, the readers commented on previously published articles, and the authors quoted themselves because they changed their opinions or wanted to show that the time proved them right. Atlas.ti has a function that enables connecting paragraphs through clickable links, so CAQDAS was useful in directly linking relevant data points to each other and accessing them all at once.

Second, Atlas.ti's coding function was used to "tag" the data. I use the word "tag"

to refer to the empty or descriptive codes that do not really have a theoretical contribution by themselves (Locke, Feldman & Golden-Biddle, 2022). For example, to easily access the articles that talked about Turkish pop, I tagged all the articles that mention Turkish pop, Turkish light music (another label used for Turkish pop in the 1970s and 1980s), and any pop artists with the "Turkish pop" tag to connect these texts. Later, when I needed to retrieve all these data separately to build a narrative on Turkish pop, I was able to access the filtered data set and the memos and notes associated with them by using the code retrieval function.

Third, I used CAQDAS to code the data. Different from the abovementioned tags, coding in this context refers to giving abstract labels to theoretically relevant and dense relationships, patterns, and processes (Locke et al., 2022). For example, a code related to Turkish pop was "pop-besk" which was used for paragraphs and articles that described and criticized how some Turkish pop artists were concealing the arabesk elements in their songs under pop beats. This move was interpreted as a manipulative and sly act where singers tried to avoid criticisms from arabesk opponents by being covert but still wanted to sell to arabesk fans by including the styles the fans would like. Pop-besk label was theoretically heavy because it related to cognitive and normative illegitimacy and to illegitimacy management strategies.

Once the coding process was completed, CAQDAS helped in the organization and retrieval of codes as well. Over time, some codes became too complex, others proved to be less critical than initially anticipated, and some codes overlapped or had misleading labels. As a result, extensive editing was required in the coding process, and CAQDAS was immensely useful for tasks such as retrieving, merging, separating, and dropping codes that could have taken significantly more time otherwise. Further, Atlas.ti maintains a coding history, allowing for tracking of all coding modifications, which increases the transparency of the data analysis process (Aguinis, Ramani & Alabduljader, 2018).

Finally, CAQDAS also helps increase the rigor of the research (O'Kane, Smith & Lerman, 2021).

The following section talks about the trustworthiness of this dissertation and how CAQDAS aided in ensuring rigor.

3.6 Research Rigor

The concept of trustworthiness was first offered by Lincoln and Guba (1985) and pointed out as the "central concept by which to judge the quality of interpretive qualitative research" (O'Kane et al., 2021, p. 105). Trustworthiness is made up of four elements: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, and it is achieved when these elements are satisfied.

Credibility refers to researchers having ample knowledge about the research setting and the data and is akin to the criteria of "internal validity" of positivist research. The main tools for ensuring credibility are data triangulation and prolonged engagement with the data (Lincoln & Guba, 2007). Triangulation is defined as gathering "insights from different sources and thus. . . corroborating and identifying contradictions in the claims of any one source" (Kipping et al., 2014). As detailed in the previous sections and Table 3.1, the data set is rich and versatile; the data comes from numerous sources and represents the opinions of both proponents and opponents. The focal texts, as well as Cumhuriyet's archive, were used to check if certain events really happened on the dates suggested, the books were compared to each other and the focal data to check their accuracy, and finally, the focal data was compared to magazines, video clips, and snippets from other newspapers to see if there are any systematic and unexpected differences between publications. Although prolonged engagement with data applies more to on-site research like ethnographies, I did spend almost three years with the data. I did all the transcriptions and translations by myself, and as required by hermeneutics, all data, including the books, were read at least twice.

Transferability refers to whether the findings and propositions of the study can be applied to other relevant settings and is similar to the criteria of external validity. In the case of interpretive research, it is achieved by thick description. Therefore, the next two chapters, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, are entirely dedicated to the case of arabesk. Additionally, one thing that ensured that arabesk was not an emic context and the contributions were not only local was the response I received from non-Turkish audiences in international conferences (EGOS 2020; 2021) and workshops. In these meetings, listeners often found parallels between various genres and cultural streams in their countries and arabesk and hypothesized how the findings could apply to their context. Other scholars also found parallels between arabesk and other genres that developed or liked by marginalized communities such as jazz, blues, and tango (Güngör, 1993). I also anticipate that these findings can be readily

applied to other contexts of marginalized or degenerate art. Additional discussion on transferability is provided in Chapter 6.

Dependability can be considered the interpretivist equivalent of reliability and is about showing consistency in the analysis. Conformability refers to being neutral and free of bias. These two criteria basically aim to guarantee that researchers protect their impartiality and consistency during the analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; O'Kane et al., 2021). In the context of this study, CAQDAS was most helpful in ensuring dependability and confirmability. Atlas.ti has sophisticated text and code retrieval functions that allow researchers to see the paragraphs coded with a certain label together in a separate space, easing the process of checking the consistency of the codes. Additionally, comments and descriptions can be attached to codes, which helps prevent confusing codes or misremembering a code's meaning. Further, retrieval is instantaneous, so any suspicions and hesitations can be checked and edited on the spot. Also, as stated above, most of the moves like coding, adding or deleting texts, and making comments or memos are trackable and have date stamps, enabling the researcher to show consistency.

CAQDAS was also used to ensure coding was not affected by fatigue, mood, or other external elements. To this end, I randomly selected 50 texts and re-coded them in another project bundle to see if the coding was consistent and unbiased. I did this three times during the analysis, coinciding with times I realized that the codes were changing fundamentally (e.g., many new codes were emerging, and salient and frequently used codes were being used less). The interrater reliability criteria do not exist in interpretive research, and it is very common to have only a single analyst coding the data (e.g., Pratt, 2000; Sonenshein, 2016). Nonetheless, this check can be thought of as a dirty test of intra-rater reliability where I ensured myself it was not tiredness, mood, or another contextual element that skewed the codes.

Lastly, to increase conformability, I tried to be as reflexive as possible. My temporal distance from the data and the fact that I did not directly witness most of the developments aided in staying impartial (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Kipping et al., 2014; Phillips & Brown, 1993). However, some of the broader ideologies and divisions in society are still alive and well; a lot of the actors are still active, and some of the deceased actors exist as historical figures. Thus, especially when the discussions were political, I tried to assess my position on similar subjects, which side I felt closer to, and how these could distort my interpretation of the data.

Another thing that can increase trustworthiness is giving the details of the stages of analysis, which the following section does.

3.7 Stages of Analysis

Like the data collection process, the steps of analysis largely followed previous influential studies that took a hermeneutical or discursive approach. As explained above, hermeneutics emphasizes the interrelatedness between the focal texts and sociocultural and historical contexts, and hermeneutical analysis is conducted by going back and forth between the focal text and the context in multiple iterations (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Prasad, 2002). These iterations aim to gradually knit the contextual and focal texts together to get a comprehensive understanding of the process. Following this premise, the analysis proceeded in three separate stages. The first stage focused on building familiarity with the data set and ensuring that the data set was exhaustive. The second stage focused on the narrowest level, that is, the level of focal data, to make the initial connections and find the most salient themes. The third and final stage started the intertextual analysis and included three iterations that progressively expanded the analysis to include the music and entertainment sector, the cultural ideology of the modern Turkish Republic, and the political climate of the country.

However, it should be noted that the stages were not rigidly separated. For example, surface-level intertextual analysis actually started in the second stage because, in some cases, the connections between codes, themes, and higher-level phenomena were obvious. Nonetheless, to make the processes more transparent and comprehensible, these stages are presented separately and in order below.

First stage: The analysis began with reading focal texts generated through the search for "arabesk" in Cumhuriyet and the initial set of contextual sources (then consisted of the front pages, surrounding articles, documentaries, and academic books and articles). As described earlier, while going through the data set for the first time, both the focal data and contextual data were supplemented by additional sources.

Moreover, this stage made me aware of the topics I was biased against or had a limited understanding of. Reading surrounding articles and documentaries revealed that the music and entertainment industry at that time was very different from what it is now in that it was significantly smaller, more unprofessional, and more disorganized. Additionally, this stage exposed that changes in the political environment affected the evaluators' reactions to arabesk significantly, which was an unexpected finding. As a result, besides the additional keyword searches and listing and finding magazine articles and TV and radio broadcasts, more data on the Turkish enter-

tainment industry and the political scene were collected to enrich the contextual data.

Another objective of this stage was to identify important actors, events, and turning points (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Navis & Glynn, 2010). First, influential actors and groups of evaluators involved in the construction of illegitimacy around arabesk were profiled. The list of important actors and their roles in the arabesk discourse is provided in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 List of Important Actors

Actors	Description
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, or TRT, was the state-backed media corporation that owned all TV channels and four nationwide radio stations in Turkey during the period from 1964 to 1990. The four radio stations owned by TRT were Radyo 1 (originally established in 1927), Radyo 2 (1974), Radyo 3 (1974), and Radyo 4 (1987). Additionally, between 1964 and 1999, TRT had six TV channels: TV 1 (1968), TV 2 (1986), GAP TV (1989), TV 3 (1989), TV 4 (1990), and TV 5 (1992).
The Police Radio	The Police Radio (PR) was established in 1952 to initially promote the services of the Turkish Police and inform the public about crime and traffic violations. However, in the 1980s, the station became a music broadcaster that spared considerable time to arabesk music and had a significant role in spreading arabesk.
Unkapanı	Unkapanı was a commonly used name for the cluster of music producers and cassette sellers organized within Istanbul Drapers' Bazaar (also known as İMÇ), a commercial collective opened in the early 1980s. The music producers in Unkapanı were known for their business acumen and ability to capitalize on emerging trends quickly.

Orhan Gencebay	Gencebay is a singer, producer, and bağlama virtuosa, primarily known as the inventor of arabesk. Gencebay had never accepted the "arabesk" label and depicted himself as a "free" and "experimental" artist who played around with many genres and instruments. Among arabesk artists, he had the highest status.
Ferdi Tayfur	Ferdi Tayfur was the second most famous arabesk singer after Gencebay in the 1970s. He brought numerous new trends to arabesk, like sighing and whimpering during the songs and the artists having a sad back story.
İbrahim Tatlıses	Originally a folk singer, Tatlıses switched to arabesk in the late 1970s. He was known for his scandalous private life and gaffes. He appeared on TRT many times throughout the 1980s and was invited to many high-profile events during Özal's regime.
Küçük Emrah	Emrah was the first child or "little" singer to rise to fame. Unlike many others, he protected his popularity over the years. In the mid-1990s, he switched to a more pop-ified image.
Küçük Ceylan	Ceylan was another "little" singer who debuted when she was only 11. After the 1990s, she stopped making arabesk and based her career on TFM.
Zülfü Livaneli	Livaneli is a musician, musicologist, author, politician, and film director who has generally been concerned with improving and modernizing Turkish Folk Music (TFM). He was among those who examined arabesk music as a "sociological issue." Later, he popularized a genre called "özgün music" that was considered as an arabesk alternative.
Ahmet Kaya	Ahmet Kaya was a musician and a Marxist activist who was very open about his Kurdish identity, over which he got into various controversies. His songs were seen as a fusion of arabesk and "özgün music."
Engin Ergönültaş	Ergönültaş was the first ever sociologist who worked on Gencebay in the 1970s. His comparative study of Gencebay and Tayfur was published in multiple music magazines and quoted by many other intellectuals. Gencebay blamed him for distorting the arabesk narrative, especially for exaggerating the connection between slum residents and arabesk.

Turgut Özal	Özal was the 19th Prime Minister (1983-1989) and 8th President of Turkey (1989-1993), known for his economically liberal, socially conservative, and populist policies. Though he denied listening to arabesk in 1983, in the late 1980s, he often invited arabesk artists like İbrahim Tatlıses and Emrah as performers at various events. His policies, personality, and followers were also strongly associated with broader meanings of arabesk.
Uğur Mumcu	Uğur Mumcu was an influential investigative journalist who often targeted Özal's policies in his daily column. He invented and popularized the terms "arabesk liberalism" and "alaturka capitalism."
Hıfzı Topuz	A prominent journalist, academic, and author, Topuz was appointed as the assistant general manager of TRT to salvage the radio ratings that had fallen significantly after the TV broadcast started. Although his time at TRT was short, his ideas and approach to arabesk became a permanent part of TRT's general policies towards arabesk during the period of this study.
Zeki Müren	Nicknamed "the Sun of Art", Müren was the icon of modernized Turkish Art Music (TAM) and alaturka. He was known for his flamboyant, effeminate style. Public intellectuals did not really like him, and they criticized him for his fashion choices. He was a regular at TRT.
Ferdi Özbeğen	Özbeğen was the father of the sub-genre "pianist-chanteur" or the second generation "aranjman." In the early 1980s, he worked closely with Gencebay. He also appeared on TRT multiple times.
Atilla Dorsay	Dorsay is a famous film critic who has been one of the most influential people in the Turkish film industry. In addition to his film reviews on Cumhuriyet and Milliyet Sanat, he has written many books on cinema and was a jury member at various film festivals. He also had a column for reviewing restaurants and food.
Tınaz Titiz	Tınaz Titiz was the Minister of Culture between 1987 and 1989. He took the problems of the Turkish music industry seriously and organized the first-ever Turkish Music Conference. He was heavily criticized for commissioning and then broadcasting a "painless arabesk" song to eradicate arabesk.

Cavidan Selanik	Selanik was a TRT officer in the 1970s and often talked to the press about TRT's classification systems and policies. Later, in the late 1980s, she worked as a musical advisor to the Minister of Culture Tınaz Titiz. She was very active in the "painless" arabesk project.
Hakkı Bulut	Hakkı Bulut is TFM and arabesk singer as well as a songwriter and composer who has been in the music industry even longer than Orhan Gencebay. In the late 1980s, he was upset about being underappreciated and ignored and strived for visibility. He was the arabesk singer of the "painless arabesk project."
Esin Afşar	Afşar was originally a theatre actress and singer known for her chansons and TFM adaptations. In the 1980s, she made a song and album called "Arabeske İnat" (Defiance Against Arabesk) and promoted it for multiple years.
Sezen Aksu	Sezen Aksu is a significant figure in Turkish pop who had numerous hits over the years and wrote and composed many songs for others as well. She started her career in 1970 and managed to protect her popularity since then. She also has had her unique style, a localized pop specifically catering to Turkish tastes. In the early 1990s, journalists accused her of selling arabesk in pop disguise.
Kayahan	Kayahan was a singer, producer, and guitarist who initially started his music career as a composer. He started to perform himself in the late 1980s and got immediate success. However, he was also criticized for arabesk-baiting under a modern appearance.

Lastly, a chronological narrative was constructed to identify important events and turning points and to track "who did what, and when" (Maguire & Hardy, 2009, p. 153). This narrative included important political, legal, social, economic, and cultural developments, as well as major developments and events in the entertainment industry, changes in TV and radio, release dates of important albums/songs/films, deaths of important artists, and changes in Cumhuriyet.

Overall, the first stage provided a general understanding of what is going on in the data and showed the parts that require further attention or that need to be supplemented by additional data.

Second stage: Following Khaire and Wadhwani (2010), the second stage focused on detecting the most manifest content and identifying the major themes in the

focal texts. To achieve this, I thoroughly read each piece of focal data and employed open, line-by-line coding. Open coding requires an unmotivated look at the data to let the data speak for itself and enable unconstrained exploration (Saldana, 2016). Specifically, what is meant here is that while the research questions and the fundamental theoretical knowledge are still kept in mind, they are not allowed to control the data to make space for unexpected or contradictory ideas. Consequently, in the beginning, I did not have a codebook or predefined codes; the code book emerged naturally as the research progressed and codes were created and defined.

After open coding was complete, the process of organizing, refining, and categorizing the codes, i.e., axial coding, began (Locke et al., 2022; Saldana, 2016). During this step, I went over the codes again to reflect on the coding process, correct any errors, and eliminate the codes that were not salient or relevant to the overall analysis (Boeije, 2010). Consequently, several codes were merged, and some were eliminated entirely.

Following axial coding, the process of "putting the patterns" together (Locke et al., 2022, p. 232). This stage was theoretically informed in that I directly investigated how the codes relate to different dimensions of illegitimacy. First, for incomprehensibility evaluations, I examined the codes to see if the explanations about the meaning and function of the category, including definitions, labeling attempts, technical analysis, comparison with other genres, and member or customer profile, followed theoretically meaningful patterns. For taken-for-grantedness, I looked for the implicit and explicit content that signaled apathy and acceptance, as well as for recurring words, phrases, and explanations that were often mentioned with the word "arabesk" to understand whether explanations got shrunk or scripted overtime. For normative evaluations, I looked for texts with prescriptive or moral claims, connected debates and discussions, and tried to understand how conversations changed over time. For regulative legitimacy, I focused on interviews with TRT and government officials and articles criticizing TRT, the police, and the government for their attitude towards arabesk.

In the end, 15 themes were found, but these themes were later adapted to the findings from the third stage.

Third stage: The third stage involved intertextual analysis, meaning that the focal texts were re-analyzed in relation to contextual sources. During this stage, I also refined the temporal differences that revealed themselves in the previous stages and bracketed these differences into phases.

Following the hermeneutic advice for progressively broadening up the context

(Phillips & Brown, 1993; Prasad, 2002), this stage consisted of three iterations that were carried out by going back and forth between the themes, the contextual data, and the literature. The first iteration explored how the immediate Turkish musical context, such as changes in music tastes, the media used (vinyl, cassettes, CDs), and radio policies related to the previously identified themes. The second iteration concentrated on the broader cultural context and attempted to understand how different conceptualizations of ideal Turkish culture and Turkish identity influenced illegitimacy evaluations. The third iteration focused on the political context and investigated how the struggles that were essentially rooted in early-to-mid 20th-century politics affected the evaluations of arabesk music. The rest of this section explains the iterations and concludes the chapter.

First iteration: The first iteration began with the most proximate higher level, which was the context of the Turkish music and entertainment industry. I started with music magazines, TV shows and media clips, and additional newspaper articles on entertainment. I additionally examined the impact of developments in communication technology (e.g., transitioning to multiple channels, the establishment of private radios) and distribution channels (e.g., the transition from vinyl to cassettes) on illegitimacy evaluations. This iteration was useful in understanding the behavior and reactions of other artists towards arabesk as well as in understanding how the disorganized and unregulated music industry and pirating helped arabesk to flourish.

Second iteration: The second iteration focused on the dominant logics in the cultural scene of Turkey and the cultural policies of the government. During this stage, I tried to understand why individuals who held negative views about arabesk considered it a negative, harmful genre and why they thought the other genres were superior. I was especially preoccupied with the prescriptive articles that provided guidelines on revoking or replacing arabesk and identifying the underlying ideologies that created such perspectives. A major insight from this stage was that my initial treatment of Cumhuriyet authors as a homogeneous group was faulty because there were factors like generational differences, individual life philosophies, and cultural knowledge that created diversity in how different authors approached to arabesk not only in terms of its goodness or badness but also in why they thought it was good or bad.

Third iteration: The second iteration made the political and ideological nature of the arabesk debate more obvious. Although political affiliations were salient in the 80s, during the second iteration, I realized that evaluations in all phases were charged by certain ideologies and ideals, in that most of the negative evaluations

were motivated by arabesk being associated with deviations from the future the authors envisioned for the country.

At the end of the third stage, the themes were refined and clustered under phases. Table 6.1 in Chapter 6 summarizes the phases and themes and associated cognitive, normative, and regulative illegitimacy evaluations.

4. BROADER CONTEXT

This chapter aims to provide an overview of the broader political, social, and cultural contexts that were significant for arabesk's development. Both the relevant literature and the data sets of this study contributed to developing a comprehensive understanding of the broader context.

This chapter starts by summarizing the political and social atmosphere of Turkey between the 1920s and 1990s. Specifically, the first section is divided into three periods that concentrate on Atatürk era policies, the chaotic and violent period of the 1950s and 1970s, and the rise and fall of the Motherland Party (ANAP) and Turgut Özal in order. The following section goes over the groups of evaluators of this study, that is, public intellectuals, the slum residents and lower classes, drivers of public transportation, and the general others. The third and final section delves into the characteristics of the Turkish entertainment industry and explains the attributes of the Turkish music scene before arabesk's arrival.

4.1 The Sociopolitical Context

4.1.1 Foundations of the Modern Turkish Republic, 1920s-1940s

When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the country was in a state of extreme distress. The public was already tired from two decades of continuous wars, invasions, and occupations, and on top of it, the problems inherited from the collapsed Ottoman Empire, including massive financial debt and decaying institutions and organizations, needed to be

solved (Nas, 2008). Nonetheless, within a span of 10 years, Turkey was rebuilt from scratch by establishing a series of "top-down reforms of secular modernization" (Somer, 2011, p. 517). Although some of these reforms were initiated by the declining Ottoman Empire of the 19th and early 20th century, most of the changes, and the most fundamental ones in that, were initiated by Atatürk himself (Zürcher, 2023). These reforms were "radical" in nature and were mainly charged with the mission of elevating Turkey to the level of Western countries, "Western" referring to countries in Europe or with European heritage (Zürcher, 2023).

Atatürks's main plan for Turkey was to leave the Islamic Ottoman past and the East, that is, the Middle East, behind and create a democratic, Westernized, and secular Republic. Most of the transitions Atatürk brought were in this direction, including his grand reforms like replacing the monarchy and the Caliphate with democracy and secularism and also more symbolic changes like replacing the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet, banning traditional and Eastern-looking garments like the fez, and shutting down religious fraternities (Koçak, 2000).

Moreover, his idea of reform was "holistic" in that it required improvement in all kinds of fields, including culture and art (Akşin, 2000b). Atatürk believed that music and performative arts were important ways to show the country's modernity and development; therefore, he was personally involved in matters related to music and often mentioned the need for improving Turkish music in his speeches (Çuhadar, 2015). In music, too, Atatürk's policy was to wrap up what was left over from the Ottomans, e.g., Classical Turkish Art Music (CTAM), Turkish Art Music (TAM), and Turkish Folk Music (TFM) and replace them with forms of Western classical music (Güngör, 1993; Tekelioğlu, 1996).

What especially bothered the reformists during this period was the monophonic nature of traditional Turkish music. Monophony refers to the technique of playing only one note in a given interval, and it stands in contrast to polyphony, which means that multiple notes and harmonies are being played in a single interval (Lachambre, Andre-Obrecht & Pinquier, 2011). Most Western musical forms were polyphonic, with Western classical music being the most complex one. Atatürk and the cultural elite of the time believed that polyphony was superior to monophony and shaped their musical policies around the goal of spreading polyphony among the public. Following this goal, in 1934, CTAM, TAM, and TFM were banned from the state radio and prohibited in state conservatories to keep the public away from monophonic music so that they could listen and get used to Western polyphony (Güngör, 1993; Özbek, 1991). Though the radio prohibition was lifted after two years, anecdotal evidence in focal data suggested that after the bans, publicly playing TFM

was not tolerated until the 1940s, and TAM artists were largely exiled to nightclubs or casinos (see below). At the same time, the state was working on building different Western classical music orchestras, a state opera and ballet, and was bringing teachers from Europe to implement Western-style cultural institutions and musical education systems. The government also sent talented young musicians to Europe to learn about the details of the craft and then bring the knowledge back to the country. As such, the 1920s-1930s were characterized by aggressive efforts to spread Western classical music in Turkey.

4.1.1.1 Kemalism and Its Critique

Atatürk passed away in 1938 and only had 15 years to implement his broad projects. However, his ideas were turned into an ideology under the notion of "Kemalism," a term coined after his first name. Kemalism aimed to protect Atatürk's legacy and was based on Atatürk's six principles: republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, etatism/statism, and reformism. These principles were championed by the political party that was established by Atatürk, The Republican People's Party, better known as CHP (an abbreviation for the party's Turkish name "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi"). For the context of this study, the most important principles are secularism, also known as laicism, and etatism, also called statism. Thus, the rest of this subsection focuses on these two principles.

First, secularism refers to the belief that the state and the constitution should be free of "domination of religious institutions and symbols" (Berger, 1967, p. 107, quoted by Keyman, 2007). Secularism was one of the most, if not the most, significant yet controversial principles of Atatürk, and a hundred years later, it is still a hot topic of debate. This controversy was sourced in the simultaneous existence of two conflicting groups in society. In particular, while a segment internalized secularism and saw criticism against this principle as an attack on the integrity of the modern Turkish Republic, the other group saw secularism itself as a threat to their religious values (Keyman, 2007).

In the 1940s and 1950s, some scholars traced this fragmentation, along with other conflicts of value in society, to the unsuccessful dissemination of Atatürk reforms to the masses. Accordingly, Atatürk's reforms were created at the top and supposed to spread from the top to the public at large (Keyman, 2007; Somer, 2011). However, the masses who were still tied to their religious and traditional values resisted the reforms, and some were not even exposed or socialized enough to these changes.

As a result, society cracked into two large groups that began to be more visible in the 1940s after Atatürk's passing. One group that generally consisted of the urban elite saw the East, Islam, and the Ottoman past as dark ages, associated it with decline, backwardness, oppression, superstition, and dogma, and idealized the West as secular, forward-looking, progressive, and scientific. They believed that Atatürk's ideology and principles were protecting the country from going back to the dark ages. Yet others, usually the lower-class masses, were still connected to Islam and tradition and saw the Ottoman past as a period of glory and something to boast about (Keyman, 2007; Zürcher, 2023).

Further, this difference was not always black and white, as many individuals were torn between the East-West dichotomy and struggled with their identity and beliefs (Özgür, 2006). In this context, arabesk, based on its connections to Arab music, Eastern melodies, and traditional masses, was interpreted as an attack from the Eastern, Ottoman-loving camp (see Chapter 5).

Second, etatism/statism refers to Atatürk's designation of the state as the main investor in various fields and is also a complex principle because the debate over whether it was a liberal or socialist endeavor is still ongoing (Arnold, 2012; Zürcher, 2023). What is important in this case is that regardless of its driving ideology, Atatürk was aware that the country, even the economic and cultural elites, did not have the capacity to invest in getting the economy and cultural developments going, as the public lacked capital, education, and manpower (Arnold, 2012). As such, at least in the initial decade, the plan was to have the government invest in firms, agricultural production, education, and cultural matters. However, the state support to sectors continued in the 1940s due to World War II forcing the economy into stagnation (Zürcher, 2023). In the following decades, though government involvement in economic and social life decreased somewhat, the government still owned a large variety of firms, and it had full control over the education system. This dependence on the government became largely institutionalized by the 1960s, at least in the cultural sectors, because, as explained in more detail in Chapter 5, it was common for musicians, directors, and music and film critics to ask for help from the government whenever their industry entered to a crisis. For example, in the 1970s, the economic and political instability put the Turkish film industry in recurring periods of depression, and always, the first reaction of the industry insiders was to call for government intervention. This dependence on the state and the habit of expecting government support later became important for arabesk discourse.

In addition to directly investing in the sectors, Atatürk provided government support for gifted students and sent them abroad to learn about best practices and

then come back and disseminate this knowledge through the country by educating the next generation, a practice inherited from the fallen Ottoman empire. An important group among these students was known as the Turkish Five ("Türk Beşleri" in Turkish), consisting of five young musicians who were tasked with the duty of polyphonizing Turkish music and spreading the Western classical music forms throughout the country.

This practice then shaped the attributes of the Turkish intellectuals in that educated individuals and people with expertise, that is, artists, scientists, authors, journalists, and politicians, assumed the duty of serving the less privileged who lacked access to education by sharing their knowledge with them and showing them the path to the modern and progressive (Argın, 2009). The next generation that internalized this dutiful intellectual identity then constituted the biggest opponent group of arabesk music.

Overall, by the 1950s, although criticism had begun, Kemalism was still the driving ideology of the Turkish Republic, as the country was under the leadership of İsmet İnönü, who was a friend and strong adherent of Atatürk. However, things drastically changed in the 1950s when CHP fell from the government after 27 years.

4.1.2 Endless Chaos and Political Turmoil, 1950s-1970s

The 1950s were a crucial period in Turkish history, as significant political changes occurred after the Democrat Party (DP) won the elections in 1950, marking the official start of pluralistic democracy in Turkey (Özdemir, 2000). Initially, DP was loyal to most of Atatürk's values, including secularism, and the primary difference between CHP and DP on the surface was their economic policies, as DP planned to free the economy and businesses from state control (Akşin, 2000a). In the early 1950s, the changes made by the DP were well-received, and DP's presence was interpreted as an improvement in Turkish democracy. However, things took a different turn after DP was re-elected to the government for the second time with fewer votes. In 1958 an economic crisis started, and the Iraqi coup d'état made DP's leader and then Prime Minister Adnan Menderes paranoid about CHP organizing a similar attack on him (Akşin, 2000a). With this belief, DP started to pressure CHP members and attempted to block them from interacting with the public. In 1959 and 1960, journalists, academics, and university students grew wary of DP, and violent student protests began in early 1960 in large universities in Turkey. These tensions then led to the coup d'état of May 27, 1960, where a group of low-ranking officers within the

Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) took over the government and arrested the President, the Prime Minister, and various other ministers, some of whom were later executed.

Progressive and left-oriented journalists and politicians interpreted this coup positively because the new constitution generated after the coup focused on expanding human and workers' rights and contributed to the development of Turkish democracy (Özdemir, 2000). Consequently, the first couple of years following the coup were characterized by a more tolerant environment where ideologies were openly aired. During this period, the intelligentsia were shifting towards socialism, or now openly declaring that they were socialists, and various artists and writers were gathering around literary journals that promoted communism (Özdemir, 2000). The increasing visibility of socialist and communist tendencies among its target voters led CHP to renew and restructure itself, and in 1965, İnönü declared that CHP was a center-left party. The left-leaning groups became an important part of the arabesk discourse, as most journalists in Cumhuriyet were among the social democrats, socialists, or communists of the 1960s and continued to endorse these ideologies in the 1970s to 1990s.

However, the stability brought by the May 27 coup was short-lived. During the 1960s, the tensions between the leftist and rightist groups escalated, and the left-right dichotomy became ingrained as the central source of political conflict in Turkey (Demirel, 2009). The majority of the 1960s were ridden by political conflict and instability, the government was changed nine times in a span of ten years, and student protests became more radical and intense (Özdemir, 2000).

These conflicts caused another military intervention in 1971, during which the TSK gave a memorandum to the sitting government, dismissed it through threats, and guided the establishment of a new "above political parties" government. Nonetheless, again, the stability and peace were short-lived, as political conflicts resurged after a couple of years following the memorandum. Things got especially bad near the end of the decade when the front pages of the newspapers were reporting multiple deaths resulting from political conflict or assassinations every day. These violent events eventually led to the coup d'état of September 12, 1980, which fundamentally changed the Turkish Republic in many ways.

4.1.3 The Reign of Özal and the Turkish Right, 1980s-1990s

1980 was a turning point in Turkish history due to the changes in Turkey's democratic and economic systems brought about by the September 12 coup d'état and the following Military Regime (Tanör, 2000). The coup was led by Kenan Evren, who was the Chief of TSK, and other high-ranking officers of the Turkish Army, allegedly to stop the growing terrorism and anarchy in the country. The TSK declared on September 12 that they were taking over the government and that a nationwide military martial law was established. For the next three years, a government that was supervised by a "National Security Committee" led by Evren directed the country. As a result, Turkey went through a period of democratic stagnation. Further, the aftermath of the coup was brutal. The Council of Ministers was dismissed, all political parties were shut down, and their leaders were put under arrest; unions were closed or restricted; thousands of people were arrested and subjected to torture, hundreds had to flee the country, hundreds of others went missing under interrogation, and yet others were sentenced to death or lifetime (Tanör, 2000).

Moreover, the September 12 coup was different from the other interventions because it resulted in fundamental changes in the economic and political systems. First, numerous new laws were enacted, and a new constitution was established in 1982. Second, the Turkish left was hit very hard by the coup and was never able to recover. Third, Turkey was put under a liberal transformation, and economic statism came largely to an end. At the same time, the power and authority of the government and the state in political and social realms were increased.

After a three-year halt, Turkey returned to democracy and civilian rule after the general elections were held in November 1983. However, these elections were criticized for not being really democratic because the victor of the election was pretty much certain due to there not being a strong opposition. The victorious party of the election was the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi in Turkish), mostly referred to by its abbreviation "ANAP." The leader of ANAP, Turgut Özal, became the Prime Minister, while Kenan Evren appointed himself as the President of Turkey and remained in office until 1989.

ANAP marketed itself as a representative and inclusive party that gathered the four major political ideologies that dominated the Turkish political scene under its roof. These streams included liberalism, conservatism/Islamism, nationalism, and social democracy and were brought together by Özal recruiting the ex-members of the shut-down political parties. Özal used this conflicting inclusivity of ANAP strategically, which confused or even alleviated the critics.

The opposition party of the Özal era was SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party, Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti in Turkish), which emerged as a continuation of CHP after the party was shut down by the military regime. SHP was led by İsmet İnönü's son Erdal İnönü, and the newspaper Cumhuriyet and other intellectuals explicitly supported SHP throughout the 1980s.

Turgut Özal and ANAP were, in a sense, similar to the other economically liberal and politically and socially conservative regimes of their time, including Reagan and Thatcher, but mostly to the military juntas of Latin America in the 1980s. Put differently, ANAP was riding Özal's version of the 1980s' neoliberalism wave, where economic liberalism was accompanied by a conservative social and political agenda and financial fraud. The columnists in Cumhuriyet blamed Özal for using utopic descriptions of liberalism, capitalism, and free market economy to cover up the "militarized economy" where economic policies were actually being forced by the coup generals and American support. In addition to the militarization of the economy thesis, the columnists added "politicization of religion" to emphasize ANAP using religion to further his political agenda. As such, Özal was criticized for applying a strange combination of Americanization and Islamization policies at the same time (Akşin, 2000a).

Additionally, populism was very important for ANAP, as it mainly targeted the lower classes, especially those who lived in slums and the rural poor. Özal was often criticized for overdoing populism and using religious values to exploit the public while he was living a lavish life (Tanör, 2000).

Beyond ANAP, Özal himself was a very eccentric person. His whole family got somewhat involved in politics or high-stake business and lived a flashy, celebrity-like lifestyle. He and his wife Semra were extravagant people and made a scene wherever they went. His policies were also conflicting as he was an enthusiast of American capitalism and neoliberalism but, at the same time, appeared religious and traditional. He was known for having a "get it done" (iş bitirici in Turkish) and "hit the jackpot" (köşeyi dönmek in Turkish) mentality, and some of his explanations were interpreted as advising the public to find ways to get rich regardless of the ethicality of the method (Tanör, 2000).

Özal's success had a similar trajectory to Adnan Menderes. His initial term, which was between 1983 and 1987, witnessed growth and increasing welfare, but after the mid-1980s, conditions in the country changed for the worse. Regardless, Özal was re-elected in 1987, though this was seen as a strategic win as ANAP changed the electoral law to their advantage just before the elections. In 1989, when Evren's terms of presidency ended, Turgut Özal moved from being the Prime Minister to

the President of the country. Two years later, ANAP fell from the government and was replaced by another right-wing political party, though in coalition with SHP. However, Cumhuriyet authors believed they were basically the same as ANAP in their mentality because, to them, all right-wing parties were the same at their core.

The main political issue of the 1990s was the Kurdish uprising in Southeastern Turkey, which could be described as an internal war between TSK and Turkish authorities and Kurdish separatists. This movement started a new wave of immigration and slumization in the 1990s from the Eastern rural to the West, leading to a change in the demographic structure of the slums (Özgür, 2006). Nonetheless, these developments were more related to another genre called "özgün music" than arabesk (see Chapter 5).

In 1993, Özal passed away, and at the same time, arabesk was losing steam and pulling away from the mainstream. In the mid-1990s, arabesk became detached from the general political context and existed within its own narrow musical realm. More information on the developments in the 1980s and 1990s can be found in Chapter 5, with exemplary quotes from the data.

The subsequent sections of this chapter delve into the social and cultural context that is relevant to the development of arabesk music.

4.2 The Evaluators

The evaluators of this study can be classified into four groups. The first and most important group is called "public intellectuals" and includes journalists, cultural critics, some well-educated musicians, writers, visual artists, actors and actresses, directors, as well as certain politicians. These professions were connected through a variety of shared characteristics such as their level of education and cultural accumulation, their interest in various social issues, their willingness to make social commentary, and their access to media. The term "public intellectuals" has various definitions, but it is generally used to refer to individuals who have expertise on a certain topic and engage in intellectual pursuits but, at the same time, go beyond the requirements of their actual job to pursue prosocial goals as well (Dallyn, Marinetto & Cederström, 2015; Fatsis, 2018). As such, this phrase matched well with the general attributes of the Turkish intelligentsia, who were also socially oriented. Relevant to this study, public intellectuals were particularly interested in arabesk and domi-

nated or "hijacked" (McPherson & Sauder, 2013, p. 180) the discussions and debates around arabesk both due to their personal influence or charisma and to their privileged access to the media (Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Snow & Benford, 1988). The second evaluator group of this study was the residents of the slums who were internal migrants that came from the rural areas of Turkey to try their luck in big cities. This group constituted a silent mass that predominantly supported arabesk music but did not express it. In debates related to arabesk, slum dwellers became representatives of all lower classes. The third group was drivers of public transportation who were the initial fans of arabesk before the association with slum residents and arabesk spread. This group occupied a special place in arabesk discourse as they were seen as the main disseminator of arabesk in its earlier days. Finally, the fourth group is labeled as the "others" and include gray groups that neither liked arabesk very much nor were that influential in the discourse. This group was made up of middle-class masses and lower-class urbanites who were susceptible to the opinions of public intellectuals. Below, each one of these groups is explored in detail.

4.2.1 Public Intellectuals

In this study, the term "public intellectuals" refers to an influential group of journalists, social commentators, critics, artists, authors, musicians, and the like who were associated with Cumhuriyet in one way or another. Cumhuriyet was established in 1924 by Yunus Nadi, who was a supporter of Atatürk and featured and interviewed him in the first issue of the newspaper. As such, Cumhuriyet was closely affiliated with CHP and later SHP, and it was the biggest newspaper that represented the left on the mainstream. The permanent authors in Cumhuriyet were influential in themselves, as most of the columnists and critics were a selected crowd that had large amounts of followers both in the networks and the general public. This group included important political columnists like Uğur Mumcu and Ali Sirmen, film and music critics like Attila Dorsay and Filiz Ali, poets and writers like Mehmed Kemal and Oktay Akbal.

Moreover, Turkish intellectuals generally leaned towards the left (Çiğdem, 2009), and Cumhuriyet's political identity and the ideology it represented, that is, the ideology of CHP, which was "center-left" or "democratic left" (CHP, 2018, p. 9), led other public intellectuals to gather around Cumhuriyet too. They wrote letters, appeared as guest writers, interviewees, or even interviewers, and their work was often quoted and reviewed by permanent columnists. This group included famous

literary writers and poets like Refik Durbaş, Muzaffer İzgü, and Buket Uzuner, politicians like Mehmet Ali Aybar, musicians like Zülfü Livaneli and Timur Selçuk, and music critics like Cem Behar and Faruk Güvenç.

One distinguishing feature of these public intellectuals was their ability to vocalize their opinions and their access to various media outlets. Additionally, their expertise, whether it was in art, journalism, or music, made others take them seriously and adopt their opinions. Some of them were even considered celebrities and had a sizable number of followers and fans. As a result, public intellectuals had "authority over cultural theory" in that their thoughts and claims dominated or hijacked the discourse (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 54; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Özbek, 1991; Özgür, 2006).

Another important attribute of public intellectuals was that they saw themselves as a continuation of the intellectuals who were sent abroad by Atatürk in the 1920s and 1930s. Though they were not selected and trained by the government for a special purpose, they believed that they, as a privileged group who had access to education, culture, and travel, had a duty to the public and created a similar pressure for themselves by establishing certain norms around intellectuality. These norms demanded intellectuals, which they defined loosely as individuals who read, think, and question, and those who were gifted in some way, to educate the public and show them the "right way." Intellectuals expected other intellectuals to include didactical or critical elements in their work to encourage society to think and learn and criticized those who did not do so. There were even groups of musicians who emigrated to Europe on their own and came back to transfer their knowledge to the masses, such as Okay Temiz and Barış Manço.

Overall, public intellectuals converged in their ideology and prosocial motives, however, they constituted a large group that differed in certain aspects. Following Suddaby et al.'s (2017) suggestion of attending heterogeneity within seemingly homogeneous groups, public intellectuals were further categorized into five sub-communities, which are summarized in Table 4.1 and discussed below.

Nostalgic intellectuals: This subgroup of intellectuals primarily consisted of columnists who were older and witnessed the Atatürk era in person. They usually grew up in bigger cities in Turkey and were able to observe the creation of the modern Turkish Republic. As a result, they were close adherents of Kemalism and were especially sensitive toward breaches of secularism. This group of intellectuals included journalists and writers like Müşerref Hekimoğlu, Melih Cevdet Anday, Oktay Ekinci, Burhan Arpad, and Oktay Akbal.

Table 4.1 Types of Public Intellectuals

Type	Foci of the Texts	Arabesk Music Knowledge	Exemplary Intellectuals
Nostalgic Intellectuals	Change, urban city scapes, aesthetic and beauty, secularism	Lacking	Müşerref Hekimoğlu, Oktay Akbal, Oktay Ekinci, Burhan Arpad
Reflective Intellectuals	Various political ideologies, ANAP, Özal	Lacking to sufficient	İlhan Selçuk, Ali Sirmen, Uğur Mumcu, Cüneyt Arcayürek
Industry Intellectuals	Future of Turkish music, polyphonization, fusions	Advanced	Zülfü Livaneli, Mahmut T. Öngören, Atilla Dorsay, Cumhur Canbazoğlu, Burak Eldem
Street Intellectuals	Public in-vivo	Lacking to advanced	Refik Durbaş, Atilla İlhan, Can Yücel, Salah Birsel
Intellectual Wannabes	Opinions of political idols or popular intellectuals	Lacking to advanced	Anonymous groups

As their name suggests, nostalgic intellectuals often wrote about the past; they idealized and idolized the lifestyle before the 1950s, that is before the multi-party regime and immigration, and criticized and complained about the changes that were brought by the internal migrants. They were also Western classical music enthusiasts and often shamed those who did not listen to or appreciate this music. They were generally unfamiliar with any form of Turkish music and did not like alaturka. They also despised arabesk and designated it as the worst of the worst, though some of them had a very shallow understanding of it.

Another characteristic of this group was that they were somehow detached from reality in that they were not able to empathize with the lower classes and were unaware of their privileges. Consequently, other intellectuals sometimes criticized them.

Reflective intellectuals: This group predominantly consisted of columnists who were interested in politics and usually wrote about daily political events, and included important names like Ali Sirmen, Uğur Mumcu, İlhan Selçuk, and Cüneyt Arcayürek. These columnists usually had degrees in law, economics, political science, or journalism and were interested in arabesk only through its effect on society and its relation to politics. They did not like arabesk because of its association with ANAP and because they found arabesk artists exploitative (see Chapter 5).

Reflective intellectuals differed from the others in their contemplative capacity and high awareness of the discourse. They were able to look at the issues from multiple perspectives and tried to be open-minded. As a result, they were more in tune with the lower classes. Additionally, they openly identified themselves as social

democrats, socialists, or even Marxists and, therefore, were bothered by attacking the poor. Thus, their criticism towards arabesk was usually through attacking ANAP and its supporters. They were bolder, had specific, satirical, and sometimes aggressive language, and were not afraid to directly call out people.

Industry intellectuals: This group consisted of well-educated and/or respected musicians, musicologists, and music and film critics such as Cumhur Canbazoğlu, Selmi Andak, Filiz Ali, Evin İlyasoğlu, Zülfü Livaneli, Sezen Cumhur Önal, Timur Selçuk, and Selda Bağcan. Industry intellectuals differed from others in their knowledge of music compared to the others. The common goal of these intellectuals was to polyphonize Turkish music by creating a synthesis of authentic, local genres and Western standards, though they differed in the specific methods they offered. They generally did not like arabesk and found it technically inferior; however, they also appreciated the skills of certain arabesk artists, some of them even saw them as colleagues; therefore, they were more tolerant in their claims. They also approached the issue of arabesk more holistically; in their evaluations, they usually considered arabesk in its broader context and took the related social and historical elements into account.

Street intellectuals: This group of intellectuals were literary writers, poets, and artists and usually appeared in Cumhuriyet as guest writers. They vehemently denied being intellectuals and sometimes even dissed the others. Still, though, they were liked and accepted by other public intellectuals. Poets and authors like Can Yücel, Attila İlhan, Salah Birsel, and Refik Durbaş belonged to this group.

What differentiated street intellectuals was the subject of their work and the specific, vulgar language they used. They often wrote about the "average Joe" and liked to depict themselves as "one of the people" as well. Because of this, they were also more tolerant towards arabesk and had generally approached it impartially. Their ideology was closer to communism, and they rejected the idealization of the West. Some of the arabesk artists like Ahmet Kaya and even the 1970's Orhan Gencebay can be seen as members of this group as well.

Intellectual wannabes: This final group of intellectuals emerged in the early 1990s, although their status as "intellectual" was a bit shaky. Other public intellectuals and humor journalists criticized them for being ingenuine and faking an "intellectual" image by mimicking the habits of real "intellectuals" based on their distorted perception. As a result, intellectual wannabes can be interpreted more like "bourgeois bohemia" or "hipsters." Further, their emergence actually hurt the prestige of public intellectuals. Their stance against arabesk is unknown; however, others accused them of loving arabesk but hiding it because it did not fit the image

they were trying to portray.

As it goes for any typology, the distinctions between these groups of public intellectuals were not sharp in reality, and there were overlaps between different profiles. For example, reflective intellectuals like Ali Sirmen and İlhan Selçuk also used street lingo and vulgar references, or some of the nostalgic intellectuals had high musical training and were involved in the music industry as well.

Nonetheless, from here on, the term "intellectual" is used to refer to public intellectuals in general, and the five types are utilized when one of the groups was more salient in defending a certain evaluation.

4.2.2 Slum Residents and Lower Classes

One of the most, if not the most, significant social events in the context of this study was the internal mass migration that began in the 1950s and continued until the 1990s. This long-term event changed the demographic structure and cityscapes of metropolitan areas fundamentally and led to numerous long-term issues (Tunalı, 2000; İçduygu, Sirkeci & Aydıngün, 1998).

Before the 1950s, rural-to-urban migration existed; however, it was limited to individuals who came to bigger cities for military service and then did not leave and worked as doormen or janitors. In the 1950s, with the acceleration of mechanization in agriculture, economic problems in rural areas started pushing the rural population to move to cities in large groups (İçduygu et al., 1998). At the same time, the cities lacked housing options and infrastructure, so when these groups arrived in the city, they began to build makeshift houses on whatever land they could find. Consequently, in a span of 20 years, large slums or shanty towns were built, mostly on the outskirts of cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. By the end of the 1970s, slums hosted 30-60 percent of the metropolitan population, and problems like culture clash, prejudice, infrastructural deficiencies, poverty, and income gap were becoming more severe (Keleş, 1978; Özbek, 1991). The original urbanites were bothered by the immigrants and were under stress because of the rapid changes they brought about (see Chapter 5). They usually expressed that the immigrants repulsed them, but at the same time, they felt bad for them, too. The clash between the urbanites and the immigrants was also ideological because it entailed the Eastern, religious, traditional, and uncultured rurals entering the space of the Western, secular, modern, and educated urban population in a way that made the underlying political frag-

mentation manifest. In a survey conducted by Cumhuriyet, an urbanite expressed the following about immigrants, which was reflective of the general sentiment among urbanites throughout the study:

> "We have no communication with them. It looks like we don't have the right to live in the city anymore. Initially, their colorful personalities, their primitiveness, and their folklore seemed cute to me. But that has changed. A crowd of women wearing hijabs and men with mustaches took over. I don't look at their faces; I don't even see them. I don't feel love or hostility towards them. I know that they came here because they had to." (Anonymous, Cumhuriyet, 1992)

Beyond the social and demographic changes, internal migrants are important for this study because slum residents were perceived as the main fanbase of arabesk. Though there is no concrete evidence backing this claim, intellectuals and the "others" associated arabesk music and slums to the point that some intellectuals believed arabesk would not exist if it was not for immigration (see Chapter 5).

Moreover, over time, slum residents came to represent all lower classes, as the rural poor and the non-immigrant poor in the cities were all jumbled together under the stereotypes attributed to the average slum dweller. These stereotypes included working in manual jobs, being traditional, religious, and orientated towards right-wing policies, being uneducated, being sexually oppressed, and not understanding aesthetics and culture. Together, the lower classes actually made up the majority of Turkish society, therefore, often referred to as "the public," "the people," or "the masses." Overall, the slum residents and lower classes were the "phantom acceptors" of arabesk (Goffman, 1963), in that they did not participate in the discourse, likely because they did not have the means to. However, their presence and support were essential for arabesk's survival.

4.2.3 The Drivers

Before arabesk was associated with slum residents, it was first connected to drivers of minibuses (minibüs in Turkish) and minivans (dolmuş in Turkish). These forms of transportation initially emerged in Turkey after the economic crises of the 1920s and are classified as "paratransit," which refers to demand-based and self-organized

forms of collective transportation that lay somewhere between taxis and conventional forms of public transportation like buses or trains (Tekeli & Okyay, 2020).

The prominence of minibuses and minivans sharply increased after the 1950s, when the immigration wave led to a huge demand for public transportation (Tekeli & Okyay, 2020). As mentioned earlier, Turkish cities did not have the necessary infrastructure or services to host thousands of immigrants arriving daily. The municipality owned buses were not able to satisfy the increasing demand for transportation, and as a result, minibuses and minivans entered the scene to fill this demand. After the 1950s, these vehicles became a central part of urban life.

Minibuses and minivans usually had 6-18 seats, with the latter being smaller than the former, though they usually worked overcapacity. They moved on a more or less stable route between two final stops like the regular buses. However, unlike the other buses, they did not follow a strict timetable. Instead, the vehicles queued at the final stops and took off when they were full (hence the name dolmuş, which means "full" or "filled" in Turkish) or after waiting for some time. Similar to taxis, the passengers could stop the vehicle and get on or off pretty much wherever they wanted.

Beyond technical attributes, minibuses and minivans were infamous for their eccentric drivers. During the 1960s and 1970s, there were certain laws on the purchasing and operations of minibus and minivan lines, but these vehicles were essentially privately owned businesses and therefore were not under any strict daily regulations by the government (Tekeli & Okyay, 2020). Consequently, they operated in an informal fashion where the rules were established by the drivers, and the passengers pretty much had to follow whatever the driver preferred to do. Besides, the vehicles were perceived as the personal spaces of drivers, and in this context, though they were paying customers, the passengers were treated as intruders. It was often reported that drivers were rude to the passengers, did not stop when they were told to, and even yelled at the passengers for simple things like not having change.

Drivers also used their vehicles as a space for self-expression and decorated them with a clatter of pictures, posters, beads, tassels, velvet pillows, and street-smart and religious quotes, which were later joined by lyrics of Gencebay's songs. "Other" evaluators often saw these decorations as gaudy and tacky and ridiculed them. They also felt the same way about the music being played on minibuses. Before arabesk, the drivers reportedly played cheap, commercial alaturka (see below, also Chapter 5), which was criticized by the intellectuals as bad music. Subsequently, when arabesk became popular among the drivers, the negative stereotypes linked to the drivers transferred to arabesk as well.

Though the minibus and minivan drivers were the most salient reference, similar rude behavior and aesthetic choices were prevalent among other drivers, including taxi drivers and later drivers of long-haul trucks and inter-city buses. Overall, minibuses, minivans, taxis, and intercity buses represented common spheres where intellectuals and arabesk fans came together, and evaluators who did not voluntarily listen to arabesk were exposed to the genre. Many articles in focal data came from intellectuals who used these vehicles, heard arabesk, and felt the need to say something about it. Drivers were also important because, unlike the silent slum residents, they were vocal and expressed their opinions. They did not directly participate in the discourse, but they interacted and debated with the journalists, who then wrote about their conversations.

4.2.4 The "Others"

This rather anonymous group essentially includes everyone outside of arabesk fans and intellectuals. A sizable group was urban middle classes who did not like arabesk but did not have as many opportunities to enter and influence the debates. Nonetheless, they entered the discourse through letters, reports on panels, surveys, and through sections like "From the Readers" or "From the Eyes of the Audience." They rarely generated original ideas and usually repeated what the influential intellectuals were saying. However, this group was accused of being "silent supporters" in that although they publicly dissed arabesk, they listened to it in private. In the 1990s and 2000s, there were also confessions from this group saying that they liked at least some arabesk songs but did not share this with other people out of embarrassment (Özbek, 1991).

4.3 Music and Entertainment

Arabesk's development and the judgments directed toward the genre were strongly influenced by the state of the music and entertainment industries during the period of the study. Specifically, the entertainment sector had changed fundamentally with TRT's establishment in 1964 and the subsequent start of TV broadcasts in 1968. Another important transition in the entertainment industry was the creation of the

music producer cluster in Unkapanı in the late 1960s.

Additionally, arabesk music emerged during a transformative phase where Turkish music was going through significant changes (Güngör, 1993). The 1960s to 1970s represented a period where musicians spent great effort to polyphonize traditional Turkish forms by synthesizing them with Western styles and instruments. Further, the period from the 1960s to the 1990s represented an era when Turkish music gradually separated from its local and traditional roots and became aligned with Western or "universal" pop music (Kozanoğlu, 1992).

The developments through the mid-1970s to 1990s are discussed in Chapter 5, along with arabesk music's development. The following section introduces the genres that were in the music scene when Gencebay released the first songs that were later labeled as arabesk. The subsequent sections briefly describe Unkapanı and TRT in their relation to arabesk music.

4.3.1 Turkish Music Scene Before Arabesk

The preoccupation with learning Western classical music and spreading it in Anatolia in the 1920s and 1930s gave way to the efforts to modernizing Anatolian music and to polyphonizing traditional Turkish music forms in the 1940s to 1960s. During the 1960s, the phrase "Turkish music" referred to four different genres. Below, these genres are summarized.

Classical Turkish Art Music (CTAM): Also called classical Turkish music or neoclassical Turkish music, CTAM was a continuation of classical Ottoman aristocratic music or Ottoman palace music. It is generally described as a synthesis of Turkic, Byzantine, Persian, and Arabic styles and its roots are followed back to the 10th century (Feldman, 1996; Tekelioğlu, 1996). CTAM reached its peak in the 15th to 17th centuries when it became popular among the elite Istanbulites and in Sufi and other Islamic monasteries. As opposed to being polyphonic and tonal like Western classical music, CTAM was monophonic and modal. This meant that in addition to the limit of playing only one note at a given interval, CTAM had a limited number of chords as well (Tanrıkorur, 2003).

Nonetheless, CTAM was still a very complex and technical genre, as it had over 600 modes, known as makam in Turkish, referring to systems or rules that dictated how and when to combine notes and intervals (Feldman, 1996; Tanrıkorur, 2003). In addition, CTAM used various instruments from different cultures, including oud,

kanun, tanbur, ney, kemenche, def, and violin (Feldman, 1996). The distinguishing sonic features of CTAM were being solemn, slow, and calm.

CTAM, in its original form, became standardized and close to innovation in the 17th to 18th centuries and the genre started to decline (Berker, 1985). In the 19th century, CTAM went through a revival phase with the emergence of prominent artists such as Dede Efendi and Hacı Arif Bey, a period now labeled "neoclassical Turkish music." However, by the 1940s, very few people practiced CTAM; the last prominent CTAM artist was Münir Nurettin Selçuk, and his death in 1981 pretty much marked the end of this genre. The following quote reflected the general sentiment of the intellectuals towards CTAM in that they did not dislike it, but they believed it was historical and needed to be wrapped up:

"Our historical Turkish music is a value that we all respect. [However] it has run its course. We are not against it. But we now have the duty of discussing and solving the shortcomings and errors in the implementation of an official education program established with the principles of the Republic's..." (Fethi Kopuz, Cumhuriyet, 1984)

Turkish Art Music (TAM) and Alaturka: Starting in the 1930s, a new, more dynamic, and "popular" version of CTAM emerged and took the names of Turkish Art Music (TAM; Türk Sanat Müziği in Turkish) or alaturka (based on the Italian phrase "a la Turca," translated as "Turkish style" or "of Turkish"). TAM was based on one of the forms of CTAM called "şarkı" and was enriched by adding a variety of instruments and interpretation styles to make the solemn and slow songs more upbeat and performable (Tekelioğlu, 1996). The creators and developers of this genre broke the strict rules of CTAM and followed a practice called "free execution" (serbest icra in Turkish) that allowed them to interpret CTAM songs in innovative ways (Tekelioğlu, 1996).

The reaction TAM received was complicated. Initially, there were singers like Müzeyyen Senar and Safiye Ayla, that were deemed talented singers and praised by Atatürk, who reportedly liked this genre but consumed it in private to not set a bad example for the public (Güngör, 1993). Nonetheless, TAM went through certain changes with the emergence of Zeki Müren and casino culture and the attitude towards TAM began to differ.

Casinos, referred to as "gazino" in Turkish, were establishments where people dined and enjoyed drinks while a, typically, TAM or alaturka singer performed on stage,

often accompanied by an orchestra. Casinos first emerged in the 1930s but gained popularity after World War II, especially among the provincial rich. Intellectuals held a negative view of this group and thought that they were gaudy and tasteless, and this judgment later spread to casinos as well.

An important figure associated with TAM and casinos was Zeki Müren (see Table 3.2). Müren was not only an exceptional singer but also brought a variety of innovations to casino performances, like the T-shape stage and orchestras dressed in uniforms. In addition, Müren was a cross-dresser who often wore excessive makeup, skirts, sequins, and fur on stage. Another prominent TAM artist, Bülent Ersoy, also came out as transgender in 1980, but before that, Ersoy was known for his feminine antics as well. Intellectuals did not really support sexual minorities back then and the popularity of Müren and Ersoy exacerbated their dislike of TAM and casino culture.

Moreover, TAM was associated with another type of lounge called pavilions (pavyon in Turkish) which were basically hostess clubs where female employees sat down with and entertained the customers. Low-profile TAM, and later arabesk, singers performed at these pavilions, adding to the negative reputation of both genres.

A related term that came up in the discourse and related to the casino and pavilion culture was "göbek atmak" which could be roughly translated to English as belly dancing. However, this phrase generally referred to an amalgamation of local dances like "Ankara Oyun Havası," "Roman Havası," and "Çiftetelli" and was generally associated with the rural populations. "Göbek atmak" was also despised by intellectuals, who often heavily criticized the men who lost control after getting drunk and began to belly dance in the casinos.

Though casinos were mostly frequented by the affluent, they also had an outlier section with cheaper tickets, which allowed middle and lower-class audiences to listen to the artists once in a while (see Chapter 5). Later in the 1980s, some journalists began to use the word casino to refer to any type of restaurant and cafe that had a stage and offered live music as well. Pavilions were typically associated with macho or mafia-fied rural immigrants and older debauchees.

In this context, TAM or alaturka came to receive different reactions. In one interpretation, intellectuals classified TAM as a respectable adaptation and continuation of CTAM and associated the word "alaturka" with the casino culture and saw it as a deformed version of TAM.

Others used TAM and alaturka as synonyms and perceived them as legitimate genres within Turkish music. Yet others, like nostalgic and reflective intellectuals, associ-

ated both terms with casinos and pavilions and had a negative view of them both. Overall, these terms meant more or less the same thing musically; however, in the focal data, alaturka had a somewhat more negative connotation compared to TAM.

As a last note about TAM, the "free execution" trend and the pressures for polyphony led to certain artists like Saadettin Kaynak to create mixed versions of TAM that were not well received. TRT also created something called "Light Turkish Art Music," which was supposed to be an amalgamation of pop and TAM and angered the critics for ruining Turkish music. Gencebay was also among these artists who experimented with TAM.

Turkish Folk Music (TFM): Turkish Folk Music (TFM; Türk Halk Müziği in Turkish) is a comprehensive term used for the authentic folk music of the Turkish masses. TFM songs, also commonly known as "türkü," encompass diverse styles of Turkish music, often characterized by the incorporation of indigenous instruments, regional dialects, and local themes (Güngör, 1993). However, the single most important instrument of TFM is "bağlama," (also called "saz"), a string instrument translated to English as "long-necked lute" (de Zeeuw, 2020). Like CTAM, TFM was also monophonic.

Historically, while the Ottoman elites listened to CTAM, TFM belonged to the rural and the province, but the rural here was "pure" and appreciated. Intellectuals believed that TFM was an integral and authentic part of Turkish culture and separated it from the Ottomans. Consequently, although most urbanites, including the intellectuals, did not traditionally listen to this music, they respected it and held it in higher regard than TAM.

Starting in the 1960s, industry intellectuals were interested in creating a fusion of TFM and Western music. They believed that this fusion represented a more appropriate way of advancing Turkish music than imposing Western classical music or imitating European pop songs. A notable example of this endeavor was the emergence of a genre known as "Anatolian rock," which synthesized elements of rock music with TFM and gained popularity among student protesters in the 1960s. In addition, two prominent musicians, Ruhi Su and Zülfü Livaneli, both of whom can be considered industry intellectuals themselves, had the mission of spreading TFM among the urban populations and made an effort to select and arrange TFM songs that could be more enjoyable for them. They were successful in their efforts because even the nostalgic intellectuals who despised Turkish music, in general, appreciated and valued their music.

Turkish Pop: The emergence of Turkish pop or "Turkish Light Music" (Türk Hafif

Müziği in Turkish) is traced to a group of "arrangers" who took European pop "hits" and wrote Turkish lyrics on them. This specific type of pop became popular in the early-to-mid 1960s and was called "aranjman." The most prominent artist of this genre was Sezen Cumhur Önal who gave quite a few interviews to Cumhuriyet. In this interviews, Önal stated that his intention was to familiarize the Turkish singers and the public with authentic, "real" pop, with the final aim of motivating Turkish composers to make original pop songs. Still, Önal was heavily criticized by other musicians for being a copycat. In the early 1970s, Turkish pop took a different turn as more sophisticated pop musicians like Modern Folk Üçlüsü, Ajda Pekkan, Özdemir Erdoğan, and Bora Ayanoğlu replaced the arrangers. Nonetheless, throughout the period of the study, pop music received varying reactions from intellectuals. While some evaluators appreciated it, others judged it negatively for being commercially driven and shallow.

4.3.2 Unkapanı

Unkapanı was actually the name of a neighborhood in Istanbul where an organized bazaar for cloth merchants called Istanbul Drapers' Bazaar (İstanbul Manifaturacılar Çarşısı in Turkish, also known as İMÇ) was located. The building of this bazaar also hosted a cluster of music producers and cassette shops. Eventually, the name "Unkapanı" came to be associated with music producers and turned into a Mecca for those who wanted to be famous. Most of the producers in Unkapanı made arabesk music and contributed to its development, and even some arabesk artists established their own companies there. However, Unkapanı insiders, that is, the producers, lyricists, composers, and company owners that resided in Unkapanı, had a strictly business attitude and avoided making value judgments, even when journalists visited them and asked questions. The owners of recording companies were known for being vile against the kind of music they thought would not sell and turned down "alternative" artists immediately. In the 1980s, Unkapanı became associated with arabesk because the producers pushed artists to sing arabesk songs even if they did not want to, as the insiders believed the other genres did not sell as easily and required promotion.

4.3.3 TRT and Music

After transferring the state-owned radio stations back and forth between various governmental agencies through the 1930s to 1960s, the government established TRT in 1964 as an autonomous media company and a permanent home for these radio stations. TRT also had the duty of establishing a TV channel and started its TV broadcasts in 1968 through "TV 1" and established a second channel, TV 2, in 1986. While TV 1 was for the masses, TV 2 was dedicated to art and culture and targeted the elite. Until 1990, TRT was the monopoly owner of TV broadcasting in Turkey. TRT internalized the statism principle and was highly dedicated to the mission of educating the public and guiding them in the right direction. Though they had a shared mission, intellectuals saw TRT as an extension of the government and criticized it harshly when a government they did not support led the parliament.

4.3.3.1 TRT's Categorization of Music

During the 1960s' TRT had four relatively stable music categories in its repertoire. These were Western music, CTAM/TAM, TFM, and Turkish pop.

When TRT was established in 1964, it had both TAM and TFM songs in its radio schedule, albeit it was reported that TRT aired TFM only after cutting or replacing local dialects and instruments and any suggestive or political lyrics. The Western music category mainly included European classical music, American and European pop (especially French and Italian), and jazz. This collection of genres was not only played on TRT's main station but also on "Radyo 3," a radio channel that was established in 1974 to solely play Western music. Compared to TAM and TFM, what was meant by Turkish pop was less clear. In the early 1970s, a TRT officer, Cavidan Selanik (see Table 3.2), classified Turkish pop as follows:

1. Original compositions that draw their material from Turkish Folk Music and Turkish Art Music,
2. Arrangements made from Turkish Folk Music and Turkish Art Music,
3. Adaptations made by applying Turkish lyrics to Western songs,
4. Light music pieces made with a Western influence,
5. Local performances of foreign compositions without alterations.
(Cavidan Selanik, Cumhuriyet, 1975).

According to the complaints from pop artists that appeared in focal data, TRT did not like it when musicians integrated local elements into pop music (2nd point above) and encouraged buying songs from Western artists and writing Turkish lyrics on them, i.e., making "aranjman" songs (3rd point above).

Further, the quadripartite categorization above was situated in a cultural hierarchy (Jensen, 2010) where Western forms occupied the top of the pyramid, followed by TAM and TFM. Turkish pop was an immature category, and its boundaries were blurry compared to the other three. This was because a large variety of songs, from Turkish versions of Western power ballads to guitarized versions of TFM, were categorized under this label. In this context, Western-influenced Turkish pop was between Western music and TAM/TFM, and those that tried to synthesize Turkish music and pop forms were put at the bottom. Arabesk could not even make it into this categorization, as TRT managers declared it a degenerate, unorthodox, and out-of-classification genre in the mid-1970s (see Chapter 5). Figure 4.1 summarizes this categorical hierarchy.

Figure 4.1 TRT's Classification

The hierarchy established by TRT was based on the belief that Turkish music, with its monophonic sounds, was inferior to Western music. TRT, like many of the intellectuals, pointed out authentic Western forms as the ultimate genres that should be followed to improve Turkish culture. Consequently, in the 1970s, TRT focused on airing classical Western music and as mentioned earlier, dedicated an entire radio station to this genre. Turkish musicians complained about this preferential treatment because Western music, even those with inappropriate lyrics, was aired without going through supervisory boards, while Turkish artists were being rejected for minor rule breaches.

4.3.3.2 TRT's Bans

From its early days, TRT imposed strict regulations on Turkish music by establishing separate "supervisory boards" for TAM, TFM, and Turkish pop. These boards meticulously evaluated whether songs submitted by creators were suitable for public broadcast. However, the auditing system was heavily criticized by pop artists and pop-folk singers who tried to fuse pop and traditional Turkish Music for making arbitrary and inconsistent decisions. When confronted by the journalists, though, TRT managers always provided long explanations on why a specific song might have been rejected while a similar other was accepted. For example, in an issue of Hey Magazine, one of the members of the Turkish Pop Music Supervisory Board said the following about their system:

> "We usually meet two days a week. In these meetings . . . the number of pieces we examine varies between 10 and 15. Because it is not just about listening and voting. We argue amongst ourselves everything to the bars of that piece, and then we vote ... If the song is rejected, it is sent back to the applicant with the reasons. . . As we expressed [in the statement we have sent to production firms], the essential elements in the rejection of a song are as follows:
>
> 1. Technical problems in execution:
> a. Soloist or ensemble's intonation and rhythm errors, ensemble errors
> b. Inappropriate, incomplete, or unbalanced intonation of the instrument ensemble
> 2. Bad recording
> 3. Lyrics are indecent

4. Prosody errors, rhythmic inconsistency of the word with the music

5. Singing Turkish with foreign accents

6. Multiple vocalizations in compositions that are against the rules of music and wrong (harmony)

7. Multiple vocalizations and rhythmic elements made with rules that are not suitable for the structure of Turkish Folk and Art Music (Quarter sounds are excluded)

8. Imitating folk music or pop music of foreign countries in local compositions

9. If the music, domestic or foreign, too bad, vulgar, or unaesthetic to be aired on radio." (Erol Pekcan, quoted in Hey Magazine, 1970)

However, other reports suggested that in certain situations, only one person made the decisions. In these cases, if the responsible personnel thought a song was okay to broadcast, it was directly broadcasted, but if they were in doubt and did not know if it was appropriate, the song was sent to the boards.

TRT was also criticized for causing delays by sending a song from one board to another and then to another under the premise that the song did not fit the categorization of that specific board.

In summary, during the time when Gencebay was getting the public's attention with his new songs, TRT exerted significant control over the music industry as the only television station and owner of three nation-wide radio channels.

5. FINDINGS

This chapter reviews the findings of the hermeneutical analysis described in Chapter 3. The findings are organized into five chronologically ordered phases. Each phase consists of three to four themes. First, Phase 1, "Emergence and Labeling," examines the early years of arabesk and the negotiations over meaning and appropriate labels for this new music genre. Next, Phase 2, "Rise and Vilification," explains arabesk's expansion and the subsequent attacks on the genre. Phase 3, "Semantic Expansion," discusses how arabesk became associated with specific lifestyles and political orientations rejected by the evaluators. Subsequently, Phase 4, "Refinement and Anticipated Decline," describes the processes of arabesk discourse retracting back to the domain of music and the gradual decline in its popularity. Finally, Phase 5, "Withdrawal," provides further insight into the fading influence of arabesk within popular culture and pop music replacing arabesk as the new villain.

5.1 Phase 1: Emergence and Labeling, 1968-1977

Despite the proliferation of debates and discussions within arabesk discourse, the genre's origin is unanimously attributed to Orhan Gencebay's work in the second half of the 1960s by scholars, insiders, and evaluators alike (Dönmez & İmik, 2020; Güngör, 1993; Özbek, 1991). The arabesk narrative begins with Gencebay producing a precedent of arabesk in 1966, called "Deryada Bir Salım Yok," performed by Ahmet Sezgin, an older TAM artist. Reportedly, after the listeners liked the song, Gencebay began to release similar songs in his own voice in 1968 (Güngör, 1993). However, the consensus in the arabesk discourse ends here, as the information about the title of the first-ever arabesk song is unclear. Books from the 1990s (Güngör, 1993; Özbek, 1991) named "Bir Teselli Ver" the first arabesk song. However, temporally closer sources in the data set titled "Başa Gelen Çekilir" as Gencebay's first arabesk

record and dated "Bir Teselli Ver" to the early 1970s (e.g., Ergönültaş, 1979). Based on available information, it looks like Gencebay first recorded "Bir Teselli Ver" in either 1968 or 1969, before "Başa Gelen Çekilir," but then he re-released it in 1970, and that was when the song became a hit. Nonetheless, between 1968 and 1977, Gencebay experienced a creative surge and released twenty-six singles and a mini album. Additionally, he appeared in nine movies and established his own record label in 1972.

Starting in 1974, other artists, primarily female TAM singers (e.g., Neşe and Gülden Karaböcek, Mine Koşan), began to come up in arabesk discussions. However, the discourse of the first phase generally revolved around Orhan Gencebay. Although Gencebay had been actively releasing music since the early 1960s and had been a professional bağlama player for over a decade, the evaluators became aware of him when his arabesk songs started to gain popularity. Initially, Orhan Gencebay's songs attracted the attention of intellectuals for several reasons.

First, the melody and lyrics were found to be pessimistic, sad, and melancholic. Second, Gencebay became disproportionately popular among minibus and minivan drivers (see Chapter 4). Third, TRT banned Gencebay's music immediately and showed no tolerance. Finally, his songs did not neatly fit into existing musical categories, prompting the evaluators to create new labels based on simple associations they observed in daily life. Each label had a "story" behind it and revealed a particular dimension of arabesk. As such, the themes of this phase are organized around these labels.

Four different labels emerged in the earlier years of arabesk, coinciding with the four themes in this phase. The first theme, "Minibus/Minivan Music," explores how the evaluators came to label Gencebay's music after minibuses and minivans and the deeper meanings behind these labels. The second theme, "Commercial Music," examines the higher-level categorization of arabesk with other genres that prioritize financial gain over social contribution. The third theme, "Arabesk as Arab Music," details the process of evaluators coining the term "arabesk" and the negative connotations this label brought to the genre. The final theme, "Degenerate Music," explains TRT's efforts to frame arabesk as a harmful music genre through prohibitions and manipulating the emerging discourse. Below, these labels are explained thoroughly.

5.1.1 Minibus/Minivan Music

In the early 1970s, Gencebay's music became strongly associated with minibus and minivan drivers. The first mention of this association appeared in 1970 when a pop singer referred to Gencebay's music as "drivers' songs." The labels "minibus music" and "minivan music" also began to circulate as early as 1971, and they were commonly used to describe Gencebay's music throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. This association helped pin down Gencebay's music but did not contribute positively to his image, as minibus and minivan drivers faced significant stigma. As explained in the previous chapter, during this and the following phases, the drivers were stereotyped as rude, vulgar, and tacky. The passengers who got along with the drivers were also seen as "of the same kind" and insulted. Therefore, intellectuals who had to use public transportation sought to distance themselves from the negative perception of minibuses and minivans. They established this distance by creating a "minibus culture narrative" and portraying themselves as outsiders to that culture, and in the 1970s, arabesk became a part of this narrative. In a letter to Cumhuriyet, a reader described his experience in a minivan as follows:

> QUOTE[Q]1: There are five people in the minivan. Based on his appearance, it is evident that the man sitting next to me, dressed in fancy fabrics, is from the rural... He also emits a strong cologne smell. Moreover, the heavy scent clashes with the smell of lahmacun coming from the mouth of the driver...creating chemical turmoil in the van. On the record, a knock-off Arab song resembling the sound of stepping on a decapitated turkey's throat is playing. As for the interior decor of the car: there are [extravagant] talismans, a portrait of driver Abidin in his circumcision outfit, and next to it, a photo of the [wrestling] World Champion, Bald Aliço. Beneath the rearview mirror is a sign that reads, "Mashallah, the lion of deserted roads." Suddenly, the driver hits the brakes, and the car slows down. As I try to understand what is happening, I realize we are going at the same speed as a beauty with a mini skirt walking on the curb... (Dr. İlhan Ünlüer, Cumhuriyet, 1974)

As such, the labels "minibus/minivan music" or "driver songs" were infused with negative connotations that were connected to a broader framework that made up the driver category with its drivers, passengers, decorations, and, ultimately, music. By reducing the fans of Gencebay's music to a notorious group, intellectuals will-

ingly or unwillingly undermined the genre and actively transferred the bias against the drivers onto arabesk. Consequently, the labels "minibus and minivan music" or "drivers' songs" were more than simple associations and had derogatory connotations.

Understandably, Orhan Gencebay rejected this association and attempted to disassociate his music from the drivers. He initially aimed to dismiss the stereotypes surrounding minibus drivers by presenting a contradictory narrative where drivers were tough yet emotional, not significantly different from the average Turkish person. In his interview with Hey Magazine, he expressed the following:

> Q2: Your records, and this kind of music [in general], are primarily adopted among the drivers. This has caused your work to be called "Minibus Music." Is there anything you want to say about this?
> − Of course, I don't quite understand this either. However, we usually like sad things as a nation. Almost all of us have a sad love adventure or have another problem. As a result, we quickly adopt sad songs. As for the drivers, most of them are adventurous and brave people. The thickness of my voice and the sadness in my songs may be another source. But I never want to appeal to a particular group. (Orhan Gencebay, interviewed by Erhan Akyıldız, Hey Magazine, 1971)

In the subsequent years, Gencebay consistently emphasized that his music was appreciated and purchased by all segments of society and claimed that his listeners were diverse. He argued that the association with the drivers occurred because they played his music openly for everyone to hear, while the others listened to it privately. In the following phases, another argument that was repeatedly used by Gencebay was comparing his album sales to the number of minibuses in Istanbul. In this particular argument, he claimed that his album sales were higher than the number of minibuses, so it was not only the drivers who were buying his records (See SQ1 in Appendix A).

In the mid-1980s, as the "arabesk" label spread, minibus/minivan music labels disappeared (see below). However, the association with the drivers persisted and expanded to include taxi drivers and the drivers of long-haul vehicles like trucks and intercity buses. This expansion was partly due to the cassette format replacing vinyl, as cassettes and cassette players were significantly cheaper than vinyl records and portable gramophones. Arabesk later became an unpleasant yet taken-for-granted part of intercity bus journeys, often frequented by intellectuals on their way to sum-

mer vacations. It was reported that some intercity bus companies had to prohibit arabesk music because of customer complaints. Intellectuals frequently discussed incidents where they or other passengers argued with the driver because arabesk cassettes were being played on a loop for long hours (see SQ2 and SQ3 in Appendix A).

Moreover, there were two reported attempts to ban cassette players in minibuses, one in the 1980s and another in the 1990s. One of these attempts was suggested by the Minibus Drivers' Association themselves to revoke the negative impression associated with the drivers. Nonetheless, these attempts were not successful, and drivers continued to listen to arabesk throughout the period covered by this study.

5.1.2 Commercial Music

Another commonly used label for Gencebay's music in the 1970s was "commercial music" (piyasa müziği or ticari müzik in Turkish). This label was broader than the minibus/minivan label in that it was not specific to arabesk but instead included a variety of music and film genres considered cheap and low quality. Moreover, the commercial music label was part of a dichotomous categorization system where "commercial" was directly contrasted with what could be called "social music" or, more generally, "social culture," i.e., cultural products that aspired to contribute to the development of Turkish society.

Specifically, this dichotomy stemmed from the cultural policies of the young Turkish Republic of the 1930s, where educated individuals and artists were assigned the duty of disseminating their knowledge throughout the country to increase the cultural level of the society (see Chapter 4). In this context, the term "commercial" was used for cultural products that were created for financial gain and, therefore, made easily consumable and marketed to the masses. In contrast, "social culture" was produced with the intention of making a contribution to society. This contribution could involve spreading "high culture" like Western classical music, adapting TAM and TFM to Western musical standards, representing Turkey in international festivals and competitions, educating the public and enhancing their taste, highlighting societal issues and raising awareness, or preserving authentic Turkish culture. The socially oriented artists were similar to the "starving artist" stereotype in that they prioritized their art and did not make any compromises for money. As such, they were considered morally "better" than the commercial artists who did not abide by the norm of advancing society (see SQ4 in Appendix A).

Like the minibus/minivan label, the commercial label was also negatively loaded. Intellectuals and TRT considered commercial genres as harmful because not only did they not offer anything substantial to the public other than mindless entertainment, but they also diverted attention from more meaningful forms of art.

In the music industry, the commercial label encompassed Gencebay's music and various others, such as aranjman, low-quality adaptations of TFM and TAM, and Turkish pop. Still, Gencebay's music was pointed out as the lowest of the low. For example, Melih Cevdet Anday, a famous author, literary critic, and Western classical music enthusiast, wrote the following in his column on TAM and alaturka:

> Q3: What I'm trying to say, in the sphere of alaturka, there is the old music which they [now] call classical Turkish music, and there is another kind called commercial. You know, [the one] they sing in expensive casinos. I'd say most of our people love that music, but that won't be true. Most of our people love a much inferior style that reduces their intelligence. They mostly play these in minivans. (Melih Cevdet Anday, Cumhuriyet, 1976)

Nonetheless, despite the criticisms, Gencebay did not refuse the accusations of commerciality. Instead, he stated that "these attempts," i.e., arabesk songs, were just a side hustle to earn money, and he had bigger plans for later. In his 1971 interview with Hey Magazine, he admitted that the music he was doing was for the mass market and did not have much value as "art":

> Q4: Could you tell us the reason why you turned to this kind of work? Why this kind of work and not folklore, not Turkish Art Music?
> — Billions of people around the world have different opinions. But feelings are universal. I started this business from the bottom; I have been making music for exactly 17 years. I tried all kinds of music, and during this time, I was able to understand the people. The whole problem is to understand the psychology of the public. Once you grasp it, the rest happens by itself. Today, unfortunately, the works that we call "works of art" cannot go beyond being on the shelves. In fact, what I'm doing now is the reflection of peripheral emotions; I'll do what I really want to do later. This will be pure Turkish folklore. (Orhan Gencebay, interviewed by Erhan Akyıldız, Hey Magazine, 1971)

However, the association of arabesk with the general commercial label bothered Turkish pop artists because they did not want to be categorized with minivan musicians whom they considered inferior. Therefore, in the early 1970s, pop singers and pop advocates made efforts to distance themselves from the overall "commercial" category, particularly from minibus/minivan music. To accomplish this, pop artists and their supporters created a narrative where pop music was the "good commercial" and arabesk was the "bad commercial." In this narrative, they argued that Western classical music was actually the ultimate genre, but the Turkish public was not ready yet because their ears were not exposed to polyphony enough. Thus, pop music was responsible for acclimating the public, especially the youth, to simpler forms of polyphony. Consequently, pop provided a first step for the listeners to develop the necessary familiarity with Western styles to appreciate the more advanced forms of music. To further their argument, they also emphasized their willingness to educate the public. After interviewing the pop singer Bora Ayanoğlu, a music critic made the following commentary:

> Q5: "Music," says [Bora] Ayanoğlu, "is not used educationally only in [our country] ... The public embraces whatever you give to them. I don't have any pretensions ... The important thing is to work towards doing something good ... To do something while keeping our community in mind ... I want to bring the issues of certain segments to the surface through music."... In our opinion, Bora Ayanoğlu is one of the positive voices in the domain of Western pop music, which, although foreign to us, inevitably managed to find acceptance amidst the cacophony that is screaming and shouting from radios and minivan gramophones . . . (Turhan Ilgaz, Cumhuriyet, 1970)

These attempts to distance pop music from arabesk were largely successful. In May of 1978, Cumhuriyet reported that the Ministry of Culture and TRT were devising strategies to use pop music to divert artists away from "minibus music" (see SQ5 in Appendix A).

Beyond the domain of music, arabesk was a part of the commercial film category. Alongside Gencebay's films, this grouping included cheap comedies, low-budget action movies, and erotic films, which were seen as "epidemics" that hurt the quality of Turkish cinema. However, in the first phase, the reaction of the film critics to Gencebay was not as adverse as the musicians and social commentators quoted above. In fact, the first "support" for arabesk came from movie critics. Although intellectuals

in the film industry used the same "social versus commercial" categorization system to assess the value of movies, their evaluation process was more nuanced compared to intellectuals in the music industry. This difference was due to the former groups' explicit recognition of the "commercial but well-made films," which referred to mass market-oriented movies that realistically depicted social conditions, offered some social commentary, and had adequate direction and script. Additionally, in earlier years, some of the Gencebay movies were directed by acclaimed and "socially oriented" directors such as Lütfi Ömer Akad and Şerif Gören, which led to supportive comments from the film critics. For example, in his earlier reviews, Attila Dorsay (see Table 3.2), one of Turkey's first and most important film critics, underlined the potential of Gencebay's films and music to contribute to the public and the development of Turkish cinema. For instance, in his review of Gencebay's movie "Batsın Bu Dünya" ("Damn This World," 1975), he said the following:

> Q6: It's not right to dismiss "Batsın Bu Dünya" as a "typical Orhan Gencebay movie"... for one, each Gencebay film has certain orientations according to its director ... Besides, it is neither correct nor consistent to belittle Gencebay's "arabesk" music or films (or films of this genre in general) ... On the contrary, it is necessary to consider and examine the extent to which this type of art (with its music and cinema) is embraced by the public and to understand what resonates with the people ... It is an interesting film not only from this perspective but also in terms of offering insights into public taste and sensitivity, which are not adequately acknowledged, evaluated, or examined. Amidst the negative aspects (fatalism, resignation, melodrama, stereotypical characters, etc.) in "Batsın Bu Dünya," I also found interesting and impactful elements. I believe we need to engage in the examination, not the defense, of this type of cinema and various widespread preferences in society. (Atilla Dorsay, Cumhuriyet, 1975)

Further, like Orhan Gencebay, directors of and the actors in arabesk movies were generally not phrased by the commercial music label and signaled that they were aware of the criticism but fine with being seen as low culture. The female leads that often appeared in arabesk movies overtly admitted that they were doing arabesk films for the money because they would starve otherwise (see SQ6 in Appendix A).

Overall, the commercial label was accepted in the arabesk community due to its label being useful for two reasons. First, arabeskers were categorized together a

broader group of others, allowing them to protest the attacks by blaming intellectuals for scapegoating arabesk and unfairly targeting them while accepting the others who did the same thing. Second, this provided a crack to shift the blame to the public. Participants of the arabesk category argued that, as pointed out by Gencebay previously (see Q4), the public did not consume "social culture" regardless, so at least through the commercial culture, they could earn the money to fund their "social" music and film projects in the future.

Like minibus/minivan music labels, the commercial music label fell out of fashion. However, for the rest of the study, the attributes transferred from the commercial category to arabesk, like being seen as cheap and detrimental to the public's development, not only continued to be a part of arabesk discourse but were also amplified in the subsequent phases.

5.1.3 Arabesk as Arab Music

The third and most significant label for Gencebay's music was "arabesk." Based on the results of keyword searches on various platforms (e.g., archives of Cumhuriyet and Milliyet, and nadirkitap, see Chapter 3), it is possible that "arabesk music" label was coined and entered the journalists' vocabulary around late 1971 or early 1972. Though no concrete evidence supports this, in Gencebay's interview in September 1971 with Hey Magazine, neither the interviewer nor Gencebay used the word arabesk, despite discussing Arab and Eastern influences on Gencebay's music in detail. As seen in Q2 and Q4 above, both the interviewer and Gencebay seemed unsure about what to call Gencebay's music, often referring to it as "this kind of music" or "this kind of work." The term "arabesk" also did not appear in Cumhuriyet or Milliyet to refer to Gencebay's music until 1972 and did not come up in magazines. The first time the search for "arabesk" brought something related to Gencebay's music was in an issue of Milliyet dated April 1972. Therefore, it is possible that the term was adopted to refer to Orhan Gencebay's music between September 1971 and April 1972.

An important note here is that during the 1960s, Orhan Gencebay released singles of TFM interpretations where he showed his bağlama skills and occasionally sang. One of his singles in 1968 was titled "Arabesk Oyun Havası-Trakya Karşılaması." However, this information did not come up in the reference books or the focal data, so it remains unclear whether it was relevant to the naming of the genre. In addition, the search for "arabesk oyun havası" did not provide any meaningful results, so why

he chose to title the song "arabesk" is unclear.

Nonetheless, the prevalent narrative surrounding the origin of the "arabesk" label, which emerged during this phase and is still used today, traced the association between Gencebay's music and Arab songs to the immense popularity of Egyptian films (e.g., Doumou' el Hub (Love's Tears), 1936) and later Indian films (e.g., Awaara (The Vagabond), 1951) in Turkey between 1930s and 1950s (see SQ7 in Appendix A). According to this narrative, the frenzy over Arab movies and their soundtracks led the government to ban songs with Arabic lyrics. In response, film importers commissioned TAM artists, like Saadettin Kaynak (b. 1895) and Hafız Burhan (b. 1897), to write Turkish lyrics for the soundtracks of the movies they bought. The films were also banned in the following years, which led the local productions of similar musical films to emerge. In the late 1950s, a group of artists, with Suat Sayın being the most prominent, continued the practice of writing Turkish lyrics on the soundtracks of Egyptian movies or releasing "original" songs that stylistically followed these soundtracks and started a new musical trend. These composers did not have a good reputation because some of their original songs were accused of being rip-offs. When Gencebay's songs gained fame in the late 1960s, some musicians found similarities between his songs and those of the alleged imitators and categorized him with them. Gencebay was highly displeased with this association and argued that the "arabesk" label fit with the imitators but not with his music, which, in his opinion, went beyond any single influence and represented experimental amalgamations of various genres. Throughout the study period, he continued to voice his dissatisfaction with "arabesk" and stated that it was sourced from the lack of musical knowledge of intellectuals.

Similar to the other two labels mentioned above, arabesk carried negative connotations and was used in a demeaning manner. However, unlike the other labels, this term actually stuck and gained additional meanings over the years.

A disclaimer should be made here that although discussions regarding the term arabesk had begun in the mid-1970s, the other labels were more popular during this period. Therefore, the majority of the debates over the meaning of arabesk took place in the early 1980s, when the arabesk label started to spread and was taking over other labels. Nonetheless, in the 1980s, even though the meaning of arabesk was still being negotiated, some intellectuals actively used this label. So, to convey the meaning of the discussions that occurred in the following phase properly, the debates surrounding the "arabesk" label are discussed in this phase.

The arabesk label had negative connotations for two reasons. One was related to the lack of originality, and the other was based on prejudices against Arab culture and

the East in general. In his 1971 interview with Hey Magazine, Gencebay mentioned both of these sources:

> Q7: Some people say that your work is imitated from Eastern music, especially Arabic music. What are your thoughts on this?
> − Look, this issue is very important. In our country, the works made under the influence of the West are not criticized, but those influenced by the East are condemned. This is only the case in our country. The famous British band the Beatles went to India to study Indian music and took the Sitar as an instrument. This was never met with backlash there. I personally love Arabic music; my music may have been influenced by it. But this is never an imitation. If anyone can bring an exact copy of my work, I promise in my honor that I will quit this profession. (Orhan Gencebay, interviewed by Erhan Akyıldız, Hey Magazine, 1971)

First, the discussions regarding imitation were predominantly initiated by Orhan Gencebay himself, who was particularly disturbed by being associated with imitators and vehemently dismissed this label at every opportunity. Even when "arabesk" became more or less synonymous with his music, and he occasionally used the label for convenience, he rejected the "arabesk" label. As emerging arabesk artists in the earlier phases largely followed Gencebay's footsteps, they joined him in denying the arabesk label when explicitly asked (see SQ8). This denial often prompted the interviewer to ask, "Then how do you label your music?" Gencebay typically responded to this question by emphasizing his experimental and innovative tendencies, his extensive musical knowledge, and his skills as a bağlama player and multi-instrumentalist. According to Gencebay's narrative, he was not satisfied with the current forms and rules of Turkish music and desired to create something new. In that regard, he followed his inspirations and explored various instruments, techniques, and sounds, and arabesk emerged as a result of these experimental attempts. Consequently, when inquired, he referred to his music as "free music" (özgür müzik in Turkish), "original/authentic music" (özgün müzik in Turkish), or "contemporary Turkish music" (çağdaş Türk müziği in Turkish). In an interview with Cumhuriyet in 1982, he said the following:

> Q8: It is said that you are the creator of arabesk music. How did you come up with the idea of making this kind of music?
> − First of all, I do not accept the term "arabesk." The music I make is

not arabesk. The main reason behind this name is certain friends who took Arabic music, adapted it into Turkish, and released it under this name in the market. I go beyond the classical Turkish forms and create my own music. The term "arabesk" is given to the music taken from Arabs... Now everything is recognized as arabesk. We may appear in the same category, but my work is not of that nature. I think the music I make should be called "free Turkish music."

− How does "free Turkish music" work?

− We have three fundamental types of music. Turkish Folk Music, Turkish Art Music, and oriental music, which cannot be easily categorized. My work incorporates elements from all three. I work freely and use all the possibilities of the technique. Turkish Art Music does not accept the guitar or piano. However, I have aimed to use not only our own instruments but also all the instruments available in the world. (Orhan Gencebay, interviewed by Yalçın Pekşen, Cumhuriyet, 1982)

Similarly, Ferdi Tayfur, arguably the second most prominent arabesk artist after Gencebay, said the following to Gong Magazine:

Q9: What is arabesk? We asked this question to Orhan Gencebay some time ago but didn't receive a response. Last week, we directed the same question to Ferdi Tayfur. He answered us by saying, "Arabesk means free music. The artist who performs arabesk plays what they [want to] play and sings what they [want to] sing. In arabesk, we can express all our emotions. In my opinion, arabesk is the genre of music where I sing what comes from within when I hold my [bağlama] in my hands." (Ferdi Tayfur, Gong Magazine, 1980)

This narrative in which the musicians presented their work as experimental, free, and unique music, and advocated for the incorporation of various genres and instruments, persisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s and became a common defense among musicians who were "accused" of making arabesk music (see SQ9 in Appendix A). This storyline was helpful because it aligned with the mission of improving Turkish music and incorporating polyphony into TAM and TFM. Besides, it directly challenged the accusations of imitation by exhibiting that not only arabeskers were not imitators but also they were innovative and misunderstood artists. The "I'm doing my own music" and "I'm playing whatever I feel like" were popular claims in the Turkish

music industry in this phase and frequently used by artists from other genres as well. These claims emphasized the creative qualities and uniqueness of the singers and helped them distinguish themselves from others.

The consensus today is that Gencebay's music was indeed experimental and included a wide variety of different instruments, rhythms, melodies, and orchestration styles (Özbek, 1991, also see Q90 below). The similarities between Gencebay's songs and Arabic music were attributed to the use of specific violin arrangements commonly found in Egyptian songs and were brought to Turkey by Suat Sayın (Özbek, 1991; also see SQ10 in Appendix A). Further, the foundation of Gencebay's songs was largely TAM makams, and there were already certain commonalities between TAM and Arabic music, such as using certain instruments like oud and kanun. However, Gencebay's songs differed from Arab music in that they incorporated and layered various techniques, melodies, and tunes, which could or could not have included the specific violin partitions in Arabic music.

In the 1980s, arabesk also took a different musical direction with the emergence of new artists. Over the years, TFM influences replaced the TAM base in Orhan Gencebay's songs. As arabesk made a name for its own right, the accusations of imitation largely diminished.

Second, beyond the imitation accusations, some intellectuals problematized arabesk's association with Arabs and the East for ideological reasons. As Gencebay's quote (Q7) above pointed out, for intellectuals, being associated with Arabs and the East was a problem in itself. Specifically, intellectuals did not like the connections between Turkish and Arab cultures because being associated with Arabs, and the East in general, was seen as an attempt to revive the religious Ottoman past. Such attempts violated secularism and modernism, which were significantly important values for the Turkish intelligentsia (see Chapter 4). The logic of modernism required Turks to turn their faces to the West and adapt to Western cultures if they wanted to progress. Turning towards the East and embracing Eastern culture and history was considered going backward, undoing all the progress made since the 1920s, and essentially betraying the principles of Atatürk and the fundamental values of modern Turkey.

Further, the refraction between different evaluator groups was the most obvious in the narratives sourced in this theme. Although the association with Arabs was not salient in the music community after the first phase, most of the nostalgic and reflective intellectuals, especially those who did not follow the developments in the entertainment sector closely, continued to use the term arabesk to refer to a bunch of different issues related to Arabs and Ottoman revivalists in the political context.

These evaluations and their implications are explained in detail in the following sections.

5.1.4 Degenerate Music

Another label associated with Gencebay's music in this period was "degenerate music" ("yoz müzik," or less commonly "dejenere müzik" in Turkish) which was commonly promoted by TRT officials.

The details of what happened between Orhan Gencebay and TRT in the late 1960s and early 1970s are unclear. However, it could be that Gencebay applied to TRT and was rejected or that he was banned without having an opportunity to apply. Whatever the case, Gencebay was not able to appear on TRT's radio stations and TV channel for the entirety of the first phase. In the late 1970s, TRT also prohibited others they perceived as singing arabesk songs.

Further, starting in 1974, TRT made their dislike towards arabesk very obvious and actively tried to manipulate the discourse against it. The first two appearances of the term "arabesk" in Cumhuriyet were in interviews with TRT officials, and the subject was brought up by the interviewees themselves while answering general questions on TRT's policies. An important actor in this period was Hıfzı Topuz (see Table 3.2), who was appointed as the "assistant general manager in charge of radios" in 1974 to revamp the interest in radio programs. Topuz intended to reform the inspection processes and the supervisory boards to create a more professional and moderate supervision policy. However, arabesk seemed to be largely outside their tolerance limits. Further, the genre was often mentioned as an example of extreme conditions that necessitated bans. For example, while talking about TRT's new open-minded policy, one of the producers and presenters of TRT Radio's morning show said the following:

> Q10: Do you answer all letters, do you fulfill all listeners' requests? For example, if a listener asks a question about their sex life, can you answer?
> − There are no restrictions. We only do not respond to requests regarding a genre called "minivan music." This music genre is beyond our understanding (Bülent Özveren, interviewed by TV and Radio reporters, Cumhuriyet, 1974)

In addition to the black sheep status, TRT's attitude towards arabesk differed from their approach to other genres. While the appropriateness of non-arabesk artists and songs was inspected on a case-by-case basis and the bans were based on particular, though usually unforeseen, reasons, arabesk was denied access to TV and radio because the entire genre was perceived as a violation against TRT's principles. Moreover, in the second phase, TRT attributed arabesk a marginal, out-of-classification status in that they claimed that arabesk songs did not belong to any categorization system in Turkish music, therefore, they were not accepted into even the supervision process (see SQ11 in Appendix A).

Instead of creating or finding a category for arabesk, TRT chose to characterize the genre as a corrupt, degenerate, and commercial trend. Through the "degenerate music" label, TRT officers were able to argue that the spread of arabesk was a great danger to society and, thus, arabesk should be fought against. This associated harm then rendered airing arabesk on TRT unthinkable since the potential danger of arabesk of damaging Turkish music and the music taste of the people directly contradicted TRT's mission of educating the public and showing them the "better." While being inquired about whether TRT had a negative bias against Turkish music, Hıfzı Topuz said the following:

> Q11: The majority of criticisms come from representatives of degenerate trends. They demand TRT air their songs without any inspection. In this way, they aim to ensure extensive coverage of the commercial music [genre] known as "minivan music" and "arabesk" music. Unfortunately, in recent years, radios outside of TRT have taken on a leading role in spreading this type of music. Turkish Radios, on the other hand, fight against the spread of commercial music and engage in a battle with the representatives of these trends. This leads to criticisms from those whose interests are affected. (Hıfzı Topuz, interviewed by Mahmut T. Öngören, Cumhuriyet, 1975)

As indicated by Topuz's above excerpt, despite TRT's determination in their war against arabesk, TRT's mission was undermined by other radio stations freely broadcasting arabesk music. The most infamous of these stations was the Police Radio (PR). The PR was the second oldest radio station after TRT and as the name suggests it was affiliated with the police. The station was initially established to raise awareness on crimes, delinquency, and traffic accidents, and however, at one point they started to make music broadcasts. They then became known for their "hybrid

programs" that included a mix of songs from various genres, including arabesk. In 1974 and 1975, Topuz made multiple attempts to have supervisory power over the broadcasts of the PR and argued that even if they were not as thorough as TRT's, the PR had to be under at least a minimum amount of supervision.

TRT's insistence on gaining control over the PR had two sides. First, and on the surface, TRT claimed they were concerned about the PR's arabesk broadcasts because they made TRT's fight against the "arabesk degeneration" futile. Second, TRT was worried because the PR was stealing their audience, and this was the first time TRT had serious competition. The interest in the PR made the demand for arabesk music a severe issue for TRT officers. The dilemma between prohibiting arabesk and risking losing their audience and broadcasting arabesk but betraying the mission of improving the public had started in this phase, and it remained a huge source of stress for TRT throughout the study. For example, this conflict was visible in Topuz's 1975 interview quoted above where the interviewer and Topuz had the following conversation:

> Q12: Don't the radio stations outside of TRT cause TRT to lose listeners by playing the music people want?
> − They do. However, it is inconceivable for TRT to give into minivan music only to compete with other radios and to be more popular. But if there is a reality, we cannot turn a blind eye to it. Therefore, various music trends can be reflected within the limited scope of certain special programs. Meanwhile, we continue our efforts to ensure that other radios also follow certain principles. (Hıfzı Topuz, interviewed by Mahmut T. Öngören, Cumhuriyet, 1975)

A strategy developed in this period and continued in the subsequent phases was TRT treating arabesk as drug addiction and adapting a broadcasting schedule analogous to drug rehabilitation. In this metaphor, the public was hooked to arabesk by self-serving and inconsiderate musicians and producers, and TRT was their rehabilitator. Accordingly, arabesk would be given through supervised and limited injections until the addicts were under control. For instance, a higher-up in TRT said the following to Cumhuriyet in 1974:

> Q13: The main focus of supervision should be to prevent the spread of exploitation, degeneration, and lyrics that are against TRT principles ... it is not feasible to reject arabesk music completely. The public wants

it. If we don't provide it, they will listen to it elsewhere, and eventually, they will stop listening to us altogether. However, it is possible to redirect their tastes towards the positive by offering [arabesk] to a certain extent, alongside the type of music that our policy requires, almost like brainwashing. If we present and promote our own authentic music in the best possible way, we can influence and make people appreciate it, ultimately leading them to abandon arabesk. (Yıleri Atamer, interviewed by Mahmut T. Öngören, Cumhuriyet, 1974)

Despite the Topuz administration being dismissed without having the opportunity to implement their plans, the analogy between drugs and arabesk persisted. The tactic of "giving a taste of arabesk once in a while" became a traditional policy for TRT starting in the second phase. Overall, TRT did not provide detailed explanations for their strictness towards arabesk beyond saying that it was degenerating the public, and how arabesk degenerated music and the public is not clear. However, some assumptions can be made from the statements provided by TRT personnel, industry intellectuals, and the reports on what and who were banned.

First, Topuz and some industry intellectuals saw arabesk as a distorted extension of TAM. Gencebay heavily used makams in his songs and had worked with TAM artists before. Additionally, some of the female artists that came to be associated with arabesk like Neşe Karaböcek, Gülden Karaböcek, and Kamuran Akkor were originally alaturka artists. As a result, some evaluators interpreted arabesk as an adapted and commercialized version of TAM and criticized the genre for modifying, downgrading, and commercializing traditional Turkish music. Further, Gencebay was a bağlama virtuoso and a lot of his songs were heavily influenced by bağlama sounds and TFM. Consequently, it is possible that the evaluators perceived that arabesk was degenerating TFM too. For example, while talking about the problems of the Turkish music industry, pop artist Özdemir Erdoğan said the following in an interview:

Q14: No one has the right to ruin our Anatolian music and classical music with their sloppy, inadequate knowledge and use it for their advertisement. The degeneration of our folk music and instruments by those who do not even know how to play Western instruments properly by surpassing the rules of sound and harmony under the demise of modernization is a heavy burden. (Özdemir Erdoğan, interviewed by Selmi Andak, Cumhuriyet, 1971)

TRT was also highly concerned with preserving the authentic forms of TFM and TAM and was particularly critical of artists attempting to modernize traditional Turkish songs. Data revealed that singers were often rejected for using innovative instruments like the "electro-bağlama," for incorrectly harmonizing TFM and TAM, for blending Western and Eastern instruments, or for mixing Turkish and foreign singing styles ("üslup" in Turkish) (see SQ13 in Appendix A). All of these factors were applicable to Gencebay's songs, suggesting that arabesk music might have been perceived as detrimental to Turkish culture because of the adaptations made to TAM and TFM.

Second, TRT insiders and intellectuals criticized Gencebay for his sorrowful and pessimistic songs. A general point of criticism for arabesk music throughout the study was its sad and melancholic lyrics and the heavy, heart-wrenching melodies accompanying them. Intellectuals and TRT argued that these songs exploited the vulnerability of depressed people and had an adverse effect on people's mental well-being. In fact, in the following years, pessimistic lyrics and melodies were used as distinguishing attributes for classifying songs as "arabesk" by certain intellectuals. Additionally, the emotionality in the lyrics exacerbated the "exploitative singer" image that arose due to the commercial music label in that arabesk artists were accused of harming people to further their own interests. In the following phases, the complaints about the lyrics became more salient, and TRT officials overtly gave "promoting hopelessness" and "having depressing effects on people" as reasons for rejecting arabesk.

Thirdly, while TRT denied making subjective value judgments, managers and board members retained the right to reject songs based on their subjective aesthetic evaluations. TRT did not explicitly state this in the first phase, but there were others who described arabesk music as shrill, harsh, or unpleasant (e.g., Q1 and Q5). The characterization of arabesk music as incomprehensible screams, cries, or cacophony continued to be a prominent theme in subsequent phases as well (see SQ14 in Appendix A). Hence, the perceived degeneration could also be attributed to arabesk music diminishing the aesthetic quality of Turkish music.

In conclusion, what is most important about the degeneration narrative for the arabesk discourse is the direct connection it drew between arabesk and "harm," where arabesk was framed as something to be fought against, and Gencebay's music was given an almost "public enemy" status. This narrative not only provided a not-easy-to-object reason for prohibiting the genre in this phase but anticipating negative consequences for the public and "culture" was a prominent excuse used by intellectuals to advocate against arabesk throughout the study. At the end of the

first phase, the familiarity of intellectuals with Gencebay and his music grew, though this acquaintance was higher among industry intellectuals. Gencebay's music was also undeniably becoming more popular, but it was still seen as a trend that could be restrained. In the second phase, the popularity of arabesk continued to increase, leading various new discourses to emerge.

5.2 Phase 2: The Rise and Vilification, 1978-1983

The interest in arabesk increased exponentially in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As new arabesk artists emerged and the genre spread, more intellectuals started to pay attention to arabesk and state their opinions. During this phase, it became evident that lower classes, especially rural-to-urban immigrants who lived in "slums" or "shanty towns" on the outskirts of big cities, had a distinct affinity towards arabesk music. This perception led intellectuals to investigate these connections and create more advanced narratives on arabesk's definition, emergence, and consequences.

This phase encompasses four main themes, and two of the themes include several subthemes. The first theme, "The Emergence of New Arabesk and Arabesk-ish Artists," delves into how other musicians perceived arabesk in its initial years and positioned themselves in relation to the genre. Different choices in positioning led to the two subthemes: "Ferdi Tayfur" who fully embraced the arabesk identity and became one of the most important arabesk artists, and the "chameleons," who saw arabesk as a business opportunity on the side of their primary genre. The second theme, "TRT's Inconsistent Bans," is a continuation of the "Arabesk as a Degenerate Genre" theme above. As such, it explains TRT's fluctuating policies against arabesk and how these policies changed the evaluators' judgments. The third theme, "Arabesk as a Sociological Issue," discusses the processes of intellectuals problematizing arabesk and framing it as a societal disease to be examined and cured. Within this theme, three causes for arabesk are identified as the subthemes. These subthemes are titled "Bans on Turkish music," "Internal Migration and Slumization," and "Fatalism and Glorification of Pain." The fourth and final theme, "Arabesk as Low Culture," is about intellectuals categorizing arabesk as the culture of lower classes and a part of general cultural degeneration resulting from economic and social changes brought about by the new neoliberal government. These themes and subthemes are explained in detail below.

5.2.1 Emergence of New Arabesk and Arabesk-ish Artists

Despite the debates surrounding the genre's classification and the negative attitudes of TRT and intellectuals, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Orhan Gencebay enjoyed the peak years of his career. While specific album sales data is unavailable, Gencebay himself claimed that his albums sold 100,000 copies in Istanbul alone in 1980. This was considered a significant achievement considering the political and financial circumstances of Turkey during that time.

Further, in the late 1970s, performers frequently expressed that the audience demanded Gencebay's songs during live performances, also indicating a strong public interest in the genre. In an article titled "The New Guest of Arabesk Music" in Gong Magazine, a journalist made the following remarks about the performance of a casino singer:

> Q15: Sibel Egemen is one of the artists who are always in search of [new] music, constantly striving for innovation. She spares no effort or expense to be liked and increase her fame... While performing her third song, "Yenildim Sana" (Defeated by You), foam starts raining down from the ceiling. She truly delivers her song in a beautiful manner. Then she transitions to arabesk songs, and that is when she receives the most remarkable reaction from the audience. Especially during Orhan Gencebay's song "Yarabbim," the hall collapses with applause. (Anonymous, Gong Magazine, 1979)

Due to the positive reaction of the listeners, in the second phase, more artists decided to try their hand at arabesk. A significant artist in the late 1970s was Ferdi Tayfur, who is considered one of the most important arabesk singers of all time. Following Gencebay and Tayfur's successes, other artists entered the arabesk scene too. The following section focuses on Tayfur's emergence, and the subsequent section explores the evaluations directed at other artists.

5.2.1.1 Ferdi Tayfur

After Orhan Gencebay, Ferdi Tayfur was the most influential arabesk artist in the late 1970s and is accepted as one of the building blocks or "legends" of this genre in

historical narratives of today (e.g., Dönmez & İmik, 2020). Like Gencebay, Tayfur was also a bağlama player and spent his teens and twenties playing bağlama for other artists and singing in small casinos and venues. In the late 1960s, he moved to Istanbul and signed a record deal, but his initial attempts were unsuccessful. After hustling for another decade, Tayfur's breakthrough came in 1977 with his movie "Çeşme" (1976) and the subsequent album "Ferdi '77." This album caught the attention of the editor of Ses Magazine, who decided to promote Tayfur by distributing his poster. Ferdi Tayfur got the attention of intellectuals and entered the discourse in 1979. This recognition was due to his eventful concert to a crowded group at the Izmir International Fair, one of the biggest summer festivals in Turkey in the 1970s, and his appearance on TRT on the New Year's Eve special program of 1979 (see the following section).

Tayfur's songs were perceived as similar to Gencebay, and intellectuals readily grouped them together. Tayfur also self-categorized himself with Orhan Gencebay and openly pledged his allegiance to him. However, Tayfur was different from Gencebay in various aspects and brought two "innovations" to the category that became permanent attributes of the genre.

First, unlike Gencebay, who was from a provincial yet middle-class family, Tayfur grew up in extreme poverty in less developed South Eastern Turkey. His father was murdered when he was six, so he had to quit school and began working at a young age. Tayfur did not shy away from detailing the sad and tragic events of his childhood or disclosing his lack of education and working-class roots. In the late 1970s, journalists and interviewers often focused on and dramatized Tayfur's unfortunate backstory and quoted various memories from his childhood. After Tayfur, having a sad past became an enduring part of the arabesk artist persona, most of the arabeskers who shot to fame in the 1980s, like İbrahim Tatlıses, Bergen, and Kibariye, not only came from poverty but also endured numerous tragedies and misfortunes. The sob stories meshed well with the gloomy and depressing lyrics of arabesk songs and created a coherent narrative where arabesk was depicted as a tool used by traumatized artists to express their sorrow (see SQ15 in Appendix A).

Second, Ferdi Tayfur's music was slightly different from Gencebay in that it was not as inclusive as Gencebay's music sound-wise, as Tayfur heavily relied on TFM bases and Arabic-style violin partitions. However, what truly distinguished Tayfur was his unique singing style, characterized by a shaky, sobbing, almost cry-like voice accompanied by whimpers during instrumental parts. This emotional and dramatic vocal style, reflecting the pain expressed in the lyrics, was actually a long-standing tradition in TAM and TFM, known as "yanık ses" (lit. trans. "burnt voice") in

Turkish and was normally an admired quality (Sefercioğlu, 2016; Özarslan, 2001). It was also used by contemporary TAM and TFM artists like Zeki Müren and Gencebay himself. Nonetheless, Tayfur was criticized for taking it to the next level, and his whimpers were a prominent reason for the negative comments he received. However, Tayfur was generally unfazed by these criticisms. He continued with his unique style and advised others who wished to try arabesk to do the same. Like the sob stories, the crying-like voice resonated well with the pessimistic lyrics and became an attribute of the arabesk genre. For example, İlhan Selçuk, a reflective intellectual that appeared in the focal data very often, wrote the following in his column upon reading the news on the possible ban on cassette players in minibuses:

> Q16: I read in the newspapers: "The cassette players predominantly playing arabesk music in dolmuş minibuses will be removed." Arabesk music? What does that mean? It means music that moans, cries, throbs, pleads, mourns, begs, sheds tears, and induces tears... You hit the road with a tiny cassette player and a bunch of tapes and the sound emanating from the speakers constantly pinches your heart, pierces your insides, constricts your breath, and shreds your lungs. Why does the public lean towards this so-called arabesk music? Is it the voice of a dark fate? (İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet, 1981)

Apart from introducing new attributes, Tayfur actively used the support of lower-class masses to defend arabesk, a frame that became an integral part of the arabesk discourse. Gencebay's relationship with his listeners was complicated in that although it was clear the less educated lower classes were the main consumers of his music (e.g., see SQ23 in Appendix A), he struggled to build a consistent narrative around them. As evident in the above quotes, Gencebay sometimes portrayed himself as an experimental, almost avant-garde artist who happened to resonate with the public (e.g., Q2 and Q8). However, at other times he acted as if he knew what he was doing and intentionally made music for the public (e.g., Q4). At the same time, it was clear that he did not want to be exclusively associated with the drivers (e.g., SQ1 in Appendix A) but then could not dismiss them because they were a significant part of his fan base. In contrast, Tayfur fully identified with the role of being the singer of the lower classes and actively used public demand to increase the legitimacy of arabesk. Unlike Gencebay, who, intentionally or coincidentally, made music "for" the people, Tayfur's background allowed him to claim that he was making the music "of" the people. He often described himself as the "child of Anatolia," "voice of the people," and "the public's singer." This frame was helpful because it put

the critics in a position of going against the people and dismissing the preference of the lower classes. As such, the "belonging to the people" narrative stuck and was frequently used by many others throughout the study.

However, intellectuals were very skeptical of Tayfur's stories. During this phase, Tayfur was earning good money, having an affair with one of his co-stars, and the press was particularly interested in his scandals. Intellectuals then pointed out the hypocrisy of Tayfur's claims and blamed him and arabesk in general for exploiting the public's sympathy and creating a false sense of identification. After observing that others were buying into Tayfur's stories, a columnist in Cumhuriyet wrote following:

> Q17: . . . saying minibus music draws its strength from the support of the masses will drag the issue into a deadlock. . . Those who say and write that minibus music is getting its strength from the public either do not know the ugly reality of Turkey or pretend like they don't know. The singers of the arabesk fabrication that is being pushed as the music of Turkish masses are earning hundred thousands liras overnight and grinning on colorful magazine pages saying, "not five million, but ten million [for you]!" to meet with their mistresses. (Burhan Arpad, Cumhuriyet, 1980)

The criticisms that arose after Tayfur's emergence were not limited to the hypocritical behavior of arabesk artists. Some intellectuals noticed a subtle yet significant difference between Tayfur's and Gencebay's lyrics. This realization then led those who were initially holding back their evaluations and wanted to see more of Gencebay like Atilla Dorsay (see Q6 above) to reassess arabesk and eventually turn into complete opponents. Specifically, in the earlier years of arabesk, a group of intellectuals, generally consisting of those who strongly identified with communism, observed the connection Gencebay naturally had with the lower classes and also detected protest and revolutionary elements in Gencebay's work. Gencebay often portrayed manual laborers living in slums in his films (e.g., "Bir Teselli Ver," 1971; "Dertler Benim Olsun," 1974; "Şoför," 1975), and some of these films depicted the realities of these neighborhoods without romanticizing them. Even if these intellectuals did not like Gencebay's songs and films personally, they saw value in them. They believed that Gencebay had the potential to mobilize the public to protest against the harsh conditions they live in or, on the less extreme side, to come up with solutions for their problems. In their view, the sorrow and complaints in Gencebay's songs and films

were not depressing and debilitating. Instead, they were rebellious and provocative. In contrast, they believed that Tayfur's work represented passive suffering, pessimism, and hopelessness. In their interpretation, Tayfur just complained and whined and pushed the listeners to a sedative acceptance of their conditions. As such, this type of arabesk was deemed detrimental to society because it aggravated the sorrows and depression of the slum residents, who were already struggling under the weight of social and financial burdens. The following excerpt was a part of a two-page essay on Tayfur titled "The Screams of Turkey in 1979 and Ferdi Tayfur:"

> Q18: Ferdi Tayfur has spent most of his life under social pressures and oppression, [however] in his work, we observe a rather submissive mindset that prefers to settle for what he has instead of reacting to the accumulation of all these hardships. Gencebay, while expressing the pains and problems, leaves a crack for hope. In this path to hope, sometimes refuge is sought in the justice of God, sometimes he underlines the necessity of rebellion. However, Ferdi Tayfur does not interpret events like Gencebay... When describing the current situation, he emphasizes that there is no hope. He tells the problems in the most heartbreaking way, making [the public] cry even more and drowning an entire society in tears along with himself. (Deniz İzgi, Gong Magazine, 1979)

Further, Tayfur was aware of these accusations and did not seem bothered by them. Instead, he used the relatable, "one of the people" narrative:

> Q19: I am ignorant, but I had accepted the order of the world like this. I cannot comprehend more anyway. I don't say more than this in my songs either. I want people to love each other. I want the rich to provide jobs for the poor and for employers to fully recognize the rights of workers. I say that employees should work with all their might to receive fair compensation for their work. This is the order I desire in the world. (Ferdi Tayfur, quoted by Deniz İzgi, Gong Magazine, 1979)

In this context, some of the previously hopeful intellectuals also started to lose faith in Gencebay. In a revolutionary art magazine, sociologist Ergin Ergönültaş (see Table 3.2), who was "investigating" Gencebay for years, compared Tayfur and Gencebay's films and songs and made a call for artists to realize the potential of arabesk in mobilizing the public into social change:

Q20: Can't a progressive artist who wants to rapidly communicate and spread their message skillfully use the motifs of "this music genre" that easily resonate with the masses? (Paying attention to finding the most appropriate forms for conveying the messages they want to deliver). And in this way, can't they reach the large masses, the crowded populations living in the slums, those who we need to establish a relationship with and influence? (Ergin Ergönültaş, Sanat Emeği, 1979)

However, this call was not realized. In the end, all the qualities brought by Tayfur, the sob stories, the screams and weeping, and the despair, spread to Gencebay and the arabesk category as a whole. For example, after Tayfur made the uneducated and impoverished arabesk artists stereotype popular, evaluators started to assume that Gencebay also came from poverty and lacked education (see SQ16 in Appendix A). Moreover, after the revolutionary claims emerged, others criticized these claims and argued that those who portrayed Gencebay as a revolutionary were attributing meanings to Gencebay's songs that were not actually there. Nonetheless, some academic texts separate the initial decade of arabesk that was dominated by Gencebay from the rest as the "social" or "revolutionary" period (e.g., Özbek, 1991).

5.2.1.2 Chameleons

In addition to Tayfur, this phase also witnessed the rise of various artists labeled as arabesk singers or perceived as "making arabesk." What distinguished this new group from Orhan Gencebay and Ferdi Tayfur was that the majority of them were originally known as artists of other genres, such as pop, TFM, or TAM, and they had a broader repertoire that allowed them to move between different genres. Thus, for convenience this dissertation calls this group of singers "chameleons." Because they continued to perform non-arabesk songs, TRT was more tolerant towards these artists, and most of them appeared on TV at least occasionally.

One of the most influential singers of this period and also the arabesk discourse of the 1980s was İbrahim Tatlıses. Tatlıses's background was an extreme variety of Ferdi Tayfur; he was born into a poorer family, he was from a less developed town, and additionally, he was Kurdish, he was barely literate, and unlike Gencebay and Tayfur, he did not play any instruments. Moreover, different from the other two who gained fame as arabesk artists, Tatlıses initially made a name for himself in the TFM community and rose to fame with the release of an anonymous folk song in

1978. His first song that was considered arabesk, "Sabuha," came out a year later in 1979. In 1980, Tatlıses announced that he was working on an "arabesk album," creating an uproar among TFM artists. Most folk singers saw Tatlıses's arabesk trials as a waste of his talents, and some others framed it as a betrayal to the public who liked him because of his TFM songs. For example, Nida Tüfekçi, a TFM artist and musicologist who also worked at various managerial positions in TRT, said the following to Gong Magazine:

> Q21: İbrahim was an asset to Turkish Folk Music. With his beautiful and captivating voice, he climbed to a great position... İbrahim had been working on arabesk music for years, but he was not able to make a name for himself. He gained fame and money with a folk song. I hear that he is now working on arabesk music again. This could be his downfall. In short, he will harm himself and those who love him. (Nida Tüfekçi, Gong Magazine, 1980)

However, Tatlıses stood his ground and argued that he had enough skills to try both genres. Moreover, his transition between genres proved to be advantageous for his career. His TFM identity allowed him to appear on TRT without much debate [5] At the same time, he was able to capitalize on the arabesk wave and had commercial success through album sales, casino performances, and his arabesk films.

In the 1980s, Tatlıses continued to oscillate between TFM and arabesk. Moreover, he had a unique interpretation where he applied the singing styles of South Eastern folk songs to folk songs from other regions as well as to his arabesk leaning songs. In addition, he sang in dialect and mispronounced some words. His style was so influential that artists who did not have accents or from other regions were also imitating Tatlıses. This style connected Tatlıses's songs to each other but blurred the boundaries between arabesk and TFM. As a result, Tatlıses pioneered a new arabesk subtype that could be called arabesk-folk (arabesk-türkü in Turkish) that was followed by many others in the 1980s, including Küçük Emrah and Küçük Ceylan (see Table 3.2).

Another chameleon artist of the early 1980s was Ferdi Özbeğen. Like Gencebay and Tayfur, Özbeğen struggled to make a name for himself in the music industry and spent the first fifteen years of his career singing and playing the piano at restaurants and casinos. Özbeğen's sets were uniquely diverse in that he performed songs from various genres, including Western pop, Turkish pop, TFM, and TAM. In the late 1970s, Özbeğen's style gained popularity, making him a sought-after artist in upscale

restaurants and prestigious casinos. In 1978, he signed with Gencebay's record company, which led to the inclusion of Gencebay's songs in his repertoire. Upon receiving positive feedback from the audience for singing arabesk, Özbeğen decided to work with Gencebay more closely. In an interview conducted in 1980, he stated the following:

Q22: I started listening to Gencebay's songs years ago. But in the last two years, I had the chance to sing them, and suddenly I found myself in a very good place. Now I have a purpose. I will revisit and interpret Gencebay's songs that didn't receive much attention because they remained hidden on the B-sides of records. (Ferdi Özbeğen, interviewed by Deniz İzgi, Gong Magazine, 1980)

This plan became reality as Gencebay helped him release an arabesk album and a movie accompanying the album in 1980. In the early 1980s, Özbeğen's style of performing a diverse repertoire alongside the piano gained even more popularity, and similar artists like Ümit Besen emerged. While their performances often included arabesk songs, these artists primarily entertained audiences in casinos, lounges, and restaurants. As a result, the arabesk songs they performed were typically more upbeat. Even if the original versions were not as cheerful, Özbeğen performed Gencebay's songs in a cheerful manner and faster tempo to allow dancing or at least moving along.

As such, some intellectuals perceived Özbeğen and those who followed his style as arabesk or a subgenre of arabesk, while others argued that they were distinct from the arabeskers. Özbeğen himself denied the arabesk label in a manner that is reminiscent of Gencebay's and Tayfur's "free music" argument:

Q23: So, does the music you play have any connection to arabesk?
− The music we play is not arabesk. We only interpret certain arabesk songs.
− Then what genre would you describe your music as?
− It's too early to make such a definition. We have paved the way, and they will give it a name later. We try to adapt [traditional Turkish music] without deforming our motifs. We prefer those that are more harmonious... I believe a musician should know all genres of music. (Ferdi Özbeğen, interviewed by Yasemin Yazıcı, Cumhuriyet, 1981)

Consequently, this genre or subgenre was given various labels. First, some intellectuals named Özbeğen's music as "aranjman" as well (see Chapter 4 for more on the original "aranjman"). This could be because Özbeğen covered and rearranged songs produced by others, including Western pop pieces, and performed them at restaurants like arrangers of the past. The second label for Özbeğen style music was "pianist-chanteur" (pianist-singer in English), which was coined because Özbeğen and his protegees usually performed with a piano or an electronic keyboard (Tohumcu, 2013). Third, the genre was called taverna (Turkish for "tavern"), a term previously used for alcohol-serving lounges run by non-Muslims in Ottoman Istanbul. This label likely emerged because both in Ottoman taverns and restaurants and what Özbeğen and similar artists performed were characterized by eating and drinking alongside live music. Lastly, this genre was called arabesk-fantazi, or only fantazi, a somewhat ambiguous label that became popular in the 1990s and usually used to refer to more upbeat arabesk songs (see SQ17 in Appendix A).

Nonetheless, only industry intellectuals were in tune with the nuances between Özbeğen's style and arabesk; those outside of the music industry continued to refer to Özbeğen and similar others like Ümit Besen, Coşkun Sabah, and Cengiz Kurtoğlu as arabesk singers (see SQ18 in Appendix A).

More importantly, the venues pianist-chanteurs performed usually had a designated space for dancing, and categorizing pianist-chanteurs with arabeskers created an association between belly dancing (göbek atmak in Turkish; see Chapter 4) and arabesk such that the phrase "belly dancing to arabesk" (arabesk eşliğinde göbek atmak in Turkish) frequently came up in the data throughout the rest of the study. This narrative developed alongside the sad, pessimistic, depressive arabesk narrative, and perplexed those who were trying to draw the boundaries of the arabesk category.

The third wave of artists that became a part of the arabesk scene in the earlier years of the second phase were pop musicians trying their hand at arabesk, or as it was put by a journalist, "those whom Orhan Gencebay poisoned." Between 1979 and 1980, many pop musicians, including those that rejected arabesk before, like Bora Ayanoğlu quoted above, released or announced they would release arabesk singles or albums. Others, like the performer described in Q15, were adding arabesk songs to their live performances at casinos because they noticed that these songs received a stronger reaction from the audience.

One interesting case among pop singers was Zerrin Özer, an unconventional pop artist who gained popularity after singing a pop version of Orhan Gencebay's song "Gönül" in 1979. After the success of "Gönül," others, especially those who were struggling to achieve fame or losing their popularity, sought salvage in Gencebay's

and Tayfur's songs as well. These artists usually declared that they were going to "make arabesk" or "try arabesk," and what they meant by these declarations was either directly working with Gencebay or Tayfur, or adapting Gencebay's songs to their own genres:

> Q24: After losing Eurovision '79 to [the band] 21.Peron and experiencing a long period of stagnation, Kuzenler created a genre they describe as "Disco-Arabesk" for their comeback. According to their plan, they will start by covering Orhan Gencebay's "Yarabbim" and then proceed to perform all the beloved songs of this music style. Kuzenler stated that with Disco-Arabesk, they are putting an end to a tumultuous period. (Anonymous, Gong Magazine, 1980)

Lastly, arabesk also spread among the TAM artists; however, this was less noticeable since Gencebay's songs already had similarities with TAM. Nonetheless, Zeki Müren's release of a self-proclaimed arabesk song called "Kahır Mektubu" garnered a lot of attention and criticism. Additionally, it was reported that the TAM singers' playlists at casinos shifted towards including more and more arabesk songs because of the demand. This situation blurred the boundaries between alaturka and arabesk even further. Consequently, some intellectuals, especially those who primarily listened to Western music, started to put alaturka and arabesk in the same basket.

Overall, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a growing trend in the Turkish music scene of imitating or covering Gencebay and Tayfur's songs. Beyond engaging in multiple genres simultaneously, these four groups of singers were similar to each other in that they openly acknowledged they were singing arabesk primarily for financial reasons. During this time, artists observed that the audience reacted better to arabesk songs and that arabesk artists were commercially successful. This realization led some singers to a mindset of "why not me?"

İbrahim Tatlıses was especially open about the financial benefits of arabesk. In addition to his arabesk albums, Tatlıses established multiple businesses that capitalized on his arabesk songs, i.e., a restaurant called "Sabuha" and an ice cream store selling hot pepper-infused ice cream with [6]. Regarding this issue, İbrahim Tatlıses said the following in an interview with Cumhuriyet:

> Q25: Can I ask for your thoughts on arabesk music, Tatlıses?
> − Of course, you can ask. Because I also sang arabesk. It sells a lot.

It's also very popular. So, I can say that it contributed to me. After "Ayağında Kundura," we made "Sabuha." No point in denying it. In terms of fame and financially... [I] have a lot of vocal talent. And I wasn't singing [arabesk]. But others [with less talent] were. (İbrahim Tatlıses, interviewed by Türkan Sezgin, Cumhuriyet, 1982)

These chameleons were also more advantageous than Gencebay and Tayfur in that they did not face significant bans or adverse reactions from TRT, except for a few that positioned themselves as proteges of Gencebay and Tayfur. The ambiguous and diluted membership status of these artists allowed them to appear on TV and radio with their non-arabesk songs. As such, they continued to go back and forth between genres, used arabesk when it served their advantage and returned to their original genres when it did not.

Moreover, because these artists did not fully identify with arabesk and considered their original genres a safety net, they did not feel the need to defend or legitimize arabesk. When they moved on from their "arabesk phase," the chameleons blamed the public. Specifically, they argued that they were not genuinely interested in arabesk, but the immense pressure from the public and the low album sales of other genres left them with no choice but to sing arabesk. In other words, they framed themselves as victims of the industry dynamics. For example, a journalist from Cumhuriyet quoted Zerrin Özer's following defense:

Q26: The singers who delved into arabesk and performed aranjman when Turkish pop music needed them the most are now writing articles in magazines, seeking redemption. Look at how Zerrin Özer criticizes herself: "Those who try to protect pop music accuse us of veering towards other music genres. But remember, we all bear the responsibility together. You and us... The singers and the listeners. We are all guilty. It has become so widespread that we found ourselves in arabesk without even realizing it. However, our duty was to resist in our own genre. We should have sought beauty within our own field. In my opinion, the widespread influence of Arabesk music should be a good lesson for all of us. It reminded us that we should embrace the music that defines us. Personally, I can say that from now on, my records will only feature songs in the pop music genre. (Zerrin Özer, quoted by Anonymous, Cumhuriyet, 1982)

However, intellectuals were not forgiving. The monetary gain associated with

arabesk, along with artists emphasizing public demand to salvage themselves, met with severe criticisms from journalists and pop musicians who refused to give in to arabesk.

Overall, the emergence of Ferdi Tayfur and chameleons worsened the perception of arabesk artists as a whole. The stereotype of arabesk singers being opportunistic and exploitative became even more deeply ingrained in the discourse.

5.2.2 TRT's Inconsistent Bans

In the second phase, TRT began to make compromises for arabesk. Although Topuz was not with TRT anymore, these compromises were reminiscent of the Topuz-era "supervised injection plans," where arabesk artists were given limited passes on special occasions. Specifically, beginning in 1978, TRT adopted a strategy of inviting a few arabesk singers to perform on TRT's New Year's Eve, and sometimes Eid, special shows annually. Apart from these celebratory days, arabesk was kept outside of TRT.

The initial compromises for arabesk began in June of 1978 when TRT announced that they bought a Neşe Karaböcek film and were negotiating to buy an Orhan Gencebay film to broadcast in the last two weeks of the month. It was reported on Cumhuriyet that TRT found a loophole in their auditing process that allowed them to broadcast these films:

> Q27: Gencebay and Karaböcek's songs couldn't be aired because they didn't pass the censorship. However, the "Cinema on TV" program is not subject to supervision, [therefore] the two artists will be able to sing their songs in their films for the first time. A senior official of TRT said the following about this: "Orhan Gencebay and Neşe Karaböcek are the realities of Turkey. Turning a blind eye to them won't benefit TRT. On the contrary, it gives an advantage to broadcasting outlets outside of TRT." (Anonymous, Cumhuriyet, 1978)

Nonetheless, although Karaböcek's film was aired on the announced date in June, Gencebay's movie was postponed and ended up being broadcast in October of the same year. Some intellectuals speculated that TRT opted for arabesk films due to a shortage of new films in their archives caused by the crisis in the Turkish

film industry. However, TRT was also trying to reach out to Orhan Gencebay in the domain of music. In September of the same year, the TV supplement of Hey Magazine reported that two TRT producers were negotiating with Gencebay to have him appear on their "Eid special" show. These negotiations were unsuccessful, but Gencebay finally went on TV as a singer on January 1, 1979, on TRT's New Year's Eve special show. The same year, TRT also decided to permit belly dancers, who were also banned on regular days, to appear on the New Year's Eve special. The belly dancer segment was eventually omitted from the final broadcast due to recent violent events in the country, but arguments on whether arabesk singers and belly dancers would or should appear on TV on special days became an important part of the discourse. These discussions came up every year and stimulated many people to give their opinions on arabesk.

In December 1979, TRT invited Ferdi Tayfur to the New Year's Eve special alongside Neşe and Gülden Karaböcek. Tayfur's appearance was more sensational because the paparazzi closely followed the negotiation process and made fun of Tayfur's requests. Additionally, after the show, Tayfur publicly criticized TRT for not keeping their promises to him. Interviews with both Gencebay and Tayfur revealed that these artists were very cautious towards TRT's offers because they felt like TRT was tricking them into working in conditions they were unwilling to accept. Specifically, Gencebay and Tayfur wanted to be the leading artist ("assolist" in Turkish) of the show. They had demands like singing more songs than the others, getting the "00:00" slot, and using a unique stage decor. TRT's unwillingness to fulfill these requests hurt the pride of both singers, who had been in the industry for longer than two decades at that point and already felt wronged by TRT. For example, Gencebay argued that it was only fair for them to sing more songs because they had never appeared on TV before. In their statements, both artists emphasized that they did not need TRT and were putting up with TRT's treatment only because of their fans. After the New Year's Eve special show aired, Tayfur said the following to Gong Magazine:

> Q28: I did not become famous through television. I owe everything to the public. I resisted appearing on the screen for years. However, I swayed because of the insistence of my fans... But you see, they exploited my feelings towards the public... Believing the words of TV personnel from now on? God forbid. I will definitely not appear on television anymore. (Ferdi Tayfur, Gong Magazine, 1980)

In 1980, after inviting Kibariye (see Table 3.2) on the New Year's Eve special of the same year, TRT declared that one-time passes were revoked and arabesk artists would not appear on TV at all. This policy remained in effect until 1985 when Gencebay was re-invited on TRT for the first time in 6 years. Nonetheless, Gencebay's relationship with TRT continued to be unsteady in the remainder of the 1980s, as TRT refused to accommodate Gencebay's demands and recommendations. Tayfur did not appear on TRT until 1992.

Intellectuals generally found these one-time passes meaningless and contradictory and often mocked TRT managers for being inconsistent and unreliable. Reflective authors also interpreted this as an indicator of TRT and the government's incompetence and lack of planning skills (see SQ19 in Appendix A).

Another important event that damaged the credibility of TRT was the song selection process for Eurovision in 1980. During the 1970s and 1980s, Turkey took the Eurovision Song Contest very seriously because it was considered as an opportunity to demonstrate to Europe that Turks were just as talented. As a result, TRT and even the government intervened with and planned every step of the process. Specifically, the preparations for Eurovision began with TRT asking several well-known producers to write and compose songs for the competition. They then approved or rejected these commissioned songs and handpicked one or a couple of artists to perform the selected songs on Eurovision Turkey Finale. During the finale, a jury, consisting either of musicians or random individuals, selected "the song" that would represent Turkey in Eurovision.

Preparations for the 1980s competition started in late 1979 and continued into the first few months of 1980. Eurovision 1980 influenced the arabesk discourse extensively because one of the commissioned songs, titled "Petr Oil," was considered arabesk by intellectuals. This perception led to heated discussions and debates on the meaning and properties of arabesk music.

The genre of "Petr Oil" was open to discussion because both the lyricist, Şanar Yurdatapan, and composer, Atilla Özdemiroğlu, of the song were pop veterans who had solely produced pop songs until that time. The selected artist for the competition, Ajda Pekkan, was also a staple in Turkish pop. The song itself had an upbeat tempo and featured lyrics that parodied the oil crisis of the 1970s. However, "Petr Oil" opened with dramatic violin sounds reminiscent of Gencebay's songs and these violin partitions continued to appear throughout the song. Like Tayfur, Pekkan also kept sighing during the middle and ending parts of the song and occasionally used shaky vocals. These similarities between "Petr Oil" and the songs of Gencebay and Tayfur led some intellectuals to accuse the song of being arabesk. When the

song entered as a candidate for the competition, intellectuals did not take "Petr Oil" seriously and believed that it was just a filler song and would not even be selected for the finale. Pekkan herself expressed her dislike for the song and stated that she would not sing it unless the lyrics underwent significant revision. Nonetheless, not only did the song make it to the finals, it also won the competition.

During the award ceremony, the songwriter, Şanar Yurdatapan, dissed TRT management for its pressure and censorship policies on live TV and refused to take the award. This confrontation further sensationalized the event, and the media began questioning the validity of TRT's censorship policies. Many intellectuals perceived "Petr Oil" to be arabesk, so this decision proved to them TRT did not know what they were doing. Industry intellectuals interpreted the results as "the bankruptcy of TRT's principles" and declared that arabesk won the war TRT had opened against it. After the finale, a journalist in Cumhuriyet expressed the following:

> Q29: The attributes of the song that won the first place actually changed a judgment, an opinion. It showed the invalidity of the decisions TRT Supervisory Board executed until now. According to an official from the conservatory, "TRT's 15-year music policy had gone bankrupt. TRT now officially recognizes arabesk as a music genre." A genre that TRT has not allowed on [its channels] will now represent us in an international music contest. (Istanbul News Center, Cumhuriyet, 1980)

The composer of the song, Attila Özdemiroğlu, was insistent on "Petr Oil" not being arabesk. In his explanations, like Gencebay's initial statements, Özdemiroğlu equated arabesk with Arab music and then argued that neither Gencebay's music nor "Petr Oil" was arabesk. Similar to Gencebay, he described "Petr Oil" as a "contemporary Turkish piece" that was based on TAM makams. Further, he argued that he used classical Turkish music makams because he wanted to showcase the authentic side of the East. He believed that the West did not want Turks to adapt to the Western styles and actually craved to see songs with local elements. He also stated that critics were attacking because they did not want to admit their Easternness.

In one of the March issues, Gong Magazine arranged a meeting for Gencebay and Özdemiroğlu to discuss arabesk and its relation to Turkish culture and made a cover story out of their conversations. According to the article, it seemed that Gencebay accepted "Petr Oil" as of "his kind":

Q30: Orhan Gencebay was asking, "Is this the first time you're trying this kind of music?"

"No," Özdemiroğlu replied, "I produced similar works for the Hürmüz musical before."

"Where did the idea to pursue this genre come from?"

"Well, my dear Orhan, if you really think about it, we are actually late! It's pointless to deny ourselves. We are from the East. What we should do is go to the [Eurovision] competition with our own authentic music... In fact, the West is always open to all kinds of innovation... (Orhan Gencebay, Atilla Özdemiroğlu, Gong Magazine, 1980)

Others, though, argued that "Petr Oil" did not have anything to do with Turkish culture. They equated arabesk to Arab songs and claimed that "Petr Oil" would resonate with Arabs more than Turks. Some musicians were worried that such a song would misrepresent Turkish culture and reinforce the stereotypes that put all Middle Easterners in the same basket.

Coupled with Özdemiroğlu's, and occasionally other arabesk artists', interventions, these discussions led to convoluted and inconsistent definitions of arabesk. For example, while criticizing the preoccupation of the public and the media with Eurovision, Ali Sirmen, one of the prominent reflective intellectuals in the discourse, introduced "Petr Oil" as follows:

Q31: Last week could be called Petr Oil week. It is worth mentioning again that Petr Oil will represent Turkey in the Eurovision contest, [it is] allegedly an arabesk song that is composed of Turkish melodies. (Ali Sirmen, Cumhuriyet, 1980)

However, as the contest date approached, the differences were set aside, and the media started to support the song because, in the end, "Petr Oil" would represent Turkey on an international platform. Another source of support came from the fact that Özdemiroğlu, Yurdatapan, and Pekkan being well-known figures in the industry. Musicians who were friends with them or worked with them also held back their opinions and gave vague answers when questioned about the appropriateness of the song. Additionally, some reflective intellectuals, although they did not like arabesk per se, supported "Petr Oil" because their dislike of TRT's bans and the government made them side with Yurdatapan. As such, the initial backlash started to soften after a couple of weeks.

The preparation process coincided with the success of "Gönül" and the trend of chameleons switching to arabesk. So, during this time, arabesk, and especially Gencebay, enjoyed positive attention from the media. Gencebay graced the cover of Gong Magazine multiple times and was even attributed the title of "pop expert."

Nonetheless, the tide turned when "Petr Oil" got 15th place in the actual competition. The results led to the resurgence of the "war against arabesk," but this time, the war was led by pop artists and industry intellectuals. They argued that this defeat should have been expected because no such genre as "arabesk" existed in European music categorization. Pop artists described the failure of "Petr Oil" as a wake-up call and convened together to discuss "the incident" and look for ways to revitalize Turkish pop. After Eurovision 1980, not only the popularity of arabesk among pop artists decreased, the attacks on arabesk intensified. As exemplified by Q26 above, even those who were involved in arabesk, like Zerrin Özer, began criticizeing arabesk. Atilla Özdemiroğlu, too, distanced himself from arabesk and gave out relatively unsupportive statements. In an investigative piece on arabesk published in late 1980, he stated the following:

> Q32: [Arabesk is] a synthesis of the genres that currently affect Turkish
> society. It is under the influence of alaturka, Western pop. It expresses
> the crisis the society is in... As society changes, this music will disappear.
> Due to its lack of diversity in content and form, and its musical qualities,
> I cannot place this music among the advanced arts. I do not desire this
> type of music to dominate [our] society. (Atilla Özdemiroğlu, Milliyet
> Sanat, 1980)

The rest of 1980 witnessed intense attacks on arabesk from the media and industry intellectuals. The attacks got so intense that arabesk artists felt the need to put a stop to it. Orhan Gencebay, Ferdi Tayfur, and Mine Koşan spoke to Gong Magazine to protest the unfair distress they were put under due to Eurovision and stated that neither the song nor the contest itself had anything to do with them:

> Q33: Arabeskers are super mad!
> The attempts to label Petr Oil's failure in Eurovision as the bankruptcy
> of the arabesk genre resulted in the expected reaction...
> Orhan Gencebay: "I do not accept that Petr Oil is arabesk... We never
> said to anyone, "Let's participate in the competition with an arabesk
> song," but now, indirectly, the music we make is getting the blame."

> Ferdi Tayfur: "If the song was arabesk, then why wasn't Orhan Gence-
> bay's opinion taken into account [in the beginning]?" (Mehmet Özakay,
> Gong Magazine, 1980)

After Eurovision 1980, the curious attention in arabesk started to fade away, and chameleon pop artists began to distance themselves from arabesk.

In addition to the developments in the entertainment industry, other intellectuals problematized arabesk in different domains as well. The subsequent theme focuses on these discussions.

5.2.3 Arabesk as a "Sociological Issue"

Another notable phenomenon during this phase was the emergence of lengthy and in-depth articles, both within and outside of Cumhuriyet, that delved into the characteristics of arabesk music and its impact on society. These articles were significant in that the ideas they proposed stayed prominent, some continuously, others through periodic revivals, throughout the study and directly influenced the discourse of the 1980s and 1990s. Some of them were published multiple times in different outlets; they were also quoted by other articles in the data. Further, these articles indirectly shaped the narratives of the 2000s, including the present day, by influencing the academic work published in the 1990s. Specifically, the books written by Özbek (1991) and Güngör (1993), both of which are heavily referenced in academic texts on arabesk, relied on these articles as their archival sources and were greatly influenced by their writing style. Therefore, interpretations and misinterpretations reviewed under this theme have been formative for the entire arabesk discourse.

The initial calls for a "sociological examination" of arabesk were made by Atilla Dorsay in the previous phase (e.g., Q6 above). These calls were motivated by the popularity of Gencebay among the slum-dwelling lower class, who were living in very harsh conditions. In the 1970s, Dorsay, and others who echoed his thoughts, argued that Gencebay's work could be helpful in representing and reaching out to the slum community.

In the second phase, the calls for seriously examining arabesk continued; however, the tone of these articles changed. Specifically, during this phase, arabesk was not seen as a medium for reaching out to and rehabilitating slum residents, but

instead, it was interpreted as one of the problems associated with immigration and slumization.

As indicated by the titles "From Orhan Gencebay to Ferdi Tayfur," "From Yunus Emre to Ferdi Tayfur,", and "Ferdi Tayfur is actually a bundle of issues!...," these articles were partly stimulated by Tayfur's emergence and the perceived harm he caused. Additionally, the increasing popularity of arabesk created a sense of urgency among sociologists and musicians, as they believed that if an immediate intervention was not made, it could be too late for Turkish culture.

Unlike some others who expected arabesk to dissipate on its own (e.g., Q32), these intellectuals argued that arabesk was not a temporary trend but rather a social "issue" or "movement" (referred as "arabesk olayı" in Turkish) and required active involvement from the state and technocrats. Metaphors likening arabesk to a disease, epidemic, infection, drug addiction, and wildfires were frequently used to emphasize the urgency and the need for attention to the issue.

In-depth articles often began or ended by criticizing other intellectuals for ridiculing or looking down on arabesk, not for the humiliation part per se, but for disregarding the negative influence of arabesk on Turkish culture and society. They also criticized the proponents of arabesk for their portrayal of the genre as "the music of the public." Instead, they inserted that arabesk must have been taken seriously and studied systematically; and then implicitly or explicitly promoted their texts as a first step in this direction. These texts first presented the case of arabesk, then proposed a series of cause-effect relationships to explain the reasons and mechanisms behind arabesk, and finally offered certain prescriptions for solving the "problem."

The first reason for intellectuals interpreting arabesk as an issue was its musical quality. The articles generally depicted arabesk as a primitive and technically flawed mixture of Eastern and Western sounds. They described arabesk as a messy amalgamation of TAM, TFM, Arab, Iranian, Indian, and European-American music that ignored the rules of harmony and layering. As a result, they argued that arabesk did not fit to musical standards. Additionally, while they appreciated that Gencebay was a talented bağlama player, they emphasized that his musical knowledge was self-thought and limited and, therefore, arabesk was an amateurish attempt at best. In sum, intellectuals agreed that arabesk was "bad music" and viewed the spread of arabesk among the slum dwellers as a major threat. They claimed that the slum residents already lacked taste and were uneducated about music and arts, and arabesk further deteriorated their condition.

Second, the content (pessimist, fatalist, melancholic, glorifying suffering) and the

style of execution (cries, screams, whining) were also explicitly mentioned as dangerous aspects of arabesk. These intellectuals highlighted that arabesk captivated the poor masses with its relatable sad and pessimistic lyrics and melodies and trapped them in a loop of despair where sadness led people to arabesk and arabesk led to even more melancholy. For example, Dorsay who was initially hopeful about the potential use of arabesk as a means of expressing the issues faced by internal migrants changed his opinion in the second phase and argued that instead of addressing the concerns of the public, arabesk ensured that people remained immersed in their sorrows:

> Q34: But Gencebay's music undoubtedly goes best with alcohol. It's as if alcohol calls this music, and the music calls for alcohol. It's pessimistic, sorrowful, and painful music. It tells the story of individuals who have constantly been dealt bad hands, who have loved and not been loved in return, or who have lost their loved ones, whose fate struck them by one blow after another. It's all complaints, feelings of inferiority, and grievances... It's all about surrendering or "submitting" to "fate," about seeking solace in alcohol. Gencebay encompasses all the problems of the world; these problems are the source, meaning, and essence of his music. In a world without sorrows, Gencebay's music would have no purpose. And that's why Gencebay is embraced. Our audience is sad; our people are sad too... In Turkey, where life is tough until societal dynamics that will provide solutions to these troubles come into action, personal remedies are sought. (Atilla Dorsay, Cumhuriyet, 1979)

The criticisms against the technical flaws and the lyrics united in their emphasis on the element of exploitation. These intellectuals, and also many of their contemporaries, were aware of the brutal conditions the lower classes lived in and wanted them to get better. In this context, arabesk singers were seen as a direct hindrance to the development of disadvantaged groups. They were condemned for exacerbating the despair and helplessness of the lower classes with their crude, unsophisticated music, and melancholic lyrics. Further, what really angered intellectuals was the concealment of this exploitation under the premise of making "music of the public." For instance, one of the reflective authors wrote the following in his column on the current state of Turkish music:

> Q35: These songs, which are not at all brilliant in terms of musical qual-

ity, seek to lull our people to sleep within a weird, drug-like masochism and look for the solution in cries of "Oh God, recreate me from scratch!" [refers to lyrics of a song called "Tanrım beni baştan yarat"]. Thousands, millions of those who cannot see that even if their creator was to recreate them ten times over within this distorted system, nothing would change are running after these questionable celebrities who pocket millions in sobs and sighs. And some others, those who are under the influence of blind and foolish populism, label these people as the true artists of our people. (Ali Sirmen, Cumhuriyet, 1981)

After describing the dimensions of the problem, these texts then explained various alleged causes that led to the emergence of arabesk. Besides, intellectuals argued that these causes were deeply rooted in Turkish culture and society, and thus, superficial actions like bans from TV and radio would be ineffective. Consequently, these intellectuals proposed certain policies for the state and other musicians to follow to eradicate arabesk. These causes, namely "Bans on Turkish music," "Internal Migration and Slumization," and "Fatalism and Glorification of Pain," and the corresponding policies proposed for them are the subthemes of this overarching theme and are explained in detail below.

5.2.3.1 Bans on Turkish Music

A frequently proposed reason for arabesk's emergence, both during this phase and in subsequent phases, was the restrictions on Turkish music and the misguided cultural policies implemented by the state and TRT. This cause was primarily offered by industry intellectuals who were knowledgeable about music, such as Zülfü Livaneli and Timur Selçuk, who portrayed arabesk as an unintended consequence that occurred because the superficial and dogmatic approaches of the authorities blocked the natural development of Turkish music. Specifically, these intellectuals pointed out two different musical policies. First, they criticized the policies of the young Turkish Republic for banning Turkish music, particularly TFM, and forcing Western classical music on the public, even though people showed no interest in Western genres at that time. They claimed that these approaches sabotaged Turkish music's development and widened the taste gap between different social classes. Second, they criticized TRT's gentrification and standardization of TFM. As described in Chapter 4, TRT did not allow the use of indigenous instruments, dialects, and musical forms and

attempted to homogenize folk songs from different regions under a limited number of compositional standards. These washed-out adaptations, in turn, hindered the public's resonance with TRT's broadcasts. Together, these policies stripped the public of their authentic music and impeded the natural evolution of Turkish music that would have otherwise developed parallel to the changes in social structure. As a result, the public, who could not identify with either the forced Western music or the diluted TFM songs, was pushed into a state of cultural deprivation or a "cultural gap." In the following years, this gap was filled with the soundtracks of Egyptian movies that were more familiar to the masses than classical Western music. In some narratives, the soundtracks are replaced or supplemented by people quitting listening to TRT and turning to Arab radios that were more in line with their tastes (see SQ20 in Appendix A). Either way, these narratives emphasized that the main culprit of arabesk was the state and TRT, who accidentally prepared the conditions for arabesk music to emerge.

The role of arabesk artists within this context was interpreted in two divergent ways. According to one interpretation, Gencebay and other arabeskers aimed to improve Turkish music or at least satisfy the public's demand for new yet familiar music through polyphonizing TAM and TFM. Nonetheless, because they did not have enough knowledge of musical rules and standards, they were unable to produce high-quality songs. This perspective was generally offered by industry intellectuals who were interviewed for the in-depth articles. These intellectuals, majority of whom were musicians themselves, appreciated the natural talent of certain arabesk artists like Gencebay, Tatlıses, and Kibariye and felt sorry that these people did not get the training that would make them flourish. They argued that although arabesk was "bad music," nobody had a right to criticize the artists for doing the most out of their circumstances. For example, a Cumhuriyet author provided the following quote from Doğan Cangal, a famous cellist and Western classical music composer:

> Q36: Cangal says that when a "national music policy" could not be estab-
> lished, the public took matters into their own hands and satisfied their
> musical needs with whatever was put in front of them. In this regard,
> Cangal explains that nobody has the right to condemn arabesk music or
> its performers. Just as, he says, when a national housing policy was not
> created, the people turned to the solution of "slums" for their housing
> needs, the same thing happened in music. (Ahmet Tan, Cumhuriyet,
> 1982)

Instead, these intellectuals blamed the state and TRT for stripping the public's cultural heritage and expecting too much from individuals without providing them with the necessary education and tools to develop a refined musical taste.

In contrast, the other narrative portrayed Gencebay and others in a more opportunistic light. Accordingly, arabeskers smartly observed society's demand for more modern forms of music, but instead of making good use of this observation, they took advantage of the cultural distress of the society by offering the simplest music that could satisfy the needs of the public. For example, in an interview with Cumhuriyet, Avni Anıl, a classical Turkish music artist, expressed his opinion on arabesk artists as follows:

> Q37: These so-called artists who spread to the entire country have taken advantage of the lack of education [of the public] and are benefiting from it. It is impossible to deal with these individuals one by one. Personally, I applaud these individuals for presenting their non-artistic skills as art, whether through the press or other media outlets, and popularizing it. They must be doing something right... They are in the spotlight, attracting a large following and making big money. It seems that we have been unable to convey the true essence and beauty of music to [the public] for years, and with today's understanding, this task will be further delayed, it seems! (Avni Anıl, Cumhuriyet, 1981)

The authors of the in-depth articles also did not have much tolerance towards arabesk artists and dismissed those with more moderate approaches to arabesk. However, they agreed that TRT and the government were the main culprits of arabesk's emergence as they were the ones who created the conditions that allowed arabesk to prosper.

Overall, this subtheme portrayed arabesk as a product of a long history of policies and regulations and emphasized that arabesk was an unintended consequence of state interference. As such, intellectuals who put forward this argument believed that music, even arabesk, should not have been banned or regulated. To get rid of arabesk and develop the musical taste of Turkish people, what should be done was to reform the music education system and train people from their childhood. When the public had the necessary education and tools, appropriate music would emerge by itself.

5.2.3.2 Internal Migration and Slumization

In the mid-1970s, arabesk's audience expanded from drivers to rural-to-urban immigrants residing in the slums and then to lower classes in general. As explained in Chapter 4, this group allegedly comprised 35 to 60 percent of the metropolitan population. Further, along with the impoverished in the province, the lower classes constituted the vast majority of the population. As a result, they were referred to as "the public" or "the masses" in the discourse.

In this context, intellectuals observed the popularity of arabesk among the immigrant communities and highlighted that slumization was a significant factor that accelerated the spread of arabesk music. Moreover, they argued that arabesk would not have been as popular if the migration had not been this severe or if the genre had emerged at a different time in history. This claim was based on several assumptions.

First, some evaluators argued that immigrants were under great stress as they were experiencing poverty, culture shock, ostracism, and deprivation of basic needs. As a result, the sadness and melancholy in arabesk songs resonated with them and validated their feelings (see Q34 above).

Second, intellectuals assumed that the immigrants identified with arabesk artists and lived vicariously through their success. Indeed, many of the singers themselves came from poor families, though usually not from the slums but from rural towns, and arabesk movies often depicted the stories of the working class. As a result, the lower classes identified with arabesk artists and developed a liking towards them. For example, in his seven-part investigative series on arabesk, musician and musicologist Zülfü Livaneli stated the following:

> Q38: The relationship between this music genre and the public is based on a sense of identification. Ferdi Tayfur, who was enthusiastically applauded by tens of thousands of listeners at the recent Izmir Fair, is one of the thousands of young people from Anatolia who have come to the big city to try their luck. [Tayfur] embodies the dreams of all these people on the stage, and he is their "personal" revenge. (Zülfü Livaneli, Cumhuriyet, 1980)

Third, although less frequently mentioned, some intellectuals hypothesized that arabesk was liked by the slum residents because it created a common culture for immigrants who came from different regions of Turkey. These intellectuals argued

that because TFM varied significantly from province to province, people who came from different geographical locations could not fully enjoy each other's music. In this context, arabesk emerged as a common interest that was appreciated by everyone in the slums regardless of their background. However, they also claimed that the slum residents gathering around arabesk led the other socioeconomic classes to distance themselves from the genre. For example, Onat Kutlar, who was also a journalist at Cumhuriyet, commented the following on this issue in his in-depth analysis of arabesk in another magazine:

> Q39: Gencebay's songs were neither specific to any region or group, and their lyrics were suitable for the daily lives, desires, and emotions of the masses. In short, they were "unifying" in terms of regional aspects and "divisive" for the impoverished population of the slum settlements. (Onat Kutlar, Milliyet Sanat, 1980)

During this phase, due to its profound influence on the demographic structure of Turkey, mass migration was a prominent topic of debate and discussion. Consequently, the relationship between immigrants and arabesk often appeared in various texts generated by a diverse set of intellectuals. In texts, various connections were formed between slum residents, migration, and arabesk. However, as intellectuals debated these associations repeatedly and a higher number of people offered their opinions, the connection between arabesk and lower classes became somewhat exaggerated and distorted. For example, arabesk was as popular among the rural areas as it was in the slums, but this popularity was often overlooked. More importantly, although very few arabesk artists came from the slums, some intellectuals associated arabesk with the slums to the point that they believed arabesk was invented in the shanty towns. Further, others attempted to create analogies between the attributes of slums and the musical qualities of arabesk, such as finding parallels between the flawed or faulty urbanization and technical faults of arabesk or between the disarray in the cities and cacophony attributed to arabesk (see SQ21 and SQ22 in Appendix A).

Gencebay also underlined that the association with slums was exaggerated and specifically accused the sociologist and journalist Ergin Ergönültaş (see Table 3.2) of starting and spreading this connection. Gencebay's motivation for dissociating himself from the lower classes was the same as his attempt to move away from the drivers in that he did not like to be limited to a certain segment of society and wanted to emphasize that everybody listened to his music (see SQ23 in Appendix

A and Q89 below).

Regardless of whether the slum residents were the main audience of arabesk, they were the most visible segment of society discussed within the discourse. Consequently, similar to the association with drivers, the connection to slums significantly influenced the narratives surrounding arabesk.

The association of arabesk with slums was also significant because it exposed the conflicting emotions experienced by intellectuals towards the poor masses. Many Cumhuriyet authors, and also external figures like Ergönültaş, self-identified as communists, socialists, or social democrats (see Chapter 4) and, at least in theory, wanted to support the lower classes. They were empathetic towards them and wanted to help improve their conditions. However, at the same time, they were repulsed by the changes resulting from mass immigration and were critical of the tastes, habits, and political preferences of slum residents. For example, while describing his walk through the neighborhoods of Istanbul that he had known since childhood, columnist Oktay Akbal expressed the following:

> Q40: . . . houses and gardens are all demolished, creating a long, wide street from Aksaray to Unkapanı. The Saraçhanebaşı of my childhood had disappeared... I must avoid going back to the past!... I climbed the stairs, and there it was the Municipality Palace... A never-ending row of minibuses... Each one exudes a different vibe. A noise that drowns out memories, a noise that squeezes joy out of the morning, like squeezing a lemon... I must escape from this bus stop, from the noise, from vulgarity, from ugliness... Yes, from ugliness... Rodin defines ugliness in art as "being devoid of personality." "Not representing any action or external reality" ... But try to remember Boileau's words: "Everything becomes ugly in poverty"... Aren't all these minibus songs, vulgarity, and ugliness the "work, the product of poverty"?... I said to myself, then again, I said to myself, "You found solace, you found a way to understand, a way to tolerate"... (Oktay Akbal, Cumhuriyet, 1981)

Intellectuals saved themselves from this dilemma by categorizing the slum residents and other lower classes as "lumpen" or "lumpenproletariat." These were Marxist terms used for the part of the working class that was incapable of or uninterested in revolution. Historically, the lumpenproletariat consisted of marginalized communities like criminals, sex workers, minorities, and nomads. Lumpens constituted the worst part of the lower classes because they were self-centered and driven by their

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own narrow interests. As such, they were in direct contrast to the ordinary proletariat, who were the active working class that would be the bearers of the revolution. Therefore, lumpens were not worthy of sympathy and assistance. In the context of arabesk, categorizing slum dwellers a lumpenproletariat meant that although slum residents were suffering now, they were cunning and self-seeking, and when they got the chance, they would side with the oppressor instead of intellectuals.

The association between arabesk and the lumpenproletariat became more prominent in subsequent phases and remained a recurring theme. This topic will be further explored and elaborated in the rest of this chapter.

The solution intellectuals proposed for the problem of immigration was improving the conditions the slum dwellers lived in. They argued that the hardships these people had to endure, whether it was poverty, humiliation, or lack of infrastructure, pushed them towards arabesk and arabeskers. Once these problems were revoked, on the condition that the necessary cultural education was provided simultaneously, their interest in arabesk would disappear by itself.

5.2.3.3 Fatalism and Glorification of Pain

Another source of arabesk highlighted by intellectuals was fatalism and glorification of pain in Turkish and Islamic culture. Specifically, intellectuals argued that the masses were able to identify with arabesk because it aligned with the fatalistic culture in which they were raised.

Fatalism in Islam ("kadercilik" in Turkish; derived from Arabic words qadr or qadar) is based on the understanding that God predetermines everything and that occurrences in life come from God for a pre-planned purpose. Accordingly, as people navigate through life, they must perceive things that happened to them as God's tests and appreciate and find value in both the good and the bad fortunes. Intellectuals associated arabesk with fatalism because they found parallels between this understanding and the lyrics of arabesk songs that pushed people to accept their unfortunate circumstances and submit to their fate. Ferdi Tayfur was specifically accused of encouraging fatalism because his lyrics often promoted helplessness, acceptance, and surrender.

Moreover, the fatalism philosophy in Turkey portrayed bad faith, suffering, and being in painful situations as high value. Beliefs such as "God gives his toughest battles to his strongest soldiers" or the Sufist notion that one can attain spiritual

elevation through enduring pain indicated that people going through hardships were of good character and would be rewarded in the future or afterlife. As such, some intellectuals argued that Turkish people liked exaggerating their pain and actively showcased their bad fortunes to gain appreciation from others. Arabesk was then used as a prop to display the pain one was in.

Moreover, intellectuals who supported this perspective intentionally or unintentionally depicted arabesk as a natural and inevitable consequence of Turkish culture. As evidence, they pointed to other cultural products that gained popularity due to their presentation of painful content. They emphasized the role of Yeşilçam movies where people measure the value of movies based on their crying factor. For example, upon being asked how music critics should approach arabesk, the musicologist Faruk Yener expressed the following:

> Q41: Considering the geographical location of our country and the economic and social conditions it is in, "arabesk" is easily understandable. [Our] ears, that are conditioned by melodies originating from the "East" adorned by "sorrowful" and "melancholic" lyrics, naturally embrace a movement [like arabesk] ... [This] strange alloy formed by mixing sorrow, gloom, hardship, melancholy, and pain had been prepared over the centuries, and it was going to be poured into millions of molds at the first opportunity, and it did... And the fire is constantly stoked for commercial gain, and the alloy is boiled vigorously for exploiting the tastelessness. . .
> (Faruk Yener, Cumhuriyet, 1983)

Orhan Gencebay also did not deny the fatalism and pessimism in arabesk. However, in this phase and the subsequent phases, he often emphasized the general tendency in Turkish songs towards pain and fatalism and pointed out that arabesk was being scapegoated. In other words, Gencebay used fatalism in Turkish and Eastern culture as a defense for arabesk by suggesting that sad lyrics and melodies were commonly shared in Turkish music over the decades and even centuries. In his 1982 interview with Cumhuriyet, upon being asked why his songs were so melancholic, he said:

> Q42: Well, before me, it was even more sorrowful. If you're interested in Turkish music, Turkish Classical Music, in particular, reflects the emotions and thoughts of people who are predominantly experiencing suffering, about ninety percent of it. Suffering is expressed in our music. Pain, hardship, and so on. Because it is present in Eastern philosophy,

in Turkish philosophy. The dominant idea is that individuals who do not suffer cannot mature. They say pain matures people. (Orhan Gencebay, interviewed by Yalçın Pekşen, Cumhuriyet, 1982)

However, the majority of intellectuals believed that no matter what the past was like, Turkish people did not deserve to be pushed into a fatalistic mindset. They argued that fatalism led people to lethargy and complacency and, thus, prevented them from actively seeking change and improvement. As a result, they viewed arabesk as especially harmful because it promoted suffering and enabled the reproduction and dissemination of fatalistic beliefs, and consequently hindered social progress. If fatalism was to be eradicated, arabesk must have been prevented too. In his column that compared arabesk to drugs, journalist Vural Sözer wrote the following:

Q43: Drugs are divided into three main categories: 1) Substances. 2) Words. 3) Sounds... When drug addiction becomes widespread, it engulfs society in a state of lethargy. The desire for work and progress decreases. Society becomes weakened and sluggish. The reason for combating drug users is precisely this... As for drug sounds... It is possible to hear them in arabesk cassettes and [casinos]. The lyrics of arabesk songs darken the listener's heart. Their eyes become teary. They become unable to think. They lose interest in life. They give up on themselves. They see people as tombstones. A businessman listening to arabesk music in a casino showering a singer with rose petals from a plate does not increase the production of that businessman's factory. A country where the majority listens to arabesk music cannot increase its exports. Their products cannot compete with Japanese products in the global market. Law enforcement agencies may or may not choose to intensify their fight against drugs in this area too. No one can interfere. (Vural Sözer, Cumhuriyet, 1983)

Consequently, unlike the "Arabesk Sourced in Bans" subtheme, which was anti-ban, and the "Internal Migration and Slumization" subtheme, which did not really focus on prohibitions, this subtheme demanded the government intervene directly. Fatalism and the inaction it brought were engrained in Turkish culture and character, and unless there were active intervention, it would not go away by itself. In addition to the government, these intellectuals called other musicians for help. They also criticized others who naturalized arabesk and demanded them not to exaggerate

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or romanticize the similarities between arabesk's melodies and lyrics and Turkish culture. The topic of fatalism in arabesk continued to be a significant aspect of the discourse in subsequent phases as well.

The three subthemes shared a common viewpoint in presenting arabesk as a threat at a societal level. They highlighted the potential adverse consequences of arabesk in various realms, such as the degradation of Turkish music standards, hindrance to the progress of lower classes, and the promotion of complacency and lethargy among the public. Frequent use of metaphors like disease or wildfire further heightened the sense of urgency conveyed in these texts. All three also believed that arabesk could be solved only through societal-level policies like proper music and cultural education.

These intellectuals succeeded in disseminating the portrayal of arabesk as a general problem since others also started to echo that arabesk was a social issue to be solved, both in this phase and in subsequent phases. However, some musicians protested this idea and believed that these intellectuals were exaggerating the situation. They argued that "bad" or commercial cultural products periodically emerged everywhere in the world, and while arabesk may not be a positive development, it should not be taken so seriously. For example, İlhan Usmanbaş, one of the first and most influential classical Western music composers of Turkey stated the following on arabesk:

> Q44: I can describe this phenomenon as environmental pollution or something similar. It is a momentary thing that will later disappear; ugly, easy, and there are many similar phenomena in the world. This type of music is listened to by those who are involved in certain struggles and can numb every second of their 24 hours. I'm not suggesting anything about this matter. Banning this music is not a solution either. (İlhan Usmanbaş, Milliyet Sanat, 1980)

This perspective, which portrayed arabesk as one issue among many others, constituted the base of the more tolerant approaches that appeared in the data. In the specific data set of this study, the tolerant approaches were not frequent or prominent enough, i.e. they did not have an impact on others, to constitute a separate theme, however, they consistently appeared throughout the study. Advocates of this perspective, although they did not personally like arabesk or see much value in it, believed that the opponents were inflating the problem. Instead they argued that arabesk was just another trend that would diminish by itself overtime, in one way or another.

Nonetheless, intellectuals generally continued to focus on adverse influences of arabesk. The following theme explores how arabesk was turned in a representative of a general decline in cultural values.

5.2.4 Arabesk as Low Culture

During the second phase, especially after the September 12 coup (see Chapter 4), intellectuals began to develop a broader narrative surrounding arabesk that went beyond music to encompass other products and categories. These new associations then expanded the meaning of the term "arabesk," which came to refer to a general process of degeneration.

Specifically, this narrative was based on two transformations that occurred in Turkey and explained in Chapter 4 in detail. First, after the coup and the general elections in 1983, Turkey transitioned to a liberal economic system. Second, the cultural impact of mass migration became more pronounced as immigrants became more visible in everyday urban life. Some intellectuals believed that the rural immigrants had become the majority and felt that they were imposing their culture on the urban population, essentially taking the cities away from the original inhabitants.

These two changes intersect in that, unlike intellectuals who disapproved of liberalism and held a negative attitude towards the economic changes, the immigrants and lower classes were very receptive to them and adapted to these transformations. Consequently, the social and cultural shifts witnessed in the early 1980s reflected an amalgamation of rural traditions and habits with the products and values imported from the West. This fusion created a "low culture" that was seen as tacky, commercial, low taste, and sometimes immoral by intellectuals. Further, intellectuals interpreted the products of low culture as indicators of society-wise degeneration or decay, and juxtaposed these cultural expressions with "high culture," which included their personal values and preferences. The low culture was made up of numerous sub-categories, and the most prominent ones are described below.

First, ugly architecture, make-shift buildings, destruction of traditional houses, and replacement of them with banal and ugly architecture were important parts of these observed transformations. Discussions surrounding the changes in landscapes, architecture, and also the demography of the cities appeared very frequently in the discourse. In these narratives, the worsening conditions of the city, ugly buildings, slumization, traffic, and pollution were associated with immigrants. Arabesk

was then used as an example to show that these people did not have any taste or aesthetic concerns. For example, Müşerref Hekimoğlu, one the most productive nostalgic intellectuals, said the following when she visited Istanbul after a while:

> Q45: Istanbul is just like a noblewoman who, despite being given ugly makeup, dressed in tasteless clothes, and hidden under incompetence, doesn't lose her noble beauty... One desires to erase those colors, tear off those clothes. One yearns for such courageous hands. One wonders how far our efforts should extend to beautify this city, to prevent it from being disfigured and petrified by inexperienced hands. But shouldn't we be a bit more realistic? In a city where arabesk music is increasingly prevalent, how can we expect any other development? (Müşerref Hekimoğlu, Cumhuriyet, 1982)

Although nostalgic intellectuals mainly focused on the aesthetic aspect of the changes and often complained about not recognizing places they used to visit, as the slums spread, others were actually concerned about the safety and health hazard unplanned and rapid urbanization would bring.

Secondly, intellectuals believed that the normally seafood-heavy culinary culture of Istanbul and Western sea towns was being ruined by the influence of immigrants who spread pungent traditional dishes such as kebabs, kuru fasulye (a traditional bean stew), cacık (a yogurt, garlic, and cucumber dip), and lahmacun (pizza like dish with ground beef and onions). In addition, American fast food items like hamburgers, pizza, cola, and beer were getting popular in Turkey, and intellectuals disliked them and saw them as cultural corruption as well (see Q1 above and SQ24 in Appendix A). Although they often consumed these foods too, intellectuals' primary concern was the food being consumed in places where they had not been sold before, indicating their unease with social change.

Strengthening the association of immigrants and arabesk, restaurants and stands that sold this food often played arabesk on speakers, and the imagery of "vulgar" rural people drinking rakı or beer and eating smelly meat alongside arabesk either in restaurants or out in the open in their balconies or picnics started to spread.

Third, forms of cheap and "commercial entertainment" like erotic movies, low-quality comedies, melodramas, foreign soap operas, tabloids, comics, and photo-novels (fotoroman in Turkish, derived from the Italian word fotoromanzi) were spreading rapidly in Turkey (see Q47 and Q48 below). This category was an extension of

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the commercial music and film category described above in that intellectuals condemned them for not contributing anything to society except for providing mindless entertainment. Further, most of these products were imported from Europe and the US, so intellectuals were also worried about Turkish people haphazardly copying Western culture and adapting American capitalistic values.

Soap operas created a craze in the late 1970s and 1980s, and the public's preoccupation with these shows when they themselves were living in harsh conditions in a politically turbulent country was criticized by intellectuals and reinforced the perception of lower classes being disinterested in social change. As such, soaps, low-quality films, and literature were considered another form of arabesk that sedated the public by bombing them with worthless content.

Fourth, various forms of lotteries, ranging from sports betting to car and household appliance raffles, gained popularity during this phase. Moreover, pyramid scheme businesses that did not sell anything but relied on members recruiting new members were also spreading. On a deeper level, intellectuals connected these phenomena to a perceived lack of work ethic and envy of the lower classes, who were jealous of the urban population but did not want to put in the necessary effort to be like them. Instead, they always chased the easy money and tried to "turn the corner" ("köşeyi dönmek" in Turkish, a phrase meaning "hitting the jackpot"). For example, İlhan Selçuk, one of the benevolent-reflective intellectuals, expressed the following in his column:

> Q46: Luck, fortune, destiny, fate, lottery, sports betting, bingo, raffle, ringo, bingo − these words are like a punch to the stomach of a society that is increasingly arabesk-ified. The philosophy of "hit the jackpot, take the money, turn the corner" is shaping our world. (İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet, 1983)

Dreams of becoming a wealthy arabesk singer or a singer in general also belonged to the hitting-the-jackpot mindset as well.

Fifth, intellectuals believed both the masses and celebrities were becoming increasingly sexually deviant. This observation was based on two things. First, during this phase, video cassettes were imported for the first time, and the public mainly used them for watching explicit content. This development, i.e., using technology for immoral purposes, was perceived by intellectuals as an indicator of the lack of character of the lower classes. Moreover, in the 1980s, arabesk artists began to in-

corporate erotic elements and nudity into their films which led to the emergence of a new subgenre of commercial films that was a mix of arabesk and mature content:

> Q47: However, these [arabesk] films also include voluptuous women who are generously displayed to attract the segment of the audience, assumed to be the "man on the street," who supposedly goes to the cinema for visual pleasure. In "arabesk" films, nudity is taken to the extreme, but, how the women like Güngör Bayrak and Banu Alkan, who expose themselves to this extent, are getting loved and accepted by the stereotypical "Analotian man" like Ferdi Tayfur [and] Gökhan Güney, could undoubtedly be a subject of sociological examination. (Atilla Dorsay, Cumhuriyet, 1982)

Furthermore, during this period, the artists' sexual identities and clothing choices came under scrutiny. Intellectuals believed that homosexuality and transgenderism were becoming "trends" and blamed certain singers for promoting such "deviations" (see SQ14 and SQ25 in Appendix A). In addition to Zeki Müren and Bülent Ersoy (see Chapter 4) becoming subjects of sensationalized media coverage, Ferdi Özbeğen was rumored to be gay and faced criticism for wearing makeup on stage. In the early 1980s, magazines often pressured him about why he was not getting married. Cumhuriyet authors, except for a couple of entertainment writers, did not really like sexual minorities. They were especially bothered by the credit Zeki Müren got and believed that his nickname, "The Sun of Art" ("Sanat Güneşi" in Turkish) was exaggerated and undeserved. They also often criticized TRT for allowing him on TV. Moreover, all of the famous arabesk artists, including Gencebay, Tayfur, and Tatlıses, had dirty private lives and were caught in extramarital affairs. Female alaturka and arabesk artists who performed at casinos were also judged negatively for wearing revealing clothes and for using sexual innuendos to attract customers.

The sixth and arguably most prominent element of low culture was music. This subcategory of low culture was equivalent to the commercial music of the first phase. It mainly included arabesk, Özbeğen style aranjman, casino music or alaturka, and, at times, pop music.

Together, these products and habits were categorized as low culture and were strongly associated with the lower-class immigrants. Further, intellectuals believed that these were not simple trends, but all these products and behavior were signs of more profound social corruption and degeneration. Like arabesk, the other elements of low culture were perceived as a disease that threatened Turkish culture and soci-

ety. As such, intellectuals called other intellectuals to stand their ground and fight against this degeneration. For example, the editor of a literary magazine wrote the following in the advertisement of his publication:

> Q48: In the past few years, we have witnessed the impact of capitalism infiltrating almost all branches of art. Foreign capital cannot represent our national culture. Since the primary concern of capital is to increase profits, it fails to fulfill the requirements of thought and creativity. Today, capital wants to steer the art branches in the following way: musicals instead of theaters, arabesk cassette industry instead of music, painted coil paper instead of literary magazines, stacked matchboxes instead of architecture, erotic films instead of cinema, commercial galleries instead of paintings, and so on. Faced with these adverse developments brought about by degeneration, it is natural that intellectuals and artists will not remain silent; they will gather around certain magazines and cultural centers. (Ahmet Say, Cumhuriyet, 1981)

This categorization also aligned with the descriptions of slums residents and lower classes as lumpenproletariat. As described above, lumpens were not interested in revolution and social improvement but instead inclined towards instant gratification and personal gain. Moreover, due to their limited access to education and exposure to high-culture, they lacked the refined tastes and sophistication associated with the bourgeoisie. Consequently, lumpens gravitated towards cheap, mindless, and flashy forms of entertainment that did not have much value or social contribution. Products of low culture were also addictive in that once the audience was hooked, they entered a trance-like state and became indifferent to anything else. As such, low culture perpetuated the disinterest of the lower classes and made them even more lumpen. So, intellectuals also referred to this process as lumpenization.

As the spread of arabesk music continued and debates surrounding it intensified, arabesk began to overshadow other products in the low culture category. Intellectuals perceived arabesk as the primary threat among the many, and consequently, coined the verb variation of arabesk, "arabeskization," ("arabeskleşme" in Turkish) during this phase to refer to the process of change and social decay. While interviewing a famous urban planner, a journalist from Cumhuriyet asked him the following question:

> Q49: Turkey is rapidly experiencing a process of arabeskization and

lumpenization. National drink, beer; national TV show, colored video full of arabesk cacophony, the national family, [Ewing] family, [this is what it] has become ... What can we collectively do to prevent this destruction? It has gone beyond a mere nostalgia; it has become a necessary fight to protect our dignity and our livelihoods... As history looks upon us, what can we pass on to future generations? (Fatma Oran, Cumhuriyet, 1982)

In addition to the phrases and words like arabesk movement, arabesk issue, and arabeskization, in this phase, intellectuals started to use phrases like "arabesk lifestyle" and "arabesk philosophy." These phrases referred to the lower classes' way of living and summarized what intellectuals thought the lower classes were interested in. The main characters of the "arabesk lifestyle" narrative were the lower classes raised with a rural, traditional, and religious mindset and found themselves in larger cities unfamiliar with their culture. They lacked the capacity to integrate and adapt to these new environments in a healthy manner. Consequently, they were consistently drawn towards tasteless amalgamations and had a tendency to use everything in the most inappropriate and useless way. As highlighted in Q40 above, poverty further perpetuated their lack of taste.

Overall, during this phase, many new arabesk and arabesk-ish artists emerged, and some introduced new attributes to the category. As the genre gained more popularity, the artists became wealthier, which led to accusations of exploiting the public for personal gain.

After enjoying a brief popularity among the music industry intellectuals and musicians, arabesk became intensely associated with the lower class, specifically, with the rural-to-urban immigrants. Moreover, the meaning of the term "arabesk" expanded as it came to refer to everything lower classes liked and symbolized.

In the following phase, evaluations that had emerged in the second phase became more intensified, and discussions surrounding arabesk became more frequent. Moreover, the meaning of arabesk expanded even more.

5.3 Phase 3: Semantic Expansion, 1984-1987

In the third phase, İbrahim Tatlıses replaced Gencebay and Tayfur as the most salient artist in the discourse. Arabesk genre also went under certain sonic changes and a new trend of "child singers" began. Moreover, in the mid-1980s, intellectuals used the term "arabesk" to refer to an even broader range of phenomena. Specifically, arabesk became strongly associated with Turgut Özal, the newly elected Prime Minister of Turkey, ANAP, his political party, and the mix of conservative and liberal policies they followed (see Chapter 4). Consequently, the meaning of the genre expanded from a culture or lifestyle to include a variety of connotations related to ANAP's policies and the attributes of its electorate. Paralleling this development, the most influential group of intellectuals during this phase were the reflective ones who initially did not pay attention to arabesk much.

The third phase includes four main themes and four subthemes. The first theme, "Arabesk's Peak," explains the changes in the melodies, tempo, and lyrics of arabesk songs and the process of how arabesk dominated popular culture. The second theme, "Association with ANAP," examines how arabesk came to be connected to Turgut Özal, ANAP, and ANAP's electorate. It also explores the attributes of the broader fan base recognized by intellectuals after ANAP's election. The third theme, "Arabesk as an Adjective," focuses on the semantic expansion of the term "arabesk" from a movement and lifestyle to a broadly negative adjective used to describe various phenomena. This overarching theme includes three subthemes, each corresponding to a different meaning arabesk acquired due to its association with ANAP's policies. These subthemes are titled "Arabesk as Flawed and Haphazard," "Arabesk as Religious and Anti-secular," and "Arabesk as Exaggeration." The fourth and last theme, "Disorientation and Defeat," delves into how the rapid and fundamental changes taking place in Turkey pushed intellectuals into a state of disconnection from reality that led them to believe that they lost their battle against arabesk and ANAP.

5.3.1 Arabesk's Peak

In the mid-1980s, Orhan Gencebay and Ferdi Tayfur had their cult following and loyal fans; however, the most visible and influential arabesk artist of this time was

İbrahim Tatlıses. Aside from sonic differences, which are elaborated below, Tatlıses differed from Gencebay and Tayfur in four ways. First, as explained above, unlike Gencebay and Tayfur, Tatlıses was not blacklisted by TRT until he got involved with a political issue, and he generally appeared on TRT more frequently than Tayfur and Gencebay. Second, Tatlıses took advantage of every opportunity he received. While Tayfur and Gencebay preferred concerts and rejected casino deals, Tatlıses performed in casinos, restaurants, matinees, concerts, and fairs. Third, Tatlıses had a better relationship with journalists than Tayfur and Gencebay. He was more approachable and friendly, told things as it was, and was open about his private life (see Q25 above). In contrast, Gencebay and Tayfur approached journalists more politically and were more strategic in what they revealed. This was because they were concerned about the legitimacy and reputation of the arabesk genre and sought to influence the discourse actively. When the journalists asked about their private lives or the conversation did not go how they wanted, they became frustrated and sometimes refused to answer certain questions. Fourth and most importantly, Tatlıses never quit TFM. During this phase, he continued to be categorized as a TFM artist by TRT and various award shows. His TFM songs and albums further expanded his audience.

Regarding the differences in sound, after his first arabesk hit, "Sabuha," Tatlıses's arabesk songs gradually evolved into a synthesis of Eastern folk songs and arabesk. In this phase, he released more upbeat and cheerful songs with even more folk influence. Additionally, his lyrics were simple, repetitive, and catchy, which made it easier for the listeners to memorize and sing along. This simplicity contrasted Gencebay and Tayfur's songs, who usually wrote heavy and complicated lyrics (see SQ26 in Appendix A). Tatlıses's songs were also similar to the pianist-chanteurs in that the songs of the latter group were also brighter and simpler. Indeed, during this phase, pianist-chanteurs or taverna became more popular together with folk arabesk. Songs like "I love you" by Ümit Besen, "Mavi Mavi" and "Allah Allah" by İbrahim Tatlıses, and "Seni Sevmeyen Ölsün" by Tüdünya were often used by politicians in their campaigns and advertisements due to their catchiness, which further increased their dissemination.

Tatlıses's fame and wealth in this phase inspired thousands from the rural areas of the country to come to Istanbul and try their luck in Unkapanı (see Chapter 4). As Unkapanı became the Mecca of those who dreamt of being the next Tatlıses, the salience of music producers and the inner workings of the music industry in the discourse also increased. Industry intellectuals started to account for influential actors working in Unkapanı, and multiple investigative pieces on the music industry were published. In the mid-1980s, a lot of one hit wonders emerged and the imagery

of "young Anatolians coming to Unkapanı with nothing but their bağlama in their hands" became a prominent symbol in modern Turkish culture. For instance, in his case study on Unkapanı, an investigative journalist ended his article with the following paragraph:

> Q50: Having "hits" like "Mavi Mavi," which sold 1.5 million copies last year, also increases the sales of other cassettes. This is because the customers who visit [the stores] become interested in others as well, and for example, Mustafa Açıkses's cassettes can sell tens of thousands in the meantime.
> − "Who is Mustafa Açıkses?"
> Don't you worry. At a speed that music listeners outside of this market cannot keep up with, new "Açıkseses" are rising and falling every day. (Cem Hamuloğlu, Cumhuriyet, 1986)

Another development in this phase was the emergence of "child singers." This trend was largely popularized by Küçük (Little in Turkish) Emrah, who rose to fame in 1985 when he was 14-15 years old. Emrah was followed by Küçük Ceylan (Little Ceylan) and then many others. The little singers were managed and marketed by their family members who intentionally wanted to evoke sympathy and pity from the public by creating an image of a poor and suffering child that had been through tragedies and had to take care of his or her family financially. Emrah and Ceylan's films also followed a unique, tear-jerker formula where they almost always played the role of impoverished orphans struggling to put food on the table for their younger siblings by working casinos and pavilions (see Chapter 4) under cruel mafia bosses. Many evaluators thought this was their real-life story, though neither of them was an orphan nor impoverished to that degree. Accordingly, the families of these little singers were criticized for both deceiving the public and exploiting their children.

An additional factor that led to the proliferation of arabesk artists was the ease of production. Both within and outside Unkapanı, many "producers" simply bought a microphone, a recording tape, empty cassettes, and cheaply produced singles and albums. These albums were then distributed through pirate sellers without paying any registration fees or taxes, as the copyright laws in Turkey at that time were weak and were not actively applied. Additionally, people could plagiarize others' songs, illegally sample other people's work, and mix different albums and create pirate mixtapes. Consequently, if someone wanted to try their hand at fame, they did not need a big investment.

However, the increase in the number of arabesk artists who copied Tatlıses's songs diminished the perceived quality of arabesk even further. Moreover, self-claimed arabesk artists were performing at shady bars and pavilions in back alleys, which were run by mafia bosses and gangsters. Arabesk became associated with sinister businesses and lowlifes, and the status of arabesk artists declined even further.

These developments subsequently led industry intellectuals to separate Orhan Gencebay from the "neo" arabeskers. Many musicians, including Zeki Müren, emphasized that Gencebay was different from the arabeskers of the current day. For example, when inquired about his thoughts on arabesk, the vocalist of the pop-folk band Yeni Türkü said the following:

> Q51: The arabesk songs produced by Orhan Gencebay in the 1970s were listenable. Today, both living conditions and art are in decline. Someone just comes forward and sings, "I love you, I love you... Do you love me..." [reference to Ümit Besen's song "I love you;" the lyrics are in English in the original] and then claims that he is contributing to art. (Derya Köroğlu, interviewed by Cultural Services, Cumhuriyet, 1986)

Despite arabesk gaining more popularity in this phase, pop artists and others did not attempt to get a piece of the pie this time. Instead, they often complained about how market conditions forced them to make arabesk or arabesk-like music and criticized the government and TRT for not supporting pop musicians. An important pop singer in this phase was Esin Afşar, who started a campaign against arabesk with her song and album titled "Arabeske İnat" (Defiance Against Arabesk). Afşar actively promoted her album for two years and often participated in panels and gave out interviews where she delivered "anti-arabesk" talks:

> Q52: Tomorrow, Esin Afşar will speak about arabesk at a meeting... Afşar addresses the negative effects of arabesk on our music and culture and states, "I do not consider arabesk as a music genre. I have always been against it. All artists should have the same attitude." (Esin Afşar, quoted by Anonymous, Cumhuriyet, 1985)

Overall, between 1984 and 1987, the arabesk category was driven to saturation with the emergence of hundreds of new names. This increase in the number of artists reinforced the opportunism associated with arabesk. Many of the newcomers

either failed, became one-hit wonders, or received only coincidental success; however, Küçük Emrah and Küçük Ceylan stood out from the rest.

5.3.2 Association with ANAP

Most intellectuals, especially those writing for Cumhuriyet, did not like Özal because of his association with the coup, the shady moves that led him to climb the political ladder, and his obsession with the US, capitalism, and open market policies. ANAP targeted the lower classes as their main electorate, and during this phase, intellectuals observed that the masses that voted for ANAP were the same people who were listening to arabesk music and embraced the arabesk lifestyle. Consequently, there was an obvious, though indirect, association between arabesk and ANAP through their mutual connection to the lower classes from the get-go. For instance, while criticizing TRT's censorship policies, the columnist İlhan Selçuk said the following:

> Q53: TRT has banned broadcasting this type of music. However, the public loves arabesk. So, it seems that TRT, which we dislike, is disconnected from the people. The devil whispered to me, and I said: Now, let me defend arabesk; let me align with the people against television. [But] the devil is saying other things too. After all, a large part of the public voted for ANAP!... Why shouldn't we defend ANAP then? I take pride in considering myself as one with the people, but what should I do if others think I am an intellectual? (İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet, 1984)

This association of the public with ANAP also undermined the validity of using public demand to defend arabesk, a strategy popularized by Tayfur in the previous phase. Intellectuals thought that the public did not know what was good for them and were ignorant; therefore, their preferences and demands became irrelevant. Intellectuals argued that opposing arabesk was opposing populism and ANAP, rather than going against the people themselves (see SQ27 in Appendix A).

Besides the connection between lower classes, arabesk, and ANAP, intellectuals began to emphasize that the other socioeconomic classes were listening to arabesk as well. The demand for arabesk and its subgenres in casinos and upscale restaurants was interpreted as an indicator of the presence of fans from other segments. Casinos were generally considered expensive, and although the public attended occasionally,

the regular and esteemed customers of these establishments were often wealthier people (SQ28 in Appendix A).

Nonetheless, in this phase, intellectuals began to scrutinize these wealthier customers and began to question their true identity, especially their "cultural level." Accordingly, they argued that aside from their financial means, slum-residing lower classes and the regular attendee of casinos were not that different. To elaborate on the connection between these two groups, intellectuals offered the terms "lumpenproletariat" and "lumpenbourgeoisie." The financially disadvantaged part of the general group of "lumpens" represented the lumpenproletariat and in the context of arabesk it referred to the slum residents. In contrast, lumpenbourgeoisie were the upper classes that pursued their own interests within the existing system and were indifferent to historical transformation. The lumpenbourgeoisie in arabesk discourse included the provincial wealthy and the nouveau-riche, i.e., people from lower classes who had recently and quickly acquired wealth. The lumpens were united in their lack of education and lack of high culture. They also shared a variety of common interests like listening to arabesk and aranjman, liking traditional dances and belly dancing, watching video, and eating kebab-like foods. Some intellectuals even argued that this affinity with the lumpenbourgeoisie made the proletariat idolize their financially able counterparts and dream of being like them by "turning the corner." Arabesk singers including Ferdi Tayfur, İbrahim Tatlıses, and Emrah, were considered part of the lumpenbourgeoisie.

In addition to emphasizing the common interests of the lumpenbourgeoisie and the lower classes, in this phase, intellectuals developed unique stereotypes for the wealthy lumpens. A fundamental characteristic of lumpenbourgeoisie was that they had money but did not know how to spend it sophisticatedly. Due to their limited cultural exposure, they equated monetary value with high culture and accumulated products and items that would show their financial status. Common descriptions used by intellectuals for lumpenbourgeoisie included drinking whiskey with traditional smelly food like cacık and pastırma (a type of dried meat known for its smell), wearing gold chains, using too much aftershave, smoking Davidoff cigars, and driving luxury cars like BMW and Mercedes. However, the reflective intellectuals warned others against being deceived by these superficial differences. Ultimately, whether rich or not, the lumpens shared the same essence. When commenting on Ali Sirmen's column comparing Turkish and American taxi drivers, a journalist made the following statement:

Q54: [He] touches upon our own taxi drivers and describes the suffo-

cating atmosphere in the cabs created by the incomprehensibly tasteless trinkets, pillows, talisman, fur coverings, compasses, prayers, and colored light bulbs, made even more suffocating by arabesk music. While he is right . . . it seemed a bit unfair to me that he excluded the other part of reality and focused solely on taxi drivers. Aren't our private car drivers the same people? ... Aren't the drivers of Mercedes and BMW mostly the results of the same etiquette, the same culture? ... just an alaturka high-society trapped between three to five brands of pants, shirts, ties, or aftershaves, squeezed into the confines of a disco-restaurant culture. . .
(Vedat N. Türkkan, Cumhuriyet, 1985)

The relation of lumpenbourgeoisie with ANAP was more direct, as this group was known to orbit ANAP to obtain privileges. Some of the members of lumpenbourgeoisie were suspicious business people who became rich or even richer through financial fraud and white-collar crime. This group wanted to be close to the government to make them turn a blind eye to their fraudulent activities. Further, some of these shady businessmen were members of ANAP.

Intellectuals categorized Özal and his family within this group based on their tastes and behavior. Although Özal denied listening to arabesk and claimed that he liked classical Western music in an interview with Cumhuriyet during his candidacy, both before and after becoming the prime minister, Özal was seen at casinos and enjoying alaturka and arabesk music. He was also known for being a huge comics fan and a luxury car enthusiast. Moreover, both Turgut Özal and his wife, Semra Özal, liked celebrities and hung out with them. Özal often hired İbrahim Tatlıses for concerts organized by ANAP or the ministry. Emrah also openly endorsed ANAP and attended their events as a singer. Orhan Gencebay was friends with Özal's son-in-law who was an ex-musician. Semra Özal showed interest in Bülent Ersoy and helped her return to the stage. A notable event during this phase was Turgut Özal singing along with İbrahim Tatlıses in an official event organized for Police Week. Cumhuriyet published a large photo of Özal and Tatlıses and reported the event as follows:

Q55: Tatlıses sang when he [decided] to take a break from talking, and [in his set list] arabesk songs were common. When Tatlıses dedicated the song "Ayırmasın Allah Bizi" to the Özals, it was seen that Mr. and Mrs. Özal held hands . . . When Tatlıses extended the microphone [to him], Prime Minister Özal also sang the song "Mavi Mavi" with Tatlıses.

After listening to Özal, Tatlıses expressed his satisfaction by saying, "A year ago, Mr. Prime Minister sang the same song following my voice." (Turhan Yılmaz, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

Including the lumpenbourgeoisie in the arabesk domain and the association of ANAP and arabesk through both groups of listeners alerted the attention of the reflective intellectuals to arabesk. As arabesk was getting increasingly more connected to ANAP, some of the attributes of Turgut Özal and ANAP transferred to arabesk, which resulted in arabesk gaining additional meanings.

5.3.3 Arabesk as an Adjective

In the third phase, an important development was arabesk being used as an adjective that transcended the meanings of musical genre and low culture. Instead, arabesk became a general term that somehow encompassed the negative attributes of ANAP and the state of Turkish society in the mid-1980s.

The utilization of arabesk as an adjective in politics was popularized by Uğur Mumcu, an ex-lawyer and investigative journalist who dedicated his entire career to exposing deep-rooted corruption within the government and related institutions. He was also a harsh critic of the September 12 coup, the military regime, ANAP, and Turgut Özal. In this period, while talking about ANAP's policies, Mumcu started to use phrases like "arabesk liberalism" and "alaturka capitalism" and later their variations, i.e., "arabesk capitalism" and "alaturka liberalism."

Initially, the phrase "arabesk liberalism" was used to criticize the privileges given to Saudi firms by the Özal government, and therefore, it was closely related to the "Arabesk as Arab Music" theme. As soon as Özal became the prime minister, he began to establish partnerships with Saudi companies through his brother Korkut Özal and other businessmen connected to ANAP. To this end, ANAP even enacted laws that provided unfair advantages to Saudi firms. This aggressive pursuit of Arab capital then evoked the attention of the reflective intellectuals. Mumcu used the phrase "arabesk liberalism" to describe Özal's over-reliance on Arab capital in his economic plans. The first mention of arabesk and liberalism together was as follows:

Q56: The Arabesk [version] of Liberalism... The date when the Coun-

cil of the Ministers made a decision that provided legal opportunities to the Saudi-Turkish financial institution called "Al Baraka," where Korkut Özal, the brother of Prime Minister Özal, was among the partners is December 16, 1983. The Özal government started their duty on December 14th... This means that the government's very first act was to bring certain politicians with Arab capital together. (Uğur Mumcu, Cumhuriyet, 1985)

In addition, Mumcu used "alaturka capitalism" to refer to ANAP's flawed and hypocritical economic policies that, on the surface, pledged to the principles of capitalism, liberalism, and free market economy, but ignored the fundamental rules of these ideologies by simultaneously following conservative social policies, by granting privileges to its supporters in government contracts and encouraging financial fraud. In this context, alaturka capitalism basically meant divergent and deceitful capitalism:

Q57: According to their own claims, ANAP was a liberal political party. Therefore, their views, attitudes, ideology, and philosophy must have been liberal too. However, this "alaturka capitalist" understanding excluded political liberalism from the agenda and limited it to only crimes related to exchange rates. (Uğur Mumcu, Cumhuriyet, 1985)

Mumcu usually employed these two phrases together in the same paragraph or sentence and, after a while, began to use them interchangeably. Nonetheless, the meanings of "arabesk as in relation to Arabs" and "alaturka as distorted" stayed intact (see SQ29 in Appendix A). Over time, other intellectuals also utilized arabesk and alaturka as adjectives in political context, not only with capitalism and liberalism but also with other political and economic terms like free market economy, democracy, and diplomacy (see SQ30 and SQ31 in Appendix A). As a result, in this phase, "arabesk" turned into a general adjective that was used to describe ANAP's policies. Further, this usage expanded to other aspects of social life under ANAP's reign. In addition to being a music and film genre and a label for low culture, arabesk gained other meanings. The three most prominent of these new meanings are explained below.

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5.3.3.1 Arabesk as Flawed or Haphazard

The first connotation arabesk acquired in the third phase was similar to that of "alaturka" in "alaturka capitalism" mentioned above. In particular, intellectuals employed the word "arabesk" to describe flawed, haphazard, sloppy, and illogical practices. As such, this term was largely pejorative and signaled that something was not up to the expected standards.

The decision on whether an idea or practice was "arabesk," i.e., faulty, or haphazard, was often arrived at by comparing Turkey to the West, where intellectuals believed things were how they were supposed to be. In other words, intellectuals depicted Turkey as illogical, unsystematic, and unprofessional and contrasted them to the logical, organized, and professional West. In this understanding, Turkish people and politicians were unruly and did not follow any instructions. Instead, they took the things they wanted to take, changed, and adapted them to fit their own liking, and during this process, usually distorted the essence of the ideology or practice they adopted. For example, "arabesk democracy" was the system that used democratic voting but simultaneously allowed silencing, censoring, or punishing the opponents for preventing them from changing the public's opinion. As such, this usage of arabesk also had a connotation of distortion and deformation.

In addition to politics, this usage was very popular among sports journalists. These columnists frequently explained various losses in international competitions or failures of Turkish teams to adapt to modern or newer strategies through the arabesk characteristics of Turkish teams. They argued that Turkish athletes were different from the others because they had their own understanding of sports that was neither "this or that," but it was something uniquely improvised and shared tacitly among the players and local coaches. Therefore, what they did was incomprehensible to foreigners and those who did not grow up within the system. For example, a sports columnist wrote the following about the Turkish National Football team when the attempts to implement a more structured training system to the team had been unsuccessful, and the team failed miserably:

> Q58: Yılmaz Yücetürk tried to implement the German [football] system in Turkey, but it looked like it was too heavy for the players because they reacted negatively. Instead of adapting themselves to the European system, the players deformed Yılmaz Yücetürk, and he was eventually crushed in the chaos. What we are trying to say is football in Turkey does not mesh with European values, it is adapted to our own values in

an arabesk fashion. (Abdülkadir Yücelman, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

While this usage mostly had negative connotations, it also brought a sense of identification in that arabesk became an adjective for things that were perceived as uniquely Turkish. The practices and events referred to as arabesk were ridiculous or irrational in themselves, but they somehow made sense or were accepted as normal because they occurred in Turkey or were carried out by Turkish people. Consequently, the term was often employed in satirical pieces or contexts where intellectuals wanted to self-deprecate themselves as a member of Turkish society. For instance, after being asked what kind of difficulties they had while working with German colleagues, Tayfun, a Turkish musician who had been living in Germany, stated the following:

> Q59: Of course, there were problems. As people who were raised by arabesk capitalism, you start a professional collaboration with two individuals from a real capitalist country. We are always late to the meetings, forget our music sheets at the hotel, and go to bars before the concerts. In contrast, Germans are extremely punctual and serious. No matter how much we try to be Western or how much they try to be Eastern, we cannot change what is in our roots. (Tayfun, interviewed by Tarık Öcal, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

Overall, while the expansion "arabesk as flawed or haphazard" added a new negative connotation to the term, it also increased the level of internalization by certain intellectuals. These intellectuals complained about the arabesk-ness of Turkish people but at the same time accepted it as an inborn characteristic.

5.3.3.2 Arabesk as Religious and Anti-secular

Another new meaning arabesk acquired during this phase was stimulated by ANAP and Turgut Özal using religion and religious symbols for political propaganda. Within ANAP, there was a group that genuinely advocated religious ideology, and further, as a part of his populist policies, Özal freely utilized religious talk and symbols. Intellectuals, most of whom were loyal to Atatürk's principle of secularism, condemned Özal's exploitation of religion for personal gain.

Certain developments and changes in regulations relating to the education system

amplified the concerns of intellectuals regarding ANAP's anti-secular policies. These changes included demands to lift the ban on wearing the hijab in universities and the proliferation of high schools that primarily focused on religious education ("imam-hatip" in Turkish). ANAP capitalized on the public's sensitivity to these issues, and Özal often used them in his election propaganda. The prevalence of religion in politics generated a significant backlash from intellectuals who perceived developments as a direct threat to secularism and the foundational values of the Turkish Republic. Additionally, intellectuals were deeply worried about the potential brainwashing of Turkish youth and viewed ANAP pushing religion as a strategy to prevent future protests against ANAP's more extreme policies.

The rise of religious ideology also triggered intellectuals to think that something similar to the Iranian Islamic Revolution, which was only 5-6 years old back then, would happen in Turkey too. Moreover, certain intellectuals directly equated Islam to Arabs, and consequently, they interpreted any kind of relations ANAP has with Arabic countries, including Özal's brother's partnerships and collaborations with Arab companies, the government selling historical properties to Arab businessmen and politicians, and rumors on public schools providing Arabic courses, as steps towards destroying the modern Turkish Republic to replace it with an Islamic one.

Intellectuals argued that these things may have seemed trivial on the surface and would not have mattered in "ordinary times." However, since ANAP was openly promoting religion, everything should have been interpreted in this light (see SQ32 in Appendix A).

In this context, based on the "arabesk as Arab music" label and Mumcu's use of "arabesk liberalism," some intellectuals employed the term arabesk to refer to the policies and practices that were perceived as backward ("gerici" in Turkish), dogmatic ("yobaz" in Turkish), and medieval (çağdışı in Turkish). Similar to the notion of arabesk as flawed and sloppy, this interpretation juxtaposed Turks to the West in that "arabesk" was depicted as a direct antonym for modern, logical, and scientific.

An intellectual that frequently used arabesk to explain that Turkey was regressing and moving away from the West was Müşerref Hekimoğlu. She popularized the phrase "arabesk atmosphere" ("arabesk ortam" in Turkish) and often employed it in her columns as follows:

> Q60: My friend scanned the room with shining eyes. Elegant women, candlelight, flowers...truly pleased the eyes. "This is a civilization island," she said...In front of me, Atatürk's corner, a civilization island

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within an arabesk atmosphere, and I drifted into deep thoughts...If the principle of secularism hadn't been compromised, would we still use the expression "civilization island" today? As that principle was eroded, the battle to become a modern society also came to a halt. (Müşerref Hekimoğlu, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

In the following phases, this meaning also came to encompass mysticism, superstition, and anti-science and was utilized by medical doctors while criticizing traditional medicine and folk remedies (see SQ33 in Appendix A).

Overall, arabesk, as it was understood as religious and anti-secular, was loaded with strong negative connotations and reflected a direct threat to the identity of intellectuals. Moreover, being anti-modern or backward came to be associated with arabesk music as well, as intellectuals advocated that arabesk music only appealed to people with a medieval and non-modern mentality:

> Q61: And now the title of our chief editor's [Nadir Nadi] new book: "My Friend Mozart!" Remembering Mozart's friendship in a society where arabesk prevails should not be considered merely an interesting reaction. This approach is not only a defense against the attacks of degeneration and backwardness in our lives but also a challenge against it... This is Turkey's hope, concern, case, and problem: Why is Nadir Nadi friends with Mozart rather than uncouth tycoons or political despots? (İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet, 1985)

Unlike the meaning of arabesk as "flawed or sloppy" that connected intellectuals and other segments (e.g., ANAP electorate, lower classes, politicians) under the Turkish identity, the interpretation of arabesk as "religious and anti-secular" further reinforced the "us versus them" understanding in that many intellectuals internalized secularism and viewed those who wanted to undermine this principle as the enemy.

5.3.3.3 Arabesk as Exaggeration

During this phase, intellectuals used the word "arabesk" to convey a variety of connotations, like dramatization, overreaction, cringeworthy displays of emotions,

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grandiose gestures, bluffing, extravagance, and tackiness that can be put under the term "exaggeration."

This utilization of the term was initially prompted by the melodramatic elements and overdone sadness in arabesk songs and arabesk films. From the start, intellectuals found the whimpering and crying in arabesk songs embarrassing and comical, and often interpreted them as unsuccessful attempts to evoke sad emotions in the listeners. Similarly, arabesk films usually featured a variety of dramatic cliches such as the impossible love story between a rich woman and a poor man, lovers separated by bad faith, tragic double suicides, and various insensible plot holes like characters randomly going blind only to regain their sight miraculously. Moreover, intellectuals viewed artists like Gencebay and Tayfur as bad actors, which made the forced and exaggerated displays of emotions in arabesk films even more absurd to intellectuals. As such, arabesk became associated with cringeworthy and dramatic expressions. Film critics then employed the term arabesk to describe the distasteful emotional scenes in non-arabesk movies as well (see SQ34 in Appendix A).

In the third phase, intellectuals expanded this meaning by using it to refer to politicians and journalists who used dramatic and grandiose sentences that were supposed to be emotional or poetic but came out as fake and laughable. For example, while criticizing another columnist's article about President Kenan Evren, Ali Sirmen wrote the following:

> Q62: During a period when we are trying to transition back to democracy, do these nonsense and weird associations, along with "arabesk" expressions like "may all roses of the garden of heart be sacrificed to the barrels of the democratic weapon," contribute to democratic efforts? (Ali Sirmen, Cumhuriyet, 1986)

Further, intellectuals observed that such ostentatious expressions and behavior were a characteristic of the "ANAP community," i.e., members of ANAP, including Özal, and their supporters, in that overreacting to events, blowing up little occurrences, and excessively praising those in power were habitual and a part of their culture.

A significant event during this phase that was often referred to as arabesk was Turgut Özal's bypass operation in Houston. Özal, along with the members of ANAP and the businessmen in their inner circle, made a huge deal out of the operation with exaggerated get-well-soon and welcome parties, and groups of businessmen flying to the US to visit him after the surgery. Moreover, while he was still in Houston

resting, Özal connected to the Council of Ministers via satellite and made TRT air the event on live TV. This entire debacle was found uncouth, tasteless, and embarrassing by intellectuals. Reflective intellectuals, in particular, were seriously disturbed by the exaggerated reaction and flattery of businessmen, politicians, and journalists. The majority of the influential columnists in Cumhuriyet wrote multiple articles on the "get-well-soon" and "welcome" celebrations organized for the surgery and often employed the word arabesk repeatedly in their texts:

> Q63: What are those businessmen rushing to Houston in herds doing? What is this fake flattery made by certain journalists? And the proclamation of Prime Minister's son Ahmet Özal as the heir? Health and well-being wishes should be conveyed with seriousness, civility, and respect. Send a telegram, make a phone call, or send flowers, you choose. There are [numerous] civilized ways to do this. No, they must prove their loyalty to the Prime Minister through these alaturka and arabesk ways! What is this arabesk show? What is this alaturka flattery? What are these artificial demonstrations of loyalty? For God's sake, what is it? (Uğur Mumcu, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

In addition to how they behaved, the taste of the "ANAP community" was also described as arabesk. This interpretation was an extension of the theme "arabesk as low culture" in that arabesk in this context was also used to describe low taste. However, a distinguishing factor was that, paralleling the expansion of arabesk listeners from lower classes to the nouveau riche, low culture expanded from literally cheap products to gaudy displays of wealth and became synonymous with a lack of elegance. Intellectuals believed that the wealthy individuals associated with ANAP, including the Özal family, were inherently tacky and that no amount of money could change their lack of taste and sophistication. Consequently, anything they did was automatically considered arabesk (see SQ35 in Appendix A).

Overall, these three new meanings of arabesk shared a common element of being traditionally Turkish in a manner that was considered unrefined and raw. As such, these utilizations were similar to the original definition of alaturka which meant "Turkish style" or "of Turkish origin," and sat on the opposite end of "alafranga," i.e., European style. In other words, arabesk, in its broadest meaning, was Eastern, provincial, closed, uncultivated, and conflicted with the standards of being Western, logical, open-minded, and refined. This understanding then led to a complete cycle where the arabesk nature of the Turkish character, i.e., being sloppy, medieval, and

reactive, was then used to explain the rapid proliferation of arabesk music (see SQ36 in Appendix A).

As arabesk became engraved in Turkish society, intellectuals varied in their reactions. The next theme explores the general impact arabesk's spread and expanded meaning had on intellectuals.

5.3.4 Disorientation and Defeat

As the popularity of arabesk music increased, and its meaning evolved significantly, intellectuals had a hard time keeping up with the developments, and confusion and differences of opinion began. This confusion paralleled the general turmoil in Turkey and the Turkish entertainment industry. First, in late 1983, the country switched from a military regime to a civil government, which brought about rapid and extreme economic and social changes, resulting in a period of conflict and contradictions. Second, the unpredictable policies of TRT regarding arabesk and intellectuals' growing suspicion and distrust of the agency added to the confusion.

Although TRT was supposedly an autonomous organization, it was under the influence of the government, as the state often had a say in appointing the general manager of TRT. Additionally, certain ministers had permission to inspect TRT's decisions and inner workings. After Özal secured his place in the government, he immediately started to use TRT for political propaganda. Intellectuals realized that TRT's news broadcasts were biased in that they were emphasizing the positive developments and downplaying negative events or just not reporting them at all. As a result, intellectuals grew extremely critical of TRT and began to view the station as an agent of the Özal government (see Q53). Intellectuals condemned every action of TRT, and there were few discussions that related to the arabesk discourse.

In this phase, TRT followed a confusing policy against arabesk. In 1984, they initially scheduled Gencebay's movie "The Driver" (1976) to be broadcast; however, they canceled the screening at the last minute due to the film being "arabesk." This incident became a subject of ridicule as intellectuals questioned how TRT had failed to notice a Gencebay movie was arabesk and what made them suddenly come to this realization. After this contradiction, arabesk was completely banned between 1984 and 1985. Nonetheless, TRT invited Gencebay to appear on TV on January 1st, 1986, to which intellectuals reacted satirically and again questioned TRT's credibility (see SQ19 in Appendix A). TRT answered the critics by saying that there was a

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general request from the public, and they invited Gencebay because they wanted to represent the "marginal communities" too. Yet in the New Year's Eve of 1988, they again banned arabesk on TV.

A somewhat permanent change in TRT's approach to arabesk occurred in 1987. In May of that year, TRT announced its intention to broadcast an Orhan Gencebay film during the Eid holiday, followed by a Ferdi Tayfur movie a week later. When TRT personnel spoke about the tentative schedule for the new broadcasting term a couple of months later, they said they were planning to buy multiple arabesk films due to public demand. After 1987, TRT aired several arabesk movies on its main channel every year [7] Although some readers sent complaint letters to Cumhuriyet, others, both journalists and readers, used humor. For instance, following the screening of these movies, one reader said the following in her letter:

> Q64: Finally arabesk: Our TV has finally given the green light to arabesk. Actually, we could not understand why they resisted this long and acted so stubbornly. Arabesk movies complement our arabesk TV very well. Me and my friends were just saying, "We will leave this world without even watching an Orhan Gencebay film." God bless them, first our brother Orhan and then Ferdi Tayfur. It can't get any better than this. We spent the last two consecutive Saturdays in joy. We were rolling on the floor laughing... Now we have hope. When will Kibariye, "Bergen, the Woman of Sorrows," Küçük Emrah, and Ceylan's films brighten our television? (Aysun Elman, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

As hinted by the above excerpt, some intellectuals thought that TRT was already arabesk in its mindset and general quality. They referred to arabesk's higher-level categorizations as low culture and tastelessness, and accordingly, they argued that "many arabesk things," including cheap alaturka, foreign soaps, low-brow comedies, and lottery drafts, were regularly aired on TV. In addition, they found the presenters' clothes and makeup excessive and the overall decor distasteful and ugly. They believed that, in such a situation, scapegoating arabesk did not make any sense and that banning arabesk was just a superficial attempt to pretend upright. In this regard, Mahmut T. Öngören, an ex-TRT personnel who wrote about TRT in his column in Cumhuriyet, stated the following:

> Q65: The TV channel under the control of the state does everything it can to increase degeneration... [TRT] showcases the most blatant ex-

amples of carelessness by broadcasting lotteries and casino-type shows. There is no longer any benefit in silencing the microphone and camera for arabesk music. The degenerating, alienating, and vulgar programs and films on TV are way worse than arabesk and other low-quality entertainment outside the TV. (Mahmut T. Öngören, Cumhuriyet, 1984)

During this phase, intellectuals ridiculed arabesk, but at the same time they took its impact on society seriously. Nearing the end of this period, the country was doing significantly worse economically and politically; but the lower classes largely seemed indifferent to the situation. Nonetheless, this time intellectuals did not use the lumpen argument. They believed that arabesk and other products of low culture were being intentionally used by the Özal government to anesthetize the public and to distract them from the consequences of their wrong policies. For instance, while talking about a conversation he held with a taxi driver, a columnist said the following:

Q66: The driver is both talking and giving detailed explanations about the personal lives of arabesk singers: "Our people love these songs. Why? Because everyone is deeply melancholic . . . " It's an interesting and sincere statement ... According to the recent announcement by the General Manager of the Tobacco and Alcohol Corporation, despite the continuous price increases, rakı consumption is also increasing. The sales of arabesk cassettes are also on the rise. [The goal is] to divert thoughts, to numb minds! But our country is heading towards a bad place... (Burhan Arpad, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

In addition to TRT's irregular bans, ANAP's attitude towards arabesk, both in its narrow and broader meanings, was confusing. In the case of arabesk music, despite Özal being seen with Tatlıses and Emrah and later stating that he is okay with arabesk being on TV (see SQ37 in Appendix A), the Ministry of Culture and the State Minister responsible for TRT generally had a negative attitude towards arabesk music. For example, in this period, the Ministry of Culture announced that they would distribute "artists ID cards" to "real" singers so that they would not be confused with "pavilion" singers and have an easier time traveling abroad. However, they initially said that arabesk artists would be excluded from this practice. Only after a musicians' association negotiated with the Ministry, arguing that it is impos-

sible to differentiate who is an arabesk singer and who is not, arabesk artists were granted their IDs (see SQ38 in Appendix A). The different attitude of the Ministry of Culture was largely due to Özal intentionally appointing ministers from the liberal wing of ANAP to pacify the cultural communities who were usually very oriented to Western culture and sensitive towards the developments of classical music institutions supported by Atatürk. As such, Ministers of Culture contradicted other ANAP members with their image and were generally more respected by intellectuals.

Beyond these contradictions, ANAP and Özal confused intellectuals with their conflicting policies and behavior. Özal was giving religious speeches, but both he and his wife drank alcohol openly; ANAP was advocating nationalism on one side and importing and imposing the American lifestyle on the other. They were advocating for democracy and liberalism and, at the same time, were trying to censor and silence the opponents. Another contradictory point observed by intellectuals was ANAP's insistence on gaining full European Union Membership (at that time European Economic Community) but refusing to implement the reforms such an application would require. Moreover, the public seemed content with ANAP, and they were living in their own world. They, too, were involved in contradictions, like praising religion and then watching erotic films, always complaining about their situation, and not doing anything about it, trying to act opportunistic and cunning but ending up making dumb moves.

In this context, intellectuals started to feel like they were the odd ones out. Especially in the second half of this phase, they often talked about feeling alienated from society and outside of reality, and they were confused by rapid changes and contradictory situations. They often referred to dystopian literature and compared them to the situation in Turkey. A foreign news reporter of Cumhuriyet wrote the following upon visiting Turkey after living abroad for a year:

> Q67: There is no use in differentiating between the beneficial from the harmful, the good from the bad, the beautiful from the ugly. Is Turkey losing its identity or undergoing renewal? Is it regressing or growing? Is Istanbul getting more beautiful or looking more like a mega rural town? . . . which courageous intellectual can answer these questions properly? The problems are changing before we have time to think to systemize what we are thinking. Is the wind blowing anew, or is it the same old wind? Is it arabesk music playing on the minibus driver's cassette player, or folk dance music, or perhaps rock music? Is the country losing its moral values or is there a return to traditional values? ... It feels like

we've become a post-modern society without going through the processes of modernization and sufficiently discussing the ideologies of the 20th century. If I push it a little further, I could say [we've become] a "surreal" society. (Sabetay Varol, Cumhuriyet, 1986)

When describing the alienation and disorientation they felt, intellectuals often talked about arabesk as the background music of the chaos they observed. Some of them expressed that they felt like they were trapped in an arabesk film or cassette that would not let them go. This was sourced in intellectuals coming across arabesk, both in its general meaning, and as a music genre, everywhere. Journalists and musicians complained that whenever they stepped foot outside, they had to hear "Mavi Mavi," "I Love You," or "Seni Sevmeyen Ölsün."

Moreover, as the meaning of arabesk encompassed numerous things from kitsch products to religion to the behavior of government officials, arabesk was imposing itself on those who did not like it through various occurrences in social life as well. As a result, some intellectuals believed that fighting against arabesk was not a productive activity. As indicated in Q67 above, they were tired of the cognitive effort required to follow the developments and form opinions. These intellectuals believed that it was time to accept arabesk as a fact of life. They advocated that it was better to come to terms with Turkey being an Eastern and underdeveloped country.

Additionally, they revoked the argument of arabesk being "an issue among many issues" and suggested that discussing it would not solve anything. Turkish society, with its music, habits, lifestyle, and government was arabesk; therefore, it was better to just go with the flow and not dwell on it too much. For example, after TRT did not broadcast arabesk on the New Year's Eve of 1988, İlhan Selçuk expressed the following in his column:

Q68: From taxis to coffeehouses, from the Police Radio to casinos, from wedding ceremonies to circumcision celebrations, from taverns to intercity buses, arabesk has grasped our culture from top to bottom and permeated the pores of our souls, at this point, attaining the status of national music. Arabesk is not just a music genre; it is a worldview and a way of life. We share the destiny of a period where our sorrowful lives and melancholic hearts blend with tearful music, stories, films, and politics... Arabesk is not lacking on television; it even prevails in the realm of politics. . . (İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet, 1988)

Nonetheless, others stated that it was not the time to give in. They often drew parallels between Adnan Menderes, another populist prime minister, and Özal, emphasizing that every leader eventually departs. In this context, intellectuals had to stand their ground and continue their fight. For example, Ali Sirmen likened Turkish intellectuals to the different main characters in Ionesco's "Rhinoceros" and advocated that an opinion or behavior being in the majority should not be an excuse to join or support them. Additionally, Mahmut T. Öngören stated the following in his column:

> Q69: TRT... tries to deceive and manipulate viewers with its arabesk efforts and biased attitude in order to capture voters ... However, we should not be surprised by occasional encounters and future encounters with some slightly modern behaviors in radio and television broadcasts. Because despite all the games, pressures, and crude force, Turkey is not dead yet. The glimmer of progress and modernity can be seen even in an institution or an individual where we least expect it, at a time we never anticipated. Such glimmers can be hopeful, but hopes cannot be fulfilled out of the blue ... [Resources] can also be used to take Turkey backward and towards conservatism. That's when we should not remain silent in our [columns]. (Mahmut T. Öngören, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

Overall, the third phase witnessed important changes in the discourse built around arabesk. The dominance of Gencebay and Tayfur was replaced by İbrahim Tatlıses and "little" singers, and the songs became more cheerful and catchy. Intellectuals also noticed that arabesk was not limited to lower classes but included the unrefined rich, members of ANAP, and Prime Minister Özal himself, who were products of the arabesk philosophy. More importantly, during this phase, arabesk moved from being a music and film genre and a label for low culture to an attribute of Turkish society and people. The meaning of arabesk expanded to include various characteristics and ideas that were shared by the masses and the government. In this context, while certain intellectuals decided to accept arabesk as a fact of life, others chose to continue their fights.

The developments in the political scene and the entertainment industry helped intellectuals regain the upper hand in the discourse. The next phase delves into these developments.

5.4 Phase 4: Refinement and Anticipated Decline, 1988-1991

During the fourth phase, arabesk continued to be used to refer to Özal and ANAP. However, this time it was more often directed at Özal's personality rather than his political party. This change became especially prominent after Özal replaced Kenan Evren as the President of Turkey in 1989. Additionally, intellectuals continued to employ the term "arabesk" to refer to various social phenomena, and they used it even more frequently than they did in the previous phase. After 1989, the usage of the term became more idiosyncratic and varied depending on the contexts and sentences it was used in. Nonetheless, the excessive utilization of the term caused it to lose impact and meaning. As a result, certain intellectuals began to criticize the broad usage of arabesk in situations unrelated to music.

Simultaneously, developments in the music industry redirected the attention of intellectuals back to arabesk music, so the music genre itself became salient in the discourse again. However, in the late 1980s, Unkapanı insiders believed that arabesk had reached its peak and anticipated its decline soon. Consequently, they began to debate on what would become the next popular genre.

Accordingly, this phase consists of three themes and three subthemes. The first subtheme, "Arabesk as an Adjective (II)," is a continuation of the previous theme with the same title and focuses on how this usage changed between the years 1988 and 1991, particularly after Turgut Özal became the President of the country. The second theme, "Resetting and Repeating the Discourse," delves into the factors that led intellectuals to move away from broader meanings of arabesk and return to the entertainment context and lower classes. As such, this theme consists of three subthemes: "Painless Arabesk," "Re-emergence of Lower Classes," and "Incoherences as Defense," each of which explores specific events that amplified discussions on arabesk music and slums. Finally, the third theme, "Özgün Music and Revolutionary Arabesk," explains the newly emerging genres that were designated as a continuation of arabesk music.

5.4.1 Arabesk as an Adjective (II)

In the third phase, intellectuals used arabesk as an adjective in the same manner as they did in the previous phase, and phrases like "arabesk liberalism" and "arabesk

capitalism," often appeared in the data. They also continued to refer to ANAP and Özal as arabesk; however, as mentioned earlier, in the fourth phase, the target of the term "arabesk" was mostly Özal rather than ANAP itself. This was primarily due to intellectuals observing that Özal became more carefree, lavish, and snobbish after his presidency.

Specifically, after it was guaranteed that he was going to be the President, Turgut Özal and his wife began to use government funds on extravagant expenses and frequently disregarded various presidential protocols. They threw lavish parties for their birthdays, utilized government vehicles, including military helicopters, to transport their staff, and Özal was criticized for attending official and semi-official events in inappropriate attire such as slippers, trainers, or shorts. He was often described as absurdly careless, whimsical, and unpredictable. In this atmosphere, the tone of reflective intellectuals became increasingly satirical, and they frequently incorporated dark humor. Instead of using his full name, intellectuals referred to Özal by his initials (TÖ or TÖÖÖ) or labeled him as the "irresponsible president" [8]. In these narratives, intellectuals used the term arabesk in its various meanings to define Özal's behavior:

> Q70: Those who were preparing to leave the presidential palace together with Evren found every move of TÖ to be "arabesk."...Yesterday, after Evren entered the Council of Ministers meeting, TÖ opened a red velvet box and presented a plaque to Evren. It had a mix of gratitude words written on it. And it was made of pure gold. The plaque was arabesk, even the way the letters were written was coarse, large, and disturbing. Evren, who did not appreciate jewelry, said that he had to "helplessly" accept the plaque because it came from the Prime Minister. We looked at TÖ, but he didn't even care. However, the arabesk TÖ wouldn't miss this opportunity either. Since the importation of gold had been liberalized [by him], gold was so abundant!... He was so arabesk, he ran to İnönü and pressured him to shake his hand, knowing that İnönü would not act discourteously. (Cüneyt Arcayürek, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

Another problem intellectuals and other politicians had with Özal was his and his wife Semra's involvement with the government. According to the law, the President should not have been affiliated with a political party, but Özal kept interfering with ANAP and tried to puppeteer the new Prime Minister. Moreover, his wife Semra pursued a high position in ANAP, and intellectuals suspected she wanted to be the

new Prime Minister. This caused serious fractions within ANAP; some members protested against Özals for getting involved in the internal workings of ANAP, while others saw Özal as their mentor and followed his orders. Consequently, in this phase, in addition to journalists, politicians, both members of opposition parties and protesters within ANAP began referring to Özal as arabesk. A significant event was when the leader of the primary opposition party, Erdal İnönü, called Özal arabesk after Özal's first-ever speech as a president:

> Q71: Erdal İnönü, the leader of the SHP, said the following about President Turgut Özal's speech during the inauguration ceremony, "It reflected his philosophy in an arabesk style. From my perspective, it was not convincing in any way." (Erdal İnönü, quoted by Hikmet Çetinkaya, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

However, starting in 1991, the political significance of arabesk began to diminish, primarily due to two important events. First, ANAP lost the 1991 general elections, which resulted in Özal not being able to interfere in the government as he pleased. The second event was an internal conflict between the owners of the Cumhuriyet and some of the older, influential writers of the newspaper. After this conflict, Uğur Mumcu, Ali Sirmen, and İlhan Selçuk, along with others, left the newspaper and did not return until the spring of the following year; Ali Sirmen did not return at all. Shortly after they came back, Uğur Mumcu was assassinated, and after that, Özal died. As a result, after the second half of 1991, the word "arabesk" was not used in the political context as often. When it was mentioned, it was usually used to refer to past events (see SQ39 in Appendix A). Therefore, after 1991, the political meaning of arabesk largely diminished.

During this phase, arabesk as an adjective was also frequently used in various other situations. In addition to meaning sloppy, exaggerated, or uncouth, intellectuals used the term in idiosyncratic ways that changed depending on the context, though the connotation was usually negative. These idiosyncratic usages made comprehending arabesk more confusing; in some articles or interviews, the meaning the author or interviewee tried to convey was unclear. In some cases, intellectuals were able to use the word arabesk in its various meanings within the same text intelligibly. For example, in his interview with Cumhuriyet, businessman and socialite Ali Koçman referred to arabesk as both "low culture" and "sloppy or haphazard" in the same interview:

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Q72: [The urban bourgeoisie] were overwhelmed by the migration from outside of Istanbul, the new lifestyles, and the new values. They surrendered and accepted everything as it was. In other words, they succumbed to what is called an arabesk lifestyle...

...Doesn't being smart contradict being emotional?

Of course, it does... And it probably results in a kind of arabesk smartness. But there are also pleasures that come with being emotional.

...One last question. When the Gulf War ends, what do you think Turkey is going to be like?

More arabesk, more Americanized, economically and politically stronger, inevitably closer to the US, and more aligned with the American way of life... A Turkey where materialism is highly valued, and the philosophy of making it big becomes more widespread, a kind of blend between American and arabesk influences, I believe. (Ali Koçman, interviewed by Atilla Dorsay, Cumhuriyet, 1991)

At other times, though, what the authors meant by "arabesk" was unintelligible. For instance, in an introduction to a book in Cumhuriyet's book supplement, a journalist described a murder as arabesk, but it was unclear what they meant by that:

Q73: "Nasty Duetto" is a surreal story that is crafted through dreams inspired by summoning spirits, an arabesk murder, and chamber music. (Gürsel Aytaç, Cumhuriyet Kitap, 1991)

The all-encompassing and incomprehensible use of the term "arabesk" caught the attention of certain intellectuals. They argued that others were exaggerating arabesk by calling every negative thing they perceived by this word and that labeling everything arabesk was becoming arabesk in itself. Moreover, in his interview published in Özbek's (1991) book Gencebay also protested people using arabesk as a general pejorative term:

Q74: Arabesk politics, arabesk man, arabesk this, arabesk that, arabesk, arabesk! They started attaching the arabesk label to everything. And we see that this means corruption, that if there is something negative, they label it as arabesk. So, they're tying all negativity to arabesk. They claim that arabesk has been around for 20 years, roughly since I started

making this music, and they indirectly imply that we are corrupt, even though there is no connection. So, according to this situation, there was no corruption 100 years ago; people weren't crooked, and politics wasn't corrupt, but now, for the past 20 years, everything has become distorted. Is that what they mean by their usage? Such a ridiculous thing. (Orhan Gencebay in Özbek, 1991)

Overall, in the fourth phase, similar to its political interpretations, the utilization of arabesk as a negative adjective that encompassed numerous social phenomena initially spread but eventually started to decline due to frequent usage, which made it context-dependent and decreased its impact. In addition, the developments in society and the music industry helped intellectuals re-focus on lower classes and the musical meaning of arabesk. The following section explains the details of this process.

5.4.2 Resetting and Repeating the Discourse

In 1988, industry intellectuals and Unkapanı insiders believed that arabesk was experiencing its peak popularity. The interest in İbrahim Tatlıses and Emrah was especially prominent. The album sales were good, and the concert tickets were selling out. However, the perceived peak was accompanied by an anticipation of decline. In particular, Unkapanı insiders observed that the arabesk market was now saturated, and it was unlikely that new artists on the scale of Gencebay or Tatlıses would emerge. They argued that once the hype over Tatlıses and child singers subsided, arabesk would complete its journey.

During this period, the focus of discussions and debates over arabesk returned to the music industry and slums. These discussions encompassed content like the definition of arabesk, the function of arabesk, and the impact of arabesk on lower classes. Further, this renewed emphasis on music was specifically triggered by certain developments within the musical and social domains. Each of these developments constitutes the subthemes of this overarching theme.

5.4.2.1 Painless Arabesk

After the 1987 elections, Özal changed the Ministries, secretariats, and important official positions to promote the liberal side of ANAP again. Related to arabesk context, he appointed Tınaz Titiz (see Table 3.2) as the new "Minister of Culture and Tourism" and Cem Duna as the new "General Manager of TRT." Both of these names were well-respected politicians and were known as "modern." As such, they were welcomed by intellectuals. They were also friendly towards journalists and artists, often participating in panels and meetings to listen to the complaints and suggestions of musicians, actors, and the press. Titiz believed that the Turkish music industry, with its good and bad, needed to be studied, organized, and structured. In that trajectory, the Ministry of Culture announced that in the summer of 1988, there would be a four-day-long, large-scale music conference titled "1st Music Conference" ("1. Müzik Kongresi" in Turkish). They invited numerous academics and experts to present their research and musicians from all genres to represent and discuss the problems of their style of music. Arabesk artists were also invited, and news articles always explicitly mentioned this information, as this invitation meant that the state was officially recognizing arabesk.

However, the only arabesk singer who attended the conference was Hakkı Bulut. Bulut, although he did not appear in the data before 1988, had been a part of the music industry since the 1960s as a TFM artist, composer, and producer. During the 1970s and 1980s, Bulut made songs that were usually a mix of TFM, Eastern percussion rhythms, and pop beats; therefore, his songs could be considered under the folk-arabesk subgenre. He also used the "arabesk as the public's music" frame and even released an album titled "I am a Peasant" ("Ben Köylüyüm" in Turkish).

Bulut was particularly sensitive about media exposure and the attention he received from the media. In the 1990s and 2000s, he often claimed that he was the original creator of "arabesk" and that he was a record-breaking artist in terms of sales. However, the magazines of that time did not pay him any attention because he was not presentable, and he ended up being overshadowed by Gencebay, who was his background bağlama player in the earlier days (see SQ40 in Appendix A).

In the late 1980s, Bulut made it his mission to obtain permanent TV permission for arabesk, and he started to contact TRT and government officials. Related to his efforts, a newspaper clip reported the following:

Q75: Hakkı Bulut, who is becoming the Don Quixote of arabesk music,

is looking for solutions by writing letters to the state: "This injustice must end."

Hakkı Bulut, like a typical Don Quixote, continues his battle alone. In his fight against TRT, his final attack was sending private letters to Minister Tınaz Titiz and General Manager Cem Duna... (Ayhan Göncer, Unknown, 1988).

These efforts proved futile, but Bulut still attended the 1st Music Conference to advocate for arabesk and get the attention of the Minister. It was reported that Bulut actively participated in the conference and delivered a lengthy speech to defend arabesk music. This time, his attempts were successful. After the conference, it was announced that Titiz had decided to consider the "arabesk issue" further. To achieve this end, the Ministry initially established a board that consisted of Hakkı Bulut, Esin Afşar, a psychiatrist, a musicologist, two sociologists, and Cavidan Selanik, an ex-TRT manager and a current advisor to the Minister of Culture.

The "painless arabesk" ("acısız arabesk" in Turkish) project was introduced to the press after the board had met. According to Selanik, this was the first step of a long-term plan that aimed to make people gradually move away from arabesk songs. Titiz and Selanik announced that the lyrics of the first-ever "painless arabesk" song would be free of suffering and masochism, and the cries and screams [9] would also be removed. Additionally, the violin partitions would be adapted to Western Classical Music standards. Then, in the second song, even more arabesk elements would be eliminated. Selanik, who worked at TRT under the Topuz administration, often disclosed the project by evoking the drug analogies of the first phase. For example, after a press conference, a journalist reported the following:

Q76: Cavidan Selanik stated that to improve the public's music taste and distance it from arabesk, they will follow a method used in the rehabilitation of drug addicts. She said, "If you eliminate arabesk [elements] completely, those who are addicted to arabesk music will not listen to [the alternative] music. [Therefore], in the first song, there are still arabesk elements. What we are doing is like reducing the dosage to help the addict to quit doing drugs. In the second stage, arabesque elements will be completely removed from the instruments, and the same filtering will be done in the vocal partitions as well." (Cavidan Selanik, quoted by Cultural Services, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

Another part of the plan was to broadcast this song on TRT, but only once, to introduce the song without crossing TRT's principles too much. Selanik argued that by broadcasting the song on TV, they aimed to not only disseminate the song but also to encourage other producers to produce similar songs to be able to appear on TRT.

In February of 1989, the first "painless arabesk" song was revealed. The song turned out to be an old song from an album Bulut released in 1986, titled "Seven Kıskanır" ("Jealousy is Love" or "Jealousy is born out of Love") that was re-arranged by Bulut and Esin Engin, who also arranged "Gönül" for Zerrin Özer. The song was generally similar to the upbeat folk-arabesk songs released by Hakkı Bulut, İbrahim Tatlıses, and Emrah before. Hakkı Bulut performed his song on TRT during a "Painless Arabesk Special" forum, where Gencebay, Selanik, pop and CTAM artist Timur Selçuk, and CTAM and alaturka artist Yıldırım Gürses were invited as the panelists. The forum lasted over 90 minutes and witnessed heated debates. The following excerpt was reported on Cumhuriyet after the show was aired:

> Q77: "Painless arabesk" was discussed on TV. The show "Forum on TV," where the Ministry of Culture's "alternative" to arabesk music, called "painless arabesk," was discussed, led to controversy. In particular, Yıldırım Gürses saying things like "We are Ottomans," and Orhan Gencebay's remarks as "Turkish [classical Western music artists] couldn't make people like music for years, now Unkapanı is making them love it" increased the tension. When Yıldırım Gürses interrupted Cavidan Selanik... with the question, "How much did the ministry invest in this matter?" Selanik tried to leave the studio. The tense atmosphere was calmed down by the moderate approaches of Ali Kırca and Timur Selçuk. (Istanbul News Services, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

Moreover, the debates were not limited to this forum. The initial news on "painless arabesk," the introduction of the song, and the forum triggered a wave of reactions from musicians and intellectuals, most of whom found the project ridiculous. Members of the "arabesk board" also dismissed the "painless arabesk plan" and claimed that the project was offered during meetings, but they disagreed. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Culture disregarded their protests and proceeded with the project.

After the attention of the news outlets, Bulut revealed that the "painless arabesk" was not developed as Selanik described. He stated that he had initially talked to Titiz at the conference and requested arabesk to be on TRT. According to Bulut,

Titiz informed him that not every arabesk song met TRT's standards, but they were willing to allow those that were of high quality and did not violate TRT's principles. As a result, Bulut made minor changes to "Seven Kıskanır" and submitted it to TRT, which accepted his song and allowed him to appear on TV. In an interview conducted in 2019, Bulut stated that it was Tınaz Titiz who initiated the conversation because he was bothered by people taking their kids to Unkapanı to make them famous and wanted Bulut to demonstrated a good example of arabesk.

On the side of intellectuals, this was interpreted as a misguided and naive attempt. Those who respected Titiz thought that it was good that the government finally acknowledged that arabesk was a problem and established a policy for it. However, they believed the approach was too simple and shallow to deal with arabesk and its sociocultural implications. Others were harsher and accused the Ministry of being disconnected from reality and wasting the taxpayers' money. Regardless, all intellectuals agreed that the "painless arabesk" project would not solve the issue of arabesk.

Specifically, intellectuals claimed that arabesk was a result or a reflection of the social and economic conditions the slum residents had to face every day. As such, their explanations in this period were reminiscent of the "arabesk sourced in slums" arguments of the 1970s. However, in addition to the socioeconomic conditions, in this phase, intellectuals also pushed the conjecture of arabesk being created by the identity crisis of the immigrants who lost their rural identity but could not acquire the identity of an urbanite. They claimed that arabesk was the music of those who were not "rural" enough to relate to TFM and were not "urban" enough to enjoy pop or Western music. Put together; they believed that arabesk would not diminish unless the underlying hardships causing poverty and identity crisis were solved. For instance, an orchestra conductor made the following statement when he was asked about his thoughts on "painless arabesk":

Q78: It is good that the government acknowledges that arabesk is not healthy. But this approach is ignorant. Arabesk is a disease caused by certain conditions. Its treatment is not the laboratory. What should be done is eliminating the cultural environment, cultural ignorance, and the social issues that [caused arabesk] ... something with deep societal roots cannot be corrected with prescription-like solutions from the government. The crying and screams in arabesk satisfy people. If you remove it, arabesk music will become like non-alcoholic rakı. (Cem Mansur, interviewed by Cumhuriyet, 1989)

Beyond this generally agreed reaction, others revived the argument "arabesk sourced in bans" as well. This project was also referred to as "painless state arabesk" ("acısız devlet arabeski" in Turkish), and intellectuals found it hypocritical because they deemed arabesk as something that was created by prohibitions on music. They claimed that nothing good would come out of state intervention and that musical development should have been left to its natural course. Further, some reflective intellectuals broadened the causes of arabesk and argued that arabesk music was sourced in a lack of democracy, the coup, the increasing populism, and clashes between classes. They revoked the arguments that believed the government was intentionally sedating the public and stated that the solution would not arise within the system. To them, solving arabesk through an arabesk song supported by the government that was responsible for its spread was not a realistic project.

As exemplified by Q78 above, some intellectuals also assumed that the "suffering" in arabesk served a positive function. They argued that arabesk was therapeutic to lower classes because it provided solace, reassurance, and a way of expression. Therefore, they criticized the state for removing the comfort arabesk gave without solving the issues that led people to seek this sort of emotional support in the first place. Finally, certain intellectuals argued that this attempt was questionable because the properties of arabesk were not clear. Arabesk artists like Tatlıses and Emrah had already released numerous upbeat and non-pessimistic songs in the previous period. Additionally, arabesk subgenres like "fantazi" or "taverna" suited the descriptions of "painless arabesk" provided by the Ministry as-is. For example, when he first emerged, Emrah claimed that he was different because his goal was to make "smiling arabesk" ("güleryüzlü arabesk" in Turkish; see SQ41 in Appendix A) that would not upset people. Bulut also stated that he did not make major changes to the song but only arranged the violins, drums, and base into a more "Western style." Supporting this argument, a journalist that talked to Gencebay about the "painless arabesk" reported the following on the issue:

> Q79: Gencebay complained that no one really knows what arabesk is, and asked, "There is a committee that includes Esin Afşar, Yıldırım Aktuna, and some sociologists. How was this committee formed, and who gave them the authority?" Gencebay continued: "Turkey is going through a transitional period, and people are calling this arabesk. I can say that this new application is normal. Arabesk, in my understanding, is a progressive and inclusive form." (Orhan Gencebay, quoted by Cultural Services, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

The heated debates sparked by "painless arabesk" shifted the discourse back to music, especially to the importance and function of suffering in arabesk and for its immediate audiences, i.e., the lower classes. Many arguments made within this context were similar to those from the first and second phases, with their focus on the lyrics, sonic qualities of the songs, and the relationship between slumization and arabesk.

Additionally, broader social factors reinforced this return to more focused discussions. The subsequent subtheme delves into the process of narrowing down the arabesk listeners to the lower classes again.

5.4.2.2 Re-emergence of Lower Classes

After being overshadowed by the lumpenbourgeoisie in the third phase, arabesk's association with the lower classes became more salient during the fourth phase. However, this time the lower classes were portrayed in a different light that described them as more oppressed, more violent, and more marginalized. This change in perception was primarily due to two different reasons.

First, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the issue of slums became one of the most discussed topics in Turkish sociopolitical discourse. This was because of the government's implementation of an "urban transformation" plan, which required them to reclaim the lands illegally occupied by slum residents. The mafia and gangs were involved in the construction business, so in addition to the state, they also tried to evict people from their homes in slums by conviction, deception, and sometimes by using force. During evacuations and demolitions, incidents like individuals throwing themselves in front of bulldozers and excavators, threatening to burn themselves, or holding their families hostage frequently occurred, and therefore the media, including Cumhuriyet, paid close attention to this issue. Another thing that drew the attention of intellectuals to the slums was the suspicious contracts and corrupt deals in the construction industry. Reflective intellectuals blamed the government for granting excessive profit margins to construction firms, unfair distribution of government bids, and not being transparent.

Simultaneously, the profile of the slum residents started to change in that, although they mostly still lived in low-income neighborhoods, a portion of the original slum residents who were able to improve their financial situation moved to apartments. Consequently, the people who resided in the slums were either newer immigrants,

ethnic minorities, or the poorest of the poor.

The salience slums in the general social and political contexts played a role in the reactions given to "painless arabesk." Additionally, this prominence led journalists and academics to conduct investigative work, interviewing people from the slums and the "original urbanites" to understand their characteristics and their opinions of each other. While describing slum dwellers, the authors of the texts usually mentioned that slum residents were avid listeners of arabesk and that both groups were bitter towards one another. Numerous forums, panel discussions, and conferences on urban planning also frequently appeared in the focal data during this phase, as the speakers in these events often linked arabesk with slums or mentioned arabesk among the problems of slum dwellers.

Second, another prominent social issue during this phase was the pressing problem of "delinquent youth" who predominantly resided in slums or in other low-income neighborhoods. Beyond slums, this group was closely associated with arabesk due to the infamous "Gülhane concerts." Gülhane Park, once the exterior garden of Topkapı Palace, was the largest park in Istanbul in the 1980s and 1990s, and was commonly used for exhibitions, festivals, and other cultural events. Over time, it became associated with immigrants and the lower classes who used the park for picnics, creating imagery that consisted of a combination of arabesk music, Turkish barbeque, rakı, tea, and bad smells. From 1987 on, a series of large-scale concerts were scheduled during the summer and early autumn in Gülhane Park. The leading artist of 1987 was Cem Karaca, an Anatolian rock artist who had just come back to Turkey after being in exile, but from 1988 onwards, arabesk artists dominated these concerts. In 1988 and 1989, the concerts coincided with Eid and were free; therefore, they served as a sort of replacement for TRT specials.

Immediately, though, the concerts acquired a negative image as fans' erratic behavior, fights, and following police interventions frequently made headlines. The concerts were often described as eventful, tense, and anxiety-inducing. It became a habit for the fans to boo the opening acts off the stage and demand the leading arabesk artist to appear earlier. Fans also climbed trees and poles and attempted to get on the stage, which then caused security or police intervention and injuries. Other violent acts like throwing bottles at the crowd, fans tearing their clothes, and shouting and swearing were reported.

A more prominent concern was, though, the acts of self-harm. The first instance of fans cutting themselves with razors was reported in 1979 at Tayfur's Izmir concert, however, no further incidents appeared in the focal data until 1989. This resurgence was largely correlated with Müslüm Gürses's increasing saliency in the discourse.

The media portrayed his fans as especially violent, and they also owned up to their negative image of being "off the streets" and vulgar. For example, a journalist who attended Gürses's Gülhane concert described the event as follows:

> Q80: "The repentant children of sinful streets" tore their shirts for Müslüm Gürses: A "painful arabesk" feast at Gülhane
> During the Gülhane concert of Müslüm Gürses who served a very painful feast [10] to his 75 thousand "fanatic" admirers, the police had a hard time appeasing the crowd. In the hands of thousands of "arabesk lovers," banners with phrases like "We are here for you," "Junkies and the King," and "The repentant children of sinful streets" stood out...Müslüm Gürses, with his "painful arabesk" songs, illuminated the "dark" worlds of approximately 75,000 devoted fans during his Gülhane Concert the previous night. (Muharrem Aydın, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

These eventful concerts stimulated another wave of "investigations" on arabesk that aimed to understand the origins of the delinquents' interest in arabesk. Intellectuals believed that this group of youth, most of whom were born and raised in slums at this point, were suppressed and depressed, as they were able to observe city life but could not participate in it due to financial and social constraints. Additionally, they grew up in traditional and conservative families and did not know how to express their emotions and desires properly. As a result, when they were in the anonymous crowds of the concerts and triggered by the music, they released their repressed emotions and engaged in hysteric and violent acts. Journalists frequently sought the opinions of psychologists and psychiatrists who argued that the fans displayed tendencies of suicide, masochism, sadism, and schizoid behavior.

As emphasized in Q80 above, the type of arabesk delinquents liked was depicted as the heavier and "darker" songs that were performed by the original artists like Orhan Gencebay, Ferdi Tayfur, and starting in the third phase Müslüm Gürses and Ahmet Kaya (see below), and not the more cheerful folk-arabesk or pianist-chanteur subgenres.

Beyond the type of arabesk they listened to, the delinquents of the late 1980s and early 1990s had a different narrative surrounding them than the lumpens or lower classes of the 1970s and early 1980s. The latter predominantly consisted of first-generation immigrants who were fighting to survive in the city, taking any job that came across them, and they still had dreams of "turning the corner" and making it big. They were more family-oriented, as the descriptions of "arabesk crowds" of

earlier years included teens, kids, middle-aged men, and even housewives. They were not perceived as violent; even the drivers, arguably the "angriest" segment of the arabesk fans in the 1980s, were approachable, and intellectuals often chatted with them in previous phases. In contrast, the concert crowds were depicted as ticking bombs ready to explode at any minute. They were also portrayed as unemployed and good-for-nothing substance abusers, which made them scarier to intellectuals than the previously sedated masses.

The third issue that redirected the attention of intellectuals to the lower classes and further increased the association of arabesk with violence was the increasingly negative image of minibus drivers. As explained earlier, the drivers were already stigmatized; however, in this phase, they were involved in more accidents, acted more recklessly, and were viler towards the customers. One particular incident involved a vehicle plunging into the sea with passengers on board while racing with another minibus. Intellectuals were frustrated over these incidents and similar others and with the fact that people were so scared of the drivers that they could not say anything even when their life was in danger. These accidents were tied to arabesk as columns and news pieces that talked about them or generally complained about minibus drivers almost always mentioned arabesk:

> Q81: . . . it is obligatory for them to carry a wrench or a screwdriver for intimidation, but it doesn't prevent them from begging and pleading in front of traffic police saying, "Please, just let it slide, buddy!" or "I have a family, man!"...They recognize no value other than their own profits and interests, and they fear nothing but brute force. . . They are ready to cause trouble anywhere they exist, every day, every minute. But they only make the news when their behavior results in death... They love to race. . . and they order passengers when to sit down and get up, to get on and off the minibus, while making them listen to the obligatory arabesk music. . . (Ali Sirmen, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

The intensifying criticisms then led the Chamber of Minibus Drivers to implement a dress code and an arabesk ban to improve the image of the drivers in 1990. However, after a small initial attempt, these reforms quickly faded.

Overall, during this phase, arabesk was not only reinstated in the slums and among lower classes, but these lower classes were fundamentally different from their earlier counterparts in that they were perceived as marginal, extreme, and violent. The slums that once looked quirky to intellectuals now turned into proper ghettos or

backstreets that included every stereotype associated with them, including drugs, poverty, crime, presence of ethnic minorities such as the Romani and Kurds, who were the prominent immigrant group in the 1990s, and even prostitution. As such, the slums and the urbanites, including intellectuals, were more segregated than ever.

As a result, the "lumpen" label was insufficient to describe this crowd, and new labels like "maganda" and "zonta" emerged. Both labels usually referred to young males from lower classes that did not know how to behave and dress. However, maganda were more gang-like, violent, and scary, and "zonta" which was coined by caricaturists of satirical magazines, was more of a mocking label that was used for those who appeared "fresh-off-the-boat" and did not know how to act in front of girls.

As the 1990s progressed, the core listeners of arabesk music increasingly became associated with these smaller groups. Despite the popularity of the catchy and upbeat songs of the previous phase and the efforts of TRT, discussions on "painful arabesk" and arabesk's negative impact on mental health also reappeared. However, more recent contextual data (e.g., Saraçoğlu, 2014) argued against these reductions and stated that the media exaggerated the violent events. They claimed that in the 1990s, arabesk music still had a broader fan base and that the marginalization of the listeners by intellectuals did not accurately reflect reality.

5.4.2.3 Arabesk's Incoherence

With the emergence of "painless arabesk" and a renewed focus on music, the debates on the definition and properties of arabesk resurfaced. As a result, during this phase, forums and panels on arabesk were quite common, as nearly half of the meetings reported in the data occurred between 1989 and 1991. Besides the open discussion on arabesk, the fourth phase witnessed the emergence of articles, series, and books that approached arabesk in a more systematic way that was reminiscent of the in-depth articles of the second phase. Nonetheless, compared to intellectuals of the second phase, these authors were more in line with the benevolent intellectual type (see Chapter 4) and, therefore, had a calmer and relatively more impartial approach towards arabesk. Though they still emphasized the "negative" parts of the genre and distanced themselves from the lower classes. In addition, unlike previous examples, this stream of examinations did not rush to define arabesk or categorize it strictly but instead presented various perspectives on the genre. Refik Durbaş, a famous poet who occasionally wrote for Cumhuriyet, even made the following disclaimer in

the introduction of his six-part series on arabesk:

> Q82: We can directly ask:
> "What is arabesk?"
> In this series of articles, instead of trying to answer this question, [I] worked towards identifying the prominent aspects of arabesk as it reflects in our daily lives. This is because, especially in the last ten years, what is arabesk and what is not have become intertwined... Yes, arabesk is now a way of life, a way of life that we have grown familiar with... It is a way of life with unclear boundaries; where it starts, and ends cannot be captured... I would have loved to write this series in an arabesk style. However, when I couldn't find the definitive boundaries of arabesk, the style just slipped away from the tip of my pen. . . (Refik Durbaş, Cumhuriyet, 1990)

As such, instead of developing a definition for arabesk, this line of work tried to create specific frameworks for arabesk. They generally distinguished the 1970s, the era of Gencebay and Tayfur, from the 1980s, when İbrahim Tatlıses, taverna, and child singers emerged. Additionally, they pointed out that the trends of the 1980s were fading and that arabesk would go through another transformation in the 1990s.

Further, as more people acknowledged that arabesk's definition was unclear, authorities also became alerted to this situation and felt the need to step in. A noteworthy event related to this issue in the fourth phase was TRT and the PR's utilization of the confusion over arabesk's meaning as a defense strategy against the Radio and Television High Council (RTYK, now known as RTÜK). RTYK was established in 1952 to supervise TRT and other radio channels but was not very active. In the previous phases, TRT mostly self-censored and used internal audit mechanisms to monitor the broadcasts. In 1989, there was an anticipation of private TV and radio channels proliferating soon, so RTYK revamped itself and started making changes to prepare for the increasing amount of TV channels.

First, they banned audio advertisements of arabesk albums on TV and radio and the use of arabesk songs in commercials. Then, they conducted an investigation called "What is arabesk − Is it degenerate music?" ("Arabesk nedir? − Yoz müzik midir?" in Turkish) and based on it, prepared a 150-200 page report that defined and explained the properties of arabesk. The report was supposed to be a handbook for TRT and the PR, so they would not "mistakenly" accept arabesk songs.

RTYK also declared that arabesk must not be allowed on TRT and PR, even as comedy content. They also issued a separate warning for the PR because their arabesk broadcasts were considered "too much." After the news of the handbook started to circulate, Cumhuriyet interviewed the Chief of the Police to ask whether they would stop broadcasting arabesk music. The Chief then expressed the following:

> Q83: The issue of "arabesk music" is still a debated and unresolved topic in our country... The concept of arabesk music is subjective; therefore, it cannot be said that arabesk music is broadcasted on the PR. (Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

Initially, when questioned by journalists, TRT managers stated that they did not see arabesk as a genre and did not allow it whether there was a report or not. However, the discussions on the report coincided with TRT's New Year's Eve preparations, and rumors about arabesk artists appearing on TV were circulating. During this period, TRT was also concerned about the preparations for private TV, which would destroy its monopoly of almost 30 years. As such, they did not want to give up their arabesk special of New Year's Eve. When the journalists kept pressing them about the RTYK's warning, TRT officers at various levels unanimously stated that they did not receive such a report, but they would be sure to follow if the report was to ever reach them, even though RTYK claimed to send the report two months ago.

Journalists kept insisting, and upon this, a TRT personnel made an argument that was very similar to the Police Chief:

> Q84: There is no consensus within society regarding what arabesk music is. TRT has certain criteria for evaluating music genres. Regardless of the genre, the lyrics, content, and appropriateness to broadcasting principles are evaluated according to these criteria. (TRT personnel, quoted by Ayşe Sayın, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

Consequently, the ambiguity over arabesk served a function similar to how chameleons' ambiguous identity benefitted them.

In general, this theme was marked by intellectuals abandoning the growingly meaningless or irrelevant expansions of arabesk and recontextualizing the term within the boundaries of music and lower classes. This return to the basics made the misunderstandings around arabesk's definition and properties more salient, though

intellectuals and authorities were not as motivated to draw the boundaries, and TRT and the PR used it for their advantage.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, intellectuals and Unkapanı insiders predicted that arabesk would lose steam soon. The final theme of this phase revolves around the predictions made by industry intellectuals and insiders regarding the future of arabesk.

5.4.3 Özgün Music and Revolutionary Arabesk

The narratives around arabesk's decline initially started in the film industry during the previous phases. In the early to mid-1980s, Dorsay and some of the prominent directors were already tired of other commercial genres, like erotic films and cheap action movies, dominating the industry, and they frequently promoted the notion of arabesk films declining (see SQ42 in Appendix A). By the end of the third phase, arabesk films indeed lost their impact, while arabesk music was still on the rise. However, this decline in arabesk films was also influenced by the instability of the Turkish film industry, which suffered from significant fluctuations in sales, taxes, censorship policies, and access to technical equipment which often resulted in industry-wise crises.

In contrast, rumors of arabesk music declining began to circulate in the late 1980s and became frequent in 1990. As mentioned earlier, a common understanding, especially among the Unkapanı insiders in this phase, was that arabesk had reached its peak with İbrahim Tatlıses and child singers, and it was unlikely the genre would experience another resurgence like that of the late 1970s or mid-1980s. Producers at Unkapanı also reported that the cassette sales, in general, were dropping and speculated that this was because arabesk was losing popularity, though this relationship could also be interpreted in the opposite direction as well.

What was popular during this period was "mixtapes" and numerous artists re-recording the same hit song. The mixtapes usually were designed for the drivers and featured various songs. The cassettes sometimes consisted of arabesk songs only, and sometimes they included a bunch of different genres like TFM, alaturka, and pop, albeit they were usually "commercial" records. In addition to the songs, the mixtapes also included random humorous monologues and dialogues between tracks. As such, these mixtapes were viewed as cheap and low quality by intellectuals.

The trend of re-recording hit songs resulted from producers and composers looking

for a quick cash grab in a stagnant industry. When a song did relatively well, no matter the genre, others started to make their own interpretations, and these records were included in the mixtapes. This situation created confusion about who was the original singer of a given song or about the actual genre the song belonged to.

In addition to these minor trends, two related music streams became increasingly popular during the fourth phase. These emergent genres were labeled "revolutionary arabesk" ("devrimci arabesk" in Turkish) and "özgün music" (can be translated as "authentic music" or "unique music"). Both genres had a political orientation and were members of the broader category of "protest music." However, they had very slight differences in tone and lyrics. "Revolutionary arabesk" was championed by Ahmet Kaya and "özgün music" was represented by a broader group of artists like Zülfü Livaneli and Selda.

To start with, "protest music" referred to a universal categorization encompassing all music that aimed to motivate people toward social movement and social change (Gooding, Yamane & Salter, 2021). Moreover, the Turkish protest music tradition had a long history and was traced to the rebellious poet/bağlama players ("aşık" and "ozan" in Turkish) of the 16th-century Ottoman Empire. Their influence continued through other bağlama players/singers, and as a result, certain lines in TFM had been carrying protest elements for a long time.

Modern Turkish protest music was generally based on TFM as well. One of the important streams closer in history was the "Anatolian rock" of the 1968 generation (see Chapter 4), which combined TFM and rock elements. Additionally, educated TFM artists like Ruhi Su and Zülfü Livaneli intentionally adapted and arranged TFM songs with rebellious themes or anthem-like rhythms to a form that they thought could unite urbanites and lower classes. These two artists were credited for introducing TFM to the urban elite. Some academics also mentioned 1970s' Orhan Gencebay, who was a contemporary of the 1968 generation, as a part of the protest music tradition in Turkey (e.g., Özbek, 1991).

The development of Turkish protest music came to a halt after the coup of September 12th, as many protest singers were imprisoned, stayed in the shadows, or had to leave the country. Starting in the mid-1980s, the pressures on the musicians began to relax, leading to the resurgence of protest music towards the end of the 1980s. Typically, protest musicians of this phase and the 1990s followed the Ruhi Su or Zülfü Livaneli tradition, where they sang TFM songs that could evoke collective spirit.

During this phase, the label "özgün music" gained popularity and was frequently

used to refer to protest musicians of the time. Özgün musicians could be soloists, who typically played bağlama and guitar, or bands that usually had large numbers of rotating members. They performed original TFM compositions or re-arranged folk songs and were generally regarded as competent musicians. Commonly used themes in özgün music included brotherhood, collective uprising, and hope. Those more oriented towards revolution also emphasized themes like prison, execution, being chased, or death. Those who were closer to the mainstream, like Livaneli, also made love songs.

Özgün musicians were described and liked to describe themselves as tired, indignant, and proud freedom or democracy fighters. Being inclusive and representative of all ethnic groups in Turkey was also a part of their identity. Most of them supported the Kurdish uprising of that time, though to varying degrees, and tried to include various emic instruments and local languages and dialects. Additionally, because özgün musicians were left-leaning, intellectuals were mostly sympathetic toward them. The following introduction, which was written for Selda Bağcan, a TFM, protest, and özgün music artist, summarizes all attributes of özgün music:

> Q85: There is oppression, pain, screams, and rebellion in her voice... There is suffering, resentment, injustice, and loneliness in her verses... Yet, there is love, peace, and friendship in her compositions. The strings of her bağlama and guitar have a warmth, gentleness, and bittersweetness that reach the depths of one's heart. "Drawing Freedom and Democracy" is full of songs carefully woven by Selda... Our country's master of özgün music, known as "protest" music globally, is tired but hopeful. She is upset but not angry... So, who is this Selda? Is she an irreparable "leftist," an incurable humanist, or perhaps a militant? (Zehra Çakır, Cumhuriyet, 1988)

One of the most important özgün music artists in this phase was Zülfü Livaneli, who had been a prominent name in the arabesk discourse from the beginning. In 1989, Livaneli's popularity was increasing, both due to his own performances and to a song he wrote for the pop artist Sezen Aksu becoming a huge hit that many other singers covered. Livaneli and other özgün musicians' albums were selling well, and on top of it, Livaneli started to gather a crowd in Gülhane that was comparable to that of arabesk singers. This evident popularity of özgün music drew the attention of intellectuals, who became hopeful that the alternative to arabesk was finally found. Unkapanı insiders agreed with this observation and expected that özgün

music would surpass arabesk soon. Livaneli also echoed this sentiment. As reported in Cumhuriyet, Livaneli said the following at his Gülhane concert:

> Q86: During the break, Zülfü Livaneli said, "Tonight is a turning point. You have shown that not only arabesk music but also our own music is listened to in Turkey." It was observed that some members of the audience were waving signs with the texts that said "Human dignity will overcome torture," "Let the prisons be emptied, freedom to the prisoners." (Zülfü Livaneli quoted by Muharrem Aydın, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

Another artist that was able to compete with arabesk singers was Ahmet Kaya, who stood out from the rest of the özgün musicians. Though his songs were not really similar to the arabesk pieces of the time, his music was often classified as a subgenre of arabesk labeled "revolutionary arabesk" ("devrimci arabesk" in Turkish), protest-arabesk, or "left arabesk" ("sol arabesk" in Turkish) and was generally understood as a synthesis of protest music and arabesk. Kaya refused this label and argued that people categorized his music as such just because his songs had sad lyrics. He also did not like the özgün music label because, to him, it just meant that one was making his or her unique music. His explanations were generally similar to Gencebay and Tayfur's in that he claimed he made music as his heart desired while keeping the good of the public in mind. In an interview with Cumhuriyet, he expressed the following:

> Q87: Some call it özgün music, while others refer to it as protest-arabesk or revolutionary arabesk. Since they couldn't find a label for the music I make, some people who like to run their mouths decided to call it özgün music. I am completely against [this term]. I definitely haven't been authentic [özgün]. Or rather, I said that everyone's work is authentic in its own way. Orhan Gencebay's music, for example, is authentic in its own way...I call [my music] social art or social music. (Ahmet Kaya, Cumhuriyet, 1990)

Kaya was very well-liked by intellectuals that had a similar political orientation as him. In her book, Güngör (1993) even called him "a breath of fresh air" that could redeem arabesk music. Their support for Kaya was sourced in a similar understanding of the support given to 1970s' Gencebay in that they believed he had the power to use his music to mobilize the public. In contrast, intellectuals

from Cumhuriyet did not like Kaya. They found him hypocritical for talking about revolution and communism on the one hand and then enjoying being a celebrity and buying luxury items on the other. Kaya also talked in big sentences and was very confident, which led to criticism and ridicule from intellectuals (see SQ43 in Appendix A).

Other özgün musicians also criticized Kaya based on the revolutionary arabesk label given to his music. They believed arabesk was about surrender and appreciation of pain and did not suit the "revolutionary philosophy" slightest. In their opinion, Kaya was simply exploiting two popular genres to get the best of both worlds. Kaya was very nonchalant about the criticisms; he said his music was not arabesk, but he did not care if people labeled it so because intellectuals were detached from reality and did not know anything about the public. The other musicians wanted to bring him down because he was a real revolutionary.

Like Livaneli, Kaya gathered huge crowds at his concerts, though his concerts were interpreted both as a new, rising subtype of arabesk and also as özgün music taking over arabesk. In addition to Kaya blurring the boundaries, the listeners were less sensitive to the differences. TRT also prohibited özgün music in its early days, and özgün music fans often included arabesk in their texts when they were protesting for TRT to allow özgün music.

As the 1990s progressed, despite certain, more moderate artists like Livaneli and Selda acquiring popularity, the heavy political affiliation of the genre hindered it from climbing to the mainstream. Therefore, özgün music, though it overshadowed arabesk from time to time, could not exactly replace it.

Overall, in the fourth phase arabesk discourse went through major transformations. The term "arabesk" moved from being a general adjective used to refer to a political party and orientation and having subtle meanings that had little to do with music back to a musical genre. At the same time, arabesk music itself transformed from being a high-demand category to a genre in decline and not worth investing in. In the following years, this anticipation was realized and arabesk music and arabesk discourse began to shrink. The final phase focuses on arabesk's withdrawal from the popular music scene and the events that contributed to this retreat.

5.5 Phase 5: Withdrawal

This phase started in the latter half of 1991 and differed from previous phases due to the position of arabesk in Turkish popular culture. Besides, in the 1990s, the entertainment industry became significantly bigger, and various social and cultural developments changed how intellectuals were perceived.

Following ANAP's loss of the 1991 elections, Özal's passing away in April 1993, and Uğur Mumcu's assassination in early 1993, the association between arabesk, the upper classes, and politicians was completely diminished. As stated above, political utilization of the term "arabesk" only appeared a handful of times, and they were usually in reference to the policies of the past.

Simultaneously, the class structures and demographics in cities were also transforming. Apartment complexes were gradually replacing slums, and increased social mobility was melting the cultural and economic differences between, especially second-generation, rural-to-urban immigrants and the original urbanites. These changes then spread to the profile of intellectuals and the credibility of the intellectual opinion.

A major development in the fifth phase was the introduction of private radio and the proliferation of private TV channels, which fundamentally changed the relationship between TRT and the music industry. Due to a sudden increase in competitors, TRT lost its grip on artists, and its ratings fell significantly.

Another observed change related to the entertainment industry was the increased variety of genres and the number of festivals and international concerts. Specifically, genres like jazz, rock, Western pop, alternative music like new age, and metal were becoming increasingly popular. Additionally, certain entrepreneurs brought art and concert sponsorship practices to Turkey and began to organize both genre-based, niche festivals and stadium concerts that were headlined by renowned artists like Michael Jackson and Metallica. As such, the Turkish music industry went from being locally oriented and dependent on TRT and state support to a more open, variant, and significantly larger sector. In this context, Turkish pop music was making a grand comeback after allegedly taking the biggest blow from arabesk's expansion and struggling for the past two decades. However, industry intellectuals were quick to inform others that this was not "pop" in its authentic, that is "Western," sense, but instead, it was an amalgamation of arabesk and pop marketed as modern, urban music. As such, the majority of the new content related to arabesk came from the

discourse that was building around the re-emergence of pop.

After 1996, the data stopped generating new insights, as mentions of arabesk were generally peripheral, repetitive, or historical. Except for brief reviews on arabesk movies broadcasted by private TV channels, the topic of arabesk rarely made a solo appearance in the data set. Instead, it was usually discussed in relation to other genres, like pop, özgün music, and TFM, or it was used as an example while referencing the music of earlier periods. The last surge of relatively contributive debates emerged when Gencebay released an album in 1996. However, after that, the analysis of the remaining three years only proved that arabesk was being shelved as the music of the marginal, lower classes. Therefore, after 1999, the data analysis stopped.

This phase encompasses three themes. The first theme, "The changing Profile of the Intellectuals," explains how the identity of intellectuals evolved, how society began to perceive them differently, and how the new intellectuals approached arabesk. The second theme, "Proliferation of Private TV," focuses on the changes that came with the emergence of alternative broadcasting channels and their impact on arabesk and its regulatory status. Finally, the third theme, "The Rise of Pop-besk," explores the belief that suggested that arabesk did not die but was living vicariously through Turkish pop.

5.5.1 Changing Profile of the Intellectuals

During this phase, mass immigration had slowed down, and the initial wave of migration was more than 30 years old. Many of the immigrants were able to climb up socially and economically; second and third-generation immigrants had become journalists, authors, artists, and university students themselves. At the same time, the ongoing interactions with rural-to-urban immigrants changed the urbanites, and the cultural gap between the urban and the immigrants was narrowing. As high culture, education, and cultural production became more accessible, the number of people who categorized themselves as intellectuals increased. Consequently, the image of intellectuals and the validity of intellectual opinion started to change.

As explained in Chapter 4, the "intellectual" identity was historically situated. It was a high-status social segment created by the urgent need for well-educated professionals and experts in almost every aspect of life in 1930s' Turkey. Cultural resources and educational opportunities were limited, so those who were able to ac-

quire these assets stood out from the rest and were given the mission of enlightening the public. Over the decades, the identity of intellectuals transformed slightly and showed specific differences. However, until the 1990s, the core values associated with intellectuals were consistent in that it was generally agreed that intellectuals had higher knowledge in their respective fields and were motivated to help the public; therefore, whether they deserved the intellectual label was rarely negotiated. The main criticism directed towards intellectuals from arabesk proponents was intellectuals being disconnected from the masses. Even such criticisms did not apply to intellectuals as a whole but were primarily directed at the "nostalgic" subgroup.

Nonetheless, as society witnessed an inflation of "intellectuals" in the early 1990s, the category of intellectuals came under question. During this phase, the abbreviation "entel" (derived from the French word "intellectuel", written "entellektüel" in Turkish) became very popular. This word was largely popularized by weekly satirical magazines and comics. In these publications, "entels" existed in the same world as "zonta" and represented another manifestation of repressed ruralness. There was even a comics series called "Zontellektüel Abdullah" which was turned into a TV miniseries by TRT in 1994.

"Entels" were stereotyped as bums who thought that they were above the others, dressed like European bohemia, and hung out in cafes and bars in certain neighborhoods in Istanbul. They imitated the "real Turkish intellectuals" and their Western counterparts in mannerisms, but they lacked substance and exposed themselves when they spoke. They often mislabeled things and confused ideas and references, and their critics believed that they pretended to like reading and listening to classical music and jazz, but they actually did not. Some of the özgün music artists and Ahmet Kaya were sometimes associated with this group.

Although a couple of Cumhuriyet authors protested the depreciation of the intellectual image and believed that spread of "entel" humor was slanderous, others disliked "entels" and tried to distance themselves from them as real intellectuals. For example, an actress expressed the following after being bothered by the behavior of attendees at a film festival:

> Q88: Yes, the dictionary meaning of the word "intellectual" is those that think, those that use their heads…[however] going to cinema [or] theater, reading many books, pretending to be marginal because it is trendy, going to cafes and bars with tied hair and beards, having a quirky attitude, etc. do not necessarily make someone an "intellectual." An intellectual person may possess the hypothetical qualities mentioned

above, but it is not obligatory for them to possess these attributes to be considered intellectual, nor is the presence of these characteristics a definitive indicator of intellectuality... In educational and art institutions, [people with] half culture, half knowledge, and unlimited courage are taking over... So much so that our society has caught in an "intellectual disease." (Esen Özman, Cumhuriyet, 1992)

However, as the "others" could not distinguish between imitators and the "real" intellectuals, the image of intellectuals took a hit. Younger intellectuals especially lost credibility, and most of them did not have the impact of older generations. Benevolent intellectuals who rejected their intellectual identity were popular during this time, and they also mocked the "entels."

In addition, Gencebay made use of the declining image of intellectuals, and in his album promotions in 1996, blamed them for misunderstanding arabesk and mislabeling his music. His interview in Cumhuriyet had the following introduction and conversation:

Q89: [Gencebay] does not like the word arabesk at all. He says the music he makes is "free music." He states that arabesk was a concept made up by intellectuals, but they were mistaken...
− You don't like your music being called arabesk? So what do you call it?
− [That] name is wrong. You can call it "free work."
− You became a subject of debate for sociologists and musicologists. You were the sensation of a period...
− They made very wrong interpretations. There were false accusations and slander. Their views were extremely incorrect. Sociologists drew parallels between the lives of people migrating from rural areas to cities and arabesk based on a single interview. It was extremely misguided. (Orhan Gencebay, interviewed by Serpil Gündüz, Cumhuriyet, 1996)

Beyond the change in the perception of intellectuals, the profile of Cumhuriyet authors appearing in the data also changed. The dominant intellectuals of this period were younger music critics that focused on not classical music but popular culture. They frequently published long, in-depth articles on the music industry and systematically reviewed albums and concerts. Unlike the previous pieces, the analyses and reviews focused on music instead of social and political elements. Their approach to

arabesk differed because they tried to be more impartial in their criticisms. Their understanding was more sophisticated as they had more knowledge about experimental music, mixing sounds, and kitsch categories. They did not want to be grouped with other "entels," so they echoed Gencebay's sentiments and wrote how others were not able to understand the complicated elements in Gencebay's music. For example, when Gencabay was accused of copying rockers who were enjoying mainstream attention during the 1990s music critics came to the defense of Gencebay. For instance, one of the most prevalent authors of the fifth phase, Cumhur Cambazoğlu, wrote the following:

> Q90: Finally, the tabloids turned Orhan Gencebay also into a rocker. By highlighting the very few parts with rock sound in his latest album, "Kiralık Dünya," they tried to insinuate that the whole album was rock and tried to capitalize on the current popularity of rock. Gencebay knew that they would do this, so in his interviews, he said he experimented with rock sounds a bit in advance. But then the [tabloids] exaggerated his words. Rock has been present in Orhan Gencebay's career; his songs even included an extremely interesting reggae attempt like "Hatasız Kul Olmaz." [The press] taking the easy road and labeling his music, which was open to sounds produced all over the world, arabesk based on the heavy Arabic rhythms, did no good other than confining Gencebay in a narrow path. (Cumhur Canbazoğlu, Cumhuriyet, 1996)

The idea of Gencebay being different from the others had been around since the peak of arabesk in the mid-to-late 1980s; however, with the new intellectuals providing a sound theoretical basis for why it was so and the credibility of typical intellectuals falling, Gencebay's reputation improved greatly. Though his 1996 album was one of the last original albums he produced, Gencebay started his journey toward general acceptance in the domain of intellectuals.

5.5.2 Proliferation of Private TV

In 1990, the first private TV channel in Turkey, Star 1, slowly started its test broadcasts for a limited time in a day. By this time, TRT already had three TV channels and prepped for the four. As such, in the previous phase, TRT was still the most dominant media company in the country. However, by 1992, the private TV

system had been fully established, and gradually more channels entered the industry. The emergence of private TV had influenced the arabesk discourse in several ways.

First, while trying to find their footing, these channels frequently aired Turkish films, including many arabesk movies, because they were the most affordable option. TRT also broadcasted significantly more arabesk movies on its fifth channel, GAP TV, which was established for the Eastern regions of Turkey but was considered a neglected burner channel by intellectuals. Cumhuriyet's TV section provided reviews for almost every movie that would be aired that day, and from 1992 on, these reviews made up a considerable portion of the focal data. However, most of these reviews were copies of earlier versions that were written five to fifteen years ago when the films originally came out. As a result, though the numbers of mentions stayed high for a while (see Figure 3.1), there was a sudden drop in the amount of meaningful content as the search results began to contribute to the insights on discourse less and less.

Second, the appearance of private TV and then private radio channels made TRT's bans and discussions on bans irrelevant. Arabesk artists appeared on TV as they pleased, and Tatlıses and Tayfur even had their own talk/music shows. To compete with private channels, TRT kept the New Year's Eve invitations, incorporated more movies, and produced more documentary-type shows and panels on arabesk. However, they were always somewhat distant and selective about what they allowed on screen. By the mid-1990s, TRT had lost its influence on the music industry and society and became "one of" the channels.

Most of the private radio stations that focused on Turkish music followed the PR's strategy in that they released a variety of different music genres back to back within the same program, including arabesk, pop, popular rock music of the time, özgün music, and TFM. These joint releases blurred the boundaries and created a familiarity between different genres, especially arabesk and pop.

During this phase, arabesk artists who felt wronged by TRT and intellectuals had the chance to go on television and explain their perspectives. Ferdi Tayfur, who had not been on TV for more than ten years, finally went on TRT, albeit for an interview in 1992, and many other shows on private channels. In those appearances, he often dissed TRT and argued that it was not him who did not want to be on TV but that TRT intentionally skipped him every year. Hakkı Bulut also talked a lot about being selectively ostracized by the press and his contributions being overshadowed. Another popular type of show during the 1990s was panel discussions between arabesk artists and the opponents; however, these shows were very heated and often consisted of people yelling at each other instead of having a proper debate. The

topics generally focused on arabesk being low-quality music and declining people's taste versus intellectuals being detached from the public and unable to understand the public's needs and desires. As a result, they did not allow arabesk artists to redeem themselves, but they were at least provided a platform for conveying their perspective to a larger audience.

5.5.3 The Rise of Pop-besk

With arabesk's decline being almost certain after 1990, intellectuals and musicians alike were very eager to find out what was going to happen in the popular music scene. As explained earlier, özgün music did not fulfill the initial expectations; however, in the early 1990s, Turkish pop was also experiencing a speedy revival. Pop singers like Sezen Aksu and Kayahan, both of whom actually had been around for a while, started to sell out arabesk albums and were constantly releasing hits. Consequently, the composers Aksu worked with and Kayahan's own compositions were in high demand, and both singers had others who followed their styles.

Though the increasing popularity of Turkish pop was exciting for intellectuals who believed that Western musical forms were superior, some music critics and musicians warned others that these artists were not making "authentic pop" or "Western-style pop," but instead, their form was a mix of arabesk and pop.

These discussions initially started around Sezen Aksu in the fourth phase. Sezen Aksu was then, and is now, arguably the biggest female pop singer in Turkey (see Table 3.2). Early on, some intellectuals noticed that she was one of the few pop singers from the 1970s that somehow preserved her popularity during arabesk's peak. However, industry insiders hesitated to classify her music as textbook pop but claimed that she had her own unique style (see SQ44 in Appendix A). In the 1990s, Aksu's ever-increasing popularity made the music critics in Cumhuriyet scrutinize her releases. These critics argued that Aksu made "hidden arabesk," i.e., sorrowful lyrics and Eastern sounds hidden under pop beats, and this style then spread among other female pop singers. In addition, critics argued that these singers curated a complicated image that had various sides ranging from the "big sister from the neighborhood" to the "mischievous girlfriend" to the "talented and mysterious singer-songwriter" and showed these sides strategically to different audiences.

Because he wanted to confirm the music critics' hypothesis about Aksu and similar others making a mix of pop and arabesk, critic Sina Koloğlu asked Onno Tunç, one

of the most in-demand producers of the time, who made quite a few songs for Sezen Aksu, about the structure of Aksu's songs. The following conversation was then published on Cumhuriyet:

> Q91: "Aside from Sezen, Nilüfer, Kayahan, [and] Zerrin perform songs with Western structures but extremely Eastern and sad melodies and the messages." Onno Tunç takes it even further "That's right. Actually, as I said before we provided the sounds and motifs the public liked. We had one distinction from arabesk artists. That is the foundational layer of the songs. I have freedom in this foundation. People who are aware of [technique] understand. . . The foundation of the song "Hadi Bakalım" in Sezen's latest cassette is acid house. But the melody is different. Those who hear it hear it. . . But it is time to make something new. I can't accept a 20-year-old girl singing songs about pain anymore" (Onno Tunç, interviewed by Sina Koloğlu, Cumhuriyet, 1991)

Simultaneously, another target of criticism was Kayahan, a singer, composer, and producer who sang along acoustic guitar and was known for his compositions for another pop artist, Nilüfer. Kayahan started to be promoted as a solo singer in the late 1980s and was initially praised for making "Mediterranean music." During the 1980s and 1990s, Mediterranean music was offered by certain intellectuals as an alternative to arabesk. These intellectuals believed that due to its geographic location, Turkish people were both Mediterranean and Middle Eastern, and as such, they had a choice between the two. They believed that Mediterranean music was the better alternative to Middle Eastern music which was represented by arabesk (see SQ45 in Appendix A).

However, those who paid closer attention to Kayahan's lyrics soon realized that although he used Mediterranean melodies, the content of his songs was not really different from that of "painful arabesk." A genuine confusion occurred when a food and restaurant reviewer who often complained about venues that played arabesk and told his readers to avoid going to these places reported the following after hearing a Kayahan song in a municipality-owned restaurant:

> Q92: Perhaps the only flaw of the place is that you have to listen to the singer that sings "roads of love to you, bullets to me" and the others like him. It could be much better to listen to the sounds of nature instead of listening to the screeching sounds from the speakers that were placed

in every tree.

When we warned the manager about this . . . he told us they don't play arabesk. (Bekri Çeşnici, Cumhuriyet Magazine, 1991)

Intellectuals who were more knowledgeable about music argued that Kayahan had the same pessimism as arabesk, but he got away with it because he used more Western, and therefore more socially acceptable, forms. When questioned, Kayahan usually gave similar explanations to Gencebay and said that he made the music he was inspired to make and that if people were insistent on categorizing his music, they could call it Turkish or Mediterranean music.

Nonetheless, industry intellectuals, especially the new generation of music critics, and rock and "authentic pop" singers, chose to call Sezen Aksu, Kayahan, and those who followed them "pop-arabesk" or, shortly, "pop-besk." They interpreted this trend as yet another opportunistic attempt by exploitative artists who not only tried to benefit from the effect sad lyrics had on people but also did it in a sneaky manner by hiding the "arabesk-ness" under appropriate song structures and "pop singer" image. Following this realization, the belief that arabesk was not dying but actually infiltrating into other genres and subtly continuing to bring Turkish music and culture down started to gain traction. Gencebay also supported the "infiltration argument" but framed it in a different way where arabesk was not in other genres but instead, other genres were now under the arabesk umbrella (see SQ46 in Appendix A). This frame aligned with his original intention of portraying arabesk as an all-encompassing, experimental genre that welcomed any sound or synthesis.

Regardless, skeptics argued that the "explosion of Turkish pop music" was actually a misconception. What was being sold was not actually pop music but an arabesk variant, i.e., pop-besk, marketed as Turkish pop to unsuspecting audiences. An investigative piece on Turkish pop's rise that spoke to multiple musicians and industry insiders reported the following:

Q93: Turkish pop is finally smiling. The sale of one million seven hundred thousand copies of Sezen Aksu's "Gülümse" cassette represents the brightest era of Turkish Pop Music. . . How did Turkish pop music, which had been struggling for years, finally got to shine? Critics and some prominent musicians are not very optimistic about this sudden rise. Thought by almost everyone and expressed by critic Erdir Zat: "Turkish pop went through the filter of arabesk." (Istanbul News Services, Cumhuriyet, 1992)

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In the following years, industry intellectuals expanded their arguments on pop-besk and drew from various sociological theories on mass culture, popular culture, and subcultures. They also often used Shils's (1975) center-periphery model, arguing that pop-besk was an attempt of the center, that is, the urbanites, at stealing the culture of the periphery, arabesk, and then reselling it to the periphery in an "appropriate" form. Such an exchange also helped those who were arabesk inside but embarrassed to admit it. In other words, pop-besk allowed people who suppressed their liking of arabesk to avoid condemnation or ridicule to enjoy their preferred music without being looked down upon. Whether it was defined as pop-besk or Turkish pop, Sezen Aksu, Kayahan, and others in their ecole largely took over the popular music scene in the 1990s.

Simultaneously, the arabesk discourse was being wrapped around Orhan Gencebay, Ferdi Tayfur, and Müslüm Gürses. From the latter half of the 1990s on, Gencebay and Tayfur became increasingly inactive. Others like İbrahim Tatlıses and Ceylan were inclined towards TFM, and Emrah attempted to pop-ify his image. Kibariye and another artist who became popular in the mid-1990s, Ebru Gündeş, did continue to sing arabesk songs and were active, but they were mainly known for their impeccable vocal talents and were not that affected by their connection to arabesk. Müslüm Gürses, who was the most prominent arabesk artist in the late 90s and early 2000s, gained traction among intellectuals with his covers of popular pop and rock songs and with his album "Aşk Tesadüfleri Sever" (Love Loves Coincidences) supervised by poet and songwriter Murathan Mungan who primarily had worked with pop artists before. Some interpreted this situation as intellectuals, or "entels," using Gürses's watered-down arabesk as a prop to show that they were different and quirky. Gürses's popularity started to decline to the margins after the mid-2000s.

Recently, after the success of the films "Muslum" (2018) and "Bergen" (2022), arabesk discourse has been re-opened and the position of arabesk in Turkish culture and history is still being re-evaluated. Today, arabesk is seen as a misunderstood genre that was unfairly insulted by snobs, though these snobs are faceless in the narratives. As stated above, the focus is generally on Gencebay, Tayfur, and Gürses, and Bergen's movie increased the interest in smaller female artists. The chaos of the 1980s, that is ANAP, Özal, and Tatlıses, is largely left out of the current discussions. Musically, the ideas that emerged in the early 1990s live through. A common argument older fans still use in forums and comment sections is that, the pop songs that are now very well-liked by those who opposed arabesk back in the day are actually arabesk songs, and arabesk still live in various genres. A recent investigative piece published in Cumhuriyet also agrees with these sentiments:

Q94: Perhaps we don't come across pure arabesk that can be called "classic" nowadays, but we can find elements of arabesk in almost all music genres in Turkey. [Ethnomusicologist] Şener shares this view as well. He says that arabesk has stylistically transformed other music genres to an extent: "It seems that arabesk has created a powerful discourse and found resonance in a wide community. So, this means that [arabesk] has become somewhat permanent." (Deniz Ülkütekin, Cumhuriyet, 2022)

6.   DISCUSSION

This chapter aims to interpret the findings to answer the research questions of this dissertation. Specifically, the goals of this study are to understand (1) how cognitive, normative, and regulative illegitimacy evaluations are produced, maintained, and challenged; (2) how the three dimensions of illegitimacy relate to each other; (3) if and how the concept of stigma differs from illegitimacy; and finally, (4) the contexts where strategies used for managing negative social evaluations are unsuccessful. The first section of this chapter focuses on inquiries (1) and (2). The following section untangles inquiry (3) and explores the relationship between stigma and illegitimacy. The final section answers inquiry (4) and investigates why arabesk artists could not redeem themselves despite the popularity of their music among the masses.

6.1 Illegitimacy Evaluations Through the Phases

The findings showed that illegitimacy evaluations do not evolve linearly on the legitimacy-illegitimacy continuum. Evaluations sometimes suddenly changed from one end to the other, stayed put for long periods of time or oscillated between different levels of appropriateness or inappropriateness throughout the study.

Table 6.1 provides a summary of how cognitive, normative, and regulative illegitimacy evaluations changed through the phases and themes.

In Table 6.1, cognitive illegitimacy judgments were assessed by asking, "Is there a consensus on what arabesk is, or are the definition and properties of arabesk confused, contested, or questioned?" "Consensus" means that the evaluators comprehended arabesk more or less the same way and built a consistent narrative around it. "Confusion" indicates that the explanations provided by the evaluators were ei-

Table 6.1 The Processes of Cognitive, Normative, and Regulative Illegitimacy Evaluations

Phases and Themes	Cognitive Evaluations	Normative Evaluations	Regulative Evaluations	Regulatory Status
Phase 1: Emergence and Labeling, 1968-1977				
Minibus/Minivan Music	Shallow Consensus	Negative	Pro-Ban	Banned
Commercial Music	Shallow Consensus	Negative	Pro-Ban	Banned
Arabesk as Arab Music	Shallow Consensus	Negative	Pro-Ban	Banned
Degenerate Music	Storytelling	Negative	Pro-Ban	Banned
Phase 2: The Rise and Vilification, 1978-1983				
The Emergence of New Arabesk and Arabesk-ish Artists				
Ferdi Tayfur	Confusion	Negative	Pro-Ban	Temporary Permissions to Banned
Chameleons	Confusion	Negative	Indifferent	Temporary Permissions to Banned
TRT's Inconsistent Bans	Confusion	Negative	Pro-Ban	Temporary Permissions to Banned
Arabesk as a "Sociological Issue"				
Bans on Turkish Music	Storytelling	Negative	Anti-ban	Temporary Permissions to Banned
Internal Migration and Slumization	Storytelling	Negative	Indifferent	Temporary Permissions to Banned
Fatalism and Glorification of Pain	Storytelling	Negative	Pro-ban Temporary	Permissions to Banned
Arabesk as Low Culture	Consensus	Negative	Pro-ban	Temporary Permissions to Banned
Phase 3: Semantic Expansion, 1984-1987				
Arabesk's Peak	Confusion	Negative	Anti-ban and Pro-ban	Banned to Temporary Permissions
Association with ANAP	Storytelling	Negative	Anti-ban and Pro-ban	Banned to Temporary Permissions
Arabesk as an Adjective				
Arabesk as Flawed or Haphazard	Consensus	Negative	Indifferent	Banned to Temporary Permissions
Arabesk as Religious and Anti-secular	Shallow Consensus	Negative	Indifferent	Banned to Temporary Permissions
Arabesk as Exaggeration	Consensus	Negative	Indifferent	Banned to Temporary Permissions
Disorientation and Defeat	Confusion to Taken-for-granted	Negative to Neutral Anti-ban	Banned to Temporary Permissions	
Phase 4: The Peak and Anticipated Decline, 1988-1991				
Arabesk as an Adjective (II)	Confusion	Negative	Indifferent	Temporary Permissions
Resetting and Repeating the Discourse				
Painless Arabesk	Confusion	Negative	Pro-ban	Temporary Permissions
Re-emergence of Lower Classes	Confusion to Taken-for-granted	Negative	Indifferent to Pro-ban	Temporary Permissions
Özgün Music and Revolutionary Arabesk	Confusion and Taken-for-granted	Negative	Anti-ban	Temporary Permissions
Phase 5: Withdrawal, 1992-1999				
Changing Profile of the Intellectuals	Storytelling	Negative and Neutral	Indifferent	Temporary Permissions
Proliferation of Private TV	Taken-for-granted	Negative and Neutral	Indifferent	Temporary Permissions
The Rise of Pop-besk	Taken-for-granted	Negative and Neutral	Indifferent	Temporary Permissions

ther incoherent in themselves or contradicted each other. "Storytelling" refers to the situations where evaluators acknowledged their confusion and actively tried to establish a consensus to the arabesk category by creating stories and disseminating them. Finally, "taken-for-granted" means that evaluators somewhat agreed on what arabesk meant and stopped questioning its definition and properties. Instead, they accepted the genre as a normal, regular part of their reality.

Normative illegitimacy evaluations are assessed by asking, "Did arabesk align with the norms and standards of the evaluators?" "Positive" refers to cases where evaluators argued that arabesk served a positive function in society or was a proper music genre, though such cases never occurred in this study. In contrast, "negative" means that evaluators believed arabesk was detrimental to the culture or society in some way or that it did not fit into musical standards. "Neutral" refers to themes where evaluators made no value judgments.

Regulative illegitimacy judgments were determined by asking, "Do evaluators think the genre should be banned?" "Pro-ban" suggests that evaluators believed that arabesk should not be allowed on TV or that the government should intervene with the genre through regulations. "Anti-ban" means evaluators were against the bans or regulatory interventions with arabesk. However, it should be noted here that the ironic narratives that appeared in the mid-to-late 1980s and suggested arabesk be on TV with all other low culture products are not interpreted as anti-ban, as the aim of these mentions was to decrease the legitimacy of either TRT or the government, and not decreasing the illegitimacy of arabesk. In Table 6.1, "anti-ban" refers to the cases where evaluators genuinely argued for arabesk to be free of prohibitions and government intervention. Lastly, "indifferent" is used for cases where evaluators were not concerned about the bans, either because they did not care or thought it would not make a difference. Regulatory status was assessed by looking at whether the genre was prohibited on TRT or not.

The subsequent sections explore how each illegitimacy dimension was unraveled over time and how other illegitimacy judgments influenced them.

6.1.1 Cognitive Illegitimacy

The process of cognitive illegitimacy evaluations is summarized in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1 Semantic Expansion and Reassessment of Arabesk

Accordingly, the salient themes of the first phase indicated that when evaluators initially perceived Gencebay's music, they could not find an appropriate framework for it. However, evaluators did not immediately begin to scrutinize and investigate his music (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011). Instead, in the beginning, they attempted to place the songs they heard in the most relevant category that came to their mind, a process that is more in line with the suggestions in category research (Alexy & George, 2013; Zuckerman, 1999). Evaluators who heard the music in minibuses or minivans labeled it as "minibus/minivan music," who were familiar with the influence of Arab music referred to it as "arabesk," and those who were sensitive about commercial categories labeled it "commercial music." Moreover, like neoinstitutional theory and research on illegitimacy discount indicated, evaluators were generally dismissive towards arabesk and assumed the genre was an unnecessary divergence that lacked value and quality (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zuckerman & Kim, 2003). This disinterest allowed evaluators of the first phase, who were limited in number, to be content with their shallow categorizations of Gencebay's music. Consequently, despite the small inconsistencies and awkwardness in their utilizations, these superficial labels, particularly the "minibus/minivan music" label, were coming to a consensus (Step 1 in Figure 6.1).

Nonetheless, TRT differed from other evaluators. Although TRT officers started with using the three labels mentioned above, they did engage in what Tost (2011) and Suchman (1995) referred to as "active evaluation" and scrutinized the genre. Specifically, when they observed that minibus music was spreading, they investigated

the genre, made more sophisticated inferences, e.g., who sings it, what is their purpose, and what are the possible consequences, and then developed a more in-depth narrative around the "degenerate music" label. Further, they proactively tried to disseminate this narrative by giving interviews. TRT's evaluation process had a different start, most probably because TRT officers believed that they had a duty to serve the public, and the perception that minibus music could be harmful to society motivated them to look for possible ways to stop its dissemination.

As such, findings suggested that when an emergent category conflicts with existing cognitive frames, whether evaluators engage in active or passive evaluations depends on the motivation of the evaluators. While disinterested evaluators look for points of convergence, interested evaluators set out to collect more information and create more sophisticated narratives.

Following the initial surface-level consensus, the second phase was when arabesk became more popular, and the debates and discussions around the genre escalated. During this phase, the associations developed in the first phase became inadequate for two reasons. First, although Gencebay's music was complex and tied to another technical genre, TAM, the labels offered in the first phase revolved around Gence-bay, and anything he released was accepted as minibus/minivan music, or nearing the 1980s, "arabesk." Emerging artists entered the category by referencing Gence-bay's music, and their proximity to Gencebay or them singing his songs served as an anchor for evaluators. However, as the number of artists trying arabesk increased and various singers brought their own styles, the consensus built around Gencebay started to crumble. In particular, the chameleons who shifted back and forth between their original genres and arabesk, the Eurovision scandal, and Gencebay's rejection of the arabesk label further exacerbated the confusion. Second, though Gencebay's protests in the first phase were not taken seriously, in the second phase minibus/minivan music labels proved to be insufficient because the fan base of the genre was much larger than the drivers and included the lower classes in general. Evaluators' opinions about the drivers and the lower classes differed, as the lower classes had different attributes compared to the drivers. Consequently, simple connections created by assuming the genre was just "one of those" (Bitektine, 2011, p. 160) became unsatisfactory and necessitated finding a new categorization. Besides, the media attention created by TRT allowing Gencebay and Tayfur to be on TV in 1978 and 1979, respectively, the debacle around Eurovision, and the increasing intensity of normative illegitimacy evaluations (see below) made arabesk a mainstream topic of discussion; therefore, it became harder for evaluators to ignore or dismiss the genre.

Overall, these developments "ticked the mental alarm" of more evaluators who began to search for new features that would allow proper categorization (Tost, 2011, p. 700). However, evaluators still differed in the level of cognitive effort, source of motivation, and proactiveness of their texts. As a result, the efforts of categorizing arabesk in the second phase developed in two related yet distinct streams. First, a group of evaluators who were more knowledgeable about music and more attuned to cultural developments, that is, the creators of the in-depth texts referenced in Chapter 5, reacted more sensitively towards arabesk's increasing popularity and its broader consequences. These evaluators were also more influential than the others because of their expertise and access to multiple media outlets (Deephouse et al., 2017; Scott, 2014). Similar to TRT in the first phase, they were stimulated by arabesk's perceived harm to Turkish culture and music and felt an urgent need to understand and address this "issue." As such, they switched to the active mode of evaluation and began to build their narratives. However, their narratives differed from TRT's in that they were historically situated and ideologically driven. Specifically, these authors had their own agenda and plans for the future of Turkish culture and music; therefore, they interpreted arabesk's sources and forecasted consequences in a way that suited their broader frameworks. By establishing stories rooted in the history of Turkey and Turkish culture, this group of evaluators aimed to convince others of particular scenarios related to the arabesk problem and its solutions. As a result, the narratives they created were longitudinal, included various sociopolitical references, and at certain points conflicted with each other (e.g., their distinct interpretation of the revolutionary qualities of Gencebay). Consequently, they did not form banal, consistent, and coherent wholes that were necessary for easy assimilation and dissemination (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995).

Nonetheless, a second, less knowledgeable, but larger group of evaluators was also searching for a new category for Gencebay and emerging musicians. Further, this second group noticed that arabesk was not the only new trend but that many things around them were rapidly changing due to internal mass migration, and some of these changes were violating their broader cultural frameworks as well. In this context, to make sense of their observations, this group created a new category that revolved around lower-class immigrants' habits and tastes. This category combined the labels of the first phase and the complicated narratives offered by the first group and encompassed the general cultural changes they observed. Specifically, based on the commercial music and degenerate music categories, they created an overarching category of cheap and harmful entertainment products that were connected through their association with the lower classes. Additionally, the texts of the second group mimicked the language of the influential evaluators but summarized and shortened

what they were saying. They adopted the analogies of wildfires and diseases offered by the first group and similarly placed themselves as problem solvers. However, their texts were more compact and simple as they often mentioned the degenerations they observed back to back and provided examples from daily life. They also repeated each other between texts and themselves within texts which eased the dissemination process (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). In the end, arabesk became the label of this broader category that was consistent, easier to comprehend, and anchored safely in the habits of the lower classes. Ultimately, the confusion around the musical genre was resolved by transforming it into an overarching term that referred to the general low culture (Step 2 in Figure 6.1).

This step provides further evidence of how characteristics such as expertise, interest, and expectations led different groups of evaluators to go through different evaluation processes (Durand & Thornton, 2018). The first group was more motivated; they were purpose-driven, i.e., they wanted to further their own narrative and prescriptions and had more knowledge at their disposal. They were "active" evaluators as they did not use heuristics and simple connections but created convoluted cause-effect relationships that unfolded over a longer period. In contrast, although the second group was also active as they did bricolage multiple different narratives and connections, they were more inclined towards solving their dissonance and wrapping up the subject into a consistent whole (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Negro et al., 2010). As such, they united at the first point of convergence they could find.

Nevertheless, this consensus around "arabesk as low culture" was almost immediately disrupted by the observation that wealthier people, including government officials, were listening to arabesk. This disruption then led evaluators to look for new categorizations. The immediate reaction was to emphasize the similarity between these groups and assimilate them into the "low culture category" alongside the lower classes. However, the entry of a new group of evaluators, the "reflective intellectuals" described in Chapters 4 and 5, their general disinterest in music and culture, and their specific expertise in politics complicated the discourse.

Similar to the others, this group also observed that ANAP's members and supporters liked listening to arabesk music. Then, by using the narratives that emerged in the first and second phases as heuristics, they politicized the word "arabesk" and began to utilize it to refer to the policies of ANAP and Özal. Although the initial utilization of reflective authors was loaded with distinct meanings, other evaluators associated arabesk with the general tendencies of the ANAP community, that is, members and supporters of ANAP, whom they perceived as different from themselves. Consequently, they adapted arabesk to refer to the habits of the ANAP

community in general. Thus, a higher-level category anchored in ANAP and Özal was established (Step 3 in Figure 6.1).

This broad and, on the surface, straightforward meaning arabesk acquired facilitated its usage. As references to arabesk spread, the label became a universal concept characterizing Turkish society and was manifest in every aspect of their lives. As such, the expansion of meaning initially enhanced the consensus around arabesk. However, after the usage became more widespread and evaluators started to use the term in a context-dependent and idiosyncratic manner, fractions among the evaluators began. The cognitive effort required to comprehend and use the term increased to the point that certain evaluators decided to accept arabesk as whatever it is and not to deal with it any further.

This process was unique in that, although there was some unintentional internalization due to the spread of both the music and the term, evaluators exhibited a voluntary and conscious switch to taken-for-grantedness. Through their texts, they unveiled their internal dialogues and convinced themselves and others that arabesk was just a fact of life that should be accepted as it is.

Regardless, others, including the proponents of arabesk, who also got tired of the contradictory and unintelligible meaning of arabesk, protested the broad utilization and engaged in efforts to reduce the cognitive load of the term by repositioning the category. As a result, unlike the other disruptions that came from the outside, this categorization cracked from the inside, and another reassessment process began. The debates around "painless arabesk," the pressing issue of slums and delinquent youth, and later ANAP's fall facilitated the search for a narrow categorization around music. As such, the term arabesk went through a refinement where it got rid of its inflated meaning, and the musical and cultural aspects became salient again.

Though some evaluators continued to use arabesk in its broadest meaning for a while, more motivated evaluators began to renew and polish the narratives. They generally took inspiration from the previous phases and adapted the earlier narratives to the social and cultural development of the current day. As a result, they depicted arabesk as the music and culture of the slum residents, who were now the marginalized urban poor, and among the slum dwellers, they often focused on the youth (Step 4 in Figure 6.1).

While creating the new narratives, evaluators acknowledged that the boundaries of arabesk music were unclear, but this ambiguity was not that important since they were now content with situating arabesk in the slums and defining it through the lower classes.

Once the evaluators were satisfied with their narratives and arabesk started to lose momentum, another process of leaning towards taken-for-grantedness began. In the early 1990s, evaluators talked about arabesk as something of the past and gradually shelved arabesk as a period and genre that occupied Turkish culture in the 1970s and 1980s (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

The last years of the study were dominated by music critics who were more concerned about exposing the arabesk elements in Turkish pop than talking about arabesk itself. Finally, pop-besk or Turkish pop took over arabesk as a compromised genre that combined the tendency of Turkish masses for the traditional and the East and the norms of modernizing and Westernizing Turkish music.

Overall, the journey of arabesk from incomprehensibility created by Gencebay's violation of musical frameworks to reaching taken-for-grantedness as an ambiguous genre and cultural moment was tumultuous and characterized by temporary comprehensibility moments periodically disrupted by various cultural and social developments. During this process, evaluators did not have much tolerance for cognitive conflict; as soon as their frameworks were disrupted, they looked for points of convergence (Alexy & George, 2013). The cognitive "laziness" present on the positive side of the legitimacy continuum, i.e., evaluators using simple cues and superficial conformance to categorize the entities they perceived, also appeared in the domain of cognitive illegitimacy (Alexy & George, 2013; Haack et al., 2014). In other words, even if evaluators did not find an appropriate framework for the category they perceived, they did not immediately switch to active evaluation. Instead, they passively looked for alternative categorizations that could somehow accommodate the emerging category. Inappropriateness to cognitive frameworks alone was not enough to push them towards switching to active evaluation and creating sophisticated narratives (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Active evaluations were facilitated by not only the category's saliency but also the evaluators' interest and motivation (Özcan & Gürses, 2018). Moreover, even when most evaluators switched to active mode, their proactiveness differed according to their level of motivation and expertise (Durand & Thornton, 2018). The difference between more or less motivated actors was visible throughout the study as the former group generated ideas and found new and deeper connections; the latter usually adapted, simplified, and repeated. This difference aligned with the recent propositions that even the seemingly homogenous groups of audiences could be fragmented (Durand & Thornton, 2018; Haack et al., 2021). Nonetheless, the fragmentation here was not based on differences in opinion, but it was similar to Hoefer and Green's (2016) differentiation between the speakers and "active" listeners. While the motivated and influential evaluators created new categorizations and narratives, others simplified

and disseminated these explanations.

In contrast to the legitimacy and category literatures that depict the move from consensus to taken-for-grantedness as a smooth, one-step process (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Durand & Khaire, 2017; Jensen, 2010; Kennedy et al., 2010; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011), in the context of arabesk cognitive evaluations were unstable, fragile, and broken every three to four years.

This dissertation proposes that the fragility of consensus in the context of arabesk can be attributed to the absence of a stable "core" or "anchor," that is, a clearly defined and explicitly stated set of attributes that differentiate arabesk from similar genres. Specifically, the lack of a categorical foundation led evaluators to look for other features they could base the category on. However, these categorizations were not sustainable because although they included arabesk, they still did not capture its essence and were unable to differentiate it from other genres. On the contrary, they were peripheral and located in social trends or "events" (Scott, 2014). As a result, when the tide changed, these broad categorizations became insufficient. After each disruption, the discrepancies at lower levels were cleared by expanding the meaning of arabesk to encompass different things until the category became so thinly spread that it broke by itself.

Another important consequence of the change in the meaning in a span of every three to four years was that it hindered stabilization of the category and prevented habituation, and ultimately taken-for-grantedness (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Piazza & Perretti, 2015). Just as evaluators were getting used to one set of attributes, the consensus was disrupted, and the category was redefined, starting another cycle of building comprehensibility.

The absence of a stable anchor had two sources. First, Gencebay's music did not have a clear definition and was indeed complicated and open to interpretation. As explained in detail in the last section of this chapter, intentionally or unintentionally, Gencebay prevented the establishment of a distinctive foundation through the vague narratives he provided. Second, a comparison of the earlier reviews to those that emerged in the 1990s showed that evaluators of the first four periods did not have the category of "experimental music" in their meaning system, and they were conditioned by the four-partite categorization system explained in Chapter 4. Musicians, including arabeskers, were also unfamiliar with experimental music, as they also often had difficulty articulating the genre and came up with claims like "I'm making my own music." The understanding of experimental music did not develop and spread until the mid-1990s, so the initial taken-for-grantedness of arabesk was a result of evaluators accepting arabesk as an ambiguous genre with fuzzy bound-

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aries, illustrating a case of taken-for-grantedness that lacked full comprehensibility (Jepperson, 1991).

6.1.2 Normative Illegitimacy

Normative illegitimacy evaluations began almost simultaneously with cognitive evaluations. When evaluators first encountered Gencebay's music and managed to associate it with familiar categories such as minibus/minivan music or commercial music, they passively transferred the normative judgments and scripts they already had about the associated categories to Gencebay's music. In particular, both commercial music and Arab music had specific narratives connected to them that explained why they were considered bad. As mentioned in Chapter 5, commercial music was understood to be immoral because it meant that the artist or producer prioritized personal financial gain over the virtue of contributing to the public. Consequently, this connection with the commercial culture made Gencebay's music violate the norms that depict artists as public servants. The association with Arab music was considered inappropriate according to the norms of modernization and Westernization, which required Turkish people to idealize Western culture and leave the East behind. The minibus/minivan music label was more of a social cue or stereotype, so discussion of this label is spared to the "Stigma and Illegitimacy" section below. Nonetheless, it also contributed to the negative perception of the genre.

The process described above is in line with Alexy & George's (2013) suggestion that emergent categories which do not fit into market prototypes are not only placed into the most relevant category but also acquire the valence associated with that category. However, Alexy & George (2013) assumed this valence was positive by default and ultimately helped the category gain cognitive legitimacy. In contrast, in the context of this dissertation, the associated categories had negative connotations, and they gave arabesk a negative valence.

Additionally, at the intersection of cognitive and normative illegitimacy, the initial perception of Gencebay's music not fitting into the existing categorical system also contributed to negative judgments. Both neoinstituionalists and category researchers argued that when faced with unfamiliar categories, evaluators become uneasy and hostile and undermine the category by looking for ways to degrade its value (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2014; Zuckerman, 1999; Zuckerman & Kim, 2003). Evaluators observed that arabesk did not follow the standards or the appropriate ways music should be made and assumed that the genre was technically

flawed and Gencebay did not know how to use Western instruments and musical forms. As a result, they judged arabesk as "bad" or "wrong" music.

As mentioned earlier, TRT immediately engaged in active evaluations and started to build a narrative under the "degenerate music" label. The categorization was different from the others because instead of being based on superficial connections, it heavily relied on the normative inappropriateness of the category. Combining the negative scripts transferred from the other labels, the depressive and melancholic lyrics, and arabesk's violation of music standards, TRT based the degenerate label solely on the genre's immoral and faulty qualities. They were able to quickly build an explanation for why arabesk was bad for Turkish culture and society and successfully disseminated the association with social harm. Consequently, the notion of arabesk being a flawed and detrimental genre was established as early as the mid-1970s. Moreover, although they were dormant in some phases and transformed, the normative explanations created in the earlier years stayed throughout the study.

In the second phase, normative illegitimacy judgments became even more widespread. Instead of arguing if arabesk was good or bad, the narratives created in this phase started with the assumption that arabesk was a defective and harmful genre and built their cases on this presumption. For example, the influential evaluators who produced the in-depth texts based their texts on arabesk being a hazard to music, culture, and society. Their main goal was not to discuss whether arabesk was immoral or unorthodox but to persuade others of the harmful impact of arabesk and control the rest of the discourse by giving the appropriate prescriptions. Similarly, evaluators who created the low culture category were already convinced that these products were a sign of decay and degeneration, and again, their focus was on creating awareness and stopping the spread of low culture.

This trend continued in the third phase. When the meaning expanded to the wealthy and the government, evaluators emphasized their deviant and immoral behavior that did not fit the image of the upper classes or the bourgeoisie. Moreover, as the meaning expanded, the term "arabesk" started to transform into an insult, and the normative flaws of the category overshadowed other attributes, even the music itself. When the evaluators began using the term in political and non-culture-related contexts, they employed it as a pejorative word, assuming others would automatically understand the negative connotations. Even when evaluators called themselves "arabesk," they saw arabesk's negative qualities in themselves and were being self-critical and self-deprecating (e.g., Q72 in Chapter 5). This shared acceptance indicates that arabesk's negative perception became taken-for-granted, meaning that its normative deficiency was ingrained in people's minds and unquestioned (Jepperson,

1991). As exemplified by the quotes in Chapter 5, even if the meaning itself was not clear, it was evident that the authors of the texts did not mean to convey a positive interpretation. This dissertation refers to this phenomenon as "negative-taken-for-grantedness," a concept developed for referring to situations where the normative illegitimacy of organization or category is accepted as a part of reality and a positive interpretation of the entity is seen out of the question. Even after the meaning of arabesk narrowed in the following phases, the negativity associated with arabesk persisted.

With the reintroduction of the narrower definition of arabesk as "music of the lower classes," its detrimental effects on these social groups, particularly their mental health, resurfaced. However, as arabesk shrank from being associated with a political party and the entirety of its supporters to a smaller and marginalized group, and with the declining popularity and visibility of arabesk music, the perceived level of social danger also diminished. Over time, normative evaluations became increasingly inactive; however, this did not mean arabesk had redeemed itself. Rather, it simply ceased to draw the attention of evaluators who were likely more interested in discussing other topics (Piazza & Perretti, 2015). Instead, the "negative-taken-for-grantedness" of arabesk was further ingrained as the narratives around why arabesk was bad and immoral became highly scripted and shelved (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Arabesk was accepted as a distortion in Turkish music, a form of kitsch that still invited ridicule to its listeners and performers until the 2010s. This phenomenon is further discussed in the next section.

Overall, while making normative illegitimacy judgments, evaluators predominantly used two comprehensive norms. The first one was the norm of modernization/Westernization that was established in the 19th-century Ottoman Empire and reformed and entrenched in the 1920s and 1930s when the modern Turkish Republic was founded. This norm was over-encompassing and informed other lower-level normative criteria like musical standards, i.e., appropriate to standards meant appropriate according to Western music, secularism, and being rational, calm, and collected. The second broader norm was the norm of artists and intellectuals being public servants. As emphasized in the previous chapters, TRT and intellectuals internalized that government agencies and academically privileged and artistically gifted people had a naturally given responsibility of improving Turkish society, and those who were among these groups and did not work for the public good were selfish and immoral. In sum, violating one of these norms was perceived as harming Turkish culture and society and led to evaluations of normative illegitimacy. These norms were intact and taken-for-granted throughout the study, and as a result, the normative judgments did not change.

The more tolerant approaches that appeared occasionally were usually situated at the intersection of these two norms. For example, those who distinguished Gencebay from others and gave him a degree of approval argued that Gencebay had good intentions and was trying to innovate Turkish music; however, he lacked education in Western music and did not know how to synthesize Eastern and Western sounds "properly."

Similarly, other tolerant evaluators that gave half-hearted support to arabesk had the same process. These evaluators agreed that arabesk was a flawed and inferior genre, i.e., violated the Westernization/modernization norm, but they opposed the opponents because they believed that others were exaggerating the sinister intentions of arabesk artists, i.e., it was not violating the public servant norm.

The stability of these norms explains why normative illegitimacy judgments remained negative and were not affected by the fluctuations in cognitive evaluations in terms of valence throughout the study. However, in the first phase, normative evaluations followed cognitive evaluations, in the sense that, cognitive associations made with minibus/minivans, commercial culture, and Arab music, granted their normative status to arabesk, and further, the violation of cognitive frameworks directly led to arabesk being evaluated as an unorthodox and flawed genre (Hsu, 2006; Zuckerman, 1999). Once the normative illegitimacy of arabesk was established, it remained rather stable. Nonetheless, the content and degree of negativity of normative judgments exhibited plasticity. As the meaning expanded, the assumed detriment or standard violation expanded alongside it, eventually reaching a point of being negatively-taken-for-granted.

Normative judgments also influenced cognitive judgments, as normative arguments created a sense of danger and urgency, and a need for intervention. This situation prevented habituation and facilitated re-categorization. Put in another way, the acceptance of arabesk was harming society kept the problematization and questioning alive and constantly pushed evaluators to scrutinize and create new narratives for solving the arabesk issue. Additionally, perceived threats to culture and the public made evaluators who otherwise would not be interested in arabesk, such as sociologists and psychologists, become involved in the discourse. These evaluators then emphasized the aspects of the arabesk "problem" that they were interested in and contributed to the expansion of meaning.

In general, though, except for reinforcing each other, these dimensions were relatively independent and were not as closely tied as depicted in the literature (e.g., Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017; Suchman, 1995). Cognitive illegitimacy was primarily influenced by the developments in the larger cultural, social, and

political environment, while normative judgments were sourced in deeply ingrained norms of modernization/Westernization and improving the public. Since these goals did not change over time, neither did normative illegitimacy judgments; despite the significant changes in meaning and arabesk's growing popularity.

6.1.3 Regulative Illegitimacy

Contrary to the suggestions in the literature (Ruef & Scott, 1998; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011), except for the first phase, neither regulative illegitimacy evaluations nor regulatory status followed normative evaluations. Evaluators did consider the social and cultural impact of arabesk and included these concerns in their texts; however, they also deliberated on whether bans and regulations would be effective or would generate the desired results. Moreover, regulatory evaluations changed depending on evaluators' attitudes toward the government and TRT. These two actors themselves experienced fluctuations in their credibility and trustworthiness, which then affected evaluators' judgments about bans and regulations.

Nonetheless, when Gencebay first emerged, evaluators believed that such music did not belong on state TV, as it was considered unorthodox, originating from minibus culture, and potentially having negative effects on the public. As such, these evaluators supported arabesk's prohibition and understood it as an unquestionable verdict. Besides, especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, the reliance on the state for managing cultural sectors was still strong, so evaluators expected the state to intervene with the developments in the music industry. Pop musicians, for example, made occasional calls for the government through the media to support them to prevent arabesk from dominating the Turkish music industry.

In contrast, during the earlier years, the mildest approach to bans came from TRT, who were actually responsible for spreading the perception that arabesk was normatively illegitimate and signaling a violation of rules by prohibiting its broadcast on radio and TV. Torn between the duty of teaching the public better and the need to cater to their demands, TRT also started to build a special regulatory system around arabesk, though the genre remained fully banned for some time.

In the second phase, when influential evaluators became involved, regulative judgments took a different direction. Particularly, within this group, some evaluators opposed the bans, believing that arabesk emerged precisely due to the restrictions imposed on musicians. They argued that music and culture should remain untouched

by the government and rule makers. These intellectuals were anti-ban not because they liked arabesk, but because they believed bans limited the natural development of music and hindered the transition from traditional forms to more sophisticated genres. As such, they based their arguments on the higher-level logic of artistic freedom and generally opposed censorship and state intervention. Further, TRT's credibility started to fall due to its "special day permissions" and the Eurovision scandal. These contradictions signaled to evaluators that TRT did not know what they were doing; therefore, their decisions were not trustworthy sources for making inferences about arabesk. As such, regulatory protests against the genre started to decrease just as normative illegitimacy evaluations were becoming more intense.

After arabesk was categorized as low culture and subsequently associated with ANAP and its supporters in the next phase, the regulative evaluations became indifferent and ironic. This reaction created a unique situation where the evaluators did not genuinely believe that arabesk should be featured on TV but rather used it as a means to undermine the legitimacy of TRT and the government. The underlying message they conveyed through the statement "let arabesk be on TV too" was to say that everything on TV was already as illegitimate as arabesk, so the bans on arabesk were absurd.

The attitude of authorities during ANAP's reign was confusing; while Özal himself endorsed arabesk and was perceived to live an arabesk lifestyle, TRT continued to apply the rules and narratives they established in the 1970s and largely kept arabesk out of its channels. In this context, the evaluators did not want to be on the same side as the government and TRT and wanted to distance themselves from them. As a result, their opinions about the regulatory status of arabesk fluctuated depending on the specific situation. When arabesk was allowed, they became pro-ban, and when it was prohibited or endorsed by ANAP, they became anti-ban. For instance, the reaction to "painless arabesk" was an example of this approach in that when the news on "state arabesk" came out, many evaluators who were furthering the argument that arabesk was being scapegoated began opposing arabesk being on TV.

Despite normative evaluations remaining negative, in some themes, the regulative dimension did not come up at all. This was most evident during the phase when the musical meaning was overshadowed. Evaluators did not consider arabesk as a cultural product but rather approached it as an abstract concept; therefore, prohibitions were not something that they would consider.

As evaluators anticipated private channels to become more widespread, the focus on TRT began diminishing. However, the violent behavior associated with arabesk

listeners and minibus drivers led evaluators to call for government intervention and regulation, and even professional associations began to intervene in the situation. Therefore, the fourth phase witnessed an upsurge in pro-ban arguments, but they were qualitatively different from those of the earlier phases.

However, when the study was coming to an end, regulative illegitimacy evaluations became largely irrelevant. There were many private TV and radio channels, and TRT's impact decreased greatly. As a result, evaluators were not concerned about what was broadcast on TRT. How private channels should be regulated was a prominent topic of discussion, but the debates generally focused on political propaganda and news broadcasts rather than music genres allowed.

In general, the bans themselves were not influenced by normative judgments or evaluators' attitudes toward bans. TRT managers seemed to follow their own propriety judgments and what they believed would be beneficial for the public at a given time and did not pay much attention to other evaluators' opinions. Therefore, the primary determinants of the prohibitions were the TRT officers themselves. During the mid-1970s and up until the 1980s, TRT's general manager changed quite frequently, which explains the short-term fluctuations in the inclusion of arabesk artists in special programs. Later in the time period covered by this study, another factor that affected TRT's attitude was the number of channels they had. After they established TV 2, which targeted the "intellectuals", more arabesk movies were aired on the first channel to become more representative of the "marginal" audiences.

Aside from structural changes that led to temporary halts, TRT's main approach throughout the study period was that one-time permissions or small doses of arabesk would not be harmful but that TRT had to have certain standards as the state channel and should not go overboard. They kept this attitude even when private TV channels were encroaching on their audience.

Overall, like cognitive illegitimacy, after the first phase, regulative illegitimacy evaluations depended more on contextual developments and other actors in the field than normative illegitimacy evaluations. However, regulative evaluations influenced the other dimensions after ANAP's election to the government in two ways. The support of arabesk singers for ANAP and Özal's affiliation with them intensified the normative illegitimacy judgments, as the perception of arabesk being a disseminator of ANAP's ideology reinforced the relationship between the genre and social harm. Second, while ironically protesting the ban on arabesk, evaluators normalized the genre by equating it with other things that are allowed on TV and considered conventional, decreasing both cognitive and normative illegitimacy.

To provide a concise answer to the second research question of the dissertation, in general, the relationships between the dimensions of illegitimacy were not as strong and interdependent as it is suggested by the literature (Bitektine, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2002; Scott, 2014; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Cognitive judgments were mainly determined by social and political developments and various cognitive associations evaluators derived. As explained thoroughly above, normative judgments were based on two overriding norms, that is, norms of modernization/Westernization and the duty to the public. Regulatory evaluations were driven by how evaluators felt about the authorities as much as perceived harm to the Turkish culture. The processes of maintaining these evaluations were also not closely intertwined because changes in evaluations were primarily stimulated by contextual factors that predominantly influenced a single dimension. The trajectories described above are presented separately, not only for clarity but also because the processes developed independently (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017; Scott, 2014).

This relative independence of the dimensions of legitimacy could be explained through the disorder in the broader social and political context and the immaturity of the Turkish entertainment industry. Although previous studies generally focused on fields and industries that are institutionalized and stable or on their way to stability, Bitektine and Haack (2015) and Suchman (1995) argued that fragmentation between dimensions can occur when higher-level institutions are not aligned or well-developed, or if the field is undergoing transitions.

Throughout the study period, Turkey was ridden with chaos and conflict that was caused by rural-to-urban immigration, slumization, constant political conflict, the military coup, the military regime, and the sudden transition to neoliberalism. Moreover, the music industry itself was unstable and going through a transition. The categories were not well defined, and people lacked knowledge about not only alternative forms of music but popular music in general. Centuries-old CTAM was slowly dying, TFM was transforming, and new styles of music were coming into the country from all directions. Because the cognitive and regulatory pillars were not stable, cognitive and regulatory evaluation fluctuated depending on external factors and did not align. In comparison, normative judgments remained relatively stable as the norms utilized in this discourse were institutionalized. However, since the other pillars followed their own trajectories, their alignment with normative judgments was also inconsistent.

6.2 Stigma and Illegitimacy

Another goal of this dissertation is to differentiate stigma from illegitimacy systematically. Initially, stigma was developed in a distinct theoretical domain from legitimacy, that is, "labeling theory," and it was first introduced to organizational studies as an individual-level construct (Devers et al., 2009; Paetzold et al., 2008). However, after the concept of stigma was taken to the organizational and categorical levels (Hudson, 2008; Vergne, 2012), the boundaries between these concepts started to blur. The overlap between stigma and illegitimacy is specifically evident in empirical studies, as these lines of research point out similar causes, consequences, and measurement methods (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Jensen, 2010; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Vergne, 2012). Thus, while the theoretical domain emphasizes their distinction, the practical applications of these concepts are still muddled.

This ambiguity was further reinforced by partial approaches to legitimacy, where theoretical and empirical papers equate the general concept of legitimacy to a specific dimension of their choice, depending on the point they wanted to emphasize while ignoring the other dimensions. For example, Helms et al. (2019), who aimed to distance stigma from legitimacy, generally focused on cognitive legitimacy and gave examples of cognitively legitimate yet stigmatized categories to prove that an entity can be legitimate and stigmatized at the same time. Lashley and Pollock (2020), who studied cannabis dispensaries as an example of categorical stigma, limited legitimacy to regulatory judgments, as prohibitions, laws, and government intervention were important in their case, and the concept of "stigma" did not cover the regulatory domain. As such, they adapted the concept of "illegitimacy" to address the regulatory aspects of their study. However, as explained in Chapter 2, cognitive and regulative illegitimacy are easily distinguishable from stigma. Stigmatized organizations could be taken-for-granted, legal, and free of government intervention, as evidenced by cases such as homeless shelters, rehabilitation centers, or mortuaries (Ashforth et al., 2017; Helms et al., 2019).

The actual overlap between stigma and illegitimacy occurs in the normative domain, where immoral conduct can lead to both stigma and illegitimacy judgments. In this regard, Hampel and Tracey (2017; 2019) argued that illegitimacy and stigma are related constructs because both are based on norms. Further, they placed normative legitimacy and stigma on the same spectrum where stigma was the extreme end of the normative illegitimacy judgments, as originally suggested by Hudson (2008). Devers and colleagues (Devers et al., 2009; Devers & Mishina, 2019) agreed that stigma

and normative illegitimacy were related; however, they advocated for studying these concepts separately because they believed that stigma and normative illegitimacy have enough differences between them, the most important one being their distinct theoretical origins.

Based on the other points of differentiation suggested by Devers and colleagues, the broader stigma and legitimacy literature, and the findings of this study, the rest of this section discusses if and how normative illegitimacy is distinct from stigma.

First, Devers and colleagues suggested that legitimacy judgments were non-individuating because they assessed the appropriateness of the evaluated entities and grouped them together based on this assessment without suppressing other attributes of the judged entities. In contrast, they referred to stigma as deindividuating because stigma evaluations reduced the target entities to their flaws, discredited them, and reinforced stereotypes. Indeed, historically, the most fundamental function of stigma has been labeling potentially dangerous individuals and groups to create social cues that trigger aversion (Goffman, 1963). As such, for evaluations of stigma, stereotypes and prejudices are very important (Devers et al., 2009; Goffman, 1963).

Beyond the conceptual differentiation of non-individuation and deindividuation, the deindividuating nature of stigma can be useful in empirical contexts as well. Specifically, the legitimacy literature has emphasized that normative legitimacy and illegitimacy must be accompanied by narratives that explain why the entity or practice in question is considered normatively improper (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Scott, 2014; Suchman, 1995). As explained in Chapter 2, though somewhat internalized, norms are shared and out-there rules of social conduct that everyone in society can observe and use to make their judgments. Therefore, normative evaluations are formed through evaluators interpreting, discussing, and convincing others why a given entity is inappropriate according to a selected set of norms (Scott, 2014; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Consequently, normative legitimacy or illegitimacy judgments are expected to come with "substantive content" (Tost, 2011, p. 692). Thus, stereotypes and surface-level flaws are not enough to render an entity normatively illegitimate, but they can be indicators of stigma.

In this study, an obvious difference of this nature emerged in the first phase when the labels were still being coined, and negative judgments were being transferred to Gencebay's music from associated categories. The associations with Arab music and commercial music, although they were stigmatized too, came with preconceived scenarios which explained why Eastern influences and commercial culture were considered improper and the potential harm that would be caused by the spread of this

genre. According to these scenarios, these categories were normatively illegitimate because they deviated Turkish people from the goal of building a modern culture and declined their cultural taste. In contrast, the negative connotations that came from the association with the drivers did not have such a script. Evaluators negatively judged the music public transportation drivers listened to based on their prejudices, such as drivers being tasteless, ill-mannered, and vulgar. Put differently, unlike the other two labels, the association with minibuses and minivans did not result from a violation of accepted norms. Drivers playing this genre out loud could have been a normative breach, but in this context, it was not important because most evaluators criticized the drivers for playing arabesk specifically and not for playing music in general. Arabesk music being unpleasant or cacophonous was a general attribute of Gencebay's music and was independent of the drivers. Only after the 1990s, when accidents became more frequent and alternative forms of public transportation emerged, did the evaluators start to develop narratives on the harms caused by the drivers. As such, the negative social evaluations generated around the drivers and specific vehicles in earlier years were predominantly based on stereotypes and are better conceptualized as occupational stigma than normative illegitimacy (Ashforth et al., 2017).

A similar observation was present in how different groups of evaluators approached internal immigrants and lower classes and subsequently generated negative evaluations of arabesk. In particular, some evaluators negatively judged arabesk based on the perceived harm it caused to lower classes. This group did not criticize the poor or the immigrants or direct negativity toward them. Instead, they saw value in them as potential revolutionaries and based their arguments on whether arabesk was helping or hindering this potential. Their target was the music and its perpetrators. In contrast, others judged arabesk as a negative category because they were repulsed and threatened by the immigrants. Urbanites felt like immigrants were stealing their city and disrupting their way of life, and consequently, began to belittle their habits and preferences as low-taste and low-quality. As a result, the negative evaluations targeted at arabesk in this context was stigma being transferred from the immigrants to another category they were associated with.

So, this dissertation proposes that one way to distinguish normative illegitimacy and stigma in normatively challenged contexts is to look for whether shared scripts or narratives accompany the judgments. If there are no such narratives, it indicates that the target is stigmatized but not normatively illegitimate.

A second distinction offered by Devers and colleagues was the involvement of emotions. Specifically, they argued that stigma evoked intense negative emotions; in

contrast, legitimacy was more of an impartial and rational evaluation.

Emotions such as disgust, horror, and hate have been a prominent part of stigma (Goffman, 1963). Like physical marks, emotions acted as cues that led people to avoid infectious diseases and ill-intended individuals. In other words, in the context of stigma, negative emotions are instincts that signal evaluators to distance themselves from the stigmatized actors and entities.

However, the role of emotions in legitimacy judgments is unclear. Neoinstitutional theory has generally ignored emotions, and it was only recently that neoinstitutionalists started to approach affect as a research interest (Greenwood et al., 2017). So far, similar to Devers et al., (2009), Deephouse et al. (2017) argued that legitimacy judgments are likely not very closely related to emotions. However, in Scott's (1995; 2014) conceptualizations, emotions like shame, humiliation, and fear play an important role in normative legitimacy judgments. According to Scott's (2014) framework, moral transgressions are expected to elicit negative emotional reactions from others, and individuals are motivated to conform to norms to avoid being shamed or degraded. In addition, Haack et al. (2014) argued that when information about an organization is not sufficient to make "legitimacy" judgments, i.e., when cognitive legitimacy is low, or there is cognitive illegitimacy, evaluators use affect-based heuristics to make legitimacy judgments. Nonetheless, they also explicitly equated stigma to normative legitimacy later in the paper, so their conceptualization is not really helpful in differentiating the role of emotions in stigma and normative illegitimacy evaluations.

In the context of this study, using emotions in normative evaluations was very prevalent. Evaluators were genuinely frustrated by arabesk and the influence the genre had on the masses. They also openly stated their hatred of arabesk artists because they believed the singers were deceiving the public, sedating and upsetting them to finance their own lavish lifestyles. Moreover, they were also angry at arabesk artists and proponents for using public demand as an excuse to justify themselves. Besides, many texts were produced after evaluators felt overwhelmed by the emotions evoked by events like reading news about the wealth or scandals of arabesk artists, seeing Özal with arabesk singers, disagreeing with TRT's inconsistent decisions, having arguments with drivers, or being shocked by the obsession of the lower classes with arabesk. As normative illegitimacy involves the perception of a violation of social good, the presence of such emotions can be expected in other cases as well. In sum, the apparent absence of emotions in legitimacy may be a result of not their actual absence in the concept but rather of the neglect of emotions in neoinstitutional theory.

A third difference pointed out by Devers and Mishina (2019) was that stigma is more enduring than normative illegitimacy. As explained in Chapter 2, this difference was more prominent in comparisons of event-based or peripheral illegitimacy judgments to core stigma. Normative illegitimacy can be hard to remove when it is directed at the essential features of an organization or category or is based on widely shared and deeply ingrained norms. For example, industries like abortion clinics, tobacco companies, and arms manufacturers have been evaluated as normatively illegitimate by large groups of audiences for decades.

However, at the individual level, the influence of stigma evaluations can be more permanent. An important distinguishing factor that was emphasized in earlier research on stigma but overlooked in recent literature is that while legitimacy evaluations exist at the organizational and categorical levels, stigma can be directed at categories, organizations, and individuals. Consequently, individuals can suffer from repercussions of normative illegitimacy evaluations aimed at the entity they are affiliated with, but they cannot be illegitimate as persons, at least within the domain of organizational studies [11].

When individuals cut their connections with the normatively illegitimate organization or category, they do free themselves from the consequences of normative illegitimacy evaluations. In contrast, stigma is sticky and easily transferred (Hudson, 2008). Once an individual becomes stigmatized due to their association with a stigmatized entity, they are likely to remain so even if they cut their ties with the source entity. This occurs because when individuals interact with stigmatized groups, evaluators interpret that the interactor is of the same bad character and stigmatize them as well (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Ashforth et al., 2017). Once an individual is stigmatized, they are discredited and stereotyped, and these negative repercussions can continue to follow them independent of their connection to the original source of stigma.

In the context of arabesk, pop artists who switched to arabesk were typecast as sleazy and opportunistic sell-outs and were reduced to being money chasers. After they stopped performing arabesk songs, they were not affected by the repercussions of illegitimacy evaluations directed at arabesk, as they were able to go on TV and got accepted back to their original genres. Nonetheless, even after these artists left the arabesk category, their opportunistic and sleazy image remained until the 1990s. Journalists often recalled their arabesk endeavors and ridiculed them, and other pop artists who did not cross to the dark side shamed them and saw them as low status. As a result, the stickiness and endurance of stigma could be true at the individual level.

While the following analysis is based on anecdotal evidence derived from my personal journey of discovering the reasons behind the negative evaluations targeted at arabesk and the comments encountered on forums and social media, stigma can outlive normative evaluations in the long term when there is a generational change in the discourse, and the scripts are not passed down properly.

Contextual texts created after the 2000s suggest a generational divide between older evaluators who witnessed the rise and fall of arabesk and knew the justifications for its negative evaluation and younger evaluators who grew up in an environment where arabesk was already considered illegitimate. While some commentators referred to older events and recalled various occasions in their comments, the others, who subsumed to be younger, were more likely to mock and distance themselves from the genre due to the stereotypes or simply because it seemed uncool and embarrassing. However, it is important to note that this study cannot draw definitive conclusions on this matter, as the encounters analyzed were limited in number and information regarding the ages of the commentators was unavailable. Nonetheless, theoretically, it is plausible for an entity to become negatively taken-for-granted to the point of narratives backing this judgment getting completely lost so that individuals generate negative evaluations based on heuristics and emotions only (Haack et al., 2014).

6.2.1 Relationship Between Stigma and Normative Illegitimacy

In addition to the ideas offered by the recently published conceptual papers discussed above, negative social evaluations literature differentially referred to stigma as both a cause and a consequence of illegitimacy (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Devers et al., 2009; Jensen, 2010). Therefore, another aspect investigated in this dissertation was the direction of the relationship between stigma and normative illegitimacy.

The findings of this study suggested that stigma can cause normative illegitimacy evaluations. Specifically, arabesk revolved around a historically stigmatized group, i.e., the lower classes or "the poor" (Goffman, 1963; Helms et al., 2019; Miller & Major, 2000). According to the larger value system of intellectuals, especially those who were more loyal to socialism and communism (see Chapter 4), hating on the poor and immigrants or belittling them for no reason was not an appropriate behavior. As a result, some of the evaluators, as in the theme of "arabesk as low culture," broadened arabesk degenerating Turkish music narrative offered by TRT and built a case around how arabesk and other habits of the slum residents was a signal of cultural decay. Consequently, their initial stigmatization of rural-to-urban

immigrants turned into a moral case of Turkish culture being corrupted by certain trends that happened to be associated with slum-dwelling immigrants.

A similar example was also present in Helms and Patterson's (2014) study of MMA organizations, where MMA was initially stigmatized due to blood and gore. However, when the stigmatizers wanted to make a case for publicly denouncing it, they emphasized the harm it caused to the athletes. They also did not change their opinions even after the proponents showed evidence that this sport was not statistically more dangerous than any other, and doctors supported their claims.

As a result, stigma can cause normative illegitimacy by leading opponents to scrutinize the stigmatized target and retrospectively build narratives that explain the possible standard violations or ethical or normative breaches.

Another proposition offered by this dissertation is that stigma triggers normative illegitimacy evaluations when individuals are put in a position to explain their negative reactions caused by stigma.

On the other side, scholars who believe that normative illegitimacy is the cause of stigma often refer to the transfer of negative evaluations onto individuals associated with normatively illegitimate categories. For example, Jensen (2010) argued that some actors did not want to get involved in comedy films with heavy erotic elements because this normatively illegitimate category may lead to their stigmatization. Others hypothesized that "illegitimate actions" such as corporate scandals can lead to the stigmatization of certain forms of organizations and individuals (Devers & Mishina, 2019; Piazza & Perretti, 2015). For instance, Piazza and Peretti (2015) described the dot-com bubble burst as an illegitimate action and argued that this event caused internet firms to be stigmatized. In general, normatively illegitimate categories are likely to be simultaneously stigmatized since normative breaches lead to at least a certain level of devaluation, discredit, and avoidance (Ashforth et al., 2017; Goffman, 1963). However, studies that portray stigma as an extreme form of illegitimacy (e.g., Hampel & Tracey, 2019; Hudson, 2008) assume that to a certain degree, normatively illegitimate organizations are not stigmatized and there is a threshold to pass for normatively illegitimacy to cause stigma. Nonetheless, what constitutes "extreme" here is unclear. This extremity could be dissemination among large groups, the severity of the normative breach, or the persistence of the opponents.

An example of this phenomenon occurred among pop artists who started to sympathize with arabesk in the late 1970s and had no problems with singing arabesk, despite the spread of normative illegitimacy evaluations. However, after the Eu-

rovision scandal, the opinions of pop artists shifted, and they started distancing themselves from arabesk, suggesting that the threshold to extremity was passed for this specific group.

In the case of arabesk, it is difficult to answer the questions about the relationship between normative illegitimacy and stigma. Due to the genre's close association with stigmatized communities, arabesk and arabesk artists were almost immediately stigmatized. In all instances where both normative illegitimacy and stigma were present (e.g., arabesk as low culture, arabesk's association with lumpenbourgeoisie and ANAP, exploitative chameleons and arabesk artists), stigma judgments seemed to develop separately by themselves or before normative illegitimacy. It is likely that these groups were going to be stigmatized even if arabesk had not been present because of other factors like class fragmentation and political polarization. As explained above, normative evaluations were also established quite early, so the current analysis cannot adequately respond to the question of how normative evaluations can lead to stigma evaluations.

This example demonstrates that the presence of stigma and normative illegitimacy in the same context does not necessarily mean that one caused the other. Rather, it is very likely that the same threat leads to stigma and normative illegitimacy through different mechanisms. For example, in industries related to health detriment and death, such as the tobacco and arms trade, stigma is traced back to fear and repulsion of death and bodily mutilation (Vergne, 2012). These notions do not directly cause normative illegitimacy, but they are likely behind the norms such as "valuing of human life" and "protecting human life," as social norms are essentially built to protect communities from external threats through rules and organization (Scott, 2014). Therefore, when an entity and practice are both stigmatized and normatively illegitimate, it is likely these evaluations are reached through vastly different processes. While stigma is based on a natural reaction to a threat, normative evaluations are based on the violation of norms that were created to control the threat that also led to the formation of stigma.

Overall, this dissertation agrees with Devers and Mishina (2019) and disagrees with Hampel and Tracey (2019) in that it may not be useful to put normative illegitimacy and stigma on the same spectrum. The examples provided above showed that normative illegitimacy and stigma are related and can develop in the same context, but they differ in their content and follow different trajectories.

As a concluding comment, it could be argued that empirical studies of stigma in OT almost exclusively focusing on cases where organizations or categories that were both stigmatized and normatively illegitimate, such as sin industries, substance-

related businesses, and organizations related to violence (e.g., Helms & Patterson, 2014; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Vergne, 2012; Wolfe & Blithe, 2015) has exacerbated the confusion. Like legitimacy, stigma is also a multidimensional construct that can have physical, moral, or social sources (Ashforth et al., 2017; Goffman, 1963). As stated multiple times throughout the dissertation, there are many organizations that are stigmatized yet cannot be contested on the moral domain because they are either serving a necessary function for the good of the society or the system or current norms do not allow moral contestation of these entities, such as homeless shelters, morgues, and mental health institutions (Devers et al., 2009; Goffman, 1963; Helms et al., 2019; Vergne, 2012). Consequently, an important step towards differentiating normative illegitimacy from stigma could be including such organizations and categories in "organizational stigma" or "categorical stigma" research.

6.3 Strategies for Managing Negative Social Evaluations

Tactics for managing illegitimacy and stigma evaluations and the level of disapproval directed at the targets have taken a considerable part of the research on negative social evaluations (Augustine & Piazza, 2022; Hampel & Tracey, 2017). Nonetheless, the literature so far has approached the issue from the perspective of illegitimate and stigmatized categories, organizations, and actors that successfully alleviated or almost eliminated the negative evaluations directed at them (e.g., Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Vergne, 2012). Therefore, the fourth research question of this dissertation is about finding contexts where strategies for managing negative evaluations fail.

In this study, one obvious reason for arabesk not redeeming itself for a long time was the class fragmentation and power dynamics in Turkish society. Public intellectuals, arabesk artists, and arabesk fans differed in their access to media outlets, ability to express themselves, and expertise and trustworthiness, all of which led to intellectuals having a disproportional control of cultural discourse. However, studies have demonstrated cases where members of illegitimate categories, who were denied access to mainstream media and faced harsh disapproval, were able to improve their situation through strategies like decoupling, impression management, category straddling, or even direct challenging (e.g., Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Jensen, 2010). Moreover, although the fans generally did not

participate in the discourse, either due to a lack of motivation or their inability to express their opinions, arabesk singers and producers were constantly pursued by the print media and given many opportunities to express themselves.

As such, the rest of this section focuses on the strategies described in the literature and investigates what could have been done in the case of arabesk differently; what crucial strategies were not attempted or were attempted but proved ineffective. Below, the reasons why arabesk proponents were unable to save the genre from illegitimacy judgments for almost three decades are presented under three sections.

6.3.1 Content and Timing

First, the most immediate finding was that the content and timing of Gencebay's initial responses may have exacerbated the disapproval directed at his music and later arabesk category as a whole. Specifically, when Gencebay first emerged and caught the attention of evaluators, the media was eager to talk to him and learn about how he had become so popular among the drivers. However, in his initial interviews with Hey Magazine, Milliyet, and sociologist Ergin Ergönültaş, Gencebay did not seem very concerned about justifying his music. Instead, his responses were rather ambiguous and based on denying accusations of being commercially oriented, catering to minibus drivers, or merely imitating Arab music. One possible reason could be that he did not take the music he was making at that time seriously. During the earlier years, Gencebay expressed that he did not plan to stick with this genre and had a different "real" direction in his mind. So, he might have been unmotivated to provide thorough narratives because he did not think his "minibus music" would become something big. Additionally, being mysterious was a part of Gencebay's persona throughout the study period. He did not perform in casinos and was selective about whom he talked to, so his initial restraint could be interpreted in that light as well. Nonetheless, Gencebay's reluctance and submissiveness in the beginning gave the opponents the upper hand in the discourse right from the get-go, as they were creating and disseminating their own narratives without much opposition.

As the critics became harsher and more accusatory after the mid-1970s, Gencebay started to decline interview requests. When he finally came back to the media after his appearance on TRT, many things had already changed. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, Tayfur, Tatlıses, and chameleons had taken over the discourse, and normative illegitimacy judgments had become somewhat established. Still, when

given the opportunity to address these issues, Gencebay created a narrative that was complex but, at the same time, ambiguous for evaluators to comprehend, let alone disseminate (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995).

The narrative that Gencebay created in the early 1980s and stayed loyal throughout the decade had three components. First, the music he made was not arabesk and it was mislabeled. Second, it did not have a designated fan base; it was directed at everyone, and in fact, according to Gencebay, it was consumed by everyone. Third, it was an experimental genre and as such, did not have well-established boundaries. Theoretically, it could include all kinds of forms, melodies, arrangements, and instruments. When pressed further, Gencebay claimed that his music was an amalgamation of TAM, TFM, Western, and Eastern music, essentially every genre that was available in Turkish cultural discourse at that time, referred to makams and delved into the complex history of CTAM and authentic folk music. In the end, Gencebay's narratives said everything and yet nothing and, therefore, did not provide a comprehensible and banal explanation that could be a guide for evaluators and new entrants to build a framework around his genre (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). He also sabotaged the inevitableness of arabesk by framing his music as an experiment and a search, thus giving arabesk a fleeting and temporary character and insinuating that the final point was going to be something else. As a result, evaluators opted for their own observations and interpretations of influential others to categorize his music.

As demonstrated by studies on category straddling and stigma dilution (Augustine & Piazza, 2022; Jensen, 2010; Piazza & Perretti, 2015; Vergne, 2012; Zuckerman, 2000), such ambiguous descriptions can be beneficial for negatively evaluated categories. Diluting and muddling the categorical boundaries of a firm, product, or genre is expected to divert attention from the "bad" parts of the entity and decrease the protests and disapproval (Vergne, 2012).

Nonetheless, in the context of arabesk, creating a categorical ambiguity did not really provide any benefits. This contradiction could be because of the immaturity of the modern Turkish music industry compared to the contexts where straddling and stigma dilution were successful in decreasing disapproval (e.g., Augustine & Piazza, 2022; Jensen & Roy, 2008; Vergne, 2012). In particular, in these studies, both the illegitimate component (e.g., arms manufacturing, pornographic elements, abortion) and the diluent (e.g., plane manufacturing, comedic elements, additional health services) were already well-understood categories. In the case of arabesk, Gencebay attempted to use TAM and experimental music to dilute the Arabic or Eastern influences; however, the experimental category did not exist in the evaluators' minds, and

their understanding of TAM and the differences between TAM and Arab music was limited. Further, although Tayfur and others like Atilla Özdemiroğlu tried to follow Gencebay's lead, many others were simultaneously self-selecting into arabesk with their own diluters or straddles, preventing creating cohesive explanations around a single distractor.

In all, Gencebay's ambiguity could not blur the boundaries because there were essentially no boundaries to blur. Therefore, it can be proposed that category straddling and stigma dilution are more likely to decrease disapproval caused by norm violation when the boundaries of the target and the diluter are somewhat established and the industry or the field they are in has stability.

The timing of Gencebay's responses was also problematic because when he finally offered his detailed explanation, the initial normative illegitimacy judgments had already been formed and disseminated. Moreover, the narrative of arabesk artists being exploitative and uneducated money chasers was also established. In this context, the permanence of normative illegitimacy judgments can be interpreted through concepts like the "vicious circle of legitimation" (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990, p. 191), "self-reinforcing feedback loops," and "retraction cascade" (Suchman, 1995, p. 597), all of which explain the notion of actors who have lost credibility digging themselves a deeper hole the more they try to explain and justify themselves. These concepts were developed for contexts where organizations were suffering from legitimacy loss, but they are readily applicable to the process of protesting normative illegitimacy as well.

In the case of arabesk, once the genre was associated with the commercial category and degeneration, and once arabesk artists were perceived as opportunistic and exploitative, everything they did was interpreted in this negative light. For example, because evaluators were convinced that arabesk artists did not know anything about music when artists like Orhan Gencebay, Hakkı Bulut, and Ahmet Kaya tried to explain their music in technical terms, their explanations were not taken seriously and were criticized as an attempt of trying to talk in big words to show off. Similarly, the "public's musician" framing backfired on Tayfur because he was already perceived as exploitative and profiting from people's sadness. In addition to the category insiders, whenever evaluators took a more tolerant approach and argued that the issue was not that deep, others dismissed them for being naive and not seeing the reality of the situation.

6.3.2 Disorganization and Lack of Motivation

Another significant reason that may have contributed to arabesk's prolonged illegitimacy is the disorganization and lack of motivation among arabesk singers, fans, and supporters. The motivation of the proponents is overlooked in the literature, as most studies focus on cases where insiders and proponents are either already organized into social movements or preparing to challenge the opponents (e.g., Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Helms & Patterson, 2014; Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015). An exception was Adams's (2012) comparative study of tattoo parlors and cosmetic surgeons.

Specifically, Adams (2012) showed how the collective efforts of surgeons led their practice to get accepted by the larger field of medicine, while the disorganization and rivalry among tattoo artists hindered their ability to establish industry-level standards that would render them approval. Adams (2012) suggested that collective action could be less common in artistic categories due to the need to show individuality and uniqueness, which could increase competition and impede industry-wide collaboration.

In the arabesk context, competition was generally higher between genres than within genres and there was silent solidarity in the arabesk community. Arabesk and arabek-ish artists all pledged allegiance to Gencebay and rarely spoke ill of each other, even when they were given the opportunity to promote themselves at the expense of others. One exception was Hakkı Bulut, though he did not appear in the discourse until later years. Nonetheless, this solidarity was not proactive. Again, until Hakkı Bulut's efforts in the late 1980s, arabesk artists were mostly inert and did not initiate any attacks or challenges themselves. Further, as mentioned above, Gencebay, as well as Tayfur, occasionally withdrew from the discourse by turning down interviews and appearances. Later artists like Ahmet Kaya and Kayahan had a similar attitude and openly stated that they did not care about the opinions of others; therefore, they would not defend themselves. This lack of organization and motivation was largely due to the fragmentation of the category and the silent support of the fans.

First, there were three types of actors who contributed to the production of arabesk music but did not actively participate in the discourse because they saw arabesk as a temporary endeavor. To start with, in the early 1980s, when the discourse was being established, chameleons, who were simply there for the money and attention, began to enter the category. Most of them considered their original genre as their primary focus and did not really care about the long-term legacy of arabesk. They considered

arabesk as a short-term side hustle, and indeed, after they stopped benefitting from arabesk, they returned to their old genres. However, their visibility in the media was very high, not only because they were still appearing on TV but also because their switches were somewhat sensational, so they received extra attention from the journalists. In the end, they were talking a lot, but their explanations were not purposeful. Instead, they sought to further individualistic goals by emphasizing their distinction from other arabeskers, consequently muddling the category boundaries even further.

After chameleons, in the second half of the 1980s, the one-hit wonders and re-recorders emerged. These singers idolized "from rags to riches" artists like Tatlıses and Emrah and wanted to be arabesk artists for quick fame and money. They were purely driven by their simplistic goal of advancing their own situations. Like chameleons, they swayed by the trends and were recording whatever was popular at that moment. As a result, they reinforced the money-chaser image and, in return, did not contribute to the discourse. They were also working at shady nightclubs and pavilions which served to harm the reputation of arabesk artists.

Lastly, Unkapanı insiders, who actually constituted a tightly organized cluster of producers, benefited greatly from arabesk; however, they were not invested in the discourse. This disinterest was because they knew that all trends would eventually fade, and arabesk would be no exception. They approached arabesk from a strictly business perspective and were not keen on participating in arguments. They were always considering their next move, and, as such, their contribution to discourse was the highest when arabesk started to lose steam and speculations on arabesk's potential heirs began.

In summary, these three groups, which made up a considerable crowd, simply followed the supply-demand dynamics of the music market and adapted their strategies accordingly. As a result, they were not loyal to any particular genre and were ready to jump in whatever was the trend. Since they did not have much at stake, it is understandable that they were not motivated enough to defend the genre. However, because they used the label "arabesk" as they pleased, they created a hindrance to the proponents and supporters because they actually exacerbated the opportunistic, commercially driven artists image. Additionally, they hurt cognitive legitimacy by using their own sounds and interpretations.

So, another proposition to be made here is that, compared to organizations, management strategies are likely to be more challenging to implement in categories, especially cultural or artistic ones, because it is harder to control who enters and exits the category. Additionally, claiming and denying an artistic label, e.g., "I am

an arabesk singer" or "I do not make arabesk music," is easy and accrues no cost to the claimer. Such claims may not convince the evaluators, but still, they can create doubts and lead to scrutiny, hurting both cognitive and normative legitimacy. In such a situation where individuals come in and out of the category as they please, even if certain members or groups within a category work hard toward decreasing illegitimacy, there are likely to be others who prefer to follow different routes or even intentionally impair strategic moves for individualistic gain (Adams, 2012; Lashley & Pollock, 2020). These "personal" interpretations by insiders are likely to be more common when incomprehensibility is high and when the originators or entrepreneurs have not provided the necessary guidelines the new entrants can look up to (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).

Second, predominant artists were also unmotivated and were reluctant to challenge the negative evaluations because artists like Gencebay and Tayfur had solid fan bases and were selling enough albums and movie tickets even in the 1970s. Coupled with the perception that intellectuals had preconceived beliefs and would not accept artists' explanations anyway, the support from the fans may have led the artists to believe that engaging in a battle against intellectuals would not be worth the effort. Consequently, these artists also focused on advancing their own careers and cultivating their individual reputations among the listeners rather than working toward justifying the genre.

The literature so far has emphasized how illegitimacy evaluations hamper access to resources (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse et al., 2017; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Zuckerman, 1999). In this study, too, not being able to appear on TV and radio and potential fans and collaborators being shamed out of the category likely hurt arabesk artists, especially those who survived on the periphery and could not build the necessary fanbase. However, the lack of motivation and disorganization in the arabesk community suggest that the relationship between illegitimacy evaluations and access to resources can be bi-directional in that, for illegitimate categories, being able to get by may lead the insiders to avoid the already difficult task of defending the category and protesting the negative evaluations, which was what initially happened with Gencebay. Although such a lethargy may seem more efficient in the short term, it may hurt the category in the long term, especially if the resources are temporarily provided, e.g., increased sales based on trends or interim public support. This is because, first, as time passes, negative evaluations spread and become more ingrained and harder to remove, and second, the lack of motivation and organization leaves the category fragile to sudden attacks. Opponents' interests can randomly increase due to various triggers, leading to changes in laws, extreme media attacks, or even physical protest; in such situations, disorganized categories may not have

enough slack resources to make up for the sudden loss of support and to build a campaign for defending themselves (Augustine & Piazza, 2022; Helms & Patterson, 2014; Lashley & Pollock, 2020).

Therefore, another proposition of this dissertation is that access to resources may lead to inaction and inertia, which makes it harder for illegitimate entities to challenge the negative evaluations later or defend themselves in cases of future attacks.

6.3.3 Persistent Opponents

Though this topic was mentioned while answering the first and second questions above, it is important to highlight the persistence of the opponents, that is, intellectuals who actively worked against arabesk, in this study. Existing research predominantly focused on proponents of illegitimate entities and took their perspective, portraying the opponents as the reactive enemy. Additionally, social evaluation research has emphasized that evaluators have a short attention span and expected a certain level of habituation and boredom to occur after a period of discussion and debates (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Piazza & Perretti, 2015).

Nonetheless, evaluators of this study stayed engaged for a long time and were generally active and motivated throughout the study. This long-term attention was largely sourced in the ever-broadening meaning and relatedly increasing threat of arabesk; however, a salient incident was a group of intellectuals waking themselves up near the end of the third phase. During this phase, while others were opting out, certain intellectuals felt that they were getting numb and used to arabesk, consciously pulled themselves out of their haze and warned the others through their texts. This awakening then led to a refreshment of the discourse. As a result, arabesk's long hauled illegitimacy was not only the failure of the arabesk community but also the success of the opponents.

Overall, creating, maintaining, and challenging legitimacy evaluations are interactive and communicative processes that require giving attention to both proponents and opponents as actors who are capable of using various strategies for furthering their evaluations (Cornelissen et al., 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016). Through this chapter, this dissertation aimed to provide at least some insights into these processes.

7.   CONCLUSION

The objective of this dissertation was to provide insights into the debated concept of illegitimacy and contribute to the growing literature on negative social evaluations in OT. To achieve this end, the dissertation first conceptualized and distinguished between cognitive, normative, and regulative dimensions of illegitimacy. Following, specific research questions were answered through a multi-level hermeneutic analysis of the empirical context of arabesk, a music genre turned into a cultural and social pariah.

This final chapter begins by highlighting the contributions of the dissertation. It then summarizes the limitations, points out future directions, and concludes the study.

7.1 Theoretical Contributions

Previous research on illegitimacy has been sporadic and fragmented (Anteby, 2010; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Jensen, 2010; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996). Additionally, the increasing interest in organizational and categorical stigma over the past decade has created confusion around the attributes of illegitimacy and led to calls for clarifying the concept (Devers & Mishina, 2019; Hampel & Tracey, 2019; Helms et al., 2019; Hudson, 2008; Vergne, 2012). Therefore, this dissertation aimed to take on the task of clearing the confusion around illegitimacy by carrying out a comprehensive and multidimensional investigation. To my knowledge, this study is a first in developing explicit definitions and conceptualizations for the cognitive, normative, and regulative dimensions of illegitimacy and examining them simultaneously in the same empirical context. In addition to this general contribution, the analysis adds to the literature on legitimacy, negative social evaluations, and category creation and emergence in several ways.

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The first contribution is to negative social evaluations and legitimacy research. Unlike previous literature that emphasized the parallel nature and interconnectedness of the processes that lead to cognitive, normative, and regulative legitimacy evaluations and expect a convergence between dimensions (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Alexy & George, 2013; Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Kennedy et al., 2010; Scott, 2014; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011), this study demonstrated that three dimensions of illegitimacy developed in separate trajectories, largely influenced by other factors in the social and political environment and the strength of pillars they were based on than from each other (Scott, 2014).

This insight highlights that using the general term "illegitimacy" to refer to different dimensions is even more problematic on the negative side of the continuum, especially if the environment is tumultuous (Deephouse et al., 2017). Put differently, if an entity is perceived inappropriate according to cognitive frameworks, norms, and regulations, depending on which dimensions are chosen by the researcher, the processes and dynamics are likely to differ; therefore, attributing dimension-specific observations to the general concept of illegitimacy will erase the unique dynamics and properties associated with the other dimensions of illegitimacy judgments. Consequently, though it may not always be possible to study all dimensions of illegitimacy, it is important to clearly specify the selected dimensions in each study.

The second contribution of this dissertation is to legitimacy and category research. Both streams of literature primarily described the process of new categories emerging, gaining comprehensibility, and finally becoming taken-for-granted as a smooth and linear progression where category insiders gradually built a consensus around their category while the confusion and skepticism of the spectators were consistently decreasing (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Durand & Khaire, 2017; Jensen, 2010; Kennedy et al., 2010; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Moreover, these studies isolated the category from the broader environment, including its historical backdrop, supporting institutions, normative systems, social, cultural, and political transitions, technological changes, and demographic transformations (Durand & Khaire, 2017).

Nonetheless, the findings demonstrated that building categorical consensus and cognitive legitimacy is an unstable, fragile, and fragmented process. Particularly, if a category emerges in an immature industry or field where cognitive frameworks are not well defined to begin with, establishing and disseminating a plausible and consistent categorical framework is likely to be a challenging and unpredictable task. In the context of this dissertation, the shared understandings around arabesk converged and diverged multiple times throughout the years. Although not covered in

this study, the negotiations over the meaning of the category re-started after a ten to fifteen-year pause in the 2000s.

Further, taken-for-grantedness developed independently of comprehensibility because acceptance of the category as a part of reality occurred without establishing a consensus around the definitions and features, such that the ambiguity of the category itself became taken-for-granted. Overall, the studies that cover shorter periods should be careful about not reporting a temporary consensus or pause in negotiations as a definitive end of the category creation process. Instead, they should focus on the content of the narratives and extend their analysis to include at least a couple of additional years of data to ensure that the observed consensus is at least semi-permanent.

In addition to the chaotic nature of building a shared understanding, cognitive illegitimacy processes were closely tied to the developments in the social and political contexts and were influenced by even seemingly distant changes. This connection to the broader sociopolitical systems should be expected, as cognitive frameworks are always situated in larger meaning systems that shape social reality (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Therefore, isolating the processes that lead to cognitive illegitimacy and legitimacy from the broader temporal and social context can crop out important insights. Thus, researchers need to pay attention to the larger context in which the category of interest is situated.

The third contribution of this dissertation is to legitimacy literature and offers the concept of "negative taken-for-grantedness" to refer to situations where the normative inappropriateness of an entity takes a fact-like status. More generally, this study supports the perspective that taken-for-grantedness is a stage of legitimacy that belongs to all dimensions regardless of appropriateness or inappropriateness and is not only an end for cognitive legitimacy judgments. As Jepperson (1991) first argued, an organization or category can be taken-for-granted without being comprehensible, normatively accepted, and regulatorily approved. However, as a byproduct of the assumed correspondence between the dimensions, the literature depicted taken-for-grantedness as a final stage for the positive end of the legitimacy continuum (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Deephouse et al., 2017; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Therefore it is crucial to emphasize that taken-for-grantedness can happen at both ends of all three dimensions.

Additionally, the concept of negative taken-for-grantedness, or the state of normative taken-for-grantedness, is different from Haack et al.,'s (2014) affective heuristics or affect-based heuristics in that negative-taken-for-grantedness is not based on feelings, but that rather the explanations provided for why the category is immoral, harmful,

or orthodox become myths that are ingrained in the shared culture (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

The fourth contribution is also to legitimacy literature. In contrast to previous studies that either ignored the regulative dimension or asserted that regulative illegitimacy follows normative illegitimacy, this dissertation showed that regulative illegitimacy evaluations do not need to align with normative judgments directed at the target entity (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Tost, 2011). This can happen when evaluators use different norms for normative and regulative evaluations, or those evaluators who dominate the normative discourse are not interested in the regulatory aspects of the issue (Anteby, 2010; Webb et al., 2009). Additionally, the attitude of the evaluators towards authorities, e.g., the state, the government, regulatory agencies, or practices like specific control and punishment methods, can influence regulatory judgments. Overall, studies of legitimacy and illegitimacy should not start with the assumption that regulative evaluations will follow the normative discussions and actually check whether it is so.

The fifth contribution of the dissertation is to the negative social evaluations research. So far, stigma research has tiptoed around the concept of illegitimacy, broadly acknowledging that they are similar but not making a clear distinction between them. The first significant step in this regard was taken by Devers and Mishina (2019), and this study used their suggestions and an empirical case to examine points of overlap and distinction between normative illegitimacy and stigma. To my knowledge, this dissertation is the first to compare stigma to normative illegitimacy in an empirical setting. Though the inquiry of untangling these concepts could not be completely fulfilled, two propositions that can be used to differentiate these concepts are offered.

One proposition is that examining the presence or absence of explanations for negative judgments could be a method of distinguishing normative illegitimacy from stigma. Stigma is based on stereotypes and heuristics; however, normative legitimacy or illegitimacy judgments are reached through scrutiny and discussions. Therefore, while the latter is backed up by narratives that explain the reasoning behind the judgments, the former does not require such explanations. A further suggestion derived from this proposition is that by increasing scrutiny and the need for self-explanation, stigma evaluations can lead to normative illegitimacy. Another proposition is that, unlike the conceptualizations in OT, stigma is not limited to the moral domains and can be caused by other factors like connection to death or bodily mutilations or socioeconomic status (Ashforth et al., 2017; Goffman, 1963). In all, the relationship between illegitimacy and stigma needs to be further studied,

and a re-conceptualization and redefinition of organizational and categorical stigma is necessary.

As a sixth contribution, this dissertation offers new insights into legitimacy, negative social evaluations, and category literature by taking a different perspective on illegitimacy management tactics. Unlike previous research, which focused on how members of illegitimate entities repelled attacks, decreased, or reversed the negative evaluations directed at them (e.g., Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Jensen, 2010; Lashley & Pollock, 2020), this study tried to explain why category insiders failed to justify themselves. The findings suggested that category straddling and resulting dilution do not work well in contexts where cognitive legitimacy and categorization systems are not established because what is being diluted with what is not clear. The ambiguity that emerges in these situations then only serves to exacerbate cognitive illegitimacy.

Additionally, organized and motivated collective action that is usually present in the studies of negative social evaluations (e.g., Helms & Patterson, 2014; Lashley & Pollock, 2020; Wolfe & Blithe, 2015) may not be present in every context, and this could be a determinant of whether the proponents succeed or fail in alleviating or changing the negative judgments. Organizing is especially important when the target is a category that is relatively easy to enter since it is harder to control what others do in such categories.

As a final contribution to the literature on illegitimacy management tactics, this study suggests that a source of disorganization and motivation among the proponents of illegitimate organizations or categories could be the availability of necessary resources, which is, in the short term, interpreted as a positive thing (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009). However, when a category is able to get by, insiders may not be motivated enough to form a collective and avoid the task of building a defensive or challenging strategy. Although this may initially seem harmless, as time progresses, indifference can turn into inertia, hindering the ability to respond to any sudden changes or attacks that may arise in the future.

As a practical implication, it can be recommended that originators of new categories that possibly violate cognitive frameworks, norms, or regulations are better off taking immediate action to establish and spread their narratives (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Such a proactive act can help prevent the discourse from being hijacked by opponents and skeptics and the new entrants from blurring the boundaries by engaging in inconsistent practices. Additionally, putting up an organized and defensive front from the beginning can ease adopting framing strategies and deflecting the attacks from the media and the public later. Being the first group to contact the regulators,

building an affiliation with them, and immediate and quick lobbying can also be beneficial in preventing bans and inspections by the authorities. Additionally, in cases where there is no legal framework catering to a specific category, establishing the legal ground upfront can serve to prevent possible regulatory challenges and could be used as a tool to defend legitimacy in other dimensions as well.

7.2 Limitations and Future Directions

This dissertation has various limitations, some of which can serve as directions for future research.

First, an area that requires further examination is the overlap between stigma and illegitimacy, as the findings were only able to provide partial insights and could not fully answer the third research question.

Initially, the focus of this study was on illegitimacy because the mid-to-late 2010s witnessed the publication of a wide variety of articles on stigma, and when the study began, stigma research in OT was entering a mature stage. As such, this dissertation was designed to primarily address the problems related to the concept of illegitimacy, which has been generally neglected in OT (Devers et al., 2009). Consequently, stigma was approached only in its relation to illegitimacy.

However, the task of differentiating between these two concepts led to studying the original sources of stigma (Goffman, 1963) and reading texts written by organizational behavior scholars (Ashforth, 2019; Ashforth et al., 2017). After getting familiar with resources that seemed peripheral in the beginning, it was revealed that stigma is also a multifaceted concept that can be sourced from other factors that are not related to morals. Further, stigma operates at micro levels, and unlike legitimacy, it can attach itself to individuals even after their affiliation with stigmatized entities ends. In sum, while the concept of stigma was being transferred from the individual level to the organizational and categorical levels, many nuances that could have helped with differentiating illegitimacy and stigma were lost in translation. A recently published article by prominent organizational stigma scholars titled "Standing on the Shoulders of Goffman: Advancing a Relational Research Agenda on Stigma" (Aranda et al., 2023) also emphasized the need to revisit the basics and reassess the definitions and properties of the concepts of organizational and categorical stigma. Time limitations and the complexity of dealing with the loaded

subject of "illegitimacy" refrained this dissertation from pursuing stigma further. However, future research can investigate the general literature on stigma to develop a more sophisticated and refined understanding of the concept on organizational and categorical levels. Such an inquiry can also help differentiate the concept from illegitimacy and answer the question of whether normative illegitimacy can cause stigma or if there is another phenomenon that triggers both.

Second, another question that was not completely answered was the role of emotions in illegitimacy judgments and whether affect can be used to distinguish stigma from illegitimacy (Devers & Mishina, 2019). The literature is conflicting on this issue as some scholars (e.g., Deephouse et al., 2017; Devers & Mishina, 2019) argue that emotions are not a part of legitimacy judgments, while others (e.g., Haack et al., 2014; Scott, 2014) point out that normative legitimacy is protected by fear of shame, and also that lingering feelings about certain organizations and categories can be carried to the entities that are similar to or connected to the initial target. Therefore, further exploration of the role of emotions in illegitimacy is needed.

Third, genres, although they are commercial categories as well, are different from other traditional "business" or "trade" categories that exchange mass manufactured goods, like car or drug dealerships, or provide services that have specific functions, like hospitals or abortion clinics, in their permeability. Cultural categories, especially popular art and music are easier to enter because music production, though the quality can change, is relatively inexpensive and straightforward compared to other categories that require physical investment or are based on complex technologies or scientific research. Additionally, specific permissions, certifications, quality control mechanisms, and standards that require entrants to wait for approval are essentially absent in art and music releases, especially when the content is self-produced and distributed. Moreover, although certain status strata can be gatekept, and critics and fans may try to chase individuals out of a category, boundaries of cultural categories tend to be more pervious because creators can self-claim their way into an artistic category (DiMaggio, 1987).

In the context of this study, i.e., the Turkish music industry in the 1970s to 1990s, copyrights were almost non-existent, and even though the majority of the technology of today was not available, producing songs and distributing them was still relatively low cost, especially after the introduction of cassettes in the early 1980s (Güngör, 1993). This enabled various singers to enter the industry as "arabesk" artists as they pleased, and, as explained thoroughly in the previous chapters, they blurred the boundaries of arabesk further.

Adding to the permeability, cultural categories are more moldable in that their

meaning and value are subjective and open to interpretation. For example, Khaire and Wadhwani (2010) demonstrated how the artwork that was initially treated as anonymous, ethnic pieces from India came to be categorized as a valuable substream in modern art where Indian artists were appreciated for interpreting Western modernity through the lens of traditional Indian art. A similar example happened with Orhan Gencebay, as his work was initially seen as an imitation or an unpleasing jumble of Eastern and Western sounds but came to be interpreted as experimental music after the 1990s.

Additionally, consumption and criticism of music are easy and widespread, as individuals are exposed to music in the media, in restaurants, on public transport, and on the streets, and they can easily form an opinion on it and then express their interpretations.

Together, the pervasiveness and the openness to interpretation of cultural categories make them more prone to cognitive illegitimacy than traditional businesses that are based on concrete products or services. Consequently, the fluctuating process of reaching category consensus described in this dissertation should be tested in other contexts as well.

Fourth, the archival nature of the data also led to certain limitations. Arabesk's survival in the face of massive criticisms and bans was largely due to the silent masses who supported the genre. However, this silent group of evaluators was not examined because they were "silent," i.e., they did not participate in the discourse. Nonetheless, silent support is a critical and underexplored phenomenon (Bitektine & Haack, 2015), and now social media allows marginalized communities who cannot enter the mainstream discourse to create online niche discourses for themselves. This development provides an opportunity for researchers to study silent support and how it affects the survival of illegitimate categories.

Finally, research at the intersection of arabesk and legitimacy is still incomplete. The discourse on arabesk has recently re-opened, and now, a different generation with distinct norms and a more sophisticated understanding of music is re-interpreting the meaning and value of arabesk. The genre is going through some sort of nostalgia-fication and redemption, and therefore, the case of arabesk could provide valuable insights into legitimacy and category research by answering the question offered by Jensen (2010): "what happens to illegitimate categories after they are dead?"

Notes

[1] The process of legitimation is often confused with the process of institutionalization. Tost (2011, p. 689) explains the difference between these two processes as follows: "Consistent with the view of institutions as self-reinforcing and taken-for-granted social conventions, an entity can be said to be institutionalized when it obtains both a taken-for-granted status (i.e., a particular variant of legitimacy, which institutional theorists term cognitive legitimacy) and the capacity to maintain itself (a capacity distinct from legitimacy). Thus, legitimacy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for reaching the outcome of institutionalization"

[2] Deephouse et al. (2017) argue that once an entity is evaluated as legitimate and its legitimacy becomes taken for granted, periodical accreditation checks and audits are usually just performative and do not really influence legitimacy judgments. Moreover, this type of questioning serves to refresh the legitimacy of the accepted entities and reassure the evaluators.

[3] Based on Rindova et al. (2006), Devers et al. (2009) define celebrity as "attracting attention and positive social evaluations through nonconformance (either overconformance or underconformance) to normative practices" (p.156). Celebrity is different from normative legitimacy and illegitimacy in that it mainly refers to the positive attention or evaluations of uniqueness given to a single organization.

[4] Other popular newspapers were Akşam, Günaydın, and Tercüman. While Akşam paused publication in 1982 and was not reopened until 1994, Günaydın went through a change of ownership in 1988 and lost its footing in the 90s. Tercüman started to have serious problems in 1993 and had a change of ownership in the same year; in 1995, it was shut down as well.

[5] Tatlıses was banned in the mid-1980s for a short while, but it was reportedly due to him singing in Kurdish or signing a political petition and not because of his relation to arabesk music.

[6] In Turkish, "acı" means both pain/suffering/tragedy and hot/spicy. So, "acılı dondurma" is a word play that means "ice cream with pain," referring to the sorrow in arabesk songs and "spicy ice cream" at the same time.

[7] This was partly due to TRT establishing its second channel, "TV 2" (now TRT 2), in 1986, which was dedicated to more sophisticated or high-culture music and films (see Chapter 4). In addition, TRT increased the broadcasting time of the first channel and, as a result, had substantially more slots to fill. Older Turkish films were usually the cheapest content to broadcast, and both TRT and later private channels used them when they had empty or low-rating slots.

[8] This was a word play on a constitution article that said: "irresponsible President" ("sorumsuz Cumhurbaşkanı" in Turkish) to mean that the President should be politically unbiased and not tied to any of the political parties, but in daily use, the word "sorumsuz" translates to "irresponsible."

[9] The word masochism was used by Tınaz Titiz, and Selanik used the phrase "feryat figan" in Turkish and newspaper articles followed their descriptions. The literal translation of this phrase is "screaming loudly while crying."

[10] In current narratives, Gürses is as salient as, if not more salient than, Gencebay and Tayfur. However, he only appeared in focal data nine times in the entirety of the 1980s, and most of them were very brief mentions. This could be because of his rather late rise to fame, that is, around the mid-80s, compared to Gencebay and Tayfur, his general reservedness and distance from the press,

and the temporal closeness of his peak of popularity (the mid-90s to early 2000s) to the current day. He also often made "arabesk" covers of popular Turkish pop and rock songs which were also appreciated by intellectuals. His death and the popularity of the biopic additionally contributed to his prominence in the most recent discourse.

[11] Although in the legal domain, the term "illegitimate" is used to refer to individuals, e.g. "illegitimate child," organizational studies have never adopted this type of usage, and always treated legitimacy as a higher level concept and they are generally outdated terms.

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APPENDIX A
Supplementary Quotes (SQ) from Focal and Contextual Data

SQ1: I got used to the phrase "minivan music," but there shouldn't be such a phrase ... I conducted personal research and [found that] the total number of minibuses in Istanbul was around fifteen thousand. At that time, I had sold a hundred thousand records in Istanbul only. That means eighty-five thousand records were sold to people that were not minibus drivers. I believe this proves that I don't make minibus music (Orhan Gencebay, quoted by Mehmed Kemal, Cumhuriyet, 1981)

SQ2: There is no such thing as peace of mind during vacation. If you are traveling by bus, be prepared to listen to the selections of our dear driver brothers. [They] love arabesk music a lot. Unless there is special instruction from the company, they listen to arabesk, which helps compensate for your lack of familiarity with this aspect of our culture. (Erdal Atabek, Cumhuriyet, 1988)

SQ3: You know, the obsession with arabesk music on buses. It's a form of torture, in my opinion. You're forced to listen to something you don't like. Professor Bahri Savcı told a story about an act of Mina Urgan that I really liked. It was truly a behavior fitting to dear Mina Urgan. [She] was on a long journey, the passengers were complaining about arabesk songs, but the driver wouldn't pay any attention. Suddenly, Mina Urgan stood up and called out to the driver. Stop, she said. I'm getting off. The driver was shocked and turned off the arabesk cassette. (Müşerref Hekimoğlu, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

SQ4: Can we use the term "bottomless well" for Turkish pop music? For a world where talent and knowledge are not even sought after? In the domain of "pop music," a commercial song can drown its performer in worldly riches, but the other side of the coin presents an intriguing picture: a God-given voice, speaking English proficiently like one's mother tongue, [and] devotion to the cause is not enough to get the recognition one deserves. Consider the singers, folk artists, and arabeskers that have recently spread like mushrooms, and then consider Nükhet Ruacan [the jazz performer]. Think about the signatures on contracts worth millions and then about the effort put forth by one of the finest voices of the younger generation to enhance her knowledge and refinement. (Salim Alpaslan, Cumhuriyet, 1981)

SQ5: Minister of Culture, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, visited TRT manager Cengiz Taşer last week to congratulate him on his new position and wish him success... Kışlalı, who said that the state would help every branch of art, emphasized that pop music would not be left out and told Taşer his plans: The State Theater had a 12-member permanent orchestra that had the opportunity to perform only a few months out of the year. Therefore, it was planned to establish a large orchestra with the support

of the country's leading pop instrumentalists and, if necessary, opera and symphony orchestras. In this way, talented artists who turned to casino and minibus music due to financial reasons would be somewhat attracted to Turkish pop music. (Anonymous, Cumhuriyet, 1978)

SQ6: From Bihter to Zekiye in "Delikan," to Cevahir in "Ah Güzel İstanbul," to her films with Orhan Gencebay, especially "Aşkı Ben mi Yarattım," Müjde Ar played women who constantly contradicted society and their immediate environment due to their femininity. Although this may be considered a coincidence, for many of us, Müjde's unforgettable performances in these roles stem from the successful collaboration of her [appearance] and the roles she played... Apart from films with Orhan Gencebay, she says that she did not receive any money for films made with good intentions like Delikan. (Fatih Özgüven, Cumhuriyet, 1982)

SQ7: Back in the day, there was a craze for Arab films and Arab songs. It was during the years of World War II, and Abdulvahap's film "Love's Tears" was shown for weeks at the Ferah Cinema in Şehzadebaşı. The traffic came to a halt due to the crowds. There was a queue of men, women, and children waiting for tickets for days. Women entered the cinema with one or two spare handkerchiefs. And they came out all their handkerchiefs soaking wet. Those long songs fulfilled a great longing in our people. The influence of Arab music also affected us. In the following years, an Indian film created similar reactions. "Awaara." The song "Awara Hoon" was on everyone's lips. Our people became united through that song. While reading the article "Minibus Music: From Orhan Gencebay to Ferdi Tayfur" by "Sanat Emeği" magazine, I relived those old moments. (Oktay Akbal, Cumhuriyet, 1979)

SQ8: How and why do you think arabesk music was born in Turkey? I don't know how arabesk music was born. Because when I was born, arabesk already existed. I don't know its history... I also don't know who started it. However, when you say arabesk, it brings up different ideas, it evokes certain associations. It suggests Arab music. But that's not really the case. I play the bağlama, and I compose my music with the bağlama. When I record a composition that I made solely with the bağlama, we perform it with a 40-piece orchestra, and maybe because we incorporate many instruments into it, they call it arabesk. (Ferdi Tayfur, interviewed by BBC Radio, 1984)

SQ9: I first created my own music in 1978, where I began interpreting adaptations of Turkish folk music and Turkish light music, primarily old melodies, accompanied by piano and a small orchestra. By reviving these old melodies, I aimed to introduce a new pleasure to the younger generation as well... It is too early to make such a definition for now. We have paved the way, and they will give it a name later.

We strive to adapt without distorting our own motifs. We choose those that are more harmonious. I believe this also happens in Western music. Don't Adnan Saygun and Nevit Kodallı interpret folk tunes? In my opinion, a musician should be knowledgeable about all music genres. (Ferdi Özbeğen, Cumhuriyet, 1981)

SQ10: Selanik stated that the violin, an important instrument in Eastern music with its delicate and emotional sound, is frequently used in a debilitating manner in arabesk music. In the prepared piece, particular attention was paid to classical music style for stringed instruments and violin partitions. (Cavidan Selanik quoted by Anonymous, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

SQ11: TRT could not categorize arabesk music under any specific genre During the meeting of the advisory board for Turkish pop music held in Ankara, it was decided that arabesk music was outside the agenda and that this genre did not fit into any particular categorization. However, artists like Ferdi Tayfur and Orhan Gencebay, who are known for their arabesk style, would be allowed to appear on screen if they performed TAM pieces. (Hıncal Uluç, Cumhuriyet, 1980)

SQ12: The Music Department has halted Turkish music!: The program featuring Yıldıray Çınar, which was prepared with great expense and effort, has been canceled by the Music Department, stating, "An electro saz is being used in the music. The electro saz is not a traditional Turkish instrument. This program cannot be aired." Furthermore, the Music Department has imposed an embargo on Bedia Akartürk's band, stating, "There are darbuka and zils present." (Anonymous, Cumhuriyet, 1975)

SQ13: Macit Akman, while explaining why TRT does not feature arabesk music, stated the following:
"The TRT Board of Directors has decided that this type of music cannot be included in our broadcasts. This music leads the public towards pessimism and despair. The people are already tired of financial difficulties and pessimism. What does it mean, I dug my own grave, will you also join me? Is this what music about?" (Macit Akman, interviewed by Anonymous, Cumhuriyet, 1984)

SQ14: While listening to a lad, whose gender has been debated for years, singing, and repeating "İtirazım var! İtirazım vaaaar!.." with such intensity that it seemed as if they were tearing apart their certain parts, I burst into laughter hearing a customer at the neighboring table saying "Hey, someone shut this person up! Can't you see? They are inciting unarmed rebellion and causing unrest among the people." Another burst of laughter erupted throughout the room when the same person commented on another arabesk singer's never-ending screams, saying, "That scoundrel is howling,

who knows whose head will explode." (Çetin Öner, Cumhuriyet, 1983)

SQ15: I got into a taxi, and the radio was on. Arabesk music was playing. The driver stepped on the gas. I asked:
— What's playing?
— It's the Police Radio, brother! On god, they erased TRT and started playing for real.
— Who's singing?
— It's Tüdanya, brother...
— Tüdanya? What kind of name is that?
— She was an ancient queen, brother. She suffered a lot, brother, [to the point] you can't believe. And this girl singing has also suffered a lot, poor girl became Tüdanya...She sings beautifully, and do you know why? Because she has suffered a lot, brother, she has become like Tüdanya...
— Does everyone who suffers become like Tüdanya?"
— They do, brother. They become like queens, their voice becomes beautiful, just like a well-brewed tea... (İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

SQ16: While doing all this, how did you protect yourself from Arabesk?
— Essentially, my growing interest in TFM was a factor that kept me protected. Additionally, my cultural background was not suitable for performing Arabesk music, and my family structure and economic conditions were never in line with the conditions of the Arabesk-loving audience. I came from a typical bureaucratic family. Moreover, I did not exhaust myself in college for ending up making arabesk music. (Selda Bağcan, interviewed by Kemak Küçük, Cumhuriyet, 1982)

SQ17: Yes, MÜYAP's music awards serve as a testimony of how Turkish pop music intersected with arabesk in the past year. Even if MÜYAP assigned various names to the awards like TAM, TFM, arabesk, even folk-arabesk, fantazi music (whatever that means), taverna, and so on. (Sina Koloğlu, Cumhuriyet, 1991)

SQ18: The New Year's Eve special entertainment program disappointed millions of people who spent New Year's Eve at home. Those who had lost hope of having fun while sitting in front of the TV expressed their dissatisfaction by calling newspapers and stating, "We sat in front of the television to have fun, but it made us bored to death. The television put us to sleep." Citizens who experienced an "arabesk" night with İbrahim Tatlıses, Cengiz Kurtoğlu, Küçük Emrah, and Coşkun Sabah expressed the opinion of, "Is it an entertainment program or a wall of tears?" (News Center, Cumhuriyet, 1990)

SQ19: According to TRT regulations, arabesk music and songs are strictly forbid-

den. However, this ban was temporarily lifted on New Year's Eve. And the "big brother of arabesk," Orhan Gencebay, delighted the Turkish nation with his bağlama and voice, giving us an arabesk feast.

No consultations were sought from the Constitutional Court, party groups, or anyone else to suspend the legislation that prohibited arabesk. The authorities were confident that the majority of the people would rejoice in arabesk and "Brother Orhan."

If the authorities were so confident, why do they settle for only pleasing the people once a year?

Is there a shared psychologist-musicologist report stating that "More than once a year of arabesk is harmful"?

These are unknown.

What is known is that the logic of "making a one-time exception for something considered harmful," along with the understanding of "Let it be, it won't hurt your heart," and "Once is not enough," is starting to dominate the governance of the state. (Ahmet Tan, Cumhuriyet, 1986)

SQ20: Arabesk music is described by Sezen Cumhur as follows: "Music is a thing that is composed of organized sound waves. Arabesk is formed by organized sound waves. This means it is music." He also attributes the emergence of arabesk music to "transistor radios," using a logical formula: "After the 1950s, the phenomenon of transistor radios began. The rural community's ears started getting accustomed to the sounds on Arab radios through these transistor radios. Gradually, it spread from generation to generation. Music is the mirror of the people. What did you give and what do you expect in return?" (Sezen Cumhur Önal, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

SQ21: Arabesk, which voices the destiny, suspicions, complaints, melodies, and exhibitions of those established overnight is like "gecekondu"; it is makeshift, collected from here and there, haphazard, neither a house nor an apartment, neither an earthen roof nor a village, neither a city nor a town... (İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet, 1988)

SQ22: It is undeniable that even the phenomenon of "arabesk music," which frustrates all of us, is largely a product of this unhealthy urbanization. A family that carries its belongings and leaves behind a town of thirty or forty households, with little connection to the world and even their own town, suddenly throws themselves into the merciless current of a million-strong city. This family is no longer rural, urban, or from a small town. They can neither sustain tradition nor embrace the new nor can they find a place between the two. Can there be a better description of "arabesk" than this? (Aydın Güner, interviewed by Celal Üster, Cumhuriyet, 1988)

SQ23: Now, there is a social segment that really likes arabesk...

– There can be one segment that likes it the most. If it is listened to by every part of the society, there can be a segment that likes the most, maybe.

– But they say that despite the existence of other groups. . . they often refer to people who have migrated from the rural areas to the cities, those who live in the outskirts of the cities.

– So they say. . .

– Yes, what do you think?

– In 74, as a result of an interview I conducted with Ergönültaş, and based on Ergönültaş's own interpretation, this conclusion became a source of reference for many intellectuals and thinkers; it became the subject of articles. And thereafter, it was always referred to in this manner; all sociologists connected it to that. However, immediately after the publication of the article, I told Engin, Ergönültaş, that there was a mistake here, that you entirely linked it to this point, which is not correct, during our phone conversation, he asked why, I explained it – I will tell you now –, and they admitted that I was right and said, "We will correct it." However, they did not, and it remained that way. This is the influence of [that article]. (Orhan Gencebay, interviewed by Meral Özbek, Orhan Gencebay Arabeski, 1991)

SQ24: There's no denying the beauty of our cuisine, but we are gradually forgetting our traditional dishes. Big cities, and even tourist towns, are filled with pizzerias, lahmacun shops, and çiğ köfte stands. The younger generations are not familiar with their authentic cuisine. It seems that lahmacun and çiğ köfte go hand in hand with arabesk music.

SQ25: Additionally, the recent coverage in the media and TRT regarding homosexuals, gender and identity transformations merely serves to showcase the societal degeneration and the perverse products of this degeneration. It has become impossible to distinguish which individuals are genuine homosexuals and which ones are unfortunate products of corruption. In our country, where arabesk and aranjman, sex, pornographic literature and film making, casinos," pictured romance novels, and the [comics] craze prevail, leading to the destruction of national culture and a terrifying extent of cultural decay, it is only natural that homosexuality would manifest itself in its most depraved form. (Dr. Ataman Tangör, Cumhuriyet, 1981)

SQ26: Recently, I was curious and bought a record...however, my heart is truly in our own Turkish music, in our popular song. I listen to [TAM], and sometimes I sing along. Although listening to arabesk songs can be pleasant at times, singing them is really hard, almost impossible. (Türkan Şoray, Sanat Emeği, 1980)

SQ27: ...it is necessary to emphasize another point once again. Desiring an im-

provement in society's way of life, culture, and level of taste does not necessarily mean glorifying the low taste that has formed in the society, enjoying arabesk music, or mindlessly listening to İbrahim Tatlıses. Avoiding the sticky muddle of populism and opposing its disgusting smell is not being against the people. (Ali Sirmen, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

SQ28: ...we divide the audience in the casino into two groups. The first is the audience inside the hall, who consume alcoholic beverages, and the second is the garden audience...The garden audience is below a certain economic threshold. They can only afford and spare time for such entertainment a few times a year... They are more crowded compared to the casino audience. The audience inside the hall is more demanding, economically powerful, and pays hefty sums. In the face of this audience, we adopt a more balanced and self-regulated attitude, needing to behave differently. However, the garden audience is more enthusiastic, which makes us enthusiastic as well, and we strive to deliver a better performance. (Müjde Ar, Cumhuriyet, 1981)

SQ29: The ban-ridden understanding of democracy created the alaturka liberalism that is deprived of political liberalism where the state interventionism is reserved to a couple of privileged firms and the rose water smelling "arabesk capitalism." (Uğur Mumcu, Cumhuriyet, 1986)

SQ30: The current economy today in Turkey is not a free-market economy but instead an "arabesk market economy." In particular, the Treasury Undersecretariat is implementing a certain "oriental economic despotism," that also hurts democracy. (Osman Ulagay, Cumhuriyet, 1985)

SQ31: Professor Abdurrahman, currently residing in London, openly advocates terrorism and wishes to destroy of all secular governments through "jihad." In the end, the so-called "arabesk diplomacy," initiated under the pretext of "solidarity with Islamic countries," has come to this extent. (Uğur Mumcu, Cumhuriyet, 1986)

SQ32: As soon as the bus left the city and entered the main road, the driver turned on the tape player. I listened closely; it was an Arabic song... You may say "aren't songs from other languages sung and played as well?" True, but considering the resurgence of conservatism and the clear will to mix religion into state affairs, doesn't the sound of arabesk songs sung in poor Arabic echoing through the roads of Anatolia exhibit the magnitude of the threat? This is a new demonstration of the desire to return from nationalism to a renewed form of pan-Islamism through music. We already know the other signs. (Recep Bilginer, Cumhuriyet, 1985)

SQ33: Mystified Turkey...First, they brought up [the plant-based treatment] inci-

dent. They presented it to the world with the arabesk methods that were sourced in their alaturka [character]. We embarrassed ourselves to those who understood that we did not even know the concept of scientific discipline. (Dr. Haydar Dümen, Cumhuriyet, 1990)

SQ34: This "fatherhood" further bolsters Hakkı's position of "authority." No one asks how he became wealthy. No one asks about the origin of his gang. Yes, Hakkı had previously talked about his impoverished childhood to Süreyya, by stating, "I lived in agony," and then with a swift arabesk transition blurting "Those were my happiest years." (Murat Belge, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

SQ35: My childhood passed...among roses, lilacs, jasmines, and honeysuckle branches. Of course, not everyone's childhood is spent in a house with a garden, among flowers...I think the real problem starts here. Nurturing love for nature, love for flowers, love for animals in a way that won't fade...Perhaps when money becomes the most important value, our perspective on other values changes as well. Or everything unfolds in an arabesk fashion. Don't the flower arrangements that fill the stages during concerts, weddings, or theater galas bother us? The flowers get lost among ribbons and lace, and more importance is given to the size of the flower basket, in an act of extravagance. Undoubtedly, this is also a cultural issue. (Müşerref Hekimoğlu, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

SQ36: We get mad suddenly and cool down quickly. Is it perhaps our national character? Well, if we look at the hundred thousand copies sold of arabesk cassette tapes, it's not entirely untrue, I guess... (Taner Kutlay, Cumhuriyet, 1988)

SQ37: I remember that we were singing the 10th Anniversary March enthusiastically. Now, I understand that they were trying to push us closer to one side, that is, kind of by force and with the hands of the government, they were trying to push us towards the West. This is why they didn't play arabesk music. The public was being pushed toward the West. But now there is no need for this anymore. At this point, we need more liberal and public-friendly programs. I say this without hesitation. Arabesk music can be aired by TRT. There is no obstacle to the broadcasting of arabesk music. (Turgut Özal, quoted by Cumhuriyet Ankara Bureau, 1988)

SQ38: We cannot separate the arabesk genre, and moreover, there is no definitive distinction between what is considered arabesk and what is not. There are songs that we will doubt whether they are arabesk or not. A committee at the ministry has discussed the names, but we do not make such distinctions. (Nevzat Sümer, quoted by Anonymous, Cumhuriyet, 1987)

SQ39: The fearful environment of the pre-September 12 era, and the suffocating

atmosphere of the military regime that came on top of it benefited Turgut Özal. In this environment of low expectations and distress, Özal looked good by solving simple but stuck problems. When the arabesk and opportunist Özal of the 1983-1987 period got further marinated with arabesk and opportunist sauces what was left after was an unpredictable notion of "getting things done." (Oktay Gönensin, Cumhuriyet, 1991)

SQ40: Back then, there was "Ses Magazine" and such. One day, the representatives of these magazines came to my company. When I saw them talking to the owner I was really happy and [thought] to myself "[Finally] they are going to talk about me!" because there was nobody who sold more albums than me... They told the owner "we are now making a music list for our magazine of the artists who sold the most, tell us their names so we can include them in the list." The owner said "The very first one is Hakkı Bulut." The representatives then looked at each other and told the owner, "He won't cut it, don't you want the best-looking ones to be on the magazine?" ... I really wanted the floor to open and swallow me ... Suat Sayın, Zeki Müren, Mr. Orhan, he was very new then, Ferdi-İbrahim were non-existent, Neşe Karaböcek, Ajda Pekkan ... they wanted those. (Hakkı Bulut, undated interview)

SQ41: Küçük Emrah states that he makes "smiling arabesk" music by incorporating fantazi in arabesk (Handan Şenköken, Cumhuriyet, 1985)

SQ42: I put a lot of effort into this film. But we were awarded. The film was very successful. On the first day, we earned 1 million 100 thousand liras in Istanbul. I believe serious and realistic films are making a comeback. The arabesk era in cinema is over... We must strive to create good things." (Ali Özgentürk, Cumhuriyet, 1982)

SQ43: When something had sadness and sorrow, they called it arabesk and he didn't understand it. [But] If they insist on giving that name to the music he creates, Ahmet Kaya was "in favor of using it." The issue was not about making music for a few individuals. As Mao said, "First, you must be a student of the people, then their teacher." Those who criticized him were "so distant from his people." The reality was that "those who made these criticisms" were actually bothered because he was a "real revolutionary." (Mürşit Balabanlılar, Cumhuriyet, 1988)

SQ44: [Producer] Turgut Çağlayan summarized the market [as] "There is a crowd in Turkey who are looking for something new. If someone makes a change or a distinct interpretation of music, they buy it. Producers who skillfully incorporate polyphony in arabesk took the crown by killing TAM." When we gave Sezen Aksu as an example and said that pop music sold well too, he said "She also makes people cry. It would be more accurate to call that Sezen Aksu music." (Turgut Çağlayan,

quoted by Cem Hamuloğlu, Cumhuriyet, 1986)

SQ45: Turkey has major identity issues, you know. Europe doesn't want us. They blatantly said recently, "We are Christians"... But we are not Middle Eastern either. I believe that Turkey will find a way out, a way to breathe, by embracing its identity as a Mediterranean country. I am convinced that salvation lies in moving towards this Mediterranean identity. (Zülfü Livaneli, Cumhuriyet, 1989)

SQ46: I was just the beginning. Now arabesk is not infiltrated into all music, [instead] all structures are in arabesk. (Orhan Gencebay, Cumhuriyet, 1991)