ELECTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING CIVIL CONFLICT:
THE CASE OF TURKEY

by
EMİNE ARI

Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Sabancı University
June 2015

ELECTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING CIVIL CONFLICT:
THE CASE OF TURKEY

APPROVED BY:

Arzu Kıbrıs

(Thesis Supervisor)

Emre Hatipoğlu

Reşat Bayer

DATE OF APPROVAL: 30.07.2015

ABSTRACT

ELECTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING CIVIL CONFLICT:
THE CASE OF TURKEY

EMİNE ARI

M.A. Thesis, June 2015

Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. Arzu Kıbrıs

Keywords: *selective violence, indiscriminate violence, Turkey, electoral outcomes*

This thesis aims to study the impact of human rights violations by combatants during a civil conflict on election results. During civil conflict, the combatant sides –either state or insurgent group- seek to gather support and paralyze the rival by cutting the human and logistic support of local people by resorting to violence. These actions of the combatants are resulted with serious human rights violations. This thesis is an attempt to estimate political outcomes of civilian victimizations by the state and the PKK. Two types of, indiscriminate and selective, victimizations are examined separately. During the analysis we use multivariate tobit regression to assess the impact of the state and PKK civilian victimizations on the government party/parties', left and right wing parties', and pro-Kurdish (HADEP) and ultra-nationalist (MHP) parties' vote share. Our results suggest that indiscriminate victimization by the state increases voter's approval rate for the government parties; while the PKK victimization decreases the government parties' vote share in the following elections. Turkish voters, who are exposed to state indiscriminate victimization, vote for the left wing parties those are more concessionist to insurgency in order to build peace. HADEP increases its vote share in response to indiscriminate victimization by both the state and the PKK.

ÖZET

SEÇİMLER VE İÇ ÇATIŞMA SIRASINDA İNSAN HAKLARI İHLALLERİ: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

EMİNE ARI

Sosyal Bilimler Yükseklisans Tezi, Haziran 2015

Danışman: Yardımcı Doçent Doktor Arzu Kıbrıs

Anahtar Sözcükler: *seçici şiddet, rastgele şiddet, Türkiye, seçim sonuçları*

Bu tez iç çatışma sırasında muharipler tarafından gerçekleştirilen insan hakları ihlallerinin seçim sonuçları üzerindeki etkisini irdelemeyi amaçlar. İç çatışma sırasında, muharipler –devlet yada isyancı grup- zor kullanarak destek toplamayı ve yerel halkın sağladığı insani ve lojistik desteği keserek düşmanı felç etmeyi amaçlar. Muhariplerin bu eylemleri ciddi insan hakları ihlalleri ile sonuçlanır. Bu tez devlet ve PKK tarafından geçekleştirilen sivil mağduriyetlerin siyasi sonuçlarını değerlendirme teşebbüsüdür. İki tip, rastgele ve seçici, mağduriyet ayrı ayrı incelenmiştir. Analiz boyunca devlet ve PKK tarafından gerçekleştirilen sivil mağduriyetlerin hükümet partisinin/partilerinin, sağ ve sol kanat partilerinin ve Kürt yanlısı (HADEP) ve aşırı milliyetçi (MHP) partilerinin oy payları üzerindeki etkisini hesaplamak için çok değişkenli tobit regresyon kullandık. Sonuçlarımız devlet tarafından gerçekleştirilen rastgele mağduriyetin hükümet partilerinin seçmen nezdinde tasvip edilme oranlarını artırırken; PKK tarafından gerçekleştirilen mağruriyetin bu oranı düşürdüğünü ortaya koymaktadır. Devlet tarafından gerçekleştirilen rastgele mağduriyete maruz kalan Türk seçmenleri, barışı sağlamak için isyancılara karşı daha fazla taviz verme yanlısı olan, sol partilere oy vermektedir. HADEP oy payını hem devlet hem de PKK tarafından gerçekleştirilen rastgele mağduriyetlere karşı artırmaktadır.

To my Father

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Turkey has been struggling with civil conflict since the first attack of the PKK (*Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan*; Kurdistan Workers' Party) in 1984. During this civil conflict the violent atmosphere reached a serious degree in the 1990s. The conflict threatened domestic peace, democracy and human rights. The combatant sides sought to gather support and paralyze the rival by cutting the human and logistic support of the local people by resorting to violence. Here are the two examples from the incidents that were common during the 1990s:

> "Karşıyaka village located in the Kozluk district of Batman province was raided by soldiers on September 1, 1995. During the raid, Medeni Altan, Mehmet Altan (the village headman), Dersim Altan and Rahmi Arıtürk were taken into custody and sent to Kozluk Gendarme Station. The village, which consisted of 11 households, was raided twice the same night. During the second raid, the houses were strafed with heavy weapons by the soldiers. 3 children were wounded, and all of the vineyards and orchards, and farms were burned down around the village" (TİHV, 1995 Annual Report, pg.93).

> "Atabilen hamlet located in Akdoğu village of the Gürpınar district of Van province was raided by PKK militants. 2 village guards, 2 children, 6 women and 2 men were killed because of the random firing of the PKK. During the attack, 13 people, mostly village guards, were wounded and 4 houses were ruined by burning" (TİHV, 1995 Annual Report, pg. 117).

The PKK tried to keep the local people under control by using force, and mostly targeted teachers, schools and the families of village guards, who represented state authority in the south-east region. The state tortured local people who were accused of providing logistic support to the PKK, and forced people to become village guards. Villages were raided and strafed frequently and randomly. The statements of state officials stigmatized and blamed Kurdish identity, and Turks and Kurds were forced

into confrontation. Throughout the conflict, Turkish and Kurdish communities were politically mobilized, militarily socialized, and polarized around ethnic identities (Wood, 2008; Kıbrıs, 2014). The Kurdish people were excluded from the social and political space.

Civil wars devastate the economic, social and political development of the host country. These three pillars of development are not mutually exclusive. Each pillar is in relationship with one another. Countries with civil wars receive lower FDI, lose capital, and achieve lower GDP and a higher poverty rates than their peaceful counterparts (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler & Younas, 2012; Carlton-Ford & Boop, 2010; Hoeffler & Reynal-Querol, 2003; Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, & Sambanis, 2003; Gates, Hegre, Nygard, & Strand, 2012). Also, the human costs of civil war that results from forced displacement, flight of human capital and death add a new burden to the host country. The countries' education (Shemyakina, 2011; Kıbrıs, 2015) and health (Ghobarah, Huth, & Russett, 2003) records are affected negatively. The economic costs, in relation with the human costs, degenerate existing social networks and political loyalties because the demography of the whole country is altered during the conflict. The conflict even changes the countries' ethnic demography by reshaping the existing cleavages and identity affiliations (Kalyvas, 2008). These are the economic and social results of civil conflict, but in this thesis we are interested in the political results of the conflict.

Civil wars are mostly associated with the high costs in human life. The combatant sides target civilians consciously, but the results of this targeting can be either productive or counterproductive for the combatant side. The people may withdraw their support from the combatant side when they are exposed to violence (Condra & Shapiro, 2012). However, this also depends on the type of the targeting or the identity of the perpetrator (Sullivian, 2014; Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013). The impact of civilian targeting during civil wars on electoral outcomes has not widely been tested; the only examples come from the Israeli case, and are mainly classified under the terrorism literature. Gould and Klor (2010) argue that terrorist attacks alter the electoral choices of the people by shifting their preferences towards more concessionist leftist parties. However, in the case of a high level of terrorism, public support for right wing parties increases

(Berrebi & Klor, 2006). The other electoral outcome of civilian targeting is on the government party's vote share in the following elections. People hold the government responsible for their losses and approval for the government decreases (Bali, 2007). Also, the political space polarizes around radical parties that hold hardline positions on the conflict (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari & Paserman, 2008; Kıbrıs, 2014).

This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the civil conflict and terrorism literature by investigating the impact of civilian targeting by the combatant sides on the electoral choices of the people. We utilize new data that we collected at the province level. While doing this, we cluster our analysis at the province level by examining the human rights violations in each province and the party preferences of people in the 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections in Turkey. The main question of this thesis is, "What is the impact of human rights violations during a civil conflict on election results?"

Throughout the thesis I use term "victimization" instead of "human rights violations." I adopt this wartime strategy term since I evaluate only the incidents that is related with Kurdish conflict. Victimization includes the direct methods of harm to civilians: torture, bombing, firing, kidnapping civilians. Victimization also includes the indirect killings (or attempts to kill) of non-combatants by economic sanctions, sieges, blockages, forced migration, destruction and confiscation of shelter and food (Downes, 2006). This analysis divides the victimization into two types according to the randomness degree of targeting: selective and indiscriminate victimization.

Surprisingly, we find that the indiscriminate victimization by the state is associated with a positive impact on the government vote share; however, the selective victimization by the state and the PKK is associated with a decrease in the approval rate of the government in the eyes of voters. Indiscriminate victimization of both the state and the PKK is associated with an increase in the vote share of left wing parties, while the vote share of the right wing parties is associated negatively with indiscriminate victimization. Selective violence is associated with exactly the opposite impact on the vote share of the right and left wing parties. Selective violence is negatively associated with the vote share of left wing parties, while it is positively associated with the vote share of right wing parties. The pro-Kurdish HADEP increases its vote share in

response to the indiscriminate victimization by the both state and PKK, but the vote share of the party is negatively associated with selective victimization by the PKK.

This thesis consists of the literature review, the historical background of the conflict and the politics of Turkey, an analysis of the data that I aggregated and the results. Finally, I present my conclusions and future research ideas.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 The Determinants of Violence during Civil War

Civil wars are mostly associated with high costs in human life. The combatant sides, either incumbent or insurgent, in civil wars try to convince civilians to gain their support and cripple the rival by cutting the logistic and human support of the local people. For this purpose, combatant sides can use various strategies. One of these strategies is the use of coercive power by targeting civilians. Targeting civilians pays back differently, depending on the level of power asymmetry between combatant sides, the individual characteristics of populations such as the size of the population, or even the geographical characteristics of the conflict region (Herreros, 2006; Downes, 2007). First, we will examine the reasons for civilian targeting among the studies that are presented in the conflict literature. Second, we will investigate the determinants/correlates of the targeting. Finally, we will look at the consequences of the civilian targeting for the combatant sides.

Among other explanations, there are two main discussions that challenge each other about the reasons for civilian deaths during civil war. On the one side, Kalyvas claims that civilian victimization is a result of struggle between fighting sides (incumbent and insurgent) to control territory and people (2006). According to Kalyvas, the level of control over territory determines the nature of the victimization. For example, an incumbent is more willing to use selective targeting to kill civilians within the territory over which the incumbent has a high level of control. The logic is that control over territory and people provides more information and makes possible selective targeting for the fighting side (incumbent or insurgent). With the same logic,

the greater usage of indiscriminate violence means the lesser control of the fighting side within that territory (Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009). On the other side, Weinstein argues that the magnitude and intensity of civilian victimization is determined by the internal discipline mechanism of the fighting sides. He finds that the most abusive and violent behavior against civilians is observed within regions in which a combatant side is operating which is internally undisciplined and ethnically fragmented, and lacks an internal punishing mechanism (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006; Weinstein, 2007). In addition to these two discussions, Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay argue that mass killings of civilians occur only in cases in which insurgency has large public support and seriously poses a challenge towards the regime (2004). The regime attacks people in desperation to cut the popular support for the insurgency, and the magnitude of the mass killing by the state correlates with the level of challenge that the insurgency poses to the regime.

The aim of the state is to stop the insurgency and end the war as soon as possible. Therefore, civilian victimization by the state is a strategic and conscious choice as a counter-insurgency strategy, and the utilization of this strategy does not vary according to the type of the regime. Both democracies and autocracies exercise the strategy of targeting civilians. The general belief that civilian victimization and human rights violations are mostly associated with autocratic regimes has been challenged by Downes, and Cornell and Roberts. Downes argues that democratic governments are closely tied with the electorate, and if the electorate thinks that the government is wasting money and lives, it can withhold its support from the government. Therefore, democratic regimes may resort to targeting civilians because a protracted war means a loss of money and lives (Downes, 2006). Lower approval levels for the government will be the result; therefore, governments try to escape audience costs. Cornell and Roberts conducted a study that compares the democratic and military regimes of Peru and their human rights violation records during the civil war. The Peruvian case demonstrates that human rights violations and the abuse of civilians are common for both types of regimes (Cornell & Roberts, 1990).

The other factor which is indicated in the literature that determines the effectiveness of civilian targeting is the type of the targeting. These studies focus on the

accuracy of the targeting. For example, torture is accurate in targeting. Forced displacements and aerial or land artillery are conducted collectively and randomly select the victims. This accuracy and randomness in the targeting of civilians determine the type of the targeting and its effectiveness. For example, according to Bennett, avoiding collateral damage with selective targeting is more effective as a counterinsurgency strategy (2008). Otherwise, the collective targeting of civilians becomes counterproductive in suppressing the insurgency since it creates new grievances towards the state and enlarges the recruitment pool for the insurgency. The general rule that has become prominent in the literature is that targeting civilians is only effective when it is selective targeting (Kalyvas, 2006; Lyall, 2009; Kocher, Pepinsky & Kalyvas, 2011). However, there are also some exceptions to this rule. For example, Downes argues that even selective targeting is worthless when the civilian ethnic and religious loyalties are not flexible (2007).

The existing research on the consequences of civilian victimization provides a picture under a detailed classification of the type of targeting. The consequences of collateral damage, torture, suicide attacks, and targeted or indiscriminate violence are examined in different cases. The type of violence either selective or indiscriminate determines the relationship between combatant parties and civilians. Selective violence gives credibility to the targeting of that party by personalizing the threat. People think that the person is punished only because of his/her actions. Therefore, selective violence became justifiable in the eyes of the public and this mechanism creates victim compliance with perpetrator (Downes, 2007). Indiscriminate violence gives a message to civilians that compliance with combatant party does not change their chance of survival. No matter what civilians done or doing, they are under threat in either compliance or noncompliance cases. Therefore, Kalyvas argues that selective violence is productive and indiscriminate violence is counter-productive for the combatant sides' chances of winning war (2004).

Condra and Shapiro find that the Iraqi people punish the perpetrator (state or insurgent) because of the collateral damage by sharing less information which would be useful for future operations (2012). Another study on Afghanistan reveals that civilian attitudes towards the perpetrator are asymmetric depending on the ideological proximity

of the perpetrator. People are more willing to punish the international security forces than the Taliban (Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013). The study of Sullivian demonstrates that torturing civilians is not useful in stopping an insurgency, and it is counterproductive because it provokes a higher insurgent violence back (2014). In the Israeli case, the suicide attacks of Palestinians that cost Israeli lives are responded to with harsh counterattacks by Israel to take revenge. On the other side, the targeted killings of Israel cause a pause on the Palestinian side, which means it works as counter-insurgency strategy for Israel (Jaeger & Paserman, 2009). However, there is other research which claims that civilian victimization can be useful as a counter-insurgency strategy. Lyall finds the Russian strategy to kill the Chechen civilians worked by reducing the activity of the insurgent groups. Lyall challenges the idea that indiscriminate violence towards civilians is an indicator of the state's desperation. He claims indiscriminate violence that targets civilians may cause a detrimental impact on insurgent communication, and logistic and recruitment capabilities, so it becomes useful (Lyall, 2009). Therefore when we take the literature as a whole, we cannot extract a clear picture about the outcomes of selective or indiscriminate targeting as a counter-insurgency strategy. However, we can conclude this discussion by adapting the general tendency in the literature and claim that indiscriminate victimization is counter-productive and selective victimization is productive as a counter-insurgency strategy, without neglecting the exceptional cases and situations.

There are studies which indicate that civilian victimization is counterproductive in the long run. For example, the case of El Salvador suggests that indiscriminate violence against civilians creates a long-term resistance among civilians which is hard to overcome in the following periods of the war. The number of incidents makes it harder to reach a peace agreement that follows the civil war (Peceny & Stanley, 2010). The relationship between the combatant side and the people determines the success of the party that competes for the democratic elections that follow the civil war. If the combatant side constructs a good relationship with civilians with less violent means, the success of the party tends to be higher because voting will be voluntary and widespread (Allison, 2010).

2.2 Electoral Behavior

The study of electoral behavior is dominated by three major schools. The first one is the sociological model claims that people are voting according to their socio-economic status (class and occupation), religious and ethnic identity, the area of residence (geography), age, and gender. One of the prominent works on the sociological model finds that the informal communication networks of the people are the main determinants of decision making on voting (Lazarfeld et al., 1944). The people are under the influence of their social surroundings. Interpersonal discussion networks such as relatives and colleagues, and mass media and political organizations can alter the voter's decision (Beck, Dalton, Greene and Huckfeldt, 2002). Therefore, the sociological model implies that voting is not an individual decision, but it depends on the group cohesion that we live in (Antunes, 2010). However, the sociological model falls short of explaining short term vote swings, since we do not expect immediate changes in people's identity, class or community they live in.

The second school is the partisanship model that incorporates the social and issue based voting models. The claim of this model is that voting is an outcome of the both distal factors such as the socio-economic level, values, and attitudes of social group; and the proximal factors such as issues, candidates, campaigns and economic situation (Antunes, 2010). The partisanship model, or in other words, the party identification model implies that people identify their ideological position with a party because of various reasons and remain loyal to the party for lifelong. The partisanship or party identification originates from the socialization of the people in their early age in peer group and family. This identification is not strict. It can change by marriage, entrance to the higher education, and change in job or residence (Antunes, 2010). For example, Belanger and Meguid (2008) find that partisan affiliation and socio-economic factors (geographical region of residence, education level and religious identity) affect the vote choice of Canadians.

The third school is the rational choice model, which aims to explain whether voting behavior is rational or not. According to this model, people do not vote according to their social identity, but vote for the party that they benefit most from.

They behave like a customer in their relations with the political parties (Antunes, 2010). Apart from these three schools we have two more specific voting behavior explanations. The first one is the issue based model and the second one is the economic model of voting.

Political parties own different issues. For example, British Labor Party is trusted for their education policies, and this general belief of people determines their vote choices. However, the issue ownership cannot explain the vote swings, in the short run. The issue ownership becomes crucial when the issue is salient for the community. An issue cannot be salient for a long time period, the vote swings can be explained by the swings in the issues that are salient for the community. For example Edwards et al. present that issues vary in salience in the eyes of the public, and that the salience of issues also has an impact on the evaluation of the president, as well as on the votes (1995). The salient issue can be security if the country has experienced a terrorist attack, or it can be ethnic identity if the country has cleavages around ethnicity (Wilkinson & Haid, 2009). The economic factors are also highly related with the voting choices of people. The voter holds the government responsible for the economic outcomes. There are two main indicators, which are commonly used in economic voting literature, that are explanatory for the economic voting. The most commonly employed indicators are employment and inflation rates. Unemployment is more essential for lower segments of the society and inflation for the higher segments of the society (Lewis-Beck &Paldam, 2000; Wlezien, 2005).

2.3 Political Violence and Electoral Behavior: the Point of Junction

The research on the impact of violence on political behavior is mostly delimited within the terrorism literature. The study of Hutchinson over 32 countries which reveals that 'individuals who feel threatened by insurgency based violence become less politically tolerant' (2014) is supported by several case studies. Gould and Klor (2010) argue that terrorist attacks alter the voting behavior and political attitude of people. Israelis become more willing to give territorial concessions and accept a Palestinian state, and identify themselves less as right wing party supporters only under a small dosage of

terrorist attacks. Beyond a certain threshold the attacks become counterproductive for the Palestinian side since they create resistance among Israeli people about giving concessions. For example, after a high level of terrorism, the public support for right wing parties increases (Berrebi & Klor, 2006). Also, the timing of attacks is strategic, since we know the impact of the attacks increases as it gets closer to the elections (Berrebi &Klor, 2008). On the side of Palestinians, Israeli violence leads Palestinians to support more radical factions, and violence lowers the support for a peace agreement with the Israel government (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari & Paserman, 2008).

Beyond the Israeli studies, De la Calle and Bali bring evidence from Spain. Their study on the relationship between ETA attacks and the electoral support for Batasuna (the political branch of ETA) shows that ETA's killings of non-nationalist politicians decreases the electoral support for Batasuna (De la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2013). Bali investigates the impact of March 2004 Madrid bombings. The bombing creates an electoral upset towards the incumbent (2007). The studies on the Turkish case provide detailed evidence on the relationship between terrorist attacks and electoral choices. The research of Kıbrıs exhibits that Turkish voters are highly sensitive to the terrorist attacks. Turkish voters, those exposed to terrorist attacks, are more likely to support right wing parties which are less concessionist towards terrorism (2011). An experimental study (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernandez-Guede, 2006) that measures the sociological impacts of the 2004 Madrid bombings in Spain reveals that people develop more allegiance to conservative values. In contrast to this trend liberal values are declining. Another study by Kıbrıs reveals that Turkish people are polarized along the ethnic identity by voting for hardliner parties as the number of terrorism casualties increases (2014).

In summary, the literature about the political impacts of violence proceeds on three different layers. During civil wars, governments and insurgents may resort targeting civilians to win the war. The consequences of this targeting depend on the individual characteristics of the cases and the parties that fight. Also the type of the targeting plays a crucial role on the outcome. However, the civil war literature focuses on practical results of this civilian victimization by investigating whether it is productive or counterproductive for winning the war. The terrorism literature covers

this gap by investigating the political impacts of terror attacks. However, these studies cannot fully grasp the issue from the insurgency perspective. Also, these studies fall short of differentiating the type of targeting. Therefore, we cannot detect the political outcomes of civilian victimization during civil wars. While investigating the relationship between civilian victimization and political outcomes, the voting behavior literature fills the gap about the social and economic factors that influence the political decision making of people.

Based on three branches of literature that we examine, I expect that the impact of selective victimization by state will be productive for the government parties; therefore, the government parties will increase its vote share as the cases of selective victimization increase in that province. On the contrary, indiscriminate victimization will decrease the vote share of government parties, since people will feel under threat no matter of their actions. They will blame the government parties because of their losses and the compliance of civilians to government parties will decrease. The PKK victimization will hurt the government party vote share, since people will think that the government parties are lack of competency to prevent the PKK activities. Here I do not have different hypothesis for the indiscriminate and selective victimization by PKK.

The second part of the analysis will be based on the left and right wing parties' vote share in response to state and PKK victimization incidents. Here I do not expect any difference between the impact of selective and indiscriminate victimization cases on right and left wing parties. I argue that PKK victimization has a positive impact on right wing party vote share and negative on left wing party vote share. People will think that right wing parties can restrain the violence by taking harsher measures than left wing parties. On the contrary, state victimization cases will decrease the right wing party vote share and increase the left wing party vote share. People who are victimized by the state want a left wing party that commands the state because the left wing parties tend to take unarmed measures for the resolution of the conflict.

In the third part of the analysis I expect that HADEP and MHP that represent the two opposite camps in the fighting, not directly but ideologically, will increase their vote share for both state and PKK indiscriminate victimizations. The state indiscriminate victimization will increase the vote share of HADEP and decrease

MHP's vote share, and likewise PKK indiscriminate victimization will decrease HADEP's vote share and increase MHP's vote share. Since we argue that selective violence will create compliance to perpetrator, selective victimization by state will decrease HADEP's vote share and increase MHP's vote share. Like, state perpetrated victimizations, selective victimization by PKK will increase HADEP's vote share and decrease MHP's vote share.

Here I should put a reminder on the fact that my analysis is based on the province level I do not have any claim on the national level about the impacts of victimization cases. The hypotheses that I stated above only comprise the province level.

CHAPTER 3

THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT AND POLITICS OF TURKEY

The civil conflict in Turkey has continued between the PKK and Turkish state forces over the last thirty years. The conflict has mainly concentrated on the Kurdish populated south-eastern region of the country. The PKK demands cultural rights for Kurds and aims to establish a regional autonomy under a federal state structure in the south-east of Turkey. The regional concentration of the conflict has provided an opportunity to the state to concentrate military repression, forced assimilation and coercion on the region under a state of emergency status from the late 1980s through 1990s. At the same time, the regional concentration became leverage by providing a nest with harsh terrain for insurgents (Nigogosian, 1996). The human and economic costs of the conflict have accumulated over the years. Between 1984 and 2012, 7,918 state officials, including police and army members; 22,101 PKK members; and 5,557 civilians lost their lives during incidents related with the Kurdish conflict (TR GNA, Human Rights Investigation Commission, 2013). The total number of 35,576 does not include unidentified murders, missing people, and those lost under custody, which were common during the 1990s.

The Turkish state ideology had been constructed on centralism and nationalism; therefore, legal measures that would embrace ethnic and religious plurality were not taken until 2009 (Aktürk, 2012). The definition of Turkish identity which is based on assimilation and homogeneity does not allow for expression of ethnic identity. This exclusive ideology created political and cultural cleavages between Turkish nationalists and the Kurdish people, and most of the time Kurds were denied expression of their identity as the disadvantaged party (Gürbey, 1996; Aktürk, 2012). For example,

Şerafettin Elçi, Minister of Irrigation and Public Works, was sentenced to a two-and-a-half year imprisonment for stating "Kurds exist, and I am a Kurd" in 1983.

The Kurds compose the largest ethnic minority in Turkey with over 18 percent of the population by 2010 (KONDA, 2011). The founding treaty of Lausanne only approves non-Muslim communities, specifically Greek, Armenian and Jewish people in minority status. In 1924 with Lausanne, the Muslim minorities, for example Kurds and Arabs suddenly lost their cultural and social rights under the name of Turkish nationalism (Muller, 1996). Despite these developments, the initial sparks of Kurdish rebellions in south-east Anatolia came after the first secularization measures. Secularization came into being with the abolishment of Caliphate in 1924, which was the last institution that highlighted the commonality between Kurds and Turks under Islam. The Sheik Sait Rebellion (1925), Ağrı Rebellion (1927-30) and Dersim Rebellion (1937-38) are the most famous, but not the only initial reactions. These rebellions were small scale and reactionary until the 1980s (Saatçi, 2002) and framed as side effects of tribal banditry, and abuse of sheikdoms or chiefs over the uncivilized people by state officials. However, these waves of rebellions were enough to label Kurdish identity as a threat to unity of the country (Yeğen, 1999).

The Kurdish issue transformed and became a new controversy in the political life of Turkish parties with the transition to multi-party elections in 1950. The Democrat Party (DP) rose as a challenger to state policies towards Kurdish people; however the DP could not challenge the old Republican People's Party (CHP) ethnic and nationalist ideology. The party conceptualized the Kurdish issue as a socio-economic development and democracy problem of the region and never uttered the word 'Kurd' explicitly (Aktürk, 2012). Also, the rise of the USSR threat in the North forced people to unite around the national identity against the outside threat (Saatçi, 2002).

The 1960 military coup disturbed the political liberalization attempts of the 1950s and followed the previous assimilation ideology. However, the 1961 constitution brought awareness of civil and political rights among university students. Kurdish people also embraced their ethnic identity, touched by political optimism and freedom (Kirişçi & Windrow, 1997). During the 1960s the Kurdish population was mainly represented by the New Turkey Party (YTP), successor of the DP, and the Marxist

Labor Party (TİP). The voting turnout rates in south-east Turkey were also high during the 1960s, but this high rate was mostly a result of close relations between Kurdish tribal leaders and the political elites of the YTP. Unlike the YTP, the TİP was the first political party that mentioned the economic and cultural problems of Kurdish people. The party publicly uttered the word 'Kurdish' and discussed the Kurdish problem in Turkey, but with the 1971 coup, the party was closed down by the constitutional court (Kirişçi & Windrow, 1997; Aktürk, 2012).

During the first half of the 1970s, Kurdish votes shifted to leftist parties. The CHP under the leadership of Ecevit gathered the Kurdish votes in the 1973 elections. Sectarian and ethnic identity became the issues that determined the voters' behavior and choices in the 1970s, and the ideological proximity between Marxist and Kurdish groups diminished, with a number of Kurdish leftist groups multiplying, one of them being the PKK (Kirişçi & Windrow, 1997). The 1970s also were marked by the rise of the Islamist National Salvation Party (MSP) under the leadership of Erbakan. The party did not emphasize ethnicity, but adopted a different point of view by marketing the Islamic community *ummah* idea to attract Kurdish votes (Aktürk, 2012).

Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK), or the Kurdish Workers Party, was rooted and fed on the ideologies of the Iraqi Kurdish Nationalist movement KDP-Iraq; the Marxist Workers Party of Turkey (TİP); and the movement of Turkish Federation of Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (DEV-GENÇ) (Gürbey, 1996). The PKK was founded as a leftist Kurdish group in 1974 in Ankara, but it distinguished itself from the other leftist organizations. The PKK moved its operations to the Kurdish populated south-east of Turkey in 1975, and with support from the Syrian regime in a short time it was able to recruit Syrian Kurds and attend education camps in Palestine (Gunter, 1997). At the first meeting of the PKK, Kurdish populated areas were depicted as Turkey's colony that had been kept under control with the collaboration of Kurdish feudalists and state elites (Kirişçi & Windrow, 1997). The initial goal of the 1980s, founding an independent state for the Kurds, transformed to the idea of autonomous region for the Kurds. For this purpose the PKK has used 'revolutionary violence,' as they called it, since 1984 (Gürbey, 1996).

In 1980 Turkey experienced another military coup because of political right-left polarization among the society and deadlock in the election of a new president. Military rule reasserted the assimilation policies against Kurdish identity. By highlighting the indivisibility of the country, other languages were forbidden to be used in public with the new constitution. A great deal of state propaganda both printed and broadcast, about the common descent of Kurds and Turks were published, and denial of the existence of Kurdish identity became a national campaign. Religion was also used as a counter force against Marxist and separatist ideals under the so-called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Kirişçi & Windrow, 1997).

The 1980 military intervention once again disturbed the political cleavages and altered the ethnic and religious camps. This time the normalization and stabilization of politics on ethnic issues was very hard because open conflict between the Turkish state and PKK started in 1984. The first attack of the PKK in Şemdinli and Eruh resulted in the death of twenty one soldiers in the south-eastern part of Turkey. The PKK attacked military, civilian and economic targets. In order to weaken the state presence in the region, the PKK attacked dams, communication and power lines, factories, schools, and teachers. Tourists and state officials were kidnapped, opponents of the PKK assassinated, urban center targeted with suicide bombings, and villages destroyed and raided by the PKK (Gürbey, 1996). On the state side, the military which had a supreme position within politics and administrative structure of Turkey was the leading actor in fighting against the PKK. The state tried to eliminate public support for the PKK. In their fight against the PKK, state security forces employed systematic torture, extrajudicial killings and wholesale destruction of Kurdish populated villages (Muller, 1996). Not only the military and police, but also other actors took a role in the fighting. For example, in 1985 the village guard system was initiated to resolve the logistic problems of the central state and to create income for local people. Local people were armed by the state and this armed unit was directly tied to the Ministry of the Interior (Gürbey, 1996). This practice created many problems and discussions. The village guards were involved in the killing of rival tribe members and arms smuggling. Also, non-state armed actors, which are believed to have been funded by the state, the Turkish Hizbullah, engaged in killings of civilians who were sympathizers of the PKK (Kirişçi

17

& Windrow, 1997). In 1987 a new multiregional governor, who was authorized with the power to suspend civil rights and liberties, was formed in Diyarbakır. The ongoing war led to the politicization of people who were affected by violence, the polarization of conflicting parties and the militarization of politics, with massive human rights violations by the state and PKK (Gürbey, 1996).

During the 1980s, the old political cleavages were altered with new ethnic and religious divides. Turkish versus Kurdish ethnic nationalist, Turkish civic nationalist versus ethnic nationalist, Alevi versus Sunni brotherhoods, secular versus religious fundamentalist voting divisions became bolder (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). In the 1987 elections the leftist Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP) and the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) competed for the Kurdish votes. The Kurdish feudal elites mostly preferred the center-right Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP). In the 1991 elections, the SHP and the pro-Kurdish People's Party (HEP) formed an electoral alliance, while the RP cooperated with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The Kurdish votes shifted towards the SHP because of these new party alignments (Aktürk, 2012). The HEP entered in the parliament in 1991 with 18 deputies with a definite Kurdish agenda for the first time (Kirişçi & Windrow, 1997). In 1993 the HEP was closed by the Constitutional Court. The deputies of the HEP registered for the Democracy Party (DEP) which was founded in 1993, but the party again closed in 1994. The deputies of the DEP were accused for collaborating with the PKK and the four deputies were imprisoned after the abolishment of parliamentary immunity of 13 DEP deputies in 1994.

The real organizational shape of the PKK became apparent at the beginning of the 1990s. The emphasis of Marxist ideology was replaced with Kurdish nationalism in the PKK discourse. President Özal saw the 1st Gulf War as an opportunity for the resolution of the Kurdish problem and took liberal steps to integrate the Kurdish population into the Turkish political life. Özal removed the ban on the usage of Kurdish language in public space in 1991. He also gave signals for further cultural rights on Kurdish education and broadcasting (Gürbey, 1996). Özal initiated a rapprochement between the state and PKK with opening peace talks, however he died in 1993. In the years following of his death, the influence of the army on politics resurfaced again. The

following political actors could not balance the power of the army and acted in line with the army in the solution of Kurdish problem. The emergency decree in the ten Kurdish provinces was tighten up by the so-called Censorship and Banishment Decree that grants further authority to the special governor of the Kurdish populated provinces. In response to these developments, the PKK, by declaring there was no positive response from the state for the demands of immediate halt of the state of emergency, cease-fire, general amnesty and granting cultural rights for Kurds, suspended the unilateral ceasefire and returned to fighting (Gürbey, 1996).

During 1990s, Turkish electoral and political party divisions were reshaped and new dimensions were added to the existing left-right political cleavages. Starting from the mid 1990s, the two new political cleavages added new segments to the Turkish political arena. The first was the religious versus secular divide (Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006; Secor, 2001). The second was the ultra-nationalist versus Kurdish divide. Specifically, the 1995 elections were remarked with the rise of the pro-Islamist right, and in the 1999 elections we observed the rise of nationalist right. Both of these newly born cleavages gained electoral allegiance in expense of center-right parties. Beside the transformation on the right, the left mostly kept its position in the both elections (Esmer, 2002; Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006). These new dimensions on the political cleavages were reflected on the electoral regions (Çarkoğlu & Avcı, 2002). The ultra-nationalist MHP and the pro-Islamist RP filled the void of defending religious sensitivity that was left by the center-right parties. Even if we classify these two parties as right-wing based on their positions on religious issues, there are also some other classifications; for example Hale classified the MHP and FP, successor of the RP, as left wing parties because of their position on the economic issues (2002). Therefore, these parties mostly gathered votes from economically neglected areas such as urban poor, rural masses and Anatolian towns. Also, another classification can be made based on the position about ethnic identity, that cut across the class and religious identity (Güneş-Ayata & Ayata, 2002). The ultra-nationalist MHP had the most extremist position on Kurdish issue. The party totally supported military solution and denied the existence of Kurdish ethnicity. The pro-Islamist RP and later FP adopted the most inclusive rhetoric on the Kurdish issue. The party supported any cultural concessions on broadcasting and education in

Kurdish. They put blame on the secular regime that ignored the religious freedom of Kurds and Turks those are brothers under Islam about the Kurdish issue (Beriker, 1997).

The 1990s was the decade of consolidation of the PKK and escalation of fighting between the army and PKK. These developments also made and impact on the center-right and center-left parties towards the Kurdish issue. While right wing parties took more hardliner position, the left wing parties shifted towards more exclusivist and assimilationist position also. One of the center right parties the ANAP, the former party of President Özal, adopted more nationalist policies from the start of the mid 1990s. The other center right party the DYP took a hawkish position towards the Kurdish issue. Especially after the political crisis that resulted with the imprisonment of the DEP deputies and closure of the party. The DYP totally adopted a rhetoric that opposed any talk and giving cultural rights by stating the famous motto 'state does not negotiate with terrorists' (Nigogosian, 1996). On the other side of the political party spectrum the picture does not change. Center-left parties made the distinction of the Kurdish problem and the terror problem. One of the center-left parties the DSP, which was the major coalitional partner after 1997, saw the Kurdish problem as the result of regional underdevelopment and feudal social structure. The other center-left party CHP, joined by SHP, also took more nationalist position on the Kurdish issue and claimed that the problem lied on the center of the mechanism of democracy in Turkey (Beriker, 1997).

The pro-Kurdish parties the DEP and later the People's Democracy Party (HADEP) were mainly classified as left-wing parties according to the pools of voters' positing of the parties (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). However, the party was solely constructed its identity around the Kurdish issue. The general definition of Chandra of an ethnic party (2011) 'that is champion of particular interests of one ethnic category' that is conveyed in the party's 'implicit or explicit messages or campaigns' was met by HADEP in the Turkish concept. After observing the closure of the DEP, HADEP took a more moderate position on the Kurdish issue and kept distance between the party and PKK (Kirişçi & Windrow, 1997).

In the Western Europe conjuncture the right and left divide is made based on the parties' position on economic policies. The left and right wing party divisions in Turkey

are complicated and maintained on different levels of political dimensions. For example, Turkish people generally refer to the religious positions of the parties while making the distinction of right and left wing (Aydoğan & Slapin, 2015). However, we have one more political dimension for right-left classification for the Turkish case, the position on the ethnic identity. For the simplicity, in our analysis we take the classification of Kalaycıoğlu (2005) and Esmer (2002) according to these classification the RP/FP, ANAP, DYP and MHP are located on right wing, and the HADEP, SHP/CHP and DSP are located on left wing.

CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 The Model

I use a multivariate tobit regression model to estimate the association between civilian victimization and vote choice in the Turkish case, and that is basically;

$$V_{\{t,i\}} = \alpha + \beta_1 N_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_2 S_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_3 C_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_4 E_{\{t,i\}} + u_{\{i\}} + e_{\{t,i\}}$$

The unit of analysis is year-province. The data incorporates three observations for each province, for those three general elections of 1991, 1995 and 1999. The data is chronologically and geographically clustered into the provinces. Our dependent variable is parties' vote share, denoted by $V_{\{t,i\}}$. We examine the impact of number of civilian victimization on the vote share of the party at election time t and in district i. The main independent variables are selective and indiscriminate civilian victimizations, and they are performed by either state or PKK in the province i. We analyze the impact of these incidents conducted by the state and PKK. The $N_{\{t,i\}}$ and $S_{\{t,i\}}$ vectors represent the number of civilian victimization cases as we classified the cases *Indiscriminate* and *Selective* respectively, in district i between the time period that covers after the election at time t-1 and before the election at time t. *Indiscriminate victimization* denotes the total number of indiscriminate victimization incidents, which is random and without prior selection of the victims, in that province. *Selective victimization* denotes the total number of selective victimization incidents, which is individualized targeting, in that province. The detailed coding rules and distinction between indiscriminate and selective victimization can be found under the data section. $C_{\{t,i\}}$ is the vector of socio-economic and demographic control variables at time t in district i. This includes population size,

population growth rate, GDP per capita, doctor per bed, urbanization rate. $E_{\{t,i\}}$ is dummy variable that takes value of 1 in existence of emergency state 0 otherwise for the time t in district i.

The analysis is threefold according to the three different dependent variables. In the first part we analyze the impact of civilian victimization on government party/parties' vote share.

$$G_{\{t,i\}} = \alpha + \beta_1 N_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_2 S_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_3 C_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_4 E_{\{t,i\}} + u_{\{i\}} + e_{\{t,i\}}$$

$G_{\{t,i\}}$ denotes the change in the vote share of the government party between the election at time t-1 and the election at time t. Turkish politics was dominated by the coalition governments during 1990s. Therefore I will aggregate the vote share of parties that form the government and look at the differences in the vote share between the election at time t and the election time t-1. The government parties are DYP and SHP for 1991-1995; and ANAP, DYP, RP and DSP for 1995-1999 time periods. I also present the results in which I evaluate government parties performance by excluding DSP. I expect state indiscriminate victimization to be negatively associated with the government parties' vote share for the elections proceeding the violence since it creates resentment among the voters against the government because of their losses (Kocher, Pepinsky & Kalyvas; Bennett, 1998). State selective victimization is expected to be positively associated with the vote share of the government parties because selective violence is believed to be perpetrated by actors with full control of territory. Therefore, the perpetrator is expected to be effective in suppressing the dissident without gathering large reactions from the people (Kalyvas, 2006). In response to PKK perpetrated victimizations people will expectedly blame the government parties due to its inability to protect people from the PKK violence (Bali, 2007; Kıbrıs, 2011); therefore, I expect a negative association between PKK perpetrated victimization and government vote share.

In the second part of analysis, I aim to estimate the association between civilian victimizations and the left and right wing parties' vote share. Turkey has a multi-party system, so we cannot talk about a single party on either right or left wing. Therefore I aggregate the parties' vote shares which are identified as right or left wing by taking classification of Esmer (2002) and Kalaycıoğlu (2005). According to this classification

23

the RP/FP, ANAP, DYP and MHP are right wing, and the HADEP, DSP and SHP/CHP are left wing parties.

$$R_{\{t,i\}} = \alpha + \beta_1 N_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_2 S_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_3 C_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_4 E_{\{t,i\}} + u_{\{i\}} + e_{\{t,i\}}$$

$$L_{\{t,i\}} = \alpha + \beta_1 N_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_2 S_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_3 C_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_4 E_{\{t,i\}} + u_{\{i\}} + e_{\{t,i\}}$$

$R_{\{t,i\}}$ is the vector for the right wing parties' vote share at the election at time t in district i, and $L_{\{t,i\}}$ is the vector for the left wing parties' vote share at the election at time t in district i. I expect indiscriminate victimization by the state to be negatively associated with the vote share of right wing parties and positively associated with the left wing parties. People, who are victimized by the state, aim to prevent this violence by voting for a left wing party which is less supportive for armed action as counter-insurgency strategy. The vote share of right wing parties, which take harsher military measures, will be affected negatively since people do not want further victimization. In response to the indiscriminate victimization of PKK, I expect that people will vote for right wing parties, which are known to have a less concessionist attitude towards insurgency. I expect that people will act in order to take revenge for their losses (Berrebi & Klor, 2006, 2008; Kıbrıs, 2011). I do not expect that selective victimization by the state and PKK will yield any different results than indiscriminate victimization. However, investigating selective victimization separately would be beneficial for detailing our analysis.

In the final part of analysis, I estimate the impact of civilian victimization on the vote share of pro-Kurdish HADEP and ultra-nationalist MHP's vote share.

$$HADEP_{\{t,i\}} = \alpha + \beta_1 N_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_2 S_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_3 C_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_4 E_{\{t,i\}} + u_{\{i\}} + e_{\{t,i\}}$$

$$MHP_{\{t,i\}} = \alpha + \beta_1 N_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_2 S_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_3 C_{\{t,i\}} + \beta_4 E_{\{t,i\}} + u_{\{i\}} + e_{\{t,i\}}$$

$HADEP_{\{t,i\}}$ is the vector for the right wing parties' vote share at the election at time t in district i, and $MHP_{\{t,i\}}$ is the vector for the left wing parties' vote share at the election at time t in district i. Unfortunately I can observe these parties' performances for only the 1995 and 1999 elections. In this analysis I will test the argument of Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti and Pedahzur's about voting motivations for radical right. Hirsch-Hoefler et al. finds that beside the ideological affinity, an existing security threat motivates people to

vote for radical right wing party in Israel (2010). Violence leads people to support more radical fractions that polarized around the salient issue, for Turkish case it is the Kurdish problem (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari & Paserman, 2008; Kıbrıs, 2014). The killings are costly for both sides; people tend to punish the perpetrator side by sharing less information if they get hurt by this side (Condra & Shapiro, 2011).

I associate MHP with the state forces and HADEP with PKK forces because of the ideological proximity of these actors. Therefore, I expect the vote share of HADEP to increase and the vote share of the MHP to decreases in provinces which experience indiscriminate victimization by the state forces. With same logic, the PKK's indiscriminate victimization is expected to be negatively associated with the vote share of HADEP, and positively associated with the vote share of MHP. Selective violence is expected to be performed in the territory that the combatant sides has full control over, and selective violence is expected to be used to consolidate existing power (Kalyvas, 2006). Therefore, I expect that state selective victimization to be negatively associated with the vote share of HADEP, and positively the vote share of MHP. Also, I expect the PKK's selective victimization to be negatively associated with the vote share of MHP, and positively associated with the vote share of HADEP.

I include socioeconomic socio-economic and demographic variables to control for factors that are expected to have an impact on electoral choices. Voting behavior of people is shaped by the social groups that they belong to (Beck, Allen, Dalton, Greene & Huckfeldt, 2002; Antunes, 2010). Population size and the urbanization rate of the province would give hint for the structure of the province. Small population size would give us smaller communication networks among the people. Also urbanization rate gives us clues about the conservative tendencies of community since the right-left divide in Turkey has for long mimicked the center (elite, secular, educated)-periphery (conservative, religious, uneducated) divide (Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006).

The economic voting literature incorporates the inflation and unemployment rate data for controlling for those economic factors that are expected to have an impact on voting decision (Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Wlezien, 2005); however, I do not have province level data on inflation and unemployment rate for the years of 1991, 1995 and 1999. To estimate the impact of economic factors I incorporate the GDP per capita data

25

for years 1991, 1995 and 1999. Also my "doctor per hospital bed" indicator will help to control for the economic development level of the province.

Population growth rate is included to control for migration flows to the province. Migration is a macro-level socio-economic indicator and it is used to measure the inclination of voters towards populist radical right and religious fundamentalist parties whose ideologies are based on exclusionism and xenophobia (Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti & Pedahzur, 2010). The populations with low income and education level afraid of competition in the labor market that results from migration inflow.

Under a more detailed model (MODEL 2) I also look at the impact of unemployment, agricultural sector share and household size on parties' vote share. These new variables can give a more detailed picture of those economic factors that people take into account while voting. Unfortunately, only the years of 1990 and 2000 data is available, so I incorporate the 1990 indicators for 1995 elections, and 2000 indicators for 1999 elections.

I also present the results under a limited model (MODEL 3) by aggregating the selective and indiscriminate victimization incidents to demonstrate the relationship between the total victimization and the vote share of government, left-right, and hardliner parties.

I use a tobit regression model- also called censored regression model- because it helps to analyze the limited dependent variables which have a below and above cut level (Wooldridge, 2005, pg. 600). Our dependent variable, the vote share of the political parties varies between 0 and 100. I have a panel data on three different time period (1991, 1995, and 1999) and I treat the unobserved factors as random effect on the province level and analyze the data on the civilian victimization that is clustered on the province level for the elections of 1991, 1995 and 1999.

4.2 Data

4.2.1 Data on Human Rights Violations

I incorporate a unique data set that I constructed by aggregating the human rights violations in Turkey between 1990 and 2000 that is related to the Kurdish conflict. The data set spans the first period of conflict which is between the beginning of the conflict and the end of the first period with the capture of Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. After Öcalan's capture, the PKK ceased its activities until 2004. Also the 1990s is the decade of the severest human rights violations by the PKK and the state. Beside the capture of Öcalan, by the end of 1999, relationship between Turkey and European Union made progress and Turkey tried to show good will to proceed negotiations by abolishing death penalty and restoring its image by decreasing the level of human rights violations.

The data set records the date (day, month and year), location (province and county), group (state or PKK) that conducted the violation, the description of human rights violation and number of people killed or wounded. Moreover, I classify the incidents into two broad types of violence: *indiscriminate* and *selective*. However, for the analysis I can incorporate only date and location (on province level), group that conducted violation, and the types of selective or indiscriminate. Unfortunately, I cannot analyze the data in county level because of the lack of enough data on county level. Also the numbers of killed and wounded are not very reliable since I do not have a consistent and continuous reports on a specific incidents that allows me to track losses of life for those are wounded.

The type of the civilian victimization comes from the Kalyvas' definition of indiscriminate and selective targeting and killing. Kalyvas defines selective violence as violence which entails individualized targeting, whereas he argues that indiscriminate violence implies the random killing or harming the people without prior selection of the victims (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 420). For example, arrest, beating, threatening, kidnapping, torture and ill-treatment after an identity check are coded as selective victimization since I know that the perpetrator knows the identity of victim. In the Turkish case it can be a doctor who was abducted by the PKK, or a community leader who was killed or tortured by the state because of attending insurgent meetings, are coded as selective

violence. I coded those cases about which I could not be sure whether the perpetrator had known the identity of the victim or not, as indiscriminate. Also arbitrary arrest, forced deportation, curfew, evacuation of villages, suicide bombings, aerial and artillery bombings are coded as indiscriminate victimization.

The dataset is built upon the annual reports of TİHV (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey). TİHV is a non-governmental organization that aims to document and prevent torture and ill-treatment. Besides reports on torture and ill-treatment TİVH also prepares reports and publications on human rights and freedoms violations. Within these reports I use annual reports for the years 1993-2000 and daily human rights reports for 1990-1992. The incidents I record and code are the incidents that are related with the Kurdish conflict.

Instead of 'human rights violations,' I used the term 'civilian victimization' which embraces the direct (selective) and indirect (indiscriminate) targeting or killing the civilians. Civilian victimization is the targeting and killing (attempt to kill) of noncombatants during the war that includes aerial, naval, and artillery bombardment; sieges, naval blockades, and economic sanctions that deprive noncombatants of food; massacres, and forced movements and concentrations of people. Civilian victimization not only includes the direct deaths but also the indirect ones that result from the intentional confiscation, destruction, or blockade of necessities of life (Downes, 2006, pg. 156). The term is mainly constructed for international warfare in the Geneva Conventions, but I apply the term for intra-state conflict. The term is problematic on the side of the unintentional killings because "collateral damage" is excluded from the definition. Nonetheless, I also count in the collateral damage in my dataset. Therefore the term civilian victimization refers to human rights violations that also include collateral damage that violates the right to life.

According to the Geneva Convention the combatants "consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units that are under a command responsible for the conduct of its subordinates," and everyone else is a noncombatant. I only counted the victimization of the non-combatants either by the state or the PKK. However, within these non-combatants I also exclude the incidents in which the deputies were involved. For example, the forced arrest of Kurdish DEP parliamentarians in 1994, violent police

28

interventions to the protests (as a result of which the deputies get hurt) and ill-treatment towards these politicians are excluded from the data. These deputies and party delegates mainly get hurt away from the province they live in or represent; therefore I cannot track the impact of the incident on voters at the province level. Mainly, the protests and the following ill-treatments occurred in the capital province. However I counted the local representatives of political parties. For example, I counted in the incidents in which village headmen were involved. Also incidents of torture and ill-treatment in prison are excluded because prisoners are kept in different provinces from their home towns, so the effect of the violations in the prisons is hard to track since I do not have the information of the hometown of the prisoners. Moreover, for most of the violations in the prisons, there is no clear information about whether it is related with Kurdish conflict or not.

Civilian victimization can be perpetrated by the state and the PKK. The state has multiple armed forces like gendarme, police, village guard, special operations department, etc. I accumulated these different parties under the name of state. On the PKK side the perpetrator does not change since PKK does not have different organization branches like state forces.

The incidents I coded is a cumulative work for torture, arrest, ill-treatment, aerial and artillery bombing, beating, threatening, lost under custody, evacuation of villages, forced deportation, curfew, kidnapping, extrajudicial execution, loss of property by setting fire or destroying, suicide bombing. I exclude the un-identified killings and deaths resulted by land mines from the dataset. With the same reason I exclude incidents in which the perpetrator's ID is not clear from the data. In some cases there is no solid evidence about the identity of the perpetrator. For these cases against the vague and contradictory official statements I refer to the local sources and statements and code in line with the local reports. If people believe that an execution is carried out by the PKK (even if they were wearing military dresses), I coded the event perpetrated by the PKK but if local sources are not clear or ambivalent excluded the event. I followed this strategy because I tried to measure the impact of the event on the people's opinions; therefore, I argue that people should decide according to what they believe in.

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics: Civilian Victimization by State on Province Level

	Observations	Mean at Province Level	Std. Dev. at Province Level	Min at Province Level	Max at Province Level
Total Victimization	1421	6.0987	17.1367	0	146
Selective Victimization	464	1.9914	6.5561	0	62
Indiscriminate Victimization	957	4.1072	11.1115	0	84
Total Victimization in Emergency State Prov.	1016	27.4594	33.9113	0	146
Selective Victimization in Emergency State Prov.	323	8.7297	14.0488	0	62
Indiscriminate Victimization in Emergency State Prov.	693	18.7297	21.1314	0	84

TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics: Civilian Victimization by the PKK on Province Level

	Observations	Mean at Province Level	Std. Dev. at Province Level	Min at Province Level	Max at Province Level
Total Victimization	811	3.4806	9.3523	0	86
Selective Victimization	427	1.8326	5.3484	0	41
Indiscriminate Victimization	384	1.6480	4.5774	0	45
Total Victimization in Emergency State Prov.	485	13.1081	16.9341	0	86
Selective Victimization in Emergency State Prov.	227	6.1351	9.6929	0	41
Indiscriminate Victimization in Emergency State Prov.	258	6.9729	8.2848	0	45

The provinces under state of emergency are Adıyaman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Batman and Şırnak.

To test Kydd and Walter's hypothesis that attacks by combatants on civilians are strategic and conscious actions to form an impact on the people I also analyzed whether the number of incidents and their intensity is associated with the timing of elections. (2002). The main argument here is that the combatant sides are conscious in their actions and act strategic about the results and impact their actions have on people. Table 3 displays the number of civilian victimization by the State and the PKK according to time distance to the elections. I accumulate the data for each election, for example Selective Victimization 1 year before the elections indicates the number of civilian victimization incidents during the years of 1990, 1994 and 1998.

TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics: The Distance between Elections and Number of Victimization

	STATE	PKK
Selective Victimization 1 year before the elections	232	147
Selective Victimization 2 years before the elections	123	192
Selective Victimization 3 years before the elections	100	84
Selective Victimization 4 years before the elections	9	4
Indiscriminate Victimization 1 year before the elections	446	194
Indiscriminate Victimization 2 years before the elections	246	101
Indiscriminate Victimization 3 years before the elections	244	81
Indiscriminate Victimization 4 years before the elections	21	8

As we can see from the descriptive statics, both the PKK and the state increase their activities as elections get closer. We can conclude that the victimization during the civil conflict in Turkey is conscious and strategic.

4.2.2 Data on Elections

Data on general election results is received from the Turkish Institute of Statistics. I incorporate the vote share of parties in the three consecutive parliamentary elections on 20 October 1991, 24 December 1995 and 18 April 1999 at the province level. I leave out the previous and subsequent elections since the civilian victimization data cover the time period between 1990 and 2000.

31

Party positions and vote share (%) are shown in Table 5. The Islamic RP later FP is evaluated under the right wing parties because of its position on religious conservatism. As we see in the Table 5 the average vote share of RP/FP is higher in the Kurdish populated areas than in overall Turkey for all the three elections. The MHP is also analyzed under the right wing parties because of its position on national and religious ideology. The HADEP is considered as left wing party; however this party also constructs its policies solely on the Kurdish cultural and social rights. In this respect I label this party as ethnic party (Chandra, 2011), but I evaluate this party under the left wing parties.

The analysis of government party vote share is difficult since during the 90s Turkey has a series of coalition governments. There were eight governments between 20 October 1991 and 18 April 1999 elections and six of them were coalition governments which are shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4: Descriptive Statistics: Governments of Turkey between 1991 and 1999 elections

Government	Leading Party	Coalition Partners	Time of Duty
49th Government	DYP	SHP	20.11.1991-16.05.1993
50th Government	DYP	SHP	25.06.1993-05.10.1995
51st Government	DYP	-	05.10.1995-30.10.1995
52nd Government	DYP	CHP	30.10.1995-06.03.1996
53rd Government	ANAP	DYP	06.03.1996-28.06.1996
54th Government	RP	DYP	28.06.1996-30.06.1997
55th Government	ANAP	DSP, DTP	30.06.1997-11.01.1999
56th Government	DSP	-	11.01.1999-28.05.1999

4.2.3 Data on Socio Economic and Demographic Indicators

The sources of population size, population growth rate, urbanization rate, GDP per capita, and doctor per hospital bed, and additional data of unemployment, agriculture sector share and household size is the Turkish Institute of Statistics (TUIK). Population size, population growth rate, urbanization rate, GDP per capita, and doctor per hospital bed data is available on yearly basis and I analyze the data of years 1991, 1995 and 1999 for each election time. For unemployment, agricultural sector share and household size only 1990 and 2000 years are available. By using these data for the 1991 and 1999 elections I will provide a richer analysis.

TABLE 5: Descriptive Statistics: The Vote Share (%) of Parties in 1991, 1995 and 1999 Elections

	1991 Elections (Turkey)	1991 Elec. (State of Emergency)	1995 Elections (Turkey)	1995 Elec. (State of Emergency)	1999 Elections (Turkey)	1999 Elec. (State of Emergency)
ANAP (center-right)	24.01	19.67	19.65	15.97	13.22	11.57
DYP (center-right)	27.03	21.58	19.18	14.50	12.01	13.19
DSP (center-left)	10.75	1.89	14.64	2.32	22.19	5.20
SHP/CHP (center-left)	20.75	36.54	10.71	4.93	8.71	4.47
RP/FP (Pro-Islamic)	16.77	18.99	21.38	24.11	15.41	15.99
HADEP (Kurdish)	-	-	4.17	27.24	4.75	29.44
MHP (ultra-nationalist)	-	-	8.18	4.84	17.98	5.99

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

5.1 Effect of Civilian Victimization on Government's Vote Share

Table 6 (Model 1) shows the estimated association of indiscriminate and selective victimization with government party's vote share. I construct my hypotheses on the idea that indiscriminate victimization is counterproductive and selective victimization is productive, but the estimated associations with both state indiscriminate and selective victimization assume the opposite direction. State indiscriminate victimization is associated positively with government vote share in the proceeding election. Moreover, state selective victimization is negatively associated with government vote share. These results do not support my hypotheses. One possible explanation may be in line of Lyall's findings on Chechen-Russian civil war. Lyall argues (2009) that Russian artillery fire in Chechnya totally demolished the insurgency communication and human network; therefore, indiscriminate violence in Chechnya was productive for Russia. If state violence is extensive enough to leave no room for people other than supporting existing ruler, people may vote for the government.

I argue that selective victimization is productive as a counter-insurgency strategy and expect state selective victimization to have a positive association with government vote share. However, this hypothesis is not supported by the findings. The literature is also contains contradictory findings on selective victimization. For example, Sullivian finds that torture does not work as a counter insurgency strategy (2014), but targeted killings of Israel does help in halting Palestinian attacks (Jaeger & Paserman, 2009). My dataset aggregates incidents of torture and targeted killings under selective

victimization. One alternative approach might be to conduct similar analyses with a more detailed typology of victimizations.

My initial expectation about the association between PKK victimizations and government vote share is supported by the findings. In the 3rd Model (see Table 12 in Appendix) we see that both state and PKK victimization are negatively associated with government vote share. The results are in line with the assumptions that civilian victimization leads to resentment against the government that harms civilians itself or is unable to protect the civilians against insurgency violence. Therefore, people retrieve their support from the governing parties.

The results do not change significantly when I evaluate the DSP separately from the other governing parties; therefore, I include the DSP into governing parties and proceed to interpret the results as such.

The estimated coefficients for GDP per capita and urbanization rate are significant. When I add the detailed variables about the socio-economic factors (see Model 2-Table 9 in Appendix), the direction of the impact of GDP per capita changes from positive to negative. Urbanization rate is negatively associated with government parties' vote share which means the more urbanized the province the lesser the approval rate of government in the province during 1990s. Also household size and agriculture share of employment are negatively associated with government vote share. These results suggest that as household size gets larger and agricultural share of employment grows in a province, the rate of approval of government is dropping among the people. The provinces that have large household size and larger agricultural share are generally the rural areas. This outcome contradicts with the previous founding of the urbanization rate's negative impact on the government vote share, or I can say that the development scores and the economic development rates of the provinces influence the voting behavior of the Turkish people.

TABLE 6 (MODEL 1): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization on Government Party Vote Share

	STATE		PKK	
	Gov Parties	Gov Parties w/o DSP	Gov Parties	Gov Parties w/o DSP
Indiscriminate Victimization	0.389***	0.313***	-0.276	-0.191
	(3.40)	(2.90)	(-1.39)	(-0.97)
Selective Victimization	-0.952***	-0.836***	-0.665***	-0.560***
	(-5.84)	(-5.44)	(-4.35)	(-3.73)
Doctor per hospital bed	4.857	5.925**	4.035	5.274*
	(1.58)	(2.05)	(1.39)	(1.85)
GDP per Capita	2.055*	0.296	1.056	-0.500
	(1.84)	(0.28)	(1.00)	(-0.48)
Population	0.0124*	0.0109*	0.0183***	0.0144**
	(1.78)	(1.66)	(2.82)	(2.25)
Population Growth	6.423	5.311	6.730	5.480
	(1.08)	(0.94)	(1.19)	(0.99)
Urbanization Rate	-0.112*	-0.118*	-0.0933	-0.105*
	(-1.68)	(-1.87)	(-1.48)	(-1.71)
Emergency State	-3.701	-3.067	1.795	0.480
	(-1.42)	(-1.25)	(0.82)	(0.22)
Constant	-16.10***	-16.84***	-14.83***	-15.65***
	(-5.09)	(-5.65)	(-4.97)	(-5.34)
sigma_u				
Constant	1.27e-17	3.67e-18	3.20e-16	7.20e-17
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
sigma_e				
Constant	7.541***	7.110***	7.112***	6.986***
	(17.49)	(17.49)	(17.49)	(17.49)
R-squared				
Number of Cases	153	153	153	153

*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***0.01

5.2 Effect of Civilian Victimization on Right and Left-Wing Parties' Vote Share

The Table 7 (Model 1) shows the predicted association between indiscriminate and selective victimization and the right and left wing parties' vote share. The first hypothesis, on the state indiscriminate victimization and its positive association with left wing and negative association with right wing parties, is supported by the findings. However, the second hypothesis that people vote for more concessionist right wing parties when they are exposed to insurgency violence is not supported. When I aggregate the selective and indiscriminate victimization incidents (see Table 13- Model 3 in Appendix) the direction of the association between PKK violence and vote share of the parties support my hypothesis. As we add detailed economic coefficients (unemployment, household size and agricultural share in employment) to our model the significance of the impact of PKK victimization –both indiscriminate and selective- and the selective victimization of the state disappear (see Table 10 in Appendix).

I do not expect selective victimization yields different findings than indiscriminate victimization; however, the results indicate that selective victimization of both combatant sides is positively associated with the right wing parties vote share, while it is negatively associated with the left wing parties' vote share. These results suggest that people, who are exposed to violence, are voting for the right wing parties those will increase intensity of the fighting. Thus, the number of victimizations is expected to increase. In order to control the impact of parties those specifically own the Kurdish issue and those are controversial on their ideological positions on the right and left divide, I construct another model by evaluating these parties separately from the rest of the right or left wing parties (see Table 15 in Appendix). However, the results do not change significantly.

Among the socio-economic indicators, doctor per hospital bed and GDP per capita are positively associated with the vote share of left wing parties; while the association turns negative with the vote share of the right wing parties. Urbanization rate is negatively associated with both parties vote share. However when I add unemployment rate, household size and agriculture share in the model doctor per hospital bed and GDP per capita variables lose their explanatory power, and the

association between urbanization rate and right wing parties' vote share turn from negative to positive (see the Table 10-Model 2, in Appendix). As the unemployment rate increases right wing parties lose vote while left wing parties gain.

TABLE 7 (MODEL 1): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization on Right and Left Wing Party Vote Share

	STATE		PKK	
	LEFT	RIGHT	LEFT	RIGHT
Indiscriminate Victimization	0.236**	-0.406***	0.508***	-0.258
	(2.52)	(-3.53)	(3.09)	(-1.24)
Selective Victimization	-0.366***	0.458***	-0.527***	0.406**
	(-2.66)	(2.70)	(-4.25)	(2.54)
Doctor per hospital bed	7.837***	-9.155***	6.486**	-8.128**
	(2.90)	(-2.88)	(2.45)	(-2.51)
GDP per Capita	3.414**	-2.519	2.555	-1.009
	(2.12)	(-1.44)	(1.58)	(-0.54)
Population	0.0208**	-0.00243	0.0198*	-0.00415
	(2.02)	(-0.22)	(1.91)	(-0.35)
Population Growth	1.629	2.389	1.348	2.368
	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.26)	(0.37)
Urbanization Rate	-0.115	-0.0748	-0.0495	-0.201**
	(-1.38)	(-0.79)	(-0.61)	(-2.02)
Emergency State	7.778***	-5.837*	7.511***	-7.043**
	(2.82)	(-1.84)	(2.74)	(-2.06)
Constant	24.11***	79.85***	23.15***	82.92***
	(6.43)	(19.31)	(6.24)	(19.18)
sigma_u				
Constant	8.415***	8.416***	8.902***	9.426***
	(10.46)	(9.29)	(10.88)	(9.38)
sigma_e				
Constant	5.589***	6.992***	5.301***	6.789***
	(16.98)	(16.68)	(17.06)	(16.28)
R-squared				
Number of Cases	229	229	229	229

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

5.3 Effect of Civilian Victimization on HADEP and MHP's Vote Share

Table 8 (Model 1) shows the impact of indiscriminate and selective victimization on HADEP and MHP's vote share. State indiscriminate victimization and its positive impact on HADEP's vote share supports my hypothesis that people polarize around their ethnic identity (Kıbrıs, 2014), and that they also punish the perpetrator side. However my second hypothesis which claims that PKK indiscriminate victimization decreases HADEP's votes is not suggested by the results. People do not punish HADEP, which is associated with the PKK, in response to their losses. One possible explanation, as in the case of Afghanistan (Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013) is that the ethnic loyalties are not flexible or people are less eager to punish a perpetrator whom they find close in terms of ethnicity, nation, and religion to the community. PKK selective victimization is expected to be positively associated with the vote share of HADEP, but the predicted coefficient turns out to be negative. I do not find any significant impact of either state or PKK victimization on the MHP's vote share. Aggregating the indiscriminate and selective victimization cases does not influence the findings (see Table 14-Model 3 in Appendix).

In terms of socioeconomic indicators, doctor per hospital bed is positively associated with the vote share of HADEP, but GDP per capita is negatively correlated with both parties' vote share, while the unemployment rate is correlated positively. When I add more detailed economic indicators the impact of GDP per capita on HADEP's vote share is diminished, but for the MHP it is still explanatory. Therefore I can say that MHP increases its vote share as the province's level of GDP per capita decreases and the unemployment rate increases. Household size correlated differently with these two parties' vote shares. As the household size gets larger HADEP's vote share increases and MHP's vote share decreases. Agricultural share of employment is positively associated with the vote share of MHP.

The emergency state status is another variable that is highly explanatory for the two parties' vote share. People living under the emergency status are more likely to vote for HADEP and disapprove the MHP. We know the provinces that are on the

emergency state status generally populated by the ethnic Kurds. Thus, this disapproval of MHP makes sense, since the party does not recognize the Kurdish ethnicity.

TABLE 8 (MODEL 1): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization on HADEP and MHP Vote Share

	STATE		PKK	
	HADEP	MHP	HADEP	MHP
Indiscriminate Victimization	0.207***	-0.0375	0.240**	-0.0189
	(3.26)	(-0.32)	(2.00)	(-0.09)
Selective Victimization	0.0110	-0.0459	-0.198**	-0.173
	(0.12)	(-0.28)	(-2.28)	(-1.07)
Doctor per hospital bed	6.434***	1.620	3.805	1.558
	(2.59)	(0.54)	(1.41)	(0.52)
GDP per Capita	-3.285***	-2.540**	-3.806***	-2.735**
	(-3.12)	(-2.28)	(-3.27)	(-2.45)
Population	-0.00766	-0.0137*	-0.000483	-0.0136**
	(-1.10)	(-1.94)	(-0.06)	(-1.96)
Population Growth	0.677	-7.064	0.573	-6.898
	(0.21)	(-1.16)	(0.19)	(-1.14)
Urbanization Rate	0.0997	0.161**	0.109	0.162**
	(1.49)	(2.44)	(1.46)	(2.47)
Emergency State	10.99***	-11.77***	12.47***	-11.86***
	(5.35)	(-4.49)	(5.33)	(-5.11)
Constant	-0.185	11.33***	1.909	11.75***
	(-0.06)	(3.59)	(0.54)	(3.74)
sigma_u				
Constant	5.404***	8.17e-17	6.484***	1.20e-17
	(9.32)	(0.00)	(9.37)	(0.00)
sigma_e				
Constant	3.097***	7.675***	2.859***	7.631***
	(11.01)	(17.66)	(10.31)	(17.66)
R-squared				
Number of Cases	156	156	156	156

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Killing civilians is believed to be a counter-productive tactic during a civil war, since it creates resentment against the combatant side and people punish the perpetrator by withholding their human and logistic support. The level of punishment depends on the identities of the combatant sides and local people who are exposed to violence. If there is ideological or identity affiliation between civilians and combatant side, people tend to be less eager to punish the perpetrator. Weinstein argues that groups which are internally undisciplined are more willing to commit crime. If we ignore the existence of this factor, we know that selective and indiscriminate violence is conscious and strategically crucial for providing advantage during the war. Indiscriminate violence is an easier form of harming civilians because it does not need any information network or planning under an organizational structure. For example, dropping a bomb, or strafing people and houses is a less risky and cheaper way to fight. However, indiscriminate targeting is not as effective as selective targeting to efficiently suppress the power of the rival. Here we care about the results of these targeting cases to win the support of people and we can measure the political results of these targetings with the electoral choices.

Interestingly the indiscriminate victimizations of the state increase the rate of approval for government, but the selective victimization backfires and decreases the government party vote share. These results do not fit with my expectations, but why? The indiscriminate victimization cases may be resulted with a total demolishment of the local people that they have no other choice to support the government party. The total victimization cases do support my hypothesis about the state and the PKK perpetrated victimization's effect.

In line with my expectations, PKK violence influences left wing parties positively and right wing parties negatively. However, total state victimization cases does not give us significant results, so I conclude that state perpetrated violence has no impact on the left-right party divide. Both combatant selective targeting actions make people to vote for the right wing parties and withdraw their support form left parties. According to these results exposure to selective victimization is associated with an increase in the vote share of hardliner rightist parties who are more likely to intensify the conflict further. This result does not seem to be realistic, so I stick with the model of total victimization and vote share or right-left parties.

The pro-Kurdish HADEP wins votes from the victimizations of both state and PKK. The positive association between state victimization and HADEP votes makes sense since we expect that communities those are exposed to violence polarized around their ethnic identity, and HADEP is the champion of the Kurdish population. I argue that the positive association between PKK victimization and the vote share of HADEP can be only the result of proximity of ethnic identity between PKK and people who are exposed to PKK violence. Also when I aggregate the types of victimization, total victimization becomes insignificant on the HADEP or MHP's vote share. I cannot gather a significant impact on the MHP's vote share either. One explanation might be that I overestimate the ideological proximity between MHP and army, or the geographical distribution of votes. The war and violence is concentrated in the south-east Turkey. The vote share of MHP among the Kurdish populated regions is low in general. Kurdish populated regions overlap with the regions under the state of emergency (see Table 5: descriptive statistics). MHP gathered 4.84 percent of the south-east provinces, while it gathered 8.18 in overall Turkey in the 1995 elections. Also in the 1999 elections, MHP's vote share was 5.99 percent in the south-east region, while the party got 17.98% of the overall votes.

Throughout the analysis I demonstrate that there is a relationship between civilian victimization and the voting decisions of Turkish people empirically. However, we should look closer to the Turkish case and victimization incidents in order to understand the mechanism behind of these empirical results.

43

"Everywhere became a target… What we have done? What was our sin? These are done since we were Kurds. The same think was done in 1992 Newroz. 40 dead, 120 wounded…We, Kurdish people, were 'terrorists' as a whole. It was our title. We were attacked…Killed, burned, and impoverished. 'Terrorists' were us too. Yet they were…innocent…" (Çiçek, BİA, 2013).

The statement above belongs to a witness that lived in Şırnak during 18 August 1992 raid. The government claimed it is done by PKK, but PKK refused. The witnesses and victims state the raid was done by Turkish army forces. This incident and victim testimony indicates that people are believed they are targeted because of their Kurdish identity. According to a survey that is conducted in 2008 (Ergil, 2010) the 62 percent of people who live in East and South-East provinces in where DTP (successor of HADEP before BDP) has leverage think Turkish nationalism increasing. The 50 percent of people who live in East and South-East provinces in where DTP is not strong think the same, like 40 percent of people who live in West provinces. The same question is asked for trend in Kurdish nationalism. Moreover, more people think that Kurdish nationalism is increasing as we moved from East to West provinces. Here we can observe the people are polarizing around their ethnic identities. At the same time they think opponent restructure its identity around the ethnic identity in Turkey (Ergil, 2010).

Avsiya says "My cousins…young people, they are all with the guerilla now. They revolted. This place was nothing but hell. If they would stay, they would be killed anyway." She lived in Çukurca county of Hakkari province during the 1990s. Her words clearly indicate that state violence is not justified in the eyes of locals and people become targets no matter of their actions are (Akın & Danışman, 2011, pg. 85). The statements of victims suggest that people find a shelter in PKK and opportunity to take revenge of their losses from state. Ergil utters a detailed map of road that lies from civilian life to guerilla membership.

"Another humanitarian plight is happening among the young people who studied in the college and returned to their villages. They cannot find a job that fits to their quality. This follows an investigation by the security forces since they are lingering around without job. This ends up to a lawsuit in State Security Courts. Finally, they are acquitted since there is no guilt exists. However, this distressed times shake deeply these young people. They are alienated from the society and political system…These people do not feel safe. As an opinion leader says 'These people cry one more year,

and then they go to the 'month.' Unfortunately, they do so…" (Ergil, 2010, pg. 134).

Şeyhan is a man who lived in a village in Lice during his early youth, after the death of his father he was forced to move to Adana. He states that state forces forced the civilians to take side between the state and PKK. He tells the behavior of PKK members just after a state raid to his village.

> "It was 1994 or 1995…I guess an armed fight took place in our village, it was the first time I saw guerilla and the thing they meant to me was rescue. They were going to save us, I understood that. They took care of us and talked to us…they were not like soldiers…" (Akın & Danışman, 2011, pg. 196).

Another opinion leader explains the reasons of the rebellion and armed activism in the South-East of Turkey by displaying the situation of civilians who get jammed between state and PKK, and "we cannot tell the truth. Because both of them-state and PKK- are sided with absolute authority, and distant from real democracy. Instead of winning the people, they want to dominate and rule the people. If you are a sheep, it is not important who the herder is" (Ergil, 2010, pg.129).

We can observe social and political impacts of a recent incident, Uludere (Roboski) massacre. On December 28, 2011 34 civilians were killed in the consequence of aerial bombardment by they were passing the border from Iraq to Turkey. All of the killed people were ethnically Kurdish. The incident is named as extrajudicial execution and mass murder by the human rights inspectors. In the following month people are asked "what happened in the last month that made you angry most?" in the KONDA Barometer -monthly political and social surveys by a Turkish public opinion research and consultancy company KONDA. The answers suggest that Kurdish people who are voting for the BDP (successor of HADEP) are highly sensitive and angry because of the Uludere massacre. The 55 percent of these people states an incident that is related to national agenda, not the personal issues. Moreover the 90 percent of these national issues were Uludere massacre. However, only the 10 percent of Kurdish people who supports AKP (government party at that period and successor of RP/FP) states an incident that is related to national agenda (Ağırdır, 2012). Here we can conclude that civilian victimization cases are important only depending on the political position of the

people. The vote share of government party AKP decreases from 20.6 percent in 2011 June elections to 8.8 percent in 2015 elections in Şırnak province, and decreases from 18.4 percent to 6.12 percent in Uludere county. We cannot conclude these results are only because of Uludere incident. There are multiple economic and social factors that is resulted with the decline of government party on the national level.

For the future studies first of all one can enlarge and detail the types of the victimization, for example torture, extra-judicial execution, ill-treatment, bombing, missing cases etc. This approach will give more accurate results. Secondly, future studies can analyze the impact of one more political cleavage on the existing research by adding religion factor. The fight between the state and the PKK is significant on the nationalist cleavage but one can also observe the religious and secular divide among the Kurds with the fight between the Hizbullah and the PKK. Religion is a critical factor that differentiates and polarizes the Kurds. Finally, we can also investigate the spillover effects of individual cases by measuring the political party preference of neighboring provinces/county/village/hamlet. Our analysis only measures the impact of an incident in that province. By measuring spillover effect we can acquire a national level or regional level results of civilian victimization incidents. The existing research is degrading the idiosyncratic impacts and features of 2232 incidents into same level. Moreover, we are aware of that some incidents have bigger impact on the public conscious by appearing in the news extensively, but some of them never have a place on the news. For this reason, in this future research we should control media effect by looking the existence of incidents on the media; if it is existed we should look whether it is uttered in positive or negative manner.

REFERENCES

Ağırdır, B. (2012, June 11). Uludere Kürtler'in oy tercihini değiştirdi mi? *T24 Daily Internet Newspaper.* Retrieved from http://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/bekir-agirdir/uludere-kurtlerin-oy-tercihini-degistirdi-mi,5237

Akın, R. C. & Danışman, F. (2011). *Bildiğin Gibi Değil: 90'larda Güneydoğu'da Çocuk Olmak.* İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

Aktürk, Ş. (2012). *Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Allison, M. E. (2010). Legacy of violence on post civil war elections: The case of El Salvador. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 45(1), 104-124.

Antunes, R. (2010). Theoretical Models of Voting Behavior. *Exedra*, 4, 145-170.

Aydoğan, A. & Slapin, J. B. (2015). Left-right reversed: Parties and ideology in modern Turkey. *Party Politics*. 21(4).

Bali, V. A. (2007). Terror and elections: lessons from Spain. *Electoral Studies*, 26(3), 669-687.

Bandyopadhyay, S., Sandler, T., & Younas, J. (2015). The tool of terrorism. *Finance and Development,* 52 (2),26-29.

Beck, P. A., Dalton, R.J., Greene, S. & Huckfeldt, R. (2002). The social calculus of voting: Interpersonal, media and organizational influences on presidential choices. *The American Political Science Review*, 96 (1), 57-73.

Belanger, E. & Meguid, B. M. (2008). Issue-salience, issue ownership and issue based vote choice. *Electoral Studies*, 27, 477-491.

Bennett, D. S. (2008). Governments, civilians and the evolution of insurgency: Modeling the early dynamics of insurgencies. *Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation*, 11 (47).

Beriker, Nimet. (1997). The Kurdish conflict in Turkey: Issues, parties and prospects. *Security Dialogue*. 28(4): 439-452

Berrebi, C. & Klor, E. F. (2006). On terrorism and electoral outcomes: Theory and evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(6), 899-925.

Berrebi, C. & Klor, E. F. (2008). Are voters sensitive to terrorism?: Direct evidence from the Israeli electorate. *American Political Science Review*, 102(3), 279-301.

Carlton-Ford, S. & Boop, D. (2010). Civil war and life chances: A multinational study. *International Sociology,* 25(1), 75-97.

Chandra, K. (2011). What is an ethnic party? *Party Politics*, 17(2), 151-169.

Collier, P., Elliot, L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M., & N. Sambanis, N. (2003). *Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy.* Washington: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

Condra, L. N. & Shapiro, J. N. (2012). Who takes the blame? The strategic effects of collateral damage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1), 167-187.

Cornell, A. & Roberts, K. (1990). Democracy, counterinsurgency, and human rights: the case of Peru. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 12, 529-553.

Çarkoğlu, A. & Hinich, M. J. (2006). A spatial analysis of Turkish party preferences. *Electoral Studies,* 25, 369-392.

Çarkoğlu, A. & Avcı, G. (2002). An analysis of the electorate from a geographical perspective. In Sayarı, S. & Esmer, Y. (Eds.), *Politics, parties and elections in Turkey* (115-137). Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Çiçek, E. (2013, December 20). Şırnak' ta 1992'de neler oldu? *Bianet*. Retrieved from http://bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/152201-sirnak-ta-1992-de-neler-oldu

De la Calle, L. & Sanchez-Cuenca, I. (2013). Killing and voting in the Basque country: An exploration of the electoral link between ETA and its political branch. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 25(1), 94-112.

Downes, A. B. (2006). Desperate times, desperate measure: The causes of civilian victimization in war. *International Security*, 30(4), 152-195.

Downes, A. B. (2007). Draining the sea by filling the graves: Investigating the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence as a counterinsurgency strategy. *Civil War*, 9(4), 420-444.

Echebarria-Echabe, A. & Fernandez-Guede, E. (2006). Effects of terrorism on attitudes and ideological orientation. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* 36, 259-265.

Edwards, G. C., Mitchell, W. & Welch, R. (1995). Explaining presidential approval: The significance of issue salience. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(1), 108-134.

Ergil, D. (2010). *Kürtleri Anlamak: Güvenlik Politikalarından Kimlik Siyasetine.* İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları.

Esmer, Y. (2002). At the ballot box: Determinants of voting behavior. In Sayarı, S. & Esmer, Y. (Eds.), *Politics, parties and elections in Turkey* (91-115). Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Gates, S. G., Hegre, H., Nygard, H. M. & Strand, H. (2012). The development consequences of armed conflict. *World Development,* 40 (9), 1713-1722.

Ghobarah, H. A., Huth, P. & Russett, B. (2003). Civil wars kill and maim people: Long after the shooting stops. *American Political Science Review,* 97(2), 189-202.

Gould, E. D. & Klor, E. F. (2010). Does Terrorism Work? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(4), 1459-1510.

Gunter, M. M. (1997). *The Kurds and the future of Turkey*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Güneş-Ayata, A. & Ayata, S. (2002). Ethnic and religious bases of voting. In Sayarı, S. & Esmer, Y. (Eds.), *Politics, parties and elections in Turkey* (137-157). Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Gürbey, G. (1996). The development of the Kurdish nationalism movement in Turkey since the 1980s. In Olson, R. (Eds.), *The Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1990s: Its impact on Turkey and the Middle East.* (9-38). Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky.

Hale, W. (2002). Democracy and the party system in Turkey. In Beeley, B. W. (Eds.), *Turkish transformation: New century-new challenges* (165-197). England: The Eothen Press.

Herreros, F. (2006). 'The Full Weight of the State': The Logic of Random State-Sanctioned Violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, *43*(6), 671-689.

Hirsch-Hoefler, S., Canetti, D. & Pedahzur, A. (2010). Two of a kind? Voting motivations for populist radical right and religious fundamentalist parties. *Electoral Studies*, 29 (4), 678-690.

Hoeffler, A., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2003). Measuring the costs of conflict.*Washington, DC: World Bank.*

Humphreys, M. & Weinstein, J. (2006). Handling and manhandling civilians in civil war. *American Political Science Review,* 100(3), 429-447.

Hutchison, M. L. (2014). Tolerating threat? The independent effects of civil conflict on domestic political tolerance. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58(5), 796-824.

Jaeger, D. A. & Paserman, M. D. (2009). The shape of things to come? On the dynamics of suicide attacks and targeted killings. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 4, 315-342.

Jaeger, D. A., Klor, E. F., Miaari, S. H., & Paserman, M. D. (2008). *The struggle for Palestinian hearts and minds: Violence and public opinion in the Second Intifada* (No. w13956). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2005). *Turkish dynamics: Bridge across troubled lands*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kalyvas, S. N & Kocher, M. A. (2009). The dynamics of violence in Vietnam: An analysis of the hamlet evaluation system. *Journal of Peace Research,* 46(3), 335–355.

Kalyvas, S. N. (2004). The logic of terrorism in civil war. *Journal of Ethics*, 8(1), 98-137.

Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kalyvas, S. N. (2008). Ethnic defection in civil war. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(8), 1043-1068.

Kıbrıs, A. (2011). Funerals and elections: The effects of terrorism on voting behavior in Turkey. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 55(2), 220-247.

Kıbrıs, A. (2014). The polarization trap. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(6), 492-522.

Kıbrıs, A. (2015). The conflict trap revisited: Civil conflict and educational achievement. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59 (4), 645-670.

Kirişçi, K. & Winrow, G. M. (1997). *The Kurdish question and Turkey: An example of a trans-state ethnic conflict*. London: Frank Cass.

Kocher, M. A., Pepinsky, T. B., & Kalyvas, S. N. (2011). Aerial bombing and counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2), 201-218.

KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık. (2011). *Kürt meselesinde algı ve beklentiler*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Kydd, A. & Walter, B. F. (2002). Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence. *International Organization*, 56(2), 263-296.

Lazarsfeld, P.F., Berelson, B. & Gaudet, H. (1944). *The people's choice: How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lewis-Beck, M. S. & Paldam, M. (2000). Economic voting: An introduction. *Electoral Studies* 19 (2), 113-121.

Lyall, J., Blair, G., & Imai, K. (2013). Explaining support for combatants during wartime: A survey experiment in Afghanistan. *American Political Science Review*, *107*(04), 679-705.

Lyall, J. (2009). Does indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks?: Evidence from Chechnya. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(3), 331-362.

Muller, M. (1996). Nationalism and the rule of law in Turkey: The elimination of Kurdish representation during the 1990s. In Olson, R. (Eds.), *The Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1990s: Its impact on Turkey and the Middle East*. (173-200). Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky.

Nigogosian, A. (1996). Turkey's Kurdish problem: Recent trends. Olson, R. (Eds.), *The Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1990s: Its impact on Turkey and the Middle East*. (38-50). Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky.

Peceny, M. & Stanley, W.D. (2010). Counterinsurgency in El Salvador. *Politics & Society*, 38(1), 67-94.

Saatçi, M. (2002). Nation states and ethnic boundaries: modern Turkish identity and Turkish-Kurdish conflict. *Nations and Nationalism*. 8(4), 549-564.

Secor, A.J. (2001). Ideologies in crisis: political cleavages and electoral politics in Turkey in the 1990s. *Political Geography*. 20, 539-560.

Shemyakina, O. (2011). The effect of armed conflict on accumulation of schooling: Results from Tajikistan. *Journal of Development Economics*, 95, 186-200.

Sullivian, C. M. (2014). The (in)effectiveness of torture for combating insurgency. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(3), 388-404.

TR Grand National Assembly, Human Rights Investigation Commission. (2013). Terör ve Şiddet Olayları Kapsamında Yaşam Hakkı İhlallerini İnceleme Raporu. Retrieved from https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/belge/TER%C3%96R%20VE% 20%C5%9E%C4%B0DDET%20OLAYLARI%20KAPSAMINDA%20YA%C5 %9EAM%20HAKKI%20%C4%B0HLALLER%C4%B0N%C4%B0%20%C4% B0NCELEME%20RAPORU.pdf

TR Human Rights Foundation. 1995 Turkey Human Rights Annual Report. (Report No. 14).

Valentino, B., Huth, P., & Balch-Lindsay, D. (2004). "Draining the sea": mass killing and guerrilla warfare. *International Organization*, 58(02), 375-407.

Weinstein J. M. (2007). *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wilkinson, S. I. and Haid, C. J. (2009). *Ethnic violence as campaign expenditure: riots, competition, and vote swings in India*. Working paper, Department of Political Science, Yale University.

Wlezien, C. (2005). On the salience of political issues: The problem with 'most important problem.' *Electoral Studies*, 24, 555-579.

Wood, E. J. (2008). The social process of civil war: The wartime transformation of social networks. *Annual Review of Political Science,* 11, 539-561.

Wooldridge, J. (2005). Introductory econometrics a modern approach. 3rd edition: Thomson Learning.

Yeğen, M. (1999). The Kurdish question in Turkish state discourse. *Journal of Comperative History*, 34(4), 555-568.

TABLE 9 (MODEL 2): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization on Government Party Vote Share

	STATE		PKK	
	Gov Parties	Gov Parties w/o DSP	Gov Parties	Gov Parties w/o DSP
Indiscriminate Victimization	0.359***	0.289***	-0.244	-0.186
	(3.69)	(2.78)	(-1.36)	(-0.97)
Selective Victimization	-0.864***	-0.765***	-0.491***	-0.496***
	(-6.15)	(-5.08)	(-3.49)	(-3.31)
Doctor per hospital bed	5.105*	5.007*	3.856	3.843
	(1.90)	(1.74)	(1.43)	(1.34)
GDP per Capita	-3.367**	-2.123	-3.501***	-2.223
	(-2.54)	(-1.49)	(-2.64)	(-1.58)
Population	0.00452	0.00407	0.00827	0.00680
	(0.70)	(0.59)	(1.30)	(1.01)
Population Growth	10.01**	7.430	9.644*	7.088
	(1.96)	(1.36)	(1.89)	(1.31)
Urbanization Rate	-0.497***	-0.348***	-0.434***	-0.287***
	(-5.95)	(-3.88)	(-5.07)	(-3.16)
Emergency State	0.0490	-2.832	3.362	-0.426
	(0.02)	(-1.03)	(1.40)	(-0.17)
Unemployment	1.039***	0.376	0.624***	-0.0208
	(4.71)	(1.59)	(2.79)	(-0.09)
Household Size	-3.405***	-0.517	-2.319**	0.499
	(-3.81)	(-0.54)	(-2.56)	(0.52)
Agriculture Share	-38.68***	-29.57***	-39.84***	-30.37***
	(-4.09)	(-2.92)	(-4.22)	(-3.03)
Constant	45.62***	17.60	41.49***	13.56
	(4.45)	(1.60)	(4.00)	(1.23)
sigma_u				
Constant	3.58e-17	8.72e-18	7.41e-17	4.28e-19
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
sigma_e				
Constant	6.390***	6.843***	6.405***	6.802***
	(17.44)	(17.44)	(17.44)	(17.44)
R-squared				

| Number of Cases | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

TABLE 10 (MODEL 2): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization on Right and Left Wing Party Vote Share

	STATE		PKK	
	LEFT	RIGHT	LEFT	RIGHT
Indiscriminate Victimization	0.191**	-0.309***	0.134	-0.0474
	(2.50)	(-2.83)	(0.89)	(-0.22)
Selective Victimization	-0.0527	0.145	-0.0581	-0.0272
	(-0.47)	(0.91)	(-0.49)	(-0.16)
Doctor per hospital bed	4.883	-4.839	3.974	-4.794
	(1.41)	(-1.14)	(1.12)	(-1.09)
GDP per Capita	2.028	1.669	2.269	1.355
	(1.02)	(0.74)	(1.11)	(0.57)
Population	0.00509	0.0106	0.0149	0.00117
	(0.46)	(0.90)	(1.32)	(0.10)
Population Growth	1.265	-1.716	1.549	-2.247
	(0.33)	(-0.31)	(0.41)	(-0.40)
Urbanization Rate	-0.186	0.432***	-0.158	0.404***
	(-1.44)	(3.05)	(-1.16)	(2.62)
Emergency State	5.824**	-6.374	7.087**	-9.072**
	(2.01)	(-1.56)	(2.43)	(-2.07)
Unemployment	0.923***	-1.515***	1.067***	-1.735***
	(4.78)	(-5.64)	(5.44)	(-6.20)
Household Size	-1.838*	2.452*	-1.860*	2.383*
	(-1.66)	(1.78)	(-1.66)	(1.67)
Agriculture Share	-11.93	46.53***	-2.713	38.27**
	(-1.03)	(3.17)	(-0.23)	(2.43)
Constant	42.41***	13.59	34.38**	22.48
	(3.19)	(0.84)	(2.57)	(1.30)
sigma_u				
Constant	9.168***	8.624***	9.793***	9.325***
	(10.59)	(8.65)	(10.89)	(8.65)
sigma_e				
Constant	3.513***	5.373***	3.444***	5.333***
	(11.01)	(10.46)	(11.15)	(10.13)
R-squared				
Number of Cases	153	153	153	153

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

TABLE 11 (MODEL 2): The Impact of Indiscriminate and Selective Victimization on HADEP and MHP Vote Share

	STATE		PKK	
	HADEP	MHP	HADEP	MHP
Indiscriminate Victimization	0.155***	-0.0374	0.328***	0.0620
	(2.78)	(-0.40)	(3.05)	(0.35)
Selective Victimization	0.0731	-0.0580	-0.190**	0.0938
	(0.92)	(-0.42)	(-2.28)	(0.64)
Doctor per hospital bed	4.292*	4.929*	2.699	5.087*
	(1.92)	(1.68)	(1.14)	(1.68)
GDP per Capita	0.470	-5.378***	0.881	-5.861***
	(0.39)	(-3.64)	(0.69)	(-3.76)
Population	-0.00919	-0.00475	-0.00109	-0.00915
	(-1.43)	(-0.64)	(-0.16)	(-1.21)
Population Growth	2.719	-7.052	2.750	-7.489
	(0.97)	(-1.42)	(1.02)	(-1.56)
Urbanization Rate	-0.0396	0.0528	0.0143	0.00600
	(-0.51)	(0.58)	(0.17)	(0.06)
Emergency State	5.799***	-3.268	7.164***	-4.163
	(2.98)	(-1.12)	(3.65)	(-1.42)
Unemployment	0.645***	1.452***	0.753***	1.580***
	(5.06)	(6.82)	(5.73)	(6.85)
Household Size	3.867***	-6.504***	3.861***	-7.429***
	(5.37)	(-5.68)	(5.17)	(-5.65)
Agriculture Share	-8.797	23.52**	1.781	20.61*
	(-1.19)	(2.28)	(0.23)	(1.96)
Constant	-15.18*	26.96**	-24.80***	35.50***
	(-1.87)	(2.44)	(-2.95)	(2.99)
sigma_u				
Constant	4.863***	3.783***	5.454***	4.636***
	(9.73)	(4.15)	(9.88)	(5.13)
sigma_e				
Constant	2.647***	5.428***	2.526***	4.996***
	(11.06)	(10.33)	(10.73)	(9.45)
R-squared				
Number of cases	153	153	153	153

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

TABLE 12 (MODEL 3): The Impact of Total Victimization on Government Party Vote Share

	STATE		PKK	
	Gov Parties	Gov Parties wo DSP	Gov Parties	Gov Parties wo DSP
Total Victimization	-0.152***	-0.150***	-0.500***	-0.403***
	(-3.40)	(-3.62)	(-7.82)	(-6.42)
Doctor per hospital bed	5.167	6.191**	3.901	5.148*
	(1.56)	(2.01)	(1.34)	(1.80)
GDP per Capita	1.751	0.0362	1.147	-0.414
	(1.45)	(0.03)	(1.08)	(-0.40)
Population	0.0156**	0.0136*	0.0195***	0.0155**
	(2.08)	(1.95)	(3.01)	(2.43)
Population Growth	5.955	4.910	6.705	5.456
	(0.92)	(0.82)	(1.18)	(0.98)
Urbanization Rate	-0.106	-0.113*	-0.0926	-0.105*
	(-1.48)	(-1.69)	(-1.47)	(-1.69)
Emergency State	0.226	0.297	2.434	1.088
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(1.14)	(0.52)
Constant	-16.26***	-16.98***	-15.09***	-15.89***
	(-4.76)	(-5.34)	(-5.05)	(-5.42)
sigma_u				
Constant	3.70e-17	2.10e-17	1.63e-17	7.76e-17
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
sigma_e				
Constant	8.151***	7.588***	7.145***	7.016***
	(17.49)	(17.49)	(17.49)	(17.49)
R-squared				
Number of Cases	153	153	153	153

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

TABLE 13 (MODEL 3): The Impact of Total Victimization on Right and Left Wing Party Vote Share

	STATE		PKK	
	LEFT	RIGHT	LEFT	RIGHT
Total Victimization	0.00241	-0.0712	-0.0898*	0.123*
	(0.06)	(-1.44)	(-1.73)	(1.91)
Doctor per hospital bed	8.007***	-9.422***	7.875***	-8.940***
	(2.91)	(-2.90)	(2.90)	(-2.76)
GDP per Capita	3.080*	-2.102	2.647	-1.097
	(1.89)	(-1.18)	(1.63)	(-0.60)
Population	0.0213**	-0.00319	0.0221**	-0.00623
	(2.04)	(-0.28)	(2.14)	(-0.54)
Population Growth	1.319	2.844	1.420	2.409
	(0.24)	(0.42)	(0.26)	(0.37)
Urbanization Rate	-0.0891	-0.105	-0.0637	-0.181*
	(-1.06)	(-1.08)	(-0.77)	(-1.84)
Emergency State	8.490***	-6.991**	9.061***	-8.428**
	(3.04)	(-2.15)	(3.29)	(-2.52)
Constant	23.21***	80.88***	22.73***	82.75***
	(6.14)	(19.20)	(6.06)	(19.30)
sigma_u				
Constant	8.490***	8.548***	8.622***	9.131***
	(10.42)	(9.20)	(10.66)	(9.32)
sigma_e				
Constant	5.702***	7.170***	5.613***	6.955***
	(16.97)	(16.64)	(17.09)	(16.40)
R-squared				
Number of Cases	229	229	229	229

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

TABLE 14 (MODEL 3): The Impact of Total Victimization on HADEP and MHP Vote Share

	STATE		PKK	
	HADEP	MHP	HADEP	MHP
Total Victimization	0.131***	-0.0409	-0.0156	-0.108
	(3.93)	(-0.97)	(-0.47)	(-1.60)
Doctor per hospital bed	6.559***	1.623	4.654*	1.469
	(2.62)	(0.54)	(1.74)	(0.49)
GDP per Capita	-3.332***	-2.542**	-3.750***	-2.692**
	(-3.13)	(-2.29)	(-3.19)	(-2.42)
Population	-0.00682	-0.0136*	-0.00173	-0.0131*
	(-0.97)	(-1.94)	(-0.22)	(-1.92)
Population Growth	0.643	-7.067	0.446	-6.910
	(0.20)	(-1.16)	(0.14)	(-1.14)
Urbanization Rate	0.0964	0.161**	0.132*	0.163**
	(1.43)	(2.44)	(1.75)	(2.47)
Emergency State	11.24***	-11.74***	13.13***	-11.59***
	(5.42)	(-4.69)	(5.53)	(-5.18)
Constant	-0.0436	11.33***	0.178	11.64***
	(-0.01)	(3.59)	(0.05)	(3.71)
sigma_u				
Constant	5.502***	5.47e-17	6.525***	6.02e-18
	(9.51)	(0.00)	(9.40)	(0.00)
sigma_e				
Constant	3.090***	7.675***	2.928***	7.636***
	(11.14)	(17.66)	(10.38)	(17.66)
R-squared				
Number of cases	156	156	156	156
***** p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01				

TABLE 15: The Impact of Total Victimization on Right and Left Wing Party Vote Share (Detailed model with new left and right divide)

	STATE				PKK			
	LEFT w/o HADEP	LEFT with HADEP	RIGHT w/o RP/FP	RIGHT with RP/FP	LEFT w/o HADEP	LEFT with HADEP	RIGHT w/o RP/FP	RIGHT with RP/FP
Indiscriminate Victimization	-0.309***	0.236**	-0.165*	-0.406***	0.184	0.508***	-0.296	-0.258
	(-2.97)	(2.52)	(-1.68)	(-3.53)	(0.86)	(3.09)	(-1.61)	(-1.24)
Selective Victimization	-0.424***	-0.366***	0.110	0.458***	-0.698***	-0.527***	0.102	0.406**
	(-2.73)	(-2.66)	(0.74)	(2.70)	(-4.35)	(-4.25)	(0.73)	(2.54)
Doctor per hospital bed	5.153*	7.837***	-6.368**	-9.155***	5.432*	6.486**	-6.050**	-8.128**
	(1.70)	(2.90)	(-2.47)	(-2.88)	(1.70)	(2.45)	(-2.34)	(-2.51)
GDP per Capita	7.479***	3.414**	2.382*	-2.519	7.937***	2.555	2.587**	-1.009
	(4.18)	(2.12)	(1.85)	(-1.44)	(4.57)	(1.58)	(1.98)	(-0.54)
Population	0.0546***	0.0208**	-0.00921	-0.00243	0.0370***	0.0198*	-0.00927	-0.00415
	(4.52)	(2.02)	(-1.13)	(-0.22)	(3.28)	(1.91)	(-1.13)	(-0.35)
Population Growth	2.804	1.629	-1.937	2.389	1.767	1.348	-1.966	2.368
	(0.47)	(0.31)	(-0.34)	(0.36)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(-0.34)	(0.37)
Urbanization Rate	-0.490***	-0.115	-0.128*	-0.0748	-0.464***	-0.0495	-0.153**	-0.201**
	(-4.61)	(-1.38)	(-1.80)	(-0.79)	(-4.22)	(-0.61)	(-2.12)	(-2.02)
Emergency State	8.083***	7.778***	-7.377***	-5.837*	3.112	7.511***	-7.678***	-7.043**
	(2.63)	(2.82)	(-3.07)	(-1.84)	(1.05)	(2.74)	(-3.22)	(-2.06)
Constant	34.25***	24.11***	57.10***	79.85***	33.24***	23.15***	57.77***	82.92***
	(7.28)	(6.43)	(18.30)	(19.31)	(7.08)	(6.24)	(18.43)	(19.18)
sigma_u								
Constant	9.382***	8.415***	5.429***	8.416***	8.256***	8.902***	5.605***	9.426***
	(9.32)	(10.46)	(7.84)	(9.29)	(8.45)	(10.88)	(7.82)	(9.38)

sigma_e								
Constant	6.271***	5.589***	6.233***	6.992***	7.028***	5.301***	6.179***	6.789***
	(16.01)	(16.98)	(16.80)	(16.68)	(16.00)	(17.06)	(16.57)	(16.28)
R-squared								
Number of Cases	229	229	229	229	229	229	229	229

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01