

**POPULIST FOREIGN POLICY : THE CASES OF TURKEY,
HUNGARY, VENEZUELA, AND GREECE**

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Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Sabancı University
JULY 2022

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HUNGARY, VENEZUELA AND GREECE**

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Date of Approval: July 20, 2022

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ABSTRACT

POPULIST FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASES OF TURKEY, HUNGARY, VENEZUELA, AND GREECE

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POLITICAL SCIENCE M.A. THESIS, JULY 2022

Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Berk Esen

Keywords: Populist Foreign Policy, Revisionism, Right-Wing Populism, Left-Wing
Populism, Typology

Populist foreign policies constitute a growing part of the populism literature. The rising numbers of populist cases, and their increasing impact on world politics lead to the question of what kind of foreign policy agendas populist leaders prefer. Considering the gap in the literature in terms of applying the method of comparison to systematically analyze populist foreign policies, this study will compare four populist foreign policy cases, Turkey, Hungary, Venezuela, and Greece. This thesis argues that populist foreign policies have common and different points that can be systematically explained. To prove this fact, the ideological component, namely right-wing or left-wing populism, and the revisionism level in the foreign policy goals, i.e., revisionist or defensive foreign policies, are used to explain the similarities and differences between populist foreign policies. Drawing a two-paired comparison table in the end, the four cases will be examined under four foreign policy indicators that can be considered the attributes of globalization, and that populist leaders construct an important part of their foreign policies on. In the end, the results show that populist foreign policies can be categorized in accordance with their ideological stances, and revisionism levels. Also, they imply that populist foreign policies have similar and divergent features under four foreign policy indicators.

ÖZET

POPÜLİST DIŐ POLİTİKALAR: TÜRKİYE, MACARİSTAN, VENEZUELA,
YUNANİSTAN

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SİYASET BİLİMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2022

Tez DanıŐmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Berk Esen

Anahtar Kelimeler: Popülist DıŐ Politika, Revizyonizm, SaĐ Popülizm, Sol
Popülizm, Tipoloji

Popülist dıŐ politika konusu, popülizm literatürünün genişleyen bir bölümünü oluŐturmaktadır. Popülist vakaların sayısının ve dünya siyaseti üzerindeki etkisinin artması ile, popülist liderlerin ne tür dıŐ politikaları benimsedikleri sorusu gündeme gelmektedir. Popülist dıŐ politikaları sistematik olarak karşılaŐtırma konusunda literatürdeki boşluĐu göz önünde bulundurarak, bu çalıŐma, dört popülist dıŐ politika örneĐini, Türkiye, Macaristan, Venezuela ve Yunanistan'ı karşılaŐtıracaktır. Bu kapsamda, popülist dıŐ politikaların sistematik olarak açıklanabilecek ortak ve farklı noktaları olduĐunu savunulmaktadır. Bu amaçla, ideoloji, yani saĐ veya sol popülizm; ve dıŐ politika hedeflerindeki revizyonizm düzeyi, yani revizyonist veya savunmacı dıŐ politikalar, farklı popülist dıŐ politika örnekleri arasındaki benzerlikleri ve farklılıkları açıklamak için kullanılacaktır. Son olarak ikili bir karşılaŐtırma tablosu çizilecek; ve dört popülist dıŐ politika örneĐi, küreselleŐmenin getirdikleri arasında sayılabilecek ve popülist liderlerin dıŐ politikalarının önemli bir bölümünü üzerine inŐa ettikleri dört dıŐ politika alanı altında incelenecektir. Sonuç olarak, bulgular popülist dıŐ politikaların ideolojik duruŐlarına ve revizyonizm seviyelerine göre kategorize edilebileceĐini göstermektedir. Ayrıca popülist dıŐ politikaların, incelenen dört dıŐ politika alanında benzer ve farklı özelliklere sahip olduĐu tespit edilmiŐtir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis advisor Assist. Prof. Berk Esen for his support from the beginning to the end of this thesis. It was thanks to his punctual and always guiding feedbacks that I was able to analyze the foreign policies of four different countries in such a deep and detailed way.

I will never forget the years at this master degree. In the middle of the pandemic, I was able to spend every hour I spent at home learning new information and methods in the name of social science. I had the opportunity to develop myself both academically and technically. But I think I will never forget how hard I worked to achieve this.

This thesis is the last part of my education for a while. The physical proof of a little girl's master's degree who was not admitted to primary school, and it is one of the most precious parts of my education life, which was more miraculous than I could even imagine. To my parents who taught me the value of hard work and perseverance, and to my friends who are part of my family who have always supported me... I am grateful to all of their support during the writing process of this thesis.

*Dedicated to
my mom and dad, for everything...*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
EU	European Union
FTAA	Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Mercosur	Common Market of South
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PFP	Populist Foreign Policy
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
US	United States

1. INTRODUCTION

How do populist leaders shape their foreign policy agendas? What kind of foreign policy actions do they implement? Do populist leaders apply a common foreign policy? Which goals do they pursue in their foreign policy lines? When one considers the examples such as Erdoğan who put the doctrine of “the world is bigger than five” into the foreground of his foreign policy discourse, Chavez who came up with the claim of realizing the Bolivarian dreams in Latin America, or Orban who built his foreign policy on the slogan of “Stop Brussels”; these questions become more relevant and insightful. These are only some symbolic examples of how populists behave in their foreign policy actions. Their PFPs are crucial not only for their own countries, but also for the whole international order, since they might have revisionist goals, challenge the existing global norms and institutions, with an aim to establish their own ideological ideas and become a global power. Also, taking the rise in the number of populist cases in the world, the necessity of understanding PFP requires more attention in terms of both global politics and international relations.

Populism is one of the most-discussed topics in political science literature recently. Its literature continues to widen with the emergence of new populist leaders. Both case studies, comparisons, and theoretical papers have common places in the literature. A huge part of this literature focus on the impact of populism on domestic politics. However, populist cases might have common points in their foreign policies as well, as they do in their domestic politics. Also, their differences can be explained through systematic comparisons. Despite this fact, the pieces that work on the foreign policy aspects of populism are not numerous. Thus, there is a considerable gap in the populism literature in terms of the nature of PFP. Then, among papers on PFP, there is only a few works (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017; Chryssogelos 2017; Destradi and Plagemann 2019a) that put their effort to analyze and theorize what kind of foreign policies that populists execute in a systematic manner.

Under these circumstances, many studies make single-case studies, emphasizing the peculiar features of their cases. Yet the critical question of whether there is one

common PFP still expects to be answered. Since comparisons are difficult to adopt due to the peculiarities of different cases, and thus the comparative studies are rare, it is hard to determine what kind of similarities and differences PFPs have. While the existing PFP literature emphasizes the importance of attached left- and right-wing ideologies to populism, they do not explain why and how two left-wing, or two right-wing PFPs are differentiated from one another. Also, none of the existing papers do evaluate the divergent goals of populist leaders in their foreign policies. For instance, when some populists endeavor to protect their country vis-à-vis the different attributes of globalization such as the increasing control of international institutions over nation-states, some others might aim to revise their regional order, become a global power and challenge the existing hegemony. Thus, the other question should be what kind of foreign policy agendas populists implement. To answer these questions there needs to be a comparative work that show the common and divergent aspects of PFPs in a systematic manner.

This study primarily focuses on responding to these two questions and aims to analyze and compare different contents of PFPs under certain foreign policy areas. In the end, the main goal is to show some general similarities and differences among populists' foreign policy contents and draw a typology that categorizes PFPs accordingly. In that way, it will be reasonable to argue whether it is possible to expect some behaviors from populist leaders. This fact is crucial for policymakers, diplomats and international relations experts as well, because if it is possible to generalize PFPs, it would be easier to foresee or predict the next moves of populist leaders in their foreign policy actions, as in a game of chess.

In that sense, I argue that PFPs are shaped in accordance with two main explanatory factors: the ideological component, namely right-wing or left-wing ideologies; and foreign policy goals, namely adopting a revisionist or defensive foreign policy. First, in this paper, populism is taken as a “thin-centered ideology” based on antagonism between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”, following the classical populism definition of Mudde (2004). Accordingly, populists' actions in a wide range of policy areas are influenced by the ideologies attached to populism. In accordance with these ideologies, populists implement different policies like anti-immigration for right-wing populists or more protectionism in trade for left-wing populists. That is because populists with different attaching ideologies define their pure people and corrupt elites differently. For instance, while right-wing populists are more exclusive in their transborder appeal, left-wing populists can behave more inclusive since their pure people definition does not include identity-based factors, i.e., national or religious features. Lastly, this first explanatory factor is also used to categorize PFPs in the existing papers (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017; Chrysosgelos 2017), thus, this study is

conducted in line with the literature. In the next chapters, these aspects of Mudde (2004)'s definition and the term attaching ideology will be examined in a detailed manner.

Secondly, and differently from the literature this time, this paper argues that PFPs can be categorized according to their foreign policy goals, or revisionism levels in their foreign policies. Namely, populists who have more revisionist foreign policy goals prioritizes different actions, i.e., more active, and transformative ones. They challenge the existing global order dominated by the West through mainly constructing their own international/regional institutions and claiming their regional leaderships. By contrast, other populists who do not have revisionist goals behave differently, they are more cautious and defensive. As opposed to the International Relations literature, in this thesis the defensive foreign policy does not mean an intention to protect "status-quo". I argue that defensive PFPs do not satisfy with the Western-dominant global order either, but in accordance with their capabilities, they aim to challenge the existing global order and institutions from within, and protect their countries from the "negative" impacts of the global order, namely the neoliberalism and disrupting national sovereignty. It is possible to give many examples in that regard from different populist cases. As explained in the next chapters, Orban who does not look for a revisionism in regional or global politics built a considerable part of his foreign policy on the claim of preventing the EU from shaping Hungarian politics with its interference in many areas from judicial system to immigration policies. The controversial example can be given from the Latin American region: Chavez in Venezuela aims to change the regional order in Latin America, decrease the dependency on the US in the region and break this latter's hegemony, and claim his leadership. In this respect, like the first explanatory factor, implying revisionist foreign policy goals affect PFPs in many areas from trade to the assertive discourses against global governance. That is why, this factor will be another point based on according to which PFPs are categorized.

In order to compare different cases and create an exhaustive typology of populist foreign policy, this thesis examines four PFPs, the populist governments of Erdoğan in Turkey, Orban in Hungary, Chavez in Venezuela, and Tsipras in Greece. While the Turkish and Hungarian PFPs are examples of right-wing populisms, the administrations of Chavez and Tsipras will be the left-wing PFPs. Also, Erdoğan and Chavez conduct revisionist PFPs, whereas Tsipras and Orban remained more defensive in their foreign policy preferences. According to this scheme, it will be possible to have two-paired comparisons. With the two explanatory factors, taking two different values for each, leading to four types of PFPs. In this thesis, for all these four types there is one case to be examined, as illustrated in the Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Typology

	Right-Wing	Left-Wing
Revisionist	Turkey	Venezuela
Defensive	Hungary	Greece

In terms of the case selection method, four cases are chosen in accordance with the changing values of independent variables. This thesis has two independent variables, the ideological stance and revisionism in foreign policy, each of which takes two main values. First, ideology can be either left-wing or right-wing. Secondly, a given populist case can be either revisionist or defensive. Each paired independent variables will be examined through a corresponding case, namely, left-wing defensive, and left-wing revisionist PFP; right-wing defensive, and right-wing revisionist PFP. Each of these values, there will be analyzed one case in this study. Thus, all values that the two independent variables can take will be analyzed. That is why, to examine four cases would be the most appropriate way to systematically show these changing values in the independent variables. Also, all these cases occupy an important place in the literature, and hence can be considered as “representative” cases in their categories in terms of right-wing or left-wing populisms. Lastly, since this study will be using mainly secondary literature, choosing the most-discussed cases in the literature will increase the availability of sources which would enhance this thesis. Yet first, it can be useful to briefly state some introductory information about each case:

First, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is one of the most-discussed right-wing populist leaders in the literature (Aytaç and Elçi 2019; Bozkurt 2013; Ayhan 2020). The country has been governed by the AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) under the leadership of Erdoğan since 2002. After a long coalition period during the 1990s, AKP gained the majority of the seats in the parliament in 2002 and won all of the national elections until today. In the first decade of its governments, the country followed the EU integration process by applying the Copenhagen criteria to get full membership. The country was a model for other Middle Eastern countries due to its democratic system led by the Muslim people. However, in the second decade of the AKP government, first, Turkey moved away from the goal of the full EU - membership (Keyman and Gümüşgü 2014). The party gradually defeated its rivals in domestic politics via several jurisdiction processes and system changes. By increasing his support by 49% in the 2011 parliamentary elections, Erdoğan consolidated his and AKP’s presence in the country. Then, Erdoğan adopted a populist discourse forming an understanding of "us" versus "others" both in internal and external politics. His internal and external policy outputs were transformed into a more revisionist and ambi-

tious foreign policy agenda. Following this transition, in 2017, he proposed a new hyper-presidential system receiving approval from a referendum (Kutlay and Öniş 2021). Today, after the alliance with Nationalist Movement Party in recent years, Erdoğan's populism became more exclusive by combining the previous emphasis on the religion for "people" definition with the connotation of Turkish nationality. Under these circumstances, Erdoğan executes a pragmatic, transactional PFP based on bilateral relationships, by signing trade agreements with Russia and China, appealing the skepticism regarding the rhetoric of international institutions, or claiming the regional leadership is some of these PFP actions, as it will be explained in the next chapters.

Hungary led by the Fidesz governments under the leadership of Victor Orban can be considered to have a more defensive PFP compared to the Turkish case. Leading to the post-communist period, Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) emerged as a liberal party opposing communism in the last decade of the 20th century. Even though Orban came to power in 1998 and had a less populist appeal, and more willing to engage in global governance, such as providing the NATO membership, until 2002, Orban transformed the party in the following years. After two defeats in 2002 and 2006, the party reshaped itself with a more populist stance, based on a nationality-based political discourse (Bozóki 2015). Then, it appeared as a populist party with a claim of protecting the Hungarian people vis-à-vis the negative impact of the EU's interferences. Benefitting from the grievances of Hungary's worsening economic conditions during the 2008 global financial crisis, Orban could get more votes. The party led by Orban won the 2010, 2014, 2018 and 2022 elections, and Orban still holds in political power today. Even though the country is geographically situated in the middle of liberal democracies and is a member of the EU, it became one of the most crucial cases of European right-wing populisms along with Poland, posing a fundamental threat to the EU, with respect to its common norms and values, such as liberal democracy and a transparent administration that are tried to be established among member states. Throughout Orban's governments, the density of populism gradually increased. The immigration crisis in 2015 also became an opportunity for Orban, to consolidate his electorate around the anti-immigrant ideas, blaming the EU for hampering Hungarian traditional values. Consequently, as it will be examined in detail throughout this thesis, the Fidesz party with its right-wing populist leader, Orban, implemented a pragmatic, Euro-skeptic, illiberal, and defensive foreign policy agenda (Varga and Buzogány 2021, 3).

Among the left-wing populists, it is possible to see similar backgrounds. Chavez is one of the most important political figures in Latin America in terms of both the leftist ideology that he applied and his usage of populism. He was the president

of Venezuela from 1999 until his death in 2013. He won four consecutive elections, along with many other regional elections with his political party. Throughout his presidency, his main goal was to revive the Bolivarian revolution that had two main dreams, pan-Americanism and anti-imperialism. Since he built the dichotomy between “people” versus “elite” along a socioeconomic criteria, rather than identity-based features, his populism was more inclusive and able to address the broader Latin American community. Conducting a revisionist PFP, his main aim was to challenge the US hegemony in the region, decrease the country’s dependency on US trade relations, and form a new leftist regional order in Latin America. To this end, he looked for alternative alliances, and organized new regional cooperation such as ALBA or UNASUR against Western international institutions. Under his presidency, the country was seen as a hybrid regime witnessing a high level of democratic backsliding and corruption (Ellner and Salas 2006). As in the previous two examples, the regime gradually became more authoritarian, more populist, and more ambitious in its foreign policy actions. In this thesis, we will mainly focus on the Chavez era. Yet it should be underlined that when Maduro came to power in 2013, he followed his predecessor’s route in terms of his increasing populist discourse and its reflection on the foreign policy agenda. His regime is more populist and has been called authoritarian due to the erosion of fair political playground for political parties.

Lastly, Syriza (Coalition of the Radical Left – Progressive Alliance) led by Tsipras, as the defensive left-wing populist case in this study, had the shortest term in power compared to the other three populists cases. The political party was established in 2004 deriving from the tradition of the Communist Party in Greece (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). With its performance in the 2012 elections, the party became more visible both in European politics and in the literature due to its achievement to build left-wing populist rhetoric and reach the Greek people successfully. When he participated in the 2012 elections, Tsipras had a radical opposition against the EU and other international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) due to their austerity policies imposed on the Greek people. In fact, derived from its already weak financial structure, Greece was one of the most affected countries from the 2008 financial crisis. In addition to its debts since 2006, the country could not pay its debts after 2008, and entered into a crisis period where the EU had to intervene and proposed a “rescue model” for the Greek economy. Yet these measures fueled Euro-skepticism and placed a heavy burden on the Greek people. In a time when “Grexit” scenarios began to be discussed among European community, Tsipras won the 2015 elections by offering a “third way” between leaving the EU and strict austerity measures imposed by the troika (Mudde 2016). The

party formed a coalition government with ANEL, a radical right-wing political party. Consequently, Syriza could stay in power between 2015 and 2019 under the leadership of Alexis Tsipras. His populist rhetoric was based on the idea to defend Greece from the impositions of the EU and particularly of the IMF. Also, his populism was again more inclusive compared to right-wing populisms (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). His success was derived from his ability to "make broader appeals along a people-elite cleavage" based on defining the "people" in socio-economic terms (Chryssogelos 2017, 10). Yet, when Tsipras concluded an agreement with the EU for the debt crisis, which had heavier conditions than before, his party lost most of its supporters, and was downgraded to opposition in 2019.

The foreign policy areas according to which the populist cases will be analyzed are determined mainly in line with the literature. In this thesis, I will examine four populist cases under four foreign policy areas called "foreign policy indicators". These indicators are the migration, trade policy, global governance, and transborder activism. The main reasons why these indicators are preferred are as follows: Firstly, the first three indicators are also used in the existing theoretical papers (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017; Chryssogelos 2017), except for transborder activism that will be a novelty for the PFP literature as a foreign policy area where cases are comparatively analyzed. Secondly, all these indicators are foreign policy areas which populists usually turn to in constructing their foreign policies on. Based on the explanation that globalization is the triggering factor behind the emergence and the rise of the populism in recent years, in fact, all these indicators can be categorized as areas that gained more importance with globalization. More open and fluid state borders for people's mobilization, the necessity of making international trade, the increasing control of international or regional institutions over nation-states, and hence more inter-state or supra-state unions are all aspects of globalization. Benefiting from people's grievances over these new issues, populists are likely to construct their foreign policies in these areas. It should be underlined that those areas are important for non-populists as well. However, they have a crucial place in the agendas of populist leaders because in those areas, they can differentiate themselves from previous governments that could not meet the needs and demands of electorates, or from the existing global order which creates grievances among the "pure people" of a given populist leader. Populists also use these fields as a tool to consolidate their supporters, by shaping the domestic political discourse. If one questions which transformations Trump brought to the American foreign policy, the anti-immigration as exemplified in closing the Mexican borders, opening the NAFTA into question, bilateralism in trade, reacting against the affairs of off-shores and put the discourse "America first" can be counted among these novelties. From this example, it be-

comes apparent is very observable how these foreign policy indicators allow populist leaders to shape their foreign policy.

Regarding the first indicator, the rising numbers of right-wing populists, especially in Europe, most populist leaders mobilize their voters around the anti-immigration policies (Ivarsflaten 2008). As briefly mentioned above, increasing support for Orban coincides with the outbreak of migration crisis in 2015. Even this crisis can be perceived as an opportunity to strengthen its nationalist and populist policy stance because immigrants were the groups that were called “foreigner” or “outsider” that aimed to demolish the native Hungarian culture, in the dichotomy triggered by Orban.

Second, to understand how populists shape their international trade policy is crucial to get an idea on their economic policies. For instance, left-wing populists pursue their ideologies on trade policies, in order to be able to claim that they do not adopt a neoliberal model which they are ideologically opposed to. That is because their main basis is to react against the neoliberal economic model and its highly competitive trade environment hampering the pure people defined by socioeconomic criteria.

Third, opposing the international institutions that lead global governance which was constructed in the post-World War II era is a common point among left- and right-wing populisms. International institutions such as the EU or the IMF having competencies and economic strengths restrict nation-states in many areas. They do not only have a right to say in shaping free-trade policies, but they also require compliance with liberal democratic values. Populist leaders react against increasing interferences and put forth the argument of prioritizing national sovereignty, and putting the voice of their nations. Thus, as in the examples of Syriza, reactionism vis-à-vis the global governance, namely the troika can be the “raison d’être” of a populist leader (Mudde 2016).

Finally, the last foreign policy indicator, transborder activism is one that was not examined in the literature before. This indicator questions whether populist leaders have an intention to expand their populist discourse to other areas, such as beyond national borders. Accordingly, some populists use this strategy in a very effective manner and could win the votes of the citizens living abroad. They put this activism into the foreground and engage in high levels in their foreign policy agendas. I argue that the scope of the community that populist leaders address is shaped according to the attaching ideology. For instance, a left-wing populist defines his pure people in accordance with the socioeconomic conditions, and hence the populist leader is able to address their appeal to all socioeconomically vulnerable people in a transborder manner. On the other hand, right-wing populists’ pure people definition makes

identity-based inclusions. Thus, right-wing populists generally target a transborder community on the basis of a selected identity, religion, tradition, and so on. Also, most populists form specific policy tools and institutions, and allocate state resources to implement this activism. In this study, we will see that all populists attempt to utilize transborder activism at varying levels and shapes. Nevertheless, the level of priority given to transborder activism by populists will change according to the specific features of each case.

For the methodology part, as mentioned above, this study utilized qualitative methods, primarily the comparative method. Analyzing cases from different regions of the world in a comparative manner is another contribution of this thesis to the existing PFP literature. Four cases will be compared as two-paired groups in accordance with the two independent variables. This study does not only analyze cases separately but also compare them with an aim to find systematic similarities and differences among PFPs. Applying the theoretical expectations to the concrete foreign policy actions of populist leaders, the study puts a comprehensive and exhaustive typology in the end, to be able to analyze other populist cases as well. Apart from the obvious across-case analysis method, within-case analysis will also be executed. While examining a long period especially for Turkey, Venezuela and Hungary, a within-case analysis is useful to determine the points that populist leaders transform both themselves and their foreign policy actions. In the Turkish case, for instance, Erdoğan's governments in their two first period might not be considered as populist as they are afterwards. Thus, this study should mainly examine the foreign policy actions of AKP governments since 2011 elections as cited above. Yet since Davutoğlu's "Strategic Depth" perception was remained in the related period, a within-case analysis provides this opportunity to understand the PFP from its construction. Also, Erdoğan's PFP first aimed to pursue regional activism with neighboring countries. However, after the outbreak of the Arab Spring movements in the region, the PFP was revised and expanded its scope to wider Asian powers or wanted to be more active in the regions such as North Africa. Another example should be how Orbán strengthened his emphasis on immigration after the migration crisis. Then, the study uses secondary sources to show the different features of four PFPs. In that sense, picking mostly known and discussed examples is a useful method to increase the number of related sources that can be contributed to this study. To this end, a large scale of literature written on these four cases is deeply examined. Based on the foreign policy indicators that touch upon different areas of a foreign policy agenda, namely from migration to international trade policy, the thesis provides a holistic picture to perceive how four populist leaders implement their PFPs. The speeches of populist leaders both for domestic politics and those in

front of the international community are also taken into consideration, even though the fact that four populist leaders speaking four different languages makes the usage of this source slightly limited. In that sense, international media channels are the main source to reach these speeches. Party programs, states' statistical publications, international agreements, leaders' media releases and other related sources are used as well. However, it should be underlined that since the thesis does exclusively focus on the concrete foreign policy actions of populist leaders, their political discourses are used as supporting resources to strengthen the empirical analyses. Instead, the thesis does examine how populist leaders act in their foreign policy, because since they are populists, their main target is to affect their pure people in domestic politics. It implies that what they say and what they do might be divergent in the end. Consequently, the concrete actions can lead to a more accurate perception for PFPs.

This study consists of five sections: Following this introduction, the second chapter is devoted to literature review. After presenting the existing studies in the PFP literature, the hypotheses will be explained under each foreign policy indicator. Then, there will be two chapters for case studies and comparisons. Each case will be analyzed under four foreign policy indicators. First, the right-wing PFPs will be examined in the third chapter, with covering first the Turkish PFP, then the Hungarian PFP. In the fourth chapter, left-wing PFPs will be put into consideration by focusing first on the Venezuelan PFP, and on the Greek PFP. In the end, the concluding section will provide an overall evaluation including the main results, contributions, and limitations of this thesis.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In 2015, amidst the Syrian migration crisis that raised concerns in Europe, in one of his parliamentary speeches, Alexis Tsipras said that he was “ashamed” of being a part of the EU, which failed to resolve this dramatic humanitarian crisis (Reuters 2015). During the same days, Victor Orban was conducting a campaign against the EU by proclaiming that the surge of Syrian migrants was a threat to the national sovereignty of the Hungarian people. In 2013, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used the motto, “the world is bigger than five.” as his foreign policy doctrine for the first time (Milliyet 2013). In the same year, Hugo Chavez died as one of the most symbolic presidents of the Latin American region, and as the “Comandante de Nuestra América” (Commander of Our America) (Wajner and Roniger 2019, 460).

Populist movements come to power in very different regions of the world recently. Despite all geographical, cultural, or structural differences, populist governments can have similar patterns in their foreign policy agendas. As can be seen from the examples above, criticizing and reacting against the international institutions which restrict populist governments’ foreign policy actions, or claiming regional leadership and challenging the existing international order can be counted among those common features. Yet it is not possible to say that all populist governments pursue the same policy positions in the international arena. When India seeks close relations with international institutions, Trump could consider the US withdrawal from NATO (Barnes and Cooper 2019). Whereas the Syriza government made efforts to protect the Greek people’s interests against the EU, Chavez in Venezuela pioneered establishing regional mechanisms to provide further integration. Consequently, there are many nuances and critical differences among foreign policy contents of different populist governments.

Therefore, one of the most critical questions in the literature should be whether one common PFP does exist. In other words, whether there are some common and generalizable features, or which features bring populist governments together should be the main question to answer. Protectionism in trade, opposition against migration,

or reacting against international institutions is arguably the most discussed common features in the PFP literature (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017). Yet since populist governments define pure people in different terms, their foreign policy agendas differ from one another (Chryssogelos 2017). Therefore, having a left-wing or right-wing ideology to be attached to populism can be an explanatory factor for clarifying differences among PFPs. However, left-wing or right-wing populisms do not all behave in the same way when they draw their foreign policy contents. Then, which attributes will be able to explain differences among cases in a systematic manner? Do populist leaders have a common foreign policy goal, and a common type of foreign policy behavior? Both left- and right-wing populists claim that they are fighting against Western institutions or the US hegemony in global politics. However, they are reacting to those institutions with multiple different tools and policies. When some populist cases such as Chavez and Erdoğan want to construct their own regional order by also declaring their leadership, the others such as Orban and Tsipras would attempt to defend their countries against the impositions of the global order. Therefore, a second explanatory factor of adopting a revisionist/defensive foreign policy perception should be also determined and analyzed.

Moreover, Zürn (2004), and then Chryssogelos (2017) argue that the emergence of populism can be linked to the attributes of globalization, such as neoliberalism, transborder mobility, and the rising restrictions that led by global governance on elected national governments. Yet they do not explain why populisms emerge differently on their own. At that point, different levels of exposure to globalization and its different impacts can have explanatory power, but that should be systematically explained. Recently, even though the number of articles that focus on PFPs is increasing, most of them prefer to examine single cases by using within-case analysis. Nevertheless, it should be a comparative analysis to explain why and how PFPs are showing similar and different features in their contents. This study will aim to fulfill this gap and conclude a typology to explain different PFPs in the world, by using the comparative method and analyzing 4 different cases from different regions of the world.

2.1 Definition of Populism

Within this framework, due to the increasing numbers of different cases called “populist” in various regions, a single definition cannot explain these diverse cases anymore. That leads to diverging populism definitions that can cover all these populist

cases. Within this framework, as opposed to normative approaches that consider populism a “disease/pathology” under the liberal approach by Kaltwasser (2014, 490), or that takes populism as a necessity/contributor for democracy to push the demands of “people” by Laclau (2005, 107); the ideational approach of Mudde (2004) purely asks what the populism is. While Mudde (2004, 542) wrote his theory on the western populist zeitgeist, he aimed to show that populism is not a “distorted” form of democracy. He wanted to demonstrate the relationship between “the people” and “the elite”, using the “general will” in their core politics. For all these reasons, the ideational approach defines populism mainly as an ideology, based on the old but still explanatory definition of Mudde (2004, 543) who takes populism,

“(...) as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.”

There are also other definitions, such as the strategic approach of Weyland (2001, 14) who claims that populism is “a political strategy (...) based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers”. This perception underlining the “unmediated” style of populism, still holds its important place in the populism literature. Additionally, Jagers and Walgrave (2007, 322) define populism as a “political communication style of populist leaders towards their people”. Recently, Moffitt and Tormey (2014) study on this approach taking populism as a “style”. What differentiates them from other similar definitions is that they take the “political style” in the broader sense, as “the repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations” (Moffitt and Tormey 2014, 387). Thus, they can analyze populist political style as a whole, rather than just its impact on the personal communication style of populist leaders.

When we return to the definition of Mudde (2004), and this definition will be used for this thesis as well, the main argument is that populism is a “thin-centered” ideology based on the antagonism between “pure people” and “corrupt elite”, rather than a fully described world view such as nationalism or socialism. In regimes that are called right-wing populisms, populist leaders define pure people in terms of nationality, religion, cultural legacies, and traditions in an exclusive manner. Thus, their corrupt elites are those who want to disrupt these values, or who criticize this nativist understanding. In that sense, corrupt elites might be not only internal political actors but also external institutions (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017), such

as the EU which enforces the acceptance of migrants in European populist cases after the Syrian Civil war. Whereas in left-wing populists, the definitions differ. For instance, Chavez in Venezuela, as will be investigated in a very detailed manner in the next chapters, combines populism with a left-wing ideology where pure people are defined in economic terms, rather than nationality or values. The pure people in left-wing populisms are economically more vulnerable part of the society that suffers from the rapid economic transformation caused by the neoliberal economic model and globalization. Consequently, the corrupt elites in left-wing populist governments are those who work for the spread of this neoliberal economic model. On the one hand, those elites exploit poor segments of the society, increasing their own wealth while excluding these poor people from political representation on the other. That is a typical perception of a left-wing populist who combines populism with a socialist worldview.

In that sense, Mudde (2004)'s definition will be more appropriate for this comparative study. First, it allows to include different pure people and corrupt elite definitions along with different ideologies that are attached to populism. Given this, I argue that having a right- or left-wing ideology attached to populism has an impact on PFPs. In other words, it is possible to categorize PFPs in accordance with their attached ideologies. Thus, right-wing populists' foreign policy programs can be systematically differentiated from left-wing populists' foreign policies in a wide range of fields from migration to international trade. For instance, based on how exclusive the pure people definition of right-wing populists is, they are more likely to oppose the inclusion of immigrants in their countries. Whereas, since left-wing populists define their pure people in more inclusive and pluralist ways, they adopt a more open migration policy for different ethnic or national groups. Consequently, this definition allows to make more accurate categorizations by using adjectives for different populisms in accordance with their left- or right-wing ideologies, (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 59). Under these circumstances, it also enables to make case analyses from different corners of the world, as called "travelability" by Mudde (2017), because it does not define populism along with the normative approaches or cultural features. As a result, since that study requires comparing and explaining similarities and differences between different populist cases through their different ideologies as one of the explanatory factors, the definition of Mudde (2004) will be used to demonstrate what populism is.

2.2 Literature on Populist Foreign Policies

Although populism is still being overwhelmingly analyzed with regard to internal politics in the literature, it should be underlined that the literature that attempts to explain the foreign policies of populist parties/governments has expanded gradually. As indicated by Chryssogelos (2017), Donald Trump's presidency paved the way for emphasizing the importance of the foreign policy agenda of a populist leader. Some of his foreign policy actions, such as the US withdrawal from Afghanistan by emphasizing the importance of American citizens and soldiers' life, or his appeal for native investment operating abroad to "return to their home countries" highly influenced world politics. His usage of Twitter to express his foreign policy choices as a way of "unmediated and uninstitutionalized communication" (Weyland 2017, 9) was another newly emerging foreign policy-making style. Thus, scholars studying on the foreign policy aspect of populist regimes argue that populism influences foreign policy agendas in different ways.

As explained above, the critical question should be whether there is a common populist foreign policy that is expected to be applied by a populist leader. Despite the growing literature on PFPs, only a few papers have a goal to answer this critical question. In fact, most scholars attempt to show how one particular populist leader implements and reflects their populism into foreign policy agendas. Accordingly, it is possible to see most research that is conducted as case studies, rather than comparative works or theoretical generalization/categorization attempts. In this regard, it will be useful to indicate some of these case studies, including especially those that will be discussed in this thesis as well.

As an early attempt among case studies, Verbeek, Zaslove et al. (2017) examine how Italian Northern League, as a coalition partner, had an impact on the foreign policy of Italy. They found out that one populist party's foreign policy preferences are linked to the content of its pure people definition, with a claim to protect their interests. Another most discussed example among the EU countries is the Hungarian case under the administration of Orban. His governance is elaborated in numerous ways, but the impact of his populism on foreign policy is considered rarely in the literature. A very recent article by Visnovitz and Jenne (2021, 683) claims that Orban uses some tools, such as "politicization and personalization of diplomacy" or constant reactions against "traditional allies" like the EU, and the IMF, to frame his pure people versus corrupt elite perception in his foreign policy. The other piece of Csehi and Zgut (2021, 53) comparatively analyzes how populist governments in Hungary and Poland construct their foreign policies of Euroscepticism through

equalizing the EU with international corrupt elites, and through the anti-imperialism discourse to claim the protection of national sovereignty. As another case from the western world, we indicated how the election of Donald Trump triggered the PFP research among scholars at the beginning of this chapter. There are also some other works examining the Trump administration, such as the piece of Boucher and Thies (2019). They focus on Trump's foreign policy discourse through the social media usage, as a way of unmediated communication with his pure people, connotating a Jacksonian type of nationalism. In that way, they argue that Trump achieves to construct a foreign policy under his personal approach (Boucher and Thies 2019, 720). Another paper by Wojczewski (2020, 292) adopted the discursive definition of populism, and claim that Trump was using foreign policy to form and consolidate a "populist-nationalist electoral coalition".

Even though the general tendency in the literature is to work on PFP in European countries or in the case of Trump, many scholars continue to analyze PFPs from different regions of the world. The most obvious example of that is studies on Latin America, particularly on Venezuela. For instance, Sagarzazu and Thies (2019) investigate the relationship between Chavez's anti-imperialism discourse against the US and the oil prices. They claim that Chavez was increasing his anti-imperialism rhetoric when the oil prices are high, and he discouraged fueling the conflict against the US when the oil prices are low. Moreover, the work of Wehner and Thies (2021) explains how Menem in Argentina and Chavez in Venezuela constructed their foreign policies on "thick ideologies" that they combined with their populism. However, they underlined that the two leaders' foreign policy understandings are different, such as Menem being more revisionist within the country in terms of his economic reforms to adopt an open market, versus Chavez implementing a more revisionist foreign policy in the region while adopting a regional integration, and focusing on the anti-imperialist rhetoric. Lastly, worth to be cited, one of the earliest papers on foreign policies of populist governments was on the comparison of Venezuela and Iran by Dodson and Dorraj (2008). They compared and found many similarities in the regimes of Ahmadinejad and Chavez in terms of their emphasis on anti-Americanism. These two rentier state examples illustrate how both governments build their foreign policies on anti-imperialism by pushing back potential influence and control of the US over the Latin American and the Middle Eastern regions while consolidating their electorates, as their "pure people" (Dodson and Dorraj 2008, 84). Another study from Asia is on the well-known case of India under the administration of Modi. Plagemann and Destradi (2019b) develop five hypotheses on the foreign policy of the populist leader. Their findings are generally related to the foreign policy-making style of Modi, such as his communication or personalization of foreign

policy, rather than the content of his foreign policy agenda. However, the general assumption that populists prefer bilateral foreign policy or “invest in global public goods” does not work for the Indian case (Plagemann and Destradi 2019b, 283). Finally, the Turkish case under the administration of Erdoğan has been a well-known case among populist scholars. Regarding the reflection of populism on Turkish foreign policy, Özpek and Tanriverdi Yaşar (2018) argue that when the populist government achieved to weaken the military in domestic politics, then it finds the opportunity to establish Islamist authoritarianism in the country. Accordingly, the country’s foreign policy understanding changed and became more assertive, making transnational populist appeals based on religion and nationalism on the one hand, and claiming the protection of the pure people internally and externally on the other. Another article on the Turkish case is written by Kaliber and Kaliber (2019, 1) claimed that the anti-Westernism and de-Europeanization, after a decade where the government claims to be a member of the EU, became the cornerstone of Turkish PFP in the second decade of AKP governments, drawing the West as the “other”, by referring to the Manichean world view between “us” versus “others” in populist discourses. Then, Turkey was able to claim to become a regional power in the Middle East, with a more aggressive foreign policy agenda compared to AKP’s first decade.

As easily observed, those case studies constituted specific features of the cases, rather than claiming generalizable impacts of populism on foreign policy. Each study wants to show that their case represents an important part of how a populist leader or government behaves in international politics. However, most scholars analyze their case uniquely, without making any comparison, except for some insightful papers such as that of Dodson and Dorraj (2008) and Wehner and Thies (2021).

One pioneer study in that sense is the piece of Chryssogelos (2017) who brings the literature together and claims some generalizable features for PFP. He also explains the emergence of populisms, their increasing frequency, and their impact on world politics with the changing international order. First, he adopts the view that populism emerges out of globalization as a reaction to the weakening national sovereignty against international or regional supranational institutions, and to rapidly changing economic and socio-cultural structures in many countries (Chryssogelos 2017, 1). Moreover, based on the other studies in the literature, he achieved to determine some common features of PFPs such as the emphasis on national sovereignty in international politics in both European cases and in the Global South. They speak for their pure people and reflect the antagonism between the pure people and corrupt elites, or the conflict between “us” versus “them” in the international arena, while defining the West as the international elite or “other”. In that sense, populist leaders exalt national will over the international norms, or international institutions

(Chryssogelos 2017, 13). However, he underlines that there is no one foreign policy type applicable to all populist cases (Chryssogelos 2017, 13). Cases vary in accordance with the ideologies that populism is combined with. Thus, he claims that the diversities are too much to be framed.

By contrary, Verbeek, Zaslove et al. (2017) form the first and only PFP typology in the literature, according to the attaching right-wing and left-wing ideologies to populism. In fact, as Chryssogelos (2017), Verbeek, Zaslove et al. (2017) ask the critical question of whether there is a PFP. Consistently, as Chryssogelos (2017), they do not expect to see one exact type of PFP, but they expect to see systematically explicable PFP types in accordance with the pure people definitions (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017, 392). In this framework, they form four types of PFP: radical right, market-liberal, regionalist, and left-wing populists; and analyze their general attitudes under the categories such as regional integration, or transborder migration. Even though this typology is a pioneer in the field, it is possible to see that their examples of the radical right and left-wing populists were prominent, whereas market-liberal and regionalist populisms do not have the same clarity. They argue that the difficulties to claim the exact nature of these PFP types are due to the definition of populism, a “thin-centered ideology” as too flexible, vague, and implicit in some cases. In both articles, the conceptualizations include many exceptions and precautions regarding the importance of looking at the peculiarity of the case. Also, none of these two theoretical papers systematically focus on cases in comparison and test their claims. They prefer to cite some case studies from different regions of the world. However, their cited cases do include not only populist governments but also populist parties on the opposition side. Therefore, they do not have the possibility to examine concrete foreign policy actions of populist governments. Consequently, their theoretical expectations cannot be exactly proved via specific foreign policy actions in a comparative and systematic matter.

A third article making theoretical assumptions and hypotheses testing is the paper of Destradi and Plagemann (2019a). They compare 4 cases by asking the question of whether populist powers contribute to a “more conflict-prone bilateral relations, to the weakening of global governance and its institutions, and more centralized and personalized foreign policymaking” (Destradi and Plagemann 2019a, 712). In fact, it is the only paper that attempts to first generate hypotheses from the existing PFP literature largely cited above and then test them with a theoretical aim. For instance, they argue that populists “centralize and personalize” foreign policy-making procedures and encourage “multipolarity” by looking for different alliances apart from traditional ones (Destradi and Plagemann 2019a, 729). However, the authors do not focus primarily on the contents of PFPs but examine mainly the style of

foreign policy-making by populists, and some few aspects of foreign policy contents. Furthermore, they do not explain the differences among PFPs systematically, and thus do not have an aim of having generalizable features for PFP contents.

Consequently, it is possible to underline two main gaps in the literature: First, there are only a few studies illustrating common points in the contents of PFPs, and they do not explain differences among cases in a systematic manner while testing hypotheses derived from the existing literature. Also, studies that compare different populist cases are not numerous. Secondly, since those papers did not exclusively work on populist governments, there is a gap in terms of understanding concrete foreign policy actions of populist governments, and how they change over time. Because political parties' foreign policy views can change when they come to power, examining the foreign policy agendas of populist governments should be distinguished from the PFPs of political parties in opposition.

This thesis seeks to address these gaps based on a comparative analysis of four different cases. The cases are chosen in accordance with the changing values of the two independent variables, ideological stance and revisionism in foreign policy, in order to be able to apply a two-paired comparison. By comparing two left-wing and two right-wing populist cases, it will be possible to understand similar features between cases that adopt the same ideology (left- or right-wing), as well as the differences between cases that adopt different ideologies. Along with the second explanatory factor, revisionism level it will be analyzed how and according to which factors cases adopting the same ideology can be distinguished from each other. This factor is not taken a "secondary" component, but an important diversification point to underline how PFPs are executed. The importance of adopting revisionist or defensive goals in foreign policy will be emphasized in this study in a comparative manner. In that sense, it should be crucial to explain what this study means by "revisionist" and "defensive".

The classical International Relations theory perceives revisionism a type of foreign policy behavior aiming to revise global/international order. Leaders who adopt this foreign policy line refuse the existing "status-quo" (Mead 2014). After the World War II, the revisionist countries are those who challenge the international order dominated by the West, namely the US and then the EU. Yet their demand in recent years is not any direct change in established national borders, but to challenge the Western global order in terms of its economic dominance and the prone liberal democracy model by Western countries. Also, those countries might increase their economic, humanitarian, or military investment in targeted regions, such as Africa or Middle East, to decrease the Western dominance in those areas, and establish their

own leadership. Namely, China is counted among revisionist powers in the literature (Mead 2014). For the populist cases, a similar picture can be considered. In this thesis, Turkey and Venezuela will be the cases adopting revisionist PFPs. Mainly, revisionist PFPs come up with an aim to construct their own international/regional institutions among selected countries, claim their leadership and become a global power that can be active, and influential with their problem-solving skills in global politics. Chavez's intention to improve regional integration in Latin America, and his actions for the regional development are only some examples of this type of foreign policy.

For the defensive PFPs, this study diverges from the term "status-quo" that is generated by the literature. The term refers to the opposite side of revisionism in the literature and refers to countries that are satisfied with the existing global order, and fight against the revisionist cases. In this thesis, I prefer to use "defensive", instead of "status-quo" in order to underline the following point: Differently from the countries adopting "status-quo" in their foreign policy, defensive PFPs complain about the attributes of global order, like revisionist PFPs. They do not satisfy the Western dominance and dictated economic and liberal model either. Yet due to varying reasons, but mainly their peculiar contexts and insufficient capabilities, they do not aim to revise the system in total but merely seek to isolate themselves from the impact of the liberal order. As such, they prefer to remain within the global order, remain as members to these international institutions, and to announce their grievances in that way with an intention to challenge these institutions from within so as to protect themselves from being shaped by the global governance. How populist governments react to the liberal order and to what extent will be also shown in the following pages, particularly in the foreign policy indicator of global governance. By deeply analyzing this study brings this explanatory factor to the PFP literature, as a major contribution.

Moreover, since all cases are selected among populist governments in power, this study investigates which policies are implemented concretely. While most papers focus on the programs of political parties, or their promises when they are in the opposition, the actions of populist governments should be more significant to understand how those intentions are implemented. To analyze the foreign policies of these populist governments, four foreign policy indicators will be used in this research, as some of the most utilized foreign policy fields by populist leaders in the political arena to produce political discourses, and the most discussed analysis indicators in the PFP literature.

2.3 Foreign Policy Indicators

The reason why populists adopt varying foreign policy positions is investigated in the literature. As a common point discussed among scholars who work on the PFP literature, there is a link between international developments and the emergence of populism. For instance, Zürn (2004) considers populism as a reaction to the increasing impact of international institutions on national governments. Accordingly, populism emerges as a reaction to the fact that national governments had been losing their sovereignty against the expanding limitations imposed by international organizations. What Zürn (2004) had in his mind was especially the European integration process that aims to form a supranational institution that restricts the sovereignty of national governments. Thus, many populist parties such as National Front in France, Fidesz in Hungary, or PiS in Poland, construct their political stance by criticizing the EU based on the national sovereignty claim. Additionally, Rodrik (2018a) indirectly contributed to this view by arguing that due to the different reflections of globalization “shocks”, populist right-wing parties are likely to emerge in Europe, whereas left-wing populist parties dominate the political scene in Latin American countries. Another similar view by Verbeek, Zaslove et al. (2017, 388) considers populism again as a reaction to main international developments having transformative power, such as globalization, the end of the Cold War, or the increasing regional integration tendencies as indicated by Zürn (2004).

First, the end of the Cold War took away the necessity to have a unified western entity against the Soviet Union which was perceived as a threat. Thus, populists found the opportunity to openly criticize the pre-established political structure while blaming political elites who were working for their own interests, rather than the interests of their countries or of pure peoples. Also, the fall of a left-wing ideology in front of the whole world decreased the reputability of left-wing political parties and paved the way for the rise of far-right movements in European countries (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017, 389). Secondly, globalization has a significant transformative power with its social, and economic impacts on citizens in many countries. On the one hand, it led to an increase in mobility in every sense of the term. In other words, not only products or services but also people gain more flexibility to travel or choose the country where they want to live in. Consequently, the need for sensibility and adherence to diversities raised, especially in the western countries, as destination countries due to their high welfare levels. That also means that native culture, religion, and traditions need to be transformed and even adopted by newcomers. These transformations cause rising concerns among native citizens in the Western

world. Consequently, protecting the native culture and values, underlining nationalism and anti-immigration become the new way of existing in the political arena for right-wing populists. They found more ground after the Syrian refugee crisis since human mobility had to be increased in western countries. On the other hand, the economic market became more international and more open with the adoption of the neoliberal model, encouraging more transnational trade and relatively fewer restrictions on investors and producers (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017, 390). Consequently, this new economic structure causes the emergence of “losers” from this globalization (Chryssogelos 2017, 3). The general aim for left-wing populists is to adopt these “losers” as their pure people.

Consequently, these international developments, i.e., globalization and its social, economic or cultural attributes contribute to the emergence of both left- and right-wing populisms. Populists should have a view and a political agenda on these impacts. They, as “protectors”, or “saviors” of the “pure people”, would represent the demands and needs of globalization’s “losers”. Thus, populist parties shaped their foreign policy promises according to the preferences of these losers, providing harmony with attaching ideologies’ political lines. For instance, with the deepening of globalization and the increasing human mobility, migration becomes a "headline" for political parties, particularly right-wing populist parties. In this regard, an international phenomenon pushes political parties to take a stance and produce a political discourse. Ivarsflaten (2008) pointed out that almost all populist right-wing parties in Europe mobilize their voters through migration issues, benefiting from the rising concerns and grievances from diversification in the society, especially in terms of changing social structure. As a result, an international and humanitarian crisis paved the way for political debates that populist parties benefitted from. In the end, those events trigger the emergence of populism, and hence, they also affect the contents of foreign policy agendas.

This explanation gives some clues to frame why populisms differ from one case to another. Populists emerge differently because their countries are exposed to different attributes of globalization at different levels, and thus their reactions to these different attributes vary. For instance, when European countries deal with the increasing national or cultural diversities deriving from the increasing migration issues, right-wing populists could find more ground to emerge and rise to the power in these countries. Whereas in Latin American countries, many left-wing populists are able to find a place in politics because the Latin American people are more exposed to the socio-economic impact of globalization, namely the attributes of neoliberalism such as increasing inequalities, rising unemployment rates, austerities, or the pressures coming from international financial institutions.

Secondly, considering the divergent impacts of globalization some populist leaders come up with more revisionist foreign policy goals. Öniş and Kutlay (2020a, 12) tested this fact and found that in the global south countries, populist leaders such as Modi in India, Erdoğan in Turkey, Putin in Russia, or Bolsonaro in Brazil are more likely to have revisionist aims to build their own global governance schemes against the Western international institutions. Chavez in Venezuela can also be counted among those populist leaders who dream to construct his own global governance model. These leaders, by producing a "victimization" discourse, claim that their countries have not developed due to the current global order, neoliberalism and institutions such as the IMF and the EU that shape world politics. They mainly aim to establish a new regional or global order and challenge the existing one that is dominated by the Western world. By contrast, some populists do prefer to protect their reactionist stance while remaining within the Western hegemony, applying a defensive stance. In those examples, populist leaders conduct a cautious and reactionist foreign policy vis-à-vis the interferences of the global governance. However, they also want to pursue their benefits that come from the membership in international institutions. In fact, revisionist PFPs do not leave the Western institutions either. The point that they differ from the defensive ones is that they intend and act to construct a new regional or global order that can be under their leaderships. Under these circumstances, the revisionism level can be another factor to explain why populist cases are differed from each other.

While examining populist cases, it is possible to observe that there have been foreign policy issues populist leaders prioritize in their agendas. Migration, resistance against international institutions, and international trade can be counted among those important fields for populists. Their level of importance might vary from one case to another due to the particular context of the cases. In that sense, following a similar path in the literature, migration, international free trade, global governance, and transborder activism are chosen to evaluate how populist leaders implement their foreign policy agenda in this thesis. That is because they are common policy areas on which populists build their foreign policies on and show their opposition to the existing international order. In other words, in these policy areas, populist leaders find an opportunity to show their reactions to the attributes of globalization, and to mobilize their voters around grievances on those attributes. Yet all populist parties do not take a position against migration. For instance, as we will see in detail in the next chapters, Syriza in Greece adopted a more inclusive and pluralist migration policy by accepting Syrian migrants, even though the government was in the middle of a debt and migration crisis. Moreover, all populists do not give importance to the same foreign policy areas. As specified above, some populists

underline particular issues that affect their country at that time. For instance, as a left-wing populist, Syriza utilized the migration crisis as the fundamental base of its PFP. Whereas for Chavez, it will not be that important because Venezuela is an emigration country, rather than immigration.

Secondly, although the literature pursues similar foreign policy indicators to analyze PFPs -except for transborder activism which will be examined for the first time in this study as a foreign policy indicator-, what lacks in the literature is to analyze those indicators in the concrete foreign policy practices of populist governments, going one step further from the analysis on political discourses of political parties. So, one of the contributions of this thesis to the literature is the detailed analysis of four populist governments' foreign policy agendas and actions along with the foreign policy indicators described below, by arguing one hypothesis under each foreign policy indicator.

2.3.1 Migration

As indicated above, populist governments are associated with their anti-immigration discourses and actions in the literature. Yet it is clear that only right-wing regimes are under this examination since their attitudes are more obvious on this subject. In other words, transborder migration is not the main topic of left-wing leaders deal with (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017, 397). Nevertheless, according to the particular context of a given country in terms of facing migration inflow, left-wing populist leaders might prefer to develop a non-exclusionary policy on migration issue. Accordingly, left-wing populist parties/regimes both in Europe and Latin America tend to be more inclusive towards diversities, in accordance with the leftist ideology that they attach to populism. Left-wing populist governments are not usually against immigrants because they do not define the "pure people" on the basis of cultural features, but their "pure people" definition is a class-based definition. Even if they might criticize the immigration flow, their main concern would be related to labors' worsening conditions due to the increasing number of "cheap" labor forces in the free market (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017, 297). By contrast, since right-wing populist governments define their pure people with nativism and traditional similarities, the anti-immigration is the milestone for their foreign policy understanding, with an emphasis on the "authenticity" of native people's lifestyle. According to the distance that they consider in cultural, national, or religious terms, right-wing populists selectively include a few groups, while excluding others. Thus, right-wing populists are more exclusive than left-wing populists in their foreign policy agendas. Based

on this evaluation of the literature, the hypothesis should be the following:

H_1 : Left-wing populists do not oppose transborder migration in principle due to their inclusive policy agenda, whereas right-wing populism adopts a policy of “selective inclusiveness” towards migrants.

2.3.2 Trade Policy

Since globalization requires adopting an economic system harmonious to international trade to establish a free market economy, with more fluid national borders and less protectionism, the policy preferences regarding international trade and finance constitute one of the most crucial aspects of populist foreign policies. As a phenomenon triggered by the globalization, and a considerable part of a government’s foreign policy choices, the agenda on international trade and finance should be included in the foreign policy analysis. Regarding the similarities and distinctions, the literature has different views. The general idea is that deriving from the isolationism of the international community claiming to establish the national sovereignty, and the idea of protecting the pure people, it is expected to see that populist governments are against international trade while adopting national protectionism. The most common example in the literature is Trump’s discourses to protect “firstly” American people’s interests. Accordingly, Trump advocated that trade agreements destroyed the interests of American workers and the middle class (Wojczewski 2020); international institutions to increase trade relations are benefiting from the surplus that the US produces. He uses social media to blame American elites by arguing that they increase international trade for their own benefit, ignoring the worsening conditions of the American people (Boucher and Thies 2019). For the left-wing populist parties, the reasoning is similar: As easily seen in Latin American countries, left-wing populists define their pure people on the basis of economic and class-based terms. Globalization “losers” for them are economically vulnerable people that were negatively affected by the rapid transformation of the new neoliberal economic model. Consequently, one part of the literature argues that all populist governments have similar views on international trade. For instance, in their typology, Verbeek, Zaslove et al. (2017) argue that both radical left- and right-wing populists are protectionist in the sense that their main goal is to “protect” their “people” from the damages derived from the effect of neoliberalism. Nevertheless, their reasons to be skeptical about international trade vary depending on the ideology that they adopt. In other words, left-wing populists want to rely on their national resources to increase the wealth of their nations, rather than depending

on foreign aid or international trade incomes (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017, 397). Whereas President Trump as a right-wing populist made an appeal to US citizens who were investing abroad to return to their home countries, in order to increase the wealth of the "people" without necessitating more international trade.

However, it is possible to find different views in this regard. Mostly, the literature relies on the example of Trump and argues that right-wing populists are against international trade. Yet many papers figure out that a closer examination should be done for an accurate explanation. As opposed to what the literature argues, left- and right-wing populists' stances on international trade and finance have not the same clarity as they do for migration policies. For instance, Gruszczynski and Lawrence (2019) argue that Trump's foreign policy is not necessarily against international trade, but he wants to adopt more bilateral trade agreements that prioritize American people's interests. He applies less tariff in the internal economy, while advocating a "more competitive" trade perception in international politics, thus not an international trade that "elites" benefit from (Gruszczynski and Lawrence 2019). Apart from this specific example, Church and Findlay (2022) claim that populists are constantly criticizing globalization, but not necessarily "active participation to international trade". They give examples from both Trump's trade policy and right-wing populists in the EU. Accordingly, they argue that Trump's foreign policy did only appear in his rhetoric. In other words, he could not implement concrete policies to isolate or "disengage" the US economy from the international market (Church and Findlay 2022, 10). Moreover, in Poland and Hungary, as the two right-wing populist governments in the EU, they contradict the EU on cultural and social issues, but not in economic policies or trade agreements (Church and Findlay 2022, 11). On the contrary, these governments continue to benefit from the economic interests that the EU by staying within the customs union framework (Church and Findlay 2022, 11).

In this thesis, as opposed to what Verbeek, Zaslove et al. (2017) argue, I will argue that right- and left-wing populists distinguish from each other in their trade policies. Accordingly, both left-wing and right-wing populist governments continue to engage in international trade, since almost none of the populist governments are close economies. Yet left-wing populists are more likely to adopt a protectionist stance against the increasing fluidity of national borders as they are accepted the attributes of neoliberalism. Whereas right-wing populists take a more prone stance toward a more open international trade environment. Under these circumstances, right-wing populists can be more active in their foreign trade because they also want to use trade as a tool to react against Western hegemony. To this end, they might develop trade relations with political motivations. Through cooperation with

non-Western emerging countries in a bilateral manner, right-wing populists mainly aim to diversify their trade relations, and challenge Western dependency. Thus, the hypothesis should be the following:

H₂: Left-wing populist governments are more likely to adopt protectionist trade policies, whereas right-wing populists seek to shape their international trade in a bilateral and selective manner, preferring mostly non-Western partners.

2.3.3 Global Governance

This third foreign policy indicator is also a common one among scholars who study on PFPs, especially for those who want to analyze the similarities and differences among cases. Since the international institutions that were constructed in the post-World War II era are those who make the rules and norms, populists' stance on this topic is crucial, because they have a risk to remain isolated and radicalized by ignoring these common rules and norms established by international institutions. With the impact of globalization, the number of regulatory institutions has been increasing since the Second World War, to establish a new international system having norms and rules. Under this foreign policy indicator, populist governments' attitudes vis-à-vis the global governance institutions will be examined and analyzed. Regarding the definition, international institutions are composed not only of regional multinational unions such as the EU or Mercosur but also of institutions dealing with the world economy, justice, democracy level, health, etc. In that sense, from the IMF to the International Court of Justice, a wide range of international institutions will be the subject of this thesis to analyze populist governments' reactions.

In fact, these norm-maker institutions have a transformative impact on nation-states, forming a "global governance" (Zürn 2004). In order not to be excluded from the international community, states should pursue the commonly accepted international rules and norms. That triggers the emergence of pressure on nation-states. We have already known that almost all populists construct their politics both internally and externally on the claim of national sovereignty and the protection of pure people. Zürn (2004) argues that populist parties appear as a reaction of societies against this "global governance" that ignores the representation of national peoples. Consequently, under this indicator, one can argue that both left- and right-wing populists' ideas should be overlapped. As it will be shown throughout the thesis, populist governments always accuse different international institutions of interfering in their internal politics, manipulating the international community against the will of their nation-states, thereby damaging the interests of pure people, while collab-

orating with elites and opposition parties, and ignoring national sovereignty. The left-wing populists are already against the market economy and free-market system under neoliberalism and globalization, which are perceived, for instance by Chavez, as unsuitable for Latin American countries. The "Western institutions", which are considered equal to the "international elite" aiming to spread this neoliberal economic model, are perceived as international agents opposed to the interests of the Latin American people. Whereas right-wing populists claim that international institutions are damaging national sovereignty. Especially, European right-wing populisms are worth closely examining, essentially the EU, as a regional supranational institution, rather than a regional multilateral institution where countries sign only trade agreements or make simple cooperation. It is clear that the populist governments of Poland and Hungary, or populist parties such as the National Front in France, want to destroy EU domination, if any, over the national sovereignty of their pure people. Their main aim is to reduce the impact of supranational decisions, requirements, or limitations on national governments in many areas where the EU has policy competences (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017, 399).

In terms of their attitude toward global governance, there should be two main dimensions to diversity PFPs: First, opposing the global governance institutions does not mean total isolation from the global order, or total isolation. Under this foreign policy indicator, populist cases having revisionist foreign policy goals aim to re-orientate and design regional order by challenging existing power balances, and forming new regional/global institutions. In those cases, populists aim to overthrow the Western hegemony and create a new order with their own economic and political rules. Chavez's attempts to establish new regional institutions in Latin America are an example of this foreign policy behavior. In this way, populist leaders are also prone to the leadership in those institutions. That is why, they are called "assertive" PFP for this indicator. Yet some others, such as the Orban's government, continue to contradict global governance institutions while trying to increase their benefits from the membership of those institutions. In fact, what they want to establish as their foreign policy preference is to protect their countries from shape by international institutions, and from the "negative" impact of global governance. To evaluate this negative impact, the second dimension enters into the picture. Right-wing populists portray the disruption of national sovereignty as the negative outcome of the international order, whereas in the eyes of right-wing populists, whereas it is the spread and negative consequences of the neoliberal economic model in the eyes of left-wing cases. Consequently, the hypotheses should be as followed according to two main dimensions:

H_3 : Both left-wing and right-wing populists have major grievances towards inter-

national institutions, though their criticisms differ: Left-wing populists mainly oppose international financial institutions that defend the neoliberal economic model; whereas right-wing populists rely on the national sovereignty claim.

H_{3a} : Populist governments with revisionist goals challenge the existing western hegemony in an attempt to establish an alternative order, usually in their own regions. By contrast, populists having more defensive foreign policy goals prefer to remain in international organizations that they are already in, and protect themselves from being shaped by global governance institutions.

2.3.4 Transborder Activism

Unlike the first three indicators, this fourth and the last one has not been considered a foreign policy indicator before, among the literature that examines foreign policy agendas of populist governments. Therefore, this section allows evaluating PFPs under a new foreign policy area where populist leaders are very active. In fact, what makes populist governments more visible in recent years is not only their emergence and quick reach to political power but also their impact on other countries. Even though the literature has not taken this criterion into examination yet, populist governments might have a revisionist foreign policy agenda as well (Jenne 2021). Their main aim does not appear always as isolationism or protectionism. On the contrary, some populist governments such as those in Turkey and Venezuela might have claims to change the regional or international order. In this regard, the tool that they use can be their ability to make a transnational appeal on the basis of features such as nationality, religion, or economic class. Under this foreign policy indicator, questions such as how differently populists use their transborder community if any, and for which goals will be under close examination. In fact, derived from the definition of pure people, populist governments include "diasporas" in their pure people definition (Moffitt 2017). These "diasporas" can be defined in accordance with the attached ideologies to populism, as it does in other foreign policy indicators. For instance, since right-wing populists define their pure people on the basis of nationality and/or religion, when they want to widen this definition, they can still use the same method. When one refers to the Hungarian example, it is observable that the populist government's transborder appeal addresses the citizens of Hungary living in abroad. Accordingly, Aslanidis (2018) argues that in this way, populist governments construct a common identity from peoples having very different backgrounds. This is also a way to consolidate its pure people understanding internally and externally. It is critical because populist governments can increase

their popular support, as we see in the Turkish example that citizens living abroad have the right to vote in Turkish national elections, and mostly support the current populist government.

When we take into account how populist cases might differ from each other, the ideological component still has the explanatory power. Accordingly, right-wing populists remain more selective in their appeals. They widen their nationality- and/or religion-based pure people definition abroad, and aim to protect those people vis-à-vis their host countries. Whereas left-wing populists continue to adopt a broader appeal with a pluralist pure people definition. Because they frame their populism around socioeconomic factors, opposition to neoliberalism and the US global hegemony as the common “enemy”, their transborder appeal will be more inclusive and broader. Moreover, this appeal can be transformed into a type of activism via foreign aid, different collaborations with host countries, or increasing the visibility of populist governments towards their transborder people through institutions. Consequently, transborder activism turns into a tool in the hands of populist governments to use in their foreign policies. It should be dependent on the foreign policy priorities of a given case.

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However, that does not mean that every populist government makes transborder appeals in a highly engaging manner. In this foreign policy area, revisionism is not taken in the sense of revising the national borders by mobilizing transborder communities. Rather, those communities are utilized to strengthen the identity-based perceptions for the right-wing cases, emphasizing the role of nationality and/or religion ; and to engage "victims" of neoliberal economic model in a transborder manner

for the left-wing populists. In revisionist PFPs, transborder community can become a tool to affect the host countries, via mobilization and manipulation by the populist leader. Transborder activism might also show up to connote the power of the populist and promote his/her leadership claim. In the Venezuelan example, it is clear that Chavez aims to strengthen his leadership claim among Latin American peoples by making a transborder appeals and actions such as humanitarian aid, or development programs for excluded communities. Whereas in the more defensive PFPs, these ambitious foreign policy goals are unlikely to emerge. First, since these populists do not mainly intend to form a new regional order, they do not aim to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries . Secondly, the context of a given country is the determinant factor as to how and whether a populist engages in transborder community. As will be seen in the Turkish and Hungarian examples, some populist leaders use state resources and institutions to lead a transborder activism policy. Some others, such as Tsipras, who does not have this financial resource or priority cannot allocate enough resource to mobilize a transborder community.

Accordingly, the last hypothesis should be the following:

H₄: Right-wing populists build their transborder activism on ethnic or religious ties, whereas left-wing populists make broader appeals to international communities by using socio-economic factors, and anti-Americanism. Secondly, revisionist PFPs are more likely to use their transborder communities to affect host countries, and to strengthen the political power of populist leader, compared to the defensive PFPs.

In the following two chapters, first the two right-wing cases, Turkey, and Hungary, then the left-wing PFPs, Venezuela and Greece, will be examined in a comparative manner.

3. RIGHT-WING POPULIST FOREIGN POLICIES

Since the beginning of the 2000s, right-wing populisms appear more frequently, especially in Europe. In a very general term, both Rodrik (2018b) and Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) determine that the right-wing populists build their Manichean worldview between pure people and corrupt elites according to ethnocultural and/or religious terms. By defining their pure people on a common and homogenous identity based on common nationality and/or religion (Greven 2016), populist leaders approach foreign affairs in different ways than non-populist leaders. For instance, they adopt a discourse that transforms “foreign powers” into “enemies” of native people. Then, they qualify political rivalries as the internal collaborators of these foreign powers. According to this perception, these two groups’ main goal is to transform the native culture and/or traditional values in a given country. In the end, right-wing populists rely on the claim to protect pure people against these internal and external elites who want to undermine the cultural or traditional way of life.

Yet the literature on PFPs is more modest compared to the literature focusing on the internal aspects of populism. Accordingly, some papers cited in the previous chapter find some common features of right-wing PFPs as protectionist, adopting anti-immigration discourse against global governance, and claiming to protect national sovereignty (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017). In fact, based on the grievances caused by the attributes of globalization such as the increasing demand for greater diversity, or the necessity of living together with different cultures, right-wing populists emerge with a claim to respond to those grievances through different policies, as will be explained in this chapter. For instance, they come up with a claim to stop “irregular migration”, and to prevent global governance from hampering the national sovereignty of their pure people. In fact, populist leaders tend to use foreign policy conflicts in domestic politics to consolidate their adherents through a nationalist rhetoric, claiming to challenge and accuse the Western hegemony.

This chapter will examine two right-wing PFPs, namely Turkish foreign policy under

the administration of Erdoğan, and Hungarian foreign policy under the administration of Orbán. Erdoğan has maintained his political power for two decades, and Orbán does so for more than one decade. After having outmaneuvered internal rivals in domestic politics, they were able to find sufficient ground to reflect their political stance on the foreign policy agendas. The two leaders combine their populist agendas with the right-wing ideology that defines pure people and corrupt elite by nationality, ethnicity, and religion, despite some minor differences that will be explained during case analyses. In terms of their common points, first, both leaders selectively include or exclude migrant groups from their pure people definition, and determine their migration policy accordingly. Then, the trade policy has crucial importance in their PFPs, because they aim to diversify their international trade portfolio in order to decrease the dependence on Western countries. To this end, both of them prefer to establish further trade relationships with China and Russia. Moreover, mobilizing transborder diaspora communities on the basis of nationality and/or religion is another common point between the two PFPs. In this last indicator, two leaders put a high effort to first constructing, and then engaging in the diaspora communities living abroad.

These similarities and differences will be shown in a comparative manner in the following pages. Erdoğan and Orbán's foreign policy actions will be analyzed under the foreign policy indicators of immigration, free trade, global governance and cross-border activism, which are the four main foreign policy areas for populist leaders. Firstly, Erdoğan's foreign policy will be presented. Then, it will be shown how Orbán implements his foreign policy agenda. Also, while analyzing the second case, the similarities and differences between the two PFPs will be evaluated for each foreign policy indicator at the end of each sub-chapter. In that way, it will be easier to understand and systematize how similar or different right-wing PFPs are, how useful to look at the ideology and revisionism level in order to compare populist cases, and how to analyze populist cases in terms of their foreign policy choices.

3.1 Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP governments of Erdoğan

After a long period of coalitions throughout the 1990s, the AKP came to power under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for the first time in 2002. The party was a fervent supporter of the EU integration process, as a crucial part of its foreign policy agenda (Keyman and Gümüşçü 2014). By fulfilling the required Copenhagen criteria, country passed through a transformation in many areas, while democratizing

and emphasizing civil presence in the political arena. In so doing, AKP consolidated its place in domestic politics while eliminating the presence of Kemalist elites, by increasing its popular support in the meantime. Consequently, the party achieved to increase its vote share to 46% in 2007 and 49% in the 2011 parliamentary elections. During this period, AKP governments implement close diplomacy with the West within the framework of the EU accession process. Even many western columnists and analysts evaluate that Turkey could be a model country for Middle Eastern countries as being governed by “Muslim democrats” (Heneghan 2007). After this first decade of power consolidation, the party’s line becomes more populist and authoritarian, as called a case of competitive authoritarianism by Esen and Gumuscu (2016), by undermining checks and balances mechanisms, damaging civilian rights, and polarizing the society on the basis of “us” versus “them” perception, especially after the approval of the presidential system in 2017.

Combining this internal deterioration in liberal democracy with the increasing opposition to the EU accession by European politicians, and the economic turmoil that the West faced during the 2007-8 global financial crisis, AKP governments’ foreign policy agenda shifted during this period (Balta 2018). With both the rising popular support and the hardening authoritarian tendencies; and the impact of the Arab Spring movements (Keyman and Gümüşçü 2014), Turkish foreign policy entered into a new scheme with more ambitious, assertive and revisionist perceptions, leaving its logic of “zero problems with neighbors”. Balta (2018) claims that after 2007, Turkey’s main foreign policy aim became gaining regional hegemony in the Middle East, instead of integrating into the EU. Briefly, as known “Strategic Depth” doctrinized by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Erdoğan’s foreign minister between 2009-2014, and prime minister between 2014-2016, this new foreign policy wants to establish Turkey as a more independent regional actor, with more autonomy in its foreign policy actions, “demanding more respect” from the Western side, while moving away from the EU integration goals, even adding Western international institutions into the “international elites” category in the PFP of Turkey (Taş 2020). Derived from Turkey’s “depth” in the region that was provided by Ottoman legacy, Turkey should look for activism in this region that it has already had enough roots to be able to become a regional leader (Murinson (2006)). Within this framework, Davutoğlu previews that Turkey should become an “order-instituting state”, instead of waiting as a bridge between East and West (Taş (2020)). Öniş (2011) states that following this “axis-shift”, Turkish foreign policy becomes unprecedentedly active in its diplomatic relations, and increasingly behaves more independent from Western partnerships, while searching for new ones. With the impact of the Arap Spring movement, more grounds appeared in order to implement those revisionist and ambitious foreign pol-

icy goals. Within the Middle Eastern region, when supported regional politicians and ideological stances could not achieve to stay in power, Erdoğan's government preferred "precious loneliness" in the region for a while (Gökalp Aras 2019, 54). By looking for new partners to both challenges Western global hegemony and pursue the goal of becoming the most powerful country in the region, AKP governments persistently continued to implement an active foreign policy, while also moving away from the Western side further, creating new disputes and demanding more right to say for regional problems. Facing the migration crisis in 2015, Turkey's relations with the EU becomes more transactional and pragmatic. In 2019, the EU officially makes Turkey's accession process freeze due to the worsening liberal values and problems regarding judicial independence (Reilhac 2019). Consequently, Erdoğan's governments gradually move away from Western alliances, and continue to follow up both trade ties and bilateral diplomatic relations with challenger global powers, mainly Russia and China. Based on this new foreign policy understanding, we will be examining how Turkish foreign policy has been implemented under four different foreign policy indicators during AKP governments in their second decade.

3.1.1 Migration

Similar to what literature expects from a right-wing populist, Erdoğan combines his populism with nationalism and religion. His exclusive pure people definition first covered Sunnis. Then, it expanded to include Turks, increasing the exclusiveness of the definition, with the impact of the coalition with MHP recently. Claiming to protect the Anatolian lifestyle and the impact of religion in everyday life of Turkish citizens against the Kemalist elites who are westernized and secular, Erdoğan announced himself as the only "protector" and "savior" of this "real people" -Turks and Sunnis - in Turkey. In that sense, although his emphasis on Turkish nationality was less than in the following periods, Davutoğlu's foreign policy perception that was implemented as the official Turkish foreign policy after the 2010s was very similar to this identity-based approach. In fact, the doctrine underlined the heritage of the Ottoman past in the region while claiming the leadership among Middle Eastern countries and their citizens, pronouncing the "leader of ummah" for the Turkish president. Related to this revisionist and assertive foreign policy perception, AKP's migration policy takes a different stance than the literature's expectations.

First, the Arab Spring is perceived as an opportunity for the Turkish populist government to realize its revisionist goals and launch an assertive foreign policy in the region. Following the Syrian civil war that began in 2011, Turkey became one of

the most impacted countries in the region because an immense refugee flow moved toward Turkish borders at a time when Turkey attempted to redefine its position in the region (Karapinar 2017, 121). That is why, during the Syrian humanitarian crisis, Turkey wanted to transform this migration inflow into a political opportunity to use in the international arena. Within a time period when the EU closed its borders and could not provide the consensus among member states as to how to respond to the immigration flow, Turkey decided to implement an "open-door policy". In the beginning, the Turkish government declared refugees as "guests", meaning who would be close ones and not permanent (Aras and Mencütek 2015). Then, in order to define them into the frame of international law, and consider the increasing number of people fleeing from the Syrian civil war, the AKP government approved the "temporary protection status" in November 2011. Consequently, the country accepted and is currently hosting 4 million refugees whose 3.6 million are Syrians (UNHCR 2022) under this status. In that regard, Turkey's stance of accepting that number of refugees can be considered a unique case among right-wing PFPs because the literature is arguing that right-wing PFPs are constructed upon anti-immigration. However, when one dives into the general foreign policy perception, it is possible to see that Turkey accepted Syrian refugees not because AKP's right-wing populism was too inclusive. In fact, the government applies a "selective exclusiveness" that facilitates the inclusion of groups who have similar features to Erdoğan's pure people. The reasons why and how Erdoğan's PFP prefers this policy are explained below :

Derived from the aim of revisionism and activism in the Middle East, Turkey wanted to become a "model country among its neighbors" with its key position to solve a large-scale humanitarian crisis while also developing its leadership goal based on the religion factor (Ayhan 2020, 27). At the beginning of the crisis, Turkey did not even demand any aid from the international community, to provide an image that Turkey was a regional leader and able to solve a regional problem without international help (Aras and Mencütek 2015). This ambitious foreign policy goal played a significant role to establish the "open-door" policy. Secondly, according to Ayhan (2020), the Turkish government miscalculated possible numbers of refugees that could move towards Turkish borders. As declared by Davutoğlu, 100.000 refugees were the psychological barrier (Calık 2012), and this barrier was rapidly exceeded in the very early days of the crisis. Furthermore, Erdoğan and his officials did assume the end of Syrian war in a short period and return Syrian refugees to their home countries. When that did not happen, the AKP government began to demand international support and cooperation to prevent further acceleration of the crisis by 2013 (Aras and Mencütek 2015, 202). For instance, Erdoğan wanted to propose "safe zones"

for refugees between Turkish and Syrian borders in a demilitarized region. Yet the international community did not consider this suggestion a priority. Rather, they, especially the EU, perceived Turkey as a "buffer state" to stop the inflow of refugees towards the West (Keyman 2016).

Thirdly, and most importantly, populist government was able to implement the "open-door" policy because its foreign policy perception had already included Muslim people in its pure people definition. Thus, "coreligionism" is a crucial factor to explain this attitude in Turkish foreign policy (Çarkoğlu and Elçi 2021, 203). Combining this claim with the policy preference of being active in humanitarian aid to many regional and African countries from Palestine to Somalia, the populist government wants to have an international reputation for humanitarian assistance (Keyman (2016)). Within this framework, as opposed to European right-wing homologous, AKP government does not perceive this high level of increase in refugee numbers as a problem, because it declares them as "guests" or "brothers", based on sharing the same religion (Aras and Mencütek 2015, 202). In other words, since his pure people definition covers Muslim-Sunni people as the inclusion condition, Erdoğan could easily legitimize the act of accepting Syrian refugees who were fleeing from the "Alawite Shiite oppression of Assad regime, in an understanding of promoting being ensars for Syrian "guests" or muhacirs (Tol (2019)). Consequently, since Syrian refugees' religious identity is coherent with the definition of Erdoğan's pure people, the open-door policy could be held and legitimized.

Moreover, it is worth mentioning how the acceptance of Syrian refugees became a "leverage tool" for Turkish foreign policy against the EU (Ayhan 2020, 23). After a deteriorating period in EU-Turkey relations, Turkey wants to use refugees as a tool to promote the interests of Turkey and to increase its bargaining power during negotiations with the EU. First, after having perceived the complexity and the endurance of Syrian refugee crisis, Turkey put pressure on the EU, requesting to share the burden, or some concessions in return to stop refugees from reaching Europe. What Turkey wanted, as compromises from the EU side, were the re-negotiation of the customs union and the right to visa-free travel for Turkish citizens (Greenhill 2016, 325). Otherwise, Erdoğan explicitly warns that he could "open the door for Syrian refugees" (Turak 2019). In the end, the EU accepted to support Turkey by sending 6 billion Euros (Greenhill 2016, 325). Also in 2015, Merkel declared that Germany would accept 1 million refugees (Hille 2019). She visited Turkey in 2015 just before the November elections, which were held due to the fact that AKP government could not gain the majority in the parliament in the previous elections in June 2015. This visit was perceived as a "gift" to AKP government by international media, emphasizing the role of Turkey and its government to solve a "stalemate"

(Sert and Danış 2021). Consequently, as a part of the foreign policy perception, Turkey implements conditionality (Aral 2019), reciprocity and "transactionism" in its relations with other countries. In other words, Turkey is looking for "coinciding interests and opportunities with international institutions" or partner countries, in a pragmatic way (Haugom 2019, 211). Erdoğan's migration policy was a good example of this foreign policy preference. Greenhill (2016) calls this PFP "opportunistic", since Turkey was using a crisis in its foreign policy to increase its capability and bargaining options in the EU negotiations. In this way, Erdoğan also could soften the criticisms coming from the international community due to his authoritarian tendencies.

As the result of all these factors, it is clear that Turkey's PFP was not inclusive, but it is mostly pragmatic. In fact, one can argue that Erdoğan implemented a selective exclusiveness towards immigrants. He was able to do that because his pure people definition was available to include and legitimize this migration policy in a coherent manner. What makes this foreign policy choice possible to happen is that those migrants are Muslims. Thus, they share the same religion with Erdoğan's pure people, as an inclusivity factor. In that sense, this Turkish migration policy is more inclusive than that of Orban, as it will be discussed in the next case. Furthermore, the decision of Erdoğan was also compatible with the aim of strengthening Turkey's regional leadership claim, and with leveraging EU-Turkey relationship by using Syrian refugees as a tool to pursue its foreign policy interests.

3.1.2 Trade Policy

In Turkish international trade policy during Erdoğan's political power, the main aim is to protect more autonomy against dependence on one side, particularly Western trade agreements, engaging in several bilateral agreements. In this regard, Turkey's right-wing PFP is not protectionist in international trade. On the contrary, the activism and revisionism, as a part of Davutoğlu's "Strategic depth" agenda, show themselves in trade policies in a clear way. Furthermore, the countries with whom Turkey develop trade relations are selected accordingly.

After the global economic crisis in 2008 and onwards, Turkey wants to become a global and regional economic power (Aydın Çakır and Arıkan Akdağ 2017; Kumral 2022). Therefore, implementing a pro-active trade policy is coherent with this goal (Keyman 2016). In fact, Kumral (2022) argues that right-wing populists in Global South behave differently from the Western right-wing populists in trade because Global South countries such as Turkey and India aim to benefit from changing

balance in global economics. Kirişçi (2009) attempted to explain changing Turkish foreign policy toward regional activeness with the fact that Turkey became a “trading state” that looking for new markets to increase and diversify its foreign trade. During its first decade, AKP governments expanded Turkey’s foreign trade portfolio to neighboring countries while decreasing the trade volume with the West. For instance, the share of trade with the US in Turkish foreign trade shrink to 5% in 2008 from 9% in 1991 (Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu 2011, 707). Whereas the foreign trade volume with neighbors, including Russia and Middle Eastern countries, increased from 4 billion dollars to 88 billion dollars between the same years 1991 to 2008 (Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu 2011, 707).

However, this tendency to trade with MENA countries has shifted afterward with the impact of Arab Spring movements in the region. Since then, the share of foreign trade with the Middle East has been decreasing. In 2013, Turkey was doing almost a quarter of its total export to Middle Eastern countries, whereas in 2021, this share shrank to 17% (Turkstat 2022). Therefore, in the second decade of the AKP governments, Turkey began to increase its trade relations with many other different regions. For instance, Kuşku-Sönmez (2019, 391) finds out that between 2009-2016, Turkey engaged in free trade agreements with a wide range of countries from different regions of the world, namely from Chile to Jordan or Malaysia, targeting mainly sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Balkan countries" (p.391). Then, especially more recently, Turkey continues this activism by improving trade relations with Asian countries, mainly Russia and China (Aydın Çakır and Arkan Akdağ 2017, 346). This point is worth underlining because according to Öniş and Kutlay (2020b, 12), Erdoğan wants to develop close relations particularly with BRICS countries, that is included China and Russia, to become a member of the global South. Within this framework, the total trade with the EU countries is not decreasing. In 2018, for instance, half of Turkey’s international trade has still been with EU countries (Ath 2020, 275). However, trade volume with BRICS countries is obviously increasing over time. Attaching the idea of gaining "economic interdependence" from Western countries, Erdoğan sees Russia and China as the main partners (Öniş and Kutlay 2021, 1093). Öniş and Kutlay (2021, 1096) measure that the trade volume with Russia quintupled to 27 billion dollars in 2020 compared to its amount in 2002. Whereas this volume increased to 22 billion dollars in 2020 from 1.6 billion dollars in 2002 with China (p.1096). During this period, China and Russia achieved to enter the main three countries that Turkey has the highest trade volume (Öniş and Kutlay 2021, 1093). Interestingly, these trade volumes consisted of mainly imports, rather than export, thus worsening Turkey’s current account deficit (Öniş and Kutlay 2021, 1097-1098). In 2021, and in the first 4 months of 2022, this tendency has continued.

Russia has been the country where Turkey has done the greatest volume of its overall importation, with 16% share in 4 months 2022 (Turkstat 2022). Then, China is following with 11% share in Turkey's imports (Turkstat 2022). In the previous year, China was the leader with 12% and Russia followed with 11% (Turkstat 2022). In fact, while increasing the level of populism and the anti-democratic tendencies in the government, Erdoğan's trade policy approaches Russia and China, two global powers that also have authoritarian regimes (Öniş and Kutlay 2021). This fact ensures that when the government becomes more populist, trade transforms into an area where political motives are more crucial than rational net import-export calculations, to choose international partners.

Additionally, Turkey has been signing bilateral trade agreements with different countries such as Turkish republics like Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan (Sabah 2022). Or, African countries¹, such as Algeria more recently have been the other target region to develop bilateral trade relations (Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications 2020). In one of his recent meetings with African trade representatives, President Erdoğan underlined that under his governments, the trade volume with Africa quintupled to 25 billion dollars as of 2020, and reached 30 billion dollars in the first 11 months of 2021 (Boutalbi 2022). He also mentioned the efforts to establish free trade agreements with 7 African countries are still ongoing (Boutalbi 2022). Also, Turkey signed a free trade agreement with the United Kingdom in 2020 (Bloomberght 2020), and with Ukraine in February 2022, before the Russian invasion (Duvar 2022). According to the official data from the Ministry of Trade, Turkey currently has free trade agreements with 22 countries², and the agreements with 3 countries³ are waiting for the ratification. Moreover, the re-update of free trade agreements with the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) has been in force as of October 2021 (Palabıyık 2021).

Consequently, we can conclude that as a right-wing PFP case, Turkish international trade policy has been very active in different regions. After having decreased the ties with Middle Eastern countries, AKP governments sought other regions to develop trade relations. There are two main features of Erdoğan's trade policy: First, trade relations develop through bilateral trade agreements, most of which are free trade agreements. Secondly, the regions and countries are selected. In that sense, Turkey does not enter into multilateral free trade agreements that develop neoliberal global

¹Ghana, Sudan, Djibouti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, Chad and Libya

²EFTA, Israel, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Albania, Georgia, Montenegro, Serbia, Chile, Mauritius, South Korea, Malaysia, Moldova, Faroe Islands, Singapore, Kosovo, Venezuela and the United Kingdom

³Lebanon, Qatar and Sudan

economic model. This PFP's main aim is to become more autonomous from the Western trade partners, and to be transformed into a regional and global power, by launching and improving new trade relationships with different countries that Turkey wants to have further progress in bilateral relations. Thus, as mentioned by Kirişçi (2009), Turkey protects its feature of "trading state" in the last decade, because the country endeavors to find new markets and diversify its trade partners. Under these circumstances, international trade is being used not only as a source of income for Turkey but also as a foreign policy tool for the populist government to promote bilateral relations with selected countries. In the example of trade with Russia abovementioned, even though Turkey's trade deficit is increasing, Russia continues to be one of Turkey's main trade partners, by increasing import volume. Thus, while signing trade agreements or diversifying trade partners, the populist government does not prioritize increasing its profits. On the contrary, in some cases the country's net export might turn into negative numbers.

That is why this PFP is mainly intending to increase Turkey's presence and active-ness in selected regions where the populist governments perceive an opportunity for progress in the long-term, and to decrease the dependency on Western countries. In the African countries, Turkey both aims to increase its visibility and to put its dominance in the region through the implementation of an active trade policy in the region. Within this framework, Erdoğan's government is also pursuing its revisionist and assertive foreign policy goals through international trade. Moreover, Russia and China as being the Asian powers in international trade and the challenging partners against Western dominance in Turkey's foreign trade share is a significant example of how Erdoğan attempts to find a new balance between East and West in Turkey's trade relations, to increase Turkey's bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU. That does not mean that Turkey's trade relations with the EU or the US fall behind. Rather, for instance, Turkey wants to update the customs union agreement with the EU to increase its benefit ⁴. Thus, in terms of its foreign trade policy, the populist government is prone to establish bilateral free trade agreements, increase international trade volumes, develop more partnerships in international trade, and thus decrease its "need" for Western partnership. In that sense, the country prioritizes selecting trade partners among new markets for Turkey, and in emerging countries, mainly Russia and China, to challenge Western hegemony over Turkey's foreign trade share.

⁴To achieve this goal, the Syrian refugee crisis was being used to increase the bargaining power with the EU, to be able to re-establish a customs union agreement that would be more profitable for Turkey

3.1.3 Global Governance

As many cited-above studies argue in the literature, the emergence of populism is related to some type of reactionism against the impact of global governance. Then, a discourse to blame and demonize global governance and international institutions that limit national governments' actions has been a very useful strategy utilized by populist leaders. Turkey is a very clear example of this common phenomenon among PFPs. Firstly, the general aim of Erdoğan and his populist government is to blame the West for domestic crises, especially economic ones. This emphasis on "West" is important because populists generally match "West" with international institutions making global rules and norms, thus having global hegemony. Therefore, that ambiguous definition of "West" or "western institutions" includes a wide range of international institutions that are parts of global governance. For instance, Kaliber and Kaliber (2019, 10) specify that the "international interest-rate lobby", or "international credit-rating agencies" can be counted among these blamed international institutions. Moreover, reflecting the fundamental antagonism between pure people and corrupt elite, international institutions leading global governance and limiting the actions of national governments are among the "international corrupt elite" who work against the interests of pure people. Within this framework, any internal crisis or problem such as the Gezi Park movements in 2013, or currency crisis since 2018 are perceived as a conspiracy led by the global governance aiming to overthrow Erdoğan, against the will of pure people. In fact, Öniş and Kutlay (2020b) Kutlay and Öniş (2020) demonstrate the introduction of this conspiratorial thinking is coherent with the axis change of Turkish foreign policy from the West to the East. Accordingly, China and Russia are perceived as crucial partners to cooperate against the Western global hegemony -as seen in Turkish trade policy -, and Erdoğan considers the EU a common institution of Western countries that want to stop Turkey's development and progress (Öniş and Kutlay 2020b, 14).

Furthermore, the populist government is able to react against criticisms or threats of sanctions coming from international institutions by claiming that the latter are intervening in the internal affairs of Turkey. As a right-wing populist leader, Erdoğan easily combines nationalism and populism to demonize "west" and its institutional apparatus. In that sense, conspiratorial understanding of foreign policy and its promotion in internal political discourse is very effective in the hands of populist leaders. All threats are denounced as if they are intentionally constructed against the will of the Turkish and Muslim people, and against their only legitimate representative. Therefore, the international community and its institutions are always taken as a threat and the enemy in the eyes of Erdoğan, against the national sovereignty and

the independence of Turkish Republic. Coherently, "western" international institutions make enter into the "international elite" definition for the populist leader. For instance, Erdoğan sees IMF as one of these "enemy" institutions, and always emphasizes that his government will never make cooperation with IMF (Palabıyık 2021). Following that line, populist government valorizes loneliness among the international community, to pursue its specific foreign policy goals (Taş 2020, 10) because in the end, they are able to produce a political discourse of protecting national sovereignty in internal politics, in the eyes of their pure people. Consequently, Erdoğan and his governments can legitimize their refusal of international institutions on the basis of protecting national sovereignty and independence.

Nevertheless, it should be underlined that Turkish foreign policy does not show any immediate interruption from international or "western" institutions. On the contrary, what the populist government wants to establish is an opportunistic foreign policy whereby the country can benefit from its historic memberships to international institutions, while still pursuing an autonomous course. The relationship with international institutions that lead the global governance became highly transactional and pragmatic. Especially in terms of the relationship with the EU, Turkey's position transformed into a more transactional foreign policy perception during and after migration crisis in 2015. Under these circumstances, the EU has been mostly an economic partner for Turkey (Öniş and Kutlay 2020b, 14). For instance, one of Turkey's demands during the negotiations with the EU regarding the migration crisis was to re-consideration of customs union agreement. This argument was also valid for the EU's perception towards Turkey. Despite the incoherence with the EU's liberal values, less emphasis on rising authoritarian tendencies in Turkey by the EU and signing agreements between the EU and Turkey with a concrete support promise coming from the EU side are showing that the EU does not consider Turkey a potential member (Saatçioğlu 2020). Rather, it adopts an approach to establishing a functionalist bilateral relationship model. As a result, Turkey, while increasing its distance from EU membership, also maintains the benefits of the strategic partnership with the union. In this way, Erdoğan also consolidates his populist discourse even more in domestic politics. Reacting to or rejecting the Western institutions becomes a way of fueling populist discourse, and showing that Turkey is not a poor or weak country any more, thanks to AKP governments. In his speech during the opening ceremony of the Turkish National Assembly in 2017, Erdoğan underlined this fact by saying, "*We no longer need European Union membership.*" (BBC 2017). In another speech, he was saying, "*We no longer need these criteria. We have Ankara criteria.*" (Bülbul 2017). He meant by "Ankara criteria" that Turkey is the strong side that puts the rules and criteria, instead of the old, weak side that obeyed the

rules of Western institutions.

For the other global governance institutions, there is a similar picture. For instance, Erdoğan does not have any official declaration to announce the intention of leaving NATO. That is because NATO membership gives the populist government the power to veto any decision contrary to its interests, and even to manipulate and intervene in decisions within NATO. For example, the recent NATO membership requests of Sweden and Finland were vetoed by Turkey in the beginning of the negotiations, claiming that these two countries do not support Turkey's war against terrorism (BBC 2022). Erdoğan utilized this first refusal in domestic politics by trying to show that his governments protect the national interests of his people. He explicitly said that it was not possible to approve two countries that impose sanctions on Turkey, and that continue to support terrorist groups (Yeni Şafak 2022). Then, Turkey accepted their memberships by enforcing to gain compromises from Finland and Sweden. Thus, by remaining within NATO and using its veto power, Erdoğan was able to put forward his political claims.

Moreover, Dal et al. (2019) argue that the UN membership is also used to denounce regional problems in front of the international community. This point is considerably crucial because first, Turkey appears as a representative country that looks for solutions to regional problems. Thus, the regional leadership claim can become more visible. Then, there is an attempt to bring regional problems to the global community in order to find more convincing solutions, and to make a regional problem the agenda of an international body, by searching for international cooperation (Dal et al. 2019, 484). In that sense, the revisionist goal is to increase the visibility of the region among the international community. Erdoğan's speeches on Syrian refugee crisis, and the Palestine-Israel conflict during UN General Assembly should be among these attempts.

To pursue its revisionist foreign policy goals, Erdoğan's government is not only using pre-established international institutions, but also reviewing regional institutions. The OIC is one of these regional organizations based on sharing the same religion among member countries' citizens. In this international organization, Erdoğan could find a place to underline regional problems, and call for cooperation among Muslim countries. For instance, in 2021, in his speech for the opening ceremony of the OIC annual meeting, he says that Jerusalem is not only the cause of the Palestinian people, but the cause of the entire Islamic world. (Anadolu Agency 2021). He also emphasized that Muslim countries should not ignore the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Secondly, D-8 (Developing-8) Organization for Economic Cooperation can be the other example of regional institutions where Turkey engages in. The

institution is composed of 8 developing Muslim countries⁵ from Bangladesh to Iran, and founded in 1997 by Necmettin Erbakan, the founding father of National Vision Movement (*Milli Görüş Hareketi*) of which Erdoğan was also a member. It aims to strengthen bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation and collaboration for the development of new energy sources among member states. Thirdly, SCO is another intergovernmental institution that Erdoğan's governments use to enhance Turkey's options for foreign partners in international relations and foreign trade. Composed of mainly Asian countries, SCO is an alternative to the EU for economic cooperation and security (Reuters 2016). However, Turkey has not applied for full membership yet, and still had a "Dialogue Partnership" status with the SCO (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). Erdoğan's main intention was to keep this option against the possibility of any radical breakdown of relations with the EU. In so doing, Erdoğan achieved to both keep his alliance alternatives open, and pursue the anti-western agenda by underlining that his governments do not need Western cooperation.

With those organizations, in fact, the populist government wants to challenge the international system that is constructed under the Western hegemony. The official doctrine of "the world is bigger than five" is a very significant component of this stance. In this doctrine, "five" describes five members of the UN Security Council. However, the idea behind this doctrine is not only the critique of UN's structural problems of five veto powers, but to blame the international system as a whole and claim the necessity of building a new system. In this way, Erdoğan mobilizes his voters as well, around the idea that "new Turkey" is the country that ensures the global justice, and equal rights for all human beings -emphasizing the Islamic world- and the country will become a global power and regional power in the end (Aral 2019). While the Turkish populist government supports alternatives to western international organizations, it also wants to strengthen its regional power and prove itself as being a part of the community that aims to revise the international system. Thus, we can say that the Turkish PFP is not only reactionist and pragmatic against global governance, but it also has assertive and ambitious goals to revise the system with an active foreign policy perspective, rather than a defensive foreign policy understanding.

⁵Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Türkiye

3.1.4 Transborder Activism

As a part of its activeness in foreign policy, it is expectable for the Turkish populist government to show activism to reach the pure people beyond the national borders as a tool of soft power and to enhance Turkey's influence and brand power abroad (Adamson 2019). Claiming to become a regional leader and a powerful country, Erdoğan's populism mobilizes the Turkish diaspora community with a feeling that their home country is powerful and able to protect their rights (Mencutek and Baser 2018, 12). Also, the populist government aims to influence other countries' internal affairs by using the diaspora community. Along with the selectively exclusive pure people definition covering Turks and Sunnis, Erdoğan wants to expand his audience beyond Turkey by addressing diasporas living in different regions, but especially in Europe. According to official numbers, 5.5 million Turkish citizens are currently living in Western Europe, constituting 83% of total immigrant Turkish people abroad (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). So, Turkish citizens constitute "the largest Muslim immigrant group" in Europe (Arkılıç 2021a, 2).

As indicated by Arkılıç (2021b, 591), Erdoğan's populism that is combined with Turkish nationalism and Muslimhood influences the Turkish diaspora community in an effective way. First, it can be argued that AKP governments intentionally constructed this diaspora community for both a tool of soft power, and lobbying activities (Mencutek and Baser 2018), increasing the impact of Turkey in a transnational manner and forming a brand of Turkey in international arena (Baser and Ozturk 2020). According to the new official diaspora definition proposed by the populist government, first, all those who "emigrate from Anatolia will be considered part of Turkish diaspora" (Arkılıç 2021b, 591). Then, Adamson (2019) points out that the establishment of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (*Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı*)-YTB in 2010 is a well-known example of how AKP governments institutionalize their diaspora politics. The Presidency coordinates all activities to strengthen the relations among Turkish citizens living abroad, related communities, and international students who study in Turkey, funding especially theses on Turkish diaspora ⁶(Baser and Ozturk 2020, 15). It also allocates resources for research on Islamophobia, xenophobia, and discrimination against the Turkish diaspora (Baser and Ozturk 2020, 15). The Presidency is a governmental establishment where Turkish citizens living abroad are seen as "ambassadors" to protect Turkey's interests, and to propagate "new Turkey" perception of AKP governments as a soft power tool (Baser and Ozturk 2020). The Presidency

⁶For more details, you can check the following website : <https://www.ytb.gov.tr/kurumsal/baskanligimiz-2>

perceives the term “nation” as not limited to official borders, but as something to be valid for a “community” that can be dispersed in multiple countries (Mencutek and Baser 2018, 10). With this foreign policy tool, AKP governments can show that their perception of citizenship, and thus the potential audience to be affected by domestic political discourse, can expand even more (Mencutek and Baser 2018, 11). To include citizens living abroad further, the populist government introduced a new law where Turkish citizens living abroad can use their right to vote in elections and referendums in places where they live, without being present in Turkey (Arkılıç 2021b, 592). That facility paved the way for attracting the support of Turkish diaspora for Erdoğan and his governments, in elections and the 2017 constitutional referendum which was to ratify the presidential system.

Also, Erdoğan wants to use the Turkish diaspora community not only for gaining more votes but also for effecting different countries’ internal politics as a “lobbying tool”. Having the largest diaspora community in Germany with almost 3 million people, Erdoğan orientated his voters in Germany for German parliamentary elections. In 2017, he explicitly addressed to Turkish diaspora community in Germany and wanted them not to vote for Merkel in parliamentary elections (DW 2017 ; Euronews 2017). This attempt was described as an “unprecedented interference” by German politics. On another occasion, Erdoğan wanted to organize a rally in Germany with Turkish diaspora community in 2018, in order to thank for the high rates of approval in the 2017 constitutional referendum (Yeni Şafak 2018), but again this demand was rejected by German authorities (Staudenmaier 2018).

Moreover, the diaspora community is also under the control through religious institutions, mainly the Presidency of Religious Affairs, *Diyanet*. According to Öztürk and Sözeri (2018), *Diyanet* was designed as a “state apparatus” to increase “transnational capacity” and control of the populist government, along with the revisionist and active Turkish foreign policy. In that sense, *Diyanet* has been organizing several events for not only Turkish community but also the Muslim community in a broader sense. To publish and distribute Qurans in different languages in Balkans, providing material support for imams, supplying scholarships for Muslim students in foreign countries, and constructing huge mosques are some activities that *Diyanet* is accomplishing. AKP governments implement these actions not only to widen their transnational influence through religion, but also to propagate a religious perspective against the influence of Gülen movements abroad (Arkılıç 2021a). Thus, religion is transformed into a soft power and a part of Turkish public diplomacy to strengthen its activism transnationally (Şenay 2021; Öztürk and Gözaydın 2018).

Consequently, the Turkish PFP applies a transborder activism strategy through con-

structuring the Turkish diaspora under the framework of controlling and enhancing mechanisms such as Diyanet or YTB. The populist government engages in this foreign policy area in a highly active manner. With this foreign policy preference, AKP governments want to use the diaspora community as a means of soft power and/or public diplomacy. Transforming the diaspora community into "brand ambassadors" in multiple countries (Baser and Ozturk 2020), Erdoğan aims to strengthen Turkey's brand power in the eyes of international community through having a strong diaspora community that he can influence. Secondly, as coherent with the revisionist foreign policy preferences, Turkey has a goal to utilize the diaspora community for lobbying activities. Enhancing the Turkish identity among citizens living abroad, Erdoğan claims to empower his hand vis-à-vis the host countries of Turkish diasporas. The appeal of not to voting for Merkel should be kept in mind to illustrate this claim. In fact, these small interventions have also aim to prevent the total integration of Turkish citizens into their host countries (Baser and Ozturk 2020). That is why, for instance, Germany had to refuse Erdoğan's meeting requests because those increasing demands to be in touch with Turkish community could damage Germany's main immigration policy, which is integration. Thus, the populist government implements an engaged transborder activism in the foreground in coherence with its revisionist foreign policy goals. The government not only aims to gain some votes from its transborder community but also to use the Turkish diaspora to prove its strength in the eyes of international community. In the Hungarian example, although the transborder appeal does exist, the Orban government does not have any aim to use its diaspora community to empower Hungary's international reputation along with any revisionist foreign policy goal.

3.2 Hungarian Foreign Policy of Orban

Orban's right-wing populism that is combined with nationalism is another common case among scholars. When the post-communist leader, Victor Orban, achieved to become political power in 2010 as the head of the Fidesz Party, it would not be his first prime ministry period. During his leadership between 1998-2002, Orban's foreign policy was more pro-Western. For instance, Hungary became a NATO member in 1999 when Orban was in political power (Bergmann and Cicarelli 2020). Whereas during the years when Fidesz Party was opposition side, the party turned into a view adopting nationalism and populism. That can be considered a pragmatic way to benefit from the negative impacts of global financial crisis that hit Hungary in 2008 and afterward where the country had to implement strict austerity measures im-

posed by the IMF (Krekó and Enyedi 2018). Blaming the dependence of Hungary on the EU for those negative impacts, Fidesz appeared to be the way to limit EU's wider influence on the country in the eyes of the Hungarian electorate. That is because the party's first discourse was to protect the Hungarian people's interests and national sovereignty against all external involvements. Accordingly, when he came to power in 2010, he argued that the Western alliance, or the EU membership could be acceptable only if they are coherent with the "national unification" (Bozóki 2011, 650), which would be "illiberal democracy" introduced by Orbán in following years, as an alternative to Western liberal democracy model. Based on a perspective underlining the superiority of Christian values and traditional culture, nationalism is the best ideology to attach populism. During his first term in power, he brought European Union into "international elite" or "enemy" definition who pursues its own interests, ignoring the demands of Hungarian people (Hegedüs 2019). By gaining the supermajority in the Parliament, Fidesz found the opportunity to make crucial amendments to the Constitution (Jenne 2021, 688). Since then, Orbán gained following three national elections in 2014, 2018 and 2022, and still is the prime minister of Hungary. Undermining checks and balances mechanisms, polarizing the society into two main camps as pro-EU "enemies" or "corrupt elites", highlighting the anti-immigration after 2015 when migration crisis also turns into a way for the Orbán administration to show his right-wing populism in a radical anti-immigration political discourse, are some of the well-known strategies of Orbán's populism. While seeking new trade alliances with Russia and China, Orbán PFP wants to increase Hungary's alternatives for the Western alliance, or at least intends to show this willingness to decrease the EU dependence. Following the period when the EU was stuck in the middle of the migration crisis, Orbán again used this opportunity to criticize and blame the EU for imposing propositions that were aiming to hamper Hungarian culture and traditions. Turning the contradiction with the EU into a conflict for the survival of Hungary, Orbán does find the meaning of his party's existence in the protection of his pure people against the EU, a supranational institution that forms the global governance. In the following sub-chapters, all these PFP implementations will be explained and exemplified in a detailed manner.

3.2.1 Migration

Reflecting the Manichean worldview dividing the country into two sides, Orbán's migration policy is one of the clearest examples in terms of understanding behaviors of a right-wing populist toward immigrants that are excluded from the pure people definition. Orbán's pure people are based on Hungarian nationality and Christianity.

Thus, those who are not Hungarian and do not adopt Christian traditional values do not represent the real people. Apart from the constant struggle against the EU, as will be discussed in the following sections, the 2015 refugee crisis was a chance to consolidate this identity politics and to build political discourse on the hostility towards immigrants, as an enemy to fight against (Waterbury 2020, 967). Due to its position in the EU, Hungary was a transitory country for many Syrian refugees. According to Tok (2018), Hungary witnessed the most crowded refugee flow of its history in 2015, even though most of those people were not aiming to stay in Hungary, but just passing toward western Europe. This "opportunity" for Orban was used to produce a discourse that blames immigrants for associating with terror, security threats for women, economic problems for the job market in Hungary, and cultural deterioration for Hungarian people (Tok 2018; Waterbury 2020). Although Hungary was not the main destination country for immigrants, president Orban triggers a type of fearmongering by exaggerating the fear among Hungarian people about migration crisis (Economist 2022). Thus, the populist government creates a "common enemy" to be rallied against. Since the newcomers are both Muslim and from outside of Europe, they should be excluded from both Hungary and Europe at all costs. He argues that migration from outside of Europe is intentionally being imposed on Hungary by external "enemies" (Waterbury 2020, 963-964). Accordingly, all internal opposition groups or the EU who support a welcoming program for more immigrants are declared as "enemies" of the Hungarian people. Based on this internal and external "enemies" perception, Orban could mobilize more voters around this fear and polarization. Consequently, his supporters increased between 2014-2018 from 44% to 48% (Tok 2018; Orbán 2014; Deloy 2018), and he achieved to stay in power in the 2022 elections as well. He also paved a way for other right-wing populist leaders or opposition parties in European countries to react against any probable pro-immigrant EU proposition. For instance, when Merkel implied a pro-immigrant policy, her coalition partner was favoring Orban's anti-immigration stance, and used this example against her (Müller 2016).

So, as in the case of Erdoğan, it is very observable how Orban can draw a line to determine which people should be accepted, in accordance with the national and religious identity that shape also his pure people definition. When Erdoğan includes Turks and Sunnis into the pure people definition, Orban covers Hungarian nationality and Christianity as decisive factors to determine which community is included. However, Orban's stance vis-a-vis the immigration crisis is sharper than Erdoğan's policy. Even though both cases make exclusive migration policies, the Turkish case can be considered more flexible in their foreign policy decisions than Orban's migration policy, as Erdoğan's choice in the 2015 crisis reflected this fact. Yet that

does not mean that Erdoğan's migration policy is very inclusive, as explained in the previous chapter. The reason why the Turkish government accepted millions of Syrian refugees is briefly its revisionist goals in regional politics. Also, Syrian refugees were a community that could be included in the pure people definition of Erdoğan due to the factor of coreligionism. A similar argumentation can be valid for also migrants coming from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Turkey. They can be perceived as "acceptable" minorities for the populist government due to this coreligionism impact. Whereas Orbán's migration policy is more restrictive, prudent, and exclusive. For those who were coming during the 2015 migration crisis, neither nationality nor religion was similar to what Orbán defines as Hungarian pure people. Moreover, if Orbán's immigration policy became softened, his party's existence would lose its coherence. Because Orbán constructed his political strategy on the opposition to the EU, and immigration crisis appears as an opportunity for Orbán to show this reaction, Orbán should have a strict immigration policy to sustain the coherence in his ideological stance. Orbán's populism does not have revisionist goals to re-design the EU's immigration policy, but it tries to react against the common EU policies, and protect Hungary's national interests during a global crisis, rather than challenge the EU's internal functioning on migration policy. Also, Orbán could increase his vote share and mobilize his voters mainly around the immigration issues. So, this exclusive foreign policy should be continued for Orbán's future in Hungarian politics because Fidesz's existence strengthens with this stance.

Lastly, as a similar point, both for Turkish and Hungarian PFPs, migration becomes an important part of how to shape the relationship with the EU. During and after the migration crisis, Erdoğan utilized the migration issue as a way to re-shape the relations with the EU in a pragmatic and transactional way. By accepting millions of refugees, Erdoğan achieved to decrease possible criticisms for the increasing authoritarianist tendencies that could come from the EU side, based on the transactional relationship that he established with the EU. Moreover, Erdoğan continues to blame the EU due to their ignorance and mismanagement of the crisis, when there is a criticism regarding the deterioration of democracy level. He also produces political discourse to be used in domestic politics. Orbán also announces the mismanagement and wrong policies of the EU in front of the international community during the migration crisis, to ignore the criticisms on the worsening democratic conditions in Hungary. Yet, since Hungary is an EU country, as opposed to Turkey, Hungary has to maintain connections with the EU if any common decision or a pro-immigrant stance is adopted. What Orbán wants to do is to protect Hungary against those common policies and to implement his own immigration policy. One of his main slogans during this period was "*We, as Hungarians, decide on our migration policy*"

(Kopyś 2022). Consequently, these two right-wing populist cases have similarities in terms of how to define pure people on the basis of nationality and religion. Yet they have also differences that can be explained through revisionist foreign policy goals, and through unique conjunctural reasons examined above. Whereas in the trade policy of two countries, it will be possible to see more similarities between the two cases.

3.2.2 Trade Policy

As indicated above, Hungary was among the European countries that were affected by the impacts of the 2008 global financial crisis. Since the country is an EU member, its foreign trade mostly relies upon the internal free trade network of the EU. However, since Hungary was hit by the negative impacts of the global financial crisis, trade appears as a field to contrast against the EU partnership, and to pursue a semi-independent trade policy for priorly Hungary's profit. Thus, for a government that built its political stance on protecting the national interests of Hungary against the external actors such as the EU, it is expectable to look for alternative cooperation in international trade. As a right-wing populist case and an EU member state, Orbán's regime does interiorize free trade, but wants to diversify Hungary's trade portfolio. That is because according to Orbán, financial dependence on the EU at that level threatens the interests of his pure people (Jenne 2021, 692).

Within this framework, Orbán's trade policy was to get closer with Asian partners in the early 2010s. Consequently, Orbán announced a transformation in Hungarian trade policies with the "Eastern Opening" in 2014. As what Erdoğan wants to achieve, Orbán intends to establish trade relationships with various countries in a bilateral manner. With this new foreign policy, the main aim was to develop collaborations with alternative markets in order to decrease the dependence on EU markets, and find a balance between Eastern and Western partnerships (Jenne 2021, 695-696). Similar to the Turkish case, Hungary's main targets became authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China, each of them for specific policy areas. In terms of getting closer with Russia, Orbán accepted to sign the second Paks agreement that previewed to build a second nuclear power plant after the first old nuclear plant again constructed by Russia with Paks One (Csaba 2022, 6). Secondly, China was drawn as one of the main alternatives to EU trade. Ignoring criticisms regarding human rights violations that China is accused of committing, Hungary has been developing bilateral trade relationships with China. Tarrósy and Vörös (2020, 115-116) found out that there is a huge increase in the trade volume between China

and Hungary, amounting to 571 million dollars in 2015, ten times more than its volume in 2003. Moreover, they underline that 2% of Hungarian export and 6% of its import derives from China (p.117). In 2021, China became the second import partner of Hungary, after Germany in line with expectations as an EU country, with 7.1% share in Hungary's total import volume (UN Comtrade Database 2022) Besides, the Hungarian populist government calls its national merchants for making trade with Chinese partners. Toplišek (2020) claims that the Hungarian government creates common places for Hungarian small and medium enterprises with emerging countries' representatives to incentive further partnerships in trade.

Hungary developed close trade relations with Turkey as well. As two right-wing populists, Erdoğan and Orbán emphasized the importance of collaborating in international trade. However, this relationship is providing benefits for Hungary, since its exports are more than its imports with Turkey. Nevertheless, it is not the case for trade with China. In other words, as in the case of Turkey, Hungarian trade relationship with China does not contribute to Hungary's growth since Chinese market is very protected and has its own rules rather than free trade of liberal systems (Csaba 2022, 11). Thus, increasing trade relations with China makes Hungary's trade deficit worsened. Then, even though Orbán wants to create alternatives in order to make Hungary more independent from the EU in economic sense, the alternatives do not provide the same benefits that Hungary gained from the trade with the. Thus, that means that Orbán's PFP does not, or cannot aim to leave the European market because he needs to benefit from the trade income that the EU provides.

In that sense, the Hungarian case has both similarities and differences with the Turkish case. Both populist leaders see trade as a foreign policy tool to reduce the dependence on Western countries. Thus, both countries put trade policy in the foreground of their foreign policy agenda, promoting more trade. Keeping the goal to show their opposition to Western hegemony, both of them choose their partners from Asian countries that challenge Western hegemony in the global economy, namely Russia and China. They want to increase their options in terms of trade partners, and both of them aim to decrease Western dependence through trade. Also, following the argument of Öniş and Kutlay (2020b), authoritarian trade powers such as Russia and China do not require any attachment to liberal or democratic values. Since both leaders in Turkey and Hungary show authoritarian tendencies in their politics, these new trade partners are also compatible with the new regime types in the two countries. Secondly, both leaders prefer bilateral free trade agreements with selected countries to enhance their partnerships. Yet Erdoğan can be considered more aggressive compared to Orbán to disseminate in different regions from the Balkans to Africa. Due to having revisionism in the foreground, Erdoğan intends

to strengthen Turkey's economic presence in various countries. Whereas Hungary has already had a free trade network within the EU, with the German main partnership. The country has not enough infrastructure and management to organize trade partnerships in regions such as Africa (Csaba 2022, 11). Moreover, Hungary does move away from regional alliances in trade policies to some extent, but it does not abandon Western partnerships. Orbán does not consider any exit scenario for Hungary either. What he wants to establish is to gain more free ground for national governments within the EU, with fewer restrictions and fewer competence areas for the EU. In that sense, Erdoğan's foreign policy goals in trade are distinguished from Orbán's foreign trade perception. The former aims to use trade as a field to show its activeness and revisionism in global market with selected partners, whereas the latter's intention is to increase the independence from the EU market, thus claiming to protect national sovereignty, and balancing Hungary's relationships between East and West, not dominated from any side. In the next chapter, this difference that is based on the opposition between having a defensive or revisionist foreign policy agenda will be more visible for those two cases.

3.2.3 Global Governance

Until this point, we have mentioned how Orbán's foreign policy contradicts the EU in many ways. In fact, as Jenne (2021) explains precisely, Orbán's main policy is to decrease the density of foreign relations with traditional allies of Hungary, under the claim of increasing the national independence of Hungary. To this end, one can easily observe that Orbán and his foreign policy officers intentionally come into conflict with the EU. There has been constant tension between European Commission and Orbán administration. Between 2015-2020, European Commission implemented five infringement procedures against Hungary due to the violation of the EU's migration policy, such as blocking access to the country (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2021). In 2017, European Commission brought Orbán's new NGOs law to the Court of Justice, because the law prohibits foreign non-governmental organizations from taking financial support from international sources (Benková 2019, 4). In 2018, combined with the criticisms coming from the Council of Europe and the OSCE on the "Stop Soros" law, which was to penalize asylum-seekers, Commission again brought the case to the Court of Justice.

While refusing any option of leaving the EU or NATO, Orbán appreciates the veto power coming from the memberships of these international institutions in accordance with his interests. For instance, Hungary refuses the EU's proposal of cooperating

with African and Arabian countries on the migration issue, although any agreement would have been useful to ease the problem (Tarrósy and Vörös 2020, 130). As another example, with his other populist partner in the EU, Poland, Orban was able to veto the EU budget proposed for a seven-year term (Visnovitz and Jenne 2021). Orban also finds ways to use this veto power in order to back new global partners. For instance, he occasionally blocks sanctions against China, Russia, or Turkey. He also vetoed NATO's military training support for Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea (Visnovitz and Jenne 2021). During the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Orban stopped the NATO support of no-fly zones for Ukraine, claiming that NATO should not intervene in the areas out of its members' borders (Yilmaz 2022). Other than NATO and the EU, the IMF is another international institution that Orban claims to fight against, because it is considered an elitist institution working against the people (Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch 2020). Although it was the IMF that provide financial assistance to Hungary to solve economic problems after the 2008 crisis, Orban praised his governments to stand against the IMF's proposals. In 2012 while Hungary was suffering from financial problems, Orban rejected the IMF's loan proposal and said that "Hungary could fund itself without help from IMF" (Reuters 2012). He legitimized this refusal by underlining that the proposal was completely against Hungarian national interests (BBC 2012).

Taking into account all these contradictions, refusals and discussions with the international institutions as global governance tools, one critical question is whether Orban, a right-wing populist leader, wants to leave these institutions. The obvious answer to this question should be that he does not want to leave them because they provide financial benefits that he could not give up. First, and foremost, Orban aims to reform the EU in a way that he could appreciate these financial benefits of being a member state, while keeping flexibility in internal affairs. He explicitly says that his intention is not to leave the EU at all, but to keep the sovereignty by reforming the EU from within (Reuters 2021). He once emphasized that "It is still better to be on the inside (within the EU) than on the outside despite all the difficulties" (Hungary Today 2020). Despite all criticisms and tensions, the Fidesz party officially remained a member of the European People's Party, which is composed of the EU's center-right parties including that of Merkel, until 2021 (DW 2021). In one of his recent speeches, he underlines that the future of Hungary is in NATO and in the EU. However, in the mind of Orban, the international institutions should be more focused on nation-states (Hungary Today 2022). Every member state should be free in its internal affairs, as a sign of protecting national sovereignty. In another speech, he claims that Brussel sees the integration as an ultimate goal, rather than a means to strengthen the European peoples, thus, he says, "an ever closer union

should be deleted from the Treaties of the EU" (Hungary Today 2021). According to this view, the EU should adopt a view of "Europe of nations", but not a Europe over the will of nations (Hungary Today 2017). In that sense, his PFP considers European integration as something that should be restricted in economic cooperation, rather than expanding to further the third pillar that requires integration in political, constitutional or judicial systems. While conducting a pragmatic way of staying within the EU and benefiting from the profits of the EU membership, he explicitly shows that he does not support the policies "dictated" by the EU. Considering the EU mostly an economic union to gain financial benefits, Orbán wants to have the power of the "last decision" over the distribution of EU's financial attributes (Kornai 2015, 44).

Secondly, what he aims to achieve is to make his struggle with the global governance institutions, but mainly the EU, a shield to hide behind when there is an internal problem. In other words, Orbán externalizes Hungary's domestic problems, and creates an "existential dichotomy" between the global governance tools and his nation's sovereignty (Hegedüs 2019, 414). In that sense, he proclaims a fight for his country's independence as if the EU or other western institutions are undermining Hungarian national interests. Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2020, 36) argue that Orbán's populism can be incorporated into populist cases, in which leaders pledge to protect their pure people against "foreign outsiders" that are working against the national will and national interests. For instance, Orbán claims that the EU sees Hungarian people as the "second-class citizens" (Hegedüs 2019, 414). During the migration crisis, Orbán was leading campaigns against the EU's mismanagement and claimed that the EU wanted to approve a proposal that would threaten the Hungarian people's security, culture, religious values, and job security. While blaming the EU institutional structure, but mainly European Commission, he argues that the EU is largely under the impact of Soros and US Democrats (Hungary Today 2021). For instance, he claims that the infringement procedures that the EU initiated against Hungary are being conducted by Soros (Hungary Today 2017). That is why, it will not be possible to see any EU act that favors Hungarian people. Moreover, he blames all domestic opposition parties that support EU's policies as internal "enemies" who collaborate with the external one, by converting all problems into crises imposed by "foreign powers".

Consequently, this latter provides the populist leader more space for political maneuver in his foreign policy since the country could involve in decision-making processes. When one compares this stance vis-à-vis international institutions that form global governance with that of Erdoğan, it is possible to see many similar points, as well as some critical differences. First, as claimed by Visnovitz and Jenne

(2021), both PFPs aim to create somehow a balance between the East and West. In that sense, both leaders attempt to develop close relations with Russia and China as challenging actors, while keeping memberships in Western international institutions alive. In other words, both populist leaders prefer to stay within the international institutions that they are already in, in order to continue to benefit from the financial support and veto powers. Yet in their eyes, international institutions, but especially the EU's demands, cannot be over the national interests. This last point becomes more important for Orbán as Hungary is an EU member. Also, there is a critical nuance to be understood to distinguish the two PFPs from each other: Orbán has built his political discourse on the idea of "defending" Hungarian pure people. It is possible to see many examples of that perspective in the above-mentioned speeches, or in his slogans such as "Stop the Brussel", "We want to live in Europe as Hungarians", or "Hungary First" (Kopyś 2022; Hungary Today 2017). Thus, Orbán's PFP was to protect Hungarian national sovereignty against the involvement of global governance, and to advocate Hungary's national interests through the usage of veto power, as a part of decision-making process. Whereas in the Turkish case, there is a search to challenge or revise the regional system as a whole, claiming to become a global power. In that sense, Turkish authorities could accept a more radical divergence from the EU in the last couple of years, while trying to build their own regional institutions, to claim regional leadership, and develop further relations with alternative global partners. Different from the Hungarian case, Erdoğan wants to form his own regional order by engaging more in the non-Western intergovernmental institutions. As a result, when Orbán takes a more defensive and cautious stance vis-à-vis the international institutions, Erdoğan wants to review global governance and step up his attempts to build a new regional system led by Turkey.

3.2.4 Transborder Activism

As in the Turkish case, transborder appeal is an important part of Orbán's PFP. Because there is historically a Hungarian minority group dispersed into neighboring countries, the literature on Hungarian diaspora community and "kin-state politics" led by Orbán is expanding gradually. First, it can be helpful to distinguish two types of Hungarian minority groups who are living abroad. The first group consisted of Hungarian citizens who emigrated from Hungary for different periods of time (Kovács 2020). Even a considerable part left the country due to the worsening democratic conditions during the Orbán's regime. At the beginning of this chapter, we have underlined that Orbán's governments gradually undermine democratic institutions, hampers the rights of opposition parties, and increases the pressure on

free media channels, universities, or NGOs. As a result, Freedom House downgraded Hungary's freedom status to "Partly Free" in 2019. During this long period where Orban leads the country since 2010, many citizens fled from the country towards other EU countries. Yet this part of the Hungarian diaspora is not a community that can be easily attracted by Orban's transborder activism (Waterbury 2020, 971).

The second part of the Hungarian minority living abroad is the main target of Orban's transborder appeal. This community can be called "kin minority" (Kovács 2020, 3). They consisted of Hungarians who stayed in neighboring countries after World War I with the Trianon Peace Treaties that changed Hungary's national borders (Pogonyi 2015). There are currently around 2.1 million Hungarians in the four countries with the largest Hungarian minority communities, namely Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Slovakia (Kovacs 2019). Since 1990 where Soviet regime collapsed, Hungarian kin minority could establish political organizations, their affiliation and demands for Hungarian identity have been alive (Kovács 2020, 3). Especially after the approval of Hungary's EU membership, citizenship for this community becomes more important since Hungarian citizenship provides also EU citizenship and right to free movement in the Schengen area (Pogonyi 2017). Orban administration was not oblivious to this demand. First, they printed the Dual Citizenship Act in 2010 during his second term, allowing gain citizenship for those who are not living in Hungary (Kopyś 2022, 134). Highlighting the trauma of Trianon Treaties, the populist leader wants to form a "re-unified" Hungarian nation that covers kin minorities, in order to strengthen his political movement by taking more support from citizens abroad. As in the Turkish case, Orban's main aim is to show that the Hungarian state is able to protect its community living abroad. Following this step, a new law was proposed to announce the "Single Hungarian nation" that could exceed national borders (Pogonyi 2015, 84). Between 2010-2015, 600 thousand people living abroad took Hungarian citizenship. By 2017, according to official numbers, among this kin minority, 1 million Hungarian people residing abroad applied and gained their citizenship status (Kovács 2020, 11). Following the amendment of citizenship law, the populist government approved another law that gives right to vote to Hungarian communities living abroad, and made postal votes possible as well (Kopyś 2022, 136). The aim was not only to form an institutional recognition of Hungarian community living abroad as a part of Hungarian nation, but also to protect or revitalize cultural ties with those people, revitalize Hungarian culture and tradition among kin minorities, and prevent assimilation or marriage with other nationalities that will cause the decline of Hungarian (Pogonyi 2017, 248). To this end, Orban's governments have been investing in some funds and scholarships. For instance, the Bethlen Gábor Fund was transformed into a state apparatus to organize

educational programs for students living in European countries, to familiarize those students with Hungarian history culture, through scholarships, language schools, cultural trips and so on (Pogonyi 2015, 89). Within this institutional framework built by the government, not only organizations but also individuals can demand funds (Kovács 2020). The Hungarian government has also a registration system through which books, announcements, or news are sent to the Hungarian diaspora community on a regular basis (Kovács 2020, 63). The government also allocates funds for cultural revitalization program that proposes cultural events to meet Hungarian young diaspora community with Hungarian history, or provides opportunities for language education (Kovács 2020, 12).

All these implementations want to establish a transborder activism based on kinship, or a historical Hungarian root/nationality. As mentioned in the Acts cited above, Orbán's nation includes the Hungarians living beyond Hungarian territories, providing a ground to move national interests of Hungary beyond its borders. That gives the populist leader an opportunity to apply a "trans-sovereign nationalism" (Waterbury 2020, 963-964). Based on this point, he could explicitly say that the "real" Hungarian borders are covering all of the Schengen areas, rather than "symbolic" state borders of Hungary (Lamour and Varga 2020). In that sense, Orbán does not consider the Hungarian diaspora community as migrants. According to Waterbury (2020), the time period when the country faced a refugee flow from non-European countries in 2015 was also the period where the country saw an emigration trend. Derived from this new phenomenon for that period, he redefined his "legal diaspora" and "illegal immigrants". Accordingly, migrants are only those coming from outside of the European continent, aiming to hamper Hungarian and Christian traditions and values, targeting the national wealth of Hungarian pure people. Thus, the Hungarian community living abroad is using their fair right to move within European borders, because they are not as "destructive" as migrants coming from outside of Europe. Consequently, the freedom of movement among the EU countries is the backbone of Orbán's transnational activism.

Then, Orbán's efforts to engage in transborder community achieved the goal of mobilizing more transborder voters. When one looks at the vote share among Hungarian community living abroad, this fact is observable. In 2014, 95% of transborder citizens voted for Fidesz Party. In 2018, the party again gained 96.2% of Hungarian votes residing abroad (Hutt 2022). Even though the turnout rates were not so high, (4% of all votes in the 2018 elections), these votes coming from Hungarian citizens living abroad, and the high numbers of applications for dual citizenship show that Orbán's transborder activism is somehow functioning in an effective manner. Under these circumstances, it is possible to specify many similarities between Erdoğan's

and Orbán's PFP in terms of transborder activism. First, for both cases, transborder appeal and activism are put in the foreground of the PFPs by populist leaders. In the Turkish case, the scope of dual citizenship is extended, in Hungarian case, the dual citizenship right is affiliated to Hungarian kin minority groups living in neighboring countries. In both cases, the right to vote for the diaspora community is; and these diaspora/kin minorities are supporting populist leaders with more than 90% of their votes. Thus, a new "transborder nation" is created by populist leaders, using political power in domestic politics. Transborder activities are also carried out via state resources in an institutional manner by establishing new institutions such as YTB or Bethlen Gábor Fund. In both cases populist leaders aim to protect their transborder community by reviving the cultural and traditional values, disseminating language education, sustaining funds for research and organizations on diaspora communities, and attempting to increase the interactions between home and host communities through those events. Lastly, both populist leaders intend to use the diaspora community as a soft power tool to show that their nations, and thus leaders' appeals can reach beyond their national borders.

Whereas two aspects can be considered differences between the two cases: First, Orbán's transborder appeal is mostly targeting the kin minority groups, which means that his transborder pure people definition is determined by Hungarian nationality. As explained in the chapter on migration, Orbán defines his pure people as having Hungarian nationality. In that regard, religion is also a factor that unifies the people, but not at the forefront. Whereas for Erdoğan, both the Turkish nationality and Sunni Islam are determinant factors for specifying transborder appeal targets. In that sense, while Orbán does not use any religious aspect or institution within the framework of transborder activism, the Turkish PFP is actively using Diyanet to provide mobilization and interaction among the Turkish diaspora community. Secondly, Erdoğan's appeal can be seen as more demanding versus Orbán's more vote-based activism. As seen in the case of appealing for vote against Merkel, or the intention to do meetings in European countries where the Turkish diaspora community does show their presence among others, Erdoğan wants to use the diaspora community to influence countries' domestic politics. We do not know whether this appeal did find response or not, but it should be underlined that those efforts led German authorities to take preventive actions. However, Orbán seemed to be more modest in his appeal. His main aim is to mobilize more Hungarian citizens to go to the ballot and vote for him. He does not have a revisionist aim, any border claim, or any intention to interfere with the internal affairs of the given country. Thus, he implements a more modest transborder activism compared to Erdoğan. As the result, apart from minor nuances, we can conclude that both PFPs give importance

to their transborder communities and uses transborder activism and appeal in an engaging manner.

Based on this comparison, the essential features of two populist cases can be demonstrated in the Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Right-Wing PFPs With Foreign Policy Indicators

	Migration	Trade Policy	Global Governance	Transborder Activism
Turkey	Selective Exclusiveness	Bilateral/More Open	Assertive	High
Hungary	Selective Inclusiveness	Bilateral/More Open	Cautious	High

4. LEFT-WING POPULIST FOREIGN POLICIES

Compared to the European right-wing populist cases, left-wing populists pursue different paths both in their domestic and foreign policy agendas. Since they combine populism mainly with socialist ideas, the main issues they address to the people are socioeconomic, rather than ethnic or cultural (Chryssogelos 2017). In other words, left-wing populists generally refer to poor or socioeconomically vulnerable people, and define the corrupt elite among those who exploit pure people and who are blamed to collaborate with foreign "imperial" powers. Therefore, left-wing populists do not refer to any religious, ethnic, or sectarian identity in their definition of pure people. That is why, they are considered more inclusive compared to right-wing populists (Chryssogelos 2017). So, if they have this intention, as in the case of Chavez, their appeal can easily claim to reach a wider community beyond nation-state borders because they do not address a specific national or cultural identity, but to all economically oppressed people (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017), emphasizing firstly the oppressed people within the national borders. In the research of Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013), Latin American populism is qualified as "inclusive", whereas the European populist cases are mostly "exclusive". In addition, left-wing populism is a concept often associated with the Latin American region due to its historical background, as De la Torre (2017, 251) describes Latin America as the "land of populism". The region is known for three waves of populism during the 20th century, consisting of left-wing populist leaders who solidified its pure people mainly around the issue of anti-Americanism and a common colonial past (De la Torre 2017). Consequently, these issues emerged as the main topics to build a traditional foreign policy behavior for Latin American left-wing populists. However, left-wing populists from other regions of the world use similar arguments to oppose the Western world, as the main founder and protector of neoliberalism and its harmful attributes to their pure people, even though they are not members of the colonized world. For instance, the Syriza government in Greece builds the fundamentals of its PFP on the reaction against the neoliberal policies that are imposed on Greece under the name of austerity politics by international institutions such as the EU or the IMF.

In their foreign policies, left-wing populists' preferences have significant differences compared to right-wing PFPs. As an example, derived from their more inclusive pure people definition, they do not necessarily oppose migration as much as the right-wing populists. Their societal division is not on the identity-based features, but on the socioeconomic attributes of globalization, namely neoliberalism. They adopt a more protectionist and mercantilist stance on trade policies. However, they have some different aspects in their PFPs due to the explanatory factor of revisionism in foreign policy. For instance, left-wing cases that have revisionist foreign goals would again implement more activism to form regional institutions led by their leaderships, such as the ALBA in the Venezuelan example.

This chapter provides a deeper analysis to understand the similarities and differences among left-wing PFPs, along with the two left-wing PFPs, namely the foreign policy agendas of Chavez and Tsipras. First, there are many similarities between the two cases due to the same leftist ideology attached to populism. Despite the fact that both countries are located in geographically different places on the world map, and have very different political cultures and histories, both governments came to power as a result of peoples' growing grievances against global powers, such as the EU and the US. Both promised to decrease the impact of the neoliberal economic model on their pure people, while also forming an inclusive type of people understanding that covers all oppressed peoples in their regions. Yet, as in the previous chapter, having revisionist foreign policy goals will be a main explanatory factor to determine why left-wing PFPs are distinguished from one another. In this study, while Chavez in Venezuela attempted to implement a revisionist PFP, aiming to become a regional power with new regional institutions and with the claim of declaring Chavez's leadership in the region as also challenging US hegemony in global and regional politics; Syriza in Greece wanted to protect the national economic sovereignty of the country against the EU during the debt crisis and the pressure of migration crisis that Greece faced in 2015.

In this chapter, it will be emphasized that the two cases also have crucial differences in terms of their capabilities and institutional liabilities. First, as an EU member state, Tsipras had not the same flexibility in his foreign policy actions as Chavez had. Secondly, Greece was under the impact of its debt crisis and economic problems. Thus, there was an obligation for Tsipras to keep the negotiations going with the international institutions. That restrictive factor was not relevant for Chavez's Venezuela either, since his country did not witness that economic pressure during Chavez's governments, and in any case the country could provide its economic benefit through natural resources. Under these circumstances, if Chavez's PFP is revisionist and challenging, the Syriza example should be qualified as more defen-

sive. In the following pages, both those similarities and differences will be analyzed in a detailed manner under four foreign policy indicators.

4.1 Venezuelan Populist Foreign Policy under Chavista Regime

Venezuela during the long presidency periods of Chavez was one of the symbolic cases of left-wing populisms in the literature. With his charismatic leadership and revolutionary claims, Chavez achieved to stay in power from 1999 until his death in 2013. His political career took off during the years when he was imprisoned for staging a coup against the government in 1992 (Rodrigues 2013). After the years in prison, Chavez, an outsider, a former soldier, became one of the most symbolic presidents of the region, after Juan Peron. In the very first years of his first term in power, he enacted a new constitution that enlarged his political power as the president via referenda. He won four consecutive elections, many referendums, and numerous regional elections under the framework of his political party. He always had development goals not only for Venezuela but also for the Latin American region. As leading a rentier state that benefits from its oil resources, he knew well how inequal the existing socioeconomic structure was in many Latin American countries. Thus, he was able to instrumentalize these inequalities to divide Latin American peoples into two parts: poor, exploited and excluded pure people (*el pueblo*), and corrupt elites, i.e., old landowners, or aristocrats (*la oligarquía*) (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 103). The common feature of those "enemies" counted above is that they were working for the US, the international "enemy" leading imperialism in the eyes of Chavez. Thus, as a left-wing populist, Chavez defined his pure people according to the socioeconomic terms in an inclusive and transborder/transnational manner. According to Chavez, Latin American people suffered from the colonial powers and the US for centuries. For that reason, they were deprived of their sovereignty for centuries. Consequently, Chavez's PFP consisted of two main goals, which were also two main dreams of the Bolivarian Revolution: pan-Americanism and anti-imperialism (Dodson and Dorraj 2008, 74). As Bolivar challenged the Spanish colonial power and protected Latin American peoples, Chavez wanted to replace the US hegemony in the Latin America region (Wehner and Thies 2021, 331), as the contemporary colonial power, and to establish an advanced regional integration model. To achieve this goal, he was aiming to liberalize the region from the US dependency through regional economic partnerships and to provide cooperation among Latin American countries in an institutionalized manner. Under this framework, Chavez implemented a leftist and revisionist PFP. While protecting

his leftist ideological attributes in his foreign policy perspective, as we will see in his migration policy and protectionist trade policy, he conducted a very active foreign policy both regionally and globally. Generating new regional institutions so that he could become the leader, Chavez wanted to dominate the region and transform its order in accordance with his leftist ideological worldview, on the basis of anti-US and anti-imperialist ideas. As we observed in Turkey, the other revisionist PFP example, Chavez had the regional leadership claim, trying to organize countries in the region for developments in a wide range of areas from trade to educational projects. In this chapter, it will be analyzed how Chavez put his PFP into action under four foreign policy indicators:

4.1.1 Migration

As opposed to the right-wing populist PFPs, left-wing populists can have more diverse preferences in migration. Essentially due to the more inclusive definition of pure people, left-wing populist leaders do not imply an anti-immigrant stance in their foreign policies. On the contrary, they can implement an open-door policy by supporting the acceptance of more migrants and granting more rights for them. Especially in the European leftist cases that experience migration crises such as Syriza, this foreign policy choice becomes more critical and provides a ground for left-wing populists to show their reaction to international institutions. Yet for some other left-wing populists, migration does not have the same important place in the left-wing PFPs. In other words, populism literature argues that left-wing populists are less likely to produce a political discourse that blames immigration for the destruction of native traditional/cultural values, compared to right-wing populists. That is because left-wing populists' pure people definition does not include ethnocultural features. Thus, migration has a secondary place in their foreign policy agendas.

This perception does work for Venezuela, but it will not work for Syriza example in Greece as we will see in the next sub-chapter. During the Chavez regime, his PFP did not have the priority of producing a discourse on migration issues because the country did not witness any migration crisis during the Chavez governments. In fact, the Latin American region has not witnessed a refugee flow, especially compared to the European populist cases. On the contrary, given the bad living conditions, poor economic performance, and political pressure, Latin America has not been a region where people want to immigrate, but rather a region of emigration. Venezuela constitutes a visible case study for this attitude. According to the

UNHCR data, more than 6 million Venezuelan people live abroad due to economic, political and social problems. The emigration trend began in 2000 with the reelection of Chavez and continued to increase until its boom in 2015 after the death of Chavez (Luisa Feline Freier 2013). In the first years of emigration, the people who left the country were highly skilled people. They were emigrating due to political uncertainties or economic insecurities, and they preferred mostly Western countries (Luisa Feline Freier 2013). After the death of Chavez and the beginning of the Maduro era, the group that leave the country changed and included mostly poor people who emigrated due to their worsening living conditions (Luisa Feline Freier 2013). Consequently, in the case of Venezuela during Chavez's presidency, there was no refugee flow toward Venezuela itself. On the contrary, many people did emigrate from Venezuela to other countries.

On the other side of the picture, Chavez did not miss the opportunity to criticize European countries for their anti-immigration stances and to take action to influence their policy choices on immigration. In 2008, Chavez threatened the EU to stop Venezuela's oil exports and withdraw from European investments (France 24 2008). The reason behind this threat was to oppose an EU proposition that aimed to send illegal or "undocumented" immigrants back to their home countries (France 24 2008). It implies that Chavez supported an "open-door" policy for the EU in the field of migration. As a matter of fact, the political behavior of Chavez was not only opportunistic but also coherent with what populism literature expects from a left-wing populist. Given the logic of defining pure people from vulnerable segments of the society in a more inclusive manner, Chavez frequently emphasized the plight of the socioeconomically exploited and oppressed people not only in his country, but he referred to the other "exploited" people such as those in the Middle East (Gill 2014). Within this framework, he sent humanitarian aid like food or medicine to the Palestinian and Syrian refugees who were living in Lebanon refugee camps (Gill 2014).

In that way, Chavez's perspective was to blame Western immigration policy based on anti-Americanist ideas. This foreign policy line is pursued by Chavez's successor, Nicolas Maduro. For instance, since US President Trump implemented anti-immigration policies against immigrants coming from Middle Eastern countries, mainly from Syria at that time, Maduro criticized the US in front of the international community (Gill 2014). He also declared that Venezuela would accept 20,000 Syrian refugees in 2015, in the middle of the Syrian migration crisis (Reuters 2015b). Although this study does not include Maduro's era, the examples can be given from his presidency as well because Maduro was following the foreign policy tradition of Chavez on this migration issue, while emphasizing the anti-Americanism

in both Latin America and the Middle East and protecting the political support for Bashar al-Assad (Reuters 2015b). Consequently, even though his actions were not numerous, Chavez's PFP can be counted as inclusive in terms of migration policies compared to European right-wing populists. Although migration was not his main issue while generating the foreign policy agenda, he attempted to be involved in migration issue as a tool to produce a discourse against Western imperialism in the Middle East, matching this latter with the Latin American region as two regions historically suffered from Western imperialism.

4.1.2 Trade Policy

As in the right-wing populist cases, Chavez's PFP used trade policies as a tool to realize their foreign policy goals. Carrying the Bolivarian Revolution dreams of challenging the US global hegemony and unifying regional countries under different regional organizations, trade was being used as a tool. Venezuela is a country benefiting from its natural resources to manage its both internal economic situation and external relations with other countries. The country's main trade partner has long been the US. Accordingly in 2013, 47% of Venezuelan oil had been purchased by the US, amounting to approximately 47 billion dollars (Sorio 2016, 102). During his presidency, Chavez's main aim was to decrease this dependency on the US, challenge this latter's hegemony, and construct regional cooperation through mobilizing regional countries around the trade. In that sense, Chavez PFP can be considered similar to Erdoğan's PFP, since both of them are revisionist. Yet first, it should be underlined how Chavez's PFP was differing from the right-wing PFPs with its leftist ideology.

Until this point, we demonstrated that right-wing populists support free trade and select their trade partners according to their specific foreign policy goals. However, in left-wing populist cases that might not be the case. In other words, left-wing populists did not support free trade in a neoliberal sense of the term, with open borders for goods and services. In the Venezuelan case, despite the fact that Chavez improved bilateral trade relations with many countries there is a mercantilist perspective toward international trade. Venezuela is a rentier state that uses oil resources in a protectionist economic model. In the Chavez era, through the nationalizations of mainly PVDSA (Petroleum of Venezuela), the management of natural resources was under the control of state-led petroleum companies (Enderwick 2011). By using those corporations and oil reserves, Chavez implemented an economic agenda based on import-substitution industrialization (Corrales and

Penfold-Becerra 2011, 49). Under this model, the amount of import depends on quotas that were determined by the president, and non-state actors could not reach import goods through their own private trade connections (Faria 2008). Thus, the Chavez government was constantly interfering in the market and putting its control over both export and import. Chavez's trade policy was restrictive because it did not allow an open free market trade while limiting export and import. In that sense, Chavez PFP was coherent with what the literature argues about left-wing PFP's trade policies, as protectionist and against free trade (Verbeek, Zaslove et al. 2017).

However, that does not mean that Chavez completely prohibited goods that come from foreign countries. On the contrary, he encouraged to develop close relations with selected countries that were considered the "enemies" of the US in global politics, such as Russia, China, Libya, Syria, or North Korea and regional countries (Wajner and Roniger 2019, 466). In fact, with a state-led export-import equation and mercantilist trade perspective, the restrictions on imports had still been in effect. But these policies were implemented in a quite flexible manner to stop the high inflation, or famine (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011). Chavez decided which countries would be the next trade partners for Venezuela while managing the import-export and foreign investments. Those partners were mainly Russia, China, or regional countries. This selective perspective was similar to what Erdoğan attempted to do in his PFP. First, both Chavez and Erdoğan aimed to challenge the Western global hegemony through new trade agreements with the emerging global forces. During Chavez's presidency, China became one of the closest trade partners with Venezuela. At the beginning of this chapter, we underlined that the US has been the most important trade partner of Venezuela. Then, China's progress in the global economy seemed to be an opportunity for Chavez to decrease the dependency on the US, and again support a challenging actor (Romero and Mijares 2016). Dodson and Dorraj (2008) emphasized that Chavez was using trade alliances to overcome the US hegemonic power, and China was a prominent partner to achieve this goal. First, Venezuela began to increase the amount of oil exports to China. In 2007, Chavez declared that Venezuela promised to sustain daily 0.5 million barrels of oil until 2008 (Dodson and Dorraj 2008, 76-77). Then, the trade volume between the two countries rose sharply during the presidency of Chavez. In 1999 their trade amounting to 200 million dollars, whereas in 2011 this amount reached 10 billion dollars (Hermann 2013, 136). At the end of this period, in 2011, China became the second trade partner of Venezuela, behind the US (Herman 2013, 136). Secondly, Russia was the other selected trade partner for Chavez. Venezuela had signed many agreements to purchase different military equipment such as attack helicopters, or weapons from Russia (Dodson and Dorraj 2008, 80). In return to the oil exports,

Russia was allowed to invest 1 billion dollars in mines such as aluminum, and to construct power plants in Venezuela (Dodson and Dorraj 2008, 80).

Thirdly, Chavez challenged the US hegemony not only through alliances, but also his main aim was to build a regional economic integration in Latin America. He promoted regional trade agreements in an institutionalized manner. In this way, he believed that regional countries could produce their own “fair trade” (Muhr 2010) that did not exploit masses for the sake of enriching a minority group, “corrupt elite”. According to this perspective, free trade agreements imposed by the US were only for its benefits, based on an unfair competition aiming to exploit and control Latin American peoples (Williams 2011, 264). Chavez’s trade policy was to overcome this obstacle and establish a fair ground for poor Latin American peoples. Among first attempts, in 2004 Venezuela and Argentina formed Petrosur as a cooperation to use their oil reserves (Williams 2011, 264). In 2006, Chavez pioneered the establishment of the *Alianza Bolivariana para América* - ALBA, against the regional institution called FTAA which was under the control of President Bush at that time (Sagarzazu and Thies 2019, 207). Within the ALBA, Chavez wanted to equalize the advantages of trade for poor countries that were generally taking the smallest part of trade profits. Dodson and Dorraj (2008) interpret that ALBA’s main goal was to encourage regional integration, and to liberate regional countries from US dependency. In that sense, the ALBA was a symbolic institution against US imperialism. It also aimed to increase the integration among Latin American peoples, contribute to their developments, and enhance an idea of being united against the US hegemony, as will be explained in the following chapters.

Another point that should be underlined is that Chavez pioneer these institutions not only to enhance trade cooperation among Latin American countries, but also to establish his leadership in the region. In that sense, if one considers the existence of Mercosur (*Mercado Común del Sur*), which previews a similar integration model among member countries, mainly by providing a free trade area in the region; it is possible to claim that ALBA has the same aim of bringing regional countries together under the free regional trade scheme. Yet when Venezuela’s full accession to Mercosur was approved in 2006, controlling Mercosur would not be possible for Chavez since the founding countries such as Brazil or Argentina, two important and active powers in the region, were aware of his intention to claim his leadership in the institution (Němec 2007). Moreover, concerns regarding the worsening democratic conditions in Venezuela were another debating point among existing members such as Paraguay which refused the accession of Venezuela into the Mercosur (BBC 2012). For the same reason, in 2017 Venezuela’s membership in Mercosur was suspended (Schipani 2017). Considering this last act of Mercosur, Chavez’s construction of

ALBA has more sense in accordance with his foreign policy goals. As a matter of fact, Němec (2007) argues that Chavez did not want to mobilize trade within existing institutions, but to form new "manageable" ones, pursuing the revisionist and ambitious goal of claiming the leadership in the region. In this direction, Chavez also supported the emergence of a common currency and common economic institutions such as a regional bank that could become an alternative for the IMF (Sagarzazu and Thies 2019, 207). To enhance and facilitate regional trade, he offered to form a regional bank called the Bank of the South. However, that remained only as a project that could not be implemented. Lastly, he always encouraged bilateral trade with regional countries. He developed many projects with countries such as Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, or Ecuador. For gas pipeline projects, Chavez signed an agreement with Colombia, amounting to 335 million dollars in 2007 (Dodson and Dorraj 2008, 76). Or, to ameliorate their cost of oil production, Chavez engaged with Brazil to construct a refinery, and invested 1.5 billion dollars in Bolivia (Dodson and Dorraj 2008, 76).

Consequently, Chavez did not support free trade in a neoliberal sense of the term which had been imposed by the US. That is because this model was against the interests of Venezuelan people, according to the foreign trade policy of Chavez. Thus, he attempted to create a peculiar free trade model by forming new regional institutions such as the ALBA where countries would have more interference rights compared to the free trade market in the EU. Also, trade was presented a way for Chavez to raise his leadership claim in the region via building new free trade mechanisms, ignoring the existing regional institutions. In that sense, he utilized trade as an area where he could pursue his revisionist foreign policy goals. Then, promoting international trade, he chose his trade partners in a very selective manner. First, he cooperated with US rivalries such as Russia or China to diversify Venezuela's foreign trade partners, and decrease its dependency on the US. However, it should be underlined that despite those efforts of Chavez, the US remained the main trade partner of Venezuela, as mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter. Secondly, and more importantly, Chavez mobilized countries in the region to trade more heavily with each other, to decrease the regional dependency on the US investments and purchases of oil. Chavez's main dream, as in Bolivarian Revolution, was to form a regional economic integration. Moreover, Chavez's usage of trade is similar to how Erdoğan uses the international trade. Both leaders improved its bilateral trade relations with the Asian powers, namely Russia and China, in order to challenge the Western hegemony in their trades. They also wanted to engage in more trade with selected countries that they think they can influence and claim leadership. When Erdoğan wants to become a global power and regional leader, he increases Turkey's

trade with the regional countries in the Middle East and African countries on the basis of sharing the same religion or under the framework of humanitarian aid. Chavez also utilized trade cooperation with regional countries, in order to claim his leadership in the region. That strategy of engaging in regional inter-state organizations should be disseminated further areas beyond the trade, according to Chavez. In the next chapters, we will see how those institutions were also functioning for regional development.

4.1.3 Global Governance

As discussed in previous cases, populists tend to be on the offensive side against international institutions that create the international order of post-World War II period. When one takes into account how decisively Chavez implemented the anti-Americanism in his PFP and how international institutions are accepted to be associated with the EU or Europe in the minds of populist leaders, it should be expected that Chavez had a stance against international institutions that lead global governance. However, there were many nuances in this part of his PFP.

First, Chavez promoted regional collaborations and integration even beyond trade agreements. Having revisionist foreign policy goals, Chavez saw regional inter-state institutions as a way to replace US control in the region. He constantly attempted to undermine existing regional institutions since they were under the control of the US. As indicated above, ALBA was established against FTAA that was seen to be under the heavy influence of the US. Chavez also considered FTAA a tool to disseminate “imperialist and neocolonial model” that damaged Latin American people, and to strengthen US dominant position in the region (Williams 2011, 270). In one of his speeches, he said that “The FTAA is an abuse of sovereignty; it is a colonial, imperialist plan” (Němec 2007, 83). Yet ALBA was not an institution only for making alliances on trade, but it enhanced the idea of a common identity among Latin American countries by previewing different development projects to improve human capital via educational programs, and to enhance cultural interactions. Chavez spent 17 billion dollars on these development projects in his two first terms until 2007 (Corrales 2009, 102).

Moreover, he played an active role in the transformation of existing regional institutions. In 2008, Venezuela became one of the founders of *Unión de Naciones Suramericanas* (UNASUR) which was a merge of two existing institutions, Mercosur and the Andean Community on Nations (CAN) (Sagarzazu and Thies 2019, 210). In fact, as explained in the previous chapter, Chavez first attempted to be a part

of Mercosur, with an aim of taking the control within this regional institution. Yet when it could not be possible due to the severe opposition from founding countries, he decided to establish the ALBA and UNASUR. Under the framework of UNASUR, founding countries were supporting the idea of drawing a regional institution similar to the EU, allowing free movement of citizens, decreasing/removing tariffs, creating a common currency, and forming a regional bank to control regional monetary policy (Dodson and Dorraj 2008, 76). Although the UNASUR was abolished in 2019 due to the fact that Colombia accused Maduro of being a dictator, and following withdrawal decisions of members from the UNASUR, Chavez's early intention while pioneering this regional establishment was prominent to understand how his PFP valued the efforts for regional integration with an aim to change the US-dependent structure of the region.

Furthermore, Chavez's refusal of international institutions that make global rules and norms had been again very selective. Until this point, we underlined that Chavez criticized, undermined, and attempted to replace institutions that were related to US control such as the FTAA, or IMF. He also blamed the EU for implementing anti-immigration foreign policy actions and used international institutions to appeal to a global audience. Therefore, the UN institutions and their regular meetings were very useful options for Chavez. He actively joined them and voiced his criticisms in an open manner. For instance, in his symbolic speech in 2006 at the UN General Assembly, he called President Bush as "the devil who talking as if he owned the world", and "spokesman of imperialism who trying to preserve his domination" (Stout 2006). In those speeches, Chavez explicitly blamed the US of exploiting and pillaging other countries (Stout 2006). As a notable point, Chavez was using a populist communication style that aims to reach the pure people with non-diplomatic rhetoric. The other example could be given from his insistent willingness to gain one rotating seat within the UN Security Council. His attempt in 2006 was prevented by the US due to the speech just mentioned above, but in 2014 after a short period from his death, Venezuela achieved to have a seat in the UN Security Council, under the presidency of Maduro (The Guardian 2014). Then, in 2009, Chavez applied to the UN Security Council to take action against the armed conflict between Colombia and the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). He did apply because on the one hand, the conflict was happening along with the Venezuelan borders, but on the other hand, he did not want to allow the installment of US forces in Colombia under the "pretext" of helping Colombian state in the combat against FARC (France 24 2009).

As easily understood from these examples, Chavez did persistently show his presence in these institutions because he was using them to be heard by international

community. He did not miss the opportunity to denounce his anti-Americanism and his grievances about the US hegemony in global governance. In other words, he did not come up with a total rejection of international institutions per se. On the contrary, Chavez wanted to show up in front of the international community, as in the UN example. Also, he conducted his peculiar revisionist foreign policy goals to challenge and replace US hegemony in the Latin American region, by establishing and pioneering new regional inter-state institutions. As emphasized above, Chavez did not want to work with existing regional institutions if he could not take control over them. Through new regional institutions as given examples from the ALBA to UNASUR, Chavez wanted to prove his leadership in the region, increase the visibility of Venezuela in global politics, and strengthen the reputation of Venezuela and himself in front of the international community (Destradi and Plagemann 2019a, 722).

4.1.4 Transborder Activism

Following his ambitious regional integration model with revisionist foreign policy goals, it is expected to see a transborder appeal by Chavez. Throughout this sub-chapter, it will be emphasized how he developed the idea of *Nuestramericana* (Our America) within the framework of the Bolivarian Revolution. Yet first, Chavez's transborder appeal was different from what we have discussed in the two right-wing PFP examples. Erdoğan and Orban, since their populisms are exclusive in terms of their pure people definition, their appeal in the international arena includes only nationally and/or religiously selected groups. When Erdoğan addressed to Turkish Muslim diaspora groups, Orban's appeals fastened on Hungarian people living within EU territories. By contrast, Chavez's transborder appeal was very inclusive and regional. He wanted to reach a very broader "people" covering many different identities within the Latin American region. As in his pure people definition, he admitted to including all exploited and vulnerable segments of Latin American peoples in his transborder people definition. In this way, he was able to claim that he was the "Commander of peoples" (Wajner 2021).

To dive into deeper, first, as Chavismo wanted to establish a regional integration pursuing "pan-Americanism", Chavez aimed to propagate this integration idea to Latin American peoples as well, by emphasizing common historical sorrows, underlining exploitations by imperial powers, or the common cultural features and practices. Then, this approach transformed into a discourse of the *Nuestramericana*, or "we, the Americans". Under this framework, Chavez created a common American

identity where he could appeal to all Latin American peoples and mobilized them around a leftist ideology based on anti-imperialism and anti-US discourse, regardless of their ethnic, religious, or national differences. That is why, when he had a speech in the international arena, he was using "peoples" in plural terms (Moffitt 2017). Consequently, thanks to his efforts and charismatic stance, Chavez appeared to be the "only fair" leader of this regional community. In the UN speech in 2006, he explicitly said that he was representing the "*peoples of the south, the oppressed peoples (...), the peoples of the world*" (Moffitt 2017, 4). He promised to defend "the sovereignty of Nuestramérica", mobilize them, and strengthen interaction among them in order to empower the Global South against the US supremacy in the world (Wajner and Roniger 2019, 460). Thus, he was combining pan-Americanism and anti-US perspectives, which were two dreams of the Bolivarian Revolution.

Chavez's transborder, and transnational appeal also included multiple ethnic groups that were historically considered to be "outsiders" in Latin America. He addressed indigenous people and Afro-descendants by making them a part of Latin American peoples who were fighting against the US hegemony and other colonial power (Wajner and Roniger 2019, 465). In fact, as mentioned above, Chavez used the common memory to unify different ethnic and national groups. He consistently reminded them that they were resisting the "enemy of the North" (Wajner and Roniger 2019, 463). Moreover, he was making references to the common regional heroes that everybody knew, such as Tupac Amaru or Guaicaipuru, who were the leaders and symbolic names of indigenous movements, and the symbols of anticolonial conflict in Peru in the 18th century and in Colombia in the 16th century (Wajner 2021, 193-194). His appeal could find positive reactions from those people as well. In 2013, during the commemoration of Indigenous Resistance Day, Venezuelan foreign minister said that Chavez taught them to be proud of their indigenous identity and history, and to feel like parts of Latin American land (Wajner 2021, 196). Also, public surveys demonstrated that in the early years of the 2000s, Latin American peoples were satisfied with the idea of regional integration and Chavez's leadership (Wajner and Roniger 2019, 462). In terms of the acceptance of Chavez's leadership in the region at the country level, it should be noted that not a wide range of countries confirmed this dominance. Yet in any case, many countries such as Nicaragua, Ecuador, Cuba, and some Caribbean islands approved the leadership of Chavez under the framework of the ALBA (Wajner and Roniger 2019, 464). In fact, they wanted to benefit from Venezuela's natural resources, and thus accepted to be engaged in a new leftist-ideological development model led by Chavez's leadership (Wehner and Thies 2021, 331). Chavez satisfied their expectation though. Apart from the bilateral agreements with Colombia and Bolivia as explained in the chapter

on Venezuelan free trade, Chavez allocated 10 thousand barrels of petrolEUM per day to Nicaragua at lower prices than the market (Pais 2007). Also, he agreed to build a refinery for the benefit of regional countries for 1.9 billion Euros (Pais 2007). As mentioned above, he founded institutions such as Petrosur or PetroCaribe in order to share Venezuelan oil at inexpensive prices for the benefit of South American countries (Sagarzazu and Thies 2019, 207). He also helped Cuba via cheap oil with the aim to rescue the country from the economic crisis (Read 2013).

This PFP to establish both bilateral trade relations with neighbor countries, and multilateral institutions to enhance regional integration into broader fields provided a common ground to strengthen human development projects. For instance, under the framework of UNASUR, many foundations working on indigenous and afro-descendant could take funding for their projects (Wajner and Roniger 2019, 465-466). In 2013, an establishment for indigenous people within the Mercosur was founded with the efforts of Chavez (Notiindigena 2013). Accordingly, Mercosur Indígena would prioritize protecting indigenous identity, culture and language. They would be met every year to promote the needs of indigenous people, discuss further development projects for them, and to increase their inclusion within Latin American peoples (Notiindigena 2013). Then, Chavez allocated funding for Cuban doctors who were making free treatments and operations on eye disorders and diseases to 2 million people in 33 countries (Wajner and Roniger 2019, 465-466). He pioneered the approval of protecting and promoting local indigenous minority languages (Wajner 2021, 198). Moreover, Chavez disseminated the campaign to fight against children's illiteracy within the Latin American regions as a whole (Wajner and Roniger 2019, 466).

To conclude this chapter, Chavez was able to make a transborder appeal. His main aim was to reach Latin American peoples in order to unify them and break the US dominance and control over them. To achieve that goal, Chavez believed that not only states should work together under institutional frameworks, but also peoples' interactions should be increased. In that sense, he was thinking that the common memory and colonial past were useful tools to remind different peoples that they were fighting for the same goal against the common enemy. Thus, his appeal was very broader and more inclusive. It did not take any reference from national, cultural or religious identity-based discourses. Yet it is based on the idea that all oppressed people could be included in the international pure people definition, who should be protected and represented by the only legitimated leader, Chavez himself. He also encouraged a greater inclusion of formerly excluded minority groups, such as indigenous people or those of afro-descendants. One crucial point to emphasize is the facilitating conditions for Chavez to make this appeal even broader. Apart from the

common colonial memory and legacy among regional countries, and the countries seeking their own interests from Chavez's leadership such as Cuba or Venezuela; the common language facilitated Chavez's transborder appeal. Since the region mostly speaks Spanish with minor differences, Chavez was able to address them in their native language. He also used this opportunity by constructing the first regional telecommunication channel "Telesur" in 2005, through collaboration with countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, or Ecuador (Williams 2011, 267). Through this channel, Chavez was able to disseminate his leftist ideology and the anti-US and anti-colonial discourse to the Latin American region (Sagarzazu and Thies 2019, 207). In the end, it can be said that an important part of Chavez's PFP was devoted to this appeal, and put this policy area into his foreign policy agenda in the foreground, in order to realize the revisionist foreign policy goals. In the end, we can conclude that Chavez relatively achieved to make himself accepted as the leader of this Nuestramericana community that was composed of all Latin American peoples.

4.2 Syriza's Foreign Policy

Syriza coalition government was one of the most symbolic examples of how globalization, its financial crises, and the rising restrictions imposed by international institutions can lead to the emergence of populisms. Greece was one of the most affected countries by the 2008 global financial crisis. Having considered the long populism tradition in Greece since the 20th century (Mudde 2016), the emergence of a leftist and populist leader might not be too astonishing. Yet the EU membership and its restrictive policies on Greece played the most important role in the Syriza's rising to political power. As having considered its relatively vulnerable economic structure, Greece remained under the pressure of huge debts and considerable financial problems since 2010. In addition to this, there had been existing stigmas on Greece such as corruption, a culture of less production and ineffective bureaucracy, and the accusation of being dependent upon the EU. Moreover, when Syriza came to power in 2015, the EU was struggling with the migration crisis, and Greece was the gateway for most refugees to reach EU borders (Nestoras 2015). Considering all those pressures on the country, the Greek people did not want to accept more austerity policies produced by the EU and the IMF, and to continue with the existing New Democracy and the PASOK coalition government, which signed agreements that worsened the living conditions of the Greek people. Thus, Syriza's *raison d'être* was to fight against the EU's hegemony and austerity politics that were not accepted by the Greek people (Mudde 2016, 28). Also, Tsipras appeared as an "alternative"

in the eyes of the Greek people, by criticizing and condemning the PASOK coalition and its deal with the EU. Consequently, Syriza formed a coalition government in 2015 with a right-wing populist party, ANEL, under the premier ministry of Tsipras. He constructed his PFP on the idea of opposing to EU's neoliberal economic model, and on the excessively technocratic management structure that was far from the EU's fundamental values, such as democracy. He put an emphasis on the negative impact of the neoliberal economic model on Greece, by eventually saying that "We are the victims of neoliberals" (DW 2015). Determining his political stance on the left side of the political spectrum, Tsipras defined his pure people in a very inclusive manner, to also be able to put a resisting view on the EU's migration policy, and to show its leftist worldview addressing its people via an ideological appeal. . Furthermore, the Greek leftist PFP attempted to show its leftist stance through its positioning against free trade policies at the EU. Lastly, Tsipras and his colleagues created a movement to spread its resistance to other EU countries via making alliances with leftist movements. With all foreign policy actions that were executed by the Syriza government, the populist leader aimed to protect his country's interests and national sovereignty while remaining within the EU. Yet he did not conduct a revisionist foreign policy line, as opposed to what Chavez attempted to do via pioneering regional collaborations and creating a regional leadership for himself to guide Latin American peoples. Compared to Chavez's powerful leadership, Tsipras' government led the country under deep pressure coming from the troika and it had to act under the legal restrictions imposed by the EU. What Syriza wanted to achieve was to regain control over Greece's economic model, decrease the IMF hegemony on Greece, and change the EU from within. In fact, this foreign policy choice is similar to the PFP of Orban, since both populist governments aim to decrease the impact of the EU on their country, and to raise the needs and demands of their pure people in front of the international community. To this end, both government blames the EU, while also expecting more favoring policies from the EU side. Consequently, as in the case of Hungary, we will call the Tsipras' leftist PFP not revisionist, but mostly defensive. In the next sub-chapters, it will be explained how Tsipras implemented his PFP under four foreign policy areas.

4.2.1 Migration

Different from other left-wing populisms, migration was a core topic in Syriza's PFP. As opposed to Chavez's Venezuela, Greece was a country situated in the middle of the Syrian migration crisis when Syriza came to power for the first time in 2015. That is why transborder migration transformed into a topic where Syriza

government and Tsipras constructed an important part of their political discourse on. Nevertheless, their political claims on migration distinguished from the nativist arguments of right-wing populist cases. As in Chavez's pure people definition, Tsipras' pure people definition was not exclusive or restrictive. On the contrary, like Chavez, Tsipras was using the inclusiveness of this definition to show his leftist political stance. Accordingly, the pure people of Syriza consisted of many different social and ethnic groups. What brought together this heterogeneous group was that they were suffering from the negative consequences of the EU's austerity policies imposed on Greece for years (Markou et al. 2017b, 62). For Tsipras, it was a way to defend the rights of all oppressed peoples repressed by Europe and its "fascist" forces (Markou 2017a, 152). Similar to Chavez, Tsipras had the willingness to reach and address as many people as possible in order to challenge the Western hegemony, and follow an anti-neoliberal policy line. In Chavez's case, the main enemy was the US, as the closest and most interfering global actor for Venezuela. In the case of Syriza, this common enemy for blaming would be the Troika. Accordingly, Tsipras defined troika exoterikou (external troika) that was consisted of 3 main international institutions: the IMF, European Central Bank and European Commission (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; Möller 2021). In terms of criticizing Western nativist anti-immigration policies, explaining the obligation of migrating with the wars caused by neoliberal countries, and blaming mainly the EU for causing, but not taking responsibility for a humanitarian crisis, Tsipras decided to apply a more inclusive foreign policy to the migration issue.

In 2015 when millions of Syrians wanted to reach the European borders, Greece was a transitory country and the gateway that immigrants only entered from. Refugees' main target was to reach the EU borders and gain asylum right mainly in Western European countries such as Germany or France. That is why, as the gateway of the EU, Greece's migration policy could influence all other EU countries (Nestoras 2015). Under these circumstances, most EU countries supported applying a strict border policy to stop more immigrants. However, Tsipras' migration policy was the opposite of this will. Markou et al. (2017b) argues that in the eyes of Tsipras, his movement would be struggling to change the EU's perspective on anti-immigration. His political party began to announce a new foreign policy to integrate and protect immigrants (Font et al. 2021, 16). Accordingly, there was no illegal migrant because the migration appeared as a result of neoliberalism and wars coming from capitalism (Nestoras 2015, 15). Then, immigrants could not be called "illegal" or "undocumented". The Western countries who spread this war and this economic model should accept the responsibility of those innocent victims of war, according to Syriza's rhetoric. Within this framework, Tsipras applied multiple policies to

include immigrants coming from the Middle Eastern countries during the migration crisis, and to increase their social and political rights. First, he provided the right of citizenship for those who were born in Greece although his/her parents were immigrants (Font et al. 2021, 17). Then, the party declared that to improve immigrants' living conditions, and "legalize" their official status, the government closed detention centers, provide them with empty state buildings to stay for a while, and cancel the necessity of travel documents (Nestoras 2015, 11-16). Even a Syriza Minister declared that the best solution to the migration crisis would be to give Greek citizenship to immigrants to assure them the right to free movement within EU borders (Nestoras 2015, 21).

It is sure that Syriza could not implement all of these projects, but Tsipras' pro-immigration discourses functioned as a pull factor to increase immigrants in Greece (Nestoras 2015). It should be underlined that Syriza applied this PFP not only to show its leftist political stance, but also to argue that the EU was far away from its founding values and could not admit its responsibility for "provoking" wars in the Middle East. Tsipras considered the EU a new type of colonial power both within Europe and the Middle East or African countries (Markou 2017a). In that sense, the migration crisis became an opportunity for Tsipras to denounce the inadequacy of the EU to deal with a global problem that it caused. During a meeting of the Syriza government with other EU leaders, Foreign Minister Nikos Xydakis underlined the existing xenophobia and nativism in Europe at that time and said that the EU should remember its founding principles (France 24 2016). On another occasion, in October 2015, Tsipras explicitly said that he was "ashamed" to be a part of the EU due to the mismanagement of a humanitarian crisis, and "hypocritical, crocodile tears for the dead children on the shores of the Aegean" who wanted to reach the EU borders (Reuters 2015).

Then, for Tsipras, as opposed to Chavez, migration had become an important policy area where Syriza could apply its leftist ideology that was based on inclusiveness and plurality by covering different ethnic, socioeconomic or national groups (Markou et al. 2017b, 63). Through the defiant migration policy that was reacting against the EU's stance towards the migration crisis, Tsipras also found the opportunity to criticize and blame the EU both for its "irresponsible" treatments of the crisis, and for its inability to control the crisis (Nestoras 2015). Interestingly, although they had two exact opposite views on migration policy, both Orban and Tsipras were able to blame the EU due to its migration policy. When the former criticizes the EU due to the "pro-migrant" stance, the latter put pressure on the mismanagement and irresponsible behavior of the EU in this crisis. For the relatively young government of Tsipras, migration constituted a crucial part of a "toolkit" that was functioning

to oppose the EU. The other area that the government would react against the EU would be trade, yet in a very softer version of its migration policy.

4.2.2 Trade Policy

Syriza coalition government came to power in a time period when Greece also dealt with the debt crisis with the EU. The country was suffering from the negative impact of the 2008 global economic crisis, as Orban's Hungary did. Yet different from Hungary, Greece had a huge debt crisis within the EU. Before the global financial crisis, Greece already had structural problems in terms of its economy with its high level of deficit due to both the internal excessive spending, and excessive lending with the Euro and with low-interest rates, and weak control mechanisms of the EU (Nelson et al. 2010). Due to this problem, the EU was imposing austerity measures that increased the burden on Greek citizens who paid more taxes and received less salary. In fact, the neoliberal economic model aimed to decrease the budget deficit of the country and then solve the recurring debt problem through austerity politics. However, the grievances of citizens regarding their worsening living conditions did not allow them to realize this neoliberalist perspective. When Syriza came to power, the party openly declared that it would not support neoliberal policies both within Greece and in the EU. According to Chatzistavrou (2016), Syriza adopted an unmitigated leftist ideology that rejected the fundamental principles of neoliberalism such as free trade and austerity. During his electoral campaign, one of the most crucial promises that Tsipras gave to Greek citizens was to decrease their burden, and reject austerity politics imposed by the EU. He promised to put his people's demands on the frontline while negotiating with the EU. As the government progressed in the negotiations with the troika, many concessions had to be given to Tsipras. However, during these negotiations, he put his efforts to make the negotiation difficult for the troika by rejecting their proposals and declaring their unfavored conditions in front of the international community. On one occasion, he announced to the international community that "Greece is the first victim. Those who do not obey countries where neoliberals are in power will be punished" (DW 2015).

In that sense, it can be understood that coherently to this anti-neoliberal perspective, Tsipras PFP should not support free trade. Also, under this debt crisis, Tsipras' PFP could not attend to international trade trends, or free trade incentives. There had already been a capital restriction on the country due to its economical inadequacies (NDTV 2015). That is why making bilateral trade agreements with third countries did not seem to be very easy for the Syriza government. That was not

their priority, either. Yet the country was a part of the customs union under the EU framework. For that reason, the perspective of Syriza on free trade could be shown in its anti-neoliberal policy stance and party's opposition within the EU against free trade proposals, or its usage of veto power within the national parliament against the EU's free trade agreements. For instance, in 2015 during the European Parliament meeting, Syriza openly rejected the Transnational Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the US to decrease tariffs and thus facilitate trade between the two sides (Michalopoulos 2015). The Minister of Syriza, Katrougkalos, declared that the Greek government would stop this deal because the regulatory laws were more flexible in the US than they were in the EU, and that would create a mismatch and lack of transparency in trade between the two countries. Consequently, that would benefit only big companies, rather than EU citizens. This means that the Syriza government tried to prevent trade agreements that could hamper worker rights in the EU. Therefore, the minister argued that Syriza was protecting not only the rights of Greek citizens, but the democratic rights of all peoples living in EU countries (Michalopoulos 2015). Furthermore, the following example has more explanatory power to understand Syriza's differences from previous governments: Between 2012 and 2019, the EU proposed 16 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) (Saravakos 2021, 6). In order for those FTAs to be implemented, they required to be ratified within member states' national parliaments. 13 FTAs achieved to be concluded by the EU and came to the ratification process. Between 2012 and 2014, 4 of 5 FTAs were ratified by the Greek national parliament while Syriza was seating on the opposition side at that time. However, after the establishment of the Syriza government, all remaining 8 FTAs were rejected by Greek Parliament where Syriza had enough majority to use its veto power (Saravakos 2021, 21).

Under these circumstances, due to its resistance to neoliberalism, and existing unpromising economic conditions, the Syriza government, deriving from the leftist ideology attached to populism, did not support free trade. Even though the economic conditions of Greek state did not allow to implement an active anti-free trade policy and to produce a political discourse on international trade, Syriza government found ways to show their ideological stance on trade policies as well. Since the political government was using a discourse opposing neoliberalism with all its features, it was coherent to resist free trade. In that sense, Tsipras' trade policy seems to be similar to Chavez's trade policy because both of them were somehow against free trade. Yet first, Chavez actively used trade as a tool to challenge the US hegemony in the region, and to realize his foreign policy goals. Whereas Tsipras had not such an option because his country had already some restrictions on trade. Secondly, Chavez was implementing a protectionist and mercantilist trade policy based on the

oil reserves of Venezuela, while Syriza had neither a mercantilist trade policy nor natural resources to pursue this type of policy. Lastly, and more importantly, Syriza had already been a part of a supranational institution having a trade policy to be followed. Thus, Tsipras found the most available option to show his leftist ideology under the rules of this supranational institution. He did not want to close national borders to the EU's free movement of goods, services, or citizens. It is not possible either without leaving the EU totally, because free movement is the *sinequanon* condition for the EU membership, as a restrictive factor on member states. On the contrary, he was using EU mechanisms, i.e. veto power during ratification processes in the national parliament, or the right to appeal his criticisms during negotiations of agreements in the European Parliament, to undermine the EU's trade policies. Therefore, Tsipras wanted to criticize the neoliberal economic model and free trade perspective adopted by the EU, as its founding principles, from within, but not from outside. In the next chapter on international institutions and global governance, we will closely look at Syriza's perception, to remain within international institutions while keep blaming them.

4.2.3 Global Governance

As briefly explained above, one of the most important reasons why Syriza could become a coalition partner in 2015 was Tsipras' claims to resist the EU's austerity politics. Since the years when Syriza was in the opposition seats, the party was saying that the economic crisis that Greece had to deal with for decades was because of the anti-democratic and neoliberal policies of the EU. Chryssogelos (2020) argues that persistent EU politics that were not approved by the Greek society increased Euroscepticism in Greece. Furthermore, the mismanagement of the crisis by the previous coalition partner, and its agreement with the EU which steadily increased the burden on the Greek people, led to the rise of a leftist populist leader. What Tsipras managed to create was a "common external enemy" that damaged Greece, ignored the Greek people's demands and needs, and attempted to undermine the democratically elected Greek government. The three institutions called troika were the international bodies charged with solving Greece's economic crisis, and controlling the country's steps in financial terms. In return for Greece's debts, the troika demanded to impose a strict fiscal reform that would cut expenditures and increase state revenue by sharply raising taxes (Markou et al. 2017b, 56). Despite the grievances coming from the Greek people, especially chancellor Merkel as the head of the German state saw the strict austerity implementations as the only solution for both Greece and for the future of the EU. That is why, Tsipras also

accused Germany of leading the neoliberal EU through its hegemonic control power (Markou 2020).

Tsipras' government consistently argued that the EU and other financial international institutions were not democratic anymore. For instance, in 2015, Tsipras proposed a referendum to ask whether Greek citizens accepted the EU package charged with full of austerity and financial restrictions. The result was the rejection of the proposal with 61% "No" votes (Markou et al. 2017b). In one of his reportages, Syriza's Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis (2016) told that according to Germany, electoral results and democracy were not enough to change the existing economic structure and politics in the EU. He concluded that for Germany "*Democracy is fine as long as it does not threaten to change anything*" (Varoufakis 2016, 20). That is why, Tsipras could claim that these institutions, German hegemony and neoliberal perspective were challenging Greek national sovereignty and supervised the country by making alliances with previous governments (Nestoras 2015, 5). In one of his speeches in the European Parliament, Tsipras talked about how his government resisted "foreign occupiers" (Chryssogelos 2020, 733).

However, Syriza government did not foresee or support a total "Grexit". In other words, this leftist PFP was aiming to solve the problem by changing the EU from within, and by protecting its national sovereignty while remaining within the EU. Since the very beginning of his governments, Syriza offered a "third way" for Greek citizens between obeying the tough austerity politics of the EU and leaving the EU totally (Mudde 2016, 10). Instead, in 2014, Tsipras proposed a series of solutions that would ease the burden of the Greek people and raise concerns among EU institutions. Nevertheless, those solutions were expecting several concessions from the EU side - and rejected by the EU due to pre-established EU rules- such as huge write-offs of Greece's debts as a form of "grace", or a "national reconstruction plan" that would be funded and proposed by the EU (Matthijs et al. 2019, 211-220). Syriza government expected to see more flexibility from the EU and more favorable solutions aided by the EU. During the negotiation periods, Tsipras declared, "*We do not need an agreement. We need a solution.*"; and the previous proposals offered by the EU and the IMF were perceived as "extreme" and "inacceptable" (Bird 2015). That is because the leftist government believed that Greece's economic crisis originated within the EU and because of the EU. Therefore, it should be solved within the EU with a more comprehensive, democratic, and flexible solution guideline (Chatzistavrou 2016, 37).

Within this framework, Tsipras declared that his leftist and anti-neoliberal movement was fighting for establishing a "different Europe" (Chryssogelos 2020, 733)

that would return to its fundamental principles of the Enlightenment, welfare state that protected its citizens, and democracy (Chatzistavrou 2016, 37). He claimed that only in this way an EU structure that is respectful to the national sovereignty would be possible. There were many examples to show this perspective of remaining in the EU, while challenging the system and protecting Greek national sovereignty. For instance, Syriza did propose nothing to leave the common currency, instead, it wanted to see more cooperation and flexibility, and to hear more national voices to manage common economic governance in a manner where less compulsory integration was held (Matthijs et al. 2019, 211). After the referendum where the Greek people rejected the proposal of the troika, Tsipras underlined that “*The courageous choice of the Greek people is not a choice to break with Europe but to return to the bases of the European Union. It is a very clear message: we must respect the choices of our people.*” (Courrier Internationale 2015). Markou (2020) underlines that Syriza was not against the idea of a supranational institution for European countries. Yet Tsipras and his colleagues did refuse the neoliberal economic model and did not want to be a part of the “unchallengeable hegemony” of the troika, and the German state (Chatzistavrou 2016, 36). To back this point, in a meeting where Yanis Varoufakis talked to Eurogroup President at that time, the Minister was saying that Syriza was supporting the EU membership, but not any collaboration with troika (Markou 2020).

Lastly, Tsipras was also opposing NATO, as an international institution having a considerable impact on Greece’s foreign defense policy, especially when Syriza was on the opposition side in Greek Parliament. In 2013, the party printed a proposition to show their views about the Syrian civil war. The party was protesting a possible US, EU or NATO intervention into the region, calling all these options "imperialist". Furthermore, they considered NATO a tool for these imperialist interventions (Nestoras 2015, 17). Yet after gaining political power, the Syriza government again did not have any intention to leave NATO. We can say that Syriza’s arguments towards NATO were more radical than those on the EU, since the party comes from the anti-NATO tradition in Greek politics. During the years in the opposition, Syriza defended the idea that Greece should leave NATO. When it was in the power, the party did continue to oppose NATO in a relatively softer manner. In the early days of the Syriza governments, the foreign policy spokesman, Costas Isychos, told how meaningless to have an institution like NATO (Dempsey 2015). However, the leftist government could not find any other alternative to cooperate in its defense policy. Due to its disagreement with Russia on Macedonia’s name issue, Tsipras had to renounce Russian cooperation, and thus did not take any action to leave NATO. In that regard, one notable point should be the fact that this resistance against the

troika, or other opposing global governance institutions had to be softened, in order to be able to have a consensus with the EU and solve the crisis. While remaining within the EU framework, an exact and radical opposition could not be very likely. First, to be able to solve the crisis, Tsipras needed to deal and agree with the EU in the end. Secondly, for an EU country having deep economic problems, it was not possible to break the relationships with the IMF, as an international financial institution that Greece has to work with. That is because as in the NATO example, Tsipras had no alternative. Consequently, Syriza was obliged to become gradually less radical in terms of its opposition to global governance. Before having the agreement with the EU, Varoufakis, the finance minister of Syriza and the symbol of the resistance against the EU, who persistently dreamed to construct a “different Europe”, had to resign by the demand of Tsipras who looked for the resolution of the crisis within the EU (Reuters 2015). Then, when Syriza concluded a deal with the EU in the end, despite public support and referendum results favoring the continuation to resist the austerity politics, Syriza’s vote rates fell down in the 2019 elections. That is because according to Mudde (2016), the coalition of the two radical left and radical right parties “lost *its raison d’être*”.

Consequently, it is clear that Tsipras and his government did not give up the EU membership. However, what they wanted to achieve was to stay within the EU, and protect their national sovereignty and regain the country’s economic prosperity with more flexible proposals. Similar to what Orban wants to implement for Hungary opposing the EU, Tsipras’ main aim was to prevent the troika from shaping Greece. By conducting a defensive populist foreign policy, both leaders intended to decrease the dependency of their countries on the EU. Differently from Chavez, even though Syriza refused to cooperate with troika, it did not propose any alternative for this institutional framework. Tsipras put his efforts to make his proposals accepted by the EU, but did not challenge the existence of the EU. Both Chavez and Tsipras constructed their PFPs on anti-imperialism, defining their "common enemy" as the US for Venezuela, and the EU and Germany for Greece. Yet their methods and the level of capabilities and revisionism were not the same. When Chavez pioneered new regional inter-state bodies under the leadership of Venezuela, and to blame or leave the existing ones, which were already under the control of the US President, Tsipras was expecting to solve the problem with new propositions to protect Greek pure people by remaining a part of the EU. That is because as Hungary, Tsipras wanted to benefit from the EU membership. This fact was very observable when one gives the example of how Syriza expected the solution and aid from the EU, through the claim that the economic crisis that Greece dealt with caused by the EU’s wrong neoliberal policies. Moreover, since Greece is a member state, the

Tsipras government was working under the institutional restrictions imposed by the EU. Then, passing through a period where Greece was under the pressure of its debt crisis, it would not be possible to put a radical resistance to the troika. That is why even though Syriza had the intention of challenging the EU with more emphasis, in the end the party had to soften its stance, and to accept the agreement with the EU. Consequently, Greece did not have the same broad room for creating a leftist PFP agenda as Venezuela could do. Under these circumstances, we can call the Syriza example as more cautious or prudent, compared to the Chavez's PFP towards international institutions that lead the global governance.

4.2.4 Transborder Activism

Although the Syriza government had to deal with Greece's own problems, Tsipras did make a transborder appeal in a way that he could also pursue his foreign policy perspective that was to blame the EU due to their austerity politics, and the undemocratic hegemonic power of the troika. First, during Syriza's government, leftist movements such as Podemos in Spain, and Five Star Movement in Italy were very active in the EU. They also constructed their foreign policy promises on the economic problems that the continent faced because of the EU's wrong neoliberal policies, and on the hegemonic understanding of the North over the South (Font et al. 2021). As a frontline to oppose the EU, Syriza did make alliances with these parties in the European Commission. In 2014 Tsipras contested in elections for the European Commission Presidency on the back of leftist movements' support (Chatzistavrou 2016, 38). Using these alliances, Syriza strengthened and broadened its criticisms towards the EU. When Syriza proposed the referendum about the approval of the EU austerity program, Podemos was explicitly supporting Syriza on their propaganda for "No". In fact, the rejection vote of the Greek people encouraged many European citizens to react against the EU (Bortun 2019). Many protestors took the streets in multiple different EU cities from London to Amsterdam, in order to show their support for Greece, claiming that austerity should be replaced, and this was the financial sector who caused economic crises in Europe, and thus, it should be the financial sector who had to pay the bill, but not the Greek people (DW 2015). Becoming a symbolic political actor for the left-wing populists among the EU countries, Tsipras began to address other European people in order to take their attention to the malfunctioning of the EU management. Tsipras' Finance Minister Varoufakis was the key figure who led this new movement. Accordingly, he was visiting various member countries to spread their ideas on the EU, and to hear European peoples' grievances about the EU. He explained the reason for his visits

by “*raising awareness of the common challenges we face and the toxicity that arises from the lack of democracy*” (Varoufakis 2016, 32).

In February 2016, after his resignation, inspired by the support he took from the Greek community, Varoufakis started a project called Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25) aiming to create a common appeal to the European peoples against the EU. This institution is crucial in terms of understanding what type of views Syriza had for the European peoples in the beginning of its governments. As seen from the manifesto of DiEM25, there was a strong attention to slogans starting with “We, the peoples of Europe”, by using the people in a plural sense, in an inclusive manner while covering all EU member states. Accordingly, one of the aspirations declared in the manifesto was to form a “pluralist Europe” that would be respectful to all ethnic, lingual, or cultural differences. In the end, the solution offered in the project was to bring “full transparency” to the EU institutional decision-making processes, to decrease the power of Brussel, to put the emphasis on national governments in order to find more acceptable and satisfying solutions to existing crises, and to form a new Constitutional Assembly consisted of elected representatives of member states to re-design EU’s future.

Nevertheless, considering the resignation of Varoufakis, and the dissolution of alliance with other European left-wing parties and leftist organizations, Tsipras’ transborder appeal could not complete its agenda. First, the alliance among leftist movements in Europe did come to an end in a short period of time, due to the fact that Syriza had to accept the EU’s proposals charged with austerity in the end. Despite all resistances, protests, and rejection in the referendum, Tsipras was not able to continue his opposition, and had to admit the only realist way of solving Greece’s debt problem, after the referendum in July 2015 (Bortun 2019). Following numerous dismissals from his team, including the key figure Varoufakis, Tsipras had to postpone his transborder appeal to an unknown time.

As a result, Tsipras mobilized his transborder audience around the opposition against the EU, and its neoliberal and undemocratic policies. His appeal was inclusive, as his pure people definition, by claiming to cover all different European peoples under the umbrella of opposing the same “external enemy”. In that sense, Syriza’s PFP was similar to Chavez’s PFP for this foreign policy indicator, deriving from its inclusiveness and the feature of defining the common “enemy” to be mobilized against. In other words, while Chavez was encouraging Latin American peoples to challenge the US regional hegemony, Tsipras was trying to do the same for the EU’s decision-making processes and economic model. Both leftist PFPs define their pure people in socioeconomic terms; and both leaders aimed to show how the neoliberal

economic model and its external actors caused the loss of national sovereignty, and left suffering peoples behind. Also, both regimes were making their transborder appeal regionally, since their potential audience and common “enemy” were in the same region.

Yet as indicated above, Tsipras’ transborder appeal could not achieve as much as Chavez did. Also, he could not pay enough attention to his transborder appeal. Many reasons can be found behind this fact: First, despite the protest movements and alliances, Tsipras had never been considered a regional leader in the eyes of European people, but Chavez could sustain his leadership in Latin America until his death. Secondly, as we saw in the national election example, Syriza’s anti-neoliberal ideas could not take enough attention from the EU citizens, even most of them criticized Greece due to the fact that the member states such as Germany or France had to pay Greece’ debts and/or tolerate them. Then, Syriza’s movement and appeal had to stop at one point due to its agreement with the EU in order to solve the crisis. The party lost the support of both the Greek people and other European leftists. In this case, Tsipras’ appeal could not be compared with the victories of Chavez who gained four elections in a row and stayed in political power for many years. Also, in Chavez’s appeal, having a common identity, legacy and speaking the same language were some facilitating factors. Based on the same colonial past, and the common memory that suffered from exploitation and poverty, Chavez could reach a large Latin American community consisting of people speaking Spanish. He even established a channel called Telesur as explained in the previous chapter. For Tsipras’ appeal, none of these factors were present. The group that he addressed had neither a common culture or identity, nor a common legacy/memory or language. Thus, considering these limitations, we can conclude that Tsipras had an intention to implement a transborder appeal. Yet both due to his political conditions and the characteristics of the addressed community, his appeal should be qualified as remaining in the background and lowly engaged, compared to the appeal of Chavez.

5. CONCLUSION

Considering the rising numbers of populist cases, and their ambitious goals challenging the international order, understanding the nature of PFPs becomes more crucial in order to make foreign policy analyses. In this study, I argue that populists can have systematic common and divergent points in their foreign policy agendas. It is still not possible to determine one single type of foreign policy agenda for populist leaders. Yet many aspects of their PFPs show similarities and differences that can be systematically explained. Accordingly, the claim is that PFPs can be categorized in accordance with the two main explanatory factors: the ideological component/attached ideology to populism (left- or right-wing), and foreign policy goals/revisionism levels (defensive or revisionist). Based on Table 3, this study puts a PFP typology with four PFP types: right-wing revisionist, right-wing defensive, left-wing revisionist, and left-wing defensive. For each type, one PFP case is examined, as illustrated below:

Table 5.1 Typology

	Right-Wing	Left-Wing
Revisionist	Turkey	Venezuela
Defensive	Hungary	Greece

Fulfilling the gap in the PFP literature, this study aims to show common and divergent points of PFPs in a comparative study. To this end, I examined four populist foreign policies, the foreign policies of Erdoğan, Orban, Chavez, and Tsipras, under four foreign policy indicators, migration, trade policy, global governance, and transborder activism. The results can be illustrated in the Table 5.2:

To quickly summarize the outputs of my analysis for each case; first, Turkey is a right-wing revisionist PFP example in this study. Conducting more populist foreign policies in its second decade since the 2011 elections where the AKP took its

Table 5.2 Results With Foreign Policy Indicators

	Migration	Trade Policy	Global Governance	Transborder Activism
Turkey	Selective Exclusiveness	Bilateral/More Open	Assertive	High
Hungary	Selective Inclusiveness	Bilateral/More Open	Cautious	High
Venezuela	Inclusive	Protectionist	Assertive	High
Greece	Inclusive	Protectionist	Cautious	Low

record high vote rates, Erdoğan has been implementing an active and ambitious foreign policy in many areas. He defines his pure people and builds the dichotomy between “us” and “other” based on being Sunni-Muslim and having Turkish nationality. Under the migration indicator, he follows a selective exclusive PFP. To pursue its revisionist goals, and as opposed to its exclusive pure people definition, the party decided to accept millions of Syrian refugees during the migration crisis period, as well as migrants from other Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Turkmenistan or Afghanistan. As a unique case among right-wing populists, Erdoğan could implement this foreign policy due to the factor of coreligionism. Also, to claim the leadership in the region and to become a country that was able to solve regional problems without taking international aid were the main motivations behind this decision when it was taken. Then, for the trade policy, Turkey wants to diversify its trade portfolio to China and Venezuela, and to other countries that Turkey should be active in order to be able to establish its leadership, by signing many bilateral trade agreements in a pragmatic way. The main goal is first to challenge Western dominance in the international trade system and in Turkey’s trade relations, then to use trade as a tool to increase Turkey’s impact on more countries. Thirdly, Erdoğan’s revisionism can also be observed in his stances vis-à-vis global governance. The tension and controversies with the international institutions that lead the global governance such as the EU, the IMF, or the NATO are declared in front of both the Turkish and international community, with also an aim to reflect this PFP into domestic politics as a way to show his populist stance to their voters. However, the AKP governments do not intend to leave their memberships in international institutions. Instead, they want to use them in such a way that they could pursue their foreign policy goals by using veto powers. Also, pursuing Turkey’s revisionist foreign policy goals, the country becomes present and more active in regional institutions such as D-8 or the OIC, with an aim to increase the collaboration among Muslim countries, or become a part of a larger community that appears as an alternative for the EU as in the example of the BRICS. Thus, we can conclude that Turkish PFP in the area of global governance is assertive and ambitious, rather than defensive. Lastly, Erdoğan puts transborder activism in the foreground of his PFP, and is highly engaged in this field. First, he constructed a diaspora community living mainly in the European countries with a wider diaspora definition, and by recogniz-

ing them the right to vote from abroad. Under these circumstances, Turkey comes up with a claim to protect its diaspora community. Erdoğan appeals to them in a persistent manner and put his influence and control over them in an institutional framework with the activities pursued by the Diyanet and the YTB. To conclude, Erdoğan's PFP is a good example to understand how a right-wing revisionist PFP acts in the international arena.

Secondly, Orbán's foreign policy is put into consideration under the category of the right-wing defensive PFP. As Erdoğan, Orbán defines his pure people exclusively, on the basis of Hungarian nationality and Christianity. He includes a limited community into his pure people definition, excluding all others and blaming them to be the "enemies" of Hungarian people who want to damage the native traditional and cultural values. Thus, different from Erdoğan's PFP, Orbán's PFP adopts anti-immigration as one of the core concepts in his foreign policy. He utilizes the 2015 migration crisis as a way of strengthening its nationalist-populist discourse. Moreover, similarly to Erdoğan's chOICe, he uses the crisis as a tool to react against the EU's proposals, and to conceal his authoritarian policies. Secondly, he uses trade policy in a similar way to Erdoğan's usage, by making bilateral cooperation with Russia and China, in order to decrease the dependency on the EU's free trade network. Yet, Hungary does not have attempt to sign free trade agreements with African countries for instance, because its main intention is not to expand its influence on wider countries, but to protect Hungary against any sudden change in the EU trade or economy, as seen in the 2008 financial crisis. Also, Orbán wants to promote the idea that Hungary is not fully dependent on the EU, or the other international financial institutions, but has alternative collaborations. In terms of global governance, he also pursues the same line to resist vis-à-vis the impositions or requirements coming from the EU membership, and claims to protect Hungarian national sovereignty against the interferences of global governance institutions. Propagating the idea that the EU imposes accepting more migrants who will hamper the Hungarian people is a good example to show how Orbán shows himself as the "protector" of his people vis-à-vis the "external enemies". Nevertheless, he underlines that his idea is not to leave the EU, or NATO, but to challenge and transform them from within. His dream is to create a different Europe that pays more attention to the European nations, with less competency area recognized to the EU. Orbán is able to use his veto power as well, via remaining Hungary's presence in the international community. Thus, he utilizes international institutions in a very pragmatic way, by putting his effort to defend his people, instead of creating a new regional order. Lastly, and very similar to Erdoğan's PFP, Orbán prioritizes trans-border activism in his foreign policy agenda by establishing a diaspora community

from the historically emigrated Hungarian people to the European countries after World War I. He gives the right to vote to the diaspora community, promotes cultural organizations, and attempts to provide interaction between Hungarian people and the diaspora community.

Thirdly, as one of the most known left-wing populism examples, the Chavista regime is used to analyze a leftist and revisionist PFP. During his very long presidency period, Chavez implemented a very active and ambitious foreign policy, with its claim to challenge the US and to create a new order in the Latin American region. As a leftist PFP, he defines his pure people in a more inclusive way, based on socio-economic criteria. Differently from the right-wing examples, Chavez did not witness any migration inflow during his presidency. That is why he did not prioritize the migration policy. Yet, derived from his discourses that react against the EU's anti-immigrant proposals, and his inclusive pure people perception, we concluded that he has an inclusive migration policy. Secondly, Chavez executed a protectionist trade policy compared to the right-wing examples, aiming to adopt import-substitution industrialization (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011, 49). Yet he also promoted trade with Russia and China, as in the other two examples, in order to decrease trade dependency on the US, since this latter was the main trade partner of Venezuela, as well as the other Latin American countries. Moreover, he promoted trade among regional countries, in a similar scheme to the EU, encouraging free trade. Adopting a leftist ideology, Chavez's dream was to build a trade mechanism among regional countries that do not hamper more vulnerable countries, instead of the neoliberal trade model that makes the latter poorer. Thus, trade was a tool for Chavez to mobilize regional countries for more cooperation. In this way, Chavez wanted to decrease the dependency on US trade. Thirdly, Chavez conducted a fervent opposition against global governance, particularly international financial institutions. Accordingly, those institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank led by the US make profit by exploiting other countries and executing a neoliberal economy model that has not been suitable for the Latin American region. Chavez explicitly declares these views and the anti-US ideology in front of the international community by remaining his presence in the UN. Also, an important part of his PFP was constructed on the dream of forming a regional union among Latin American countries, as one of the Bolivarian Revolution dreams, pan-Americanism. He wanted to establish this scheme under his own leadership. The institutions such as the ALBA or UNASUR were some examples of these institutions pioneered by Chavez. In this way, he aimed to make his leadership accepted in the region. In the end, since he wanted to build a new and Venezuela-led regional order, and break the US-dependent tradition, he pursued a revisionist PFP. For the same goal of proving his leadership, he implemented

highly-engaged transborder activism. Under the same idea of pan-Americanism, based on the inclusive pure people definition, Chavez wanted to bring all Latin American peoples together within the framework of *Nuestramerica*. By connotating the common memory and common colonial past, and using the common language as another facilitating factor, Chavez's appeal reached a broader Latin American community, not only with his discourse but also by providing humanitarian aid to increase the socioeconomic levels of vulnerable communities. Consequently, his PFP agenda did pursue his revisionist goals under each indicator.

The last case that is examined in this work is the short-termed but crucial European leftist and defensive PFP example, the Syriza governments led by Tsipras. Following the radical leftist tradition in Greece, Tsipras came up with a claim to solve Greece's debt crisis in an anti-austerity way. Using the existing grievances for the previous governments, and Euro-skepticism among Greek people due to under heavy burden of austerities imposed by the troika, Tsipras defended a third way between leaving the EU and these austerities (Mudde 2017). First, different from the example of Chavez, migration became one of the core PFP areas for Tsipras, since he came to power in the middle of the migration crisis in 2015. Based on the inclusive pure people definition on the basis of socioeconomic factors, and anti-neoliberal policy stance, Tsipras claimed that migrants should be accepted due to the fact that migration is a consequence of imperialism and neoliberalism. Also, migration was a way for Syriza to put its opposition against the EU. Tsipras criticized and even blamed the EU for their mismanagement and irresponsible attitude in the migration crisis. Secondly, as a member of the EU free trade network, and as a country struggling with the debt crisis, Tsipras was not able to conduct an active trade policy. Yet Tsipras followed the protectionist way in the trade policy as well. Derived from the anti-neoliberal perception, he vetoed most of the free trade agreements in the EU, by claiming that he and Syriza tried to protect the interests of all EU citizens.

Thirdly, for Syriza, the resistance against global governance, especially financial institutions as in the example of Chavez, was an important part of the PFP because its *raison d'être* (Mudde 2016) was somehow to stop the EU from shaping Greek politics and the troika from imposing the economic measures that the Greek people did not confirm. In fact, what the Syriza offered was not a total "Grexit", but the approval of a set of solutions proposed by the Syriza governments, expecting compromises from the EU side. Thus, as in the case of Orban's PFP, as a defensive PFP example, Tsipras wanted to challenge the international institutions, such as the EU, from within, and protect Greece from the impositions of the troika. He aimed to establish an EU that hears more of the vOICE of European peoples. However, it was not expectable to reject all offers from the EU side, or totally break the relationship

with the global governance. Dealing with both migration but mainly debt crises, the government had to agree with the troika in the end, with heavier conditions than the deals proposed before. Lastly, as in the other populism examples, Tsipras attempted to conduct transborder activism, appealing to a wider European citizens community based on the socio-economically defined pure people. Also, Tsipras' appeal aimed to engage European peoples against the technocratic and anti-democratic management of the EU, by mobilizing other leftist movements and political parties in Europe. Nevertheless, due to the same reason of struggling with the crises, Tsipras could not pay enough attention to his transborder activism and allocate the required resources for this goal, compared to the other cases. In the end, Syriza's international support were withdrawn because of the final deal that Tsipras signed with the troika.

If we briefly look at the overall results of this study for each indicator; for migration policies, the attached ideology seems to be a major determinant factor as to whether adopt a more inclusive or exclusive foreign policy agenda. Thus, we can conclude that the case analyses and the first hypothesis show similar facts. In that sense, the Turkish example should be a unique case among right-wing populists in terms of its selective exclusiveness. Nevertheless, in this study, I argue that this uniqueness can be explained by the revisionist foreign policy goals. Moreover, Erdoğan's PFP is similar to other examples in terms of using migration as a policy tool to bargain with Western countries. Secondly, trade is an important area for all populists, relatively except for Syriza due to its peculiar conditions, in order to put the economic resistance against the existing Western hegemony, and behave in accordance with their national sovereignty. As argued in the second hypothesis, they do diverge first in accordance with the right- or left-wing ideologies, adopting a more open trade approach, or remaining more protectionist. Secondly, in accordance with the revisionism level, they do use trade as a tool to promote a regional collaboration with an aim to claim the leadership and challenge the current dominance. As a notable point, populist leaders are likely to choose their trade partners with the political motives, by preferring countries led by authoritarian or populist leaders. In the end, we can say that trade appears as an area where populists look for alternative cooperation and attempts to decrease their dependence on Western trade partners. Thirdly, global governance occupies an important place for all populist leaders, because they intend to show themselves as the "protector" and "savior" of their peoples and their sovereignty vis-à-vis the "external enemies" that are considered to be international institutions forming the global governance in the post-World War II order. Their PFPs are differentiated in accordance with both the ideological stance and the revisionism level, as divided in the third hypothesis: Leftist PFPs' emphasis is mostly on the contradiction with the international financial institutions, considering them

representatives of neoliberalism. Whereas the right-wing PFPs are opposing the fact that international institutions damage national sovereignty. Then, the more defensive cases aim to remain in the international institutions to benefit from the financial attributes of their memberships and mainly protect their countries from being shaped by the impositions of the global governance. Whereas in more revisionist cases, even though these goals are already present, they also mobilize in their own regional institutions to challenge the existing hegemony, as exemplified in Turkish and Venezuelan PFPs. Lastly, the results show that all populist leaders put an emphasis on forming and appealing to their transborder community at different levels. As argued in the last hypothesis, right-wing populists, Erdoğan and Orban, constructed their diaspora community on the exclusive identities, nationality and religion. Whereas left-wing populists could make a broader appeal caused by their inclusive pure people definition. They aim to mobilize their transborder community around the criticisms of the neoliberal economic model, and the US hegemony in world politics. To execute this transborder activism, populist leaders can also utilize state resources. Also, revisionist PFPs more intend to use their transborder community to influence other countries and strengthen their presence in host countries. Thus, engaging in transborder community shows the high capabilities and ability to make a broader appeal for a populist leader. In that sense, this foreign policy indicator shows that transborder appeal can be considered a common point among populist leaders. Yet their engagement level might be divergent in accordance with their conditions, as in the case of Tsipras' transborder activism.

Consequently, this study achieves to analyze PFPs in a comparative manner and shows a theoretical output applicable to further cases. In that sense, this thesis contributes to the PFP literature in many ways: First, it comes up with a theoretical expectation which is to draw a typology, based on the existing and new arguments for the PFPs. Although some of the tested arguments were generated similar to what the literature offers, they have not been tested before in PFP examples in a systematic manner, under foreign policy indicators. For the first time, four cases that are picked from different regions of the world are examined and compared under four foreign policy indicators within the same study in that systematicity. Then, the other contribution of this study should be the fact that it examines foreign policy actions of current or past populist governments, rather than populist political parties that could not execute their PFP since they are not the political power. Thus, this study exclusively focuses on the foreign policy actions of populist governments. Moreover, since the thesis looks at how populists behave in four different foreign policy areas, this thesis provides a deeper and holistic understanding of how populists behave in their foreign policies. It does not emphasize the peculiarities of PFPs but

seeks generalizable common and divergent features of PFPs. Moreover, this study offers a new foreign policy indicator, which is transborder activism. The results show that all populist leaders somehow attempt to use the transborder activism at different levels in accordance with their circumstances, as a way to reach a broader community beyond their national borders. Lastly, the study introduces a new explanatory factor, revisionism level, to diversify the PFPs. Accordingly, revisionist and defensive PFPs show different features in areas especially global governance and transborder activism. They mainly intend to construct new global governance institutions, interfere into the other countries' internal affairs through transborder communities, become an influential actor in regional actor, and claim their leadership. Whereas the defensive PFPs aim to protect themselves from the negative impact of the existing global order. For both types of PFPs, their targeted groups to build a transborder community, or the definition of "negative" impact of global governance vary according to the ideological component. Thus, looking at two explanatory factors at the same time gives this broader and analytical perception to diversify the PFPs more accurately.

Also, the level of capability might be another significant point to understand why some populists remain defensive, while the others seek for more ambitious goals in their foreign policies. The liabilities deriving from the international agreements or memberships to global governance institutions emerge as the restrictive factor in front of populist leaders. For instance, Orban is able to diversify Hungarian international trade portfolio to some extent via trade agreements with Russia or China. Nevertheless, it is not possible to leave the free agreements within the EU. Leaving the EU is not a considerable option for Hungary either, because the country has very important economic and social benefits from the EU, such as being in the free trade area, or free movement right for Hungarian people. Consequently, for Orban, looking for a new regional institution should not be probable. The best remaining option is to challenge the EU from within while denouncing the problems and grievances regarding the EU institutions and decisions. In so doing, Orban administration also tries to minimize the impact of EU decision in his country. In the Greek example, Tsipras faced similar limitations as well. Moreover, since he struggled with debt crisis, it was not possible to adopt a revisionist PFP, because the country was not capable of executing such ambitious goals. As implied in the related sections, for instance, while trying to solve a less severe solution for the debt crisis, Tsipras had to follow the negotiations with the troika. In the end, he had to even sign an agreement. By contrast, for Turkey and Venezuela the conditions are more flexible. In the second decade of AKP governments, Turkish economy was going well with the impact of implementing the EU requirements. The country has

not a restrictive factor such as the EU membership. Even in the last years, Turkey could buy S-400 missile systems from Russia, contracting to its NATO membership. The country has a crowded population, an important diaspora community living mainly in the Western Europe, and the ability to mobilize this community through state resources. Under these circumstances, pursuing regional leadership, engaging in diaspora community, looking for and participating in alternative alliances that challenge the global order are more applicable, compared to the two previous examples. Similarly, we emphasized how Chavez had some facilitating factors such as the common colonial past, the existence of a common “enemy”, sharing the same language, to build a transborder community, as well as to mobilize regional countries for more cooperation. Furthermore, since Venezuela is a rentier-state, Chavez has more options to orientate Venezuelan economy according to his ambitious goals, because the country has already had enough economic resource. As a result, countries’ capabilities and particular contexts have a significant impact on their preference to pursue a defensive or revisionist PFP.

As argued in the introduction, the main aim of this study is to provide an exhaustive typology that should be applicable to a wide range of cases from different regions of the world. Picking four cases from Europe, Middle East and Latin America and determining their systematic similarities and differences adjusted peculiar cultural or traditional features as well. Consequently, the two independent variables of this thesis have still explanatory power to understand divergent points among populist cases. The four cases were chosen in accordance with the changing values of the independent variables in this study. Then, they are examined and evaluated under four foreign policy indicators, according to their types. The same method can be followed for implying this typology to further cases. . For the ideological component, many left- and right-wing populists diverge in their migration, and trade policies, as I argued. For instance, in Poland led by Duda, a right-wing defensive PFP example, general features are observable. First, since he defines his pure people and corrupt elite on the basis of selected identities, mainly nationality, the case should be a right-wing populism. Then, Duda’s defensive PFP aims to remain within the EU and challenge the European system from within. In terms of the capabilities of the country, the restrictions and liabilities coming from the EU membership as in the Orban case are similar. That is why Poland right-wing populism should be counted as a defensive case, and foreign policy indicators should be evaluated accordingly. Many features such as opposing the immigration policy of the EU, protecting the national sovereignty vis-à-vis the global governance, generating trade agreements with Russia and China, and using the veto power in order to protect the anti-Western partners against the EU sanctions can be considered similar to what the

typology offers for a right-wing defensive PFP. Then, for Trump in the US, if it is counted as a right-wing defensive PFP example, a similar comment might be correct in migration policy with an anti-immigrant stance. One of his main election promises was to construct a wall into the Mexican border to prevent migration inflow. Even though his trade policy was evaluated as mercantilist/protectionist, he promotes bilateral free trade agreements, rather than multinational ones. (Gruszczynski and Lawrence 2019). He wants to adopt a reactionist behavior vis-à-vis the international institutions such as NATO or the EU that are dependent on the US in different levels and areas. For this indicator, he was not against the cooperation, but mainly against the multilateralism that puts requirements on the nation-state. In a different region, Bolsanoro in Brazil, a right-wing revisionist PFP, he also shows similar anti-immigrant and anti-global governance stances in his PFP. As pursuing a revisionist PFP, he challenged the US hegemony in the Latin American region, as well as followed steps to claim the leadership in the region.

Also, among leftist cases, Podemos in Spain, Five Stars Movement in Italy, or Lula in Brazil show similar patterns in their PFP. All these examples define their pure people on the basis of socioeconomic vulnerabilities, excluding the identity-based features. Also, their main target is the neoliberal economic model imposed on their countries, and its negative consequences. Especially, Lula in Brazil's example shows how a left-wing PFP could emerge as a reaction to neoliberal policies and austerities as in Tsipras's case. In Spain and in Italy, the above-mentioned examples build a considerable part of their foreign policy promises on contradicting the EU or other neoliberal institutions. They also supported the transborder appeal of Tsipras in order to be heard more by the EU institutions.

Yet, the results of this study should be implied to further cases in a prudent way, while considering the peculiarities of PFPs due to the "thin-centered" aspect of populism itself (Chryssogelos 2017). Accordingly, since populist leaders can behave more flexibly and transform their populisms in accordance with domestic political interests, determining general features applicable to all populists is not easy. All populists do not behave in the same way for each indicator. For instance, in the case of Bolsanaro, he puts a more anti-neoliberal policy way in his trade policy, since he came to power benefitting from the grievances of the Brazilian people due to austerity. For the international trade, he pursues the leftist line. Trump did not implement a transborder appeal since the country did not have a diaspora community. Modi in India adopted a closer stance toward international institutions, even though he continues to accuse those institutions during his discourses in internal politics. The examples can be multiplied. This means that it is not always possible to easily determine a given case fits which type. However, it can be concluded that

in many ways, the two explanatory factors, the ideology, and the revisionism level can be implied in other cases at different levels.

Another limitation of this study, it looks at only four foreign policy areas in line with the existing literature. Those areas are also significant because the populist leaders show relatively active foreign policies. To frame the work, some other foreign policy behaviors are excluded from the scope of this study. For instance, some PFPs are considered more assertive in the sense of engaging in military operations beyond their national borders. In that way, especially revisionist PFPs, such as China, Russia, and Turkey want to challenge the Western hegemony in selected regions via the military presence. Whereas in defensive cases, the military presence beyond national borders is generally intent to be decreased as in the case of Trump who wanted to withdraw American soldiers from Afghanistan. Thus, further areas can be included in order to have a broader perception of PFPs.

This study takes populism as a “thin-centered” ideology, following the classical definition of Mudde (2004). There are other definitions of populism as well, that perceive the latter as a communication style (Jagers and Walgrave 2007), or as a political strategy (Weyland 2001). The reason why I preferred the definition of Mudde (2004) is because it facilitates to analyze foreign policy contents of populist leaders. However, populist leaders might have also a different communication style in their foreign policy agendas. Conducting bilateral negotiations and agreements instead of multilateral ones as in the case of trade agreements proposed by Erdoğan, Orban or Chavez ; increasing the density of personal relationships with other country leaders to solve international problems, such as the relationship between Putin and Erdoğan ; eliminating institutional diplomatic tradition and promote a more personal and unframed type of diplomacy as in the case of Erdoğan, Chavez ; or constructing an unmediated communication style to be able to make foreign policy issues a tool to propagate populist leaders’ views and to consolidate their support such as in the all examined populist cases in this study can be counted as some of the implication/reflection of these different populism definitions into the foreign policy agendas of populist leaders. Thus, following these different definitions, and analyzing PFPs accordingly should be insightful to understand the way in which populist leaders build their foreign policies in further research.

In addition, as observed during this study, populist leaders do not always act as they say. Foreign policy is presented a tool for them to utilize in domestic politics as well. Therefore, they might claim to implement radical foreign policy actions, or say to do so. For instance, Syriza was more radical in many areas when the party came to power for the first time, or when it was at the opposition side. However, when

the time of negotiations with the troika has come, the realities were not coherent with the promises. In this study, I focus on the concrete actions of PFPs, rather than the promises of populist leaders. Thus, a further research can analyze what populist leaders claim in their foreign policies, and to what extent they are able to execute these actions. In that way, it would be possible to see that what kind of institutional mechanisms prevent populist leaders from taking action in foreign policy. For instance, one of the most discussed foreign policy promises of Trump was to build a wall on the US-Mexico border. Yet when he implemented this foreign policy, Trump faced a strong opposition and many vetoes from the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, in many countries led by populist leaders, the institutional mechanisms that stop populist leaders are gradually deteriorated by populists. Related to this last point, another critical question to think for a further study on PFPs might be how democracy level in a populist case influences foreign policy actions. For instance, in this study we underlined that Turkey and Venezuela have been governed by anti-democratic systems in different levels. That implies that institutional restrictions and limitations on presidential decisions are rare for Chavez and Erdoğan. That leads to the capability of pursuing their ambitious and sometimes personal goals in the foreign policy area. Whereas for Orban, even though his regime is not fully democratic either, the institutional mechanisms that limit his actions should be more prone. Even infringement procedures led by the EU institutions put a pressure on his government. Consequently, a further research on this topic can also be insightful in terms of understanding democratic mechanisms, and their transformations during populist regimes.

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