THE INTERACTION OF CONFLICT, ETHNICITY, AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

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THE INTERACTION OF CONFLICT, ETHNICITY, AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines the effect of civil conflict on electoral behavior by comparing the Turkish and Peruvian cases. Employing aggregate-level conflict and electoral data, it seeks to explain the effect of the cleavage type on the relationship between conflict and voting behavior. Both empirical chapters delve into the effect of civil conflict on voter turnout, and the vote shares of the insurgent-affiliated and incumbent parties. The findings suggest that an increase in the level of conflict decreases voter turnout due to an increase in the cost of voting in both Turkey and Peru. The effect of conflict on popular support for the insurgent-affiliated party in Turkey is positive in high conflict regions. However, the insurgency-associated party loses electoral support as the level of conflict increases in Peru. Lastly, the incumbent's vote share increases as the level of conflict increases in Turkey while this effect is statistically insignificant in the Peruvian case. The differences between the two cases are explained from the perspective of social identity theory and different natures of conflict in these countries. While the conflict in Turkey is ethnicity-based, that in Peru is ideology- and class-based. Thus, the comparison reveals that the cleavage type has a modifying effect on the relationship between conflict and electoral behavior.

ÖZET

ÇATIŞMA, ETNİK KİMLİK VE SEÇMEN DAVRANIŞININ ETKİLEŞİMİ

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SİYASET BİLİMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2022

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Anahtar Kelimeler: sivil çatışma, seçmen davranışı, etnik kimlik, Türkiye, Peru

Bu tez, Türkiye ve Peru örneklerini karşılaştırarak sivil çatışmanın seçmen davranışı üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. İlçe ve seçim bölgesi düzeyinde çatışma ve seçim verilerini kullanarak çatışma ekseninin, çatışma ve oy verme davranışı arasındaki ilişki üzerindeki etkisini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Her iki ampirik bölüm de sivil çatışmanın seçmen katılımı ile isyancılarla bağlantılı partinin ve hükümet partisinin oy oranları üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Bulgular, çatışma düzeyindeki artışın hem Türkiye'de hem de Peru'da oy vermenin maliyetindeki artış nedeniyle seçime katılımı azalttığını göstermektedir. Çatışmanın Türkiye örneğinde HDP'ye verilen seçmen desteği üzerindeki etkisi, çatışmanın yoğun olduğu bölgelerde pozitif yöndedir. Ancak Peru'da çatışma düzeyi arttıkça isyancılarla bağlantılı parti seçim desteğini kaybetmektedir. Son olarak, Türkiye'de çatışma düzeyi arttıkça iktidar partisinin oy oranı artarken, Peru örneğinde bu etki istatistiksel olarak anlamsızdır. İki vaka arasındaki bu farklılıklar, sosyal kimlik teorisi perspektifinden ve bu ülkelerdeki çatışmanın farklı doğası yardımı ile açıklanmaktadır. Türkiye'deki çatışma etnik iken, Peru'daki çatışma ideoloji ve sınıf temellidir. Dolayısıyla karşılaştırma, çatışma ekseninin, çatışma ve seçmen davranışı arasındaki ilişkiyi koşullandırıcı bir etkiye sahip olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

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To my loving mom and dad
who always support me no matter what

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATONS

1.   INTRODUCTION

Even though elections are usually considered a competition between political parties that seek governing power, sometimes external actors rival these political actors despite not participating in the electoral process. Such external actors have been recognized to influence the decision-making processes of both political elites and electorates (Dunning 2011). These external actors frequently take on the form of ethnic or ideological armed groups engaging in violent attacks inside and against a political entity where elections take place (Brathwaite 2013; Staniland 2015). In this respect, both ethnicity and ideology might be important determinants of conflict initiation and electoral behavior.

Previous literature has mainly focused on the effects of ethnicity either on civil war initiation and duration or electoral behavior. It has shown that ethnic differences along with language, religion, and geographical concentration of the ethnic groups are robust determinants of both voting behavior and conflict (Gubler and Selway 2012; Harris 1994; Ichino and Nathan 2013; McKenzie 2004; Reynal-Querol 2002; Weidmann 2009). Although the relationships between ethnicity and conflict, ethnicity and voting behavior, and conflict and voting behavior have all been widely studied, there are few studies on the intersection of these three. The literature is thus quite limited when it comes to explaining the effect of the type of conflict or the cleavage dimension on electoral behavior, especially conflict-ridden regions with both the insurgent groups using violent tactics to demand rights of their constituencies and legitimate political parties representing the interests of the same constituencies.

What makes explaining the vote choice of ethnolinguistic groups in conflict settings valuable is that it is usual to find ethnic insurgents along with ethnically-based political parties in such contexts. In addition, these two entities are most likely to pursue contradictory strategies because what they regard as the legitimate area of contestation differs. Namely, a political party operates on an electoral level while insurgents aim to reach their goals through violent means. In such circumstances, there are three kinds of actors whose actions and motives can be explored. First of

1

all, there is the ethnic group, which is defined as a community that distinguishes itself from others with its shared heritage, culture, language, territory, and a "conceptual autonomy" (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008, 520). Alongside the ethnic group, there are the two distinct entities that claim to represent the ethnic group's interests. Apart from pursuing their own interest in different areas, these groups can also be expected to affect the decision-making mechanisms of the other entities as well as their own constituencies. Since the previous literature does not address this issue, it is a valuable topic to study since explaining the coexistence of distinct and opposing entities originating from the same group and its effect on the political attitudes of voters is important for both the electoral studies and conflict resolution literatures. This importance stems from that scholars will be able to better understand what people tend to choose when they have two different organizations with distinct tactics to advance their interests. The findings could also help us understand the electoral effects of civil conflict in analyzing political contestation. Therefore, novel conflict resolution opportunities could emerge from such a research on violent civil conflicts.

This thesis has thus two main questions regarding the interference of conflict, ethnicity, and electoral behavior. First, I aim to demonstrate how civil conflict affects electoral behavior. Second, I seek to establish the importance of the cleavage dimension in this relationship by comparing two different cases. To this end, I will conduct two empirical case studies on Turkey and Peru in the following chapters. The main distinction between these cases is the nature of the conflict. While the conflict in Turkey is classified as an ethnic one, the Peruvian conflict is of ideological nature. Even though both the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan; PKK) and the Shining Path had aimed a communist revolution when they were founded, PKK has altered its communist ideology in the mid-1990s and started to demand Kurdish autonomy. That is, the PKK has quickly turned into an ethnicity-based movement after its establishment while the Shining Path has long remained an ideology-based one. This also brings another distinction regarding the aim of the militant organizations in those countries. PKK is a secessionist organization. However, the Shining Path aims to overthrow the existing regime and establish a communist state. Moreover, while the Shining Path attacks were widespread across the country, including urban centers, PKK attacks are primarily concentrated in the Southeastern and Eastern Turkey. Furthermore, the demands and ideology of the insurgent-affiliated parties in those countries also differ. Turkey has a pro-Kurdish ethnic party associated with the PKK, whereas the electoral wing of the Shining Path is a far-left electoral alliance without any ethnicity-based demands. Such differences between these cases, despite their similar electoral systems

(i.e., proportional representation rule, compulsory voting, and presidential elections by popular rule) and long histories of civil conflict, will provide us with an important opportunity to examine the impact of the cleavage dimension on the relationship between civil conflict and electoral behavior.

As proposed by the calculus of voting theory, citizens will vote according to a cost-benefit calculation which includes a calculation of the probability of one's vote changing the outcome of elections, expected policy benefit as a result of the election of the desired candidate, cost of voting, and a sense of civic duty (Aldrich 1993; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Previous studies demonstrated that the probability that one vote will change the winner of the election approaches zero in most circumstances. The cost of voting and sense of civic duty are, thus, the main determinants of the decision to vote (Aldrich 1993; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; Panagopoulos 2008; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). While the literature on electoral violence suggests a negative relationship between the level of conflict and political participation (Bali 2007; Bekoe and Burchard 2017; Birch and Muchlinski 2018; Burchard 2015; Toros and Birch 2021), others also note voter intimidation during civil wars caused by militants and security forces as an important reason for a decrease in participation (Condra et al. 2019; Hassan 2017; Palmer 1994; Tezcür 2015). It is expected that the insecure electoral environment, including voter intimidation caused by the conflict, increases the cost of voting. Moreover, recent studies find a negative relationship between conflict and institutional trust (Alacevich and Zejcirovic 2020; Hadzic, Carlson, and Tavits 2020), which might decrease the sense of civic duty. Therefore, one should expect a decrease in voter turnout as the conflict increases because the reward from voting will become negative as a result of the conflict.

To understand the support for insurgency-associated parties, we refer to Tajfel and Turner's (1986) social identity theory. As explained by Tajfel and Turner (1986), the social context determines the salience of identities by causing individuals to decide which identity to emphasize according to their relevance and the threats against them. Thus, individuals construct in-group and out-group attitudes by comparing the salience of different identities. Individuals may have several identities based on gender, religion, socioeconomic class, or ethnicity, which are considered fluid and open to change (Chandra 2006). Thus, living in a high-conflict environment might reinforce the salience of one's group identity. Previous literature suggests that an increase in the level of ethnic conflict increases the salience of ethnic identities and creates in-group favoritism and out-group differentiation (Sambanis and Shayo 2013; Wilkinson 2004). Hence, one should expect that an increase in the level of conflict will increase ethnic voting by increasing the salience of the ethnic identity. Although this should be the case for the Turkish case, such an effect is unexpected in the

Peruvian case because neither the conflict nor the insurgent-affiliated party has an ethnic background.

On the other hand, conflict should also increase the salience of the ethnic identity for the majority group, which might foster national unity. Thus, an increase in the level of conflict is expected to translate into higher electoral support for incumbent parties. This situation can be explained by the rally around the flag effect occurring in high conflict contexts. In a violent conflict, citizens tend to perceive their government as more competent in dealing with security issues and support them in the war effort (Mueller 1973). The literature also suggests a positive relationship between conflict and trust in authorities in the short-run (Huddy et al. 2002; Sinclair and LoCicero 2010). Thus, one should expect a positive relationship between conflict and incumbent support in the short run. However, Norpoth and Sidman (2007) argues that the rally around the flag effect disappears over time, and citizens begin to criticize the incumbent's counterinsurgency policies and punish them electorally. Another theoretical expectation, then, is the vote share of the incumbent decreases as the level of conflict increases in the long run.

The first empirical chapter of this thesis on Turkey will employ an error-correction specification (ECM) estimated using generalized least square regressions on voter turnout as well as the vote share of the pro-Kurdish party, and electoral support for the incumbent, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). We aim to answer how the Kurdish conflict affects electoral behavior in Turkey. Temporal coverage of this chapter will be limited to the elections between 2011 and 2018, in which Turkey had a single-party government. Both parliamentary and presidential elections will be analyzed by considering conflict's short- and long-term effects on voting behavior. To the best of our knowledge, previous studies on the Turkish case do not differentiate between those short- and long-term impacts of conflict. Furthermore, most studies rely on province-level electoral data for at most two consecutive elections. Our analysis will thus also focus on a more extended time period. Thus, we will account for more variation over time and across space. Moreover, we will measure conflict in four different ways by taking into account the different operationalizations in previous literature. Our empirical analysis of the Turkish case demonstrates a negative relationship between the level of conflict and voter turnout. Furthermore, voters continue to vote for the pro-Kurdish presidential candidate as conflict increases. An increase in conflict also creates a rally around the flag effect and increases the incumbent party's vote share in parliamentary elections.

Peru is the second case study of this thesis. The third chapter will focus on the effect of the Shining Path's terrorist incidents on voter turnout, the vote share of the

United Left, and the support for Change 90 in Peru. Similarly to the first chapter, we will examine both the parliamentary and presidential elections between 1980 and 1995. This period is chosen because the Shining Path became almost ineffective after the capture of its leader in 1992. In addition, its electoral wing, the United Left alliance, participated in the elections during the 1980s and 1990s. Due to a lack of province-level electoral data, our analysis for this case will rely on department-level data. The literature on the Peruvian conflict and electoral behavior is limited to a few studies analyzing a shorter time period. Thus, our study again will be able to extend the previous literature despite this limitation.

The findings of the second empirical chapter point to that while conflict decreases voter turnout, as in the Turkish case, it also decreases the support for the insurgency-associated political party. Our empirical analysis also suggests that conflict does not significantly affect the incumbent's electoral support in Peru. Comparing these findings with the Turkish case leads us to conclude that having an ethnic conflict and ethnic party competing in the political arena might have a modifying effect, which deserves more attention in future research.

The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: our next chapter focuses on the Turkish case and examines the effect of the Kurdish conflict on electoral behavior. After presenting the literature on ethnicity, conflict, and electoral behavior, I will review the previous literature on the effect of the Kurdish conflict on electoral behavior in Turkey. The following section will provide our theoretical framework focusing on the calculus of voting, social identity theory, and rally around the flag effect. Then, we will proceed to the examination of our theoretical expectations. The third chapter examines the effect of the Shining Path conflict on voting behavior in Peru. Before providing our empirical findings, I will review the Peruvian conflict and voting behavior literature and present our theoretical expectations. A comparison of the two case studies will follow our empirical analysis. Each empirical chapter will be concluded by referring to the irrespective strengths and limitations of our findings together with recommendations for future research. The last chapter will summarize our theoretical expectations, empirical findings, and implications of our comparison of the Turkish and Peruvian cases.

2.   THE EFFECT OF KURDISH CONFLICT ON ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR IN TURKEY

2.1 Introduction

In this thesis, I chose to examine the Kurdish conflict in Turkey as a case study to explain the effect of conflict on electoral behavior because Turkey has a long history of democratic elections and civil conflict. The Kurdish terrorist organization started its operations against Turkey in 1984. At the time, the Kurdish political movement also emerged. From the 1980s onwards, thousands of people, including civilians, terrorists, and security forces, died because of the conflict between the PKK and Turkish state. On the other hand, Kurdish ethnic parties have been contesting the elections since the general elections in 1991 (Tezcür 2010). The fact that Kurdish ethnic parties have been participating in the elections in the presence of terrorist attacks by PKK for over thirty years makes it a valuable case to investigate the effect of conflict on electoral behavior.

By employing aggregate-level election, terrorism, and sociodemographic data, this study seeks to answer how the level of violence by ethnic armed groups affects turnout, the vote share of the Kurdish ethnic party, and the incumbent party's electoral support. Specifically, I examine the effects of the level of Kurdish ethnic conflict on voter turnout, electoral behavior of Kurdish voters, and support for the incumbent party in Turkey by analyzing the 2011, 2015 June and November, and 2018 general elections, and the 2014 and 2018 presidential elections. This is the first study that accounts for both the short- and long-term effects of conflict on electoral behavior in Turkey and estimates error-correction models (ECM).

I find a negative relationship between conflict and voter turnout. I argue that this negative relationship is mainly caused by the increased cost of voting and voter intimidation in the presence of a high level of conflict. Another important finding is that the level of ethnic voting increases with the level of ethnic conflict in ethnically

Kurdish areas. This finding can be explained by the social identity theory, arguing that an inter-group conflict increases the salience of the group identity and leads to increased in-group favoritism and out-group differentiation (Hodson, Esses, and Dovidio 2006; Stevens 2013; Tajfel and Turner 1979). The salience of ethnic identity might explain the increase in ethnic voting as a result of the ethnic conflict in Turkey. As the level of conflict increases, the salience of the ethnic identity would increase out-group hostility and in-group favoritism of Kurds so that their political preferences would increasingly converge in supporting pro-Kurdish political parties, which is also supported by Kıbrıs's (2014) findings. On the other hand, the increased level of conflict also increases the salience of the Turkish national identity. Even though the increased intensity of the conflict increases support for the incumbent by creating a rally around the flag effect, some voters tend to punish the incumbent for policy failure regarding the Kurdish issue and increased conflict in the Southeastern and Eastern Turkey. This causes the vote share of the incumbent, seen as then head of the executive in the eyes of many voters, to decrease as the level of conflict increases in the presidential elections.

After reviewing the literature on ethnicity, conflict, and electoral behavior, the studies on the Turkish case will be discussed. The theoretical framework regarding this chapter will then be explained by referring to the calculus of voting theory, social identity theory, and rally around the flag effect. The fourth section will lay down the data and research design. Then, the empirical findings will be discussed in the fifth section. I will conclude by summarizing the findings and discussing the limitations of this chapter.

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 Ethnicity, Conflict, and Electoral Behavior

The literature suggests a causal relationship between ethnic identities and the outbreak of conflict. Weidmann (2009) examines the influence of the geographical concentration of ethnic groups on ethnic conflict. The findings support that population dispersion negatively affects conflict likelihood. Similarly, Gubler and Selway (2012) argue that spatial dispersion of the ethnic group is one of the main components of the mobilization of rebel groups in the case of civil war since the geographic concentration of ethnic groups makes the recruitment process easier. Thus, when the geographical concentration of ethnic groups is higher, as in the Turkish case,

the likelihood of an ethnic conflict is also higher.

Ethnicity is an influential determinant not only of civil war onset but also of voting behavior and political activism. Chandra (2004) argues that ethnic identities are targeted explicitly by political parties in countries where patronage is common. Thus, the salience of ethnic identities considerably affects political behavior. However, the reverse causality can also be established between electoral behavior and ethnic identity. For example, Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) explain how ethnic identities are affected by political competition with respect to the proximity and competitiveness of upcoming elections by tracing evidence from ten different African countries. Their findings suggest that when elections are temporarily close and highly competitive, people are more likely to identify themselves in ethnic terms than based on their class. Furthermore, the effect of the proximity of the election is highly contingent on its competitiveness.

Posner (2004) explores an unsolved puzzle regarding the different effects of cultural cleavages on the political competition by conducting a natural experiment based on the Chewa and Tumbuka populations in Zambia and Malawi. The author concludes that when the size of the groups in a social cleavage is larger as proportional to other electorates, this cleavage would become politically salient. For example, cultural differences between Chewa and Tumbuka communities have politically salient effects in Malawi because of their larger population size. In contrast, these cultural differences remain insignificant in Zambia due to the smaller size of the ethnic group.

In the same vein, for voting behavior, Ichino and Nathan (2013) examine the relationship between the spatial composition of ethnic groups and its effect on ethnic voting in Ghanaian presidential elections. They anticipate that voters who consider themselves a part of an ethnic community are more likely to vote for ethnic parties representing their own groups' interests. In another study, Houle (2019) looks into the effects of ethnic homogeneity in terms of religion, language, and race on ethnic voting and concludes that the homogeneity of the ethnic group increases the effect of ethnicity on electoral behavior.

The literature suggests that ethnic conflict is one of the important determinants of electoral behavior (e.g., Alacevich and Zejcirovic 2020; Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2021; Bali 2007; Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008; Dunning 2011; Gallego 2018; Kıbrıs 2011, 2014; Koch 2011; Tezcür 2015). For example, Gallego (2018) discusses the impacts of guerrilla and paramilitary violence on voter turnout and concludes that while paramilitary violence does not affect election participation, turnout rates diminish as guerrilla violence increases. He argues that the existence of paramilitary violence decreases electoral competition and provides third parties with new alliance oppor-

tunities. In a similar vein, Alacevich and Zejcirovic (2020) analyze the effect of the Bosnian conflict on voter turnout between 1990 and 2014 and conclude while civilian victimization decreases turnout. Scholars conclude that conflict reduces trust in democratic institutions.

The level of conflict affects not only voters' participation in elections but also their vote choice. Hadzic, Carlson, and Tavits (2020) examine the effect of the Bosnian war on ethnic voting and find a positive relationship between the level of conflict and ethnic voting. They conclude that ethnic groups lose trust against out-groups due to the conflict and vote for ethnic parties. In another study, Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) looks to the Israeli-Palestinian war and its impact on voting behavior. Their findings suggest that voters tend to support hawkish right-wing parties, targeting terrorism in the presence of a terrorist threat. Violence would lead voters to support the parties and candidates that are less likely to give concessions.

Koch (2011) analyzes the impact of casualties in interstate conflict on electoral outcomes and suggests that the increasing number of casualties does not always produce negative electoral consequences for the incumbent political party. Based on the investment model, voters with partisan attachments perceive the casualties resulting from the conflict as investments made for the partisan attachments and continue to support the incumbent. Norpoth and Sidman (2007) reach a similar conclusion by analyzing the 2004 presidential elections of the United States. They argue that the conflict in Iraq helped George W. Bush be reelected in 2004 because of a rally around the flag effect and an expectation of victory in the war.

The Kurdish ethnic community in Turkey should be considered a politically salient group not only because they are the largest minority group in Turkey but also because Kurdish political actors have played an important role in the construction and politicization of the Kurdish ethnic identity and mobilized the ethnic group around this identity interest since the 1990s (Sarıgil 2012; Watts 2006; Yavuz 2001). As the above-mentioned studies suggest geographical concentration is a significant determinant of ethnic voting (Ichino and Nathan 2013), Kurds are also thus expected to vote on the basis of ethnicity since they are geographically concentrated in a specific region. The Kurdish ethnic conflict, ongoing since the 1980s, can also be an important determinant of electoral behavior in Turkey. In fact, previous literature identifies the pro-Kurdish movement and Turkish nationalism as the second main dimension of competition in Turkish politics (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006).

2.2.2 Kurdish Conflict and Electoral Behavior

Kurdish conflict and electoral behavior in Turkey, thus, stand as an important case to examine. In this line of research, Tezcür (2015) looks to voter turnout and concludes that armed conflict and nationwide electoral threshold decrease the voter turnout in the conflict region. He suggests that both of these factors negatively affect conflict resolution attempts targeting the Kurdish issue. On the other hand, explaining only voter turnout at the province level is insufficient for understanding the dynamics of ethnic conflict and ethnic voting. The reason is that turnout does not explain how terrorism affects the vote choice of ethnic groups but only focuses on explaining whether people choose to vote.

Kıbrıs (2011), in her study on conflict and electoral behavior, looks to the effect of the level of terrorism on the electoral choices of Turkish voters and finds that an increase in the level of terrorism leads to a decrease in the vote share of concessionary parties because Turkish voters drift towards the right of the political spectrum and vote for rightist political parties that are more rigid towards the Kurdish issue. In another study, the author finds that an increase in the number of casualties leads to an increase in the vote shares of two nationalist parties because ethnic conflict causes polarization between different ethnic groups due to the increased salience of ethnic identities. In her former study, Kıbrıs (2011) focuses on the effects of the Kurdish conflict on the voting behavior of only Turkish electorates. In the latter research includes the Kurdish voters, too. Still, the level of terrorism is operationalized as only the casualties of security personnel in PKK attacks (Kıbrıs 2014), which may lead to an underestimation of the effect of PKK and civilian casualties on the vote choice of the Kurdish electorate.

In recent literature, Aytaç and Çarkoğlu (2021) look to the effects of increased conflict between the elections of June 2015 and November 2015 on the vote share of the incumbent party. Their findings suggest that an increased level of conflict causes a change in voters' perception regarding the salience of political issues. Voters perceive terrorism as the most salient issue and shift their electoral choice in favor of the incumbent. In a similar vein, Aksoy and Carlson (2022) examine the effect of terrorist attacks by Kurdish paramilitary groups between 1995 and 2015 on the electoral performance of the incumbent party and find that terrorist groups choose their targets according to the closeness of competition between the Kurdish ethnic party and governing parties. In contrast to Aytaç and Çarkoğlu's (2021) findings, Aksoy and Carlson (2022) conclude that as the level of violence increases, voters punish the incumbent party in the elections. However, they only examine general elections at the district level and do not consider the presidential elections.

What is necessary to increase our understanding of the relationship between civil conflict and electoral behavior in Turkey is to examine both civilian and terrorist casualties as well as attacks by PKK and military operations of the Turkish state against the terrorist organization. In this chapter, I aim to introduce two alternative ways of operationalizing the conflict variable to include civilian and terrorist casualties along with the security force casualties. The elections analyzed in this chapter are general elections between 2011 and 2018, and two consecutive presidential elections in 2014 and 2018 in Turkey, in which the country has had a single-party government and a relatively calm political arena compared to the 1990s. By adopting these changes, I aim to increase the external and internal validity of the findings. This is, to the best of my knowledge, the first study that examines the effect of ethnic conflict not only on voter turnout but also on Kurdish ethnic voting and electoral support for the incumbent party at the district-level.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

According to the rational choice theory, people choose the best outcome for themselves as a result of a cost and benefit calculation. Political participation also depends on individuals' calculation of the cost and benefits (Aldrich 1993; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). The calculus of voting theory suggests that people decide to vote when R is greater than zero. R denotes the reward from voting that is calculated according to the following formula:

$$R = p*B - C + D$$

p is the probability of one's vote changing the outcome, B stands for the expected policy benefit, C is the cost of voting, and D, which is added later to the formula by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), is a component that includes one's satisfaction from voting, willingness to express her partisanship or her sense of civic duty. Citizens vote if R is positive (Aldrich 1993). However, the p-value approaches zero in most elections, making this policy benefit (B) infinitesimal. Thus, the C and D terms are the only determinants of the decision to turn out (Aldrich 1993; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; Panagopoulos 2008; Riker and Ordeshook 1968).

The level of conflict in a particular setting might affect the cost of voting. Conflict makes the voting environment insecure for people living in close proximity to the conflict zones and witnessing frequent terrorist attacks. The insecurity felt by vot-

ers might cause them to abstain (Bali 2007; Bekoe and Burchard 2017; Birch and Muchlinski 2018; Burchard 2015; Toros and Birch 2021).

The literature also argues that conflict decreases trust in institutions (Alacevich and Zejcirovic 2020; Hadzic, Carlson, and Tavits 2020). Thus, people might not turn out because they might lose their sense of civic duty due to the high level of violence. Alacevich and Zejcirovic (2020) also argue that voters might feel a disadvantage that surpasses the incentives of voting for parties associated with the conflict as the level of violence increases.

Another theoretical argument is that voter intimidation during high conflict might cause voters to not turn out. Tezcür (2015) argues that the members of the terrorist organization and the Turkish military might force voters to act in line with their own political position. They might pressure voters to vote for a specific party or prevent them from voting (Condra et al. 2019; Hassan 2017; Tezcür 2015). In such a case, voters might abstain from voting to avoid conflict with armed groups. For example, in a survey study in Nigeria, Bratton (2008) finds that electoral violence through voter intimidation decreases the voter turnout. As a result, I expect a negative relationship between voter turnout and the level of conflict. However, the size of this effect is likely to decrease in the long term because voters might be more concerned about election security when the timing of the attacks is temporarily more proximate to the election.

H₁: As the level of conflict increases, voter turnout decreases.

The electoral behavior literature mentions several group identities, such as socioeconomic class, religion, age, or gender, which determine voters' electoral behavior (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Schoultz 1977; Wilson and Banfield 1964). Ethnic identity is an important one of those individual identities that might affect the voters' electoral behavior (Chandra 2004).

Ethnic conflict increases both the political salience of ethnic issues and the salience of ethnic identities because the intensity of conflict makes the issues regarding ethnicity more prominent and visible (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013; Sambanis and Shayo 2013; Wilkinson 2004). The political salience of ethnic issues raised by the conflict increase out-group hostility and in-group favoritism (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Hodson, Esses, and Dovidio 2006; Stevens 2013; Tajfel and Turner 1979). So, Kurds would situate themselves farther away from the Turkish parties and closer to the pro-Kurdish party and its candidates. Thus, I expect that the members of the Kurdish minority in Turkey act in line with their ethnic group in the elections and vote for a specific political party that best represents their interests.

The theory of issue voting presents some social and political factors as key predictors of vote choice since they have special importance for many voters. Voters may link some social or political issues with specific political parties because those parties tend to emphasize those issues more than others. Thus, single-issue voters support parties emphasizing more such issues and having a similar stance with them. Parties also benefit from the salience of the issues they prioritize the most (Kiewiet 1981; Petrocik 1996; Rabinowitz, Prothro, and Jacoby 1982). In the case of Turkey, as a result of the increased political salience of the Kurdish issue since the 1980s, voters' perception of the ownership of the ethnic issue by Kurdish parties, most recently Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) might have changed. As the salience of the issue increases, the probability of casting an issue vote should also increase (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995). Moreover, political actors can emphasize ethnic dimensions of other issues such as education or welfare in such circumstances to shift voters' perception and increase their vote share (Wilkinson 2004). Individuals who are sensitive and responsive to such changes in elite discourse and the political campaigns of ethnic political parties should vote for the ethnic party (Rabinowitz, Prothro, and Jacoby 1982).

Both the Kurdish minority and Kurdish conflict are mainly located in the Southeastern and Eastern Turkey. When increasing salience of ethnic identity together with Kurdish voters' ethnicity-based (issue) voting is considered, I expect a positive relationship between the level of conflict and the vote share of the HDP, especially in the areas where conflict is high.

H_{2a}: As the level of conflict increases, the vote share of the Kurdish ethnic party increases in the conflict-zones.

On the other hand, the conflict also increases the salience of Turkish identity among Turks. It is also likely that Turkish citizens feel insecure due to the increasing level of violence. This insecurity might increase out-group hostility, as mentioned above. Then, Turks would also situate themselves against the pro-Kurdish party. Especially, those who voted for the pro-Kurdish party with strategic motives might change their vote choice as the level of conflict increases. However, voters might not react to the ethnic party as soon as the attacks happen. It might take a while to understand the ethnic and other parties' position on the issue. First, the ethnic party should own the issue as the salience of the ethnic identity increases. Then, the intensity and consequences of the conflict become more clearer to the public. After such a process, voters are likely to better evaluate the stance of the parties on the conflict. Therefore, I expect a long-term change in the vote share of the pro-Kurdish

party owning the issue.[1]

These expectations are also in line with the findings of Kıbrıs (2014) that ethnic conflict before the 1995 and 1999 general elections increased ethnic voting among Turkish and Kurdish voters. As she argues, ethnic conflict increases the salience of the Kurdish ethnic identity as opposed to the unitary national identity among Kurds, while it also increases the sense of national identity among Turkish voters. As a result, the salience of ethnic issues in electoral politics rises. When the size of the Turkish and Kurdish electorates together with the expectation of a decrease in turnout, is considered, I expect a nationwide decrease in the vote share of the ethnic party in the long run. Therefore, the other hypothesis is as follows:

H_{2b}: As the level of conflict increases, the vote share of the ethnic party decreases in the long run.

Building on the social psychology literature suggesting that identities are fluid and can change according to the surrounding conditions in which an individual finds herself (Chandra 2006), I expect the conflict to increase the salience of the national identity of Turkish voters as well. The incumbent may emphasize security concerns, national unity, and patriotism to pursue votes when the salience of national identity is increased, resulting from the increased conflict (Bélanger and Meguid 2008). As a result of their material and non-material losses, out-group hostility among Turkish voters is also expected to increase. This out-group discrimination might lead voters to align with their own ethnic group by fostering in-group cohesion. Thus, in the short term, a sense of national unity against an external enemy might emerge and create a rally around the flag effect in the country (Mueller 1973). As a result of increased security concerns, voters might attribute competence to incumbents and support them, although the incumbents do not necessarily have the capability to fight against terrorism (Koch 2011). Furthermore, terror attacks also induce fear among the public. This fear and sense of national unity cause citizens to align with the incumbent because of a need for an authority to prevent further attacks. The literature suggests that at its initial stage, terror attacks increase trust in authorities (Huddy et al. 2002; Sinclair and LoCicero 2010).

On the other hand, the literature also suggests that the rally around the flag effect diminishes after a certain time period (Mueller 1973; Norpoth and Sidman 2007), and conflict decreases trust in institutions (Alacevich and Zejcirovic 2020; Hadzic, Carlson, and Tavits 2020). In the long run, people might start to criticize the

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[1]The owner of the issue might change or the salience of the issue might decrease in the long run. Thus, an alternative theoretical framework might be established to explain the long-term decrease in the ethnic party's vote share by considering issue voting and issue salience in future research (see Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2021; Budge and Farlie 1983; Meguid 2008; Rabinowitz, Prothro, and Jacoby 1982; van der Brug 2004).

government's security policies and find them ineffective in reducing the level of conflict in the country. Moreover, the level of trust in institutions among the public might decrease as voters learn more about the government's responses to terrorist attacks, outcomes of its past policies, and continuity of security related problems. Such distrust and insecurity might cause voters to withdraw their support from and punish the incumbent (Gartner 2008; Wollebæk et al. 2012, 2013). Thus, the last hypotheses of this chapter are as follows:

H_{3a}: As the level of conflict increases, the vote share of the incumbent party increases in the short run.

H_{3b}: As the level of conflict increases, the vote share of the incumbent party decreases in the long run.

2.4 Data and Research Design

This chapter uses time-series cross-sectional data on elections and conflict in Turkey. The unit of analysis is a district in a given election. The data on conflict come from the Turkey Terrorism Incidents Database (TTID, Alptekin 2021) and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED, Raleigh et al. 2010). TTID provides data on terror attacks conducted by the PKK and armed conflict between Turkey and PKK. The dataset contains information on the number of fatalities and wounded people between January 2004 and December 2018. It is geocoded, which means it includes the precise coordinates of such events. It also categorizes the fatalities as security force casualties and PKK fatalities, which allows us to account for the effects of security force casualties and PKK fatalities on the vote shares of the ethnic and incumbent parties. ACLED is also a geocoded dataset that includes all types of violent incidents and killings in those events and their locations in Turkey between 2016 and 2019. One of the main reasons for using ACLED is that it also includes civilian casualties, while TTID does not provide any information on that. However, ACLED does not differentiate between the types of fatalities, and it covers a shorter period. Because of the shortcomings of both datasets, I merged TTID and ACLED to account for the effect of civilian casualties while calculating total fatalities. The temporal coverage in the merged dataset is limited to the period between the July 22, 2007, and June 24, 2018 general elections. Fatalities and attacks outside the boundaries of Turkey are excluded from the analysis. Data on all other variables and elections are obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, TurkStat).

2.4.1 Dependent Variables

As mentioned in the previous section, PKK has started its terrorist attacks in 1984 (Tezcür 2010) and Turkey had ten general elections since then. The general elections in 1987 are not included because the first Kurdish ethnic party established after the emergence of the PKK was the People's Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP), which was founded in 1990. However, they did not participate in the 1991 election as a party but instead made an informal alliance with the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP). After the HEP was banned by the Constitutional Court of Turkey, a new pro-Kurdish party named the People's Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP) was established and participated in the 1995 and 1999 elections. In 2002, they participated in the election as a new political party named Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP) (Moral and Tokdemir 2017). However, the period between 1987 and 2002 was marked by several coalition governments in which measuring the effect of conflict on the incumbent parties' vote share is problematic. Turkey, however, has a stable single-party government since the 2002 elections. However, the general elections in 2002 and 2007 are also left out because the data on conflict are only available from 2004 to 2019 and district-level socioeconomic controls are not available for those elections. Thus, the study only examines the 2011, June 2015, November 2015, and 2018 parliamentary elections, along with the two presidential elections conducted by popular vote in 2014 and 2018.

Our three dependent variables are voter turnout, and the vote shares of the Kurdish ethnic and incumbent parties. First, the turnout rate is calculated by dividing the number of people who voted in the election by the number of eligible voters. Houle (2019) defines ethnic voting as the political behavior of an ethnic group voting for a specific party distinctly from the rest of the country's voters. Similarly, in this study, ethnic voting is defined as the extent to which an ethnic group voting for a specific party or a candidate in an election because this definition provides an opportunity to observe the voting behavior of ethnic groups even in the cases where there is not an ethnic political party in the system. For example, in the 2011 general election, the Kurdish ethno-nationalist political party at the time did not contest because of the nationwide electoral threshold. However, they participated through independent candidates. Therefore, I operationalized ethnic voting as the total share of the votes of the independent candidates in the 2011 elections and HDP, a pro-Kurdish political party in the June 2015, November 2015, and 2018 general elections. I also included the vote share of Selahattin Demirtaş in the 2014 and 2018 presidential elections because he was nominated by the HDP. Lastly, the

16

incumbent's vote share is measured as the vote share of the AKP in parliamentary elections and the vote share of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the presidential elections.

The number of districts and their borders has changed since the 2011 elections. While Turkey had 957 districts in 2011, it increased to 970 until the 2015 elections. In the 2018 elections, the number of districts was 972. Since we use lagged dependent and independent variables, most of the observations coming from districts whose borders have changed or are newly established will be omitted from our sample. Differently from previous literature, in order to overcome this problem, the districts are rearranged and merged with their former districts using neighborhood-level data obtained from the TurkStat in order to have longitudinal data on newly formed districts in our sample. The information on the new boundaries of districts was obtained from the official gazette. Then, aggregating from the neighborhood-level election and socio-demographic data, all variables including the controls are coded as if the borders of the districts were not changed as of 2011.

2.4.2 Independent Variables

Our primary independent variable is the level of conflict. Kıbrıs (2011; 2014) operationalized conflict as the number of military and police force casualties between 1991 and 1995. Tezcür (2015) measures conflict by aggregating the number of PKK fatalities and clashes between two elections at the province level. Neither of these measures accounts for the civilian casualties or total number of fatalities. Thus, conflict, in our study, is measured in four different ways. First, I operationalized the conflict as the total number of terrorist attacks by PKK. Alternatively, the total number of fatalities, including civilians, security forces, and PKK members, is used to measure the level of conflict. The other two measurements include security force casualties and PKK fatalities separately. The merged dataset captures all casualties including civilians, security force personnel, and PKK members, for the total number of attacks and fatalities. Since ACLED does not provide information on whether the casualties are civilians or PKK members or the Turkish security force personnel, the data on PKK fatalities and security force casualties are only obtained from TTID. All measures are calculated by summing the number of casualties and attacks between two consecutive elections. Since the period between successive elections differs in length, the monthly averages of casualties and attacks are used in the analyses.

Vote share of the ethnic party can be affected by several other factors other than ethnic conflict, as discussed in literature. It has been argued that the geographical

concentration of an ethnic group will have an impact on ethnic voting (Ichino and Nathan 2013). Posner (2004) argues that geographical concentration has a positive effect on the political salience of ethnic groups. Consequently, higher geographical concentration leads to higher salience of the ethnic groups. When the political salience and relevance of an ethnic group are higher, the ethnic group might believe that political contestation provides them with a higher chance of attaining their goals. Thus, the varying population share of the Kurdish ethnic group across districts in between electoral cycles is included as a control variable. However, the last available data on the ethnicity of individuals in Turkey were collected in the 1965 general census because asking people about their ethnic origin is prohibited by law in Turkey due to a clause referring to the unitary nature of the Turkish state. Therefore, such data are not collected by the state since then. Therefore, this study measures the Kurdish population share using the data obtained from the Address Based Registration System of the TurkStat. One of the main assumptions underlying the operationalization of this variable is that people who are registered in 17 provinces, namely Adıyaman, Ağrı, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Iğdır, Kars, Kilis, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Tunceli, and Van, are classified as Kurds, regardless of their current province of residence. Since the study does not use individual-level survey data, there is no specific way of knowing the ethnicity of individuals when we consider the above-mentioned limitations. However, the mean Kurdish population in the sample is calculated as 16%, which is close to the calculation of a recent survey conducted by Aytaç and Çarkoğlu (2019), which asks for the mother tongue of individuals who participated in the study and show that 15.4% of the participants were Kurdish. Kıbrıs (2014) calculates Kurdish population share by combining district-level Kurdish population data obtained from the 1965 census with the information on the birthplace of residents in the 1990 and 2000 census results. The author uses the 1965 Kurdish population share as the probability of being Kurdish. Kurdish population share is calculated as 14% in 1990, which is closer to our study's imputation – i.e., 16% on average between 2011 and 2018.

Other control variables include a natural logarithmic transformation of district population, population growth rate, female share, literacy rate, dependency ratio, average household size, and urbanization. Female share is calculated by dividing the number of women in a district by the district's population. It is included because the literature suggests a divergence between men and women in their electoral behavior (Hatemi et al. 2012; Inglehart and Norris 2000). The literacy rate is added as an indicator of social development. The inflation and unemployment rates are considered as main economic variables in economic voting by Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000).

Since data on the inflation and unemployment rate at the district level are not available, I used the dependency ratio instead. Average household size and urbanization are introduced in the model to adjust for the effect of the center-periphery divide, which is one of the crucial determinants in the Turkish electoral behavior literature (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006). Two dummy variables for border district and Southeastern/Eastern region are also added to the model. The border dummy marks the districts on the Iraqi, Iranian, Syrian, and Armenian borders. Region is another binary variable that scores 1 for Southeastern and Eastern districts. Those two binary variables are included in the model equation since the conflict has a higher intensity in these regions.

2.4.3 Model

I use error-correction models (ECM) estimated using generalized least squares (GLS). The first model examines the effect of conflict on voter turnout and ethnic and incumbent parties' vote share in parliamentary elections. My main model equation is as follows:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Y_{t-1} + \beta_2 \Delta X_t + \beta_3 X_{t-1} + \gamma_{it} + u_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

The choice of ECM is appropriate since we have non-stationary data. In ECM, both dependent and independent variables are included by transforming them into the first difference between consecutive time periods (Δ). Furthermore, the lagged forms of independent variables$_{(t-1)}$ are also added to the model. ECM provides information on the short-term effect of independent variables on the dependent variable through the coefficients of the first differenced forms of independent variables (Δ), while the long-term effect can be captured by the coefficient of the lagged$_{(t-1)}$ independent variables (De Boef and Keele 2008).

One of the main concerns might be endogeneity. It means that conflict might increase because of a decrease in the vote share of the incumbent or pro-Kurdish party. However, this is not a concern for our study. I estimate the ECM while analyzing the parliamentary elections to handle endogeneity and assess conflict's long- and short-term effects by including lagged and the first differenced forms (Δ) of independent variables. ECM also accounts for the possibility that the level of conflict before the 2011 elections might also affect the June 2015 election. The change in the level of conflict between different periods might also change the vote choice of individuals.

Thus, the level of change is included to account for both short-term impacts and contemporaneous correlation.

Furthermore, I also estimate the first three models by using GLS with random effects to account for serial correlation because the vote share of a political party is mainly determined by its past vote share. Similarly, one of the main predictors of voter turnout is the turnout in the previous election. The models thus include lags to estimate their long-term impact. In order to account for possible heteroskedasticity caused by the hierarchical nature of our data, the standard errors are clustered by districts. Since each election has different averages of voter turnout and vote shares of parties of interest, in order to account for any election-specific omitted variables, election dummies for the 2015 November, and 2018 general elections are also introduced in the model.

Since there are only two presidential elections by popular vote, the remaining models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) without the inclusion of the lagged and first difference forms of independent variables. The reason is that when we include those variables we can only measure the effect of conflict on our dependent variables in the 2018 presidential election because the other presidential election should be used as the base category. Thus, the model equation for presidential elections is:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{it} + \gamma_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

Dependent variables are again voter turnout and vote shares of ethnic and incumbent parties in this model. However, the lagged and first differenced forms of the independent variables are not introduced here because of the aforesaid limitations. Unlike the previous model, this model also does not include the lagged form of the dependent variable due to that Turkey had only two presidential elections by popular vote. Standard errors are again clustered by districts and election dummies are added to the model equation.

2.5 Empirical Findings

According to the combined dataset of ACLED and TTID, 15580 people died in 7464 violent incidents caused by the conflict between PKK and the Turkish state in

20

nearly 11 years. Figure 2.1, below, depicts the distribution of the intensity of the Kurdish conflict between 2007 and 2018. Each map represents monthly averages of terrorist incidents between two consecutive elections and their distribution across the country. As Figure 2.1 shows, the conflict is primarily located in the Southeastern and Eastern regions of Turkey, which requires adding a region dummy in the models. It can also be seen that conflict has intensified over the last years.

Figure 2.1 Monthly Average of Terrorist Attacks Between Consecutive Elections

Tables 2.1-2.3 present GLS regressions on voter turnout and the vote share of the ethnic and incumbent parties, in parliamentary elections. The effective sample size is 2871 because there are observations from 957 districts from each parliamentary election since 2011. The sample size decreases because of the lagged and first-differenced forms of the dependent and independent variables required by the ECM specification.

Table 2.1 shows that the coefficients of independent variables are negative and distinguishable from zero regardless of how we measure the level of conflict. However, the size of the effect changes with temporal proximity. The effect is larger in the short-term than in the long-term. These findings are in line with our expectations that the size of the effect might decrease in the long run. The increased cost of voting resulting from increased salience of security issues or voter intimidation might

21

cause voters to abstain. These findings are also supported by literature on election security and voter turnout. Tezcür's (2015) findings show that as the number of PKK fatalities increases, voter turnout decreases. In a similar vein, Condra et al. (2019) finds that the voter turnout decreases by 30% in Afghanistan due to voter intimidation. Since our findings suggest a statistically and substantively significant negative effect of conflict on voter turnout, it is included in the following models as a control in order to account for its such effect on our dependent variables.

Table 2.1 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on the Voter Turnout

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Turnout$_{(t-1)}$	0.704***	0.704***	0.704***	0.709***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
ΔMonthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	-0.007*			
	(0.004)			
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$	-0.016***			
	(0.005)			
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election		-0.003**		
		(0.001)		
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$		-0.005***		
		(0.001)		
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election			-0.002***	
			(0.001)	
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$			-0.002***	
			(0.001)	
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election				-0.007***
				(0.002)
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$				-0.009***
				(0.002)
Kurdish Population Share	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Population Growth Rate	0.058	0.061	0.063	0.067
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Population (Logged)	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urbanization	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Female Share	0.044	0.033	0.030	0.018
	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Average Household Size	0.003**	0.003**	0.003***	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Literacy Rate	0.084***	0.084***	0.086***	0.081***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Dependency Ratio	0.018**	0.018**	0.019**	0.021***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Border District	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Southeastern/Eastern Region	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Election = 2015 November	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.013***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Election = 2018	0.028***	0.028***	0.028***	0.029***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.130***	0.135***	0.135***	0.135***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
N	2871	2871	2871	2871
R^2 (between)	0.948	0.949	0.949	0.944
R^2 (overall)	0.691	0.690	0.692	0.697

Robust standard errors clustered by district are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

A standard deviation increase in (Δ) monthly average of PKK attacks translates into a decrease in the turnout by about (0.54*0.009) 0.5% when the mean change

in voter turnout between consecutive elections is 0.004. That is, the effect of a standard deviation increase in the average monthly count of violent incidences on voter turnout is higher than the mean change in voter turnout in our sample. We thus conclude the short-term effect of violence on turnout is both statistically and substantively significant.

Similarly, in the long run, a standard deviation increase in the monthly average of PKK attacks means a (0.54*0.007) 0.4% decrease in turnout in the long run. It is equal to the mean change in voter turnout in parliamentary elections. Thus, the effect of conflict on voter turnout is also statistically and substantively significant in the long run.

The coefficient of the Southeastern and Eastern region dummy is negative and statistically significant. This means that turnout, on average, is lower in those regions. Since the conflict was widespread in those regions over the course of the examined time period, this finding might be another supporting point for the expected relationship that conflict decreases turnout.

Table 2.2 demonstrates that the relationship between the number of PKK attacks and the vote share of the ethnic party is negative in the long run, as expected. This situation might be caused by the nationwide shifts of strategic voters and voters who are conflict intolerant from the pro-Kurdish party as a result of increased conflict. Moreover, the coefficient of the first differenced (Δ) form of the independent variable is not distinguishable from zero because voters may better evaluate the party's stance regarding the issue in the long term and may not immediately react to the conflict. As the pro-Kurdish party does not take a harsher stance toward the terrorist organization and distinguish itself from PKK, voters might be alienated because increased salience of national identity among Turkish voters creates out-group hostility towards HDP and in-group favoritism for non-Kurdish parties, which results in a decrease in the vote share of the pro-Kurdish party.

Furthermore, the monthly average of PKK attacks also has a substantively significant effect on the ethnic party's vote share in the long run because a standard deviation increase in the average monthly count of terror events causes a (0.54*0.02) 1% decrease in the vote share of the Kurdish ethnic party in the affected districts while the mean change of the ethnic party's vote share is also 1% between consecutive elections.

Table 2.2 also shows that the coefficient of Kurdish population share is positive and statistically significant. This means that ethnic party's vote share is also largely determined by the Kurdish voters. Therefore, it can be concluded that a higher

Table 2.2 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on Ethnic Party's Vote Share

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Ethnic Party's Vote Share (HDP)$_{(t-1)}$	0.861***	0.860***	0.866***	0.861***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
ΔMonthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	0.002			
	(0.005)			
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$	-0.015			
	(0.013)			
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election		0.001		
		(0.003)		
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$		-0.008**		
		(0.004)		
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election			-0.002*	
			(0.001)	
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$			-0.005*	
			(0.003)	
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election				-0.001
				(0.003)
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$				-0.021***
				(0.005)
ΔTurnout	0.895***	0.895***	0.884***	0.870***
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Turnout$_{(t-1)}$	0.092***	0.094***	0.094***	0.092***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Kurdish Population Share	0.073***	0.073***	0.072***	0.077***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Population Growth Rate	-0.026	-0.026	-0.016	-0.008
	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Population (Logged)	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Urbanization	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female Share	-0.358***	-0.367***	-0.386***	-0.390***
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Average Household Size	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Literacy Rate	-0.037	-0.039	-0.034	-0.041
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Dependency Ratio	-0.026	-0.027	-0.023	-0.023
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Border District	-0.005	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Southeastern/Eastern Region	0.024***	0.025***	0.024***	0.025***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Election = 2015 November	-0.078***	-0.078***	-0.078***	-0.077***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Election = 2018	-0.076***	-0.076***	-0.075***	-0.073***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.168***	0.173***	0.174***	0.180***
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.053)
N	2871	2871	2871	2871
R^2 (between)	0.989	0.989	0.989	0.989
R^2 (overall)	0.941	0.941	0.941	0.942

Robust standard errors clustered by district are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

geographical concentration of Kurds is associated with a higher level of ethnic voting. It is also substantively significant because a standard deviation increase in the Kurdish population share increases the vote share of HDP by 2% (0.07*0.31). This represents an increase that is twice as large as the mean change of HDP's vote share between consecutive elections.

Nevertheless, the monthly average of security force casualties and total fatalities since the previous election do not have a substantively significant effect on the vote

share of HDP in the short or long terms. This means that voters are more responsive to the frequency of the terrorist attacks rather than how many people die in those attacks.

Figure 2.2 The Interactive Effect of Conflict on Turnout and Vote Share of the Ethnic and Incumbent Parties

Figure 2.2 shows the interactive effect of the PKK attacks on turnout and vote share of HDP and AKP. The subsample employed in these models covers the districts that had at least one PKK attack between two consecutive parliamentary elections. When the sample is limited to the conflict zones, the size and the direction of the effects of the independent variables change.[2] In the short term, the effect of conflict on the vote share of HDP becomes statistically significant and positive. This finding is in line with our expectations. While the pro-Kurdish party lost votes in the full sample due to the conflict, the effect is in the opposite direction in the conflict region, where the Kurdish population share is also higher. This means that Kurds vote for the Kurdish ethnic party in the conflict zones. This might be caused by the increased salience of ethnicity and in-group favoritism as a result of an exogenous shock caused by the PKK attacks. Conflict might thus be increasing the salience

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[2]GLS regression estimates on the effect of conflict on voter turnout, ethnic party's and incumbent party's vote shares in sub-sample limited to districts with terrorist attacks can be found in Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6 in Appendix A.

of ethnic issues and ethnic identities in the short run. Moreover, HDP's owning of the Kurdish issue gains more prominence when the conflict increases the salience of ethnic issues, which might lead Kurdish voters to support the party.

On the other hand, the effect of conflict on the ethnic party's vote share changes direction and becomes statistically insignificant in the long run. Furthermore, the findings show that the negative relationship between the short-term effect of conflict and the incumbent's vote share is in the opposite direction in the long-term in high conflict districts. This change might be caused by people's discontent with the conflict that impacts their everyday lives in a negative way. Such discontent might undermine the salience of ethnicity in the long term. That is, voters who live under intense conflict might become discontent with the pro-Kurdish party's political discourse regarding the conflict as the party does not offer a viable solution for the issue. In such circumstances, people might switch their vote choice to the incumbent party.

In Table 2.2, the findings show that turnout's short- and long-term effects on ethnic party's vote share are both positive and statistically significant. Thus, as turnout increases, the vote share of the ethnic party also increases. However, conflict has a negative effect on turnout. Figure 2.2 also shows that the magnitude of the effect of conflict on turnout is higher in the high conflict regions. This means that ethnic voters might abstain while other party voters continue voting. That is, a decrease in turnout due to a high level of conflict might also decrease the vote share of the pro-Kurdish party.

Table 2.3 shows that the coefficient of the lagged total fatalities variable is statistically distinguishable from zero and positive. This means that in the short term, the monthly average of total fatalities in terrorist attacks increases the incumbent's vote share as we expected (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2021). A standard deviation increase in (Δ) monthly average of PKK attacks translates into a decrease in the turnout by about (0.54*0.03) 1% when the mean increase in the vote share of AKP between consecutive elections is a 2% increase. It means that the effect of a standard deviation increase in the average monthly count of terrorist attacks is higher than the mean change in the incumbent's vote share. Therefore, we conclude that the conflict has a substantial long-term effect on the vote share of the AKP.

This effect can be explained by referring to the rally around the flag effect and voters' perceptions about the competence of the AKP government. Such an effect is expected to occur in instances where the incumbent can convince the public that there is an external threat that needs to be faced by putting up a united front. In these cases, the public, including the opposition, decides to support their

Table 2.3 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on the Incumbent Party's Vote Share

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Incumbent Party's Vote Share (AKP)$_{(t-1)}$	0.889***	0.890***	0.892***	0.895***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
ΔMonthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	-0.004			
	(0.006)			
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$	0.019*			
	(0.011)			
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election		-0.004		
		(0.003)		
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$		0.011***		
		(0.003)		
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election			0.002**	
			(0.001)	
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$			0.007***	
			(0.002)	
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election				-0.002
				(0.003)
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$				0.031***
				(0.004)
ΔTurnout	-0.268***	-0.269***	-0.251***	-0.238***
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Turnout$_{(t-1)}$	-0.105***	-0.105***	-0.107***	-0.099***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Kurdish Population Share	-0.029***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.031***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Population Growth Rate	0.172	0.171	0.155	0.144
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.124)
Population (Logged)	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Urbanization	-0.010***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.010***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female Share	0.189***	0.192***	0.229***	0.218***
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)
Average Household Size	0.005**	0.005**	0.004*	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Literacy Rate	-0.023	-0.022	-0.023	-0.016
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Dependency Ratio	0.029**	0.030**	0.023	0.024
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Border District	0.000	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Southeastern/Eastern Region	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Election = 2015 November	0.160***	0.161***	0.160***	0.161***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Election = 2018	0.009**	0.009**	0.008*	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.019	0.015	0.008	0.001
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
N	2871	2871	2871	2871
R^2 (between)	0.987	0.987	0.987	0.987
R^2 (overall)	0.902	0.902	0.902	0.904

Robust standard errors clustered by district are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

leader by temporarily leaving aside their domestic political divergences (Mueller 1973). Such explanation is also supported by Aytaç and Çarkoğlu's (2021) findings regarding the effect of terrorism on the vote share of incumbent between the June 2015 and November 2015 elections. The authors find that the increased level of conflict encouraged voters to support the incumbent. Their analysis suggests that voters' belief in the AKP government's competence in addressing the security issues and providing protection played a role in such an increase.

On the other hand, the long-term effect of conflict on the vote share of AKP is also positive and statistically significant as opposed to our expectation that the rally around the flag effect does not last forever and people will hold the government accountable due to their material and non-material losses. In fact, the size of the effect is even larger in the long run, which means that people are satisfied with the government's policy responses against the conflict and choose to support the incumbent as the level of conflict increases. Voters do not blame the incumbent but rather blame the ethnic party for the conflict because of its perceived ties with the terrorist organization. Kıbrıs (2014) also finds that as the conflict increases, Turkish voters shift to the right of the ideological spectrum and vote for nationalist parties. Then, the increase in the incumbent's vote share can be explained by the electoral alliance between the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) in the 2018 elections. Furthermore, MHP and its leader Devlet Bahçeli have declared their strong support for the incumbent since the 2015 June elections (Moral 2021). Thus, Turkish voters might have also supported the incumbent by following MHP's stance on the issue, which should be examined in further research.

It is also interesting that the coefficient of Kurdish population share is negative and statistically distinguishable from zero. This means that Kurdish voters punish the incumbent for their losses, which might be caused by the increased salience of ethnic identity and ethnic issues fostering in-group cohesion and out-group hostility. Region dummy is also negative and statistically significant. Since the votes in the region is predominantly Kurdish and witness a higher intensity of conflict, this might also help explain the vote choice of Kurdish people who live in the conflict region.

Figure 2.2 also shows that the coefficient of the first differenced form of the conflict variable operationalized as PKK attacks becomes significant in the conflict zones and it is negative. This means that voters who live in the conflict zones blame the government for their losses in the short term. The inability of the government to fight against terrorism and prevent the conflict is more apparent in the areas with higher conflict intensity. This might also be caused by the increased level of out-group hostility among Kurds towards Turkish parties as a result of the conflict and is also in line with the literature suggesting that Kurdish voters move away from the Turkish parties when the level of conflict increases (Kıbrıs 2014).

Furthermore, the magnitude of the positive effect of PKK attacks on the incumbent's vote share is smaller in the conflict zones, as Figure 2.2 shows. This finding suggests that the rally around the flag effect is not applicable to the conflict zones where voters are exposed to the negative effects of conflict more frequently.

Tables 2.4-2.6 present OLS regression estimates on turnout, the vote share of the Kurdish candidate, and the vote share of the presidential candidate of the incumbent. The effective sample size is 1914 and these models do not separately account for the short- and long-term impacts as noted above.

Table 2.4 OLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on the Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	0.015			
	(0.010)			
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election		0.003		
		(0.004)		
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election			0.000	
			(0.001)	
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election				0.001
				(0.002)
Kurdish Population Share	-0.045***	-0.044***	-0.044***	-0.044***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Population Growth Rate	-0.143	-0.143	-0.144	-0.144
	(0.208)	(0.208)	(0.207)	(0.208)
Population (Logged)	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Urbanization	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female Share	0.090	0.089	0.075	0.078
	(0.084)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Average Household Size	0.016***	0.016***	0.016***	0.016***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Literacy Rate	0.451***	0.451***	0.452***	0.452***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Dependency Ratio	0.136***	0.137***	0.139***	0.138***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Border District	-0.012	-0.012	-0.011	-0.012
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Southeastern/Eastern Region	-0.009*	-0.009*	-0.009*	-0.009*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Election = 2014	-0.090***	-0.090***	-0.090***	-0.090***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.369***	0.368***	0.372***	0.371***
	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)
N	1914	1914	1914	1914
R^2	0.598	0.598	0.598	0.598

Robust standard errors clustered by district are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01)

The effect of conflict on voter turnout in the presidential elections is shown in Table 2.4. The effect of conflict is insignificant in the presidential elections. This might be caused by the fact that presidential elections are like a zero-sum game in which citizens might feel a higher cost of abstention when their least preferred candidate is elected. Thus, presidential elections are considered high salience because they have only a single winner, and the public is more concerned with the outcome of elections. Moreover, presidential elections have more publicity mainly due to the size of political campaigns and media coverage (Aldrich 1993). Therefore, the cost of non-voting in the election might outweigh the effect of conflict on the cost of voting. As a result, the effect of conflict on turnout in high salience elections such as presidential elections is likely to be null.

Table 2.5 OLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on Ethnic Party's Vote Share in Presidential Elections

	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	0.209***			
	(0.047)			
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election		0.037***		
		(0.010)		
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election			0.011***	
			(0.003)	
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election				0.033***
				(0.010)
Turnout	-0.100	-0.091	-0.085	-0.088
	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.100)
Kurdish Population Share	0.321***	0.328***	0.327***	0.322***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Population Growth Rate	-0.412*	-0.414*	-0.414*	-0.412*
	(0.211)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.212)
Population (Logged)	0.006**	0.007**	0.007**	0.007**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Urbanization	0.038***	0.039***	0.039***	0.038***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Female Share	-0.771***	-0.807***	-0.854***	-0.875***
	(0.199)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.212)
Average Household Size	0.053***	0.054***	0.054***	0.055***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Literacy Rate	-0.112	-0.117	-0.116	-0.102
	(0.134)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.135)
Dependency Ratio	0.153**	0.164**	0.164**	0.167**
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Border District	-0.004	0.002	0.004	0.005
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Southeastern/Eastern Region	0.025*	0.024*	0.024*	0.023
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Election = 2014	0.017*	0.017*	0.018**	0.020**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	0.285	0.283	0.302*	0.304*
	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.177)
N	1914	1914	1914	1914
R^2	0.745	0.738	0.738	0.738

Robust standard errors clustered by district are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 2.5 shows the regression estimates on the vote share of pro-Kurdish candidate Selahattin Demirtaş. The coefficients of all conflict variables are both positive and statistically significant. A standard deviation increase in (Δ) monthly average of PKK attacks translates into an increase in the vote share of Demirtaş by about (0.47*0.03) 1% when the mean vote share of Demirtaş is 9% and the standard deviation is 0.18. Thus, we may conclude that the conflict also has a substantively significant effect on the vote share of the presidential candidate of HDP.

Moreover, the effect of the Kurdish population share on the vote share of Demirtaş is even larger than in the previous model measuring the effect of conflict on the ethnic party's vote share in parliamentary elections. Since the strategic voters who vote for HDP in parliamentary elections do not benefit from voting for Demirtaş, Kurdish ethnic voting can be better evaluated in presidential elections. These findings are in line with the expectation that the conflict increases the salience of ethnic identity among Kurds and fosters ethnic voting. The nomination of Demirtaş as

a presidential candidate is a symbolic way of raising the concerns of the Kurdish minority because it is evident he does not have a chance of winning the election. Therefore, we might conclude that voters are either sincerely voting for Demirtaş or raising their dissatisfaction with the government's approach to the Kurdish issue. Therefore, the findings align with previous studies suggesting that the increased salience of the ethnic identity due to the conflict encourages in-group cohesion and out-group discrimination among Kurds and, consequently, increases ethnic voting.

Table 2.6 OLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on the Incumbent Party's Vote Share in Presidential Elections

	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	-0.167***			
	(0.048)			
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election		-0.030**		
		(0.012)		
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election			-0.010***	
			(0.003)	
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election				-0.033***
				(0.009)
Turnout	-0.140	-0.148	-0.152	-0.149
	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Kurdish Population Share	-0.386***	-0.392***	-0.391***	-0.386***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Population Growth Rate	0.529	0.531	0.529	0.525
	(0.467)	(0.466)	(0.467)	(0.467)
Population (Logged)	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.027***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Urbanization	-0.076***	-0.077***	-0.077***	-0.076***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Female Share	1.749***	1.778***	1.798***	1.801***
	(0.327)	(0.317)	(0.312)	(0.307)
Average Household Size	0.061***	0.060***	0.060***	0.059***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Literacy Rate	-1.285***	-1.282***	-1.280***	-1.292***
	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.206)
Dependency Ratio	-0.217**	-0.226**	-0.223**	-0.223**
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Border District	-0.047	-0.052	-0.052	-0.052
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Southeastern/Eastern Region	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Election = 2014	-0.026**	-0.026**	-0.027**	-0.029***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant	1.277***	1.279***	1.267***	1.269***
	(0.264)	(0.262)	(0.262)	(0.261)
N	1914	1914	1914	1914
R^2	0.325	0.320	0.322	0.323

Robust standard errors clustered by district are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

The effect of conflict on the vote share of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is negative and statistically significant, as presented in Table 2.6. However, the effect of the monthly average of PKK attacks on the vote share of Erdoğan is not substantively significant since a standard deviation change in the independent variable decreases the vote share of Erdoğan only by (0.47*0.03) 1% when the mean vote share equals 55% and the standard deviation is 0.18. This might be caused by the increased salience of the national identity among Turks as a result of increased conflict. Their stronger nationalist attitudes might cause voters to punish the incumbent because of their

perceived inability to fight against terrorism. This finding is also in line with Kıbrıs's (2014) conclusion that Turkish voters tend to change their vote choice when exposed to conflict and punish the incumbent party's candidate for the harm they endure.

However, the contradictory findings for the parliamentary and presidential elections suggest that the rally around the flag effect does not hold for the presidential candidates in Turkey. People punish leaders, not the parties, as a result of the conflict. This finding is also in line with literature suggesting that voters might punish the incumbent, due to the increased level of conflict (Gartner 2008; Mueller 1973; Wollebæk et al. 2012, 2013. For example, in a case study on the effect of the 7/22 terrorist attacks on Norwegian public opinion, Wollebæk et al. (2012) finds that voters withdrew their support from the incumbent party and criticized the policies as more sources of information had become available regarding the ineffectiveness of the government's security policies.

The coefficient of Kurdish population size is again negative and statistically distinguishable from zero in Table 2.6. This means that Kurdish people also punish the incumbent party's presidential candidate as the level of conflict increases as in parliamentary elections. Increased levels of in-group favoritism and out-group hostility are likely to be the reasons for this negative relationship. Karakoç and Sarıgil (2020) also mention several factors possibly reducing Kurdish support for the incumbent such as the imprisonment of Kurdish political elites, the abandonment of the peace process together with cultural and political reforms, and President Erdoğan's hawkish discourse on the Kurdish autonomy in Syria and Iraq. The authors argue that the members of the Kurdish minority might have distanced themselves from the incumbent because they perceive the AKP "as a state party" rather than a reformist one as a result of the resecuritization of the Kurdish issue, especially since 2015 (Karakoç and Sarıgil 2020, 252).

2.6 Conclusion

Although there are many studies on ethnic conflict and ethnic voting, there have been relatively few studies combining the two phenomena. While some of the studies aiming to explain the effect of conflict on electoral behavior concerned with turnout rates, others examined only the Turkish electorate. Moreover, most of these studies estimate the effect of conflict on electoral behavior at a higher level of aggregation than in our study. Therefore, the literature had a gap in explaining the effects of ethnic conflict on voting behavior. As the Kurdish issue is salient in Turkish politics and

has important implications for the conflict resolution literature and voting behavior literature, it presents a crucially important research area. In that sense, Kıbrıs's (2014) study is unique since she looks to the effect of the Kurdish ethnic conflict on ethnic voting for both the Kurdish and Turkish voters and addresses this gap to an extent. In this chapter, I aim to introduce two alternative ways of operationalizing the main independent variable of conflict, including civilian and terrorist casualties in addition to the security force casualties. The elections analyzed in this chapter cover a period in which the country had a single-party government and a relatively calm political arena compared to the 1990s. Furthermore, this study contributes to the literature by estimating the effect of the conflict on turnout, the Kurdish ethnic party's vote share, and incumbent support at the district level in both the parliamentary and the presidential elections. The study also employs ECMs, which allows us to account for the short- and long-term effects of the conflict on our dependent variables.

The findings of this article are in accordance with previous studies of Kıbrıs (2014) and Tezcür (2015) and our theoretical expectations mentioned above. Conflict decreases turnout because of the insecure environment created by terrorism. Ethnic voting increases in regions where the intensity of conflict is higher. The causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables can be explained by referring to the political salience of identities from the perspective of social identity theory. Accordingly, the high number of terrorist attacks by Kurdish armed groups increases the political salience of the Kurdish issue along with the salience of the Kurdish identity for voters. Consequently, Kurdish voters become more perceptible to the campaigns of Kurdish ethnonationalist political parties and candidates. Moreover, the increase in the salience of the Kurdish identity results in Kurdish voters' higher tendency to favor their in-group and cast votes on the basis of their ethnic group identification. Similarly, in-group cohesion and out-group discrimination are higher where the Kurdish population share is high. This also results in voting on the basis of ethnicity among the Kurdish electorate.

In contrast, the conflict increases the salience of the Turkish national identity and causes out-group hostility against Kurdish parties, and creates a rally around the flag effect. The rally around the flag effect causes an increase in the incumbent party's vote share in the short- and long-terms. However, the effect is negative in the case of presidential elections.

One of the main limitations of this study is related to ecological inference. Because of the lack of individual-level data especially regarding ethnicity and ethnic voting, this study reaches individual-level conclusions based on aggregate-level data. However,

I seek to overcome this limitation by controlling for the Kurdish population share. Admittedly, this is not the ideal design, and panel studies data would be more suitable for measuring the effect of conflict on individuals' in-group and out-group attitudes.

Another limitation is measuring the Kurdish population share, which requires assuming that people from certain provinces are ethnic Kurds. This limitation is caused by the lack of survey data that could more accurately identify Turks and Kurds. However, our operationalization leads to an estimation of the Kurdish population that is in line with other studies in literature (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2019; Kıbrıs 2011, 2014; Tezcür 2015).

Unavailability of long-term panels on presidential elections also limits our analysis because we cannot account for the short- and long-term effects of the conflict on voting behavior. The study also lacks generalizability since it focuses on only one ethnic group in a single country. This limitation is mainly caused by the lack of cross-country data on province-level electoral behavior and conflict. However, I examine four parliamentary elections and the study accounts for over-time and district-level variation, which is an important contribution to the literature on the generalizability of findings. Most previous studies on the Turkish case either focus only on two elections or are at the province level. Thus, our research design is able to account for more variation across time and space.

Lastly, the main independent variables, the number of killings in terrorist attacks and the total number of terrorist attacks, have limitations because they only account for the geographical location of terrorist attacks. However, these attacks may also affect the vote choice of people living in other districts where the funerals of casualties take place, not the attacks. To overcome these limitations, a more comprehensive dataset on conflict-related casualties should be compiled.

Future research might advance on the research design and the operationalizations of this study's dependent and independent variables. Survey data may improve the findings of future research aiming in terms of both external and internal validity.

3. THE SHINING PATH AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR IN PERU

3.1 Introduction

The empirical findings of the previous chapter suggest that the level of conflict has statistically and substantively significant effects on electoral behavior in Turkey. As the level of conflict increases, voter turnout decreases due to an increase in the cost of voting and voter intimidation. Another important finding the previous chapter shows is that even though the vote share of the pro-Kurdish party decreases as the level of conflict increases, the effect is in the opposite direction when we limit our sample high conflict regions and predominantly Kurdish zones. We explain this effect of conflict on the electoral behavior of ethnic voters through the increase in the salience of ethnic identities as a result of heightened level of ethnic conflict. As the aforementioned literature suggests, ethnic conflict increases the salience of ethnic identity and reinforces in-group favoritism among and out-group discrimination towards ethnic groups. Conflict also increases the Turkish identity's salience, creating a rally around the flag effect on the support for the incumbent government. Our findings suggest that a rise in the level of conflict increases the level of electoral support for the incumbent. The theoretical argument of the previous chapter based on the social identity theory would be better explained with the help of a comparative case study where the nature of the conflict is different.

To this end, we chose Peru as the second case study of this thesis because Turkish and Peruvian cases have many similarities as well as some crucial differences. While the countries are similar in their electoral systems, history of conflict, and legitimate political parties associated with terrorist organizations, they mainly differ in terms of the nature of the conflict. Firstly, Turkish and Peruvian electoral systems have common features. Peruvian presidential elections are held by popular vote, and the candidate who receives an absolute majority of the votes becomes the president.

If no candidate receives an absolute majority of the votes at the first round, a second round is held. In this respect, the presidential elections of Peru and Turkey are similar. The fact that voting is compulsory in both Peru and Turkey explains the high level of turnout in both countries and makes their electoral institutions comparable.

Turkey and Peru also have some commonalities concerning parliamentary elections. Between 1980 and 1993, Peru had two chambers elected by a popular vote. After 1993, the Parliament has become unicameral. Presidential and parliamentary elections are held concurrently and both the president and the parliament are elected for five years. Like Turkey, Peru has a proportional representation system, and parliamentary seats are allocated using the d'Hondt method. Unlike Turkey, Peru did not have an electoral threshold in the 1980, 1985, and 1990 general elections (Soldevilla 2005). That is, strategic voting due to the 10% electoral threshold in Turkey might not be observable in Peru since it has a more permissive electoral system.

Another comparison should also be made regarding the history and nature of the conflict in both countries. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) started its terrorist attacks in the Ayacucho department of Peru on the day of the 1980 presidential and general elections, May 18, 1980 (Palmer 1994). However, it quickly expanded its sphere of influence over the rest of the country, including urban centers (McClintock 1984). Unlike the SL, PKK's terrorist attacks are primarily concentrated in Southeastern and Eastern Turkey, except for a small number of attacks in urban centers. The 1980 elections in Peru were the first democratic elections held after the military government left office. This re-democratization process coincided with the start of the conflict in Peru (Birnir and Gohdes 2018), as in the case of Turkey. The SL is also a Marxist-Communist terrorist organization that conducts guerilla warfare like the PKK in Turkey. However, PKK has changed its stance and adopted a discourse mainly concerned with the ethnic cleavage since the mid-1990s.

Moreover, the SL has been commonly associated with an electoral alliance named the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU) because the alliance includes the electoral counterpart of the SL, called the Communist Party of Peru – Red Homeland (Partido Comunista del Perú - Patria Roja, PCP-PR) (Birnir and Gohdes 2018). However, one of the most important differences regarding the nature of the conflict is that in the Turkish case, the conflict is ethnic, while in the Peruvian case, it is based on the Marxist ideology and a class struggle. Political parties associated with these terrorist organizations also represent different groups' interests. While HDP is considered a pro-Kurdish ethnic party, the IU is a leftist alliance representing the demands of the lower classes. Therefore, comparing the cases of Turkey and Peru will further our

understanding of the role of the cleavage type in the relationship between conflict and electoral behavior.

The findings of this chapter suggest that, as in the Turkish case, voter turnout diminishes as a higher level of conflict increases the cost of voting and voters intimidates. Moreover, the increasing level of conflict hurts the electoral support for the insurgency-associated party because the conflict only reinforces the salience of socio-economic identities in the absence of a salient ethnic identity. Thus, voters electorally punish the IU when the level of conflict increases. However, the effect of conflict on the incumbent's vote share is insignificant since the conflict is not ethnic and does not create an in- and out-group differentiation, which makes the rally around the flag effect less likely.

In order to explain the effect of conflict on Peruvian electoral behavior, I will, firstly, review the literature on the conflict and electoral behavior in Peru. Then, I will discuss the theoretical framework of this chapter by referring to the calculus of voting and social identity theories and the rally around the flag effect. After explaining my data collection and research design, I will discuss the theoretical implications of the findings and compare the two case studies of this thesis. This chapter concludes with an explanation of the limitations of our empirical analysis and recommendations for future research.

3.2 Literature Review

As discussed in the previous chapter, several studies have revealed that geographical concentration, spatial composition, and homogeneity of ethnic groups are significant determinants of both ethnic voting and conflict (Houle 2019; Ichino and Nathan 2013; Weidmann 2009). As the groups are geographically concentrated and homogenous in terms of race, religion, and language, the level of ethnic voting increases. Even though the indigenous population in Peru is mainly located in rural areas, they are highly heterogeneous in their language and religion (Palmer 1994; Thorp, Caumartin, and Gray-Molina 2006). Considering these explanations, the level of ethnic voting should be limited in Peru.

Previous studies on ethnic minorities and electoral behavior also underline the importance of descriptive representation in determining the voting behavior of minority groups (Mansbridge 1999; Rocha et al. 2010; Williams 1998; Zingher and Farrer 2016). Descriptive representation refers to the idea that a representative with a spe-

cific background is likely to promote the interest of those who share similar traits with her. For example, black deputies are considered to promote the welfare of Black people, or representatives with a background in farming might promote the farmer's interest (Mansbridge 1999). Rocha et al. (2010) find a significant relationship between the level of descriptive representation and voter turnout among African Americans and Latinos in the US. Similarly, Zingher and Farrer (2016) examine the effect of the nomination of an ethnic candidate on the cultivation of long-term electoral support for a party and conclude that parties rely on descriptive representation by nominating ethnic candidates to win votes from ethnic groups.

In this line of research, Madrid (2011) examines the relationship between ethnicity and electoral behavior in the 2000, 2001, and 2006 presidential elections in Peru and argues that despite not having an ethnic political party or candidate, indigenous groups in Peru engage in ethnic voting by voting for a candidate who is ethnically more proximate to their community. The author defines an ethnically proximate candidate as a person who responds to the demands of indigenous communities and uses ethno-populist discourse in their electoral campaign without self-identifying as indigenous.

Another line of research focuses on the effect of conflict on electoral behavior. While some find that a high level of conflict decreases voter turnout (Alacevich and Zejcirovic 2020; Bratton 2008; Gallego 2018; Tezcür 2015), others argue that it increases ethnic voting by increasing the salience of ethnic identities (Hadzic, Carlson, and Tavits 2020; Kıbrıs 2014). The findings in previous literature also suggest an increase in the vote shares of ethnic parties associated with terrorist organizations. However, in the case of Peru, Birnir and Gohdes (2018) look into the effect of the level of conflict on the electoral performance of the insurgent-affiliated party in the 1990 presidential elections and find that indeed, the electoral counterpart of the terrorist organization loses votes where the level of conflict is high. However, the party sustains its electoral support or even increases it in more peaceful provinces. That is, the conflict's negative effect on the IU's vote share seems to be localized.

As explained previously, the findings in the literature regarding the effect of conflict on incumbent support are contradictory. Some argue that a high level of conflict produces a higher level of incumbent support, which is explained from the perspective of the rally around the flag effect, investment theory, and issue salience (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2021; Koch 2011; Norpoth and Sidman 2007). Others also find empirical evidence in support of the electoral punishment of the incumbent due to an increase in the intensity of conflict (Aksoy and Carlson 2022; Gartner 2008; Wollebæk et al. 2012, 2013).

However, in the Peruvian case, Weyland (2000) finds that the president's counterinsurgency policies do not significantly affect the level of public support for the incumbent between 1992 and 1997. The author argues, as the level of conflict decreases, the salience of the conflict also decreases. In this context, voters pay more attention to other issues, such as the economy. For example, the economic growth between 1990 and 2000 is the main determinant of the consecutive electoral successes of Alberto Fujimori, while his military victory against the Shining Path has no significant effect according to monthly public opinion surveys. These contradictory findings regarding the effect of conflict on the support for the incumbent lead Arce (2003) to investigate the effect of violence by the Shining Path on the support for the Presidents between 1985 and 1997. The author also uses monthly public opinion surveys asking respondents whether they approve the President's security policies. The findings suggest that voters maintain their support for right-wing governments. However, they tend to disapprove the policies of leftist presidents as the level of violence increases because right-wing governments take more hawkish stands regarding the resolution of the conflict. Voters who perceive leftist presidents as soft-liner seek to punish the incumbents due to the policy failure. However, voters tolerate an increase in the level of conflict when the president is a hard-liner because they attribute more competence to the incumbent in such cases.

The literature on the effect of conflict on electoral behavior in Peru is quite limited. Even though Birnir and Gohdes's (2018) study is unique in that sense, they examine a single election at the province level. However, their analysis is also limited in terms of cross-sectional variance because the province-level electoral data are not available for all provinces. Thus, they only examine 183 provinces out of 194 in the 1990 presidential elections, which might cause a selection bias. Despite being an individual-level study covering a longer period, Arce (2003) only examines the effect of conflict on the public approval of presidents' security policies. Moreover, the public opinion surveys used in Weyland's (2000) and Arce's (2003) studies were conducted only in the capital of Peru, Lima, which causes a lack of generalizability. The elections analyzed in this chapter are both the parliamentary and presidential elections between 1980 and 1995, covering a period when the SL was actively operating and the IU was competing in the elections. Thus, our sample allows us to extend previous literature both temporarily and geographically. This study also allows us to test the validity of the contradictory findings in the literature on the effect of conflict on incumbent support through an analysis of the 1990 and 1995 presidential elections. It is also one of the first studies that account for both the short- and the long-term impacts of violence on both turnout and support for an insurgency-associated party in Peru.

3.3 Theoretical Framework

As explained in the previous chapter, the calculus of voting theory suggests that people choose to vote when the reward from voting (R) is positive. Since the probability of one's vote changing the outcome of the election (p) is almost zero in most elections, the expected policy benefit (B) as a result of the election of the desired candidate becomes infinitesimal. Thus, the cost of voting and citizens' sense of civic duty are the main determinants of the decision to vote (Aldrich 1993; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; Panagopoulos 2008; Riker and Ordeshook 1968).

In our case, the conflict may increase the cost of voting by creating an insecure electoral environment for voters (Bali 2007; Bekoe and Burchard 2017; Birch and Muchlinski 2018; Burchard 2015; Toros and Birch 2021) and it may also decrease the citizens' sense of civic duty. That is because as previous studies argue that the conflict causes a loss of trust in institutions (Alacevich and Zejcirovic 2020; Hadzic, Carlson, and Tavits 2020). When the cost of voting increases and the sense of civic duty decreases, the reward from voting should also decrease.

Voter intimidation is also common in high-conflict settings (Condra et al. 2019; Hassan 2017; Tezcür 2015). That is, voters might decide to not participate because of the pressures from the members of the terrorist organization or the Peruvian security forces. For instance, McClintock's (1984) findings show a notable decrease in voter turnout in the Ayacucho and Huancavelica departments compared to the rest of the country. The author argues that the conflict might have caused the voters living in rural areas to abstain from voting in the 1980 presidential elections because they would fear had they voted for a non-Marxist candidate, the SL would punish them by increasing their terrorist attacks. Furthermore, Palmer (1994) points out that the SL had frequently relied on a strategy of boycotting the elections, interrupting political campaign efforts, and assassinating electoral candidates. The author further notes that the government had to abolish the application of inerasable ink in the 1987 municipal elections because of a fear that the SL might cut off the fingers of those who voted. Thus, the first hypothesis of this chapter is the same as in the previous one and as follows:

H₁: As the level of conflict increases, voter turnout decreases.

People can identify themselves with various ethnic or non-ethnic identities, and those different identifications affect individuals' electoral behavior, as discussed in the previous chapter in detail (Wilkinson 2004). However, electoral competition tends to be dominated by socio-economic interests when society has no salient group-

based cleavages such as ethnic identities (Tavits and Potter 2015; Tavits and Letki 2013). Since ethnic cleavages are not politically activated in the context of conflict or electoral behavior in Peru, the Peruvian conflict should not increase the salience of ethnic identities among the indigenous groups. It may, however, increase the salience of socio-economic class identity and create an in-group bias among those from lower socio-economic classes towards the SL and its electoral front, the IU. In this context, socio-economic interests are more likely to dominate the electoral competition rather than ethnicity, unlike in the Turkish case.

However, the increased salience of socio-economic identity should not remain effective in the long run because social identity theory suggests that individuals seek to acquire and preserve a positive social identity based on a comparison between in-group and out-group attitudes (Tajfel and Turner 1986). When people perceive their social identity negatively, they try either to change their identity or "to make their existing group more positively distinct" compared to out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 16). In the case of indigenous groups or lower classes of Peru, the social identity might be negatively affected by the increasing level of violence due to being associated with insurgents. Since the conflict is not ethnic and does not reinforce such ethnic differences, those groups might more easily differentiate themselves from insurgents. As discussed above, the social group engaging in the conflict in Peru is highly heterogeneous, which makes developing an in-group bias less probable than in an ethnic conflict as in the Kurdish case. Since the insurgency-affiliated party is also not an ethnic party and does not have a considerable number of indigenous candidates, these groups might desire to differentiate themselves from the conflict-associated party as the level of conflict increases in the long run to maintain a positive social identity. Moreover, the SL frequently targets indigenous communities and civilians in impoverished rural areas (Stern 1998). This is likely to create discontent among those communities in the long run as they perceive themselves as the victims of the conflict. Thus, I expect a decrease in the vote share of the IU as a result of a long-term increase in the level of conflict. However, the magnitude of this negative effect might be smaller in the short run since this out-group differentiation might take longer when ethnic identity does not determine electoral behavior.

H_2: As the level of conflict increases, the vote share of the insurgency-associated party decreases in the long run.

As explained in the previous chapter, a high level of conflict may work to create a rally around the flag effect and increase the support for the incumbent (Koch 2011; Mueller 1973; Norpoth and Sidman 2007). This effect is also expected in the Peruvian case since the SL frequently targets the civilian population, disrupts

public services, and carries attacks in urban city centers. Another important aspect of the Peruvian conflict worthy of noting here is that the leader of the SL, Abimael Guzman, was arrested in 1992 during Fujimori's presidency, which provided him with public popularity (Stern 1998). The capture of the leader of the terrorist organization might increase trust in the government's counterinsurgency policies. Despite the increasing intensity of the conflict, voters might thus continue to support the incumbent. It is also argued that an increase in the level of conflict makes the security more salient, which leads voters to reward the president for the capture of Guzman in the short-run regardless of the ongoing violence (Weyland 2000). Therefore, I expect the level of support for the incumbent to increase as the level of conflict increases.

H_3: As the level of conflict increases, the vote share of the incumbent president increases.

3.4 Data and Research Design

This chapter uses time-series cross-sectional data on the Peruvian elections and conflict. The unit of analysis is a department in a given election because province-level data were unavailable for the Peruvian elections in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the ACLED data for the Peruvian conflict are only available from 2018 onwards, the data on conflict for this chapter come from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 2021). GTD is another geocoded dataset that includes information on all kinds of terror events and their locations between 1970 to the present. The dataset also includes the number of fatalities including civilians, insurgents, and security forces. However, GTD does not provide information on the types of fatalities. Since this chapter only examines the elections between 1980 and 1995, the temporal coverage of conflict data is limited to the period between 1980, the first year that the SL started its terrorist attacks, and 1995.

The data on elections are obtained from the National Election Board (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, JNE) of Peru, and the data on all sociodemographic control variables come from the 1972, 1981, 1993, and 2007 Censuses of Peru obtained from the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, INEI).

3.4.1 Dependent Variables

The SL was mainly effective between 1980 and 2000 in Peru, and its electoral front, PCP-PR, contested the elections between 1980 and 1995 as part of the electoral alliance, the United Left. Thus, this chapter only examines the 1980, 1985, and 1990 Peruvian lower-chamber elections and the 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995 first-round presidential elections. Second-round elections are excluded because the IU did not compete. Since department-level data on the 1995 lower-chamber elections are not available, it is also excluded from our sample.

In the previous chapter, ethnic voting is defined as voting for a political party that is linked to a specific ethnic identity. This party should also represent the interests of that ethnic group (Horowitz 2001). However, Peru has neither an ethnic political party nor an ethnicity-based political movement. On the other hand, there is a legitimate political party associated with the SL, and the indigenous population takes part in both of these organizations to some extent (Birnir and Gohdes 2018; Madrid 2011; McClintock 1984). Thus, this chapter adopts a broader definition of ethnic voting, which refers to the members of an ethnic group voting for a political party (without necessarily being defined as an ethnic one) that best represents their group's interest (Houle 2019). However we should note that since indigenous peoples in Peru are generally located in the most impoverished and underdeveloped parts of the country (Madrid 2011; Palmer 1994), the IU's emphasis on class struggle and economic inequality might be relevant to the political interest of these indigenous communities as well.

Therefore, our three main dependent variables for this chapter are voter turnout, the vote share of the insurgent-affiliated party, and the incumbent party's vote share. Similar to the previous chapter, voter turnout is calculated as the ratio of the number of votes cast in the election to the number of eligible voters. However, the data on the number of eligible voters are not available for the parliamentary elections. I calculated the voter turnout for these elections by using the number of eligible voters in the presidential elections. Since parliamentary and presidential elections are held concurrently in Peru, this operationalization should not bias our estimates. The vote share of the insurgent-affiliated party is calculated by dividing the absolute number of votes the IU alliance received by the size of the electorate. Unlike in the previous chapter, in this chapter, we do not examine the effect of the conflict on the incumbent party's vote share in parliamentary elections because Peru is a presidential democracy. However, Peruvian incumbent parties had varied from one election to the subsequent and electoral volatility was high during the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, the Popular Action (Acción Popular, AP) became the

incumbent in the 1980 elections. However, the government changed hands in the 1985 elections, and the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) became the governing party. Then, in 1990, Change 90 (Cambio 90, C90) won the second round of the presidential elections (Palmer 1994). For this reason, we only examine the effect of conflict on the vote share of the Change 90 in the 1990 and 1995 presidential elections.

The number of departments increased after the 1980 elections. While there were 24 departments in Peru in the 1980 elections, the Ucayali was formed by splitting the Loreto department into two. Since the province-level data are not available for the 1980 elections, in order to keep longitudinal data on Ucayali in the other elections, the department is re-merged with Loreto by aggregating the the absolute number of votes cast, votes received by the IU and the Change 90, and eligible voters.

3.4.2 Independent Variables

Similar to the previous chapter, the primary explanatory variable is the level of conflict. While Birnir and Gohdes (2018) measure the level of violence in their study by aggregating the number of killings and disappearances five years before the election, Arce (2003) operationalizes political violence as the natural logarithmic transformation of the monthly number of terrorist events. Weyland (2000) measures the conflict as the total number of terrorist events per capita one year before the election. Differently from the previous chapter, the conflict is measured in only two different ways in this chapter since GTD does not have information on the fatality types.[1] The first measure is the total number of terrorist events from assassinations, bombings, armed assaults, facility attacks, hijackings, barricade incidents, kidnappings, and unarmed attacks by the SL between 1980 and 1995. The second measure of conflict is the total number of fatalities calculated by aggregating the number of killings caused by all types of terrorist attacks listed above. Both of these measures are the aggregates of the incidences or fatalities between consecutive elections, except for the 1980 elections. Since the SL started its operations in 1980, there were only two incidents before the 1980 elections. In order to standardize the measure across different elections, I use the monthly average of total terrorist events and fatalities in the analysis.

Since previous studies argue that the basis of the SL's and the United Left's sup-

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[1] More detailed information regarding the fatality types can be found in the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru released in 2003 (Available at https://www.cverdad.org.pe. Retrieved on July 25, 2022). Even though the final report has information on fatality types, the precise date and location of the attacks and fatalities are unfortunately unavailable.

port comes from indigenous communities (Birnir and Gohdes 2018; Madrid 2011; McClintock 1984), I added indigenous population share as a control in our model. Although indigenous groups have considerable population shares in Peru, many people belonging to these communities avoid identifying themselves as indigenous or speaking their indigenous languages, mainly because of the repressive policies of the Peruvian state or societal stigma attached to them. However, some still identify themselves as indigenous and continue speaking indigenous languages (Madrid 2011). The data on the indigenous population share come from the 1993 and 2007 censuses. I operationalized this variable as the ratio of the number of people whose mother language is either Quechua or Aymara to the full population. Since the data are only available for 1993 and 2007, I calculated the indigenous population share that will coincide with each election year by linearly interpolating missing data.

Other control variables include a natural logarithmic transformation of departmental population, female share, education, unemployment, and urbanization. Data on all controls for each election year are also imputed by the linear interpolation method. In order to calculate the population for each election year, I used the 1972, 1981, 1993, and 2007 censuses. For the remaining variables, the 1993 and 2007 censuses are used. Similarly to the previous chapter, female share is included in our models to account for the divergence in electoral behavior (Hatemi et al. 2012; Inglehart and Norris 2000) and calculated by dividing the number of women in a department by the department's total population. The education variable is operationalized as the ratio of the number of university graduates in a department to the total population as an indicator of social development. Unemployment is calculated by dividing the number of people currently employed by the size of the labor force and added to the model to control for economic voting (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Urbanization is included in the model because the SL recruits its combatants mainly from rural areas. This variable is calculated as the ratio of people living in a department's urban areas to its total population. Since the Ucayali department was established after 1980, all control variables are coded as if Ucayali was still a part of the Loreto department. In addition, a dummy variable of border, which marks the departments on the Bolivian, Brazilian, Colombian, and Ecuadorian borders, is added to the model to account for cross-border terrorist activities.

3.5 Empirical Findings

In our sample, there are 3995 terrorist events led by the Shining Path between 1980 and 1995. The total count of fatalities in those events is 9318. Figure 3.1, illustrates the distribution of the intensity of the conflict in Peru over 15 years. Each map depicts monthly averages of terrorist incidents between successive elections and their distribution across departmental units. As Figure 3.1 shows, the conflict had intensified between 1980 and 1990. The intensity of violence decreased after the capture of the SL's leader in 1992. It can also be seen that the conflict is more evenly distributed across departmental units, except for a few departments, compared to the higher regional concentration in the Turkish case.

Figure 3.1 Monthly Average of Terrorist Attacks Between Consecutive Elections

Tables 3.1 and 3.2, below, present random-effect GLS regression estimates on voter turnout and the vote share of the IU in the parliamentary elections. The model choice is the same as in the previous chapter, albeit with different control variables. The standard errors are again clustered by departments in order to account for possible heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, election-fixed effects are introduced in the model to overcome the possible omitted election-specific factors. The effective

sample size is 48 in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 because of the lagged independent variables, which causes the 1980 election to be used as the base category and dropped from the estimation sample.

Table 3.1 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on the Voter Turnout in Parliamentary Elections

	Model 1	Model 2
Turnout$_{(t-1)}$	-0.001	0.013
	(0.144)	(0.155)
ΔMonthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election	0.019	
	(0.012)	
Monthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$	-0.021	
	(0.014)	
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election		0.005***
		(0.002)
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$		-0.007***
		(0.002)
Indigenous Population Share	0.040	0.054
	(0.107)	(0.103)
Population (Logged)	-0.027	-0.021
	(0.026)	(0.020)
Education	-0.077	-0.035
	(0.605)	(0.620)
Unemployment	-0.368*	-0.383**
	(0.189)	(0.180)
Female Share	1.071	1.004*
	(0.698)	(0.598)
Urbanization	0.485***	0.495***
	(0.134)	(0.139)
Border District	0.035	0.035
	(0.040)	(0.037)
Election = 1990	-0.246***	-0.239***
	(0.042)	(0.041)
Constant	0.321	0.261
	(0.257)	(0.257)
N	48	48
R^2 (between)	0.675	0.694
R^2 (overall)	0.719	0.746

Robust standard errors clustered by department are in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

The effect of the monthly average of terrorist attacks on voter turnout in parliamentary elections is not statistically significant in the short- or long-term, as shown in Table 3.1. However, the effect of conflict becomes statistically significant when it is operationalized as the monthly average of total fatalities between consecutive elections. This suggests that Peruvian voters are less responsive to the frequency of the terrorist attacks than the losses caused by those attacks. The short-term effect of conflict on voter turnout is positive as opposed to our expectations. The effect is statistically significant and negative in the long term. On the other hand, these effects are not substantively significant because a standard deviation change in the

monthly average of total fatalities decreases turnout only by 2% (0.005*4.3) in the short run and 3% (0.007*4.3) in the long run while the mean change of turnout in parliamentary elections is 13%. That is, contrary to our expectations the conflict does not have a significant effect on voter turnout in parliamentary elections, which might be caused by Peru being a presidential democracy and voters not perceiving lower-chamber elections as salient.

Another important finding is that the level of urbanization has both statistically and substantively significant positive effects on turnout. A standard deviation change in the level of urbanization (0.4*0.2) translates to an 8% increase in turnout, which is close to the mean change of turnout in parliamentary elections. That is, people living in urban areas turn out more than those living in rural places. This might be caused by the higher level of voter intimidation in rural areas. Even though the number of attacks and fatalities is also high in urban centers, the members of the Shining Path find refuge in villages and highlands (Palmer 1994; Stern 1998). This makes people living in rural areas be in closer contact with insurgents. Thus, voter intimidation might be more influential in those areas, which causes voters to abstain.

Table 3.2 shows that the level of conflict has a negatively significant effect on the vote share of the IU in both the short and long terms. The vote share of the electoral alliance decreases by 2% (0.004*4.3) as a result of a standard deviation increase in the monthly average of total fatalities between successive elections. This decrease almost equals half of the mean change in the IU's vote share, which is 5% in parliamentary elections. Thus, the effect of conflict on the vote share of the insurgent-affiliated party is both statistically and substantively significant. This effect is also in line with our expectations that an increase in the level of conflict should decrease the vote share of the IU. Note that the previous studies also find a negative relationship between the conflict and the vote share of the IU (Birnir and Gohdes 2018). Since the Shining Path conflict is an ideological one, it should not increase the salience of ethnic identities. Furthermore, the political elites of the IU alliance do not have indigenous descent. Thus, in the case of Peru, in-group favoritism should only occur for lower-class voters. However, voters have few reasons to align with the IU political elites because those politicians are neither indigenous nor poor. So, when the conflict increases, they might more easily differentiate themselves from the IU alliance in order to adopt a positive group identity as suggested by the social identity theory.

On the other hand, the positive coefficients of the indigenous population share variable in Table 3.2 indicate that as the indigenous population share increases, the

electoral support for the IU also increases. Although the effect of indigenous population share on the IU's vote share is statistically distinguishable from zero only at 95% confidence level, it is substantively significant since a standard deviation change in indigenous population share translates into a 2% (0.1*0.2) increase in the IU's vote share in the parliamentary elections. This effect is in the expected direction since the indigenous groups are among one of the most impoverished classes in Peru (Madrid 2011; Palmer 1994). Thus, the leftist economic policies of the IUemphasizing on income inequality tend to attract indigenous voters.

Table 3.2 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on the Vote Share of the United Left in Parliamentary Elections

	Model 3	Model 4
Vote Share of the United Left$_{(t-1)}$	0.059	0.155
	(0.347)	(0.338)
ΔMonthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election	-0.009	
	(0.007)	
Monthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$	-0.006	
	(0.005)	
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election		-0.004***
		(0.001)
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$		-0.004**
		(0.002)
ΔTurnout	-0.094	-0.100
	(0.099)	(0.100)
Turnout$_{(t-1)}$	-0.073	-0.050
	(0.299)	(0.274)
Indigenous Population Share	0.136**	0.138**
	(0.065)	(0.062)
Population (Logged)	-0.021	-0.022
	(0.022)	(0.018)
Education	0.676	0.414
	(0.667)	(0.587)
Unemployment	0.039	0.046
	(0.164)	(0.143)
Female Share	-0.408	-0.503
	(0.403)	(0.373)
Urbanization	-0.037	-0.047
	(0.125)	(0.119)
Border District	-0.003	-0.009
	(0.034)	(0.032)
Election = 1990	-0.118**	-0.139**
	(0.057)	(0.057)
Constant	0.715***	0.784***
	(0.245)	(0.212)
N	48	48
R^2 (between)	0.524	0.651
R^2 (overall)	0.565	0.604

Robust standard errors clustered by department are in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

49

Tables 3.3-3.5 present random-effect GLS regression estimates on turnout, IU's vote share, and the vote share of the incumbent (C90) in the presidential elections. The effective sample size is 72 in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 due to the ECM models. However, the effective sample size is 48 in Table 3.5 because the sample is limited to the 1990 and 1995 presidential elections when the Change 90 was incumbent. Furthermore, the models in Table 3.5 do not account for the short and long-term impacts.

Table 3.3 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections

	Model 5	Model 6
Turnout$_{(t-1)}$	0.124	0.060
	(0.112)	(0.104)
ΔMonthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election	-0.006	
	(0.010)	
Monthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$	-0.012	
	(0.008)	
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election		-0.001
		(0.003)
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$		-0.007***
		(0.002)
Indigenous Population Share	0.051	0.070
	(0.044)	(0.044)
Population (Logged)	0.013	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.008)
Education	0.182	-0.046
	(0.223)	(0.238)
Unemployment	-0.134**	-0.089
	(0.063)	(0.064)
Female Share	0.596**	0.710***
	(0.276)	(0.194)
Urbanization	0.308***	0.315***
	(0.085)	(0.086)
Border District	0.064***	0.058***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Election = 1990	-0.157***	-0.140***
	(0.021)	(0.022)
Election = 1995	-0.197***	-0.190***
	(0.020)	(0.014)
Constant	0.126**	0.219***
	(0.063)	(0.076)
N	72	72
R^2 (between)	0.878	0.876
R^2 (overall)	0.801	0.819

Robust standard errors clustered by department are in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 3.3 shows that similarly to parliamentary elections, neither the first differenced nor the lagged monthly average terrorist attacks has statistically significant effects on turnout in the presidential elections. However, when the conflict is measured as the average monthly count of fatalities, the effect becomes statistically significant in the

long run as in the parliamentary elections. Moreover, a standard deviation increase in the monthly average of total fatalities causes an almost 3% (0.07*3.85) decrease in turnout, which is almost equal to the mean change between elections (0.04). We thus conclude that the long-term effect of violence on turnout is both statistically and substantively significant. This finding is in line with our expectations that the conflict increases the cost of voting and decreases the level of electoral participation. Previous studies also suggest the high level of voter intimidation by the Shining Path insurgents during the Peruvian conflict as a reason for the decreasing turnout in this period (Birnir and Gohdes 2018; McClintock 1984).

However, the level of conflict does not have a short-term significant effect on turnout in the presidential elections in contrast to our expectations. This implies that it is likely that takes time for Peruvian voters to react to the increasing level of violence. In the long run, feelings of fear may become stronger as voters are constantly exposed to material and non-material losses and the negative effects of conflict in general. In addition, while their trust in democratic institutions does not decrease in the short term, the incapabilities of the authorities regarding the resolution of the conflict may decrease their trust in institutions (Alacevich and Zejcirovic 2020; Hadzic, Carlson, and Tavits 2020). Thus, in the long run, they may lose their sense of civic duty and opt-out from the electoral process.

Figure 3.2 The Relationship Between Voter Turnout, Fatalities, and Urbanization

As presented in Table 3.3, the level of urbanization has statistically significant positive effects on turnout in the presidential elections as in the case of the parliamentary elections. Since a standard deviation change in the level of urbanization (0.3*0.2) translates into a 6% increase in turnout, which is one and a half times of the mean change in turnout in the presidential elections, it is also substantively significant. Figure 3.2 also shows that average turnout is lower in rural areas compared to urban centers while some outlier rural areas have an exceptionally higher average number of fatalities. Even though the average number of killings does not directly reflect the level of voter intimidation in rural areas, the higher intensity of conflict might also discourage those living in villages from voting. This finding is again in line with Birnir and Gohdes' (2018) finding that as the level of conflict increases, voter turnout diminishes.

Table 3.4 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on the Vote Share of the United Left in Presidential Elections

	Model 7	Model 8
Vote Share of the United Left$_{(t-1)}$	-0.082	-0.120*
	(0.071)	(0.072)
ΔMonthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election	-0.005	
	(0.004)	
Monthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$	-0.003	
	(0.003)	
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election		-0.002**
		(0.001)
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$		-0.003***
		(0.001)
ΔTurnout	-0.028	-0.057
	(0.080)	(0.091)
Turnout$_{(t-1)}$	0.039	-0.013
	(0.089)	(0.101)
Indigenous Population Share	0.078**	0.093***
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Population (Logged)	0.001	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.006)
Education	0.426	0.331
	(0.263)	(0.284)
Unemployment	0.024	0.042
	(0.062)	(0.056)
Female Share	-0.634***	-0.639***
	(0.198)	(0.176)
Urbanization	-0.049	-0.039
	(0.044)	(0.044)
Border District	0.002	-0.001
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Election = 1990	-0.122***	-0.115***
	(0.028)	(0.027)
Election = 1995	-0.211***	-0.212***
	(0.024)	(0.021)
Constant	0.487***	0.551***
	(0.119)	(0.104)
N	72	72
R^2 (between)	0.429	0.469
R^2 (overall)	0.836	0.841

Robust standard errors clustered by department are in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The effect of conflict on the IU's vote share is, again, negative and significant in the short and long terms, as presented in Table 3.4. A standard deviation increase in the average monthly count of fatalities decreases the IU's vote share by (0.002* 3.85) 0.8% in the short run and a (0.003* 3.85) 1% in the long run when the mean change is 0.8% in presidential elections. While the substantive effect in the short run is equal to the mean change of the IU's vote share between consecutive elections, it is even larger in the long run. This means that voters tend to punish the IU also in the presidential elections because of its affiliations with the Shining Path.

Similarly to parliamentary elections, we find a statistically significant positive relationship between the indigenous population share and the IU's vote share. This is also substantively significant because a standard deviation increase in the indigenous population share causes a 2% (0.09*0.23) increase in the IU's electoral support in presidential elections. Thus, the indigenous population share seems to be one of the robust determinants of the electoral support for the IU. Given this significance, we also control for the interactive effect of the average monthly count of attacks and fatalities with the indigenous population share on the vote share of IU (see Appendix B Table B.3).

Figure 3.3 Marginal Effect of Monthly Average of Total Attacks$_{(t-1)}$ and Fatalities$_{(t-1)}$ on the United Left's Vote Share in Presidential Elections | Indigenous Population Share (95% Confidence Level, Based on Models 1 and 2 in Table B.3)

Figure 3.3 above depicts the marginal effect of the monthly average of total attacks and fatalities on the IU's vote share in the presidential elections in the long run. The subplots show that the IU's electoral support decreases where the indigenous population share is higher as the level of conflict increases. This finding is in line with our expectations that the indigenous groups might punish the insurgency-affiliated party due to the lack of politically salient ethnic cleavages causing the indigenous population to move away from the conflict-associated groups and adopt a positive group identity as explained by the social identity theory.

Table 3.5 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on the Incumbent Party's Vote Share (Change 90)

	Model 9	Model 10
Monthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election	0.005	
	(0.005)	
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election		-0.000
		(0.006)
Turnout	-0.380	-0.427
	(0.236)	(0.267)
Indigenous Population Share	0.057	0.072*
	(0.043)	(0.039)
Urbanization	0.012	0.038
	(0.093)	(0.099)
Population (Logged)	-0.006	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education	1.533***	1.622***
	(0.387)	(0.377)
Unemployment	0.906***	0.867***
	(0.203)	(0.189)
Female Share	-0.186	-0.328
	(0.813)	(0.825)
Border District	0.009	0.011
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Election = 1990	-0.307***	-0.300***
	(0.030)	(0.032)
Constant	0.797**	0.775**
	(0.313)	(0.315)
N	48	48
R^2 (between)	0.721	0.719
R^2 (overall)	0.880	0.879

Robust standard errors clustered by department are in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

As shown in Table 3.5, the conflict does not significantly affect the support for the incumbent party in the 1990 and 1995 Peruvian presidential elections. Even though this finding is against our expectations, it is in line with the literature arguing that the conflict is not a significant determinant for presidential approval during the 1990s (Weyland 2000). As Figure 3.1 shows, the intensity of the conflict decreased

in the mid-1990s after the capturing of Shining Path's leader. This decrease in the intensity of the conflict might have also decreased the salience of the issue for voters while deciding on whom to vote for. This might also be related to the nature of the conflict. Since the conflict caused by the Shining Path is not an ethnic one, it does not increase the salience of ethnic identities. Thus, a sense of national unity and in-group cohesion are unlikely to be observed. This might thus limit the possibility of a rally around the flag effect on the incumbent's electoral support.

On the other hand, one of the most critical issues in the mid-1990s in Peru was the economic recovery and growth (Arce 2003; Weyland 2000). As shown in Table 3.5, the coefficient of unemployment is statistically distinguishable from zero at 99% confidence level and positive. That is, as the level of unemployment increases, the vote share of the incumbent also increases. This might mean that the public has trust in the government's economic policies and their ability to tackle economic problems and thus continue supporting the incumbent. The economic policies of the Fujimori government are also among the most significant determinants of public approval of the president in 1990s, as argued in previous studies (Weyland 2000). It is also in line with previous findings that in the absence of a salient group identity such as ethnicity, electorates tend to vote based on their socio-economic interests (Tavits and Potter 2015; Tavits and Letki 2013).

3.6 Discussion

In both the Turkish and Peruvian cases, the level of conflict has statistically significant negative effects on voter turnout due to an increase in the cost of voting and voter intimidation. However, these two countries differ in their ethnic voting and support for the incumbent. While the insurgency-affiliated candidate, Demirtaş, increases his vote share as the level of conflict increases in the Turkish presidential elections, the IU loses support due to an increase in the level of conflict in Peru. This contradiction can be explained by the distinct nature of the conflict in these countries and from the perspective of the social identity theory.

The SL mainly recruits combatants from the impoverished and underdeveloped regions of Peru, and the conflict is based on the Marxist ideology aiming to replace the capitalist Peruvian state with a communist one (Palmer 1994; Stern 1998). In this respect, the conflict caused by the SL and the PKK differs since the PKK in Turkey aims to establish an independent Kurdish state. Although the PKK is also a Marxist terrorist organization, it is directly linked with a specific ethnic group,

Kurds in Turkey. On the other hand, the SL's aims might only relate to the Peruvian peasantry or the working class to some extent.

Another important difference is that HDP, an insurgent-affiliated political party in Turkey, recruits its political elites mainly from the Kurdish minority, which might foster in-group cohesion in the presence of an ethnic conflict. On the other hand, the electoral alliance associated with the SL has few indigenous candidates and does not appeal to the ethnic identities of these groups (Madrid 2011). The main emphasis of the IU is on class struggle. Moreover, various groups such as workers, farmers, peasants, migrants, university youth, urban poor, and indigenous people together created the electoral base of the IU (Stern 1998). Thus, ethnic cleavages are not salient either in the context of conflict or electoral behavior. While Kurdish voters might more easily affiliate themselves with the pro-Kurdish party and its presidential candidate, the same does not apply to the Peruvian case. In the Turkish case, an increase in ethnic conflict makes the ethnic issue and identity more salient, reinforcing in-group favoritism among the Kurdish minority. In the case of Peru, the IU is mainly supported by indigenous people, as our findings suggest. Nevertheless, neither the IU nor the SL owns the ethnic issue. Since the conflict is also an ideological rather than an ethnic one, it is not expected that the conflict increases the salience of the ethnic identity. It can only reinforce class-based identities. Therefore, an increase in the level of conflict does not transform into an increase in the level of support for the IU alliance in the absence of a politically salient ethnic cleavage in Peru.

Another distinction between these two cases is related to the incumbent support. While a rise in conflict increases the support for the incumbent in Turkish parliamentary elections, the effect of conflict on Fujimori's vote share is not statistically significant in the Peruvian presidential elections. This can also be explained by the non-ethnic nature of the conflict in Peru influencing the probability of a rally around the flag effect. In the Turkish case, an increase in ethnic conflict makes the ethnic identity of Turkish voters more salient. This increased salience creates higher in-group favoritism among Turks and reinforces out-group discrimination and hostility towards Kurds. Thus, an increase in the level of ethnic conflict contributes to developing a sense of national unity in return. As the sense of national unity increases, it is more likely for Turkish voters to support the incumbent in their counterinsurgency efforts and to continue voting for them. However, the Peruvian conflict does not rely on ethnic differences that could increase the salience of ethnic identities. It is neither a war against an external enemy that might foster a national sense of unity. Thus, the level of conflict does not significantly affect the incumbent's vote share. In addition, the capture of the leader of the terrorist organization in 1992 and the

subsequent decrease in the intensity of the conflict might also lead to this finding.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to examine the effect of conflict on electoral behavior in Peru and compare it with the Turkish case. Having similar electoral systems and rules is one factor that facilitates the comparison of Turkey and Peru. Peru also stands out as a suitable case for comparison since it has a long-lasting history of violent conflict caused by a domestic terrorist organization. Furthermore, Peru has a political party closely associated with the terrorist organization, as in the case of Turkey. However, there is a crucial difference between these two cases regarding the nature of the conflict. Kurdish conflict in Turkey has an ethnic origin, whereas the Peruvian conflict is class-based. This difference allows us to single out the effect of the cleavage type on the relationship between conflict and electoral behavior.

This chapter has shown that the level of conflict has a statistically negative effect on voter turnout in Peru, which is explained by the increased cost of voting and voter intimidation. The increasing level of violence makes elections more insecure and discourages voters from participating. Conflict might also decrease trust in democratic institutions, which reduces the sense of civic duty. This finding is in line with the previous chapter's conclusion regarding the effect of conflict on turnout. That is, an increase in the level of violence might depress turnout regardless of the nature of the conflict.

Consistent with Birnir and Gohdes's (2018) findings, this chapter shows that the vote share of the IU decreases as the level of conflict increases, which means that Peruvian voters punish the insurgent-associated party for the heightened violence. Nonetheless, conflict does not have a significant effect on the vote share of the incumbent. The comparison between Turkey and Peru reveals that cleavage type in a violent conflict is an essential determinant while analyzing the relationship between conflict and electoral behavior because when ethnic identities are politically activated, the direction and magnitude of the effects vary. For instance, the findings of the previous chapter suggest that an increase in ethnic conflict increases the insurgent-affiliated party's vote share in Turkey. It also increases the level of support for the incumbent by creating a rally around the flag effect. However, conflict has a reverse effect on the electoral support for insurgency-associated party and has not significant effect on the incumbent's vote share in Peru where the ideological cleavage is predominant.

One of the main limitations of this chapter is again related to ecological fallacy because we rely on aggregate-level data while making individual-level inferences. Similar to the previous chapter, I seek to overcome this limitation by introducing the indigenous population share in the models. However, future research might advance our study by employing individual-level panel studies in order to increase the validity of the findings. On the other hand, comparing the Turkish and Peruvian cases allows us to comment on the salience of ethnic identity and its effects on electoral behavior.

Another limitation is that department-level sociodemographic data are unavailable for each election year. In order to overcome this limitation, we employed linear interpolation to impute missing data. Furthermore, in order to calculate voter turnout in the parliamentary elections, we used the number of eligible voters in the presidential elections because the data were unavailable for parliamentary elections. However, this should not bias our estimates because the parliamentary and presidential elections were held concurrently in Peru. Even though our analysis is at the department-level due to the lack of longitudinal data at the province-level, our study extends previous research in terms of both time and space.

Lastly, since the data on fatalities types are unavailable, we cannot control for the effect of different operationalizations of conflict as in the previous chapter. GTD also has its own limitations because the dataset is coded from newspapers and articles and online and governmental sources then after the end of the conflict. This means that some records might be deleted in the meantime.

Understanding the relationship between cleavage type, conflict, and electoral behavior is likely to contribute to developing novel conflict resolution methods. Thus, future research may continue to compare the countries with ethnic conflicts and political parties in order to better understand whether the findings of this research hold in other cases. A large-N study employing survey data may also improve the findings of our study by increasing its generalizability.

4.   CONCLUSION

Previous studies suggest that ethnic identity is a robust determinant of conflict initiation (Gubler and Selway 2012; Weidmann 2009). The literature also emphasizes the impact ethnic identity has on the electoral behavior of ethnic communities. For instance, Chandra (2004) claims that ethnic identities become salient and determine electoral behavior as they are targeted by political actors. In addition, Ichino and Nathan (2013) show that when ethnic groups are spatially concentrated, they are more likely to vote along ethnic lines. In a similar vein, Houle (2019) argues that the homogeneity of ethnic groups in their race, language, or religion increases the extent of ethnic voting.

Tajfel and Turner's (1986) social identity theory points to the role of social factors in determining one's individual and group identity. Chandra (2006) further suggests that individual identities tend to solidify following a change in surrounding conditions. In another study, the author categorizes ethnicity as one of the most important identities influencing vote choice (Chandra 2004). In light of the previous literature, if we consider civil conflict as a social factor impacting those individual identities and group behavior, it can also be inferred that conflict may have an impact on electoral behavior. The unanswered question is how long-term exposure to violent civil conflict affects vote choice. Does the cleavage type have any influence on the relationship between conflict and electoral behavior? These questions are also important to understand the dynamics of civil conflicts and produce novel ways of conflict resolution. Although several authors have studied ethnicity, conflict, and electoral behavior, there is a gap in the literature regarding the effect of cleavage type on the relationship between civil conflict and electoral behavior. Furthermore, most previous studies focus on a single case. This study sought to address this gap by comparing the Turkish and Peruvian cases where the nature of the conflict differs.

The first empirical chapter focuses on the Kurdish ethnic conflict in Turkey to explore its effects on electoral participation, electoral behavior, and incumbent sup-

port. I estimated an error-correction model by employing generalized least square and ordinary least square regressions and using data on terrorist events, conflict-related casualties, and parliamentary and presidential elections at the province level to analyze the effect of PKK terrorism on turnout and vote share of the pro-Kurdish party and AKP. Differently from the previous literature, this study accounts for both short and long-term impacts of conflict on electoral behavior. It is also one of the few studies that examine the effect of the Kurdish conflict on electoral behavior at the aggregate and the first at the district level.

I found that increased intensity of conflict causes a decline in voter turnout in parliamentary elections. The effect of conflict on turnout is statistically and substantively significant. I argued that turnout decreases because the election environment becomes more insecure during a civil conflict, which increases the cost of voting. Furthermore, voter intimidation by insurgents and security forces might discourage people from voting by spreading fear and creating further security concerns. Our findings are consistent with previous research suggesting that increasing level of conflict decreases electoral participation (Birnir and Gohdes 2018; Bratton 2008; Condra et al. 2019; Hassan 2017; Tezcür 2015). On the other hand, the level of conflict does not have a significant effect on turnout in the presidential elections. This effect is insignificant possibly because presidential elections are considered more salient. As opposed to parliamentary elections where even the smallest parties can gain representation, only a single candidate can be the winner of the presidential election. Therefore, voters may attach a higher level of importance to turning out in presidential elections since the cost of non-voting might exceed the cost of voting.

Furthermore, our findings showed that the Kurdish population share and HDP's vote share are possibly correlated. This finding indicated a possibility of ethnic voting among Kurds. Contrary to our expectations, the vote share of HDP decreases as conflict increases in parliamentary elections. However, we argued that this effect is caused by a change in the vote choice of voters with strategic concerns and a decrease in turnout. Since Turkey has a 10% electoral threshold, some voters might support the HDP in the parliamentary elections for strategic reasons. The escalation of the conflict might cause these voters to move away from the ethnic party. In addition, turnout has a significantly positive effect on the pro-Kurdish party's vote share. That is, when turnout decreases as a result of an increase in conflict, it might also decrease the vote share of HDP.

On the contrary, the pro-Kurdish presidential candidate increases his vote share as a consequence of an increase in conflict. This effect is also substantively significant. We explained it by referring to the social identity theory. Higher levels of violence

60

deepen the ethnic cleavages in a society by increasing the salience of ethnic identities. In such a context, individuals get closer to their ethnic community by embracing their ethnic group identity, whereas they move away from the other party of the conflict (Tajfel and Turner 1979). While this increase in the salience of ethnic identity causes in-group cohesion and favoritism to arise among the Kurdish electorate, it also creates out-group differentiation and hostility towards Turkish parties. As a result, Kurdish voters support a presidential candidate of their ethnicity. The effect of conflict on ethnic voting in presidential elections is also more pronounced since there is no strategic reason for Turkish voters to vote for a Kurdish presidential candidate with almost no chance of winning. Kıbrıs (2014) also reaches a similar conclusion after analyzing the effect of the Kurdish conflict on electoral polarization and suggests that increasing conflict reinforces the salience of ethnic identities and increases the vote share of ethnic and nationalist parties in the 1995 and 1999 general elections.

We also hypothesized that increasing conflict causes an increase in the incumbent's vote share in the short run. Our findings supported the expected relationship between conflict and incumbent support in the context of parliamentary elections. The positive effect of the level of conflict on AKP's vote share is explained by the rally around the flag effect and social identity theory. With an increase in conflict, the salience of the ethnic identity increases. As explained above, such an increase in the salience of the ethnic identity develops in-group cohesion among Turks and they situate themselves far away from the Kurdish parties. This contributes to the formation of a stronger national unity. Thus, voters maintain and increase their support for the governing party, believing that the incumbent has the necessary means to resolve the conflict. In this respect, our findings are in line with Aytaç and Çarkoğlu's (2021) conclusion that voters who perceive terrorism as the most important issue after a rise in the intensity of conflict between the 2015 June and 2015 November elections attributed a higher level of competence to the government in dealing with the issue and increase their support for the incumbent. However, this positive effect of the conflict on the incumbent's vote share remains significant in the long run as against our expectation that the rally around the flag effect will not be effective in the long run due to voters' discontent with the increasing violence. We argued that these findings may reflect voters' satisfaction with the government's counterinsurgency policies and its electoral alliance with MHP, a Turkish nationalist party. Despite that voters maintain their support for the incumbent in parliamentary elections, our findings show that they tend to punish the incumbent candidate as the level of conflict increases. That is, voters punish the leaders they deem responsible for policy failure instead of the parties.

Our second case study was on the Peruvian parliamentary and presidential elections in the presence of the Shining Path conflict between 1980 and 1995. We chose Peru to compare with Turkey because both countries have a long history of conflict, similar electoral systems and institutions, and legitimate political parties long associated with terrorist organizations. On the other hand, the conflict types in these two countries are different. While the conflict in Turkey is based on ethnicity, the conflict in Peru is an ideology and class-based one. Examining the effect of conflict on voting behavior in the presence of such a difference helped us better understand the role of cleavage type.

In our second empirical chapter, we analyzed the effect of the Shining Path conflict on voter turnout, the vote share of an insurgent-affiliated party, the United Left, and the support for the incumbent president. We again estimated an error-correction model to be able to analyze the short and long-term impacts of conflict. However, we could not examine the temporal effect of conflict on the incumbent's vote share because Peruvian governments had frequently changed hands during the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, we only looked to the effect of conflict on the vote share of Fujimori who was a presidential candidate of Change 90 in both the 1990 and 1995 elections.

Our first conclusion for the Peruvian case was that conflict has a statistically significant negative effect only in the presidential elections. Even though the literature suggests that voter intimidation is widespread in Peru, its effect was only visible in presidential elections in the long run. On the other hand, the effect of urbanization on turnout is also negative. We explained this negative relationship between urbanization and turnout by referring to the higher voter intimidation in rural areas because members of the Shining Path were located in rural areas, especially in mountainous and forested places, and in this way, they might have put more pressure on the local people with closer contact. That is in line with Birnir and Gohdes (2018) who find a negative relationship between voter turnout and conflict in their analysis of the 1990 presidential elections.

Another important finding was that as the level of conflict increases, the insurgency-affiliated party loses electoral support in both the parliamentary and presidential elections in Peru. We argued that neither the Shining Path nor the United Left emphasizes ethnicity in their political or insurgency efforts. Furthermore, as explained in previous literature, ethnic cleavages are not politically salient in the Peruvian case (Madrid 2011; McClintock 1984; Palmer 1994). Thus, the salience of ethnic identities is not reinforced by the level of conflict. In such a case, it is unlikely that there will be higher levels of in-group cohesion and out-group differentiation as a result of heightened conflict. Following the social identity theory, we claimed that people

would seek to differentiate themselves from the conductors of violent events in order to adopt a positive social identity. Therefore, as the conflict increases, voters tend to punish the United Left given their link with the terrorist organization.

Lastly, we looked into the effect of conflict on the vote share of Change 90, which was the incumbent party between 1990 and 2000. We analyzed the 1990 and 1995 presidential elections and concluded that the relationship between conflict and incumbent support is insignificant because of the non-ethnic nature of the conflict. The rally around the flag effect does not occur without an external enemy or a salient ethnic differentiation. Since the conflict in Peru is based on class struggle, it neither reinforces the salience of ethnic identity nor the sense of national unity. This finding is also in line with the individual-level studies in the literature suggesting that the counterinsurgency policies did not affect Fujimori's re-election in 1995, but instead economic policies played an important role (Weyland 2000).

Our comparison between the Turkish and Peruvian cases reveals that cleavage type has an important role in the relationship between conflict and electoral behavior. Ethnic conflict deepens the ethnic cleavages and enhances the salience of ethnic identities where there is a politically salient ethnic group. It thus increases the level of support for the ethnic party among the ethnic community despite its affiliation with the terrorist organization because people tend to favor their co-ethnics when the salience of ethnic identities increases. On the other hand, an ethnic conflict also creates a rally around the flag effect and increases the incumbent support by creating an out-group differentiation and hostility. When the dominant ethnic group feels threatened by the ethnic conflict caused by a minority, they assign a higher level of competence to the government in resolving the conflict. On the other hand, when the cleavage is based on ideology as in the case of Peru, voters more easily differentiate themselves from the insurgent-affiliated party to adopt a more positive social identity. Furthermore, when the conflict is ideological, its effects on the incumbent's vote share is null. That is, the rally around the flag effect is more likely to occur when ethnic identities are politically activated.

Consequently, our study contributes to the literature in several regards. To the best of our knowledge, the case study on Turkey is novel in the sense that it is the first study that employs an error-correction model to account for conflict's both the short- and long-term effects on electoral behavior at the district level. Similarly, the case study on Peru is the first study that looks into the effect of the Shining Path conflict on electoral behavior over a long time span. Furthermore, among the studies examining the effect of conflict on voting behavior, our study is one of the few that examines this effect from a comparative perspective.

However, it should also be highlighted that our study is not without its limitations. First, making individual-level inferences by employing aggregate-level data may lead to an ecological fallacy. We tried to overcome this limitation by comparing two cases and including ethnic population shares as control variables in our models. However, an ideal design should employ panel data measuring the salience of ethnic identities when exposed to violence. Using individual-level data, future research might draw more valid inferences on the causal relationship between ethnic conflict and ethnic voting.

Another limitation is that we only examined two cases, both of which are developing democracies, mainly due to the unavailability of comprehensive time-series cross-country data on conflict and electoral behavior. A cross-country analysis might increase the generalizability of our findings. Furthermore, comparing similar cases in their nature of conflict such as Northern Ireland, Spain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey might also reveal important insight regarding the conditioning effect of ethnicity on the relationship between civil conflict and electoral behavior. Further research might also adopt a resarch design making intra- and inter-group comparisons.

Given the unavailability of data at the province level, we had to rely on department-level data and ended up with fewer observations in the Peruvian case. Thus, collecting province-level data which also include fatality types might shed more light on the relationship between conflict and electoral behavior in Peru, especially in the case of voter intimidation, regarding which our findings suggest a possible difference between rural and urban areas.

Another weakness of this study is that the second chapter treats the Kurdish minority as a homogeneous group. However, Sunni and Hanefi divide within Kurds, the existence of Zazas possibly with somewhat different motivations, and the level of religiosity might have modifying effects on the relationship between conflict and the support for the pro-Kurdish party. Such an effect can be explained by employing individual-level data in future research. Thus, further research is needed to better understand the within-group differences regarding ethnic conflict and ethnic voting.

Lastly, while the Kurdish conflict is still prevalent in Turkey, the Peruvian conflict ended with a peace process. Such a difference might be explained by the distinct effects of conflict on the incumbent party's vote share. Our findings suggest that the main beneficiary of the conflict is the incumbent in the Turkish case, which increases its vote share as the level of conflict increases in the short and long terms. These findings might have important implications in explaining the peace attempts as well as the failure of reconciliation in both countries. Turkey had two failed peace

processes initiated, in turn, in 2009 and 2013, aiming to solve the Kurdish issue and end the civil conflict. Both processes were introduced and abandoned under the leadership of the same political party. The failure of these peace attempts might be explained by a decrease in the popular support for the incumbent as opposed to an increase in the electoral support for the pro-Kurdish party (Yavuz and Özcan 2015). Acknowledging that all political parties aim for office, one might expect incumbent parties benefiting from the rise of conflict to adopt a more hawkish stance and to be less enthusiastic about solving the issue in order to remain in power. However, in the Peruvian case, conflict did not have a significant effect on the popular support for the incumbent, which might have implications for the success of the peace process. Future research Should consider this effect of conflict on the incumbent support while explaining the initiation and failure of peace processes.

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Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics for Parliamentary Elections

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Vote Share of HDP (Ethnic)	0.1	0.2	0	0.97	3828
Vote Share of AKP (Incumbent)	0.48	0.17	0.01	0.95	3828
Turnout	0.86	0.04	0.62	0.98	3828
Total Fatalities since the Previous Election (Logged)	0.23	0.82	0	7.13	3828
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election	0.15	1.48	0	40.1	3828
PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election (Logged)	0.13	0.57	0	5.83	3828
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election	0.05	0.53	0	15.25	3828
Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election (Logged)	0.09	0.43	0	4.26	3828
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	0.02	0.21	0	9	3828
PKK Attacks since the Previous Election (Logged)	0.29	0.75	0	5.89	3828
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election	0.09	0.54	0	11.58	3828
Kurdish Population Share	0.16	0.31	0	0.99	3828
Population Growth Rate	0	0.02	-0.35	0.27	3828
Population (Logged)	10.41	1.3	7.32	13.73	3828
Urbanization	0.70	0.29	0.06	1	3828
Female Share	0.5	0.02	0.31	0.55	3828
Average Household Size	3.57	1.05	2.12	9.06	3828
Literacy Rate	0.94	0.04	0.74	1	3828
Dependency Ratio	0.2	0.11	0.04	0.69	3828
Border District	0.04	0.19	0	1	3828
Southeastern/Eastern Region	0.21	0.41	0	1	3828

Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics for Presidential Elections

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Vote Share of Demirtaş (Ethnic)	0.09	0.18	0	0.94	1914
Vote Share of Erdoğan (Incumbent)	0.55	0.18	0.03	0.95	1914
Turnout	0.83	0.07	0.58	0.95	1914
Total Fatalities since the Previous Election (Logged)	0.35	1.05	0	7.15	1914
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election	0.17	1.36	0	27.54	1914
PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election (Logged)	0.19	0.72	0	5.99	1914
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election	0.05	0.4	0	8.67	1914
Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election (Logged)	0.13	0.53	0	4.41	1914
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	0.02	0.11	0	1.76	1914
PKK Attacks since the Previous Election (Logged)	0.43	0.96	0	5.94	1914
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election	0.08	0.47	0	8.24	1914
Kurdish Population Share	0.15	0.3	0	0.98	1914
Population Growth Rate	0	0.01	-0.04	0.07	1914
Population (Logged)	10.41	1.31	7.32	13.73	1914
Urbanization	0.76	0.28	0.07	1	1914
Female Share	0.5	0.02	0.31	0.56	1914
Average Household Size	3.47	0.97	2.08	8.58	1914
Literacy Rate	0.95	0.03	0.77	1	1914
Dependency Ratio	0.21	0.11	0.04	0.69	1914
Border District	0.04	0.19	0	1	1914
Southeastern/Eastern Region	0.21	0.41	0	1	1914

Table A.3 Descriptive Statistics (Sub-Sample Limited to Districts with Terrorist Attacks)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Vote Share of HDP (Ethnic)	0.28	0.29	0	0.97	1192
Vote Share of AKP (Incumbent)	0.4	0.19	0.01	0.93	1192
Turnout	0.85	0.05	0.58	0.98	1192
Total Fatalities since the Previous Election (Logged)	1.31	1.62	0	7.15	1192
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election	0.77	3.09	0	40.1	1192
PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election (Logged)	0.72	1.22	0	5.99	1192
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election	0.24	1.06	0	15.25	1192
Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election (Logged)	0.52	0.92	0	4.41	1192
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	0.09	0.39	0	9	1192
PKK Attacks since the Previous Election (Logged)	1.62	1.1	0.69	5.94	1192
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election	0.42	1.08	0.02	11.58	1192
Kurdish Population Share	0.42	0.42	0	0.99	1192
Population Growth Rate	0	0.02	-0.07	0.27	1192
Population (Logged)	11.12	1.33	7.52	13.73	1192
Urbanization	0.78	0.28	0.06	1	1192
Female Share	0.49	0.03	0.31	0.55	1192
Average Household Size	4.27	1.39	2.16	9.06	1192
Literacy Rate	0.94	0.04	0.8	0.99	1192
Dependency Ratio	0.13	0.08	0.04	0.61	1192
Border District	0.11	0.31	0	1	1192

Table A.4 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on the Voter Turnout (Sub-Sample Limited to Districts with Terrorist Attacks)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Turnout$_{(t-1)}$	0.598***	0.598***	0.600***	0.601***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.047)
ΔMonthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	-0.001			
	(0.003)			
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$	-0.007**			
	(0.004)			
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election		-0.000		
		(0.001)		
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$		-0.002**		
		(0.001)		
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election			-0.001	
			(0.001)	
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$			-0.002**	
			(0.001)	
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election				-0.002
				(0.001)
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$				-0.005**
				(0.002)
Kurdish Population Share	-0.014	-0.015*	-0.013	-0.011
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Population Growth Rate	2.061***	2.061***	2.118***	2.118***
	(0.575)	(0.580)	(0.573)	(0.568)
Population (Logged)	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Urbanization	0.016**	0.017**	0.017**	0.017**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Female Share	0.068	0.060	0.034	0.037
	(0.125)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.123)
Average Household Size	0.006*	0.006	0.006*	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Literacy Rate	0.111	0.101	0.108	0.093
	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.106)
Dependency Ratio	0.067	0.059	0.065	0.067
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Border District	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Election = 2015 November	-0.045***	-0.045***	-0.044***	-0.043***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Election = 2018	-0.027***	-0.027***	-0.025***	-0.024***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	0.176	0.192*	0.186*	0.193*
	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.110)
N	260	260	260	260
R^2 (between)	0.776	0.767	0.770	0.771
R^2 (overall)	0.602	0.599	0.604	0.603

Robust standard errors clustered by district are in parentheses.Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.5 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on Ethnic Party's Vote Share (Sub-Sample Limited to Districts with Terrorist Attacks)

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Ethnic Party's Vote Share (HDP)$_{(t-1)}$	0.679***	0.677***	0.685***	0.679***
	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.057)
ΔMonthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	0.013***			
	(0.004)			
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$	0.007			
	(0.009)			
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election		0.005		
		(0.003)		
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$		0.001		
		(0.004)		
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election			0.001	
			(0.001)	
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$			-0.002	
			(0.002)	
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election				0.006*
				(0.003)
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$				-0.001
				(0.005)
ΔTurnout	0.459***	0.459***	0.462***	0.483***
	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.159)	(0.155)
Turnout$_{(t-1)}$	0.466***	0.475***	0.484***	0.487***
	(0.171)	(0.173)	(0.172)	(0.169)
Kurdish Population Share	0.133***	0.137***	0.132***	0.134***
	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Population Growth Rate	-1.101	-1.278	-1.141	-1.397
	(2.016)	(1.997)	(2.045)	(2.056)
Population (Logged)	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Urbanization	0.050*	0.051*	0.047*	0.049*
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Female Share	-0.671**	-0.659**	-0.684**	-0.645**
	(0.309)	(0.317)	(0.306)	(0.311)
Average Household Size	-0.011	-0.013	-0.012	-0.013
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Literacy Rate	-0.564*	-0.573*	-0.558*	-0.571*
	(0.300)	(0.307)	(0.299)	(0.307)
Dependency Ratio	-0.303*	-0.319*	-0.311*	-0.332*
	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.174)	(0.177)
Border District	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.003
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Election = 2015 November	-0.181***	-0.181***	-0.180***	-0.185***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Election = 2018	-0.208***	-0.209***	-0.208***	-0.209***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Constant	0.744**	0.747**	0.731**	0.745**
	(0.317)	(0.323)	(0.319)	(0.326)
N	260	260	260	260
R^2 (between)	0.964	0.963	0.964	0.963
R^2 (overall)	0.936	0.935	0.936	0.935

Robust standard errors clustered by district are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Table A.6 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on the Incumbent Party's Vote Share (Sub-Sample Limited to Districts with Terrorist Attacks)

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Incumbent Party's Vote Share (AKP)$_{(t-1)}$	0.647***	0.652***	0.653***	0.655***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)
ΔMonthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election	-0.011***			
	(0.004)			
Monthly Average of Security Force Casualties since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$	-0.008			
	(0.006)			
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election		-0.006***		
		(0.002)		
Monthly Average of PKK Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$		-0.000		
		(0.003)		
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election			-0.001	
			(0.001)	
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$			0.003*	
			(0.002)	
ΔMonthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election				-0.006**
				(0.003)
Monthly Average of PKK Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$				0.006*
				(0.003)
ΔTurnout	-0.399***	-0.385***	-0.384***	-0.391***
	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.130)	(0.124)
Turnout$_{(t-1)}$	-0.636***	-0.624***	-0.642***	-0.628***
	(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.139)
Kurdish Population Share	-0.069***	-0.069***	-0.069***	-0.069***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Population Growth Rate	1.484	1.627	1.445	1.600
	(1.274)	(1.291)	(1.299)	(1.264)
Population (Logged)	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Urbanization	-0.037	-0.037	-0.034	-0.036
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Female Share	0.442**	0.394**	0.460***	0.422**
	(0.175)	(0.181)	(0.177)	(0.178)
Average Household Size	0.022**	0.023**	0.022**	0.023**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Literacy Rate	0.428*	0.429*	0.414*	0.423*
	(0.242)	(0.246)	(0.241)	(0.245)
Dependency Ratio	0.154	0.171	0.159	0.176
	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.134)	(0.135)
Border District	-0.023	-0.024	-0.027	-0.026
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Election = 2015 November	0.163***	0.166***	0.162***	0.168***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Election = 2018	0.104***	0.105***	0.102***	0.100***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Constant	-0.122	-0.125	-0.116	-0.132
	(0.239)	(0.240)	(0.239)	(0.242)
N	260	260	260	260
R^2 (between)	0.917	0.919	0.919	0.917
R^2 (overall)	0.862	0.865	0.862	0.863

Robust standard errors clustered by district are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

APPENDIX B

Table B.1 Descriptive Statistics for Parliamentary Elections

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Turnout	0.70	0.17	0.21	0.94	72
Vote Share of Izquierda Unida	0.13	0.1	0.01	0.39	72
Total Number of Fatalities in Terrorist Attacks (Logged)	2.49	2.4	0	7.56	72
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election	1.7	4.33	0	31.98	72
Total Number of Terrorist Attacks (Logged)	2.03	1.9	0	6.52	72
Monthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election	0.71	1.81	0	11.25	72
Indigenous Population Share	0.22	0.23	0	0.71	72
Population (Logged)	13.11	0.98	10.36	15.6	72
Education	0.05	0.04	0	0.14	72
Unemployment	0.11	0.13	0	0.83	72
Female Share	0.5	0.04	0.31	0.6	72
Urbanization	0.59	0.23	0.2	1	72
Border District	0.33	0.47	0	1	72

Table B.2 Descriptive Statistics for Presidential Elections

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Turnout	0.79	0.11	0.5	0.96	96
Vote Share of the United Left	0.08	0.09	0	0.34	96
Vote Share of the Change 90	0.37	0.18	0.02	0.66	48
Total Number of Fatalities in Terrorist Attacks (Logged)	2.7	2.29	0	7.56	96
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election	1.62	3.85	0	31.98	96
Total Number of Terrorist Attacks (Logged)	2.1	1.81	0	6.52	96
Monthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election	0.69	1.78	0	11.25	96
Indigenous Population Share	0.22	0.23	0	0.71	96
Population (Logged)	13.16	0.97	10.36	15.71	96
Education	0.05	0.03	0	0.14	96
Unemployment	0.1	0.11	0	0.83	96
Female Share	0.5	0.04	0.31	0.6	96
Urbanization	0.6	0.23	0.2	1	96
Border District	0.33	0.47	0	1	96

Table B.3 GLS Regression Estimates on the Effect of Conflict on the Vote Share of the United Left

	Model 1	Model 2
Vote Share of the United Left$_{t-1}$	-0.127	-0.112
	(0.085)	(0.072)
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election	-0.001	
	(0.006)	
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$	-0.001	
	(0.005)	
ΔMonthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election × Indigenous Population Share	-0.003	
	(0.012)	
Monthly Average of Total Fatalities since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$ × Indigenous Population Share	-0.004	
	(0.008)	
ΔMonthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election		-0.003
		(0.004)
Monthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$		0.001
		(0.003)
ΔMonthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election × Indigenous Population Share		-0.013
		(0.011)
Monthly Average of Terrorist Attacks since the Previous Election$_{(t-1)}$ × Indigenous Population Share		-0.023***
		(0.007)
Indigenous Population Share	0.098***	0.102***
	(0.036)	(0.036)
ΔTurnout	-0.048	-0.057
	(0.111)	(0.097)
Turnout$_{t-1}$	-0.000	-0.003
	(0.115)	(0.112)
Urbanization	-0.041	-0.034
	(0.052)	(0.052)
Population (Logged)	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Education	0.324	0.356
	(0.298)	(0.294)
Unemployment	0.041	0.022
	(0.057)	(0.063)
Female Share	-0.638***	-0.647***
	(0.199)	(0.209)
Border District	-0.000	0.002
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Election = 1995	-0.210***	-0.216***
	(0.024)	(0.026)
Election = 1990	-0.114***	-0.119***
	(0.031)	(0.028)
Constant	0.554***	0.536***
	(0.111)	(0.110)
N	72	72
R^2 (between)	0.472	0.489
R^2 (overall)	0.841	0.841

Robust standard errors clustered by department are in parentheses.Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01