

**BUILDING STATE CAPACITY: THE UNEVEN TERRITORIAL
REACH OF THE TURKISH STATE DURING THE REPUBLICAN
ERA**

by
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ERA**

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ABSTRACT

BUILDING STATE CAPACITY: THE UNEVEN TERRITORIAL REACH OF THE TURKISH STATE DURING THE REPUBLICAN ERA

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Keywords: state capacity, state building, infrastructural power, territorial
challengers, organizational challengers

This thesis examines the process of building Turkish state capacity in the early period of the Turkish Republic. This thesis regards the territorial reach of the state in order to control and regulate civil society as the prerequisite for building state capacity. The literature on state and state capacity emphasizes the necessity of continuous protection of territorial political power through penetration of the state institutions and state personnel into civil society to perpetuate the existence of political power and state. In this sense, the state has to radiate its own institutions and personnel from the center to the periphery. This effort constitutes the process of the territorial reach of the state. However, as the literature indicates, due to the existence of challengers to the state in the territory, the state does not evenly reach the territory. Based on these arguments, this thesis focuses on the process of the territorial reach of the Turkish state through two state institutions, namely Umumi Müfettişlik (the Inspectorates-General) and Halkevleri (People's Houses), in order to build the state capacity. However, due to the existence of territorial and organizational challengers in the territory, the Republican elites had unevenly established these state institutions in the territory. They preferred to establish Umumi Müfettişlik in mainly eastern provinces where territorial challengers existed while opening Halkevleri in mainly western provinces where organizational challengers lived. In addition to the qualitative method that I use to construct causal mechanisms between challengers and the decision of the Republican elites, I employ the

quantitative method to present empirical analysis on the causal mechanisms based on the dataset that I collected from various studies and archives. Moving from qualitative and quantitative evidence, I conclude that the Republican elites took the location of challengers into consideration while deciding to establish these state institutions. This selection procedure resulted in the uneven territorial reach of the Turkish state. As a result, I conclude that the Republican elites built unequal state capacity in the territory because of the uneven territorial reach of the Turkish state.

ÖZET

DEVLET KAPASİTESİNİN İNŞASI: CUMHURİYET DÖNEMİNDE TÜRKİYE DEVLETİNİN DÜZENSİZ BÖLGESEL ERİŞİMİ

ALPER YILMAZ

TÜRKİYE ÇALIŞMALARI YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2021

Tez Danışmanı: Asst. Prof. Berk Esen

Anahtar Kelimeler: devlet kapasitesi, devlet inşası, altyapısal güç, bölgesel meydan okuyucular, organizasyonel meydan okuyucular

Bu tez, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin erken döneminde Türk devlet kapasitesinin inşası sürecini incelemektedir. Bu tez, sivil toplumu kontrol etmek ve düzenlemek için devletin bölgesel erişimini devlet kapasitesini inşa etmenin ön koşulu olarak görmektedir. Devlet ve devlet kapasitesi ile ilgili literatür, siyasi iktidarın ve devletin varlığını sürdürmek için devlet kurumlarının ve devlet personelinin sivil topluma nüfuz etme yoluyla bölgesel siyasi iktidarın sürekli korunmasının gerekliliğini vurgulamaktadır. Bu anlamda devlet kendi kurumlarını ve personelini merkezden çevreye yaymak zorundadır. Bu çaba, devletin bölgesel erişim sürecini oluşturur. Ancak literatürün de belirttiği gibi topraklarda devlete meydan okuyanların varlığı nedeniyle devlet topraklara eşit olarak ulaşamamaktadır. Bu savlardan hareketle, bu tez, Türk devletinin, devlet kapasitesini inşa etmek için Umumi Müfettişlik ve Halkevleri gibi iki devlet kurumu aracılığıyla toprak erişimi sürecine odaklanmaktadır. Ancak, bölgede bölgesel ve örgütsel meydan okuyucuların varlığından dolayı, Cumhuriyetçi seçkinler bu devlet kurumlarını bölgede eşit olmayan bir şekilde kurmuşlardır. Umumi Müfettişlik'i daha çok bölgesel meydan okuyucuların bulunduğu doğu illerinde kurmayı tercih ederken, Halkevleri'ni daha çok örgütsel meydan okuyucuların yaşadığı batı illerinde açmayı tercih ettiler. Meydan okuyanlar ve Cumhuriyetçi seçkinlerin kararları arasında nedensel mekanizmalar oluşturmak için kullandığım nitel yöntemin yanı sıra, çeşitli araştırmalardan ve arşivlerden topladığım veri kümesine dayalı olarak nedensel mekanizmalar üzerine ampirik analizler sunmak için nicel yöntemi kul-

lanıyorum. Niteliksel ve niceliksel kanıtlardan hareketle, Cumhuriyetçi seçkinlerin bu devlet kurumlarını kurmaya karar verirken meydan okuyanların yerini dikkate aldıkları sonucuna varıyorum. Bu seçim prosedürü, Türk devletinin eşit olmayan toprak erişimiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Cumhuriyetçi seçkinlerin, Türk devletinin eşit olmayan toprak erişimi nedeniyle bölgede eşit olmayan devlet kapasitesi inşa ettiği sonucuna varıyorum.

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To my Family

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1. INTRODUCTION

How does a state complete its territorial reach during the first years of its formation? In other words, after getting political power, how do the state elites construct their authority in its claimed territory? Although the state has been getting the attention of scholars for the last decades after the influential study of “Bringing State Back In” (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), the question regarding the state territorial reach has been a subject of little concern and empirically unexplored in the state literature except for a few studies. In this thesis, I aim to fill this gap by focusing on state territorial reach as a part of state capacity in the first years of a nation-state. Rather than investigating the capabilities of the state, which most of the studies do to analyze the state capacity (Cingolani 2018), I mostly pay attention to how the state tries to reach the territory by spreading its state institutions. In this regard, I regard the state territorial reach as a part of the process in which the state increases its capacity.

In the first years of state formation, there are two challenges with which state elites mostly struggle. The first is the process of getting political power by eliminating opponents. This process happens in the political arena, and after the political maneuvers, one group arises as a sole power, which possesses political power. The second challenge of the state elites is to spread the political authority in the claimed territory to demonstrate itself as the only power to the society. In fact, this challenge generates the process of the territorial reach of the state in which state elites attempt to launch a web of differentiated state institutions and state personnel in the territory to penetrate the civil society (Mann 1984). Thus, this process completes and succeeds as long as the state elites penetrate the civil society through a differentiated set of state institutions and state personnel. However, the degree of territorial reach and the type of institution may vary according to regions, and this differentiation results in “uneven penetration of the state within countries” and “in an unequal presence of the state across subnational units” (Giraudy and Luna 2017). The reason for the unevenness and an unequal state presence originates from the

existence of challengers, a group of people who are not compliant with the state policies, in the territory. These challengers differ based on their demands. When people challenge the state elites' reforms, which aim to organize the society by transforming people's modes of living, they emerge as the organizational challengers and demonstrate their challenges more subtly and indirectly. On the other hand, as the second type of challengers, territorial challengers regard the state elites' policies as a threat to their governance understanding. In this regard, territorial challengers reveal their challenges in a more obvious way, such as rebellion, to create an independent state.

However, the state elites manifest their approach toward these groups differently. Since territorial challengers have the capability to stage rebellions, thereby being a threat to the existence of the state's authority in the territory, the state elites establish state institutions, which have coercive power, in areas where the territorial challengers existed in order to observe the potential danger for the state. On the other hand, the state elites prefer to open state institutions, which possess the regulatory power, in areas where organizational challengers live to regulate the relationship between the state and these people. Since organizational challengers do not have a problem with the state's authority but the policies, they do not have incentives to either damage or destroy the state's power. In this regard, the state elites do not recognize these people's challenges as a threat as much as the organizational challengers. Thus, they endeavor to reconnect these people to the state by launching state institutions as mediators between the state and these people.

In order to examine these arguments, I investigate the first three decades of the Turkish Republic. The reason why I choose the Turkish Republic as a case is four-fold. The first is that after the fall of the Ottoman empire, Republican elites under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal have begun a fast and challenging state-building process to create secular, modernized, and unified Turkey. The most critical barrier making this process challenging is that although state elites inherited some state institutions from the Ottoman Empire, a severe vacuum of authority has emerged in especially places far away from the central state after the fall of the Ottoman empire. For this reason, Republican elites, who had incentives to create a centralized state, established different state institutions to construct effective control over the society. The second is that after the fall of the Ottoman empire, people who saw the vacuum of authority as an opportunity to gain independence or resist the reforms enacted 18 rebellions in this period (Tunçay 1999). These various rebellions indicate the existence of territorial challengers who did not comply with the Republican elites' authority. At the same time, people had not been experienced any radical change for almost six centuries during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. However, people's lives have been transformed dramatically because of the new radical reforms that

the Republican elites initiated. Therefore, these efforts of the Republican cadres to organize society caused the emergence of organizational challengers in the local election held in 1930.

Thirdly, to my knowledge, there is not any research that focuses on the state capacity, the territorial reach of the state, subnational variation of the state institutions considering the Turkish Republic. For this reason, this thesis is the first study to focus on these issues regarding the Turkish Republic, and thus I contribute to the literature with this thesis. Lastly, investigating the territorial reach of the state in the Turkish Republic enhances our understanding of the state-building process of a nation-state, the challenges of a nation-state in the first years, determinants of state institutions, and uneven territorial reach of the state and unequal state presence across subnational units. Since the formation processes of a nation-state mostly happen in the same setting and challenges, the arguments of this study are applicable for different cases.

I conduct this research by focusing on two state institutions: Umumi Müfettişlik (the Inspectorates-General) and Halkevleri (People's Houses). The reason why I choose these two institutions comes from the fact that these two institutions were established for calling specific duties. Therefore, I consider these two institutions extraordinary due to their feature of being founded when deemed necessary. Secondly, these two institutions are entirely different from each other. Umumi Müfettişlik was an institution with exceptional military power to observe society and take measures for potential dangers (Koçak 2003). On the other hand, the main aim of Halkevleri was to fill the gap between the state and the civil society by disseminating the principles of Kemalism through cultural activities (Karaömerlioğlu 1998; Şimşek 2005). Therefore, I consider Umumi Müfettişlik as a coercive institution and Halkevleri as a regulatory institution.

Furthermore, 18 rebellions emerged in these years, and all but except one were enacted by the Kurdish people in the eastern provinces. For this reason, I regard the Kurdish people as the territorial challengers who demanded to gain independence from the Turkish state and create a new state in the territory. On the other hand, I consider the Turkish people as organizational challengers. The reason for that is that the Turkish people exposed to radical transformation had a great dissatisfaction towards the Republican cadres' policies. Based on this dissatisfaction, the Turkish people revealed their challenges to the state elite in the first opportunity that they have taken with the local election. Thus, the Republican cadres realized the Turkish people's potential to change the government in the general election; in other words, they recognized their challenges to them.

In order to examine these relationships between the population and state institutions, I employ the mixed method while combining the qualitative and quantitative methods. First, I use the qualitative method to demonstrate causal mechanisms between these relationships. Therefore, I employ the process-tracing method used to generate the causal mechanism. At the same time, second, I employ the quantitative method to present the causal effect on factors that affect the establishment of these state institutions. For this reason, I create my original data to test these hypothesized relationships. While collecting data at the province level as a jurisdictional unit, I consult various studies, historical documents, and censuses. In this regard, my dataset covers 58 provinces in the years between 1923 and 1950 and includes 1624 observations.

Based on the qualitative and quantitative evidence, I conclude that the Republican elites have determined and located the type of state institutions considering the existence of challengers in provinces. The Republican cadres have taken the presence of the territorial challengers into consideration while deciding the location of Umumi Müfettişlik. Therefore, based on the statistical analysis, I find empirical support for which the density of Kurdish people increases the probability of establishing Umumi Müfettişlik. On the other hand, the statistical analysis provides empirical support that the Republican cadres were more likely to establish Halkevleri in the Turkish-populated and non-rebelled provinces.

As a result, the choice of the Republican cadres regarding the state institution and their location constitutes the uneven territorial reach of the Turkish state. The reason for that comes from the varying level of the state presence through these institutions in the territory. The number of Halkevleri is high in the western provinces while this number decreases in the eastern provinces. On the other hand, Umumi Müfettişlik was mainly established in the eastern provinces. However, this institution was not opened in provinces in the western and central Anatolia regions. As I emphasized above, these institutions manifest different aspects of state power. While Halkevleri reveals the regulatory aspect of state power, Umumi Müfettişlik exposes the coercive aspect of state power. For this reason, the Republican cadres preferred to demonstrate the coercive power of the state to the eastern provinces to audit the Kurdish people. However, they had chosen to show the regulatory power of the state in the western provinces to transform the Turkish people into more compliant with the state. Therefore, since the uneven territorial reach of the state determines the level of the state capacity, I conclude that the Turkish state developed unequal state capacity in the territory.

As a result, this thesis aims to demonstrate these findings, and it proceeds as follows.

In the first chapter, I present how I select the Turkish Republic as a case and the basic facts that make this case puzzle. After that, I present methods that I aim to employ while examining this case. In the second chapter, I give the literature review regarding the state and state capacity. In this section, I provide a bunch of studies emphasizing different aspects of the state while explaining the state capacity. Moreover, I examine studies that give an explanation for the development of the Turkish state capacity. After that, I present the theoretical framework of this thesis based on the relational tradition that emphasizes the interactions between the state and society in explaining the state capacity. I also provide the main hypotheses of this thesis derived from the theoretical expectation in this chapter.

In the third chapter, I give a detailed analysis on the uneven territorial reach of the Turkish state by employing qualitative and quantitative methods. In the first section, I explain how the Turkish Republic emerged as a nation-state with the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. The second section of this chapter explains the reforms, which the Republican cadres initiated, to organize and transform the state and society. Based on these reforms, the third section explicates the emergence of territorial and organizational challengers and the establishment of Halkevleri and Umumi Müfettişlik. While explicating them, I demonstrate the causal mechanism that connects the specific events that affected the Republican cadres to establish these state institutions. After presenting causal mechanisms, I switch to statistical analysis to test hypotheses. In light of evidence derived from employing qualitative and quantitative methods regarding Halkevleri and Umumi Müfettişlik, I discuss the Turkish state's uneven territorial reach and unequal state capacity in the territory in the last section of the third chapter. Finally, I summarize the findings, and discuss the limitation of this thesis and provide further research regarding the state capacity in the conclusion chapter.

1.1 Case Selection and Puzzle

As is indicated in the introduction section, I am investigating the first three decades of the Turkish Republic, where the Republican cadres endeavored to create a nation-state in the modern sense by making various reforms in the institutional and social areas. For this reason, I need to answer the following questions: Why do I select the Turkish Republic as a case? What makes the Turkish Republic puzzle?

In the late period of the Ottoman Empire, the state authorities attempted to control the periphery by initiating reforms that aimed to spread the bureaucratic-

administrative networks over the territory. These efforts to transform the system of governance to direct rule through bureaucratic mechanisms were deemed as one of the necessary measures that state elites had to take in order to extract more resources and draw the human resources required for the bureaucracy and the military. However, the Ottoman authorities did not fully succeed in maintaining effective control over peripheral areas due to the resistance of provincial power-holders to these reforms (Karpas 1972; Yaycıoğlu 2011; Zürcher 2014) and the low administrative capacity of the central state (Karaman 2009; Ma and Rubin 2019).


After the fall of the Ottoman empire, Republican elites under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal have begun a fast and challenging state-building process to create a secular, centralized, and unified Turkey on the basis of nation-state model. The most crucial barrier making this process challenging is that a severe vacuum of authority has emerged in the territory, especially provinces far away from the central state after the fall of the Ottoman empire. This inefficiency to control some provinces was one of the significant problems inherited by the Turkish Republic, and the Republican elites were aware of this inefficiency. For this reason, the Republican elites improved the state capacity in these years, thereby maintaining effective control over territory. Graph 1 shows the development process of the state capacity of the Turkish state over the years. The dataset that I use to generate this graph comes from the dataset of O'Reilly and Murphy (2020).

Since many datasets measure the state capacity in the literature, I need to clarify the reasons why I prefer this dataset. The reason why I use this dataset is two-fold. The first is that these authors generate their dataset from the Varieties of Democracy dataset, a consistently used dataset in the political science discipline. Secondly, these authors use six different variables, which include “the rule of law, the authority of the state over its territory, the rigorousness and impartiality or public administration, whether public expenditures are on particularistic or public goods, the modernity of the state’s source of its revenue, and the universality of the provision of education” (O'Reilly and Murphy 2020, 3). Together with the fact that these variables are capable of measuring the reach of the state over the territory, especially one of these variables, namely the authority of the state over its territory, is the variable that I aim to examine in the case of the Turkish Republic.

Therefore, this graph is able to show how the Republican elites improved the state capacity after the proclamation of the Republic. As shown in this graph, while the level of the state capacity in the late period of the Ottoman Empire was deficient, this level had dramatically increased from 1923 to 1950 when Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP) was in power. Furthermore, this level

had endured until 1950, when the CHP lost power, and Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, DP) won the election. However, after this year, the level of the state capacity has slightly decreased to below zero. For this reason, examining these years to grasp how the Republican elites improved the state capacity would be very informative for the scholars, and thus its results would be precious for the literature.

Figure 1.1 The Turkish State Capacity




In addition to that, since Graph 1 shows the level of the state capacity at the aggregate level, it says nothing about the subnational variation of the state capacity. Together with the fact that the Republican cadres dramatically improved the state capacity in these years, this development of the state capacity has been reflected in different ways in the territory. Thus, the main argument of this study is that the Republican cadres had unevenly built the state capacity in the territory in these years. In this regard, the main argument of this thesis differs from studies in the literature since most of the studies analyze the Turkish state capacity as one unit. However, I am investigating the development of the Turkish state capacity at the subnational level, and thus, I aim to demonstrate that the state capacity of the Turkish state had not developed in the same way in the territory.

To reiterate, one of the major problems inherited from the Ottoman Empire is the inefficient control of the state over some parts of the territory. The Republican elite has realized the outcome of this incapability with the 18 rebellions, which

emerged in these years (Tunçay 1999). Except for one, all rebellions emerged in the eastern provinces of Turkey. These rebellions were enacted by the Kurdish people in aiming to gain independence from the Turkish Republic and create an independent Kurdish state in the Turkish territory. In addition to the inefficient control over the population, the Republican cadres had a problem with reaching society. The main reason for that is that the Ottoman Empire could not spread the educational institution, which is the primary institution to make a connection between state and society, over the territory. Because of these reasons, the inability of the Republican cadres to control society and regulate the social relationship is an undeniable fact for these years.

Figure 1.2 The Number of Schools and Administrative Buildings in 1927



To demonstrate the capabilities of the state over the territory, I create two maps that show the number of schools and administrative buildings ¹. The state presence over provinces through schools and administrative buildings shows the capability of the state to reach over the territory (Soifer 2015b). Although the reasons for the difference of the state presence between provinces require an in-depth examination, nevertheless, these maps are able to reveal the spatial variation of the state presence

¹The number of these buildings comes from the census conducted by the state in 1927. I used the current borders of the provinces in these maps. As of 2021, Turkey is divided into 81 provinces. In 1927, this number was 63. As I will explain below, I have combined some provinces because there are social and economic similarities between some provinces. Therefore, there are 58 provinces in my dataset. I show which provinces I have combined in Table A.1 in Appendix.

over the territory as a preliminary finding. As can be understood from these two maps ², the number of these institutions varies according to provinces. The number of schools is lesser in the eastern provinces than in the western provinces. In the same way, while the number of administrative buildings is less in the eastern provinces, this number increases when looking at the western provinces. Moving from these maps, it is possible to see the variation of the territorial reach of the state and thus the state capacity across subnational units in the fourth year of the Turkish Republic.

For these reasons, the following question arises: How did the Republican elites improve the reach of the state in the sense of control over the territory and regulation of social relations? My answer to this question is that the Republican cadres established new state institutions and radiated them across the territory. These state institutions were Umumi Müfettişlik and Halkevleri. What makes these institutions different from other institutions is that these state institutions were founded for the specific needs I explained above. While Umumi Müfettişlik has been equipped with exceptional military power to control the civil society (Koçak 2003), Halkevleri has been founded for the need to fill the gap between the state and the civil society by disseminating the principles of Kemalist ideology with cultural activities (Karaömerlioğlu 1998; Şimşek 2005).

However, the Republican elites have unevenly established these institutions across the territory, and thus the number of institutions varies according to provinces. Umumi Müfettişlik has been primarily established in the eastern provinces and some provinces in the black sea and Thrace regions, but this institution did not exist in provinces in the western and central Anatolia regions. On the other hand, although Halkevleri has been established in the eastern provinces, the number of Halkevleri is meager in these provinces, and the number of Halkevleri is relatively high in provinces outside of this region.

The selection of different institutions and the changing quantity of these institutions across provinces generate uneven penetration and unequal presence of the Turkish state in the territory and makes me ask the following question: Why did the Republican cadres establish these institutions as varying numbers across provinces despite the fact that this selection procedure created an uneven territorial reach of the state, thereby building an uneven state capacity varying to subnational units?

What makes this question unique for the literature is that none of the studies in the literature address this question. As will be emphasized in the literature review

²Since Hatay was not connected to the Turkish Republic in 1927, there are no data for this province. Hatay was connected to the Turkish Republic in 1939.

chapter below, studies focusing on the Turkish state capacity mainly investigate it at the aggregate level and neglect the development of the Turkish state capacity at the subnational level. Because of these reasons, these studies have not developed a satisfactory analysis on the development of the Turkish state capacity. In this regard, my study is the first study that asks and answers this question in the literature thereby, making the first attempt to examine the subnational variation of the Turkish state capacity based on quantitative and qualitative evidence.

Therefore, this study reveals the origin of the current problems related to state capacity in the Turkish Republic. The fact that the uneven territorial reach of the state results in unequal social good provision (Chadha and Nandwani 2018; Gao 2016; Giraudy and Luna 2017; Singh and vom Hau 2016; Soifer 2015*a*), inequality (López 2018) across provinces is demonstrated in various studies in the literature. Even if my study does not examine the outcomes of the uneven state capacity in the Turkish Republic, the findings of this study will become the pioneer for coming studies that may analyze the outcomes originating from the territorial reach of the state.

Lastly, my study is the candidate to demonstrate the preliminary findings for the question focusing on whether the uneven pattern of the state capacity endures in the Turkish Republic. The findings regarding the uneven state capacity built in the first years of the Republic carry hints about the enduring pattern for the whole Republic history. As a result, together with the fact that this question contributes to the literature and conceives new questions related to the state capacity, it provides an opportunity to find the sources of the problems with which the Turkish Republic currently encounters. Therefore, the puzzle of this study addresses the real-world problem and fills the gap in the literature.

1.2 Method

As indicated by my research question, my research aims to analyze the case of the Turkish Republic. Before I proceed to the following paragraphs where I discuss three methods, namely case study, the comparative method, the process-tracing, the mixed-method in which I aim to apply, the selection procedure needs its own justification and thereby should clarify the following question: How did I select the Turkish state as the case? The first criterion for case selection is that a selected case should represent a sample and vary according to the theoretical expectation (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 296). In this regard, one can select one case or more

as dependent on several techniques.

I argue that my research is a typical case study, which exemplifies one specific relationship, which is observable in countries where elites of a nation-state unevenly build the state capacity due to the existence of challengers to the state and also different ethnic groups (Giraudy and Luna 2017; O'Donnell 1993; Soifer 2015a). Therefore, I select the Turkish Republic as the typical case to confirm or disconfirm a widely recognized relationship in the literature. In this regard, I assert that the Turkish Republic carries features that represent the whole population.

Firstly, the Turkish Republic attempted to build the modern state in the years when most of the modern nation-state were emerging. Since the period of the Turkish state-building process temporarily coincided with other state's building processes, the activities of the Turkish state elites in this process can serve as a model to grasp the other state elites' activities. Secondly, the Turkish Republic is a nation-state that was founded based on the Turks. In the constitution 1924 accepted after the proclamation of the Republic, Article 88 explicitly states that all citizens of the Turkish Republic are called Turk without the distinction of religion and race (Earle 1925, 98).

Together with that, thirdly, there were six different ethnic groups in the territory, as distinctively stated in the census conducted in 1927 (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü 1928). These ethnic groups were Kurdish, Greek, Armenian, Arabic, Jewish, Circassian. Although other ethnic groups existed in the territory in these years, I emphasize these groups because the officers who conducted the census provided separate information about the population of these groups. For this reason, rather than other ethnic groups, the Republican elites might have regarded the aforementioned ethnic groups as major ethnic groups. As a result, it is possible to say that the Turkish Republic is a nation-state where different ethnic groups exist.

Lastly, as is stated in the previous sections, there were 18 rebellions that emerged in these years. In addition to that, the result of the 1930 municipality election held in the condition, which was not free and fair (Tunçay 1999), revealed that people did not internalize the ideas of the Republican elites, thereby being reactive to these reforms. These disagreements between the state and society indicate the existence of challenges to the state and the state elites and, thus, the existence of challengers in these years. For these reasons, the case of the Turkish Republic has the capacity to exemplify the impact of the interactions between a nation-state and ethnic groups on the state-building process and the state capacity. The findings of my research or the theoretical framework that I use in this research is applicable to the other state-building process.

As a result, I focus on one case to investigate a causally constructed relationship. Since focusing on one case without a temporal or spatial variation is not logically feasible (Gerring 2004, 344), I examine the early period of the Turkish Republic, which consists of twenty-seven years. Therefore, this case is similar to Case Study I in this respect (Gerring 2004, 343). At the same time, my puzzle expects the subnational or within-unit variation of the territorial reach of the state in a given territory. In this regard, as Snyder (2001) suggests, I scale down the unit of analysis from country to province as a jurisdictional unit (Soifer 2019) to observe the subnational variation within a case. By doing that, my aim is also to solve the fundamental problem of case studies, namely many variables, small N, by increasing the number of cases (George and Bennett 2005; Lijphart 1975, 163). Furthermore, since my research aims to analyze a causal relationship at the subnational level rather than presenting descriptive analysis in which case study is more appropriate, scaling down to increase observations enables this research to demonstrate the causal inference in a better way. Within this framework, this research corresponds to time-series cross-sectional research design (Gerring 2004, 343).

Together with that, since my study focuses on the process of state elites' attempts to build the state capacity in the territory, this research carries a claim to construct causal mechanisms about the reasons of state elites to build uneven state capacity. Apart from the causal mechanism, because of the fact that this research employs the statistical analysis, it also carries a claim to demonstrate the causal effect, which emerges from the probabilistic relationship between dependent and independent variables, in order to confirm the theory.

In this sense, in addition to the case study method, I employ the comparative method with many cases to test the theory and process tracing to construct causal mechanisms. As is discussed above, my research compares 58 jurisdictional units in the Turkish Republic. The existence of data on 58 provinces in 27 years of time span enables this research to employ the statistical method (Lijphart 1975, 116). The statistical method is more successful in observing the causal effect in intra-unit comparisons than countries due to the presence of controlled comparison (George and Bennett 2005; Lijphart 1975, 168) and a high degree of similarity between units. Therefore, the whole-nation bias, which mostly appears in the statistical method employed for countries, will no problem in my research. However, it can draw one's critique because of the "whole-province" bias. Therefore, since there are no data on the district level, this research may suffer from this bias. Nevertheless, my study minimizes the drawbacks that emerge from this problem as much as it can.

In addition to that, my research provides analysis in the light of historical data

collected from archival sources, which have not been used in any research. These data include the location of rebellions, the number of state institutions, the general population as well as the population of ethnic groups by mother tongue, GDP per capita, the distance of the institution from the capital city, the density of population the area measure of the province. In this regard, this research might have a reliability problem. That being said, these data have been mined from open archival sources, so one who doubts these data may consult these archival resources and replicate my result to measure the reliability. Last but not least, the statistical method speaks about the causal effect, which bears on the correlation between dependent and independent variables. Thus, the statistical method does say nothing about the causal mechanism. In this regard, my research carries a claim to solve this drawback with the process-tracing method about which I explicate below.

Therefore, in addition to the statistical analysis, my research employs the process-tracing method to solve the validity problem arising from the causal effect. Even though I control intervening variables by adding them to the regression analysis, the statistical method still observes only the causal effect of these intervening variables. For this reason, it is not capable of ruling out the alternative explanations that are candidates to substitute the main explanation hypothesized by the theory (Falleti and Mahoney 2015; George and Bennett 2005, 152). In this regard, employing the process-tracing method will reveal the causal mechanism that connects the dependent and independent variables by ruling out alternative explanations through process-tracing tests (Falleti and Mahoney 2015; George and Bennett 2005, 153).

In order to employ the process-tracing method properly, I use one of the comparative sequential methods, which scholars of comparative-historical analysis conceptualize, to systematically analyze events as being causally connected to one another (Falleti and Mahoney 2015, 216). The causal linkage that my research expects is a probabilistic linkage rather than being deterministic. In this sense, I will juxtapose events that are causally ordered as follow: the rise of a nation-state; the state reforms that organize and transform the state and society; the emergence of challengers, which separates into two as territorial challengers and organizational challengers; the establishment of coercive and regulatory institutions; the uneven territorial reach of the state. In this sequence, I consider the rise of the nation-state as a necessary background condition; the reforms to centralize, secularize, unify the nation-state as the first event that leads to the emergence of challengers; the establishment of coercive and regulatory institutions as the precautionary event to reach across the territory; and the uneven territorial reach of the state as the end result.

As a result, I employ the mixed-method strategy in this study by combining quan-

titative and qualitative methods. One of the recently used methods in political science is a mixed-method strategy, especially a nested analysis (Ahmed and Sil 2012; Lieberman 2005). A nested analysis is a mixed-method strategy that combines statistical analysis employed for a large sample with an in-depth examination of one or more cases drawn from a full sample (Lieberman 2005, 435-436). The main contribution of the nested analysis is the improvement of "the quality of conceptualization and measurement, analysis of rival explanations, and overall confidence in the central findings of a study" (Lieberman 2005, 436). However, it is worth emphasizing that employing a nested analysis is not a method that necessarily leads to improve the conclusion (Ahmed and Sil 2012) and may generate ambiguity rather than clarity (Lieberman 2005). According to Ahmed and Sil (2012, 936), the mixed-method can only be employed in studies, which "proceed from a similar empiricist perspective to examine the covariance of particular variables within a common set of boundary conditions."

As being aware of these risks of using the mixed-method research, I combine the process-tracing method in the sense of generating causal-process observations through the comparative sequential method with the statistical analysis. As is stated previously, in addition to the fact that my project focuses on one case through employing the process-tracing method, it also employs Large N analysis to examine causal effect between dependent and independent variables in 58 jurisdictional units. For this reason, my project is able to employ a mixed-method strategy.

However, I have to answer the following question: How do I employ the nested analysis? As I emphasized above, my study focuses on the reasons why the Turkish Republic had uneven reach over its territory, thereby being developed unequal state capacity across provinces. For this question, my argument is that the Republican elites have constructed state presence at a varying level regarding the number and type of institutions in provinces because of contentious politics. Therefore, I employ process tracing to present the causal mechanism between these events and state elites' preference to establish these institutions, i.e., to generate causal-process observations (Dunning 2014). By doing that, I aim to demonstrate the causal connection between these sequential events, thereby reach the hypothesized relationship. Since the research question expects the variation of a state's territorial reach at the subnational level, my study examines this variation in 58 provinces of the Turkish Republic.

Therefore, my study becomes a study that employs the quantitative method to test the hypothesized relationship in the time-series cross-sectional data empirically. My dataset covers 58 provinces and a 27-year time span. In this regard, my dataset

makes my study possible to employ statistical analysis. However, the result of the statistical analysis is to present a causal effect, thereby being insufficient to demonstrate a causal mechanism. For this reason, readers might have a doubt about the causal mechanism and raise some alternative explanations. For these doubts and alternative explanations, I may overcome these challenges by using the process-tracing method. According to Dunning (2014, 216), using the process-tracing method helps “validation of assumptions about causal process that are embedded in quantitative models.” In this sense, I need to return to the qualitative analysis to improve the robustness of the conclusion by ruling out these doubts and alternative explanations. In doing that, I present alternative explanations and demonstrate why these explanations are not sufficient to rule out my explanations. If I rule out these explanations and reach a satisfactory conclusion, then I end my analysis. This is how I employ a nested analysis in my study in following the framework that is offered by Lieberman (2005, 436).

Furthermore, my study, as is emphasized above, aims to investigate the Turkish state’s development process of state capacity in the territory in the years between 1923 and 1950 when the state elites attempted to construct a modern state. For this purpose, this study analyzes a historical process when the interactions between the state elite and society happened. Thus, I need to examine historical studies and historical documents to reveals what happened in those years.

I examine historical studies to understand how specific events happened and affected the state elite and society, while I examine historical documents such as censuses conducted in these years in order to observe the population. Since official state institutions do not give information regarding the population in these years, I had to look at these censuses conducted in 1927 (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü 1928), 1935 (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü 1937), 1940 (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü 1941), 1945 (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü 1950), and 1950 (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü 1961). In those censuses, there are some irregularities for the population of minority groups between these years. Moreover, because of the Turkification policy that the Turkish state implemented in those years, some members of the minority groups hesitated to explain their mother tongue (Dündar 2000). Therefore, these censuses do not have consistent information about the population. Nevertheless, the reason why I use these censuses is that there is no other study that provides detailed information about the population of ethnic minority groups. Moreover, the state elites did not have other information but these censuses to determine the locations of people in the territory. Therefore, the state elites used these censuses to determine their policies. As being aware of these inconsistencies and irregularities, I am using these censuses to observe the relationship between state policies and population. Furthermore, for

the number of Halkevleri, I observe official documents ³ taking place in the state archive. These documents were produced by the state officials, and various studies use these documents for the number of Halkevleri.

For the historical studies, there is one central bias that a researcher should consider when s/he uses these historical studies: the selection bias (Lustick 1996; Thies 2002). This selection bias emerges from two reasons. The first one is that a historian may present a distorted narration of historical events by excluding specific primary sources. The second is that a political scientist may focus on only one historian's studies and exclude other historians' works (Thies 2002, 359). In order to overcome these problems, what a political scientist should do is that s/he never relies on one historian's works and should check the narration on these events with other historians' studies within the same historical tradition or in other traditions (Thies 2002, 360). Based on these suggestions, I am attentive to using multiple historical sources in the same tradition and coming from other traditions. It is worth emphasizing that I rely on the tradition where historians produce historical studies based on documents in the state archive. These sources collect documents from state archives and produce studies based on these documents. For example, studies such as *Umumi Müfettişlikler (1927-1952)* (Koçak 2003), *Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları* (Hâllî 1992) are the historical studies, which use documents collected from state archives. In addition to that, another type of historical study that I use in this study is the memoirs of state officials. This type of historical source includes detailed information on specific events and opinions of high-level officers on these events.

As a result of this method section, I explicitly aimed to demonstrate which methods are employed in this study. As a summary, my research uses the tools of qualitative and quantitative methods, thereby employing nested-analysis as one of the mixed-method strategies. Firstly, by following the sequences, which I will discuss in a detailed manner below after the literature review and theory chapters, I will demonstrate how these sequences are causally connected to each other. In doing that, I will present the causal mechanism on how the state elites decided to establish these state institutions by employing the process-tracing. After reaching the causal mechanism, I will examine the causal effect of this mechanism in the Large N. As depending on the result of statistical analysis, I will examine some alternative explanations and rule out these explanations in order to make my research more robust and valid. I will conclude my findings with this analysis and be ending this research.

³Directorate of State Archives Republican Archives. Fond Number: 490-1-0-0; 3-15-17, 847-351-1

2. THE STATE AND THE STATE CAPACITY

2.1 Literature Review

The influential book, “Bringing State Back In” written by Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol (1985), has transformed the theoretical understanding of state literature in a way that scholars put the state at the center in their approach. This group of scholars criticizes the society-centered approach, which conceptualizes the state as an arena where economic interest groups or normative social groups struggle to shape public policy decisions (Skocpol 1985, 4). The main criticism of Evans and his colleagues (1985) towards the society-centered approach originates from the argument that the state is more than an arena because the state has autonomous power, which enables it to structure the relationship between civil society and authority as well as many relationships within civil society. In this sense, neo-statist scholars suggest that the state should be regarded as an actor regulating social relations rather than an instrument used by social groups to make public decisions (Skocpol 1985).

As a result of the neo-statist arguments’ acceptance in the literature from the 1980s onward, this theoretical framework provides new methodological tools and resources to scholars to examine the state, its apparatus, and activities comprehensively. Rather than examining only the effect of economic relations on public decisions, treating the state as an actor taking an active role in society enabled scholars to investigate “the observable variations of state strength, state autonomy, or the scope of state policies between regions and countries” (Quiles 2019, 32). Thus, state capacity emerges as the central concept that captures these features of the state.

In this regard, state capacity and its outcomes, which include many issues such as economic growth, the welfare system, the stability of the political regime, the presence of the state, subnational variation of state capacity, have been systematically examined in the literature (Berwick and Christia 2018; Cingolani 2018; Enriquez

and Centeno 2012; Soifer and vom Hau 2008). However, studies do not develop a common approach to conceptualizing and operationalizing state capacity in the literature. These studies can be differentiated according to their ontological understanding of the state and its functions (Quiles 2019, 32). Improving on the Weberian understanding of the state, these studies explicate the origin of state capacity by emphasizing three distinctive features of the state, namely the monopoly of violence, the bureaucracy, and the territory. Therefore, in following the categorization of Cingolani (2018), it is possible to examine the literature three categories: The bellicist tradition, the Weberian tradition, and the relational tradition¹.

The studies of Tilly (1975; 1992) focusing on the formation process of European states generate the main argument of the bellicist tradition, which emphasizes the violent aspect of the state. Tilly (1992) elaborates his argument based on the incentives of the state to collect taxes by using its coercive power. In this process, the state, which wants to wage war, needs to collect taxes. Thus, these efforts of the state elites cause the neutralization of internal rivalries because the state eliminates people who refuse to pay taxes. In this sense, the attempts of the state to extract the revenues lead to increase and improve the administrative, coercive, and extractive functions of the state for making the process of collecting tax sustainable, waging a continuous war, and protecting the population (Tilly 1992).

In addition to the studies of Tilly, Geddes (1994) and Levi (1994, 10) emphasize the administrative, coercive, and extractive functions of the state as a source of its capacity. While Geddes (1994, 14) emphasizes the dependency of successful implementation of state-initiated policies on the capability of collecting tax, coercing, and creating effective administrative mechanisms, Levi (1994, 10) highlights the impact of the ruler's extractive incentives on the development of state capacity. In the same vein, Besley and Persson (2014, 106) argue that the ability to collect taxes is one of the main elements to explain the development of the state capacity, and they find a negative relationship between being developing countries and share of taxes in GDP. In line with Tilly's basic argument, Scheve and Stasavage (2014, 545) demonstrate that countries that participated in World War I systematically increased income tax rates during the war period, thereby developing progressive income taxation war.

Apart from the formation process of European states, the arguments of bellicist tradition are also applicable for the activities of colonial states because the main aim of the colonial powers is to extract revenues from colonized countries as much as possible. For this reason, these states improve administrative capacity more

¹In fact, Cingolani (2018) presents the literature under four categories. The category that I exclude is the political economy tradition since the aspect of political economy is not concern of this study.

in regions where revenue extraction is more possible, but not increase it in other regions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Huillery 2010; Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau 2006).

As a result, this tradition equates state capacity with the capabilities of the administrative, coercive, and extractive functions, thereby mainly focusing on the outcomes of these functions. According to Soifer and vom Hau (2008, 220), studies belonging to this tradition perceive the state as having high capacity if the state successfully establishes a monopoly of violence, enforces contracts, controls its populace, regulates institutions, extracts resources. Therefore, these studies use state capacity to explain outcomes, which originate from these capabilities, and they mostly use GDP per capita, military power, taxation power to measure the state capacity.

Secondly, studies regarded as part of the Weberian tradition primarily focus on the role of modern bureaucracy as a central actor, which has a mediating role in the relationship between conflict, resource extraction, and stateness (Cingolani 2018). Moving from the emphasis of Weber on the bureaucracy, these studies focus on the effect and role of the communications between the state apparatus, state elite, and bureaucratic actors while explaining the state capacity. For example, early studies of Skocpol (1979; 1985) explain the role of bureaucracy and skilled, loyal administrative staff as the precondition to implement and maintain the state's official goals. Her main emphasis on state capacity comes from the autonomy of bureaucracy, which enables the state to separate from the demands and interests of all social groups while setting its own goals (Skocpol 1985, 9). Therefore, the effectiveness of the state originates from the capability of attaining these goals by preserving the state's own goals from the impact of societal demands or interests. In this sense, this approach puts emphasis on the distinction between social forces and the state. Thereby, it considers the state and its bureaucratic capacity as omnipotent and unconstrained.

In addition to Skocpol's studies, Stepan (1985), Carpenter (2001), Evans (1995), Evans and Rauch (2000) also develop this understanding of state capacity and analyze the autonomy of bureaucracy in different cases. For example, while Stepan (1985, 318) focuses on the effect of authoritarian bureaucracy in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil, Carpenter (2001, 4) analyzes the consequences of bureaucratic autonomy in the United States. In the same vein, Evans (1995, 6) investigate the transformative role of bureaucracy's embedded autonomy in the economy in Brazil, India, and Korea. Moreover, Evans and Rauch (2000, 758) provide quantitative analysis about the effect of bureaucratic quality, conceptualized as "Weberianess", on the economic growth for 35 developing countries. Similarly, Andrews and his colleagues (2017) compare the capability of states based on governmental effectiveness,

which mainly consists of indicators measuring the ability of policy implementation, and they empirically demonstrate that governmental effectiveness increases the state capability.

In fact, these two traditions are more state-centric as to underestimate the role of social forces in the state-building process and development of state capacity. For example, the bellicist tradition excludes the effect of social forces on these two processes. The reason for that is that it gives more attributes to the incentives of the state to extract revenues than the social forces' formative impact on the state. In the same way, the Weberian tradition putting more emphasis on the bureaucracy regards state-building process and development of state capacity as dependent on only the activities of the bureaucracy and rigid separation of the bureaucracy from society. It does not mean that these traditions neglect the existence of social forces. However, looking at these processes without looking at social forces generates two main problems. The first problem is that these two approaches reinforce the existing sense of literature on the ambiguous boundary between state and society by excluding the effect of social forces. The reason for this problem comes from the fact that these traditions do not explicate the position of social forces in processes of state-building and the development of state capacity on whether these are active or passive participants. Therefore, analyzing the role of these participants in this ambiguous relationship is not persuasive and explanatory for the effect of forces in these processes. Moving from the first problem, the second problem is that not specifying the position of these participants in procedures inhibits making inferences on the subnational variation of the state capacity in a given territory. The reason is that the main obstacle that the state builds an equal state capacity in a territory is the existence of social forces, offered as the main endogenous factor that constructs a causal mechanism (Soifer 2015*b*). For this reason, the ambiguous position of social forces that these traditions suppose remains incapable of offering an approach to analyze the subnational variation of the state capacity.

On the contrary to these two traditions, the relational tradition emphasizes the interaction between the state and society in explaining the state formation and state capacity, thereby being regarded as less state-centric (Cingolani 2018). In addition to that, the relational tradition, which reviews the state as an actor developing a strategy by considering social forces, led to reconceptualize the relationship between the state and society. Thus, it removes the ambiguous boundary between state and society as suggested by the other two traditions (Cingolani 2018, 36) and the position of these two actors is precisely determined.

The prominent studies of this tradition come from studies of Migdal (1988) and

Mann (1984; 1986). In the prologue, Migdal (1988) explicitly argues that focusing on only the state provides a partial explanation for the relationship between the state and society. Thus, Migdal (1988) suggests that the impact of society on state activities is the precondition to illustrate the state as an actor that aims to penetrate society by competing with societal actors. For this reason, he states that the societal forces' strength at varying levels should be examined in explaining the state capacity (Migdal 1988).

In the same vein, Mann (1986) states that political power is essentially territorial due to the fact that the existence of political power depends on continuous protection in a given territorial area backed by the threat of physical force. Therefore, states have to reach across their territory to maintain political power, and this is a fundamental facet of state capacity (Soifer and vom Hau 2008; Soifer 2008). In this regard, the state is able to improve and increase its capacity as long as it penetrates civil society and implements logistically political decisions in the territory (Mann 1984, 113). For this reason, Mann (1984, 114) emphasizes the necessity of spreading bureaucratic mechanisms across the territory to build the infrastructural power as a part of state capacity, in turn, states are able to control civil society and regulate social relations within society. However, Mann (2012) asserts that the capacity of the state to penetrate civil society would not be equally developed and could show a variation in the territory because, according to the strength of active societal forces in the territory, so the state may not spread bureaucratic networks in specific territories.

Apart from the other two traditions, the main emphasis of this tradition is the role of the societal forces on building state capacity. Rather than the bellicist and Weberian traditions, which neglect the role of societal forces in explaining state capacity, the relational tradition considers societal forces as a part of the process of building state capacity. In this regard, these understandings assert that societal forces have an impact on the process of building state capacity in the sense that the hindering or constructive position of societal forces determines the degree of state capacity. Furthermore, this understanding, which combines territorial and functional dimensions, provides a new methodological tool to systematically examine the uneven variation of state capacity and reachability of states between countries and in subnational units (Quiles 2019, 35).

For example, Migdal (1988) explains the differences in the penetration ability of the states between Egypt, India, Israel, Mexico, and Sierra Leone based on the power of societal actors standing against authority, thereby classifying these states as either weak or strong. Moreover, O'Donnell (1993) suggests that the existence of many "brown areas" where states are not able to reach with legal and bureaucratic

mechanisms due to an ethnically heterogeneous population determines the variation of democratic stability between Latin American countries. For the same region, Whitehead (1995) argues that varying levels of state presence within the territory in Latin American countries originate from the failure of states to suppress local notables' non-compliance, in addition to inaccessibility and disinterest to control these areas. Similarly, Soifer (2015*b*) who examines the reach of Peruvian and Chilean governments in their territory, highlights the existence of different patterns for these two countries. Chile has completed the reachability of the state in the territory. However, because of the presence of powerful and great numbers of guerrilla organizations, which have been struggling with the Peruvian central authority for several decades, the state could not penetrate these regions where guerilla organizations show up.

In the same vein, Herbst (2000) argues that the reason why African states failed to build a strong state is the inability of states to control substantial outlying territories because of the presence of relatively low population density, complex physical geographies, the presence of artificial boundaries, and state systems. On the contrary to this exogenous argument, Boone (2003) finds the reasons for this inability of African states in the bargaining and political struggles, which happened between rulers, their rural allies, and their provincial rivals.

In addition to early examples of this tradition, more contemporary studies also find similar variations for the state capacity both within countries and between countries. These studies mainly focus on the outcomes of the state's uneven territorial reach ranging from the varying levels of public goods provision (Chadha and Nandwani 2018; Gao 2016; Giraudy and Luna 2017; Singh and vom Hau 2016; Soifer 2015*b*) and inequality (López 2018) to human rights violation (Holmes et al. 2021; Sullivan 2020) and democratic breakdown (López 2020). The common finding of these studies is that uneven territorial reach of the state, which originates from the ethnic fragmentation and incomppliance of these groups with the central authority, results in an unequal level of state capacity. Thereby, this differentiation of the state capability across subnational units leads that people could not equally get benefits from state resources.

For the Turkish case, there is conceptual confusion in explaining the process of state-building. Most of the studies that examine the early republican period tackle with nation-building process in which the Republican cadres aimed to unify the nation based on being a Turk by applying exclusionary policies. For this reason, these studies regard the institutionalization of the Turkish state as a part of the nation-building process (Aslan 2015; Bayar 2014; Kezer 2015; Üngör 2012). How-

ever, although these two processes are interchangeably used, as Smith (1986) emphasizes, state-building and nation-building are distinct processes that should be treated distinctively. Nation-building is a process in which the ideology of the state elites determines, so it explicates the institutional formation as a consequence of this process. On the other hand, analyzing state-building processes requires focusing on each element of a modern state, thereby explaining the institutional formation as a conscious choice to build a modern state.

Apart from studies explaining the formation process based on nation-building approach, scholars, who prefer to deal with this period as a state-building process, explain it as a continuum of Ottoman empire (Ahmad 1993; Lewis 2002; Zürcher 2010) and by focusing on the role of bureaucracy to create a modern-state (Esen 2014; Heper 2001; Jacoby 2004). However, these studies do not have a concern to explain the state capacity.

To my knowledge, not many studies deal with state capacity development in the sense of the territorial reach of the state and its subnational variation. Instead, these studies examine other aspects of state capacity's development during the Republican period, such as the development of coercive power (Aslan 2011; Belge 2011; Orhan 2012; Watts 2000; Çeğin 2014; Üngör 2012), economic resources (Turan and Öztan 2015), and the construction of legitimacy (Genç-Yılmaz 2013). In fact, these studies analyze the development of the state capacity as a consequence of unifying policies in following the approach of existing literature. For this reason, these studies take building state capacity as the outcomes of the state policies rather than a part of a deliberative process. Furthermore, these studies do not deal with the subnational variation of the state capacity. Thus, the causal mechanism that these studies offer fails to enlighten the building process of the state capacity in the territory. As a result, these studies remain incapable of illustrating the state capacity building in the territory and address its subnational variation.

In this regard, no research explains the building process of state capacity during the first years of the Turkish state and its subnational variation in the territory ². Thus, this thesis would fill this gap by offering different analytical aspects from studies in the literature and using various methods of political science, thereby contributing to the literature. Furthermore, the relational tradition from which this thesis derives its theoretical framework differentiates the approach of this thesis from other studies evaluating the development of state capacity as contingent upon different policies. As I emphasized before, the relational tradition explains the development of state

²There are some studies that focus on the varying level of state strength considering to the subnational level in the last years of the Ottoman Empire. I do not include these studies because I examine the first years of the Turkish Republic. For those who are interested, see; Emrence (2012).

capacity as the necessary measures to protect territorial political power. Based on this approach, this thesis considers the development of the state capacity during the Republican era as the planned policy of the Republican cadres, who were aware of the incapability of the state in some provinces through the challenges that societal forces raised. For this reason, this thesis explicitly falls in the relational tradition because of putting emphasis on the interactions between the state elites and societal forces to explain the development of the state capacity. Thus, rather than focusing on the consequences of the state functions without positioning societal forces that other two traditions make, the relational tradition emphasizes the role of societal forces in explaining the development of the state capacity. As is emphasized while presenting studies that focus on the Turkish state capacity, this type of understanding that indicates the position of societal forces in these processes has not been employed much in the Turkish literature. However, in this thesis, I explicitly locate the societal forces as challengers, which force state elites to improve the state capacity through territorial reach of the state. Therefore, this research theoretically contributes to the literature by presenting a distinct explanation for both the state-building process and building state capacity.

Furthermore, the emergence of resistance in the territory as a critical juncture that made the state elites realize the inability to the state control over some provinces generates one of the main hypotheses of this thesis. Thus, presenting a causal mechanism, which links these two processes, will be one of the other contributions to the literature. The reason for that is, as above-mentioned, the literature explains the territorial reach of the central state as a consequence of Turkification policies. Rather, I regard the territorial reach of the state as a part of the state-building process to increase the capabilities of the central state in aiming to control the territory and regulate the relationship between state elite and society as well as within society. Thus, employing the process-tracing method enables me to rule out alternative explanations. In doing so, I will present a causal mechanism on the efforts of the state elites to build the state capacity in the territory by considering whether territorial challengers were present. Thus, I will bring a new explanation in the literature on the state-building process of the Turkish state.

In addition to these, although I conduct this thesis as a case study by focusing only on the Turkish case, I examine the subnational variation of the state capacity because the unevenness of the state capacity across provinces is another hypothesis of this thesis. Thus, I examine the level of the state presence at the fifty-eight provinces in twenty-seven years span. This scaling down from country-unit to province-unit to compare the variation of the state presence at the jurisdictional units will be one of the features that make this thesis an original study in the literature. The

reason for that is that no study compares the subnational units in the literature on the state-building process of the Turkish state. In addition to that, comparing the subnational units in Turkey will reveal the unevenness of the Turkish state's capabilities across the territory. Thus, this thesis goes beyond the existing explanations of the studies, which mostly focus on one region, by demonstrating the variation of the state capacity in the territory.

In this regard, I use statistical analysis as a quantitative method tool to examine the varying level of the state capacity in fifty-eight provinces. Therefore, this thesis follows the recent trend in political science in which scholars use the mixed-method strategy to make hypotheses more robust. For this reason, I generate my original dataset, including many variables and twenty-seven years, by collecting observations from state archives and other studies. My dataset includes observations on the number of Halkevleri and Umumi Müfettişlik, the population of ethnic groups by mother tongue in provinces, the presence of resistances, area measurement of provinces, and GDP per capita. Thanks to the dataset, I observe the unevenness of the territorial reach of the state at the subnational level. As a result, I provide an empirical analysis on the causal effect of independent variables on the dependent variable. This feature of this thesis will be another unique contribution to the literature since this study provides a new dataset and empirical analysis to the literature on the Turkish state.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

In the literature on the state capacity that I presented in the previous section, there is a conceptual and methodological contradiction, which originates from variables used in studies to analyze the state capacity (Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar 2017; Enriquez and Centeno 2012; Soifer 2008). Centeno and his colleagues (2017, 7) argue that the danger for the state capacity comes from the blurring line between causes and outcomes, which generates a tautology in these studies. Because of this ambiguity, studies mainly analyze the outcomes, which the state capacity determines. To overcome this ambiguity, Centeno and his colleagues (2017, 8) make a distinction between outcomes and causes and articulate their distinction as follows: while outcomes are more related to state performance such as the capacity to collect taxes, economic performance, the causes of the state performance are connected to the organizational or state capacity. Based on this distinction, they state that after the understanding of the nature of politics, i.e., origins, the first thing to understand

the overall performance of the state is to focus on the organizational capability of the state, i.e., state capacity as the only source, which affects the performance of the state (Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar 2017, 8).

As a result, analyzing the state capacity is crucially important to understand why some states are more successful in economic growth, the maintenance of order and peace, and democratic inclusion than other states. In this regard, Centeno and his colleagues (2017, 10) present the following indicators as the elements, which generate the state capacity: Resources, presence of the state, mandarins, and coherence. Since each of these elements constitutes the subject of further research, I focus on only the state presence in this study, as I am trying to emphasize since the very beginning. Therefore, based on the assumptions of Centeno and his colleagues (2017), I argue that the presence of the state, i.e., the state territorial reach constitutes one part of the state capacity, and thus, it is vital for the state to perform well in the future. However, two questions arise regarding the state presence: Why is it vital, and how does the state accomplish it?

The theoretical framework of my study to answer these two questions bears on the understanding of state capacity and infrastructural power of Mann (1984; 1986; 2012). Mann, who is significantly influenced by Max Weber, develops relational understanding in which the interactions between the central state leaders, the radiating differentiated set of institutions and state personnel, and society constitute the state and its capacity (Soifer 2008). Mann (2012) states that Weber analyzes the state by differentiating three stages: the political power, the state, and the modern state, which explains the institutional development of the state. Weber thinks that political power, which ruling elites have, exists before the state, and thus its existence and order depend on its continuous protection “within a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical force” (Mann 2012, 55). Thus, Mann (2012, 55) claims that “political power is essentially territorial, and it is physically imposed by a specialized (implicitly centralized) staff.” In the second state, the state appears as a compulsory political organization, and its emergence is contingent upon the success of administrative staff to keep “the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” (Mann 2012, 55). For the third stage, Weber asserts that the modern state has emerged as a result of organized activities of the administrative staff, so-called bureaucracy and thus Mann (2012, 55) states that with the emergence of bureaucracy, routine, formalized, rationalized institutions have come to the scene to penetrate territories with both law and administration.

In this sense, Soifer (2015b) claims that because of the fact that the bureaucracy of

the modern state has emerged based on “a foundation of political power institutionalized in a monopoly of a legitimate force through a given territory,” the success of the modern state necessarily depends on the capability of “the state to reach, and exert its will over the population and territory, through the application of force as necessary.” In other words, the modern state has to reach the territory by expanding routine, formalized, rationalized institutions to penetrate society, thereby governing society. In this sense, the territorial reach of the modern state is vital to perpetuating the existence of the state. It means that the modern state survives in the territory as long as it accomplishes the territorial reach.

For the second question regarding the techniques used by the state to accomplish the territorial reach, the infrastructural power, which is conceptualized by Mann (1984), elucidates the capability of the state to reach all parts of the territory and penetrate the society. Mann (1984) puts emphasis on the four features of the state. According to him, the state is “(1) a differentiated set of institutions and personnel (2) embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a center, to cover a (3) territorially demarcated area over which it exercises (4) some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force” (Mann 1984, 112). Moving from this definition, it is possible to regard the state as a political network, which spreads to the territory from a center, aiming to control civil society and regulate the relations in a given territory through a differentiated set of institutions and personnel. In this sense, Mann, who establishes the relationality between the state and society as such, brings three collective actors into the forefront: central state leaders, the radiating differentiated set of institutions and state personnel, and society (Soifer 2008).

As depending on this triangular relationship, Mann (1984) offers two types of state power in which the state elite can be regarded as powerful. These are despotic and infrastructural powers. While despotic power refers to “the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society group,” infrastructural power means “the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann 1984, 113). The despotic power is more related to the monolithic power, which is performed upon society as a one-way relation. On the other hand, infrastructural power is much more influenced by Weberian understanding of the state, and it refers to the radiating a differentiated set of routine, formalized, rationalized institutions, and state personnel from the center to periphery to penetrate civil society and to show its existence to peripheral areas. Soifer (2008) argues that infrastructural power is the vital element of the state, which eases to control the distant places from the central state and regulate the relations there

through the bureaucracy.

Regarding the second question, based on the assumptions of Mann, which I present above, I argue that the ability of the state to penetrate, thereby controlling society and regulating the relationship between the state and society and within society, depends on the degree of infrastructural power that the state has. In other words, the state obtains effective control over society as much as it can penetrate the territory, which it claims the right to rule, with its own bureaucratic networks. Thus, the state elites aiming the effective control over the territory should increase its infrastructural power by radiating a differentiated set of institutions and personnel from the center to the periphery. In this sense, the state elites may succeed the territorial reach by expanding the infrastructural power. For this reason, I regard the state territorial reach as a technique of increasing the infrastructural power, thereby the state capacity.

Here, it is needed to clarify one point that is related to my aim with this study. Since the modern state has three collective actors, as I emphasize above, Soifer (2008) argues that each relationship between these three actors explains the unique aspect of central state power to execute its power over societal actors in a given territory. In other words, he claims that these three actors, in fact, are different facets of state infrastructural power (Soifer 2008, 235). Thus, while the relationship between the central state and society explains the capabilities of the state to exercise control, the relationship between the radiating state institutions and society reveals the effects, or weight, of the state on societal power networks (Soifer 2008, 235). Lastly, the examination of the relationship between the central state and radiating institutions captures the spatial reach of the state and its subnational variation (Soifer 2008, 235). Thus, I aim to examine the relationship between the central state and its radiating a set of differentiated institutions and personnel, thereby focusing on the spatial reach of the state and its subnational variation.

However, the intention of the state elite for the penetration of society through institutions and personnel may not result in what they expect to. In other words, despite how much state elites want to penetrate to society and reach the territory through the bureaucratic mechanism, the ability of the state territorial reach and what type of mechanism the state will use is contingent upon whether social forces comply with the central authority. For the issue regarding the variation of state territorial reach, Giraudy and Luna (2017, 93) make two central assumptions about its possible outcome and the degree of territorial control. Firstly, they state that the clashes and negotiations between central state elites and non-state actors over the control of territory determine the degree of the state territorial reach, which is

inherently political and distributive. Thus, secondly, they claim that the strength of the central state elites to control territory is not absolute but relative (Giraudy and Luna 2017, 93). Based on these two assumptions, they argue that determinant factors for the unevenness of the state territorial reach are the struggle between the central state elite and non-state actors and their respective intentions and resources to control the territory (Giraudy and Luna 2017, 93). In this sense, as similar to the emphasis of Mann (1984), the penetration of the state to society, i.e., the state territorial reach, is a relational process to which the interactions between the state elites and social forces determine.

Based on these assumptions, Giraudy and Luna (2017, 97) define the state territorial reach as “an intrinsically political and distributive outcome that results from confrontations and compromises between national state officials who seek to expand state authority over peripheral (meaning subnational) territories, and the territorial challengers who seek to resist it.” Moving from this definition, they present four ideal types of state territorial reach depending on the incentives and resources of the state elites and challengers. The types of the state territorial reach are the following: (1) unrestricted, (2) contested, (3) unprojected, and (4) restricted. Each type of state territorial reach is classified based on the resources and incentives of the state elites and challengers. For example, the unrestricted type of state territorial reach implies a situation where state elites have high incentives and resources but low for challengers. On the other hand, the contested type indicates a situation where both state elites and challengers have high resources and incentives to control the territory. Figure 2.1 presents the classification of the ideal types for the state territorial reach, which is taken from Giraudy and Luna (2017).

Figure 2.1 Ideal Types of State Territorial Reach (Giraudy and Luna 2017, 98)

State officials’ incentives and resources to control the territory	High	(1) Unrestricted	(2) Contested
	Low	(4) Unprojected	(3) Restricted
		Low	High
	Incentives and resources of subnational non-state actors (i.e., territorial challengers) to control parts of the territory		

I need to open a parenthesis here about the challengers. Giraudy and Luna (2017, 94-95) specifically focus on the territorial challengers’ impact on the state territorial reach. The concept of territorial challengers refers to non-state subnational actors,

which include insurgent groups, armed rebels, drug traffickers, and warlords, as well as indigenous groups seeking territorial autonomy to defend communal models of governance. These groups aim to neutralize the authority of the state, its regulations, and its institutions. In fact, Giraudy and Luna (2017) borrow this concept from Eaton (2012). Eaton (2012, 644) describes three distinct but interrelated transformations in the Latin American context; democratization, liberalization, and decentralization. These transformations are the outcomes of the specific policies of the state elites, and since these policies aim to transform the existing structure in the state and society, they generate challenges thereby, leading to the emergence of challengers. In determining the type of challengers, Eaton (2012, 648) uses the two-dimensional approach of the infrastructural power, i.e., the spatial/territorial and organizational/relational powers, and determines the type of challengers by looking at the challenges that non-state subnational actors rise against these powers. As Soifer and vom Hau (2008) emphasize, the infrastructural power of the state emerges from the territorially constructed state organizations as well as the organizational entwining between state and societal actors. The territorial challengers, which I explained who they are above, thrive in the territory where the state does not yet establish state presence. In this regard, these challengers stand against the state's policy, which aims bringing to an end the relative autonomy of these groups (Eaton 2012, 648). Thus, territorial challengers as a concept are more apprehensible. However, it is worth dwelling on the concept of organizational challengers because it might be more confusing.

The organizational entwining between state and societal actors refers to the situation where the state works with the societal actors in order to achieve official goals. The example which Soifer and vom Hau (2008) give to illustrate this partnership is the following: The urban regeneration of Manchester initiated by state officials was achieved thanks to the local elites. In this regard, the state needs to organize society to become compliant with the state. The reason for this that whenever the state needs non-state actors to achieve the state's official goals, it needs to find a compliant and willing non-state actor with this partnership. Therefore, the state implements new policies in aiming to organize, transform or control society to work with it when the state needs. As the result of this process, organizational challengers emerge seeking to impede the attempt of the state to organize, transform or control society. On the contrary to territorial challengers, the attempts of these challengers to inhibit the state are more subtle, less direct, and less visible (Eaton 2012, 649). I close the parenthesis.

For Figure 2.1, it is worth emphasizing that these types of state territorial reach are the depiction for the outcomes, which results from the struggle or concession

between state elites and subnational non-state actors. It means that the main reason why these types of state territorial reach emerge and differ is that either the projection of state elites for the specific territory differs according to incentives or resources of state elites, or challengers have high or low resources and incentives to control provinces. For this reason, the state can only expand its authority and complete its territorial reach in the provinces where challengers have low resources and incentives or are defeated in the struggle with the central authority. Therefore, two outcomes arise where the expansion of the state authority and the territorial reach are successfully achieved. The first outcome emerges when the state expands its authority without the need to clash with challengers as being emphasized with unrestricted state territorial reach. On the other hand, the second outcome appears when challengers rebel against controlling part of the territory but are captured by the central authority as being highlighted with contested state territorial reach. In this sense, I argue that the projection and the communication style of the central state elite towards these provinces vary as contingent upon the existence of whether challengers appeared. My principal aim is to examine the territorial reach process of a nation-state in the first years of its formation. In this sense, the state elites, who aim to create a centralized, modernized and unified nation-state, targets to control and penetrate society as well as to disseminate their ideology to create their ideal citizens. For this reason, the state elites aiming to control the territory or to disseminate their ideology establish new state institutions to achieve these purposes. However, as I am trying to emphasize with the differentiation of the projection and communication style, the state elites establish different types of institutions, which prioritize achieving these particular purposes.

As Soifer (2015*b*) points out that since the infrastructural power elucidates the ability of the state to reach and penetrate the territory, the different types of state institutions and the radiating of them from the center to periphery enable the state to do these two main aims. Thus, he differentiates these institutions based on their feature as dependent on their unique power, which each institution has (Soifer 2015*b*). While the first type of institution in terms of having militaristic power is considered as a coercive power, the second type of institution in terms of possessing the power to shape the social relations is described as regulatory power. Institutions, which have regulatory power, mostly are institutions that disseminate the state ideology, such as public primary schools. On the other hand, institutions having coercive power intend to maintain peace and order, such as military garrison. I name these institutions as coercive and regulatory institutions to underline and emphasize the central features. Therefore, the critical question arises: How do the state elites decide where they establish these institutions?

In parallel with the outcomes of the state territorial reach, I argue that the state elites determine where these institutions will set up according to the presence of challengers ³. I claim that while the state elites decide to establish coercive institutions in provinces, which are contested territory, they decide to establish regulatory institutions in provinces, which are unrestricted territory. The reason for that is that the state elites constantly are in need of observing the provinces where territorial challenger stage a rebellion because they feel distrust towards these people who live in these provinces. Therefore, they want to be prepared and intervene immediately through coercive institutions for a risk of a new rebellion and non-compliance with authority. On the other hand, these state elites approach differently towards people who were regarded as organizational challengers. On the contrary to territorial challengers, organizational challengers emerge because of the lack of institutionalized connections between the state elite and society (Eaton 2012, 649). The main objection of these challengers is policies that the state elites imply in aiming to transform society to what the state elites demand. Moreover, as I emphasized above, these groups' challenges are more subtle, less direct, and less visible, and thus the state elites do not struggle with these challengers in the same way they struggle with the territorial challengers. For this reason, the state elites try to attach people with the state by disseminating ideology through regulatory institutions, and thus people who internalize the state ideology become the ideal citizens, which the state elites expect.

However, a new question arises about how the state elites identify these challengers. The first option for the state elites to determine the territorial challengers is to look at the location of rebellions that the people enact. If one province experiences a rebellion, then the state elites might locate this province as the contested province. As related to this, the second option is that if these rebellions are enacted by people belonging to a specific ethnicity, the state elites locate these provinces where the density of ethnic group is high as the contested province thanks to the information collected from the censuses (Belge 2016). On the other hand, identifying

³In this thesis, I only examine the outcomes of interactions between the state elites and societal forces which emerged as challengers. However, what if there is no challenger or challenger in a province? Giraudy and Luna (2017) answer this question with the ideal types of unprojected or unrestricted state territorial reach. The unprojected state territorial reach is one of the ideal types that the state could not achieve reach all parts of the territory. One of the reasons that the state elites do not try to reach these regions is because the cost of reaching these regions is more than the gain that the state might get. Moreover, there are no challengers in these regions, or there is no gain that the challengers may get by controlling these regions. However, for my case, which I will explicate in a detailed manner with Figure 3.6, which demonstrates the number of the regulatory institutions for each province, there is no province that the state elites did not reach through state institutions. It implies that the state elites have incentives and resources to control all parts of the territory even if they do not face challengers. This situation indicates the unrestricted state territorial reach where the state elites have incentives and enough resources to control these regions. Even if there is no challenger in these regions, the state elites have a projection for these regions, thereby making an effort to reach these regions. In my case, as similar to the unrestricted state territorial reach, the state elites had established the regulatory institution in some provinces, although the challengers do not show up.

organizational challengers is more arduous because their challenges are not directly observable as direct as the rebellion. Therefore, the first option is that the state elites look at the election result (Belge 2016). The election result has a capacity to reveal the organizational challengers because these people would reflect their objection to policies of the state through casting a vote, which is regarded as a chance to change the government. Based on this result, the state elites determine the locations of organizational challengers. In addition to that, as these elites determine the territorial challengers, they locate organizational challengers by looking at the information taken from censuses (Belge 2016).

Figure 2.2 Theoretical Expectation about the State Territorial Reach through Institutions

<div>Social Forces</div> <div>The State</div>	Contested Provinces where the state struggle with territorial challengers' rebellions, or the density of territorial challengers is high.	Unrestricted Provinces where the state does not struggle with the territorial challengers' rebellions, or the population of organizational challengers is high.
The types of institution, which state elites decide	Coercive institutions	Regulatory institutions

As a result, I hypothesize this theoretical expectation as follows: While state elites are more likely to establish the coercive institution in the contested provinces, they are more likely to establish the regulatory institution in the unrestricted. I present the theoretical expectation in Figure 2.2.


The Coercive Institution Hypothesis: State elites are more likely to establish the coercive institution in contested provinces.

The Regulatory Institution Hypothesis: State elites are more likely to establish the regulatory institution in unrestricted provinces.

I examine these hypothesized relationships in the first three decades of the Turkish Republic. For that reason, before the Large N analysis that includes 58 province-units, I present the causal mechanism on these hypotheses by employing the process-tracing method, which is used as generating causal observations. In order to do that, as I stated in the method section, I employ a comparative sequential method.

Figure 2.3 demonstrates the sequences that I aim to analyze. By following these sequences, I aim to demonstrate the causal mechanism on the impact of the existence of challengers on the decision-making process of the Republican elites.

Figure 2.3 The Sequential Argument



Based on these sequences, I firstly demonstrate how the Turkish Republic as a nation-state arose after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. After that, I examine the state reforms, which aimed to organize and transform the state and society based on the principles of the Republican elites, and the challenges that loudened from the societal forces against these state policies. Dwelling on these challenges, I identify challengers and demonstrate the decision of the Republican elites, depending on the challengers, to establish Umumi Müfettişlik as a coercive institution and Halkevleri as a regulatory institution.

3. THE TURKISH REPUBLIC AND CHALLENGERS

3.1 The Rise of a Nation-state

After the armistice that followed the first World War, the situation for the Ottoman Empire seems hopeless because, together with the Balkan wars, the Empire had engaged in a war for almost 20 years. In addition to that, neither the Sultan nor the Ottoman authorities had the power to rescue the Empire. Under this condition, the Sultan's government was willing to accept the conditions of the new treaty, thereby signing the treaty of Sevres on 10 August 1920 (Ahmad 1993, 48). At the same time, a nationalist resistance movement had been developing in Central Anatolia in following the event of Greek's invasion of İzmir. Based on the congress held in various cities of Turkey, the nationalist movement prepared the manifesto called Misak-i Milli (the National Pact). This manifesto consists of six articles that show the main aim of the nationalist movement (Zürcher 2014, 136). This nationalist movement rejected the annexation of western Anatolia and the emergence of a new Armenian or Kurdish state in the east of the Anatolia.

The resistance movement has left as the only source for the salvation of Anatolia with the loss of the Sultan's legitimacy with the treaty of Sevres and the legitimacy that it gained with the Bolsheviks' military aid. Thanks to his military achievement in various war fields and his independence of political factions throughout the constitutional period, Mustafa Kemal Pasha has become the leader of the resistance movement (Ahmad 1993; Zürcher 2014, 142). In 1920, the resistance movement had been struggling with the Greek, Armenian, and French forces. However, as a result of the Allied conference held in London in 1921, which revealed the disagreement between Allied forces, the Italian and French governments pulled back their military support to Greek forces, and only the British left to support the Greek forces for the war continuing between the Turkish forces. In 1922, the Turkish military forces ended the war by defeating the Greek forces and recapturing İzmir. The Turkish

forces, which participated in the Lausanne peace conference in 1923 as the winning side, made the Allies accept the demands on the Turkish national sovereignty, and the Allies signed the Lausanne peace treaty as the acceptance of the creation of the Turkish state.

Mustafa Kemal, who already had started to consolidate his power during the independence war, emerged as a president of Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey, TBMM). However, the ongoing political struggle between modernist and conservationist forces since the first years of the independence war was reflected in the TBMM. The Kemalist was a minority group in the TBMM (Ahmad 1993; Tunçay 1999; Zürcher 2014). For this reason, in order to eliminate the political opponents and restore TBMM, Mustafa Kemal called a new election. Mustafa Kemal reorganized the Anadolu Rumeli Müdafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti and founded a political party, Halk Fırkası (People's Party, HF). The HF participated in the election. In fact, the election was held in not free and fair condition, and the Kemalists already determined potential candidates (Tunçay 1999, 56). As a result of this election, all political opponents of Kemalists had been eliminated so, the HF under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal emerged as one political organization in TBMM.

The elimination of political opponents and thus HF arose as a sole power in TBMM enabled the Kemalist group to initiate reforms in aiming to restore the state and society. The main issue for this period was the character of the regime. During the independence war, the resistance movement had succeeded in gathering other forces around on the basis of the claim of the restoration of the Sultan's power and the salvation of the caliphate. For this reason, most of the people had an expectation from Mustafa Kemal to transform the regime into a constitutional monarchy in which the Sultan is the president as ceremonial (Ahmad 1993, 53). However, Mustafa Kemal, who had an utterly different system in his mind, proposed the Republic as a system with an elected president, a prime minister appointed by the president, and a conventional cabinet system (Zürcher 2014, 167). Because of the absence of any political opponent in TBMM, the proposition was accepted by the majority in TBMM. The Turkish Republic was declared on 29 October 1923, and Mustafa Kemal became the first president of the Turkish Republic.

As a result, there left no power that can stand against the Republican cadres, which emerged from the political struggle as the winning side, and thus the elite consensus was accomplished behind the Kemalist government (Esen 2014, 607). In this vast field of maneuver, the constitution was still the issue that the Republican cadres did not yet determine. The constitution, which was in force in 1923, was the Teşkilat-ı

Esasiye Kanunu (the Law on Fundamental Organization), which was as the restored version of the Ottoman constitution 1876, prepared during the independence in 1921. In 1924, the Republican cadres prepared a new constitution and accepted it as the first constitution of the Turkish Republic. Although this new constitution revealed the detail of the new system, because of Mustafa Kemal's charismatic power, the constitution remained mostly on paper (Tunçay 1999).

However, it is worth emphasizing that Article 88 demonstrates the aim of the Republican cadres to create the state based on the specific ethnicity. Article 88 explicitly determines the ethnic basis of the Turkish Republic. Article 88 states that "The name Turk, as a political term, shall be understood to include all citizens of the Turkish Republic, without distinction of, or reference to, race or religion" (Earle 1925, 98). In fact, as it can be understood from this article's emphasis on the nation without specific race and religion, the Republican cadres' aim was to construct civic nationalism, which is defined on the basis of the territory (Kirişçi and Winrow 2004, 89). However, as it is realized from the policies that the Republican cadres implemented throughout the early years of the Republican period, the expectation for civic nationalism gave way to the nation-state based on the Turks. As a result, the 1924 constitution legally confirmed that the Turkish Republic is a nation-state founded based on the Turks.

3.2 State Reforms to Organize and Transform the State and Society

The main aim of the Republican cadres was to create a centralized nation-state on the basis of secularism and modernism. First in foremost, the Republican cadres abolished the caliphate. One of the main reasons that the Republican cadres abolished this ancient institution is that the political opponents had been using it as the symbol of opposition. The opponents' main tool to gather the criticism against reformers was Islam, and thus the opponents were able to manipulate people through the caliphate, which has been the symbol of Islam for centuries (Ahmad 1993, 54). Together with that, the caliphate was one of the strong links that connect the Turkish people with the old regime and Islam. Thus, the Republican cadres regarded the caliphate as the barrier to create a state based on the nation. For these reasons, the Republican cadres abolished the caliphate in 1924 and ordered all members of the Ottoman dynasty out of the country (Zürcher 2014, 168).

The importance of the caliphate comes from the fact that the caliphate as an institution bounds all Muslim population each other, mainly Kurds and Turks. In the

independence war, the resistance movement declared the liberation of the caliphate as one of the main aims, and this aim was one of the crucial reasons why the Kurds had participated in the resistance movement and fought with the Turks. However, with the abolishment of the caliphate, no reason bounds the Kurds to the new regime (Kirişci and Winrow 2004, 101).

After the proclamation of the new constitution, the level of reforms regarding secularization and modernization increased, and, in this period, the Republican cadres initiated many reforms in aiming to break the link with the old regime's institutions. For this purpose, the Republican cadres aimed to unify education on the basis of secularism and rationalism and broke the connection of education with the traditional religious authorities. Therefore, the "Unification of Education" law was passed in TBMM in 1924, and thus the madrasas where Islamic clergies educate people based on the Islamic tradition have been abolished with this law. In 1925, the Republican cadres closed down religious shrines (türbes) and dervish convents (tekkes). These religious institutions were vital for the Muslim community because these institutions were an inseparable part of the Muslim community's daily lives (Zürcher 2014, 173). In addition to that, the Republican elites prohibited the turban and fez from using their daily lives and replaced them with the Western-style hat or cap. The prohibition of the fez got many backlashes because the fez was a symbol of Muslim identity that makes a distinction between European Christians and Muslims. Especially, the obligatory wearing of hats was seen by Muslims as an apparent attack on their own identity (Zürcher 2014, 173). Together with that, the Turkish Republic still had been using the sharia law after the proclamation of the Republic. This sharia law was one of the institutions inherited from the Ottoman Empire. In 1926, the Republican cadres abolished the Sharia law and replaced it with the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Penal Code, and the Commercial Code (Ahmad 1993, 80). With these new laws, the Republican cadres succeeded in secularizing the family law, in return, improved the role of women in social life.

Another break with the past that the Republican cadres made is the introduction of the Latin alphabet instead of the Arabic alphabet. The Arabic alphabet was still securing the connection of people with the Islamic past and the Ottoman Empire. In addition to that, the Republican cadres regarded the Arabic alphabet as the barrier to increase literacy. Illiteracy was a widespread problem in the country. In the 1927 census, the portion of the literate people was around 8 percent of the whole population (Ahmad 1993, 82). This was one of the significant problems to which the Republican cadres paid attention because the Republican cadres knew that the dissemination of the state ideology and the creation of the new nation depends on the proliferation of literacy. Therefore, the Republican cadres introduced the Latin

alphabet as the new alphabet of the Turkish language in 1928. The introduction of the Latin alphabet had achieved the desired success, and the rate of literacy increased from 8 percent in 1928 to 20 percent in 1935 (Ahmad 1993, 82). However, it is worth reminding that the removal of the Arabic alphabet, which is also the Quran's alphabet, intensified the resentment of people against the Republican cadres.

The Republican cadres aimed to secularize and modernize the state and society with these reforms. In this process where the Republican elites maintained the state-building with these policies, they also proceeded the nation-building process based on the Turkish identity. The Republican elites prevented the Christians and Jews from getting educated in the military schools and academies (Kirişci and Winrow 2004, 99). The unwritten rule for getting an education in these schools was to come from the Turkish race. The most visible policy of the Republican cadres in the name of Turkification was the İskan Kanunu (the Settlement Law) in 1934, which separated the territory based on the language and culture (Kirişci and Winrow 2004, 99). This law separated the territory into three zones where people who speak Turkish and are part of the Turkish ethnicity; people who do not speak Turkish but are part of the Turkish culture; and people who do not speak Turkish and are not part of the Turkish culture. In fact, although there was no reference to Kurds, the third zone implied the areas where Kurdish people intensively lived. Based on these zones, the Republican cadres compelled the Kurds to settle into the western provinces and the Turks into Kurdish-populated areas. This policy was an explicit example of the assimilation policy conducted by the Republican cadres.

In addition to secularization/modernization and unification policies, the Republican cadres also paid attention to the centralization issue. Although the Ottoman authorities attempted to centralize the state by transforming the system to direct control to regulate the taxation system, they could not succeed it. The reason for that is that the appointed governors were unable to maintain control over provinces after the removal of Kurdish emirates, which have been enjoying autonomy under the protection of agreement with the Ottoman Sultans for centuries. According to Yeğen (1996, 219), the reason for this inability to control is that the appointed governors do not know regions where tribes struggled with each other for years, thereby unable to stop these confrontations. Therefore, Yeğen (1996, 219) states that the inability of the Ottoman governors to restructure order in Kurdistan led to the emergence of Sheiks as new actors. During the last period of the Ottoman empire, these Sheiks and also Kurdish landowners enjoyed autonomy in the region where the Ottoman presence was relatively low.

During the independence war, Kurds had decided to join the independence war with

Turks because Kurds wanted to protect their religion and lands from Armenians to whom the treaty of Sevres promised the eastern land of Turkey. In this period, the Assembly proposed a draft law that offered the autonomous administrative organization to Kurds based on the national customs. At the same time, it promised the usage of the Kurdish language in schools. However, the Republican cadres had a centralized administration in their plan for the country because the Ottoman Empire had experienced the damaging consequences of a decentralized system, especially the irregularity to collect taxes. In 1923 when the Republican cadres did not yet consolidate their power in the Assembly, the Republicans proposed many laws that aimed to transform the taxation system into more centralized (Şinik and Görgün 2014, 780). However, these laws got reactions from the opponents who criticized the centralization policies, and thus these policies were not passed in the Assembly.

After the consolidation of the Republican cadres' power, the Republican elites accelerated the level of centralization policies (Keskin 2009) ¹. The Wilayat system, which had existed for many years in the Ottoman Empire, was abolished, and the İl (province) system, which was easier to govern with the appointed governors from the central state, was adopted. In addition to that, the government has decided to decrease the number of İl. According to Keskin (2009), the main aim of the Republican cadres in implementing these policies was to improve the ability of the state for the security issues by fastening the decision-making process and breaking the strength of the Kurdish landowners by controlling them.

As a result of these policies that the Republican cadres implemented in this period, people, who have been living in Anatolia, experienced big transformations in a way that the reversion was impossible. The Ottoman dynasty had not touched upon their lives, and although in the last years of the Empire, the reformers attempted to change the whole system, they could not achieve as much as what the Republican cadres did. In this regard, the Republican cadres transformed and reorganized the structure of the state and society, which remained the same for almost six centuries. When thinking about these radical transformations that affected people's everyday life, it seems impossible to expect that people do not get reacted to these policies. For this reason, in the next section, I aim to describe the challengers that I divided into two as territorial and organizational challengers above. Hence, I firstly focus on the rebellion that can be regarded as the first territorial challengers that had a great impact on the Republican cadres' decisions to establish the coercive institution. After that, I aim to explain the specific event that revealed the organizational challengers, thereby the decision of the Republican cadres to establish the regulatory

¹Keskin (2009) gives a detailed analysis on the transformation of the administrative organization of the state during the Republican era.

institution, which followed this event.

3.3 The Emergence of Challengers and the Establishment of State Institutions

3.3.1 The emergence of territorial challengers

As I emphasized while concluding the previous section, the significant and radical transformations that people living in Anatolia experienced led to the emergence of challengers in the years between 1924 and 1938. In this period, 18 rebellions broke out in the country. Except for one, all of them emerged in the eastern provinces of Turkey, and eight of them arose in the years between May 1929 and December 1930 (Kirişci and Winrow 2004, 101). These rebellions, which took place in the eastern region of Turkey, were enacted by the Kurdish people (Tunçay 1999, 128). For this reason, the main subject of these rebellions was the Kurdish people. The first rebellion that occurred in 1924 is the Nasturi rebellion. Although rebels captured Hakkari's governor and three gendarmes, the military was able to quickly suppress the rebellion.

However, the rebellion that the man named Sheik Said staged in February of 1925 was not easily suppressed as it was in Nasturi. This rebellion had a significant impact on the governing cadres, thereby causing to change the government, even the type of regime, and making new measures for the security of the eastern provinces. For this reason, it is worth dwelling on this rebellion and the situation of the state in a detailed manner.

Although the Republican cadres eliminated the opponents who mainly were the member of the Second group and the former members of İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti² (Committee of Union and Progress) (Tunçay 1999, 55), the notables who were the friends of Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü and also participated in the resistance movement as high-ranking commander such as Kazım Karabekir were continuing to criticize the İnönü government. The main criticism of these people was the implementation type of reforms that the government conducted. Although this group did not stand against the reforms, this group had been demanding the government implement these reforms in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary type. As a result

²The usage of Republican in the name of newly founded political party led to change the name of Halk Fırkası to Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (the Republican People's Party, CHP) (Zürcher 2014, 168). From this point, I use CHP rather than HF.

of continuing this type of criticism to the İnönü government, these people founded a new political party named Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (the Progressive Republican Party, TCF), which was similar to the Western European liberal political parties (Zürcher 2014, 168). TCF mainly criticized the Kemalists' centralist, radical and authoritarian tendencies, thereby advocating the separation of powers, decentralization, and also the liberal economy. The foundation of the new political party led CHP to take new measures to stand more potent against this party in the eyes of İstanbul and the conservative east (Zürcher 2014, 169). Therefore, CHP reconstituted the party discipline, and İsmet İnönü was replaced with Ali Fethi Okyar, who was more conciliating compared to İnönü.

As a result, the Sheik Said rebellion broke out in a situation where the governing cadres struggle with the nascent opposition party. The Kurdish people's autonomous power in the region, which has already been started to change since the last period of the Ottoman Empire, wholly changed with the proclamation of the Republic. In fact, the Ottoman Empire has recognized the Kurdish emirates' autonomous power in the region, and it has used these emirates to maintain control over the region and collect taxes from people for centuries (Bruinessen 1992, 136). However, with the centralization policies, which were implemented during Mahmud II and Abdulmajid and intensified with the Tanzimat period, the autonomous power of the emirates has been broken, which has led to the emergence of various rebellions in this period. However, as I emphasized above, the inability of the Ottoman authorities to control the region caused the Sheiks as new actors to arise³. Kurdish nationalism began to develop in the period, along with the appearance of Sheikh Ubaydullah as a military and religious leader (Olson 1989, 2). The main feature that makes Sheikh Ubaydullah important for Kurdish nationalism was his demand for an independent Kurdish state the contrary to other Kurdish notables who demanded more autonomy in the region. During the Abdelhamid II period, the establishment of the Hamidiye Regiments reinforced the nationalist tendency around the Kurds because the Hamidiye Regiments enabled the Kurds to be together and institutionalized the relationship with the central state. Although the main aim of the Abdelhamid II with the Hamidiye Regiments was to reduce the strength of the Sheiks, this policy could not succeed, on the contrary, accelerated the spread of Kurdish nationalism under the leadership of the Sheiks during the Young Turk period in which the political activities gathered momentum (Olson 1989, 16).

During the independence war, the rebellion named Kocgiri rebellion broke out in the region of Dersim. The Turkish military crushed this rebellion with the help of

³See more; Olson (1989)

some Kurdish landowners. Olson (1989, 38) states that the Koggiri rebellion was the first event that caused the nationalist government to think about dealing with the Kurdish question. The government's intention for the Kurdish question, especially the Dersim region, was to wait for now until other issues were solved. Nevertheless, the Kurdish people, as I emphasized above, participated in the independence war, and Mustafa Kemal sent a letter expressing his thanks to the Kurdish landowners for their support (Olson 1989, 38). At the same time, the Assembly was discussing the draft law that offered the autonomous administration for the Kurdish nation and the usage of the Kurdish language in schools in this administration. This law was opposed by most of the Kurdish deputies because the draft law also offered that the central state would appoint the governor of this administration if it is deemed as necessary.

However, the governing elites determined the character of the regime with the proclamation of the Republic and the approval of the 1924 constitution. The constitution did not offer any autonomy to the Kurdish people. Instead, it revealed the intention of the Republican cadres to centralize the country in terms of nation, culture, and administration. Moreover, while the abolishment of the caliphate explicitly demonstrated that the Republican cadres would implement the secularization policies, the unification of the education implied the unification policies on the basis of the Turkish nation would come. Therefore, the Kurdish people felt these policies as a danger for their identity, culture, and religion, which they enjoyed for centuries without the presence of the state in the region.

As a result of the danger, the Kurdish nationalists founded a new political organization called the Ciwata Azadi Kurd, in short, Azadi. In 1924 when Azadi organized the first congress, the Azadi took a decision that a general uprising takes place in Kurdistan following the declaration of independence (Bruinessen 1992, 280). Sheik Said, who had a significant impact on the Zaza-speaking tribes, was one of the attendees to this congress. In following the abolishment of the caliphate, Sheik Said staged a rebellion in February of 1924 with the demand of an independent Kurdish state. In a short period, many Kurdish tribes participated in this rebellion, and the number of rebels reached 15.000 (Olson 1989, 102). The rebels surrounded Diyarbakır captured Elâziğ and Palu⁴. The Turkish government responded to this rebellion with a military force of 52.000 men and airstrikes (Olson 1989, 102). Although the government captured the rebellion leaders and Sheik Said in April, the military operation continued until the end of May.

As it is indicated in the theory section, the territorial challengers are defined as

⁴Diyarbakır and Elâziğ were the biggest provinces in the eastern region. Palu was a sub-province.

nonstate subnational actors, which include insurgent groups, armed rebels, drug traffickers, and warlords as well as indigenous groups seeking territorial autonomy to defend communal models of governance and the main aim of these groups is to neutralize the authority of the state, its regulations, and institutions. For this reason, it would not be wrong to identify these rebels as the territorial challengers. This rebellion resulted from the state's various policies considering secularization, unification, and especially centralization (Olson and Tucker 1978, 199-200). These policies were targeted to change the structure of these Kurdish tribes, and thus, as I am trying to emphasize, the rebels aimed to gain independence from the Turkish state. Thus, in addition to being an insurgent group with armed rebels, what makes them territorial challengers is the demand of the independent state in the territory. These rebellions, which were enacted by the Kurdish people and aimed to gain independence from the Turkish state, endured until 1938, and after this rebellion, there were 15 more rebellions broke out in the eastern region. In moving from the theoretical framework and qualitative evidence, I argue that the Kurdish people have become territorial challengers for the Republican elites with this rebellion, and thus the Republican cadres formulated their policies towards the Kurds on the basis of this understanding.

As I emphasized above, this rebellion had a great impact on the governing cadres. In the first days of the rebellion, the government under the prime minister of Ali Fethi Okyar regarded the rebellion as a small-scale rebellion by bandits, which was usual during the first years of the Republic, thereby belittling the rebellion. However, as information about the region has begun to come, the deputies understood the rebellion was not a small-scale rebellion. For this reason, the Okyar government was criticized for not taking the necessary measures. Hence, Ali Fethi Okyar was forced to resign, and the authority to form the government was given to İsmet İnönü, who was known as a hardliner. İnönü government declared *Takrir-i Sükun* (law on the maintenance of order), which lasted until 1929, over the country and reopened the independence tribunal (Tunçay 1999, 140). The Republican elites used the *Takrir-i Sükun* as the opportunity to consolidate their power, and in this period, the Republican elites closed eighteen newspapers and journals, which were published in mostly İstanbul and various cities. Moreover, the İnönü government decided to close the opposition political party, TCF, for the accusation of the indirect support of the emergence of the rebellion (Tunçay 1999, 146). During this period, the Republican cadres totally gathered the power their hand, and the regime completely has changed into a single-party authoritarian regime with these decisions.

3.3.2 The establishment of coercive institutions

After the emergence of a single-party authoritarian regime, the Republican elites began to take measures for the Kurdish question as they wished without any criticism. The İnönü government continued to implement the martial law over the eastern provinces, which were Muş, Bingöl, Elazığ, Siirt, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Tunceli, Urfa, Bitlis, Van, Hakkari, Malatya, Erzurum, until 1927. Together with that, the Republican cadres decided to resettle some Kurdish tribes to western provinces (Tunçay 1999, 173) and decrease the number of provinces from 74 to 63 in order to strengthen the control over the provinces (Keskin 2009, 305). By the time of 1927, the Republican cadres have decided to establish Umumi Müfettişlik that was foreseen to be established in the Teşkilat-ı Esasiye. In the process of constitution-making debates in 1921 on administrative divisions, one of the deputies explicitly stated that the reason for the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik is to fill in the gap between the central state and local authorities (Keskin 2009, 278). Thus, with the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik, the territory would be tightly controlled by the central state. In fact, Umumi Müfettişlik was firstly established during the end of the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire (Koçak 2003, 31). The task given to Umumi Müfettişlik and its inspectorate was basically to provide order and security in the region and to build the infrastructure in order to strengthen the state mechanism in the region. Umumi Müfettişlik was initially established in the eastern region and the Balkans, but this practice was terminated during the Tanzimat period. Its establishment was formulated in the 1921 constitution, and a draft law offered that the whole country was governed through Umumi Müfettişlik by dividing the country into six zones. However, the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik took place in 1927.

According to Tunçay (1999, 174), the Republican cadres' aim to establish Umumi Müfettişlik was to find an institutionalized solution for the security problem, which might occur after the end of martial law on 23 October 1927. As a result, the decree regarding the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik was adopted in the Assembly, and the Birinci Umumi Müfettişlik was established in Diyarbakır as taken its headquarter by including Elazığ, Urfa, Hakkari, Bitlis, Siirt, Mardin, and Van on 28 January 1928. In addition to that these provinces were the provinces where rebellion broke out, the density of the Kurdish population was high compared to the Turkish population in these provinces.

When considering the provinces where martial law was implemented, and Umumi Müfettişlik was established, the claim that Tunçay (1999, 174) makes seems valid. As similar to Tunçay's claim, my main aim is to demonstrate this continuity between the martial law after the rebellion and the decision to establish Umumi Müfettişlik.

Therefore, it would be false to think the decision of the Republican cadres to establish Umumi Müfettişlik as independent from the Sheik Said rebellion. The reason for this lies in the characteristics and extraordinary power of this institution, which makes it a coercive institution.

According to the draft law submitted to the TBMM, the reasons for the establishment of the Umumi Müfettişlik are presented as "order and security," "strict inspection and auditing," and "to be present in the provinces to perform what the administrative needs required" (Koçak 2003, 63). Thus, the government has given extraordinary powers, which include activating the security forces such as police, gendarmerie, and soldiers whenever he deemed necessary without the need of the government's permission, to the inspector of Umumi Müfettişlik, who was expected to fulfill these duties. Moreover, if the inspector identifies an insurrection or any preparation for insurrection, which may harm order and security, he had the authority to proclaim martial law in provinces without consulting the government. Thus, it is possible to argue that Umumi Müfettişlik is an autonomous little state since it seems that the inspector is independent from the central state regarding its decisions and use of violence. However, the government expected that the inspectors report daily to the government about situations of order and peace in provinces and form a three-month report about the general situation in provinces. For this reason, as long as the inspector harmoniously works with the government, it is more appropriate to consider that Umumi Müfettişlik was established for the purpose of centralizing the Turkish Republic. The Republican cadres, in nine years, increased the number of Umumi Müfettişlik to four. These four Umumi Müfettişlik included 23 provinces. 16 of these provinces were the eastern provinces where the Kurdish population was high, and 14 of them were provinces where the rebellion broke out⁵.

Soifer (2015*b*, 202) defines coercive capacity as the ability to mobilize force and exercise it effectively, so an institution having coercive power intends to maintain peace and order, such as military garrison. For this reason, I define these institutions, which have coercive power, as the coercive institution. Due to the fact that the inspector of Umumi Müfettişlik equipped with extraordinary coercive power that I presented above, I consider the Umumi Müfettişlik as the coercive institution. Hence, Umumi Müfettişlik, as a state institution, fits this definition.

As a result, in this section, I argued that the Republican cadres established Umumi Müfettişlik as a coercive institution in the contested provinces where the territorial challengers struggled with the state by staging rebellions or the territorial chal-

⁵I will discuss the reasons why the Republican cadres established Umumi Müfettişlik in the provinces where the rebellion did not break out and the Turkish population was high in the next chapters.

Table 3.1 Provinces where Umumi Müfettişlik was established

Umumi Müfettişlikler	Provinces
Birinci Umumi Müfettişlik (1927)	Diyarbakır, Bitlis, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Urfa, Van,
İkinci Umumi Müfettişlik (1934)	Edirne, Kırklareli, Tekirdağ, Çanakkale
Üçüncü Umumi Müfettişlik (1936)	Erzurum, Ağrı, Çoruh, Erzincan, Gümüşhane, Kars, Rize, Trabzon
Dördüncü Umumi Müfettişlik (1936)	Elazığ, Bingöl, Tunceli
Beşinci Umumi Müfettişlik (1947)	Adana, İçel, Seyhan, Hatay, Gaziantep, Maraş

lengers, who were Kurds, lived as a major group. To demonstrate the causal mechanism on the reason of the Republican cadres to establish Birinci Umumi Müfettişlik, I presented a detailed examination about the reasons for the emergence of the Sheik Said rebellion and its impact on the Republican cadres' policies. In this regard, I demonstrated that the radical transformations that the Republican cadres implemented during the first years of the Turkish Republic led the Kurdish nationalists to stage rebellion to gain independence from the Turkish state and create an independent state in the territory. I presented that the Republican cadres formulated their policy based on this rebellion towards the Kurdish people, which I identify as the territorial challengers. For this reason, the Republican cadres firstly decreed martial law and then established Umumi Müfettişlik as a coercive institution in the provinces where the rebellion broke out, and the population of the Kurdish people was relatively high to the Turkish people. In this section, I aimed to demonstrate the causal connection behind the reason for the establishment of the Birinci Umumi Müfettişlik. Moving from this causal mechanism, I employ the quantitative method to present the causal mechanism between the rebellion or the density of Kurds and other Umumi Müfettişlik after this chapter.

3.3.3 The emergence of organizational challengers

Not only the Kurdish people but also all citizens of the Turkish Republic have been affected by the radical transformations. Although their resentment to these radical transformations emerged as small-scale demonstrations, which local military forces suppressed efficiently, the Turkish people's discontent with the regime and its policies have not been taken very seriously by the Republican cadres. During this period, citizens had no channels to reach the state because the reforms conducted by the Republican elites broke the connection of people with the old tradition as well as the state (Akin 2007, 439). Already, the Republican elites had no intention to reach society in these years since they were mostly concerned with the reforms

to organize the state and society. In addition to that, the Republican cadres had been dealing with the wave of the Kurdish rebellion, which emerged throughout the 1920s.

After 1925 when the regime changed into a single-party authoritarian regime, the Republican cadres created a suffocative political atmosphere for the country. As I emphasized above, the Republican cadres closed many newspapers and journals, decreed censorship over the country, and abolished the one opposition party of the country in 1925. In this atmosphere, the discontent of the Turkish people increased because of the regional and local authorities' authoritative behaviors, corruption, and favouritism, in addition to the absence of civil liberties and the radical transformations (Zürcher 2014, 178). At the end of this decade, with the impact of the great depression, the discontent of the people reached a peak level. The great depression badly affected the Turkish economy, which was already in bad condition because of the dept of Düyün-u Umumiye (Ottoman Public Debt Administration) and bad harvest (Akin 2007, 439). At the same time, the Ağrı rebellion broke out by the Kurds in the eastern region in this year, and although the military forces suppressed this rebellion, this rebellion created unrest in the country (Cagaptay 2006, 41). Together with these challenges to the state, the Republican cadres felt more secure about the state and reforms since they accomplished major reforms, thereby almost completing the state formation (Şimşek 2005, 74). The Republican cadres thought that the time has come to reconstitute the state legitimacy, which has been harmed because of the radical transformations, bad economic conditions, rebellion, and demonstrations (Akin 2007, 439). In this regard, the Republican cadres signaled that the new period would begin.

Mustafa Kemal knew the proliferation of the people's discontent with the regime from various reports and inspection tours in the country (Soyak 1973, 435)⁶. Hence, he has requested Ali Fethi Okyar as one of his close friends, to form a political party in aiming to create a channel for citizens who demanded to proclaim their discontents to the regime. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal wanted to wake up CHP with his request since the CHP government under the leadership of İnönü slightly got used to govern the country without criticism (Cagaptay 2006; Tunçay 1999; Zürcher 2014). However, this attempt to transform the system into a multi-party system was a controlled attempt because, before the foundation of the political party, the leaders of the parties and Mustafa Kemal have agreed on the impartiality of Mustafa Kemal and the remaining loyal to the secularism and republicanism (Zürcher 2014, 178).

⁶Soyak (1973, 435) talks about the anger and frustration of Mustafa Kemal towards to situation of the country after the 1930 inspection tour in his memoir. As Soyak conveys, Mustafa Kemal mentioned the discontent and poverty of people and the consequences of unqualified state personnel.

As a result of this agreement, the new political party, named Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Free Republican Party, SCF), was founded by Ali Fethi Okyar on 12 August 1930.

Just after the foundation of SCF, Ali Fethi Okyar has begun to arrange party rallies in Anatolia. Wherever the meeting was held in Anatolia, vast and enthusiastic crowds participated in rallies and appreciated the newly founded political party (Ahmad 1993, 59). The İzmir rally was the most critical rally because the Republican cadres have been shocked by the unexpected support of the SCF in İzmir. İzmir was one of the important cities for the Republican cadres since the resistance movement explicitly salvaged İzmir from Greek occupation, so the Republican cadres had confidence in the people of İzmir. However, more than 100.000 people (the population of İzmir center was over 150.000) participated in the rally, so because of the anger and frustration of people, the rally has become anti-government demonstration in a short period (Ahmad 1993; Cagaptay 2006; Zürcher 2014, 59). In this demonstration, the disorder occurred, and police and gendarmerie used weaponry to stop people. In this disorder, 12-year-old a child was killed, six people were wounded, the CHP's party building's windows and the car of CHP were broken, and the photograph of İsmet İnönü was trampled underfoot (Soyak 1973, 430). As a result of this incredible support and these incidents, Mustafa Kemal and his party got shocked and alarmed, and Mustafa Kemal decided to leave the impartiality promise to which he has given to Fethi Okyar, so he openly stated he was the head of CHP. This was the first but not the last shock that CHP experienced from SCF.

The Republican cadres discussed whether SCF would participate in the local election, which was planned to be held in October 1930, and they did not consider the participation of SCF in the local election very favorably (Tunçay 1999, 271). However, SCF has decided to participate in the local elections, although the party did not fully prepare for the election. SCF has gotten success in the local election, which cannot be belittled for the newly founded political party under this political atmosphere where the President of the country explicitly demonstrated his support and under the condition where the election was not free and fair. SCF won 31 out of 502 election districts (Tunçay 1999; Yetkin 2004, 267) and gained many seats in various municipalities (Cagaptay 2006, 42). As I emphasized, this election was not free and fair, and the Republican elites have noticed that the result would be completely different if the election was held in a free and fair condition ⁷(Soyak 1973; Tunçay 1999, 436). In this regard, the Republican cadres did not expect the success

⁷Soyak (1973, 436) conveys that during the local election, Mustafa Kemal says that we are not winning the election, who wins the election is the administrative party, which includes gendarmerie, police, town manager, and governors.

of SCF in the election, and thus they began to fear that CHP would lose power in the coming general election. On the other hand, Fethi Okyar, in the Assembly, had been criticizing the government for its interference through fraud in the election. Not only that, but he was also trying to corner the government with all kinds of accusations. CHP government, in return, accused the leader of the party of the high treason of the country. As a result, Mustafa Kemal demanded Ali Fethi Okyar dissolve the party, and he decided to close the party on 16 November 1930.

While the echoes of this success of SCF was continuing, in a month later after the election, in Menemen district, which was connected to İzmir, the six people under the leadership of one named Dervish Mehmet, who claimed that he is Mahdi, rebelled in aiming to restore the sharia law and the caliphate (Tunçay 1999; Zürcher 2014, 293)(Tunçay 1999, 293, Zürcher 2014, 179). They killed a lieutenant and two neighborhood watchmen. This incident was very crucial and shocking for the Republican cadres because the public did not protest this incident. Instead, people had demonstrated their support to them by clapping (Soyak 1973; Tunçay 1999, 454). Therefore, the support of people to Dervishes who demanded to restore the sharia law and caliphate has made Mustafa Kemal anxious about the emergence of widespread unrest in the country (Cagaptay 2006, 42). As a result, the Republican cadres have realized the legitimacy crisis for the regime, which emerged from the lack of communication between the state and society (Akin 2007, 439).

In the section, I aimed to demonstrate the emergence of organizational challengers, which unearthed with the unexpected support to the opposition party, seen as a hope to change the government, and people's support to Menemen incident. In the theory section, I argue that the organizational challengers emerge for seeking to impede the attempt of the state to organize society through transformations, and I state that, on the contrary to territorial challengers, the attempts of these challengers to inhibit the state are more subtle, less direct, and less visible (Eaton 2012, 649). For this reason, moving from qualitative evidence, I argue that it would not be wrong to describe the Turkish people as organizational challengers.

As I insistently emphasized, the radical transformations that the Republican cadres implemented changed the way of life of Turkish people entirely and even their daily practice. The Republican cadres aimed to restructure the society with these transformations intending to create a nation on the basis of secularism and modernism. Hence, their aim was to create a society, which would be compliant with the state. However, it would not be wrong to say that society did not be prepared for and internalize these transformations. Rather, they challenged these transformations and

attempted to change the government in the first opportunity that they got⁸.

Moreover, because of the lack of institutions that may take a role as the channel between the state and society, except for reports and inspection tours and small-scale demonstrations, people's challenges or organizational challengers were not directly visible from the Republican cadres. For this reason, the election was an opportunity for the Turkish people who unearthed their challenges. In other words, the election was a critical event that revealed the existence of organizational challengers, who attempted to impede the government with a hope to change the government for the Republican elites. As I emphasized above, the unexpected support of SCF alarmed and frightened the Republican cadres on the loss of power in the general election. As a result, the emergence of the organizational challengers led the Republican cadres to take new measures, which I will present in the next section.

3.3.4 The establishment of regulatory institutions

I emphasized above that 1930 was a turning point for the Republican cadres. The reason for that is the realization of problems by the Republican cadres regarding the lack of communication with society and thus legitimacy crisis, and new measures that the Republican cadres to solve this lacking. The understanding of the problems occurred with the unexpected support of SCF. On the other hand, the method, which aimed to solve this legitimacy problem and the lack of communication with society, has been determined in the inspection tour of Mustafa Kemal over specific regions just after the dissolution of SCF and the Third General Congress of the CHP on 9-16 May 1931.

After the dissolution of SCF, Mustafa Kemal organized an inspection tour. In fact, the inspection tours of Mustafa Kemal were regular events since the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. However, there was an important reason that made this tour special. The main aim of the Mustafa Kemal with this tour was to closely see the citizens' reactions, which were unearthed with the SCF's success, to determine the source of problems, and appease these reactions (Soyak 1973, 448). In this tour, Mustafa Kemal almost determined all-regions such as central Anatolia, Black Sea, Thrace, Egean, south and southwestern regions as the route except for the eastern provinces (Cagaptay 2006; Soyak 1973, 448). More specifically, he toured Kayseri, Sivas, Tokat, Amasya, İstanbul, Tekirdağ, Kırklareli, Edirne, Ankara, İzmir, Balıke-

⁸Considering the 1930 election result, it would be not true enough to say that the one and the only reason to cast a vote for the opposition party is their discontent with the transformations. This discontent with the transformations had been more intensified by deteriorating economic conditions in 1930. Thus, I do not neglect this factor for the emergence of this election result.

sir, Aydın, Denizli, İçel, Mersin, Adana, Malatya, and Konya. In fact, the Menemen incident that I mentioned above, occurred during this inspection tour. This might be one reason why Mustafa Kemal got anxious about the emergence of popular unrest because wherever Mustafa Kemal went, he encountered people's complaints to the regime, the government, and local authorities. Based on these complaints, he might have worried about the emergence of popular unrest. As a result of this inspection tour, Mustafa Kemal concluded that people were not sufficiently instructed for the principles of the CHP (Cagaptay 2006, 43).

Hence, Mustafa Kemal took action and began to take new measures in this regard. He first requested a new election and appointed Recep Peker, a faithful nationalist, as the new Secretary-General of the CHP (Cagaptay 2006; Tunçay 1999, 43). The CHP, the only party that participated in the election, formed the government and presented a new party program. In this program, the CHP highlighted nationalism and the maintenance of order as their main missions under the guidance of republicanism and populism. Together with that, Mustafa Kemal announced the principles of Kemalism as republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism in his speech (Cagaptay 2006, 43).

In addition to the government of the new program and Mustafa Kemal's speech, which demonstrate the measures taken in an ideological sense, the institutional consequences of these measures have been determined in the Third General Congress of the CHP. In this congress, the CHP declared its new program and by-laws. The CHP explained the requirement of the new party program as "the organizational procedures of the party, which had been actualized, in accordance with lessons gathered from experience" (Cagaptay 2006, 44). The experience that was mentioned here is what I emphasized above as the SCF's success and Mustafa Kemal's conclusion after the inspection tour. In this congress, the CHP dwelled on the importance of being a nation as a Turk, thereby emphasizing the importance of education as the primary institution to raise the consciousness of being a Turk.

As a result, based on the lessons that the CHP gathered from experience, one of the main institutional consequences of this congress was the establishment of Halkevleri. As I emphasized with Mustafa Kemal's conclusion, the Republican cadres realized that they failed to convey the principles of the regime to the people. The reason that the Republican cadres found for this was the lack of institutions that bounds the state and society. For this reason, Halkevleri emerged as an institution to fill the gap between the state and society on the basis of principles of CHP.

In fact, there was an institution similar to Halkevleri, named Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearts), whose number reached 255 over the country at the end of 1930. Türk

Ocakları, regarded as the forerunner of Halkevleri, was established in 1911 to formulate and disseminate nationalism. However, Türk Ocakları became the center to promote racialism in 1930 and took an independent position from the line of the Republican cadres' thought (Karpas 1963, 57). As a result, Mustafa Kemal, who regarded the existence of Türk Ocakları as a threat to the regime, decided to disband and transfer the property to the CHP. In fact, the closure of Türk Ocakları should be evaluated with the closure or dissolution of other independent organization such as Student Unions, Teachers' Unions, Journalists' society, the Reserve Officers' Association, the Union of Turkish Woman, Mason Lodges during this period (Akın 2007, 42). The reason for the closure or dissolution of independent organizations was that the Republican cadres wanted to see the principles of Kemalism as the only source to create a nation through the institution as dependent on them. The institution that aimed to achieve this purpose has been Halkevleri, which was founded with the Third General Congress of the CHP.

To reiterate, the Republican cadres guaranteed their political power and existence through the elimination of opposition at the end of the 20s. However, based on the lessons, the Republican cadres have realized that people did not internalize the transformations. Rather, they challenged these transformations at the first opportunity. In fact, while the Republican cadres endeavored to make reforms at both societal and state levels and to struggle with the opposition in the 20s, they neglected to gain people's support and consent for the regime as the requirement to create a new society based on the principles of the Kemalism. According to Şimşek (2005, 74), the Republican cadres have created the Turkish Republic, but they did not yet succeed in creating the republican Turks at the end of the 20s. Because of these reasons, the Republican cadres have begun to establish and spread Halkevleri to intend to be an institution, which enhances and develops the political communication between the state and society, and the intelligentsia and people. As Şimşek (2005, 78) emphasizes, the primary purpose of the Republican cadres with Halkevleri was to alter the expectations, the custom and practices, and the mindset and souls of the Turkish people. However, how did Halkevleri try to do all these things?

Halkevleri, which was established in a province or sub-province, was working with a membership system. First things first, Halkevleri was similar to the institution of education. Here, people can attend literacy courses as well as various courses, which include vocational, music, painting courses. At the same time, as highlighted above, Halkevleri was an institution that disseminates the state's ideology. In line with this purpose, Halkevleri organized conferences and various cultural activities, including concerts, film shows, theatrical performances, and exhibitions. The prin-

cial purpose of the Republican cadres through these activities was to convey the state and party ideology to the people (Şimşek 2005, 78). In this regard, it would not be to describe Halkevleri as a regulatory institution.

Soifer (2015*b*) describes the state's regulatory power as the state's power to regulate and structure the relationship between the state and society and many relationships within society. In this regard, what Soifer (2015*b*) gives as an example for the institution with a regulatory power is public primary schools, which aim to disseminate the state ideology with teachers and public text. In this regard, it would be valid to regard Halkevleri as a regulatory institution. The reason for that is that Halkevleri as an institution was established for the dissemination of the principles of Kemalism through the literacy class and various activities that I presented above. In this regard, it is not false to argue that Halkevleri aimed to regulate and structure the relationships between the state and society.

As a result, Halkevleri was established in firstly Adana, Afyon, Ankara, Aydın, Bursa, Çanakkale, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Eskişehir, İstanbul, İzmir Konya, Samsun, and Van in 1932. In this regard, the provinces where the first Halkevleri were established almost match with the provinces, which Mustafa Kemal went to during the inspection tour after the dissolution of SCF. This demonstrates that the Republican cadres, who experienced the existence of organizational challengers firsthand, determined the location of the first Halkevleri during the inspection tour. Furthermore, the fact that Mustafa Kemal did not tour the eastern provinces where territorial challengers existed in this inspection tour, in fact, shows the main incentive of Mustafa Kemal to observe only the Turkish people, which I regard as organizational challengers.

As a result, these two facts constitute the causal mechanism for the regulatory institution hypothesis. To reiterate, I argued that the Republican cadres were more likely to establish the regulatory institution in unrestricted provinces where the organizational challengers existed. In this regard, I presented the success of the SCF as the event to expose the organizational challengers to the Republican cadres. After that, I demonstrated that the inspection tour of Mustafa Kemal, which aimed to observe the challenges of people as the firsthand encounter of the Republican cadres with the organizational challengers. Therefore, I demonstrated that these two events led the Republican cadres to be founded of Halkevleri in the congress of CHP and establish the first Halkevleri in the provinces where Mustafa Kemal went. Based on this causal mechanism, I will provide statistical analysis that measures the causal effect of the regulatory institution hypothesis after this chapter.

In conclusion for this chapter, I aimed to present the causal mechanism for two hy-

potheses of this study. While the coercive institution hypothesis suggests that state elites are more likely to establish the coercive institution in contested provinces, the regulatory institution hypothesis offers that state elites are more likely to establish the regulatory institution in unrestricted provinces. Based on the case of the Turkish Republic, I identified the Umumi Müfettişlik as the coercive institution and Halkevleri as the regulatory institution. I demonstrated the impact of the Sheik Said rebellion on the reason of the Republican cadres to establish Umumi Müfettişlik. At the same time, I presented the success of the SCF in the local election as a reason for the Republican cadres to establish Halkevleri. Therefore, I described the Kurdish people as the territorial challengers, who staged a rebellion to gain independence from the Turkish state and want to create an independent state in the Turkish territory. Together with that, I portrayed the Turkish people as the organizational challengers who demonstrated their potential to change the government in the local election. As a result, in this chapter, I demonstrated how the Republican cadres decided to establish Umumi Müfettişlik in contested provinces where the territorial challengers existed and Halkevleri in unrestricted provinces where the organizational challengers existed.

Based on these causal mechanisms, now, I can switch to quantitative analysis. As I emphasized in the method chapter, the statistical analysis does not offer a causal mechanism but a causal effect between variables. Together with that, I argue that the conclusion that I reached from Small N will be applicable in Large N. It means that the causal mechanism that I concluded from a few provinces will apply to all 58 provinces of the Turkish Republic by demonstration through statistical analysis. For this reason, in the next chapter, I will present the dataset that I use and the research design for statistical analysis.

3.4 Testing Causal Mechanisms: Quantitative Analysis

In concluding the previous section, I stated that I test these two causal mechanisms to demonstrate whether these mechanisms are applicable for all provinces of the Turkish Republic or not. For this reason, I subject these causal mechanisms to quantitative analysis. To reiterate, I have two main hypotheses. First, the coercive institution hypothesis suggests that state elites are more likely to establish the coercive institution in contested provinces.

As stated in the previous sections, I contextualize Umumi Müfettişlik as a coercive institution. Together with that, I present contested provinces as areas where the

territorial challengers stage a rebellion or territorial challengers exist. In this respect, I regard the Kurdish people as territorial challengers because the Kurdish people were the only group who staged a rebellion to gain independence and create an independent state in the Turkish territory. For this reason, the Republican elites considered the location of rebellion or the density of the Kurdish population while deciding to establish Umumi Müfettişlik.

The Republican cadres regarded the density of the Kurdish people as the determinant factor because they knew the Kurdish people had developed their national identity thanks to the resolution of the conflict among the Kurdish tribes. Therefore, the Republican cadres took their togetherness as a threat to the emergence of a new rebellion. Furthermore, the resettlement of the Kurdish people with İskan Kanunu, which transferred some Kurdish groups into the Turkish populated area, proves that the Republican cadres regarded the togetherness of the Kurdish people as a threat. As a result, I expect that either rebellions or the density of the Kurdish population were the determinant factors for the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik. Based on this expectation, I hypothesize these relationships as follows:

The Coercive Institution Hypotheses

H1: Republican elites were more likely to establish Umumi Müfettişlik in provinces where rebellion broke out,

or

H2: Republican elites were more likely to establish Umumi Müfettişlik in provinces where the density of the Kurdish people was high.

As the second central hypothesis of this thesis, the regulatory institution hypothesis offers that state elites are more likely to establish the regulatory institution in unrestricted provinces. As I discussed in a detailed manner in the section on the establishment of regulatory institutions, I regard Halkevleri as a regulatory institution. In addition to that, I refer to unrestricted provinces as areas where rebellions do not break out, or organizational challengers exist. While determining organizational challengers, I argued that the Turkish people fit this definition. The reason for that is that the Turkish people, who did not internalize the principles of Kemalism, exposed their challenges to the state and regime in the local election. Therefore, I evaluated the local election as the emergence of organizational challengers. In this regard, I presented the inspection tour of the Mustafa Kemal as the tour that the Republican cadres organized to observe the organizational challengers. As a result, I expect that the Republican cadres had might considered non-rebellion provinces and provinces where the Turkish people lived as the significant factors to establish

Halkevleri. Based on this expectation, I hypothesize these relationships as follows:

The Regulatory Institution Hypotheses

H3: Republican elites were more likely to establish Halkevleri in provinces where rebellion did not break out,

or

H4: Republican elites were more likely to establish Halkevleri in provinces where the Turkish people lived.

I test these expectations by employing different sets of regression models for the coercive institution hypotheses (H1 and H2) and the regulatory institution hypotheses (H3 and H4). The reason for that comes from the fact that the dependent variables have different types of data. I explicate this issue after I present the dataset that I use.

3.4.1 Research design

I created my own original dataset for this thesis by collecting from the various studies and state archives. I generated this dataset because no dataset includes observations regarding Umumi Müfettişlik, Halkevleri, rebellions, ethnic populations, and other variables. For this reason, I mined these observations from state archives, censuses, and historical sources. In creating this dataset, the main sources that I use are following: Umumi Müfettişlikler (1927-1952) (Koçak 2003) to locate Umumi Müfettişlik, the historical documents collecting from the Directorate of State Archives Republican Archives⁹ to determine the number of Halkevleri, Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları (Hâllî 1992) for the location of rebellions, and censuses conducted in 1927 (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü 1928), 1935 (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü 1937), 1940 (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü 1941), 1945 (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü 1950), and 1950 (İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü 1961) for the population and area measure, Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar (Dündar 2000, 155-193) for the ethnic population. In addition, I employ the linear interpolation method to fill missing observations originating from the absence of censuses for specific years. As a result, I collected observations based on the province as a jurisdictional unit. Thus, my dataset covers 27 years between 1923 and 1950 and includes 1624 observations.

In fact, the number of provinces has consistently changed in these years. For this

⁹Fond Number: 490-1-0-0; 3-15-17, 847-351-1

reason, I follow adjustments that Aşık, Karakoç, and Pamuk (2020) make. They argue that although the number of provinces often changed until today, some provinces show a significant degree of continuum in terms of economic activity and population (Aşık, Karakoç, and Pamuk 2020, 8). In this regard, they combine some provinces and generate 58 province units (Aşık, Karakoç, and Pamuk 2020, 54). As a result, my dataset covers 58 provinces as a jurisdictional unit. Provinces can be found in the Appendix.

The main dependent variables for the two models are the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik and the number of Halkevleri. Therefore, I code the variable *Umumi Müfettişlik* as a binary variable. If the Republican cadres established Umumi Müfettişlik in one province, I code it as 1, and 0 otherwise. I collect data from the study of Koçak (2003) regarding the history of Umumi Müfettişlik. One of the primary sources regarding Umumi Müfettişlik in the literature is the study of Koçak (2003). He produces his research based on the various documents collecting from state archives and newspapers. Therefore, he makes cross-check facts regarding the location of Umumi Müfettişlik.

Together with that, I code variable *Halkevleri* as a continuous variable. I coded Halkevleri opened every year by adding them to the previous year. For example, if one province had five Halkevleri in 1935 and three Halkevleri were established in 1936, I coded eight Halkevleri in 1936. In addition, I collect data from the Directorate of State Archives Republican Archives. These documents were produced to inform Ankara about the number of Halkevleri, so they have observations on Halkevleri opened every year in provinces.

In addition to these, the main independent variables of this thesis are *Rebellion*, *the Density of the Kurdish Population*, and *the Turkish Population*. I code the *Rebellion* variable as a binary variable. If a rebellion broke out in a province, I code it as 1 and 0 otherwise. Moreover, if this rebellion spilled over another province, I also code it as 1. I collected data on rebellion from the study of Hâllı (1992). This study contains observations on the location of rebellion from the military documents. This research can be found unreliable because it exaggerates the strength of the Turkish army forces or belittles rebels' forces. Nonetheless, this study contains the location of rebellions collecting from the military documents, and thus I only use these locations. Furthermore, in determining the location of rebellions, the author provides maps that the military produced for the operation. Moreover, Tunçay (1999) uses this research to determine the rebellions, which broke out in the early Republican period. For this reason, it possible to regard that information regarding the location of rebellions is reliable.

For the variable the *Density of the Kurdish population*, I collect data from the censuses of 1927, 1935, 1945, and 1950, which have observations on the Kurdish and Turkish populations based on mother tongue. Then, based on population, I employ simple calculations to calculate the density; I divide the Kurdish population by the Turkish population. I prefer this method because, as I emphasized above, the Republican cadres considered the high density of the Kurdish population as a factor that led to the emergence of new rebellions. In addition, I employ the linear interpolation method to fill missing observations.

For the *Turkish Population* as another independent variable, my dataset relies on the censuses, which have information on the Turkish population by mother tongue. In addition, I take the natural logarithm of the Turkish population. Taking the natural logarithm is a widely used method to make data more meaningful for the analysis. The reason for that is that natural logarithm transforms data into normal distribution by reducing the skewness of the data.

I also control several variables, which are *log (GDP per capita)*, *log (Population)*, *Population Density*, *log (Area Measure (km²))*, *Log (Distance (km))*. I control GDP per capita because the state elites had might consider establishing these state institutions to improve or endure the well-being of people. In fact, the Republican elites' expectations from the inspector of Umumi Müfettişlik were to improve the province's infrastructure and conditions for economic activities (Koçak 2003, 63). For this reason, I expect that the Republican cadres were more likely to establish Umumi Müfettişlik in provinces where GDP per capita was low. On the other hand, the Republican cadres' other intention to establish Halkevleri was to ensure the continuity of economic development in provinces through various courses regarding economic activities such as farming and home economics (Karpas 1963, 56). For this reason, the Republican cadres had might established Halkevleri in provinces where GDP per capita was high.

Data for the GDP per capita comes from the study of Aşık, Karakoç and Pamuk (2020, 57). The authors use various statistics from Ottoman and Turkish sources to estimate these data. Their dataset includes observations from 1927, 1939, and 1950. I use these data to observe the effect of GDP per capita on establishing these state institutions with the interpolation method. In addition to GDP per capita, I also control the total population to observe whether the size of the population affects the decision of the Republican cadres to establish Umumi Müfettişlik. As a result, I collect data on the population from the censuses, and I take the natural logarithm after interpolating it according to year.

Together with that, I control population density. According to Quiles (2019), popu-

lation density has a positive effect on establishing state institutions. For this reason, I observe the impact of the population density, which I calculate by dividing the population by area measure. Moreover, I control the area measure to observe whether it has a positive effect on these institutions. The reason why I control the area measure comes from the fact that the state elites are prone to establish more state institutions in wider provinces to strengthen state control. Related to the state strength, the state elites are also prone to establish more state institutions to increase the state's capability to control the population in provinces, which are too far from the capital city because as provinces move away from the capital, the central government has difficulty in controlling provinces.

For this reason, the state elites are more likely to establish state institutions, which aim to control the population easily, in provinces far away from the capital city. In this regard, I expect a positive relationship between the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik, which aimed to audit the population who live in distant provinces from the capital city, Ankara. Hence, I calculate each province's distance based on kilometers from Ankara by using the `geodist` command in Stata 17. Then, I take the natural logarithm.

As a result, my full model has seven independent variables, of which three are main independent variables. To reiterate, the main dependent variables are the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik and the number of Halkevleri. While I use different models to measure the effect of independent variables on dependent variables, I control the same variables for each model except one for the regulatory institution hypothesis. In fact, there may be other confounding variables that might affect the decision of the state elites to establish these state institutions. Since my study is historical research, I must say that collecting data for these years is challenging. Nevertheless, I collect data from various sources as much as possible to control these confounding variables that the literature emphasizes. Together with that, it is worth reminding that this absence of data for these years is one of the main limitations of this thesis.

3.4.2 Modelling the establishment of the coercive institution

The coercive institution hypothesis posits two expectations as summarized above. The first one assumes a positive relationship between rebellion and the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik. At the same time, the second expects a similar relationship between the density of the Kurdish population and the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik. In this regard, since the dependent variable is a binary variable, the model that should be used to test these expectations is the logistic regression model

(Wooldridge 2015, 525).

Table 3.2 Logistic Regression Estimates for the Coercive Institution

	Model.1	Model.2	Model.3	Model.4	Model.5
Rebellion	1.373*** (0.384)	0.005 (0.460)	-0.105 (0.459)	-0.103 (0.460)	-0.878* (0.462)
Density of Kurds		0.801*** (0.085)	0.751*** (0.089)	0.755*** (0.100)	0.079* (0.044)
log(GDP Per Capita)			-0.852*** (0.172)	-0.853*** (0.172)	0.593*** (0.221)
log(Population)			0.063 (0.161)	0.069 (0.183)	0.239 (0.208)
log(Area Measure (km2))				-0.011 (0.158)	-0.453** (0.186)
log(Distance (km))					5.802*** (0.399)
Constant	-1.230*** (0.060)	-1.635*** (0.072)	1.286 (1.969)	1.318 (2.019)	-39.776*** (3.888)
N	1624	1624	1624	1624	1624
Log-likelihood	-872.609	-744.622	-731.460	-731.457	-465.396

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01


Table 3.2 summarizes the regression outputs for the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik as a dependent variable ¹⁰. Model 1 tests the effect of the rebellion variable alone, while Model 2 tests the effect of main independent variables together. In addition to that, Models 3-5 control the effect of independent variables with confounding variables. Model 3 controls demographic factors with GDP per capita and the population of provinces, and Models 4 and 5 look at the impact of geographical factors on the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik. In fact, I differentiate Model 4 and Model 5 because I want to show how adding distance variable changes the impact of other variables on the dependent variables.

In a short conclusion, the regression outputs provide strong support for Hypothesis 2, whereas there is no evidence for Hypothesis 1. While looking at the rebellion variable, it is a positive and statistically significant variable in Model 1. However, while adding another main independent variable and control variables, rebellion loses

¹⁰See Appendix for the robustness tests.

its significance, and its indicator switches into a negative. It means that rebellion is a determinant factor alone for the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik. However, looking at Models 2, 3, 4 and, 5, rebellion is not a significant variable at the 95 percent anymore. Therefore, I cannot find evidence for Hypothesis 1. In this regard, I cannot falsify the null hypothesis suggesting that the Republican cadres are not more likely to establish Umumi Müfettişlik in provinces where rebellions broke out.

Figure 3.1 The Effect of the Density of the Kurdish Population on the Establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik



On the other hand, the coefficients of the density of the Kurdish population variable are positive and statistically significant throughout all models. Although adding other control variables decreases the effect of the density of the Kurdish population variable slightly, this variable is still statistically significant and positive. In the logistic regression model, which assumes a non-linear effect, the coefficient of a variable does not say much about the unit change of an independent variable's impact on the dependent variable. For this reason, the average marginal effect implies the effect of unit changes in an independent variable on the dependent variable. When I control the average marginal effect of the density of the Kurdish population in Model 4, it is distinguishable from zero and equals 0.104. It posits that one-unit change in the density of the Kurdish population variable increases the probability of the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik by 10.4 percent points. Figure 3.1 shows the effect of the density of the Kurdish Population variable on the probability of

establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik. This graph demonstrates that while the density of the Kurdish population increases, the probability of which the Republican cadres establish Umumi Müfettişlik increases. Thus, these findings provide strong support for Hypothesis 2, suggesting that the density of the Kurdish population is associated with an increased probability of the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik. In this regard, I conclude that the Republican cadres are more likely to establish Umumi Müfettişlik in contested provinces where the territorial challengers existed.

While looking at the coefficient of GDP per capita, Model 3 and Model 4 demonstrate that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between GDP per capita and the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik. This implies that the probability of which Republican cadres establish Umumi Müfettişlik is high in provinces where GDP per capita is low. These findings align with my expectation as summarized above on the positive relationship between GDP per capita and the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik. However, when I add the distance variable, although the significance of the variable does not change, the sign of the variable switches to positive. It means that while controlling the distance variable, the Republican cadres might have established Umumi Müfettişlik in provinces where GDP per capita is high.

In addition, the regression outputs do not provide any evidence to comment on the effect of the population on the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik. The reason for that is the coefficients of population variable are not statistically significant.

Together with these, area measure has a positive impact on the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik while looking at Model 5. It means that the probability of which the Republican elites establish Umumi Müfettişlik decreases when a province's size becomes wide. Lastly, the distance variable is statistically significant and has a highly positive effect on the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik, as indicated by the variable's coefficient in Model 5. This finding falls with my expectation on the increased probability of the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik in distant provinces from the capital city, Ankara.

In fact, this finding regarding the positive relationship between the distance and the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik demonstrates the basic precaution that the Republican elites took for one of the main problems inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The reason for that is, in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, although the Ottoman authorities made an effort to reach the eastern region, they did not fully succeed (Emrence 2012, 106). Therefore, complete control over these provinces could not be achieved. Therefore, the Republican elites who have known this situation found a solution by establishing Umumi Müfettişlik. Since the main aim of Umumi

Müfettişlik as the coercive institution ensure the order and peace, the Republican elites established Umumi Müfettişlik in distant provinces where the Ottoman authorities could not achieve total control. For this reason, the positive relationship between Umumi Müfettişlik and the distance empirically shows the intention of the Republican elites.

As a result, the coercive institution hypothesis posited two probable expectations regarding the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik. While the first hypothesis suggests rebellion as the determinant factor for the Umumi Müfettişlik, the second hypothesis introduces the density of the Kurdish population as the main factor that affects the decision of the Republican cadres to establish Umumi Müfettişlik. In this regard, I found empirical support for the second hypothesis throughout the regression outputs. However, I could not find empirical support for the first hypothesis. Therefore, the Republican cadres have taken the density of the Kurdish population into consideration while deciding the provinces to establish Umumi Müfettişlik.

3.4.3 Modelling the establishment of the regulatory institution

As summarized above, the regulatory institution hypothesis assumes two relationships (H3 and H4). The first one is that Halkevleri were more likely to be established in provinces where rebellions did not occur. This implies that there is a negative relationship between the establishment of Halkevleri and rebellion. On the other hand, the second relationship expects a positive relationship between the establishment of Halkevleri and the Turkish population. This positive relationship indicates that Halkevleri were more likely to be established in provinces where the Turkish population was high. In order to test these expectations, I employ the negative binomial regression model. The reason why I prefer this model originates from the type of dependent variable data. The type of Halkevleri variable data is the count data. One of the main characteristics of the count data is the overdispersion of observations. In this regard, the model that handles the overdispersion is the negative binomial regression (Hilbe 2011, 2). Therefore, to estimate the effect of independent variables on Halkevleri, I employ the negative binomial regression.

Table 3.3 demonstrates the regression outputs for Halkevleri as a dependent variable. Model 6 tests only the impact of the rebellion variable on Halkevleri, while Model 7 tests the main independent variables together. In addition to that, I generate Model 8-10 by adding several control variables, which are GDP per capita, area measure, population density, and distance. In fact, I exclude the population variable as a control variable. Since the Turkish population and total population of provinces are

highly correlated (0.72), it generates the collinearity problem for the estimation.

Table 3.3 Negative Binomial Regression Estimates for the Regulatory Institution

	Model.6	Model.7	Model.8	Model.9	Model.10
Rebellion	-1.787*** (0.343)	-1.238*** (0.340)	-1.231*** (0.340)	-1.430*** (0.335)	-1.446*** (0.336)
log(Turkish pop.)		0.428*** (0.037)	0.415*** (0.041)	0.255*** (0.048)	0.271*** (0.049)
log(GDP Per Capita)			0.066 (0.090)	-0.188* (0.099)	-0.177* (0.099)
log(Area Measure (km2))				0.566*** (0.088)	0.580*** (0.089)
Pop. Density				0.018*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.003)
log(Distance (km))					0.030 (0.019)
Constant	1.400*** (0.036)	-3.878*** (0.451)	-4.008*** (0.486)	-6.764*** (0.804)	-7.306*** (0.884)
lnalpha	0.581*** (0.047)	0.458*** (0.049)	0.457*** (0.049)	0.397*** (0.050)	0.394*** (0.050)
N	1624	1624	1624	1624	1624
Log-likelihood	-3967.644	-3906.965	-3906.698	-3874.532	-3873.439

Standard errors in parentheses


* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In a short conclusion, these regression outputs provide strong support for hypotheses 1 and 2. While looking at the rebellion variable, its coefficients are statistically significant and negative throughout all models. Although the effect of rebellion decreases slightly when I add control variables, its sign and significance remain the same. It implies that the rebellion variable has a negative impact on the establishment of Halkevleri. When I control the average marginal effect of the rebellion variable, which indicates the effect of the independent variable's one unit change on the dependent variable, it is statistically distinguishable from zero and equals -6.25. It means that when a rebellion breaks out in a province, the probability of the establishment of Halkevleri in this province decreases by six times. Furthermore, Figure 3.2 demonstrates the effect of rebellion on the probability of the establishment of Halkevleri. In this regard, it shows the decreasing effect of rebellion on the probability of the establishment of Halkevleri when a rebellion breaks out. There-

fore, these findings provide empirical support for H3. In this regard, I conclude that the rebellion is associated with a decreased probability of the establishment of Halkevleri. Therefore, it is valid to state that the Republican cadres might not have preferred contested provinces to establish Halkevleri.

In addition to Hypothesis 3, I find empirical support for Hypothesis 4, which expects the positive relationship between the Turkish population and the establishment of Halkevleri. From Model 7 to 10, the coefficients of the Turkish population variable are statistically significant and positive. It indicates that the Turkish population has an increasing effect on the establishment of Halkevleri. When I control the average marginal effect, it is statistically distinguishable from zero and equal to 1.18. It means that one unit change in the Turkish population variable increases the likelihood of the establishment of Halkevleri by one time. In addition, Figure 3.3 shows the increasing effect of the Turkish population on the probability of the establishment of Halkevleri. This graph indicates that when the Turkish population increases, the probability of the establishment of Halkevleri increases. Therefore, these findings support H4, which assumes the positive relationship between the Turkish population and the establishment of Halkevleri. In this regard, I conclude that the Republican cadres were more prone to establish Halkevleri in provinces the Turkish population mostly lived.


Figure 3.2 The Effect of Rebellion on the Predicted Count of the Establishment of Halkevleri



As a result, I find empirical support for two expectations (H3 and H4) of the regulatory institution hypothesis. Therefore, I conclude that the Republican cadres might have taken the non-rebelled provinces and the Turkish-populated provinces into consideration while deciding the location of the Halkevleri. Furthermore, as I emphasize, while adding control variables, the effect of the rebellion and the Turkish population remains the same. For this reason, the conclusion for the determinant factor on the establishment of Halkevleri is not affected by other variables.

For the GDP per capita variable, the outputs are not what I expected. I assume that the Republican cadres might have established Halkevleri in provinces where GDP per capita is higher. However, as Models 9 and 10 indicate, the GDP per capita's coefficients are negative and barely significant at 90 percent. It indicates a negative relationship between Halkevleri and GDP per capita, meaning that more Halkevleri were established in provinces where GDP per capita was low. In fact, the political science literature accepts the 95 percent confidence interval to determine whether the statistic is significant or not, so it is not possible to say that the GDP per capita variable is significant at a 95 percent confidence interval. Therefore, I do not find a meaningful relationship between the GDP per capita and Halkevleri.

Figure 3.3 The Effect of the Turkish Population on the Predicted Count of the Establishment of Halkevleri



Together with that, the regression outputs indicate a positive and significant relationship between the area measure and Halkevleri and population density and

Halkevleri. I expected that the Republican cadres might have considered these two factors to establish Halkevleri because the Republican cadres aimed to reach people as much as possible with Halkevleri. In this sense, a positive and significant relationship between these two variables enables me to reach the conclusion that the Republican cadres have preferred to establish Halkevleri in wider and dense provinces. However, it is not possible to comment on the effect of the distance variable because the distance variable is not a significant variable. For this reason, how distant a province from the capital city has no impact on the Republican cadres while deciding the location of Halkevleri.

3.5 The Uneven Territorial Reach of the Turkish State

I present statistical analysis for the coercive and regulatory institution hypotheses in the previous section. The expectations, which I derived from the coercive institution hypothesis, are a positive relationship between rebellion and Umumi Müfettişlik (H1) and the density of the Kurdish population and Umumi Müfettişlik (H2). I did not find empirical support for the relationship between rebellion and Umumi Müfettişlik. However, I found empirical support for the relationship between the density of the Kurdish population and the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik. It means that the probability of which Republican cadres establish Umumi Müfettişlik in provinces where the Kurdish population is dense is higher than non-Kurdish populated provinces. As I emphasized above, the Republican cadres regarded the Kurdish people as territorial challengers and taken the density of the Kurdish people as a threat to the emergence of a new rebellion. For this reason, I argued that the Republican cadres had taken the Kurdish-populated provinces into consideration while deciding the location of Umumi Müfettişlik. In this regard, the statistical analysis supports this argument.

Moreover, the statistical analysis indicates that the Republican cadres paid attention to the distance of provinces from the capital city in deciding the location of Umumi Müfettişlik. In fact, this relationship demonstrates for what purpose the Republican cadres established Umumi Müfettişlik. I emphasized that as moving away from the capital city, the state elites had difficulty controlling the population because of the insufficient infrastructure. For this reason, the Republican cadres decided to establish Umumi Müfettişlik, which has coercive power, to control provinces far away from the central government. In this regard, the statistical analysis supports the intention of the Republican cadres towards the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik.

For the regulatory institution hypothesis, I had two expectations. These are a negative relationship between rebellion and Halkevleri and a positive relationship between the Turkish people and Halkevleri. In this regard, the statistical analysis supports these two expectations. It means that the probability of establishing Halkevleri in non-rebelled and Turkish-populated provinces is higher than rebelled and Kurdish-populated provinces. As I highlighted above, the Republican cadres aimed to disseminate the ideology of the state through Halkevleri. In this sense, the Republican cadres, who regarded the Turkish people as the organizational challengers, endeavored to reorganize them with activities aiming to inculcate the principles of CHP in Halkevleri. Therefore, the Republican cadres sought to transform the Turkish people from challengers into more compliant with the state with Halkevleri.

However, the Republican cadres had not preferred to establish Halkevleri in non-Turkish populated provinces since they perceived the Kurdish population as territorial challengers needed to observe and audit rather than transform them. The main difference in the perception of the Republican cadres towards the Kurdish and Turkish populations might have originated from their different demands. Although the Turkish people had disagreed with the principles of the Republican cadres, they have been demanding to restore the old system rather than gaining territorial independence from the state. However, the Kurdish population staged various rebellions in aiming to create an independent state.

For this reason, the Republican elites had made a choice between the transformation or auditing for the Kurdish and Turkish people. In this regard, these interactions between society and the state might be one of the main reasons determining the state's ability over the territory. The reason for that is that the choice of the Republican cadres resulted in the uneven territorial reach of the Turkish state, thereby developing unequal state capacity over the territory. As I am trying to emphasize throughout this thesis, the territorial reach of the state is a determinant factor for the state capacity. For this reason, the institutional choice of the state elite and the institutions' presence in the provinces at a varying level in the first years of the state formation generates one of the main reasons that the Republican elites had unevenly reached over the territory.

In order to illustrate the spatial variation of the presence of the Turkish state with Umumi Müfettişlik and Halkevleri, I generate two maps. Figure 3.4 shows the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik in provinces, while Figure 3.6 demonstrates the varying number of Halkevleri in provinces. These two maps explicitly expose the institutional choice of the Republican cadres at the province level. Thus, these maps reveal the uneven nature of the state territorial reach through these state institutions'

presence. In addition to the varying level of the presence of state institutions, the uneven nature also originates from the characteristics of these state institutions. As I explicated in previous sections, Halkevleri was founded to disseminate the state's principles to people, while Umumi Müfettişlik was established to control people. In this regard, officers had organized activities and courses in aiming to inculcate the principles of the CHP in Halkevleri. However, the primary aim of the inspector of Umumi Müfettişlik was to audit people and inform the central government about the activities of the people by preparing a weekly report. In this sense, it is worth reminding that these state institutions are different in the sense of possessing distinct purposes. Therefore, it would be accurate to say that the state differently had developed its capability in the territory, resulting in varying state capacity levels in the territory. In this perspective, this result originates from the fact that the state unevenly reached the region with different institutions, which had distinct aims.

Figure 3.4 The Presence of Umumi Müfettişlikler in 1950



As a result, the Republican cadres had mostly preferred to establish Umumi Müfettişlik in the eastern provinces where the Kurdish population was high, as visualized in Figure 3.5. Therefore, the comparison of these two maps, which show the Kurdish people and the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik, support the argument regarding the choice of the Republican cadres to establish Umumi Müfettişlik in the Kurdish-populated provinces. Although the Republican cadres found Halkevleri in these provinces, the number of Halkevleri is lesser compared to western provinces. As the map in Figure 3.6 demonstrates, the number of Halkevleri varies from 1 to 7 in the eastern region. However, this number increases in western provinces, ranging from 7 to 29. In this sense, it would be correct to state that the Republican cadres exposed the coercive aspect of the state power over the eastern provinces where the Kurdish people mostly lived while revealing the regulatory aspect in the western provinces where the Turkish population mainly existed.

Figure 3.5 The Kurdish Population in 1950



Figure 3.6 The Number of Halkevleri in 1950



Here, I need to open a parenthesis to clarify one issue regarding the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik in Turkish-populated provinces. The Republican cadres had established Umumi Müfettişlik in some Turkish-populated provinces located in the Thrace and the northwestern regions. The Republican cadres established Trakya Umumi Müfettişlik (Thrace Umumi Müfettişlik), the second Umumi Müfettişlik, which includes Tekirdağ, Çanakkale, Kırklareli and Edirne provinces in 1934. The leading cause of which the Republican cadres established this Umumi Müfettişlik is the existence of the Jewish population in these provinces. In fact, the pogrom against the Jews happened in provinces of Edirne, Kırklareli, Çanakkale, Tekirdağ in 1934¹¹. As a matter of fact, the establishment of the Thrace Umumi Müfettişlik coincided with this pogrom. During this pogrom, residents in these provinces have beaten the Jews, sexually assaulted the Jewish women, and looted their homes (Pekesen 2019, 412). As a result of this pogrom, those found guilty were given light sentences, and the government promised the repair of the Jewish people's loss. However, the Jews had emigrated from the Thrace region, and their number decreased from 13.000 to 2.000 by 1945 due to these light sentences that led to the

¹¹The reasons for the pogrom require an in-depth explanation. These reasons are not concern of this thesis so, those who are interested see Pekesen (2019)

loss of the Jewish people's trust (Pekesen 2019, 413). Figures 3.7 and 3.8 visualize the Jewish population in respectively 1927 and 1935. As understood from these maps, the Jewish concentrated on only the Thrace region.

For this reason, the Jewish people in the Thrace region were a problem for the government. Evidence that strongly supports this argument is the minutes of meeting among the inspectors of Umumi Müfettişlik under the interior minister in 1936 (Varlık 2010). This meeting was held to talk about the general situation of Umumi Müfettişlik and the population in the regions. It is worth reminding that four Umumi Müfettişlik had existed in 1936.

Figure 3.7 The Jewish Population in 1927



Figure 3.8 The Jewish Population in 1950



Therefore, four inspectors had participated in this meeting and had briefed the interior minister about Umumi Müfettişlik and ethnic groups that lived under Umumi Müfettişlik. While discussing an issue regarding public order, Kazım Dirik, an inspector of the second Umumi Müfettişlik, has mentioned four different ethnic groups in the Thrace region; Pomak, Circassian, Alawite, and Jewish (Varlık 2010, 170-171). He stated that Pomaks, Circassians, and Alawites are not their concern much because they speak Turkish and mostly embraced Turkish culture. However, he has said that it requires to dwell on the Jewish group as the public order issue. The

reason for that, he continued, is that the Jewish people became the most powerful economic group in the region through their assets in the industry. For this reason, he mentioned the necessity of dealing an economic blow to Jews. Based on the meeting's minutes, it would not be wrong to argue that the establishment of Thrace Umumi Müfettişlik was related to the existence of the Jewish community. Both the pogrom against the Jews happened in 1934, and their increasing economic power was one of the main problems that Republican cadres regarded in this region. Therefore, in addition to the Jews community, while considering the dire economic condition of the Thrace region, it is comprehensible why the Republican cadres opened Umumi Müfettişlik in this region.

The third Umumi Müfettişlik was established in 1935 at the request of İsmet İnönü after his inspection tour over northeastern and eastern provinces (Cagaptay 2006; Koçak 2003, 171). The government decreed to open this Umumi Müfettişlik including Erzurum, Ağrı, Erzincan, Kars, Çoruh, Gümüşhane, and Trabzon. One of the main reasons why Umumi Müfettişlik was established in these provinces is, as the inspector of the third Umumi Müfettişlik stated, the increasing population of the Kurdish people in these provinces due to the migration from Iran and Erivan (Varlık 2010, 121). However, there were three Turkish-populated provinces, Trabzon, Gümüşhane, and Çoruh. According to Cagaptay (2006, 47), the government included these Turkish-populated provinces in the third Umumi Müfettişlik to develop the economic conditions for these impoverished provinces. This argument is correct because the inspector of the third Umumi Müfettişlik mentioned only blood revenge between some families as a security issue and mostly briefed the development of infrastructure in these provinces in the meeting mentioned above (Varlık 2010, 121). For this reason, it would not be wrong to say that the inclusion of these Turkish-populated provinces mainly was for economic concerns. As a matter of fact, in the previous section that presents statistical analysis, the regression outputs indicate that the probability of which the Republican elites established Umumi Müfettişlik increases when GDP per capita decreases. For this reason, the fact that the government included these three Turkish-populated provinces in Umumi Müfettişlik resulted from economic reasons. I close the parenthesis.

As a result, the reason why the Republican cadres opened Umumi Müfettişlik is mainly related to security issues. In other words, the Republican cadres' expectation from the inspectors was to audit and control the population. In this meeting that I mentioned above, every inspector who took the floor firstly summarizes the security situation in the region to the interior minister. They then talk about the Kurdish population's situation, the existence of essential tribes, and their potential dangers. On the basis of these dangers, they propose either relocating the groups

the Kurdish population and aimed instead to keep them under control.

In conclusion, the Republican elites' choice regarding the presence of these institutions at varying levels in provinces constitutes the uneven territorial reach of the Turkish state. In the theory section, I emphasized the necessity of continuous protection for the political power, which is essentially territorial, based on the framework conceptualized by Mann (2012, 55). In this regard, I underlined the importance of which the state needs to penetrate society through bureaucratic mechanisms to regulate the social relations and control the population, in other words, the territorial reach of the state. However, since this process is dependent on the resources and incentives of the state elites and social forces, the territorial reach eventuates in uneven in the sense that the state presence varies considering the existence of challengers.

Based on this framework, the Republican elites unevenly completed the territorial reach of the state. As I emphasized above, the Republican cadres established state institutions at varying levels considering challengers in the territory. In this regard, the Republican elites established coercive institutions in the eastern provinces while opening regulatory institutions in the western provinces. Since these institutions' existence provides different capabilities to the state, these capabilities determine the state capacity in the territory. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that the Turkish state capacity also had been developed unevenly in the territory. Although this thesis does not examine the outcomes of the uneven territorial reach of the Turkish state, studies focusing on other countries demonstrate the unequal public goods provision, anti-democratic practices, human rights violations, and economic inequality as the consequences of the uneven territorial reach of the state. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, these issues regarding the Turkish Republic have not been concerned much in the literature. However, I find one research, which can be regarded as to present the state performance indirectly. As I emphasized in the theory section, one of the factors that determine the economic performance, the maintenance of order and peace, and democratic inclusion, i.e., state performance over the territory, is the state presence over the provinces, according to Centeno and his colleagues (2017, 10).

In this regard, Aşık and her colleagues (2020, 39) examine the possible factors that affect the development of the GDP per capita in the years between 1913 and 1950 in Turkey. They investigate the relationship between the GDP per capita and Kurdish provinces, which are Siirt, Mardin, Ağrı, Diyarbakır, Muş, Van, and Urfa. In this regard, they find a negative correlation between these variables in the years between 1950 and 2010. It means that GDP per capita has developed less in these Kurdish

provinces compared to others. The reasons for the unequal development in these provinces require an in-depth examination. However, it would not be wrong to claim that one of the reasons for the underdevelopment of these provinces is the Republican cadres' choices, which resulted in the uneven territorial reach of the state. In this sense, since their approach towards the Kurdish-populated provinces on the basis of security understanding caused to generate policies more related to security over these provinces, the Republican cadres might have neglected the economic issues for these provinces. As the maps in Figures 3.10 and 3.11 indicate, the level of the GDP per capita decreased from 1927 to 1950. In this regard, it is accurate to say that the eastern provinces were the provinces with the least GDP per capita level in 1950. Moreover, as understood from the findings of Aşık and her colleagues (2020, 39), this pattern endured over after the loss of power of CHP in 1950, thereby resulting in unequal state performance over the territory.

Figure 3.10 The GDP Per Capita in 1927 (Aşık, Karakoç, and Pamuk 2020, 57)




Figure 3.11 The GDP Per Capita in 1950 (Aşık, Karakoç, and Pamuk 2020, 57)



As a result, although this thesis does not concern the outcomes of the uneven territorial reach of the Turkish state, the finding regarding the varying level of GDP per capita across provinces gives a clue on the consequences of this nature of the territorial reach. As I emphasized above, the uneven territorial reach of the state

constitutes various problems related to political, economic, and social issues, and scholars in the literature do not study much these problems emerged at the sub-national level in the Turkish Republic. In this sense, the absence of this type of research can be taken as an opportunity to contribute to the literature. Therefore, this thesis is the first research that takes the first step regarding these issues.

4. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I examined the territorial reach of the Turkish state by focusing on the establishment of the Umumi Müfettişlik and Halkevleri, thereby investigating the process of building the state capacity in the first years of the state formation. The theoretical framework of this thesis, which derives from the relational tradition, suggests that the existence of the state depends on the continuous protection of the political power, which is inherently territorial (Mann 1984). Therefore, the state has to increase its capabilities in the claimed territory to perpetuate its political power. One way to do this is to launch a web of differentiated sets of institutions in the territory. The state elites enable themselves to penetrate civil society and implement political decisions in the territory through these institutions. In this regard, this process constitutes the territorial reach of the state in which the state elites established new state institutions and spread them in the territory. However, the level of the state's territorial reach results from the interactions between the state elites and subnational non-state actors. Hence, the resources and incentives of the state elites and subnational non-state actors determine the type of state institutions and the density of these institutions' presence. For the regions inhabited by the territorial challengers, which reveal their challenges more visibly and therefore pose a threat to the existence of the state, the state elites prefer to establish the coercive institutions to audit them. On the other hand, in the areas where organizational challengers exist and do not threaten the state's authority, the state elites establish the regulatory institutions that aim to transform and internalize them.

Based on these expectations, I analyze the Republican elites' choice regarding the factors that determine the level of the territorial reach of the state in the first three decades after the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. I consider Umumi Müfettişlik as the coercive institution because it has the extraordinary coercive power to observe people. On the other hand, I regard Halkevleri as the regulatory institution since it aims to fill the gap between the state and people by disseminating the principles of Kemalism through various cultural activities and courses. There-

fore, I expected the establishment of Umumi Müfettişlik in the Kurdish-populated provinces and Halkevleri in the Turkish-populated provinces. The reason for that is that the Kurdish people posed a threat to the existence of the state by enacting various rebellions. However, since the Turkish people did not threaten the state as much as the Kurdish people and their challenges were more related to the state policies, the Republican elites preferred to establish Halkevleri in the Turkish-populated provinces.

On the basis of the causal mechanisms that I demonstrated between the specific events that affected the state elites to decide to establish these state institutions, I find empirical support from the statistical analysis for these hypotheses. I find a positive relationship between the density of the Kurdish people and the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik. It means that the probability of which the Republican cadres establish Umumi Müfettişlik increases when the density of the Kurdish people is high. At the same time, I find empirical support for the positive relationship between the Turkish population and Halkevleri. The statistical analysis supports that the probability that the Republican cadres establish Halkevleri in the Turkish-populated provinces is higher than the Kurdish-populated provinces. In addition to these main hypotheses, I found the distant provinces and low level of GDP per capita as determinant factors that affected the Republican cadres to establish Umumi Müfettişlik. Moreover, I found that the wider and densely populated provinces are the significant variables that led to the establishment of Halkevleri.

Based on these findings, I concluded that the Republican elites had unevenly reached the territory, thereby building unequal state capacity in the territory. The reason for unequal state capacity in the territory comes from the fact that the Republican elites established Umumi Müfettişlik in the eastern provinces while establishing Halkevleri in the western provinces. For this reason, the coercive aspect of the state power with Umumi Müfettişlik manifested in the eastern provinces, while the regulatory aspect with Halkevleri reflected in the western provinces in a denser way. Hence, the uneven territorial reach of the Turkish state through these state institutions had resulted in an unequal state capacity in the territory. Although this thesis does not examine the consequences of the unequal state capacity in the territory, another study's findings regarding the low level of GDP per capita in the eastern provinces after 1950 suggest the emergence of economic inequality between the Kurdish and Turkish populated provinces.

However, this comment regarding the relationship between the uneven territorial reach of the state and economic inequality could be a coincidence. In order to make such comments more robust, it is necessary to examine more formal state institu-

tions and see how they spread. Therefore, one of the limitations of this thesis is that it examines less formal state institutions compared to garrisons and schools to grasp the territorial reach of the state. In a way, examining such more formal institutions would be more constructive for understanding current conditions regarding economic and social issues. However, since institutions such as Halkevleri and Umumi Müfettişlikler are very particular institutions, it would be more appropriate to comment on the communication style of the state toward these people. For this reason, investigating more formal institutions that determine existing problems and allow us to compare them with other countries will deepen our knowledge of the Turkish Republic. In the literature, many studies focus on the territorial reach of the state through institutions that provide social goods and the consequences of the unequal presence of these institutions. Unfortunately, these types of studies regarding the Turkish Republic are nonexistent. Therefore, the absence of such studies can be seen as an opportunity to contribute to the literature.

As the second limitation of this thesis, this thesis deals with the historical data that I created from various studies and historical documents. This status of the thesis generates a defective condition for the reliability and multiplicity of the data. Therefore, the reliability problem and the absence of data regarding the factors can harm the findings of this thesis. However, as I explained in the method section, I was attentive to cross-check the facts from other traditions' studies while collecting data and using historical studies. Together with that, I explained my data collection process regarding which sources were used and also the potential drawbacks of these sources. In this regard, I mitigated the potential harms regarding the reliability, which may occur for the findings of this thesis.

However, the absence of data regarding factors that affected the establishment of these state institutions is still a problem for this thesis. For example, there may be another confounding variable that I could not control due to the absence of data. The studies regarding Halkevleri suggest that the literacy rate and urbanization were the other factors that affected the decision of the Republican cadres to locate Halkevleri. Moreover, the inefficient military strength in areas may be another factor that determined the location of Umumi Müfettişlik. Hence, in the light of new data, this thesis' findings can be replicated and extended.

Finally, this thesis is the first research that examines the subnational variation of the Turkish state capacity. To my knowledge, neither the development of the Turkish state capacity nor the subnational variation of the Turkish state capacity has been examined much in the literature. As Centeno and his colleagues (2017) emphasize, the state capacity is one of the factors that determine the existing conditions for the

state performance regarding economic performance, the maintenance of order and peace, and democratic inclusion. In this regard, examining the subnational variation of the state capacity reveals the state performance, which can vary considering provinces. In this regard, the state capacity of the Turkish regarding the state performance in the territory state seems untouched. The findings of this thesis lightened up a small part of the iceberg regarding the Turkish state performance. However, it is necessary to examine the Turkish state capacity more comprehensively to grasp the state performance regarding economic performance, order and peace, and democratic inclusion. Most significantly, the democratic inclusion of the Kurdish people and the economic development of regions where the Kurdish people live and peace and order in these regions have always been problematic in the Turkish Republic. For this reason, examining the subnational variation of the Turkish state capacity may expose the origin of the current problems in the Turkish Republic.

Above all these limitations and these suggestions for further research, this thesis demonstrates preliminary findings regarding the uneven territorial reach of the Turkish state. Although this thesis does not examine the consequences of the uneven nature of the territorial reach of the state, it is possible to say that choosing different institutions at the varying level in the territory causes the emergence of different results considering provinces. For example, as Aşık and her colleagues demonstrate, economic development in the eastern part of the territory, which already was dire situation compared to the western part of the territory before 1950, could not show much progress after 1950 and the economic divergence between eastern and western provinces has widened until today. These institutions are not institutions that were founded to improve the economic situation of provinces.

Nevertheless, since these institutions were the product of a particular understanding toward the population and there have to be consequences of this understanding, it is not wrong to argue that the attitude of the state elites toward these provinces remained the same. Thus, although Umumi Müfettişlik and Halkevleri were officially closed by the DP, which came to power in 1950, it can be understood from these unchanged economic indicators that the approach of the state elites toward these provinces was not utterly different from the Republican elites.

Furthermore, the attitudes of the Republican elites toward the Kurdish people, which reflected in the foundation of Umumi Müfettişlik, led to exclude the Kurdish people from the political area, thereby failing to integrate the Kurdish people into the Republic. This approach of the state elites after the CHP remained the same. Up to the present, several pro-Kurdish political parties were closed, and many Kurdish politicians were arrested. Although the Turkish state elites do not explicitly

show the same approach toward regions where the Kurdish people lived in terms of state institution as similar to Umumi Müfettişlik, this exclusionary approach, which reflected in different policies, endured in almost whole Turkish Republic history at these regions, such as appointing a trustee to municipalities, which pro-Kurdish political party won. In this sense, as Centeno and his colleagues (2017) emphasize by arguing that the state capacity determines the state performance, which includes democratic inclusion, it is correct to say that the uneven nature of the Turkish state's territorial reach through different institutions led to uneven democratic inclusion.

As a result, examining the territorial reach of the state as a factor that determines the level of the state capacity might include many answers and solutions for the problems with which countries have been facing in the territory. For this reason, grasping the level of the territorial reach of a state might be one of the first steps that policymakers take in order to determine policies improving the well-being of people's lives. Since every region has different and specific problems, which originate from the capabilities of the state varying at the sub-national level, the policymakers should consider each province separately to make policies for these provinces. For example, as is emphasized above, since the territorial reach of the state is one of the determinant factors for the unequal level of social good provision at the sub-national level, policymakers have to determine the level of state presence through state institutions at the sub-national level to improve the equality for social good provision. Along with new research conducted regarding the territorial reach of the Turkish state through formal institutions, this thesis is one of the first studies that emphasizes the necessity to improve the Turkish state capacity and reduce the divergence between provinces in terms of state performance.

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APPENDIX A

In Table A.2, I recoded the presence of Umumi Müfettişlik variable. In these models, I just code Umumi Müfettişlik as 1 for the year it opened. I coded other years as 0.

Table A.2 Logistic Regression Estimates for the Coercive Institution

	Model.1	Model.2	Model.3	Model.4	Model.5
Rebellion	3.273*** (0.577)	2.718*** (0.636)	2.542*** (0.655)	2.551*** (0.721)	1.634** (0.703)
Density of Kurds		0.192** (0.076)	0.149* (0.084)	0.149* (0.086)	0.052 (0.083)
log(GDP Per Capita)			-0.496 (0.560)	-0.507 (0.568)	0.497 (0.605)
log(Population)			-0.272 (0.506)	-0.302 (0.806)	1.030 (1.025)
log(Area Measure (km2))				0.003 (0.789)	-1.418 (1.087)
Pop. Density				0.002 (0.022)	-0.036 (0.037)
log(Distance (km))					3.692*** (0.891)
Constant	-4.228*** (0.237)	-4.296*** (0.244)	1.254 (6.129)	1.593 (6.802)	-28.216*** (10.112)
N	1271	1271	1271	1271	1271
Log-likelihood	-104.878	-102.607	-101.882	-101.875	-87.727

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In the Table A.3, I add province dummy variable.

Table A.1 58 provinces and the existing provinces (Aşık, Karakoç, and Pamuk 2020, 54)

58 Provinces	Existing Provinces	58 Provinces	Existing Provinces
Adana	Adana, Osmaniye	İstanbul	İstanbul, Yalova
Afyon	Afyon	İzmir	İzmir
Ağrı	Ağrı	Kars	Kars, Ardahan, Iğdır
Amasya	Amasya	Kastamonu	Kastamonu
Ankara	Ankara, Kırıkkale	Kayseri	Kayseri
Antalya	Antalya	Kırklareli	Kırklareli
Antep	Gaziantep, Kilis	Kırşehir	Kırşehir, Nevşehir
Aydın	Aydın	Kocaeli	Kocaeli, Sakarya
Balıkesir	Balıkesir	Kütahya	Kütahya, Uşak
Bolu	Bolu, Düzce	Malatya	Malatya, Adıyaman
Burdur	Burdur	Manisa	Manisa
Bursa	Bursa	Maraş	Kahramanmaraş
Çanakkale	Çanakkale	Mardin	Mardin
Çankırı	Çankırı	Muğla	Muğla
Çoruh	Rize, Artvin	Muş	Muş, Bingöl, Bitlis
Çorum	Çorum	Niğde	Niğde, Aksaray
Denizli	Denizli	Ordu	Ordu
Dişarbakır	Dişarbakır	Samsun	Samsun
Edirne	Edirne	Siirt	Siirt, Batman, Şırnak
Elazığ	Elazığ, Tunceli	Sinop	Sinop
Erzincan	Erzincan	Sivas	Sivas
Erzurum	Erzurum	Tekirdağ	Tekirdağ
Eskişehir	Eskişehir	Tokat	Tokat
Giresun	Giresun	Trabzon	Trabzon
Gümüşhane	Gümüşhane, Bayburt	Urfa	Şanlıurfa
Hatay	Hatay	Van	Van, Hakkari
İçel	Mersin	Yozgat	Yozgat
Isparta	Isparta	Zonguldak	Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın

Table A.3 Logistic Regression Estimates for the Coercive Institution with Province Fixed-Effect

	Model.1	Model.2	Model.3
Rebellion	-1.733*** (0.481)	-1.615*** (0.497)	73.287 (.)
Density of Kurds		-0.990*** (0.341)	4440.951 (.)
log(GDP Per Capita)			-9880.371 (.)
log(Population)			100250.440 (.)
Constant	-1.792*** (0.540)	-1.768*** (0.540)	-1.256e+06 (.)
N	644	644	644
Log-likelihood	-332.889	-326.762	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In the Table A.4, I add province dummy variable.

Table A.4 Logistic Regression Estimates for the Regulatory Institution with Province Fixed-Effect

	Model.6	Model.7	Model.8
Rebellion	-1.809*** (0.359)	-0.919*** (0.351)	-0.916*** (0.351)
log(Turkish pop.)		2.968*** (0.177)	2.968*** (0.177)
log(GDP Per Capita)			0.095 (0.221)
Constant	0.728*** (0.263)	-37.440*** (2.292)	-37.907*** (2.542)
lnalpha	0.374*** (0.051)	0.049 (0.055)	0.050 (0.055)
N	1624	1624	1624
Log-likelihood	-3865.806	-3684.269	-3684.177

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In the Table A.5, I add year dummy variable.

Table A.5 Logistic Regression Estimates for the Regulatory Institution with Year Fixed-Effect

	Model.1	Model.2	Model.3	Model.4	Model.5
Rebellion	4.102*** (0.809)	1.477 (1.365)	1.339 (1.331)	1.287 (1.342)	0.911 (1.538)
Density of Kurds		4.149*** (0.375)	3.878*** (0.373)	4.617*** (0.457)	3.309*** (0.647)
log(GDP Per Capita)			-1.104*** (0.254)	-1.066*** (0.253)	2.937*** (0.579)
log(Population)			-0.761*** (0.222)	-0.208 (0.514)	-4.437*** (0.909)
log(Area Measure (km2))				-0.912* (0.480)	-0.693 (0.725)
Pop. Density				0.000 (0.010)	0.009 (0.015)
log(Distance (km))					11.696*** (1.102)
Constant	-0.420 (0.268)	-1.013*** (0.313)	13.419*** (2.897)	14.647*** (3.331)	-24.493*** (6.475)
N	1392	1392	1392	1392	1392
Log-likelihood	-756.896	-459.941	-439.064	-430.984	-182.157

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01