

**FROM RECIPIENT TO "EMERGING" DONOR:
THE NEW TRAJECTORY OF TURKISH FOREIGN AID**

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FROM RECIPIENT TO "EMERGING" DONOR:
THE NEW NARRATIVE OF TURKISH FOREIGN AID

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ABSTRACT

FROM RECIPIENT TO "EMERGING" DONOR: THE NEW TRAJECTORY OF TURKISH FOREIGN AID

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Aid, Aid Donors, and AKP

The recent emergence of ‘new’ aid donors on the international scene has raised questions about their real motivations and the implications their presence will have on the traditional aid scenario. Hence, the debate over the role and the impact of “emerging donors” are becoming increasingly intense. There has been varying opinions towards those new actors of international aid community. This thesis, reviews the global aid system and its changes, having as focus the role of rising power and humanitarian state Turkey in this scenario, the country’s motives, and the implications of the new role of Turkey as a new aid donor from a former aid recipient. It analyzes Turkey's motivations for embarking on this path and the international and domestic contexts in which this shift occurred. In other words, this study is concerned with the evolution of Turkey's humanitarianism.

ÖZET

YARDIM ALAN ÜLKEDEN "YENİ DONÖR" ÜLKEYE: TÜRKİYE DIŞ YARDIMININ YENİ YÖRÜNGESİ

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Dış Yardım Donörleri, ve AKP

Uluslararası sahnedeki "yeni" yardım bağışçılarının yakın zamanda ortaya çıkması, gerçek motivasyonları ve onların varlığının geleneksel yardım senaryosuna getireceği etkiler konusunda sorular doğurdu."Yeni donörler"in rolü ve etkisi etrafında dönen tartışma gittikçe yoğunlaşıyor. Uluslararası yardım topluluğunda, bu yeni aktörler için farklı görüşler mevcut. İşbu nedenle, bu tez küresel yardım sistemini ve bu sistemdeki değişimleri gözden geçirerek; yükselen güç ve insani yardım yapan ülke olarak Türkiye'nin bu senaryodaki rolünü, ülkenin amaçlarını ve eski bir yardım alıcısı olduğu halde, bu yeni donör pozisyonunu inceleyecektir. İşbu tez Türkiye'nin bu yola çıkma konusundaki motivasyonlarını ve bu değişimin gerçekleştiği uluslararası ve yerel bağlamları analiz edecektir. Başka bir deyişle, bu çalışma Türkiye'nin insani yardım evrimi ile ilgilenmektedir.

*To my family, and to
Zeynep Sümeyye Durgun &
Mert Öz & Sumru Küçüka;
With my lifelong gratitude for their
love and support...*

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Authority
BRICs	Brazil, Russia, India, China
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EU	European Union
EEC	European Economic Community
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JDP	Justice and Development Party (in Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SPO	State Planning Organization
SU	Soviet Union
TMFA	Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TIKA	Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı (in English, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency)
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WB	World Bank

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

A new facet of foreign policy that became important after the Second World War period is foreign aid. Foreign aid has been widely used for more than 70 years. Despite changing circumstances in international politics, particularly in the post-Cold War era, development assistance¹ has gained importance, and acquired greater salience around the globe. The collapse of the Soviet Union (SU) has witnessed the end of bipolar world order resulting in the emergence of the strong leadership of the United States (US) as a hegemon. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the US hegemony was visible in the realms of global politics and the economy. However recently, due to the economic and political rise of new powers, the world has been going through a significant shift from a unipolar international system to a multipolar one (Armijo 2007; Grimm et al. 2009). Such shift affected the balance of global economic power as a result of active engagement of the fast-developing economies in global affairs (Ahearn 2012; Cornelissen 2009). Those powers are called as "rising powers" (Ahearn 2012), or to put it differently "emerging powers" (Carothers and Youngs 2011) or latecomer countries (Okano-Heijmans 2012) and they are believed to play a future pivotal role in global governance and the economy (A. F. Cooper 2016; Schirm 2012). Whatever they are called, there is a consensus in the literature that these powers will continue to remain both challengers and contributors to the system.

During the recent decades, not only the volume of development assistance, but also the

¹ In this thesis, the terms "foreign aid" and "development assistance" are used interchangeably.

number of donors has increased exponentially. Today, most of the countries are taking their places either as donors, as recipients, or as both in the international system. Particularly, newly emerged aid providers are affecting the traditional landscape of development assistance programs as rivaling DAC (Development Assistance Committee) donors. Even though there is not yet an extensive investigation of emerging donors, a variety of opinions have been suggested, ranging from "friendly" to "relatively hostile"(Naim 2007). The foreign aid literature of emerging donors is a fairly new one, and the literature thus far has been concerned with categorizing them homogenously. As one of the rising donors², Turkey has been experiencing of becoming a regional along with a global player on the international scene. Hence, the primary focus of this thesis will be on the trajectory of Turkish foreign aid from recipient to a new provider. In this study, Turkey is taken as an emerging power with regional importance and as a humanitarian state. Humanitarianism can be counted as one of the key concepts that Turkey has adopted for its foreign policy interests (Öniş and Kutlay 2015). Turkey has been pursuing its humanitarian diplomacy as part of its development cooperation policy as well. In that sense, foreign assistance plays a significant role in realizing Turkey's role in the international regime. To that end, the structure of the study is as follows. The thesis begins by discussing its approach to foreign aid and emerging donor issues. The field of research essentially necessitates a broad literature review on emerging powers as background information. Thus, firstly the study will try to develop an understanding of the shifts in the international aid system. Later, how these donors have been influencing the global system will be reviewed. After reviewing the literature, the thesis clarifies the vocabulary used and pays attention to the changes in the international aid structure. In other words, the description of how the development assistance system works, and the donors' motivations of aid are provided. What is more, traditional donors and emerging donors will be analyzed in the following section, with a particular focus on changes in the international scenario through contributions of "new" ones. It is important to uncover some commonalities and differentiations among donors. And at the third chapter, the thesis will be paying attention on Turkey's development assistance experience with reference to "humanitarian state", which signifies a distinctive characteristic of the Turkish aid model from that of both established and emerging donors. The history of Turkey's aid allocation and motives and some relevant statistical

² In this thesis, the terms "emerging donor" and "new aid provider" are used interchangeably.

data on Turkey's development assistance will be given with detailed information on channels of aid delivery, regional-sectorial allocation, and aid institutions to be able to determine the characteristics of the "Turkish model" of aid giving. At the end, there is a discussion chapter to clarify limitations and to propose suggestions for further research.

The aim of this thesis is to understand how Turkey became an aid donor from an aid recipient, with the complementary purposes of comprehending its motivations and the implications of such change. In other words, this thesis traces the evolution of Turkey's foreign aid efforts as an example of the new humanitarianism associated with rising powers. This study provides numerous contributions to the literature; it sheds light on the debate about emerging donors by providing general outline of the current aid framework and discussing the terminology. Second, the thesis positions Turkey as an emerging power and as a humanitarian state and specifies its development cooperation provision in accordance with the international aid agenda. Furthermore, since the foreign aid of Turkey has been understudied or selective in focus, paying attention to Turkish foreign aid experience will be beneficial for the literature on international aid. In other words, the thesis aims at filling the clear gap of studies concerning Turkish development cooperation. It is true that there are studies that investigate foreign policy of Turkey with touching upon its aid policies, yet as far as is known no study has conducted that discuss the new positioning of Turkey in the global aid regime and its foreign relations with this approach, under the terms here proposed.

The nature of this thesis requires a qualitative methodological approach. According to Berg (2001), the qualitative study is conducted with the purpose of answering questions through social setting analysis, and observation of structures. Hence, in qualitative research the scholar may repeat previous studies in order to confirm the use of theories. Moreover, the evidence is compiled by academic literature, in-depth foreign policy publications, and archival research; and will be analyzed. The larger implications of this thesis include deeper understanding of the motives and interests of emerging donors, with application for Turkey. Hence, in that way, this thesis forms a basis for to extend similar analysis to other cases of the rising donors. To put it differently, the data used here are both from primary and secondary sources. Mainly from recent years, the thesis consists data from of digital sources (mostly articles), and libraries for books. The criteria for the data selection were set as the relevance to the topic, the year of

publishing (in certain cases) and the reliability of resource. Briefly, this study claims that Turkey's foreign aid policy vision as an emerging power and as a humanitarian state can be explained, according to which a state attributes itself a global role in one of the niche areas, namely humanitarianism.

2. INVESTIGATION

2.1. Foreign Aid at a Glance

Each year, billions of dollars are transferred to developing part of the world via development assistance efforts to promote economic growth and to increase governance quality. Sometimes with numerous political prerequisites, those financial flows intend to foster and to protect human rights and liberties, and to accomplish higher level of government responsibility in recipient countries. Yet, aid is a complex term to define, based on the fact that it may be delivered through different channels such as bilaterally or multilaterally; or through different modalities such as humanitarian aid, technical assistance aid, sector-wide approaches etc. Therefore, to conceptualize key terms in this study is crucial, since there are divergent views about the definitions of main concepts in the literature.

A plethora of scholars have defined foreign aid in varying ways. As Riddell (2007) puts it, all types of resources that donors provide to the recipients in need and that are given for developmental and emergency purposes can be categorized as development assistance (ibid.). On the other hand, Furtado (1964) claims that foreign aid consists of solutions with targeting to improve a collective of persons' life quality, rather than merely capital accumulation. Moreover, another foreign aid definition refers it as a transnational capital flows that involve either a loan or a grant, by donor governments to developing and least developed countries; distributed either bilaterally, multilaterally, or through a nongovernmental organization (Todaro 2009). The author explains bilateral distribution of aid as a transfer from donors' to the recipients' government (ibid.). Yet, foreign aid also can be funded via multilateral channels if it is funded "by a group of countries and/or organizations to one or more specific recipients" (ibid.).

The most commonly used definition of development assistance is provided by DAC, the forum to coordinate aid efforts of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), under the name of Official Development Assistance (ODA) (Riddell 2007). According to ODA, the term "foreign aid" refers to "deliberate relocation of public resources" from the donor or donors, to an NGO, or to a global association with the aim of improving the human condition in recipients' country (Lancaster 2007). Correspondingly, a vast majority of international aid community use ODA as a blanket term in order to describe those aid flows which are technical aid, official grants, or loans that concessional in character "with a grant element of %25 or more", provided via bilateral or multilateral channels, through not including military or commercial aid (OECD 2017). Moreover, according to OECD definition, donor countries' purposes for their development assistance efforts need to include recipients' economic development and good governance. In other words, ODA has the following conditions:

- "1) Multilateral development institutions have to be provided by official agencies, which includes state and local governments, or by their policymaking agencies
- 2) Each transaction has to pursue the following principles;
 - a) The main purpose of aid is to stimulate economic development and welfare in developing countries
 - b) Is according to concessional loans, i.e. grant element of at least 25 per cent." (OECD 2008)

Beside of ODA, there are two other classifications for that DAC has for aid transfers that do not meet ODA's criteria, which are Official Assistance (OA) and Other Official Flows (OOF). While former one is similar to ODA, main difference relies on whether recipient is placed in Part II according to DAC's List of Aid Recipients. OOF, on the other hand, includes official sectorial transactions either with less than 25% grant element, or with non-development purposes. Thus, ODA is the aid category that most people have in mind when discussing development assistance (Radelet 2006). Herewith, for the purposes of this study, DAC's definitions will be focused.

In spite of aid donors, delivery mechanisms, and modalities have changed significantly over time; OECD's stated objectives remain the same. Regardless of the form of the

development assistance, whether it is a project aid, a budget support, or another form of aid; the global donor community aims at supporting development in countries or governments of developing world, and that the aid is used for enhancing recipients' conditions for peace and stability.

2.2. Foreign Aid in an Age of Paradigm Shift: Origin and Evolution

Development assistance, which emerged as a mechanism to foster diplomatic solidarity and to improve economic wellbeing in the aftermath of the World Wars, has been widely used for more than 70 years. What began as a financial support to poor countries and territories between two World Wars, owing to Marshall Plan, turned out to be known as development assistance. The US Secretary of State General George Marshall's aid program not only helped the rebuilding of Europe, but also along with decolonization processes; gave impetus to international aid practices (Browne 1999). To put it differently, the current form development aid has its roots back to the post-World Wars period, as bilateral relations through financial flows has started between developed and developing countries.

The world political context changed since the 1950s, so foreign aid has evolved along with it. The Marshall plan was considered as an achievement in industrializing European countries, yet same outcome was not observable for the account of developing countries (Denizer et al. 2011). In early 1950s, development aid was heavily based on sectorial support through development agencies attempts to achieve direct productive sector growth in recipient countries in the form of large-scale industrial projects. Because of the Cold War dynamics, development assistance became a tool of foreign policy that started to be used for strategic concerns to gain alliances and to halt the communism (Goldsmith 2001). Donors were in competition for influence with geopolitical strategies and aid was the primary component of their foreign policy.

When it comes to 1960s, primary foreign aid motivations started to become poverty-related issues. (Denizer et al. 2007) As a primary establishment, Development

Assistance Committee was started to promote resource flows to less developed countries (OECD Website). Which triggered by a mutual concern over to combat with global communism during the Cold War, brought donors together for the future cooperation to set poverty reduction as a common goal under the same roof of the DAC regime. Thus, via developed countries giving more importance to state-led initiatives as an appropriate means to alleviate poverty, there was a gradual and steady increase in financial flows through the developing world (Denizer et al. 2007). However, in the 1970s, economic prosperity came to a halt together with oil price shock, leading to the international debt crisis (White 2004). Worldwide unequal interest rates and inflation made developed world to set poverty considerations aside during such macroeconomic crisis (Lancaster 2007). In the meantime, the OECD-DAC introduced the concept of ODA, which is considered as main achievement of the forum.

Dominated by neoliberal perspective, in the 1980s industrialized countries revised their views on state-led economic growth and development. On the contrary, government intervention began to be considered as the main barrier to achieve it (Kenny and Williams 2001). Instead, re-establishing market mechanisms with allocation emphasis became all that really mattered for development outcomes, and in that way poverty and income inequality would take care of themselves. To illustrate while World Bank's funding for research on poverty and income distribution was at its peaked in 1975, it decreasingly became almost zero between 1980 and 1985 (Little et al. 1970). During that period, development aid was mainly delivered in the form of the budget support conditioned on policy reforms.

When the Cold War ended, changes took place at the international scene of foreign aid. The market approach for the practice of aid donations gave its place to prioritizing good government policies; in addition to renewed emphasis on poverty alleviation, and on multilateralism instead of unilateralism (Schraeder et al. 1998). Such shifts in the global aid scene were explained by Girod (2008) as instrumental, since aid begun to be distributed to developing countries with a good history of governance, economic performance and political stability; rather than strategic allies (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Moreover, owing to Burnside and Dollar (2000), a consensus was reached as market and state to be partners in the growth process (ibid.). Concordantly, the practice of political conditionality has taken on great importance as a democracy promotion

device (Brown 2005). On the other hand, the strategy adopted to combat poverty was also new, which contained social investments in education and healthcare systems to meet the needs of the poor. By the end of the 20th Century, the bulk of developed countries had established adequate development strategies, structured aid policies, and professional aid organizations to orient recipients.

With the new Millennium, conditionality became a hallmark with emphasis on human rights, democracy, and good governance; which also recognized through multilateral development effort within the international cooperation framework (The 2000 UN Millennium Development Goals, The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, The 2005 DAC-Outreach strategy, and The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action). Particularly the Paris Declaration, which includes following principles, changed the scope of aid effectiveness to produce better impact:

- i. Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.
- ii. Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.
- iii. Harmonization: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures, and share information to avoid duplication.
- iv. Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured.
- v. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results.³

More recently developing countries, mostly recipients themselves, have started to contribute to international aid architecture as emerging donors via steadily gaining prominence. From the viewpoint of traditional donors, hence, the emergence of new aid providers is not surprising. In order to identify all donors, next section will focus on characterizations and motivations of donors' in the international aid system.

³ <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm> accessed 17 November 2018.

2.3. Donors in The International Aid System

As aforementioned, since the 1950s there have been aid flows through developing part of the world. Most of the world's leading aid providers have been members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Hence, the term "traditional donor" was commonly taken as a reference point to highlight the characteristics of ODA providers that mainly consist of Western members. The current DAC framework has been serving as a fundamental structure of foreign aid for its donors through regulating, managing, and delivering official aid flows (OECD 2010a). Thus, draw upon a shared belief system and a shared set of goals; bilateral donors serve cooperatively for DAC's institutional foundation (Lancaster 2007). In other words, traditional donors have common beliefs and value commitments "to eradicate poverty and promote global development without becoming entangled in the national interests of individual member countries" (Sato et al. 2010). Furthermore, it can be said that the DAC is very much focused on normative element of its members' provision and experiences (Chaturvedi 2012). The organization has a clear stance, and selective admission process in development cooperation providers: "in order to adhere to the DAC, candidate countries have to send a report detailing its strategies, the running of an evaluation and monitoring system for its programs, and details that it spends over 100 million US dollars" (OECD 2015a).

Via introduction of "official development assistance" (ODA) by the late 1970s, which is defined as concessional financial inflows except military or commercially driven aid (with a grant element of 25 percent or more) to developing parts of the world on the DAC list of ODA recipients and to multilateral institutions; traditional donors have started to stimulate the economic development and welfare of recipients. To achieve above-mentioned moral commitments, established donors believe that collective and coordinated effort is necessary for self-restraint (Sato et al. 2010). Thus, in order to ensure compliance with certain norms and principles by each member; the established donors put an emphasis on transparency of aid delivery via The Creditor Reporting

System (CRS) since 1973 to contribute to improve development cooperation (ibid.). In addition, DAC monitors aid flows, holds periodic peer reviews among its members, and publish systematical reports. Compendiously, Western donors have been accumulating a set of institutions to assure common ground and mutual interests. Currently DAC has 30 members including European Union, which takes part in the committee as a full member. On the other hand, there are also OECD countries that are not formal members of the committee yet participate fully in meetings; namely, Turkey, Mexico, Chile, Estonia, Israel, and Latvia. What is more, the role of observers is filled up by UNDP, The World Bank, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Until the new millennium, foreign aid was predominantly delivered by traditional donors. Yet today, this is being complemented by the contribution of non-DAC donors. In recent years, there have been significant differences in the international aid architecture. It is the fact that those nontraditional donors are certainly not new to the development cooperation and have track records of delivering aid dating back to the 1950s (Woods 2008; Lin 1996). Regardless of those aid-activities, the recent growth of developing countries' aid programs in terms of the size and scope is regarded as "emergent" (Sato et al. 2010). In other words, through recent development activities, those international actors have become more influential in the landscape of foreign aid that can no longer be ignored by traditional donors (ibid). Via providing general figures on new actors in international development, the DAC tries to institutionalize those donors' development efforts. A variety of opinions have been suggested, ranging from "friendly" to "relatively hostile" (Naim 2007).

New, emerging, rising, non-traditional, or non-DAC donors; all of those refer to countries with reemerging development assistance programs; namely Brazil, Russia, India and China (better known as the BRICs or providers of South-South Cooperation), Turkey, Mexico, Poland, Slovenia, Arab countries, Thailand, Malaysia, and as recent providers Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, etc. In the following chapter, the thesis will highlight the characteristics of emerging donors via paying attention to commonalities between, and to diversity among the community.

2.4. "Emerging" Donors as New Aid Providers

As it is discussed so far, this section will be slightly different via paying particular attention to the emerging donors of aid community and their places beside of traditional ones. With their growing importance, rising donors are playing an increasing role in international aid architecture and gaining international validation as challenging players. The category of the "emerging donor" is placed in contrast to the OECD's DAC, in order to highlight the characteristics of non-DAC aid providers and their donor identity (Mawdsley 2012). It is crucial to pay attention to new donors' identity to comprehend their foreign aid provisions and establishment of bilateral relations. According to Woods (2008), those new participants have triggered "a silent revolution" in the international "aid market". The emerging donors are not merely can be labeled as "alternative source of development finance" yet they participate in development as powerful substitutes to challenge traditional ways of understanding ownership in the aid regime.

Up to a recent past, rising donors have been mainly recipients of ODA. Nonetheless, by the late 1990s, this tendency began to change when those new actors started to deliver development assistance themselves. The practice of foreign aid, thus, has changed its course through emerging donors' prospects for altering the conventional ways, boosting the volume of their aid, and challenging the predominance in development finance (Kragelund 2008). One needs to see that those new players are active for development solutions and have not that small share of total aid (Dreher et al. 2013).

It can be said that, on the one hand, the Development Assistance Committee has recognized the presence of emerging donors and aims to incorporate their activity in the global aid framework. On the other hand, the rising donors seem to create a community for them outside of the DAC's boundaries. When it is compared with the traditional donors, emerging providers deliver development assistance in different terms. Recipient countries are not obliged to meet the strict aid criteria of Western aid, neither to achieve specific political and economic policies. Instead, rising donors state their respect for sovereignty of recipient countries and adopt 'not-interfere' attitude. And since most of

emerging donors were once a recipient, it seems they have more familiarity with the problems of developing countries and their needs. Hence it can be said that, what makes rising donors different is that, they are suggesting to recipients a choice as equals (Sato et al. 2010). In other words, instead of conditionality, "horizontal cooperation" which is based on the values of equality, partnership and mutual interest takes place at emerging donors' aid agenda (ibid.).

Non-DAC donors are not easy to analyze due to lack of information about how they formulate their aid strategies, and establish their bilateral institutions with recipients (Dreher et al. 2013). When particular attention is paid to the aid operations of emerging donors, one can observe that they have not yet established collective institutions among themselves for self-restrict instead each of countries has developed their own ways of aid delivery (Sato et al. 2010). Thus, the lack of DAC-like institutions to restrain themselves results in considerable level of independence for emerging donors to chase their national interests in aid allocation process (ibid.). The restrictive institutions, strict rules, and regulations of current DAC consensus, on the contrary, can be harmful for recipients since traditional donors restrict use of massive tied loans for the sake of their own economic advantage (Brautigam 2009). Another reason why emerging donors differ from traditional ones is their rejection of the conventional hierarchical donor–recipient metaphor, which emphasizes unequal power relations (ibid.).

Even though there is no a full-scale study of emerging donors, a range of opinions has already been put forth. Startled by the increasing participation of new aid providers, many observers and researchers have seemed to focus seriously on their activity in the global foreign aid landscape. Some scholars accuse new aid providers with delivering "rouge aid" and "undermining the merit-based aid allocation" regime that has established by traditional donors (Dreher et al. 2011). Moreover, new aid providers' obvious aid allocation preference of putting first their own national interests and foreign policy agenda, seemingly bother DAC consensus. In this sense, emerging donors are located as "challengers" or even "threats" to the international "aid market" dominated by the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan (Naim 2007; Sato et al. 2010). In other words, at the "hostile" spectrum, rising donors are blamed for seeking their own narrow political and economic interests for the short-term benefits (Naim 2009). At the "opportunity" end of spectrum, however, emerging donors are considered

as healthy competition providers via rendering possible transnational collaboration between donors (Davies 2010). Furthermore, Kim and Lightfoot (2011) argue that, threat-opportunity dichotomy is not enough to characterize emerging donors as they are becoming much more relevant at international level (ibid.). However, such debates over dichotomy of emerging versus traditional donors seem oversimplification due to rough generalizations that are often limited and biased. Instead, it can be said that there are commonalities and differences between traditional donors and emerging donors, also within emerging donor community. Moreover, in terms of aid effectiveness, rising donors are found comparatively satisfactory. Beside of criticisms, emerging donors also receive support from the developing countries based on the fact that they propose less conditionality with "criteria defined by the recipient countries" and they have more sympathetic attitude towards needs and constraints of recipients (Brautigam 2009). In short, non-DAC donors are starting to become alternatives of traditional donors. According to Woods (2008), this trend is likely to continue as a "silent revolution" underway via developing countries becomes wealthier.


Among those emerging powers, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Mexico, Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, South Chile, Thailand, and the Gulf Countries can be counted as active development partners. Those new players in the aid regime share few common characteristics. They have started to experience economic growth and political stability after long periods of uncertainty (Sucuoglu and Sazak 2016). Moreover, it can be said that emerging donors are also regional powers; hence aid efforts can be counted as a part of soft or hard power policy (ibid.). These powers, as mentioned in the literature above, have recently experienced rapid economic growth and they are willing to increase their market access. Their eagerness in this field also motivates them to become active parties in global politics. In a way, they become important actors in global governance, while at the same time they lead to the recent shifts in the international system. Beside of aforementioned commonalities, those new donors also share numerous principles in terms of aid delivering such as respect of national sovereignty, rejection of hierarchy, non-interference, and pursuit of the common interest (Mawdsley 2012).

It is also essential to give a brief insight about the BRICS since they are considered as the first category of emerging powers (Chaturvedi et al. 2012). Sometimes labeled as

challengers of the traditional workings of global governance (Armijo 2007; Çağaptay 2013; Stephen 2014), or as balancers against them (Narlikar 2013); scholarly opinions varies about the BRICs yet they are important to mention owing to their rapid increase of economic capacity and expanding political, economic and cultural influence. The global power bloc is not a part of the OECD, let alone the DAC. Hence it can be argued that as donors they have less constraint owing to being outside of the DAC-centered international aid architecture to pursue their own political and economic self-interests (Sato et al. 2010; Fuchs and Klann 2013). The member nations are not new to the development cooperation (Kragelund 2008). To illustrate while China is in the aid business since 1950, the date is 1969 for Brazil (Fuchs and Muller 2017). Yet owing to the rapid growth in size and scope of the aid, power bloc's activities have begun to be considered as significant (Woods 2008; Walz and Ramachandran 2011). The BRICS nations undermine the international development cooperation dominated by the U.S. and its allies in Western Europe and Japan via reforms or the establishment of new institutions (Tierney 2014). To elaborate on, through "bilateral aid budgets, the joint construction of new multilateral development organizations, the rejection of aid conditioned on policies and institutions, the focus on aid tied to goods and services from the donor economy", the power bloc members-as emerging donors- challenge the current DAC-centered international aid architecture (Bunte 2012). Moreover it can be said that the BRICS's power comes from the numbers as well. The member nations are among the most populous countries in the world. Those five countries make up over more than 40 percent of the world's population (Globalization Report 2018). Furthermore the BRICS club has started to share around 20% of the global GDP in a short period of time, which makes it a critical economic power bloc. Yet still in terms of economic development, they fall behind compared to advanced industrial countries that may affect their aid motives (Asmus et al. 2017).

As some studies argue, however, the BRICS cannot be categorized as a homogenous group in terms of domestic politics and economics since they have more differences than similarities. To illustrate while India, South Africa and Brazil are democratic regimes; Russia and China have authoritarian governments. Moreover, they can be considered as having cultural and historical diversity.

Table 1: The BRICS Infographics (2018)




Source: World Trade Organization (2018)

When it comes to the BRICS' economy in particular, Brazil depends on agricultural products while Russia is richer in terms of natural resources and both of the countries are commodity exporters. India and China, on the other hand, rely on importing commodities (WTO 2013). The former becomes prominent with its intellectual resources and the latter's defense technology and industrial base make the country powerful (ibid.) While contextually different, the BRICS cooperate with one other for the sake of their foreign policy objectives (Glosny 2010). To put it differently, even though new donors are generally treated as a monolithic group, it is a fact that they have significant diversity within (Sato et al. 2010). Thus, the following sections discuss the current state of BRICS member nations one by one briefly, as examples of emerging

donors, to provide a better understanding on similarities and differences between the group and traditional donors, and within the group itself via reflecting their own unique experiences.

Figure 1: Geopolitical Positions of BRICS Countries (2018)



Source: BRICS Information Platform (2018)

Brazil uses its soft power to pursue more active foreign policy since the new millennium. That soft power came from the democratic reform that achieved after military rule, which has been consolidated through democratic institutions. The term "Brazilian Sphere" was coined to define Brazil's rapid economic growth through Latin American market (Gray and Murphy 2013). Moreover it gradually has become a trustworthy security partner in South America and Africa. Brazil's constant contributions to UN peacekeeping operations since 1947 draw attention in contrast to other emerging powers (De Coning and Prakash 2016). The country also pays attention to environmental issues and comes to forefront for climate change negotiations, which can be interpreted as Brazil's efforts of becoming more influential regional power and

environmental power as a pioneer of green growth (Riethof 2016). From Brazilian perspective, beside of peace efforts and military missions; humanitarian engagements are also crucial in to achieve aforementioned international status. The country's humanitarian response as a non-DAC donor following the 2010 Haiti earthquake reflects Brazil's agenda (Binder et al. 2010). Yet one needs to state that Brazilian efforts fall short in terms of effective humanitarian and developmental aspects of peace-building (Sucuoglu and Sazak 2016). Finally, like other rising actors, the country prioritizes sovereignty and inclusivity for its aid policy.

Russia, whose foreign policy could be defined by opposing the West, is the only global northern member of the BRICS club. During post-Cold War period, the country stayed oppose to unipolar international system. Not only being anti-US dominance but also military support for President Bashar Al-Assad during the Syrian Civil war and the annexation of Crimea put Russia at the center of Western sanctions. Hence, in order to preserve its national sovereignty and eliminate American hegemony, Moscow has prioritized the multilateral international institutions namely the UN, the Security Council and regional organizations such as the BRICS (Hettiarachchi and Abeyrathne 2016). In that sense, Russia's trajectory appears to be economically and politically sustainable for the foreseeable future. Today international opinion on the Kremlin today is divided, the West is broadly hostile on the one hand; particularly the club members India and China friendly on the other.

India is a veteran contributor and has been a devoted provider of military and technical assistance particularly for peacekeeping operations since 1940s (Sucuoglu and Sazak 2016). Moreover the country is also in favor of multilateralism and pluralist international society for the sake of its national sovereignty. As Carothers and Youngs (2011) argues such attitude can be observed also in the other rising powers since they have similar concerns over the intervention in their domestic politics. As a third largest economy of the world India has multifaceted roles in the BRICS club, which are not only political and social but also economic. The country seems to grow in economic importance beside of political one. By 2018, India's rate of development was ranked highest among the BRICS. And in the coming years, the country's regional importance of Asia and of the global system is likely to enable it to enjoy greater economic development as a growth maker for the BRICS club.

China is growing exponentially, similar to India and aims to be a global actor as well as regional one (EDC 2020). The country is considered as an "exception among exceptions" in many ways. By most measures, it is the second largest economy and the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves (Neely 2017). Chinese integration into the world economy leads to a shift in the global economic and political landscapes (Golley and Song 2011). It has been repeatedly noted that China has passed the U.S. and the EU with its fast-growing economy (Stiglitz 2015). Some of the scholars interpret the Asian Giant's rise as a new world downing that ends American decline and changes global hegemony (Ipek 2013). Not only economic positions of China, but also its political advantage as a permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC), categorize the country separately (Glosny 2010). In the same vein, the country's rise as "an authoritarian alternative to liberal order" raises concerns (Carothers and Youngs 2011). Yet, similar to Russia, China prioritizes its foreign policy engagements with multilateral international organizations to succeed its "national policy objectives at the highest level" (Deleanu 2015). Beside its global impact, the growing influence of China is also observable within the BRICS nations (Movchan 2015). Movchan (2015) argues that the dominant role of Chinese economy in the club's trade relations makes the BRICS "more China-with-partners group than a union of equal members."

South Africa is the most recent member of BRIC grouping, since 2010. The roles of South Africa in the BRICS are stated as "to advance our national interests; to promote regional integration and related infrastructure programs and to partner with key players of the South on issues of global governance reforms" by official authorities (Sooklal 2014). The country is also the struggling member because of poverty, unemployment and overall economic condition and lags behind other BRICS nations (Durokifa Anuoluwapo et al. 2018). Yet on the other hand South Africa has introduced new opportunities for the BRICS nations including infrastructure, technological and developmental investments (ibid.). Overall the country is considered as an influential actor in Africa, with the emphasis on the need for creating policies that will provide sustainable development.

When it comes to development cooperation, the BRICS aid differs from traditional aid. Since the member nations of BRICS operate outside of the DAC's regulatory

framework, they are not committed to established set of principles, standards, procedures, and regular peer review that traditional donor countries aligned themselves with (Ben-Artzi 2017). Additionally, the lack of collective institutions within the emerging donors to restrain countries' activities prevents coordinated aid efforts and results in "a certain level of freedom to pursue their own short-term national interests through their aid activities" (Sato et al. 2010). According to Kragelund (2008) the BRICS' tied aid efforts of delivering goods and services through their own donor economy, are in conflict with the established donors. In other words, recipient countries have obligation to buy goods and services from the aid givers (ibid.).

Furthermore, the BRICS aid includes the objective of achieve mutual benefits - instead of poverty eradication - via South-South Cooperation, with the exception of Russia (Mwase and Yang 2012). The authors list numerous features in this regard; one of them is "developing country identity" as a common ground between donors and recipients (ibid.). Secondly aforementioned aid providers locate themselves as "partners" not as "donors" to abolish traditional hierarchical donor-recipient relations (ibid.). Moreover, the absence of political conditionality, and the efforts towards micro-sustainable individual projects -unlike DAC-centered long-run debt sustainability aid model- are part of the BRICS aid (ibid.). As authors put it the BRICS way of aid model could "be traced back to the South-South Cooperation discussions, which emphasize principles of equality, solidarity, and mutual development and complementarity" (ibid.). Non-interference into domestic affairs and the respect for sovereignty in development cooperation are essential principles for emerging donors (Larionova 2016). Such public rejection of conditionality and "providing aid without any strings attached" enable emerging donors to challenge the DAC's dominance (Dreher et al. 2013). In that way they can develop a more active role in international politics.

In the same vein, the BRICS aid enables multilateralism via putting an emphasis on "a non-interventionist, diverse approach that guarantees the rights of state sovereignty" (Mwase and Yang 2012). Additionally, those non-DAC donors highlight their former experience as recipient, which enables them to understand recipients' needs better (Dreher et al. 2011). They can also address global issues such as climate change, peacekeeping etc. to achieve global collective goods (Grimm et al. 2009).

This brief literature review gives some idea of similarities and dissimilarities of the BRICS nations. The growing importance of those rising powers and emerging donors brings about changes both at regional and global levels. The BRICS are particularly active with their policies in order to shape global politics more effectively, to build more sustainable and multipolar international order, to preserve sovereign rights of the state, and to achieve cooperation between members in economic and security affairs. It is the fact that the BRICS do not have a joint foreign aid plan yet (Gu et al. 2016). Because beside of their similarities, the manner in which member nations deliver development cooperation substantially differs within the group "in terms of their growth outlook, the channels through which they were affected by the global recession and their future growth possibilities" (Khalid 2014). Yet, as one of those powers, Turkey stands apart with its humanitarian diplomacy, conflict-mediation, and peace-building efforts. And unlike some other rising powers (such as India), Turkey welcomes being called an "emerging donor" (Meier and Murthy 2011). Such status translated by the Turkish government as being increasingly important, effective, and self-confident regional and global actor (Gul 2008; Binder et al. 2010). That is why, the thesis will continue with particular focus on Turkey's experience as a rising donor and as a humanitarian state in the new aid landscape.


3. TURKEY'S EXPERIENCE WITH FOREIGN AID

As a rising power with enhanced diplomatic and commercial relations, Turkey has undertaken a vital role in the international community with its recent development assistance performance. Over the past years, Turkey's government has presented new aid strategies particularly in the humanitarian field associated with emerging countries. According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2017, Turkey is ranked as the world's second-largest humanitarian donor after the US and as the most generous country relative to its gross national income (GNI). Being a former aid recipient country, Turkey's development assistance journey goes back to the late 1940s. As of today, Turkey has transformed itself into an active aid provider, and eventually gained a seat in DAC meetings. It is quite true that Turkey has been delivering foreign aid since the mid-1980s. But Turkish trajectory has changed dramatically when the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) came to power in 2002. After that, Turkey started to become one of the major donors of global aid regime. As 2017 ODA yearly report shows, the country provided more than \$8 billion in development assistance, which hits more than \$9 billion as total development assistance when private flows are also included. Moreover, for the last three year, Turkey is the most generous donor country in official emergency and humanitarian aid. Despite of being OECD member and being voluntary reporter of OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Turkey's characteristics of development assistance differ essentially from traditional donors' and other emerging donors' aid practices. Hence as an emerging donor at the forefront of international community, Turkey's development assistance efforts based on a humanitarian approach is crucial to pay attention.

When particular attention is paid to development efforts it can be stated that in recent years, Turkey has been drawing attention with its increasing participation as an emerging donor. Turkey became an aid provider around the mid-1980s, yet volume of

the aid started to become crucial with the AKP. Since then, Turkey has become a major donor in the international aid architecture. From 2002 to 2017, aid volumes rose from \$85 million to \$8.1 billion. Turkish development aid exceeded most of traditional donors' contribution.

Table 2: Turkey's Official International Aid (2003-2017; Million Dollars)



Source: TIKA (2018)

The reorientation of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP can be counted as one of the factors behind the country's new position as an aid provider. According to this new position, foreign aid has become a soft power tool to expand Turkey's influence over the region and to strengthen the country as a global actor. In line with that, as Hasimi (2014) puts it: "Rather than disputing or rejecting the relationship, Turkey has claimed

to relocate the connection between politics and aid activities in a way that allows the relationship to become part of the discussion in forming a responsive new international order." With AKP governments in the office, Turkey turned into a unique aid donor as an emerging power and as a humanitarian state. It can be also argued that the country became one of the key global humanitarian actors of world politics. Before going into further details, the study will give a brief overview of the Turkish foreign policy transformation.

3.1. Turkish Foreign Policy

In order to analyze the factors behind Turkey's new position as an aid provider, the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy is important to understand. To begin with, the strategic partnership with the U.S. and shared interests with Europe have played a vital role in shaping Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War years (Çağaptay 2013). Particularly after the World War II, the country was one of the Marshall Plan nations, which was an American economic assistance package that delivered to rebuild war-torn regions and to prevent spread of Communism (Lancaster 2007). Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. and Turkey established stronger relations with agreements and partnerships, namely the Bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement or Enhanced Partnership (Isyar 2005). During that period, Turkey also became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and took sides with the Western Bloc, which stayed as the main organization that connects the country with the Western security system (Hale 2000).

Along with the close relations with the United States, it can be claimed that the European Union (EU) accession process has also constituted another important pillar of Turkish foreign policy. With the Ankara Association Agreement in 1963, Turkey's membership process began and continued for decades with ups and downs (Hursoy 2017). In 1987 Ozal government applied for full membership to European Economic Committee (EEC-renamed as EU after 1993), however that request was not accepted since Turkey did not seem to be ready to fulfill obligations of membership (Tocci

2011). By the end of the Cold War era and the bipolar international order, Turkey became more independent in its foreign policy and new alternatives emerged through historical and cultural ties with surrounding states in its region (Dal 2014). During that period Turkey built close cooperations with newly independent Turkic nations in the Caucasus and Central Asia in order to support their independence and to integrate them into the global system (Ametbek and Amirbek 2014). Turkey's EU journey continued with The Customs Union, which came into force on 1995. Nonetheless, Turkey was rejected again for the next enlargement and did not receive a candidate status due to some domestic and international problems. During the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey achieved to become a candidate country; and the pre-accession process for full membership started in line with the Copenhagen Criteria, which defines political, economic and legal conditions of eligibility to become a member country. Hence it can be argued that in the end of 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey was occupied with the European Union reform efforts. Yet in recent years, due to the major changes in both domestic and international politics, the country has been distancing itself from the European norms and becoming more and more authoritarian, thus risking full accession.

In its relations with the neighbors, as another crucial issue of Turkish foreign policy, the country was reluctant to engage in regional conflicts and has pursued cooperation and peace (Bayer and Keyman 2012). Yet, as a result of changes in the international structure at both global and regional levels, the edges of Turkish foreign policy are shaped through the new geopolitical approach where the country broke from the Western political order and started to engage more actively in regional and global affairs (Meral and Paris 2000). Especially with the AKP's coming to power, Turkey's foreign policy formation axis shifted from West, instead the country has increased its regional engagements (Altunisik 2011). Owing to its economic growth and relative political stability, Turkey has started to pursue a more assertive foreign policy since the early 2000s (Keyman and Sazak 2014). Beside of its successful domestic performance, Turkey also emerged as an important regional actor and had influence over international events particularly with respect to Middle East and North Africa (Meral and Paris 2010). With then-foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and his doctrines, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to develop a multivector foreign policy, which included strategic, multi-dimensional, and humanitarian oriented foreign policy (Murphy and Sazak 2012). In line with those developments, the country started to pay special attention to its

historical, cultural, and religious ties as well as the shared values with the neighboring region. During the Arab Spring and the Refugee Crisis stemming from the ongoing Syrian civil war, for example, Turkey emerged as an important regional actor that has a say in the events. As an extension of these policies, the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy in a more proactive way under the AKP can be counted as one of the factors behind Turkey's rising development cooperation activities and humanitarianism (Murphy and Sazak 2012). In that way, foreign aid has become a political tool for Turkey to restore peace and security and to expand influence in its region. Many scholars agree that Turkey's broader regional engagements and distancing itself from the West can be interpreted as the country's aim of becoming more influential in global and regional politics. As Woods (2008) claims emerging powers like Turkey, tend to combine their economic growth with an assertive foreign policy hence they are more likely to engage in development cooperation. In this regard Turkey's rising power role strengthens its humanitarian approach. Before dwelling on this subject, looking at the brief history of Turkey's practice of development cooperation seems important.

3.2. Historical Context for Turkey's Development Cooperation Efforts

In order to provide a better understanding on the Turkish case, Akçay's (2012) division of Turkey's development assistance history would be beneficial to use. According to his separation in the first period between 1923 and 1992, Turkey was only an aid recipient when diplomats or bureaucrats put personal efforts in the matter of development cooperation without pursuing strategic foreign policy objectives (ibid.). During the second period between 1992 and 1999, with the establishment of TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), the country aimed at providing development assistance as well as technical support for infrastructure for the newly independent Turkic nations (ibid.). As of the last period, from 1999 to the present time, Turkey began to use foreign aid effectively as a soft power tool particularly after AKP came to power (ibid.). In line with that Hasimi (2014) argues that Turkey's development assistance activities, both as a recipient and as a donor, presents a direct link between country's economic growth and political stability as well as its self-defined role in

international politics.

Turkey was one of the aid recipient countries during the late 1940s. After the end of the WWII with the declaration of the Truman Doctrine by the United States, Turkey started to receive aid (\$150 million) in the context of the Marshall Plan, along with Greece (Fidan and Nurdun 2008). Owing to such development assistance, economic growth process had a positive trend in Turkey during 1950s (Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun 2010). The aid package was motivated by the foreign policy concerns of the USA that aimed to support the Western Block of Europe in post-war period. Apart from the US, Japan and Germany were also main aid providers to Turkey. Besides those countries, Turkey's development process was also funded by numerous multilateral international institutions; namely Asian Development Fund (ADF), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) with the channel of aid delivery (Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun 2010).

Even though Turkey continued to be an aid recipient during this period, the country launched the first official phase of its own official foreign aid program in 1985 with Turgut Ozal's support through State Planning Organization. Ozal's government had tripartite foreign policy objectives. While bolstering Turkey's economic strength by integrating into the world economy, Ozal's government wanted to endorse a more confident image via using development assistance as a foreign policy instrument to boost trade and soft power relations in developing countries (Murphy and Sazak 2012). In accordance with that foreign policy orientation, a comprehensive aid package (\$10 million) was implemented in 1985 to develop institutional capacity of Sahel countries namely Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somali, and Sudan (Birtek 1996). During the latter part of the 80s, Turkey benefited from an economic growth owing to export-oriented growth strategy. Hence it can be said that Ozal's foreign policy goals were met through country's economic growth, increased influence over the region via its soft power on the one hand, while such development cooperation efforts enhanced a positive image around the globe on the other.

Other main power against the United States was the Soviet Russia; hence bipolar system deriving from different ideological stances was taken place on the international stage. In such an environment, Turkey chose to align with pro-Western regimes. Its foreign policy orientation could be observed with its membership to the OECD in 1948

to the Council of Europe in 1949, and to NATO in 1952. In the context of the Cold War, Davutoglu (2001) argues that realist foreign policy choice was inevitable for Turkey through "politics of balancing the near threat by means of collaborating with the rising axis" (ibid.). Yet with the collapse of the USSR and dissolution of the bipolar power structure, a new international order had begun. Under those new conditions, Turkey took a maneuver through historical and cultural ties with states in its surrounding region (Altunışık 2009).

By the early 90s, the changes in the international system through the collapse of the Soviet Union and conflicts that tore the Balkans apart; put Turkey into a different phase of foreign policy strategy which is development assistance. As a former recipient, the country advanced its interests in the changing international environment owing to its geopolitical position and enhanced its international image via assisting the region in order to promote state security and economic stability (Murphy and Sazak 2012). Turkey also benefited from the historical legacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire and reestablished its relationships in the Central Asia and the Caucasus (Hale 2000). In the light of these developments, official development assistance had become a strategy for Turkey's foreign policy. Hence the country turned the dismantling of the former Soviet Union into an advantage and reconnected with the region through its strong historical, cultural, and linguistic ties (ibid.). As Hale argues:

"Turkey is the only state, apart from Russia, with territory in both Europe and Asia, and is affected by and affects international politics in both south-eastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, in Transcaucasia and the southern regions of the former Soviet Union, and in the northern part of the Middle East. Historically, Turkey's most strategically significant asset has been its control of the straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, on which Russia had depended for direct maritime access to the Mediterranean, and the only route through which Britain, France and later the United States could challenge Russia in the Black Sea (or try to assist it during the First World War)" (ibid.).

Thus, during Ozal's premiership, Turkey revised its foreign policy interests as he put it in 1992 "The next century will be a Turkish century." Being a Muslim majority country with a secular and democratic rule, having special relations with the West, and promoting market economy; owing to these features Turkey was depicted as a role

model for other Muslim and Turkic speaking countries that it connected with religious and ethnic bonds (Winrow 2000). Considering these developments, the country began to cooperate with the newly independent Turkic republics via using various forms of assistance; including telecommunication services, scholarship for students, and training courses for diplomats and businessmen etc. to promote its presence (Dal 2014).

To conclude, as an emerging power and emerging donor, most important motives of Turkish foreign policy were to improve country's international image, to reattach to its Ottoman past through emphasizing shared political and sociocultural ties, and to foster the expansion of foreign trade with secured alliances by using development assistance as a significant foreign policy tool (Celik 1999). In other words, Turkey has reoriented its foreign policy in line with the development cooperation efforts as the result of a combination of aforementioned changes. Thus, as an official channel of state aid, TIKA deserves more attention.

3.3. Establishment of TIKA

Turkey begun its first development cooperation efforts under the supervision of the State Planning Organization (SPO) to Eurasian countries and prioritized their immediate needs during their post-Soviet transformation, until the establishment of TIKA. With the changes in the international system and Turkey's foreign policy objectives as such, TIKA was founded in 1992 to administer aid through an official state sponsored agency. In that way, Turkey's development cooperation policy became better coordinated under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). And since 2005, the agency became the Turkish government's official channel of state aid that controlled through the Office of the Prime Minister. Initially formed to coordinate development assistance efforts in Central Asia and Caucasia for enhancing cooperation in a wide range of areas such as diplomacy, economy, and socio-culture; the organization turned into one of the important soft power tools of the government. According to Law No. 4688, TIKA's duties can be listed as follows;

- i. developing economic, commercial, technical, social, cultural, and educational relationships between Turkey and developing countries;
- ii. organizing projects and programs that may help to the development of developing countries;
- iii. giving technical assistance for personnel and students of these countries through providing training and internship opportunities;
- iv. performing educational and cultural cooperation programs in the foreign countries;
- v. ensuring the necessary cooperation and coordination with regard to the main services and duties (TIKA Report 2008).

In other words, the agency defines its main role as "a significant instrument that allows new avenues for classical diplomacy in economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian fields." (ibid.) During the 1990s TIKA delivered technical support for infrastructural development and conducted projects in health, agricultural development, finance, tourism sectors (ibid.). In that way, Turkey became the first country to shoulder the burden for the Eurasian countries (Fidan and Nurdun 2008).

Table 3: Turkey's ODA towards Central Asia (1992-2001; Million Dollars)

Recipient/ USD Million	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Kazakhstan	215.719	3.087	3.147	54.094	48.048	4.675	4.662	3.289	1.646	1.340
Kyrgyzstan	25.901	53.995	7.234	4.188	7.088	3.716	7.247	2.057	2.084	1.543
Tajikistan	3.488	249	592	250	285	695	348	157	265	320
Turkmenistan	94.570	11.792	6.076	5.665	6.158	8.252	6.435	1.914	2.637	1.449
Uzbekistan	754.706	11.013	2.711	2.268	44.193	2.733	3.288	927	276	360

Source: Nükrettin Parlak, Orta Asya-Kafkasya-Balkan Ülkeleriyle İlişkiler ve Türk Dış Yardımları (1992-2003), (Ankara, TİKA, 2007)

Throughout this decade, the country spent \$3.75 billion on its development cooperation efforts. When it comes to the recipients; Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were the main countries of TIKA's activities (Parlak 2007). Despite all expectations, through this initial phase Turkish assistance activities stayed limited and insufficient due to lack of coordination (Akçay 2012). TIKA was also in charge of Turkey's foreign aid measurements based on to OECD's DAC criteria. Yet there was no standardized method to calculate Turkey's foreign aid statistics (Ozkan 2011). Furthermore SPO was only counting in bilateral aid activities, which excluded other types of assistance such as humanitarian aid. In other words, due to miscalculations and the lack of coordination, it was not possible to estimate the total amount of Turkey's foreign aid properly at that period (ibid.).

Regardless of its activities, the agency did not considered successful new donor in the international aid community since there were numerous obstacles that Turkey faced. Throughout the 1990s, as Mutlu (2012) claims, Turkey has insufficient resources to effectively carry out foreign aid activities. Furthermore, the country's terror problem one the hand and its political instability on the other hand were exhausting (ibid.). When it comes to the global environment, Turkey's geopolitical position was left it with ethnic and national conflict in post-Soviet period. Also it can be claimed that Turkish authorities overestimated the country's capacity to influence that region (ibid.). Overall, as a new aid facilitator, Turkey's performance was not satisfactory.

With the new millennium, the parameters of Turkish foreign policy have been redefined and became more proactive and multidimensional, as mentioned elsewhere in this study, which led to a significant change in the country's development policy orientation. To facilitate this transformation, TIKA broadened its scope and tripled its Program Coordination Offices abroad (TIKA n.d.). The agency started to operate more independently with a structural change under the Prime Ministry, instead of the MFA (Denizhan 2010). Moreover, TIKA's aid allocation axis also shifted from Central Asia-center to a broader level (Apaydin 2012). Currently, the agency operates in 150 countries through 61 Programme Coordination Offices located in 59 countries across 5 continents (TIKA n.d.)

The evolution of TİKA to a modern development agency, beside of its modifications for bringing into line with the global aid community has formed the basis for the accomplishment of Turkish aid policy in the 21st century. Beside of TİKA, other foreign aid apparatus of Turkey can be counted as AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Authority), Office of Public Diplomacy (KDK), Türk Kızılayı (Turkish Red Crescent), and Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs). These state institutions are mainly supporters to help the shape the Turkish foreign aid narrative.

After the collapse of the USSR and dissolution of the bipolar power structure, a new international order had begun. Under those new conditions, Turkey took a maneuver through historical and cultural ties with states in its surrounding region (Altunışık 2009). On the other hand, it is fair to claim that Turkey was still taking side with the West after the end of Cold War. Hale (2000) argues that it can be observed through NATO as staying the main organization for Turkey to position itself with Western security system in the post-Cold War era (ibid.). Another sign was that, Turkey established its aid program in the 1990s to support newly independent Turkic nations. Furthermore, there was a progress in the context of Turkey-EU relations as well via the Custom Union (1995). Thus, when these developments are taken into consideration, it can be said that at the turn of new millennium, Turkey was mainly preoccupied with Western oriented foreign policy efforts and was an effective regional power. The new millennium, however, have changed the trajectory of Turkey in an irreversible way.

3.4. Turkish Foreign Aid under the AKP Era

Since the early 2000s, there appears to be a consensus on dramatic changes that occurred in Turkey's policy dynamics as a result of domestic and global conditions. When particular attention is paid to the international order, significant changes were taking place. 9/11 terrorist attacks then the Arab Uprising, which are described by Aras (2013) as "tectonic shifts in the international order", made the global context more security and democracy prone (ibid.). Along with the Syrian Civil War, Turkey has correspondingly re-arranged its foreign policy in a more assertive way with the AKP's coming to power (ibid.). As Murphy and Sazak (2012) state, there are numerous

operational purposes behind AKP's ideological basis for the foreign affairs; namely a balance between security and freedom, "zero problem with Turkey's neighbors," proactive peace diplomacy, strong global relations, active involvement in international issues, and cooperation with all international organizations. As for the domestic dynamics, the AKP- as a single party government with parliamentary majority that won successive elections local and nationally, brought relative stability to Turkey that set the stage for the country's rising role in global politics. Along with the political stability, the country's economic performance appeared impressive in the aftermath of the Eurozone financial crisis and Arab uprisings (Çagaptay 2014).

With the AKP's presence in the office, Turkish foreign aid policy has become one of the most prominent foreign policy activities. The new decision makers in the office with varying foreign policy preferences have affected the narrative of Turkish politics, including aid allocation. The systematic and structural change in Turkey's development cooperation efforts started right before AKP and with the establishment of TIKA, yet accelerated when the party won 2002 elections. The party's four elections success through country's economic stability and placing religion at more center in public life made the government more powerful (Muftuler- Baç and Keyman, 2012). Hence such changes of Turkey's domestic dynamics during that period have also affected the foreign policy. In accordance, with the new millennium, Turkish foreign aid policy were no longer limited to post-Soviet countries, and the government began to strategically pursue development of sociocultural and religious ties within the Balkans, Black Sea, Middle East and North African countries or region, Asia, Latin America and the Sub-Saharan African countries (ibid.).

According to Bayer and Keyman (2012) AKP governments in their office times, have been politically active, compared to predecessors. With ons and offs, it can still be said that Turkey established better relations with its neighbors between 2002 and 2010, partly owing to "zero problems with neighbors" policy (Ozel and Ozcan 2011). Back in that time period, with great contribution of Davutoglu (2008) Turkish foreign policy gained momentum with the combination of "balance between freedom and security", "zero problems with the neighbors", and "rhythmic diplomacy". In the light of these developments, the scope of TIKA started to develop wide-ranging projects from cultural sphere to capacity buildings in recipient countries. During 2013, TIKA has become an

agency with its "35 offices in 32 countries and operated in 110 countries" with almost tripled budget (TIKA 2014). Furthermore in recent years, Turkish cultural heritage has also turn to a foreign policy tool to build bridges in the region. It can be argued that cultural products, particularly Turkish television series have become beneficial for Turkey's prestige in the Arab World (ibid.). As another cultural development, Kardas (2013) claims that Turkish leaders visit to Africa, Asia, and Latin America for the sake of new strategic partnerships are crucial to pay attention (p.3). As Keyman (2012) argues, "Turkey has no choice but to be innovative and active as a policy leader and globalization visionary." As a result, Turkey has begun to undertake one of the most generous donors position, which shows its ambition to stay as a crucial emerging power in the international system.


Along with cultural and diplomatic developments; the adoption of a proactive, multifaceted and humanitarian foreign policy has become a significant policy tool of Turkey since AKP came to power, as Keyman (2012) refers it as a "unique brand of internationalism". He continues as: "new Turkish globalism is not simply an act of augmenting its power and influence or of revitalizing its Ottoman past to extend the sphere of its regional influence; on the contrary, it demonstrates its deep commitment to multilateralism and to enhanced cooperation as a way of making our world stable and peaceful." Hence Turkey was trying to overcome both regional and international difficulties with its humanitarian diplomacy (Davutoglu 2013). According to Davutoglu: "Our idea is for Turkey to be a compassionate and powerful state" (ibid.). To that end, Turkey has been increased its humanitarian aid activity and with a systematic focus on LDCs (Least Developed Countries) in the last decade. And as 2011, Turkey's development assistance to LDCs has exceeded \$250 billion for the first time (TIKA 2014). The "open door policy" towards Syrians who were victims of Syrian Civil war is also another noteworthy example of Turkey's humanitarian discourse. As Gabiam (2016) puts it, particularly that crisis played crucial role in Turkish humanitarian diplomacy through being host to more than 2 million refugees. Hence the combination of key foreign policy tools introduced by Davutoglu has been reflected on TIKAs activities. In that way, a new era in Turkey's official development assistance began, which will be analyzed in detail in the next section with a focus on allocation of ODA.

3.5. Turkey's Aid Allocation

Turkey's development cooperation efforts began to be significant during post-Cold War period. As a result of a need for institutionalization of that time period, TIKA was established in 1992. When particular attention is paid to the institutional analysis of Turkey's aid allocation, TIKA is still the main institution of aid delivery. The agency is a channel of coordinating and monitoring Turkey's ODA, hence it does not have decision-making authority (Murphy and Sazak 2012). With the AKP's rule, the agency's activities started to regard as a success, owing to its overseas expansions (particularly towards Africa) and structural changes in line with the global aid community (Ozkan 2010). TIKA started to operate more independently with a structural change under the Prime Ministry, instead of the MFA after 2005 (Denizhan 2010). Yet with the July 2018 decision, as it is stated by the agency itself, TIKA is "a public legal entity and a private budget and it carries out its activities" and on the governmental level under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (TIKA n.d.).

Headquarter of the agency is located at Ankara. Furthermore, TIKA broadened its scope and tripled its Program Coordination Offices abroad (TIKA n.d.). While the number was 12 in 2002, currently the agency operates in 150 countries through 61 Programme Coordination Offices located in 59 countries across 5 continents (ibid.). Turkey's ODA is broad in its geographical scope. On the regional basis, Turkish aid is allocated particularly to the Middle East, the North Africa, and South and Central Asia; and increases through the Balkan region (OECD. Stat 2018). In 2017, the Middle East has received a total amount of US\$ 7,324.82 billion while Africa has received US\$ 296,63 million, which followed by Europe with US\$ 226,88, and South and Central Asia with US\$ 127,41 (TIKA 2017). As recipient countries, Syria, Somalia, Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Pakistan, and Kosova are at the forefront (TIKA 2017).

Figure 2: Turkey's Bilateral Most Official Development Assistance by Country (2017; Million Dollars)




Source: TIKA (2018)

When it comes to income groups, Turkey is concentrated on to lower-middle income countries (75.6%) and upper-middle income countries (10.6%), followed by least-developed countries (7.5%) (TIKA 2014b). In 2017, The LDCs that most benefiting from the Bilateral Assistance of Turkey are Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Niger, Sudan, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Djibouti, and Uganda (TIKA 2017). Taken together, according to TIKA's annual reports, Turkey's aid volumes rose from 67 millions USD to 2.53 billion USD, from 2003 to 2012. Above statistics give a brief overview on Turkey's ODA allocation in numbers.

Apart from TIKA, there are other crucial actors for Turkish practice of development cooperation such as other state institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector organizations (OECD n.d.). The agency works in coordination with those foreign aid apparatuses, namely Ministries of Development, Interior and Justice; AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Authority), Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs), Office of Public Diplomacy (KDK), the Turkish Red Crescent (KIZILAY), Cansuyu Charity and Solidarity Foundation, IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation), Yeryüzü Doktorları (Doctors Worldwide), the Hasene Foundation, DUNYEV (the Foundation for World Orphans), the Beşir Foundation, Dost Eli

Foundation, Gulistan Foundation, Turgut Ozal Schools, Sema Foundation, the Nile Foundation, and Yardımelı Derneđi (the Helping Hands Foundation).

Figure 3: Turkey's Official Development Assistance (2003-2012; Million Dollars)




Source: TİKA (2013)

Moreover, TİKA is funded through "a central budget; project based special funds appropriated by the Prime Ministry; funds received on behalf of other governmental institutions and; those received through international commitments" (Murphy and Sazak 2012). As a statistical data on TİKA's aid allocation, as can be seen in the figure below, the number of projects and programs were increased significantly throughout the 2000s (Kardas and Erdag 2012). While TİKA conducted 360 projects in 2002, this number reached five times of it in 2012 and became 1879. Today TİKA carries out tens of thousands projects in many fields such as technical assistance, health, restoration, agricultural development, industry, finance, capacity increase, and tourism (TİKA, n.d.). Social Infrastructure and Services (education, health, water and sanitation etc.) constituted 65.4% Turkey's sectorial distribution of aid allocation while the percentage is 24,3% for economic infrastructure and services (transport and storage, improving communication infrastructure, energy etc.) and 7% for multisector activities (TİKA 2016). More specifically, in terms of sectorial distribution of assistance, Turkey prioritizes projects and services on health, cultural cooperation and restoration,

strengthening of educational infrastructure, agriculture, and urgent humanitarian aid (TIKA 2014a).

Figure 4: The Number of Projects Implemented by TIK A (2002-2012)



Source: TIK A (2013)

Turkey's development assistance is not only limited to ODA. Different forms of aid such as direct investments, acute humanitarian efforts, technical support, and NGOs flows are also included in Turkey's aid programs. Furthermore, when it comes to deliver aid packages, Turkey mostly prefer bilateral channels. Turkey's choice in that sense makes sense due to the fact to increase the aid effectiveness and to provide tangible results. On the other hand, Turkey is skeptical about nation building. Keyman and Sazak argue that, it does not impose its political culture, or national security interests, on the recipient countries as a result of an ethics-based foreign policy and humanitarian diplomacy that rejects state-centric realpolitik and external interference in domestic affairs (Keyman and Sazak 2015).

Turkey's activism in foreign aid giving has different motives related to cultural, linguistic, and religious aspects established by the country's historical ties with the recipient states; as Apaydin (2012) puts it, an activism based on "historical and imagined kinship ties". The country is in a strategic position to reach the developing part of the world through using its Ottoman past; via religious and cultural affinity to the MENA region, via linguistic affinity to Central Asia, and via cultural affinity to the Balkans. And for the rest of the recipients, the Turkish foreign aid model highlights its

humanitarian approach and its non-colonial past, as in the case of Sub-Saharan African and Latin American region. To analyze more in detail, after the Cold War Turkish government developed certain policies towards Central Asia and Caucasia. Back in time, the Turkish motives were to renew its relationship with newly independent Turkic states, to strengthen its security through those new allies, and to increase its economic activity via cooperating with the resource-rich countries (Denizhan 2010; Çelik, 1999). To that end, the official state aid delivery channel TİKA has gone through major changes and became more compatible with different geographical settings (Apaydın 2012). Moreover during AKP's rule, Turkish foreign policy reoriented strategically through overseas expansion, which can be seen in the case of "opening to Africa" (Hasimi 2014). In that way, the former Ottoman territories in African region, such as Egypt, Somalia, Tunisia Libya, Algeria, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Djibouti are included in aid programs (Ozkan 2010). According to Keyman (2012), "new Turkish globalism is not simply an act of augmenting its power and influence or of revitalizing its Ottoman past to extend the sphere of its regional influence; on the contrary, it demonstrates its deep commitment to multilateralism and to enhanced cooperation as a way of making our world stable and peaceful."

Another motivation behind Turkish aid allocation is related to religious proximity and Islamist ideology (Kavakli 2018). What differs AKP from its predecessors is the Islamist traditional root it has. According to such tradition, the emphasis is needed to be on Muslim community (ummah-ümmetçilik) as opposed to Turkish nationalism (kavmiyetçilik) (Aktürk 2012). The idea of ummah includes all different branches of Islam. Erdogan states that inclusiveness in his speech:

"The AKP is not just Turkey's party, but a world party. [...] From Mogadishu to Sarajevo, from Damascus to Skopje, from Sanaa to Bishkek, from Abu Dhabi to Islamabad, from Gaza to Benghazi, from Pristina to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus - wherever there is a victim in the world, the AKP is at its side. [...] This is the kind of party we are."

The Islamic root of the AKP's ideology, combined with the support it has received from other Muslim nations in the region, as Kavakli (2018) argues, results in Muslim countries receive more Turkish foreign aid. A former U.S. diplomat Peter Galbraith

states "Turkey used to identify itself as a nationalist Kemalist regime; today it is Sunni... With the AKP, being a Sunni has become the common denominator and the AKP chose to emphasize this identity" (Basaran 2012). Thus, religious identity matters for rising donor Turkey in the context of humanitarian aid, which makes it different from traditional donors (Kavakli 2018). Thus, aid allocation is not merely result of generosity and/or altruism; which can be observed in the Turkish context where humanitarian components of total aid seem to be distributed with populist motives since it is newsworthy and easily catch public attention (ibid.). What is more, prioritizing fragility and conflict for aid allocation with humanitarian commitments makes Turkey different amongst emerging donor community (Keyman and Sazak 2014).

It is also important to pay attention to the increasing role of economic factors in Turkish foreign aid policy. The volume of Turkey's foreign trade has grown "from 23% of its gross domestic product (GDP) in 1995 to almost 40% by 2005", which led to domestic interest groups who rely on trade ties to become more powerful (Kirisci 2009). As Kirişçi states, during pre-AKP era, Turkey's foreign policy decisions were mainly driven by security concerns. Nonetheless, post-AKP era made Turkey more of a "trading state" whose one of the main targets became pursuing markets and economic benefits (Kirisci and Kaptanoglu 2011). In that way, Turkey, as an emerging donor, has become more similar to traditional donors in regard to its foreign aid allocation policies through prioritizing its trade partners (Kavakli 2018). As mentioned above, Turkey's development aid policy has transformed during the AKP era. The party's expansionist approach has reflected and sustained by steady state economy. Turkey's per capita income increased from USD 8,630 to USD 18,190 and GDP from USD 232 billion to USD 789 billion within the first decade of the AKP (World Bank 2013). Such massive shift made Turkey the largest economy in the Middle East in terms of total GDP. Economic growth as well, increased Turkey's confidence as an emerging donor.

From regional engagement of the 1980s and 1990s, Turkish development aid efforts has become a more multidimensional process via including international mediation, state-building, peacemaking, and humanitarianism. This has been developed in parallel with new foreign policy activities that emphasize both mediation and enhanced economic ties as potential peace building strategies that are of mutual benefit to both Turkey and recipient states (Sucuoglu and Sazak 2016). As a part of development assistance efforts;


a vast range of activities were made including development projects, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations, infrastructure projects, health care and education services, job creation, sector reform, and institutional capacity building projects etc. (ibid.) Such approach to development aid made Turkey an emerging power with unique characteristics in the international aid regime.

The above discussion gives a good insight on Turkey's aid allocation principles. Turkey has sped up their development cooperation efforts as a rising donor. To summarize Turkey stresses its cultural, historical and also religious ties with the partner countries if possible, and humanitarian-sensitive generosity if not. Besides, by following proactive manners in the international arena, the country combines its increasing economic activities with an active foreign policy (Chin and Quadir 2013). Within this context, development assistance is one of the areas that Turkey actively engages in with humanitarian aspirations. In the following section, 'Turkish way' of humanitarianism will be focused.

3.6. Turkey as a Humanitarian State

Turkey has traditionally been a country undertaking important role in humanitarian aid, lending a helping hand to those in need. Beside of development cooperation efforts, the country has growing humanitarian engagement with regions and peoples in crisis over the past decades. According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2018, Turkey is the world's second largest humanitarian government contributor and the world's most generous nation (compared to its GNI) via providing over \$8 billion worth of developmental and humanitarian support. Turkish government's efforts not only has expanded across countries, but also varied in terms of types of activities. By doing so, Turkey has been introducing new methodologies and practices for humanitarian activism around the world. In line with that, it can be argued that the country uses humanitarianism to build its "national brand".

Figure 5: 20 contributors of largest amounts of humanitarian assistance (2017; Million Dollars)



Source: Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2018

The humanitarian assistance landscape has long been dominated by traditional donors of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). With the rising powers coming to the international arena as emerging donors, the course of humanitarianism has begun to change, as well as foreign aid practices. It is the fact that some of those emerging donors are hardly new to humanitarian practices. Yet their contributions have not been included since they do not have a seat in the key international forums. As the diversity of actors become more non-traditional in the field of humanitarian assistance, the substantive nature of humanitarianism and development assistance has begun to change. Emerging powers, like Turkey, have both the capacity and the will to reshape the

international humanitarian system since it fits well with their active diplomatic agendas that aim to increase both regional and global influence through development assistance.

Turkey, as an aspiring emerging power, has become an important actor on the humanitarian scene over the last years. There are numerous domestic and international dynamics that affected Turkey's humanitarianism, which had been taking shape since the end of the Cold War. Following the AKP's electoral victory in 2002, Turkish foreign policy took a new form and became more proactive. During the party's rule, particularly humanitarian aid has become one of the strongest elements in foreign policy. In that way, Turkey begun to act in accordance with its geopolitical position and its acquaintance that goes back to the Ottoman period (Binder 2014). Moreover as mentioned earlier, the concept of "ummah" which is the idea of Muslim community without any borders, became one of the driving force for the AKP's foreign policy (Atalay, 2013). From Central Asia to the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe, such ideational expansionism is reflected to the Turkey's foreign policy through humanitarianism (Binder 2014).

Table 4: Share of government budget (2005-2012; Million Dollars)

Year	Crisis	Budgetary Allocation	Total
2005	Indian Ocean Tsunami	USD 7 Million	USD 51 Million
2005	Kashmir Earthquake	USD 100 Million	USD 175 Million
2010	Pakistan Floods	USD 31 Million	USD 161 Million
2011	Somalia Famine	USD 49 Million	USD 409 Million
2012	Syrian Refugee Crisis	n/a	USD 550 Million

Source: Andrea Binder: The Shape and Sustainability of Turkey's Booming Humanitarian Assistance (2014)


During the first decade of 2000s enabled Turkey's official aid budget to increase dramatically. Especially after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Turkish government launched an initiative called "İstanbul Process" with the aim of providing humanitarian assistance and establishing regional security to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Moreover, Turkey conducted aid operations after the devastating earthquakes in Haiti and Chile in 2010, and in Japan in 2011 (MFA n.d.). At the same time, Turkish NGOs started to be active in countries like Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Iraq, and Egypt during and after their political upheavals to deliver humanitarian aid. By 2013, Turkey gave Philippines and Balkan countries a helping hand after typhoon and floods. Those efforts of humanitarian and development assistance have contributed to Turkey's positive image in the international arena. Driven by the expansionist agenda, the country has reinforced its soft power through humanitarian projects beyond its immediate neighborhood (Binder 2014).

Furthermore, the challenges from the international system have also affected Turkey's trajectory. The post-Arab Spring environment undermined the country's assertive approach yet created new space of opportunity concomitantly. Despite of the modifications, foreign policy objectives of Turkey stayed in line with Davutoglu's (2012) doctrines; "to grant national and regional stability through a balance between security and democracy, to elevate (Turkey's) position as an international power and conducting a pro-active foreign policy agenda, to protect and promoting Turkish economic interests in the world in the face of the changes and challenges of the global economy." The Turkish elite adopted new instruments in country's soft power and adapted humanitarian diplomacy. It is the fact that humanitarian policy was designed and started to be executed before the Arab Spring, yet such attempt by Davutoglu could be interpreted as legitimization efforts of Turkey's involvement in case of any crisis and political instability in its surrounding region (Hasimi 2014). Humanitarian diplomacy has different definitions in the literature. In terms of Turkish understanding, it includes "preservation of universal human rights and respect for the dignity of human life" (Keyman and Sazak 2014). Hence, "humanitarian diplomacy" occurred as a key theme of the Fifth Annual Ambassadors Conference (2013) where Davutoglu stated that the adoption of inclusive, human-centered approach in crisis regions is necessary. According to his perspective, humanitarianism is holistic, multifaceted, and multichanneled. In that way, Turkey adopts humanitarian diplomacy as a powerful foreign policy tool to manage crises within the surrounding regions on the one hand; the country takes responsibility to overcome global problems on the other hand (Davutoglu, 2013). What is more, unlike previous "ummah" understanding, "Islamist internationalism" was embraced for humanitarian engagements without taking religious

affiliations into account (Binder 2014). And over the past years, the Syria crisis accelerated Turkey's rising humanitarian profile since the country bears the burden of the refugee crisis as a number one patron of refugees via hosting more than 3.5 million people.

Figure 6: Distribution of Turkey's Official Emergency and Humanitarian Aids (2005-2017; Million Dollars)




Source: TIKA (2018)

Beside of the international dynamics, there are numerous domestic driving forces for Turkey's humanitarian rise. AKP governments in the office brought relative political stability as well as economic growth, which paved the way for the country's rising humanitarian profile. Moreover, unlike other traditional donors, civil society organizations play a vital role in sustaining humanitarian activity in Turkish politics (Atli 2011). With the AKP and rise of political Islam in Turkey, religious civil-society has become a relevant component of the country (Donelli 2015). In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, another Davutoglu doctrine began to be implemented which is "total performance" (Aras 2012). That principle aims to include all the political and socio-economic groups of the country; from universities to business circles, think tank, NGOs into the foreign policy-making process." (ibid.) Furthermore the Independent

Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD) has been established as an alternative to the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD), which is one of the oldest, secular, and most prominent business groups (ibid.). MUSIAD is known with its lobby activities in Turkish foreign policy regarding economy and humanitarian aid (Yankaya 2009). As a result, there has been an increase in Turkish humanitarian activities in numerous crisis situations of human suffering inflicted by war, natural disasters, or poverty across the globe. In parallel with these developments, Turkey's humanitarian contributions have grown exponentially and the country broadened its humanitarianism via including peace-building, conflict-mediation, and much else, which has turned the country into the leading actors in humanitarian issues

Figure 7: Turkey's Official Development Assistance (2017; Million Dollars)



Source: TIKA 2018

Through adoption of an assertive, multifaceted and humanitarian foreign policy since AKP came to power, cultural and humanitarian diplomacy have become prominent foreign policy instruments of Turkey. The country's success as a humanitarian actor has gained international recognition with the first ever World Humanitarian Summit, which took place in Istanbul in 2016. Turkey conducts humanitarian operations in a variety of countries and towards different ethnic groups, national identities, and religions (TIKA). As of 2018, Turkey's total development assistance hits \$9.3 Billion Dollars with \$7.2 Billion Dollars of official emergency and humanitarian aid (TIKA 2018).

Former Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Somalia in 2011, with the aim of stressing the situation of 12 million Somali victims of drought, has presented a turning point in Turkey's global humanitarian role. With this humanitarian mission of high-profile 200-person delegation, Turkey showed its interest to increase its presence in Somalia (Achilles et al. 2015). The country was suffering from twenty years of political vacuum, civil war, and humanitarian crises. Erdogan was the first leader from outside Africa to visit the country within a 18-year period. In Mogadishu, then-prime minister Erdoğan did not put the blame on the West. Instead he said:

"In fact, the tragedy in Somalia is testing modern values. What we want to emphasize is that contemporary world should successfully pass this test to prove that Western values are not hollow rhetoric. I would like to address conscience of people one by one, I would like to address parents living in the other areas of the world. Please don't forget that rights of your children, who cheerfully pass their time in parks, are also valid for the children here. Mothers and fathers in Somalia are deeply grieving. It is in fact possible to put out this fire. As Turkey, we are not waiting for what the other countries will say."

The visit paved the way for Turkey to use humanitarianism as its "national brand". Afterwards, Turkey's state and non-state institutions begun to mobilize effectively in Somalia as the country became Turkey's model engagement to prove its humanitarian power (Harte 2012). As Davutoglu (2013) states: "Turkey's approach to the Somali crisis is one of the visible examples of Turkey's human-oriented foreign policy".

Turkey has numerous foreign policy goals towards Somalia:

- i. Ending Somalia's international isolation,
- ii. Providing humanitarian aid,

- iii. Rebuilding infrastructure and supporting development projects,
 - iv. Helping to restore security,
 - v. Promoting political consensus and state-building as well as fostering unity.
- (Akpinar 2015)

Turkish government's engagement in Somalia drew the attention due to the involvement of various actors such as state institutions, NGOs, and private sector partners and various modalities such as trade agreements, military aid, and peace-building initiatives etc. Taken together, African Initiative constitutes crucial part of Turkey's development cooperation policy, which will be focused in the next section.

African Opening

In the globalization era, Africa has become a geopolitically competitive region for emerging powers to increase their influence in the international arena, owing to demand for mineral and energy resources as a result of the transformation of the global economy (Korkut and Civelekoglu 2012). In the same vein, while The Economist announced the continent as "hopeless" in 2000, the newspaper designated Africa as "rising continent" in 2011, which is relevant to make sense of foreign aid policies of emerging donors. Within the same year, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that seven of the world's ten fastest-growing economies were in Africa. When it comes to Turkey, the country began to seek commercial interests through alternative export markets for sustainable development in early 2000s (Bayer and Keyman 2012; Apaydin 2012). Furthermore, Turkey had desire to become more autonomous actor and to gain political influence in the international fora. Hence, similar to other rising powers, the parameters of Turkey's foreign policy have been redefined towards Africa in recent years with those motives. In that way, the country started to pursue more proactive development aid policy with political and economic concerns (Kulaklikaya and Nurdun 2010).

Turkey's expansion into Africa began in the late 1990s via the 1998 Africa Action Plan, which aimed to establish closer ties politically, economically, and culturally (Bilgic and Nascimento 2014). The relationship between two countries gained momentum with the AKP's rule. While Turkey has represented by 12 embassies in Africa in 2002, that

number reached 34 within a decade (MFA n.d.-b). Moreover, the AKP announced 2005 as the "year of Africa" and in the same year obtained African Union (AU) observer status. Furthermore, the AU showed goodwill via declaring Turkey as Strategic Partner of the Continent in 2008 (MFA n.d.-b). Also African countries voted in favor of Turkey as non-permanent member at the UN Security Council for the period 2009-2010, as another indication of good relations (Tepebas 2015).

During the first decade of the AKP's rule, trade volume between Turkey and Africa has quadrupled from \$5 billion to \$23.4 billion (Albayrak, 2014). As for the economic partnership, DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey) started to increase its number of Business-Councils with African Countries, as of 2017 this number became 40 (DEIK 2017). Furthermore, TIKA opened new offices across the continent to facilitate its cooperation via development projects such as schools and hospitals constructions, provision of social services (Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun 2010).

There is an ongoing debate about motives of Turkey's opening up to Africa. The country defends its humanitarian engagement, via highlighting its non-colonial past and "kinship" with the Muslim population of the continent (Wheeler 2011). According to Bilgic & Nascimento (2014), Turkish officials intentionally emphasizes Turkey's experience as a recipient, and as an anti-colonial state to use it to receive support from African partners. In line with that, in his speech on African Opening, former minister of foreign affairs Davutoğlu (2011) said that:

"At times when we were able to strengthen our interactions, cultural links, trade connections and political positions, we were triumphant and prosperous. However, when our ties and defenses were weakened due to many reasons including imperialism, colonialism, conflicts, or inner strife, we were both weakened and fell back behind other nations and groupings."

Turkey's growing humanitarian and commercial engagement with Africa can be interpreted as a part of the AKP government's multidimensional foreign policy. Hence Turkey's foreign aid provision includes altruistic as well as strategic reasons. Turkish ambassador to Somalia, Kani Torun summarizes the situation via stating that

"Turkey wanted to expand its influence, as we wanted to improve our bilateral relations with not only Somalia but also with other African countries for mutual benefit. We call this a win-win situation. Somalia is a part of this strategy."

Today, Turkey continues to take an interest in the continent as a humanitarian actor, a peace-builder and a trade partner.

The Turkish Model for Humanitarian Assistance

When it comes to analyze the humanitarian efforts of the country, it can be claimed that over those years, a “Turkish model” of engagement has emerged owing to numerous characteristics. According to Keyman and Sazak, humanitarian state is "rather a strategically crafted concept that demarcates state building and nation building, and it reveres the former over the latter" (2014). One of the attributes of Turkey as a humanitarian state is its human-centered approach and humanitarian diplomacy. Its diplomatic effort to convince international actors for establishment of protected zones for refugees in Syria is an example of this. In parallel with that, the Turkish model is considered to have two basic components: humanitarianism and generosity (TIKA personal communication, 2017). Moreover, Turkey’s human-centered approach differs significantly from other aid campaigns on the ground that it does not seek improving economic or political interests through the aid efforts. Therefore, it is not a calculated action but an initiative that concerns only with the relief of the humanitarian sufferings, which is claimed to be based on addressing the underlying needs of the recipients. In this regard, Turkish model does not interfere into countries’ domestic decision-making processes and only focuses on supporting people’s lives. Another distinctive characteristic of the Turkish model is the close collaboration among government, religious civil society organizations, and faith-based small-to-medium-sized enterprises, in line with Davutoglu's "total performance" doctrine. The Turkish approach is also holistic and diverse which put together business, education, development, and aid with peace-building and politics (Tank 2013). Beyond official state aid there are a number of significant NGOs, including the Turkish Red Crescent, and the Humanitarian Relief Foundation, who also disburse humanitarian assistance. Also, the quick delivery of assistance and programs with Turkish personnel on the ground can be counted as one of the features of Turkey's humanitarian aid model (Sazak and Woods 2017). Turkish aid favors bilateral arrangements. That is because bilateral engagements increase effectiveness in rushing the process and delivering tangible results, as Turkish officials frequently state (Keyman and Sazak 2014). Furthermore, the Turkish government puts

emphasis on Turkey's experience as a recipient. Therefore, Turkey claims to understand the recipient needs without exploiting them and also tries to portray a trustworthy image because of not having been one of the former colonial powers. The latter has become more significant when Turkey started to have several attempts to open up to overseas, especially in Africa. As Bilgic & Nascimento (2014) also emphasized that Turkish government uses anti-colonial discourse in order to receive political support from its African partners. Furthermore, on the ground, Turkish aid is known for its efficiency, its fast delivery methods, its close collaboration with the local population, and its visible results.

Yet, there are also numerous criticisms towards Turkey's development cooperation efforts. Despite being a major foreign aid provider, Turkey does not have a comprehensive strategy and vision for its development cooperation. It mostly funds small and isolated projects; does not attach political or economic conditions to the aid, which could promote long-term change; and pays little attention to aid effectiveness. One of them is related to aid coordination and the lack of communication between key government ministries and agencies including TİKA, ministries of foreign affairs, development, health, and justice (Sucuoglu and Sazak 2016). In line with that, the diversity of aid actors make the Turkish humanitarian assistance landscape complex. Turkey also does not pay attention to nation-building while having some efforts towards state-building. What is more, the lack of institutional training and knowledge of procedures and communication within organizations like TİKA also complicates communication and coordination between the field offices and Ankara. Furthermore, Turkey is also criticized as "being middle of an existential debate over the multilateral versus bilateral approach to effective aid delivery" (Keyman and Sazak 2014). While the country prefers latter one, such aid delivery mechanism makes difficult for Turkey to coordinate its efforts with global community to a healthy degree (ibid.).

Having said that, Turkey's rising power strategy is reachable when Turkey emphasizes its historical aspects that include sharing linguistic, cultural and religious ties, which Turkey combines with its humanitarianism. Therefore, one might argue that the main characteristic of Turkey's foreign aid behavior is shaped by its geographical position, and relatedly its historical ties that enable Turkey to connect many different regions. Turkey's approach towards the developing world constitute cultural, linguistic and

religious aspects established by its geographical advantage, because Turkey's development process is not effective when presented as a global development model. Therefore, Turkey's foreign aid behavior tends to be more region or culture specific if applicable, with an emphasis on humanitarianism.

4. CONCLUSION

It is crucial to comprehend the emerging donor identity to be able to make sense of foreign aid and its provision. Past discussion surrounding new aid providers mainly consist of over-simplified approaches to portray them as pursuing their short-term national interest; unlike traditional donors, which has depicted as of collective self-restraint. However, such generalizations fall short to explain newly emerged donors' motives. To better understand Turkey's expansion on a global scale in terms of development assistance, in this thesis the aim was to focus on the country's aid efforts as an emerging donor. Turkey's humanitarian aid practices are also analyzed as being part of the country's desire to play a greater role internationally as a rising power. Developing its status of humanitarian donor, African Opening supported such perception of a Turkey on the rise. Hence this thesis concerns with evolving of Turkey's humanitarianism.

Emerging powers owe their status to the steady political and economic development that they enjoyed at the twenty-first century owing to the weakening of the Western order. After the Cold War, power vacuum enabled regional actors with relative economic stability and security to assume certain responsibilities of traditional donors. Like most BRICS countries and other rising powers, Turkey also enjoyed the rapid economic growth, relative stability, and an ongoing political transition. As the world shifts to a more multipolar system, Turkey started to use its religious, ethnic, and cultural ties as a part of its soft power policies. During this period, Turkey has raised its profile as a regional actor, an emerging donor, and a humanitarian state. Hence, the thesis focused on development policies of Turkey. The primary reason is that development cooperation is one of the soft political issue areas of international affairs where the country pursues its global strategies. Therefore, foreign aid policy enables Turkey to be in close cooperation with the developing world, and in a way fulfill its

demands of being good global citizens by contributing to the betterment of human lives. Here, it is essential to note that development cooperation should not be considered solely from an altruistic perspective. In this research it is stated that Turkey, as an emerging power, has mixed motives in foreign aid allocation. That is to say, its development policies are not only altruistic in its essence, but also involve some strategic calculations. Moreover, Turkey has been using development cooperation efforts to further its foreign policy goals, to its increase regional power, and to strengthen its commercial ties. Furthermore, it also strengthens Turkey's diplomatic engagements with the developing world. Hence, foreign aid is an important tool for Turkey to realize its emerging power strategies of having a bridging role between the developed and the developing world, as well as of realizing its national interests.

When the AKP period is taken into consideration, Turkish foreign aid policy drew great attention. Having decades of experience as a receiver country of foreign aid, Turkey has turned into an important donor country and more specifically it became a significant humanitarian state. This is the reason why this study starts its analysis with the aim of understanding the underlying mechanism of this remarkable change in Turkish foreign aid policy in the last years. Under the AKP governments, the crucial role of important agencies such as TIKA, Turkish NGOs and the private sector turned development cooperation efforts into essential pillar of Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, Turkey's humanitarian approach to development cooperation is more in line with cultural, linguistic and religious aspects established by Turkey's historical ties with the neighboring regions. Turkey has increased its visibility and reputation in the international arena as well as in the international organizations. Therefore, Turkey has turned into a country, which uses its capabilities of conducting regional policies while engaging in global issues simultaneously as leverage for the first time in Turkish politics. The most prominent example of this change is seen when Turkey announced 2005 as "The Year of Africa" and implemented several foreign aid projects in the continent, which in turn helped Turkey to ask for the support of the African countries in its attempts for becoming a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. What makes Turkey's approach more region-specific and culture-specific is its geopolitical position that combines many different regions from the developing world together with its Ottoman history where Turkey was in constant interaction with them. Therefore, a discourse of cultural, linguistic, and religious proximity makes sense in achieving a

global stance for Turkey. Based on above conclusions, it is fair to claim that Turkey benefits from its best qualities in order to strengthen their relative position in international politics tries to make a unique contribution to international development in order to become qualified and active players of international development policy. In that sense, it can be stated that Turkey's aid practices are unique which makes country fundamentally different from both traditional and emerging donors owing to its humanitarianism understanding and practices. Overall, it seems Turkey's race into becoming an influential and respected humanitarian state can only be strengthened through overcoming its problems; namely lack coordination, communication, and strategy. Yet as a reliable partner in peacebuilding and peacekeeping, Turkey shows that there are better alternatives to realpolitik in a responsible global leadership. Moreover, already a rising actor and a humanitarian state, Turkey's status as a relative newcomer to humanitarian sector leaves it with plenty of time to be confronted by the same challenges as traditional donors. Yet Turkey's devotion to moral superiority, unconditionality, and effort in the constructiveness of bilateral relations can provide a valuable and effective aid provider model. There is room, or improvement in Turkey's activities as a responsible actor of development. Via such new status of "relatively newcomer to humanitarianism", Turkey opens the door for further research.

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