

**TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: DIFFERENTIATED
INTEGRATION FROM A SECURITY ANGLE**

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**TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: DIFFERENTIATED
INTEGRATION FROM A SECURITY ANGLE**

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ABSTRACT

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Differentiated integration is a theory that explains the European integration process by looking at different integration types and levels of different countries to the European Union. Regarding this theory, not only members, but also non-members can have some amount of integration to the Union. Being a candidate country, Turkey has a differentiated integration to the European Union in terms various different areas of cooperation. As the European Union and Turkey has a strong cooperation in terms of security and defence since the Cold War and Turkey's being a member to NATO, security and defence is one of the areas of cooperation that Turkey has an opt in to. Turkey's opt in can be seen through institutional ties and the operations and missions that are conducted under the flag of the European Union. The thesis will examine these institutional ties between Turkey and the European Union to uncover to level of Turkish inclusion to the security and defence cooperation of the European Union, and will analyze civilian and military operations and missions of the European Union to show Turkish contribution to European security and defence.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE VE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ: GÜVENLİK PERSPEKTİFİNDEN FARKLILAŞTIRILMIŞ ENTEGRASYON

HILAL SERT

AVRUPA ÇALIŞMALARI YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, AĞUSTOS 2020

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye, Farklılaştırılmış Entegrasyon,
Savunma, Güvenlik

Farklılaştırılmış entegrasyon, Avrupa Birliği entegrasyon sürecini farklı ülkelerin Avrupa Birliği'ne farklı entegrasyon türlerine ve seviyelerine bakarak açıklamaya çalışan bir teoridir. Bu teori, sadece üyelerin değil, diğer ülkelerin de Avrupa Birliği'ne olan entegrasyon seviyesini açıklamaya çalışır. Avrupa Birliği üyelik sürecinde adaylık statüsünde bulunan Türkiye, çeşitli farklı işbirliği alanları açısından Avrupa Birliği ile farklılaşmış bir entegrasyona sahiptir. Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye'nin, Türkiye'nin NATO üyesi olmasından bu yana Soğuk Savaş döneminde başlayarak güvenlik ve savunma alanında güçlü bir işbirliğine sahiptir. Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'nin güvenlik ve savunma politikalarına olan katılımı, Birlik'in kurumsal yapılarına katılmasından ve Avrupa Birliği bayrağı altında yürütülen operasyonlar ve misyonlara katılmasından görülebilir. Bu tezde, Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'nin güvenlik ve savunma işbirliğine katılım düzeyini ortaya çıkarmak için Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği arasındaki bu kurumsal bağlar incelenmiştir ve Türkiye'nin Avrupa'ya katkısını göstermek için Avrupa Birliği'nin sivil ve askeri operasyonları ve misyonları analiz edilmiştir.

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*Sevgili annem Zeliha, babam Halil, minik meleđimiz İlay, abilerim Osman ve
Okan'a*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina	53
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy	9
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy	4
DI Differentiated Integration	2
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo	46
EC European Community	7
EDA European Defence Agency	12
EDC European Defence Community	6
EEA European Economic Area	26
EEAS European External Action Service	12
EEC European Economic Community	17
EFTA European Free Trade Area	26
EMU European Economic and Monetary Union	18
ESDI European Security and Defence Identity	35
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy	13
EU European Union	1, 53
EUAM The EU Advisory Mission	57
EUAVSEC The EU Aviation Security Mission	54
EUBAM The EU Border Assistance Mission	57
EUCAP The EU Capacity Building Mission	57

EUFOR European Force	54
EUJUST The EU Rule of Law Mission.....	54
EUMAM The EU Military Advisory Mission.....	54
EUMM The EU Naval Monitoring Mission.....	57
EUNAVFOR The EU Naval Force Operation.....	55
EUPAT The EU Police Advisory Team.....	54
EUPM The EU Police Mission	53
EUPOL The EU Police Mission	54
EUSEC The EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform.....	54
EUSSR The EU Mission in Support of the Security Sector Reform	54
EUTM The EU Military Training Mission.....	57
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.....	53
LI Liberal Intergovernmentalism	21
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization.....	6
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.....	61
PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation.....	13
RCA Central African Republic	54
UK United Kingdom	9
US United States.....	9
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The Soviet Union	7
WEU Western European Union	6

1. INTRODUCTION

The basis of the European Union (EU) emerged right after the Second World War was over. As the Second World War was destructive and damaging to the whole continent, the idea to restructure political relations in a way that would preserve peace on the continent was on the rise. Certain states on the European continent such as the United Kingdom and France wanted to eliminate the possibility of another European War that could have damaged the continent. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, was one of the founding fathers of the EU who wanted to create a system that would ensure peace on the continent came up with the idea that a united Europe would have been the solution to conflicts among the European Nations. In 1946, he gave a speech in University of Zurich and he mentioned about it as,

“There is a remedy which ... would in a few years make all Europe ... free and ... happy. It is to re-create the European family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe.” (*Europa / European Union 2020* 2020).

Here, it can be understood that for European nations to be safe and free, a new structure and a cooperation among them is necessary. The idea behind the formation of the European Union was creating a safe and free Europe after the war and this idea affected all kinds of relationships among the European nations.

As the European Union was a peace project from the very beginning, one can argue that security and defence was a priority for the nations. Even though cooperation in terms of security and defence could not start right away when the formation of the European Union began, the issue itself was highly important. From the very beginning, cooperation in terms of security has been tried, however, due to the circumstances of the day, it was not achieved. Owing to what happened in the Second World War, it was hard to come up with a solution that could include all

European nations under one institution to have a security cooperation. However, these challenges have been overcome in time, and since the end of the Cold War, the attempts to create a security cooperation have increased and this cooperation in terms of security and defence became more crucial for the members of the European Union.

Over time, as the EU has become a political club that has different member states in terms of capacities and capabilities, the member states began to be varied in terms of their perceptions towards the EU. Certain members wanted integration more and the others wanted less, whereas, certain members wanted to integrate in some policy areas and others did not want that. Especially in terms of security and defence, the willingness of the member states have been varied since the beginning of the cooperation. When their willingness is varies, their integration process has began to be different from one another as well. Because the member states do not integrate at the same speed in terms of their policy compliances, the integration process is identified as differentiated. Thus, Differentiated Integration (DI) has emerged to conceptualize the integration process in the EU. Today, when we look at the members and non-members of the Union, there are a variety of integration levels to the Union based on the consent of the both sides.

Turkey is one of the non-member states that has been trying to become a member for a long time. Over this period of trying to become a member, Turkey has been integrated into some policy areas of the EU based on the consent of the both sides. For any state to become a member of the Union, there is a political and legal criterion to fulfill to make sure that the third state would be in harmony with the Union when it becomes a member. Thus, for a long period of time, Turkey has tried to align itself with certain policy areas of the EU by changing its legal and political structure. One of these areas that both the EU and Turkey is prioritizing is security and defence. Besides aligning the policies, Turkey has been a partner to the EU in terms of security and defence and tried to become a part of the security and defence cooperation of the EU as well. With aligning its policies with the European Union in terms of security and defence by creating institutional ties between them, Turkey has been trying to define itself as a part of European security. For the purpose of this thesis, the question of whether Turkey is a part of the European Union's security and defence cooperation will be tried to answer by looking at the institutional ties between the EU and Turkey. To provide a theoretical basis for this argument, Differentiated Integration will be used as this theory can explain different levels of integration to the European Union both from members and non-members. The argument of this thesis is that Turkey and the European Union has a very high degree of alignment in terms of security and defence, and Turkey has a high degree

of opting in to the security and defence of the European Union.

To support this argument, this thesis has five chapters. The first chapter will provide historical background for the security and defence cooperation of the Union. This is an important section of this thesis to form the constituent steps towards the security and defence cooperation that the Union has today. The attempts that have been successful and the ones that could not achieve their goal of cooperation will be analyzed in this section.

Following the first chapter, the second chapter will provide a basis for the Differentiated Integration theory. As this theory explains third country inclusions to the structure of the European Union, it is an important part to analyze Turkey's inclusion to the security system. Theory will be analyzed, and European integration processes will be evaluated. In addition to that, European integration process in terms of security and defence will be analyzed in this chapter as well.

Third chapter will provide background on Turkey's inclusion to the EU system with the lenses of Differentiated Integration. In this chapter, Turkey's differentiated integration to the EU security and defence cooperation will be discussed. The meaning of institutional ties and Turkey's efforts to become a part of the security cooperation will be analyzed here.

The fourth chapter of the thesis will provide empirical data from Turkish inclusion to the system of security and defence cooperation. This chapter is composed of two part, one analyzing the historical ties between the EU and Turkey in terms of security cooperation and the other one analyzing the Turkish contribution to the operations and missions that are conducted under the flag of the EU.

Lastly, the fifth chapter will provide a current discussion of the Turkish inclusion to the EU security and defence cooperation. Current situation within the European Union in terms of security and defence cooperation and Turkey's position in it will be analyzed as there is a change from the historical position.

For the purpose of the study, for theoretical and historical backgrounds, a literature review and a content analysis will be made. For the empirical data to uncover the relationship between the EU and Turkey in terms of security and defence cooperation, again a content analysis will be made to see the relationship in the history. For current ties, the operations and For the purpose of the study, for theoretical and historical backgrounds, a literature review and a content analysis will be made. For the empirical data to uncover the relationship between the EU and Turkey in terms of security and defence cooperation, again a content analysis will be made to see the relationship in the history. For current ties, the operations and missions that are

held under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU will be utilized as sources. To uncover the Turkish inclusion to these missions and operations, The Progress Reports on Turkey since 2003 will be used with the Tubakov Dataset. The reason why 2003 was selected as a milestone to start looking at Progress Reports is that the missions and operations started in 2003 and still continue. Thus, all progress reports since 2003, will be reviewed to see Turkish contribution to these missions and operations. In addition to the reports, declarations of the Turkish and EU public officials will be used to analyze the contributions of Turkey to the EU system of security and defence. Lastly, with the data that is gathered, an analysis on whether Turkey is a part of security and defence cooperation of the EU will be elaborated.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

2.1 Introduction of the Chapter

As of 2020, the European Union defines itself as;

“At the core of the EU are the 27 Member States that belong to the EU, and their citizens. The unique feature of the EU is that, although the Member States all remain sovereign and independent states, they have decided to pool some of their ‘sovereignty’ in areas where it makes sense to work together.” (*The EU - what it is and what it does* / *European Union* 2020).

The main rationale behind the European Union is that the member states are transferring their competences to the Union to have a coherent policy about certain policy areas that they are willing to cooperate. From the very beginning, the reason why European states wanted such cooperation among themselves was to ensure that there will not be any war on the European continent and according to the founding fathers of the Union this could have been achieved by ensuring economic interdependence among the European states (*The EU - what it is and what it does* / *European Union* 2020). Thus, the EU was a peace, and a security project in the eyes of the Europeans that can be achieved through economic tools. For this reason, one can argue that security is one of the most important areas of cooperation for the EU. Having this security cooperation was not easy for the European Community/Union. Member states needed a process to integrate in such an important area as it is hard to have similar opinions over security and defense related issues because of different member state preferences. For this reason, the integration level that the EU has

today is a result of many different steps and efforts. For the purpose of this thesis, the different efforts that the EU has made to have a further integration in terms of security and defense will be analyzed.

2.2 First Steps Towards Security Cooperation in the EU

European states have begun to cooperate in the post-World War II period which is known as the Cold War period. The initial steps towards a security cooperation had been taken in this period as well. The beginning of the European security cooperation has its roots to 1947. The Dunkirk Treaty which was signed by the United Kingdom and France is meant to begin cooperation in terms of European defence (Bloed and Wessel 1994). A year after the Dunkirk Treaty, Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) countries and Dunkirk countries convened a conference on Brussels and they signed the Brussels Treaty in 1948 (Bloed and Wessel 1994). The Brussels Treaty was the treaty that established the Western European Union (WEU) which aimed to be the defense arm of the European countries. Its basic rationale was collective defense. However, with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, the WEU lost its meaning as NATO became the security provider of the European states during the Cold War (Yilmaz 2006).

At the same time, European nations were trying to cooperate in terms of defense and security in another institutional setting as well: the European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC was designed according to the plan of French Prime Minister Rene Plevin and his plan aimed at cooperation at the highest level to make war more costly to the European nations to prevent another war on the European continent. According to him, if the interdependence of the European states would have been achieved through policy areas which are considered as high politics such as security and defense, it would have been easier to eliminate the possibility of a war. The main rationale behind the EDC was that it ensured German contribution to the defence of the European continent whilst not letting Germany have their own national army like it was agreed after the end of the World War II to prevent any German strength in terms of military (Deighton 1998). However, this plan did not work out because French Parliament did not ratify the EDC Treaty and cooperation through such institutions could not be realized until the end of the Cold War period (Glarbo 1999). Certain member states, in this case France, do not want to lose core competency

areas of state like security, and foreign policy; thus, it becomes harder to have cooperation in those areas (Winzen 2016). Having a structured cooperation in terms of security and defense was harder for the European countries and they cooperated in terms of economic and technical issues. This is why, until the end of the Cold War, mostly the European Community did not have a security cooperation, it was a regional, economic cooperation. NATO was seen as the security provider for the European states as well and they did not need another structure of security cooperation. This situation began to change after the Cold War structure was dismantled.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO had fulfilled its task of securing European nations from the Soviet threat (Wallace 2017). When the common enemy was gone, the need for NATO was gone as well and the question of who would provide European security began to be thought about. The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Cold War structure has increased uncertainty in the international arena which meant that the European countries were pushed to find a way to cooperate to secure themselves under this uncertain environment. The reason why the Maastricht Treaty, the founding treaty of the European Union was signed right after the end of the Cold War was to react to the changes and uncertainties in the international environment (Desai 2005). With this treaty, the European Community (EC) has turned into the European Union which means that from now on, there will be a change in the way that the countries are cooperating among themselves. Before, the EC was mostly seen as an economic community, however, the Maastricht Treaty has turned it into a political one. After that, the EU has begun to prioritize cooperation in terms of other policy areas rather than economics and the Union has begun to be talked about as being different powers rather than solely an economic one. Until then, for the last three decades, the EU has been seen as a security actor in the international arena as well (Carrapico and Barrinha 2017).

The Maastricht Treaty was a game changer for the European Union in terms of creating the basis of the security structure. With the Maastricht Treaty, the Western European Union was defined as an ‘integral part’ of the Union which will be the defense arm of the Union (Luoma-aho 2004) and EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy was established which will show the EU’s global standing on the issues that needed to be addressed (Süleymanoğlu Kürüm 2015). Incorporating the WEU to the EU meant that the associate members of the EU will be associate members of the WEU as well (Ricketts 2017). Concurrently, in 1992, with the Petersberg Declaration, it was declared that the associate members will have the same amount of rights with the EU members in terms of operations held under NATO and the limit of the operations were determined as ‘humanitarian/rescue; conflict preven-

tion/peacekeeping; peacemaking; disarmament operations; advice and assistance; and post-conflict stabilisation' (Ricketts 2017). Looking at the limitations of the Petersberg tasks, one can say that the WEU is not authorized to operate in any time, the situation needs to be under Petersberg tasks. One can argue that these developments in the EU's security structure was the basis of the security cooperation that the member states have today.

2.3 From Saint Malo Declaration to PESCO

The Treaty of Amsterdam which was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999 was another important step towards a more coherent security and defence cooperation which amended the Maastricht Treaty in terms of security and defence. With the Amsterdam Treaty, it was decided that in time, the WEU should be fully integrated into the EU as a common defence mechanism in Article J.7 as,

“The Western European Union ... supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide.” (*Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts* / *European Union* 1997).

The article is an illustration of how the EU has begun to prioritize cooperation in terms of security and defence which would eventually lead to develop an aim of having a European defence capability. In addition to the amendments regarding the WEU, Treaty of Amsterdam has created the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy which would be responsible for administering foreign and security policy of the EU, coordinating foreign policy tools of the EU, representing EU at the international arena and attending regular meetings in European Council and debates when necessary in the European Parliament (*High Representative/Vice President* / *EEAS* 2019).

The Saint Malo Declaration, one of the most significant milestones in the security cooperation of the EU, was declared in 1998, after the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed but not entered into force. This declaration came out of a bilateral summit

between the United Kingdom (UK) and France about the defence cooperation of the Union. Until that time, the EU had no military capabilities to react to immediate crisis in the EU territory and it was seen as a deficiency in the security structure which was seen in the Kosovo War. The ineffectiveness of the EU during the Serb offensive in Kosovo proved that the EU still has no capability to act towards any crisis that can erupt in the European continent (Shepherd 2009). American-led NATO operation has ended the crisis in Kosovo, however, the incident has shown that there will be some crisis that the Americans would not want to take initiative but the Europeans would have to take initiative to contribute to the security of the EU (Shearer 2000). This meant that the EU needs to be able to take action when needed and the EU's interdependence to the United States (US) and NATO should decrease. This shift in the EU's perception towards the European defence and security initiated some important steps towards European security and defence cooperation. One of these was the Saint Malo Declaration.

The Joint Declaration on European Defence which was issued after the Saint Malo Summit (4 December 1998) included that the Union needs to have a military force to back up the Union's response to the crises in the EU territory and beyond (Shearer 2000). The declaration addressed the issue of defence as

“The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). . . . To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”. (Rutten 2001).

The declaration wanted to ensure that the European collective defence should be provided by the Europeans and to this end, they wanted to restore the Brussels Treaty that was signed in 1948 and lost its meaning after NATO was founded. "In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained." (Rutten 2001). As the failure during the Kosovo War changed the perceptions of the European nations, one of the most important aims of this declaration is to make sure that the EU will be able to react to immediate crisis on European continent or in the EU's neighborhood that could risk the security of the EU. To this end, British-French declaration addressed providing the necessary

means as "Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology." (Rutten 2001).

This declaration was the very first initiative to find a European based military force to act towards any crisis, and also was one of the very first initiatives that will form more institutionalized cooperation in terms of security and defence. The most important aspect of the Saint Malo Declaration was it showed that the EU wants to conduct autonomous operations, especially France was the one who pushed for being independent of NATO (Ricketts 2017). These ambitions of the United Kingdom and France were the beginnings of the EU having a more enhanced security cooperation and being a security power/actor globally.

After the Saint Malo Declaration, the changes in the security and defence structure of the EU has gained speed. The Treaty of Amsterdam came into force and the changes that the treaty has done regarding the security and defence cooperation has been integrated to the Union. In the Cologne Summit of 1999, the Western European Union and the European Union merged and decisions regarding WEU began to be made under the CFSP of the EU (Aybet and Muftuler-Bac 1999). This meant a change for the non-EU members of the associate members of the WEU as their right to take part in the decision-making process in the WEU has been taken away from them. However, this merge also meant that the EU is committed to strengthening its security and defence structure in the EU. In addition to that, in the Conclusions of the Presidency of the Cologne Summit, there was an emphasis on the need for a common security and defence policy which led to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (*Cologne European Council Conclusions of the Presidency | European Council 1999*).

One of the most important developments regarding integration in terms of security is the EU's cooperation with NATO. Throughout the Cold War years, the security of the European Union was provided by the American-led NATO and the Brussels Treaty that created collective-defence for the Europeans was ineffective. As the EU wanted to provide its own security and defence, it has proposed to cooperate with NATO and wanted to use NATO assets for the operations that the EU will conduct under CFSP as the EU does not have a standing army or military that is ready when the action is needed which was seen in the Kosovo War. The EU's proposal was found logical by the US government as the US will not be "decoupled" from the security cooperation of the EU, the non-EU members of NATO are not "discriminated" and the capabilities of NATO will not be "duplicated" by the EU (Çayhan 2003). Even though the proposal seemed to be logical, when the EU asked

for automatic access to NATO assets, it became a problem for the non-EU members of NATO such as Turkey. Not only Turkey wanted to be a part of the missions that will be held under the name of the EU but also wanted to have a say in the decision making procedure of these operations and did not want to give automatic access to the EU to its military assets (Bali Aykan 2005). At the time, Turkey had an aspiration to ensure Turkish participation in the operations that will be led by the EU with or without NATO cooperation, thus, there have been lots of discussions about the issue during the late 1990s and early 2000s. In NATO's Washington Summit that was held in 1999, the automatic access issue was debated. As a result, with Turkey's unwillingness to give the EU automatic access to NATO assets, the issue was concluded as there will be unanimous decision by all NATO members to give NATO assets to the EU (Park, 2000) and the decision will be made case by case (Müftüler-Baç 2000). The Washington Summit decisions made NATO members a veto player to the European-led operations. This situation was not a problem for the countries that are both members of the EU and NATO. However, the non-EU European members of NATO were a problem. If the automatic access was given to the EU, the military assets of the non-EU members of NATO would have been used with or without their permission. Thus, the non-EU members like Turkey opposed the idea of automatic access. Merger of the WEU with the EU has increased the tension between European countries and the non-EU European members of NATO as they have lost their power on the WEU Council. Throughout the beginning of the 2000s, the debates have continued.

At the end the decision was made with the Berlin Plus Agreement (2002) and non-EU members of NATO, such as Turkey, were given the right to participate into the military and civilian operations and missions that will be made under the CFSP of the EU (Dursun-Ozkanca 2017). One can argue that Turkish aspiration to become part of the security cooperation of the EU is an indication that the EU has begun to be seen as a security power by the third states like Turkey, and these third states have begun wanting to be a part of the security cooperation of the EU. The Berlin Plus Agreement paved the way to the first operations to be held under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

After the Berlin Plus Agreement which paved the way to make operations under Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, the EU began its military and civilian operation in 2003 and since then, there have been 36 civilian and military missions and operations in total. These operations were highly important for the European Union after the failure to react in Kosovo War as it can be seen in the declaration of Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

“Significant progress has been made in our ability to deploy a "package of instruments" rapidly and coherently. Consider the examples in the Balkans in the past two years: in FYROM, in the Presevo Valley, Kosovo and in Montenegro. In each case there is hard evidence of the EU acting early and acting effectively. The incentive to act in this manner is overwhelming. It's not just good diplomacy, its good economics. In FYROM the cost of conflict prevention will have been less than one-tenth of the cost of the conflict management in nearby Kosovo." (Solana 2002).

In 2003, European Security Strategy was adopted to "achieve a secure Europe in a better world, identify the threats facing the EU, define its strategic objectives and set out the political implications for Europe." (*Timeline: EU cooperation on security and defence / European Union 2020*). Since then, the EU's core interests in terms of security and defence have been specified with this document and a collective sense of direction has been determined.

One other attempt to create defence cooperation is European Defence Agency (EDA). EDA has aimed to create a defence procurement agency without duplicating the existing procurement agencies, thus, they decided to create a broader agency with shallower powers (Heuinckx 2008). The agency was created under the CFSP of the EU. The main aim of the EDA is to support the member states in terms of increasing their defence capabilities (Heuinckx 2009). EDA has created European Defence Research and Technology Strategy and a Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base to create a collaborative environment for the member states. The basic rule of the EDA is that it is voluntary and non-binding. Member states choose to be a part of the EDA and they become subscribing member states and there is no legal penalty for the non-observance to the Code of Conduct of the EDA (Heuinckx 2008). To conclude, the EDA is created for the member states who want a higher level of integration in terms of their defence capabilities. As of 2020, EDA has 26 member states, all EU members except Denmark and Norway (2006), Switzerland (2012), the Republic of Serbia (2013) and Ukraine (2015) has signed Administrative Arrangements with the EDA to participate in the Agency (*European Defence Agency Countries / European Union 2020*). Negotiating these arrangements are still on the way.

The attempts after EDA have come with the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007, entered into force in 2009. Institutional changes such as enhancing the post of High Representative to be Vice-President of the European Commission to ensure coordination among the EU institutions and establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS) had an intention to have more strategic and consistent European foreign, security and defence policy (Zwolski 2012). The European Security and Defence Pol-

icy (ESDP). has been replaced with Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although some scholars like Zwolski (2012) argue that the developments that happened after the Lisbon Treaty are enabling the EU to adopt a 'holistic' approach to the security problems of other countries and relate these problems with the policy areas such as development that could be better used for the EU. It can be said that they aimed to have more comprehensive cooperation among the member states.

In 2016, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy was published. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini presented the idea behind Global Strategy as "Our wider region has become more unstable and more insecure. The crises within and beyond our borders are affecting directly our citizens' lives. In challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together." (*European Union Global Strategy | European Union* 2016). The main rationale behind the Global Strategy was to enhance security and defence of the Union whilst acting as a one united body. In the same year, the EU and NATO made a joint declaration aiming to increase the practical cooperation in areas such as

“countering hybrid threats, including through the development of coordinated procedures, operational cooperation at sea and on migration, coordination on cyber security and defence, developing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities, facilitating a stronger defence industry and greater defence research, stepping up coordination on exercises, building the defence and security capability of the partners in the East and South.”. (Laas and Leyts 2016)

Another important institutional cooperation has been introduced to the EU system of security with the Lisbon Treaty is Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). PESCO was formally established in 2017 with the Council decision and its aim is to bring the member states who have higher military capabilities and want a deeper integration (Tardy 2018). There are different defence capability building projects under PESCO which aims to integrate further the EU members who are willing to and create a stronger security and defence actor in the region. However, there has been a controversy between France and Germany about how inclusive PESCO should be. Germany wanted it to be inclusive and have as many member states, however, France wanted it to be a small group of states that have similar amount of military and defence capabilities (Baun and Marek 2019). Disagreements between the two major contributors have led to inefficiency of PESCO projects and the aim

would not have been realized.

Over time, with the developments in the institutional setting of security cooperation, it can be said that the EU has become a visible actor in the international arena more than ever. In the Cold War years, there was no security actorness of the EU as the security provider for the EU was the United States. In the post-Cold War era, gradually, the EU's activeness in the security and defence both in its region and in the international arena has increased.

2.4 Operations under CSDP of the EU

Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), formerly European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is an important tool for the EU to show its activeness in the security arena. CSDP has existed since 2003 and it was first discussed in the Saint Malo Summit between the UK and France. From the very beginning, it is operational under Petersberg tasks (humanitarian, peace keeping, rescue and crisis management operations and missions) and as the EU has seen that the military operations are not the only applicable way to deal with all kinds of crises that erupted, CSDP operations include civilian ones as well (Kaldor 2012). For the EU, one of the most important aspects of these operations is that the EU has a human security approach which means that in the missions both military and civilian forces are working together under a civilian command to contribute to global security at all possible levels (Kaldor 2012). The approach of the EU to these missions is an illustration of how the EU wants to become a contributor to global security and wants to be an actor who provides both military and civilian assistance to the situations that need to be controlled for global security. It can be said that the EU has been trying to be one of the security providers and keepers in the world by the missions that it has been doing since 2003.

One of the problems that hinders the effectiveness of CSDP is its decision-making procedure. As CSDP is one of the policy areas that needs intergovernmental and unanimous decision making, it is hard for all member states to have similar preferences about a crisis that needs to be reacted to. Because member states did not want to lose their competences in the areas that are mostly affiliated with state sovereignty like security and defence policy, these areas remained under intergovernmental unanimous voting (Winzen 2016). As the decisions are made unanimously,

the different opinions that different member states have about a crisis affects the EU's capability to react to that crisis. These decisions can be affected by any variable in any time of the crisis. For instance, for the Somalian operation that the EU has launched, when it was not seen as a threat to the EU's shipping interests and only was seen as a humanitarian problem, the EU countries could not agree on launching an operation (Nováky, 2014), only after the EU member states began to be affected by the Somali piracy, they decided to take action. It can be inferred that CSDP operations are also used by the member states according to their interests which might decrease the credibility of CSDP operations in the international arena. One can argue that this is a problem that makes the EU less active and less strong in the global arena as a security power. In addition to that, planning processes of some of CSDP missions were too long such as EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina took nine months to be prepared which is an undesired situation as these crises that the EU is reacting are mostly in need of immediate reaction (Boštjancic-Pulko 2017).

The goal of civilian operations that the EU is launching are mostly peacebuilding operations that have police training and rule of law missions and the military operations are mostly for peacekeeping (Kirchner 2013). As of today, the EU has completed 19 of its civilian and military missions and operations and there are 17 ongoing ones. For the current ones, only 6 of them are military missions, other ones are civilian operations of the EU.

The most important element of the European Union's security system that makes the EU a global security power is its Common Security and Defence Policy missions. As these operations are beyond the EU territory, it is a way for the EU to show its activeness in international security issues. Especially in the places such as Western Balkans that are closer to the EU, the EU is considered to be one of the key foreign policy actors (Kirchner 2013). EUFOR Althea was an important turning point for the EU in terms of its consciousness about being a foreign policy and security actor in the region (Boštjancic-Pulko 2017). The success of the operation has strengthened the EU's self-perception as a security power and increased the EU's credibility in the international arena as a security power. Between the period of 2003-2008, the operations were mostly based on 'search and rescue' (SAR) model, however, since 2008, most of the operations that have been launched have utility-driven aspirations behind them (Palm and Crum 2019). Even though the utility-based logic is decreasing the credibility of the EU as a security power in the world due to the fact that the EU is trying to use its military operations for its own benefits increasingly, one cannot argue that military and civilian missions and operations are becoming a core strategy of European security policy as a whole. It also can be argued that

even though the member states are pursuing their own interests, the third parties are also benefiting from these (Wright 2011). The same logic is applicable to the CSDP missions and operations as well, although the member states are using these missions as a tool to benefit themselves, it is benefiting countries that the missions are launched. It can be argued that the rationale behind the missions is not making the EU uncredible in terms of being a security power. As a matter of fact, there are some discussions about the EU trying to balance the United States with its CSDP missions and operations. Even though scholars like Wang (2019) concluded that the EU is not trying to balance the US in terms of being a security power, the discussion itself shows the EU's credibility as a security power in the recent years. To conclude, it can be said that the EU can be considered as a security power/actor in the international stage and it is trying to secure its place as it is.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: DIFFERENTIATED

INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

3.1 Introduction of the Chapter

“What began as a purely economic union has evolved into an organization spanning policy areas, from climate, environment and health to external relations and security, justice and migration. A name change from the European Economic Community (EEC) to the European Union (EU) in 1993 reflected this.”. (*The EU in Brief / Europa* 2020)

As stated above, one could argue that the European Union has started its journey as an organization that provides economic and functional cooperation among its members. As the integration has proceeded further, the organization has turned into a political one which has rules and regulations about different policy areas. Further integration was accompanied with the increase in the number of member states. These changes in the structure of the EU has brought alterations in terms of further integration.

Six founding members of the European Union were Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Over time, more European countries wanted to become members of the Union. In 1973 the United Kingdom (left on 31 January 2020), Ireland and Denmark; in 1981 Greece; in 1986 Spain and Portugal; in 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden; in 2004, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania; in 2013 Croatia has joined (*Countries / European Union* 2020). As the number of the member states has increased, the differences between member states have become more visible in terms of the differences in the integration capacities and willingness

to integrate further. Especially when the Central and Eastern European countries joined in 2004, the heterogeneity among members have increased dramatically Andersen and Sitter (2006) as the newcomers were less developed and much poorer than the current members which need to be absorbed in the EU system (Sepos 2005). This situation caused a natural differentiation among the member states in terms of their integration capabilities and capacities to the EU. As the number of the policy areas that the EU has regulations on has increased, member states have begun to have various opinions about the policy areas that they will be integrating. Especially with the integration of the Schengen visa regime to the EU and the establishment of the Eurozone has created different opinions among the member states (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014). Some of the member states did not want to participate and asked for an exemption in these policy areas because of reasons such as not being able to meet the criteria or not being able to comply with the policy area due to domestic issues like public opposition whereas some of the outsiders wanted to become a participant. For instance, as of 2020, Ireland which is a member state is not a participant in the Schengen visa regime, on the other hand, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Lichtenstein are not members but participating in the Schengen visa regime (*Schengen Area - Visa Information for Schengen Countries* 2020). When it comes to the Eurozone (European Economic and Monetary Union-EMU), in 1999, when the euro was introduced 11 out of 15 EU member states have joined; in 2001 Greece; in 2007 Slovenia; in 2008 Cyprus and Malta; in 2009 Slovakia; in 2011 Estonia, in 2014 Latvia and in 2015 Lithuania has managed to join (*What is the euro area? / Europa* 2020). Denmark has an opt-out from the Eurozone area which means that it does not want to participate now, but can in the future. The other members of the EU which are not in the Eurozone area are not yet qualified to join the Eurozone, thus, they have a derogation which means that when they meet necessary conditions to enter the Eurozone, they will participate (*What is the euro area? / Europa* 2020). The difference between Denmark and others is that Denmark's opt-out is voluntary, the other member states could not meet the criteria. As Denmark was already a member state to the EU when the Eurozone was negotiated, it could voluntarily stay out. However, member states who join after the negotiations are done cannot voluntarily opt-out, at some point they have to be in the Eurozone, they can temporarily stay out if they do not meet the criteria to be in the Eurozone. When it comes to the outsiders, Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican City are using Euro as their national currencies but as they are not EU members, they are not in the Eurozone (*What is the euro area? / Europa* 2020). These instances over time indicate that increases in the number of member states and policy areas have created a differentiation among member states. These changes have been accompanied by a change in the integration types. Member states do not

have to be a part of all policy areas that the EU has a regulation, or non-members do not have to stay out of a policy area just because they are not full members of the Union. Member states can stay out of a policy area if they are already members when the policy area has been negotiated, new member states can integrate at different speeds if they are not ready to be a part of an area, non-members can participate in some of the policy areas if the both parties can agree on. As a result of these, now there is a difference in terms of the integration levels of the members and non-members to the EU.

The different levels of integration to the EU is analyzed through the theory of Differentiated Integration. Basically, the theory argues that the members of the EU can integrate to the policy areas which they want to be a part of, and non-members of the EU can be a part of some of the policy areas with the consent of the both parties. The membership of the EU does not require a uniform integration of the members to the EU and exclusion of non-members from all policy areas.

3.2 Differentiated Integration as a Theory

The European Union is a political club which takes significant competences from its member states and enables significant integration among its members by the policy areas that it has regulations about. The first step of integration was taken with the Treaty of Rome (signed in 1957, entered into force in 1958), that created the predecessor of the European Union (EU), European Economic Community (EEC). Since then, the EU enlargement process has endured both by deepening and widening. Deepening of the integration process refers to the increase in the areas of cooperation that the European Union takes competences from member states and the increase in centralization of the policies (Schimmelfennig 2016). Since the joining of the 3 (the UK, Ireland, Denmark) newcomers in 1973 after the original six, widening of the integration refers to the increase in the number of states that the European Union has (Laurent 1994). As both deepening and widening have proceeded in recent years, the uniformity of the integration process has begun to be lost (Schimmelfennig 2016). As the integration process has deepened as member states negotiate on an issue and sign a treaty to form an institutional reform, member states' different preferences about further integration in various policy areas have become differentiated according to their willingness and capacities as it happened with the establishment of the Eurozone and Schengen visa regime. As widening

happened, member states began to be different from one another in terms of their size, integration capabilities and wishes as it happened when Central and Eastern European countries joined. These differences between member states are significant in terms of differentiation as integration happens when the member states express consent. For this reason, there are different groups of countries that have different integration levels with the EU according to their wishes and preferences. As deepening and widening happened, differentiation has increased as well, today, almost 40 percent of the European law has been differentiated (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014).

Theories that aspire to explain European integration processes have been advanced as there are new developments in terms of the functioning of the Union. Different theories come with different problems and outcomes of the integration process. When the first attempts of integration were taken with the Pleven Plan and a creation of a political and security community was thought, transactionalism tried to explain the phenomena of integration in the EU. Karl Deutch's transactionalism argued that if a security community could have been established in the European continent, the formation of this community would lead to a sense of belonging among the European nations and a common identity against a common enemy, which in return would enhance the integration and secure peace (Laursen 2008). However, when European integration process proceeded in a way that the cooperation was achieved in low political issues like economics and technical issues, transactionalism could not explain what was happening in the European integration process. When transactionalism was not directly explaining what was happening, neofunctionalism came into the picture. According to neofunctionalism, the European integration process has begun with European Coal and Steel Community and it created a spillover process that cannot be taken back (Hooghe and Marks 2019). Supranational institutionalism and further integration originate from the spillover process as integration in one policy area creates a need for integration in another policy area (Schimmelfennig 2018). For neofunctionalism, the basis of the integration process is the spillover and supranational institutions are the authorities to control the integration process. However, in the European integration process, supranational institutions of the EC/EU could not take the lead for spillover and integration process as it was anticipated by neofunctionalism owing to the unwillingness of politicians in European states in terms of transferring their sovereign rights to a supranational institution. As a result, neofunctionalism has lost its significance in terms of explaining European integration process due to the fact that supranational institutions of the EU could not take the lead and national governments protected their national interests in policy making. Both neofunctionalism and Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergov-

ernmentalism (LI) have significant explanatory power for European integration, but they focus on different actors/processes to do that. LI argues that the national preferences of the member states of the EU is important for proceeding of integration as opposed to neofunctionalism argues supranational organizations are important (Schimmelfennig 2018). Nation-states do not want to lose their competencies in high political areas such as foreign, security and defence policy and decision-making in these areas are made through intergovernmental discussions. Lowest common denominator is crucial in these intergovernmental discussions as only this could ensure cooperation among states while guaranteeing national sovereignty (Wolfe 2011). According to LI, states may cooperate in functional level and they do this with three steps, national preferences in the international level are shaped by domestic preferences, these national preferences are expressed in the intergovernmental bargains and the result of these bargains are secured through European institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2019). LI theory was successful in explaining the intergovernmental integration process of the EU, however, when the integration levels of member states have begun to be different from one another with different capabilities and capacities as a result of deepening and widening, LI has begun to be insufficient. Thus, to conceptualize different integration levels in the EU, Differentiated Integration (DI) theory has emerged among scholars.

The basic rationale behind the European Union is that the EU takes the competencies of the member states about certain policy areas, and the decisions in terms of these specific policy areas are taken by the supranational EU institutions on behalf of the member states. With this kind of a structure, for certain policy areas, all the EU members have aligned their policy preferences as the EU takes decisions and all member states are obliged to comply with the decision. However, for other policy areas aligning policy preferences is not easy. Since the integration process has continued both by deepening and widening in the EU, there has been a heterogeneity in terms of the state preferences about the level of integration and this heterogeneity has increased as both the number of member states and the policy areas in which the EU takes the competencies have increased (Schimmelfennig, Leuffen, and Rittberger 2011)). For some member states, integration in certain policy areas, especially those considered to be the core competences of being a nation-state (such as security and foreign policy related issues), is considered a sovereignty concern (Winzen 2016). Because these areas are important for nation states in terms of the survival of the state, it can be said that transferring competencies to a supranational organization such as the EU seems to be illogical for them. As the EU requires from the prospective members of the Union to align their legal systems and regulations with the EU, this is seen as a concern of legal sovereignty, and states do not want to encounter

any problems regarding sovereignty (Walker 1998). Thus, as integration has gone further, especially in the areas of core competencies of being a nation-state, and the number of member states increased, the level of differentiation has increased as well. Especially after the 1990s, differentiated integration has become a natural phenomenon of the EU and began to be talked about by scholars.

The differentiated integration comes from the logic that without a differentiated integration, possibility of a further integration is lower as some members may not want to be a part of that new design and before DI, the decision for the member states was always for further integration or against it (Schimmelfennig 2016). With differentiated integration, the members who do not choose to become a part of the new policy can stay out (opting-out) and not bloc the other members who want further integration. There are different types of opting out from an EU policy area which is enabled by differentiated integration. Mostly, opting out is the outcome of not being able to fulfill the necessary conditions for being a part of that policy area. For the ones who do not fulfill the necessary conditions, they have temporary derogations until they fulfill the criteria (Koller 2012). However, for some member states who were members in times of negotiation of a certain policy area who do not want to be a part of that specific policy area because of political reasons, they have different kind of derogation, permanent derogation such as Denmark's permanent derogation from EMU (Koller 2012). For new member states, it is not possible to have permanent derogations from a policy area as they have to be included in all areas that the EU has regulations on, nevertheless, for member states who were members in times of negotiation can have that option. When this type of a situation happens, for member states to make a decision unanimously, constructive abstention is an option. If a decision is supposed to be made anonymously and if a member state does not want to apply that specific decision, that member states can abstain from the decision which enables that member state to not be a part of that decision without blocking the decision as well (Blockmans 2014). With constructive abstention, member states who are not against integration in some policy area, but also do not want to integrate can abstain from voting to enable other member states to make a decision about integrating in that policy area or not.

Differentiated integration enables further integration for the ones who are willing and enables it to stay out for the ones who are not. In addition to the differentiation in terms of the member states, differentiated integration enables non-members of the EU to participate in some policy areas (opting-in) such as Switzerland's being a part of the common visa regime of the EU, Schengen regime. For the new members, the same logic does not apply. Any third country who aspires to become a full member, staying out of a policy area that has already been integrated into the EU acquis

is not an option until they become a member state. As they willingly choose to become a member of a union that has all these rules and regulations, they know that they need to comply with all the rules and regulations, thus, they do not have an option to stay out of any of the policy areas that have been integrated. However, if they are not ready to participate in those policy areas, they can have temporal derogations or opt outs meaning that there will be differentiation in terms of the time that they will participate in these areas (Schimmelfennig 2016). Basically, this enables newcomers to stay out of a policy area until they are ready to be a part of that.

Differentiated Integration is a controversial issue about its implications to the European Union. Differentiated integration not only enables different levels of integration to the member states according to their preferences, but also provides derogations to the new member states that do not possess the necessary capabilities. This means that even though some of the new member states have been accepted to the 27-membered political club, they are not equal with the all the old members of the Union in terms of the policy areas that they can be a part of. The question is whether this creates a discrimination among the member states or not. As Schimmelfennig (2014a) indicated as a result of his analysis about the bargaining powers of the member states and the normative constraints that the new and the old member states have for one another, he concluded that even though the members that have been accepted in the same enlargement round is not discriminated from one another, in general, there is a difference and sometimes a discrimination when comparing different enlargement rounds. This means that the late comers can be discriminated from some policy areas using differentiated integration as a tool which can create problems for the late comers. Because of enabling different integration, levels DI is causing a discrimination problem among the member states. Thus, one can argue that the DI may not be beneficial for the EU as an integration model for the future because of these problems. On the other hand, as Bellamy and Kröger (2017) argues that the EU is a democratic club where the integration decisions are made unanimously and democratically, thus, the only way to ensure democracy in such a heterogeneous club is to ensure differentiation. It can be said that because the member states are heterogeneous in preferences, capabilities and expectations regarding the integration process, the only way to make decisions democratic is to enable differentiation among member states. One can argue that DI ensures the future of the EU by making it a democratic entity as levels of integration are based on member states' consent. Although there are different views on whether the DI makes the EU integration process more democratic or discriminatory, the practice of DI has enabled new members of the EU to integrate to some extent which would

not happen without DI.

When it comes to the differentiated integration types, basically there are three concepts: temporal, territorial and sectoral differentiation (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012). According to Holzinger and Schimmelfennig (2012), temporal differentiation means that some member states will integrate to some policy areas and some will not temporarily or permanent, there is a time-wise differentiation; territorial differentiation means that certain territorial groups are not integrating to some of the policy areas; and lastly, sectoral differentiation means that certain countries would not be a part of some policy areas of the EU or they will join later than the other ones. These differentiations had already taken place in the EU integration process. Looking at the integration level in the Schengen arena or European Monetary Union (EMU), one can realize that both members and some non-members that want to opt in to these areas have different preferences about integration to these areas. In addition to that, there are two different differentiation types: internal and external. Internal differentiation means that the levels of integration of the member states can be different from one another according to their preferences and capabilities, and external differentiation means that non-member countries can have different integration levels to the EU as well.

3.3 Historical Background of Differentiated Integration in the EU

Differentiated integration is not a new phenomenon of the EU. Especially when the Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1992, entered into force in 1993), founding treaty of the European Union was negotiated, there were certain arguments which indicate that the EU has come to its natural borders in terms of the number of its member states and others indicated that the EU integration has come to its furthest point by taking significant amount of competencies from the member states Andersen and Sitter (2006), both deepening and widening was questioning at the time. It meant that the members of the EU have been diverging regarding their preferences about enlargement to come (Eastern enlargement) and further integration. There is a correspondence with the time when these arguments have flourished, and the differentiated integration has begun to be talked out loud.

Especially during the 1990s, with the Eastern enlargement, the different integration models began to be talked about. Even though the early scholars have foreseen

that the integration will be more uniform after the Maastricht Treaty, it has proven to be wrong (Bellamy and Kröger 2017). With the Maastricht Treaty, the entry requirements for the European Monetary Union (EMU) was determined. For the newcomers, entry into the EMU was tied to their economic performances and the time needed by the newcomer to comply with the entry requirements was differing among member states (Koller 2012). This indicated that the integration could be at different speeds for the newcomers. The fact that Denmark and the United Kingdom were given derogations to the Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty about the EMU meant that the member states can decide not to participate in a new integration area because they do not want to (Koller 2012). The design that created the EMU with the Maastricht Treaty (1992) indicated that member states may not wish to integrate at the same levels. At some point, differentiated integration as a model for European integration has been acknowledged by the European Council as well. It can be seen in the Council Conclusion of 26/27 June 2014 saying that "In our Union, different degrees of cooperation and integration exist" (*Strategic Agenda for The Union in Times of Change* / *European Council* 2014). One can argue that seeing the differences among member states has led to the European Union to adopt differentiated integration as an alternative way to use in the integration process. Even though the study of differentiated integration is perceiving DI as a theory, it also is a system for the EU to make sure that the EU integration process is delivering what the states can do and want to do (Leruth and Lord 2015). The EMU example is the first and one of the most important examples that shows us that member states may choose not to be a part of further integration and there can be differentiation among the members in terms of the level of integration.

After the Maastricht Treaty and the opt outs of the member states from the EMU, most significant differentiation happened with the Eastern enlargement. This wave of enlargement has encountered differentiated integration the most as it has increased the heterogeneity in the EU the most (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2017). There were huge differences in terms of the initial integration levels of the countries in the Eastern enlargement according to their capabilities. However, as Schimmelfennig and Winzen (2017) argues, even though there has been a differentiated integration in the beginning, over time, most of Eastern enlargement countries have become 'normal' members of the EU. Differentiation enables them to participate in the policy areas that they initially can, and then they have participated in the other areas over time as they become ready for those as well.

Besides the differentiation among members, opt-ins of non-member states is an important phenomenon of the EU as well. Norway and Switzerland are important examples of differentiated integration of a third country to the EU policies. The

basic rationale in this type of integration is that the country does not want to become a member of the Union but wishes to participate in some policy areas which is done by opting-in to those areas. Since the 1960s, with the association agreements, non-members have begun to opt in to some policy areas of the EU. Differentiated integration can happen to any section of the EU *Acquis Communautaire* (EU law), by a third country.

Membership of the EU is tied to integrating rules and regulations of the countries with the EU on the policy areas in which the EU has regulations or rules. If the European Union has a legislation about a policy area which falls under the community pillar that is described in the Maastricht Treaty, the future members should align their policies with the EU as well. Switzerland did not have an aspiration to become a member, thus, did not align its policies with the EU. This was basically because it did not have a membership perspective due to the fact that it is not seen as beneficial to Switzerland that it would be worth the pain of aligning legal structures (Schimmelfennig 2014*b*). However, Switzerland is a part of the common visa regime of the EU, thus, there is a free travel between the citizens of the members of the EU and citizens of any third country who has a Schengen visa approved by any member of the EU can enter into Switzerland. To make it possible, Switzerland had aligned its policies regarding movement of persons with the EU regulations (Schimmelfennig 2014*b*). It can be said that Switzerland has an opt in to the Schengen regime of the EU even though it is a third country.

When it comes to the Norway example, Norway is both part of the Schengen regime and European Economic Area (EEA). EEA is the agreement between the EU and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries to have a common internal market and have common regulations for this internal market (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). EFTA was set up in 1960 with its seven members for providing a free trade area among its members. In 1994, with the EEA agreement's entry into force, EFTA countries joined the Internal (single) market of the EU. It means that Norway has reshaped its legal structure about both internal market and visa regulations to be aligned with the EU. It can be said that the level of integration that Norway has to the EU is higher than the level of integration that Switzerland has. Looking at the two important examples of external differentiation, it can be argued that the distinction between member and non-member states of the EU has been blurred because there is now the 'graded membership' option (Schimmelfennig 2003). Countries may choose to be a non-member which participates into some policy areas of the EU if both parties can agree on.

One of the most important debates about differentiated integration is whether DI is

beneficial for the EU and the non-member country when an external differentiation happens. It can be said that if the external differentiation is not beneficial for the EU, member states would not allow it to happen. The same logic applies for the non-member state who wants an integration. However, DI might hinder the non-member state who is willing to become a member state. As DI is an option for integration, the EU might not be willing to accept new members and a country who has a membership perception might not be able to realize its desire to become a member. One other important debate is whether the DI is bringing the end of the EU or not. Some argue that differentiated integration is loosening the ties among the members due to the loosening the integration levels. However, as it is argued by Kölliker (2001), differentiated integration will not bring an end to the EU as it allows the willing ones to integrate initially, and gives time to the ones who do not choose to integrate immediately which will eventually lead to the integration in the long run. Looking at the history of the Eastern enlargement it can be said that, even though at the beginning integration levels of some countries were loose, eventually enabling DI at the beginning led to a somehow uniform integration. According to Avbelj (2013), differentiated integration is a useful tool to manage the heterogeneity and diversity among the members in a way that it would not damage the whole structure of the EU and as it can include countries like Switzerland, Turkey and Western Balkans it would create a bigger but a looser union. For Lord (2015), choosing differentiated integration over uniform integration is a better idea for the states in cases where the DI will serve better in terms of meeting the obligations to the public.

To sum up, differentiated integration is not a new phenomenon for the EU, but the use of the differentiated integration becomes more visible as the European integration process moves further. As the integration especially in terms of security and defence has proceeded further, different opinions of member states have begun to be seen as Denmark has an opt out from the second pillar (foreign policy and security related matters) issues. There are different ways to differentiate the integration with regards to different preferences of member states and it does not seem that it is harmful to the EU enlargement in the long run as without differentiated integration, there might not be any integration with some countries.

3.4 EU Integration Process in Security and Defence

Security and defence has been an important area of cooperation for the European Union since the end of the Second World War. From the very beginning, the EU was a peace project for the European nations that have been destroyed in the Second World War. For this reason, they wanted to eliminate the possibility of another war on the European continent and secure themselves. As the EU defines itself as a unity "to foster stability, security and prosperity, democracy, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law at international level" (*The EU in Brief / Europa* 2020). It can be said that security and defence has been one of the most important policy areas to integrate further.

During the Cold War years, most of the security and defence cooperation of the European Union was under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Even though there have been some attempts to integrate further in terms of security and defence such as the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948 and European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952, these attempts did not work. The Western European Union proved to be unnecessary with the establishment of NATO in 1949 (Yilmaz 2006) and French Parliament did not ratify the European Defence Community Treaty, the founding treaty of the EDC (Glarbo 1999). EDC was aimed to provide integration and interdependence among European countries after the Second World War to prevent another war, however, cooperation in terms of high politics could not be achieved at the time.

Most important developments towards further integration happened after the end of the Cold War. After the dismantling of the Cold War structure, the EU began to feel the need to rely only on themselves for the European security and defence. The EU security and defence has its basis on the Maastricht Treaty with the creation of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and making the WEU the defence component of the EU (Çayhan 2003). With these initial steps and the steps that would follow them, integration in terms of European security and defence has enhanced. As the third chapter of the thesis will focus on the historical background of the EU security and defence cooperation, the details of the cooperation will be elaborated deeply in that section.

3.5 Differentiated Integration in Security and Defence

Security and defence has always been one of the most important areas of cooperation, however, integration in these areas has not been easy. From the very beginning, the debate of supranationalism vs intergovernmentalism has affected the decision-making procedure of issues related foreign policy, security and defence (Erdag 2016). Due to member states' unwillingness to give up on their sovereign rights over security and defence related issues (Winzen 2016), the decision-making mechanism in these issues have been intergovernmental and it was upon unanimity. For this reason, further integration in these policy areas has always been harder than others as compromising in these areas were harder.

Due to the fact that there are different national preferences of the states, the integration has not been easy among the member states. Without unanimous approval of the members, integration in foreign, security and defence policy cannot be realized. Thus, integration has always been decided unanimously, however, it has never been easy and both internal and external differentiation happened (Schimmelfennig, Leuffen, and Rittberger 2011).

The Maastricht Treaty (entered into force in 1993) was the basis of European security and defence policy. The creation of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was decided unanimously which would decide the EU's international stance on the foreign policy related issues (Süleymanoğlu Kürüm 2015). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) created the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy which would be the spokesperson for the foreign policy related issues (*High Representative/Vice President / EEAS* 2019). In addition to that, differentiated integration was formally introduced to the EU system and first differentiations were seen in the European Monetary System; Western European Union and the Schengen Agreement (De Neve 2007). Differentiated integration enabled the ones who are able and willing to integrate further. Later developments after the Treaty of Amsterdam came with the Treaty of Nice (signed in 2001, entered into force in 2003). For the purpose of this thesis, the importance of the Treaty of Nice is that it brought enhanced cooperation in CFSP.

Uniform integration in terms of the establishment of the institutions and tools of security and defence cooperation is necessary. Meanwhile, even though the European Union has a common policy, the member states can act unilaterally if their action is not creating a controversy to the Union's decision (Cremona 2009). As states do not want to lose their competencies in the area of security and defence, they are

free to establish their own policies which hardens to form a uniform policy. For instance, Denmark has an opt out from the defence component of the integration project in terms of security, meaning that Danish did not participate in CSDP and European Defence Agency (Ondarza 2013). Except Denmark, establishment of CSDP was unanimously accepted by the members as a result of highly intense bargaining between member states. However, the contributions to CSDP differ among the members according to their willingness to contribute. The Treaty of Nice (2002) enabled subgroups among the EU to form enhanced cooperation in terms of defence if it is going to serve better in terms of efficiency and effectiveness (De Neve 2007). Before the Treaty of Nice the number of the member states was 15 and as Central and Eastern European countries would join with the Nice Treaty, number of the member states would increase up to 25, which would create a huge difference between the member states in terms of their willingness and capabilities in terms of contributing defence and security cooperation of the Union (Heinemann 2003). Thus, enhanced cooperation among member states who are willing to contribute can start an enhanced cooperation with the consent of 8 countries with the Treaty of Nice, which required a unanimous decision prior to the Treaty (Heinemann 2003). It can be argued that the Nice Treaty has allowed for further integration among the members who are willing to, which can be called as some kind of differentiated integration.

In terms of CFSP decisions regarding security and defence, as the decisions are made unanimously, if a decision can be agreed upon, all the member states become integrated to the cooperation in that area. If a decision is not made, it is up to member states' own willingness to integrate with the decisions that have been tried to agree on. However, under these circumstances, a decision is hard to take. To make it easier, the EU has come up with a mechanism called constructive abstention. With this mechanism, a member state who does not want to comply with the CFSP decision might abstain from a vote which means that member states would not be a part of that decision and would not block the decision as well (Blockmans 2014). With constructive abstention, member states who are not against but also do not want to apply the decision may abstain from vote, so that the other member states may come to a conclusion about implementing it or not. This is a mechanism enabling further integration in terms of CFSP among the members who are willing to. The ones that are not willing do not have to participate, thus there is a differentiation in terms of the participation levels of the member states to CFSP of the Union.

In terms of CSDP, there are civilian and military missions and operations that are held under the name of the EU. The contribution to these missions and operations are decided individually by the member states. Thus, all members are integrated to

the CSDP operations and missions of the EU in varied levels and all contribute to the cooperation different from one another. They can decide to be a part of these decisions or not, the decision is made case by case by the members and they can be a part of the ones that they are willing, to the ones they are not willing they use their right to constructive abstention (Törő 2014). In addition to that, they can choose to comply with a portion of the decision but not apply the decision as a whole, for instance, complying with the necessary political measures but not sending troops to the missions and operations under CSDP (Ondarza 2013).

Differentiated integration is more visible in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) which is integration in terms of military capabilities of the EU. Being a part of PESCO is voluntary among the member states, for the ones who want to become a part of the PESCO, they can be immediately; and for the ones who want to leave PESCO, they can withdraw any time they wish (Ondarza 2013). As being a member of the PESCO would require further commitment on the EU defence and security, the structure of the PESCO was created in a way that only the capable and willing members of the EU would join (Blockmans and Macchiarini 2019). This is one of the most important examples of the differentiated integration among the EU members in terms of security and defence. It can be said that recent developments in the EU enable differentiated integration more than the previous ones as it works for efficiency and effectiveness.

Differentiated integration in terms of security and defence has been complicated when the external differentiation was allowed to these areas. Normally, third parties are not allowed in the EU bodies and it applies for the security and defence cooperation as well. Third parties are not members of CFSP, PESCO, EDA or CSDP. With Brexit, the United Kingdom, as a third party to the Union, will try to find a way to be a part of these institutions and tools of the EU which can be a gamechanger for third countries as well (Glencross 2019). However, under current circumstances, even though the third countries do not have any decision-making rights under CFSP/CSDP, they are allowed to participate in the missions and operations that are conducted under CSDP. The EU-NATO cooperation under CSDP operations has made third party involvement in the CSDP missions and operations possible and one can argue that there is an external differentiation in terms of security and defence cooperation due to the contributions to these operations and missions. For the purpose of this thesis, Turkish differentiated integration and opt in to the area of security and defence will be analyzed through CSDP missions and operations.

4. TURKEY'S DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION TO THE EU

Foundation of the legal grounds of the EU-Turkey relations has its roots to the 1963 Ankara Agreement. Since then, Turkey has been an associate member of the Union and since 1999, a candidate country. With the beginning of the accession negotiations in 2005, Turkey is waiting to be a full member of the Union. However, in the last decade, there has been a change in the Turkish attitude towards the accession negotiations of the EU. Turkey has been moving away from the EU especially in terms of its political accession criteria (Müftüler-Baç 2017). The membership prospect of Turkey has begun diminishing due to a number of reasons such as credibility of the EU as a negotiation partner has decreased due to the fact that the negotiations are described as an 'open ended process' by the EU Commission (Karakas 2013) and different levels of commitment of the member states towards Turkish membership (Müftüler-Baç 2017) which made Turkish side believe that there is not a harmonized policy perspective towards Turkey in the EU. It can be said that Turkey has lost its hope for full membership of the EU. However, Turkey and the EU have been partners for a long time and the integration between them is undeniable and unbreakable.

Under these circumstances, for some scholars and politicians, Turkish full membership seems unlikely in the near future as Jean-Claude Juncker, the EU Comissions President has declared in 2016 "I believe that Turkey, in its current state, is not in a position to become a member any time soon and not even over a longer period," (*Turkey in no position to become EU member any time soon: Juncker / Reuters 2016*). Therefore, Turkey and the European Union can continue their cooperation under an external differentiated integration model. Considering the fact that Turkey already has opt-ins to some policy areas, pursuing cooperation with differentiated integration can be beneficial for both sides. With the differentiated integration model, Turkey would be part of the policy areas that it wishes to, and the EU would make use of Turkish assets in the policy areas that Turkey could be beneficial without excluding full membership prospects of Turkey in the future (Cianciara and Szymański 2020).

Turkey has opt ins to some policy areas of the EU. With the Customs Union Agreement that Turkey signed with the EU in 1995 Turkey became a part of the Customs Union. As of 2019, Turkey is one of the most important trade partners of the EU (fifth largest trade partner) (Özer 2020). By having a customs union Turkey has an opt in to the trade related regulations of the EU. In addition to trade related regulations, Turkey also has an opt in to the development policy by aligning its institutional design and administrative and legal frameworks to the EU where not all the members are complying with the EU decisions (Cihangir-Tetik and Muftuler-Bac 2018). On top of development and trade related regulations, Turkey is a significant partner for the EU in terms of security and defence cooperation since the Cold War. For some important policy areas of the EU, Turkey already has opt-ins to the EU policy areas due to the fact that Turkey has begun its integration with the EU as early as possible (Ankara Treaty-1963). One can argue that Turkish integration project to the EU began even before most of the current member states. For this reason, in some policy areas, Turkey is an important partner to the EU and has serious amounts of opt-ins.

As Müftüler-Baç (2017) argues, functional cooperation between Turkey and the EU is significant in the areas of economic, security, energy and justice and home affairs. According to her proposal, Turkey should be a part of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) under CFSP, and European Defence Agency (EDA) to increase the level of differentiated integration in terms of security and defence (Müftüler-Baç 2017). Accepting the fact that Turkey and the European Union should continue their cooperation under differentiated integration as full membership of Turkey does not seem achievable in the near future, one can argue that Turkey already has various kinds of opt-ins to the EU in different policy areas including security and defence.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze the external differentiated integration that Turkey constitutes to the EU, especially in terms of security and defence related policies. To this aim, the level of differentiated integration will be analyzed through the operations that are conducted under Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU and Turkey's contribution to these operations. Analysis of these operations will uncover whether Turkey has an opt in to the security and defence cooperation of the Union or not. In addition to that, Turkey's differentiated integration to the EU in terms of security and defence related matters can be seen in the Progress Reports on Turkey. Every year, the European Commission prepares a Progress Report to see whether Turkey has made any progress in terms of aligning policies according to the Union's expectations. When Progress Reports between 1998-2019 (1998-first report, 2019-last report that was prepared) analyzed, it can be concluded that since 1998, there has been an increase in the alignment of Turkey to the EU's security

and defence structure, however, for the last couple of years the situation has begun to change.

For further analysis, this thesis will look into the details of the data that has been gathered from Progress Reports on Turkish contribution to the European security system. To do that, CSDP military and civilian operations and missions will be used to see whether Turkey has an opt in to this area of cooperation.

5. AN ANALYSIS OF TURKEY'S OPT IN TO THE SECURITY COOPERATION

5.1 Introduction of the Chapter

“Maintaining peace and security in Europe is of great importance. Turkey, as a European Ally in NATO, has made a significant contribution to peace and stability in Europe during the Cold War years. Subsequently, she has supported the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), as well as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the EU." (*The European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and NATO-EU Strategic Cooperation / Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d*)

As stated in the website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs above, Turkey has always prioritized European security and defence. This prioritization has caused Turkey to be a part of the European security and defence cooperation. Since the beginning of the relations between Turkey and the EU, security and defence is one of the most significant areas of cooperation as the beginning of the relationship dates back to the Cold War years. As security and defence was one of the most important concerns of that day, it was one of the most significant determinants of the relationship between Turkey and the EU. Both parties have been a security partner for one another since the Cold War years even though the structure of the cooperation has changed over time. Turkey has been a significant asset and an important security partner in the region for the European Union both with regards to Soviet threat and the threats that come after the dissolution of the Cold War structure. For Turkey, the EU has been a crucial partner in terms of being a part of Transatlantic Cooperation, thus, Turkey has shown a lot of effort to be included

into the EU security system.

5.2 Historical Background: Turkey as a Security Partner

The relation of Turkey and the European Union (EU) has its roots in the period of post-Second World War. Since the beginning, the European Community/Union and Turkey can be considered as partners in terms of security and defense. After the war ended, the European nations had turned their attention to eliminating the possibility of another war on the European continent because it was significantly damaging to them. They have come up with the idea that they should increase the material costs of war by becoming interdependent to one another. The easier way to do that was being interdependent on technical issues, thus, the European integration process has begun. Under these circumstances, the Cold War structure was reaching its peak. Soviet expansionism and American triumphalism have caused the world to diverge to two different camps. This was the structure that has specified the roots of the EU-Turkey relations as security partners as the relationship between two parties has begun under those circumstances.

Throughout the Cold War years, the East-West division has increased the fear of a new war after the destruction happened in the Second World War. Under these circumstances, one of the most important things for European states was to ensure security and prevent another war. Turkey has been seen as an important security partner to both the European Community and to the United States due to Turkey's geopolitical proximity to both the Soviet Union (USSR) and the European Community.

One of the most important developments happened in the Cold War years regarding Turkey's inclusion to the collective defense institution of the Western Bloc, becoming a NATO member in 1952. With the membership, Turkey has become a part of the European security order although it was not a part of European economic, political or cultural order (Redmond 2007). It can be inferred that security was the first area that Turkey has begun to be incorporated into the European order. Throughout the Cold War years, as Turkey contributed to the security structure of the EC against a common external enemy and as Turkey has joined the inter-governmental organization, NATO, that aimed to preserve Western World from the common enemy, Turkey ceased to be seen as an 'other' to the European nations

(Oğuzlu 2003). Prior to NATO membership, Turkey was still seen as an historical enemy and an "other" to the European nations due to the fact that Turkey's historical ties with the Ottoman history and Ottoman Empire's relationship with the European nations at the time. NATO membership was the beginning of a long years of security cooperation and the inclusion of Turkey to the security cooperation of the EC/U after long years of competition. Because being a NATO member at the time meant that Turkey is sharing the same values with the Western World culturally and to protect these cultural values Turkey can use its military (Yilmaz and Bilgin 2005). This premise was crucial in the sense that it founded the roots of the security cooperation between the EU and Turkey based on cultural values. In addition to that, being a part of Western strategic alliance was seen as an important determinant of Western identity, which Turkey found itself in by being a member of NATO (Aybet and Muftuler-Bac 1999). NATO membership and its significance for Turkey points out that Turkey was not only an ally to the Western World owing to the fear of the USSR, but also Turkey shared similar cultural values and an identity with the Western World which eased Turkish inclusion to the European security system.

For both the European states and NATO, Turkey was seen as an important asset during the Cold War years. Western Camp which included Turkey and the European states had mutual security goals against the Soviet Union. Because the international structure that has been created by the Cold War enabled Turkey and the EU to easily define themselves as against-Soviet countries, the mutual goals and shared identity helped them to cooperate in terms of security issues (Buzan and Diez 1999). It can be inferred that during the Cold War years, for the European Community, Turkey was not an outsider, it was an ally who shared a similar identity by being in the same bloc. Identity is an important factor in terms of Turkish inclusion to the European security system because if the EU would continue to see Turkey as an outsider during the Cold War years, the inclusion into the security cooperation would not be achievable for Turkey. Besides, the geopolitical position of Turkey makes it an important player of the NATO coalition during the Cold War period as it can hinder the Soviet Union from accessing some important geostrategic positions (Aydin 2003). In the Western Bloc, there were no other actors that could have such an impact on the USSR. Being in the Black Sea region and controlling Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits has given Turkey a huge advantage in terms of balancing the SU in the region which has been an important asset for the EU and the Transatlantic coalition during the Cold War years no other actor than Turkey could have such an advantage. In addition to that, Turkey was one of the countries in NATO that had one of the largest armed forces (Aydin 2003) which meant that in need of a

collective defense, Turkey could be a useful asset to the European nations both with its military capability and its geostrategic position.

During the Cold War years, the most important security provider of the EU was NATO. Therefore, for Turkey, NATO membership meant to be included into European security cooperation. Because the European countries did not want to give up on their competences in terms of security issues from the very beginning of their cooperation and integration, they chose to rely on NATO and the United States in terms of security issues. Even though the creation of the Western European Union (WEU), the defence arm of the European Union goes back to 1948, the establishment of NATO in 1949 made WEU unnecessary until the end of the Cold War (Yilmaz 2006) and the WEU was not active as a strong initiative until 1984. In addition to that, during the Cold War years, there was another attempt that would create another institutional background for European defence, which is European Defence Community. European Defence Community Treaty was signed by the original six members of the European Coal and Steel Community; France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the three Benelux states (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) in 1952. However, the creation of an intergovernmental defense organization was a challenging job, thus, even though the six members have signed the treaty, French parliament did not ratify the treaty and the European Defense Community could not come to life as it was anticipated (Glarbo 1999). As NATO was an important security provider to the European states and because there was a hardship building their own cooperation on the security grounds as it was hard to make a compromise in terms of defense and security issues on an intergovernmental level, there was no other European initiative during the Cold War years that Turkey could join to be a part of the security cooperation of the European Community.

When the Cold War ended with the dissolution of Warsaw Pact and dismantling of the Soviet Union there was an increasing uncertainty in the international arena. With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union ceased to be a threat for the Western alliance, thus, the need for NATO which was based on deterring the USSR disappeared as well. That is why, European nations have found themselves in a position that they need to find a common ground to ensure their defense and security, thus, the Maastricht Treaty was signed which founded the EU with its common grounds of European cooperation in terms of security and defense (Desai 2005). The uncertain international environment caused European nations to find a way to ensure their own security rather than relying on only NATO and the US. During those times, there was an attempt to build a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) as well. ESDI was thought to increase the capability of NATO with its operations, where NATO is not engaged in and where the operation is not falling

under the article 5 (Çayhan 2003). The establishment of the EU with the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of ESDI created the basis of European cooperation and integration in terms of security. With the Maastricht Treaty, the integration in terms of defense and security has deepened with some developments such as the creation of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. Although the Western European Union was active since 1984, its main duty in European security and defense started when the WEU was designated as the defense component of the EU with the Maastricht Treaty (Çayhan 2003). Turkish effort to be a part of the post Cold War developments began with the WEU. As an associate member of the EU since the Ankara Treaty was signed (1963), Turkey became an associate member of the WEU in 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty. Simultaneously, with the Petersberg Declaration in 1992, the tasks that could be commenced under WEU were designated which are called Petersberg Tasks that included humanitarian, rescue and peace keeping and crisis management missions (Müftüler-Baç 2000). After the Amsterdam Treaty that was signed in 1997, the WEU was incorporated into the EU and the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was established. With the European Council decision in the Cologne Summit of 1999 the EU and WEU was merged. With every step in the integration process, European security and defence cooperation was deepened as well.

When it comes to Turkey's inclusion to this new European system of cooperation in terms of defense and security, there has been some challenges. Owing to the dissemination of the Cold War structure in the international arena, the position of Turkey into the Western alliance began to be questioned. As the main reason why Turkey was included into the Western alliance from the beginning was its geostrategic position and its strategic capabilities in terms of deterring the USSR, after the dissolution of the USSR, Turkey found itself in a position where its place in the Western alliance began to be shaken. However, in this international order, Turkey was still an important asset to the Western alliance as being a bridge country between the underdeveloped world and developed world and being a significant role model for the Muslim world by being a secular, Westernized democracy (Öniş 1995). In addition to that, Turkish foreign policy began to be changed after the Cold War and Turkey has begun to emerge as a regional power in the Middle East (Öniş 1995). Thus, it can be argued that for Western alliance and for the EU, even though the importance and position of Turkey has changed a bit, it was still seen as an important ally. Because in some regions like Caucasus and the Middle East there was a security vacuum after the dissolution of the USSR, thus, these regions were seen as conflict regions (Öniş 1995) and Turkey was seen as a gatekeeper for the EU (Müftüler-Baç 2000). In addition to these, the voting right of Turkey in NATO

and its military capabilities made Turkey an important asset and a partner to the EU in the post-Cold War period as well (Müftüler-Baç 2000). Once the position of Turkey has been decided in the post-Cold War period, the inclusion of Turkey to the European system of cooperation in terms of security and defense has been deepened. Being a NATO member since the Cold War has helped Turkish inclusion to the security and defense cooperation in the EU.

As NATO was a security provider for the European Union throughout the Cold War Years, for the operations that would be held under the Western European Union, the EU wanted to use the NATO assets. The proposal was found appropriate by the government of the US saying that the rationale behind this proposal is to make sure that the US is not "decoupling" from the security cooperation of the EU, the new structure is not "discriminating" the non-EU members of the NATO and the EU is not "duplicating" the NATO's capabilities (Çayhan 2003). The basis of the EU-NATO cooperation was firstly decided with the Washington Summit in 1999. Owing to Turkey's push for not giving an automatic access to the EU in terms of using NATO assets, it was decided that the EU can use NATO assets after the unanimous decision of the NATO Council (Park, 2000) and in addition to that, Turkey also insisted on not giving an automatic access to the EU, they argued that permission to use NATO assets must be given case by case (Müftüler-Baç 2000). This made Turkey a veto player to the EU-led operations which requires the use of NATO assets.

The participation of non-EU European members of NATO created a question in terms of the cooperation between NATO and the EU. Between 1992-1999 when Turkey was an associate member of the WEU and had an impact on the decision-making procedure in the WEU (Çayhan 2003). However, when the WEU and EU have merged, the WEU Council which Turkey was a party with a decision-making power has ceased to exist and the decisions about the WEU has started to be made under the EU's CFSP intergovernmental structure (Aybet and Muftuler-Bac 1999). For non-EU European members of NATO, this newly emerging structure has created problems as they had a say in the older structure. Nevertheless, their impact in this new structure in terms of decision-making capabilities will be decreased. Although in the Cologne Summit, there has been a commitment to find a way to include non-EU European members of NATO to take part in the WEU operation, there was dissatisfaction especially in Turkey (Park, 2000). When the voting right has been taken away from Turkey with the merger, it made Turkey unhappy with the situation as Turkey also felt responsible for the crises that are happening on the borders of Europe as mostly these places are on the borders of Turkey as well (Ayaz Avan 2017). Under these circumstances, Turkey was not happy about the developments

that are happening in the EU and it was obvious and legal that Turkey can use its power in NATO in terms of decisions regarding EU-led operations.

As Turkey is an integral part of NATO and would be an important contributor to EU operations, it was important to satisfy Turkey and include it to this new structure. Even though Turkey is not a member of the European Union, there was a discussion to include Turkey to the second pillar of the EU (CFSP) and make Turkey feel that it still has an influence in terms of CFSP operations that would ensure Turkey's contribution and also its vote in NATO (Müftüler-Baç 2000). It can be inferred that being a long-term NATO member and having an important military capability made Turkey an important part of the European security and defense system. Therefore, inclusion of Turkey to the EU-led operations was crucial for both the EU and Turkey. It can be argued that the reason why the candidacy status was given to Turkey in the Helsinki Summit was to decrease the level of dissatisfaction in Turkey about the EU's decisions regarding security and defense cooperation. However, the Helsinki decisions did not ease the suspicions in Turkey.

Throughout the year 2000, in the EU summits, the EU could not satisfy Turkey with its decisions. In the Feira Summit in 2000, it was decided by the Council decision that if the EU is using NATO assets, non-EU European members of NATO would be able to participate to the operations; if the EU is not using NATO assets, non-EU European members of NATO can be invited by the Council decision (Müftüler-Baç 2000) which meant that non-EU NATO members were not given equal participation in decision making and in implementation (Bali Aykan 2005). This meant that Turkey would preserve its position in NATO and would not give automatic and guaranteed access to the EU and preserve its veto power. However, other NATO members, especially the US wanted to give the EU what it wanted about NATO assets and the EU's guaranteed and automatic access because they did not want the EU to develop their own structure of defense independent from NATO, thus, Turkish side could not find much support in NATO to its arguments and its blockage (Bali Aykan 2005). For this reason, there was a push especially from the US to Turkey to lift its blockage to the decision. However, Turkey's concerns about the issue still exist. Until 2002, the discussion continued.

In 2002, Berlin Plus Arrangements brought an end to the discussion of the inclusion of non-EU European members of NATO to the EU-led operations. With these newly decided arrangements, non-EU members of NATO would be consulted in case of a possible operation if its geographical proximity would affect a non-EU member of NATO and they will be consulted if their national interests would be harmed significantly (Cebeci 2011). In return for that, the EU was assured a predetermined

set of NATO assets which was assured to not be used on an Ally (Cebeci 2011). In addition to that, with Berlin Plus Arrangements "non-EU NATO members have the right to participate in EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, whereas they will be invited to take part by a unanimous decision of the Council to EU-led operations not requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities" (Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012, p.563). It can be said that, both parties, the EU and non-EU NATO members have compromised and come to a solution. It can be inferred that with these arrangements, Turkey's aspirations about being a part of security cooperation of the EU has been fulfilled and the EU's aspirations about guaranteed and automatic access to NATO assets has been also fulfilled in a way that Turkey's inclusion to the operations were ensured. After the Berlin Plus Arrangements became operational in 2003, the EU-led military and civilian operations began, and Turkey is one of the most important contributors to these operations.

Lastly, when Turkey's alignment to security and defence cooperation of the European Union, the progress that Turkey has shown can be understood by looking at Progress Reports that are prepared by the European Commission every year.

Table 5.1 Evaluation of Turkish Inclusion to the EU's Security and Defence Policy

<i>Year</i>	<i>Progress Reports</i>
1998	"Turkey has not asked to be associated with European Union common positions, joint actions or common démarches or declarations. Turkish troops were involved in IFOR/SFOR and the Multinational Protection Force in Albania." (<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 1998</i>)
1999	"Turkey has not asked to be associated to the positions taken by the EU in the area of CFSP. Turkey has contributed significantly to crisis management operations in the Western Balkans. Turkish troops are involved in IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia, in the Multinational Protection Force in Albania and most recently in KFOR. During the Kosovo crisis the country has accepted several thousand Kosovo refugees. It applied the NATO-decided oil embargo on Yugoslavia and, on the basis of NATO obligations, a ban on Yugoslav flights, though it did not formally participate in the EU-decided flight ban. Turkey remains concerned about its status with regard to possible EU-led operations in the framework of the European security and defence policy. It has indicated that the establishment of a satisfactory formal mechanism concerning this issue is a priority condition for its consent to the use of NATO facilities by the EU." (<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 1999</i>)

<p>2000</p>	<p>"As regards alignment with EU statements and declarations, Turkey, since the Helsinki summit, has regularly aligned its positions with those of the Union and when invited to do so has associated itself with the Union's joint actions and common positions. Concerning the development of ESDP as part of CFSP, Turkey has actively participated in exchanges in this context with the EU, in EU+15 format (i.e. non-EU European NATO members and candidates for accession to the EU) and in EU+6 format (i.e. non-EU European NATO members). However, Turkey is not satisfied with arrangements set out at the Feira European Council (June 2000) for dialogue, consultation and co-operation with the 6 non-EU European NATO members on military crisis management. The matter is subject to further mutual consultations."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2000</i>)</p>
<p>2001</p>	<p>"Turkey has regularly aligned itself with statements and declarations of the EU, and has associated itself with the Union's joint actions and common positions. Since October 2000, it associated itself with 8 EU common positions, including 3 on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the field of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Turkey has actively participated in exchanges with the EU in EU+15 format (i.e. non-EU European NATO members and EU candidates) and in EU+6 format (i.e. non-EU European NATO members). However, it has not yet been possible to reach agreement with Turkey on the European Security and Defence Policy, in particular as regards access to NATO assets in order to carry out the "Petersberg tasks" with a Rapid Reaction Force."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2001</i>)</p>
<p>2002</p>	<p>"Turkey has played a constructive role within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including meetings at the level of Political Directors. Turkey is monitoring closely the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as part of the CFSP, and has actively participated in exchanges on this subject with the EU, in both EU + 15 format (i.e. non-EU European NATO members and candidates for accession to the EU) and EU + six format (i.e. non-EU European Members of NATO).The issue of Turkey's modalities for participation in decisions on EU-led operations using NATO assets as part of the European Security and Defence Policy has remained unresolved. Turkey has aligned itself with decisions, resolutions and declarations of the EU and has associated itself with a number of the Union's common positions and joint actions.</p>

<p>2002 cont'd</p>	<p>In particular, Turkey has associated itself with an EU joint action concerning the EU's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons. It has also associated itself with several EU common positions, including on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2002</i>)</p>
<p>2003</p>	<p>"Turkey has played a constructive role within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including meetings at the level of Political Directors. As regards EU sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations and démarches, Turkey has aligned itself with decisions, resolutions and declarations of the EU and has associated itself with a number of the Union's common positions and joint actions. In particular, Turkey has aligned itself with an EU declaration calling on the government of Iran to conclude and implement urgently and unconditionally the international non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. Turkey's agreement to the comprehensive deal reached in December 2002 regarding EU- NATO relations allowed cooperation in military crisis management, lifting the obstacles in the implementation of the Berlin Plus agenda. Turkey participated in the EU-Balkans Summit in June 2003. Turkey participates in SFOR and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo, as well as in the EU-led operation in FYROM. The Turkish armed forces took over the command of the South-Eastern Europe Peacekeeping Force for two years in July 2003."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2003</i>)</p>
<p>2004</p>	<p>"With respect to the CSFP, despite its overall satisfactory record, Turkey aligns itself with significantly fewer EU declarations than the other candidate countries. Turkey has shown a keen interest to continue active participation in political dialogue with the EU including ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) developments. It has actively participated in the exchanges in this context with the EU and, for ESDP, in the EU + 5 format (i.e. meetings of the EU with non-EU European NATO members). As in the previous year, Turkey's record of alignment with EU sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations and demarches, demonstrated the considerable extent of common EU-Turkey views.</p>

<p>2004 cont'd</p>	<p>"In particular, Turkey has aligned itself with all EU declarations calling on the government of Iran to conclude and implement urgently and unconditionally the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, together with the Additional Protocol. Since its inception in 2003, following in particular the conclusion of the Berlin plus- agreement on EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management, Turkey has taken an active interest in the development of the ESDP and ESDP crisis operations in the Balkans. Turkey has contributed forces to both EU police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYROM. Turkey has a proven potential to participate in international peacekeeping and it has a long history as a supporter of UN peacekeeping. In 2003 it participated in seven UN peace keeping operations, including Kosovo and Afghanistan, and in the NATO KFOR, SFOR and Afghanistan missions."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2004</i>)</p>
<p>2005</p>	<p>"Turkey has broadly continued to position its foreign and security policy in line with that of the European Union. Turkey's record of alignment with EU sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations and demarches continues to demonstrate the significant extent of convergence of EU-Turkey views. In particular, Turkey has generally aligned itself with EU common positions and declarations in particular as regards terrorism and non-proliferation. Turkey continues to display an active interest in the development of the ESDP. In this connection, Turkey is presently participating in the EU led police missions in Kosovo (UNMIK), in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Proxima) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUROPOL KINSHASA). Turkey has participated in several UN and NATO missions in the Balkans which was replaced in December 2004 by EUFOR-ALTHEA, in which Turkey also participates. It has similarly expressed its desire to contribute to the EUJUST LEX in Iraq concerning the development the rule of law. Turkey's participation in the ESDP continues to present certain difficulties. Indeed, Turkey and the EU have a different interpretation of the "Berlin Plus" agreements between EU and NATO. As a result, Turkey's insistence that Cyprus and Malta be excluded from the EU- NATO strategic co-operation in crisis management has so far hampered such co-operation."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2005</i>)</p>

<p>2006</p>	<p>"Turkey has broadly continued to align its foreign and security policy with that of the European Union. The regular enhanced political dialogue established as part of the accession strategy with Turkey has continued. Turkey has displayed its strong interest in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Turkey has been participating in the EU-led police missions in Bosnia – Herzegovina (EUPM), in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Proxima) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUROPOL KINSHASA). Turkey’s participation in several UN and NATO peace missions in the Balkans continues. After participating in UNPROFOR, IFOR, KFOR and SFOR missions, Turkey is contributing to the EUFOR- ALTHEA mission since December 2004. Despite Turkey’s active contribution to the ESDP certain difficulties have prevailed. Turkey has been resisting the inclusion of the Republic of Cyprus and Malta in the EU-NATO strategic cooperation based on the “Berlin Plus” agreement. Concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Turkey’s broad alignment with EU sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations, and demarches has continued."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2006</i>)</p>
<p>2007</p>	<p>"Turkey has continued alignment with CFSP statements, declarations and demarches. In 2007, Turkey aligned itself so far with 45 out of 46 CFSP declarations. Within the framework of the ESDP, Turkey continues to contribute to EU-led military EUFOR operation ALTHEA. Turkey also assists EU-led police missions EUPM-II in Bosnia-Herzegovina and EUPOL KINSHASA in the DRC. Turkey wishes to further enhance cooperation in this area and seeks increased involvement in the ESDP decision- making process. Turkey signed an Administrative Arrangement with the European Defence Agency. However, difficulties are experienced in relation to the full implementation of this document. Turkey provides support for the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Darfur. In May, Turkey assumed the command of Multinational Task Force South regional command of KFOR for a period of one year. However, as regards EU-NATO cooperation, Turkey objects to the inclusion of the Republic of Cyprus and Malta in the EU-NATO strategic cooperation based on the “Berlin Plus” Agreement."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2007</i>)</p>

<p>2008</p>	<p>"Turkey's broad alignment with common foreign and security policy (CFSP) statements, declarations, and demarches continued. In 2008, Turkey aligned itself with 109 out of 124 CFSP declarations. Within the framework of the European security and defence policy (ESDP), Turkey continues to contribute to the EU-led military mission EUFOR/ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkey is also supporting the EU-led police missions EUPM in Bosnia- Herzegovina. Turkey is one of five non-EU countries contributing to the EULEX mission in Kosovo. Turkey wishes to enhance cooperation on ESDP, while stressing its discontent with its status within ESDP, with the stalemate over the conclusion of a bilateral security agreement with the EU, as well as over the administrative arrangements with the European Defence Agency. However, concerning EU-NATO relations beyond the "Berlin Plus" arrangements, Turkey continues to object to EU-NATO co-operation which would involve all EU Member States. This created problems for EU-NATO co-operation in the context of civilian ESDP missions, in particular in Kosovo and Afghanistan."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2008</i>)</p>
<p>2009</p>	<p>"Turkey's broad alignment with common foreign and security policy (CFSP) statements, declarations and démarches continued. Turkey aligned itself with 99 CFSP declarations from a total of 128 declarations adopted by the EU during the reporting period. Within the framework of the European security and defence policy (ESDP), Turkey is continuing to contribute to the EU-led military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR/ALTHEA). Turkey is also contributing to EUPM, the EU-led police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the EULEX mission in Kosovo. Turkey wishes to enhance cooperation on ESDP, while stressing its discontent with its status within this framework, due to the stalemate over conclusion of a bilateral security agreement with the EU and over the administrative arrangements with the European Defence Agency. However, in the area of EU-NATO relations beyond the 'Berlin plus' arrangements, Turkey continues to object to EU-NATO cooperation which would involve all EU Member States. This creates problems for EU-NATO cooperation, notably in the context of civilian ESDP missions."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2009</i>)</p>

<p>2010</p>	<p>"As regards the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), in the reporting period, Turkey aligned itself, when invited, with 54 out of 73 the relevant EU declarations and Council decisions (74 percent alignment). As regards the common security and defence policy (CSDP), Turkey is continuing to contribute to the EU-led military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR/Althea). Turkey is also contributing to EUPM, the EU-led police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the EU rule of law mission (EULEX) in Kosovo. The issue of EU-NATO cooperation that would involve all EU Member States beyond the 'Berlin plus arrangements' remains to be resolved."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2010</i>)</p>
<p>2011</p>	<p>"As regards the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), in the reporting period Turkey aligned itself, when invited, with 32 out of the 67 relevant EU declarations and Council decisions (48 percent alignment). As regards the common security and defence policy (CSDP), Turkey is continuing to contribute to the EU-led military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR/Althea). Turkey is also contributing to EUPM, the EU-led police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the EU rule of law mission (EULEX) in Kosovo. The issue of EU-NATO cooperation that would involve all EU Member States beyond the 'Berlin plus arrangements' remains to be resolved."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2011</i>)</p>
<p>2012</p>	<p>"As regards the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), Turkey aligned itself, when invited, with 37 out of 70 relevant EU declarations and Council decisions (53 percent alignment). As regards civil and military crisis management in the framework of the common security and defence policy (CSDP), Turkey continues to contribute to the EU-led military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea). It is also contributing to the EUPM (the EU-led police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and to the EULEX mission in Kosovo. The issue of EU-NATO cooperation beyond the 'Berlin plus' arrangements that would involve all EU Member States remains to be resolved."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2012</i>)</p>

<p>2013</p>	<p>"The rate of Turkey's alignment as regards the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) (46 percent alignment) was affected inter alia by its approach to the EU during the second half of 2012 when Cyprus held the Presidency of the Council of the EU and Turkey did not align with any EU declaration or statement in the framework of international organisations. As regards civil and military crisis management in the framework of the common security and defence policy, Turkey continues to contribute to the EU-led military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) and the EULEX mission in Kosovo. Turkey was invited to join a number of additional EU-led missions. The issue of EU-NATO cooperation beyond the 'Berlin plus' arrangements, involving all EU Member States, remains to be resolved."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2013</i>)</p>
<p>2014</p>	<p>"As regards the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), Turkey aligned itself, when invited, with 13 out of 45 EU declarations and Council decisions (29 percent alignment compared to 46 percent during the reference period of the 2013 Progress Report). Turkey continued to participate in civil and military crisis management operations in the framework of the common security and defence policy (CSDP). Turkey contributed to the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR ALTHEA, the EULEX mission in Kosovo and EUPOL-COPPS in the occupied Palestinian territory. Turkey made a concrete offer to contribute to EUFOR CAR and EUBAM Libya and is considering the possibility of joining EUTM Mali. The first working visit of the EU Military Staff to Turkey took place in January. The issue of EU-NATO cooperation going beyond the 'Berlin plus' arrangements, involving all EU Member States, has not yet been resolved."(<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2014</i>)</p>

<p>2015</p>	<p>"Regarding the common foreign and security policy, Turkey aligned itself, when invited, with 16 out of 40 EU declarations and Council decisions (40 percent alignment, against 29 percent during the reference period of the 2014 Progress Report). Turkey continued to participate in civil and military crisis management operations under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), in particular EUFOR ALTHEA Bosnia Herzegovina and EULEX Kosovo. It has offered to contribute to EUFOR RCA, EUBAM Libya, EUTM Mali and EUAM Ukraine. The issue of EU-NATO cooperation, going beyond the Berlin plus' arrangements, involving all EU Member States, has not yet been resolved." (<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2015</i>)</p>
<p>2016</p>	<p>"Regarding the common foreign and security policy, Turkey aligned itself, when invited, with 18 out of 41 EU declarations and Council decisions (44 percent alignment for the period 1 September 2015 to 1 September 2016, against 40 percent during the reference period of the 2015 Report on Turkey). Turkey continued to participate in civilian and military crisis management operations under the common security and defence policy, in particular EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and EULEX Kosovo. Turkey briefly participated in the EUAM in Ukraine and the EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories. The issue of EU-NATO cooperation, going beyond the 'Berlin plus' arrangements, involving all EU Member States, continues to be unresolved." (<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2016</i>)</p>
<p>2018</p>	<p>"On common foreign and security policy (CFSP), Turkey voiced support for the overall objectives in the Global strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. Turkey aligned itself, when invited, with 10 out of 64 EU declarations and Council decisions representing an alignment rate of around 16 percent during the reporting period. Turkey continued to actively participate in military crisis management operations under the common security and defence policy (CSDP) notably EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkish participation in EM Ukraine and EULEX Kosovo was suspended after Turkish seconded staff was withdrawn following the attempted coup of 2016, but Turkey later expressed its interest in continuing to contribute to these missions and submitted applications. The issue of EU-NATO cooperation, going beyond the 'Berlin plus' arrangements, involving all EU Member States, continues to be unresolved." (<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2018</i>)</p>

<p>2019</p>	<p>"The institutional framework enabling Turkey's participation in the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and security and defence policy (CSDP) is in place. Turkey voiced support for the overall objectives in the Global strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. During the reporting period from beginning of March 2018 until end of February 2019, Turkey aligned, when invited, with 16 out of 87 relevant High Representative declarations on behalf of the EU and Council decisions, representing an alignment rate of around 18 percent. Turkey continued to actively participate in military crisis management operations under the EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) notably EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkish participation in the Ukraine and Kosovo missions was suspended after Turkish seconded staff was withdrawn following the attempted coup of 2016, but Turkey later expressed its interest in continuing to contribute to these missions and submitted applications. The issue of EU-NATO cooperation, going beyond the 'Berlin plus' arrangements, involving all EU Member States, continues to be unresolved. Turkey continued to lobby in favour of a reform of the UN Security Council and reiterated its dedication to the 2030 Agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals." (<i>European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2019</i>)</p>
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When data from Progress Reports is analyzed, it can be concluded that since 1998, Turkey has been a major contributor to the European security and defence structure with its alignment to that CFSP decisions and its contribution to the CSDP operations. Details of this alignment will be discussed in the next chapter of this thesis. However, since 2016, with the coup attempt in Turkey, the commitment of Turkey to ally its foreign and security policy to the EU has changed.

To sum, it can be said that Turkey has been a partner to the European security and defense cooperation since it became an ally to the Western camp during the Cold War. Even though the rationale behind this partnership has been changed over time, Turkey being a partner to the EU did not change as Turkey is an important asset with its military capability and its geostrategic location. Still, Turkey is an important security and defense partner of the EU even though the conditions have changed a lot.

5.3 Turkey's Contribution to CSDP Operations

Turkey has been an important asset and a partner to the European Union (EU) in terms of security and defence cooperation since the Cold War period. With every step of further integration, Turkey tried to be a partner to the EU. One of the most important areas of these cooperation is operations that are launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. With the developments that have happened between 1999-2003, the EU has gained the ability to conduct military and civilian operations under its own flag and inclusion of non-EU members of NATO to these operations were crucial. Turkey being one of those non-EU members of NATO, has gained access to the operations with the Berlin Plus Agreement (Dursun-Ozkanca 2017). The Berlin Plus Agreement was an important milestone for the European Union countries because with this agreement, the operations that would be held under CSDP began to be formed. In addition to that, this agreement was an important milestone for Turkey-EU relations as well because Turkey opting in to the EU's security and defence cooperation has increased with its participation in the EU-led military and civilian missions and operations. For the purpose of this thesis, these operations will be analyzed and Turkey's contribution to them will be found out to determine Turkey's level of opt in to the EU's security cooperation.

The idea of the CSDP was discussed in the bilateral Summit in Saint Malo between France and the UK. From the very beginning, since 2003, the CSDP has been operational under the Petersberg tasks which include humanitarian, peace keeping, rescue and crisis management operations and missions. Not only military but also civilian operations are conducted as well because of the fact that the CSDP is addressing lots of different kinds of crisis and for some of those crises, military operations are not applicable (Kaldor 2012). The military missions that are held under the flag of the EU includes peacekeeping operations, training missions, naval and terrestrial forces. The civilian missions that are launched by the EU includes rule of law missions, police missions, monitoring and advisory missions. The EU is trying to be an actor in the international arena that provides security and defence to both its member states and to the outside world. That is why, these missions and operations are one of the most important tools that the EU is using in terms of security. When we look at the numbers today, the EU has completed 19 of its operations and there are 17 current operations. Among 17 current operations, only 6 are military operations, other ones are civilian (*Military and civilian missions and operations* / EEAS 2019).

Geographically, these operations are launched in the wider European neighborhoods as well as other parts of the world because the EU wants to secure itself by securing its neighborhood. Being active in a wider geographical arena helps the EU to be seen as a security power in the international arena. For instance, with the help of these operations, especially in its neighborhood such as Western Balkans, the European Union has begun to be seen as a key foreign policy and security actor (Kirchner 2013).

Considering the EU-led operations, the first ones were launched in the Western Balkans places like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. One of the first operations were held in BiH -EUFOR Althea- and it was an important turning point for the EU in terms of its consciousness about being a foreign policy and security actor in the region (Boštjancic-Pulko 2017).

“Operation Althea will be the largest in size ever launched by the EU, with 7,000 troops from 22 EU Member States and 11 third countries. It will add in a significant way to the EU’s political engagement, its assistance programmes and its ongoing police and monitoring missions with a view to helping BiH make further progress towards European integration in the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process.”. (Solana 2004)

From what Javier Solana, the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU declared, it can be understood that the European Union was giving significant importance to the EUFOR Althea in the Sarajevo as it was the largest operation held under the CSDP of the EU. Turkey was one of the important contributors to the Operation Althea which still is a continuing operation and the currently the only military operation that Turkey is taking part in.

Table 5.2 Finished Operations of the EU

Finished Operations	To Where	Operation Type	Civilian / Military
EUPM/BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	The EU Police Mission	C
EUeunavfor MED Operation Sophia	Southern Central Mediterranean-Libya	The EU Naval Force Operation	M
CONCORDIA/FYROM	Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	The EU Military Operation	M

EUPOL Afghanistan	Afghanistan	The EU Police Mission	C
EUPOL PROX-IMA/FYROM	Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	The EU Police Mission	C
EUPAT	Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	The EU Police Advisory Team	C
EUSSR Guinea-Bissau	Guinea-Bissau	The EU mission in support of the Security Sector Reform	C
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	Eastern Chad and the North-Eastern of the Central African Republic	The EU Military Operation	M
EUJUST THEMIS/Georgia	Georgia	The EU Rule of Law Mission	C
EUJUST LEX-Iraq	Iraq	The EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission	C
EUAVSEC South Sudan	South Sudan	The EU Aviation Security Mission	C
EUMAM RCA	Central African Republic	The EU Military Advisory Mission	C
ARTEMIS/DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	The EU Military Operation	M
EUPOL RD CONGO	Democratic Republic of Congo	The EU Police Mission	C
EUSEC RD CONGO	Democratic Republic of Congo	The EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform	C
EUPOL KINSHASA (DRC)	Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo	EU Police Mission	C
EUFOR RD Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo	The EU Military Operation	M

EUFOR RCA	Central African Republic	The EU Military Operation	M
Aceh Monitoring Mission - AMM	Aceh-Indonesia	Monitoring Mission	C

Notes: Information is drawn from Tubakov dataset and EEAS website.

Table 5.3 Turkish Contribution to the Finished Missions of the EU

<i>Finished Missions</i>	<i>Civilian / Military</i>	<i>Turkish Contribution</i>
EUPM/BiH	C	Yes
EUPOL KINSHASA (DRC)	C	Yes
EUPOL PROX-IMA/FYROM	C	Yes
EUJUST LEX-Iraq	C	Offered to contribute
EUPAT	C	No
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	C	No
EUJUST THEMIS/Georgia	C	No
EUAVSEC South Sudan	C	No
EUMAM RCA	C	No
EUPOL RD CONGO	C	No
EUSEC RD CONGO	C	No
Aceh Monitoring Mission - AMM	C	No
CONCORDIA/FYROM	M	Yes
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	M	Yes
EUFOR RD Congo	M	Yes
EUFOR RCA	M	Offered to contribute
ARTEMIS/DRC	M	No
EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia	M	No

Notes: Information is drawn from Tubakov dataset and EEAS website.

From 19 operations that have been finished, 6 of them is military operations: EU-NAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, CONCORDIA/FYROM, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, ARTEMIS/DRC, EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR RCA. From these 6 military operations, Turkey has been part of three of them; CONCORDIA/FYROM, EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR RD Congo (Yalçinkaya et al. 2018). It can be said that, for the finished military operations, Turkey's contribution to these operations were 50 percent. For EUFOR RCA, Turkey has shown its interest in 2014 and in 2015 for contribution and in the Turkey Progress Report of 2014, it was mentioned as "Turkey made a concrete offer to contribute to EUFOR CAR" (*European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2014*) and in the Turkey Progress Report of 2015, it was mentioned as in 2015, Turkey "has offered to contribute to EUFOR RCA..." (*European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2015*). It can be inferred that among 6 completed operations, Turkey has been or wanted to be a contributor to 4 of them which is a significantly high percentage for a third country.

When it comes to the civilian operations, there are 13 completed civilian missions under CSDP. Turkey has been a part of three of the civilian operations EUPM/BiH, EUPOL PROXIMA/FYROM and EUPOL KINSHASA (DRC). Looking at the data, Turkish contribution to the civilian operations are 23 percent, which corresponds to the half of the contribution to military operations. In addition to these ones, Turkey "has similarly expressed its desire to contribute to the EUJUST LEX in Iraq concerning the development of the rule of law." (*European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2005*). If Turkey's aspiration to contribute to the EUJUST LEX in Iraq would have been realized, Turkey would be a part of the 30.7 percent of the completed civilian missions. Looking at the contribution levels of Turkey, it can be said that despite the fact that Turkey is not a decision maker in the CSDP, its compliance with the CSDP decisions of the member states of EU is very high and it can be seen looking at its significant amount of contributions to the EU led operations as a third country.

Table 5.4 Current Operations of the EU

Current Operations	To Where	Operation Type	Civilian / Military
EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	The EU Military Operation	M
EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta)	Somalia	The EU Naval Force Operation	M
EUAM Iraq	Iraq	The EU Advisory Mission	C

EUAM Ukraine	Ukraine	The EU Advisory Mission	C
EUBAM Libya	Libya	The EU Border Assistance Mission	C
EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine (This Mission is not managed by CSDP structures)	Moldova and Ukraine	The EU Border Assistance Mission	C
EUBAM Rafah	Rafah	The EU Border Assistance Mission	C
EUCAP Somalia	Somalia	The EU Capacity Building Mission	C
EUCAP Sahel Mali	Sahel Mali	The EU Capacity Building Mission	C
EUCAP Sahel Niger	Sahel Niger	The EU Capacity Building Mission	C
EULEX Kosovo	Kosovo	The EU Rule of Law Mission	C
EUMM Georgia	Georgia	The EU Monitoring Mission	C
EUNAVFOR MED IRINI	Libya	The EU Naval Force Operation	M
EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories	Palestinian Territories	The EU Police and Rule of Law Mission	C
EUTM RCA	Central African Republic	The EU Military Training Mission	M
EUTM Somalia	Somalia	The EU Military Training Mission	M
EUTM-Mali	Mali	The EU Military Training Mission	M

Notes: Information is drawn from Tubakov dataset and EEAS website.

Table 5.5 Turkish Contribution to the Current Missions of the EU

<i>Current Missions</i>	<i>Civilian / Military</i>	<i>Turkish Contribution</i>
EULEX Kosovo	C	Yes/the only one still continues
EUPOL (COPPS/Palestinian Territories)	C	Yes
EUAM Ukraine	C	Yes
EUBAM Libya	C	Offered to contribute
EUAM Iraq	C	No
EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine (not under CSDP)	C	No
EUBAM Rafah	C	No
EUCAP Somalia	C	No
EUCAP Sahel Mali	C	No
EUCAP Sahel Niger	C	No
EUMM Georgia	C	No
EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH	M	Yes
EUTM Mali	M	Offered to contribute
EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta)	M	No
EUNAVFOR MED IRINI	M	No
EUTM RCA	M	No
EUTM Somalia	M	No

Notes: Information is drawn from Tubakov dataset and EEAS website.

For the current operations and missions of the EU, 6 out of 17 missions are military missions. Turkey is only contributing to the EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH. The percentage of Turkish contribution to the EU-led military missions that are continuing is 16.77 percent which is lower than the contribution to the finished ones. However, in 2015, Turkey "has offered to contribute to EUBAM Libya, EUTM Mali and EUAM Ukraine." (*European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2015*). This means that Turkey wanted to be a part of one more current military operation

-EUTM Mali- however it did not realize and if this was realized, Turkey's contribution to the current military operations would have been 33.3 percent. When it comes to the civilian operations, EULEX Kosovo is the one operation that Turkey is contributing significantly. For a brief period of time, Turkey also contributed to EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories and EUAM Ukraine in 2016, however, due to coup attempt in Turkey, these participations were suspended. "Turkish participation in EM Ukraine and EULEX Kosovo was suspended after Turkish seconded staff was withdrawn following the attempted coup of 2016, but Turkey later expressed its interest in continuing to contribute to these missions and submitted applications." (*European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2018*). It can be said that, out of 11 civilian missions, Turkey has participated in three of them; EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories, EULEX Kosovo and EUAM Ukraine, which corresponds to 27.27 percent of the current civilian missions. If Turkish offer to contribute to EUBAM Libya was realized, its contribution to the current civilian operations would have been 36.36 percent. Currently, Turkey is not participating in any civilian EU-led missions and only participating in EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH military operation among 17 current operations.

Comparing completed operations with current ones, it can be inferred that Turkey's participation in military operations have decreased, however, the level of participation to the civilian operations have increased over time. As a matter of fact, if Turkey would not have encountered a coup attempt in 2016, Turkish contribution to other operations could have been realized. In that case, Turkish contribution to the current civilian operations would have been higher than the finished ones. According to some scholars like Müftüler-Baç (2016), Turkey's contribution to the CSDP operations and inclusion to the security and defence cooperation is an indicator that the differentiated integration can be the way for Turkey to be included into the EU system.

The impact of the operations that have been held under CSDP of the EU, The European Union has begun to be seen as a security power in the last few decades and it is trying to strengthen its place in the global arena as such. Although some scholars are careful to say that the EU is a security power, it can be said that gradually the EU is becoming a security power in the global arena. Although lately the activeness of the EU has decreased and the operations that are launched are not as much as it was in the period of 2003-2008, it still is an important player in some parts of the world.

Having showed that there is high degree of Turkish contribution to the CSDP operations, a comparison is needed among third countries who are contributing to see

whether Turkish contribution is significant. According to the Parliament of the UK's publications in 2018 about CSDP missions, mostly third countries provide "less than 20 staff" to the operations where Turkey provided 160 personnel for EUFOR Althea where second most significant third country contributor to this operation, Switzerland, provided 20 personnel (*Third Country Participation in CSDP Missions and Operations / House of Lords* 2018). Operation Althea is an exemption that only this operation has a sizeable amount of third country contribution, which comes from Turkey and Turkey is the second-largest contributor (*Third Country Participation in CSDP Missions and Operations / House of Lords* 2018).

Furthermore, a comparison between Turkey and the UK in terms of their contribution to current operations will be made. The UK is an important country to compare as it prioritizes security and wants to contribute to European security more, whereas, it is not a member state as of 2020. According to Parliamentary data that belongs to April 2018, the UK has contributed to 5 out of 6 current military operations, which means 83.3 percent contribution, where Turkey has only contributed to one of them which means 16.77 percent contribution and wanted to contribute to one more which means 33.3 percent contribution. When it comes to participation in civilian operations, the UK has contributed to 5 of the civilian operations, which means a 45.45 percent contribution (*Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations - European Union Committee / House of Lords* 2018), where Turkey has contributed to 3 of them (27.27 percent), and wanted to contribute one more (36.36 percent) contribution. Comparing these contribution levels, it can be said that even though Turkey is not a decision maker in these operations like the UK, Turkey has contributed at a very high rate especially when it comes to civilian operations. Considering that Turkey might have some restraints that hinders Turkey to not contribute to these operations as it is not a decision maker and an outside contributor, these contribution levels is very high.

Lastly, a comparison between Turkey and Norway will be made as Norway is one of the most important countries that has a significant amount of external differentiated to the EU. As of 2018, according to Tone Skogen, who is State Secretary of Norway, Norway has contributed to 3 military and 9 civilian missions (Skogen 2018) whereas Turkey has contributed to 4 military and 6 civilian missions and wanted to contribute to 2 more military and 2 more civilian missions. Comparing these contribution levels, it can be said that Turkey and Norway have similar amount of contribution levels. If Turkey would have contributed to all operations and missions that it wanted to, Turkish contribution level would have been higher than the Norwegian one. Considering the fact that Norway is in the European subcontinent where it would prioritize security concerns of the EU more than Turkey, and Norway has opt

in to the multiple policy areas of the European Union, it is expected from Norway to have higher contribution than Turkey to the CSDP operations. Comparing the contribution levels, it can be said that, having less opt ins to less policy areas of the EU than Norway, Turkey has significant amount of contribution to the operations which supports the claim of this thesis that Turkey has an opt in to the security and defence cooperation of the Union.

In addition to the operations that are held under the CSDP of the EU, Turkey has been taking part in operations that have been launched under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Peacekeeping missions that have been held under the OSCE is another important area for Turkish contribution for EU security cooperation. Out of 8 missions (peacekeeping missions) that have been held under the OSCE (*Where we are / OSCE* n.d.), Turkey has contributed to 3 of them; KVM-OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, BMO-OSCE Border Monitoring Operation in Georgia and OMIS-OSCE Mission to Skopje (Yalçınkaya et al. 2018). Which means Turkey's contribution to the OSCE peacekeeping missions corresponds to the 37.5 percent of all peacekeeping missions. This is another indicator of how Turkey is trying to be a member of the EU security cooperation.

To conclude, looking at Turkey's contribution to the CSDP operations, it can be said that Turkey is a partner to the EU in terms of its security and defence cooperation. Without being a decision maker in CSDP operations, Turkey has managed to be a part of the missions by 27.77 percent and wanted to be a part of 11.11 percent of the operations. In total, Turkish participation and will to participate in the CSDP missions corresponds to 38.88 percent of total number of operations and missions that have been launched by the EU. The number of Turkish actual contribution and desire of contribution shows that Turkey has a significant amount of opt in to the EU security and defence cooperation. For Turkey, the differentiated integration can be seen as a way of integration to the EU system without being a full member as it already has been integrated to some areas like defence and security.

6. CURRENT OBSTACLES IN SECURITY COOPERATION

The current situation regarding CSDP missions and Turkish contribution to them is a little bit different. Since the Arab Spring, there is a significant decrease in the number of CSDP missions and operations in general. Thus, there is a significant decrease in Turkish contribution as well. There are different reasons behind these changes, however, the ultimate end this situation creates is that currently, there is a less coherent defence and security policy of the EU in terms of the operations and missions that are held under the flag of the EU.

The decrease in the operations in general is due to several reasons. One of the main reasons is that decision making in terms of security and defence has always been hard. Since member states need to be on board with the decision to make it happen in terms of security and defence, different preferences among members has created a problem. Since the Arab Spring, as it increased the instability in the European continent by creating a terrorist threat and migratory flows, the differences among member states in terms of security and defence has become visible (Tardy 2018). Especially when British declaration of exiting the EU, election and Trump in the US and Russian aggressiveness came on top of these, different opinions about security and defence related matters has increased among the members. As willingness of the member states to cooperate is the key necessity in terms of enhancing and increasing cooperation in terms of security and defence, when the willingness of the member states decreases, the level of cooperation decreases as well. When these new challenges have arisen in the international arena in terms of security, the willingness of the member states decreased. For this reason, there has been a decrease in the number of CSDP missions and operations as member states were more willing to cooperate in the beginning of the 2000s. In addition to these challenges, there has been some problems regarding cooperation with NATO that concern Turkish contribution as well. From the very beginning, Turkey's contribution to the operations have some difficulties.

“Turkey's participation in the ESDP continues to present certain dif-

ficulties. Indeed, Turkey and the EU have a different interpretation of the “Berlin Plus” agreements between EU and NATO. As a result, Turkey’s insistence that Cyprus and Malta be excluded from the EU-NATO strategic co-operation in crisis management has so far hampered such co-operation. Turkey has so far vetoed Cyprus’ accession to the Wassenaar agreement concerning the Code of Good Conduct on Arms Export as well as the dual use regulation. This hampers the functioning of the single market in the areas covered by the agreement.". (*European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2005*).

From what has been indicated in the 2005 Turkey Progress Report, it can be inferred that the Cyprus issue was a significant issue for Turkey’s contribution to the CSDP missions. And it continued as such. "As regards EU-NATO cooperation, Turkey objects to the inclusion of the Republic of Cyprus and Malta in the EU-NATO strategic cooperation based on the “Berlin Plus” Agreement." (*European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2007*). Since 2007, in every year, in Turkey Progress Reports, The EU mentions about the same problem as "The issue of EU-NATO cooperation, going beyond the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements, involving all EU Member States, continues to be unresolved." (*European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2019*). Turkey’s blockage and Cyprus issue is one of the most important problems that hinder Turkey from further cooperation and hinder the EU from making much more effective operations and missions. One of the reasons why the CSDP is not effective as it was between 2003-2010 -as most of the operations were held in that period- is that the problem regarding the EU-NATO cooperation is not solved yet. Turkish position to the issue is stated in Ministry of Affairs’ website as;

“As for Cyprus, we will not allow anything that will change the state of affairs, including in NATO-EU relations. ... But if there is no movement in Cyprus and if there is no movement on Turkey’s concerns in the EU with regard to our participation in the Common Security and Defense Policy, no further movement should be expected on the NATO-EU dossier.". (*Turkey’s views on current NATO issues / Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d*)

It can be said that without clarifying the Cyprus issue, the issue of contribution to the CSDP operation would remain to be solved. Another issue concerning Turkey’s contribution to the missions is the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016. Due to the coup attempt, Turkish contribution to some of the missions were suspended and even though Turkey expressed its interests to contribute more, the situation has not

been restored yet.

Turkey's contribution to these missions and operations are crucial to show that Turkey is a significant part of the security and defence cooperation of the EU. Even though the level of cooperation has decreased recently both in terms of cooperation among the EU members and the cooperation between the EU and Turkey, it can be said that Turkey had an opt in to the security and defence cooperation of the EU and it can easily be restored in the future as well. Recently, due to the circumstances in the international arena, security and defence cooperation has become harder among the EU members as well. Under these circumstances, the decreasing level of Turkey's alignment and contribution to the security and defence of the EU is an expected outcome. As Turkey has a basis for external differentiation in terms of security and defence, the cooperation in terms of these areas can enhance easily in the near future. Although there are some challenges now, one cannot argue that Turkey do not have an opt in to the security and defence cooperation. It can be argued that Turkey has an opt in to the security and defence cooperation, however, currently is not playing an active role in this cooperation due to several other political situations.

7. CONCLUSION

This thesis has looked into the relationship between the European Union and Turkey through the glass of security and defence aiming to show that there is a high degree of inclusion of Turkey not only cooperation. As Turkey and the EU have been security and defence partners since the Cold War years, one can argue that Turkey has been a part of security cooperation of the EU since then and their cooperation and Turkey's inclusion still continues today although the type of the cooperation has changed over time. Turkish inclusion to the EU security and defence institutions and its determination to be a part of the ones that it is not already a part of since the Cold War has shown that there is a significant degree of inclusion of Turkey to the system of the EU along with high degree of willingness to be included into the system.

The argument of this thesis is that Turkey has an opt in to the European Union's security cooperation. According to Differentiated Integration theory, some of the non-member states of the EU can opt in to the certain areas of the cooperation if both parties agree on the terms of the cooperation. Accepting that the external differentiation can happen under the EU Acquis Communautaire, this thesis argues that Turkey has been an example of external differentiation in terms of security and defence cooperation. From the very beginning of the security cooperation, Turkey has tried to be a part of it. Even though NATO was not directly an institution of the EU, membership of NATO was an important milestone for Turkish inclusion to the security cooperation of the EU as the EU has changed its perception of "other" towards Turkey after its membership to NATO. Being in the same collective defence organization during the Cold War years has created some sort of a similar understanding of security and defence. As the security cooperation has enhanced among the members of the EU and the EU has become a more visible security power in the world, it changed the relations between Turkey as well. With the increased cooperation among members, Turkey has been trying to become a member of this increased cooperation and trying to be a member of the security institutions of the EU. The importance that was given to the associate membership to the Western

European Union by Turkey and the disappointment that the merger of the WEU and EU caused on Turkey is an example that shows how Turkey has prioritized being in the security institutions of the European Union since the end of the Cold War.

With the Berlin Plus Agreement, Turkey has gotten the acceptance of being a part of EU-led operations and missions that are held under CSDP of the EU. Even though Turkey is not a decision maker, its contribution to the EU-led operations is significant. Turkey has contributed to 4 of the 12 military missions (6 current, 6 finished) that are held under CSDP, which corresponds to 33.33 percent and wanted to join 2 more of them. If Turkey would have been able to contribute those two more operations, the contribution level would have been 50 percent of the operations which is a significant amount for a non-member state. Even the member states are not obligated to contribute to the missions and operations, the level of Turkish contribution is immense.

In addition to the military operations, Turkey has been a contributor to 6 of the 24 civilian missions (11 current, 13 finished) which corresponds to 25 percent. Besides these 6 operations, Turkey wanted to join 2 more of the civilian operations. If Turkey would have been able to contribute those two more civilian missions, the contribution level would have been 33.33 percent, which is again a significant amount of contribution.

Looking at the contribution levels of Turkey, this thesis argues that Turkey has an opt in to the security and defence cooperation of the European Union. Along with institutional bounds, Turkish contribution to these operations that are voluntary to be a part of shows Turkish dedication to be a part of European security cooperation. Although, lately, the level Turkish participation in the missions and operations has decreased, the level of missions and operations that are conducted under CSDP has decreased as well. There is a mission fatigue in the European Union lately, and there are different reasons why. The presence of the European Union in security arena depends on the willingness of the members and it is very unlikely to come up with a common position in terms of security and defence related matters as this is a sovereignty issue for all member states. For this reason, the tendency for the European Union to be present in the world as a security power through the operations that are held under the EU flag has been decreased. With the decrease, Turkey position in this cooperation has changed as well. Due to the fact that Turkey-EU relations are in a different position than it was in the period of 2003-2008, the security cooperation of the two parties have changed to some amount. Turkey is not a major contributor of the operations and missions as it was before.

However, this does not mean that the Turkish aspiration to become a part of EU security cooperation has ended or Turkey does not have an opt in to the security cooperation of the EU anymore. The reasons for this change are owing to other political determinants and the cooperation between Turkey and the EU in terms of security and defence has not ended.

For further cooperation, Brexit might be an opportunity for Turkey. As the United Kingdom may want to be a part of security institutions of the EU after Brexit, the third part involvements can change accordingly. In today's structure, third parties cannot become a part of PESCO or CSDP, however, with the adjustments which will be made for the UK can create new opportunities for Turkey to be involved in the institutional cooperation of the European Union.

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