TO VOTE OR NOT TO VOTE? AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION AND VOTER TURNOUT IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines the effect of affective polarization on voter turnout in Turkey. Although the relationship between affective polarization and voter turnout has been examined in consolidated democracies, this thesis contributes to the literature by testing this relationship beyond established democracies. In addition, if party identification is an explanation for voter turnout, this thesis also examines whether the positive effect of party identification on voter turnout is conditional on varying levels of affective polarization. The theoretical framework of this thesis builds upon Social Identity Theory. Therefore, affective polarization and party identification are treated as the results of social identities which reflect the long-lasting social cleavages in Turkey. Affective polarization is defined as the extent to which voters have positive and negative feelings toward different political parties and is measured based on party and leader feeling thermometers. To test the hypotheses, this thesis employs Modules 3 to 5 of CSES data which include 3 post-election surveys in Turkey. The analyses present empirical evidence for the main hypothesis of the relationship between affective polarization and voter turnout. On the other hand, the second hypothesis which expects that the positive effect of party identification on voter turnout is conditional on higher levels of affective polarization is not supported by empirical findings. In fact, empirical findings present that the effect of partisanship on voter turnout decreases when affective polarization increases.

ÖZET

OY VERMEK YA DA VERMEMEK? TÜRKİYE'DE DUYGUSAL KUTUPLAŞMA VE SEÇİME KATILIM

UMUT KORAY İMAMOĞLU

SİYASET BİLİMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2022

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Duygusal Kutuplaşma, Seçmen Davranışı, Seçime Katılım, Parti Aidiyeti, Seçimler

Bu tez, Türkiye'de duygusal kutuplaşmanın sandığa gitme üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Duygusal kutuplaşma ile sandığa gitme arasındaki ilişki konsolide demokrasilerde incelenmiş olsa da, bu tez söz konusu ilişkiyi yerleşik demokrasilerin ötesinde test ederek literatüre katkıda bulunmaktadır. Ek olarak, parti aidiyeti seçmen katılımının bir açıklamasıysa, bu tez parti aidiyetinin seçmen katılımı üzerindeki olumlu etkisinin değişen duygusal kutuplaşma düzeylerine bağlı olup olmadığını da incelemektedir. Bu tezin teorik çerçevesi, Sosyal Kimlik Teorisi üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Bu nedenle, duygusal kutuplaşma ve parti kimliği, Türkiye'de uzun süredir devam eden toplumsal bölünmeleri yansıtan toplumsal kimliklerin sonuçları olarak ele alınmaktadır. Duygusal kutuplaşma, seçmenlerin farklı siyasi partilere yönelik olumlu ve olumsuz duygularının derecesi olarak tanımlanmakta ve parti ve lider duygu termometrelerine dayalı olarak ölçülmektedir. Hipotezleri test etmek için bu tez, Türkiye'deki 3 seçim sonrası anketi içeren CSES verilerinin 3, 4 ve 5'inci Modüllerini kullanmaktadır. Analizler, duygusal kutuplaşma ve seçmen katılımı arasındaki ilişkiye ilişkin ana hipotez için ampirik kanıtlar sunmaktadır. Öte yandan, parti kimliğinin seçmen katılımı üzerindeki olumlu etkisinin daha yüksek duygusal kutuplaşma düzeylerine bağlı olduğunu bekleyen ikinci hipotez, ampirik bulgularla desteklenmemektedir. Aslında ampirik bulgular, duygusal kutuplaşma arttığında partizanlığın seçmen katılımı üzerindeki etkisinin azaldığını ortaya koymaktadır.

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1.   INTRODUCTION

Party identification, which is mostly defined as the psychological link between electorates and political parties (e.g., Greene 2002), has been considered as an essential determinant of political behavior since the publication of American Voter, the seminal book by Campbell and his colleagues (1960). Although negative feelings toward political parties are also emphasized as important elements of political behavior by Campbell and his colleagues, the negative side of partisanship remained neglected in the literature for a time. New studies in social psychology presented that the positive and negative feelings toward social groups are distinct phenomenons (e.g., Brewer 1999). Then, political scientists started to analyze the concept of negative partisanship (e.g., Maggiotto and Piereson 1977; Bankert 2021; Medeiros and Noël 2014). In order to analyze the extent to which individuals have both positive and negative feelings towards different parties, scholars in the literature have developed the affective polarization term. Then, the effects of affective polarization on political behavior has been analyzed by several researchers (e.g., Ward and Tavits 2019; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Wagner 2021).

Turnout rates in Turkey are relatively higher than in other regions of the world. In other words, the propensity of the median Turkish voter to turn out is relatively high. What accounts for the high tendency of Turkish voters to cast a ballot? Can affective polarization be a factor that is driving voters to turn out in Turkey? In line with the expressive partisanship approach in the literature, I treat affective polarization by referring to Social Identity Theory. According to the theory, social behavior is affected by social and personal identities. Once an individual identifies herself with a social group, her social behavior would be in accordance with her social identity. Since Turkish society and politics have been strictly divided by long-lasting social cleavages, the social identity approach is appropriate to treat affective polarization in Turkey based on Social Identity Theory. The "kulturkampf" of today's Turkish society and politics directly affect the social and political behaviors of Turkish citizens. According to the kulturkampf thesis of Kalaycıoğlu (2014), Turkish poli-

tics has been divided by religiosity and ethnicity. On the one side of this political conflict in Turkish politics, there is a "secular image of good society" which reflects the ideas and beliefs of individuals who imagine a good society based on science and human rationality; while the other side represents the religious individuals who develop their own "conservative image of good society" based on traditional and religious values (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). According to Kalaycıoğlu (2014), the effects of these two worldviews on political and daily life can be observed in several areas, from the vote choice of voters to the economic and social attitudes. The roots of the religious-secular and the Turkish-Kurdish cleavages can be traced back to the center-periphery cleavage which had affected the social and political life from late Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey (Mardin 1969). In the first years of multi-party elections in Turkey, there were two major parties. While the Republican People's Party (CHP) was representing the center, Democrat Party (DP) was supported by the rural masses. However, because of democratization, urbanization, and industrialization after the Second World War; the periphery captured the center (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2021). Consequently, the center-periphery cleavage had been replaced by new cleavages during the 1960s and the 1970s. The religious and Kurdish nationalists started to create their own elites; hence, the divisions based on values become more important to understand the political culture of Turkey than divisions based on power-share (Kalaycıoğlu 2014). The rising salience of nationalism and Islamism changed the social structure in Turkey. Consequently, new political parties emerged or became politically more powerful, such as Welfare Party (RP) and its successors, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and Kurdish nationalist parties. However, the effect of social identities on political behavior continued to be important. Although political parties in Turkey are not old enough for the development of party identification, clues of party identification can move from parents to their children for different parties which have the same political position (Aytaç, Çarkoğlu, and Yıldırım 2017). Hence, social identities and their effects on political behavior are relevant to Turkish politics.

My main argument is that affective polarization increases voter turnout in Turkey. Abramowitz and Stone (2006) treat the high turnout in the 2004 presidential elections in the U.S. as a result of the polarized feelings of American voters toward George W. Bush. Similar to the Bush effect, there can be an "Erdoğan effect" in Turkey. As one of the most dominant actors in Turkish political history, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the head of state and the leader of the incumbent party, has a lot of lovers and haters. Hence, the voters who have strong positive feelings toward Erdoğan and strong negative feelings toward Kılıçdaroğlu, who is the leader of the main opposition party, may go to the polls because of their feelings. This affec-

tive polarization based on the feelings toward Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu reflects the religious-secular cleavage in Turkey since Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Republican Peoples' Party (CHP) are the political representatives of the religious and the secular. Similarly, voters, who identify themselves with a position on the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage, may have strong negative and positive feelings toward Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) as well as their leaders. Hence, I hypothesize that an increase in affective polarization increases the propensity of Turkish voters to turn out. Although this hypothesis has been tested in established democracies in the literature (e.g., Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Ward and Tavits 2019), I contribute to the literature by moving the hypothesis beyond consolidated democracies. In developing democracies, political parties are relatively younger and their institutional continuity has been interrupted by several incidents such as military interventions or revolutions. On the other hand, political parties are older and have more stable policy and ideological positions in consolidated democracies. However, partisan affiliation and affective polarization do not develop only in consolidated democracies. Instead, partisanship has certain effects on political behavior in established democracies, in developing democracies (Brader and Tucker 2009*b*), and even in competitive authoritarian regimes (Brader and Tucker 2009*a*). Although today's regime of Turkey is defined as competitive authoritarian (Esen and Gumuscu 2016) and the institutional continuity of electoral politics has been interrupted by military interventions, Turkey has never been a full dictatorship since 1950s. The duration of military rules were relatively short and multi-party elections were held after coups. The quality of democracy may decrease for some periods, but the electoral competition has continued. I also contibute to the literature by using leader feeling thermometers apart from party feeling thermometers which are vastly used in the literature. Although party feeling thermometers are useful to examine individuals' positive and negative feelings toward different parties, affective polarization may reflect itself on the positive and negative feelings toward party leaders in Turkey, since some leaders are more prominent than their parties in Turkish politics. Finally, I also examine whether there is an interactive relationship between party identification and affective polarization. If party identification increases an individual's propensity to turn out, then I argue that the positive effect of party identification on voter turnout would be conditional on varying levels of affective polarization. In other words, I expect that a partisan voter would go to the polls when she has strong negative feelings toward an out-party. As argued in Social Identity Theory, individuals feel threatened when the out-group has a superior social status. Consequently, the electoral victory of an out-group may be perceived as a threat by voters in Turkey. Hence, they would be more likely to turn out in order to prevent the electoral success of the out-group. On the other hand,

I expect that individuals would not be motivated to cast a ballot because of their party identification when they do not perceive a threat from an out-party.

In order to test my hypotheses, I employ Modules 3 to 5 of CSES data which cover 3 post-election surveys in Turkey. Since affective polarization is a relatively new concept, there is not an agreed method of measurement in the literature. Hence, I use several calculations to measure affective polarization such as the spread of like-dislike scores and the difference between the feelings toward the most liked and the most disliked parties. Although affective polarization is measured by using party feeling thermometers in the literature, I also use leader feeling thermometers since some political leaders are more salient than their parties. I also control for the effect of several variables, such as party identification, perceived ideological (party) polarization, ideological extremity, and socioeconomic variables.

In the following chapter, I provide the existing literature on partisanship, affective polarization, and voter turnout as well as the studies on social identities and electoral behavior in Turkey. Then, I provide a theoretical framework for the relationship between affective polarization and voter turnout. In the theory chapter, I also state my hypotheses. The fourth chapter presents my research design, employed data, and variable operationalizations. Then I present and interpret the findings from empirical analyses. In the last chapter, I conclude my thesis by discussing my findings.

2.   LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter of my thesis, I present the existing literature on the association between affective polarization and voter turnout. As a political behavior, voter turnout is also related to certain issues such as party identification and ideological polarization. Therefore, I provide a detailed analysis of the literature on party identification, polarization, and political behavior. Then, I elaborate on the alternative explanations for voter turnout. Lastly, I review the literature on social identities and electoral behavior in Turkey.

2.1 Party Identification, Polarization, and Political Behavior

2.1.1 Positive Party Identification and Negative Partisanship

Party identification, which is mostly defined as the psychological link between electorates and political parties (e.g., Greene 2002), has been considered as an essential determinant of political behavior since the publication of American Voter, the seminal book by Campbell and his colleagues (1960). This phenomenon has been first analyzed in American politics by several researchers (e.g., Greene 1999). Then, recent literature has shown that partisanship is also a powerful predictor of political behavior in multi-party systems (Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema 2017) as well as in new democracies in Latin America (Lupu 2015), post-Communist countries (Dalton and Weldon 2007), and Africa (Carlson 2016). Although some scholars argue that it is not as common for voters to identify themselves with political parties as before (e.g., Wattenberg 1981); most of the studies in the literature show that the influence of partisanship on electoral behavior has not diminished for last decades (Miller 1991), and that it is still relevant for today's voters, including younger generations (Wray-Lake, Arruda, and Hopkins 2019).

Partisanship has been mostly considered as a type of social identity in the existing literature. For instance, Greene (1999) treats social identification as an important element of partisanship, when the author uses Social Identity Theory as his theoretical framework to explain partisan identification. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), who are the founders of Social Identity Theory, individuals identify themselves by their group belongings and this leads to a categorization of us versus them. The categorization also improves an individual's self-image since it causes to focus on the positive aspects of the in-group and the negative sides of the out-group. Based on this theory, party identification has been seen as a result of long-lasting social cleavages which divide societies into different segments and affect the attitudes and perceptions of individuals. The identity-based understanding of partisanship, which is also named as "expressive partisanship" by Bankert and his colleagues (2017), has been vastly used in the literature by several researchers (e.g., Greene 2004; Mason 2015; Huddy and Bankert 2017; Ward and Tavits 2019). On the other hand, some scholars develop an alternative approach to partisanship. The approach which is called "instrumental partisanship" by Bankert and his colleagues (2017) takes partisanship as an informed deliberation and responsive to leadership and policy shifts in party programs (e.g., Downs 1957; Adams 2012). The main difference between the two approaches is that while the expressive partisanship approach considers partisanship as a psychological commitment that the individual develops thoughtlessly towards political parties and continues throughout her life, the instrumentalist approach treats partisanship as a changeable and responsive phenomenon. Beyond these two approaches, Fiorina (1981) develops a different model to explain the development of partisanship. According to Fiorina, an individual determines her vote choice based on prospective evaluations of parties and their policy positions when she does not know anything about the political setting. However, since individuals know the political parties and the political environment in their countries, they evaluate political parties retrospectively. Hence, partisanship is a dynamic link between political parties and voters, rather than a fixed thoughtless attachment. In other words, Fiorina argues that partisanship is a "running tally" in which voters evaluate parties retrospectively.

Although Campbell and his colleagues (1960) have emphasized the importance of the negative feelings toward disliked groups in both the formation of partisanship and political behavior at the very beginning of the literature, the negative partisanship concept had remained neglected by the literature for a time. After studies on social psychology had presented that in-group affinity does not have to be attended by out-group enmity (Brewer 1999), the literature on political behavior started to pay attention to the negative partisanship term. The first empirical analysis of neg-

ative partisanship has been made by Maggiotto and Pierson (1977). The authors' research demonstrates that feelings toward the disliked party are also important for measuring partisanship. In addition, negative feelings toward the disliked party may be independent of the positive partisan identification with the liked party. Bankert (2021) also shows that negative party identification differs from positive partisanship with respect to its characteristics and effects on political attitudes. Iyengar and Westwood (2015) also treat increasing negative feelings toward the opposition party and its leader as the main source of polarization in the society. Although the origins and effects of positive partisanship have mainly been examined in the existing literature by covering both two-party and multi-party system cases, researchers mainly focus on two-party systems when they analyze negative partisanship (e.g., Abramowitz and Webster 2018) and the effect of negative partisanship in multi-party systems has been recently attracted in the literature (Medeiros and Noël 2014; McGregor, Caruana, and Stephenson 2015; Mayer 2017; Bosco and Verney 2020; Meléndez and Kaltwasser 2021).

Since political parties are the key actors in the political sphere and create strong links between the people and states, emotional and psychological bonds between political parties and voters have been seen as an important element of political life. In line with this understanding, positive partisanship is regarded as a catalyst for democracy because it encourages political engagement and integration of the masses into politics (Miller 1991). In addition, positive party identification can also play a life-giving role in new democracies by increasing the beliefs of individuals in the new democratic setting (Dalton and Weldon 2007). On the other hand, perspectives on negative partisanship in the literature are conflictual. While some researchers treat negative partisanship as a threat to democracy, others examine its importance in political participation and democratic norms. For instance, according to Abramowitz and Webster (2016), the rising negative partisanship may make cooperation among deputies from different parties less possible and increases the risk of gridlocks. From another point of view, negative partisanship may increase political integration and voter turnout and this effect of negative partisanship on political participation is critical in understanding individuals who do not positively attach themselves to any party (Haime and Cantú 2022).

Since party identification begins to form in early childhood under the influence of family and social environment and continues to affect the individual for many years, positive and negative sides of it have been treated as important determinants of political behavior, including voting and non-voting attitudes. For instance, both positive partisanship and negative partisanship increase the propensity of individuals to vote for the in-group party. However, party identification can also go beyond

vote choice and affect a voter's political engagement (Campbell et al. 1960). In addition, experimental studies have shown that positive party identification and negative partisanship can influence individuals' daily behavior and preferences including decisions about marriage (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).

2.1.2 Affective Polarization and Other Concepts of Polarization

In order to analyze the extent to which individuals have both positive and negative feelings towards different parties, scholars in the literature have developed the affective polarization term. Iyengar and his colleagues (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012) define affective polarization as the social distance between partisans of different parties who have negative feelings toward each other. Similarly, Wagner also focuses on affection instead of ideology when he defines affective polarization as "the extent to which citizens feel sympathy towards partisan in-groups and antagonism towards partisan out-groups" (Wagner 2021, 1). Since affective polarization is relatively a new concept, there is not a single agreed method of measurement in the literature. While most of the scholars in the literature rely on party feelings thermometer questions in surveys, some researchers criticize the use of like-dislike scores and develop alternative measurements. For instance, Iyengar and his colleagues (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012) examine the view of individuals regarding marriages among out-groups along with party feeling thermometers. Even though the earlier studies on affective polarization had mostly focused on the American two-party system, several researchers have recently started to examine affective polarization in multi-party systems by developing more sophisticated methods to measure it (e.g., Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2021).

The influence of affective polarization on political behavior has also attracted several researchers in the existing literature. As an earlier study on the effects of partisan identities on political behavior, Greene (1999) argues that social identities create more positive feelings toward the identified party and negative feelings towards others. Although Greene does not use the affective polarization term, he depicts its relevance by emphasizing the importance of the distance between positive in-group feelings and negative out-group feelings on political behavior. According to Greene, strong positive and negative feelings toward parties increase individuals' propensity to turn out. In their cross-national analysis, Ward and Tavits (2019) also argue that individuals tend to interpret the ideological position of a party as more extreme when they have strong positive or negative feelings toward the party. In addition, the authors find empirical evidence for the argument that affectively polarized

individuals perceive electoral politics as an intense and high-stake conflict among political parties, consequently affectively polarized voters are more prone to turn out. The claim that affective polarization is the psychological root of voters seeing the political struggle as more intense can also be seen in the research of Iyengar and Westwood (2015). The authors find that affective polarization based on partisanship leads to more extreme perceptions of in-group and out-group members compared to racial division, ideological polarization, and instrumental bonds. Wagner (Wagner 2021) also analyzes the influence of affective polarization on democratic values and political participation by comparing 51 countries including two-party systems as well as multi-party systems. Wagner uses "satisfaction with democracy", "who vote for makes a difference", and "who is in power makes a difference" questions of CSES data in order to measure democratic norms. When measuring political participation, the author uses the turnout variable of CSES data along with certain questions for other forms of political participation such as persuading other voters for a party or candidate, expressing support for a party or candidate, contacting a politician, protesting, and cooperating with like-minded people. According to the findings of Wagner, all measures of affective polarization have a statistically significant positive effect on democratic norms and political participation. Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe (2015) also obtain similar findings when they examine the effect of the positive in-group and negative out-group feelings toward political parties on political engagement. According to the authors, affective polarization increases individuals' campaign involvement and creates more powerful emotions toward electoral campaigns. Abramowitz and Stone (2006) also argue that the high turnout rate in the 2004 presidential elections in the U.S. was a result of voters in the U.S. either loving George W. Bush or hating him.

In addition to the effects of affective polarization on political behavior, the literature has shown that affective polarization influences human behaviors even outside of politics. For instance, Rudolph and Hetherington (2021), in their experimental study, find that affective polarization influences consumption patterns, interpersonal trust, neighborhood selection, and romantic relationships. The findings of Rudolph and Hetherington also show that the influence of affective polarization on nonpolitical behaviors is stronger than its effects on political behavior. Abramowitz and McCoy (2019) also note that the rising affective polarization in the American society is undermining social trust and leading to degradation in democratic norms by creating tolerance of illiberal behaviors.

Even though affective polarization has gained the attention of scholars recently, several concepts of the political polarization term have been on the agenda of political scientists for a long time. Political polarization can be defined as "the simultane-

ous presence of opposing or conflicting principles, tendencies, or points of view" (Fiorina and Abrams 2008, 566). Hence, affective polarization is only a concept under the political polarization term which covers several other concepts. For instance, Dalton (2008) calculates party polarization based on the perceived distance among the ideological positions of political parties. In addition to perceived party polarization, Moral (2017) treats the difference between actual and perceived party polarization as an important explanation of political behavior (e.g., voter turnout). Besides party polarization, several studies in the literature has focused on the ideological polarization of deputies or elite polarization (e.g., Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 2010; Banda and Cluverius 2018). Lastly, Moral and Best (2022) examine the effect of citizen polarization on political behavior. The authors measure citizen polarization as the standard deviation of respondents' self-placements on the left-right dimension. According to the findings of Moral and Best, citizen polarization increases when party polarization increases. In addition, politically engaged and sophisticated citizens are more responsive to changes in party polarization than less politically engaged and unsophisticated ones (Moral and Best 2022).

Although it is possible to argue that affective polarization and ideological polarization are interconnected (e.g., Abramowitz and Webster 2016), there are several studies in the literature that take affective polarization and ideological polarization as distinct concepts. For instance, Iyengar and his colleagues (2019) argue that divisions on issue opinions and ideological positions are not necessary conditions of affective polarization. In other words, an individual can be affectively polarized regardless of ideological and issue polarization. In another research, Wagner (2021) also treats affective polarization as a distinct concept instead of considering it as a mere derivative of ideological polarization. In addition, Wagner analyzes the relationship between perceived ideological (party) polarization and affective polarization. When the author regresses ideological polarization on the weighted measurement of affective polarization in cross-national research, he finds that the relationship is not perfect since the correlation coefficient is just 0.44.

2.2 Alternative Explanations of Voter Turnout

Turnout can be measured as the ratio of the total number of individuals who cast a ballot in a given election to the total number of eligible voters in the country. Alternatively, voter turnout can be defined as an individual's propensity to vote. The systemic-level turnout can be beneficial to understand the variation in turnout rates

among different countries, while individual-level turnout is useful to understand why some individuals are more likely to vote than others. In order to understand the turnout phenomenon, scholars in the literature have appealed to institutional mechanisms, socioeconomic conditions, psychological attitudes, polarization, and the calculus of costs and benefits of voting. As an example of the institutional explanations, Powell (1986) argues that when competition in electoral districts is high and parties and voters are strongly bonded to each other turnout rate increases. Similarly, Jackman (1987) argues that nationally competitive districts along with other institutional mechanisms such as compulsory voting and unicameralism increase turnout rates.

On the other hand, since casting a ballot is an individual behavior, several researchers in the literature analyze voter turnout at the individual level by focusing on socioeconomic variables. For example, in their comparative study on the political life in Norway and the US, Rokkan and his colleagues (1970) find that education and occupation have an influence on turnout. According to the findings of the authors, individuals who have higher education and work in urban jobs (e.g., salaried employees, managers, and businessmen) are more prone to turn out, while voters who have lower education and work in rural jobs (e.g., manual workers, fishermen, smallholders) are less likely to cast a ballot. Although socioeconomic conditions have important effects on voter turnout, Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) argue that resources of time, money, and skills are also important determinants of political participation. Those resources which are not only obtained in early childhood but also develop during the lifetime of individuals shape political behavior.

Besides the effects of socioeconomic conditions and resources on voter turnout, polarization has been also treated as an important explanation for turnout in the literature. For instance, Dalton (2008) argues that party system polarization based on voter perceptions of party positions increases turnout rates. By calculating the party system polarization, Dalton estimates the quality of competition among political parties, instead of the quantity of parties. Dalton argues that an increase in party system polarization produces more alternative options for voters, and turnout rates increase as voters are more likely to find a more suitable party for them. Although Crepaz's (2006) measurement of party system polarization differs from Dalton's measurement, the arguments are findings of Crepaz present a similar logic. When the party system is more polarized, individuals would be more likely to identify themselves with a political party since there are more alternatives. By analyzing the effect of party polarization on voter turnout in European multi-party systems, Moral (2017) also finds that high levels of party polarization increase the probability of casting a ballot for both politically sophisticated and unsophisticated voters.

In addition, Moral finds that the positive relationship between party polarization and turnout mostly comes from actual party polarization, rather than perceived polarization.

From a game-theoretical point of view, Downs (1957) analyzes the paradox of voting. According to Downs's theory of voting, an individual's decision to turn out depends on the costs and benefits of voting. Hence, an individual cast a ballot when the benefit of voting outweighs the cost of voting. According to Downs, voters can have two types of benefits from the act of voting. Firstly, an individual may benefit from the maintenance of democracy when she attributes importance to democratic norms. Secondly, the act of voting may produce a benefit of choosing the favored party or candidate when the electoral competition is perceived as competitive by voters. The second benefit is also conditioned by the closeness of the election. The cost of voting for the electorate is going to the polls on the election day and spending time registering and gathering information in the pre-election period. Since a voter's individual effect on elections is minimal, the cost of voting mostly exceeds the potential benefits. A solution for the paradox of voting is developed by Brennan and Hamlin (1998) who argue that voting for a candidate or a party produces an expressive benefit for voters instead of benefiting from the outcome of the election. Although a single vote does not determine the winner of an election, showing support for a candidate or a party may be the most important benefit of voting and this benefit may overweigh the cost of voting. Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan (2007) provide another alternative solution for the paradox of voting. According to Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan, the well-being of others may constitute the benefit of voting for socially motivated voters.

2.3 Social Identities and Electoral Behavior in Turkey

Partisan identification as a social identity has been vastly analyzed in consolidated democracies. However social identities are important elements of political behavior in developing democracies. For instance, Brader and Tucker (2009b) find that partisanship produces similar effects on policy opinions in the United Kingdom (a consolidated democracy) and Poland and Hungary (post-communist developing democracies). In another experimental study, Brader and Tucker (2009a) also find that partisanship makes individuals support public policy proposals of parties and adapt themselves to parties' issue positions even in Russia which is a competitive authoritarian regime. The existing regime of Turkey is competitive authoritarianism;

since elections are not fair, civil liberties are systematically violated, and the political playing field is skewed in favor of the incumbents (Esen and Gumuscu 2016). However, before the rise of competitive authoritarianism in recent years, Turkey was not an established democracy; instead, Turkey's regime was tutelary and semi-democratic (Somer 2016). Hence, the effects of social identities on electoral behavior in Turkey, in which political parties are younger and their institutional continuity has been interrupted by several incidents, may provide a different puzzle than in consolidated democracies, in which political parties are old and have relatively stable policy and ideological positions for the development of strong psychological links between parties and voters. This puzzle is examined by Laebens and Öztürk (2021). In order to analyze the effect of partisanship on electoral behavior, Laebens and Öztürk use original survey data conducted after the 2018 elections. According to the findings of the authors, partisanship is effective for the supporters of the incumbent party, when there are strong clientelistic linkages between the party and electorates. On the other hand, the psychological bonds between the main opposition party and its partisans are powerful regardless of patron-client linkages. Although the difference between the ruling party and the main opposition party in terms of the effect of partisanship is explained by the autocratic regime dynamics by Laebens and Öztürk, the history and characteristics of these parties can be an alternative explanation for this difference. The incumbent party (Justice and Development Party, AKP) is a much newer party than the main opposition party (the Republican People's Party, CHP). In addition, AKP was established as a continuation of certain previous parties (e.g., Welfare Party, RP), the members of AKP come from different backgrounds, and in the first years of its rule AKP glowed up with economic success. On the other hand, CHP is the oldest political party in Turkey since the War of Independence and it has continued its existence and grassroots after leader changes. Hence, to be a partisan of AKP may be more instrumental, while partisanship of CHP can be heritable from one generation to another. In addition, if the partisanship of AKP materializes itself with the contribution of clientelism because of the uneven distribution of resources, the same patron-client relations may be important for certain opposition parties which rule several municipalities in Turkey. In the same research, Laebens and Öztürk also find that being threatened by other political parties is also associated with party identifications. In addition, threat perceptions are higher among supporters of AKP, CHP, and the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP).

In one of the earliest studies on voting behavior in Turkey, Esmer (2002) examines the effects of demographic characteristics, economic status, religious values, and political values on voting choice. According to the findings of Esmer, party identification is the most relevant explanatory variable for vote choice for all political

parties in the effective sample. However, Esmer also notes that party identification and vote choice are the same variables in Turkey since there is a strong correlation between the party voters vote for and they the party voters belong to. Some recent studies also demonstrate that partisanship affects vote choice (Kalaycıoğlu 2012; Aytaç, Çarkoğlu, and Yıldırım 2017; Demirel-Pegg and Dusso 2021), turnout (Demirel-Pegg and Dusso 2021), electoral volatility (Çakır 2020), and even popular support for populist principles (Aytaç, Çarkoğlu, and Elçi 2021). For instance, Aytaç and his colleagues (2017) find that partisanship is the most relevant determinant of the support for presidentialism in the 2017 constitutional amendment. Since the knowledge of Turkish citizens on the merits of the presidential system is limited, voters had developed their vote choices in the 2017 constitutional amendment based on their party identifications which help individuals to simplify political phenomena. While the partisans of AKP supported the switch to the presidential system, partisans of opposition parties voted "no" to the change. In another study, Demirel-Pegg and Dusso (2021) show that partisanship produces more important motivations for turnout and vote choice than concerns about democracy in an analysis of the 2019 local elections in Istanbul. As indicated above, electoral volatility can also be influenced by party identification in Turkey. Since partisanship creates permanent and positive evaluations for a party, partisans are less likely to change their vote choice (Çakır 2020). Lastly, Aytaç and his colleagues (2021) find that partisanship has an impact on the formation of popular support for populism. Since party identification helps the internalization of elite messages, populist attitudes of political leaders may be supported by the partisans.

Once the importance of party identification on electoral behavior in Turkish politics has been accepted, the roots of partisanship become a relevant question. Kalaycıoğlu (2008) provides an explanation of the roots of party identification in Turkey by analyzing the importance of socialization, ideological positions, economic expectations, and ethnicity. According to the findings of Kalaycıoğlu, parental socialization explains the formation of party identification only for older parties in Turkey. Hence, the partisans of the Republican People's Party (CHP) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP) learn party identification in their early childhoods from their families. On the other hand, since Justice and Development Party (AKP) is relatively younger, its supporters are less likely to be affected by their families and consider the economic performance of the party when they identify themselves with the party. While ideology is more important for the supporters of CHP than AKP and MHP, ethnicity has a significant impact only on the formation of MHP affiliation.

Although the effects of party identification on political behavior in Turkey have been recently attracted in the literature, there is limited research on the association

between affective polarization and political behavior in Turkey. To the best of my knowledge, there are very few published studies that have measured affective polarization in Turkey by using party feeling thermometers (e.g., Moral 2016; Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerci 2018; Lauka, McCoy, and Firat 2018; Orhan 2022). Although Wagner's (2021) cross-national analysis covers 51 countries around the world, the author does not include countries that have a polity IV score below 8 in the effective sample. Turkey's polity IV score is 7 in 2011, 3 in 2015, and -4 in 2018. Therefore, Turkey has not been analyzed in Wagner's article.

Using feeling thermometers, Moral (2016) examines the relationship between affective polarization and political behavior in Turkey. Employing panel data, Moral finds that the "choice set" of Turkish voters is strongly influenced by their levels of affective polarization. According to the empirical findings of Moral, the effective number of political parties in an individual's choice set decreases as her affective polarization increases. In other words, a voter excludes some alternative political parties from her choice set as her affective polarization increases. In another study, Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerci (2018) analyze the determinants and consequences of affective polarization in Turkey. The authors treat affective polarization as an increase in the distance between party supporters and the adoption of party preferences as social identities. According to the findings of Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerci, affective polarization increases as a result of the politicization of identity-related mechanisms such as overlapping of social identities with political parties, group exclusion, or group superiority. The findings of Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerci present that affective polarization influences Turkish citizens' political behavior and their perceptions of social and political reality. For instance, supporters of different groups evaluate the economic and political situation differently. While the supporters of AKP perceive that the economic performance of the government is successful, electoral processes are democratic, all worldviews are represented in the political arena fairly; the supporters of CHP perceive the opposite. Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerci also find that affectively more polarized individuals are more likely to participate in protest movements (Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerci 2018). In a comparative study on the effects of affective polarization on democratic backsliding, McCoy and her colleagues (2018) analyze Turkey as a case. McCoy and her colleagues define a polarized society as "a society in which cross-cutting cleavages are flattened and a single boundary begins to divide societies into two camps, with political identities becoming social identities" (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 22). Hence, McCoy and her colleagues treat the rising affective polarization in Turkey as a result of the social and political divisions in Turkish society. In addition, McCoy and her colleagues emphasize the importance of the long-lasting social cleavages, such as the center-periphery cleavage, in today's

social and political struggles as well as democratic backsliding in Turkey. In another study, the relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding has been examined by Orhan (2022). According to Orhan, party identification enhances in-group affiliation and out-group hostility. Consequently, rising partisanship increases intolerance toward out-groups and leads to affective polarization. Then, negative feelings toward out-groups support partisan loyalty and increase the cost of mobility among social groups and political parties. Therefore, a voter can find herself in a position in which she cannot oppose the anti-democratic practices of politicians.

Although there has not been much research on affective polarization in Turkey, studies examining some concepts that can be alternatives to affective polarization reveal the importance of social structures and identities in Turkey. For instance, Patkos (2022) develops the partisan polarization index as an alternative to affective polarization based on party feeling thermometers. While most of the literature relies on the like-dislike score for parties in Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data, Patkos proposes to measure the partisan polarization index as the ratio of average incumbent support to average opposition support by collecting necessary information from European Social Survey (ESS) data. According to the findings of Patkos, Turkey has one of the highest partisan polarization scores in the effective sample. As another example of the alternatives to affective polarization, Ertan and her colleagues (2022) measure the mass political polarization in Turkey by using "cognitive political networks", an approach based on the cognition of inter-personal social networks. This approach analyzes the way in which individuals perceive and represent the social structures to which they belong. In the research, cognitive political networks are defined based on whether the respondent approves of potential cooperation between each pair of political parties (preference) or whether the respondent accepts that the asked pair of political parties are working together in the parliament (perception). Both perceived and preferred cognitive political networks of respondents demonstrate that individuals approve or perceive cooperative relations among parties with respect to the structural divisions in Turkey. In other words, cooperation is more acceptable between AKP and MHP, a conservative party and a Turkish nationalist party. Similarly, CHP and IYI Party are also preferred and perceived to be in cooperation as two secularist parties. Although the findings of Ertan and her colleagues can be explained in the light of social identities in Turkey, the perceived and preferred cognitive political networks reflect the existing alliances among political parties. Since AKP is working together with MHP and there is an alliance between CHP and IYI Party, the findings of Ertan and her colleagues are not surprising. However, the alliances among these parties may be a

result of social identities, which can be analyzed in a further study. Lastly, although Mete-Dokucu and Just (2022) do not analyze affective polarization, their findings also highlight the importance of social divisions in Turkey; because, according to the findings of Mete-Dokucu and Just, party system polarization in Turkey represents the differences among parties on social issues instead of economic issues.

3. THEORY

Turnout rates in Turkey are relatively higher than the average turnout rates in other regions of the world. What accounts for the high tendency of Turkish voters to go to the polls? What brings Turkish voters to the ballot box? Can the effect of social identities be one of the driving forces of voter turnout in Turkey? Does the increasing affective polarization among Turkish citizens have an influence on voter turnout? Can an individual cast a ballot because of her negative feelings toward a political party or leader? When an individual's positive and negative feelings for different parties or leaders diverge, how does this affective polarization influence the individual's probability of casting a ballot? If individuals are going to the polls because of their positive party identifications, can affective polarization influence the relationship between partisanship and turnout? In this chapter of my thesis, I provide a theoretical framework to find answers to these questions. Firstly, I start with a brief overview of Social Identity Theory which constitutes the theoretical background of my hypotheses. Secondly, I present a theoretical framework for political identities and their influences on political behavior. Then, I provide a theoretical explanation of why I expect that affective polarization increases a voter's propensity to turn out in Turkey. Lastly, I explain my hypotheses. Although the relationship between affective polarization and voter turnout has been examined recently in consolidated democracies, I make a contribution to the literature by moving the hypothesis beyond consolidated democracies. In addition, I measure affective polarization by using leader feeling thermometers apart from party feelings thermometers which are vastly used in the literature. In consolidated democracies, political parties are older and their policy and ideological positions are relatively more stable than in developing democracies. Hence, voters may develop psychological attachments toward political parties, instead of their leaders. However, in Turkish politics, leader feeling thermometers may be more appropriate to measure affective polarization since some leaders are more dominant than their political parties. Finally, I also examine whether there is an interactive relationship between party identification and affective polarization. If party identification increases an individual's propensity to turn

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out; then, I argue that the positive effect of party identification on voter turnout would be conditional on affective polarization.

3.1 Social Identity Theory

Social Identity Theory is a theory in social psychology that analyzes the interaction between the individual and social identities. The theory is designed to understand and explain the conditions in which human beings imagine themselves as individuals and as group members. In addition, Social Identity Theory also takes into account the way in which individual perceptions and group behavior are influenced by social identities. The foundations of Social Identity Theory grounds on the studies of Tajfel and his student Turner in the early 1970s (Tajfel et al. 1971; Turner 1975). Then, the theory has been developed and formulated in a later study (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Although the founding father of the theory Tajfel had described it as "positive distinctiveness theory" and never preferred the term "social identity theory" (Turner and Reynolds 2010), the literature has used the theory by the name of Social Identity Theory which is developed by Turner and Brown (1978).

According to Social Identity Theory, individuals imagine themselves as group members in society through three processes: social categorization, social comparison, and social identification. In the first process, individuals categorize the world as a division between "us" and "them". Human beings imagine themselves and others as members of certain groups, instead of individuals who have distinct characteristics. In this process, social categorization makes people feel like they belong to the social world. In the social identification stage, people internalize the identity of the group to which they belong. The identification process also creates the self-esteem of individuals which rests upon the feeling of membership. The meaning of this process is that individuals do not watch the real world as mere witnesses. Instead, the individual identity of a person and her relations with other individuals are shaped by other people and groups around her. In the last process, individuals compare the importance and social status of other groups with the group they belong to. In the social comparison stage, the individual favors her own group over other groups in order to protect the self-esteem which is created in the second stage.

The social identity of an individual is formed as a result of social categorization, social identification, and social comparison. Therefore, being a member of a certain group, developing an emotional connection with the characteristics of the group, and believing in the superiority of the group to other groups determine an individual's

social identity. This definition also differs an individual's social identity from her personal identity which ground on her individual characteristics. Being a polite or rude person can be rooted in the individual's personal identity, while the same person can have a social identity based on her occupation, gender, race, or religion. For instance, let the imaginary person A be a generous black female teacher. While the generosity of person A comes from her personal identity, the other features are formed because of her social identity. Being a black person implies that there are different races and person A is a member of one of these groups. Similarly, being a female and a teacher also indicate group membership. While personal identity influences an individual's personal attitudes, social behaviors are affected by both personal identity and social identity. Since individuals tend to favor their in-groups and dislike out-groups in the development process of social identity by comparing the importance and social status of their groups with other groups, person A may think that teachers are superior to other occupational groups. Hence, person A may develop a strong affinity with other teachers and negative feelings towards the members of other occupational groups. This effect of prejudice in favor of the group to which an individual belongs is so powerful, even though the basis for group categorization is minimum (Billig and Tajfel 1973).

In social conflict, Social Identity Theory categorizes the strategies for social status enhancement as individual mobility, social competition, and social creativity. The first one refers to the idea that an individual may improve her social status by becoming a member of a superior group, while the social status of the previous in-groups does not change. Unlike individual mobility, social competition is a group-level strategy that aims to improve the social status of the group by collaborating with members of the group. The last strategy is changing the perception of the group in the eyes of its members. In order to change this perception, members of the group may focus on new features of the group which can make the group look superior to other groups. Alternatively, members can compare their in-groups to a new inferior out-group. By describing those three strategies, Social Identity Theory demonstrates that social identity is not a fixed and given phenomenon; instead, it may change and adapt itself to new environments.

Social Identity Theory also accounts for several identity threats. For example, members of a group may feel threatened when the group to which they belong has a lower social status in society. Besides, when a person does not approve of the behavior of her in-group, she may think that her moral values do not match the moral values of the group. In addition, social identities may be threatened when group members think that their group does not significantly differ from other groups in terms of its features. Another threat is more related to the categorization process. When an

individual may be associated with more than one group, the individual may wish to reject some of these identities. In addition, an individual may be rejected by the other members of the group when she wants to identify herself as a member of the group. Individuals develop different methods to overcome those threats. For instance, they may change their perceptions of the characteristics of the groups or they recategorize the real world.

3.2 Social Identities and Political Behavior

As indicated in the literature review chapter of my thesis, Social Identity Theory has provided a theoretical background to explain the effects of social identities on political behavior in the existing literature. Partisanship and affective polarization are also examined in line with Social Identity Theory. For instance, Kelly (1988) finds that an individual's identification with a group is positively correlated with the distance between positive feelings for the in-group and negative feelings toward the out-group. Although Kelly does not use the term affective polarization, her findings can be interpreted as there is a correlation between party identification and affective polarization. In another study, Kelly (1989) finds that partisans tend to imagine the other members of their parties as relatively diverse and the members of the opposition party as relatively homogeneous and extreme. Kelly's findings also indicate that social identities influence both partisanship and interparty affection. Besides Kelly, there are various studies in the literature which consider partisanship and affective polarization as a reflection of social identities (e.g., Greene 2004; Mason 2015; Huddy and Bankert 2017; Ward and Tavits 2019). In line with the existing literature, I also examine affective polarization in Turkey by focusing on social identities which are rooted in the long-lasting social cleavages in Turkish society.

3.2.1 Social Cleavages in Turkey

Today's Turkish society has been divided by several social cleavages which directly affect individuals' social identities and their social and political behaviors. According to Kalaycıoğlu (2014), Turkish politics has been divided by religiosity and ethnicity. Kalaycıoğlu argues that the effects of these two divisions on the social and political behavior of Turkish citizens are more important than class-based and rural-urban divisions. The author also treats today's polarized society as a result of the religious-secular and the Turkish-Kurdish cleavages. On the one side of the "kulturkampf" of

Turkish politics, there is a "secular image of good society" which reflects the ideas and beliefs of individuals who imagine a good society based on science and human rationality; while the other side represents the religious individuals who develop their own "conservative image of good society" based on traditional and religious values (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). According to Kalaycıoğlu (2014), the effects of these two worldviews on political and daily life can be observed in several areas, from the vote choice of voters to the economic and social attitudes.

Today's political conflict based on religiosity and ethnicity is the result of a long historical process. Before the rising salience of these two issues, Turkish politics and society had been divided by the center-periphery cleavage which had been significant from the late Ottoman Empire to the 1970s of modern Turkey (Mardin 1969). According to Mardin, the roots of the center-periphery cleavage can be traced back to the division of Ottoman society into "askeri" and "reaya" classes. Before its modern years, Ottoman Empire was a patrimonial regime in which the Sultan monopolizes all kinds of political power. The lack of veto players such as feudal lords, aristocracy, independent religious institutions, free cities, and the bourgeoisie had also empowered the patrimonial structure of the state (Özbudun 1988). Although it is not possible to notice the modern bureaucracy in Ottoman Empire, the sultan's political affairs were made by the "askeri" class which consists of enslaved children of Christian families. The "reaya" class, on the other hand, consists of all other subjects, including all Muslims and Turks. In addition to the bureaucracy, the janissaries which was the elite group of the Ottoman army also consisted of the enslaved children of Christian families, and Muslim Turks were completely excluded from the political and military arena. This exclusion was not only about who would fill the military and bureaucratic offices, but it was shaping the political culture of the Ottoman society (Mardin 1973). The political culture of the Ottoman society had been divided into "the great culture" and "the little culture". The former is the culture of social and political elites who live in Istanbul, and are influenced by Western culture, science, and art. The latter represents the culture of rural masses who live in Anatolia or the Balkans and are maintaining the traditional Muslim lifestyle. Mardin (1973) argues that the exclusion of Muslim Turks and the sharp division between the great culture and the little culture had become more important during the modernization period. During the modernization period, with the establishment of modern educational institutions all over the country, elites had become visible outside of Istanbul and the area covered by the great culture had expanded. Hence, the division between the elites in the center and the rural masses in the periphery had become a social and political conflict.

After the modernization period of the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks and their

political descendants, the Committee of Union and Progress, became the dominant actors in the center. Abdulhamid II neutralized the bureaucracy which was established during the modernization period and established a neopatrimonial regime. The permanence of this regime would be possible with the success of the mission of connecting the center to the periphery. This mission was initially adopted by the Young Turks, but with the establishment of the second constitutional monarchy, the ties between the center and the periphery were broken again. Subsequently, the Party of Union and Progress started to follow the policy of spreading the great culture of the center throughout the periphery rather than connecting the center to the periphery.

During the War of Independence and the foundation of the republic, the social and political spheres of the country had been also shaped by the center-periphery cleavage. There were two groups in the first parliament in Ankara (Turkish Grand National Assembly). On the one hand, soldiers and bureaucrats who trained in modern education institutions constituted the centralist and secular segment. On the other hand, the second group which was representing the periphery consisted of Islamists and decentralists, who were wishing more local powers. Mardin (1973) treats the existence of these groups as an example of the sharp division in the political culture of Turkey: "the secularist-modernist-nationalist camp" versus "the traditionalist-Islamist-conservative camp". From the early years of the republic to the 1950 elections, the first camp was the dominant one and this domination has affected the future political culture of the country (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). Under the Democrat Party (DP) rule, the periphery and its values started to be more salient in the political culture of the country. From 1950 to the 1990s, the contestation between the center and the periphery continued in a relatively balanced manner, although military interventions had influenced this balance in favor of the center for short periods. During this time, the periphery had been represented by center-right parties such as the Democrat Party, and Justice Party (AP); while Republican People's Party (CHP) was the main representative of the center. Since the center-periphery had been the most important division in Turkish society, political parties have concentrated around two sides of this cleavage since the very beginning of multi-party elections. Consequently, the center-periphery cleavage has dominated the political sphere and affected the distribution of political power.

According to Mardin (1973), Turkish politics has been dramatically changed during the 1970s by the rising salience of nationalism and Islamism. The center-periphery cleavage had been replaced by the religious-secular and the Turkish-Kurdish cleavages. Consequently, political life and the competition among political parties changed during the 1970s. Although religious individuals and the secular

were concentrated on the different sides of the center-periphery division, the main issue was not religiosity for the center-periphery cleavage. Instead, religiosity was an indirect result of it. Since elites in the center had been identified by Western culture, they tended to be more secular than the rural masses in the periphery who were identified by traditional Muslim values. During the 1970s, religiosity has become an important dynamic in the political sphere and new social identities formed around it. A similar process has occurred for the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage. Since the center was more nationalist than the periphery, Turkish nationalists tended to be members of the center. Similarly, the decentralists, who were wishing more local power, and minorities were members of the periphery. Kurdish nationalists were also members of the periphery. When nationalism become a more salient issue in Turkish politics, Turkish nationalists and Kurdish minorities began to concentrate on the different sides of the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage.

Although Mardin (1973) treats the 1970s as the starting point for the rising importance of religiosity and ethnicity, Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2021) argue that the center-periphery cleavage had lost its importance since the periphery captured the center after the Second World War. According to Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu, democratization, urbanization, and industrialization had mobilized the masses and destroyed the homogeneity in the center. Consequently, the political culture of the country has also been reshaped by the increasing salience of new cleavages, such as the left-right conflict during the 1960s and 1970s or the division between the religious and the secular. In addition, Kalaycıoğlu (2014) differs from Mardin (1969) on the definition of social cleavages. While Mardin (1969) defines the center-periphery as a conflict among the powerful political elites and the powerless rural masses, Kalaycıoğlu (2014) uses Yalman's (1973) kulturkampf term which treats the social cleavages as a division between rationalist or positivist values and traditional or religious values. In today's Turkish politics, religious society as well as the Kurdish nationalists have their own powerful elites. Therefore, social cleavages do not reflect a political conflict based on power share; instead, all sides of social cleavages have their own elites and masses. Consequently, the kulturkampf thesis of Kalaycıoğlu may be more appropriate to understand today's political preferences of Turkish citizens.

In line with the arguments of Social Identity Theory, individuals in Turkey categorized Turkish society as religious and secular. Subsequently, some individuals identify themselves as members of a religious group, while others imagine themselves as seculars. Lastly, members of the religious group and the secular group favored their in-group when they compare it to the out-group. The "kulturkampf" of Turkey, which is divided by the religious-secular and the Turkish-Kurdish cleav-

ages, reflects itself in electoral politics (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). Both in elections and referenda, voters determine their vote choices based on their social group identities (Kalaycıoğlu 2012; Çarkoğlu 2012; Kalaycioglu 2013; Aytaç, Çarkoğlu, and Yıldırım 2017). Individuals who come from religious, secular, and traditional backgrounds are more likely to identify themselves with conservative parties since they belong to the religious-conservative side of "the kulturkampf" of Turkey. Therefore, partisans of the Democrat Party (DP), Justice Party (AP), Welfare Party (RP), Justice and Development Party (AKP) along with other conservative parties develop their party affiliations in their childhoods by socializing in religious and conservative families and neighborhoods. Similarly, political parties which represent the secular good image of society find partisans from secular segments of Turkish society who develop their social identities in secular families and social circles. Therefore, socialization in a secular environment leads individuals to identify themselves with Republican People's Party (CHP) or Democratic Left Party (DSP). The Turkish-Kurdish cleavage also produces similar results to the partisans of Turkish nationalist parties (e.g., Nationalist Movement Party, MHP) and Kurdish nationalist parties (e.g., People's Democratic Party, HDP). Once a voter becomes a partisan of a certain political party, the psychological link between the voter and the party affects the individual's perceptions of the political environment. Partisans can develop more decisive voting preferences, even though they do not understand the political reality (Aytaç, Çarkoğlu, and Yıldırım 2017). Partisans are also more likely to go to the polls than nonpartisans (Ward and Tavits 2019). Social identities not only produce in-group affiliation but also generate negative feelings toward the out-groups. Therefore, the religious-secular and Turkish-Kurdish divisions have produced both positive affiliations to certain parties and negative feelings toward others. As in the explanations of Social Identity Theory, voters from religious groups develop positive feelings toward religious-conservative-rightist parties and antagonism toward secular and left-wing parties. Conversely, secular voters positively identify themselves with secular or left-wing parties, while they dislike religious-conservative-rightist parties. The extent to which individuals have positive and negative feelings toward different parties provide affective polarization in Turkey. As the issues which lead to divisions in the society between the religious and the secular as well as Turkish nationalists and Kurdish nationalists become more salient, affective polarization increases.

Partisanship develops during one's early childhood under the influence of parental socialization and strengthens during the lifetime by repeated voting for the identified party (Converse 1969). Hence, party identification needs older parties that have relatively stable ideological and policy positions. Consequently, it can be argued that partisanship in Turkey is not strong because most of the parties in Turkey

are relatively young, they do not have institutional continuity because they were closed by military interventions, and they are also frequently divided by intra-party struggles. However, the grassroots of political parties in Turkey are the reflections of long-lasting social cleavages (Mardin 1973; Kalaycioğlu 1994; Çarkoğlu 2012) and Turkish parties differ from political parties in the Western countries which generally represent economic, class-based cleavages. Even though the institutional continuity of the parties was interrupted several times, new parties were opened to replace the closed parties and these new parties continued to find partisans by maintaining the positions of preceding parties on social cleavages (Kalaycıoğlu 2012; Aytaç, Çarkoğlu, and Yıldırım 2017). Therefore, a partisan of a political party may develop her partisan attachment to the party from her parent who had attached themselves to the ancestor of today's party. For example, Justice Party (AP) was the successor of the Democrat Party (DP) which had been closed in the 1960 military coup. In the aftermath of the military intervention, AP gained its grassroots and partisans by maintaining the position of DP on the center-periphery cleavage, although AP differs from DP with respect to its logo and administrative staff. Therefore, the psychological attachment of parents to DP can pass to their children as partisan affiliation to AP. In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, all political parties were closed, and the executives of parties were banned from politics for five or ten years by the military regime. In 1983, the military regimes allowed the introduction of new parties. The True Path Party (DYP) was founded as a continuation of AP with its new leader and executive staff, but could not participate in the 1983 elections because of the disapproval of the military regime. At the same time, Motherland Party (ANAP) was established as a new party that maintains a position close to DP and AP. Although the former leader of AP, Süleyman Demirel, joined DYP after the 1987 referendum, which removed the political bans, ANAP continued to be a strong political party that represents the conservative segments of the society. Hence, during the 1980s and 1990s, the former partisans of DP and AP had two options to identify themselves. Another example is the Republican People's Party (CHP) which has been closed in the 1980 military intervention like all political parties. Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) and Democratic Left Party (DSP), which were established during the 1980s, operated as the successors of the CHP, and the pre-1980 supporters of CHP became supporters of SHP (renamed in 1992 as CHP) and DSP. On the religious-secular cleavage, the first Islamist party National Order Party (MNP, 1970-1971) was succeeded by National Salvation Party (MSP, 1972-1981), Welfare Party (RP, 1983-1998), Virtue Party (FP, 1997-2001), and Felicity Party (SP, since 2001). On the other hand, on the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage, the first Turkish nationalist party Republican Peasants' Nation Party (CKMP, 1958-1969)

was succeeded by Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, since 1969[1]) and IYI Party[2] (since 2017). Kurdish side of the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage consists of these parties: Democracy Party (DEP, 1991-1994), People's Democracy Party (HEDAP, 1994-2003), Democratic People's Party (DEHAP, 1997-2005), Democratic Society Party (DTP, 2005-2009), Peace and Democracy Party (BDP, 2008-2014), and the People's Democratic Party (HDP, since 2012). Lastly, today's Justice and Development Party (AKP) can be seen as the successor of both Islamist parties, such as MNP, MSP, and RP, and the parties of the periphery, such as DP, AP, ANAP, and DYP.

3.3 Affective Polarization and Voter Turnout in Turkey

Table 3.1 Average Voter Turnout Around the World from 1950 to 2015

	Average Voter Turnout
Eastern Europe and post-communist Countries	63.97
Latin America	70.32
North Africa and the Middle East	77.11
Sub–Saharan Africa	67.19
Western Europe and North America	79.41
Eastern Asia	68.13
South–Eastern Asia	70.76
Southern Asia	64.38
The Pacific	68.24
The Caribbean	63.99
All Countries	72.29
Turkey	81.43

Turnout rates have always been relatively high in Turkey. In the 2018 general elections [3], which was the last general election in Turkey, the voter turnout was 86.24 percent. The average turnout rate of all general elections in Turkey from 1950 to 2018, including the 2014 presidential elections, is 81.35 percent. When we include local elections and referenda, the average turnout rate decreases to 80.92

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[1]MHP was closed in 1981 by the military regime. The successor party operated under the name of Nationalist Task Party (MÇP) from 1983 to 1992. Then, the party was renamed as MHP in 1992.

[2]IYI Party, which maintains a secular and Turkish nationalist position, was established in 2017 by a group that left MHP.

[3]The presidential and legislative elections were conducted concurrently in 2018

percent. Table 3.1 demonstrates the average turnout rates of all legislative and presidential elections around the world from 1950 to 2015 [4]. Table A.1 in the appendix presents a detailed list of turnout rates in Turkey, including all local, legislative, and presidential elections as well as referenda from 1950 to 2019. The average turnout of all countries is 72.29 percent. The maximum value of average turnout rates among regions (79.41 percent) is seen in Western Europe and North America which mostly consist of established democracies. The average turnout rate in Turkey is above all regions as well as the global average. In other words, in general elections, the mean Turkish voter's propensity to turn out is higher than the mean voters in other regions. Why are voters in Turkey more likely to participate in elections than voters in other regions? What are the determinants of high levels of voter turnout in Turkey? Can affective polarization be an explanation for the high turnout in Turkey? Although the hypothesis that voter turnout will be high in countries where individuals are affectively polarized requires an aggregate level cross-national analysis, I focus on the question of why some voters in Turkey go to the polls while others do not. Can affective polarization be an important determinant of the decision to vote or not to vote in Turkey?

Affective polarization, which is defined as the extent to which voters develop positive and negative feelings toward political parties, is an important determinant of political behavior (Wagner 2021). Affective polarization leads voters to perceive electoral competition among political parties as a more intense and high-stake conflict (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). As a political behavior, the decision to cast a ballot is also influenced by affective polarization (Greene 1999; Ward and Tavits 2019; Wagner 2021). The political culture in Turkey is shaped by long-lasting social cleavages such as the center-periphery cleavage, the religious-secular cleavage, and the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage. As Social Identity Theory explains, individuals in Turkey develop their social identities under the influence of these social divisions. Once an individual identifies herself as a member of a social group, she starts to have more positive feelings toward her in-group and more negative feelings toward the out-group. Group identities reflect themselves in the political sphere as positive and negative psychological associations between voters and political parties. Consequently, as the positive and negative feelings of an individual toward political

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[4]Turnout rates are obtained from V-Dem data. Elections are included in the average turnout calculation when the binary democracy variable is coded as 1 for the election year, in order to exclude elections that are neither free nor fair from the sample. The binary democracy variable in V-Dem data is taken from Boix and his colleagues' dataset of political regimes (2018). Boix and his colleagues code a country as a democracy, when the political leader is chosen through free and fair elections and a minimal level of suffrage. Since both the electoral process and the election results are highly manipulated in dictatorships, turnout information could be misleading in antidemocratic settings. Because the binary democracy variable is available until 2015, elections after 2015 are not included in the calculation. In order to compare Turkey to other regions, I include elections after 1950 which is the first year of multi-party politics in Turkey. Turnout rates are corrected for Turkey in 1950, 1977, 2011, and 2015 since V-Dem data differ from the reports of the Supreme Election Council in Turkey (YSK).

parties diverge, the individual becomes affectively polarized. She begins to perceive the success of her liked party as vital for her interests and, even, for her existence; while the success of the out-party is perceived as an existential threat. Consequently, as the affective polarization of a voter increases, she perceives casting a ballot as a more important action in order to support her liked party or prevent the success of the disliked party. Therefore, I theoretically expect that affective polarization increases a voter's propensity to vote. I thus hypothesize that:

H_1: Affectively more polarized voters are more likely to turn out than affectively less polarized voters.

As explained in the literature review chapter of my thesis, the decision to turn out can be affected by several factors. For example, party identification is one of the most emphasized explanations for turnout in the literature. Therefore, I include a binary variable which is coded as 1 when the individual identifies herself as close to any political party. I also control for the effect of perceived party polarization, since it is examined in the literature (e.g., Moral 2017; Wagner 2021). Perceived ideological polarization is measured in the literature as the extent to which individuals' perceptions of the ideological positions of the parties diverge from each other (e.g., Dalton 2008). The ideological extremity of voters may also affect their decisions to vote. However, if a voter places herself at the extremes of the left-right scale, she may not go to the polls by feeling excluded from the political system. In addition, voting may be considered meaningless by the voter if she supports a party that is at an extreme point of the left-right scale but cannot exceed the electoral threshold. Hence, the level of ideological extremity may matter. When I control for the effect of ideological extremity on turnout, I also analyze its marginal effect. In addition, I include certain socioeconomic and demographic conditions as control variables in my model, since socioeconomic factors are also treated as important determinants of voter turnout in the literature (see Rokkan et al. 1970 for the effect of education). Although electoral institutions are considered as explanations for voter turnout (e.g., Powell 1986; Jackman 1987, these institutions are the same for all voters in Turkey. Hence, I do not control for the effects of electoral institutions in my model.

The model specification for H_1 is as follows:

Voter Turnout = β_0 + β_1(Affective Polarization) + β_2(Party Identification) + β_3(Perceived Ideological Polarization) + β_4(Ideological Extremity) + β_5(Gender) + β_6 (Age) + β_7(Education) + β_8(Rural/Urban) + e

Abramowitz and Stone (2006) explain the high turnout in the 2004 presidential elections in the U.S. by the "Bush effect". According to the authors, those who

hate George W. Bush went to the polls to avoid his electoral victory. Similar to Abramowitz and Stone, I expect that individuals are going to the polls not only because of their positive party identifications but also their negative feelings toward certain parties or leaders in Turkey. Although positive partisanship and negative party identification are regarded as distinct determinants of political behavior in the literature (Bankert 2021; Iyengar and Westwood 2015), I examine whether there is an interactive relationship between positive party identification and affective polarization. An individual may go to the polls because of her strong affiliation to a political party but this effect of partisanship on the decision to turn out can be mediated by affective polarization. For example, I expect that the propensity of a CHP partisan to turn out does not depend only on her strong affiliation to CHP but also on her negative feelings toward AKP or its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Similarly, an AKP partisan may go to the polls because of her strong affiliation to AKP, but her partisanship would not create a motivation to turn out when she does not have strong negative feelings toward CHP or its leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Therefore, I expect that the positive effect of party identification on turnout would be mediated by the extent to which an individual's positive and negative feelings toward parties or leaders diverge. In other words, I expect that as affective polarization increases, the positive effect of party identification on turnout increases. On the other hand, if an individual positively identifies herself with a political party without having strong negative feelings toward other parties, her party identification would not drive her to go to the polls. Hence, my second hypothesis is that:

H_2: The positive effect of party identification on a voter's probability of turn out increases as her affective polarization increases.

The second model specification is as follows:

Voter Turnout $= \beta_0 + \beta_1$(Party Identification $\times$ Affective Polarization) $+ \beta_2$(Party Identification) $+ \beta_3$(Affective Polarization) $+ \beta_4$(Perceived Ideological Polarization) $+ \beta_5$(Ideological Extremity) $+ \beta_6$(Gender) $+ \beta_7$ (Age) $+ \beta_8$(Education) $+ \beta_8$(Rural/Urban) $+ e$

4.   RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter of my thesis, I present my research design, employed data, and the operationalization of dependent and independent variables. Even though it is possible to analyze the link between affective polarization and voter turnout at the aggregate level, my unit of analysis is the individual. Since I focus on Turkey in my thesis, I employ Modules 3 to 5 of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data which include questions for party feeling thermometers and turnout along with useful information about both respondents and the political context. The effective sample consists of 3-post election surveys that were conducted in 2011, 2015, and 2018.

The dependent variable is turnout which is a binary variable that scores 0 for respondents who did not cast a ballot in the current election and 1 for those who did. Since Turkey had operated under the parliamentary system before 2017, I use the lower house election turnout variable in Module 3 of CSES data for the 2011 elections and Module 4 of CSES data for the 2015 elections [1]. Although Turkey switched to the presidential system with the 2017 referendum, presidential and parliamentary elections were held concurrently in 2018. Therefore, I use again the lower house election turnout variable of Module 5 of CSES data, which provides the same information as the presidential election turnout variable.

My independent variable is affective polarization which does not have a single agreed method to measure in the literature, since it is a relatively new concept. Instead, there are several approaches that have been used. For instance, Iyengar and his colleagues (2012) propose to measure affective polarization by focusing on the negative feelings of an individual about a marriage between her child and an out-party supporter. In addition, the authors also consider stereotypes about party supporters. As an alternative method; using implicit behavioral indicators in an experimental

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[1] In 2015, two general elections were held. Since none of the political parties won the parliamentary majority in the June 2015 elections, the cabinet could not be formed in the aftermath of the election. Then, a new legislative election was held in November 2015. Since the CSES survey was conducted before the November 2015 elections, my effective sample covers only the June 2015 elections.

design, Iyengar and Westwood (2015) develop an indirect measurement of affective polarization. On the other hand, using survey questions on individuals' like-dislike scores for political parties, which are also known as feeling thermometer questions, has mostly been used in the literature for the measurement of affective polarization (e.g., Rogowski and Sutherland 2016; Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2018; Ward and Tavits 2019; Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2021;). Despite the widespread use of this measurement, there are some critiques in the literature. For instance, Druckman and Levendusky (2019) criticize this measurement by asserting that like-dislike scores represent only general attitudes about parties and do not represent all meanings of affective polarization. The authors also add that affective polarization is based on identities, while party feeling thermometers focus on feelings towards parties and do not capture individuals' like and dislike feelings towards party supporters. Another critique is about the lack of differential item functioning in like-dislike scores. Wilcox and his colleagues (1989) argue that some respondents may attribute more positive scores to all parties while others may express their feelings over a wider range. Finally, like-dislike scores do not present a clear clue about whether the respondent likes or dislikes a particular party because of its policies or the represented identity (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Despite these criticisms, Wagner denotes that "these shortcomings should not prevent us from examining affective polarization using like-dislike scores" (Wagner 2021, 3), because other measurements of affective polarization are highly correlated with party feeling thermometers and the best advantage of like-dislike scores is their wide availability (Wagner 2021).

In the American two-party system, measuring affective polarization based on the party feeling thermometer is quite simple. Since there are only two parties that have equal importance with regard to their vote share, the absolute value of the difference between one's like-dislike scores about two parties gives affective polarization. However, measuring affective polarization in multi-party systems is more complex than in two-party systems and requires a different methodology. Wagner (2021) argues that affective polarization should be measured as the spread of like and dislike scores because this method takes into account the possibility that an individual can have positive and negative feelings towards multiple parties which exists in multi-party systems.

In order to test my hypotheses, I use Wagner's (2021) calculations of affective polarization which are the most suitable measurements for my research question. Firstly, I calculate affective polarization as the unweighted spread of like-dislike scores of each respondent in the effective sample as "the average absolute party like-dislike difference relative to each respondent's average party like-dislike score" (Wagner 2021, 4). I consider only major legislative parties in my thesis. Major legislative parties in

the effective sample are Justice and Development Party (AKP), Republican People's Party (CHP), Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), and Good Party (IYI Party). Since IYI Party is founded in 2017, the data for IYI Party are available only in the 2018 elections. Since Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is the predecessor of today's HDP, I consider BDP as HDP in the 2011 elections. BDP participated in the 2011 elections as an alliance of independent candidates under the name of the Labor, Democracy, and Freedom Bloc, instead of running as a party because of the high electoral threshold in Turkey. Hence, I assume the vote share of the bloc as the vote share of BDP in the 2011 elections. Today, in addition to these five parties, there are several minor parties in the parliament, but these minor parties were either established after the 2018 elections or entered the parliament with the support of major parties. Because of the lack of available data, I do not include these minor parties in my effective sample. The calculation of unweighted affective polarization is as follows:

$$\text{Affective Polarization (Unweighted Spread)}_i = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{p=1}^{P}(like_{ip} - \overline{like_i})^2}{n_p}} \qquad (4.1)$$

Where, p is the party, i the individual respondent, $like_{ip}$ the like-dislike score assigned to each party p by individual i, and n_p is the number of parties. Like Wagner (2021), I also calculate the weighted version of affective polarization to account for the differences among feelings towards smaller and larger parties. The weighted version is calculated as:

$$\text{Affective Polarization (Weighted Spread)}_i = \sqrt{\sum_{p=1}^{P} v_p (like_{ip} - \overline{like_i})^2} \qquad (4.2)$$

Where, v_p is the vote share of each party, rescaled from 0 to 1. The mean affect should also be weighted by party size and is calculated as:

$$\overline{like_i} = \sum_{p=1}^{P} (v_p * like_{ip}) \qquad (4.3)$$

Both in weighted and unweighted versions, respondents who provide a like-dislike score of at least two parties are included in calculations. In addition to the spread measures, I also calculate affective polarization as the distance between the most liked party and the most disliked party. Although this method is more appropriate

for two-party systems, Wagner (2021) argues that affective polarization should be calculated in multi-party systems by assuming that the political arena is divided into two distinct camps. Since social cleavages in Turkey divide Turkish society into distinct camps, the distance measurement of affective polarization may help us to capture the affective distance between the religious and secular voters as well as Turkish nationalists and Kurdish nationalists. The distance between the most liked and the most disliked party (Max-Min) is calculated as:

$$\text{Affective Polarization (Max-Min)}_i = (like_{max} - like_{min}) \qquad (4.4)$$

The spread and the Max-Min measures are my main independent variables. However, I also test my hypotheses by using the mean-distance measure of affective polarization which is used by Wagner (2021). Since Wagner argues that the spread measure is superior to the mean-distance measure, I use the latter as an alternative method, instead of using it as the main independent variable. The regression results for the mean-distance measure are also provided in Appendix B. Since two or more parties can take the maximum like score in the party feeling thermometer of an individual, I use the question of "which party do you feel closest to" variable of CSES data in order to determine the most liked party of an individual. The mean-distance measure of affective polarization is calculated as:

$$\text{Affective Polarization (Distance)}_i = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{p=1}^{P}(like_{ip} - like_{max,i})^2}{n_p - 1}} \qquad (4.5)$$

I test my hypotheses with distinct models for each measurement. For party like-dislike questions, "have not heard of the party", "refused", and "do not know" answers are treated as missing values in my thesis. Nonmissing values of the party like-dislike variable are distributed from 0 which represents strong dislike to 10 which reflects strong like. Although affective polarization is measured by using like-dislike scores for political parties, positive and negative feelings toward party leaders may be an alternative measurement of affective polarization. In Turkey, party discipline has always been high and party leaders are the prominent actors in the political sphere. Due to the fact that positive and negative feelings of voters towards leaders might be more meaningful than feelings towards parties, I replicate all computation processes by replacing party like-dislike scores with leader like-dislike scores which are also available in CSES data. Affective polarization measures based on leader feeling thermometers are also used in distinct models. The spread measures of affective polarization take values from 0 to 5, while the Max-Min measures of affective

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polarization take values from 0 to 10.

As discussed in the theoretical overview chapter of my thesis, voter turnout may be affected by some alternative variables. For example, party identification has been treated as an explanatory variable for voter turnout. Although some scholars argue that identification with a political party may cultivate negative feelings toward other parties by changing perceptions about the differences between parties or leading to biased interpretation of information (e.g., Greene 1999), I do not analyze the origins of affective polarization and take both variables as distinct, in my thesis. I include party identification as a control variable in my models to account for the effect of partisanship on voter turnout. Since it is the most preferred measurement of partisanship in the literature, I also use the standard question in CSES data: "Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?" Therefore, party identification is a binary variable that is recoded as 1 for respondents who answer the question as "yes" and 0 for those who say "no". "Refused" and "do not know" responses are recoded as missing values in my thesis. The mean value of the party identification variable is 0.76 in the effective sample. In other words, 76 percent of respondents in the effective sample have reported partisanship toward a political party.

In addition to partisanship, the effect of ideological polarization on voter turnout is also examined in the literature (e.g., Moral 2017; Wagner 2021). Hence, to account for the effect of ideological polarization on turnout, I include it in my model as a control variable. As discussed in the theoretical overview chapter of my thesis, ideological polarization is strongly related to affective polarization, however, this relationship is not perfect (Wagner 2021). I operationalize ideological polarization using Wagner's method which measure (weighted) ideological polarization using a 0–10 left-right scale. The formal representation of the calculation is:

$$\text{Perceived Ideological Polarization}_i = \sqrt{\sum_{p=1}^{P} v_p (position_{ip} - \overline{position_i})^2} \qquad (4.6)$$

Where position is the perceived left-right position of parties. The mean position is also weighted by the vote-share of parties, and it is calculated as:

$$\overline{position}_i = \sum_{p=1}^{P} (v_p * position_{ip}) \qquad (4.7)$$

In addition to partisanship and ideological polarization, I control for the effect of ideological extremity due to the fact that extreme leftist or rightist individuals may

tend to be more engaged in politics and their probability of turnout may be higher. However, if a voter places herself at the extremes of the left-right scale, she may not go to the polls by feeling excluded from the political system. In addition, voting may be considered meaningless by the voter if she supports a party that is at an extreme point of the left-right scale but cannot exceed the electoral threshold. Hence, the level of ideological extremity may matter. When I control for the effect of ideological extremity on turnout, I also analyze its marginal effect. The ideological extremity variable is measured in my thesis as the absolute difference between a respondent's self-position on the left-right spectrum and the neutral point of this scale, which is 5 in the modules of CSES data. Although political sophistication may affect individuals' propensity to turn out, the political knowledge variable is available for Turkey only in Module 4 of CSES data. In order to avoid decreasing the number of observations in the effective sample, I include the political knowledge variable only in alternative models in Appendix B. The political knowledge variable is calculated as the sum of correct answers to political information questions in CSES data.

Finally, I control for the effect of certain socioeconomic variables on voter turnout by including age, education, gender, and residence (rural/urban) variables, as control variables in my models. Although religiosity is an important socioeconomic variable that can affect voter turnout, Module 5 of CSES data does not cover the ordinal (perceived) religiosity variable which is included in Module 3 and Module 4. An alternative measurement of religiosity may be the religious service attendance variable, however, the highest value of the religious service attendance variable is "once a week/more than once a week". In Turkey and other Muslim societies, praying once a week and praying five times a day do not show the same levels of religiosity, while they are considered as the same in the religious service attendance variable. Yet, I include both the perceived religiosity variable and the religious service attendance variable in alternative models in Appendix B. The descriptive statistics of the dependent, explanatory and control variables are demonstrated in Table 4.1. The mean and the standard deviation of the dependent variable are 0.94 and 0.24 in the effective sample, respectively. In models in which party feeling thermometers are used, there are 2564 observations in the effective sample. When I use leader feeling thermometers, the number of observations is 2565 since leader feeling thermometers have more non-missing observations in the effective sample. Table 4.2 presents the correlation coefficients for each pair of independent variables for 2560 listwise observations. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Turnout	0.94	0.24	0.00	1.00	2564
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	3.17	1.06	0.00	5.00	2564
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party	3.16	1.18	0.00	4.93	2564
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party	7.76	2.45	0.00	10.00	2564
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader	3.11	1.12	0.00	5.00	2565
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader	3.11	1.25	0.00	4.93	2565
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader	7.57	2.61	0.00	10.00	2565
Party Identification	0.76	0.43	0.00	1.00	2564
Perceived Ideological Polarization	3.22	0.96	0.00	4.94	2564
Ideological Extremity	2.68	1.77	0.00	5.00	2564
Age	39.97	15.21	18.00	90.00	2564
Education	2.03	1.20	0.00	4.00	2564
Gender	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00	2564
Rural/Urban	1.88	1.09	0.00	3.00	2564
Perceived Religiosity	2.19	0.70	0.00	3.00	1596
Religious Service Attendance	3.63	1.83	0.00	5.00	2402
Political Knowledge	1.98	1.00	0.00	4.00	909

Table 4.2 Cross-correlation Table of Independent Variables

	Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) Party	Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) Party	Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) Party	Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) Leader	Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) Leader	Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) Leader
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	1.00					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party	0.93***	1.00				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party	0.98***	0.89***	1.00			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader	0.78***	0.74***	0.75***	1.00		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader	0.73***	0.81***	0.70***	0.93***	1.00	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader	0.75***	0.71***	0.76***	0.97***	0.90***	1.00

*$p<0.1$, **$p<0.05$, ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed tests. Listwise number of observations is 2560.

5.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSES AND FINDINGS

In this chapter of my thesis, I provide empirical analyses and findings. Since my dependent variable, voter turnout, is a binary variable, I employ a logistic regression for each measure of affective polarization in order to test my first hypothesis. The regression estimates with robust standard errors are reported in Table 5.1. In the first three models in Table 5.1, the spread and the Max-Min measures of affective polarization are calculated by using party feeling thermometers. In Models 4 to 6 in Table 5.1, leader feeling thermometers are used to measure affective polarization. Alternative models in Table B.2 in the appendix present regression estimates on the mean-distance measures of affective polarization which are explained in the research design chapter. Figure 5.1 also illustrates the predicted probabilities of voter turnout for different values of affective polarization along with confidence intervals at the 95 percent level. Figure 5.2 also demonstrates the marginal effect of affective polarization on voter turnout for varying levels of affective polarization as well as the 95 percent level confidence intervals around the marginal effects.

According to the findings, affective polarization has a statistically significant positive effect on voter turnout in Turkey. The coefficients on all measures of affective polarization are positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. Model 1 in Table 5.1 gives the highest coefficient on affective polarization. According to the findings in Model 1, a one-unit increase in affective polarization (the unweighted spread of party like-dislike scores) increases the logged odds of voter turnout, on average, by .373 at the 99 percent confidence level, when other variables in the model are held constant. Table 5.1 also presents the log likelihood, AIC, and BIC values for all models. Model 3 which regresses voter turnout on the Max-Min measure of affective polarization provides the highest log likelihood value (-519.197) as well as the lowest AIC (1057) and BIC (1110) values. Therefore, Model 3 offers a better fit to the data than other models. I also present the predicted probabilities of voter turnout for different values of affective polarization in Figure 5.1. Predicted probabilities provide the probability of turnout for a certain level of

Table 5.1 The Effect of Affective Polarization on Voter Turnout

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.373*** (0.080)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.337*** (0.080)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.172*** (0.031)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.265*** (0.077)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.200*** (0.074)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.119*** (0.030)
Party Identification	0.918*** (0.179)	0.920*** (0.175)	0.874*** (0.182)	1.035*** (0.180)	1.075*** (0.178)	1.018*** (0.182)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	-0.190* (0.100)	-0.193* (0.099)	-0.188* (0.098)	-0.185* (0.101)	-0.180* (0.101)	-0.182* (0.100)
Ideological Extremity	0.017 (0.049)	0.017 (0.048)	0.016 (0.049)	0.033 (0.049)	0.038 (0.049)	0.031 (0.049)
Age	0.040*** (0.009)	0.038*** (0.009)	0.040*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.009)	0.037*** (0.009)
Education	0.120 (0.078)	0.111 (0.077)	0.121 (0.079)	0.115 (0.079)	0.104 (0.078)	0.114 (0.079)
Gender	0.039 (0.172)	0.016 (0.171)	0.035 (0.172)	0.051 (0.171)	0.042 (0.170)	0.045 (0.171)
Rural/Urban	-0.021 (0.087)	-0.018 (0.086)	-0.025 (0.088)	-0.025 (0.086)	-0.028 (0.086)	-0.024 (0.086)
Constant	-0.025 (0.563)	0.180 (0.555)	-0.158 (0.565)	0.284 (0.558)	0.486 (0.553)	0.211 (0.562)
Log likelihood	-521.855	-522.980	-519.465	-529.197	-531.264	-528.211
AIC	1062	1064	1057	1076	1081	1074
BIC	1114	1117	1110	1129	1133	1127
N	2564	2564	2564	2565	2565	2565

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

affective polarization when other variables in the model remain constant at their representative moments (e.g., the mean for continuous variables and the median for categorical and binary variables). Predicted probabilities and the 95 percent level confidence intervals around them demonstrate that as affective polarization increases the probability of voting increases significantly since the confidence intervals are distinguishable from zero. In other words, a voter's probability of voting increases when her affective polarization increases. Moreover, all graphs in Figure 5.1, except for the bottom-middle graph, demonstrate that confidence intervals are distinguishable from each other for the higher and lower values of affective polarization, although they are indistinguishable from each other for moderate levels of affective polarization. On the other hand, the three graphs at the bottom of Figure 5.1 illustrates a less powerful effect of affective polarization on voter turnout. For

Figure 5.1 Predicted Probability of Voter Turnout

Predicted Probabilities

Figure 5.2 Marginal Effect of Affective Polarization on Voter Turnout

Marginal Effects of Affective Polarization on Turnout

instance, none of the confidence intervals in the bottom-middle graph of Figure 5.1 are distinguishable from each other. Therefore, the measure of affective polarization based on party feeling thermometers are better predictors of voter turnout in Turkey than the measures based on leader feeling thermometers. In addition, Figure 5.2 illustrates the marginal effects of affective polarization on voter turnout for varying levels of affective polarization and the 95 percent level confidence intervals around the marginal effects. All graphs in Figure 5.2 show that the marginal effects of affective polarization on voter turnout are positive and statistically significant when affective polarization is high. On the other hand, lower values of affective polarization also produce positive and statistically significant marginal effects on voter turnout, except for the bottom-left and the bottom-middle graphs in Figure 5.1. Therefore, the marginal effect graphs also provide empirical evidence for my first hypothesis. In addition to these graphs, Figure B.1 in the appendix also illustrates the predicted probabilities of voter turnout for varying levels of affective polarization by splitting the sample into partisans and non-partisans. All graphs in Figure B.1 demonstrate that the predicted probabilities of turnout are higher for partisans than non-partisans for all levels of affective polarization. In addition, the predicted probabilities of voter turnout are increasing when affective polarization increases for both partisans and non-partisans. Figure B.2 in the appendix also illustrates the marginal effect of affective polarization on voter turnout for both partisans and non-partisans. All graphs in Figure B.2 present that the marginal effect of affective polarization on voter turnout are statistically significant and positive for both partisans and non-partisans. On the other hand, the coefficients on the mean-distance measures of affective polarization in alternative models in Table B.5 in the appendix are not statistically significant.

Although the empirical findings reject the null hypothesis, the substantive significance of affective polarization on voter turnout in Turkey is questionable. In other words, my first hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence; however, this statistical significance does not have to signal a substantive significance. The graphs in Figure 5.1 show that voters' probability of voting is not low when they are affectively less polarized. The minimum boundaries of the confidence intervals for the least polarized individuals are about .85 and .90 for all measures of affective polarization. Therefore, a voter who has the same affection towards all parties will go to the polls with at least 85 percent probability, at the 95 percent confidence level. This may be a result of the low variation in my dependent variable, voter turnout. Since most of the respondents in the effective sample reported electoral participation, the number of individuals who did not vote is very low. For instance, 94 percent of all respondents report electoral participation in the effective sample of Model 1. This lower

variation is not surprising since I presented the average turnout rate in Turkey in the theory chapter of my thesis. Hence, in a representative sample of Turkey, the ratio of the respondents who report electoral participation to those who did not vote must be high. However, this low variation in the dependent variable should not disable researchers to analyze the roots of turnout in Turkey since it is a political preference and behavior, rather than a fixed phenomenon.

The coefficients on the party identification variable are positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in all models in Table 5.1. Party identification is one of the most prominent explanations of voter turnout in the literature. The empirical findings in my models also provide empirical evidence for a positive and statistically significant relationship between partisanship and voter turnout. The logged odds on perceived ideological (party) polarization indicate a negative relationship between ideological polarization and voter turnout; however, coefficients are statistically significant only at the 90 percent level. Among other control variables, only the age variable has a statistically significant effect on voter turnout according to the empirical findings. In addition to gender and education, I also control for the effect of ideological extremity. As discussed in the previous chapters, I consider that the level of ideological extremity may lead to different effects on voter turnout. Hence, in order to account for the effect of ideological extremity on voter turnout, I present the marginal effects of varying levels of ideological extremity on voter turnout in Figure B.3 in Appendix B. According to all graphs in Figure B.3, ideological extremity does not have a statistically significant effect on voter turnout since the 95 level confidence intervals around the marginal effects are not distinguishable from zero. Table B.1 in the appendix also presents the coefficients on the squared version of the ideological extremity variable. Figure B.4 also illustrates the marginal effect of ideological extremity on voter turnout for the squared version of the ideological extremity. Both Table B.1 and Figure B.4 present that ideological extremity does not have a statistically significant effect on voter turnout. Among socioeconomic and demographic variables, only the coefficients on the age variable present statistical significance. According to the findings in Table 5.1, the coefficients on age are positive and significant at the 99 percent confidence level. Hence, empirical findings show that as an individual gets older, her probability to vote increases. In the alternative models in Table B.3 in the appendix, I also include the squared version of the age variable. The coefficients on the squared version of the age variable are also statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level but the logged odds are negative. As discussed in the research design chapter, I include political knowledge and religiosity variables in alternative models because of the lack of available data. Table B.5 and Table B.7 present that neither perceived religiosity

nor religious service attendance has a statistically significant effect on voter turnout in models for my first hypothesis. On the other hand, political knowledge has a positive effect on voter turnout according to the findings in Table B.9 in the appendix. The coefficient on political knowledge is statistically significant at the 95 percent level in Model 5 in Table B.9, while the coefficients in other models are statistically significant at the 90 percent level. However, the political knowledge questions are available only in Module 4 of CSES data. Hence, the number of observations is only 909 in these models which include the political knowledge variable.

In my second hypothesis, I expect that the positive effect of party identification is conditional on increasing values of affective polarization. In other words, when the affective polarization of a voter is low, partisanship would not drive the voter to go to the polls. Moreover, I expect that partisanship increases an individual's propensity to turnout as her affective polarization increases. The regression estimates from models for my second hypothesis are presented in Table 5.2. The first three models in Table 5.2 provide estimates from models in which affective polarization is calculated based on party feelings thermometers, while leader feeling thermometers are used in the last three models in Table 5.2. As in Table 5.1, Model 3 in Table 5.2 offers a better fit to the data than other models since it presents the highest log likelihood value as well as the lowest AIC and BIC values. The coefficients on the constitutive term of party identification are positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in all models. In other words, the unconditional effect of partisanship on voter turnout is distinguishable from zero at the 99 percent confidence level. On the other hand, the coefficients on the constitutive terms of affective polarization are also positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in all models. However, the coefficients on the interaction term of party identification and affective polarization are negative in all models. The coefficient on the interaction term is statistically significant at the 99 percent level in Model 2, at the 95 percent level in Model 1, and at the 90 percent level in Model 5; while the coefficients on the interaction term are not statistically significant in other models. Therefore, I fail to reject the null of my second hypothesis based on the findings in Table 5.2. Moreover, some models present that the positive effect of party identification on voter turnout decreases when affective polarization increases, while I expected the opposite in my second hypothesis.

Figure 5.3 presents the marginal effects of party identification on voter turnout, conditional on affective polarization. Figure 5.3 also illustrates the 95 percent level confidence intervals around the marginal effects. The marginal effects and confidence intervals are calculated by allowing the affective polarization variable to vary within its in-sample range (from 0 to 5 for the spread measure and from 0 to 10

Table 5.2 The Effect of Party Identification on Voter Turnout

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Identification	1.893***	2.137***	1.586***	1.587***	1.726***	1.351***
	(0.529)	(0.492)	(0.501)	(0.483)	(0.444)	(0.464)
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.524***					
	(0.109)					
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	-0.358**					
	(0.171)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.573***				
		(0.118)				
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		-0.474***				
		(0.166)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.216***			
			(0.043)			
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			-0.107			
			(0.067)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.353***		
				(0.102)		
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				-0.203		
				(0.157)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.320***	
					(0.107)	
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					-0.247*	
					(0.148)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.140***
						(0.040)
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						-0.050
						(0.063)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	-0.172*	-0.169*	-0.176*	-0.173*	-0.166*	-0.176*
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.100)
Ideological Extremity	0.016	0.012	0.015	0.030	0.033	0.030
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Age	0.040***	0.039***	0.041***	0.037***	0.036***	0.037***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Education	0.120	0.113	0.122	0.119	0.109	0.116
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Gender	0.034	0.023	0.032	0.052	0.049	0.045
	(0.173)	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.171)
Rural/Urban	-0.021	-0.016	-0.026	-0.024	-0.025	-0.023
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Constant	-0.397	-0.372	-0.422	0.048	0.179	0.074
	(0.574)	(0.570)	(0.575)	(0.587)	(0.584)	(0.588)
Log likelihood	-519.551	-518.620	-518.248	-528.312	-529.839	-527.897
AIC	1059	1057	1056	1077	1080	1076
BIC	1118	1116	1115	1135	1138	1134
N	2564	2564	2564	2565	2565	2565

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

for Max-Min measures) and setting all other variables to their representative moments (e.g., mean for continuous variables and median for categorical and binary variables). Marginal effects in Figure 5.3 also do not provide empirical support for my second hypothesis. The marginal effects of party identification on voter turnout are decreasing when affective polarization increases. In addition, the confidence intervals around the marginal effects are not distinguishable from zero for higher values of affective polarization, except for the bottom-right graph in Figure 5.3. In my second hypothesis, I expected an increase in the marginal effects of partisanship on voter turnout when affective polarization increases. In other words, I expected that the positive effect of partisanship on a voter's propensity to turn out would

Figure 5.3 Marginal Effect of Party Identification on Voter Turnout

increase when the voter is affectively more polarized. However, the findings in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3 do not provide empirical support for expectation.

The coefficients on perceived ideological (party) polarization are negative and statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in Table 5.2. Hence, ideological polarization and voter turnout are not positively associated with each other, according to the findings from all models. The coefficients on ideological extremity, education, gender, and residence (rural/urban) are also not statistically significant in the interactive models. Similar to the findings in the previous empirical analyses, only the coefficients on age are statistically significant among socioeconomic and demographic variables in the interactive models. The models in Table 5.2 also support the positive association between the age of a voter and her propensity to vote. The alternative models in Table B.4 in the appendix include the squared version of the age variable. The coefficients on the squared age variable are also statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. However, the coefficients on the squared age variable are about zero. Because of the lack of available data, perceived religiosity, religious service attendance, and political knowledge are included in alternative models in Table B.6, Table B.8, and Table B.10 in the appendix, respectively. Both perceived religiosity and religious service attendance do not have statistically significant effects on voter turnout according to the findings. On the other hand, the

coefficients on political knowledge are positive and statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. However, the number of observations is 909 in models which include the political knowledge variable.

Lastly, Table B.11 and B.12 in the appendix present robustness checks. In the models in these tables, I check whether there are average election effects on voter turnout by using election dummies. According to the findings, the average effect of the 2015 elections on voter turnout is statistically significant and negative. In other words, on average, the probability of turnout in the 2015 elections is lower than in other elections, when other variables remain constant. The average turnout in the effective sample is 94 percent for the 2011 elections, 91 percent for the 2015 elections, and 93 percent for the 2018 elections. Hence, the negative coefficients on the 2015 elections variable may be the results of the relatively lower average turnout in the 2015 elections in the effective sample.

6.   CONCLUSION

A voter cannot change the results of an election on her own. However, voters find certain motivations to turn out in elections. In addition, the propensity of the median Turkish voter to turn out is higher than the median voters in other regions of the world. What accounts for the high tendency of Turkish voters to go to the polls? What brings Turkish voters to the ballot box? I tried to find an answer to these questions in my thesis by hypothesizing and empirically analyzing the relationship between affective polarization and voter turnout in Turkey. Although affective polarization has been treated as an explanation for voter turnout in established democracies in the existing literature, my research on the relationship between affective polarization and voter turnout in Turkey contributes to the literature by moving the hypothesis beyond consolidated democracies. In addition, I measure affective polarization by using leader feeling thermometers apart from party feelings thermometers which are vastly used in the literature. In consolidated democracies, political parties are older and their policy and ideological positions are relatively more stable than in developing democracies. Hence, voters may develop psychological attachments toward political parties, instead of their leaders. However, in Turkish politics, leader feeling thermometers may more appropriate to measure affective polarization since some leaders are more salient than their political parties. Finally, I also examine whether there is an interactive relationship between party identification and affective polarization. If party identification increases an individual's propensity to turn out, then I expect that the positive effect of party identification on voter turnout would be conditional on affective polarization.

In line with the "expressive partisanship" approach in the existing literature (e.g., Greene 2004; Mason 2015; Huddy and Bankert 2017; Ward and Tavits 2019), I also treat affective polarization by referring to Social Identity Theory. Although there are other understandings of partisanship such as the instrumental partisanship approach (e.g., Downs 1957; Adams 2012), the expressive partisanship approach is more appropriate to understand partisanship and affective polarization in Turkey,

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since Turkish society has been divided by certain social cleavages for a long time. From the late Ottoman Empire era to modern Turkey, there has been a division between "the great culture" of modern and secular elites in the center and "the little culture" of the traditional rural masses in the periphery. After the Second World War, the periphery captured the center because of democratization, urbanization, and industrialization. Consequently, with the rising salience of nationalism and Islamism, the religious-secular cleavage and the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage became prominent in the post-1983 era. The center-periphery, as well as the religious-secular and the Turkish-Kurdish cleavages, have reflected themselves in the political arena through major political parties, and voters in Turkey have identified themselves with political parties based on their social identities. As Social Identity Theory argues, social identities affect individuals' social behaviors since they change the individual perceptions of social reality. Turkish voters are also under the influence of their social identities in their political decisions. Hence, as a form of political behavior, voter turnout is also affected by social identities.

Since strong positive and negative feelings toward political parties and leaders increase individuals' political engagement, I theoretically expected a positive relationship between affective polarization and voter turnout in my first hypothesis. Secondly, I hypothesized that if party identification positively influences voter turnout as explained in the literature, this positive effect of partisanship on turnout should be mediated by affective polarization. Similar to the Bush effect in the 2004 presidential elections in the U.S. (Abramowitz and Stone 2006), there can be an Erdoğan or Kılıçdaroğlu effect on voter turnout in Turkey. In other words, I expected that individuals in Turkey are going to the polls because of their positive and negative feelings toward political parties and their leaders. Moreover, partisans turn out not only because of their party identifications but also because of their strong negative feelings toward other parties.

In order to test my hypotheses, I employed Modules 3 to 5 of CSES data which cover 3 post-election surveys in Turkey. I used several measures of affective polarization since there is not a single agreed measurement of this new concept. I calculated the weighted and unweighted versions of the spread of like-dislike scores as well as the difference between feelings toward the most liked and the most disliked parties. I also controlled for the effects of several variables on voter turnout. According to the findings of empirical analyses for my first hypothesis, all measures of affective polarization have statistically significant effects on voter turnout. Apart from affective polarization, party identification and age present strong positive associations with voter turnout. On the other hand, I could not find empirical evidence for my second hypothesis. The coefficients on the interaction term of party identification

and affective polarization are negative. Similarly, marginal effect plots also illustrate that the positive effect of party identification on voter turnout is decreasing when affective polarization increases, while I expected the opposite in my second hypothesis. Although I found empirical evidence for my first hypothesis, the substantive significance of my findings is questionable. Although the predicted probabilities of turnout are increasing as affective polarization increases, a voter's predicted probability of turnout is also very high when her affective polarization is low. This may be a result of the low variation in the dependent variable, turnout. Most of the respondents in my effective sample reported electoral participation. However, this low variation in the effective sample which reflects the actual turnout rates in elections should not prevent a political scientist to analyze the roots of the high propensity of voters to turnout in Turkey. Because voter turnout is a political behavior, it cannot be assumed as a fixed phenomenon. A further study may find stronger empirical evidence for the relationship between affective polarization and voter turnout by analyzing more comprehensive data which include more observations. In addition, measuring affective polarization based on feeling thermometers may be problematic, since thermometers are based on the respondents' self-reports in surveys. In addition, it is not clear whether party feeling thermometers reflect an individual' like-dislike score for the policy position of a party or its supporters and leaders.

Lastly, casting a ballot is only one example action of political participation. Non-voting political activities, such as attending rallies, donating money to parties and candidates, signing petitions, and protesting, are also important to understand the level of political engagement of an individual. However, due to the lack of available data for non-voting political participation, I focus on voter turnout, instead of a wider conceptualization of political participation. A further study may take into account these non-voting participation behaviors by analyzing more comprehensive data.

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Voter Turnout in Turkey in All Elections from 1950 to 2019

Table A.1 Turnout Rates in Turkey from 1950 to 2019

Year	Election Type	Turnout Rate (%)
1950	Parliamentary Elections	89.30
1954	Parliamentary Elections	88.60
1957	Parliamentary Elections	76.60
1961	Parliamentary Elections	81.41
1961	Referendum	81.05
1963	Local Elections	77.64
1965	Parliamentary Elections	71.30
1968	Local Elections	55.23
1969	Parliamentary Elections	64.35
1973	Parliamentary Elections	66.82
1973	Local Elections	51.39
1977	Parliamentary Elections	72.40
1982	Referendum	91.35
1983	Parliamentary Elections	92.27
1984	Local Elections	88.46
1987	Referendum	95.03
1987	Parliamentary Elections	93.28
1988	Referendum	88.85
1989	Local Elections	77.76
1991	Parliamentary Elections	83.92
1994	Local Elections	90.53
1995	Parliamentary Elections	85.20
1999	Local Elections	87.09
1999	Parliamentary Elections	87.09
2002	Parliamentary Elections	79.28
2004	Local Elections	76.25
2007	Parliamentary Elections	84.25

2007	Referendum	67.51
2009	Parliamentary Elections	85.18
2010	Referendum	73.71
2011	Parliamentary Elections	83.20
2014	Presidential Elections	74.13
2014	Local Elections	89.15
2015 (June)	Parliamentary Elections	83.92
2015 (November)	Parliamentary Elections	85.23
2017	Referendum	85.43
2018	Parliamentary & Presidential Elections	86.24
2019	Local Elections	84.67

Source: The Supreme Election Council in Turkey (YSK)

The Effect of Affective Polarization on Voter Turnout for Partisans and Non-partisans

Figure B.1 Predicted Probability of Voter Turnout for Partisans and Non-partisans

Figure B.2 Marginal Effect of Affective Polarization on Voter Turnout for Partisans and Non-Partisans

Marginal Effects of Affective Polarization on Turnout

Voter Turnout and Ideological Extremity

Table B.1 The Estimates from Alternative Models for H_1 including the squared version of Ideological Extremity

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.383***					
	(0.080)					
Party Identification	0.946***	0.945***	0.901***	1.065***	1.065***	1.048***
	(0.178)	(0.175)	(0.181)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.181)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	-0.218**	-0.222**	-0.218**	-0.209**	-0.209**	-0.207**
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.101)
Ideological Extremity	-0.249	-0.254	-0.261	-0.200	-0.200	-0.206
	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.161)
Ideological Extremity^2	0.055*	0.057*	0.058*	0.049	0.049	0.050
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Age	0.040***	0.039***	0.041***	0.037***	0.037***	0.037***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Education	0.129	0.121	0.130*	0.123	0.123	0.121
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Gender	0.049	0.025	0.046	0.059	0.059	0.054
	(0.172)	(0.171)	(0.172)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.171)
Rural/Urban	-0.014	-0.012	-0.019	-0.019	-0.019	-0.018
	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.347***				
		(0.080)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.176***			
			(0.031)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.269***	0.269***	
				(0.077)	(0.077)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.121***
						(0.031)
Constant	0.121	0.326	-0.003	0.421	0.421	0.351
	(0.579)	(0.572)	(0.581)	(0.572)	(0.572)	(0.575)
Log likelihood	-520.452	-521.520	-517.963	-528.089	-528.089	-527.066
AIC	1061	1063	1056	1076	1076	1074
BIC	1119	1122	1114	1135	1135	1133
N	2564	2564	2564	2565	2565	2565

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

Figure B.3 Marginal Effect of Ideological Extremity on Voter Turnout

Marginal Effects of Ideological Extremity on Pr(Turnout=1)

Figure B.4 Marginal Effect of Ideological Extremity^2 on Voter Turnout

Marginal Effects of the Squared Version of Ideological Extremity on Pr(Turnout=1)

Mean-Distance Measures of Affective Polarization and Voter Turnout

Table B.2 The Estimates from Alternative Models include Distance Measures of Affective Polarization

| | Hypothesis 1 | | Hypothesis 2 | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Party Identification			2.341*	0.971
			(1.205)	(0.991)
Party Identification	-0.099	-0.063		
	(0.488)	(0.487)		
Aff. Pol. (Distance) - Party	0.087		0.590**	
	(0.059)		(0.275)	
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Distance) - Party			-0.529*	
			(0.279)	
Aff. Pol. (Distance) - Leader		0.057		0.256
		(0.053)		(0.191)
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Distance) - Leader				-0.216
				(0.198)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	0.026	0.040	0.010	0.045
	(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.147)
Ideological Extremity	-0.118	-0.114	-0.119	-0.117
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Age	0.043***	0.043***	0.043***	0.043***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education	0.052	0.046	0.060	0.053
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Gender	-0.041	-0.049	-0.049	-0.051
	(0.238)	(0.238)	(0.239)	(0.238)
Rural/Urban	0.052	0.051	0.045	0.048
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Constant	1.226	1.374*	-0.975	0.440
	(0.844)	(0.834)	(1.273)	(1.126)
Log likelihood	-313.614	-313.961	-311.492	-313.340
AIC	645	646	643	647
BIC	696	696	699	703
N	2004	2003	2004	2003

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

Figure B.5 Mean-Distance Measures of Affective Polarization and Voter Turnout

Alternative Models including Age^2

Table B.3 The Estimates from Alternative Models for H_1 including Age^2

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.373***					
	(0.081)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.338***				
		(0.080)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.172***			
			(0.032)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.258***		
				(0.080)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.192**	
					(0.076)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.118***
						(0.032)
Party Identification	0.942***	0.941***	0.901***	1.057***	1.100***	1.037***
	(0.184)	(0.180)	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.184)	(0.188)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	-0.166	-0.172*	-0.167*	-0.160	-0.154	-0.158
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.102)
Ideological Extremity	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.033	0.038	0.031
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Age	0.221***	0.220***	0.222***	0.222***	0.221***	0.223***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Age^2	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	0.146*	0.136	0.148*	0.134	0.122	0.133
	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Gender	-0.066	-0.084	-0.071	-0.065	-0.067	-0.074
	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.175)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.173)
Rural/Urban	-0.025	-0.024	-0.029	-0.035	-0.038	-0.035
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.086)
Constant	-3.359***	-3.156***	-3.503***	-3.095***	-2.892***	-3.182***
	(0.743)	(0.733)	(0.746)	(0.739)	(0.734)	(0.743)
Log likelihood	-500.720	-501.697	-498.295	-506.121	-508.106	-505.028
AIC	1021	1023	1017	1032	1036	1030
BIC	1080	1082	1075	1091	1095	1089
N	2564	2564	2564	2565	2565	2565

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table B.4 The Estimates from Alternative Models for H_2 including Age^2

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Identification	1.940***	2.185***	1.652***	1.582***	1.717***	1.345***
	(0.545)	(0.505)	(0.520)	(0.497)	(0.453)	(0.480)
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.528***					
	(0.111)					
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	-0.365**					
	(0.175)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.582***				
		(0.122)				
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		-0.484***				
		(0.170)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.218***			
			(0.043)			
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			-0.112			
			(0.068)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.343***		
				(0.107)		
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				-0.194		
				(0.162)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.307***	
					(0.111)	
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					-0.234	
					(0.152)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.138***
						(0.042)
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						-0.047
						(0.065)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	-0.146	-0.143	-0.152	-0.147	-0.139	-0.151
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.102)
Ideological Extremity	0.016	0.012	0.016	0.030	0.033	0.029
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Age	0.222***	0.223***	0.224***	0.222***	0.221***	0.223***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Age^2	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	0.146*	0.138	0.148*	0.138	0.127	0.135
	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Gender	-0.071	-0.078	-0.075	-0.064	-0.060	-0.073
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.173)
Rural/Urban	-0.025	-0.021	-0.030	-0.034	-0.036	-0.035
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.086)
Constant	-3.769***	-3.772***	-3.808***	-3.328***	-3.188***	-3.316***
	(0.773)	(0.772)	(0.774)	(0.774)	(0.767)	(0.772)
Log likelihood	-498.395	-497.300	-496.998	-505.352	-506.873	-504.770
AIC	1019	1017	1016	1033	1036	1032
BIC	1083	1081	1080	1097	1100	1096
N	2564	2564	2564	2565	2565	2565

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

Alternative Models including Religiosity Variables

Table B.5 The Estimates from Alternative Models for H_1 including Perceived Religiosity

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.317***					
	(0.094)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.274***				
		(0.095)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.147***			
			(0.037)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.211**		
				(0.090)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.164*	
					(0.092)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.100***
						(0.036)
Party Identification	0.785***	0.809***	0.751***	0.913***	0.947***	0.891***
	(0.228)	(0.219)	(0.229)	(0.230)	(0.226)	(0.229)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	-0.001	-0.004	-0.001	-0.003	-0.000	-0.005
	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.122)
Ideological Extremity	-0.063	-0.059	-0.066	-0.038	-0.035	-0.041
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Age	0.039***	0.038***	0.040***	0.036***	0.035***	0.036***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Education	0.068	0.063	0.071	0.072	0.064	0.074
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.106)
Gender	0.183	0.159	0.182	0.194	0.186	0.192
	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.213)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.211)
Rural/Urban	0.077	0.078	0.076	0.068	0.066	0.068
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.104)
Perceived Religiosity	-0.084	-0.111	-0.077	-0.108	-0.123	-0.102
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Constant	-0.243	0.014	-0.369	0.110	0.305	0.029
	(0.726)	(0.713)	(0.731)	(0.712)	(0.701)	(0.717)
Log likelihood	-343.952	-344.904	-342.754	-349.886	-350.756	-349.228
AIC	708	710	706	720	722	718
BIC	762	764	759	774	775	772
N	1596	1596	1596	1597	1597	1597

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table B.6 The Estimates from Alternative Models for H_2 including Perceived Religiosity

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Identification	1.825***	2.205***	1.559***	1.482**	1.698***	1.399**
	(0.649)	(0.598)	(0.600)	(0.590)	(0.555)	(0.566)
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.508***					
	(0.144)					
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	-0.387*					
	(0.212)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.603***				
		(0.156)				
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		-0.567***				
		(0.207)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.208***			
			(0.057)			
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			-0.124			
			(0.082)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.314**		
				(0.131)		
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				-0.209		
				(0.191)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.329**	
					(0.140)	
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					-0.295	
					(0.188)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.137***
						(0.052)
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						-0.077
						(0.076)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	0.019	0.029	0.012	0.011	0.020	0.008
	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.120)
Ideological Extremity	-0.070	-0.076	-0.072	-0.046	-0.048	-0.048
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Age	0.039***	0.038***	0.040***	0.036***	0.035***	0.036***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Education	0.069	0.063	0.072	0.079	0.071	0.079
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Gender	0.166	0.152	0.169	0.194	0.193	0.192
	(0.214)	(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.211)
Rural/Urban	0.077	0.080	0.076	0.067	0.066	0.067
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.104)
Perceived Religiosity	-0.052	-0.061	-0.053	-0.102	-0.110	-0.098
	(0.160)	(0.161)	(0.159)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Constant	-0.729	-0.771	-0.739	-0.165	-0.113	-0.210
	(0.744)	(0.738)	(0.745)	(0.744)	(0.733)	(0.745)
Log likelihood	-342.151	-341.035	-341.643	-349.270	-349.516	-348.740
AIC	706	704	705	721	721	719
BIC	765	763	764	780	780	779
N	1596	1596	1596	1597	1597	1597

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table B.7 The Estimates from Alternative Models for H_1 including Religious Service Attendance

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.366*** (0.085)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.328*** (0.084)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.173*** (0.033)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.268*** (0.081)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.195** (0.078)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.123*** (0.032)
Party Identification	0.904*** (0.187)	0.910*** (0.182)	0.850*** (0.190)	1.019*** (0.186)	1.066*** (0.184)	0.997*** (0.189)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	-0.198* (0.103)	-0.201* (0.103)	-0.197* (0.101)	-0.197* (0.105)	-0.190* (0.105)	-0.195* (0.104)
Ideological Extremity	-0.004 (0.050)	-0.004 (0.051)	-0.007 (0.051)	0.012 (0.051)	0.019 (0.051)	0.009 (0.051)
Age	0.039*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.010)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.010)
Education	0.097 (0.081)	0.088 (0.080)	0.099 (0.082)	0.092 (0.082)	0.080 (0.081)	0.091 (0.082)
Gender	0.104 (0.178)	0.078 (0.176)	0.102 (0.178)	0.114 (0.176)	0.102 (0.175)	0.108 (0.177)
Rural/Urban	-0.033 (0.090)	-0.032 (0.090)	-0.036 (0.091)	-0.035 (0.089)	-0.039 (0.088)	-0.033 (0.089)
Religious Service Attendance	-0.023 (0.046)	-0.029 (0.046)	-0.022 (0.046)	-0.025 (0.047)	-0.029 (0.047)	-0.025 (0.046)
Constant	0.200 (0.602)	0.418 (0.594)	0.036 (0.605)	0.496 (0.597)	0.721 (0.589)	0.407 (0.601)
Log likelihood	-489.957	-491.017	-487.280	-496.589	-498.773	-495.402
AIC	1000	1002	995	1013	1018	1011
BIC	1058	1060	1052	1071	1075	1069
N	2402	2402	2402	2404	2404	2404

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table B.8 The Estimates from Alternative Models for H_2 including Religious Service Attendance

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Identification	1.912***	2.177***	1.594***	1.661***	1.805***	1.405***
	(0.565)	(0.521)	(0.532)	(0.510)	(0.466)	(0.488)
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.523***					
	(0.118)					
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	-0.367**					
	(0.182)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.575***				
		(0.128)				
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		-0.489***				
		(0.175)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.220***			
			(0.046)			
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			-0.111			
			(0.071)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.372***		
				(0.110)		
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				-0.235		
				(0.166)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.331***	
					(0.113)	
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					-0.276*	
					(0.155)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.150***
						(0.043)
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						-0.061
						(0.066)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	-0.181*	-0.176*	-0.186*	-0.186*	-0.176*	-0.188*
	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.103)
Ideological Extremity	-0.008	-0.013	-0.010	0.008	0.012	0.006
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Age	0.039***	0.039***	0.040***	0.037***	0.036***	0.037***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education	0.097	0.092	0.099	0.098	0.087	0.094
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Gender	0.101	0.088	0.100	0.117	0.113	0.110
	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)
Rural/Urban	-0.032	-0.029	-0.037	-0.034	-0.036	-0.032
	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Religious Service Attendance	-0.016	-0.019	-0.017	-0.023	-0.026	-0.024
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Constant	-0.192	-0.174	-0.243	0.215	0.361	0.235
	(0.611)	(0.609)	(0.613)	(0.629)	(0.624)	(0.630)
Log likelihood	-487.721	-486.725	-486.062	-495.486	-497.100	-494.965
AIC	997	995	994	1013	1016	1012
BIC	1061	1059	1058	1077	1080	1076
N	2402	2402	2402	2404	2404	2404

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

Alternative Models including Political Knowledge

Table B.9 The Estimates from Alternative Models for H_1 including Political Knowledge

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.223*					
	(0.116)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.219*				
		(0.122)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.108**			
			(0.046)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.095		
				(0.119)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.052	
					(0.125)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.049
						(0.049)
Party Identification	0.781***	0.770***	0.739**	0.920***	0.959***	0.900***
	(0.293)	(0.290)	(0.295)	(0.288)	(0.290)	(0.286)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	0.132	0.126	0.126	0.159	0.168	0.155
	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.133)
Ideological Extremity	-0.075	-0.076	-0.076	-0.063	-0.061	-0.064
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Age	0.055***	0.054***	0.055***	0.054***	0.054***	0.054***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Education	0.046	0.044	0.051	0.036	0.027	0.038
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.153)
Gender	0.161	0.149	0.153	0.170	0.173	0.166
	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.268)	(0.266)	(0.266)	(0.266)
Rural/Urban	0.166	0.166	0.169	0.153	0.150	0.154
	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.125)
Political Knowledge	0.261*	0.267*	0.256*	0.267*	0.272**	0.264*
	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.140)
Constant	-1.852*	-1.771*	-1.940**	-1.617*	-1.515	-1.661*
	(0.966)	(0.962)	(0.968)	(0.970)	(0.958)	(0.972)
Log likelihood	-213.905	-213.890	-213.447	-214.975	-215.176	-214.843
AIC	448	448	447	450	450	450
BIC	496	496	495	498	498	498
N	909	909	909	909	909	909

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table B.10 The Estimates from Alternative Models for H_2 including Political Knowledge

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Identification	1.278*	1.648**	1.034	1.649**	1.843**	1.644**
	(0.760)	(0.752)	(0.719)	(0.744)	(0.741)	(0.738)
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.306*					
	(0.161)					
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	-0.177					
	(0.237)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.407**				
		(0.170)				
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		-0.338				
		(0.241)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.128*			
			(0.065)			
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			-0.043			
			(0.093)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.219		
				(0.165)		
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				-0.263		
				(0.235)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.232	
					(0.175)	
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					-0.337	
					(0.241)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.098
						(0.068)
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						-0.110
						(0.096)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	0.140	0.140	0.130	0.184	0.200	0.180
	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.132)
Ideological Extremity	-0.075	-0.079	-0.076	-0.070	-0.071	-0.071
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Age	0.055***	0.055***	0.055***	0.055***	0.054***	0.055***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Education	0.046	0.045	0.051	0.041	0.034	0.043
	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.153)
Gender	0.152	0.142	0.149	0.160	0.172	0.157
	(0.268)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.268)	(0.268)	(0.268)
Rural/Urban	0.165	0.164	0.168	0.151	0.147	0.153
	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.125)
Political Knowledge	0.262*	0.263*	0.257*	0.265*	0.265*	0.261*
	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.141)
Constant	-2.059**	-2.185**	-2.055**	-1.948**	-1.951**	-1.982**
	(0.971)	(0.968)	(0.974)	(0.987)	(0.967)	(0.990)
Log likelihood	-213.660	-212.969	-213.363	-214.386	-214.177	-214.270
AIC	449	448	449	451	450	451
BIC	502	501	502	504	503	503
N	909	909	909	909	909	909

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

Robustness Checks: Election Dummies

Table B.11 The Estimates from Alternative Models for H_1 including Election Dummies

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.381***					
	(0.080)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.345***				
		(0.081)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.173***			
			(0.032)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.263***		
				(0.077)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.196***	
					(0.075)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.118***
						(0.031)
Party Identification	0.924***	0.924***	0.882***	1.052***	1.093***	1.035***
	(0.180)	(0.175)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.178)	(0.182)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	-0.161	-0.161	-0.159	-0.158	-0.149	-0.155
	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.101)
Ideological Extremity	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.034	0.038	0.032
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Age	0.041***	0.040***	0.042***	0.038***	0.037***	0.038***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education	0.150*	0.147*	0.154*	0.140*	0.132	0.140*
	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Gender	0.022	-0.000	0.020	0.035	0.029	0.030
	(0.173)	(0.171)	(0.173)	(0.171)	(0.170)	(0.171)
Rural/Urban	-0.029	-0.026	-0.032	-0.034	-0.036	-0.033
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.084)
2011 Elections	0.076	0.145	0.117	0.048	0.095	0.065
	(0.233)	(0.234)	(0.233)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.232)
2015 Elections	-0.466**	-0.420**	-0.425**	-0.431**	-0.397**	-0.416**
	(0.202)	(0.201)	(0.202)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.201)
Constant	-0.064	0.067	-0.232	0.278	0.434	0.192
	(0.597)	(0.596)	(0.603)	(0.593)	(0.591)	(0.598)
Log likelihood	-517.896	-519.100	-515.782	-525.929	-528.100	-525.024
AIC	1058	1060	1054	1074	1078	1072
BIC	1122	1125	1118	1138	1143	1136
N	2564	2564	2564	2565	2565	2565

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table B.12 The Estimates from Alternative Models for H_2 including Election Dummies

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Identification	1.834***	2.120***	1.540***	1.572***	1.734***	1.337***
	(0.526)	(0.496)	(0.502)	(0.485)	(0.451)	(0.468)
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	0.521***					
	(0.110)					
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Party	-0.334**					
	(0.170)					
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		0.576***				
		(0.119)				
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Party		-0.466***				
		(0.167)				
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			0.213***			
			(0.043)			
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Party			-0.099			
			(0.067)			
Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				0.345***		
				(0.102)		
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Unw. Spread) - Leader				-0.191		
				(0.158)		
Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					0.312***	
					(0.107)	
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (W. Spread) - Leader					-0.242	
					(0.150)	
Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						0.137***
						(0.040)
Party Identification × Aff. Pol. (Max-Min) - Leader						-0.046
						(0.063)
Perceived Ideological Polarization	-0.145	-0.139	-0.149	-0.146	-0.135	-0.149
	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.101)
Ideological Extremity	0.015	0.012	0.015	0.031	0.033	0.030
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Age	0.041***	0.041***	0.042***	0.038***	0.037***	0.038***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education	0.151*	0.150*	0.154*	0.144*	0.137	0.142*
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Gender	0.018	0.007	0.017	0.036	0.035	0.030
	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.172)	(0.171)	(0.172)
Rural/Urban	-0.029	-0.025	-0.033	-0.033	-0.034	-0.032
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
2011 Elections	0.088	0.152	0.118	0.052	0.094	0.066
	(0.234)	(0.236)	(0.235)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.232)
2015 Elections	-0.443**	-0.407**	-0.414**	-0.422**	-0.394*	-0.412**
	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.202)
Constant	-0.424	-0.476	-0.476	0.054	0.138	0.068
	(0.608)	(0.610)	(0.611)	(0.619)	(0.615)	(0.619)
Log likelihood	-515.876	-514.916	-514.743	-525.148	-526.743	-524.767
AIC	1056	1054	1053	1074	1077	1074
BIC	1126	1124	1124	1144	1148	1144
N	2564	2564	2564	2565	2565	2565

The coefficients are logged odds. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests.