

COOPERATION VERSUS DISCORD IN THE CYPRIOT CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF
TURKEY

by
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COOPERATION VERSUS DISCORD IN THE CYPRIOT CONFLICT:


THE ROLE OF TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

COOPERATION VERSUS DISCORD IN THE CYPRIOT CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF TURKEY

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Keywords: Cyprus conflict, Turkey, European Union, Exclusive Economic Zone, Natural Resources

Cyprus Conflict has been persisting for many decades. Even though, the United Nations has made several attempts to solve the conflict, no solution has been reached. With the change of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus president and the change of the Republic of Cyprus president, hope started to rise that the vicious cycle of the conflict could be altered. Also, recently there has been a new water pipeline project between Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Besides, there has also been recent hydrocarbon discoveries in the Levant basin, which is in the Eastern Mediterranean and covers the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus. In such a nexus, by using the theoretical framework of structure/agency, the aim of the thesis is to research and analyze whether and in what ways resources (water and natural gas) can change the course of the Cypriot conflict and what is Turkey's role in this nexus. After the change of the presidents, resource allocation for water and natural gas provides an incentive for both actors to negotiate and resolve their conflict, but these are not enough to solve the issues that come from the past and create a hurdle in the mediation process today.

ÖZET

KIBRIS UYUŞMAZLIĞINDA İŞ BİRLİĞİNE KARŞI UYUMSUZLUK: TÜRKİYE’NİN ROLÜ

BEGÜM BAYDAR

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Anahtar Sözcükler: Kıbrıs uyuşmazlığı, Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, Münhasır Ekonomik Bölge, Doğal Kaynaklar

Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı yıllardır sürmektedir. Birleşmiş Milletler bu sorunu çözmek için çeşitli girişimlerde bulunmuş olmasına rağmen, bir sonuca varamamıştır. Bu bağlamda, Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyetinde ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyetinde cumhurbaşkanlarının değişimi, bu kısır döngünün değişebileceği yönünde umutları arttırmıştır. Son dönemlerde, KKTC ve Türkiye arasında su boru hattı projesi başlamıştır. Bunun dışında Doğu Akdenizin Levant havzasında hidrokarbon keşifleri yapılmıştır. Bu bölge Kıbrıs’ın münhasır ekonomik bölgesinin bir parçasıdır. Bu konjonktürü göz önünde bulundurarak, bu çalışmanın amacı, yapı/yapan teorik çerçeveyi kullanarak doğal kaynakların Kıbrıs sorunundaki rolünü analiz edip, bunların çözümdeki rolünü incelemektir. Aynı zamanda Türkiye’nin de rolü bu soruya dahil edilmiştir. Aktörlerin değişiminden sonra, su ve doğal gaz kaynaklarının paylaşımını bu bağlamda iki aktör için teşvik sağlamaktadır, fakat bu kaynaklar geçmişten gelen sorunları çözmekte yeterli değildir. Aksine, kaynakları ilave bir engel haline gelmiştir.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BCM	Billion Cubic Meters
BCF	Billion Cubic Feet
DSI	The State Hydraulic Works
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NM	Nautical Miles
RoC	Republic of Cyprus
TCF	Trillion Cubic Feet
TCM	Trillion Cubic Meters
TPAO	Turkish Petroleum Cooperation
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of Seas
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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INTRODUCTION

The Cypriot conflict which has started in the mid-20th century has been persisting for many decades. Even though there have been many attempts to solve the conflict, until today no solution has been reached. Thus, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is standing on its own, and it is not recognized by the international community whereas the Greek Cypriot administration is seen by the international community as the sole government and representative of Cyprus.¹

In the early period of 2015, with the election of Mustafa Akıncı as the president of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, hopes for a settlement increased. One of the reasons for this was the political background of Mustafa Akıncı. Additionally, in 2004, before Mustafa Akıncı and Nicos Anastasiades became the president of TRNC and RoC, they were two important supporters of the Annan Plan. After, the election of Akıncı, both presidents demonstrated their willingness for a settlement of the conflict by walking together through both sides of Nicosia.² This occasion foreshadowed a possibility for the settlement of the Cyprus conflict. Thus after 2015, negotiation rounds started to accelerate again.

Throughout many speeches which are indicated in various parts of the thesis, Mustafa Akıncı proposed that resources (water and natural gas) could be used as an incentive in the mediation of the conflict. In this respect, the question of whether the recent developments could become an incentive for the settlement of the conflict arises. The recent developments are the water

¹ Onur Öymen, *Silahsız Savaş: Bir Mücadele Sanatı Olarak Diplomasi* (Etiler-İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2015), 460.

² *Deutsche Welle*, "Rival Leaders Take Historic Stroll through Cyprus Capital," May 23, 2015. <http://www.dw.com/en/rival-leaders-take-historic-stroll-through-cyprus-capital/a-18472011>.

project between Turkey and TRNC, and the recent hydrocarbon findings in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Since early periods, due to climate change and geographical location of the island of Cyprus, water supply has been constituting as a major problem. For many years, the two communities of the island have obtained their water supply from desalination plants and from a small number of water dams. However, because of climate change, precipitation rates have decreased which decreased water supply of the island.³ Thus, the problem of water scarcity arose. In recent years, Turkey built a water pipeline to TRNC in order to solve the problem.⁴

Secondly, due to its strategic geographical location, the island stands in the middle of important energy routes which increases the significance of the island. In this respect, recent hydrocarbon discoveries have increased the geopolitical importance of the island.⁵ In March 2010, the U.S. Geological survey announced that the Levant Basin in the Eastern Mediterranean has an essential potential of recoverable natural gas fields. The survey estimated that there is around 3455 billion cubic meters of recoverable natural gas.⁶ Thus, this occasion has also increased the geopolitical importance of Cyprus because the Levant basin also covers a part of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Cyprus. When countries define and agree on the boundaries of their EEZ, they can freely exploit the resources within their EEZ boundaries.⁷ However, there are problems of the EEZ which have effects on the Cypriot conflict. These problems and its effects on the Cypriot conflict will be elaborately analyzed in the thesis.

³ Michael Mason and Rebecca Bryant, "Water Technology and Sustainability in North Cyprus." Rep. *Water Technology and Sustainability in North Cyprus*. Oslo, Norway: PRIO, 2017.

⁴ Rebecca Bryant, "Cyprus 'Peace Water' Project: How It Could Affect Greek-Turkish Relations on the Island." *European Politics and Policy* LSE European Institute (blog), November 10, 2015. <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2015/10/28/how-turkeys-peace-water-project-could-affect-relations-between-greek-and-turkish-cypriots/>.

⁵ Hüseyin Canyaş, Süha Kocakuşak, and F. Orkunt Canyaş, "The Security Architecture of the Eastern Mediterranean and Relations between Israel and Cyprus in Terms of Global Power Relations," *TODAIÉ's Review of Public Administration* 7, no. 2 (June 2013):116.

⁶ "Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean." March 2010. *Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean*. U.S. Department of the Interior / U.S. Geological Survey. <https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf>

⁷ "Preamble to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." Accessed 29 March 2018, *United Nations*. United Nations. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm

In this respect, the thesis will examine whether and in what ways the resources (energy and water) could become an incentive for mediation. In order to answer this question, the first chapter elaborates on the long-lasting Cypriot conflict. The first part gives a brief insight on the earlier phases of the Cypriot conflict. The second part focuses on the UN attempts to solve the conflict. Here, the Annan Plan and the accession of Cyprus to the EU plays an important role since it can be interpreted as a game changer in the Cypriot conflict. The latter part of the chapter focuses on the election of Mustafa Akıncı and it gives special emphasis to the recent negotiation rounds between Akıncı and Anastasiades.

The second chapter of the thesis focuses on the problem of water scarcity of Cyprus. The chapter clarifies the water problem and it also elaborates on the water pipeline project between TRNC and Turkey. The aim of this chapter is to analyze whether this project could serve as an incentive in the negotiation process between the two communities.

The third chapter assesses the recent hydrocarbon findings in the Eastern Mediterranean. This chapter sheds light to earlier conflict in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey in order to clarify its effects on the Exclusive Economic Zone problems in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the chapter analyzes possible pipeline projects from Cyprus and Israel to the EU. By evaluating possible pipeline projects, the chapter tries to assess if the projected pipeline projects could act as an incentive in the negotiation process of the Cypriot conflict.

In the last chapter, the thesis firstly examines the rising regional power of Turkey. Afterwards, the thesis elaborates on the effects of Turkey as a regional power on the Cypriot conflict. This chapter gives special emphasis on three issues that act as a hurdle in the negotiation process of the Cypriot conflict. These three issues are the Karpas Peninsula, Turkish military presence in Cyprus, and the issue of rotating presidency. By considering these three factors, the role of Turkey and the security concerns of the actors are analyzed.

In this respect, after having examined the two important factors (water and natural gas) that could become an incentive, the thesis argues that after the change of the presidents of both sides, resource allocation for water and natural gas provides an incentive for both actors to negotiate and resolve their conflict, but these are not enough to solve the issue that comes from the past. In other words, the resources add up to the already existing problems. These existing problems come from the past and they are factors that shape the actions of presidents of both sides today

(TRNC and RoC). Thus, even though both presidents want to settle the conflict, they cannot act as they wish because of the political concerns that come from the past and limit their actions today. The thesis supports this argument with the theoretical framework of the relationship between structure and agency.

Theoretical Framework

In order to frame and analyze the Cypriot conflict, this part tries to provide a theoretical framework.

In the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx states that,

“(m)en make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”⁸

In the book *Democracy, Identity, and Foreign Policy in Turkey: Hegemony Through Transformation* (2014) Keyman and Gümüşçü apply this to the structure/agency debate. Here, it is proposed that agents (political actors) make their own history. However, agents cannot do this as they desire, since the structure determines their actions. In other words, agents operate under the structure, and the decisions of the agents are determined by the circumstances in the structure. These circumstances are transmitted from the past, or they are already in existence. Therefore, the capabilities of the agents are limited by the given circumstances.⁹

This explanation of the structure/agency debate can be applied to the Cypriot case. The change in the presidents/agents increased hope for a settlement of the conflict because both leaders were visualized as more optimistic and welcoming towards a solution. Two examples for this was that in 2015, the Turkish Cypriot leader and the Greek Cypriot leader walked together through

⁸ Karl Marx, 1852. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. New York: Die Revolution in Keyman, E. Fuat, and Şebnem Gümüşçü. 2014: 71-72. *Democracy, Identity, and Foreign Policy in Turkey: Hegemony Through Transformation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁹ Keyman and Gümüşçü, 72.

different sides of Nicosia. The other example was that in 2004, before Akıncı and Anastasiades were the presidents, both were supporters of the Annan Plan. Thus, the change in agents implied that the new actors are more willing towards a common solution to the conflict. By taking into the suggestion of Marx, here it should be interpreted that even though both leaders were in favor of a settlement, they could not achieve this aim at the given period because of given the circumstances. These circumstances are the occasions that come from the previous stages of the conflict that shape the structure today. The actors act in line with this structure which limits their actions and capabilities for a solution. Thus, even though resources could be an incentive, the circumstances that come from the past limit the actions of the actors. As a result, because of the political concerns that come from the past, resources have added up to these factors and they have become additional obstacles for a settlement of the conflict. More elaborately, both parties have overlapping interests that come from the past which effect the process of the negotiations today. The parties and actors are trying to increase their political gains because of the given structure. Hence, in such an environment, actors which have limited choices, could not use the resources as an incentive.

CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

1.1. Early Period

Cyprus conflict has been persisting for many decades. There have been several attempts to solve the conflict. One of these was the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements, which assisted the formation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. However, due to rising tensions and conflict, the constitution failed to create lasting peace. After 1974, with the intervention of Turkey, relations between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots entered into a stalemate. Since 1977, negotiations have continued between the two parties. Negotiations were initiated both by the two parties themselves and by the UN, but no agreement has been reached¹⁰. This chapter aims to elaborate on the history of the negotiation process and the UN initiatives.

Throughout history, Cyprus has been ruled by different empires, such as the Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Arabs and Crusaders. The Ottoman Empire started to rule Cyprus in 1571, and it remained a part of the Ottoman Empire until 1878. In 1878 the island was ceded to Britain.¹¹ After this ascent, the Greek Cypriots launched a struggle for independence against British rule. During this struggle, the Greek Cypriots maintained the ideal of uniting with their “motherland” Greece. The Turkish Cypriots saw this as a threat and as a response demanded *Taksim* (partition of Cyprus). This created tension between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek

¹⁰ "Cyprus (Historical Overview)," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accessed March 2, 2018. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-historical-overview_en.mfa

¹¹ "Cyprus (Historical Overview)," 2018.

Cypriots. Thus, in 1959 the agreements of Guarantee and Alliance were signed, which led to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The new republic was based on a bi-communal partnership. However, the Greek Cypriots were dissatisfied with the bi-communal system, which led to rising tensions between both parties again. Finally, in 1974 a military junta was established in Greece to annex Cyprus to Greece. In order to stop Greece from annexing Cyprus, Turkey launched a military intervention into Cyprus. Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided into two parts, the Greek Cypriot territory and the Turkish Cypriot territory.¹²

Makarios who was the president of Southern Cyprus and Denktash who was the president of the Northern part of Cyprus, started negotiations on the 12th of February 1977. Unfortunately, Makarios died on the 31st of August and Kipriyanu came to power, interrupting the negotiations because Kipriyanu was reluctant to complete them. However, the negotiations appeared on the political agenda again two years later in 1979. Kipriyanu and Denktas agreed on ten clauses for negotiations, but the result was a stalemate. After this occasion, the Turkish officials perceived that the Greek Cypriots were unwilling to make an agreement, so the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was declared on the 15th of November 1983. This declaration was not welcomed in the international political arena. Even today, only Turkey recognizes the TRNC.¹³

In 1985, a new round of negotiations began under the supervision of the United Nations. Both the Greek Cypriot Community and the Turkish Cypriot Community were invited to the United Nations meetings in New York. The Secretary General of the UN, Perez de Cuellar, closely followed these meetings, proposing a new plan based on the desires of both sides.¹⁴ According to this plan “the Federal Republic of Cyprus would be composed of two federal states and its constitutional structure would be based on two zones and two communities”¹⁵. However, again no agreement on this issue could be reached. The most important development in this period that affected the course of the negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was Greece entering the European Community (now the EU) in 1981. By accepting Greece, the Community

¹² Senem Aydın Düzgüt and Nathalie Tocci, *Turkey and the European Union*. (London; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 11-13.

¹³ Onur Öymen, *Silahlı Savaş: Bir Mücadele Sanatı Olarak Diplomasi* (Etiler-İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2015), 460.

¹⁴ Öymen, 461.

¹⁵ İnanç Kamburoğlu, “Behind the change in Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus between 2002 and 2004: The impact of leadership and the EU” (PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham 2015), 64.

has lost its capability to employ any pressure on the country¹⁶. Backed by the European Community, Greece started to use its position and they started to put pressure on Turkey and Turkish Cypriots to resolve the issue¹⁷. Until Greece was accepted to the Community, Greece and Turkey were treated equally in the eyes of the West (Europeans and the United States). This could be observed from the positive attitudes of the EC when both Turkey and Greece applied because the EC welcomed the applications of both countries¹⁸. In 1980, there was a coup in Turkey, and this occasion froze the relations between the EU and Turkey.¹⁹ In other words, it could be analyzed that with the membership of Greece to the EC, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots were integrated one step further with the EC, whereas the Turks and Turkish Cypriots were one step behind. Since the Greeks and Greek Cypriots felt the European support on their back (or they could put pressure on the EC), it could be perceived that they started to be more reluctant about finding a common solution that satisfied both sides.

In 1988, Vasiliu became the president of the Greek Cypriots. In order to revive the relationship with the Greek Cypriots, Denktash proposed a new plan to Vasiliu. Denktash proposed to collaborate in the areas of tourism, trade, environment, sport, and culture. The idea behind this collaboration was to establish confidence between the two states. However, this collaboration plan was rejected by Vasiliu.²⁰ It could be assumed that, if this plan had been accepted, the trust could have been built between the two sides. Trust is important to maintain peace and carry out negotiations. Without trust, it is harder to make negotiations. Hence, the proposal of Denktash could have encouraged further negotiations. However, the proposal was rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The main reason for this rejection could be considered as the approval of Greek side could also mean that they have recognized the TRNC.

In the same year, a forum in which both communities could get to know each other and build common interests had been organized. This was referred to as 'intercommunal talks'. However,

¹⁶ Bahar Rumelili, *The European Union's Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict*, working paper, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham (2004): 9.

¹⁷ Rumelili, 8.

¹⁸ Atilla Eralp, "The Role of Temporality and Interaction in the Turkey-EU Relationship," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 152.

¹⁹ Eralp, 154.

²⁰ Öymen, 462.

the talks ended in 1990 because the Greek Cypriots stated that they did not “accept the principle of equality between the two communities.”²¹ From both of the examples above, it could be inferred that the Greek Cypriots were reluctant to find a common solution that satisfied both sides.

In March 1990, the Security Council of the UN reaffirmed in its resolution 649, that they support the establishment of a bi-communal Federal Republic of Cyprus. The resolution pointed out the importance of the independent Republic of Cyprus which would “exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession.”²²

In 1992, the United Nations Security Council put out a “Set of Ideas”. This was an informal draft of a negotiation framework on which negotiations could be constructed upon.²³ Also, in 1994, the Vienna negotiations took place between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. These discussions were held under UN auspices. During this period, the Turkish Cypriots had accepted the Confidence Building measures that would create trust between the parties. However, the Greek Cypriots did not accept these measures, and so this negotiation process was closed without any positive outcome. Another step in solving the issue was taken again in 1995 by Denktash. He proposed a “4-point Peace Offensive”, which urged for a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic of Cyprus. Additionally, in 1997, it was asserted that sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus would stem from the equality of the two communities which was stated in the Joint Draft Statement.²⁴ Again, the Greek Cypriots had rejected this statement.

In 1993, the Greek Cypriot side applied for EU membership. The application emanated from strategic and political concerns rather than economic reasons. The Greek Cypriot leader Clerides stressed out in a speech that, this application would be a stronger guarantee for them which would clear away Turkey’s right of intervention which was given by the Treaty of Guarantee. Thus, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots aspired that the EU would settle the Cyprus issue in respect

²¹Meltem Müftüleri-Baç, “The Cyprus Debacle: What the Future Holds,” *Futures* 31 no.6 (1999): 562.

²² “UNSCR Search Engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” n.d. Security Council Resolution 649 - UNSCR. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/649>.

²³ Müftüleri-Baç, 563.

²⁴ Ibid.

with their own requests.²⁵ Additionally, the EU membership was a unique opportunity for the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to put international pressure on the Turks and Turkish Cypriots.²⁶ Hence, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots heavily relied on the membership of the Greek Cypriots to the EU.

Also, in 1993, Greece and the Greek Cypriots signed a pact of mutual defense. This pact aimed to strengthen the military cooperation of Greece and Greek Cypriots.²⁷ With this doctrine, Greece increased its role as a military power in the Central Mediterranean region.²⁸

In 1998, full membership negotiations started between Greek Cypriots and the EU. At this point, Turkey declared that the further integration of EU and Cyprus would direct Turkey to more intensely integrate with TRNC, based on the common declaration stated by Turkey and TRNC on the 20th of January 1997.²⁹ After the Luxembourg summit in 1997, the relations deteriorated between Turkey and the EU because the EU declared that Turkey was not included in the enlargement agenda of the EU.³⁰ In 1998, Denktash stated that there should not be the Federal Republic of Cyprus anymore and instead, he stated that discussions could be resumed with the new proposal of a confederation. Thus, this proposal put forward that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides would be two sovereign states which are equal states.³¹ On the one hand, Greek Cypriots desire to join the EU and on the other hand the proposal of Denktash for a confederation fueled the tension instead of a step to the solution.³²

²⁵ Salahi R. Sonyel, "The European Union and the Cyprus Imbroglio," *Perceptions*, (1998): 78.

²⁶ Pierre Oberling, "How the Greek and Greek Cypriot Governments Are Precipitating a New Crisis in Cyprus by Using the European Union." *How the Greek and Greek Cypriot Governments Are Precipitating a New Crisis in Cyprus by Using the European Union*, 17-18.

²⁷ James Ker-Lindsay, "UN involvement in Cyprus after the 2004 referendum,"(2006): 2, <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/2af14cce-7c05-4552-b1c8-75e5c17c0e80.pdf>

²⁸ "Kıbrıs Meselesinin Tarihiçesi, BM Müzakerelerinin Başlangıcı." T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Accessed March 2, 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris-meselesinin-tarihcesi_-bm-muzakerelerinin-baslangici.tr.mfa

²⁹ "Kıbrıs Meselesinin Tarihiçesi, BM Müzakerelerinin Başlangıcı," 2018.

³⁰ Meltem Müftüleri-Bac and Lauren McLaren, "Enlargement preferences and policy-making in the European union: Impacts on Turkey," *Journal of European Integration*, (2003): 21.

³¹ Neill Nugent, "EU Enlargement and 'the Cyprus problem'," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, (2000): 135.

³² Ker-Lindsay, 3.

1.2. Annan Plan

On the 4th of November 1999, in order to slow down the acceleration of the tension and move towards a solution, the secretary general of United Nations, Kofi Annan, made an announcement stating that negotiations should resume between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Thus, negotiations started on the 3rd of December 1999. The specialty of this negotiation process was that the two sides did not come face to face with each other. Instead, they held separate discussions with the UN, where they had the opportunity to express their concerns and inclinations for a solution of the dispute. Based on these discussions, on the 11th of November 2002, Kofi Annan presented the Annan Plan. At first, both the Greek side and the Turkish side refused to sign the plan. Thus, based on the demands of both sides, small arrangements were made in the plan. However, again no solution could be reached, so the Annan plan negotiations continued.³³

During the same period, the Greek Cypriot membership negotiation resumed between the Greek Cypriots and the EU. At the same time, these negotiations were carried out at the Copenhagen summit, the EU put forward that the membership of the island of Cyprus was negotiated as a whole and not for the Greek Cypriot part alone.³⁴ Here, it is again possible to interpret that the EU has been on the side of the Greek Cypriots. Also, this stance of the EU may be regarded as the disapproval of the Turkish and UN requests for a federal state. Thus, they see the Turkish side as a minority of the Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot part).

A factor that determined this stance of the EU was the Greece factor since Greece was a member of the EU. Additionally, at first, the EU was reluctant to intensify membership negotiations with Cyprus without a solution of the problem. However, at that time the EU gave importance to Eastern enlargement, and Greece claimed that if the EU would not implement membership negotiations with Cyprus, then they would hinder the negotiations with Eastern Europe. Thus, the membership process of Cyprus persisted.³⁵ As a result, it made harder for a negotiation

³³ "Kıbrıs Meselesinin Tarihiçesi, BM Müzakerelerinin Başlangıcı," 2018.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Müftüleri-Bac and McLaren, 27.

between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to succeed because while the UN and TRNC were working on a solution which put forward a federal state, the EU was slowing this process down by conducting membership negotiations with the Greek Cypriots. Naturally, it could be maintained that Greek Cypriots did not feel enough energy to struggle for a solution which gratifies both sides.

In 2003, there was a change in the government of Republic of Cyprus. Tasos Papadopoulos won the elections as a common candidate of the parties AKEL and DIKO. In February 2003, the Annan Plan was updated based on the claims of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. On the 10th of March, Denktash and Papadopoulos came together in a conference in the Hague with the three guarantor countries Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom. Negotiations were held to formulate the final version of the Annan Plan. The negotiations lasted for a long time in different places and finally ended on the 31^h of March 2004. On this date, Kofi Annan represented the final draft of the Annan Plan.³⁶ The Annan Plan stated that both sides would recognize the different identity and integrity of each other. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus would be based on a federal state and a bi-zonal friendship which would be composed of two constituent states: “the Greek Cypriot Constituent State and the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State.”³⁷ Both states would operate their power inside the given territory. In other words, no side should try to become dominant over the other. Thus, respect for each other’s authority and over their territory was emphasized. Furthermore, the plan also stated that both sides should respect each other’s cultural, religious, political, social and linguistic identities.³⁸

On the 24th of April 2004, a referendum was held in both the Turkish side and Greek side of Cyprus. While 75.83% of the Greek population rejected the Plan, 64.92% of the Turkish side approved the plan.³⁹ The reason for a negative outcome in the Greek side is the negative stance of Papadopoulos. On the 7th of April 2004, Papadopoulos made a speech to his folk by saying that they should reject the plan.⁴⁰ After this occasion, the international arena declared that they

³⁶ "Kıbrıs Meselesinin Tarihiçesi, BM Müzakerelerinin Başlangıcı," 2018.

³⁷ "Cyprus (Historical Overview)," 2018.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ "Dump UN Plan, Greek Cypriots Told," *BBC News*, April 07, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3608771.stm>

were upset about the result of the referendum, but they also pointed out that in these circumstances the Turkish side cannot isolate itself anymore.⁴¹ As a result, it could be inferred that even though the Turkish side displayed a positive attitude for negotiations, they were the ones who became affected by the negative results.

With the full membership of the Greek Cypriots to the EU on the 1st of May 2004, the pressure on the Turkish Cypriots increased.⁴² On the one hand, the membership caused a problem of the Turkish membership of EU, on the other hand, it caused a problem to solve the dispute of Cyprus. More elaborately, “a country that had said ‘no’ to the Annan Plan in a referendum was a member of the EU and would have veto power over Turkey’s accession process.”⁴³

On the same day, Turkey declared that TRNC is not a part of the European Union and the Greek Cypriots do not have a right to represent the whole island in the Union.⁴⁴ The membership of Cyprus could also be inferred as a pressure on TRNC to unite with Cyprus and be recognized as a minority. If TRNC had accepted this, they would have to give up on their ideal of a Federal Republic.

Some could maintain that it was a paradox that Papadopoulos accepted the final version of the Annan Plan in the UN negotiations but made a speech to his public that they should reject the plan. This not only wasted the parties time and efforts, but it abandoned the whole negotiation process.

1.3. New Negotiation Rounds

On the 3rd of September 2008, a new process of negotiations was initiated. “The six chapters discussed in the full-fledged negotiations were ‘Governance and Power Sharing’, ‘Property’, ‘EU Matters’, ‘Economic Matters’, ‘Territory’ and ‘Security and Guarantees’.”⁴⁵ During this

⁴¹ "Kıbrıs Meselesinin Tarihçesi, BM Müzakerelerinin Başlangıcı," 2018.

⁴² "Cyprus (Historical Overview)," 2018.

⁴³ Eralp, 162.

⁴⁴ "Kıbrıs Meselesinin Tarihçesi, BM Müzakerelerinin Başlangıcı," 2018.

⁴⁵ "Cyprus (Historical Overview)," 2018.

process Derviş Eroğlu became the new President of TRNC. However, no development was attained in the recent round of the negotiations. In 2013, Anastasiades came to power in the Greek Cypriot part. Thus, on the 11th of February 2014, Mr. Eroğlu and Mr. Anastasiades resumed the negotiation process under the auspices of the UN. At the time the negotiations were progressing, the Greek Cypriot side started to initiate off-shore drilling activities.⁴⁶ This stagnated the negotiation process because the Turkish Cypriots claimed that they were doing this in the Turkish Cypriots exclusive economic zone. However, the Greek side claimed that it was their own licensed area. Thus, in October 2014, the Greek Cypriots cancelled the UN negotiation process.⁴⁷

1.3.1. The Election of Mustafa Akıncı

In 2015, Mustafa Akıncı was elected as the new President of the TRNC. The election campaign of Mustafa Akıncı was, “With my election there is hope.”⁴⁸ One of the reasons for this was because Akıncı and the Greek Cypriot leader have sown the seeds of constructive dialogue.⁴⁹ The optimism for the new presidential election was also stated by Turkey, Greece and Great Britain. This optimism was stressed out by the British Foreign secretary as, “The stars are aligned.”⁵⁰

What made Akıncı trustable for reunification also stemmed from the previous roles he took in the politics of the TRNC. Before he became the president, Mustafa Akıncı was the first mayor of Northern Nicosia. During this period, he collaborated with the mayor of South Nicosia (Greek Cypriot) and they won several awards for their projects.⁵¹ After his office as a mayor, Akıncı

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ *Al Jazeera*, “Mustafa Akıncı: 'With My Election There Is Hope'.” June 18, 2015. <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2015/06/mostafa-akinci-election-hope-150617173155876.html>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ *Cyprus Mail*, “The Players: Mustafa Akıncı,” December 24, 2016. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2016/12/24/players-mustafa-akinci/>

became the leader of the political party Communal Liberation Party (TKP) and he served here from 1987 to 2001. From the years 1991 to 2001, Akıncı also worked as the deputy prime minister and minister of tourism. In 2003, he established the ‘peace and democracy movement’ which aimed to support reunification efforts based on the Annan Plan.⁵² During this period, Anastasiades who was the leader of the right-wing Greek Cypriot party DISY of that time, also supported the Annan Plan.⁵³ This is one of the important incidents that demonstrated that Akıncı and Anastasiades are both willing to come to a common solution for the conflict.

Furthermore, what differentiated Akıncı from the former TRNC presidents was that he was perceived as more flexible compared to the former presidents. More elaborately, former presidents urged for a clear separation of the Turkish Cypriot community and the Greek Cypriot community.⁵⁴ Akıncı also saw EU integration as an important subject.⁵⁵ This could also be seen from his words, “the efforts by Turkish Cypriots to increase their contacts with the EU as well as the preparation for harmonization with the EU laws should continue without interruption.”⁵⁶ However, Akıncı also points out that “These efforts should not become victim to the “obstacles” imposed by the Greek Cypriot side.”⁵⁷ After the election of Mustafa Akıncı on the 26th of April 2015, the Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades also expressed his satisfaction by his words, “At last, our hopes are high that this country can be reunified.”⁵⁸

Finally, when on the 23rd of May 2015, the two leaders walked together down Ledra Street which was the dividing line of the island hopes had increased for reconciliation.⁵⁹ This street

⁵² “Biography of Mustafa Akıncı,” Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last modified April 27, 2015. <http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/biography-of-mustafa-akinci/>.

⁵³ *Cyprus Mail*, “The Peace Plans: 2004 Annan Plan,” December 29, 2016. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2016/12/29/peace-plans-2004-annan-plan/>.

⁵⁴ George Kyris, “Is Mustafa Akıncı the Best Hope Yet for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem?” *The Guardian*. April 28, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/28/mustafa-akinci-solve-cyprus-problem-turkey-election>.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Cyprus Mail*, “Akıncı Wants Uninterrupted EU Harmonisation,” August 30, 2017. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2017/08/30/akinci-wants-uninterrupted-eu-harmonisation/>.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *The Economist*, “Come Together?” April 28, 2015. <https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21649892-re-unification-supporter-wins-turkish-cyprus-presidential-elections-come-together>

⁵⁹ Vincent L. Morelli, “Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive,” *Congressional Research Service*, (2018): 13, <https://fas.org/sfp/crs/row/R41136.pdf>

was a part of the Turkish Cypriot territory, and it was the first time a Greek Cypriot leader stepped onto that territory. Thus, this movement was regarded as a symbol of hope and solidarity.⁶⁰ By taking into account this background and the recent occasion of both leaders walking through both sides of Nicosia, hopes increased that finally a settlement to the long-lasting conflict could come.

1.3.2. Continuation of the Negotiations

With the change in agents, comprehensive settlement negotiations proceeded on the 15th of May 2015. During the negotiation process, there were improvements in the chapters of ‘EU matters’ and ‘Economy’ whereas problems occurred in the chapter ‘Governance and Power sharing’.⁶¹ Also, further problems occurred in the chapter of territory. Even though these problems could not be solved, this could be considered a positive step because this was the first time such issues were discussed since the 2004 Annan Plan. In order to enhance and accelerate the negotiations, the UN stepped in again, and the Geneva negotiation process started.⁶²

The plan of the Geneva Conference contained three rounds. The schedule of the meetings was that on the 9th of January 2017, all issues excluding territory and security would be discussed. On the 11th of January, the territorial dispute would be discussed with both sides representing their proposed maps for the adjustment of the disputed territory. Finally, on the 12th of January a five-party conference would be held. In this meeting, the guarantor states and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot side would try to settle the issue of territory and the future of security guarantees together. It was thought that this would lead to the final agreement.⁶³ However, there was a stalemate again because of the issue of territory. Additionally, Turkey also proposed that the four freedoms of EU should also be granted to Turkish Cypriot citizens. This also caused a

⁶⁰ Morelli, 13.

⁶¹ "Cyprus (Historical Overview)," 2018.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Morelli, 17.

problem. Thus, the representatives of the five countries had to leave the meeting without any result.⁶⁴

Anastasiades and Akıncı were keen on resolving the dispute. Therefore, they decided “to establish a working group of technical experts to continue to iron out differences and prepare for new meetings later in January or February 2017”.⁶⁵ However, they again they could not achieve an agreement. An underlying reason for the failures in the recent rounds of negotiations could be pointed out as the pressure of the political parties of both sides. In both parts, the opposition parties stated that the leaders (Akıncı and Anastasiades) were being influenced. Thus, it could be stated that the pressure from the inside was also a factor which determined stalemate in these meeting.⁶⁶

Even though it was predicted that negotiations would continue under the positive attitudes of the two leaders, this was shattered by the decision of the Greek Cypriot parliament. On the 13th of February 2017 the “right-wing ELAM political party introduced an annual event in the form of a reading and discussion in public schools to mark the January 1950 referendum on *enosis* (the union of Cyprus with Greece).”⁶⁷ In this regard, Akıncı stated that he could not continue negotiations until this decision was changed. Thus, after long discussions, “the Greek Cypriot parliament took action to partially reverse the *enosis* requirement by turning the decisions over how the historical event would be addressed by the Greek Cypriot school system to the Education Ministry.”⁶⁸ After this partial reversal Akıncı decided to continue with the meetings.⁶⁹

On the 4th of June, it was decided that there should be a revival of the Geneva conference. This was called the Crans Montana conference. Again, the major issue in this conference was the security issue. During the conference, representatives of Turkey stated that they could not accept to abolish the security guarantees under the existing treaties. However, they stated that they

⁶⁴ Morelli, 18.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Morelli, 19.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Morelli, 20.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

could remove the military troops with the condition that a very small percentage of Greek and Turkish Cypriot troops would stay, suggesting that the deployment of the troops could be renewed in 15 years. However, the Greek Cypriots insisted that the Treaty of Guarantee should be abolished. Furthermore, they stated that a small number of troops could stay in the condition that a date for their deployment should be immediately set up.⁷⁰ Together with this issue, there was also the unresolved question of rotating presidency. Since no agreement could be reached, the conference ended on the 28 of September 2017.⁷¹

All in all, it can be seen that even though, there have been various attempts both by the primary, secondary and third parties to solve the dispute. Still, no agreement has been reached. Throughout this chapter, it was shown that there had been many underlying reasons for the negative outcome of the numerous meetings. First of all, it can be stated that the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community have clashes of interest. In this respect, the Greek Cypriot Community does not agree with the UN decisions that a federal republic of Cyprus should be formed, based on a bi-communal and bi-zonal state. The Greek Cypriots do not recognize the Turkish Cypriot as a different community. Since the 1960 constitution, they have been rejecting the equality of the Turkish Cypriots in terms of having equal rights in governing the Republic of Cyprus. Until today, they have still not changed their stance and instead, they developed other ways to put pressure on the Turkish side to make them join the Republic of Cyprus as a minority population. Because of the trust breaking and violent actions of the Greek Cypriots towards the Turkish Cypriots that had happened throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, it could be argued that the Turkish Cypriots are reluctant to accept the proposal of the Greek Cypriots. Also, the population of the Turkish Cypriots is large and thus they do not want to be seen as a minority. These circumstances have shaped the TRNC demand of establishing a federal state of Cyprus with bi-zonal and bi-communal equality.

Additionally, there is also the fact that, the demand for the Federal Republic of Cyprus was also supported by the numerous UN resolutions.⁷²

⁷⁰ Morelli, 22.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Müftüleri-Baç, 563.

As stated in the previous parts of this chapter, another critical factor that has helped the Greek Cypriots in insisting on their demand could be determined as the Greece factor in the EC/EU. Greece has not only influenced the EC to take actions supporting the Greek Cypriot demands but also thanks to the Greek pressure inside the EU, Cyprus (as a divided island) was accepted as a member of the EU. This not only hindered the Annan Plan, but it also put an obstacle to Turkey's membership process in the EU.

By elaborating on the historical negotiations and the stances of the different parties, the chapter has analyzed that, in order to come to a solution for the long-lasting dispute there needs to be an incentive that would encourage the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to come to common grounds. This is because the negotiations have turned into a vicious cycle in which the similar issues (issues of territory, equality, rotating presidency, and so on) have repeatedly been discussed without advancement in the solution. Thus, in thesis it will analyzed if whether and in what ways the recent developments in natural resources could become an incentive for the Cyprus conflict.

CHAPTER 2: WATER SCARCITY IN CYPRUS: SOLUTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE WATER PIPELINE FROM TURKEY ON THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

The Eastern Mediterranean region is getting warmer and becoming more arid day by day. Cyprus is also affected by the rising temperature and climate change in this region. Cyprus has been heavily dependent on rainfall for meeting their water demand.⁷³ However, since the 1970's, with increasing climate change, rainfall in Cyprus has fallen by 20%. Thus, this decreased the water resources on the island. Both communities in Cyprus have been negatively affected by this situation.⁷⁴ Throughout history, many measures have been taken. However, none of these measures were enough to avoid the water crisis in 2008. After this date, the water problem in Cyprus became more serious. Therefore, in 2015, Turkey constructed a pipeline from Turkey to TRNC in order to solve the water problem in TRNC. In 2015, politicians and academics of Turkey and TRNC believed that this could become a stepping stone into solving the conflict in Cyprus because Turkey stated that the Turkish Cypriots could share the water with the Greek Cypriots. Hence, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots believed that if Greek Cypriots would accept the water, then this pipeline project could be a 'peace project'. However, the Greek Cypriots rejected the water supply that comes from Turkey even though they have lack of water supply.

⁷³ Michael Mason and Rebecca Bryant, "Water Technology and Sustainability in North Cyprus." Rep. *Oslo, Norway: PRIO*, (2017), <https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1361&type=publicationfile>.

⁷⁴ *Reuters*, "Drought-Hit Cyprus Starts Emergency Water Rations," March 24, 2008. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-water-idUSL2455576320080324>.

In this chapter, the reasons for the Greek Cypriot stance is elaborated as well as the place of the water pipeline in the Cyprus conflict. Afterwards, in the chapter, it is stated that even a vital problem such as the water problem has not brought the two communities together due to political concerns of the parties. This also stems from the circumstances that comes from the past and affects the stance and limits the actions of the agents.

2.1. Water Supply in Cyprus

Since its colonial times, the island of Cyprus has been an arid island with a plain nature. “Due to the arid climate, evapotranspiration consumes as much as 80% of the total annual precipitation”.⁷⁵ Thus, even in the earlier periods the water problem in the island was visible. In this respect, in the 1950’s the British officials wanted to find alternative ways to bring water to the island and so they collaborated with an American firm, Ralph Parsons to conduct a research. The researchers pointed out that water should be transported from Turkey because this choice was the cheapest choice compared with other solutions such as building desalination plants. Therefore, after several talks with Turkey, the British officials persuaded Turkish officials to initiate this project. According to this project, water would be brought by tanks or by underwater pipelines from Turkey to the island of Cyprus. The project would be funded by the U.S. However, this project fell into abeyance after a Turkish ship was caught in the Mediterranean which was bringing weapons to the island.⁷⁶ Thus, search for continuous water supplies began.

In the 1960s one of the very first plans for this issue was the plan of Makarios III called “No drop to the Sea”.⁷⁷ In this respect, dams were constructed, and the freshwater storage capacities were increased which were based on rainfall and river flow in a significant amount.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Iacovos Iacovides, “Water Resources in Cyprus: Endowments and Water Management Practices.” Essay. In *Water Resources Allocation: Policy and Socioeconomic Issues in Cyprus, Global Issues in Water Policy 1*, edited by P. Koundour. Springer Science Buisness Media B.V. (2011): 12. <https://www.springer.com/us/book/9789048198245>.

⁷⁶ Mason, 2-3.

⁷⁷ Clemens Hoffmann, “From Small Streams to Pipe Dreams – The Hydro-Engineering of the Cyprus Conflict.” *Mediterranean Politics* 23 no.2, (2017): 266. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2016.1264137?journalCode=fmed20>.

⁷⁸ Iacovides, 16.

When the island was divided into two in 1974, the Northern region of Cyprus was rich in high yielding citrus farms, but this region was deprived from a larger quantity of water supply since the groundwater sources coming from the Troodos mountains was in the Southern part of the line.⁷⁹ Thus, the only functioning underwater aquifer in the Northern part was an aquifer in Morphou.⁸⁰

In the 1990s, the problem of water scarcity intensified due to climate change. Precipitation rates had decreased by a significant amount. Thus, the dams which were based on rainfall could not provide sufficient water to meet the demand. The Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC started to take different measures in this respect. In the Republic of Cyprus, Clerides initiated the construction and development of desalination plants. With this plan the aim of the government was to meet the domestic and industrial water demand from desalination plants and they also aimed to use surface water for irrigation purposes. Thus, desalination plants and underground aquifers provided water supply.⁸¹ However, these measures could not prevent the coming water crisis in 2008 because of four other issues.

Firstly, some of the remaining water reservoirs in some areas got mixed with mud, and the percentage of salt in some underground aquifers increased in a substantial amount. Also, more than half of the capacity of the desalination plants could not be used because of the problems caused by the high levels of salt that is inside the water. Thus, the quality of water decreased which had an essential impact on water supply.⁸² Secondly, due to climate change, precipitation rates decreased even more which had a serious effect on the water supply of the aquifers. More elaborately, “Repeated and persistent drought episodes reduced direct and indirect groundwater recharge, while the construction of dams further reduced recharge of downstream aquifers”.⁸³ Thirdly, because of the economic crisis and the austerity measures, president Papadopoulos put

⁷⁹ Hoffmann, 273.

⁸⁰ Hoffmann, 274.

⁸¹ Hoffmann, 276.

⁸² Mason, 6-7.

⁸³ Iacovides, 14.

halt on the investments for desalination plants.⁸⁴ Lastly, the RoC also did not have sufficient water management capabilities.⁸⁵

Compared to the Republic of Cyprus, the TRNC stayed behind in the developments of increasing water supply. The few developments in TRNC could also not prevent the forthcoming 2008 water crisis because of the mismanagement of water supply. In order to elaborate the problems in managing the water supply, three issues will be put forward.

The first issue is that at first, the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) of Turkey instituted some projects such as drip irrigation to increase the efficiency in using the water supply. However, due to the unconditional agricultural assistance from Turkey, such small-scale projects for water management did not seem attractive.⁸⁶

Secondly, in TRNC, the management and allocation of water were decentralized. The municipalities were in charge of water management. “Municipalities use water bills to collect payments for other local services (e.g., waste disposal), making them a major revenue-raising instrument for local government.”⁸⁷ This caused the politicization of water management, so the water supply was not distributed by regarding future needs. Also, the governments in TRNC changed constantly which complicated the process of planning and regulating the system of water supply for municipalities.⁸⁸

The third problem was the inefficient usage of water supply. Besides local people, farmers have also used the water supply in an inefficient way.⁸⁹ Thus, it can be seen that even though TRNC has a meager water supply, they have not made a long-term plan to manage the water supply. Even though municipalities were in charge of the management, they did not give enough supervision and thus there was a waste of water which not only decreased the water supply, but it also decreased the quality of the water in TRNC.

⁸⁴ Hoffman, 276.

⁸⁵ Iacovides, 11.

⁸⁶ Hoffmann, 277.

⁸⁷ Mason, 9.

⁸⁸ Mason, 8-9.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

Thus, it can be seen that both regions suffered from water problems because of climate change and lack of water management. Here it should also be pointed out that the water resources of the island are also affected by seawater intrusion and also rising water demand in the seasons in which tourism is high.⁹⁰ However, it was seen that even though RoC had taken some measures, the problems concerning water supply reached a peak in 2008 and both regions in the island of Cyprus experienced water crisis.

2.2. 2008 Water Crisis of Cyprus

In March 2008, water crisis reached a peak in the whole island. There was a drought in the largest water reservoirs of Cyprus, Kouris (Greek Cypriot Part). “Authorities (of the Greek-Cypriot Administration) said they would cut water supplies to district distribution networks by 30 percent. They would also seek water imports from Greece, likely to occur in the next five months, Stefanou said”.⁹¹ Therefore, the next month an agreement was signed between the Greek Cypriots and Greece which projected the transportation of clean water from Greece to Cyprus through ships. However, the cost of the transportation and infrastructure was very high. Only the transportation cost was 35 million €. The total cost was 5.125€ per million cubic meters (mcm) of water imported. This was a very expensive option because it was approximately five times more expensive than water obtained from desalination plants.⁹² Therefore, another solution was needed in order to cope with water scarcity in the island. Therefore, “Since 2008, four desalination plants have been built which can produce a total 220,000 cubic meters of water daily, covering the supply needs of Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca and Famagusta.”⁹³

⁹⁰ Iacovides, 11-12.

⁹¹ Reuters, “Drought-Hit Cyprus Starts Emergency Water Rations,” March 24, 2008. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-water-idUSL2455576320080324>.

⁹² Anastasia Sofroniou and Steven Bishop, “Water Scarcity in Cyprus: A Review and Call for Integrated Policy.” *Water* 6 no. 10 (2014), <http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4441/6/10/2898/htm>.

⁹³ Evie Andreou, “Over Reliance on Desalination Plants.” *Cyprus Mail Online*, October 16, 2016, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/10/16/reliance-desalination-plants/>.

In the TRNC, the minister of agriculture Önder Sennaroğlu stated that this drought was one of the biggest droughts Cyprus has faced and he stated that the government is working on measures to overcome this issue. In this respect, he stated that the government in TRNC will give drought compensation advanced payment to the farmers, since the drought has seriously affected agriculture. Also, he stressed out that TRNC would import 60 thousand tons of barley and 30 thousand tons of corn from Turkey.⁹⁴ Furthermore, in the year 2008, Turkey has spent around 2.551.893€ to TRNC for the construction and development of new dams, main transmission lines and other projects concerning water supply and investment. In the same year, Turkey also finished the project of the construction of a wastewater treatment plant in Kyrenia.⁹⁵

As stated before, the reason for this drought was because since the 1970s rainfall in Cyprus has fallen by 20 percent.⁹⁶ The 2008 crisis was turning point in the water problem of Cyprus because this issue has shown the seriousness of the increasing water shortages of Cyprus. After this occasion, more desalination plants were built. However, desalination plants also have their consequences. For example, they are more expensive compared to dam water and carbon dioxide is emitted during the desalination process.⁹⁷ After these occasions, Turkey proposed to introduce a peace water project with TRNC, which aimed to transport 75 mcm of water per year.⁹⁸

2.3. Turkey-TRNC Water Pipeline

In 2011, Turkey decided to initiate a water project with TRNC because of the decreasing precipitation rates and future risks of droughts. According to this project a pipeline would be

⁹⁴ *Kıbrıs Postası*, “Tüm Ülke Kuraklık Alanı İlan Edildi,” April 26, 2008. http://www.kibrispostasi.com/c35-KIBRIS_HABERLERI/n12999-Tum-ulke-kuraklik-alani-ilan-edildi.

⁹⁵ “KKTC’Ye Yapılan TC Yardımları 2008 YILI FAALİYET RAPORU,” 2008. *KKTC’Ye Yapılan TC Yardımları 2008 YILI FAALİYET RAPORU*. T.C. Lefkoşa Büyükelçiliği. <http://www.kei.gov.tr/media/1146/2008-faliyet-raporu.pdf>.

⁹⁶ *Reuters*, “Drought-Hit Cyprus Starts Emergency Water Rations,” March 24, 2008. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-water-idUSL2455576320080324>.

⁹⁷ Andreou, 2016.

⁹⁸ Rebecca Bryant, “Cyprus 'Peace Water' Project: How It Could Affect Greek-Turkish Relations on the Island,” *European Politics and Policy*. LSE European Institute. November 10, 2015, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euorpblog/2015/10/28/how-turkeys-peace-water-project-could-affect-relations-between-greek-and-turkish-cypriots/>.

built between from Mersin, Turkey to Kyrenia, TRNC. The pipeline would connect the Alaköprü dam in Turkey and the Geçitköy Dam in TRNC. The goal of this project was to supply water to Turkish Cypriots for 50 years.⁹⁹ 75 million cubic meters (mcm) of water would be transported yearly. It was planned that 37,76 mcm would be used as clean water for drinking, industries and other usages whereas 37,24 mcm would be used for irrigation water.¹⁰⁰ However, when the project was opened in 2015, new problems emerged about how to manage the water supply because it was argued that the municipalities should not be the only ones in charge of the water system. Because of this problem, the pipeline could not operate until 2016. After several negotiations, it was decided that the management of the water supply would be given to a supreme board which would include TRNC government agency and a Turkish Cypriot private firm.¹⁰¹ With this negotiation, it can be seen that the water management in TRNC would not be given into the hands of municipalities which could not cope with the management of water. Instead, a public-private Turkish Cypriot partnership was created which would use the water supply in the intended way and thus reach the goals of development.

When the pipeline was being constructed, politicians and academicians from TRNC, and Turkish politicians believed that this project would give many advantages to TRNC. First of all, the former prime minister of Turkey, Davutoğlu, stated that “We are bringing water, we believe that both communities in Cyprus will live peacefully.”¹⁰² Mustafa Akıncı stated that due to globalization that the world is facing today, water has become more important than petroleum. He also stated that the water would change the color of Cyprus from yellow to green and TRNC will increase its production.¹⁰³ Finally, the prime minister of TRNC Ömer Kalyoncu also stated that one day this water supply could pave the way for peace.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, Mehmet Hasgüler,

⁹⁹ *Hurriyet Daily*, “Turkish Cyprus Receives Millions of Tons of Fresh Water from Turkey,” August 16, 2016. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-cyprus-receives-millions-of-tons-of-fresh-water-from-turkey---102910>.

¹⁰⁰ *Sozcu*, “‘KKTC Su Temin Projesi’ Hizmete Alındı,” November 17, 2015. <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/ekonomi/kktc-su-temin-projesi-aciliyor-962092/>

¹⁰¹ Zeynep Güranlı, “KKTC ile ‘Su Meselesi’ Çözülüyor,” *Sozcu*, February 9, 2016. <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/kktc-ile-su-meselesi-cozuluyor-1082131/>

¹⁰² *Hurriyet*, “KKTC Su Temin Projesi’nin Açılışı Gerçekleştirildi,” October 17, 2015. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/kktc-su-temin-projesinin-acilisi-gerceklestirildi-30333510>.

¹⁰³ *Hurriyet*, “KKTC Su Temin Projesi’nin Açılışı Gerçekleştirildi,” 2015.

¹⁰⁴ *Sozcu*, “‘KKTC Su Temin Projesi’ Hizmete Alındı,” October 17, 2015. <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/ekonomi/kktc-su-temin-projesi-aciliyor-9620>

who is an academic in TRNC, affirmed his enthusiasm for this project by stating that since the water crisis has drastically affected both sides of the island, Turkey's water supply could be a positive aspect in the negotiation period. Additionally, the water supply would enhance agriculture in TRNC.¹⁰⁵ Another professor in TRNC, Ata Atun stressed out two critical points. First of all, he stated that the water supply would enhance the land in TRNC in such a way that the Turkish Cypriot land would become much more efficient than Greek Cypriot land because the Greek Cypriot lands are dry. Secondly, Prof. Atun affirmed that the Greek Cypriot administration would also need the water that comes from Turkey because they rely too much on desalination plants which have negative consequences on the environment.¹⁰⁶

Thus, as it can be seen from the statement of the state officials of Turkey and TRNC and two academicians of TRNC, the hope that new water project would solve the water crisis in Cyprus and also solve the Cypriot conflict was high. This project was interpreted as a peace project. Also, this would strengthen the hands of the Turkish Cypriots in the negotiation process. The fact that TRNC would develop more easily was also stressed out. These hopes relied on the fact that water is a vital source. In other words, clean water coming from Turkey would not only serve for the basic needs of the Turkish Cypriots, but it would also support industrialization and enhance agriculture.

However, the hopes of Turkey and TRNC faded away because the Greek Cypriots did not perceive the project as a peaceful act and thus they did not want to use the water that comes from Turkey. Instead, right-wing Greek Cypriot politicians argued that this was a 'third invasion' of Turkey on the island. The Greek Cypriot administration also pointed out that this project would increase the zone of influence of Turkey on Cyprus.¹⁰⁷

Firstly, the Greek Cypriot Foreign Ministry claimed that the project of Turkey is a form of integration of TRNC and Turkey and thus this violates international law. Additionally, the ministry officials also claimed that; "With this action, Turkey bolsters its presence in the

¹⁰⁵ AA, "'Barış Suyu' Kıbrıs'ta Müzakerelerin Seyrini Değiştirecek!," October 30, 2015. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/baris-suyu-kibrista-muzakerelerin-seyrini-degistirecek/458036>.

¹⁰⁶ AA, 2015.

¹⁰⁷ Bryant, 2015.

occupied areas, not only through the ownership of the resource which will be conveyed to Cyprus, but also by dictating the terms of its management."¹⁰⁸

After the statements of the Greek Cypriot politicians, deputy Prime Minister Recep Akdağ stated that the Greek Cypriot officials had no intention to collaborate with TRNC on the water issue. Even, he stated that “There are some (...) Greek Cypriot politicians and leading figures who say they would rather drink poison than Turkish water”.¹⁰⁹

2.4. The Impact of the Project

The outcome of the project could be divided into two categories. The first impact is the effect of the water project on the negotiation process. The second impact is the effect of this project on TRNC for their development.

In the first part, it could be stated that even after the change in agents and their wish to find a solution to the conflict, the incentive could not be a steppingstone for mediation because of the given structure that comes from the past and shapes the current structure today. This structure is formed of circumstances that shape and control the actions of the actors which also shape the way of the negotiation process.

After the project of water pipeline started, it could be seen that the Greek Cypriot discourse was not as predicted. The Ministry of Foreign affairs of RoC concluded that “an overarching strategy to tackle issues such as the island’s water supply problems can be forged only after reunification.”¹¹⁰ Additionally, the Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades also stated that, “A Cyprus settlement, reached as quickly as possible, will assist not only in Israeli (gas export)

¹⁰⁸ *Mail Online*, “Cyprus Slams Turkey’s Water Link with Breakaway North,” October 15, 2015. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3274389/Cyprus-slams-Turkeys-water-link-breakaway-north.html#ixzz5FUo6Hxez>.

¹⁰⁹ *Hurriyet Daily*, “Greek Cypriots Don’t Intend to Use Turkish Water, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Says,” December 12, 2017. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/greek-cypriots-dont-intend-to-use-turkish-water-turkish-deputy-prime-minister-says-124023>.

¹¹⁰ *The National Herald*, 2018.

planning, but also contribute greatly to restoring relations with Turkey.”¹¹¹ Thus, even though the Greek Cypriots rely on few water desalination plants for water supply, they are not willing to admit the water supply that comes from Turkey.¹¹² Although agents were positive about the mediation process, the Greek Cypriot officials did not see this occasion as an incentive. Since both parties want to increase their political gains in the negotiation process, the Greek Cypriot officials do not want to increase the political hands of the Turkish Cypriots by accepting to share the water.

Additionally, another reason for this stance of the Greek Cypriot officials is that sharing the water that comes from Turkey with the Turkish Cypriots might be interpreted as partly recognizing them. “In Greek Cypriot discourse, cooperation with any institution in the North, including its academic institutions, constitutes ‘recognition by implication’, meaning that although doors opened in the island, these were not doors that connected Turkish Cypriots to the world.”¹¹³ Thus, this manner of the Greek Cypriot officials is a practice that stems from the past and impacts the structure of the negotiation process today. In the previous chapter, this discourse of the Greek Cypriots were also seen throughout the negotiation process. More elaborately, the Greek Cypriot officials see the Turkish Cypriots as a minority of the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, throughout history, they have refrained from any action that could be implicated as a partial recognition of the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, it was no surprise that the Greek Cypriots did not perceive the water that comes from Turkey as ‘peace water’.

Additionally, throughout history, the Greek Cypriots have been reluctant to accept solutions that proposed equal political rights with Turkish Cypriots. This stance of the Greek Cypriots reached a peak with the 2004 Annan Referendum because after the Greek Cypriot officials accepted this plan, they asked their citizens to vote against the Annan Plan. This choice of the Greek Cypriot officials could be interpreted as the Greek Cypriots are trying to increase their political power in the mediation process as much as possible. At the same time Turkish Cypriots want to have equal representation with the Greek Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, here it can be

¹¹¹ Times of Israel, “Cyprus water plan: Peace pipeline or Trojan Horse?” March 1, 2014. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/cyprus-water-plan-peace-pipeline-or-trojan-horse/>

¹¹² *The National Herald*, “Cyprus Slams Turkey’s Water Link.” Accessed 20 April, 2018, <https://www.thenationalherald.com/102266/cyprus-slams-turkeys-water-link/>

¹¹³ Bryant, 2015.

argued that in order to gain as much as power in the negotiation process, both sides prefer to increase their political gains rather than economic gains. This is a circumstance that comes from the past and still influences the negotiation process today. Since accepting the water that comes from Turkey would increase the hands of the Turkish Cypriots in the negotiation process, Greek Cypriots officials did not accept the water.

The second part of the impacts is mainly about the arguments of how the project impacts TRNC.

After the Republic of Cyprus became a full member of the EU, the Turkish Cypriot officials understood that they also need to increase their political gains. Thus, if the Turkish Cypriots use the water as planned than they can economically enhance which would make them politically stronger in the negotiation process.

Also, with the entrance of the Greek Cypriots to the European Union, it could be interpreted that their main aim is to put pressure on the Turkish Cypriots, so that they will have no other choice than to accept being a minority in the Republic of Cyprus. This occasion showed Turkey that they need another strategy against the Greek Cypriot strategy of putting pressure on Turkish Cypriots. Thus, it can also be argued that the Turkish politicians aimed to make TRNC stronger so that they can develop and stand on their own so that they will not have to give up their demand of a bi-communal and bi-zonal republic of Cyprus.¹¹⁴

As stated before, the water supply of Turkey will be used for industries, agriculture and other purposes. Thus, it can be analyzed that Turkish support will help the Turkish Cypriots to develop TRNC as much as possible in order to be able to cope against the pressures of Greek Cypriots and eventually stand on their own.

All in all, at first the water project did not give TRNC an incentive because the Greek Cypriots did not want to use the water that comes from Turkey. On the contrary, it cannot be denied that this project will have long-term benefits for TRNC because it will help them develop their industries and agriculture.

¹¹⁴ Bryant, 2015.

Conclusion

The problem of water scarcity in Cyprus is a vital problem. Water is not only the basis of basic human needs but is also crucial regarding development. Without water, industries cannot work, and agricultural production stops. Throughout history, the island of Cyprus always had water shortages. Even though several measures have been taken such as building dams and constructing desalination plants, the water supply has still decreased. In order to solve this problem, Turkey initiated a water pipeline project that would connect a dam in Turkey and TRNC. At first, Turkish politicians, TRNC politicians and academics believed that this could give the Turkish Cypriots an incentive in the negotiation process of the Cypriot Conflict. However, the Greek Cypriots rejected the water supply even though they have been going through a problem of water scarcity. As it was also seen in the historical chapter, the Greek Cypriots have been reluctant towards a common solution which proposed political (For example rejection of Annan Plan in 2004). Even when the Republic of Cyprus was formed in 1960, they did not want to share the administration with the Turkish Cypriots, and this has caused severe problems between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Thus, it can be analyzed that the aim of the Greek Cypriots is to include the Turkish Cypriots into the Republic of Cyprus as a minority group. In order to achieve their aim, they have refrained and are refraining from any action that could be interpreted as partial recognition of the Turkish Cypriot administration. Thus, the impact of the past circumstances on the current structure and its limitations on the agents' actions can be observed. Hence, a vital problem such as the water problem has not brought the two communities together. Nevertheless, the pipeline that comes from Turkey will enhance development in TRNC, and so the Greek Cypriots will not be able to achieve their plan of excluding TRNC from the international arena. If TRNC manages to enhance its development and stands on its own, then naturally increase its bargaining power in the negotiations of the Cypriot conflict.

CHAPTER 3: HYDROCARBON DISCOVERIES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: THE CASE OF CYPRUS

As the world population is increasing, the energy demand of the world is also increasing. Fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal are the most used primary energy sources.¹¹⁵ However, in the recent years, new reserves of natural gas have been found in different parts of the world. One of these discoveries was made in the Eastern Mediterranean. In March 2010, “U.S. Geological Survey estimated 122 trillion cubic feet (around 3455 bcm) of recoverable natural gas in the Levant Basin Province using a geology-based assessment methodology”¹¹⁶. This has created new geopolitics of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean Region. In this chapter, emphasis will be given on recent hydrocarbon findings in the Eastern Mediterranean and the changing geopolitics of Cyprus with new explorations of new gas fields in Aphrodite. When Mustafa Akıncı was elected as the new President of TRNC he emphasized that natural gas exploration could be an incentive for a negotiation. He stressed this emphasis by the words,

“Natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean has created a new dynamic for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Instead of fighting over the natural gas that has not yet been extracted to the surface, it is the most rational, fastest and least costly way to agree on how to share the wealth and with a solution together to move this gas to Europe via Turkey. The natural gas wealth beneath our seas, the 9,000 square kilometers of territory of this island, the water that we expect to come to the island from Turkey

¹¹⁵ “Fossil Fuels,” Our World in Data. Accessed April 20, 2018. <https://ourworldindata.org/fossil-fuels>.

¹¹⁶ “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean,” March 2010. *Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean*. U.S. Department of the Interior / U.S. Geological Survey. <https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf>

– all taking into consideration of Turkish Republic authorities – we should show the ability to share these in equitable measures.”¹¹⁷

The new explorations in Israel and Cyprus can contribute to diversification efforts of the European Union and Turkey but the geopolitics in Cyprus is very complicated because of the long-lasting Cyprus conflict. Therefore, it is vital to tackle with the question of whether these recent hydrocarbon findings pave the way to negotiation in the Cyprus conflict. While tackling with this issue, the circumstances that come from the past will also be noticed since they have an impact on the negotiations today. These circumstances also appear as a hurdle for resources to be an incentive in the negotiation process.

3.1. The Importance of Natural Gas

Natural Gas is the youngest fossil fuel, and thus it is becoming a popular primary energy resource. This energy resource is mostly used for electricity generation. Other essential characteristics of natural gas are that it burns more cleanly and efficiently compared to other fossil fuels and thus, generates fewer CO₂ emissions per unit of energy it produces and induces lower non-carbon emissions such as pollutants.¹¹⁸ Another advantage of natural gas is that it requires minimal processing before its use. Also, there are abundant global gas reserves and discoveries are being made in the recent years.¹¹⁹

Compared to other fossil fuels, the capital costs for building power plants for natural gas is relatively low, it is quicker, and it also has an inherent ability to respond quickly to demand changes. Another important characteristic of natural gas it that it can also be used as the crucial backup capacity for renewable power plants.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ “4th President of TRNC Mustafa Akinci,” Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last modified April 30, 2015. <http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/4th-president-of-trnc-mustafa-akinci/>

¹¹⁸ "Natural Gas and the Environment," U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), June 2017, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=natural_gas_environment.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ “Natural Gas and Its Advantages,” n.d. *Shell Global*. <https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/natural-gas/natural-gas-and-its-advantages.html>.

Considering these benefits of natural gas, it is evident that demand for different natural gas markets is rising. More precisely, according to the Gas Report published by International Energy Agency (IEA) in 2017, natural gas demand will grow more than other fossil fuels in the upcoming five years because of its advantages stated above.¹²¹

Table 8.1 > Natural gas demand by region in the New Policies Scenario (bcm)

	2000	2016	2025	2030	2035	2040	2016-40	
							Change	CAAGR*
North America	800	961	1 045	1 068	1 109	1 143	182	0.7%
United States	669	779	834	846	867	880	101	0.5%
Central & South America	97	166	183	205	237	271	106	2.1%
Brazil	9	36	38	43	55	64	28	2.4%
Europe	606	590	604	618	633	631	41	0.3%
European Union	487	463	461	467	469	454	- 8	-0.1%
Africa	57	134	177	211	251	306	171	3.5%
South Africa	1	4	5	7	8	10	6	3.8%
Middle East	174	477	568	657	737	795	318	2.2%
Eurasia	471	575	583	593	615	636	61	0.4%
Russia	388	456	452	456	463	470	13	0.1%
Asia Pacific	314	732	998	1 167	1 331	1 472	740	3.0%
China	28	210	397	482	554	610	401	4.6%
India	28	55	97	126	155	183	128	5.2%
Japan	82	123	95	100	106	107	- 16	-0.6%
Southeast Asia	88	170	195	216	244	269	99	1.9%
Bunkers**	0	0	16	26	37	51	51	n.a.
World	2 518	3 635	4 174	4 545	4 950	5 304	1 669	1.6%

* Compound average annual growth rate. ** LNG used as an international marine fuel.

Table 1: Natural Gas Demand by Region in the New Policies Scenario (Bcm)¹²²

As it can be seen from the table above, natural gas demand will rise almost all over the world. In 2016, demand was 3635 billion cubic meters (bcm), and it is projected that in 2025, the annual gas demand will rise to 4174 bcm and until the year 2040, there will be an additional demand of 1130 bcm of natural gas. This shows that the demand for natural gas will rise, and it also implies that the world will need more gas supply. In other words, as demand for natural gas is increasing, various gas explorations and production are becoming more essential. However, as stated before, there are abundant global natural gas reserves in specific regions, and also there are numerous undiscovered gas reserves in the various parts of the world. This shows that the

¹²¹ “Gas 2017 / Analysis and Forecasts to 2022 / Executive Summary,” 2017. *Gas 2017 / Analysis and Forecasts to 2022 / Executive Summary*. International Energy Agency. <https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/gas2017MRSsum.pdf>.

¹²² “World Energy Outlook,” International Energy Agency, 2017: 339.

importance of natural gas will continue in the coming decades. The chart below depicts the share of natural gas reserves.




Figure 1: Distribution of Proven Reserves¹²³

The pie diagrams above illustrate that the proven natural gas reserves have risen in an important amount since 1996. As it can be seen, in 1996 total natural gas reserves were 123.5 trillion cubic meters (tcm) which have risen to 158.2 tcm in 2006 and reached 186.6 tcm in 2016. The numbers are still rising with new gas discoveries. This indicates that fossil fuels will not lose its importance in the energy mix of various countries. Also, in the chart, it can be seen that most of these reserves are in the Middle East and Europe& Eurasia regions.

Furthermore, a specific focus should be given to the natural gas demand of the European Union. As it is shown in table 1, according to the 2040 projections, the natural gas demand of the EU will decrease in a very small percentage (2%). More precisely, the natural gas demand of the European Union was 463 bcm in 2016. According to the projections, the demand will be 461 bcm in 2025, 467 bcm in 2030, 469 bcm in 2035 and 454 bcm in 2040. Thus, it can be seen that the European Union will still have a high demand for natural gas.

¹²³ “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017,” 2017. <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2017/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2017-full-report.pdf>

Table 8.4 ▷ Natural gas trade by region in the New Policies Scenario

Net importing regions in 2040	Net imports (bcm)			As a share of demand		
	2016	2025	2040	2016	2025	2040
European Union	-329	-374	-389	71%	80%	84%
China	-73	-177	-278	35%	44%	45%
Other Asia Pacific	52	-47	-178	17%	16%	40%
Japan and Korea	-165	-150	-181	98%	98%	99%
India	-24	-55	-99	43%	57%	54%
Other Europe	24	9	-18	16%	6%	10%
Net exporting regions in 2040	Net exports (bcm)			As a share of production		
	2016	2025	2040	2016	2025	2040
Russia	188	265	314	29%	37%	40%
North America	-1	119	192	0%	10%	14%
Middle East	108	134	201	18%	19%	20%
Caspian	80	87	140	40%	40%	46%
Australia	45	100	137	49%	64%	68%
Sub-Saharan Africa	29	48	106	48%	54%	50%
North Africa	42	49	47	29%	26%	19%
Central & South America	10	-6	5	6%	3%	2%

Notes: Positive numbers denote net exports and negative numbers denote net imports. Import and export totals should sum to zero; the difference in 2016 is due to stock changes.

Table 2: Natural Gas Trade by Region in the New Policies Scenario¹²⁴

The table above shows that the European Union is heavily dependent on natural gas imports. Additionally, the net import will be -389 bcm by 2040. This means that the net imports of natural gas in the European Union will rise to 84% by 2040. These facts show that the European Union is the biggest importer of natural gas in the world and it also shows that the import dependency of the Community to natural gas will increase significantly due to low gas production.

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Natural gas					
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Russia	34.6	33.0	32.1	31.2	27.6	26.8	28.3	27.8	32.4	29.7	29.4
Norway	20.2	21.7	23.3	23.7	24.5	22.9	22.1	24.9	23.6	25.0	25.9
Algeria	15.0	13.6	12.7	12.3	11.9	11.7	10.7	10.8	10.1	9.7	8.8
Qatar	1.3	1.5	1.8	1.9	4.6	8.1	9.6	6.8	5.2	5.5	6.1
Libya	1.4	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.2	0.6	1.5	1.4	1.7	1.7
Nigeria	2.9	3.6	3.8	3.3	2.0	3.4	3.6	2.8	1.4	1.2	1.6
Trinidad and Tobago	0.2	1.0	0.7	1.4	1.9	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.5
Peru	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.2
Turkey	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
Others	24.5	23.5	23.1	23.5	24.8	23.5	24.2	23.9	24.8	26.0	25.5

Table 3: Main Origin of Primary Energy Imports of the EU Between 2005-2015¹²⁵

As it can be seen from the table above, the main gas exporters to the EU are Russia, Norway, and Algeria. After the Ukrainian crisis in 2006 and 2009, the Union aimed to diversify its imports of natural gas from Russia. The reason for this was to decrease its dependence on

¹²⁴ "World Energy Outlook," 361.

¹²⁵ "Energy Production and Imports," Eurostat, June 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports

Russian imports. In these two crises, Russia cut supply to Ukraine. Since Ukraine is a transit country which carries Russian gas to Europe, European countries were severely affected by the gas disruptions.¹²⁶ After the two Ukrainian crises, energy security became one of the priority issues on the EU's agenda. At this point, it should be noted that; "The security of the EU's primary energy supplies may be threatened if a high proportion of imports are concentrated among relatively few partners. Almost two thirds (64.1 %) of the EU-28's imports of natural gas in 2015 came from Russia, Norway or Algeria"¹²⁷.

To come back to the Cyprus problem, on March 2010, the U.S. geological survey stated that they are projecting undiscovered natural gas reservoirs in the Levant Basin in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Levant basin is shown in the map below. More elaborately the survey estimated that "For undiscovered gas, the total mean volume is 122,378 billion cubic feet of gas (BCFG), with a range from 50,087 BCFG to 227,430 BCFG"¹²⁸ This amount is a necessary amount for countries in the region to meet their gas demand. Thus, exploration of hydrocarbon in the Eastern Mediterranean became more important because of the export potential of Cyprus and Israel. This also has an implication on the geopolitics of Cyprus. Even though some gas was found after this survey, gas exploration activities are continuing. However, before going into further details of gas explorations and proven reserves, the problems regarding the geopolitics of Cyprus should be analyzed. In other words, there are considerable amount of discovered and undiscovered natural gas reserves in the Levant region, but the potential cannot be used because of the problems of territorial waters, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) between Turkey, TRNC, and Greek Cypriot administration.

¹²⁶ Morena Skalamera, "Energy Security in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis: Getting the Real Threats Right," *Global Policy*, July 2015. <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/sites/default/files/Skalamera - Energy Security in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis, Getting the Real 07.15.pdf>

¹²⁷ "Energy Production and Imports," 2017.

¹²⁸ "Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean," March 2010. *Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean*. U.S. Department of the Interior / U.S. Geological Survey. <https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf>




Figure 2: Levant¹²⁹

3.2. Territorial Waters

The problem of Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea also emerged between Turkey and Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea after the hydrocarbon discovery activities began in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There are three critical issues of the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea that stand as an obstacle in the hydrocarbon issue. These could be explained as Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, and Exclusive Economic Zone.

Before the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the maximum breadth of the territorial waters of states was limited to 3 nautical miles (NM). After the convention in the year 1958, states decided to extend their territorial waters, even though the

¹²⁹ "Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean.", 2010.

convention did not particularly state the maximum breadth of the territorial waters. In this respect, in 1971, some countries including Greece decided to extend its territorial breadth to 12 NM.¹³⁰

12 NM would create a problem in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey due to close location of Greek islands to Turkish coasts. “At present, the breadth of the territorial sea of both Turkey and Greece in the Aegean is six nautical miles”.¹³¹ However, Greece wants to extend its territorial water borders to 12 NM, disadvantaging Turkey in the Aegean Sea. More elaborately,

“At present, due to its many islands, Greek territorial waters make up about 40% of the Aegean Sea. In the case of 12 nautical miles wide territorial waters, the ratio rises to over 70%. In the case of extension of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, Turkey’s territorial waters remain less than 10% of the Aegean Sea while the size of the high seas falls from 51% to 19%.”¹³²

If Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 NM, the Turkish ships and other vessels would need to take permission from Greece in order to get out of the Turkish Straits to the Aegean Sea. Thus, considering that Turkey has a vast coastline in the Aegean Sea, if territorial waters are valid in line with the Greek argument, then Turkey will be ‘stuck in the stairs’.¹³³ Thus, it can be seen that Greece’s claims in the Aegean Sea is unilaterally biased and it deprives Turkey’s fundamental rights in the Aegean Sea.

For many years, Turkey has been urging Greece to negotiate with Turkey to find an equitable solution for both countries interests¹³⁴. However, this problem is still an ongoing issue between Turkey and Greece. At present, Greece has not been able to increase its territorial waters to 12 NM yet.

¹³⁰ Par Didier Ortolland, “The Greco-Turkish Dispute over the Aegean Sea: a Possible Solution?” *La Revue Geopolitique*, April 10, 2009. <https://www.diploweb.com/The-Greco-Turkish-dispute-over-the.html#nb4>

¹³¹ “The Outstanding Aegean Issues.” n.d. Accessed 25 March 2018, *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/maritime-issues---aegean-sea---the-outstanding-aegean-issues.en.mfa>.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ortolland, 2009.

¹³⁴ Ibid.




Figure 3: Territorial Waters in the Aegean Sea¹³⁵

3.3. Continental Shelf

Regarding the debate on the continental shelf, Turkey and Greece have two choices to define the continental shelf. The first option is that the continental shelf division will be based between the coast of Turkey and coast of Greek islands. The second option is that it will be based between the Greek mainland and Turkish mainland.¹³⁶ At this point, it should be noted that the Greek islands are distributed in various areas around the Aegean Sea, and some of these islands such as Rhodes, Kos, Chios, and Lesbos are very close to the Coast of Turkey. Thus, this creates a problem of continental shelf because if continental shelf would start from the Greek islands, then Turkey would have almost no space of continental shelf. However, the Greek officials justify their claims by giving reference to the United Nations Convention on the Law of Seas

¹³⁵ Alkman Granitsas and Stelios Bouras, "Greek Maritime Claims Rock Boat with Turkey." *The Wall Street Journal*, March 7, 2013. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323978104578332352776971978>

¹³⁶ Petros Siousiouras and Georgios Chrysochou, "The Aegean Dispute in the Context of Contemporary Judicial Decisions on Maritime Delimitation." *Laws*, January 14, 2014. www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/3/1/12/pdf

(UNCLOS) in 1995.¹³⁷ According to this treaty, coastal states have exclusive rights over their continental shelf which has a minimum breadth of 200 NM. Additionally, “all islands have a right to territorial waters, a contiguous zone, an Exclusive Economic Zone and a Continental Shelf.”¹³⁸ Thus, the Greeks argue that the continental shelf agreement should be based on the principle of equidistance/median line “between the coast of Greek islands across Turkey and the Turkish coast.”¹³⁹

In contrast, Turkish officials argue that the arguments of the Greek side are invalid because the Greek islands are located in the continental shelf of Turkey. Thus, Turkey claims that the median line method that Greece claims cannot be applied in the Aegean Sea between the Greek islands and the Turkish coasts. More elaborately, the distance between some Greek islands in the Aegean Sea and the Turkish coast is 3 NM. For this reason, they argue that this leaves a very little space for Turkey in the Aegean Sea if they recognize the continental shelf of Greece starting from the Greek islands and rocks. Instead, Turkey argues that the median line should be drawn between the Greek coast and Turkish coast.¹⁴⁰ In this context, the map below depicts Turkey’s perception of the continental shelf.




Figure 4: Median Line According to Turkish Side¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ “Greek-Turkish Dispute over the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.”, *Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, n.d. Accessed 27 March 2018, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/delimitation-of-the-continental-shelf.html>

¹³⁸ Petros Siousiouras and Georgios Chrysochou, “The Aegean Dispute in the Context of Contemporary Judicial Decisions on Maritime Delimitation.” *Laws*, January 14, 2014. www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/3/1/12/pdf

¹³⁹ Siousiouras, 15.

¹⁴⁰ Yüksel İnan and Yücel Acer, “THE AEGEAN DISPUTES.” *Foreign Policy*. n.d., <http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/251202.pdf>

¹⁴¹ Siousiouras, 16.

As it can be seen from the map above, if the Greek islands are not included in the continental shelf, Turkey and Greece would have an equal amount of rights over the Aegean Sea. However, as it can also be seen from the map, the Greek islands (yellow ones) are very close to the Turkish coast. Consequently, it is seen that if the continental shelf of Greece would start from the Greek islands than Turkey would be deprived of its rights in the Aegean Sea.

All in all, the reason why the issue of territorial waters and continental shelf is essential in the Aegean Sea is that this issue also affects the problems in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). More elaborately, if Turkey accepts the territorial water and continental shelf claims of Greece in the Aegean Sea, then it would also have to accept the EEZ perception of Greece and Greek Cypriots in the Mediterranean Sea. This would deprive Turkey of basic rights in the Mediterranean Sea. More elaborate information about how territorial issue in the Aegean Sea affects the EEZ claims in Eastern Mediterranean will be given in the latter parts.

3.4. Exclusive Economic Zone

Before explaining Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the difference between this concept and the continental shelf should be elaborated. EEZ involves the water column and the seabed whereas the Continental Shelf accommodates only the soil and subsoil¹⁴². In 1982, in the Maritime law of the sea, the United Nations put forward the concept of EEZ. According to this law;

“The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.”¹⁴³

¹⁴² "Portuguese Task Group for the Extension of the Continental Shelf." EMEPC. Accessed 25 March 2018, <https://www.emepc.pt/en/146-kit-do-mar/ponte/etapas?start=18>

¹⁴³ "Preamble to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." Accessed 29 March 2018, *United Nations*. United Nations. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm

In Article 57 of Chapter V, it is stated that the exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 NM from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.¹⁴⁴ Also, according to the treaty, countries which have not signed this law should sign bilateral treaties. Turkey has not signed this convention because these laws could not be applied to the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

In the Aegean Sea, there is a narrow sea space between Greece and Turkey, more elaborately, the sea miles are lower than 200 NM. Therefore, this creates a problem between Turkey and Greece like in territorial waters and continental shelf issues in the Aegean Sea. The Aegean Sea dispute has an implication to EEZ of the Mediterranean Sea. The Greek Cypriots and Greece have a different perspective of the EEZ in Eastern Mediterranean than the Turkish and Turkish Cypriots perspective of the EEZ. Below, there are two different maps which depict different arguments of Turkish and Greek sides.




Figure 5: Exclusive Economic Zone from Greek Perspective¹⁴⁵

As is can be seen on the map above, the Greek side has left very little space for Turkey in the Southeastern part of the Aegean Sea because Greek side used 12 NM as a base. Other than that, Greek Cypriot administration defines their EEZ by taking the median of EEZ of Greek islands, Egypt and Turkey. As a result, it can clearly be seen from the map above that the Greek Cypriots and Greeks claim much greater EEZ for themselves. Here it should also be noted that the Greek

¹⁴⁴ "Preamble to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," 2018.

¹⁴⁵ "Can Gas Save Cyprus? The Long-Term Cost of Frozen Conflicts," *International Crisis Group*. March 22, 2013. <http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2013/03/22/can-gas-save-cyprus-the-long-term-cost-of-frozen-conflicts/>

Cypriots signed EEZ delamination agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010).¹⁴⁶



Figure 6: Continental Shelf Agreement Between Turkey and TRNC¹⁴⁷

On the 21st of September 2011, Turkey and TRNC signed a continental shelf agreement which creates a borderline between the Northern Coast of Cyprus and the Southern Coast of Turkey based on international law. This continental shelf agreement was actually a reaction to the drilling process started by the Greek Cypriots.¹⁴⁸ This was a response to EEZ agreement between Israel and the Greek Cypriot administration.



Figure 7: Exclusive Economic Zone from Turkish Perspective¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ "Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf," *MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Republic of Cyprus*. Accessed 25 March 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/mfa86_en/mfa86_en?OpenDocument

¹⁴⁷ Ayla Gürel, Fiona Mullen, and Harry Tzimitras, "The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios," Rep. *The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios*. Oslo, Norway: PRIO (2013). [https://files.prio.org/publication_files/Cyprus/Report 2013-1 Hydrocarbons.pdf](https://files.prio.org/publication_files/Cyprus/Report%202013-1%20Hydrocarbons.pdf).

¹⁴⁸ Gürel, 24.

¹⁴⁹ "Can Gas Save Cyprus? The Long-Term Cost of Frozen Conflicts," 2013.

It should be noted that the maximum width of the Mediterranean Sea does not exceed approximately 300 NM. From the map above, it can be seen that Turkey defines its EEZ by taking the median of Turkish and Egyptian coasts. Other than that, as stated before, in the territorial waters issue in the Aegean Sea, Turkey gives the 6 NM to Rhodes, Karpathos and other islands for the determination of the EEZ. Besides, Turkey also gives 6 NM to Southwestern part of Cyprus.

Moreover, the EEZ plays a very crucial role in the energy politics of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Cyprus issue because in 2007 and 2014 the Greek Cypriots opened the EEZ zones to international firms for offshore exploration activities.¹⁵⁰ Turkish officials stated that this action could not be acceptable because there was an overlapping claim on EEZ between Turkey and the Greek Cypriots. Thus, the hydrocarbon exploration in these areas has created a clash of interest between Turkey and the Greek Cypriots.¹⁵¹

3.5. The Beginning of Gas Discoveries

The most significant discovery in Israel was the Leviathan field. The discovery was made in 2010 by the firms Noble Energy, Delek Drilling, Avner Oil and Ratio Oil. In October 2012, it was estimated that this field had 17 tcf which means 491 bcm and it was also estimated that other smaller fields would have a total of 190 bcm¹⁵². After this occasion, in December 2010, Israel agreed on EEZ with the Greek Cypriot Administration. The maritime border agreement with Israel provided support for the Greek Cypriot Administration to start drilling at the Aphrodite gas field in block 12, which was licensed to American energy company Noble Energy in 2008.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ "Can Gas Save Cyprus? The Long-Term Cost of Frozen Conflicts," 2013.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Gürel, 2-3.

¹⁵³ Chris Lo, "Timeline: Game-Changing Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean," *Offshore Technology*, December 13, 2017. <https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/timeline-game-changing-gas-discoveries-eastern-mediterranean/>.

After the natural gas discovery in Israel, on December 2011, another natural gas field was discovered on the Aphrodite field in the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus. The firm Nobel estimated that this field had 198 bcm of natural gas but Noble's partner, Delek, estimated that the natural gas reserves were around 147 bcm¹⁵⁴. At first, the amount of the discovered fields seemed inefficient to do further exploration of hydrocarbons, but after the enormous potential of the Zohr field of Egypt was discovered by Eni, energy companies decided to continue their hydrocarbon exploration activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁵⁵ In this respect, Eni decided to make drilling in Block 6 and Block 3 in Cypriot EEZ. Other than Eni, ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum also decided to make drilling in Block 10 of Cypriot EEZ.¹⁵⁶

What is essential about this exploration activities are that as stated before, according to the U.S. geological survey, there is a greater potential for natural gas in the Mediterranean field. Thus, if the higher potential is found, they could be combined with the recent findings. This would make the Eastern Mediterranean a more significant supplier of natural gas. That is why exploratory drillings in the Eastern Mediterranean are very important, and that is why the problem of the EEZ is becoming a more crucial problem in the Cypriot conflict.

3.6. The Stances of the Different Sides on the Hydrocarbon Discoveries

The recent gas findings in the Eastern Mediterranean raised two important questions. The first question is; Who has right to do explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean? The second question is; Do Greek Cypriots need to share revenues from hydrocarbon exploration with Turkish Cypriots?

¹⁵⁴ Gürel, 3.

¹⁵⁵ "The Eastern Mediterranean's New Great Game Over Natural Gas," *Stratfor*, February 22, 2018. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/eastern-mediterraneans-new-great-game-over-natural-gas>

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

To start of with the Greek Cypriots perspective, the officials base their right of exploration of the hydrocarbons on the multilateral agreements on the EEZ and also on UN law of maritime.¹⁵⁷ Here it should be noted that the Greek Cypriots signed EEZ delamination agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010).¹⁵⁸ Thus, the Greek Cypriot officials basically state that they have the rights to conduct explorations.

In response to the second question, the Greek Cypriot officials state that they can share the revenues that come from hydrocarbon explorations with Turkish Cypriots only if the conflict on Cyprus resolves. At first, Greek Cypriot officials stated that they were ready to share the hydrocarbon findings and they even stated that these might be a steppingstone into a solution for the Cyprus conflict.¹⁵⁹ However, the Greek Cypriot government was criticized by the opposition and the citizens. This led to a change in the rhetoric of the government. With the new rhetoric, the Greek Cypriot officials stated that it is difficult to talk about sharing the revenues before finding a solution to the Cypriot problem.¹⁶⁰

At this point, the Turkish Cypriot stance was actually quite different. Instead of differentiating the two factors of the right to explore hydrocarbons and sharing the revenues, the Turkish Cypriots took these issues as a whole, and they based their argument on the agreements on 1960. According to this agreement, the Greek Cypriots need to share the sovereignty as well as the revenues of the hydrocarbon findings with them. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots officials pointed out that, the Greek Cypriots do not have a right to engage in hydrocarbon exploration discussions without the consent of the Turkish Cypriots¹⁶¹.

At this point, Turkey is concerned with the hydrocarbon discovery activities of the Greek Cypriots because they assert that Greek Cypriots violate the EEZ of Turkey. Also, Turkey stresses out that the Greek Cypriot administration does not have a right to represent the island

¹⁵⁷ Ayla Gürel, Fiona Mullen, and Harry Tzimitras, "The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios," Rep. *The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios*. Oslo, Norway: PRIO (2013). https://files.prio.org/publication_files/Cyprus/Report_2013-1_Hydrocarbons.pdf.

¹⁵⁸ "Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf," 2018.

¹⁵⁹ Gürel, 44.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Gürel, 49.

has a whole. Consequently, Turkey is concerned with the Turkish Cypriots' rights in the hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in Cyprus.¹⁶² More elaborately,

“Turkey also says that the Turkish Cypriots, or equivalently the TRNC, have ‘inherent equal rights and interests’ in the maritime zones of Cyprus. Thus, from Turkey’s point of view, the EEZ delimitation agreements between what is internationally regarded as the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and Egypt, Lebanon and Israel have no validity as they have been signed by the Greek Cypriots alone with disregard for the Turkish Cypriots’ equal rights.”¹⁶³

This means that Turkey does not recognize the hydrocarbon exploration of Greek Cypriot administration because they do not represent the whole island. In this respect, Turkey argues that the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in the maritime zones and natural resources of Cyprus is overseen¹⁶⁴.




Figure 8: Exclusive Economic Zone Claimed by Cyprus¹⁶⁵

As it can be seen from the map, Turkey claims a portion of numbers 1,4,5,6 and 7 of the alleged EEZ of Greek Cypriots. On the contrary, the Greek Cypriot administration claimed that these parts belong to Greek Cypriot EEZ.

¹⁶² Gürel, 49.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ *Cyprus Mail*, "Turkey and the Law of the Sea: Some Facts," February 11, 2018. <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/11/turkey-law-sea-facts/>

3.7. Gas Discoveries in Cyprus

Even though there are overlapping interests in the EEZ's, Greek Cypriot administration violated the EEZ of Turkey by giving licenses for hydrocarbon exploration activities to international energy companies. In order to search for any potential of hydrocarbon in the EEZ of Greek Cypriots, they opened the EEZ for a two-dimensional seismic study in 2006 and a three-dimensional seismic study in 2007.¹⁶⁶ After these studies, the Greek Cypriot administration opened first exploration licensing round in the period February- August 2007. However, blocks 13 and 3 were not searched in the first round. At the end of August, Noble Energy International was granted a license to search the block number 12 in 2008. Additional seismic searches were initiated in 2009.¹⁶⁷

As stated before, a critical point in the hydrocarbon discovery happened when Turkish-Israeli relations deteriorated in 2010. In the same year, Israel signed the EEZ delamination agreement with the Greek Cypriot administration which paved the way for Noble Energy to start its first exploratory drilling in Block 12. There was a giant natural gas field found in the Leviathan field of Israel. Block 12 is very close to the Leviathan field.¹⁶⁸ “In December 2011 Noble announced the discovery of the Aphrodite field with a mean potential of 3-6 Tcf”.¹⁶⁹ However, after the second drilling process, it was stated that the potential of the field could not exceed 5 Tcf. Afterwards, no more drilling was done in the area.¹⁷⁰

In reaction to licensing of Greek Cypriot administration, Turkey gave response by giving license to Turkish national energy company TPAO to make drilling in Block 3 in 2011. This stems from

¹⁶⁶ Hayriye Kahveci Özgür, “Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons: Regional Potential, Challenges Ahead, and the ‘Hydrocarbon-Ization’ of the Cyprus Problem.” *Perceptions* 22 (2017): 37. <http://sam.gov.tr/tr/eastern-mediterranean-hydrocarbons-regional-potential-challenges-ahead-and-the-hydrocarbon-ization-of-the-cyprus-problem-hayriye-kahveci-ozgur/>.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

the fact that Ankara argues that Block 3 lies on the EEZ of Turkish Cypriots rather than Greek Cypriots.¹⁷¹

After the potential of the Aphrodite field was discovered, in February 2012, the Greek Cypriot administration decided to initiate a second round of licensing. There was a high number of interest, and after negotiations, the Greek Cypriot administration decided to authorize exploratory drilling in blocks 2,3,9,10 and 11. The blocks, 2,3 and 9 were granted to ENI Cyprus Ltd. and KOGAS Cyprus Ltd Consortium. The firm TOTAL E&P Cyprus B.V. was granted the licenses of Blocks 10 and 11.¹⁷²

In 2014, the second exploratory drilling resumed in block 9. However, after two processes of drillings, there was no gas found. Even, ENI stopped the exploration process. This occasion also discouraged French company TOTAL from conducting exploration activities in the blocks 10 and 11.¹⁷³

In 2016 the Greek Cypriot administration decided to grant licenses for blocks 6,8 and 10 which would be the third round of exploration licensing. After several negotiations it was decided that ENI Cyprus Ltd. /Total E&P Cyprus B.V. would be responsible for Block 6; ENI Cyprus Ltd. was granted Block 8; and Exxon Mobil Exploration and Production Cyprus (Offshore) Ltd. Qatar Petroleum International Upstream O.P.C. were selected to start the operations in block 10.¹⁷⁴

3.8. Geopolitics of Recent Gas Findings

As stated before, ENI got exploration license from Greek Cypriots in 2012 while Turkey granted license to TPAO to make exploration in Block 3 earlier than Greek Cypriot administration. In

¹⁷¹ “The Eastern Mediterranean's New Great Game Over Natural Gas,” *Stratfor*, February 22, 2018. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/eastern-mediterraneans-new-great-game-over-natural-gas>

¹⁷² Kahveci-Özgür, 39.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

February 2018, when ENI started drilling activities in Block 3, Turkish warships gave a response by blocking ENI drilling vessels near block 3. This is because Turkish side claims that Block 3 belongs to EEZ of Turkish Cypriots. After this incident, the vessels of ENI left Block 3 in order to not to fuel the dispute.¹⁷⁵

Besides ENI, in March 2018, two ExxonMobil vessels began explorations in block 10 which is in the southwestern part of EEZ of Republic of Cyprus. Even though Turkey kept ENI vessel out of Block 3, it could not do the same thing for ExxonMobil vessels. In fact, Turkey has no claims on block 10, but it expressed its concerns about unilateral drilling decision of the Greek Cypriot administration. Turkey could not block ExxonMobil vessels because the U.S. Navy 6th fleet ships escorted to ExxonMobil vessels and the U.S. warships conducted exercise near Cyprus. Consequently, it was not possible for Turkish warships to block ExxonMobil vessels. Rather than blocking, Turkish side warned the U.S. against sending its 6th fleet to Mediterranean region.¹⁷⁶

The presence of U.S. Navy ships to protect drilling vessels in the Mediterranean caused deterioration of the relations between Turkey and the U.S.. Protection of drilling vessels by the U.S. Navy demonstrates that the U.S. recognizes EEZ of the Greek Cypriot administration and it will protect the interests of ExxonMobil by using force if Turkey attempts to intercept American drilling vessels. The U.S. officials repeatedly voiced their support to the Greek Cypriot administration to make hydrocarbon drilling, but they also stated that hydrocarbon resources need to be shared on equal footing between the two communities.¹⁷⁷ However, Greek Cypriots are not willing to share hydrocarbon resources with Turkish Cypriots. The main proof of this is a change in the rhetoric of Greek Cypriots as stated earlier. At first, they agreed to share revenues with Turkish Cypriots, but then they changed their decision.¹⁷⁸ Other than that, Greek Cypriots took unilateral decisions both to make hydrocarbon drilling and giving licenses

¹⁷⁵ “Despite Threats, Exxon Mobil Moves Ahead Off Cyprus.” *The Maritime Executive*, March 14, 2018. <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/despite-threats-exxonmobil-moves-ahead-off-cyprus#gs.25HxJ88>.

¹⁷⁶ “US Navy Arrives Off Cyprus, Near Turkish Warships Blockade.” *The National Herald*. March 7, 2018. <https://www.thenationalherald.com/192914/us-navy-arrives-off-cyprus-near-turkish-warships-blockade/>.

¹⁷⁷ “Despite Threats, Exxon Mobil Moves Ahead Off Cyprus.” *The Maritime Executive*. March 14, 2018. <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/despite-threats-exxonmobil-moves-ahead-off-cyprus#gs.25HxJ88>.

¹⁷⁸ Gürel, 49.

to international energy companies to make drilling. This shows that backed by the European Union and the United States, Greek Cypriots try to maximize its gains as possible.

As stated earlier, the natural gas discoveries of Noble Energy and its partners in Leviathan field in Israel led to natural gas discoveries in Aphrodite field in Cyprus in 2012. Leviathan field has the capacity of 621 bcm.¹⁷⁹ As it can be seen in the figure, there is only 7 km between Leviathan and Aphrodite fields. Besides, Italian energy company found gas in Zohr field in Egypt. The hydrocarbon reservoir has the total capacity of 850 bcm.¹⁸⁰ As seen from the map below, there is only 90 km between Aphrodite field and Zohr field. Therefore, it was not surprising for Noble Energy to find gas in Aphrodite field.



Figure 9: Gas Fields in the Eastern Mediterranean¹⁸¹

Even though gas discovered in Aphrodite field, the amount of gas is not higher compared to Zohr and Leviathan fields. There is only roughly 120-129 bcm gas available in the Aphrodite field.¹⁸² Currently, residents of Cyprus do not use natural gas, and there is no gas infrastructure. It is expected that building gas infrastructure for gas will be costly for Cyprus because they need

¹⁷⁹ Chen Herzog, Norden Shalabna, and Guy Maor. "Israel Natural Gas Demand Forecast 2017-2040." July 2, (2017):85, <https://www.delek-group.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/BDO-Gas-Market-Forecast-2-07-2017-for-Delek-Group-with-final-letter-1.pdf>

¹⁸⁰ "Zohr: production underway in record time." *ENI*. Accessed March 08, 2018, https://www.eni.com/en_IT/operations/upstream/exploration-model/zohr-egypt.page

¹⁸¹ "Israel's Leviathan Field Development Progress." *Lebanon Gas News*. September 04, 2017, <https://lebanongasnews.com/wp/leviathan-field-development-progress/>

¹⁸²Michael Ratner, "Natural Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean." August 15, 2016: 5. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44591.pdf>

to build pipelines to deliver gas to both industrial facilities, power plants, and homes.¹⁸³ However, gas infrastructure can decrease energy import dependency of the Greek Cypriot part. Besides domestic use, Cyprus can export its gas in two ways. Either through LNG or pipeline. Cyprus is considering export its gas to Europe. However, since the discovered gas is around 120-129 bcm, Cyprus is waiting for new gas discoveries to export its gas.¹⁸⁴

Recent findings in Israel and Cyprus have created the question of whether the EU can import natural gas from Israel and Cyprus together. This is important because this opens a door for the EU to find a new route to diversify Russian gas.

With the planned construction of Vassilikos LNG facilities, Cyprus aims to export LNG by the end of 2019.¹⁸⁵ However, without new discoveries, it will not be cost competitive for Cyprus to export its gas in the form of LNG. Cyprus can export its gas to three countries via pipeline. These countries are Egypt, Greece, and Turkey.¹⁸⁶

In 2017, Egypt and Cyprus agreed to start negotiations to build a pipeline between Egypt and Cyprus. Egypt wants to buy as much as gas possible from the newly found Aphrodite field. The plan of Egypt is to buy Cypriot gas, convert it to LNG and to sell to Europe.¹⁸⁷ Since a great amount of gas discovered in Zohr field of Egypt, Egypt will combine its gas with Cypriot gas and sell it to European countries. However, construction of a pipeline is costlier than LNG in Cyprus because of the very long undersea routes of the pipeline. At present, the export capacity of Egypt cannot be calculated given its rising domestic gas demand.¹⁸⁸

In 2017, the governments of Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy signed a joint declaration for the implementation of Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline (EMP). The length of the pipeline is over 2000 km, and majority part of the pipeline will cross underwater. The project is designed to

¹⁸³ Ratner, 5.

¹⁸⁴ Kakouris, Stephen, "Cyprus Looks to Revive Vasilikos LNG Plan," *Interfax Global Energy*, Interfax Energy Ltd. March 16, 2017. <http://interfaxenergy.com/gasdaily/article/25072/cyprus-looks-to-revive-vasilikos-lng-plan>.

¹⁸⁵ "Cyprus to Invest in Vassilikos Port LNG Facility," *PortSEurope*. September 17, 2017. <http://www.portseurope.com/cyprus-to-invest-in-vassilikos-port-lng-facility/>.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ *Cyprus Mail Online*, "Cyprus, Egypt Preparing Ground for Gas Pipeline, Foreign Minister Says," April 10, 2018. <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/04/10/cyprus-egypt-preparing-ground-gas-pipeline-foreign-minister-says/>.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

carry 12-16 bcm gas from Leviathan and Aphrodite fields to Greece and then to Italy. Considering its long undersea route, the costs of the pipeline is high compared to other available options (LNG and pipeline to Turkey).¹⁸⁹ However, in 2015, the EU prioritized the project under Project of Common Interest (PCI), and feasibility studies are being made. The main aim of the PCI is to develop projects that will strengthen energy links and infrastructure of European countries.¹⁹⁰ The European Union gives special attention to the project because the project can help the EU to diversify its energy suppliers and secure its energy supply.¹⁹¹ It is worth to remind that Cyprus will be able to supply gas thanks to Israeli gas export capacity. Without Israeli gas export, Cypriot gas remains insignificant.

Another possible route is a direct pipeline between Israel and Turkey in which Cyprus supplies its gas to that pipeline. It is the cheapest and shortest pipeline compared to Egypt- Cyprus pipeline and EastMed pipeline.¹⁹² At present, Turkey and the European Union have connected gas infrastructures and pipelines. Additionally, new pipelines are being built, and they will be in service until 2020. These are Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) pipelines. TANAP has 16 bcm capacity whereas TAP has 10 bcm capacity, and they will carry Azeri gas to Europe. Since there will be existing infrastructure, it will be less costly for both Israel and Cyprus to deliver their gas to Turkey and then to Europe.¹⁹³

The proposed pipeline can only pass through two routes. In the first route, the pipeline can pass from EEZ of Syria and Lebanon, and in the second route, the pipeline can pass from EEZ of Cyprus.¹⁹⁴ Considering hostile relations between Israel and Arab countries, the first route is not viable for the pipeline. In the second route, the proposed pipeline needs to pass from EEZ of Cyprus. However, Cyprus could be reluctant to give permission for the passage of the proposed

¹⁸⁹ "Eastmed," *IGI Poseidon*, April 6, 2018. <http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/eastmed>.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Pasquale De Micco, "The prospect of Eastern Mediterranean gas production: An alternative energy supplier for the EU?" Directorate-General for External Policies. European Parliament. April 2014: 16. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2014/522339/EXPO-AFET_SP%282014%29522339_EN.pdf

¹⁹³ Pasquale De Micco, 22.

¹⁹⁴ Pasquale De Micco, 21.

pipeline. This stems from the tense relations between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. Noble is the operator of Aphrodite field together with its Israeli partner Delek company. The latter company insists on the construction of a pipeline to Egypt and Turkey, and they are reluctant for the construction of LNG facilities in Cyprus.¹⁹⁵ Relatively low costs for the construction of the pipeline and available infrastructure to export gas to Europe makes Turkish route more profitable to both Cyprus and Israel. Even though Turkish route is one of the economically viable options, Cyprus expresses their support on EastMed pipeline while Israel remains indecisive. This is because political interests dominate economic interests. The same case was seen in the second chapter of the thesis. The parties have political concerns and therefore they prefer to choose economically more costly options in order to increase their political gains.

In the regional context, Russia was totally against the construction of the pipeline that goes to Turkey and Europe because Russia is the greatest gas supplier to the EU and it wants to protect its market share in Europe. As stated before, after the 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises, the EU started to reconsider its dependence on a single supplier that is Russia, and they developed Southern Gas Corridor (SGC).¹⁹⁶ With this corridor, the EU plans to reach gas sources from the Caspian, the Middle-East and the Mediterranean regions. To prevent the construction of a pipeline to Turkey, Russia stands on the side of the Greek Cypriot administration to fuel friction between the two communities.¹⁹⁷

3.9. The Impact of Natural Gas Explorations on the Mediation Process

The Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of TRNC regards the natural gas exploration as,

¹⁹⁵Michael Hadjitofi, "Gas in Cyprus: Opportunities for Dutch Business & Knowledge Institutions." Rep. *Gas in Cyprus: Opportunities for Dutch Business & Knowledge Institutions*. Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Nicosia, Cyprus.14, 2017.

¹⁹⁶ Simone Tagliapietra, "The EU-Turkey Energy Relations After the 2014 Ukraine Crisis: Enhancing Th Partnership in a Rapidly Changing Environment." *Energy:Resource and Markets Series*, 2014. <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/107714/1/NDL2014-075.pdf>.

¹⁹⁷ *Sigma Live*, "Russia: Turkey Needs to Express Support to Cyprus Talks," June 25, 2016. <http://www.sigmalive.com/en/news/politics/146290/russia-turkey-needs-to-express-support-to-cyprus-talks>.

“The natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean provide a potential for cooperation not only between the two sides on the Island, but also among other actors in the region, while at the same time providing a potential for economic interdependence that would serve regional stability. The Greek Cypriot leadership, however, has opted to turn this area for potential cooperation into a source of regional tension by attempting to create a *fait accompli*.”¹⁹⁸

Furthermore, when Akıncı was elected as President he declared that the gas exploration activities could go both ways. They can be an incentive for cooperation or they could also give harm. He stated this as,

“(…)I see a big opportunity there, if treated properly, handled properly, without any fear of accidents [ourselves] and the others we can get mutual benefit out of it ... If not handled properly, you may expect accidents at any time.”¹⁹⁹

However, the Greek Cypriot administration stated various times that the sharing of the resources is only available after the Cyprus conflict is settled. This stance of the Greek Cypriot officials could also be seen by the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RoC, Mr Ioannis Kasoulides, “(…) Extraordinary potentials in energy are there and could be even stronger after an agreement on Cyprus.”²⁰⁰

Thus, both parties believe that energy resources could be an incentive for cooperation. However, Greek Cypriot officials argue that this cooperation could only be done after the settlement of the Cyprus Conflict whereas Turkish Cypriot officials believe that the resources should be used as an incentive for the settlement of the Conflict. Hence, the circumstances that comes from the past shapes the current structure of the conflict today. Here, the circumstances that come from the past is the fact that RoC cannot cooperate with TRNC because it will be partially recognizing them. Additionally, both parties want to increase their political hands in the negotiation process. Sharing the resource of natural gas would increase the political hands of the TRNC. Therefore, it can be argued that the Greek Cypriots want to use this as a tool to increase their own political

¹⁹⁸ “Regarding the Natural Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of TRNC. Last modified February 13, 2018. <http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/statement-regarding-natural-resources-eastern-mediterranean/>

¹⁹⁹ *Al Jazeera News*, “Akinci: Greek Cypriots All Talk and No Action on Reunification,” March 13, 2018. <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2018/03/akinci-greek-cypriots-talk-action-reunification-180329094015316.html>

²⁰⁰ “The Minister of Foreign Affairs Met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy,” MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Republic of Cyprus. Last modified September 13, 2016. [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/All/CDF95BCFE095EFE8C225802D00371FB2?OpenDocument&highlight=natural gas](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/All/CDF95BCFE095EFE8C225802D00371FB2?OpenDocument&highlight=natural%20gas).

gains. This stance was also seen in the previous chapter. In this respect, it can be argued that and this practice comes from the past and it shapes the actions of the agents today.

Conclusion

To put it in a nutshell, the Eastern Mediterranean has a significant potential of natural gas fields. However, there are ongoing disputes between Greece and Turkey on territorial waters and continental shelf. Also, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey have different perceptions of the EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean. This creates disputes in the hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities. Also, as stated in this chapter, if Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Turkey, and Israel collaborate to export the gas to Europe then all of these parties would benefit economically from the solution. Thus, if such collaboration is done, this might be a first stepping stone in trying to find a solution to the Cypriot dispute. However, as stated in the historical analysis chapter, the Greek Cypriot administration does not want to collaborate with the Turkish Cypriots because they do not want to recognize them as a different community. Thus, in this chapter it is argued that the historical structure of the conflict limits the choices and actions of the agents. More elaborately, since the Greek Cypriot officials do not want to recognize TRNC as a different community this affects the current flow of the negotiation today.

In this respect, the Greek Cypriot administration is using other tools that suits the circumstances that comes from the past to find a solution. They believe that if they do not try to negotiate by taking into account the claims of the Turkish Cypriots, then the Turkish Cypriots could stop resisting to international pressure and naturally they will except to be a minority group in the Republic of Cyprus. However, in this chapter, it could be seen that if the countries stated above collaborated in exporting the natural gas found in the Leviathan field and Aphrodite field, then they would all gain economic benefits. Hence, this would create an atmosphere in which the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would find an atmosphere in which they could try to solve the dispute. Today, both the Cypriot conflict and the hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities is an ongoing process. However, as seen in the case today it can be stated that even if more gas will be found this would not be an incentive for the conflict. Rather, it would increase

the dispute because as seen in various parts of the thesis, the different parts of the conflict find political gains more important than economic gains.

CHAPTER 4: COOPERATION VERSUS DISCORD IN THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

On the 23rd of March 2015, Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı and Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades walked together through both sides of Nicosia. This occasion revived the hope for a settlement of the Cypriot conflict.²⁰¹ In this respect, at the beginning of 2017, the Geneva negotiation rounds started. However, as in the past, these rounds could not bring a settlement to the Cypriot conflict. Thus, it can be inferred that after the change in agents, the posture of the friendship of both Cypriots leaders did not last long. There were three main factors which stood as an obstacle for the negotiations. These were the issues of Karpas peninsula, the military issue, and the question of rotating presidency.²⁰² In this chapter, these issues have been elaborated. However, in order to analyze the effect of these factors on the Cypriot conflict, the chapter also briefly demonstrates how the increasing regional power of Turkey affects the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, due to recent hydrocarbon findings in the Eastern Mediterranean, the importance of the region has increased. Thus, this chapter argues that Turkey, as a rising regional power, has a significant impact on the Cypriot conflict. Both the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots are trying to gain more political benefits from the negotiation process. After elaborating on these different issues, it can also be argued that due to Turkey's regional power, the Greek Cypriots officials are trying to increase their political gains.

²⁰¹ *Deutsche Welle*. "Rival Leaders Take Historic Stroll through Cyprus Capital," May 23, 2015. <http://www.dw.com/en/rival-leaders-take-historic-stroll-through-cyprus-capital/a-18472011>.

²⁰² Fikret Bila, "Kıbrıs'ın Geleceği." *Hurriyet*, January 10, 2017. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/fikret-bila/kibrisin-gelecegi-40331438>.

4.1. Turkey as a Regional Power

In order to understand the place of Turkey in its region, Turkish Foreign policy will be briefly explained in three periods. The first period is from 2002-2010, the second period is from 2010-2015, and the third period is from 2015-present. The most important occasions in the first period were the September 11 attacks and the following ‘war on terror’.²⁰³ In the first period, “Turkish foreign policy was shaped by soft power and active globalization.”²⁰⁴ Thus, Turkish foreign policy started to change, and Turkey started to carry out the role of a mediator. In this respect, the country also started to prioritize cooperation. For example, Turkey arbitrated the conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Israel and Hamas and Syria and Israel. This shows that instead of focusing on security by using hard power, the country started to put more emphasis on cooperation. Besides, Turkey also started to give importance to economic cooperation. An example for this is the Caucasus Platform for Economic Cooperation with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia which was initiated by Turkey.²⁰⁵ Thus in this period, the defense spending of Turkey had also declined whereas Turkey’s role in the international organizations had increased.²⁰⁶ One important example for this is that in the period of 2009-2010 Turkey has also served in the United Nations Security Council.²⁰⁷

Additionally, since 2000, Turkey has been going through a period of Europeanization. Therefore, in the first period, the role of Europeanization is very important since it has affected the foreign policy of Turkey. In 1999, in the Helsinki summit, Turkey was granted a candidate status. In this respect, between 1999-2004, Turkey tried to adopt democratization and reform

²⁰³ E. Fuat Keyman, “A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards Proactive ‘Moral Realism.’” *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 1 (2017): 58.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ Joerg Baudner, “The Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government.” *Insight Turkey* 16, no. 3 (2014): 87.

²⁰⁶ Baudner, 88.

²⁰⁷ “Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy.” *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Accessed April 25. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>

packages.²⁰⁸ Besides, with Europeanization, the Turkish military's role in the foreign policy decision making and also public policy making declined. Turkey started to put emphasis on diplomatic tools rather than other tools including hard power.²⁰⁹ However, this situation started to change in 2006, when the European Council froze 8 chapters related to the Customs Union and the accession negotiations could not advance. The reason for this was because of the hostile relations between the Greek Cypriot government and Turkey. The Council demanded Turkey to open its borders and airports to the Republic of Cyprus and the Council put forward that they would not open related chapters until Turkey fulfills its commitments. In 2007, France vetoed the opening of five chapters and in 2009, the Republic of Cyprus vetoed the opening of six chapters. In total, 19 chapters were blocked.²¹⁰

More elaborately, Turkey has been trying to consolidate its relations with the European Union for a very long time. Turkey applied to the EEC in 1959 as an associate member and it applied to the EC in 1987. However, Turkey's application was rejected when it applied in 1987. Also, in the Luxembourg summit in 1997, it was stated that Turkey could not be given a candidate status but when Ankara suspended all relations with the EU, Turkey was given a candidate status in the Helsinki summit in 1999. Finally, in 2005, full membership negotiations initiated.²¹¹ However, in 2004 Republic of Cyprus became a member of the EU which affected the negotiation process of Turkey.²¹² Thus, here it should be pointed out that Turkey is the sole country that is not able to become a member while it is one of the first applicants of the community. Therefore, Turkey started to move away from its Western orientation and its relationship with the European Union started to change. "The virtuous cycle of reform that characterized the 1999-2005 period has been replaced by a vicious cycle in which lack of conditionality feeds into political stagnation which in turn moves Turkey and the EU further

²⁰⁸ Meltem Müftüler Baç, 'Turkey's Political Reforms: The Impact of the European Union', *South east European Politics and Societies* 10, no. 1 (2005), 16-30.

²⁰⁹ Meltem Müftüler-Bac and Yaprak Gursoy, "Is there a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? : An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates," *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 3 (2010), 420.

²¹⁰ "Türkiye-AB İlişkileri Kronolojisi," Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı. August 7, 2017, https://www.ab.gov.tr/siteimages/2017_08/kronoloji.pdf

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² "Cyprus," *Europa.eu*. European Union, accessed 28 May 2018, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/cyprus_en#overview.

away from one another.”²¹³ In other words, as hopes of Turkey to become a member declined, Turkey has moved away from aligning with the EU and also differences started to emerge in its foreign policy.

The second period started with the Arab Uprisings. To put the uprisings in a nutshell, the first uprisings started in Tunisia as a bottom up protest against the authoritarian regimes, urging a more democratic form of government. Later on, these uprisings spread to other countries in the region. After all, these uprisings did not turn out as planned, which turned the region to an unstable place with internal wars and so on. In this regard, Turkey was influenced from these changes, which had impacted its foreign policy.²¹⁴

The third period was not very much different from the second period. The effects of the previous period still lasted. The most important occasions which have affected the global environment and Turkey were the refugee crisis, war against ISIS, problems in the MENA region and so on.²¹⁵ By considering the environment in its immediate neighborhood in the last two periods, it can be stated that in such a nexus, Turkish foreign policy started to divert from soft to hard power. More elaborately,

“From the war against ISIS to the creation of order and stability, from managing the refugee crisis to state building, the pivotal role of Turkey was perceived more in security terms rather than in terms of economy, culture, identity and democracy. Turkey’s military and geopolitical hard power capacities began to draw attention.”²¹⁶

All of these depict the changes in the Turkish Foreign Policy from 2010 onwards. Furthermore, there were also other occasions which have affected Turkey’s foreign policy and its role in the region. An essential turning point was the deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli relations. Until 2009, Turkey and Israel had good relations. They had cooperated in many areas including economy and politics. Furthermore, Turkey played a significant role as a mediator in the conflicts between Israel-Syria and Israel- Lebanon.²¹⁷ However, in 2009, the Davos crisis

²¹³ Senem Aydın-Düzgit, and E. Fuat Keyman, “EU-Turkey Relations and the Stagnation of Turkish Democracy.” Working paper. *Global Turkey in Europe* (2013).

²¹⁴ Keyman, 59.

²¹⁵ Keyman, 63.

²¹⁶ Ibid.


²¹⁷ Baudner 87.

erupted which deteriorated the relations between these two countries. Another crisis, the low chair crisis, took place in the next year. This crisis increased the tension between Israeli and Turkish officials which further deteriorated the relations between these the two countries. Lastly, the Mavi Marmara was an occasion in which the relations between these two countries deteriorated.²¹⁸ This is another clear depiction of Turkey’s transformation from soft power to hard power.

Since 2002, Turkey has been transforming into a regional power. Turkey’s “proactive foreign policy has seen it act as a pivotal state/regional power in an uncertain, insecure and globalizing world.”²¹⁹ In other to elaborate this role of Turkey, the concept of regional power will be clarified.

In general, a regional power is a country that has economic and military capabilities and it is also the ability to use these capabilities to convince a sufficient number of countries in the region. These countries can also have the power to represent the other states in the region in other places and so on.²²⁰

To start with economic capability, the chart blow shows the GDP of different countries in the region.



²¹⁸ İdris Demir, ed. *Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: Under the Shadow of the Arab Spring*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017: 13-14.

²¹⁹ Keyman, 62.

²²⁰ Baudner, 84.

Figure 10: GDP of 15 Middle-East Countries²²¹

IMF data shows that Turkey has the greatest GDP among 15 Middle-East countries. As stated in the clarification in the concept of regional power, economy is one of the important factors for regional leadership. Thus, from the figure above it can be argued that Turkey's power in the region has risen. However, again by looking at the concept of regional power, it can be seen that economy is only one aspect of the leadership in the region. It needs to be supported by strong military and other political dynamics.

Since 1998, Turkey has modernized its army, and it has developed its defense technologies. For many years, Turkey used American military equipment and then the country started to produce its technologies from domestic sources.²²² Considering that Turkey is close to unstable regions such as the North-Africa, the Middle-East, Caucasus and Balkans, multiple threats such as radical Islamism, terrorism, nuclear missile threat and regional rivalry led Turkey to develop and strengthen its army with the latest technologies. According to 2014 Global Power Index, Turkey is the strongest country among 15 Middle-East countries.²²³ In the latest version of the same index which has been published in 2018, Turkish military is still the strongest army in the region.²²⁴

Turkey has had a greater GDP and military power compared to the Middle-East countries. Therefore, the country fulfills two conditions to become a regional power that is the ability to influence the region economically and militarily.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the eruption of the Arab Spring opened a door for Turkey to increase its power in the region. Therefore, the country started to support revolutionary uprisings against the dictatorships most importantly in Egypt and Syria.²²⁵ This means that Turkey was

²²¹"World Economic Outlook," *IMF*. April 2018, <http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/TUR/SYR/SAU/ISR/IRN/IRO/EGY/ARE/LBN/QAT/YEM/OMN/JOR/KWT/BHR>

²²² Armin Rosen and Jeremy Bender, "The Most Powerful Militaries in The Middle East [RANKED]." *Business Insider*. October 27, 2014, <http://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-militaries-in-the-middle-east-2014-8#no-2-turkey-15>

²²³ Rosen and Bender, 2014.

²²⁴ "Middle Eastern Powers Ranked by Military Strength," *Global Fire Power Index*, 2018. <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-middle-east.asp>

²²⁵ Şener Aktürk, "Turkey's Role in the Arab Spring and the Syrian Conflict," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, March 14, 2017. <http://turkishpolicy.com/article/844/turkeys-role-in-the-arab-spring-and-the-syrian-conflict>

both influenced and affected by the regional affairs and it has turned its attention from Europe to the Middle-East.

4.1.1. Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus

In chapter 3 of this thesis, Turkey's role in the Mediterranean was elaborated and in the previous part of this chapter, Turkey's foreign policy and its role in the Middle east was also briefly shown. Both of these have an effect in the place of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. In other words, in the Eastern Mediterranean nexus, the role and zone of influence of Turkey is visible due to its rights in the Mediterranean Sea and Turkey's military capabilities, economic capabilities and so on. Turkey's ability to use its naval and air powers in the periphery of the island enables the country to control the trade from the Middle-East and the Mediterranean to the West, and it decreases the zone of influence of the Republic of Cyprus.²²⁶ By taking into consideration Turkey's regional power and its capabilities, it is argued that Turkish military presence in the island put psychological pressure on Greek Cypriots. The size of the Turkish military in the island is three times greater than national guards of the Republic of Cyprus.²²⁷ Considering that Turkey has the strongest army in the region, Greek Cypriots fear from Turkish aggression.

Thus, it can also be asserted that when the Republic of Cyprus blocked opening accession chapters with Turkey together with France, Turkey moved away from aligning with the West and it turned to a regional power. This means that the Republic of Cyprus contributed to the process of transformation of Turkey from civilian power to regional power. Therefore, with the increase in economic and military capabilities of Turkey, the role of the country in this region increased. Consequently, Republic of Cyprus felt more threatened.

As stated in the previous parts of this chapter, regarding the economy, the GDP of Turkey has increased, and it turned to the greatest economy in the region. The 2008 global economic crisis hit European countries in the 2010s. Especially, Southern European countries were severely

²²⁶ Phivos Klokkaris, "The Security Problem of Cyprus," Rep. *European Rim Policy and Investment Center*, (2009): 5. <https://erpic.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/the-security-problem-of-cyprus-2009.pdf>

²²⁷ Ibid.

affected by the crisis. The government's miscalculation of the budget, the collapse of the Greek economy, and the government's exposure to Greek government bonds led to the collapse of the banking system in Cyprus in 2012-2013.²²⁸ The Republic of Cyprus is the fourth country in the eurozone after Ireland, Portugal, and Greece that seek a bailout. The country has recovered from the crisis, but high private debt and non-performing loans are the remaining challenges of the Cypriot economy.²²⁹ Even though the country has recovered, unemployment is still high, and banking system cannot support itself.²³⁰ As a result, economic problems in Cyprus increased security concerns of the country since Turkey turned to the biggest economy in the region. By being the largest economy, Turkish influence in the region has increased. Here, it can be argued again that the Greek Cypriots have felt threatened by the rising power of Turkey due to its economy. The main reason behind this argument is that if Turkey's regional power increases in the Eastern Mediterranean, then its bargaining power will also increase. However, due to the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean and also the recent hydrocarbon discoveries, Greek Cypriot officials do not want a rising regional power since it would affect their political bargaining power in the region. Thus, as stated in Chapter 2, political bargaining power have become more important in the region.

4.2. Obstacles to Cooperation in the Cyprus Conflict

From the first chapter and also the second chapter of the thesis, it can be interpreted that the members of the European Union have used the carrot of membership to Turkey to solve the Cyprus problem. This can be seen because the negotiation process between the EU and Turkey froze in 2006 because of the Cypriot conflict.²³¹ Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots have used their advantageous position that is being a member of the EU, over Turkish Cypriots and Turkey

²²⁸ *Cyprus Profile*, "Cyprus Banking Crisis: Causes and Consequences," July 10, 2014. <http://www.cyprusprofile.com/en/articles/view/cyprus-banking-crisis-causes-and-consequences-bailout>.

²²⁹ *Cyprus Mail*, "Bright Prospects for Cyprus Economy," December 15, 2017. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2017/12/15/bright-prospects-cyprus-economy/>.

²³⁰ Rebecca Bryant and Christalla Yakinthou, *Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey*. Istanbul, Turkey: TESEV Publications, (2012). http://tese.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Cypriot_Perceptions_Of_Turkey.pdf.

²³¹ "Türkiye-AB İlişkileri Kronolojisi," Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı. August 7, 2017, https://www.ab.gov.tr/siteimages/2017_08/kronoloji.pdf

to put pressure on these two countries. Consequently, it can be argued that these countries are being suppressed by the members of the European Union in the Cyprus conflict. Multiple pressures are coming from the Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.

In order to elaborate this argument, the historical process should be reminded shortly. Until the Annan Plan, third parties such as the U.N and the U.S., supported the idea of bi-zonal federal Republic of Cyprus. The Annan Plan was based on this proposal.²³² After multiple rounds of negotiations, the Annan Plan was accepted by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders. The last step for the negotiation was holding a referendum in both communities.²³³ Before this referendum, the Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos gave a speech that the Greek Cypriot citizens should vote against the Annan Plan.²³⁴ The reason behind the Greek Cypriot attitude could be laid behind the reason on the continuing accession negotiations of Cyprus to the EU. More elaborately, since the Greek Cypriots officials were planning to become a member of the EU, they knew that they would have an advantage in the negotiations. Therefore, it could be interpreted that, the Greek Cypriots wanted to negotiate after they became an EU member, so that they could put more pressure on the Turkish Cypriots to make them join the Republic of Cyprus as a minority group.

Additionally, it can be argued that the Greek Cypriot officials thought that with the membership card, they could also put pressure on Turkey by using its veto power. In contrast, if the Greek Cypriots would have accepted the Annan Plan, Cyprus would have joined the EU as a whole. Thus, “the crises that stopped the negotiations would probably never happen.”²³⁵ Consequently, this plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots whereas it was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots. This was a turning point in the Cypriot conflict because even though the Greek Cypriots were the ones who wasted the negotiation time, they were the ones being awarded with the membership of the EU.

²³² "Kıbrıs Meselesinin Tarihiçesi, BM Müzakerelerinin Başlangıcı." 2018.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ "Dump UN Plan, Greek Cypriots Told." BBC News. April 07, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3608771.stm>

²³⁵ Funda Ata Keskin, "EU-Turkey Relations (1999–2016): Conditionality at Work?" Essay. In *Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach*, edited by Pınar Gözen Ercan, Palgrave Macmillan (2017):22.

The most important negotiation process after the Annan Negotiations were the recent conferences in Geneva in 2017. However, again in these conference series, there were problems which came from the past and still cannot be resolved. Even though the new leaders showed an attitude of willing to solve the conflict, their will and efforts could not overcome the existing problems coming from the past.

First of all, territorial issues have always been an issue in the conflict between the two communities. In the recent rounds in Geneva, this issue came to the forefront again. One important territorial dispute is the one over the Karpas peninsula. Secondly, the presence of military troops of Turkey in TRNC have also created a problem. The last factor that will be examined is the issue of a rotating presidency system.

4.2.1. The Issue of Karpas Peninsula

At the Geneva conference in 2017, one of the obstacles to the solution of the Cypriot conflict were territorial issues. The Greek Cypriot officials claimed that before the division of the island in 1974, the areas of Karpas, Varosha and Morphou were mostly populated with Greek Cypriots. Therefore, they requested that some parts of these areas should be given back to the Greek Cypriots.²³⁶ However, the Karpas peninsula has a significant strategic location.

More elaborately, the importance of this peninsula has risen in the recent years due to the Syrian crisis. The aim of the PYD terror organization and its supporters is to create a Kurdish corridor in Syria which connects to the Mediterranean sea, so that they can conduct trade.²³⁷ It is also argued that the region between the Karpas peninsula, Gulf of Alexandretta and Syria is rich in oil and natural gas reserves.²³⁸ Thus, if the Kurdish corridor extends to the Mediterranean and some parts of the Karpas peninsula is taken by the Greek Cypriots, then Turkey and the Turkish

²³⁶ “Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive.” 2017. 22. Rep. *Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive*. Retrieved from https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170418_R41136_145b0f942bfab20506c5649746f5eb2db9e4c960.pdf


²³⁷ Fikret Bila, “‘Kıbrıs’Ta Son Söz Söylenmedi.” *Hurriyet*, December 7, 2016. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/fikret-bila/kibrista-son-soz-soylenmedi-40300230>

²³⁸ Ömer Bilge, “Kıbrıs’Ta Petrol Savaşı.” *Hurriyet*, June 14, 2009. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/kibris-ta-petrol-savasi-11861921>

Cypriots will partly be deprived of its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. Also, since the location of Karpas is very close to Turkey, this place also plays an important role in the security of Turkey.²³⁹ Thus, the Karpas area is of strategic importance to Turkey.

Also, the problems of the continental shelf, territorial waters and exclusive economic zone should shortly be mentioned again here. In the previous chapter, it was explained that Greece and the Greek Cypriots continental shelf, territorial water, and exclusive economic zone claims would deprive Turkey's rights in the Aegean and the Mediterranean Sea if Turkey would accept these claims. One of the important reasons for this can be stated as Turkey's increasing role as a regional power.

As argued in the previous part of this chapter, Turkey's rising influence in the region has created intimidation for Greek Cypriots. Additionally, with the Olive Branch operation, Turkey aims to block the Kurdish corridor from reaching the Mediterranean.²⁴⁰ Thus, here it can be analyzed that the rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean prevents the usage of the resources as an incentive.



²³⁹ Fikret Bila, “‘Kıbrıs’Ta Son Söz Söylenmedi.’” *Hurriyet*, December 7, 2016. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/fikret-bila/kibrista-son-soz-soylenmedi-40300230>

²⁴⁰ Ali Ünal, “ORSAM Chair Professor Ahmet Uysal: Operation Olive Branch Advancing Cautiously to Minimize Casualties, Prevent Collateral Damage.” *Daily Sabah*, February 11, 2018. <https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2018/02/12/orsam-chair-professor-ahmet-uysal-operation-olive-branch-advancing-cautiously-to-minimize-casualties-prevent-collateral-damage>

Figure 11: Syrian Civil War Map: Who's in Control Where²⁴¹

All in all, it can be asserted that the claim of Karpas of Greek Cypriots officials is actually a way to decrease the role of Turkey in the region and also to decrease the political gains of Turkish Cypriots. Additionally, as stated in the previous chapter of energy, Turkey and TRNC have signed an EEZ delamination agreement which shares the right of the area between the North of the Karpas Peninsula and Gulf of Alexandretta.²⁴² Here it should be reminded that the UNCLOS had given the right of making a bilateral agreement on the continental shelf between two Coastal states. Thus, by claiming the area of Karpas, it can be argued that the Greek Cypriots are trying to increase their influence in the Northern part of the Eastern Mediterranean. If they get their claims, then they can make new bilateral agreements in the region and thus increase their EEZ.

4.2.2. Military removal of Turkey from Northern Cyprus

Another important factor which created a problem in the Geneva conference is the presence of Turkish military troops in TRNC. Thus, during the negotiations, the Greek Cypriot officials urged Turkey to remove its military troops from the Northern part of Cyprus, and they also urged for the abolishment of the security treaties.²⁴³ As stated in the previous parts of the chapter, the Greek Cypriot officials stated that they see the presence of Turkish military in the island as a threat, and it is even claimed that this creates a psychological pressure on Greek Cypriots since the size of Turkish military in the island is three times greater than national guards of Republic of Cyprus.²⁴⁴ During the conference, representatives of Turkey stated that they could not accept to abolish the security guarantees under the existing treaties. Nevertheless, the representatives

²⁴¹ Alia Chughtai, "Syrian Civil War Map: Who's in Control Where." *Aljazeera*, May 10, 2018. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/05/syria-country-divided-150529144229467.html>

²⁴² Ayla Gürel, Fiona Mullen, and Harry Tzimitras. 2013. "The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios." Rep. *The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios*. Oslo, Norway: PRIO. [https://files.prio.org/publication_files/Cyprus/Report 2013-1 Hydrocarbons.pdf](https://files.prio.org/publication_files/Cyprus/Report%202013-1%20Hydrocarbons.pdf)

²⁴³ Morelli, 22.

²⁴⁴ Phivos Klokkaris, 2009.

asserted that Turkey could remove the military troops with the condition that a very small percentage of Greek and Turkish Cypriot troops would stay, suggesting that the deployment of the troops could be renewed in 15 years. However, the Greek Cypriots insisted that the Treaty of Guarantee should be abolished. Furthermore, they stated that a small number of troops could stay in the condition that a date for their deployment should be immediately set up.²⁴⁵

However, based on the treaty of Alliance signed between Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom in 1960, Turkey is allowed to keep military troops in the Northern part of Cyprus. More elaborately,

“The presence of the Turkish Army takes its legitimacy from the need to protect Turkish Cypriots and its legality from Article 181 of the 1960 Cyprus Constitution (which is still recognized as the only valid Constitution by the international community) as well as the Article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance. Turkey maintains its presence to protect the Turkish Cypriot population....”²⁴⁶

However, the UK still has two different military bases in two different places on the island. Additionally, Greece also has a military base in the Baf region.²⁴⁷ Nevertheless, if Turkey removes its troops, then it can be argued that there will be a change in the balance of power inside the island. Additionally, as stated before, the Cypriot conflict is one of the obstacles to Turkey’s accession to the EU. Even if Turkey would compromise with the troop withdrawal and thus give up its use of the right to protect the Turkish Cypriots on the island, there is no guarantee for the problem to be solved. Thus, Turkey’s accession to the EU will also not be guaranteed. As a result, it can be analyzed that accepting this could decrease the bargaining power of Turkey. Finally, it can also be argued that these troops are important for the Turkish Cypriots to feel more secure.

4.2.3. Rotating Presidency

²⁴⁵ Morelli, 22.

²⁴⁶ Erhan Bora, “Cyprus in International Law,” *Ankara Bar Review*, (2013): 29–57. <http://www.ankarabarsu.org.tr/siteiler/AnkaraBarReview/tekmakale/2013-1/1.pdf>

²⁴⁷ Fikret Bila, “Kıbrıs'ta Aldığımız Ders,” *Hurriyet*, January 13, 2017. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/fikret-bila/kibrista-aldigimiz-ders-40334824>.

During the Geneva negotiations, another important factor that could not be resolved was the question of the rotating presidency.²⁴⁸ However, in 2016 Akıncı stated:

“A rotating presidency is one of the indispensable topics for the equality of the Turkish Cypriot nation. If the Greek Cypriot side says that ‘the rotating presidency will never be a parameter of the solution,’ then this means there will be no deal”.²⁴⁹

The reason behind this statement of the Turkish Cypriot president can be because of the historical occasions. To elaborate, the Republic of Cyprus was formed in 1960 with a common constitution which gave both communities equal rights. For example, the division of jobs was based on the percentage of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot populations. Additionally, the President was Greek Cypriot, and the Vice President was Turkish Cypriot, and both had veto power which gave them equal say in politics and equal rights. Additionally, the Parliament was divided equally to the percentage of both groups. Even though the constitution gave equal rights, discord started to rise, and the Greek Cypriots tried to exclude the Turkish Cypriots from the government.²⁵⁰ Hence, the reason why the Turkish Cypriot leader wants a rotating presidency is to secure the Turkish Cypriot right in the government. In other words, since in the past, the Greek Cypriots tried to exclude the Turkish Cypriots from politics and on the other hand Turkish Cypriots want to guarantee their political rights.

Furthermore, during that period, the Greek Cypriots aimed to achieve the aim of Enosis which was to unite with their motherland Greece. To achieve this aim, they had to be the only government in the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, since the 1960 constitution, they have been rejecting the equality of the Turkish Cypriots on the right of governing the Republic.²⁵¹

Today, with having partial objections to the issue of rotating presidency, Anastasiades argues that political equality in the Republic of Cyprus can be reached through other means. Moreover,

“Political equality, he said, was expressed through equal representation in the Upper House and on other issues such as judicial or quasi-judicial matters. He said

²⁴⁸ Morelli, 23-25.

²⁴⁹ Cansu Çamlıbel, “Akıncı: No Cyprus Deal If No Rotating Presidency,” *Hurriyet Daily*, September 19, 2016. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/akinci-no-cyprus-deal-if-no-rotating-presidency-103999>

²⁵⁰ Baskın Oran ed. *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar 1919-1980*. Vol. 1. 3 vols. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık A.Ş (2014): 719-724.

²⁵¹ "Cyprus (Historical Overview)," 2018.

it would be unprecedented for a majority community to be numerically equated with and represented by the minority community”.²⁵²

When he is asked about the system of guarantees, he states that there will be guarantees by the UN Security Council and the European Union.²⁵³ From this argument of Anastasiades, it can be asserted that the Greek Cypriots see the Turkish Cypriots as a minority group and so they do not really want the Turkish Cypriots to be involved in politics. In the quotation above, it is stressed that there can be equal representation in the Upper House. However, this does not really guarantee the political rights of the Turkish Cypriots as in rotating presidency. In the quotation, it is also stated that one of the guarantees will be the EU. However, from the historical occasions, it can be understood that the EU is not a neutral actor. Instead, they are biased because Greece is a member of the EU whereas Turkey is not. This is important because Greece will be able to keep on guaranteeing the rights of the Greek Cypriots whereas Turkey will not be able to guarantee the rights of the Turkish Cypriots because Turkey is not an EU member. Thus, it can be concluded that the rotating presidency system is one of the options for securing the right of Turkish Cypriots in the government. As stated before, the Turkish Cypriots do not want to be seen as a minority community and they want to have a place in the government of the Republic of Cyprus. At this point, the rotating presidency system is an important issue to secure the rights of Turkish Cypriots in the decision-making processes of the Republic of Cyprus. Finally, if the EU will be included in the guarantee system whereas Turkey will not be included, this would be a partial and change the balance of power.

Finally, Turkey wants to maintain its role as a regional power, and thus the country believes that it needs to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. In this respect, Turkey, as well as TRNC, have a common view that TRNC needs to be included in the decision-making process. Therefore, Turkey and TRNC have been urging for a bi-communal and bi-federal Republic of Cyprus.

Conclusion

²⁵² *Cyprus Mail*. “Rotating Presidency and Political Equality ‘Different Things’ Anastasiades Said,” February 26, 2017. <http://cyprus-mail.com/2017/02/26/rotating-presidency-political-equality-different-things-anastasiades-said/>

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

All in all, it can be concluded that since Turkey can be classified as a regional power, other countries in the region such as Greece and Republic of Cyprus do want Turkey to increase its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Recently, there were important projections on natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the tension in the area including the Cyprus conflict makes it hard for the mediation of how to use the hydrocarbon findings. This situation has also affected the Cypriot conflict because Greece and Greek Cypriots as well as the other parties included wanted to gain the most they can from the energy resources that are discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, it can be asserted that the role of Turkey in the recent negotiation affects the course of the negotiation process. However, Turkey has a significant coastal line in the region, so the country does not want to be deprived of its rights in the region. Also, since Turkey perceives itself as a regional power, it believes that it also perceives itself as a supporter of TRNC.

CONCLUSION

In 2015, hopes have risen for a settlement of the conflict since the leaders of both communities have demonstrated positive act towards each other by walking through both regions of Cyprus together. At the same time, new developments were taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean region. These were the water pipeline project from Turkey to TRNC and the recent hydrocarbon discoveries in the region. Hence, the thesis tried to investigate whether and in what ways the resources (water and natural gas) could become an incentive for mediation. In order to answer this question, the thesis was divided into four parts in which the first chapter tried to clarify the history of the Cypriot conflict, the second chapter analyzed the water problem of the island and its impact on the conflict, the third chapter elaborated on the recent hydrocarbon explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the recent debates on the EEZ and the effects of these on the Cypriot conflict. Finally, in the last chapter the role of Turkey as a rising regional power in the Eastern Mediterranean region was analyzed. In this chapter, the obstacles in front of the Cypriot negotiation process and Turkey's place in this nexus was analyzed. Within this context, the thesis concluded that due to the rising political concerns of the regional actors (Greek Cypriots, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots) resources could not act as an incentive in the negotiation process. Rather than that, they became elements of bargaining and they added up to the recent problems.

More elaborately, even though resources could have become an incentive towards the negotiation, the historical situations that stem from the past have made this not possible. The circumstances that come from the past, limit and shape the actions of the leaders today. Thus, the agents cannot act freely since they need to take into account the past circumstances.

There are important issues that come from the past and still impose a problem in the conflict today. For the resources to become an incentive, past issues must be resolved. Otherwise resources would become political tools for bargaining rather than becoming an incentive. In order to make a clearer analysis, the thesis chose three issues that comes from the past stages of

the conflict and still impose a problem today. These are territorial issues, military issues and the issue of rotating presidency which were also clearly identified in the last chapter of the thesis.

In short, territorial issues is an essential problem that comes from the past because the island has a very strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greek Cypriots have claims on some of the territories in TRNC of which the Karpas peninsula is one of their claims. However, the Turkish Cypriot representatives have claimed that this area belongs to the TRNC. As stated in the last chapter, today the Syrian conflict and the recent hydrocarbon findings have increased the strategic importance of the Karpas peninsula. This area is also of vital importance for Turkey to secure itself in the Eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, it is estimated that the region of the Karpas peninsula has undiscovered hydrocarbon reservoirs. Thus, it can be asserted that this place is both vital for security reasons and it is also important in terms of increasing gains in hydrocarbon revenues for TRNC, Turkey and Greek Cypriots. In this respect, the thesis has come to the conclusion that in the case of the Karpas peninsula, the recent hydrocarbon discoveries have not acted as an incentive. Instead, they have increased tension in the area.

Both Greece, Turkey and the U.K have military troops in the island of Cyprus. When the U.N. Security Council resolutions are examined, it can be seen that these troops of all parties have been on the island for a very long time. In various resolutions throughout the period, the UN has urged all parties to remove their military troops and to avoid military exercise in the island. Today, still in the Geneva rounds, this issue is a remaining issue that stays as an obstacle. One of the reasons for this is that due to security reasons Turkey does not want to remove its troops. Here, the thesis has concluded that there have been recent occasions such as the Greek Cypriot violation of the EEZ of Turkey. Also, if Turkey removes its troops than it will also not be able to protect the Turkish Cypriots and its own rights in the Mediterranean region caused by the disputes over the EEZ.

Finally, rotating presidency is seen as one of the factors that supports the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in the government. This issue also stems from the past because three years after the Republic of Cyprus was formed, Turkish Cypriots were excluded from the government. However, Greek Cypriots are not in favor for a system of rotating presidency in the republic of Cyprus. In this respect, in the thesis it is argued that problems of who will govern also have various effects on the resources. Since the government cannot be shared, parties are trying to

strengthen their hands politically. Thus, it could be stated that they have started to use resources as a political tool rather than using them as an incentive in the negotiation process.

All in all, the thesis argued that after the change of the agents which are more optimistic towards a common solution to the conflict, resource allocation for water and natural gas provides an incentive for both actors to negotiate and resolve their conflict. However, these are not enough to solve the issue that comes from the past. Conversely, resources have added up to the already existing problems. These existing problems are factors that shape the actions of presidents (agents) of both communities today.

After having demonstrated the aim and arguments of this thesis, constraints and limitations should also be briefly pointed out. First of all, interviews with Turkish officials could have been done to more strongly support the arguments in the thesis. This could not be done in this thesis because of time constraints. Secondly, there is also a planned electricity project between Turkey and TRNC which is not mentioned in the thesis. This project is still in the planning stage; therefore, it was not included in the research. Thirdly, the thesis only examined the issue in terms of politics and the historical relations between the actors. Nevertheless, culture and ethnicity are also important determinants of the Cypriot conflict. In the thesis, culture was not included because this thesis focused more on a state level approach. Finally, in future researches, instead of elaborating on three issues, a broader research could be done on all of the issues that come from the past and stand as an obstacle in the negotiation process.

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